Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I: Social, Political and Ecological Perspectives 9811596158, 9789811596155

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Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I Social, Political and Ecological Perspectives Edited by Chosein Yamahata · Donald M. Seekins · Makiko Takeda

Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I

Chosein Yamahata · Donald M. Seekins · Makiko Takeda Editors

Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I Social, Political and Ecological Perspectives

Editors Chosein Yamahata Graduate School of Policy Studies Aichi Gakuin University Nisshin, Aichi, Japan

Donald M. Seekins Emeritus Professor at Meio University Nago, Okinawa, Japan

Makiko Takeda Faculty of Policy Studies Aichi Gakuin University Nisshin, Aichi, Japan

ISBN 978-981-15-9615-5 ISBN 978-981-15-9616-2 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To those who are working on transformations of all kinds to make societies freer, communities more prosperous and individuals more empowered: may your pursuit of just rights and good opportunities towards building an equal, stable and peaceful environment, particularly in India, Myanmar and Thailand, prevail and may it never cease.

Foreword By Paul W. Chambers

In early 2020, the Covid-19 pandemic suddenly and unexpectedly swept the global stage, demonstrating the speed in which society can face swift and unforeseen turmoil. In fact, the whirlwinds of change are rapidly transforming the world in which we live. The dynamics of globalisation have increasingly integrated populations, contributing to greater arenas of interaction and producing interlinked and successive transformations. Change is thus transnational in nature and rapid in effect, presenting both challenges and opportunities on a global scale because in some countries there has been more resistance to it while in others there has been greater acceptance. Issues where attempts at change have made their mark include frictions among ethnicities and religions, healthcare problems, climate change, disaster management, energy responsibility and preserving peace. While transformations often occur at the macro-level in terms of politics, economics and society, the micro-level—centring upon communities, groups and individuals—is often ignored. The volume at hand endeavours to spotlight the latter—localities. It generally asks three questions: What factors initially motivated these social transformations? What continues to drive change forward? What has social transformation, if any, produced? The book focuses upon three different countries in the most populous continent—Asia. India, Myanmar and Thailand are three nations in Asia which are undergoing rapid societal change. Though they are not the only countries where change is afoot, they represent fascinating cases from Asia. In each of the three countries, marginalised people are confronted with enormous obstacles to political, economic and social advancement. These hindrances represent continuing impediments in equality, justice, security, empowerment, human rights, public health, the environment, development and freedom despite residing under a formal democratic system, apparent moves towards democratisation, and/or a seemingly robust economy. Though one would think that the state apparatus in all three countries would be addressing these issues, at the community level, state remedies have, in many cases, proven insufficient. As a result, there have been grassroots efforts and community initiatives, sometimes led by women and/or minorities—empowerment from below. These local endeavours have worked to build social and human capital in order to achieve positive social transformations at the community level, often vii

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despite the inabilities or apathy of state officials who have tended to be less aware of or unsympathetic to local problems anyway. Nevertheless, there are sharp distinctions among the cases of India, Myanmar and Thailand. In terms of political space, India is the most democratic while authoritarianism is much more prevalent in Myanmar and Thailand. In addition, in terms of demographics, India is a much more diverse and populous country, with more sizeable numbers of separate ethnic and religious communities than Myanmar and Thailand. Finally, India possesses more structural inequalities than Myanmar or Thailand. As for Myanmar, it is the poorest of the three countries. Since 1962, Myanmar has been dominated by a hegemonic military though today military domination is concealed under a halfway democracy. In addition, the country possesses more ethnic groups than Thailand or India. Lastly, Myanmar infamously has the world’s most and longest internal conflicts, repression of minority ethnicities and more human rights violations than the other two cases. Regarding Thailand, though it has long been seen as a stable tourist destination overseen by an internationalised liberal economy, the country also holds the record for the most military coups ever carried out. Indeed, though a frail military-dominated democracy was established in 2019, the authoritarian institutions of monarchy and military have continued to rule supreme across the country with any attempts at lasting democratisation lost in transition. Though Thailand’s economy might be relatively buoyant at the macro-level, the country continues to suffer an extraordinarily high level of relative poverty. The challenges which marginalised peoples continue to face in India, Myanmar and Thailand amount to a wholesale insecurity crisis. That is, some or all the seven dimensions of human security have proven to be deficient for many local people in these three countries. In 1994, the United Nations offered an initial definition of human security as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether in homes, jobs or communities.” Human security shifted from being state-centric to people-centric, emphasising “freedom from fear,” “freedom from want,” and “freedom to live in dignity.” Human security was comprised into seven dimensions: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. All seven were considered essential for grassroots-driven efforts to alleviate local problems though achieving them would require effective social change. People-centred human security problems are finding some solutions in India, Myanmar and Thailand. Beyond local empowerment and human security, this volume’s areas of focus are (1) fairness, equality and freedom, (2) communicative participation and (3) livelihoods amidst social cohesion. The book persuasively argues that it is necessary to promote political participation at the community level to address problems in the periphery. The chapters within each of these three parts are quite diverse, from examining such subjects as plurilingualism and press freedom, environmental communication and educational as well as public health reform, and urban planning initiatives as well as efforts towards multicultural justice.

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Finally, this book interestingly advocates the Academic Diplomacy Project, a method of scholarship in which collaboration between academics and non-academics contributes to problem-solving at local levels which assists in piecemeal efforts towards social transformation. Such diplomacy shifts the focus from state-level diplomacy to an enhanced dialogue among academia, civil society, the media, NGOs and local people. Though there are many contemporary studies on transitional areas of the world, this work is remarkable most importantly because it prioritises communities and the local level—the peripheries of nations. Most other such books have highlighted the national level or the centres of societies. The book is also significant because the editors succeed in weaving together a plethora of human insecurity issues facing India, Myanmar and Thailand. Finally, the authors demonstrate that indeed there are often local solutions to local problems. Where solutions have not been achieved, the authors show that resolving the challenges are necessary now. The book is thus extremely useful in terms of illustrating a wide variety of issues hindering, witnessing and contributing to social transformation across time, space and context affecting both centres and peripheries situated in India, Myanmar and Thailand. Readers should come away from this book with a greater appreciation and understanding of marginalisation and how some communities in Asia have sought to confront it. Phitsanulok, Thailand August 2020

Dr. Paul W. Chambers

Dr. Paul W. Chambers is a Lecturer and Advisor for International Affairs at the Center of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. He is a Research Fellow at the GermanSoutheast Asian Center of Excellence for Public Policy and Good Governance, the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. He is also Editor of the Routledge (SCOPUS) journal Asian Affairs: An American Review. Dr. Paul is the co-author of Khaki Capital: The Political Economy of the Military in Southeast Asia.

Foreword By Shovan K. Saha

The editors of this book compile academic enquiry that can have a meaningful impact upon comprehending the challenges facing societal change and how to overcome these obstacles by calling to employ academic diplomacy built on four pillars: (1) “causative focus” on the root causes of socio-economic challenges; (2) “curative focus” on how to ameliorate root causes through bottom-up approaches that empower local communities; (3) “transformative focus” that aims to reconfigure societies and provide the foundation for lasting, sustainable change; and (4) “promotive focus” on wider structural changes. The Academic Diplomacy Project, the term coined by the editors, is proposed as a tool to empower society in general and each individual member of the community in particular through the dissemination of knowledge and information so as to bring in a community-driven collective struggle to preempt any sort of exploitation and exclusion and psychological violence thereby facilitating positive social transformation. When members of a society collectively hope for hope of a change leading to improvement of any kind in their lives by adopting hitherto untried means and attitudes, it leads to social transformation. In a structurally divided society, the possibility of section or strata wise differential transformation contributes to sustenance of the society as such. Therefore, transformation of such a society in a holistic fashion may not occur according to known or expected pattern and pace. The intensity of desire for change in the existing situation and the ability to dominate collective opinion of the society therefore determine the character of transformation. Under the democratic process, based on its analysis around the world, four options are observed by Smooha and Hanf (1992): partition, ethnic democracy, consociational democracy and liberal democracy for resolving “deep internal ethnic conflicts.” In the Asian context, such an exercise needs to consider further complexities. In India the society is structurally divided in two ways, according to religious faith, mainly Hindus and Muslims constituting 80.4 percent and 13.4 percent of the population respectively (GoI 2011). And Hindus are divided according to four major occupations Brahman (priest), Kshatriya (warriors and kings), Vaisya (traders) and Shudra (service personnel). In terms of social hierarchy, Brahmins are on top followed by the other three in the order as above. Each of the four main castes got further subdivided into many subcastes associated with specific occupations. The sum result is a highly complex structurally xi

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divided society where reaching a consensus or resolving a conflict are particularly challenging. The Japanese caste system following the Confucian logic and philosophy, have had Samurai (warriors) at the top, followed by farmers, artisans and merchants. Transformation of a society, including structurally divided societies may occur according to their natural evolution or may be induced through persuasion as well as domination. Both have their own advantages and disadvantages. The all-pervading high sense of discipline of the Japanese society is easily credited to Japan’s traditional social structure where the Samurai is on the top who are authorised to be ruthless and enforce behavioural changes on the society at large. In contrast, under prevailing circumstances the priests in India are permitted to bend inherited procedures to some extent to carry forward the fundamental rituals or events. In the contemporary post-industrial era, transformation of societies including structurally divided ones are induced according to universal rule books: The National Constitutions, that consider ethnic or other kinds of discrimination illegal, thereby expecting members to protect their unique identity within themselves, families and homes and contribute to nation-building in the global world. Instances of members presently in an occupation with no link whatsoever with his inherited one, may be seen in Bali, Japan, India and elsewhere. Colonisation of some parts of Asia by the Europeans might have introduced the idea thereby promoting transformation of structurally divided societies. However, the increasing number of violent conflicts across the globe is proof enough to believe failure of international, regional and most of the domestic agencies and leaderships in this regard. In light of the above understanding, this book discusses the complex challenges of the subject with special reference to local issues, inclusiveness of difficulties, initiatives or innovations as well as possibilities from India, Myanmar and Thailand towards any possible positive change. Accordingly, different contributors through a varying means of engaged academic research focus on the challenges facing meaningful social and political transformation towards pluralistic societies in South and Southeast Asia. As a salient feature, the book portrays the struggles, roles, capacities and initiatives of the agents, the obstacles they face and how these challenges are addressed through academic enquiry essentially inspired by ground realities. The aim of the book as stated in its opening chapter, is to bridge the gap between academia on the one hand and policymakers, practitioners and community builderscum-advocates on the other by bringing contributions together written by a diverse set of authors both not only from academics but also community builders and local specialists based in Myanmar, Thailand, India and beyond. The book is an attempt to reflect the vital importance of having a meaningful collaboration among the academia, media, organisations and other non-state actors in order to document, disseminate, dissect and direct the sources and forces of transformation across three countries. A total of 23 contributions are organised under three parts: “Fairness, Equality and Freedom,” “Communication, Participation and Challenges” and “Livelihoods, Social Cohesion and Planning” covering topics of justice, peace, culture, minority

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issues, press freedom, climate change, women’s political participation and rights, social and human capital, borderlands, vulnerability reduction, ecological approach and social livelihood, ethno-religious conflict and human rights. Therefore, the book addresses an inspiring set of very topical issues as well as regional themes that should be of great interest to different readers keen to learn about how structural inequalities coexist with a vibrant democracy like India, how Myanmar’s struggling democratic transition in dealing with the military which holds the sway in the wake of political liberalisation, peacebuilding and national reconciliation, and by understanding how three distinct sets of contending supporters of monarchy, military and democracy in Thailand are trying to achieve a steady-state in governance. In sum, the editors attempt to underscore the relevance of active participatory democracy to thwart all forms of socio-economic and ethno-cultural exploitation and persecution besides political exclusion across the three societies. August 2020

Dr. Shovan K. Saha Professor and Director Institute of Hygiene and Environmental Sanitation New Delhi, India

References Government of India (2011). Census of India 2011. Smooha, S. & Hanf, T. (1992). The Diverse Modes of Conflict Resolution in Deeply Divided Societies. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 33 (1–2), 26–27. Dr. Shovan K. Saha is a Professor and, currently, Director (Planning and Research) at the Institute of Hygiene and Environmental Sanitation, New Delhi. Before his current position, Dr. Saha successfully worked as a founder Director, SPA Vijayawada, and founder Dean, School of Planning and Architecture (SPA), Sharda University, Greater Noida. His career represents a total of 47 years of professional, academic and research experience. While based in SPA New Delhi, in addition to his academic tasks, Dr. Saha, contributed in research projects, including, Buddhist Circuit projects in Bodhgaya, Nalanda, Rajgir and Kushinagar in India; landscape design of sites in Kyoto-Nara region in Japan; Master Plan of Lakshadweep 2025; Tsimalakha New Town Bhutan 1978; academic projects with postgraduate teams of SPA New Delhi; Ecocity Plan of Puri, Odisha sponsored by GTZ; Environmental Management Plan, Bengaluru; and Post Tsunami (2004) Development Plan for Cuddalore, Tamil Nadu SPA New Delhi, and SAP Anna University, Chennai. He worked at the UN Fellow at UN Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan for Metropolitan Living Environment in Asia and Urban Conservation. Dr. Saha’s recently co-authored “Visualising Environmental Impact of Smart New Delhi” in T. M. Vinod Kumar (Ed.) Smart Environment for Smart Cities published by Springer.

Acknowledgments

The courageous voices, memories, movements and innovations of individuals and communities have constantly enabled us in realising our mission of academic diplomacy in many ways. We acknowledge all those who have given us such energy and support in their processes of promoting societal change. Our deepest appreciation and heartfelt gratitude for the former Chancellor of Aichi Gakuin University (AGU), the late Professor Dr. Tadataka Koide (小出忠孝), who had generously given many opportunities, support and guidelines to launch international research from AGU. We would also like to extend our sincere gratitude to the following foundations for generously allocating research grants, which empowered some parts of our mission to be accomplishable in the present form. They include: the Science Research Promotion Fund for 2016-17 (学術研究振興資金), Heiwa Nakajima Peace Foundation for 2017-18 (平和中島財団、アジア地域重点学術研究助成), Daiko Foundation for 2017-18(大幸財団、人文・社会科学系学術研究助成), and Japan Society for Promotion of Science for 2017-20 (日本学術振興会、科学研究費). We are greatly indebted to many different individual scholars belonging to various institutes, non-state actors working on ground, local facilitators of different capacities, people in public service, media/communication experts, and students who came across to us through network activities such as the Asian Network for Public Opinion Research (ANPOR), the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF), the Euro-Aunfair Roundtable (EAR), the European Association for Southeast Asian Studies (EuroSEAS), the International Conference on Burma/Myanmar Studies (ICBMS), the International Conference on International Relations and Development (ICIRD), the Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC), and the Thammasat University Conference on Asia-Pacific Studies (TU-CAPS). We extend our thankfulness to Professor Masami Umekawa, the former Director of the Centre for International Studies at AGU for his institutional support, and the staff of the Centre for International Program, who kindly provided logistics whenever needed.

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Last, but not least, we express our deepest appreciation for all the contributors to the third book of the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) in extending its concept, applying its functions and generating impacts to reach any possible corners of different localities. October 2020

Chosein Yamahata Donald M. Seekins Makiko Takeda

Contents

Part I 1

2

3

Fairness, Equality and Freedom

Forces of Change: Transformation from the Lens of Academic Diplomacy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chosein Yamahata

3

Justice and Fairness: Reflections from a Short Look at the Philosophy of John Rawls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Donald M. Seekins

23

Building Equality and Social Cohesion in Myanmar: Plurilingualism as a Platform for Establishing Peace Culture. . . . . . . Makiko Takeda

29

4

The Origin of Minority Problem: Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Takashi Tsukamoto

5

Press Freedom Under the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi: The First 5 Years. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yoshikazu Mikami

51

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Part II Communication, Participation and Challenges 6

7

8

Climate Change Communication in Southeast Asia from Journalist Perspective in the Context of Thailand: Raising Awareness by Environment Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pimonpan Chainan and Viroj Sutthisima Urban Ecological Approach for Climate Change Adaptation Toward Sustainable Urban Planning and Development: An Indian Perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bhavna Vimawala

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Urban Dynamics, Socioeconomic Transformation and Built Heritage in a Historic Town of India: An Appraisal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Subrata Kr. Paul, Souvanic Roy, and Soumen Mitra xvii

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Contents

Women in Myanmar: Marginalisation, Peacebuilding and Participation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Sar Yar Poine and Chosein Yamahata

10 Public Health Reform and Transition in Burma/Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . 165 Voravit Suwanvanichkij and Saw Nay Htoo 11 Challenges and Opportunities for Educational Reform: Under the New Myanmar Government. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 Thein Lwin 12 Local Transformation in Chiang Rai: The Roles of Administrative Organisation in Management and Preparedness for Earthquake. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 Wanwalee Inpin 13 Impact of Institutions on the Performance of Firms in India: Towards Policy Implications for MSMEs from Empirical Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195 Akhilesh K. Sharma Part III Livelihoods, Social Cohesion and Planning 14 Drugs, Livelihoods, and the Limits of Social Transformation in a Highland Periphery of Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Bobby Anderson 15 Urban Transformation and Applied Planning Initiatives in Indian Cities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Anjali K. Sharma and Sushant Jain 16 Rehabilitative Planning Strategy for Transformative Changes of Vulnerable Communities in Indian Sundarban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Soumen Mitra, Souvanic Roy, and Subrata Kr. Paul 17 Towards Social Transformation in Thailand: Orwellian Power Struggles and ‘Digital’ Human Rights Under the Socio-technical Thai Internet Panopticon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Michael J. Day and Merisa Skulsuthavong 18 Reinforcing Social Cohesion in Myanmar’s Borderlands: Strength, Solidarity, and Sustainability of Ethnic Women Organisations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 Makiko Takeda and Chosein Yamahata 19 Multicultural Transformation and Anti-Multicultural Injustice: Critical Histories in the Muslim-Dominated Deep South of Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 Takashi Tsukamoto

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20 Social Transformation and the (Un) Changing Violent Conflict in the Deep South of Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363 Thanikun Chantra 21 Disputed Pillars at the Margin of History: Manipur-Myanmar Boundary and India’s Strategic Silence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377 Malem Ningthouja 22 Naypyidaw: An Elite Vision for Burma’s Future?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 397 Donald M. Seekins 23 Driving Transformation Forward. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 Makiko Takeda, Michał Lubina, and Chosein Yamahata Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423

Notes on Contributors

Mr. Bobby Anderson is a Research Fellow at the Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy and specialises in political economy, governance, conflict, fragility, community-driven development, ex-combatant reintegration, conflict resolution, livelihoods, frontline service delivery, M&E system design. He was formerly with USAID, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the World Bank, and the International Organization for Migration. He was previously a Rotary Peace Fellow at Chulalongkorn University, a Scholar at the National University of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, and a Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Mr. Anderson is the author of “Papua’s Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery” (East-West Center Policy Studies 73), among other works. Dr. Pimonpan Chainan is a Lecturer and an Associate Dean for research and international relations at the Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Dr. Chainan is one of the founding members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Dr. Thanikun Chantra is a Lecturer at Department of International Development, School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand. She specialised in political science. Dr. Chantra’s teaching and research covers international development, volunteerism in disaster management, political participation, local governance and politics, and conflict and violence in the Deep South of Thailand. Dr. Michael J. Day is a digital human rights researcher in South-East Asia. Dr. Day is committed to the education of marginalised learners in South-East Asia. A UK qualified teacher, with leadership experience in schools and higher education, his research focuses on developing the pro-human Web in South-East Asia. Mr. Saw Nay Htoo is a Programme Director of Burma Medical Association (BMA) stationed in Mae Sot, Thailand.

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Dr. Wanwalee Inpin is a Lecturer at the School of Social Innovation at Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand. Dr. Wanwalee’s current teaching research areas cover disaster management, decentralisation, policy implementation and local autonomy. Mr. Sushant Jain is an Urban Designer and Architect. He is currently a Visiting Faculty at the School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi. He is active in research projects covering the designs related to affordable Mass-Housing and Urban MRT, urban regeneration plans, strategies, and schematic, technical design and detailing of buildings towards the promotion of livelihoods and societal change in cities. Mr. Jain is also working on residential Design-and-Build projects in Delhi NCR and the Uttarakhand Himalayan region. Dr. Michał Lubina is an Associate Professor at Jagiellonian University, Poland and is the author of “The Bear Overshadowed by Dragon. Russia-China 1991–2014,” the first book on contemporary Sino-Russian relations in Polish (soon to be published in English) as well as three books on Burma/Myanmar, including the only biography of Aung San Suu Kyi in Polish. Dr. Lubina is also the author of Russia and China: A Political Marriage of Convenience—Stable and Successful . He wrote The Moral Democracy: The Political Thought of Aung San Suu Kyi (2019) and A Political Biography of Aung San Suu Kyi: A Hybrid Politician (2020). Dr. Thein Lwin is a highly respected education expert devoted to the promotion of democratic education in Myanmar. He is the founder of Thinking Classroom Foundation to spread teaching methodology that nurture logical thinking, practice analytical framework and develop skills through a principle of lifelong learning since 2001. Dr. Lwin was also with the National Network for Education Reform (NNER), Myanmar. Prof. Yoshikazu Mikami is a Professor of Journalism and Media Studies at Mejiro University in Tokyo. He has covered Burma/Myanmar since 1989 and interviewed Aung San Suu Kyi in 1989 and 1995, and wrote her first biography Aung San Suu Kyi Arrested Peacock in 1991. In the same year, Professor Mikami was a KnightBagehot Fellow at the School of Journalism, Columbia University, and later worked as a foreign correspondent for Reuters and Time magazine. Dr. Soumen Mitra is an Associate Professor in the Department of Architecture, Town and Regional Planning at Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology (IIEST) Shibpur. Dr. Mitra is engaged in teaching, research and consultancy in the areas of environmental planning, transportation and tourism planning and urban heritage conservation. He is active in various research projects and publications. Dr. Malem Ningthouja is an Independent Researcher specialising in history since his doctoral project at the University of Delhi. He was a Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. Dr. Ningthouja’s recent publications include is India’s War on Democracy (2015), Diametrical Nationalisms: Rulers, Rebels and Masses in Manipur (2015), and Freedom from India: A History of Manipur Nationalism (2011). He is associated with the International League of Peoples’ Struggle.

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Dr. Subrata Kr. Paul is an Associate Professor in the Department of Architecture, Town and Regional Planning at Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology (IIEST) Shibpur. He is engaged in teaching, research and consultancy in the areas of urban heritage conservation, urban planning and management. Dr. Paul has conducted studies on conservation strategies for several historic settlements in Eastern India. Ms. Sar Yar Poine is a Programme Coordinator at the Mon Women Organisation (MWO). She plays an instrumental role in promoting donor relationship, project support and local survey, overseeing logistics and operations, conducting training and workshops, and organising forums and conferences specialising facilitation. Being an active researcher and advocate, Ms. Poine’s specialisation covers the promotion of women’s rights, empowerment, networking and diplomacy, gender justice, women’s political participation as well as involvement in peace processes. Dr. Souvanic Roy is a Professor and former Head of Department of Architecture, Town and Regional Planning and a Founder and Director, School of Ecology, Infrastructure and Human Settlement Management Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology (IIEST), India. He is one of the core members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Dr. Roy is active in teaching, research and consultancy in the areas of urban heritage conservation, environmental planning and urban policy and management. He has conducted a number of international research projects and has several publications to his credit. Dr. Donald M. Seekins is an Emeritus Professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Meio University, Japan. He is the Author of Burma and Japan since 1940: From “CoProsperity’” to “Quiet Dialogue’” (2007); State and Society in Modern Rangoon (2011) and The Historical Dictionary of Burma (2017). Dr. Seekins is the Lecturer for the annual Burma/Myanmar Lecture Series organised at Aichi Gakuin University, Japan and co-founder of Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) in 2009. He is also the active Advisor to the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and the Aunfair-Euro Roundtable (EAR). Dr. Anjali K. Sharma is a Professor and former Dean of Architecture and Planning. She is a Senior Fellow with the Higher Education Academy, now Advance HE, UK and a recognised RIBA Chartered member and worked on Indian Heritage Cities Network programme, UNESCO. Dr. Sharma is also a founding member of Asian Universities Network Forum on Advances in Research, Japan. She is active in research, presentation with Asian and international platforms, and member of various international advisory committees for conferences. Dr. Akhilesh K. Sharma is an Assistant Professor at the Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, India. Previously, he has been affiliated with the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi and Institute of Economic Growth, New Delhi. Dr. Sharma was a former scholar of the Alfred Nobel Charity Fund

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and the fellow of Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Doctoral Fellowship. His specialisation covers MSMEs, entrepreneurship, institutional economics, social protection, inclusive growth, human development and macro-economic modelling. Dr. Merisa Skulsuthavong is an Assistant Professor at Department of Media and Communication, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Suzhou, China. Her research explores intercultural communication, gender and new media technology. Dr. Skulsuthavong has published proceedings on the development of media literacy within Thailand. In her spare time, Dr. Skulsuthavong is a graphic designer and author, having published several popular education books that seek to improve English literacy skills for young children in Thailand. Dr. Viroj Sutthisima is a Lecturer at School of Communication Arts at Bangkok University. Dr. Voravit Suwanvanichkij is an Advisor of Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, and also a member at the Centre for Public Health and Human Rights of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, United States. Dr. Makiko Takeda is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. Her original research covers business management, second language acquisition and programme evaluation. Dr. Takeda engages in interdisciplinary area studies with a special focus attached to women, children and ethnic minorities, multilingual education and ethnic women organisations (EWOs) in Myanmar to reduce inequality, and promote social cohesion and grassroots peace in divided societies. She is the convener of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC) launched from Japan. Dr. Takeda is the author of Women, Children and Social Transformation in Myanmar (2020). Dr. Takashi Tsukamoto is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and a Director of the Thai APEC Study Center and Australian Studies Centre Thailand. Dr. Tsukamoto is one of the key members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Dr. Bhavna Vimawala is an Architect from School of Architecture, CEPT Ahmedabad and a professor at the Faculty of Architecture, SCET (Sarvajanik College of Engineering & Technology), India. She has been coordinating Urban Climate Change Resilience project in association with the National Institute of Urban Affairs under the ACCCRN (Asian Cities Climate Change Resilience Network Funded by Rockefeller Foundation). Dr. Vimawala has published a book on “Infrastructure Development: JNNURM and India Infrastructure.” Dr. Chosein Yamahata is a Professor at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. He is the coordinator of the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) and its subsequent collaborative programmes (BRACIF, AUNFAIR, TIJC, EAR) in bridging interdisciplinary area studies to reach locals across different

Notes on Contributors

xxv

sectors through the soft power of academia. Dr. Yamahata co-edited Rights and Security in India, Myanmar and Thailand (2020). He also serves as Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Mass Communication at Chiang Mai University, Thailand.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2

Fig. 1.3 Fig. 1.4 Fig. 1.5 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Fig. 3.3

Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3 Fig. 8.1

Pattern of sustainable resource use for the future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview of political and social integration, stability, and strength of institutions in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (Source World Governance Indicators [2008–2018], https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/; Bertelsmann Transformation Index [2008–2018]; Institute for Economics and Peace Global Peace Index [2008–2018]). . . . . Good governance in a conceptual flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Academia’s engagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Applied focuses of academic diplomacy and social transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The stages and causes of violence (Source Developed by the author based on Galtung [2000]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conceptual relationships among different factors and proposed direction for building sustainable peace (Source Developed by the author). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A conceptual framework for building sustainable peace through plurilingual education (Source Developed by the author). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The diagram of contemporary urban ecology: key components and their relationship (Adapted from Wu 2014). . . . . Different perspectives in urban ecology and the rising prominence of the urban landscape ecology approach to the studies of cities and human-dominant areas (Adapted from Wu 2008, 2014, Wu et al. 2013a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The scope of urban landscape ecology: three key components and their relationship. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location of Serampore and key heritage structures revealing Indo-Danish-British heritage of the place (1:Data source-Google Maps; 2: Aalund, F., & Rasten, S. (2010); 3–8: Photographs by the authors‚ 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

6 14 16 18 37

41

44 107

108 109

116 xxvii

xxviii

Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3

Fig. 8.4

Fig. 8.5

Fig. 8.6 Fig. 10.1 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2 Fig. 15.1 Fig. 15.2

Fig. 15.3 Fig. 15.4 Fig. 15.5 Fig. 15.6 Fig. 15.7 Fig. 16.1 Fig. 16.2 Fig. 16.3 Fig. 18.1 Fig. 18.2

List of Figures

Serampore in Danish Era (Source “Frederichsnagore or Serampore” by James Thompson, 1827). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The main gate of the administrative compound and its alteration by the British (Left: Photograph during the Danish Era [Undated, British Library]; Right: Photograph by Nana Anderson, 1949, NMD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Apartment buildings in Serampore seen spoiling the character of heritage zones (Photographs by the authors, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Private heritage properties in a state of despair/under derelict condition (Photographs by authors, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Lost ambience and sanctity of the administrative compound and church square (Photographs by authors, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . Courtesy of health convergence core group. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NNER organizational structure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Active fault zones in Thailand (Source Department of Mineral Resources 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage distribution of enterprises by social group of owners (Source MSME Annual Report 2018–19). . . . . . . . . . . . Type of MSMEs and registration of unincorporated enterprises in India (Source Author’s calculation). . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proposed investment regions and industrial areas (Source www.dmicdc.com cited in Quora). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Smart City Mission at the national and regional level (Source Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MRT corridor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bangalore–Chennai Expressway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BRT systems (Source Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Smart traffic monitoring technology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Heritage conservation (Source Bhopal Smart City Development Corporation Ltd. 2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Location of Sundarban Biosphere Reserve, India and Bangladesh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Land cover and linkages of Indian Sundarban. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Locations of proposed clusters of rehabilitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A conceptual framework of social transformation through the creation of a culture of peace by EWOs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The conceptual flow of EWOs’ grassroots peacebuilding based on a Culture of Peace (CoP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125

127

128

129 130 172 181 187 199 203 247

251 252 252 253 253 254 260 262 275 346 346

List of Tables

Table 1.1

Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 8.1 Table 9.1

Table 9.2 Table 9.3

Table 9.4 Table 9.5 Table 9.6 Table 9.7 Table 10.1 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 12.3 Table 13.1 Table 13.2

Comparative trends of human rights, corruption, and government effectiveness in India, Myanmar, and Thailand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparative highlight of adherence to main international instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Selected indicators on inequality, quality of life and environment, and insecurity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Analytical framework. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Women’s suffrage year in comparison with other indicators among 52 autocratic and former autocratic states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constitutional provisions in Myanmar related to women’s rights and equality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ASEAN member states: Status of non-ratification of major international instruments, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law violations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gender inequality in Myanmar relative to 52 autocratic and former autocratic states. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Share of parliamentary seats held by women at State and Regional levels in Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Governmental and administrative positions held by women at different levels in Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparative health indicators of Burma with Thailand. . . . . . . . Earthquake statistics occurring in Chiang Rai Province. . . . . . . . Areas that have been damaged by the earthquake that occurred in the Province Chiang Rai on 5 May 2014. . . . . . Data on the damage from an earthquake in Chiang Rai on 5 May 2014. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Definition of MSMEs in India. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Description of variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7 9 12 121

138 141

142 149 155 157 158 166 188 188 189 198 201 xxix

xxx

Table 13.3 Table 13.4 Table 13.5 Table 13.6 Table 13.7 Table 14.1 Table 16.1 Table 16.2 Table 18.1 Table 18.2 Table 18.3 Table 18.4 Table 18.5 Table 18.6 Table 18.7 Table 23.1

List of Tables

Registration status of MSMEs in 2015–16. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Registration and performance of MSMEs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Impact of registration on the performance of MSMEs. . . . . . . . . Registration of unincorporated enterprises across states. . . . . . . . Registration of unincorporated enterprises across activities (NIC 2 digit). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eradication rates by ha in Shan and Chin States, 2006–2018. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Block-wise vulnerability and suitability for rehabilitation. . . . . . Proposed clusters for rehabilitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Basic data on active EWOs founded before and in 2000. . . . . . . The criteria and indicators of agent analysis to promote social cohesion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KWAT’s potential and capacity for promoting social cohesion based on five criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . KWO’s potential and capacity for promoting social cohesion based on five criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . MWO’s potential and capacity for promoting social cohesion based on five criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TWO’s potential and capacity for promoting social cohesion based on five criteria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Keywords in the mission, objectives, values, and visions of EWOs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparative characteristics of contents from academic diplomacy perspective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

202 204 205 208 209 233 271 273 316 321 323 328 334 339 344 414

Part I

Fairness, Equality and Freedom

Chapter 1

Forces of Change: Transformation from the Lens of Academic Diplomacy Chosein Yamahata

An Unequal World Developing countries across different regions are being confronted by common challenges such as economic disparity, social injustice, environmental degradation, and natural disasters while some of these countries have severe ‘trap-like’ situations of poverty, drought, violent conflict, hunger, health crisis, and state fragility. According to the UNDP, the countries are categorised into four levels: very high human development, high human development, medium human development, and low human development. The annual human development reports offer comparative outlooks on four dimensions of poverty: income, human capacity, freedom, and equality. Since poverty is a constant and pressing danger that threatens the economic lives, social livelihoods, political stability and development relations of a country, the global governance, humanitarian assistance, and international cooperation matter more than ever (Knight 2017, p. 139). What is equally important domestically for each country under such circumstances is a state’s ability in developing, managing, and sustaining its scarce resources—natural, economic, and human—to meet the needs of individuals and communities in a sustainable manner. Todaro and Smith (2017) provide an explanation about a great deal of diversity of development problems existing throughout the developing world, and calls for different specific policy responses and subsequent development strategies. Accordingly, the common development phenomenon of the developing world consists of 10 major areas, known as the ‘diversity within commonality’—(1) lower level of living and productivity, (2) lower levels of human capital, (3) higher levels of inequality and absolute poverty, (4) higher population growth rates, (5) greater social fractionalisation, (6) larger rural populations but rapid rural-to-urban migration, (7) lower levels C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_1

3

4

C. Yamahata

of industrialisation and manufactured exports, (8) adverse geography, (9) underdeveloped markets, and (10) lingering colonial impacts and unequal international relations. Regarding the differences, Todaro identifies eight major areas between the developed and the developing worlds, specifically (1) physical and human resource endowments, (2) per capita incomes and levels of GDP in relation to the rest of the world, (3) climate, (4) population size, distribution, and growth, (5) historical role of international migration, (6) international trade benefits, (7) basic scientific and technological research and development capabilities, and (8) efficacy of domestic institutions (pp. 57–74). However, the position of the developing countries is significantly different from their developed counterparts in their earlier stages of economic development. The world’s nations are far from equal in their capacity to change living conditions inside as well as outside their own borders. The economically, technologically, and militarily most powerful countries—the US, Japan, Canada, Australia, EU countries, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, and China—have the ability to make a difference in the societies of less developed countries through foreign aid, trade, private investment, and international relations. Their political will, collective goals, policy approaches, and the implementation of such approaches matter in enabling a much needed positive change to take shape in their own countries as well as beyond their borders. As such, it is crucial for each developing country to know, based on its resource constraints, which direction it should be heading to. What are the choices available and what kinds of new options should be created? How can all plans and priorities be achieved through diverse trade-offs? Who are the prime beneficiaries in the process as well as in the end? While the ready-made answers are not yet available for all developing countries, a sure path to invest towards a better future is developing and multiplying human resources as it is the commonality among all differences of the developing world. For realising such a goal, it is crucial for every government and its system to nurture and expand human capital, among three capitals, towards social change and harmony, human well-being, and national development through every measure and policy. The policies and actual programmes on ground must be focused on increasing access, promoting equal rights, widening opportunities, building capacities, diversifying entitlements, guaranteeing basic freedoms, and raising dignity to empower and facilitate every member of society towards fulfilling their maximum entitlement. Development in its broadest terms defines it as ‘improving the society’ which comprises people (individuals) under varying identities, beliefs, colours, races, ethnicities, and backgrounds in the formation of groups or communities. Therefore, development in the society implies enabling people to achieve their aspirations through a continuous process of change making them take control of their own decisions and destinies to maximise their full potential—that is building each invaluable capacity strengthened by confidence, knowledge, healthiness, skills, assets and most importantly, freedoms. Such able human resources are the human capital of a country in which building it requires democratic process, political willingness, facilitation measures, and international cooperation (Clark 1991, p. 26).

1 Forces of Change: Transformation from the Lens …

5

Fig. 1.1 Pattern of sustainable resource use for the future

It calls for a transformation of resource use as a common principle to be integrated in development policy and planning at each decision-making layer and mechanism of governments. The degree of success in formulating major policies to deliver its intended target of multiplying human capital among populations can be assured by the political will as well as setting common priorities on the widening of the provision of human rights (accessibility and basic/equal rights), the application of human development framework (capacity formation, entitlement, and opportunity), and the promotion of the guaranteeing measures for human security (guarantee, dignity, and civic freedoms) as the composite enabling mechanism. Against this light, each developing country shall put urgency and priority on the maximising of feasible choices to build its human capital, out of its principal assets— natural resources (renewal and non-renewable resources), economic resources, and human resources, in narrowing the equality gap towards empowering and improving a society (Fig. 1.1).

Challenges in India, Myanmar and Thailand The issues that hinder social transformations toward democracy and development in the Global South are considered in this book through a set of questions. What are the implications, which might affect some parts of this globalising world’s more urbanising nations, and for the lives of the majority of people and communities? How can we avert or prevent major difficult situations affecting many lives? Has history already taught us not to make situations of ‘humanity in crisis’ in the world’s developing regions? What are the both common and salient features in the selected case countries? What are the major root causes that influence agents of change? How do environmental factors play roles in any societal impacts in positive terms? How are

6

C. Yamahata

the roles of the knowledge sector and citizens’ sector interacting in the community as a platform to strengthen towards those positive changes? With such curiosity in the background, the chapters in this book focus on the forces of change necessary towards addressing the wider issues and interests of Asian developing countries, namely India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Figure 1.2 illustrates a comparative outlook of India, Myanmar, and Thailand from the dimension of peace and stability by using the most recently available aggregate data on institutional strength, effect of rule of law, socio-political integration in the society, as well as the absence of violence in each case. All countries show a common phenomenon depicting a similarity for the presence of violence with political instability. Meanwhile, each country has varying degrees in terms of political and social integration, the effective role of the rule of law, and the strong democratic institutions. Myanmar can be understood through the interpretations from these indicators as a society with more divisions, with the least level of the rule of law while also facing challenges in building democratic institutions. On the other hand, the degree

Fig. 1.2 Overview of political and social integration, stability, and strength of institutions in India, Myanmar, and Thailand (Source World Governance Indicators [2008–2018], https://info.worldb ank.org/governance/wgi/; Bertelsmann Transformation Index [2008–2018]; Institute for Economics and Peace Global Peace Index [2008–2018])

1 Forces of Change: Transformation from the Lens …

7

of political integration, presence of the rule of law, and strong democratic institutions in India are outstanding in comparison to Myanmar and Thailand. Focusing on the absence of violence and political stability, Thailand stays ahead of India and Myanmar whereas India’s data indicates itself to be the worst among three. Based on the indication from the Global Peace Index (GPI), which measures more than just the presence or absence of war in a country by capturing the absence of violence or the fear of violence across the domains of safety and security, ongoing conflict, and militarisation, India is relatively the worst among all three. To further confirm the findings of these countries’ peace and stability illustrated in the figure above, Table 1.1 shows the trends on human and political rights, equal opportunity in employment, the control of corruption, the intensity of state fragility, and the efficiency of the government during the 2008–2018 period. In terms of political rights, Thailand indicates more political control than liberty compared to the past while India enjoys more liberty. In contrast to Thailand, Myanmar currently has more political rights than previous years. However, Myanmar’s human rights Table 1.1 Comparative trends of human rights, corruption, and government effectiveness in India, Myanmar, and Thailand 2008 Human rights protection scores

Political rights

Ratio of female to male labor force participation rate (%)

Control of corruption

Fragile States Index

Government effectiveness

2010

2012

2014

2016

2018

India

−1.9

−1.9

−1.8

−1.6

−1.5

−1.4

Myanmar

−2.3

−2.3

−2.1

−2.0

−2.4

−2.5

Thailand

−1.5

−1.5

−1.4

−1.1

−1.2

−1.2

India

2

2

2

2

2

2

Myanmar

7

7

7

6

6

5

Thailand

6

5

4

4

6

6

India

34.4

31.9

28.8

28.1

27.6

27.2

Myanmar

65.8

65.2

64.8

64.4

62.9

61.5

Thailand

79.8

79.7

80.6

78.3

78.3

77.9

India

44.2

38.6

37.0

41.8

47.6

49.5

Myanmar

1.0

0.5

13.7

20.2

32.2

30.3

Thailand

40.3

46.2

44.1

38.9

42.3

40.9

India

72.9

79.2

78.0

76.9

79.6

76.3

Myanmar

100.3

99.4

96.2

94.3

96.3

96.1

Thailand

75.6

78.8

77.0

77.0

78.8

75.0

India

54.8

56.9

48.8

45.2

55.8

63.9

Myanmar

2.9

2.9

3.8

9.1

16.4

12.5

Thailand

61.7

61.7

61.1

65.4

66.4

66.8

Source Fariss, Christopher (2019). “Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 3”, https://doi. org/10.7910/DVN/TADPGE; Freedom House (2008−2018). “Freedom in the World”; World Bank. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FM.ZS; World Governance Indicators. https:// info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/; The Fund for Peace (2008–2018). “Fragile States Index” https://fragilestatesindex.org/

8

C. Yamahata

scores have been declining while India and Thailand are showing progress. The indicator of ratio of female to male labour force participation rate shows the trends in equal opportunity. Although all three countries depict a downward trend, India’s case appears to be a considerable deterioration with 21% decrease within a decade. Government effectiveness measures the perception of the quality of public policies and their implementation as well as the credibility of the government’s commitment to delivering them. In terms of the comparative level of government effectiveness, India and Thailand are significantly above Myanmar. However, Myanmar has shown considerable improvement since its transition in 2011. Table 1.2 draws attention to each country’s status in terms of international obligations which serve as enabling factors or checklists for a government to meet its principal responsibilities: providing security, well-being, and happiness for its own citizens. Myanmar’s total non-ratification of key international legal instruments, inclusive of six major human rights documents, stands as the highest—with the nonratification of six out of eight key instruments among three countries—implying the fundamental loopholes in respecting universal values and neglecting international norms for states to guarantee human rights and civic freedoms for its citizens. Both India and Thailand ratified more major international treaties and instruments than Myanmar but all three countries have not ratified ICC and Protocol II of Geneva Convention 1949. With respect to human rights violations, India shows more based on the available data. All three countries are more or less on the same board in relation to International Humanitarian Law (IHL) violations. Although India is considered to be the world’s largest democracy, it faces inadequacies related to its development. Structural inequalities have riddled India with poverty, hindering its achievement of a sustainable democracy that nurtures just development. Today, India struggles with the urgent need for equal distribution of wealth and opportunities among its masses. On the other hand, Myanmar is plagued with divisions that can be traced back to colonialism. These divisions have only been exacerbated since the Burman-majority military government seized political, economic, and social control, while its ethnic minorities have been marginalised. Despite its recent regime transition, the civilian government’s inability to address the deep-rooted grievances of ethnic minorities and lack of civilian control over the dominant military has perpetuated Myanmar’s longest-running civil war to date. Similar to Myanmar, Thailand is also afflicted with its history of military coups. Thailand faces political divisions that involve contending supporters of the monarchy, military, and democracy. The looming possibility of military intervention continues to be a serious issue testing Thailand’s road to democratisation.

1 Forces of Change: Transformation from the Lens …

9

Table 1.2 Comparative highlight of adherence to main international instruments Articles or items under focus

India

HDI (2018)

0.647 0.584

0.765

GNI per capita in 2018 (2011 PPP$)

6829

Myanmar Thailand 5764

16129

Ratio of education and health expenditure to military expenditure 3.1 (2013)

NA

5.4

Civil Rights

×

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

×

Racism

×

Women ×

×

Protocol II of Geneva Convention 1949

×

×

×

ICC

×

×

×

Total non-ratificationa

3

6

2

Death Penalty

1

Executions

3

Torture Child

1 3

3 2

Disappearances Death under custody

2

Torture

3

3

2

Arbitrary detentions

3

3

Unfair trials

3

3

Impunity

3

3 3

3

Political prisoners HR defenders

2

3

Discrimination

3

3

23

21

2 3

Journalists Total HR violationsb Hague Convention (IV)

19

1

Child soldiers 3

3

3 (continued)

Social Transformation: Peace, Security, and Development Convergence No country, developed or developing, is free from the reality of social transformation at one stage of state building. India, Myanmar, Thailand, and other industrialising countries face challenges of security, development, and the related strain on fragile ecosystems in which livelihoods of individuals and communities are dependent on. This section focuses on the necessity of interrelated social transformations from (1)

10

C. Yamahata

Table 1.2 (continued) Articles or items under focus

India

Myanmar Thailand

Total IHL violationsc

3

4

3

Source Data from UNDP, “Human Development Reports (1990–2018)”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ data; Data from Escola de Cultura de Pau, “Alert 2011! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding” (2011) Note The method is adopted from Alert 2011! a Measures how many of the eight human rights instruments and international humanitarian law have not been ratified b Measures the total number of human rights violations divided into 12 categories based on the occurrence of violations of international human rights law across a range from 0 to 36. A value of 3 is given where there is systematic violation of human rights; a value of 2 is given when such violations have frequently taken place; a value of 1 is given when such violations have sporadically occurred c Measures violations of international humanitarian law across a range of 0–4, where a value of 1 is given where child soldiers are used, and a value of 3 is given where IHL provisions have been violated

conflict to peace, (2) insecurity to security, and (3) underdevelopment to development. Although national policy should, in principle, contribute to alleviating these challenges, they often neglect the necessity of local agents and local solutions. In this regard, Korten (1981) reflects on the importance of re-establishing the connection between the individual and their sense of belonging and responsibility to their community and environment. Therefore, social transformation requires grassroots actors to shape what communal institutions and national governments do by putting capable and informed individuals empowered by the freedom of information, ideas, and dialogue at the core. Social transformation is interrelated to and interdependent on globalisation, the latter of which is a process with widespread effects in various domains inclusive of culture, politics, economy, mobility, technology, and environment; it involves transnational connectedness, generating effects on national societies, local communities and individuals. Therefore, social transformation needs to be approached from a transdisciplinary analytical framework in order to comprehend global interconnectedness and its regional, national, and local effects. It can be achieved through the following six focuses: adopting an interdisciplinary holistic approach; promoting local knowledge training; understanding empirical evidences towards future possibilities; gaining insight into the significance of cultural and historical factors as well as the global and the local through comparative analysis; facilitating the participation of all groups and stakeholders at all levels inclusive of marginalised groups; understanding the integral role of culture and identity (Castles, 2001). Justice should not be disregarded in the process of social transformation as justice, by definition, is social. Although there are various definitions of social justice, its fundamental principles are based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that value equality, solidarity, and human rights (Zajda et al., 2006). Schugurensky (2004) highlights the importance of the state in prioritising national policy to guarantee the welfare of its citizens, ensure a just access to resources and public goods and protect

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their human rights. It refers to the ‘overall fairness of a society and its divisions and distributions of rewards and burdens’ (Zajda et al., 2006, p. 13). Furthermore, social justice is also conceived as an idea with mobilising power by identifying everyday forms of injustice, such as inequality and oppression, towards social transformation (Bonnycastle, 2011; Newman and Yeates, 2008). Sen (2011) articulates that this process of social transformation towards social justice as a continuous process rather than the building of a utopian just society. Common problems of transitional and developing countries can be characterised as lacking infrastructure, skills, and a sound legal system, while compounded by high unemployment and inflation, corruption, social insecurity, and inequality. Therefore, institutional transition and socio-economic changes are intertwined for those countries where social divisions, ethnic diversity, religious tension, and political upheavals stay as obstacles towards development, political liberalisation, and social transformation (Tökés 1996). Social justice calls for governments to have a political will towards change, formulate equitable policies that address social injustice, and implement them accordingly, regardless of gender, race, identity, economic status, religion, and sexual orientation. In this light, social justice becomes a social policy that is necessary towards ensuring a long-term, sustainable peace in democratic societies. A peaceful coexistence among the populations of a country, as well as among diverse ethnic, religious, ideological, and cultural groups within its borders is a solid foundational stone in promoting an equitable society. Therefore, peace and security is an essential factor in increasing well-being and quality of life in every society (Knight 2017, p. 145). This pillar is critical to the economic and social development of a country as well as for the improvement of human rights by creating a conducive environment. It is, in turn, propelling national production, trade, investments, employment, and stability across all sectors of the economy to impact positively on the individuals in human development terms, and the whole society in the dimension of national development. Table 1.3 compares 17 indicators of India, Myanmar, and Thailand to identify three categories—inequality, degradation of well-being and environment, and insecurity. Ethnic diversity is a common feature among the three countries. Firstly, educational inequality is the worst in Myanmar while gender inequality is the most apparent in India and income inequality is the most severe in Thailand. Secondly, Myanmar appears to encounter the most pressing challenges in the category of human well-being and environmental degradation. Starting with natural resource depletion, Myanmar experiences the highest level of natural resource extraction among the three countries. Its development issues are encompassed in the lowest percentage of rural population with access to electricity and the population using basic drinking water services. Furthermore, the percentage of Thailand’s skilled labour force is two times higher than its counterparts, implying that India and Myanmar need to maximise their human capital for a higher level of development. In addition, the majority of the rural population of India and Myanmar are engaged in informal employment. Thirdly, the category of insecurity examines economic, social, and political vulnerability in terms of jobs, health expenditure, and socio-political crises. India encounters the highest level of insecurity in terms of employment as indicated by the significant

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Table 1.3 Selected indicators on inequality, quality of life and environment, and insecurity Focus and indicator

India

Myanmar Thailand

Inequality in education (%)

11.9 (2018)

26.9 (2018)

18.3 (2018)

Gender Inequality Index (GII)

0.501 (2018)

0.459 (2018)

0.377 (2018)

Inequality in income (%)

18.8 (2018)

19.9 (2018)

23.8 (2018)

Number of ethnic groups (diversity)

Over 2000 135

70

Degradation of wellbeing and Natural resource depletion (% of GNI) environment

1.0 (2017)

2.7 (2017)

1.6 (2017)

Carbon dioxide emissions per capita (tonnes)

1.6 (2016)

0.4 (2016)

3.5 (2016)

Rural population with access to electricity (%)

89.3 (2017)

59.9 (2017)

100 (2017)

Population using at least basic drinking water services (%)

93 (2017)

82 (2017)

100 (2017)

Proportion of informal 74.8 employment in (2012) non-agriculture employment (% of total employment in non-agriculture)

78.1 (2017)

NA

Skilled labour force (% of labour force)

17.6 (2012)

17.5 (2017)

38 (2018)

Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and primary income)

10.1 (2017)

5.2 (2017)

4.7 (2017)

Current health expenditure (% of GDP)

3.5 (2018)

4.7 (2018)

3.7 (2018)

Total unemployment (% of labour force)

2.6 (2018)

1.6 (2018)

0.7 (2018)

Vulnerable employment (% of total employment)

76.7 (2018)

59.5 (2018)

47.3 (2018)

Youth not in school or employment (% of ages 15–24)

27.5 (2012)

17.4 (2017)

15 (2016)

Press freedom index

45.33 (2020)

44.77 (2020)

44.94 (2020)

Socio-political crisis

3 (2015)

2 (2015)

2 (2015)

Inequality

Insecurity

Source Data from UNDP, “Human Development Reports (1990–2018)”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/ data; Data from Reporters Without Borders, “2020 World Press Freedom Index”, https://rsf.org/en/ ranking; Data from Escola de Cultura de Pau, “Alert 2016! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding” (2016)

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levels in total unemployment rate, proportion of vulnerable job holders, and youth not in school or employment. In terms of current health expenditure as percentage of GDP, both India and Thailand spend considerably less than Myanmar. As for the total debt service ratio, India’s debt burden is two times higher than its counterparts. Although socio-political crises do not reach the level of armed conflict, they include demands for self-determination, oppression, coup de’tat, control of natural resources, or territory among other clashes. India experiences the highest intensity of socio-political crises while Myanmar and Thailand share the same level of intensity. In addition, the three countries share a relatively similar level of press freedom. Building peace and adequate security requires a wide range of efforts by diverse actors in government and civil society at the community, national and international levels to address the root causes of violence and ensure that people have freedom from fear of discrimination, abuse, humiliation, war, and conflict (Knight 2017, p. 151). Furthermore, it is essential to empower the marginalised members of society to have freedom from want of poverty, hunger, drought, job insecurity, inequality, and social injustice. In addition, good governance and rule of law are essential prerequisites to ensure that resources and services are equally available to people, freedom from fear and violence is guaranteed, and the rule of law is respected as a cornerstone to just development. Peace and development are related to the processes of global social development. As a result, local communities and local agents of change should be guided by such global processes. Local situations and constraints should thus be considered in transforming conflict to peace, instability to security, underdevelopment to development. For example, the need to foster a responsible and transparent approach in natural resource extraction and distribution of resource revenue is important as the unsafe extraction and illegal acquisition of resources often culminate into dissents that further escalates into instability. This must be addressed at both local and global levels; local needs, priorities, and impacts need to be considered in line with global standards to ensure good resource governance as well as the well-being of communities and quality of the surrounding environment. Therefore, local governments and communities serve as facilitators in promoting sustainable local platforms towards a variety of indigenous social innovations. To that end, international communication and involvement for capacity building, financial support, and technical assistance are crucial empowerment measures for locals to implement their initiatives. Approaches for attaining peace and security for national development must have both external and internal collaborations. With this, there can be a favourable international environment and subsequent facilitations to direct business, investments, social services, and overall economic development of a nation. Since conflicts with multiple drivers, operating as systems are often local and do not stop at state borders, addressing their root causes is a complex, long-term task. Moreover, effective peacebuilding as a workable response to any peace process also requires the influence, resources, and commitment of states, institutions, and communities at different levels. Therefore, in unequal and divided societies, democratic participation needs to be reconsidered in order to address the social grievances due to various forms of conflicts, which are harboured by many and diverse groups.

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Fig. 1.3 Good governance in a conceptual flow

Therefore, every government is required to commit to an effective multilateral system, by adhering to international legal instruments including universal values, international norms, and humanitarian treaties, based on inclusiveness, equity, justice, and multiple cooperation as the best foundation for achieving consensus and progress on major security challenges. Social transformation is impossible with existing social inequalities and divisions. Therefore, good governance is necessary in order to address structural inequalities and bridge deep-rooted divisions in India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Although such nations have been transitioning into democracies, their governments have been challenged by issues that prevent rapid social transformation as needed. The needs and interests of diverse members of these communities have been marginalised and forgotten in some cases after the elections. Social injustices that exist between different groups remain visible and often left unaddressed as holding regular free and fair elections alone as only the first step towards achieving a true democracy. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Global Compact, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), among others, are examples of global policy frameworks in place to plan for a sustainable future that stress the urgency of promoting action at grassroots levels. However, countries in the Global South, such as India, Myanmar, and Thailand need to find ways other than receiving foreign aid and investment to facilitate societal change and development. However, weak institutional support, lack of knowledge, poor governance, and inadequate economic capacities, act as obstacles to wider societal change. Figure 1.3 highlights the conceptual process for the elevation of much needed good governance from the current levels and contexts of India, Myanmar, and Thailand to remedy structural, ethnic-cultural, and political inequalities towards coherent social transformation.

Empowering Individuals as Forces of Change: Challenges and Possibilities Now more than ever, there is a need to create environments that encourage meaningful participation from different groups inside a nation. Therefore, the contents of chapters taught us about communities as the centre for change. Creating institutional

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mechanisms that address inequalities and grievances at a grassroots level invites and mobilises individuals to become catalysts of social transformation. In other words, the forces of change are inspired by enabling effective participatory methods that involve the many and diverse interests of various groups. This bottom-up approach in tackling social issues raises a few questions. How can individuals become forces of change? What resources will they be equipped with? What are the effects of a decentralised system of governance? The educational sector has traditionally played a significant role in social transformations. Providing education as a public good provides different members of the community with the tools to access, understand, and disseminate information. Essentially, it empowers individuals to have a substantial voice to engage in political and decision-making processes. This grassroots approach to political participation is meaningful as they serve the needs and interests of the diverse populations, rather than benefiting a certain segment. Therefore, people become the forces of change through active and meaningful participation in a community’s political, economic, social, and ecological decision-making. The responsibility of promoting such grassroots participation lies in the hands of society, especially educators and other actors who are able to transfer knowledge. They are entrusted to transfer applicable knowledge and skills to individuals in order to equip them for becoming forces of change. Therefore, new approaches could be adopted by universities and institutions to address such challenges. Scientific and technological advancements, as well as action-research driven by ground surveys with local interactions, have been made in both conventional and innovative ways at a rapid pace. The fast-changing socioeconomic boundaries, ethno-religious barriers, as well as politico-cultural influences call for more innovative and indigenous approaches as well. The Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP), which is the main vehicle of realising this book, aims to put such approaches in action as contributed by each chapter. Coined by the contributors of this book, the ADP is a group of networked individuals belonging to different educational institutions and civil society organisations, as well as media persons and independent citizens working together in order to empower individuals to become forces of social transformation. It applies a peaceful academic means to solving critical problems, issues, and challenges faced by communities, societies, and nations, especially in Asia. The ADP engages in (1) conducting surveys and scholastic investigations on the ground, (2) reaching out to locals and enabling their capacity promotion, (3) organising international and local academic gatherings where academic and non-academic sectors engage with each other to collaborate in making meaningful impacts, (4) publishing interim inferences and progress reports, as well as providing feedback meetings and outcome consultations, and (5) activating public/international campaigns through academic functions for making positive transformations. The ADP focuses on long-term capacity building and empowerment with such outlined objectives and phases. It places importance on its applicability in local realities, endorsing the importance of the promotion of public relations, professional networking, local consultation, and citizen participation. Moreover, the ADP emphasises on the need for impartiality. It aims to be devoid of any political bias that especially may serve unjust authoritarian systems. The

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Fig. 1.4 Academia’s engagement

sources of its funding are also independent without any ideological, racial, commercial, and religious affiliations. Instead, the ADP is multifaceted in both their integration into existing academic structures and consolidated into the functions of the non-state actors regarding their delivery, process, and monitoring and evaluation. It is being pursued through the designated programmes by collaborating with the voluntary, media and other sectors of the areas and regions under the focus of our studies. It especially focuses on the successful implementation of the following functions: absorbing, sharing, surveying, learning, innovating, empowering, disseminating, monitoring, and activating. Essentially, academic diplomacy works towards benefitting the targeted populations, including students and citizens of different communities, regions, and nations, even if it is done so on a small tangible scale. Figure 1.4 illustrates the mechanism of the ADP, summarised through the contributing chapters, in relation to enabling social transformations in needy grounds, which follows transitions towards equity, development, security, democracy, and peace. The ADP is thus a vehicle for change promoted through study projects, involving local individuals and communities. This figure places social transformation at its centre and the individuals and their communities as catalysts to enable it. The academic diplomacy project in collaboration with other sectors of society become important facilitators in building an open society through generating higher and wider political participation—a grassroots approach towards social transformation. The collective message is that in order to address widespread divisions and inequalities in developing South and Southeast Asian societies, a facilitation of political participation is urgent. This requires the diversification of engagement at the grassroots level to strengthen the capacity of individuals as the decisive stakeholders. By doing so, communities become the catalyst of social transformation for which the ADP serves as a key platform in enabling (equipping) individuals to be active and effective in political decision-making processes. As clearly shown in discussions

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throughout the book, even though there are many differences among the case countries—India, Myanmar, and Thailand—in terms of root causes of crises, escalating processes and attempted solutions, there are also commonalities. They can be utilised in launching social innovation, even out of existing disadvantages, weaknesses, and loopholes once individuals at those communities are facilitated and integrated as key drivers of change. This perception of India, Myanmar, and Thailand become an added value to the readers’ understanding. As collectively illustrated in Fig. 1.2 for the purpose of simplification, a framework regarding the means to promote academic diplomacy actions is summarised through four focuses—causative, curative, transformative, and promotive—depending on the nature, magnitude, and need of the identified problem of the local community concerned. The logic is that a struggling, divided, fragile or transitional nation needs to aim towards building its society to be more open, inclusive, plural, and rule-based. This process requires installing a system of guaranteeing the individuals (citizens) to secure information, knowledge, choices, and opportunities, i.e., building an open society through many transitions towards democracy; development; equality and justice; and multiculturalism. The whole scenario can be understood as a process of social transformation in making communities more fluid, interconnected, interdependent, and responsible. In light of this goal, the causative focus analyses the root cause through the use of local inputs, including traditional practices and indigenous methods, to be harmonised with adaptable external ideas, information, and norms that are applicable; these are the key functions in strengthening local individuals and communities towards the curative focus. The curative focus is directed towards targeting the innovation of empowering activities to be driven, tested, and transferred to the locals. Additionally, this should be designed with the locals, while documenting and researching such bottom-up alternatives to make them applicable elsewhere. The transformative focus centres on dual functions through a series of coordinated efforts and cooperation. The first is through introducing a ‘preventive’ diplomacy against the re-occurrence of negative processes, such as man-made disasters and other related human errors and social injustices. The second method is ‘multiplying’ diplomacy, which initiates various alternatives towards a speedy and irreversible change. The final function, promotive focus, is therefore geared towards pushing concerned communities to be managed by the individuals who are the key driving forces in strengthening democracy, development, justice, and equality and multiculturalism-rich communities in these three countries (Fig 1.5). In sum, the causative phase aims to strengthen the process of identifying major and common problems of the concerned society, while the curative focus promotes the healing process as it is more concentrated on recovering and repairing measures. The aforementioned transformative focus is the most crucial step in enabling prevention as well as further development of communities to become a promising possibility—a better change. The promotive focus induces a long-term cycle of changes bringing benefits to the drivers (forces) of transformation through strengthening a series of transitions towards democracy, development, equal justice, and multiculturalism.

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Fig. 1.5 Applied focuses of academic diplomacy and social transformation

This book, Social Transformation in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Social, Political, and Ecological Perspectives, is composed of selected papers, which are peerreviewed after presentations at academic venues, the 1st and 2nd AUNFAIR, the 1st EAR, and the 2nd BRACIF to be combined with a couple of invited chapters by specialists. The analytical contributions indicated by the chapters of the book, which are case-specific research prepared based on the application of academic diplomacy’s functions applied through aforementioned four focuses, are introduced as follows. The contents discussed in this book are centred on the listed keywords such as ‘bridging divisions’, ‘enabling communication’, ‘strengthening transition’, and ‘fostering drivers of change’ from various dimensions. It also focuses on the examination of those activities of applied research projects adopted by voluntarily committed individuals, who belong to academia and the civil society sector in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, as part of a preventive function to avoid ‘undesirable crises’ affecting the communities, groups, and societies in their individual environments. Dr. Seekins (Chapter 2) revisits the concept of fairness and justice by citing the philosophical works of John Rawls, which directly addresses the question of how a truly just society should be constructed, and hence serving as the thematic chapter of the book. It attempts to describe Rawls’ ideas briefly and show their relevance to issues of development in developing countries, including India, Myanmar, and Thailand. Dr. Takeda (Chapter 3) highlights ethnicity and religion as pressing issues for Myanmar’s peaceful transition to bridge divisions that perpetuate inequality, discrimination, and human insecurity before discussing the possibility of plurilingualism. The conclusive message is that respecting and promoting ethnic equality and minority rights can be initiated through proactive educational means from extracurricular community-based plurilingual classrooms towards the building of peaceful coexistence. Dr. Tsukamoto (Chapter 4) delves into the origins of ethno-cultural minority problems in the Deep South of Thailand where the majority of residents are Muslims. Dr. Mikami (Chapter 5) explores press freedom under the government of

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Aung San Suu Kyi, analysing the situation that surrounds both her and her country, the nature of constraints and ongoing challenges pertaining to press freedom in Myanmar. He argues that there is no absolute press freedom, and that despite major Western news outlets’ negative depiction of Aung San Suu Kyi, a nuanced and contextual understanding is needed. Dr. Chainan and Dr. Sutthisima (Chapter 6) discuss how most citizens and countries are not ready to face climate change induced problems; one of the reasons for such unpreparedness is due to a complex nature of climate change communication. The authors argue that human-oriented reporting is a crucial factor towards change as tackling climate change should start from agenda setting to framing news towards raising awareness of the problems and potential for bridging collaboration. Dr. Vimawala (Chapter 7) attempts to address the importance of the ecological approach for climate change adaptation and its importance on the implementation of ecological planning in sustainable urban development in India. The chapter discusses in detail regarding the response to climate change and urbanisation through urban development policies from a sustainable focus as well as the use of new strategies for improving the quality of urban ecosystems. Dr. Paul, Dr. Roy, and Dr. Mitra (Chapter 8) investigate the causal links in the contest between the built heritage, prevalent urban dynamics, and the related socio-economic transformations in Serampore, a historic town in India. The finding explains several challenges and threats to heritage conservation in the developing world and also identifies the major indicators specific to the case study. Ms. Sar Yar Poine and Dr. Yamahata (Chapter 9) analyse gender inequality in Myanmar’s context, highlighting the different barriers women face as a marginalised group in political participation, peace processes, and decision-making processes, while advocating for social transformation towards gender equality and equal representation. Dr. Suwanvannichkij and Mr. Saw Nay Htoo (Chapter 10) report how ethnic community-based health organisations (ECBHOs) have responded by developing their own local health systems to assist many internally displaced populations (IDPs) from communities across eastern Myanmar who were blockaded by the military and thus lacked access to official health services from the government and international humanitarian assistance. Dr. Thein Lwin (Chapter 11) discusses the important role of civil society education organisations for introducing educational reforms including decentralisation, academic freedom, and language rights and the minority groups’ call for autonomy in education. There is a unique and straightforward voice from an educational specialist that highlighted the provisions of the 2008 Constitution in Myanmar, which imposes many restrictions on the NLD administration. Dr. Inpin (Chapter 12) shares the challenges of the Subdistrict Administrative Organisations (SAOs) of Chiang Rai Province in implementing their responsibilities in relation to earthquake disaster prevention and mitigation. The discussion is based on the experience of the 2014 earthquake that hit Chiang Rai on May 4. It examines the roles of local administrative organisations (Saikao SAO, Paan District) towards disaster management and preparedness. Dr. Sharma (Chapter 13) explores the role institutions play in the performance of firms in India, highlighting the impact of policy interventions that support the growth of MSMEs, benefitting socially backward groups and promoting social transformation.

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Mr. Anderson (Chapter 14) presents the limits of social transformation by discussing the historical and contemporary insurgency and opium cultivation in Myanmar, and drawing attention to the role of opium as a proxy indicator for the coerced integration of non-market-reliant peoples into markets. Dr. Sharma and Mr. Jain (Chapter 15) describe how Indian cities have been undergoing large-scale urban transformation, especially in the last three decades. The spatial impact from the increased international flow of trade, capital, and inter/intra-city mobility includes growing urban sprawl, heavy infrastructural development, and diversifying the social fabric. This chapter documents the tendency of urban policies to reinforce and upgrade the status of existing cities, especially mega-cities of national and international importance. Dr. Mitra, Dr. Roy, and Dr. Paul (Chapter 16) propose vulnerable communities’ dependence on natural resources within the largest estuarine mangrove ecosystem, Sundarban, and the planning measures to rehabilitate the populations. It highlights how in recent decades, the quality of life of the coastal islanders has become vulnerable due to the absolute dependence on natural resources for their livelihoods. Additionally, the lack of physical and socio-economic infrastructure, remoteness from the main landmass, frequent conflict with endangered animals, gradual change in climate and its induced disasters have forced a number of victims to become refugees. Dr. Day and Dr. Skulsuthavong (Chapter 17) draws attention to the worrisome ‘digital’ future for Thai citizens in which a newly ‘legitimate’ and military-backed government since 2019 has been seeking to realise a sociotechnical Thai Internet Panopticon. The discussion covers harsher punishments than have been imposed previously, less personal freedoms, and even more vague legislation since May 2014 all combined to restrict ‘digital’ human rights. Dr. Takeda and Dr. Yamahata (Chapter 18) highlight the potential of ethnic women’s organisations for resolving differences and creating a culture of peace in Myanmar. The study argues that these organisations have been making alliances across ethnic and religious boundaries as an alternative strategy to influence the ongoing peace process by promoting grassroots peace. Dr. Tsukamoto (Chapter 19) examines two critical movements in the Deep South of Thailand, the Dusun-nyor incident of 1948 and the Krue Se incident of 2004, and looks at how these events had been represented by governing elites, intellectuals, and Malay-Muslims. It argues that the incidents illustrate how Muslims of the Deep South are victims of the injustice imposed by the government’s illiberal and anti-multicultural abuse of Muslims’ cultural and religious rights. Dr. Chantra (Chapter 20) examines the relationships between social transformation and the violent conflict in the Deep South of Thailand as the study shows that the conflict has its own dynamic that changes from time to time depending on the social conditions. It argues that while many studies posit that conflict leads to violence in society, few studies consider the possibility that conflict may lead to a nonviolent social transformation. Dr. Ningthouja (Chapter 21) contemplates that the creation of ‘scientific boundaries’ aimed at enforcing colonial ‘tranquility and peace,’ which took for granted the political destiny of the ‘subjects’ who were subsequently locked into either side of a boundary line, was the fallout of the overarching framework of imperialist exigencies. He argues that the ambiguities, compounded by lack of timely actions to settle boundary questions, by and large, contributed to disputes

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and contentious demands. All these became the driving factors of two different trends of restorative and defensive demands raised by Manipur in the following decades. Dr. Seekins (Chapter 22) discusses the visions held by the post-junta civilian politicians and the military elite on nation-building by giving an example about building a new capital, Naypyidaw, which represents the elite’s blueprint for a new Myanmar. Naypyidaw and a new headquarters for the armed forces are located in the centre of the country, poised to take advantage of a new infrastructure, integrating continental Asian economies and strategic proximity to restive ethnic armed groups such as the Kachin Independence Army. However, he argues that the construction of the Upattasanti Pagoda is an assertion of Myanmar’s traditional identity, creating a nation of the Buddhist Burmese and the non-Buddhist ‘others’. Dr. Takeda, Dr. Lubina, and Dr. Yamahata (Chapter 23) conclude the contents of this volume by comprehending the overall message from the contents as the innovative and initiating attempts towards freedom from insecurity, degradation, and insecurity affecting the segments of each society. The chapter briefs stark differences among India, Myanmar, and Thailand, bringing attention to basic insecurities driven by structural inequality, ethnic inequality, and political inequality, which worsen divisions on many fronts. It also emphasises key highlights of a variety of contents as ‘reflections’ from another dimension by solidifying chapters per case country towards a further hint for mending fences across wide divides. Finally, the discussion generated serves as an extension of this volume in order to design the focal point to be carried over in the next book. In sum, the book is a thought-provoking mix of chapters, in which dimensions of sustainability have been explored extensively from varying contexts towards a gradual process of social transformation of many kinds. However, the views presented in each chapter are those of the contributors and theirs alone. The editors hope that this third book of the Academic Diplomacy Project will contribute new knowledge for the readers as well as provide an extension to the existing literature on India, Myanmar, and Thailand as a comparative analytical tool on analysing the recent trends, opportunities, challenges, and possibilities to improve these societies. The editors would like to record our deepest appreciation and highest gratitude to each contributor for devoting their time and energy in accomplishing this mission.

References Bertelsmann Stiftung. (2020). Bertelsmann Transformation Index. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https:// www.bti-project.org/en/home.html?&cb=00000. Bonnycastle, C. (2011). Social justice along a continuum: A relational illustrative model. Social Service Review, 85(2), 267–295. https://doi.org/10.1086/660703. Castles, S. (2001). Studying social transformation. International Political Science Review [Revue Internationale De Science Politique], 22(1), 13–32. Retrieved August 9, 2020, from www.jstor. org/stable/1601283. Clark, J. (1991). Democratizing development: The role of voluntary organizations. London: Earthscan Publications.

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Escola de Cultura de Pau. (2011). Alert 2011! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding (Rep.). Barcelona: Icaria Editorial. Escola de Cultura de Pau. (2016). Alert 2016! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding (Rep.). Barcelona: Icaria Editorial. Fariss, C. (2019). Latent Human Rights Protection Scores Version 3. Harvard Dataverse. http://doi. org/10.7910/DVN/TADPGE. Fragile States Index. (2020). Fragile States Index. The Fund for Peace. https://fragilestatesindex. org/. Freedom House. (2008). Freedom in the world 2008. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2008_complete_book.pdf. Freedom House. (2010). Freedom in the world 2010. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020–03/FIW_2010_Complete_Book_Scan.pdf. Freedom House. (2012). Freedom in the world 2012. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020–02/Freedom_in_the_World_2012_complete_book.pdf. Freedom House. (2014). Freedom in the world 2014. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2014_complete_book.pdf. Freedom House. (2016). Freedom in the world 2016. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020-02/Freedom_in_the_World_2016_complete_book.pdf. Freedom House. (2018). Freedom in the world 2018. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2020-02/FreedomintheWorld2018COMPLETEBOOK_0.pdf. Knight, B. (2017). Towards transformation. In Rethinking poverty: What makes a good society? (pp. 139–162). Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv43vv1s.12. Korten, D. (1981). The management of social transformation. Public Administration Review, 41(6), 609–618. https://doi.org/10.2307/975736. Newman, J., & Yeates, N. (2008). Social Justice. Maidenhead, Berkshire, Eng: OUP in association with the Open University. Reporters Without Borders. (n.d.). 2020 World Press Freedom Index. Retrieved from https://rsf.org/ en/ranking. Schugurensky, D. (2004). The Tango of Citizenship Learning and Participatory Democracy. Lifelong Citizenship Learning, Participatory Democracy And Social Change, 2. Sen, A. (2011). The Idea of Justice‚ Cambridge . Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Todaro, M. P., & Smith, S. C. (2017). Economic development (12th ed.). Noida: Pearson India. Tökés, R. (1996). Political transition and social transformation in Hungary. Revista CIDOB D’Afers Internacionals, (34/35), 79–101. Retrieved from www.jstor.org/stable/40585629. UNDP. (n.d.). Human Development Data (1990–2018) . Retrieved fromhttp://hdr.undp.org/en/data. Vision of Humanity. (2008). Global Peace Index 2008. The Institute of Economics and Peace. http:// allianceau.com/pics/advant/2007_Economist.pdf. Vision of Humanity. (2010). Global Peace Index 2010. The Institute of Economics and Peace. https:// www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB201002B.pdf. Vision of Humanity. (2012). Global Peace Index 2012. The Institute of Economics and Peace. https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2012-Global-Peace-Index-Report.pdf. Vision of Humanity. (2014). Global Peace Index 2014. The Institute of Economics and Peace. http:// visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/04/2014-Global-Peace-Index-REPORT_0-1.pdf. Vision of Humanity. (2016). Global Peace Index 2016. The Institute of Economics and Peace. http:// visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/02/GPI-2016-Report_2.pdf. Vision of Humanity. (2018). Global Peace Index 2018. The Institute of Economics and Peace. http:// visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2018/06/Global-Peace-Index-2018-2.pdf. World Bank. (2019). Worldwide Governance Indicators. The World Bank. https://info.worldbank. org/governance/wgi/. Zajda, J., Majhanovich, S., & Rust, V. (2006). Introduction: Education and social justice. International Review of Education / Internationale Zeitschrift Für Erziehungswissenschaft / Revue Internationale De L’Education, 52 (1/2), 9–22. Retrieved fromwww.jstor.org/stable/29737064.

Chapter 2

Justice and Fairness: Reflections from a Short Look at the Philosophy of John Rawls Donald M. Seekins

As the decades of the 1970s began, the cloistered world of academic philosophy experienced a quiet revolution with the publication of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, professor of philosophy at Harvard University.1 At the time, the kind of philosophy taught in the classrooms of major English-speaking universities on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean tended to be “academic” in the bad sense of the word, concerned primarily with small or arcane issues that had little to do with the important matters that concerned, and still concern, the world. However, Rawls’ theory, which he described and argued for in over 600 pages of A Theory of Justice, directly addressed the question of how a truly just society should be constructed. Rawls’ readers saw his theory as an attempt to reinvigorate the fundamental ideals of a liberal and democratic society by uniting them with the ethical assumptions of the modern welfare state. It is impossible to do justice to Rawls’ ideas in a few pages, but I will attempt to describe them briefly and show their relevance to issues of development in Third World Countries such as India, Myanmar and Thailand. He considered the fundamental design of a society, which we might call its “political economy,” in terms of a “thought experiment.” Imagine, he wrote, a group of people being asked to choose the sort of society they would wish to live in, assuming that all of these people would have material, psychological and social needs and would participate as fully as possible in social life (in other words, they would not be hermits or recluses). However, these hypothetical people, existing in what Rawls called the “original position,” stand behind a “veil of ignorance” as to their own identity in the society they are (hypothetically) going to live in. They would be ignorant of their personalities, health, appearance, talents, race or ethnicity, social class, family background and other factors which make life in an ordinary human society so tremendously unequal 1 John

Rawls. 1971. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press).

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… and unfair. For example, in choosing the basic institutions for a country like India or Burma, people in the original position wouldn’t know whether they would be born into a family of Brahmins, Vaishyas or Dalits; or whether they were Burmans, Shans or Rohingyas, landless labourers, internally displaced people or Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs. Under such a condition of ignorance, the people in the original position would— if they were rational, Rawls argued—try to draw up the basic structure of a society that was inherently just and fair for everyone. Since they identify with no ethnic, class, religious or social group, nor with any physical or mental trait that would guarantee their individual success or happiness, they could be objective (or rational) in choosing social institutions that would be fair for all people, regardless of their own individual characteristics. Their lack of concrete interests defined by social class or role would assure their objectivity. Since, for example, a person in the original position would not know whether he/she would be mentally and physically impaired, he or she would want to make some provision for a worst-case scenario of finding himself/herself with a serious disability by ensuring special public or private help for disabled people. In a sense, Rawls thought of designing a just social system as similar to purchasing insurance, making allowance for the worst outcome that could possibly happen (the worst social position, e.g., an Untouchable) rather than gambling on the best outcome (being born a wealthy Brahmin). This is what Rawls called the Maximin Principle, making sure that the people who are least well-off in society in terms of their health, intelligence, gender, ethnicity, class or other category, are properly taken care of. Rawls’ concept of a just and fair society, however, is not one in which all people are (necessarily) equal: rather, inequality can be considered just if it contributes in some way to the welfare of the least well-off individuals. Thus, Rawls’ schema does not require a society in which all property is held in common (communism), or all people have exactly the same standards of living. Unequal income or wealth is not “deserved,” but is considered instrumental for benefiting less well-off individuals in society. Rawls’ concept of the original position and rational choice in opting for one social arrangement over another is not entirely original, since it draws upon a legacy of social contract thinking which goes back at least to the writings of the seventeenthcentury English philosopher Thomas Hobbes and his classic work, Leviathan.2 In Rawls as well as Hobbes, the social contract is not based on abstract ideals or collectivism but on self-interest. Most people involved in development studies think pragmatically, both because of their own education and inclinations and the need to appeal to powerholders whose major preoccupation is likely to be creating a stable society in order to stay in power. To such experts, philosophy is a useless study because it is too abstract and impractical. However, philosophical concepts like those of Rawls enable us to confront the assumptions that most development experts accept without question.

2

In Hobbes’ Leviathan, rational individuals would choose to live under a powerful, even autocratic, sovereign in order to escape the worst possible fate, violent death in an environment of anarchy.

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One of these is the definition of “success” in terms of economic growth. A Theory of Justice reminds us that a preoccupation with aggregate Gross Domestic Product, annualized percentages of GDP growth and GDP per capita (obtained simply by dividing the GDP by the population) blinds us to the much more important issue of how GDP is distributed. For example, the GDP in real terms of the world’s largest economy, the United States, has grown from US$6.8 trillion in 1980 to US$19.1 trillion in 2019.3 However, these impressive figures do not show us how much gaps between rich and poor have grown in the previously largely middle-class United States: most of the GDP growth has benefited the so-called “ten percent,” the richest sector of the population, while standards of living for people in the working and middle class of the country have stagnated or fallen. This is due largely to the economic policies adopted by the administration of Ronald Reagan and his successors (the emphasis on lowering taxes for the richest people and “trickle down” economics), outsourcing of jobs to cheaplabour countries, automation and, to some extent, immigration. Clearly, if GDP were distributed more equitably, in accordance with Rawls’ principles, life in the United States would be very different than it is now. In developing countries such as Burma, attention to aggregate GDP growth (and profits) is likely also to be highly counterproductive in terms of decent living standards and social stability. For example, in central Burma, a joint venture between the Tatmadaw-owned Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, Ltd., and a Chinese enterprise, Myanmar Wanbao, to expand the Letpadaung Copper Mine was opposed by local farmers in 2012–2014 who realized that opening a bigger mine would not only force them to give up their land but seriously contaminate the region’s natural environment. The investment would benefit not only the owners and stockholders of the investing companies, but workers at the mine and their families who would gain greater employment opportunities. However, it would create a group of least well-off people who would be driven off their land and would have to seek a livelihood outside of their traditional communities. In other words, the benefits to relatively well-off persons (investors, possibly although not necessarily workers) would be purchased at the cost of making many other people (the local community) substantially worse off. This can be compared unfavourably to, for example, a reforestation programme that would have relatively few benefits for investors but would greatly benefit local communities, including farmers, since the replanted forest would not only provide them with new resources but help protect the environment by enhancing flood control and stopping soil erosion. Another example might be the building of a luxury hotel in a large city like Rangoon: certainly, the project would benefit the investors through profits and probably well-heeled tourists and some if not all hotel employees, but would it harm the interests of local residents who might have been evicted from their homes without adequate compensation?

3

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Economic Research (November 27, 2019), at fred.stlouis.org. Accessed 12-19-2019.

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In the practice of development, based on making purely economic decisions, the interests of the less well-off people are routinely ignored. The chasm between philosophical thinking and the actual dynamics of neoliberal development strategies in Third World countries is enormous. Indeed, the notion that the least well-off people should be (justly) looked after and provided for is so alien to much development thinking as to seem absurdly impractical. In most cases, it is the most well-off, both inside and outside the society affected, who benefit the most, or indeed exclusively, as countries like Burma are “opened up” to a predatory form of capitalism. Moreover, as western countries impose economic sanctions on countries they morally disapprove of (Myanmar, Iran, North Korea), it is rarely the elites who suffer; the major impact of such misplaced moralism is felt by poor people. These people are generally forgotten as grand pronouncements are made in Washington, London or Brussels.4 An idea generally assumed to be true among development strategists is that economic development alone will resolve political or social conflicts: for example, in many border area locations in Burma where the interests of the Burman-dominated central government and local ethnic minorities’ interests clash. It is true that ethnic minorities are among the poorest people in the country, but the purely economic development of minority regions runs the risk of benefiting people who come in from other localities (including Chinese workers who are employed on many Beijing- or Yunnan-funded projects) and destroying local communities whose land is taken for industrial or agricultural projects. The “economics-first” strategy of development is particularly prominent in Burma, including large infrastructure projects, industrial estates, and special economic zones designed to make profitable use of cheap labour and raw materials that end up creating new populations of worst-off people, despite impressive increases in Gross Domestic Product.5 Since the “collapse” of communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the Soviet Union itself in 1991, a particularly virulent strain of capitalism— known as neoliberalism or market fundamentalism—has been seen as the only system of distribution of limited resources that “works” to make people prosperous. The reasoning is that by shrinking “big” government, lowering taxes, especially for the wealthiest classes, deregulating business and unrestricted world trade, investment in “innovation” will increase and the benefits will “trickle down” to the poorest people. This model has been applied with deadening regularity to Third World countries and, 4 For example, one of the effects of the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act signed into law by the administration of President George W. Bush was to close down American markets for Burmese textiles; factories were shut down in newly built industrial zones and large numbers of mostly women workers (estimated at around 100,000) were laid off. According to one US official at the time, these women had few work alternatives, and many were obliged to work in Burma’s sex industry to support their families. See Donald M. Seekins. 2005. “Burma and US Sanctions: Punishing an Authoritarian Regime.” Asian Survey, vol. XLV, no. 3 (May–June), pp. 437–452. 5 See, for example, Donald M. Seekins. 2015. “Japan’s Development Ambitions for Myanmar: The Problem of ‘Economics Before Politics.’” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, no. 2, pp. 113–138.

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as in developed countries, it has only served to make gaps between rich and poor wider, creating ever-larger numbers of worse-off people and social unrest. Being a philosophical study, A Theory of Justice is necessarily abstract—dealing in what could be called “first principles” in organizing a society of cooperative individuals. However, the essays in this volume show numerous ways Rawls’ perspective can be applied to concrete development issues to improve the lives of the most unfortunate people including the poorest people in urban areas, people living in environmentally distressed regions, discriminated-against ethnic and religious minorities, women and those communities who do not fit easily into the “homogenizing” vision of the State, a situation found unfortunately in Burma, Thailand and India, the countries discussed in this volume. One of the great benefits of thinking outside the box of GDP growth is to see society as a whole and how policies and projects impact all people inside society, especially the least well-off. Thinking philosophically can teach us that things can be different from the way they are, that the mind doesn’t have to be shackled to the status quo. Instead, Rawls’ theory of justice can free us from the flawed assumption that growth- and GDP-centred economics is the only path to development that “works.”

Chapter 3

Building Equality and Social Cohesion in Myanmar: Plurilingualism as a Platform for Establishing Peace Culture Makiko Takeda

Introduction Decades of civil war and military rule have had a tremendous impact on the people of Myanmar, especially ethnic minority groups, which comprise an estimated third of the population of 51 million. Nevertheless, in 2015 the country took two monumental steps toward democratization and resolution of these issues. Firstly, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed by President Thein Sein and eight out of the total of twenty-one ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Secondly, the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a landslide victory in a free and fair general election. Even so, there is still a long way to go to build a fully democratic society that can bring sustainable peace and development to the people. The brutal repression committed by the Burmese Army has left a deeply ingrained sense of distrust, grievance, and fear in the minds of ethnic minority people. Ongoing peace initiatives, such as the 2015 NCA and the twenty-first Century Panglong conference of 2016–2018, were adopted by the state with the aim of promoting national unity. However, they resulted in new divisions between the minority of NCA signatories and the rest of the NCA non-signatories, as well as among non-signatories themselves, and even increased intra-ethnic conflict in Shan State (Dolan 2016). Aung San Suu Kyi has stated many times that her government’s top priority is to resolve ethnic conflict as soon as possible through an “all-inclusive” peace process, but significant challenges remain to be addressed. Myanmar is a society of great ethnic, ideological, religious, and social heterogeneity. However, the prolonged military dictatorship has transformed this rich diversity into deep division at various levels, exacerbated by inequality, discrimination, poverty, and human insecurity. Unless ethnic harmony is established by redressing inequality, peace will be never in the hands of the people. M. Takeda (B) Department of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_3

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This chapter explores the potential of plurilingualism, a fundamental concept of language education policy in Europe, for promoting equality and social cohesion in Myanmar’s divided society and establishing a conceptual framework for sustainable peace and development. First, the history of ethnic division in Myanmar up to the present is examined. Second, the literature pertaining to peacebuilding and tackling inequality is reviewed. This is followed by a discussion of European efforts to promote unity and inclusion through plurilingualism, in a conscious effort to avoid a repetition of the continent’s catastrophic experience in the first half of the twentieth century. Third, a conceptual framework for achieving social transformation is laid out that might well bridge the various divides that have existed in Myanmar for decades. Then, the possible effects of plurilingual education in Myanmar are discussed, based on the parallels between the situations in Europe and Myanmar. Finally, bearing in mind the current complex situation, what progress might mean in the context of language policy is discussed in relation to the promotion of equality and social cohesion. It is hoped that such an attempt might open up a new path toward pluralist democracy and sustainable peace which can only be possible through the realization of a harmonious Myanmar.

The Historical Background of Social Division and Ethnic Identity Myanmar is undoubtedly one of the most culturally and linguistically diverse nations in Southeast Asia, with 135 ethnic groups officially recognized by the government. The majority “Burman” population is estimated at about 30 million, comprising twothirds of the population. Ethnicity and religion remain the key obstacles to peaceful democratic transition and national harmony, and the civilian government has so far failed to resolve the long-standing ethnic conflicts. However, ethnicity was not always a major issue in Myanmar. The problem was deliberately created and developed during the colonial period and its aftermath. Therefore, it is indispensable to examine the historical background to understand the depth of social division and the reasons why ethnic identity became a divisive issue in a country where cultural diversity was once well respected.

Pluralistic Society in the Pre-colonial Burma Not all multiethnic and multireligious countries undergo violent conflicts. In fact, in many countries with great cultural, religious, ethnic, and racial diversity, people live together peacefully. In the same way, social and ethnic issues were hardly problematic in precolonial Burma. Although people had different languages and cultural heritage, social, political, ethnic, and religious identities were not so clearly fixed

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and unipolar. Individual and communal identity was based primarily on position in the tributary hierarchy, which was more important than language as a determinant of identity (South 2008). Power depended on spatial inclusion by alliances (how far from the royal centre or main cities people lived) and also on the integration of classes in a social hierarchy, which constituted intertwined horizontal and vertical axes. Horizontal inclusion and vertical integration rested upon lines of personal relations and spheres of influence. In such a complex and densely interconnected society, individual kinship, affinal relations, and the strength of patron–client relationships were the most important factors shaping individual and communal identity. Therefore, intermarriage between different ethnic and linguistic groups to form interstate alliances was quite common (Gravers 2007). Discussing precolonial Burmese society, Anderson (1991) observes that states were naturally defined by their leaders and their power, and thus, borders were not clearly delineated, and sovereignty dissolved gradually and imperceptibly beyond the reach of the leaders’ power. Buddhism was another important factor-shaping identity in the precolonial period. According to Safman (2007), “Myanmar seems to have become, culturally speaking, an ethnically variegated but fundamentally unified place where the boundaries were defined in the minds of inhabitants (and those with whom they had recurrent relations) by a social organization based around wet-rice agriculture and a similar interpretation of Theravada Buddhism” (p. 52).

Causes of Division and the Politicization of Ethnicity in the Colonial Period The dawn of the colonial era in the early 1800s brought an end to the traditional relationships whereby the various layers of society were loosely integrated. The British used a “divide and rule” strategy, playing upon ethnic differences to establish their absolute authority. The colonial government divided the colony into the central lowlands of “Burma Proper,” where most of the Burman population reside, and the peripheral and mountainous “Frontier Areas,” where the majority of the minority ethnic groups live. The British took direct control over the central region, while they followed the more common British colonial practice of indirect rule by local ethnic leaders in the Frontier Areas. Consequently, “non-Burmans” in the less-populated mountainous areas were allowed to retain their own forms of government in exchange for promises to end hostilities and resource concessions (South 2008). The British largely ignored the indigenous cultures and simply treated the newly acquired colony as an extension of India (Taylor 1987). They adopted military, administrative, and legal systems from India as well as importing more than a million Indian workers to control the central lowlands (South 2008). As well as these Indians, “non-Burmans,” especially Karen, Kachin, and Chin, were often recruited to run the

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country’s affairs, serving as civil servants, merchants, moneylenders, and soldiers, whereas only a few Burmans were employed in these roles (Fink 2000). One of the underlying reasons for this recruitment was the rapid growth of Christian missionary activity targeting the “oppressed minorities.” The preachers-cumteachers and scholars promulgated their faith as far as the secluded regions of the uplands. They not only taught religion but also supported education, often in local languages, which they helped codify for the first time. There was an increase in the number of Western British-style schools based on Christianity—as opposed to the traditional monastic schools. Ethnic minority people who had been marginalized in precolonial society had unprecedented opportunities to communicate with like-minded people as part of a global religious community. Therefore, many people from ethnic minorities converted to Christianity. This enabled them to access new career opportunities in commerce, and the lower and middle tiers of the colonial administration, while members of the previously dominant Burman majority, did not generally embrace Western institutions and culture and remained predominantly Buddhist (Safman 2007; South 2008; Taylor 1987). These educational and career opportunities, derived partly from missionary activity, consolidated the identity of ethnic minority people as being distinct from the Burman majority. The religious distinction between Buddhists and Christians gradually became synonymous with the ethnic difference between majority Burman and minority non-Burman. Japanese invasion in the early 1940s led to changes in the political situation. The Japanese cooperated closely with Myanmar nationalists who had been suppressed under British rule, including Aung San, the father of Aung San Suu Kyi, who is now considered the “Father of the Nation.” The Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was founded (the forerunner of the modern Tatmadaw) and fought alongside the Japanese against the British, carrying out reprisal attacks and committing atrocities against their perceived enemies among the pro-British Karen and other minority communities (South 2008). Thousands of Indians and people from ethnic minority groups helped to carry out a counterinsurgency operation. The ethnic leaders remained loyal to the British, since they were given vague promises of independence after the war (Smith 1999). Taylor (2006) states that “whether intentionally or not, the consequence of the policies pursued by the British reified ethnicity and made religion an issue in the politics of Myanmar. This was the result of both acts of omission and acts of commission” (p. 9).

The Outbreak of Ethnic Conflicts After Independence Armed conflict between the central Burman-dominated government and ethnic minority armed opposition groups broke out soon after independence from Britain in 1948. Since then, ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) have been struggling for self-determination and independence, and ethnic minorities have been brutally suppressed and manipulated for political and economic purposes. Due to the abundance of resources such as timber, oil and gas, gemstones, and minerals in ethnic

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upland regions, successive governments have been unwilling to give up control, and they have exploited the natural resources with almost complete disregard for the socioeconomic impact on the local population. A policy of “Burmanization” aimed at assimilation of non-Burmans into Burmans. The government outlawed the teaching of minority ethnic languages and favoured Buddhism as the de facto state religion. Gravers (1996) refers to this process as “cultural corporatism” in that an “imagined Myanmar has one singular cultural essence, which is embodied in individual citizens” (p. 240). “One voice, one blood, one nation,” a quasi-fascist ideology originating in the independence movement, was manipulated to legitimize the forced assimilation of ethnic minorities in the post-war era. The egregious human rights violations committed by the Burmese Army have been more the rule than the exception. Innocent ethnic civilians have suffered sexual violence, extra-judicial killing, torture, forced labour, and land confiscation. Rape continues to be used as a strategic weapon of war to terrorize and subjugate ethnic minorities. However, the 2008 constitution places the military outside the purview of the civilian courts, so that almost all of the perpetrators can continue to carry out appalling atrocities with perfect impunity. Years of prolonged political turmoil have exacerbated underlying divisions between the Burman majority and other ethnic groups.

The Emergence of New Divisions During the Process of Democratization Against the backdrop of democratic movements, globalization, and international pressure, the military junta was left with no alternative but to change the political landscape. The 2010s have seen a series of revolutionary political, economic, and administrative reforms. The most notable advances in terms of democratization and peacebuilding have been the establishment of the first civilian government for more than fifty years, the NCA, and the three subsequent “twenty-first Century Panglong” peace conferences, named after the historic meeting between ethnic leaders and general Aung San in 1947. However, these movements for democracy and peace have also resulted in multiple new social divisions between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. A further set of grievances is frustration with the performance of the NLD government, which has struggled to live up to people’s expectations. The NLD won a landslide victory in the general election of 8 November 2015, taking 77% of the contested seats. With widespread popular enthusiasm for democracy, the NLD gained many votes not only in the central lowlands, but also in ethnic minority areas like Kachin, where smaller, identity-based parties had been expected to perform well (Fisher 2015). However, the current 2008 constitution reserves a quarter of the seats in the national parliament for the military, which also controls the nomination of one of the

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two vice presidents and the three security-related cabinet positions: Defence, Border affairs, and Home affairs. Thus, despite the NLD’s efforts at democratic reform, the military retains significant control of the government, which gradually fueled suspicion of the Burman-dominated NLD among ethnic minority people. With regard to peace initiatives, the Myanmar government under former President Thein Sein and some EAOs signed the NCA in October 2015, just before the election. This was the first multilateral ceasefire agreement in the almost seventy-year history of ethnic conflict in Myanmar (some bilateral ceasefires were signed individually in the mainly 1990s). The NCA was intended to pave the way for peacebuilding and national dialogue. However, of around twenty-one EAOs, six were not invited to the NCA negotiations. Of the fifteen that did attend, eight signed the agreement, while seven refused to sign on account of the government’s divide and rule policy. On 13 February 2018, two more armed groups, the New Mon State Party and the Lahu Democratic Union, signed a ceasefire agreement. The issue of inclusion also arose at the first twenty-first Century Panglong conference, which was held from 31 August to 3 September 2016. The government excluded three EAOs—the Arakan Army (AA), Myanmar National Democracy Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)—and also refused to recognize three smaller groups. According to ISDP (2015), the government was concerned that including small EAOs might open the door for other small groups to enter the NCA negotiations, not all of which could be accommodated. In addition, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) delegation walked out of the conference. Since the NLD has maintained the previous government’s position of allowing only NCA signatories to participate in future political dialogue, they felt discriminated against in conference accreditation (Thawnghmung and Robinson 2017). As a result of the peace processes, multiple new divisions have been created between NCA signatories and the rest of the non-signatory EAO groups, as well as among the non-signatories themselves. The ethnic minorities represented by some non-signatory groups continue to face brutal military repression, which has caused hostility towards the NCA signatories, who have been offered benefits and cooperation by the Burmese Army. Since August 2016, old conflicts have been renewed and intensified, especially between the military and the Northern Alliance (the three previously excluded EAOs discussed above and the Kachin Independence Organization or KIO) along the Chinese border in the north and east of the country (Thawnghmung and Robinson 2017). These hostilities have served to undermine the unity of even the NCA non-signatories. In 2016 and 2017, four EAOs, including the TNLA and the MNDAA, resigned their membership of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), an alliance of nine non-NCA signatory armed groups, which was originally formed with 12 ethnic organizations to achieve various objectives of peace process including building a genuine multi-party system and establishing a federal union. Although the initial expectation for UNFC was high, it has been broken apart. First, the Karen National Union (KNU) suddenly resigned in 2014 due to an internal power struggle. One year later, Chin National Front (CNF) and Pa-O National Liberation Organizations (PNLO) were suspended since the two groups signed NCA, although others rejected NCA because of its non-inclusiveness. Unlike other bigger

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and more powerful groups, CNF and PNLO could not challenge military attacks, which left them no choice but to sign NCA because of the security concern. The TNLA and the MNDAA, which were excluded from both of the peace processes, wished to form a strategic alliance with the powerful UWSA in order to focus on military defence, unlike some other UNFC members (Naing and Kha 2016). At the moment in 2020, the remaining members of UNFC are five—National Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), Karenni national Progressive Party (KNPP), Lahu Democratic Union (LDU), and Arakan National Council (ANC), out of which, NMSP and LDC are signatories and other three are non-signatories. The second Panglong conference, held from 24 May 2017 to 29 May 2017, had mixed results, with some progress combined with setbacks. Fifteen armed groups were present at the conference, including eight NCA signatories and seven nonsignatories, including the Northern Alliance as well as the UWSA, because of Chinese facilitation. Although consensus was reached on 37 of 41 points discussed, the government did not change the policy of restricting political dialogue to NCA signatories, and the non-signatories were invited on an observer or special guest basis. Therefore, five armed groups remaining in the UNFC (four members resigned earlier) pulled out of the conference because they would not have the right to fully participate (Lynn and Slow 2017). In addition, the different peace processes employed by different groups within the same ethnic state have provoked intra-ethnic conflict—namely between the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and the TNLA. Although largely grouped into one of eight national groups, there are many subethnic groups within it, which are affiliated with the different EAOs. Their history, current situation, expectations, and relationships with other groups and external actors like China are all different, making it difficult for them to move forward collectively (Naing and Kha 2016). A further source of division is the growing religious tension in Rakhine State. Myanmar is predominantly Buddhist, and people of other faiths, who generally belong to ethnic minority groups, have a history of discrimination and persecution. In particular, most of the Muslim Rohingya in Rakhine State have been denied citizenship as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh since the implementation of the Myanmar Citizenship Law in 1982, and they have experienced serious human rights violations. In late 2016, long simmering tension boiled over into armed conflict between Muslim militants and the military. The root cause of the violence was earlier mass attacks on Muslims by Buddhist extremists inspired by the rise of Ma Ba Tha. This conflict exacerbated the division between the Muslim minority and Buddhist majority, including the Buddhist Arakan ethnic group.

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Peacebuilding, Reduction of Inequality, and Identity As discussed above, the people of Myanmar have historically been stratified along lines of ethnicity, religion, and race, with new sources of division arising from political, economic, and social reforms, and the peace process itself. Therefore, an allinclusive NCA is unlikely to be reached in the near future, and without stability and peace, Myanmar remains in a perilous situation where new conflicts might erupt. The distrust, grievance, and fear that are deeply ingrained in people’s minds and memories prevent them from effectively collaborating in moving the peace process forward. Thus, it is important to review the literature related to violence and peacebuilding, as well as the reduction of inequality, since this could indicate a way to bridge the divide that might offer a breakthrough.

Working for Peace Means Working Against Violence Johan Galtung (2000), known as “the father of peace studies,” states that “to work for peace is to work against violence; by analysing its forms and causes, predicting in order to prevent, and then acting preventatively and curatively since peace relates to violence much as health relates to illness”(p. xi). Therefore, if the ultimate goal of Myanmar is “all-inclusive peace,” necessitating a change in society from deep division to harmony, the nature of violence has to be scrutinized as a doctor diagnoses a disease and prescribes preventative or curative medicine. There are three stages in the development of violence. The first stage is a conflict between two parties with incompatible goals, a ubiquitous phenomenon in human and social reality. In other words, a conflict is caused by contradictions, which leads to frustration and has the potential to result in mutual aggression. The second stage is polarisation, where people are separated into two groups, “Self and Other.” In such a situation, the Other is dehumanized like Satan, and the Self is exalted as supreme and sacred like God. Polarisation is driven by negative attitudes and behaviour, such as prejudice and discrimination toward the “Other,” based on deep and long-lasting social structures (Galtung 2000). Galtung (1969) also points out the importance of an extended concept of violence, which he defines as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is” (p. 168), and it is an avoidable mode of behaviour. There are two types of violence: direct or personal and indirect or structural. The former refers to “physical acts of violence,” while the latter is “the different allocation of goods, resources, opportunities, between different groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc., because of the structure governing their relationship” (Galtung 2000, p. 17). Therefore, it could be argued that polarisation itself is already structural violence if the subaltern group is hurt or harmed. However, unresolved conflict and polarisation alone do not always lead to the third stage of physical violence unless their basic needs are deeply insulted. Suffering can

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Fig. 3.1 The stages and causes of violence (Source Developed by the author based on Galtung [2000])

persist without violence, when people see their predicament as an inevitable part of human life. Galtung further argues that when there is also a culture of violence or cultural violence then conflict resolution through direct violence is likely to result and can become normalized. Galtung (1990) defines cultural violence as “any aspect of a culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence—exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science—that can be used to justify and legitimize direct and structural violence” (p. 291). Figure 3.1 shows the stages and causes of violence. Galtung (2000) argues that the presence of all three components, bad actors, bad structures (polarised), and bad cultures (violent), results in violence, but there will be always violence-prone actors and incompatible goals. To prevent violence, it is better to build on peace structures and peace cultures. Contradictions, which are the causes of conflict, can be resolved by the parties non-violently, creatively, and empathetically through dialogue, if a bad structure does not exist. Structural violence, which is the cause of polarisation, is based on social inequality, therefore depolarisation can be achieved by reducing inequality. In UN jargon, these two activities are known as peacemaking and peacebuilding respectively (Galtung 2000). As the concept of violence is extended, the concept of peace also becomes two-sided if peace is regarded as the absence of violence. Galtung (1969) refers the absence of personal violence and structural violence as ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ respectively. Thus, it can be argued that negative peace, which could be achieved through ceasefire alone cannot create the other side of peace.

The Concept of Peacebuilding and Its Direction The sixth UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, defined peacebuilding as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (United Nations 1992). According to Lederach (1997), peacebuilding is “a comprehensive concept that encompasses,

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generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (p. 20). From the two definitions, it is apparent that peacebuilding concerns change in relationships and structures to prevent violent conflicts. Zelizer and Oliphant (2013) explain that the focus of peacebuilding is on “transforming relationships and structures in society to decrease the likelihood of future conflicts” (p. 7). Based on these definitions and the discussion in the previous section above, peacebuilding can be defined as changing the bad social structures and cultures of violence in Fig. 3.1 to peace structures and cultures of peace.

The Relationship Between Inequality, Identity, and Group Mobilisation Pettigrew (2007) defines social identity as “those aspects of the self-concept that derive from an individual’s knowledge and feelings about the group memberships the person shares with others” (p. 35). In other words, social identity is the group component of the self-concept and therefore directly affects self-esteem and many other aspects of self-identity. People usually belong to many social groups and see themselves in many different ways. Whereas some identities are temporary and insignificant, others are more permanent and important, such as gender, ethnicity, and religion. Violent group mobilisation is likely to occur when a group of people have serious grievances along lines of their shared identity that are significant and influential in shaping their behaviour and well-being. People become strongly motivated to fight when severe and consistent economic, social, and political inequalities between culturally defined groups exist. However, it is not only the relatively deprived but also the privileged who may instigate violence due to fear of losing their power and position. Stewart (2008) observes that “the prospect of the possible loss of political power can act as a powerful motive for state-sponsored violence which occurs with the aim of suppressing opposition and maintaining power” (p. 12).

The Four Dimensions of Inequality As discussed above, a key aspect of peacebuilding is transforming social structures by reducing inequality since violent group mobilisation tends to occur when substantial inequalities persist between groups based on social identity. Stewart (2008) describes inequalities between culturally identified groups or groups with shared identities as horizontal inequalities (HIs) and distinguishes them from vertical inequalities (VIs), which exist between individuals. There are four dimensions of HIs: political participation, economic aspects, social aspects, and cultural status. HIs in political participation refers to participation in government at various levels and state institutions

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such as the army and police. Economic aspects include access to and control of assets, employment opportunities, and incomes. Social aspects encompass access to services such as education, health, water, sanitation, and housing, as well as human outcome indicators including measures of health and educational achievement. HIs in cultural status encompasses the extent to which a society recognizes a group’s cultural norms and practices, such as religion and language. These four dimensions of HIs have causal interconnections. For instance, HIs in political participation often results in social and economic inequalities. Although recent research on the causes of civil wars predominantly focuses on political and economic issues, in many conflicts, those issues are complemented by perceptions of cultural discrimination, exclusion, or inequality of treatment. In fact, political and economic inequalities usually occur along the line of cultural differences. Such cultural status HIs can arise where the state is primarily connected to one cultural group (Langer and Brown 2008). According to Kymlicka (2004), cultural exclusion “occurs when the culture of a group, including its language, religion or traditional customs and lifestyles, is denigrated or suppressed by the state” (p. 2). The simultaneous existence of acute cultural status HIs together with political, economic, and social HIs causes an especially explosive situation, since in such a context, deprived political elites not only have strong incentives to mobilize their supporters for violent conflict, but also gain support relatively easily (Langer 2007). Huntington (1993) argues in his hypothesis of the clash of civilisations that “the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” (p. 22).

Means of Reducing Inequalities for Changing Relationships Numerous approaches for dealing with HIs have been pursued by different countries. Ultimately, all the policies are aimed at reducing actual inequalities. However, in practice, the initiatives have to be targeted at the processes driving these outcomes, rather than the outcomes themselves. There are three main types of approach: direct, indirect, and integrationist (Stewart et al. 2008). Direct approaches have positive impacts on the deprived and negative impacts on the privileged. Indirect approaches focus on the same outcomes as direct approaches indirectly via general policies. While direct approaches unavoidably increase the salience of identity differences, indirect approaches are fairly neutral and might be instrumental in greater integration in the long run. Reducing the sharpness and salience of group distinctions by increasing integration is the target of the integrationist approach. It does not aim at reducing HIs themselves, but it should reduce the possibility of group mobilisation. Some examples of direct approaches for reducing HIs in cultural status dimension are minority language recognition and education, and symbolic recognition such as public holidays and attendance at state functions. Indirect approaches include freedom of religious observance and non-existence of state religion. Integrationist

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approaches encompass civic citizenship education and promotion of an overarching national identity (Stewart et al. 2008, p. 304). Nonetheless, such policies may meet with serious opposition from the privileged due to the perceived threat to their own position. Therefore, a broad consensus on the importance of national unity and stability, as well as transparency in the projects, is essential for winning support and avoiding resistance. Development is also important, since when measures to address HIs coincide with strong economic growth, the policies are less likely to be politically controversial (Stewart et al. 2008). Peace and development form two sides of the same coin, because they strengthen and widen each other’s credibility, viability, and sustainability (UNESCO 2013).

Means of Creating the Culture of Peace The other aspect of peacebuilding is to transform the culture of violence into the culture of peace. The United Nations (1998) defined the culture of peace as: a set of values, attitudes and behaviors that reflect and inspire social interaction and sharing based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, all human rights, tolerance and solidarity, that reject violence and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation and that guarantee the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the development process of their society.

Galtung (2000) explains that cultures of peace “promote peace as a value, espect and celebrate differences and protect/promote the political, civil, social, economic, and cultural rights of all individuals, communities, and groups, and are inclusive (by choice and dialogue rather than by force), rather than exclusive in vision” (p. 19). In short, the culture of peace can be said to be a set of values, attitudes, and behaviours that respect the rights of all humanity equally and tackle the roots of violence proactively in a truly democratic society. The UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration on a culture of peace, identifying eight action areas. These were: (1) foster a culture of peace through education, (2) promote sustainable economic and social development, (3) promote respect for all human rights, (4) ensure equality between women and men, (5) foster democratic participation, (6) advance understanding, tolerance, and solidarity, (7) support participatory communication and the free flow of information and knowledge, and (8) promote international peace and security (United Nations 1999).

Building Sustainable Peace Through Depolarisation and Cultural Change Figure 3.2 shows conceptual relationships among different factors and proposed direction for building sustainable peace. As identified previously, the presence of

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Fig. 3.2 Conceptual relationships among different factors and proposed direction for building sustainable peace (Source Developed by the author)

two main factors, bad structure and culture, is likely to result in violence (Fig. 3.1). Therefore, the key aspects of peacebuilding are to change bad social structures and culture of violence into peace structures and culture of peace, so that sustainable peace can be established through changes in relationships, leading to social harmony and cohesion (the target actions are indicated as dotted arrows in Fig. 3.2). A peace structure is constructed through depolarisation, which is promoted by reducing four different inequalities with possibly three different approaches, direct, indirect, and integrationist. A culture of peace is promoted by taking action in eight areas. When a peace structure and a culture of peace exist, Self/Other relationships can be changed to more peaceful ones, and with shared development, peace is more credible, viable, and sustainable.

The Council of Europe’s Initiatives and Language Policy The Background of the Council of Europe’s Initiatives for Greater Unity The first half of the twentieth century was indisputably the most violent period in European history. Kershaw (2005) argues that more precisely, the years 1914– 1950—from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second World War—constitute “the era of violence.” Many European countries underwent war, civil war, revolution, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, causing appalling casualties and misery for millions of people. The Council of Europe, the continent’s oldest intergovernmental organization, was founded in 1949. It comprises 47 member states, 28 of

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which are members of the European Union. The overall aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity among its members, and all the member states signed the European Convention on Human Rights, a treaty designed to protect human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. This overall aim has been broken down into four specific objectives (Council of Europe n.d.-a): (1) “to protect human rights, pluralist democracy and the rule of law,” (2) “to promote awareness and encourage the development of Europe’s cultural identity and diversity,” (3) “to seek solutions to problems facing European society, such as discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, environmental protection, human cloning, terrorism, human trafficking, organised crime and corruption, cybercrime, and violence against children,” and (4) “to help consolidate democratic stability in Europe by supporting political, legal and constitutional reform.”

Language Policy and Plurilingualism: Toward a Greater European Identity The Council’s activities to champion linguistic diversity and language learning are conducted within the framework of the European Cultural Convention, which was adopted in 1954 and ratified by 49 states. One such initiative is the promotion of plurilingualism. This is a fundamental principle of language education policy, since it has the potential to strengthen linguistic diversity and language rights, deepen mutual understanding, consolidate democratic citizenship, and sustain social cohesion. Plurilingualism is defined as: the ability to use languages for the purposes of communication and to take part in intercultural interaction, where a person, viewed as a social agent, has proficiency of varying degrees, in several languages, and experience of several cultures. This is not seen as the superposition or juxtaposition of distinct competences, but rather as the existence of a complex or even composite competence on which the user may draw. (Council of Europe 2007)

Plurilingualism is different from the similar term, multilingualism, which refers to “the presence in a geographical area, large or small, of more than one ‘variety of language’ i.e. the mode of speaking of a social group whether it is formally recognised as a language or not; in such an area individuals may be monolingual, speaking only their own variety” (Council of Europe n.d.-b). In a plurilingual society, all the citizens have a command of several languages and experience of several cultures. The European Policy Unit in Strasbourg, France, implements intergovernmental programmes to support language policy development, and these programmes are complemented by other Council of Europe institutions, such as the European Centre for Modern Languages (ECML) in Graz, Austria. Plurilingualism facilitates mobility within Europe for leisure and work purposes, but is above all crucial for the social and political inclusion of all Europeans and for the development of a sense of European identity. The European Council has identified six main social benefits of plurilingualism (Council of Europe 2007, n.d.-b):

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Promotion of linguistic diversity, Recognition of language rights and mutual understanding, Evolution of a greater European identity, Respect for and development of democracy, Social and political inclusion, and Promotion of social cohesion.

In multilingual societies under plurilingualism, the use of all varieties of languages spoken by the citizens of Europe is facilitated, which has a direct influence on the promotion of linguistic diversity. Moreover, the experience of learning other languages inevitably promotes intercultural communication and acceptance of cultural differences, which results in mutual understanding and greater recognition of others’ language rights. Interaction and communication with other Europeans also encourage a sense of belonging to Europe and the acceptance of a European identity. Furthermore, the plurilingual competence of individuals is crucial for participation in democratic and social processes, thereby promoting social and political inclusion. Plurilingualism enhances equality of opportunity for personal development, education, employment, mobility, access to information, and cultural enrichment, with positive consequences for social cohesion (Council of Europe 2007 n.d.-b). Having pursued the principle of plurilingualism, the EU’s language education policy emphasizes the following five points (Council of the EU 1995): (1) Every EU citizen should master their mother tongue, plus two other EU languages, (2) establishing or developing early teaching of modern languages in primary schools, (3) encouraging contact with native speakers through the virtual and physical mobility of students and teachers, (4) promoting innovative methods in schools and improving quality of teacher training, and (5) promoting less widely used or less frequently taught languages at all levels of teaching and throughout all types of curriculum. Children who receive plurilingual education, irrespective of their perceived social status, can readily develop a respect for the cultures and identities embodied in other languages by learning with friends from diverse cultural backgrounds. It is obvious that the establishment of the Council of Europe was a manifestation of Europeans’ firm determination not to repeat past mistakes arising from extreme nationalism and intolerance of diversity. In 2012, the EU received the Nobel Peace Prize for its contribution to and advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe. The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s main reason for the award was the stabilizing role that the EU has played in transforming most of Europe from a continent of war to a continent of peace. The division between East and West has been largely brought to an end, democracy has been strengthened, and a number of ethnic conflicts have been settled (Nobelprize.org 2012). Pettigrew (2007) analysed two surveys conducted in Europe regarding the relationships between prejudice, social identity, and the potential for group violence and found that more inclusive identities correlate with higher levels of tolerance, less prejudice, and lower levels of overt violence. There was also a correlation between age, education, and political views. The older respondents tended to be less educated,

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more politically conservative and nationally identified. It is compelling evidence for this trend that while only 19% of people aged 18–24 supported a British exit from the EU, 59% of pensioners voted to leave (Shuster 2016). The younger generations tend to be more politically liberal and have more universalistic identities due to the ceaseless effort by the EU to promote peace. Universalistic identities can counteract the negative impact of the narrower forms of nationalism. Therefore, it can be argued that plurilingualism has to a certain extent, the positive effects of reducing personal and structural violence. Plurilingualism could be promoted by direct, indirect, and integrationist approaches to reduce cultural and social inequalities (Fig. 3.2). In addition, plurilingualism can surely facilitate the action areas for the culture of peace, since learning other languages nurtures a spirit of mutual respect and tolerance of diversity, promotes democracy and social cohesion as well as creates a stronger sense of civic identity.

A Conceptual Framework for Peacebuilding and the Possible Consequences for Myanmar’s Divided Society Figure 3.3 depicts a conceptual framework for building sustainable peace through plurilingual education in Myanmar. As discussed above, the focus of peacebuilding is to change a bad structure/polarisation and a culture of violence into a peace structure/depolarisation and a culture of peace so that sustainable peace can be created through changes in relationships, resulting in reconciliation, social harmony, and cohesion. Moreover, development is an important factor for such changes to be less controversial and more credible, valid, and sustainable. Polarisation is caused by four different kinds of inequalities. Without polarisation, a culture of violence cannot be created. In other words, inequalities are a prerequisite for the establishment of a culture of violence. Underdevelopment also arises in part out of spatial inequalities. Development is not simply material growth but also involves mental progress (Jenamani 2005). Todaro (1977) explains that underdevelopment has three principal components: low standards of living, low self-esteem, and limited freedom. Low standard of living is a material factor, while the other

Fig. 3.3 A conceptual framework for building sustainable peace through plurilingual education (Source Developed by the author)

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two are non-monetary aspects of underdevelopment, though they are all interrelated. Polarisation and underdevelopment rooted in various inequalities contribute the development of a culture of violence. As explained above, plurilingualism can help to reduce personal and structural violence, as well as addressing the eight action areas of the culture of peace, including sustainable development. In Myanmar, people are deeply divided and polarised along ethnic and religious lines. In addition, 37% of the population still live near or below the poverty line, and most of these vulnerable people live in rural and ethnic areas (World Bank 2017). If plurilingual education is successfully encouraged and implemented on a long-term basis, peace structures, a culture of peace, and sustainable development could be achieved, leading to changes in relationships and reconciliation between the polarised groups and the promotion of sustainable peace. Lederach (1997) proposed three factors needed to catalyse reconciliation and sustain it in divided societies. First, he argues that it is important to view protracted conflict as a system and that reconciliation can be built on the mechanisms of the system so that the conflicting groups engage in constructive dialogue as humanin-relationship. Second, reconciliation represents an encounter where both parties can acknowledge the past and work interdependently for their shared future. Third, reconciliation involves the creation of social space, since it is necessary for people to encounter one another to transform their relationship. By implementing plurilingual education, social space is inevitably created at school, not only for children but also for teachers, parents, and communities. Children represent a shared future. When more and more broad-minded children with plurilingual competence grow up, they would be a powerful driving force for harmony and sustainable peace in Myanmar.

Language Policy in Myanmar: Progress or Setback? On 30 September 2014, the National Education Law was enacted, despite being widely criticized as undemocratic and overly centralized. Students and other protestors staged demonstrations against the new law in different parts of the country and were violently dispersed. Student representatives released an eleven point demand for the amendment of the new law. Point 7 of the demand addresses issues of language rights in relation to multilingual education, calling for the National Education Law to guarantee freedom to use ethnic languages and mother tonguebased (MTB) multilingual education for ethnic populations and tribes. Because of these students’ efforts, a revised version was issued on 25 June 2015. However, this revised law, as well as subsequently drafted by-laws, has also been criticized for assigning too much decision-making power to the government (Ei Shwe Phyu 2016). The current education reforms, although not going as far as most ethnic educators and students demanded, have engaged with issues of ethnic MTB education. Some government schools have started teaching ethnic languages as a subject of instruction, although this is still a long way from MTB education, in which all subjects are taught

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in the mother tongue (South and Lall 2016). Moreover, in reality, a large number of children, especially in government-controlled areas, remain without MTB education. Apart from government schools, there are also various ethnic schools, often developed by non-state ethnic education regimes under EAOs authority. These schools have offered MTB education, particularly at the primary level, and taught their own culture, literature, and tradition. They differ considerably in terms of their degree of independence from the government, curriculums, and language focus. Although MTB education is important for academic achievement and cognitive development, separate education systems have certain disadvantages, such as limited job opportunities without Burmese language skills and difficult transitions to government schools and integration into Burmese society (South and Lall 2016). Thus far, language policy has been discussed in terms of the linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic minorities, focusing on MTB education, but not in relation to peace process. Language, culture, and identity are inextricably related. SavilleTroike (1986, p. 49) argues that “language is a key component of culture,” a defining feature of an individual person’s identity that exercises considerable influence over his or her behaviour, thoughts, and views about the world (Rovira 2008). Therefore, the suppression of an ethnic minority group’s mother tongue through a policy of assimilation is equivalent to a denial of that group’s ethnic identity, which damages self-esteem and fosters hatred as well as promoting group mobilisation. In addition to the eight main ethnic groups, there are a number of subgroups with distinct cultures and languages. Further marginalisation might occur if the consideration is not given to these vulnerable people, who are in danger of losing their mother tongues. The creation of lingua franca may be necessary within the main ethnic groups, but there must be constructive dialogues for promoting general agreement as well as transparency of the process. Therefore, unless the issues of language policy are properly addressed, any peace processes may end up with mere fruitless efforts. Direct physical violence may end due to ceasefire agreements, but structural violence and the culture of violence are deeply rooted in people’s minds. If a triggering event occurs, the consequence might be a resurgence of violence, as ceasefire agreements have been invalidated a number of times in Myanmar’s history. What is overlooked in the current discussion is that language policy reform involves not only ethnic minorities but also the majority. To realize a sustainable peace, there must be change in the mindset of such people. Unless both minorities and also the majority try to adapt for the common good, it will be difficult to create harmony among people. Although the issues of language policy have been addressed and some progress has been made on MTB education, in terms of people’s attitudes to language policy, this might still be the first step along the road toward a pluralistic society. In addition, awareness of the minorities within ethnic minorities needs to be raised. However, there are some hopeful signs. Intellectual monks with a global perspective in Mon State, interviewed by the author in February 2018, have started providing multilingual education to impoverished children as an extracurricular activity, regardless of their ethnic background, including ethnic majority children. The number of children taking the course has increased dramatically, from 68 in 2014 to over 1000

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in 2017. Although changes in formal language policy may take time due to the political situation, a small informal change has already started in poor communities. If grassroots initiatives working with the most vulnerable children, as in the example from Mon State, can be sustained, there will be more broad-minded people who might well be able to make positive changes for the future of Myanmar.

Conclusion This chapter describes the possibilities of plurilingualism for promoting equality and social cohesion in Myanmar’s divided society and to establish a conceptual framework for sustainable peace and development. First, the history and the current situation of ethnic division in Myanmar were examined. Although Myanmar was a largely plural society in the precolonial era, the British divide and rule policy resulted in the politicisation of ethnicity and religion, as well as the creation of multiple divisions in the society. Soon after independence, ethnic conflicts broke out. Under military rule, the policy of Burmanization was implemented to suppress the languages and cultures of the minorities, which exacerbated underlying divisions between the majority and the ethnic minorities. Even after the advent of civilian government, peace talks haven’t borne fruit as all the population wished, and new divisions have emerged due to the uneven distribution of new opportunities among the different ethnic groups. Second, theories of peacebuilding and reduction of inequalities were reviewed. Peacebuilding involves changing bad social structures and the culture of violence to a peace structure and culture of peace, so that the relationship of the conflicting groups is changed, preventing violent conflicts. Structural violence and the culture of violence are the result of various inequalities. Therefore, it was argued that reducing inequalities and implementing the eight action areas of the culture of peace identified by the UN, as well as development, are crucial to make the changes more credible, viable, and sustainable. Third, the background of the Council of Europe and its initiatives to unite and include all Europeans through plurilingualism were explored together with the theoretical perspective. Children who receive plurilingual education can readily develop respect for different cultures and languages as well as mutual understanding, which facilitates a sense of European identity. Research indicates that more inclusive identities correlate with higher level of tolerance, less prejudice, and lower levels of overt violence. Therefore, it can be argued that plurilingualism reduces personal and structural violence. Fourth, a conceptual framework for sustainable peace through plurilingual education was established to illustrate its potential effects on Myanmar’s divided society. The deeply rooted mistrust, grievances, and hatreds are difficult to change, but children have greater potential to build close relationships regardless of ethnicity. When such broad-minded children with plurilingual competence reach adulthood, they would be a powerful driving force for harmony and sustainable peace in Myanmar.

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Finally, bearing in mind the current complex situation, what progress might mean in the context of language policy was discussed in relation to the promotion of equality and social cohesion. The issues related to language policy have so far been discussed in relation to ethnic rights, focusing on MTB education, but not in relation to the peace process. Physical violence may end when the political landscape changes, but the current language policy will perpetuate feelings of hatred and distrust. The language issues are not only relevant to the minorities. Unless these issues are addressed with wider perspectives, including the future language use of the citizens including the majority, genuine peace may be difficult to achieve in the near future. People around the world know that respecting diversity and promoting mutual understanding, which reduce inequality and discrimination, form a prerequisite for sustainable peace in a multiethnic and multicultural society, but “HOW?” is always the question. In particular, how could ethnic minorities who have experienced ironfisted oppression be reconciled with those who used to be enemy aliens? Nelson Mandela made a remark on the importance of using the language of the other side during negotiations in the apartheid era: If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.

Language is not just a shared means of communication. It is an intrinsic embodiment of a people’s culture and identity, encompassing custom, morale, tradition, beliefs, and the concept of values. Using the languages of the “other side” therefore has the potential to promote heart-to-heart understanding, solidarity, and cohesion. The slogan of Myanmar’s independence movement, “one voice, one blood, one nation,” needs to be changed to “one voice, many bloods, one nation.” It could be argued that the implementation of plurilingual language education, which has the potential to change children’s perceptions, could partly answer such a difficult question in the context of Myanmar.

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Ei Shwe Phyu. (2016, October 5). Activists demand reform of National Education Law before by-laws sink in. Myanmar Times. Retrieved March 12, 2018, from https://www.mmtimes. com/national-news/yangon/22895-activistsdemand-reform-of-national-education-law-beforeby-laws-sink-in.html. Fink, C. (2000). An overview of Burma’s ethnic politics. Cultural Survival, Burma; Human Rights, Forgotten Wars, and Survival, 24(3), 11–14. Fisher, J. (2015, December 3). Myanmar’s 2015 landmark elections explained. BBC News. Retrieved September 17, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036. Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167–191. Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27(3), 291–305. Galtung, J. (2000). Searching for peace: The road to transcend. London: Pluto Press. Gravers, M. (1996). The Karen: Making of a nation. In S. Tonnesson & H. Antlov (Eds.), Asan forms of the nation. Surry: Curzon. Gravers, M. (2007). Introduction: Ethnicity against state—State against ethnic diversity? In M. Gravers (Ed.), Exploring ethnic diversity in Burma (pp. 1–33). Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilization? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. ISDP. (2015). Myanmar’s nationwide ceasefire agreement . Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy. Retrieved January 8, 2018, from http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publicati ons/2015-isdp-backgrounder-myanmar-nca.pdf. Jenamani, S. (2005). Poverty and underdevelopment in tribal areas. New Delhi: Concept Publishing Company. Kershaw, I. (2005). War and political violence in twentieth-century Europe. Contemporary European History, 14(1), 107–123. Kymlicka, W. (2004). Culturally responsive policies (Background Paper for Human Development Report 2004). New York, NY: United Nations Development Programme. Langer, A. (2007). The peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana (CRISE Working Paper No. 25). Oxford: Center for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, University of Oxford. Langer, A., & Brown, G. K. (2008). Cultural status inequalities: An important dimension of group mobilization. In F. Stewart (Ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Lynn, N. H., & Slow, O. (2017). Mixed results at latest Panglong peace conference. Frontier Myanmar. Retrieved September 6, 2016, from https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/mixed-results-atlatest-panglong-peace-conference. Naing, S. Y., & Kha, K. (2016, May 20). A fragmented ethnic bloc impedes Suu Kyi’s ‘Panglong’ Vision. The Irrawaddy. Retrieved September 17, 2017, from https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/ commentary/afragmented-ethnic-bloc-impedes-suu-kyis-panglong-vision.html. Nobelprize.org. (2012). The Nobel Prize for 2012. Retrieved February 6, 2018, from https://www. nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2012/press.html. Pettigrew, T. F. (2007). Social identity matters: Predicting prejudice and violence in Western Europe. In J. L. Peacock, P. M. Thornton, & R. B. Inman (Eds.), Identity matters (pp. 34–48). New York, NY: Berghahn Books. Rovira, L. C. (2008). The relationship between language and identity. The use of the home language as a human right of the immigrant. REMHU Revista Interdisciplinar Da Mobilidade Humana, 16(31), 63–81. Safman, R. M. (2007). Minorities and state-building in Mainland Southeast Asia. In N. Ganesan & K. Y. Hlaig (Eds.), Myanmar: State, society and ethnicity (pp. 30–69). Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Saville-Troike, M. (1986). The ethnography of communication: An introduction. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

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Shuster, S. (2016, June 24). The U.K.’s old decided for the young in the Brexit vote. Time. Retrieved February 8, 2018, from http://time.com/4381878/brexit-generation-gap-older-younger-voters/. Smith, M. (1999). Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (2nd ed.). London: Zed Books. South, A. (2008). Ethnic politics in Burma: States of conflict . Oxon: Routledge. South, A., & Lall, M. (2016). Schooling and conflict: Ethnic education and mother tongue-based teaching in Myanmar. Washington, DC: USAID and The Asia Foundation. Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: An introduction and some hypothesis. In F. Stewart (Ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Stewart, F., Brown, G. K., & Langer, A. (2008). Policies towards horizontal inequalities. In F. Stewart (Ed.), Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multiethnic societies. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Taylor, R. (1987). The state in Burma. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers. Taylor, R. (2006). Do states make nations? The politics of identity in Myanmar revisited. South East Asia Research, 13(3), 261–286. Thawnghmung, A. M., & Robinson, G. (2017). Myanmar’s new era: A break from the past, or too much of the same? Southeast Asian Affairs, 2017, 237–257. Todaro, M. P. (1977). Economics for a developing world. London: Pearson Education. UNESCO. (2013). UNESCO’s programme of action culture of peace and nonviolence a vision in action. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. United Nations. (1992). An agenda for peace preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the SummitMeeting of the Security Council, 31 January 1992. UN Documents A/47/277. United Nations. (1998). 53/25 International decade for a culture of peace and non-violence for the children of the world, 2001–2010, 10 November 1998 . UN Documents A/RES/ 53/25. United Nations. (1999). 53/243 A. Declaration on a culture of peace, 13 September 1999. UN Documents A/RES/53/243A. World Bank. (2017, August 30). Myanmar PovertyAssessment 2017: Part one examination of trends between 2004/05 and 2015. TheWorld Bank. Retrieved March 9, 2018, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/myanmar/publication/myanmar-poverty-ass essment-2017-part-one-examination-of-trends. Zelizer, C., & Oliphant, V. (2013). Introduction to integrated peacebuilding. In C. Zelizer (Ed.), Integrated peacebuilding: Innovative approaches. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Chapter 4

The Origin of Minority Problem: Thailand Takashi Tsukamoto

Introduction In general, majority and minority relations have been tensional and complex. In the case of Thailand, the Muslim-dominated provinces, particularly Narathiwat, Yala, and Pattani, in the deep South1 have been a problem for state élites who seek to formulate Thai national identity for more than a century. In terms of demography, the majority of the population in the deep South of Thailand is Muslim2 whereas 90% of the population of Thailand is Buddhist. This figure shows a unique Thai demography where Muslims are a minority in the country though they are a majority only in its deep South. The deep South has been a space of the “Other” or the “unThai” within Thailand. The following transcription of an interview with former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2009 illustrates the problem: Well you know it [the insurgency in the South] was ripe for many years because of the history of that part of Thailand. The map has been redrawn. Some parts that used to be Thailand have become Malaysia. Some parts that used to be Malaysia have become Thailand. The Thai part that became Malaysia, there’s no problem with, but in the part of Malaysia that became Thai there is a problem. They [Malay Muslims] look at Malaysia, where they prosper. The side in Thailand does not prosper. It could, but we haven’t handled it properly because education is a problem. We allowed them to have only religious education which means they cannot

1 The deep South, in my account, refers to the three southernmost provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Yet, the four Muslim-dominated districts in Songkhla and Satun may be included as parts of the deep South in other accounts. 2 82 per cent of the population in Narathiwat is Malay-Muslim, 81 per cent in Pattani, and 69 per cent in Yala (Funston 2008, p. 7).

T. Tsukamoto (B) International College of Liberal Arts, Yamanashi Gakuin University, Kofu, Japan

© The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_4

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T. Tsukamoto work after that. So they are poor—they want to go back to the Malaysian side because the Malaysian side is better. That’s the problem that has been there for many years.3

As Thaksin mentioned in the above quotation, after the map was drawn by European colonial powers and the Thai ruling élites in the early twentieth century, Muslims who were ethnically Malay became part of the Thai nation. Before the Malays became part of Siam, it was obvious to Thai élites that they were “foreigners”. The drawing of a new map as a process of national demarcation incorporated these foreigners into the territory of Thailand. Thus, when state élites formulated a unified or integrated notion of Thai national identity or culture, they consciously had to consider how to deal with those who had previously been foreigners but were now Thai citizens. This chapter deals with roughly the period from the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, during which the Thai ruling élites, such as King Chulalongkorn, incorporated minority ethno-cultural groups, such as MalayMuslims, into the boundary of the Thai nation-state. These groups were incorporated into Thailand when the élites and the colonial powers negotiated and established the national boundary of Siam at the end of nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. After the national boundary demarcation, ruling élites defined the chief differences between most Thais and the newly incorporated ethno-cultural minorities in national terms. In the eyes of the Siamese élites, these groups were un-Thai and the Other that existed within the nation. Thus, this chapter primarily looks at how the Thai ruling élites identified, recognised and depicted the deep South as an un-Thai field. In this chapter, I look at the historical transformation of the deep South before and after the Siamese state’s centralisation. This chapter examines how ruling élites identified and defined the status of the deep South within broader notions of Thai culture, Thai national identity and Thainess. I look at the nature of the deep South prior to the centralisation and reforms under the absolute monarchy. Then I examine pre-1932 monarchical centralisation and its impact in the deep South. I look at élites’ identification of the deep South as un-Thai by examining one of established conceptions of Thainess: the geo-body of the territorial national Self (Thongchai 1994).

The Pre-Reform Deep South: Tributary Relation and “Divide and Rule” The geographical, ethno-cultural, and linguistic-cultural space of the deep South of Thailand provides an example of how the creation of the geographical and cultural national community of Siam had the paradoxical effect of also producing un-Thainess within the Thai nation. The deep South has ontologically been located within the Siamese/Thai geo-body, at least, since the area became a part of Siam in 1909 and lost the status of a quasi-independent or tributary state. It has also been within the Thai 3 The

interview appeared on 9 November 2009 in Times Online, accessed at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6909258.ece?token=null&offset= 120&page=11.

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imagined community, at least, since Vajiravudh imposed the Compulsory Primary Education Act to compel children in the country to learn the Thai language in 1921. From Bangkok’s point of view, the centralisation and rationalisation of the state at the end of the nineteenth century demarcated the territory of Siam, and thereby generated the geo-body of Siam. The demarcation of Siam, however, willy-nilly engulfed primordial cultural “givens”,4 such as Malayness, Islam, and other local customs and traditions, into Siam. This demarcation occurred because treaty negotiations between Siam and European powers—not ones between Siam and tributary states—abolished the quasi-independent status of tributary states. The people living in these former tributary states, including Patani, were now absorbed within the state of Siam. Yet although the Malay-Muslims were consequently incorporated into the Thai geo-body, the Thai élites depicted them as non-Thais. In order to understand this process, a more precise analysis of the nature of the precentralisation deep South and its transformation under centralisation is necessary. The literature on the deep South, including that written by natives of the area,5 highlights that the deep South, where the current provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat are located, used to be an autonomous kingdom or state. In pre-modern times, the region was known as the ancient kingdom of Langkasuka, the centre of which was probably located in present-day Pattani, and it was later called the Kingdom of Patani (Che Man 1990, p. 32; Gilquin 2002, p. 10; Teeuw and Wyatt 1970, p. 3).6 By 1457, the Kingdom of Patani7 was an Islamic state, and it eventually became a major centre of Islamic scholarship (Yegar 2002, p. 74). The pre-centralisation deep South had two significant features that are significant for this study: tributary relations with Siam and a colonial-style of divide and rule practised by Bangkok. First of all, the kingdom of Patani was, as contemporary sources suggest, a tributary state or a vassal of the Siamese court. The status of Patani was both “autonomous from” and “dependent on” Siam (Surin 1982, pp. 60–61; see also Che Man 1990, p. 34; Gilquin 2002, p. 65). In order to maintain their tributary relations with Siam, sultans (rajas) of the kingdom of Patani were required to send the Bunga Mas, flowers/trees of gold and silver, to the Siamese court every two and a half years. The Bunga Mas was a “token of vassalage” or a “sign of loyalty” to the Siamese 4 On

this point, I refer to Clifford Geertz’s widely quoted definition of “primordial attachment”, which he defines as “one that stems from the ‘givens’—or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed ‘givens’ of social existence” (Geertz 1963, p. 109). 5 Stories of the area written originally in Malay language by native authors include: Hikayat Patani (the Story of Patani) (Teeuw and Wyatt 1970) and Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani) (Syukri 2005). Both are available in English translation. 6 When of the establishment of the kingdom of Pattani occurred is uncertain. It was probably after 1350 (see Che Man 1990, p. 32; Gilquin 2002, p. 11). Tomé Pires, a Portuguese who wrote of the region of Patani in the 1510s, explained that the Kingdom of Patani had existed for a long time, perhaps since the end of the fourteenth century (see Teeuw and Wyatt 1970, p. 3; Che Man 1990, p. 32). 7 In this thesis, Pattani, spelt with double “t”s refers to a modern province of southern Thailand. Patani, spelt with a single “t”, alludes to the area of the former independent kingdom which roughly covered the area of the present-day three provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat, or to the area of southern Thailand in Malay nationalist consciousness.

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court (Surin 1982, p. 33; see also Che Man 1990, p. 34). Yet, the sultans of Patani saw sending the Bunga Mas as a choice rather than as an obligation compelled by the Siamese court. They viewed establishing tributary relations with the Siamese court as a beneficial strategy. Gilquin describes the situation in the Malay Peninsula at the beginning of the Ayudhya period (1351–1767). As he puts it: Located at the crossroads of the traditional imperial states of Angkor, Pegu, Ayutthaya [Ayudhya], these peninsula settlements [principalities or kingdoms in the Malay peninsula] had a precarious status and often had to find distant allies who would be ready to support them in case the balance of power shifted, but who were unlikely to assert their authority in these far distant trading outposts. (Gilquin 2002, pp. 10–11)

The tributary relations which the sultans in the Malay peninsula established with the Siamese court provided “protection” from other powers. This was clear when a sultan of Patani tightened the tributary relationship with Siam in 1786, in response to, as Gilquin (2002, p. 65) puts it: “The developing British presence in the peninsula, after occupying Penang at the end of the century, as well as inter-Malay conflicts with the arrival of the Minangkabau and the Bugis, tightened the tributary relationship with Siam, but the sultanate courts retained considerable autonomy, which they used brutally on occasions”. However, the raja of Patani did not maintain tributary ties with Siam exclusively. At the end of the 1890s and the beginning of the 1900s, when King Chulalongkorn started tightening Bangkok’s control over Patani by reducing the power of local leaders (Surin 1982, p. 29),8 the raja asked the British, who had by then colonised Malaya, for assistance and support. The raja of Patani wrote to the British governor of the Straits Settlement, Sir Frank Swetthenham. Surin (1982, p. 30) summarises the raja’s appeal as follows: The Thai government was suppressing and interfering with the peaceful life of the people of Patani and was condemning the Malay-Muslims to misery and destruction. The only hope for relief was the intervention of the British on behalf of these Malays.

Surin also points out that the raja hoped to stimulate British fear that “other colonial powers might come to the rescue of the Malay provinces under Thai rule” (Surin 1982, p. 31). On this point, Tengku Abdul Kadir, then the raja of Patani, wrote to Swettenham in 1901 that: … it will be seen that my application, for the intervention and good offices of Great Britain, has good grounds on which it is founded, and on which such application can be made to Great Britain or some other of Great Powers either European or others (CO 273/282 cited in Surin 1982, p. 30).

That Patani had tributary relations with Siam did not mean that Patani was part of Siam. Although tributary ties required Patani to send military aid when Siam was at war (Piyanat 1991, p. 84), those military forces did not fight as Siamese. Such forces 8 For example, Chulalongkorn intervened in the succession system of sultans in the area, by inhibiting

the traditional succession from father to eldest son. Chulalongkorn’s interference was, for the raja of Patani, an attempt to destroy Islam and local culture (see Loos 2006, pp. 83–84).

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were the price paid in exchange for Siam protecting Patani from outside enemies (Piyanat 1991, p. 84). Patani’s tributary relations operated for its own benefit, not only for those of Siam. However, there was a gap between the Siamese court and the sultan of Patani in understanding what “tributary relations” meant. Gilquin succinctly analyses this gap: For Siamese, the receipt of tribute corresponded to a degree of recognition of the sacred nature of their monarch. For the Muslim princes, the gold and silver trees and other presents were merely the price to pay (a sort of tax) to enable them to continue to develop their profitable enterprises. … For Thais, in their accepted version of history, allegiance implied ipso facto recognition of the nation, religion, and the sacred nature of the Siamese monarchy, whereas for Muslims this submission only had a tactical dimension and did not imply the recognition of an “ungodly” authority, particularly in matter of legislation. (Gilquin 2002, p. 13)

The gap was clear. Whereas the Siamese rulers saw the Kingdom of Patani as part of Siam under the tributary relationship, the sultans of Patani did not. Tributary relations between Siam and Patani were by no means stable. When the Siamese court was weak and the Kingdom of Patani was strong, Patani rajas refused to send the Bunga Mas and revolted against the Siamese court to restore Patani’s autonomous status (Loos 2006, p. 77; Che Man 1990, p. 34). The earliest rebellions against Siam occurred from 1630 to 1633; they recurred when Ayudhya collapsed in 1767; and again even after Patani was placed under Siamese suzerainty at the end of the eighteenth century (Che Man 1990, p. 34). Whenever rebellions occurred, the Siamese rulers sent military forces to the southern region and forced the sultan to re-establish tributary relations, and send the Bunga Mas. The Siamese rulers in the Chakri dynasty wanted to end this rather unstable tributary relationship (Loos 2006, p. 77). This series of rebellions against the Siamese court led to the second significant aspect of the pre-centralisation period: a colonial-style policy of “divide and rule”. Under the reign of King Rama I (1782–1809), the Siamese court divided the administration of the southern region into two parts in 17919 : Kelantan and Saiburi were placed under the control of governors of Nakhorn Sri Thammarat; Trengganu and Patani were put under the control of governors of Songkhla (Piyanat 1991, p. 84).10 Later, in the early nineteenth century, the Siamese court broke Patani into seven Malay principalities (huamueang): Pattani, Nong Chik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring (Piyanat 1991, pp. 84–85; Che Man 1990, p. 35; Loos 2006, p. 77). 9 The

kingdom of Patani was ruled by two major dynasties until 1729: the Patani dynasty (? – 1688) and the Kelantan dynasty (1688–1729). Civil war began in 1729 and lasted for a long period of time until an aristocrat from Dawai, Mayo, unified Patani in 1767. Upon unifying Patani, this aristocrat became Sultan Muhammad, who ruled Patani until Patani came under the suzerainty of Siam in 1786. After 1786, the Siamese court captured the ruler of Patani, Tengku Lamidin, and then rebellions against the court occurred (Che Man 1990, pp. 34–35). As for the history of the Siamese kingdom, Ayudhya collapsed in 1767, and then after a brief period of the Thonburi dynasty, the Chakri dynasty (with a new capital in Bangkok) was established in 1782, and Rama I came to the throne. 10 Songkhla was historically the Siamese base for its southward expansion after the Portuguese captured Melaka in 1511 (Yegar 2002, p. 74). Nakhon Si Thammarat was a tributary state of Siam from the thirteenth century (Gilquin 2002, p. 13).

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However, in this period these Malay principalities were still governed by local Malay rajas, except Nong Chik whose governor was a Thai Buddhist (Loos 2006, p. 77). The Siamese court also adopted divide and rule policies within each principality. For example, in the reign of Rama III (1824–1851), the principality of Saiburi led rebellions against the Siamese court. The court then in 1839 divided it into smaller principalities of Perlis, Satun, Saiburi, and Kabangbaru. Each principality was autonomous from the others, but rulers of these principalities were still under the control of Nakhon Si Thammarat (Piyanat 1991, p. 85). The Siamese court vested these rulers with title of phraya, which was an important title for tributary sultans in the hierarchy of nobility (Gilquin 2002, p. 69) The policy of divide and rule generated ambivalent relations between the Siamese court and the Malay principalities. A historian, Piyanat (1991, pp. 85–86), argues that the policy effectively made Patani and Saiburi weak, and deepened their status as “dependencies” of Bangkok. The policy was successful under the reign of Rama III as the Malay principalities did not generate political problems at that time (Piyanat 1991, p. 85). King Mongkut (Rama IV: r. 1851–1868) continued to implement this policy, yet, under his reign, the Malay principalities had relatively more freedom in conducting internal administration than other principalities of Siam. This was because the region was geographically distant from the capital, causing communication difficulties (Piyanat 1991, p. 86). Under the tributary relationship until the end of the nineteenth century, the Siamese court did not vest the Malay principalities with complete freedom in conducting internal administration. It still—rather indirectly—interfered in their internal affairs. Succession in the principalities was based on kinship; the position of raja was passed from father to eldest son. Yet, Siamese monarchs “approved” the succession of a new raja. Apart from this, as in the case of governors of other principalities, rajas of the Malay principalities had to fulfil certain ceremonial responsibilities to show their loyalty to the monarchy. These responsibilities included attendance at funerals of monarchs in Bangkok and at other monarchical ceremonies, such as marriage celebrations and birthday anniversaries (Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanuphap et al. 1960, pp. 81–85). Monarchical rule over the Malay principalities, described above, shared some characteristics with colonial rule in neighbouring colonial territories, such as British Malaya. One was the pattern of indirect rule. I have pointed out that before Bangkok’s centralisation, the Siamese court divided Patani into seven principalities, appointing local Malay rajas to govern the areas. In the case of British Malaya, William Case (1995 p. 83) argues that British indirect colonial rule “preserved, even elevated, some of the rulers’ traditional authority”. The British provided the native rulers with “more formal authority in their respective negeri11 over Islam and culture” (Case 1995, p. 83; see also Stockwell 1982).12 In both systems, the ruling power governed through traditional chiefs. 11 “negeri”

is a Malay and Indonesian term, meaning country, land, or state. British High Commissioner Sir Hugh Clifford’s claim illustrates this point. As he argues, “everyone in this country [should] be mindful of the fact that this is a Malay country, and we British 12 The

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Another characteristic of Siamese monarchical rule over the Malay principalities which resembled colonial patterns was the way that it enhanced and depended upon ethnic divisions. The pre-centralising Siamese state implemented policies that had the effect of heightening ethno-cultural differences. As already explained, the court adopted a strategy of divide and rule in the Malay-dominated south, which resulted in the establishment of seven Malay principalities. The aim was “to limit and to undermine” dissidents and rebellions (Brown D. 1994, p. 223). In British Malaya the divide and rule strategy adopted by the British enhanced ethnic differences, the legacies of which would be evident in postcolonial Malaysia. As Case (1995 p. 87) puts it, “the British forged ‘the epitome of the plural society’ closely juxtaposing the Malays and Chinese and concretizing their differences in an ethnic division of responsibilities and reward”.

The Deep South During Centralisation: Difference, Threat, and Uncertainty In the previous section, I have suggested that comparison should be made between the Siamese monarchical state before the centralisation of administration and colonial states in South East Asia. This section makes a comparison in the next stage of Siam’s history: between the Siamese monarchical state during centralisation and postcolonial (nationalist) states in South East Asia. Both states faced inter-ethno-cultural problems. While during centralisation Siamese élites were becoming cautious of the danger of dissidence from Malay principalities in the southern region, postcolonial states, such as Burma, faced dissident responses from ethnic minority groups when they tried to “nationalise” their society. After national independence, partly as a result of the legacies of colonial policies of divide and rule, some former colonies in South East Asia experienced interethnic tensions within the nation-state. In the case of postcolonial Burma, Gravens (1996) highlights ethnic tensions between Burmans and Karens. When the military and General Ne Win enhanced “Burmanisation” of society in the 1960s, they prompted a dissident response from the Karen. The Christian-led Karen National Union (KNU) claimed that “It is a [hopeless] dream that Karen and Burman can ever evolve a common nationality” (Gravens 1996, p. 238). This ethnic tension occurred in the period of “nation-building” when the Burmans tried to Burmanise the Karen. Expressed theoretically, the state tried, through nation-building, semantically to incorporate the Otherness possessed by the Karen into an overarching Burman identity. This attempt involved also an attempt by the state to erase the ethnic differences between majority Burmans and minority Karens.

came here at the invitation of Their Highnesses the Malay Rulers, and it is our duty to help the Malays to rule their own country” (cited in Keith 2005, 140).

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Siamese monarchies made similar efforts vis-à-vis minority groups through their administrative reforms. King Chulalongkorn and Prince Damrong Rajanubhap initiated a new system of centralised provincial administration, called thesaphiban, from the end of the nineteenth century. Administrative policy no longer involved colonialstyle separate and autonomous rule of the region, but promoted the integration and centralisation of provinces. A historian, Tej Bunnag (1977), analysed the new provincial administrative system of thesaphiban,13 which was established under the guidance of Prince Damrong (the Minister of Interior). Tej shows that Damrong transformed the old Ministry of the North (mahatthai) into a functionally oriented Ministry of Interior whose administrative realm extended to cover the country as a whole.14 Thongchai links Damrong’s thesaphiban system to the transition in the conception of the realm of Siam. Thesaphiban involved “the reorganization and redistribution of space [to] suit the new exercise of administrative power on a territorial basis” (Thongchai 1994, p. 120). The centralisation also involved the integration of nonThai ethnic groups into the Thai administrative system. Ethnic minorities were now ruled in the same way as people in other parts of Siam. This integrative policy resembled—and anticipated—those of postcolonial states in other parts of South East Asia. The implications of this new system for the Malay principalities became clear late in the reign of Chulalongkorn. Integration and centralisation reduced the power of the Malay raja who were provincial governors in the deep South in various ways. In 1901, the Ministry of Interior restructured the administration of the South, by integrating the seven Malay principalities—Pattani, Nong Chik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring—into one administrative zone (boriwen jet huamueang). The government appointed an area commissioner (khaluang boriwen) who was based in Pattani principality and controlled this administrative zone (Piyanat 1991, p. 86; Che Man 1990, p. 35). The government also appointed assistant area commissioners and royal clerks to help area commissioners to administer these Malay principalities (Piyanat 1991, p. 87). In 1906, the government further reshaped the administrative structure of the principalities. It abolished the boriwen jet muang and created a division, called monthon. In the monthon Pattani, there existed four provinces: Pattani, Yala, Saiburi and Bangnara (Che Man 1990, p. 35). The purpose of the centralisation was to strengthen Bangkok’s control over the Malay principalities. The government attempted to reduce the power of the provincial governors by introducing the administrative system which was used in Bangkok. The introduction of the new system meant that “the status of the Malay provinces [principalities] was … changed from that of being mere dependencies to that of “provinces” and integral parts of the Thai kingdom” (Surin 1982, p. 33). Being integral parts of the kingdom also meant that local methods of administration and local traditions were replaced by 13 “Thesaphiban”

means the protection of space and place. the pre-reform period, there were core two ministries: Ministry of the North (mahatthai) and Ministry of the South (kalahom). The mahatthai was responsible for the administration of the area to the north of the capital and the kalahom to the south. In this period, these two ministries were not functionally oriented, but assumed responsibilities for a number of administrative duties, such as finance, justice, and so on (see Brown 1992, pp. 5–6).

14 In

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those from Bangkok. The traditional form of tributary relations between the Malay principalities and Bangkok was replaced by a modern form of tax payment, with the Ministry of Treasuries ordering the people of these provinces to pay taxes (Piyanat 1991, p. 87).15 The provincial governors no longer gained income from the public and their vassal principalities. Their incomes were now derived from salaries paid by the central government in Bangkok (Surin 1982, pp. 33–36; Khajadphai 1976, p. 253). In the 1890s and the 1900s, the Thai government introduced Thai courts and Thai laws to the judicial system of the Malay-Muslims. The change in the judicial system had an enormous impact on Malay-Muslim culture. Surin Pitsuwan explains that the administration of justice in the Malay-Muslim area was previously considered sacred terrain. As Surin (1982, p. 41) puts it: In a culture where the law (sharia) is fused most intimately with customs (adat) and life and its meaning is defined by that fusion and “engulfs the total person, connecting him, as far as he is concerned, to the deepest foundation of existence”, (Geertz 1968, p. 111), any tampering with social institutions invited malevolent reactions.

The Thai government replaced Islamic and customary law with Thai law and sent judges to the South to enforce the change. Although Islamic laws and customs still applied to marriage and inheritance (Surin 1982, p. 42; Che Man 1990, p. 63), “[t]he sitting Thai judges in the principalities would retain the final decision on any case decided upon by the Qadis (Kadi) [Muslim judges] chosen by the parties” (Surin 1982, p. 42). Scholars argue that the reforms introduced by Bangkok in the early 1900s had negative impacts on the feelings of Malay-Muslims in the region and promoted resentment towards the central government. Both Surin and Che Man suggest that administrative and financial reforms caused resentment in the former Malay ruling class, and the abolition of sharia and adat elicited hostile feelings from Muslims at large (Surin 1982, p. 41; Che Man 1990, p. 63). The enormous impact of the abolition of the Islamic law was due to the fact that “every Malay-Muslim considers that his religious commitments, which are based on the sharia and customs, are ‘the axis of his whole existence, his faith is what he lives for and would quite willingly die for’ (Geertz 1968, p. 111)” (Che Man 1990, p. 63). Resentments among Malay-Muslims in the early 1900s are evident in surviving local sources, or at least those from a generation or two later. Ibrahim Syukri, a native of Patani who was well-educated in his local tradition and culture and in Westernstyle learning, including some knowledge of English (Wyatt, Forward 2005, p. x), wrote a nationalist history of Patani after World War II. In his book, entitled Sejarah Kerajaan Melayu Patani (History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani), Syukri claimed the period of the early 1900s involved the fall of the Malay Kingdom of Patani to the hands of the “Siam-Thai”. As Syukri (2005, p. 81) wrote: 15 The

centralisation was legitimised by the royal order of local administration (see Khajadphai 1976, p. 253).

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T. Tsukamoto A.D. 1902 was the year of the ultimate fall of the country of Patani, the loss of its sovereignty of its rajas, the destruction of the rights of suzerainty of the Malays in the country of Patani, and the pawning of all rights to liberty and independence to the Raja of Siam-Thai. This was the last and most unfortunate year in the history of the fall of the Malay Kingdom of Patani.

Siamese élites in the reign of Chulalongkorn were aware of cultural differences between residents of Bangkok and those of distant places located far from Bangkok, including the Malay-Muslims deep South. They regarded the Malay-Muslims as non-Thai. As Tamara Loos (2006, p. 81) argues, writing about Siam during the centralisation at the end of the nineteenth century, the Malay-Muslims were “culturally located irrevocably outside the boundaries of Siam’s national citizenry because of their ethnic and religious differences”. In describing the Malay-Muslims, Siamese élites used the term, khaek. This word means a “guest” or a “stranger”, and had for centuries been used to refer to non-Thai (Thanet 2007, p. 8). Its connotation was gradually transformed to “a qualifier to specify particular costumes, language, and eventually ethnic Malays and other Muslims … including Arabs and Indians” (Thanet 2007, p. 8). Anthony Diller notes that Arabs, Indians, Persians, and Malays would have been among the first regular strangers, commercial visitors, or immigrants to Thailand, and already by the time of the reign of King Naresuan (1590-1605), these people were called khaek (Diller 1988, p. 154). Diller also points out that in the reign of Chulalongkorn, Prince Naritsaranuwattiwong, who travelled to the south to inspect telegraph lines, used the term kheak as an ethnic reference to describe Malays, Brahmin Indians, and Semang negritos. The Prince used this term in southern villages to distinguish Thai from non-Thai villagers (khaek) (Diller 1988, p. 158). For local Muslims, the term khaek was a derogatory and inappropriate term since, according to scholars (Che Man 1990, p. 42; Thanet 2007, p. 8), local Muslims had resided in the region for centuries, and thus saw themselves as neither aliens nor guests in the area.16 Thongchai notes that from the 1880s to the 1920s, urban élites and intellectuals started frequently travelling to peripheral areas in Siam and abroad for pleasure. These élites and intellectuals wrote reports and diaries when they travelled. These writings were “ethnographic records similar to what we might call ‘field notes’” (Thongchai 2000a, p. 534). Thonghcai explains that those travel writings helped illustrate élites’ construction of Others. In their writings, the élites described people living in the border areas, often in mountainous and highlands areas (chaopa), and in rural areas (chaobannok) as uncivilised and backward subjects. Thongchai explains that in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, Siam was a hierarchical country based on different levels of civilisation (siwilai) in different places. As he puts it: “Forest, rural areas, and city are differentiated spaces of civilization. The elite

16 Rattiya Sahae, a scholar at Thaksin University at Songkhla, also points out the same thing. Rattiya argues that “They did not come to live in or migrate to Patani. They have been residing in Patani from the beginning” (see Abdus-Shakur bin Shafiyy 2006: 36).

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considered themselves and the city as the representation of Siam. The chaopa and chaobannok were the Others Within (Thongchai 2000a, p. 537).”17 One good source on this topic is the late nineteenth-century travel writing produced by Prince Damrong, who was Chulalongkorn’s half-brother and has been acclaimed the father of royalist Thai history. Damrong argued that people could obtain new knowledge by travelling outside Bangkok which they could not get in the capital (Damrong Rajanuphap 1961, pp. 4–5). He suggested that government officials should travel extensively in order to see many things, including local cultures and local ways of life outside Bangkok. If government officials became familiar with local cultures in particular regions, they would know how to govern there, and would avoid making mistakes when they were appointed to serve outside Bangkok (Damrong Rajanuphap 1961, p. 5). Damrong suggested a number of areas as suitable ones to visit for the purposes of such knowledge accumulation, including the Southern region (Damrong Rajanuphap 1961, pp. 12–13). Another good source on this topic is Phrasommutamornphan, who was a government official in the reign of Chulalongkorn who travelled to the Malay Peninsula with Chulalongkorn from 1888 to 1891, and wrote travel reports when he visited various places there. He reported that local officials entertained the king by showing him Muslim games (chonkae) and plays (lakhon khaek) (Rueang thiao thi tang tang pak thi 8, 1920, pp. 44, 92). His report included descriptions of the landscape and how it differed from that around Bangkok. He wrote that the local market in Patani resembled the one in Kelantan, not the one in Bangkok. The market was full of Muslim style tailors (ran khai phan) (Rueang thiao thi tang tang pak thi 8, 1920, pp. 44–45). In Saiburi, his report illustrated local scenes, such as Muslim people rowing the boat for the governor, and Muslim cemeteries (Rueang thiao thi tang tang pak thi 8, 1920, pp. 91–92). The author pointed out cultural and customary differences from Bangkok which he found in the Malay Peninsula. He repeatedly used the terms, khaek or puak khaek (a group of khaek), to describe the Malay-Muslims he met in the Southern provinces.18 Chao Phraya Yomarat, (Pan Sukhum), a special commissioner (khaluang) in charge of the integration of Malay principalities into Siamese territory and a senior government officer stationed in Nakhon Sri Thammarat from 1896 to 190619 , also pointed out the foreignness of the inhabitants of the Malay principalities. Chao Phraya Yomarat’s reports to Damrong, then the interior minister, described the Malay-Muslim population as foreign, uncivilised, and backward compared to that of Bangkok (Loos 2006, pp. 80–81). In one report in 1898, he wrote: The town of Nakhon Sri Thammarat is very poor. People there are badly dressed. They seem to be sick all the time. They never comb their hair. There are reasons why people look like 17 Thongchai

calls uncivilised and backward subjects the “Others within” (see Thongchai 2000a, 2000b). 18 Another report was written by Somdej Phrarachabitula Baromphongsaphimuk, who also accompanied the king to travel to the Malay Peninsula. His report also illustrated difference that he found through travel (Jotmaihet 1928). 19 Prince Damrong appointed him as a special commissioner in early 1896 (see Loos 2006, p. 80).

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T. Tsukamoto this. Firstly, there is no one in the area to tell local people how to dress properly. Even when some people show them the proper way to dress, local people just laugh and never take it seriously. Secondly, they always carry a lot of things by placing them on their heads. So, water from fish and seafood drips on their bodies. That is why they look so dirty. (NA R5 M 47/4)

Siamese government officials did not only see the inhabitants of the Southern regions as foreigners, but they also saw them as threatening. Whenever Damrong talked about the seven Malay principalities of Pattani, Nong Chik, Raman, Ra-ngae, Saiburi, Yala, and Yaring, he called these principalities huamueang khaek (Malay principalities) (NA R5 M 47/4; NA R5 M 49/27). Even after Damrong started centralising provincial administration, he regarded these principalities as inhabited by khaek and as a possible source of threat. When Phra Seniphithak was appointed as a special commissioner (khaluang) in Shongkhla in 1895, Damrong warned Phra Seniphithak of the danger of dissidence from huamueang khaek. As Damrong wrote: The seven Malay principalities used to be only one area, called Tani (Patani). When Tani rebelled against Siam, we sent military forces to suppress them. We divided Tani into seven principalities. These seven principalities were still called tributary states, and were under the control of Songkhla. They had rights to be locally independent, but had to send tax to Thailand. We sent a Thai government official, a son of Phraya Songkhla, to be the head of these seven principalities. … We must not let Tani be powerful because it may be rebellious as it was in the past. … The government intends to establish Tani, which was previously independent, to be big but dependent upon the control of Songkhla. (NA R5 M 49/27)

Government officials and even the king expressed much uncertainty about the Malay principalities after the administrative centralisation. For example, Chao Phraya Yomarat, feared dissidence by the Malay raja. He reported to the Ministry of Interior that Malay rajas might intrigue against the government (NA R5 M 1/49).20 King Chulalongkorn himself conveyed a similar message in 1904, when he requested Damrong to control the region. Chulalongkorn was uncertain about the Malay principalities and did not know how to control the area. He referred to dissidence in the southern territory of Siam as if it was happening in another other country, and confided his fear to Damrong: I am not used to control administrations of other countries/nations (chat uen). I am scared of the situation which I should not be scared of. I am brave in a situation in which I should not be. I am doing something that I should not do. I am generous in a situation in which I should not be. Even if I want to be mean, I do not know how to be mean enough. I would 20 Against this backdrop, the government employed violence. It sent senior officers from the ministry of the interior and police forces with a battleship to Pattani on 20 February 1902. The government deprived Tengku Abdul Khadir—the charismatic raja—of authority over Pattani, and replaced him with another Malay raja. After being removed from the position of raja of Pattani, Tengku Abdul Khadir was sent to Songkhla for a while and then to Phitsanulok for two years and nine months (until 1904). Then, the king released Tengku Abdul Khadir and allowed him to return to Pattani. Tengku Abdul Khadir’s charismatic character was identifiable when he return from Phitsanulok to Pattani. When he returned, five hundred people were waiting for him in eighty boats at the mouth of the Pattani River. Two thousand people were standing at the bank of the river. Four monks and a hundred Haji were waiting for him at his house (Khajadphai 1976, pp. 254–256; see also Loos 2006, pp. 84–85; Kobkua 1988, 178–181).

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like to ensure people’s happiness and public interest. But I do not know how to use power in a proper way. … I want to do something directly, but I have to be considerate and to pay attention to other people’s feeling. So I do not know how to speak, and I look down on my own power (amnat tua eng). When the situation became like this, I hesitate, too much, to control the Malay provinces. And I would like to ask you to consider controlling the Malay provinces to make the situation there better. (NA R5 M 3/49)

Obviously, Chulaongkorn still regarded the Malay provinces—at the very point they were integrated into Siam’s emerging geo-body—as “other nations” (chat uen), which generated a sense of uncertainty and threat. If the creation of the geo-body signified the creation of the nation of Siam, it also involved importing threats and uncertainties from other nations into the new nation. In this sense, the creation of the nation and its demarcated boundary also entailed a new recognition of difference within the bounded territory. Therefore, the national demarcation did not give rise to a straightforward idea of a national Self. Instead it also generated the idea of “foreigners” living within the nation. The national demarcation is a starting point from when the Thai ruling élites had to start to deal with these foreigners living within the nation. Once foreigners came into the territory of Siam, a task of the ruling élites was to know who these foreigners were. I examine how they performed this task in the next section.

The Role of the Deep South Under Colonialism If the Thai ruling élites felt a sense of uncertainty about the deep South, why did they feel compelled to incorporate the region in the new the nation-state? Conventional wisdom and revisionist accounts provide different analyses of the process of administrative reform under the absolute monarchy. According to conventional wisdom (and royalist accounts) of Thai history, monarchical centralisation of the country’s administration was necessary in order to save the kingdom from direct colonisation. The incorporation of Patani under Bangkok’s control was also a product of the “centralisation” of the state (Loos 2006, p. 82; Kullada 2004, p. 1; Kobkua 1988, pp. 8–9). By contrast, revisionist accounts argue that monarchical centralisation can be understood as “internal colonisation” of peripheral regions. Anderson (1978) and Tamara Loos (2006, Ch. 3) show that reforms to pursue centralisation undertaken by King Chulalongkorn and Prince Damrong resembled those promulgated by the British in colonial South East Asia. As argued in Thongchai’s influential analysis, tributary states, such as Patani, were the ultimate losers (Thongchai, 1994, esp. Ch. 4 and Ch.7). Yet, both conventional wisdom and revisionist accounts agree on the outcome: Siam retained formal independence by demarcating its national territory, and by incorporating peripheral territories, such as the Malay principalities. Why did Siam have to incorporate these Malay principalities to retain its independence? Threats by colonial powers were real. They were emphasised, for example, in Damrong’s writings. When Phra Seniphithak was appointed as a special commissioner (khaluang) in Shongkhla in 1895, Damrong explained to him the situation in

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the two southern principalities of Kelantan and Trengganu, which were still formally dependent on Siam in this period. These principalities were located next to British Malaya. Damrong’s comments suggest that in controlling the Malay principalities, Siam’s ruling élites were cautious about potential British intervention in the area. He asserted that the Thai should not fight the British but please them: Even though we control these two principalities as usual, if we rush to capture these principalities, the British will look for any reason to intervene against us. … The British, more than ever, do not want the Thai to intervene in these principalities. If we had a fight with the British, that would, more or less, be disadvantageous for Siam. This is because, at this time, the Thai have to maintain commercial relationships with the British in order to protect us from the French. So we have to be careful not to let such things happen. (NA R5 M 49/27)

Foreigners (farang), particularly the British, were a threat to Siam. That Mongkut, Chulalongkorn and Vajiravudh regarded foreignness, western influence, and western ideas of liberalism as threats to Thai society and values of Thai political traditions is widely known.21 Yet, they not only rejected foreignness as un-Thai, they and other Siamese ruling élites also sought equality with it. The ruling élites’ efforts to seek equality with the West can be understood in terms of their desire to be civilised (siwilai) in the Thai context. Thongchai (2000a) argues that, from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, the term “civilised” (siwilai) connoted various meanings, from etiquette and manners to the idea of “an achieved state of development” or progress (charoen). Moreover, “‘Western things and ways of conduct’ were considered siwilai” (Thongchai 2000a, p. 530). Western (European) influences were not only a threat to Siam but also an opportunity to be charoen and siwilai. As Thongchai (2000a, pp. 537–538) puts it, “‘Europe’ became a signifier in the discourse on siwilai, referring to a distant land that was the imagined model for progress and desirable changes”. The main thrust of Thongchai’s argument is that civilisation can be understood as a new conception in which Siamese élites felt they needed to re-conceptualise Siam. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Siamese élites and colonial powers demarcated Siam’s boundary and abolished the traditional galactic polity system. European colonial powers became the new axis 21 For example, King Chulalongkorn fiercely rejected the idea of western liberalism when younger princes who studied in Europe requested that Chulalongkorn should introduce a system of constitutional monarchy in Siam. Chulaongkorn emphasised the different historical courses that Siam and Europe had experienced. Chulalongkorn said that western political institutions, such as parliaments and political parties, were not suitable for Siam (see Murashima 1988, pp. 82–9). Vajiravudh was also critical of western influence. In 1915, Vajiravudh published “the Cult of Imitation”, under the pseudonym “Asvabahu” (one of the epithets of Buddha). Vajiravudh criticised revolutionaries both in Thailand and foreign countries. In Thailand, a coup conspiracy in 1912 involving a small junior military group implied the emergence of an alternative political agenda. The coup conspirators challenged the existing political order (Wyatt 1984, pp. 226–7), criticising the monarchy as an “unprogressive and dying institution” (Reynolds 1998, p. 132). Vajiravudh criticised the group for being influenced by Western ideas and being too utopian (Murashima 1988, p. 94). Vajiravudh was very critical of the mere imitation of the West. He believed that imitating the West meant becoming slaves to the West. As Murashima argues (1988, p. 94–5), in Vajiravudh’s view, in order to be civilised, a nation had to use “its own potentialities and abilities”, instead of copying the ideas and ideologies of the West.

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mundi. “In order to survive, not from colonialism but from indignity and inferior existence, and to remain majestic, Siam needed a confirmation according to the new ethos of civilization that it measure up to other leading countries” (Thongchai 2000a, p. 534). The reforms carried out by Chulalongkorn and Damrong can be examined in terms of their aims to civilise the country. The reforms introduced and promoted a degree of uniformity in the administration of justice, the maintenance of Bangkok based law and order, the conversion of local customary bodies into agencies of salaried officials, and the establishment of village and district level elected institutions (Wilson 1989, p. 56). It can be argued that Siamese élites used the deep South, adjoining British Malaya, to show their ability to civilise the country, in terms of their quest to seek equality with the West. Tamara Loos’s analysis of Siam’s Malay states as a “showcase of Siam’s ability to modernize local administration” explains how the discourse on siwilai was developed in the context of the deep South (Loos 2006, pp. 87–88). The reforms carried out by Chulalongkorn and Damrong were remarkably similar to those of the British in Malaya. This was because Chulalongkorn sought equality with the British. As Loos (2006, p. 87) explains: King Chulalongkorn wanted Siam “to catch up with” the British in modernising the political and economic administration of the Malay areas, especially Kelantan and areas directly bordering Siam’s territories; otherwise, the British would believe that they could better modernise the region. King Chulalongkorn had long been keeping track of British assessments of Siam’s ability to govern the Malay principalities.22

Making the deep South civilised preoccupied the élites. In 1895, Damrong wrote to both Chulalongkorn and Phra Seniphithak, who was about to take up the position of khaluang at Songkhla province. Damrong carefully tried to establish Siam’s position in the world. As he said: By considering the international situation, now we, Siam, need to hurry to recover from our backwardness. We already have the administrative system which will help Siam (muang thai) appear in the world by herself. (NA R5 M 49/27)

Under these circumstances, Damrong proposed to “civilise” the deep South. Damrong chose Songkhla principality as a model for the government’s efforts. As he argued: King Chulalongkorn ordered to arrange the principality of Songkhla in a progressive way (thang charoen). King Chulalongkorn hopes that such progressive arrangement will be prevalent among the citizens, and knowledge of it will be disseminated to inside and outside Siam. The seven Malay principalities, located next to Songkhla principality, will easily make progress by following Sonkhla’s path. … Therefore, King Chulalongkorn would like to implement such arrangement inside Songkhla and then proceed to do so outside the Songkhla principality. (NA R5 M 49/27) 22 After the 1909 Anglo-Siamese treaty, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis, and most of Kedah were passed to the British. The result of the treaty was the determination of the present borderline between Thailand and Malaysia. In exchange for these territories, extra-territorial protection of Britain’s Asian subjects was removed and Siam managed to obtain a loan at four per cent interest from the Federated Malay States to establish a railway in southern Siam (Loos 2006, p. 85; Gilquin 2002, p. 68).

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Siamese élites’ aim of civilising the deep South was, in some sense, achieved since even in the eyes of some British the reforms in the southern region appeared to be successful.23 In 1899 a British employee of the Siamese government and Director of the Department of Mines, Henry G. Scott made a tour of the east-coast Malay principalities and wrote to British Consul-General George Greville that: The Malays are difficult people to deal with, but by tactic and perseverance he [Chao Phraya Yomarat] manages to secure their co-operation in the carrying out of all his reforms. In the introduction of the “village system”, in the establishment of Courts, and in propositions for public works the Malay chiefs are given every inducement to take a leading part. A considerable number of Siamese have to be employed in the administration on account of the unbusinesslike methods of the Malays and their inability to do office work, but so far as I have been able to see, the officials of the two nationalities are working together in perfect harmony. […] What all this amounts to is that Siam, in the course of two years, has been highly successful in organizing the administration of a large part of her Malay States, and that it is very probable, if not certain, that in a few more years there will be a decent Government, extending to Perak on the west and Pahang on the south, and that all the country will be open to enterprise of any kind. (Foreign Office Records FO 69/204 cited in Wilson 1989, pp. 56–57)

In short, the Malay principalities were not only victims of Siam’s internal colonialism, but also a model showcase of Siamese modernisation. It was not only the incorporation of the south into Siam that was a response to the British, so too were the reforms carried out in the deep South. Both were intended to show the abilities of the Siamese élites to transform Siamese administration from an “uncivilised” to a “civilised” pattern. In terms of the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 1, under these circumstances, the Malay principalities became useful as a site of the uncivilised which the ruling élites could turn into a showcase of modernisation. The South was at this time not primarily an object of Othering as un-Thai even if its inhabitants were described as foreign. The main objects of national Othering, in élites’ minds, were colonial powers which were stationed close to the Thai frontier. By dealing with the British both as threat and object of desire, the ruling élites engaged in civilising the deep South. However, monarchical centralisation also involved integration of non-Thai ethnocultural groups into the geo-body of Siam. As a result, ruling élites had to recognise that cultural differences and foreignness existed within Siamese territory. The MalayMuslim south connoted two contradictory meanings. One was a source of threat. The other was a showcase of modernisation. The former had to be eliminated; the latter could be accommodated. The state élites of the Chulalongkorn era handed the task 23 I say “in some sense” because some British colonial officials deprecated the aims of the reform of the provincial administration. The Governor of the Straits Settlements, Sir Frank Swettenham, said in 1900 that “[T]he policy of the King of Siam during the last five years has been to strengthen his control over Malay States in his part of the Malay Peninsula, including the dependencies of Kelantan and Trengganu; especially in Kelantan where a disputed succession gave him a good opportunity of asserting authority” (Foreign Office Records FO 69/224 cited in Wilson 1989, p. 57). If reforming Siam had become, in some sense, a threat to British colonial officials stationed in British Malaya, it might have, then, be said that élites’ aim of civilisation by the reforms was successful.

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of dealing with these contradictory meanings of the Malay-Muslim South over to the next generation of Siamese élites.

Conclusion This chapter has analysed the history of élites’ efforts to integrate the deep South until roughly the early twentieth century, and the outcomes and by-products they produced. The ruling élites regarded the deep South as being different and foreign to Siam. However, once they and the colonial powers negotiated a national boundary for Siam, the deep South geographically became part of the country. The incorporation of the deep South into Siam did not mean, however, that the region became fully Thai in the eyes of local Muslims, or even of the country’s rulers. Rather, the demarcation implanted national Others within the boundary of Siam. The deep South, which the central government described as khaek or foreign, posed a threat to Siam. Local rebellions that occurred under the reign of Chulalongkorn in response to administrative and judicial reforms made this threat obvious. Yet, the deep South was not merely a source of threat to the ruling élites. When the Siamese élites embarked on their centralising reforms, modelled on reforms in colonial territories in other parts of South East Asia, the deep South became a showcase in which they tried to demonstrate their ability to civilise the area. By doing so, the élites sought equality with the British. In this sense, the deep South was also a necessary Other for the ruling élites. This chapter illustrated that in from the end of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, in which state élites, such as absolutes monarchs, came to recognise the non-Thai ethnicities and cultures that existed within the geographical boundary of Siam. This was the origin of ethnocultural tension in the deep South.

References Abdus-Shakur bin Shafiyy. (2006). Fai wikrit chaidaeng tai nai sai ta khong ustas [Southern Crisis in the Eyes of Ustadz]. Bangkok: Matichon. Anderson, B. R. (1978). Studies of the Thai State: The state of Thai Studies. In E. B. Ayal (Ed.), The study of Thailand (pp. 195–247). Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies. Aphornsuvan, Thanet. (2007). Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories. Washington: The East-West Centre Washington. Brown, I. (1992). The creation of the modern ministry of finance in Siam, 1885–1910 . London: McMillian. Brown, D. (1994). The state and ethnic politics in Southeast Asia. London, New York: Routledge. Bunnag, Tej. (1977). The provincial administration of Siam, 1892–1915 . Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

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Case, W. (1995). Malaysia: Aspects and audiences of legitimacy. In M. Alaggapa (Ed.), Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority (pp. 69–107). Stanford: Stanford University Press, California. Che Man, W. K. (1990). Muslim separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Oxford, Singapore and Manila: Oxford University Press and Ateneo de Manila University Press. Damrong Rajanuphap, Prince. (1961). Athibai Rueang Thiao [Explaining about Tours]. Bangkok: Khrusapha. Diller, AV. (1988). Islam and Southern Thai ethnic reference. In AD Forbes (Ed.), The Muslims of Thailand: Volume 2: History and cultural studies (pp. 155–167). Gaya [Bihar]: Centre for South East Asian Studies. Funston, J. (2008). Southern Thailand: The dynamics of conflict . Washington: The East-West Centre. Geertz, C. (1963). Integrative revolution: Primodial sentiments and civil politics in the New States. In C. Geertz (Ed.), Old Socieries and New States (pp. 105–157). New York: Free Press. Geertz, C. (1968). Islam observed: Religious development in Morocco and Indonesia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gilquin, M. (2002). The Muslims of Thailand. Chiang Mai: Silkworms Books. Gravens, M. (1996). The Karen making of a Nation. In S. Tønnesson & H. Antlöv (Eds.), Asian Forms of the Nation. Curzon: Richmond, Surrey. Jotmaihet [Letter]. (1928). The Cremation Volume for Somdej Phrarachabitula Baromphongsaphimuk. Bangkok: Sphonphiphatthanakorn. Keith, P. (2005). Ousted!: An insider’s story of the ties that failed to bind . Singapore: Media Masters. Khajadphai Burusphath. (1976). Thai Muslim. Bangkok: Praephitthaya. Krom Phraya Damrong Rajanuphap, Somdej Phrachao Baromwongthoe, & Phraya Rachasanaw. (1960). Thesaphiban. Phra Nakhon. Kullada Kesboonchoo Mead. (2004). The rise of decline of Thai absolutism. London, New York: Routledge Curzon. Loos, T. (2006). Subject Siam: Family, law, and colonial modernity in Thailand. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Murashima, E. (1988). The origin of modern official state ideology in Thailand. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 6(1), 80–96. Piyanat Bunnag. (1991). Nayobai khong rat to chao thai muslim nai jangwat chaidaen phak thai: pho so. 2475–2516 [State Policies toward Thai-Muslim in the Deep South: 1932–1973. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. Reynolds, C. J. (1998). Globalization and cultural nationalism in Modern Thailand. In J. S. Kahn (Ed.), Southeast Asian Identities: Culture and the Politics of Representation in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand (pp. 115–145). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Rueang thiao thi tang tang pak thi 8 [Different Journeys to the Region 8]. (1920). The Cremation Volume for Phraya Wichiangkhiri. Bangkok: Sphonphiphatthanakorn. Stockwell, A. J. (1982). The White Man’s Burden and Brown Humanity: Colonialism and Ethnicity in British Malaya. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, 10(1), 44–68. Surin Pitsuwan. (1982). Islam and Malay nationalism: A case study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand. Dissertation, Harvard University. Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua. (1988). Thai-Malay relations: Traditional intra-regional relations from the seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. Singapore, New York: Oxford University Press. Syukri I. (2005). History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Sejarah Kerajaani Melayu Patani) (C. Bailey, & J. N. Miksic, Trans.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Teeuw, A., & Wyatt, D. K. (1970). Hikayat Patani: The Story of Patani. Hague: M. Nijhoff. Thaksin Shinawatra. (2009, November 9). Interview. Times Online. Retrieved from http://www.tim esonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6909258.ece?token=null&offset=120&page=11. Thongchai Winichakul. (1994). Siam mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

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Thongchai Winichakul. (2000a). The Quest for Siwilai: A Geographical Discourse of Civilizational Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam. The Journal of Asian Studies 59(3), 528-549. Thongchai Winichakul. (2000b). The Others Within: Travels and Ethno-Spatial Differentiation of Siamese Subjects. In A. Turton (Ed.), Civility and Savagery: Social Identity in Tai States (pp. 1885–1910). London: Curzon. Wilson, HE. (1989). Imperialism and Islam: The impact of “modernisation” on the Malay Muslims of South Thailand. In AD Forbes (Ed.), The Muslims of Thailand (Vols. Volume 2: Politics of the Malay-Speaking South) (pp. 53–72). Gaya [Bahir]: Centre for South East Asian Studies. Wyatt, D. K. (1984). Thailand: A short history. London: Yale University. Wyatt, DK. (2005). Forward. In: Syukri I (ed) History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Sejarah Kerajaani Melayu Patani (C. Bailey, & J. N. Miksic, Trans.). Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. vii–xi. Yegar, M. (2002). Between integration and secession: The Muslim communities of the Southern Philipphines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma/Myanmar. Lanham, Md: Lexington Books.

National Archives NA R5 M47/4, Jad rachakan huamueang lae jadkan bamrung huamueang tang tang nai monthon nakhon sri thammarat [Restructuring and Management of Various Principarities in Monthon Nakhon Sri Thammarat] (20 January 114 [1896] – 11 December 116 [1898]). NA R5 M49/27, Phonprayot mueang nongchik lae mueang kheak 7 mueang [Benefits of Mueang Nongchik and 7 Malay Principalities] (4 March 114 [1896]). NA R5 M1/49, Phraya sukhum naiwinit thueng krasuang mahathai thoralek thi 222 [Chao Phraya Yomarat Sending a Telegraph to the Ministry of Interior at 222] (11 February 1902). NA R5 M 3/49, Krommaluang damrong rachanuphap krab thun krommakhun somut amonphan [Prince Damrong talking to Prince Amonphan] (30 April 1902).

Chapter 5

Press Freedom Under the Government of Aung San Suu Kyi: The First 5 Years Yoshikazu Mikami

There Is No 100% Press Freedom Major Western media has criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for not speaking out for the Rohingya refugees. TIME magazine had a cover story entitled “Will Rohingya Exodus Be Aung San Suu Kyi’s Fall From Grace,” (Dias 2017) stating that “one voice remained notably silent,” and “did not condemn the atrocities.” But the political situation in Myanmar is more complicated and nuanced than what many of the Western media claims. Firstly, it is very important is to understand that Aung San Suu Kyi’s political power base is not as strong as one would imagine it to be; the military still wields strong power in Myanmar politics. It is also undeniable that the country has made huge progress in promoting freedom of speech since 2011. One other premise of this paper is that there is no absolute, i.e. 100% press freedom in any country, and that all governments have their own way of dealing with the press. For example, Japan’s press freedom is limited to a certain extent because of the existence of “kisha clubs,” (“kasha” means a “reporter” in Japanese) an elite journalist corps that admits only a certain selected members of the press and outcasts the rest; “kasha clubs” is also criticized for maintaining cozy relations with the political elite and failing to be a “watchdog” of those in power. Japan’s press freedom has its own internal characteristics and limitations, which when viewed from the outside, is often heavily compromised. According to “Reporters Without Borders 2019 World Press Freedom Index,” Japan’s degree of press freedom ranks 67th out of 180 countries in the world, due primarily to the existence of “kisha clubs” (Myanmar ranks 137th and the United States 45th).

Y. Mikami (B) Department of Media Studies, Mejiro University, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_5

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In addition, Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had his own way of handling reporters and manipulating the press to his advantage. So did all other Japanese prime ministers before him. The same can be said about the United States under the former presidency of Donald Trump. Instead of holding a regular press conference like other preceding presidents, President Trump liked to tweet instead of speaking to reporters in public. And when he held a press conference, his attitude was combative and only liked to talk to a selected group of reporters. What is the nature of press freedom under the new government of Aung San Suu Kyi? Why is it still restricted despite Aung San Suu Kyi coming into power? These are the main research questions of this paper and, at the end of the analysis, it will make 5 concrete suggestions on how to improve media freedom in the country. The paper is based on qualitative research and in-depth interviews (structured and semi-structured) conducted in Burma/Myanmar over 3 decades. This writer first visited Burma in 1989 and interviewed Aung San Suu Kyi on separate occasions and published a book on her in 1991; it was the first biography on her to be published and was quoted in her later biographies (Wintle 2007 and Popham 2017).

Military Still Rules Since the Rohingya refugee problem erupted, the Western media criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for not addressing the issue and failing to explain the situation to the world. And when the two local Reuters journalists were arrested for the coverage of the Rohingya refugees, the Western media attacked the current NLD government for not supporting the journalists and protecting press freedom. These arguments may be valid but one should not forget that although Aung San Suu Kyi is the de facto ruler of the NLD government, she is not by far the ruler of the country. Her hands are tied by the military, which occupies one-fourth of the parliament and a vice-president seat, and is in charge of the police and national security, particularly the campaign against the ethnic minorities along the border area. The armed forces of Myanmar or the Tatmadaw is not only the strongest constraint on the NLD government but it is also a conglomerate which operates a wide array of businesses ranging from a national daily to jewellery companies to smartphone ventures. In short, the Tatmadaw wields tremendous levels of political and economical influence, often unchallenged by any political group including the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi herself. “Civilian control” of the military is a key principle in any modern democratic society, in which the military is a professional group of soldiers that is apolitical, not involved in party or national politics. But unfortunately, the Tatmadaw is not such an institution. It is not only the Tatmadaw that wields influence in every corner of the political, economical sphere, many people from the previous military regime are still running the government. The Tatmadaw ruled the country for over five decades and the NLD

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took power only in 2016, some 5 years ago. The quasi-democratic government of Thein Sein led major changes in the media but the reforms were implemented halfheartedly and the government had very limited experience with press freedom. That is true for the new NLD government as well as for the private news media that sprang up after the 2011 reforms. Media freedom improved when the censorship board was eliminated and a number of imprisoned bloggers and journalists were released from jail or returned from exile. Some political opinions and comments that were theretofore impossible to express in public were allowed in publications. But limitations still remain and lawsuits, trumped charges, editorial control and difficulties accessing information are commonplace in today’s Myanmar’s journalism. “Unofficial” censorship of the media is still at work too, including “selfcensorship” due to the fears of government oppression and sometimes due to commercial considerations. Editorial decisions are regularly influenced by the political beliefs of financial backers. For five decades the government censorship board acted as a political judge on what to publish and what not to publish and, in a way, the criteria was simple and clear-cut. But when the censorship board was abolished, the editors of especially private news media were forced to judge what was publishable and what was not. In such cases, the media itself wrote what is acceptable to the authority rather than taking risks and challenging them with true facts.

Outdated Laws Still Remain Intact Another major reason why press freedom is curtailed and compromised is because of the prevalence of outdated laws stretching back more than a hundred and fifty years. For example, the Unlawful Association Act (1908a, b), Penal Code (1861), the Official Secrets Act and the Telecommunications Law. Despite the relaxations in media freedom, journalists have been arrested and imprisoned, charged mostly under these criminal codes. The Unlawful Association Act was enacted in 1908 during British colonial era and it still exists to this day, hampering journalists’ access to information. The case in point with this law is Section 17 (1) which stipulates: “Whoever is a member of an unlawful association, or takes part in meetings of any such association, or contributes or receives or solicits any contribution for the purpose of any such association, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term (which shall not be less than two years and more than three years and shall also be liable to fine).” Section 17 (2) stipulates: “Whoever manages or assists in the management of an unlawful association, or promotes or assists in promoting a meeting of any such association, or of any members thereof as such members, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term (which shall not be less than three years and more than five years and shall also be liable to fine).”

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Furthermore, the Penal Code of 1861, Section 500 stipulates as follows: “Whoever defames another shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” Also Section 505 (b) stipulates as follows: “Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumor or report with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquillity shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” Standing alongside these outdated and draconian laws from the colonial period, “the 1962 Printing and Publishing Law” was replaced by “Printing & Publishing Enterprise Law and News Media Law” in March 2014 by the parliament. “News Media Law” was drafted by Interim Press Council and it “guarantees the rights and freedom of the media personnel.” For example, this law in Chapter (2) “Objectives” stipulates that “To ensure that News Media can stand firmly as the fourth Estate of our nation.” (Section 3 (b)) In the same section (c), it says as its objective: “To guarantee that News Media workers are fully provided with entitlements and freedom.” It continues to say that “To establish and develop responsibilities, ethics, rules and regulations and practices to be adopted within relevant industries and organization.” (d) And (e) guarantees that “To make news accessible to every citizen.” In Chapter 3, “Entitlements of Media Workers” Section 4 (a) calls on to say that “The News Media workers shall have the right to freely criticize, point out or recommend operating procedures of the legislative, the executive and judiciary in conformity with the constitution.” In the following 4 (b), it says “The News Media workers shall have the right to investigate, publish, broadcast information and related opinions to which every citizens is entitled in accordance with rules and regulations.” On the other hand, “Printing & Publishing Enterprise Law” approved in the same year, contains some limitations, such as “Printers and publishers shall not print or publish the relevant publications which revel a subject that aggrieves other religious, other similar groups/minorities or other different ethnic groups/minorities.” (Section 8 (a)) And in same section (b) the law stipulates that “Printers and publishers shall not print or publish the relevant publications which instigate for violence or jeopardize the tranquility of community; and prevalence of law and order.” This law was drafted by the Ministry of Information under the Thein Sein government and tries to restrict the publication of news content that is unfavourable to the government. The “News Media Law” supports press freedom and media’s role in the democratic society but nevertheless the “Printing and Publishing Enterprise Law” sets out to control the media and limits press freedom. The two laws contradict each other and it illustrates the current press situation in the country: on one hand it purports to guarantee free press but on the other hand, curtails democratic rights. This obviously has a negative effect on the media in covering sensitive news; they would not run sensitive or critical content if they fear that it could infringe on the law and thus are forced to be prudent and assume the role of the scrutiny board themselves.

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The same can be said of the 2008 Constitution. On one hand it dictates in Section 354 (A), “Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the right to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions,” meaning to say not only the media but the whole society and citizens have the right to raise their voice however challenging it may be to the authorities. Yet the same constitution restricts that right related to the principle of “Union security, prevalence of law and order, and community peace and tranquillity.” Reporters have also been charged under Article 66 (d) of the Telecommunications Law, which broadly defines defamation and carries a penalty of up to three years imprisonment. Maung Saungkha, an independent analyst of “We Support Journalist,” a local advocacy group, was quoted in an AP article as saying that “the telecommunication law in particular has been employed to crush freedom of expression….About 80 other people (on top of at least 33 reporters charged with crimes since Aung San Suu Kyi took office), including activists and protestors, have been charged under the law” (Pitman 2018).

Aung San Suu Kyi: Politician, Not Human Rights Activist When five Myanmar journalists from the Unity publication were sentenced to a decade-long prison term for reporting the alleged existence of a military-run chemical weapons factory in Myanmar and charged with violating the Official Secrets Act, Aung San Suu Kyi condemned the harsh punishment as “very excessive” (Pitman 2018). In a July 2014 rally, she was also quoted as saying to her supporters that “it’s not that I don’t accept a concern over national security but in a democratic system, security should be in balance with freedom.” She added that when “the rights of journalists (to report) are being controlled,” the very notion of democratic reform in Myanmar is “questionable” (Pitman 2018). The remark was made when she was an opposition lawmaker. But when she took power in 2016, she became a different person, or as many have pointed out, she had “changed.” Hostility against the media, especially international news agencies covering Myanmar, has escalated since the Rohingya crisis. Roughly 700,000 Rohingya Muslims have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh since a “clearance” operation (some condemn this as “ethnic cleansing” or “genocide”) began in August 2017. The United Nations Human Rights Council reported that grave atrocities had occurred, including mass rape, several massacres and widespread arson attacks that left hundreds of Rohingya villages burned to the ground (Kirby 2018). The government of Aung San Suu Kyi had denied atrocities and defended the military action and accused critical media reports as “fake news.” They have limited reporting by blocking access to areas where alleged abuses occurred, made it harder for foreign reporters to enter the country; also it is said that the case of two Reuters

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reporters were intended to create a climate of fear: the message is if you report critically, you risk going to jail. Aung San Suu Kyi blamed “a misinformation campaign” and announced she would no longer attend the U.N. General Assembly in late September 2018. Finally after 25 days since the atrocities stunned the world, she spoke to the world. TIME magazine wrote: Finally, 25 days after the first village was burned, Suu Kyi addressed the world. In a televised global address from Myanmar’s capital, in front of army officials and foreign diplomats, Suu Kyi declined to criticize the military. Instead of reaching out to the Rohingya, she questioned the international outcry itself. Her government, she said, was “concerned” about reports of villages burning in Rakhine, but had to weigh “allegations and counter allegations” before taking action. She argued that the international community should pay more attention to areas where there was peace than areas where there was conflict. “It is very little known that the great majority of Muslims in the Rakhine state have not joined the exodus,” she claimed. “It is sad that in meeting our diplomatic community, I am obliged to focus on just a very few of our problems.” Her remarks prompted outrage. “Her speech tried to sugar-coat ethnic cleansing,” says Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch. (Dias 2017)

It was clearly a turning point for her; the world found out that she had in fact “changed.” Or maybe she was always who she was but the world did not realize her true self, blinded by her struggle against the military which kept her under house arrest for over 15 years. The world might have “mistakenly” championed her as a prime example of a human rights activist. In an interview with this author back in 1995, a remark she made repeatedly stands out clearly. She reiterated that she was a “politician” than anything else. Asked about her family she left behind in London and her role as a mother, her answer was clear and simple: “I’m a politician,” trying to fulfil her obligation back in her home country. Asked about women’s role in today’s politics, she again referred to herself simply as a “politician,” rather than a struggling woman among male generals and politicians. In retrospect, her comment “I’m a politician,” implicitly could have meant “I’m not a human rights activist.” That is, should a situation demand change and some sacrifices, as a realistic and nationalistic politician, she would not hesitate to make tough choices in order to survive and achieve her political goals. Time magazine quoted Ben Rhodes, President Barack Obama’s Deputy National Security Adviser as saying: “She sees herself very deliberately now as a political actor inside of a changing Burma, not as an icon that essentially speaks out on human rights. Her single-minded pursuit of that objective of political reform inside of Burma has created a very glaring and tragic blind spot” (Dias 2017). Aung San Suu Kyi is equally fierce about the imprisoned Reuters reporters. Bill Richardson, a former US cabinet member who advocated for the democracy movement and her release when she was under house arrest, met her in January 2018 at an advisory board on the Rohingya crisis, and brought up the subject of the two Reuters reporters. According to him she was “furious,” and “it brought an explosion on her part.” Consequently he withdrew from the board, calling it a “whitewash” (Beech and Gladstone 2018).

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The two local Reuters reporters, Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo, were charged with the same Official Secrets Act, which was used to sentence reporters to a decadelong prison term for reporting the alleged existence of a military-run chemical weapons factory. Then Aung San Suu Kyi condemned the harsh punishment as “very excessive,” but in 2018 the two Reuters reporters were sentenced to 7 years in jail.

Perception Gaps Bill Richardson also commented that she has “changed” from the days when she was under house arrest and confronting the military. Rhodes and Richardson’s view coincide and may tell an aspect of the truth. Yet maybe that could be only half of the truth. She might have been the same person who always had a “single-minded pursuit” of her political ambitions. In an interview with this author, she remarked that her objective was to bring democracy to Burma and she would do whatever necessary and she would not give up until that objective was fulfilled. “The world loves to crown heroes from despair,” (Dias 2017) remarked TIME magazine and true, the world sympathized with this frail woman who stood against the military and forced her into house arrest and separated from her family. The world adored her so much that the Nobel Peace Prize was an obvious prize for her fight for democracy. She was, in short, a living “Statue of Liberty.” But looking back wasn’t that too exaggerated, wasn’t that too high a hope? When unrealistically high hopes are crushed, the harder the fall and the sharper the despair is. When Aung San Suu Kyi did not act the way the Western media and human rights activists wanted in the Rohingya crisis, they felt betrayed and denounced her. “This is how icons fall,” commented TIME magazine (Dias 2017). But if the “human rights icon” had really fallen from grace, is it the fault of person on the pedestal or the fault of the people who put that person on the pedestal? Whichever it may be, or whatever the Western press might say, there is no doubt that Aung San Suu Kyi is still enormously popular among the populace and very few share the views of the Western press. Aung San Suu Kyi does not yield to the Western press because she hesitates to criticize the military but also as it is not a popular issue among the general public, which is predominately Buddhists and considers Rohingya people not as a part of their population but as “illegal immigrants.” Undoubtedly, there is a huge gap between the Western press and the local perception of Aung San Suu Kyi; the gap originates also from how the people generally view Rohingyas in Myanmar. “On the “Rohingya” issue, opinions vary wildly between the international community and Myanmar community. The editorial question on covering that kind of news is whether you use Rohingya or Bengali. Most of the local media rarely use the name “Rohingya” in their reports. In Myanmar society, they have specific opinions on this issue because the majority does accept the Rohingya as Myanmar citizens. The aspect of Myanmar’s growing nationalism must be taken into consideration by local journalists while covering this kind of issue.” (Ohnmar Nyunt 2018)

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Ohnmar Nyunt’s paper does not deal with the period of the new Aung San Suu Kyi’s government, only during the Thein Sein government, but the attitude towards Rohingya Muslims has remain unchanged. If this issue is unpopular among the populace, there is no reason why Aung San Suu Kyi should take a different position from that of the military and the populace and risk her political life.

Five Suggestions to Improve Press Freedom in Myanmar Aung San Suu Kyi has tried to do some damage control and answered some interviews in 2017, including Japan’s NHK and the Nikkei Asian Review and BBC but the interviews are becoming fewer and rarer. And since Aung San Suu Kyi “exploded” when Bill Richardson mentioned about the two Reuters journalists and subsequently resigned from the international advisory board on Rakhine state in January 2018, she has rarely granted any formal interview with the foreign press. She has remained silent. So have other leading members of the NLD party leaders. There are 23 ministries in the country but very few of the ministers have opened their mouth on the record to the foreign press. Even the Information Minister has remained almost silent. One of the few interviews he gave to a foreign press was for an article for Financial Times Weekend Magazine, Jan. 2018, in which he told FT: “We are just transitioning to a democracy–we still have to build democratic institutions, legal infrastructure and other democratic practices…We are still in the process of transition…” (Reed 2018). The situation got so dormant that even the former Information Minister U Ye Htut has criticized current Information Minister U Pe Myint for the icy relationship with private media and the unchanged role of the strong state-run media. U Ye Htut was quoted as saying to The Irrawaddy (English edition) that the government’s relationship with the media has declined in the past few years while state-run media have grown stronger under NLD administration. (Aung 2019) The state media, in fact, became a mouthpiece for the NLD government rather than serving its purpose for a larger audience’s public interest. Needless to say, if the NLD considers itself to be a democratic government, the NLD politicians, including Aung San Suu Kyi, should be accountable for their deeds and have a duty to explain to its people and to the world. Even President Thein Sein had mentioned the media as “the fourth pillar” during his addresses in the first Union Assembly in August 2011 (Ohnmar Nyunt 2018). The media has a vital role in checking the integrity of the legislative, executive and judiciary systems and should function as a watchdog to check the government’s performance and make positive suggestions for the future. What could the NLD government do to improve press freedom? Five suggestions could be recommended. First, each ministry should hold a regular press conference. This is vital at least to let the press know the government views on relevant issues. It is important to ensure an official communication channel between the government and the press.

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Secondly, establish an “Information Law.” Currently there is no Information Law in Myanmar but in almost all advanced democracies, Information Law exists requiring the disclosure of government information. In Myanmar, this law would compel the government to provide necessary information to journalists. Thirdly, abolish or amend outdated laws. This is not impossible because the NLD holds a majority in parliament and has the power to amend or abolish such legislation. Indeed, they had succeeded and were proud of abolishing the 1950 Emergency Provisions Act used by the military regimes to jail thousands of dissidents (Mikami 2017). Fourthly, try to protect journalists. Some of the journalists working for the international news agencies and local newspapers have left the country as they faced death threats or feared being jailed by the police. Lastly but not least, Aung San Suu Kyi should talk to the press in whatever capacity. During an interview with her, the author of this paper came out with an impression that she did not like interviews or reporters. Having worked as a professional journalist for decades, one develops a sense of whether the person likes the experience of being interviewed or not, or likes the press at large. The impression was that she did not like talking to reporters, especially being challenged or almost criticized by a reporter; in short she was not media friendly (Mikami 1991). Her attitude reflects the NLD’s attitude towards the press and since she is the de facto leader of the party, her views shape the course of politics. Within the NLD, nobody can challenge her credentials: she is the daughter of General Aung San and she had withstood the harsh punishment of house arrest. And without any obvious successor in line, her views reflect the party’s attitude towards the press. No one in the ranks can challenge her. As Bill Richardson has commented, everyone is afraid of her and everyone is her “cheerleader” (Beech and Gladstone 2018). She has a Facebook page (probably operated by her secretary or somebody else) updating her activities and a national television that follows her whenever and wherever she visits a local cities and villages. Yet those are one-sided portrayals, simply reporting on her most recent activities. In order to accommodate the press, she could either hold a regular press conference or even tweet like President Trump. The worst is that she keeps silent because it would silence other NLD politicians and could mean total silence on the part of the government, a situation unacceptable in a democratic country, however young its democracy may be. Are these suggestions likely to happen? It would require strong political will and initiative from Aung San Suu Kyi. There could be a hope because NLD won a second landslide victory in the 2020 general elections and won a confortable majority in the parliament. She and her party won a mandate from the people but in the 5 years to come, the party must achieve economic improvements so that people feel their lives have improved. For that foreign investment holds the key and a free flow of information is paramount in order to build trust with foreign governments and companies. The free flow of information is essential not only for the press, but for a vibrant economy. Obviously, jailing journalists is not a good public relations move.

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However, one day the government and the press in Myanmar should find a way of negotiating and structuring the relationship between the two. It needs not to be a Western way like that of UK or the US or any country in Europe, but a system that can work in Myanmar. A system that is unique to the country and that is equitable, fair and workable for the press, the government, the people and Aung San Suu Kyi. It could be like that of “kasha club” of Japan; as mentioned earlier “kisha club” is a press system unique to Japan and, for good or bad, it works in Japan. It is only about 5 years since the NLD came to power and in a way it is understandable they have not come up with workable press system to ensure a free flow of information. Hopefully, soon the government and the press will come to a certain solution that will fit the social and cultural needs of the country.

End the “Beauty and the Beast” Cycle Finally, one more aspect that has to be mentioned: the foreign media, especially the Western media, should change too. It should alter its perceptions on Aung San Suu Kyi. One day she fell from grace like a celebrity in the entertainment business. For some time, she was a “Beauty,” and suddenly she was a “Beast.” Once she was the icon of democracy, now she was responsible for the genocide; once a beacon of human rights, today she has to defend herself for a crime against humanity. But both extremes are basically untrue: she is not a human activist working for the human rights of fellow man or “the Beast” like Adolf Hitler planning an ethnic cleansing or condoning genocide of another race. All the hagiographies written about her are too simple-minded as well as the other extreme of attacking her as a coldblooded traitor who betrayed their high hopes. This in fact is the centre of the problem: the world sees the plight of Rohingya Muslims from the perspective of human rights and human dignity. Whoever they are, whatever their religion may be, Rohingyas have the right to be treated as a fellow human being and no genocide should be tolerated. It was a harsh lesson the international community learned from the events in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide that claimed the lives of about 800,000 people. This clash of two opposing views was highlighted at the International Court of Justice in Hague in 2019; the court condemned the Myanmar government for the genocide of the Rohingya Muslims. Of course, Aung Sang Suu Kyi denied the charges and defended her country and the military, which some observers have criticized her defence as a calculated political move to secure her popularity back home before a general election in late 2020. Whatever her political intentions may be, one day she may face justice for not doing enough for the Rohingya Muslims. Yet for now is there anybody else but Aung San Suu Kyi? Is there anybody else who can advance democracy in the country however limited it may be and who can maintain a delicate balance between the people and the military and the world? The tough reality is that she still remains to be the best hope available in Myanmar and in resolving the Rohingya problem. It

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is important to warn Aung San Suu Kyi and her government that the world will not condone a genocide; yet where will that lead to? Vital it may be to hold a politician accountable, but will that solve the Rohingya problem? She is what she is: an ambitious politician with a mission, or more correctly, a strong-minded, staunch nationalist who endeavours to achieve her goals whatever the costs it entails. The first sacrifice she had to endure was her own life—her comfortable life in England, then her family and her dying husband and when she got into power, the Rohingya Muslims and now her own reputation. They were the costs to be paid for her unwavering mission; history proves that costs and sacrifices were inevitable for great saviours of a nation like Gandhi of India and Mao Zedong of China: they were the great leaders of the nation, saving the country from foreign dominance and dictatorship but not without huge human casualties and loss. In Myanmar, matters of profound importance are at stake: the lives of Rohingya Muslims and press freedom. To avoid further tragedies of grander scale, the foreign press should come to terms with the real Aung San Suu Kyi, a calculated politician trying to make the best decisions out of the available possible options, sometimes meaning having to choose the lesser evil. Some had criticized Aung San Suu Kyi for abandoning her family to pursue her political career. True, she had to make very difficult choices in the last 32 years since she joined the democratic movement. What the foreign media can do is to understand and analyse the real challenges she is facing and to present balanced picture of an extremely difficult and complex situation. If not, foreign media will again end up in a cycle of hagiographies and harsh criticisms: the “Beauty and the Beast” cycle of a politician trying to save her country, a nationalist politician with a fierce ambition and mission to stay in power, possibly as the President of Myanmar.

References Aung, S. Y. (2019, September 16). Myanmar ex-Information Minister Criticizes Successor’s Failure to Reform. The Irrawaddy (English edition). https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmarex-information-minister-criticizes-successors-failure-reform.html. Beech, H., & Rick, G. (2018, January 24). Citing “Whitwash,” Bill Richardson quits Rohingya Post. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/world/asia/bill-richardson-mya nmar-rohingya.html. Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2008). https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/ Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf. Dias, E. (2017, September 21). Will Rohingya exodus be Aung San Suu Kyi’s fall from grace. TIME. https://time.com/magazine/south-pacific/4951754/october-2nd-2017-vol-190-no13-asia-europe-middle-east-and-africa-south-pacific/. Kirby, J. (2018, August 28). UN report: Myanmar generals should be prosecuted for genocide against the Rohingya. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2018/8/27/17786078/un-myanmar-genociderohingya-rakhine-state. Mikami, Y. (1991). Aung San Suu Kyi peacock under arrest. Tokyo: Kodansha. Mikami, Y. (2017, April 14). Myanmar one year after the New Aung San Suu Kyi government interview with U Tin Uoo. Huffington Post (Japanese edition).https://www.huffingtonpost.jp/yos hikazu-mikami/aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmar_b_15951228.html.

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News Media Law. (2014). https://www.burmalibrary.org/en/myanmar-news-media-law-legal-ana lysis-english. Nyunt, O. (2018). Challenges to press freedom of private news media in Myanmar. Chiang Mai: Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development, Chiang Mai University. Pitman, T. (2018, Feburary 16). Government cracks down on Journalists. Myanmar Times. Popham, P. (2017). Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s struggle for freedom. Rider. Printing & Publishing Enterprise Law. (2014). https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/ 3679/Printing-and-Publishing-Enterprise-Law-Bill.pdf. Reed, J. (2018, Feburary 24/25). The fracturing of Myanmar. FT Weekend Magazine. https://www. ft.com/content/2003d54e-169a-11e8-9376-4a6390addb44. Reporters Without Borders. (2019). World press freedom index. https://rsf.org/en/ranking. The Official Secret Act. (1923). http://www.asianlii.org/mm/legis/code/bosa1923206/. The Penal Code. (1861). https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs6/MYANMAR_PENAL_CODE-corr. 1.pdf. The Telecommunication Law. (2013). https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs23/2013-10-08-Teleco mmunications_Law-en.pdf. The Unlawful Association Act. (1908a). https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs09/UNLAWFUL_ASS OCIATIONS_ACT.pdf. The Unlawful Association Act. (1908b). http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/lawsand-regulations/laws/british-burma-1824-1942-1945-1948/the-unlawful-associations-act-indiaact-xiv-1908-11th-december-1908.html. Wintle, J. (2007). Perfect hostage: A life of Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s Prisoner of Conscience . New York, NY: Skyhorse Publishing.

Part II

Communication, Participation and Challenges

Chapter 6

Climate Change Communication in Southeast Asia from Journalist Perspective in the Context of Thailand: Raising Awareness by Environment Communication Pimonpan Chainan and Viroj Sutthisima

Southeast Asia and Climate Change Challenge It can be said that climate change is high on global agenda requiring collaboration from different sectors not solely on one country’s domestic agenda to tackle the problem. In Southeast Asia (SEA), due to its current stage of development and advancement of technology and management coupled with its geographical position, impacts of climate change in the region seem to be very violent. According to the fourth assessment report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ICPP), there will be real massive deadly impacts of climate change on the SEA as the region depends heavily on agriculture and natural resources. Annually, SEA faces extreme climate change problems, especially flooding, drought, and tropical cyclone while large areas of the region are highly prone to flooding and influenced by monsoons. Impacts of climate change set limits to the locals’ means of earning their living as there are limitations to their adaptation to the impacts upon natural resources as follows: ● agriculture: in SEA, irrigation is profoundly affected by rainfall and the amount of water flowing into the area as rainfall is considered important source of water and irrigation water is used when rainfall is insufficient. That is to say, climate change creates detrimental effects on water supply in SEA where water shortage is common. ● coastal ecology: the coastline of SEA is adversely affected by climate change, treacherous currents, tropical cyclone, and increase in rainfall. Higher sea level and higher temperature at sea surface are obvious results of climate change in P. Chainan (B) Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand V. Sutthisima School of Communication Arts, Bangkok University, Bangkok, Thailand © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_6

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the coastline, and these result in erosion of the coastline, sinking of islands and deltas, adverse currents and saltwater intrusion. ● ecology system: in SEA, ecology system is a crucial factor in the region’s economy system because water and food are key factors in the survival of human beings and natural resources such as the forests and fisheries. Deterioration of the ecology system severely affects the cultural, social, and economic stability because poor community largely depends on the system. ● water resources: in poor rural areas of SEA, water resources are considered top priority natural resources. Water scarcity is apparent in the region—large areas depend only on limited groundwater and rainwater storage. Climate change also affects food security and heavy rainfall may pose risk of flooding (Core Writing Team, Pachauri, & Reisinger 2007). In SEA, there are both serious and obvious ecological impacts and impacts on human survival resulted from climate change in the region. Moreover, climate change in the region also exerts impact upon the economy and budget for post-disaster recovery. United States Agency for International Development or USAID’s report1 (as cited in Chan 2015) on climate change impacts indicated that in Mekong Basin during violent weather, agriculture, fishery, aquaculture, and livestock farming are at risk, and countries like Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam are at risk of 16 billion USD loss due to extreme weather such as typhoon, drought, and storm. The Manila-based Asian Development Bank (ADB)2 pointed out that economic loss resulted from climate change in SEA was at 60% which was higher than the prediction (Chan 2015). Countries in SEA are not ready, in terms of management, technology, economy, law, infrastructure, and public understanding of high complexity of climate change, to tackle the problems.

The Mystery of Climate Change The words “weather, climate, climate change, and global warming” seem to overlap one another and can replace each other in some cases. When asking about the differences between these words, only some people would be able to clearly differentiate or elaborate on the words and their systematical impacts or explain their causes and relationship. In the aspect of being a technical term, “weather” refers to conditions of 1

USAID is the lead U.S. Government agency that works to end extreme global poverty and enable resilient, democratic societies to realize their potential. Information from WHO WE ARE on https:// www.usaid.gov/who-we-are. 2 The Asian Development Bank was conceived in the early 1960s as a financial institution that would be Asian in character and foster economic growth and cooperation in one of the poorest regions in the world. ADB assists its members, and partners, by providing loans, technical assistance, grants, and equity investments to promote social and economic development. ADB is composed of 67 members, 48 of which are from the Asia and Pacific region. Information from WHO WE ARE on https://www.adb.org/about/main.

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the atmosphere at a certain time or for a certain period on a daily or weekly basis. The word “climate” refers to long-term weather conditions in an area, usually longer than 30 years with official statistics. There is a confusion in public mind between “climate change” and “global warming” as it is common that these two words are generally used in very similar manner, whereas in reality, they connote different meanings. Climate change refers to long-term changes in the earth’s weather or widespread phenomenon in particular areas or changes in global average temperature, weather conditions which last for a long time such as a decade of heavier snowfall than usual in some areas. By contrast, global warming connotes narrower meaning—a general increase in world temperatures. For example, from 1880 until 2012, global temperature increased by 0.85 degrees, and for the last 50 years, increase in heat is apparent (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2013). To sum up, long-term natural phenomenon affecting the climate differentiates climate change from global warming which refers only to rise in global temperature (Salathong 2017). Lack of knowledge and understanding of the environment including the above terms indicates that despite the fact that today people are overwhelmed by different types of media or bombarded by information from various forms of media, only a handful of them have full understanding of environmental matters and be able to properly react to environmental phenomena. Studies on public understanding of climate change and other environmental problems show that the public still lack adequate scientific understanding of climate change, particularly show confusion over causes and results or impacts of climate change. In-depth comprehension of this issue varies depending on each individual’s personality such as education level, age, gender, and domicile (Manuti 2013). Cox and Pezzullo state that it is difficult to distinguish our knowledge about the environment from means of communication for the matter. In other words, means of communication relating to the environment has influence over our perception and relation with the environment. In the case of having a large number of people communicate and perceive environmental issues from the mass media, level of comprehension of the issues and problems will rise accordingly (Cox and Pezzullo 2016). Empirical evidence reveals direct relation between awareness about environmental problems and television exposure, together with pro-environmental behaviour. From the evidence, level of television exposure directly relates to the potential of television as a medium to create environmental attitude and behaviour (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009).

Mass Media Coverage on Climate Change Climate change news reporting greatly increases in different forms of media worldwide, resulted from noticeable physical changes caused by natural phenomena. Environmental agendas are a high priority for the mass media, and they are considered powerful tool to create public awareness about environmental issues (Schoenfeld et al. 1979; Slovic 2000).

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However, Cox (as cited in Noppan 2009) gives an interesting remark by paraphrasing a senior journalist’s remark on environmental news saying that environmental issues including natural disaster or pollution are issues that often create confusion among the audience as there is no obvious solution to them, no clear explanation for the impacts, and the issues do not arouse curiosity among the public. As if it is a natural phenomenon that happened far away from us, we tend to view it as an irrelevant issue; consequently, environmental communication is quite difficult. Influence on the public opinion is wielded over a short period of time, especially during crisis since by its nature, news reporting generally jumps from one to another topic daily. In the long-term, interest in an issue often could differ vastly owing to Down’s (1972) presentation of five stages of the issue-attention cycle or ecology. Down explains about how the cycle does not reflect the reality of an event as follows: Stage 1—Pre-problem stage: in this stage, social problems are already presented, and some experts or stakeholders are aware of the problems, but they are not in the public interest yet. Most of all, at this stage the arising problems become worse than the time when the public are aware of them since the problems are addressed by relevant personnel. Stage 2—Alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm: at this stage, the public begin to be aware of the problems and their severity. The awareness usually grows at the same time as the awakening awareness of a belief that the society is capable of dealing with the problems or having an effective strategy to deal with them within a short period of time. From a pessimistic viewpoint, the belief will be in contrast as they believe that most problems cannot be solved. Stage 3—Realizing the cost of significantly progress: at this stage, the public begin to be aware of an increase in costs of solution which do not refer to only money but also contribution by the majority of society. The public begin to be aware that there is a certain group in the society benefits from the management. In some cases, technology advancement can partly reduce impacts of the problems without structurally changing the society or making a certain group of people loses benefit. Stage 4—Gradual decline of intense public interest: at this stage, public awareness of severity of the problems and their high costs of solution is dramatically increasing. Public response is normally produced in three types: first group expresses a feeling of downhearted, second group is viewing the problems as positive threat, and third group expresses a feeling of boredom of the problems. Consequently, level of public interest in the problems begins to reduce and at the same time, other problems begin to present and arise from Stage 1 to 2. Then, public interest begins to shift from the prior problems to the newer ones instead. Stage 5—Post problem stage: at this stage, public interest begins to shift to be lengthy or vanished or sometimes shifting back to the matter for a short period. During the intense public interest stage, social institutions, projects, and policies are formulated to address the problems, and this process continues, even though the public interest shifts to other issues. At times, problems or issues gaining public interest at national level regain public interest as sometimes these issues interrelate with newer issues because by nature, human tends to show interest in issues or problems that they used to deal or face rather than brand new ones (Down 1972).

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Below are characteristics of problems or issues that can regain public interest. 1. The majority of people in a society are negatively affected by the issues or problems; 2. Negative effects of the problems or issues are resulted from social system management in which benefits only the majority or a group of the authorities in the society; 3. The problems or issues are not interesting or exciting, and this often relates to news reporting done by the mass media. Basically, a problem or an issue that can regain or maintain public interest is likely to be interesting and exciting. When public interest in environmental problems reaches the middle stage of the cycle in which large number of people are aware of the problem and realize that they need to contribute both money and effort to address the problems, active interest and stimulation of the problems are gradually diminishing but the public interest still does not reach the post-problem stage because the problems are very noticeable having greater severe impacts upon the majority of the authorities than other social problems. As a matter of fact, most of the time solely environmental news that does not connect with political, economic, or other types of issues rarely becomes big news. Historically, in comparison to political, economic, entertainment, sports news, there has been only a small number of environmental news reported via the media, especially in Thailand. That being said, there is not much data on this available as well as senior environmental journalists. Typically, an environmental journalist requires to possess knowledge in various fields as environmental issues connect with various dimensions such as science, law, economy, politics, and human rights, and in terms of writing environmental news, lack of reliable news sources or key informant who can give unbiased in-depth information is the main problem. As a result, most data are from private environmental organizations. In terms of public interest in environmental news, it is obvious that level of the public interest maintains at moderate since they view the matter as irrelevant or indirect (Niyomsuan 1993). Although this maybe true, impacts of climate change are very obvious in many areas, particularly developing countries in Southeast Asia, and it is usually more difficult for them to recover the loss they have suffered than wealthier or highly developed countries. To tackle the impacts, one requires the following relevant information: present situation and government problem-solving approach. This information must be quickly and widely passed to the public, so the mass media plays a crucial role in this process. The mass media require to have knowledge and understanding of climate change, coupled with social responsibility to give necessary information for the public’s decision-making in accordance with central role of the mass media in giving knowledge to the public, monitoring the society, and running social campaign. These are mandatory for the public to react to the present situation. As previously mentioned, environmental issues are highly complex and interrelated to various dimensions: science, politics, economic, and legislation. Craig Trumbo’s study (1996) reveals that climate change news reporting depends on quoted

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sources and frames in news reporting. The findings of this study point out that a scientist tends to report news using frame of news reporting putting an emphasis on the problem and cause or root of the situation or phenomenon whereas politicians and stakeholders use a frame emphasizing judgement and cure for the problems. The more politic the issues become, the less scientists are used as news sources. This often results in a more difficult task for the mass media to produce in-depth and well-rounded news report. In fact, environmental issues generally are continuous issues covering a lengthy period not a brief issue with immediate impacts, so by their nature, the issues do not attract the public interest because people tend to show interest towards issues with suspense, conflict, and uncertainty (Trumbo 1996). This idea also applies to environmental issues (Antilla 2005). Communication including interpersonal and mass communication is the key to open up comprehension of environmental issues for the public; conversely, studies showed that the mass media still gave inadequate information on the issues for the public. Further analysis of the data indicated that the mass media focused on stimulating interest and economic impacts on personal level rather than looking at the whole system. The inadequate information distribution by the mass media and their agendasetting play a big part in generating the public interest in environmental issues (Stamm et al. 2000).

Mass Media Coverage, Cognitive Setting and Frame Construction of Climate Change A huge majority of the public seldom experience or relate to tangible results of climate change, so it can be said that most of all, people realize the matter through the mass media. The mass media are considered key news source, but in reality, they present information focusing on the impacts only on the surface. Based on McCombs and Shaw’s theoretical framework of agenda setting (1972), analysis of the mass media’s influence over the public perception and thinking process suggests that news has important influence upon setting public agenda or “telling people what to think about” through presentation management. For instance, newspaper has a guide to suggest the significant stories for the readers. Page layout plays a key role in this regard. Important stories are appeared on the front-page, and font use and headline help give implication in the like manner. By the same token, television uses cues as a guide for the audience such as opening and duration of news reporting. These guides are repeatedly used by the mass media so that the public learn about the priority of stories. McCombs and Shaw (1972) also make comparison to show that priority of news relates directly to the mass media’s agenda setting with great statistical significance (McCombs and Shaw 1972). Pioneering study on agenda setting for environmental issues was done by Ader (1995), and it suggests that public awareness of pollution relates closely to news reporting rather than real-world conditions (Ader 1995).

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The incorporation of framing into the analysis indicated greater media influence in terms of agenda setting—telling people what to think about and how to think about a matter than just setting public agenda. In other words, framing is considered cumulative process of agenda setting as the principles of framing include meaning construction of an issue/a story (Goffman 1974). By doing this, the media basically provide metaphor, story, slogan, jargon, catchphrase, contrast, and a value judgement (Fairhurst and Sarr 1996). Framing is still a highly controversial topic in context of climate change since climate change does not categorized as environmental problem but as systematical problem relating to human beings in all dimension: science, technology, legislation, economy, politics, culture, and way of life. News reporting, in a nutshell, requires highly complex framing to produce well-rounded information and at the same time, the presented information needs to be simplified to bring full comprehension to the receivers. Another important factor for framing is the presenter of information; to enumerate, scientist, industrial sector, policymaker, and NGOs. Each of these groups try to present information from their own viewpoint. From Schäfer and O’Neill’s (2017) research on climate change, NGOs used framing, specifically diagnostic framing to explain effects of climate change which ordinary people are not aware of and bring them in the public interest, together with prognostic framing to show that human behaviour can be changed and to encourage cooperative and sustainable living. Stakeholders in economic sector including companies, trade association or industry association, use framing that helps or supports their own business, along with developing strategy for their own organizational objectives (Schäfer and O’Neill’s 2017). Agenda setting and framing by the mass media also depend on the extraction of news values. Climate Change in ASEAN: A Guidebook for journalism students and communicators (2017) directs attention towards news values as follows: 1. Impact: it is considered the most important thing because the receivers need to know about climate change which will affect their lives. An increase in average temperature of a country which will definitely affect people’s harvest is a case in point. Indeed, agriculture is not the only field facing the impacts of climate change, but in fact, climate change affects the whole country’s economy and living conditions. 2. Human interest: global climate change stories presenting emotional dimension of human beings is another factor boosting news values. For instance, news about storming resulted from climate change causes many to be displaced. This story is considered a tragedy so that to tell this kind of story with human-oriented reporting style is really challenging. 3. Proximity: this does not refer to the nearness in distance but refers to mental distance and feelings on the matter/situation; to illustrate, a matter affects people of one race but in different areas. The more the readers are in close proximity to the matter, the higher news values towards the target audience are. Climate change is normally viewed as borderless issue as it covers vast areas. For this reason, it is a journalist’s responsibility to foster a sense of belonging among the audience.

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If there is flooding in the Golden Triangle due to climate change, relevant news and information about this will be valued highly among Thais or people are not living in the areas. That is to say, these people are not directly affected by the issue but in the big picture they are still somehow affected indirectly so they are not really aware of the problem and this often leads to being indifferent to take action. 4. Timeliness: this is considered the heart of fundamental news reporting. Timeliness does not mean everything in a report has to be literally fresh or just only recent occurrence. It can be new discovery of information or new aspect and news report is done using these such as when new exciting discovery is made in terms of climate change in Thailand, but in reality, the change has been taking place for a long period of time. 5. Prominence: famous person appeared in news is generally more attractive and accountable. Today, apart from the relevant authorities to climate change, plenty of famous people today have stepped into take action in climate change. Albert Arnold “Al” Gore Jr., the 45th Vice President of the United States is one of the obvious examples to get involved in global warming campaign. Leonardo Wilhelm DiCaprio is another notable example to actively involve in preserving the environment. News reporting featuring famous figure also boosts the power of a news story and social movement. 6. Unusualness: when there is unusualness or strangeness in a story, people will pay more attention to the story. This principle also applies to climate change. For example, an increase in the average temperature of a country, even there is no cooling season or winter in a certain province will probably draw close attention (Salathong 2017).

Missing Framing for Climate Change in SEA According to news coverage from the mass media focusing on exciting and violent portrayal of climate change impacts, it is apparent that climate change news reporting in this region lacks some dimensions, so this leads to the climate change expert meeting to produce A Guidebook for Journalists on Climate Change and Sustainable Development in Asia Pacific which gathers important dimensions that are not covered by the mass media as follows: ● dimension of gender and age: information about impacts of climate change affecting different genders, ageing population, teenagers, and relevant human rights; ● dimension of solution: information about results of adopting solution, developmental approaches, and technology to respond to climate change and help people in their decision-making. ● dimension of responsibility/role of each country: climate change is considered global agenda so that the whole world is responsible for it together. There should be

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presentation of roles and responsibilities lying on each country regarding climate change in order to encourage collaboration. ● dimension of cause of the problem: climate change news reporting often puts emphasis on economic and social impacts without enough explanation of the root of the problem in order to prevent future threats or problems. ● dimension of being humans: human-oriented news reporting will help pinpoint their involvement with climate change, especially their behaviour and their part in addressing the problems.

Framing and Developing Understanding of Climate Change and Regional Collaboration Climate change bringing changes and collaboration in addressing relevant problems depends on framing for news reporting that focuses on creating awareness about their involvement in tackling the problems and dealing with climate change among the receivers: policymakers, private and public sectors, and the public. Climate change actually needs urgent solution and creative communication or problem-solving approaches to deal with.

Climate Change Situation and Communication About the Situation in Thailand As mentioned earlier, information about climate change and global warming giving to the people in SEA lack some dimensions to portray the issues as a systematically complex problem relating to mankind. Also, as the literature points out that using only scientific based frames to inform and raise awareness about the issues among the people is inefficient. Therefore, Thailand’s case well exemplifies the apparent lack and inefficiency of information circulation. Thailand is situated in the Southeast Asia, and there are close similarities in terms of geographical and physical conditions among the countries in the region; consequently, impacts of climate change upon them are similar. For example, they have suffered weather-related natural disasters such as storm, flood, landslide, and coastal erosion. The most common one is storm which is resulted from global warming as it rises the temperature of seawater and the increasing temperature causes tropical storms—depression, cyclone, and typhoon, along with La Niña. The severity and the frequency of the disasters has gradually increased, and caused floods that damaged the agricultural sector, especially the agricultural lands and crop production. Evidently, in 2011, Thailand was directly and indirectly suffered from five storms, originated in South China Sea: Haima, Nock-ten, Haitang, Nesat, and Nalgae 2554, 2011). (

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Historically, effects of climate change were not brought to public attention as the country’s dedication and implementation of communication and problem-solving are inadequate for raising the citizens’ awareness about climate change. Nonetheless public policy towards the issues was implemented and relevant state departments educated the citizens via their websites, conferences, and workshops. For instance, the state held a conference, on October 17–20, 2016 in Bangkok, with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—195 member countries to assess and discuss about the situation. However, the examination of the state’s communication campaigns for dealing with global warming revealed that the experts gave information based on social frames while the relevant documents used in the campaigns gave information based on financial frames. The target groups of the campaigns used scientific frames. The least noticeable frames were the cultural ones. Past researches and interviews with experts suggested that although the use of scientific frames made Thai people recognize and understand the issue of global warming, it was not able to cause behavioural change. Additionally, they also suggested that building a novel conceptual frame with importance attached to the existing frames such as religions and the King Rama IX’s philosophy of the Sufficiency Economy would help engage the people in being more open towards global warming. In other words, integration of Thai and Western beliefs would help increase the people’s understanding of the issue (Chongkolrattanaporn 2011). By the same token, studies focusing on content about climate change and global warming in Thai context showed that 15 Thai websites listed in www.google.co.th provided the majority of information in article writing format and used scientific frames—putting emphasis on the impacts upon foreign countries. Examples of the content found included risk assessment, possible dangers, and simple guidelines for dealing with global warming at individual level 2008). In addition, the results of relevant study about news seeking ( behavior and news exposure in Thai context indicated that in terms of news seeking behaviour, the samples sought news from the mass media, personal media, and ad hoc media at moderate level, and their level of awareness about global warming was 2009; 2007) high ( It is apparent from the above example that providing information about climate change and global warming from scientific standpoint alone is inefficient. In fact, providing information from various perspectives and cooperation between various sectors could help focus the people’s attention to the problems.

Regional Collaboration Climate change communication relates with science but bombarding the receivers with empirical scientific data is not a good idea as the problem in this regard is not the fact that people do not know about those facts but rather the lack of proper means of framing for storytelling to be remembered. One way is to create awareness or pinpointing that the problem is really at their hands not something irrelevant, intangible, or some scientific information that requires a voyage of discovery, even

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something requires governmental action. Communication, at this point, needs to engage the receivers in realizing about their involvement; for instance, by talking about the effects of climate change related to their way of lives, careers such as fishery or agriculture. In Communicating Climate Change: Focus on the Framing, Not Just the Facts suggests that the use of metaphor is another case in point. It is stated in the article that the use of metaphor in news reporting really helps change attitude and even behaviour (as cited in “Communicating climate change: Focus on the framing, not just the facts” 2017). To illustrate, the use of the word “war” to describe climate change will definitely make the receivers suddenly be aware of the urgency and violence of the problems. SEA really needs collaboration at regional level to deal with climate change problems as the matters are geographically interconnected between countries in the region. These countries bear similarities in way of life so that a problem in one certain area is tangibly and easily affecting another area. By nature, climate change causes systematically problems in which the problems cannot be addressing from only one angle or dimension alone. Communication to create framing for mutual understanding and awareness among the whole region is very challenging for media professionals since at this moment, there still no existing efficient communication approach to deal with all climate change issue and will work with every group of people, even make them realize about the significance of climate change. By doing so, a sender requires real insight into the matter and full comprehension of the audience, together with possessing high level of creativity to deliver information aiming at successful communication.

References 2554 [Archive of Severe Floods in 2011]. (2011). National Hydroinformatics and Climate (THAIWATER). Retrieved February 29, 2020, from https://www.thaiwater. net/current/flood54.html. . (2008). [The presentation of global warming on thai websites and the audience’s risk perception]. Master’s thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Retrieved from http://cuir.car.chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/ 14621. . (2009). [Media exposure, awareness and behavior related to global warming issues of university students in Bangkok]. Master’s thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Retrieved from http://cuir.car.chula.ac. th/handle/123456789/16699. . (2007). [Information seeking, awareness and participation in lessening global warming problems of people in Bangkok]. Master’s thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Retrieved from http://cuir.car. chula.ac.th/handle/123456789/44121. Ader, C. R. (1995). A longitudinal study of agenda setting for the issue of environmental pollution. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 72(2), 300–311. Retrieved from http://journals. sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/107769909507200204.

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Antilla, L. (2005, December). Climate of scepticism: US newspaper coverage of the science of climate change. Global Environmental Change, 15(4), 338–352. Retrieved from https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2005.08.003. Chan, C. (2015, December 18). What the Paris climate deal means for Southeast Asia. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/what-the-paris-climate-deal-means-for-southeastasia/a-18927616. Chongkolrattanaporn, T. (2011). Global warming campaigns in Bangkok: framing analysis and campaign effectiveness. Doctoral dissertation, Chulalongkorn University. Retrieved from http:// doi.org/10.14457/CU.the.2011.1287. “Communicating climate change: Focus on the framing, not just the facts.” (2017, March 6). The Conversation. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/communicating-climate-changefocus-on-the-framing-not-just-the-facts-73028. Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R. K., & Reisinger, A. (Eds.). (2007). IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report, 104. Retrieved from http://www.ipcc. ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html. Cox, R., & Pezzullo, P. C. (2016). Environmental communication and the public sphere. Los Angeles: Sage. Downs, A. (1972). Up and down with ecology-the issue-attention cycle, public interest, 28, 38. Retrieved from https://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/teaching/articles/Downs_Public_Interest_1972. pdf. Fairhurst, G., & Sarr, R. (1996). The art of framing: Managing the language of leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. New York: Northeastern University Press. Retrieved from https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/SOC 571E/um/E.Goffman-FrameAnalysis.pdf. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2013). Working Group I Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2013 The Physical Science Basis. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ WG1AR5_SummaryVolume_FINAL.pdf. Manuti, A. (2013). Climate change awareness: An explorative study on the discursive construction of ethical consumption in a communication campaign. American Journal of Applied Psychology, 1(3), 65–71. Retrieved from http://pubs.sciepub.com/ajap/1/3/6/index.html#Reference1. McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. Niyomsuan, J. (1993). The editors and reporters awareness in reporting environmental information: Case study Thai Daily Newspaper. Master’s thesis, Thammasat University, Bangkok. Retrieved from http://www.thaithesis.org/detail.php?id=59754. Noppan, K. (2009). The effect of framing in environmental news on risk perception. Master’s thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. Salathong, J. (2013). Thai audiences and journalists’ responses to a holistic, future oriented, participatory and empowering (HOPE) model for climate change coverage. International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics, 9(1), 71–85. Salathong, J. (Ed.). (2017). Climate change in ASEAN: A guidebook for journalism students and communicators. Bangkok: UNESCO. Sampei, Y., & Aoyagi-Usui, M. (2009, May). Mass-media coverage, its influence on public awareness of climate-change issues, and implications for Japan’s national campaign to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Global Environmental Change, 19(2), 203–312. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2008.10.005. Schäfer, M. S., & O’Neill, S. (September 2017). Frame analysis in climate change communication. Climate Change Communication. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228620.013.487. Schoenfeld, A. C., Meier, R. F., & Griffin, R. J. (1979). Constructing a social problem: The press and the environment. Social Problems, 27(1), 38–61.

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Slovic, P. (2000). Informing and educating the public about risk. In P. Slovic (Ed.), The perception of risk. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. Stamm, K. R., Clark, F., & Eblacas, P. R. (2000). Mass communication and public understanding of environmental problems: The case of global warming. Public Understand, 9, 219–237. Retrieved from https://www.upf.edu/pcstacademy/_docs/2000_stamm.pdf. Trumbo, C. (1996, July 1). Constructing climate change: Claims and frames in US news coverage of an environmental issue. Public Understanding of Science, 5(3), 269–283. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-6625/5/3/006.

Chapter 7

Urban Ecological Approach for Climate Change Adaptation Toward Sustainable Urban Planning and Development: An Indian Perspective Bhavna Vimawala

Introduction In the twenty-first century there are significant challenges over Humankind. Growth of human inhabits on the earth that even, more live in urban areas and as a result of population growth and urbanization, ecosystems are altering on a global scale. Subsequently, the human activities are driving these changes and threatening many of the ecological sides that are essential to humanity. Climate change and urbanization are one of the most global challenges faced by the humankind. Although human have been adapting to their environments throughout history, climate change poses unique challenges that threaten lives and livelihoods. Cities are home to more than half of the world population. According to the projections by the United Nations, 80% of the global population will be urban by 2050. Even after the world population stabilizes around 2050, the urban population will continue to grow, (Wu et al. 2014) and almost all future population increases will take place in urban areas (mostly in developing countries of Asia and Africa). The world’s urban areas, occupying 3–4% of the world’s land surface, use 80% of its resources, and discharge most of the planet’s solid, liquid, and gaseous waste (Girardet 2015) and thus cities illustrate ever-increasing signs of environmental problems due to the negative impacts of urban activities. Climate change and development pressure on urban areas have become major concerns for cities. The degradation and depletion of natural resources become increasingly vulnerable to climate change risks and, subsequently, face serious health challenges which are in turn linked to extended healthcare, infrastructure, and other costs burdening the economy and the environment (Harlan and Ruddell 2011). An extremely important function of an urban ecosystem is to provide healthy and sustainable environments for both natural systems and communities. Health is another field that influences sustainability theory, planning, and implementation, as a sustainable community is also a healthy community, reflecting the health of its B. Vimawala (B) Faculty of Architecture, Sarvajanik College of Engineering and Technology, Surat, India © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_7

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citizens. However, health is influenced by the physical and social environments in which we live and work as well as by interventions from the healthcare system (Roseland 2012). The urban areas share several common characteristics such as, high population density, abundant built structures, extensive impervious surfaces, altered climatic and hydrological conditions, air pollution, and modified ecosystem function and services (Pickett et al. 2001; Grimm et al. 2008).Therefore, ecological planning is necessary in the establishment of sustainable built environment. Human needs are fulfilled with ecological planning while natural resources are used in the most effective way and the ecological balance is sustained. Thus this paper attempt to address how urban ecological approach can be employed to adapt to climate change effects, while at the same time contributing to sustainable urban planning & development including social and health benefits. Cities have been the centres of economic and social developments. “Development” should not be intermingled with “growth”; while quantitative increases (e.g. in income, population, production, and size) are aptly described as “growth”, qualitative changes (e.g. in health, knowledge, quality of life, walkability, and efficient resource use) are more accurately described as “development”. Moreover, sustainable development should not be conceived of as a trade-off between the environment and the economy, since protecting ecosystems and developing sustainably need not mean loss of employment or economic decline. It is about a new way of thinking about economic development over the long term: it is about “doing development differently” (Roseland 2012).

The Urban Footprint: Indian Scenario With 70% of the population living in rural areas, India’s carbon contribution is much lower than other developed countries as the energy consumed by a rural economy in terms of heat, lighting, and transport is much lower than the urban areas. But this will dramatically change in the next decades with the urban population increasing. According to “Metropolis Indian Cities: Managing Urban Growth 2011” India has the second largest urban system in the world, although presently the 5100 urban centres hold less than 30% of the total Indian population, this figure is expected to rise to 40% by 2030 in an estimated 70,000 urban settlements, as urban population is likely to grow by 575 million over the next 50 years. By 2025, 70 Indian cities are expected to have more than one million inhabitants. India is projected to be the world’s most populous country by 2025. Cities are far more dependent on energy than rural areas where activities like agriculture, animal husbandry, and local artisanal work have a low ecological footprint. As population in cities grows, pressure on ecosystems increases. Large quantities of food, water, and fuel need to be moved into the cities and huge amounts of garbage and sewage have to be moved out. Nutrient-rich human wastes—an asset in a rural setting can become an economic liability in an urban environment. Aquifers and wetlands, farmlands and forests are all as essential to a city’s survival as much as

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transport networks. Water, at once the most vital and most abused urban resource illustrates the dangerous relationship that now exists between cities and the natural system.

Urban Climate Change Challenges Climate change is no more an environmental concern. It has emerged as the biggest developmental challenge for the planet. It is acknowledged as the largest threat to our societies in the coming decades, potentially affecting large and diverse groups of urban residents in this century of urbanization. Its economic impacts, particularly on the poor, make it a major governance issue as well. India is a climate-sensitive nation and is ranked high among the nations exposed to climate change risks. With immense geographic diversity and different climate zones, vulnerability to climate change and risks are varied and multidimensional. Considerations for climate-proofing are therefore not only desirable for climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and water, but also for the overall development paradigm, so as to develop resilience to climate change impacts in the long term. This initiative seeks to present an urban perspective on the adaptation challenge.

Direct Impact of Climate Change in Urban Areas Effects on nature and people are first experienced in cities. Influences of climate change on society include flooding, sea-level rise, cyclone heat waves, landslides, droughts, increased aridity, extreme precipitation, water scarcity, and air pollution, health-related effects and socioeconomic impacts induced by increased numbers of such different events.

Flooding The impact of climate change poses considerable risk to Indian cities. It is expected that impacts will include: a general increase in temperatures by 2–4 °C, an increase of 7–20% in annual precipitation, with increased intensity, alongside increases in Riverine flooding, cyclones, storm surges, and sea-level rise (SLR) (Revi 2008). A study on Low Elevation Coastal Zones estimates that India sees about 3% of its national area at risk of SLR (McGranahan et al. 2007). On July 26, 2005, Mumbai was caught unawares by the highest rainfall of the century. Public transport ceased to function. People were stranded at work or waded back home, their long return journey sometimes taking up to 10 hours. Suburban trains, rickshaws, and approximately 10,000 commercial vehicles suffered damage. The most affected people were

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the slum dwellers who live in the low lying areas. Their shelter built of salvaged materials, are highly vulnerable. In the aftermath of the floods, hundreds of people died of various diseases (leptospirosis, gastroenteritis, malaria, dengue, hepatitis) because of poor or nonexistent sanitation. Economic losses (both housing damages and destruction, and commercial and financial losses) were estimated in hundreds of crore. Where other is a flood devastated the Himalayan village of Kedarnath, India, the destination of half a million Hindu pilgrims annually. The deluge tore apart dozens of bridges, swept away miles of paved roads, and carried off herds of livestock. All of these impacts come with associated environmental health risks. Climate change impacts in Indian cities need to be considered in the context of significant demographic, rural to urban and environmental transitions (Revi 2008). Given that urban areas concentrate disaster risk, this continuing urban growth poses significant challenges for effective and adaptive urban management in Indian cities. The populations most vulnerable to climate change induced hazards are often those in informal settlements, who live in insecure housing, with inadequate or non-existent provision of basic services, and frequently along the marginal and most at-risk areas of a city, such as on riverbanks. At the same time, vulnerability is not solely dependent on hazards but also wider socio-economic risk (Satterthwaite et al. 2007)

Sea-Level Rise One of the alarming prospects of climate change will be its impact on the rise in sea level. Mainland India, endowed with a long coastline of 5700 km will not escape the fury of the seas. The total length of the Indian coastline is about 7500 km when all the island territories of Andaman and Nicobar, and Lakshadweep are taken into account. Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZ) is regions, which fall under 10 metres of coastal elevation. Approximately 81,000 square km of land fall under LECZ in India, housing a population of over 60 million. 50% of this population is in urban regions comprising approximately 31 million people. It is projected that the sea-level rise along the Indian coast will be between 30 and 80 cm over the next century. In the absence of any preventive measures, the people living in coastal areas are potentially going to be affected. Three major cities Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai are on the coast and are on an average elevation of 2–10 metres in the LECZ. They are likely to suffer from flooding of lands particularly during high tide, salinization of water sources, destruction of ecosystems, and natural resources that supply them. Cities in deltaic locations like Kolkata are more likely to be affected by coastal floods as they are at lower elevation, experience more or less natural subsidence and, in some cases, receive more water from the rivers feeding melting glaciers.

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Heat Waves, Draught, and Land Slight Global warming will be felt more in cities because of the “urban heat island effect” that makes cities warmer than their surrounding from 2 to 6 °C because of the modification of the land surface and waste heat produced by high-energy use. Heat waves aggravate thermal discomfort in heat islands, often culminating in health issues that even can kill hundreds of people may become more frequent and intense. India is facing the worst drought it has seen in the last 150 years, affecting the lives of millions of people across the subcontinent. India is facing an unprecedented drought—hundreds of farmers suffer crop losses are and hence committing suicide and large numbers of animals are dying. Landslides are very common indeed in the Lower Himalayas. Heavy rains are one of the major causal factors for landslide.

Water/Sanitation Changes in precipitation patterns and water cycle will increase the already existing and one of the major problems of water supply and quality in urban areas, especially in big cities. The IPCC Report underlines those cities in drier regions like Delhi will be hit hard (IPCC 2007).

Health/Diseases Climate change is expected to increase environment-related diseases. Warmer and/or wetter period of breeding due to global warming will provide ideal conditions for expansion of mosquito-borne diseases as puddles, in which malaria-carrying mosquitoes breed, are created either by excessive rainfall or by droughts in rivers. Poor areas that lack health and other services, combined with crowded living conditions, poor water supply and inadequate sanitation, are ideal for spreading respiratory and intestinal conditions, and for breeding mosquitoes and other vectors of tropical diseases such as malaria, dengue, typhoid and yellow fevers. Lack of sanitation and potable water will increase contaminated water and food-borne diseases like cholera, typhoid, diarrhea, hepatitis, and gastroenteritis. Warmer cities will also induce an increase in respiratory diseases due to pollution whose effects are reinforced by higher temperatures. Poor people may suffer more as they have lesser possibilities to adapt.

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Indirect Impact of Climate Change on Urban Areas Impact of Urbanization According to Darryl D’Monte (2007), “three-quarters of the carbon dioxide in the world, which is the biggest greenhouse gas, is emitted by cities. One has only to remember that half the population of the globe is urban today. Half this carbon dioxide is contributed by buildings, which need to heat or cool their interiors; the rest is generated by motorized transport, which is growing exponentially in our country. This locates the problem squarely in our midst, as urban-dwellers. As is painfully evident from city after city in our country, urban development here is highly unsustainable.” This phenomenon is further emphasized by the move towards high-energy consuming buildings. Because of globalization and adoption of new technologies, traditional patterns of construction are abandoned for homogenized types of building that largely use cement and glass, air conditioning regardless of the environmental and climatic conditions.

Migrations Climate change-related drought and floods are expected to foster rural to urban migration, increase overpopulation of cities and the proportion of poor and vulnerable people living in urban areas. It is estimated that 500 million people are going to be affected by water problems in India because of global warming. The migrants are the most vulnerable groups in any city. With no access to the city’s livelihood network and a lack of skill sets to help them survive, these groups live in the slums which are illegal and that have no access to basic amenities.

Infrastructures Storms, floods, cyclones, coastal flooding that is expected to be more frequent put infrastructure at great risk. This includes transportation (roads, railways, bridges, ports, and airports) and communication networks, water supply, sewage, gas pipelines, drainage, flood and coastal defense systems, power and telecommunication infrastructures, industrial units, plants. As far as buildings are concerned, informal and traditional housing are the most vulnerable to storms and floods.

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Economic Impacts Cities form the centre of the economy in many countries, so climate change’s impact on urban populations also damages the nation and thus national Gross Domestic Product due to shortage of fresh water, damage to agriculture and fisheries, disturbance of tourism, and other consequences. Health consequences of climate change especially, heat waves, could have a great impact on economy. The resulting increase in expenses on health care by individuals would escalate leading to greater stress. Hence, this vicious cycle would lead to depreciation of human resources. Climate change through more frequent and intense drought or floods is already severely affecting the agricultural sector and food production. One of the side effects of this rural and agricultural crisis is increase in food and biomass fuel prices in cities.

The Poor and the Vulnerable People Climate change will affect more the poor people who constitute between a quarter and half of the Indian cites. The slum dwellers, squatters, migrants, people living in informal settlements which are generally situated in vulnerable areas (river beds, flood plains, hill slopes) will be directly affected. They already suffer from insecurities due to “poor governance, lack of investments in infrastructure and in the commons, strong connections between the political class, real-estate developers and public agencies” (Revi 2008).

Difficulties to Climate Change Adaptation Most cities today continue to construct energy-consuming infrastructure, build roads without transit and pedestrian considerations, plan development that generates long travels, dispose of waste without utilizing it as a power source, and ignore distributed generation and renewable energy options. When they make these oversights, they constrain themselves to a future of wasted energy and high GHG emissions for times to come. The reasons these opportunities are missed are mostly due to lack of awareness, technical know-how, and support. One of the biggest hurdles is the lack of adequate knowledge and information at every level, national, regional, and local. Climate change is still not taken as an emergency. Moreover most of the attention is more on mitigation but the focus needs to be also on adaptation, especially for the vulnerable communities. In order to reduce vulnerability, a shift in public policy from greenhouse gas mitigation to incorporate adaptation is required, with action and the necessary structures and institutions in place on multiple levels, from the national to the state, city, and neighbourhood levels (Revi 2008). Policies have to insert into each and every planning and implementation exercise an adaptation.

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The concept of sustainability has become an important paradigm in urban planning, as the cities play a key role in our society. Urban planning strategies for climate change are moving beyond mitigation and beginning to encompass adaptation as well. As adaptation concerns move higher up the policy agenda, planners, and policymakers will be faced with difficult choices about how to effectively generate responses that take into account a wide range of societal concerns of sustainable development. Addressing climatic changes and including land use and transport planning, critical infrastructure planning, flood plain hazard assessment and disaster readiness plan, health and social welfare provision and environmental protection plan are some of the climate change adaptation address in present strategy planning. According to Mainstreaming Urban Resilience Planning in Indian Cities (TERI 2011), India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) issued in June 2008 offers opportunities for integrating urban resilience planning, through the eight National Missions, such as the National Mission on Sustainable Habitats (NMSH) and the National Water Mission. There is also the opportunity and attempt to make use of existing national urban renewal programmes, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and City Development Plans are also an avenue for developing an action plan to address inequalities in service provision. However, for this to be effectively implemented, there is a need for adequate capacity building at the city level with regards to understanding climate risks and how they can be mitigated, and effectively coordinated across the multiple stakeholders and agencies which need to be involved. In response to these problems, urban development policies need to move towards sustainable focus and cities have to develop new strategies for improving the quality of urban ecosystems with ecological approach.

Emergence and Perspective of the Discipline of Urban Ecological Approach Urban ecology as a subdiscipline of ecology only emerged in the 1970s in response to a growing awareness of human impact on the natural environment, and the role of cities in this regard (Cadenasso and Pickett 2008; McDonnell 2011). It is “the study of the relationship between people and their urban environment” which is essentially human ecology of the city (Park et al. 1925). Urban ecology studies the interactions of organisms, built structures, and the physical environment, where people are concentrated. Urban ecology looks at cities both as complex social and ecological systems and places that are uniquely structured for human needs. The urban ecology has expanded during by ecologists as well as urban geographers, planners, and social scientists (McDonnell 2011; Wu 2014). Presently, urban ecology usually consists of three kinds of research components that interact with each other in the study of cities, making urban ecology an interdisciplinary science that integrates research with practice (Fig. 7.1).

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Fig. 7.1 The diagram of contemporary urban ecology: key components and their relationship (Adapted from Wu 2014)

Consequently, urban ecology can be defined as “the study of spatial and temporal patterns, environmental impacts, and sustainability of urbanization with emphasis on biodiversity, ecosystem processes, and ecosystem services” (Wu 2014). Wu (2014). Urban ecology and sustainability: the state-of-the-science and future directions. Landscape and Urban Planning, 125: 209–221. Creative adaptation while living within limits “resilience and sustainability” is the key to facing the coming social and environmental challenges of the twenty-first century. With the rapidly increasing availability of remote sensing data, geographic information systems (GIS), and spatial pattern analysis methods, the number of studies on the spatial and temporal patterns and socio-economic drivers of urbanization began to ascend (Wu et al. 2013a). These ecological perspectives have been categorized as either “ecology in cities”, which focuses primarily on the nonhuman organisms in the urban environment, or “ecology of cities”, which considers the whole city as an ecosystem or as a socioeconomic system (Wu 2008). Considering the new developments in urban studies, Wu and its collaborators (2013a) added a third category—“sustainability of cities”. Based on this categorization, five distinct but related urban ecological approaches can be identified as illustrated in Fig. 7.2 (Wu 2008, 2014; Wu et al. 2013a). Understanding the relationship between spatial and social structures in the city is a key component in urban landscape ecology, particularly when urban sustainability is important criteria. To illustrate how urban landscape ecology is related to urban

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Fig. 7.2 Different perspectives in urban ecology and the rising prominence of the urban landscape ecology approach to the studies of cities and human-dominant areas (Adapted from Wu 2008, 2014, Wu et al. 2013a)

ecology, here we provide a synopsis of the evolution of different perspectives and approaches in urban ecological research since its early years (Fig. 7.2). These five urban ecological approaches identified were (Wu 2008, 2014; Wu et al. 2013a): ● Social ecology approach or human ecology approach has followed the ecology of cities category that views cities as socio-economic systems and investigates human behaviour and social organization in cities based on borrowed ecological theory and concepts. ● Bioecology approach has followed the ecology in cities category that views cities as trashed or damaged habitat and has evolved with a focus on how urbanization affects the distribution and dynamics of plants and animals in cities. ● Urban systems approach or human ecosystem approach, both of which treat the city as a whole ecosystem consisting of both socio-economic and biological components. ● Urban landscape approaches treats urban areas as spatially heterogeneous landscapes that are composed of multiple interacting patches. This approach focuses on the relationship between urbanization patterns and ecological processes. ● Emerging urban sustainability approach that treats cities as coupled human–environment systems or socioecological systems. This approach integrates the various urban ecology perspectives, and its scientific core develops around the structure, function, and services of the urban landscape, with an increasing emphasis on the relationship between ecosystem services and human well-being in urban areas.

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Fig. 7.3 The scope of urban landscape ecology: three key components and their relationship

This emerging urban sustainability approach integrates the various urban ecology perspectives. It is the science of studying and improving the relationship between urban landscape pattern and ecological processes for achieving urban sustainability. Urban sustainability is an adaptive process of maintaining and improving ecosystem services and human well-being in the urban landscape (Wu 2010 2013b). As such, urban landscape ecology consists of three interactive major components: (Figs. 7.2 and 7.3). ● The first component is to characterize the spatiotemporal patterns and driving processes of the urban landscape. This involves mapping and quantifying urban morphological attributes and landscape patterns over time, identifying key socioeconomic and environmental drivers, and understanding urban pattern (Jenerette and Wu 2001; Luck and Wu 2002; Batty 2005; Schneider and Woodcock 2008; Wu et al. 2013a, b). ● The second component is focused on “impacts studies” that investigate how urbanization affects biodiversity, population and community processes, ecosystem functions, and ecosystem services. ● The third component of urban landscape ecology focuses on the sustainability of urban areas—urban sustainability.

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These scenarios have to be investigated in concert with landscape planning and design because they involve intentional alterations of landscape composition and configuration. In addition to the methods mentioned above, sustainability indicators may play an important role in accomplishing these goals.

Ecological Planning for Sustainable Urban Development Ecological planning is the management and urbanization of the landscape in harmony with the underlying landscape ecology. Ecological planning is a functional requirement in the establishment of sustainable built environment. With ecological planning human needs are supplied while natural resources are used in the most effective and sustainable manner and the maintenance of ecological balance is sustained. Protecting human and environmental health, having healthy ecosystems, eliminating environmental pollution and providing green spaces are various benefits of ecological planning.

Planning Methodology ● Land use suitability analysis driven by ecological and environmental considerations ● Economic Analysis based on anticipated and planned GDP growth ● Influence Zones of existing development and infrastructure. An ecological planning approach provides a strong foundation for balance urban growth and environmental considerations. It is a clear, logical, and systematic process, enabled by the use of Geographic Information Systems. The GIS facilitates the integration of multi-criteria decision parameters allowing for complex inputs yet simple and clear planning outputs. The cartographic modeling process provides a replicable decision process for ecological planning that can be applied across the country, including in its localized variations. This process helps identify most environmentally suitable locations for urban development activity in a focal manner as opposed to a sprawl across the region.

Biophilic Urbanism Approach for the Cities Similar approach of Biophilic approach on Cities has also increasing recognition of the need to be with nature, to live happy, productive, meaningful lives. Current interest for biophilic design among planners, architects, and designers acknowledge this power of nature. Biophilic design holds that good design, at the building, site,

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city, and regional scale, must include nature and natural elements. Cities and urban environments contain a variety of ecological and green assets, from parks to trees to rivers and riparian habitats, and increasingly, efforts are being made to further enhance the green elements and features of these living and work environments. Daylighting, urban streams, installing trails, planting new trees and forests, community gardens, installing green walls and vertical gardens, are among the many ways in which cities and urban environments can become greener. Biophilic urbanism can and must happen at different scales. Biophilic cities are cities that provide close and daily contact with nature, nearby nature, but also search for to foster an awareness of and caring for this nature. Other features of biophilic are: ● ● ● ● ●

Resilience through Urban Natural Systems Help to Strengthen Commitments to Place Enhance Family and Individual Resilience and Adaptive Capacity Help Build Social Capital and Trust Obstacles to Biophilic Resilience.

The movement in the direction of making cities greener, more natural, more biophilic, will also help to make them more resilient. Biophilic cities can also serve to make a city more resilient in the long run, ecologically, economically, and socially. There are also such initiatives of Green Urbanism, Smart Cities; Nature-based solution Eco-City approaches follow the parallel concern leading towards achieving the goal of sustainable development all over the world.

Indian Perspective Knowing India is currently confronted with the emergence of more than 35 cities having million-plus population, and is further estimated to house 14% of the world’s urban population by 2025. This adds to the overall climate change vulnerability especially in pockets inside cities that have inadequate infrastructure. Urban sustainability will be a critical challenge, particularly for developing nations like India. Sustainability of the Indian economic growth remains largely threatened due to the adverse impact of climate change. Most of the Indian cities are far behind in quality as well as quantity of urban ecological concerns. Indian urban planning needs major overhaul. Indian cities are currently facing high challenges because of growing urbanization and the impacts of climate change. Rapid urbanization and widespread urban sprawl have depleted green cover and increased urban vulnerability to climate change. There is a lack of understanding of using urban green spaces for climate adaptation and mitigation. Increase in population has adversely affected the green cover in urban India. Lack of technical data and scientific awareness among city dwellers has resulted in devaluation of green cover. It is very necessary to have urban green spaces as a cost-effective measure for climate adaptation. It also recommends best practices in green space planning for the conservation of urban biodiversity, climate change

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adaptation, disaster risk management, and enhancement of ecosystem services for Indian cities. Urban planning is crucial to address health equity. An approach to urban planning that heeds health and its determinants will lead toward sustainable development. The Government of India (GoI) has launched many programmes to enhance the quality of urban life and tackle the challenges faced by Indian cities. But the Smart Cities Mission stands out as the most popular. The programme aims to create 100 smart cities in order to improve the standard of living in urban spaces as well as improve the local environment in the cities. The Smart City Mission aims to achieve these goals by applying technology-heavy solutions in order to make the most efficient use of available resources and infrastructure. Resilience is important for not just climate adaptation but also to maintain the social, infrastructure and economic integrity of the city. Smart city planning must be seen with a climate lens to enhance its resilience. The overlapping of three agendas—climate, development, and cities—will be the focus this year as the previous year for both Climate and SDG processes. In 2016, Habitat III and COP22 are potent opportunities for India to harmonies its understanding of the problems and opportunities posed by growing urbanization. The ecological planning for climate change adaptation and resilience planning programmes with sustainable development should be address together and incorporated in every aspect of the Smart City development. India can learn a lot from the Chinese model of urban forestry development as both of them are the topmost populated countries of the world.

References Batty, M. (2005). Agents, cells, and cities: New representational models for simulating multiscale urban dynamics. Environ Plan A, 37, 1373–94. Cadenasso, M. L., & Pickett, S. T. A. (2008). Urban principles for ecological landscape design and management: Scientific fundamentals. Cities and the Environment, 1(2), 1–16. D’Monte, D. (2007, September). The role of cities in climate change. InfoChange. Girardet, H. (2015). Creating regenerative cities. Available online: http://www.sustainable-per formance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Regenerative-Cities.pdf. (accessed on 12 September 2015). Grimm, N. B., Faeth, S. H., Golubiewski, N. E., Redman, C. L., Wu, J., Bai, X., et al. (2008). Global change and the ecology of cities. Science, 319(5864), 756–760. Harlan, Sharon L., & Ruddell, Darren M. (2011). Climate change and health in cities: Impacts of heat and air pollution and potential co-benefits from mitigation and adaptation. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 3, 126–34. IPCC. (2007). Summary for Policymakers: In Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report. Jenerette, G. D., & Wu, J. (2001). Analysis and simulation of land use change in the central Arizona—Phoenix region. Landscape Ecology, 16(7), 611–26. Johnson, C. (2011). Indian cities: Managing Urban Growth. London: A Metropolis Publication in Association With India’s National Institute of Urban Affairs. Luck, M., & Wu, J. G. (2002). A gradient analysis of urban landscape pattern: A case study from the Phoenix metropolitan region, Arizona, USA. Landscape Ecology, 17(4), 327–39.

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McDonnell, M. J. (2011). The history of urban ecology: An ecologist’s perspective. In J. Niemelä, J. H. Breuste, G. Guntenspergen, N. E. McIntyre, T. Elmqvist, & P. James (Eds.), Urban ecology: Patterns, processes, and applications (pp. 5–13). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. McGranahan, G., et al. (2007). The rising tide: Assessing the risks of climate change and human settlements in low elevation coastal zones. Environment and Urbanization, 19(1), 17–37. Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W., & McKenzie, R. (1925). The city (p. 250). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Pickett, S. T. A., Cadenasso, M. L., Grove, J. M., Nilon, C. H., Pouyat, R. V., Zipperer, W. C., et al. (2001). Urban ecological systems: Linking terrestrial ecological, physical, and socioeconomic components of metropolitan areas. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematic, 32, 127–157. Revi, A. (2008). Climate change risk: An adaptation and mitigation agenda for Indian cities. Environment and Urbanization, 20(1), 207–229. Roseland, Mark. (2012). Toward sustainable communities: Solutions for citizens and their governments (4th ed.). GabriolaIsland, BC: New Society Publishers. Satterthwaite, D., Huq, S., Reid, H., Pelling, M., & Romero Lankao, P. (2007). Adapting to climate change in urban areas: The possibilities and constraints in Low-and middle-income nations (Human Settlements Discussion Paper). London: IIED Schneider, A., & Woodcock, C. E. (2008). Compact, dispersed, fragmented, extensive? A comparison of urban growth in twenty-five global cities using remotely sensed data, pattern metrics and census information. Urban Studies, 45(3), 659–92. TERI. (2011). Mainstreaming Urban Resilience Planning in Indian Cities, a Policy Perspective. Delhi: The Energy and Resources Institute. Accessed March 23, 2014. http://www.acccrn.org/ sites/default/files/documents/Final_Mainstreaming%20Urban%20Resilience%20Planning% 20copy.pdf. Wu, J. (2008). Making the case for landscape ecology: An effective approach to urban sustainability. Landscape Journal, 27(1), 41–50. Wu, J. (2010). Urban sustainability: An inevitable goal of landscape research. Landscape Ecology, 25(1), 1–4. Wu, J. (2014). Urban ecology and sustainability: The state-of-the-science and future directions. Landscape and Urban Planning, 125, 209–221. Wu, J., He, C. Y., Huang, G. L., & Yu, D. Y. (2013a). Urban landscape ecology: Past, present, and future. In B. J. Fu & K. B. Jones (Eds.), Landscape ecology for sustainable environment and culture (pp. 37–53). Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media. Wu, K.-Y., Ye, X.-Y., Qi, Z.-F., & Zhang, H. (2013b). Impacts of land use/land cover change and socioeconomic development on regional ecosystem services: The case of fast-growing Hangzhou metropolitan area, China. Cities, 31, 276–284. Wu, J., Xiang, W.-N., & Zhao, J. (2014). Urban ecology in China: Historical developments and future directions. Landscape and Urban Planning, 125, 222–233.

Chapter 8

Urban Dynamics, Socioeconomic Transformation and Built Heritage in a Historic Town of India: An Appraisal Subrata Kr. Paul, Souvanic Roy, and Soumen Mitra

Introduction The value of built heritage is well acknowledged across the globe. Nevertheless, significant monuments and precincts in many historic towns, particularly in the developing world, continue to contend with multifaceted contest in the face of prevalent urban dynamics and the related socio-economic transformation. Consequently, the built heritage either loses sanctity or are destroyed completely. This, in turn, obliterates the identity, character and attractiveness of the historic towns. The research question delved in this study: How the present urban dynamics is in contest with the existing built heritage of Serampore, which is an archetypal European colonial town in India. Presently, it is undergoing urbanisation as part of a larger urban agglomeration of Kolkata Metropolitan Area (KMA). Serampore grew up on the western bank of Bhagirathi–Hooghly River, at about 20 kilometres upstream from Calcutta (Kolkata). The town has a multilayered history of Indo-Danish-British eras, reflected in an array of historic buildings, including churches, government houses, a tavern, schools, colleges, hospitals, jail, temples, mosques, gateways, riverside pavilions, industrial estates and villas (Fig. 8.1). Unfortunately, several of the buildings are in a dilapidated state at present. And those under private ownership are mostly abandoned and face a high risk of demolition to make way for new developments. However, lately, laudable works of restoration are observed in selected monuments. But the degraded environs raise undeniable questions on the comprehensiveness of the initiatives.

S. Kr. Paul (B) · S. Mitra Department of Architecture, Town and Regional Planning, Infrastructure and Human Settlement Management, Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, Shibpur, India S. Roy School of Ecology, Infrastructure and Human Settlement Management, Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, Shibpur, India © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_8

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1. Location map of Serampore 4. Serampore College 7. Temple of Gourchandra

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2. Danish Government House 3. St Olav’s Church 5. Water tower 6. Palace of an Indian landlord 8. Residence of Sub-Divisional Officer, Serampore

Fig. 8.1 Location of Serampore and key heritage structures revealing Indo-Danish-British heritage of the place (1: Data source-Google Maps; 2: Aalund, F., & Rasten, S. (2010); 3–8: Photographs by the authors‚ 2014)

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Three reasons underpin the rationale for this study: First, India being one of the signatories of the International Committee of Shared Colonial Heritage (ICOMOS 2002) is responsible for conserving the Danish Heritage in Serampore; second, Serampore would not be able to contribute in the recent state initiative for river tourism development (WBTDCL 2016) without a coordinated effort towards conserving the existing heritage assets; third, a comprehensive policy is imperative for meaningful internalisation of the opportunity created by the Serampore Initiative of the National Museum of Denmark (Aalund and Rasten 2010) for conserving selected Danish monuments in the town. The research question leads to the focal intent of the study that is to investigate the causal links in the contest between the built heritage and the prevalent urban dynamics in the case of Serampore. Overarching issues emerging from the analyses are identified. Possible policy implications are highlighted in the concluding remarks.

Urban Dynamics and Contested Built Heritage Urban dynamics refers to a description of growth and decline of an urban area, and also the continuous process responsible for changes related to land use, economic base, demography and sociocultural profile, which, in turn, transform its morphological characteristics. The elements of the process include: urbanisation/suburbanisation, counter-urbanisation, decentralisation, consolidation, urban decay, and urban renewal (Forrester 1969; Mass 1974; Schroeder 1975; Alfeld 1995; Larkham and Conzen 2014). Studies on urban dynamics frequently attempt to explain the role and the interrelationship between the complex administrative, economic, social, cultural, physical, and environmental processes, which guide the continuous formation and transformation of cities. Several earlier studies (Horayangkura 2005; Alicka 1997; William 2002) reported destruction and obliteration of built heritage in a rapidly urbanising scenario. Timothy and Nyaupane (2009) identified a number of ‘challenges and threats’ to heritage conservation in the less-developed world. The ‘challenges and threats’—outlined below—reveal the diverse facets of the contest impacting built heritage in urbanising towns in developing countries:

Financial Constraints Endemic scarcity of public-funds for conservation is acute in the developing world. Consequently, public agencies often ignore built heritage and assign least priority to heritage conservation programmes (Ribeiro 1990; Rasamuel 1989). Economics is the primary motive for conserving the built and living past in developing regions (Timothy and Nyaupane 2009), as heritage is often seen in many places as an

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economic saviour for developing tourism. Most historic sites throughout the developing world charge admission fees, upon which their maintenance and care is dependent. And often, tourism cannot regenerate enough returns to sustain conservation programmes. Many historic buildings, worthy of conservation, are privately owned and, in several instances, the owners do not have adequate financial strength for the upkeep of such properties. Consequently, ensembles of dilapidated buildings remain in a state of despair and continue to degrade via human-caused and natural wear (Leech 2004).

Modernisation—Development Versus Conservation The stresses of urban growth cause a significant threat to urban heritage, since with rise in population and economic pressure, new structures are too often constructed to house growing urban activities in historic landscapes—destroying its ambience and sanctity (Castriota 1999; Oren et al. 2002). Likewise, old buildings are ruined in the name of modernisation, permanently obliterating the characters of historic precincts (Burton 1993; Sadek 1990). While in the developed world, a common trend is for historic buildings to be renovated and used for modern purposes (as offices, apartments, etc.), in developing regions, traditional buildings tend to be razed and replaced anew (Timothy and Nyaupane 2009). The financial-cost associated with preserving historic structures often cannot defend their maintenance; consequently they are removed in favour of new buildings offering more economic promise (Setiawan and Timothy 2000). All too often, indigenous building technology and skill go unrecorded and are eventually lost (Shackley 1996).

Lack of Social Will While in the developed world, conservation is often done for aesthetic, educational, or other perceived socio-psychological benefits, in less developed regions, the notion of heritage conservation is relatively new and few people appreciate the need for it (Timothy 1999; Fielden 1993). Several earlier studies reported that many residents of less-developed regions view preservation with suspicion and ignorance. Unlike their counterparts in the West, who tend to value heritage for its sentiment and nostalgic worth, people in developing nations correlate preservation and conservation with backwardness—antithetical to modernity. Therefore, in many instances, past is of low priority to community members, who pride themselves in scraping the old and constructing new (Burton 1993; Timothy 1999). Evidently, this puts historic buildings and ancient monuments in a serious contest, where important historic buildings and ancient monuments are more likely to be replaced by modern structures.

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Lack of Political Will In sync with common perception, at various political levels too, culture and built heritage are often seen as an unaffordable luxury if other public services are lacking and money is in short supply. Thus, for many less-developed regions, heritage conservation is not high priority for political leaders (Hernández Llosas 2001). In some countries, conservation is done solely by foreign investors and international agencies (Timothy and Nyaupane 2009). Various manifestations of public corruption that use market forces to abuse and/or destroy heritage assets for devious financial gains are noted in earlier works. Common illustrations include disregarding rules and laws for a fee (Timothy and Nyaupane 2009); allowing constructions/alterations in heritage sites in the name of promoting tourism (Winter 2002); supporting abusive construction activities in heritage precincts in the name of protecting people’s development rights, etc. Timothy and Nyaupane (2009) opine that threats driven by public corruption to built heritage is much widespread than it appears on the surface. The low political priority of heritage conservation is evident in the sluggishness associated with enactment of the protective legislations and enforcement of their legal provisions. The belatedness of these acts has been blamed for much loss of artefacts and archaeological sites throughout the developing world (Leech 2004; Ribeiro 1990). Turnbull (1998) reported that where a government has an interest in preserving heritage, the focus is often bias towards economic benefits. Jansen-Verbeke (1997), Paul and Roy (2016) observe ‘conservation-bias’, where it is noted that in instances of tourism-driven conservation, intensely visited monuments are selectively given priority funding for conservation, neglecting others that are less visited by tourists.

Lack of Cooperation and Holistic Management Cooperation and collaboration among stakeholders, such as government agencies, private and public sectors, polities and communities, is important for sustainable development in general and, for heritage management in particular—since many overlapping authorities lay claim to historic artefacts and places. Without adequate cooperation, sites are often neglected, overused or caught in legal battles (Timothy 1998). ‘In most of world, there is a general lack of holistic management’ (Timothy and Nyaupane 2009). Each public sector, or level of government, is primarily interested in carrying out its own set of responsibilities without taking into consideration the efforts of other departments, ministries or the private sectors. This results in overlapping or parallel development, ill-fitting projects, over expended budgets, stalled work and sectoral fragmentation (Hornik 1992; Timothy 1998). The widespread haphazard

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situation is further aggravated in a rapidly changing urbanising scenario, characterised by overcrowding, growing commercial activities, environmental pollution, increased demand for housing, infrastructure and other urban services.

Analytical Framework The analytical framework of the present study (Table 8.1) identifies five ‘challenges and threats’ to built heritage from literature as major facets of the contest and highlights their causal links with the key elements of the urban dynamics prevalent in the developing world, namely urbanisation, counter-urbanisation, changing governance, economic base, sociocultural profile and technology. Indicators of the contest are also listed.

Methodology and Data This study on Serampore adopts a ‘qualitative and exploratory’ method of analysis based on the analytical framework that entails the exploration of the following parameters: (a) The major elements of the urban dynamics that shaped its built heritage over time (b) Built heritage assets with their past and present use, ownership, physical condition, status of conservation and vulnerability to the elements of the present urban dynamics (c) Perception of the stakeholders—West Bengal (State) Heritage Commission (WBHC); West Bengal State Tourism Department (WBSTD); Archaeological Survey of India (ASI); National Museum of Denmark (NMD); the Urban Local Body (ULB)/Municipality; civil society-based Serampore Heritage Restoration Initiative (SHRI); citizens and heritage property owners—about the value of heritage assets, their capacity and efforts towards conservation, challenges faced and future plans. Data related to the above parameters were collected from secondary sources and primary survey. The secondary sources include historical documents, publications, plans and survey reports. The primary data was collected (during 2013–2016) through reconnaissance, participant observation, photographic documentation, focus group discussion (FGD) and in-depth interviews. Forty significant historic structures and their surroundings were surveyed. Sample sizes for the FGDs and interviews were decided based on the ‘principle of theoretical saturation’.

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Table 8.1 Analytical framework Facets of the contest

Causal links with the elements of urban dynamics

Indicators of the contest

1. Financial constraints

# Less priority for funding heritage conservation programmes at the government levels, owing to pressing demand for infrastructure and service delivery arising out of rapid urbanisation # Inadequate financial capacity of private heritage asset owners in a changing socio-economic scenario

# Insignificant/no provision for heritage conservation in development plans # Foreign fund depended conservation activities # Presence of heritage structures in a state of despair # Envisaged conservation programmes depending solely on tourism

2. Modernisation versus conservation

# Urbanisation-led population growth results in raised land value that, in turn, leads to abuse, partial modifications or complete destruction of historic structures

# Razing of heritage structures to construct new facilities for satisfying growing urban demands # Mushrooming of activities at historic precincts spoiling the ambience and sanctity # Modification in heritage buildings obliterating authenticity and characteristics # Loss of traditional technology and skill

3. Lack of social will

# Changing technology, capital, and culture bring forth pride and concern for new developments neglecting heritage. # New generation populace and in-migrants do not belong to the tradition and history of the place

# Insignificant nostalgic attachment to the heritage of the town or the property under possession # Lack of awareness about the tradition and history of the place #Nearly always, public opinions on heritage are guided by perceived economic value # Ancestral properties abandoned for reasons other than poverty—pride in scraping the old and constructing new

4. Lack of political will

# Changing governance, technology, capital and urban aspirations generate market-forces that favour modernisation subduing conservation. Political-corruption often utilises the market-forces for narrow and short-term benefits

# Remote priority for conservation activities # Sluggishness in implementation of the provisions of conservation legislations # Politically favoured market-forces abusing/destroying heritage structures (continued)

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Table 8.1 (continued) Facets of the contest

Causal links with the elements of urban dynamics

Indicators of the contest

5. Lack of cooperation and holistic management

# Administrators and government departments carry out their own responsibilities without taking into account the efforts of others. # The adverse effect of lack of cooperation and holistic management is worsened in a rapidly urbanising scenario

# Conflicting claims on heritage assets among various authorities # Uncoordinated state programmes and municipal-level development plans # Sectoral fragmentation at municipal level and other line departments, resulting in ill-fitting projects/delay in implementation

Serampore: Urban Dynamics, Socioeconomic Transformation and Evolution of Built Heritage This section presents a brief account of the administrative system, demography, sociocultural character, economic base, land use, town planning and architecture in Serampore through its distinct layers of history. It reveals the urban dynamics in the town over time and space, and sets the background for the built heritage in existence. The evolution of Serampore from an agrarian village to a historic town can be traced in the four distinct periods outlined below:

Pre-Danish Serampore (1752–1755) The present Serampore town comprised of a cluster of rural settlements until I752 A.D., when the local landlord, under Mughal sovereignty, set up a temple of Lord Rama and amalgamated three surrounding rural villages namely, Sripur, Gopinathpur and Monoharpur to rename Srirampore after the name of the deity. During this time, the social hierarchy in Serampore was dominated by the prevalent Hindu caste system, nevertheless the demographic and sociocultural diversity was notable due to presence of a varied group of inhabitants that included original settlers belonging to several religious cults (Hindus, Shaivaites and Baishnavs) and in-migrants, namely the Muslim soldiers of Akbar’s (Mughal Ruler in India, 1542– 1605) army (settled around 1565) and the Marathas, who came as plunderers during 1660s. Pre-Danish Serampore was essentially an agrarian village rich with various natural produces such as rice, jute, betel nuts, palm, coconuts and Gangetic spikenards. The high quality of natural produces of Bengal was known to Europe since the first century B.C. and there was a well-organised trading sector through land and water routes. In addition to the agricultural activities, the economy of the place was

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significantly dependent on several trading centres of different hierarchy within and around Serampore. During this period, the topography of Serampore was marked by settlements of amorphous layout with several swamps, wetlands and intermittent water bodies. Ownership claims were restricted to cultivable lands. Communities exercised joint rights over natural assets of land and water. Huts with mud walls and thatched curvilinear roof were the predominant builtform of this era. A more lasting form evolved with the introduction of burnt bricks walls and terracotta roof-tiles by the Muslim in-migrants. The building material used to reflect the economic status of the people—the landlords had brick palaces, while the majority of common people had mud house. Temple architecture was simple with a tapering shikhara over a small rectangular room of the deity. Mosques used to comprise of a rectangular dome-topped sanctum, flanked by an open space enclosed by boundary walls with minarets at four corners.

Danish Era (1755–1845) The Danish era at Serampore began in 1755, when the Danish Asiatic Company obtained an agreement from the then Bengal Nawab (Governor) Ali Verdi Khan to acquire land in Serampore and conducting free trade in Bengal against a payment of 2.5% duty (Feldback 1969, p. 130). Consequently, the Danes bought 60 bighas (0.08028 km2 ) of land from Serampore for setting up a trading post. In 1759, they further acquired 120 bighas in the flanking villages and agglomerated the entire area renaming Fredricksnagore (after King Frederick V of Denmark) or Serampore (anglicised Srirampore) (Chatterjee 2009). Eventually, in 1777, owing to continued economic problems and loss, the Danish crown took over all the Danish possessions in India. Thus, Fredricksnagore came and continued to exist under the Danish sovereignty, with few interruptions in between, until the Danes were forced to sell the town to the British (the most dominating coloniser in India, 1756–1947) in 1845. This marked the end of Danish governance in Bengal. The Danes set up the Serampore municipality in 1842, but it remained non-functional till 1864–1865. In spite of several adversities and colonial rivalries, Serampore emerged as a port town under the Danes. The commodities dealt were textiles, sugar and saltpetre. During the heyday of the Danes, the economy of the town thrived significantly through overseas trade. However, the state of prosperity changed abruptly in 1801, when Serampore was fleetingly (1801–1815) surrendered to the British as an indirect consequence of the war and political turmoil in Europe that resulted in a significant loss to the Danish trade. Also, industrialisation in England led to introduction of power-looms that largely extinguished the overseas trade in Indian hand-woven textiles, further accelerating the economic decline of Serampore. During this recession-period, majority of the Danes left India and several prosperous Indian merchants abandoned the town that marked a significant counter-urbanisation. In contrast, merchants from Calcutta came forward with capital support that was readily

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grabbed by the local artisanal and producer groups of the town. Consequently, Serampore lost its economic stronghold and increasingly came under in the influence of British Calcutta. The flourishing commercial activities initiated the process of urbanisation in Serampore with a number of in-migrants, particularly artisans, native business class and middlemen between local producers and Danish merchants (O’Malley 1912). This resulted in a notable transformation in the demographic character of the town, which is the emergence of a socio-economic hierarchy replacing earlier caste-based division and ascribed role. Four classes emerged among the Indians in the town— the landlords; the Dewans officiating between the landlords and the Europeans; the Thekaders, who were essentially middlemen and; the producer groups. In 1793, the Danish company gave refuge to the Baptist Missionaries (led by William Carey, 1761–1834), who introduced new religious influences and various philanthropic activities that benefited the society significantly. With the setting up of the first Indian printing press, a botanical garden, the Serampore College (1818), and several schools by the Baptist Mission, Serampore became a significant place of education and culture. Under the Danish influence, significant transformations were notable in the town planning and architecture in Fredricksnagore—constituting a major part of the built heritage of today’s Serampore. European principles of town planning influenced the development of Fredricksnagore. Three distinct zones emerged facing the river (Fig. 8.2): first, the academic and religious area nucleating around Serampore College; second, the administrative core area comprising the Danish Government Compound and St. Olav’s Church as the landmarks surrounded by riverside pavilions, cemeteries, Catholic Church and European Villas; and third, the western part of the town encompassing the palatial residences of the Indian landlords and business people. The notable style of architecture that emerged during the period was Danish Neoclassical. Major religious, institutional and administrative structures and a number of stately villas of colonial and Indian elites were built in this style with local materials and workmanship. In 1803 a travelogue described the European buildings as follows: ‘They were in themselves picturesque being white, with expensive porticos to the south and the windows closed by Venetian blinds painted green’ (Nilsson 1968, p. 27).

British Era (1845–1947) The most important administrative event that took place in Serampore under the British regime was initiation of the Serampore Municipality in 1865 that involved revival of the old body formed by the Danes in 1842. The Municipal Committee had elders, well-off and influential members, officiating duties that were sanctioned by a British head, who disseminated orders received from Calcutta. This marks the

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Three major zones: 1. Academic and educational area 2. Danish Government house and administrative compound 3. Palaces of Indian elites

View from the Bhagirathi-Hooghly river side

Fig. 8.2 Serampore in Danish Era (Source “Frederichsnagore or Serampore” by James Thompson, 1827)

increasing administrative dependence on Calcutta that led to emergence of Serampore as a ‘satellite town’ of a larger urban centre. The late nineteenth century was the era of emergence of jute industry in the region under the British initiatives. A number of closely concentrated jute mills (111 on record during 1855–1905) developed along the river bank. The cultivation of jute gained priority replacing rice with a promise of better returns. Sharp decline in rice production resulted in the Bengal famine (1943), and a new factory-based economy replaced the pervious mutually beneficial one. The jute mills were created to supplement the demand of the fibre in the European market. However, after the Second World War (1945), the overseas demand declined sharply due to production of artificial fibres, and therefore, without a domestic market a number of mills had to shut down. The town further declined economically. The societal composition underwent significant transformations due to changes in the economy: The rich landlords sought land far away from Serampore that marked the beginning of the trend of absentee landlords, who retained their palaces in the

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town; some Dewans became self-conferred local lords; the thekedars began to exercise ownership rights over the lands they leased out. Consequently, property dispute related to subdivisions and ownership became prevalent. Noteworthy transformation in the demographic character of the town came about during the British era owing to three types of in-migration: first, the emerging jute industries attracted industrial workers from the surrounding villages and neighbouring states namely Orissa, Bihar and Telangana; second, Muslim soldiers fearing retaliation after the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 immigrated in Serampore; third, post partition (1905) Hindu refugees from East Bengal settled in the southern part of the town. Owing to in-migration, the population of Serampore increased from 24,440 to 44,451 during 1872–1901. Decline in local trade, subdivision led diminution in earning from land property and spread of Western education added a new demographic feature in the town leading to the emergence of a class of ‘white-collar’ job seekers in early 1930s. A majority of them would commute daily to Calcutta using suburban railway service that marked the beginning of the role of Serampore as a dormitory-town of a larger urban agglomeration. Land reclamation through filling of wetlands and clearing of forest areas were rampant in British-led urban developments in general, and for making way to rapidly growing jute mills along the riverbank in particular. The Botanical Garden set up by the Missionaries was replaced with a jute mill (1866). The immediate consequence was the pollution of the river and the air around the jute mills that changed the Danish ‘green-city’ to a densely polluted factory town (Mitra 1951). The rapid emergence of the jute mills was simultaneously accompanied by mushrooming of slum areas in the town. The slums, arranged by lease agreements between the local landlords and the mill-owners for habitation of the mill workers, were inevitably overcrowded with poor physical conditions and unhygienic environment. The introduction of railway track in 1854 resulted in notable transformation in the structure of the town. Rail became the major spine of transportation, replacing the river. Commercial activities developed around the rail station and the town grew on either side of the railway track, replacing agricultural land and water bodies. The architectural style of this era was British Neoclassical with traceable variations, as may be observed in the buildings of India Jute Mill and the present residence of the subdivisional officer, constructed on the site of the Danish warehouse. The British introduced a new brick size (10'' × 5' × 2.5'' ) that was used to add and alter the Danish Government Compound into a Courthouse (Fig. 8.3). Similar alterations were made to the Jail. The Indian elites experimented with the Neoclassical style in their villas.

Post-Independence Period (1947–Till Date) Since independence (1947) the town is under the administration of Serampore Municipality run by elected people’s representatives. The population of the town is approximately 0.18 million (Census 2011) over an area of 11.87 km2 . The share of migrated

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Fig. 8.3 The main gate of the administrative compound and its alteration by the British (Left: Photograph during the Danish Era [Undated, British Library]; Right: Photograph by Nana Anderson, 1949, NMD)

population in some areas is as high as 67.3%. About 55% of the population is in the low-income range (earnings less than US$160 per month), while 2.8% earns US$600 or a little more per month. A sizeable number of people commute daily to Kolkata for work. Religious festivals, namely Durga Puja and Rathajatra, are major features in the socio-cultural profile of the town. Once a very famous local festival, Shiva Ratri Mela (agricultural and handicraft fair) has almost lost its glory with time. Sporting clubs, music schools, riverside parks and shopping malls are recent addition to urban facilities. Development of water supply, drainage, power and telephone network, construction of blacktop roads, introduction of postal, banking and recent wireless communication systems are the major additions to the town’s infrastructure since Independence. The development of the town was guided by Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority (KMDA) set up in 1970. The role of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) was primarily limited to the delivery of urban services until the 74th Amendment of the Constitution of India Act 1992 and The Bengal Municipal Act 1998, which required the municipality to prepare development plans. Consequently, the first Draft Development Plan (DDP) for Serampore was prepared in 2005. The architecture of the town in the post-independence period essentially included three typologies of residential buildings in distinct phases: First, during 1950– 1970, plotted development prevailed with compact layout of houses (replacing the earlier courtyard-centric plans), with load-bearing wall in cement/lime mortar and RCC/RBC roof; Second, during 1970–2000, the plotted development continued, but RCC roofs/frames became more popular. Advancement in building construction led to even more compact form of houses, with completely integrated services (toilets and kitchens); Third, multi-storeyed (5–6 floors) apartment buildings are the prevalent architecture in Serampore since the beginning of the millennium. The apartments have been developed on large private properties, or by agglomerating smaller lots. Preference for these buildings arise from several facts—the landowners receive significant one-time financial benefits; the buyers find an affordable means to satisfy their aspiration of owning a house; the municipality perceives it as an

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Fig. 8.4 Apartment buildings in Serampore seen spoiling the character of heritage zones (Photographs by the authors, 2014)

economical way of development with a good source of revenue; and the developers earn good returns on their investments. However, these buildings significantly alter the streetscape, open-to-built ratio, scale of the street and density of population. In the absence of any control, the sporadic development of apartments is destroying the character of the heritage zones in the town (Fig. 8.4).

Contested Built Heritage at Serampore: Analysis and Discussion The various facets of contest suffered by the existing built heritage in Serampore have been examined based on the analytical framework. The findings are discussed in the following sections:

Financial Constraint Financial constraint is a critical impediment for conservation of built heritage in Serampore. Of the eighty-two listed heritage structures (Roy et al. 2016), only three heritage buildings (Henry Martin’s Pagoda, Temple of Gourchandra, Danish Cemetery) are protected by the ASI and three monuments (House of Raja Krishnalal Goswami, Danish Government House, Baptist cemetery) are maintained by the state. The ongoing restoration work at five selected monuments (St Olav’s Church, Danish Tavern, Main Gate, South Gate, Land Record Office) is solely dependent on the funding of the NMD. This indicates that funding of the state or the republic is not available for conservation of majority of the heritage assets in the town. Thus, the responsibility of protection of the assets continues to be with the ULB and the private heritage property owners. Unfortunately, the ULB—which always

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Fig. 8.5 Private heritage properties in a state of despair/under derelict condition (Photographs by authors, 2014)

works with a deficit of annual budget—is not in a position to assign conservation programmes a priority, as revealed from the DDP. Primary survey revealed that the financial capacities of the majority of the existing private heritage property owners are too deficient for supporting the required maintenance of their assets that resulted in decay of several significant heritage structures (Fig. 8.5).

Modernisation Versus Conservation The present trend of urbanisation has triggered increased real-estate activities in Serampore. Financial weakness of the private heritage property owners coupled with a desire for a maintenance-free residence and immediate financial gain have jointly resulted in demolition of several heritage structures to make way for new apartments and commercial buildings that are not sensitive to the context of the place. Unregulated parking, growth of commercial and ancillary activities and display of billboards around the administrative compound (presently courthouse) and the Church Square have destroyed the ambience and sanctity of the heritage precincts. Random alterations for installing modern amenities in several heritage structures have spoiled their authenticity (Fig. 8.6). FGDs revealed that unavailability of skilled masons is a major constraint in preserving the original characteristics of the heritage assets.

Lack of Social Will Primary survey indicated that a significant part of the populace, particularly the informal groups and the new in-migrants, have little knowledge about the history of Serampore. Only a few of them are sensitive to the losses inflicted on heritage assets by market forces. It was observed that the owners of the commercial establishments, near the court compound, relate the ongoing conservation works readily with its perceived economic benefit. Nevertheless, most of the respondents favour conservation of the heritage assets for the sake of posterity.

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Signage and encroachment in front of the main gate

Random alterations of heritage façade

Vista obstructed by traffic congestion and parking

Incoherent new constructions

Fig. 8.6 Lost ambience and sanctity of the administrative compound and church square (Photographs by authors, 2014)

Lack of Political Will While financial constraint is a major impediment to conservation programmes in Serampore, the sluggishness of the ULB in implementing the provisions of the existing conservation legislation also confirms the absence of political will. In keeping with the provision of the existing legislation, the ULB did constitute a Heritage Conservation Committee (HCC), but it is not proactive enough to set forth meaningful conservation programmes for the town. Similarly, feeble enforcement of the building bye-laws, evident in new developments, favours market forces. This encourages real-estate developers to flout rules and laws for narrow financial gains, with no concern for the heritage value of the place.

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Lack of Cooperation and Holistic Management In absence of a conservation plan, the aforementioned ongoing restoration projects and maintenance activities in Serampore are more of scattered interventions rather than a part of comprehensive effort for sustainable management of the heritage assets.

Overarching Issues The following overarching issues, interrelated and complex in nature, emerge from the foregoing discussion:

Impact of Urban Transformation on Heritage The course of urban transformation, fall in financial capacity of the old landlord class, decline in industrial activities and weak economic base of the municipality have had an adverse impact on sustained maintenance of built and cultural heritage, resulting in decay and demolition of these structures.

Abuse of Heritage Precincts The administrative and other subsidiary activities in the court compound have induced development of diverse informal activities, leading to encroachment of heritage premises and facades of heritage structures. Loss in sanctity of the compound is linked to indiscriminate growth of service-sector activities related to transport and inappropriate setting of public facilities such as drinking fountains, public urinals and vats.

Derelict Sites The historic core has quite a few derelict sites, which are likely to be converted to real-estate ventures, conforming to the present trend. The possibilities of transformation through insensitive real-estate development would lead to incompatible use and activity pattern, further obscuring the heritage fabric and cultural value of the area.

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Weakness in Institutional and Community Capacity and Coordination for Conservation The HCC of the ULB is deficient in terms of capacity (human and financial resource) required for conservation and restoration of the heritage properties. Furthermore, the ULB is burdened with more pressing priorities of urban service delivery. The private developers, active in the area, operate with the objective of profit maximisation through real-estate ventures (mostly flouting municipal building rules) with little concern for conservation. The court compound, which belongs to the state administration, suffers sporadic growth and incoherent transformation of its built-form, revealing the lack of knowledge about heritage and weak institutional coordination among various state agencies.

Absence of Urban Planning and Regulatory Framework Urban planning activities in the town are limited to DDP that is primarily a fiveyear perspective of resource allocation for provision and maintenance of urban basic services. DDP does not have any long-term planning strategy, and is oblivious to the interface of conservation and urban development. Thus, spatial development in Serampore is influenced by unregulated market forces with the short-term objective of monetisation of land. This in turn has led to densification in and around the historic centre and along major arterial roads. In the absence of an effective planning and regulatory framework in the town, long-term perspective of heritage conservation and its linkage with improvement of quality of public life is non-existent. Lack of enforcement of development-control regulations obscures majority of the heritage structures and adversely affects the image and visual quality of the historic core.

Concluding Remarks Serampore is an archetype of Indian colonial town that has distinct layers of history shaped by changing economic base, socio-cultural characteristics, colonial intervention, missionary activities, architecture, technological innovations and diverse system of town governance. The built heritage at Serampore is more of reminiscence of the colonial past than indigenous tradition and culture. Nevertheless, these historic structures are important ‘cells’ in the ‘urban tissues’ defining the composite heritage of the town. Conservation of the built heritage is imperative for preserving the historical identity, educating the future generation and upholding the urban attractiveness and quality of life in the town.

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Presently, Serampore is undergoing suburbanisation as a constituent of KMA, the largest urban agglomeration in east India. Like many instances in the developing world, the built heritage in Serampore faces several challenges and threats from development closely linked to the present urban dynamics of the town. ‘Financial constraints’ and ‘lack of shared understanding’ are the key challenges, from which other threats—social and political unwillingness—find ground, and result in neglect, abuse and decay of historic structures. On the other hand, the ongoing urbanisation generates market force of ‘modernisation’ that easily surmounts feeble conservation initiatives, leading to razing of heritage assets and obliteration of the historic character of the town. The overarching issues imply four possible policy implications: First, the state and the ULB will have to take proactive and coordinated initiative for conservation of the built heritage in Serampore, as majority of the monuments are not included in the ASI listing. Second, case-specific creative strategies are to be formulated for protecting the heritage assets, particularly the private ones, which are in a state of despair due to inadequate financial-capability of the owners. A private–public approach may be attempted, where the state would take a call for hand-holding. Third, while the cultural heritage of Serampore undeniably shows its promising role in the recently envisaged river-tourism development programme of the state, tourism should not be the sole financial underpinning of its conservation programme—since examples of exclusively economically self-sufficient ‘sustainable conservation’ are very few—next to non-existent. An Integrated Conservation and Development Plan (ICDP) needs to be formulated to link conservation programmes with other development issues of the town. Attempts should be made for supporting conservation programmes through cross-subsidy at the ULB or the state level. Fourth, the state should take a priority call for developing a shared understanding about heritage conservation among the various stakeholders, which is a prerequisite for successful implementation of conservation programmes. The present study recognises the causal links in the contest between the built heritage and the prevalent urban dynamics of the town. The policies prescribed above may act as suggestive tools to address the identified issues. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to note that institutionalising a shared understanding, materialising publicprivate partnership programmes and undertaking benevolent conservation activities are easier said than done, particularly in a socio-political landscape with limited resources, conflicting priorities and fast-changing aspirations. There’s need to further study towns comparable to Serampore to reach a conclusion about the suggested policies. Acknowledgements The cooperation received during the survey work from the respondents is thankfully acknowledged.

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References Aalund, F., & Rasten, S. (2010). Indo-Danish Heritage Buildings of Serampore. Survey report by the Serampore Initiative of the National Museum of Denmark. Retrieved September 27, 2016 from https://natmus.dk/fileadmin/user_upload/natmus/etnografisksamling/billeder/Seramp ore/Serampore_report_2010_web.pdf. Alfeld, L. E. (1995). Urban dynamics—The first fifty years. System Dynamics Review, 11(3), 199– 217. Alicka, Y. (1997, July/August). Albania’s threatened heritage. The UNESCO Courier, 78–79. Burton, S. (1993, July 12). History with a bottom line. Time, 36–37. Castriota, L. (1999). Living in a World Heritage Site: Preservation policies and local history in Ouro Preto, Brazil. Traditional Dwellings and Settlements Review, 10(2), 7–19. Chatterjee, S. (2009). Conservation of Indo-Danish-British heritage of Serampore. Unpublished dissertation report, Department of Architectural Conservation, School of Planning and Architecture, New Delhi. Feldback, O. (1969). India Trade under the Danish Flag 1772–1808: European enterprise and Anglo-Indian remittance and trade. Copenhagen. Fielden, B. M. (1993). Is conservation of cultural heritage relevant to South Asia? South Asian Studies, 9, 1–10. Forrester, J. W. (1969). Urban dynamics. Cambridge: MIT Press. Hernández Llosas, M. I. (2001). Archaeology, management and potential cultural tourism in Andean Argentina (South America): The case of Quebrada de Humahuaca. Bulletin of the Australian Institute of Maritime Archaeology, 25, 97–108. Horayangkura, V. (2005). The future of cultural heritage conservation amid urbanization in Asia: Constraints and prospects. Journal of Architectural/ Planning Research and Studies, Thammasat University, 3, 71–84. Hornik, R. (1992, April 6). The battle of Angkor. Time, 54–56. ICOMOS. (2002). www.icomos.org. Accessed 27 September 2016. Jansen-Verbeke, M. (1997). Urban tourism: Managing resources and visitors. In S. Wahab & J. J. Pigram (Eds.), Tourism, development and growth (pp. 237–256). London: Routledge. Larkham, P. J., & Conzen, M. P. (2014). Agents, agency and the urban form: The making of the urban landscape. In P. J. Larkham & M. P. Conzen (Eds.), Urban form: Explorations in morphological agency (pp. 3–24). New York: Routledge. Leech, K. (2004). The ravage of India. Blueprint, 218, 86–91. Mass, N. J. (Ed.) (1974). Readings in urban dynamics (2 vols., Vol. 1). Cambridge MA: Productivity Press. Original edition, Wright-Allen Press and MIT Press. Mitra, L. M. (1951). The Danes in Bengal. Calcutta: Prabartak Publishers. Nilsson, S. (1968). European Architecture in India 1750–1850 . London: Faber and Faber. O’Malley, L. S. S. (1912). Bengal District Gazeteer. Hooghly, Calcutta: The Bengal Secretariat Book Depot. Oren, U., Woodcock, D. G., & Var, T. (2002). Sustaining tourism development: A case of Cumalikizik, Turkey. Tourism Analysis, 6, 253–257. Paul, S. K., & Roy, S. (2016). Tourism based heritage conservation in Murshidabad: An appraisal. Journal of Heritage Tourism. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1743873X.2016.1159685. Rasamuel, D. (1989). Problems in the conservation and restoration of ruined buildings in Madagascar. In H. Cleere (Ed.), Archaeological heritage management in the modern world (pp. 128–141). London: Unwin Hyman. Ribeiro, E. F. N. (1990). The existing and emerging framework for heritage conservation in India. Third World Planning Review, 12(4), 338–343. Roy, S., Mitra, A., Paul, S. K., Mitra, S., & Chatterjee, A. (2016). Listing and assessment of heritage buildings in Serampore’s historic core. Unpublished report. Sadek, H. (1990). Treasures of ancient Egypt. National Parks, 64(5), 16–17.

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Schroeder, W. W., III. (1975). Urban dynamic and the suburbs. In W. W. Schroeder & L. E. Alfeld (Eds.), Readings in urban dynamics. Cambridge, MA: Productivity Press. Setiawan, B., & Timothy, D. J. (2000). Existing urban management frameworks and heritage conservation in Indonesia. Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research, 5 (2), 76–79. Shackley, M. (1996). Too much room at the inn? Annals of Tourism Research, 23, 449–462. Timothy, D. J. (1998). Cooperative tourism planning in a developing destination. Journal of Sustainable Tourism, 6(1), 52–68. Timothy, D. J. (1999). Built heritage, tourism and conservation in developing countries: Challenges and opportunities. Journal of Tourism, 4, 5–17. Timothy, D. J., & Nyaupane, G. P. (2009). Protecting the past: Challenges and opportunities. In D. J. Timothy & G. P. Nyaupane (Eds.), Cultural heritage and tourism in the developing world: A regional perspective (pp. 20–41). London and New York: Routledge. Turnbull, R. (1998). A fragile dance. Far Eastern Economic Review, 161(52), 36–38. West Bengal Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (WBTDCL). Ganga Heritage River Cruise Circuit Project. Retrieved June 20, 2016 from www.iidcindia.co.in. William, L. S. (2002). The disappearing ‘Asian’ City: Asia’s urban heritage in a globalizing world . Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. Winter, T. (2002). Angkor meets Tomb Raider: Setting the scene. International Journal of Heritage Studies, 8(4), 323–336.

Chapter 9

Women in Myanmar: Marginalisation, Peacebuilding and Participation Sar Yar Poine and Chosein Yamahata

Challenges in Myanmar’s Transition Although the election in 2015 enabled Myanmar towards a democratic transition, as the NLD gained the legitimacy to secure control from the previous quasi-civilian government, the military remains powerful by exercising an inordinate level of authority over the new civilian government. Therefore, contrary to the public’s high expectations in the early days of the Aung San Suu Kyi-led new civilian government, Myanmar’s democratic transition appears to be confronting uncertainty or pressing challenges ahead. In addition, many hurdles and confusion have been created by various extreme groups serving the interest and agenda of the military (Jones 2014; Ghoshal 2013). In order to ensure a peaceful transition towards democracy, Myanmar must not neglect the concerns of its people; this includes all groups that have been routinely marginalised, such as, but not limited to, women and ethnic people (Nilsen 2013). This chapter explores the need for women to be active agents for social transformation in Myanmar. As shown in Table 9.1, among Myanmar and eight other Asian countries, Myanmar and Thailand can be seen as the countries with the earliest dates of granting women the right to vote in 1935 and 1932, respectively. However, both Myanmar and Thailand, which have had a long history of military interference in politics, indicate that the guarantee of human rights and human freedom, or lack thereof, are worse in Myanmar than Thailand. Moreover, the comparison among the nine Asian countries show that Myanmar’s human rights and human freedom situation is the worst at 7.042 and 5.44, respectively. It is crucial to cross-check the interpretation of these indicators with the reality of local scenarios to discern whether there is any S. Y. Poine Mon Women Organization, Mawlamyine, Myanmar C. Yamahata (B) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_9

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Table 9.1 Women’s suffrage year in comparison with other indicators among 52 autocratic and former autocratic states Countries

Women’s suffrage year

Human rights index (2010)

Human freedom index (2019)

Democracy status (2020)

Russia

1917

6.694

6.34

4

Belarus

1919

2.572

6.65

4

Azerbaijan

1921

3.500

6.22

5

Tajikistan

1924

2.167

5.77

5

Kazakhstan

1924

2.292

6.90

4

Thailand

1932

5.556

6.55

5

Turkey

1934

5.556

6.21

4

Myanmar

1935

7.042

5.44

5

Togo

1945

2.292

6.31

4

Venezuela

1946

3.069

3.80

5

Vietnam

1946

3.444

6.29

5

Cameroon

1946

2.111

5.64

5

Pakistan

1947

7.722

5.69

5

Singapore

1947

3.369

8.11

4

Syria

1949

4.222

3.79

5

China

1949

5.486

6.17

5

Ivory Coast

1952

3.861

6.59

4

Cambodia

1955

3.792

7.13

5

Honduras

1955

3.069

6.81

4

Ethiopia

1955

6.333

5.25

4

Nicaragua

1955

1.750

6.86

4

Egypt

1956

5.181

4.50

5

Haiti

1957

4.167

6.71

4

Zimbabwe

1957

5.361

5.65

4

Chad

1958

6.833

5.46

5

Laos

1958

1.694

6.20

5

Mauritania

1961

2.653

5.47

4

Burundi

1961

3.369

5.56

5

Rwanda

1961

2.472

6.82

5

Algeria

1962

4.097

4.99

4

Uganda

1962

6.111

6.61

4

Iran

1963

6.458

5.10

5

Congo

1963

2.611

5.80

5

Morocco

1963

5.125

6.18

5 (continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued) Countries

Women’s suffrage year

Human rights index (2010)

Human freedom index (2019)

Democracy status (2020)

Kenya

1963

4.153

6.85

4

Libya

1964

3.194

4.64

5

Sudan

1964

7.931

4.32

5

Guatemala

1965

3.014

7.07

4

Yemen

1967

5.972

4.30

5

Democratic Republic of Congo

1967

8.097

5.00

5

Bangladesh

1972

4.333

5.77

4

Bahrain

1973

3.556

6.63

5

Jordan

1974

3.792

6.84

4

Angola

1975

3.931

5.40

4

Mozambique

1975

0.972

6.24

4

Iraq

1980

6.667

4.34

5

Central African 1986 Republic

4.431

5.41

5

Qatar

1999

2.000

6.15

5

Oman

2003

1.583

5.98

5

Kuwait

2005

1.208

6.19

4

United Arab Emirates

2006

3.208

6.13

5

Saudi Arabia

2011

5.069

5.42

5

Source http://archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/suffrage.htm; Cato Institute (2019) The Human Freedom Index; Bertelsmann Stiftung (2020) Bertelsmann Transformation Index; Escola de Cultura de Pau (2011) “Alert 2011! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding” Note South Sudan, Turkmenistan, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Cuba, Djibouti and Afghanistan were not included in the above table due to unavailability of some data. Autocratic and formerly autocratic states were selected from the GWF Codebook Version 1.2

gap in grasping the issue. In addition, such situational realities may have somehow produced both intended or unintended negative impacts on women’s roles in society in general and their political participation in particular. The study provides an overview of women’s political participation in Myanmar while also highlighting the gap between policy and practice. As shown in the above table, since 1935, Myanmar became the second country in what is now ASEAN to grant women the right to vote, and since then, women were guaranteed the constitutional rights of equal participation in politics (Minoletti 2014). Therefore, if Myanmar, during its process of democratic transition, can respect the terms of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BPfA) in order to actively enforce the

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“[Removing of] all the obstacles to women’s active participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural, and political decision making”, there will be a promising future for the active and equal participation of women in politics (“Fourth World Conference on Women” 1995). Table 9.2 outlines the different constitutional provisions pertaining to the promotion and guarantee of gender equality stipulated in Myanmar’s Constitution of 1947, 1974 and 2008. Myanmar’s current constitution, as well as the previous two, have provisions that require the government to uphold the principles of equality as their obligation in all functions and areas. Those national legal provisions as stipulated in the constitutions also need to be in line with international norms and legal instruments respected as universal values. Article 349 of the 2008 Constitution guarantees that “citizens shall enjoy equal opportunity in carrying out the following functions: (a) public employment; (b) occupation; (c) trade; (d) business; (e) technical knowhow and vocation; and (f) exploration of art, science and technology”. In particular, Article 350 states that “women shall be entitled to the same rights and salaries as that received by men in similar work”. Moreover, Article 352 states that “the Union, in appointing or assigning duties to civil service personnel, shall upon specified qualifications being fulfilled not discriminate for or against any citizen based on race, birth, religion, and sex”. Despite prohibiting gender discrimination regarding appointment to government posts, the same Article seemingly contradicts itself in stating that “nothing in this section shall prevent appointment of men to positions that are naturally suitable for men only”. Table 9.3 highlights the non-ratification status, as well as violations of human rights and international humanitarian law among 10 ASEAN countries. Myanmar and the Philippines show the highest international humanitarian law violations, while Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia and the Philippines all share a similar number of total human rights violations. Regarding the non-ratification of major international legal instruments, Myanmar, Malaysia and Singapore share the same level of non-ratification. A commonality among these three strands is Myanmar’s negligence towards adherence to universal values and international norms; such problem areas need to be addressed to promote the rights of women and facilitate their political participation and representation.

Marginalisation of Women in the Political Arena: Barriers Gender can be defined as the social construct of sexual difference; it is the culmination of the ways in which “societies define and regulate femininity and masculinity. By nature, gender is multidimensional. It is recreated and transformed through an inseparable mix of norms and behaviours that are cultural, economic, historical, sociological, linguistic, scientific, and always political” (Dore 1997, p. 9). Although men and women have different biological characteristics, they are more similar than different (Reardon 1996, p. 57). Society’s production and reproduction of separate

Section 26(b)

Section 32(a)

Section 347

Section 348

Section 349

Section 76(4)

Section 350

Section 351

Article 154 Section 352

Section 37(1)

Section 368

Source Myanmar Law Library, “Constitution of 1947”, http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/laws-and-regulations/constitutions/1947-constitution.html; Myanmar Law Library, “Constitution of 1974”, http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/law-library/laws-and-regulations/constitutions/1974-constitution.html; Myanmar Law Library, “Constitution of 2008”, http://www.myanmar-law-library.org/lawlibrary/laws-and-regulations/constitutions/2008-constitution.html

Section 21(a)

Section 6(e)

2008 Constitution

Article 147

Article 22

1974 Constitution

Section 15

Section 13

1947 Constitution

Section 14

Sections/Articles related to the protection of women’s rights and promotion of equality

Constitutions

Table 9.2 Constitutional provisions in Myanmar related to women’s rights and equality

9 Women in Myanmar: Marginalisation … 141

MMR

LAO

VNM

IDN

PHL

THA

MYS

Death Penalty

Death under custody

Disappearances

Executions

2

3

1 2

1

× 2

×

2

×

3

×

6

ICC

0 Total non-ratification*

×

×

×

Child

Protocol II of Geneva Convention 1949

×

×

Torture

×

×

×

×

– –

2

– 2 2

× 5

3

1

6

×

×

3

1

2

×

× ×

3

1

×

×

×

×

Racism

× ×

×

×

Civil Rights

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

Women

BRN

SIN

3

6

(continued)

×

×

×

×

×

×

HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) 0.581 0.584 0.604 0.693 0.707 0.712 0.765 0.804 0.845 0.935

KHM

Articles or items Comparative status of each ASEAN regarding the non-ratification, HR violations and IHL violations (In ascending order of human development index) under focus

Table 9.3 ASEAN member states: Status of non-ratification of major international instruments, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law violations

142 S. Y. Poine and C. Yamahata

MMR

3

Impunity

VNM

2

IDN

PHL

1 3

1

3

21

3

1

3

3

2

3

Child soldiers

21

3

3

3

3

3

3

Hague Convention (IV)

17

3 8

21

3

2

2

2

2

21

Journalists

Total HR violations#

2 2

2

2

3

3

3

3

3

HR defenders

Discrimination

3

3

1

Unfair trials

3

3

3

3

Torture

Arbitrary detentions

Political prisoners

LAO

THA

MYS

BRN

SIN

3

19

3

2

3

3

22

3

3

3

2

3

2

3

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

(continued)

16

3

3

3

2

2

HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) 0.581 0.584 0.604 0.693 0.707 0.712 0.765 0.804 0.845 0.935

KHM

Articles or items Comparative status of each ASEAN regarding the non-ratification, HR violations and IHL violations under focus (In ascending order of human development index)

Table 9.3 (continued)

9 Women in Myanmar: Marginalisation … 143

LAO

VNM

IDN

PHL

THA

MYS

BRN

SIN

0

4

0

0

0

4

3

0

0

0

Source Data from UNDP, “Human Development Reports (1990–2018)”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data; Data from Escola de Cultura de Pau, “Alert 2011! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding” (2011) Note The method is adopted from Alert 2011! *Measures how many of the eight human rights instruments and international humanitarian law have not been ratified # Measures the total number of human rights violations divided into 12 categories based on the occurrence of violations of international human rights law across a range from 0 to 36. A value of three is given where there is systematic violation of human rights; a value of two is given when such violations have frequently taken place; a value of one is given when such violations have sporadically occurred + Measures violations of international humanitarian law across a range of 0 to 4, where a value of one is given where child soldiers are used, and a value of three is given where IHL provisions have been violated

Total IHL violations+

MMR

HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) HDI (2018) 0.581 0.584 0.604 0.693 0.707 0.712 0.765 0.804 0.845 0.935

KHM

Articles or items Comparative status of each ASEAN regarding the non-ratification, HR violations and IHL violations (In ascending order of human development index) under focus

Table 9.3 (continued)

144 S. Y. Poine and C. Yamahata

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gender identities is thus a “divergent process of socialisation” beginning as early as childhood, as boys are expected to help their fathers with physical labour while girls are expected to help their mothers with domestic labour (McDermott 2015, p. 755). Such division of roles that assign men to the public sphere and women to the private sphere has created a tradition of gender hierarchy. One of the reasons why there is a gender disparity in the public sphere is due to how “in most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context” (Khen and Nyoi 2014, p. 8). Thus, a conclusion can be reached that “gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context” (ibid., p. 8). The continued male domination in both professional and political spheres remain to be a challenge in many societies despite the general assumption that women have equality with men. Helbert (2012, p. 3) highlights that “women still constitute only 19.6% of the members of parliament around the world. […] the structural constraints women have to face if they wish for a political career are the same within political parties”. Although women are recognised as key players in development, they have been systematically omitted from both the process itself and the subsequent benefits they reap (Momsen 2010; Willis 2011). Many societies do not care about or notice the barriers for women to participate in social, economic and political life. In the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995, p. 39), it is stated: “the traditional working patterns of many political parties and government structures continue to be barriers to women’s participation in public life”. Such barriers facing women in the public sphere originates from their restricted roles imposed by the traditions and culture of a society. Consequently, women continue to be underrepresented in the political landscape worldwide as there is only a small number of women to fulfil key roles. Despite laws and policies that document the rights of women in social, economic and political life, gender inequality remains entrenched and women are profoundly underrepresented in public life. As stated in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), ensuring gender equality and empowering all women and goals is crucial to achieving them. In the case of Myanmar, women are typically required to perform all household tasks even for those who need to engage in income-generating activities to support their families. Young women are viewed to be “good house-keepers, respectful, quiet, non-political and non-social, good business people, caring, restrained in their manner, emotional, over-sensitive…[when in actuality, they are] physically and emotionally strong, brave, bright, outspoken, politically and socially concerned, caring, and active participant, capable…” (Burma: Voice of Women 1997, p. 96). On the other hand, men are not expected to share such household tasks. Since political involvement is seen as a male jurisdiction, there are only limited numbers of female politicians besides Aung San Suu Kyi, especially during the 1988–2011 period, to serve as role models for women to follow suit in politics. According to young women in Myanmar, they are not placed “in decision-making positions because the senior party members

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often do not have confidence in [them]. And most parties don’t have a specific department for youth and the parties’ leadership tends not to utilize the resources and skills youth have” (“Women in Political Parties in Myanmar”, 2014). The barriers to women’s participation in politics and across all sectors are mainly due to cultural restrictions, as well as restraints stemming from traditional customs, inadequate educational opportunities and limited skills, the burden of domestic workload, and outdated perceptions of gender roles (Lofving 2011). On top of that, politics from the aspect of women’s participation in Myanmar draws higher attention from both policymakers and academics, but systematic data on the subject remains lacking (Minoletti 2014). As long as the fulfilling of basic needs of families without either essential or additional source of income is expected from women, it is hard for them to participate in politics. Other barriers include their lack of experience as well as structural barriers, such as discriminatory laws and institutions that limit women’s options to run for office and gender capacity gaps. Issues of gender inequality are deeply rooted in the history and culture of Myanmar. Cultural attitudes towards male superiority and expectations of women to prioritise housework are reflected in the gendered divisions of labour which limit women’s economic opportunities (Gravers et al. 2014). Such structural impediments are also evident in some laws as the current ones do not define terms like sexual violence. Moreover, gender-based violence in everyday situations as well as during conflict time perpetuate the violation of women’s rights and hinder women’s participation in politics (“Gender Inequality in Myanmar”, n.d.). The Burmese military has a record of using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minority women, in which the security personnel typically enjoy impunity for sexual violence and human rights violations. Decades of military rule and male-dominated resistance groups have long disregarded women (Lall 2016). Myanmar and other states engaged in conflict leave their inhabitants vulnerable to threats that include violence, disease and famine. In any conflict, the population is categorised into combatants and non-combatants. The characteristics of armed conflicts have changed as (1) wars today take place in areas where women, children and older people live, (2) non-combatant civilians constituted 90% of deaths caused by war worldwide, (3) violence/war economies replace customary civilian economic cycles and relationships, (4) trade involves arms, drugs and women, and (5) lack of other financial means causes those orphaned by war to join militias as willing fighters (Schoninger 2003). From traditional precedents of conflict to contemporary ones, women are agents assigned to the private sphere—attending duties in homes, hospitals and schools, while men are on the front lines as combatants. Their bodies and sexualities have also been deployed as tools for interrogating purposes. Women are also victims of war, as they are subjugated to violence in order to compel men to surrender. For example, house invasions were the norm in the 2004 Iraq Invasion (Khalili 2010) and the militarised abuse of women in the form of sexual slavery had been practised in Rwanda (Enloe 2014). Such strategies cause the battlefield to be expanded into the private sphere. Essentially, the femininity of women is constructed and employed through conflicts in history, perpetuating patriarchal views that masculinity is privileged over femininity. Consequently, such notions

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that women are the “weaker sex” in need of protection dismisses widespread and common violence against women as a normative universal reality (Bahun-Radunovic and Rajan 2015). Women, in particular, also experience reduced security in the wake of conflict. This is not limited to gender-based violence such as rape and domestic violence, but also encompasses the lack of reproductive rights or access to AIDS medication. These threats induced by conflict and states without good governance are especially challenging for women as they are usually not granted the same rights as their male counterparts. Thus, their abilities to economically maintain themselves are obstructed and marginalised, causing women to become homeless or forced into prostitution. The relationship between power and women can be highlighted as being one that is overshadowed by the dominance of men in positions of political power. This situation can be seen in the context of Myanmar since it has been under military rule since 1962 “…and the army is almost all men. Almost all cabinet officers, all people in senior positions have been men, for decades. That has cultural and political reasons as well as realities that have to change” (Hedstrom 2013, p. 5). Thus, the imbalance in the gender-biased distribution of power is one of the main components that keep women underrepresented and in unstable situations in Myanmar’s political environment. In general, the participation and representation of women in politics still remains low across the world (“Annual Report 2012–2013”, 2013). Furthermore, women face time constraints that serve as “…a bigger barrier to their involvement in village administration offices than in most other village-level governance activities” (Minoletti 2014). As a result, women’s participation is also typically limited in political parties and religious organisations, whereas they are “…highest within civil society, with women being engaged not only in large numbers here, but also often occupying senior positions with real decision-making power” (Minoletti 2014, p. 1). According to the UN Resolution of the General Assembly 66/130 on Women and Political Participation, the UN has urged all states: To strongly encourage political parties to remove all barriers that directly or indirectly discriminate against the participation of women, to develop their capacity to analyse issues from a gender perspective, and to adopt policies to promote the ability of women to participate fully at all levels of decision making within those political parties. (UN Resolution of the General Assembly 66/130, p. 3)

As indicated, women’s qualities and capabilities are misperceived and underestimated. Ethnic women continue to face cultural, political, social and economic barriers that hinder their progress and exclude them from effective participation in key national agenda, including the peacebuilding process, which all ethnic women see as the common theme and cornerstone to build Myanmar towards a federal democratic state empowered by a diversity of ethnic nationalities. Therefore, creating the opportunity to fully utilise the potential of women’s capacities is one of the keys to close gender disparity in politics.

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Gender Equality Generally, young women in Myanmar are hesitant to participate in changing realities without having better knowledge and experience on the given issue. Gendered divisions in society dismiss the reality that women are active participants in the development process, through both their productive and reproductive roles (Moser 1993). They are integral in the development process as the “… continued neglect of women’s productivity was a costly mistake that planners could no longer afford to make. The issue was not so much that women needed development, but that development needed women” (Kabeer 1994, p. 25). Therefore, gender inequality is a developmental issue as it can affect the economic and social development of both the individual and society as a whole; the inclusion of women’s participation in the development process is indispensable. Security is also an important factor when it comes to women’s political participation, particularly in ethnic border areas like the Mon state, where armed conflict have left people vulnerable even after the New Mon State Party has been on ceasefire with the military for the past 25 years since 1995. Gender equality is a stronger indicator of the peacefulness of a state than measuring its level of democracy, gross domestic product (GDP) or religious freedom. A correlation exists between women’s involvement in leadership positions and the stability and peacefulness of a state (Mechoulan et al. 2016), as evidenced by the rankings of Iceland as both first consecutively in the Gender Gap Index from 2009 to 2019 and Global Peace Index from 2008 to 2019. Table 9.4 shows gender inequality in Myanmar in comparison with 52 autocratic and former autocratic countries. Although situations of gender equality have improved to some extent, there remain huge obstacles for women to effectively participate in decision-making processes. Tracking the progress of women’s increasing participation and freedom in post-conflict societies is also possible through the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and related statistics, area reports and policy reviews. Based on such information, countries can determine which aspects of gender equality measures need to be improved and accordingly produce the necessary solutions. GII in Myanmar stands at 0.374, with much room for improvement (“Human Development Report 2016” 2016). This figure remains far from the definition of gender equality, which refers to equal opportunities, rights, responsibilities and relations between women and men and those with other gender identities (Transnational Institute 2017). Although there are currently more female parliamentary seat-holders than any other time in history, after the by-election in 2012, the number still remains low with only 4.3% in the Union Assembly and 2.0% in a ministerial position (Gravers et al. 2014). The percentages of women elected to parliament are as follows: Pyithu Hluttaw (Lower House) at 5.7%, Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) at 1.8%, Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Assembly: Upper and Lower House) at 4.4% and Pyinae/Tine Daetha Gyi Hluttaw (State/Region Parliaments) at 2.7% (Minoletti 2014). Moreover, although women have “entered educational institutions and

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Table 9.4 Gender inequality in Myanmar relative to 52 autocratic and former autocratic states Countries

Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)

Libya

0.065

23.0

1.17

45.1

Kenya

0.113

22.5

4.41

14.9

Mozambique

0.119

33.1

0.56

52.4

Guatemala

0.163

24.9

0.78

45.4

Cambodia

0.172

16.0

1.65

22.0

Congo

0.203

22.1

1.33

48.6

Laos

0.224

19.9

6.77

14.9

Azerbaijan

0.245

3.1

5.11

31.8

Honduras

0.255

16.1

0.94

49.4

Zimbabwe

0.270

18.8

11.67

20.2

Venezuela

0.272

9.8

6.00

14.2

Myanmar

0.304

8.8

7.59

12.0

Nicaragua

0.305

17.4

1.42

28.3

Democratic Republic of Congo

0.314

26.7

0.90

47.2

Ethiopia

0.321

16.8

1.39

44.0

Tajikistan

0.377

5.3

1.17

47.5

Burundi

0.377

20.0

0.84

20.6

Saudi Arabia

0.412

55.7

1.00

36.1

Iran

0.443

21.3

2.11

17.2

Syria

0.450

14.9

2.96

17.4

United Arab Emirates

0.455

45.7

1.36

51.1

Morocco

0.458

22.2

1.13

41.2

Vietnam

0.459

10.2

1.75

43.7

Bangladesh

0.463

27.5

0.86

47.0

Ivory Coast

0.469

15.4

1.73

16.5

Chad

0.474

19.3

0.75

48.5

Uganda

0.479

21.1

1.56

48.2

Kazakhstan

0.492

5.9

1.99

16.5

Cameroon

0.492

12.7

1.68

43.3

Haiti

0.492

18.4

1.21

15.7

Total unemployment rate (female to male ratio)

Share of female employment in non-agriculture (% of total employment in agriculture)

(continued)

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Table 9.4 (continued) Countries

Gender Inequality Index (GII)

Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)

Qatar

0.508

37.3

1.85

55.6

Oman

0.520

38.8

0.55

24.1

Central African 0.525 Republic

34.3

1.23

42.5

Iraq

0.531

34.3

1.50

39.2

Rwanda

0.536

20.3

1.97

20.2

Yemen

0.540

25.2

1.71

13.0

Sudan

0.545

23.3

0.98

41.4

Pakistan

0.547

13.2

3.43

12.8

Mauritania

0.547

20.0

2.04

10.0

Angola

0.560

31.0

2.52

16.8

Egypt

0.566

17.6

0.70

53.6

Bahrain

0.566

29.3

1.34

41.8

Kuwait

0.569

39.6

1.06

33.2

Jordan

0.578

30.5

1.10

43.6

Singapore

0.579

14.0

1.14

47.6

Belarus

0.620

2.7

1.49

60.6

Algeria

0.620

20.3

1.42

31.2

Thailand

0.655

8.2

0.66

36.1

Togo

0.657

9.2

1.55

47.3

Turkey

0.682

8.6

1.20

41.9

China

0.701

15.3

1.37

39.9

Russia

0.834

0.5

1.94

4.4

Total unemployment rate (female to male ratio)

Share of female employment in non-agriculture (% of total employment in agriculture)

Source Data from UNDP, “Human Development Reports (1990–2018)”, http://hdr.undp.org/en/data

the labour force in significant numbers, women only hold about 17 percent of the world’s parliamentary seats” (Hughes 2009, p. 174). Increasing gender equality through women’s formal representation and participation in the political public sphere is what Myanmar needs. As one of the members of the United Nations, Myanmar has a standing obligation to adopt the UNSCR 1325 for its implementation on the ground with the necessary enforcement by national, political and legal provisions. The UNSC Resolution 1325 is an essential instrument to ensure women’s equal participation for the “maintenance and promotion of

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peace and security” as it requires its members to ensure women and girls’ perspectives to be incorporated into all peacebuilding processes, and a minimum quota of 25% representation be reserved for women in all areas of public life, and in decision-making processes of peacebuilding efforts in particular. It urges member states to incorporate necessary gender perspectives in all peacemaking operations. In addition, the UNSC Resolution 1889 developed indicators to measure the progress of women’s participation in peace processes. Although this is an important global initiative in enforcing the protection of women and empowering their participation, it is not so easy to implement where domestic challenges impede transformations in post-conflict societies. When a state is not responsible for fulfilling its international cooperation for practising the set norms, it is failing to provide peace and security to its own citizens. The responsibility to ensure that human rights are guaranteed in such countries shifts to the international community, including global and local civil society organisations (CSOs) to fill the gaps. Such gaps left by the state are being taken care of by nonstate actors, especially, ethnic organisations in Myanmar, such as but not limited to ethnic women’s organisations, ethnic media organisations and ethnic research/think tanks. In particular, these ethnic organisations take initiative in addressing pervasive inadequacies in social and environmental spheres. The role of women in such ethnic organisations is especially important as they have emerged to actively work towards improving the social and environmental deficiencies of their communities as well as protecting women’s rights and promoting women’s capacities. They are devoted to bringing equality as well as promoting resilience for populations and communities in need in their native lands and beyond, by the use of both indigenous and modern means. These organisations have formed coalitions across ethnic, religious and national boundaries to contribute towards nurturing peace and security. It is up to the member states to make commitments to fulfil the international standards that are dedicated to empowering women.

The Importance of Women in Political Participation, Peace Processes and Security Women’s political participation increases the consideration directed to legal protection, social welfare and transparency in governments and businesses (Hudson et al. 2008/2009). Increasing the representation of women in parliament is correlated to decreasing the likelihood of human rights abuses, torture or wrongful imprisonment of citizens, and the use of violence in response to international crises (Mechoulan et al. 2016). As such, the security of women can be linked to the security of states as “security is a garment that must be woven without seam: if we are not paying attention, the loose threads of women’s systematic insecurity will unravel peace for all” (Hudson et al. 2008/2009, p. 44). Since security challenges from women’s dimensions are different from men, the significant policy implications need the integration

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of women’s decision inputs in the peacebuilding process. Their interests, priorities, fundamental concerns and consensus, based on the practical experiences and accumulated grievances related to rape, domestic violence/abuse, food insecurity, lack of opportunity for capacity-building and leadership training, community tension, gender inequality, and inadequate accessibility to funding, as well as legal support, must be captured in security sector reform or peace processes. The importance of women in political participation, particularly in conflict mediation and peace processes, has been recognised by UN Resolution 1325 (UNSC 1325), yet a distinction remains between the participation of women in community-based peacebuilding and their participation in peace processes. While the NLD and Aung San Suu Kyi were under severe suppression following the 1990 election, women have been participating in civil society over decades. Therefore, women’s organisations in Myanmar are highly active in “informal, communitylevel peace-building and reconciliation activities, while remaining largely excluded (with a few exceptions) from formal and high-level peace-making initiatives, including bilateral negotiations and nationwide ceasefire talks” (Transnational Institute 2017). Major peace processes that occurred between 1992 and 2011 indicate that women only accounted for 2.4% of the chief mediators. There are three key reasons why this is an oversight that must be rectified as women should be more involved in such processes. Firstly, such peace negotiations set the direction that is to be taken after an agreement has been reached, which affect the entire society, including women, thereby is a matter of equality (O’Reilly and Súilleabháin 2013). The consistent inclusion of women is key as “if women were not integrated into peace processes right from the start, they were mostly also excluded from reconstruction and reorganisation of society” (Schoninger 2003, p. 349). Secondly, women are able to bring different perspectives to the table where a novel approach is needed regarding what constitutes peace and security. Furthermore, their involvement does nothing to hinder negotiations as there has been zero negative impact recorded due to their inclusion in a peace process, unlike the case in Sri Lanka, where Buddhist monks and CSOs rallied against the peace processes. The positive impact of women in peace processes is evidenced in various cases, such as in Liberia, where women were integral in calling for the signing of the peace agreement. Furthermore, women have also contributed to Kenya and Burundi as well as Egypt and Yemen to tackle the root causes of conflict and change societal power relations, respectively. In Guatemala, women’s involvement was integral in promoting and upholding indigenous women’s rights, as well as ensuring sexual harassment to be classified as a criminal offense (O’Reilly et al. 2015). Thirdly, research conducted has indicated that the involvement of women leads to a sustainable and more durable form of peace (O’Reilly and Súilleabháin 2013). Therefore, the experiences, interests, approaches (negotiations) and the power of women are essential in peace processes to end armed conflicts through sustainable solutions. An agreement was more likely to be reached in the first place when women were included in the negotiations process; their inclusion in the peace process results in a peace agreement that is 20% more likely to last for at least two years,

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while their participation in the construction of a peace agreement makes it 35% more likely to last for fifteen years (O’Reilly et al. 2015). Women often play an indispensable role in sustaining peace as peace promoters. They are the ones who share the values of mothers, daughters, wives with the experiences of motherhood and suffering of women to advocate for peace. Research indicates that women have enhanced or acquired many valuable and transferrable skills, inclusive of active listening, speaking, mediating and facilitating dialogue, among others, giving them distinct styles of leadership and management through socialisations (Jordan 2003). The collaboration of women creates trust and confidence, and open lines of communication among conflicting factions, parties and ethnic nationalities, different faithbased groups, political differences, and socio-economic strata, curing the wounds and moving on for reconciliation from the grassroots among the conflict-affected communities. “An inclusive peace process is more likely to lead to lasting peace” (O’Reilly and Súilleabháin 2013, p. 6) as it reduces the possibility of excluded parties undermining the process, and allows for all those affected to indicate problem areas that need to be addressed. Without the active involvement of women in “all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality, development, and peace cannot be achieved” (Panday 2008, p. 489). Although efforts to transition into a democratic society have taken place since 2011 in Myanmar, the gender implications of suffering and marginalisation are rarely factored in initiatives for national reform; women are not always viewed as having a valuable role in democratisation and peace processes. In such cases, men are assumed capable of speaking for women, overlooking urgent and specific needs of women (Hewitt et al. 2010). Nonetheless, women in Myanmar have remained highly active as agents for reconciliation and political change, and their participation has improved since 2005 (“UNDP Annual Report: The Sustainable Future We Want” 2012). The integration of women into the decision-making process of a given political party can benefit in terms of the organisation’s transparency and democratic practices (Romao and Sineau 2003). The same point has been discussed further in the European Youth Center Council of Europe Strasbourg Seminar, where the conclusion had been reached that in order to provide young women with a voice in decision-making processes, democracy and transparency should be promoted in political parties, and “measures should be taken including funding and support for potential candidates, inclusive and representative selection processes, including quotas – legal or voluntary, in relation to young women candidates” (ibid., p. 29). Furthermore, CEDAW has asserted that democracy will be meaningful only when women and men have an equal right to participate in political decision-making (Bacik and Afacan 2013). Peacebuilding in conflict-affected states of Myanmar, in principle, needs multiple measures to build good security, governance, justice and reconciliation and socioeconomic development, which must positively affect the improvement in the lives of individuals and communities. If such actions are initiated without clearly ending the on-going armed conflicts of all kinds with a variety of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), through internationally respectable ceasefire agreements backed by accountable politico-legal arrangements, any efforts to consolidate meaningful sustainable

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peace can fail repeatedly as Myanmar’s history has proven. This is because any peacebuilding process needs accountable, workable and verifiable strategies, programmes, policies and political commitments in order to rebuild trust and confidence, restore peace, prevent relapse into violent conflict, and reconstruct the post-conflict areas towards genuine peace in sustainable functions. Women in Myanmar and especially, ethnic women of the conflict-affected states as well as those who work for various ethnic organisations in local and national affairs across the country are insufficiently included in the current peacebuilding process. Despite such exclusion, women have been consistently playing an instrumental role in propagating peace, playing constructive roles in reaching out to various divides, serving as advocates, activists, educators and leaders for community peace throughout Myanmar’s history, democratisation process and the current transition. They portray themselves as key stakeholders as many of them experienced grievances during the conflict, who are equipped with information, experiences, skills and will towards ending all kinds of violence and conflicts. Those unique features are possessed by women in their individual capacity as either leaders or ordinary members as well as in their organisations representing women including those who are in conflict-affected regions.

From Local to National: Reality on Ground There are three different levels of women’s participation in Myanmar, in which the first level is at the national level: women working in parliament, businesses or international non-profit organisations (INGO). The second level is at the local/regional community level: women and men working and living in villages. The last level is at the village level: women participating in their village communities, CSOs or local non-government organisations (LNGOs) that are dedicated to improving the lives of vulnerable people and their environment (Women and Leadership in Myanmar” 2013). Women’s participation is pivotal not only for the political parties but also in community-based organisations and women’s groups. Romao and Sineau (2003, p. 5) explain that women are “under-represented in public office and in civil service; we can also observe a low participation rate by young women in conventional and/or institutional politics”. Although the participation of women remains low, this could be taken as a “hopeful sign that the inclusion of women can be increased as the processes in Myanmar develop” (Minoletti 2014, p. 7). Women’s exclusion from politics due to sociocultural factors, in turn, causes much disempowerment to their lives, as well as household and community development (Eade and Williams 1995). In spite of the female population exceeding the proportion of men in Myanmar, women are being treated as second class citizens in most decision-making at all levels. International policymakers and researchers have increased attention on women’s participation as an extremely significant issue on the grounds of promoting equity and good governance in Myanmar (Minoletti 2014). As shown in Table 9.5, the propor-

67:424

23:145

44:279

84:575

4:155

24:283

25:634

Upper House

Lower House

State/Regional

3.94

8.48

2.58

6.39

%

Women: Men

28:438

14.60

15.77

15.86

15.80

%

1/221

2:108

0:56

2:164

Women: Men

2/219

2:108

0:56

2:164

Women: Men

2016–2021

Women: Men

2011–2016

2011–2016

2016–2021

2011–2016

2016–2021

Elected women members of Proportion of the appointed parliament (WMPs) as percent women and men from the active of total elected members of military service as MPs during parliament (TMPs)

Proportion of parliamentary seats held between the elected women and men members of parliament (MPs) during

Union

Parliaments

Table 9.5 Proportion of parliamentary seats held by women in Myanmar

3.04

6.64

1.89

4.98

%

2011–2016

10.83

11.88

11.44

11.73

%

2016–2021

Women MPs (the elected and the appointed military personnel) as percent of all MPs including the military appointees combined during

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S. Y. Poine and C. Yamahata

tion of women’s participation in parliaments in Myanmar stands at 6.4% (2011– 2016) and 15.8% (2016–2021) as Members of Parliament (MPs) at the national level (Union). Table 9.6 indicates that women’s representation in the subnational level is even lower, only comprising 3.9% (2011–2016) and 14.6% (2016–2021) as MPs at state and regional levels. Table 9.7 shows how the level of women’s involvement in administration is very low since at the township level, ward/village tract, and minister positions, it stands at 0, 0.11, and 2.4, respectively. Women have not been involved in the administration of the different ethnic armed groups and have only had minor roles in the related political parties in Myanmar (Minoletti 2014). Mi Sar Dar, the only woman who has participated as a Central Committee (CC) member at the New Mon State Party (NMSP), has explained that women need to represent themselves as they are equally affected by issues of development and politics (Khen and Nyoi 2014). Such national figures of Myanmar are relatively small when compared to other countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and those around the world. Since there are many challenges as well as effects to women’s participation in politics, especially young women, their participation in religious organisations and political parties have been limited. “Nevertheless, women participate in the senior positions and as decision-makers within civil society organizations, groups and associations even though they are not a big [proportion but] remains extremely low, and… multiple forms of gender discrimination interact to severely curtail women’s ability to participate” (Minoletti 2014, p. 3). In order for the participation of women to be a meaningful contribution, “women’s presence [must reach] a ‘critical mass’- usually regarded to be around the 30 [percent] mark, which is why the BPfA set this as the minimum amount quotas should start from” (Alliance for Gender Inclusion in the Peace Process 2015, p. 19). The deficit in female participation has far-reaching effects as “political parties, parliaments and trade unions are major vehicles for political careers and the low participation of women in these organizations, especially at the leadership level, closes important paths for advancing to decision-making positions in government” (Karl 1995, p. 65). In a hypothetical scenario, where “we are hoping that women in political leadership will prove themselves less corrupt than men”, it would allow women to gain an advantage in the political arena (Goetz 2007, p. 96). Furthermore, as the main objective of setting gender quotas is to enable more women to access political positions, women should be given the opportunity to participate in the forefront in realising the implementation of set gender quotas in the case of developing countries. Sparke (2013) argues that efforts to increase women’s participation in politics have gained some success in the past two decades resulting in how at the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women: Action for Equality, Development and Peace held in Beijing in 1995, delegates called on governments for women to occupy 30% of governmental representatives. Their special interests need to be included as well as the opportunities to uplift their social, economic and legal status. Such opportunities can arise from changes made to the traditions and nature of the education women receive as decisions regarding “the path of educational training made early in life by young girls under the strong influence of families, peer group

7.48

6.52

5.56

5.26

5.26

2.86

1.96

1.75

0

0

0

0

0

0

Proportion = 3.78

8

6

3

3

2

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total = 25

Ayeyarwady

Bago

Kachin

Rakhine

Magway

Mandalay

Chin

Kayah

Kayin

Mon

Sagaing

Tainintharyi

Remark

WMPs as percent of total elected members of parliament (TEMPs)

Yangon

Women members of parliament (WMPs)

Parliamentary seats held by

Shan

State/Region

Total = 222

7

25

8

6

5

6

19

17

12

13

19

18

31

36

Total = 4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

1

1

0

11

12

13

13

11

10

11

11

11

14

11

12

12

17

Proportion = 2.37 Total = 169

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

14.29

0

8.33

8.33

0

(TMCs)

Active military Women members of cabinet (WMCs) personnel appointed by Number of WMCs as percent Total number of Commander-in-Chief WMCs of total members members of as non-elected MPs of cabinet cabinet (TMCs)

Grand total = 883

Total = 661

21

76

23

17

15

18

57

51

35

38

57

54

92

107

Total elected members of parliament (TEMPs)

Table 9.6 Share of parliamentary seats held by women at State and Regional levels in Myanmar

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Table 9.7 Governmental and administrative positions held by women at different levels in Myanmar Government

Position

State and region

MPs Ministers

Total number

Position held by women

Women held positions as percent of total

883

25

2.83

169

4

2.37 0

Township

Administrators

330

0

Ward/village tract

Administrators

16,743

19

0.11

etc. often closes many opportunities to women and propels them towards the direction of traditionally [and] socially-approved ‘female’ careers” (Jekayinfa 1999). The inclusion of women requires a fundamental rearrangement of some kind (Porter et al. 1999). While the proportion of women constitutes more than half of the total population as well as the electorate in most countries, their representation in political and public decision-making remains largely limited (Bacik and Afacan 2013). A classic example is how Myanmar had ratified CEDAW in 1997, yet the tangible accomplishments are still insufficient on ground due to the lack of enforcement of the agreed principles and articles. It is still hard to find adequate numbers of women decision-makers in political parties, parliaments, governments and at the regional and local decision-making levels. Therefore, the on-ground reality has shed light on the slow progress in the increase in women’s representation from 1990 up to date.

Enabling Political Participation of Women This chapter explores the perceptions and realities regarding the participation and representation of women in Myanmar’s politics, indicating that women continue to be marginalised and underrepresented in political arenas and public life. Useful lessons can be learned from other case studies regarding how women have endeavoured to counter their political marginalisation through their reliance and participation in civil society movements. In Niger, women’s roles as union members and political party activists gradually paved the way for their political participation in a formal capacity. Various initiatives have been spearheaded in Niger to increase the role of women in political participation and widen their opportunities. Firstly, civil society organisations have utilised their social media platforms to support the campaigns of women running for office; ten candidates out of the sixteen that were supported were elected to parliament. Secondly, capacity-building measures through training programmes have been implemented to increase the capacities of women who have been elected, thereby bolstering their positions and status within their political parties. Thirdly, a gender quota law requiring 10% of women to be elected in parliament was put into effect.

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As a result, the representation of women has seen a rise from 1.2% in 1999 to 12.4 and 13% in 2004 and 2011, respectively. Greater inclusion of women have allowed for more attention to be directed to the implementation of laws that protect women from violence. Lastly, women have used Women’s Day as an opportunity to lobby for an increase in the set gender quota from 10 to 30% (Mindzie 2015). Similarly, in Senegal, a national gender policy as well as a parity law were adopted. As a result, the representation of women in parliament increased from 18 to 43%. Special attention was also given to the prevention of electoral fraud as women’s associations worked to establish an election monitoring platform, where such monitoring rooms were used by women who had received appropriate training to observe the elections. Training and consultations were implemented, adopting the three-pronged strategy of mobilisation, mediation and monitoring in order to encourage the active participation of both women and youth in the electoral process (ibid. 2015). Two key root causes can be pinpointed as fundamental obstacles that inhibit women’s political participation—the exclusivity of governance and its lack of accountability. As such, governance that is centred around people is required, and hence the following seven recommendations are proposed: reconciliation of policies with their implementation, capacity-building of both women and youth to facilitate their political participation, reinforcing movements that exist to empower women and youth, increasing the accessibility of social services and widening the role of the private sector to reduce poverty, the use of media to promote political participation of women and youth, connecting various groups and communities, and lastly, strengthening the women, peace, and security agenda (ibid. 2015). A reconciliation of traditions, customs and societal attitudes with national policies is integral to close the gaps between them and ensure that legal frameworks are put in place to counteract any existing attitudes that hamper gender equality. Gender quotas, though alone are insufficient to increase women’s participation, are a key tool in involving women in decision-making bodies. As such, multifaceted indicators are needed to fully include women in such processes. Accessible education, health plans for women, and laws and policies regarding domestic violence and set quotas on the positions for women in leadership positions are all essential factors in empowering women (Mechoulan et al. 2016). Although many think that women are equal to men in their participation in CSOs and other development sectors, a majority of women, in contrast, believe that there remains a huge gender gap in political parties. Low representation and participation of women in political parties may cause women to be dissatisfied, and in turn, discourage them from participating in politics. Such low levels of participation within political parties prove a significant part of the problem in bringing women into political decision-making processes. The barriers that challenge women’s active involvement in Myanmar’s political culture largely rest on the gendered cultural and traditional norms strongly embedded in society that continue to be produced and reproduced through everyday practices. The analysis of literature indicates that there are commonly found factors that stand against women’s active and equal participation in politics. They include patriarchy and inequality, limited spaces for participation, the constraints by age, few women role models, confidence, education and experience,

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and party policies and quotas. These imply and recommend that all stakeholders that relate to each factor can play an important role in enabling young women’s political participation in politics. In addition, the Myanmar government, political parties and women’s organisations should consider improving or promoting women’s political participation by upholding international obligations. Furthermore, women should empower themselves to be knowledgeable on their rights via trainings and have access to any assistance that may be needed; women’s access to education and participation in social areas is vital to ensure that they are able to search for opportunities. The National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women has been established to improve systems, structures and practices that improve women’s livelihoods, reduce poverty, and ensure fairness and equal rights for women in relation to employment, credit, resources, assets and economic benefits. Accomplishing such targets depend on the correct combination of priorities, right choice of policy formulation among alternatives and efficient implementation as well as sufficient enforcement, which require proper data collection, investing in research and advocacy, promoting capacity-building efforts, facilitating partnership between government and non-government stakeholders, and adequate resource allocation. The 12 priority areas are the following: (1) improve women’s livelihoods and reduce poverty; (2) ensure women’s and girls’ access to quality formal and non-formal education; (3) protect, promote, and fulfill women’s and girls’ rights to quality affordable health care, including sexual and reproductive health care; (4) eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls and respond to violence against them; (5) ensure women’s right to protection in emergencies and their participation in emergency preparedness, response, disaster and conflict risk reduction; (6) ensure fairness and equal rights for women in relation to employment, access to credit, resources, assets and economic benefits; (7) ensure women’s equal participation in decision-making and leadership at all levels of society; (8) establish and strengthen institutional mechanisms for the advancement of women, and ensure women’s participation as equal partners in national development strategies and decision-making processes; (9) ensure the protection, promotion, and fulfillment of women’s and girls’ economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights; (10) ensure that the media promotes women’s advancement and raises public awareness about women’s rights and their contribution to society; (11) ensure women’s meaningful participation in managing and safeguarding natural resources, the environment, and adapting to climate change; and (12) promote, protect and fulfill the rights of the girl. Currently, women’s participation in CSOs and NGOs are quite effective. However, women still think that they need awareness raising trainings and empowerment programmes such as political awareness promotion, gender training for men and facilitation for young women’s political participation. Therefore, there is an urgent need to promote capacity-building in order to increase women’s active participation in politics; now more than ever, it has become crucial and beneficial to conduct research on women’s roles in political decision-making processes. In order to improve and enhance women’s participation in politics, more support is needed in Myanmar, including financial and technical support offered from various organisations.

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In addressing the lack of women’s political participation, there is a need to support a bill for reserved seats for women in parliament. On the other hand, political parties need to develop gender-sensitive policy and guidelines to increase women’s participation in the leadership role, and candidate list. Furthermore, we should be aware of the obligation of parliaments to adopt the government’s budget, and to allocate more resources to gender issues. MPs should also try to establish women’s caucuses, and supporting women in engaging with the media to develop a positive image of women in leadership roles. It is also essential to conduct a diverse capacity-building programme for women MPs and potential women candidates with the coordination and cooperation among professional institutions, CSOs and research institutions. The ongoing accelerating democratisation efforts by the NLD government led by the State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi since 2016 actually offers many hopes (expectations) and opportunities for promoting equity (at least in gender and ethnic terms), advancing the position of women in society and increasing women’s participation in the leadership structure of administrative, legislative and bureaucracy, as well as in all processes of attaining peace and national reconciliation. Recently, the NLD announced the selection of its candidates for the upcoming election on 8 November 2020, which include 20% of women in its total. The inclusion of ethnic minority among the NLD’s candidates is another positive hope towards the promotion of ethnic and religious diversity in the nation’s political force. Therefore, the upcoming election of 2020 could be a turning point in making a landmark for realising women’s increasing political participation and witnessing their representation in Myanmar’s post-2020 political landscape and peacebuilding process. The question about the success of new measures is how these hopes, opportunities and initiatives will be able to practically overcome the backlogs and new obstacles by interpreting the state’s powerful and constant political will into legal provisions and lawful enforcement on grounds. The answer is for a holistic approach by recommitting to laws and policies, empowering politico-administrative reforms to tackle long-rooted inequalities of all kinds. These must address the accumulated grievances in terms of ethnicity, religion, ideology and history, elucidating the root causes of ethnic conflict, religious tension and community insecurity, and incorporating women’s perspectives in the whole processes of peace, national reconciliation and security. A genuine, just and sustainable development would be an illusion fostering division within communities unless peace, reconciliation and security can be guaranteed to be equally available on grounds starting from the community level up to the national scale. Therefore, integrating the participatory power of women to deepen the practice of spreading the democratic culture of promoting political dialogue in debating about peacebuilding is a meaningful stepping stone for Myanmar in accomplishing the target of UNSCR 1325 after 20 years of its international commitment.

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Human Development Report 2016. (2016). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ 2016_human_development_report.pdf. Human Freedom Index. (2019). Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/human-freedom-index-new. Jekayinfa, A. A. (1999). Economic empowerment: A panacea for active participation of Nigerian women in politics. Nigerian Journal of Social Studies, 8(1), 47–51. Jones, L. (2014). Explaining Myanmar’s regime transition: The periphery is central. Democratization, 21(5), 780–802. Jordan, A. (2003). Women and conflict transformation: Influences, roles, and experiences. Development in Practice, 13(2–3), 239–252. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614520302944. Kabeer, N. (1994). Reversed realities: Gender hierarchies in development thought. London: Verso. Karl, M. (1995). Women and empowerment. London: Zed. Khalili, L. (2010). Gendered practices of counterinsurgency. Review of International Studies, 37(4), 1471–1491. https://doi.org/10.1017/s026021051000121x. Khen, S., & Nyoi, M. (2014). Looking at the current peace process in Myanmar through a gender lens [Ebook]. Swisspeace. Retrieved from https://www.swisspeace.ch/assets/publications/dow nloads/Articles/4ff70ad542/Looking-at-the-Current-Peace-Process-in-Myanmar-through-a-Gen der-Lens-14-swisspeace-reflection-research.pdf. Lall, M. (2016). Understanding reform in Myanmar: People and society in the wake of military rule (1st ed., pp. 93–132). London: Hurst. Lofving, A. (2011). If given the chance: Women’s participation in public life in Myanmar . Yangon: Oxfam, CARE, and Action Aid. McDermott, R. (2015). Sex and death: Gender differences in aggression and motivations for violence. International Organization, 69(3), 753–775. https://doi.org/10.1017/s00208183150 00065. Mechoulan, D., Mahmoud, Y., Súilleabháin, A., & Roesch, J. (2016). The SDGs and prevention for sustaining peace: Exploring the transformative potential of the goal on gender equality. International Peace Institute. Mindzie, M. (2015). Building peace and development in the sahel. International Peace Institute. Minoletti, P. (2014). Women’s participation in the subnational governance of Myanmar [Ebook]. Retrieved from https://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/WomensParticipationintheSubnation alGovernanceofMyanmar.pdf. Momsen, J. (2010). Gender and development (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Moser, C. (1993). Gender planning and development. London: Routledge. Nilsen, M. (2013). Will democracy bring peace to Myanmar? International Area Studies Review, 16(2), 115–141. O’Reilly, M., & Súilleabháin, A. (2013). Women in conflict mediation: Why it matters . International Peace Institute. O’Reilly, M., Ó Súilleabháin, A., & Paffenholz, T. (2015). Women’s impact on peace processes . International Peace Institute. Oxfam, Trocaire, Care, ActionAid. (2013). Women and leadership in Myanmar. Yangon. Panday, P. (2008). Representation without participation: Quotas for women in Bangladesh. International Political Science Review, 29(4), 489–512. https://doi.org/10.1177/019251210809 5724. Porter, F., Smyth, I., & Sweetman, C. (Ed.). (1999). Appendix: Gender and development Oxfam’s policy for its programme, agree by Oxfam council on 16th May 1993, Gender Works, Oxfam Experience in Policy and Practice (pp. 337–342). An Oxfam Publication, UK. Reardon, B. (1996). Sexism and the war system (pp. 10–29, 52–58). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Romao, I., & Sineau, M. (2003). The participation of young women in political life. Strasboung: European Youth Centre Council of Europe. Schoninger, I. (2003). Women in War: Victims and hopes for peace at the same time. Development and Cooperation, 30(8/9).

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Sparke, M. (2013). Introducing globalization: Ties, tensions, and uneven integration. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Transnational Institute. (2017). No women, no peace: Gender equality, conflict and peace in Myanmar. UNDP. (n.d.). Human Development Reports (1990–2018). Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/ data. UNDP Annual Report: The Sustainable Future We Want. (2012). Retrieved from https://www.undp. org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/corporate/annual-report-2011-2012–the-sustainable-fut ure-we-want.html. UNDP Gender Inequality Index. (2013). Retrieved from https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-4-Gen der-Inequality-Index/pq34-nwq7. United Nations General Assembly 66/130. Women and Political Participation. A/RES/66/130. (19 December 2011). Available from https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/ 66/130. UN Women. (2013). Annual Report 2012-2013. United Nations, New York. UN Women. (2014). The Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action: Beijing +5 Political Declaration and Outcome. United Nations, New York. Willis, K. (2011). Theories and practice of development (2nd ed.). London: Routledge. Women in Political Parties in Myanmar—What Way Forward? (2014). Retrieved from https://dipd. dk/news/women-in-political-parties-in-myanmar-what-way-forward/.

Chapter 10

Public Health Reform and Transition in Burma/Myanmar Voravit Suwanvanichkij and Saw Nay Htoo

Background Since independence in 1948, Burma, one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries, has never been at peace. Although the ethnic Burmans, for whom the country was named after, constitute the largest ethnic group, the highland frontiers of the country, beyond the central plains and the Irrawaddy River Valley, are dominated by other ethnic groups, speaking over 100 different languages and dialects. In many of these areas, ethnic calls for increased autonomy in a federal union were met with a military response, particularly following General Ne Win’s coup d’etat in 1962, which would usher in almost five decades of military rule. With key decisions made by a small cabal of generals, insulated from accountability to the needs of the people, social spending was given low priority. As a result, decades of military rule in Burma was characterized by severe disinvestments in social services, including health and education, along with extreme centralization and Burmanization of governance, with ethnic concerns and aspirations dismissed or marginalized, including in health (Lintner 2017). Under rule of the last military junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), Burma’s health system earned the dubious honour of being among the least funded in the world, the lion’s share of the government budget going to defence, despite a lack of external military threats. In 2000, the Burmese health system was ranked by the WHO second to the bottom in overall performance, only outperforming Sierra Leone, it’s basic health indices, particularly for infants, children, and women, among the worst in the region (Table 10.1) (WHO 2000). Yet these official figures obscure the realities facing many ethnic communities living in the conflict zones of the country. Here, not only is severe disinvestment V. Suwanvanichkij (B) Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand S. N. Htoo Burma Medical Association (BMA), Mae Sot, Thailand © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_10

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Table 10.1 Comparative health indicators of Burma with Thailand General gov’t spending on health/capita (2012)

Thailand

Burma

Eastern Burma

$164

$5

N/A

General gov’t spending on health/capita (2012), PPP

$385

$6

N/A

Total health expenditure, % of GDP (2012)

4

2

N/A

Infant Mortality Rate, per 1000 LB, 2013

11

40

73

Under-5 Mortality Rate, per 1000 LB, 2013

13

51

138

Maternal Mortality ratio, per 100,000 LB, 2013

20

178

721

Source HISWG (2015); United Nations (n.d.); WHO (n.d.)

in health problematic but, in addition, for decades the Tatmadaw or Burmese military, employed a counterinsurgency policy known as the Four Cuts policy, aimed at disrupting the flow of supplies, information, funds, and recruits to ethnic armies. The cornerstone of this policy was the destruction of villages in contested zones or their forced relocation to areas controlled by the government, coupled with widespread human rights abuses against civilians (particularly forced labour, forced relocation, arbitrary taxation, and confiscation of food and property). Since 1996, an estimated 3700 villages have been destroyed, relocated, or abandoned, leaving at least 400,000 internally displaced in southeastern Burma (TBC 2012). The end result has been a health catastrophe, one which has been described as a “Chronic Emergency” (Back Pack Health Worker Team 2006). In eastern Burma, basic health indices in internally displaced populations (IDPs) are far worse than Burma’s official figures. Multiple population-based analyses collected by networks of ethnic community-based health organizations (ECBHOs), some working now for over three decades with displaced communities of eastern Burma, have consistently demonstrated infant, child, and maternal mortality rates that are far higher than Burma’s official figures, already among the highest in ASEAN. In these communities, these figures bear closer resemblance to other settings hosting coincident, complex humanitarian disasters, such as Somalia (Table 10.1) (BMA, NHEC, BPHWT, and EHOs 2010; HISWG 2015). Morbidity and mortality remains often from preventable entities such as diarrheal disease, respiratory infections, malaria, and malnutrition. Yet as has been frequently the case elsewhere in Burma, in the face of official neglect, marginalization, and abuse by agents of the central state, all policies that have widened health disparities in the country between ethnic communities and more Burman and urban areas of the country, local community organizations have mobilized to respond to these failures in order to provide essential social services. Without access to official health services from the Burmese government and with international humanitarian assistance to many IDP communities in eastern Burma blocked or curtailed by the Burmese military, ECBHOs have responded by developing their own local health systems. These initiatives are rooted in their communities and designed to quickly and appropriately respond to local health priorities and needs, which often vary greatly among and even within different communities. In over three decades in operation, these programs have come together to form a

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coalition of health providers in eastern Burma and network even beyond. Today, a trained cadre of over 2600 health staff cover a population of almost half a million individuals, treating almost 200,000 patients a year through a large network of village health volunteers, mobile medical staff and clinics. Together, in addition to providing basic preventive and curative services for the most common communicable diseases (particularly diarrhoea, malaria, and respiratory infections), this health system also operates basic reproductive health care (working in conjunction with trained traditional birth attendants), child health services, health education campaigns, control of disease outbreaks, relief during acute emergencies (such as storms and flooding), and water and sanitation programmes. A referral system is also in place whereby secondary and tertiary level care can be obtained by patients across the Thai border through the Mae Tao (Dr. Cynthia’s) Clinic in Mae Sot. For patients requiring even more specialized care, the Mae Tao Clinic is able to refer patients directly into the Thai public hospital system. In 2013, even following the ceasefires that allowed for increased freedom of movement for many IDP communities of eastern Burma, for almost 70%, including for among the most vulnerable populations of Burma, this parallel system was the sole source of health care; only about 8% of those who sought care for an illness did so from Burmese governmental sources. In addition to physical accessibility and financial barriers to accessing official Burmese health services, there exists widespread distrust of the Burmese health system and the low perceived availability of health care personnel (HISWG 2015). The operation of a large and varied workforce, with members performing a variety of roles, including medic and health administrators has meant that ECBHOs have had to develop their own training curricula and standardized medical protocols to address the diverse health priorities and needs in their own locales. The development and review of all training packages is done through extensive and longstanding collaborations with local Burmese, Thai and other international partners, providing experience and building capacity locally to respond to new and emerging local and international priorities. Similar collaboration between ECBHOs has addressed the absence of reliable population-level health data, essential for cost-effective and evidence-based programming, leading to the development of joint information collection and analysis efforts between multiple ethnic and community health organizations, under the rubric of the Health Information System Working Group (HISWG). Altogether, these components of the health programmes operated by ECBHOs constitute a separate health system for Burma, one covering ethnic and displaced populations, among the most vulnerable communities of eastern Burma, one operating through a devolved, participatory manner, a paradigm diametrically opposed to that of the Burman-dominated central state. In 2011, the last military junta of Burma, the SPDC, was officially dissolved, replaced by a quasi-civilian administration headed by a former General, President Thein Sein. Under this administration, local ceasefires were brokered with most major ethnic armed organizations operating in eastern Burma which, along with the limited political space afforded by Burma’s recent reforms, have afforded more mobility and security for many IDP communities. This includes for ethnic and community health workers, facilitating their ability to perform their duties providing health services to

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IDPs, even as official international humanitarian assistance continues to be controlled or blocked by the government. For the first time in decades, ECBHOs providing health services in eastern Burma and the Thai border have been able to engage in meetings and limited collaborations with the Burmese Ministry of Health and Sports (MoHS), particularly in the fields of nationally and internationally recognized priority diseases (such as malaria, reproductive health, and childhood vaccinations), spurring optimism about the possibility of a “convergence” between these two disparate, parallel systems providing health services in eastern Burma. This optimism must be, however, tempered by an examination of the deep structural barriers that renders any such possibility in the near future unlikely. As opposed to the primary, participatory health system operating at the grass-roots level which is the modus operandi of ECBHOs of eastern Burma, the governance structure of the official Burmese health system is the polar opposite. In Burma, health governance remains highly centralized, with the military-drafted 2008 Constitution of Burma providing the central government in Naypyidaw exclusive legislative power over all aspects of health policymaking (2008 Constitution, Article 96) (ENAC 2016). Although the Constitution also brought into being the existence of state and regional parliaments, their roles are very limited, including in health, where they are only entitled to enact legislature covering traditional medicine and, even then, only on matters “not contrary to traditional medicine policies prescribed by the Union [government]” (2008 Constitution, Article 188) (ENAC 2016). Although state and regional level health departments also exist, these bodies exist in an ambiguous position, bereft of a clear relationship with the central government Ministry of Health and Sports and Sports. In addition, state and regional level governments do not have jurisdiction over these health departments, only an informal coordination role, rendering them largely legally unaccountable to local communities (HCCG n.d.; Nixon et al. 2013). Local health departments also do not administer, nor do they have purview over, healthcare facilities (including hospitals and clinics) in the state, which are run entirely by and are thus solely accountable to the Ministry of Health and Sports in Naypyidaw. Although efforts have been made recently to try and deconcentrate power from the union level to the state and regional level authorities, the bulk of key decision-making, including on issues that have significant impacts on the local community, remains at the central level (ENAC 2016). It is also significant that the administrative backbone of the Burmese government, including state and regional governments, all their departments, as well as union ministries, is an agency known as the General Administration Department (GAD), an agency formed during the military dictatorship to centralize control over the county. The presence of the GAD throughout governance structures at the state and regional level means that all correspondence and administration, including funding, of the executive and legislative branches of local government are operated through this department (Nixon et al. 2013). The GAD has been transferred from the militarycontrolled Ministry of Home Affairs to the civilian Ministry of the Office of the Union Government in late 2018. It was an important step towards the goal of demilitarising

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governance in Myanmar. However, ensuring that the reforms also support decentralised governance, which is where they could have their most powerful influence, that is a key to Myanmar’s political, economic, and social transitions to be more effective and successful requiring the government to do more. The GAD was originally under the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, one of three ministries headed by a minister directly appointed by the Burmese military commander-in-chief, independent of any elected government. This constitutionally derived power gives the Tatmadaw yet another means to control or interfere with the administration of states and regions centrally (HCCG n.d.). This problem is exacerbated by the decades-long pattern of “militarization” of ministries in Burma, including in the Ministry of Health and Sports, whereby high ranking military officials are transferred to high-ranking positions (including health officers and director-generals) in the ministry, individuals often with limited experience but whose decisions and opinions prevail over those of experienced civilian staff and have the power to promote, transfer, demote, or dismiss civilian personnel (Mann 2015). Meanwhile, the filling of senior positions with military personnel also results in limiting opportunities for advancement of more experienced, civilian personnel, contributing to low morale and inefficiency in the work of the ministry (Myint 2015). Thus, despite recent changes in Burma, public health governance remains highly centralized, resulting frequently in a top-down, ineffective, disjointed approach to local health priorities and needs and an ongoing, disproportionate focus on urban, tertiary care facilities despite the often greater needs in more remote areas (3MDG n.d.; ENAC 2016; MoHS 2016). This disparity is exacerbated by the inequitable distribution of skilled healthcare staff, which heavily concentrated in urban areas, particularly Rangoon and Mandalay, with few willing to work in more rural areas, particularly in long term in government-operated facilities (MoHS 2016; UNICEF 2017; Thomson Reuters Foundation 2017). These problems result in and are further compounded by a bottleneck in decisions in Naypyidaw, decisions often made by individuals who have little or no accountability to or knowledge of local populations, who largely remain shut out of decision-making processes aimed at strengthening or improving public health in their own communities. With little actual power given to local health authorities and a health administration structure that disincentivizes improvement, the end result is that for many rural, ethnic communities in Burma, there remains little tangible change in access to vital health services (HCCG n.d.). The current, official Burmese government health framework leaves little formal space for local health departments and organizations such as the ECBHOs of eastern Burma to participate in the health of their communities. Indeed, they remain operating illegally: as organizations not officially registered in Burma, they are “illegal organizations”, their members and contact with their members liable to prosecution under statutes such as the British-era Unlawful Associations Act, originally drafted as the India Act XIV of 1908 (Naw 2017). Although currently selectively unenforced, the continued existence of this and other repressive laws serve to hinder wider, official collaborations between ECBHOs of eastern Burma and official bodies. Furthermore, for the cadre of health personnel trained and certified through locally developed curricula and treatment protocols, formulated based on the specific needs of the

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communities in which they work, such individuals operate now in Burma without official accreditation from the Burmese government and the vital services they have and continue to provide are illegal under Burmese law, and such individuals do so at the risk of arrest (HISWG 2015). Burma has set an ambitious goal of achieving universal health coverage by 2030. The government’s most recent National Health Plan includes the extension of a Basic Essential Package of Health Services (EPHS) to be “guaranteed for everyone by 2020”, “…through the engagement of Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs), Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), private-for-profit providers, etc.” (MoHS 2016). Yet significant hurdles exist to realize this goal, not the least of which remains the existing health governance political structure, reform of which is needed in order to more efficiently and equitably deliver vital health-related services, which must be locally rooted and decentralized, given the extreme diversities and disparities that exist in Burma, particularly for the most vulnerable communities in the country (Zaw et al. 2015a; 3MDG n.d.; EHOF 2017). This reality is also noted in the country’s latest NHP, which recognizes the need for the participation of health actors such as ECBHOs and further decentralization (MoHS 2016). Structural reform would also be essential if Burma is to meet its Sustainable Development Goals, particularly in reducing maternal and child mortality and combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other infectious diseases, health issues that often disproportionately affect marginalized and ethnic communities of the country (HISWG 2015). The country could address these disparities relatively quickly by leveraging the existing health system built up over decades by ECBHOs of eastern Burma, who have been and must continue to be legally empowered and engaged, including through their existing administrative structures, and with other local health actors, in key decisions and programs affecting their communities, a model which has been able to design programmes to respond effectively and appropriately to specific health priorities in ethnic communities (EHOF 2017). Yet despite the recognition of the importance of ECBHOs and the urgent need for decentralization by the current government, it also continues to advocate the need to strengthen the management and leadership role of the central government in Naypyidaw on health policies, counter to the more decentralized model promoted by ECBHOs of eastern Burma, one in which the role of ECBHOs themselves in the management and operation of primary health programmes in more remote ethnic communities of Burma are maintained and expanded, freeing up the central health authorities in Naypyidaw to take on more technical and coordination roles and focus on setting national-level policies and priorities (ENAC 2016; MoHS 2016). Concurrently, more resources should be devoted to support access to local health services and local health authorities should be given more responsibility and made more accountable for the health of their communities, particularly given severely limited human resources and capacity of the Ministry of Health and Sports in Burma, a problem especially acute in rural and conflict-affected areas (EHOF 2017). These measures, in addition to helping to enhance health performance and ensure more equitable distribution of health services, will also engage communities, increase civic participation and, ultimately, aid the democratization process. However, such

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reforms can only occur with extensive structural reform, starting from the country’s many outdated laws as well as Burma’s military-drafted Constitution. Finally, it must be recognized that decentralization and a true convergence between Burma’s official health system and the devolved, inclusive, primary care system that has been operating in eastern Burma for decades is intimately and inextricably tied to longstanding discrimination and ethnic conflict, and progress towards such will be inseparable from prospects of achieving a lasting peace in the country, given the diametrically opposed health governance structures and operating models of these two systems. ECBHOs in eastern Burma have proposed a model for health reform and convergence, the Rocketship Model, which highlights the reality that health reform and convergence can only progress in tandem with efforts towards achieving sustainable peace and a federal union in Burma. (See Fig. 10.1) The current situation is that ceasefires have largely stopped significant, overt conflict between major ethnic armed organizations and the Tatmadaw in eastern Burma, affording more security and mobility for IDPs of eastern Burma and enabling limited collaborative efforts between ECBHOs and official health bodies in Burma. However, ceasefires are not guarantees of a durable peace and, in the absence of further, significant decentralization of political power and more equitable and inclusive involvement of ethnic peoples in the future of their own communities, there can be little meaningful integration of the work of ECBHOs into a coherent, equitable national health system of Burma, particularly when periodic skirmishes, ongoing militarization of ethnic homelands, and ongoing human rights abuses continue, all of which further heightens mistrust of the central government (HCCG 2014; KHRG 2016). Today prospects of this remain distant: while the current Burmese government and Tatmadaw road map to peace involves ethnic armed organizations formally joining the political process under the rubric of Burma’s highly centralized 2008 Constitution, many ethnic organizations, including ECBHOs of eastern Burma, are pushing for a more fundamental renegotiation of the relationship with the central authorities. For many, the constraints of the 2008 Constitution remain unacceptable, in peace and in health governance (Nixon et al. 2013). During this critical transition period, international support for the work of ECBHOs, which are the health system for an estimated 500,000 of the most vulnerable communities of Burma, must be continued, and agencies supporting initiatives in the country, particularly in more rural and ethnic areas, should be cognizant of the implicit conflict-sensitivities this entails. Given the extreme diversities in the country and long history of discriminatory policies by the central government, along with the highly centralized, Burman-dominated system currently in place, it must be recognized that the efforts of ECBHOs in eastern Burma cannot be seen solely as technical health service providers. They are also a longstanding expression of community agency: communities mobilizing themselves to realize their right to health, providing services to peoples long-neglected, marginalized, and abused by successive military administrations who have abrogated their responsibilities, particularly in social spheres. Being locally owned, ethnic-run, and responding most quickly to local priorities, ECBHOs are perceived by local peoples as being more trustworthy and legitimate than the health bodies of the state and are the de facto health system

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Fig. 10.1 Courtesy of health convergence core group

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for large communities living in conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma (South 2014; Myint 2014; Joliffe 2013). As such, there is an inherent, overt political dimension to health delivery in Burma, one which donors and others wishing to work in Burma should not overlook. Encouraging further support for the work of ECBHOs and not solely supporting organizations and projects approved by the central government can foster the building of a participatory, public health system, increasing trust within and between communities, and the prospects of a long-awaited, genuine peace. This potentially critical role of health systems as a catalyst for peace and a promoter of reconciliation has been recognized by the WHO, and has contributed to such in many diverse settings including Angola, Croatia, Mozambique, and Bosnia/Herzegovina (WHO n.d.). Yet in Burma, the converse is also equally true: without an adequate understanding of the country’s complex history and ongoing ethnic and political dynamics, supporting health initiatives in ethnic homelands solely from the perspective of or in cooperation with the central, Burman-dominated government not only risks problems such as lack of absorptive capacity at the central level and structural constraints that limit the ability to provide timely, accessible services to among the most vulnerable populations, to many communities, it can also implicitly discount local initiatives as “inferior (Joliffe 2013)”. This risks being counterproductive for the peace process, exacerbating ethnic mistrust and jeopardizing the prospects of durable, equitable improvements of the health of all of the peoples of Burma.

References Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT). (2006). Chronic emergency: Health and human rights in Eastern Burma. Chiang Mai: Wanida Press. Burma Medical Association (BMA), National Health and Education Committee (NHEC), Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT) and Ethnic Health Organizations (EHOs). (2010). Diagnosis Critical: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma. EHOF. (2017, May 22). Ethnic health organizations forum: Better health together. Myanmar: Ngwe Saung. Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC). (2016). Sectoral policy recommendations for building future federal democratic union (draft). HCCG. (2014). Primary health care convergence model for Burma/Myanmar. Myanmar: Health Convergence Core Group. HCCG. (n.d.). A Federal, devolved health system for Burma/Myanmar. A Policy Paper. Health Information System Working Group (HISWG). (2015). The long road to recovery: Ethnic and community-based health organizations leading the way to better health in Eastern Burma (A Report by the Health Information System Working Group). Joliffe, K. (2013, December 18). Do no harm: Promote ‘ethnic’ service structures. US Institute of Peace (Blog). http://research.kim/works/do-no-harm-promote-ethnic-service-structures. Accessed Jan 10 2018. KHRG. (2016). Ongoing militarisation in Southeast Myanmar. Myanmar: Karen Human Rights Group. Lintner, B. (2017, June 3). A question of race in Myanmar. Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/art icle/question-race-myanmar/. Accessed 7 Feb 2018.

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Mann, Z. (2015, August 12). Movement against army appointees in Burma’s health ministry vows to continue advocacy. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/movement-aga inst-army-appointees-in-burmas-health-ministry-vows-to-continue-advocacy.html. Accessed 24 May 2017. 3MDG. (n.d.). Collective voices: Exploring barriers to healthcare access in Myanmar. Yangon: The Three Millennium Development Goal Fund. MoHS. (2016). Myanmar National Health Plan 2017–2021 . Myanmar: Ministry of Health and Sports, The Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Nixon, H. et al. (2013). State and region governments in Myanmar. Washington, DC: Asia Foundation. Myint, S. Y. S. (2014, May 5). Health budget up but challenges remain. Myanmar Times. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/home-page/142-in-depth/10271-health-budget-upbut-challenges-remain-2.html. Accessed May 20, 2017. Myint, S. Y. S. (2015, August 31). Black ribbons fail to deter militarisation of Health Ministry. The Myanmar Times. https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/16219-black-ribbons-fail-to-determilitarisation-of-health-ministry.html. Accessed 25 May 2017. Naw, S. (2017, March 8). They call it a crime: Being born non-bamar in a conflict zone. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/call-crime-born-non-bamar-conflict-zone.html. Accessed March 8, 2017. South, A. (2014, March 28). The Myanmar context. Open Democracy. http://www.opendemocracy. net/ashley-south/myanmar-context. Accessed May 20, 2017. TBC. (2012). Changing Realities, Poverty and displacement in South East Burma/Myanmar. Bangkok: The Border Consortium. Thomson Reuters Foundation. (2017, May 23). Myanmar children in conflict-hit areas left behind—UN. Bangkok Post. http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1254946/myanmar-chi ldren-in-conflict-hit-areas-left-behind-un. Accessed May 24, 2017. UNICEF. (2017). Lives on Hold: Making sure no child left behind in Myanmar. Myanmar: UNICEF. United Nations. (n.d.). Millennium development goals indicators. New York, NY: United Nations Statistics Division. http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/. Accessed Jan 10 2019. WHO. (2000). The World Health Report 2000, Health Systems: Improving Performance. Geneva: World Health Organization. WHO. (n.d.). Health as a potential contribution to peace. Realities from the field: what WHO has learned in the 1990s. http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/hbp/HBP_WHO_learned_1990s.pdf. Accessed Jan 10 2019. WHO. (n.d.). Global health expenditure debate. http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicator s/en. Accessed January10 2019. Zaw, P. P. T. et al. (2015a). Disparities in Health and Health Care in Myanmar. Lancet, 386 (10008), 2053. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(15)00987-3. Zaw, P. P. T. (2015b, August 20). Myanmar’s ‘black ribbon movement 2015’: The Tip of the Iceberg. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2015/08/myanmars-black-ribbon-movement-2015-thetip-of-the-iceberg/. Accessed 25 May 2017.

Chapter 11

Challenges and Opportunities for Educational Reform: Under the New Myanmar Government Thein Lwin

Introduction This article highlights current state of education in Myanmar in terms of management in education, school curriculum and quality of teaching and learning. It also analyses the National League for Democracy (NLD) party’s education policy, included in the party’s election manifesto, the 100-day plan of the Education Ministry of the NLD government, and National Education Strategic Plan (NESP), 2016–2021. It also examines the education policy of the Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC), a think-tank for the ethnic armed groups. The paper includes recommendations for public education policy submitted by National Network for Education Reform (NNER) which is a coalition of civil society education groups comprising of student unions, teacher unions, faith-based schools, ethnic-based schools, etc. Due to differences between the government and non-state actors, this article gives the following suggestions for discussion in the process of Union Peace Conference. 1. To initiate education reform in the light of democratic federalism 2. To implement the Sustainable Development Goal No. 4 (SDG4) to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. 3. To recognize the schools opened by ethnic armed revolutionary groups, schools in refugee and IDP camps, schools for migrant children, and self-help schools opened by local communities 4. To respect and practice the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP 2007).

T. Lwin (B) Thinking Classroom Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_11

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Current State of Education in Myanmar In terms of right to education, the system does not meet human rights obligations. Regarding availability, hidden costs of education such as extra tuition fees prevent poor families from sending their children to schools. Besides, there is a lack of adequate infrastructure and qualified teachers. The education system is not accessible for marginalized children such as children with disability and children living in conflict areas. The contents of school textbooks are not culturally acceptable for ethnic minority children. In terms of adaptability, the education cannot meet the changing needs of society including skills needed for the world of work. Poor quality of education is an impact of military rule since 1962. Since then, the regime has exercised centralized education system. There has been a lack of access to education and a high dropout rate due to years of neglect regarding compulsory basic education. There was no provision for inclusive education. Therefore, marginalized children such as children with disability, children of poor family background, children living in conflict areas, and language minorities have been facing difficulties to get schooling. The education system exercises centralized curriculum and single textbooks for all schools throughout the country until today. Besides, the school curriculum fails to promote skills, which are needed for the world of work as well as social life. Indigenous languages and local wisdom are not allowed to teach at schools. The language policy applied by the regime has been to Burmanise at the expense of the language and culture of other indigenous nationalities. In other words, seeks to assimilate in the name of national unity (Thein Lwin 2007). Under the previous U Thein Sein’s government, some ethnic languages were allowed to teach after school hours. The system does not promote teaching profession. The quality of teaching and learning is very low in public schools. It focuses on rote learning and exam-based system. The educational spending is very low. According to the Myanmar EFA National Review 2014, educational expenditure has increased from 0.7% of GDP in 2010/2011 to 2.1% of GDP in 2013/2014. According to UNICEF the budget allocations to the Ministry of Education was 7.75% of the total government’s expenditure in 2017/2018 which has doubled of the previous government. However, this allocation is still low compared to other countries of South-East Asian region. In September 2014, the then parliament and government approved National Education Law. Since the education law still exercises centralization and does not include for students to form student unions, students protest against the National Education Law. As a result of the protest, the then government organized four-party dialogue among the student leaders, government, parliament and National Network for Education Reform, a civil society education coalition. Twenty representatives from each group participated in the dialogue. The students asked for 11 points to amend the National Education Law. These are: 1. 2.

CSOs participation in the process of education reform Decentralization of education

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3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Autonomy and school-based management Independent student unions and teacher unions Active learning and critical thinking Formative assessment and self-determination for the university entrance Mother-tongue based multilingual education Equity, inclusive and quality education for all Transitional justice for those students who got punishment for their participation in the democratic movement 10. 20% of national budget for education 11. At least nine years of compulsory education. These points were agreed at the dialogue. However, the students were severely beaten and arrested by the police after the dialogue. Then the agreed students’ proposals were turned down when the parliament approved the amendment of National Education Law.

The Education Policy in the NLD’s Election Manifesto in 2015 The NLD party released its election manifesto before the 2015 November elections. It included an education policy along with policies in other sectors, such as politics and economics. Even though its slogan to win the elections was “Time to Change”, the education policy did not involve any commitment to democratic education reforms. It only included policies that are in line with the framework of the 2008 Constitution and the 2014 National Education Law. Regarding educational management, the whole education sector is placed under the control of central management, even though it states that universities will be autonomous in the 2014 National Education Law. The manifesto generally states that it will carry out education that enhances languages and cultures of ethnic nationalities, but it does not mention the rights of respective ethnic nationalities or regions to have independent curriculums. Regarding learning the language and literature of indigenous people, there is no policy to set up a threelanguage system based on the mother tongue of indigenous people. It only states that primary students will be able to learn from mother-tongue speaking teachers, while Burmese language will be the main medium of instruction. The policy states that it will implement a Free Basic Education system so that every child can finish primary school, as expressed in the 2008 constitution and 2014 National Education Law. There is no state policy to increase the education budget. Regarding the financial sector, it only states that educational expenses will have to be transparent. Thus, the main gist of the election manifesto is in accordance with the 2014 National Education Law.

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100-Day Plan of the Ministry of Education at the Beginning of the NLD Government After the NLD had been in power for 100 days, an authorized person from the Education Ministry announced that the ministry’s 100-day plan had been successful. However, a closer review of their plan reveals that it included no significant education reforms, only routine tasks—such as improving school grades, carrying out student registration and cleaning the school environment. Although there is a statement for teachers and education staff getting full salaries and disbursing salaries through the bank, teachers still do not get the amount of salary they deserve for their work. There is only an instruction that action will be taken against teachers if they teach tuition classes. However, it is not fair to only take action against teachers without amending the grade-based pass-fail examination system—the root cause of the tuition culture. For the first time, senior lecturers are allowed to attend Ph.D. courses, after decades of being banned from their right to educational development and life long learning. However, there is no support for them to boost their skills to enable them to study for a Ph.D. degree. Anyone who is qualified to study for a Ph.D. degree should have the right to do so. Even though the 100-day plan stated that projects would be set up after carrying out reviews and analysis of technical and vocational training, I have not heard of any such projects. On July 15, 2016, I saw a statement saying, “The State Counsellor has instructed that vocational education be enhanced so that it is prioritized as firstclass education”. I am glad to see Daw Aung San Suu Kyi giving advice to promote the standard of vocational skills. Nevertheless, it is not appropriate to infer that other types of education are second-class or third-class, while vocational education is recognized as first-class. All educational fields should be valued equally. Even though vocational education is included in the objectives of education, it is not the first priority. It is only one component. Every component should be equal. In education, we should consider to balance the four pillars of education—learning to know, learning to do, learning to be and learning to live together (UNESCO 2015). Other plans like assessing the teaching ability of teachers are not something that can be carried out in the short-term. It will take a huge amount of energy and commitment to improve the quality of education over the long term. I overheard that a meeting to implement Alternative Education was held in Naypyitaw recently. I still do not know what will be implemented and in which ways.

The National Education Strategic Plan (2016–2021) The National Education Strategic Plan was published in early 2017 and was based on the Comprehensive Education Sector Review (CESR) done by the previous (2010– 2015) government. It has nine categories to be implemented within 5 years. The categories include kindergarten education, basic education, higher education, vocational

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education, alternative education, teacher education, management, assessment, and quality assurance. However, the national plan has various fundamental weaknesses in terms of addressing the needs of students, teachers and marginalized groups in the country, and the global initiative of Sustainable Development Goals No. 4 (SDG4). There was no consultation with regard to the national education plan with civil society education groups, including the student unions, teacher unions and rightbased education groups. It was not publicly known until it was published in 2017. It is found that there is little space for CSOs in drawing national education strategic plan. It has a lack of consideration on Indigenous Rights to Education such as recognizing schools established by indigenous groups, their local curriculum and mother tonguebased multilingual education system. The paper therefore argues that the NESP (2016–2021) fails to meet the needs of democratic education reform in light of participatory decision-making, inclusive education, right to education, and academic freedom (Thein Lwin 2019).

The Education System Desired by Ethnic Armed Revolutionary Groups The NLD’s education policy and NLD government’s performance are different from the education system that indigenous people want. The indigenous communities want an education system that accords with their desire for self-determination. They want to study their own culture, local wisdom and history with their own language, with the right of curriculum freedom. They want to advance their education with their own talent and creativity. When the stakeholders discuss establishing a democratic federal union in order to achieve sustainable peace, I would like to present the following suggestions so that the education policies desired by indigenous communities can be discussed, whether in the main meeting of the union peace conference or in the national level consultations. There is a possibility to reform the education system if the peace talks with ethnic armed revolutionary groups are successful. An education policy was drawn up after ethnic armed revolutionary groups collaboratively formed the Ethnic Nationalities Affairs Center (ENAC) and drafted policies. ENAC’s education policy is based on a democratic federal union. It is directed towards an education system whereby respective States and Regions have self-determination, and central control is reduced. The policy guarantees freedom of curriculum, freedom of language, and freedom of association. If a democratic federal union can be established when the peace talks are successful, a democratic education system, involving self-determination, can be established as well. The second possibility for reform involves the schools which have developed outside of the central government’s management. These include the schools opened by the Kachin education department of Kachin Independence Organization, the Karen

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education department of the Karen National Union, the Mon National Education Committee of the New Mon State Party, and the Karenni education department of the Karenni National Progressive Party, the community schools at the Thai-Shan border, the schools opened by Christian churches, the schools in refugee and IDP camps, the Burmese migrant workers’ schools in Thailand, etc. Totally, there are about 1000 schools and hundreds of thousands of students. These are schools run independently from successive central governments’ management or support. These schools appoint native teachers and teach based on locally contextualized curriculums and languages of native indigenous children. They also provide quality education. The graduate students from those schools can be able to attend international universities. They are also leading in community work. By officially recognizing the existence of these schools, the schools will have the right to self-determination. Coordination between one school and another, and one region to another, regarding curriculum issues and student transfer issues, will enable a democratic education system to be implemented. The third expectation is that education reform can become possible if the Myanmar government follows and implements the Education for Sustainable Development Goals (SDG 4), decided at the World Education Forum held in Korea in May 2015. The decisions of the World Education Forum included: to implement a basic education system, with at least 9 academic years of compulsory education; to carry out inclusive education; to practice equity so that every child can access qualified education; to practice lifelong learning; to use from 15 to 20% of the national budget for education expenses. This is identical to the demands of NNER and students. The fourth expectation is that if the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, 2008 can be implemented, the indigenous people who co-exist in Myanmar will have the rights to establish schools, to practice their local curriculum and to study in their mother tongue.

The Education System Suggested by Civil Society Education Groups The National Network for Education Reform (NNER)1 is a coalition of nonstate education actors who initiated democratic education reform since October 2012. NNER is formed by three major networks—thematic education networks, states/divisions CBOs education networks and indigenous education organizations. Thematic networks include student unions, teacher unions, faith-based education groups, disable education groups, refugee/migrant education groups, and others. NNER connects community education groups in all states and divisions in Myanmar. It also connects indigenous education organizations such as Kachin Education Department, Karen Education Department, Karenni Education Department and Mon National Education Committee (see Fig. 11.1). 1 This

author is one of the founders and chair of the NNER network.

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Fig. 11.1 NNER organizational structure

NNER organized 28 consultation meetings in all states and divisions in 2013 that collected public opinions for education reform. It held an education conference in June 2013 attended by over 1200 representatives from states and divisions education networks, scholars and experts in educational issues. As a result of the conference, recommendations for education policy reform could be submitted to the government and parliament. The recommendations cover thirteen areas in education from early childhood education to higher education. The priorities are citizen participation in education reform, academic freedom, promoting quality education, nine years of compulsory education and decentralization in educational management (i.e. schoolbased management such as curriculum development, deciding mother-tongue based education and recruiting teachers). In 2013 and early 2014, NNER could present its policy recommendations at the parliament and meetings with officials from the ministry of education. Although they took some minor points but neglect major recommendations such as nine-year compulsory education, decentralization, mother-tongue based multilingual education and 20% of national budget for education spending.

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Challenges and Opportunities The major challenge is 2008 Constitution that allows army to take political roles in the parliament and three ministries (Defense, Home Affairs and Border) in the government. The Chief of the army declared to defend 2008 Constitution and to build stronger army. Army takes large amount of the national budget (over 20%) while education budget is less than half of the military budget. The National Education Law is centralized and the ministry of education is formed by people from previous military government. There is no evidence of policies and implementations for democratic education reform and right to education. They are exercising the same practice from the previous government. Adult illiteracy remains a critical issue. Drop-out rate is still high and exclusion of the poor and marginalized sectors from accessing education makes worse. Hidden costs of education (i.e. extra tuition fees, compulsory donations and bribes) prevent poor families from sending their children to schools. Challenges in public funding for education have paved the way for anti-poor education financing arrangements. Regarding education quality, there are problems with quality and relevance skills for their adult life and for the world of work. Current fighting in Rakhine, western part of the country and recent fighting at the northeast of the country make difficult for the children in the conflict areas to get schooling. According to the news released by the Shan State Education Office, 98 schools in Muse Township, where fighting took place were closed down. Children of Rohingya minority and Rakhine villages in the western part of Myanmar suffer severely. According to a senior United Nations official, Myanmar army is seeking ethnic cleansing of Rohingya by saying, “soldiers are killing Rohingya men, raping women and slaughtering children”. (BBC 2016)

Although challenges are still there, there are some opportunities. Civil society education groups including student unions are active advocating the government for changes in education. Indigenous nationalities and local communities are establishing schools to teach children to get quality education. These efforts are inline with UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP 2007). In the article 14 (1) of the Declaration, it is stated that “Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning”. Another great opportunity is agreement among the member countries of United Nations on the implementation of education for sustainable development (SDG4) together with other Sustainable Development Goals led by United Nations to be fulfilled until 2030. SDG4 clearly stated to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all. Peace negotiation (Union Peace Conference: 21st Peng Long) is initiated on 31 August 2016 and it is in the process. There will be parallel CSO Forum for Peace and National Level Peace Conference in States and Divisions. It will be good opportunity for civil society education groups and indigenous people to advocate their desired education systems to discuss at the peace conference.

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Conclusion Facing massive challenges, it has little hope to ensure “inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all” under the current political situation in Myanmar. Civil society education groups have been advocating democratic education reform. But their voices were not heard. In October 2016, NNER, civil society education coalition, has sent a letter to the Ministry of Education to discuss for the implementation of SDG4 and to find ways to recognize schools run by indigenous organizations. But no response from the Ministry of Education. Indigenous nationality groups are also preparing their education policies to implement in the democratic federal union. However, peace dialogue is not smooth with continued fighting between Myanmar army and indigenous groups. Children of Rakhine and Rohingya communities in the western part of Burma suffers and their education was interrupted by the act of Myanmar army. However, there is a hope that peace negotiation organized by the government can be able to solve these problems. The paper therefore would like to suggest all stakeholders in education to consider the following: ● To sustain and enhance dignity, capacity and welfare of all people living in the country in relation to others and to nurture the fundamental purpose of education (UNESCO 2015). ● To promote four pillars of learning: learning to know, learning to do, learning to be and learning to live together with humanistic vision of education (ibid.). ● To reform education inline with peace negotiation for a sustainable peace in the country. ● To enhance citizen engagement in education policymaking. ● To increase education budget. This paper would like to propose international communities to mediate between the Myanmar government and civil societies including indigenous communities to create space for civil societies and to build coordination mechanism among government, civil societies and development partners to work on education as common good.

References BBC. (2016, November 24). Myanmar wants ethnic cleansing of Rohingya—UN official. https:// www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38091816. Accessed 2 December 2016. Lwin, T. (2007, July). Education and democracy in Burma: Decentralization and classroom-level educational reform. This paper was written and read at the International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for Democracy (NED), USA. Lwin, T. (2019, June). Global justice, national education and local realities in Myanmar: A civil society perspective. Asia Pacific Education Review, 20 (2), 273–284.

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UNDRIP. (2007). The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. United Nations. UNESCO. (2015). Rethinking education: Towards a global common good? Paris: UNESCO Publishing.

Chapter 12

Local Transformation in Chiang Rai: The Roles of Administrative Organisation in Management and Preparedness for Earthquake Wanwalee Inpin

Introduction Decentralisation is considered as the foundation of democratic governance (Heywood 2002, p. 159). When the government grants decentralisation, the state must be aware of independence in the performance of government officials at the local level. Obviously, once the government has given the power to govern under the concept of the decentralisation, the role of the national government is not only a supervisor but also the principle that holds the freedom of the people to have self-governance (Hague and Harrop 2007, p. 294; Starr 1972). In the case of Thailand, it has a long history of the bureaucratic state where the top level and a lower level have a gap. The top level government always plays an important role in exercising its power to administrate a country (Charoenmuang 2005, p. 23), yet those who work at lower level become only tools in fulfilling what the top level commands, rather than playing its roles working autonomously like any other states. Since the amendment to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand during the year 1997, it was promulgated and required the power transmission to the communities in order to participate in policymaking at the local level. Thus far, it has been marginally difficult for the Thai government to carry on, especially the local government, which is known as a street level (Lipsky 1980, p. 13). The SAO was established under the local government decentralisation policy of the Thai government under the Tambon Council and Subdistrict Administrative Organisations Act 1994, which came into force in the following year from 2 March 1995. The objective of the establishment was to create the local unit in order to solve various problems at local level. As a result, the Tambon Administrative Organisation is acknowledged as the lowest level of local government which has been given the W. Inpin (B) School of Social Innovation, Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_12

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power, obligations and autonomy not only to make but also to implement decisions that the central government expected it to perform competently. After the establishment of the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Authority Act B.E. 2537 (1994) under the decentralisation policy, the Thai government set one of the most significant responsibilities for the SAOs. Section 67 states that the SAOs are required to provide a public service system on disaster prevention and mitigation. One tangible example was that when the 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the Northern part of Thailand on 5 May 5 20141 , the SAOs became the direct agent of giving mitigation and evacuation to deal with the situation at a primary level. In the case of Thailand, there are types of disasters, like drought, wildfire, storm, flood and conflagration occurred frequently, except earthquake. Still, the local government is unacquainted with an earthquake. The infrequent earthquake disaster happening in Thailand was challenging to the SAOs as they are inexperienced in dealing with it. However, the local government is required to have significant roles in the local administration and to give a public service system as its obligation regarding disaster prevention and mitigation to work effectively. Since there is a possibility that the earthquake may happen at any time, it is very significant for the local administrative organisation, which in this case means the SAOs, to be best-prepared in providing good and services to the victims if the disaster occurs. This chapter aims to present the role of the local administrative organisation towards disaster management by using a case study of Saikao Subdistrict Administrative Organisation, Paan District, Chiang Rai Province in the preparedness for earthquake disaster.

Chiang Rai’s Earthquake Disaster in 2014 Located on active fault lines, Chiang Rai province has four fault lines out of the 14 fault lines underneath, namely (1) Mae Chan fault line in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, (2) Mae Ing fault line in Chiang Rai province up to Laos, (3) Phayao fault line in Phayao, Chiang Rai and Lampang provinces, and (4) Mae Tha fault line in Chiang Mai province (Fredrickson 2014). The earthquake occurring on 5 May 2014 was affected by the Phayao fault. During that time, the earthquake destroyed seven districts, 50 Subdistricts, 609 Villages, 11,173 houses, including one death casualty (Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department 2014, pp. 40–41). Besides, as reported by the department’s deputy chief of the Department of Mineral Resources, the earthquake would possibility happen at one or more of the fault lines namely, (1) Mae Chan fault line in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, (2) Mae Ing fault line in Chiang Rai province up to Laos, (3) Pua fault line in Nan province, 1 The Seismological Bureau, Meteorological Department initially reported that the earthquake focus

located in Saikao Subdistrict, Paan District, Chaing Rai Province. And then, the Department of Mineral Resources and the Seismological Bureau had re-calculated and announced that the new earthquake focus was around Dong Mada Mae Lao District, Chiang Rai Province.

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(4) Mae Tha fault line in Chiang Mai province and (5) Thoen fault line in Phrae and Lampang provinces (Fredrickson 2014) (Fig. 12.1). Chiang Rai’s earthquake was classified as a shallow earthquake which was about 6 kilometres deep. Consequently, people could feel a trembling in many areas of Northern part of Thailand, especially in Chiang Rai which was a centre of the earthquake, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Lampang, Nan, and Phayao, and some provinces such as Nong Khai and even in Loei province in the northeastern region, and some

Fig. 12.1 Active fault zones in Thailand (Source Department of Mineral Resources 2016)

188 Table 12.1 Earthquake statistics occurring in Chiang Rai Province

W. Inpin Magnitude

Times

5.0–5.9

8

4.0–4.9

32

3.0–3.9

154

less than 3.0

more than 747

Source Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department (2014)

Table 12.2 Areas that have been damaged by the earthquake that occurred in the Province Chiang Rai on 5 May 2014

Districts

Numbers of subdistricts

Numbers of villages

5

63

Paan

15

234

Muang Chiang Rai

15

196

Mae Lao

Mae Suai

6

39

Pa Daet

5

58

Phaya Mengrai

1

2

Wiang Chai

3

17

Source Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department (2014)

tall buildings in Bangkok (Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department 2014, p. 2). According to the Seismological Bureau of Thailand, the earthquake statistics occurring in Chiang Rai province was shown as in Table 12.1. During that time, the earthquake destroyed 7 districts, 50 subdistricts, 609 Villages, 8,935 houses were damaged, including one death casualties (Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department 2014) (Table 12.2). The earthquake also destroyed housing, community buildings and governmental buildings as shown in Table 12.3. From these above tables, the local administrative organisation attempted to respond to the earthquake situation by providing goods and services to affected people. From this, the role of local government in terms of response to the effect of the earthquake disaster will be discussed below.

Roles of Local of Saikao Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in Preparedness of Earthquake Disaster Generally, when decentralisation has emerged, it is vital that all local governments have a certain degree of autonomy so that those local governments can duly perform their responsibilities properly and effectively. Perhaps, while local government has

12 Local Transformation in Chiang Rai … Table 12.3 Data on the damage from an earthquake in Chiang Rai on 5 May 2014

Damage Death Injure Damage housings State roads Overpass bridge Temples Churches School University Hospitals/Health centres

189 Number 1

Value of damage (Baht) 4,000,000

107

6,313,000

11,173

369,633,000

1

25,000,000

2

5,000,000

147

95,022,780

9

2,142,000

122

222,294,355

1

50,000

28

52,000,000

Factories

6

9,100,000

Government building

4

2,178,000

Total

792,733,135

Source Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department (2014)

more roles in national administration in order to perform their obligations at local level, the central government is rather only the regulator, than a commander, so that, they are able to aware and support its local government officials and local people in term of governing themselves capably (Dhiravegin 1996, p. 244). Therefore, local government could exercise their obligations well, provide better, faster and efficient services to local people as well as foster development at the local level. In Thailand, after the Thai government promulgated the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997), which emphasised more on decentralisation, it makes its local government become a dominant keystone of Thailand’s democracy. However, local government remains having limited proficiency of working experience because the local government always works under the supervision of the government at higher levels (central and provincial level) hardly and genuinely experiencing with decentralisation approach (Dhiravegin 2003, p. 97). With this larger context, it seems that local government gets affected by the long-term administration circumstance. When the decisions come mainly from the central government who are acknowledged as decision-makers of the concept and practice of self-government at the central level (local self-government or local autonomy), autonomy definitely would not happen in Thailand. Regarding this political order, even though Thailand’s political system was transformed from an absolute monarchy to democratic governance in 1932, the central government played an important role as it dominated in a political system, which still carries on until the present. With this subsequent, it leads the local government to have less opportunity, not only to respond to local problems but also to provide goods and services to the people at the local area in times of need.

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For instance, the result of promoting decentralisation in Thailand at the very beginning influenced the SAOs to face several difficulties such as roles, power limitations, or even the independence of the local decentralisation. Furthermore, the potential of the decentralisation policy was not implemented as intended. For instance, it has resulted that there were implementation gaps that likely caused by deficiencies in the capacity of SAOs to achieve the decentralisation goal. Since the SAOs remain struggled with decentralisation, especially in the practice of self-government, it then leads the SAOs to have difficulties in responding to the earthquake disaster issue, which is a very new problem Thailand ever dealt with before. Thus, in order to respond to the problem immediately and effectively, the authority becomes under the influence of the government at a higher level instead. Subsequently, local governments get along with decentralisation. With the autonomy and obligations transferred from the central government, local governments are now able to work more effectively. In the case of Thailand, after the establishment of the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Authority Act B.E. 2537 (1994) under the decentralisation policy, the Thai government sets one of the most significant responsibilities of the SAOs written in Section 67 which states the SAO to provide a public service system on disaster prevention and mitigation. As a result, SAO was the first agent of mitigation at the local level, when the 6.3 magnitude earthquake hit the Northern part of Thailand on 5 May 2014.2 According to the in-depth interview from the SAOs staff consisting of Chief Executive of the SAOs, Deputy Chief Executive of the SAOs, Chief Administrator of the SAOs, Deputy Chief Administrator of the SAOs, and officials who got involved with the Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Sector. It was found that: 1. The Role of Saikao Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in Preparedness of Earthquake Disaster 1.1. For the Independence Authorities on Disaster Management Plan The interview indicated that the SAOs have already operated the community action plan for disaster prevention and mitigation that is in accordance with the conceptual framework and policy from the central government. It is noted that while the degree of independence from the government to the SAOs was appropriated and sufficient for management, staff who rather had limited experience due to the different approaches they have to deal with. This happened because the earthquake disaster seldom occurs in Thailand, or even it happens not on the big scale as other countries like Japan, Indonesia or Myanmar. In addition, when it is related to disaster preparation in response to the earthquake, SAOs respond differently from other disasters such as fire, flood and landslide. However, with their basic knowledge of managing a preparation to fire, flood and landslide disasters, SAOs staff could adjust their own experiences to a new approach straightforward. Therefore, this made the staff adapt to sketching an action plan significantly. 2 The Seismological Bureau, Meteorological Department initially reported that the earthquake focus

located in Saikao Subdistrict, Paan District, Chaing Rai Province. And then, the Department of Mineral Resources and the Seismological Bureau had re-calculated and announced that the new earthquake focus was around Dong Mada Mae Lao District, Chiang Rai Province.

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In order to set a preparedness of earthquake disaster plan, the SAOs set several action plans in cooperation with other government organisations such as Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Provincial Office Chiang Rai Province, on training knowledge of disaster’s emergency respond and rescue; Paan District hospital, on training of medical treatment service, first aids and rescues; and National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission, on training of telecommunication during a situation. In terms of implementing the action plan, the SAOs have prepared and set up more manpower with expertise in order to cover all areas as their responsibilities. They also delegated duties and responsibilities for all staff within the organisation as well as assigned them to cooperate with staff from other organisations. According to the interview, even though there were limited numbers of staff who obviously understand their roles, responsibilities, the scope of working in the preparedness of earthquake disaster, and staff who still have less experience, they were willing to gain more knowledge on this respective expertise and field. Therefore, when making a preparedness plan, the SAOs require some time to adjust to setting a disaster management plan which they are usually familiar with, but in case of the disaster management plan on earthquake, it is different from the one which they usually do on other types of disasters. Otherwise, the SAOs could not provide services to the community effectively. In other words, while the earthquake disaster occurred, it possibly had to deal with evacuation, building damage and rescue unpredictably without any preparation comparing to a preparation plan for the forest fire, flood and landslide that was usually conducted ahead each year before these disasters happened during their seasons. Since the earthquake barely happened and the SAOs staff had limited experiences, they had more difficulties to consider of what they designed on the action plan for earthquake due to their less experience of what they have experienced before as lesson learned. For other areas in the world, like Japan, Indonesia and Myanmar, the frequent earthquake experiences generate more lessons learned that could be useful for conducting the action plan. 1.2. Roles of Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in Collaboration between Some Government and Private Sectors on Disaster Management Plan Because of the establishment of the SAOs under the decentralisation policy, the SAOs then also have the autonomy to conduct their obligations. For the government sectors, regularly, the SAOs face fewer barriers having cooperation in building partnerships with other government sectors. The operation can be proceeded accordingly step by step. It is noted that even though, those government officials are from different governmental organisations, there is no problem at this stage. This is because their status is government officials. So, they can build up their cooperation and assist one another in order to provide the community goods and services easier. For example, Saikao SAO worked cooperatively with the Chiang Rai Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Office, Fire and Rescue Department, and hospital. Apart from that, if in case of the Saikao SAO faces with unsolved problems, basically, the staff can report the problems to its supervisor who is assigned by higher government, which in this case refers to the District Chief Officer which presents the report further to the provincial level or the Governor in order to support their preparedness plan later on.

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In the case of the private sectors, the SAOs will slightly face more difficulties comparing to governmental sectors. In fact, the SAOs have their autonomy to make a decision in cooperation with an outside organisation. If the cooperation is related to donation or item support, the SAOs tend to be aware more of transparency. According to the interview, the SAOs mostly get cooperation and support from private sectors during the emergency response period. However, during a preparedness stage, the SAOs did not collaborate with the private sectors much comparing to the governmental ones. 2. Roles of Subdistrict Administrative Organisation in Launching Preparedness Plan 2.1 Budget Management Comparting to the limitation of the amount of the budget for aiding affected people suffering from the disaster under the regulation of spending money to relief people in the community according to support the victims from disaster in case of emergency 2556, by the Ministry of Finance which the SAOs usually faced, the SAOs are able to conduct preparedness plan ahead and put those plans into a fiscal year plan. From this, the SAOs can face fewer problems with it. 2.2 Community Participation Under community participation, it was found through the interview that the SAOs still faced a problem in bringing people to participate in their action plan under the preparedness. This is because the focus group could not participate continuously due to their daily work for a living. Therefore, those people who could participate are mostly elder people and children. This obstacle led the SAOs to either adjust or delay the plan, which sometimes affects its regular responsibilities that already scheduled. Another issue that challenges the SAOs is that ever since the earthquake in 2014, there was no earthquake in Chiang Rai again, but it happened in other provinces with a small scale (less than 5.0 magnitudes). Within a period of 5 years, some people who were not directly affected have already forgotten about the training and even those who were suffered from the earthquake disaster. They were less aware of this as they consider an earthquake will happen only occasionally. Since they had some issues which were more important, then they tended to deal with those things instead. From this, it was necessary for the SAOs to consider and plan ahead to achieve their obligation as set up.

Conclusion The results of this study are expected to survey basic information regarding the roles of local administrative organisation in management and preparedness towards earthquake by using a case study of Saikao SAO, Paan district, Chiang Rai province. The findings of this study aim to depict a better understanding of “How and When” the SAO staff must respond to the earthquake disaster preparedness plan to make it become more effective.

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In the aspects of the local administration, the “Bottom-Up Approach” is highly emphasised. As the reason that it will allow the local governments, as in this case, refers to Saikao SAO, Paan district, Chiang Rai province plays an important role as well as has autonomy in order to have a self-governance. With this perspective, it will be enhanced the proficiency of local officials to work effectively and curiously. Regarding the implementation of management and preparedness towards the earthquake disaster, even though the Saikao SAO has no problem in setting a preparedness plan, it was noticeable that the more challenging factor they are facing is about community participation. In this regard, to educate staff in order to be able to perform their obligation to prepare for a disaster is definitely sufficient to protect the people as disaster can happen every time unpredictably on how big it is and how much of damage it will cause. This is the factor that the local government, as a direct agent of mitigation, must be aware of preparing the local people for such things, like people’s lives and property. Now, even though the SAOs face difficulties, the SAOs remain keeping its disaster preparedness plan regularly by inviting community representatives to be trained and practice with a new technique. Consequently, those representatives can continue to give their community members training on earthquake mitigation afterwards. Acknowledgement This article is a part of the proceedings presented in the 4th International Conference on International Relations and Development (ICIRD), 9-10 July 2015, Mahidol University, Thailand of my research entitled “An Efficiency of Local Administrative Organisation in the Borderland Province Toward a Disaster Mitigation: a Case Study of the Independence of Local Authorities of Saikao Subdistrict Administrative Organisation, Paan District, Chiang Rai Province in a Mitigation of Earthquake Disaster” granted by the Thailand Research Fund.

References Charoenmuang, T. (2005). 100 years of Thai local government 1887–1997 . Bangkok: Kobfai Publisher. Department of Mineral Resources. (2016). Active fault zones in Thailand. Retrieved June 12, 2016, from http://www.dmr.go.th/main.php?filename=fault_en. Dhiravegin, L. (1996). The Evolution of the Thai political system. Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasart University. Dhiravegin, L. (2003). Democracy and Thailand’s political revolution . Bangkok: Chaopraya Rabop Kranpim. Fredrickson, T. (2014). Big earthquake shakes Thailand’s North . Retrieved June 12, 2015, from http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/408301/big-earthquakeshakes-thailand-north. Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2007). Comparative government and politics: An Introduction (7th ed.). New York: Palgrave. Heywood, A. (2002). Politics. New York: Palgrave. Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

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Seismological Bureau, Thai Meteorological Department. The earthquake in Chiang Rai Province Report. (2014). Retrieved June 12, 2015, from http://www.seismology.tmd.go.th/documents/file/ seismo-doc-1404703458.pdf. Starr, S. F. (1972). Decentralization and self-government in Russia 1830–1870 . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 13

Impact of Institutions on the Performance of Firms in India: Towards Policy Implications for MSMEs from Empirical Evidence Akhilesh K. Sharma

Introduction The orthodox economic thinking does not consider significance of institutions and other non-economic factors on the economic growth. Thus, it fails to understand many growth phenomenon and to provide solution to many socio-economic problems caused by economic growth. The development of institutional economics has attempted to explain the importance of non-economic factors on the economic development regardless of limitations of measurability of institutional factors and definitional issues. Despite these limitations, researchers across the world have tried, in recent decades, to establish the relationship between institutions and growth (Baumol 2004; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2005, 2014; Boettke and Fink 2011). In general, institution acts as a medium to determine the behaviour of economic agents and thus affects their performance and finally economic growth (Singh et al. 2008; Sharma and Singh 2013). Its impact may be positive or negative depending upon the nature and interrelationship between economic agents. Majority of studies with focus on institutional issues are based on developed economies while there are only few in the context of developing countries. Further, given the ambiguity in the definition of institutions and their functioning, the relation between institution and development is less clear. An institution being effective in one set type of condition may not be effective or equally effective in other types of condition. Further, the impact of an institution may change over time due to changes in its functions. Therefore, there is a need for such study in the context of developing countries. The present paper aims to study the impact of institutions on the performance of MSMEs in India. The study is mainly based on secondary data, i.e. 73rd round survey (2015–16) of unincorporated non-agricultural enterprises conducted by National A. K. Sharma (B) Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2021 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Social Transformations in India, Myanmar, and Thailand: Volume I, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9616-2_13

195

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A. K. Sharma

Sample Survey Office (NSSO), Government of India. Different types of regulations have been considered as proxy for institutions. It has been assumed that a firm registered under a particular regulation follows it and obtains benefits provided by the government under that regulation. The findings indicate that institutions have positive impact on the performance of the firm. The paper has been structured in following sections—Institutions and Firm Performance; MSMEs in India; Methodology; Major Findings, Interpretation and Analysis; Conclusion and Policy Implications for Social Transformation; Appendix; and References.

Institutions and Firm Performance The influence of non-economic factors, such as institutions, on the economic growth has been less attended by traditional economists till recently (Sharma and Singh 2013; Voigt 2013) or have not obtained desired recognition in the main stream of economics (Yay et al. 2018). However, the development of institutional economics has emphasised their roles in economic activities. The discourses of Veblon to Coase and Coase to Hodgson have shown the conceptual journey of institutional economics. Hodgson provided a new shape to the institutional economics by wedding old and new institutional economics (Singh et al. 2008). In the literature, institutions have been defined as ‘the rules of the game’ which shape interaction of agents (North 1990). Social behaviours (which guides human interaction such as norms, customs, traditions, taboos, culture and religion) are informal institutions while laws and regulations framed by any legislative/executive authorities (such as constitutions, law and property rights) are formal institutions. The distinction between formal and informal institutions has been shown by North (1990). According to him every society has a range of institutions from unwritten laws (i.e. social values, taboos, rituals, customs and traditions) to written constitutions and laws (i.e. socio-political and economic regulations enacted by the parliament and or introduced by the government, and contracts between two/more parties). With the development, the society becomes complex and so the laws. In terms of institutions, it is movement from unwritten laws to written laws. Further, written laws may have an impact on the effectiveness of the unwritten laws by reducing costs of information, monitoring and enforcement (North 1990) by enhancing the trust between the economic agents. Institutional factors affect the entrepreneurship which is the driving force of social change (Baumol 1990; Kirzner 1999; Knight 1921; Schumpeter 1934; Scott 1995). Few studies have also observed that institutions act as a medium in which interaction of economic agent takes place (Singh et al. 2008; Sharma and Singh 2013). Social change originated by changing preferences and relative prices under effect of given institutional environments (Yay et al. 2018). Many studies have observed a correlation between institutions and economic growth (e.g. Marx 1867; Weber 1930; McClelland 1961; Greif 1994; Granato et al. 1996; Swank 1996; Williamson 2000; Baumol

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2004; Rodrik et al. 2004; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2005, 2014; Tabellini 2010; Boettke and Fink 2011). In addition to existence of an institution, the quality of institutions also matters in determining its impact on both short term and long term performance (Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005) by stimulating productive entrepreneurship and discouraging unproductive entrepreneurship1 (Sobel 2008). Efficient institutions foster the growth while inefficient institutions act as impediment to the economic growth (North 1994; Hall and Jones 1997; La Porta et al. 1997; Leuz et al. 2003). Institutions reduce transaction costs by influencing trust between economic agents (North and Thomas 1973). It minimises risk of doing business. Thus, the good institutions generally lead to better firm performance (La Porta et al. 1997; Beck et al. 2005; Herrera-Echeverri et al. 2014). Majority of the studies focusing on institutional issues are based on developed economies and there are few such studies in the Asian context to understand the role of institutions on the economic development. An enterprise can avail benefits of formal institutions after its registration, i.e. becoming a formal enterprise. Registration of a firm ideally ensures that its acceptance and following of institutional procedures which entails bearing some costs such as taxes, compliance with labour and environmental laws among others. It acts as disincentives for many small enterprises to register. However, there are large number of studies which depicts unregistered enterprises as poor performing (e.g. Baumol 1990; Farrell 2004; Palmer 2008; La Porta and Shleifer 2008, 2014; Sharma and Singh 2013). According to a study by Rand and Torm (2012) on Vietnamese SMEs, registration of a firm leads to increase in profit, investment and access to credit. In a study on Brazilian enterprises, Vries (2010) found that the productivity and efficiency of registered enterprises were higher than unregistered enterprises. However, in recent years some studies attempted to understand the positive effects of being informal, i.e. unregistered. It has been observed that performance of unregistered enterprises is higher than that of registered enterprises (Williams and Kedir 2016). La Porta and Shleifer (2008) also found in a panel data analysis 26 countries that in case of 6 countries performance of informal enterprises was higher than that of the formal enterprises. Therefore, there is no agreement among researchers on nature of relationship (i.e. positive or negative) between firms’ following institutions (i.e. registration) and their performance. The study aims to understand the impact of institutions on performance of the small firms in India.

1

The concepts of productive and unproductive entrepreneurship are coined by Baumol (1990). He categorises entrepreneurship in terms of activities. Productive entrepreneurship represents entrepreneurial activities such as innovation while unproductive entrepreneurship represents entrepreneurial activities such as renting and crime.

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Table 13.1 Definition of MSMEs in India Type of enterprise

Manufacturing

Services

Investment → in → ‘plant → and machinery’

Investment → in → ‘equipment’

Micro enterprises

Investment