Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II: Identity and Grassroots for Democratic Progress 9811671095, 9789811671098

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Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II Identity and Grassroots for Democratic Progress Edited by Chosein Yamahata

Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II

Chosein Yamahata Editor

Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II Identity and Grassroots for Democratic Progress

Editor Chosein Yamahata Graduate School of Policy Studies Aichi Gakuin University Nisshin, Aichi, Japan

ISBN 978-981-16-7109-8 ISBN 978-981-16-7110-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To those who are working on social transformations of all kinds to make societies freer, communities more prosperous and individuals more empowered— May your pursuit of just rights and good opportunities towards building an equal, stable and peaceful environment, particularly in India, Myanmar and Thailand, prevail and may it never cease. Especially to the fallen heroes—children, women, and men—of Burma/Myanmar who have bravely taught the world about their peaceful resistance against the February coup and the subsequent brutal militarisation to date— Our deepest appreciation, admiration, and continued thoughtfulness to all the heroes. We salute you.

Foreword by Sueo Sudo

The Myanmar military, known as the Tatmadaw, launched a coup on February 1, 2021, announcing a yearlong state of emergency and arresting opposition figures, including de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and civil society activists. It is thus worried that the military coup and ongoing violent campaign against the Rohingya minority group have dashed hopes for democratic progress in Myanmar. Although it is too early to assess its effects and impacts, this amply suggests the need for a broader transformation to strengthen democracy, development, and equality in Myanmar. Highlighting this academic need in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, the book’s Volume I, subtitled as social, political, and ecological perspectives, assesses the different challenges and opportunities for social transformation that were well explored by centring communities and individuals as the main drivers of change. Following the Volume I, this Volume II focuses on identity and grassroots for democratic progress. Indeed, the book provides additional insight through the resources contained in India, Myanmar, and Thailand from both specific and multiple perspectives of democratic struggles. The editor anticipate that the resources contained, the analyses presented, and the message conveyed will contribute to policy debates, formulation of new engaged research projects, and the means for bridging divides to widen social transformation. Accordingly, each chapter compares India, Myanmar, and Thailand through available national data of selected indicators such as institutional strength, the effect of the rule of law, socio-political integration in the society, and the absence of violence to comprehend a reality of each society from the perspectives of peace, democracy, and stability. As explained by many in this book, the resulted outcome is that all countries show a common phenomenon depicting a similarity for violence with political instability. Another indication is that all countries have varying degrees in political and social integration, the impact of the rule of law, and the strength of democratic institutions. Given these unique perspectives underlying each chapter, the book could be welcomed by many and regarded as a timely publication. As such, this volume provides excellent reference materials for graduate students and scholars. Especially noteworthy are each author’s attempts to challenge the long-standing debate over the role of grassroots participation and community development. vii

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Finally, the “China factor” should not be neglected when discussing stability for democratic governance in India, Myanmar, and Thailand or other countries in the Indo-Pacific. Although not a defining element, the influence external powers like China may have on the region’s democratic progress, as it has undermined democratic values in Hong Kong and Taiwan, can be a critical factor. As the last chapter amply suggests, by focusing on the commons, prospects, and challenges out of multiple contents, each author could explore the need to grasp viable alternatives and subsequent considerations. A major finding from these chapters underscores a direction indicating that the promotion of the freedom of information flows and effective communication is essential to consolidate democratic practice. Especially valuable in this regard is the volume’s focus on identity and grassroots for democratic progress. The chapters that follow will help scholars and policy makers understand the resulting changes and adapt their behaviour in ways that will assure a continuation of democratic progress. July 2021

Sueo Sudo, Ph.D. Professor Thammasat University Bangkok, Thailand

Foreword by Monti Narayan Datta

As of this writing, more than 4 million people across the globe have lost their lives from the COVID-19 pandemic. Tragically, in parts of the world like India, the virus is out of control. One conservative epidemiological estimate from The New York Times puts the number affected in India at 400 million. Indeed, across much of the Global South, the pandemic seems to have no end in sight. The Delta variant has ripped across Southeast Asia. This contrasts markedly with the Global North, in which a handful of wealthy nations, like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, have managed to vaccinate half of their respective populations. Bangkok and Mumbai are going back on lockdown when New York and London are reopening for business. Myanmar not only faces rising cases of the pandemic but also the military coup that has plagued the nation since February 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic and its global response teaches us two lessons. First, transnational threats like pandemics are borderless menaces. A virus does not need a passport to move swiftly from one nation to the next. Second, nation states, when confronted with existential threats, tend to act in their own self-interests, even if such behaviour is harmful to the greater good and pushes back on collective human security arrangements. Themes of selfishness emerge when the survival of a nation is at stake. All of this calls into question the effectiveness of the Unite Nations’ global human security paradigm—seeking to create a world in which there is, to borrow a phrase from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “freedom from fear and want”. COVID-19 has taught us that, when faced with global threats, many nations will become more fearful and wanting. Given this sombre reality of global governance, and the spectre of other transnational threats like climate change/global warming, key questions arise in finding ways to help the greater good. One critical question we need to consider is how to forge and sustain new identities at both the grassroots and elite levels so that we may act more wisely amidst global collective action problems. How can we best identify and transcend long-standing social, economic, and political differences when such differences might impede effective governance? Importantly, the editor of this volume have tackled this question and have assembled a collection of essays on identity, equality, and communication in South and ix

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Southeast Asia, focusing on India, Myanmar, and Thailand as case studies. The authors of these essays, distinguished scholars in their respective subfields, offer new and thought-provoking insights on how old identities might be reimagined. Essays covered in this volume include analyses on minority grievances, gender inequality, ethnic identity, community peacebuilding, trauma and resilience, democratisation, and digital freedom. The chapters in this volume are also mindful of rapidly developing geopolitical dynamics, such as the rise of China and its assertion across Southeast Asia and Africa such as through the One Belt One Road Initiative. In sum, the chapters in this volume offer much food for thought on ways to strengthen democracy, development, and equality in the world. We owe it to the next generation to leave no intellectual stone unturned in finding ways to address the challenges of the future. COVID-19 will not be the last pandemic we face, and we will need greater collective solutions moving forward. July 2021

Monti Narayan Datta, Ph.D. Associate Professor Richmond University Virginia, USA

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the counterpart institutes and individuals working together in promoting academic diplomacy by the means of various engaged research projects and dialogues through different networks, including the ones launched at Aichi Gakuin University (AGU) in Japan—Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF), Asian University Network for Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), Japan + India, Myanmar, Thailand Conclave (J+IMT), and Euro-Aunfair Roundtable (EAR). Beyond this, we have worked on the Academic Diplomacy Project’s publications as a mission based on an overarching theme per volume. Although there are too many to list, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the list of individuals who have helped bring to life many of these collaborative activities, without whom they would not have been possible. On top of this, I am indebted and grateful to have had the privilege of working within such a wonderful, dynamic, generous, academic, and real-world community at large. All initial foundations for the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) were laid down since the middle of the 2000s over smaller exercises of academic collaborations. I humbly extend my gratefulness to both the former Chancellor of AGU, the late Professor Dr. Tadataka Koide, and the former Dean of the Graduate School of Policy Studies at AGU and an Emeritus Professor of Nagoya University, Professor Dr. Takashi Matsugi for every act of encouragement, words of guidance, and generous facilitation they kindly provided in many ways. A note of special appreciation to the following foundations for generously allocating research grants, which were invaluable starters in planting the initial seeds of our engaged research projects to be accomplishable in a tangible form. They include: The Science Research Promotion Fund for 2016–2017; Heiwa Nakajima Peace Foundation for 2017–2018; Daiko Foundation for 2017–2018; and Japan Society for Promotion of Science for 2017–2020. On behalf of the colleagues, co-workers and students who believe in our activities, I would like to extend my sincere gratitude and appreciation for those who contributed

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their works into this book for information dissemination and knowledge impact to cross boundaries. June 2021

Chosein Yamahata

Contents

Part I 1

2

3

4

5

6

Identity and Equality

Challenges Facing India, Myanmar and Thailand: The Future of Democratic Progress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chosein Yamahata, Yoshikazu Mikami, and Terapatt Vannaruemol

3

“The Revolution of the Spirit” and Beyond: The Role of Social Transformation in Aung San Suu Kyi’s Political Philosophy . . . . . . . Michał Lubina

19

Environmental Awareness as a Trigger to Ethnic Identity: Constructing Ethnic Identity Among the Tangkhul Nagas, Northeast India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Satoshi Ota Reducing the Level of Ethnocultural Tensions in Thailand: Transformation Through National Unity with Otherness . . . . . . . . . . Takashi Tsukamoto Muslim Women in Modern India: Public Debates from Identity to Religious Freedom to the Citizenship Amendment Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kanupriya Dua Seeking Common Ground and Reconciliation: Islam, Thai Citizenship and Multiculturalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Takashi Tsukamoto

33

51

71

83

7

Unfairness to Fairness: The (Im)Possible Ways to Promote Gender Equality in Thai Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Pradit Chinudomsub and Thanikun Chantra

8

Social Policies as Vehicles of Transformation for Women in India: Review of Post-Globalisation Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Rekha Mistry and Anuj Ghanekar xiii

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Contents

“The West Betrayed?”: Buddhism, the Lady and Xenophobia in Myanmar (Burma) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145 Donald M. Seekins

Part II

Grassroots, Communication and Development

10 Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Beyond Myanmar’s Moribund Peace Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Bobby Anderson 11 The Grassroots Mobilisation After a Large-Scale Disaster: Examining the Effects of Savings Groups in Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Naw Thiri May Aye 12 Transforming Differences Through Women’s Initiatives in Myanmar: Forging an Inter-ethnic Alliance for Grassroots Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 Makiko Takeda 13 Education Model Development of Media Health Literacy for Adolescents in Upper Northern Thailand: A Process of Change for Social Upliftment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223 Kwanfa Sriprapandh 14 Bridging Divides in Northeast India: Rethinking Nationalism and Democratic Communication towards a Common Cause . . . . . . . 233 Malem Ningthouja 15 Media Literacy in Thailand as a Key in Communication to Strengthen Democratic Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 Pimonpan Chainan 16 Turbulence in Thailand? The Thai Digital Civil Rights Movement and a ‘Pro-Human’ Contract for the Web . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Michael J. Day and Merisa Skulsuthavong 17 Japan’s Democracy Assistance to Myanmar: Few Seeds in Infertile Soil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291 David M. Potter 18 Strengthening Civic Vision to Bridge Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307 Chosein Yamahata and Makiko Takeda Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

Notes on Contributors

Mr. Bobby Anderson is a Research Fellow at the Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy and specialises in political economy, governance, conflict, fragility, community-driven development, ex-combatant reintegration, conflict resolution, livelihoods, frontline service delivery, and M&E system design. He co-edited a book entitled Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crsis (2022). Mr. Anderson also authored chapters on “The World is Not “Flat”: Limits to Development and Control on a Burmese Periphery” (2022) in Yamahata C. and Anderson B. (eds.) Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis, and “Drugs, Livelihoods, and the Limits of Social Transformation in a Highland Periphery of Myanmar” (2021) in Yamahata C. and Seekins D. M. and Takeda M. (eds.) Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I. He is the author of “Papua’s Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery” (East-West Center Policy Studies 73) amongst other works. Mr. Anderson was formerly with USAID, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the World Bank, and the International Organization for Migration. He was previously a Rotary Peace Fellow at Chulalongkorn University, a Scholar at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and a Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Ms. Naw Thiri May Aye is currently a Doctorate Fellow at the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain. Her studies cover international development, public policy, and Japanese language. Thiri’s research interests include the interrelations between human behaviours and changes in the environment, such as sudden natural, and industrial, disasters, and the slow-onset climate change. Her current research explores ecological distribution conflicts with a particular focus on fossil fuel extraction/processing and their contribution to limiting the global carbon budget. Thiri’s investigation particularly addresses the implications of alternative mitigation pathways for climate change. Dr. Pimonpan Chainan is an Assistant Professor and leads the research and international relations as an associate dean at the Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang

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Mai University, Thailand. She is one of the founding members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), and Japan + India, Myanmar, Thailand Conclave (J+IMT) Conclave. Dr. Chainan recently co-authored a chapter entitled Climate Change Communication in Southeast Asia from Journalist Perspective in the Context of Thailand: Raising Awareness by Environment Communication (2021), and an independent chapter on Online Political Parody in Thailand: Political Communication under the Computer Crime Act (No. 2) 2017 (2020). Dr. Thanikun Chantra is a Lecturer at Department of International Development, School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand.She specialised in political science, and her most recent chapter is Social Transformation and the (Un) Changing Violent Conflict in the Deep South of Thailand (2021). Dr. Chantra’s teaching and research areas cover international development, volunteerism in disaster management, political participation, local governance and politics, and conflict and violence in the Deep South of Thailand. Dr. Pradit Chinudomsub is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Maejo University at Chumphon, Thailand. He specialises in law, government, international relations and political science. Dr. Chinudomsub’s research interests include, but not limited to the following areas, social inequality, social movement, social classes, local politics and participation, international relations, and military conflicts. His latest English publication is Equality of Opportunity in Education: A Way to Reduce and Prevent Conflicts in Thai Society. Dr. Chinudomsub also works as a peer reviewer for several national conferences in Thailand. Dr. Michael J. Day is a Digital Human Rights Researcher in South-East Asia.His most recent chapter was Towards Social Transformation in Thailand: Orwellian Power Struggles and “Digital” Human Rights Under the Socio-technical Thai Internet Panopticon (2021). Dr. Day is committed to the education of marginalised learners in Southeast Asia. A UK qualified teacher, with leadership experience in schools and higher education, his research focuses on developing the pro-human Web in South-East Asia. Ms. Kanupriya Dua is a Lecturer at Yamanashi Gakuen University’s International College of Liberal Arts where she teaches foundation courses in inter-disciplinary reading and academic writing. Her research specialisation covers comparative literature studies and English literature. Mr. Anuj Ghanekar is a Social Anthropologist based in India and has also worked as a young professional with different non-profit organisations. His speciality covers the conceptualisation and implementation of multiple research cases, training and advocacy projects in thematic areas of humanities, urban health, gender and sexuality rights, child friendly spaces, environmental sustainability, and mental health. Mr. Ghanekar’s additional professional background of being a psychological counsellor has provided him opportunities of consistent self-reflection as well as intrapersonal, inter-personal, and group counselling practice. He is a regular blogger and expresses himself through creative writings on the blog.

Notes on Contributors

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Dr. Michał Lubina is an Associate Professor at Jagiellonian University, Poland. He published a chapter in 2022 on “The Role of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar’s Transition (2011–2021)” in Yamahata C. and Anderson B (eds.) Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis. Dr. Lubina’s latest book is A Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi: A Hybrid Politician (Routledge, 2020). Dr. Lubina is the author of The Bear Overshadowed by Dragon. Russia-China 1991–2014, the first book on contemporary Sino-Russian relations in Polish (soon to be published in English) as well as three books on Burma/Myanmar, including the only biography of Aung San Suu Kyi in Polish. He is also the author of Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience—Stable and Successful. Prof. Yoshikazu Mikami is a Professor of Journalism and Media Studies and Dean at Mejiro University in Tokyo. He has covered Burma/Myanmar since 1989, interviewed Aung San Suu Kyi in 1989 and 1995, and wrote her first biography Aung San Suu Kyi Arrested Peacock in 1991. Prof. Mikami’s most recent chapter is “Press Freedom Under the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi: The First 5 Years” (2021) in Yamahata C., Seekins D. M. and Takeda M. (eds.) Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I. He was a Knight-Bagehot Fellow at the School of Journalism, Columbia University, and later worked as a foreign correspondent for Reuters and Time magazine. Dr. Rekha Mistry is a teaching faculty and appointed Ph.D. Guide at MSW Programme, Veer Narmad South Gujarat University, Surat, and Gujarat. She is active in presentations at national and international conferences, and research publications with records of five major research projects to her credit to date.Dr. Mistry is also an Accredited Socio-Economic Expert for Environment Impact Assessment report. She has been commissioned for several Government and NGOs for academic purposes. Dr. Mistry is a trained Counsellor working with Psycho-Social problems of Adolescents and Youth. She is a Columnist addressing burning issues related to education, parenting, and Career selection in local Newspaper. Dr. Mistry’s special areas of interest are Gender Justice and Sustainable Development. Dr. Malem Ningthouja is an Independent Researcher specialising in history since his doctoral project at the University of Delhi. He wrote a chapter on Disputed Pillars at the Margin of History: Manipur-Myanmar Boundary and India’s Strategic Silence (2021). Dr. Ningthouja’s other publications include India’s War on Democracy (2015), Diametrical Nationalism: Rulers, Rebels, and Masses in Manipur (2015), and Freedom from India: A History of Manipur Nationalism (2011). He is associated with the International League of Peoples’ Struggle. Dr. Satoshi Ota is a Professor at Tama University, School of Global Studies, Japan. He specialises in social anthropology and recently published a chapter on “Redrawing or Blurring the Boundary? Observations of Naga People’s Political Struggles and Local Cross-Border Trade Practices” in Yamahata C. and Anderson B. (eds.) Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis. Dr. Ota worked as an Adjunct Lecturer at University of Delhi, and Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. His research

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areas include popular culture, consumption and consumerism, youth culture, identity construction, globalisation, nationalism, Japan, Taiwan, Northeast India, and the Naga in Myanmar. Dr. David M. Potter is a Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies at Nanzan University. One of his recent chapters is Japanese Development Assistance, Geopolitics, and “Connectivity” in the Mekong Region: Implications for Aid to Myanmar (2020). Dr. Potter is also an adjunct professor at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University. He is one of the core members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and involved in organising Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) since its launch. Dr. Donald M. Seekins is an Emeritus Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Meio University, Nago, Okinawa, Japan. He co-edited a book entitled Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Dr. Seekins’ most recent publications include a second edition of The Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) and State and Society in Modern Rangoon (Routledge, 2011). He is a co-founder of the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) launched in 2009. Dr. Seekins is also one of the core advisors of the Academic Diplomacy Project. He lectures for occasional academic events related to the Burma/Myanmar Lecture Series organised at Aichi Gakuin University. Dr. Merisa Skulsuthavong is an Assistant Professor at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, China. She specialises in Journalism, Media, and Cultural Studies, and her research explores intercultural communication, gender, and new media technology. Dr. Skulsuthavong co-authored a chapter on Towards Social Transformation in Thailand: Orwellian Power Struggles and “Digital” Human Rights Under the Socio-technical Thai Internet Panopticon (2021). She has published proceedings on the development of media literacy within Thailand. Being a graphic designer and writer, Dr. Skulsuthavong publishes several popular education books that seek to improve English literacy skills for young children in Thailand. She was previously a lecturer of Mass Communication and Media Studies at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Dr. Kwanfa Sriprapandh is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. He is the chief coordinator of the Master of Arts in Integrated Communication that focuses on the linkage of the communication study to the related sciences studies. Dr. Sriprapandh specialises multiple engaged research projects focusing constantly on community empowerment and media education. He is also a visiting lecturer at Collage of Arts and Sciences, Imus Institute of Science and Technology, The Philippines. Dr. Makiko Takeda is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. She has been the convener, founding member, and secretariat of academic networks launched from Aichi Gakuin University including the

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Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), ThailandIndia-Japan Conclave (TIJC), Euro-Asia Roundtable (EAR), and Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) since 2014. Dr. Takeda plays the role of the conference secretariat coordinating the activities of the Academic Diplomacy Project with overseas counterparts. She co-edited a book entitled Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) and is the author of Women, Children and Social Transformation in Myanmar (Palgrave Pivot, 2020). Dr. Takashi Tsukamoto is an Associate Professor at Yamanashi Gakuin University. His recent chapters are The Origin of Minority Problem: Thailand (2021), Multicultural Transformation and Anti-Multicultural Injustice: Critical Histories in the Muslim-Dominated Deep South of Thailand (2021), and Escalation of EthnoCultural Tensions in Southern Thailand in the Midst of Assimilation and Homogenisation (2020). Dr. Tsukamoto also teaches at the Master of Arts in Asia-Pacific Studies (MAPS) at Thammasat University, and the Graduate School of Policy Studies at Aichi Gakuin University, as an Adjunct Professor. He is one of the cooperating members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR). Dr. Tsukamoto was a Director of the Thai APEC Study Centre and Australian Studies Centre Thailand at Thammasat University. Prof. Terapatt Vannaruemol is the Current Dean of the Faculty of Mass Communication at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. His expertise includes communication strategies, crisis communication, and public relations as well as advertising planning. Professor Vannaruemol promotes research projects involving media development, radio organisation management, and new media. Prior to the deanship, he had led the International Relations Division of Chiang Mai University as an assistant president from during 2008–2018. The most recent international conference that Professor Vannaruemol hosted was the Asian Network for Public Opinion Research (ANPOR) in 2019 as he coordinated Power of Public Opinion and Multicultural Communication towards Global Transformation at his institute. He is also the key leader of for academic collaboration promoted by the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Dr. Chosein Yamahata is a Professor of Global and Area Studies at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. His latest co-edited book with Bobby Anderson on Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis (2022) has been published by Palgrave Macmillan. Dr. Yamahata has been the coordinator and convener of the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) in promoting the soft power of academia through engaged research activities. He also co-edited Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I (2021) together with Dr. Donald M. Seekins and Dr. Makiko Takeda, and Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (2020) together with Dr. Sueo Sudo and Dr. Takashi Matsugi. Dr. Yamahata is also a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Mass Communication at Chiang Mai University, Thailand. He also teaches the Master of Arts in Asia-Pacific Studies (MAPS) at Thammasat University, Thailand.

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 11.1

Fig. 11.2

Fig. 11.3 Fig. 11.4 Fig. 11.5 Fig. 11.6 Fig. 12.1

Fig. 18.1

Convenience store in Ukhrul (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Garbage on a street in Ukhrul (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rubbish bin placed in front of a shop (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Garbage thrown away in a gutter in Ukhrul Town (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A rubbish bin in a park near Halan Village placed by a youth group (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017) . . . . . . Tropical cyclone Nargis damage assessment map Myanmar (Source Constructed by the author using Google Maps Based on MIMU* [2008]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Level of Education of working-age population (61 Households) (Note Samples who are under 15 years of age are excluded. Source Author [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Satellite picture of the location of drinking water ponds (Source Author [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Health condition in 2013 (61 households) (Note: N = number of individual. Source Author [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Financial security to deal with Health Problems (61 households) (Source Author [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The distribution of propensity scores: A before and A after (Source Author [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The relationship between the activities of WCSOs, their effects, and enabling factors (Source Takeda and Yamahata [2020]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Generating civic vision, identity and engagement under crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40 41 42 43 45

200

200 201 201 202 202

220 318

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List of Tables

Table 6.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 11.3 Table 11.4 Table 11.5 Table 12.1

Selected Census Data in Pattani Yala and Natathiwat 1990–2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of members of parliament by gender, 1986–2019 . . . . The significant changes in gender equality in Thai politics since 1932 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of women in national parliaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Articles in constitution of India focusing on equality of women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Outcomes and implications of policy initiatives as per specific national level indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Insurgent NCA signatory and non-signatory groups . . . . . . . . . Insurgent NCA signatory and non-signatory group membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Population before and after the disaster (disaster affected area) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Description of data collected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Determinants of participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sample before and after the disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The average effect of savings groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Women’s representation in the peace process between 2011 and 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92 110 112 113 128 134 162 163 203 203 205 206 207 213

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Part I

Identity and Equality

Chapter 1

Challenges Facing India, Myanmar and Thailand: The Future of Democratic Progress Chosein Yamahata, Yoshikazu Mikami, and Terapatt Vannaruemol

Current Crises 2021 started with a myriad of crises that pose a serious challenge to each society. Additionally, challenges from the continuation of COVID remain very much present in everyday life. Now more than ever, there is a need for a broader transformation to strengthen democracy, development and equality in the world. This volume aims to highlight this need in India, Myanmar and Thailand. The most recent information on COVID infections in India has shown a devastating situation as it confronts over 200,000 daily cases in April, double the number of the peak in 2020 (Pathak, 2021). Amid the coronavirus pandemic, thousands of farmers from three states staged continuous protests against the Indian government to repeal three new agricultural laws threatening their livelihoods (Bhardwaj, 2021). Moreover, the rights of non-Hindus, especially that of Muslims, have worsened under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Freedom House, 2021). Notably, the Indian parliament passed the Citizenship Amendment Act in December 2019, which applies religion as a criterion in granting citizenship. Moreover, the amendment is discriminatory as it allows the fast-tracking citizenship to non-Muslims seeking refuge (e.g. Tamils from Sri Lanka) but excludes Muslim minorities facing persecution (e.g. Rohingya from Myanmar) (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Thus, despite being the largest democracy in Asia, India faces significant challenges in ensuring equality.

C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan Y. Mikami Department of Media Studies, Mejiro University, Tokyo, Japan T. Vannaruemol Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_1

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Myanmar faced yet another military coup on 1 February 2021. The military junta detained State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, other members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and civilians totalling 4,212 people in May. At the same time, 1,762 were issued warrants (Nikkei Asia 2021). The coup abruptly reversed democratic progress made since the first democratic election after the end of military rule in 2015. By 21 May, security forces’ use of lethal weapons had already killed 812 unarmed people, who staged a series of nationwide protests of different kinds against the coup, the junta State Administration Council (SAC), and the subsequent illegitimate laws and regulations imposed on citizens (AAPP 2021). Coups of the past have destroyed Myanmar’s development path and dumped its society into the depths of poverty and armed conflicts. In particular, the 1962 coup was devastating; it removed the constitution for 12 years under military rule and placed Myanmar on the LDC category in 1987 after an additional 14 years under the Burmese Way to Socialism. After the 1988 coup, Myanmar being a “Chinadependent” nation, was once again without a constitution for 20 years and under military rule for a total of 23 years until 2011 when the army generals changed to civilian dress to camouflage the military running the government under President Thein Sein. The short-lived democracy and the freedom that people enjoyed under the NLD government during the 2016–2021 period was abruptly hijacked by the latest coup on 1 February 2021, caging Myanmar’s society under darkness again and prompting nationwide protests against the coup. All coups staged by the state’s armed organisation in Myanmar throughout its post-independence history have proved one clear indication: the military junta and its dictators are the source of the nation’s problems in putting society under the traps of poverty, conflict and bad governance. In other words, it is worth concluding that the military has been a burden for the nation and its people since 1962 till date—a total of nearly six decades. Like Myanmar, Thailand has a long history of coups and the current government is led by the leader of the 2014 coup junta, former army general Prayut Chan-o-cha. Hutt (2020) emphasised in his piece how Thai millennials have gone through a series of crises—three economic crises, two military coups and countless constitutional changes since 1990. Thailand’s national crisis, before the coronavirus pandemic, was demonstrated in the form of student protests generated out of the accumulated disapproval of the government. Causes of their displeasure include the hybrid nature of the government causing political turmoil, unresolved corruption, conservative social values, worsening air pollution and illegitimate stacked elections. Notably, the Thammasat University demonstrations of 1976 and the Black May protests of 1992, two major events against military dictatorships in the past, have shaped the Thai national memory. Recent student protests against the government demanded a change of government and reform in the establishment. In addition to the 1992 coup and the 2014 coup, Thailand was affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2008 global recession, and most recently, by the coronavirus pandemic. Thailand’s society has continuously been divided in the same way that is evident in the politics of Southeast Asia with urban–rural, rich-poor and generational divisions.

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What do all the selected crises of today entail? Yamahata (2021) compares India, Myanmar and Thailand through available national data of selected indicators such as institutional strength, the effect of the rule of law, socio-political integration in the society and the absence of violence to comprehend a brief reality of each society from the perspectives of peace, democracy and stability. The interpretation is that all countries show a common phenomenon depicting a similarity for violence with political instability. Another indication is that all countries have varying degrees in political and social integration, the impact of the rule of law and the strength of democratic institutions. The comparison shows that India’s state of political integration, presence of the rule of law and strength in democratic institutions are ways ahead of Myanmar and Thailand. The same indicators depicted how Thailand enjoys the absence of violence and political stability compared to India and Myanmar. The same study showed that Myanmar’s society faces more divisions with the least effective rule of law. At the same time, it struggles to build democratic institutions compared to India and Thailand. The commonality among the three societies is that these crises are neither new nor a surprise; they culminate in democratic erosion. Yamahata (2021) also highlights domestic instability in the three countries. As an extension of the study, this chapter probes into the influence external powers like China may have on the region’s democratic progress by asking the following questions: What are the implications of China’s rise for the rest of Asia, and in particular, India, Myanmar and Thailand? Has China or the US contributed to the recent illiberal trends in the region? Although China claims it does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, it has undermined democratic values in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Gokhale 2020). Such presence of China’s authoritarianism could also normalise illiberal regional trends and hence offer an easy alternative to democracy (Ford and Hass 2021). Therefore, the “China factor”, although not a defining element, should not be neglected when discussing stability nor democratic governance in India, Myanmar and Thailand or other countries in the Indo-Pacific.

The China Factor China has always been influential and will always be so, yet the year 2020 was the defining moment for the country. Not only did the pandemic outbreak start there but also, for the first time, its state capitalism has proven to be resilient despite the perspectives of Western liberal democracies that deem authoritarian systems to be “inherently fragile because of weak legitimacy, overreliance on coercion, overcentralisation of decision making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms” (Nathan 2003: 6). China’s state capitalism is perceived to be functioning far better than the world’s oldest democracies, especially that of the US and the UK.

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After the summer of 2020, the pandemic started to flare up in France, the UK, Spain and other parts of Western Europe and the US. China, however, succeeded in containing the coronavirus, particularly through the lockdown in Wuhan, a city of 11 million people and almost eradicated the coronavirus from the country. Meanwhile, in the US, President Trump caught the coronavirus but ignored the fearful harm of the contagious virus. At the same time, the country continued to suffer from the virus, and many people died. In terms of accumulated fatalities, the most recent indications of handling the pandemic in the US and the UK reached 335,000 and 71,100 while the infected populations are at 19.4 million and 2.33 million, respectively, as of 29 December 2020.1 Does China’s ability to contain the coronavirus show that its rise is not only inevitable, but also one that would be powerful? Can China’s neighbours in the region count on its accountability and information transparency for any future events? China’s power does not stop there. It is on the cutting edge of all types of stateof-the-art technologies, such as electric vehicles, driverless cars, smart cities, clean energy, semiconductors, 5G telecommunication, hi-tech arms and computer games (Schoff and Ito 2019). China has recruited many scientists worldwide to build a powerhouse of hi-tech industry in almost all fields. The Economist (2019) stated that China has also convened “a giant gathering of Nobel laureates” to cope with “the challenges of our age”. It is ironic that of all countries, the state-led capitalist government could perform more efficiently and lead the world in advanced industries than the Western democracies. Many Asian nations may not be too vocal about their admiration towards China, but there is a clear sign of affection and empathy (and, of course, fear) towards Beijing (Silver et al. 2019). For decades or even centuries, Asia looked up to the US and European countries. Although this may still be true, there has been a sea of change: it now looks as though China’s state-led capitalist system is equally, or even more productive and efficient than that of the West; the clear leader of Asia is China and may replace the US as the world leader in the future. That may or may not happen, but obviously, the coronavirus has pushed the world onto a new paradigm shift. Does this mean that the twenty-first century will be the century of Asia with China leading its way? What are the potential implications for societies in India, Myanmar and Thailand?

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: China or the US? To answer this question, countries in the region, as well as the international community, are required to assess China’s responsibility and reputation in respecting international norms to sustain peace and stability, manage the pandemic, protect the freedom of expression and the right to information and to guarantee human rights. Two factors are examined: where the troubled US-China relations will lead to and 1

However, the US and UK have been leading the global vaccine rollout since the end of 2020, effectively bouncing back from the high infection rates in the onset of the pandemic outbreak.

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how democratic values will be respected in Asia. How could China or the US affect the region’s security, development, democracy and peace?

Security and Development As for the economy and realpolitik in Asia, the US-China relationship will be utterly crucial. For decades, Asian countries have enjoyed the best of both worlds: security provided by the US and benefits from the rise of China’s economy. After World War II, Pax Americana laid a secure and stable strategic framework where countries like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore prospered with an open economy with exports to the US market (Baker 1991). With China opening up and thriving since Deng Xiaoping adopted a market economy, Asian countries have benefited from these two large markets. President Xi Jinping has said that the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both the US and China (Takahashi 2017). However, he has also stated that only Asians shall take care of Asian security. Could this imply that the US should lay its hands off Asia while China dominates the region by applying a new security umbrella? To date, Asians have enjoyed a delicate power balance in Asia. US Marines and soldiers are stationed in Okinawa, a Japanese island near Taiwan, and the US 7th Fleet is stationed in Yokosuka, Japan, to ensure regional security in Southeast Asia. Similarly, US forces are stationed in South Korea to balance potential threats from North Korea. As there have been territorial disputes in the South China Sea, in which Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan are also claimants, China’s strategic advances to its claims by increasing naval presence may potentially lead to the US seeking to contain its rise. The Philippines has also contested China’s claims on the ground that they are incompatible with the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and “initiated arbitration under Annex VII of the UNCLOS for a declaratory judgment to that effect” (Pemmaraju 2016: 265). According to PCA Case No. 2013-19, the tribunal concluded that: There was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within “nine-dash line”; UNCLOS does not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit; China had breached its obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and Article 94 of UNCLOS concerning maritime safety, and China violated its obligations to refrain from aggravating or extending the parties disputes during the pendency of the settlement process.

Despite the ruling of the court, China has rejected the outcome and continued to maintain its presence there. Although ASEAN member countries recently “raised their concerns on the South China Sea dispute and presented a cohesive diplomatic front against China’s aggressive postures in the South China Sea”, the Peoples’ Liberation Army was found leading a military drill there a few weeks later (Mishra

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2020). In response, the US had condemned China’s actions and conducted naval exercises to counter China’s aggression in international waters. Japan and South Korea share mixed views on China’s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea, reinforcing internationally recognised rights and freedoms through the Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs). Since 80% of Japan’s crude oil imports and 90% of South Korea’s are imported through the South China Sea, the potential impact on energy security is tremendously huge for both economies if China retaliates. Although both countries share the benefit of promoting the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, it is in their best interest to avoid raising the risk of great-power conflict and economic retaliation as US allies and China’s trading partners. However, such divided attitudes due to conflict of interest allow China to disrupt the regional order by ignoring legal rulings and changing the security landscape “through the construction and occupation of artificial islands” (Strating 2020: 1). India has also called for safeguarding FONOPs in response to China’s escalation in the region by entering Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone last November. This was reinforced by the E3 countries (UK, France, and Germany), which recommended the ongoing negotiation between ASEAN and China by “sticking to a rule-based, cooperative and effective Code of Conduct consistent with UNCLOS in the South China Sea” (Chaudhury 2020). Since the South China Sea belongs to the global commons, India and other countries share an interest and duty in promoting peace and stability in the region. Maritime security is especially of critical importance to Japan, a maritime nation surrounded by the sea. For example: Japan relies on sea transport to import energy resources. Accordingly, ensuring secure sea lanes is vital for the survival of the nation. Furthermore, securing the stable use of one of the global commons, the “maritime domain,” is a key security issue for the international community. In recent years, maritime trends in the countries concerned are drawing attention, including compliance with relevant international norms’. (Defence of Japan 2017)

Therefore, Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) conducted trilateral military exercises with Australia and the US to “show off its naval might in the waters” as a chance to emphasise their collaborative security commitment to the so-called free and open Indo-Pacific Strategy (Johnson 2020). Similarly, India has organised the Malabar military exercise in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea in November 2020 as part of the defence cooperation among four members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Australia rejoined the Quad for the first time since 2007, at the height of India and China’s confrontation at the contested Himalayan border and China’s increased maritime presence in the Indian Ocean Region (Kapoor 2020). In 2021, a naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal was led by France and joined by the Quad. Although France has shown no interest in joining the Quad yet, the deepening of France’s bilateral security ties with the Quad is underway (Rej 2021). These multilateral military exercises show that a risk of future confrontation cannot be ruled out. For this reason, most Asian countries would hesitate to choose between the two countries. The question poses a deeper challenge than allowing TikTok to operate in

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one’s country or not. In particular, “the trade war, the fallout from COVID-19, and increased military activity raise the risk of conflict between the US and China in the South China Sea” (Mastro 2020). If China and the US fail to come to a certain modus vivendi, the situation will be dangerously unstable. If the confrontation comes to a head, the growth of Asia will be in peril.

Liberal Democratic Attitudes Another factor to consider in the US-China rivalry is the spread of liberal democratic attitudes and values throughout Asian countries, such as human rights, social justice and civic freedoms. China’s message is loud and clear: economic prosperity first, freedom of speech and other democratic values last on the priority list (Gallagher 2002). Despite China’s rising advantage through its advanced technology, countries do not look up to China’s status because of its handling of the coronavirus, disrespect of human rights and neglect of democratic values and the lack of freedom of speech in the press. Its crackdown on Hong Kong was aired worldwide, which painted a poor public image of China. A series of protests started in March 2019 due to a proposed bill that provided extradition of Hong Kong residents to mainland China, threatening the rule of law in Hong Kong and amplifying demands for universal suffrage. The situation intensified when the National Security Law (NSL) was passed in June 2020, which significantly undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy (Toru 2020: 102). Although Beijing claims that the National Security Law targeted only a tiny minority of violent protesters, it criminalised nonviolent expressions of dissent as well: “Subversion” covers not just “acts by force or the threat of force” but also “other unlawful means,” which could include unauthorised peaceful protest. “Terrorism” refers to violence against property and disruption of transport as well as injuries to human lives. “Collusion” involves disrupting government policies, undermining elections, calling for sanctions, and provoking hatred. Moreover, the law encompasses not just concrete “acts” but also loosely defined “activities” of “incitement,” “assistance,” “abetment,” and “provision” of financial and other forms of support. (Davis and Hui 2020)

The law stipulates harsh penalties, including life in prison for secession, subversion, terrorism and collaboration with foreign forces, but does not clarify what specific activities merit charges. The statement by Freedom House (2020) criticises the NSL as: Imposed by the Standing committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) without consultation with the people of Hong Kong and set out broad prohibitions encapsulating an ill-defined array of “conduct” and “activities” that can include the peaceful exercise of fundamental rights protected under Hong Kong’s Basic Law (Hong Kong’s functional constitution), the PRC constitution, and international law.

Accordingly, Hong Kong’s most prominent pro-democracy activists, Agnes Chow, Ivan Lam and Joshua Wong received jail sentences. There have also been “more than

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10,000 arrests and 2000 prosecutions related to the protests” since last year (Lau 2020). Besides Jimmy Lai, the founder of the Apple Daily newspaper supporting Hong Kong’s democracy movement, and who has also been lobbying for US support in preserving Hong Kong’s autonomy and fundamental freedoms, could face life in prison by the charge under the accused crime of “collusion with a foreign country” of the NSL (Yu et al. 2020). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was alarmed about Hong Kong’s deteriorating human rights situation concerning the NSL since its drafting stage; it must comply with rights obligations (UN News 2020). Furthermore, the Washington Post highlighted Jake Sullivan’s deep concern about the continuing arrests and imprisonment of pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong, as well as the additional sanctions imposed on 14 Chinese officials for China’s “unrelenting assault” against Hong Kong’s democratic processes (Yu et al. 2020). Abuses of Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang have also caught international attention. Since 2001, state suppression of Uighurs have been justified by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) claim “to be at risk from Islamist terror groups with links to the Taliban, al-Qaeda and ISIS, whose shared aim is to separate Xinjiang for China” (Holdstock 2020: 58). One of the assimilationist policies used by the CCP includes detention in “vocational education centres”. The detention of “a high percentage of the Uighur minority population in these centres requires their denouncement of their religious beliefs, language and overall culture should they ever hope to be released back into society” (Finnegan 2020: 10). Other tactics include birth control measures in which Muslim women have been subjected to “mandatory pregnancy checks, forcible insertion of intrauterine devices (IUDs), and forced sterilisations and abortions” (Finley 2020: 6). Such human rights violations have been defined as “cultural genocide”, a form of suppression “often employed by State governments, representative of the majority, to extinguish the minority cultures and create a culturally homogenous state” (Finnegan 2020: 1). Although human rights activists worldwide have called for international actions on the CCP’s repressive policies against the Uighurs, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has rejected investigating allegations for genocide and crimes against humanity (Hernández 2020). Although China has received praise for its success in containing the coronavirus, it has also faced criticism for its lack of transparency during its outbreak. The US, in particular, has claimed that “it was ill-advised by the World Health Organisation, which it accused of taking the Chinese side and exercising little scrutiny over China’s initial handling of the outbreak” (Yik-wai 2020). Furthermore, an independent Chinese journalist, Zhang Zhan, who documented the initial coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan, has been jailed for four years (Gan and Griffiths 2020). Similarly, Wuhan doctor Li Wenliang, who used China’s social media platform WeChat to warn his classmates of coronavirus after contracting it, was reprimanded by the local police and asked to sign a statement acknowledging his “false statements” (Neuman et al. 2020). Thus, China’s lack of transparency and silencing of whistleblowers pose a need for international scrutiny. A total of 39 countries led by the Permanent Representative of the German Mission to the United Nations delivered a cross-regional joint statement in October at the UN that highlighted China’s human rights policies as its treatment of minority groups,

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especially in Xinjiang and Tibet and the impacts of its NSL on human rights in Hong Kong. They called on China to allow “unfettered access” to Xinjiang for independent observers, including the UN Commissioner for Human Rights and to urgently refrain from detaining Uighurs and members of other minorities (Lederer 2020). Moreover, they asked China to guarantee the rights protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Sino-British Joint Declaration maintaining the rights to speak freely, participate in politics, join civic groups and protest peacefully without fear of arrest. With the transfer of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, those rights were ensured by an independent and professional judiciary, a free media and respect for the rule of law. The current scenario with the application of the NSL to arrest the most prominent pro-democracy activists heightened an environment of fear in Hong Kong. China has repeatedly said that those incidents were “internal affairs” and warned the West to stop meddling with China. In any case, the effect of US-China relations in the region’s security, development and the respect of democratic values will have an enduring and profound influence on Asia after the coronavirus pandemic. So what are the implications of China’s rise in India, Myanmar and Thailand?

Implications for India, Myanmar and Thailand India’s stance against China is evident. Tensions between the two countries erupted earlier in 2020 when 20 Indian soldiers were killed in a violent clash with Chinese forces on the Himalayan border. Although the 3,440 km-long border has been contested since the war in 1962, there has not been an escalation in violence until last year (BBC 2021). As India undoubtedly has rocky relations with China, it would choose the US instead of China, as can be observed by its membership in the Quad. However, the US’s delay in assisting India’s devastating rise in coronavirus cases, which reached the world’s highest daily death toll in May 2021, was a significant disappointment to India and would haunt the future of Indo-US relations (Pant 2021). Meanwhile, China had success in containing the virus with 4,600 deaths and 87,000 infected cases. How India will survive this human disaster is unknown, but China’s rivalry with it will inevitably tip towards Beijing for the foreseeable future. Myanmar and Thailand will have a difficult position to choose between the two giant nations currently at loggerheads over just about everything. So naturally, they would prefer to go along with the policy line of ASEAN. Still, the question of human rights issues will be detrimental to the development of both countries. As for the economic systems in Myanmar and Thailand, they cannot be easily compared to China nor be described as state capitalism. However, in both countries, the military wields solid political power and enormous economic might. Like a large business conglomerate, the military controls many areas of businesses and invests in various projects. In that sense, the two countries’ economic systems can be called “military

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capitalism”: another type of state capitalism run not by a party but by the military and its affiliates. Furthermore, both countries have ongoing projects with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a collection of infrastructure projects that would make up the New Silk Road. However, critics of BRI often accuse Beijing of exercising debt-trap diplomacy. An example of this can be seen by the controversial deal to lease Hambantota port and the land around it to a Chinese-majority joint venture for 99 years due to the Sri Lankan government struggling to repay its loans (Samaranayake 2021; AbiHabib 2018). In addition, China’s infrastructure projects in Myanmar and Thailand have been met with backlash. For example, Thailand’s investment in developing a high-speed railway that would link China to other ASEAN countries was met with criticism. According to Punyaratabandhu and Swaspitchayaskun (2020), Thai academics, civil servants and politicians have expressed their distrust of China and how the construction of the railway could lead to Chinese economic dominance in the future. The Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and Myitsone Dam projects in Myanmar were also met with similar criticism and protests from locals. According to a survey conducted by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, nearly half of 1008 respondents polled from ASEAN member states said that the BRI would bring ASEAN “closer into China’s orbit” (Reuters 2019). Thailand, Myanmar and the rest of Southeast Asia are thus generally wary of the rise of China. Myanmar had high hopes for further advancing democracy in the country as Aung San Suu Kyi took office in 2016. Many hoped and believed that a change in government could easily enhance democratic values soon after she took office. However, the democratic transition was neither that simple nor entirely the case as expected. The powerful military’s influence and interference are tangible everywhere in the security sector, economy, judiciary, politics, religion, bureaucracy and legislative functions; all affect both the daily lives of ordinary people in one way or another and the nation’s democratisation. Moreover, the ethnic cleansing of 700,000 Rohingya by the military’s security operations that amounted to genocidal killing in Rakhine state forced them to flee to Bangladesh. As a result, the world realised the incapacity-cum-limitation of Aung San Suu Kyi’s government to control the military’s atrocities and bring the military under civilian oversight. The UN and other human rights organisations witnessed the tragedy in Kosovo and Rwanda, criticised the Myanmar government for lack of respect towards human dignity and human rights, and condemned the military’s ethnic cleansing against a minority race. Aung San Suu Kyi defended genocide as the military reacting against “terrorism” and “distortions in the Western media”, who allegedly understand nothing of the country’s internal affairs. Myanmar’s transition, although significant, was very limited, and thus the recent coup is not a surprise; it is the collective act among the military’s stakeholder generations being planned since some time ago to redesign the nation’s political system to guarantee the military an overwhelming power to control any government. At the same time, the coup has also surfaced allegations that China has been involved in its outbreak and escalation. Moreover, Beijing has a history of maintaining good relations with the junta in the years before democratisation. Therefore, it is

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unsurprising that Myanmar’s authoritarian reversal automatically places the country in China’s corner as the US and the rest of the West shun the coup regime. In Thailand, tens of thousands of pro-democracy protestors gathered in October protesting against military rule, the royal institution and the dissolution of a popular party. They also demanded the release of jailed activists allegedly kidnapped on the street and went missing (Johnson and Wongcha-um 2020). The government responded by issuing a decree banning demonstrations and placing a new curfew. This sweeping crackdown was reminiscent of Hong Kong riots, and the attitude of the Thai government denying the freedom of assembly resonated with the staunch and unyielding stance of China and Myanmar. This autocratic pattern could potentially shift Thailand closer to China and drift the future of Thai-US relations.

Will Democratic Values Be Honoured? The vital question of 2021 is whether democratic values can be honoured in Asia. Reality cannot be explained by neither “yes” nor “no” yet. Although it should be a “yes”, the question is when and how soon they could be implemented. In a broader context, the world is moving towards ethical consumption. Values like diversity, racial and gender equality, democracy and fairness, environment and climate change defined in the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are becoming essential in people’s livelihoods. An ethical attitude towards life and society is imperative and a “social design” to build such a society became a necessary way for economic development. It should be noted that any country that ignores the SDGs in their development would ultimately face repercussions from the world and the natural environment, like in the case of the coronavirus. If Asia does not heed the warnings of the coronavirus, the twenty-first century will not be the century of Asia. But, of course, that was never inevitable nor foreordained. Currently, the Asian century is endangered. Seekins (2021) reminds us not to overlook Rawls’ Theory of Justice as it can free us from the flawed assumption that growth- and GDP-centred economics is the only path to development that “works”. Numerous innovative ways of applying Rawls’ principles to concrete development issues to improve the lives of the most unfortunate people—the poorest people in urban areas, people living in environmentally distressed regions, discriminated minorities, women and their communities who do not fit easily into the “homogenising” vision of the state, a situation found unfortunately in India, Myanmar and Thailand (p. 27). But suppose Asia wakes up to the call of the coronavirus soon enough. In that case, Asia still has ample potential to be at the centre of the global “green” economic growth with a new social design incorporating businesses and investment with human rights and democratic values: not only just an emulation of Western capitalism but also a new hybrid economy with new consciousness and hope, as resilience in strengthening democracy.

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Then Asia could shine provided that China—after the coronavirus—can be engaged with preventive and proactive diplomacy, which requires an open and accountable collaboration with all to reduce potential disruptions, disorder and disadvantages driven by the further continuation of the virus, and China’s spheres of aggressive influences.

Focal Points of the Chapters The chapters in this volume discuss the different internal driving and hindering forces that affect each country’s democratic progress. The nine chapters are organised under Part I with identity and equality as its theme, while Part II develops an additional nine chapters under the focuses of grassroots, communication and development. Chapter 2 proceeds to address important aspects of Myanmar’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, a legend. The analysis delves into Suu Kyi’s political philosophy, linking it to social transformation and the democratisation process. Chapter 3 investigates how young Naga people in the Tangkhul Naga are tackling a growing littering problem at their settlements by calling on indigenous knowledge and traditional values to help construct a new ethnic identity with environmentally conscious traditional understanding. Chapter 4 seeks to provide an introduction to some of the key debates with respect to a transformation process that helped reduce ethnocultural tensions in the Deep South. By drawing on civil and multicultural nationalisms, the author highlights Prem’s strategic policy that opened the way to integrate the ethnocultural diverse populace in Thailand. Chapter 5 is concerned with the instances in Indian history where the agency of women from minority religions are analysed; the study examines the claim by taking three instances to illustrate that barring these events, the issues and rights of minority women have often receded into the margins. Chapter 6 analyses the use of ethnoculturally and religiously neutral ideas, such as justice and freedom, to define the principles of Islam as intellectual actors tried to redefine both Thai and local identities to seek common ground. Chapter 7 draws attention to Thailand’s patriarchal system of governance, explaining how female participation could be improved and promoted in the political system since the commitment to gender equality should be reflected in political participation. Chapter 8 focuses on the unequal and subordinate status of women and describes some social change owing to the formation of social policies facilitating women in attaining enshrined fundamental rights. Chapter 9 covers a comprehensive set of analytical interpretations on the face of Buddhist terror committed by the extremists, the military and its affiliates and the Lady concerning the Rohingya genocide. Chapter 10 highlights the challenges within the current peace process under “Panglong 21” and the complexities such as disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, war economies, illicit livelihoods, service delivery and migration. Chapter 11 reflects more realities of socio-economic vulnerabilities in rural Myanmar by citing

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the recovery from Cyclone Nargis as a case in point towards policy recommendations in strengthening the resilience of rural people. Chapter 12 examines the emergent potential of women’s civil society organisations (WCSOs) for resolving differences and creating grassroots peace in Myanmar. Chapter 13 draws on findings from a model of media health literacy (MHL) for adolescents in Upper Northern Thailand, proposing a model of MHL in four approaches: accessibility and identification, analytical ability, critical ability and media producing power. Chapter 14 analyses conflict-ridden Northeast India, the crucial territorial space of India’s Act East policy. Since concurrent nationalisms are the dividing factor in the borderland state of Manipur and its surrounding areas, the author argues that democratic communication can bridge the divisions among the indigenous peoples. Chapter 15 is concerned with the importance of informed and engaged citizens as the pillars for a strong democratic society. It argues that a true government led by the people needs media literacy to equip citizens to examine the government’s performance, discuss and seek solutions to problems and demonstrate a new form of social movement through media. Chapter 16 highlights Thailand’s current situation concerning digital civil rights in a very informative way. The authors argue that despite the citizens’ constitutional rights, “Internet blue pencilling” hinders those in vulnerable fringes of Thai society most and, in doing so, question the integrity of the Web governance agenda in Thailand. Chapter 17 draws on the findings of Japan’s ODA concerning democratisation in Myanmar by examining Japan’s democracy assistance in the context of the post-2010 political liberalisation. It highlights the confusion over whether election assistance is a component of democracy assistance or peacebuilding. Chapter 18 collectively draws core resources from all chapters—background, facts, conceptual flows, interpretations and analytical findings—to sum up the volume by focusing on the commons, prospects, challenges and alternatives explored throughout the book to outline viable means to bridge divisions in India, Myanmar and Thailand. The book provides additional insight through the resources contained in India, Myanmar and Thailand from both specific and multiple perspectives of democratic struggles. The editor anticipates that the resources contained, the analyses presented and the messages conveyed will contribute to policy debates, formulation of new engaged research projects, and the means for bridging divides to widen social transformation. Nevertheless, the views presented in each chapter are those of the contributors and theirs alone. The editor would like to thank the authors for their timely contribution and the publisher’s teams for their outstanding coordination and full assistance.

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Chapter 2

“The Revolution of the Spirit” and Beyond: The Role of Social Transformation in Aung San Suu Kyi’s Political Philosophy Michał Lubina

Burma/Myanmar’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the former State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a legend. Recently, however, in the West she became controversial due to her stance on the Rakhine crisis. The mainstream Western narrative on Suu Kyi accuses her of betrayal of democratic values. For more than twenty years, Suu Kyi preached about “the revolution of the spirit” needed to bring democracy to Burma. Has she changed or forgotten about what she has been saying previously? Are these accusations correct? To answer this question, it is a good idea to delve into Suu Kyi’s political philosophy to see how Suu Kyi understands the social transformation. Suu Kyi’s political leitmotif is a belief in a conscious, educated individual who is an agent of change. This reflects her belief in individual agency that is able to shape history. In order to achieve this ideal, she believed she needed to empower the people, to teach them how to discriminate between what is right and what is expected. The people should be educated to tell the good from bad; once they are they would understand that democracy is politically and morally the most benevolent option for them, as it allows self-improvement; consequently, they would choose democracy and by doing so they would help to uplift themselves and restore Myanmar’s proper place among nations of the world. In short, Suu Kyi’s democracy is built on internal, inward-based moral qualities of individuals. And this has both positive and negative consequences.

Introduction Aung San Suu Kyi entered the Burmese political system in 1988 in the very specific circumstances. The BSPP-dominated system was crumbling due to mass protests M. Lubina (B) Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_2

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ranging on the streets. Tatmadaw was able to restore its power by staging a bloody coup on 18 September 1988. Since then military junta, known as SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council, since 1998, SPDC, State Peace and Development Council) ruled with naked power, but without legitimacy. To use the Burmese phrases, it had ana (or physical power), but lacked awza (authority). Suu Kyi, who initially wanted to mediate between protestors and the regime, but—ignored by the latter—later joined the opposition camp, dominated the opposition movement by late 1988. By the virtue of being Aung San’s daughter she became the most recognisable opposition leader and soon secured impressive popularity. Hence, a battle lines were drawn. On the one side, there was SLORC with power but without legitimacy, on the other there was opposition movement under Suu Kyi with authority but without power. The army had guns, Suu Kyi had people behind her. This is the context that must be taken into consideration when reading Suu Kyi’s texts (transcripts of speeches and articles later authored by her when, after July 1989, she was locked in a house arrest). To put it bluntly, Suu Kyi needed to empower (or to rebel) the people to make them stand against the Tatmadaw, to oppose the military more than just morally. She elaborated on that in one speech: “You ask, ‘Is it enough to support a democratic cause’. It’s not enough just to give your moral support, even though public support is very important. Some people say that the majority is doing nothing but giving their moral support. It’s the minority who are shaking and moving. I did not mean that moral support from the majority was not effective (…) But we have to go one step further” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, p. 317). Hence, if she was able to awake/rebel the society, she could come to power. This was her first and foremost, albeit never disclosed, political goal.

Awakening or Rebelling the People However, she faced a rough going to do so. In 1980s (and to some extend even now) the Burmese culture was dominated by authoritarian patterns (especially in the areas of law and order and public security), promoting obedience and non-confrontation towards the authorities (Maung Maung Gyi 1983, pp. 157–164). Hierarchy still remains one of the most important features of Burmese social life (Keeler 2017, pp. 2–26). These were cultural obstacles for any politician wanting to come to power by democratic means. Thus, Suu Kyi wanted to change it. In her speeches in 1988, 1989, 1995 and 1996 Suu Kyi tried to transform the patterns of Burma/Myanmar’s culture into more democratic ones. And in her texts, she elaborated more in detail: she claimed the Burmese were “largely incapable of understanding and working a democratic political system” due to “Bamar ‘mentality’, rooted in authoritarian past”; this mentality allowed “‘men without integrity and wisdom’ to rule the country and thus reinforced this alleged national thought pattern or political culture” (quoted in: Taylor 2009, p. 411). According to Suu Kyi, due to such cultural circumstances (the failure of citizens “to carry out the duties of citizenship”) the Tatmadaw was able to seize the power in 1962 and keep it for 26 years; if, however, “single one

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of us” would “bear this responsibility conscientiously”, we would be able to secure “a stable democracy in the future (Suu Kyi 1991/2010, p. 222). So, she constantly attempted to empower the people. “We have to make all the people VIPs”—she was preaching in 1995—“This is not impossible. People become important when we are under people’s rule and influence” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, pp. 478–479). Suu Kyi believed she needed to make people awaken, realise their potential: “our people have intelligence, eyes and ears. You can’t shut their eyes and ears as they always learn what they should know” (ibid., p. 316). In was supposed to be a common endeavour: “all the ladies and gentlemen, who are going to save the country from falling into the cliff, are here. They are the citizens of the country. One person cannot save [it]. A group cannot save [it]. Only then whole people of the nation can save the country. Who can do it? Only the peoples can. The system which includes all the peoples of the country can save the country from falling into the cliff. Therefore, if we don’t want the country fallen into the cliff, we need to set up a system that includes all the people” (ibid., pp. 488–489). In her speeches Suu Kyi often urged “to cultivate the habit of questioning arbitrary orders and to stand firm and united in the face of adversity” (Suu Kyi 1997, p. 193). Once she was saying: “We cannot just sit and accept everything. We have to think, reason and question about it. We need to question everything why it has to happen like that. We need to question again and again why in our country, in Myanmar, there is no democracy at all. Don’t just sit and accept” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, p. 431). She constantly appealed to her listeners to disobey arbitrary orders (ibid., pp. 171, 189, 321, 543). looseness-1In doing this all, Suu Kyi dreamed herself a role of a teacher, as the one who awakes the people from fear and inertia (Blum 2011, p. 51). That is why she stressed the importance of teachers in her speeches (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, p. 90) and in her Letters from Burma (Suu Kyi 1997, pp. 159–163). According to her deputy, Tin Oo (Tin U), she felt “the need to deepen people’s understanding of democracy”, so that “the more that the people understand democracy, the less helpless they will fell whenever a crisis develops”; her party “represent[s] the people and in so doing we want to educate them to also represent themselves” (Clements 1996/2008, p. 273). Thus, Suu Kyi “deplored the wrong understanding of democracy by many people and tried to educate them” to “to internalise the ‘true meaning of democracy’” (quoted in: Taylor 2009, p. 411). This education is another cornerstone of Suu Kyi’s political philosophy. It is a means to achieve democracy: “her vision of democracy depends and centres on educated citizens rather than the implementation of institutions and the separation of powers”; in this regard, “the democratic system depends on mature, voluntarily participating citizens” (Blum 2011, p. 51) Suu Kyi’s vision was that of “the ideal of a civil society composed of engaged and politically-aware individuals who dare to intervene in politics even if they put themselves at risk” (Zöllner 2011, pp. 103–104). An individual “formed the core of any democratic system” according to Suu Kyi’s political philosophy, but it was “an educated individual, capable of sound judgement and moral discretion, who upheld a democratic state with his independent decision making, whether he worked for the government or was an ordinary citizen was

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immaterial” (ibid., pp. 290–291). Here emerges the leitmotif of Aung San Suu Kyi’s political ideology: a belief in an individual, an educated and conscious individual, who is the agent of change (Sengupta 2015). Such educated, empowered individual would be able to take matters into his (or her) hands and improve to conditions. The fate of the people depends on them and only on them: “we can do to change our own situation. Everyone is capable of change” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialoguess 2014, p. 153); “everybody is essential” (Clements 1996/2008, p. 90); “what we can do to achieve democracy depends on individual” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, p. 317). Suu Kyi emphasised the role of every person in making a difference by his/her own behaviour and by giving example to others (and, preferably, influencing them to follow suit): “be critical on the issues that call for our criticism. You should also encourage your friends and neighbours not to give in to unfair practices”; “one can do in one’s capacity”; “every individual, teacher or civil servant, can do something for democracy in their capacity (…) we can do many things for democracy” (ibid., pp.317–319). This is a vision of practice of democracy “achieved by an improvement of the Buddhist spirit” of the people (Blum 2011, p. 41)—of each and every one— which would in turn translate into greater, social good. Suu Kyi’s stress on the ability of the people (who can disobey unjust orders, who can be educated and who can succeed in grass-root activities) is a Burmese equivalent of “yes, we can”. She tried to establish a civil society built on engaged and politically conscious individuals, courageous enough to take part in politics even at the cost of a personal risk. Logically, she also strongly rejected scepticism about individual’s agency. Replying to a question (from a woman) that an action of individual does not matter, she said “I told her, if everyone thinks like you, my action wouldn’t move a thing. But individuals who think that they can make a significant contribution to the society multiply into hundreds to thousands, our action will make a difference. I want to give you the same message. Don’t think that you are alone and your action is not effective. We will prevail when individual action snowballs to influence 45 million people in this country” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, pp. 320–322). Unsurprisingly, she criticised traditional social fatalism (as it stood on the way to empower the people). Suu Kyi did so by using Buddhist arguments, “I don’t like this kind (fatalistic - ML) of attitude at all. This is the mindset that readily gives up on life. One must adopt the mindset that can conquer life. If only you can change your mind, you will get to your destination. If we do not conquer our own mind, what can we expect to achieve elsewhere? Do not rely on the external. Buddhist tradition has it that oneself must [have] one’s shoulder to rely on. Rely on yourself. Change yourself (…) You have to train yourself to be able to face the suffering for life. Tough it out, be brave. Hold the truth firmly. Those who can do it are a happy lot. Courage is a serendipity in the process of self-reliance for truth. If only you try it, you will experience how rewarding it is” (ibid.). When she was speaking over the gate of her house, she urged the gathered people: “you are the author of your own fate” (ibid., p. 543) and pleaded to them to develop a critical mind: “We have to be critical (…) If we keep quiet, we will be subject to questions such as, ‘if you don’t find anything disagreeable, why are you calling for change? Our criticism reflects the situation

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that needs change. That’s why we are criticising what we should. People should also criticise what they should” (ibid., p. 322). Naturally, there was a hidden political agenda in it: “I think our people should be more active in their efforts for democracy. People’s participation is key for the success of a struggle such as ours” (ibid., p. 517). Looking at it from a distant perspective, Suu Kyi’s political strategy was evident: by awaking (or rebelling) the society against the regime she hoped to come to the power. It was a rational calculus given the limited political space she enjoyed in SLORC- (later: SPDC-) dominated Myanmar.

Fear and Freedom For her best political needs, Suu Kyi tried to convince the people that change depends on themselves. The most difficult part of this job was to convince them to overcome far and become free. That is why she emphasised the need to be courageous (ibid., pp. 191, 219), to face life, to get involved instead of keeping away as the Burmese traditionally opted to; seeing from this angle, “the elimination of fear, hatred and the excessive pursuit of want” are “prerequisites for social and political change” (quoted in: Blum 2011, p. 37). Here one can see a direct link between fear and freedom. These two are related: “true freedom can only arise in one who has overcome fear which, in turn, is related to an accurate perception of what is dangerous in a particular political environment” (Houtman 1999, p. 296). Suu Kyi explained it the following way: “freedom would mean that I would be able to do what I understand to be right, without the fear that by doing so I would be exposing myself and others to danger” (ibid.). Suu Kyi concentrated on the ways of liberating from fear (Suu Kyi 1991/2010, pp. 181–184). She criticised the traditional inertia of people and hoped for making them emancipate from fear; by doing so they would be able to liberate themselves from Tatmadaw’s tyranny (Sengupta 2015, pp. 274–277). That is why fearlessness (a state that allows emancipation from fear) is the central theme of her early 1990s political philosophy, while the people are the central actors. They live under tyrannical circumstances, but try hard not to be corrupted by fear. Where “just laws” are absent (read: in Burma), “the burden of upholding the principles of justice and common decency falls on the ordinary people”; their “cumulative effect on their sustained effort and steady endurance which will change a nation where reason and conscience are warped by fear into one where legal rules exist to promote man’s desire for harmony and justice while restraining the less desirable destructive traits in his nature” (Suu Kyi 1991/2010, p. 182). In an imperfect world, where the goals of the Declaration cannot be fulfilled automatically, it is only an individual who can make changes. At the same time, everyone should strive to overcome fear by himself/herself: “fearlessness may be a gift but perhaps more precious is the courage acquired through endeavour, courage that comes from cultivating the habit of refusing to let fear dictate one’s actions, courage that could be described as ‘grace under pressure’ – grace which is renewed repeatedly in the face of harsh, unremitting pressure”

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(Suu Kyi 1991/2010, p. 184) Suu Kyi optimistically wrote that there exist a “capacity for the sustained mental strife and physical endurance necessary to withstand the forces of negativism, bigotry and hate” (ibid., p. 179).

The Revolution of the Spirit In Aung San Suu Kyi’s political philosophy there is the faith in person as prime mover of history. A person is capable of making a change. Suu Kyi “would emphasise on the individual as the ultimate agent of change” (Sengupta 2015, pp. 259, 264). To do so, however, she or he needs to be empowered and for this empowerment a revolution of the spirit is needed. According to Suu Kyi, “the revolution of the spirit” is a “quintessential revolution born of an intellectual conviction of the need for change in those mental attitudes and values which shape the course of a nations development” (Suu Kyi 1991/2010, p. 183). It is different from an ordinary revolution. The later “aims merely at changing official policies and institutions with a view to an improvement in material conditions”, but “has little chance of genuine success” because “without a revolution of the spirit, the forces which produced the iniquities of the old order would continue to be operative, posing a constant threat to the process of reform and regeneration” (ibid.). Moreover, “in a revolutionary movement there is always the danger that political exigencies might obscure, or even nullify, essential spiritual aims”, so “a firm insistence on the inviolability and primacy of such aims is not mere idealism but a necessary safeguard against an Animal Farm syndrome where the new order after its first flush of enthusiastic reforms would take on the murky colours of the very system it had replaced” (ibid., p. 178). Consequently, “it is not enough merely to call for freedom, democracy and human rights. There has to be a united determination to persevere in the struggle, to make sacrifices in the name of enduring truths, to resist the corrupting influences of desire, ill will, ignorance and fear” (ibid., p. 183). The Burmese people according to Suu Kyi “want not just a change of government but a change of political values”; this change is necessary to remove legacy of authoritarianism—thus, a “concept of absolute power” must be replaced “by the concept of confidence of the people in their right and ability to decide the destiny of their nation”, by “confidence in the principles of justice, liberty and human rights” (ibid., p. 178). Suu Kyi strengthened her message by invoking saddha, or “confidence in moral, spiritual and intellectual values” as the most important of “four Buddhistist virtues conductive to the happiness of laymen” (ibid., p. 178). Accordingly, “to instil such confidence not by an appeal to the passions but through intellectual convictions, into a society which has long been wrecked by distrust and uncertainty is the essence of the Burmese revolution for democracy”, a revolution “which moves for changes endorsed by universal norms of ethics” (ibid.). This revolution is naturally a “revolution of the spirit”, a “true revolution” that is “going beyond a change in the material world” and requires “a change of the spirit”; hence her “struggle for democracy” is based

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on “spiritual values”, “values that are different to those you have lived by before” (Clements 1996/2008, pp. 82, 116). As one can see from these quotes, Suu Kyi portrayed her “revolution of the spirit” as something broader than an ordinary revolution. She claimed her revolution stopped not at merely building a popular movement, changing a regime or establishing a set of democratic institutions, or external structures. Her revolution, on the other hand, required an inner, mental transformation, a moral regeneration. This was needed to establish a free society (Sengupta 2015, pp. 279–280; Houtman 1999, p. 302). To quote Suu Kyi: “free men are the oppressed who go on trying and who in the process make themselves fit to bear the responsibility and to uphold the disciplines which will maintain a free society (…) a people who would build a nation in which strong, democratic institutions are firmly established as a guarantee against state-induced power must first learn to liberate their own minds from apathy and fear” (Suu Kyi 1991/2010, p. 183). With a “revolution of the spirit”, anything is possible. This was “an almost nibbanic vision of a safe haven of strong democratic institutions, free from any fear” (Sengupta 2015, p. 279). At the same time, there was not a promise to lend a helping hand to those who strive hard for this nibbana-style democratic institutions, or the people: “the responsibility lay with the individual, the oppressed who aspired to be ‘free man’”; what they had to do was “to go on trying, to exercise volition to be able to cut through habitual misapprehensions and existing social norms” (ibid., p. 279). A behaviour of an individual “had an accumulative effect on his own character (make themselves fit to bear the responsibilities) as well as the culture at large (free society)”; consequently, “to lead a full life, free from fear they needed to engage in fearless acts which would leave a residue of fearlessness in the kammic web” (ibid.) In other words, “an ethical transformation” is “achieved by volitional individual endeavour which in turn could not divested of its social dimension since each individual act had its impact in the kammic web of existence” (ibid., p. 280). To put it much simpler: each and every one is responsible for his (or her) own “revolution of the spirit”. He or she should awake and emancipate from fear. This would help him or her but in a karmic, or butterfly effect, would liberate the society. The ultimate effort to liberate the country had to be done by the people themselves. Them, and only them, could emancipate from fear, rise and change their environment, making paradise-like democratic conditions come true. The struggle for democracy for Suu Kyi is a moral undertaking based on an individual agency (Lubina 2018, pp. 227–228, 282). The struggle for democracy is in everyone’s best interest: “we need to make everyone understand why we are working for democracy. Everybody has their own self-interest. This is not to blame. However we should point out to one another that one’s pursuit for self-interest often has implications for public interest”; otherwise, egoism would pay back and be self-defeating: “some people tend to be more interested in their own rights. On the other hand, there are also people who are afraid of having to stand up for their own rights. They argue that they will suffer more if they speak out. If they don’t, they will suffer more and more. If we are just sitting and doing nothing the change we desire will be slow in coming” (Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues 2014, pp. 320–322). Democracy for Suu Kyi, then, is a choice of free

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people who understand that democracy is the best option for them, both externally (establishing effective administrative system) and, more importantly, internally: as a way of self-improvement and making this world a better place to live (Lubina 2018, p. 282).

Political Struggle in a Spiritual Disguise From the point of view of PR what is important here is the fact that Suu Kyi presented her par excellence political ideas as non-political ones: idealistic, universal and humane goals: “the main impetus for struggle is not an appetite for power, revenge and destruction but a genuine respect for freedom, peace and justice” which makes “the quest for democracy in Burma” a “struggle of a people to live whole, meaningful lives as free and equal members of the world community. It is a part of the unceasing human endeavour to prove that the spirit of man can transcend the flaws of his own nature” (ibid., p. 179). Disguising a political movement in non-political language and vocabulary was a very smart political move. A one that circumvent the negative connotations of politicalness, both in Myanmar and beyond. By doing so Suu Kyi contributed to interpreting her struggle as a spiritual, not political one. This was a very popular, if not dominant, view of Suu Kyi in the West in 1990s and 2000s. But it was false. Suu Kyi’s struggle has been political from the very beginning, but she was able to win many hearts and minds by her engaged essays and interviews in which she presented her struggle as a spiritual one. Her interviews to Alan Clements from the mid-1990s were particularly significant in this regard (“my highest aspiration is very much spiritual: purity of mind”; “truth is something towards which we struggle all the time”, Clements 1996/2008, pp. 56–58), but there are other examples as well (e.g. “only if you revolutionise your soul or change your mind-set, will there be real revolution”, quoted in: Walton 2017, p. 184). Suu Kyi was very successful in convincing half of the world that her political struggle for power in Myanmar represents higher, humanistic values. It helped her to get Nobel Peace Prize, the status of democracy icon in the West and continued Western support for more than two decades (this was possible thanks to Suu Kyi becoming “boutique issue” in US foreign policy, Steinberg 2010, pp. 35–59) which in turn helped her to remain in the political game despite being politically in much inferior position to the generals. In a way the political situation in Myanmar forced her to paint her political struggle in spiritual colours (McCarthy 2006, pp. 168–169). In 1990s she had to concentrate on abstract, spiritual aspects as these were one of the very few avenues available inside Burma: “the call for a ‘revolution of the spirit’ is necessitated by a lack of room to manoeuvre in the political and social sphere”, “given the lack of fronts on which she can fight the regime with any success, the spiritual sphere is a very good beginning for it elicits the broadest support with the Burmese people” (Houtman 1999, pp. 302–303). Even Suu Kyi herself partially admitted it: “because of the tremendous repression to which we have been subjected it’s almost impossible for

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it to be either a political or a social revolution. We’re so hemmed in by all kinds of unjust regulations that we can hardly move as a political or a social movement. So it has had to be a movement very much of the spirit” (Clements 1996/2008, p. 82). However, few took notice of her words. Most believed that her personal, political struggle for power in Burma represented universal quest for good (these are the ones who shout loudly today about her alleged “betrayal of values”).

No Longer the Revolution of the Spirit? Despite philosophical optimism coming from Suu Kyi’s texts and speeches, her movement did not succeed. More than two decades (1988–2011) of her non-violent struggle did not lead to a victory. Instead, it led to a political stalemate in Myanmar. Tatmadaw was winning but could not win decisively; Suu Kyi was losing but never lost completely; the regime did not concede while Suu Kyi did not give up. Myanmar paid the price of losing yet another two decades: 1990s and 2000s (after already lost three decades of Ne Win’s rule). Change came unexpectedly from within the regime (Ye Htut 2019; Maung Aung Myoe 2014; Egreteau 2016; Thant Myint-U 2019), stimulated by bottom-to-top changes in the society (Lall 2016). After rigged 2010 elections, a new civilianised government of Thein Sein (ex-general and previously no. 4 in the junta) was sworn in in March 2011. By mid-2011 the reformers within regime overwhelmed the conservatists/hardliners1 and initiated groundbreaking reforms than ultimately resulted in Myanmar’s liberalisation and re-connection with the global world. Suu Kyi, released from house arrest in November 2010, was initially outside the process. The reforms and new political reality meant an uneasy choice: keep her “moral icon” position, respected but politically irrelevant or playing a risky game on (post)generals’ terms with diminishing foreign backing. Being a real politician she chose the latter. This has proved to be a winning strategy. Despite painful concessions to the military establishment and despite enduring blockade on her presidency, she was able to secure a thundering electoral victory in 2015 and between 2016 and 2021 was ruling as the State Counsellor and the most powerful politician in the country (check and balances from the military establishment notwithstanding). This all, however, had nothing to do with “the revolution of the spirit”. From 1988 until 2011 Suu Kyi hoped that through her “two-pronged approach”: “a united population with a sacrificial will combined with international pressure” she would “bring the junta to its knees” (Zöllner and Ebbighausen 2018, p. 102). It never happened. As one empathetic researcher put it “her ‘revolution of the spirit’ does not look capable of achieving the genuine democratic transformation she had in mind” (Jordt 2014). One can even dot the “i” and say it failed completely. Myanmar’s transformation happened due to elites negotiated pact (Egreteau), not thanks to moral 1

Terms hardliners (conservatives)/moderates should be used with reservations (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2004, pp. 23–26; Thant Myint-U 2019, p. 68).

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regeneration of the society (society was largely passive in the process). And Suu Kyi adjusted accordingly. When a chance arose to jump on the bandwagon political changes initiated by the regime, she did not hesitate and resigned from attempts to come to power thanks to public support in favour of negotiating her position with Tatmadaw (by acceptance the military constitution). As a veteran Burma watcher and one of Suu Kyi’s long-time critics mercilessly summarised the (alleged) reasons of her political twist in 2011: “important may have been her internal processes, by which I mean her character and her political instincts. By character I focus on her hubristic conviction that she was born to rule, on her stubbornness, belief in her own infallibility and high-handedness. When you combine this with her political ambitions, she has shown herself quite capable, like most other politicians I know, of making a complete U –turn when faced with realities. What was sacred dogma only yesterday can be tossed overboard in a trice when other interests come into play. She is not, in short, a person for whom principles are enduring, except her own personal self-interest” (Tonkin 2020). If this interpretation is correct, Suu Kyi—a pragmatist pure and simple in the footsteps of her father—developed the idea of “the revolution of the spirit” (and other accompanying ideas) as a means to come to power. When, however, it turned out that these are unsuccessful means (public support had proven too little to come to power in Myanmar), she resigned from it and concentrated on navigating herself the best position within Tatmadaw-established political system. Such interpretation although not entirely incorrect would be, however, unjust. Despite the fact that “the revolution of the spirit” failed as opposition’s winning strategy, many of her pre-2011 ideas remained afterwards (that is: in the period of her rule as the State Counsellor). And these ideas are again quite politically convenient for her.

The State Counsellor Suu Kyi’s rule in cohabitation with the army was not a particularly successful (though it was not a total failure either). What is important here, is how she presented some of her political ideas. In October 2017, during one of her (rare) addresses to her nation, she tackled the thorny issue of Rakhine. The speech, however, was not about Rohingya or about the international outcry. It was about rebuilding this impoverished and conflict-torn region. Suu Kyi painted this undertakings as a moral task (“our country needs to continue doing the things that need to be done”, “the things that need to be done, should be done correctly, bravely and effectively”), based on individual agency (“we will be able to utilise the strength of will, determination, and knowledge; bravely and energetically”, “we will use the power of truth and purity, so that this Enterprise will be worthy of being called a ‘milestone’ in our history”, Report to the People by State Counsellor 2017). What Suu Kyi presented in her speech is a sort of continuation of her previous “revolution of the spirit” ideas. She placed individual moral development at the heart of reforming the country at the expense of concrete, mundane means (the

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people should rebuild Rakhine, not necessary the government, in a way taking the responsibility off the government). A similar logic she presented in her address to civil servants. Suu Kyi she admitted that low salaries are the essential problem (“we are acutely aware that many civil servants’ salaries remain low, particularly in comparison to counterparts in other sectors”), yet she did not offer any solution to this challenge (“on this issue, I will be frank: there are no immediate solutions. The raising of salaries must be an incremental process, carried out responsibly and sustainably, in accordance with the resources available under the national budget”, ibid.) Instead she told the civil servants that they should be free from fear and, consequently, from corruption. In other words, their increased morality would fight with corruption much more effectively than such mundane aspects as increasing of salaries (Lubina 2018, p. 367). These speeches are just two examples of a wider tendency. Despite her populists pledges of serving the people, when Suu Kyi spoke in public she did not concentrate on mundane aspects, moving away from her earlier “her self-portrayal as a politician focused on assuring the public that she would meet their needs as they view them”, which she promised previously (Callahan 2017). Instead Suu Kyi levitated high and offered hope to the people. This guaranteed her the iconic position within Myanmar (seen in publications such as Alinsek 2019), though no longer outside it. But more importantly, this attitude liberated her from delivering concrete results in governance. Suu Kyi’s “view of what constitutes her personal responsibilities as national leader is no longer one of articulating an actionable plan for modernization”, but rather “to spur a ‘revolution of the spirit’”, consequently, “she increasingly sees her role as using her voice, formal positions and iconic status to achieve a transformative remolding to a moral-based national political economy, starting with each person’s mindset” (Callahan 2017). In this vision, “she does not consider it proper for citizens to expect or ask the government for help in solving the personal, community or regional problems”, instead, “individuals should muster ‘courage’ and ‘self-confidence’ to take personal responsibility for their own and the nation’s solutions”; this is “a socially conservative ideology of radical self-sufficiency and laissez-faire relations between the state and society” (ibid.). This was best captured in what Callahan called “Kennedy-inspired line”, when Suu Kyi said “think of what you can contribute for the development of your country, not what benefits you can have from your country” (ibid.). Given the fact that Suu Kyi was saying something similar in the 1990s (“why don’t you take matters into your hands? Instead of asking others what they can do for you, ask yourself what you can do. Be a responsible person. We should fulfil our obligations first. Ask yourself what you can do before asking others what they can do for you”, Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues with the People 1995–1996, p. 45), one can see an intellectual consistency in Suu Kyi’s message. In the post-2016 circumstances, however, it had different implications. If previously it was the people who should have had transformed themselves to enable the democratic transition, after 2016 the people should have cared for themselves without expecting the state to do so. In other words, this Suu Kyi’s attitude liberates the state from tasks which the state is unable to perform well (such as health care, public

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administration or even cleaning the streets). One can see the political pragmatism of this philosophy quite clearly.

Conclusion Aung San Suu Kyi’s political philosophy plays a supportive role to her political goals: coming to power and restoring the (imagined) Aung San’s legacy. But it does not mean this political philosophy is irrelevant or empty. On the contrary, it an intriguing, even if eclectic, mix of Burmese Buddhist political ideas (transformation of the world one should start from oneself) with Western democratic component. This is a vision of educated individuals who are capable of improving themselves and by this virtue they can see by themselves that democracy is the best available system. So, they choose it. In doing so they help themselves and, equally important, they help others, too, as democracy with its benign features establishes environment that serves each and every one. This democracy is built on inward-based qualities: morality and responsibility. In this vision, external features (e.g. institutional framework like check and balances) are of secondary importance. For Aung San Suu Kyi moral people make good system. Aung San Suu Kyi called it “the revolution of the spirit” and tried to come to power by it. This philosophy was envisioned as a way to awake (or to rebel) the people so that they would stand up against Tatmadaw. In this regard it failed, as the popular support proved to be too little to remove Tatmadaw from power. Ultimately it was Suu Kyi who adjusted to Tatmadaw-established political system, not the other way round. Her political concession (acceptance of the 2008 constitution) paved her way to (limited but still significant) power after 2016 that lasted until 2021. When in power Suu Kyi did not forget about “the revolution of the spirit”: she still used these ideas, this time to justify inaction or incompetence of her government. Again this was a rational strategy. Objectively speaking, Myanmar state is a weak state (in terms of administrative capacity) which is a sorry consequence of six decades of Tatmadaw’s (mis)rule. Hence, Myanmar state is unable to deliver many services developed countries can. Although Suu Kyi is not to blame for it (she inherited this sorry state of affairs), she is absolutely aware of the weakness of the state. So when she tells the people the Burmanised version of Kennedian message—“ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country” she is liberating the state from duties the state cannot perform (due to its weakness). Suu Kyi is, in short, making a virtue out of necessity.

References Alinsek (2019), The Wisdom of Aung San Suu Kyi. Soft Heart in Hard Times, Yangon, Kaung Thant.

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Blum, Franziska (2011), Teaching Democracy: The Program and Practice of Aung San Suu Kyi’s Concept of People’s Education, Regiospectra, Berlin. Callahan, Mary. (2017, March 29). Aung San Suu Kyi’s quiet, puritanical vision for Myanmar. Nikkei Asia Review. Clements, Alan (1996/2008), The Voice of Hope: Conversations with Aung San Suu Kyi, 2nd edition, Rider, London, Sydney, Auckland, Johannesburg. Daw Suu’s 25 Dialogues with the People 1995–1996 (2014), transl. Ko Ko Thet, Frankie Tun, ed. H.-B. Zöllner, Hamburg-Yangon, Abera Verlag. Egreteau, Renaud (2016), Caretaking Democratization: The Military and Political Change in Myanmar, Hurst, London. Houtman, Gustaaf (1999), Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa Monograph, Series No. 33, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. Jordt, Ingrid (2014), “Breaking Bad in Burma,” Religion in the News, Fall, Vol. 15, No. 2. Keeler, Ward (2017), The Traffic in Hierarchy: Masculinity and Its Other in Buddhist Burma, Honolulu: Univ. of Hawai’i Press. Kyaw, Yin Hlaing (2004), “Political Impasse in Myanmar,” in: Prisms on the Golden Pagoda: Perspectives on National Reconciliation in Myanmar, Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.), NUS Press, Singapore. Lall, Marie (2016), Understanding Reform in Myanmar: People and Society in the Wake of Military Rule, Hurst, London. Lubina, Michal (2018), The Moral Democracy: The Political Thought of Aung San Suu Kyi, Warsaw, Scholar. Maung Aung Myoe (2014), “The Soldier and the State: The Tatmadaw and Political Liberalization in Myanmar Since 2011,” South East Asia Research, Vol. 22, No. 2. Maung Maung Gyi (1983), The Burmese Political Values: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarianism, Preager, New York. McCarthy, Stephen (2006), The Political Theory of Tyranny in Singapore and Burma: Aristotle and the Rhetoric of Benevolent Despotism, Routledge, New York. Report to the People by State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Office of State Counsellor, 12.10.2017, http://www.statecounsellor.gov.mm/en/node/1072 (access: 20.07.2018). Sengupta, Nilanjana (2015), The Female Voice of Myanmar: Khin Myo Chit to Aung San Suu Kyi, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Steinberg, David (2010), “Aung San Suu Kyi and U.S. Policy Toward Burma/Myanmar,” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, No. 3. Suu Kyi, Aung San (1991/2010), Freedom from Fear and Other Writing, ed. M. Aris, 1st edition 1991/3rd edition, 2010, Penguin Books, London. Suu Kyi, Aung San (1997), Letters from Burma, Penguin Books, London. Taylor, Robert H. (2009), The State in Myanmar, Singapore University Press, Singapore. Thant Myint-U (2019), The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21th Century, Norton, New York. Tonkin, Derek (2020), Private email correspondence 17.02.2020 Walton, Matthew J. (2017), Buddhism, Politics and Political Thought in Myanmar, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Ye Htut (2019), Myanmar’s Political Transition and Lost Opportunities (2010–2016), ISEAS, Singapore. Zöllner, Hans-Bernd (2011), The Beast and the Beauty, The History of the Conflict Between the Military and Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, 1988–2011, Set in a Global Context, Regiospectra, Berlin. Zöllner, Hans-Bernd, & Ebbighausen, Rodion. (2018). The Daughter. A Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books.

Chapter 3

Environmental Awareness as a Trigger to Ethnic Identity: Constructing Ethnic Identity Among the Tangkhul Nagas, Northeast India Satoshi Ota

Introduction In this paper, I investigate how young Naga people react to the growing littering problem in Naga villages and urban areas by calling on indigenous knowledge and traditional values to help construct a new ethnic identity. Naga is a generic term for a group of sub-tribes residing mainly in Nagaland and adjacent hill areas in Northeast India, such as Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. Some Naga sub-tribes live in the northwest of Myanmar. Among these sub-tribes, I primarily focus on the Tangkhul Naga. The Tangkhul Naga are the dominant ethnic group of the Ukhrul district in Manipur state. The capital of the Ukhrul district is Ukhrul town, where littering has become an increasingly visible problem, as India’s economic growth in the past decades has brought about increased consumerism. In this paper, I investigate how the Nagas’ traditional views about the environment and hygiene have been changing as they are exposed to modern consumerism and the global spread of information and technology. When I visited Ukhrul and observed Naga people criticising littering and environmental pollution, I occasionally heard them using the words “civilised” and “uncivilised” to compare themselves with Mainland Indian people,1 invoking their ongoing political struggle against the Indian majorities. Thus, I also look at the Naga people’s opposition to littering and their concern about the environment as it relates to their political struggle with other ethnic Indians.

1 The term “Mainland Indian” is a vague notion. It is used often when people of Northeast India refer to Indian people from non-Northeast areas. “Indians” and “Mayang people” are also used to refer non-Northeasterners. In this paper, I use the term Mainland Indians to refer non-Northeast Indian people.

S. Ota (B) School of Global Studies, Tama University, Fujisawa, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_3

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Because of the circumstances of their incorporation into the Indian nation, many Nagas consider ethnic identity an important issue, and tradition is a significant anchor of it. However, some of their “traditions” have been invented relatively recently by younger Nagas (cf. Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992). The tradition to protect the environment that the young people articulate may be part of their efforts to construct Naga ethnic identity with environmentally conscious traditional knowledge. The notion of who is civilised and uncivilised may be related to the caste system that has been part of Hindu society since early Indian history and was further codified during British colonisation (cf. Dirks 2001). Another factor in the civilised– uncivilised issue is Christianity. Christian missionaries came into the region during the British colonial period. The Naga people gradually converted to Christianity, and the majority are Christian now. According to Shimray (2001: 210), the missionaries considered traditional Naga customs as barbaric and educated the Naga to become more civilised. Influenced by missionary teachings, the Naga people were reluctant to promote their traditional culture until recently. Young people went to metropolitan areas such as Delhi and Mumbai for higher education and learned about modern global indigenous movements. They learned that cultural traditions the Western missionaries once suppressed were positively accepted in Western culture now, and this caused the students to reevaluate and then promote traditional culture.

Environmental Movements in India and Northeast India India’s environmental awareness began in earnest in the 1970s. According to Guha (1997: 345), a series of events in 1973 facilitated debates on environmental issues. The first was the Indian Government’s launching of Project Tiger to protect the country’s national animal. The second was the publication of the article “A Charter for the Land” in Economic and Political Weekly, which drew attention to land degradation in India. The third was the Chipko Movement, a series of protests involving peasants hugging trees to stop loggers from felling them. Other environmental movements that year included Save the Bhagirathi and Stop Tehri Project in Uttar Pradesh, Save the Narmada Movement in Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat, the Appiko Movement in the Western Ghats, and the campaign against the Silent Valley project (Karan 1994: 32). According to Karan, environmental movements in India differ from those in Western countries in that they are concerned with both environmental preservation and issues of economic inequity and social justice, influenced by the Gandhian nonviolent tradition. Ishizaka applies these views in his research on the Chipko Movement (Ishizaka 2011) and the anti-Tehri Dam Movement (Ishizaka 2006, 2011). His research focuses on Sunderlal Bahuguna, who led both movements. Bahuguna turned these initially local movements into broader environmental crusades that involved multilayered groups of participants. Unlike the conventional environmental movements that he calls “politics of confrontation”, Ishizaka insists that Bahuguna used a tactic of “connective politics” (2011: 25). This is politics that tries to connect local activists, central government politicians, foreign activists, and other concerned groups.

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In Northeast India, the Naga Women’s Union Manipur, Zeliangrong Union, and United Naga Council joined many other organisations opposing the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam in Manipur. The Naga groups insisted they had the right to be informed and participate in the environmental assessment and development of any project that affected their livelihood and dignity (Bhattacharjee 2013: 6). The protesters emphasised the state’s penetration into the life-world of indigenous people, and they fought against state and central governments by networking at local, regional, national, and international levels. Bhattacharjee’s research on the protest against the construction of the Tipaimukh Dam is insightful; however, the main purpose of the movement is to protect the indigenous people’s rights to protect their lands as well as their rights for ecological sustainability. The connection between indigenous knowledge and the discourse of civilised and uncivilised is not a focus of his research paper. Harsha and Sarmah (2014) also look at environmental issues in Northeast India, but their research focuses on the legal aspects of environmental issues. A substantial number of studies reevaluate indigenous knowledge. Kakati, Ao, and Doulo (2006), for example, study how traditional vertebrate-originated medicines were used for the treatment of illness among Ao Naga. Devi, Singh, and Dutta (2011) study traditional medical plants used among Kabui Naga people and document these plants for further research. However, these research papers mainly focus on the recording and classification of indigenous products, not political aspects of the reevaluation of indigenous knowledge. This paper tries to connect Tangkhul Nagas’ awareness of the environment using traditional knowledge to their political struggle vis-à-vis Mainland Indian people, and I hope it can be extended to my further research.

Sense of Cleanliness The concept of cleanliness includes physical as well as metaphysical pollution. The concept of uncleanness varies in different societies. Things that tend to be considered unclean or dangerous are those that cannot be categorised neatly into some preexisting and understandable category (cf. Douglas 1996). The sense of uncleanness was more closely related to symbolic and moral impurity in primitive societies, but the logic of hygiene becomes more influential as a society becomes more modern. In Indian cities, one can observe that people keep the inside of their houses clean, but the outside is filled with garbage. People may criticise this as Indian people lacking a civic sense, but some Indian elites interpret it as an inside–outside dichotomy. Inside is interpreted as the spiritual and traditional East, while outside is the materialistic and modern West. This notion is influenced by anti-colonial sentiment. Jaffrelot and van der Veer (2008: 24) argue that Indian elites such as Gandhi thought that the West succeeded materially and the East was defeated materially, but that the East has rich spiritual, philosophical traditions that the West lacks. Taguchi (2017) develops an inside–outside framework to analyse changes in Indian public spaces through her study of flats in Mumbai. She investigates how middle-class Indian

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people in Mumbai interpret their flats’ compound as their space. The compound is a communal space for the flats’ residents, so it is not inside their houses; however, they extend their sense of “inside” to the compound and try to keep the space clean (Taguchi 2017: 167). Taguchi adds that the residents’ senses of inside and outside shift depending on the historical situation. The notion of inside and outside in the context of South Asia is also researched by Ito. Her research cites the notion of inside and outside in waste management among Newar people in Kathmandu valley, Nepal (Ito 2017). She looks at the Nepalese term H¯amro, which means “our”, and discusses how women’s H¯amro space has been shifting over time. Women are expected to maintain cleanliness inside the house, and it is H¯amro space for them. Before modernisation, women were restricted from going outside their hamlet. The involvement of international organisations influenced the Newar sense of H¯amro space, and now it extends to the riverbank of the Bagmati River, a 45-minutes walk from their home where the women go and dump their garbage (Ito 2017: 23). Ito argues that unlike previous H¯amro space, which was shared only by relatives, the modern H¯amro space is more open to outsiders such as non-Newar people. However, she also documents that when Newar women found garbage scattered near their residential area, they blamed outsiders (Ito 2017: 24). Therefore, H¯amro space is an ambivalent space that changes depending on different situations. Naga people show this ambivalence vis-à-vis North Indian people. Both North Indians and the Nagas are Indian nationals, so in this regard, they are in the same category. However, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously, from the Nagas’ point of view, North Indians are outsiders. The Naga people also have complicated feelings towards the Indian Government and Mainland Indians, based on historical experience. I will discuss the process of Naga incorporation under the Indian Government in subsequent sections, but further investigation is needed to apply inside–outside relations to the relations between the Naga and Mainland Indians. This paper does not further examine this issue because of the lack of substantial data so far.

Naga Political Struggles Because Naga sub-tribes were relatively independent and did not previously interact with other sub-tribes, they did not have a sense of unified identity as “the Naga” until the British occupation (cf. Ao 2002; Vashum 2005). British colonial rule brought about a Naga movement to achieve autonomy within the Naga-inhabited area. They based their claim to autonomy on the fact that neither India nor Burma occupied Naga territory before the British arrived and that the British had drawn their land’s current borderline. In February 1946, shortly after the end of World War II, the Naga formed a united Naga National Council (NNC) and in 1947 sent a memorandum to the Viceroy of India requesting that an Interim Naga Government be created for ten years, at the close of which the Naga people would be left to autonomously elect a new form of government (Vashum 2005: 73). The NNC declared Naga National Independence on

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August 14, 1947, one day before Indian independence; however, British India did not recognise the Naga declaration. A. Z. Phizo was the independence movement leader at the time and was responsible for shaping the Naga nation. In December 1949, Phizo again advocated for a sovereign Naga State outside the Indian Union, with a separate flag, currency, and so on, but the Indian Government again refused the request. The NNC then decided to establish a separate sovereign state in April 1950, electing Phizo NNC president in December 1950. India and the Naga fought several battles during the 1950s and 1960s. The Chinese began supporting the Naga rebels in 1962, and the first group of Naga guerrillas went to China in 1966 for military training (Bhaumik 2009: 17). The NNC eventually separated into several groups because of disagreements among the members. Isak Swu and Th. Muivah, who established their base in Burma-Naga territory in March 1975, along with the Naga armies who had returned from China, formed a new group called the National Socialist Council for Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980 (Vashum 2005: 94). Later, the NSCN also separated into different groups, while several groups other than the NSCN began fighting for Naga freedom. An NSCN-IM group led by Swu and Muivah claimed the area called Greater Nagalim, which consisted of Naga-inhabited areas, including some parts of Myanmar. The Naga independence movement continued for years without gaining any traction with the Indian Government until 1997, when the NSCN-IM and the Indian Government signed a ceasefire agreement (Kashyap 2015). In 2007, this ceasefire was extended, and in 2015, NSCN leadership signed a peace accord with the Government of India; however, ongoing disputes remain between the Naga and India. Northeast India is rich in ethnic diversity, and a significant number of ethnic groups are engaging in political activism to claim their demands. In Manipur state, apart from the Naga, the Meitei and Kuki also have militant groups and are making political claims. Meitei are the majority group in Manipur and mainly reside in the Imphal valley, while the Naga and Kuki live in the hill areas. The Meitei, Naga, and Zo (Chin/Kuki/Lusei) groups have complex conflicts among each other (Suan 2009: 268), and Haokip (2008) describes in detail the conflicts between Kuki and Naga. The Naga’s political struggle is complicated because of the number of stakeholders involved. Zeal for autonomy is stronger among the Nagas in Manipur than those in Nagaland. Among the same sub-tribes, Naga people who are close to a member of a militant group consider Naga independence an important issue. Naga people engaged in business are more concerned about business opportunities. Nevertheless, whether or not they strive for the achievement of political rights, one common trait among Naga people is their consciousness of ethnic identity. In the next section, I look at an example of their assertion of ethnic identity.

The Enunciation of Ethnic Identity and “Tradition” This section explores the recent tendency of promoting tradition among Naga societies by encouraging tourism. The “traditional” cultures they promote sometimes

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have not been practiced for a long time. However, as Smith (1990: 178) mentions, the traditions will survive and flourish as part of a repertoire of national culture only if they follow vernacular motifs and styles. Young Tangkhul Nagas have similar ideas about environmental protection as being rooted in traditional knowledge. I will address later the environmental protection discussion. It happens that constructed tradition can be considered as plausible past. One example is in the promotion of “traditional” Naga culture for tourism. Koiso (2015: 184) discusses a Hornbill Festival as an example of staged authenticity (cf. MacCanell 1973) and argues that the festival programme is not the same as the festival tradition practiced before the Naga converted to Christianity.2 The costumes, panoplies, songs, and dances basically follow the old tradition; however, the festival timing has nothing to do with the original calendar, and the celebrants perform on stage in front of an audience. Various Naga groups perform these songs and dances, but fundamentally, such ensembles did not happen in the past because different Naga tribes were enemies of each other. Therefore, the Hornbill Festival is a new generation’s festival (Koiso 2015: 184). Its purpose is not only to promote tourism but also to teach “traditional Naga culture” to younger generations. Many participants are in their teens or twenties. As Koiso (2015: 184) notes, the festival helps people reaffirm that they are “Nagas” by inviting Naga people from different areas where people do not have regular opportunities to meet each other. Regarding the Naga people’s re-excavation of their traditional culture, Koiso (2015: 185) also notes the role Christianity plays in the Hornbill Festival. As mentioned earlier, Christian churches treated the Naga’s culture as backward and something to be civilised. As a result, much Naga culture and many traditions were gradually lost. In fact, the Naga are retrieving some of their lost customs by consulting books written by British colonial administrators or Western anthropologists (Koiso 2015: 186). From the churches’ point of view, the revival of Naga culture could threaten the teachings of Christianity, so they carefully manage the festival (Koiso 2015: 185). The clash between indigenous values and Christian teachings can happen not only in tourism promotion but also in environmentalism, although the conflict is not as obvious. Christianity prohibited the “barbaric” custom of headhunting and opened schools for modern education, symbolising civilisation and modernity, whereas tribal customs represented unscientific, superstitious belief. Partly influenced by the notion imposed by Christian missionaries that Naga culture was backward, the Naga people did not positively promote their traditional culture (cf. Horam 2014). The recent increase of “cultural festivals” among Naga tribes gives the Naga people opportunities to re-appreciate their tradition, which in turn leads them to embrace their ethnic nationalism. They can reduce the dichotomy between modernity and “backward” indigenous culture by defining traditional knowledge as science, which leads to environmentalism. The eco-friendly past, which was based on “traditional knowledge”, goes well with the narrative of ethnic nationalism. 2

The festival started from 2000 under the guidance of the Nagaland state government. Since then the festival is held in December every year (Koiso 2015: 180).

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Christianity and Religious Practices of Everyday Life This section will discuss the way ordinary Tangkhul Naga people practice Christianity in everyday life and how they balance it with traditional practice. The majority of the Nagas being Christian, many of them go to church regularly, dressed in their best clothes. Many pray before a meal. Christianity is deeply ingrained in their everyday life. Catherine is a Tangkhul woman in her thirties who was visiting Grihang village with her daughter to meet her husband’s in-laws.3 The village is around 50 km east of Imphal city,4 where Catherine is a primary school teacher. When we were discussing Christmas events in the village, a group of young people came into the house and gave us sticky rice cooked in bamboo. They said it was a traditional Naga food. Then we began speaking about traditional culture, and Catherine mentioned that after Christianity came, traditional cultures diminished. I asked her about the recent resurgence of traditional Naga culture. “It is a good thing to keep Naga traditions. We are Nagas, and we have responsibilities to pass our tradition to children”, Catherine said. I asked whether Christian teaching could oppose Naga traditions, and she replied, “I don’t think so”. She said Christianity was part of her life. She was born a Christian, and she goes to church every Sunday. She said her church did not deny traditional culture. I heard similar comments from Naga people at different times and on different occasions. Western missionaries came to the Naga hills nearly 100 years ago. In those days, the missionaries might have thought their mission was to civilise barbaric people, and this view of their mission might have been dominant in Western societies, too. However, in the twenty-first century, Western churches’ and Western society’s views have changed. Some Naga people, especially those who are involved in the church, may be seeking the tribal theology to which Vashum (2014) referred. However, the Naga people I contacted do not seem to think that their Christian practices and traditional views contradict each other. They are proud of both being Christian and practicing Naga traditions. However, further research is needed to investigate how Naga traditional practices are kept in syncretic forms with Christianity, and the discussion should be developed deeper in my future paper. In the relationship between the Nagas and Mainland Indians, Christianity can play a positive role. When I spoke with Tangkhul students in a student hostel in Delhi, the conversation turned to the difficulties Naga and other Northeastern people face in adjusting to Mainland Indian rules. Tony, a Tangkhul student studying for a 3

For the purpose of maintaining privacy, the names used in this paper are pseudonyms. The author was mainly based in Delhi from August 2007 to March 2012. The fieldwork in Manipur state was conducted in December 2008, August 2015, May 2017, December 2017 to January 2018, December 2018 to January 2019, and December 2019. The data in this paper was mainly collected from the fieldwork, but some data was collected from Naga people in Delhi. The research data was collected through participant observations, unstructured interviews, and semi-structured interviews. Because of space limitations, it is not possible to introduce all the people the author interacted with; therefore, the cases and conversations presented in the paper are selected as representative. The date in this section was collected during the visit of December 2018 to January 2019.

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Master’s degree, said, “Oh, those Hindu people, they are so narrow-minded”. From the students’ and other Nagas’ points of view, the Hindus tend to adhere to Hindu rituals and rules too much; they do not have broad, international minds. The majority of Mainland Indians are Hindus, and Hinduism is mainly practiced in India, while Christianity is practiced globally. A similar analogy happens in language. Naga people receive English language education at school, while many Indian boys in downtown Delhi speak English poorly. These people are not university graduates. They do manual labour and work in shops, and when the Nagas in Delhi have trouble, it is usually with these boys. Because the Nagas struggle to live as an ethnic minority, being more global may be an advantage to distinguish themselves from the local boys.

Urbanisation and the Rise of Consumerism in Ukhrul Town Ukhrul town is the district capital of Ukhrul district in Manipur state, and it has been developing for the past decade. Its economy is developing and food consumption is rising with its population growth. I observed more restaurants and eateries in my in 2017 and 2018 visits than when I visited Ukhrul for the first time in 2008. There are more grocery stores, and even convenience stores have opened on the high street (Fig. 3.1). The rise of consumerism has increased the amount of garbage. I saw a large amount of garbage on the streets of Ukhrul town, much of it plastic garbage. Figure 3.2 shows plastic garbage content: most was used plastic bags; snack packages,

Fig. 3.1 Convenience store in Ukhrul (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017)

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Fig. 3.2 Garbage on a street in Ukhrul (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017)

chewing gum wrappers, and plastic bottles made up the rest (Fig. 3.2). People throw away trash on the streets immediately after they finish snacks and drinks. I observed people littering on the street without hesitation when I visited Ukhrul in 2008. The custom had not changed in my visits in 2017 and 2018, when street rubbish was even more visible because of population growth. Roadside shop owners are placing boxes outside as rubbish bins (Fig. 3.3), but people do not always use them. Littering happens not only on the street but also in backyards, gutters, picnic places, and the forest (Fig. 3.4). In addition to littering problems, Ukhrul and other Naga villages have no municipal plumbing, so untreated sewage drains directly from the kitchen and toilet and creates sludge piles in some places. If Ukhrul were a village of only a few hundred, there would be much vacant space between the houses where residents could build a new toilet outside the house when the vicinity becomes too dirty. Given the more urbanised town Ukhrul has become, the problem of untreated sewage will become more serious in the future.

Environmental Awareness in Ukhrul District Environmental awareness is spreading among the Tangkhul Naga people. Tennyson Kazingmei, a 65-year-old man, is in charge of a microfinance programme in the Ukhrul district organised by an NGO, Volunteers for Village Development (VVD).

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Fig. 3.3 Rubbish bin placed in front of a shop (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017)

He has been promoting environmental issues for many years. In 2002, as a member of the Interim Civic Body Committee of Ukhrul Headquarters (ICBC), formed in August 2002, Kazingmei drafted a bylaw, Sanitation and Environmental Rules & Regulations of Ukhrul District Headquarters. Section 3.3.1, for example, states: “No one should throw waste materials both degradable and non-degradable including sewage into the roads” (Kazingmei 2002: 5). Thus, since 2002, this adopted civic bylaw has promoted an end to litter on the streets. The Civic Body Committee, however, is not a part of the Ukhrul government. The committee cannot enforce the bylaws; it can only promote people’s awareness of how they benefit the environment. When I interviewed Kazingmei, he pointed out that the committee had launched promotions such as “earth day” and “environmental day”. People participating in these events became environmentally aware, but they would forget eventually because the environmental issues are not their immediate

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Fig. 3.4 Garbage thrown away in a gutter in Ukhrul Town (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017)

concern. Kazingmei also told me how the forest had changed in the past decades. Before, wild animals were plentiful, and it was easy to hunt them for food. Now, the wild animals are scarce because people have hunted them too much and destroyed their forest homes by cutting down trees, which they either sell or use for firewood. Kazingmei said private corporations do not care about the environment but only about profits. Kazingmei’s environmental awareness came from his interaction with Western people when he went to Canada to join a study programme on sustainable development. The recent excessive use of forest resources has led to proposals for a reevaluation of traditional forest management knowledge. Varah (2014) has conducted research on traditional forest management among the Tangkhul Nagas and argues that some of their traditional knowledge can be validated with scientific evidence. For example, the Tangkhul people have a custom of not cutting down trees in March and April, because they believe it causes the wood to be more prone to insect attack. A recent study shows that during the budding period in March and April, the cell wall becomes thinner, and the tree would be more susceptible to insect damage if its branches were cut (Varah 2014: 272). Kazingmei’s opinion that young people do not care about an eco-friendly way of life may be true for the majority of young Nagas; however, some young people are concerned about the environment, even if their numbers are yet small. Varah (2014: 284) mentions student movements that have begun to focus on the environment, such as Tangkhul Katamnao Long and Tangkhul Mayar Ngala Long, which have argued against government-related projects such as tree planting and other activities likely to disturb the ecological balance. These

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organisations collaborated with All Tribal Students’ Union Manipur and All Naga Students’ Association Manipur and succeeded in restricting forest exploitation by the Manipur state government and raising awareness of biodiversity importance (Varah 2014: 284–285). Environmental awareness also is spreading among other youth associations. In Ukhrul district, a mountain called Shirui Kashung Peak is well-known for the Shirui Lily flower. The lily blooms only in this area, a popular picnic destination for locals during the flower season of May and June. To celebrate the flower, the locals hold a festival during this season. Since 2017, the festival has been supported by the Manipur Government and has become more formalised. Presumably because the flower blooms in the rainy season, the state-supported festival is now held during the dry season. The more popular visiting Shirui Hill becomes, the more the environment is destroyed because of littered plastic. Concerned about this environmental deterioration, some youth organisations began a campaign to clean the hill, making announcements against littering. Beth, one of the organisers of a group involved in the clean-up campaign, said that it is each individual’s responsibility to keep nature clean. She has noticed that the garbage in Shirui Hill is increasing because of the increasing popularity of the area for picnics and thought that people visiting the hill needed to be aware of the environment. Beth pursued postgraduate study in Delhi and joined an international NGO after finishing her study, visiting countries in Europe and other areas. She now follows current environmental issues, including littering problems in developing countries. In addition to monitoring large events like the Shirui Lily Festival, youth groups are increasing environmental awareness on a smaller scale. One campaign involves setting up rubbish bins in parks and village streets (Fig. 3.5). Thanks to these groups, the environment around these areas is kept relatively clean. The young people engaging in environmental issues in village areas are mostly those who have pursued higher education in large cities such as Delhi, Mumbai, and Bangalore, where they absorb Western environmentalism and scientific knowledge related to the environment. They bring what they learned in the large cities back to their local villages. Interestingly, when I interacted with these young people, many insisted on the importance of also using traditional knowledge shared by the Naga people to solve environmental issues. In another example, I met a group of young people who were collecting garbage at a picnic site near Shangshak village. I approached and began a small conversation. The young people were locals, and they also came to picnic. They said they bring their garbage back with them and collect the other trash scattered at the site. A young man in his twenties mentioned that they sometimes organise clean-up events at the picnic site because he feels it is their responsibility to care for nature. Plastic is not biodegradable; it remains forever. He lamented that people now have become materialistic and individualistic and do not care about their community. These young people and a significant number of others I contacted argue that littered plastic and environmental pollution are products of modernisation and excessive consumerism. If young Naga people do not reconsider their recent rush towards consumerism, they could face a devastating future. The increasingly visible

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Fig. 3.5 A rubbish bin in a park near Halan Village placed by a youth group (Photo taken by the Author, May 2017)

consumerism in Ukhrul town may be affecting young people’s visions of their future. During my visit in 2017, I met young people who said they would like to become flight attendants or cabin crew members on an international cruise ship. I did not meet anyone who mentioned these occupations when I visited the Ukhrul district in 2008. At that time in Delhi, a significant number of people from Northeast India were working as sales staff in shopping malls, and I assumed that working these service sector jobs in large cities and earning substantial salaries would make it possible for them to enjoy consumer goods. Now, such consumer culture is spreading to Ukhrul through young people who have worked and studied in large cities and

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returned to Ukhrul for holidays or work. Those who are concerned about this excessive consumerism insist it is time to reevaluate the Naga people’s traditional customs as a more eco-friendly, sustainable way of life. Naga people are becoming conscious about the environment in reaction to the recent increase of consumerism. However, as Kazingmei pointed out in his interview, environmental matters were not issues for them before; their primary concerns were political, and still are for many people. Many Naga communities and NGOs see human rights and conflict resolution as the significant issues that engage them. When I interviewed Kazingmei, he talked about Naga political struggles, one of which was the conflict between the Naga and the Kuki. He said this conflict was an example of complicated Naga political positions and that VVD was working on conflict resolution between the two parties. Kazingmei feels the Naga people’s political circumstances cannot be separated from his work.

Littering is an Uncivilised Behaviour As in the cases of Shirui Hill and Shangshak village, students and youth groups play a major role in cleaning the environment. The importance of keeping the environment clean is slowly spreading to the village level. The small, remote Grihang village is an example. The village is around 50 km east of Imphal; however, due to the steep mountain ranges between, the road detours to circle the mountains and is very rough. It takes around 8 hours to reach the village from Imphal. When I visited in December 2017, I saw bamboo rubbish bins on both sides of the main street. Villagers threw garbage in the bins, so the whole village was very clean. I mentioned the rubbish bins to Fillip, who had invited me to the village. Fillip is in his thirties and from Grihang village. He finished his PhD in Delhi and was teaching in a college in Delhi at the time. When he was a PhD student, he had been the president of Naga Student Union, Delhi. Fillip came back to the village to spend Christmas and New Year. “I asked the village council to set these rubbish bins”, Fillip said. “And I also asked them to educate the villagers to throw the rubbish in the bins. You see, Grihang village is very clean”. Kevin is a Tangkhul man in his thirties who coaches football in Delhi and has relatives in Grihang village. He was visiting his relatives for Christmas. “You know, Delhi is so dirty. Full of garbage. Oh, those Indians, they throw garbage everywhere”, Kevin said. “They are so uncivilized. Compared to Delhi, Grihang is so clean”. Kevin’s comment on Mainland Indians being uncivilised is a common Naga observation. When I was in Delhi, I heard these comments many times from many Northeastern Indian people. The Nagas and other ethnic groups from the Northeast are considered outsiders in India. When Naga students invited me for dinner or other gatherings, they often complained about Indian boys: “They call us Chinky”. I heard this phrase several times. Chinky is a derogatory term Mainland Indians use to describe

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people from the Northeast. When Fillip was the president of Naga Student Union, he had to deal with many Naga harassment cases, such as a female Naga student being sexually abused by a local boy and a fight between young Naga men and young local men provoking them. These kinds of incidents happen often in Delhi, and many Naga people have experiences of being harassed by Mainland Indians. This paper has looked at the Nagas’ historical background. Because of that history, many Nagas are not entirely happy about being incorporated into India. When they reside in the cities of Mainland Indians, they are treated as “different people”. Conversely, for the Nagas, Mainland Indians are outsiders. As in Ito’s research on the Newar people who blame outsiders for littering (Ito 2017), the Naga people blame Mainland Indian people for polluting the environment. They apply the same logic to Meitei people, the major ethnic group of Manipur state. A majority of the Naga reside in the state of Nagaland, but some sub-ethnic groups such as Tangkhul mainly live within Manipur state, where they are an ethnic minority. Both the Meitei and the Nagas are from Northeast India, and Mainland Indians treat both groups as outsiders. They have a common position in this respect. However, within Manipur state, the Meitei are the majority, and the Nagas are the minority, so the power balance between the two groups is with the Meitei. This relationship can come up in everyday conversations. Walsh is a Tangkhul man in his early thirties living in Imphal. He finished his Master’s degree in Delhi and is working in an organisation run by Manipur state. When I asked him about the littering problem in Imphal city, he criticised Meitei people and said that they threw garbage everywhere. “Those valley people are less conscious about the environment”, Walsh said. Here, “valley people” refers to Meitei people. In Manipur, Naga towns and villages are in hill areas, and the Meitei are concentrated in the Imphal valley. Walsh criticised Meitei people for their careless attitude towards the environment; however, I observed Walsh throwing garbage on the street many times. He and many other Naga people throw garbage on the street naturally, without thought. Their littering behaviour is not so different from that of Meitei people, but when discussing environmental issues, they criticise Meitei people for polluting the environment.

Concluding Remarks A wave of economic growth has arrived in the Naga hills, and the consumption of manufactured products has been increasing for the past decade. As a result, littering has become an environmental issue, and some youth groups have tried to increase awareness of it. In this paper, I have investigated how young people regard environmental issues and how environmentalism relates to Naga ethnic identity. Western missionaries of the early twentieth century taught the Naga people that they should be “civilised”. Influenced by the missionaries, many Naga rejected their traditional culture as superstitious, illogical, and unscientific and did not pass down their traditional practices to later generations.

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Recent economic development and increased consumption in India have involved the elements of modernisation, Westernisation, and the “civilised” way of life the missionaries promoted. However, recent global awareness of indigenous people’s rights, the importance of indigenous wisdom, and a sense of environmental responsibility have caused the young Naga people to reevaluate their own culture, often led by young people who left their communities to study in mega-cities such as Delhi and Mumbai. Politically speaking, “traditional” culture could be a tool to distinguish one culture from another (cf. Wallerstein 1990), so promoting traditional culture can strengthen Naga identity as separate from “Indian” identity. Some Naga use this logic in the area of tourism, which Koiso discussed in his research (Koiso 2015). Similarly, traditional knowledge can be connected to environmentalism, and criticism against excessive Western consumerism on a global scale is helping the educated young Naga people to reevaluate their traditional lifestyles, which they see as ecofriendly and non-wasteful. As to the “traditions”, some of them were invented, as this paper illustrates. However, some of the old customs have been proven scientifically valid, although the Naga did not have that scientific knowledge when they began the practices. Affirmation by scientific knowledge can assure the educated young Naga that their traditional knowledge did not consist merely of illogical, superstitious practices, as the Christian missionaries told them. However, many Naga people now seem to have no problem with practicing Christianity and returning to their traditions. Christianity has been part of their life for decades. Furthermore, some young Nagas I contacted think Christianity is a global religion that can be used to criticise uneducated Indian boys who do not have global minds. The West is considered superior to India, and the Naga Christians, being closer to the West, may regard themselves as more civilised. Nagas living in India’s larger cities may use this mindset as an offset to their reallife harassment by Mainland Indians. The reality is that Nagas living in Delhi do encounter many difficulties as an ethnic minority. Some young Tangkhul Naga people try to combat the consumption practices of their elders by telling them littering is an uncivilised act. In the process, they are reevaluating the Naga people’s past as a civilised society. The young, educated Tangkhul Naga try to distinguish themselves from Mainland Indians by claiming they are more civilised than “Indians”. Unlike “Indian” people who pollute the environment by littering garbage, they claim they were eco-friendly people in the past and remain environmentally conscious today. This attitude that treats Mainland Indians as outsiders is applied also to Meitei people in some contexts because relations between the Tangkhul Nagas and the Meitei are delicate. The Nagas, and especially the Tangkhul Nagas, are coming to understand that their political circumstances are linked to the ethnic identity that infiltrates so many aspects of their lives. Therefore, environmental issues are political issues in Naga societies. For the Tangkhul Nagas, environmental issues are part of the struggle to construct Naga identity.

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References Ao, Lanunungsang A. (2002) From Phizo to Muivah: The Naga National Question in Northeast India. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Bhattacharjee, Jhimli (2013) Dams and Environmental Movements: The Cases from India’s North East. International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications, 3(11), 1–11. Bhaumik, Subir (2009) Troubled Periphery: Crisis of India’s North East. New Delhi: Sage. Devi, M. R., P. K. Singh, and B. K. Dutta (2011) Ethnomedicinal Plants of Kabui Naga Tribe of Manipur, India. Pleione, 5(1), 115–28. Dirks, Nicholas B. (2001) Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Douglas, Mary (1996 [1966]) Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge. Guha, Ramchandra (1997) Social–Ecological Research in India: A Status Report. Economic and Political Weekly, 32(7), 345–52. Haokip, P. S. (2008) Zale’n–Gam the Kuki Nation. Delhi: KNO Publication. Harsha, S. and D. Sarmah (2014) Environmental Governance in Northeast India and the Role of the Judiciary. International Journal of Legal Studies and Research, 3(2), 176–98. Hobsbawm, Eric and T. Ranger (eds.) (1992 [1983]) The Invention of Tradition, Canto edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Horam, Ringkahao (2014) Undeclared War: The Naga Political Movement. New Delhi: Sunmarg Publishers. Ishizaka, Shinya (2006) The Anti Tehri Dam Movement as a New Social Movement and Gandhism. Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies, 8, 76–95. Ishizaka, Shinya 石坂晋哉 (2011) 『現代インドの環境思想と環境運動——ガンディー主 義と』(Environmental Movement in India: Gandhism and “Connective Politics”). 京都: 昭和堂 (Kyoto: Showado). Ito, Sanae 伊東さなえ (2017) 「ネパール・カトマンドゥ盆地におけるハムロ・空間の表 出——廃棄物をめぐる実践の事例から——」(The Emergence of H¯amro Space in the Kathmandu Valley, Nepal: A Study of Waste Management). 『南アジア研究』(Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies), 29, 6–32. Jaffrelot, Christophe and P. van der Veer (2008) Introduction. In C. Jaffrelot and P. van der Veer, eds., Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China, pp. 11–34. New Delhi: Sage. Kakati, L. N., B. Ao, and V. Doulo (2006) Indigenous Knowledge of Zootherapeutic Use of Vertebrate Origin by the Ao Tribe of Nagaland. Journal of Human Ecology, 19(3), 163–67. Karan, P. P. (1994) Environmental Movements in India. Geographical Review, 84(1), 32–41. Kashyap, Samudra Gupta (2015) Towards the Govt-Naga Peace Accord: Everything You Need to Know. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-towards-accord-step-by-step/. Accessed January 11, 2021. Kazingmei, Tennyson (2002) Sanitation and Environmental Rules & Regulations of Ukhrul District Headquarters. Unpublished Booklet. Koiso Manabu 小磯学 (2015) 「インド共和国ナガランド州の観光の現状について——祭り とアイデンティティーの考察」(Contemporary State of Tourism in Nagaland, India: A study on Festivals and Identity). 『神戸山手大学紀要』(Journal of Kobe Yamate University). 17, 175–90. MacCanell, D. (1973) Staged Authenticity: Arrangement of Social Space in Tourist Settings. American Journal of Sociology, 79(3), 589–603. Shimray, A. S. W. (2001) History of Tangkhul Nagas. New Delhi: Akansha Publishing House. Smith, Anthony (1990) Towards a Global Culture? In M. Featherstone ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, pp. 171–91. London: Sage Suan, H. Kham Khan (2009) Hills–Valley Divide as a Site of Conflict: Emerging Dialogic Space in Manipur. In S. Baruah, ed., Beyond Counter–Insurgency: Breaking the Impasse in Northeast India, pp. 263–89. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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Taguchi Yoko 田口陽子 (2017) 「ウチとソトの交渉とずれの生成——ボンベイ・フラット と市民の活動からみた公共空間」(Negotiation the Inside/Outside, Generating Gaps: Public Space Seen through Bombay Flats and Civic Activism). 『文化人類学』(Japanese Journal of Cultural Anthropology), 82(2), 163–81. Varah, Franky (2014) Indigenous Forest Management: Trends in Tangkhul Naga Community. In R. Vashum et al., eds., Encountering Modernity: Situating the Tangkhul Nagas in Perspective, pp. 267–89. New Delhi: Chicken Neck. Vashum, R. (2005) Nagas’ Right to Self-Determination: An Anthropological-Historical Perspective, 2nd edition. New Delhi: Mittal Publications. Vashum, Yangkahao (2014) Introducing Tribal (Tangkhul) Theology: A Case for Contextual Theology. In R. Vashum et al., eds., Encountering Modernity: Situating the Tangkhul Nagas in Perspective, pp. 137–53. New Delhi: Chicken Neck. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1990) Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System. In M. Featherstone, ed., Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity, pp. 31–56. London: Sage.

Chapter 4

Reducing the Level of Ethnocultural Tensions in Thailand: Transformation Through National Unity with Otherness Takashi Tsukamoto

Introduction The deep South was incorporated into the geographical and linguo-cultural Thai national community through the first half of the twentieth century. For people in Siam/Thailand, the deep South was a distinct ethnic, cultural and historical construct, and the process of nation building and cultural assimilation pursued by the Thai ruling élites, such as Phibun Songkram, involved the incorporation of that distinct construct within the Thai nation. These élites identified the deep South as an ethno-culturally un-Thai area after they defined and demarcated Thai culture and community nationally. In the 1980s, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda, however, shifted the government to a different approach, which involved not “assimilation” but “acceptance” of and “association” with local ethno-cultural diversity. Prem was born in Songkhla and served in the Fourth Army Region in the South. He became Army Commander-inChief in 1978, and established a close relationship with the King. “Understanding” (khwam khaw chai) was a key word in Prem’s approach to governing the deep South, an approach he derived from his experience as a deputy army commander fighting communists in the second region. He used his personal background in the deep South to stress his affinity to and familiarity with the area and tried to develop policies that were characterised by his support of Muslims’ equal citizenship as Thais and their ethno-cultural distinctiveness. Prem, as Prime Minister from 1980 to 1988, straddled the forces of civic and multicultural nationalism. Prem de-essentialised the idea of Thainess so that the MalayMuslims could be part of the Thai nation without discarding their local culture, tradition, and language. He tried to treat the Malay-Muslims as Thai citizens. Prem’s ideas were aligned with the notion of civic nationalism, which offers “a version of a community of equal citizens” and promotes “difference-blindness” (Brown 2000: 126–127). T. Tsukamoto (B) School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_4

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Yet, as the leading theorist of multiculturalism, Will Kymlicka, claims, civic nationalism is by no means ethno-culturally neutral. As Kymlicka (2001: 24) argues in the case of the United States, which is often referred to as an ethno-culturally neutral state or a civic nation, the government of the United States deliberately ensured that anglophones would be a majority within each of the fifty states, establishing the English language as the dominant language. For him, civic nationalism camouflages the fact that ethnic majorities promote their own culture and values, and that each supposedly civic nation is defined by an ethnic core. Therefore, the civic nation does not generate ethno-cultural neutrality. The case of Prem emphasised the significance of the Thai language, which helps everyone be proud of being Thai, pointing still to the centrality of an ethnic core in his vision of nation.1 On the other hand, Prem understood ethno-cultural sensitivities and recognised the significance of local cultures and traditions in the deep South. Prem’s attempt can be understood as an effort to establish the Thai nation as a “multicultural nation”, which can, in scholarly terms, be defined as “an encapsulating social justice community which is bound together by common values relating to the celebration of ethnic diversity, and the commitment to inter-ethnic equity” and “a national community within which the diverse ethnic communities can flourish, and within which disadvantaged ethnic minorities can be guaranteed the rights and resources necessary for the attainment of their full development” (Brown 2000: 128–129). As Panitan Watthanayagon (2004: 25), a security specialist, pointed out, during the eight years of Prem’s premiership conflicts and violence in the deep South were significantly reduced. Omar Farouk Bajunid (2006: 208) also argues that “the highest level of Malay-Muslim cooperation with the Thai state” took place after Prem came to office.2 The problem which needs to be explored from these definitions of a multicultural nation is the relationship between a mainstream majority group and minority groups. Proponents of multiculturalism (see Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 2001) examine whether national minority groups, be they ethnic or religious, need to be integrated into a larger cultural community of the national majority or can maintain their regional autonomy and group-specific rights. On this point, Kymlicka, with special reference to national 1

For example, when Islamic leaders visited Prem at the Office of Prime Minister on 10 September 1980, he told them: [I will] provide fairness and equality to everyone who believes in any religion. The Thai government will take care of everyone equally with love and good-will in order to bring every Thai up to an equal standard. The government always allows you to have religious freedom. The government clearly announced the policy that it will support all religion. What I would like to ask the Thai Muslim brothers and sisters is that we must learn what the majority of the Thai people learn, which is the Thai language, as we are born as Thai. (Samnakngan soemsang ekkalak khong chat 1986: 234–235)

2

Omar Farouk Bajunid tries to connect the degree of Malay-Muslim cooperation with the type of régime, by saying that the cooperation took place “during the democratic era or at least when there was some resemblance of democracy” (Omar 2006: 208). Chai-Anan Samudavanija (1990) calls the regime under Prem a “stable semi-democracy”. A full parliamentary democracy was installed after 1988, when the elected Prime Minister, Chatichai Choonhavan, came to the office.

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minorities, argues that it is fair for these minority groups that have already “formed functioning societies on their historical homelands prior to being incorporated into a larger state” to maintain their own distinct culture (Kymlicka 2001: 54). He calls this distinct culture a “societal culture”, which is “a set of institutions, covering both public and private life [such as schools, media, law, economy and government], with a common language, which has historically developed over time on a given territory, which provides people with a wide range of choices about how to lead their lives” (Kymlicka 2001: 53). For Kymlicka, the construction of such a societal culture is important in the context of the liberal multiculturalism. How successfully national minority groups establish their societal cultures depends on whether they uphold liberal notions of individual autonomy and freedom. Kymlicka (2001: 53) argues that their societal cultures should make various options available for individuals “to make free and informed choices about how to lead their lives”. He also argues that it is unfair and costly for national minorities to be integrated or assimilated into a larger societal culture of a national majority since their free and informed choices might be restricted when that happens. Kymlicka’s argument on a societal culture suggests that a modern liberal democratic state can promote the establishment of two or more societal cultures in its territory if it contains national minorities who have their own historical homelands. A country would be more multicultural if it has more and more societal cultures. Yet, the question is, asks Kymlicka, “how best to combine group-specific multiculturalism policies with difference-blind common rights?” To answer this question requires the elucidation of the relationship between a mainstream societal culture of a national majority group and the smaller societal cultures of national minority groups. In the context of Thailand in the 1980s, Prem tried to bridge two societal cultures: the mainstream Thai-Buddhist culture and the minority Malay-Muslims societal culture. Prem used the term Thai-Muslim to refer to Muslims in the deep South. He did not use this term to try to assimilate Muslims into Thais as his predecessors did. Instead, he tried to recognise and promote specific identities and traditions for Muslims and their equal citizenship as Thais. Prem’s notion of Thai-Muslim helped to fill the gap between the two societal cultures by letting him recognise and then ignore ethno-cultural differences between the Thai-Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims. This chapter examines how official political discourse under the Prem régime demonstrated an accommodative attitude towards Muslims in the deep South, and how it treated ethnic and cultural differences. Prem tried to erase the boundary which previous ruling élites had used to establish national enemies, such as communists and separatists. In other words, Prem tried to be rhetorically indifferent to a set of opposing poles between Thai and un-Thai. His notion of Thainess did not focus on eliminating or eradicating un-Thai enemies, such as communists or separatists, but on accommodating or absorbing them. Prem transformed those communists and separatists from enemies into friends of the nation as long as they surrendered and worked for national development. Prem’s effort was to reduce the uncertainty in the deep South by encouraging previously defined enemies to transform themselves into friends. In so doing, Prem liberalised and pluralised the idea of Thainess, so that ethno-cultural and political differences could be accepted as parts of the Thai

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nation. In short, Prem promoted a view of Thai-Muslims, which helped bridge the gap between the Thai-Buddhist and the Malay-Muslim culture. This chapter attempts to elucidate how Prem constructed an idea of the ThaiMuslim which could accommodate ethno-cultural diversity and promote liberal values of equality in the deep South. Firstly, I outline Prem’s strategy to accommodate national enemies into the Thai nation with reference to his experience of combating communists, and its relevance to the deep South. Secondly, I examine how he saw ethno-cultural differences in the deep South as compatible with Thai culture. Thirdly, I examine whether Prem and his idea of being Thai provided the Malay-Muslims with equal opportunities to Thai citizens living in other parts of the country. This sections aims to show how Prem’s civic idea of the Thainess also incorporated multicultural elements. The chapter draws on a number of speeches and statements given by government officials, particularly Prem. I use these speeches and statements, which are now publicly available, as representative of views that were widely shared among government officials in the 1980s.

Prem, National Enemies and the Deep South In dealing with the unrest in the deep South, Prem drew on his experiences of combating communists. Prem shifted policy towards communists away from the harsh suppression used by previous regimes towards accommodation. In the late 1970s, a group, called the “Democratic Soldiers”, emerged in the military. This group was centred on the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), an anticommunist intelligence unit. The Democratic Soldiers started advocating that the military reduce its emphasis on armed suppression of communist insurgency, and instead, wage a political struggle against it (Pasuk and Baker 2002: 346; Connors 2003: 106). Prem took these ideas over when he became the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and then rose to be Prime Minister in March 1980. His prime ministerial order 66/2523 was well-known as a symbolising a “political offensive” or “politics to lead military” policy (kanmuang nam kanthahan), which was a strategy of negotiation between government officials and communists. The strategy of combating national enemies with military force was replaced by one using political means. In 1981– 1982, the government gave amnesty to not less than 1,200 communists (Chichanok 2004: 59). The strategy of negotiation stemmed from Prem’s experiences while he was serving as a deputy army commander in the second army region (the North-East). He said he came to re-think the meaning of “enemies”. As he said: When I started serving in the second army region, I looked at communist bandits as enemies of the nation that needed to be killed. But luckily I also had a look at another site and thought about why villagers fled from us when I visited their village. We walked into their villages, but they were not interested in us. I understood that villagers hated us. They did not want to talk to us. We were discouraged and disappointed. Umm, why didn’t they welcome us? […]

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We tried to think of what we should do. If we had looked at villagers with the feeling that they are enemies, they would have become more enemies (than we could expect). We tried to spend a long time staying in their village and, in the end, they started talking to us. We asked them questions: what did they hate? They said that they were bullied, abused and squeezed. There were three reasons why the Thai people went to join communists. The first one was poverty. The second was oppressiveness stemming from unfairness and injustice in the society. The third was abuse. I said that … if we could not solve these problems, we could not win over communist bandits. (Jatawa 1995: 58–59)

In order to precisely understand Prem’s notion of a political offensive, it is necessary to explain Order 66/2523. The aim of the order was to end the warfare waged by the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). It accepted communists as people who had just made mistakes and treated them as partners to develop the country (point 4.7 of Order 66/2523). The order’s primary stated aim was to respect and protect the three important institutions of official Thai nationalism, nation, religion and the king, and the democratic form of government with the king as head of the state. Prem thus added the notion of democracy to the three formal pillars of national ideology, and interwove democracy and national identity. Article 1.3 of Order 66/2523 stated that: … The government considers happiness of the people, the common interests of the people in the nation, and ideal Thai identity as being important in solving economic, political and social problems. The government will instil the ideology [of nation, religion, monarchy and the democratic form of government with the king as head of the state] in every single Thai, particularly by urging them to sacrifice personal interests for the common interest. The government will reform the bureaucracy to be more efficient to serve the people and adjust it to conform to the system of democracy. The military should have the role of defending the country, to save national sovereignty and to protect democracy under the king as head of the state.

Order 66/2523 demonstrated the way the Democratic Soldiers, members of which played a role in drafting this Order (Pask and Baker 2002: 346), and the ISOC conceived the idea of democracy. As Michael Connors argues, they explained the idea of democracy through the notion of a Rousseauian social contract.3 For them, democracy was a system in which the people ruled through representatives: “The People’s will takes the form of a social contract to the government in the interest of the people” (Connors 2003: 107–108). The general or collective will of the people should be paramount over the private interest: “The general will is not the collection of individual wills, but is, rather, the will of people relating to their collective desires and interests. These collective wishes are sovereign” (Connors 2003: 108). When communists, terrorists and bandits who were previously labelled as un-Thai were granted amnesties and if they wished to be accepted back as members of the Thai nation, they had to work for the “collective will of the people” and “sacrifice their own interests”. Indeed, doing so might be seen as a basic condition for them to be Thai. Thus, the “political offensive” was defined, by the Democratic Soldiers, as 3

Connors cites evidence from a blueprint for national reform issued by the ISOC in 1983. He says that the blueprint was withdrawn but it had already been distributed widely, together with an educational text, to soldiers and bureaucrats (Connors 2003: 107; see also Chamlae nayobai kongthap, n.d.: 142–156).

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“any action that results in the people recognizing that this land is theirs to protect and preserve” (Chavalit 1989: 176 cited in Connors 2003: 106). Prem regarded the political offensive as an important means by which to construct national unity. Prem explained this notion in the parliament on 20 May 1983: The government implements the official national policy by considering national unity, happiness, poverty reduction, progress and development, and national security together with the development of administration towards the stable democracy. … [The political offensive] will construct a unity among the nation and will unify powers of the Thai people, who have different ideas, to help the country develop and progress. (Prem 1986b: 23; 25)

In highlighting that different ideas could be unified in the nation, Prem discursively entrusted the task of building national unity to the people, by letting the people recognise that they had to protect their sovereign collective will (Prem 1988: 192– 193). However, this shift did not mean that communists were no longer national enemies. On the contrary, for Prem and his government, communists pursued private interests, rather than working for the public interest and the nation. Communism as an ideology was still an enemy and needed to be defeated, although “communists” could be Thai if they determined to preserve and protect the collective will of Thailand from the invasion of “communism”. To combat communists, the government did not exclusively rely on the armed forces to eradicate communists, but emphasised the “psychological dimension” (article the 4.9 of Order 66/2523). For Prem, psychological warfare involved establishing trust between the government and the people, particularly in areas facing crises (Jatawa 1995: 88). Prem abandoned the old perception that all the “forest people” were communists, and tried to understand the situation in the forest.4 In other words, Prem tried to refine the blanket demonisation of the past. He emphasised that, by working closely with the villagers and by establishing trust between the villagers and the military, lots of “communist bandits” returned from the forest to live in their own villages (Jatawa 1995: 88–89). In addition, Prem mobilised villagers—including those who returned from the forest – to protect their villages from the “bandits” who had remained in the forest (Jatawa 1995: 89). He did so by establishing a militia, called thai asa pongkan chat (the National Defence Volunteers). The military trained members of this militia (Jatawa 1995: 89). Prem also developed his policy of a “political offensive” for the deep South, where MCP and CPT guerrillas were still working (Kitti 2005: 116). Although the goal of Order 66/2523 was to combat communists, the idea of a political offensive also attracted some separatists to become members of the “Group Joining the Development of the Thai Nation” (klum ruam phatthana chat thai), and not less than 1,200 separatists surrendered after 1980 (Chichanok 2004: 58). Once they surrendered, the government did not criminalise them. Prem specifically extended the idea of a political offensive to the deep South, by issuing Prime Ministerial Order 8/2524 in January 1981. This order established two institutions in the area. One was the Civil-Police-Military Task Force 43 (CPM 4

In the mid-1970s, the phrase “to go to the forest” meant to be a member of the Communist Party of Thailand (Rigg and Stott 1998: 99).

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43), which aimed at ending extra-judicial killings and disappearances, which were military tactics prior to that time. The other was the Southern Border Provincial Administration Centre (SBPAC), established in 1981 under the Fourth Army Region Commander and later the Interior Minister. The SBPAC included many local officials from the deep South (ICG 2005: 11). Takashi Hashimoto (1987: 239), who conducted extensive research in the Muslim South in the mid-1980s, pointed out that in the SBPAC there were about a hundred employees, forty per cent of whom were local Muslims. Prem charged both institutions with solving unrest in the deep South and ordered them to do so by using political means, as well as military ones (Panitan 2004: 25). The SBPAC emphasised that its work encompassed “socio-psychology, political administration, development, efficiency of government officials, socio-economic development and the local people, and cooperation with the local people and with neighbouring countries” (So Oo Bo To 2002: 31). As McCargo (2007: 41) explains, “the Centre [SBPAC] was a beacon for ideas of administrative justice, symbolizing the Thai state’s sincerity and goodwill”. Prem’s creation of the SBAPC became a symbol of harmony and reconciliation between Thais and Malays in the deep South. There was both historical continuity and change between Prem and his predecessors. On the one hand, Prem’s approach to the deep South was similar to that of his predecessors in that Prem still called local Muslims Thai-Muslims. In his public statements, Prem also promoted national unity through the goal of the development of the Thai nation. On the other hand, Prem did not focus on clearly delineating the border between friend and enemy. In the pre-Prem period, the Malays occupied a zone of uncertainty since they might easily be persuaded to be communists or separatists, and they tried to reduce this uncertainty by assimilating, integrating and eliminating Malayness. In the case of Prem, as I have pointed out, communists and separatists were now considered potentially part of the Thai nation so long as they gave up their radical ideas. Prem tried to reduce uncertainty, which communists and separatists posed, by providing them with opportunities to reconcile with the Thai nation. The main change between the pre-Prem period and the Prem period was thus that Prem’s predecessors established a clear binary of friend and enemy, and tried to eradicate the enemy; Prem, however, tried to incorporate persons previously defined as national enemies, such as communists and separatists, as part of the Thai nation. Here, Prem employed a civic nationalist strategy. He deliberately became difference-blind since he gave previous enemies opportunities to be Thai as long as they worked for the collective will of the people. Prem guaranteed equal citizenship as Thais to everyone who paid loyalty to the common value of the collective will of the people. Ethnocultural nationalist myths about the common ancestry were not significant to Prem’s approach. This approach also meant that Prem sought national unity within ethno-cultural diversity. In doing so, he tried to re-classify the idea of Thainess, by establishing the idea of the “Thai-Muslim” which would bridge the gaps between the Thai-Buddhist and the Malay-Muslim culture. This approach helped Prem establish a multicultural nation. This idea of the Thai-Muslim did not aim to assimilate the Malays but to seek coexistence between the Thai-Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims. At the same time, he regarded Muslims in the South as equally Thai citizens. The Prem régime and

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its successors bolstered two notions in constructing this idea of the Thai-Muslim. One was the notion that the government needed to promote ethno-cultural diversity and the distinctiveness of the deep South, and to diversify the notion of Thainess rather than to purify it. This involved the promotion of local culture, religion, and language in the deep South. The other was to provide Muslims in the deep South with equal access to Thai citizenship despite their ethno-cultural differences from the mainstream Thai-Buddhist culture. Prem recognised ethno-cultural diversity but, at the same time, tried to make the idea of Thainess ethno-culturally difference-blind so that even Malay-Muslims could be equally Thai. I shall look at these notions separately, with reference to two cases: education and national development. Both fields have historically been Thai-centric. The government established, in the reign of Chulalongkorn, an educational system based on a Buddhist framework. Nidhi Eoseewong (2004: 7) argues that educational policy has since then promoted cultural homogenisation and not recognised cultural differences. In the history texts that the government has produced, local histories have not appeared. In terms of national development, the national economic development plans, formalised by the National Economic Development Board—now known as the National Economic and Social Development Board—established in 1959, aimed to seek the integration and unity of the Thai nation (Thak 2007: 131). My aim in the following sections is to elucidate how far the central government in the Prem period made room for Malay-Muslims and encouraged them to participate in these Thai-centric fields of education and development.

Promotion of Diversity Prem recognised and accommodated the distinctiveness of the Malay-Muslims in the deep South. The government under Prem emphasised the need to reach mutual understanding between government officials and the Malay-Muslims. To do this, the government not only promoted the use of the Thai language to bridge the linguistic gap between government officials and local people, as previous governments had done. It also encouraged government officials serving in the region to receive Malay language training. Intensive Malay language courses for government officials started in 1983 (So Oo Bo To 2002: 115). The SBPAC also provided both new and long-term government officials in the deep South with training or orientation to understand local customs and traditions and the key principles of Islam (Chichanok 2004: 61). The SBPAC’s report at the time of its twentieth anniversary emphasises that: The SBPAC pursues the project of Thai language development in order to promote the use of the Thai language among the Thais who are Muslim. At the same time, the SBPAC … arranged the project of Malay language training for government officials who had direct contact with local (Muslim) people. If we [both the government officials and local people] learn to know our languages, we understand each other better. The mutual understanding will lead to the development of the region. (So Oo Bo To 2002: 122–123)

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As we can see from this quotation, the SBPAC accepted Malay as an important language for the development of the deep South (see also Chichanok 2004: 61). Although Prem tried to encourage Malay-Muslims to use the Thai language (So Oo Bo To 2002: 177), he never discouraged them from utilising Malay in the local community. Prem told the Malay-Muslims to use Malay freely as long as they also learned Thai. For example, he told teachers and students from private schools for Islamic education in Pattani Yala, Narathiwat and Satul who visited him on 30 April 1980: … As legally being Thai, [you] have the same right as other Thai people have. Just the religion you believe is different. But this is not an obstacle to be Thai. … This government will fully support everyone to have freedom to believe in any religion. In terms of education, [I] think that the Thai language is the standard language with which every Thai communicates. Thais in the countryside and different provinces can speak their own local language freely. But the Thais should accept the necessity to speak and use Thai. (Samnakngan soemsang ekkalak khong chat 1986: 87)

The way Prem promoted the cultural distinctiveness of the Malay-Muslims was not ethno-culturally neutral but Thai-centric. His support of the use of the Malay language made clear it was still subservient to the promotion of the culturally hegemonic language of Thai in the deep South. In a meeting of the special research committee on Thai language development held on 8 September 1986, Prem emphasised the advantages of knowing the Thai language and explained how it should be used and learned in the deep South and other border areas: People in the three provinces (of the deep South) prefer to speak the local Malay language which they called Yawi. [They speak Yawi] because these three provinces are close to Malaysia. In fact … people prefer to use local languages in other border areas, too. Yet, when they come to talk to government officials, they use Thai which is the official and national language. … If we live in the countryside and talk in local languages, there should not be a problem. When villagers are staying in their village, they use the same local language in the village. But when they go outside their village, … the Thai language is important and necessary in communicating with other people. … At this moment, the government is trying to develop electronic media, such as radio and television, in every village. I suggest those involved in the project of the Thai language development to motivate people [in the deep South] to consume the media, such as radio and television. This is the way they can gradually learn Thai. Do not take it seriously, if people [in the deep South] do not pronounce clearly. … It happens to every Thai who is living in the border area. … What is most important is that if people are born in Thailand, they need to speak Thai and should be proud of our national language. (Prem 1988: 140–141)

Similarly, the SBPAC stated that: To let the Thai-Muslims understand Thainess, [the SBPAC] widely promotes them to speak and use the Thai language. The SBPAC will remove any factors which make them not feel like speaking Thai. It also let them realise the benefits and advantages that they can obtain by knowing the Thai language. … By enlarging communications [with local people] and improving psychological effects [to the local people], it is important to promote awareness of being Thai [among the Muslim populace]. (So Oo Bo To 2002: 177–178)

For Prem, Malay-speakers were entitled to be Thai without discarding the Malay language or traditional culture and without experiencing intervention in their religiocultural affairs. Prem adopted more tolerant rhetoric vis-à-vis Malay. He did not ban

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the use of Yawi, the Malay language transcribed in the Arabic script. Instead, he encouraged people in the deep South to use the media to consume the Thai language. Prem’s promotion of the Malay language helped liberalise or pluralise the notion of Thainess. The cultural distinctiveness of the Malay-Muslims could be incorporated as a secondary part of Thai hegemonic culture. Whereas previous governments were obsessed with identifying and eliminating elements which could damage national development, Prem identified non-Thai elements, such as the Malay language and culture that could be incorporated into his notion of Thainess, albeit in a subservient position. Prem also sought a symbiosis between the promotion of ethno-cultural Thainess and the preservation of Islamic education. To do so, the government under Prem tried to reduce promotion of Thai culture in favour of the preservation of Islamic culture. The Secretary of the National Security Council, Suwit Suthanukul, warned in 1988 that too much emphasis on the development of Thai language education might have undesirable effects: … the transformation of private Islamic schools into normal private schools in the future may be a correct idea to develop Thai language knowledge among Thai Muslim youth. However, to change the status of Islamic schools to normal ones will destroy Muslim culture and we have to abolish Islamic schools with great care, by paying attention to the intentions of the owners and administrators of the schools. (NR 0506/799)

According to Suwit, the only way that the government could satisfy the MalayMuslim population (or Muslim parents who sent their children to study in the Private Schools for Islamic Education) was to increase Islamic subjects in the school curriculum (NR 0506/799). The Ministry of Education changed the curriculum for junior high schools in the South in the early 1980s, aiming to reduce Buddhist elements and increase Muslim subjects. For example, the Ministry reduced the amount of physical education and replaced it with religious subjects. It also ordered that religious elements be introduced to secular subjects. For example, in music classes, students needed to sing Islamic songs, such as Anasid, or to read the Qur’an. For the South, the ministry also announced that: In the subject of social science, the ministry orders to reduce content about Buddhism. The teaching of Buddhism will be just general. It does not have to be in detail. [The ministry orders this] to promote the understanding among people who have different religions. (The Ministry of Education Order on Change and Amendment to the Junior High School Educational Curriculum on 28 April 1980)

The government also enhanced Islamic higher education. The government revised the national educational system, by considering local needs and demands. The Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982–1986) had a specific Section (3.2) titled “social development measures to generate Thai identity” (NESDB 1981). The section contained not only information about promotion of the Thai language, but also about the development of Islamic education. The Prince of Songkla University at its Pattani Campus offered Islamic studies, as a major subject, from 1982 (Madmarn 2002: 103). The cabinet also approved an undergraduate course in Arabic in 1986, and the College of Islamic Studies was established as an independent

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faculty of the university in 1988 (Madmarn 2002: 110).5 These institutional arrangements helped to provide further education opportunities for graduates of the Private Schools for Islamic Education (Madmarn 2002: 121). In summary, the Prem government recognised and accepted the culturally distinctive identities of the Malay-Muslims. Its language and cultural policies revealed that although the government still believed it was important to implant consciousness of being Thai through encouraging them to learn to speak Thai, it understood the significance of Malay for the people of the deep South. The new discourse of Thainess disseminated through the language policy under Prem contained both promotion of Thai national identity and accommodation of ethno-cultural Malay identity. The notion of Thainess which the Prem government developed marked a gradual transition to—not an achievement of—multiculturalism, by accepting cultural diversity and by promoting cultural distinctiveness of the Malay-Muslim minority. The government promoted the celebration of ethno-cultural diversity by incorporating the expansion of Islamic education as part of the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (Section 3.2) (NESDB 1981). Muslims were now allowed to participate in national development plan. In the liberal multiculturalist perspective, being ThaiMuslim had more free and informed choices about how to lead their lives than simply being Malay-Muslim. To obtain Thai citizenship or to participate in Thai national education and development were not available options if Muslims only stayed in the Malay-Muslim societal culture.

Equal Citizenship If Prem’s idea of Thainess bridged the gap between the Thai-Buddhist and the MalayMuslim culture, then we would expect it to provide the Malay-Muslims with equal access to educational and economic opportunities, which Thai citizens living in other parts of Thailand enjoyed. Indeed, Prem promoted equal opportunities for Muslims in the deep South. He promised that he would treat both Muslims and Buddhists equally. A starting point for this analysis is a statement Prem made after he became Prime Minister, when a number of Islamic leaders from the deep South visited Prem in Bangkok in September 1980. On this occasion, he started his message to those Islamic leaders by saying that: [I] will give my speech as a person who was born in the South, and who have a lot of ThaiMuslim friends. When I was a kid and studying in Songkhla, one of the four provinces in the [deep] South, we did not have problems. … This problem [of violence] occurred not because of religious conflicts, and not because of conflicts between the Thai-Muslims and the Thai-Buddhists. Those who created this problem are bad people, who could be either Thai-Muslims or Thai-Buddhists. (Samnakngan soemsang ekkalak khong chat 1986: 235; 241) 5

One of the aims of the establishment of this college was to provide government officers in the deep South with an intensive training programme in Islam (Madmarn 2002: 117).

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In this speech, he not only said that religion was not the problem but also implied the possibility that Thai-Buddhists could be part of the problem. Although it cannot be denied that his statement was ceremonial, his perception of Muslims was different from that held by many other Thais. A scholar who conducted the field research in the 1980s argued that “in general, Thai people call Muslim khaek without considering how derogatory this word is to Muslims. By looking at the separatist movement and violence generated by bad people or criminals (phu rai), the Thais have perceptions that those Muslim people in the deep South as a whole are violent” (Hashimoto 1987: 248–249). One strategy of the SBPAC from 1981 to 1988 was to implant awareness among Muslims in the deep South that they were not a minority (So Oo Bo To 1989: 84). For example, Fourth Army Commander, Harn Leenanond who used a policy called “Tai rom yen” (South in the cool shade), pointed out that: Even some high-ranking military officials have misperceptions that the Thai-Muslims are the minority. In this regard, the Thai-Muslims were Thais, the same as other Thais living in other regions. [Differences] in religion, language and cultural tradition will not make them a minority at all. (Harn 1983: 50)

From this message, it was clear that although Harn called Muslims in the deep South Thai-Muslims, he de-essentialised the notion of Thainess, suggesting that language, religion, and culture were irrelevant to Thaness. The difference between the Prem government and the previous ones was that Prem and other government officials, including Harn, at least recognised ethno-cultural differences, and rhetorically gave them equal status to the Thai mainstream, even if they then trivialised such differences. Harn, for example, ignored the fact that Muslims were a religious and ethnic minority and that Muslims in the deep South were ethnically Malays not Thais. The key was that even if the government ignored ethno-cultural differences, it also did not try to eliminate non-Thai cultures and traditions, or imply that they were un-Thai. Instead, it claimed that the Malay-Muslims were equally able to be Thai citizens irrespective of their ethno-cultural distinctiveness. Prem also promoted equal access so that Malay-Muslim children could participate in national education. His idea was broadly twofold. First, Prem said that he wished to develop and preserve Thai culture and promote Thainess (Prem 1986b: 35). In this respect, he was similar to his predecessors. Second, he said that he would uphold fairness and freedom in education (and in religion) and would maintain high-quality education (Prem 1986a: 36). Prem specifically addressed these issues in parliament on 20 May 1983. As he said: We will train [the people] in terms of discipline, morality, knowledge, and their responsibility to the society and individuals. We will also inculcate affection toward culture and recognition of Thainess in order to maintain identity, independence, sovereignty of the nation, and the system of democracy with the king as head of the state. Apart from this, we will support religious institutions to increasingly play roles in teaching morality. … We will mobilise resources from different areas to expand education and develop its quality, and will improve the method to allocate such educational resources in order to create equality in education. We will emphasise that we will provide opportunities to students in the countryside, students from poor families, and minority groups. (Prem 1986b: 36)

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Prem was also cautious of the possibility that national education could be too Thaicentric, and wanted the education system to be able to adapt to local conditions. He told parliament on 27 August 1986 that: “The government will decentralise education in order to structure it by matching the local demands” (Prem 1988: 66). Looking at government policies on national development under the Prem régime, we can also witness an attempt to accommodate the local populace into national projects. The official government discourse on national development can be divided into the realms of security and economy. In both realms, the government emphasised the accommodation of the people in the deep South, as well as the need to create awareness of Thainess among the populace there. Regarding national security, the fourth army and the Internal Security Operations Command analysed the security problem in the deep South, which disrupted development initiated by the government. These security organisations argued at the end of the 1980s that under the Prem régime, old problems of armed insurgencies, such as communist “bandits”, terrorists and the MCP had significantly been reduced.6 The idea of separatism, which insurgents had used, was officially said in the Prem era to be “defunct” (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 2). Yet, there were still security problems. According to the fourth army region and the ISOC, some former insurgents had become “normal criminals” (mitchachip7 ). They took people’s money, bombed important places, and burned schools and private vehicles. They also increasingly frequently murdered villagers (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 2). Here, older official notions of what constituted un-Thai elements have been transformed. Previously, the government tried to identify un-Thai forces such as communists and separatists, which destabilised the development of national unity. By saying that communists and separatists were no longer working in the deep South but had become “normal criminals”, the fourth army and the ISOC emphasised that the security problems in the deep South were the same as in other regions in Thailand. From the government’s point of view, this strategy would make the people in the deep South feel similar to people residing in other parts of the country. By treating security threats as normal criminal problems, the government tried to ignore or deny the perception that the people in the deep South were different from other parts of Thailand (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 2). Indeed, the fourth army and the ISOC specifically argued that previously the government adopted special security policies to deal with communists and separatists in the deep South, with the result that the people in the deep South came to the misunderstanding that they were not Thai (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 2). However, after 6

According to the fourth army and the ISOC, in 1981, there are 3,600 armed insurgents of various sorts in the southern region. At the end of the 1980s, however, there were 20–30 “communist bandits” and about 270 “terrorists” in Satul and Songkhla. In Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, there were about 750 armed communist insurgents (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 1–2). 7 This means the acts or people involved in earnings by means of criminal offences.

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the government changed its security strategy, the people in the deep South started feeling that they were Thai (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 2). The Prem régime, I would argue, was strategic in how it described security threats. By insisting that security threats in the South were not specific to the area, but normal criminal problems experienced throughout the country, the government could discard older notions that highlighted the threatening presence of national enemies and sidestep underlying ethnic and ideological problems. The government also encouraged the people in the deep South to participate in national development, in a context where, from the 1980s onwards, as I mentioned earlier, the government now stressed that national sovereignty was based on collective rather than private desires and interests, instead of private interests. One government policy which specifically addressed the development of the region for the people of the deep South was the so-called New Hope Policy which was established by the Military Commander, Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, in the five southernmost provinces in 1988. This policy encouraged locals to participate in national development, by trying to find them employment and by establishing cooperation between the military and local villagers.8 The name of this project in Yawi was “Harap-pan baru”.9 According to Chavalit, the project had four goals: (1)

(2)

(3) (4)

The deep South will attract interest and attention as a forefront of the development of the southern region of Thailand and will be more prosperous than other regions of the country. People in the five provinces of the deep South will receive full protection from the government in terms of security of their lives and property. Everyone will peacefully be able to earn their living without any danger. The project will develop the quality of people’s lives, and incomes in the five provinces of the deep South to the level of the standard Thai citizens. The project will make people in the deep South attached to, satisfied with and proud of national sovereignty and unity of Thailand (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: n.p.).

The New Hope Project also tried to promote local cooperation with the government by providing local Malay-Muslims with opportunities for economic and social development of the region. The spokesman of the fourth army region, Banchon Chawalasil, provided a stronger statement, which requested cooperation from the people: The project [of New Hope] is a scheme of cooperation between the government and the people, and emphasises that to solve socio-psychological problems is the most significant priority. … It uses the method to create a harmonious image of the southern region by making the region a special economic zone. (Bunkalom 1989: 206) 8

Author’s interviews with the Muslim scholar, Muhammad Omar Japakiya in Yala on 23 September 2009 and with the former Election Commissioner in the Yala Province in Yala on 24 September 2009. 9 Harap-pan means hope and baru means to be new.

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Typical of the government’s new approach, Banchon identified the southern region as an area of cooperation for economic development, ignoring ethnic and religious differences there, and not even explicitly saying that the area was the “Muslimdominated deep South” or an area of insecurity-descriptions which had been very common in rhetoric security officials had used in the past to talk about the area. The southern region was discursively transformed from an area of cultural specificity or national insecurity to an area of harmonious cooperation for the sake of economic development. Therefore, one of the major plans of the New Hope project was to create good relationships between the military and the people, by reducing mistrust and planning development of villages (Kong thap phak thi 4 lae kong amnuai kan raksa khwam mankhong phai nai phak 4 1989: 7): [The aim of the New Hope Project] is to remove mutual animosity between government officials and the people, and among the people themselves, and to create understanding, affection, and harmonious unity in the region. [The project] is also to support the Thais in the region to participate in solving their own problems as much as possible. (Phanaek amnuaikan khrongkan khwam wan mai harap-pan baru 1992: 2)

The objectives stated that the project entrusted the tasks of development to the local Malay-Muslims and wanted them to cooperate with government officials and directly participate in the project. The government, through this project, tried to bridge the gap between government officials and ordinary Malay-Muslims in the deep South. Moreover, government discourse on development emphasised unity of the nation by ignoring ethnic and religious differences between Thais and Malay-Muslims. On this point, Chavalit clearly argued that the primary problem in the deep South was the distance between the Thais who believed in Buddhism and people who believed in Islam and between government officials and the people living there. His aim, through the New Hope Project, was to abolish this distance (Chayakorn 1991: 71). The project aimed to remove any conditions that caused misunderstanding and mistrust between the local populace and government officials in the southern region. Chavalit said that the project was aimed to develop the region of the deep South as a whole and did not focus on the development of religiously or ethically demarcated segments, such as the Malay-Muslims or Thai-Buddhists (Chayakorn 1991: 71). This regional development rhetoric camouflaged the fact that the goal was still to incorporate the Malay-Muslims into the Thai nation, in which Thais were the dominant ethnocultural group. It also strategically ignored the fact that the Thai-Buddhists were the majority and the Malay-Muslims were the minority. The project exhibited a new notion of Thainess. Although it emphasised the creation of pride in being Thai, the notion of what constituted being Thai was not exclusively derived from primordial factors, such as ethnicity, blood or Buddhism. The project promised to accommodate different ethnicities and religions into the pride of Thainess. The project stated that: The project to develop New Hope of the Thai people in the five provinces of the deep South … aims to solve the problems in the deep South in order to create an attitude of pride in being Thai, affection, harmony and peaceful coexistence without denying ethnic and religious differences. The project implants the recognition of being Thai and the responsibility of

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In summary, government policies under the Prem régime transformed the notion of Thainess and the Thai nation into one that promoted ethno-cultural diversity as a value of the Thai nation and that emphasised an ethno-culturally difference-blind notion of Thai citizenship. The Thai nation could respect and accommodate diversity because Prem did not define Thainess in essentialised terms. Thus the government discursively made room for Muslims in the deep South to reside in the Thai nation. Prem stressed the significance of equality of all Thai citizens. As Prem regarded ethno-cultural diversity as a part of Thainess, he and other government officials managed to ignore ethno-cultural differences as sources of conflicts within the nation. They also deliberately sidestepped the majority-minority division pertaining to those ethno-cultural differences. When Prem became Prime Minister, the area of the deep South was uncertain since there had been violent incidents, including bombings and shootings. Rather than eliminating uncertainty, he employed a strategy to know such uncertainty by incorporating it into part of the “us” of the Thai national Self. Being Thai was not a condition for Muslims to be Thai citizens. Thai citizenship opened an opportunity for ethno-culturally non-Thais, such as Malay-Muslims, and previously defined unThais, such as communists, to be Thai. The government did not label communists and Malay-Muslims as un-Thai, if they worked for the collective will of the people. The significant point in the Prem era was the transformation of official perceptions about how to distinguish Thainess from un-Thainess. Before the Prem era, the distinction was based on who they were: being communist or being Malay was un-Thai. Under Prem, it was based on what they did. Being communist or being Malay per se was not un-Thai. Former Communists and Malays were entitled to be Thai if they acted and worked for the collective will of the nation. Prem and other government officials utilised civic nationalism to integrate Muslims in the deep South as equal citizens of Thailand. They promoted differenceblindness, saying that ethno-cultural difference did not make Muslims a minority. At the same time, Prem used multicultural nationalism, by supporting ethno-cultural diversity and group-specific rights, such as everyday use of Malay language and the promotion of Islamic education. Prem’s multicultural approach also promoted a policy of “psychological warfare” to understand and win over local Muslims. Prem’s multicultural approach was influential, affecting the approach of subsequent régimes. The policies of successor governments increasingly highlighted the significance of local language and cultural diversity. In the twentieth anniversary year of the SBPAC in 2000, Palakorn Suwannarat, the former chairman of the SBPAC and Privy Councillor, reviewed the national security policy from the 1980s onward. The National Security Policies on the Deep South had been issued four times since 1978 (1978–1987; 1988–1992; 1994–1998; 1999–2003). The second policy, according to Palakorn, emphasised the “hearts” of local people in psychological warfare. The policy highlighted the role of religious and local leaders as “bridges” to reduce the gap between the central government and local people (So Oo Bo To 2002: 84). The

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use of the Thai language was also promoted for the purpose of reducing the gap (So Oo Bo To 2002: 178). The third plan continued to emphasise this aspect, and more importantly accepted bilingualism, emphasising the significance of both Thai and Malay as linguistic tools in the region. The fourth endorsed cultural diversity as playing a role in keeping society strong and peaceful (So Oo Bo To 2002: 65) and encouraged government officials to respect different cultures and learn their languages (So Oo Bo To 2002: 85).

Conclusion This chapter has examined how the Thai ruling élites in the 1980s formulated the ideas of Thainess by considering ethno-cultural differences, specifically those relating to the Muslim-dominated deep South. Throughout the period, they disseminated ideas about Thainess together with integrative discourses, stressing national integration, national unity or national harmony. Those integrative discourses repeatedly faced the problem of how to deal with un-Thai “enemies”, such as communists, separatists and ethno-cultural differences. Yet, Prem in the 1980s did not view the Malay-Muslims as enemies. The Prem government called Muslims in the deep South “Thai-Muslims”, providing them with equal citizenship and promoted cultural diversity. He trivialised the security threat in the South as a normal criminal problem. He insisted that he would not arrest communists and separatists if they surrendered and came to work for the government. Prem promoted national unity by telling Muslims to conform to the notion of democracy. Prem did not emphasise the threat of national enemies who had to be eradicated, but endeavoured to abolish the previously established border between friend and enemy, the Self and the Other. His policy aimed to accommodate subjects previously defined as enemies into the field of Thainess. The strategy Prem employed was to hide and to ignore differences. On the one hand, he recognised ethno-cultural differences in the deep South. On the other, he tried to make the notion of Thainess difference-blind. Prem used both civic nationalism and multicultural nationalism. He tried to integrate the ethno-culturally diverse populace, requesting them to pay loyalty to ethnoculturally blind notions, such as democracy and the will of the people. He also recognised the significance of ethno-cultural diversity. Prem promoted both equal common rights, such as rights to participate in national development projects and national education and group specific identities, such as the use of local language. His idea of the Thai-Muslim functioned as bridging the gap between the Thai-Buddhists and the Malay-Muslims. Being “Thai-Muslim” provided Muslims in the deep South with more options to lead their lives, such as participating in national development and national education, and being bilingual. Yet, Prem’s policy was not fully multicultural. In a multicultural context, individuals are allowed to make free choices about how to lead their lives. In a fully multicultural environment, the Malay-Muslims would have been allowed to choose to stay as “Malay” without being required to

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speak Thai. Prem’s goal was national unification and harmonisation. Thus, being consciously Thai was important to citizens in Thailand. In the period this chapter examined, ethno-cultural diversity was a social reality that the Thai ruling élites were unable to deny. Prem tried to liberalise it. In the context of liberalisation, Prem formulated the notion of Thai-Muslim which could intermediate the two different ethno-cultural environments: the Thai-Buddhist and the Malay-Muslim culture. His idea of being Thai-Muslim allowed the Malay-Muslims to preserve their local tradition and culture and to have access to national projects. In dealing with the ethno-cultural differences that the Malay-Muslims possessed, Prem did not establish a set of opposing poles between Thai and un-Thai. He used civic nationalism to promote equal citizenship, by ignoring the ethno-cultural division between the Thai-Buddhist and the Malay-Muslim. Yet, Prem was not simply ethno-culturally difference-blind. He also recognised the significance of diversity and group-specific identities. In this case, Prem used multicultural nationalism to accommodate ethnic diversity in the nation. Both nationalisms did not establish a division to distinguish Thai from un-Thai. These nationalisms which Prem employed provided Muslims in the deep South with opportunities to be Thai citizens.

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Prem Tinsulanond, Pramuan sunthonphot phanathan nayok ratthamontri phon ek prem tinsulanond phutthasakara 2529 [The Collection of Speeches by Prime Minister Prem Timsulanond in 1986] (Bangkok: Rongphim akson thai, 1988). Prime Ministerial Order 66/2523 (1980). Riggs, Jonathan and Phillip Stott, “Forest Tale: Politics, Policy Making and the Environment in Thailand”, in Desai, Uday (ed.), Ecological Policy and Politics in Developing Countries: Economic Growth, Democracy, and Environment (Albany: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 87–120. Samnakngan soemsang ekkalak khong chat, Jotmaihet kitjakam khong phanathan nayok ratthamontri phon ek prem tinsulanond pi phutthasakarat 2523 [The Chronicle of Activities of Prime Minister Prem Timsulanond in 1980] (Bangkok: Khana anukammakan, 1986). Sun amnuaikan borihan jangwat chaidaen phaktai (So Oo Bo To), Surup phonkan damnoenngan pi 2532 lae naew thang patipat [Annual Report 1989] (Sun amnuaikan borihan jangwat chaidaen phaktai, 1989). Sun amnuaikan borihan jangwat chaidaen phaktai (So Oo Bo To), 20 pi so. oo. bo. to. Banthuk prawatisat 2 thasawat chaidaen tai [Twentieth Anniversary of SBPAC: Records of a Two-DecadeHistory of the Deep South] (Sun amnuaikan borihan jangwat chaidaen phaktai, 2002). Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, edited by Amy Gutmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992). Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell Southeast Asian Program, 2007).

Chapter 5

Muslim Women in Modern India: Public Debates from Identity to Religious Freedom to the Citizenship Amendment Act Kanupriya Dua

Minority Female Subjects of India The first part of this chapter will discuss India’s democratic and secular set-up which is peculiar because it allows for fluidity of religious identities to all Indian citizens and makes possible the creation of personal law boards that give different religious communities the freedom to practice their religion without any fear of state intrusion. However, the same personal law boards have been detrimental to women’s rights in general and even more so among women of minority religions. This section will be followed by the second part that summarizes the efforts put in by the British to improve a lot of Indian women, in general, the lack of such efforts when it comes to Muslim women. The third part of the chapter seeks to detail the two-land mark judgements made in the Indian courts that brought justice to Muslim women in the light of the ills that plague women who are divorced following Islamic customs i.e. the lack of adequate maintenance after divorce and unilateral divorce. Fourthly, the chapter will argue that the controversy arising out of the Citizenship Amendment Act has thrown the question of Muslim identity and especially women’s identity at the forefront of India’s public debates. Lastly, the chapter highlights potential problems that might arise from criminalizing those who might resort to the now-defunct instant unilateral divorce and also underlines other difficulties faced by Muslim women and suggests a way forward.

Personal Law Boards: Democratic and Secular Set-Up The past 73 years of India’s Independence have been marred by many communal spats between its religiously diverse population of more than a billion people. A K. Dua (B) International College of Liberal Arts, Yamanashi Gakuen University, Kofu, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_5

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conservative estimate would put such major strifes at least once every decade. The very creation of the modern Indian nation saw the largest human migration in recorded human history with the creation of secular India and religious Pakistan. The UNHCR estimates that roughly 14 million people fled in India’s direction if they were Hindu or Sikh or towards Pakistan following the partition of British India. The catalyst of India’s partition was the religious, communal chasm and a fight over political representation between the two dominant populations of the Indian subcontinent, namely the Hindus and the Muslims. Borders were drawn on religious lines, but even then, the fact that India chose secularism over any singular overarching religion speaks of its inherently plural character and continues to be home to the secondlargest population of the followers of Islam in the world. India’s secular setup is unique as it allows for the non-establishment of a predominant religion but not the separation of religion and state. This results in a peculiar space where both religion and the state co-exist, but this plurality has often meant that various religious communities are at loggerheads with each other. Since religious identity had played a significant role in the formation of modern India and Pakistan and subsequently in the formation of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), the framers of the Indian Constitution thought it best to give a unique spin to secularism. They enshrined this concept into the fundamental rights given to all citizens. The Constitution of India guarantees the right to freedom of religion to individuals and religious groups. This is protected in Articles 25, 26, 27 followed by Article 28 of the Constitution. Interestingly, the word “secularism” did not initially appear in the Constitution, though it was not because of the framers’ reluctance or scepticism but because India’s secular, pluralistic status was taken for granted. It was later added in the 42nd amendment of the Constitution in 1976. In the words of KK Munshi, one of the members of the constitution committee “the non-establishment clause (of the U.S. Constitution) was inappropriate for the Indian conditions… we had to establish Indian secularism… we are a people with deeply religious moorings. At the same time, we have a living tradition of religious tolerance- the result of a broad outlook of Hinduism that all religions lead to the same god…In view of this our state could not possibly have a state religion nor a rigid line be drawn between the church and the state as in the U.S.”.1 The Indian model of secularism, as opposed to its western counterpart, also allows for the establishment of personal law boards for all religions in matters dealing with private lives, for example, family, marriage and succession. The citizens of modern India are governed by law, in keeping with their religious sensibilities and customary practices (Article 26). At the same time, this secular model reinforces religious identity, and over time, the law boards have changed little and have proven to be detrimental towards gender rights. Since these law boards are central to minority identity, any attempt at reforming women’s lives is seen as the state’s interference in

1

Acevedo, D. D. (2013). Secularism in the Indian ContextD [Abstract]. The Journal of American Bar Foundation, 38(1), law & social inquiry, 138–164. Retrieved December 25, 2020, from https:// www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/ddasacev/workingpapers/LSI-SecularismInTheIndianContext.pdf.

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religion. This has meant that many laws that govern the lives of women are frozen in time. Interestingly, most such laws were erroneously interpreted by the British and came to be known as Anglo -Hindu and Anglo- Muhammadan Laws, etc. When it came to unifying people under these arbitrary laws, the British reinforced sameness on all followers of a particular faith and refused to acknowledge diversity. The presumption that a single and fixed set of rules could apply to all Muslims was both against Islamic doctrine and inadequate to respect the legal peculiarities of life among different Muslim groups.2 Consequently, these laws became central to the British’ dispensation of justice and continued to rule the lives of India’s colonial subjects for over 200 years. Under the colonial state, the category of “Muslim” or “Modammadan” took on a new fixity and certainty that had previously been uncommon (Anderson, 1996). In theory, each individual was linked to a state-enforced religious category. Identities that were syncretic, ambiguous or localized gained only limited legal recognition for the most part litigants were forced to present themselves as “Modammadan” or “Hindu” (Anderson, 1996). “Courts repeatedly faced the problem of accommodating the diversity of social groups within these two categories.”3 After India’s independence due to the large assortment of minority religions, the framers of the Constitution devised an Indian variation of secularism as the bedrock of its democracy, however, laws framed and dispensed by the British also became procedural adjudication. Many errors in understanding native customs of all religions were later amended over seven decades of independence.

Improvement in Women’s Rights: An Exception on Muslim Women? Unlike the British’s substantial efforts to intervene on behalf of Hindu women to rescue them from the atrocities inflicted by customary practices, such exertions were few and far between when it came to the Muslim women. On December 4, 1829, the then Governor-General Lord William Bentinck banned the practice of Sati in all jurisdictions of British India under The Bengal Sati Regulation. This meant that widows could no longer be compelled to burn themselves on the funeral pyres of their departed husbands. This was followed by the Act of 1856 which removed all legal obstacles to the remarriage of Hindu widows. Unlike Hinduism, widow remarriage is sanctioned and encouraged in Islam. The Child Marriage Restraint Act was passed in 1929. This particular act had a far-reaching effect on women’s lives all over India. The British made no efforts to make laws against such practices as Triple Talaq, Mutah Marriage, Khafd and Polygamy, which commonly ailed Muslim women.

2

Anderson, M. R. (1996, June). Occasional Paper 7: Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India. Retrieved December 25, 2020, from http://www.wluml.org/node/5627. 3 Ibid., Para 7.

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Initiating a divorce is a man’s prerogative in Islam, and men can do so unilaterally and without cause. This privilege given to men has given rise to what is referred to as instant one-sided unilateral divorce, commonly referred to as Triple Talaq. Yet another practice that could have been legislated upon is called “Mutah” marriage. This term can be translated to marriages of/for pleasure or temporary marriages in which a man pays a sum of money (i.e. so-called dower) to a woman and can have sexual relations with her for however long they agree for in the Mutah contract. The British could have also intervened on behalf of women to check the practice Khafd or female genital mutilation which is a practice commonly found among the Bohra Muslims of India. Similarly, the practice of polygamy, where Muslim men are allowed to marry up to four women, even without their wives’ consent, could have been brought under checks and balances. Lastly, the British could have arbitrated on yet another issue pertaining to the lives of Muslim women i.e. the issue of the lack of maintenance (beyond the first three months post-divorce also known as the Iddat period) after divorce, consequently, all these issues continued to linger for decades after India’s independence.

Some Semblance of Justice After 1947, two landmark judgements were passed by the Supreme Court of India regarding two of the issues highlighted in part II: post-divorce maintenance past the iddat period (three months) and instant unilateral divorce. It must be reiterated that the secular set-up of the Constitution dissuades the Indian state from intrusion in matters governing religious faith thus when the Supreme Court passed judgements foregrounding gender justice over religious sentiment in 1985 and again 2017 fears of eroding the fundamental right to practice religion was paramount in the minds of Indian Muslims. The first case, Mohd. Ahmed Khan V Shah Bano Begum, 1985, was filed by Ms Shah Bano Begum, who was an unlettered woman against her husband, a lawyer who had unilaterally divorced her after 43 years of marriage. In her petition, the wife had sought to get maintenance beyond the three months (iddat) required and sanctioned under Muslim Personal Law. As a woman in the twilight of her life she had no prospects of remarriage and her own family who was supposed to be entrusted with her responsibility in case of dissolution of her marriage had mostly passed away. This put her in a predicament where she had no social network to fall back on. This precipitated her decision to apply for maintenance from her former husband, under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C, 1973). In Court, Mr Khan argued that Ms Begum’s claim for maintenance should be dismissed as Ms Begum had received the amount due to her on divorce under the Muslim personal law; the lower Court granted Ms Begum’s claim for maintenance, set at 179 rupees per month

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by the High Court in a revision application.4 Mr Khan appealed to the Supreme Court in 1985, and the Court held that a payment made according to personal laws could not absolve a husband of his obligation to pay fair and reasonable maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C, 1973 and a husband can be liable to pay maintenance beyond the iddat period.5 The Court awarded her a paltry sum of a few rupees per month which was in no way enough to bring her out of penury. The Supreme Court cleverly bypassed Personal law by applying Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure, designed to prevent vagrancy and begging. The Court opined that after three months of Iddat, Ms Shah Bano Begum was left destitute with no income sources and would in effect be forced to beg to survive. The pronouncement of this judgement was seen as a triumph of gender justice in India, but these celebrations were short-lived as the members of the Muslim orthodoxy opposed what they perceived as the Court’s interference in matters of faith. This verdict’s implications were far-reaching and led to a massive uproar, public protests, and heated debates. Eventually, under pressure from many sections of society and the need to quell the Muslim electorate’s fears, the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi used his party’s majority in the parliament to repeal the judgement to please fundamentalists. The Congress government headed by Rajiv Gandhi then enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, to set aside the Shah Bano verdict. It is widely believed that this act’s name is both ironic and misplaced as it sets aside the rights of divorced women to receive maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Court. It must be underlined that what is at stake, in this case, is in effect a contest between the right of Muslim women as full and equal citizens of India who ought to enjoy the constitutional rights protected in the Constitution as opposed to the rights denied to them as a part of cultural practices as members of their faith. Amid all the hullabaloo Shah Bano Begum, the person became, but a hallowed symbol of Muslim identity and she was used for political mileage by both Hindu and Muslim right-wing interest groups. However, the problem is that the question of advancing rights in the name of gender justice always run the risk of infringing on minority rights unless a uniform civil code fully ratified by all communities of India becomes the default position. In 2017, another milestone case was decided upon by the Supreme Court of India, the woman who filed a writ petition in Court holds a Masters in Sociology, though she was not allowed to put her education to work. The case is called Shayara Bano V Union of India, 2017. The petitioner Shayara Bano was married to Rizwan Khan for 15 years before he unilaterally instantaneously divorced her under a provision called Talaq -a- Biddat or Triple Talaq. In her petition, she named three customary practices chief among them: Talaq -a- Biddat which she argued violated Articles 14, 15, 21 and 25 of the Indian Constitution and wanted the judiciary to use its power of review and strike down these practices. Along with this, she also sought justice over two more practices, namely Polygamy and Nikah Halala. Talaq- A-Biddat is a custom which gives a Muslim man the right to divorce his wife by merely uttering the word “talaq” 4

Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum. (n.d.). Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https:// www.law.cornell.edu/women-and-justice/resource/mohd_ahmed_khan_v_shah_bano_begum. 5 Ibid., Para 3.

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three times in one sitting without the wife’s consent. Though it must be noted that many Islamic scholars have time and again said that this type of divorce is against the precepts of Islam and that the word “talaq” ought to be said at three different times and only then would it lead to an irrevocable divorce. However, somewhere in the sands of time and prevalence of all-encompassing patriarchal precepts of the Indian subcontinent Talaq ul Biddat became a malicious provision available to men. Her petition also borough to light the unfair custom of Nikah Halala, a practice where if a woman wants to remarry her ex-husband, she is prohibited to do so directly after divorce. She is compelled to marry another man and only then return to the first husband who had previously divorced her. Lastly, Shayara Bano also sought to challenge yet another doctrinal advantage, also known as polygamy available to men of Islamic faith to marry more than one wife. The instant divorce is a practice sanctioned not only by custom but also by law under the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. Thus, the All India Muslim Personal Law Board’s (AIMPLB) uncodified Muslim personal law is not subject to judicial review. The practices highlighted above were understood to be essential practices of the faith and were protected under Article 25, the Freedom of Religion Act of the Constitution. It should be acknowledged that any law that interferes with the fundamental rights of an Indian citizen can be brought to Court and examined under judicial review under the ambit of Article 13, but this does not apply to personal laws which primarily regulate family, marriage and succession unless a couple has opted explicitly to marry under the Uniform Civil Code. Contrary to the position taken by the AIMPLB, organizations like the Bebak Collective and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BAMMA) that work for gender justice sided with the petitioner Shayara Bano. The attorneys of these organizations argued in Court that since the three uncodified practices in question specifically Polygamy, Nikah Halala and Talaq- ul-Biddat had over the years become codified they had for all intents and purposes become “law” and hence could be treated like any other statutory law and thus declared unconstitutional since it infringed on the fundamental rights of Muslim women. In the light of this constitutionality argument, the Supreme Court made a five-judge bench on March 30, 2017. These judges opined that under Article 25 of the Constitution, only those customs that are “essential religious tenets” cannot be changed by the state. The Court decided to define an essential practice as a ritual/s in the absence of which a particular religion ceases to exist, the Court noted that triple divorce was not an essential part of Islam and thus declared that Talaq- ul-Biddat or unilateral instant divorce illegal. The Court further noted that the holy Quran does not speak of Talaq- ul-Biddat, it instead talks of Talaq- e-Sunnat. The word “Sunnat” refers to the prescribed or correct way of granting and seeking a divorce. Divorce is further divided into two categories, namely Talaq- e -Ahsan (best) in which a man declares his intent to divorce his wife and the two essentially separate during the period of tuhur (time between menstruations) have no marital relations during the three intervening months or lunar cycles. This is also called iddat period or the period of prohibition, if all this is followed, then a divorce is revocable after this time. These three intervening months can be understood as a cooling off period, Islam allows a

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man the chance to take his wife back. During this period, efforts must be made for conciliation and arbitration. Simultaneously, the second prescribed form of divorce is called Talaq Ahsan (good), which also allows the utterance of the word Talaq or divorce only after a considerable period upon much deliberation. The Supreme Court further noted that triple divorce had been declared null and void in several Islamic nations. The Court concluded that Talaq- ul-Biddat or unilateral instantaneous divorce violates Article 14 (Equality before Law) Article15 (prohibition of discrimination of Indians based on religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth) Article 21 (Protection of life and personal liberty) and Article 25 (Freedom of Religion) of the constitution and thus this type of divorce was injuncted for six months. During this time, the country’s parliament was instructed to form a law in keeping with the Supreme Court’s verdict. This law was passed in 2019, and it was later made into a bill known as the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on Marriage) Bill. This finally meant that if anyone gives instant triple divorce through either verbal pronouncement, in written or electronic form, would be punished by law. Similar to the Shah Bano case, this judgement and the subsequent bill came under considerable attack. Questions were raised about how a civil matter such as divorce could be made punishable under criminal law? Why was the state inferring in religion? This was followed by more practical questions like how will a husband who is under arrest pay maintenance? Despite these queries, most organization and public interest groups of all religions have hailed this judgement and bill as a triumph of gender justice and equality. The political party under whose aegis this law was passed is the Hindu right-aligned Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); it is no wonder then, that this judgement has been seen as a political manoeuvre aimed at eroding rights of minorities. Unlike 1985–1986, where the Supreme Court’s law was repealed by the then PM Rajiv Gandhi, the present government has been compelled to do no such thing.

Muslim Identity in Public Debates This paper contends that despite the judgement of 2017, most successive governments of India have failed to champion the rights of women in general and minority women, in particular, this is not only true in the case of women who follow Islam but also women from communities like the Parsis (Zoroastrians) Christian, Tribal and Dalit women. The general lack of seriousness towards women’s rights and gender violence is also particularly pertinent owing to millions of pending cases in court. Among the 350,00,000 pending cases, women have filed only 10% of all cases; this reflects on the country’s deep patriarchal setup where men continue to be at the helm of decisionmaking. This meagre figure must be understood in the context of the high rates of crime against women in India. Statistics report roughly 39 crimes are committed against women every hour, four of which are rapes. This alarming statistic makes the pending cases even more heart wrenching because most women do not report the assaults and harassments they face due to India’s profoundly patriarchal setup.

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The few hundred women who do muster the courage to seek justice are denied a redressal of their grievances due to the enormous lag in the dispensation of justice. In the context of India, the adage “justice delayed is justice denied” is sadly true. In December 2019, India’s government passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB), the explicit aim of this bill was to give the persecuted religious minorities of countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, Indian citizenship. The CAB seeks to provide citizenship to non- Muslims from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan who came to India before December 31, 2014. Provisions were made for Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Jains and Sikhs who often face widespread persecution in these countries. In other words, people from these religions were not be considered as illegal migrations if they had entered India before the cutoff date mentioned above. It must be noted that this offer of citizenship comes with riders. Nevertheless, the issue that has stemmed from the CAB’s introduction is exclusion of people who follow Islam. Muslims who report being persecuted their own countries, for example, the Rohingya Muslims, the Ahmedias in Pakistan or the Hazaras in Afghanistan have been excluded from this offer of citizenship. Many say that though CAB sounds both noble and benign, the fact that it blatantly excludes members of the Muslim community who had entered India primarily from Bangladesh and have become majority populations in many Indian states bordering Bangladesh are being discriminated against. The fears faced by practitioners of Islam have been compounded by the proposal to bring in the National Register of Citizens (NRC) a situation where being a Muslim and document-less could potentially deprive one of the citizenship rights.6 This situation was further exacerbated on August 5, 2019, when the government at the centre decided to repeal Section 370 of Section 35 A of the Indian Constitution, which gives special privileges to the citizens of Kashmir, the only Muslim majority state of India. Among these privileges is the relative autonomy given to it. History reminds us that this promise of autonomy was the main reason behind of Kashmir’s decision to join India’s union after independence in 1947 since it was an autonomous princely state much like many other territories of the subcontinent. This provision helped lure Kashmir towards the union of India otherwise, they could have arguably been free to remain a separate entity or could have chosen to join Pakistan. Thus, the Article’s importance cannot be understated mostly in the context of the demographic majority of Muslims. The four relatively recent decisions, namely the Muslim Women (Protection of rights on marriage) Bill 2019, Citizenship Amendment Bill 2019, the desire to bring in the National Register of Citizens and the revocation of Section 370 (Section 35 A) of the Indian Constitution in Kashmir were taken by the Hindu right-aligned BJP, a political party which has formed the government at the centre since 2014 and is now in its second term in power. These changes have inspired fears among people who think that this political party seeks to meddle with the secular set-up of the Indian democracy and establish a Hindu nation that goes against India’s avowed 6

Shankar, S. (2019, December 16). How Democratic Processes Damage Citizenship Rights: The Implications of CAA-NRC. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www.cprindia.org/news/ 8339.

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secularism. Further harm has been done by many in the media that have expressed doubts about Muslims’ loyalty towards India and frequently suggest that all those who are unhappy with the recent decisions of the government are free to move to Pakistan. Many T.V. channels that enjoy large viewership openly cast aspersions on the Muslim community a phenomenon that was relatively absent before the present political party came to power. As a result of the changes proposed in the Citizenship Amendment Bill (CAB) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), Muslim women came out in droves and started protesting out in the open. Their might and solidarity were especially on display in the Shahin Bagh area of New Delhi in December 2019, but these protests were eventually met with the police force that sought to disperse them. These demonstrators were eventually driven back homes amid fears of contagion by the novel Coronavirus in early 2020. Meanwhile, some factions of the media continued to suggest that protesting Muslim women were paid agitators and it was nothing but economic incentive that brought these women to protest in India’s capital. These open protests even led to curfews in some parts of New Delhi and its surrounding areas. One must bare in mind that it was the threat to their citizenship that brought these women to protest in the streets. Thus far, most of these women had been content to sit in the confines of their homes and live their lives. Before 2019, no other issue had unified Muslim women in this manner, not even polygamy, Mutah marriage, Triple Talaq, or lack of adequate maintenance. It is interesting that when the Muslim women came out and welcomed the Supreme Court’s decisions in 2017, they were hailed as silent victims who finally got some much-needed agency in their lives. However, when the same Muslim women protested against the CAA and the NRC, the might of the Hindu right’s propaganda machine was unleashed on them. They were portrayed as marionette dolls that were being manned by the religious patriarchy of their faith. When it comes to political representation, economic prosperity and educational attainment Hindus account for a majority share followed by members of several other religions followed at the tail end of followers of Islam. The National Sample Survey Office in its 2012 report states that the economic conditions of Muslims have not improved despite the uptick in India’s economy and that they are stuck in a vicious circle of poverty primarily due to a lack of education. These are alarming indicators for the working-age adult male population; these numbers are even worse when it comes to India’s female Muslim demography. Thus, the lack of education, economic opportunities and access to the job market marginalize these women even further compared to their counterparts of almost any other religious group. These women in most cases dwell in the marginal periphery of modern India. They face severe handicaps principally because of being women, secondly due to belonging to a religious minority and thirdly because of being poor. They are underrepresented in all areas of power and thus continue to be fettered by religion, customs and patriarchy. They were portrayed as mysterious veiled creatures by the British and have been forced to retain their victim status post-independence. They continue to be pawns in

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a sinister struggle that endeavours to subsume their individual identity and reduces them into victims.

The Way Forward The fact that the Supreme Court verdict has been made into a bill and passed by both houses of the Parliament has been widely welcomed. However, nowhere in its judgement had the court declared triple divorce a criminal offence. Yet, the subsequent bill criminalizes divorce and is thus a textbook example of overcriminalization, making the Muslim men of India even more vulnerable to arrests. According to the National Crime Survey Bureau report of 2011, though Muslims make up about 14% of India’s population, their incarceration rate puts them at roughly three-fourths of total prison population about 19.7%. One must remember that merely earmarking an otherwise civil offence as a criminal offence doesn’t eradicate a social problem it stems from. In 1798, Jeremy Bentham, philosopher and legal theorist, set out three conditions that should be kept in mind before declaring any offence as a criminal act. Firstly, if there is no evil in the action that the legislature endeavours to prevent, then it should not be made into a criminal offence. Since the triple talaq has already been declared illegal, even if a husband does end up giving this divorce, it will be invalid; thus, it would arguably not harm the woman. Secondly, Bentham reminds us that criminal law shouldn’t be used when the punishment prescribed is inefficacious or unproductive. The three-year sentence doesn’t prohibit a man from divorcing his wife in fact if a man has been incarcerated at the behest of his wife it is common sense that he won’t be interested in continuing a relationship with her. Thirdly, Bentham prompts the lawmakers not to punish an offence that is more evil than the violation it purports to curtail. If this type of divorce continues to be a criminal offence, then men might abandon their wives rather than setting them free by resorting to divorce. Spousal abandonment is a problem that is often reported by many women in India. Bentham further warns legislators that the principal source of errors in legislation is false ideas of its utility. A spirit of spite comes across against Muslims in the criminalization of divorce, what’s more, it’s a violation of Article 15 of the Constitution since it’ is exclusively discriminates based on religion. The three-year sentence that now hangs over men of this community is an unfair quantum of punishment mostly because a similar period of incarceration is prescribed if someone promotes enmity against different classes of people, or for those who cause grievous harm resulting in someone’s death or if someone makes and circulates counterfeit currency. Though legal recourse is, no doubt is essential still, campaigns must be run to educate people all over the country irrespective of religion about gender equality. Bear in mind that India has no dearth of laws aimed at gender justice. A few notable examples include dowry prohibition, laws have been made against physical and mental cruelty, rape, and female infanticide and foeticides, yet these practices are still rampant among all sections of society. Though the events of 2017 seem to be a momentous victory for Muslim women, the judiciary and the successive governments

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have failed to address: Halala, Unilateral divorce and Polygamy although these were central issues highlighted in Shayara Bano V Union of India, 2017. Though this chapter has focused on India’s Muslim women, it would be wise to emphasize that the condition of all women in India even that of the majority Hindu religion is no better. The present government enjoys support from large sections of the Hindu population, and it perhaps feels that it doesn’t need to do anything to remain in the good graces of its female electorate and thus chooses to do nothing despite the alarming rate of crimes in the country. When it comes to Muslim women, many legal scholars suggest that the marriage contract (Nikah Nama), which is the bedrock of any Islamic marriage, must carry a pecuniary penalty if anyone tries to divorce their wife unilaterally in a single sitting. All Islamic marriages have a dower which can be any sum of money or property that a wife demands from her husband before she agrees to marry him. Thus, a dower is a debt that a husband owes to his partner the non-payment of which a civil offence. Though making unilateral divorce a criminally punishable looks great for the BJP and gives the impression that the government cares for gender justice perhaps greater things can be achieved by earmarking more resources for appointing more police officers, judges and increasing the number of all-women police stations. It would be wise to embrace the spirit of some practices originally prescribed in Islam which were revolutionary and gender just during its inception 1400 years ago. For example, the concept of Mehr or dower, as mentioned earlier, it is a means of financial security written into the Islamic marriage contract; agreed and signed on by both the bride and the groom. Islam also gave women property rights centuries ago. But unfortunately, these decrees have been diluted by patriarchal organizations and religious leaders who see their benefit in women’s subjugation. In the year 2000 under the aegis of the Planning Commission of India, activist Sayeda Hameed, in her report aptly named Voice of the Voiceless expressed concerns that if followers of Islam don’t change dated practices that are harming women, then there might be a time in future that the government might interfere in personal laws. Seventeen years later, those words turned prophetic as the right-aligned BJP government brought about the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights of Marriage) Bill, 2017. It’s time that the community pays heed to women’s anxieties not just regarding marriage and divorce, but they must also address the lack of education and employment opportunities. Another significant area that desperately needs Muslim women’s participation is, politics. Representation of Muslim women in Parliament as of 2010 was 0.7%. As of 2019, 24 out of 29 states of India had no Muslim women representation. These figures speak for themselves and should be a wake-up call for both government and social organizations. Demands must be made each day for greater gender parity and rights of women irrespective of religion affiliations.

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References Acevedo, D. D. (2013). Secularism in the Indian ContextD [Abstract]. The Journal of American Bar Foundation, 38(1), law & social inquiry, 138–164. Retrieved December 25, 2020, from https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/ddasacev/workingpapers/LSI-Secularis mInTheIndianContext.pdf. Anderson, M. R. (1996, June). Occasional Paper 7: Islamic Law and the Colonial Encounter in British India. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from http://www.wluml.org/node/5627. Crimmins, J. (2019, January 28). Jeremy Bentham. Retrieved January 4, 2021, from https://plato. stanford.edu/entries/bentham/. Diamant, J. (2020, May 30). The Countries with the 10 Largest Christian Populations and the 10 Largest Muslim Populations. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/01/the-countries-with-the-10-largest-chr istian-populations-and-the-10-largest-muslim-populations/. Explanation Desk, S. (2020, February 7). Explained: What Is Female Genital Mutilation, and Why Is It Practised? Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/ explained-what-is-female-genital-mutilation-6254573/. G. (1979, December 20). Law Commission of India, Eighty-first Report. Retrieved from https://law commissionofindia.nic.in/51-100/report81.pdf. Hameed, S. (2000, June 9). Retrieved January 1, 2021, from http://ncw.nic.in/content/voice-voicel ess-status-muslim-women-part-3-best-practices-conclusions-and-recommendations. Hasan, Z., Menon, R., & Vatuk, S. J. (2005). The Diversity of Muslim Women’s Lives in India. In The Diversity of Muslim Women’s Lives in India (pp. 18–58). New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Judicial Aberrations on Gender Issues Are Worrisome. (2018, March 8). Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://thewire.in/women/is-the-indian-judiciary-going-back-on-gender-justice. Koundinya, S. (2010, August 27). The Concept of Mutah Marriage: Is It a Social Evil? Retrieved December 27, 2020, from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666848. Mehrotra, I. (2018, November 05). No Respite from Poverty for Muslims. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/no-respite-from-poverty-for-muslims/ article25429598.ece. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum. (n.d.). Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www. law.cornell.edu/women-and-justice/resource/mohd_ahmed_khan_v_shah_bano_begum. Nagarajan, A. (2020, February 12). In a Minority, but a Major Presence in Our Prisons—Times of India. Retrieved January 4, 2021, from https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/in-a-minoritybut-a-major-presence-in-our-prisons/articleshow/73266299.cms. S. (1947, September 25). Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www.theguardian.com/cen tury/1940-1949/Story/0„105131,00.html. Shankar, S. (2019, December 16). How Democratic Processes Damage Citizenship Rights: The Implications of CAA-NRC. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://www.cprindia.org/news/ 8339. Thakur, P. (2017, October 9). Just 10% of Pending Cases Filed by Women. Retrieved December 27, 2020, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/just-10-of-pendingcases-filed-by-women/articleshow/61001629.cms.

Chapter 6

Seeking Common Ground and Reconciliation: Islam, Thai Citizenship and Multiculturalism Takashi Tsukamoto

Introduction The Muslim-dominated deep South, which covers the present-day Pattani, Yala and Naratiwat provinces, was historically and ethno-culturally a distinct community before its annexation to Thailand—then Siam—in the early twentieth century. The annexation impelled the Malay-Muslims to live under rulers who were ethnically Thais and religiously Buddhists. These Thai élites had somewhat arbitrarily but fatefully incorporated this region into the national community of Thailand when they negotiated to demarcate the Thai national boundary with colonial powers from the middle of the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. For the Thai élites, the boundary demarcation did not simply mean the establishment of a bounded nationstate. It also provided a territorialised notion of Thainess, at least, at the élite level. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Thai government implemented a policy of forced assimilation, which enraged the Malay-Muslims residing there, and sowed the seed of separatist movements. Since then, the ethno-cultural relationship between the Thai central government and the Malay-Muslims has precariously been delicate and problematic. Although the Thai ruling élites have, since the 1980s, attempted to transform the official discourse on the Thai nation in a multicultural direction by recognising the significance of ethno-cultural diversity and promoting difference-blind equal citizenship, their perspective of Thainess is only conditionally multicultural. It requires Muslims to show their willingness to be part of the “Thai-Muslim” category, the conception of which was coined and formulated by the ruling élites themselves. Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to examine the possibilities for an accommodation between Thai nationalism and Malay-Muslims on the basis of multiculturalism. In particular, it aims to examine how the Malay-Muslim minority can be compatible with the overarching Thai identity, and how it can be seen as compatible via common agreement on certain liberal principles and institutions. Rather T. Tsukamoto (B) School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_6

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than examining whether the government’s invented notion of the Thai-Muslim is incompatible with local ideas of Malay-Muslim identity, I choose to examine the interaction between these identities and to illustrate how Muslims might choose to identify themselves as Thai. In order to examine the positive interactions between Muslims in the deep South and the Thai nation, I look at two key agonising moments for the Malay-Muslims in the deep South, and examine how Muslims, particularly intellectuals and religious leaders responded these moments. The first moment is the Dusun-nyor incident in 1949. In April 1948, a violent incident occurred in Dusun-nyor village in Narathiwat province when a protest organised by local Muslims in response to the imprisonment of a well-respected leader, Haji Sulong, was suppressed by the government. The second was the Krue Se Mosque incident in 2004. On 28th April 2004, a violent incident occurred at Krue Se Mosque in Pattani, in which 107 insurgents (mostly young people) were killed, including 32 inside the mosque.1 There is evidence that the Muslim militants who were involved in the incident regarded non-Muslims in the Thai security forces as their enemies. This perception is evident in the document, Berjihad di Patani (Carrying out jihad in Patani), which was found on bodies of militants killed inside the mosque on the day of the incident. Berjihad di Patani explains that the Thais had, throughout history, oppressed the freedom, culture and religion of the Patani-Muslims. This chapter re-examines these two key historical moments in order to show how at even such apparently “separatist” and “rebellious” moments we can see evidence of positive interaction between Muslims and Thais, and even attempts by Muslims to interpret the idea of Thainess through the principles of liberalism and multiculturalism. I do not deny, however, that there is a separatist struggle in the deep South, or that this struggle has struck deep roots. This chapter focuses on opinions conveyed by intellectuals who write widely in the media and to religious leaders. Intellectuals formulate “ideas and ideals of the nation’s cultural identity” and they are “a minority which has influence on others by virtue of thinking about a particular subject” (Yoshino 1992, pp. 1; 6).2 Religious leaders are similar to intellectuals in that they wield ideological influence. I look at how intellectuals and religious leaders use views about Thai identity that accord with civic nationalism in ways which promote ethno-culturally difference-blind equal citizenship and multiculturalism. These actors celebrate ethno-cultural diversity as a value of the community and as a guarantee of inter-ethno-cultural equality.

1

Many newspapers and magazines also reported that government officials also died at the incident of Krue Se. For Example, the Thai-language Muslim Newspaper said that five died and more were injured (Muslimthai Newspaper, 15 May–14 June 2005). 2 I adopted this definition from the sociologist Kosoku Yoshino’s idea of “thinking elites” (Yoshino 1992). For Yoshino, intellectuals are “devoted to the formulation of original ideas and engage in creative intellectual pursuit” (Yoshino 1992, p. 6). When he looks at the discussion of Japanese uniqueness in contemporary Japan, he finds that élites who are engaged in the discussion are not necessarily those who are devoted to creative intellectual pursuit. They are not only academics but journalists, diplomats and businessmen (Yoshino 1992, p. 6). Thus, he uses the term, “thinking elites”, to describe diverse types of élites.

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The first part of this section revisits the period surrounding the Dusun-nyor incident and looks at opinions of a well-respected Malay-Muslim leader, Haji Sulong and a native Malay nationalist, Ibrahim Syukri, who wrote Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani). Despite being viewed as prominent separatists, if we examine their views closely, in fact, they tried to reformulate the conception of Thai citizenship to be in accordance with liberal principles of individual freedom and autonomy. Later sections look at efforts to reformulate Thai citizenship in liberal multicultural terms in the period after 2004 and at how some Muslim intellectuals critically reviewed Berjihad di Patani to argue that Islamic principles do not call for the separation of Muslims from non-Muslims, but allow Muslims to coexist with non-Muslims peacefully. This chapter, in other words, traces how intellectuals, be they Muslims or non-Muslims, have promoted civic and multicultural nationalist ideas and tried to reformulate the ideas of Thai citizenship and Islam through the principles of liberalism and multiculturalism. Some of them have tried to solve the problem of injustice inflicted by the government, by reformulating Thai educational and legal institutions in directions that would guarantee group specific rights and cultural autonomy. Others have also attempted to reformulate Islamic ideas to be compatible with liberal notions of freedom and equality. I argue that those efforts made by intellectual élites are the discursive processes to seek common ground between the two opposing poles of local Muslim specificities and Thai ethnocultural traditions, and that these processes are bolstered through the promotion of multiculturalism.

Haji Sulong and Ibrahim Syukri: Muslim Separatism and Thai Citizenship Revisited At the time of the Dusun-nyor incident, one of the intellectuals and religious leaders who tried to transform the idea of Thai citizenship so that it could be compatible with liberal principles was in fact Haji Sulong. Although he has been presented in official government narratives as a founding leader of separatist ideology in the South, a careful re-reading of his activities and demands suggests that he was open to accommodation between Thai and Malay-Muslim identities. Rather than calling for independence, at first Haji Sulong asked the government to grant regional political autonomy to the Muslim-dominated South. After the Second World War, on 20 March 1947, the government under Thamrong Nawasawat established a “commission to investigate the situation in the four provinces of the deep South” (Chaloemkiat 2004, p. 86). Local Muslim leaders in Pattani happened to know, from the Pattani Provincial governor (khaluang) and from newspapers that the commission would come to Pattani on 3rd April 1947. Haji Sulong and other local Muslim leaders held a meeting on 1st April to draft a proposal for the commission concerning the religious

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and other rights of the Malay-Muslims. This draft became the “seven-point demand”.3 I am paraphrasing here three significant components of it (see Chaloemkiat 2004, pp. 89–90). Firstly, the document requested that in the four provinces of the southern region, Malay-Muslims should be appointed as governors. This was because Malay-Muslim governors could more easily resolve “misunderstandings” between government officials and local Malay-Muslims. Conflicts between government officials and locals would not occur if eighty per cent of government officials were MalayMuslims. In terms of language, both Thai and Malay should be used. If the young generation learned to use both languages, they would be able to resolve future misunderstandings. Secondly, the signatories stated that they thought that the Federation of Malaya was developing more prosperously than the four provinces. The government was collecting taxes from the four provinces and spending them in other provinces, particularly in Bangkok. Malay-Muslim leaders thought that if taxes collected in the Southern provinces would be spent there, they would develop at the same pace as the Federation of Malaya. Thirdly, the Islamic Provincial Committees should have power to issue religious regulations and orders. Dato Yutitham (Islamic judges) should decide cases of family law and inheritance. At that time, Dato Yutithams were only advisors to Thai judges and were unable to appeal the judges’ decisions. This situation could lead to the misapplication of Islamic law on family (marriage and divorce) and inheritance matters, which are important for Muslims. Against this backdrop, Malay-Muslim leaders wished to separate the Islamic Religious Courts from the Thai Civil Court. At this time, Islamic leaders in the deep South did not call for independence of the Patani state from Thailand, but for “only an autonomous territorial and cultural entity to preserve its special identity” (Surin 1982, p. 152; see also Thanet 2008, p. 111).4 Haji Sulong’s seven-point demand can, thus, be understood as an attempt to reformulate Thai democracy rather than as a rejection of Thai society altogether. He requested the protection of local Muslims under the Thai legal framework. He aimed to reformulate the Thai administrative, legal, and cultural systems and values, in order to protect the rights and culture of Muslims in the deep South. Moreover, he intended to negotiate with the government to achieve these goals. When, at the end of 1947, the Thai government sent the Malay-Muslim politician, Banjong Srijarun, to ask Tengku Mahyiddin, the youngest son of the last raja of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kadir, to be an advisor to the government on the problems of the deep South, Haji Sulong also approached Tengku Mahyiddin. Haji Sulong desired Tengku Mahyiddin to be a representative of the Malay-Muslims in negotiating with the government. Therefore, in January 1948 Haji Sulong published the document, 3

According to Surin Pitsuwan (1982, p. 152), the Malay-Muslim leaders in Patani under the leadership of Haji Sulong submitted the seven-point demand to the Thai government on 3rd April 1947. 4 Thanet (2008, p. 111) argues that the seven-point plan was “the first demand by local citizens for self-government or the decentralization of Bangkok’s administration of a provincial region”.

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chanthanumat, which contained signatures and fingerprints of up to 250,000 local residents. Haji Sulong wanted to present Tengku Mahyiddin with this document in order to underline local grievances (Chaloemkiat 2004, pp. 120; 126). When he published the document, he explained that: At present, the Malay-Muslims who live in the Thai administrative circle suffer from oppression, hurt, and cruelty. Government officials and the Thai government do these things to every Malay, every Malay group, and the chat [race or ethnicity] and religion of the Malays until we cannot tolerate them. Even though we ask government officials and the Thai government to investigate the situation, they do not do this. Therefore, the Malay people send the chanthanumat to Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin … who lives in Kelantan. We ask Tengku Mahyiddin to extend his invaluable help to Malay people so that we will be able to uphold the Malay race (chat malayu) and to have faith in Islam and various rights based on Malay ethnicity and as mankind. (cited in Chaloemkiat 2004, p. 121)

In short, Haji Sulong intended to protect the rights and culture of local Muslims through negotiations with the government. Even in his trial from 1948 to 1950, prosecutors failed to provide evidence that Haji Sulong intended to establish an independent state or to separate the four provinces of the southern region from Thailand (Chaloemkiat 2004, pp. 145; 154). In the trial (at the first and appeal courts), Haji Sulong was accused only of the vague crime of insulting the Thai government and government officials. In both the first and appeal courts, he was found guilty of producing the chathanumat to arouse local people to insult the government (Chaloemkiat 2004, pp. 147; 154). Haji Sulong regarded the government as an oppressor that violated the rights of Muslims as citizens of Thailand. In the tribunal, he protested that producing the chanthanumat was a way to tell the truth that government officials did not take care of local Muslim in the deep South (Chaloemkiat 2004, p. 121). He argued that it was the right of the people to criticise their own government and officials. He took newspapers as an example, saying that newspapers which reflected the people’s voice always criticised the government and that doing so was constitutional. He also questioned why he was not permitted to take constitutional and legal actions to request that the government take better care of local Muslims (Chaloemkiat 2004, p. 137). In the Supreme Court, Haji Sulong explicitly argued that if the court regarded him as a Thai citizen, he should have the right to freedom of religion. The constitution endorsed this right. If his right was abused, he should have the right to make an appeal to the government (Chaloemkiat 2004, p. 155). In summary, Haji Sulong tried in his trial to protest that his actions were legal and constitutional. He asserted that the Thai government should observe democratic rules and regulations, which would protect the rights and freedom of the Muslims in Patani, including his own. He insisted that problems would not arise if the government treated local Muslims equally under the Thai constitution and in accordance with the principles of democracy it endorsed. Although the government established Thai-Muslims as Thai citizens, it did not guarantee their group specific rights and autonomy. Haji Sulong’s protests showed how—even as they protested—many local Muslims tried to be Thai citizens, adapting themselves to the Thai legal framework.

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The same argument can be made in the case of some of the individuals who are otherwise known as Malay nationalists. An example is Ibrahim Syukri, who was “a native of Patani well-educated in his local traditions and culture” (Wyatt 2005, p. xi). He published a book entitled Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani) in the Yawi script in Malaya after the Second World War. His audience was strictly confined to the Malay-Muslim community who were able to read Yawi (Wyatt 2005).5 Syukri wrote about the history of the defeat which came with the loss of independence of the Malay Kingdom of Patani in 1785 and the abolition of the status of the Malay rajas in 1902 (Syukri 2005, pp. 58; 81). Furthermore, towards the end of his book, Syukri stressed that the Thai government ignored the nationality of the Patani-Malays as Malays, and that the Patani-Malays should not be viewed by the world as “Thai-Islam” (Syukri 2005, p. 95). Thus, it is plausible to argue, as Patrick Jory (2007, p. 261) does that, “The theme of national liberation is strongest towards the end of the book when Syukri calls for the recognition of the ‘nationality [of the population of Patani] as a Malay people’”. Yet, is it right to assume that the requests Syukri make for the Thai government to call the Patani-Malays Malay-Muslims may only be seen as part of a Malay-Muslim struggle for national liberation? In fact, the dividing line between autonomy and independence movements is often very thin and depends on strategic calculations. I do not deny that Syukri’s book did convey Patani-Malay nationalist views and inspired Patani-Malay nationalism (see also Jory 2007, p. 261). Yet, what Syukri criticised in the end was the way the Thai government mistreated the principles of democracy and liberalism and its outcomes in the Patani area. With regard to the Dusun-nyor incident, Syukri critiqued the Siamese government by saying that: The Siamese government tried to keep the events [the Dusun-nyor incidents] which led up to the battle and lied to the world by saying that it was simply a battle between a group of bandits and the guardians of peace. But the truth could not be hidden in the face of clear evidence that showed that the Malays had lost their patience and were increasingly dissatisfied with the Siam-Thai government. The sacrifice of hundreds of Malay lives was a major event in the history of the rising of the Malay people of Patani, who demanded justice and freedom. (Syukri 2005, p. 97, emphasis added)

At the very end of his book, Syukri (2005, pp. 100–101, emphasis added) argued that: The principles of democracy in Siam claim to provide equality and freedom, to assure adequate education to the people and certain other beautiful claims. But it has been 17 years since democracy in Siam has been in effect, and no evidence is visible to the Malay people. Certainly there is progress in a period of democracy, as can be seen in the city of Bangkok, which is far more developed than ten years ago. The streets of the city have been made with concrete, hundreds of hospitals have been built, tens of institutions of higher education have 5

David Wyatt (2005, p. x) argues that “He [Ibrahim Syukri] was addressing a local audience, within an intimate context of shared values, and for political purposes, in order to persuade, mobilize, and inform his fellows”. The intention of Syukri is not clear. We can interpret it in two ways. It might have been that Syukri had to persuade and mobilise his fellow local Muslims in Patani because PataniMalay nationalism was not popularly accepted in the Malay-Muslim community. Or, alternatively, he simply wanted to galvanise an anti-Thai/Siamese nationalism that was already widely accepted.

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been established, all aspects of the livelihood of the Siamese have been given assistance, and many kinds of useful guidance given to the Siamese people. In Patani, democracy such as this appears not to have arrived and is unknown by the Malays in Patani. Siamese democracy apparently reaches only the area of Bangkok and the territory surrounding it. Siam-Thai democracy is for the Siam-Thai, for the religion of the Buddha, for the oppression of the Malays, and for the violation of the religion of Islam. Truly peculiar is the Siamese democracy, and it is clear that democracy made in Siam is not fit for the Malay people. […] Among the 100 million Malay people of the world, the Malays of Patani are the most ill-fated. Even though the Malay people of Patani long have lived in the democratic world, because Siam-Thai democracy is limited, the fate of the Malay people is like a climbing vine unable to grow up the trellis. In truth the fate of the Patani Malay people should not be placed in the hand of the SiamThai government. Rather, measures to improve their fate and condition should be placed in their own hands.

Although the final two sentences do indeed look like a call for national liberation, a different interpretation is also possible. Syukri wrote these sentences as a conclusion to an analysis indicating that Thai democracy did not bring about desirable benefits for the Patani area. In other words, he presents the call for national independence as a response to the failures of the Thai state. If the Thai government had transformed its democratic system from a limited to a more liberal form, endorsing equality and freedom in terms of religion and race and autonomy and group specific rights, would these sentences have still been valid? In fact, the final two sentences can be interpreted in two ways. One interpretation is that the Patani-Malay should be independent from Thailand and have their own political system. Another interpretation would be that the Patani-Malays should have political and cultural autonomy which would allow them to govern themselves, but remaining in Thailand if the Thai government adopted a model of democracy that would provide them with that autonomy. The above survey suggests that Malay nationalists and local Muslims argued that Muslims in the deep South should have religious, cultural and political autonomy. In the 1940s, Phibun codified Thai national culture and forced the Malay-Muslims to conform to Thai national culture, ignoring the significance of Muslim culture and tradition. This process involved the abolition of Muslim cultural traditions and practices and ending of formal recognition of Islamic law. Phibun’s Thai-fication of national culture was, thus, from the perspective of local Muslims in the deep South an illiberal form of nationalism that inflicted injustice on Muslims (see Tsukamoto 2020). As the liberal theorist and leading theorist of multiculturalism Will Kymlicka (2001, pp. 39–40) puts it, such forms of nationalism “use coercion to promote a common national identity” and “prohibit forms of speech or political mobilization which challenge the privileging of a national identity”. Viewed in this way, obstacles for Muslims in the South to fully realise their roles as Thai citizens arose not from the separatist struggle there but because Thai citizenship did not function in accordance with liberal principles and multiculturalism. Even if Muslims in the South accepted being Thai, the government did not provide full equality and freedom to them. The only way for local Muslims to remain in Thailand as Thai-Muslims without accepting second-class citizen status was to attempt to

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transform the notion of Thai citizenship in liberal and multicultural directions such that every ethno-cultural group would attain religious and cultural autonomy and equality. The discursive contestation between the Thai government, and Haji Sulong and other local Muslims in the region was not simply religious or ethno-cultural. Instead, it involved contestation between an illiberal majority discourse and a liberal minority discourse. The seven-point demand and Haji Sulong’s protests in the tribunal were responses to government nation-building policies to ethno-culturally assimilate Muslims as Thai and represented attempts to reformulate Thai citizenship in a direction which would celebrate ethno-cultural diversity and provide intercultural equality. Haji Sulong’s protest in his trial illustrated that he criticised the government for not providing Muslims in the deep South with equal rights as Thai citizens. His seven-point demand requested group specific rights, such as the use of local language and the adoption of an Islamic legal system. Both Haji Sulong and Ibrahim Syukri suggested that Muslims could choose to be Thai citizens if legally being Thai guaranteed their full access to freedom and equality. As for Haji Sulong’s seven-point plan, scholars and intellectuals stressed that it was not a sign of the separatist movement in the deep South but a request for autonomy. I further argue that it was an attempt to advance the idea of Thai citizenship in a multicultural direction, by asking the government to acknowledge the significance of Malay-Muslim grievances linked to their ethno-cultural and religious identity. A Malay-Muslim leader, Haji Sulong, and a Malay nationalist, Ibrahim Syukri tried to transform the idea of Thainess from an ethno-culturally Thai centric concept to an ethno-culturally difference-blind one so that Muslims could be Thai citizens without losing their Malay-Muslim identity. Haji Sulong and Ibrahim Syukri tried to reformulate the idea of Thai citizenship so that Muslims as Thai citizens could have autonomy and freedom to choose their own religion and culture.

The National Reconciliation Commission: Promotion of Ethno-Cultural Diversity An attempt to recognise Malay-Muslim grievances linked to ethno-cultural and religious identity was made by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), a government-appointed independent body consisting of respected Muslim activists from the south, academics, human rights defenders, politicians and government officials, which was established in March 2005 by the Thaksin Shinawatra government. The body, consisting of forty-eight members, was headed by respected former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun. Its establishment was initiated by intellectuals. On 8th November 2004, 144 academics from 14 universities released an open letter which demanded Thaksin: (1) apologise for the Tak Bai tragedy which resulted in the deaths of 78 Muslim protesters, particularly to Muslims and the relatives of people killed; (2) not use violent approaches to deal with the Southern unrest; and (3) consider his mistakes in handling the Southern problem and admit responsibility

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for the failure of his policies (Matichon, 8 November 2004). On 14th November, a group of 22 academics among these 144 met Thaksin at the Office of Prime Minister and proposed that the government establish the National Reconciliation Commission (Matichon, 15 November 2004). Thaksin endorsed their request, and the body was established several months later. In early 2006, the NRC produced a reconciliation proposal to solve the violent conflict in the deep South, in it the Commission endorsed notions of cultural diversity, local autonomy and equality. The proposal resonated with Haji Sulong’s seven-point demand and Ibrahim Syukri’s effort to advance Thai democracy in a liberal direction as it proposed use of Patani-Malay as a working language, implementation of Islamic law, recognition of cultural diversity, support for local educational institutions and improvement of the judicial process based on the rule of law. Thus, the approach of the NRC was not to provide a “new” solution to the problem in the deep South but to ease and remove the grievances which Malay-Muslims had had since at least the early twentieth century. By this time, in theory, Muslims in the deep South had full access to liberal principles of freedom and equality, and even to multicultural ideas of group specific rights, without being forced to integrate into the dominant culture. The forced assimilation policies of the Phibun era had long passed, and though some of the demands from Haji Sulong’s time (such as official status for the Malay language) had not yet been achieved, arguably Malay-Muslims no longer faced overt discrimination. As I pointed out, Kymlicka argues that in a liberal multicultural perspective, it is unfair and unnecessary for national minority groups to integrate into the dominant majority culture. In a liberal multicultural context, in theory, argues Kymlicka, national minorities are entitled to have a “satisfactory context for the autonomy of their members” (Kymlicka 2001, p. 55). From such a perspective, Malay-Muslims do not need to integrate into the dominant culture of the Thai-Buddhist majority. Yet, being completely secluded from different cultural groups is neither multicultural nor fully possible. Despite renewed Malay nationalism, there is evidence to suggest that Malay-Muslims have in fact gradually integrated into Thai culture. For example, a member of the Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organisation (TAO) in Pattani said that: For my grandfather’s generation, if people called local villagers khaek (the derogatory word for Malay-Muslim people), there was no problem. They did not understand the meaning of khaek. But, now, this is a problem. [After they came to know Thai language], they know that khaek is a term to insult them, and not to respect them.6

He pointed out that Muslims in the deep South did not live strictly in their own Malay-Muslim culture alone. The very fact that Muslims had come to know that Thais use a derogatory term to describe them is a result of their integration into Thai linguistic culture. There are other examples throughout the South. For example, I witnessed that nowadays many Muslims put their hands together in salute (wai) when they meet non-Muslims. This style of greeting is part of Thai-Buddhist tradition 6

Interview with author in Pattani on 16 February 2008.

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Table 6.1 Selected Census Data in Pattani Yala and Natathiwat 1990–2000 Pattani Year

Yala

Narathiwat

Average

1990

2000

1990

2000

1990

2000

1990

2000

Muslim 78.4 Population (%)

80.7

63.8

68.9

79.2

82.0

73.8

77.2

Malay Speakers (%)

70.5

76.6

62.4

66.1

77.9

80.4

70.3

74.4

Thai Nationality (%)

99.4

99.9

97.3

99.8

99.0

99.8

98.6

99.8

Absentees from School (6–24 years old) (%)

56.3

39.4

50.1

34.9

51.2

38.2

52.5

37.5

Source Samnakngan sathiti haeng chat, Datchani chiwat thi samkhan khong prachakon lae thi yu asai sammano prachakon lae kheha pho. so. 2533 lae pho. so. 2543 (Changwat Pattani; Yala; Narathiwat) [Key Performance Indicators for Population and Housing Censuses in 1990 and 2000 (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat)].

and shows that Muslims are at least partially integrating into Thai religious culture. Thus, for some Muslims, being Thai citizens and interacting with mainstream Thai culture are part of a reality of multiculturalism they cannot deny. There is also quantitative evidence of a gradual integration of Malay-Muslims into the Thai majority. Although in the deep South, the Muslim and Malay-speaking population generally increased from 1990 to 2000, residents registered as Thai nationals also increased. While the number of the Muslim population that linguistically and culturally wanted to be “Malay” increased, one that legally wanted to be “Thai” also increased. This means that although Muslims still wanted to preserve their Malayness, they could accept their status as Thai citizens. The portion of those who did not study at schools registered with the state fell by about fifteen per cent in average (see Table 6.1). In the February 2005 General Election held in the midst of ongoing violence, Muslims in the deep South exercised their rights as Thai citizens. Average voter turnout nationwide was a record 72.3% (The Nation, 10 February 2005). Voter turnout in the deep South was higher than the national average: Patani at 73%; Yala at 75.1%; and Narathiwat at 76.1%. Thaksin’s ruling party, Thai Rak Thai won a landslide victory in the elections, but it lost in the constituencies in the deep South. Even Muslim politicians from the influential Muslim faction, wadah, who were Thai Rak Thai members at the time of the elections did not win seats. Muslims in the deep South used Thai institutions to voice objections to the Thai Rak Thai government and their security policies towards the deep South (Funston 2006a, p. 87; Ockey 2008, p. 153). Thus, James Ockey (2008, p. 153) argues that “For people in the lower South, those elections could be considered something of a referendum on the security

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policies of the government, given that this was easily the most important issue for people there”. The NRC did not discourage Muslims in the deep South from integrating with the Thai majority, but attempted to establish “harmonious reconciliation between people of different religions or of different ethnicities in the community” (NRC 2006b, p. 87). It emphasised the main components of a multicultural approach, by promoting cultural diversity, equality and non-discrimination (NRC 2006a, pp. 9–11; 2006b, p. passim). The NRC chairman Anand asserted the significance of cultural diversity in Thailand and of Malayness when Thaksin’s heavy-handed and culturally insensitive approach had had anti-multicultural effects in the South. Anand’s idea was shown in a televised debate with Thaksin, which aired their contesting opinions over the emergency decree the government issued in July 2005. As paraphrased by the Nation: Anand reminded the audience that the world was now globalised and national borders were becoming increasingly insignificant. He suggested that the making of Thailand’s nationstate aimed at turning the Malays in the deep South into “Thais” had created a great deal of resentment in the Malay-speaking region, coupled with a lack of understanding and appreciation for the region’s cultural uniqueness from the general public. Anand suggested that “Thai” was a loaded word and pointed out that Kingdom is ethnically diverse and consists of Mon like himself and Chinese like the prime minister, as well as Malays in the deep South. (The Nation, 29 July 2005; see also Anand 2007, pp. 72–73)

Like Anand, the NRC argued that the government’s promotion of “Thainess” ignored and suppressed cultural diversity and local identity and that under these circumstances Muslims were likely to resist the government. As the NRC report on the situation in the deep South, published in June 2006, explains: The government implemented policies to promote “Thainess” (khwam pen thai) without respecting the cultural identities of the local people, and promoted centralisation by limiting political space for the locals under the democratic system. Insurgents cited religion, culture, history, and the way the government violated freedom of the local to use violence. (NRC 2006b, p. 52)

The NRC’s report also explains why Malay-Muslims felt that they could not be Thai: If we ask local villagers who they are, they respond that they are Malay-Muslims (khon malayu muslim). This means that they are ethnic Malays believing in Islam. Some of them say they are people of Islam (khon islam), … and say that they are religiously very strict. Others say that they are ookhaenayu (Malay) not ookhaesueyae or ookhaesiyam (Siamese). It is possible that they do not dare to say that they are Thai because there is a group of people who understand that Thai or Siamese means Buddhist. If they reply that they are Thai, they will fall into the category of “murtad”, which means that they are freed from Islam. [Literally murtad means apostate.] Language and religion have been playing strong and continuous roles in constructing identities for local Malay-Muslims. (NRC 2006b, p. 28)

Illustrating a new sensitivity to Malay-Muslim opinions and sensitivities, the NRC, thus, appreciated the perception of many Southern Muslims that they could not consider themselves Thai because they see the idea of the Thai in ethno-cultural and religious terms. Against this backdrop, the NRC proposed providing locally

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and culturally specific rights to Malay-Muslims so that they could have options to maintain their Muslim and Malay identity as well as to be Thai citizens. One option the NRC promoted was the formal recognition of Islamic law. The NRC’s survey pointed out that 76.7% of the local population agreed to the establishment of sharia courts in the deep South (NRC 2006b, p. 20). The NRC proposed: – to issue Islamic laws in conjunction with family and inheritance in detail …. – to investigate the possibility of establishing an Islamic law section in the courts in the deep South. – until an Islamic section is established, to adopt the arbitration court system under the civil procedural code for use in civil cases when Muslims are involved. … Arbitrators should have specialised knowledge of Islam, and should be respected in the Muslim community, such as imams. The legal procedure should be able to consider Muslim cases law under the authority of the judge. – to revise the manual of Islamic law to be used in the case of final judgements, and it needs to be written in everyday language which makes the public easily understand the content. This manual should be used together with Islamic laws on family and inheritance. – to establish a system to consider Muslims cases regarding family and inheritance, and to solve disputes in the Muslim community, by allowing religious leaders, such as imams who have close relationships with the Muslim community, to participate in its establishment (NRC 2006b, pp. 81–82). Another option the NRC promoted concerned language policy. The NRC promoted the use of “Pattani-Malay”, an important component of local identity of Muslims, as an additional—not the only—“working language” in the region for the purpose of communications between local Muslims and government officials. As the NRC report explained: The Malay language is a standard to define who is Malay, and a tool of connect the presentday people with the glorious past of the Pattani kingdom. When the Malay Peninsula was under the influence of Islam, local people adopted Arabic scripts to be used in the Malay language. Therefore, the Malay language written in Arabic script is not only valuable in terms of communication, but also in terms of religion, because it is used in the education and spread of Islam and its faith. For these people, the Malay language is an important part of their great culture and a source of pride for Muslims of Malay descent. (NRC 2006b, pp. 28–29)

Under the NRC’s proposal, it was hoped that Muslims would find it more attractive to choose to be Thai since doing so would not deny their Muslim identity. Moreover, the use of Malay would not only bolster local autonomy but also help Muslims establish equal relationships with government officials. As the report argued: We have to admit that people with little knowledge of the Thai language have a problem in communicating with government officials. Sometimes they are discriminated against because of their linguistic difference. Therefore, the Malay language should be an additional working language in the three southern border provinces. For example, official documents used in the deep South should be written in both Thai and Malay. Signs for government officials, street names and village names should be written in Yawi [as well as in Thai]. The number

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of government officials who know the Malay language should be increased. The teaching of Malay should be arranged according to the need of government officials in the region. Most importantly, Malay language communication should be promoted for the convenience of local people, for example, the use of bilingual interpreters at government offices. (NRC 2006b, p. 91)

The NRC did not advocate prioritising Malay cultural distinctiveness in the deep South against other cultures but instead sought the coexistence of Malay and Thai cultures in a form that would both celebrate ethno-cultural and religious diversity and promote equality between Muslims and Thais (NRC 2006b, p. 64). Language policy reform along the lines promoted would help provide Muslims in the deep South with equal access to common institutions, such as education and laws, provided by the Thai government. In terms of education, the NRC tried to promote both cultural diversity and equality. Ponohs, privately owned Islamic schools, were key points of difference between Malay-Muslims in the deep South and Thai-Buddhists. Little wonder that the NRC proposed to recognise and maintain the diversity in the educational system of the deep South. The NRC argued that the school curriculum which consisted of secular, religious and vocational subjects had already properly been developed, considering ethno-cultural diversity in the region. Diverse educational institutions run by families, communities, the private sector and the government were products of cultural heterogeneity in the region (NRC 2006b, p. 83). However, equal access to education in the deep South remained problematic. According to the NRC, only two percent of the school-age children in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat completed tertiary education (NRC 2006b, p. 25). There were various reasons for this result. One was that students studying at Ponohs spend much more time studying religious subjects than secular subjects. The state does not provide Muslim students who complete Islamic studies at the high school level with qualifications for further study at tertiary institutions in Thailand, so that these graduates have to study in other countries (NRC 2006b, p. 93). Another reason was MalayMuslims’ perceptions of the government. Muslims are likely to regard secular education promoted by the state as a tool to assimilate Malay-Muslim culture into the Thai-Buddhist mainstream (NRC 2006b, p. 26). If Muslims were not anxious to have equal access to common institutions established by the state, one way to provide them with equality is to allow them to establish common institutions for themselves. Thus, the NRC proposed: – to arrange the learning and teaching of religious subjects or Islamic studies in public schools. (The state may cooperate with private Islamic schools or Ponohs, and Tadikas at the primary level.) – Public and private schools may cooperate to arrange the school curriculum for subjects, such as studies on peace and cultural diversity. A centre for cooperation between Thai Buddhist and Thai Malay students may be established. – to support educational arrangements by local communities, such as Tadikas and Ponohs, and to promote the participation of local communities in establishing both public and private education (NRC 2006b, pp. 83–84).

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By such reforms, the NRC hoped to provide Muslims with equal opportunities to participate in education, in part allowing them scope to influence its content. Rather than isolating Muslim educational institutions from the Thai majority, the NRC wanted to allow Muslims to establish their educational curriculum as part of the standard Thai system. The reform of educational institutions was also promoted by Thaksin, since he regarded these Muslim institutions as being backward and illegible to the Thai majority and the state. Thus, his reform of Ponoh was part of the government’s effort to intervene and enforce a change in an institution of a minority culture. Thaksin promoted the reform of Ponoh based on his idea of Thainess which was still defined around an ethnic core, and thus, under his reform, the relationship between the Thai majority and the Malay-Muslim minority was not equal. In contrast, the NRC attempted to transform Muslims’ educational institution into a place where Muslims could choose to coexist with the Thai educational standard. On law, the NRC emphasised that, as Thai citizens, Muslims had the right to be protected under Thai laws. It stressed the necessity of a judicial process strictly based on the rule of law: To run the justice process strictly based on the rule of law is greatly important to make citizens in the deep South trust and uphold the justice system. This process also ensures that the state will not discriminate against or deprive justice from the populace in the deep South, who are mostly Thai-Muslims with Malay ethnicity and have negative experiences with law enforcement pursued by government officials. Thus, the justice process in the deep South urgently needs to be developed as a model of the process which conforms to the rule of law before this is introduced to other places in the country. (NRC 2006b, p. 74)

In the deep South, government officials have not enforced the law based on the rule of law, and therefore Muslims did not have equal access to the justice system. For example, the Muslim human rights defender and lawyer, Somchai Neelaphaiji, who later mysteriously disappeared on 12 March 2004, had, since the 1990s, identified the deep South as a badly run administrative zone. He explained that the problem was that government officials were sent to the deep South as a “penalty” or demotion. Local government officials were not effective leaders, did not work for local residents in the region, and sought personal benefits. As a result, innocent people often became victims of illegitimate arrests or detention. For example, some district officers (nai ampoe) detained suspects they alleged were PULO (Patani United Liberation Organisation) members just to show the Interior Minster that they were working (Matichon Sudsapda, 2–8 April 2004, p. 13). Government officials fabricated evidence to arrest and detain suspects and skilfully distorted traffic regulations in order to fleece the Malay-Muslims of money.7 Somchai argued that the government deliberately categorised the Malay-Muslims as being a different sort of citizen than other Thais. Government officials regarded Muslims and people who only spoke Malay as “second class” citizens of Thailand (phonlamuang andap song khong prathet) (Matichon Sudsapda, 2–8 April 2004, p. 13). In the deep South, administration was not 7

The National Reconciliation Commission, a government-appointed independent body to deal with a conflict in the South, also identified the problem of injustice in the deep South. Government officials did not observe the rule of law, and exercise illegitimate power over local people, neglecting freedom and fundamental rights of individuals (NRC 2006b, pp. 17–18).

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government of the people, by the people and for the people (Matichon Sudsapda, 2–8 April 2004, p. 13).8 Against this backdrop, the NRC strongly argued that the rights of Muslim as Thai citizens needed to be protected, and proposed doing so by the establishment of a system to monitor and improve the judicial process. The system would include training of human rights defence lawyers from the Muslim community from the deep South, assistance from international organisations, and establishment of an independent committee to monitor the way the state enforces the law through the justice system (NRC 2006b, pp. 76–78). In sum, the NRC proposed a range of efforts to promote coexistence between Thais and Muslims. The NRC favoured providing Muslims as Thai citizens with both autonomy and equality. Autonomy included official status for the Malay language and Islamic law, both important parts of Muslim identity. Equality included the establishment of fair education for Muslims and the enforcement of the rule of law. In the case of education, they suggested that Muslims could equally participate in educational institutions if the government maintained ethno-cultural and religious diversity in the education system. In the case of law enforcement, Muslims’ rights as Thai citizens would be protected once the government equally applied Thai laws to Muslims in the deep South. Thus, in the case of law enforcement, Muslims could gain equality once the government ignored ethno-cultural and religious differences between Thais and Muslims. The NRC, thus, highlighted how to operationalise the notions of autonomy and equality which Thai ruling élites had previously talked about but not established in practice. The NRC as well as Malay-Muslim leaders recognised that the grievances of the Malay-Muslims, in turn linked to their ethno-cultural identity, culture and history, were at the heart of the problems in the deep South. They tried to de-essentialise and de-ethnicise the idea of Thai citizenship so that it could incorporate the ethnocultural distinctiveness of minority groups. One way of putting this is that autonomy and equality were discursive and practical tools for the NRC to ease local MalayMuslims of their grievances. Reducing their grievances in this way was a means to take Thai nationalism in a multicultural direction. The NRC saw these measures as a means to preserve Thai unity. The NRC did promote ethno-cultural diversity in the South, which was, as Kymlicka (2001, p. 25) argues, “the inevitable result of the rights and freedoms guaranteed” to citizens. Yet, such diversity would not segregate Muslims from the Thai majority. In the NRC’s proposal, ethno-cultural diversity in the deep South could be balanced and maintained by institutional and linguistic cohesion (see Kymlicka 2001, p. 25). Thus, 8

Therefore, Somchai argued that government officials were not acting as protectors of local Muslims. Muslims then needed to seek someone else to safeguard and protect themselves. Somchai argued that local residents had no choice but to rely on bandits or terrorist groups. They could provide better protection to local residents. As for criminal cases that local residents involved, they relied on charisma (barami) of bandits and terrorist groups in revenge for government officials (Matichon Sutsapada, 2–8 April 2004, p. 13).

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if Muslims as Thai citizens were guaranteed autonomy and equality, they could celebrate “cultural diversity to the extent that it is as freely chosen as possible” (Sen 2006, p. 150; see also Kymlicka 2001; Chapters 2 and 3).

Liberalisation of Islam? Echoing the process by which some intellectuals in the NRC tried to rethink Thai nationalism and the state’s operations in the South in ways that would accord better with multicultural notions, so too have some Muslims in the South tried to rethink their interpretations of Islam in the period since tensions began to escalate in the early and mid-2000s. As we have seen, some Islamic actors in the South, such as the authors of Berjihad di Patani, put forward an interpretation of Islam that leaves no space for cooperation or interaction between Muslims and Thais in the South. That text depicted Thais as invaders, condemned Muslims who worked with the state as hypocrites, and called for independence of the South. In response to such views, and to the wider increase of conflict, some influential Muslim intellectuals, including Chularajmontri, have put forward interpretations of Islam that abjure militancy and provide greater scope for positive interaction between Thai-Buddhists and MalayMuslims. Such efforts endeavour to provide a discursive or ideological space whereby Malay-Muslims can identify as Thai citizens, without having to abandon their Malay or Muslim identities. The dilemma that Muslims intellectuals who sought reconciliation faced was that the more they promoted cultural diversity, the more likely it was that Muslims would isolate themselves from the Thai majority. Promotion of a distinct MalayMuslim culture might lead to the creation of what Amartya Sen (2006, p. 157) calls “plural monoculturalism”, under which “two styles or traditions [coexist] side by side, without the twin meeting”. Plural monoculturalism goes against the idea of the multicultural nation as it promotes fragmentation. The possibility of plural monoculturalism and the liberation of the deep South was promoted by the like of the authors of Berjihad di Patani. They not only stressed Malay-Muslim grievances linked to their history and identity but also tried to incite Muslims in the South to isolate or separate themselves from Thailand by arousing Muslim resentments against the Thai state. In response to attempt to arouse Muslim resentments, the Office of Chularajmontri, the Bangkok appointed Islamic leader, argued that Berjihad di Patani did not explain the “real” context of Islam, but tried to persuade Muslims to see people of different religions as their enemies. According to the office of Chularajmontri, such a notion goes against the content of the Qur’an (Kampong, June 2004, p. 14). After Berjihad di Patani was found, the Office of Chularajmontri set up a committee to investigate this document. The committee concluded with five main points (Kampong, June 2004, p. 14):

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(2) (3) (4) (5)

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Berjihad di Patani, spread out in the three southern provinces, did not follow the teaching of the Qur’an; but misled [people about] the meaning of Islam, and created conflicts in the south. It damaged the image of Islam. There were a lot of mistakes in terms of interpretations of the Qur’an. The person who wrote the document was neither a religious scholar nor one who knew the Qur’an; and this person did not live in Thailand. Berjihad di Patani negatively affected Muslims and the reputation of Islam; the Qur’an does not impel Muslims to see different religions as their enemies. Berjihad di Patani affects national security and stability because it will cause the misunderstanding of Pattani.

The Office of Chularajmontri criticised the authors of Berjihad di Patani for creating a division between Thais and Malay-Muslims. As it argued: The authors [of Berjihad di Patani] wrongly aroused consciousness of Malay ethnicity since the authors try to instigate people who are ethnically Malay to participate in insurgencies in the deep South. They do not think that ethnic Malays are Thai. In Thailand, there are Thai people with other ethnic backgrounds. To arouse ethnic consciousness clearly opposes the idea of Thai nation-building. It also opposes the teachings of Islam since Islam, as a religion and belief, transcend the boundary of ethnicity. In the Islamic perspective, Muslims have to cross over the frontier of ethnicity, because Muslims maintain Muslim comradeship, regardless of ethnic differences, differences in skin colour, and linguistic differences. (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 17)

The Office of Chularajmontri criticised the way the authors of Berjihad di Patani connected the ethnic notion of Malayness with the religious notion of Islam and used Malay consciousness to mobilise Muslims in the deep South to separate themselves from Thais. On this point, Bahrun, a former Islamic militant in southern Thailand and now a columnist for the Thai weekly magazine, Nation Sudsapda, also fiercely critiques the notion that ethnicity can be a source of establishing divisions among human beings. As Bahrun argues: The Malay and the Thai are egos of self-identification. These notions make people love their own race/ethnicity. By doing this, we will lose justice. We do not feel that we are making trouble to other ethnic people even though we are actually damaging them. [If we only love our ethnicity, we do not have to care about other ethnic people]. In the Islamic perspective, the notion of ethnicity is the root of the real problem in human society, and deep inside our heart. … In the Qur’an, God informs that human beings are coming from the land. [Every human being is equal and comes from the same source.] … The Malay-Muslims and the Thai-Muslims are illusion and will not last long. … The real (ethnic) Thai do not exist [since the Thai have been mixed with other ethnicities through intermarriage, etc]. The Malay would be the same. (Bannathikan 2004, p. 130)

Effectively, what the Office of Chularajmontri and Bahrun argued was that the promotion of Malay consciousness in the style of Berjihad di Patani would lead to plural monoculturalism, where Muslims and Thais live in Thai society without the twin meeting. It also leads to rejection of multiculturalism or any other form of compromise which may accommodate cultural diversity and the coexistence of Malay-Muslims and Thais. Both the Office of Chularajmontri and Bahrun acknowledged religious distinctiveness and agreed that such distinctiveness should not be

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a source of divisions—let alone resentments. Indeed, Bahrun deliberately ignore Muslim grievances linked to their Malay identity which he believes could generate the segregation of Muslim from Thais. He criticised the NRC for being Malay-centric, by saying that “the NRC still hovers around the history of the Malay kingdom and Malay identity” (Bahrun 2005, p. 121). Yet, he does not deny the significance of ethno-cultural diversity and the reality of multiculturalism, arguing that a duty of the NRC is to promote official recognition of ethnic diversity and multiculturalism not only in the deep South but in Thai society as a whole (Bahrun 2005, p. 120). And for Bahrun as well as the office of Chularajmontri, in an ethno-culturally diverse or multicultural society, ethnic, religious and cultural diversity can be balanced and constrained by dogmatic religious cohesion: every human being is equal. After Berjihad di Patani was found in Krue Se mosque, the office of Chularajmontri as well as other important institutions that would play roles in restoring peace in the deep South, such as the Advisory Council of Southern Border Provinces PeaceBuilding (hereafter the Advisory Council),9 took care in trying not to depict Muslim grievances as being linked to their religious identity. Instead, they used general, universal and noncommittal values, such as justice, peace and freedom, to stress the possibility that Muslims could coexist with non-Muslims. After Berjihad di Patani was found, the Office of Chularajmontri published a booklet to explain the meaning of Islam. The purpose of the booklet was to point out parts of the Qur’an that Berjihad di Patani “misinterpreted” and “distorted” and to present a “correct” understanding of Islam (see Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., pp. 23–51). In the booklet, the office attempted to define Islam in liberal terms. Likewise, The Advisory Council also published booklets which aimed to explain Islamic ideas in de-ethnicised and liberal terms. If, as I have argued above, intellectuals in bodies like the NRC had tried to de-ethnicise and de-essentialise the idea of Thai citizenship so that Muslims could have equal rights as Thai citizens, here we see Muslim intellectuals trying to deethnicise Islamic discourse. Thus, the Advisory Council argued that according to the principles of Islam, seeking independence on the basis of ethnicity was unacceptable because Islam can accommodate ethno-cultural diversity (So So To 2007a, p. 19). The Advisory Council cited Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy, an influential Islamic Scholar in Egypt, who argued that religion cannot be used to divide human beings, and rejected the linkage between Islam and extreme ideology: As a human being, everyone has the same right. In terms of religion and faith, everyone believes in his/her own religion. Everyone enjoys the freedom of performing his/her own religious ritual. This is because we (Muslims) believe in the principle of non-compulsion. Real Muslims cannot interfere with anyone’s religious principle. […]

9

The Advisory Council of Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building was established as a part of the revived Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre under the Surayud Chulanont régime (2006–2008). It consists of representatives of religious leaders, local community leaders, military, police and local administration. Its tasks are to provide the government with appropriate advice on the issues of education, socio-economic development, religion, culture and local customs (Prime Minister’s Order 207/2549).

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Violence, killings, subversion, fanatical partisanship, extreme nationalism and so on cause tragedy and weaken the nation-state. Adherence to partisanship and extreme nationalism should disappear. Affection, consideration, harmony and cooperation among the people in the nation will bring glorious future and progress to the nation. (So So To 2007b, pp. 25; 28)

Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy’s view quoted by the Advisory Council did not link Muslim grievances to their religious and cultural identity, but instead used very common place and arguably superficial liberal terminologies, such as “freedom”, “harmony” and “cooperation”, to try not to kindle their grievances. The Advisory Council argued that religious coexistence was both a reality and a necessity. For the Advisory Council, freedom is the foundation of mutual respect in a multicultural society (So So To 2007a, pp. 16–17). Thus, it argued that Muslims could submit to the rule of a non-Islamic state if the state provides them with fairness and religious freedom (So So To 2007a, p. 17). It emphasised that Muslim cannot legitimately fight for a particular ethno-culture and that Islam does not justify discriminatory or biased perceptions towards non-Muslims. The Office of Chularajmontri also avoided emphasising the grievances linked to Muslim identity when it explained the meaning of jihad. The Office pointed out that the authors of Berjihad di Patani clearly used the word jihad for the purpose of justifying separatist struggle in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and some parts of Songkhla, and that they pursued jihad in order to kill innocent people, be they Thai-Buddhists or Muslims, and government officials, be they Thai-Buddhists or Muslims (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 18). As the Office explained: [Berjihad di Patani] divide Muslims into three groups. The first one agrees to fight for independence following the authors. [According to the authors], this group consists of real Muslims. If they fight and die, they will be categorised as shahip (martyr). The second group consists of Muslims who disagree with the mission of separation. The authors call these Muslims betrayers. Even though these Muslims strictly follow the teachings of Islam, the authors call them disbelievers. The third groups consist of non-Muslims (kafir or Mushrik). A duty of the first group is to eradicate the second and the third groups. (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., pp. 18–19)

The Office of Chularajmontri proposed that engaging in war in this way contradicted the teaching of Islam, and that to die without conforming to the principles of Islam could not be religiously regarded as shahip (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 18). The Advisory Council explained the conditions under which Muslim can pursue jihad in the sense of a violent struggle: (1) (2) (3)

if Muslims are immorally suppressed; if Muslims are deprived of their religious rights; and when Muslim can restore conditions of the above (1) and (2) (So So To 2007a, p. 20).

Although the notion of jihad allows Muslim to wage a war and to use weapons, the moral conditions for pursuing jihad are high. The Advisory Council writes that:

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Jihad is not a tool to wage a war against innocent people. It does not mean to destroy lives and properties of innocent people. This is not a tool to bully the weak. Jihad cannot be declared to fight against these people, whatever the religion they believe in. Thus, to use the word jihad when destroying lives and properties of innocent people is regarded as being incorrect under the Islamic principles. (So So To 2007a, p. 21)

The Office of Chularajmontri explained that the effect of Muslim militants’ pursuing jihad in the style of Berjihad di Patani was to worsen the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The task of the Office of Chularajmontri was to provide correct understandings of jihad (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 49), which it defined as a fight against “ourselves” and “evil inside ourselves” (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., pp. 49; 54). The Office defined the meaning of jihad as “one’s dedication to the order of Allah in order to strictly maintain Islam” (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 49). It also argued that although many people nowadays regarded jihad as a war with violence, to wage a war was just one aspect of jihad, whose proper aim was to maintain moral principles inculcated by Allah in Muslim society (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 50). As the office explained, “the real meaning of Jihad is to develop yourselves to win over your own greed and self-satisfaction. … Jihad requires people to be good human beings” (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 54). The Office denied that the goal of jihad was to wage a war against non-Muslims (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., p. 51). Instead, jihad could be interpreted as a fight against injustice: – to respond to injustice and invaders to protect one’s life, family and properties of religion and homeland. – to protect religious freedom and religious rights that some invaders tried to slander and to suppress. – to protect the expansion of Islam that upholds sympathy and peace to every human being. – to give lessons to whoever breaks a promise, no longer has faith, does not conform to the order of Allah, and rejects justice and compromise. – to provide protection to people who have been oppressed (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d., pp. 50–51). Under these conditions, as long as Muslims enjoy religious freedom and justice, they do not have to wage a jihad against anyone. If the Thai state provides Muslims with freedom and justice, there is no reason under Islamic principles for Muslims to reject coexistence with Thais. The Office of Chularajmontri explained that no element of jihad could be used to deliberately create tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Instead, pursuing jihad should help to build a justice community which would guarantee freedom and equality.

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Conclusion This chapter re-examined key historical moments in order to show how even at points of significant “separatist” and “rebellious” tension we can see evidence of positive interaction between Muslims and Thais, and even attempts by Muslims to interpret the idea of Thainess through the principles of liberalism. My analysis suggests that the conflict is not best understood simply as being based on a binary of mutually incompatible identities, as some participants and observers sometimes suggest. Intellectual actors in the South and at the centre have tried to multiculturalise and liberalise the idea of Thai citizenship. Such efforts began as early as the second Phibun régime in the middle of the twentieth century, a period that is also seen as the beginning of the modern separatist movement. For example, Haji Sulong requested regional cultural autonomy for the South. His goals included the official recognition of the Malay language as well as Thai, the use of taxes collected in the four provinces in the South for local development, and the application of Islamic law. Haji Sulong argued that the Thai constitution endorsed cultural autonomy, and that if the government regarded him as a Thai citizen, he should be entitled to have religious and cultural freedom. Ibrahim Syukri argued that the government adopted democratic rule only for the ethnic Thais, not for the ethnic Malays. Although both Haji Sulong and Syukri are often today viewed as early separatists, in fact they requested that the government provide citizenship rights and the full benefits of democracy to Malay-Muslims. More practical efforts to reformulate Thai citizenship in a multicultural direction were made by the NRC when it responded to the violent conflicts in the deep South after 2004. According to the NRC’s research, Muslims viewed Thainess as being imbued with ethno-cultural and religious connotations, making it difficult for them to identify as Thai. The NRC proposed that the government should provide Muslims with culturally specific autonomous rights, such as the official recognition of Malay language and the adoption of Islamic law (recommendations not far removed from Haji Sulong’s demands sixty years earlier). It also proposed to guarantee Muslims equal access to educational and legal institutions. In other words, it advocated the equality of Muslim citizens both by recognising their ethno-cultural differences from other people living in Thailand when it came to certain central institutions important in the central realm, and by ignoring those ethno-cultural differences when promising equal access to beneficial institutions, such as laws protecting human and other rights of Thai citizens. Yet, finding a place for Muslims in a multicultural Thailand requires not only redefining Thainess. It also means challenging ethnicised and essentialised conceptions of Islam, such as those presented in Berjihad di Patani, and instead advancing interpretations, which accommodate ethno-cultural diversity and seek coexistence with other religious groups. After 2004, some Muslim intellectuals, such as those in the Office of Chularajmontri, did just that by arguing that Islam was ethnically difference-blind. Although they still stressed Islamic authenticity and certain core differences from other religions, they also stressed that Muslims can peacefully

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coexist with non-Muslims. They also argued that the goal of jihad was not to wage war against non-Muslims, but against injustice. The chapter illustrated what might be called the multiculturalisation of Thainess in relation to Muslims in the deep South. It looked at how intellectuals and religious leaders have tried to reformulate both Thainess and aspects of local identity in order to provide a place for Malay-Muslims in Thailand’s imagined community. The analysis suggests that Muslims might freely choose to be Thai citizens if the government provides them with cultural and religious autonomy and freedom, and equal access to common educational, political and legal institutions, and if Muslims understand the idea of Islam in liberal terms. In one critical respect, the views of intellectuals and religious leaders examined in this chapter were different from those of ruling élites. Intellectuals and religious leaders acknowledged the seriousness of Malay-Muslim grievances and acknowledged these grievances as being linked to their ethno-cultural history and identity. As a result, they stressed the need to provide Muslims with local cultural autonomy and group specific rights, which they believed would help remove the grievances. This was a quintessentially multicultural goal since it promotes cultural diversity as a value of Thai citizenship. In the NRC’s proposal, such cultural diversity was balanced by institutional and linguistic cohesion. The NRC proposed that local Muslim participate in the establishment of the school curriculum in the South. It also proposed to use the Malay language as an additional working language there so that Muslim could easily have access to and communicate with government officials. Addressing a Muslim Southern audience, the Chularajmontri also tried to maintain a multicultural environment, but did so from a different angle. It tried not to emphasise Muslim grievances which might arouse their resentments against the Thai majority. Thus, it used general liberal ideas, such as justice, freedom and equality, to describe Islam, attempting to sidestep the issue of Muslim grievances linked to their ethnocultural and religious identity. This chapter highlighted intellectual efforts—at least discursively—to seek common reconciliatory ground where the Mala-Muslims could possibly be Thai citizens. By de-ethnicising the idea of Thai citizenship and defining Islam in liberal terms, intellectuals and religious leaders attempted to incorporate Malay-Muslims cultural specificities into difference-blind and culturally neutral Thai citizenship and allowed the Malay-Muslims to coexist with people from other ethno-cultural and religious groups, including Thai-Buddhists. This chapter has, however, managed to touch on only a fraction of the possible evidence. Yet it is true that the ideology and discourse of multiculturalism have officially been a significant part of the government’s security policy towards the South at least since the end of the 1990s. The Office of National Security Council has, at least since the end of the 1990s, officially valued cultural diversity as an “important source of strength in terms of development and solving problems of the society” and as “social wisdom (panya khong sangkhom) which was an important asset to society (tonthun khong sangkhom thi samkhan) in problem solving and creating harmony leading to stability” (Sathaban yutthasat santiwithi 1999, pp. 57; 66). After the unrest re-intensified in 2004, the Office also

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recognised that “in order to solve the ongoing unrest in the deep South, it is necessary to correctly understand the meaning of multicultural society (sangkhom phahu watthanatham), which has been developed throughout history”, and aimed to establish a multicultural society in order to “seek coexistence and peace in the deep South” (Khrongchai, n.d., p. 1). Thus, at least since the end of the 1990s, argues Connors (2003, p. 444), “there has been a recasting of the monolithic notion of Thainess … toward a more open pluralised Thainess”. The accommodation of cultural diversity and ethno-cultural distinctiveness of minority groups became a significant part of official discourse on Thainess. Cultural diversity was also balanced and constrained by institutional cohesion, that is, the constitution which promised to provide equality, fairness and justice to all Thai citizens. The multiculturalisation of Thainess, however, still remains difficult. Multiculturalism as a discourse—or as a lip service—has become significant part of Thai national identity. Yet the state has not fully introduced multiculturalism in practice. The multiculturalisation of Thainess is particularly challenging in the South due to strong Thai ethno-culturalist traditions and their hostility to ethno-cultural and religious differences.

Bibliography Anand, P., “Khon thai kap khwamlaklai thang wathanatham [Thai People and Cultural Diversity]” in Surichai, W. (ed.) Kamnoed fai tai [The Origin of Southern Fire] (Bangkok: Samnakphim haeng julalongkorn mahawithiyalai, 2007), pp. 68–77. Bahrun, Yihat si thao: khrai sang khrai liang fai tai [Grey Jihad: Who Started and Who Is Stoking the Southern Fire] (Bangkok: Samnakphim Sarika, 2005). Bannathikan (Editors), “Kho sanoe phak prachachon to sathanakan khwam rungraeng nai phak tai [People’s Proposal to Violence in the South]”, Fa diaw kan 2 (3) (2004), pp. 120–170. Chaiwat, S., “Untying the Gordian Knot: The Difficulties in Solving Southern Violence” in Funston, John (ed.) Divided Over Thaksin: Thailand’s Coup and Problematic Transition (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 96–109. Chaloemkiat, K., Hayi sulong abdul kadir: kabot … rue wiraburut haeng si jangwat phak tai [Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir: Rebel … or Hero of the Four Southern Provinces] (Bangkok: Matichon, 2004). Connors, M. K., “Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change”, Journal of Contemporary Asia 33 (4) (2003), pp. 431–448. Funston, J., “Terrorism in Thailand: How Serious Is It?” in Hogue, C. (ed.) Thailand’s Economic Recovery (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006a), pp. 92–106. Funston, J., “Thailand” in Fealy, G. and V. Hooker (eds.) Voices of Islam in Southeast Asia: A Contemporary Sourcebook (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006b), pp. 77–88. Funston, J., Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict (Washington: The East West Centre, 2008). Jory, P., “From ‘Melayu Patani’ to ‘Thai Muslim’: The Spectre of Ethnic Identity in Southern Thailand”, South East Asia Research 15 (2) (2007), pp. 255–279. Kampong (Newspaper). Khrongchai, H., Raingan kansueksa wijai rueang sangkhom phahu watthanatham kap khwam mankhong khong haeng chat koroni changwat chai daen phak tai [A Study about Multicultural

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Society with National Security in the Case of the Deep South] (Bangkok: Samnakngan khwam mankhong haeng chat, n.d.). Kymlicka, W., Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991). Kymlicka, W., Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Matichon (Newspaper). Matichon Sudsapda (Weekly Magazine). Muslimthai Newspaper (Newspaper). The Nation (Newspaper). National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Raingan khana kammakan isara phuea khwam samanachan haeng chat (ko. oo. so.): aw chana khwam runraeng duai phalang samanachan: botsarup samrap phu borihan [Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC): Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation: Executive Summary] (Bangkok: NRC, 2006a). National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Raingan khana kammakan isara phuea khwam samanachan haeng chat (ko. oo. so.): aw chana khwam runraeng duai phalang samanachan [Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC): Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation] (Bangkok: NRC, 2006b). Ockey, J., “Elections and Political Integration in the Lower South of Thailand” in Montesano, M. J. and P. Jory (eds.) Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 124–154. Prime Minister’s Order 207/2549. Samnak Chularajmontri, Chijaeng kho tejjing kan bidbuen khamson sasana islam nai ekkasan berjihad di patani (kan to su thi pattani) [Pointing Out Truths: Deviation of Teachings of Islam in Berjihad di Patani (Carrying Out Jihad in Patani)] (Samnak Chularajmontri, n.d.). Samnakngan sathiti haeng chat, Datchani chiwat thi samkhan khong prachakon lae thi yu asai sammano prachakon lae kheha pho. so. 2533 lae pho. so. 2543 (Changwat Pattani; Yala; Narathiwat) [Key Indicators of the Population and Households, Population and House Consensus 1990 and 2000 (Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat)]. Sathaban yutthasat santiwithi (ed.), Santiwithi: yutthasat chat phuea khwam mankhong thi yan yuen [Non-violence: Strategies for a Stable Security] (Bangkok: Rong phim samnak lekhathikan khana rathamontri, 1999). Sen, A., Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2006). So So To (Sathanthi prueksa soen sang santisuk jangwat jangwat chaidaen phak tai), Islam kap khwamjing thi tong ru [Islam and Truth That You Need to Know] (Yala: Sathanthi prueksa soen sang santisuk jangwat jangwat chaidaen phak tai, 2007a). So So To (Sathanthi prueksa soen sang santisuk jangwat jangwat chaidaen phak tai), Chumnum pathakatha phunam ongkorn muslim lork [Speech in Assembly: Leaders of World Islamic Organisation] (Yala: Sathanthi prueksa soen sang santisuk jangwat jangwat chaidaen phak tai, 2007b). Surin, P., “Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand” (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1982). Syukri, I., History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani [Sejarah Kerajaanj Melayu Patani]. Translated by Bailey, Connor and John N. Miksic (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005). Thanet, A., Kamnoed lae khwampenma khong sithi manusayachon [Origin and History of Human Rights] (Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing, 2006). Thanet, A., Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories (Washington: The East-West Centre Washington, 2007). Thanet, A., “Origins of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand” in Montesano, M. J. and P. Jory (eds.) Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 91–123.

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Tsukamoto, T., “Escalation of Ethno-Cultural Tensions in Southern Thailand in the Midst of Assimilation and Homogenisation” in Yamahata, C., S. Sudo, and T. Matsugi (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar and Thailand (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 61–88. Woramai, K. (Phiksuni), Dusung-nyor 2491 thung tak bai wipayok [Dusun-nyor 1948 to Tak Bai Separation] (Bangkok: DTAC, 2005). Wyatt, D. K., “Forward” in Syukri, I., History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani [Sejarah Kerajaanj Melayu Patani]. Translated by Bailey, Connor and John N. Miksic (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005), pp. vii–xi. Yoshino, K., Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan: A Sociological Enquiry (London: Routledge, 1992).

Chapter 7

Unfairness to Fairness: The (Im)Possible Ways to Promote Gender Equality in Thai Politics Pradit Chinudomsub and Thanikun Chantra

Introduction In the current world of political correctness, many parts of society demonstrate their beliefs and desires. Many of them go to the streets and call for significant changes. Social media is used as a platform for ideas, anger, and expression. At the same time, new trends are also created through online channel. Several social issues have been addressed or, at least, become acknowledged. Some topics become a political device for politicians. Prominent groups such as LGBTQ and BLM have been able to gain attention and support beyond the state boundary. However, the inequality between men and women seems to be gradually forgotten, despite the fact that this is a major issue concerning half of the world’s population. Women have been oppressed in the battle of gender equality for several years. In fact, subordination of women by men is real and still exists with complexity. Gender disparity in areas such as rights, occupation, salary, opportunity, life chance, or even security, has not much improved. Centuries of male domination and patriarchal rule have brought about an acceptance and normality of the situation. Women are expected to be wives and play supportive roles rather than to be the head of the family. Many people believe that women are not able to achieve greater things than men. This belief creates limitations for women when making life decisions such as education or career choices. However, lack of women in politics and decisional process can be a problem. Obviously, men cannot truly understand, represent or care the true extent of what women in society need. Many laws and amendments concerning women are deemed unnecessary and often blocked by a male dominate parliament. Proposals P. Chinudomsub · T. Chantra (B) School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, Thailand

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_7

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Table 7.1 Number of members of parliament by gender, 1986–2019 Election day (B.E.)

Members of House of the Representatives

% Distribution

Total

Female

Male

Female

27 July 1986 (2529)

347

12

335

3.5

96.5

24 July 1988 (2531)

357

10

347

2.8

97.2

Male

22 March 1992 (2535)

360

12

348

4.2

95.8

13 September 1992 (2535)

360

15

345

4.2

95.8

2 July 1995 (2538)

391

24

367

6.1

93.9

17 November 1996 (2539)

395

22

371

5.6

94.4

6 January 2001 (2544)

500

46

454

9.2

90.8

6 February 2005 (2548)

500

53

447

10.6

89.4

23 December 2007 (2550)

480

56

424

11.7

88.3

3 July 2011 (2554)

500

79

421

15.8

24 March 2019 (2562)

500

78 (2a )

420 (2a )

15.6 (0.4)

84.2 84 (0.4)

a

Remark: In the parenthesis, it indicates the number of those who are alternative gender (LGBT) Source National Statistical Office of Thailand; Office of the Election Commission of Thailand; Thai National Assembly

of new regulations on abortion or the death (or life sentence) penalty for rapists are not voted into law. In a democratic society, it is important that people’s voices are heard and their rights protected with their grievances aired in parliament. However, having only a handful of representatives in parliament to represent half of the world’s population seems inadequate and outrageous. Also in a democracy, representation and election are based on the freedom of choice and merit, not gender. This may prompt people to ask the question why should a woman be a member of parliament just because she is a woman? Does it seem unfair? The unfairness or discrimination of the quota system is concerned by political scientists. Under the gender quota system, women may be elected (or appointed), although they are not the most qualified candidates. In other words, every time a woman is elected a man missed an opportunity, not because of his qualification but gender (Spender, 2015). As of 2019, Thailand has a population of 66.5 million (around 32 million men and 34 million women1 ). As shown in Table 7.1, only 15.6% of the lower house members of the current government are women.2 According to the table above, it can be seen that the percentage of women in the lower house is on the upward trend, from 3.5% in 1986 to 15.6% in 2019. However, those numbers are not enough to represent female collective voices as

1

The data is as of January 2019 from the National Statistical Office of Thailand. Members of the Senate or the upper house were mostly appointed throughout the history of Thailand. Therefore, it is not taken into analysis in this study.

2

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they do not reach a “critical mass” or 30% in the parliament.3 Nonetheless, it seems to be a positive sign considering Thailand was only modernized and has recently changed from an absolute monarchy less than a century ago.4 The expansion of education, communication, and transportation played a significant role in Democracy development throughout the country. The idea of Democracy was something new for many Thais after the end of absolute monarchy. Even though Western-style education was established since 1916 by the creation of Chulalongkorn University, it was not until 1990 that the University enrollment rose to more than 600,0005 (Ockey, 1999). With an increasing number of university students and educated people, Thais now understand more about rights and equality which have resulted in the increasing number of female MPs. However, should it not be a simple math that half of the population gets half of the seats in the parliament? This article will explore a gender situation and possible way to promote women’s gender equality in Thai politics.

Brief History of Women Participation in Thai Politics After Thailand changed its political system from an absolute monarchy to democratic system since 1932, there have been many significant changes in terms of gender equality in Thai politics, as shown in Table 7.2. According to the table above, Thai politics were mostly dictated by men. Although women seem to have played significant roles in Thai politics for a long time, there are only 15.6% or 78 female MPs out of 500 MPs in the current parliament. Looking back at the period before the first constitution, it can be seen that a highly developed patriarchal system existed where men controlled Thai society and had a much higher status. Patriarchy is “a social system that is male-identified, male-controlled, malecentered will inevitably value masculinity and masculine traits over femininity and feminine traits” and women are regarded as fulfillment of men’s needs (Becker, 1999). In Thailand, the Monarchy system can be seen as perfectly compatible with patriarchy social structure. Having many wives was “a manifestation of the wealth and power of the elite” (Duanghathai, 2017) in Siam’s6 traditional values. Noble women had to understand how to “please their husbands and the proper ways women ought to groom themselves in order to be sufficiently qualified as a royal concubine, in line with the popular practice of offering daughters to the King in exchange for his favor” (Duanghathai, 2017). Moreover, during the process of modernization of Siam, the 3

The critical mass refers to the critical proportion in numbers that is large enough to make a substantial change in policies. The minimum number is settled, based on political theories, on 30%, see Dahlerup (2006a). 4 Thailand has changed its political system from absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy in 1932. 5 In 1950, numbers of students enrolled in the university was only 25,000 students, see Ockey (1999). 6 Siam was changed its name to Thailand in 1939.

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Table 7.2 The significant changes in gender equality in Thai politics since 1932 Year

Details

1932

Thailand had its first constitution and it was perhaps the first time that women’s rights were treated the same as men under the Thai law

1949

Ms. Orapin Chaiyakan was the first Thai woman elected to the Parliament

1965

Ms.Chalorjit Jittarutta was appointed to be the first female judge of Thailand

1969

Ms. Jintana Nopakul took office as the first Thai female mayor of Muang Potharam Municipality of Ratchaburi Province

1976

Thailand had The first two non-parliament female Ministers in the Cabinet (Khunying Lersak Sombatsiri, Ministry of Transportation and Ms.Wimonsiri Chamnarnwej, Ministry of University Affairs)

1982

The first female sub-district chief (Ms. Malichian Pengwong) and the first female village chief (Ms.Somsong Surapan) were appointed

1988

The first elected female MP (Khunying Supatra Masdit, Office of the Prime Minister) was appointed Minister in the Cabinet

1994

The first female provincial governor (Ms. Charatsri Teepirach) of Nakhon Nayok province, along with one female deputy governor, was appointed

1995

The constitutional amendment of the 1991 Constitution, Section 24 to provide equal opportunities for women in political, public life and education

1996

The first female district chief, Ms. Prasom Dumrichop, of Amphawa district, Samut Sakhon province, was appointed

2011

Thailand had the first female prime minister, Ms. Yingluck Shinnawattra

Source National Statistical Office of Thailand

roles of women still “primarily within the house or other forms of private (non-public) space, while the public space or political space belonged to men” (Duanghathai, 2017). Obviously, these values still influence Thai society and politics. The role of women in Thai politics is limited as people tend to believe that politics belongs to men. Interestingly, Thailand was actually the second country in the world to have female suffrage since 1897 when the Local Administration Act of 1897 allowed female suffrage in village elections (Bowie, 2010). However, the gender equality in Thailand does not illustrate much progress since then.

In the World of Gender Inequality Thailand is not the only country that has a low percentage of women in its parliament. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), as of March 2020, less than a quarter of every nation’s Member of Parliament are women. More importantly, in the world of 7.7 billion people with slightly more men than women,7 there are only 7

The world population in 2019 was 7.7 billion people, including 3.82 billion of females and 3.89 billion of males. For more information, see United Nations, Department of Economic and Social

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Table 7.3 Percentage of women in national parliaments Rank Country

% of women in the Rank Country lower chamber

% of women in the lower chamber

1

Rwanda

61.25

76

China

24.94

2

Cuba

53.22

83

United States of America

23.78

3

Bolivia

53.08

99

Bangladesh

20.92

4

UAE

50

111

Saudi Arabia

19.87

5

Mexico

48.2

117

Republic of Korea 19

6

Nicaragua

47.25

119

Colombia

7

Sweden

46.99

120

Democratic 39.51 People’s Republic of Korea

8

Grenada

46.67

124

Turkey

17.32

9

South Africa

46.58

131

Madagascar

15.89

10

Andorra

46.43

133

Guinea

15.79

11

Finland

46

134

Thailand

15.75

16

Switzerland

41.5

143

Malaysia

14.41

39

United Kingdom 33.85

166

Japan

9.91

48

Germany

181

Sri Lanka

5.33

31.17

18.34

Source Inter-Parliamentary Unit (IPU), 2020, Percentage of women in national parliaments, InterParliamentary Union, Retrieved from https://data.ipu.org/women-ranking?month=5&year=2020

4 countries, which consist of Rwanda, Cuba, Bolivia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that have equal numbers or more women than men in their parliament, as shown in Table 7.3. Generally, people might have expected that gender equality would be better in developed nations than developing countries. However, in terms of politics and number of MPs, the statistical data from the IPU shows that Rwanda has the highest share of women in national parliament (61.25%). Only decades ago, this country was destroyed and divided by hate based on racial discrimination. The Rwandan genocide in 1994 that caused a mass slaughter of some 800,000 people was recorded in the mankind’s history but nowadays Rwanda is ranked the highest country in the world with most women in the parliament. The successful Democratic transition after the genocide played an important role for women in Rwanda. The 2003 constitution was designed to have a collective voice of women being heard by adopting the proposal for women’s participation at the level of 30% by the United Nations Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (Powley, 2006). Together with the immediate aftermath of genocide where population was 70% female, women in Rwanda became a prominent force of change. Affairs, Population Division (2019). World Population Prospects 2019: Volume II: Demographic Profiles.

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At present, in Rwanda’s parliament, 49 out of 80 seats in the lower house and 10 out of 26 in the upper chamber are women (IPU, 2020). According to Hughes (2009), civil war is one of the important factors that forces women’s political participation in Rwanda. She stated that the violent conflict, on the one hand, caused a devastating effect on the country, the civil war, on the other hand, brought about turning points and positive changes in changing traditional gender norms. The process of reconciliation after the violent conflict was moved forward in the main by Rwandan women. The second rank, as shown in Table 7.3, is Cuba, a failed state by the Western standards. Cuba, despite its economic deficiency due to trade sanctions imposed by the United States for more than 50 years, is a medically advanced country and a socially progressive (Franceschet et al., 2018). The country has 322 female MPs from the total of 605 seats (equally 53.22%) in the lower house. Also, it was the first country to sign and the second country to ratify The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The third place in the IPU table is Bolivia, a country where the elected president was controversially forced to resign (Human Rights Watch, 2020). This socialist country was led by Evo Morales, who openly against the US and its influence in the region (Pineo, 2016). Before his resignation, Bolivia’s parliament consisted of 69 MPs from the total of 130. And in the upper house, there were 47.22% of women (IPU, 2020). The fourth place is United Arab Emirates (UAE) with exactly 50% of women MPs in the lower house of 40 MPs in total. According to the BBC, UAE is an authoritarian country but less conservative and perhaps the most liberal country in the gulf (BBC Monitoring, 2020). Despite the promising equal number of male and female MPs, it does not represent anything more than symbolic as the country is an authoritarian regime ruled by kings, or Emirs as they are known, who choose the government. According to China, it is ranked at 76 which is higher than Republic of Korea (South Korea, rank 117), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea, rank 120) and Japan (166), as shown in Table 7.3. Unsurprisingly, Saudi Arabia where women have very limited rights sit at rank 111 with only 19.87% of women in the parliament. Thailand is ranked at 134 with 15.75% of women in the lower house and 10.4% in the upper house (IPU, 2020). On the other hand, developed countries like Finland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Germany, and USA ranked 11, 16, 40, 49, and 81 respectively, as shown in Table 7.3. From the statistical data showing percentages of women in national parliaments, it shows that gender equality in politics is not necessarily higher in democratic systems of governance. Autocratic nations, as shown in Table 7.3, have a higher percentage of women in parliament, than democratic nations. On the other hand, democracy perhaps has nothing to do with the number of female MPs because people, either male or female, choose their representatives not mainly based on gender. As McElroy and Marsh (2010) argued, the candidate gender has little impact on voter choice. Nonetheless, considering only the numbers of women in national parliaments from the IPU data, it can be misleading. According to Table 7.3, Rwanda, Bolivia, and UAE have a quota system where a certain number of parliamentary seats must be reserved for women. In case of Rwanda, it was stated in the 2003 constitution that

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…a state governed by the rule of law, a pluralistic democratic government, equality of all Rwandans and between women and men reflected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty percent of posts in decision making organs.8

As a result, 48% of parliamentary seats went to women in the 2003 election, a big jump from 17.1% in 1997, and move forward to 63.8% in the parliamentary elections in 2013 (World Bank, n.d.). In 2015, the constitution of Rwanda was revised but the quota system for women did not change. Nonetheless, the success in increasing roles of women in politics came from the initiative of Paul Kagame, Rwandan President. He realized that it is impossible to rebuild Rwanda without the help of women. Therefore, a quota system in the 2003 constitution was introduced as well as the promotion of gender inclusiveness and girls’ education (Warner, 2016). Interestingly, Rwanda not only has a remarkable number of women in parliament but Rwandan women also “make up 42 percent of Cabinet members, 32 percent of Senators, 50 percent of judges, and 43.5 percent of city and district council seats” (UN Women, 2013) after the 2013 election. Bolivia, which is in the 3rd rank of Table 7.3, also shown that the highest number of women in national parliaments also has a type of quota system. According to its electoral law, adopted in 2010, it constituted candidate quotas whereas …both principal and alternate candidate lists in multi-member constituencies for elections to the Lower House (Cámara de Diputados) must include equal numbers of men and women, in alternation. In the case of a list composed of an odd number of candidates, preference will be given to women. In single-member constituencies, at least 50% of the candidates (principal and alternate) nominated in all of the constituencies must be women (IPU Parline, n.d.).

In addition, Cuba is the only country among the top four countries in Table 7.3 that does not have any form of quota system for women. Since Cuba is not a democratic country and its election is, arguably, “a deception of a democratic process” (Foundation for Human Rights in Cuba, 2019), the number of women in the National Assembly of People’s Power most likely represented nothing in terms of gender equality. It is debatable whether election in Cuba free and fair, and whether representatives can actually participate in the decision-making process (Luciak, 2005; Wylie & Shoker, 2019). In fact, most countries, except Cuba, Grenada, and Andorra, in the top ten list shown in Table 7.3 apply a quota system, in the form of either legislated or voluntary candidate quotas for women. In case of Thailand, it is mentioned in section 90 of the 2017 constitution regarding the issue of gender equality that political parties must prepare their party-list candidates by taking gender equality into consideration.9 However, as it is only a guideline for political parties to consider gender equality, it had no such effect as in Rwandan 8

See Title I, Chapter 2, Article 9 of “The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda,” Government of Rwanda. http://www.cjcr.gov.rw/eng/constitution_eng.doc. 9 The 2017 constitution of Thailand, Paragraph 3 of Section 90 stated that “In the preparation of a list of candidates under paragraph two, the members of the political party shall be allowed to participate in the deliberations, and regard shall be had to the candidates for election from different regions and equality between men and women”.

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parliament. As a result, only 15.75% of seats in the current parliament went to women. The low percentage of women in parliament leads to an argument; that without some form of candidate quota, the number of women in any national parliament will be lower than men. So, the question is, in order to have gender equality or gender fairness in politics, should the Thai government have a quota system even though it may be unfair?

Questions of Election and Quota System Elections are one of the fundamental components of a liberal democracy. A meaningful election must be, at least, free and fair. There should be no limitation for those who seek candidacy in politics. Voters should have freedom to choose any candidate without any form of interference. Also, everyone should have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for an election. But how can the election be free and fair if a country sets a candidate quota in an election? Is the gender quota system a fair system? All are up for debate. On the one hand, liberalists insist the state should not interfere with individual rights in the election process and consider gender quota as a violation of liberal principle (McDonagh, 2009). Neo-liberalists on the other hand, allow state interference in shaping gender equality so that the vulnerable ones can have an equal opportunity in a society (Bacchi & Eveline, 2003). On the positive side, Rwanda would be one of the best examples of how the quota system has flourished. The number of women in parliament has exceeded the quota intended for them. However, there are some criticisms that a high percentage of women in politics does not really represent the situation of Rwandan women in daily life and the country is facing gender-based issues such as women rights to education and gender-based violence (Hogg, 2009). Although the gender quota system more or less promotes women’s participation in national politics, there are some challenges and different outcomes of implementing the system. The gender quotas are considered differently among political science scholars. Some support the gender quota systems because it seems to be a proper instrument in increasing women’s representation in political structure (SchwindtBayer, 2009), whereas some scholars are not certain whether or not the quota system does work and really promote gender equality (Besley et al., 2013). Reasons provided by the latter, who is not convinced by the gender quota system are many. First, despite a decrease of gender discrimination, the quota system can lead to a “reverse discrimination,” in which a male qualified candidate with equal qualification cannot equally compete, not because of his capabilities, but gender, through the women’s quota system. Second, the quota system is undemocratic because the system limits the choice for voters to choose a female. So, this system somehow diminishes the principle of liberal democracy. Third, women who received privileged under this gender quota system may not feel so much proud. According to Dahlerup (2006b), many women do not want to get elected just because they are women. However, agreed conclusion on the effectiveness of the gender quota system is not yet found,

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but some experiences from countries that adopted the gender quota system can lead to more insightful lessons and improvement. For example, Bangladesh applies a system called “temporary special measures (TSMs)” that reserve a certain number of seats for women at all levels of government in order to encourage meaningful representation of women in politics. However, the system shows some loopholes through such problems as a nontransparent nomination process, tokenism, and discrimination (Paasilinna, 2016). …political parties must abide when nominating women for reserved seats. Party leadership has the sole discretion to decide who should be placed on the list and in what order. The selection process is not necessarily merit-based, resulting in potentially under-qualified and unprepared representatives, which further erode the public’s trust in their female representatives. (Paasilinna, 2016, p. 16)

The cases of Rwanda and Bangladesh show that reserving some seats in parliament for women does not guarantee gender equality. In fact, by simply putting more women in the parliament, there are only some women, who comply with (or at least do not threaten) patriarchal values, can succeed (Becker 1999). Then, the objective of having meaningful representations in terms of gender equality will be only an attainment of numerical delegations of women. Interestingly, according to the report by the World Bank (2019), there are six countries, including Belgium, Denmark, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Sweden, have equal rights for men and women based on how effectively the governments guarantee legal and economic equality between the genders. Four of them, excluding Denmark and Latvia, apply the gender quota system. The data shows the improvement comparing 10 years ago when there is zero country that has equal rights for men and women from the former survey. Saudi Arabia, which applies electoral quota for women, was the worst in the rank. The data showed by the World Bank (2019) clearly illustrates that the gender quota system is not the only possible way to promote gender equality. Among the 85 countries that apply the quota system (IPU, 2013), the success of this system is questionable. In case of Thai politics, according to the study by King Prajadhipok’s Institute (2008), there are at least three ways for Thai women to be in politics; firstly, by her own personal qualification, secondly, by inheriting political heritage from her parents, husband, brother, or sister, thirdly, by being a nominee of a politician, who cannot enter politics at that period, in order to preserve his political territory and power. These three ways for women to enter politics are actually the same as for men. However, the conditions and qualifications that will make women successful in politics are, sometimes, very idealistic. According to the national seminar on “women and politics” organized by King Prajadhipok’s Institute on 10 March 2008, participant, including local and national politicians, civil society activists, and government officials as well as international organization representatives, mentioned about the required conditions for successful female politician that she must (1) have outstanding knowledge, (2) have good presentation skills, (3) have a good public image, (4) have outstanding work performances, (5) be widely accepted by local community and society, (6) stay away from corruption and (7) be good at collaborating and networking (King Prajadhipok’s Institute, 2008). These conditions seem to be idealistic, yet quite impractical

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conditions, for both male and female candidates, especially when the country still has problems of vote buying and corruption. It is too difficult to guarantee that having met all the above conditions a Thai woman can successfully enter politics and vice versa. In addition, there is widespread belief that women are less corrupt and more trustworthy than men so they should then be more effective in politics to promote honest government (Dollar et al., 2001; Goetz, 2007; Wängnerud, 2012). However, by generalizing women as better or cleaner politicians, it will create two important questions. Firstly, although women are generalized in politics as more trustworthy, there are some corrupt ones too, such as Imelda Marcos, a Filipino first lady and politician10 or, more recently, Park Geun-hye, a former president of South Korea11 ? Secondly, by generalizing women as more trustworthy than men, is this gender stereotyping contributing to discrimination? In order to promote gender equality in politics, the encouragement of women’s political rights and positions should be based on their abilities, not just a privilege of being female. Both men and women should have the same opportunity to compete in politics. Although the current constitution of Thailand requires all political parties to “consider” nominating their candidates based on gender equality, it was hardly successful as the number of women in the parliament is only a handful. Even for candidacy, according to the data from the Office of the Election Commission, women’s share in the 2019 national election was quite low as only 22% of women ran for parliamentary constituencies and 22% ran under the party-list system. The more important issue may not be an increase in numbers. The encouragement of gender equality in politics should be beyond numerical analysis and elections. Despite having a gender quota system, as seen in some countries mentioned above, the number of women in politics cannot guarantee equal rights of women in a society. The real problem is perhaps not the lack of women in parliaments, but the lack of political will of both men and women to promote women’s political participation.

10

Imelda Marcos was a former first lady of former President of the Philippine, Ferdinand Marcos, from 1965 to 1986 and a former Fillipno politician. During the 21-year period of Ferdinand Marcos’ presidency, she was criticized for luxurious and extravagant life. Then, she was charged of corruption crime, dealing illegal money to bank account of Swiss-based NGOs while serving in her husband’s government in the 1970s and 1980s (estimated up to 10,000 million US dollars) before her family were expelled from the Fillipno people in 1986 and fled to stay in Honolulu, Hawaii in the United States for many years. 11 Park Geun-hye, a former first-female president of South Korea from 2013 to 2017, was accused of abuse of power, coercion, bribery, and leaking government secrets in 2017. In addition, she colluded with her close friend, Choi Soon-sil, demanding bribes from various companies—a total of 77.4 billion won (US$68 million)—in exchange for political benefits.

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The Quota System: An Expressway to Gender Equality in Thai Politics According to the Gender Inequality Index (GII)12 in Human Development Reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the scores on gender equality of Thailand do not show much progress, even though there are attempts by both governmental and nongovernmental sectors to promote gender equality in Thailand. Despite having the second highest percentage of women in senior management in 2019 (Bangkok Post, 30 October 2019),13 the GII shows unimpressive results. Thailand’s GII score increased to 0.377 in 2018 from 0.374 in 2016 and 0.314 in 2013 (UNDP, 2019). Under the patriarchal system, women are seen as weaker and less capable than men, while men are given priority in making decisions over women in all aspects of society. As a result, many women went to vote but rarely nominate themselves as candidates. The same value of patriarchy can also explain why some women do not vote for women. According to the politics in terms of a battle among interest groups, who can understand and protect the interest of women better than women? However, since women are believed as inferior to men, some women voted for male candidates. The patriarchy somehow discourages women from political participation, either as voters or electoral candidates, underestimates women’s capabilities and limits themselves into an unchallenging, yet restricted zone. And vice versa, men do not vote for female candidates as the conservative believes politics is not really for women (Clavero & Galligan, 2005). While the fairness is emphasized in the liberal democratic system, the unfairness is also an issue of gender equality, such as the gender quota system and voting preference under patriarchal society. How can inequality be developed into equality? It is hard to get rid of patriarchy beliefs that are imprinted into the Thai society for a long time. Perhaps, some sort of expressway to shorten the process and achieve gender equality may be possible. At first, it is important to level the political playing field for both male and female players. As Kodelja (2016, p. 9) mentioned, “inequality becomes a means of achieving equality, as it corrects prior inequality: the new equality is therefore the result of leveling two inequalities.” By providing the equality of opportunity to success, it is conceivable to truly claim that both men and women are equal. The political concept of the equality of opportunity stated that luck, circumstance, or gender (in this case) must have no influence on individual prospect of success and it is not necessary that individual with the same effort will always have the same outcome (LeFranc et al., 2009). It means that, in politics, men and women should have the same starting point or be able to use their talents equally to achieve 12

The UNDP defines The Gender Inequality Index (GII) as a composite measure reflecting inequality in achievement between women and men in three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and the labour market. 13 According to the report in 2019 by the Credit Suisse Research Institute (CSRI), Thailand ranks second globally for women represented in senior management, with the highest percentage of female chief financial officers and the third-highest rate of female chief executives.

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their goals in election (Kodelja, 2016). However, in the world of politics, everyone does not have the same starting point, especially under a patriarchal system. The inequality should then be compensated since it is not anyone’s fault (LeFranc et al., 2009). This does not mean that women should receive privilege over men. Instead, equal opportunity should be provided for all, regardless of their gender. Therefore, the quota system can be one of the possible and practical ways to promote gender equality in Thai politics; not by giving parliamentary seats to women but providing them an opportunity to get elected. Although people argue the quota system is seemingly unfair, it can also bring the positive change of gender equality in politics. The next question is, what kind of quota system should be applied to Thai politics? After learning from other countries’ experiences, there are, at least, 3 types of quota systems. The first and probably the most straightforward one is the reserved seats system. This system is to reserve a certain number of parliamentary seats for women. Although it is the most effective and fastest way to increase women participation in the parliament, it is the least democratic method. Setting a certain number of seats for women makes an election less fair since it limits voters’ freedom of choice. In some cases, the female MPs from a reserved seat system are appointed without an election and the importance of having them is merely for better statistics (Maguire, 2018). More importantly, there is no guarantee that female candidates who entered politics by this method will have real power and actually work for the interest of women. The second method is the legal candidate quota system. A requirement is set either in a constitution or election law that every political party must have a certain number of female politicians in its candidate list. This method legally requires all political parties to nominate a certain number of female candidates in elections. This way ensures that women will have opportunity in election as same as men, at least in terms of candidacy. The rest would depend on the personal performance to win the election in democratic way. Arguably, this is the best solution compromising of a quota system and a democratic election. The third method is the voluntary party candidate quota. This quota system is based on voluntary basis by recommending every political party to have an equal number of male and female candidates, or at least some, if not many, women, in the candidate lists. This method is on a voluntary basis and not legally binding. Therefore, it is possibly less effective compared to other methods. For example, as mentioned in the 2017 constitution of Thailand, the gender equality must be considered by political parties when nominating people in election.14 However, in practice, only a few women have been nominated, let alone successfully elected, as the list of female politicians in Thailand shows in Table 7.1. It seems that there is no best method of quota system, as different systems suit different national contexts. For example, the voluntary quota system may work well in a country like Sweden where all political parties voluntarily nominate a good 14

The 2017 constitution of Thailand, Paragraph 3 of Section 90.

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number of women in an election and, as a result, the country ranks seventh by IPU with 46.99% of women in the lower house, as shown in Table 3. But it is not comparatively effective in Thailand where the same system applies but has only 15.75% of female representatives. There are many reasons contributed to these differences between Thailand and other countries. Each country has its own distinctive conditions. For example, Rwanda went through genocide before women greatly participated in politics. A political system that allowed more women MPs than men in Cuba heavily relied on its autocratic regime. Under absolute Monarchy, it has only strengthened gender inequality and male-dominated society in Thailand. The male dominance nature of this system not only provided example for people but also created a society where men are well above women in the hierarchical order. Starting from the top of Thai society, only the Prince can be ascended to the throne while Princesses only play supportive roles the same goes for peasants where the male (father) is the leader of the family while females (mother) are expected to take care of the household and children. During the era of absolute Monarchy, men could have many wives as long as they could look after them. Therefore, having many wives (and kids) is a sign of man’s wealth. In addition, it was common that many women (daughters) were sent to marry with high ranking officers or oligarchs by their families. Another evidence of male-dominated society can be seen through the form of folklores or local history that only a handful of women could achieve heroic status. Social structure, history, and culture made it hard for women to achieve greater things than men. The lack of women’s participation in any major events in politics may also contribute to a negative perception about women and politics. Almost all uprisings, coup, or political transformations in Thai history were led or directed by men. In the modern and Democratic era, women in Thailand are still inferior to men in the eyes of many. The Thai government shows an attempt to promote gender equality in politics by applying the third method, a voluntary quota system, to no avail. The gender gap in parliament and Thai politics is still high and growing. Women need equal opportunity, not privilege, to flourish. If women have privilege over other groups in society, the given opportunity will not be so different from what previously happened under the patriarchal system. To achieve gender equality through a quota system, it can be simply done by making or amending the constitution (or election law) to facilitate the gender quota system in elections. For example, in the article 90 paragraph 3 of the 2017 constitution, In the preparation of a list of candidates under paragraph two, the members of the political party shall be allowed to participate in the deliberations, and regard shall be had to the candidates for election from different regions and equality between men and women.

The gender quota should rather be specified in the candidate list, not based on voluntary basis, but be legally binding. Yes, there will be questions and arguments coming from this alteration. For example, how to organize the party-list candidate? Should male or female candidates be the first on the list? And so much more. Obviously, it needs more research and greater effort to improve the equal election system

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of Thailand. Considering Thailand has changed the election system so many times in the past, making another change is particularly difficult, but not impossible. The legal gender quota system may be an expressway that can lead Thailand achieving better gender equality.

Conclusion Are there any countries or regimes that truly give equality to their citizens? As a matter of fact, almost every country embraces the idea of gender equality in the constitution. Even in North Korea, its constitution15 stated that Article 66 (1) All citizens who have reached the age of 17 have the right to elect and to be elected, irrespective of sex, race, occupation, length of residence, property status, education, party affiliation, political views or religious belief.

or, more directly, Article 77 (1) Women are accorded equal social status and rights with men. (2) The State affords special protection to mothers and children by providing maternity leave, reduced working hours for mothers with several children, a wide network of maternity hospitals, crèches and kindergartens, and other measures. (3) The State provides all conditions for women to play their full roles in society.

The same goes for Thailand and other Democratic countries that the constitution states the need for equality of men and women. In theory (and under the law), men and women are equal. In practice, women are far behind men in many ways. At present, there are many things that men can do but woman should not do in Thailand. More importantly, women are expected to know their place in the hierarchical order. It is undeniable that the patriarchal values are embedded in Thai society and have caused the problem of gender inequality for a very long time. Even so, it does not mean that there is no way for change or improvement. To solve that problem, people should stop discriminating and prejudicing about women. As stated by Mary Becker (1999, p. 26), …he can insist that the point made by a female colleague at a meeting is a good one when others ignore it (until it is made by a man)...Or she too can insist that a point made by a female colleague at a meeting (and ignored) is an important one.

Both men and women need to work together, not against each other in order to encourage gender equality in society. However, in terms of politics, it also needs systematic change to shorten the process and achieve gender equality. The gender 15

The English version of North Korean constitution is based on an official translation provided to the public by Naenara. http://www.naenara.com.kp/main/index/en/politics?arg_val=leader3.

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quota system is one of the possible ways to help leveling the playing field and at least provide women the equal opportunity to men. Nonetheless, it is of great importance that the quota system should not become a privilege system that creates more inequality between men and women nor be beneficial only for numerical significance. Then, the seemingly unfairness of the quota system can be the way to fairness.

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King Prajadhipok’s Institute. (2008). Satri kap kanmueang: Khwampenching phuenthi thang kanmueang lae kan khapkhluean [Women and politics: Reality, political space and the driving]. Thammada Press. Kodelja, Z. (2016). Equality of opportunity and equality of outcome. CEPS Journal, 6(2), 9–24. LeFranc, A., Pistolesi, N., & Trannoy, A. (2009). Equality of opportunity and luck: Definitions and testable conditions, with an application to income in France. Journal of Public Economics, 93(11– 12), 1189–1207. Luciak, I. A. (2005). Party and state in Cuba: Gender equality in political decision making. Politics & Gender, 1(2), 241–263. Maguire, S. (2018). Barriers to women entering parliament and local government (IPR Report), University of Bath. Retrieved from https://www.bath.ac.uk/publications/barriers-towomen-ent ering-parliament-and-local-government/attachments/barriers-to-women.pdf. McDonagh, E. (2009). The motherless state: Women’s political leadership and American democracy. University of Chicago Press. McElroy, G., & Marsh, M. (2010). Candidate gender and voter choice: Analysis from a multimember preferential voting system. Political Research Quarterly, 63(4), 822–833. Ockey, J. (1999). Constructing the Thai middle class. In M. Pinches (Ed.), Culture and privilege in capitalist Asia (pp. 230–250). Routledge. Paasilinna, S. (2016). Women’s reserved seats in Bangladesh: A systemic analysis of meaningful representation. Arlington, VA: International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Pineo, R. (2016). Progress in Bolivia: Declining the United States influence and the victories of evo morales. Journal of Developing Societies, 32, 421–453. Powley, E. (2006). Rwanda: The impact of women legislators on policy outcomes affecting children and families. UNICEF “The State of the World’s Children” Background Paper. Schwindt-Bayer, L. A. (2009). Making quotas work: The effect of gender quota laws on the election of women. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 34, 5–28. Spender, P. (2015). Gender quotas on boards—Is it time for Australia to lean in? Deakin Law Review, 20(1), 95–122. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2019). World Population Prospects 2019: Volume II: Demographic Profiles. https://population.un.org/wpp/Pub lications/Files/WPP2019_Volume-II-Demographic-Profiles.pdf. United Nations Development Programme. (UNDP). (2019). Human development report 2019. http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2019.pdf. UN Women. (2013, August 13). Revisiting Rwanda five years after record-breaking parliamentary elections. https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/8/feature-rwanda-women-in-par liament. Wängnerud, L. (2012). Why women are less corrupt than men. Good government: The relevance of political science (pp. 230–250). Edward Elgar. Warner, G. (2016, July 29). It’s the no. 1 country for women in politics—But not in daily life. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/07/29/487360094/invisibilia-no-one-tho ught-this-all-womans-debate-team-could-crush-it. World Bank. (n.d.). Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%)—Rwanda. The World Bank. Retrieved June 1, 2020, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL. ZS?locations=RW. World Bank. (2019). Women, business and the law 2019: A decade of reform. World Bank Group. Wylie, L., & Shoker, S. (2019). Cuba: Women’s complicated political participation and representation. In S. Franceschet, M. Krook, & N. Tan (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of women’s political rights. (pp. 405–419). Palgrave Macmillan.

Chapter 8

Social Policies as Vehicles of Transformation for Women in India: Review of Post-Globalisation Era Rekha Mistry and Anuj Ghanekar

Introduction The low status of women constituted a problem in almost all human societies and appeared today as a central concern in human development. Social construction of gender in terms of differentiation in gender roles, gender attributes, and gender expectations is elementary to the understanding of the status of women in Indian society. This would lead to the understanding of women’s social, legal, and ideological position and their rights as a “human being” and privileges in a society. Women’s status result from their traditional and constantly changing situation in a society. The changes in the status of women is directly associated with factors like socio-cultural traditions, economic development, educational achievement, social security, and political participation. Literature review showed the concept of “status of women” had been elaborated differently. According to Dixon (1978), it means the extent of women’s access to social and material resources within family, community, and society. Committee on the Status of Women in India (GOI, 1974) defined it as women’s power and authority within the family and community and the prestige commanded from other male members or the position in the social system distinguishable from, yet related to other positions. As suggested by United Nations (1975), it is the extent to which women have access to knowledge, economic resources, and political power as well as the degree of autonomy they have in decision-making and making personal choices at crucial points in their life-cycle. The enhancement of women’s status principally implies the amplification of the scope of participatory rights in society. As much R. Mistry (B) MSW Programme, Department of Sociology, Veer Narmad South Gujarat University, Surat, India A. Ghanekar UGC Junior Research Fellow, School of Health Systems Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_8

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well-adjusted the opportunity structure for men and women, higher their status of women in society as they can perform more functions (Krishna Raj, 1986). Women’s status in society can be identified based on different empirical indicators determining aspects like sex ratio in society, health and nutrition outcomes, economic and political participation, women’s control over resources, mobility and their safety against any forms of violence, exploitation, or discrimination. These are the most important parameters to measure and compare women’s position in society as compared to men and to define women’s status. There have been many vital agents of enhancement of status of women—reforms, state policies, economic development, education, women’s movement, empowerment of women, etc., towards equality. This chapter examined the transformation of women in the light of social policies. This chapter firstly reviews the gender inequality persistent in Indian society in different spheres of life, ranging in different historical periods. Secondly, the current status of women is described observing the progress across some key indicators in time-frame of Post-Globalization and Liberalization in India. Thirdly, an analysis with a gender lens is done to understand the social transformation and subsequent recommendations to policy makers for holistic empowerment of women.

Roots in Indian History: A Snapshot India owns the complex history and cultural heritage of more than 3000 years. Multiple powers have ruled the country and different religions, heritages, ethnicities, and ideologies have always been flourished in India. The status of women possessed differential qualitative dimensions of historicity of India is examined. There is so much variability in the way women were positioned in society, during different time periods that it is difficult to generalise the argument. The plight of women in India ranges from household level disparities to societal oppressions. However, it can be observed that the subordination of women in society acts a structural constraint to their participation in various activities. Kumari (2011) opines that in Vedic times, the glimpses of equal status of women can be found to some extent in religious and educational context. There were also many noteworthy women scholars of the past such as Kathi, Kalapi, Bahvici, Maitreyi, and Gargi. Women also participated in sacrificial rites and had to be men’s equals in upholding “Dharma” (one’s righteous duty). In Rig-Veda (oldest among Vedas), the husband and wife seem to have occupied equal status—both of them were designated as “Dampati”. In the Post Vedic period of Indian culture, the overall status of women in family and society had been low. Various societal and structural factors resulted into this low status—patriarchy and male domination, economic dependence of women over men, various caste restrictions, religious prohibitions and prejudices, and illiteracy. Some intrinsic factors also included the lack of leadership quality, low self-esteem and apathetic and indifferent attitude of men. During pre-colonial period, India

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witnessed many anti-women social practices like sati (woman sacrificing her life after’s husband’s death), child marriage, and restrictions on widow marriage, became a part of social life. Despite of such anti-women elements, some women excelled in the fields of politics, literature, education, and religion. There was much unrest among women in India during colonial period. The period of 1920’s were a period of social and political awakening in India, followed by intense efforts by social reformers to change the existing social evils related to women. Women like Savitribai Phule, Pandita Ramabai, and Ramabai Ranade put tremendous efforts for empowerment of women. Many women have also given immense contribution in freedom movement of India. Thus, the issue of women’s status, which had long become the focus of social reform, was also reflected in a series of political and legal enactments relating to or affecting women after independence. India has shown disproportionate sex ratio with less proportion of female population as compared to male. Even today, women in India constitute less than fifty per cent of the total population. Women’s status, by and large, is of general subordination to men in societies known for the perpetuation of cultural heritage and tradition. India is a multicultural society with a great diversity having various forms of social hierarchy and inequality like caste and class. Women’s role, rights, norms, values, customs, etc., are greatly influenced by religion, institutions of family, marriage, kinship, descent, inheritance, caste hierarchy, and other cultural traditions. In short, it can said that women in India have been experiencing “Gender Inequality” in various forms can be labelled as socio-cultural problems (Ahuja, 1993). This gender inequality is evident in different spheres of life like education, health and nutrition, livelihoods, and social-political participation. The structural gender inequality is further exacerbated by cross-cutting themes of age, caste, religion and ethnicity, occupation, socio-economic class, urban–rural background etc.

Post-Independence Social Policies in India Shaping the Status of Women Gender is a social construct. Being social construct, gender issues are influenced by social fabric of the national social policies, play an important role in addressing gender issues. India is among the few developing countries where the status of women is specifically discussed in the central goals of development and social policies. Postindependence, Constitution of India provided women the social, economic, political, and legal rights as number of articles show commitment of the constitution (Table 8.1). Various women centred legislations by state too have protected women against social discrimination, violence, and other social evils. Some examples of this involve Equal Remuneration Act (1976) for equal pay, Hindu Marriage Act (1955), Child

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Table 8.1 Articles in constitution of India focusing on equality of women Article 14

Guarantees to all Indian women equality

Article 15(1)

No discrimination by the State

Article 16

Equality of opportunity in matter of public appointments for all citizens

Article 39(d)

Equal pay for equal work

Article 15(3),

special provisions to be made by the State in favor of women and children

Article 51(A) (e) Renounces practices derogatory to the dignity of women Article 42

State supposed to make provisions for securing just and humane conditions of work and for maternity relief

Marriage Restraint Act of (1976) against child marriage, The Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (1956) making sexual exploitation as cognisable offence, Dowry Prohibition Act (1961), Medical Termination Pregnancy Act (1971) legalising abortion on humanitarian or medical grounds by qualified professional, Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act of 1986 and the Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1987 against women’s exploitation and The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (2005). India has also ratified and endorsed many international conventions to secure equality rights like Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1993), The Mexico Plan of Action (1975), the Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies (1985), the Beijing Declaration as well as the Platform for Action (1995) etc. Gender specific Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals set by United Nations had also been timely adapted by India as an agenda. Critical enquiry of women empowerment in India has been timely shown by various commissions, research, and development indices. The Report by National Committee on the status of women in 1975 marked the first comprehensive official attempt in contemporary times to study the status of Indian women and recommend changes to improve it. The report highlighted that despite constitutional guarantees the roles, rights, and participation of women in all spheres of life were limited. Five year plan documents from planning commission are important documents to analyse the programmatic interventions for women’s status (GOI, Planning commission, various years) Social policy towards gender equality in India has witnessed a paradigm shift from welfare approach to empowerment approach from the sixth plan (1980–1985) onwards. The sixth plan (1980–1985) initiated this shift from “welfare” to “development” recognising women as participants of development and not merely as objects of welfare. The plan adopted a multidisciplinary approach with a special thrust on health, education, and employment. Accordingly, several programmes were introduced to create employment opportunities for women in agriculture, animal husbandry, small scale industries etc. The successive plans also focused on empowering women. The seventh plan (1985–1990) approach was to instill confidence among women and bring about an awareness of their own potential for development. A significant

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step in this direction was to identify/promote the “Beneficiary-Oriented Schemes” (BOS) in various developmental sectors which extended direct benefits to women. Voluntary organisations and educational institutions were fully involved in launching organised campaign to combat the evils of dowry and harassment of women. Also, during the same time, the preparation for a new Educational Policy marked occasion for gender advocacy and education for women’s equality within the National Policy on Education. Government of India’s decision National Perspective Plan also wanted increase in women’s participation and presence at decision-making levels—in local self-government bodies, state assemblies, and Parliament. India adopted the New Economic Policy in 1991 with an emphasis on Globalisation, Privatisation, and Liberalisation. These have influenced the thinking and philosophy of social services in India. With the introduction of neo-liberal policies private participation has increased in the production of goods and services in all sectors including services like health care and education. This change also affected women’s status as well as government approach to look at it. Eighth plan (1992–1997) adopted the strategy to ensure that benefits of development from different sectors do not bypass women. Special programmes were launched to complement the general programmes. Another important mile stone was the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments for encouraging women to participate in governance. The Ninth Plan (1997–2002) declared the “Empowerment of Women” as one of the nine primary objectives of the Plan and the transfer of control of social infrastructure in the public sphere to women’s groups as a strategy of the Plan. Ninth Plan directed both centre and states to adopt a special strategy of “Women Component Plan” through which not less than 30% of funds/benefits are earmarked by all women-related sectors. National Nutrition Policy (1993), Pradhan Mantri Gramodaya Yojana (2000–2001), National Population Policy (2000), National Policy on Education (1992), and National Agriculture Policy (2000) also made significant attempts to mainstream gender concerns during the Ninth Plan period. The National Health Policy 2001 promised to ensure increased access to women to basic health care and commits highest priority to the funding of the identified programmes relating to women’s health. During the Ninth Plan period, several new initiatives were taken as part of the Reproductive and Child Health (RCH) Programme (1997). The National Policy for Empowerment of Women (NPEW) 2001 was approved by the Government. The Tenth plan (2002–2007) advocated multiple initiatives for social and economic empowerment of women as well as the gender justice. Gender budgeting is another tool introduced to track gender sensitive public investments in 2005–2006. Since then expenditure division of the ministry of finance has been issuing a note on gender budgeting as a part of the budget circular every year. This gender budget statement comprises two parts—Part A and Part B. Part A reflects Women Specific Schemes, i.e. those which have 100% allocation for women. Part B reflects Pro Women Schemes, i.e., those where at least 30% of the allocation is for women. The Eleventh Five year plan (2007–2012) emphasised on the creation of an environment for women that is safe and free from violence. It advocated regular

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campaigns to prevent female feticide, physical abuse, trafficking, gender discrimination, and domestic violence. The 11th Plan recognised that a nation will be healthy if women are healthy and it suggested measures to combat anemia and malnutrition among the adolescent girls and infant mortality. This plan is also known for the gender sensitive allocation of public resources (Kaur, 2018). The vision for the twelfth Five Year Plan (2012–2017) was to improve the position and condition of women by addressing structural and institutional barriers as well as strengthening gender mainstreaming. The Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD), Government of India was established as a separate Ministry on January 30, 2006 carving out of Ministry of Human Resource Development. It is the nodal ministry for all matters pertaining to development of women and children in the country. The vision envisaged was “Ensuring overall survival, development, protection and participation of women and children of the country”. The National Mission for Empowerment of Women (NMEW) was launched by the Government of India on International Women’s Day which aimed to provide a single window service for all programmes run by the Government for Women under the aegis of various Central Ministries. Several policies and programmes are introduced for reducing the gender gap. The policies related to the Promotion of education among the girls was identified as an important strategy which have a direct influence on capabilities of women. The Government of India with the National Policy on Education-1986, revised in 1992 proposed national education system to play a positive interventionist role in the empowerment of women, fostering of development of new values through redesigning of curriculum, textbook, training, and orientation of teachers. It aimed at vigorous pursuit to eliminate sex stereo-typing in vocational, technical, and professional education at different levels and to promote women’s participation in non-traditional occupations, as well as in existing and emergent technologies (GOI, National Policy on Education 1986). Recent National Education Policy (2020) advocated gender sensitive approach (GOI, National Policy on Education, 2020). Expenditure of both central and state governments on education, health for the marginalised groups and disadvantaged groups has increased from 14.4% of the total plan outlay in sixth plan (1981–1985) to 34.7% in twelfth plan (2012–2017). Eleventh plan has seen a major jump from Rs. 3473.91 Billion to Rs. 11,023.27 Billion. During twelfth plan an amount of Rs. 26,648.43 Billion was allocated. During 2014–2015, social service expenditure was 7.3% of the GDP and out of this major part was (3.1%) spent on education (Mahendevada, 2020). Some recent examples of specific gender related social policy where all women in India have voting rights as well as decision-making opportunities in legislations. According to the Indian Economic Survey (2019), there had been considerable improvement for women in areas of decision-making. India is one of the few countries which has enabled this. India scored high rank on the political empowerment subindex by World Economic Forum report (2016). Various acts to prevent gender based discrimination, government schemes and measures like Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao, Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana, mission Indradhanush, and mandatory maternity leaves are implemented meticulously. Flagship initiative “Beti Bachao Beti Padhao” has

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been instrumental in improving the Child Sex Ratio at birth in 104 out of the 161 districts has been implemented in. The government has also introduced programmes focused on young women such as the “Mudra Yojana Scheme for Women” which helps them start new enterprises or businesses without mortgaging an asset.

Status of Women in India in the Light of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Other Key Development Reports in Last Five Years Most recently, the commentary on women empowerment in the light of SDGs is crucial as it matches with world-wide and nation-wide agenda. Sustainable Development Goal 5 (SDG-5) from 17 SDGs determined by United Nations stands for Gender equality–“Achieve Gender equality and empower all women and girls” (UN, 2015). Targets under SDG-5 focus on three key areas1.

2. 3.

Ending all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere and eliminating all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres, including trafficking and sexual and other types of exploitation. Eliminating all harmful practices, such as child, early, and forced marriage and female genital mutilation. Provision of public services, infrastructure, and social protection policies and the promotion of shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally appropriate using different methodologies to provide economical access to women.

Latest SDG India Index Baseline Report by NITI Aayog (2019) provides India level index for all SDGs. It categorises two goals which need special attention and gender equality goal is one of those red zoned goals. Other than the states and UTs of Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh—all other states lied in the red zone or the “aspirant zone”. This implied that these states haven’t started performing in any sort of progress towards gender equality. The four states that don’t lie in the red zone, lie in the “performer” (yellow) zone, barely above the aspirant zone. No state in India has qualified the gender equality achiever or even the front runner position. This also reflects in India’s position in first ever SDG Gender index (2019) calculated at International level. The Index was developed by Equal Measures 2030, a partnership effort of regional and global organisations. This index measured progress made in achieving gender commitments against internationally set targets, where India was ranked 95th out of a total 129 countries. India’s score of 56.2 meant that it is among 43 countries which fall in the “very poor” category. India scored the highest in health (79.9), followed by hunger (76.2) and energy (71.8) while performed poorly are partnerships (18.3), industry, infrastructure and innovation (38.1), and climate (43.4).

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The Human Development Report (2019) also addressed the question of inequalities in terms of unequal distribution of wealth and power. South Asia was found to be having the widest gender gap in HDI. According to this report, more Indian men and women were showing biases in general social norms and indicating the persistent gender inequality. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap index, India is in 108th position (WEF, 2016) and it stands at 125th out of 159 countries in the Gender Inequality Index (Human Development Report, 2016). According to World Economic Forum, India is behind in Gender Gap Index than its neighbours like China, Srilanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh. According to WEF report, the mean years of schooling for girls is 4.7 years whereas for boys it is 8.2 years. Girls are often withdrawn from school after they reach puberty and their education or skill training is cut short owing to various socio-cultural causes. Social institutions play an important role in perpetuating gender gap. The role of social institutions is reflected in the Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI, 2012) of India at 56th position out of 86 countries. Thus, India’s position in terms of gender equity needs much improvement while considering its international ranking in recent years.

Transformation Through Social Policies The situation of women in Indian context represents a classic case of policies driven social transformation. Women in India have been in the process of transformation in past few decades. Different policies, programmes, legislations, and special initiatives have been rolling to achieve the vision of gender equality. Additionally, women as a subgroup is separately considered in other sectorial initiatives like poverty elimination, food security, primary education, healthcare, housing, water, and sanitation. Social transformation is different from conventional social change. Social change implies changes in human interactions and relationships that transform cultural and social institutions. While Social transformation is systematic approach applied to social change. It can be defined as the process by which an individual alters the socially ascribed status of their parents into socially achieved status for themselves. It is a philosophical, practical, and strategic process, to effect revolutionary change within society (Nazhath, 2015). To build commentary on the social transformation, it is important to review the outcomes of all the constitutional provisions, legislations, policies and programmes, and International commitments, in the light of specific human development indicators as follows: Focusing on status of women in India, this analysis tried to identify differentials across last three decades in seven thematic areas, namely—(1) Demography, (2) Health and survival, (3) Nutrition, (4) Education, (5) Employment (6) Safety and Protection, and (7) Participation, freedom, and mobility. This analysis was based on

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secondary data from Population Census of India, National Family Health Survey, Sample Registration System, National Crime Records Bureau, and recent reports published by agencies. This must be noted that, considering the scope of chapter, attempt has been made to discuss only key indicators and broadly highlighting the sub-group disparities (Table 8.2).

The Thematic Area-wise Key Implications Demography The child sex ratio has declined from 945 in 1991 to 927 in 2001 and further to 914 in 2011. The proportion of missing daughters can be described in the possibilities of growing incidence of female feticide. (Subramanian & Corsi, 2011) The body of literature shows the preference for sons over daughters manifests itself in shaping their lives and reflects in discrimination against daughters in provision for food, health care, and education (Ganatra & Hirve, 1994; Mishra et al., 2004; Pande & Astone, 2007; Ravindran & Mishra, 2000).

Health and Survival Comprehensive Maternal health is an important aspect for increasing equity and Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is considered a vital indicator to assess the health status of women. National Health Mission has strategically invested to prevent and treat maternal deaths (MOHFW, 2012). Past three decades have seen encouraging progress in culmination of preventable maternal deaths. MMR declined gradually from 556 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 113 in 2016–2018. SDG target of India for MMR is 70 per 100,000 live births by 2030 while as per National Health Policy 2017, the target for MMR is 100 per 1, 00,000 live births by 2020 (Government of India, 2017). Also, challenge of disparities within India in MMR and healthcare access between regions and socio-economic classes also needs to be addressed (Ali & Chauhan, 2020; NITI Ayog, 2020). Even though there is improvement in proportion of mothers accessing antenatal care from 37% in 2005–2006 to 51% in 2015–2016, urban–rural gap prevails. Only 45% rural mothers accessed this service against 66% urban mothers in 2015–2016. For preventive services like the number of antenatal visits and the type of services provided during these visits, there are considerable state differences too (Arsenault et al., 2018). Adolescent pregnancies is another indicator directly associated with health while indirectly deriving scenario of child marriages to certain extent. There is a considerable reduction in the teenage pregnancies and increase in the age of delivery of first child. The decline has occurred from 12.1% in 200,506 to 5.2% in 2015–2016.

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Table 8.2 Outcomes and implications of policy initiatives as per specific national level indicators Thematic area

Key Indicator considered

Demography

Child Sex ratio

Health and survival

Education

Economic status

Safety and Protection

Participation, freedom and mobility

Value

Source Census of India (Various years)

1991

945

2001

927

2011

914

1990

556

1997–1998

398

2004–2006

254

2011–2013

167

2016–2018

113

2005–2006

12.1

2015–2016

5.2

Women whose Body Mass Index (BMI) is below normal (BMI < 18.5 kg/m2)

2005–2006

35.5

2015–2016

22.9

Per cent of women with anemia

1998–1999

51.8

All women age 15–49 years who are anemic (%)

2005–2006

55.3

2015–2016

53.1

Literacy rate for female (in %)

1991

39.3

2001

54.2

2011

65.5

Age specific Attendance Ratio among children aged 6–17 years by gender in urban India

2005–2006

76.1

2015–2016

88.0

Work participation rates for Female (in %)

1991

22.3

2001

25.7

2011

25.5

Crimes against women (in lakhs)

1996

1.15

2001

1.43

2007

1.85

2011

2.19

2017

3.59

Maternal Mortality Ratio (women dying during child birth per hundred thousand live births) Teenage Pregnancies

Nutrition

Year of reference

Women having a bank 2005–2006 or savings account 2015–2016 that they themselves use (%)

Source Various official reports

15.1 53.0

Sample Registration System (SRS) by Registrar General of India (RGI) (Various years) Indian Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and MoHFW (Various years) National Family Health Survey rounds

Census of India (Various years)

NIUA-UNICEF (2020)

Census of India (Various years)

Government of India. Ministry of External Affairs. National Crime Records Bureau (various years) Indian Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and MoHFW (Various years) National Family Health Survey rounds

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Nutrition Maternal nutrition plays a significant roles in the proper nutrition, growth, and development of child, including future socio-economic status of the child. Reports of NFHS and WHO have timely highlighted the rates of malnutrition and anemia among adolescent girls (future mothers), pregnant and lactating women, are alarmingly high in India (Lim et al., 2012; WHO, 2016). According to UNICEF data, one-third of women in India in their reproductive period are malnourished. They give birth to malnourished babies and this becomes a vicious cycle for the generations (Jain & Pathak, 2002). However, as far as longitudinal progress is concerned, the decline in percentage is observed in NFHS rounds 3 and 4. Proportion of thin women has been decreased from 36% in 2005–2006 to 23% in 2015–16, as per the body mass index (BMI), an indicator derived from height and weight measurements. The reported anemia as per NFHS in Indian women seems to be revolving from 51 to 55% in last three decades. There was an average decrease of only 3.5 percentage points in iron deficiency anemia in NFHS rounds 3 and 4. Eight states failed to reduce their burdens (Delhi, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala, Meghalaya, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh) (Rai et al., 2018).

Education Education for women implies improvement in health, nutrition, and economic status of household, which is nothing but a micro-unit of the economy of nation. The literacy rates of women have shown an improvement from 39.3 to 54.3% of the total female population between 1991 and 2001, and further to 65.5% in 2011. However, women achieve far less education than men. According to Census 2011, the male literacy rate is higher than female literacy rate by 17%. Data disaggregation shows some rays of hope, for example, age specific Attendance Ratio among children aged 6–17 years by gender in urban India has been improved from 76% in 2005–2006 to 88% in 2015–2016 (UNICEF & NIUA, 2020). However, disparities across regions and social groups need to be addressed as women’s education can be impediment for social and economic development of country (Gupta & Yesudian, 2006; Das & Pathak, 2012).

Economic Status Economic growth in Post-Globalisation era was expected to create opportunities for the participation of women in employment. However, data for work participation rates for females are discouraging in general and in comparison with males, even

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though it shows slight increase from 1991 till date. Data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) endorse that (ILO, 2014). For instance, when the Indian economy grew by 7% between 2004 and 2011 but female participation declined from over 35% to 25%. It’s also noteworthy that on one side increase in access to education and gender parity is achieved in education over the past few decades and on other side, women work participation is declining. Other datasets support it too. Employment among currently married women age 15–49 has declined from 43% in NFHS-3 to the current 31% NFHS-4. ILO attributes this to three factors: increasing educational enrollment, improvement in earnings of male workers that discourages women’s economic participation, and the lack of employment opportunities at certain levels of skills and qualifications discouraging women to seek work. Further, social dilemmas associated with these trends like duel burden of educated working women who often face the competing demands of home and paid work could be more significant aspect for discouraging women for employment. Kapsos et al. (2014) argued that the factors like social norms have limited occupation choices for women. The positive outcomes reflect improvement in trends of earning cash income by urban women, for example, ILO reports. The share of women who are married below 18 years has declined from 45.6% in 2005–2006 to 28% by 2015–2016 (NFHS-4).

Safety and Protection “Crimes against Women” include the crimes which are directed specifically against Women although women may be victims of any of the general crimes like murder, robbery, theft etc. NCRB data reported increase in crimes against women gradually over last three decades. Data from NFHS-3 and NFHS-4 also revealed only a marginal reduction in the percentage of women reporting domestic violence. Regional crosssectional studies depicted further nuances, say, very few Indian women who experience spousal violence seek help. In a study conducted by Mistry (2016), 68.10% of the respondents would oppose the action of violence against them. However, very few (15.9%) expressed that they would complain to police. This implies women need for social security from family which compels her not to disclose conflict outside the family. This belief points out social stigma attached to seeking police help. Such studies must be used as evidence to plan programme interventions by pin-pointing the exact needs. Various social factors need to be researched to cultivate the exact picture of women’s safety and protection. The education and economic empowerment can be called as two key drivers for the increased self-respect of an individual and in turn, ability to raise the voice against domestic violence. Trends in case of other forms of exploitation also need special attention. The 2006 Prohibition of Child Marriage Act has seen numbers of early marriage declined; however, the country still has the highest numbers in the world, and early marriage of girls represents 47% of all marriages (WHO, 2013). Due to socio-legal interventions, there is an improvement in the age at marriage. The average age at marriage of girls

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has increased from 17.2 years to 19.2 years from 2001 to 2011 (Census of India, 2011).

Participation, Freedom, and Mobility To combat gender inequality in politics, the Indian Government has instituted reservations for women seats in local governments. However, India ranks 20th from the bottom in terms of representation of women in Parliament (WEF, 2012). As far as voting rights are concerned, trends are encouraging than situation before. (Kapoor & Ravi, 2014) For example, women turnout during India’s parliamentary general elections in 2014 elections was 65.63%, compared to 67.09% turnout for men. Decision-making about investing on property or owning of the property are another reference indicators at household or micro level. In a study conducted by Mistry (2016) among economically empowered women, very nominal respondents (only 5.8%) said to spend on purchase of the property. This entails women’s limitation in buying and owning property, further it indicates the limited control over assets among economically empowered women. It may be due to structural and functional pattern of Indian society. Disparities can be found in women’s participation and mobility trends too. The percentage of women reporting freedom is high among educated and employed women. According to NFHS-4, nearly 50% of women do not have freedom to visit market, health care centre, and relatives living outside their village by themselves. NFHS Survey shows some other encouraging trends too in relation with mobility, freedom, and participation. There is an increase in the percentage of women who have bank account used by themselves increased from 24 to 61% in urban areas and 11 to 48.5% in rural areas. It has increased with education and health status of the family. The share of women reporting joint decisions regarding spending money increased from 55 to 58% in urban and 57% to 63% in rural India. To summarise, it can be stated since pre and post-Independence, the Government of India (GOI) has showed great concern towards various social issues faced by women. GOI made various policy-acts, in the field of health, education, security, employment, participation in decision-making with guidelines for strict implementation of programmes to uplift the status of women at par with men. However, owing to various social-cultural reasons the aimed targets have not been achieved equally for all women. Hence, it is a point to ponder for achieving higher targets in gender equality for all the concerned.

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Recommendations Discussion on key policy recommendations has been categorised as some sector specific recommendations and generalised recommendations applicable for all thematic areas.

Thematic Area Specific Key Recommendations • Universal, accessible, and effective healthcare services must be provided eliminating regional and within group disparities. A special focus should be given in states which don’t perform well in terms of crucial key indicators. The services should be aimed to achieve “health for all”. The current pandemic has disproportionately affected women’s health. Policy interventions must include such context in design and implementation. • Policies, schemes, and programmes related to women education must work towards achieving the goal of education for all. Policy focus must be shifted from “universal enrolment” to “universal attendance” as many girl students have been enrolled but they don’t necessarily attend schools due to gender burden in household work. Existing acts like Right to Education must encompass secondary schooling to prevent dropouts. • Social policies should be aimed at reducing occupational segregation in India such as discouraging discriminatory employment practices. • Immediate legal actions are especially needed in matters related to crimes against women, gender discrimination, and all forms of women’s exploitation. Integrated approach would be needed to plan and execute the interventions for protection of women against crime. Only “curative” systems like police and judiciary would not resolve the magnitude of problems faced by women. The Government, International organisations, NGOs, academia, and neighbourhoods itself must join hands for collaborative actions. The coordinated approach must focus on preventing the crime rather than post-crime actions. • Women empowerment is the means and end. Elements which are integral to the process of empowerment are process of Conscientisation, Participation, and Organisation, which can be accomplished through bringing change in the immediate environment. It is a multidimensional and interlinked process of change in power relations. Economic empowerment of women will help them to achieve greater autonomy, self-reliance in the household and in their personal development, and decision-making power.

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Generalised Recommendations • State’s role in the liberalised Indian economy is to formulate the gender sensitive policies and making appropriate investment. For example, investment in establishing high quality crèches at work place which are accessible by organised and unorganised sector workers, maternity benefits to mothers, and social security to vulnerable women. • State has an important role in addressing “gender inequality” where social investments in collaboration with the private sector and civil society are desirable, for instance, creating more job opportunities, provision of affordable and effective healthcare, education for all etc. • There is a need for auxiliary efforts in gender-aware intervention to strengthen the foundations of justice, equality, and participation of women is required. • The Volunteer Organisation/civil society can take up the work of the implementation of various government schemes, monitoring and evaluation in collaboration and coordination with police department, legal framework, and welfare departments. • Civil society must actively join hands by being “gender sensitive” through transformation of micro-units of society like workplaces, neighbourhoods, families, and social institutions like schools, health facilities etc. • Gender equity awareness campaigns must be the lens of any community engagement programme. Such campaigns will be the building block of gender sensitive neighbourhoods and social institutions. • Special focus should be given to mainstreaming the vulnerable groups of women like migrant workers, scheduled caste and scheduled tribes, homeless women etc. A focus should be disaggregated on adolescent girls as often they remain hidden and invisible in policy discourse. • The well-structured social institution of family should be strengthened to address the special needs of women. It can be done by working with the powerful societal factors and social customs like early girl marriages, dowry, and societal perception about women’s capabilities, for example, which impede in bringing gender equity in almost all walks of life. • Family system is a significant socialising agent and it needs functional changes for upliftment of women. Young women’s parenting ideology must be shaped up in a different way by Social Workers, educators, and community practitioners. Women can only bring changes in society as she being the core member of the family socialises children in their formative years to adopt roles suitable to their gender. • Changes in the society is possible only by fostering attitudes of receptivity towards new ways of doing things. The culture of silence of Indian women has forbidden even the female members of society from extending their assistance to other women to cope with difficult situation. • To make women active partners to create the holistic social development in a true sense as a goal, various stakeholders have to take leading role as an educator

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and practitioner in directing and implementing various strategies for fundamental implication of human rights and social justice through transformation of social structure at all the three levels, micro, mezo, and macro. To combat all the social and economic gender inequalities, empowerment is seen as pivotal process. As a means of empowerment, social mobilisation process involves continuous awareness campaigns about women’s situation, discrimination, rights, and opportunities as the first step towards gender equality. The mindset of society need to be changed for different conflicts experienced by specific group of women. Professional Social work practitioners should give priority to gender inequality and elimination of it as the starting point for working with women at individual, group, or at community level. Upholding the rights of women, promoting freedom from oppression, encouraging women to speak for themselves, listening to what women have to say and assisting in creating alternative life- style, integrating theory and practice, valuing women’s contributions, and respecting the individuality and uniqueness of each woman should be the universal goal while working with women. Information Communication Technology (ICT) must be widely used to promote information and news with women and related to gender appropriate matters. Importance of ICT will increase multi-fold benefits in the post-COVID world. Behavior Change Communication (BCC) programmes are needed to ensure long term and sustainable change. Evidence based knowledge needs to be developed based on ground level reports. This can be the thrust of programme interventions. Joint conscious efforts should be a commitment to non-discriminatory practice and non-gender blind approach in personal and professional life and in taking up researches on issues of social equity to generate data base for influencing policy formation. Every government should prioritise goal oriented programmatic interventions as far as SDG-5 targets is concerned for holistic social transformation of a woman in reality and society at large across all thematic areas.

Conclusion Bringing women into the mainstream of development is a major concern of the Government of India (GOI). The Indian constitution resolves to secure social, economic and political justice, liberty, equality, and dignity to every person. The political and legal efforts have been initiated through formation and implementation of various special acts related to women to grant equality to and empowering women. The main thrust of development efforts in post independent India has been reflected in five year plans. The development policies have been reflected a transition of approaches to dealing with women’s concerns. The process of development should prioritise women’s health, education, political rights, and economic empowerment. SDGs and targets are inter-related and seen as a whole. Redoubled efforts are urgently

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needed particularly in Gender equality. To experience the real change, need to have policies which deal with gender bias, and a cultural shift as well whereby women are empowered through education to stand up for their rights, take leadership roles and challenges. In short, to develop their capacity to participate as equal partners in cultural, social, economic, and political system of a society. Multidimensional efforts from all directions put together to ensure women to live with dignity all the time is the fundamental right of all human beings. Women need to be empowered so as to act as agents of social change and development. Ministry of women and child development still requires giant efforts in framing social policies and effective implementation of the same. All efforts should be directed for creation of enabling environments to bring changes in social attitudes are required to achieve gender parity in all dimensions.

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Chapter 9

“The West Betrayed?”: Buddhism, the Lady and Xenophobia in Myanmar (Burma) Donald M. Seekins

In a simple world, where good and evil are clearly defined, the West, or at least the liberal West, were “betrayed.” Betrayed by whom, you ask? By Burma (or Myanmar), or more specifically, by (1) Burmese Buddhists, especially their spiritual guardians, members of the Sangha or monkhood; (2) Aung San Suu Kyi, known to the world as “The Lady,” who after decades of preaching human rights and democracy not only to her own people but to the outside world (“use your freedom to help us gain ours”), turned her back on Burma’s most persecuted people, the Muslim Rohingyas1 ; and (3) an array of former foes of the State Peace and Development Council, who suffered persecution, jail and exile during the SPDC’s years in power but lined up to support both the post-junta Army-State and Daw Suu Kyi for their refusal to recognize the Rohingyas of as citizens of Burma, even dismissing their persecution as “fake news.”2

1 In 2016, Daw Suu Kyi requested to the United States ambassador Derek Mitchell that he not refer to the Bengali-speaking Muslim residents of Rakhine State as “Rohingyas”—a kind of Orwellian “erasure” of that group’s identity. 2 These include not only Aung Zaw, managing editor of The Irrawaddy on-line magazine, who was arrested and jailed by the junta after 1988 and established The Irrawaddy, one of the most important dissident publications, in exile in Thailand, but also (according to the magazine): U Tin Oo, founding member of Daw Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy; Ko Ko Gyi, a veteran of the Eighty-eight Students’ Generation Movement; Min Ko Naing, the most renowned of the 1988 student leaders; and even U Win Tin, NLD founding member who spent twenty years in junta jails and was a mentor to Daw Suu Kyi. All of them agree that—in Min Ko Naing’s words—“the [self-identifying Rohingya] are not one of the 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar.” “Analysis: Using the term ‘Rohingya.’” The Irrawaddy on-line www.irrawaddy.com, September 21, 2017, accessed September 23, 2017.

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“The Face of Buddhist Terror” On July 1, 2013, Time magazine published a cover article about the “militant” monk, Ashin Wirathu, describing him as the “face of Buddhist terror” for his anti-Muslim hate speech, which had inflamed incidents of Buddhist-on-Muslim violence not only in Rakhine State but throughout the country. He was quoted as saying: “You can be full of kindness and love, but you cannot sleep next to a mad dog.” And “if we are weak, our land will become Muslim.”3 Among westerners who supported the Burmese people’s struggle against the SPDC junta, this has created a good deal of cognitive dissonance. Isn’t Buddhism supposed to be a religion of non-violence, peace, and compassion? And aren’t monks living embodiments of those ideals? Yet after incidents of communal violence in 2012 and 2013, Wirathu made himself the most prominent Buddhist monk in Burma, eclipsing those much more favorable images of brown-robed Buddhist monks marching in the streets of Rangoon during the September 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” or their active role in bringing relief to victims of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 at a time when the SPDC, comfortably housed in its landlocked new capital of Naypyidaw, was indifferent to their plight. But the situation of Buddhism in post-junta Burma cannot be accurately summed up by the ugly face of Wirathu. He was criticized by other prominent monks, including U Gambira, a leader of the “Saffron Revolution” and founder of the All Burma Monks’ Alliance, and a fellow monk-activist leader U Thawbita, who expressed disgust at Wirathu’s obscene remarks about United Nations human rights investigator Yanghee Lee during her visit to Burma in January 2015 (calling her a “whore,” and worse): “the words used that day [by Wirathu] are very sad and disappointing. It is an act that could hurt Buddhism very badly.”4 Moreover, the officially recognized body of senior monks in Burma, the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (SSMNC, also known as Ma Ha Na, the Burmese acronym), established by the dictator Ne Win in 1980, criticized Wirathu for his extremism and even banned him for a time from preaching.5 In November 2020, just before the General Election which gave Daw Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy a second landslide victory, Wirathu, who had been underground, turned himself into the authorities on charges of sedition after he criticized her government.6 Thus, we can see that on the ground, Buddhist politics is complicated and everchanging.7 3

Hannah Beech. “The Face of Buddhist Terror.” Time Magazine, July 1, 2013. Donald M. Seekins. Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). Second edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017: p. 533). 5 See Mike Ives. “Ultranationalist Monks in Myanmar, Facing Crackdown, Say They’re Unrepentant.” The New York Times, nytimes.com, May 26, 2017, accessed October 9, 2017). 6 Myo Min Soe. “Myanmar’s Ultranationlist Monk U Wirathu Turns Himself in After a Year in Hiding.” The Irrawaddy, November 2, 2020, at www.irrawaddy.com accessed March 31, .2021. 7 Based on interviews with local residents, the International Crisis Group’s report, “Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar,” September 2017, describes in detail attempts by the SSMNC to rein in 4

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This is not merely a contrast between “bad” monks like Wirathu who advocate violence and seek to advance their own ambitions and “good” monks who sincerely try to adhere to the dhamma, the Buddha’s teachings. The situation among both Buddhist monks and lay people is much more complex and (morally) ambiguous and has deep historical roots. Outside of a few scholars and specialists, westerners have tended to view Buddhism through a rose-tinted glass of ignorance. While over the centuries, western Christians have vilified Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism, Buddhism has often been viewed positively, depicted as rational, tolerant, non-violent, and conducive to true mental cultivation. While there are many Buddhist monks and lay people in Burma who affirm these positive images, over the centuries many others have been violent, much like their counterparts in other Buddhist countries such as China, Japan, and most recently, Sri Lanka. In other words, the tendency, widespread in the West, to view Buddhism as a kind of ethereal spirituality has precluded understanding of the religion as immersed in conflict-filled human societies.8

The Faces of Buddhism in Post-Junta Burma Everyone familiar with Burma knows the little phrase “to be Burmese is to be Buddhist.” Although this simple assertion ignores local complexities and ambiguities such as the coexistence or syncretism of Buddhism with other religions, especially Hinduism and nat or spirit worship, an estimated ninety percent of Burma’s population of 54 million are Buddhists, the great majority of these Buddhists adhering to the Theravada tradition. Over 400,000 males are members of the Sangha as well as around 30,000 un-ordained “nuns,” known as silashin. In addition, Buddhist meditation centers for lay people are extremely popular.9 Most people familiar with Burmese history also know that a “crisis” has existed in Burmese Buddhism since the beginning of the British colonial occupation of the country in the nineteenth century. After the annexation of Upper Burma in 1885 and the colonizers’ decision to abolish the Burman Konbaung Dynasty, the colonial regime severed the centuries-old mutually supportive or symbiotic relationship between the state and the sasana, the religion, and replaced it with a secular, modernizing and globalizing regime as a province of British India. It also opened up the country to settlement by large numbers of Indian Hindus and Muslims (including Wirathu and the Ma Ba Tha, the most prominent Buddhist “extremist” group. See pp. 10, 11, 15, 16, 17. 8 Probably, the strangest example of the over-idealization of Buddhism in the West was the “Zen industry” in 1950s America, whose propagator was D. T. Suzuki, author of Zen and Japanese Culture, who during World War II was a promoter of an aggressive, militarist form of Zen that was used to legitimize Japanese imperialism. See Brian Victoria. “The ‘Negative’ Side of D.T. Suzuki’s Relationship to War.” The Eastern Buddhist, 41:2, 97–138 (2010). 9 See Ingrid Jordt. Burma’s Mass Lay Meditation Movement (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2007).

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many of the Rohingyas), as well as smaller numbers of Overseas Chinese and a tiny elite of British and other Europeans. Although the mainstream of the Burmese struggle to gain independence from colonial rule was led by the secular Aung San and his Thakin comrades, who were deeply influenced by socialist ideas and disapproved of the mixing of politics and religion, militant monks and their lay supporters remained a vital component in the evolution of modern Burmese nationalism from the beginning of the twentieth century.10 U Ottama, one of the most eminent monkactivists of the colonial era, preached that monks should undertake political struggle against the colonizers before attempting to achieve nibbana (nirvana).11 With the exception of the Ne Win regime during 1962–1980, which was socialist and secular, post-colonial governments have attempted to restore this traditional symbiosis in some form: the parliamentary government of U Nu, which amended the 1947 Constitution in 1961 to make Buddhism the state religion; Ne Win himself, who convened an assembly of senior monks and established the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee (Ma Ha Na) in 1980, placing monks under a state-controlled hierarchy similar in structure to Ne Win’s top-down Burma Socialist Programme Party; and the State Law and Order Restoration Council and its successor the SPDC (1988– 2011), whose military leaders sought to affirm their legitimacy with the Buddhist majority by undertaking a “Buddhist building boom” of pagodas and other holy sites which culminated in the raising of a new hti or finial on the summit of the revered Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon in 1999 and the construction of a Shwedagon replica, the Uppatasanti Pagoda, at Senior General Than Shwe’s new capital of Naypyidaw during 2006–2009. That the SLORC/SPDC junta’s Buddhist “works of merit” failed to win support for the regime is evidenced by the activism of thousands of members of the Sangha during the “Saffron Revolution” demonstrations in 2007, which were suppressed only when the Army-State arrested, detained, and even killed monks and their lay supporters.12 Perhaps even more than during the long period of military rule (1962–2011), the post-junta era that started with the implementation of the 2008 Constitution following the General Election of November 2010 has been a period of disorienting change that has been deeply unsettling to many Burmese. And as in the colonial and post-colonial past, they have perceived this economic and social change as endangering core Buddhist values that—nationalists claim—comprise a coherent national identity. But this is reflected not only in hate speech and violence directed against Muslims, but in a variety of social movements inside Burma that can be defined more positively as both benefiting ordinary people and preserving the Buddhist religion. Ashin Wirathu’s career as a troublemaker is closely identified with two groups, or movements: “969” and the Ma Ba Tha, or the Association for the Protection of

10

See Donald E. Smith. Religion and Politics in Burma (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965: pp. 38–116); and Alicia Turner. Saving Buddhism: The Impermanence of Religion in Colonial Burma (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2014). 11 Seekins. Historical Dictionary, p. 414. 12 . Ibid., pp. 467, 468.

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Race and Religion. Until it was banned in 2013 by the Ma Ha Na, the “969” movement encouraged Buddhist lay people to boycott Muslim businesses and patronize those owned by co-religionists.13 Thereafter, it transformed itself into the Ma Ba Tha and began campaigning for “Protection of Race and Religion Laws” that were successfully passed by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, the Union Parliament, in 2015. These were: 1.

2.

3.

4.

the Population Control Law, which empowered the government to promote birth control in areas of the country where birth rates and maternal and infant mortality were high; this measure has been interpreted as focusing especially on Muslim areas, where birth rates are higher than among Buddhists or adherents to other religions; the Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, which requires local government approval for interfaith marriages involving a Buddhist woman and a nonBuddhist man, and the latter’s promise not to attempt to force his wife to adopt his religion, or to denigrate Buddhism in any way; the Religious Conversion Law, which requires that anyone wishing to convert from one religion to another have an interview with local authorities in order to gain their permission; and, the Monogamy Law, which makes it a legal offense for a man to have more than one wife, to cohabit with an unmarried partner or be unfaithful to his wife, with penalties as severe as seven years’ imprisonment.14

Although all of these laws can be interpreted as directed against Muslims, especially the bans on easy conversion from one religion to another and polygamy, and they were criticized internationally for limiting Burmese women’s freedom of choice in religion and personal life, what the International Crisis Group labels as “female nationalists”—including silashin or Buddhist “nuns” as well as lay women—demonstrated in favor of the laws, which they saw as protecting the rights of Buddhist women against being forced by Muslim spouses to convert to Islam or endure polygamy. In other words, these laws, which to many outsiders seemed oppressive and discriminatory, were seen by many Burmese, especially Burmese women, as measures to defend their “traditional” autonomy and freedom.15 A loosely structured association of individuals and groups nationwide, one of Ma Ba Tha’s strengths was its success in carrying out social service activities in one of Southeast Asia’s poorest countries. These include promotion of Buddhist education (e.g., the Buddhist Sunday Schools Movement, where children gain basic knowledge of the religion) and cultural activities in a country where state-provided educational and cultural facilities are still dreadfully inadequate, providing food and other forms of aid through Buddhist monasteries affiliated with Ma Ba Tha, disaster relief in 13

“969” stickers were often placed in the front of the shops and stores of Buddhist merchants or in the windows of Buddhist taxi drivers, the numbers referring to the Three Gems of the religion. Seekins, Historical Dictionary, pp. 401, 402. 14 International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power,” pp. 11, 12. 15 Ibid., pp. 12, 13.

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a country where floods, earthquakes, and fires are frequent and special attention to improving the position of women, especially in rural areas, educating them about their rights and traditional freedoms. Ma Ba Tha has been especially active in providing legal aid for women, getting them redress in cases of domestic or workplace abuse.16 Thus, although Ma Ba Tha, like the “969” Movement before it, is committed to curbing and even eliminating Muslim influences inside Burma, many of its activities seem to have been constructive and indeed protective of people’s rights, especially women’s. In fact, according to the International Crisis Group, the group has overall proven more effective in advancing social welfare than the National League for Democracy, which constituted a challenge to the continuation of Daw Suu’s socalled “de facto” leadership. For one thing, the NLD tended to be highly centralized and inflexible, which limited its effectiveness in carrying out social service, legal or educational work on the grassroots level. Into this “vacuum,” the Ma Ba Tha moved energetically, its legitimacy enhanced by its close association with Buddhism and highly respected Buddhist monks, of whom Ashin Wirathu is only one.17 Ashin Wirathu was critical of Daw Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy, accusing them of being secretly pro-Muslim though offering no concrete evidence.18 During the run-up to the General Election of November 8, 2015, he supported the “pro-government” Union Solidarity and Development Party, though, being a member of the Sangha, he could not comment directly on politics. The stunning election victory of the NLD both in 2015 and in 2020 seems to indicate that the majority of voters did not listen to him or other likeminded “extremist” monks: in 2015, Daw Suu Kyi’s party won 57% of the popular vote and 79% of elected seats in the Union, state and region legislatures.19 In 2020, the NLD won 83% of all seats. However, the crisis in Arakan, especially the “terrorist” Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army’s attacks on security forces in 2016 and 2017, has made the Muslim issue toxic and was probably a major factor in her decision to remain silent on the persecution of the Rohingyas. Despite her popularity as reflected in the election results, she could not afford to be seen as pro-Muslim and in fact did not put up any Muslim NLD candidates in the November 2015 election. Two Muslims ran on the NLD ticket in 2020. There was suspicion that Ma Ba Tha might have been involved in the assassination of Ko Ni, a prominent lawyer and advisor to the NLD on Muslim issues, who was shot at Rangoon airport on January 29, 2017. Although no evidence of this was (apparently) found by the government, the Ma Ba Tha was under pressure from the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, or Ma Ha Na, to disband. Ma Ha Na ruled that Ma Ba Tha could not be recognized as a legitimate Sangha organization because of its political activities, and in response the group underwent an organizational reshuffle and changing of names, resulting during 2017 in the establishment of the 16

Ibid., pp. 20–22. Ibid., pp. 23–27. 18 Seekins, Historical Dictionary, p. 570. According to Wirathu, the fighting peacock symbol of the NLD is “not a real fighting peacock, but a peacock fighting for Muslims.”. 19 International Crisis Group, “Buddhism and State Power,” p. 14, fn. 62. 17

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Buddha Dhamma Parahita Foundation and the founding of a separate, and lay personrun, nationalist party known as the “135 Nationalities United.”20 The cat-and-mouse game played by Ma Ha Na, which while having senior Buddhist monks as members is seen widely as a government tool, along with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in the cabinet, and Ma Ba Tha and other “militant” Buddhist groups are motivated by the state’s desire to keep the latter under some control but not suppress them, which would cause a huge negative popular reaction. This again is evidence of the complexities of Buddhist “politics.”21

The Lady and Her Vicissitudes Even more than the monks, Daw Suu Kyi’s “betrayal” has wounded western hearts. Her admirers in the West have viewed her not only as an intrepid defender of human rights and democracy, but as a “bridge person” connecting East with West and most gratifyingly finding familiar themes such as respect for the individual and human rights in the unfamiliar context of Buddhist tradition.22 Western feminists have admired her for embodying both strong will-power and an “Asian” femininity and dignity that give her a decidedly “exotic” attractiveness.23 After the Rohingya crisis (actually the third, or even fourth, “Rohingya crisis” since 1978) began and Daw Suu Kyi remained silent, many irate people in the West called for revocation of her Nobel Peace Prize, which was awarded to her in 1991 while she was under house arrest. St. Hugh’s College in Oxford, where she studied politics, philosophy, and economics in the 1960s, had already removed her portrait from its premises and the city of Oxford revoked her “key to the city.” In a sense, the atmosphere among western former fans of Daw Suu Kyi was not unlike the oppressiveness of military rule which Daw Suu Kyi so long opposed: a person who was “once a hero,” could become “less than zero” almost overnight.24 Chief among her western critics has been Peter Popham, author of two generally admiring biographies on Daw Suu Kyi: The Lady and the Peacock and The Lady and the Generals. In a September 2017 article published in the British Independent 20

Ibid., 16, 17. Matthew J. Walton. “Misunderstanding Myanmar’s Ma Ba Tha.” Asia Times, www.atimes.com, June 9, 2017, accessed October 9, 2017. According to Walton, Ma Ha Na is regarded by people as “a rubber stamp for former military governments” and is concerned with “protecting the image of Buddhism writ large.” (p. 4). 22 Aung San Suu Kyi’s most eloquent attempt to harmonize (western) human rights with the Buddhist tradition is found in her short essay, “In Quest of Democracy.” pp. 163–179 in Michael Aris, ed. Freedom from Fear and Other Writings (London: Penguin, 1991). 23 See Tamara Ho. Romancing Human Rights: Gender, Intimacy and Power between Burma and the West (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2015: pp. 64–91). 24 During my interviews with Rangoon residents more than a decade ago, the phrase “once a hero, now less than zero” was often used by informants to describe the fall of SPDC Secretary-1 Lt.-Gen. Khin Nyunt in October of 2004. 21

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newspaper, Popham writes that Daw Suu Kyi’s silence, or weak reaction, to the army’s massive violation of human rights in Rakhine State, is something of a mystery given her cosmopolitan background: It is possible that she has become a Buddhist bigot, but there is little on the record to indicate that’s true. Suu Kyi lived for more than 20 years in multicultural England. Her first serious boy-friend at Oxford University was a Pakistani fellow student. Hindu and Muslim South Asians were her closest university friends. One of the key figures in persuading her to dive into the democracy movement was Maung Thaw Ka, a Muslim and a best-selling writer who later died in jail. There is little evidence that she has shed the liberalism of a lifetime.25

Popham seems to have forgotten that an impressive curriculum vitae, including life as the daughter of Burma’s ambassador to India, an Oxford education and service at the United Nations in New York, does not necessarily reflect her deepest convictions or values. Indeed, a long term expatriate such as Daw Suu Kyi, married to a local national, fluent in the host nation’s language and familiar with its culture on an unvarnished, daily basis, is often the very one who develops the deepest doubts and disillusionments about her “adopted” country, in her case the United Kingdom. And one can easily imagine that as a Southeast Asian not all of her encounters with Britons or westerners in general were pleasant or friendly ones, though her life on the higher echelons of British academic society may have shielded her from the worst home-grown bigotry, a bigotry that has grown more virulent in recent years with the successful campaign of the Brexit movement to take Britain out of the European Community. The western media described Daw Suu Kyi as facing a dilemma: she could speak out against the Tatmadaw’s persecution of the Rohingyas and face the wrath of the Army-State, which could sabotage her progress toward a democratic Burma, or remain silent to allow the seeds of democracy to take root despite the Army-State’s gross misuse of its power. But another way of describing her dilemma is to say that she is caught between the dilemma of sacrificing her credibility with the international community, which has faithfully supported her until now, and alienating the Burmese Buddhist voters who in 2015 (and 2020) brought her National League for Democracy Party to power, among whom prejudice against Muslims is strong and widespread. In other words, she could have remained “one of us” in the eyes of westerners, or become “one of them,” supporting ordinary Burmese Buddhist voters with all their politically incorrect prejudices against Muslims. Hence, the bitter feeling of betrayal on the part of western observers, who wanted so much to believe that she was, when all is said and done, “one of us.” As I shall explain in more detail below, Daw Suu Kyi’s fateful decision to bring herself and her National League for Democracy Party in late 2011 into the armydominated political system defined by the 2008 Constitution was a leap of faith— or perhaps a leap of despair—that with the increase in tensions between Buddhist and Muslim communities inside Burma has not turned out well. To use a stronger metaphor, her undertaking a “political” career with the ultimate goal of amending the 25

Peter Popham. “As Aung San Suu Kyi’s biographer, I Have to Say That the Only Good Thing She Can Do Now Is Resign.” The Independent, September 8, 2017.

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Constitution and becoming president of the Union of the Republic of Myanmar can be seen as drinking deep from a poisoned chalice.26 Whether she saw this as a choice or as an inescapable and unpalatable concession to the all-powerful Army-State is very difficult to say. The seeming near unanimity of many veterans of Burma’s past struggles for democracy such as The Irrawaddy’s Aung Zaw in denying the Rohingya legitimate membership in Burma’s multi-ethnic society might seem to be motivated by their fear of the military authorities. While such persons may have had much to lose from openly criticizing the Army-State, it is also unclear that any of them advocated citizenship or any other kind of rights for the Rohingyas prior to the relinquishing of power by the SPDC junta in early 2011. In other words, their opinions about the Muslim minority have probably never changed.

The Army-State and Its Victims: Buddhist and Christian as Well as Muslim Terrible human rights violations, instigated by the Tatmadaw and Rakhine Buddhist mobs in Rakhine State, have taken place. According to an October 16, 2017 report by Reuters, around 536,000 Rohingyas had fled Burma for Bangladesh since August 25, when the “terrorist” Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked security forces and provoked what Reuters calls a “ferocious military response.”27 Refugees’ accounts of murder, rape, the torching of villages, and other communal violence seem to be consistent.28 If only because the Army-State’s history of handling the Rohingya and other minority peoples has been so bad, even before the assumption of power by Ne Win and his Revolutionary Council in March 1962, I believe that what is happening now is indeed “ethnic cleansing.”29 Twice before, the Tatmadaw was responsible for driving Rohingyas out of Rakhine State into Bangladesh: first in 1978 during “Operation Nagamin,” when the army, searching for illegal immigrants, caused a panicked exodus of between 200,000 and 300,000 Rohingyas out of the country; and then in 1991–1992, when an estimated 280,000 of them were forced to flee. 26

Ibid. According to Popham, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton “pressured” her to agree to entering politics under the 2008 Constitution, though she “loathed” it. 27 Reuters. “Thousands of New Refugees Flee Violence, Hunger in Myanmar to Bangladesh.” Published in The Irrawaddy, www.irrawaddy.com, October 16, 2017, accessed October 16, 2017). Note that The Irrawaddy names the refugees “self-identifying Rohingyas.”. 28 See the Reuters report, “UN report Details Brutal Myanmar Effort to Drive Out Half a Million Rohingya.” The Guardian (UK), www.theguardian.com, October 11, 2017; and Jeffrey Gettleman. “Rohingya Recount Atrocities: They Threw my Baby into a Fire.’” The New York Times, www.nyt imes.com, October 11, 2017, both accessed October 11, 2017. 29 See Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe’s The Shan of Burma: Memoirs of a Shan Exile (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987: pp. 96–136), for a description of the systematic abuses of power by the Tatmadaw under Ne Win during the 1950s, when Prime Minister U Nu was in power.

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Moreover, since communal violence between Buddhists and Muslims broke out in 2012, some 140,000 Rohingyas have been confined to what amount to concentration camps, unable to return to their homes. Thousands more of them have sought refuge in other countries by becoming “boat people,” many of whom were lost at sea or abandoned to die in the jungle.30 What we tend to forget now is that since the 1950s in Shan State, the “Four cuts” have been the one-size-fits-all response of the Tatmadaw to ethnic or religious minority opposition, or even their mere existence, as the case of the Rohingyas shows even before the appearance of “Muslim terrorists” (the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, or ARSA) in Rakhine in 2016–2017.31 The “Four cuts” have been practiced on people regardless of their religious identity. Relations between the Burman Buddhist-controlled Army-State and indigenous Buddhist minority groups have been far from harmonious. In the mid-1990s, for example, following the retirement of drug warlord Khun Sa and the breakup of his powerful Mong Tai Army, the Tatmadaw began a brutal policy of forced resettlement in central Shan State that involved some 300,000 people, most of whom were Shan Buddhists, with numerous accounts of the rape of Shan women and the shooting of people who tried to return to their home villages.32 In southeast Burma, both the predominately Mon Buddhists and many Karens who are Buddhist—along with Christian and animist Karens—have been targets of repeated military pacification campaigns, with over one million Shans, Mons, Karens, Pa-Os, Karennis. and other ethnic minorities finding refuge in Thailand. Even a portion of the “turncoat” Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, which broke away from the mainstream Christian-dominated Karen National Union in 1994, refused to give up its arms to the Tatmadaw and renamed itself the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army.33 Indeed, the history of continued suppression of these Buddhist, Christian, and animist ethnic groups in the name of “National Unity” has been a major reason why a viable Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement proved so illusive even after the National League for Democracy party formed a parliamentary majority in 2016. Few if any minorities trust the Army-State, or for that matter Aung San Suu Kyi, whose father Aung San founded the Tatmadaw, to which she has said on numerous occasions she feels “very close.” Perhaps of all Burma’s minorities, it is the Kachins of the far north (represented by the Kachin Independence Organization/Army), a majority of whom are Christian, who most regret their making a cease-fire with the junta in 1994: junta-related groups have come in and stripped Kachin State of its jade and gold resources, drug abuse has become a debilitating problem, especially among Kachin young people, and the KIA 30

Seekins, Historical Dictionary, pp. 462, 463. The “Four cuts” (Burmese: pyat lei pyat) were formally adopted in the late 1960s and consist of denying (“cutting” insurgents off from food, funds, information and recruits in disputed areas. Ibid., p. 220. 32 See Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN)/Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF). License to Rape. Chiang Mai, Thailand: June 2002. At www.shanwomen.org, accessed October 19, 2017. 33 Seekins, Historical Dictionary, p. 179. 31

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felt it had no alternative but to resume struggle against the increasingly aggressive Tatmadaw in 2011.34 Often, when the so-called international community begins to condemn human rights abuses in a country, skeptics point out that the situation is “complicated” and in turn are accused of whitewashing the behavior of some particularly odious regime (especially in the Third World). However, in the case of Burma, the situation is both simple and complicated. The simple part is that under the 2008 Constitution, the Army-State that waged war against most of Burma’s ethnic and religious minorities even before 1962 has enjoyed near-total power, and has chosen not to alter its hard fisted suppression of these minorities; the complicated part is the response of Burma’s Buddhist majority to the challenges of living in a multi-religious, modernizing society; and the role of Daw Suu Kyi, erroneously referred to in the international media as “Burma’s de facto leader,” in the tension-filled and unstable relationship between the Army-State and her “democratic” forces in the post-2011 political environment.

The Army-State: Alive and Well Even During “Transition Since the election victory of the National League for Democracy in November 2015, Aung San Suu Kyi was often, if not usually, been described in the world media as “Burma’s [Myanmar’s] de facto leader.” A look at the dictionary shows that this is not at all an appropriate description of her political situation. De facto is defined as “actual... being such in effect though not formally recognized.”35 A synonym for such leaders might be “the power behind the throne,” such as the “retired emperors” (insei) of medieval Japan or the powerful eunuchs who manipulated weak emperors during late Ming and late Qing China. In the British political system, the de facto leader is the prime minister, while the monarch is primarily a figurehead. By no stretch of the imagination could Burma’s “state counsellor,” Aung San Suu Kyi, be considered the “power behind the throne” or capable of manipulating the Army-State from behind the scenes. Daw Suu Kyi is not even the antonym of the de facto leader, the de jure leader, whose role is to be a figurehead despite the fact that real (de facto) power is exercised by someone else. Her title, “state counsellor,” is not mentioned in the 2008 Constitution and was only granted to her by the NLD parliamentary majority in the Union Parliament over the opposition of the 25% of the legislature who are military members appointed by the real de facto (and de jure) leader of Burma, Tatmadaw commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Aside from being a member of parliament, Daw Suu Kyi’s only formal titles were Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education.

34 35

Ibid., p. 284. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, 11th edition, s.v. “de facto”.

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Since the 2008 Constitution grants near-complete freedom of action to the Tatmadaw and its top commanders, especially concerning issues relating to the border areas, of which the Rakhine State is one, it has been the armed forces, not Daw Suu Kyi, who have taken the initiative in carrying out the “ethnic cleansing” of Rakhine Muslims. That she has been assigned the unenviable task of—rather ineffectively— whitewashing persecution of the Rohingyas by the army, border guards and Rakhine Buddhist vigilantes (“fake news”) shows her weak position. Indeed, one wonders what Aung San Suu Kyi was able to achieve in the years from 1988 to 2011, most of which she spent under house arrest. Although she drew international attention to Burma’s plight under military rule and won worldwide backing for the country’s democratization, future historians may consider it strange that while she stalwartly opposed participating in the SLORC-led constitutional drafting process by withdrawing the NLD from the so-called National Convention in November 1995, many years later she decided to support and participate in the Army-State’s new political system which it dominated, and still dominates, completely. Between 1995 and 2011, it seems her supporters who endured jail, exile, ill treatment, and even death at the hands of the military junta suffered and died in vain. In this sense, we can truly understand the meaning of the notion that by agreeing to participate in politics in late 2011, she drank deep from a poisoned chalice.

Conclusion: Back to Square One The coup d’état carried out by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing on February 1, 2021 has brought Burma back to “square one”: Daw Suu Kyi and other leaders of her party were arrested, detained, and served with baseless charges—in her case illegally importing walkie-talkies, receiving cash from foreign sources, and breaking coronavirus social distancing rules; the senior general established a junta, the State Administration Council or SAC, and filled ministry posts with compliant, pro-military figures; massive public protests against the new junta by the people have been met by escalating violence from the security forces, resulting in at least 475 deaths of mostly unarmed demonstrators by late March 2021; and there is talk among dissidents in central Burma of forming a new “federal army” hand-in-hand with Ethnic Armed Organisations such as the Karen National Union and the Kachin Independence Organisation. For good reason, the fashionable term “transition,” so evident in the years following Daw Suu Kyi’s entry into politics in 2012, is no longer used by Burma-watchers. In an interview with the Asia Society a few days after the coup, Scott Marciel, former United States ambassador to Burma, speculated that Daw Suu Kyi failed to take seriously the military’s objections to the 2020 election process, despite their being articulated by Min Aung Hlaing days before the voting. He indicated that crisis

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might have been averted if the State Counselor had not been so complacent over her election victory.36 Aung San Suu Kyi has proven to be a person with major faults, chief among which are her complacency and unwillingness to listen to the advice of others, her insistence on being a “one-woman leader.” In her statements covering for military atrocities and ethnic cleansing in Rakhine State, she betrayed—not her western admirers—but the very democratic and humanitarian ideals she had espoused since she first came to the world’s attention in summer of 1988, the ideals which won her the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is an intriguing and tragic figure. She is endowed with extraordinary courage and indifference to threats to her own life, as is evident from her years under house arrest. Born of post-dynastic “royal” blood (she is the daughter of Aung San, Burma’s independence leader), she seemed often to assume an attitude of entitlement that—she thought—exempted her from taking a critical view of her own political decisions. And her indifference to the suffering of the Rohingyas seems indicates a deep hypocrisy concerning her previous espousal of the highest human rights ideals, expressed in her publications meant for both Western and Burmese readers. But she is also a formidable figure in Burma’s, and Asia’s, modern history. And even if Daw Suu Kyi had been wiser and more circumspect than she was after her 2020 election victory, it remains doubtful that Min Aung Hlaing and his fellow generals would have refrained from launching a power grab at some time. The real mystery of Burmese politics today is not Daw Suu Kyi’s betrayal of democratic ideas, but the sheer indifference of the military toward the suffering of their own people as the death toll steadily mounts in the streets of Burma’s cities and towns and the border areas where ethnic minorities still struggle to survive. March 31, 202137

36

“Three reasons why Myanmar’s Military Launched a Coup: interview with Scott Marciel, former US Ambassador to Myanmar.” Asia Society, February 6, 2021, accessed March 31, 2021. 37 Updated from an earlier version of October 17, 2017.

Part II

Grassroots, Communication and Development

Chapter 10

Borderland Economies, Service Delivery, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Beyond Myanmar’s Moribund Peace Process Bobby Anderson

Myanmar’s history is defined by violence between a relatively stable lowland Bamar core and a fragile non-Bamar highland periphery. The country hosts numerous ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) including the world’s longest-running separatist insurgency. Since independence in 1948, Myanmar has never met Weber’s minimalist definition of a state as the holder of the monopoly of the use of physical force within a given territory. Beginning from a low point in 1948, when Karen separatists were assembled on the outskirts of Rangoon, Myanmar’s army or Tatmadaw grew over the years into a formidable military force as it asserted central control over all lowland areas, pushing insurgents year-by-year into more inhospitable and state-resistant terrain.

The Stalemated Peace Process The Union of Myanmar’s current “21st Century Panglong” peace process seeks to end 70 years of insurgency in the country’s borderlands. Five years after Myanmar’s first ethnic armed organisations or EAOs signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement or NCA, the process is equal parts deadlocked and contested, The first meeting between the Union and EAO signatories, in August 2016, bore few results but was significant in that it actually happened. The second, in June 2017, resulted in agreement on 37 basic principles, but not federalism, equality, autonomy, and the drafting of state constitutions. The process has been subjected to significant criticism, not least from the participants themselves: of the 17 EAOs who signed the NCA, in July 2017 eight came together to form a “Peace Process Steering Team” to evaluate the current NCA, referring to it as a “deviation from the path they had envisioned” (Nyein 2017). This was followed by a year’s worth of postponed meetings. B. Anderson (B) School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_10

161

162 Table 10.1 Insurgent NCA signatory and non-signatory groups

B. Anderson Signatories

Non-signatories

1. Arakan Liberation Party

1. Arakan Army

2. All Burma Students Democratic Front

2. Kachin Independence Army

3. Chin National Front

3. Karenni National Progressive Party

4. Democratic Karen Buddhist Armya

4. National Democratic Alliance Army

5. Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army

5. National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang

6. Karen National Union

6. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army

7. Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council

7. Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army North

8. Lahu Democratic Union

8. Ta’ang National Liberation Army

9. New Mon State Party

9. United Wa State Party

10. Pao National Liberation Organisation 11. Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army South a The

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army is a breakaway faction of the Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army; the latter, for that matter, was a breakaway faction of the KNU

An analysis of NCA signatory group numbers version NCA and non-NCA signatory group memberships reveals the shallow nature of the current process.

Insurgent Numbers Let’s begin with the insurgent groups and their fighters. Measuring NCA participation by the number of groups rather than the number of fighters within groups produces unexpectedly rosy results, with eleven signatories and nine non-signatories (Table 10.1). If we look at armed fighters as a whole, a less sanguine picture emerges. Of a total of 84,660 fighters in the twenty groups, represented in Table 10.2,1 NCA signatories contain 21,560 fighters, while non-signatories contain 63,100 fighters, or 75% of fighters. 1

All fighter estimates in these tables courtesy of the Myanmar Peace Centre: http://www.mmpeac emonitor.org/stakeholders/armed-ethnic-groups.

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Table 10.2 Insurgent NCA signatory and non-signatory group membership National ceasefire agreement signatories #

Other

01

Karen National Union/ KNLA

Max est. 7,000

02

Restoration Council of Shan State/ Shan 8,000 State Army South

03

Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army

04

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (Kloh 1,500 Htoo Baw Battalion)

05

All Burma Students Democratic Front

400

06

Pa-O National Liberation Organisation

400

07

Chin National Front

200

08

Arakan Liberation Party

60

09

Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council

200

10

New Mon State Party

800

11

Lahu Democratic Union

0

NCA total estimated Fighters

21,560

5,000

5,000

BGF

Max est. 100

2,000 reserves

Non-signatories:

#

Other

11

United Wa State Party

30,000

30,000 reserves

12

Kachin Independence Army/ Organization

10,000

Max est. 15,000

13

Myanmar National Democratic Alliance 2,000 Army (Kokang)

14

National Democratic Alliance Army (Mongla)

3,000

15

Shan State Progress Party/ Shan State Army North

8,000

16

Ta’ang National Liberation Army

6,000

17

Arakan Army (Kachin branch-not Paletwa branch)

3,000

18

Karenni National Progressive Party

600

19

National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang

500

Non-NCA total estimated fighters

63,100

Max est. 3,000

Max est. 10,000

If we include credible reserves, the total number of fighters increases to 116,660–23,560 signatory fighters and 93,100 non-signatory fighters. Signatory fighters drop to 20%. If we include estimated increases in non-signatory numbers through recruitment—such as found within the Ta’ang National Liberation Army or TNLA, for example (Davis 2018)—the numbers weigh even more heavily towards non-signatories.

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Who Is a Threat to Peace? Not many of the signatory groups actually possess recent combat experience. The non-signatories have it in spades. The Karen National Union and the Restoration Council of Shan State—the main actors that legitimise the NCA—have it. The New Mon State Party and the Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army/ Democratic Karen Buddhist Army also merit mention, although the former is now a Border Guard Force under Tatmadaw command. The other NCA groups are no longer significant, and a few are historical relics; they have been described by Bertil Lintner as NGOs rather than EAOs. Of the non-signatories, the military refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of many of the groups it is most actively attempting to destroy: namely, three of the four entities which constitute the Northern Alliance, which launched an offensive against the Tatmadaw in late 2016 in Shan State North. The NA is comprised of the Arakan Army or AA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army or MNDAA, the TNLA, and two brigades from the Kachin Independence Army or KIA. Even if the former three wished to sign the NCA, the Tatmadaw wouldn’t let them. The three contain a minimum of 11,000 experienced fighters: adding the KIA to the total brings it to a minimum of 21,000. The Arakan Army deserves special mention (Economist 2020). From inauspicious beginnings as a proxy force founded by the KIA in 2011: AA’s first recruits, David Scott Mathieson (2017) notes, were ethnic Rakhine working in the Hpakant jade mines. Since then the group has grown exponentially in experience and ambition and is fighting the Tatmadaw tooth-and-nail across much of Rakhine and Southern Chin State’s Paletwa Township, killing scores of Tatmadaw and police on a regular basis, while carrying out attacks on Tatmadaw facilities and training centres in other parts of the country far from the lands it contests, as well as assassinating government officials.2

Insurgent Alliances The Northern Alliance, for its part, falls under the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee, or FPNCC, a negotiating block created and led by the United Wa State Party or UWSP—the largest, best armed, and most cohesive EAO in the country, so much so that the Tatmadaw, unlike its behaviour even towards NCA signatories, purposefully avoids provoking them. The Shan State Progress Party and 2

For example, the AA are alleged by the Union to be the murderers of former Mrauk U township administrator Bo Bo Min Theik, stabbed to death and dumped on a roadside next to his torched car in February 2018: https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/police-point-finger-at-aa-over-mrauk-u-adm inistrators-death). A roadside bombing of the Rakhine state minister’s convoy on the Gwa—Sittwe road was attempted in late 2017. AA may have been behind three Sittwe bombings in February 2018, one of which targeted the State Government Secretary.

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the National Democratic Alliance Army—a separate group from the MNDAA—are also FPNCC members. Unlike many an EAO alliance, the FPNCC is proving more durable, and at present it contains, including reserves, 92,000 fighters: the absolute majority of EAO fighters countrywide. The NCA continues to lack substance if it lacks these groups and lacks the means by which to include them. Unable to recognise the elephant in the room, both the military and the civilian government refuse to negotiate with the FPNCC as a bloc. This is an inelegant attempt at “divide and rule”: the continued use of a playbook that has failed the state across the last half-century. The FPNCC, for its part, has suggested a new peace process beyond the confines of the NCA, which frustrated EAOs might embrace. They might force a different settlement.

A Fundamental Difference in Chronology EAOs want a political dialogue about the parameters of a federal state followed by security sector and constitutional reform, after which disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of EAOs (DDR) might occur. The Tatmadaw, fantastically, want EAO disarmament prior to political negotiations. This could also be described as “surrender”. The Tatmadaw make the same demand for the non-signatories it wages war against in the north. The civilian government supports their position, with a government spokesperson suggesting that groups banned by the Tatmadaw should show courage and disarm so they can participate. This is a complete non-starter, and reflective of a lack of sincerity, as well as a page from the abovementioned playbook. In 1981, talks between the KIA and the Tatmadaw fell apart when limited autonomy was rejected. 37 years on, the word federalism is used as a lure, but it is, so far, without substance. That a discussion around it has not even occurred since 2015 reflects an incompatibility of positions. Besides federalism, the Tatmadaw demands that signatories acknowledge the 2008 constitution, which formalised Tatmadaw embeddedness in the civilian government through control of the Ministries of Defense, Border Affairs, and interior/ home affairs; an allotted 25% of parliamentary seats that ensures veto power; and a defined right to seize control of, and disband, an elected civilian government. This obviously discourages EAO disarmament. The few powerful signatories engaged with the NCA with the implicit belief that the process might lead to the reform of that same constitution. Few believe this is now likely, especially after the murder of Ko Ni.

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The Threat of Signatories Leaving the Peace Process Whether the KNU will remain in the current NCA peace process is also an open question. Their acceptance of the agreement was also an acceptance that they would maintain their territories in the southeast, with no government or Tatmadaw encroachment without permission. But the Tatmadaw is extending roads into KNU territory in Papun, Kayin state, and fighting between the two is ongoing. The Tatmadaw’s claim that the roads they are extending will be for civilian, and not military, purposes, is disingenuous. Roads transport troops. The Tatmadaw is violating the NCA through these acts, for all EAOs to see, while paradoxically encouraging others to sign the same agreement they don’t abide by. If the KNU leaves the process, the process may well be over.

The Role of China The FPNCC—the most powerful and significant non-state actor in the country— is implicitly backed by the most powerful state actor beyond Myanmar’s borders: China, which has emerged as the biggest non-Myanmar player in the peace process. Western groups, for their part, struggle to maintain relevance. Times have changed since human waves of Chinese Red Guards overran Tatmadaw positions in Northern Shan State in 1968 and established the area as Communist Party of Burma or CPB stronghold. The CPB leadership’s declared support for China’s “Gang of Four” clique in the power struggle which occurred after Mao Zedong’s death in 1976 backfired when Deng Xiaoping emerged victorious from that struggle: Chinese support to the CPB and other foreign revolutionaries waned as Deng implemented a benign foreign policy focused on trade. Across decades of sanctions, China provided an economic lifeline to the Tatmadaw that, through then-Military Intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt, closely aligned itself with China’s civilian and military authorities. Factionalisation within the Tatmadaw emerged from such alignment, and Khin Nyunt was arrested and jailed in 2004. His faction—and China’s intimate influence—was purged. The Tatmadaw’s allowance of a shift to quasi-civilian government reflected in part the need to diversify foreign relationships, especially in the west. But from a low point of the halting, by then-President Thein Sein, of the US$3.6 billion Myitsone dam project in 2011, China has deepened connections and investment across the country, including the establishment of special economic zones, a port at Kyaukphyu, Rakhine state, and pipelines from there to Yunnan, reducing dependency on the straits of Malacca of oil and natural gas shipments. That pipeline is one reason of many that China needs calm on Yunnan’s western border, where the fighting between non-signatory EAOs and the Tatmadaw is heaviest. Enter the FPNCC, which was created with China’s implicit support. It reflects, in part, recognition in China that the NCA is stalled and either needs a boost or a burial.

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The seriousness in which China takes its involvement is reflected in the appointment of Special Envoy Sun Guoxiang: while the NLD finds itself in the position of untrusted mediator between the Tatmadaw and EAOs, Guoxiang successfully mediates between all three, and it was his diplomacy that led to FPNCC representatives attending the June 2017 Panglong conference, including guaranteeing the safety of the delegation. A consolidation of influence also occurred through the election, in January 2018, of a new KIA leader, N Ban La, who lacked the Christian-influenced sentimentality past leaders had for the west, followed by that group’s membership in the bloc. A resilient FPNCC might result in a transformation of the NCA and Panglong 21 peace process or the emergence of an entirely new process. It falls the those involved in the NCA to demonstrate its worth through substantive discussions of the shape of federalism and autonomy that may be acted upon, and all of this prior to the pipedream of disarmament prior to change. For now, among smaller EAOs, the NCA serves as an ego boost for retirees, while for the larger EAOs, it serves as breathing space.3 The NCA also serves as breathing space for the Tatmadaw: such ceasefires in the past have allowed it to concentrate force elsewhere. In 1994 the Tatmadaw signed a ceasefire with the KIA, in order for the former to attempt to destroy the Mong Tai Army and the Karen National Union. The MTA ended at that time, with its remnants later reconstituted into the RCSS; the KNU was severely weakened. Now it’s the KNU with the ceasefire while force is concentrated on the KIA. For many EAOs, this surely appears cyclical. The breakdown of the 1994–2011 KIA ceasefire due to that group’s refusal to convert itself into a BGF under Tatmadaw command was also the pre-planned end of a ceasefire whose utility, to the military, had ended. Military businesses, for their part, remain deeply involved in natural resource extraction in contested areas, which casts a shadow across the NCA process as well.

Seeing Beyond the Stalemate The peace process seems paradoxically to engender more mistrust with every month that passes. Let’s assume, however, that the Panglong 21 process continues: that the Tatmadaw and the EAOs eventually demonstrate realism and flexibility, and that an agreement on federalism leads to security sector and constitutional reforms that will serve as guarantors of future peace between the lowland Bamar state and its borderlands. Far from being the closing of a chapter, such a success signifies the beginning of a more arduous and insecure process that will likely stretch across generations. It is only after federalism is agreed upon and peace agreements are signed that the process of DDR will likely begin among EAOs and other militias. This process is codified by the United Nations in the Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 3

The Restoration Council of Shan State, for example, is expanding into areas it did not previously control, in order to strengthen its position if negotiations ever attain substance.

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Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards, based on an accumulation of complex and not-always-successful DDR experiences across the 1990s and early 2000s. DDR now stands as a fundamental part of modern peace processes it seeks to address “the post-conflict security problem that arises when ex-combatants are left without livelihoods or support networks, other than their former comrades, during the vital transition period from conflict to peace and development”. Combatants are disarmed, demobilised from armed structures and are supported in their transition to roles in a licit peacetime economy through grants, job training, education, and so on. This process is important so that insurgents, stripped of their ideological justification for existence but still with their illicit funding streams, don’t simply become another organised criminal gang for lack of alternatives. Many—and in some contexts, the majority—of ex-combatants reintegrate spontaneously: the concern is those who do not. In Myanmar, this reintegration process will involve: the disarming of people across economically and infrastructurally undeveloped and geographically remote areas of the state whose livelihood is fighting; the dismantling (or more likely, conversion) of numerous insurgent command structures and the ending of revenues generated by extralegal taxation and other means; and, the absorption of inappropriately skilled combatants into local economies, much of them subsistence, which are also making the transition from illicit to licit. Overall, this is the altering of structures of non-state actor government and governance across areas of the Union of Myanmar, and the imposition of the state, where the Union government has held no sway for generations, if at all.

Numbers An unknown number of insurgents exist in Myanmar. In addition to the tabled figures for NCA and non-NCA signatories above, other non-Tatmadaw fighters exist. Border Guard Forces or BGFs, for example, are EAOs folded into the Tatmadaw command, of which the Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army, with 5,000 fighters, may be the largest. Other former EAOs that have converted to BGFs include the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, which broke away from the above mentioned MNDAA to become a BGF. John Buchanan, in Militias in Myanmar (2016), characterises BGFs as a category of militia, of which there are hundreds—maybe thousands—of such groups, most allied with the Tatmadaw, although a few are allied to the KNU and KIA. That publication notes that Major General Maung Maung Ohn, then head of the Directorate of People’s Militias and Territorial Forces, reportedly estimated that the total strength of the militias, as of 2010, was over 80,000. The highest estimate thus far, from Min Zaw Oo, claims 180,000 militia members in 5,023 groups (Oo 2014). Combining the conservative estimates from Myanmar Peace Monitor which total roughly 117,000 fighters and reserves in the largest 20 or so groups, with the conservative figure of 80,000 militia members, this gives us a minimum of nearly 200,000

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persons who make their living with guns and through such practices as extralegal taxation. This, of course, is an oversimplification; many will be part-time fighters, and may trade or farm, and many have family providing remittances from Thailand and further abroad. Many may also work within operations/logistics and administration in the more complex EAOs, UWSP in particular. But even such applied nuance will still leave a significant number of fighters with inapplicable skills to earn acceptable incomes and engage in meaningful livelihoods, in peacetime.

Continued Absorption of EAOs into BGFs/Tatmadaw We can anticipate that a minority of these fighters will continue to be relatively “demobilised” from their existing command structure and absorbed into Tatmadawaffiliated border guard forces—groups that the Tatmadaw actually pays and equips (unlike Tatmadaw-affiliated militias who are allowed to raise their own funds, and who will become a law and order issue in any future peace). The BGF initiative is very much found within the tenets of DDR: the primary reason it doesn’t emerge in many other contexts, however, is that the military cannot afford the cost of maintaining such forces. The Tatmadaw, however, is able to maintain its border guard forces as part of its “deep state” structure, and the further conversion of EAOs into BGFs will, to both it and the civilian government, be viewed as another pillar of support to the consolidated peace that may emerge from Panglong 21. But the KNU, KIA, and UWSP will likely object, and given their sizes and territories, special accommodations may be reached for some type of “national guard” formation in their respective areas. A second, less plausible option would be to absorb these forces within new “Karen Rifles” and “Kachin Rifles” divisions of the Tatmadaw: something politically untenable for both the EAOs and the Tatmadaw. At present, it is unlikely that the Tatmadaw would accept any large number of insurgent fighters into the mainstream military, much less the officer class. They cannot do so and retain what to its leadership must be its defining Theravada Buddhist and Bamar characteristics, which many a Karen or Kachin or Wa likely refusing to accept a thoroughly Bamar officer class. With these challenges in mind, the most likely outcome is that a significant number of EAO fighters will need to undergo DDR processes if the promise of Panglong 21 is to be met. The manner in which Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration strategies will unfold, especially within the context of Myanmar’s under-developed and illicit borderland economies, remains to be seen, but some predictions can be made.

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Disarmament The government of Myanmar possesses the capacity to undertake disarmament and demobilisation processes. But what it is still theoretically building with EAOs is the trust necessary to engage in such a process. Despite this, the government is unlikely to go down the well-trod path many other states have travelled via the subcontracting of Disarmament and Demobilisation processes to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other UN agencies that have expertise in such work. China’s acquiescence, however, matters here: elements of One Belt, One Road require the stability in Myanmar’s border with Yunnan, and this has been amply demonstrated by the involvement of special envoy Sun Guoxiang in the latest Panglong Meeting. It is unlikely that China would involve itself in disarmament and demobilisation directly; a process under the auspices, not of the EU or DPKO, but of ASEAN, may be more palatable for them. The disarmament aspect of DDR is a technically easy, time-bound process that only requires the will of each entity to engage with the other, under third party facilitation. This may involve insurgent entry into cantonments and dual-key weapons storage after a given peace process reaches a certain pre-defined milestone. The weapons initially handed over will likely be constituted in large part by “museum pieces”, while better functioning weaponry is held back in case Panglong 21 breaks down, or for sale. Implicit in such a process is the building up of state police forces in insurgent areas—often made up of ex-insurgents under state command—in a structure resembling BGFs, but more lightly armed.

Demobilisation and Insurgent Economics Demobilisation of insurgent forces is both a discharging of soldiers and dissolution of the insurgent command structure. In most DDR processes, within the timebound framework that also encompasses disarmament, it is almost purely symbolic: soldiers in formation hand over their weapons on a parade ground in front of press and dignitaries, and are then “dismissed”, one last time, by a commanding officer. The pageantry implies they all go home after. This is disingenuous. Despite claims of demobilisation or conversion, the structures nearly always remain, down to the grassroots level. In less-organised EAOs, these structures are most apparent in financial flows generated by legal and illegal economic activities. Ex-All Burma Students Democratic Front rebel and former MPC director Aung Naing Oo estimated the size of the conflict economy in Myanmar’s borderlands at between US$20 billion and US$30 billion (Ghoshal 2016)—and while conflict will stop, the raising of funds often does not. Many EAOs, namely those with longstanding ceasefires with the Tatmadaw have built up lucrative portfolios constituting of real estate in Yangon and Mandalay, hotels, bus companies, and so on. These are generally in the hands of individual

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insurgents rather than a group as a whole. Extralegal taxation is the norm, with trade taxed at checkpoints, and businesses and even households taxed in many areas. Sometimes, these taxes are used for legitimate ends within complex EAO structures providing services; other times, they are simply protection fees. Often, insurgents exploit natural resources to fund rebellion and charge others for the license to do so: in Myanmar, jadeite, rubies, and timber are especially lucrative. Taxes on jadeite, for example, provided up to half of the KIA’s operating budget (Levin 2014). In border areas, the smuggling of untaxed goods also constitutes a norm, as does insurgent taxes on such goods. Vice is also a popular business, as is gambling, in Kokang and Mongla especially. This also doesn’t stop with a peace agreement, and military businesses also remain deeply involved in natural resource extraction in contested areas, which casts a shadow across Panglong 21. On the furthest end of the spectrum of illegality, select EAO and militia economies are constituted by drug cultivation and processing, namely heroin and methamphetamine. Indeed, some EAOs and militias operate as particularly well-armed criminal syndicates with a thin veneer of ideology masking economic rationales. As mentioned elsewhere, some crime will be tolerated by the authorities, written off as the “price of peace”. A particularly negative example can be found in the experience of neighbouring Northeastern India, where Naga insurgents who rose up against the Indian state in the 1950s developed comprehensive extortion and protection rackets, and engaged in fratricidal wars—more so than they either fought the state or provided services. They and other insurgent groups in Assam, Manipur, and other areas of Northeast India, espouse ideologies to mask the economic rationales of their current activities, and they act as shadow security forces, “descending, despite high-sounding ideals and rhetoric, into a criminalized oligarchy” (Chasie and Hazarika 2009). The Indian state tolerates these behaviours in the insurgents it has treaties with and the groups it is still trying to negotiate with. Yet, another example of tolerated criminality can be found in Indonesian Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra. There, the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or GAM) fought the Government of Indonesia from 1976 until 2005, when a mediated peace process culminated in the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, followed by the 2006 Law on the Governing of Aceh. GAM disarmed and theoretically demobilised; the structure remained in place, with GAM veterans continuing to collect extralegal taxes from individuals and businesses across the province, as well as other organised criminal activities. This is implicitly allowed by the provincial government, with only GAM dissenters from the main GAM corpus declared “outlaws” and killed (Anderson 2013). In Myanmar, peace will also offer lucrative protection opportunities for insurgent structures, especially regarding construction contracts in EAO areas. Improved roads and new businesses will mean more goods and services to tax. These structures will prove durable long after the peace process ends. The government will initially lack both the capacity and the will to police exinsurgents and militias, and the Tatmadaw will not do so either. On the contrary, rogue elements of the Tatmadaw within its regional command structure may engage in the

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same activities, forming new partnerships with EAOs and militias and continuing existing ones. Ultimately, this will be important for a future when the Tatmadaw itself contracts, firstly through its Border Guard Forces. Its affiliated militias, which the Tatmadaw does not finance, will present more immediate law and order problems.

Drug Eradication and Alternative Livelihoods As in Afghanistan, chaos and statelessness in Shan and other areas of Myanmar engender drug production. A key element of DDR is the halting of principal insurgent funding streams, and in select (but not all, the KNU, for example, historically executes drug traffickers) EAO and militia areas, this means opium poppy cultivation and heroin/methamphetamine production. The primary way in which this should be undertaken is the ramped-up targeting of grassroots opium poppy cultivators through alternative livelihoods programmes, which UNODC and partners have implemented for years through introduction of alternative crops and agricultural extension services. If the alternative livelihood process occurs in a cautious manner, then a period of crop introduction and extension services will occur prior to opium poppy field eradication and law enforcement. Drug treatment programmes will follow this process: many poppy cultivators are also addicts. This can result in much economic distress to poppy cultivators: In “The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?” (2007), Tom Kramer notes that, when the UWSP leadership were indicted by the US Department of Justice for drug production in 2005, they launched eradication efforts on their own accord, and this resulted in widespread declines in household incomes, as well as small-scale famine. As opium was the only cash crop in the area, and hardly any other edible crop was grown, farmers didn’t have the ability to purchase rice and other staples. However, a future alternative livelihood process may be less economically painful for these poor households. If it were a seller’s market, no alternate crop would equal the value a farmer can earn from opium, but this may not be the case in Myanmar: the last UNODC Southeast Asia Opium Report (2016) indicates a fall in the opium purchase price which may result from market consolidation. Initial successes in alternative livelihoods might result in buyers offering higher prices, which could eliminate licit gains made in a non-coercive manner. Other administrations have also taken crop substitution initiatives, in Kokang especially, with sugarcane supplanting poppy grown there (Li 2015). A better-funded—and for communities, less beneficial—“alternative livelihoods” model has been pursued by private businesses which are opening rubber and other plantations, and paying local labourers pittances. This exploitative capitalism, disguised as beneficial to former opium cultivators, can lead to exactly the type of instability that more traditional alternative livelihoods programmes seek to avoid.

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Individual Combatant Reintegration The reintegration element of DDR is likely to be seen by Myanmar and China as less politically sensitive. It is also the aspect of the triage that disarmament and demobilisation practitioners avoid, as it is often sub-contracted to the UN sister agency or at the NGO level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are key reintegration implementers, but this does not mean they have been uniformly successful in past endeavors. Reintegration of ex-combatants from insurgent groups into civilian life is not time-bound and is fraught with difficulty, if not failure. When insurgencies end, there often isn’t enough work for civilians, much less fighters, as insurgent areas are distinguished by a lack of infrastructure and undeveloped licit markets. The majority of the economy is illicit, with significant organised criminal activity, as EAOs are regularly excluded from licit markets unless, in the example of the UWSP and others, they control a large enough territory. Most civilians in such areas are engaged in subsistence agriculture or, to a lesser extent, petty trading. There is often also a lack of health and education services, although this was not the case historically in KIA, KNU, and then-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) territories. When it comes to the type of work available to ex-combatants, there is also the issue of pride. Having a weapon taken away, as a soldier, can be a traumatic experience. The work one can do in civilian life when one fought previously cannot just be any work. It has to have meaning. We cannot expect people who have killed and suffered for a cause to become subsistence farmers on their own land, much less land that is not their own, or bicycle-riding vegetable sellers—especially when previously, in addition to fighting, they acted in a tax-collecting capacity (or what in peacetime is referred to as conducting a protection racket) and when the old insurgent structure still exists for them to return to. This is why the recidivism rate among select ex-combatants to violence and crime is high, and why after millions of dollars in reintegration programming in other contexts, only a minority of excombatants identified as problematic by their own structure are engaged in licit work (as a direct result of a programme, be it a job training or grant) after five years. Reintegration of individual combatants will consist of job training, apprenticeships, support to small businesses, and remedial/vocational and technical education. It will be proven that the rural economies of EAO areas do not have the capacity to absorb large numbers of fighters into roles other than subsistence ones. The leadership class of insurgents, on the other hand, will become local politicians and construction contractors for the myriad projects that the union and the Tatmadaw will launch, and non-competitive contracts will likely be awarded to them by the government in order for them to feel that peace is profitable. Such leaders will be able to provide for much less of their rank and file than they would have before the peace. One-time reinsertion payments for demobilised soldiers will be spent quickly and demands for pensions may follow. A particularly expensive example can be found in Timor-Leste, where disgruntled insurgents from the 1975–1999 conflict acted as the foot soldiers for a

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2006 insurrection; since then the government has prioritised veteran’s pensions in order to maintain stability and has committed to paying off select veterans and their descendants through 2122. The Union of Myanmar cannot afford this. And so a certain amount of illegal activity will continue to be committed by the non-integrated rank and file. Extortion and other crimes are often tolerated by the state and the EAO authorities as the price of peace. And so the future peace, for select EAO host populations, might be a cold one, with some insurgents shorn of their ideological justification continuing to feed on communities, while other ex-combatants face the disappointment of local economies that cannot accommodate their peacetime ambitions. Reintegration, crop substitution, extension services, and other livelihood programmes are not only for ex-combatants and opium poppy cultivators. The morass of internally displaced within Myanmar and refugees from Myanmar in Thailand will require not just resettlement but an economic role and livelihood source. The UNHCR and other agencies estimate nearly 100,000 internally displaced in Kachin and northern Shan, and roughly 400,000 in the Karen and Mon areas of the southeast. The government will likely prioritise formerly armed populations for reintegration and livelihoods programming, and will neglect returnees, because in the cynical but pragmatic calculus of authorities, they pose less of a threat. Other aspects of state building in insurgent areas, service delivery and migration in particular, are worth considering, as well as a comparative look at state building in formerly insurgent areas of Northwest Thailand in previous decades. DDR processes are only one aspect of the state building process that will need to occur in EAO areas; durable peace will only arrive when communities in EAO areas discern value in citizenship, and so a distrusted state must deliver health, education, and other services, and offer impartial protections, including the provision of land tenure. Education is particularly important: successful reintegration and enhanced livelihood security in EAO areas are fundamentally a question of human resources, the foundation of which is public schools. Across Myanmar, the educational system is in need of repair, and this is doubly so in many EAO areas. Education is supposed to create citizens as well as workers literate in a common language. A lack of vocational and technical training centres, not only in areas accessible to EAO populations, but in Myanmar as a whole, is also an urgent issue. These matters warrant much greater exploration—exploration that is beyond the scope of this analysis, however. Afghanistan amply demonstrates how both DDR and alternative livelihood programmes fail when they are standalone programmes occurring in areas lacking the administrative, service-oriented, and coercive presence of the state. The process of state building in insurgent areas will occur through an inflow of Bamar civil servants into these areas to deliver services, and this will also lead to resentment. As a rule of thumb, many EAO host populations will not possess the requisite human resource capacity to completely staff education, health, and general administrative posts. Business and capital, some of it exploitative, will follow. Migrants historically dominate local markets in newly colonised areas; Chinese already play this role in Kachin, while Naga markets in Northeast India are dominated by Marwaris and Biharis, and Han Chinese in Tibet. This can also cynically

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play into conflict resolution efforts, if it gives struggling ex-EAOs entities to levy extralegal taxes on. Myanmar’s ethnic minorities—and for that matter, China’s Tibetans, Indonesia’s highland Papuans, Thailand’s hill tribes, and others—know that uncontrolled inmigration will reduce them to minorities, with their cultures and lands subsumed by newcomers. James C Scott’s engulfment—defined as the settlement of loyal (read: docile) populations with an existing “national” identity in areas where such identity was lacking among indigenous peoples—may occur as a part of an unstated but overarching government strategy to dilute the concentration of peoples with separatist tendencies in sensitive areas. Rich historical precedents exist, such as Manchu/ Qing settlement of Han Chinese colonists and soldiers in Southwest China (Unger 1997): Han settlement into areas where they are not a majority has been a Chinese government policy that transcends types of rule, and its continuity from empire to republic to communist dictatorship to the present appears unbroken. Significantly, however, the greater the disruption of the previous demographic status quo, the greater the volatility, as is demonstrated by contemporary anti-state violence in Xinjiang and unrest in Tibet. Controls on migration will likely be sticking points in future negotiations, between the Union and the KIA, KNU, MNDAA, NDAA, and UWSP in particular.

Lessons from Thailand The future settlement of conflicts in Myanmar’s EAO borderlands, either through Panglong or another forum, cannot be predicted, but the contours of a long path can be inferred from the recent experience of Northwestern Thailand, which only became integrated into the modern Thai state beginning in the 1960s. While Afghanistan’s experience demonstrates how reintegration and alternative livelihoods standalone programmes not synchronised within a larger state building and service delivery exercise can often prove futile, Northwestern Thailand’s integration into the Thai state confirms this. The region’s hill tribe regions were developmentally and administratively ignored until the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) based itself there: hill tribe members served as CPT foot soldiers, and the exponential increase in poppy cultivation in hill tribe areas made many Thais perceive them as threats to the state. The government’s defeat of the CPT involved coaxing CPT members to surrender, but unlike Myanmar, the Thai state’s relatively strong position made the process a simpler one than the current context of EAO areas. In Thailand’s opium-growing strongholds, much of them in then-CPT areas, poppy cultivation dropped from 12,112 hectares in 1961 to 281 hectares in 2015, and the opium trade shifted almost entirely to Laos and Myanmar. The historical success of Northwestern Thailand’s incorporation into the state through both counterinsurgency and alternative development in formerly insurgent areas is not attributed to any one factor, but to a combination of many. Opium poppy cultivation there was not halted because substitute crops earned the same income as

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opium. In the Thai case, nothing equaled the price of opium to smallholder farmers, especially those without land tenure and the consequent inability to invest in longerterm crops: in 1984, 15 years after alternative crops and extension services were introduced, cultivation was again peaking, and the Thai authorities introduced forcible eradication and arrests in response. But alternate crops did provide income, especially through Arabica coffee. Despite the interference of middlemen and exploitative contract farming—problems for farmers across Thailand and Myanmar, not simply in opium cultivation areas—farmers did earn a living. But the end of illegality was aided by much more than new crops and price guarantees, and the presence of state security actors. The means by which this once remote area of Thailand was truly integrated into the state was through the provision of health and education services, the extension of roads, the provision of land tenure, and the assignment of civil servants to administer areas they were previously absent from—both the presence of the state, and people’s perceptions that its presence was worthwhile (Anderson 2017). This success took generations. Myanmar’s will as well: if Panglong 21 is a success, then it will only be because it serves as the foundation upon which services and protections for EAO communities are built. If Panglong 21 is the end of a process, rather than a beginning, then it will fail.

Conclusion The negotiated assertion of the power of the lowland state into state-resistant areas continues with the Panglong 21 peace process. Myanmar’s borderland insurgents have replicated lowland state coercive power in order to fight the state. The egalitarianism discussed by Scott and others mainly exists in those armed communities which continue to resist the state, as they form and fracture over time. Many of these insurgents historically protected their communities from Tatmadaw incursions distinguished by violence, flight, and impunity. Like states, they also tax and control the communities they protect. Many have resorted to criminal activities to survive, and also, profit. EAO communities have been caught between a rock and a hard place. Panglong 21 offers them a chance to be relieved of the pervasive insecurity and occasional violence they have been subject to for generations. It offers many of those who represent them less: what we witness in the insurgent offensives that began in Shan in November 2016 may be the last gasp of certain smaller groups and the beginning of serious negotiations between larger entities and the government. That process will see EAOs surrender some powers while retaining others: outlaws will legitimise, and a certain amount of post-conflict criminality from former militia and EAO structures will be tolerated as the price of peace. The peace process, if it works, will not be the end of an era of instability, but rather, the beginning of a different type of insecurity, and expectations must be managed. Transitional justice and other demands will prove to be illusory.

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No one should underestimate the long task ahead of both the government and the insurgents; it will take a generation, at least, before insurgent populations will find a place in licit economies, and before adequate services are provided. No particular programme or step serves as a “magic bullet”. The same infrastructure that will allow troops to travel quickly to quell unrest will also serve to reduce costs for farmers to get their produce to market and reduce times for people to access emergency care. That access, to name one example of many, gives people a vested interest in the state. And in many an EAO territory, that interest is lacking. It is exactly this type of social capital that the state needs to invest in EAO areas that will guarantee peace after Panglong. The state’s presence will be measured not in terms of soldiers but by health, education, markets, and opportunities.

References Anderson, B. (2013, March 13). Gangster, ideologue, martyr: The posthumous reinvention of Teungku Badruddin and the nature of the Free Aceh Movement. Conflict, Security and Development 13(1), 31–56. Anderson, B. (2017, April). People, land and poppy: The political ecology of opium and the historical impact of alternative development in northwest Thailand. Forest and Society 1(1). http://journal. unhas.ac.id/index.php/fs/article/view/1495. Buchanan, J. (2016). Militias in Myanmar. The Asia Foundation. http://asiafoundation.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2016/07/Militias-in-Myanmar.pdf. Chasie, C., and Hazarika, S. (2009). The state strikes back: India and the Naga insurgency. East West Center Policy Studies 52. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/state-strikes-back-indiaand-naga-insurgency. Davis, A. (2018, April 12). Myanmar’s peace process in crisis. Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor. Economist. (2020, April 4). Guerillas with attitude. Economist Online. https://www.economist. com/asia/2020/04/16/an-ethnic-militia-with-daring-tactics-is-humiliating-myanmars-army. Ghoshal, D. (2016, Nov 5). A year after winning power, Aung San Suu Kyi is struggling to transform Myanmar. Quartz India. https://qz.com/825494/a-year-after-aung-san-suu-kyi-won-powerthe-worlds-most-famous-political-prisoner-is-struggling-to-transform-myanmar/. Kramer, T. (2007). The united wa state party: Narco-army or ethnic nationalist party? East West Center Policy Studies 38. http://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/united-wa-stateparty-narco-army-or-ethnic-nationalist-party. Levin, D. (2014, Dec 1). Searching for Burmese jade and finding misery. New York Times. https:// www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/searching-for-burmese-jade-and-finding-misery.html. Li, X. (2015, May 20). Can China untangle the Kokang knot in Myanmar? The Diplomat. http:// thediplomat.com/2015/05/can-china-untangle-the-kokang-knot-in-myanmar/. Mathieson, D. S. (2017, June 11). Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars. Asia Times. Nyein, N. (2017, July 4). NCA Signatories recommend review of peace path. Irrawaddy online. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/nca-signatories-recommend-review-peace-path.html. Oo, M.Z. (2014, Feb). Understanding Myanmar’s peace process: Ceasefire agreements. Swisspeace. http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Media/Publications/Catalyzing_Refl ections_2_2014_online.pdf. Unger, J. (1997, July 1). Not quite han: The ethnic minorities of China’s southwest. Critical Asian Studies 29(3), 67–78. http://psc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/IPS/PSC/CCC/publicati ons/papers/JU_not_quite_han.pdf.

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United Nations. (n.d.). Integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operational guidelines. http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/Operational%20Guide.pdf. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). Southeast Asia Opium Survey 2015. https://www. unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/sea/Southeast_Asia_Opium_Survey_2015_web.pdf.

Chapter 11

The Grassroots Mobilisation After a Large-Scale Disaster: Examining the Effects of Savings Groups in Myanmar Naw Thiri May Aye

Introduction When a large-scale natural disaster occurs, the majority of the affected population loses physical assets, shelters, and employments which are the foundation of the wellbeing in general. In extreme cases, the affected populations may suffer from longterm physical and mental health problems caused by either direct or indirect effects of the hazard, while some may lose their social assets such as losing family and close friends. These elements such as physical and mental health, social connections, and secure shelters are essential components in maintaining positive aspirations. From 2005–2014, a total of 1.7 billion people were affected by natural disasters worldwide (UNISDR, 2018). Geographically, Asia was the most frequently hit region by disasters from 2005 to 2014, as well as the highest in the number of affected victims, among different continents (Guha-Sapir et al., 2016). In the past few decades, over 95% of deaths from natural disasters occurred in developing countries, and the proportion of economic loss is twice as high in low-income countries than in higher-income countries (Zissener, 2010). The United Nations estimated that 85% of the people who are exposed to earthquakes, tropical cyclones, floods, and droughts are living in developing countries. The increasing frequency of natural disaster occurrences is inevitable regardless of the development status of a country. However, developed countries have better infrastructure, a dense network of communication, and transportation systems. In contrast, the rural communities in developing countries are lack communication devices, adequate shelters that can withstand storms and floods, and lack of education on how to protect themselves. The direct outcomes of disaster, the destruction of infrastructures, the erosion of livelihoods, degradation of natural N. T. M. Aye (B) Institut de Ciència I Tecnología Ambientals (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB), Bellaterra, Spain

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_11

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resources, and the loss of human capital hinder the development of the region. Consequently, the degradation of natural resources and food security increased the risk of armed conflicts, internal displacement, human trafficking, poor governance, and economic crisis. Identifying measures to build disaster-resilient community and to maintain and improve the well-being in such communities had become increasingly important especially in the regions which are most frequently hit by natural disasters. Myanmar during the past decades’ faces changes institutionally, as well as noninstitutionalised social transformation. The democratisation during recent years may create opportunities for grassroots mobilisations to respond to the needs and enhances the capabilities of rural people to cope with changes in the natural environment. In this light, this study examines the effects of grassroots mobilisation of the women’s savings groups on recovering from natural disasters, both the economic and physical well-being of disaster-affected people. The study focuses on issues related to the long-term effect of natural disasters on health, such as self-reported health conditions after the hazard, financial security to deal with health problems, the quality of drinking water, and socioeconomic conditions. this study examines in recovering from a major disaster experience in Myanmar after Cyclone Nargis. The Post-Nargis Recovery Preparedness Plan (PONREPP), established by the Tripartite Core Group (TCG), which worked as the governing body of disaster management during the aftermath of the devastating cyclone in 2008, included the restoration of livelihood in cooperation with international funding agencies as well as implementing agencies as one of its components. This element of PONREPP included the promotion of assistance in financial services. The national government, the United Nations agencies, and NGOs carried out many microfinance programmes such as microcredit groups, self-reliance groups, and savings groups as the disaster recovery efforts in the cyclone-hit area. However, there is a lack of evaluation of these informal groups. This paper aims to investigate whether grassroots member-owned microfinance institutions (MOIs), particularly self-organised savings groups, are a good strategy for disaster recovery and to enhance the understanding of community-based organizations in Myanmar. Findings from this study can contribute, to revising current disaster management policies and adopting new strategies to build disaster-resilient communities in Myanmar through mobilisation.

Background Myanmar experiences frequent natural disaster occurrences such as cyclones, floods, and earthquakes. The areas along the coastal line and delta region are prone to suffer from storms and storm surges frequently. Over the last 60 years, 11 severe tropical cyclones hit Myanmar; Cyclone Nargis was the most catastrophic disaster in history. Nargis was a tropical cyclone that devastated Myanmar on May 2nd, 2008 with highspeed winds up to 250 kilometres per hour and a 3.6-metre tidal surge. It affected a total area of 23,500 square kilometres, which included 37 townships in two major

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divisions of the delta region, Yangon division,1 and Ayeyarwady division.2.4 million out of a total population of 7.35 million in the delta region were affected by the disaster. The number of deaths or missing was approximately 138,000; the major cause of death was drowning. 800,000 houses were destroyed or severely affected, and 1,400 schools were destroyed. Infrastructure, farmland, farming tools, ports, fishing gears, livestock, rice mills, fish processing industries, salt industry, SMEs were severely affected by the disaster. Figure 11.1 shows the level of damage in four levels: limited damage, moderate damage, moderate to extensive damage, and extensive and catastrophic damage. Regardless of the cyclone path, the level of damage is highly associated with exposure to the sea. Ayeyarwady Division is the region with the highe st poverty share, with 18.7% of national poverty (UNDP, 2011). The region used to produce rice exports during the 1930s, before World War II, under the colonisation by the British. Compared to the 1930s, when exports were seven million metric tons annually, Myanmar exported only 778,000 tons of rice in 2011 (Boot, 2012). Having favourable conditions for rice and crop agriculture, the Ayeyarwady Delta region is known for the production of rice, and 30% of national rice production is produced in the Ayeyarwady delta region (Kan Zaw et al., 2011). Despite its contribution to the economy, the region remains one of the poorest. Although rice production has increased from the 1980s after market liberalisation and agriculture policy reforms, middlemen and traders have benefited more than farmers, and the improvement of the rural livelihood remains critical (Okamoto, 2008). The disaster made the situation worse for the agriculture sectors and put the region in critical need of rehabilitation. After the disaster, a committee formed by the National Government, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United Nations called TCG (Tripartite Core Group) conducted an impact assessment of the cyclone, which is called Post Nargis Joint Assessment (PONJA). PONJA assessed 283 villages affected by the disaster one month after, to find out the vulnerabilities and needs of the population, the damage on the assets, and the impact on the income. The PONJA stressed serious concern on health issues as the findings show low food security, a decrease in food intake, and 75% of health facilities being destroyed. The TCG instituted Periodic Reviews (PR), a process of assessment on the economic and social situation after cyclone Nargis, and to monitor the whole affected area for effective distribution of aid. The first PR (PRI) was carried out from October to November in 2008. The PRI findings show poor food consumption persists, but some communities showed improved food security from the previous PONJA findings; however, this is only a reflection of external assistance rather than the recovery of food production or purchasing power of the communities. The following PRII and PRIII conducted in the year 2009, found progress regarding health. However, PRIV conducted in May 2010, found that 69% of households out of 653 did not attend a health facility within 12 months, and poor food 1

The country is home to a large number of ethnic groups and it is divided into seven states and seven divisions. States are former feudal states where seven main ethnic groups belonged to and divisions are formed by the geographical position.

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consumption was also found to be persistence in some communities. There is a relationship between food security and impact on the dwellings; households that had their houses destroyed were more likely to have less food security. The households who reported that they didn’t have enough food, the most common strategy was to borrow food or to buy food on credit at least once per week. Among the respondents who did not have enough food, their second most common strategy was choosing less expensive food while other strategies are mentioned as consuming fewer meals per day or skipping meals. Disasters can affect poor households in several different ways; however, these households have a similar pattern of coping strategies in the time of crisis. The economic impacts of disasters on poor households are being identified as the inability to earn income, increased expenditure, loss of income-generating assets, and loss of household assets (Nagarajan & Brown, 2000). One of several common coping strategies is borrowing money from close relatives and friends, informal sources, or microfinance (Parker & Nagarajan, 2000). In the case when financial supports are not available, reducing household consumption is chosen as a coping strategy. Usually, it is often identified with a reduction in food consumption, which in turn leads to poor physical health, and as a result, can affect the well-being in the long-term. The empirical research on the effect of weather shocks in Mexico found that food expenditure is not always more likely to be protected than other expenditures, and child malnutrition is found as a result of a decrease in food consumption (Skoufias & Vinha, 2012). Having access to credit programmes and other welfare programmes can ease the impact of extreme climate shocks by serving as informal safety nets in protecting the well-being of households (Skoufias et al., 2012). After the disaster in the recovery period, many self-help savings groups were introduced as safety nets to provide financial support and food security. This study observed one of the women’s savings groups to evaluate participation in the group help recovers their well-being after the disaster. Microfinance as a disaster recovery tool gained international attention after the 2005 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami. International Humanitarian Organizations saw the potential of microfinance not only in supporting the livelihoods recovery of the disaster-affected people but also strengthening disaster mitigation, preparedness, and emergency relief (Chakrabarti et al., 2005). MFIs face similar constraints as commercial banks in providing financial services to the poor in the time of crisis and can become an underlying factor of exposing its clients to the risk of poverty traps (Parvin & Shaw, 2012). Conversely, other studies argue microfinance had a positive impact on disaster recovery, reducing the vulnerability of the poor. (Zaman, 1999; Hudon & Seibel, 2007; S. Ray-Bennett, 2010; Becchetti & Castriota, 2011). The long-term sustainability of microfinance provided by NGOs and international organisations is questionable due to ownership problems. In many cases, nongovernmental organisations are forced to retreat from disaster-affected communities after some period. As a result of those short-lived experiences, the focus tends to shift from providing needs to providing training, raising awareness, facilitating social capital, or building civil societies. Member-owned microfinance institutions (MOIs), financial institutions owned and controlled by the local people, are useful recovery

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tools in the post-disaster reconstruction (Hudon & Seibel, 2007). Some examples are Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Self-reliance Groups, and Community Banks. MOIs provide the process of development from within and can actively facilitate the process of recovery with technical and financial support from external organisations. Although there had been many studies on the effect of microfinance on disaster recovery, the studies focused on MFIs and Micro-credit programmes managed by NGOs. The effects of MOI programmes, although widely being implemented in disaster-affected areas and being proposed to be a useful component in the disaster recovery process, are still scarcely researched. Microfinance was first introduced in Myanmar in 1997, in the poorest districts of Ayeyarwaddy Division (Bogalay, Mawlamyine Kyun, and Labutta township), five districts in Shan State, and three in arid zone upper Myanmar, and was financially supported by the government and UNDP. Three MFIs, namely GRET (French-based NGO), PACT (USA), and the Grameen Bank were the first three NGOs to introduce microfinance to Myanmar (Myint, 2013). Women’s savings groups in this study are similar to Rotating Saving and Credit Associations (ROSCA) by definition. It was assumed to be remodeled by local and national NGOs, after the Self-Reliant Group (SRG) which was first introduced to Myanmar in 1998 by UNDP. Since UNDP’s model of SRG has many components and integration of services, the NGOs’ facilitated groups are simplified and therefore use different terms. Although the establishment of women savings groups and self-help groups were widely implemented in disaster-affected areas, evaluation of the effects on the disaster recovery process is scarce. The assessment of the women’s savings group on disaster not only contributes to disaster recovery literature but also contributes to the strengthing of grassroots organisations in Myanmar.

The Conceptual Framework: The Vulnerability, Capabilities, and Wellbeing Numerous studies can be found examining the well-being and natural disasters. However, most of the studies explored the physical and psychological conditions of the disaster-affected victims using subjective well-being as an indicator of wellbeing. Using subjective well-being or life satisfaction is regarded as an indicator that lacks future aspirations (Ootegem & Verhofstadt, 2016). Many of the previous studies explored the victims’ present emotions as an outcome of the hazardous event than focusing on the capabilities and positive aspiration of the individuals after being affected by the hazards. Even though the previous studies do not attempt to link the concept of well-being at a deeper level, they exhibit valuable results. A study conducted in Pennsylvania, United States examines the physical and psychological well-being of the elderly women after a flood disaster revealed that the elderly female victims did not have long-term mental stress caused by the disaster, however, they perceived that their physical health was deteriorated by the disaster (Melick & Logue,

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1985). A well-being study in Sendai City after affected by the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake revealed that the life satisfaction is affected in the female with age 60 by the disaster but not in other groups, however, psychological stress such as difficulty sleeping, sadness, and crying persists among the survivors (Sakai, 2015). Another well-being study in the case of pluvial flood victims in Belgium found that well-being as life satisfaction is not related to past or expected future flooding, while well-being as capabilities in life is negatively related to both past and expected future flooding (Ootegem & Verhofstadt, 2016). Concerning the OECD framework of well-being, the concept of well-being in this study is based on the capabilities approach, where the understanding of well-being is on what people can be and do rather than simply on what they have (OECD, 2013). In the field of disaster studies, the approach to identifying disaster risk had shifted from merely identifying natural factors to the structural weaknesses of the social system. In other words, it is not the hazard alone that caused the disaster, it is what limits the individuals and groups in responding to the hazard. Therefore, using the capabilities concept of well-being, disaster studies can explore what unable people to achieve well-being while recovering from the disaster, rather than examining the conditions of people after being affected by the hazards. It aims to answer the question “How do grassroots mobilizations facilitate recovery of well-being after the disaster?” The results of the studies can be useful in promoting disaster-resilient communities. However, the application of well-being as capabilities in the disaster study can be challenging. The definition of “Capabilities” is the individuals’ options or opportunities in life, which are essential to evaluate individual well-being (Ootegem & Verhofstadt, 2016). By this definition, evaluating the well-being of individuals is challenging as there are difficulties selecting indicators for every individual. The OECD conceptual framework of measuring well-being which is based on the capabilities approach proposed by Sen in 1982, uses a broad scope of indicators in three major domains, namely the quality of life, the material conditions, and different capital that require to maintain sustainable condition (OECD, 2013). In this study, regarding these operational guidelines of measuring well-being, indicators are selected to evaluate well-being after the disaster.

Methodology The main objective of this research is to examine the effects of savings groups on the disaster recovery of households that were affected by the cyclone disaster. The author uses the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) method. ATT method is widely used in evaluating the impact of a programme or treatment on a group of people. The treatment can be a policy, a training programme, or medical treatment. ATT is widely used in experimental studies, such as in the psychological and medical fields; it is also being used in many observational studies. ATT has been widely used in many impact evaluation literature on microfinance; one recent

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example is Takahashi et al. (2010)’s evaluation of the short-term impact of microfinance in Indonesia. Furthermore, Skoufias et al. (2012) on “Poverty on Welfare Impact of Climate Change” used the ATT method in evaluating the effect of welfare programmes on households affected by extreme weather conditions. In the treatment effect literature, both ATT and Average Treatment Effect (ATE) are widely known. ATE measures the difference between the average outcome of the treated group and the control group. ATT is the difference between the average outcome of treated and the outcomes of the treated observations as if they had not been treated. Additionally, the propensity score matching method (PSM) was used to reduce selection bias with the combination of the difference in difference (DID method) which is a measurement of the treatment effect in combination with and without treatment and before and after treatment (Kono & Takahashi, 2010). The samples are a member of the savings group and non-member of the savings group for the evaluation of differences in changes in the well-being after the cyclone disaster. Five capitals of livelihood assets, income, assets, social capital, drinking water quality, self-reported health conditions, and financial security to deal with health problems are used as indicators to measure well-being. The survey did not include the measurement for a psychological condition, however, future goals as a group were discussed to evaluate future aspirations. The natural disasters cause the inability to earn income, decrease in assets, losing shelters, and decrease in food consumption which results in poor health conditions. Disasters can also cause a decrease in social capital due to resettlement and external interventions. Lack of cultural considerations in the reconstruction can affect the community through “less communication”, “more anonymity” and “worse neighbourhood relationships” (Geipel, 1991). Quality of water is also an important variable in analysing disaster recovery because water resources are usually affected by the disaster, resulting in decreased quality of water. The descriptions of the indicators used in the analyses are as follows. (Financial Capital) • Average household income per capita in 2013 Average household income per capita is the variable that indicates the average monthly household earning in the year 2013. The variable was extracted from the total earning generated by working members in the household monthly divided by the number of household members. • Average Income Difference 2007–2013 Average Income Difference 2007–2013 is the variable that indicates the difference between the average monthly income in the year 2007 and the average monthly income in the year 2013. (Physical Capital) • Asset Recovery The asset recovery is a household level variable that indicates the recovery condition of physical assets. The outcome variable is evaluated with the following questionnaire question: “Compared to your physical assets, such as housing, land, and

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household assets you possessed before the cyclone, the possession you have now is (1) increased (2) same as before, or (3) decreased”. (Social Capital) Frequency of participation in social events 2013 Frequency of participation in social events 2013 is a variable that indicates the frequency of participation in social events by eligible female participants. The participants were asked the average number of social events within a year and the frequency of their participation or attendance in the year 2013. The difference in frequency of participation in social events 2007–2013 The difference in frequency of participation in social events 2007–2013 is the participant level variable that indicates the difference between the monthly participation in the year 2007 and the monthly participation in the year 2013. (Natural Capital) Quality of drinking water in dry season 2013 The Quality of drinking water in the dry season is the household level variable that indicates the quality of drinking water in 2013. The quality of water is evaluated by its clearness and taste. The scales used are (1) the water quality is very good, (2) the water quality is somewhat good, and (3) the water quality is not good. Change in Quality of drinking water in dry season 2007–2013 Change in Quality of drinking water in the dry season, 2007–2013 is the difference in drinking water quality between the year 2007 and the year 2013. (Human Capital) Healthy household member Ratio in 2013 A healthy household member Ratio in 2013 is a household level variable that indicates the health condition of household members. The outcome variable is evaluated by asking the health condition of each member of the households in the year 2013 using the following scales. (1) Healthy with no illness, (2) healthy but sometimes has an ordinary illness, and (3) Not healthy with frequent illness. The number of healthy members of households is added up and divided by the total number of household members to get this ratio. Financial security to deal with health problems in 2013 Financial security to deal with health problems in 2013 is a household level ordinal variable that indicates financial security to deal with health problems. The outcome variable is evaluated by asking the following question: “In the year 2013 if a member of the household has ordinary health problems such as flu you have (1) no saving or extra money to deal with it, (2) have little saving, (3) have some saving, or, (4) have enough saving?”.

Sample Selection The sample villages were selected using three factors: the geographical position, the resettlement rate, and the existence of member-owned savings groups in operation. Cyclone Nargis was a tropical cyclone followed by a tidal surge (high-speed winds of

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up to 250 kilometres per hour and a 3.6-metre storm surge). It affected two divisions in the delta region, Ayeyarwaddy and Yangon Division (TCG, 2010). Ayeyarwaddy Division has 6 districts: Pathein District, Hinthada District, Myaungmya District, Main District, Pyapon District, and Labutta District. Among them Labutta, Pyarpon Districts, and a few townships in Yangon Division were hit at the highest level of damage; thus, the government regarded these districts as emergency zones. The disaster-affected area is divided into less affected and most affected, and even though affected by the cyclone, depending on the damage level, the treatment was given differences between the two areas. The damage level is decided by the fatalities and damage level on the house and livelihood. Communities in the less affected area were affected by high-speed wind but were not affected by the sea surge. Among the most affected areas, the hardest-hit area is the Labutta District, with an official death count of approximately 20% of its population. As shown in Fig. 11.1, Labutta had a huge loss of human capital compared to other districts. In the case of Pyarpon District, overall figures of all townships showed that, even though there were losses of human capital, the population grew 6 months after the disaster impact. However, in Labutta, death rates were so high that some villages lost almost all the villagers. Therefore, the remaining villagers had to migrate or be relocated. For this reason, the sample villages were chosen from Pyarpon District instead of the Labutta District. Pyarpon District consists of 4 townships: Pyarpon Township, Bokalay Township, Kyite Lat Township, and Daydaye Township. Among the four townships, Pyarpon Township and Kyite Lat Township have more population density than the other townships. Kyite Lat and Bokalay townships’ major economic activities are agriculture; Bokalay, having a large area of habitable land, is more favourable in growing crops while Kyite Lat has a limited area of land and its economy is concentrated mainly on agriculture. Pyarpon and Daydaye are active not only in agriculture but also in fishery and food processing industries. I selected one village tract called Ohmbin Village tract from Daydaye Township with two operating savings groups. Ohmbin Village tract consists of two villages: Ywar Thit (New Village) and Ohmbin Ywarma (Main Village). It is situated approximately 116 km (70 miles) from Yangon City. The criteria for the selection of saving groups are (1) It must be a member-owned institution2 and (2) It is currently in operation. The criteria are set accordingly to the framework of the research.

Data Collection The data was collected from mid-August to mid-September in 2013. For the sample of this study, members of the saving groups and non-members are randomly chosen from the same district affected by the cyclone disaster in 2008 in Ayeyarwaddy Division, Myanmar. The total number of interviewed households was 81 households, 2

Operated by its own members and decision-making on how to use the money is decided by the members.

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but only 61 households and 278 individuals’ data were chosen to use in this study. Besides, interviews with the head of an NGO, a local NGO Program manager, village monks, and leaders of women’s groups were conducted. The data collection method is the questionnaire interview survey using both quantitative and qualitative questions. The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part is the demographics of all household members, and the second part is the impact of the disaster on the household and recovery status. The last part is detailed questions on saving groups, related only to the respondents whose members are. Also, the respondents could share their experiences of the disaster and how they managed to rebuild their lives. The written records and documents from the weekly meeting were also collected.

Profile of Research Site According to the secondary data, the number of total households (HHs) in the Ohmbin Village tract is 762 HHs (209 HHs for Ohmbin Ywar Thit and 553 HHs from Ohmbin Ywarma) with an average household size of 4.1. It has a total population of 3154 with 1601 males and 1545 females. 85.5% of households responded to their primary livelihood as casual labour (daily wages). More than 80% of the household’s own houses, while less than 20% do not. Regarding migration, around 30% of the households said they had a family member who had migrated. Among 762 households, 594 households shared their information regarding food security. Less than 30% of the population has more than enough food secure for 3 months while more than 60% of households live by hand-to-mouth existence. The number of samples collected is 61 households covering a population of 278. The average household size is 5, with an average of 5 years of education. The level of education of the working-age population is shown in Fig. 11.2. It shows 60% of the sample working-age population has no more than 5 years of education. Low levels of education are found and according to interviews, it is found that many participants whose age is higher than forty received only non-formal education, such as monastery education. The respondents explained that the community did not have formal elementary schools when they were young; the previous community monk was the one who started giving education in their community. The government of Myanmar recognises monastery education as a form of non-formal education and that it is equivalent to formal elementary education. Thus, those who completed monastery education are counted as those who complete elementary education. The dependent population: both dependents and students are higher than those who are working. The dependents are not only the elderly and women, working-age men are found to be dependent because of poor health and unemployment. Casual Labour is the highest among other occupations; the type of casual labour available during the time of the survey is mostly part-time work in a fish processing factory. Selling vegetables, boat taxis, motorcycle taxis, rice planting, and harvesting are also listed as casual labour by the respondents. Self-employed in farming is found to be a rare case in this sample, and none of the respondents’ farms. The respondents who

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own small businesses such as a snack shop, motorcycle rental, and transportation service fit in the category of non-agriculture, non-fishery self-employed. The fishing sector includes two types of job categories, employment in the fishing company, and the small-scale self-employed fishing. The fishing sector has a faster recovery rate than other sectors such as farming and industries, and according to interviews, fishermen started working after 6 months to one year after the impact of the disaster. The impact of the disaster is measured by two variables, the impact on the house and the impact on the livelihood. The impact of the house was measured in four scales; 100% destroyed, destroyed between 100 and 50%, 50%, and less than 50%. 60% of respondents lost their house completely due to the storm, and the only 13% of the respondent had impact lower than 50%. Here, in this case, as big proportions of the samples’ dwellings had destroyed, therefore, it is considered that level of a vulnerability is high in the sample population. The impact on the livelihood is measured by four scales, no impact, small impact, high impact, and severe impact. Surprisingly, despite having a big impact on house, it is found that nearly half of the respondents have either a small impact or no impact on their livelihood The reason may be due to their economic background, as most of the respondents are casual labours, and live very close to the city; the impact on the livelihoods may not be as high as those who are in farming a sector or those who are self-employed. 77% of the respondent answered that their property ownership is the same before and after the disaster, which means they have recovered their assets while 8.62% answered their properties had increased. Some of the respondents who answered the increase in property and assets explained that they own now bicycles, motorbikes, motorised boats, and household appliances. Those who answered their assets decreased explained that some of their income-generating assets such as boats and equipment to make food were lost by the storm, and they still have not recovered them. 48% of the respondents answered that their interactions had increased while 45% stayed the same and 5% had decreased. The respondents who had increased their interactions are mostly members of the savings group. Respondents who had decreased their social interactions explained that their interactions decreased because of their health problems. For some households, the quality of water decreased after the disaster. The villagers use rainwater as drinking water in the rainy season and in the dry season, they use pond water. Although the respondents did not mention the existence of two drinking water ponds, it was found out later during my village observation. There are two ponds in the village; they can be seen in the square in a satellite picture (Fig. 11.3). According to observations, the one on the left which is close to the river has no fencing, and many plants are growing in the water and animals were wandering around the pond. Before the disaster, the distance to the river and the pond were longer, however, it becomes closer because the riverbank was collapsed by the storm. The pond to the right, although it is more distant from the dwellings, has fences around it and looks clearer than the other one. Therefore, it is considered that the quality of water differs because of different sources of water.

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The health condition in 2013 was evaluated by asking the health condition of each member of households in the year 2013 using the following scales. (1) Good (Healthy with no illness), (2) fair (healthy but sometimes has ordinary illness), and (3) Bad (Not healthy with frequent illness). It is shown in Fig. 11.4 that 59% of the sample population has good health conditions; 20% is in fair health condition and 19% is in bad health condition. When the respondents were being asked regarding their financial security to deal with health problems, only 5% of the households said they have enough money to deal with health problems. On the other hand, 17% said they do not have any savings or extra money to deal with health problems. The majority answered they only have small savings to deal with health problems (shown in Fig. 11.5). Lastly, the respondents who are not participants of the savings group were asked the reason why they did not join the savings group, and the majority answered that they do not have enough money to save. According to the leader of the groups, the members were economically no different from non-members. The members also did not know that they could save in the beginning, and the initial saving rate was negotiable among the members, therefore, financial problems may not be the real reason to join the group as they perceived. 17% of non-participants answered that they did not join because they do not know what the savings group is about. This indicates a lack of information or exclusion to a certain group of people. Many group members joined because of invitation from their friends, thus, non-members who do not have strong social ties with the members may likely to be excluded from the network of information. A few respondents responded they could not join due to health problems. It should be noted that although it is listed as a health problem it is not because of poor health issues but the problem is related to pregnancy and childcare during the member recruitment time of savings group. According to the interviews, there were exclusions and distortion in aid distribution due to the lack of policy and legal framework. In the case of the research area, the local authorities were not able to engage actively due to their limitations. The local authorities did not have decision-making power to actively promote emergency relief activities.

Findings Table 11.1 shows basic household characteristics in 2007 and 2013. The sample households are classified into the treated group, who are participants of the savings group, and the control group, who are non-participants. To focus on the characteristics of women who are eligible to participate in the programme, “eligible women” were defined as women over 18 years of age and either head of household or spouse, regardless of actual treatment status. The average age of the eligible women was approximately 40 years for both groups. The average years of education are 6, which is less than the 8 years required for lower secondary graduation in the 5–3–2 education system of Myanmar. Notably, the average years of education in the treated group is higher than the control group.

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It indicates that the savings groups attract women with longer years of education completed. The savings groups are not merely just access to credit but it requires participants to save and they are obliged to participate in meetings, thus women who have more knowledge are likely to join the group than those who are less educated. The support for this argument can be found in occupation data. Although the number of self-employment is the same, there is no waged employment in the control group. It means that women in the treated group have access to the formal labour market due to their level of education. Furthermore, women from the control group are more likely to be housewives or conduct casual labour which requires less skill and knowledge. The social interactions indicator shows how many social events they participate in monthly. In traditional Burmese society, many festivals and religious events are held, regardless of their educational background and economic status, women equally participate. In 2013, both groups had increased their frequency of interactions, but the treated group had increased a lot more compared to the control group, mainly because of the monthly savings group meetings. Characteristic of a household head is decided by his or her age, years of education, and occupation. A household head is defined as the person who is not only the representative of the household but also contributes income to the household. The average head of household age is approximately 40 years of age in both groups. The years of education of household head for the treatment group here are also higher than the control group, indicating support for the argument of savings group attractiveness to the more educated members in the community. Household heads who engaged in wage-employment are similar between the treatment group and the control group members. It is very common for husbands, and sons, in the family to be employed as monthly waged fishermen. Household heads of the control group are more likely to engage in self-employment, while household heads of the treated group are more likely to work as casual labourers. It seems that a few years’ difference in education does not have much influence on the occupation. The living standard of the two groups will be discussed by examining the household characteristics. The Average household income is quite similar between the two groups with approximately 2000 Kyats higher in the treated group, from this evidence; we can say that the living standard of the two groups is not much different. For the treated group, average household income increases by 6600 Ks compared to 1000Ks increases in the control group. Although the income increases are not much, the treated group was able to increase their income more than the control group. In both cases before the disaster and 2013, the dependency ratio is likely to be higher in the treated group; however, the treated group was able to decrease their dependency ratio in the year 2013, while the control group persists to hold the same level of dependency ratio. The female ratio is being considered because in some cases having more males in the household may increase income, and by having more females in the household, they can share their role of caretaker in the family, facilitating eligible women to participate in social activities. However, since there is not much difference between the groups the latter hypothesis is proven wrong. Regarding health, the control group has more household members with poor health conditions with an average of 25% compared to 13% in the treated group. The

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percentage of increase in the number of workers shows 37% in the treated group and −3% in the control group. This data is consistent with the dependency ratio data, the dependency ratio increases due to an increase in the worker. After five years of the impact of a disaster, it is assumed that children who used to be dependents may become workers. However, in the case of the control group, there is a decrease. One explanation may relate to health factors because the composition of household members with poor health is high in the control group. The average percentage of recovery in assets and quality of water is higher in the treated group than the control group with approximately 20% difference. According to the interviews the savings group, in cooperation with the local authorities wrote a proposal to a district government to receive electricity in their community, and it was already confirmed that they will receive electricity soon. The group attempted to set up an eel cultivation farm, however, the cultivation was canceled per neighbours’ requests. The techniques they were using in eel cultivation produced an unpleasant odor in the neighbourhood. The group was planning to set up a business together on establishing rice storage together shortly. From the description of data and the interviews, compared to the non-member of the savings group, the members of the savings groups are found to have slightly more income, faster recovery of assets. However, in terms of quality of life, the members of the savings group have more healthy family members, better quality drinking water, and clear positive goals for the future. In terms of the material well-being and livelihood assets, the difference is not quite significant. However, in terms of the quality of life, members of savings groups are found to have a better of quality life compared to non-members. Therefore, being a member of a savings group, being connected to a network of people, receiving training, and being empowered financially and socially can contribute to a better quality of life during the time of disaster recovery.

Estimation Results 1.

Participation in Savings Groups To determine who participates in savings groups, a regression analysis was conducted using a Probit model. The dependent variable is binary (1 if households join the programme and 0 otherwise). There are four groups of independent variables: the eligible participant characteristics, the household head characteristics, the household characteristics, and the impact of the disaster; all variables used are from before the disaster and before receiving the treatment from the saving groups. Here, ideally, the data needs to be collected at the time of becoming members, however, due to limitations; the data was collected at the time being treated. Even though many models were tested in the analysis process, the results of only a few models are presented in this thesis. For example, I included occupational variables in some of the models, but since they did not have any significance, they were excluded from the final models. The results of

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the Probit estimation are presented in Table 11.2 Model 1 includes only eligible female characteristics and Model 2 includes the only head of household characteristics. The two groups are not included in one model to avoided collinearity. Models 3 and 4 include household characteristics and Models 7 and 8 include the level of the impact of the disaster. The results are found to be consistent with some of the implications from the qualitative analysis, as will be explained later. Since Model 7 has the highest explanatory power judging from the value of the pseudo R2, the result based on Model 7 is used in the subsequent interpretation. The age of eligible female characteristics and its square term did not have a significant impact on the decision to participate in the savings groups programme. The coefficient of completed years of education of eligible women is positive while its squared term is negative, and both are significant at a 1% significance level. This indicates an inverse U-shape relationship between education and the probability of participation. It means the probability of participation among women increases as the years of education received increases, but after a certain level of education, the probability decreased. In other words, the least and most educated women are not attracted by the savings group, but the median level tends to participate. The coefficient values of household characteristics are found to be consistent with qualitative implications but were statically not significant. The coefficient value for the impact on the house was positive but not significant. However, the coefficient value for the disaster impact on livelihood is negative and significant at a 10% confidence level. This indicates that the victims of a disaster whose livelihoods were less affected by the disaster are more likely to join the savings groups than those whose livelihoods were severely affected by the disaster. Since savings need to be accumulated to provide loans in the savings groups, those whose livelihoods were severely affected may not have the confidence to deposit savings because they were struggling to recover their livelihood assets. This assumption is consistent with qualitative implications, identifying a lack of money to contribute to the savings group as a reason for not joining the savings group. From these results, it can be argued that establishing savings groups in the disaster-affected region requires consideration of the education level of the targeted population and the impact of the disaster on their livelihoods. Since the differences in characteristics are found between the treated group and the control group, propensity score matching was implemented to make the sample more comparable. Propensity Score Matching and Balancing Test Ideally, the sample size of the control group should be more than the treated group sample so that the matching programme can search for a well-matched sample with similar characteristics such as the same age, education level, impact on dwellings, and livelihood, etc. However, due to the limitation of my fieldwork, the sample size is relatively small to include all parameters from Model 7. According to Caliendo (2005), only variables that simultaneously influence the participation decision and outcome variable should be included in propensity score matching. As a result, participant age and the impact on the house were

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chosen as parameters to estimate the scores. Excluding age from the estimation and using years of education would cause bias because the age difference can influence the outcome variable more. Since the average years of education is below lower secondary and considering from the fact that return of education is small, especially in rural Myanmar, age was chosen as the parameter to avoid matching individuals that have significantly different ages but the same years of education, such as a 20-year-old and a 49-year-old that both have 7 years of education. The reason for choosing the impact of the disaster on the house is that impact on the dwellings highly influences the outcome variable since the previous research findings show the more impact on the house increases more food insecurity. Furthermore, using these two variables produce a better balancing test result. The treatment group was matched with the control group that has the closest propensity score with a predetermined distance of (0.1). The observations without any match available were dropped from the analysis. The matching procedure successfully paired 27 treated households to 28 from the control group. The distribution of the propensity score before and after matching is illustrated in Fig. 11.6. The horizontal axis represents propensity and the vertical axis represents the frequency of observation found. The upside-down bars represent observations from the control group. Thick upside-down bars in graph A become more equal to the treatment samples at the top in graph B. In an additional balancing test, a t-test was performed to test the differences between the two groups. Table 11.3 shows the calculation of the t-test for each independent variable to investigate whether the sample became closer after the match. The result shows that the means become closer between the two groups with no statistical significance in difference, except for the years of education. The years of education, however, after matching the means become closer to each other. The samples, although not perfect because of limitation in the size of the sample, become much more comparable after propensity score matching. Average Effect of Savings Groups The result of ATT estimations is shown in Table 11.4. Due to a lack of data availability, the results were estimated for both PSM-Ordinary ATT and PSMDID only for the outcome variables income, social capital, and quality of water. The results are found positive in almost all outcome variables and statistically significant at 1%, meaning that savings groups have had a positive effect on disaster recovery. PSM-Ordinary ATT is the difference between the outcome between the treated households and the control group households with similar characteristics using one-year data. PSM-DID uses before and after data of the outcome variables to determine the improvement from the treated households before treatment. Although characteristic parameters were set, there can be bias in the results if the initial income of the treated group was higher than the control group households. Average household income for Ordinary ATT shows a positive value of 8,242 Ks meaning that the income of savings group members is 8,242 Ks higher than households from the control group. However, the PSMDID result shows only 5,693 Ks higher in the treated group. In the PSM-DID,

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the value is lower than the ordinary ATT result, indicating that using only oneyear income data results in an exaggeration in the effect on income; therefore, by using the PSM-DID this increased bias has been reduced. The results for the effect on social capital also show positive and significant values for both PSM ordinary ATT and PSM-DID. The Ordinary ATT shows an effect of approximately 1.9 times the higher frequency, while PSM-DID shows an effect of over 2 times, slightly higher than ordinary ATT, meaning that savings group participants had increased their frequency of monthly social interaction almost two times higher than similar households from the control group. Normally the PSMDID results are lower than Ordinary ATT results, however, PSM-DID for the social capital indicator is slightly higher. The decrease of social capital in the control group is assumed as the reason. The result for the quality of water shows 0.32 for ordinary ATT, meaning the quality of water is 32% more likely to be recovered for the treated group. Likewise, in PSM-DID the quality of water is 14% more likely to be recovered for savings group members. The result for the asset recovery has only one result from PSM-DID due to the limitation of data. It shows members of the savings groups are 20% more likely to recover their assets than non-members. The health result has two variables, healthy members in the household and financial security to deal with health problems. The result shows the savings group members have 16% more healthy members than non-members. However, the variable financial security to deal with health problems was not statistically significant, but it was positive with the value of 0.33, meaning that members are 33% more likely to have the financial security to deal with health issues. Not having significant value does not mean savings groups do not affect financial security to deal with health but assumed that it may take a longer period of membership to accumulate their savings or wealth to overcome health issues. a.

The Effect of Savings Group on Income Recovery The victims of the cyclone disaster are more likely to have better income recovery if they have access to loans and special loans for rice from the savings groups. The evidence from loan records of the members reveals members could borrow up to 100,000ks per loan during the year 2012, and the total interest paid for 3 months is 15,000 at the 5% interest rate. Compared to informal money brokers’ interest rates of 12–20%, it can be claimed that the members highly benefited from the savings group. According to interviews, the respondents invested in businesses such as selling snacks, buying boats, buying fishnets, and buying motorcycles. They explained that sometimes the loans from the savings group were not enough to make investments; in that case, they combined the loans from other resources to establish businesses. Participants become more active in economic activities because of the savings they have and the loans that are available to them. Additionally, it was found that savings group members are more likely to be healthier than non-members and are, therefore, more likely to have more labourers contributing to more working hours and more earnings.

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c.

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The Effect of Savings Group on Asset Recovery Members of the savings group are more likely to recover their assets and property than non-members. Members’ access to loans appears to be a factor for better asset recovery as explained by the members that use the loans to buy boats and tools to generate income. Drawn from qualitative evidence, a non-member used to sell snacks on her boat; then her boat, utensils, and food containers were taken away by the cyclone, and since she lost her income-generating assets she became a dependent in the family and was unable to recover. Many members of the savings group have similar stories; however, the difference is that they had already replaced their assets such as boats, utensils, and financial capital by using loans from the savings group. The Effect of Savings Group on Social Capital Recovery Members of the savings group are more likely to have more social capital than non-members. There is a decrease in social capital in the case of non-members, and according to interviews, the respondents said they became less active in social interactions because of health problems. Qualitative evidence shows that members not only participate in meetings but are also involved in additional activities together, such as eel cultivation. On the day of the interview, the members of the savings group appeared in their uniform t-shirts with the name of the savings group imprinted. It shows the members’ solidarity and a strong sense of belonging to their group and group members. From these observations, it is evident that the participants’ social interactions had increased, not just in a superficial form of weekly meetings but at a deeper level by doing other kinds of activities through the membership. The Effect of Savings Group on Water Quality Members of the savings group are more likely to have a better quality of drinking water than non-members. There are two ponds for drinking water in the village; both are near the Buddhist monastery. One is closer to the river and the other is located inland, further from the neighbourhood. The riverbank collapsed during the disaster and the pond became more exposed to the river. According to my observations, there were no protections around the pond. The second pond, which is further away, is well protected and has a better quality of water. Evidence from village observations and satellite pictures shows that water resources with better quality are located further away from the affected community, thus, more time and labour are needed to get better quality water. It is assumed that getting better quality water consumes more time and money because of the distance. Since members have access to loans, they can overcome their problems with health and money to get better quality water. Since members of the savings group have a better health condition, they are more capable of fetching good quality water. And with the loans available to them, they can hire a worker who fetches water even if they are in poor health condition. The Effect of Savings Group on Health Members of the savings group are more likely to be healthier than non-members. The victims of the disaster are more likely to have better health conditions if they

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received loans from the savings groups. The analysis result from both qualitative and quantitative implications found evidence contributing to this argument. Households with poor health members are found regardless of participation in savings groups, as a result of the impact of the disaster. However, it was found that among disaster-affected households, the households who participate in the savings group have a lower number of household members with poor health conditions than non-participants’ households.3 Both ordinary loans and loans for rice have contributed to increasing food security and smoothing food consumption of members’ households. Moreover, having savings and access to loans, members of saving groups are more likely to be able to deal with health problems. In Table 11.1, the variable “bad health condition ratio” shows that 25% of the household members are in poor health conditions in non-participants’ households, compared to 13% in participants’ households in 2013. Regarding the outcome variable on financial security to deal with health problems, it is found that there is no significant effect from the savings group. Healthcare services in Myanmar are relatively expensive and there is a lack of health insurance providers. Therefore, access to loans might not be enough to provide substantial financial security for health expenditures, but this is expected to improve over time, as longer membership periods will result in a larger accumulation of funds in the savings groups, and the amount members can borrow will also be higher. To conclude the findings, the grassroots mobilisation of the savings groups for the recovery from a disaster, based on the evidence from the disaster-affected community in Myanmar was examined by measuring income recovery, assets recovery, social capital, the quality of drinking water, and health. The results of these five indicators were all positive. This study has, therefore, identified that grassroots mobilisations of disaster-affected communities have a positive effect on disaster recovery. Members of the mobilised groups show a greater increase in income over non-members. The savings group has allowed members to invest in income-generating assets using loans that are given at higher amounts and lower interest rates that are otherwise unavailable to non-members. Secondly, members’ access to a loan with low-interest rates from savings groups was a driving factor for improved asset recovery. This further contributes to enhancing income recovery. The non-members who lost their boats still could not replace them while members of saving groups already replaced their boats utilising loans from the savings group. Thirdly, the savings groups increased social interactions and strengthened social capital. The study found evidence on stronger social ties and more frequent social interactions among the members compared to non-members. These stronger social ties, in turn, enabled the members to become more involved in economic and social activities. The fourth finding is that savings groups improve the well-being of the disaster-affected people by providing better access to higher quality drinking water to members compared with non-members. 3

Liner regression results also found correlation between outcome variable healthy household member ratio and months of membership to saving group, implying that the longer the membership the better health condition.

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Members can use the funds from the loans to obtain higher quality drinking water through hired help if they are unable to fetch it themselves due to poor health conditions. Lastly, members of savings groups have better health conditions than nonmembers; the availability of financial loans and rice loans improves the capacity of members to improve and maintain their health compared to non-members.

Conclusion The findings of this research offer several policy implications regarding the improvement of disaster management in rural areas. Grassroots mobilisations should be promoted in either disaster-affected areas or disaster-prone areas for communities to become resilient against disaster. The study has proven that the savings groups have a positive effect on disaster recovery. Since the members themselves funded initial capital, delinquency problems can be overcome by strong social ties and ownership, and the burdens to the government and donor agencies are lesser because of low operational and implementation costs. Therefore, this study offers suggestions for policy: first, to establish frameworks to promote citizen’s participation in the process of disaster management. The current Microfinance Law of Myanmar, 2011 does not differentiate member-owned savings groups or self-help groups from other institutionalised microfinance providers. It would be beneficial for disaster recovery and disaster preparedness plans if member-owned savings or community-based self-help groups are given distinct treatment from other external institutions as these groups provide resilience and reduce the vulnerability against disasters at the community level. Second, setting up funds for the NGOs with technical knowledge on community mobilisation is crucial. Mobilisation and technological support from NGOs are considered essential to initiate a sustainable community formation in the context of Myanmar. Thus, international funding agencies and governments can set up a source of funding for NGOs to facilitate community-based mobilisations. Thirdly, the research found that successful savings groups with good performance in disaster recovery comprised an educated leader with strong leadership, strong discipline, and strong social ties. These can be considered as elements that hold the group together in a sustainable manner. These findings suggest the promotion of women’s education and empowerment in marginalised communities. Fourthly, there was a lack of food security in the community affected by the disaster mostly in the area where the majority is non-farming households, which is found to be consistent with other literature. Because of the lack of food security, there were serious health problems that become barriers to immediate and long-term economic activities. The inclusion of a special loan for the food/rice bank programme is necessary for all forms of microfinance in the post-disaster recovery. Lastly, a revision of the disaster management legislation is necessary. The research found that many victims affected by Cyclone Nargis still could not replace their income-generating assets five years after the impact. These problems were supposed to be tackled in the initial phases of disaster

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management. The study found that in the case of the research area, the local authorities were not able to engage actively due to their limitations of decision-making power. This kind of exclusions and distortion in aid distribution is related to the weaknesses of the disaster management legal framework. The active participation of local governments in disaster risk reduction, emergency relief, and recovery should be enforced by law to promote the active involvement of local governments to establish an effective disaster management system in Myanmar. Strengthening legal institutions and empowering local governments and individuals are important elements in promoting effective disaster management activities which in turn help accelerate the recovery and maintain the quality of life of the survivors. The active participation of local government in disaster risk reduction, emergency relief, and recovery should be enforced by law. For example, the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act of Japan, Article 5 says “In the interest of protecting the area of a city, town or village, the life and limb of its residents and their property from disaster, the city, town or village as a local government at the base shall have the responsibility to formulate, with the cooperation of related agencies and other local governments a disaster prevention plan on the area of said city, town or village, and to implement said plan as provided by law”. The statement is made that engaging in disaster management is the local government’s responsibility by law. The study shows mobilising marginalised communities have a positive influence on the quality of life of the affected people after a large-scale disaster. Both qualitative and quantitative implications found evidence of stronger social ties and more frequent social interactions among the members compared to non-members. These stronger social ties, in turn, enabled the members to become more involved in economic and social activities. Women empowerment, improvements in social connectedness, social mobilisation, education, vocational training, and leadership skills training are crucial inputs to achieve positive aspirations and promote well-being in the post-recovery conditions and sustainable development. From these perspectives, the democratisation process and reforms are considered as opportunities to empower the grassroots mobilisation, not only for the disaster management implications but also for the improvement of the overall well-being of the rural people. The bottom-up model of development through enhancing capabilities of the rural people, such as mobilising grassroots organisations, citizens organisations, neighbourhood associations, and the institutional arrangements which enhances the decision-making power at the local level are the crucial components for the sustainable rural development, as well as the social and economic well-being of the people in Myanmar.

Appendix See Figs. 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5, and 11.6 and Tables 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, and 11.5.

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Cyclone Nargis Track

Extensive to catastrophic Damage Moderate to Extensive Damage Moderate Damage Limited Damage

Fig. 11.1 Tropical cyclone Nargis damage assessment map Myanmar (Source Constructed by the author using Google Maps Based on MIMU* [2008])

Fig. 11.2 Level of Education of working-age population (61 Households) (Note Samples who are under 15 years of age are excluded. Source Author [2020])

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Fig. 11.3 Satellite picture of the location of drinking water ponds (Source Author [2020])

N=266

Fig. 11.4 Health condition in 2013 (61 households) (Note: N = number of individual. Source Author [2020])

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Fig. 11.5 Financial security to deal with Health Problems (61 households) (Source Author [2020])

Fig. 11.6 The distribution of propensity scores: A before and A after (Source Author [2020])

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Table 11.1 Population before and after the disaster (disaster affected area) Division

District

Township

Population Before

Ayeyarwady

Pyarpon

Bokalay

285,909

Death

By Dec 2008

Ayeyarwady

Pyarpon

Kyite Lat

177,339

Ayeyarwady

Pyarpon

Pyarpon

240,091

728

310,321

Ayeyarwady

Pyarpon

Daydaye

211,353

3748

216,959

Ayeyarwady

Myaungmya

Wakema

N

310,914

Ayeyarwady

Myaungmya

Myaungmya

N

282,388

Ayeyarwady

Pathein

Ngaputaw

330,058

Ayeyarwady

Pathein

Pathein

352,915

Ayeyarwady

Maubin

Maubin

397,421

Ayeyarwady

Labutta

Labutta

394,553

84,454

310,099

Ayeyarwady

Labutta

Mawlamyine Kyun

267,989

5039

256,872

349,427 196,406

5325

343,343 359,292 309,921

Source ASEANHTF, Post Nargis Periodic Review IV (2008)

Table 11.2 Description of data collected Description of sample Treated group

Control group

Mean

Mean

Standard deviation

Standard deviation

Eligible participant characteristics Age

41.2

9.47

40.8

15

Years of education

6

2.51

4.6

1.32

Self-employment (%)

33.3

48

33.3

47.9

Wage-employment (%)

7.4

26.6

0

0

Casual labour (%)

18.5

39.5

36.6

49

Dependent (%)

14.7

50

30

46.6

Social interaction per month 2007

1.1

0.6

1.2

0.43

Social interaction per month 2013

3.03

1

1.13

0.43

Household head characteristics (continued)

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Table 11.2 (continued) Description of sample Treated group

Control group

Mean

Standard deviation

Mean

Standard deviation

Household head’s age

42.2

8.7

40.1

11.01

Household head years of Education

6.5

2.8

5.3

1.84

Self-employment (%)

29.6

46.5

40

49.8

Wage-employment (%)

33.3

48

30

46.6

Casual labour (%)

37

49.2

26.6

44.9

Average household income 22,488.3 in 2007 per capita

12,654.1

20,878.6

10,356.9

Average household income 29,088.4 in 2013 per capita

13,749.8

21,973.4

12,267.4

Difference AHI (2013–2007)

6600.1

12,598.1

1094.8

4774.9

Number of household members

4.6

1.6

4.5

1.61

Dependent ratio 2007(%)

57.7

20.2

47.4

23.9

Dependent ratio 2013(%)

50.9

17.6

47.7

24.4

Female ratio (%)

43.5

22.6

50.1

19.7

Bad health condition Ratio(%)

13.2

22.9

25.7

31.4

Number of increased worker (%)

37

68.7

-3.3

31.98

Asset recovery (%)

96.2

19.2

76.6

43

Water recovery (%)

100

0

83.3

37.9

Impact on the house

3.33

1.03

3.1

1.19

Impact on livelihood

1.62

1.14

1.93

0.9

Number of kind of assistance received

3.18

1.24

3

1.3

Observations

27

Household Characteristics

Impact of disaster

Source Author (2020)

30

11 The Grassroots Mobilisation After a Large-Scale Disaster …

205

Table 11.3 Determinants of participation Result of probit regression: Determinents of participation Model 1

Model 2

Model 3 Model 4 Model 5

Model 6

Eligible participant characteristics Age

0.15*

0.19

0.17

Age2

−0.001*

−0.00

−0.001

Years of education

1.91***

1.59*

2.42***

Years of education 2

−0.09***

−0.07*

−0.12***

Household head characteristics Household Head’s Age

0.33*

0.26

0.30

Household head’s age2

−0.003*

−0.002

−0.002

Household head years of education

0.51

0.36

0.53

Household head years of education 2

−0.01

−0.003

−0.01

Household characteristics Average household income in 2007

0.00

0.00

Number of household members

−0.03

−0.64

Dependent ratio

2.02

3.03

1.88

2.21

Female ratio

−1.30

−2.48*

−1.06

−2.57

Impact of disaster Impact on house

0.31

0.28

Impact on livelihood

−0.57*

−0.39*

Number of kind of assistance received

0.007

−0.63

Pseudo R2

0.2338

0.1622

0.2679

0.2766

0.3602

0.3143

Observations

57

57

57

57

57

57

Note Dependent Variable = 1 if participated, = 0 otherwise ***, **,* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively Source Author (2020)

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Table 11.4 Sample before and after the disaster Changes in sample after PSM variable

Mean Sample

Age Age squared

Control

t-test Treated

t

p t

Unmatched

40.83

41.22

1.42 0.90

Matched

42.25

41.22

0.30 0.75

Unmatched

1886.03

1852.04

0.11 0.91

Matched

1989.18

1852.04

0.44 0.66

4.73

6.19

− 2.39 0.02

Years of education

Unmatched

4.87

5.93

− 3.92 0.02

Years of education

Unmatched

26.07

44.85

− 1.80 0.08

squared

Matched

26.14

44.85

− 1.74 0.09

Average income in the 2007

Unmatched 20,878.57 22,488.32

− 0.53 0.60

Matched

Matched

− 1.75 0.09

0.51

0.58

− 1.25 0.22

0.50

0.44

2.77 0.26

0.49

0.44

2.01 0.24

Unmatched

3.13

3.33

− 0.67 0.51

Matched

3.29

3.33

− 0.17 0.87

Unmatched

1.93

1.63

1.09 0.28

Unmatched Matched

Female ratio

Unmatched Matched

Impact on livelihood

Matched Number of Kind of Assistance received Unmatched Matched Source Author (2020)

− 0.61 0.55

0.58

Dependent ratio

Impact on house

20,584.18 22,488.32 0.47

2.00

1.63

1.31 0.20

3.00

3.19

-0.53 0.60

3.14

3.19

-0.12 0.90

11 The Grassroots Mobilisation After a Large-Scale Disaster …

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Table 11.5 The average effect of savings groups Average effect of savings groups PSM-ordinary ATT

PSM-DID

Outcome

Observed

ATT

t

ATT

t

Income Per capita Average household income

55

8242.180 ***

2.29

5693.735***

2.70

Social capital Frequency of participation in social events per month

Per participant

55

1.912***

6.22

2.008 ***

8.73

Water Quality of drinking water in dry season

Per household

55

0.312 ***

2.41

0.142***

2.20

Physical capital Recovered assets/property

Per household

55

0.208***

0.10

Health Healthy household Member Ratio

Per household

55

0.162***

2.07

Financial Security Per to Deal With household Health Problems

55

0.330

1.54

Note PSM-ATT (Propensity Score Matching-Average Treatment on the Treated), PSM-DID (Propensity Score Matching-Difference in Difference) Variable Income is in Myanmar Currency Kyats(Ks) Approximately USD1$=900ks ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% confidence levels, respectively Source Author

Works Cited Amin, S., & Goldstein, M. (2008). Data Against Natural Disasters: Establishing Effective Systems for Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction. Washington, DC: The World Bank. ASEAN. (2010). Voices of Nargis Survivors: The Story of Survivers from Cyclone Nargis. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat. ASEANHTF. (2008). Post Nargis Periodic Review I. Coordinating Office for the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force: Yangon. ASEANHTF. (2010). Post Nargis Periodic Review IV. Yangon: Coordinating Office for the ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force. ASEAN Humanitarian Task Force. (2009). A Bridge to Recovery: ASEAN’s Response to Cyclone Nargis. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Aung, N. (2011). An Assessment on Performance of Community Based self Reliance Groups in the Ayeyarwady Delta. Yangon: Yangon Institute of Economics. Becchetti, L., & Castriota, S. (2011). Does Microfinance Work as a Recovery Tool After Disasters? Evidence from the 2004 Tsunami. World Development, Vol. 39, No. 6, 898–912.

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Boot, W. (2012, August 20). Can Burma Become World Rice Bowl Again? The Irrawaddy. Retrieved December 21, 2021, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/business/can-burma-become-world-ricebowl-again.html. Caliendo, M. (2005). Some Practical Guidance for the implementation of propensity Score Matching. Bonn, Germany: IZA. Carter, M., Little, P., Mogues, T., & Negatu, W. (2006). Shocks, Sensitivity, and Resilience: Tracking the Economic Impacts of Environmental Disaster on Assets in Ethiopia and Honduras. Washinton, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. (2014). The International Disaster Database. Retrieved 1 May, 2014, from Natural Disasters Trends: http://www.emdat.be/natural-disasterstrends Chakrabarti, P. D., Kull, D., & Bhatt, M. R. (2005). Disaster Risk Mitigation: Potential of Micro Finance for Tsunami Recovery. International Workshop on Disaster Risk Mitigation: Potential of Micro Finance for Tsunami Recovery. Ahmedabad: United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction ALL INDIA DISASTER MITIGATION INSTITUTE. Coleman, B. (1999). Microfinance in NorthEast Thailand. Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank. CRED and Munich Reinsurance Company (Munich Re). (2009). Disaster Category Classification and Peril Terminology for Operational Purposes. Munich: Center for Research on the Epidemiology on the Disaster. Duflos, E., Luchtenburg, P., Ren, L., & Chen, L. (2013). Microfinance in Myanmar: Sector Assessment. Yangon: CGAP. Ferris, E. (2013, April 16). What Were the Impacts of Natural Disasters in 2012? Retrieved November 16, 2013, from The Brookings Institution: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/ posts/2013/04/16-natural-disasters-2012-impacts-fatalities-affected-population. Fisher, T., & Sriram, M. (2002). Beyond Microcredit: Putting Development Back into Microfinance. New Delhi: Oxfam. Geipel, R. (1991). Long-Term Consequences of Disasters: The Reconstruction of Friuli, Italy, in Its International Context, 1976-1988 (Springer Series on Environmental Management). NewYork: Springer. Grameen Communications. (2013, January 1). Credit Lending Models. Retrieved 22 November, 2013, from Grameen Bank: Bank for the Poor: http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option= com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=93. Guha-Sapir, D., Hoyois, P., & Below, R. (2016). Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2015 – The numbers and trends. The Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters(CRED). Louvainla-Neuve: Ciaco Imprimerie. Hudon, M., & Seibel, H. (2007). Microfinance in Post-disaster and Post-conflict Situations: Turning Victims into Shareholders. Savings and Development, Vol. 31, No. 1, 5–22. Joakim, E. (2008). Post-disaster Recovery and Vulnerability. California: University of Waterloo. Kan Zaw, D., Lwin, N. N., Nyein, K. T., & Thandar, M. (2011). Agricultural Transformation, Institutional Changes, and Rural Development in Ayeyarwady Delta, Myanmar. In P. S. Intal Jr, S. Oum, & M. J. O. Simorangkir (Eds.), Agricultural Development, Trade & Regional Cooperation in Developing East Asia (pp. 307–355). Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta. Kono, H. (2006). Is Group Landing a Good Enforcement Scheme for Achieving a High Repayment Rate?: Evidence from Field Experience in Vietnam. Chiba, Japan: Institute of Developing Economies. Kono, H., & Takahashi, K. (2010). Microfinance Revolution: It Affects Innovation and Challenges. The Developing Economies, 15–73. Lindell, M. (2013, May 30). Disaster Studies. Current Sociology. Melick, M. E., & Logue, J. N. (1985 ). The Effect of Disaster on the Health and Wellbeing of Older Women. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, Vol. 21, No. 1.

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Morduch, J. (1998). Does Microfinance Really Help the Poor? New Evidence from Flagship Programs in Bangladesh. Stanford: Stanford University. Morse, S., McNamara, N., & Acholo, M. (2009). Sustainable Livelihood Approach: A Critical Analysis of Theory and Practice. Geographical Paper No. 189, 5. Myint, S. (2013). Efforts on the Sustainability of Microfinance: Fourteen Years of Microfinance in Myanmar. Yangon, Kamaryut: ThinSarpay. Nagarajan, G., & Brown, W. (2000). The Bangladeshi Experience in Adapting Financial Services to Cope with Floods: Implications for the Microfinance Industry. Bethesda, MD: Development Alternatives, Inc. NHK. (2012, 1 7). NHK Special Series: Eastern Japan Earthquake Disaster “Unemployment” Crisis of 120,000. Japan: NHK. Nishino, Y., & Koehler, G. (2011). Social Protection in Myanmar: Making the Case for Holistic Policy Reform. London, UK: Institute of Development Studies. OECD. (2013). How’s Life? 2013 Measuring Well-Being. OECD Publishing. Okamoto, I. (2008). Economic Disparity in Rural Myanmar: Transformation under Market Liberalization. IDE-Jetro. Ootegem, L., & Verhofstadt, E. (2016). Well-Being, Life Satisfaction, and Capabilities of Flood Disaster Victims. Environmental Impact Assessment Review(57), 134–138. Parker, J., & Nagarajan, G. (2000). Can Microfinance Meet the Poor’s Financial Needs in Times of Natural Disaster? USA: DevelopmentAlternativesInc. Parvin, G., & Shaw, R. (2012). Microfinance Institutions and a Coastal Community Disaster Risk Reduction, Response, and Recovery Process: A Case of Hatiya, Bangladesh. Disasters, Vol. 37, No. 1, 165–184. Ray-Bennett, N. S. (2010). The Role of Microcredit in Reducing Women’s Vulnerabilities to Multiple Disasters. Disasters, Vol. 34, No. 1, 240–260. Robinson, M. (2001). The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Rubin, C. B., Saperstein, M. D., & Barbee, D. G. (1985). Community Recovery from a Major Natural Disaster. The University of Colorado Boulder. Institute of Behavioral Science. Sakai, S. (2015). The Well-Being of Elderly Survivors after Natural Disasters: Measuring the Impact of the Great East Japan Earthquake. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 15-E-069. Skoufias, E., & Vinha, K. (2012). Timing Is Everything: How Weather Shocks Affect Household Welfare in Rural Mexico. In E. Skoufias, The Poverty and Welfare Impacts of Climate Change (pp. 77–98). Washington, DC: The World Bank. Skoufias, E., Katayama, R., & Essama-Nssah, E. (2012). Chapter 3 Too Little Too Late: Welfare Impacts of Rainfall Shocks in Rural Indonesia. In E. Skoufias, The Poverty and Welfare Impact of Climate Change: Quantifying the Effects, Identifying the Adaptation (pp. 55–75). Washington, DC: The World Bank. Stiglitz, J. (Performer). (2009, December). Towards a More Productive Agrarian Economy for Myanmar. Yangon, Yangon, Myanmar. Takahashi, K., Higashikata, T., & Tsukada, K. (2010). The Short-Term Poverty Impact of SmallScale. The Developing Economies, Vol. 48, 128–155. TCG, 2010. Post-Nargis Periodic Review IV 1. Yangon. The Impact Alliance. (n.d.). Myanmar - Empowering Women Through Self Reliance Groups (SRGs) in Myanmar. Retrieved 1 April, 2014, from The Impact Alliance: http://www.impactalliance.org/ ev_en.php?ID=49432_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC. The World Bank. (n.d.). Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) Techniques. Retrieved 1 April, 2014, from The World Bank: http://go.worldbank.org/EU99NNIVS0. UNDP. (2011). Integrate Household Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar (2009–2010), UNDP 2011. UNISDR. (2018, Aug 4). Disaster Statistics. Retrieved August 4, 2018, from the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. https://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/disaster-statistics. United Nations. (2009). UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: UNISDR.

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United Nations Development Programme. (2004). World Report on Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challange for Development. New York: United Nations Development Programme. United Nations Development Programme. (2013–2015). Local Governance Programme Document. Yangon: UNDP. Win, M. (2012). Social and Economic Analysis of Post Cyclone Nargis HUmantarian Response in Laputa. Yangon: Yangon Institute of Economics. Zaman, H. (1999). Assessing the Poverty and Vulnerability Impact of Micro-Credit in Bangladesh: A case study of BRAC. Zissener, M. (2010). Solutions for Those at Risk in Climate Disasters. United Nations Institute for Environment and Human Security

Chapter 12

Transforming Differences Through Women’s Initiatives in Myanmar: Forging an Inter-ethnic Alliance for Grassroots Peace Makiko Takeda

Introduction Fundamental rights, including women’s rights, have long been violated in Myanmar. The endurance of suffering, especially among ethnic minorities and rural women, has continued because good governance, which requires the rule of law, does not exist. This has been compounded by failures of enforcement in the security and judicial sectors, contributing to the deprivation of women’s rights throughout the country. Furthermore, ordinary citizens are unaware of how their rights are being violated and do not know how to respond effectively, which aggravates an already appalling situation. This has largely arisen as a result of inadequate education and poor access to information, as well as insufficient advocacy work by external actors. Limited press and media freedoms, as well as inconsistent political access to local media, remain key issues in the protection of human rights. Consequently, cleavages in society have widened and become more complex, while the tension among different ethnic groups in the current transition period has increased as new opportunities and challenges have emerged. Against this backdrop, a multitude of women who share the same pain, are standing in solidarity to protect their rights and build grassroots peace, irrespective of their ethnic and religious differences. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the potential women’s civil society organisations (WCSOs) offer for resolving these differences and creating grassroots peace in Myanmar. Women are the most marginalised group in society, their rights are often brutally violated, and they are excluded from the formal peace process. Despite this, they have employed an alternative strategy to advocate for a gender perspective in the ongoing peace process and promote their rights by working together across ethnic and religious boundaries. At present, one of the principal reasons for the inadequate progress of peace negotiations are the power struggles taking place among different actors, which inevitably focus on negative peace or hard security. Similar M. Takeda (B) Department of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_12

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power games have also emerged among male-dominated civil society organisations (CSOs). To understand the overall picture for Myanmar women, this chapter explores women’s involvement in the ongoing formal peace process. This highlights the extremely limited space afforded to women in decision-making and in taking on leadership roles in the reconciliation and peacebuilding operation. Then, it examines how women contribute and influence formal peace process by alternative means as well as unite voices of women by making inter-ethnic alliances. Women’s rights organisations in rural, remote, and ethnic regions of Myanmar are extremely active and monitor, protect, and carry out advocacy across ethnic boundaries despite inter-ethnic tension among certain groups.

Women in the Formal Peace Process Although women’s rights have been severely violated, especially in ethnic and conflict-affected areas, and women in general are afforded limited political space, an increasing number of WCSOs have been making a substantial contribution to social sectors and the promotion of women’s and children’s rights. Women also work as community-level or informal actors engaged in conflict prevention, resolution, and peace-building. Despite this, they have consistently been excluded from formal peace negotiations and processes. This has impeded them from presenting women’s perspectives on agreements and policies. It has also prevented them from utilising their potential for developing mutual understanding and creating a durable future peace. To move towards genuine democratisation and peace, women’s meaningful participation at all levels of political dialogue and peace negotiations is crucial. Table 12.1 details women’s representation in the formal peace process between 2011 and 2016. The nationwide ceasefire processes that took place from 2011 to 2016 were entirely dominated by males. This may be partly related to the narrowly defined nature of the ‘peace process’ in Myanmar, which was considered a ‘process towards the absence of violence’ in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), the narrow focus of which was on troop movements, violence management, and monitoring.1 Of the 52 members of the Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC), only two were women. These were Min Yin Chan and Doi Bu Nbrang, parliamentarians from Mon and Kachin State. Furthermore, all members of the Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC) were men. The formation of the negotiation team organised by ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) reflected a similar trend. Women rarely take a leadership position within EAOs and CSOs, although an increasing number have been active in the front lines of NGOs. Male domination is deeply embedded in the social structures and institutions 1

Although the aim of the NCA is stated as achieving just and sustainable peace, the entire agreement focuses primarily on what Galtung termed ‘negative peace,’ which is ‘absence of physical violence.’

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Table 12.1 Women’s representation in the peace process between 2011 and 2016 Negotiation body

Year

Total number of women

Total number of the body

Percentage of women (%)

Union Peacemaking Central Committee (UPCC)

2012

0

11

0.0

Union Peacemaking Working Committee (UPWC)

2012

2

52

3.8

The Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT)

2013

1

16

6.3

Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM)

2015

0

16

0.0

Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)

2015

3

48

6.3

Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC-Union level)

2015

0

26

0.0

The Senior Delegation (SD)

2015

2

15

13.3

National Reconciliation and Peace Centre

2016

2

11

18.2

Source Human rights watch (2016) and AGIPP (2015)

of Myanmar, which relegates women to low-ranking positions in social and political life. Only one woman, Saw Mra Razar Lin from the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), was appointed as a member of the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team (NCCT) established in 2012, which consisted of representatives from 16 EAOs. In June 2015, Naw Zipporah Sein, former General-Secretary of the Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO) and a pioneering co-founder of the Women’s League of Burma (WLB), was chosen as the lead negotiator for Senior Delegation, the negotiation team for EAOs. Thus, there were only two women—Saw Mra Razar Lin form NCCT and Naw Zipporah Sein—among the 15 members of Senior Delegation involved in the NCA negotiation (Upreti et al., 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2016). Consequently, only a small number of women were included as signatories of the NCA; one of ten governments, one of 24 EAOs, two of 21 witness signatories, and zero of six international witnesses (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The three committees set up to implement the NCA in 2015 also replicated the male-dominated structure. Three women from three EAOs—the Karen National

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Union (KNU), the New Mon State Party (NMSP), and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)—were appointed to be Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee members. Two other committees, the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting and Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, did not include any women. Thus, there were only three women out of the ninety people involved in the NCA mechanism (Upreti et al., 2019). Similarly, the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC), successor to the controversial Myanmar Peace Centre, included two women among its 11 members: Aung San Suu Kyi as head of the NLD and Shila Nan Taung, a Kachin Member of Parliament (MP) in the national upper house (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Due to the persistent underrepresentation of women in political dialogue and peace negotiations, mass advocacy campaigns have been organised by active women’s organisations to secure a 30% representation of women in the peace process. However, this 30% quota was initially rejected by the government. Consequently, an ambiguous compromise was reached in the NCA (section 23 of Chapter 5), stating: ‘We shall include a reasonable number/ratio of women representatives in the political dialogue process’ (Upreti et al., 2019). Nonetheless, in the January 2016 Union Peace Conference (UPC), pressure from women’s organisations resulted in a decision to include 3 gender-friendly clauses aimed at achieving a 30% quota in the final Framework of Political Dialogue (Article 2, Article 4.2.2, Article 10.2), although the term used was ‘encouragements’ rather than ‘mandates’ (Warren et al., 2018). An increasing number of women have participated in the four peace conferences held since the NCA. For instance, women comprised 7.7% of the total number of participants at the January 2016 UPC, 13% of the August 2016 UPC, 19.7% of the May 2017 UPC, and 22% of the July 2018 UPC (Khullar, 2019; Warren et al., 2018). Although the growth in representation of women can be clearly identified in this series of peace conferences, these figures include not only actual negotiators (delegates) but also facilitators, technical assistants, and observers, none of whom were involved in decision-making. Moreover, the AGIPP (2017) reported an imbalance in women’s representation in the 5 sectors (political, social, economic, security, and land and environment) discussed at the May 2017 UPC. Women were best-represented in social sectors (33% of representatives) with much lower representation in the other sectors. Of these, representation in the security sector was the lowest at 9–10%.2 It is therefore clear that women’s participation in formal peace dialogues since 2011 has been extremely limited. Although there has been an increase in representation at the Union Peace Conferences, the figures fall considerably short of the 30% target and women’s involvement has generally been confined to the social sector. Thus, women’s crucial role in reconciliation and peacebuilding has not received formal acknowledgement from the government or from EAOs. As a result, WCSOs

2

The sector-wide policy discussions were held on 25th and 26th May, 2017. Women’s representation in each sector on both days was as follows (two figures indicate percentage on 25th and 26th, respectively); Political sector: 18, 18%; Social sector: 33, 33%; Economic sector: 21, 20%; Security sector: 9, 10% and Land and environment sector: 14, 14%.

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have largely been excluded from decision-making positions in formal peace negotiations or high-level committees (TNI, 2016). In fact, even in cases where women have been in representative positions, they are often marginalised due to their lack of seniority (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016). Nang Raw Zahkung, who served as a formal technical advisor of SD and NCCT, asserted that some women were reluctant to take a leading role because of what she called the ‘burden of conservative tradition’ and lack of an ‘enabling environment.’ Nevertheless, there have been a handful of women from EAOs (Thein, 2015). Most notably, women have been excluded from negotiations relating to traditional security issues such as security sector reform, demobilisation and disarmament of armed groups, and ceasefires and ceasefire monitoring. A representative of EAOs stated that ‘women’s role is to ease tensions. The armed parties are very defensive positions, and women can ease this. Women are not negotiators; they are not diplomatic actors. The negotiations are now military to military’ (HRW, 2016). Another EAO representative claimed that ‘the ceasefire is only related to the government and ethnic groups, not other groups. After signing a ceasefire, both sides will organise meetings to get ideas from the people. They will be invited according to the issues. Women’s representatives will be invited for women’s issues’ (TNI, 2016). As indicated by the language of the EAO representatives, the focus of peace negotiation is on hard security, not individual human security. Due to the limited understanding among political and ethnic leaders regarding the need for a gendered understanding of security, peace tends to be narrowly defined as national security while human security is disregarded (TNI, 2016). Consequently, women have often been confined to the kitchen to prepare food for the negotiators in the peace process (Thein, 2015).

A Contribution Towards Reinstalling a Peace Culture at a Grassroots Level Women-to-Women Diplomacy, an Alternative Method of Peacebuilding One of the few access points CSOs have used to participate in peace negotiations is to serve as technical advisors. Both SD and NCCT contained two female technical advisors whose roles were to offer guidance on many critical issues. These were Nang Raw Zahkung and Ja Nan Lahtaw from the Nyein (Shalom) foundation (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016), which is a national NGO dedicated to ensuring a durable and inclusive peace with justice. These women gained trust due to their knowledge, skills, and expertise in relation to ceasefire accords, implementation practices, and international protocols as well as best practices and standards pertaining to women’s inclusion. They also had a strong connection with one of the EAOs. These experts were chosen at this Track 1 level to represent the overarching interests of the teams rather than women’s agenda (AGIPP, 2015; Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016).

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Another access point CSOs have used is to serve as observers. However, observer status was not always secured and permission to observe each session was granted based on the requests of each individual or group. Because EAOs often accepted these requests, representatives of WCSOs, including alliances such as the Women’s League of Burma (WLB) and the Gender Equality Network (GEN), were able to attend the peace negotiations (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016). 21.6% of all observers (40 out of 185) at the 2017 May UPC and 32.3% of all observers (66 out of 204) at the July 2018 UPC were women, a much higher representation than among delegates (Nyein Nyein, 2018).3 Although they were not part of any formal decision-making bodies, WCSOs highlighted two main advantages of observing the sessions. First, they could obtain information from the proceedings which enabled them to report the content of the talks back to their WCSOs in a timely manner. In so doing, they were able to carry out advocacy work to exert influence on the draft. Second, they could engage in sidebar mediation or advocacy with delegates in the hallway, which provided opportunities to make requests or express concerns around the negotiations (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016). While these two channels are the only ways CSOs can become involved in the peace process at a national level, CSOs can also submit recommendations to the UPDJC working committee for thematic-based issues through the CSO Forum working committee, which is based on a discussion at the CSO Forum at sub-national level. At the first CSO Forum in February 2017, women comprised 37% of representatives and 23.2% of working committee members, although the thematic issues they could discuss were limited to certain economic, social, and land/environmental issues that excluded political or security issues (Warren et al., 2018). Although WCSOs have been under-recognised in high-level negotiations, they have been striving to influence formal peace processes indirectly as well as promote and produce policy and advocacy strategies to secure greater representation (PSF, 2016). Because there is little formal space available in which to influence ongoing negotiations, women’s activists have pursued what they called ‘tea break diplomacy’ to persuade male delegations during breaks in meetings (HRW, 2016). In addition, women have mobilised informal peace-building efforts and become more political within CSOs (Cardenas, 2019). WSCOs have had to find alternative ways to advocate for a gender perspective in the ongoing peace process. For instance, they have united to mount a concerted campaign as well as lobby EAOs and the government directly for their inclusion in the peace process. Utilising the slogan ‘No Women, No Peace,’ women also staged a massive public campaign to call for their participation in peace negotiations on the International Day of Peace 2015 (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016; TNI, 2016). Indeed, for many years, women have been active agents for reconciliation and political change in grassroots and civil society initiatives aimed at peace, community development, and reform (TNI, 2016).WCSOs networks, for instance, have a long 3

At the May 2017 UPC, 105 of the 700 delegates were women while at the July 2018 UPC, 120 out of 700 delegates were women, denoting 15 and 17% representation, respectively (Nyein Nyein 2018).

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history in Myanmar (Muehlenbeck & Federer, 2016), although these have involved informal cooperation. However, the situation for women over the past few decades has necessitated building formal alliances across ethnic, religious, and other ideological boundaries to develop a greater voice with which to address women’s issues (Cardenas, 2019; Fink, 2011). There are now a number of formal WSCO alliances at a national level, such as WLB, GEN, Women’s Organisation Network (WON), and Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP), as well as many regional alliances of community-based organisations (CBOs). Under these umbrella organisations, women from diverse backgrounds have cooperated to build peace at a grassroots level and larger women’s movements at a national level by sharing their expertise, mobilising their resources, and working with international NGOs. Therefore, to understand women’s roles in peace-building, analysis should not be limited to their contribution to the formal peace process; it should also include the alternative strategies devised by women to bring about societal change for long-term sustainable peace (Gizelis, 2011). This alternative method of informal peacebuilding was termed ‘women-to-women diplomacy’ by Cardenas, who was inspired by the concept of people-to-people diplomacy. It represents ‘efforts to create platforms for dialogue and cooperation that challenge the existing conflict narratives’ (Cardenas, 2019, p. 47). A principal strategy of women-to-women diplomacy has been to promote social interaction between women, share experiences of struggles in conflicts, and establish a collective goal of gender equality. This enables women to develop a comprehensive understanding of how peacebuilding can be affected by gender inequality regardless of ethnic, religious, and political boundaries. It also evokes a sense of fellowship based on common experience as women, which bridges various divisions and serves as a platform for grassroots cooperation (Cardenas, 2019).

Women’s Efforts Towards Forming an Inter-ethnic and Religious Alliance for Peace-Building The pioneer of formal alliances between WCSOs through women-to-women diplomacy in Myanmar is WLB. The formation of WLB was based on the formidable dilemma faced by numerous Myanmar women. They realised that neither ethnonationalist nor pro-democracy movements could resolve women’s issues without women occupying leadership positions and exerting an influence on decision-making (Cardenas, 2019). In January 1995, several female members of the All Burma Student’s Democratic Front (ABSDF), who managed to flee to the Thai-Burma border, established the Burmese Women’s Union (BWU). Most took part in the 8888 uprising and continued to devote themselves to their role as active political actors. However, a male-dominated ABSDF, like other political organisations, continued to focus exclusively on broader political goals such as democracy and selfdetermination rather than diverting their energies to women’s rights (Fink, 2011). The

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goal of gender equality therefore provided solid ground for cooperation across all faiths and ethnicities (Cardenas, 2019). BWU sought to reach out to women of all ethnicities who were living along Burma’s borders, as well as those who resettled in the West, as the expansion of membership and representation would be important in enabling women to have a greater voice in politics and promote women’s rights. They later realised that an alliance of existing WCSOs should be formed, which would bring together diverse women from different ethnic groups (Fink, 2011). The BWU contacted other WCSOs to discuss the formation of an umbrella political organisation, empowered women by conducting grassroots leadership training, and held seminars and conferences with representatives of various women’s associations to promote inter-ethnic dialogues. They shared the experience of suppression by the military and issues such as discrimination against women as well as learning about the activities of other groups (Fink, 2011). However, trust-building was not a straightforward process. Initially, many ethnic-based WCSOs expressed doubts about the women’s conferences convened by the BWU. They believed that the BWU was a Burman organisation with strong ties to the ABSDF and that it therefore had a hidden agenda of ‘Burmanisation’ that would put them under ABSDF control. Other challenges also emerged, including tensions between ethno-nationalist projects and the promotion of women’s active roles as a political project while creating a unifying identity for women (Cardenas, 2019). In addition, the political agendas of EAOs, which cooperated closely with ethnic WCSOs, influenced ethnic WCSOs’ decisions to form an alliance. While most ethnic WCSOs largely operated in exile and in conflict areas, the situation of ethnic WCSOs from Mon state—the Mon women’s organisation (MWO) and the Mon women’s rights organisation (MWRO)—was somewhat different. These groups had to take a conciliatory approach towards the military regime due to the ceasefire agreement signed in 1995 by the New Mon State Party and its armed wing, the Mon National Liberation Army (Fink, 2011). Nonetheless, through a series of formal and informal face-to face interactions, women from different ethnic groups gradually built up trust and deepened mutual understanding. Finally, on 9 December 1999, the final day of the women’s forum, WLB was founded as the first umbrella women’s organisation comprising 12 member organisations that transcended ethnic and religious differences and political positions (Fink, 2011). The WLB promotes six core values: (1) ‘Mutual respect and nondiscrimination’; (2) ‘Opposing all forms of violence against women and protecting women from violence (believing in & respecting women’s human rights)’; (3) ‘Upholding the principles of democracy and equality’; (4) ‘Responsibility, accountability, and transparency’; (5) ‘Upholding gender equality’; and (6) ‘Peaceful coexistence’ (WLB, 2009, p. 0). At present, there are three main programmes to which all member organisations are devoted; peace and reconciliation, women against violence, and women’s political empowerment. The WLB organises various workshops, exchange meetings, and training programmes, and conducts grassroots advocacy as well as lobbying for women’s agendas (WLB, n.d.). It can be argued that through women-to-women diplomacy, the WLB has managed to transform interethnic conflict and distrust among women into wider inter-ethnic cooperation and trust. This remarkable achievement of inter-ethnic coalition building demonstrates

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that women have the ability to overcome differences, promote equality, and work together for the common goal of achieving peace. Other women’s inter-ethnic and inter-religious alliances, such as GEN and WON, were originally founded to support women in response to Cyclone Nargis in 2008 (PSF, 2016). The activities of both umbrella organisations eventually expanded to include those related to gender equality, women’s participation in decision-making and gender justice, and gender-based violence (Peace insight, 2013; GEN, n.d.). Since the change in political landscape in 2011, there has been further cooperation and alliance-building among women’s networks and organisations both along the border and inside the country (TNI, 2016; WON, 2016). In 2014, another alliance, AGIPP, was formed by eight women’s networks and organisations working for women’s rights, gender inclusion, peace, and security. These included WLB, GEN,WON, and Mon Women’s Network (MWN). The specific aim of AGIPP is policy advocacy to support women’s participation in ongoing peace and democratisation processes. Several essential policy briefs were developed by AGIPP with the assistance of international NGOs to provide critical information for the NCA process (Kolas, 2019). MWO, which decided not to join the WLB due to the political situation in 1999, is a member of MWN. Nevertheless, 15 years after the formation of the WLB, MWO began working with WLB members under the larger umbrella alliance, AGIPP. As a result of the formation of AGIPP, women from diverse backgrounds can now cooperate to achieve shared goals, not only within individual women’s alliance networks but also in a wider alliance encompassing different women’s networks. Aung San Suu Kyi (2003) has emphasised the importance of women’s roles and their participation in the reconstruction of a devastated and divided society: Women have traditionally played the role of unifier and peacemaker within the family. They instill a nurturing sense of togetherness and mutual caring. They balance love and tenderness with discipline while nurturing growth and understanding. Women have the capacity for the compassion, self-sacrifice, courage and perseverance necessary to dissipate the darkness of intolerance and hate, suffering, and despair. Women have an innate talent for resolving differences and creating warmth and understanding within a framework of mutual respect and consideration. This ability should be used to address not only our individual, family and community needs, but also to contribute towards the process of reconciliation, which will make our country a democratic society that guarantees the fundamental rights of the people. (p. 1)

Overview of the Activities of Ethnic-Based WCSOs As demonstrated by the formation, contribution, and alternative measures of informal peacebuilding created by women’s alliances, WSCOs in Myanmar cooperate to pursue a common objective beyond ethnic and religious differences while working for their respective community. It can therefore be augured that women have great potential to bridge the multiple divisions that are the underlying causes of conflicts and a key hurdle in the reconciliation and peace process. Many of them are ethnicbased WCSOs, which comprise the most marginalised population and experienced

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Fig. 12.1 The relationship between the activities of WCSOs, their effects, and enabling factors (Source Takeda and Yamahata [2020])

serious human rights violation under the military rule. Figure 12.1 summarises the activities and effects of WCSOs in Myanmar with respect to the three categories— participation, empowerment, and rights protection and promotion—and the relationships among these. This Fig. 12.1 is based on information provided by four ethnic WCSOs. WCSOs promote social interactions among women and encourage them to participate in various meetings and events. They integrate all women from a diverse range of backgrounds and form coalitions to take collective action with the support of international NGOs. They also conduct a number of training programmes and workshops to support women’s empowerment, including women’s leadership and political empowerment programmes. Women can thus build their capacity to become productive members of society as well as take on leadership roles for wider societal issues. WCSOs also protect women who are the victims of human rights violations, promote women’s rights, and raise people’s awareness of human rights issues through community events at a grassroots level and through publication and conferences targeted at the international community. They support diverse ethno-religious groups in their respected communities on the basis of equality, which reflect the diversity of the country. A substantial amount of work has been carried out with the cooperation of other WCSOs through women’s inter-ethnic and religious alliances as well as individually on the ground, which promote harmony among WCSOs and members in the communities through a respect for diversity. Therefore, it can be argued that WCSOs foster grassroots peace through women-to-women diplomacy based on dialogue and negotiation approaches, thus forming the basis for sustainable development, peace, and unity in the longer term.

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Conclusion This chapter examines the potential of women’s civil society organisations (WCSOs) for resolving social division and creating grassroots peace in Myanmar. Although the advent of a democratic administration has undoubtedly changed the political landscape and peace negotiations have been conducted among three male-dominated institutions—the military, the government, and EAOs, the bleak prospects for peace and genuine democratisation have cast a shadow on the future of the country. Multiple divisions created over time and during the transition have made it difficult to unite diverse groups and to move the peace process forward. Under such circumstances, women have overcome their differences and cooperated across ethnic and religious boundaries to strive for the shared goals of gender equality, peace, and reconciliation. However, their political space has been limited by social and cultural norms that have excluded them from formal peace processes. Although there has been an increase in the number of women attending peace conferences, they have generally only been allowed to participate as technical assistants or observers and thus have not been involved in decision-making. Although the continuous neglect of women in political dialogue continues, they have used alternative means to advocate for a gender perspective. For instance, they have been united in mounting a concerted campaign as well as directly lobbying EAOs and the government for their inclusion in the peace process. Women have realised that they need to transform their differences and cooperate as one to create a bigger voice and provide an impetus to the movement to achieve peace. For instance, WCSOs have employed the strategy of women-to-women diplomacy to build bridges between all the different groups in their communities, serving the marginalised population on the basis of equality. Having witnessed the stagnation of the current formal peace process, which focuses heavily on negative peace while ignoring the root causes of the violence, it is clear there is a need to promote grassroots peace based on the principle of equality, which can further promote tolerance, respect, and understanding in the minds of the people. This research suggests that WCSOs can be agents capable of creating peace on the ground while at the same time working to address wider societal issues. Therefore, women’s empowerment and their representation in the peace process is crucial in driving peace forward in Myanmar.

References AGIPP. (2015). Women, Peace and Security Policymaking in Myanmar: Context Analysis and Recommendations, Edition 1/2015, December. Yangon: Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process. AGIPP. (2017). Analysis of Myanmar’s Second Union Peace Conference-21st Century Panglong from Gender Perspective. Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process (AGIPP). Aung San Suu Kyi. (2003). A Foundation of Enduring Strength. In Thanakha Team (Eds.), Burma 〜Women’s Voice Together (pp. 1–2). Bangkok: Altsean Burma.

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Cardenas, M. L. (2019). Women-to-Women Diplomacy and the Women’s League of Burma. In Kolas, A. (Ed.). Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar Between Feminism and Ethnopolitics (pp. 33–43). Routledge: Oxon and New York. Fink, C. (2011). The Founding and Development of Women’s League of Burma—A Herstory. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. GEN. (n.d.). About GEN. Retrieved January 26, 2020 from https://www.genmyanmar.org/about_us. Gizelis, T.-I. (2011). A Country of their Own: Women and Peacebuilding. Conflict Management and Peace Science 28(5): 522–542. Human Rights Watch. (2016). A Gentleman’s Agreement: Women’s Participation in Burma’s Peace Negotiations and Political Transition. Human Rights Watch. Khullar, A. (2019). Women’s Participation in Myanmar’s Peace Process. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Retrieved January 26, 2020 from http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articl eNo=5610. Kolas, A. (2019). Introduction: Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar: The Map and Terrain. In Kolas, A. (Ed.). Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar Between Feminism and Ethnopolitics (pp. 33–43). Oxon and New York: Routledge. Muehlenbeck, A. and Federer, J. P. (2016). Women’s Inclusion in Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. Inclusive Security and Swiss Peace. Nyein Nyein. (2018, July 15). Women Playing Larger Roles at This Year’s Peace Conference. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved January 3, 2020 from https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/timelinechina-myanmar-relations.html. Peace Insight. (2013). Women’s Organization Network of Myanmar (WON). Retrieved January 26, 2020 from https://www.peaceinsight.org/conflicts/myanmar/peacebuilding-organisations/won/ PSF. (2016). The Women are Ready: An opportunity to transform peace in Myanmar. Yangon: The Peace Support Fund. Takeda, M. and Yamahata, C. (2020). Promotion of Women’s Rights in ASEAN: Myanmar Women’s Organisations for Sustainable Unity in Diversity. In Yamahata, C., Sudo, S. and T. Matsugi (Eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar and Thailand (pp. 105–140). Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Thein, C. (2015 September 23). Anger as Women Kept ‘in the Kitchen’ During Peace Process. Myanmar Times. Retrieved January 11, 2020 from https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/ 16630-anger-as-women-kept-in-the-kitchen-during-peace-process.html TNI. (2016). No Women, No Peace: Gender Equality, Conflict and Peace in Myanmar. Myanmar Policy Briefing 18. Amsterdam: The Transnational Institute. Upreti, B. R., Upreti, D. and Adhikari, D.P. (2019). Women in the Myanmar Peace Process: The 30-Percent Target. In Kolas, A. (Ed.), Women, Peace and Security in Myanmar Between Feminism and Ethnopolitics (pp. 33–43). Oxon and New York: Routledge. Warren, R., Applebaum, A., Fuhrman, H. and Mawby, B. (2018). Women’s Peacebuilding Strategies Amidst Conflict: Lessons from Myanmar and Ukraine. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security. WILPF. (2020). National Action Plans for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Retrieved March 7, 2020 from https://www.peacewomen.org/member-states WLB. (2009). Building a Movement within a Movement: WLB Marks Ten Years of Gender Activism. Chiang Mai: Women’s League of Burma. WLB. (n.d.). Programs. Women’s League of Burma. Retrieved January 26, 2020 from https://wom enofburma.org/programs WON. (2016). The Voices of Myanmar Women. Research Report in Support of CEDAW Alternative Report. Women’s Organization Network of Myanmar.

Chapter 13

Education Model Development of Media Health Literacy for Adolescents in Upper Northern Thailand: A Process of Change for Social Upliftment Kwanfa Sriprapandh

Conceptualizing Health Literacy and Media Health Literacy Child alcohol abuse, nutrition problems, and mental health problems are major health challenges in Thailand. Lane H, Porter K, and Hecht E (2019) mentioned that the strength of the education sector especially a school-based study on health literacy shows that the teachers can follow-up advocacy activities during a yearlong study. They operated a participatory research study to reduce sweet beverage consumption. The study found a deep understanding of health motivation to continue reducing behavioral problems. Furthermore, D. Barwood, A. Jones, and E. O’Hara (2020) specified that school-based educational programs are identified as an effective means to increase awareness and promote healthy behavior. They developed three consecutive lesson plans for use with adolescent students. This describes the education model of the development of media health literacy that is designed for school-based education. This model focuses on continuous learning of media health literacy and to empower them on MHL’s four abilities of media health literacy: accessibility and identification, analytical ability, critical ability, and media producing ability. Furthermore, the education model of MHL is the school-based program to encounter the health problems in Thai adolescent students. UNICEF Reported on the Situation of Adolescents and Youth in Thailand (UNICEF, 2016: 21) uses the United Nations criteria to define the word teen as referring to people ages 10 to 19, referring to the general health problems of Thai youth, namely: Adolescent who drinks alcohol before the age of 15 is likely to become alcoholic than those who drink at the age of 20. Youth in each of UNICEF (UNICEF, 2016: 22–23) also discusses the problem of smoking among adolescents. From 2007 to 2014, the average age of adolescents (ages 15 to 24) who started smoking decreased from 16.8 years old to 15.6 years old. According to the Department of Health’s, in K. Sriprapandh (B) Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_13

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2014 data showed that data in 2013, 16.7 percent of children and adolescents aged 6 to 18 years were underweight. Moreover, data from the Department of Health in 2013 (UNICEF, 2016: 24) shows that children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 18 years old were estimated to be 8.9 percent overweight or obese. The number of adolescents who are obese in the year 2014 is reported to be 9.9% higher than the school-age population aged 5 to 14 years. Furthermore, UNICEF (2016: 25) reported that depression is a mental health problem among Thai youth aged 15 years to 24 years. They were estimated to be about 0.3–2.1 percent. Stress was the main factor contributing to the risk of suicide. Suicide was the second-leading cause of death among Thai adolescents following car accidents. In 2011, the suicide rate was 3.43 per 100,000 population aged 15 years to 19 years. This mental health problem is so important in the life of Thai youths nowadays. One of the recommendations to combat health problems is to make the adolescents have a healthy behavior that is on media health literacy and is related to the ability of health media analysis, comparison of self-experience, evaluation of heath media value, producing of health media. Park A, Eckert T, and Zaso (2017) mentioned that media health literacy is crucial to acquire health-related knowledge, adopt healthy lifestyles, and benefit from healthcare services. In the discussion on international health literacy, there is an interest in the level of health awareness offered by Don Nutbeam, containing functional health literacy, communicative interactive health literacy, and critical health literacy. The first stage of health literacy means knowing about health risks, health services, health education that lead people to participate in health project activities. All are considered as roles of data from health education. The health information is passed from the individual’s network and the media. This basic level of media awareness includes the knowledge of hygiene, nutrition, drug safety, human relationships, parenthood, and sexuality (Rask M, Uusiautti S, and Määttä K, 2013: 51–71). The goal of health literacy in communication or response level is the pride of being human being motivated, and self-confident which is interesting results that will benefit the individual. Furthermore, youth are also interested in social norms and group activities. Health education is about making people discover their unique needs. Health literacy in communication and its response level wants to improve the person. Including the development of an environment that encourages healthy people (Rask M, Uusiautti S, and Määttä K, 2013: 51–71). Moreover, scholars have introduced such ideas. MHL is concern about the ability of individuals to identify the linkage between health and media. This research will focus on the impact of media on health behavior and the concept of health literacy (D. Levin- Zamir, D. Lemish, and R. Gofin, 2011). The researcher applies the concept to construct a conceptual framework for developing health literacy and examine the adolescents of the upper northern part of Thailand. The concept of MHL by Diane Levin-Zamir, Dafna Lemish, and Rosa Gofin (2011: 323–335) creates the criteria for measuring MHL. The focus is on (1) the influence of the media on knowledge, attitudes, behaviors of children and youth, (2) the persuasion of the media that affect the users on media usage, and encoding–decoding negotiation. (3) The influence of content offered through television to children and

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youth on taste, and (4) they become the target audience of content producers offered in online media now. It has designed activities that encouraged children and youth to be involved in the creation of content through the media. From the previous research, some scholars focused in the area of study especially on credible sources of online health information and mental health literacy (Mansfield R, Patalay P Humphrey N, 2020. Television series exposure, literacy, sexual attitude, and HIV prevention and treatment hit their interest (Urisa Ngamwutikorn, 2013; Sujha Subramaian et al., 2017). Most of them investigated health literacy and the influence in specific health behavior such as media health exposure and the reduction of alcohol drinking, nutrition education programs and adolescent obesity, health campaigns, and the reduction of sweet beverage consumption. (G. Haddar S, Valerio M, Garcia C, 2012; Kampol Duangprasert, 2013; Park A, Eckert T, and Zaso M, 2017; LeRouge C, Durneva P, Sangameswaran S, 2019; Barwood D, Jones A, and O’Hara, 2020). In this article, the researcher focused on the education model of the development of media health literacy which led to some health issues that will reflect on the thinking and social skills of adolescents in choosing a healthy lifestyle. This will result in adolescents’ motivation and health information accessibility and identification. It also includes the analytical ability, critical ability, and media producing ability in their everyday life.

The Need for Media Health Literacy The quantitative sample contains 3 parts as follows: (1) Textbooks related to the development of educational MHL models (2) experienced experts or research related to MHL. The researcher uses a selective approach, experienced professionals, or research related in media that focuses on health as for all 4 persons. Results from interviews with health communicators and health educators found that there is a growing need for knowledge about health activities for adolescents. • The development of the basic healthcare knowledge is needed for the youth that consists of teaching and learning that provides both knowledge and healthcare activities, creating a health education group on Facebook youth health media production, and special health activities are organized between educational institutions and outside agencies. • The development of self-esteem for youth consists of raising the case for students to see the differences, trying to make the students see the advantages and disadvantages, and accept themselves. • The self-development approach to good health for youth consists of learning and teaching that combines both knowledge and practice. Furthermore, teachers should organize health activities for students to attend to their interests outside of class time and create a healthy youth model. Moreover, teachers should support activities sharing between healthy youths with youth, and activities sharing between youth and family members.

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Testing Media Health Literacy: Skills, Lessons, and Implications The researcher provides information about health literacy for junior high school students at Wattanoothai Payap School. There are 30 participants in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The first part of the activity provides information about the purpose of education activities, awareness, and health using media. Firstly, the researcher discussed the meaning of “Media literacy” and how the students access health media. The activity focused criticism of students on health media and on spreading information about health care to their friends. These skills are important in fostering health information that will affect the well-being of the youth. The second part of the activity mentioned the purpose of the activity. The researcher’s purpose is to measure the accessibility of health media, criticizing and to develop the skill on health media that improved after the programs on Education Model Development for MHL. The researcher expects that students will be able to describe the credible media features, provide good health advice to friends in the classroom, and will improve the level of media literacy after participating in this activity. In the second part of the program, the researcher designed a level measurement for skills on health literacy. The researcher’s theoretical framework focuses on the accessibility of health media, criticism on the skill of health media, and developing the skill on health media. This was tested on the students before the program on health media. It is a question to general health care such as food, exercise, skincare, mental health, stress, and socialization. At this stage, about seven students are divided into groups that enable everyone to share ideas about the health issues that the young generation faces today. Each group chooses the topic that most members are interested in or experienced. These health problems include eating pills, exercise, skincare, mental health, stress condition, and social activities. Then they passed on the activity leaflet to the group members to do brainstorming for 30 min with the following questions. (a)

Students identify the advantages and disadvantages of health products such as slimming pills, fashion braces, brain food, whitening products. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the health product?

(b)

Students can search for information. What are the sources of information on websites or social media?

(c)

What makes the students determine that the resources are reliable?

(d)

Friends used slimming pills, fashion braces, brain food, whitening products and had health problems. And how will the students help with fixing it?

(e)

What advice would you give to a friend about consuming or using those products?

During the group presentation, the group select fashion braces. First, fashion braces harm health with the quality of its material that makes teeth rusty, rocking, and led to poor dental health. Second, the search can be obtained from the hashtags on Instagram, Googled dentist shop, brand endorser, and information from people around. Third, the students concluded that they accepted health information from the

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source fact and has data validity including a clear reference. Fourth, some students from the group tried fashion braces and they experienced a toothache, gingivitis, and tooth decay. Last, the recommendation to those who tried fashion braces is to consult a dentist about having braces and as well as research about the harm caused by it on the different media platforms. The groups who are interested in using diet pills come up with a meaningful discussion. First, taking pills harms health and is a waste of money. There may be residues that can be also harmful to the body and will not reduce body weight. On the other hand, taking it in a good manner may have advantages in losing weight fast and having a healthy body. Second is the information that can be found on websites and health books, social media platforms, as well as inquiries from parents and sales. The third is trust is the reliability of the source that came with experience and ratings. Fourth, the group had no direct experience in the use of anti-obesity drugs but have some close relatives that used pills and weight reduction is not successful. Last, their suggestions to friends about weight loss should point out both the advantages and disadvantages and encourage friends to exercise. The group who is interested in health drinks has the following findings. First, health drinks have a positive effect on the body that makes the mind and brain healthy. It also helps the skin in regulating cold temperatures. At the same time, the effect will cause myopia and increase sugar levels. Second is the search can be obtained from the online trends on Instagram, Google, newspaper, inquiries from friends and parents. Third, the source of information was based on references that were confirmed by medical experts or media information. Fourth, the group had direct experience in health drinks. Fifth, suggestions to friends about health drinks to drink it in moderation, read the warning before drinking, see the expiration date, and must choose a trusted brand. Each group wrote a summary of the brainstorming activity and presented it to other groups to share the lessons they have learned to their classmates. The conclusion of the lesson about that the information on health literacy was provided. The students have experienced media health literacy skills as follows. First, the research came from a variety of sources from medical experts’ Facebook pages. Second is a comparative analysis of data from various sources. They consider health information from different media such as social media, websites, print media, television programs, news programs, and advertising. Moreover, they compare medical references to their experiences. Third, they believe medical references and compare the health information with their experiences. Last, they were sharing some useful health information on their social media. Especially, they were tested on MHL skills and their MHL skills were better after they participated in the interventional activities. The results of the paired t-test at sig. 000 show that the MHL post-scores are higher than the MHL pre-score. It means that adolescents have a better MHL score after they participated in the MHL model program.

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Attention, Accessibility, and Interaction Attention Potter (2013: 60–80) mentioned that media health exposure and attention affect the health self- care of receivers. However, he explained that the receivers always have different psychological needs and experiences from each other throughout their life. All receivers explore the health media depend on their attention and by the health information based on their experiences. Furthermore, Harold Pashler (referred to Potter, 2013: 101–120) explained that stimulus affects receivers’ perception and selective attention. They select the information according to their interests, attitudes, and cognitions. On the other hand, they always avoid information that makes gives them stress or unequal cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, Potter (2013: 400–410) specified that the receivers give attention to explore the health information for self-care. They needed the MHL skills, especially adolescent’s exposure. MHL skills make adolescents criticize news content and construct media storytelling. Moreover, adolescents who are active receivers always select the media contents by self-attention. They will not explore the media contents that give a negative impact on their feeling and belief.

Accessibility Rask M, Uusiautti S, and Määttä K. (2013: 51–55) mentioned that health accessibility is the first stage of MHL and it influences the understanding of self-care, health risks, health services, and health education. As a result, health accessibility is the basic investigative skill of health education and leads people to participate in health projects. Health information is passed from the media to individuals through the use of a health communication network. For research findings, Nathan (referred to Potter, 2013: 380–385) reported the relationship between the analytical ability and health evaluation and its influence to the health knowledge and the protection for health risks.

Interaction Potter (2013: 380–386) explained the importance of interpersonal communication especially between adolescents with a family member and peer group in their school. Desmond, Singer, Clam, and Colmore(referred to Potter, 2013: 380–401) mentioned that the adolescent’s accessibility to information will affect to their positive attitude. However, Nathanson (referred to Potter, 2013: 380–385) reported that adolescents who have limited access to information because parenting, most likely to have a lower

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positive attitude on the content that they are exposed to. Furthermore, Nathan (2013: 380–423) proposed that co-viewing between parents and adolescents on television will make them learn from media contents and make them have critical thinking on political issues.

Social Impacts: A Process of Change in Thinking and Living In conclusion, I proposed the three main factors that affected the adolescents’ health changes, such as school health programs, family based health education, and community-based health services. These are integrated factors that have worked together as a health and social transformation system of changing health beliefs and behavior that has an impact on Thai adolescents and society. First, the MHL model was developed for a school-based study of the informal education system. The MHL model needs to shift the focus from providing health information to health self-accessibility and identification, health analytical ability, health critical ability, and health media producing ability. The hypothesis showed that MHL education practicing helped increase to MHL score of Thai adolescents who participated in school-based activities in the classroom. This school health program can be obtained by changing health beliefs and behavior through schoolbased learning. The same findings with Dai C. (2019) reported that health education programs emphasized behavioral change skills, such as goal setting and selfmotivation, and have a positive impact on students’ physical activity behaviors. School-based health education programs also helped increase access to physical activity among populations. Second is the health-social transformation resulted from family based health education. From the findings of MHL, it shows that most Thai adolescents communicate with their parents and family members about their interest in health topics. The interpersonal communication between adolescents with their family members is the primary resource for health education. De Montfacon A. (2018) mentioned that family health education (ESF) helped individuals to learn how to handle their usual health problems and emergencies. Furthermore, Schor E. and Starfield B. (1987) specified the families establish patterns of health behavior that are stable over time and maybe amenable to have selective interventions. Healthcare planning, whether for service delivery or health education intervention, should consider family health data as an important source of information. Third, community-based health services were influenced by health and social transformation. Community healthcare partnership is the research area that some scholars targeted. Kamei T. (2017) aimed to develop people-centered care (PCC), a partnership model to address the challenges of social changes affecting the population’s health. These health projects resulted in individual and social transformation by improving community health literacy and behaviors using people-centered care and enhancing partnerships between healthcare providers and community members through advanced nursing practices. Moreover, people-centered care started when

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community members and healthcare providers foreground health and social issues among community members and families. This model tackles these issues, creating new values concerning health and forming a social system that improves the quality of life and social support that sustains universal health care through the process of building partnerships with communities. A process of health and social transformation in changing health beliefs and health behavior is always an ongoing process toward advanced practice along with the MHL school health program and the collaboration with family based health education and community-based health services.

References Barwood D, Jones A, and O’Hara E. (2020). Pre-service teachers’ mobilising health literacy in sun safety education. Australian Journal of Teacher Education 45(5) 62–73. Retrieved from https:// www.mendeley.com/catalogue/679f2eac-98f4-30a6-8654-605264c1f566/ Dai C. (2019). School health program: Impacting Physical activity behaviors among disadvantaged students. Journal of School Health 89(6) 468–47. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/cat alogue/4ed086a8-099a-3ee3-bbd2-87c86b408fd6/ De Montfalcon A, D’ivernois J, and Riquet S. (2018). Implementation of family health education in lorraine. Education Therapeutique du Patient 10(1). Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/ catalogue/77f08c26-07f0-35cd-87c3-713f12d57583/ Diane Levin-Zamir Dafna Lemish and Rosa Gofin. (2011). Media Health Literacy (MHL): Development and measurement of the concept among adolescents. Health Education Research 26(2) 323–335. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/32a959fa-2c82-3431-990d-1c7 63a8c4416/ Ghaddar S, Valerio M, and Garcia C. (2012). Adolescent health literacy: The importance of credible sources for online health information. Journal of School Health 82(1) 28–36. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/bf23d235-d06f-3f15-9322-1121a3d6f62d/ Gray NJ. (2005). The Internet : A window on adolescent health literacy. Journal of Adolescent Health 37(3):243e1–243e7. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/e88f7bbde67a-3e27-b0c7-3eb9b9d4ad71/ Kamei T, Takahashi K, Omori J. (2017). Toward advanced nursing practice along with peoplecentered care partnership model for sustainable universal health coverage and universal access to health. Revista Latino-Americana de Enfermagem 25. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley. com/catalogue/77f08c26-07f0-35cd-87c3-713f12d57583/ Kampol Duangprasert. (2013). Media exposer knowledge Attitude, and participation on alcohol drinking solution in Thai Youth Group, Bangkok, Thailand. Bangkok: Rajamangala University of Technology Chakapong Bhuvanat. Lane H, Porter K, and Hecht E. (2019). A participatory process to engage appalachian youth in reducing sugar-sweetened beverage consumption. Health Promotion Practice 20(2) 258– 268. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/7874c852-aaab-34d7-aa33-29f6e2 17bad3/ LeRouge C, Durneva P, and Sangameswaran S. (2019). Design guidelines for a technology-enabled nutrition education program to support overweight and obese adolescents: Qualitative usercentered design study. Journal of Medical Internet Research 21(7). Retrieved from https://www. mendeley.com/catalogue/0e4989cf-f699-30a0-b135-e7a82968701a/ Levin D, and Gofin R. (2011). Media Health Literacy (MHL): development and measurement of the concept among adolescents. Health Education Research 26(2):323–335. Retrieved from https:// www.mendeley.com/catalogue/32a959fa-2c82-3431-990d-1c763a8c4416/

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Mansfield R, Patalay P, and Humphrey N. (2020). A systematic literature review of existing conceptualisation and measurement of mental health literacy in adolescent research: Current challenges and inconsistencies. BMC Public Health 20(1). Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/cat alogue/9ff88a95-4e89-39cf-b5a7-574969023bf3/ Park A, Eckert T, and Zaso M. (2017). Associations between health literacy and health behaviors among urban high school students .Journal of School Health 87(12) 885–893. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/da1bc08d-b363-3903-b6d2-adf85265beb5/ Parrish, Nathan. (2013). Classifying with confidence from incomplete information. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 14, 3561–3589. Potter WJ (2013). Media Literacy. SAGE, London Rask M, Uusiautti S, and Määttä K. (2013). The fourth level of health literacy . Community Health Education 34(1) 51–71. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/31617249-c5c83ddf-a1aa-a2540af08c2c/ Schor E, Starfield B, and Stidley C. (1987). Family health utilization and effects of family membership. Medical Care 25(7) 616–626. Retrieved from https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/6be 494a2-e314-3fbe-bf36-1f8a8b9b2d74/ Subramanian, S., Kibachio, J., Hoover, S., Edwards, P., Amukoye, E., Amuyunzu–Nyamongo, M., … Yonga, G. (2017). Research for Actionable Policies: Implementation science priorities to scale up non-communicable disease interventions in Kenya. Journal of Global Health, 7(1). https:// doi.org/10.7189/jogh.07.010204 Urisa ngamwutikorn. (2013). TV drama exposure, media literacy and opinion on sexual preference and imitation of male homosexual among youth in Bangkok. Retrieved from http://cuir.car.chula. ac.th/handle/123456789/32890 UNICEF. (2016). UNICEF annual repoRT 2016. Retrieved from https://www.unicef.org/publicati ons/index_96412.html

Chapter 14

Bridging Divides in Northeast India: Rethinking Nationalism and Democratic Communication towards a Common Cause Malem Ningthouja

Introduction Northeast India is an important space of India’s Act East policy. The Government of India has heavily militarised this region to suppress insurgency, maintain law and order, and defend from any external intervention or aggression. It promotes Indian nationalism above all forms of loyalty. In the name of ‘national’ development, it facilitates various International Financial Institutions in allowing investment in this region to extract profit and resources. The policy has been supported by subordinate state governments formed by members of legislative assemblies elected through periodically held adult franchise. But the governance has breed resistance that is revealing in the growth of insurgency. The demands of insurgency are diverse, ranging from complete sovereignty from India to shared sovereignty and autonomy. The insurgents may be broadly categorised based on their goal of ‘territorial nationalism’ or exclusive ‘ethno nationalism.’ These two forms always clashed one another. At the same time, either of the categories is not freed from factionalism and clash of interests, thereby dividing peoples along party lines. This is particularly revealing in the context of borderland state of Manipur and its surrounding areas where ethnic tensions have been the order of the day. Anyone from this region will say that he/she wants peace, development, and democracy. But he/ she finds no practical methods to achieve it. The paper studies the context, chronology, and nature of these tensions. It also studies the missing link among peoples. Why and how the link is still missing? Who is responsible for it? Can’t there be democratic communication to bridge the divides? What are the common issues that the people are phasing with? My paper will attempt to respond to some of these questions.

M. Ningthouja (B) New delhi, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_14

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The Indian Context India, a political concept embodying an expanding geographical expression, is a UNrecognised ‘nation-state’ and plays important roles in the South Asian geopolitics. It is projected a politically sovereign and militarily powerful country in South Asia and the world’s largest democracy. It enjoys an effective diplomatic relation with the advanced capitalist countries to the extent that its entry in the United Nations Security Council is a near possibility. Its neo-liberal economic policy has far-reaching impacts on economic coordination with and capitalist expansionism to the immediate neighbours and Southeast Asia. This trend is shown as a linear progression following the lapse of British rule in 1947. Perhaps the British colonial system was replaced by the Indian big bourgeoisie’s agenda to inherit British colonial territorial assets and install a regime control over the territories that subsequently became known under a geo-administrative rubric call India. On 15th August 1947, the Indian ‘national leader,’ who became the first Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru jubilated millions of Indian patriots with his famous mid-night political speech Tryst with Destiny. The political rhetoric of Indian nationhood that was embodied in the speech and the ecstatic panorama of the Independence Day ritual raised the epitome of an imagined India among millions of consumers who were inclined to Nehru’s national agenda. Perhaps, on the eve of the ‘independence’, there was widespread imagining, “…there has arisen in Indian, an Indian nation, an Indian nation with Indian culture and an Indian civilisation. …”1 On 26 January 1950, Indian Republic was formally declared. The Indian Constitution was adopted with a spectacular effect. It created the resonance of a mechanised perception called unity in diversity. All these constituted effective visual and audio ingredients for promoting the Indian nationalist trope, influencing a large bulk of the consumers. However, the politics of defiance, resilience, and rebellions refuted the polemics of national independence, democracy, integration, development, and progression. Years before the Indian independence was achieved, the course of the ‘independence movement’ pursued by the Indian National Congress and some other left-wing leaders was criticised by those who upheld different ideologies, revolutionary goals, and strategies. In 1931, the international coalition such as the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence was critical about the leadership of the independence movement. The League "warns the Indian national-revolutionaries to be on their guard against the deceitful and confusing manoeuvres which will undoubtedly be carried out by Nehru, Bose, Roy and the other left-wing nationalists who have now become agents of British imperialism.”2 When British paramountcy lapsed and the Indian Nation Congress virtually ruled the Dominion Government of India, which involved the simultaneous process of the maintenance of law and order, drafting of the Constitution and ‘territorial integration,’ 1

Statement of Hon’ble Mr. Shri Krishna Sinha (Bihar: General) on Monday, 16 December 1946; Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume I. 2 Resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee of the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence, Berlin, 2 June 1931.

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the Communist Party of India expressed strong contention. In January 1948, the CPI argued that “the establishment of the Central Government headed by Pandit Nehru has not solved a single problem of the democratic revolution. Its establishment does not symbolise that the Indian people have won either freedom or independence.”3 The Political Thesis of the Second Congress of the CPI, adopted in 1948, discussed the multiple facets and factors of the general economic, political, social, cultural, and communal crises prevalent in India. The polemic argued that India was a semi-feudal and semi-colonial territory ruled by an oppressive and exploitative feudal-capitalist State that collaborated with the foreign monopoly finance capitalists [sic. AngloAmerican Imperialism]. The interests of the feudal-capitalist State were fulfilled by capturing political power through diabolic means and the suppression of the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural interests and rights of the workers, peasants, agriculture labour, artisans, progressive national bourgeoisie, middle and lower-income professionals or employees or educated unemployed youths, religious minorities, smaller nationalities or linguistic groups, tribes, lower castes, economically backward regions, women, etc.4 The general crisis illustrated in the Political Thesis was reaffirmed when the CPI adopted the programme for a democratic revolution in 1951, some months after the Indian Constitution was announced on 26th January 1950.5 More than 70 years have passed since the Indian Independence was declared. Lots of changes have occurred within India and in India’s relation with the immediate neighbours and beyond. The Constitution has been amended at least 104 times as of January 2020. The State has enforced lots of policies, rules, and programmes. Many contentious issues have phased out, and new ones emerged. These changes are seen as transformation showcasing the State’s ability to keep pace with the changing circumstances towards progressions. But these changes do not bring a qualitative shift towards a people’s democratic revolution. The changes are structural adjustments by innovating new jargon of the contents within the neo-liberal system’s broader framework. The changes in the jargon of contents do not actually upset the basic premise, structure and form of the neo-liberal path that perpetually keeps India under semi-feudal semi-colonial conditions. The territory is continued to be ruled by a feudal-capitalist State; though there have been changes of guards under cliques of the regime from time to time through the parliamentary elections, no alternative has emerged in terms of overthrowing crony capitalism and bureaucratic capitalist authoritarianism. As a result, the general crisis highlighted in the 1951 programme remains persistent throughout the decades. In 1996, few years after adopting India’s structural adjustment programme (or neo-liberal open door policy) that promoted the imperialist slogan of Liberalisation, 3

(1948). On the Present Policy and Tasks of the Communist Party of India, January. (1948). Political Thesis of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India held in Calcutta, February 28–March 6. 5 1951 Program Document of Communist Party of India; Mohit Sen. Ed. (1977). The Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India. Vol. VIII (1951–1956). New Delhi: People’s Publishing House. pp. 1–18. 4

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Privatisation, and Globalisation, a Marxist Leninist group of the journal Revolutionary Democracy, highlighted that the problems that India was suffering from. According to the polemics, India was suffering from combined onslaughts of: (a) domination by world imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism; (b) lack of democratisation of the political structure; (c) failure to recognition of the rights of the nations; (d) suppression of the rights of the minorities, backward castes, dalits, and tribes; (e) domination by landlordism, impoverishment of peasant and agricultural debts; (f) increasing privatisation of the main branches of industry, lack of the protection of the dignity of labour, unemployment crisis, and lack of adequate social insurances, etc.6 The crisis became a regular feature as manifested in the frequent assertions of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights from different circles. The State resorted to enforcing repressive laws, police brutality, paramilitary assault, and military occupation (selectively to suppress national liberation movement) to suppress freedom of conscience, speech, press, assembly, strike and protests, and democratic movements. The overall designs had far-reaching and peculiar effects on the Northeast borderland region.

Expansionist Course and Northeast Question The making of Indian territory after 1947 and the subsequent capitalist path followed an aggressive and expansionist course regarding the smaller nations, backward regions, and weaker tribes that were forcibly taken over by military power, financial arrangements, and political manoeuvering. Territorial annexation was an important agenda seriously considered by the Constituent Assembly from 1946 to 1949. The territory was a prerequisite to making India since Capital, which is both a precondition and outcome of capitalism, requires a sovereign territorial base to thrive. In the immediate period after the lapse of British rule, the successor Indian rulers had an opportunity to expand their territory. Though territorial expansion could be obstructed due to competition and rivalry among the advanced capitalist countries, the Indian bourgeoisie took advantage of ‘western’ imperial interregnum7 in South Asia in the immediate years after the end of the Second World War. They capitalise resources to expand as India had reached the stage of a middle-level developed colony during the British rule. As a result, they expanded the territorial base wherever possible. They used several tactics such as blackmailing or bribery8 of feudal princes and powerful landlords or intimidation or military tactics to annex territory. The latent agenda of territorial expansionism, to date, is constitutionally recognised,9 the latest example being the annexation of Sikkim in 1975. 6

(1996). “On the Stage of the Indian Revolution.” Revolutionary Democracy. II(1). April. Japanese, French, British powers were considerably weakened in Northeast and the adjoining Southeast Asian regions. 8 Privy purse and other royal prerogatives for submissive princes/kings. 9 Constitution of India: Part I, Article 1. 7

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The territorial obsession of the Indian national bourgeoisie is logical. In the years after 1947, they were eager to compete with the rising Chinese, Burmese, and Pakistani counterparts in expanding domination. Nehru carried forward the ambition to create a super-national state stretching from the Middle East to South-East Asia and to exercise an important influence in the Pacific region.10 They continued with British expansionism,11 decided to create a ‘Curzonic Scientific Frontier’12 comprising Himalayan kingdoms of Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, and Tibet,”13 and Northeast. The Indian national leader Patel had presumed that “our Northern or North-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam.”14 In Tibet, the British Mission in Lhasa became officially Indian Mission on 15 August 1947.15 Furthermore, when a Tibetan Trade Mission headed by Tsepon Shakabpa visited Delhi in January 1948, the Indian State refused to talk about trade matters unless the Tibetans had recognised that the Indian State was “the legal inheritor of the treaties, rights and obligations of British India.”16 In 1949, India signed a treaty with Bhutan to guide the latter’s foreign affair. In the same year, India seized the opportunity of a local uprising against the Sikkim ruler to send in troops and bring the state into closer dependence as a protectorate than it had formally been under the British.17 “Nepal, too, according to Nehru, was certainly a part of India.”18 The Treaties of Peace and Friendship, and Trade and Commerce (1950) subjected Nepal to compelling Nepal to consult the Indian State before buying war material from any other country.19 According to the bureaucratic technocrat of expansionism Nari Rustomjit, it was the advanced economies that for the purposes of industria19l development, strategic necessity or other considerations of self-interest that they had initiated contacts to expand.20 The Northeast, which was inhabited by economically backward tribal 10

Suniti Kumar Ghosh. (1996). India’s Nationality Problem and Ruling Classes. Calcutta. p. 31. “… from 1911, Government of India embarked on a deliberate advance of the northeastern boundary, which looked not only to bringing the tribal territory under ‘loose political control’ but also to annexing a salient of territory which the British had recognised to be China’s ever since they reached Assam nearby ninety years before”; Neville Maxwell. (1970). India’s China War. Bombay: Jaico Publishing House. p. 45. 12 (1907). Text of the 1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of Frontier by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy of India (1898–1905) and British Foreign Secretary (1919–1924). 13 Suniti Kumar Ghosh. (2002). The Himalayan Adventure: India-China War of 1962—Causes and Consequences. Mumbai: Research Unit for Political Economy. 14 Sardar Patel’s Letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, Dated 7 November, 1950: Karunakar Gupta. (1983). Spotlight on Sino- Indian Frontiers. Calcutta: Friendship Publications. 15 Hugh Richardson, the last British Representative was nominated the first Indian Head of Mission. 16 “The Evolution of Nehru’s Policy on Tibet: 1947–1954.” In Tibetan Bulletin. (2000). Official Journal of the Tibetan administration, May–June. 17 Maxwell, India’s China War, pp. 67–68. 18 Ghosh, The Himalayan Adventure … 19 V.N. Khanna. (2001). Foreign Policy of India, 4th Edn. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. pp. 141–142. 20 Nari Rustomji. (1983). Imperilled Frontiers: India’s North-eastern Borderlands. Delhi: Oxford University Press. pp. 20–21. 11

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and peasant communities, apart from strategic calculation21 was important for; (a) exploitation labour, resources (water, uranium, oil, coal, precious stones, minerals, plantation, flora and fauna, tourism, carbon credits, and forest products), and market, (b) creation of a buffer vis-à-vis the presumed Chinese social-imperialism, and (c) development of a military stockpile and commodity stocked to carry out commercial interest in Bangladesh (East Pakistan till 1971), Bhutan, Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, etc. They, therefore, annexed the Northeast; forced integrated it into inter-territorial division of neo-colonial relation, and subjected to the restructured economic order as the primary supplier of labour, raw material, market, and military stockpile for the Indian capitalist expansionism. They believed that the Northeast constituted the ‘weak spots’ that must not go away in the hands of potential competitors such as China and erstwhile East Pakistan. “The State of Sikkim and the District of Darjeeling connect Tibet with the Indian Union, and Assam, the easternmost frontier of the Indian Union, is linked with the rest of India by a narrow strip of land consisting of portions of Darjeeling district and Jalpaiguri. These areas in view of their strategic importance need to be strengthened and consolidated.”22 Capitalist expansionism is aggressive and militarily brutal to suppress potential resistances. This policy arose from the fact that in the Northeast, the sudden forced annexation of the tribal and ‘political communities’ that had been established under respective ‘polity’ parallel to the Indian State had created the objective conditions of disloyalty and resistance.23 The resistances ranged from communist armed resistance,24 tribal resistance, national liberation movements, and democratic assertion. As a result, the Northeast’s loyalty was suspected, and it was governed through governors and military officials for several years until reliable local regimes have been installed through sham democratic elections. The Assam Disturbed Areas Act 1955 and the Armed Forces (Assam & Manipur) Special Powers Act, 1958 were imposed. To date, the AFSPA interplayed with other repressive legislations such as the Land Acquisition Act 1894, Prevention of Seditious Meetings Act, 1911, Indian Penal Code and Criminal Laws, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967, National Security Act, 1980, Prevention of Terrorism Activities Act, 2002,25 and etc. Interwoven deceptive jargons such as ‘national security,’ ‘counter terrorism’, and ‘law and order problem’ were circulated widely to cover up the national subjugation, exploitation, and oppression. Militarisation has a toll on civil and political liberties. It has severe ramifications on economic, social, and cultural rights. For instance, the army and paramilitary forces operate with impunity under AFSPA. They occupied and converted several 21

(1949). Statement by Shri Ari Bahadur Gurung and Rev. J.J.M. Nichols Roy in the Constituent Assembly of India, respectively, on Wednesday, 23 November and Saturday, 19 November. Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume XI. 22 (1949). Statement by Shri Ari Bahadur Gurung on Wednesday, 23 November in the Constituent Assembly of India. Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume XI. 23 There were submissions by several landlocked tribes and communities that had lacked unity, consciousness, political leadership, and means of resistance. 24 Communist armed revolutionary movement in Manipur (194–1951). 25 Repealed on Thursday, 9 December 2004.

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strategically important hilltops, tourist centres, grazing grounds, communal lands, institutional and religious campuses, etc. into barracks (including those in the residential areas). War hysteria in the operational zones had severe repercussions on the social mobility for economic livelihood. Militarisation undermined the role of civil administration. At the same time, it has different facets. There are hordes of police, rifles, and underpaid auxiliary forces recruited on a contract basis that operate under the unified command structures of the Indian army and enjoy a certain amount of impunity in actions. There are also batches of gangsters operated either from jail or under the command of the rulers. They included funded ‘counter’ groups and ‘surrendered’ groups who used the cloak of revolutionary and indulged in rampant extortion, looting, killing, harassment, and terrorism. There are also communal warmongers and conservative reactionaries who enjoy stakes in crony capitalism. They misappropriated public funds, displaced peoples on the pretext of development, exploited labour, drained the wealth of the people, and perpetuated misrule. They carried out communal campaigns to cover up class exploitation and diverted away from the attention of genuine democratic issues. The intertwined tactics of militarisation and collaboration with loyal puppets, backed by propaganda, divisive tactics, and cosmetic packages achieved some successes in keeping the Northeast under perpetual rule. The grant of statehood to the Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland states are the classic examples of the intertwined tactics. i.

First, Manipur was never a part of British India. It had a democratic constitution and a responsible government in 1948. The Dominion of India annexed Manipur and abolished the government on 15 October 1949 and relegated her to the position of Part C State status in 1950. Those who either opposed the annexation or Part C status were silenced. But changes in the status were introduced from time to time as a policy to raise democratic hopes within the system and to win away from the armed insurgency. For instance, many in the late 1940s had opposed integration with any other entities. But they were silenced. Communist-armed resistance was suppressed in 1951, and repressive steps were taken up against Revolutionary Nationalist Party in 1950s. In the meanwhile, Manipur’s status was upgraded to a 32-Member Territorial Council in 1950, further to Union Territory with 32-Member Legislative Assembly on 16 August 1957. It was upgraded to a 32 members Territorial Legislative Assembly in June 1963 and furthermore to statehood on 21 January 1972. The status change is considered a lineal and constitutes a success story of the Indian integration trajectory. But resistance conveys a different history. A new wave of insurgency for the national independence of Manipur resurfaced from the early 1960s. Since then the military approach of counter-insurgency steps began to suppress Meetei State Committee, Revolutionary Government of Manipur, United National Liberation Front (1964); Peoples’ Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (1977); Revolutionary Peoples’ Front (1979); Kangleipak Communist Party since (1980), Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup since (1994), and others that emerged after 2000.

ii.

Second, the Indian State successfully kowtowed Mizo National Front. To recall, the British had created Lushai Hills (Mizoram) as a separate district in Assam in 1898. It was declared a ‘Backward Tract’ and an ‘Excluded Areas’ under the Government of India Acts 1919 and 1935. The Indian State constituted it into a Union Territory on 21 January 1972 and granted statehood on 20 February 1987. Before statehood, the Mizo National Front (MNF), under the leadership of Laldenga carried out an insurgency to integrate Mizo people and liberate from India. The MNF, formed on 22 October 1961,

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M. Ningthouja declared its objective on 21 December 1961, rose in widespread in February 1966, and declared independence on 1 March 1966. The Indian State suppressed it brutally using aerial bombings. MNF regained and became active particularly from 1975. However, the Indian State succeeded militarily in bringing MNF to a negotiating table in 1984. According to the Mizo Accord of 30 June 1986, MNF laid down arms. Carrot and stick policies (policies of granting concession or co-option and repression respectively) were carried out in dealing with parties that were demanding for the integration of Mizos under a single administration such as the Hmar People’s Convention since 1986, Zomi Reunification Organisation since 1993, Hmar People’s Convention-Democracy since 1995, Bru National Liberation Front (formed in 1997) and others. However, while insurgency in Mizoram became a standstill, an extension in certain deviation forms of nationalism was gradually spread in Manipur’s certain pockets.

iii.

Third, regarding the Nagaland state, the British in 1866 constituted Naga Hills District in the then Assam province. By 1940s, a large section of the Nagas living in the Naga Hills and Tuensang Areas openly rose in asserting Naga identity. About a decade back, in 1929, a Naga Club was formed, and it submitted a memorandum to the Simon Commission asking for protection of their rights. In 1945, Naga Hills District Council was formed. It was converted into Naga National Council (NNC) in 1946. NNC rejected integration with the Dominion of India. However, in June 1947, an agreement known as Nine Point Agreement was signed between Sir Akbar Hydari, the then Governor of Assam and NNC. NCC, however, was dissatisfied with the outcome and held a referendum in May 1951. The Indian State did not recognise the referendum. As a result, NNC continued to struggle. On 18 September 1954, it declared sovereign Naga republic.26 On 22 March 1956, NNC formed Naga Federal Government (NFG) and Naga Federal Army (NFA). In the meanwhile, the Indian State could influence a moderate section. Accordingly, the Naga Peoples Convention (NPC) comprising representatives of various tribes was held in August 1957. In response to the recommendation of NPC, the Indian State created the Naga Hills—Tuensang Area (NHTA) on 1 December 1957. Furthermore, a Sixteen Point Agreement was signed between NPC and the Indian State in July 1960. Accordingly, the State of Nagaland Act was passed in September 1962 and Nagaland state was inaugurated on 1 December 1963. However, those dissatisfied with the outcome continued insurgency under various party banners spreading in areas outside the Nagaland, including Manipur.

Problems of National Question in Manipur During the 70 years of the post-annexation holocaust, the Northeast border state Manipur has been inflicted with the crisis of antagonistic nationalisms. Perhaps, Manipur has a long history. Manipur’s genesis is generally traced to the Meetei kingdom that is considered more than two thousand years old. Meetei is a stabled linguistic nation evolved in Manipur’s valley as a result of amalgamation and assimilation of people from the surrounding communities and beyond. From a Marxist perspective, Manipur in the 1940s was inhabited by self-sustaining, sparsely inhabited, small tribal dialectical groups, semi-feudal village communities, and certain sparsely dotted urban settlements that were yet to be collectively evolved into a 26

Moamenla Amer, “Identity and Autonomy Issues in Nagaland” in L. Muhindro Singh (2013). Ed. Conflict Transformation Peace and Ethnic Divide in India’s Northeast: The Context of Recent Trends. Guwahati: Kamakhya Publishing House. p. 92.

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stable community of the nation. It was not economically recovered from the ravages of the Second World War. However, a political process towards a democratic system had emerged since the early 1930s. Between 1934 and 1948, there were anti-feudal assertions for a responsible government. There was a certain degree of elite coordination across communities, which culminated in the constitution of a stipulated federation of communities for five-year experimentation. Accordingly, the Manipur Constitution was finally adopted on 26 July 1947. The monarchical Durbar (court) was abolished. The administration was entrusted to an Interim Council, headed by a Chief Minister and six ministers. Election to the Assembly took place in June– July 1948, and a coalition government was inaugurated on 18 October 1948. What was created was a ‘political community’ forging into a confederation of the federation of tribes (in the loose sense of the term) and Meetei nation, which may evolve into a stable nation in the course of history. However, the annexation was a watershed as it reversed to a colonial condition. After annexation, the Indian capitalist path obstructed the linear progression towards a proportionate economic development necessary for the peoples’ gradual evolution into a nation. On the contrary, the feudal-capitalist State with bureaucratic authoritarianism created the puppet elites’ favourable conditions to perpetuate non-productive pre-capitalist forms of accumulation of wealth, individual opportunism, sectarianism, and communalism in their scramble for political power and wealth. Industrial capitalism had not evolved in Manipur. The local elites did not directly create surplus value through investment in constant and variable Capitals. The phase of crony capitalism has entered. The local elites collaborated with the Indian rulers to accumulate wealth through misappropriation of public fund or expansionist rent (in the form of central grants) allocated by the Indian State as responsible for keeping Manipur within the Indian’s ambit empire. It created contradiction or polarisation within the Manipur ruling elites or the upstart aspirants. But these are reconcilable contradictions as the local ruling elites indulged in two-way strategies to retain their opportunist political and economic grips. On the one hand, they carried out sectarian and communal propaganda to cover up their nefarious roles in the neo-colonial system’s inherent crisis. On the other hand, they arose as social champions by mobilising people to curve out exclusive revenue blocks for unrestraint control over land, labour, fund, and resources. All these are interwoven into one with a communal interpretation of economic grievances and misrule. The situation had the side-effect of creating several layers of unsuccessful counter-elites over generations who strived to equally use communal propaganda as the easiest route to create for themselves communal revenue blocks and ‘alternative administration arrangements.’ Therefore, while some took a sectarian parliamentary course to assert claims, some took up a non-parliamentary militant course of extortions and exploitation. Communal politics became lucrative for those who adopted sectarian and opportunist lines, often creating confusion between revolutionary and reactionary. The overall picture is, there are several parallel community organisations under different nomenclatures, cultural assertion or revivalism, sense of loss of freedom and ‘national’ identity, and spread of democratic ideas. Therefore, insurgent groups range from those who raised armed revolution to liberate from India

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to those who sought for ethnic/tribal/communal autonomy. While some are proManipur, there are others that had a different agenda. All of these had a commonality in regards to the articulation of: (a) one nation theory to consolidate, respectively, projected ‘nation,’ (b) anti-colonial discourse against the projected national enemy, and (c) divisive discourse as responsible for internal contradiction. It is against this backdrop that diametrically counterpoising nationalisms became operative, causing some serious and unprecedented ramifications. Those are the nationalisms of India or Bharat or Hindustan, Manipur or Kangleipak, Nagalim, and Zale’n-gam or Zogam or Zoram. (1) India or Bharat or Hindustan While Manipur was in the making, the Indian rulers could penetrate and co-opt a section of the elites, who became instrumental in ‘annexation’ by India. Certain initiatives towards the co-option had been gaining momentum since around the 1930s. Among the loyal elites was a section of the Durbar members composed of the landowning aristocrats. Accordingly, the king signed the Stand Still Agreement on 2 July 1947 and the Instrument of Accession on 11 August 1947. Among the political parties, the Manipur State Congress was eager to speed up the ‘annexation.’ It was against this background that the King of Manipur and the Dominion of India’s representative entered into a secret agreement that came to be known as the merger agreement and controversial. In other words, Indian rulers were successful in schematising the Merger Agreement and bringing Manipur under its capitalist regimes. In the subsequent period, it could co-opt with and create a subordinate class of ‘rentier bourgeoisie’ composed of chiefs and landlords, usurers, contractors, commission agents, corrupt officials, petty merchants, and elite NGO sectors and others that are dependent on the former for political and economic power. Certain service sectors have been opened up, which subsequently generated employment, and it helped create various layers of loyal middle classes. They became the direct or indirect agents of promoting India nationalism and counter-insurgency. India has been successful in keeping Manipur within the ambit of its overarching empire. (2) Kangleipak Kangleipak (sic. Manipur) protagonists construed the colonial image of the Indian State. They refuted the Sanskritised history on the ground that Manipur had no long historical and cultural ties with Hinduism or India in the past. They traced Manipur’s origin in the primordial past, comparable to both British and Indian ‘national’ histories. According to Sanajaoba, Manipur “… had her defined territory, population, successive governments, external relations with neighbours, economic centralisation, common official language, common ancestry for two millennia and above all, a fullfledged constitutional system, equipped with judicial mechanisms.”27 In order to fit into national ‘criterion’ within the framework of international instruments prescribed by the UN and other international conventions, Revolutionary People’s Front asserted 27

Sanajaoba Naorem. (2001). “Why India cannot disturb Manipur boundary of 1947? uti possidetis juris”.

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that “the basic parameters of an independent state, as stipulated by the Montevido Convention, 1933, viz., (a) territory, (b) population, (c) government and (d) capacity to maintain external relations, had been found in the state of Manipur.”28 They concentrate on: (a) continuous reproduction of anti-colonial discourse challenging the Indian national history, (b) articulation of one nation theory for Manipur positing against the divisive discourses of Nagalim and Zalen’n-gam histories. Firstly, the peoples of Manipur are being depicted as having common racial and genealogical origin; different from the Indians (Mayangs). They rely on mythology, legends, and traditions to substantiate the claim. Secondly, there is constant effort to identify citizenship with Manipuri language to substantiate that a common language that binds the people.29 Thirdly, there is a constant articulation of cultural similarities and assimilation among the people30 based on common ritual and customary practices.31 Fourthly, Manipur is being shown as a historically evolved stable community possessing a common territory.32 This is based on historical documents such as agreements, negotiation, procedures, maps, survey reports, chronicles, and the existing political, economic, social, and cultural conditions, etc.33 Fifthly, the people of Manipur are being shown as playing important collective role in state formation throughout the history as they had lived under “federation evolved out of the autochthonous groups.”34 Territorially, the status quo of Kangleipak withstands challenges of disintegration, though the demand for political sovereignty and social emancipation has not been achieved. (3) Nagalim According to Nagalim protagonists, the Nagas had always been a sovereign nation occupying an area of 120,000 sq. km of Patkai Range in between longitude 93º E and 97º E and latitude 23.5º N and 28.3º N. Nagalim is located at the tri-junction of

28

(1999). Memorandum submitted to the Secretary General United Nations and the chairman of the Decolonisation Committee (committee of 24) for de-colonisation of Manipur from Indian colonialism and alien racist regime, enlisting Manipur in the list of the non-self-governing-territories of the United Nations and, restoration of independence and sovereignty of Manipur, Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), Manipur. 2nd Ed. 29 P. Lalitkumar Singh. (2001) ‘The people of Manipur’. 30 (2002). People of Manipur Rises to Save Unity and Territorial Integrity. Imphal: United Committee Manipur. 31 Ibid. 32 (2003). Memorandum on the protection of the Territorial Integrity of Manipur submitted to the Prime Minister of India, by All Political Party Delegation from Manipur, 20 January. 33 “As one can easily verify from Henry Yule’s map of Manipur in 1500 A.D., down to James Johnstone’s Map in nineteenth century and to Surveyor General of India’s map of Manipur, 1984 A.D. They have been corroborated and recognised by other countries in their official maps and records,” ‘People of Manipur rises…’. 34 (1999) “Criticism and constructive submission regarding the study on treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between states and indigenous populations”, Report submitted by Centre for Organisation and Research Education, Manipur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, UN. March.

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China, India, and Burma35 ; bounded in North by China, in West by Assam, in South by Manipur Valley and Mizoram and Chin Hills (Burma), and in East beyond Chindwin River and along its tributary Uyu River (Burma).36 In order to claim the aboriginal title and claim for exclusive territorial rights, Nagalim is being romanticised as the only land first settled and continued to be settled by Nagas alone.37 The Nagalim agenda refute the existing territorial boundaries as arbitrary and mechanical. For instance, “to the Nagas, the very creation and existence of the state of Manipur has been perceived as an instrument of suppression of their rights and insult to their dignity.”38 Manipur is identified with Meetei and they argue, “the Nagas have nowhere at any point of time given their allegiance to the Meeteis or their Maharajas to decide their future, orally or through an agreement.”39 They articulate that Nagas and Meeteis were two different peoples since “Naga people have their own culture and history, which they all wish to appreciate and learn.”40 They condemn one nation theory for Manipur since it is “nothing but lies … there is no reason for the Meeteis to be overlording the Nagas.”41 Therefore, they would not allow Manipur officials to visit the disputed Dzuko valley where Manipur had an official stake.42 They would never tolerate what they termed “Kuki homeland (Zale’n –gam) to be carved out of the Naga areas of the four hill districts of Manipur (Chandel, Senapati, Tamenglong and Ukhrul), parts of present Nagaland and Assam where the Kukis inhabit.”43 The demand continues, though serious setbacks have crept in due to sectarianism among Naga organisations. (4) Zalen’n-Gam Secondly, Zale’n-gam or land of freedom or Kukiland “is the ancestral land of the Kuki people”44 where they “originated, on which they were raised, developed, excelled and fought valiant battles (for survival)”.45 The imagined Zale’n-gam inhabited by Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups comprises ‘contiguous’ regions in Northeast India, Northwest Burma, and Chittagong Hill tracts in Bangladesh.46 In Manipur, Zale’n-gam comprises half of the geographical area of Manipur i.e. Chandel and Churachandpur districts, Sadar Hills (in Senapati District), and vast tracts in Ukhrul,

35

Concise Background information on Nagaland (Nagalim). http://www.angelfire.com/mo/Nagaland/, accessed in April 2002 (dead link now). 36 Achan Ramsan. “The basis of territorial integrity and history: a quest for justice in retrospection”. 37 (2001). Naga Peoples Convention, Senapati Declaration, 28 June. 38 “The basis of territorial integrity and history: A quest for justice in retrospection”. 39 (Naga Peoples Convention…). 40 (2006). Statement of Support by Gloria Kim, President & Mughali Achumi, General Secretary, Naga People’s Friends Network Korea, 18 August. 41 (Statement of Support by Gloria Kim…). 42 (2006). “Naga tribe not to allow Manipuris to enter Dzuko.” Imphal Free Press. 17 February. 43 (1993). Press statement of Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, 17 September. 44 P.S. Haokip. “Ideological Aspects of Zale’n-gam”. 45 Manifesto of the Kuki National Organisation. 46 Ibid.

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Tamenglong, and Senapati Districts.47 Their sovereignty is traced in the past, “prior to the advent of British colonialists, there was complete self-rule and independence in Zale’n-gam.”48 Their forebears had lived exclusively and gloriously in Zal’egam possessing ‘unique’ custom, culture, and tradition.49 Their territorial claim refuted Naga exclusive territorial claims over Chandel, Tamenglong, Senapati, and Ukhrul Districts. They issued a caution against the threat by potential migration of Meeteis and others in Zalen’n-gam. They perceived immediate threat from what they termed Naga ‘design of territorial expansionism’50 and Meetei ‘chauvinists’ who used Zale’n-gam as launch-pad to carry out activities against the Kukis and the Indian army.51 Inaddition to the threat, they are apprehensive about community defections. It has been charged that the Anal, Moyon and Monshang, Chiru, Chothe, Lamkang, and Maring peoples, who belong to the Old Kuki categorisation were manipulated to adopt Naga as a political identity by the NSCN-IM operating in Manipur52 They considered that statehood for Zale’n-gam would bring a solution to all these.53 To achieve it, they would go to the extent of forging an alliance with the State and, at the same time bidding a "farewell party to the Meeteis (Manipur) in the same way the Manipur Nagas are doing.”54 There is a change in the demand of KNO and others, as they now demand a communal territorial council without immediately breaking the existing territory of Manipur. The above nationalisms are diametrical. These are the results of polemics defending the, respectively, projected nationhood. From a theoretical point of view, these polemics and projected nationhood suffer from paradoxes. However, the organisational or political and armed efforts centred on any of these nationhood had real implications in one way or the other. There are nationalist fronts behind each of them. They are involved in consolidating peoples into respective imagined nationhood by attempting to make national ideology as above all other loyalties. These are carried out to constitute a strong central national authority, develop economic rationality, and rapid material developmentof the ‘national’ citizens. In this scenario, India or Bharat or Hindustan, Manipur or Kangleipak, Nagalim, and Zale’n-gam were status quo and with diametrical objectives. There are coordination and conflict among these fronts. These are largely strategic and tactical to accomplish, respectively, subscribed nationalism. India will attempt to wipe out the rest. Indian State’s objective of suppressing insurgency and political dissent has been very clear. In pursuing the objectives, the Indian State military 47

P.S. Haokip. (2006). “Greetings from Zale’n-gam, the Kuki nation!,” 10 April. “Ideological Aspects of Zale’n-gam”. 49 ‘Brief History of Kuki’. http://www.ksdf.org/about_kukis.asp; accessed on 24 December 2006. 50 (2006). KNO’s Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India. 51 (2006). KNO’s letter to Gen Than Shwe, Chairman, State Peace and Development Council, Burma. 52 (2007). An introductory statement concerning the Kukis on the occasion of the United Old Kuki Army joining the Kuki National Organisation; Ref No. ZG/IS 02–06/07, 4 December. 53 (2006). KNO’s Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India. 54 Luntinsat. “Kuki-Meiteis: Not Border Fencing but Farewell will.” KSDF. 48

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confronted the insurgents or entered into tactical negotiations and ceasefire with some insurgent parties. It will negotiate with anyone who would fall into its trap and wipe out the one that challenges its sovereignty. Similarly, Kangleipak will fight the rest. It suspects but wants to unite a section of Nagalim and Zalen’gam to defend the territorial unity and defeat India. Nagalim and Zalen’n-gam protagonists posited against one another over territorial assertion. At the same time, they will temporarily unite and posited against the India and Kangleipak agenda. The two theories are interwoven in constructing divisive discourses between a tribe and non-tribal. It described the Nagas and Kuki-Chin-Mizos as tribes and claimed for exclusive rights over the hills that comprise 90% of the entire geographical area of Manipur. The Meeteis are being cited as exploiters leading to deprivation and marginalisation of the tribes. The two forwarded respective one nation theory for Nagalim and Zalen’gam. Coordination and conflict among these fronts were largely strategic and tactical to accomplish, respectively, subscribed nationalism. At the same time, there are also dynamics of exigency. For instances, when parties of Nagalim suffered from party split and sectarian wars, a splinter may look for the support of either India or Kangleipak for survival. The same rule applies to others who are facing internal party conflicts and factional clash. In the case of party fissures within fronts, there were ‘internal’ party conflicts and perplexing situation of tactical party coordination across fronts to defend party interest. Firstly, parties may enter into a tactical alliance to outlive others that were perceived to be an immediate party enemy. Secondly, in tactical coordination, nationalism affiliation alone is not the determining factor as during factional war, immediate party survival was more important than national loyalty. It is beyond this chapter’s scope to dwell on the minute details of the coordination and conflicts among the armed insurgent parties. However, the activities of the insurgent parties can be broadly grouped into three: (a) Restorative, (b) Chauvinistic and, (c) Integrative. Firstly, it could be restorative as in the case of demand for restoration of perceived lost territory. Secondly, it could be ‘national chauvinistic’ in the sense that communal hatred and ethnic cleansing are being perpetrated to assert an exclusive territorial claim. Thirdly, it could be ‘integrative’ to consolidate and prevent ‘nation’ from being divided into segments. In the course of action defections or desertion to other party, factional clash within parties, conflict and coordination among parties were reported from time to time. Overall, many are caught in the vicious cycle of conflict generated by diametrical nationalisms towards making Indian, Kangleipak or Manipur, Nagalim, Zale’n-gam, Zogam nations. However, in the above context, official nationalism precedes ‘nation,’ and the national claims remained paradoxical. Different individuals affiliated to different nationalisms were intermixing and the borders bases on nationalisms are overlapping across communities. The paradox is exemplified as peoples are mechanically encapsulated in one nation theory, which merely articulates superficial nationhood cloak but fails to diffuse psychological cohesion towards any officially imagined nation. But the powerful dominates, as exemplifies by the Indian State’s continuous rule for more than 70 years. To sum up, at present Manipur is conflict-ridden, also compounded by different national ‘imagining’ and projection of, respectively, designed nationhood. These

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conflicts are being modelled and perpetuated under an overarching neo-liberal political economy. First, while India has been suffering from semi-feudal and semicolonial constraints, Indian expansionism in the Northeast had the other aspect of militarisation, subjugation, exploitation, and oppression. The colonial conditions have created liberation movements of various trends. The solution sought by the Indian State is bent on the Indian integration trajectory without rooting out the system responsible for creating a colonial situation. The colonial system is manifested in unrestrained militarisation to facilitate the penetration by the powerful monopoly finance capitalists and its satellite agencies, to control over the territory, resources, markets, service sectors, and labour. They collaborate with the local puppet regimes and sectarian collusive forces. Secondly, it is also apparent that powerful communal forces are organised under the leadership of middle-class capitalism aspirants who are bent on the neo-liberal solutions. They either confront or collude with different local ruling groups depending on issues, but they all have a commonality in communal orientation and sectarianism in specific forms or the other.

Threat of Finance Imperialism The turn of the twenty-first century is remarkable in terms of increasing collaboration of the Indian big bourgeoisie with the finance imperialism under the leadership of the US imperialism and other International Financial Institutions. Many considered that India’s rise as an important power block is the corollary of qualitative and structural changes after the end of the cold war between the American and Soviet blocks. In fact, in 1991, India adopted an economic policy that is being popularly known as the Structural Adjustment Programme (liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation). In terms of foreign policy, these collaborators could penetrate deep in the Southeast Asian countries for market and resource. They had directly or indirectly played a role in serving US imperialist interest in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. They indulged in collaborative cum competitive relations with Chinese social Capitalists in post-LTTE Sri-Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, etc. Since then, India’s foreign policy’s focus has been more or less on the development of bilateral and multilateral relations with Southeast Asian Countries. This shift is exemplified by adopting ‘Act East Policy’ (earlier known as Look East Policy)—for strategic or security, economic, political, and institutional linkages, which has now covered a vast geographical horizon to encapsulate Australia and East Asia as well. There has been a ‘national euphoria’ about the prospects of this Policy. Within India, the Act East Policy has a special focus on the ‘insurgency ridden’ North-eastern region. The predominant perception is that Southeast Asia would begin from the Northeast region because of the abundant resources, geostrategic viability, and development necessities. Accordingly, in 2008, the Government of India published a voluminous policy framework known as the Northeast Regional Vision 2020, which emphasised the Act East Policy’s prospects towards addressing problems of ‘underdevelopment’ and insurgency in the region. Therefore, at the

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policy level, Act East Policy is not about foreign policy alone, as generally perceived by many. The Act East Policy is a vast and integrated neo-liberal project sponsored by the powerful monopoly financial capitalist countries, that has to do a lot with the Northeast region to strengthen India’s foreign relations with the Southeast Asian countries. Before the lapse of the Northeast Regional Vision 2020, in 2016, India’s Government released the Hydrocarbon Vision 2030 for Northeast India, which highlighted the steps to leverage extraction of hydrocarbon resources from the Northeast region by MNCs.55 Currently, this profit-driven policy is militarily backed by the Indian State and financed in the form of Foreign Direct Investment by a collaboration with the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other allied monopoly finance capitalist cartels such as the Asian Development Bank, Agence Francais De Development (AFD) of France, Deutsche Investitions- und Entwicklungsgesellschaft (DEG), and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), etc. This is revealed by the draft policy of the Public–private Partnership (PPP) circulated in 2011 and the latest Consolidated Foreign Direct Investment Policy Circular of 2017 “to attract and promote foreign direct investment to supplement domestic capital, technology, and skills, for accelerated economic growth.” In the overall, the Act East Policy brings in drastic ‘changes’ include: (a) infusion of FDI by the monopoly financial capitalists in the forms of loans or debt services or obligatory interest payments with conditionalities; (b) construction of Trans-Asian Highways and railways, international airports, and trade related infrastructural components; (c) militarisation and military establishments to ensure security and safety of the commercial interests; (d) establishment of extractive industries such as oil explorations, drilling and extraction, and hydro-electric power projects in order to ensure adequate supply of energy, which are required for the ‘commercial growth;’ (e) corporatisation and privatisation of key economic and service sectors such as power, water, supply provisions, health and medical, monoculture, agribusiness, etc. in order to promote and maximise the super-profits of the MNCs; (f) amendment and de-regularisation of the existing safeguard laws relating to environment, mining, land, water, natural resources, and democratic rights (civil, political, economic, social, and cultural); (g) demographic invasion by migrant monopolists, skilled and unskilled labour, and other powerful market forces. The Act East Policy generates mixed responses from different sections in the Northeast. The decisive section of the creamy layer crony capitalists, corrupt bureaucrats, and comprador bourgeoisie find in the project a lucrative opportunity to extract personal commissions from the infrastructure construction sectors and trade. They are the dominant local support base of the Policy. It is also believed that many insurgent groups who wanted quick fundraising through exhortation from ‘projects’ do not oppose the Policy. Most of their mass organisations are either the silent observer or have co-opted with the project mongers. There is also general subscription to the policy, as the trickle-down effect benefitted many at various layers—passing 55

Under the New Exploration Licensing Policy, Petroleum Exploration License, Petroleum Mining Lease (PML), and Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy (HELP)/Open Acreage Licensing Policy (OALP), The National Mineral Policy of 2019, and Mineral Laws (Amendment) Act, 2020.

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down from big contractors to the levels of project dealers, medium- and smallscale construction entrepreneurs, labour contractors, skilled and semi-skilled labours. The larger bulk of the so called influential ‘intellectuals,’ journalists, politicians, and bureaucrats who uncritically subscribe to the deceptive neo-liberal concepts such as development, liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation private–public partnership’ and etc. have not critically assessed the Policy. Reaction to the policy comes from certain minority ‘organic’ sections and the immediate victims of displacement and inadequate rehabilitation arrangements. The immediate victims’ reactions are generally localised and confined to specific demands about their livelihood, compensation, and rehabilitation. The organic sections, who are sceptical about the policy’s long-term impact, play some supportive role in educating and organising the victims to raise their legitimate concerns at a higher and coordinated level. The organic sections are mainly environmentalists and progressive community protagonists who had different development and sustainable goals. Many of them operate at local, state, national, regional, and international levels. The majority of them are associated with either what is being called the NGO sector or Civil Voluntary Organisations. They critically evaluate the Policies and raised apprehension about destructive tendencies related to landscape, ecology, ownership of land and resources, demographic invasion, cultural extinction, political subordination, income disparity, and underdevelopment. They incorporated the idea of ‘indigenous rights’ pitting against the invasive foreign capital and projects, the influx of outsiders, and market forces. They spearheaded a series of seminars, conventions, talks, advocacy, demonstrations, petitions, protests, blockades, and agitations to arouse popular consciousness to address some of their concerns. While the open reactions are casual, localised, and sporadic, the monopoly finance capitalism’s onslaught is rapid and powerful. The projects’ mechanised dramatic thrust could not be completely obstructed other than obtaining certain degrees of compensation to certain sections of the victims. In the overall, Act East Policy cannot be reversed for lack of effective resistance. As a result, the Policy has begun to cause an enormous amount of forced displacement of population, land and resource alienation, destruction of the environment and ‘traditional’ economic livelihood, policing, militarisation and violation of ‘human rights,’ and obstructions to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. The scramble for a share of wealth from the projects has sharpened income disparity, the growth of parasitic classes whose diabolic individual opportunisms are camouflaged by carrying out emotive propaganda of sectarian communal rights and community identity. The temporary economic or beneficiary boon at various levels—which are the immediate results of funding in the name of ‘shared incentives’ under the Constitutional provision of the Concurrent List, infrastructural constructions, and job opportunity; which had created a face value of attraction to many, but legitimises massive misappropriation of wealth out of which a microscopic section of the exploiters accrues unequal share of the tricked down benefit in descending order—has strengthened the grips of the foreign monopoly financial imperialists and their agents at the cost of oppressed nations. Practically, the Policy has undermined the international standards such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), International Covenant on Civil and

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Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015).

Bridging the Divides through Democratic Communication The Spectre of conflicts looms on the Northeast, particularly in Manipur. The conflicts are manifold. First, on the one hand, the Indian State adopts neo-colonialism. It facilitates economic onslaught by monopoly financial imperialists, therefore creating an antagonistic confrontation with the armed insurgents who strife for national liberation. Second, the Indian State collaborates with the local agents who pose themselves as local champions but practically suppress local aspirations. They rely on military, paramilitary, and police forces to defend the neo-liberal agenda. Therefore, latent antagonism between the two camps of the State and its agents on one side and those who opposed it leads to sporadic unrest from time to time against the State’s specific policies. Third, there are communal forces, directly or indirectly backed by armed communal insurgent parties, who raised contentious national imagining and adopted chauvinistic reactions, leading to cold-blooded tensions and open clashes from time to time. Some of them operate in collaboration with the State and the MNCs. Fourth, conflicts persist between the ‘indigene’ and the huge number of unregulated ‘migrants’ whose numerical size creates ramifications on demographic balance, political bargaining, land and resource ownership, market monopoly, employment, cultural identity, and social unity. Fifth, individual opportunism and organised sectarianism have added to rampant subjugation, oppression, exploitation, oppression, deprivation, inequality, and marginalisation of various sections at varying degrees. Therefore, mistrust reigns both at interpersonal and organisational levels. There is a lack of ideological cohesion, systematic organisation, and consistent initiatives for a common popular cause. The powerful dominates by hook and crook. Many fail to foresee that neo-colonialism and finance imperialism pose the threats that would negatively affect everyone in some ways to others. Many fail to conceptualise and feel the pangs of the aggressive neo-liberal assaults. Instead, many looked upon the tactical short-term relief measures and deceptive promises of the neo-liberal regimes as the only option to fulfil their immediate individual opportunism. They do not question the system, policies, forms of wealth accumulation, and the corresponding disastrous impacts. Many questions could have been raised: (1) Do the people own their ancestral territory, natural resources, and markets? (2) Do the people enjoy the right to national self-determination in political and economic decision-making? Can they recall unpopular elected representatives? (3) Why have people become economically dependent on imports? Why is the State reluctant to invest in the primary and secondary economic sectors? Why economic discrepancies and sharp inequalities among people, corruption, bribery, unemployment, etc. have become the permanent features? (4) Why is the State not investing in creating an adequate amount of the forces of production and means of production to

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improve the economy? (5) Why is the State reluctant to invest in the essential service sectors such as health and medicine, water, electricity, roads, transport, education, cold storage and granaries, housing for the poor, etc.? Why is the State more interested in facilitating extractive industries financed and run by the foreign monopoly capitalists? (6) Why is the State investing money in militarisation and the culture of impunity under various draconian and repressive laws? (7) Why is the State unable to bring a halt to the unrestrained population invasion by migrants? (8) Why is the State unable to end the widespread illicit business in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances? Why poppy monoculture flourishes at the cost of the environment, stable foods, health, community, and society? (9) Why is there a restriction on the freedom of conscience, expression, opinions, and political dissent? There can be many more questions. But all the questions can be clubbed into those related to civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. What should be efforts to dissect the perplexing problems to study and arrive at practical some answers? Individual opportunism, career obsession, and absence of progressive ideology and vision have pushed many into selfish sectarian goals and reactionary approaches. But the question is, can an individual or a section or a community single-handedly address the issue that affected all without taking on board the confidence, trusts, and roles of the affected others? Those who want a progressive and qualitative change must come out of the parochial mindset’s cocoon and conservative worldviews. It needs to be understood that as conflicts have been prolonged and taking tolls across sections, durable mechanisms to initiate transformations or reforms or changes towards creating a common agenda for collective welfare would be welcomed. But on what principle would the durable mechanism emerge? It would have to be based on the ideal of democratic communication. The agenda should be to look for common interest to strive for a system, laws, and policies that would be best suitable as common wealth. In other words, democratic communication has to be a viable mechanism to establish durable peace, order, and development. Ideally, democratic communication would mean a communication system marked by a fair exchange of information and opinions among peoples who also participate in a collaborative network of participation in the decision-making process. Practically, finding a common agenda and democratic push to insert that agenda have to be the result of a progressive organisational effort. But democratic communication cannot evolve automatically as a free gift from an enlightened or divine power. In the context when the fair exchange of correct information and opinions has been obstructed because of lack of transparency and accountability by those who are in authority, attack on ‘Right to Information’ activists, an attack on freedom of expression and conscience; to create a favourable premise of democratic communication requires lots of courage, resource, and efforts. It has to be achieved through organised efforts. But then, a practical democratic communication either between or with whom? We have seen that some armed insurgent groups on the Indian side of the Indo-Myanmar border region have entered into either ceasefire or memorandum of understanding or suspension of operation with the Indian State. Following these, armed hostilities among them have almost come to an abrupt halt. However, some issues have emerged out of this process. First, it has proven that the

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negotiation between a militarily aggressive powerful Indian State and the weaker forces always favoured the interest of the powerful. There is no respite from the State’s neo-liberal aggressive policies. Second, although armed hostility has come to a halt, the militant groups continue to enjoy extortion of money from project and essential supplies that directly affect the general consumers. Many of them continued to operate as the fifth column of the imperial forces to incite mutually genocidal communal politics among the people. Third, these militant organisations do not pose a check and balance against the neo-liberal onslaughts. Instead, they directly or indirectly work in collaboration with the MNCs. On some occasions, some of them have obstructed popular demands for the right to adequate compensation and rehabilitation against displacement caused by projects. Therefore, while the temporary halt of armed hostility may be welcomed, the procedure and fallout of the negotiation cannot be considered a democratic communication from the perspective of those who aspire to combat the domination of imperialism and neo-liberal assaults. Democratic communication, therefore, must be based on a clear-cut ideological perception and functional holistic approaches to involve many to achieve the higher goal of democratic rights. In the historical context where the voice of guns and voice of popular democratic militancy alone have reverberating effects on the State to agree to have some effective dialogue, the conditions are not fertile enough to have absolute trust in sporadic academic discourses, episodic political mendicancy, and whimsical display of idealism as the effective means of democratic communication with the State. The point is democratic communication has to be the agenda of the popular organisation or party that must concentrate on organising people to build up an adequate popular strength to initiate dialogue with others and the State in a phased manner. The concern popular organisation or party must have a visionary political thesis. It must have a political programme and tactical lines based on the thesis. It must build up cadres and mass bases by organising people along the political programme lines and finding fraternal alliances and supporters along its tactical lines. Therefore, democratic communication must begin in a phased manner to build itself into a powerful block that may have the capacity to lead a democratic movement to bargain with the State. Without powerful popular support and effective bargaining tactics, the State cannot be humbled down to affirm and promote democratic communication in the strict sense of its principled meaning. In short, the need for democratic communication has to be guided by a higher revolutionary goal to combat the domination of imperialism and the Indian State dependent upon it, which is engaged in an intensified offensive under the slogans of liberalisation and structural readjustment programmes. The strategic collective demand must incorporate tactical specific needs of specific sections pertaining to immediate threats to either or combination of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. In the Northeast context, there is a need to strive for the first stage of the People’s Democratic Revolution.

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Bibliography Book ———. Part I, Article 1: Constitution of India. Ghosh., Suniti Kumar. (1996). India’s Nationality Problem and Ruling Classes. Calcutta. Ghosh., Suniti Kumar. (2002). The Himalayan Adventure: India-China War of 1962- Causes and Consequences. Mumbai: Research Unit for Political Economy. Gupta., Karunakar. (1983). Spotlight on Sino- Indian Frontiers. Calcutta: Friendship Publications. Khanna., V. N. (2001). Foreign Policy of India, 4th Edn. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. Maxwell., Neville. (1970). India’s China War. Bombay: Jaico Publishing House. Rustomji., Nari. (1983). Imperilled Frontiers: India’s North-eastern Borderlands. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Singh., L. Muhindro. (2013). Ed. Conflict Transformation Peace and Ethnic Divide in India’s Northeast: The Context of Recent Trends. Guwahati: Kamakhya Publishing House. The Documents of the History of the Communist Party of India. Vol. VIII 1951–1956. New Delhi: People’s Publishing House.

Article, Journal, Booklet ———. ‘Brief History of Kuki.’ http://www.ksdf.org/about_kukis.asp (accessed on 24 December 2006.) ———. (1996) ‘On the Stage of the Indian Revolution.’ Revolutionary Democracy. II(1). April. ———. (2000). Tibetan Bulletin. Official Journal of the Tibetan administration, May-June. ———. (2002). People of Manipur rises to save unity and territorial integrity. Imphal: United Committee Manipur. ———. Concise Background information on Nagaland (Nagalim). http://www.angelfire.com/mo/Nagaland/, accessed in April 2002 (dead link now). Haokip., P.S. ‘Ideological Aspects of Zale’n-gam’. (2006). ‘Greetings from Zale’n-gam, the Kuki nation!,’ 10 April. Luntinsat. ‘Kuki-Meiteis: Not Border Fencing but Farewell will.’ KSDF. Naorem., Sanajaoba. (2001). ‘Why India cannot disturb Manipur boundary of 1947? uti possidetis juris.’ Ramsan., Achan. (n.d.) ‘The basis of territorial integrity and history: a quest for justice in retrospection’ Singh., P. Lalitkumar. (2001) ‘The people of Manipur.’

Documents ———. Manifesto of the Kuki National Organisation. ———. (1931). Resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee of the League Against Imperialism and for National Independence, Berlin, June 2. ———. (1948). On the Present Policy and Tasks of the Communist Party of India, January. ———. (1948). Political Thesis of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India held in Calcutta, 28th -February-March 6.

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———. (1999). ‘Criticism and constructive submission regarding the study on treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements between states and indigenous populations’, Report submitted by Centre for Organisation and Research Education, Manipur to the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights, UN. March. ———. (1999). Memorandum submitted to the secretary general United Nations and the chairman of the Decolonisation Committee (committee of 24) for de-colonisation of Manipur from Indian colonialism and alien racist regime, enlisting Manipur in the list of the non-self-governingterritories of the United Nations and, restoration of independence and sovereignty of Manipur, Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF), Manipur. 2nd Ed.. ———. (2001). Naga Peoples Convention, Senapati Declaration, 28 June. ———. (2003). Memorandum on the protection of the Territorial Integrity of Manipur submitted to the Prime Minister of India, by All Political Party Delegation from Manipur, 20 January.

Press release, texts, and Statements ———. (1907) Text of the 1907 Romanes Lecture on the subject of Frontier by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy of India (1898–1905) and British Foreign Secretary (1919–24). ———. (1946) Statement of hon’ble Mr. Shri Krishna Sinha (Bihar: General) on Monday, 16 December, in the Constituent Assembly of India; Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume I. ———. (1949) Statement by Shri Ari Bahadur Gurung and Rev. J.J.M. Nichols Roy in the Constituent Assembly of India, respectively on Wednesday, 23 November and Saturday, 19 November in 1949. Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume XI. ———. (1949) Statement by Shri Ari Bahadur Gurung on Wednesday, 23 November 1949 in the Constituent Assembly of India. Constituent Assembly Debate, Volume XI. ———. (1993). Press statement of Naga People’s Movement for Human Rights, 17 September 1993. ———. (2006). ‘Naga tribe not to allow Manipuris to enter Dzuko.’ Imphal Free Press. 17 February. ———. (2006). KNO’s letter to Gen Than Shwe, Chairman, State Peace and Development Council, Burma. ———. (2006). KNO’s Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India. ———. (2006). Statement of Support by Gloria Kim, President & Mughali Achumi, General Secretary, Naga People’s Friends Network Korea, 18 August. ———. (2007). An introductory statement concerning the Kukis on the occasion of the United Old Kuki Army joining the Kuki National Organisation; Ref No. ZG/IS 02–06/07, 4 December.

Chapter 15

Media Literacy in Thailand as a Key in Communication to Strengthen Democratic Society Pimonpan Chainan

A democratic society is a form of government by the people, which has a foundation from citizens that participate in political and public issues. In other words, informed and engaged citizens are the key to a strong democratic society. In a society where people are not able to exercise their civil rights and freedom as expected, democracy will be weak and cannot be a true government by the people for the people. One factor that affects the development of ordinary citizens into informed and engaged citizens is media literacy. Media use and communication skills can equip citizens with the abilities to get access to various sources of information to examine the government’s performance, discuss and seek solutions to social and political problems, and demonstrate a new form of social movement through media.

Informed and Engaged Citizen There are many definitions of citizenship, but all are based on a common ground of a relationship between citizens and their community or society regarding the citizens’ rights and responsibilities towards themselves and the society as members of the community. Civil rights can be divided into three elements. 1.

Civil rights—Civil rights are essential to a person’s freedom. This includes the freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly, the freedom of movement, the right to thinking, the right to legal equality, and the right to ownership. Therefore, civil rights mean exercises of rights in civil society.

2.

Political rights—Political rights allow a person to participate in political life. Major political rights include the right to election, the right to stand for election, and the right to hold public office. The state of political rights relates to development of the right to vote on general topics, political equality, and a democratic regime.

P. Chainan (B) Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_15

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P. Chainan Social rights—Social rights guarantee fundamental social status of a person and lead to exercises of civil rights and political rights. Social rights mean the rights to civilised living according to social standards (Marshall, 1950 cited in Heywood, 2007: 441).

In the Western world where democracy is robust, the Council of Europe (cited in Cecchini, 2003: 4) inclusively defined citizenship with the following dimensions: – political dimension, which includes participation in political decision-making and use of political power; – legal dimension, which includes compliance with laws and awareness of civil rights and responsibilities; – cultural dimension, which includes respect for diversity, democratic values, and common and diverse traditions and histories and support of peaceful relationship between different cultures; – social and economic dimensions, especially a fight against poverty and exclusion, an interest in a new model of community development and work, and a shared social responsibility; – European dimension, which includes awareness of cultural integrity and cultural diversity of Europe, learning to live in a European context, and learning about European institutions and rights of European citizens; – global community dimension, which includes awareness and encouragement of global dependencies and solidarity.

Traditional meaning of citizenship is derived from a concept of nation state, but the definition of citizens may also include identity, gender, engagement, attitude, values, rights, and responsibilities of the people. Accordingly, citizens can be defined as a set of norms, values, and practices to solve problems that have been caused by shared actions of the group, as well as personal awareness that they have rights and obligations towards one another if they want to solve the problems together (Pattie et al., 2004). This also involves civic engagement, which means an action to make a difference in the civic life of citizens and the communities and development of knowledge, skills, values, and motivation to make that difference. Such actions will promote the quality of life in the community through both political and non-political processes (The New York Times). Civic engagement consists of four elements: civic action or participation in activities such as volunteer projects to help improve the community; civic commitment or duty or the willingness to make positive contributions to the society; civic skills or the ability to involve in civil, political, and democratic activities; and social cohesion or the sense of reciprocity, trust, and bonding with others. Most definitions of citizens and civic engagement are created in a social context that was not linked to technological changes. From an aspect of technological determinism, however, civic engagement definitely varies according to changing social contexts and technologies, especially communication technologies. This is consistent with the idea of Loader, which explains a phenomenon in which citizens, particularly young people, have become disaffected with politics, become dissatisfied with the government and the leader, lost their loyalty to the government, no longer believed that the government would be able to help them, and lost faith in the liberal democratic

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regime. This phenomenon is interpreted as constantly growing passiveness towards politics and withdrawal from public affairs, which has led to weakness of democratic citizens in many countries worldwide, including Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar and Thailand. Such a phenomenon contradicts media use behaviour of the new generation, which has access to political information and engaged in political communication more than their parents. The contradiction can be explained from a perspective of cultural displacement and a new form of political engagement of the youth. The cultural displacement perspective argues that the young generation is not less politically active than the older generation, but traditional political activities do not seem to fit the contemporary culture of young people. The cultural displacement aspect believes that social technology could progress and extend its influence without affecting traditional institution politics. New media could exist in parallel with traditional media or institutional political communication, or it could become a new channel for political communication of young people. Websites and online social network could be designed to be a place or tool that connects political institutions with citizens (Loader, 2007). The potential of new media to revive political participation under a democratic regime was widely mentioned during the rise of the Internet. The flexibility of communication via a computer network and the global characteristic of the network facilitated the emergence of public sphere according to the concept of Jürgen Habermas, which means an open sphere for world citizens to share information, participate in critical discussion, and challenge the state’s authority. This idea considers the Internet as a tool for social learning and enabling the new generation.

Informed Citizen and Media Literacy Informed and engaged citizens in a democratic society, therefore, should be able to use their knowledge and internet communication skills as a tool to obtain information and participate in social and political activities. Nonetheless, media use and communication skills involve several factors and contexts. As a result, citizens of a specific community may have different levels of media literacy, and this could be an impediment to promotion of communication and engagement in a democratic society. Media literacy means an idea of developing citizens to have literacy and awareness of benefits and harms of media content, so they become active, have freedom to obtain sufficient information for their decision-making, and are able to protect themselves and others from unwanted information. Media literacy can be categorised into four levels: access, critical thinking, evaluation, and creativity. Consequently, development of policy instruments to protect children and youth from potential harms or risks of foreign media has focused on improving and promoting media, information, and digital literacy among media users, especially children and youth, so that they are aware of possible hazards from media content to

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which they are exposed, as well as provided technical tools for media users to block harmful content by themselves. The concept of media, information, and digital literacy involves media literacy, information literacy, and digital literacy, which is a set of competencies that cover the twenty-first-century skills regarding an ability to get access to information through media and digital technology, an ability to choose, analyse, evaluate, and use information creatively, and an ability to produce media content to drive society forward by themselves. Those competencies also relate to other sets of skills such as life skill, which includes self-awareness skill and interpersonal and communication skill in the information and digital era and the multicultural and democratic society (Child and Youth Media Institute & Thai Civic Education Center, 2016). A study of the state of media literacy research in Thailand in 1997–2018 analysed 120 researches about media literacy, which were conducted between 1997 and 2017, and discussed the findings with experts from various professions (Viroj Suttisima et al., 2018). The study suggested interesting relationship between social and political contexts and media literacy of the citizens as follows. Summary table of the state of media literacy researches over the two decades, which was divided into four significant periods. 1997–2006 Researches on media literacy were still in an early stage. The growth of the Internet and state plans to support a new media landscape led to studies of online literacy. Meanwhile, the emerging trend of freedom of expression and information perception with responsibility led to studies of media users and media effects 2007–2011 A context of online social network became increasingly important along with a political context. There was promotion of media literacy by both international organsation (UNESCO) and national organisation (NBTC). Meanwhile, with soaring political temperature and flooding information from various parties, there were more researches on media literacy in this period. Topics of media use and relating factors were also raised, so researches were conducted on media users that were youth and university students from concern about their behaviour. The political context was also increasingly added to research topics 2012–2016 Major contexts of this period were intensifying political situations, transition to a digital system, and dominance of online social network use. Promotion of media literacy was extensive; it can be said that media literacy researches proliferated the most in this period. The topics of studies were diversified; they were not just limited to past topics like media use behaviour but extended to topics like media impacts and policies. Evaluation tools were developed to measure and promote media literacy skills in various contexts, especially an online context. There were also transdisciplinary researches, which combined various academic disciplines in the study, such as a teaching discipline and a Buddhism discipline 2017–2018 A context of digital era and traditional media disruption is the key of this period. Studies of media literacy extended to a digital platform, where media literacy and media use skills still needed promotion. The approach of digitalisation also raised new issues amid the changing society, such as cyberbullying and online hate speech. Moreover, the coming of ageing society also led to studies of media literacy for the elderly

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According to those past researches, media literacy levels of Thai message receivers varied with different media, content, demographic factors as well as the measuring criteria. However, the findings showed that Thai youth had a moderate level of media literacy in overall. While those youth had data searching skills, they still lacked critical thinking, evaluation, and creativity skills. At the same time, there were only few researches on media literacy of the elderly, but findings from existing researches showed that older people obtained online information only from some applications (LINE) and they had a low level of online literacy and online media use. This is consistent with findings from a group discussion with experts from various fields, which suggested that media literacy should be taught to the elderly and there should be researches that focus on this particular group of media users in future. Suggestions from this research encouraged future researches on development of media literacy to improve critical thinking, evaluation, and creative skills for media production. There should also be researches that focus on active audiences within a new media landscape, digital context, cyberbullying, and hate speech. In terms of research population, the emphasis should be on media literacy in various generations, especially the elderly, or on media literacy in specific groups such as media content producers or parents or adult guardians. Fresh concepts and theories should be utilised such as digital quotient, transmedia literacy, or new indicators for a Thai context should be developed. Digital media use is another factor that could change the meaning of media literacy. Media users in a digital context use knowledge and media use skills for a specific objective in a specific context. Digital media use is unique in terms of technology-generated user experience, specifically generated content/messages, exposure to and use of specific technology and content, and assembly of users of similar opinions. These characteristics create experience and impact on media users at a different level. Consequently, different media user groups require different media literacy levels and in different dimensions. As media literacy paradigm is expanding and involving many factors such as social contexts, cultural and economic capital, and psychological factors of media users, media literacy cannot have the same definition in all social contexts. The required level of media literacy depends on social and cultural contexts, which include social norms, values, code of conducts, and morality. Therefore, media literacy components can change along with social contexts. A person develops media literacy in a society where there is unequal distribution of political, social, and economic resources. As a result, media literacy must take into account the relationship between an economic competency and culture as well as a social context of technology use which determines the interpretation of interaction with the digital system. Besides personal factors such as media use skills, comprehension, critical thinking, and interaction with others through media, development of media literacy also needs to consider the following factors: media studies, media policies, media availability, and the role of media industry and civil society.

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Media Literacy and Political Context of Thailand It has been seven years since the military coup on May 22, 2014 that Thailand is under the administration of the government of Gen. Prayut Chan-o-cha, head of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), who subsequently became the 29th prime minister of Thailand after a general election in 2019. This government leader has been with Thai people for seven years and may stay for two more years if he completes his government term in 2023. All those years of his administration have induced severe political polarisation, anti-government protests, and calls for political reforms, which have led to the atmosphere of hate speech and assembly of people who have similar political opinions and ignore different beliefs and views of the opposite groups. This situation is called an echo chamber. A research of online echo chamber and first-time voters in the 2019 general election (Pirongrong Ramasoota et al., 2020) studied the elements of echo chamber in online political communication and its relationship with political attitudes of firsttime voters. The study of the sample group, which consisted of first-time voters in four regions of Thailand, showed that four-fifths of top sources of political information of the first-time voters were online sources, especially online social network, in which users were part of the network. Majority of the sample group also viewed that they should have political participation and that they could make a political difference. In terms of the echo chamber of online communication, the sample group evaluated themselves as having a low level of echo chamber behaviour. The sample group gave a moderate score for themselves in three topics, which were: sharing political content that matches their political opinions, sending political content that matches their political ideology to friends of the same political opinions via the Messenger application or LINE personal account, and staying silent or refraining from expressing political opinions when their opinions are different from the majority opinions in the online sphere. This behaviour reflects that the sample group only communicated or expressed their political opinions on a personal space and with the group of people who shared similar political opinions. Moreover, choosing to be silent is another characteristic of most Thai citizens, who usually avoid disputes or political discussions. In addition, the findings from self-evaluation of echo chamber behaviour disagreed with the findings from evaluation of experience of information filtering by online platforms, as the sample group answered that they experienced a high level of information filtering by the platforms in most aspects. However, filtering algorithm of the online platforms usually used data from the user’s behaviour. In other words, the fact that the sample group evaluated themselves as having a low level of echo chamber behaviour might indicate their selective exposure to messages that agreed with their existing beliefs. Yet, they did not choose to be in closed room and receive only the messages that echoed their own thoughts. Meanwhile, the sample group reported a high level of filter bubble experience, and that filter bubble effect resulted partly form their platform use behaviour.

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Another interesting topic regarding the filter bubble experience was that, the sample group stated that “perceived social trends in their online social network” and “policies of political parties and politicians” were sources of information that affected their decision-making in the general election on March 24, 2019 at a high level. Consequently, it can be said that the sample group received information that was important to their political decision-making from online platforms, and those platforms were managed by algorithm, so the information they used in the decision-making was previously filtered by the algorithm as well. The suggestions from this research indicated the importance of informed and active citizens and development of awareness about existing risk of echo chamber and its impact on the development of deliberative democratic society. Another important topic is development of media literacy on online social network algorithms, as media users may be unaware that these algorithms are a communication ecology that is created by the system. Future studies may put the emphasis on the influence of social network algorithms in framing political attitudes and beliefs as well as the marketing influence.

Conclusion and Suggestions Strong democratic society is created by informed and engaged citizens through important mechanisms like freedom of communication. Citizens will be able to fully exercise their rights when they have access to media and can use the media to communicate what they want to express, based on the foundation of critical thinking, consideration, criticism, and reasonable expression of political opinions. Exchanges of different political opinions and views are also necessary. If society cannot guarantee this basic foundation of rights to communication, it can affect the development of informed, engaged and active citizens. While academics and the society expect the citizens to have media literacy skills amid the prevalence of flooding information and drastic political polarisation, media literacy still depends mainly on the strength of democracy and social infrastructure. Citizens of a digital era may not be politically disaffected, but the online sphere that used to be the hope of communication and active participation may not truly support their freedom of expression.

References Cecchini, M. (2003). Active citizenship: Adult learning and active citizenship, lifelong learning and active citizenship. Key note speech in EAEA Conference. Child and Youth Media Institute & Thai Civic Education Center. (2016). Framework of the Development of Curriculum for Media, Information, and Digital Literacy for Building Democratic Citizens. In Development of framework and curriculum for media, information, and digital literacy for advocating democratic citizenship. Conference material, Bangkok: Mandarin Hotel. (in Thai) Heywood, A. (2007). Politics (3nd ed.). New York: Palgrave.

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Loader, B. (2007). Young citizens in the digital engage: Political engagement, young people and new media. London, New York: Routledge. Pattie, C. et al. (2004) Citizenship in Britain: Values, participation and democracy. Cambridge University Press. Suttisima, V., Chainan, P. and Yuwakosol, S. (2018). The state of media literacy research in Thailand [1997–2017]. Thai Media Fund. (in Thai) Ramasoota, P., Chainan, P. and Suttisima, V. (2020). Online echo chamber and first-time voters in the 2019 general election. Thailand Science Research and Innovation (TSRI). (in Thai) The New York Times. The Definition of Civic Engagement. Retrieved from https://archive.nytimes. com/www.nytimes.com/ref/college/collegespecial2/coll_aascu_defi.html on 15 May 2021.

Chapter 16

Turbulence in Thailand? The Thai Digital Civil Rights Movement and a ‘Pro-Human’ Contract for the Web Michael J. Day and Merisa Skulsuthavong

Introduction On 25 November 2019, a proclamation for 2020, from the inventor of the protocols that drive the World Wide Web (the web), Sir Professor Tim Berners-Lee, was made, with the support of the Web Foundation, a United States-based non-profit organisation advocating for web openness (Berners-Lee, 2019). Their latest agenda is a social ‘Contract for the Web’ of nine principles to further web governance (Sample, 2019). This chapter discusses if, like the campaign for a ‘Web We Want’ in 2015, led again by the Web Foundation and Berners-Lee, the concept of a ‘pro-human web’ that emerged as an idea in Weaving the Web, and was later developed as an educational framework, can be realised in Thailand during a politically turbulent period, to set an example for wider Internet freedoms in South-East (SE) Asia (Day et al., 2015; Web Foundation, 2014; Berners-Lee, 2000). A pro-human web is an ambitious idea. The contract for it seeks a promise among users, technical entities, business forces and nation-states to play nice. It is, therefore, unrealistic. After all, five years on, even in democratic settings, we still do not have what Berners-Lee (2000) has long insisted the public wanted; a web free of control and full of personal empowerment. Of course, this is a vital idea. But, the further we look from democratic settings, towards those built on different social ideas about freedom of expression, justice, liberty and personal rights, the more difficult it becomes. In support of changing this, in July 2020, The 2020 Manifesto for Web Science was released by contributors aligned under The Web Science Trust, a charity promoting study of the web through the discipline of Web Science. An interdisciplinary endeavour, the discipline and manifesto seek ‘inclusive, intelligence and sustainable futures for the Web’ (Berendt et al., 2020). M. J. Day Bangkok, Thailand M. Skulsuthavong (B) Media and Communication, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, China © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_16

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An impressive public relations (PR) slogan, the dream for the web put forward in the manifesto echoes this throughout; it speaks as to how the web must unfold to benefit everyone. Berendt et al. (2020, p. 1), the authors of the manifesto, champion pro-human web governance but, wisely, acknowledge that their ‘observations occupy a particular point in time and are skewed towards our experience as Western scholars- a limitation that Web Science will need to overcome’. This, undoubtedly, is a considerable limitation that Web Science faces. While the ambitions and intent behind writing any form of pro-human web advocacy is admirable, such efforts are frequently driven from the safety of a western democratic setting, often by those seated comfortably in armchair academia. So, such efforts are far from globally realistic and seldom represented by diverse voices, which makes it difficult to truly speak for anything other than western ideas of entitlement. In SE Asia, human rights are not guaranteed; neither is an Internet connection, or the money for one, a particular problem in Myanmar, which has faced brutal terrorism aided by Internet repression at the direction of a military junta that consolidated power over 2021 and neighbours Thailand, the country and focus of our discussion in this chapter. Both share similarities in the culture of surveillance that governs much of digital life normalised in such a way to include and encourage peer-reporting of controversial online activity, alongside harsh decisions about personal privacy made by what is, upon writing, a military backed government. In SE Asia, publicly expressed opinion on the web yields data that produces an evidence trail of dissenting activity then used to prosecute citizens, much like academics who want to write about it and are arrested, or driven from their roles (Day & Skulsuthavong 2021a). Now, more than a year on from Web Science’s manifesto, we do not have any sense of ‘pro-human inclusive governance for the web’ in Thailand, a country split by public debate concerning rights to online expression, or even unmonitored usage access. With thousands of students engaged in protest, on social media initially, then out onto the streets, it has led to arrest warrants. Since 25 September 2020, this includes, allegedly, the arrest of children under the age of 16 for sharing, usually on social media, views that challenge pro-nationalist rhetoric and criticise social taboos (Thai PBS, 2020; Bangkok Post, 2020a; Khaosod, 2020). Sharing such views, or anything critical even in their same context, such as to advocate for the protests, violates a series of domestic laws. Attacking a widely revered Thai elite is an act of defamation punishable under a law known as Lèse-majesté, found in Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code. This carries 3–15-year prison sentences for every charge issued, which, for example, can be applied to each message sent online. The view of the government is clear: do not speak, write, or post online negative views about certain topics, people, or freedoms, or popularise those who do by repeating their ideas (Voice Online, 2021). There is, likewise, an unspoken expectation to ideologically condition students away from critical thinking and towards this and other conservative views whilst they are studying in Thai higher education, where it has often been implied, across 2020 and 2021, that academics should comply with nationalist views, and limit their own expression along with their student’s thinking. This comes with a firm Rote pedagogy emphasis to encourage students to obey the law and for their teachers

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to design learning so not to stir up any attitude otherwise. Unsurprisingly, Thailand graded E in the Academic Freedom Index released in March 2021, ranked low and alongside other authoritarian countries such as North Korea, South Sudan, Rwanda and Iran (Prachatai, 2021; Kinzelbach et al., 2020). The situation grew worse as international attention shifted to the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar over 2021, largely due to external scrutiny being drawn away to focus on mass-killings in the nation, which neighbours Thailand and itself has seen heavy repression alongside censorship of digital activity in an attempt to hide war crimes against citizens. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR, 2021) reported, as of mid-March 2021, that 70 people have been charged in Thailand under Section 112 in 60 cases, and 26 cases were founded by complaints from everyday citizens, four by the Thai Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) and the rest via police investigation, with four of those charged being under the age of 18. Amnesty International (2021) released a statement, again in March 2021, suggesting that the prosecution of 382 protest leaders, alongside everyday peaceful demonstrators, in 207 cases since 2020, was censorship of their rights. Hall et al. (2016), who are founding Web Scientists, often ask how the web can further humanity. In Thailand, this idea would be difficult to raise in public, or challenge as an academic process; to speak out regarding freedom and the web is dangerous (HRW, 2019). Thailand, unlike Europe and the USA, is a setting where students are met with authoritarian computer crime laws, meanwhile academics have considerable scrutiny of every act of research. Across 2020 and 2021, as well as continuing into 2022, we can observe something akin to a Thai digital civil rights movement unfolding within Thailand. Indeed unhappiness amongst young people has been gaining momentum over the last decade. Led by more liberal Thai citizens, its goal is to achieve some sense of social, intellectual and personal equality, and an attempt to secure human rights for all Thais. Galvanised, we can note a distinct increase in civil disobedience, boycotts and protests at public monuments, as well as within universities. Likewise, there have been mass marches in the streets, all with a range of other non-violent activities not dissimilar to the United States (US) during efforts by African Americans to end institutional discrimination. A hallmark feature of the US Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to challenge segregation and recognise the need for greater education, combating unequal opportunity, within the political domain, alongside wider reaching aspects of social freedom, which included housing, universal healthcare and, notably relevant to our discussion, freedom of opinion and opportunity. Until this act, such ideas of expression were often met with the use of disenfranchisement and legislative repression, as seen in the Jim Crow laws that sought to prevent interracial marriage, social advancement, shared accommodation and even education. Do Thais, then, need a Digital Civil Rights Act of 2022? While not the same, there are similarities between then and what has unfolded in Thailand over 2020 and 2021; certainly, a powerful group of actors seek to ensure political disqualification of rivals, as well as limit education to prohibit suffrage, or even an interest in politics in the first place (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b).

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Open Access to the Internet: A Contextual, not Universal, Human Right in Thailand? For example, research in Thai academia countering conservatism is frequently not approved by those in positions of power in a university or seated on its usually statealigned ethics board and, understandably, to journal outputs in the west, this kind of research is thus unpublishable. Thai surveillance culture and academic oppression, however, is not new; in 1976, students were massacred at Thammasat University, an elite university located in Bangkok, Thailand, for engaging in a protest movement tied to freedom of expression. In Thailand, various diverse cultural views circulate about the very idea of protest itself, ranging between ultra-right-wing conservatives who denounce it as un-Thai, to a young, Internet empowered generation, and everyone in between. This creates a variable political spectrum, more like a pendulum where groups polarise, antagonise and popularise each other, splintering any potential for mediation and moderation (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b). Thailand has a high-context, sensitive culture; citizens are easily stirred by nationalist exposure to global otherness communicated through the web, with some affected akin to digital reverse culture shock when they realise how different freedoms are in other democratic nations. Fear of ‘the other’ and attempting to limit citizens’ exposure to it has long been a feature of ‘Thainess’ that exists as a concept within Thailand to reflect deeply conservative pro-state behaviour and government policy. This has to do with conservative Thais encouraging an internally generated narrative over several decades and across educational policy focused around furthering the idea of never being colonised by foreign powers, which has led to commonplace xenophobia (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b). A point of considerable cultural pride, Thailand’s self-driven champion-defender narrative has been described as ambivalent and self-Orientalist, in a culture of borrowing that adapts different cultures ideas and re-purposes them as their own, often in educational systems and to a point so extreme that outright misappropriation is considered acceptable, as is brutal hazing ritualism (Waters & Day, 2022). Usually, the Thai sense of social, political and educational narrative is driven by a nostalgic desire to create a mythic identity reinforcing conservative views, that permeates into all walks of life, including advertising, television, gender, sexuality and beauty (Skulsuthavong, 2016). This is a setting where, after all, in 2021 it is not uncommon for female academics, as well as students, to still be required to wear skirts to universities, in order to look ‘feminine’ and this seeks to shape ideological values ‘constructing’ young people’s identity in public universities. Most Thai university students are still required to wear a uniform not dissimilar to that found in western high schools. This seeks to reinforce gender roles and traditional conservative values, pushing both the objectification of the female form and the emphasis of a patriarchal dominance over women’s bodies. There are likewise implications for transgender students and, indeed, such gender discrimination undoubtedly reduces wider acceptance of LGBTQ rights, roles and inclusion within Thailand. Meanwhile, in November 2021 the Thai Constitutional Court ruled that Section 1448 of the Civil and Commercial Code, which allows

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only for a man and woman to get married, was legal. As such, it was stated as not violating of civil or constitutional rights for LGBTQ couples, suggested because it is felt, within conservative Thailand, that LGBTQ couples ‘cannot reproduce or form a functioning family’ and so should not be allowed to marry, as it ‘is against nature’ (Thai PBS World, 2021). Such prejudice and discrimination indirectly also echoes a traditional belief in Thailand that it is the role of women, in Thai society, to serve men, via acting as vessels for reproduction, which creates what is seen as a high status role but only within the context of the home and family units (Skulsuthavong, 2016). looseness-1Hence, in Thailand, protesters are one facet of a complex momentum of change, which extends in many directions with respect to social justice and equality, itself set back by decades of rigorous political control embedded into nearly every walk of life. Critics of this, and many other forms of social emancipation, are seen, as well as described in state-levied media, as anti-nationalist, and anti-Thai. Criticism of the government, then, is seen as an attack on the nation, because government politicians work hard to cultivate their ideologically enforced role, usually through educational policy and political design, as national protectors. To conservative advocates, negative expression about Thailand is akin to terrorism. Those who protest, in contrast, see themselves as digital citizens of the world, connected to it through the diverse heterogeneity found on and across the Internet. Usually, in reply to outspoken calls for liberal civil rights, conservative forces frequently urge such young people to leave the country, if they are unhappy with it, thereby mortgaging the future of Thailand by limiting potential critical thought and seeking to desperately prevent any social desire for change (Thanthong-Knight, 2021). Acts of online protest, and opinions related to it, still exist, for many traditional Thais, as governed by a social contract of rules and regulations defined nationally (Bangkok Post, 2020a). There are, of course, no real laws or governments that can truly dictate the web. As such, what is essentially a free social and technical hybrid space that cannot be policed easily, is deeply disruptive to a system of authoritarian governance built on decades of ideological rhetoric and installed via a morally bankrupt educational system, in particular driven by university actors whose professional advancement is tied to state-approval and satisfication. Indeed, it is not uncommon for Thai students sharing, online and off, opinions against their government to be described as nation-haters, even by their teachers. Sedition is, after all, a criminal offence in Thailand, and even acts of expression can be seen as seditious intent, hence reporting any such intention curries favour (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b). Thailand has some of the strictest laws concerning free speech in the world. A culture rooted in authoritarian surveillance, repression of the self, more importantly, has an ideologically indoctrinated acceptance, in particular across older Thais long conditioned by a patron-client society. Put another way, many Thais expect and support an intrusive level of political observation. Domestically, this is often termed by Thai conservatives as having respect for the lasting ‘Thai context’ via social deference. This echoes a system of ordering that existed for hundreds of years, the Thai Sakdina, which is similar in nature to feudalism, but that lasted much longer, and, unfortunately, ran until only a few hundred years ago, prohibiting

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speaking out about state-rhetoric of ‘Thainess’ or against those in a higher social class (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021a; AFP, 2020a, 2020b; Beech, 2020). This was a contributory factor that led to a strong military surveillance culture in Thailand, which now applies to the web, in particular after a military coup in 2014 eventually translated into the current political government, with many of the key actors still in power nearly a decade later (Laungaramsri, 2016). This has had a lasting impact on democratic and web freedoms. In October 2020, Twitter removed 926 surveillance accounts, alleged as run by bots, automated data collection tools, which were driven by the Thai government for surveillance and information operations against Thai citizenry, in the same period some government figures deemed posting photos online, of attendance at protests, as criminal dissent (Twitter, 2020; HRW, 2020). An eventful month, on 18 October 2020 approximately 10,000 citizens gathered at Victory Monument, a landmark in Bangkok, in reply, to protest human rights and military scrutiny (Bangkok Post, 2020b). Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2019) argues that, often in the background of any such digital human rights debate, it is good PR to suggest proclamations and manifestos of pro-human digital change then ignored by ‘megalomaniacs who will carry on doing their worst’ anywhere that human rights are not assured. This is possible because the web is a decentralised, supranational entity, so it is very challenging to shape rules for it that work in every context. Consequently, it is a philosophical challenge to universalise socially ‘just’ rules for a system developed to facilitate communication across different systems and between entities not limited by traditional nation-state boundaries. Meanwhile, a protest at Thammasat University on 10 August 2020 led government figures, including the Prime Minister of Thailand, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, to be reported by journalists as stating students had crossed sociocultural and legal lines in their points of objection (Chetchotiros et al., 2020). Thailand’s MDES were likewise reported in the same period as asking major web entities, such as Facebook, to remove anti-nationalist social media commentary (O’Connor, 2020; Tortermvasana, 2020). Legally speaking, both can do so under Thai law (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b). Indeed, the laws and legal system related to expression and communication in Thailand is very complicated, influenced heavily by the government and amended, as will be discussed, often to suit political demands in response to social upheaval. Meanwhile, when we turn to the tradition of Émile Durkheim, a forefather of the discipline of Sociology, it would be clear why we see resistant Thais uniting online, perhaps even breaking laws in response to nation-state oppression. Social entities act as they want in anomie, an idea that can be unpacked to suggest that when rules are not set by truly democratic, hence politicised, agreement it disrupts social conventionality (Çam and Irmak, 2014). Problematically, non-binding promises are informal words. So, if nobody governs the web then both pro-human and anti-human conduct is permissible. This, again, is because of such anomie. Berners-Lee, along with the Web Foundation, can disagree with this status quo all they want, but seem to imply a socially deterministic view of the web. Their ideology assumes, then, that social forces can govern technical protocols. This is natural because Berners-Lee invented the ones that drive the web (Sample, 2019). He did not, however, invent the

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web as we know, see and experience today. The world did. The Web Foundation’s (2020) nine non-binding principles, however, suggest a global agenda to be upheld, or perhaps enforced, as the first three are for governments, the second for companies and third for citizens to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Ensure everyone can connect to the Internet. Keep all of the Internet available, all of the time. Respect and protect peoples’ fundamental online privacy and data rights. Make the Internet affordable and accessible to everyone. Respect and protect people’s privacy and personal data to build online trust. Develop technologies that support the best in humanity and challenge the worst. Be creators and collaborators on the web. Build strong communities that respect civil discourse and human dignity. Fight for the web.

There is no doubt that Berners-Lee gifted the world three reconfigurable protocols that enable communication atop the Internet: HTML, HTTP and URL are his version of a file-sharing network system that was used, in the first instance, by a culture of technical academics who were very experienced in shaping, as well as sharing, information (Berners-Lee, 2000). The web of 2021, however, has only a passing resemblance and is built in the dynamic and organic interplay of social and technical forces distributed as a network of networks globally acting in temporarily aligned, thus socio-technical, symbiosis. Hence, the web has grown far beyond the control, or opinion, of one person, or even academic group. The way society and technology evolve in such a manner is discussed at length by Mackenzie and Wajcman (1999) and Pinch and Bijker (1989). Both draw from Durkheim’s (1933) far earlier idea of organic solidarity. This can be unpacked to suggest if social contracts, so consensus between individual units, for Durkheim (1933), or actors, for sociologist Bruno Latour (1984), in a society breakdown, or do not exist, it is because these actor-units want this to happen. It is not, then, that a sense of technical ‘mechanical solidarity has lost ground, but because all the conditions for the existence of organic solidarity have not been realised’ (Durkheim, 1933, p. 364). Such thinking can be unpackaged and understood as suggesting that there is not anything anti-human about the technical actors of a given society, nor are they less important than the human in networks. Both negotiate, create and then shape relying on each other. Without each other, there could be no phenomena in the first place (Latour, 1984). Applied to the web, and the Internet supporting it, technical actors enable social connectivity, communication and renegotiation. This occurs in a realm beyond traditional governance and, as a result, social ideology, justice, rules and unified agreement on pro-human usage. Such norms, therefore, ethically vary in each point, place and moment of connection, and change based on who facilitates such connectivity. On and in the web, then, actors can exist as socially norm-less units, organised by non-traditional forms of technical governance, and vice versa: URL, HTTP and HTML are protocols granting network access, not an entitlement to social justice or digital human rights as an idea recognised globally, in the same way using the web is.

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Subsequently, no universal pro-human conditions have ever been agreed on, nor will global web governance be easy to realise. This is because of the same freedom these protocols allow: you do not have to be a nice person to play on the web, nor adhere to any particular view of morality within it. Rather, you just need to know HTML. Put another way, the absence of an initial state of web governance invited pre-existing, or more powerful, institutions with sufficient knowledge, hence power, to fill the vacuum. We now need the influence of Facebook, for example, to empower discipline and ordering of communication practice within one form of social media. This creates a digital nation, perhaps, in our global web society, where terms of usage fill the void of traditional nation-state laws, yet political influence cannot be denied. Meanwhile, if people were unhappy with Facebook, or their policies, they could leave, or opt-out from participating in that particular realm of discourse, at least in the view of Durkheim, because they can seek anew, in the endlessness infinity of communication and connectivity that the web offers (Çam and Irmak, 2014). Durkheim refers to social infinity to describe a sense of boundless reality devoid of norms, and, likewise, social affinity, the search for kindred in this state of essential normlessness, so the absence of agreed norms, moral practices or ethical responsibilities, other than decided upon, in our context, by usage, users, or perhaps market forces (Durkheim, 1933). Across his work, Durkheim championed social justice by questioning its absence, and we cannot escape the fact that a lack of morally focused web governance invites broader forms of political abuse that furthers various forms of social injustice (Çam and Irmak, 2014). Merton (1938) built upon Durkheim’s tradition, developing thinking with respect to Durkheim’s anomie, the idea that deregulation of order erodes prior community practices and consensus, which includes undermining political governance (Merton, 1968). Such reasoning questions whether the absence of social order, or a sense of ethically driven democratic governance, is negative, or if indeed the absence of a universal ‘conscience’ promotes anti-human outcomes alongside liberality, itself a pro-human outcome (Çam and Irmak, 2014). Human rights, including access to the web, are defined, at length, by the United Nations (UN) but shaped, in reality, by situational context and legality, not any true social universality (Merton, 1968). Therefore, such suggestive web social contracts, as argued for by the UN, or similarly by Berners-Lee and Web Scientists, are ultimately non-binding, despite being admirable conceptual ideas. Hence, they are worthless in settings where concepts of humanity and entitlement, as a living being, is suggested as not as important as that of politically motivated opinions of right and wrong. Often spoken by corrupt, abusive and military backed governments who, unlike the dinosaurs they resemble, have yet to become extinct. In SE Asia, the lives of those who protest are seen as cheap, disposable or destroyable. More importantly, human rights are not understood as something that need protecting, in certain authoritarian circles. Meanwhile, while common ideas of ‘just’ and ‘justice’ are influenced across, and decided by, consensus in all social levels- they can be overwritten by those with considerable political power (Pohle and Van Audenhove, 2017). Durkheim (1933) similarly infers that in anomie, the absence of traditional social ordering is not about democratic participation: the powerful influencing a society shape the status quo and decide acceptability for the

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majority. To this end, it is impossible to determine what a just social contract is for the whole world, as well as for the web.

Thai Censorship: Digital Reverse Culture Shock as a State of ‘new’ Normlessness in Thailand? Furthermore, different cultures all have different ideas of what being pro-human means; there is also no global agreement over what being anti-human means, nor justice (Merton, 1938). For conservative citizens in Thailand, protesting online, and off, is not pro-human. Durkheim (1933), in contrast, suggested that there is not anything ‘wrong’ with the absence of, or challenge to, traditional order, as resistance reshapes the norm and ‘it is not sufficient for there to be rules, however, for sometimes the rules themselves are a cause of evil’ (Durkheim, 1933, p. 374). Hence, it is fair to assume most in Web Science have, probably, never protested for human rights at the risk of imprisonment under Section 112 of the Thai Criminal Code, a law that if violated, or even interpreted as offending anyone in its framework, carries a prison sentence. In contrast, Thai students protesting in universities, some about digital rights and often resulting in imprisonment, then, seem to be doing a much more prolific job of advancing critical discussion about inclusive, sustainable and intelligent web governance, alongside Thai social inclusion, across the global stage. We must, therefore, inevitably question if developing grand agendas for the web and seeking to export them globally inclines a culture of western academics articulating ego-driven views for a phenomenon they have little control over, or even much influence with respect to. Or, perhaps, ask critically what the true motivations are for raising such questions in the first place, in an increasingly competitive academic landscape madly driven not for student welfare, but for stable windfalls. We likewise need to avoid the suggestion of what we might think of as digital colonialism. Each country has a different cultural attitude with respect to digital freedoms and social, alongside technical, rights. If we assume that change can be willed into the web, and the users, of countries we have never set foot within, then, we begin to lean back and become technically focused, deterministic and likely-AI-fascinated researchers. Computer Science has long seen digital human rights as one might a slow-moving horse. So, one that is all too easy to hitch a cart onto, possibly to advance a narrative, when timing suits, perhaps when a lab needed to fund their next timely research project, pay-to-play conference, academic research impact framework or promotion committee. Anthony Giddens (2014), a sociologist concerned with globalisation, infers that as ‘universal social ideals’ shift, so does activity, risk, strain, acceptability, identity and reward, as a by-product of socio-technical ‘unlimited’ agency. It is no surprise this extends to academia. Across his work, the author echoes Durkheim’s social infinity, which is found in and on the web; Giddens (2014) seeks to consider how ethical dilemmas produce wider, global network changes, though is less concerned with

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adopting an absolutist view of what global society should look like. For example, Edward Snowden, a CIA analyst, exposed PRISM, a US government operation intercepting user data, which led to social changes in privacy expectations (Pohle and Van Audenhove, 2017; Kumar, 2017). Applied to the web, the data mined by industrial forces, or governments, might be unethical, but the ends could justify the means if it prevents, for example, terrorism. Or, alternatively, fuels educative services; Google often profile our search data and patterns to improve their services. Therefore, to echo Mestrovic (1998), social contracts ‘deemed worthy of respect by most of society’s members will be regarded as just, and, of course, every society will have standards of justice peculiar to it in addition to some standards that might be termed universal’ (Mestrovic, 1998, p. 194). Hence, if Thailand is split in opinion, and it is, over the protest movement and very concept of expression itself, with an older conservative majority set against an emancipated youth, then it is not all Thai society calling for pro-human digital governance. Few in Thailand know what the Web Foundation is, or why they should listen to them. Nor, in Thailand, can one easily teach about pro-human views of the web without risk of imprisonment (HRW, 2019). Freedom to use the web, to punish or liberate, is possible due to lack of governance in its original design (Kumar, 2017). When we look towards Giddens’ position on justice, we find it subjective; consensus is not universal, and it is natural governments will determine certain norms, practices, and ideas of social acceptability with respect to expression (Tucker, 1998). Web governance is problematic; it is inevitably impeded by regional, geographical, cultural, economic, political and linguistic divisions. These are but a few components widening not just a digital, but a socio-technical divide in Thailand. For Castiglione (2015), a philosophy of encapsulated interest produces an advantage. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) might control usage on behalf of a government in Thailand, but in exchange citizens can access the Internet, something that was far less widespread ten years ago. Growing web participation has led to increased military scrutiny. In one view, people are being pro-human by being pro-themselves. This includes the Thai government. The problem is, of course, there may be some confusion over what pro-human usage should mean. Indeed, in Thailand, education and critical thinking is still developing (OECD, 2019). For Thailand, as of 2021, we find a culture of digital paranoia, surveillance and an Internet Panopticon co-existing alongside a constitutional right to freedom of expression (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021a). This creates a confusing landscape for citizens seeking to mobilise social transformation, ensuring a state of deliberate uncertainty and fear inherent to a system of authoritarianism. A military coup-d’état occurred in 2014, then was ratified by a subsequently elected government in 2019, led in both instances by, upon writing, the now Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha. In what followed, changes to the freedoms with respect to the web occurred, as, likewise, did repression concerning sexual, political and social activity, that had been building as a result of conservative agendas to influence Thai society back towards older generational values that rely heavily on creating an ideological adherence in favour of nationalism (Shytov, 2015). Censorship in Thailand is seen as needed, by many conservatives, because a state of digital reverse culture shock among young people has led to political unrest;

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connected via the web, unrest is a very real and an increasing problem for conservative forces. New users of the web are the first generation of ‘next-gen’ Thais, those with a more global outlook, hence digitally emancipated from a previously tightly politically controlled education system with a heavy emphasis on Rote pedagogy, ancestral traditions, hazing that is built in a wider setting constructed around filial piety and deference to elders (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021b). Given a significant socioeconomic divide, for many Thai citizens overseas travel, hence global exposure to contrasting practices that would have changed the way citizens think, was unthinkable. Such travel was reserved for the wealthy, who are often conservative in Thailand due to the centralised nature of business dealings operated nearly exclusively from the Thai capital, Bangkok. Family business dynasties are not uncommon, with a large amount of wealth held by a very small minority, and no clearly defined middle class, which has created a serfdom mentality for most working-class Thais; employers have much greater control over the private lives of Thai citizens and a national emphasis on Buddhist traditions encourages deference further, often out of fear of metaphysical punishment, a particular concern for many spiritually motivated Thais. Therefore, advancement in Thailand previously required considerable political capital. The Internet, as a tool of democratic communication, expanded access to affordable 4G mobile Internet data, which has widened opportunities for Thais. The world was once a far-away place for many Thais. Now, citizens of a country with an economy built around serving tourism, and their government, can digitally travel the globe and, in doing so, connect with ‘otherness’, so new political ideas, identities and cultures. As a result, some Thai citizens return, in a manner of speaking, in reverse to their prior thinking; finding affinity online for views that had to be repressed, or were, prior to the web, ideologically punished by government-mandated educational ordering and elite-held power, has redefined their entire cognition (Low et al., 2020). This creates a state of psychological shock upon seeing the freedoms of others compared to their own. Subsequently, initiatives to prevent this have unfolded in the last decade. The Thai Computer Crime Act (TCCA, 2007) has been a polarising tool to this end, granting far-ranging, yet vague, powers over Web activity, which the 2019-elected government, allegedly, have used to police dissent against the legitimacy of their coup d’état or, starting from 2020, those who encourage protest (Pitaksantayothin, 2014; Kummetha, 2015).

Thailand’s Internet ‘Blue Pencilling’ Doctrine? What is fascinating, however, is that brutal punishment, such as imprisonment, for having controversial, or even just critical, opinions is socially acceptable to many conservative Thai citizens because the country has had an embedded attitude of surveillance, and a class-subordinated mentality, established over hundreds of years (Ramasoota, 2000). Controlling media, for example, can be traced, in one instance, to a government initiative to minimise Thailand’s reputation as a sex trade

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industry. Indeed, many ISPs still block pornography in 2021 despite the contradictory, yet widespread acceptance, of Thailand as a popular destination for sex tourism (Nuttavuthisit, 2007; Manokha, 2018; Boonchutima, 2009; McDowall and Ma, 2010). Often, what is suggested as protection of Thai citizens, or the nation, due to inexperience, or poor education, is part of government rhetoric. To this end, what we describe within this chapter as an ‘Internet blue pencil doctrine’ emerged in 2014 as an alternative social ‘contract for the web’ in Thailand; challenges to the constitution led to a radical rewriting of legal freedoms within Thailand, to legitimatise a coup against a democratically elected government that had agreed to hold another election, to enable dissatisfied citizens to vote for new leaders. The concept of ‘blue pencilling’ is found in westernised legal thinking to create legally valid adjustments of a contract, so allows a system of governance, such as a court, to change part of a pre-existing legislation without starting over (Pivateau, 2008). The revised version is meant to represent the original vision. So, not shift a negative to a positive, thereby allowing biased rectification. Indeed, we could argue that Thailand’s constitutional charter has been blue-pencilled more than once; the 2017 constitution was approved, initially as a charter reform in August 2016, by approximately 60% of Thai voters. Though, at this time, dissent or disagreement about the proposed rewriting of the constitution led to a decade in jail (Ghosh, 2016). As of April 2017, six changes were made to then voter-approved charter and, allegedly, this was not known until after the public ratification, suggested by the government as acceptable because of the ‘complexity’ of the changes (Bangkok Post, 2017; Bangprapa, 2016). Internet blue pencilling is used, in this chapter, to describe the self-appointed reactive adjustments to relevant laws, and the constitution, by countries, such as Thailand, who favour increasingly harsh penalties tied to speaking out online and with respect to the web. Usually, against specific actors and concerning advancements in the sophistication of their usage and expression of opinion via social media channels. Thus, it is a doctrine that must keep up with advancements in citizens’ socio-technical behaviour, so is inherently reactive. Global social infinity and affinity of the web was, to a government led by predominately older generation conservative Thais newly elected in 2019, a complicated threat to tackle. These same leaders were central in the military junta in 2014, which is why many changes have been reactive because the widespread adoption of the Internet has only, and easily, emerged in Thailand over the last decade (Pitaksantayothin, 2014). Indeed, there is a matter of generational expertise. The Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, drew considerable media interest in 2019 when he was reported as suggesting, at a UN assembly, that use of Google was an innovative tool for ‘executives’ and hence something that many ‘everyday’ Thais had yet to master (Bangkok Post, 2019). Internet blue pencilling grew as web infrastructure developed; now, in 2022, Thailand is at a point where 5G is widely available. Thus, a cycle tied to freedom of expression and a need to limit this has unfolded, followed by retrospective pencilling of rules and a race, by users, to find methods to circumvent censorship, data surveillance and page-blocking (Laungaramsri, 2016; Bunyavejchewin, 2010; Gebhart et al., 2017).

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This creates a Thai Internet arms race, where one set of actors constantly responds to the other, creating new ways to prosecute, or share and populate, views that go against values deeply embedded within the conservative fabric of Thai society. Discussing them even abstractly is considered taboo, or treason worthy of imprisonment (HRW, 2019). Some argue Kafkaesque rules are applied in Thailand and, indeed, as area studies scholars the authors are unable to repeat controversial views under Thai law, which is so far reaching it includes describing them academically (Streckfuss, 2011; ONI, 2012). More accurately, confusion arises because acts of expression are constitutionally protected, so free. Citizens can have an opinion and have a right to expression but, legally, some acts of expression are also simultaneously criminal (Srinuan et al., 2011). There is likewise a cultural component. It is no surprise Thais seek to use the web ), to speak out; expressing negatively, in person, acts against being Kreng Jai ( the cultural practice of consideration and respect, often by repressing one’s feelings, even in the face of attack, which is embedded in a framework of ‘Thainess’ and a ‘face’ culture (Wyatt and Promkandorn, 2012). Therefore, for some, speaking out in public domains about Thailand, or figures within it, is inherently un-Thai; anonymity afforded by the web forced the Thai government to adjust the TCCA, from 2014 onwards, to regulate negative, globally reaching political opinion voiced by citizens within Thailand, which was potentially driven by fears of it affecting ‘Thailand’s face’ (Farrelly, 2010; Shklovski and Kotamraju, 2011; Gebhart et al., 2017). ONI (2012) has long argued that human rights violations are a feature in Thailand. This was very clear at the time of the 2014 coup (O’Brien, 2014). Therefore, the widening reach of the TCCA after 2014 to stop junta dissidents, seen in increases of blocked pages and malicious tracking used to prosecute citizens for criticising what was then a military regime (Laungaramsri, 2016; TCCA, 2007; Gebhart et al., 2017). The continuation of these methods of censorship after a 2019 democratic election was a catalyst of much of the political resistance that was seen among everyday citizens in 2020 and 2021. However, it is a mistake to assume all social contracts need to be democratic, because a social contract is, often, first a governance contract, so one intended to create order and prevent anomie. So, it entails submission between the people and governing force implementing it. Put another way, in Thailand, it is the Prime Minister, General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, who defines ‘the terms on which society is to be governed: the people have made a contract… which determines their relations with him’ (Gough, 1936, pp. 2–3). Consequently, the nine ideological points to better the web, described by Berners-Lee, clash with the TCCA and leave Thai citizens vulnerable to harm, rather than promoting pro-human outcomes. This is problematic and highlights why western views of web freedoms do not necessarily translate to other nations, with different cultural systems and social agreements. Therefore, can we even consider such a web contract to be pro-human, in Thailand? For Durkheim (1933) disagreement shapes division, which can be ‘a source of social cohesion’ and efforts, therefore, to limit activity often increase it (Durkheim, 1933, p. 395). Indeed, culture is shaping of cognition (Low et al., 2020). Cycles of resistance, then, shape social transformation. Yet, to challenge authority is to

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challenge being Thai, for many citizens; Thai media outlets have long been influenced by the military, or conservative powerful elites in strong business positions, which further embeds conservative rhetoric into the fabric of Thailand and rules that govern daily life (Talcoth, 2015). For example, the Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation (B.E. 2548–2005) grants power, during any crisis, over all communication (Article 19, 2020). Such a state has been in effect since Coronavirus (COVID-19) spread to Thailand; as a hub of tourism for Chinese tourists, Thailand had an estimated 20,000 visitors early in the global pandemic (Wipatayotin, 2020). Given the age of the act, the word ‘web’ is seldom mentioned in the translation. Its terminology instead covers any form of media likely to terrify the public or is distorted to bring about a misunderstanding (TCCA, 2018). Comprehensive digital literacy education about the web is still low within Thailand. Thus, this sometimes is used as a justification for a need to control online information, by the government. This has been seen during the COVID-19 crisis, when opportunists sought to exploit a state of crisis and created several states of localised panic (Talcoth, 2015; Rojanaphruk, 2019; Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021a). While government censorship could be debated as unethical, philosopher David Hume (1777) felt it is not an issue if people ‘pay obedience more from fear and necessity, than from any idea of allegiance or of moral obligation’ (Hume, 1777, p. 472) and we could argue that by following the Thai government, as a citizen, rather than renouncing citizenship and leaving Thailand, ‘every individual has given tacit consent’ to authoritarian governance (Hume, 1777, p. 475). Indeed, within Thailand public opinion over a right to privacy, expression and social compliance often is divided politically, economically, intellectually and across generations. There is no Thai consensus, yet there are often dynamic efforts to try to instal a conservative ideology.

Prohibition of ‘Dangerous’ Temptations or Dominating Deviance? In 2015, the Thai Prevention and Suppression of Temptations to Dangerous Behaviours act proposed to blue pencil Section 287 of the Thai penal code, so reinforce TCCA rules against criminal, and more vaguely, deviant sexual behaviour. It began, commendably, as an act to stop child pornography; a pro-human undertaking by the Thai government, one acting of a pro-human social contract. Kummetha and Areerat (2015), however, argued that the terminology included vague ideas that could be interpreted widely as covering group sex, bondage, as the harm of physical form, or the sale of sexuality, in a country with an already socially stigmatised sex worker industry. Interestingly, many articles were once searchable about it, yet, upon writing, are not easily found when you search within Thailand; this might be a result of the rapid increase of search engine data, or the possibility of compliance from ISPs in Thailand, who have long been influenced by the Thai government, including

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in November 2020 when MDES banned Pornhub, a popular online pornography website, along with 190 others, leading to a spike of 640% in searches for Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) to circumvent the ban, compared to the September–October daily average (Reuters, 2020). Sex work is hardly uncommon in Thailand; the government has long-driven agendas to eradicate Thailand’s reputation as a place of sexual service to maintain Thai face and limit potential for embarrassment at a nation-level, an idea that many Thais are deeply concerned about because of a strong nationalist pride that is held, in particular, among ultra conservatives in positions of power (Boonchutima, 2009). There is, then, a mixture of ethical points, as well as implications for social contracts within Thailand; certainly, attempting to limit the harm of children is important. The proposed challenge and increase of prosecution related to this could yield greater pro-human outcomes. However, without the ability to freely use the web to arrange, vet and be paid for sexual services, blacklisted by ambiguousness of the proposed reforms, potentially alienates an already vulnerable minority, sex workers, within a wider, highly conservative Thai culture. Some sex workers, of course, could ignore the law, but this chapter has discussed, at length, that Thailand has a punitive and authoritarian view of violating laws rooted in ‘Thainess’. Therefore, ignoring the rules after the Thai government launched campaigns to rehabilitate Thailand’s salacious sex worker image is unwise, and indeed many legitimate sex workers narratives can be lost among arguments concerning trafficking and criminality that prevail in discussions about sex work and gender equality in Thailand (McDowall and Ma, 2010). Hence, Thai sex workers cannot exist online, nor can they safely operate without potential security afforded by using the Internet freely. This creates a context of empowerment, control, economic need and affirmation, as also argued by a contract for the web. Likewise, these are suggested as reasons for engaging in sex work, in countries where prejudice and, indeed patriarchal dominance, in particular over women, rules as a dominant political force (Robinson, 2012). It could be said that Thailand is one such country. Although, of course, not the only gender of a sex worker in Thailand, the public role of women, and gender equality, is often state-constructed, or, at the very least, strongly influenced by traditional television and print media that, in turn, is influenced by political forces (Skulsuthavong, 2016). These often conservatively dominate much of the public sphere, as well as design of learning found in mainstream education systems that lack considerable development compared to international standards, because they do not really champion equality, use of the web to access diverse learning material, or critical thinking skills, so offer a direct contrast to the way learning is being reshaped in western settings and institutions (Web Foundation, 2020; Crooks and Baur, 2011; Fongkaew, 2017). Undoubtedly, in Thailand, liberation found in sex work helps circumvent patriarchal views in Thailand of men being served by women, via their sexuality being tied to marriage and duty to the home. However, sex work is often met by counter-power moves by Thai political coalitions and public groups, motivated towards the position that is the right of society to dictate women’s behaviour: sexually, politically, economically or socially (Buranajaroenkij, 2017). Sutherland (2004) offers an analysis of

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sex work in developing nations, such as Thailand, which questions the objectification of the sex worker as relying on sexuality for survival. In their view, this stigmatises sex workers’ sexuality, as if to proscribe a lack of it therein. Cases of Thailand’s traffic-driven sex work, discussed by Barry (1995), describe stories of the dehumanisation of Thai women. However, a complex socio-technical economy surrounding the sex trade, and the empowerment of women through it, in Thailand, emerged in the 1970s, with the posting of US soldiers, and evolved into an industry furthered by technology (Bishop and Robinson, 1997). There is, as a result, a digital sexual free market in Thailand, not just binaries such as victim/agency, danger/pleasure or even poverty-stricken streetwalker/‘high-class’ escort (Robinson, 2012). The Internet has played a central role in furthering Thai sex work and alternative feminist studies argue some sex workers can even use it to engage in being trafficked, demonstrating power, rather than structural coercion as objects, or victims (Ruenkaew, 2002; Ferreira, 2015). Others engage in sex work as industrialists; they connect via social media, and other web driven methods, with sex tourists, with whom they can travel, or even relocate abroad with and then seek work legitimately, if they have sufficient education to do so (Resurreccion, 2017). Consequently, Thai sex workers targeted by Internet prohibition are seen, within such conservative reform, almost as disposable objects, victimised by theme-park thrill-seeking sex tourists and therefore in need of protection by a male-dominated Thai government, in turn seeking to protect the reputation of Thailand and thus extend the mythos sought by conservatives (Nuttavuthisit, 2007). However, in some, perhaps even many, instances, these are workers who act as business owners invested in their own personal development, not anthropomorphised theme-park characters posing for photos. So, we contend that they should not be disadvantaged, rather recognised inclusively as professional agents. Studies of social media technology and sex work affirm that sexuality and health education is enhanced through freedom to use the web (Weaver, 2018; Phuengsamran et al., 2018). Social media dating applications, for example, are one way used to better vet clients (Visrutaratna et al., 2018). Within the UK, one study suggested that many sex workers felt that the web, and social media, improved conditions and reduced their workload because the growing popularity of BDSM and webcam services offered new sources of income (Sanders et al. 2017). Therefore, it is not as clear-cut to suggest that using the web for sexual servicing is anti-human, as is sought by social contract and governance in Thailand. An open web is thus important to Thailand’s future, and repression of sexuality with respect to it is problematic, potentially detrimental. The web empowers counselling about sexual rights, grants health information, while dilutes, through connective affinity, the impact of stigmatisation in Thai state-levied conservative media, which historically has impacted inclusive equality for the Thai LGBTQ community (Kille et al. 2017). As of 2016, there was an estimated 300,000 sex workers in Thailand (Muangjan et al., 2016). UNICEF Thailand, supported by Mahidol University, investigated pressures on young people in education, with respect to sex, and found that 31.7% of young women agreed with the statement ‘a woman cannot refuse to have sex with her

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husband because it is her duty’ (Center for Health Policy Studies, Mahidol University, 2016, p. 25). Within this same study, it was found young people of sexually active age, engaged in mainstream education, lacked a correct understanding about sexuality, menstruation and contraception, as evidenced via incorrect multiple-choice responses when compared to their own estimation of their understanding of sexuality. In Thailand, the web offers an evidence trail to those seeking to target vulnerable groups; sexual deviance, such as sex work on the web, is seen by conservative nationalists as damaging society (Skulsuthavong, 2016; Phaka, 2014). The TCCA and Emergency Act grant powers to arrest people for any communication seen to convey harm to Thai citizens. For some, in Thailand, the Thai government’s approach could even be seen as a ‘just’ social contract, keeping order based on one set of patriarchal cultural values that have long been established and, for many, are preferred. Yet, social transformation within the parameters of pre-existing law begins by teaching about, as well as discussing, the web and considering pro-human principles, which is challenging given a lack of emphasis on critical thinking, a problem within Thai education (OECD, 2019; Day, 2019; Day and Skulsuthavong, 2021a). Meanwhile, the governing effort to maintain a decades-old way of conservative thinking does little to help matters. However, within the waves of protests, younger generations of Thai citizens have demonstrated that the power of conservative ways of thinking is not just diminishing, but is no longer relevant. This has a lot to do with them gaining, through digital reverse culture shock, a much broader mindset of what their freedoms, hence critical thinking, should be.

Conclusion: A Thai Digital Civil Rights Movement? Inclusive Futures in Thailand With a global mindset cultivated and empowered by Internet connectivity, young protestors have been calling out for a more inclusive society. One where minority groups, such as LGBTQ, for example, are respected for their differences and sex workers are no longer criminalised. To those outside Thailand, it may seem strange that for many Thais, reality is a harsh and uncaring inferno, rather than paradise. Such views are lost, perhaps in what is an easy to mistake to make. So, Thai social and political mild tolerance to gain tourist-driven economic advantage, then, is not the same as a liberal and a global perception of sex work, or social expression based around democratic liberality, built by the respecting of marginal groups. Hence, as of 2022, the Thai government allowing certain acts to continue is really a tool to reap the benefits of economic tourism and creates a reality where those who seek to champion the welfare of different groups advocating against the government, which includes many points raised in protests, actually are met with hostility and repression (Thongnoi, 2020). This slows reform to a point of regression, as those who seek change are often imprisoned for violating rules deemed as such by a conservative majority in powerful positions. Inevitably, Thailand is highly conservative and those

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that exist beyond that sphere are persecuted, behind the scenes; conservative media and public figures have challenged such movement towards greater equality. For example, in the case of advocating for sex workers rights and welfare, as is discussed above, conservative Thai critics usually offer reply, at a political level, as uninformed and misguided. The more hostile conservatives have gone so far to suggest that those who advocate, or protest, are hiding an intention and desire to be a sex worker (AFP, 2020c). Such an idea may seem far-fetched, perhaps even amusing. However, as established in the opening of this chapter, an intrinsic feature of ‘Thainess’ is the creation of myths, often by conservative figureheads, who then seek to write a narrative of themselves as champions, protectors or guardians of Thailand, thereby protecting it from some kind of deviance that requires challenge. Actually, this is intended to preserve historical ordering, so perpetuates further cycles of ancestrally indoctrinated, highly ritualised ideas that determine what is, or is not, acceptable to Thai culture, in the view of Thai ‘high society’ that controls much of the wealth, and, as such, lives, of everyday Thai citizens. Over time, this becomes ‘built’ into the nature of being Thai (Low et al., 2020). This, likewise, provides the perfect excuse to engage in a Thai coup-loop, whereby a coup is periodically justified as needed to protect conservative values, anytime progress is felt, or measured, towards democracy or liberality. Mestrovic (1998, p. 194) argues that such values-driven egoism erodes society, but it can likewise construct it by polarising groups and drawing opponents together. Thailand is a high-context culture; linguistic interaction, even on social media, such as Tweets, are scrutinised for meaning, and the slightest offence leads to peer-reporting because of a sense of personal attack, with conservatively indoctrinated citizens quick to defend their leaders out of a concern for their presumed loss of face. Thus, there is little concern for the welfare of other humans in a shared democracy, rather support of a successful government driving surveillance culture in Thailand to protect everyone from anything and anyone that might seek to disrupt the sustained loops of mythic stability. However, this Thai ‘culture of looping’ and mythos is one supported by wider consensus of agreement among citizens about historic nationalism, Thainess and protection of the nation as a justification for many actions. Undeniably, to borrow from noted sociologist Max Weber (1946), many Thais still obey the government because they ‘believe in the leader’ General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, and in doing so further devotion to ‘his disciples, his followers, his personal party friends’ creating a myth ‘oriented to his person and to its qualities’ (Weber, 1946, p. 79). We can find many examples of this in Thailand. For example, upon writing, when an executive assistant within the Thai Prime Minister’s Office reported a criminal charge against an everyday citizen, whose social media Tweet criticised their leader for illegitimately seizing power, then alleged that they are unable to do the job they took via a legitimate-yet-contested election (Ngamkham, 2021). This lends weight to the idea that even a single critical Thai voice is seen as dangerous, dissenting and disturbing of the created myth, perhaps even cult. Hence, it is a criminal offence to say otherwise, and the web is thereby a disruptive presence because social media enables distribution of such ideas beyond casual

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whispers between citizens in their homes. Politically, those who protest are eradicated from society entirely, along with anyone who spreads such views (Ngamkham, 2021). After all, if we return to classical ideas found in thinking about a state and social contract, we find that it is thus interconnected with the personalities of those governing, and these people state where the law is, can or should not be applied, often with little consistency (Gough, 1936; Waters and Waters, 2015). Consequently, can Berners-Lee’s contract exist in Thailand, without creating injustice? Perhaps we should move away from promoting and calling for web governance based on humanistic values, asking instead what changes bring stability. This echoes the neutrality of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Articulated by Bruno Latour (2010), ANT seeks to step away from moralistic bias, tracing instead the problems in networked relationships, which are never just socially constructed by one actor, such as the Thai government or its political leader. Instead, ANT positions a grand relational symmetry unfolding between humans and non-humans. Therefore, an actor-network is defined by Latour (2010) as the sum of ‘moving parts, and you have a whole. And then the only remaining question is to find a possible solution to combine or reconcile the parts with the whole’ (Latour, 2010, p. 8). Echoing Donna Haraway (1985), socio-technical cyborgs are in the driving seat of our web in Thailand, and the conservative Thai political elite see themselves as a resistance movement. Meanwhile, there are perhaps too many complex actornetworks to count, at least within Thailand and affecting web freedoms. We could still try to follow the ideas of the Web Foundation. However, this group once, at the Southbank Centre, London, UK, in 2014, sought to disperse their social contract as ideas via soliciting the public in awareness campaigns and leaflets for a web, they claimed, the world wanted, ironically at the same time as the current Thai political elite took power in a coup then repressed the Internet. As of 2022, it seems, such a UK public were largely unconcerned with the points being raised to them by the Web Foundation, who seek pro-human governance for everyone (Web Foundation, 2014). It would be interesting, perhaps amusing, to see if this kind of social empowerment campaign could even be recreated in Sukhumvit, Bangkok, Thailand; a popular point of tourism, like Southbank, it is famous for soliciting a very different kind of engagement and entertainment. The infamous Soi-Cowboy, a popular location within this district, is a free market for outsider sexual deviance (McDowall and Ma, 2010; Barme, 2002). However, in such a location, as in many parts of Thailand, disciples of Berners-Lee and those seeking to narrate what the web should be, according to western values, will more-than-likely encounter a scene akin to Weber’s (1958) often used quote from The Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism. So, not a deeply concerned public but ‘narrow specialists without mind, pleasureseekers without heart; in its conceit, this nothingness imagines it has climbed to a level of humanity never before attained’ (Karlberg, 2005, p. 124). Thus, if Web Science wants an inclusive, intelligent and sustainable web, less ‘safely situated’ agendas describing what the web should be, or could be, are needed. Rather, as this chapter intends, a reality is check is required, one suggesting it needs to engage more readily, and directly, with the here, now and those most persecuted, without digital

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rights or welfare. Especially given that much of the narrative discussed at present in the domain of digital web futures is, at best, hypothetical technical futures about machine learning masquerading as intelligent, 5G telecoms agendas and what, to some situated far and away from a western setting, might be easily mistaken as digitally Orientalist, so, undoubtedly, colonial. After all, what is an advocacy manifesto or contract for the web? Essentially, the views of digitally empowered, academically privileged actors, maybe even better seen as colonisers, who are seeking to impose a sense of religion, language, economics, myth, ethics and other cultural practices as akin to west-is-best, when, in reality, calling for inclusive web governance is a far flung idea, if attempted in Thailand (Berendt et al., 2020; Hall et al., 2016). Meanwhile, we face a time when Thai students, upon writing, are protesting for human rights connected to the Internet, and challenging historical dominance of expression, all in a culture built around principles of surveillance, hierarchy and patriarchy (Chetchotiros et al., 2020). Their movement is a turning point for Thailand, but it creates turbulence. Even giants such as Facebook are not immune from being rocked. This was seen when the social media network took down a controversial political group, in late August 2020, at the request of the Thai government and then replied with the suggestion of legal action, as Thai protesters expressed disappointment and a sense of betrayal linked to their favouring of big business over the rights of users in Thailand (Beech, 2019, 2020). Consequently, in this landscape, we must remember no contract for the web can be an effective universal script. A wider, more dominant set of conservative forces influence decision making and social transformation for many Thais, who willingly and openly embrace their governance, seeing it as good leadership and not oppression (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2021a, 2021b). Of course, moving towards a more pro-human web in Thailand means we should follow the advice of Web Science to secure an ‘inclusive, intelligent and sustainable’ dialogue and promote education systems to reflect the growing digital shift among young people, by reinventing education and establishing principles for web education (Day, 2019; Day et al., 2021). However, this needs to be more than stirring manifestos from the safety of the side-lines. After all, on 25 March 2021, the Thai political Minister for Higher Education was reported as suggesting that academic freedom, in Thai higher education, is conditional and subject to nationalist expectations, hence anyone of critical view should not be in the Thai academic community (Voice Online, 2021). Indeed, both authors of this chapter followed his advice a year before, in part due to the shifting landscape of academic repression and pedagogical regression that required adherence to principles that were inherently un-academic. Furthermore, the culture of racial, gender, and sexual stigmatisation in Thailand now extends, as of 2022, far beyond academic culture, and towards an intrinsic ideological feature and war of indoctrination that has reshaped many Thais, helped through and by ancestral conditioning inclining service and servitude towards those more wealthy, hence seen as powerful (Low et al., 2020). Therefore, changing the web in this setting might require much more human rights mediation beyond the limited, though ideal, scope of thinking found in Berners-Lee’s contract. The time for manifestos, contracts or conferences is, however, probably long past in SE Asia. Web Science now concerns itself with intelligence that is artificial,

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and at best still algorithmic, so lacks sentience. Yet, there are sentient Thai students currently sat in very real, so distinctly un-hypothetical, prisons, which are widely considered to be some of the most brutal in the world. Their sentences will last for decades. To these students, a contract for the web communicated just in English and ultimately unbinding in law is of little help; not everyone in Thailand can read English and, indeed, literacy levels are generally considered to be some of the lowest in all of ASEAN (OECD, 2019). However, the digital future is approaching, and young digital Thai natives have already been prepared. They seem to be more-than-ready, perhaps even beyond that of academics, to challenge what they believe is unjust. Yet, as they do so, the harder and longer the government or conservative voices try to resist, or more brutally they reply in force. Hence, this conflict will not only prolong the disruption of change, along with social transformation, but it will also be seen as making the very citizens of Thailand an enemy, and the focus of a dominant military government fully prepared to prosecute any individual that operates beyond the values and myth they seek to create, cultivate and maintain in a cycle of repetition. This is less than ideal, in a period that could instead be fostering not only a Thai digital renaissance, which Thailand seems primed for given an explosive development of 5G connectivity and a growing start-up culture of technological entrepreneurship, but also social inclusion and sustainable growth that comes from being able to connect, facilitate and build lives through the Internet (Day & Skulsuthavong, 2019). Now, as Web Scientists and digital rights activists, we need to be engaging with people in places where the web is not free, rather than universalising rules for it without ever having been to such places. What is clear is that the educational systems of Thailand are not without issue, or perhaps, even, are complicit in the status quo and for this reason essentially serve a government not concerned with allowing critical thinking or freedom of expression to exist within Thailand (Day et al., 2021). After all, if Thais become ‘aware’ of the world, then this highlights the gross inequality many live in on a daily basis, even within a major capital city like Bangkok. It is possible, then, that Thai academia and educational development is part of the problem, not the solution. Such systems determine the future of Thai society. Teachers within education will set out, to the future young voters and citizenry public, what is, or is not, acceptable to say, do, think, or express. In such a setting, with an Internet empowered and increasingly emancipated youth, we foresee a potential for civil and economical division widening, not narrowing. Worsening digital reverse culture shock is equally problematic. Political governance and indeed, big businesses, still control much of how Thais communicate. Hence, we must be careful in articulating universal rules for a system that was built without any in mind, beyond the tools needed to communicate. There is no consensus on what acceptable web usage looks like within Thailand, so by championing a particular set of views we risk ignoring that cultural standards and personal values are seldom unified, nor should they be. At the same time, driving towards a pro-human web is still instrumental, as are the views raised by those in Web Science and Berners-Lee. Consequently, finding a way to bridge such a striking divide and difference of opinion, in order to further mediation without demanding moderation is vital for the future of Thailand.

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This begins by improving how we educate about the web and reducing the stigma about its freedoms, as well as fears of reverse cultural shock. Understanding what the web is, and why change with respect to it need not be threatening, indeed, instead, can be constructive to stimulating debate in the public forum to create a more diverse society, is a vital first step towards reuniting a society that has been fractured, not united, by the Internet. Therefore, collaboration between government, companies, universities, schools and citizens is mandatory to cultivate a communal space, accessible by all, where everyone is given freedom of expression. This is a good place to start. However, this seems like a far-fetched utopia, especially for Thailand at present, where, upon writing, critical thinking, inclusion and liberty are considered threatening to the government. Beyond this government, social elites now see everyday citizens as threats, as evidenced by the examples discussed in this chapter. When one group of powerful people view the Internet, and social media found within the web, as a tool of resistance, simply because it has introduced a hallmark of democracy, that is democratising knowledge and power among citizens by enabling them to create a public sphere and voice, we find overall social progress, along with transformation, stalled. Another significant problem is that a now shocked younger generation of Thais sees the web as a tool of empowerment and a space where voices are heard, so increasingly flock to it for an escape. So, they become less defined by their domestic citizenship, and more by life as digital citizens (Day, 2014). Therefore, socialdivision and violent clashes in Thailand will continue to be inevitable, whilst driving out more and more liberal voices. The cycle of disruption will fuel the Thai system of looping violence, which will continue until ‘blue pencilling’ of doctrine turns into ink, perhaps signed in blood. After all, with respect to many of those targeted for expression online, we find the future of Thailand, namely young people. Because these same younger people have experienced the web and now feel that their opinions should be respected, they will continue to protest. At the same time, they will be charged with criminal offences. For some with power, the opportunity to imprison people further strengthens the myth of being a protector of the people. Left unchecked, what is likely going to occur is clear. There will be a generational schism that results in entire families displaced from one another, simply because of expression on the Internet. After all, a Thai citizen was reported, during the junta period that began in 2014, by their parents under digital crime laws related to personal expression on social media (Prachatai, 2014). Web education may be the least obtrusive alternative solution to equip younger generations of citizens with the skills to be more strategic and legally informed in their web usage and, ultimately, to fight for their digital rights. They should not, however, fight alone, which raises a spotlight onto agendas similarly sharing their objectives, a free and open web, but situated far and away from the front lines of the brutal situation in Thailand. Thus, for such advocates, they are free of any consequences with respect to championing a pro-human web. Despite rights to expression, Thai citizens are increasingly prosecuted by Internet blue pencilling that wants to retrospectively adjust digital activity and communication laws to militarise online activity. We have argued, across this chapter, that this particularly affects those in vulnerable fringes of Thai society. Much as it did for other racial groups in other civil

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rights movements. Subsequently, we have witnessed, in the last decade, considerable political efforts born from prejudice that, for all intensive purposes, are seeking the revocation of Thai suffrage as expressed through the right to democratic opinion expressed in online public communication. This, in a very real sense, has denied Thai citizens freedoms of speech, privacy and the opportunity to grow into global participants in the wider world. Until such a time, however, that digital rights are respected, it seems young people in Thailand will continue to be treated as not only separate, but far from equal in a society built around surveillance.

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Chapter 17

Japan’s Democracy Assistance to Myanmar: Few Seeds in Infertile Soil David M. Potter

Introduction This chapter examines Japan’s international election assistance and considers it in light of recent elections in Myanmar. This chapter reviews the purposes and composition of Japanese democracy assistance and concludes that location of democracy assistance within a peacebuilding framework, lack of political attention, and a technocratic and economistic view of development assistance in general limit such assistance. This chapter then surveys types of democracy assistance and Japanese actors involved in it in the context of Myanmar’s post-2010 political liberalization.

International Democracy Assistance During the Cold War democracy assistance and international election assistance were deemed political interference and therefore limited by reference in national sovereignty in the politics of international law and international organizations (Hashimoto 2006). In the post-Cold War era, three developments led to their development as international norms: (1) economic and political transition in the post-Soviet sphere, to which Western democracies responded with democracy assistance and economic policy aid (Carothers 1999; Mendelson 2001; Henderson 2002; Hashimoto 2006); (2) the “second wave” of democratization begun in the 1970s took hold and donors began to look to democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991; Diamond et al. 1997; Diamond 1999); and (3) international responses to civil war linked democracy to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (Hashimoto 2006; Inada 2004: 36–39). D. M. Potter (B) Faculty of Policy Studies, Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_17

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Democracy assistance covers a wide range of policies. Thomas Carothers (1999) points out three main areas of assistance. One is electoral systems and strengthening of political parties. A second aims to improve state capacity, including constitution making, the rule of law, development of legislatures and local administration, and reform of military-civilian relations. A third focuses on civil society and includes improving NGO capacity, civic education, strengthening the media, and development of labor unions. Carothers’ formulation highlights electoral institutions. Election assistance is as an integral part of the process of democratization and, therefore, a form of democracy assistance. It can also be understood as a component of governance, that is to say development of the institutional capacity of government to formulate and administer policy according to accepted rules and procedures. Governance is also an aspect of reconstructing peace following civil conflict. In this latter aspect the stakes of elections for the survival of a political system (or the introduction of a new one) can be high, as Paul Collier (2008) points out. International electoral assistance increased apace with democracy assistance and has developed as an international norm to the point where even illiberal governments are under pressure to observe at least the formalities of electoral processes (Kelley 2009; Hyde 2011a, b). Hyde (2011a: 356) notes that currently about 80% of elections worldwide are subject to international observation. Election assistance can be understood as involving two different actions: one is election monitoring, the other is assistance to improve the planning and execution of elections. The former is typically short-term, with international monitors entering and then leaving the country depending upon the duration of a specific election. The aim is to help ensure a fair election. The latter can be of much longer duration and may extend to include the design of election systems, including legal reform, choice of election rules, and extension of the franchise (Carothers 1999). Carothers (1999: 125–128) points out five main types of election assistance: (1) electoral system design; (2) good administration of elections; (3) voter education; (4) international election observation; and (5) election mediation. He further notes the importance of assistance to strengthen the capacity of political parties and their electoral activities, while at the same time maintaining a position of political neutrality (142–144). Of these five categories, electoral design, electoral administration, voter education, and election mediation might be deemed positive electoral assistance in that they aim to improve the electoral system overall and have impacts that outlast one electoral cycle. Election observation, on the other hand, might be considered negative electoral assistance in that it focuses on ensuring a fair election free of illegal activity (although this may have cumulative effects over time). It should be remembered that the choices to receive election assistance and of what kind depend on the government holding elections. The Government of Thailand, for example, did not allow international observers to monitor the 2019 parliamentary elections. Reviewing elections in 130 countries from 1990 to 2003 Von Borzyskorvski (2016) found a strong preference for election observation rather than electoral technical assistance. This finding is consistent with Hyde’s (2011b) illustration of the dilemma facing illiberal governments. On one hand, they are expected to demonstrate

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that elections are free and fair; on the other they have incentives to devise schemes to ensure that their candidates win, at least enough to ensure control of the government.

Japan’s Democracy Assistance Ichihara Maiko (2017) examined Japanese democracy assistance since the 1990s. Her conclusions are not encouraging. First, she notes that Japan’s monetary contribution to democracy assistance is among the smallest in the DAC donor community despite its being among the largest ODA donors. Moreover, democracy assistance is understood largely in terms of the strengthening of capacity and legitimacy of public institutions, a predilection that emphasizes state agencies as targets of assistance. “Rule of law” assistance is a signal feature of its assistance, meaning technical assistance in improving legal systems in a recipient country. In contrast to democracy assistance by the United States and other selected donors, which includes assistance for civil society institutions independent of the state. Ichihara points out the Japanese government’s preference for assistance to state institutions. Evaluations of Japan’s democracy assistance by the nongovernmental Democracy Coalition Project and Freedom House have rated Japan’s promotion of democratization as “fair” (Sugiura 2009: 23) and support for democracy and human rights as “minimal” (Sato 2016), respectively.1 The timing is important. Having striven to avoid interference in the domestic politics of recipient countries in its aid program during the Cold War Japan cut its teeth on democracy assistance in the 1990s, the heyday of UN peace-keeping operations and humanitarian intervention to save failed states. JICA emerged from that decade articulating a vision of peacebuilding as its contribution to problems in post-conflict societies (Amakasu and Potter 2016). The current structure of Japan’s election monitoring assistance still reflects the issues of that period. PKO-related election monitoring is under the jurisdiction of the International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, a unit inside the Cabinet Agency. Decision-making includes representatives from ten cabinet-level agencies and ministries. Election monitoring outside of the PKO framework is handled by the 1

The author found very little on the topic of democracy assistance in Japanese. The earliest is a standard work on peacebuilding and the rule of law by Shinoda Hideaki (2003). Aside from Ichihara (2017), Sugiura (2009) reviewed Japan’s democracy assistance in the 1990s and concluded that it was not a high priority in the aid program. Hashimoto (2006) surveyed the transition toward democratic consolidation by the international community but found that Japan’s assistance focused on technical issues of election administration rather than introducing democratic values and practices. Work on election assistance is also scarce. Yoda (2000) analyzed “the politics of election monitoring” in democratic transitions to peace in post-conflict societies based on the experience of the OSCE in the 1990s. Yoshikawa (1994) similarly surveyed the OSCE’s transition from a focus on human rights to democracy assistance. Another, a booklet for popular consumption, introduces NGOs to the nuts and bolts of election monitoring (Sutou and Matsuura 2002). In English Hugo Dobson’s book on Japan and UN peacekeeping (2003) includes some discussion of Japan’s participation in international election monitoring.

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with dispatch of monitors handled either from Tokyo or resident embassies abroad. Monitoring teams are typically made up of Japanese MPs, bureaucrats, NGO representative and representatives of civil society. This has consequences for the scale of Japanese election monitoring in Myanmar simply because there has been no PKO in that country, hence no election monitors dispatched by the Peace Cooperation Headquarters.

Democracy Assistance and Peacebuilding Japanese aid places issues of democratization within the realm of peacebuilding rather than seeing it as an independent category of assistance. Peacebuilding has become a central component of Japan’s ODA and as a concept grew out of postconflict reconstruction assistance in the context of the international community’s attempts to deal with civil wars and failed states in the 1990s. As a result, peacebuilding assistance has a strong focus on problems of restoring the capacity of formal state institutions: in a word, nation building. Democracy assistance, including election assistance, becomes a subset of governance. Peacebuilding is necessarily broad-based, not restricted to democracy per se, and has a strong state orientation. It is a concept also that has developed alongside the concept of governance, which is not necessarily the same thing as democratization. Chie Miyahara (n.d.), a JICA official, reports that the agency defines governance as a concept “encompassing not only government institutions, but also the mechanisms and systems which determine the relationship among government, civil society and the private sector.” It is “(t)he development and operation of all the institutions, including government organizations and systems, the synergetic relationship among government, civil society and the private sector, and the processes of decision making, in order to mobilize, allocate and manage the resources of the country efficiently and in a manner that reflects the will of the people, with the aim of realizing the stability and development of the country” (67–68). JICA’s approach also emphasizes the importance of the partner country’s commitment to improving its own governance and democratic institutions and is chary of imposing its own institutions on the partner. “JICA assists the government of the partner country to select, develop and operate the necessary systems and institutions by providing information and engaging in dialogue. In other words, it adopts approaches such as ‘the provision of policy options’ or ‘joint thinking’” (68). Miyahara points out in practice JICA sees its role as (1) providing “options for developing new systems and mechanisms and to stimulate changes in the awareness of government organizations and the parties concerned;” (2) assisting “the development of new institutions and mechanisms;” and (3) assisting “the development of detailed measures and methods and the necessary organizational reform and human resource development for putting the systems and mechanisms into operation” with the bulk of projects located in the third option (68).

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JICA’s guidelines on peacebuilding assistance make this clear “establishment of good governance in post-conflict countries aims at assisting the construction (or reconstruction) of a political regime that can serve as the basis of nation building as well as at restoring war-torn governmental functions. Thus, establishment of good governance in post-conflict countries incorporates mid- to long-term perspectives. In supporting the post conflict reconstruction, the nation building is one of the priorities. Accordingly, it is essential to start assistance for democratization, establish judicial systems and support for administration with emphasis on the ownership of a recipient country. The significant difference between the post-conflict assistance to governance and general support for governance is that the former needs support in every sector essential for establishing good governance of a conflict-torn country/region which has experienced collapse of its basic national governance and administrative systems… In these cases, external support is required in all aspects, including judicial systems, administrative functions and human resources development. In addition, the process of new nation-building requires special considerations to ensure the fairness of a newly reconstructed society. This means the nation-building process should encourage equal participation of citizens, including women, ethnic minorities, persons with disabilities, child soldiers, excombatants and those often marginalized from society” (JICA 2003, p. 31).

Abe Doctrine and Values Diplomacy To this peacebuilding/governance framework, the administration of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has added a grand strategy for “international cooperation,” a mix of official development assistance (ODA) policy and other policy tools, most notably security policy, that is currently a feature of the Abe administration’s “proactive contribution to international peace.” Christopher Hughes (2015) has dubbed this “the Abe Doctrine.” The Doctrine contains five elements: (1)

A more robust defense policy which is the foundation for a proactive security role internationally and especially in the Asia–Pacific;

(2)

Values-based diplomacy based on liberal political and economic principles;

(3)

revitalization the Japanese economy in order to promote the first goal and to raise the country’s prestige overseas;

(4)

A concern to play a great power role internationally;

(5)

Close security cooperation with the United States especially in the Asia–Pacific region.

Thus, values-based diplomacy based on economic and political liberalism is not specifically about democracy promotion per se but rather advancement of Japan’s national interest. In all of this, there is no specific emphasis on constitutional design or the design of electoral systems as a foundation of democratization and democratic stability.

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Nor is there any indication that the Japanese government sees Japan’s postwar electoral history as a model of a successful democratic transition and consolidation of democracy. The approach to governance, which frames democracy assistance and therefore election assistance, is seen from a non-political technocratic and administrative perspective in which the donor does not impose its policy preferences on the recipient. Values diplomacy, moreover, takes an instrumental view of democracy and democratization.

Electoral Assistance In terms of electoral assistance, Ichihara (2017) found that Japan was among the eight largest donors between 2002 and 2013, but due to the limited number of countries undergoing democratic transitions amounts across the board are modest. She points out that Japanese aid agencies are reluctant to provide assistance to political parties, in contrast to the United States and European donors (Ichihara found no evidence at all of Japanese aid to political parties in recipient countries). Assistance to civil society actors is also modest as Japanese aid agencies express their concern that direct assistance to civil society might undermine the capacity, and therefore legitimacy, of state institutions. As a result, democracy assistance is directed at state agencies.

Civil Society Actors If the Japanese government does not specialize in democracy assistance, do actors in civil society take up the slack? The answer appears to be that they do not. This author’s research comes to the same conclusion as Ichihara’s: Japan’s political parties do not provide electoral assistance. Nothing like the German party-based stiftungen or the National Institute for Democracy in the United States exist in Japan. Of some 350 Japanese international NGOs currently listed in the JANIC NGO Directory (a national NGO that acts as a clearinghouse for Japan’s international NGOs) nine reported themselves as engaging in “democracy and good governance.” The author found two that might fit the case at hand. One is InterBand, an organization engaged in election assistance. The NGO’s scope of activities is broader, however, including election monitoring, advocacy against light arms, peacebuilding training, and emergency assistance. The second is Human Rights Now which, like InterBand, does not specialize in election assistance, although it is affiliated with ANFREL. In addition, these and other NGOs participate in various capacities in election monitoring, either as participants in monitoring teams dispatched or as trainers for specific dispatches. In a similar vein, the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, a registered nonprofit organization contracted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide training for peacebuilders, does not include courses on election assistance among its repertoire of training programs.

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This latter point reveals a deeper issue with international election assistance in Japan: there appears to be no systematic training for election monitoring or election assistance either in the public sector or the nonprofit sector. Training for election monitors apparently is carried out prior to specific dispatches either by the foreign ministry or by a sponsoring NGO. A survey of JICA governance training courses from the FY 2012 catalogue Outline of Training Courses and Dialogue Programs include courses on law and criminal justice, statistics and public audit, local government and governance, public safety, and democratic institutions focused on the National Assembly. More active election assistance is so rare that the critical mass to create and sustain systematic training does not exist.

Japan’s Aid to Myanmar Since 2010 The reforms since 2010 have brought international donors back to the country, none with more alacrity than Japan. Myanmar is now among of the top ten recipients of Japanese aid, and was first in 2013–2014. Japan’s basic policy on aid to Myanmar since 2011 highlights the twin issues of democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict (citation here). However, it is not clear how democratization is to be achieved through the application of Japanese aid. As Donald Seekins (2015) points out, Japanese recent aid to Myanmar has tended to emphasize economic over political considerations. David Potter (2020) argues that competition with China and awareness of the geopolitical importance of Myanmar as the western terminus of Mekong connectivity, and therefore Indo-Pacific connectivity, also informs Japanese aid. These various considerations were on display in an interview with Japan’s thenforeign minister Kono Taro by the newspaper New Light of Myanmar in early 2018. Kono stated Japan’s “commitment to extending full support for the democratic nation-building of Myanmar,” spoke of its aim to promote regional stability through “rule-based, free and open maritime order,” its support for foreign investment promotion and regional connectivity through the Thilawa Special Economic Zone and Myanmar’s national peacebuilding efforts (New Light of Myanmar 2018: 6). Thus, considerations of economic advantage (as Japanese companies have also rushed to reenter more liberalized Myanmar) and geopolitics compete with considerations of democratization and political reform. In practical terms, the current JapanMyanmar Cooperation Program emphasizes alleviation of urban–rural economic disparities across nine areas of development assistance centered predominantly in industrial development and related fields intended to promote it (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan n.d.). None is related to democracy assistance. Thus, one finds a Japanese aid approach focused on its traditional strength, infrastructure development for economic growth.

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Japan’s Democracy/Election Assistance in Myanmar Myanmar is a difficult country in which to carry out democracy assistance. Patrick Strefford (2007, 66) pointed out before the current liberalization that “it is extremely difficult for the Japanese government to pursue its official policy of democratization in Myanmar. Myanmar is a sovereign nation with its own government, a government that sees democratization as fundamentally opposing its interests.” There is a general consensus among scholars that the process of political opening begun in 2010 has been more economic and (limited) political liberalization rather than commitment to democracy. Lee Jones (2014: 156) observes that the military initiated the current round of democratization from a position of strength, allowing it to manage the reform process. Renaud Egreteau (2014) argues that Myanmar remains a praetorian state in which the Tatmadaw retains political influence in the bureaucracy, executive, and legislature. The 2015 elections were the first freely contested elections since 1990, and even then the reservation of one-quarter of the seats in both houses of parliament for nonelected military members undermines the ideal of a freely elected legislature able to make law independently. In addition, the state has not made it easy to even do the basics of electoral assistance. The head of Human Rights Now, a former Diet member representing the now-defunct Democratic Party of Japan, reports that the DPJ planned an election monitoring mission to observe the 2012 by-elections only to have the team’s visa applications denied (Sakaguchi 2015). This may have resulted from the government’s decision not to issue visas to ANFREL during that election (see Lidauer 2012: 92). Ichihara (2015: 45–58) notes that democracy assistance consists of three basic types: assistance for state institutions, strengthening civil society, and support for the development of political parties. She then takes up three specific sectors that directly related to democracy as opposed to governance more generally: election assistance, political party assistance, and civil society assistance. This section examines the extent to which Japanese aid supports these sectors. At a basic level, the resumption of a full aid program to Myanmar after 2010 can be seen as a form of “democracy” assistance. The Japanese government since the late 1980s has gradually increased the application of economic sanctions in response to political problems identified with aid and trade partners. Sanctions can be negative, meaning that aid is reduced or suspended in response to worsening of a recipient’s human rights situation, occurrence of a coup d’état, and so on; or they can be positive, rewarding a recipient for improvements in political performance (Takamine 2006). Japan was a reluctant partner in the international community’s condemnation of the Burmese military’s suspension of the 1990 general election and subsequent military rule. It adopted a policy of “quiet diplomacy” while applying negative sanctions by suspending new aid negotiations and limiting aid to humanitarian assistance and debt relief through the early 2000s. Even then, however, Japan accounted for the bulk of bilateral official development assistance to Myanmar, and selected projects were approved or suspended in response to the Tatmadaw’s treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi

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or crackdowns on public protests (Seekins 2007: 88–106, 124–145). The resumption of regular aid relations after 2010 might therefore be seen as the application of positive sanctions encouraging liberalization and, hopefully, democratization. Japan, however, was again reluctant to apply negative sanctions in the wake of the February 2021 coup d’etat, arrest of leading legislators, and the subsequent nullification of the 2020 election results, resorting to the policy of suspending only new aid as it had thirty years earlier. The content of this aid, however, shows little sign of direct support for democratization itself. Japan’s basic aid orientation in general is to support the development of economic productive sectors primarily through assistance for economic infrastructure development. The Japanese commitment to the construction of special economic zones at Thilawa and Dawei, the former the flagship project of new aid, are consistent with this overall orientation. Conversely, assistance for democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict in Myanmar are problematic for Japan. “Nation building” in the form of developing an economic base for national development assumes a centralized, competent state with a clear commitment to promoting the national weal and capable of carrying out development in the country’s periphery. These are problematic propositions in the Burmese case. In addition, Japan’s democracy assistance focuses on reforming state institutions, such as the courts and the police, rather than the development of a democratic and independent civil society. Thus, a values-based diplomacy and democracy assistance run the risk of strengthening a still-authoritarian state while ignoring the political concerns of ethnic minorities. Considering sectoral distributions of aid, one finds that loan aid reflects the preoccupation with the economic foundations of development. Thilawa, Dawei, and the Baluchaung Hydroplant 2 projects are representative cases. Debt relief also took up a substantial portion of loan aid in 2012 and 2013. Grant aid and technical assistance reflect a mix of social development and economic development concerns, the former focusing on social and community development projects in ethnic communities and the latter the preparatory phases of long-term transportation and production sector development. Two other projects, one a grant aid project, the other a technical assistance project, highlight the dilemma pointed out above. The first is a project in Rakhine State titled “Assistance to Displaced Persons in Ethnic Minority Areas.” This project includes training “for good governance and coordination of the camps” in cooperation with the UNHCR. This sidesteps the thorny question of why there are displaced persons in Rakhine State in the first place. So far, Japanese government responses to the Rohingya crisis in that region have been limited to admonitions to improve the human rights situation there. The second project provides technical assistance for “Capacity Development of Legal, Judicial and Relevant Sectors in Myanmar” and focuses on the “institutional and human resources capacity of legal, judicial, and other relevant authorities…to develop and implement laws in response to social and economic needs according to international standards” (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2016). Both emphasize the official institutional aspects of democratization within the context of the Burmese state. Moreover, Nicholson and Kuong (2014: 155–156) point out that

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Japan’s legal assistance does not “export” rule of law, rather “aid that will assist with political change (such as democratization) has to be purposely sought by the recipient.” Other grant aid follows a well-developed pattern of providing assistance for facilities construction in social development fields, a pattern which tends to reinforce the physical presence of official institutions. Subsidized NGO projects have a clearer social development and human security focus. These are typically small-scale projects that approach human security from the freedom from want perspective favored by the Japanese government (see Amakasu and Potter 2016). Many of these projects are carried out in ethnic minority regions. Like grant aid partnerships with UNHCR and UNDP in IDP assistance, partnerships with NGOs in the provision of human security assistance afford the Japanese government a certain distance from communities when dealing with politically sensitive policy issues. In sum, there is little evidence of election assistance in Japan’s aid program from 2008 to 2020. One grant aid project supported this field in the run-up to and execution of the November 2015 national elections: in June it made a grant of $895,000 through the UNDP to provide 25,000 solar lamps for polling stations (UNDP 2015). It also provided a grant ahead of the 2020 election in the form of ink to prevent double voting (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). The lack of attention to civil society organizations identified above as a characteristic of Japanese democracy assistance in general is mirrored in a lack of attention to same in Myanmar. This is unfortunate because, on the one hand, civil society organizations in that country have been dependent on international assistance (Matelski 2016); on the hand, liberalization has provided space for the development of “a politically engaged civil society” (Lidauer 2012: 88) that could support democratic consolidation. The author was able to identify only one case of election assistance, ahead of the 2015 general election, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsidy schemes for Japanese NGOs and local organizations. Two of the most prominent foundations, the Nippon Foundation and its twin, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, both with long histories of assistance to Myanmar are otherwise engaged, the former has focused on economic and social development, the latter on the peace process. Unfortunately, InterBand’s online information on election monitoring ends at 2011, so the author could not determine if it has participated in Myanmar elections since then. Its current JANIC profile lists Indonesia and Cambodia as countries in which it is active. Since 2009 Human Rights Now has administered a Peace Law Academy together with the Burma Lawyers Council (in Mae Sot, Thailand until 2013, in Myanmar thereafter). The focus is on developing legal talent among Burmese citizens and thereby strengthening the legal system (Piisu Ro Akademii koushi haken houkokusho 2010). In 2010 Kubota Yuka, a staff member, reported introducing principles of democratic elections and Japan’s electoral experience at the Academy (Kubota 2010). The author was unable to confirm, however, whether this was an ongoing curriculum. Economic and political liberalization in Myanmar has allowed greater interaction between Myanmar’s labor unions and international trade federations. In this context, the Japan Trade Union Confederation (RENGO) and the Japan International Labour

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Foundation have sponsored seminars in Japan and Myanmar to provide information on Japanese labor law and policy, international labor standards, and so on (Ohmi 2015; Industrial Relations and Labour Policy Seminar in Myanmar 2014). Finally, the Sasakawa Pan-Asia Fund financed a five-year program (2012–2017) to invite a small group of Myanmar’s parliamentarians each year to visit Japan for about one week. The intention was to increase understanding of Japan’s parliamentary system and Myanmar’s democratization through exchanges of views with Japanese government officials, scholars, and so on, as well as visits to local areas (Sasakawa Pan-Asia Fund 2012).

Election Monitoring Japanese official and civil society agencies have been involved in election monitoring in Myanmar. At the request of the Government of Myanmar, Japan agreed to dispatch three monitors to observe the 2012 by-elections for parliament. In 2015, two separate missions were dispatched. One was the official government delegation and was led by Sasakawa Youhei, president of the eponymous Sasakawa Foundation and the Nippon Foundation. Sasakawa is also Japan’s special envoy for national reconciliation in Myanmar. The other mission was conducted by the Dietmembers League to Support Democratization in Myanmar, a team made up of opposition party Dietmembers, notably the Democratic Party of Japan; NGOs close to the DPJ, including Human Rights Now; and several private individuals (Sakaguchi 2015). Sasakawa again led Japan’s official election observation team during the 2020 general election (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2020). Why not more Japanese democracy assistance? Following the 2015 election Ichihara Maiko wrote an article in Foreign Policy titled “Burma’s Timid Friends” which pointed out that Asian democracies, Japan included, had sent monitors and assistance for the election but then were remarkably cautious in congratulating the NLD on its victory (Ichihara 2015). Japan’s support before and during the election was equally timid. Three reasons for this can be discerned. First, Japan’s official development assistance overwhelmingly directed at public sector development projects. Despite attention to public–private partnership in recent years, Japanese aid is primarily a transfer of resources between governments. The emphasis on governance and its consequent emphasis on support for the rule of law, meaning reform of state legal and judicial institutions, illustrates that. The emphasis is very much on nation building predicated upon a strong and competent state. Civil society, a key component of electoral assistance, is given much less priority. Second, Japanese aid focuses on economic development, more so than is the case with most other DAC donors. This is reinforced in the case of Myanmar because of the obvious need to develop economic infrastructure after decades of isolation and because of the perception in the Abe government of the potential for Japanese

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business in the country. Donald Seekins (2015) refers to this preference as “economics before politics,” a fair assessment. Again, democracy assistance is given less priority. Third, it is not clear that the Japanese government is interested in democracy and elections per se. It is certainly shy about promoting the Japanese brand in this area despite the fact that Japan has in recent memory reformed its electoral rules in a direction taken by other parliamentary democracies. In the mid-1990s it adopted a version of the two-ballot election for parliament, combining single member districts with a modified proportional representation ballot. The two-ballot system has much to offer a country like Myanmar. There are two problems with this, however. First, the electoral rules have not necessarily delivered on the promise of rotation of political parties in power, nor have they even guaranteed smaller parties a viable role in national politics. Second, Japan has no experience designing election systems for a multiethnic society torn by decades of civil war. Aside from the NLD the non-government parties of Myanmar are mostly regional and ethnically based and therefore potentially undermine the nation building project Japanese aid favors. The author was able to identify only one project specifically designed to introduce Japanese democracy, the five-year Sasakawa Pan-Asia Fund project mentioned above. In conclusion, Japan’s democracy assistance to Myanmar is limited and formalistic. Myanmar in its current mode of liberalization focused on economic reform rather than democratization per se is a difficult place in which to promote democracy given that the military in particular is not interested in handing over power to a completely democratically elected government. Japan’s official development assistance is mostly focused on economic development, secondarily social development in the ethnic areas of the country. What democracy assistance it provides is technical and provided through official channels. There is no direct official support of civil society in Myanmar, including political parties. Japan’s civil society provides some support to its counterparts in Myanmar, but this support is limited. Electoral assistance depends on the electoral cycle, of course, and is limited to financial assistance and dispatch of election observers, the least active form of democracy assistance identified by Carothers. Finally, the Tatmadaw is not interested in genuine democratization in Myanmar. The 2008 constitution guarantees the military representation in the parliament outside of the regular electoral process and insulates the security services from oversight. Thus, liberalization of the economy and partial adherence to the procedural aspects of democracy are the goals which the military has set for the country. The February 2021 coup d’etat and nullification of the 2020 general election results demonstrates the military’s unwillingness to tolerate a government it does not control. Japanese government officials understand the top-down aspects of reform and therefore the limits that imposes on democratization and efforts to assist it. Note An early version of this chapter was presented at the 2nd Burma Review and Challenges International Forum 2018, Aichi Gakuin University, July 7–9, 2018. The author is grateful to Michael Lidauer for constructive and valuable comments on that presentation. Subsequent research and revision was generously supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science grant JP20KO1516 and a 2021 Nanzan University Pache 1-A-2 grant.

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Chapter 18

Strengthening Civic Vision to Bridge Divisions Chosein Yamahata and Makiko Takeda

Reflections: A Common Phenomenon? Political conflict is a manifestation of contention between stakeholders with different and opposing interests. The continuation of tensions over long periods of time often triggers violence. The chapters in this volume discussed the different driving and hindering forces in perpetuating political conflict, which has affected each country’s democratic progress. While this volume was being finalised, Myanmar’s limited but significant democratic transition was hijacked by the 2021 coup staged by the military, also known as the Tatmadaw. Consequently, Myanmar’s many anticipated possibilities and opportunities have been on a reverse course, striking a significant blow to everything—the future of democratic transition, the potential of the nation’s development to ‘catch up’ to promising regional economies, the guaranteeing of basic civic freedom, the widening chances to re-bridge with the international community, the hope to rewrite the 2008 constitution towards a federal state, and most importantly, a platform towards building durable peace to transform Myanmar’s political turmoil. The coup and the subsequent destruction have been bringing Myanmar down with many lost opportunities, dreams and promising progress in economic and political terms since day one. Among other losses, the severity of human loss due to brutal killings with the use of excessive force of battle-grade weapons against the protesters is very alarming, totalling the loss of 857 civilian lives during the past 127 days (1 February–8 June) (AAPP 2021). The timing and the event itself—the 2021 coup, the fourth in Myanmar’s postindependence history—indicated a need to put a special focus in this chapter on ‘political conflict’ when grasping the salient and collective reflections of the chapters C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan M. Takeda Department of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4_18

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highlighting a myriad of challenges to democratic progress in India, Myanmar and Thailand. Out of 18 chapters, eight are devoted to issues surrounding identity and equality; they are discussed through the perspectives of ethnic and religious minorities, gender and political ideology. Yamahata, Mikami and Vannaruemol promote a thematic discussion of the volume on democratic progress by focusing on China’s role in the region and the subsequent implications for India, Myanmar and Thailand. As highlighted in Lubina’s discussion, Myanmar’s Nobel Peace Prize laureate and the State Counsellor, Aung San Suu Kyi, remains a legend. The analysis delves into Suu Kyi’s political philosophy by linking it to social transformation and the democratisation process in Myanmar; the central argument states that Suu Kyi’s democracy is built on internal, inward-based moral qualities of individuals resulting in both positive and negative consequences. Ota investigates how young Naga people, the Tangkhul Naga, react to the growing littering problem in Naga villages and urban areas by calling on the application of indigenous knowledge and traditional values to help construct a new ethnic identity. This study also looks into the Naga people’s opposition to littering and their concern about the environment as it relates to their political struggle with other ethnic Indians. It explains the tradition to protect the environment, which the young people articulate as part of their efforts to construct Naga ethnic identity with environmentally conscious traditional knowledge. Tsukamoto articulates that in a multiculturally diverse society, the ethnocultural relationships between a national majority group and national minority groups have been tense and problematic. The Deep South of Thailand where Malay-Muslims are a majority was incorporated into a predominantly Buddhist national community of Thailand through the process of nation-building and fierce cultural assimilation in the early twentieth century. The author analyses the difference in policies of the 1970s and the 1980s, especially, under the premiership of Prem Tinsulanonda, by discussing the ruling elites who gradually promoted understanding of the Malay-Muslim minority. Among his findings, the highlight is that such a transformation helped reduce the level of ethnocultural tensions in the Deep South by Prem’s successful attempts drawing on civil and multicultural nationalism. Dua seeks to find instances in Indian history where the agency of women from minority religions was usurped not only by India’s erstwhile colonial masters but also their brethren post-independence. This study examines the claim by taking three instances specific to Muslim women, namely Mohd. Ahmed Khan V Shahbano Bano Begum (1985), Shayara Bano V Union of India (2017) and the anti-CAA protests of January 2020, which illustrate that by barring these events, the issues and rights of minority women have often receded into the margins. It argues that these women’s identities are carved for them based on the political zeitgeist of the day, which entails that they can either be victims of religious patriarchy or enemies of the state. Tsukamoto examines how intellectuals and religious leaders attempted to transform Thai citizenship into a multicultural conception. This study accordingly discusses Muslim intellectuals, such as those in the Office of Chularajmontri, the royally appointed head of the Islamic Committee of Thailand, who tried to challenge

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exclusivist interpretations of local identity and religious doctrines, such as those put forward in the document, Berjihad di Patani (carrying out jihad in Patani). It analyses the use of ethnocultural and religiously neutral ideas, such as justice and freedom in order to define the principles of Islam as intellectual actors tried to redefine both Thai and local identities in order to seek common ground. Chinudomsub and Chantra draw attention to Thailand’s patriarchal system of governance that is widely prevalent and accepted. Although the role of women has been increasingly accepted in the political system, female politicians still face some difficulties. This study explains how female participation could be improved and promoted in the political system to reflect gender equality in political participation through the introduction of the legality of the female quota system. Mistry and Ghanekar emphasise the fact that the status of women in India has been unequal and subordinate for hundreds of years, and the same has been the subject of analysis from various perspectives. This study explores social transformation through policies that facilitate women in attaining enshrined fundamental rights. It also reviews global–local studies to highlight positive achievements in a snapshot as well as critiques the system and grassroots level gaps before ending with key-phased recommendations. A discussion by Seekins explains the reality of Myanmar’s political deadlocked scenario as it is the 2008 Constitution that grants near-complete freedom of action to the Tatmadaw and its top commanders to all issues related to border areas, of which the Rakhine State is one; it has been the armed forces, not Aung San Suu Kyi, who has taken the initiative in carrying out the ethnic cleansing of Rakhine Muslims. Instead, she was ‘assigned’ the unenviable task of—rather ineffectively— whitewashing persecution of the Rohingyas by the army, border guards and Rakhine Buddhist vigilantes. The author argues that Aung San Suu Kyi is an intriguing and tragic figure endowed with extraordinary courage and indifference to threats to her own life, and her indifference to the suffering of the Rohingyas indicates deep hypocrisy concerning her previous espousal of the highest human rights ideals, expressed in her publications directed for both Western and Burmese readers. His analysis indicates that she is also a formidable figure in Myanmar’s, and Asia’s, modern history. This chapter concludes with a doubt that Min Aung Hlaing and his fellow generals would have refrained from launching a power grab at some time. The real mystery of Burmese politics today is not Suu Kyi’s betrayal of democratic ideals, but the sheer indifference of the military towards the suffering of their own people as the death toll steadily mounts in the streets of Myanmar’s cities, towns and the border areas where ethnic minorities struggle to survive. The collective message gathered from the chapters are twofold: firstly, most political conflicts, contention, and other social ills, including discrimination are generated on the prejudice of identity established or perceived in a majority-run society, which are drawn on the lines of gender, religion, ethnicity, history and ideology; secondly, there is always a possibility and solution to tackle such identity-based tensions and conflicts by promoting equality through the introduction of social innovation and related policies in a bottom-up fashion.

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The other four chapters focused on the analysis and recommendations on the role, potential, challenges and accomplishments of the grassroots’ performance in national or local affairs of the countries concerned in strengthening the grassroots. Anderson’s discussion focuses on the fundamental differences in the perception between Myanmar’s military, civilian and insurgent authorities concerning the ‘Panglong 21’ peace process. It explores the challenges within the current peace process and the complexities of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, war economies, illicit livelihoods, service delivery and migration. Thiri highlights socio-economic vulnerabilities in rural Myanmar and argues that the country faces institutionalised and non-institutionalised social transformation. This chapter provides policy recommendations towards democratic reforms in strengthening the resilience of rural people as the democratisation process created opportunities for mobilising grassroots organisations to respond to the needs of rural people and enhance their capabilities. Takeda explains the potential of women’s civil society organisations (WCSOs) for resolving differences and creating grassroots peace in Myanmar. This study analyses that one of the principal reasons for the inadequate progress of peace negotiations is the power struggles among different actors, which inevitably focus on negative peace or complex security. At the same time, power games have also emerged among male-dominated civil society organisations (CSOs). Sriprapandh explains the model of media health literacy (MHL) for adolescents in Upper Northern Thailand and proposes an education model development of MHL as a solution for social upliftment in four approaches: accessibility and identification, analytical ability, critical ability and media producing power. The salient lesson learned from the contributors is for us to realise the constructive, undivided and grassroots roles of communities across different boundaries, especially the power of women organisations, in accomplishing any agenda towards knowledge transfer, social development, and community and resilience building. The implication is that there is still a need for external inputs as well as investments towards empowering the grassroots-based and identity bias-free programmes and processes. The remaining five chapters, including this one, promote the process, progress and concerns of political challenges towards democratic communication. Ningthouja highlights the situation of conflict-ridden Northeast India, an important territorial space of India’s Act East policy. Since concurrent nationalisms are the dividing factor in the borderland state of Manipur and its surrounding areas, the author argues that democratic communication can bridge the divisions among indigenous peoples. Chainan outlines her findings in this chapter that a strong democratic society is created by informed and engaged citizens through important mechanisms like the freedom of communication, which requires such guarantees as a full exercise to their rights when they have access to media and can use it to communicate what they want to express. Citizens of a digital era may not be politically disaffected, but the online sphere that used to be the hope of communication and active participation may not truly support their freedom of expression. Therefore, it is the motivation and responsibility of academics and the society to expect citizens to have media literacy

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skills amid the prevalence of information flooding and drastic political polarisation; media literacy depends mainly on the strength of democracy and social infrastructure. Day and Skulsuthavong demonstrate how, in Thailand, the internet has become a tool of liberation and oppression by suggesting a state of digital reverse culture shock driving an emancipated generation of Thais, previously limited by conservative values and educational inequality, much like 1960s America. They highlighted the fact that despite constitutional rights to expression, Thai citizens are increasingly prosecuted by ‘Internet blue pencilling’ that wants to retrospectively adjust laws to militarise the internet and limit personal expression with respect to it. The authors analyse the situation over the last decade to note how considerable political government efforts born from prejudice are seeking the revocation of suffrage as expressed through the right to a democratic opinion debated in online public communication. This implies the denial of digital citizenship to Thai citizens and the opportunity to grow into global participants in the wider world. Their assessment states that until such digital rights are respected, young Thais will continue to be treated as not only separate, but far from equal in a society built around surveillance. Potter promotes his findings on Japan’s ODA concerning democratisation in Myanmar by examining Japan’s democracy assistance in the context of the post2010 political liberalisation. He reviews the purposes, institutional composition, rule of law assistance, election assistance and ethnic minorities. Yamahata and Takeda conclude the volume by focusing on the commons, prospects and challenges out of multiple contents explored throughout the book to grasp viable alternatives and subsequent considerations that need close attention in bridging the divisions of each society. This chapter argues that there is a need to establish a civic identity and promote civic engagement that respects the rights and ensures the self-determination of different groups. Moreover, a major finding from these chapters highlighted a direction indicating that the promotion of the freedom of information flows, and effective communication is essential to consolidate democratic practice. In sum, the ending or reduction of conflicts need not only focus on negative peace but also the promotion of positive peace, which is created by tackling structural violence through guaranteeing social justice. Political contention, conflict and antagonism, caused by differences are not strange to societies in India, Myanmar and Thailand. For further understanding of conflicts and social transformation, we delve into the complexities of Myanmar’s case in the following section.

A Case in Review: Myanmar’s Unresolved Political Deadlocks and Backlogs Although Myanmar’s constitutions of 1947, 1974 and 2008 have all stated the equality of all people, ethnic nationalities have been brutally oppressed and serious human

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rights violations, including sexual violence against women by the military and security forces, have been reported by the UN, international NGOs and CSOs (Human Rights Council 2018; Human Rights Watch 2019; WLB 2016). The brutal repression in the hands of the military, aggravated by the recent coup in February 2021, has fed deep-seated distrust, grievances and fear in the minds of ethnic minorities. This section looks at the root causes of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts, widely recognised as the world’s longest-running civil war, as well as the forces that have driven and hindered conflict resolution and democratic progress. In the aftermath of the Cold War, social identity conflicts or equivalently, ethnic conflicts became far more outstanding as ideological differences diminished in parallel with the erosion of socialism. According to Stewart (2008), the proportion of all conflicts that are identified as ethnic warfare increased dramatically from 15% in 1953 to almost 60% by 2005, while other types of warfare such as interstate and revolutionary intra-state wars decreased substantially (Centre for Systemic Peace 2018). A comprehensive survey reveals that a total of 275 ethnic groups in 116 countries were at a social disadvantage or at risk in some way. The number of those people is more than 1 billion, which accounts for 17.4% of the world’s population (Gurr 2000). Therefore, the potential pitfall that the disadvantaged fall into conflict remains high. Social identity is ‘the group component of the self-concept’ and thus ‘directly influences self-esteem and many other aspects of self-identity’. Consequently, our self-esteem is raised or undermined dramatically depending on the performance and recognition of our membership groups (Pettigrew 2007, p. 34). Mobilisation of violent groups often occurs when people nurse serious grievances along the line of such shared identity, which is important for them. In fact, group motives based on social identity—their religion or ethnicity—rather than personal motivation are a crucial driving force for violent conflict making people prepared to fight, kill and die in the name of that identity. Therefore, those divisions based on social identity have tremendous social significance, which influences the behaviour and well-being of people (Stewart 2008). In other words, social identity may potentially lay the foundation for violent conflict regardless of the identities constructed by themselves, the state or other groups. Myanmar’s ongoing ethnic conflicts were caused by economic and political inequalities created along the lines of ethnicity. The ethnic division has its roots in the ‘divide and rule’ strategy employed by the British colonial government. The central lowlands of ‘Burma Proper’ where the majority Burman population is concentrated were under the direct control of the colonial regime, whereas a certain autonomy was granted to ethnic minorities within their respective territories located in the peripheral ‘Frontier Areas’ (South 2008). In addition, those non-Burmans were often recruited to serve as civil servants and soldiers who run national affairs (Fink 2000). In other words, the minorities were given favourable treatment, which consequently yielded a deep antagonism of the majority Burman towards minorities at that time. As a result, it provided the Burma Independence Army, which later developed into the Tatmadaw, a cogent reason to fight against the British and pro-British ethnic minorities during the time of Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945.

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Despite the deep division between the majority Bamar and minority ethnic nationalities due to the politicisation of ethnicity by colonial Britain’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy, Aung San who was considered to be the ‘Father of the Nation’, made an effort to establish a united Burma; his vision involved guaranteeing equality for Frontier Areas peoples. At the Panglong Conference held from 7 to 12 February 1947, Aung San and other leaders of major ethnic nationalities reached an agreement known as the Panglong Agreement. The commitments, including a semi-federal system with special ethnic states, are embodied in the 1947 constitution. However, the dream of establishing a Union by Aung San who won the trust of ethnic counterparts was never realised in the end as he was assassinated five months later (Seekins 2017; Harding and Oo 2017). Almost immediately after independence in 1948, the government led by U Nu who was the successor of Aung San and the country’s first prime minister, faced multicoloured insurgencies; ethnic conflicts broke out between the Burman-dominated central government and ethnic minority groups which strived for self-determination (Seekins 2017). Since then, there has been a civil war between the Burma-dominated central government and ethnic armed opposition groups, marking the world’s longestrunning civil war. The situation was further aggravated under the two successive military governments (1962–1988 and 1988–2010), which resorted to all forms of state-sponsored violence to suppress minorities for political and economic purposes. Due to the abundant resources in ethnic peripheral regions, the government did not want to give up control and monopolised political power and natural resources with complete disregard of the socio-economic and ecological impacts on the native ethnic population (Woods 2018). A policy of ‘Burmanisation’ was also implemented to assimilate non-Burmans into Burmans, outlawing the teaching of minority languages and favouring Buddhism as the de facto state religion. The minority cultures, histories and socio-political aspirations were subsumed under a homogenising national identity rooted in the Burman historical tradition (South 2007). Ethnic nationalities were ferociously oppressed as minorities by the Burmese military and their basic rights were violated, which aggravated mistrust, fear and grievances of minorities towards the majority of Burmans. Charney (2009, p. 72) said that ‘by comparison to the 1945–1947 period, when the Burmese had unity, but not independence, that under U Nu, Burma had independence, but not unity’. It can be argued that Burma, which was once nearly united under the leadership of Aung San, became naturally fractionated without clear direction. Nevertheless, ethnic differences alone do not lead to violent conflict. According to some proponents of the instrumentalist approach, the correlation between ethnic diversity and civil war is weak; civil war is primarily attributed to poverty, weak governments and other factors, which lower the threshold of violence (Kaufman 2011). People fight over some ultimate issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, which provoke economic and/or political grievances (Stewart 2008), whereas it is also true that they are expressed along ethnic lines (Kaufman 2011). Governments dominated by one particular ethnic group often suppress and sometimes attack other groups. In fact, it is evident from many cases that state violence has been

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the initiating cause of recent conflicts (Holsti 2000). Such domination suppresses the rights and self-determination of identity groups. Ultimately, the recurrence of ethnic conflicts can be explained by accumulated grievances. Grievance theory argues that the causes of civil war come from ethnic and religious divisions, political repression and inequality (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). In post-colonial states, ethnic and religious divisions are often the case due to the divide and rule strategy the colonial administration executed along the lines of those identities. This colonial legacy consolidated inequality among the different identity groups, which promoted discrimination and polarisation between the groups as some have more economic advantages or political power than others. Consequently, it caused mounting tensions between the groups, which in some cases motivated largescale violence such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Yamahata 2020). However, Collier and Hoeffler (2002) argue that neither inequality nor political repression alone increases the risk of conflict, but they found some evidence of systematically higher risk of civil war in societies characterised by ‘ethnic dominance’ where 45–90% of the population belongs to one ethnic group. Under the military dictatorship, ethnic nationalities were ruthlessly suppressed, thus reinforcing horizontal inequality and compartmentalisation based on their ethnic identities. A majority-run chauvinism and domination are also a characteristic of the country where one prominent group, the Bamars, consists of approximately 68% of the population. Despite the advent of a new democratic administration in 2016 that gave much hope to all citizens, the majority Bamars and ethnic nationalities alike, the government has been under pressure and faced limitations to make much progress towards national reconciliation. The military remains powerful by exercising an inordinate level of shadowing over the government because of the power-sharing structure that enabled it to occupy the three key branches of power—Ministry of Defence, Border Affairs and Home Affairs, which is also imposed by the 2008 military-drafted constitution. It has allowed the military to continue to secure its interests, resulting in communal tensions, developmental deficit, lack of civic freedoms, as well as human security challenges of the ethnic population (Yamahata 2020). As such, the NLD-led civilian government from 2016 to 2020 faced serious challenges in making progress towards the peace process and democratic consolidation. Although the continuous peace efforts, such as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in 2015 and the Union Peace Conferences, which were held four times between 2016 and 2019, were initiated by the state for national unity, they ironically resulted in the emergence of new divisions between the NCA signatories (NCA-S) and the rest of the NCA non-signatories (NCA-NS), as well as among non-signatories themselves, and even increased intra-ethnic conflict in Shan State (Dolan 2016). Aung San Suu Kyi stated many times that her government’s top priority is to solve the violent armed conflict between the military and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) as soon as possible through an ‘all-inclusive’ peace process. However, the autonomous military’s continuous, intrusive and violent activities waged against ethnic nationalities has resulted in more inequality, injustice and underdevelopment in the periphery. The hybrid nature of the transition that allows military impunity, as well as the incompetencies of the NLD administration and legislature, have been disappointing for

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ethnic nationalities; the period of democratisation, although promising in form, had inevitably accumulated more grievances. Furthermore, the 2021 coup by the Tatmadaw has destroyed the legitimate mandate of the NLD-led government and the parliaments to pursue its stated goals towards building genuine peace, amending or rewriting a new constitution, developing a rule-based society and freeing society from deeply rooted corruption. The NLD’s landslide victory in the 2020 election has somewhat frightened the Tatmadaw and its generations of leaders, old and new, represented by Min Aung Hlaing, to seize political power from the sitting legitimate government for the purpose of guarding the Tatmadaw’s interests before it fully ‘loses’ to Myanmar’s democratisation.

Towards Durable Social Transformation: Civic Identity and Civic Engagement Ethnicity is strongly connected to the modern development of the nation-state. However, in the contemporary global order, it can also be a cause of violence and conflict as it is inextricably intertwined with nationalism and democracy. As nonnegotiable symbolic issues are the matters of social identity conflicts, those conflicts are less likely to be influenced by settlement or resolution through warfare; therefore, they tend to persist and/or re-emerge over time (Centre for Systemic Peace 2018). If that is the case, how can diverse groups coexist in a multicultural society? After all, most states are multiethnic and hence have overlapping spaces with other identity groups, which is very much the case for Myanmar. In order to address the various root causes of Myanmar’s conflicts as well as other issues of political contention towards facilitating social transformations, there is a need to establish civic identity and promote civic engagement. Brown (2007, p. 18) defined national identity into a threefold distinction between the civic, ethnocultural and multiculturalist ideals. Civic identity is ‘the perception of the nation as being built on a distinctive nonethnic national culture into which all citizens ought to be integrating’. On the other hand, ethnocultural national identity encompasses ‘the perception by citizens that ethnic minorities should assimilate into this ethnic core or remain marginalised’. Meanwhile, multiculturalist national identity involves ‘the perception by citizens that their nation-state is a coalition of ethnic communities held together by a shared vision of progress toward the just allocation of power, resources, and rights to its diverse ethnic segments’. Indeed, people may have three ideas of national identity altogether or have different ideas about different public policy. Clearly, ethnocultural and multiculturalist national identities are incompatible with each other, which forms the basis of political contention. However, if the strategies and policies demonstrate civic ideas, it can help to diffuse the two conflicting ideas of national identity. Therefore, it is crucial to strengthen civic vision in order to ameliorate and end conflicts.

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To promote civic ideas, Walzer (1995) argues that building a new sense of collective identity based on a new community of interest is important and the function of the state and its policy primarily is to do justice to individuals. Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore are the successful implementers of such policies which promoted a civic vision of the nation-state in response to the ethnic conflicts in the 1960s and reduced tensions between ethnic majorities and minorities (Brown 2007). It indicates that the promotion of not only negative peace but also positive peace, which is created by tackling structural violence through guaranteeing social justice, is crucial to promote civic ideas and end ethnic conflicts. Kymlicka (2001) further emphasises that civic identity is not attached to a certain culture or society but rather formed when the demands for justice supersede them. In other words, civic identity emerges when the common civic vision is justice for all, regardless of identity. Civic identity thus demands individuals and states to respect the rights and self-determination of people of different identity groups, especially those who are marginalised. They should not only have ‘governing power over the generation, expression, and transmission of national culture - ability to speak their own language without suffering disadvantage, freedom of religion and self-government over religious institutions, the constitution of autonomous schools, and the like’, but also ‘control over land and resources which they as a group make autonomous decisions’ (Young 2005, p. 142). Therefore, Young (2005) conceptualises selfdetermination as ‘non-domination’ where groups are allowed to govern themselves without interference and unequal dependence. A federal system, in which the rights and autonomy of self-governing entities are respected, becomes central towards addressing the root causes of conflict, thereby contributing to forming a common civic identity and preventing future contention. In India, Myanmar and Thailand, where political conflict is prevalent due to structural injustices, enabling different identity groups a democratic platform to exchange ideas, interests and information in decision-making processes is crucial to realise civic identity. It is recognised that there has been a clear conflict of interests among the key actors up until the coup—the military, the government and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), which perpetuated divisions, tensions and continued armed conflicts. Both the Tatmadaw and ethnic minorities have pursued incompatible identities for the goals of nation-building; the military has searched for ethnocultural national identity whereas the ethnic minorities have aimed for the realisation of multiculturalist national identity. This difference in the vision for nation-building has been further exacerbated by the recent coup. Hence, now more than ever, the promotion of civic identity is important, which could reduce the dichotomy between the two opposing identities, making the peace process move forward. As Walzer (1995) argues, the state and its policy must do justice to individuals in order to develop a new shared identity underpinned by a common civic vision. Although the recent coup has not only brought military violence to the centre but also escalated it, the people of Myanmar have never been more united since pre-independence. This time, instead of being united against the common enemy of

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colonial powers, Myanmar faces the military which is terrorising the society and people in communities. Myanmar faces a second independence struggle: rather than Burma having ‘independence but no unity’, it now has ‘unity but no independence’ (Charney 2009, p. 72). Moreover, they share a collective vision towards building a federal democracy: to be ‘Myanmar’ is no longer tied to being Bamar or Buddhist, but rather to be anti-military and hence reconstructing a new civic identity (Yamahata 2022) Furthermore, the National Unity Government (NUG) has also been employing democratic communication to integrate once marginalised and abused ethnic minorities, including the Rohingyas, into conversations of the country’s future by committing to build a ‘federal democratic union’. The NUG has also abolished the 2008 Constitution and the undemocratic and discriminatory citizenship rule of 1982 which violates the rights of the minorities, to be replaced with the arrival of a new federal democratic constitution which is under process. In addition, it has published the Federal Democracy Charter. Of course, there is more to be done, but it certainly marks the beginning of the new age of Myanmar. In order to further integrate minorities into this process, citizens should be encouraged to participate in politics through the creation of an inclusive dialogue reaching divided parties to narrow their differences. The implication, therefore, is that any functioning mechanism of society must guarantee the promotion of dialogue, which can increase equal participatory rights for all. This would mitigate the marginalisation of minorities or suppressed identities of a society in its integral process. The question is how, by what means, and who shall initiate, facilitate and accelerate the mode of democratic communication to guarantee a much-needed dialogue in bridging divisions. Leydet (2006) explains that ‘a strong civic identity can itself motivate citizens to participate actively in their society’s political life’. Examples of civic engagement include voting in elections, paying taxes, joining the military, protesting against injustices, and the like (Hart et al. 2011, p. 771). Voluntarism is a key culture to strengthen society, especially in the countries on their diverse transitions towards democracy and/or development. In a society that operates like a well-oiled machine, the voluntary sector is a crucial component in the interconnected and interdependent relationship between the government, corporate sector, media, academia and the general public. The harmonious functioning among these sectors impacting communities at the local level enables an open and inclusive society. In particular, the voluntary sector acts as a responsive pillar and proactive force in tackling societal challenges while recognising the invaluable existence of diversity. In the light of the discussion above, Myanmar’s ongoing political contention, security challenges, ethno-territorial tensions, conflict-prone nature and situations of democratic backsliding can be understood in relation to the 2021 coup staged by the military as well as the subsequent peoples’ counter-coup efforts (Fig. 18.1). As shown in the figure, the military (Tatmadaw) and the 2008 Constitution are deeply entrenched factors causing Myanmar’s political conflict affecting peace, stability, livelihoods and freedom of all people, especially, ethnic nationalities and religious minorities.

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Fig. 18.1 Generating civic vision, identity and engagement under crisis

The conceptual flow is centred on ‘political conflict’ emerging out of identitybased cleavages as a common phenomenon in Myanmar. It shows Myanmar’s political deadlocks and backlogs with a special focus on its ethnic conflicts that make up the world’s longest-running civil war. In order to address the various root causes of Myanmar’s conflicts as well as other issues of political contention towards facilitating social transformations, the figure illustrates the need to establish civic identity and promote civic engagement that respects the rights, equality, diversity, and ensures self-determination of different ethnic nationalities through federal democratic values. Although states must fulfil their role as a primary guarantor of democracy, security and good livelihoods, citizens could also have powerful capacities as well as both the responsive and proactive responsibility to uphold democratic values. Through the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), People’s Defence Force (PDF), General Strike Committee (GSC), General Strike Committee-Nationalities (GSC-N), Ethnic Civil Society Organisations (ECSOs) among other unions and civil society organisations, citizens from all walks of life have been active in resisting the coup junta. Together, they have established an anti-military civic vision or ‘new nationalism’ (Yamahata 2021).

Citizens for Democratic Progress Civic identity and civic engagement should also not overlook the role of communication, which is at the centre of every community, country and the world as a whole

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as it enables raising public awareness regarding crucial public issues. This responsibility lies not only with the authority of governments but also with the cooperation of citizens in a functional alliance and correspondence with related organisations, including educational institutions. Moreover, democratic communication creates a free and open environment enabling citizens to participate in public affairs. All sectors need to assume a role in the revision of the role of communication towards the development of and not limited to particular groups of people. The accumulation of human rights violations and under-protection of equality for different groups will only lead to the escalation in the absence of security, deepening the existing divisions. It will therefore be vital to resolve any unhealthy divisions in terms of political and apolitical landscapes at community, local and national levels. This will only be possible through the creation of an inclusive dialogue through communication reaching divided parties. Despite the challenges to democratic progress in Asia, people across the region have been communicating and advocating for democratic values both online and offline as part of the Milk Tea Alliance: a solidarity movement against undemocratic forces in Asia, whether it be the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) overstretch in Hong Kong and Taiwan to military rule in Myanmar and Thailand (BBC 2021). The alliance first emerged after an argument between CCP-aligned netizens and Thai, Hong Kong and Taiwanese netizens (Hui 2020). More than 11 million tweets have featured the Milk Tea Alliance hashtag since its emergence, prompting Twitter to launch an official emoji in support of the regional movement (Tanakasempipat 2021). The recent coup in Myanmar had reignited the Milk Tea Alliance as activists across the region shared protest tactics and held rallies supporting the people of Myanmar’s fight for democracy (Potkin and Tanakasempipat 2021; Hui 2021). Although each country that makes up the Milk Tea Alliance faces different crises, the underlying discontent towards undemocratic forces resonated across the region. The lack of progressive ideological stance, absence of consistent democratic political commitment and inability to relate the individual concern with a collective civic vision have caused hindrance in the three countries. Of course, states must fulfil their role as the primary guarantor of democracy, security and livelihoods of the citizens and all people residing within. However, as long as democratic values are defended and upheld by the people, there is always potential for democratic progress in India, Myanmar, Thailand and beyond.

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Index

A Abe Doctrine, 295 aboriginal title, 244 abortion, 128 absolute monarchy, 111 academia, 138 academic freedom, 282 Academic Freedom Index, 265 academic oppression, 266 access, 125, 129, 131, 133, 136 accessibility and identification, 223, 225, 229 accessibility of health media, 226 accountability, 251 across ethnic boundaries, 212 Act East Policy, 247–249 Actor-Network Theory, 281 adequate maintenance, 71, 79 administration of elections, 292 administrative capacity, 30 administrative system, 26 adolescent girls, 130, 135, 139 advocacy activities, 223 agent of change, 19, 22, 24 agents of social change, 141 agricultural laws, 3 aid, 181, 190, 199 aid program, 293, 298, 300 alcohol, 223, 225 alcohol drinking, 225 All Burma Monks’ Alliance, 146 All Burma Student’s Democratic Front, 217 Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process, 217 ana, 20 analytical ability, 223, 225, 228, 229

anemia, 130, 135 annexation, 236, 238–240, 242 anonymity, 275 anti-government protests, 260 anti-military, 317, 318 anti-nationalist, 267, 268 anti-Thai, 267 apprenticeships, 173 Arakan Army, 164 arbitrary orders, 21 arbitration, 77 armed conflict(s), 4, 180, 314 armed forces, 56 armed insurgencies, 63 armed structures, 168 armed suppression, 54 ASEAN, 7, 8, 11, 12 assimilation, 240, 243 attention, 228 attitude, 22, 29 Aung San Suu Kyi, 19, 22, 24, 30, 145, 151, 152, 154–157, 214, 219 authoritarian patterns, 20 authoritarian surveillance, 267 authorities, 20 autocratic nations, 114 autonomy, 78, 125, 138, 161, 165, 167, 233, 242 awareness, 128, 139, 140 awza, 20

B backward castes, 236 bad governance, 4 Bamar, 313, 317

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 C. Yamahata (ed.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume II, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-7110-4

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324 basic health care, 129 Bay of Bengal, 8 behavioral change skills, 229 Beijing Declaration as well as the Platform for Action (1995), 128 belief in an individual, 22 Belt and Road Initiative, 12 biases, 132 biodiversity, 44 BJP, 78 blanket demonisation, 56 blocked pages, 275 blue pencilling, 274, 281, 284 body weight, 227 borderland(s), 161, 167, 170, 175, 233, 236 boundary demarcation, 83 bridging divisions, 317 broader transformation, 3 BSPP, 19 Buddhism, 313 Buddhist arguments, 22 Buddhist education, 149 Buddhist politics, 146 Buddhist Women’s Special Marriage Law, 149 bureaucratic capitalist authoritarianism, 235 Burma-Naga territory, 37 Burmanisation, 313 Burma Proper, 312 Burmese Way to Socialism, 4 Burmese Women’s Union, 217 butterfly effect, 25

C campaigns, 130, 139, 140 candidate list, 120, 121 caste restrictions, 126 casual labour, 188, 191 ceasefire monitoring, 215 ceasefire(s), 215, 246, 251 central actors, 23 child marriage, 127, 128 Child Marriage Restraint Act of (1976), 128 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 10 Chinese government policy, 175 Chipko Movement, 34 Chittagong Hill tracts, 244 choice of free people, 26 citizenship, 78, 79, 85, 89, 90, 97, 100, 103, 104, 174, 255, 256 Citizenship Amendment Act, 3, 71 civic education, 292

Index civic engagement, 256, 315, 317, 318 civic freedom(s), 9, 307, 314 civic identity, 316–318 civic nationalism, 51, 66–68 civic nationalist strategy, 57 civil administration, 239 civil disobedience, 265 Civil Disobedience Movement, 318 civilian life, 173 civil procedural code, 94 civil rights, 255, 256 civil servants, 29 civil society, 21, 139, 182, 255, 259, 292– 294, 296, 298–302 civil society organisations, 310, 318 civil war, 312–314, 318 class exploitation, 239 cognitive dissonance, 146 cohabitation with the army, 28 collaboration, 230 collaborative actions, 138 colonial administration, 314 colonial regime, 312 colonial rule, 148 commercial interest, 238 Commission of Sati (Prevention) Act 1987, 128 Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 318 common interest, 251 communal campaigns, 239 communal orientation, 247 communal tensions, 314 communal violence, 146, 153, 154 communication, 111, 179, 185, 268–270, 273, 276, 279, 284 communication ecology, 261 communicative interactive health literacy, 224 communist insurgency, 54 community-based health services, 229, 230 community-based organisations, 180 community defections, 245 community engagement program, 139 community identity, 249 compartmentalisation, 314 compensation, 249, 252 computer crime laws, 265 conditionally multicultural, 83 conflict, 4, 8, 9, 15 conflict resolution, 175 conflict-torn region, 28 connective politics, 34

Index conservative reactionaries, 239 constitution, 111, 113–115, 118, 120–122 constitutional reform, 165, 167 constitutional rights, 75 constitution making, 292 Constitution of India, 72 construction contracts, 171 consumerism, 33, 40, 44, 46, 48 contested areas, 167, 171 Contract for the Web, 263 conventional social change, 132 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1993) (CEDAW), 114, 128 Coronavirus, 79 coronavirus pandemic, 3, 4, 11 corporatisation, 248 corruption, 4, 29 counterinsurgency, 175 creative skills, 259 credible media features, 226 crimes against humanity, 10 crimes against women, 136, 138 crisis, 182 critical ability, 223, 225, 229 critical health literacy, 224 critical mass, 111 critical thinking, 229, 257, 259, 261 crony capitalism, 235, 239, 241 crop substitution, 172, 174 crude oil imports, 8 CSO Forum working committee, 216 cultural assimilation, 51 cultural autonomy, 85, 89, 90, 103, 104 cultural considerations, 185 cultural displacement, 257 cultural distinctiveness, 95, 97, 105 cultural genocide, 10 cultural heterogeneity, 95 cultural identity, 84, 97, 101 culturally hegemonic language, 59 cultural obstacles, 20 cultural policies, 61 culture of silence, 139 curriculum, 130 customary practices, 72, 73, 75 Cyclone Nargis, 146

D damage level, 187 data surveillance, 274 debt relief, 298

325 debt-trap diplomacy, 12 decision-making, 77, 125, 129, 138, 212, 214–216, 219, 221 decision-making opportunities, 130 decision-making process, 251, 316 de facto state religion, 313 defamation, 264 defense policy, 295 degradation of natural resources, 180 dehumanisation, 278 demobilisation, 165, 170, 173, 215 democracy, 3–5, 7, 9, 11–13, 15, 19, 21, 23–26, 30, 145, 151–153, 233, 234 democracy assistance, 291–294, 296–299, 302 Democracy Coalition Project, 293 democracy icon, 26 democratic communication, 233, 250–252, 310, 317, 319 democratic consolidation, 291, 293, 300, 314 democratic erosion, 5 democratic institutions, 5, 25 Democratic Kayin Benevolent Army, 164, 168 democratic movements, 236 democratic progress, 4, 5, 14, 307, 308, 312, 319 democratic revolution, 235 democratic society, 110, 255, 257, 258, 261 democratic stability, 295 democratic transition, 307 democratic values, 5, 7, 9, 11–13, 318, 319 democratisation, 291–295, 297–299, 301, 302 democratisation process, 199 demographic status quo, 175 demonstrations, 4, 13 dependent population, 188 depression, 224 de-regularisation, 248 development, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 127–130, 135, 138–140, 233, 234, 237, 239, 241, 245, 247, 249, 251 developmental deficit, 314 development assistance, 291, 295, 297, 298, 301, 302 dhamma, 147 digital citizenship, 285 digital civil rights movement, 265 digital colonialism, 271 digital era, 258, 261 digitalisation, 258

326 digital literacy, 257, 258 digital literacy education, 276 digital quotient, 259 digital renaissance, 283 digital reverse culture shock, 266, 279, 283 digital sexual free market, 278 disadvantaged groups, 130 disarmament, 165, 167, 170, 173, 215 disaster management, 180, 198, 199 disaster management policies, 180 disaster mitigation, 182 disaster recovery, 180, 182–185, 192, 194, 197, 198 disaster-resilient community, 180, 184 discrimination, 110, 113, 116–118, 126, 127, 130, 131, 133, 138, 140 discriminatory citizenship rule, 317 discriminatory employment practices, 138 disenfranchisement, 265 divide and rule, 312–314 divisive tactics, 239 divorce, 71, 74–77 Doi Bu Nbrang, 212 domestic laws, 264 domestic violence, 130 donor community, 293 Dowry Prohibition Act (1961), 128 draconian, 251 drinking water, 180, 185, 186, 189, 192, 196, 197 dropouts, 138 droughts, 179 drug production, 172 drug safety, 224 durable peace, 307 Dusun-nyor incident, 84, 85, 88

E earthquakes, 179, 180 echo chamber, 260, 261 ecological balance, 43 economically empowered women, 137 economic and political liberalism, 295 economic competency, 259 economic crisis, 180 economic dependence, 126 economic development, 57, 58, 65, 125, 126, 135 economic empowerment, 129, 136, 140 economic grievances, 241 economic inequity, 34 economic livelihood, 239, 249

Index economic loss, 179 economic opportunities, 79 economic policy aid, 291 economic prosperity, 9 educated and employed women, 137 education, 21, 109, 111, 115, 116, 122, 126–130, 132, 133, 135–140 educational achievement, 125 educational development, 283 educational framework, 263 educational institutions, 129, 225, 319 educational policy, 58 educational system, 95 education model, 223, 225 education sector, 223 education services, 173, 176 effective communication, 311 election law, 120, 121 election mediation, 292 election rules, 292 electoral administration, 292 electoral institutions, 292 electoral law, 115 electoral system design, 292 electoral systems, 292, 295 electricity, 192 emancipate from fear, 23, 25 emergency relief, 182, 190, 199 emergent technologies, 130 employment opportunities, 128, 136 empowerment, 24, 218, 220, 221 empowerment approach, 128 empowerment of women, 126, 127, 129, 130, 138 environmental assessment, 35 environmental awareness, 34, 43, 44 environmental deterioration, 44 environmentalism, 38, 44, 47, 48 environmental issues, 34, 35, 42, 44, 47, 48 environmental movements, 34 environmental preservation, 34 environmental responsibility, 48 equal access, 58, 61, 62 equal citizenship, 51, 53, 57, 67, 68, 83, 84 equality, 3, 13, 14, 126, 128, 129, 131, 132, 137, 139, 140 equal opportunity, 116 equal participation, 295 equal participatory rights, 317 equal pay, 127 Equal Remuneration Act (1976), 127 erosion of livelihoods, 179 ethnic armed organisations, 161, 314, 316

Index Ethnic Civil Society Organisations, 318 ethnic cleansing, 12, 246 ethnic conflict(s), 297, 299, 312–314, 316, 318 ethnic division, 312 ethnic dominance, 314 ethnic identity, 33, 34, 37, 47, 48 ethnic minorities, 154, 157, 211, 309, 311, 312, 315–317 ethnic nationalism, 38 ethnic peripheral regions, 313 ethnic tensions, 233 ethno-cultural distinctiveness, 51, 62 ethno-cultural diversity, 51, 54, 57, 61, 66– 68, 83, 84, 90, 95, 97, 100, 103 ethno-cultural traditions, 85 ethno nationalism, 233 ethno-religious groups, 220 ethno-territorial tensions, 317 evaluation, 257, 259, 260 excessive force, 307 Exclusive Economic Zone, 8 exclusive territorial claim, 246 ex-combatants, 168, 173, 174 exile, 145, 156 expenditure, 182 exploitation, 126, 131, 136, 138 exploitation labour, 238 exploitative contract farming, 176 extension services, 172, 174, 176 external assistance, 181 external features, 30 external intervention, 233 external powers, 5 external structures, 25 external support, 295 extortion and protection rackets, 171 extremism, 146

F factional clash, 246 factionalism, 233 fair education, 97 fair election, 292 family based health education, 229, 230 family member, 228 fear, 21, 23–25, 29 fearlessness, 23, 25 Federal Democracy Charter, 317 federalism, 161, 165, 167 Federal Political Negotiation and Consultation Committee, 164

327 female feticide, 130, 133 female genital mutilation, 74, 131 female literacy rate, 135 female suffrage, 112 Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan, 60, 61 file-sharing network system, 269 finance imperialism, 247 financial arrangements, 236 financial capitalist countries, 248 financial flows, 170 financial security, 180, 185, 186, 190, 195, 197 floods, 179, 180 food consumption, 40 food production, 181 food security, 132, 180–182, 188, 197, 198 forced assimilation, 83, 91 forced displacement of population, 249 forced marriage, 131 forcible eradication, 176 foreign investment, 297 foreign media, 257 foreign policy, 247, 248 foreign powers, 266 forest exploitation, 44 forest management, 43 forest resources, 43 formal labour, 191 formal peace process, 211, 212, 217, 221 fragmentation, 98 free and open environment, 319 freedom, 23, 24, 26 freedom from oppression, 140 Freedom House, 293 freedom of assembly, 13, 255 freedom of choice, 110, 120 freedom of expression, 6, 263, 266, 272, 274, 283, 284 freedom of expression and conscience, 251 freedom of information flows, 311 freedom of movement, 255 Freedom of Navigation Operations, 8 freedom of religion, 72 freedom of speech, 255 free media, 11 free social space, 267 free society, 25 free speech, 267 frequency, 179, 186, 191, 194, 195 Frontier Areas, 312, 313 functional health literacy, 224

328 G gender, 125–132, 135–141 gender advocacy, 129 gender attributes, 125 gender-based issues, 116 gender-based violence, 116 gender bias, 141 gender discrimination, 266 gender disparity, 109 gender equality, 109, 111–122 Gender Equality Network, 216 gender expectations, 125 gender gap, 130, 132 gender inclusion, 219 gender inequality, 126, 127, 132, 137, 139, 140 Gender Inequality Index (GII), 119 gender justice, 219 gender mainstreaming, 130 gender parity, 136, 141 gender rights, 72 gender roles, 125, 266 gender sensitive approach, 130 gender stereotyping, 118 gender violence, 77 generalised recommendations, 138 General Strike Committee-Nationalities, 318 generational divisions, 4 genocide, 10, 12, 14 genuine democratisation, 212, 221 geographical position, 181, 186 geopolitics, 297 global commons, 8 global dependencies, 256 globalisation, 135 goal setting, 229 good governance, 295 governance, 129, 292, 294–299, 301 governance contract, 275 government officials, 54, 57–59, 62, 65–67 government schemes, 130, 139 grass-root activities, 22 grassroots level, 150, 170 grassroots mobilisation, 180, 197, 199 grassroots peace, 211, 220, 221 Greater Nagalim, 37 Grievance theory, 314 group disparities, 133, 138 group specific rights, 85, 87, 89, 90, 104 H harassment, 129

Index harmonious reconciliation, 93 harmony, 57, 65 hate speech, 146, 148, 258–260 hazard, 179, 180, 184 health awareness, 224 health behavior, 224, 225, 229, 230 health beliefs, 229, 230 health campaigns, 225 healthcare, 29, 132, 133, 138, 139 health care services, 224 health drinks, 227 health-related knowledge, 224 healthy lifestyles, 224 hegemonic culture, 60 hidden political agenda, 23 hierarchical order, 121, 122 higher education, 34, 44, 282 Hindu Marriage Act (1955), 127 homeless women, 139 Hong Kong riots, 13 horizontal inequality, 314 household assets, 182, 186 household consumption, 182 household level disparities, 126 household work, 138 housing, 132 HTML, 269, 270 HTTP, 269 human development, 125, 132 human development indicators, 132 humanistic values, 26 humanitarian intervention, 293 human relationships, 224 human resources, 174 human resources development, 295 human rights, 6, 9–13, 140, 145, 146, 151– 153, 155, 157, 211, 218, 220, 264, 265, 268–271, 275, 282 human rights activists, 10 human rights defence lawyers, 97 human rights violations, 312, 319 human security, 300, 314 human trafficking, 180 hygiene, 33, 35, 224

I iconic position, 29 identifying disaster risk, 184 illiberal governments, 292 illicit business, 251 illiteracy, 126 immediate individual opportunism, 250

Index Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (1956), 128 imperialism, 234, 236, 238, 247, 250, 252 impoverishment, 236 impunity, 238, 251 inability to earn income, 182, 185 inclusive dialogue, 317, 319 income disparity, 249 income-generating assets, 182, 189, 196– 198 income recovery, 195, 197 Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act of 1986, 128 independent and professional judiciary, 11 independent observers, 11 India’s Act East policy, 233 Indian bourgeoisie, 236 Indian Muslims, 74 indigenous knowledge, 33, 35 indigenous people, 35, 48, 175 indigenous rights, 249 individual agency, 19, 25, 28 individual identity, 80 Indo-Pacific connectivity, 297 inequality, 109, 112, 119, 121–123, 311, 314 infant mortality, 130 inferior position, 26 informal peace-building, 216, 219 information literacy, 258 informed and engaged citizens, 255, 261 infrastructure, 179 in-migration, 175 inside–outside framework, 35 institutional arrangements, 199 institutional barriers, 130 institutional cohesion, 105 institutional linkages, 247 institutional strength, 5 insurgency, 161, 233, 239, 240, 242, 245, 247 insurgent funding streams, 172 integration, 234, 239, 240, 247 integrative, 246 intellectual convictions, 24 inter-ethno-cultural equality, 84 internal displacement, 180 internally displaced, 174 internal party conflicts, 246 international attention, 182 international coalition, 234 international community, 6, 8, 152, 155, 307 international conventions, 128, 242 international cooperation, 295

329 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 11 international donors, 297 international election assistance, 291, 297 international election observation, 292 International Financial Institutions, 233, 247 international funding agencies, 180, 198 international health literacy, 224 international instruments, 242 International Labour Organisation, 173 international law, 291 internationally recognised rights, 8 internationally set targets, 131 international norms, 6, 8 International Organization for Migration, 173 international organisations, 182, 291 international outcry, 28 international trade federations, 300 international waters, 8 internet connectivity, 279 internet empowered generation, 266 Internet Service Providers, 272 Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 112 interventionist role, 130 intra-ethnic conflict, 314 investment, 139, 233, 241, 248 inward-based qualities, 30 Islamic marriage customs, 71 Islamic Religious Courts, 86 J jailed activists, 13 Japanese democracy assistance, 291, 293, 300, 301 Japan International Labour Foundation, 301 Japan-Myanmar Cooperation Program, 297 Japan Trade Union Confederation, 300 job training, 168, 173 judicial process, 91, 96, 97 judicial review, 76 judicial systems, 295 judiciary, 75, 138 junta, 145, 146, 148, 153, 154, 156 justification, 276, 280 K Kafkaesque rules, 275 Karen National Union, 164, 167, 214 Karenni National Progressive Party, 214 Krue Se Mosque incident, 84 Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port, 12

330 L labor unions, 292, 300 lack of education, 79, 179 lack of transparency, 10 land and resource alienation, 249 land and resource ownership, 250 land degradation, 34 land tenure, 174, 176 language education, 60 language policy, 94 large-scale, 179, 199 law and order, 233, 234, 238 law enforcement, 96, 97 leadership roles, 141, 212, 220 legal aid, 150 legal candidate quota system, 120 legal equality, 255 legal framework, 139, 190, 199 legal institutions, 85, 103, 104 legally binding, 120, 121 legal obstacles, 73 legal reform, 292 legislations, 127, 130, 132 legislative assemblies, 233 legislative functions, 12 legislative repression, 265 legitimacy, 20, 164 legitimacy of public institutions, 293 lethal weapons, 4 LGBTQ rights, 266 liberal democratic attitudes, 9 liberalism, 84, 85, 88, 103 liberate themselves, 23 limitations for women, 109 limited control over assets, 137 limited political space, 23 linguistic cohesion, 97, 104 linguistic gap, 58 littering, 33, 41, 44, 47, 48 livelihood programmes, 174 local administration, 292 Local Administration Act of 1897, 112 local autonomy, 91, 94 local governments, 137 localised panic, 276 local markets, 174 loss of human capital, 180, 187 low-income countries, 179 lowland Bamar state, 167 low salaries, 29 M Ma Ba Tha, 147–151

Index Ma Ha Na, 146, 148–151 majority-minority division, 66 Malay-Muslims, 51, 53, 54, 57–62, 64–68, 83, 84, 86–89, 91–99, 103, 104 male-dominated institutions, 221 male literacy rate, 135 malicious tracking, 275 malnutrition, 130, 135 mandatory maternity leaves, 130 Manipur, 233, 238–246, 250 marginalisation, 246 marginalisation of minorities, 317 marginalised groups, 130, 211 market economy, 7 market liberalisation, 181 market monopoly, 250 mass advocacy campaigns, 214 mass protests, 19 maternity benefits, 139 media, 292 media availability, 259 media content producers, 259 media health literacy, 223–225 media literacy, 255, 257–259, 261 media policies, 259 media producing ability, 223, 225, 229 media production, 259 media studies, 259 media usage, 224 media users, 257–259, 261 medical experts, 227 Medical Termination Pregnancy Act (1971), 128 Mekong connectivity, 297 member-owned microfinance institutions, 180 member-owned savings groups, 186, 198 mental health, 179, 223–226 metropolitan areas, 34 Mexico Plan of Action (1975), 128 microfinance, 180, 182–184, 198 migrant workers, 139 migration, 188 militant group, 37 militarisation, 238 military businesses, 167 military-civilian relations, 292 military coup, 4, 268, 272 military establishment, 27 military junta, 20 military occupation, 236 military regime, 275 military rule, 148, 151, 156

Index military scrutiny, 268, 272 military surveillance culture, 268 militia, 56 Milk Tea Alliance, 319 Millennium Development Goals, 128 Ministry of Digital Economy and Society, 265 minority groups, 10, 52, 53, 62 minority identity, 72 minority religions, 71, 73 minority rights, 75 Min Yin Chan, 212 misappropriation of public fund, 241 mobility, 126, 132, 137 modernisation, 36, 44, 48 monasteries, 149 monastery education, 188 monetary contribution, 293 monk-activist, 146 monkhood, 145 Mon National Liberation Army, 218 Monogamy Law, 149 monopoly, 235, 247–251 Mon Women’s Network, 219 Mon women’s organisation, 218 Mon women’s rights organisation, 218 moral icon, 27 morality, 29, 30 moral regeneration, 25, 28 moral undertaking, 25 multiculturalism, 52, 53, 61, 83–85, 89, 92, 99, 104, 105 multicultural nationalism, 51, 66–68 multicultural society, 315 multidisciplinary approach, 128 multiple divisions, 219 municipal plumbing, 41 Muslim identity, 71, 75 Muslims, 147–150, 152, 154, 156 Muslim women, 71, 73–76, 79 Myitsone Dam, 12 Myitsone dam project, 166 N Naga identity, 48 Nairobi Forward Looking Strategies (1985), 128 national agenda, 234 national chauvinistic, 246 National Democratic Alliance Army, 164, 165, 168 national development, 53, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67

331 national education, 61–63, 67 national education system, 130 national harmony, 67 national identity, 55, 61, 148, 313, 315, 316 national integration, 67 national interest, 295 nationalism, 83, 84, 88, 89, 91, 97, 98, 101, 148, 233, 240, 242, 245, 246 nationalist views, 264 national liberation, 88, 89 national reconciliation, 314 National Reconciliation and Peace Centre, 214 National Reconciliation Commission, 90, 96 National Register of Citizens (NRC), 78, 79 national security, 56, 63, 66 National Security Law, 9 national unity, 56, 57, 63, 67, 314 National Unity Consultative Council, 318 National Unity Government, 317, 318 nation building, 295, 301, 302, 308, 316 Nation Ceasefire Agreement, 314 nation-state boundaries, 268 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, 154, 161, 212 Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team, 213 natural disaster, 179, 180 natural resource extraction, 167, 171 natural resources, 313 Naw Zipporah Sein, 213 Naypyidaw, 146, 148 NCA non-signatories, 314 NCA signatories, 314 negative peace, 211, 212, 221, 310, 311, 316 neighbourhood associations, 199 neo-liberal open door policy, 235 network access, 269 New Hope Project, 64, 65 New Mon State Party, 164, 214, 218 new values, 130 NGO capacity, 292 NGOs, 138, 180, 182, 183, 198 nibbana, 25, 148 nibbana-style democratic institutions, 25 Nippon Foundation, 300, 301 NLD-led civilian government, 314 NNC, 36, 37 Nobel Peace Prize, 26 non-formal education, 188 non-political language, 26 non-traditional occupations, 130 Northeast India, 233, 244, 248

332 Northern Alliance, 164 Northwest Burma, 244 No Women, No Peace, 216 NSCN, 37 numerical significance, 123 nursing practices, 229 nutrition, 126, 127, 135, 223–225

O obese, 224 occupation, 109, 122, 127, 136 occupational segregation, 138 ODA donors, 293 online expression, 264 online information, 276 online political communication, 260 online social network, 257, 258, 260, 261 online trends, 227 online trust, 269 operational zones, 239 opium poppy cultivators, 172, 174 opportunity, 109, 110, 116, 118–121, 123, 126 opposition movement, 20 oppression, 238, 247, 250 orientation of teachers, 130 overweight, 224 owning property, 137

P page-blocking, 274 pagodas, 148 Panglong Agreement, 313 Panglong Conference, 313 paramilitary assault, 236 paramilitary forces, 238 parenthood, 224 parents, 227, 229 parliament, 109–118, 120, 121 parliamentary elections, 235 participants of development, 128 participation, 212, 214, 216, 219, 220 participatory rights, 125 partnership model, 229 patriarchal rule, 109 patriarchal system, 111, 119–121 patriarchy, 79, 126 peace, 5, 6, 8, 14, 233, 251 peace agreement, 171 peacebuilding framework, 291 peacebuilding operation, 212

Index peace process, 161, 165–167, 170, 171, 176, 310, 314, 316 Peace Process Steering Team, 161 peacetime economy, 168 pedagogical regression, 282 peer group, 228 peer-reporting, 264, 280 People’s Defence Force, 318 people-centered care, 229 people-to-people diplomacy, 217 persecution, 78, 145, 150, 152, 156 personal law boards, 71, 72 personal risk, 22 physical abuse, 130 physical assets, 179, 185 physical health, 182, 183 physical well-being, 180 pipelines, 166 plastic garbage, 40 plural monoculturalism, 98, 99 police brutality, 236 police department, 139 policing, 249 policy framework, 247 policy implications, 198 policy instruments, 257 policy recommendations, 138 political abuse, 270 political attitudes, 260, 261 political autonomy, 85, 89 political capital, 273 political concession, 30 political conflict, 307, 316, 317 political control, 267 political decision-making, 256, 261 political device, 109 political dialogue, 165 political dialogue and peace negotiations, 212, 214 political discourse, 53 political dissent, 245, 251 political empowerment, 130 political engagement, 257 political game, 26 political goal(s), 20, 30 political grievances, 313 political ideology, 22 political inequalities, 312 political instability, 5 political interference, 291 political leitmotif, 19 politically conscious individuals, 22 political manoeuvering, 236

Index political movement, 26 political needs, 23 political negotiations, 165 political neutrality, 292 political participation, 114, 118, 119, 125– 127, 257, 260 political parties, 292, 296, 298, 302 political philosophy, 19, 21, 23, 24, 30 political polarisation, 260, 261 political power, 313–315 political pragmatism, 30 political reforms, 260 political representation, 72, 79 political repression, 314 political rights, 255, 256 political stalemate, 27 political strategy, 23 political structure, 116 political struggle, 26 political turmoil, 307 pollution, 33, 35, 44 polygamy, 74, 76, 79 poor governance, 180 Population Control Law, 149 population growth, 40 positive peace, 311, 316 post-colonial states, 314 post-conflict reconstruction, 291, 294 post-conflict societies, 293 post-disaster reconstruction, 183 poverty, 4 poverty elimination, 132 poverty traps, 182 power, 125, 132, 138 power balance, 7 Prem régime, 53, 57, 63, 64, 66 preparedness, 182, 198 preventive and proactive diplomacy, 14 primary education, 132 private assistance, 300 private sector, 139 private spheres, 131 privatisation, 236 privilege system, 123 procedural adjudication, 73 professional education, 130 profit, 233, 248 progression, 234, 241 pro-human Web, 263, 264, 282–284 Project Tiger, 34 promotion of dialogue, 317 pro-nationalist rhetoric, 264 propaganda, 239, 241, 249

333 property ownership, 189 Protection of Race and Religion Laws, 149 Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (2005), 128 protest tactics, 319 Provision of public services, 131 public–private partnership, 301 public administration, 30 public awareness, 319 public forum, 284 public resources, 130 public schools, 174 public sphere, 129 public support, 20, 28 puppet regimes, 247 purchasing power, 181 Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, 149 Q Quad, 8, 11 qualified candidates, 110 quality of life, 184, 192, 199, 230 quality of water, 185, 186, 189, 192, 194– 196 quasi-civilian government, 166 quota system, 110, 114–123 R raising awareness, 182 Rakhine, 28 Rakhine crisis, 19 Rakhine State, 145, 146, 152, 153, 156, 157 real politician, 27 realpolitik, 7 reconciliation, 57, 91, 98, 212, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221 reconfigurable protocols, 269 recovery period, 182 reforms, 24, 27, 126 regime, 20, 23, 25–28 regional autonomy, 52 regional economies, 307 regional movement, 319 regional security, 7 regional stability, 297 rehabilitation, 181, 249, 252 reintegration, 165, 168, 173–175 relationships, 220 reliability, 227 religio-cultural affairs, 59 religious communities, 71, 72 Religious Conversion Law, 149

334 religious divisions, 314 religious freedom, 101, 102 religious identity, 71, 72, 90, 100, 104 religious institutions, 62 religious leaders, 84, 85, 94, 100, 104 religious prohibitions, 126 religious rights, 101, 102 renegotiation, 269 representation of women, 137 represent female collective voices, 110 repressive laws, 236, 251 reserved seats system, 120 resettlement, 174 resettlement rate, 186 resources, 233, 236, 238, 241, 247–250 responsibility, 21, 25, 29, 30 Restoration Council of Shan State, 164, 167 restorative, 246 retrospective pencilling, 274 reverse discrimination, 116 revolution of the spirit, 24–30 rights, 109–111, 114, 116–118, 122 rights of the minorities, 236 rights protection and promotion, 220 right to information, 6 right to privacy, 276 Rohingya, 28, 145, 148, 150, 152–154, 156, 157 root causes of the violence, 221 royal institution, 13 rule-based society, 315 rule of law, 5, 9, 11, 91, 96, 97, 292, 293, 300, 301 ruling élites, 51, 53, 67, 68 rural communities, 179 rural economies, 173 rural women, 211

S saddha, 24 safeguard laws, 248 Saffron Revolution, 146, 148 salary, 109 Sangha, 145–148, 150 Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 300 Saw Mra Razar Lin, 213 school-based program, 223 secondary schooling, 138 sectarian collusive forces, 247 sectarianism, 241, 244, 247, 250 Section 370, 78 sectorial initiatives, 132

Index sector specific recommendations, 138 secular education, 95 secularism, 72, 73, 79 security, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 109 security challenges, 314, 317 security policy, 295 security sector, 165, 167 security sector reform, 215 sedition, 146 self-determination, 250, 314, 316, 318 self-employment, 191 self-motivation, 229 self-reliance, 138 senior management, 119 separation of religion and state, 72 separatist movements, 83 separatist struggle, 84, 89, 101 service sectors, 242, 247, 248, 251 sex trade, 273, 278 sexual deviance, 279, 281 sexual exploitation, 128 sexuality, 224 sexual stigmatisation, 282 sex work, 276–279 Shan State Progress Party, 164 shared identity, 312, 316 shared responsibility, 131 shared sovereignty, 233 shelters, 179, 185 Shila Nan Taung, 214 Shwedagon Pagoda, 148 signatory groups, 164 silashin, 147, 149 Sino-British Joint Declaration, 11 SLORC, 20, 23, 148, 156 smoking, 223 social and cultural norms, 221 social assets, 179 social attitudes, 141 social capital, 182, 185, 194–197 social class, 268 social compliance, 276 social connectivity, 269 social construct, 127 social contract, 267, 271, 275, 276, 278, 279, 281 social deference, 267 social development, 299, 300, 302 social emancipation, 243, 267 social empowerment campaign, 281 social groups, 135 social identity, 312, 315 social inclusion, 271, 283

Index social infrastructure, 129 social institutions, 132, 139 social insurances, 236 social interactions, 220 social justice, 9, 34, 140, 267, 269, 270, 311, 316 social mobilisation, 199 social mobility, 239 social mobilisation process, 140 social movement, 148, 255 social network algorithms, 261 social norms, 132, 136 social policy, 126, 127, 130, 141 social protection policies, 131 social responsibility, 256 social security, 125, 136, 139 social service activities, 149 social service expenditure, 130 social services, 129 social stigma, 136 social support, 230 social taboos, 264 social tolerance, 279 social transformation, 19, 180, 229, 230, 272, 275, 279, 282, 308–311 societal culture, 53, 61 socio-cultural traditions, 125 socio-economic class, 127, 133 socio-economic conditions, 180 socio-economic divide, 273 socio-legal interventions, 136 socio-political integration, 5 South Asian geopolitics, 234 South China Sea, 7–9 sovereignty, 233, 243, 245, 246 SPDC, 20, 23, 145, 146, 148, 151, 153 special economic zones, 166 speeches, 20, 21, 27, 29 stability, 5, 6, 8, 317 stacked elections, 4 stakeholders, 139, 307 State Administration Council, 4 state building, 174 state capacity, 292 state capitalism, 5, 11 State Counsellor, 19, 27, 28 state interference, 116 state intrusion, 71 state-levied media, 267 state policies, 126 state religion, 148 state-rhetoric, 268 state security actors, 176

335 state violence, 313 statistics, 120 status of women, 125–128, 132, 133, 137 statutory law, 76 strategic collective demand, 252 structural adjustment programme, 235 structural constraint, 126 structural gender inequality, 127 structural injustices, 316 structural readjustment programmes, 252 structural violence, 311 structural weaknesses, 184 struggle for democracy, 24, 25 student movements, 43 subjugation, 238, 247, 250 subordination of women, 109 suicide, 224 suppressed identities, 317 suppression, 235, 236, 244 sustainability, 182 sustainable change, 140 sustainable development, 199 Sustainable Development Goals, 128, 131 sustainable growth, 283 sweet beverage consumption, 223, 225 systematic approach, 132 systematic change, 122

T tactical negotiations, 246 Talaq ul Biddat, 76 Tangkhul Katamnao Long, 43 Tangkhul Mayar Ngala Long, 43 Tangkhul Naga, 33, 39, 41, 48 Tatmadaw, 20, 23, 27, 28, 30, 152–156, 161, 164–173, 176, 307, 309, 312, 315–317 Tatmadaw encroachment, 166 Tatmadaw-established political system, 28, 30 tea break diplomacy, 216 technical assistance, 292, 293, 299 technical education, 173 technical governance, 269 technological determinism, 256 technological entrepreneurship, 283 technology-generated user experience, 259 teenage pregnancies, 133 territorial disputes, 7 territorial expansion, 236 territorial nationalism, 233 territorial unity, 246

336 Thai adolescent students, 223 Thai-Buddhist culture, 58 Thai-Buddhists, 53, 57, 61, 65, 67 Thai citizenship, 58, 61, 66 Thai Civil Court, 86 Thai Computer Crime Act, 273 Thai Criminal Code, 264, 271 Thai Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, 276 Thai identity, 83, 84 Thai Internet arms race, 275 Thai Lawyers for Human Rights, 265 Thai-Muslim, 83, 84 Thai national boundary, 83 Thainess, 51, 53, 54, 57, 59–63, 65–67, 83, 84, 90, 93, 96, 103–105, 266, 268, 275, 277, 280 Thai politics, 111, 112, 117, 119–121 Thai ruling élites, 83, 97 Thai Sakdina, 267 Thai surveillance culture, 266 Thein Sein, 27 Theravada, 147 the revolution of the spirit, 19, 24, 27, 28, 30 tolerance, respect, and understanding, 221 tourism, 37, 38, 48 trade war, 9 traditional gender norms, 114 traditional social fatalism, 22 traditional values, 33 trafficking, 130, 131 training, 182, 184, 192 transition, 168 transmedia literacy, 259 transparency, 251 transportation, 111, 179, 189 tree planting, 43 tribal theology, 39 trilateral military exercises, 8 tropical cyclones, 179, 180 2008 Constitution, 148, 152, 153, 155, 156, 165, 307 21st , 161 tyrannical circumstances, 23

U Uighur Muslims, 10 underrepresentation of women, 214 underweight, 224 unemployment, 188, 236, 250 unequal distribution, 132 unfairness, 110, 119, 123

Index unified agreement, 269 uniform civil code, 75 unilateral divorce, 71, 74 Union Peace Conference, 214, 314 Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee, 214 Union Peacemaking Central Committee, 212 Union Peacemaking Working Committee, 212 United Nations Development Programme, 173 United Wa State Party, 164, 172 universal health care, 230 unjust orders, 22 unmonitored access, 264 untreated sewage, 41 Uppatasanti Pagoda, 148 upward trend, 110 urban areas, 33 urban-rural background, 127 urban-rural divide, 4 urban-rural economic disparities, 297 urban-rural gap, 133 urban settlements, 240 URL, 269 US-China relations, 6, 11 V values-based diplomacy, 295, 299 veto power, 165 victims, 179, 183, 193, 195, 196, 198, 208 village elections, 112 violence, 5, 9, 11, 126, 127, 129, 131, 136, 307, 312–316 violent conflict, 312, 313 vocational training, 199 voluntary basis, 120, 121 voluntary party candidate quota, 120 voluntary sector, 317 voter education, 292 voting rights, 130, 137 vulnerabilities, 181 vulnerable women, 139 W water and sanitation, 132 weak state, 30 wealth, 132 Web Foundation, 263, 268, 272, 277, 281 Web governance, 263, 264, 270–272, 281, 282 Web openness, 263

Index Web We Want, 263 welfare approach, 128 Western narrative, 19 whistleblowers, 10 widow marriage, 127 widow remarriage, 73 women in daily life, 116 women in politics, 109, 115–118 women’s alliances, 219 women’s civil society organisations, 211, 221 women seats, 137 women’s health, 129, 138, 140 women’s movement, 126

337 Women’s Organisation Network, 217 women’s representation, 116 women’s rights, 71, 77, 211, 212, 217–220 women-to-women diplomacy, 217, 218, 220, 221 women turnout, 137

Y younger generations, 279, 284 youth associations, 44 youth health media production, 225 youth organisations, 44