Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion: A Study of Dalits in a Caste Society, Nepal (Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies, 2) 9811589070, 9789811589072

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Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2

Uddhab Pyakurel

Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion A Study of Dalits in a Caste Society, Nepal

Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies Volume 2

Editor-in-Chief Takashi Inoguchi, J. F. Oberlin University, Tokyo, Japan Series Editors Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, NY, USA G. John Ikenberry, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA Lien Thi Quynh Le, Hue University, Hue City, Vietnam Etel Solingen, University of California, Irvine, CA, USA William R. Thompson, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN, USA Stein Tønnesson, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway Editorial Board Chiyuki Aoi, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan Bertrand Badie, SciencesPo, Paris, France Miguel Basanez, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA Titli Basu, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India Kerry Brown, King’s College London, London, UK Alexander Bukh, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand Pongphisoot Busbarat, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Timur Dadabaev, University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan Richard Estes, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA Ofer Feldman, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, University of Essex, Colchester, UK Peshan R. Gunaratne, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka Purnendra Jain, University of Adelaide, SA, Australia Koji Kagotani, Osaka University of Economics, Osaka, Japan Ken Kotani, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan Yuichi Kubota, Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan Meron Medzini, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel Paul Midford, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway Satoru Miyamoto, Seigakuin University, Ageo, Japan Mehdi Mozaffari, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Maung Aung Myoe, International University of Japan, Niigata, Japan Takako Nabeshima, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan Edward Newman, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Aparna Pande, Hudson Institute, Washington DC, USA Uddhab Pyakurel, Kathmandu University, Kathmandu, Nepal Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA Motoshi Suzuki, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan Shinichi Takeuchi, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, Japan Motohiro Tsuchiya, Keio University, Kanagawa, Japan Chikako Ueki, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan Ayse Zarakol, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK

This series aims to publish books on peace and conflict with evidence-based approaches, befitting an era best characterized by uncertainty and complexity. Even if occurrence of major wars among sovereign states has dramatically decreased, from 5 million soldiers killed between 1938 and 1945 per annum; through 100,000 soldiers killed between 1945 and 1989 per annum; to 10,000 soldiers killed between 1989 and 2019 per annum; many kinds of peace and conflict keep arising in the world, with extraordinary technological progress and unprecedented spatial coverage. All parts of the world now are so well connected and interdependent. At the same time, they easily and suddenly become sources of immense vulnerability and fragility, bringing one or another of them to the verge of collapse and destruction. The causes are diverse: climate change, migration, pandemic and epidemic disease, civil strife, religious dissonance, economic competition, arms races, terrorism, corruption—a virtual plethora of sources. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, calls these and many others “problems without passports.” The basic methodological orientation sought in this series is broadly that of modern social and behavioral science. Of importance is that verifiable evidence (quantitative and qualitative, graphs and photos) be solidly attached to whatever arguments are advanced. Overseen by a panel of renowned scholars led by Editor-in-Chief Takashi Inoguchi, this book series employs a single-blind review process in which the Editor-in-Chief, the series editors, editorial board members, and specialized scholars designated by the Editor-in-Chief or series editors rigorously review each proposal and manuscript to ensure that every submission makes a valuable contribution that will appeal to a global scholarly readership.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16598

Uddhab Pyakurel

Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion A Study of Dalits in a Caste Society, Nepal

Uddhab Pyakurel Department of Development Studies Kathmandu University Dhulikhel, Nepal

ISSN 2730-5651 ISSN 2730-566X (electronic) Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies ISBN 978-981-15-8907-2 ISBN 978-981-15-8908-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

No society is equal in the world; neither any human-being expects equality in absolute terms in the given diverse nature of humanity. However, people want to partake in debates on the concept of social equality that advocates the same civil, political, economic and social rights. In fact, the concept is similar to egalitarianism which says that ‘all citizens of a state should be accorded exactly equal rights’. To have an egalitarian society with ‘social equality’, there should be no legally enforced social class or caste boundaries and no discrimination motivated by an inalienable part of a person’s identity. Though Karl Marx and his followers think the idea of equality is actually a vehicle for bourgeois class oppression, and something quite different from the communist goal of the abolition of classes, it is equality that opens the door for the greatest possible variety of activity and development as argued by Alexander Berkman. The concept of social equality or egalitarianism typically prescribes that one should not only refrain from harming the worse-off, but should also positively act to improve their situation whenever it is in their power to do so. Equality does not mean equal amount, but equal opportunity. True equality implies freedom, not quantity. The proposition, i.e. everyone must eat, drink or wear the same things, do the same work, or live in the same manner, does not meet the criterion of equality. Rather, it acknowledges diffident needs, tastes and appetites of different individuals. It is equal opportunity to satisfy individuals that constitutes true equality, and it can be achieved by cooperation and implicit peer pressure rather than by explicit rules and punishment. Samuel Scheffler (2003, 2005) postulates how the theory of justice has been advanced further to the concept of ‘distributive egalitarianism’ and eventually to ‘luck egalitarianism’ (Arneson 2000). According to Schwffler, the inequality which derives from the choices people have voluntarily made are acceptable, but the similar inequality will be considered unjust and unacceptable if it is the outcome of unchosen features of people’s circumstances. Those unchosen circumstances include social factors like the class, caste, ethnicity, language and natural distances. While going through the history of a traditional society like Nepal, most the previous attempts were not to create a society with an informed choice. Rather, the state had legally enforced social boundaries, i.e. caste, ethnicity, and gender. While doing so, different v

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citizens of a state had to be accorded exactly with different rights. Many state attempts including the social codes which were introduced and formalized under the regimes of Jayasthiti Malla of Kathmandu (1382–1395), Rama Shah of Gorkha (1606–1633) and Janga Bahadur Rana (1846–1877) were the most important examples of ‘different laws for different people’. As a result, the Nepali society became hierarchical mainly due to inequality by the unchosen features of people’s circumstances. I feel lucky in many ways as I could start my career only in the ‘democratic’ Nepal with a strong enthusiasm to tempo the ‘modernity’ project in the country. Being born in a high-caste Brahmin family, I had no clue at all why Nepal could not progress in the directions expected and designed by the State. As others, we often blamed the modern political systems, and political organs for their incompetence and irrelevancies, but never tried to go for introspections within. It was obvious for people like me who had to join modern job market in the middle of teenage (at the age of 15) to earn money in order to fulfill family needs brought to the household level along with the ‘modernity’ aspirations of the community and state. As a result, I could be a part of the community to reproduce the inequality by being ignorant to many of the historical realities instrumental to make Nepali society a hierarchical one in many aspects. I had played some roles to change some of the rules of my home, i.e. the hierarchical and discriminatory seating arrangements we had in kitchen, but never questioned the roots of such practices. I never tried to read the first Civil Code of Nepal introduced in 1854 and practiced as law of the country for more than 108 years. Neither had I, being a law student for 5 years, realized that I should compare the new civil code of 1962 with the oldest one. Also, I kept on referring to Jayasthiti Malla, and Rama Shah as ‘reformers’ while writing in exams, without trying to understand the details of the attempts they made in the name of ‘reforms’. The reflection above involves my understanding of Nepali society even after I earned a Master Degree in Sociology. I now realize that such ignorance of ours had helped the regime to avoid bringing to public discussions the historical ill practices we had in the society in the name of customs, laws, rules and values. Before I moved to Kathmandu from the rural village for my further study, I had borne such feeling of inferiority that the understanding was due to less exposure because of growing up as a first-generation school-goer in the village with poor infrastructure. But such ‘complex’ could not live longer in my life once I started reading major Nepali literatures produced on society and polity. I, as many of my contemporaries, was not trained to question the structure. Rather, I had to have a university degree to join ‘modernization’ project of the state, and also to satisfy my family. The difficulty students like me had to face was to remember some jargons to mention in the exam sheets. Most of the students, including majority of the instructors, had no access to original texts published in English, and there were hardly any theory books and reference materials translated in Nepali. However, quite a good number of students could pass the exam if we wrote something by mugging up. There was no need to contextualize the theory, neither to be critical and innovative. Teachers could teach theories primarily based on Western society, and we could get a good grade even if we did not link the theories with the local context. I could say that my entry to the Department of Sociology at Delhi School of Economics to pursue for M.Phil. became

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a milestone of my academic life. I, then, started questioning the knowledge transfer project of Nepali state in the name of ‘modern’ education system. The introspection of my journey from M.A. in sociology to Ph.D., and major challenges faced by the social science disciplines, i.e. sociology along with its aggressive expansion in teaching and research in Nepal in the beginning of twenty-first, has been already published in the book chapter titled ‘History of Sociology in Nepal: Re-reading the Concerns in Contemporary Nepal’ in Ravi Kumar et al. (eds.), Sociology and Social Anthropology in South Asia: Histories and Practices (Noida: Orient Blackswan, 2018). I jumped to academic research when Nepali youths had started challenging the government in the name of Maoist ’people’s war’. The government which was in place then was an elected government through the parliamentary election just after the people rejected the king’s direct rule terming it as ‘undemocratic’. The big question, then, was why people especially youths were not satisfied by the democratically elected government even if a government by the people was the agenda of 1990 mass movement? I began my research with an interest to understand the background of the youths and reasons behind their mobilization in the name of Maoist movement. Once I completed reviewing the Maoist Movement in 2007, it was the time when Maoists were searching an opportunity to give a safe landing to the movement. The conclusion I drew about the Nepali Maoist movement was that the youths who were involved in the movement in the name of Maoist were more political strategists but not the real followers of the ideology of Mao Zedong. Once the movement group accepted the leadership of those who were part of parliamentary politics earlier, my suspicion was whether the leadership joined the parliamentary politics once again with the achieved strengths by the movement. While doing so, I had analysed some of the attempts of the then underground Maoist party to appease the marginalized community, and concluded that satisfying the caste, ethnic and other minority communities and maintaining caste and ethnic harmony were the main challenges of the time. Once the realization was that the problem lingered elsewhere rather than in the modern structures, I took interest not much in an ideological issue but in the structural one. While going through the literatures on the issue of marginalization, subjugation, suppression, etc., I found the concept of ‘social exclusion’ as an umbrella concept to deal with all sorts of unacceptable inequalities and marginalizations due to unchosen features of people’s circumstances. The study I have done with empirical evidences is now in the public domain as part of Springer series–Evidence-based approaches to peace and conflict studies. The concept of social exclusion and inclusion are directly related to human beings and their perceptions. A researcher who is interested in analysing these aspects of human nature and their social links and relations with the household, community and state has to not only acquire first-hand information (known as primary data in social science research) by direct interaction with people at their homes and workplaces, but also review available archival materials. There are two ways in which this study aims to complement the ethnographic base in Birendranagar, Surkhet, Nepal. The first is to look at the larger political economy and discursive formations that provide the context for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, as outlined in the section on Secondary Data,

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as well as by drawing on theoretical insights about relatively comparable issues from sociological and anthropological literature. The second strategy is to elicit insights through in-depth interviews or case studies. This study is an exploratory one, i.e. it intends to test the broader proposition of how inequality perpetuates the backwardness of a society in general, and certain groups or communities of people in particular. Following the argument of Beteille (1990; 1991: 26), ’the sociological approach must take its orientation from the lived experiences of the present rather than the presumed idea of the past’, the present researcher spent two months in preliminary fieldwork and another seven months to understand the respondents’ conditions and their perceptions and experiences on social exclusion. The follow-up was a regular approach for the researcher for which he used discussion with the key informants and study reports of the areas. This study involves both quantitative and qualitative research methods; however, focus has been put on the latter. The universe of this study is Dalits, who are in various spheres of activities, such as government employees; students of schools and colleges; owners, shareholders and employees of registered private enterprises (i.e. hotels, firms, cottage industries, media houses, and so on); and local executive bodies of the political parties. Because the nature of this universe comprises people from diverse social positions, the total universe of the study has been classified into four clusters: government employees; private sector enterprises; the political sector; and students pursuing higher educations. Owing to the non-availability of relevant data from secondary sources, I did preliminary fieldwork to collect the appropriate sampling. Of the identified Dalits, the study could survey 244 respondents including 48 government employee Dalits, 36 Dalits in private enterprises, 32 Dalit members in political parties at the local level, and 128 Dalit students at the +2 and above level in verious educational institutions. The key informants for the study were those working as policy makers in the Dalit NGOs, pro-Dalit INGOs, and Dalit wings of the various political parties. A total of 33 in-depth interviews and 12 key informant interviews (KIIs) were conducted to include all the major categories of interest to the study (men, women, community leaders, sub-caste categories of Dalits et al.). Indepth interviews were very informal, and extended beyond one sitting. Nevertheless, five focused group discussions were also conducted to understand the feelings and perceptions of Dalits on the discourse of ’social exclusion’. I choose Surkhet as my study area as it was convenient for me to travel from Kathmandu and Delhi (India) using a land route. Also it was purposive as Surkhet is one of the districts in Mid-Western Nepal where Dalits are mostly concentrated. Surkhet is the district that has 20% of the total Badi population of Nepal, 8% of the total Gaine population, 6% of the total Sonar, almost 5% of the Kami, almost 3% of the total Damai/Dom, and almost 2% of the total Sarki of Nepal. The population of major Dalit groups was found to have substantially increased in the 2011 Census in Surkhet. This is a book that affirms the uniqueness of a caste-based hierarchical order among Hindus, providing a detailed account of how hierarchy has been maintained historically by the Nepali state. It provides an understanding for scholars about the

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different approaches of a Hindu society to bring outsiders, especially ethnic groups, religious minorities and foreigners into the caste fold. The topics addressed in the book include the contemporary state of Dalits, the community that was put at the bottom of a very hierarchical social order in Nepal in three sectors: education, politics and employment. The long-standing debate of social inclusion/exclusion in a hierarchical Hindu society has been discussed initially before going to the detailed discussion on the themes. It is argued that although inequality is present in one form or another in every society, it is caste-based inequality that is still prevalent in Nepal. Illustrated by scientifically employed and interpreted data, the book suggests that the caste-based discrimination has not been destroyed by the ’new’ Nepal along with new socio-political changes, but still exists there in a reproduced and sophisticated manner. For that reason, people who were born in the ’high caste’ still have more access to the resources and opportunities available in society in comparison to those born into the ’lower caste’. Also, social capital which is one of the powerful determinants to fix one’s social status (especially in the political participation and bureaucracy), is also much higher to the dominant group compared to the historically marginalized. As a result, the participation of marginalized groups is time and again questioned by the society citing their ‘weak’ performance, and inefficiencies, making them more defensive. The book is an outcome of a long journey I travelled in the past. Many people had to contribute to making my journey a success and to shaping this book in the present form. Initial support of my elder sister Tulasi Poudel (Pyakurel) and parents (father Mr. Krishna Prasad Pyakurel, and mother Ms. Sita Pyakurel) deserve high value. Without them I could not be the first member of my family (also village) to pass School Leaving Certificate Exam. I am greatly indebted to Prof. Lok Raj Baral, Prof. Virginius Xaxa of Department of Sociology, Delhi School of Economics, and Rajdev Raya, the then Head Master of Kalika Primary School Nuwakot for constantly pushing me into the academia. Prof. Nandu Ram and Prof. Anand Kumar were my teachers and supervisors guiding me further while I was student of JNU. My close association with Gandhian Socialist groups in India and the west, especially Finland, has helped a lot to experience shifts in the whole thinking patterns— from belief system of a ‘hill Brahmin nationalist’ to curious student of Political Sociology. The credit for the ideological shift goes to the members of SADEDIndia, Vashudhaiva Kutumbakam (VK), Network Institute for Globalizing Democracy, Siemenpuu Foundation, World Social Forum and South Asian Dialogues on Ecological Democracy. Mr. Vijay Pratap, Mr. Pradeep Giri, Prof. Krishna Khanal, Prof. Krishna Hachhethu, Prof. Thomas Wallgren, Prof. Teivo Teivanen, Mr. Marko Ulvila, Dr. Matti Kohonen, Mr. Kari Bottas, Ms. Ruby Vanderwekken, Prof. Ritu Priya and many others are to be remembered for their enthusiasm to accept me as a member of the above-mentioned fraternities. The informal discussions with Dr. Dinesh Prasain and other Nepali colleagues in JNU greatly contributed to shape the initial stage of this research. I wish to remember the value of all the informal interactions with them. I express my sincere thanks to Prof. Mahesh Banskota and Prof. Sagar Raj Sharma for providing academic space within the Kathmandu University. I want to remember contributions made by friends like Dr. Arjun Bahadur Ayadi

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and his family, and Ram Sharan Sapkota, without which my fieldwork would not be possible. Also, thanks go to Dr. Hem Raj Kafle, Mr. Shiva Tiwari, and Mr. Neel Kumar Chhetri for their inputs in the development of the manuscript. Last but not least, my sincere gratitude and acknowledgements go to my spouse Dr. Indra Adhikari and daughter Aditee, who had to suffer a lot during my academic journey. They never expressed any complaints, but remained sources of inspiration. Kathmandu, Nepal August 2020

Uddhab Pyakurel

References Arneson, RJ (2000) Luck egalitarianism and prioritarianism. Ethics, 110(2), 339–349 Beteille A (1990) Race caste and gender. Man 25:489–504 Beteille A (1991) The reproduction of inequality: occupation, caste and family. Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.) 25(1) Pyakurel U (2018) History of sociology in Nepal: Re-reading the concerns in contemporary Nepal. In: Ravi Kumar et al. (eds), Sociology and social anthropology in South Asia: Histories and practices Orient Blackswan, Delhi Scheffler S (2003) What is egalitarianism? Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31(1), 5–39 Scheffler S (2005) Choice, circumstance, and the value of equality. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 4(1): 5–28

Contents

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Dalits as a Marginal Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Differences Between Hill Dalits and Other Dalit Groups . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Research Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6 Surkhet at A Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7 Social Composition of the Population of Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.1 Surkhet Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.2 Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.7.3 Birendranagar Municipality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.8 Study Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 2 7 19 28 31 34 35 38 38 38 39 42

2 Dalits and Exclusion in Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Education and Social Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Education as a Source of Inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Teacher as an Agent of Inclusion or Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Educational History of Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Education During Rana Period (1846–1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Education After the 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Dalit Education and Government Policy After the Janaandolan-I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Dalit and Education in Birendranagar, Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47 49 52 56 68 69 73 77 78 83

3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 3.1 Traditional Occupation Assigned to Different Caste/Sub-caste of Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 3.2 State Intervention in Reproducing Occupational Stigma . . . . . . . . . . 93 3.3 Nexus of Land, Capital/Market and Poverty of Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 3.4 Caste/Class Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 3.5 Work and Employment State of Nepali Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 xi

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3.6 State of Dalits in Work and Employment in Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.1 Dalit and Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6.2 Dalits in Private Enterprises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107 108 109 118

4 Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 History of Political Inclusion of Dalits in Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Inclusion in Party Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Dalits in the Parliament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Dalits in the Constituent Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Dalits in the Decision-Making Bodies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 Politics and Social Exclusion of Dalits in Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

121 122 124 129 131 136 139 157

5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Affirmative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Education as an Ultimate Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Annihilation of Caste as Social Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

161 161 167 170 174 177

Uncited References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

About the Author

Uddhab Pyakurel currently teaches Political Sociology while heading the Department of Development Studies at School of Arts, Kathmandu University, Nepal. He completed his Masters in Political Science and Sociology from Tribhuvan University, joined Delhi School of Economics (University of Delhi) to pursue M.Phil, and earned Ph.D. from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Pyakurel, who has been an adjunct Fellow at School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Western Sydney University of Australia, is also associated with various democracy forums including South Asian Dialogues on Ecological Democracy (SADED), Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (VK), and Network Institute for Global Democratization (NIGD). He often writes op-ed articles to local newspapers as part of his campaign for ‘public sociology’, and also engages in academic general articles and book chapters on poverty, people’s participation, social inclusion/exclusion, conflict, identity, democracy, election, Nepal’s foreign relations and other socio-political issues of Nepal and Asia. In addition, he is the author of the book Maoist Movement in Nepal: A Sociological Perspective (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2007); co-author of three books: Nepal-India Open Border: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2016), Dalit Representation in National Politics of Nepal (Kathmandu: NNDSWO, 2012) and State of Conflict and Democratic Movement in Nepal (New Delhi: Vij Books, 2013); and editor of three books: Contemporary Nepal (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2012), Higher Education in Nepal: Inclusive Policy Guidelines (Lalitpur: School of Arts, Kathmandu University & SNV-Nepal, 2014), and Samajbad, Sambridhi Ra Bikas (Socialism, Prosperity and Development) (Kathmandu: Sangri-la Books, 2020). He also serves as the editor of Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies.

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List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 1.2 Table 1.3 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 3.1 Table 3.2

Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 3.5 Table 3.6 Table 3.7 Table 3.8 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 4.4 Table 4.5

Dalit populations in Nepal and the sub-castes within the Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Classification of the population in Surkhet (non-Dalits and Dalits) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Population composition of Birendranagar Municipality . . . . . . . Dalit/non-Dalit share in two of the main Boarding Schools in Surkhet Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Composition of Dalit Teachers in Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of Dalit student’s Enrolment at various levels . . . . . . Situation of Education, 1951–92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Educational Status of Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of traditional occupation assigned to different caste/sub-caste of Dalits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage of seats allotted to different social groups from 45 reserved positions in the civil service (parenthesis show the actual numbers that would be hired) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dalits in civil service in Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dalits in the various categories of private enterprises in Surkhet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Occupational status of population aged 5 years and above . . . . . Response to various indicators related to equal opportunity . . . . Responsible for Denial of equal opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Responsible groups/person for keeping caste-based prejudices alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dalits in the National Panchayat 1961–1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Caste and ethnic representation in the highest body of the state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dalits in the CA 2008 from different political parties . . . . . . . . . Caste and ethnic representation in the CA 2008 and CA 2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dalit representation in the Cabinet after 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33 35 39 55 60 65 73 79 89

105 108 109 110 112 113 113 130 131 134 135 137 xv

xvi

Table 4.6 Table 4.7

Table 4.8

List of Tables

Dalit members in four major political party organizations in Surkhet District (at the time of field visit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Political participation, performance and causes of Dalits’ inability to be in politics (according to data during the field visit) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The CPN (Maoist) regional autonomous government 2000 . . . .

139

140 143

Chapter 1

Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

Nowadays, almost everyone speaks in support of equality, but people find it difficult to speak in favour of hierarchy or inequality at least in public (Beteille 1991: 3). Even for the sake of rhetoric, nations seem to follow a “people-centric” approach by adopting various programmes. Not all such programmes have however been able to empower the general public. States throughout the world are competing with one another to declare themselves welfare states and have come up with programmes such as poverty alleviation and social security. These programmes are not only to deal with the problems faced by their own citizens, but also to show their “democratic and farsighted” nature to the rest of the world. New programmes and schemes are being launched now and then to deal with “human security”, although the contents of such programmes differ. When the discourse has shifted from the concept of “traditional security” to the new concept of “comprehensive or non-traditional security”, states are also compelled to formulate policies that have to be more people-centric, both in theory and practice. States should not only focus on the military aspect of security to protect the state sovereignty or to safeguard the interests of the rulers (Baral 2006a). No contemporary society comes very close to implementing fully the principles of justice as equal opportunity (Barry 2002: 20). However, concepts such as “equality” and “social justice” have helped nations to make their citizens appear equal before the law, although in practice, they are not so in terms of resource distribution and participation. Again, exclusion of various types are prevalent in society. In this context, the concept of “social exclusion” can become all-encompassing to deal with all kinds of exclusions and to bring all marginalized groups into the “mainstream”. The primary focus of this term in India and in neighbouring countries is to ensure the participation of the marginalized, especially Dalits, in social services, social welfare and security networks, and political choices. Exclusion is generally a more serious issue in a heterogeneous society than in a homogeneous one, because differentiation and stratification complement each other, and every difference implies a hierarchy (Gupta 2000: 6–7). In the given situation, the term “social exclusion” needs to be © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9_1

1

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

examined in the case of a group or community in relation to another one in terms of their participation or access to the policies and programmes initiated by the state. There is no society in the world without differences and inequalities. Nepal is no exception, and it has suffered enormous problems due to exclusion because it has both the human and ecological diversities. Non-democratic or autocratic regimes and the state-sponsored processes of Hinduisation and Nepalisation (Pyakurel 2007b) had accelerated the effects of exclusion in Nepal. Although Nepal’s constitution promulgated—and laws accepted—equality and social justice at different times after the formal abolition of caste-based discrimination in 1963,1 in practice people are still being marginalized and the practice of inequality remains deeply and firmly entrenched in Nepali society. Studies by various authors (Bhattachan 2000; Neupane 2000; Lawoti 2005) have argued that there is a lack of a total, inclusive policy enabling the empowerment of diverse socio-cultural groups. According to these studies, there has been no substantive change among the marginalized groups even after the democratic period of the post-1990s. The Dalits of South Asia are considered marginal groups not only in terms of power and resource distribution but also in their settlements. The notion of marginal/marginality and the concepts of centre/periphery or core/periphery will be well taken into consideration in this study. Although Sen (2000) has not confined himself to South Asia and Dalits in particular, his idea of inclusion/exclusion broadly covers a process similar to the one of the exclusion/inclusions that Dalits are facing. But first we shall briefly look into the concept of marginality and marginalization.

1.1 Dalits as a Marginal Community Young (2000) defines marginalization as exclusion of a group or minority from meaningful participation in society because the labour market does not or cannot accommodate them. Marginalization has the ability to cause severe material deprivation and, in its most extreme form, can exterminate groups. Minority groups, such as individuals living with disabilities (physical or mental), women, racial minorities, aboriginal communities, elderly individuals, single mothers, and homosexuals among others face marginalization due to dominant discourses within the structures of society (Mullaly 2007). Material deprivation is the most visible result of marginalization when looking at how unfairly material resources (such as food and shelter) are dispersed in society. Along with material deprivation, marginalized individuals are also excluded from participation in services, programmes, and policies (Young 2000). The term “marginal” or “marginality” generally means location of a person, group, or community practically outside the mainstream, although ideally the orientation may be towards it (Oommen 1986: 53–74; Ram 1995: 201; Guru 2002: 111–116). 1 For

example, Article 42 of Nepal’s constitution talks about social justice for marginalized castes and categories.

1.1 Dalits as a Marginal Community

3

Guru (2002: 111–114) argues that as discourses on marginalization have replaced earlier terms such as “exploitation”, “domination,” and “suppression”, “marginalization” could encompass these terms. The relation between the margin and the core, for him, is always of a hierarchical nature. It is dichotomous in that the core exists only at the cost of the margin. In other words, the existence of the margin becomes the logical requirement of the core. According to Ram (1995: 202), “marginality may be viewed in terms of the relations between centre and periphery where a marginal individual or group or community located at the periphery is practically deprived of all resources and opportunities”. He has used the terms “marginal areas” and “marginal culture” to explain their relation with the centre. Generally, “marginal culture” refers to a “distant or border culture”, where a marginal person, group, or community located at the periphery is practically deprived of all resources and opportunities. Here, the term “mainstream culture” metaphorically represents the notion of the term “centre” and the latter or the “marginal culture” represents “periphery”. In other words, the term is applicable to both, whether the “centre and periphery may be either physical (spatial) or socio-economic and political constructs” (ibid.). He also tries to show the marginal position of the Dalits by referring to their multiple identities in society. He subscribes to Berreman’s views (1979: 164–177) and says that the Dalits, collectively as a group, suffer from their traditionally stigmatized identity, which adds extreme humiliation to the already ascribed lower status to them in society. He writes, Identity of a large majority of the Dalits at the local level is of a landless labourer, menial workers and of belonging to a caste lowest in the caste hierarchy found in a region. In the urban areas their segmented identities can be seen as slum and pavement dwellers, unskilled and semi-skilled workers employed generally in the unorganized sectors, hawkers, etc. (Ram 1995: 95–96)

Talking about the situation of Dalits in the context of South Asia, it may be said that the Dalits are placed not only at the periphery in terms of physical or spatial relation, but are also practically deprived from access to recourse and opportunities available in society. A large number of the Dalits in India remain comparatively backward, in spite of the vigorous efforts made by Ambedkar during his lifetime (Ram 1995: 92). Physically, Dalits are settled in the outskirts or hutments located near the open space used for toilets in the rural areas, and they live in the slums, which are invariably located near the sewers, drainage, garbage, graveyards, slaughter-houses, or on the pavements during the people’s lives (Guru 2002: 114). Generally, in electoral politics, voices of groups are well taken by political parties if the group is large in terms of its members. However, the notion, by and large, seems inexplicable to the Dalits, who are being used as vote banks and their voices are being manipulated by the parties, although they are large in number. Because they are “virtually out of the mainstream”, the voice of the Dalits is kept aside either by excluding them from the decision-making body or by admitting them in a minority. The marginalization or the mis-recognition of Dalits’ abilities can be seen in the political sphere when a Dalit is deliberately given an unimportant portfolio such as the Ministry of Social Welfare even if he or she is inducted into the political hierarchy (Guru 2002: 111). Guru (ibid.) further talks about the marginalization of Dalits over the years not only

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in politics, but also in the intellectual field, educational institutions, material realm, and so on, and argues that lack of recognition of Dalits, “though being competent enough”, is one of the main causes of their marginalization in society (ibid.). There are only a few studies based on empirical data on the Dalits in the context of Nepali society. A brief review of the Dalits and their socio-economic status based on the literature is presented herewith. Nepali Dalits without any doubt can be categorized as a marginalized community as they are at the margins politically, economically, socially, and culturally. In Nepalese society, there exists the social discrimination vis-a-vis social exclusion, which Lawoti (2005: 19) terms as “near total exclusion”. Discussing the political process in Nepal after 1990 and examining the existing socio-cultural, political, and economic structure of the country, Lawoti (ibid.) elaborates how traditionally excluded groups, such as women, indigenous nationalities, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims, and others have been discriminated against on the basis of caste, class, gender, language, culture, region, and religion. He examines the process of exclusion of these groups from mainstream politics and talks about how such exclusion leads to conflict, violence, and insurgency, which have affected democracy in the country. He has also attempted to present an alternative framework for their inclusion. Criticizing the functioning of liberal democracy in South Asia, Baral (2006b: 14–20) says that participatory democracy becomes an exclusive case in the region because of the different setting of historical and socio-economic patterns of exploitation of weaker sections of the society. His criticism covers the roles of the political parties in turning democracy into a vote calculus, the rise of identity-based politics, religiosity, and the politics of vote banks. The class hierarchy has created a permanent hiatus between the traditional elites and the general public along with the existing caste hierarchy that does not allow the process of social change to percolate to the deprived or marginalized section of society. Talking about the exclusion of Dalits, he states that the democratic system continues to be discriminatory with no Dalit induction into the government. Mahat (2005: 25–27) also briefly discusses social exclusion in relation to Nepal’s human and ecological diversity. Discussing the role of the Muluki Ain (civil code) of 1854, which formally codified the caste system in Nepal, he states that political and administrative power in Nepal has largely been monopolized by three uppercaste Hindu groups, the Brahmins2 and Chhetris and the culturally, educationally, and commercially advanced ethnic group, the Newars. He also agrees that the Dalits, the ethnic hill groups of Tibeto-Burman origin, and the Madhesis in Terai, have negligible shares in the country’s administrative and political power. He reiterates that the Dalits remain the most subjugated community of the country, and this status quo is perpetuated by a hierarchical caste structure and discriminatory social and political practices. Biswakarma (2004) discusses the deep-rooted discriminatory value-based social edifice, passive government policies, hegemonic governance, and ineffective laws and policies as the factors that contribute to perpetuation of exclusion in Nepali 2 Terms

like ‘Brahmins’ and ‘Brahman’ are interchangeably used in this book.

1.1 Dalits as a Marginal Community

5

society. He argues that until and unless these discriminatory practices are abolished, it will be almost impossible to ensure inclusion in the genuine sense. Economic security, assets, resources, a social voice, capabilities, knowledge, skills, and information, should be assured for Dalits for their inclusion. He argues that Dalits have been included in spheres such as sanitation, sewing clothes, making pots, and working as domestic helpers or in tanneries, among others, which are imposed on them by the social elites and are not professions chosen by the Dalits themselves. Putting forth the data of 67 discriminatory legal provisions as an example, he argues that Dalits are blatantly excluded from access to the public sphere, the legal system, and public policy. Cameron (1998) has conducted an anthropological study on the Dalits of Bajhang District. He did an ethnographic study of gender and caste relations in Nepal, a true story narrated by Dalit women of Bhalara village in Bajhang District. In the context of so-called lower-caste women’s artisan and domestic work, Cameron (1998) describes the work of women of six local artisan groups, namely, the Badi, Sarki, Sunar, Lohar, Parki, Oudh, and Damai, in their traditional occupational settings. On the issue of upliftment of Dalits, Dahal et al. (2000) have formulated a national strategy to support Dalit empowerment and thereby their inclusion, for the Tenth National Plan (2002–2007). As in India, “untouchability” is also prevalent in Nepal. Bhattachan et al. (2003) have studied the status of untouchability in Nepali society. The report stated that there was a high degree of caste-based discrimination exhibited by upper-caste Hindus (48.1%), but 38% of indigenous nationalities also subscribed to discriminatory attitudes towards Dalits. The World Bank (WB) and Department for International Development (DFID) (2006) have examined the old hierarchies that continue to structure access to political influence and economic opportunities. While using Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA) tools, the study shows gender, caste, and ethnicity as three interlocking institutions that determine the individual’s and group’s access to assets and capabilities. Similarly, another study by the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), the WB, DFID, and Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2006), also deals with the process of exclusion in Nepal. It traces the historical roots of exclusion and deals succinctly with the exclusion process based on caste and ethnicity, gender, religion, and income. One of the important policy options suggested is “building human capital” to bring “prosperity to the excluded” (CBS, the WB, DFID and ADB 2006: 38). According to Dahal (2003), not only the “high-caste Hindus” but also indigenous nationalities have a tendency to exhibit exclusionary behaviour towards the Dalits in their ways of life such as by not accepting cooked food or water from the former “untouchables”. Such kinds of exclusion have been practiced even within Dalits themselves. Giving an example of Dalits beaten by a Gurung (one of the ethnic groups in Nepal) hotelier for not cleaning a glass for tea, Dahal tries to explain that the Dalits are the most suppressed and excluded groups in Nepal. However, he is worried about relatively less improvement in the conditions of Dalits in spite of serious efforts of the government, NGOs, and others for the upliftment of Dalits. For this, he blames Dalits for remaining within the dominant Hindu caste value of social stratification, and rights-based advocacy approach to liberation of Dalits. He

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criticizes the Dalit NGOs for not helping poor Dalits to improve their socio-economic condition. Because these NGOs are the creation of Dalit elites and are mostly based in the capital, Kathmandu, he concludes that they have their own interests to fulfil rather than helping poor Dalits. Further, criticizing the modus operandi of Dalit NGOs and their leadership, Dahal argues that they do not want to let Dalits become aware and economically empowered but want to reaffirm the traditional Hindu model of hierarchy, as this structure provides power and authority to those in NGOs in various settings in the name of Dalits In Nepal, there are certain castes that are categorized as Dalits in the social practice in the country. These people are considered as ritually impure and are generally forced to live apart from mainstream society. This poorly understood community is treated as untouchable mainly in the rural areas of Nepal. The literal meaning of “Dalit” in the Nepali dictionary is “a person who is suppressed”. In the socio-cultural discourse, Dalits are known as pani nachalne, or untouchables, from whom water cannot be accepted. Dalit activists use some words such as srijansil (creative) and karmajan (labourers) as dignified terms to refer to people belonging to so-called untouchable castes in Nepal. Basically, “Dalit” is a term borrowed from India. It is said that formerly untouchables preferred to be called Dalits, especially after emergence of the Dalit Panthers movement in the 1970s in Maharashtra. The term Dalit came into use perhaps for the first time in 1973, exactly 17 years after the death of Ambedkar in 1956. The English terms “depressed” or “depressed classes” was used to refer to them during the 1920s and 1930s. The Dalit Panthers, once a militant organization, used the term in a much broader sense (Ram 1995: 87). The term as propounded by the Panthers, was class-based, as they included the Scheduled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), the landless and poor peasants, women, and all those who were exploited politically, economically, socially, and on the grounds of religion (Murugkar 1991: 237; Ram 1995; Kumar 2008: 273). The Panthers, in reality, not only wanted to propound such a definition of a group that never had existed before, but also desired to forge an alliance between these aforesaid groups and categories so that they could get maximum support from them in their movement (Kumar 2008). In fact, Dalits remain “the most oppressed, excluded and divided groups in Nepal” (BK 2009; Bennett et al. 2006). The two terms “oppressed” and “excluded” are now part of the official definition, while “divided” adds a new, dynamic dimension to the meaning of the term. Dalits constitute approximately one-fifth of the Nepali population but remain marginalized socially, economically, politically, and in terms of their access to opportunities—an outcome of the divisions within, as well as discrimination by others. They are divided not only in terms of the political ideologies they subscribe to, but also socially, in terms of hierarchy and class, determined by economic standing. The group’s identity is not uniformly understood. However, there are also some who are not in favour of using the term. They argue that “the word/title Dalit is contradictory to the goal of creating an equal, free, honoured and dignified society. Because it will divide the society into two groups forever – non-Dalits and

1.1 Dalits as a Marginal Community

7

Dalits, which is not our vision”.3 Kalawati Paswan, a CA member from the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) concurs: “The Dalit word should be erased from popular usage. Everybody must be viewed as equals” (Darnal 2009: 74; Bennett et al. 2013). Amar Bahadur B.K. (2009) has examined national discourses on Dalits and found them defined in four different ways: by caste, class, class–caste, and race. He states, “those defining Dalits on the basis of caste consider Dalit as part of [the] Hindu caste system having [the] lowest and impure position in caste hierarchy based on purity and pollution, and their backwardness in economic, social, educational and political sphere…. Those defining Dalit on the basis of class consider [them] as those people who are poor, exploited and oppressed, irrespective of caste, ethnicity or religion. This definition includes all the farmers, labourers, industrial workers and peasants.” The other definitions accepted “Dalit as both class and caste and the backwardness of Dalits as [a] product of interface of class and caste exploitation”. The proponents argue “emancipation of Dalits lies in fighting both class and caste at the same time. And those defining Dalit on the basis of race consider Dalit as race and their backwardness as a result of racial discrimination” (ibid.). A 2008 document of the National Dalit Commission (NDC) defines the Dalits as groups that “have traditionally been subjected to untouchability and caste-based discrimination; groups that have been extremely marginalized, excluded or deprived of opportunities in the social, cultural, political, educational, administrative or economic sectors; or communities of artisans, craftsmen, and labourers” (Darnal 2009). As a group, the Dalits have “asserted a new identity as Dalits, discarding the identity as untouchable given by the society and the state. Historically, Dalits were characterized negatively by the state and the society as ‘untouchable’ or ‘low caste’ and certain disabilities were imposed upon them” (B.K. 2009).

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community The term “social exclusion” originated as a concept in France, where it became popular in the context of the economic, social, and political crises experienced during the 1980s (de Haan 1999). It is a multi-dimensional concept. People may be excluded in many ways, e.g., from livelihoods or earnings, employment, owning property, minimum-level consumption, housing, education, participation in the functioning of the welfare state, citizenship, personal contacts, self-respect, and so on. (de Haan 1999; Silver 1994). The term les exclus was considered the first formally used phrase in French social policy during late 1970s and early 1980s (Pierson 2002: 4). René Lenoir, Secrétaire d’État a l’Action Sociale of the French Government, is given credit for coining of the term (Sen 2000: 1), which dealt with the excluded population of France. Later, this term entered simultaneously into academic discourse and at the level of policy and programmes of the member states of the European Union (EU). Academicians, particularly sociologists, have used the term “social exclusion” 3 Discussion

with Durga Sob, March 11, 2009.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

to refer to the new sources of inequality, and the EU has taken a prominent place in the discussion of social inequalities and social policies with the objective of alleviating poverty of the most disadvantaged, and overcoming all kinds of deprivation and inequalities (Atkinson and Davoudi 2000; Daly and Saraceno 2002). The notion has, however, already made substantial inroads into the discussions and writings on poverty and deprivation (Sen 2000). Arjan de Haan says that the concept of social exclusion focuses attention on the central aspects of the deprivation comprising multidimensional phenomena, and deprivation is part and parcel of social relations (de Haan 1999). De Haan sees the possibility of people being deprived of different things at the same time. He understands social exclusion as deprivation in the economic, social, and political spheres and as the concept also implies, the focus on the relations and processes that cause deprivation (de Haan 1999). Social exclusion refers to ways in which individuals may become cut off from full involvement in the wider society. It is a broader concept than poverty, although the latter is one of its significant dimensions. It is not only the result of people being excluded; it can also result from people excluding themselves from various aspects of mainstream society (Giddens 2001: 356). It can be placed parallel to poverty, inequality, deprivation, alienation, and marginalization in developing as well as developed countries or societies. Social exclusion, in the European context, has been defined in relation to social rights of citizens to retain basic standards of living and to participate in the major social and occupational opportunities of society. Scholars have identified the various forms of exclusion, namely, exclusion from goods and services, the labour market, land, both physical and environmental security, security of livelihood, protection against contingencies of illness and death, human rights, and so on. (Rodgers et al. 1995). Hughes et al. (2000: 346–347) talk about four distinct dimensions of social exclusion, which are poverty or exclusion from adequate income or recourses, exclusion from the labour market, exclusion from services, and exclusion from social relations In 1998, the World Bank described social exclusion as a “process through which individuals and groups are wholly or partially excluded from full economic, political and cultural participation in the society in which they live” (The World Bank Annual Report 1998). In Britain, under the Labour Party government of Tony Blair, the term “social exclusion” was used in the Party’s 1994 Commission on Social Justice. The move by the Blair government is considered a break from the socialist and social democratic principle. The objective of the move was to stress inclusion, rather than equality (Lister 1998, 2001). It is also said that the shift advocated a middle way between the new left and the more radical left wings of the party, which dubbed inclusion as the “levelers”, and as those more predisposed to Thatcher’s New Right solution termed it, the “deregulators” (Alcock 2002:14). Studying diversified society, Dobrowolsky and Lister (2006:164) affirm that racial, ethnic, and other minority communities continue to experience racism, discrimination, and exclusion in multiple realms, including employment. Conceptualizing social exclusion in a “truly comprehensive” sense, they argue that social exclusion would highlight the interconnections between collective identity and poverty; access to goods and services such as housing, health, physical safety, and well-being.

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

9

Hence, inclusion would incorporate broader, more substantive citizens’ rights, and foster a wider array of socio-political networks and a deeper sense of belonging. Dobrowolsky and Lister deal not only with the concept of social exclusion, its origin and its manifestations in the British context, but also talk about who is to be included and who is to be excluded. The answer to why most of the concerns about social exclusion are comparable to those prevailing in Britain is because the Blair government, which applied the concept of social exclusion, had neither adequately addressed ethnic and racial minority issues, nor had it extended it to issues of (im)migration, asylum, exclusionary controls, and punitive policies that still abounded (Dobrowolsky and Lister 2006:165). Levitas (1996) identifies three discourses of social exclusion with the following acronyms: • Redistributions, Egalitarian Discourse (RED), where social exclusion is concerned about extreme forms of inequality and the way to address them through redistributing wealth and including the notion of citizenship, social rights, and social justice. • Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD), considered to be the right-wing approach, deals with individual values and behaviour, and considers social cohesion at risk due to a series of problematic behaviours, and forms of social and moral decay. • Social Integration Discourse (SID), where social exclusion results from a shortfall in education and employment opportunities. Social exclusion is about more than issues of income and poverty. It is shorthand for what can happen when people or areas face a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, discrimination, poor skills, low income, poor housing, high crime, and bad health and family breakdown. These problems are inter-linked and mutually reinforcing, creating a vicious cycle in people’s lives (SEU 2004: 3). Further, Pierson (2002: 190–203) talks about how people from minority ethnic backgrounds, who are more likely to live in poor housing, remain unemployed, and have low income, die young and suffer from social exclusion. Placing many cases of exclusion in Europe, especially in Britain, he explores the various facets or dimensions of exclusion faced by (im)migrants, refugees, and especially asylum seekers, which are mainly dislocation, powerlessness, discrimination, among others. Atkinson and Davoudi (2000) discuss the reasons for and the manner in which the notion of social exclusion has developed within the EU social policy discourse. Providing a clear understanding of its origins, functions and multiple dimensions, they suggest that the concept has played a positive role in keeping issues such as inequality and poverty on the policy agenda. Their observation is that although the notion of using the term “social exclusion” has acquired important strategic connotation by stressing structural and cultural–social processes, the precise meaning of the term remains somewhat elusive. Ogata (1998) raises the status of refugees as an intensely important case of social exclusion and talks about two kinds of exclusions: active and passive. He also gives an example of the case of an active exclusion of immigrants or refugees who are not given a practical political status. In his opinion,

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this applies to many of the deprivations from which minority communities suffer in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. With regard to conceptual understanding of social exclusion in developing societies, it is exclusion that can encompasses life and livelihood as a whole, and can severely restrict participation in social services, welfare, and security networks, consumer culture, political choice, bases of popular solidarity, and also in the understanding of the circumstance(s) surrounding the people at large. The contribution of Appasamy (1996) and sees the Indian concept of social exclusion in terms of basic needs from which 90% of the population is excluded on the bases of nutrition, elementary education, basic health care, access to housing, water supply, sanitation, and social security. Still the contemporary Indian contenient continues to remain patriarchal and stratified. Certain castes have been historically marginalized and socially excluded in comparison to others in that restrictions have remained on their social participation. Instead of being corrected by democratic processes, caste politics has still been decisive and has even engendered violence through competitive populism. Thus, for him, social exclusion is a societal phenomenon that cuts across the historical concept of exclusion based on gender and caste and can also be discerned in the educational, health, and developmental sectors. Kothari (2003) tries to discuss the whole theme of exclusion and marginalization of a large section of people and of diverse communities and classes within that section. His broad perspective covers the journey from a highly inclusive model of nation building to one that excludes large masses and reduces them to becoming objects of humiliation, derision, and contempt. Conceptualizing the term “social exclusion” in the Indian context, he concludes that both the communal and technocratic mind-sets produce the same results, both undermining pluralist politics and social identities based on a diverse and differentiated social order. He suggests a need to become the foundation of an alternative postmodern era of action and knowledge to marginalize the mainstream monolith and to popularize the politics of diversity and plurality. Another suggestion is that of a need to move from “government of humans” to “humane governance,” which, according to him, involves making the dispensable—of bringing back human concern to the centre of regulating both the state and civil society. Stressing the role of grassroots movement as a source of “humane governance”, he has further argued that the diverse marginalized people, who have been excluded by the militarized and marketised logic of the state, have to become the source for creation of norms by which the state should be governed. The need is, as he suggests, to reverse the earlier catchphrase “think globally and act locally” and to put it into a grassroots perspective, “think locally and transform globally”. Prasad (2003) also argues that the concept of “social exclusion” is broadly synonymous with the concept of marginalization and is related to a number of other concepts, notably poverty, unemployment and deprivation, disengagement, withdrawal, the underclass, alienation, lack of freedom, and so on. It is a multi-dimensional concept, covering social, economic, cultural, and political situations, which offers various forms of disadvantages within a single analytical framework and emphasizes the integration of forms of exclusion to share experience of exclusion collectively. He

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

11

divides the concept into the South, which supports flexible and diverse livelihoods, and the North, which is related to the formal job sector. He further says that the issues such as access, personal security, vulnerability, and self-esteem are now firmly on the agenda in societies in both the North and South. For him, social exclusion is a process, which restricts the access of certain social groups to valued resources and entitlements, relegating them to the status of social outsiders. Muffels and Fouarge (2002: 202–232) see the shift of poverty research from an “absolute” to a “relative” notion and from the “income-related poverty” and “lack of basic needs” to “social exclusion” and its counterpart, “social integration”. For them, these are the popular phrases used by the prosperous Western world to avoid “almost non-existent words” such as “hunger and starvation”.4 However, they suggest extending the policy scopes to include employment policies, health policies, education, and housing policies. Begg et al. (2002: 311–312) observe that social exclusion becomes a much broader and multi-dimensional perspective on social policy. They suggest narrowing down the concept and making it an identifiable and observable one so that it can be studied empirically in a society. Barry (2002: 13–29) raises very-micro issues on social exclusion, terming it violation of values of social justice and social solidarity. Defending the “voluntary” type of social exclusion, he states that social exclusion is the denial of the opportunity to participate as individuals or groups, irrespective of whether they actually desire to participate or not. If one has no desire to take part in the opportunity right away, it does not mean that he or she may never participate; rather he or she may re-think it and decide to participate later. Barry sets out the discourse with examples of how a group of the minority excludes the majority, and a rich person keeps out his and her fellow citizens through his or her own wealth, power, and so on. Sen (2000) recognizes the idea of social exclusion and its conceptual connection with well-established notions in the literature on poverty and deprivation. He argues that it can appreciate the contributions made by the new literature on social exclusion by placing it in the broader context of the old or very aged idea of poverty as capability deprivation. He accepts the antecedents that are far older than the specific history of the terminology and says that their connections or even applications with a very general approach of social exclusion would help us to appreciate the particular emphases and focal concerns of social exclusion. Sen rejects the very ancient, but still fairly common and established, literature on deprivation and destitution by characterizing poverty as simply shortage of income. He argues that “income may be the most prominent means for a good life without deprivation, but it is not the only influence on the lives we can lead (ibid. (2000): 3; Sen 2004). He further says that ultimately poverty must be seen in terms of poor living, rather than just as lowness of income, and “nothing else”. “If our paramount interest is in the quality of lives that people should lead—the freedom they need to have [in order] to lead minimally decent lives—then it cannot but be a mistake to concentrate exclusively only on one 4 According

to them, words such as “hunger” and “starvation” are being used by the modern Western world of prosperity for some particularly vulnerable groups such as the homeless or illegal immigrants.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

or other of the means to such freedom”, he states. He sees interconnection between economic opportunities, political liberties and social power and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and so on for human progress. He mentions that the exclusion from political participation is itself deprivation, and a denial of basic political freedom and civil rights directly impoverishes lives of excluded people and groups. Sen’s thesis on social exclusion is influenced by the idea of Adam Smith (1776), who says that “the ability to appear in the public without shame” is a necessary factor on the freedom to live non-impoverished lives. Not only the economic but also the social and cultural aspects affect the ability of human beings to “appear in public without shame”. The notion tries to link a human being with social life and social relations in which interaction is important. Thorat and Mahamallik (2006: 41) also acknowledge social relations and institutions as key components to understand the concept of exclusion and discrimination. Either it is exclusion from social relations or inability to interact freely with others. The conditions of these situations can lead to more deprivations; that is the difficulty that deprived people are experiencing in taking part in the life of the community (Sen 2000). Byrne (1999) sees social exclusion on the active relation between class and capitalism. He tries to see social exclusion as a synonym of under-development and says that both the terms—development and underdevelopment—are a strategic introduction of the capital to control the working class. He argues that the words “development” and “underdevelopment” always co-exist because hierarchy is the key to capital’s control, and development is always accompanied by relative or absolute underdevelopment for others in order to maintain hierarchy. For him, the socially excluded are those sections of the population who have been actively underdeveloped, as the thesis of underdevelopment is seen as one of exploitation and immiseration. The account of underdevelopment, according to him, suggests that social exclusion is not an accidental by product of capitalist development but is absolutely intrinsic to it. Declaring himself a Marxist, he says that, “I cannot understand domination without an economic dimension”. He objects to the understanding of domination and exclusion as similar concepts and says that “Exclusion is not domination. It is not to do with identity considered either as something intrinsic or self-chosen. It is to do with specific economic relation”. In his opinion, “the battle against exclusion must be a battle against exploitation” (Byrne 1999: 55–59). Thorat (2006: 692–693) argues that economic exclusion or discrimination can be independent of income, productivity, or merit of individuals in groups. Often, people are excluded from markets due to causes such as low income, productivity, and low merit. However, in the case of group-based exclusion, these causes are not the original sources but the outcome of the exclusion associated with group identity. He also says that an economically better-off member of a group is also considered a member of an excluded group and he or she would even suffer from discrimination5 since

5 But

the discrimination may not be in the same degree and magnitude for the poor members of his or her group.

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

13

exclusion has a group focus. This argument of Thorat seems to be just the opposite of the argument of Byrne (1999), which denied accepting the identity-related exclusion. On the other hand, the concept “social inclusion” is understood more as the opposite of the term “social exclusion” (European Foundation 1995: 4 cited in de Haan n.d.: 26; DFID/World Bank 2005: 5). According to the report of the DFID/World Bank (2005: 5) social inclusion is defined as “the removal of institutional barriers and the enhancement of incentives to increase the access of diverse individuals and groups to development opportunities”. In other words, many people started understanding the concept “social inclusion” as a process to overcome exclusionary practices and to integrate individuals into the mainstream. However, the fact is that both exclusion and inclusion are relative terms and can be seen in various forms. Inclusion may not always produce a positive result, and exclusion may not always be bad for the human being. Indeed, there can be simultaneous exclusion and inclusion, that is, individuals and groups can be excluded in one domain and included in another. Jackson (1999) tries to challenge the binary and polarized formulation of exclusion and inclusion. She relates the debate on exclusion–inclusion with gender perspective and argues that there can be simultaneous exclusion and inclusion. Thorat (2006: 695) links the concept of social exclusion with the caste system and argues that the fundamental characteristics of caste system are those which the system has fixed—civic, cultural, and economic rights for each caste, with restrictions for change. This restriction leads to “forced exclusion” of one caste from the rights of the other caste, or from undertaking the occupations of other castes. Therefore, exclusion and discrimination in civic, cultural, and economic rights are internal to the caste system. Conceptualizing the term “social exclusion” in the Indian context in general, and the case of Dalits in particular, Louis (2003: 164) draws the legitimacy of social exclusion from religious values and argues that it does not remain only as exclusion, but it also expresses itself in the most tyrannical form of discrimination and dehumanization. For him, the sentiment of discrimination is imparted to the members of a society through socialization, and the attitudes of discrimination are passed from society to the individual, and, in due course, the individual passes it back to society. Thus, both the individual and society reinforce discrimination. Changing the discriminatory practices seems very difficult because even those who are discriminated against do not want to alter the situation since they fear greater discrimination and assault. Louis finds that the most fascinating feature of the caste system is the sentiment of purity and superiority of some castes, which does not allow them to be in solidarity with the oppressed to wage a united struggle against the exploiters, who are almost at the same level in all castes. In sum, caste-based exclusion and discrimination can be seen within the frame of Sen’s point of view on “deprivation in multiple spheres”—exclusion not only from economic rights but also from civil, cultural and political rights. The argument

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of Walker and Walker6 (1997: 8) also seems quite similar to that of Sen (2000). Possible exclusion and discrimination in the use of public roads, temples, bodies of water, and service delivery institutions such as education, health, and other public services, for Thorat, is the exclusion in the civil and cultural spheres. Discrimination in the exercise of political rights and in participation in decision-making processes is exclusion in the political spheres, exclusion in the labour market—in hiring for jobs, exclusion in the capital market through the denial of access to capital, exclusion in agriculture in the land market through the denial of sale and purchase or leasing of land, exclusion in the input market through the denial of sale and purchase of factor inputs, and exclusion in consumer market through the denial of sale and purchase of commodities and consumer goods, and so on—are the exclusions in the economic spheres (Thorat 2006: 696–697). Thorat further writes: The caste and ethnicity-based exclusion thus reflects the inability of individuals and groups like the former “untouchables’, Adivasis and other similar groups to interact freely and productively with others and to take part in the full economic, social, and political life of a community. (ibid.: 696–697)

The term “social exclusion” has been defined as “a multi-dimensional process in which various forms of exclusion are combined: participation in the decision making and in the political process, access to employment and material resources, and integration into the common cultural process. When combined, they create acute form of exclusion that finds a spatial manifestation in particular neighbourhoods” (Madanipour et al. 1998: 22 cited in Kumar 2008: 273). Interestingly, almost all societies in the world have accepted the existence of social exclusion as well as marginalization of certain groups and communities found within them, and have formulated policies for their inclusion in their existing political and social structures. They have also worked out some mechanisms to implement inclusive policies and programmes for bringing these groups and communities into the mainstream, as stated earlier. There have been built-in institutional mechanisms of social exclusion in the hierarchical arrangement in almost all societies in the world. In relatively traditional societies like India and Nepal, caste has been a mechanism to exclude the people belonging to certain castes located at the bottom of the hierarchy. Generally, it is understood that the term “caste” was coined and defined, in the context of India, initially by the colonizers and later by the Indian scholars (Ghurye 1932; Srinivas 1962; Dirks 2001). Like other countries in South Asia, Nepal also has an influential caste-based hierarchical society (Kisan 2005). Historically, the caste system has regulated the social and economic life of the people through certain customary rules and norms. However, the use of the word “caste” does not convey the meaning of the Nepali word jaat, and the term “caste system” fails to show the picture of the social hierarchy called jaat-paat or jaat-bhaat (caste system) in Nepali society. 6 According

to Walker and Walker, social exclusion as a more comprehensive formulation refers to the dynamic process of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political or cultural system which determines the social integration of a person in society. Social exclusion may, therefore, be seen as the denial (or non-realisation) of the civil, political and social rights of citizenship.

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

15

Hofer (1979) says that the Muluki Ain (civil code) of 1854 formally codified the caste system in Nepal. According to him, the Muluki Ain was a written version of the social code that had long been in practice in some parts of Hinduised Nepal. Its caste categories diverged from the four varnas (four basic categories defined under caste system) of the classical Vedic model, and, instead, had three basic divisions to accommodate the tribal people between the pure and impure castes. These were further classified into five hierarchies with the following order of precedence (Hofer 1979; Gurung 2003): A. B. C. D. E.

Wearers of a holy cord (Tagadhari) Non-enslavable alcohol-drinkers (Namahsine Matwali) Enslavable alcohol-drinkers (Mahsine Matwali) Impure but touchable castes (Pani Nachalne Chhoi chhito halnya naparne) Impure and untouchable castes (Pani Nachalne Chhoi chhito halnya parne)

Although the scheme was biased in favour of dominant Bahun, Thakuri, and Chhetri hill castes, it tried to incorporate other non-Hindus, especially the ethnic communities, in the caste system. According to the categorisation, hill Brahmin, Thakuri, and Chhetri castes were placed at the top of the hierarchy. But the Newar Brahmin caste was placed below the Chhetri. The second rank included the Magar and Gurung, long associated with the Gorkha regime, and also the Sunuwar, who received in 1825 the Lal Mohar (royal seal) to use Bahun priests to perform different rituals. There was no reference to the Rai and the Limbu, the last tribes to succumb to the Gorkhali rule. The third rank included the peripheral Bhote, Tharu, and some smaller tribes and descendants of the freed slaves (Gharti). The fourth and fifth ranks or orders were considered of impure castes with the distinction that the former were “touchable” (no water sprinkling needed after contact) and the latter “untouchable” (purification necessary after contact).7 Of the six sub-caste groups included in the fourth rank, four were Newar sub-groups, Muslims, and Mlechhs (Europeans). The fifth and the lowest order or rank had six artisan castes of the hills and two Newar8 scavenger sub-groups. However, it would be more accurate to say that the Ain (Act) made the existing social hierarchy and the laws more complex (Regmi 2002). It made monopolizing political and administrative power easier for the two upper castes of Hindus, the Brahmins and the Chhetris, and the culturally, educationally, and commercially advanced ethnic group, the Newars. The Dalits, the ethnic hill groups of Tibeto-Burman origin, the Madhesis living in the Tarai, and others have a negligible share in the country’s administrative and political power (Lawoti 2005; Mahat 2005; DFID World Bank 2006; Baral 2006b; Pyakurel 2007a). But the domination of the Brahman–Chhetris seems to be a process that had accompanied the Gorkhali conquests mainly in the last decade of the eighteenth century and initial decades of the nineteenth centuries. 7 Sprinkling

purified water on bodies of so-called higher castes was necessary when these people touched so-called untouchables, and it was not necessary to sprinkle such water when these highercaste people had touched the so-called touchables. 8 Ma ju pim is used to refer the impure and untouchable in the Newari language.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

Before the conquests, it was only in few states9 that the Brahman–Chhetris had dominance over other communities, although Chhetris were traditionally considered the ruling families (called Rajputs or Thakuris in the Muluki Ain).10 Dalits face discrimination in day-to-day life due to the belief in “untouchability” which has tremendous influence in most parts of the country, especially in farwestern Nepal. They face discrimination and untouchability in housing, employment, marriage, and general social interactions. These kinds of discrimination are preserved and reinforced through the practice and threat of social exclusion or physical violence. Based on the belief that Dalits are “polluted”, they are typically restricted to tasks and occupations that are deemed too “filthy” or “polluting” for “upper-caste” communities. It is also seen as an expression of the social belief of purity–pollution that makes the upper castes regulate certain timing and contexts of “inclusion” for the Dalits (Dumont 1980; Shah et al. 2006: 26–27; Guru 2002: 113). Dalits are segregated from members of other castes and are prohibited from touching non-Dalits and their possessions. Even until now, some people of the so-called upper castes in rural areas of Nepal purify themselves by taking a ritual bath if they come into contact with a Dalit or his or her belongings. The sprinkling of drops of water on “impure” objects or individuals is also practiced. The water is “purified” or “made holy” by submersing a golden ornament into it, which is called Sun-Pani. By the act of sprinkling of SunPani, a non-Dalit is made free from the sin that he or she has incurred by coming in contact with the “sinful untouchables”. Even among the educated people, there are some words that are specifically used to refer to the Dalits such as “under water”, “acid”, “leather”, and other terms.11 For instance, one finds such a scenario among the Nepalese in India although educated people do not practice untouchability. In the context of Nepal, there is a fear among the educated people that they would be criticized by their community members or elders if they became too accommodating or inclusive in their relations with the Dalits. Especially in rural Nepal, Dalits are also often denied entry to public places, such as hotels, shops, and restaurants. If they are able to enter public restaurants, they are given drinking water and tea in separate glasses set aside for them and eat daal bhat (rice and lentils) from plates reserved for them. Even in modern times, Dalits have to wash the dishes that they use or touch in the houses of “upper-caste people” and in hotels and restaurants. An incident in Kalikot is an example in which a 31-yearold Manbir Sunar was beaten to death on the charge of intruding into the kitchen of a Shahi family on December 10, 2011 (Pyakurel 2011). The exclusion of Dalits extends to the religious sphere as well. Although they are considered Hindus, they are routinely denied entry into Hindu temples.12 Marital relationships between Dalits and others is strictly prohibited in society, even though they are legally permitted. 9 For

example, in Palpa Magars had considerable influence, in the Sena-ruled Kirat region called Vijaypur and Chaudandi, Kirats had influence. 10 For example, earlier even the Brahmans could be subjected to slavery but in the nineteenth century, they were made immune to it. 11 Oral narratives available among the Indian Nepalese. 12 In the past, the Nepali Congress under B. P. Koirala believed that the inclusion of Dalit women and Janajatis can be done only through education, and for this a school was opened in the village

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

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The Dalits, who constitute almost 15% of the total population of Nepal, bear the brunt of extreme exclusion with all the disadvantages of caste discrimination, lack of education, landlessness, and lack of political space to have their say. The data used by Mahat (2005) shows that Dalits have only a 0.3% share in the integrated national governance, which makes them the most subjugated community in the country. A study administered by the International Labour Organization (ILO, undated) asserts that the Dalits in Nepal are denied employment even if job openings are available, and they are paid lower wages and salaries in both the private and informal sectors (compared with their “upper caste” colleagues) due to their caste status. The study discloses that there is much less participation of Dalits in national and local-level political organizations as they constitute only 1.63% of Dalit chairpersons and 3.95% of vice-chairpersons of the 735 such organizations (ibid.). The caste-based discrimination also persists in the Nepali Army, in which the “upper castes” constitute 98% of all army officers (Marks 2004), although they form only 35% of the general population of the country. The Dalit women’s disproportionate and extreme poverty stems from illiteracy, untouchability, physical violence, and lack of empowerment. The Dalit women and girls in Nepal endure the dual burden of caste and gender discrimination (Sob 2004: 68). Indeed, caste-based discrimination was formally abolished by the revised Muluki Ain in 1963; however, no inclusive policies were initiated by the Nepali state until 1990, as there were no fundamental democratic rights such as freedom of opinion and expression and the right to organise demonstrations and protests peacefully. It was only the multi-party era of the post-1990s when the then Nepali government undertook greater efforts to make Nepal a more inclusive state (DFID/World Bank 2005). The process of inclusion of all the excluded and marginalized groups has accelerated only in recent years, especially after the April 2006 uprising. Now, a good number of people from the excluded and marginalized groups such as Dalits and Janajatis can be seen participating in state institutions, political spheres, and so on as compared with the earlier period. However, the trend of socio-political participation sometimes is said to be for the sake of participation only (Baral 1978). Media also often give space to grievances of privileged groups. In this context, the topic of social exclusion and inclusion that has lately become a popular discourse in Nepal, has been selected as a research topic to place it in the Nepali context. In this broad framework, this present study is to investigate the issue of social exclusion and inclusion in Nepal in general, and the plight of the Dalits in particular, who are considered one of the poorest and most oppressed, marginalized, alienated, subjugated, and socially excluded groups in Nepal. In other words, the study examines both the exclusion and inclusion of the Nepali Dalits in a particular manner.

of Humin in Palpa for educating the Dalits. However, in the 1990s, the Communist Party of Nepal– United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) activists began purification ceremonies for Dalits such as performing Satya Narayan Pooja in Dalits’ homes and organizing movements for their temple entry, which is dubbed by the Nepali Maoists as the Sanscritization process.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

Looking at the above review of literature, an important point to be noted in today’s context of Nepali society is that Dalits face exclusion mainly in the socio-cultural dimension that consists of the private space of families, hierarchies within the political parties, and the lowly attitude of mainstream communities towards the Dalits, as a result of which there is a narrative in Nepali society that Dalits or pani nachalne people face more discrimination than any others in society. By and large, there are three distinct groups of Dalits in Nepal: Hill Dalits, Newar Dalits, and the Tarai Dalits. They can be classified as follows. 1. The castes comprising the Hill Dalits are Biswakarma: Sunars (gold and silversmiths), Kami or Lohar (ironsmiths), Tamata (coppersmiths), Od (masons and house builders), Chunara (carpenters); Sarki or Mijars (leather workers), Damai (tailors, musicians), Gaine or Gandharva (bards, singers), and Badi or Bhands (village entertainers and prostitutes). The physical features of these castes are mainly Semitic and Mediterranean with an admixture of Nordic, Mongoloid, and Austro-Asiatic traits. A few of them also show Nordic features with a mixture of Austro-Asiatic and Mongoloid traits. For instance, the Gahatraj clan of Sunars, the Chhinyal, and Ghaleki clan of Damais, and the Ruchal clan of Sarkis are of this last catagory. 2. The Newar Dalits consist of Chyame and Halahu, considered as untouchables belonging to the Newar community. They mainly live in the Kathmandu Valley. They are from Austro-Asiatic and Mongoloid stock, speaking Newari, a TibetoBurmese language. An unresolved issue on defining Dalits is the classification of Newar Dalits: some sub-groups want to be recognized as Dalits and others do not. Even within groups, there are some factions seeking recognition as Dalits and others who do not want to be identified as such. 3. The Tarai Dalit groups (who are also called Madhesi Dalits) are similar to the Indian Dalits racially and culturally. They constitute the people who have moved over the years to the plains of Nepal, mainly from the neighbouring areas of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The Dalits of Tarai comprise Chamar, Musahar, Tatma, Khatwe, Dusadh, Dhobi, Dom, Pasi, Paswan, and Halalkhor people. Being Madhesi Dalits involves dual identities and double discrimination. Among the Madhesi Dalits, there is a feeling of regional discrimination added to the longstanding caste discrimination faced by all Dalits. Even though the poverty levels for Dalits staying in the plains (Madhesi Dalits) are not as intense as those for Dalits staying in the hills (Hill Dalits, who have actively sought education in the past 30–40 years), the Madhesi Dalits have lower development income. The situation of some Madhesi Dalit groups (Dushad/Musahar, Dom, Halalkhor) is well below the average for Hill Dalits. The Human Development Index (HDI) for Madhesi Dalits was 0.400, compared with 0.490 for all Nepalis. The HDI for all Dalits was 0.434. Among the groups with the highest HDI were the Newar (0.565) and Hill Brahmin. The HDI for Madhesi Brahmin-Chhetriwas 0.536 (UNDP 2014). The Madhesi Dalits are not as educated or empowered as the Pahadi or Hill Dalits, who, being close to the power centres and donors, have been better able to project their concerns. Moreover, within the emerging Madhesi identity, concerns of the Madhesi Dalits have also remained largely overshadowed by the

1.2 Dalits as a Socially Excluded Community

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larger political agenda of the Madhesis, with Madhesi elites calling for solidarity among the Madhesi groups in order to forge a powerful voting bloc. As a voting group, political parties from the Madhesi have emerged as powerful stakeholders in national politics, which they were not in the past. However, the issue of the Terai Dalits may soon become a major cause of concern to these parties. A similar issue surrounds the listing and delisting of the Lohar, a Madhesi group listed as an Other Backward Caste (OBC) by the Ministry of Local Development (MLD). A ministerial decision on July 19, 2009, informed the Nepal Dalit Commission (NDC) of the listing of Lohars as Dalits. (Lohars were not listed as Dalits by the NDC, and this had been communicated to the Ministry on June 5, 2008). Thereafter, the NDC made recommendations (for seeking benefits from the state) for four Lohar sub-categories saying they were Dalits. Then, the other Madhesi Dalits took up the issue with the MLD and the NDC arguing that the Lohars were not “water untouchable”, following which the ministerial decision was annulled by the Minister of State on September 30, 2009. As things stood in late 2009, the Lohars were (rightly) not on the list of Dalits. The study conducted by NDC in 2009 recommended adding six more groups to the list: Madhesi Dalits: Patwa, Bintau, Bin (Mukhia), Malaha (Sahani), Godiha, and Dhankar (Bishwakarma et al. 2009). These groups have their own stratification system and those higher up on the ladder have greater access to opportunities, and discriminate (and even practice untouchability) against others who are supposedly below them in the caste system. When discussing institutional efforts to classify the Nepali Dalits in general and the Hill Dalits in particular, there is no consensus on definitions as well as on the number of Dalits. Based on the prevailing social practices, the NDC has identified 22 major castes as Dalit. In 1997, the Dalit Vikas Samiti (Dalit Development Committee) identified 23 various cultural groups as Dalits, and the Nepal Dalit Commission, formed in March 2002, forwarded a bill to the government, identifying 28 cultural groups as Dalits in Nepal. A 2009 NDC study has listed 671 Dalit surnames. The official website of the NDC (2017) lists 23 distinct Dalit sub-castes that include Bishwakarma, Damai, Sarki, Gandharva, Badi, Kori, Fatik, Khatwe, Dhobi, Kalar, Chidimar, Pasi, Bantar, Musahar, Mestar, Kakaihiya, Dom, Tatma, Dushad, Sarbhanga and Pattharkatta, among others. There are as many as 46 groups that have been identified as Dalits. This needs to be clarified for effective implementation of support programmes (Bagchand 2006).

1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal The history of untouchability in Nepal cannot be described within a single sociopolitical framework. Generally, among the Nepali scholars who like to relate and identify untouchability, the social hierarchy, and caste system with the Hindu religion

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

and monarchy. This perspective made scholars argue that the Shah dynasty (1769– 1990) was responsible for all the ills of the caste system and untouchability in Nepal. However, if we seek a better understanding of history, the caste system in Nepal has to be seen in comparison with that in India, because untouchability is part of caste system in both India and Nepal. The untouchables or Dalits themselves are divided into higher and lower castes. Untouchability as the part of the caste system, or jaatpaat, have evolved throughout history. Here, we mainly focus on the first group of Hill Dalits, who form the majority of the Dalit population of Nepal. To trace the roots of untouchability and caste system in Nepal, one can go back only to the fourteenth century AD in search of archives, when Raja Jayastithi Malla (1380–1395) of the Kathmandu Valley legally classified the Newari people into 64 castes with the help of five Brahmans from the southern plains (now in India) on the basis of occupation and genealogies (http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/np/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/-jayaesthiti-malla-sudhar.pdf). Even before the fourteenth century, different castes seem to have existed in the Kathmandu Valley. For instance, the Licchavi Raja Basanta Dev’s (506–532) inscription at Thankot refers to “welfare of the peasants by all eighteen castes including Brahmins at Jaypallika village” (Singh n.d.). It seems that the practice of untouchability may not have appeared suddenly during the reign of Jayastithi Malla. However, it can be inferred that they existed at least in the time of writing the Thankot inscription of Basanta Dev in the sixth century. Outside the Kathmandu Valley, in the Khasa political formation or Khasadesa (Adhikary 1997), based in the present Karnali region that seems to have existed from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, there are some archives to show the existence of a caste system ((Adhikary 1997; Pandey 1997). There were the titles associated with the professions,13 and some Brahmans are mentioned in inscriptions as Joisi, or astrologers, knowledgeable persons, teachers of rulers such as Asokachalla, and recipients of land grants. The rulers such as Pala and Challa/Malla claim to be of Kshatriya varna (Adhikari 1997). However, any ruling family exercising power could claim to be Kshatriyas as in the Indian plains, hence it can be said that varna was not a social concept. Nevertheless, the jati (caste) system seems to have been well established in the western hills, which was unique and differed from that of the Kathmandu Valley. Untouchability is not mentioned in the Khasa inscriptions. However, the names of professions associated with so-called untouchable castes such as Tamata, Sarki, and others in the copper plates of rulers in far-western Nepal, in the fourteenth century, who came to power soon after the fall of the Khasa Desa. An important feature of Nepali society is that the position of communities associated with artisanal works and tailoring in the Pahade community is different from that of Tarai and Newari society. Castes engaged in various metal works, carpenters, masons, and tailors are untouchables among the Pahades, but these castes are of the middle categoryor rung among the Newars and Tarai communities. It seems that the 13 For

instance, Adhikari (judicial and administrative officers of dara (a group of villages or a sub-district), Karki (fiscal officers of dara), Mahatara (village headmen), Rokaya (subordinates of Mahatara), Lekhaka (writers of public documents), Senapati (commanders of the army), and Paikela (warriors such as Thapa, Khadga, and others).

1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal

21

Tibetan caste system of treating the metalsmiths and tailors as untouchables was adopted by the Khasa people of western Nepal as the Challa/Malla rulers of Khasa Desa were followers of Tibetan Buddhism or Lamaism. According to the popular version of Nepali history, the political formations known as baise-chaubise emerged after the break-up of the Khasa Empire. There were a few families and clans who dominated such political formations. In most of the political formations such as Gorkha, Jumla, and Bajhang, only males who belonged to certain tagadhari, or thread-wearing families,14 could hold high positions. It is said that in the sixteenth century, a few people of the Kami, Sarki, and Damai communities, along with the Brahmins, accompaniedg Dravya Shaha from Lamjung to settle in Gorkha (Pradhan 1991: 24). The code of Ram Shaha (1606–1636 AD), the Raja of Gorkha, mentions char varna chhattis jaat (4 varnas and 36 jaats). It also refers to barha thar (12 surnames)15 and athara thar (18 surnames). The code appointed the members of six families as the council of Gorkha, also called thar ghar; where except for one Rana Magar, all people holding important positions were Tagadharis.16 Another community that practiced social hierarchy was the Tamu or Gurung. A seventeenth-century document from western Nepal clearly shows that the Gurungs were divided, based on birth, into 4 jaats and 16 jaats (Pradhan 1991: 37). The 4 jaats were considered superior among them. Prithvinarayan Shaha’s decree of 1761 (Regmi 2002) that was issued in relation to Jaisi Bahuns mentions the Shudra along with Khas. It orders the Shudra, Khas, and other castes to offer salam to Jaisis. It seems that the Tagadharis thought that those who did not wear the “holy thread” were Shudra. The work of agriculture and cattle-rearing done by Matwali castes most probably was seen as service. In the Muluki Ain. also those who made liquor at home and consumed it were called matwali and they were categorized as Shudra.17 Shudra was used symbolically, as there are no people in the Nepali Pahade (hill) community called Shudras in the oral narratives of the people although there were mathilo jaat (upper castes) and tallo jaat (lower castes). The upper and lower castes were also called thulo jaat (big caste) and syano jaat (small caste). All this is an indication of the jati system but not varnas. 14 People of certain castes such as Brahmin, Chhetri, Thakuri, and some other castes were allowed to wear “holy” threads called Janai. These castes were also called Tagadhari. Castes wearing holy thread were considered to be superior to those not wearing them. 15 Thar in Nepali means a variety or a type, where as gotra means a clan. In some communities such as Kirats (Rai-Limbu people), thar means a clan. 16 The members of six families belonged to the clans of Pandey, Aryal, Panta, Rana, Khanal, and Bohra. Their forefathers had helped Dravya Shaha to establish the political formation of Gorkha in the sixteenth century. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Kirkpatrick was assured that even the throne of the ruler would not be safe if the thar ghar thought that his actions would endanger sovereignty; he says that their ascendancy rested on the respect they derived from their services and attachment to the ruling family of Gorkha. See William J. Kirkpatrick, An Account of the Kingdom of Nepaul, Manjusri Publication House, New Delhi, 1969, pp. 124–125. 17 Matwalis were also categorized as those who could be enslaved, and those who could not be enslaved. They were also categorized on the basis of whether water could or could not be accepted from them. For an English translation of Muluki Ain regarding jaat, see M. C. Regmi, Nepal: An Historical Miscellany, Adroit Publishers, Delhi, 2002.

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By the nineteenth century, a socio-political framework was created in the Himalayan region, under the ceremonial or nominal leadership of the Gorkhali Shaha rulers, based in Kathmandu. This political formation was ruled by the influential nobles with the help of local landlords in the countryside. This was the Gorkha Muluk, which was defined as Nepal18 by the British, and it gradually evolved as Nepal in the psyche of people as time passed. The basis of governance and law was defined in terms of ceremonial purity as derived from Hinduism practiced in Nepal and the rituals of the so-called upper castes (Bahun-Chhetri castes). The idea of sanctity or purity became the dominant discourse in a society, contributing to the idea of God and religion, continuously representing the idea of people’s existence. Because there were various jaats or jatis with different traditions and customs, the concept of purity was adjusted to the practices of these communities. Infractions of such customs and practices were made offenses that were punished with fines. For instance, ritual purity required that different jaats had priests of appropriate jaats for performing ceremonies during birth, funerals, and other occasions. Brahman priests were not allowed to perform such ceremonies for the jaats who “keep liquor, chicken, and pork” in their houses (Regmi 2002: 18). Various laws were also introduced regarding sexual relations, and the acceptance of food and water among the jaats.19 The archives of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries show instances of caste degradation associated with the making of the lower castes or untouchables. The royal Brahmin priests used to play a central role in diplomacy of conquests and relations among the Rajas through the medium of letter exchanges and the news transmitted by reporters and spies, who were also Brahmins. The killing of a Brahmin and a guru (teacher) was considered a mahapapa (great sin) and mahaapradha (great crime); these are also mentioned in the medieval inscriptions. Hence, a Brahman was not given a death sentence for his crimes (Vaidya and Manandhar 1985). Five types of serious punishments called Panchakat—confiscation of property, degradation from caste, banishment, mutilation, and death—were awarded to criminals. Degradation of caste would be the most severe penal action for the Brahman; his holy thread would be torn off, his head shaved, and a small pig hung on his neck. Another way would be to make him drink wine and eat pork. He was declared an untouchable, considering it equivalent to death. Crimes such as murder, spying, and conspiracy against the state committed by a Brahmin were punishable with caste degradation (Regmi 2002). This punishment was inflicted often on those people who were regarded as enemies of the Gorkha Raj (Pradhan 1991). Some instances of caste degradation in history are worth mentioning. The Jaisi Brahmins of Belakot had planned to hand over the son of Prithvi Narayan Shah, the crown prince Pratap Singh Shaha of Gorkha, to Jaiprakash Malla of Kathmandu. When he (Prithvi) learned about it, he degraded the Jaisis from their caste to 18 In

the past, only the Kathmandu Valley was called Nepal. such laws and punishments see Tulasi Ram Vaidya and Triratna Manandhar, Crime and Punishment in Nepal: A Historical Perspective, Bini Vaidya and Purna Devi Manandhar, Kathmandu, 1985.

19 For

1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal

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untouchable status, had them killed, and their properties confiscated. He also made the families of the Makwani Army untouchables when he conquered Makwanpur. According to Captain Knox, in 1799, after the death of his queen, Kantavati, Rana Bahadur Shah degraded some Brahmins to lower caste because they could not cure her.20 Kulnidhi Tiwari, a Brahmin, was punished with degradation to the lowest caste and was banished from the kingdom by Rana Bahadur Shah in 1796 when he unearthed a major corruption scandal.21 In1837, the physicians (Brahmins) who were suspected of poisoning the prince under the direction of Bhim Sen Thapa were made untouchables. In the nineteenth century, the process of Hinduisation and Sanskritisation was accelerated and enforced by the state. Certain existing practices such as cross-cousin marriage (with a maternal uncle’s daughter), levirate, and marrying the elder brother’s widow including the widows of cousins, were declared illegal. The Brahmins who committed this crime were to face caste degradation (jaat patit garnu) or they were made ajaat, or untouchable, during the prime ministership of Bhim Sen Thapa, who defined these relationships as incest. In 1853–1854, Prime Minister Jung Bahadur Rana introduced the legal code called Ain, later to be known as Muluki Ain, which was an attempt to bring the various jaats into a single framework. This Muluki Ain divided people into four vertical categories: Tagadhari, Matwali, Pani nachalne chhoichhito halnu naparne (water unacceptable but whose touch does not require purification through sprinkling of water), and Pani nachalne chhoichhito halnu parne (water unacceptable and whose touch needs purification through sprinkling of water).Tagadhari consisted of vertically arranged jaats: Upadhyaya Brahman, Rajput,22 Jaisi Brahman, Chhettri, Dyabhaju Brahmin (Newars and Madhesi Brahmans). Matwali consisted of two hierarchical divisions: Namasine (non-enslavable) and Masine (enslavable). Magar, Gurung, and Sunuwar23 were defined as Namasine, while jaats such as Bhotya (including Tamangs and Sherpas), Tharu, Gharti, Chepang, Majhi, Danuwar, Hayu, Darai, Meche, Kumal, and others were defined as Masine. Matwali and Shudra are used interchangeably in Ain. In the third category, the Newars such as Kasai, Kusle, Kulu, Dhobi, and Chudara are mentioned; others are Musalmans, Mlechchha (Europeans), and Teli from Madhes. The lowest category consists of “untouchables”: Sarki, Kami, Sunar, Chunara, Hudke, Damai, Gaine, Badi, Chyamkhalak, and Pode. Except for the last two Newar jaats, others are pahade untouchables. This Muluki Ain continued in effect until 1963 but with amendments from time to time. 20 “He cut off noses and ears of many of the Brahmins who officiated at the temples where prayers had been offered for the recovery of the Rannee; he deprived others of their caste by forcing the flesh of dogs and hogs into their mouths”. For details, see M.C. Regmi, Kings and Political Leaders of the Gorkhali Empire 1768–1814, Orient Longman, 1995, p. 9. 21 It appeared that Kajis and Bhardars sent Tiwari to Bhirkot (the then new territory) to collect gadibubarakh tax without royal authority. Tiwari collected NRs.6,000, which he shared with his co-conspirators. For details, see M.C. Regmi, Kings and Political Leaders of the Gorkhali Empire 1768–1814, Orient Longman, 1995, pp. 58–59. 22 These pahade Rajputs are today called Thakuri. 23 Later, Rais and Limbus were added to the Namasine category.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

The reading of Muluki Ain introduced by Prime Minister Jang Bahadur Rana in 1853–1854 and the legal codes issued earlier during the times of Bhimsen Thapa in the first half of the nineteenth century provide ample archives for the understanding of discriminatory provisions of the political establishment in terms of caste and religion. This also made women subordinate to men. The caste divisions and its system of high and low castes were made possible by controlling the bodies of women—to be precise, by making laws regarding sexual relations and marriage. As inter-caste marriage (intermixing of blood) could not be stopped, the rulers and their advisers ensured that children born out of inter-caste marriages be assigned lower status, usually the caste of their mothers where the father belonged to a higher caste in the social hierarchy. In the nineteenth century, archives show that the heads of the untouchable castes were called Mijars (Kami and Sarki) and Nagarchis (Damai). Oral traditions also confirm this social practice. The Mijars and Nagarchis enjoyed the benefit of smallscale industries and trade until 1923, when the Ranas allowed British goods to enter Nepal and did not take much interest in technical or industrial development of the country. These heads were entrusted with the task of sorting out issues related to their castes. This system was developed with the objective that the community members would not have to go to offices or courts to settle trivial legal matters. A Mijar sometimes used to exploit his people; no appeal was heard against him. The Muluki Ain uses the terms “untouchable” and “lower caste” for the so-called lower castes in the chapters consisting of rules and regulations and not as separate castes. Nowhere, does the Ain treat them as a part of society but, rather, as casteless people. In the Muluki Ain, the chapter titled “Dharma Adhikar Ko” is full of stipulations, in violation of which the Tagadhari was degraded to untouchable status. The crimes for such a punishment in Ain are adultery; sex with an untouchable; marriage with an untouchable; a woman undergoing abortion; accepting rice, pulse, or water from untouchables and from the people of Jhana pana sect (heretics); revolt or conspiracy against the state (only Brahmins were made untouchables for this crime, while others were killed); and marriage and sexual relations with the relatives (especially cross–cousin marriage and marrying the widow of an elder brother). The royal authority appointed the Dharmaadhikars, the judges from the Upadhyaya Brahmin caste. A person accused of a crime was presented before the court of the Dharmaadhikar, who would brand him as an untouchable. Such a person could re-join his caste after a purification ceremony, but he had to obtain a certificate called patiya from the judge to undergo such a ceremony on payment of a heavy fine and, in most of the cases, his property was confiscated by the state. According to the Ain, the judge could issue such a certificate only to those persons who had committed the crime “unknowingly”. Crimes such as marriage with an untouchable and conspiracy or revolt against the state were unpardonable, and no patiya could be issued for these crimes. If it was found that the accused had committed the crime in full awareness, the judge could issue patiya only through royal permission; the accused had to approach the palace and prove his innocence to get, permission for it, and this was not an easy task for anyone. For instance, Tanka Prasad Acharya, who later became Prime Minister

1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal

25

of Nepal, was made an untouchable by the Ranas, and he spent 10 years in prison, but when he was released after the downfall of the Ranas, he was re-admitted to the Brahmin caste (Fisher 1998: 107–108). This shows that the king could re-admit even those persons who had become untouchables for 10 years back to their previous caste. The Ain did not spare the judge also; if he issued the certificate before branding the accused as an untouchable and had taken rice or water from him, the judge himself would be dismissed and degraded to untouchable status. The officials who had assisted him also faced the same punishment. If the officials and state functionaries helped the accused person in getting a certificate by taking bribes, they would meet the same fate. The Muluki Ain continued until 1963 and was made invalid after the introduction of a new Muluki Ain by King Mahendra. The degradation of caste through marriage with untouchables continues as a social practice even though it is outlawed. The law facilitated the system of degradation from caste. If a person from a higher caste had sexual relations with a lower-caste woman, he was required to pay a nominal fine or none at all. If he married a woman from a lower caste, it was not necessary for him to pay Jarikhat, i.e., he did not have to pay a fine to the former husband of his wife.24 A person was degraded to the caste of his wife but was allowed to maintain his property and have social relations with his relatives and friends from his previous caste. However, the system of degradation legally recognized them as members of castes such as the Kami, Damai, and others. Such suppression in the name of caste or religion was challenged by the Brahmins themselves, especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by starting a Josmani cult. aimed at reforming society. The most popular among the Josmani saints was Gyan Dil Das (1821–1883) from the eastern hills of Nepal–Ilam. He preached against caste and religious rituals. In fact, he had disciples from all castes such as Kami, Damai, Rai, Limbu, Kirat, Brahmin, Chhetri, and others. As a result of this movement, the Rana regime under Janga Bahadur became alarmed, and issued an order to arrest Das. They could not arrest him but got some Brahmins to oust Das from the Brahmin community. Consequently, Das fled to Darjeeling, India, saying that he was going to “find his lost caste” (Kisan 2005: 87). Another example of dissent against the Ranas is that of Yog Maya Koirala (1868– 1941). She was a Josmani Brahmin who criticized the caste system and social practices and mobilized the people against these practices. She committed suicide along with her followers by jumping into the Arun River after the Ranas learned of the movement and tried to arrest them. It was a symbolic protest against caste discrimination and violence during the Rana regime. In fact, untouchability was equivalent to death, and the untouchables were out of the social system as casteless. They tried to create a space in society or a system by creating an identity, which could be possible only by organizing themselves into castes and by strengthening their castes. For this reason, they seem to have converted the existing terms associated with work into castes such as (1) Sunar, Kami, Tamata, 24 A man who married the wife of another man had to pay certain penalty as specified in the law to the former husband of the woman. The fine was called Jarikhat.

26

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

Chunaro, Od, Lohar; (2) Sarki; (3) Damai; and (4) Gaine—Gandharva. The Bhands or Badis were given the lowest status. Population size and economic status were the factors that determined the higher and lower strata. In the course of time, caste became a self-enclosed unit, limiting social intercourse with other castes, including marriage. There are myths among them that show their desire to be accepted in society. For instance, the myth about Kamis is that they are the descendants of Bishwakarma (the heavenly engineer of the gods and the son of Brahma), while the Gaines say that they were Gandharvas or the musicians of the gods, but due to the curse of a Rishi (a Hindu seer or sage) they became untouchable. As the Nepalese found themselves headed towards modernity, they still had broad divisions in society. Just as the khola-nala (rivers and streams) used to divide the political formations (usually called baisi-chaubaisi rajya) in the Himalayan region before the Gorkha Raj, water was dividing society into pani chalni (water-acceptable castes) and pani nachalni (water-unacceptable castes). Within the water-acceptable castes, the Bahun-Chhetri were dominant and had easier access to the political life of Nepal. The Matwalis or Janajatis were deprived of holding positions of power and decision making; whereas the pani nachalni or Dalits were considered the most impure and were not allowed to enter into the socio-politic and cultural arena of the state. When Nepal became a member of the United Nations in 1955, the state had to abolish the caste system, which had been prevalent since the time of Jayastithi Malla in the fourteenth century. It became embarrassing for the Nepali ruler, King Mahendra, to legally support the caste system as the Muluki Ain had envisioned. King Mahendra thus introduced an idea of equality before the law in 1963 through a new Muluki Ain. The main reason was that Article 1 of the UN charter aims “To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” Similarly, Article 55 provides for universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. Article 2 mentions that “all members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.” Thus, we can see that in 1963, King Mahendra, most probably under compulsion, promulgated a new Civil Code (Mulki Ain), making degradation of caste and discrimination illegal. Soon after the introduction of this new Muluki Ain, the Dalits attempted go inside the Pasupatinath temple, from which they had hitherto been banned. The government reacted quickly and stated that the caste system was not abolished. It cited Section 10, entitled Adal ko (on disciplinary matters), and it warned, “those who indulge in actions prejudicial to the social customs and traditions of others will be punished”. The punishment granted by the section was imprisonment for one year or a fine of Rs. 1,000 (Singh 2012). Untouchability and discrimination against the Dalits are perpetuated in the name of tradition even today. The constitution of 1990 makes untouchability and discrimination illegal and mentions that the state would take measures to uplift the Dalits. In addition, the interim constitution of 2006 said that

1.3 History of the Caste System and Untouchability in Nepal

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the representation of Dalits in each sector and level of the state would be guaranteed. The constitution of Nepal promulgated in 2015 has various provisions regarding social justice, ensuring rights, and uplifting the lives of Dalits. In the preamble only, the constitution says that the historic document aims to end untouchability. Articles 3, 6, 16, 17,18, 26, and 32 have to do with ensuring rights of all citizens including Dalits and other marginalized communities. Article 24 is specifically against discrimination and untouchability. According to Article 24(1), “no person shall be treated with any kind of untouchability or discrimination in any private or public place on grounds of caste, ethnicity, origin, community, occupation, or physical condition”. Article 24(2) aims to end untouchability in public places. It says, “no person belonging to a particular caste or ethnicity shall be prevented from buying an object or getting services or facilities in the process of production of such objects or in the distribution or delivery of services, or no such objects shall be sold to, or facilities or services distributed or delivered to, persons belonging to a particular caste or ethnicity only.” Articles 24(3) and 24(4) deal with ending untouchability and racial discrimination. Article 24(5) has made untouchability “punishable by law as a serious social crime, and the victim of such an act shall have the right to compensation as provided for by law.” Article 40 of the constitution outlines rights of Dalits specifically. The sub-articles of this article have the following provisions— • Dalits shall have the right to participate in all agencies of the state based on the principle of proportional inclusion. There shall be special legal provision of empowerment, representation, and participation of the Dalit community for employment in other areas also, including public service. • Provision of free education with scholarships shall be made for Dalit students from the primary to higher levels of education as provided for in law. Special provision shall be made in law for Dalits to pursue higher education in technical and professional subjects. • In order to provide health care and social security to the Dalit community, special arrangements shall be made in accordance with law. • The Dalit community shall have the right to use, preserve, and develop their traditional occupations, knowledge, skills, and technology. The State shall give priority to modern professions of Dalits in relation to their traditional occupations, by providing them with necessary skills and resources. • The State shall, according to law, provide land to landless Dalits for one time. • The State shall, according to law, make housing arrangements for Dalits who do not have housing of their own. • The facilities provided to the Dalit community according to this Article, shall have to be justly distributed to Dalit women and men and all the Dalit communities living in different parts of the country, ensuring that all Dalits receive the facilities proportionally. To provide these rights and ensure that Dalits have a dignified social life and representations, Article 255, 256, and 257 are about establishment of the Nepal Dalit Commission not only in the federal capitals but in provincial capitals as well.

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1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

Articles 258 and 259 are about inclusion and rightful representation of marginalized communities in various spheres of social and political life. Although there have been such constitutional and legal provisions, it seems that very little has been translated into practice. According to new Civil Code that came into force from 17 August 2018, no person can be discriminated against on the bases of religion, race, caste, community, profession, sex, physical disability, marital status, language, and ideological inclination. According to the law, people must not be discriminated against in either the private or public spheres of life.25 The act made to amend and unify laws related to criminal offences and to discrimination based on caste and other grounds was outlawed. According to this law, a person engaged in caste-based discrimination either in personal or public interactions including buying and selling of goods and services can be fined 30,000 Rs. and/or imprisoned for three years.26 In Nepal’s democratic exercise, the Nepali Congress (NC) in the 1950s tried to sensitize marginalized communities such as women, Dalits, Janajatis, and Madhesis about their political rights by providing space for their members in political activities. The Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) was in forefront in talking about issues of Dalit and Janajati groups. During the Maoist insurgency or “people’s war”, they mobilized and organized people along the lines of caste and ethnicity. These issues gradually became popular owing to the concepts of inclusion and politics of representation since the dawn of liberal democracy after the Second Janaandolan and the first CA election in 2008. Even though Nepal has become a democratic country with equality of individuals of all genders, castes, religions, and other divisions, social hierarchy based on caste still exists in Nepal despite the adoption of democracy as a political system.

1.4 Differences Between Hill Dalits and Other Dalit Groups It is generally believed that Hinduism and Hinduisation are the sources of untouchability in society, and the discourse of the former untouchables (who are termed Dalits today) in Nepal also could not go beyond Hinduism while making an analysis of it. Although there may be some truth in this argument, it might not give the whole picture. In fact, the practice of untouchability seems to have gone beyond Hinduism (Pyakurel 2011). Looking at the social hierarchy, the communities that perform artisanal works are placed in the system as untouchables. However, in the Hindu Dharmasasthras, compiled in India, nowhere are the artisans mentioned as untouchables. This also can be seen in the case of the Newari system, where the artisans are placed above the middle jaats, the Jyapus. This leads us to look into the social hierarchy of the Indo-Gangetic plains from where the scholars have said the caste system and practice 25 The

Act made to amend and unify the Civil Laws, 2017. 10 of the act amended and unified laws related to criminal offences.

26 Section

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of untouchability was introduced into Nepal. This assumption, however, could not hold true because in the Indo-Gangetic plains the artisans and craftsmen comprised the middle castes. Thus, it is difficult to say that the concept of untouchability in the hills of Nepal was brought from the South, present-day India. Nevertheless, one has to look towards the north to find something that helped to introduce practices of untouchability. Jayastithi Malla did impose a caste-system in Kathmandu in the fourteenth century after consultation with five Indian Brahmins invited all the way from Banaras. But that did not put artisans and craftsmen, such as Nakarmi and Kau, into the untouchable category. It was becase they imposed the Indian caste system in which artisans and craftsmen were not untouchables. At the same time, a different practice was found not only in the hills of Nepal, but also in the whole of the Himalayan region, from Ladakh in the west to Sikkim in the east, in which people with similar occupations were treated as untouchables. It is necessary to seek out the causes of such practices in that region. There has been no serious study on why artisans and craftsmen were given two different identities in the same region. Some literature indicates that Lamaist Buddhism, which was practiced in Tibet, was instrumental in categorizing them as untouchable. Although Buddhism is considered an egalitarian religion, it has been practiced in different ways in different communities. Research into Indian history (e.g., Sharma 1983; Shrimali 2007) has shown that the Buddha’s theory of Karma could have granted a backdoor entry to the caste system in which birth in a low caste could be explained as the result of the Karmas in previous births. The Buddha did not oppose the caste system but tried to show the superior status of the ruling class (Kshatriya) over the priestly class—the Brahmins. What the Buddha opposed were the rituals and ceremonies, involving the sacrifice of animals. The Buddha again did not consider the caste of a person only when admitting him to the Sangha (monastic order). He said that the caste of the person mattered only during marriage and social intercourse. Moreover, Lamaist Buddhism practiced in Tibet, which incorporates different values from Buddhism than those practiced in the rest of the world, seems to have helped introduce the idea of untouchability for artisans and craftsmen. It seems that during the time of the Khasa kingdom, which also included western Tibet, Buddhist lamas brought with them the idea that artisans and craftsmen were impure and should be put in the lowest rank of society. It is said that metalsmiths and tailors were considered low-ranking people in Tibet, similar to untouchables in Nepal and India. Working with iron was considered impure, so much so that Tibetans never used iron ploughshares in agriculture. Some people define Lamaist Buddhism as “a network of social institutions that came to prominence on the basis of feudal ownership of land and serfs”. And in turn, Lamaist doctrine justified that exploitation by insisting that “the righteous were born to rule and sinners born to suffer”. Various studies (e.g., Dhungel 2002) reveal that such a practice continues in societies influenced by Tibetan culture. In Ladakh, Bhutias, in their communities still consider the Gara (metalsmiths), Mon (tailors and musicians), and Bheda (sweepers)

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to be untouchables.27 In the case of “untouchable castes” in the hills of Nepal, it seems that in the past there were manufacturing units functioning under guilds, each guild being under one head. A guild or a person was known by the associated work—gold workers were called Sunars, those involved in construction and pot-making were called Od, working on copper made one a Tamata, one engaged in iron-related work was known as Lohar or Kami, those making utensils from wood were called Chunara, one who crafted bamboo works as Parki, those who worked with leather were Sarkis, and tailors and weavers were called Damais. And, there was a class of people called Gandharvas who moved from place to place, spreading the latest news through their songs. However, it seems many scholars and activists have either not realised the different practices or deliberately tried to overlook the issue. However, few historians such as D.R. Regmi have touched upon this issue. Although Regmi’s study by and large covers the history of the Kathmandu Valley in which Jayasthithi Malla introduced the caste system making it similar to the Indian caste system, it seems relevant to discuss his arguments while examining the practice of untouchability in Nepal. According to him, caste existed in Nepal from early times, and it was based on the traditional concept of four castes (varnas), 36 sub-castes (jaata), and the lowest being the untouchables. The division of castes broadly corresponded to the four main functions—priests, warriors or officials, traders and merchants, and artisans and peasants, and others. Below these four varnas were untouchables who performed essential but unclean work.What was interesting was that the various tribes outside the Valley of Nepal were treated as a distinct caste at par with the fourth one (Regmi 2007: 655). But artisans and peasants were not in the list of untouchables. He further quotes Amarakosa (Canto II, Sudravarga, 5–14), compiled in India, which states that the castes of artisans, garland makers, potters, plasterers, tailors, weavers, painters, armourers, leather workers (two types), blacksmiths (two types), goldsmiths (four types), washer men (two types), sheep graziers, and temple guards were mentioned as Shudras. Also, some sources place jugglers, dancers (five types), actors, players of certain musical instruments such as the mrdanga28 and flute, hunters of wild birds, meat sellers (three groups), labourers (five groups), and carriers (three groups) also as Shudra (Regmi 2007: 695) rather than untouchables. Some social historians such as Prayag Raj Sharma and Ramesh K. Dhungel do acknowledge that there is a strong sense of hierarchy within Tibetan society. Historian Ram Ninas Pandey reveals that the mountain tribes in Nepal, especially the Gurungs, followed Lamaistic Buddhism. According to him, they started following a caste system only after the influx of Rajputs in the region in the fifteenth century. Sharma says he is unsure whether the Tibetan community had an influence on the caste system practiced by its southern neighbours (Pyakurel 2011). However, Dhungel is sure that there was indeed some impact of western Tibetan culture on the Khasa rulers who ruled the entire Himalayan region for centuries. The Khasa entered Nepal not via 27 Based

on interactions with research scholars from Ladakh on September 21, 2008, in JNU. in the Odia language or mridôngo is a terracotta two-sided drum used in northern and eastern India as accompaniment for devotional music.

28 Mrdanga

1.4 Differences Between Hill Dalits and Other Dalit Groups

31

the Indo-Gangetic plains but via the north, especially from areas in western Tibet, such as Mansarovar and Kailash. And it was the Khasa rulers who introduced the mixed caste system by bringing Tibetan and Hindu traditions together. They did so as they were heavily influenced by Tibetan Buddhism before entering into Nepal (ibid.). Dhungel’s conclusion seems to be based on his study in the Lo/Mustang region, where he found a hierarchical system similar to the caste system. According to his study (2002: 14–15), a single phuru (drinking bowl) is used among people of equal status in public festivals and meetings. The bowl goes last to the “low status” person. Kha-thug and Kha-mi-thug (acceptability and denial of the touching of food by mouth) have been practiced in Lo/Mustang as old Tibetan traditions. Interestingly, Dhungel seems to have forgotten to look into whether the tradition of Kha-thug and Kha-mi-thug had any link with the practice of untouchability in the Nepali hills. This is because he writes in subsequent lines that the tradition of acceptability and denial of the touching of food by mouth “does not have any link with the Nepali pani chalne and nachalne tradition” (ibid.). In sum, whatever situation Nepali Dalits have been facing is not different than that of the problems faced by Dalits in other parts of the world. But the caste system, which is instrumental in dividing society into Dalits and non-Dalits, has been different in Nepal and hilly areas of South Asia in particular. In fact, the caste system practiced in Nepal’s hills and Himalayan regions was neither based on Hindu culture nor the only outcome of Lamaist Buddhism. It was a mixed system that borrowed most of its caste-related ideas from Hinduism, but in classifying artisans and craftsmen as untouchable, it borrowed heavily from Lamaist Buddhism. This must be the reality of D.R. Regmi (2007: 657), who writes that the “Buddhist section of Nepal was not self-contained and isolated in regard to its caste system. They had not only to maintain close-knit relations with their counterparts in other sections, but they had also to depend for various social services on castes according to tradition”.

1.5 Research Setting The following section broadly introduces the field area with its population composition, geographical locality, and so on. Topographically, Nepal is a mountainous region that is inhabited by people of Tibetan origin, i.e., Bhote, Sherpa, Thakali, and others. The mountainour region is the northern part of the country covering 15% of Nepal’s total land area and containing 0.7% of its population. The hill region is situated between the mountain and Terai regions. It covers the hills and river valleys of the Mahabharat Hills range south of the Himalayas and the Churia hills north of the Terai region. Of a total of 77 districts in Nepal, 15 are located in this region. Also, it has a hilly region, which covers approximately 68% of the land area along with having 48% of the population of Nepal with 36 districts. Several caste and ethnic settlements overlap in this region. Of a total of 36.4% of the ethnic population of Nepal, 25.8% reside in this region only. Likewise, of a total of 57.5% of the caste population in Nepal, 40.3% are settled in this region. The third is the Terai region,

32

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

which is considered the traditional homeland of tribal people, i.e., Tharu, Rajbansi, Dhimal, and others. People of “Indian origin” are also settled in Terai. The Terai is a flatland and an extension of the Gangetic Plain that spreads all along the border with India in the southern part of the country. It covers 17% of the area of Nepal and has 24 districts with 52% of the country’s population (Pyakurel 2007b). Politically, Nepal is divided into seven states (provinces), with 77 districts, each having a number of municipalities. At least four states cover all three ecological zones, viz., the Mountain, Hill and Terai regions, whereas two states lie towards the plain area. Only Karnali state, in which Surkhet is located, is is structured with hill and mountain areas. Although Dalits are spread all over the country, there is regional variation in the distribution of their population. For instance, Dalits are very few in number in the mountain region and the eastern and central parts of the hill region. They are numerically well represented in the western hill region and Terai. Table 1.1 shows in terms of sub-castes the Dalit population in Nepal enumerated in the censuses of 2001 and 2011. According to the 2001 Census, Dalits constituted a sizable population of 2.9 million (12.9%), in Nepal. In Nepal, Dalits are classified into three broad categories: Hill Dalits, Terai Dalits, and Newar Dalits. However, the Newar Dalits are not enumerated in the 2001 and 2011 national census. Census 2011 (CBS 2014) enumerated a total of 12.6% of Dalits that includes 5 castes under the Hill “low caste” or Dalits with a population of 2,151,526 (8.1% in total), and 15 castes as Madhesi “low caste’” groups (defined as socio-economic level 3 in the Census) with a population of 1192,517 (4.5%). Table 1.1 shows many varying situations as far as Dalit populations are concerned. This is due to the fact that identification by a separate cultural category has been steadily increasing in Nepal in recent years. During this time, a cultural group is placed either within the Adibasi/Janajati or Madhesi or Dalit category as there is lack of knowledge of the history and culture of various ethnic/caste groups (World Bank 2006). On the issue of ethnic group, the CBS identified only 60 ethnic/caste groups in the 1991 census, 100 ethnic/caste groups were further identified in the 2001 census, and the list of ethnic/caste groups was 125 in the 2011 census. The Adibasi/Janajati Uthan Prathistan (2002) provided a list of 59 cultural groups within the Adibasi/Janajati category alone. A technical committee formed by the Adiabsi/Janajati Pratisthan further updated this list to 81 groups (Dahal 2014: 3). As far as Dalits are concerned, it was the Dalit Commission that had listed 22 separate cultural groups within Dalits in 2003, but again it updated the list of Dalits, adding 7 more groups in the Dalit category, making a total of 29 cultural groups within Dalits, citing recommendations of the technical committee formed by the commission. From census 2001 to census 2011, quite a big change could be seen within the list of Dalit population. Six more groups—Kalar, Natuwa, Dhandi, Dhanikar/Dharikar, Kori, and Sarbariya—were added as “low caste” groups of the Tarai in the 2011 census. Also, some groups that were under the category of Dalit in the 2001 census were moved from the list of Dalits to ethnic communities while analysing the 2011 census. The ethnographic research carried out by the research team of SIA-EP of the Central

1.5 Research Setting

33

Table 1.1 Dalit populations in Nepal and the sub-castes within the Dalits S.N.

Group

Census 2011 Total population, 2011

Census 2001 National average (%)

Share of Dalits (%)

Share of total (%)

1

Kami

1,258,554

4.8

37.64

29.57

2

Damai

472,862

1.8

14.14

12.98

3

Sarki

374,816

1.4

11.21

10.53

4

Sunar/Sonar

64,335

0.2

–

4.79

5

Gaine

6,791

0.02

0.2

0.19

6

Badi

38,603

0.1

1.15

0.15

7

Bantar/Sardar

55,104

0.2

1.65

1.18

8

Chamar/Harijan/Ram

335,893

1.3

10.04

8.9

9

Chidimar

1,254

0.005

0.04

0.41

10

Santhal/Satar

51,735

0.2

–

1.41

11

Dome

13,268

0.05

0.4

0.29

12

Dushad/Paswan/Pasi

208,910

0.8

6.25

5.23

13

Dhobi

109,079

0.4

3.26

2.42

14

Halkhor

4,003

0.02

0.12

0.12

15

Khatchwe

100,921

0.4

3.02

2.47

16

Lohar

101,421

0.4

–

2.73

17

Mushar

234,490

0.9

7.01

5.69

18

Tatma/Tatwa

104,865

0.4

–

2.53

19

Kori

12,276

0.05

0.37

–

20

Kalar

1,077

0.004

0.03

–

21

Sarabaria

4,906

0.02

0.15

–

22

Kalar

1,077

0.004

0.03

–

23

Dhandi

1,982

0.007

0.06

–

24

Natuwa

3,062

0.011

0.09

–

Source Various tables of the CBS census report 2001 and CBS 2014

Department of Sociology and Anthropology in 2012–2014 (Dahal 2014) suggested that the “Chidimar” community is no longer a Dalit community as outlined previously by the National Dalit Commission. The Lohar and Sunar/Sonar, Santhal/Satar (https://www.jagaranmedia.org.np/dalit–center/), Tatma/Tatwa, and others that were Dalit groups according to the 2001 census were removed from the list in 2011. Likewise, the CBS (2014) excluded Chidimar from the group while analysing the Dalit population. But the Chidimar were enumerated in the census as we could see in Table 1.1. Here it is noted that the Nepali state through its census omitted the group

34

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

from the Dalit category, on the one hand. On the other, another government body— the National Dalit Commission—treats them as Dalits even today. Due to these kinds of confusing and contrary acts being carried out by government institutions, a sudden decrease in the total Dalit population and change in the population number of particular caste groups could be witnessed while comparing the data of two censuses. In a 10-year gap from 2001 to 2011, while exponential growth rate of the Chidimar is –22.83% and the Sunar/Sonar is –8.13% (CBS 2014: 120), the Badi population went up by 21.62%, and the population growth rate of the Kami population was 3.46% (CBS 2014: e).

1.6 Surkhet at A Glance This study is based on data about the Dalits of the Surkhet District in general, and in the Birendranagar Municipality in particular. Surkhet, a dynamic and rapidly progressing area, is the capital of the Karnali state of Nepal. It is full of breathtaking natural beauty and resources. Green jungles and valleys with magnificent mountains are the main attractions of Surkhet. The district is situated at an altitude of 198 to 2,367 m above sea level. It occupies a 2,451 sq. km area and comprises effective local government units (five municipalities and four rural municipalities) reorganized from an earlier structure of 50 Village Development Committees (VDCs) and a municipality. The old name of this district was Chaubhanchaus, which was later changed to Surkhet. The new name, Surkhe, means “secured place” and there are a couple of sayings connected with this name: 1. It is the place that covers and is secured by the Bheri River from the east and the Karnali River in the west. People started called it Surkhet instead of the Nepali name Surakshit Chhetra (“Secured Place”). 2. Siru (a species of grass) was available in this area. That is why it was called Siru Khet. Later, people started calling it Surkhet instead of Siru Khet, as the first was easier to pronounce. 3. There was a god named Sura who drained all the water out of the valley and the area became habitable. This area was called Surkhet (named after Ejod Sura). The longitude of the district is from 28º 20 N to 28º 58 N, and the latitude is 80º 59  E to 82º 2 E. Salyan District in the east; Doti District and Achhham District in the west; Achham, Dailekh, and Jajarkot districts in the north; and Kailali and Bardiya districts in the south border the district of Surkhet. Approximately 43% of the land is in the Mahabharat hill range, 42% of the land is in the valley and hilly region, and 13% of the land is in the Churia Range. It ranks amongst the most developed 24 districts of the 75 districts in Nepal, which is comparable to Lalitpur (21) on the development scale, if not to Bhaktapur (12) in the Kathmandu Valley. As the overall composite index suggests, the situation of Surkhet District on the intermediate level remains fairly sound, if not completely satisfactory, on the national development scene (Pyakurel 2011). The 2014 Human Development

1.6 Surkhet at A Glance

35

Index (HDI) of the district is 0.389 which is commendable in comparison with other districts on the west of the Gandak zone.

1.7 Social Composition of the Population of Surkhet According to the CBS (2011), the population of Surkhet District had reached 350,804, of which 169,421 were males and 181,383 were females. Of the total population, 72.3% are urban as they reside in the five municipalities. Table 1.2 shows the major ethnic/caste groups of populations in the district dominated prominently by the people of Chhetri (a high-caste group) followed by the Janajati Magars and Kami (blacksmiths) of the Dalit group. This district has the largest population of three Hill Dalits (Kami, Sonar, and Badi) and an ethnic group, Raji. The district, thus, is multi-ethnic, comprising people of different dialects including a number of Magar and Tharu mother tongues. Surkhet is one of the districts in mid-western Nepal where Dalits are mostly concentrated. Some 3.64% total of the population of Hill Dalits of Nepal and 17.42% of the total Hill Dalits residing in the Mid-Western Development Region live in Surkhet. If further broken down, it is the district that has 20% of the total Badi population of Nepal, 8% of the total Gaine population, 6% of the total Sonar, almost 5% of the Kami, almost 3% of the total Damai/Dom, and almost 2% of the total Sarki of Nepal. It is Surkhet District that alone has 18.7% of the Kami in the total regional population. Likewise, it alone accounts for 15.25% of Damai/Dom, 21.79% of Sonar, 22.79% of Gaine, and 26.77% of Badi in the total regional population (Pyakurel 2011). Table 1.2 Classification of the population in Surkhet (non-Dalits and Dalits) Caste/Ethnicity

2001 Census

Number

Percentage

Chhetri

74,820

25.93

110,907

31.6

Magar

55,668

19.29

66,219

18.9

Kami

40,382

14.00

64,159

18.3

Brahmin

33,285

11.54

40,440

11.5

Number

2011 Census Percentage

Thakuri

12,277

4.26

16,628

4.7

Damai/Dholi

10,553

3.66

15,781

4.5

Sarki

5,502

1.91

8,157

2.3

Sanyasi

5,109

1.77

5,989

1.7

Tharu

5,631

1.95

6,890

2.0

Gurung

4,312

1.49

4,614

1.3

Source Population Census Record 2001 (Mid-Western Development Region), Kathmandu: NPC/June 2002; CBS, Surkhet 2014

36

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

In the case of Surkhet District, the 1991 census report had shown Dalits comprising 26.2% (59,064) of the total population. The population of Kami was the highest, numbering 42,166 (18.7%), followed by Damai (10,506) constituting 4.7% of the total population of Surkhet District. However, in 2001, both the population of Kami and Damai declined in the district. The National Labour Academy has shown a decline in the Dalit, population, which stood at 70,579 in Surkhet District. But again the population of major Dalit groups was found to have substantially increased in 2011: Kamis, who numbered around 40,382 (14%), had reached 64,159 (18.3%) in 2011 whereas the Damai population, which had numbered 10,553 (3.66%) in 2001, went up to 4.5%; and Sarki, from 5,502 (1.91%) to 2.3%. No pertinent reasons were given for this sudden change in the population of these two groups, but it is assumed to have been caused either by internal or external migration (Kumar 2010). The High Caste Hill group, which has been the dominant caste group in the district, had accounted for a total of 41.73% in 2001, and it also rose, to almost 48% in 2011. Although there was not much change in the Brahmin and Thakuri caste group, the change in the Chhetri caste group from 25.93 to 31.6% seems to have had an impact. Interestingly, the ethnic population decreased more in 2011 than in 2001. Magar, which alone constitute some 19.29% of the population of Surkhet District, came down to 18.9% and Gurung from 1.49 to 1.3%. Hunger and starvation in remote districts of mid-western Nepal have become recurrent phenomena in the past few decades. As recorded, the lowest consumption levels are among the low-caste Dalits with a poverty incidence of 46%, which is 15% higher than the incidence of poverty in the national average (CBS 2005: 9– 10). In Surkhet District, Dalits are at the bottom of the social ladder; a majority of them are landless and jobless; they cannot produce enough crops even to sustain three months’ needs. In terms of the HDI, they are thus at the bottom in the absence of social opportunities; they comprise a poverty-ridden group along with Janajatis and other disadvantaged groups. They are therefore, a relatively mobile population in search of “green pastures” and survival for want of a livelihood. If measured in terms of the dimension of human security—“freedom from want and freedom from fear”– Dalits represent the most vulnerable group. Surkhet, being a district made up mostly of the migrant populations from adjoining districts, is a good example to examine the migration patterns and the reasons for them. In a field study, respondents attributed the following reasons for the fragmentation of the family. Some 85% work at other places beyond the locality; 81% are in military service; 6% are in schooling; 4% are married; 2% have joined guerrilla forces; 0.37% left Surkhet because of conflict; and 1.4% were displaced by conflict. Despite the population figure being very low, nearly 2% of respondents pointed to the reality that people had been living together in a family for four generations, with 35% of the respondents claiming there were three generations living together, 49% for two generations, and only 10% in a nuclear family amongst the Hill Dalits—the target-group population of the study. Accordingly, some 50% of the family members live together, with the same ratio of people living separately. A total of 48% of Dalit families live together in the VDCs, whereas the ratio was 81% of Dalit families living

1.7 Social Composition of the Population of Surkhet

37

together in the municipality. Very few (5%) were those whose. Barely 1.0% of the children live in villages while their parents live in the town to earn a livelihood. As usual, cross-cutting social ties, functional ethnic-boundary-maintenance, and economic cooperation are prominent attributes of Surkhet. The reason for such a characteristic of the people living in the district is that most of them are migrants from the north—especially from Dailekh District in the north, Achham District to the northwest, and Jajarkot District in the northeast. It is said that the people from Dailekh, who are mostly settled in the towns, are in the majority. As Surkhet was a part of Dailekh District before 1962, the Dailekhi people have formed a bond of togetherness as they share a common origin and belong to the same socio-cultural and economic background. Surkhet is part of the development dossier of donors. Birendranagar town swarms with the NGOs andINGOs. In Surkhet District there are 47 local NGOs operating on a regular basis. With their broader nexus in the country and abroad, they have been performing developmental work in the district. Surkhet has, therefore, become integral to the socio-political and cultural activities of various NGOs. The activities of NGOs and INGOs are directly contributing to the businesses of the local hotels and allied industries. In this way they are helping to improve the economy and the lifestyle of the people by providing additional income sources, even though to a limited extent. Contacts with the activists of NGOs have also given opportunities to the local inhabitants to watch their behavioural patterns while interacting with them and learning from their experience in maintaining social relationships. Through the advocacy and development work, the activists are perhaps contributing to raising social awareness in the community, although the impact is not markedly visible at present. Another feature of Surkhet, which is linked with development activities contributing to the local economy, is the growth of the transport sector. Surkhet is already linked with the southern plains and Kathmandu through the Mahendra Highway. Expansion of the road network to Salyan, Jajarkot, and Dolpa districts and the existing road linking Jumla to Surkhet perhaps would be of tremendous value for the economy of Surkhet and its burgeoning transport industry controlled by the mid-western syndicate system making travel expensive at the moment. Provided with a road network linking both the south and the north, Surkhet can become a regional hub of economic activities, creating an impact on social relations in the future. Local people have opined that Surkhet has everything, including infrastructure, needed for a capital city. It is the “gateway to Karnali”. With the construction of the 232-km Karnali Highway, which is also known as the Surkhet–Jumla Road, Surkhet could act as a catalyst in the sphere of development. It can play the role of the capital of Federal Nepal.29 Also, more than 30 local newspapers are registered in the valley, out of which six are in publication.

29 Call

to Make Surkhet New Capital”, Himalayan Times, 31 March 2008

38

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

1.7.1 Surkhet Valley The Surkhet Valley area is about 50 km2 . It consists of Latikoili and Uttarganga VDC (one out of nine wards of Jarbutta VDC) and Birendranagar Municipality. The population of the city is approximately 55,000. Villagers from smaller surrounding communities migrate here in search of a better livelihood and personal security. It is approximately 400 km west of the Nepalese capital, Kathmandu. The temperature ranges from 5°C to 38°C from winter to summer. The inhabitants started living in this valley after the eradication of malaria. Before its own identity as an independent district, it was under the Dailekh District. Surkhet is a central hub to remote districts such as Dailekh, Kaalikot, Jumla, Mugu, Jajarkot, and Salyan.

1.7.2 Accessibility The Surkhet Valley is accessible by air service and road from various parts of the country. The Ratna Highway links it to the rest of Nepal. The Karnali Highway, currently under construction, will link Surkhet to the remote western region, Karnali. Surkhet is connected to Kathmandu, Nepalganj, Jumla, and several other districts by air service. There are three colleges which provide education up to the master’s level. It has a district hospital that provides basic medical services for its people. The main occupation is farming.

1.7.3 Birendranagar Municipality Birendranagar is situated in Surkhet District in the hill region of western Nepal. It is one of five districts of the Bheri zone which are part of the Karnali State. This state is located in the western part of the federal division that consists of 10 districts among the 77 districts of the country. Birendranagar, a mid-sized municipality with a 34 km2 area, is the headquarters of Surkhet District as well as the province’s capital. It is also the largest city of Karnali. The municipality, which lies on the banks of the Jhurpa and Bheri rivers, was established in 2033 BS.30 The municipality is located in a small, bow-shaped and beautiful valley surrounded by the Mahabharat and Churia hills. It is at an elevation of 655 m above sea level, and the climate is moderate. The municipality that was bordered by Latikoili and Uttarganga VDC in the south, Gadhi VDC in the north, Jarbutta VDC in the east, and Uttarganga and Lekhgaun VDCs in the west, has been expanded with restructuring in 2017. The population of Birendranagar municipality is 30 Bikram Sambat (BS) which is also called Vikram Samvat is known as the Vikrami calendar, a historical Hindu calendar in the Indian subcontinent. It is the official calendar of Nepal.

1.7 Social Composition of the Population of Surkhet Table 1.3 Population composition of Birendranagar Municipality

39

S. N

Category

Total

%

1

Chhetree

27,075

27.0

2

Brahman—Hill

20,680

20.6

3

Magar

12,675

12.6

4

Tharu

6,172

6.1

5

Tamang

242

0.2

6

Newar

1,128

1.1

7

Musalman

1,648

1.6

8

Kami

11,232

11.2

9

Gurung

1,642

1.6

10

Damai/Dholi

4,231

4.2

11

Thakuri

6,262

6.2

12

Sarki

2,829

2.8

13

Sanyasi/Dashnami

2,551

2.5

14

Bhote

418

0.4

15

Gaine

299

0.3

16

Badi

352

0.04

17

Chhantyal/Chhantel

112

0.1

18

Terai Others

101

0.1

Source CBS 2011

100,458, of which 51,687 are women (CBS 2017: 75). Table 1.3 shows the population composition of Birendranagar Municipality. Table 1.3 shows that almost 19% (18.85%) of Dalits live in the municipality. If we look at sub-castes of Dalit residents, we see that 11.2% Kami, 4.2% Damai/Dhobi, 2.8% Sarki, including 0.4% Badi and 0.3% Gaine have chosen the municipality as their permanent residence. Of the total number of Dalits, Kami themselves account for almost 60% of the share in Surkeht municipality. Although the general urban Damai/Dhobi and Kami populations are 13.1% and 10.2% respectively, they comprise a fair share in Surkhet.

1.8 Study Method The concept of social exclusion and inclusion are directly related to human beings and their perceptions. A researcher who is interested in analysing these aspects of human nature and their social links and relations with the household, community, and state has to not only acquire first-hand information (known as primary data in social science research) by direct interaction with people at their homes and workplaces, but also review available archival materials. There are two ways in which this study aims

40

1 Defining Dalits in a Nepali Context

to complement the ethnographic base in Birendranagar, Surkhet, Nepal. The first is to look at the larger political economy and discursive formations that provide the context for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood, as outlined in the section on Secondary Data, as well as by drawing on theoretical insights about relatively comparable issues from sociological and anthropological literature. The second strategy is to elicit insights through in-depth interviews or case studies. This study is an exploratory one, i.e., it intends to test the broader proposition of how inequality perpetuates the backwardness of a society in general, and certain groups or communities of people in particular. Following the argument of Beteille (1990, 1991: 26), “the sociological approach must take its orientation from the lived experiences of the present rather than the presumed idea of the past”, the researcher spent almost a year (including preliminary fieldwork and main data collection period) to understand the respondents’ conditions and their perceptions and experiences on social exclusion in Surkhet Valley. Also, data were updated along with regular follow up. This study involves both quantitative and qualitative research methods; however, focus has been put on the latter. The main objective of collecting quantitative data is to obtain an enriched qualitative analysis. The universe of this study is Dalits, who are in various spheres of activities, such as government employees; students of schools and colleges; owners, shareholders, and employees of registered private enterprises (i.e., hotels, firms, cottage industries, media houses, and so on); and local executive bodies of the political parties. Because the nature of this universe comprises people from diverse social positions, the total universe of the study has been classified into four clusters: government employees; private sector enterprises; the political sector; and students pursuing higher educations. To understand the rationale of the cluster division and to make the process simple, all the teachers and staff of private schools and colleges were placed in the private sector enterprises category, and teachers and staff of government schools and colleges were placed in the government employee category. Owing to the non-availability of relevant data from secondary sources, the researcher did a preliminary fieldwork in order to draw the appropriate sampling. In the preliminary stage, the researcher visited the field in a very informal manner to communicate with the people in the neighbourhood, so that informed consent could be obtained for systematic entry into the field report. This period was used for establishing rapport with the people. The researcher also visited government offices, local offices of various political parties, educational institutes of the field area, and so on to identify the actual size of the research universe. In the findings of the preliminary fieldwork, there were 322 Dalits of a total of 6,087 in four focal clusters, i.e., there were 64 (4.39%) Dalits of a total 1,456 government employees; 35 (5.93%) Dalits of a total 590 in private enterprises; 84 (10.30%) Dalits of a total 815 members in the political parties; 139 (4.17%) Dalit students of a total of 3,326 students at the + 2 and above level of education. We could have taken 5% of the total universe as a sample according to the scientific principle of sampling for reliable generalization of analysis of the data. However, this could not be done simply because of the fact that in some clusters such as government employees and students pursuing education at

1.8 Study Method

41

+2 and beyond levels, the representation of Dalits was less than 5%. As the focus of this study is on Dalits, and the number of Dalits found in all the four clusters of the field area was not large, the total number of Dalits has been selected as respondents for data collection. However, the study could cover only 244 respondents (Dalits) out of total sample of 322. Of those, there were 48 government employee Dalits; 36 Dalits in the private enterprises; 32 Dalit members in the political parties at the local level; and 128 Dalit students at the +2 and above level in verious educational institutions. This relatively small number can be attributed to the following reasons: 1. As mentioned earlier, the researcher had collected data one year prior to actually recording the data in a systematic manner. However, it happened that during this gap of one year, there was a major demographic change in the universe; many government employees were transferred; many job posts were vacated due to a severe economic crisis faced by government offices; many students left their educational institutes after they completed their studies; and many changes also took place at the local level of the political parties due to introduction of new policies after the successful mass movement in 2006. 2. The researcher was unable to meet a number of respondents in spite of visiting their residences and offices/institutions a couple of times. This was because civil servants were out of their offices either on leave or on deputation when the researcher tried to contact them; some students were studying as regular students and were simulteniously working in various locations as there is strict rule for compulsory attendance in educational institutions, especially in the government colleges; some memebers of political parties remained confined to the village even if they were district level leaders. 3. There were a number of cases in which the respondents were not ready to speak to the researcher. Most of them had been interviewed on earlier occasions by other researchers and expressed resentment at being asked for information again, because for most of them it can be associated with merely seeking information by the researcher while they, however, have to continue to live in the same conditions even after telling their story to several researchers. The very concern of those who do not wish to respond, the researcher think, has challenged the very task of field research on moral grounds. As Akeroyd (1984) states, “fieldwork exercise is considered morally inappropriate if its findings create more hardship to the life of the population that has been studied”. There is a controversy among scholars as to what type of research is appropriate on moral grounds; researchers have to be engaged with the very concern raised by those people. Although the positivists31 and the normative32 have different arguments, each of them have 31 The advocates of a positivist approach have argued that research guided by the values of researchers present only a biased reality. They twist facts of realities to conform to the value of the researcher. They support a line of thought or behaviour, or opposed each other. Such value-loaded research is morally inappropriate. For sociology to become a science, it should manifest a belief in inductive reasoning. It should collect the facts and derive its statements based on what is exactly implied in those facts. 32 The normative approach on the other hand does not envisage the possibility of a value-free science of society. It considers that the very notion of “value-freeness” is itself a value. In the guise

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their own limitations and strengths. The researcher found himself in a conflict between the professional needs of the research and the moral constraints of field situations while doing the fieldwork. For a researcher like him who has no ability to help the Dalits in their mundane problems of livelihood which they have been facing for generations, it was morally shocking to ask questions about how they look at the caste-based atrocities being experienced by them in society. The researcher conscience pricked him particularly when he asked questions about the working conditions of Dalit employees at offices or Dalit students at schools and colleges in the very society in which caste is still a very powerful institution. The researcher felt equally uneasy when he had to discuss issues relating to separation or breakdown of the family, sale of household assets to meet the educational expenditures of their children, sickness and death of members of the family, and so on. While the objective of this research was to explore these areas of people’s life situations, it was quite disturbing and painful to touch on these delicate issues for a purpose that is meaningless to the informant families. Basic socio-economic and demographic data of all the respondents were collected using a structured schedule after sufficient rapport was established. The structured schedule was used to collect the data from the respondents about their households. Other methods were also used in addition as the tools of the survey research were strictly defined, and there was limited time through use of strictly defined research tools to gather detailed information about people’s behaviour related to the problem under investigation Total 33 in-depth interviews and 12 KIIs were conducted to substanciate the survey data by qualitative informations. In-depth interviews were very informal, and extended beyond one sitting. For the purpose of in-depth case studies, 5–10 respondents were selected from the four different clusters that had different (bitter or sweet) experiences or knowledge in the areas or aspects of the study. Key Informants for this study were those working as policy makers in the Dalit NGOs, pro-Dalit INGOs, and Dalit wings of the various political parties. Nevertheless, five focused group discussions were also conducted to understand the feelings and perceptions of Dalits on the discourse of “social exclusion”.

References Adhikary SM (1997) Introduction. In: Surya Mani (ed) The Khasa Kingdom: a trans-himalayan empire of the middle age. New Delhi, Nirala Publications Alcock P (2002) Welfare policy. Dev Br Polit 6: 238–256 Appasamy PP (1996) Social exclusion from a welfare rights perspective in India. Geneva, ILO Publications of “value-free” discussion of observable facts of current reality, it distracts academic attention from the analysis of dynamics and change in society.21 It is a conceptual tool to guide research in favour of the status quo in society. The emphasis of any academic work should be geared towards liberation of society. It should be able to debunk the obstacles of its progressive change.

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Atkinson, R Davoudi S (2000) The concept of social exclusion in the european union: context, development and possibilities. J Common Mark Stud 38(3) Bagchand RB (2006) Sambidhan sabha dwara nirman garine naya Nepal ko sambidhan (Dalit sambandhi byabasthaka lagi masauda ra bakhyatmak tippani). Kathmandu, Lancau Nepal Baral LR (2006a) Introduction: democracy and freedom as key elements to non-traditional security. In Lok Raj Baral (ed) Non-traditional security: state, society and democracy in South Asia. New Delhi, Adroit Publishers Baral LR (2006b) Participatory democracy: Concept and context. In: Lok Raj Baral (ed) Nepal: quest for participatory democracy. New Delhi, Adroit Publishers Baral LR (1978) Village politics and development: a study of three village panchayats (Monograph). Kathmandu, CNAS Barry B (2002) Social exclusion, social isolation, and the distribution of income. In: Hills J Le Grand J Piachaud D (eds) Understanding social exclusion. New York, Oxford, pp 13–29 Begg I, Muffels RJA, Tsakloglou P (2002) Conclusion: social exclusion at the cross roads of EU employment and inclusion policies. In: Ruud JA Muffels, Panos Tsakloglou and David Mayes (eds) Social exclusion in european welfare states. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Bennett L, Sijapati B, Thapa D (2013) Gender and social exclusion in Nepal: Update. Patan, Himal Books Bennett L, Tamang S, Onta P, Thapa M (2006) Unequal citizens: gender, caste and ethnic exclusion in Nepal. Department for International Development and The World Bank, Kathmandu, www.cpnuml.org, www.nepalicongress.org Berreman GD (1979) Caste and other inequities: essays on inequality (No. 2). Meerut, Folklore Institute Beteille A (1990) Race caste and gender. Man 25: 489–504 Beteille A (1991) The reproduction of inequality: occupation, caste and family. Contributions to Indian Sociology (n.s.) 25(1) Bhattachan KB (2000) Possible ethnic revolution or insurgency in a predatory unitary hindu state, Nepal. In: Dhruba Kumar (ed) Domestic conflict and crisis of governmentability in Nepal, Kathmandu, CNAS Bhattachan KB, Hemchuri K, Gurung Y, Biswakarma CM (2003) Existing practices of caste-based untouchability in Nepal and strategy for a campaign for its elimination. Kathmandu, Action Aid Nepal Biswakarma MB (2004) Social exclusion of Dalits in nation building, a paper presented to a program organised by Inclusive research fund at Hotel Himalaya, Kathmandu from January 4–13 Bishwakarma B, Sunam R, Nepali D (June 2009) Report. Nepal dalit commission. Kathmandu (unpublished) BK, AB (2009) The making and unmaking of Dalit identity (unpublished) Byrne D (1999) Social exclusion. Backingham, Open University Press Cameron M (1998) On the edge of auspicious, gender and caste in Nepal. Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press CBS (2005) Poverty trends in Nepal (1995–1996 and 2003–2004). Kathmandu, Central Bureau of Statistics CBS (2011) Nepal living standard survey. Kathmandu, Central Bureau of Statistics CBS (2014) Population Monograph of NEPAL volume II (Social Demography) https://nepal.unfpa. org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Population%20Monograph%20V02.pdf CBS (2017) https://cbs.gov.np/wp-content/upLoads/2018/12/Surkhet_Profile_2074.pdf CBS, The WB, DFID and ADB (2006) Resilience amidst conflict: An assessment of poverty in Nepal 1995–1996 and 2003–2004, Nepal: CBS, The WB, DFID and ADB Dahal DR (2003, April 24–26) Hindu nationalism and untouchable reform: The status of alit in Nepali society, paper presented at the program the agenda of transformation: inclusion in Nepali democracy organized by social science Baha, Birendra International Conventional Center, Kathmandu

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Dahal DR (2014) Social composition of the population: caste/ethnicity and religion in Nepal. In: Population monograph of Nepal Vol. II, pp. 1–48. Kathmandu, Central Burau of Statistics Dahal DR, Gurung YB, Acharya B, Hemchuri K, Swarnakar D (2002) National Dalit strategy report, part I: situational analysis of Dalits in Nepal. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission, Nepal. Action-Aid Nepal, CARE Nepal and Save the Children US Daly M, Saraceno C (2002) Social exclusion and gender relations. In: Hobson B, Lewis J Siim B (eds.) Contested concepts in gender and social politics. Cheltenham, Edward Elger Darnal S (2009) A land of our own: Conversations with Dalit members of constituent assembly. Kathmandu, Samata Foundation and Jagaran Media Center de Haan A (1999) Social exclusion: towards an holistic understanding of deprivation a paper prepared for the World Development Report 2001 DFID/World Bank (2005) Citizens with(out) rights: Nepal gender and social exclusion assessment (Summery Report). Kathmandu, DFID/World Bank DFID World Bank (2006) Summary report. Citizens with(out) Rights: Nepal gender and social exclusion assessment. Kathmandu, DFID/World Bank Dhungel R (2002) The Kingdom of Lo (Mustang). A historical study. Tashi Gephel Foundation Dirks NB (2001) Castes of mind: colonialism and the making of modern india. Princeton University Press Dobrowolsky A, Lister R (2006) Social exclusion and changes to citizenship: women and children, minorities and migrants in Britain. In: Evangelia T, Alexandra D (ed) Women, migration and citizenship: making local, national and Transnational connections. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Dumont L (1980) Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and its Implications. University of Chicago Press European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (1995) Public Welfare Services and Social Exclusion: The Development of Consumer Oriented Initiatives in the European Union. Dublin, The Foundation Fisher JF (1998) Living martyrs: individuals and revolution in Nepal (with Tanka Prasad Acharya and Rewanta Kumari Acharya). Delhi, Oxford University Press Ghurye GS (1932) Caste and race in India. London, Kegan Paul, Trench Giddens A (2001) Sociology. Cambridge, Polity Press Gupta D (2000) Interrogating caste: Understanding Hierarchy & Difference in Indian Society. New Delhi, Penguin Guru G (2002) Dalit from margin to margin. India Int Cent Q 27(2): Summer Gurung H (2003) Trident and Thunderbolt: cultural dynamics in Nepalese politics. Lalitpur, Social Science Baha Hofer A (1979) The caste hierarchy and the state in Nepal: a study of the Muluki Ain of 1954. Innsbruck, Universitatsverlag Warger Jackson C (1999) Social exclusion and gender: does one size fit all?. The European Journal of Development Research II (1, June), pp. 125–146 Kisan YB (2005) The Nepali Dalit social movement. Kathmandu, Legal Rights Protection Society Kothari R (2003) Social exclusion: historical, institutional and ideological dimensions. In: AK Lal (ed) Social exclusion: essays in honour to Dr. Bindeswar Pathak. New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company Kumar V (2008) Changing trajectories of Dalits assertion in Uttar Pradesh. In: Ram N (ed) Dalits in contemporary India: discrimination and discontent. New Delhi, Siddhant Publications Lawoti M (2005) Towards a democratic Nepal: inclusive political institutions for a multicultural society. New Delhi, Sage Levitas R (1996) The concept of social exclusion and the new durkhiumian hegemony. Crit Soc Policy 16(1) Lister R (1998) From equality to social exclusion: new labour and the welfare state. Crit Soc Policy 18(2) Lister R (2001) New labour: a study in ambiguity from a position of ambivalence. Crit Soc Policy 21(4)

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Louis P (2003) Social exclusion of Dalits agony and assertion of an outcasted community. In: AK Lal (ed) Social exclusion: essays in honour to Dr. Bindeswar Pathak. New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company Madanipour A, Cars G, Allen J (eds) (1998) Social exclusion in European Cities. London, Jessica Kingsley Mahat RS (2005) In defense of democracy: dynamics and fault lines of Nepal’s political economy. New Delhi, Adroit Publishers Marks TA (2004) Insurgency in Nepal. Faultlines, February Muffels RJA, Fouarge DGAG (2002) Do European welfare regimes matter in explaining social exclusion?. In: Ruud JA Muffels, Panos T, David M (eds) Social exclusion in European Welfare states. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Mullaly B (2007) Oppression: the focus of structural social work. In: B. Mullaly (ed) The new structural social work. Don Mills, Oxford University Press Murugkar L (1991) Dalit panther movement in Maharashtra: a sociological appraisal. Bombay, Popular Prakashan Neupane G (2000) Nepalko Jatiya Prashna: Samajik Banot ra Sajhedariko Sambhawana (Caste issue of Nepal: Social composition and possibilities of accommodation). Center for Development Studies, Kathmandu (in Nepali Language) Ogata S (1998) Statement. Asian development bank seminar on inclusion or exclusion: social development challenges for Asia and Europe. Geneva, 27 April Oommen TK. (1986) Insiders and outsiders in India: primordial Collectivism and cultural pluralism in nation building. Int Sociol 1(1) Pandey RN (1997) Making of modern Nepal: a study of history, art, and culture of the principalities of Western Nepal (Vol. 35). Delhi, Nirala Publications Pierson J (2002) Tackling social exclusion. London, Routledge Pradhan K (1991) The Gorkha conquests: the process and consequences of the unification of Nepal, with particular reference to Eastern Nepal. Oxford, Oxford University Press PRASAD R (2003) Concept, meaning and scope. In: AK Lal (ed) Social exclusion: essays in honour of Dr. Bindeshwar Pathak. New Delhi, Concept Publishing Company Pyakurel U (2007a, August 22–24) Dalit assertion and democratic transition. Paper presented in an international seminar on “Constitutionalism and Diversity in Nepal,” organized by CNAS, TU in collaboration with ESP, Kathmandu, Nepal Pyakurel U (2007b) Dalit and the issue of state restructuring. Dalit Solidar 9(4), July-September Pyakurel UP (2011) A debate on dalits and affirmative action in Nepal. Econ Polit Weekly 46(40):71– 78 Ram N (1995) Beyond Ambedkar: essays on Dalits in India. New Delhi, Har-Anand Publication Regmi DR (2007) Ancient Nepal, Medieval Nepal (2 vols). Modern. Nepal. New Delhi, Rupa and Co Regmi MC (2002) Nepal: an historical miscellany. New delhi, Adroit Rodgers G, Van Der Hoeven, Ralph Saldana, Denjil (1995) New approaches to Poverty analysis and policy-III: poverty agenda, trends and policy options. IILS Sen A (2000) Social exclusion: concept, application & scrutiny (Social Development Paper No. 1). Manila, Asian Development Bank Sen A (2004) Development as freedom, New Delhi, Oxford University Press (Seventh impression) SEU (Social Exclusion Unit) (2004) Breaking the cycle: talking stock of progress and priorities for the future, A Report by the Social Exclusion Unit. London, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Shah G, Thorat S, Despande S (2006) Untouchability in rural India. New Delhi, Sage Publication, pp. 26–27 Sharma RS (1983) Material culture and social formations in ancient India. New Delhi, Macmillian Shrimali KM (2007) Religions in complex societies: myth of the ‘dark age’. Religion in Indian history, pp. 36–70 Silver H (1994) Social exclusion and social solidarity: three paradisms. IILS Discussion Papers no. 69. Geneva, ILO

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Singh S (2012) Dalits in Nepal: politically manufactured karma—the facts on ground. http://rou ndtableindia.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=5649:dalits-in-nepal-pol itically-manufactured-karma&catid=119:feature&Itemid=132 Smith A (1776) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Vol 1. In: Edwin Cannan (ed) Chicago, University of Chicago Press Sob D (2004) Dalit women in Nepal: issues and challenges 3 (Working Paper Presented at International Consultation on Caste based Discrimination, Nov. 29–Dec. 1, 2004) Srinivas MN (1962) Caste in modern India and other essays. caste in modern India and other essay. Calcutta, Asia Publishing House The WB and DFID (2006) Unequal citizens: gender, caste and ethnic exclusion in Nepal. Kathmandu, The World Bank; and Department for International Development Thorat S (2006) Caste system and economic exclusion. In: K Voll, D Beierlein (eds) Rising IndiaEurope’s partner?. Weibensee Verlag, Mosaic Books Thorat S, Mahamallik M (2006) Human development and the status of social groups in Gujarat. New Delhi, Indian Institute of Dalit Studies UNDP (2014) Nepal human development report 2014: beyond Geography, Unlocking Human Potential. Kathmandu, UNDP Vaidya TR, M¯anandhara T (1985) Crime and punishment in Nepal: a historical perspective. Kathmandu, Bini Vaidya and Purna Devi Manandhar Walker A, Walker C (eds) (1997) British devided: the growth of social exclusion in the 1980s and 1990s. London, Child Poverty Action Group Young IM (2000) Five faces of oppression. In: Adams M (ed) readings for diversity and social justice. New York, Routledge

Chapter 2

Dalits and Exclusion in Education

Investment in learning in the 21st century is the equivalent of investment in the machinery and technical innovation that was essential to the fist industrial revolution. Then it was capital, now it is human capital. (DfEE 1996: 15)

The pamphlet of the United Kingdom (UK) Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) contains the above quotation to show the importance and priority of education for individuals and the governments. A similar but interesting quotation based on Aristotle’s conversation with anonymous is available in a recent book by Chalam (2008), in which Aristotle explains the importance of education for human life. When Aristotle was asked how much superior the educated were to the uneducated, his reply was “as much as the livings are from the dead” (cited in Chalam 2008: 83). These nuances clearly indicate the importance of education in human civilization. Education is a source and agency of empowerment of people (Chalam 2008: 85). The classical liberal economic assumptions that ‘education is an investment which lifts individuals out of poverty by increasing their returns in the labour market (Woodward 1997: 2, in Tomlinson 2004: 154) were facts becoming too simplistic, where labour markets were disappearing, and education had become a rationed positional goods effectively designed to exclude many potential competitors (Brown and Lauder 1996). Education is a crucial type of investment for the exploitation of modern technologies (Halsey et al. 1961: 1–2). Education is also defined “as the art of utilization of knowledge” (Newman cited in Chalam 2008: 84). There are scholars who like to compare educational qualifications to a paper currency that ‘could be exchanged for work opportunities’ (Tomlinson 2004: 160). Education is also seen “as central to the creation of a welfare state which intends to redistribute social goods and recourses more equitably and to encourage economic growth and productivity.” Despite the successes in educational sectors, expectations that more access to education would lead to a more equal society has become a kind of disillusionment. Education is seen

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9_2

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as something that helps a person to transcend traditional boundaries which otherwise have important role in defining the personality of an individual. There has been an element associated with education that can transcend and liberate individuals. At present, globalization has made education all the more important because of the increase in interaction among people from different parts of the World. (Kumar 2004: 235). For variety of reasons, governments around the world were beginning to recognize the need for expanded education systems, offering more and extended education to people who had previously been excluded (Tomlinson 2004: 15). Scholars like Amartya Sen started arguing in favour of measuring development on the basis of human development indicators (Dreze and Sen 1995). This is termed as new direction of development discourse (Kumar 2006: 309). As part of this direction, the issue of hunger, poverty, lack of ‘basic education,’ basic health facilities, marginalization on the basis of caste and gender, etc. acquired greater significance (ibid.). When trying to see educational system of modern South Asia in historical perspective, we have to start from colonial educational system, which was devised as an ‘ideological apparatus’ that sought to legitimize the privileges and domination of colonizers. Though Nepal was never colonized, it was nevertheless under a heavy influence of British colonial rulers in India. Common civilizational history and sociocultural proximity also contributed to the impact of colonialism in Nepal. Hence, it was obvious for Nepal to be influenced by the educational policy of India under the British rule. It is said that Nepal had a vibrant educational system with a good number of village schools, which according to Pathak (2002: 72–73), was an indigenous education system. It was a different education system from that of the British. Along with the expansion of British colony, its education system started to be considered modern and superior. The East India Company was least interested in spreading modern/European education in India. Instead, it began supporting the indigenous Indian education system so that it could ‘control the Indian subcontinent politically’ by controlling the emergence of new educated elites through a modern or superior education system (ibid.: 81). Gandhi opposed colonial education because of its Western origin and ‘its inherent elitism, its irrelevance as far as the needs of India’s rural/subaltern masses were concerned’ (Pathak 2002: 89). In fact, Gandhi’s plan was to impart education through the medium of village handicrafts like spinning, carding, etc., through which he wanted to spearhead the silent social revolution (quoted in Acharya 1997: 604). However, the governments and elites of South Asian countries betrayed the idea of Gandhi and started commercializing the educational systems. People were compelled to consider education like other commodities which could be bought from the market, provided they had enough money. As a result, the Indian educational system appears to legitimize the existing social inequality in the name of academic work to produce quality (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990) though formal education has been greatly emphasized as one of the various agents of social change (Ram 1995: 21).

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2.1 Education and Social Exclusion At present, the members of socially or economically disadvantaged groups widely perceive education as the most promising way of upward mobility for their children. Education has become one of the most important agenda ever since its recognition as essential for the development of human capital. It can be seen as the ‘enabling’ factor that promotes or constraints the freedom that individuals have. It is also considered a helping tool to overcome the traditional inequalities based on gender, caste and class, because the reduction of these inequalities contributes to the sustainable development of education (Kushiyait [Yadav] 2009), besides facilitating access to the economic opportunities (Dreze and Sen 2003: 3). Apart from being an instrument of creating knowledge, in an informal as well as formal way, it continues to be treated as an important site of ideological contest, and has been linked to the struggle for liberation (Kumar 2006: 301). Moreover, the importance of education has more urgently been “realized in the case of Dalits particularly in the absence of alternative but relatively more stable source of their livelihood” (Ram 1995: 22). The traditional social oppression of Dalits in South Asia, including in India, is linked to their position as ‘untouchables’ in the caste system, whereby they were prohibited from owning land and other assets, and denied access to education. Scholars have observed that the incidents of blatant untouchability in India are less visible (Nambissan 1996, 2006). However, other studies say that it is very much existent in the society but in different forms (Shah et al. 2006; Mosse 2018:422). Data collected during the study in Nepal also reveal the fact that untouchability is less visible and is now mainly limited to the private sphere, especially in urban areas. As Nambissan’s views, inclusion in education should not be seen merely in relation to entry to school without seeing attendance and completion rates. In other words, she follows Kabeer (2000) in viewing exclusion in education as a far more complex process that positions social groups differently with regard to valued resources: knowledge, skills and cultural attributes, future opportunities and life chances, sense of dignity, self-worth and social respect. Some scholars regard education as the most important tool of consensus-building in society. For instance, Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels (1968) sees education as ‘an instrument used by the ruling class to sustain its hegemony in society.’ Similarly, Foucault (1980: 51–52) observes that the exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, knowledge constantly induces effects of power. He further states that it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge and it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power (ibid). When education is seen as a source of knowledge production, the social reality in South Asia is that a certain section of the society was denied access to education and was excluded from the knowledge production system. In Nepal’s context, social exclusion captures an important reality of the socially and economically discriminated, and thereby disadvantaged, groups such as Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and women being more deprived of basic education. Therefore, basic education is the key factor to generate social exclusion and inclusion in the society like Nepal (Kushiyait [Yadav] 2009).

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The Shah regime (that lasted from 1768–1990) in Nepal was instrumental for Hinduisation and Nepalisation of the country (Pyakurel 2007), as stated in the previous chapter. Political system during the Rana rule (1846–1950) was distinctively characterized by the institutionalized differences in dress, speech and manner between the Ranas and Non-Ranas. The Non-Ranas were not allowed to be richer than the Ranas and were restricted even from building houses, getting education, etc. (Adhikari 2010). The Dalits or ex-untouchables were directly excluded from access to education for centuries. Even if there is an inverse relation with the level of education and the process of inclusion/exclusion (Dahal 2009: 141), it is the Dalits who could not find easy access to education due to their socio-cultural exclusion until present. According to the 2011 Census, 65.94% of the total population (5 + years) were literate in Nepal and it was 73.12% in my field area, Surkhet district. The level of literacy of Dalit groups in 2011 was only 52.4 in Nepal (2011, Census). However, according to another study (Kumar 2009b), the literacy rate of Dalits in Surkhet was quite good (67.2%), compared to other parts of the country. Though Kumar (2009a: 183) argues that literacy and education among Dalit community is spreading due to social awareness, Surkhet seems to be an exception in case of the literacy of Dalits. Similar studies from other parts of the country tell a very disappointing story about the literacy rate of Dalits. For instance, the Tarai region of Nepal has not improved much in terms of education over the years (Dahal 2009). However, Surkhet could do better as it had more than 30% share of Dalit students’ enrolment at primary level, and out of which 48.3% were girls in (DoE 2006). Two contradictory scenarios could be observed about education. On the one hand, educational institutions have increased like never before in the history, but the gap between educated and uneducated and also among the educated also is also increasing. Shaha (1990: 46) is among the few scholars who could see the possible negative but long-term impact of the gap created by modern education in the Nepali society. He writes: In recent years the gap between all the educated modernizing elites and political, the bureaucratic and the military and the masses, has grown more rapidly and become much wider than that between the traditional or feudal elites and the masses. The gap between traditional elites and the masses can, to a large extent, be bridged overnight, by abolishing ascribed distinctions of caste and status. But the distinction between an educated elite and the masses cannot be removed easily because the population cannot be educated overnight.

Thus, according to Shah (1990), education has become one of the most influential indicators of social hierarchy and exclusion at present. It is because Nepal has a large number of illiterate population, and they are mostly from the historically, socially and economically discriminated groups such as Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, women and other religious minorities. As discussed earlier, in the past education was not accessible to all but was unequal and hierarchised even if it was one of the most socially valued attributes. That must be the case why Ambedkar, being an icon of the marginalized groups, has firmly believed that the education, especially the primary education, is very important for the suppressed classes in India. For him, education is what provides the necessary background to enter into public life (Chalam 2008:

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44). In order to achieve the goals of modernization, Ambedkar had chosen education and industrialization as the two important tools. In fact, Ambedkar is one who not only problematized the social reality, but also tried to think of the ways to overcome it. He greatly emphasized on education of the Dalits with the view that only education could liberate them from their traditional bondage and subordination to the upper castes and classes. Education, in his opinion, would enlighten them and expose them to the outside world (Ram 1995:22). He further stated: It would sensitize them to realize their long cherished goals of embracing quality, liberty, fraternity and justice. Besides, it would also prepare them to collectively strive for achieving a respectful social identity of the nation. (ibid.)

Inequality in education essentially reflects the iniquitous social relations, and this is evident in the way better educational facilities are enjoyed by those who have better purchasing power (Kumar 2006: 306). Bourdieu’s view may be helpful to substantiate the argument of Ambedkar. Bourdieu writes about the ways and means through which culture is reproduced through the education system. He states: Reproduction sought to process a model of the social mediations and processes which tend, behind the blacks of the agents engaged in the school system—teachers, students and their parents—and often against their will, to ensure the transmission of cultural capital across generations and to stamp pre-existing differences in inherited cultural capital with a meritocratic seal of academic consecration by virtue of the special symbolic potency of the title (credential). (Bourdieu 1990: ix–x)

He further writes that the school helps “to make and to impose the legitimate exclusions and inclusions which form the basis of the social order” (ibid.). The unequal structural realities of village life play a very important role in producing and reproducing educational inequality in the village. This gets reflected in almost every aspect of schooling, from curriculum to the pedagogy (Apple 1990). In fact, social exclusion is structurally constructed. Unless the structures that protect the inequalities are broken, or at least consciously manipulated, social exclusion will be recreated at every state in society. According to Chalam (2008: 95), “the iron frame of caste structure is so strong that it absorbs whatever improvements are attempted and finally allows them to settle within the frame. This unique innovation that has an Indian parent is reincarnated time and again. This cannot be tinkered with western hammers.” It is also considered that there is a dialectical relationship between cultural exclusion, socio-economic status and participation in the local society. The basis of exclusion is a complex interplay of the local context of power. There is a cultural paradigm, dominant and overwhelming in character, which infuses certain images and motivates certain discourses to establish and sustain the hegemony of certain sections and marginalized others (Kumar 2006: 313). In this regard, education is regarded as an instrument to make some breakthrough in the citadel of the hegemony of inequality or social inequality.

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2.2 Education as a Source of Inequality At present, most of the countries of the World have adopted free market policies. And this very free market seems to have legitimised and continued inequality and the exclusion of weaker social groups in education and the economy (Tomlinson 2004: 164). In fact, education persists as a means by which inequalities are created, legitimised and justified. The privileged groups continue to use the divisions and distinctions of schooling to confirm and reproduce their own position (Tomlinson 2004: 9–10). It is evident that the very concept of ‘different schools for different people’ is an innovation of the so-called first world. According to Tomlinson, education in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was openly intended to reinforce a class structure based on ascription by birth and wealth. Tomlinson refers the Taunton Commission of 1886 in Britain as an example to advice for the need of a “different teaching for different classes of society and the different occupations” (ibid.). This notion was later translated into different schools for pupils based with different backgrounds. The ‘public’ schools were for the aristocracy and upper classes, minor public schools and hierarchy of grammar schools were for middle classes, and elementary education for masses. The report referred to “a great body of professional men who have nothing but education to keep their sons on high social level.” It was the Newsom Committee, 1963, which voiced against the prevailing notions of the fixed ability and intelligence (of which the working class always appeared to have less). The Committee states that intellectual talent is not a fixed quantity but a variable that can be modified by social policy and educational approaches (Ministry of Education 1963: para 15). Following the Newsom Committee Report, Kothari (1997: 213) predicted that the modern education would make the people part of a single and homogeneous middle-class. Yet, several studies are undertaken to examine how inequalities are reproduced in society through modern education. It seems that the available educational system today is a deliberate attempt to exclude certain individuals and groups from the benefits that come through educational achievements. Tomlinson (2004) is categorical in examining the persistence of inequalities in educational sector based on social class despite a half–century of dramatic social, economic and educational policy changes and a more recent focus on poverty and social exclusion. By using a popular football metaphor, Tomlinson (2004) tries to elaborate the situation in which class structure has been providing remarkable resilience to exclude a large number of people in improving their human capital potential by acquiring more qualification. She writes, “there is no level playing field in a class society, and the goalposts are moved by pressures from, and attention paid to, the upper and middle classes.” She further states that educational policies, either deliberately or by default, have increasingly favoured groups already privileged or seeking privileges. It seems that the measures are taken to tackle the social exclusion in education but pursued policies ultimately ensure the exclusion of lower socio-economic groups (Tomlinson 2004: 128). Such a deliberation is not coming out through the educational policies only, but that entire politics seems to be behind it. Gould (1998) elaborates how and why

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political parties today make an electoral strategy to continue or reproduce inequality through education. The growing middle-classes have many things to do as middleclass is no longer to be viewed as a small, privileged sub-sector of society; mass politics is becoming middle-class politics today. And also, winning elections is, by and large, very difficult unless one wins support of the middle-class (1998: 396 cited in Tomlinson 2004: 130). It seems that this sentiment is very much translated into policies which reaffirm educational privileges for the middle class. Recent studies i.e. Kumar (2009a: 97) and Pfaff-Czarnecka (2019) substantiate the argument through many examples based on the Nepali reality. Tomlinson’s argument would be relevant here as well which states how the middleclass has proved more useful in explaining educational exclusion and the persistence of schools as places of class reproduction rather than studying the characteristics of the excluded (Tomlinson 2004: 132–133), regardless of the political focus on social exclusion and inclusion. Despite the heterogeneous nature of the middle and aspirant groups,1 a common characteristic has become a commitment to a social and political system that provides them with advantages and a ‘good life.’ Many of them want a relatively better life than their parents, and their fierce determination is to see their children reproduced into similar spheres. Middle-class groups have now realized the increasing importance of the access of knowledge and credentials. Then, important sections of the middle-class are educated in private or good state schools and ‘good’ universities, dominating the communications, information and propaganda industries, and the political arena. Also, they can conveniently resist egalitarian and social democratic school organizations. These groups are determined to see that their children have similar access to privileged education. This entails not only using traditional social networks and contacts with private schools, but also using new market powers to “choose” schools that would equip their children with the credentials to move on to the most prestigious universities (Tomlinson 2004: 133). Though John Galbraith talks of a ‘culture of contentment’ among the middleclass (Galbraith 1992), it is the middle class who, according to Giddens (1998), are well aware of the hazards and risks of modern life, and opt out of the public provisions because they have a more active orientation to risk management (Tomlinson 2004: 135). These are some of the ways the middle-classes have started escaping the government schools and are encouraged to switch to the private schools. To substantiate this argument, Reay (1998) has shown how the middle-class mothers help in maintenance and reproduction of class inequalities through assisting their children’s educational achievements. According to Reay (1998, see also Beteille 1999:145), the mothers or women from middle-class background not only have confidence, but also knowledge in dealing with the school. They are competent enough in acting not only for their own children’s best interest, but also acting against the best interests of the less privileged mothers as they help their children to engage in social contacts, extra-curricular activities and dinner parties in which education is discussed. 1 Middle classes including highly paid managers, administrators and professionals, lower paid semi-

professionals, white-collar employees, skilled workers, and the well-pensioned retired.

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Dreze and Sen (2003: 4) have shown serious concern about the school participation on the part of children from disadvantaged castes. They consider it a major challenge to the conservative upper-caste. Since majority of them constitute the middle-class, they have all along been trying to exclude majority of the marginalized masses by saying that knowledge is not important or appropriate for members of the lower orders (ibid.). Again, Tomlinson (2004) suggests that the educational needs of the middleclass could be understood as a reaction of heightened insecurities. The middle class have largely become the anxious classes, certainly as far as their children’s education are concerned. That is why, they opt for the particular ways to satisfy them by the use of private education, by the advantages that choice policies deliver, by the avoidance of a vocational curriculum, and by avoidance of the poor and socially excluded (Tomlinson 2004: 134). For Brown (1997: 744), middle class people opt for different schools as they want a value-added curriculum vitae (CV), which demonstrates the right personal and social skills, and cultural experience. Using figures from a study by Pollard and Adonis (1996), Davies (2000) documents the enormous power and influences of the product of top public schools. According to the figure, 7 out of 9 senior army generals, 33 out of 39 senior judges, half of the 18 permanent secretaries, and half of the 94 top civil servants, had been educated privately in Britain. Also, Goldthorpe (1997) and Breen and Goldthorpe (1999) disclose the fact that merit plays a limited role in class mobility and that children of lower socio-economic origins have to demonstrate much more merit to achieve a desirable class position. In a study of the 40 richest young people in Britain in 2000, O’Sullivan (2000) has stated that most of them had rich and influential parents, and were educated in top private schools (cited in Tomlinson 2004: 131). The present study indicates that Nepal is also following a similar path in terms of making a shift from public or state-designed to private education. The following Table 2.1, based on my field data, shows the social composition of students of two of the English-medium schools of the study area. The composition of both the schools was somewhat similar to that of several government schools in the past, just before the introduction of English-medium private schools, when education was not accessible to all. It meant that those who had access to education in the past have now shifted to the privately run Englishmedium schools, and those who are the first-generation, to go to school, are now with the government run schools. Among the literate, some 13.03% respondents of my study are already from privately run boarding schools. It is a good ratio to analyze the shifting pattern, as there is a short history of privately run boarding schools of the study area. In fact, the Usha Balbatika Boarding School was the first private boarding school in Surkhet established in 1982–1983. Again, the boarding schools were badly disturbed during the Maoists’ insurgency in Nepal, which began in 1996 and ended in 2006. Here, one can say that if there was easy accessibility to the private schools and if there had been no disturbance by the Maoists insurgency, the percent of people educated in privately run boarding schools would have been much higher than that of today. Those who are in the government jobs have stopped sending their children to the government-run public schools. In other words, they prefer sending their children

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Table 2.1 Dalit/non-Dalit share in two of the main Boarding Schools in Surkhet Valley Grade

Usha Balbatika Boarding School

Surkhet Horizon Boarding School

Total students

Total students

Dalit students %

Dalit students %

1

58

5.2

53

7.5

2

70

4.3

43

14.3

3

88

3.4

68

13.2

4

65

3.1

68

8.8

5

96

1.0

61

6.6

6

79

2.5

71

8.5

7

75

2.7

47

8.5

8

70

2.9

46

4.4

9

84

1.2

42

7.1

10 Total

65

1.5

44

11.4

750

2.7

542

9.0

Source Fieldwork 2009 (compiled from School Register, 2009–10)

to privately run boarding schools. Then, there are businesspersons who also left public or government-funded schools. It is said that the trend is common inside the country. The situation of the capital city—Kathmandu valley—and other major cities is even worse. One hardly finds children of any influential politician or bureaucrat or business person who are studying in government-run schools or colleges. They are either studying abroad or in the privately run expensive schools and colleges. The trend has not been decreasing. Rather, it has been rapidly increasing. The government data show that there are 15.3, 16.2 and 15.6% students studying in privately run primary, lower secondary and basic levels, respectively (CEHRD 2015–2016). Indeed, private education has now become an important factor to those who could afford to buy competitive advantage for their children. This is rather an old trend that the upper classes and old middle classes effortlessly get most of their children admitted into “renowned” schools. Also, we can see new aspirants or first-generation learners from the marginalized groups who are equally enthusiastic to grasp the advantages of both excellent resources and old boys networks, with the additional legitimacy of meritocracy. It is mainly because the whole society regards private schools as first-grade or ‘superior,’ and the government schools as second-grade or ‘inferior’ (Pyakurel 2009). Philip Brown rightly points out that an expanding section of both the old and new middle-classes have been undermining the principle of equality of opportunity by returning to the idea that educational outcomes should be determined by parental wealth and preference, rather than the ability and effort of pupils. “This form of social closure is the outcome of an evaluation by the middle classes that educational success is too important to be left to the chances of a formally open competition” (Brown 1997: 402). Also, the conclusion of a study by Hirsch (1977: 6) reveals that the kind of resistance of former winners in education markets against the attempts in the 1960s

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and 1970s in both the USA and Britain to integrate inferior with superior schools is very much relevant in Nepal today. It seems that the middle-class who were formerly winners in education market are still determined to retain their advantages. It is the middle-class and aspirant groups who have continued to avoid or to move away from schools attended or being attended by the poor and disadvantaged. And market policies have always helped them to do so. In fact, as Tomlinson states, education markets have not encouraged social balance in schools, equalized opportunities or helped the socially excluded. Also, social segregation in education has worked against the possibility of preparing good citizens who care about each other (Tomlinson 2004: 139–169). She blames the government policy for spreading such inequality, and argues saying these educational policies of the government are to bag the support of middle class and aspirant groups, whose votes governments depend on, which create and recreate the social exclusion on a daily basis. Governments are aware that the policies which threaten the middle class advantage threaten the electoral advantage. For her, educational policies which seek to exclude potential competitors for social goods, and defend and extend privileges for some groups, are always more likely to support division and inequalities than any common good (Tomlinson 2004: 180). She rightly points out how elected governments do not want to go against the interest of the middle-class. It may be because the governments see middle-class as opinion makers and every attempt of the former should be guided towards how to make the middle class people happy, so that they help the government to remain in power for a long time. That is why, the governments avoid bringing policies, which threaten the middle and aspirant classes’ thinking that in turn could threaten the government’s electoral base (Tomlinson 2004: 140). In other words, we find a nexus between the middle-class people and the governments to work together for strengthening the concept of ‘different education for different people.’ It has not only restricted the access of particular groups to particular forms of education, but also has created a dominant form of social exclusion.

2.3 Teacher as an Agent of Inclusion or Exclusion There is much talk, today, about the role of a teacher in terms of teaching a student. Sir Aurobindo is one who rightly points out many things about the duty of a teacher. “Nothing can be taught’ is one of his principles of true teaching. According to him: The teacher is not an instructor or task-master; he is a helper and a guide. His business is to suggest and not to impose. He does not actually train the pupil’s mind, he only shows him how to perfect his instruments of knowledge and helps and encourages him in the process. He does not impart knowledge to him; he shows him how to acquire knowledge for himself. He does not call forth the knowledge that is within; he only shows him where it lies and how it can be habituated to rise to the surface.

But, today there are teachers who firmly believe that they are the only source of knowledge, and the students and their parents have nothing to share with others.

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57

Such mentality of a teacher often makes the students, especially the new generation learners, disappointed and somehow harassed, too. As a result, there would be the high drop-out rate of students. It is said that teachers always make education as complicated as possible. It is due to their feeling of superiority and also due to the ‘limited’ knowledge and ‘narrow’ beliefs the teachers have. One of the important deficits of teachers today, as the teacher respondents shared, is that they are trained to go through the curriculum, but it is not as practical as per the day-today life of students. The adopted tools and techniques by the teachers to clarify a particular subject to the students would mostly be either unfamiliar or out of their understandability. Also, there is a saying that teachers want the students to be molded mentally as per the teachers’ wishes. Generally, it will be very difficult for children when the interest of the parents and teachers was merged against the interest/desire of the students. The situation is, according to Aurobindo, ‘a barbarous and ignorant superstition’ which is against the teaching principle—mind has to be consulted in its own growth’. Aurobindo heavily comes forward against it and says that there can be no greater error than this. He argues that the chief aim of education should be to help the growing soul to draw out which is best and makes it perfect for a noble use. In fact, Aurobindo wants to see a child to be treated like a product of nature, and he firmly believes in natural growth rather than forced and artificial. “A free and natural growth is the condition of genuine development. There are souls that naturally revolt from their surroundings and seem to belong to another age and clime. Let them be free to follow their bent; but the majority languish, become empty, become artificial, if artificially molded into an alien form”, he argues. Regarding the issue of language as instruction, Aurobindo says, The first attention of the teacher must be given to the medium and the instruments, and, until these are perfected, to multiply subjects of regular instruction is to waste time and energy. When the mental instruments are sufficiently developed to acquire a language easily and swiftly, that is the time to introduce him to many languages, not when he can only partially understand what he is taught and masters it laboriously and imperfectly. Moreover, one who has mastered his own language has one very necessary facility for mastering another. With the linguistic faculty unsatisfactorily developed in one’s own tongue, to master others is impossible.

Presently, it is the teachers who do not want to introspect their own weaknesses, but often blame others by saying that family factors were responsible for the poorer educational performance of marginalized section or working class children (Tomlinson 2004: 17). The survey of literature on educational development and policies shows that the blame-game is not a South Asian trend, but is common all over the world. Tomlinson cites Keith Joseph’s2 speech delivered in 1975 which often blames others, mainly those who are not ideologically like-minded, for the decline in educational standards. He has vehemently charged the left-wing intellectuals with

2 He

was given a responsibility of Minister of Education under Margaret Thatcher 1981–1986.

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such words that ‘bully boys of the left are responsible for decline of educational standard’— national pride; and the lower classes, for good measure, were over-producing and threatening the national stock (Joseph 1975 cited in Tomlinson 2004: 20). Besides, the general perception about teachers, especially those who teach in the rural schools, is that they do not work or perform duty as assigned. Cutting the public expenditure on welfare programmes, including health and education, privatization of such services and restraint on wages and public sector employment in the name of right steps for ‘stabilization of economy’ (Saxena 2006: 190), also have helped in decreasing the quality of education. Involvement of teachers in political activities is another factor which keeps them away from school too often reducing teaching time, as mentioned in the study of Kingdom and Muzammil (2001). The subjects taught and the way these are taught are other matters, which make the child more alien. That is why, experts often advocate integrating words, sounds and images of the learner to make education interesting and meaningful. The above-mentioned method, as also mentioned by Tabib (1998: 208 cited in Kumar 2006: 319), would be more relevant in the case of children from oppressed groups whose life does not ‘naturally’ find its expression and portrayal in the vocabulary and thoughts of the privileged in society. A number of scholars show concerns why the first-generation learners, in most of the cases, perform poorly in comparison to others in education. Freire (1968), in his book Pedagogy of Oppressed, also insists that the educator should always be conscious of the cultural background and of the class, gender, race, etc. of the subject. He explains how literate education has been used as one of the important agents to suppress the disadvantaged groups to carry on the hegemony of the ruling classes. Lawrence et al. (2004) equally provide insights in argument that a textbook that speaks of traffic jams and flats in high-rise buildings has nothing to offer to the rural child. This is especially true of the children who come from different cultures. Curriculum is mostly available in the dominant language and culture, but the pupils need education in their own languages, using familiar objects and ideas. For example, the post offices and bus stops are the landmarks for an urban person. It is difficult for the rural child to perceive these as he/she uses trees and other natural symbols as a landmark. Many teachers do not even recognize the fact as they learn in a way that honors them and keeps their own knowledge system alive. Educational system treats the villagers as if they have to be ignored, they are stupid and are to be kept illiterate (Lawrence et al. 2004: 30 cited in Dhagamwar 2006: 86). There are reports about teachers who always view parents of first-generation learners within the middle-class frame. They expect the parents to provide academic support and orientation to their children in a similar manner as the middle-class parents offer to their children. When children arrive school without their clothes and books in order and their homework incomplete, they are punished (often corporal) rather than the teachers showing sympathy towards them for the difficult conditions under which they avail education (Nambissan 2006:244). Also, many teachers appear to disapprove of incentives being given to the children from the marginalized communities and often pass disparaging remarks about Dalit parents ‘being more interested in the monthly grain installments that they receive and the scholarships that their children bring home rather than in their children’s academic performance

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(Balagopal and Subrahmanian 2003: 52 cited in 245). Kumar considers this a cultural construct. According to him, it has been created to categorise the marginalised parents as responsible for their children’s educational backwardness as they (the parents) are seen as people uninterested in education, who are always drunk, and least bothered about the future of their children (Kumar 2006: 338). Though the poor financial condition of the household is cited by parents as a major reason for absenteeism and the dropping out of children from school, teacher’s absence, hostile environment and lack of children’s interest in what is taught are also mentioned as reasons for children not attending school (Pratichi 2002: 30). Parents from Dalit (and Adivasi) communities in the villages interviewed by Pratichi complained about the ‘step-motherly’ treatment that their children received in primary schools. Here, the most urgent need of young first-time school-goers is to feel comfortable in school. It is often reported that the other caste teachers in many schools look down upon and even thrash the children from the Dalit and Adivasi communities for no reasons, which forces many children to stay out of school (Kumar 2006: 336–337). They often do not feel comfortable with those who are different from them. This is particularly true of the children from the marginalized groups, with most school teachers hailing from the privileged groups, who view their culture and language as inferior to that of their teachers and fellow students from the privileged background. This has a strong negative impact on the children and leads to their dropping out of school (Lawrence et al. 2004: 8 cited in Dhagamwar 2006: 87). Kumar’s study reports of a strong feeling such that “had he been a teacher from their community, he would have been sensitive to the needs of their children” (Kumar 2006: 236). It is also important to remember that school teachers are mainly from the non-Dalit backgrounds, while their pupils are from the low-ranked castes who are also poor. In this situation, ‘the growing chasm between teachers and children in terms of social class or economic and educational backgrounds is often seen to underline negative attitudes towards poor students and their disparaging comments on the absence of parental support for education’ (Sen 2002). As reported in many instances by Nambissan (2006: 249), in keeping up with the changing times, teachers may not directly speak despairingly of ‘caste status’ and ‘pollution’, but use the more acceptable ‘secular’ discourse of ‘ability’ and ‘merit’ to relegate the pupil from the marginalized groups, especially Dalits, as ‘uneducable’. Interestingly, no student respondent in my study argues like this. Rather, many student respondents have said that it does not matter whosoever is their teacher. Here, I must admit the situation and argue that students are yet to be habituated with the kind of different experiences of having one teacher from the same community and another teacher from a different community. The following table shows the composition of Dalit teachers in different schools in Nepal. Table 2.2 clarifies that the number of Dalit teachers is increasing but still not in a good number. A report of the Department of Education, Government of Nepal (DOE 2015) reveals that the share of Dalits has reached to 5.3% in 2015 from 4.5% in 2011 school year. However, the teacher-student ratio is still very low. As a result, many Dalit students may not know if it is better for them to be taught by a Dalit teacher.

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Table 2.2 Composition of Dalit Teachers in Nepal Level

Dalit Teachers (%)

Year

2008–2009

Dalit (Women) Teachers (%) 2015

2008–2009

2015

Primary level

3.2

6.4

0.9

3.7

Lower Secondary Level

2.6

4.6

0.7

3.3

Source Flash Report (DoE 2008–09); and DoE (2015) computed by the researcher

As Surkhet records a good participation of Dalits in terms of education, I often managed to interact with Dalit teachers during my fieldwork. Bhairab Higher Secondary School has three out of 13 Dalit teachers in the study area who teach at the school level. What I have observed is that my respondents see no difference between the Dalit and non-Dalit teachers in terms of their teaching quality. But there are grievances and complaints of Dalit teachers about how they have been treated in the society even after they have been teaching there for many years. But neither teachers, nor any student respondents of the school advocate the need of a teacher from the same community. Rather, teachers from the Dalit background express their grievances/dissatisfaction over the Dalit parents and students. Also, no coordination was found even among the Dalit teachers. Khagishara Nepali,3 a female Dalit teacher in Bhairab Higher Secondary School, has shared how as a teacher she had been treated by her own society on two occasions. The Dalit students had complained to their parents, accusing her of being casteist and biased against them. She would call them by derogatory names. Contrarily, according to her, parents and students consider her suggestions not as didactic but derogative. I also observed while talking to her that she had less sympathy over the Dalit students. That is why, she often said, “I am the teacher of all, not for only Dalits.” Another Dalit teacher,4 whom I interviewed, raised several points against the Dalit students such that they are dirty, less studious, etc. He mentioned many weaknesses about Dalits which, according to him, were the primary causes of their backwardness and marginality. He was against the practice of providing scholarships to Dalit students. According to him, scholarships offered by the government could not bring about any change in the Dalits, as it is given to all without distinction and discrimination between the studious and non-studious students. This is however the opinion of those who believe that the school-going trend in itself for the first-generation learner is much about education and the process of learning. Teachers have seldom said that the child was intrinsically unable to study, but described the difficulties involved in teaching them, by blaming parents for their lack of interest in their children’s education, their drinking habits, their failure to create a more conducive “home” environment and their continued reliance on traditional occupations (Balagopal and Subrahmanian 2003: 49). Again, according to Khagisara Nepali, Dalit students are poor in study due to their home environment. “Most of the parents who send their 3 Based

on researcher’s discussion with her, November 2, 2009. Sunar, talking with the researcher on November 5, 2009.

4 Balaram

2.3 Teacher as an Agent of Inclusion or Exclusion

61

children to a government school are habitual drinkers and fight with family members when they come back from work in the evening. The situation neither helps a student get academic guidance nor a good study environment at home,” she states. She also says that the parent’s indifference and biases against those who study in private and government schools are a matter of concern. According to her, the parents who send one child to a private school ensure that their child is clear and well-dressed, whereas another child attending a school run by the government is neglected, and dirty with crumpled clothes. Then the question arises as to why they have many things to say against their own community that has suffered from historical prejudices? This can be explained through a simple answer that while they are teachers of the same hierarchical social background, they are also socialized like the teachers from the ‘upper caste’ background. However, the matter is profound if we look at the socio-cultural dimension of Nepali life. Dalit castes are considered impure in the ritual hierarchy of jati system. So, in the past, they were considered ineligible for learning the art of reading and writing that today involves the pattern of receiving education. Consequently, Dalits developed the culture of not attaching importance to education or idealistic thinking that includes only about the dimensions of human life. Such lack of idealistic thinking leads them not to realize the value of educational degrees or certificates. This also accounts for the non-existence of environment for education in Dalit families, especially in rural areas. One can compare an upper caste post graduate student and a Dalit with same qualification to know about the lack of idealism among the Dalits. While an upper caste student would talk about the issues of society, politics or a theory, the Dalit student would emphasize on ways to earn money, job opportunity, food, clothes, motor bikes, etc. If he talks about politics, it is just because of fashion or prevailing trend in the society that he imitates from others. There are few Dalits in Nepal today who have understood the value of education, and those highly qualified Dalits do not live in Nepal but in western countries like USA and Canada. Those Dalit youths who are capable and have knowledge always look for opportunity to go to the Western countries for better careers. This is unlike the upper castes who though highly educated mostly prefer to work in their country even if their income is lower than they could earn in the Western countries. This author met one Dalit engineer in 2013 in Tansen (Palpa), who was not satisfied with his income. He said that his parents had spent lot of money in educating him, and he wanted to earn double the money in three years that could be possible only by going to UK, USA or Canada. Whereas engineers from so-called upper castes, who have also spent lot of money during their education, mostly prefer to work in Nepal. There is some desire in them to do something for their country. However, there are also engineers from upper castes who go abroad to work. The absence of respect for knowledge among the Dalits makes them see education merely a way to earn money rather than the acquisition of knowledge. Another fact qualifying the Dalit culture is that a highly educated person is not respected by his community if that person does not earn huge amount of money. Becoming a doctor, engineer or a government official is for Dalits just way to earn a lot of money. Among majority of Dalits, the condition is even worse as most of them drop-out from high school and college to go abroad even if they belong to lower middle class

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and middle class families. Since 1990s, many of them have gone to Gulf countries like Qatar, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and also Malaysia for earning money. We also find upper castes going to these countries to work, but they educate their children as the main priority. For Dalits, the main aim is to buy property, clothes and jewelries. Education of the children is usually the last priority. Dalit children are in government schools even if their parents can send them to private schools, whereas even poor parents from so-called upper castes try their best to send their children to private schools. Only few Dalit families have sent their children to private schools as they have understood the value of educating their children to acquire degrees and certificates. The education of Dalit girls is a recent phenomenon, so there are only few highly educated Dalit girls. There is a lot of pressure on Dalit female students from their family to get married, which restricts them from acquiring higher education. Among the upper castes, even girls are educated up to higher level or are given professional education so that they do not have to depend on their husbands when they get married and can stand on their own feet. Thus, one can say that Dalits are struggling to get education due to their own culture of self-interestedness, and lack of respect towards knowledge, coupled with the lack of tradition of getting education. In this age of globalization that depends on sharing and selling of information and knowledge, educated people have a bright chance to survive or to dominate in the socio-political and economic life of any country, where Dalits stand marginalized. Many studies have been undertaken to inquire about the implications and effects in the school environment and in the education system after the parents from the middle and upper classes have shifted their children from government schools to the private schools. One can see it as a positive change and argue that it has helped the governments in increasing support for the educational upliftment of children from the marginalized sections of the society as they only continue to remain in the government schools. But the reality is that the quality of education is going down and social class segregation increasing due to the paradigm shift. An OECD (1994: 7) study, carried out in seven countries, has concluded that a major result of choice policies globally had been to increase social class segregation in schools. It says that the “more privileged groups are more active in choosing desired schools, sometimes it is because such schools are in more prosperous neighbourhoods whose residents continue to get more privileged access to them. The seminal research carried out by Stephen Ball and his colleagues in UK during the 1990s showed that the social difference enabled more privileged choosers to discriminate between schools, evaluate teachers and avoid schools with negative characteristics” (Gerwirtz et al. 1995; Ball et al. 1996). The privileged parents have the required cultural capital and educational knowledge for them to emerge as winners in local school markets, and ‘the implementation of market reforms in education is essentially a class strategy, which has as one of its major effects on the reproduction of relative social class (and ethnic) advantages and disadvantages (Ball 1993: 4). Self-selection by parents and pupils has an impact on social class differentiation in schools even in socially democratic countries like Sweden (Hatcher 1998). Examining the relationship between poverty and pupil performance of 5000 children, a study commissioned by Ealing Council in London has showed that the children from higher socio-economic groups attended

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better schools and performed better. The study has further suggested that the ‘social class is a crucial factor in determining whether the child does well or badly at school’ (Dean 1998: 3). The middle-class families devise strategies not only to avoid their children from being educated with the poor, but also to ensure that their children attend well-resourced schools and avoid stigmatized forms of education (Tomlinson 2004: 138–139). It could be due to the competitive anxiety among the middle-classes which come all of a sudden from the rising qualification and skill level among the poor and the marginalized section of the society. A question arises as to why welfare systems designed for the poor were being dismantled and used as a tool or strategy for excluding the poor, as Jordan (1996) writes. It is, for Giddens (1999), more likely to happen where ‘social exclusion at the top’ was practiced by elites who sought to escape financial and social responsibilities and form their own communities. Again, it is said that no school is now an independent, creative and democratizing institution, and it is the market forces today which are controlling education. It is said that school, as an institution for learning, is creation of the industrial age in the 19th century (Jha 2006). In this connection, Tomlinson states that educational institutions which had any purpose other than an economic function had almost completely disappeared from the policy-making discourse. Here, good intention for reducing social inequality and exclusion through easing accessibility to education is balanced by the political reality, which is all the government’s concern not to make middle class and aspirant groups disappointed. Hence, every government wants to show its reluctance if a policy threatens the middle and aspirant classes thinking that it could even threaten the government’s electoral base (Tomlinson 2004: 170–171). This is somewhat similar to the idea of Heller (1988: 24), wherein politics and good intentions do not blend together. Though there are many loopholes and weaknesses, many people in the world and even my respondents still believe in education as a single way out in order to achieve the goals of modernization. However, the recent policy of the government regarding its concentration on elementary education and leaving higher education to the market would adversely affect countries like Nepal, which hardly has 9% population with School Leaving Certificate (SLC), 5.14% with +2 and equivalent education, 2.68% with Graduation, and 0.73% with post-graduate degree (Pariyar 2007). Nepal has 10.3% enrolment of students at secondary level education (DoE 2008–09), 17.6% at +2 levels, and only 3.4% at the level of Bachelor and above. The marginalized, especially the Dalits, will be worst affected as they have only 33.8% literacy rate, 3.4% enrolment at +2 level, and only 0.4% at the level of Bachelor and above (DFID/World Bank 2005). The World Bank’s suggestion to make primary education free and to privatize the secondary education is not based on the reality of South Asia, but comes as a policy guided by the developed countries like USA, where the higher education system is privately managed. We may not also forget the fact of how often students get scholarships and studentships through government and other non-governmental agencies there. The privatization of higher education suited to USA as it had already 43% enrolment level in higher education. Nepal’s neighbouring country India is also moving towards privatization of the higher educational system as done by the USA.

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But it will be difficult for India as the overall enrolment ratio in higher education is only 7%. However, India has started investing a huge amount of money for providing scholarship and grants to students for higher education, particularly to the weaker sections of society. That is why it could survive even if it follows the new guidance of the World Bank. However, Nepal has been trying to follow the World Bank guidelines without making any arrangements to provide funds such as scholarships for the needy students to complete higher education. Ambedkar may be quoted here: , “equality of treatment to the people who are unequal is simply another name for indifferentism and neglect” (Chalam 2008: 48). The worst sufferers from privatization of education are again the people from the marginalized groups. There would be reorganization if their children get certificate from the government schools and colleges; and they would not have much fund available to send their children to the private colleges to get a ‘recognized’ degree. As mentioned earlier, Freire (1968) introduces several new concepts like banking system of education, dialogic process, and suggests that educators should side with the oppressed and promote learning through dialogue on the basis of learner’s experience and praxis. Today, one finds a very contradictory position in terms of education. On the one hand, many countries in the world along with international agencies, have focused on universalizing education to all. The UNESCO’s 2000 World Education Report states that there has been a change in the world’s perception of the right to education over the past decades. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that ‘everyone has the right to education’, that elementary and fundamental education shall be ‘free’ and that ‘elementary’ education shall be compulsory…‘every person—child, youth and adult—shall be able to benefit from educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning needs’ (UNESCO 2000). In other words, it can be said that the focus has been made to overcome inequality and deprivation through universalisation of elementary education. On the other hand, the existing education system is helping not only the issue of social deprivation but also social injustice to go for further marginalisation of the deprived (Graham-Brown 1991; Saxena 2006: 176). Studies have shown that the formal system of education is neither reaching the deprived sections, nor is it meaningful (Saxena 2006: 178). The regular school system has not helped in improving the drop-out rates in any significant manner (ibid). More than that, privatization of higher education and introduction of choice policy from primary level of education has helped more in reproducing inequality and excluding the groups who have been left out for decades. Caste status, as Nambissan (2006: 233) states, is an important barrier to school completion. It is seen in the fact that school attendance and completion rates for Dalit children are well below that of the other-caste groups. The following table shows an interesting scenario about the school enrolment ratio of Dalits at various levels of education in Nepal. Table 2.3 show that percentage of Dalit students in all primary, lower secondary and secondary level has been increased compared to 2006–2007. Remarkably, the percentage of Dalit students is more than proportion of their population, which is 13%. It is not because of increased awareness and enrolments of Dalit students in

2.3 Teacher as an Agent of Inclusion or Exclusion Table 2.3 Percentage of Dalit student’s Enrolment at various levels

School

Primary

2006–7

18%

65 Lower secondary 9.5%

Secondary 5.3%

2008–9

20.2

11.4

7.8

2015–16

19.7%

14.4

11.0%

Source Flash Reports of Department Of Education 2006–07, 2008– 09 and CEHRD (2015–16)

school but because Dalits tend to send their children to government schools due to their inability to afford their children’s education in English medium private schools. There is an interconnection between educational deprivation and poverty, as supported by our field data. For instance, Purna Nepali, a teacher who teaches at Jana Uchcha Higher Secondary School, Surkhet, mentions that Dalits cannot put education in priority as they have to work hard for managing their daily meals.5 It is similar to a research of Pratichi Trust which narrates, “How can we bear the expenses when we cannot even provide daily meals to the children?” (Pratichi 2002: 33). Again, the Pratichi Trust Report cites the case of Munni, a girl student who had completed class IV and was good in her studies but had to join her mother in agriculture wage work after being pulled out of school. Her father could neither provide private tuition (which, he believed essential for studying), nor could he arrange money for buying books and other stationery needed (Pratichi 2002: 51). From the argument of most of the Dalit parents interviewed for this research, I find that the cost of schooling has become a burden for the parents. Similar points can be found in the research conducted by National Council of Applied Economic Research (Shariff 1999: 280; Nambissan 2006: 236), India, which clearly points out how costs of schooling have become an extra burden for the poorest segment of rural households. According to Jha and Jhingran (2002), parents often say that education is important but not relevant for their children. They further stress that they were not in a position to see that their children were enrolled and attended the school. However, my respondent Mr. Sanju Singh B. K., a Dalit activist in Surkhet, reports of parents who want instant profit from children’s education. They calculate the scholarship amount which their children get in school versus the amount which a student has to pay to the schools under different headings while studying there. Parents are found saying “you will earn Rs.300 from school if you attend to it, but you will have to pay Rs.800 for the school as fee. Who will pay rest of the money to be able to continue in the school?” BK sees it as a genuine question which has to be addressed pragmatically. But there are other views as well. Some see poverty not as a single cause but one of the causes behind the non-schooling of the Dalit children. One of our respondents,6 who also teaches at the primary school level, argues that it is the mentality and not the real poverty, which adversely affects schooling of Dalit children. He reveals, “I have seen many upper caste parents who send their children to school, even though 5 Based

on the discussion with the researcher on September 15, 2009. on the discussion with Khadga Bahadur Nepali, a teacher at Bhairab Higher Secondary School, Surkhet on November 2, 2009.

6 Based

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their economic background is worse than that of many Dalits in the locality. Dalit parents spend more money than other caste parents on food and drinking. But when the issue of education comes, they show their poverty.” He used to suggest Dalit parents not to spend much money unnecessarily for non-productive things such as alcohol and meat. But the suggestion aggravates the parents’ annoyance. Most of the time, he gets such replies from those parents as these: “Have we spent your earnings? Are we spending anyone’s earnings?” There are debates such as mass education or quality education. Other opinions have equally featured in public debates. Some people consider the debate about the quality of education as a conspiracy to continue excluding the people who have been left out for centuries from getting education. For them, school-going is a kind of beginning of the learning process which helps one to be educated. It is more so for their children who have been kept out of school for a century. Those who emphasize on quality education view education as a knowledge producing and consuming system, having both—“certain quality” and practical “relevance”. They also illustrate that it should help one learn how to swim before diving into the deep pool, which is the place to practice for perfection (Dhagamwar 2006: 86). In other words, the argument is that one cannot learn swimming unless he/she is inside swimming pool. As being in a swimming pool is a major benchmark to learn swimming, being in school helps one to start getting education. As mentioned earlier, scholars show some concern about why the first-generation learners perform low in comparison to others in education, and how to make education friendly to the first generation school-goers. Lawrence talks about a student- friendly textbook, curriculum based on their culture, students’ mother tongue as a means of instruction, etc. (Lawrence et al. 2004: 30 cited in Dhagamwar 2006: 86). He talks about a teacher from their community who would be more sensitive to the needs of their children. More important here, as Dhagamwar (2006: 87) states, is the kind of empathy towards children from weaker sections of society who for the first time go to a completely new world when they start schooling. That is why, the primary objective of schools and teachers should be to let the children feel happy in school before they start carrying a load in the name of knowledge. But what we are practicing in schools, in general, and in private schools, in particular, is that we compel pupils to be bent under piles of homework, force them to learn English before they learn their mother tongue. In fact, primary education is not about getting a job. It is about getting basic skills and confidence to live one’s day-to-day life. It opens many more possibilities in the world than we can think of (ibid.: 87). It is the higher education, which opens up the possibility of getting a job. But both the parents and society do not think of the truth that the basic ability to read and write is essential for every human being, and it will not be learnt unless one goes to the school. Instead, they see that education is relevant for students only if there is possibility of getting a job. In other words, education is now primarily linked with employment, especially the white collar jobs and both education and employment together determine the nature and degree of social change and social mobility among the people (Ram 1995: 22). The feeling is more with the students from poor economic background and marginalized sections.

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67

That is why, they cannot get access to higher education as they have hesitation to start from the primary level. As mentioned earlier, many studies show interconnections between poverty and deprivation from education. A large majority of the youth who are out of the education system are also the ones who have no resources to pay for their education (Saxena 2006: 193–194). But we find less discussion about another part of the story i.e., the duty of parents towards their children. There are only a few researches which have focused how to make it a duty of a parent and government in educating a child. Wiener (1994) is among them: Education should not be regarded as a right granted by the state, but as duty imposed by the state. When education is made a duty, parents, irrespective of their economic circumstance and beliefs, are required by law to send their children to school. It is the legal obligation of the state to provide an adequate number of schools, appropriately situated and to ensure that no child fails to attend school. (Wiener 1994: 87)

Here, Wiener suggests the modern states to regard education as a legal duty and not merely as a right, and sending their children to school to be the duty of parents. Also, attending school is the duty of a child, and the State is obliged to enforce compulsory education. The State, thus, as the ultimate guardian of children protects them against the both—parents and possible employers (Weiner 1994). Dhagamwar (2006: 89) also has a similar understanding about educating children as a duty rather than a right. She states: We want the state to interfere when parents give dowry. Yet, when the child is not sent to school, we still do not want to compel parents…the parents must be duty-bound to send the child to school regardless of any pressing need to make cowdung cakes, graze the cow, or attend a wedding or to a guest. Finally, the child must have a duty to go to school, however much s/he may prefer to play cricket or skip role.

Only when all this is put into place, Dhagamwar argues, we will get full-time schools that spend on educating the child in the real sense of the word. When we go through the historical evidences, we find a kind of relevance of such arguments. Dhagamwar shares her experiences about the provision of compulsory education by the erstwhile Bombay and Baroda states too. It was the Bombay Province in which education was made compulsory through the Bombay Education Act, 1923. As the state would charge a fine of Rs. 5.50 on guardians for not sending their children to school, no one was found illiterate at that time. Due to the provision of compulsory education by the Baroda state, every citizen of that time was literate. It was also due to proper mechanism to cross-check absentees, i.e., the school peon would call at the house of the absent child to ask why s/he was not in school. As a result, as Dhagamwar (2006: 61) reports, one old woman of Baroda was literate, but her grand-daughter, who was then young, was not. Here, we have to seriously think whether, in Nepal, we should continue to see educating children only as a right of children or make it a duty and compel parents to send their children to school.

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2.4 Educational History of Nepal The concept of schooling in ancient Nepal, as in India, originated among high caste Hindu people, the Brahmins, and Sanskrit, a language of the elites, was the medium of instruction (Koirala 1996). Though present day Nepal’s origin can be traced to 5th century under the rule of the Lichhivi dynasty (250–878), the foundation of the modern State of Nepal was laid by King Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha in 1769 (Gupta 1993: 2). It seems that the Lichhavi rulers, being popular for their cultural and architectural achievements, also had the concept of education, but they took the issue of educating common people as an extra burden (Sharma 1986). Until in the recent past, as Sanskritization had been aided and abetted by the enforced imposition of Brahmanic social systems and codes of behaviour by the Hindu dynasties, it has dominated much of Nepal for the past thousand years. The most important of these social codes were introduced and formalized under the regimes of Jayasthiti Malla of Kathmandu (1382–95), Rama Shah of Gorkha (1606–33) and the founder of the Rana political system, Janga Bahadur Kunwar (1846–77). As stated by Joshi and Rose (1966: 11), orthodox Hindus attempted to codify the structure of Nepali society— both Hindu and non-Hindu—within a basically orthodox Hindu framework. One finds certain kind of initiatives on education by the Malla dynasty (1879–1968), which replaced the Lichhivi dynasty in Kathmandu.. But they also could not expand education beyond the ruling family and families of the traditional priests or Pundits (Joshi 1982). In fact, in both ancient and medieval Nepal, schooling was a prerogative of the high castes people rather than a right of the common people such as Dalits (Koirala 1996: 43). Regarding the availability of modern institutions in Nepal in general and in Kathmandu in particular, the first high school (and hospital) was established only in the last decade of the 19th century. More specifically, the first high school–Durbar High School—was opened in 1892, the first college—Tri-Chandra College—was opened in 1918; and the first university—Tribhuvan University— was established in 1960 (Joshi and Rose 2004: 18). Though the exposure of the Kathmandu Valley to the modern world is a recent phenomenon, the Valley, being the only modernized, educated and sophisticated city of Nepal, could be seen as a cultural heritage. But it was least representative in terms of education and other human development indexes among people of the different social categories. It is because it has been serving as the administrative capital since the Eleventh century, and politics has largely been restricted to the urban areas of Kathmandu Valley. The city of Kathmandu serves as the prototype of progress for the rest of Nepal, and public leaders envisage the development of little Kathmandu over the length and breadth of the country (ibid.: 17). Review of the education policy of the Nepali rulers in the past reveals only little attention paid by the state to provide mass education outside the clan of the rulers. Unfortunately, the Jati system discouraged Dalits to get education (Koirala 1996) though they were religiously put under the Hindu communities. In fact, they were rather barred from not only touching but also listening to recitation of the Hindu literatures such as Vedas, Puranas and Upanishads. Thus, Dalits could get no place

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69

in traditional schools to become literate and educated. Koirala (1996) states that each Varna was supposed to have its own schools to teach them duty prescribed by it through the education institution. But there was deliberate denial of traditional schooling to Janajatis and Dalits because of their prescribed duty to provide service to people of other castes. Vir (1988: 54) highlights the reason behind the need of varna-based education to all other three categories, but he does not mention how and why education is relevant to the forth category—the Shudras. According to him: For Brahmins, formal schooling was regarded as a religious necessity because they had to read and preach the religious texts. The Kshetriya had to learn the rule and get acquainted with previous weapons, state crafts and organizational matters, and schooling for this purpose was considered helpful. The Vaishyas required schooling for learning arithmetic in order to transact business, keep records and maintain accounts. (ibid.: 84)

It is said that Dalits in India also had no access to education before 1850 as the Hindu Varna system was very much dominant and applicable there. It was the Christian Missionaries who tried to make the Dalits aware of the value of education for the first time in the 1850s, with the hope of converting them to Christianity (Naik 1980). But Nepal did not allow the missionaries before 1952,7 even if they tried three times to come into the country during the 7th, 8th and 18th centuries (Koirala 1996). King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of modern Nepal, tried to use the state resources for educating children. But he had a narrow social base that confined his policy to educating children of the soldiers who lost their lives in wars. Moreover, such policy did not have much social change, but continued the ‘socio-religious’ status quo, strengthened the already existing social order based on ‘tradition’ (Ezewu 1992: 22) and spread it all over the newly occupied territories. While doing so, he acknowledged the supreme position of Brahmins in the social order, employed members of higher-caste noble families, distributed tax-free lands called Birta, Jagir, and Guthi for exclusive religious and administrative purposes and granted them (the Brahmins) some of the special rights and immunities such as total immunity from capital punishment. This is why some writers see his rule as a continuation of ascendancy of Brahmanic orthodoxy in Nepal (Levi 1905–8 cited in Gupta 1993: 7). Later, the heirs of Prithvi Narayan Shah also ignored the state responsibility in schooling children (Wood 1965: 9 cited in Koirala 1996) until the success of the democratic struggle in 1950.

2.4.1 Education During Rana Period (1846–1950) When the Shah dynasty was in crisis due to internal feuds, a family oligarchic system, popularly called Rana regime, came into power in Nepal. The Rana rulers wanted 7 Once

during the rule of Pratap Malla (1641–1674) a Roman Catholic Mission was able to obtain state sanction to practice their religion through which some Nepalese started practicing Christianity in the country. Later, they were either driven away from the country or forbidden from practicing their religion by succeeding regimes (Koirala 1996).

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to continue ruling Nepal by discouraging the spread of education. In fact, since the Rana regime considered schooling as a threat to the government and hence opposed mass schooling, literacy could increase marginally only (Koirala 1996; Uprety 1962; Aryal 1970; Shrestha 1982). In order to prevent the growth of new ideas among the people, the Ranas kept the country rigidly isolated from outside contacts (Gupta 1993: 17). They stopped people from traveling abroad terming it as violation of religious and social tradition (Hoftun et al. 1999; Joshi and Rose 2004: 11). Further, the prevalence of feudalism or the lord-and-servant relationship was one of the basic features of the Rana regime which prevented growth of an independent middle-class, exerting influence of middle classes against the continuation of an autocratic regime in the long run (Gupta 1993:17). In other words, total control in a static society was the base of the Rana rule, and the two major means of maintaining this situation were the policy of isolation and the Hindu social order (Hoftun et al. 1999: 3). Even Janga Bahadur, mentor of the Rana political system, had to face a warning of his caste defilement when he visited England in 1950–51. He was accused of having lost his membership of clan by dining and socialization with Europeans. To escape from the allegation, he had to undergo rites of purification soon after his return to Nepal and visit important Hindu pilgrimage centers like Dwarka, Rameshwaram and Banaras in India (Joshi and Rose 1966: 44–45). Here, one can imagine the kind of punishment if a non-ruling family dared to leave the country for any reason. On the one hand, basic facilities like education inside the country were not made accessible to all. On the other hand, one had to be deprived of one’s property and receive additional punishments when he/she returned to the country after being educated abroad (Gupta 1993: 18). There are several evidences how the Rana regime tried to maintain social hierarchy based on caste and power so that they could control the Nepali people by keeping them away from knowledge and education. It was the Rana regime which rigidly enforced on the Gorkha recruits the rules of caste purification upon their return (Joshi and Rose 1966: 52). Kedar Man Byathit illustrates the rigidity of caste system at the time of the Rana regime by narrating a personal experience. While he was in jail under the Rana government, Byathit received a letter from Parikshit Nar Singh, a liberal member of the Rana family who was studying at one of the universities in India. The letter addressed Byathit as “Respected Kedar Man Byathit.” When the letter fell later into the hands of the government, they summoned the writer of the letter, and asked: ‘how can you write like this to a Newar? Remember, you are a Rana’. And he was chastised and banished from Kathmandu to Gorkha (Byathit’s interview cited in Hoftun et al. 1999: 4). It is also said that the Rana government asked the British authorities not to promote Gorkha recruits beyond the rank of sergeant, fearing that the veterans might bring modern ideas into their village (Joshi and Rose 2004: 52). However, the urge for change began to gain momentum in a section of the Nepali people. Basically, there were three types of émigré Nepalis—(1) some families in Nepal Tarai, who come in greater contact with people in India than in Kathmandu; (2) some members of the lower class civil servants who left Kathmandu to settle in India; and

2.4 Educational History of Nepal

71

(3) some ‘C’8 class Ranas excluded from the succession and also banished from the country who then migrated to India, got higher education and were the first to begin awakening people in Nepal against the Rana regime (Gupta 1993: 16–18). It is also considered that the first Indian Civil Disobedience Movement, started in 1920, helped the Nepali community at Banaras9 to become conscious about their own nationalistic feeling, along with the anti-Rana consciousness. As mentioned earlier, the Rana rulers had introduced policies—isolationism and systemization of the social order through the Muluki Ain 1854—to stop radicalizing the society. The government’s education policy was instrumental in doing so. In fact, growth of education was restricted during the regime. It became a matter of conviction for the rulers to suppress the growth of an educated intelligentsia during the Rana regime. Though Jang Bahadur introduced Western-type schooling system after he returned to Nepal from England, the right to education was strictly limited to the members of the ruling family, and acquisition of knowledge by ordinary citizens was regarded as an act of sedition. Throughout the Rana period (1846–1950), only one college (Tri-Chandra College) and four high schools were in function (Gupta 1993: 17). But if we talk about the access to these institutions, no common people could get admission in the Durbar High School.10 Admission in the Tri-Chandra College was limited to the members of the Rana family and high ranking civil servants from higher castes (Hoftun et al. 1999: 4; Regmi 1948). As a result, there were only 321 primary schools, 11 high schools and 2 colleges in the entire country with an enrolment of only 8500 primary school students, 1680 high school students, and 250 college students in 1952 (Shrestha 1982; Thapa 1988; Hoftun et al. 1999: 4).11 However, a small group of middle-class or newly educated elites emerged in the country, especially in Kathmandu (CBS 1985; also Gupta 1993: 234)12 in the 1920s. As mentioned earlier, it was because Kathmandu served as an ancestral home of the traditional Nepali political, military, and sacred or religious elites. This helped further expansion of the elites as an impact of gradual modernization. Most of the middle class members had received a college-level education, had travelled abroad, and had exposure to the nationalistic political consciousness in India. The Ranas, therefore, were generally hostile to the Indian nationalist movement and Gandhi’s initiatives. But they did not dismiss all of Gandhi’s ideas and programmes. It is said that the Rana regime seems to have viewed certain features of Gandhi’s programme, like ‘basic education’13 (Kumar 1989: 70), as an effective 8 Rana

family was divided into “A”, “B” and “C” classes on the basis of marriage. The legitimate offspring, the A class Ranas, would fill the highest position. Thereafter it was “B”. Class “C” was excluded from holding the army or civil administration. 9 Banaras had been the home in exile for Nepali political expatriates for many centuries. 10 Admission for the common people was formally opened in 1902. 11 However, Sharma (1986) states that there were 27 high schools in Nepal in 1951. 12 It was Kathmandu Valley which had more than 50 percent male population and 19 percent of female was found literate even though the country’s literacy rate was only 2 percent in the 1950. 13 Gandhi’s idea of basic education was to relate the schools to the processes of production in the local milieu, with the aim of making the school itself a productive institution. In symbolic terms, by proposing the introduction of productive skills and the knowledge associated with them in the

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check upon the modern ideas and attitudes that were being enthusiastically adopted by Nepali students at Western-style educational institutions at home and in India. In 1947, the Rana government sought to encourage Gandhi’s basic education system as the prototype educational system for Nepal. The initiative of Ranas, according to Joshi and Rose (1966: 52–53), was considered an attempt to exploit Gandhi’s name and programme in order to discourage a higher education system based on the western model, which the Ranas considered politically more dangerous. When the Ranas started facing a mounting pressure of anti-Rana movement, the then Rana Prime Minister, Padma Shamser, announced authorization of seven new schools in Kathmandu Valley, along with several other programmes, through his speech on May 16, 1947. It was also one of the outcomes of his objective to associate the people with the government to a greater degree than in the past. However, the programme was not actually sympathetic for the cause of common people’s welfare. Jayatu Sanskritam Andolan is a good example to describe the narrow and limited educational system, which existed in Nepal before 1950. In July 1947, students at Sanskrit School in Kathmandu launched an agitation, demanding that the curriculum in their school be modernized to include more subjects like geography, history, economics and social sciences. The background of the movement was that no mechanism had been developed for taking examinations inside the country, and those studying for degrees in Sanskrit had to travel to India to take their main examinations. One easily finds about the nature of education policy when he/she knows the fact that there were only five persons inside the country, in 1944, who had obtained university degrees of the Master’s level. According to Hoftun et al. (1999: 4–5), the Nepali society of 1950 was with a literacy rate of only 2% of the total population of over 9 million, which was as 5.3% by the population census 1952–1954. In this situation, it was likely that less than 100 Nepali Dalits were fortunate to be literate till that date (Koirala 1996: 44). In fact, the Sanskrit students’ movement was not only directed against the Ranas but also against the Brahmin priests who were directly responsible for supervising the schools. Later, the movement was suppressed by not only discontinuing the stipends of these students, but also expelling them from the school and compelling them to flee from Kathmandu. In fact, the provision to go to India for writing the final examination had made education less accessible to the common people. At the same time, the provision had left the kind of positive implication for the Nepali democracy struggle too. While taking examinations in India, the students got the opportunity of meeting leaders of anti-Rana movement in Banaras, discussing the issues and becoming encouraged to take a stand against the Ranas. Most of the students who were involved in the students’ movement later joined the anti-Rana movement in Banaras (Joshi and Rose 1966), which ultimately helped in ending more than a century-old Rana regime in 1951 and turning the country into democratic Nepal, with a multi-party democratic system.

curriculum, Gandhi was advocating the allocations of a substantive place in education to systems of knowledge developed by, and associated with the oppressed groups of Indian society.

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2.4.2 Education After the 1950s The first and foremost achievement of the revolution of 1950–1951 was the end of centuries of isolation, and the opening up of the country’s borders to foreign influences. This period witnessed the beginning of modernisation in Nepal. External powers also helped in implementation of development programmes. Consequently, it also helped moving towards a major expansion of education (Koirala 1996: 45). The full force of this process of modernization, however, came only after the death of King Tribhuvan in 1955- Hoftun et al., 1999: 45), though the priority was given to expanding education after 1950. In fact, ‘education expansion process’ was boosted only after 1971, after the introduction of National Education System Plan (NESP) in that year. It was the NESP which tried not only to bring schools under government control and made Nepali language mandatory as the medium of instruction (Hoftun et al. 1999: 221), but also to produce graduates loyal to the king, country and the newly introduced political system—the Panchayat (Nepal-Ministry of Education 1970: 9 cited in Koirala 1996). In fact, the making Nepali language mandatory as the medium of instruction, in theory, was introduced through the Report of the National Education Planning Commission in 1955 (Pyakurel 2007). The Plan also introduced a ‘standard’ national curriculum, including subjects relating to national culture and history, with the objective of the integration between Nepalis belonging to different communities and different social classes. Yet, it failed as the government lacked the capacity to manage the whole education system effectively. Though the Plan existed for a short while, it had left many negative and positive impacts in Nepal’s education sector. It had compelled the local communities to feel that the schools were no longer their own. That is why, researchers describe it as Shiksha Niyojana (education limitation), rather than Shiksha Yojana (education plan) (Hoftun et al. 1999: 222). On the other hand, increased enrolment of the pupils at primary level was its positive impact. The average annual increase in students’ enrolment between 1974 and 1980 was 16.2%. Interestingly, the number of primary schools increased from 321 in 1951 to 4001 in 1961, 7256 in 1970, 11,869 in 1985 to 19,498 in 1992. The following Table 2.4 shows the scenario of the expansion of Table 2.4 Situation of Education, 1951–92 Period

Number of students at various levels Primary

1951

9000

1961

182,000

1970

449,000

1985

1,812,000

1992

3,034,000

Secondary 1680

Percentage of Students Higher

Male

Female

250

9.5

0.7

21,115

5142

16.3

1.8

102,704

17,200

24.7

3.7

216,473

55,560

34.9

11.5

364,525

95,240

56.2

23.5

Sources * Joshi 1990: 133; Manandhar 1995: 568 cited in Hoftun et al. 1999: 221; ** Source: Spotlight 5/1/1996 cited in Hoftun et al. 1999: 9;*** CBS 1985: 55; Kansakar 1989: 46 cited in Hoftun et al. 1999: 95

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education during 1950–1992. Here, one could ask as to why an undemocratic government wanted to spread education. It can be said that such expansion of education to the masses had helped strengthen the anti-Panchayat movement. Even senior members of the Panchayat System seemed to be aware of the danger of continuing the undemocratic Panchayat regime if they continued expanding education. But it is said that they did not stop it as any attempt to slow down educational expansion would have been politically impossible. It is stated: An autocratic regime could only hope to use the lesser educated section of the population as a bulwark against the intelligentsia but the Panchayat regime, in contrast, had to portray itself as totally committed to development as King Mahendra not only termed the Panchayat as ‘suited for soil’ but also had justified his 1960 takeover as providing Nepal a better opportunity for progress than would have been possible under the parliamentary democratic system. Ultimately, the Panchayat system was ended with the successful Janaandolan I in 1990. It is said that the anti-Panchayat movement was successful as the ranks of the educated young were swelling and their sympathies did not lie with the Panchayat regime. (Hoftun et al. 1999: 225)

Later, Niranjan Thapa, the former Home Minister during the Panchayat System, acknowledged the fact and pointed out that the failure to forge links with intellectuals and obtain their sympathy was one of the main reasons for the fall of the Panchayat System (cited in Hoftun et al. 1999: 227). Likewise, there were people who considered the small number of educated middle-class as a deficit in deepening democracy in the country. It was the time when Nepal was struggling to institutionalize the achievements of successful pro-democracy movement as it could not save the first popularly elected government in 1960. It is said that if there had been adequate educated elites and middle-class, the king’s coup would not have been possible in 1960. Literate minority and inadequate growth of an educated middle class became a deficit to consolidate democracy which could act as an effective agency to impart political education to the masses. In absence of such class, the communication among various groups, castes and communities, on the basis of new occupational pursuits, had not then taken place. As a result, organized social and cultural activities, which may have served as a means of introducing new ideas, remained largely unknown to the people. Gupta (1993: 234–235) states that people could not “realize the value of political freedom” due to the lack of elementary education. Finally, the lack of adequate number of educated middle-class became instrumental in sabotaging the process of democratization in Nepal. Moreover, the NESP and its provision to make Nepali language compulsory as the medium of instruction contributed much to student’s shift from government schools to the privately run English-medium schools. Better-off parents were in search of a pretext to shift their children from government schools to the private, English-medium education. When Nepali language was made compulsory medium of instruction through the policy, the demand for English medium education within Nepal also rose steadily (Hoftun et al. 1999: 260). The older elite English-medium schools such as St. Xavier School and St. Mary’s School also started luring students of middle-class background by giving discounts on tuition fees and through other

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measures. Many private English-medium schools were established, in Kathmandu Valley and all over the country, with the ‘sole aim of imparting quality education.’ Even the then government of Nepal established the Budhanilkantha School in 1972 in the name of ‘National School’ of Nepal, which was a fully residential English medium co-educational public school. All these activities, helped strengthen people’s wishes and willingness to go for English-medium schools. This was due to the social status and economic opportunities that came with fluent English and western-style education (Hoftun et al. 1999: 260). In fact, those who received education from abroad, especially from the western countries, had enjoyed higher prestige in Nepal for long, and NESP helped spread the notion up to the very grassroots level. Then, there was increased trend of Nepalis from the upper and middle-class background leaving the country in pursuit of higher education. It is reported that the amount of money sent only to India for that purpose was equivalent to over 60% of Nepal’s education budget in the first quarter of 1990 (ibid.). In addition, the provision of NESP to bring all schools under the direct control of the government mechanism had to do many things for the expansion of private education. As mentioned earlier, people considered the attempt as confiscation of their rights to regulate schools, which were meant for the society. When the role given to the community was stopped, then education went beyond the control of the society. As a result, the quality of education in the government schools began to be questioned. In fact, there was something wrong with the NESP as well. When the government took back all authority to run schools, villagers did not respond the provision of the school management committee positively as there was less role provided to them. Then, the monopoly of teachers increased. As teachers were also divided according to political ideologies, they started focusing to act like politicians rather than as teachers. The ultimate effect was seen in the quality of education. Then those middle-class and local elites who were playing a vital role in the school management system earlier became passive in the issues as they were not given any role in the new policy. Consequently, there was very less concern from the community level even if many adverse things happened in the school. Today, the scenario is that the first-generation students, who belong to the Dalits and other marginalized groups, enter into government school to receive formal education. In my field area, the enrolment of the Dalit students at the primary level was more than 30%. Simultaneously, we can witness that the second and third-generation learners not only from the upper castes, but also from the so-called marginalized groups are ‘moving out of publicly-funded schools and getting enrolled into private institutions’ in India (Ramachandran 2002). Some scholars argue that such a move from the government-funded public schools to the privately managed institutions is likely to result in greater quality as public resources can then be used for the neediest. However, the detachment of the middle-class, which is considered the ‘vocal and opinionmaking section of society,’ from government schools has negative consequences leading to a further decline in the quality of education in those schools since the schools lack critical voices. This is to say, presence or absence of the middle-class affects the community in general and quality of education in particular. Nambissan

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(2006: 247) is right in stating that the situation after the absence of middle-class and local elites in the school welfare has been “worse rather than better to the detriment of children from hitherto educationally deprived groups who are increasingly attending these schools.” She explains that poor parents have no control over the quality of classroom transactions and social relations within the classrooms, and are likely to continue to ‘witness drop-out, failure and poor school completion rates’ (ibid.: 256). Kumar (2006: 323) subscribes to the notion arguing that the participation of a marginalized community, especially Dalits, in the village affairs in Nepal is ‘negligible and they are treated as non-identities in the local socio-political processes of governance and administration. A statement from NIAS (2002: 24) is worth mentioned here: as middle-class and better-educated and professional parents withdraw their children from government schools, the accountability of teachers and the pressure on them to teach or perform their other duties in school decreases. As working-class parents, especially the labouring poor, can not wield authority and exert pressure like the educated and professional parents, they and their children are seen as liabilities and dependent recreants who are unworthy of being educated. Further, such differentiation has other implications for the children’s experience of schooling, the authority and rights of teachers and the larger purpose of education.

The above excerpt seems to be relevant in Nepal as the media reports and research findings often mention about degradation in quality of education not only in the schools, but also at the university system. Here, it is equally relevant to quote an American researcher who narrates a scene he had witnessed during the 1974 School Leaving Certificate (SLC) Examinations at a high school in Pokhara: …examinees from various parts of western Nepal sat shoulder to shoulder in the examination rooms passing answers they received through open windows from youths outside. These well-wishers approached the examination rooms through a cordon of disinterested police supposedly stationed around the schools to protect the integrity of the examination. Nervous and embarrassed proctors tried vainly to maintain an appearance of priority despite the obvious and open cheating. (Ragsdale 1989: 170)

Though we blame the NESP for all the unfavourable things, especially for the decreased educational quality and the shift of middle-class and aspirants from government school to the English-medium private schools, it seems that the global economic liberalization has equally helped acceleration of the process. As the market inside the country was open for educational institutions through the economic liberalization process, many people felt secure to invest in private education. As a result, mushrooming of more private schools inside Nepal became possible. As Mukherjee (2004) states, Nepal follows the action taken by India, but in case of economic liberalization, India followed Nepal. It was in 1990 that the tempo of liberalization was accelerated. When there was an option and sending children to English-medium schools was made a matter of social prestige, people started shifting their children from the government schools to the private ones. Also, there was vested interest of the middleclass, which always wanted (and even want today) to create a gap between them and the majority of the masses. Both the NESP and the economic liberalization became a

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pretext for the middle-class to fulfil their interest. It was their success as they accomplished doing so within a short period. Today, we can see that the government schools remain full with children of the marginalized majority, especially the first-generation school-goer children of Dalits and poor, and children of the middle-class and aspirant groups are either in the English-medium boarding schools or abroad. According to Shah (1990: 44), the educated Nepali middle-class has mindset distinct from that of the majority. He explains: The educated class in Nepal belongs to the tiny upper crust of the privileged section of society called the middle class; as distinct from the majority of the people…the modern educated elite have thus not been able to withstand either the strain of poverty or that of prosperity. They have developed a split mentality which is the worst enemy of national character and which can be curbed only by an intensified effort on their part to coordinate their belief and action as much as possible. Their education in western values has made the elite neglect traditional values without being able to adopt western values in practice. They find themselves cut off from the mainstream of national life and culture with the result that they can fit in nowhere. The political elite, merely bound by selfish interests for the maintenance of the status quo, however cohesive it may appear outwardly and temporarily, cannot withstand the pressure of social forces generated by the process of modernization. (ibid.: 43)

2.4.3 Dalit Education and Government Policy After the Janaandolan-I No doubt market liberalization, which started increasing in Nepal in the 1990s, has contributed to the flourishing and spread of privately run English-medium schools to colonize the Nepali education system. Sharp distinction seems to have appeared between the educated and uneducated people inside the country. It is thought imperative that the community schools should improve standard of their English both for survival and to be able to compete with their private counterparts. But the popularly elected governments after the success of Janaandolan I in 1990 have taken many positive actions as far as education for Dalits is concerned. In fact, the budget for fiscal year 1995-96, began for the first time in Nepal a scheme to provide a monthly stipend of Rs. 25 to all Dalit children attending primary schools. The same government made other efforts, along with a modest cash incentive for girl students. The effort has increased adult literacy rate in a substantive way during the 12-year time of democratic politics after 1990. During this time, literacy rate actually doubled (Mahat 2005: 216). Nepal put mass education, especially the education of Dalits and other backward communities, on priority in the Ninth Five Year Plan (1997–2002). The main mission of the Plan was to increase the capability of the Dalits and other backward communities. Then, through the budget for 2003–2004 the government made efforts for offering free secondary education for Dalit students. A monthly stipend of Rs. 500 was provided for each and every Dalit student who was pursuing secondary level education. As a result, as reported by the Flash Report 2005, the Dalit students’ enrolment number in the year went up to 185,935, which was some 47% higher than that of the previous year (DoE 2005). The cash incentive for Dalit

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students, which was started in 1995–1996 with a nominal amount, was doubled in the budget for 2006–2007. Now Rs. 400 per student per annum is being provided under Dalit scholarship and institutional school are obliged to provide 10% financial assistance to poor Dalit students (IDSN 2015). The Higher Secondary Education Board of Nepal also started some welfare schemes for the education of Dalits. It started offering a monthly stipend under Student Bank (Scholarship Bank) scholarship scheme in 2004. In this scheme, every school/college has to offer 5% quota of its total seats to student bank scholarship (Dalit Welfare Organization) of Rs. 1500 to those Dalit students who were pursuing intermediate level of education, and Rs. 2000 for students at the graduate level. Tribhuvan University (TU), the largest university of Nepal, had reserved 10% seats for Dalit students in the year 2006 (B.S. 2061) (Press release of TU, 10 Bhadra 2061; Lamichhane 2007). The budget for fiscal year 2009/10 of the government of Nepal included a huge investment for poverty alleviation and inclusive development. Education for all and literacy, along with other especial programmes, were executed with high priority for education, health, employment and empowerment of the indigenous people, ethnic groups (Tharus, Madhesis, Dalits, Muslims), Madhesi-backward groups, endangered ethnic groups, oppressed, poor, disabled and people living in backward regions, who were backwards in economic and social development. With the objectives to make the girl children of the poor families of Terai/Madhes selfreliant through enhancement of skills and capacity, scholarships were granted to them for technical education. The girls from these communities passing 8th grade could get scholarship to study Auxiliary Nurse Midwifery (ANM) or equivalent technical education. Likewise, Dalits along with other marginalized communities are prioritized while conducting vocational and skill-oriented trainings. The budget also declares education as the fundamental right of the people. It is argued that the base of progress and prosperity of all Nepalis is easy access to education with assurance of it as a fundamental right of the people. Since education is constitutionally mandatory, illiteracy eradication programme is being conducted “to literate all Nepalis within two years” (Government of Nepal Budget of fiscal year 2009–2010). It meant that the governments, after the restoration of democracy in 1990 in general and Government of Nepal of the year 1995–1996 in particular, have given some sort of attention for Dalits’ education, which results in the rise of literacy among Dalits community from 34.5 to 52.4% during 2001–2011 (CBS 2011).

2.5 Dalit and Education in Birendranagar, Surkhet Birendranagar is the headquarters of not only Surkhet district but also the erstwhile Mid-Western Development Region of Nepal. It is a valley with an area of 34 square kilometers. Dalits in Surkhet district are more educated than in other districts of the Mid-Western Development Region. This may be so as there are more educational institutions imparting education at the primary, secondary and higher level. The following Table 2.5 is the educational status of the district in 2009 and 2015.

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Table 2.5 Educational Status of Surkhet Description

Primary

Year

2009

Lower secondary 2016

2009

Secondary 2016

2009

2016

Number of schools

396

557

75

208

66

98

Number of Teachers

1197

2007

245

580

156

292

Number of students

72,513

9888

13,578

69,414

24,674

33,216

Source District Education Office, Surkhet (2009, 2016)

School level educational statistics publishes by Department of Education in 2015 provides an important opportunity to compare students at primary level in Surkhet. The number which was 72,513 in 2009 could reach to 79,441 in 2011. However, the number lowered to 74,347 in 2012, 72,850 in 2013, 71,859 in 2014 and 69,414 in 2015. One could see a drastic fall in the number in the year 2012, and it was because the number of male students, which was 40,106 in 2011, went down to 36,533 within a year. If we look at the student data of government schools and boarding schools, we find a contrary data. Enrollment of boys in boarding school increased from 2469 in 2011 to 2802 in 2012, but the number of boys which was 37,637 in the government schools in 2011 came down to only 33,731 in 2012. In the meantime, female students studying in privately run boarding schools came down from 2134 in 2011 to 1932 (DoE 2015). The literacy rate among the people in Surkhet has changed from 72.3% in 2005 (Pyakurel 2012) to 96.26% in 2017, out of which 99.21% are males and 93.23% females DoE 2015). Surkhet, which was a district with more than 30% enrolment of Dalit students at the primary school level (Pyakurel 2012), has been changing. The enrolled number decreased to 25.28% in 2011, went up to 29.32 in 2012 and again came down to average 27% in 2013, 2014 and 2015. However, there was a slight decline in the enrollment proportion of Dalit girls from 49.14% in 2011 to 44.74% in 2015 (DoE 2015 computed by the author). A recent national data stated that there were only 0.4% Dalits with graduation and higher degree (Pariyar 2007), and Pyakurel (2012: 125) revealed that there were 4.41% Dalits studying +2 and above in 2009. Though the data were quite appreciable in comparison to the national data, it was not very encouraging for Surkhet. In fact Birendranagar serves as the educational centre of almost all districts of Mid-Western Development Region, except Banke and Bardiya. Students come to Birendranagar all the way from Dailekh, Kalikot, Rukum, Jumla, Humla, Salyan, etc. for their studies. In this situation, one has to be critical and serious on how to make Dalit-friendly higher education in general and in Birendranagar in particular. Data used by Pyakurel (2012: 126) also stated that the Dalits who pursue higher education come from the relatively well-off families but are getting higher education especially from government-funded campuses, not from privately run colleges. As

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a consequence, Dalits’ presence in arts and humanities is relatively better than in other professional and technical subjects like commerce and sciences (Weisskopt 2005: 43). Also the data from Surkhet (Pyakurel 2012) exemplifies the fact that the number of Dalits in general and Dalit girls in particular could be increased in an educational institution if it were available nearer to the Dalits settlement. There were 4.5% Dalit students in the Bachelor level in total and 6.3% in BA in Birendranagar Multiple Campus. This substantiates the argument that the ‘Dalits generally prefer not to go away from home town for study purpose’. The well-known reason is the weak economic background and fear of the practice of untouchability. It has also been observed that availability of higher educational institutions near the Dalit settlements increases the number of Dalit students studying there. In other words, educational attendance of the Dalit students will be determined by physical location of the educational institutions and the Dalits habitation (Jha and Jhingram 2002; Nambissan 2006). In semi-urban society i.e. Surkhet, fear of the practice of untouchability was stronger for Dalit students for not going out of their home town. Many of my respondents confessed how they had to hide their identity if they went to stay outside. Bimal Nepali, Principal of Horizon Academy Boarding School, Surkhet may be quoted about the different situations he faced while studying in Surkhet and in Kathmandu. He shares: I did not have any bad experience while studying in Surkhet. Rather I was helped by everyone while I was studying in Birendranagar. I want to give credit to Khadananda sir without whom it would be impossible for me to be in today’s position. I remember that day when he came and took me from the street, where I was playing with kids, saying that there was an exam for scholarship in the Education Office. It was scholarship which made me able to study up to intermediate level. But when I moved to Kathmandu for further studies, I spent some 11-12 years not disclosing my caste identity. I used to hide my real surname, which was “Nepali”, and used a fake surname “Nepal.” I did it to be safe from the atrocity of non-Dalits towards a Dalit. You cannot believe the kind of psychological discomfort faced by me while doing so in Kathmandu. (Pyakurel 2012: 128)

Scholars suggest that the easy access to a hostel would be helpful for Dalit students to overcome such problems. But the following observation indicates that it is Dalit students again who have to face a difficult situation outside home even today even if the hostel is available for them. A physically handicapped boy came to me and asked for a room in the hostel. As he (being a disabled) is entitled to be in hostel in any circumstance, I received his application and suggested him to stay in room number 17. He gave a cursory look at the Hostel register and came to request me to allot a room other than room number 17. I then told him to go to another room without asking the cause. But, later on I came to know that he refused to stay in room number 17 as he went through the surname of the students and found out that two Dalit students were staying in the room. Before meeting the Dalit friends and knowing about their personality and behaviour, he tried to escape from them on the basis of the prejudice that they are Dalits. (ibid.)

Also, the good representation of the Dalit students at the bachelors and masters level courses indicates that they want to capitalize the available opportunities in the

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locality. They prefer going to private higher secondary schools for intermediate level education as such schools are available in locality and are believed to be better than the government-funded campuses. But they do not hesitate to go to the governmentfunded campuses for bachelors level if privately run colleges are not available in the locality. Since Surkhet is inhabited by a relatively large numbers of Dalits (Kumar 2009b), it is natural to expect larger of Dalit students studying in schools and colleges in Surrkhet. Data provided by Flash Report (DoE 2008–09) is encouraging as far as Dalit students’ enrolment at primary school level is concerned. The Report reveals that Surkhet, along with a few other districts, is the district which has more than 30% enrolment of the Dalit students at the primary level. It is a good record for a district to have almost 21% Dalit population (Census 2001) and a share of more than 30% enrolment of the Dalit students in the primary education. The data also show that more Dalit parents have started sending their children to schools. But we should be conscious about whether there is hidden interest in presenting such data. Sanju Singh BK shares something about it. According to him, there are some government schools which incorporate some fake names of Dalit students in the school attendance register. In fact, he was able to point out some fake names in the school registers. And, it was done not only to take advantage of having additional teachers but also to manipulate the scholarship amount offered to Dalit students. After reading Nambissan (2006), one finds that such a trend to manipulate benefits at the cost of marginalized groups is not limited to Nepal only; it is a South Asian phenomenon. According to her, teachers are expected to go to the homes of children and register their names in the school records (ibid.: 240). This is the reason for a gap between the proportion of children enrolled and those who actually attend schools regularly. But what we have to accept here is that a fair representation of the Dalit students exists at the primary school level in general and in grade 1 in particular even if there is data manipulation. The concern is about their continuity in school. Also, it is a great challenge to ensure the quality of education as expected by them and to make education relevant in their lives to meet the needs of the communities. If schools do not make education relevant for Dalit children and cannot fulfil their expectation of receiving quality education, they would discontinue as their families are unable to provide the academic support that school expects from them. One of the political activists consulted by Pyakurel (2012: 29) speaks in similar lines, “My sons are very poor in education though they go to school regularly. As their mother also works in a campus, no one is available at home to watch their activities in the day-time. They spend most of their time playing. Their weakness in education may be because of these reasons.” In fact, poverty, verbal abuse and physical punishment and harassment by upper-caste teachers to Dalit children in primary schools have a critical impact on these first-generation school-goers. Many researches (Balagopal and Subrahmanian 2003: 43; Jha and Jhingram 2002: 95) and NIAS (2002) show that most teachers do not empathize with parents’ working and living condition, and also do not understand the limitations faced by the children who are the first-generation learners.

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Teachers and high-caste people play important role in decision-making, especially in establishing marginalized students-friendly environment inside the school. They often sought the involvement of the more marginal groups mainly where there was need of mobilization of labour and resources (Subrahmanian 2003: 31). The limited empowerment of its members, especially from Dalits, and their passive attendance at meetings, as mentioned by World Bank (2003), has many things to do in making an unfriendly environment at school for the children of the marginalized section. How the presence of a person from a particular community helps overcome many problems faced by the community is rightly mentioned by one of the respondents, Sanju Singh BK. He talks about the importance of the presence of a right person in the decision-making body to ensure the right decision. He says, “Education would not be Dalit-friendly unless well-informed Dalits attend the decision-making body meetings of schools and colleges”. He questioned about the representations from Dalits in the decision-making bodies of schools such as in the School Management Committees (SMC). He further says: Yes, there are people from Dalit groups, but what is unfortunate is that the member who represents Dalits in the committee does not understand the problem faced by many, especially the poor Dalits. It was due to the fact that only a rich and Dalits with access to authorities of power have been representing in the committees and representation of real Dalits is still very much limited. (Pyakurel 2012: 130)

According to him, most of the Dalits who are represented in the SMCs send their children to the private schools. This is why the rich Dalits neither represent the poor Dalits, nor understand the problems faced by them. The answer to why it is happening is that the deprived section generally have no resources to contribute, except their labour. It is a fairly common experience that the stratified rural society invariably implies continued domination of influential people who can provide resources, including space, for running a center or school (Saxena 2006: 193–94). Finally, the fact that Dalits are increasingly enrolling their children in schoolsreflects the growing value that they place on education for the future of their children, as mentioned by Nambissan (2006: 256) in the case of Indian Dalits. For Dalits, education is a crucial resource to enhance their life’s chances as well as for social and political mobilization. There are reflections of Dalit children about being made to feel ‘inferior’ and ‘different’ from their classmates in schools and excluded from classroom activities. They have to face caste-based prejudices even today. That is why there is a greater interaction across castes inside school today. In our study, we have found that more than 70% Dalit students surveyed in Birendranagar say that the best friends they have are not from their own caste but from from higher castes. It is contrary to the finding of the study by Chitnis (1981). However, it seems that such interactions have been confined ‘within schools’ and are yet to be extended ‘outside the boundaries of the institution, particularly to the private space of the home’ (Nambissan 2006: 246). Such interaction across castes at least inside schools, as referred to by Balagopal and Subrahmanain (2003), is likely to be more common in towns and cities than in the villages. However, this much of interaction is also better than no interaction.

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At present, an increasing number of Dalit parents are trying to send their children to English-medium schools. They think that more quality education is available in English medium schools and think that it is necessary for their children’s survival. It is, as Balagopal and Subrahmanian (2003: 46) say, due to a belief that the ‘academic mobility’ comes with private schooling, and the ‘entire community not only imbibes the culturally hegemonic language around the failure of government schools, but also uses this to criticize the lack of academic rigour in the government-run schools.’ But it is not the way out as each and every one cannot afford it. As it is a power struggle, no one can narrow the gap between the students who have studied in different schools if there is no societal and state intervention. Ultimately, the cultural bias will further increase the notion of ‘different schools for different people’. Therefore, the agenda of building ‘common inclusive schools’ in the neighbourhood is only the solution today to stop the middle-class and elite game for reproducing inequality through different schools. It is the common school as discussed by Jha (2006: 294) that addresses not only the concern of equality and social justice, but also provides a perfect setting for organizing ‘inclusive education’.

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CBS (2011) Nepal living standard survey. Central Bureau of Statistics, Kathmandu CEHRD (2015–2016) Flash report. The Centre for Education and Human Resource Development, Kathmandu Chalam KS (2008) Modernization and Dalit education: Ambedkar’s vision. Rawat Publishers, Jaipur Chitnis S (1981) A long way to go. Allied Publishers, New Delhi Dahal DR (2009) Social exclusion and group mobilization: A case study of Yadavas and Tarai Dalits in Dhanusha. Contrib Nepal Stud (36):131–174 Special Issue Davies N (2000) State of despair as public schools get the cream, Guardian, 8 March Dean C (1998) 5000 pupils prove social class matter. Times Educational Supplement, 16 June DfEE (1996) Learning to complete education and training for the future. Consultation Document. HMSO, London Dhagamwar V (2006) Child rights to elementary education: National and international provisions. In: Kumar R (ed) The crisis of elementary education in India. Sage, New Delhi DFID/World Bank (2005) Citizens with(out) rights: Nepal gender and social exclusion assissment (summary report). Department for International Development, The World Bank, Kathmandu DoE (2005) Flash reports of department of education 2005. Department of Education, Kathmandu DoE (2006–2007) Flash reports of department of education 2006–2007 DoE (2008–2009) Flash report. Department of Education, Kathmandu DoE (2009) Flash reports of department of education 2008–2009. DOE, Kathmandu DoE (2015) Flash report 2015–16. Department of Education, Government of Nepal, Kathmandu DoE (2016) Flash report 2015–16. Department of Education, Government of Nepal, Kathmandu Dreze J, Sen A (1995) India: Economic development and social opportunity. Oxford University Press, New Delhi Dreze J, Sen A (2003) Basic education as a political issue. In: Jandhyala BGT (ed) Education, society and development: National and international perspectives. National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi Ezewu E (1992) Sociology of education. Longman, London Foucault M (1980) Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Harvester Wheatsheaf, London Freire P (1968) Pedagogy of the oppressed. Seabury, New York Galbraith J (1992) The culture of contentment. Sinclair-Stevenson, London Gerwirtz S, Ball SJ, Bowe R (1995) Markets, choice and equity in education. Open University Press, Backingham Giddens A (1998) Risk society, the context of British politics. In Franklin J (ed) The politics of the risk society. Polity, Cambridge Giddens A (1999) ESRC tenth annual lecture. Economic and Social Research Council, London Goldthorpe J (1997) Problem of meritocracy. In: Halsey AH, Lauder H, Brown P, Wells AS (eds) Education, culture, economics and society. Oxford University Press, Oxford Gould P (1998) Unfinished revolution. How the modernisers saved the labour party? Little, London Graham-Brown S (1991) Education in developing world: Conflict and crisis. Longman, London Gupta A (1993) Politics in Nepal 1950–60. Kalinga Publication, Delhi Halsey AH, Floud J, Anderson CA (1961) Education, economy and society. Free Press, London Hatcher R (1998) Class differentiation in education: Rational choices. Br J Sociol Educ 19(1):27–40 Heller J (1988) Picture this. Ballantine, New York Hirsch F (1977) Social limit of the growth. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., Great Britain Hoftun M, Raeper W, Whelpton J (1999) People politics and ideology: Democracy and social change in Nepal. Mandala Book Point, Kathmandu IDSN (2015) Annual report international Dalit solidarity network 2015. International Dalit Solidarity Network Jha J, Jhingran D (2002) Elementary education for the poorest and other deprived groups. New Delhi Centre for Policy Research Jha MM (2006) Inclusive education in the context of common schools: A question of equality, social justice and school reforms. In: Kumar R (ed) The crisis of elementary education in India. Sage, New Delhi Jordan B (1996) A theory of poverty and social exclusion. Polity Press, Cambridge Joseph K (1975) Speech to Birmingham conservative association. Sunday Times 20 October

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Joshi RK (1982) Nepal ma Siksha (Education in Nepal at Glance) (in Nepali). Dean’s Office, Institute of Education, Sanothimi, Nepal Joshi RK (1990) Education and polity: A historical perspective. CERED, Kathmandu Joshi BL, Rose LE (1966) Democratic innovations in Nepal: A case study of political acculturation. University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles Joshi BL, Rose LE (2004, reprint) Democratic innovations in Nepal: A case study of political acculturation. Mandala Book Point, Kathmandu Kabeer N (2000) Social inclusion, poverty and discrimination: Towards an analytical framework. IDS Bull 31(4):83:97 Kansakar VBS (1989) Population of Nepal. In: Kamal PM (ed) Nepal: Perspectives on continuity and change. Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu Kingdom GG, Muzammil M (2001) A political economy of education in India: The case UP. Econ Polit Wkly, August 11 Koirala BN (1996) Schooling and the Dalits of Nepal: A case study of Bungkot Dalit community. PhD thesis, the department of educational policy studies, University of Alberta Kothari R (1997) Caste in Indian politic. Orient Longman, New Delhi Kumar R (ed) (2006) The crisis of elementary education in India. Sage, New Delhi Kumar D (2009a) Encountering marginality: Social exclusion of Hill Dalits in Surkhet district. Contrib Nepal Stud (36):175–220. Special Issue Kumar D (2009b) Encountering marginality: Social exclusion of Hill Dalits in Surkhet district, A draft report submitted to NIBR, Oslo, Norway/CNAS, Kathmandu Nepal Kumar K (1989) Social character of learning. Sage, New Delhi Kumar K (2004) Globalization and educational. In: Vanaik A (ed) Globalization and South Asia: Multidimensional perspectives. Manohar and ATWS, New Delhi Kushiyait (Yadav) B (2009) Social education in education: A study of school dropouts in Tarai and Hill districts of Nepal. Report to Social Inclusion Research Fund, Norwegian Embassy, Kathmandu, Nepal Lamichhane R (2007) Dalit scholarship and education reservation, Lamichhane. In: Darnal S (ed) The politics of special rights and reservations. Jagaran Media Center, Kathmandu Lawrence S, Kikkeri N, Ritambhara H (2004) Adivasis of India and development Strategies. HIVOS, Bangalore Mahat RS (2005) In defense of democracy: Dynamics and fault lines of Nepal’s political economy. Adroit Publishers, New Delhi Manandhar TB (1995) Educational development, population and literacy. In: Population monograph of Nepal. CBS, Kathmandu Marx K, Engels F (1968) Selected works in one volume. Lawrence and Wishart Ministry of Education (1963) Half our future: Cmnd 2165, Report of the Central Advisory Council for Education (England) (Newsom Report). HMSO, London MoE (1970) National educational system plan, 1970–75. Ministry of Education, Kathmandu Mosse D (2018) Caste and development: contemporary perspectives on a structure of discrimination and advantage. World Dev 110:422–436 Mukherjee IN (2004) Globalization and Nepal. In: Vanaik A (ed) Globalization and South Asia: Multidimensional perspectives. Manohar and ATWS, New Delhi Naik JP (1980) Education of the schedule caste. In: Shah VP (ed) Removal of untouchability: Proceedings of a seminar. Gujarat University, Ahmedabad Nambissan GB (1996) Equity in education? Schooling of Dalit children in India. Econ Polit Wkly, 1011–1024 Nambissan GB (2006) Terms of inclusion: Dalits and rights to education. In: Kumar R (ed) The crisis of elementary education in India. Sage, New Delhi NIAS (2002) Caste, class and school Tanjavur Tamilnadu: Local education report. National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore O’Sullivan T (2000) The young rich. Observer (review), 12 March OECD (1994) Schools: A matter of choice. OECD, Paris Pariyar G (2007) Dalit Yuba: Chunautisangai Abasar (Youth Dalit: Opportunity with the Challenge). Paper presented to Dalit Citizen’s Assembly held in Kathmandu on June 16–17

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Pathak A (2002) Social implications of schooling: Knowledge, pedagogy and consciousness. Rainbow Publisher, Delhi Pfaff-Czarnecka J (2019) Burdened futures: educated Dalits’ quandaries in contemporary Nepal. Contrib Nepal Stud 46(2):195–227. Pollard S, Adonis A (1996) A class act. Macmillan, London Pratichi (2002) The Pratichi education report. Pratichi Trust, Delhi Pyakurel UP (2007) Maoist movement in Nepal: A sociological perspectives. Adroit Publishers, New Delhi Pyakurel UP (2012) Social inclusion and exclusion: A sociological study of Dalits in Nepal. An unpublsihed PhD thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Pyakurel, U (2009) Food globalization and its impacts: What ‘development’ contributes to the villages of Nepal. Nepali J Contemp Stu XI(2), September Ragsdale TA (1989) Once a Hermit kingdom: Ethnicity, education and national integration in Nepal. Ratna Pustak Bhandar, Kathmandu Ram N (1995) Beyond Ambedkar: Essays on Dalits in India. Har-Anand Publication, New Delhi Ramachandram V (2002) Gender and social equality in primary education: Hierarchies of access. European Commission, New Delhi Reay D (1998) Class work: Mothers’ involvement in their children’s primary schooling. UCL Press, London Regmi DR (1948) Vartaman Nepal aur Jana-Andolan ka Uddeshya. Regmi, Banaras Saxena S (2006) Marginalization of quality Agenda. In Kumar R (ed) The crisis of elementary education in India. Sage, New Delhi Shah G, Mander H, Thorat S, Baviskar A, Deshpande S (2006) Untouchability in rural India. Sage, New Delhi Shah R (1990) Politics in Nepal 1980–1990: Referendum, stalemate and triumph of people Power. Manohar, New Delhi Shariff A (1999) Indian human development report: A profile of Indian states in the 1990s. National Council of Applied Economic Research and Oxford University Press, New Delhi Sharma GN (1986) History of education in Nepal: From ancient time to 1950 (in Nepali). Samjhana Press, Kathmandu Shrestha KN (1982) Educational experiments in Nepal. Tribhuwan University/ Institute of Education, Kathmandu Subrahmanian R (2003) Community at the center of university primary education strategies: An empirical investigation. In: Kabeer et al. (eds) Child labour and the right to education in South Asia: Needs versus rights? Sage, New Delhi Tabib M (1998) Educating the oppressed: Observation in working class settlement in Delhi. In: Sureshchandra S, Kaul R (eds) Education, development and underdevelopment. Sage, New Delhi Thapa KB (1988) Major aspects of Social, economic and administrative history of modern Nepal. Ambika Thapa, Kathmandu Tomlinson S (reprinted 2004) Education in a post-welfare society. Open University Press, Berkshire UNESCO (2000) World education report 2000—The right to education: Towards education for all throughout life. UNESCO Publishing, Paris Uprety TN (1962) Financing elementary education in Nepal (Doctorial Dissertation). Nepal American Education Foundation, Oregon Vir D (1988) Education and polity in Nepal: An Asian experiment. Northern Book Centre Weisskopf TE (2005) Some aspects of reservations in higher education. In Thorat S, Negi P (eds) Reservation and private sector: Quest for equal opportunity and growth. Rawat Publications, Jaipur Wiener M (1994) India’s case against compulsory education. Seminar 413(January): 83–86 Wood HB (1965) The development of education in Nepal. Office of education, US Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington Woodward D (1997) Economic dimensions of education and role of the world bank. Paper to NGO Economic Forum, London, October

Chapter 3

Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

In the twenty-first century, any difficult work means an activity involving a lot of physical strength. In the socio—economic discourse of our times, the term ‘work’ has been defined and classified as organized and non-organized sectors, whereas employment refers to the ’gainful activities.’ Even though the measurement of the “unorganized” or “informal sector”1 activities are problematic,2 it is, for statistical purposes, regarded as a ‘group of production units that form part of the household sector as household enterprises or, equivalently, unincorporated enterprises owned by households.’

1 In

fact, developing countries like Nepal quite often use the terms “unorganized” and “informal” interchangeably (for details, see Rudra Suwal and Bishnu Pant, “Measuring the Informal Economy in Developing Countries,” Paper Prepared for the Special IARIW-SAIM Conference on Measuring Informal Sector Economic Activities in Nepal, Kathmandu, Nepal, September 23-26, 2009). 2 The precise meaning of informal sector has nevertheless remained somewhat elusive and the subject of controversy, as the concept has been defined in different contexts with different meanings (Hussmann, 2004). It is a somewhat controversial subject because there are different viewpoints from which one can observe the informal sector. In view of this, countries have the flexibility to adopt their definition which is appropriate to their needs and the system of data collection for the same. With a view to helping the member countries in providing comparable statistics of employment in the informal sector, the fifteenth International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS) adopted a resolution on informal sector statistics which was subsequently endorsed by the UN Statistical Commission in February 1993. Then onwards, the Systems of National Accounts (SNA) has been applied as guidelines to undertake the informal sector data recommended and endorsed by the fifteenth ICLS.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9_3

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3.1 Traditional Occupation Assigned to Different Caste/Sub-caste of Dalits In the past, the Dalits, mainly Kamis (blacksmiths and coppersmiths), were employed in the munition3 or gun factories, and the Damais were employed as musical bands in the armies of Baise-Chhaubaise and Gorkha Kingdoms. They were paid with food grains every year. Similarly, in thaans or temples, Nagara (big drum) players who were Damais were paid in the same manner. Regarding the private sector, most of the Dalits used to work in their own family capacity according to their caste profession as Sunars (goldsmiths), Kamis: Chunara (carpenter mainly making theki and madani for churning curd into ghee), Od (mason and house builder), Parki (bamboo worker), Lohar (iron smith or black smith). Similarly, there were other so-called untouchables such as Tamota ot Tamata (copper smith), Sarki (leather worker); Damai (tailor and musician), Gaine (bard or a singer), and Bhand or Badi (entertainers whose women danced and were allowed prostitution). The following is the list of traditional occupation of the Caste/sub-caste groups of Dalits (Table 3.1). Apart from working independently and under sarkar (the government) as mentioned above, these castes also worked in guilds under the Mijars (heads of Sunars, Kamis and Sarkis), and Nagarchis (heads of Damais). A Mijar or a Nagarchi was appointed by the sarkar for a region, which was a hereditary post. He was allowed to collect half a rupee from every household once a year in his region who also had judicial powers over his communities except the right to award capital punishment which was only exercised by the dharmadhikar or the criminal judge appointed by the sarkar. Such heads like Mijars and Nagarchi were under the Jimmuwal (landlords) in villages, who were in turn under the Mukhiya or a governor of the region. A person, whether he worked independently or in guilds, was under the community head. Ram Niwas Pandey (1997) says in context of far western Nepal that the people of lower tribes or untouchable castes were economically well-to-do in the past. Oral traditions of the Dalits also corroborate such a conclusion. For instance, the Sunars in Syangja District say that their forefathers were richer than they are today. There are oral traditions saying that Sunars, Kamis, Sarkis and Damais in the past used to go to plains like Calcutta (Kolkata), Lakhnow (Lucknow), Banaras (Varanasi), Ilahabad (Allahbad), and Patna to learn their works and to bring gold, silver, shoes, and clothes to their villages to mostly barter and sell. The poorer among them moved to Darjeeling, Sikkim, and Assam in search of opportunities. Thus, one can say that Dalits in the past were not excluded from socio-economic activities although a few political elites from upper castes at the top level used to dominate the socio-political scenario. As the Dalits were not eligible to become the Dharmadhikar or judge, governor of a region, they were slowly pushed to the corner with control in their economic activities as well. It is argued that the exclusion of the Dalits in socio-economic and political dimensions started after the downfall of the Ranas 3 that

refer to name of desert in India and Pakistan.

Sarki

Kami

Hill Dalits

Caste

Agri; Acharya; Afaldhoti; Od; Kasara; Kallohar; Kalikote; Kaliraj; Gadal; Gahatraj (Gahate); Kumarki; Kaini; Koli; Koirala; Khadkathoki; Khapangi; Khati; Gajamer; Gajurel; Gadilee; Giri; Gotame; Gawa; Jandkami; Tamata (Tamrakar); Niraula; Nepal; Panthi; Pokharel; Paudel; Paudeli; Barailee (Baral, Baralee); Sripali; Diyalee; Dudhraj; Bhushal; Bhool; Mahilipar; Rahapal; Rajilauhar; Sapkota; Sigaure; Sijapati; Setipar; Ramdam; Rijal; Lwagoon; Sonam; Hemchuyuri; Tiruwa; Ghatanee (Ghatne); Ghamal; Ghartee; Ghimire; Ghamchatla; Chunar; Chhistal; Thagunna; Thatara; Nagarkoti; Pallaya; Parajuli; Potel; Buchebhale; Banskota; Bhatta; Bhattarai; Mahar; Rasailee; Suchyuree; Sundhuwa; Setisuruwal; Setimahar; Sashankar (Sadshankar); Serela; Lamgade; Sob; Ruchal; Pahari; Padhyabati; Lamakarki

Surnames

Leather work

Produce copper utensils

(continued)

Produce bamboo products such as Dalo, Naglo etc.

Produce wooden utensils such as Theki, Dudhero, Madani

House construction, works related to soil and timber

Iron works and agricultural tools

Gold and silver works, jewelry

Produce Khukuri, weapons, agricultural tools etc.

Metal work

Traditional Occupation

Acchami; Uparkoti; Upreti; Kamar; Kisan; Koirala; Honorary title granted by the rulers Khatiwada; Giri; Gaire; Gairipipal; Gathe; Ghimiore; Charmakar Produce leather products Chand; Gotame; Chudal; Chuhan; Thagunna; Bhool Chhamarki; Thaurasya; Thadarai; Dale; Tolangi; Thak; Produce leather products Thapaliya; Thapa; Daulakoti; Dhaulakoti; Dabe; Dahal; Dulal; Dhamel; Dhamala; Dhanali; Payeli; Purkoti; Pulami; Paudel; Dasel; Bamarel; Bayelkoti; Bishunkhe; Bastakoti; Bogati; Bhagyal; Bheyel; Bhool; Bhurtel; Bhipal; Mangrati; Majakoti; Majaboti; Malbul; Malchok; Mudel; Ramtel; Ruchal; Raut; Roila; Roka; Lamjel; Lamsal; Sahi; Srimali; Siraute; Surkheti; Sanyel; Sanjawal; Hamal; Hitang

Mijar

Tamata

Parki

Chunara

Od

Lohar

Sonar

Kami

Sub-caste

Table 3.1 List of traditional occupation assigned to different caste/sub-caste of Dalits

3.1 Traditional Occupation Assigned to Different Caste/Sub-caste of Dalits 89

Damai/Dholi

Caste

Table 3.1 (continued)

Hudke

Dholi

Ngarachi

Suchikar

Pariyar

Sub-caste

Adhikari; Asasaya; Aujee; Kanal (Kandel); Katuwal; Kakrki Dholee (Mudula; Sutar; Lama; Khulal); Kalakheti; Koirala; Khatiwada; Khati; Guide (Guindel); Gautam (Gotame [Siwa]); Ghale; Gurung; Cahar; Chuhan; Jairu; Thagunna; Thatal; Daude; Dhyakee; Tiwari; Trikatri; Thapa; Darnal; Das; Nagarchi; Negi; Nepal; Naubag; Chudal; Panta; Panchkoti; Pokharel; Bardewa; Bagchand; Bagdas; Baiju; Budhathoki; Budhaprithi; Bhandari; Bhattarai; Bhitrikoti; Bhusal; Magar; Mote; Mahara; Male; Rajabar; Ranapaili (Ranapal; Ranapaheli); Rana; Rai; Raingai; Raika; Ryainjhyain; Lapre; Lamghate; Luintel; Shildhar; Sunam; Sundas; Suncheuri; Sahi Samundri (Sai; Saisamundri; Samundrasai); Suji; Hingmang; Hudke; Aptarya; Ghalek; Bhedikar; Betuwa; Dharal; Retan; Bitalu; Nagarkoti; Yagne; Ghatani; Bhende Siba; Kekhure Siba; Sungure Siba; Damai Pariyar; Ratnapariyar; Achhame Pariyar; Chhinal Pariyar; Thak Pariyar; Nakadholi

Surnames

Play Hudke musical instrument

(continued)

Government’s messenger to inform community people by playing Dhol

Play Nagara musical instrument during special occasion in temples and palace

Tailoring

Tailoring

Play Panche Baja musical instrument during marriage and on auspici ous occasions

Traditional Occupation

90 3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

n.a.

Gaine

Badi

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

Chamar/Harijan/Ram

Musahar

Dusadh/Paswan/Pasi

Tatma

Madhesi Dalit

Sub-caste

n.a.

Caste

Table 3.1 (continued) Singing by playing Sarangi musical instrument

Traditional Occupation

Leather works

Tatma

Paswan; Hajari; Hajara; Madhaiya (Magaiya); Kurmi; Kamhar; Paliwar; Kurna; Dar; Sarjaha (Surajiya); Panjiyar; Pakhir Daid; Suryabanshi

Weaving (continued)

Godayit (‘Messenger’) of social events; village watchmen; Kamtiya (watchmen to secure harvest

Sada; Sadaya; Rishidev; Rishikul; Raut; Tirhutiya; Collect food grains from holes in the farm; animal grazing Madhaiya; Kharpuria; Satnapuria; Kauchh; Gharmunta; Pachharu; Mudi; Macharu

Ram; Mochi; Harijan; Rabidas (Raidas); Chamara; Mahar; Mahara; Mehara; Raut; Bhagat; Das; Bajar; Bagh; Dhusiya; Daswatiya; Madhesiya

Khati; Rasailithapa; Rasaili; Lekali; Chhinal; Baral; Produce musical instruments such as Madal, Dholak, clay Thakur; Rana; Kumal; Khadka; Jogi; Bote; Upadhyaya; products such as Chilim, gagri (and lately associated with Rijal; Singha; Shrestha; Paudel; Adhikari; Kami; sex work by some women) Damai; Badsaha; Khan; Dhital; Niraula

Adhikari; Kami; Kalakausik; Kala Paudel; Kalichan; Gosain; Jogi; Thakuri; Turki; Bahun; Budhathoki; Baikar; Badhyakar; Bestha; Bista; Bogatai; Bhusal (Parbate); Maheswar; Biswakarma; Bishnupad; Raisamundra; Sursaman; Setaparbat; Setichan; Kookchin Rana

Surnames

3.1 Traditional Occupation Assigned to Different Caste/Sub-caste of Dalits 91

n.a.

Kakahiya

a Sarvanga/Sarbariya

Hunting birds

Soil work

Wash clothes

Weaving clothes; spinning; carry Doli during marriages

Traditional Occupation

Pasi

Purbiya; Pachhimha; Chamara; Kotchamara; Dakhinaha; Bahiryinya

Chandal; Barawa; Bhogariya; Bachara; Chaula; Khirahi; Tawada; Chamariya; Taki; Dayama; Bagadi

Kalar/Sarvanga/Sarbariya

Kakahiya

Kuswadiya/Patharkatta

Jamadar; Raut; Sariswal; Turka; Amariya; Dahaiya (Darwe); Panpuri; Bakhariya; Mahar; Mestar; Halkhor

Liquor production from Tadi tree

Weaving clothes

Deer leather work

Begging

n/a

Stone products

Cleaning streets

Kothita; Mkhaita; Talwar; Tawakait; Chachewar; Bamboo products; play musical instruments; cut Kolniyar; Sanparaya; Ghatait; Amleriya; Mahawaita; umbilical cords during child birth, dig burial place; burn Balgachhiya; Kanoon; Bakhatiya; Modaliya; Jhojhawa; dead bodies Chirniya; Bhalwait; Baisi; Baswar

Chidimar

Rajdhami; Dhami; Sardar; Majhi; Raut; Bant

Kanujiya; Madhaiya; Belbar; Surjaha; Tamoli; Tirhitiya; Turtuk; Dhoiba; Baitha; Rajak; Pathik; Safi; Arya

Mandal; Tirhutia; Badaha; Kyotar; Parasa; Pokharbhinda; Hasuliya; Newar; Nanaud; Bake

Surnames

and Kalar are the same caste group. Kalar is a derogatory term. Therefore, they prefer to call themselves as Sarvanga/Sarbariya.

Source NDC 2003 cited in UNDP (2008)

n.a.

n.a.

Kuswadiya/Patharkatta

Pasi

n.a.

Mestor/Halkhor

n.a.

n.a.

Dom

Kori

n.a.

Chidimar

n.a.

n.a.

Bantar (Sardar)

n.a.

n.a.

Dhobi (Rajak)

Khatik

n.a.

Khatbe

Kalar/Sarvanga/Sarbariyaa

Sub-caste

Caste

Table 3.1 (continued) 92 3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

3.1 Traditional Occupation Assigned to Different Caste/Sub-caste of Dalits

93

in the latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of Panchayati system directly under the King. The Panchayati system was characterized by modernisation or westernisation of Nepal that brought the people under centralized administration that eroded the traditional system of governance. Along with introduction of modern education system, educational qualification or degrees from educational institutions became a sign of eligibility for employment in the government system replacing the skills. Since the Dalits did not have the tradition of reading and writing, they found themselves excluded from employment opportunities in public sector that came to be occupied by educated members of Bahun-Chhetri and Newar communities. The division of the country into 75 districts each under the administration of the Chief District Officer (CDO), and the organization of villages into Village Panchayat or VDCs under a secretary (sachiv) brought the country into the hands of educated employees and the officials from educated upper castes.

3.2 State Intervention in Reproducing Occupational Stigma Scholars, i.e. Uprety (2008), state that the traditional system of governance, outside of the Royal Court, was more accommodative and inclusive. The first Civil Code of Nepal (1854) created a vast gap amongst occupational groups. Major occupational groups with technical skills i.e. Kami (blacksmiths), Damai (tailor/musicians) and the Sarki (cobblers) were put within the ‘impure’ group, collectively called pani nachalne or ‘those from whom water cannot be accepted’, and ranked at the very bottom and classified as achhut or ‘untouchable’. However, these groups could not get any relief or upliftment. Domination was carried forward in the 1960s in the name of modernization or westernization. In fact, Section 10 of the Chapter of Decency of Muluki Ain, for instance, upholds the right to discriminatory practices in the name of ‘traditional social norms and values’ and allows the denial of entry to Dalits in the name of the same traditional rituals, norms and values (Kisan et al. 2015). Here, it is important to look into the political discourse during those critical times. BP Koirala’s writings show that he was never in favor of westernization as he wanted to continue with self-sufficiency of the past. What he emphasized was education, land reform and medical facilities. It is said that King Mahendra was in favor of replicating western culture and foreign aid that brought Koirala into direct clash with the King who deposed him from the post of Prime Minister in 1960, imprisoned him and went along with the project of ‘modernizing’ Nepal. However, there are many incidents and examples in which ‘modernization’ could not deliver the expected result as perceived by the propagators in a traditional society like Nepal. An expansion of the practice of untouchability within the Madhesi girls during their menstruation can be analyzed in the perspective to understand such impact. Madhesi community had not looked at menstruation from the angle of purity before they interacted with hill people, and there was no discrimination till recently. Nowadays, women especially young-aged people started considering the condition as ‘impure’ following most of the Hill communities in Nepal. It was due to the

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interaction amongst women of two communities that was possible only after women mobility was ensured following ‘modernization’. Those who migrated to Kathmandu and other cities for education and work are considered the major actors to introduce the concept of menstruation-related impurity within Madhesi society. “Our grandmother had no hesitation to go to the temple and prayers room during her period; we cannot do the same as we have been influenced by our peers whom we met in the colleges and working places,” Pratima Sah who was pursing her Master in Development Studies at Kathmandu University shared with the author. The very concept of ‘sin’ seems to have influenced the Madhesi women here. But there is another example from Upper Mustang where state-led modernization has helped introduce new caste-based hierarchy within Loba society which used to be less hierarchical in nature. Reyes (2001: 3) refers to Coleman and stresses differentiation of political structure; secularization of political culture—with the ethos of equality; and enhances the capacity of a society’s political system as three main features of modern societies. It is also argued that modernized political systems have a higher capacity to deal with the function of national identity, legitimacy, penetration, participation, and distribution than traditional political systems. Similar argument has been made by describing modernization as a transition from primitive to technological economies, subject to a participant political system, closed to open status, religious to secular, etc. (Tipps 1973). However, Loba society has had a different experience, which is that modern organizations have created the problem of integration, and of coordinating the activities of the various new institutions as argued by Smelser (1964: 268–274). According to a recent study by Pyakurel and Bhatta (2019), the Loba ethnic community comparatively with less hierarchy than a Hindu society had to suffer from more orthodox hierarchical order in the recent years. The change was not due to other reasons but due to the intervention of the ‘modern’ Nepali state. Loba society had a tradition of Kha-thug and Kha-mi-thug. These two terms together were translated differently as “touching of (food by) mouth is acceptable or not acceptable.” This practice, according to Dhungel (2002), was the old Tibetan tradition and it does not have any relation with the mainstream Nepali terminologies i.e. “Pani chalne” and “Pani nachalne” tradition. But the state’s attempt in the middle of the twentieth Century and later made the social hierarchy stronger, equivalent to Hindu caste hierarchy. The locals argue that the present social stratification is not as simple as some researches mention about division of the households in Lo-Manthang into three groups i.e. kudak (noble class) who use Bista as their surname, Phalwa (commoner class) who use Gurung as their surname and Ghara as the lowest class people.4 Rather, Loba’s interaction with modern Nepali state further widespread the hierarchy within them giving Dalit-like surnames and social status of a caste society to the low class Ghara. The low social status was given basically on those Ghara groups, who lived outside the main village near the river. Pema Mustange, a local who lives near the river states, “We were the same people until recently. We all had residence (53 households) 4 http://researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/bitstream/handle/10182/5458/Thakali_phd.pdf?sequence=

3&isAllowed=y.

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within the boundary called Jhong. But some of our ancestors chose to plant Ghatta (Watermill) to ease the life of their own family members and also the whole Lowa community. Initially, they used to do it by being within the same compound as others. Along with the growth of family members, they felt comfortable to live near their Ghatta. After some generations, the social hierarchy started becoming visible within people living near rivers and those living within the walls” (cited in Pyakurel and Bhatta 2019). Pema remembers his grandparents’ saying and narrates there that they started weaving Tibetan Bakkus (jackets made of raw wool of ships and Himalayan goats), making some of the leather materials to be used while riding horses, while working in Ghatta. By this time, the society with minor discrimination between people within compound and outside was visible, but such hierarchy could be changed quite a lot along with Nepal government’s initiatives to distributing citizenship to them. According to Pema and Norbu (former Chairperson of Kaligandaki Youth Club), it was a government team (door) sent to offer citizenship to people of Lo-manthang, which helped make the hierarchy more visible towards caste lines. Local people who were illiterate with no any exposure to the outside world were suggested to accept Bika identity by the Door. The logic of the government officers here was such that those who work with iron in the middle hills in Nepal were called Kami or Bishwakarma and the short form of Bishwarma was Bika or BK. That is what was suggested by the Door to Lowa people residing near the river. Pema recalls the account shared by his seniors and states that those who were given new surnames as Bika of BK could share their happiness as they could sound like Bista. The joy was due to the illusion that they could also regain almost the similar surname and social status amidst a sort of social hierarchy within them. The story doesn’t end here. Two members of Lowa community were invited and sponsored by the government to get trained in metal work. And, the community sent Nyima Tashi and Dorje for the purpose. That is why they expertise themselves to iron-related work. But eventually the same modern state becomes instrumental to segregate the Buddhist community in the caste line. All those who expertise with blacksmith work were given surname Bika or BK initially by the state. That is how many seniors of Lowa residing in the river side are having citizenship with BK surnames. It has been changed and young generations have had Lowa as surname along with Janajati movement in the late 1980s. But the social hierarchy established along with government intervention to modernize them with state identity and trainings remains almost similar even today. Now those who live within the compound and nearby areas and identify themselves either as Bista or Gurung consider people of riverside as “others” but not as Lowas, and the map available in the locality also indicates the area as low-caste village named as Jhong. As a result, the society had to fall under the new but very orthodox caste hierarchy. It is neither due to the choice of the community to follow the tradition, nor as result of their customary practices but solely because of the intervention of the modern Nepali state. Since the Dalits face exclusion in the socio-cultural dimension owing to jaat-paat (caste discriminations), they are now given some concessions to enter into the public sectors mainly through a reservation system. As compared to the non-Dalits, fewer

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Dalits have entered in government jobs largely owing to the reservations being recent in Nepal after the establishment of democracy. Today, employment has been divided further into public (government and semi-government) and private sectors including NGOs and INGOs. Looking at today’s’ scenario in socio-economic dimension, the Dalits are far behind from the non-Dalit communities in both public and private sector. Moreover, they seem still to be in the margin in the private sector- the sector, which creates more than 70% of jobs today. Rather One main reason for it seems to be the fact that Dalits generally prefer to go abroad to Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Dubai and other Gulf counties rather than preferring to work in Nepal. Educated Dalits also prefer to go to western countries unlike the educated members of upper castes who stay and work in Nepal as one can observe in the towns and villages. In the given situation, the chapter explores whether the present socio-economic dimension is different and inclusive compared to that of the traditional one. Then, it analyses causes and consequences of continued exclusion of Dalits in economic activities at present, based on the field data collected during the fieldworks of this particular study. Hence, it looks into the state of work and employment of the Nepali Dalits in general, and the Dalits in Surkhet in particular. Moreover, by narrating experiences of the various Dalits in Surkhet, it attempts to explain whether an improved status of a Dalit in terms of work and employment helps him/her in overcoming the caste-based prejudices. Although the caste system was legally abolished long time ago, because Nepal was the only Hindu state with monarchical system until recently, it is not surprising to find the pathetic conditions of Dalits. Dalits of Tarai region are in worse conditions than the Dalits in the Hill districts and Kathmandu. The caste system, for being a closed and hereditary system, gave no choice to the people to change their occupation and social status (Shah et al. 2006: 1). It meant that individuals born into a particular caste were also ‘born into’ the occupation associated with their caste for their entire life. And, certain socially despised occupations, as per the social discourse under the caste system, were treated as inferior. However, Nepal at present has an inclusive and secular Constitution though there are is some discontentment with it. On the one hand, many Dalits are yet to go beyond a specific ‘traditional occupation.’ On the other hand, there are very limited initiatives for upgrading their skills through training, for modernizing traditional occupations, and for forming cooperatives among them. However, if they find traditional occupations as profitable as in case of goldsmiths, then they do not consider it inferior. For instance, we find other than Sunars as prominent among the owners of jewelry shops in towns and cities, and other than Kami or Bishwakarma in metal workshops. Moreover, because of the expanding market of readymade consumer products, Dalits’ traditional occupations like leather works, and tailoring have rapidly lost their markets forcing many Dalits in some areas like Karnali, and Mahakali zones either to resort to wage labour or to live in misery. According to a study, most of the Dalits (71.2%) have given up their traditional occupations, and various reasons have been given for their quitting the work. For example, 41% of them said they did not like the occupation whereas 38.8% said that the jobs did not generate enough income to meet their household expenses. Due to landlessness, poverty and illiteracy, and declining significance of

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their traditional occupations, many Dalits resort to wage labour. For example, 60.4% of wage labourers are Dalits, as opposed to 20.6% among the Tagadhari and 13.3% among the Matwali (Team Consult 1999). Many Dalits, according to an NGO report, said that engaging in the traditional occupation made them inferior in the society (NNDSWO 2006). Such data can be subjective. Nevertheless, if we take the whole situation of socio-economic dimension, then only 7% of Dalits are engaged in their traditional occupations.5 Besides, it seems that the affordable ready-made clothing merchandise has made tailoring less attractive; factory-made shoes have turned cobblers’ works unproductive, and the factory-made agricultural tools and utensils have made blacksmiths’ works unprofitable.

3.3 Nexus of Land, Capital/Market and Poverty of Dalits Once a society moves from traditional structure to modern, employment becomes the main source of income for everyone. And, the informal sector plays a crucial role in employing a significant part of the economically active population in a country like Nepal where the employment in the organised sector of the economy has been stagnant at about 3% of the country’s population. Out of the total employed in the organised sector, more than 8% of the work force constitutes non-Nepali origin (Suwal and Pant 2009). Nepal, being one of the ‘poorest’ countries in the world, is still heavily dependent on agriculture. Of the total employed population of Nepal, it is said that about 79% are self-employed, and about 71% self-employed labour force is concentrated in agriculture. According to the data availed from CBS (2011), agriculture is still the predominant sector of employment for Nepalese either by economic activity (54.7%) or occupation (67.3%). Agriculture is further substantiated by remittance economy. There has been increasing tendency among active people aged between 18–45 to go abroad for work. People belonging to this age group are found working either abroad or in towns and cities. This has now become like a culture. The Nepal Labor Force Survey (NLFS 2008) states that more than 11 million persons aged 15 years and above are employed in the informal sector, the share of which compared to the total employment comes around 96.2%. Besides, of the total informally employed population, more than 76% are engaged in the agricultural sector, whereas about 24% are employed in the non-agricultural informal sector. Agriculture and forestry, mining and quarrying sectors have the highest percent of informally employed persons followed by wholesale and retail trade, fishing, and hotels and retail trade industries (Suwal and Pant 2009). As far as Dalits of Nepal are concerned, no national level data is available about their participation in formal and informal sector economic activities. It is because the collection of statistics pertaining to informal sector was attempted for the first time in Nepal through the Nepal Labor Force Survey 1998 with only limited questions. In Nepal, the organised 5I

owe this information to Hira Biswakarma, a Dalit activist.

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sector comprises enterprises for which the statistics are generally available from various government reports including the budget documents, annual reports or survey reports. Also, the unorganised sector refers to those enterprises whose activities or collections of data are not regulated under any legal provision and/or which do not maintain any regular accounts (Suwal and Pant 2009). And, unlike in other statistically developed countries of the region, the CBS has not yet conducted a nation-wide survey of the informal sector in Nepal. As a result, detailed information could not be compiled. Though the information on the informal sector was updated with the data collected through Nepal Labor Force Survey 2008, including additional questions on the informal sector, caste-wise data is yet to be collected. However, some studies such as by Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organization (NNDSWO 2006) try to avail such data regarding Nepali Dalits. According to the study, less than 10% economically active Dalits are working in “organized (governmental and non-governmental organizations) sectors even though they are economically more active than other social groups (60.4% Dalits, 58.1% Janajatis, and other 52.4% were found economically active). As witnessed in India, we could see a lot of resentment in the private sector enterprises for recruiting the Dalits in their employment-force.Their usual excuse is the compromise with the quality of their productions, of whatsoever form, had they recruited their employees from these caste and communities through the affirmative action. Thus, by attributing demerit to the members of these communities, the private sector denigrates these castes and communities as a whole as being non-meritorious, duffer, and, hence useless (Ram 2008: 18). Disclosing the participation of less than 10% economically active Dalits in organized sectors, NNDSWO (2006) indicates that more than 90% of Dalits are associated with the informal or unorganized sector economic activities. On the one hand, almost a three-fourth (44.4% out of 60.4%) of Dalits out of their total economically active population are working in the field of agriculture. On the other hand, job prospects in agriculture do not seem promising. Moreover, the jobs available in the informal sector, including in agriculture, are low-paid and the job security is poor. While the informal sector offers a cushion to workers during economic crisis, the benefits of informal employment may not be sufficient to achieve an acceptable standard of living, as informal employment rarely comes with social protection, good working conditions and adequate wages. In this case, the Dalits seem to suffer the most. Considering all the facts, Deulyal (2006: 44) has come up with the following different issues related to the market/private sector, which affect the day-to-day life of Dalits in Nepal. This is evident from the fact that no market is available for goods produced by Dalits, and nor the market rate has yet been decided for the goods produced by them. The study by Bhattachan et al. (2008) states that Dalits face economic hardship every day as their traditional occupations are of menial types and with the lowest social status as social construction of “Dalits” is primarily based on occupation or division of labour. Once non-Dalits attribute inferior status to Dalits who work as tailors, blacksmiths, cobblers, etc., young generation Dalits choose not to continue with it. The Nepali caste system has normally placed all those who earn

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bread by manual labour into a quite low in the hierarchy of castes which could be classed as Shudras (Regmi 2007: 693). Manu divided Antajas (outcastes) into two types—first, those whose touch polluted the cooking pots, and others whose touch did not cause pollution. The former category was advised to reside in localities close to cremation grounds, hills and forests on the outskirts of the village. The Chandalas, who lived outside the limits of the village area, were executioners. They had to accept the clothing of the dead at the cremation grounds. The Nisadas and Chandalas had to wear ornaments made of iron. They could not enter a village at night. In daylight they could enter it, only by making known through some signs (Regmi 2007: 696–697). There were restrictions in getting education and reading and touching the Vedas were considered sacrilegious. Though the system was based on socio-economic exploitation of the ‘lower caste’ in the villages (Kumar 2008: 277), there was an opportunity for the ‘lower caste’ to gain expertise on various occupations such as farming, leather related work, tailoring, music related work, etc. However, they had to be more marginalized once social perception towards their expertise had been based on dogmatic negativism and it was only because they had no knowledge of works performed by other sections of the society. Once the perception of a society gets constructed in this structure, the will of the people also changes accordingly. In this case, even if some people from the so-called ‘low-caste’ could do better from their traditional occupation, they still prefer to go for other occupations. They do so because it would be very hard for them to resist social dogmatism. Also, the ‘low caste’ had to give up their traditionally assigned occupations once the market was open (and widely accessible to all investors or consumers.), and they could not invest enough to compete with the investors other than their caste. Ambedkar mentions two enemies—Brahminism and Capitalism—which the workers of the country have to deal with. When Ambedkar was convinced that the social dogmatism towards ‘low-caste’ was an outcome of Hindu Shastras, he started hating Hindusim. He states that people are not wrong in observing caste. In his view, what is wrong is their understanding of religion, which has inculcated the notion of caste. “If this is correct, then obviously the enemy you must grapple with is not the people who observe caste, but the Shastras which teach them this religion of caste…. the real remedy is to destroy the belief in the sanctity of the Shastras,” Ambedkar (1989: 68–77) states. The situation is such that even the old generation have not been able to continue with their traditional occupation as the works have been taken away by non-Dalits in the name of “garment industry”, “shoe manufacturing”, etc. As a result, Dalits got displaced from their traditional occupation as Dalit-related traditional occupations/professions were not considered dignified, on the one hand and on the other hand, hardly any credit facility is available from banks and other financial organizations to Dalits. Here, one could easily see nexus of newly popularized role of market and capital to reduce or increase poverty of a particular group. It is ‘free market’ of Nepal which not only undermines Dalits’ labour and products, but also will be underpaid by non-Dalits in villages and urban areas (UNDP 2008: 27). A

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study by Bhattachan et al. (2008) refers to respondents belonging to 1 l Dalit castes and discloses their experience that they cannot sell milk to the collection centers. Similarly, the practice of ‘untouchability’ in hotels and restaurants is declining, but has not been completely eliminated. The number of respondents belonging to three Dalit castes reported that the local restaurant staffs practice untouchability against them. Similarly, respondents belonging to one Dalit caste reported that they did not get loans to buy cows, buffaloes, and to run tea shops as these are directly related to the practice of untouchability (Bhattachan et al. 2008). Also, the same study discloses the kind of caste-based prejudices practiced in the health-related fields, such as in health centers, a private clinic, patient’s house, and health worker’s house. The private sector enterprises in the country have started greatly influencing every sphere of life towards the self-interest and maximization of profit making intention as sole goal of capitalist line with the market. But issues such as social equality, justice and nation-building have not been in their priorities. Rather, those issues remain only a lip-service for them. Dalits’ exclusion from modern credit facility could be an example of the link within market/capital nexus. Also, the nexus of land, market and capital contributing to the highest poverty rate of a community can be analyzed to understand further marginalization of Dalits today in view of their economic mobility. Researchers such as Hatlebakk (2009) find caste-based price discrimination in informal rural credit markets. Dalits, being at the bottom of the caste system, often suffer not only from higher interest rates, but also demands for collateral that eventually discourage Dalit households from performing profitable investments. Generally, the poor face a greater demand for collateral because threats of punishment are less effective against them. These credit restrictions make more difficult for them to develop their entrepreneurial activities. Higher interest rates and demands for collateral are the main hindrances for Dalits from adopting new technologies and performing profitable profession changes. It stops them from making profitable investments in their businesses and expanding production (Iversen 2013). Earlier, the state was far more powerful than the ‘landlord’ because the landlord was a functionary of the state and a tenant himself. In an agro-based society, land relation is one of the important issues. If one has no land or insufficient land, he/she has to be deprived of many eocnomic opportunities. Researches by NNDSWO (2006) indicate that Hill Dalits own some piece of land and their everyday life seems to be eaisier than Dalits in Tarai. It states that, unlike in India, more than 90% Nepali Hill Dalits have some piece of land. This particular study also reveals similar data, and states that 97.95% Dalit respondents have their own land, and 96.31% respondents have their own house. A similar study conducted in 2008–2009 also has suggested that the similar number (97%) of Dalits have owned their land in Surkhet District (Haug et al. 2009: 10). However, agricultural produce from their own land is found sufficient only for four to five months (NNDSWO 2006). In the situation, such access to land to Hill Dalits has not helped them much due to its low quality. Regmi (1976) reminded us that the state itself, and not a large landowner with an independent and hereditary political, economic, and cultural power base, was the true landlord—notwithstanding several layers of ‘infeudation’. Landlordship was farmed out by the state to the highest bidder, who often extracted a modicum of unpaid labour

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from ‘his’ tenants. But capitalism in Nepal ‘ought not to be one that is driven by the state’ but by capitalist class (Mishra 2014). Understanding the complex dynamics of feudal or “semi-feudal” reproduction in an era of globalisation was crucial for country like Nepal to ‘identify avenues for collective mobilisation against inequitable pre-capitalist and capitalist class relations’ (Sugden 2013). However, the way precapitalist reproduction in Nepal was promoted by facilitating through the entrenched political power of landed classes, it has not helped formerly landless community i.e. Dalits but eventually helped reproduce gap that was already witnessed in the society. Quite often the argument comes from business houses as if the capital they could enjoy were solely due to their commitment, labour and investment as it is in the western society. While arguing so, they have forgotten the truth that the kind of capital they are talking about is not entirely the proportion of profits or earning coming from their investment and work. Here I agree with Prof. Chaitanya Mishra (2014) who argues that the recognition to be a capitalist state ‘constitutes no less than a revolutionary recognition’. As Nepal is yet to go through industrial revolution unlike other countries in the world, the capital Nepali businessmen talk about has a very direct and strong link with semi-feudal social structure that is landlordism. In other words, most of the owners of Nepali private sectors today are in existing status inheriting legacy of land which were offered to their ancestors by the then feudal institutions, especially authoritarian monarchy. Until the sixteenth century, there could be more transfer of land between rulers and Brahmins as Birta (one of the systems of handing over land) and Jajaman (a patron) to Brahmins while making a Sankalpa (religious promise to hand over anything including land). They could give lands to the Brahmin indicating its boundaries as so and so mound, so and so river, so and so paharo (rock) and so and so kanlo (small hill) and there was not a system of mentioning measurement, like this much Muri, this much Ropani of the field before 1600s. The then king Ram Shah (1606–1636) had revealed that there was lack of specific Sandh Killa (four side boundaries and sign posts for it) to the land given to the Brahmin as Birta and other Raikar (taxable) land. Therefore, he ordered that while making a Sankalpa (religious promise to hand over anything including land) as a Birta to the Brahmin, there should be a system to accept or transfer Birta upon specifically mentioning the measurement of the land.6 The land was further handed over to persons by the state along with Gorkha’s ambitious ‘unification’ process. Then the warriors, particularly Chhetris, started getting land as a Jagir (award for their service in military and civil service) in lieu of cash payment. Some of the ethnic communities, i.e. Magar and Gurung, could also be benefited by the Jagir as they were very loyal to Gorkha. But other ethnic communities had to suffer a lot by the system (Regmi 1976) as some of the land which was under their control was also confiscated to offer as Jagir to state’s military and bureaucracy.

6 For

details, http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/rules-issued-byram-shah.pdf.

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While the state was offering land to particular social groups in various names, Dalits were working as bonded labour such as Haliya,7 Bista,8 Balighare,9 Khaliya,10 Doli,11 and Sino Khaney/Phyakney12 with no rights, only the duty to submit to any order and any kind of treatment by the members of Hindu castes (Fuchs 1981). They were taught to accept their lot without complaining, as the fruit of their ‘karma’ or the results of their misdeeds in their previous life. And the rules were made in such way that they were to rely on food, clothing and shelter provided by their masters. In the hills and mountains, a culture which historians have called the Jajmani system (system of patron-client relation), prevailed till recently. Such a culture has been based on the agrarian relationship in which the landlords as well as rich peasants were regarded as feeders and protectors of those who toiled either as labourers on their lands, or worked under them in the capacity of village artisans and service providers. Those Dalits who were not working as bonded labourers had also many restrictions in housing, clothing, and walking in the street. The ownership of both irrigable and dry land is a result of that policy where highest possession among the “high caste” is 5.63 Ropanis of irrigable and 6.64 Ropanis of dry land, and least by the Dalits that is 2.05 Ropanis of irrigable and 4.76 Ropanis of dry land (UNDP 1998). Team Consult (1999) states that 77% of Dalits own less than three Ropanies (just over 1,500 Sq. mtrs.) of irrigable land. Another study after a decade came up with the data that 54% of Dalits in the mountains and in the hills, and 100% in Terai own less than three Ropanis of dry land (Bhattachan et al. 2008). In a largely agricultural and poor country, landlessness means food deficiency (ibid). Thus, due to landles Bhattachan et al. sness, poverty, illiteracy, and declining significance of their traditional occupations, many Dalits resort to wage labour; as 60.4% of wage labourers are Dalits compared to 20.6% Tagadhari, and 13.3% Matwali. However, those who could be the part of land possession in the name of Birta, Sankalpa or Jagir historically could easily convert from landlords to businessmen or capitalist in new context as modern institutions. For example, banks and financial institutions came with policies suitable only to those who had plot of land. That is where Nepal’s move towards market- or capital-driven society is found firmly 7 Haliya

is a form of forced labour in which “high caste” people employ Dalits as agriculture labourers and provide food, clothing and shelter throughout the year, and loans as needed. 8 Bista is a form of patron-client relations between “high caste” people and Dalits at the community level. A Dalit family is patronized by a “high caste” family as their Bista. It means the Dalit “client’ must do their occupational work as and when needed by their “patron”. The “client” gets rewards, mostly in kind and occasionally in cash, for their services. 9 Balighare is a form of forced labour in which Dalits provide their occupational services to their “high caste” masters and get food grains as “wages” during harvesting seasons. 10 Khaliya is form of labour done by Dalits for “high caste” people for food grains. Food grains for labour works are paid during harvesting seasons only. 11 Doli is a form of labour work performed during weddings/marriages. Dalits belonging to certain Dalit caste carry the groom and the bride of “high caste” people in “Doli” during their marriage. They receive cash and kind for such labour. 12 Sino Khaney/Phyakney is related to a practice in which it is mandatory for Dalits to dispose of dead animal. In many communities, member belonging to certain Dalit castes are forced to use carcasses as food.

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different than many capitalist countries in the world. As a result, a Dalit with very good skills and business plan have been excluded to get credit from banks and financial institutes as he/she is unable to secure a land mortgage, hence live in poverty and social deprivation. In 1996, around 43% of the Nepali population generally lived below the poverty line, where as among Dalits 68% of Kamis, 67% of Damais, and 66% of Sarkis were found to be under poverty well above the national average (Gurung 2003). Another study by Wily et al. (2008) states that poverty was higher for Dalits than other social categories; while only 28% of members of upper castes or Newars fell below the poverty line, it was 46% for Dalits, 41% for the Muslim minority in the Tarai. The latest Human Development Report of Nepal, 2014, cites CBS (2011) and mentions that consumption-based poverty varies quite significantly across different castes and ethnic groups as poverty was 43.6% for Hill Dalits and 38.2% for Tarai Dalits. The data was linked with the per capita income. The per capita income of Hill Brahmans was 1.7 times higher than that of the Dalits in general, and two times higher than that of the Madhesi Dalits.

3.4 Caste/Class Debate Work and occupation can be seen as an indicator of improved status. But there is a strong correlation between class structure and caste system. There are people who could “not realize any substantial change in their caste status in spite of their improved status in the class structure” (Ram 1995: 207). Even this particular study reveals the similar experiences of exploitation of those who are placed in better posts with better economic conditions. This is why people are shy about their Dalit background and they were found to be coming in the way of their ‘perfect social mobility’ and complete assimilation in the mainstream. To address this background, Ram (1988: 112–121 cited in Ram 1995: 209) has coined the phrase “new middle class” as they cannot be considered equal as middle class because even the middle class Dalits are marginal as they are still outside the basic organization of the Hindu mainstream. They are still excluded from the most immediate relationships even with their non-Dalit acquaintances and many times their presence was also not solicited on some auspicious occasions at the place of their most intimate non-Dalit friends (Ram 1995: 209). For Ram (1988, 1995: 94), the term ‘equality’ is a relative and not an absolute term. According to him, equality for Dalits would mean achieving status of the higher caste in the caste system (in whatever form it exists in a village or in the adjoining region) if the frame of reference to their status is the caste status. He states: … equality for them would mean the eradication of their poverty and reaching to the level of those who are economically affluent and materially prosperous. In other words, they would aspire for equality of their class with the relatively higher and, perhaps, with the highest class in the class structure or in the system of socio-economic status. Or, equality for them may also have the frames of reference of the bureaucratic and political power wherein they would like to have their access equal to the others. So may be the case of their entry to the

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educational domain. Thus, their concept of social equality would be relative and entirely located in the imperial situation centered around them. (Ram 1995: 94)

It seems that the socially and politically conscious Dalits are more sensitive to the issues of social equality and identity. The main cause of concern, as Ram (1995: 96) states, is that upper caste people see Dalits as ‘naturally’ unequal to them, and are lower in every respect. Attempts by Dalits to demand their rights are met by economic boycott.

3.5 Work and Employment State of Nepali Dalits As mentioned in the following sections of this book, representation of Dalits in various formal fields including the employment sector, was next to nil till recently. According to a 2007 study report based on civil service, there were only 74 Dalit officers in the civil service or about 0.9% of the total of 8,096 officers (Gurung 2007: 33). The study provides the basis for the division of seats among excluded groups, based primarily on their proportion in the 2001 census. So far as others are concerned, the number of Brahmins was 4,721 (58.3%), Newars 1,152 (14.2%) and Chhetris 1,080 (13.3%), that of Janajatis (other than Newars) was 264 (3.3%), and that of Madhesis, Muslims and Marwadis was 805 (9.9%).13 Again, there were no Dalits in the Special Class (the highest in the hierarchy), three in the First Class position, 11 in the Second Class, and 60 in the Third Class (ibid). The situation remains almost the same as there was noone in the post of secretary from Dalit community even if there are some 69 people enjoying the post.14 Why had it happended even in the twenty-first century? As Begg et al. (2002) rightly state, finding a job (though it depends partly on the persons’ efforts) is mainly affected by ‘social’ variables such as basic education, prosperity of the region of residence, inclusion in networks, access to transport or health care, etc. That is why they suggest that the policy of inclusion or policy to counter exclusion should be about providing the individual with capailities, and thus opportunities, in a way that empowers and increases prospects and life chances (ibid.). In the case of Nepali Dalits, social stigma prevented them from utilising their capabilities as they were excluded historically from opportunity to education, and again the same social stigma hindered them from availing the opportunities even if they had the capabilities. Having observed the situation, the political parties and other civil society groups, after the successful Jana Andolan II, put pressure to have a legislature to bring more

13 The

study notes that more Madhesis were employed on some “technical services” compared to other groups. 14 Man Bahadur BK has been the first Dalit to reach the special class (the rank of Secretary) in the country’s civil service after the Government of Nepal promoted him from Joint-Secretary to a vacant position of the Secretary on July 14, 2020.

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Table 3.2 Percentage of seats allotted to different social groups from 45 reserved positions in the civil service (parenthesis show the actual numbers that would be hired) Law/Social Group

Women

Adivasis Janajati

Madhesis

Dalits

Backward regions

Police Act

20 (9)

32 (14.4)

28 (12.6)

15 (6.75)

5 (2.5)

Development Committee Acta

33 (14.8)

27 (12.15)

22 (9.9)

9 (4.5)

4 (1.8)

Education Acta

33

27

22

9

4

Nepal Special Servicesa

33

27

22

9

4

Health Services Act

33

27

22

9

4

Armed Police Act

20

32

28

15

5

Army Act

20

32

28

15

5

Source GoN 2065 (2007).

a Five

% reserved for differently-abled people

people from the marginalized section of the society on board in various government bodies. As a result, the Interim Parliament amended the Civil Service Act of 1993 on August 3, 2007 requiring reservations for women (33%), Janajatis (27%), Madhesis (22%), Dalits (9%), persons with disabilities (5%), and backward regions (4%). The police service regulations which were amended on November 8, 2007, included reservation similar to those in the ordinance discussed above. Again, the Maoist-led government on January 12, 2009 issued an ordinance called “Ordinance to Amend some Nepal Acts to make Public Service Inclusive, 2065” with an objective to make public services inclusive. The ordinance lumped up inclusion provisions in seven earlier laws or regulations15 and set down the provisions for distributing reserved openings—a total of 45%—in selected government services for competition within specified social groups—specifically “women, Adivasi Janajatis, Madhesis and Dalits”—and people coming from “backward regions.” Even the ordinance tabled by the Maoist-led government was similar to the earlier ordinance. In other words, the Dalits, through the new ordinance, would receive something “special” (that the Maoists advocate) over and above what they had already been receiving. The fact that the ordinance did not include the government’s agreement with the Dalit Janajati Party, which was to raise Dalit education quotas to 15%, concluded well before the ordinance was issued, and also underscores this argument. Rather, as mentioned in the previous Chapter, it has decreased the quota for Dalits in the scholarship scheme from 15 to 9%. The following table shows the percentage of seats allotted to different social groups from 45% reserved positions in the civil service (Table 3.2). 15 The ordinance has amended the Police Act 2010, Development Committee Act 2013, Education Act 2028, Nepal Special Services Act 2042, Health Services Act 2053, Armed Police Act 2058 and Army Act 2063.

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3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

In fact, there are several laws, including the Scholarship (fourth amendment) Regulation, 2010; Local Self-governance (fourth amendment) Regulation, 2010; Legislative-Parliament Secretariat Service Act, 1993 (amended 2007); Army Act, 2001 (amended 2009); Police Act, 1955 (amended 2009); Armed-Police Act, 2006 (amended 2009), Nepal Special (intelligence) Service Act, 1985 (amended 2009); Development Committee Act, 1956 (amended 2009); Education Act, 1971 (amended 2009); and Nepal Health Service Act, 1997 (amended 2009) to talk about inclusivity to be arranged for Dalits. What is interesting is that the percentage differed across services and no basis for the allocation of a given percentage to a particular social group was provided even though the law set down specific percentages for inclusion of different groups in each of the different services. For example, in four of the seven laws put together in the ordinance, the share of Dalits had been fixed at 9%. Regarding the achievement of the newly introduced legislatures, only limited numbers of Dalits have benefited from it. Rather, there was a serious problem in implementing it. According to a report in Himal Khabarpatrika, none of the Madhesi and Dalit candidates appearing the Public Service Commission (PSC) examinations in the law and justice category were able to pass the written test, the result of which was published on November 17, 2009. Three seats were reserved for Madhesis and two for Dalits.16 The requirement is that candidates from all groups have to obtain at least 40 out of 100 to pass the written test. According to the Himal Khabarpatrika report, a large number of Dalits were unable to pass the written test for 19 advertised openings since 2008–2009, when the reservations were introduced. This is largely a result of poor education achievement, which in turn is a result of two decades of discrimination and exclusion. It is said that only three Dalits had benefited from this provision by the end of November 2009. Among them, Jagadish Nepali from Argakhanchi district was appointed to the administrative service on Bhadra 16, 2066 (September 1, 2009). He has been posted at the Ministry of Health. “It takes a lot of effort to obtain the pass marks (40),” he said. He added that he used to feel that he would always be “ruled” by others, but now he is happy to be in a position where he can exercise power “even more permanently than politicians.” Two other Dalit candidates had passed in the same batch as that of Jagadish Nepali in the 2008 PSC intake after ‘reservations’ were introduced. Another similar study done by Dhakal (2012) analyzed five annual reports by Public Service Commission (PSC), which points out a need to revise the modus operandi of the Commission to implement the provisions as per the spirit of the constitutional and legal frameworks. According to him, there are quite a few seats on Inclusive categories which go unfulfilled, and it is because no candidate was able to get the minimum required level in the examination. This incidence reflects two major points: firstly, the entry of marginalized community cannot be ensured just by allotting certain seats. Second, the system which is applied by PSC is not entirely based on affirmative action of seat reservation but a mixture of quota and meritocratic selection. Even if the seats are reserved for certain groups, they have to at least get minimum requirements to enter the service. As a result, the success rate 16 For

details, browse http://nepalihimal.com/article/13130 (viewed on October 13, 2020).

3.5 Work and Employment State of Nepali Dalits

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of marginalized groups in the quota is lower than the allocated seats. If it happens, the system transfers the benefit again to the dominant groups. PSC Advertisement No. 3044/069-70 could be an example of analysis in which 19 section officers were to be selected from women under marginalized category. The vacancy which was to bring women including marginalized Dalit and others published a result of 29 successful candidates who cleared written examination, all from dominant groups –27 from Hindu high caste groups, and the remaining two from another Newar. Pariyar (2017) analyzes Nepal’s civil service in 2017 and states that there are only 0.8% Dalits among the 83,000 personnel in Nepal. Among the Dalit service holders only 18% are women, which is not much lower than the national average of 20%17 . Dominance of Hill Dalits compared to Tarai Dalits, and overrepresentation of Bishwokarma, a Hill Dalit, were the major findings of the study. As one of the least developed counties, about two-thirds of the development fund of Nepal relies on foreign aid. INGOs and bilateral/multilateral agencies also have been contributing significantly to the development initiatives in Nepal. However, a study refer by (Neupane 2000) states that the presence of Dalits in these international aid agencies working in Nepal is very nominal. According to the report, only 1.2% of the professional workforce was working in these INGOs and bilateral/multilateral agencies. As it is difficult to expect to influence the decisions of these aid agencies in favor of the Dalits with such a low representation, INGOs are trying to engage with a discourse on how to make this work, and make the employment sector an inclusive sector and pro-Dalit. As an outcome of the effort, Dalit workforce in INGOs and bilateral/multilateral agencies has increased to 3.8% in 2007 (INSEC 2007).

3.6 State of Dalits in Work and Employment in Surkhet Generally, each occupation should be respected on equal footing. But caste system, which is based on the groups’ occupation, was responsible for dividing professions into prestigious and less prestigious. In the same line, Ambedkar states that “caste system is not merely a division of labour, which is quite different from division of labour — it is hierarchy in which the divisions of labourers are graded one above the other” (Ambedkar 2007: 14). According to the caste system, manual labour, the work usually assigned to the Dalits, is always given lower status than the white collar jobs. This is why Dalits still have less access to civil service and business. Absence of job opportunities and means of productive engagement of people of working age population has been a common feature of Nepali national life. This has resulted in majority of people having to live with meagre resources and low income. Income poverty, therefore, remains one of the crucial indicators of pauperization of the people. There are traditionally three unique features of the caste system: (a) fixed occupation (property rights) for each member of caste by birth, and its 17 For details, see https://kathmandupost.com/sports/2017/03/28/dalits-in-civil-service, accessed on 28 July, 2018.

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3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

hereditary continuation (b) unequal distribution of economic and social rights related to occupation, property, employment, wages and education among different caste groups, and (c) the provision of a strong system of penalties for enforcement of the system (DSN 2005). Exclusion and discrimination in occupation and labour employment is, therefore, an inevitable outcome of the caste system. Normally, as elsewhere in Nepal, Dalits were excluded just because of being untouchables. Besides the traditional occupation, the economic activities of the people in Surkhet were strictly limited; very few were engaged in government services in non-gazette ranks and working as constables in the police service and in other low-paying jobs. Some Dalits with highly educated backgrounds were found working in NGOs. This study reveals the following scenario in work and employment.

3.6.1 Dalit and Employment Talking about formal employment, Pyakurel (2012) details the state of Dalits’ in civil service in Surkhet as follows (Table 3.3): If we compare the above with Nepal’s national civil service data, the finding of this study seems to be worse so far as the share of Dalit officers is concerned. It is 0.9% at the national level, whereas there is only a single officer (0.56%) from Dalits working in Surkhet. However, Dalits in other non-officer positions seem to be better off. It is due to their historiclal exclusion in education because of which most of them continued to remain either illiterate, or with less qualification. As per perception, Dalits by default should be in the lower ranking level even in the case of their deprivation in education because they are either incapable of being educated or, if educated, will pose a threat to village hierarchies and to those in power. A Dalit could not work as an assistant or peon in the town because “a peon has to work in kitchen for which a Dalit is disqualified even today” (Pyakurel 2011). Here, one should not conceal the fact that the share of Dalits in the category of ‘Peons and Others,’ which is 5.13% as a whole, is not because Dalits are working as peons or office assistants in Surkhet, but because all those who work as sweepers in Birendranagar Municipality have also been kept in this category. And the data also included some caretakers of office gardens, security guards, etc., from various offices. Table 3.3 Dalits in civil service in Surkhet Level

Total Members

Dalit (Total)

Percent

Dalit (Women)

Percent

Officers

177

1

0.56

0

0

Non- Officers

859

20

2.32

4

0.47

Peons and Others

545

28

5.13

1

0.18

Total

1581

49

3.13

5

0.32

Source Pyakurel 2012

3.6 State of Dalits in Work and Employment in Surkhet Table 3.4 Dalits in the various categories of private enterprises in Surkhet

109

S. N.

Category

1

Construction

160

2 (1.25)

2

Computer Work

16

0 (0)

3

Advertisement

4

0

4

Metal/Furniture

49

9 (18.36)

5

PCO(Public telephone)

39

4 (10.26)

6

Photo Studio

15

1 (6.67)

7

Medical Shop

23

1(4.34)

8

Hotel

66

0

9

Printing Press

16

1(6.25)

10

Others

210

21 (10)

598

39(6.39)

Total

Total

Dalit (%)

Source Pyakurel 2012

The same study by Pyakurel (2012) reveals that there were only 2.76% teaching staffs, and next to nil (0.52%) non-teaching staff in higher education institutions.

3.6.2 Dalits in Private Enterprises As per the old and new discourses on occupational hierarchy in Nepal, business or enterprises have maintained the middle rank in between job and farming for a long time. Earlier, farming was considered the best and Nokari (job) was considered the lowest profession; but now the thinking has reversed. The following table shows the composition of Dalits in the various categories of private enterprises in Surkhet (Table 3.4). As not even a single hotel out of 66 registered hotels is run by Dalits, the table above very clearly shows that even today Dalits in Surkhet have no opportunity to do public business because tradition has not allowed this to them. Also, their unexpectedly lower involvement in metal/furniture business proves the grim reality of their profession. However, a good indication is that they also are trying to engage in diversified business such as PCOs (telephone service), photo studios, construction, printing press, etc. The Hill Dalits make a mean income of NRs. 2, 919 against the non-Dalits’ earning of Rs. 3,561 a month. This was the average income, inclusive of the remittance sent back home to the family members. The economic condition of Hill Dalits of Surkhet was assessed on the basis of their productive activities and engagement on various occupations and their impact on the households and community levels. Table 3.5, which is an outcome of a similar study conducted in 2007–2008, suggests that a majority of people (both Dalits and non-Dalits) are engaged in agriculture or

110 Table 3.5 Occupational status of population aged 5 years and above

3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits Occupation

Dalits

Agriculture

14.6

18.4

.9

.9

Agriculture wage within Nepal

Non-Dalits

Agriculture wage outside Nepal

.4

.1

Non-Agriculture wage within Nepal

5.8

2.8

Non-Agriculture wage outside Nepal

8.8

6.8

Service in Nepal

3.1

3.4

Service outside Nepal

2.4

2.4

Trade Business

1.7

2.5

Household Jobs

17.6

15.7

Students

29.4

28.6

Dependants

7.0

9.5

Source Kumar 2009a (revised by the author)

agriculture-related occupations, followed by household work and non-agricultural wage labour. According to the above data, it is interesting to note that only 3.1% of Dalits were found engaged in service occupation in the country with 2.4% doing such jobs outside the country. However, the percentage of non-Dalits was 3.4 and 2.4, respectively, while considering the occupation status of the people aged 5 years and above. Also, the percentage of dependent Dalit population above the age of 5 seems to be lower (7.0) than the other groups (9.5). This means that Dalits have no option but be dependent unless one is seriously incapable of working. A survey by NNSDWO (2006) which was conducted in Surkhet in 2004 shows that majority (30.4%) of the Dalits are engaged in household work, followed by wage labour (20.8%). Those working in the agriculture sector are 17.2%, and 5.2% own non-agriculture business. Similarly, the survey shows that 7.3% Dalits in Surkhet are working in foreign employment. Analysis of data by sex shows that males are mostly involved in wage labour (33.3%), whereas females are in household work (51.5%). Similarly, participation of female Dalits in foreign employment is very low (0.8%), compared to the male Dalits (13.7%). Regarding the place of work, majority of the Dalits in Surkhet work in private organizations (47.8%), followed by non-government organizations 40.7%. Those working in government or semi-government organizations account for only 8.6%. Analysis of the data by sex shows that more than two-thirds of the female Dalits are pursuing their own activities, whereas the corresponding figure for male Dalits is 39.7%. Males generally work in non-government organizations. Although more male Dalits are working in government/semi-government organizations compared to the female Dalits, the difference is not substantial. Prior to the date of survey, Dalits aged 10 years and above had responded to the questions about the involvement in household work the last 12 months, 40.3% said that they could not work because of the lack of educational qualification. Majority

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111

(43.6%) of the Dalits said that they did not work, not because of education but due to various other reasons such as old age, pension or physically handicapped conditions. Others were seeking jobs. This means that most of them are engaged in household work and do not have any opportunity to go outside for other works. Further analysis of the data by sex shows greater variation in the reasons for not working. For example, 57.7% female Dalits responded by giving some other reasons for not working, which is probably because of their engagement in household work, whereas the corresponding figure for male Dalits is only 9.8%. Similarly, 68.8% male Dalits did not work because of pursuing studies, whereas the corresponding figure for female Dalits is only 28.4%. People who emerge as the work force or those aspiring to work require some knowledge and expertise about the work to be undertaken. A knowledgeable and resourceful person is, therefore, called a skilled worker/labourer, who earns more than unskilled workers/labourers without any basic know-how. Job skill enhances a person’s importance and supports professional life with competitive income contributing to the economic status of the family. Against this reality, as discussed above, a majority of Dalits in Surkhet work as porters and daily wage earners doing different odd jobs. Thus, this section explored whether the target group population was skilled or non-skilled in the profession they occupy. Like in the case of the occupational groups, there were three clusters of data constituting the skill of the person in different types of work. In all the three clusters, majority were in the non-skilled workers’ categories. Therefore, they were correspondingly low wage earners compared to their skilled compatriots. Of the total number, 77.6% Dalits were non-skilled labourers. Similar situation was found among the non-Dalit groups in which more than 81% were non-skilled. Only 2.7% Dalits were found skilled in carpentry, whereas very few Dalits in all the age groups were found skilled either as blacksmiths or shoemakers. Likewise, Kami (blacksmith) were the highest in number (40,382) and Sarkis with population of 5502 figured as significant population group in Surkhet. The implication thus could be that either these Dalit people had abandoned their traditional jobs for the better, or they had not revealed their real profession during the survey. Dalits’ population skilled in masonry work, tailoring and carpentry was below 4% even among people above 15 years of age. Except for the bamboo work/basket-weaving jobs producing marketable goods, Dalits had extremely limited skills to compete in the job market. Thus, they were deprived of economic opportunities. Generally, Dalits are a selfreliant artisan class, less educated and occupied in wage earning labour and porter jobs. They are mostly unskilled labourers. Thus, it limits their economic opportunities in the market place where they have to compete with people from other vocations. A majority of the Dalits were thus engaged in households jobs (24.3%) followed by agriculture (20.5%). Agriculture as a whole, including animal husbandry and fishing activities, makes a total of 21.3% which was fairly below the wage earners, which was as high as 23.4% in Dalits. As per the data of the above-mentioned study by Kumar (2009a), 68% of Dalits were found literate compared to 72% of non-Dalits. The family life of the Dalits

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3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

suggests they were less mobile as regards the members of the family living separately in different places due to jobs and occupations. Thus, the primary sources of sustaining the livelihood of Dalits in Surkhet district were agriculture and wageearning labour. A study by Cameron (1998: 100) reveals that ‘low’ caste people or Dalits do most of the agricultural work. Dalit women are mostly involved in weeding and digging the fields, carrying manure (fertilizer), and transplanting seedlings. The socio-economic situation of Dalits can thus be classified as pathetic as they are denied access to the most prominent and valuable assets of rural life – the ownership of land, which ensures the social as well as economic status of a person in society. In fact, it is the land which not only allows a rural family to survive by harvesting it, but also is the source of debt as one hardly gets a loan unless he/she submits either the land or house as mortgage. A study by IIDS (2009) explains: Rural financial market is land-based. Land is necessary to get credit and basic education is needed to make use of micro-credits. Dalits living in rural areas are mostly landless and lack basic education. Hence they have no access to financial market. Dalits who go to Punjab in India for seasonal labour take credit from local money-lenders in Nepalese rupees and after their return pay back in Indian currency. It means they pay 60% of interest in just 3 months, which is indeed highly exploitative and regressive.

As a result, some 85% of the respondents had taken loans from the traditional moneylenders rather than from banks and financial institutions. They had also taken loans from relatives rather than cooperatives. Out of the total, 76% Dalits would have to take loans. They disclosed that they were heavily indebted to the source of borrowing. To a question on the economic activities of the people, 75.6% Dalits said that they were the family’s bread-earners. Of them, for a large number of people (60.8%), the major source of earning remains daily wages from labour followed by salaries/pensions for 17.7%. Remuneration/allowances/fees, etc. were reported as source of income by 5.1%, and other odd jobs by 16.5%. But the range of income these people make varies considerably—from Rs. 200 to over Rs. 24,000 per month. There were two persons whose monthly income was just Rs. 200 and one person whose average monthly income was around Rs. 24,000 a month—a case of vertical inequality. To questions like whether a person gets equal treatment in competition with others in the neighbourhood for government service or other employment opportunity—food exchange in locality, and access to employment opportunities by to all—the answers were as follows (Table 3.6): Table 3.6 Response to various indicators related to equal opportunity Specific point at issue Food exchange in locality

Positive response (YES) Negative response (NO) 72

26

Access to eemployment opportunities for all

30.1

47.4

Equal treatment in competition with others in the neighborhood for government service

31.9

42.6

Source Kumar 2009a (revised by author)

3.6 State of Dalits in Work and Employment in Surkhet

113

In fact, only 30.1% respondents said “yes” against 47.4% of them replying in the negative firmly saying “no”. The number of respondents in the “don’t know” category was 21.2% and one person made no response at all. Likewise, a similar question was asked whether the people of all communities and ethnic groups are provided with equal opportunities in the government service and other employment agencies; the respondents saying “no” were in the majority, as 46.4% of them replied in the negative in comparison to 32.0% responding in the positive. There were 20.8% in the “don’t know” category, followed by 0.7% giving no response, out of the total respondents. A follow-up question was raised by asking the respondents who they think was/were responsible for such discriminatory practice in the society. The Table below indicates the reasons for discrimination, as pointed out by most of the respondents during the recordings (Table 3.7). Majority of the respondents had identified the local power elites (48.8) followed by the state/government (47.7) and leaders of political parties (34.6) as the main actors in discriminatory treatments. However, the response of the respondents regarding a question of “who is responsible for making caste-based prejudices still alive?” the detail of the answer is as follows (Table 3.8): This study reveals that there is a nexus between high caste groups and administration in continuing caste-based prejudices. Also, there are people who still adhere to the faith that humans are born unequal. Interestingly, there are quite a large number of Table 3.7 Responsible for Denial of equal opportunities

Denied by

Yes

No

Do not Know

Government/State

47.7

17.80

34.4

Political Parties/Leaders

34.6

25.8

39.6

Local Power Elites

48.8

15.4

35.8

Cultural/Religious Obstructions

25.3

36.9

37.8

Landlordism

15.4

39.6

45.0

Source Kumar (2009b)

Table 3.8 Responsible groups/person for keeping caste-based prejudices alive S.N.

Responsible Groups/Person

1.

High Caste Groups

2.

Administration

11.5

3.

Both (High Caste Groups and Administration)

13.1

4.

Fate

1.6

5.

All (including High Caste Dalits)

13.1

6.

Not Applicable

45.9

9.

Total

Source Pyakurel 2012

Percentage of Respondanst 14.8

100.00

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3 Work, Employment and Social Exclusion of Dalits

people (13.1%) on the upper strata of their society, who blame Dalits for the continuation of caste-based practices. During this field study, a good number of respondents (45%) opened up to report that they have no easy access to schools, and were denied entry to temples and restaurants. The following accounts give a lot of information about how and where such discrimination can be seen even today. Mrs. Gauri Nepali, Sarki (Pyakurel 2011), has been working in the District Land Conservation Office for the last 35 years. And unfortunately, she is still there as a daily-wage worker. According to her, it is primarily due to caste-based prejudice against her. She states: I felt excluded when I was not selected for the post of messenger of the office a couple of years ago. I applied for the post without hiding my Dalit surname but was denied to be there since I belonged to Dalit community. I was shocked when I was informed that I could not get through only due to my caste identity. They even argued that the post is designed not only to help at the office, but also for serving the boss as his/her cook. One person who was senior to me went further and told me that I was not eligible for the post because a messenger had to serve tea, water, etc., inside the office during the office time, too. That was the case which compelled me to work as a daily-wage worker in the office garden for decades. Otherwise, I also would have been sitting there on the chair (points to a man who was sitting on the chair in front of her)… I have been working here for 35 years, but I am yet to make my future life secure. All others get a good amount of money when they take retirement. But I would get nothing when I leave even after serving for 35 years.

According to Sukumaya BK (a woman worker, Women Development Branch, Surkhet), it is difficult to see out the caste-based prejudice inside the office at present. “But it is very much there in other behaviours like in speaking, in selecting language to abuse their (colleagues) offspring, etc.” She further states: They (non-Dalit staff) do not want to go together with the Dalit staff to the field work. They send me to the field which is comparatively more difficult than others. They ask me to produce the field report earlier than the deadline. They often use the word “dum” (the derogative term to abuse Damai, a Dalit sub-caste) while they abuse their offspring. When I listen to the abuse, I feel like I am being abused by them…My colleagues inform each other and even talk to all personnel including a peon of the office if they are going to attend some programme. But they never ask or take me with them to the same. (Pyakurel 2011)

After observing and analyzing the situation of Dalits, one is compelled to say that the centuries old caste-based discrimination is the sole cause of social exclusion of Dalits. It bars the Dalits from education, so-called prestigious occupations, and from the politics or decision-making bodies. Today, at least by law, caste-based discrimination is no more existing in Nepal after the Naya Muluki Ain 1963 (in 2022 B.S.) replaced the old one. As the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 had guaranteed equality, and as the Muluki Ain (Country Code) also got amended after the historic parliamentary declaration of June 4, 2006, the caste-based discrimination, both in private and public sphere, has been made punishable. The Constitution of Nepal promulgated on 2015 mentions in the preamble itself that discriminations based on the ground of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe, origin, language or ideological conviction or any of these are illegal. Right to equality (Article 18), Right against untouchability (Article 24), Rights of Dalits (article 40), Right to social justice (Article 42) are there to ensure rights of Dalits and other marginalized categories. These all have helped

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overcome caste-based prejudices and discriminations. However, various evidences say that Dalits still suffer from the practice of untouchability even if such a practice is not so much visible as in the past. It is true that the continued struggle for democracy and its very concern on inclusive policy within the system has helped make positive provisions to ensure Dalits’ participation in politics and other mobility-related institutions. It is also true that a good number of Dalits, by capitalizing such inclusive provisions, managed to enter in many such institutions. But they are not freed from the kind of torture of castebased discrimination, which has been enforced for several centuries even if they are ‘included’ in the new system in a new era. As mentioned earlier, the discrimination those ‘included’ Dalits are facing today is similar to what their ancestors’ experienced in the past. The only difference one finds is that the practice of untouchability and caste-based discrimination was internalized by most of the Dalits in the past, as it was part of legal system untill some years ago. Therefore, people could openly practice it in the past. But today people who want to continue such a practice have to search for a set of different excuses, pretexts and ways, as it has not only been made illegal, but also considered a heinous crime. The following data collected during fieldwork helped to substantiate the statement. ‘We find that a good number of Dalits have been included/entered into different mobility-based institutions but the discrimination they have been facing has not changed even today’. Those ‘included’ Dalits acknowledge the fact the modus operandi of discrimination has changed in a drastic manner, which for them is transformed from the practice of untouchability to “Savya Chhuwachhut (civilized practice of untouchability)”, “Nadekhine Chhuwachhut (unseen untouchability)”, “Sikshit Bhedbhabh (educated discrimination),” “indirect,” “unobservable”, etc. In each sector, be it in education, business, employment or work, data show that Dalits prefer not to go out from their hometown as they have to conceal their identity. If we follow the district profile of political parties in terms of the caste composition, we find it as the best representative body, which has more than 16% Dalits represented. And every party has included not less than 9% Dalit members in the committees. But if we listen some of the Dalit members, we feel like it is only a ritualistic inclusion. According to a study by Ram (1995: 207), one finds a partial correlation between class structure and caste system. Those who had improved their status in class structure also found some meaningful change in their caste where, unlike their less achieving caste people, they were not subjected to any crude practice of untouchability and caste discrimination. They interacted ‘freely’ with people of other castes and communities more in urban areas and enjoyed a considerable degree of respect from them. But unfortunately, it was not the case in Nepal. In other words, this study very stongly reveals the fact that the caste-based prejudices cannot be removed but are reproduced in different forms until people know one’s caste. Here, one’s social status or mobility based on political and economic opportunities, which could be gained through the introduction of various policies such as affirmative action seems less relevant to overcome the caste-related prejudices. The following are some of the case studies collected during fieldwork. It is presented with a hope that one will be able to understand how Dalits are still suffering

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from caste-based discrimination even after they are in the mainstream. Sanju BK (Pyakurel 2011), who not only owns a big bungalow at the main city center, but also has recognition as an educated person as well as a leading civil society member, seems to be convinced that caste-prejudice is more powerful than any of the economic and political empowerment. “Non-Dalit neighbours avoid inviting us to many rituals even if we have very good interaction and sharing in day-to-day life,” he reveals. According to Prem Sunar (Pyakurel 2011), who is an M.A. in sociology and works as a non-gazetted officer in a government office, there is no discrimination based on caste at the office. But the presence of such discrimination is felt at each and every step. He explains: One simple example I can give you is that they (so-called upper caste) are biased towards us while we greet each other. Most of my juniors who are supposed to respect me, avoid me most of the time so that we do not exchange greetings. I have had such experiences many times. They address all others as ‘sir’ and ‘madam,’ but try to call me as ‘brother’ instead of saying ‘sir’. Through such attempts, they want to humiliate me. Also, discrimination comes while taking tea or snacks inside the office. I, in most of the cases, will be the last one to collect tea and snacks from the plate. Even if I am seated in the first row of the seating arrangement, they go the other way around and offer me at last. Outsiders like you cannot observe such discrimination from which I have been made to suffer.

He further said, “It is more in the residence. We only assemble outside the room and chat. No ‘upper caste’ colleagues invite us inside their room and offer food. I have not had the opportunity to share and dine with my colleagues till date”. Khadga Bahadur Nepali (Pyakurel 2011), a primary school teacher at Bhairab Higher Secondary School, Surkhet, also had a similar experience. According to him, he has suffered from caste-based prejudice even if he is economically well-off because of being a teacher in a school there. He states: Most of my neighbours are from non-Dalit castes. We share many things but we are not allowed to enter into their homes. No one invites us for lunch or dinner. Everything is discussed and settled outside the house. There will be two separate queues if someone organizes a lunch/dinner party.

The account of Bimal Nepali (Pyakurel 2011), the Principal of a renowned boarding school, Horizon Academy Boarding School, Surkhet, also paints a similar kind of image on the influential role of caste, more than anything else, in the society. He says: I spent some 11-12 years hiding my caste identity. I used to hide my real surname that was “Nepali” and used a fake surname “Nepal.” I did it to be safe from the atrocity of non-Dalits towards a Dalit. You cannot believe the kind of psychological terror faced by me while studying in Kathmandu. I am now the principal of one of the reputed boarding schools in town. It is one of the prestigious jobs. But no parent of our students invites me for taking dinner or lunch together with them. It may be due to my Dalit identity which is yet to be accepted by the society.

Experience of Balaram Sunar (Pyakurel 2011), who was the first man to go underground from Surkhet District just after the Maoists of Nepal decided to go for

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“people’s war”, also gives a perspective on whether to remove the caste or other disparities first. He states: On the surface, we cannot find the practice of untouchability at the higher level of party. However, we somehow feel it while we are with the newly joined party members. I have a couple of experiences related to caste prejudice during the People’s War. There were incidents in which we Dalits were left outside and others were taken inside the home at the time of eating. I used to be surprised and even disappointed from my ‘upper caste’ friends who discriminated us by following the house owner. They did not oppose but accepted the offer like it was their pride to eat inside the home…. One very interesting factor I see today is that people of high caste often try to hide from me so that they are not bound to greet me with a Namaskar… Also, I never find the kind of closeness between Dalits and non-Dalits even if we work together for the same party. I always find my non-Dalit friends’ formal behaviour towards me, whereas they (non-Dalits) often tease each other and even use slang words among them. I do not understand the reason why we could not be that much closer even if we worked together for decades.

The observation of Tara Nepali (Pyakurel 2011), a district committee member of Rashtriya Jana Morcha, also helps those to rethink on their perspective who advocate the line that affirmative action policy for politico-economic mobility and empowerment help overcome each problem including caste-based prejudice. According to her, the practice of untouchability is still in the society, and she has been suffering from “not direct but an indirect version of the practice of untouchability.” To conclude, the caste-based discrimination and ‘untouchability’ traditionally had very strong ties in Nepal as in India because of the occupational division of caste groups. Prestigious economic activities were monopolized by ‘high’ caste people and the degrading menial works were assigned to the Dalits. Due to the growing market economy in urban centres and intensified efforts by the Dalit movement, the caste-based untouchability is declining rapidly, but it is yet to be eliminated. While talking about the link between work, employment and social exclusion, and whether an improved status of a Dalit in terms of work and employment helps him/her in overcoming the caste-based prejudices, the field data collected for this particular study reveals that the expected outcome is yet to come though more and more steps are taken to evolve a Dalit-friendly economy and society. In fact, social exclusion, as mentioned in earlier chapters, is “a multi-dimensional process” in which various forms of exclusion are combined. And access to employment and material resources is one of the main dimensions (Madanipour et al 1998: 22 cited in Kumar 2008: 273). Income, poverty, weak labour market integration, low level of education, and multiple problems in accommodation are four major indicators of social exclusion. Since the caste system traditionally prescribed caste-based occupations which were ‘hierarchised and ranked as superior and inferior’ (Ram 2007: 2), Dalits themselves remained economically deprived, and have to face discrimination even though it is different than that of the traditional one. In fact, a complete social mobility is possible only along multiple dimensions like education, occupation, social class, social power (Lispet and Zetterberg 1966: 561–573 cited in Ram 1995: 204). And, these factors are more important for economic upliftment along with occupation, which are considered the sole criteria for determining one’s social status (Ram 1999: 441). Even Ambedkar, who was initially convinced that Dalits could achieve political equality with others

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with the adoption of the democratic constitution, became disillusioned and started making alternative strategies of communization or collectivization of agriculture along with nationalization of industries (Ambedkar 1979: 408 cited in Ram 1995: 89) in achieving both the economic equality and gaining real political rights for the Dalits. As discussed earlier, Dalits have to rely mostly in the informal sector due to the various reasons, including their limitations such as lack of experience, education, and lack of network. And, that is the informal sector, which offers a cushion to workers during economic crisis. The benefits of informal employment may not be sufficient to achieve an acceptable standard of living as informal employment rarely comes with social protection, good working conditions and adequate wages. That is why, it is necessary that efforts be made, and focus directed to the needs and constraints faced by the working poor, especially the Dalits, in the informal economy. And, one can see that a few steps have been taken recently towards this direction. Some INGOs have taken initiatives to intervene in South Asia, so that such international agencies could stimulate participation of Dalits and other marginalized groups into higher qualified jobs. Article 21 of the Constitution provides rights of proportional representation of Dalits at all organs, sections, levels and structures of the State. However, there are several laws i.e. Section 7 (7) of Civil Service Act, 1993; Scholarship (4th amendment) Regulation, 2010; Local Self-governance (4th amendment) Regulation, 2010; Legislative-Parliament Secretariat Service Act, 1993 (amended in 2007); Army Act, 2001 (amended in 2009); Police Act, 1955 (amended in 2009); ArmedPolice Act, 2006 (amended in 2009), Nepal Special (intelligence) Service Act, 1985 (amended in 2009); Development Committee Act, 1956 (amended in 2009); Education Act, 1971 (amended in 2009); and Nepal Health Service Act, 1997 (amended in 2009) and Constituent Assembly Members Election Act, 2007/2013) to provide a nominal representation, if not proportionate in accordance with the newly implemented Constitutional provisions. However, as the mindset of Nepali society, especially the implementing agencies, is not welcoming to promote the weakest section of the society to join the job market available in the ‘modern world, the number further goes down while recruiting in the reserved seats. As a result, Dalits with basic educational qualification remain unemployed and, therefore, are facing multiple exclusions including exclusion from decent lives.

References Ambedkar BR (1979) Caste in India: their mechanism. Genesis and Development, In selected Writing, 1. Bombay: Dept. of Education, Government of Maharastra Ambedkar BR (1989). Writings and speeches (Vol. 1). Mumbai: education department, government of Maharashtra Ambedkar BR (2007) Annihilation of caste. New Delhi: critical quest (first published in 1936)

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Chapter 4

Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal

Political representation has been at the center of the political debates in recent times as facilitating a representation of multiple interests, as addressing diversity is one of the basic issues of democracy today (Hasan 2002: 12). Political theories tell us that there are two kinds of representations. First, the election of individual representative by ‘abstract citizens’ (Pitkin 1967) in which any elected member of the political body is considered a representative of the nation as a whole. Secondly, the discussion is based on the social identities of the represented and representatives. Jaffrelot mentions that the former has been epitomized by the post-revolutionary France since 1789 and the latter was introduced by the British in the nineteenth century (Jaffrelot 2009: 1). In fact, notions of diversity and difference have been central to liberalism from its inception and to liberal democracy throughout its formation. The defining characteristics of liberal democracy, as Dahl (1989) clarifies, are grounded in the heterogeneity of the societies that gave birth to it. In the conventional understanding of liberal democracy, differences are regarded primarily as a matter of ideas, and representation is considered more or less adequate depending on how well it reflects the voters’ opinions, preferences and beliefs. Problems of political exclusion are perceived either in terms of the electoral system (which can over-represent certain views and underrepresent others), or in terms of people’s access to political participation (Phillips 1995: 1). It was the diversity of the citizenry, as much as its absolute size, that made the earlier (more consensual) practice of Athenian democracy so inappropriate to the modern world (Phillips 1995: 5). Sometimes people feel that the differences are not something we have only just noticed such as on the bases of gender, ethnicity or marginalization. But it has been perceived in an overly cerebral fashion as differences in opinions and beliefs, and the resulting emphasis on the ‘politics of ideas’ has proved inadequate to the problem of political exclusion (Phillips 1995: 6). Along with the development of the very notion of democracy in many respects, democracy theorists keep investing the multiple relation of representation in strengthening

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9_4

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the democratic system. Then, they find that representing underlies ‘acting in the interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’ (Pitkin 1967: 209). In other words, it was realized that the fair representation could be achieved in a more continuous process but not be guaranteed in advance, which depends on a (somewhat unspecified) level of responsiveness to the electorate (Phillips 1995: 4). Then, the move for switch from direct to representative democracy has shifted the emphasis from the notion of ‘who the politicians are’ to ‘what kind of policies, preferences and ideas’ they represent. In doing so, it has made accountability to the electorate with the pre-eminent radical concern which is called ‘politics of ideas’ (Phillips 1995: 4). But they do not engage significantly with the widely felt sense of political exclusion by groups. Indeed, many of the arguments around which democracy revolves, are related to the demand of political presence as defined by Phillips (1995: 5). According to her, demands for the equal representation of women and men, demands for a more even-handed balance between the different ethnic groups that make up each society, demands for the political inclusion of groups, etc., are all for the political inclusion of groups that have come to see themselves as marginalized or silenced or excluded (Phillips 1995: 5). In major reframing of the problems of democratic equality, the separation between ‘who’ and ‘what’ is to be represented, and the subordination of the first to the second, is subject to questioning. That, as Phillips (1995: 5) reveals, can be called a challenge to the ‘politics of ideas’ by an alternative notion of ‘politics of presence.’ As mentioned in the earlier chapters, the issue of social mobility of Dalits along with other marginalized groups reached the acme in public debate in Nepal after the successful Jana Andolan I in 1990. Again, it was increased and expanded after the successful mass movement of April 2006 which is also termed by movement groups as Jana Andolan II. Subsequently, after the political change in 1990, the Nepali state has come up with various policies of “preferential treatment” or “positive discrimination” with the objective of overcoming the past marginality and social exclusion. As a result, people belonging to the Dalit groups, even if they are in a small number, have benefited from several provisions of the reservation in education, employment in government departments and representation in parliament and other political institutions. In the given situation, as mentioned by Ram (1999: 440–441) in the Indian context, such beneficiaries have improved their social status, especially in the caste and class hierarchy. However, it is not very certain whether their improved status in the class structure has affected, in the same magnitude, their status in the caste system. With this background, this chapter tries to explore whether political inclusion affects the change of one’s status in the caste system.

4.1 History of Political Inclusion of Dalits in Nepal Every social/political movement has a relation with the political system, which provides the space for movement groups and individuals to make their demands as per the rights available under a system. And democracy is the only system which provides

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space for every social movement. Though there were several attempts to oppose the caste-based discrimination earlier, the 1940s had become the starting point for Nepali Dalit movement in Nepal as the anti-Rana and pro-democracy movement was started at that time. In fact, during Indian independence movement, many Nepalese along with Dalits in a good number were inspired by the movement and even took part in it. Ultimately, that helped them to understand not only the basic elements of democracy, but also provided enough knowledge about the demerits of caste system. It is said that Dalits, especially Sarbajit Biswakarma and Saharshanath Kapali, were those youths1 who got ideas while they were in India during the independence movement and went back to Nepal with inspiration to work against the caste-based discrimination and for advocating democracy (Kisan 2005: 89). Biswakarma became the first person to establish an organization called Vishwa Sarvajan Sangh (Association for All People of the World) in 1947, which was the first organization formed in Nepal with the objective to promote the self-respect of Dalits (INSEC 1993 cited in Kisan 2005). This encouraged others to form such organizations and fight against the caste-based prejudices and for social justice to all. As a result, in 1947, Tailors’ Union in Kathmandu, and Nepal Samaj Sudhar Sangh (Association for Social Reform, Nepal) in the eastern part of Nepal were established. After this, several such organizations were formed in quick succession, and movements were expanded up to grassroots. Nepali Congress (NC), as the revolutionary party, which basically led most of the political movements of Nepal including the anti-Rana revolution in 1950 became the first political party and appointed Dhanman Singh Pariyar, a Dalit, General Secretary of the party in 1952. It was the NC that had a Dalit named D. B. Pariyar as founding member when it was formed in 1946. The party also elected Saharsha Nath Kapali, a Dalit, as a Member of Parliament in the first elected parliament of Nepal in 1959 (Biswakarma 2006: 256–257). It was the attempt of the NC which tried to give a message to all that one’s caste had nothing to do with one’s responsibility and work. In fact, the NC as the oldest political party working for ‘democratic socialism’ encouraged the Dalits and others to be recognized beyond their traditional and casteist mindset. However, the issue of Dalit emancipation along with other processes of democratization was sidelined after the coup d’état by the king in 1960. Then the Dalits had to combine their struggle with the struggle for democracy and wait for 30 years till 1990 to find the opportune time to launch a peaceful movement for their emancipation from caste-based prejudices. Once Dalits also contributed widely in the 1990s pro-democracy movement, the Drafting Committee of the 1990s’ Constitution had made a provision of 5% reservation for women and 3% reservation for Dalits in parliament in the proposed constitution. But reservation for Dalits was abolished by the then Interim Government before the constitution was promulgated (Khanal et al. 2012: 80–81). However, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 could guarantee equality considering caste-based division, the practice of untouchability and discriminations as crimes. For the first 1 Biswakarma

was studying Hindu scripts and Sanskrit language in Banaras Hindu University, and Kapali was sent by the Ranas to Calcutta to attend a tailor’s training as his father was the personal tailor of the Rana Generals.

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time in the history of Nepal, Article 11 (4) of that Constitution declared any contravention of this provision as punishable by law. However, the parliament did not make laws for the protection, empowerment or advancement of the interests of marginalized groups, and also did not come up with the law to punish those who committed crimes as per Article 11 (4) of the constitution. Moreover, the Muluki Ain (Country Code) amended in 1992 allowed discriminatory “traditional practices” to occur within the realm of religion. This was amended only after the historic parliamentary declaration of 4 June 2006. This declaration made discrimination punishable in both the public and private spheres. In summary, it can be said that the political change of 1990 provided enough space to the Dalits and other marginalized groups to be organized and aware, but could not do much in bringing them into the decision-making bodies. The Interim Constitution 2007, which was promulgated after Jana Andolan II, had declared the intention of building a nation with multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multireligious and multi-cultural characteristics ensuring equality and ending untouchability and racial discrimination. Article 13 of it guaranteed the Right to Equality, and clause (2) of the Article said that no discrimination should be made against any citizen in the application of general laws on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, tribe, origin, language or ideological conviction or any of these.” Moreover, clause (3) stated that the Nepali state “shall not discriminate among citizens on grounds of religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, origin, language or ideological conviction or any of these”. The accompanying provision provided for affirmative action towards groups that have been subject to discrimination. It reads: Provided that nothing shall be deemed to prevent the making of special provisions by law for the protection, empowerment or advancement of the interests of women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic tribes, Madhesis peasants, labourers or those who belong to a class which is economically, socially or culturally backward and children, the aged, disabled and those who are physically or mentally incapacitated.

4.2 Inclusion in Party Organizations Affiliation to political parties is important for individuals associated with them because the organizations can help them assume leadership roles and prepare for larger political responsibilities. It could also result in short-term gains such as appointments to public offices. In modern democracy, political parties build a crucial bridge between the public and politics through their representative function. They mobilise civilians, aggregate demands and recruit candidates for legislation and government. This way, the political party functions as an essential intermediary between the state and society (Khanal et al. 2012: 28). In neither practice nor theory is there any other body that can replace this crucial function: “The political party created democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties” (Schattschneider 1942: 1) This section of the chapter provides a state of representation of Dalits in party structures. Also an outline of how the inclusion agenda was picked up by the political parties and its leaders.

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The political parties started having Dalits in their organizations, but their presence and influence had been minimal before 2006. As a result, hardly any Dalits could be seen in top leadership positions. One major change one could observe after 1990 was that each major party started forming an affiliated Dalit organization. The organizations were hardly ever very influential in outlining party priorities and strategies in the initial years. But the trend has changed after the parties decided to go for inclusive politics. Party policies for Dalit inclusion before the Jana Andolan II was neither in much debate nor in practice. Leaders of political parties would pick up some of their aides to the party structure just to show that there was someone from marginalized communities. In 5 July 2003 an alliance of five parties—NC, UML, NSP, Majdoor Kisan Party and Janamorcha Nepal—produced a document that laid out how they would deal with inclusion. The document entitled Agragami sudharsamandhi dristikorn ra karyakram (Vision and Programmes for forward-looking reforms) committed to reforming the election system increasing the representation of women, Dalits and backward regions, to change the Upper House of Parliament into one that would accommodate ethnic nationalities, Dalits, women and people of repute from different walks of national life, to making Nepal a discrimination-free country with the right of equal access to all citizens and to make laws for the upliftment of backward regions and groups, among others. Though the commitments were not sufficient to address the concerns of Dalits, what was important is that the change in the attitude of the parties towards excluded groups was beginning to emerge even before the Jana Andolan I (Bennett et al., n.d.). In the document the parties committed to make untouchability punishable, to formulate effective laws and to ensure strict enforcement. The common statement from the five parties reflected their awareness of the growing discontent among the masses with the ongoing conflict between the Maoists and the government, and the moves by the king towards concentrating power in his hands. It may have also reflected the parties’ growing realization that the Maoists had gained the moral high ground by condemning various types of exclusion, which they said they were fighting to change. The protests of the parties demanding restoration of democracy led by the parliamentary parties, and the ongoing Maoist-government conflict created an environment for an understanding called the 12-point understanding between the Maoists and the political parties on 23 November 2005. The introductory text of the 12-point understanding reconfirmed the commitment of the parties to “resolve problems related to class, caste (sic), gender, and region.” However, none of the points mentioned caste-based discrimination in particular. The real position of the major political parties towards Dalits can be seen by analyzing the recommendations to the Drafting Committee of the Interim Constitution. According to the proposal, the NC made 17 recommendations in which it suggested including a clause on the rights of classes, women, Dalits, Janajatis, Adivasis, the disabled and backward regions, and trade union rights as fundamental rights. It stood for a mixed election system of the First-Past-the-Post and proportional representation. As the directive principles of the constitution, the NC suggested including proportional inclusion through special arrangements of excluded groups

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in all opportunities arising in the state. The UML recommended special rights for Dalits in the directive principles, but did not underline specific provisions for ending economic and caste-based discrimination against Dalits (Bhatta 2007). The UCPNMaoist demanded a commitment to end “untouchability against the Dalits and classic Hindu text, the Manusmrti (laws of Manu), ideologically justifying the system of caste discrimination and ‘untouchability’ for ensuring special rights for Dalits in all sectors.” It also supported inclusion of women, oppressed ethnicities, Dalits and the disabled in the CA in proportion to their population. Nepali Congress (Democratic) became the first political party to provision the reservation for representations from Dalits, women, ethnic groups, Madhesi and Karnali zone in its constitution and went for general convention in November 2005. It reserved 8 seats—2 for Madhesi, 2 for ethnic groups, 2 for women, 1 each for Dalits and people from Karnali zone—out of 28 elected seats from the Convention. Likewise, Banke district committee of the United Marxist Leninist Party became the first local level committee in terms of inclusive policy in the party committee. Its General Convention held in 2006 formed an inclusive district committee with 65% reservation for women, Dalits, ethnic groups, Madhesi and labourer groups (Basnet and Darnal 2007). Though the Maoists have been very vocal in championing the cause of Dalits, the party did not have Dalit representation in its Central Secretariat, the top decisionmaking body, until it was dissolved in early 2009. In fact, the secretariat was made up of Brahmin-Chhetri and Janajati males. It did have two Dalit members in the 45member politburo, the leadership body that comes after the secretariat in the pecking order. When the CPN (M) and CPN (Unity Centre), which had contested elections as Janamorcha Nepal and was known by that name, merged in 13 January 2007 and became the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist), it had 6 Dalit members (4.34%) in the 138-member Central Committee. The NC, which was the first political party to offer the post of General Secretary to a Dalit in the 1950s, has once again become the most inclusive party2 in terms of Dalit representation. Out of its 61 elected members in the Central Committee, it has reserved 5 seats (8.19%) for Dalits in which 2 (3.27%) had to be from Dalit women. Also, it has reserved one seat each for Janajati, Madhesi and Dalit women while fulfilling the terms of Central Committee through nomination. It means that the NC has been trying to create space for all marginalized communities including Dalit women in its supreme executive body—the central committee. In the 11th General Convention in September 2010, NC adopted a resolution on restructuring of the state and inclusive democracy stating that ‘state restructuring has been necessary to change the centralised structure by making changes in the present political culture and character of the state to realise democracy. Nepali Congress realises that it is necessary to democratise the state by providing full rights and autonomy to the people for political participation based on equality’.

2 It has reserved 6 seats for women, 5 seats each for Janajatis, Madhesis and Dalits, in which 2 each

women are a must, and a seat for the Muslims.

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In the current central committee of Nepali Congress there are 5 Dalit members, 2 of whom are females, which is in accordance with party’s provision (www.nep alicongress.org, 2017). The Communist Party of Nepal (UML), the political party which opted for multi-party competitive politics since 1990 and become one of the two major parties in Nepal, had 86 full members and 29 alternate members in its central committee. After its 8th General Convention (16–25 February 2009), the UML had elected eight Dalits to its Central Committee appearing as one of the inclusive political parties. Rai (2009) argues that the UML had reserved 45% seats in the central committee for women, Dalits and other excluded groups. However, out of the eight, five were alternative members and could attend the meetings only when the full quorum of members was not there. Only three members were elected for forming the quorum under reservation. Out of five alternative members, four were elected under the Dalit quota and the remaining one was from the seat reserved for workers. It means Dalits in the UML Central Committee were 6.89% in total with only 3.5% full members. However, the party provision to select one Dalit for every 75 members in the party units (it was one worker for every 75 members, one woman for every 100 and one male for every 200 members) as convention representatives had helped bring 145 Dalits (8%) to the 1820-member convention. In terms of gender inclusion, there was no provision for Dalit women. As a result, none of the Dalits women were there in 15-women members in the Central Committee, and among eight Dalit members none were women (Bishwakarma 2009). The 10th Convention held in July 2014 could also repeat almost the same provision without any significant changes in Dalits representation. There were altogether 9 members (7.82%) including alternative member in the central committee (www.cpnuml.org, 2017). Though the party had included Dalits in the party structure like NC, the modus operandi of CPN-UML diverged from that of NC. Rather than providing Dalit membership based on a quota in its constitution and subsequently holding separate elections for Dalit candidates, CPN-UML’s leadership first screened for ‘eligible’ Dalit candidates before deciding how many Dalits to elect. It is worth to quote Ganesh B.K., a Dalit member of the discipline commission of CPN-UML. According to him, his party provisioned no seats for Dalits in the central committee till recently as leadership was not convinced that there was any Dalit in the party able to perform as a central committee leader. “Only when the leadership saw that three Dalits were eligible to be given the opportunity to be in the central committee, the party introduced a policy of reserving three seats [full member] in the central committee”, Khanal et al. (2012) quotes BK as saying. The United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-Maoist), which emerged as one of the three political parties3 in Nepal after Jana Andolan II, had 6 (4.34%) Dalits in its 138-member Central Committee. The UCPN-Maoist was formed in January 2009 along with the merger of the CPN-Maoist and Communist Party of NepalUnity Centre. It was the party not provisioning seats for either of social categories (marginalized or dominant groups) with a stand that ‘state should be inclusive but not 3 It

could emerge as the single largest party in the 2008 elections, but had become distanced third party in the 2013 elections.

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the political party’. That is why it did not have any Dalit representation in the Central Secretariat, its top decision making body, until it was dissolved in early 2009. Later, the party included two Dalit members in its 45 member Politburo, the executive body that came after the Secretariat. It had six Dalit members in the merged 138 member Central Executive Committee making up 4.34%. As there was no reservation policy in the party, the selection criteria was ‘contribution, commitment and loyalty’. As a result, all Dalit nominations in the central committee have been based on ad hoc decisions rather than on party provisions. For Sita Devi Boudel, her party UCPNMaoist was full of ambiguity in party line as far as inclusivity was concerned, and that discouraged Dalits to be in the party leadership. She states that the Maoist party had accepted the contribution of the Dalit community during the Maoist insurgency, but the party is yet to bring a policy to secure Dalit representation in the Standing Committee and Politburo of the party. A study by Khanal et al. (2012: 146) quotes her “We want the party to introduce a policy similar to Nepali Congress. Unless such policy is introduced, party leadership may exclude Dalits in the name of contribution, commitment and loyalty”. The two major parties—the Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist Leninist) (CPN-UML) and Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre)—announced their unification as Nepal Communist on May 17, 2018, and agreed for 43 standing committee members and 441 members in its Central Committee. Once the party formed the committees, it could not maintain the inclusivity as it was before the unification. There is only a Dalit member (2.32%) in the 43-member Standing Committee, and 13 members (2.93%) in the 441 members Central Committee. Out of 13 Dalits, only four (0.9%) are Dalit women (FEDO/IDSN 2018). If one sees the 9-member Party Secretariat, none of them are from marginalized communities like women and Dalits. The composition of newly formed ruling party has invited a heavy criticism by its own cadres and other rights activists saying that the newly formed party violated not only the constitution and the government’s rules and regulations, but also NCP statute which clearly states that all party committees should have 33% women representation. According to Article 15 (4) of Political Party Registration Law, a political party should have at least one-third women representation in all its committees. On the issue of inclusion of Dalits, even Madhesh-based parties are not very welcoming. They criticize other major parties linking the latter’s inclination towards hill high caste, but the recent general convention of the Terai Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP) held in June 2016 was a glaring example of how Madhesi parties are no different from the national parties. In the central committee of the TMLP, all the high office-bearers are from the Madhesi ‘upper caste’, and there is absence of women, Tharus, Dalits and Muslims in the leadership positions. Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum (MJF) also had only a Dalit member in its 35-member Central Committee (Pyakurel 2011). In many respects, the party bodies seem to be instrumental in recommending or nominating members for positions in government and parliament. That is why the party position is very important for individual members and groups in democracy— that is yet to be inclusive. A recent report includes:

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129

Brahmins and Chhetris and the middle castes in the plains still dominate the decision-making bodies of all major parties. Dalits, even in parties where they have some representation, do not have the numbers or the political clout to influence decisions. (Bennett et al. 2013)

Regarding the composition of Dalits in each party, Dalits are present in each political party in two ways. One is through the direct representation in party mechanism; and the other is through the formation of a fraternal organization under the party. In fact, parties started forming their Dalit fronts just after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Now each major party has its own Dalit wing. Nepali Dalit movement was not far away from Indian Dalit movement which had gone through quite a few experiments. On the issue of party affiliation, Indian Dalit movement has had two different opinions: the first was to work with other mainstream parties and bring change by influencing them. Another was to form Dalits’ own political party under their own leadership. Following Ambedkar’s call for forming parties and to be active in political parties led by Dalits, Rup Lal Bishwakarma had tried setting up the Dalit Shramik Morcha after 1990. It was a try to follow Ambedkar, but the party failed to win for itself a place in the parliament. Bishendra Paswan, who was formerly associated with the UML, established the Dalit Janajati Party before the 2008 elections. The party was able to secure enough votes to place one member in the CA under the proportional representation system. The DFID report has analyzed about the causes of the failure of Dalit-led parties in Nepal. According to it, “it is very difficult for a Dalit party to be competitive because they lack charismatic leaders of national stature.” Another reality involves “the ideological differences among Dalit leaders now in different political parties” (Bennett 2005).

4.3 Dalits in the Parliament As mentioned earlier, discourse of political inclusion in a particular caste and ethnic group began with the inclusion in the government bodies, particularly in the legislative bodies. The reason behind this was that the legislative body is a major organ to change in constitutions and laws. Slowly the discourse started highlighting the need for inclusivity in executive branch of the government arguing that the law cannot be implemented unless the implementing body is also inclusive in nature. This section discusses Dalit’s representation in the legislative bodies in Nepal. As written earlier, political inclusion was not in the priority of Nepali society until recently. Though a new political elite emerged along with revolution of 1950 with a reformist spirit, they lacked such political consciousness and mobilisation, resulting in endless rivalries and power struggles among major political parties and politicians, which allowed the reemergence of the traditional elite under leadership of the monarchy (Joshi and Rose 1966). However, though people like Saharsha Nath Kapali, were allowed to be as a Member of Upper House in the first elected parliament of Nepal in 1959 (Biswakarma 2006: 256–257), no Dalit was elected in the House of Representatives of 1959. As only one Dalit candidate was in the list of total 786

130 Table 4.1 Dalits in the National Panchayat 1961–1990

4 Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal Name

Year of appointment

1. Dhanman Singh Pariyar

1962

2. Hira Lal Bishwakarma

1971

3. Hira Lal Bishwakarma

1974

4. Hira Lal Bishwakarma

1981

5. T. R. Bishwakarma

1981

6. Tek Bahadur Bishwakarma

1986

All nominated by King

Source Khanal et al. (2012)

candidates contesting the election, one could realize the social structure of the time. NC, known as the organization in which “people from all walks of life and all parts of Nepal had come to join” (Singh 1982: 16), had won a landslide victory during the 1959 general elections, securing 74 out of 109 seats. But it had failed to put forward any Dalit candidate in the election. In the 30-year long Panchayat era that was started with Kings’ coup in 1960, only four Dalits were nominated (six nominations) as representatives in the National Panchayat. Those were shown in Table 4.1. The number of seats in the National Panchayat varied with constitutional amendments. At first in 1962, the constitution had provisioned a National Panchayat with 125 members, of whom 15 were nominated by the King with the remainder elected indirectly through lower tiers of the Panchayat system. The first amendment in 1975 increased the number to 135, of whom 23 were nominated by the King. After the third amendment in 1980, it had 140 members, of whom 112 were elected from the districts on the basis of adult franchise, while 28 were nominated by the King. Nominating Dalits in the National Panchayat gave an illusion of legitimacy to the autocratic regime without sincerely having to address the concerns and demands of Dalits. It was a method of royal co-optation. All four Dalit members listed above had been the members of the National Panchayat nominated by the King. No Dalit was elected either through indirect or direct ballot in the partyless elections of the National Panchayat. However, political consciousness and mobilisation was widened along with these opportunities and the society started asking political parties to be more and more inclusive by bringing people on board from the marginalized section of the society. Though NC was the only political party credited for getting a Dalit elected in the House of Representatives in 1991, it also shied away from putting forward Dalit candidates across other two general elections. It put none in 1994, and 1999. In the CPN-UML had only 3 (0.53%) candidates from the Dalit community. The RPP alone put forward 3 Dalit candidates in the 1994 and 1999 elections. The other smaller

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Table 4.2 Caste and ethnic representation in the highest body of the state Caste/ethnicity

HoR 1991 number (%)

HoR 1994 number (%)

HoR 1999 number (%)

Interim HoR 2007 number (%)

Brahmin/Chhetri

117 (57.07)

131(63.90)

126(61.46)

166(50.30)

Ethnic Groups

46 (22.42)

36 (17.55)

38 (18.53)

74(22.42)

Madhesi

41(20)

38(18.53)

41(20)

72(21.81)

Dalits

1(0.48)

–

–

18(5.54)

Total seats

205 (100)

205 (100)

205 (100)

330 (100)

Source Election Commission, Parliament Secretariat and Bhim Prasad Bhurtel cited in Darnal (2009: 15)

communist parties, Rastriya Janamorcha (National People’s Front) and CPN-ML, the latter being a split from CPN-UML that first contested in 1999, put forward 4 and 5 Dalit candidates, respectively. And, the Rastriya Janamukti Party, associated with the Indigenous Communities of Nepal, put forward 6 Dalits in the 1990s elections. Dalits such as Man Bahadur Bishwakarma, Rishi Babu Pariyar, Ratna Bahadur Bishwakarma, Bijul Kumar Bishwakarma, Dal Singh Kami, Golche Sarki, Lal Bahadur Bishwakarma, and Ram Prit Paswan were elected in the Upper House (Rashtriya Sabha) by indirect election in the period of 1990–2006. However, even if we include 8 Dalit leaders in the Upper House, Dalit representation was not very encouraging during 16 years from 1990 to 2006. Table 4.2 provides an overview of the caste and ethnic composition in the House of Representatives of 1991, 1994, 1999, and in the interim parliament of 2007. Table 4.2 states that all three parliamentary elections under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 were not as inclusive as people expected in a democracy. Contrary to people’s expectation, the parliament of 1994 and 1999 were less representative than that of the house elected just after the Jana Andolan I in 1990. One could observe the same on the issue of Dalits as the first house, unlike the rest two, could have at least a member elected from Dalit community. And, it is the Interim parliament which paved ways to be inclusive decreasing the number of representation in the apex legislative body from the dominant groups. Once their representation was lowered, representation of others went up. Dalits also could secure 5.54% seats in the 330-member Interim Parliament than zero in the previous two HoRs.

4.4 Dalits in the Constituent Assembly The Interim Constitution provided for an electoral system which made it possible to bring Dalit candidates into the CA. In fact, the constitution had a separate article on right against untouchability and racial discrimination. Article 14 (1) stated: “No person shall, on the ground of caste, descent, community or occupation, be subject to racial discrimination and untouchability in any form. Such a discriminatory act

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shall be liable to punishment and the victim shall be entitled to compensation as provided by the law.” According to Article 14(2), “no person shall, on the ground of caste or tribe, be deprived of the use of services, conveniences or utilities available to the public, or be denied access to any public place, or public religious places, or be prevented from performing any religious act.” Also Article 14 (3) stated, “No person belonging to any particular caste or tribe shall, in relation to the production or making available of any goods, services or conveniences, be prevented from purchasing or acquiring such goods, services or conveniences; and no such goods, services or conveniences shall be sold or distributed only to members of a particular caste or tribe.” In sub-clause (4) of Article 14, the constitution underlined: “No one shall be allowed to purport to demonstrate superiority or inferiority of any person or a group of persons belonging to any caste, tribe or origin; or to justify social discrimination on the basis of caste and tribe; or to disseminate ideas based on caste superiority or hatred; or to encourage caste discrimination in any form.” Article 63 (Third Amendment) provided for a 601-member assembly, with 240 candidates elected from the first-past-the-post (FPTP), 335 members elected through proportional representation and 26 members nominated by the Cabinet. Article 63 (4) specified the principle of inclusiveness to be adopted to “ensure the proportional representation of women, Dalits, oppressed communities/indigenous groups, people from backward regions, Madhesis and other groups in accordance with the law.”4 Likewise, Article 63 (5) specified that 33% of the candidates to be nominated must be women, but remained silent on the proportion of candidates from other social groups, including Dalits. Article 63, Clause 3(c) related to the nomination of candidates to the CA by government categorically mentioned that they would be “distinguished persons and persons from among ethnic and indigenous groups who fail to be represented as a result of elections…” but again failed to mention the Dalits. The Election Act, 2007 takes inclusion a step forward by specifying the basis for inclusion. Clause 5 (3) of Election to Members of the Constituent Assembly Act, 2064 (2007) requires political parties to take into account the “principle of inclusiveness” while nominating candidates for the First-Past-the-Post system, and clarifies provisions for doing it for candidates nominated under the proportional representation system.5 Similarly, clause 7(3) provides the basis for naming candidates for the “closed list.”6 The law requires political parties to prepare the closed list to ensure proportional representation of “Women, Dalits, Oppressed tribes/Indigenous tribes,

4 For

details, see The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007: 114). mixed election system for the CA had 240 FTTP candidates, 335 under proportional representation and 26 nominated by the Council of Ministers. 6 The closed list is prepared and submitted by political parties to the Election Commission before the election. Once submitted the list is final or closed and cannot be amended by the parties, even though the names on the list are not secret. Under the PR system, voters vote for the parties and the candidates from the closed list get elected based on the order of names on the list. 5 Nepal’s

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133

backward regions7 and Madhesis” including other groups on the basis of their population.8 Schedule-1 of the Election Law requires parties to ensure 13% representation of Dalits—50% men, 50% women. While nominating Madhesi candidates, the law requires political parties to ensure proportional representation of Dalits, and indigenous Janajatis including other groups. The law requires parties to nominate at least 33% women for election under both the systems, but does not demand the same for candidates from other social groups, including Dalits. However, the law allows political parties the leeway for going 10% above or below the requirements in the final nominations. However, clause 7 (14) governing the closed list of candidates provides parties contesting for less than 20% of seats the flexibility not to be inclusive, other than for women. The Madhesi Morcha (a front of three political parties, Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum, Terai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party and one of the several splinters of the Nepal Sadbhavana Party), which were formed just before the CA election, wanted to change this threshold for granting such flexibility to parties contesting less than 30%. However, as the election law was not amended, it could not be implemented even if the government agreed to the demand on February 28, 2008.9 If this amendment had been implemented, it would have been against the interest of excluded groups, especially the Dalits and Janajatis of Tarai region. The fact that the parties (including those in government) agreed to the anti-exclusionary demands helped analyze how Nepali political parties are serious and committed to the issue of inclusion of the marginalized section of the society. Eventually, Nepal held the first CA election on April 10, 2008 in which the CPN (M) emerged as the largest party with 226 seats,10 followed by the NC (114), UML (107), Madhesi Janaadhikar Forum (MJF) (52) and the Terai-Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) (22). As Nepal adopted a mixed election system for the CA election (240 members through the FPTP, 335 through proportional representation, and 26 appointed by the cabinet), the parties largely preferred Dalits to be nominated through the proportional representation. However, few Dalits were given the party’s tickets by parties to contest through the FPTP. According to this, the Maoists had given 18 Dalit candidates, NC had given 1, the CPN (UML) had 3 and the TMLP had 1 for the FPTP. Out of 23 candidates from major parties for the FPTP election, seven from Morang-8, Siraha-5, Kavre-4, Kaski-4, Kalikot, Banke-1 and Nawalparasi-3 were elected. This

7 Backward

regions according to the EC are Accham, Kalikot, Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, Mugu and Humla districts of the Mid- and Far western regions. No Dalits nominated to the CA come from this category even though the Dalits nominated do come from these districts. 8 The Election Commission uses the term “oppressed tribes” and “indigenous tribes” in its translation of the Election Law, even though the terminology is not in use in Nepal. It could have come into the translation through international consultants hired by the UN to help it conduct the CA election. The usage remains largely unopposed. 9 Interview with Shyam Sundar Sharma, Joint Secretary, Election Commission, November 3, 2009. 10 The CPN(M) united with the CPN (Unity Centre) on January 13, 2009 to form the United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Its number of seats in the CA rose to 238, including members nominated by the Council of Ministers.

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Table 4.3 Dalits in the CA 2008 from different political parties Party

Men

Women

Hill

Madhesi

Total

UCPN

14

9

19

4

23

NC

4

5

7

2

9

UML

6

6

8

4

12

MJF

0

2

0

2

2

Tarai Madhesh Loktantrik Party

0

1

0

1

1

Dalit Janajati Party

1

0

0

1

1

Rashtriya Prajatantra Party

0

1

0

1

1

Rashtriya Janamorcha Nepal

1

0

1

0

1

Total

26

24

35

15

50

Source Suvash Darnal, Dalits in Nepali Politics (unpublished) 2009, Nepal Centre for Dalit Studies, cited in Bennett et al. (2013)

was the first time that so many Dalit candidates had won an election to parliament.11 Among the constituencies from where Dalits won were having a strength of minimum 9.26% (Morang-8) to 23% (Kaski-4) enlisted Dalit voters (EC 2008 cited in Darnal 2009). The one in Siraha had a sizeable Dalit population (more than 25%) but not enough to win an election. The election outcome therefore could either have resulted from the support of the Maoist party under which all the winning candidates contested or the increasing acceptance of Dalits as leaders by the general population. The election had encouraged a sizeable number of independent Dalit candidates giving confidence among individuals about their likelihood of being accepted as leaders and/or also the confidence to challenge the political parties on their own. The 601-member CA of 2008 had members from 25 political parties. A total of 189 Dalit candidates, including independents, had contested the election. Out of them, the Dalit women’s proportion was 10.5%, and Madhesi Dalit proportion was 6.1% only. Fifty Dalits12 in the assembly made up about 8.3% of the total, which was still short of their proportion in the population as per Census 2001 (13%).13 Table 4.3 shows the representation of Dalits in the CA 2008 and the political parties of which they were members. As the CA 2008 was the first election after the peace agreement between UCPN and other parliamentary political parties, the UCPN performed as most inclusive party compared to others. That was the case for the representation of Dalits in the CA 2008 as it could send 23 Dalits in the CA, followed by UML (12) and Nepali Congress (9). Table 4.4 shows a comparative overview of CA 2008 and CA 2013. 11 The first Dalit member elected to the House of Representatives was Krishna Singh Pariyar, Banke,

in 1991, with an NC ticket. 12 Some do not count Uma Kapali, a CPN (M) nominee to the CA as Dalit. Her name is included here as she was elected on a Maoist ticket under the Dalit category. 13 The Dalits have been demanding 20% representation based on their claim of undercounting by the census and also as compensation for the suffering they have had to endure in the past.

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135

Table 4.4 Caste and ethnic representation in the CA 2008 and CA 2013 Caste/ethnicity

CA 2008 number (%)

CA 2013 number (%)

Brahmin/Chhetri

163 (27.12)

236 (41.0)

Ethnic Groups

216 (35.94)

179 (31.1)

Madhesi

196 (32.61)

120 (20.8)

Dalits

50 (8.30)

40 (7.0)

Total seats

601(100)

575 (100)a

a There

were 601 members in the CA, 2013 as well. But the calculation excludes 26 seats to be nominated by the government Source Adopted from Election Commission, Nepal 2008–2013

There is a significant difference between the CA’s composition in 2008 and 2013. The proportion of members from the Hill high caste, who dominate the State, accounted for 32.1% in the 2008 CA, rising to 41% in 2013—representing an increase of 8.9%. Meanwhile, excluded groups lost some of their representation. For example, the Janajati lost 4.5%, followed by Madheshis, with a loss of 2.9%, then Dalits (−1.2%) and Muslims (−0.4%). Women across all these groups lost about 12% of representation in the 2013 elections. For instance, in the FPTP, women had won 30 seats in 2008 against only ten seats in 2013. On all seven provincial assemblies today with the total 550 members, only 34 (6.18%) are Dalits. Out of them, 4 are elected through FPTP and rests 30 are from PR system. To calculate, the representation of Dalits is 10% in Province 1, 16.8% in Province 2, 5% in Bagmati Pradesh, 13% in Gandaki Pradesh, 15% in Province 5, 23% in Karnali Province and 17.7% in Sudur Paschim Pradesh. Out of 30 Dalit members elected through PR, 26 are females, which offer a good message that 87.5% of Dalit members in provincial legislative bodies are females (Darnal, n.d.). However, such outcome was not by choice, but by the constitutional compulsions. In the existing House of Representatives, the powerful lower house of federal parliament, there are just 6.5% of Dalits. Madhesi Dalits have not found place in proportional lists of bigger national parties, the CPN (UML) and the Nepali Congress (Darnal, n.d.). In the upper house of the federal parliament—the National Assembly—there are total 59 members, 8 each elected from each province and 3 nominated by the President. Since there is a constitutional provision of election of at least one Dalit member, 7 Dalits have been elected to the National Assembly. The result is such that there are 11.86% Dalits of the total, which is better or more inclusive than local bodies and the House of Representatives. However, even in National Assembly Dalit members could not be elected from open category. Out of 22 females elected in the National Assembly, there is no representation of Dalit females. Out of seven Dalit members of the National Assembly, there are 2 Madhesi Dalits but no females (Darnal, n.d.).

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4.5 Dalits in the Decision-Making Bodies Only 9.8% of my respondents said that their family members and relatives were in the decision-making bodies. In fact, few Dalits already had a chance to be in the decision-making body prior to 1990. As mentioned earlier, Dalits became founding member and general secretary of the NC party during the 1950s. Saharsha Nath Kapali of NC became Member of Parliament in the first elected parliament in Nepal in 1959. Even the monarchy, after it took over power from the democratically elected government in 1960, brought Dalits in the decision-making bodies by the method of co-optation. But they were brought by picking up based on their loyalties, without legal or constitutional provisions. That is why no Member of Parliament, except Rishi Babu Pariyar from NC, got elected in the House of Representatives between 1991 and 1999. However, it was only after the 2006 change in Nepal through which the people from marginalized community were represented in the decision-making bodies by making it a constitutional or legal provision. Just after the beginning of negotiations between the Maoists and the government during the peace process in May 2006, there was agreement on preparing an Interim Constitution through a Drafting Committee and the government declared the names of the members of the Drafting Committee in consultation with all parties including the Maoists. Nevertheless, the six-member team formed initially included no member from marginalized communities including Dalits. However, the government expanded the commission by adding five members from Janajati groups, one from Madhesi14 and one from Dalits. Various social groups such as women, Dalits, Janajatis, etc. raised voice for their representations.15 The finally formed committee included four women, but not ever one from Dalits. Min Bahadur Bishwakarma of the Nepali Congress party was a Dalit representative in the Drafting Committee. Bishwakarma’s appointment to the committee was a major achievement for the Dalit movement because it marked the first real chance to influence the country’s fundamental law. But it is said that his major recommendations into the draft were not incorporated in the constitution. He was, in fact, demanding that caste-based discrimination should be prohibited in both the private and public spheres (Article 14). His other recommendations were that the parties should nominate Dalit candidates in proportion to their population (20%) (Article 43) and while naming members for ministerial positions (Article 43) and other structures of state (Bennett et al. 2013). Following the Jana Andolan II and the promulgation of Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007 on 15 January 2007, the parties often appointed Dalits not only in the parliament but also in the cabinet. Table 4.5 shows Dalit representation in the Nepali 14 There were two Madhesi members, i.e. one Madhesi member was already included in the initial committee. 15 The members of the drafting team were Laxman Prasad Aryal (Chair), Agni Kharel, Pushpa Bhusal, Laxman Prasad Aryal, Sindhu Nath Pyakurel, Harihar Dahal, Khim Lal Devkota, Sushila Karki, Shambhu Thapa, Chhatra Kumari Gurung, Shanta Rai, Sunil Prajapati, Chandeshwor Shrestha, Kumar Yonjan Tamang, Mahadev Yadav, Parshuram Jha and Min Bahadur Bishokarma.

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Table 4.5 Dalit representation in the Cabinet after 1990 Name

Position

Under the Prime Ministership of

Year of appointment

Prakash Chitrakar

Assistant Minister

Appointed by King

2002

Hari Shankar Pariyar

Assistant Minster

Sher Bahadur Deuba (from NC)

2004

Lal Bahadur Bishwakarma

Minister of State

Sher Bahadur Deuba (from UML)

2004

Man Bahadur Bishwakarma

Minister of State

G. P. Koirala

2006

Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma

Minister

2007

Chhabilal Bishwakarma

Minister

2006

Mahendra Paswan

Minister

Pushpa Kamal Dahal

2008

M. K. Nepal

2009

Sushil Koirala

2014

Nabin Bishwakarma Minister of State Jeetu Gautam

Minister of State

Khadga Bahadur Basyal

Minister of State

Kalawati Dushad

Minister of State

Lalbabu Pandit

Minister

Min Bishwakarma

Sher Bahadur Deuba

2017

Karna Bahadur B.K. Minister of state

Sher Bahadur Deuba

2017

Jagat Bahadur Bishwakarma

K. P. Sharma Oli

2018

Minister

Source Computed by the author

cabinet after 1990. Table 4.5 shows that the state had no realization to make the cabinet inclusive by bringing the marginalized Dalits on board. Nepal had to wait for the twentyfirst century to see a Dalit person in the cabinet. And the gesture was made not by political parties who were considered the change agents in modern nation-state, but by a monarchy trying to impose authoritarianism to a parliamentary democracy. But the coincidence was such that it was the time when the Maoist had popularized the agenda of empowerment of Dalits and other suppressed groups, and the kingled government had to show its commitments towards inclusivity in order to make conducive environment for a government-Maoist dialogue. Two Dalit members16 were inducted in the new cabinet with full ministerial portfolio when the Maoists joined the Interim Government on 1 April 2007. Almost every government had to appoint one as either Assistant Minister or State Minister after 2002. However, Dalits had to often remind the leadership for the same. 16 Khadak Bishwakarma, Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare, the UCPN-M; and Chhabilal Bishwakarma, Minister of Agriculture & Cooperatives, the CPN-UML.

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For example, the first CA had 50 Dalit representatives, but the government formed just after the election under the leadership of the Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal Dahal did not include Dalits in the cabinet for seven months. Eventually, he had to appoint a Dalit in his cabinet at the last minute17 after pressure from Dalit organizations. It was a case for the existing cabinet led by K. P. Sharma Oli who took weeks to appoint Dalits in the cabinet. Madhav Kumar Nepal was the Prime Minister who appointed Kalawati Dusad, a Madhesi Dalit woman, as a minister of state in September 2009. It was the senior-most appointment in government for a Dalit woman till then. Kalawati Paswan had served as Assistant Minister before her. Both came from the MJF party. Dusad joined the splinter of the MJF party that joined the new coalition government formed after the Maoist-led team stepped down in May 2009. Nevertheless, the number of Dalits in the government still remains very small, and they are often included as assistant ministers or ministers of state with fringe ministries. It is due to the lack of policy and legal provision which binds the parties to do so. Still, there is no Dalit representation in the planning commission, the most important body in making plans and allocating budgets. Also there is only one Dalit appointed as Ambassador—Padam Sundas for Bahrain—till today. Dalits are yet to be considered national figures. They are rather treated as leaders of Dalit community only even if their contributions and sacrifices are comparable to others. After the promulgation of the Constitution of Nepal in 2015, Nepal went to the federal set up in the true sense. The Constitution has provided for three levels of government—federal, provincial and local. The Constitution has mandatory provisions for marginalized categories in political representations in different levels of the governments. For example, the Constitution says that there should be at least one female Dalit Ward member in each rural municipality and municipality. As a result, 5567 Dalit females got elected to various posts through the elections of local level governments held in May, June and September 2017. Now there are 6680 Dalit female representatives at the local level because each ward has at least one elected Dalit woman and there are other constitutional provisions. Also, four Dalits have been elected as Mayors, and nine Dalit females as the deputy mayors of different municipalities, whereas a Dalit individual was able to make to the post of Chairperson and nine Dalit females as deputy Chairpersons of rural municipalities. Likewise, 30 Dalits are now working as Ward chairpersons (Darnal, n.d.), including seven as Chiefs and three in the post of Deputy Chiefs of District Coordination Committees (Margadarshan 2007: 3–7). A study by Benett et al. (2013) mentions such a trend as a prerogative (even whim) of the leaders of political parties. In fact, political leaders and party strategies play the determining role in instigating caste and communal crusades (Hasan 2002: 375). It can be said that such political mobilisation around the issue of caste discrimination, social recognition, and religious identity helped them to be more assertive to raise their own issues. Though the politics of caste identity disrupts the traditional 17 Pushpa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” of the UCPN-M became Prime Minister on August 15, 2008. Mahendra Paswan was appointed Minister of Land Reforms and Management after pressure of Dalit activities and party members only on March 26, 2009.

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Table 4.6 Dalit members in four major political party organizations in Surkhet District (at the time of field visit) Party

Total members

Dalit (total)

Percent

Dalit women

Percent

CPN (M)

206

39

18.93

4

1.94

NC

57

6

10.52

0

0

CPN (UML)

43

4

9.30

1

2.32

Rashtriya Janamorcha

13

4

30.76

1

7.69

Total

319

53

16.61

6

1.88

Source Pyakurel (2012)

definitions of caste-based hierarchy in Hindu society by polarizing caste into blocks and demanding representation on a block basis, caste-based political mobilisation converges on control of the state. Such strategies of caste polarization can destabilize the political system but, as Hasan (2002: 375–376) states, it appears to be necessary to achieve justice for lower-caste groups. In other words, what may be seen as a destabilizing political process from one perspective can be seen as deepening democracy by empowering marginalized groups.

4.6 Politics and Social Exclusion of Dalits in Surkhet Ram (1999: 443) has rightly stated that it is easier to acquire and improve social status in class structure than in the caste system. Certain types of changes have taken place in the caste system in recent times but these are less significant in the case of improvement in status of the Dalits in the caste hierarchy. In other words, it is witnessed that some members of Dalit communities have improved to some extent their socio-economic status in the class structure, but they have not witnessed the same scale of changes in their caste status even today. Let us bring some of the cases as examples (Table 4.6). Table 4.7 shows the interest/involvement of Dalits in politics, their performance and main causes for not taking interest in political affiliations. Even though there have been visible positive changes in the micro and macro spheres, little has changed in terms of caste-based discrimination, which runs deep and continues to negatively affect outcomes for Dalits in terms of personal interactions at the community level. This has not spared anyone, as shown by the experience of Rima Nepali, a CA member from UML: I am in the leadership position, but even friends in the district don’t usually let me enter their homes. That creates a sense of inferiority. When I was in the field on party duty, other friends ate inside the house, but brought the food outside for me. I realised that to protest there would adversely affect the party’s image, so I quietly gave the food to a dog. Those friends regretted the error afterwards… During the election of 199918 , I went with some friends 18 The

book mentions the year as 2000, but no election was held that year.

140 Table 4.7 Political participation, performance and causes of Dalits’ inability to be in politics (according to data during the field visit)

4 Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal Family members/relatives in politics Yes 29%

No 71%

Cluster-wise response

Performance

Cluster-wise response

Causes

Students (12%)

Very good (17%)

Students (88%)

Do not like (23%)

Govt. workers Good (66%) (42%)

Govt. workers Society does (58%) not accept (13%)

Business (29%)

General (11%)

Business (71%)

Lack of resources (58%)

Politicians (100%)

Poor (6%)

Politicians (0%)

Busy in other works (6%)

Source Pyakurel (2012)

to Swargadwari Ashram (Temple). My friends entered, but I was asked to wait outside. I protested against that and (later) they apologized for their conduct. (in Darnal 2009: 121)

The dynamics of discriminations are changing, but slowly. Discrimination is withdrawing into the private sphere where it is difficult to detect and rectify. Worldviews based on hierarchies of ritual purity and pollution persist and justify discriminatory practices in the name of protecting tradition, culture, or religion. Mrs. Raju Nepali, a district level Dalit leader of the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist mentions: I was not usually greeted by many people in the society when I was first elected the member. They used to say ‘who greets a Damini (a derogatory term used to abuse women from tailor and musician Dalit community) … Even today, on several occasions, people, especially women counterparts, refuse to eat the food touched by us … they refuse the available cooked food items on some pretext or the other, such as stomach ache, gastritis, etc. (Pyakurel 2011)

She terms such practices as “civilized untouchability” which, according to her, “cannot be observed directly” (Pyakurel 2011). The conclusion she draws is that caste-based prejudices cannot be entirely eliminated but are reproduced in a different shapes. “One’s social status or mobility was based on political and economic opportunities, which could be gained through the introduction of affirmative action. But it seems less relevant to overcome from the caste-prejudices,” she states. This appears to be a valid argument (Ram 1999: 443). For example, Sanju BK (Pyakurel 2011), who not only owns a big bungalow at the city center of Birendranagar Bazaar, but also has recognition as an educated person and a leading civil society member, seems to be convinced that caste-based prejudice is more powerful than any of the economic and political empowerment. “Non-Dalit neighbours avoid inviting us to many rituals even if we have very good interaction and sharing in day-to-day life,” he reveals.

4.6 Politics and Social Exclusion of Dalits in Surkhet

141

Those statements can be further substantiated through statements of Prem Sunar, Khadga Bahadur Nepali, Balaram Sunar and Ganesh Nepali. Prem Sunar (Pyakurel 2011), an M.A. in Sociology and a non-gazetted officer in a government office, says: Formally, there is no discrimination based on caste. But the presence of such discrimination is felt in almost every sphere of social life. One simple example I can give you is that they (so-called upper caste) are biased towards us while we greet each other; most of my juniors who are supposed to respect me, avoid me most of the time so that we do not exchange salutations. I have had such experiences many times. They address all others as ‘sir’ and ‘madam,’ but try to call me as ‘brother’ instead of saying ‘sir’. Through such attempts, they make me feel humiliated. Discrimination can be felt even while taking tea or snacks inside the office. In most of the cases I will be the last one to collect tea and snacks from the plate; even if I am seated in the first row of the seating arrangement, they go the other way around and make me the last recipient. Outsiders like you cannot observe such discrimination from which I have been made to suffer. It is more in the residence. We only assemble outside the room and chat. No ‘upper caste’ colleagues invite us inside their room and offer food. I have not had the opportunity to dine with my colleagues till date.

According to Khadga Bahadur Nepali (Pyakurel 2011), a primary school teacher at Bhairab Higher Secondary School, Surkhet, he has suffered from caste-based prejudices even if he is economically well-off by virtue of being a teacher in a school there. He states: Most of my neighbours are from non-Dalit castes. We share many things but we are not allowed to enter into their homes. No one invites us for lunch or dinner. Everything is discussed and settled outside the home…There will be two separate queues if someone organizes a lunch/dinner party.

That must be the reason why he seems reluctant to advocate such affirmative action policies. Rather he says, “There are Dalits in the leadership but they are rewarded in the name of inclusion. Those who are in the position must have benefited from the inclusive policy. But significant change does not seem to take place in the community.” The account of Bimal Nepali (Pyakurel 2011), Principal of Horizon Academy Boarding School, a renowned boarding school in Surkhet also gives a similar kind of image on the influential role of caste, more than anything else, in the society: I spent some 11-12 years hiding my caste identity. I used to hide my real surname which was “Nepali” and used a fake surname “Nepal.” I did it to be safe from the atrocity of non-Dalits towards a Dalit. You cannot believe the kind of psychological terror faced by me while studying in Kathmandu. I am now the principal of one of the reputed boarding schools in town. It is one of the prestigious jobs. But no parent of our students invites me for taking dinner or lunch together with them. It may be due to my Dalit identity which is yet to be accepted by the society.

Experience of Balaram Sunar (who was the first man to go underground as a Maoist cadre from Surkhet District just after the Maoists of Nepal decided to go for “people’s war”) also gives a perspective which helps substantiate the earlier arguments. He states:

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Simply we cannot find the practice of untouchability at the higher level of party. However, we somehow feel such a practice while we are with the newly joined party members. I have a couple of experiences related to caste prejudice during the People’s War. There were incidents in which we Dalits were left outside and others were taken inside the home at the time of eating. I used to be surprised and even disappointed from my ‘upper caste’ friends who discriminated us by following the wish of house owner. They did not oppose but accepted the offer like it was their pride to eat inside the home. One very interesting factor I see today is that people of high caste often try to hide from me so that they do not have to do me ‘Namaskar’-- a Nepali greeting to respected people. Also, I never find the kind of closeness between Dalits and non-Dalits even if we work together for the same party. I always find my non-Dalit friends’ formal behaviour towards me whereas they (non-Dalits) often tease each other and even use slang words among themselves. I do not understand the reason why we could not be that much closer even if we worked together for decades. (Pyakurel 2011)

Some people argue that politico-economic mobility will help to overcome the castebased prejudice, but the observation of Tara Nepali (ibid.), a district committee member of Rashtriya Jana Morcha, can make people with such perspectives rethink. According to her, the practice of untouchability is still prevalent in society, and she has been suffering from “not direct but indirect ways of the practice of untouchability.” She seems quite clear that the end of the class-divided society could be possible after one gets good education and job. However, the same thing may not help in ending one’s caste. That is why she prefers making “free and equal education for all to end the caste.” Nepali Maoists claim that they have played an important role in empowering Dalits. However, the representation of Dalits in leadership positions is very less. The Maoists discouraged thousands of Dalit youths, both males and females, from attending schools for education. They appealed them to “boycott the bourgeoisie education.” However, the party did not appoint Dalits in the Constitution Drafting Committee in 2006. Also, the party humiliated Dalits by replacing cabinet minister Khadga Bahadur Bishwakarma after a few months of his appointment by a Brahmin lady Ms. Pampha Bhusal on December 30, 2007. There seems to be disparity between what Maoists say and do regarding Dalit representation and empowerment (Pyakurel 2011). The party mobilized marginalized communities by promising their representations in the proposed state committees, which was also implemented during the difficult situation of their “people’s war”. But as soon as the party joined the peace process, the party changed the leadership of the committees and replaced the leaders belonging to marginalized communities by mostly the leaders from upper caste. Table 4.8 shows the Maoists leadership in their caste/ethnicity based autonomous state. Also, the Maoist-led government had reduced the scholarships for Dalits from 15 to 9% following which Dalit student groups had organized protests in Kathmandu. Bishendra Paswan took up the issue from there. According to Paswan, the remaining 49 Dalit members in the parliament did not support him openly “even though indirectly they said they agreed to his demand.” However, the inclusion ordinance that the government issued later had reserved only 9% seats for Dalits in education (Pyakurel 2011).

4.6 Politics and Social Exclusion of Dalits in Surkhet

143

Table 4.8 The CPN (Maoist) regional autonomous government 2000 No.

Name of autonomous regions

In-charges during the “people’s war” (1996–2006)

In-charges after 2007

1

Kirat Autonomous Region

Gopal Khambu

Gopal Kirati

2

Tambsaling Autonomous Region

Hit Bahadur Tamang

Agni Sapkota

3

Newar Autonomous Region Not announced

Hitman Sakya Suman

4

Tamuwan Autonomous Region

Dev Gurung

Hitaraj Pandey

5

Magarat Autonomous Region

Santosh Buddha Magar

Hemanta Prakash Oli

6

Tharuwan Autonomous Region

Ram Charan Choudhary

7

Madheshi Autonomous Regiona

Matrika Yadav

Abadha-Debendra Paudel Sunil Tharuwan-Haribhakta Kandel Bhojpura-Bhim Prasad Gautam Kochila-Haribol Gajurel Mithila-Bishwa Nath Sah

8

Bheri-Karnali Autonomous Region

Khadga Bahadur Bishowkarma

Khadga Bahadur Bishowkarma

9

Seti-Mahakali Autonomous Region

Lekh Raj Bhatta

Dharmendra Bastola

a Madheshi

Autonomous Region was divided into smaller parts by the UCPN-Maoist party after it entered into peaceful politics Source Computed by author after email correspondence with the UCPN-Maoist Secretariat, July 2010

Here, a genuine question arises that though each political party needs Dalits for making their movement successful, why are Dalits time and again betrayed by those political parties? Generally, Dalits are blamed for it as they themselves never present a single and clear voice to negotiate with the authority (Pyakurel 2010). However, it seems that the Dalits have now realized their past division as blunder and started working by forging an alliance even if they have different opinions and ideologies. In doing so, they have now two joint initiatives to work commonly for Dalit agenda. The first one is an alliance of seven Dalit organizations that came into existence on 12 October 2009. Those seven Dalit organizations agreed on a set of political demands, which they wanted addressed by the constitution. It was the manifestation of the realization that Dalit organizations could have a greater impact by having a collective voice. The group also agreed to continue raising the demands of their political parties—reservation, progressive reservation and special rights, among others—while agreeing on the 20-points,19 most of which are related 19 The signatories to the pact were Tilak Pariyar, president, Nepal Rashtriya Dalit Mukti Morcha (the UCPN-M); Chatra Bahadur Tailor, Acting president, Nepal Dalit Sangh (the NC); Lal Bahadur

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4 Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal

to politics, decision-making and social exclusion/inclusion of Nepali Dalits. These points are: 1.

Proportional representation based on population and an additional 10% as compensation in all state structures; 2. Immediate amendment of the Interim Constitution and guarantee of 20% participation of Dalits in all state structures, and amendment of Article 1420 to make caste-based discrimination a heinous social crime against the state and humanity; 3. Introduction of scientific land reforms and prioritisation and guarantee of land ownership of landless settlers and Dalits; end of all dehumanising traditions such as haliya, balighare, doli, carcasses disposers, witchcraft, musicians, sudeni (midwife) and haruwa-charuwa imposed on the Dalits; 4. Modernising traditional occupations of Dalits and ensuring their prior rights to those occupations, certifying specialists in their professions and providing them jobs; establishing a National Dalit Academy and museum to conserve and develop the skills, arts and occupation of Dalits; 5. Providing scholarships and free education to Dalit students in higher education (private and public); reserving 23% seats for Dalits in all technical schools and hostels; ensuring access of Dalits to the Sanskrit University and compulsory inclusion of a subject for ending caste, caste-based discrimination and social discrimination in the curriculum; appointment of one Dalit teacher (mandatorily) at each school (by state) and initiation of policy to hire women teachers as a priority; 6. Making the National Dalit Commission a constitutional body; creating pressure to immediately enact the laws against caste-based discrimination and the NDC law; 7. Ensuring proportional rights to Dalit women in all rights provided by the state to women and Dalits; making special arrangements for Dalit women in higher and technical education, providing employment and prioritising them in development of skilled human resources; 8. Assuring access of Dalits to asan, rasan and sashan (a place to live, food and power) as fundamental rights; making special “discount cards” available to families below the poverty line for transport, education and food; 9. Making healthcare free for Dalits and initiate policy for assuring expectant Dalit mothers an allowance and other facilities; 10. Assurance from the state that the budgets of the centre and local bodies allocate 23% of the total for Dalits; making available collateral free loans at low interest rates to Dalits for industry, agriculture and business;

Bishwakarma, president, Nepal Utpidit Jatiya Mukti Samaj (the CPN-UML); Ms. Dhanrupa Bishwakarma, Jatiya Samata Samaj (Janamorcha); Kesh Bahadur Pariyar, president, Utpidit Jatiya Utthan Sangh (United); Ramchandra Ram, president, Nepal Sadbhavana Dalit Manch; Ranjit Paswan, Nepal Rastriya Dalit Kendra. 20 Article 14 on Rights against discrimination and racial discrimination has five parts.

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145

11. Ensuring constitutional provisions to enable the Election Commission to bar registration of parties that do not comply. The constitutions and manifestos of all parties state that social and caste-based discriminations are heinous social crimes against the state and humanity and make efforts to increase representation of Dalits based on proportional and inclusive principles; 12. Guaranteeing appropriate alternatives for Badis and ending their disgraceful profession; initiating the implementation of the agreement between the Government of Nepal and the Badi community; 13. Ending all forms of oppression against the Madhesi Dalits; ensuring Madhesi Dalits’ proportional participation in all rights made available by the state to the Madhesi and Dalit communities; 14. Guaranteeing proportional representation in all state services—security, civil service (revenue, education, health, foreign affairs, forests, law, justice, etc.)— in all new appointments and promotions; formulating policy to ensure “20 to 23%” representation and in programs in mass media, both public and private; 15. Formulating policies to provide modern equipments to sanitation workers and recognising them as salaried employees, and encouraging them to change their professions; 16. Taking initiatives to set up a ‘Dalit Development and Social Justice Ministry’ for ensuring Dalit rights and making efforts to establish special benches at all courts, a separate Dalit cell at all police stations and discrimination watch centres at all local agencies; and for establishing a separate department for looking into Dalit issues at all state levels; 17. Since the state discriminated against the Dalits based on caste and excluded them from all state structures, making efforts to ensure an additional “seven to 10%” as compensation for oppression and ensuring an election system that ascertains their representation accordingly; 18. Ensuring proportional representation of Dalits with additional rights in all public and private organisations, financial institutions, foreign employment and all agencies in the non-government sector; 19. Establishing a special Dalit census commission for scientifically finding out the population of Dalits and to create pressure for classification of Dalit groups whose statuses are controversial, for establishing their political, economic, social-cultural status; 20. Taking initiatives for setting up a high-level monitoring and evaluation committee for monitoring the implementation of commitments made by the government to Dalits, existing laws and rules and for initiating the formulation of new laws with the participation of Dalit organisations and associations. Another joint initiative was the Dalit Sabhasad Manch (the Dalit MPs Forum) that took shape in November 2009. It was a forum of Dalit MPs from different parties which had all 50 Dalit CA members. It had a list of 24 activities that it wanted to accomplish. All decisions of this forum were to be based on agreement of the members, and where there were differences, individual members were free to raise the issues as they pleased. The members were expected to lobby witht their parties for

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4 Politics, Decision-Making and Dalits in Nepal

support on the issues covered in their minimum common programme. The Forum’s regulations also required all members to support proposals agreed upon by the group when individual members raised them in the CA and that members informed the group of any atrocities against Dalits and about Dalit-related issues they planned to a rise in the CA. The effectiveness of this Forum, however, depended on the willingness of the larger political parties to allow them to function as planned, and the willingness of the Dalit MPs to take off their party glasses and look at issues from Dalits’ point of view. The Forum’s minimum programme supported demands raised by Dalits in different forums and those that had been articulated by the Nepal Dalit Commission. Some of the major demands in the administrative and political sectors are: 1. Make efforts to ensure 7% compensation over proportional representation (13% based on the proportion of Dalit population according to the 2001 census) to take the proportional share for Dalits to 20% in the federal (central) council of ministers and legislature for now, and eventually in the executive and legislative and policy making bodies of provincial legislatures and local bodies; 2. Make efforts to ensure 20% representation (7% compensation + 13% proportional share) in the federal (central) army, police, courts, government and semi-government agencies, and constitutional bodies; 3. Make efforts to ensure 20% representation (7% compensation + 13% proportional share) in the police, courts, government and semi-government agencies at the federal units; 4. Make efforts to get the legislature to establish a National Dalit Rights Commission with quasi-judicial authority and to have its branches in all federated units; 5. Ensure that the federated units cannot reduce the rights granted to Dalits by the federal constitution; 6. Make efforts to ensure proportional sharing of all representation quotas available to Dalits among women, Khas-Hill, Madesi and Newar Dalits; 7. Remain solidly committed to seeking provisions for guaranteeing land enough for livelihood to landless Dalits as a priority; 8. Remain committed to ensuring 20% Dalit presence in employment in government, semi-government and non-government organizations.21 One common goal of the Forum then was to raise the issue of exploitation of Dalits jointly in parliament to draw the attention of the government. The other objective was for Dalits to work together and have a united voice to ensure Dalit rights in the new constitution.22 For example, the 50 members in the Forum had issued one joint statement condemning the failure of the political parties to appoint Dalits as ministers. As restructuring the Nepali state and promulgation of the constitution were the major agenda, Dalits mobilized themselves in the issue of state restructuring, especially in the issue of federalism. It seemed that federal models proposed by all political parties might not work in the interest of Dalits. But the Forum also could not settle out the 21 Common

Minimum Programme of the Dalit Sabhasad Manch. Dulal “Aahuti”. Member of the CA. Interviewed by Darnal (2009: 114).

22 Biswabhakta

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issue. The idea of a non-territorial union for Dalits, which was in an earlier draft of the Common Minimum Programme, was removed from the final programme that was announced on November 19, 2009. The idea first appeared in the statements of some members of the Maoist party and it was possibly dropped for being a Maoist idea. Later even the Maoist party did not back the idea and, therefore, it was dropped. The idea of federal states that seek to give “ancestral” territories to identity groups is complex for the Dalits as they are scattered throughout the country and do not have areas of concentrated residence in any one region. In the Constitution of Nepal promulgated in 2015, there is a provision that the state shall provide land to landless Dalits for one time, which is mentioned in Article 40 (5). Nepal is debating on identity-based federations and it is said that the Dalits do not have a distinct language, culture and religion, nor exclusive territory. So, it is difficult to demarcate certain territory for them. According to pro-Maoist scholars, Dalits have no way except to be satisfied with the provision of affirmative action based on their population proportion in the provinces. As mentioned at various places, I am against the caste/ethnicity-based state because my thesis on it is that the name of the state should be neutral if we want to see a real inclusive society (Pyakurel 2006). Scholars and activists (for instance Bhattachan 2005) talk about the historical place of origin of caste/ethnicity, the present social and demographic set-up as basic criteria for federal structure, and try to exclude these two communities—Dalits and Janajati—from the debate of federal structure based on identity. Regarding the size of population, hardly few researchers and scholars have tried to calculate the composition of Dalit and Muslim population to assess whether the population composition would also be suitable to make a new federal set up named after their identity. The Dalits in 13 Mid-Western and Far-Western districts—Achham, Baitadi, Bajhang, Dadeldhura, Darchula, Dailekh, Doti, Jajarkot, Banke, Bardiya, Kailali, Kanchanpur and Surkhet—constitute 17.87% of the total population. Likewise, the size of Dalit population would be 15.44% in the 12 western districts—Lamjung, Syangja, Palpa, Parbat, Pyuthan, Rolpa, Gulmi, Kapilbastu, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Arghakhanchi and Baglung. In the midst, nine Tarai districts—Bara, Rautahat, Dhanusa, Mahottari, Morang, Saptari, Sarlahi, Siraha and Sunsari—constitute 15.83% Dalit population, which would meet a criterion for creating Dalit states (Pyakurel 2007). First, I think, one needs to be very clear as to why almost all sections of the society were demanding restructuring of the state. If it was to overcome the marginalization and deprivation, the first and foremost task was to find out the group which are the most suppressed, marginalized or excluded in Nepal. It is obvious that the Dalits are the most marginalized and excluded in socio-economic and political sectors. Then, it should focus on how to make the forthcoming state structure as Dalit community-friendly as possible. It was true that ethnic groups, Madhesis and women are also excluded from getting a proportional share in the state mechanism compared to their population size. It was necessary to think how their share can be increased elsewhere in the state mechanism. However, focus was tobe given on Dalit community whose share in political and other institutions was negligible. Apart from that, Dalit is the community which is not eligible to sit and share food together with other groups in the society. It is not allowed to have conjugal relations with other communities.

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However, only a few studies have been done about these issues. Sharma (2008) stated that Dalits have an absolute majority only in 12 VDCs in the entire country. And in 211 VDCs, in the western and far-western hills and the eastern plains, Dalits make up over 30% of the population. Their numbers are over 12% in 31 districts and it ranges from 23 to 30% in eight districts of western Nepal—Baglung, Jajarkot, Surkhet, Dailekh, Kalikot, Achham, Bajura and Doti. In fact, attention was drawn to uncertainties in Dalits about how their rights would be addressed in the emerging framework of identity-based territorial units being championed by Janajatis and Madhesis. The identity-territory nexus was problematic for Dalits as the major stake-holder would be in a jubilant mode when it gets state based on identity. At this juncture, the most likely scenario was that all the groups, including Dalits, would have to face more deprivation and domination by the dominant identity of the province. That is why the challenge was to ensure pro-Dalit federal units before the federalism was formalized. Otherwise, the likely scenario was that the federal units could be less inclusive than even in the interim period. Eventually the Constitution of Nepal 2015 formed the provinces differently, avoiding the concept of identity-based federal set ups. As mentioned in the initial portions of this chapter, the ‘politics of idea’ is considered an inadequate vehicle for dealing with political exclusion, there is little to be gained by simply switching to a politics of presence. Taken in isolation, the weaknesses of the one are as dramatic as the failing of the other. Most of the problems, indeed, arise when these two are set up as exclusionary opposites: when ideas are treated as totally separate from the people who carry them; or when the people dominate attention, with no thought given to their policies and ideas. It is in the relationship between ideas and presence that we can best hope to find a fairer system of representation, not in a false opposite between one and the other (Phillips 1995: 25). Politics of presence seems to have come as outcome of democratic practice, the best notion of which, as Dahl (1989: 28) states, is that “no one can know better than I do what are my preferences and priorities and needs.” The concept of political presence, though it is new one, is largely influenced by the theory of consociation or consensual democracy introduced by Lijphart (1984: 22– 23). He argues that the majority rule is not only undemocratic, but also dangerous because minorities that are continually denied access to power will feel excluded and discriminated against, and will lose their allegiance to the regime. The defining characteristic of the alternative consensual democracies is that they will distribute executive power and economic resources in proportion to the size of the different communities. It goes without saying that their electoral systems will follow principles of proportional representation, thereby ensuring that political parties are represented in the legislature in proportion to their overall electoral support. Also, it establishes some elements of power-sharing at the executive level (a cabinet, for example, composed of leading figures from all the leading parties); makes some provisions for minority veto over those issues that are most socially divisive; and aims at the proportionate distribution of public funds or positions in the civil service between the constituent communities. He repeatedly stresses the unfairness of majoritarinism when it is applied to plural societies saying that it is dangerous and undemocratic

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(Phillips 1995: 14). But, in the context when different groups vote for different parties, Lijphart (1984) has proved that the democratic system itself is less adept in responding to the demand of political inclusion. To deal with the situation, the discourse has led to the formation of one of the group’s own political party along with a strong belief in itself and its interests (Phillips 1995: 16). It is said that the British, for the first time in South Asia, introduced a group-based form of representation, and it was in India in which they allocated seats for not only the landlords, merchants, etc., but also for the caste groups and religious minorities. They began such a policy in the name of democratizing the government institutions. Generally, such group representations are provisioned by different governments due to the pressure from interest groups. However, it was the British colonial rule, which laid itself to such pressure and predisposed the government to be responsive. That is why the policy has also been termed as British “strategy of divide and rule” (Jaffrelot 2009: 1–2). Kumar (2008: 272) rightly points out that “the whole struggle of the Indian Dalits was qualitatively different from the earlier stages of reform movements led by the Dalit saints and social reformists”. Ambedkar was one, who started a battle, from a more secular quarter, with the objective of liberation of Dalits by giving primacy to political power and participation in functioning of a number of institutions. It is also seen that the electoral politics in India has led to caste associations, which formally served only social charitable or educational purpose, to jump into the political arena. Vote banks on caste lines have started becoming prominent day-by-day. The political mobilisation of caste has led to new forms of caste alliance. This has initiated a process of fusion in the caste structure (Kumar 2010). Moreover, when democratically elected bodies started working in decision-making process and distribution of economic resources and opportunities at all level of the state, caste organisations became conscious and started showing their interest to enter into “electoral arena to gain power and resources.” While reading Ambedkar and other advocates of the idea of presence, one realizes that the ‘ideas of presence’ is the best democratic practice. In fact, it demands the fair-share of representation rather than either’s hegemony. Here, it is worth quoting Ambedkar: The patriot’s one cry is power and more power for him and for his class. I am glad that I do not belong to that class of patriots. I belong to that class which takes a stand on democracy and which seeks to destroy monopoly in every shape and form. Our aim is to realize in practice our ideal of one man one value in all walks of life, political, economic and social. (Das 1963: 27)

In fact, Ambedkar’s argument about the Dalit representation before the Round Table could be considered more or less similar to the basic thrust of the concept of “politics of presence.” Ambedkar believed that there would be no change unless the political power was grabbed by the powerless class. He used to say, “nobody can remove our grievances as well as we can and we cannot remove them unless we get political power in our hands” (Das 1963: 16–17). He used to be very often reminded that the problem of the depressed class is a social problem and that its solution lies elsewhere

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and not in politics. He further says “we hold that the problem of the depressed classes will never be solved unless they get political power in their hands. It is eminently a political problem and must be treated as such” (ibid.: 18). He senses power as the only means whereby one can secure liberty and free himself/herself from all obstacles. For him, political power has a potency which, if it is not as great as religious or economic power, is quite real and effective as it goes (ibid.: 41). That is why he not only subscribed to the British idea, but also launched a social movement for the special representation system along with a separate electorate for minorities, i.e., Dalits. However, this embryonic form of ‘mirror-representation’ got further reduced in India after its split into Pakistan and India. Because of this, the system of separate electorates allotted to Muslim minority was blamed as the attributing factor for the partition of India. By this, the Muslims, Marathas and others, except the Dalits and tribes in India, lost their reserved seats after India’s independence (Jaffrelot 2009: 2). However, Indian political parties kept fielding candidates from either of the marginalized social category at the time of election with the objective of “vote bank politics”. Because of this, the primacy of caste as a criterion for mobilisation was valued very much as a composition of the Assembly was given high priority to registering the deepest and most significant changes compared to other social indicators including education and occupation (Zerinini 2009: 28). In elaborating such a case, Zerinini (2009: 27) blames political parties for their consistent effort in putting forward primary identity factors as the basis of identification with a candidate or a party. It, according to Zerinini (2009: 27), is just in search of majority in India’s plural society. “Of these community orientations, the much-villained criterion of caste is primordial in the understanding of the evolution of the politics and, through politics, of society,” he states. Later, he mentions that it is also because parties had to find a new basis for mobilisation after the all-embracing goal of independence was reached. “As ideological politics withered away and no new ideological orientations were offered, the opportunity was seized to fill the gap. Caste provided with an easy, ready-to-use mobilisational social basis” (ibid.). Generally, it is believed that the role of the politicians is to carry a message. But what one should know is that the message will vary, but it hardly matters if the messengers are the same. However, one has to see that the messenger elected for representing a decision-making body will ultimately have a monopoly on the political skills of articulating policies and ideas. One should not forget the fact that men compared to women and Brahmins compared to the rest have a monopoly as they have been playing the role of messengers on behalf of the rest. That is why, it is harder to meet demands for political inclusion without also including the member of such groups. In this context, Ambedkar rightly argued that any electoral arrangement cannot be solution of the larger social problem. It requires more than any political arrangement (cited in Das 1963: 33). Phillips (1995: 6) also gives an appropriate example of ‘the concept of messenger matters’ and argues that men may conceivably stand in for women when what is at issue is the representation of agreed policies or programmes or ideals. But how can men legitimately stand in for women when what is at issue is the representation of women per se? Also, he raises a question whether

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an all-White assembly can really claim to be representative when those it represents are so much more ethnically diverse. Attempts were on to find out a more satisfactory way of ensuring that all interests are adequately addressed. Burnheim23 (1985), for example, has suggested that one’s interests would be better protected when one could be represented by those who share their own experience and interests, and that this similarity of condition would be a far better indicator than whether people might share one’s own rather shaky opinions. He proposes a sweeping alternative to electoral politics, in which decisionmakers would be chosen by lot as ‘statistically representative’ samples of the various groups concerning the decisions (Phillips 1995: 3). On the other hand, the model of choosing representatives by drawing of lots24 rather than by elections has been widely debated. It emphasizes on ensuring that these representatives are a typical sample of the various interests spread across the society (Callenbach and Phillips 1985). For them, choosing representatives on the basis of their beliefs or opinions (or, more strictly, which party they represent) is often seen as encouraging a mere façade of serious discussion, behind which the people with money or access to the media will make sure that they get re-elected. That is why this is not considered the best way to protect minority interests. Nor does it particularly encourage citizens to deliberate on political affairs (Goodwin 1992). Generally, as Phillips (1995: 1) states, all desire to be represented by people whom they regard as well-wishers or abler than themselves, but, when faced with a choice between someone more competent and someone whose views they can share, they usually feel safer in giving their support to the latter. There is a strong debate about where the real decision-making power lies. Some people believe that the elected assembly or the parliament is the decision-making body as it decides each and every policy along with the legislature. Also, there are others who consider the cabinet as the highest decision-making body which decides the policies and implements the laws. As representation varies, not all representation may affect the decision-making process. It is considered that the core power in the state would be in the government or in the cabinet rather than in the Assembly (Zerinini 2009: 54). Wherever it lies, power is the only means whereby one can secure liberty and free himself from all obstacles. Political power has potency which, if it is not as great as religious or economic power, is quite real and effective as it goes (Das 1963: 41). However, the much-talked power through representation may not be achieved unless the position of any marginalized group gets secured in government as well as in the Assembly. “Representation in the Assembly is only one form of political change and to understand it fully, we need to identify various types of commitments to the process of power-sharing,” Zerinini (2009: 58) mentions. Then, in addressing the question about whether the representation is only “ritualistic” or the “enthusiastic” (Baral 1978), further analysis is required on this particular subject. Assertion of any marginalized groups, which includes the Dalits, in a democratic set-up seems to be a very positive step because it has strengthened democracy. In fact, Dalit assertion and their representation in the various state machineries have been 23 Burnheim 24 For

J (1985), Is democracy possible? Cambridge. detail on the lottery principle, see Goodwin B (1992) Justice by lottery, London.

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seen in more positive ways for breaking the myth within the society that the Dalits cannot rule. These have also “strengthened the democracy” and helped move the long practiced ‘representative’ democracy towards participatory democracy (Kumar 2008: 294). “Earlier, others used to take decisions for Dalits and the official machinery never implemented them. But now, the Dalits themselves are placed in the institutions of power, and are taking and implementing decisions on their own,” Kumar (2008: 294) claims. But it is not always applicable perfectly as there are many other factors to be considered. In many cases, political parties and leaders feel “necessity to recruit individuals who could win the election” through “prestige, money and coercion.” Then, riches, the English-medium educated professionals, and “political goondas”25 get party’s ticket for the election and become the representatives of the masses even if their “links with the masses were only limited to their socio-economic influence” (Zerinini 2009: 48–51). Interestingly, what Nepal’s recent experiences disclose in the given situation is that it would be a ‘ritualistic representation’ of a certain group even though the compositions of government and assembly are made as inclusive and representative as possible. It is due to the heavily rooted concept of ‘superiority’ and ‘inferiority’ in the society. Such superiority and inferiority complex prevails among both the sections of the society—those “well-educated” and “less-educated” and those economically well-off and the poor, etc. The Constituent Assemblies and the present parliament of Nepal are live examples, which could not provide a much different experience to the marginalised communities even though the parliament is considered the most inclusive South Asia has never seen before. Also, political parties cite, “the increased competition in politics and necessity for large private campaign funding” and select “candidates notable for their personal wealth or aura rather than for long-term ideological or organizational association with the party they come to represent” (Zerinini 2009: 62). Why? It is because those who belong to the marginalised communities seem to have internalized a feeling of hesitation for having less knowledge on various issues than those who are from the ‘superior’ class and caste. Besides, the general masses are overwhelmed by a strong negative feeling that the representatives who belong to the marginalised groups have comparably less knowledge. Such a perception always discourages them from being equally assertive as their counterparts. On many occasions, these perceptions become the pretext for leadership to stop the marginalised community members from representing various decision making bodies of the society. Nepali Maoists’ decision to replace Khadga Bahadur Biswakarma (a Dalit Cabinet Minister) by Pampha Bhusal (a high-caste woman) in 2008 can be considered an example of how a “revolutionary” party also could not be exceptional from the influence of upper-caste mania. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),26 which is considered among few political parties under the Dalit leadership in South Asia in general and in India in particular, has been following the same trend. 25 Those

who have money and power to influence decisions of the political parties. no upper caste member in the Legislative Assembly till in 1993. In the next election, nearly 15% of the members of Assembly were from upper caste. 26 BSP

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In fact, it is always difficult for society and the political leadership to go beyond the ongoing practice, and the question of participatory leadership could not be an exception. The hierarchy in society is also reflected in representations in leadership positions. It is said that even the liberals were not, at first, democrats in the modern sense (Bobbio 1990). Scholars like Smith (1976) and Mill (1966) made a wonderful contribution in bringing democratic notions in the liberal ideology.27 They came to accept democracy only reluctantly. In his essay on Government, James Mill averred that the main end of politics was to permit people to become rational and mature individuals. This could be done, he argued, only when they are able to make decisions that affect their own lives. For him, a limited representative state would be better than any others even though a wise and benevolent absolute ruler might make better decisions than individuals could make for themselves. It is because “individuals would be responsible for their own mistakes” if they themselves represent (Opello and Rosow 2005: 107). Later his son, John Stuart Mill became the first liberal to argue in behaviour of the vote not only for the working class but also for women (Opello and Rosow 2005: 108). According to J. S. Mill, a rational and well-educated public was the best guarantee against the state becoming too powerful and violating individual rights. By the 1960s and 1970s, when US Civil Rights Movement expanded up to the feminist movement, the question of “who could best speak for oppressed or disadvantaged groups” was converted into question of “who can best speak for or on behalf of another.” Once men were dislodged from their role of speaking for women, “problem of authenticity” got expanded within the women. Then, the discourse of dislodging one woman’s role of speaking for others, i.e., white women’s role of speaking for black women, heterosexual women for lesbians, and middle-class women for those in the working class, started gaining popularity (Phillips 1995: 9). Phillips (1995: 12) rightly says that “the main achievement of nineteenth and twentieth century democracy was to make citizenship more universal: pulling down, one after another, all those barriers that excluded women, people with the wrong religion, the wrong skin colour, or just people with too little property,” or people born in “lower caste” family. Phillips (1995: 8) wonderfully articulated about the different notions of liberals and socialists, and their theses on equality and differences. According to him, liberals believe that there is a possibility to be equal regardless of differences. Women do not want to change their sex, or black people the colour of their skin, as a condition for equal citizenship; nor do they want their differences discounted in an assimilationist imposition of ‘sameness’. Then socialists believe that no one can be equal until the class difference has been abolished. The politics around class always led back to those social and economic conditions in which class differences were grounded (Phillips 1995: 8). According to him, the traditions of revolutionary Marxism and welfare state 27 Liberalism is based on the assumption that human beings are rational creatures who should be permitted to develop their inherent capacity to the fullest and all barriers to the individual’s inherent ability to achieve his/her capacities must be removed. For details, see Smith, A (1976) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, vol 1, Cannan, E (ed). University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

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social reform have tended to converge on a broadly materialist analysis of the problems of political equality, seeing equal political access as something that depends on more fundamental changes in social, economic and sometimes educational conditions (ibid.: 13). As Morgan (1993 cited in Phillips 1995: 34–35) puts it, they saw representative democracy as superior to direct democracy precisely because it “enables the people to delegate power to persons as unlike most of themselves as possible, to persons distinguished by their abilities and talents, by the very talents that would lead voters to favour them.” The best political leaders would then be inspired by their integrity and merit, and they would be people who could see more widely and deeply than those whose future they were chosen to guide. However, politics of developing countries in general and South Asian politics in particular often deviate from the common purpose and move in a direction without any logic, which is disappointing. As Ram (2008: 21–22) rightly points out, the political culture has greatly vitiated over the last few decades wherein politics has become a vocation or employment in place of an avocation or commitment. He states: It is now shaped largely by the undesirable attributes and primordial consideration like caste and community, religion, region, etc. More so, it has now become a business in which the leaders make investment in contesting elections to either of the Houses, and reap the benefits for the diminishable period after getting elected. The political leaders in general and the elected representatives in particular are not free from various kinds of vices. They have become more self-centered instead of people-centered, and when they articulate the issues related to the people’s welfare, protection and development, their articulation is often goaded by politics or political calculations of the leaders and not that of the spokespersons or statement of the people. (Ram 2008: 21–22)

He also says that the Dalit political leadership has, by and large, not remained exception to this (above-mentioned political culture) (ibid.: 22). That must be the case why the Dalit leaders have been termed elite (Sinha 1977) or Dalit-neo-Brahmins (Parvathamma 1989: 128–144 cited in Ram 2008: 22) based on their style of functioning and behaviour with the Dalit masses. However, Ram (2008: 22) sees that there is a qualitative difference between the Dalit leadership and non-Dalit leadership. He states: Since a sizable number of Dalit leaders are first generation leaders with relatively weak social base, they find themselves somewhat uncomfortable in getting fully acclimatised in the contemporary political culture of the country. Moreover, they themselves have undergone the trauma of social disgrace and human indignity; hence, they have entered in politics with a mission of social amelioration of the Dalits but find difficulty to carry it out due to the unfavorable political atmosphere. (Ram 2008: 22)

When Ambedkar realized that the social reforms had failed to bring any positive and significant change in the socio-economic conditions of the Dalits, he persuaded the then government to bring about the political reform and to provide political safeguards to the depressed classes, lower-caste untouchables (the Dalits then used to be called Depressed Classes). Ambedkar knew that the Dalits could bring about basic changes in their socio-economic conditions by occupying important positions in the state power structure. That is why, he tried to popularise the concept of political party

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among Dalits by establishing Dalit-led political parties. According to Dirks (2001: 278), Ambedkar was committed to the need to politicise caste, using it as the basis for organizing political constituencies and waging political battles. According to Hasan (2002: 379), the dominant tendency among Dalit leaders has favoured a change in the power structure, so that opportunity could be channellised to the deprived sections of society. It seems to be the new trend initiated by Kanshi Ram whose activities were focused on welfare and reform in the 1970s. By late 1970s, he changed his strategy as he no longer believed in the primacy of social reform. He came to realize that share in political and administrative power would only bring about the desired social change (Mendelsohn and Vicziani 1998 cited in Hasan 2002: 380). Through controlling power, they hope to ensure that members of lower-caste secure jobs and places in educational institutions (Hasan 2002: 381). It seems that Ambedkar tried his best to bring Dalits in the politics. As members of marginalised communities were hardly active in political parties and politics, he tried to encourage them to join political parties formed under the leadership of their own community members. He, then, theorized that politics without a political party was meaningless. To enter politics means the formation of a party. He was against politicians who preferred to be independent. He was suspicious of a politicians who said that they wanted to remain independent and argued that if a politician was so independent that he could not join with anybody, then he was useless for all practical purposes as they could achieve much without having power to bargain politically. But many politicians wanted to be independent, not because their intellectual honesty demanded it, but because they wanted to be free to sell themselves to the highest bidder (Ambedkar cited in Das 1963: 54). As they did not have any economic power to enthrone themselves to the political power or authority, their number was the only strength. Ambedkar was of the view that in the politics of number, Dalits might clearly work out a strategy and occupy important positions of power in government, bureaucracy, etc. (Kumar 2002: 21–22). Sinha (1977) cites Jagjivan Ram and says that the Harijan elites or the elected legislators play positive roles in bringing about social change among the Dalit masses (Aggarwal 1983: 270–271): My holding high position in the government has very definitely helped the cause of Harijans. I have been instrumental in getting the money for several institutions. I have helped many individuals in their careers. I have pushed many legislations relating to Scheduled Castes through parliament. I have used my power to help the Harijans as much as possible…they now resist exploitation. That is partly due to the political participation.

Besides, findings of several studies provide a kind of disappointing situation, too. Parvathamma (1989) has found that the Dalit leaders are not only self-centered but also behaving with the Dalit masses almost in the same fashion in which the nonDalits used to behave. Hence, she has called them neo-Brahmins who exploited the poor Dalits and treated them as untouchables. She also called them classes visà-vis Dalit masses. Also, Srinivas et al. (1990) state that the political process not only failed to erase divisions within caste/class groupings, but actually provided new opportunities for exploitation and enrichment of elites, a process they claimed would be further enhanced by implementation of the Mandal reforms…the ploy of caste-based reservation, encouraging caste-based politicization, which was not the

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solution to these problems. For all we know, this will benefit only the rich and the influential in all the castes and leave their poor and weak where they are. In addition, Hasan (2002: 389) states that the failure to address inequalities in education, health, and employment opportunities, which are in fact a reflection of inequalities in the social and economic powers of different groups, is not a unique feature of lower caste parties. She states (2002: 389): A point worth noting is that low levels of incomes and education, rather than just underrepresentation and non-recognition, is the major constraint on access to and spread of social opportunities. Tackling local problems entails a class approach to pressurise the government for implementation of economic redistribution, which a caste-based following cannot achieve and which the party wants to avoid. Far from generating social and political dynamism, caste-mobilisation and sectional governance tend to block much-needed structural change.

But in the subsequent lines of the same writing, she states that, they have managed to bring formerly marginalised groups into the government and diverted public resources and flow of benefits to them although the lower-caste people led parties also have no agenda of structural reform. Also, the acknowledged reality is that it is now difficult for any government to ignore the interest of Dalits. Significantly, it has opened new spaces for the lower castes to enter the urban middle classes (Hasan 2002: 396). It seems that Ambedkar had a strong understanding of lacuna of political participation of a marginalised group. Even he seems to have a sense that only entry of few Dalits in politics and their involvement in the decision-making process cannot change the system as a whole. But they would be prisoners of the established system in which, as Jagjivan Ram states, “untouchability is deep rooted in the minds of our people and notice it frequently” (cited in Aggarwal 1983: 270–271). This can be why Ambedkar advocated a separate electorate, which meant an electorate composed exclusively of untouchable voters who were to elect an untouchable as their representative to the legislature. He advocated the proposal with a belief that the Dalits would be in a position to elect a man (may be women too now) in whom they had complete confidence and who would be independent to fight the battle of the untouchables on the floor of the legislature against the representative of dominant upper caste (Ambedkar 1991: 412–414). He further explained that if there was a joint electorate in these constituencies, the representatives of the untouchables would be only a nominal representative and not a real representative, for no untouchables who did not agree to be a nominee of the Hindus and a tool in their hands could be elected in a joint electorate. According to him, joint electorate system gave representation for namesake, but compelled untouchables to work “really as a tool of the Hindus” (ibid.: 414). To conclude, the politically mobile Dalits still have remained in “semi-limbo” situation (Isaacs 1965: 128–142 cited in Ram 1999: 454) as they are uprooted from their family and caste, and nobody knows where they will go and for what reasons. They have also been suffering form the “stigmatized identity” (Berreman 1979: 164–177 cited in Ram 1999: 454) of being untouchables. Studies suggest that the

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emergence of a “new middle class28 ” of Dalits consisting of the political leadership as an outcome of various protective discriminations is quite different from the general middle class. It, as Ram (1999: 454–455) claims, is due to the different but specific social background and distinct historical origin, and it takes time for the members of the new middle class to be fully accepted by the old middle class. Racine (2009: 450) rightly points out that the earlier elite castes have developed alternative strategies for maintaining their socio-economic positions without being greatly represented in the legislative assembly, while sections of the backward classes have seized the opportunities offered by electoral politics for promoting their emancipation and their empowerment. Upper caste in general and Brahmins in particular have certainly retreated from politics, but they have not disappeared from the stage of power as far as the decision-making mechanism is concerned. It is because they have for long invested in spheres where education is considered the key component for empowerment. Such a trend has been confirmed by recent developments such as the rise of the knowledge economy, the growth of media professions and the opportunities offered, abroad or in India, by globalisation (Racine 2009: 481). Where education is seen more than ever as a key to social mobility, what one has to understand is that education plus politics can only enhance empowerment of either of the marginalised or socially excluded community. And Nepali Dalits have to simultaneously opt two strategies for meeting the above-mentioned policy. These are: (1) to be assertive to fight against social exclusion and to have an inclusive policy for proportional and meaningful representation at all levels, and (2) to mobilise themselves to assure the ‘quality’ and ‘competent’ education for their people. Another important point is that political inclusion would not solve the problem of caste discrimination and untouchability. The Dalits need social sanction to be free of caste discrimination that would only come from socio-cultural reform programs like games, musical concerts, drama, movies, etc., where Dalits and non-Dalits can interact. It is only through interaction at the mass level that can bring end to caste discrimination. This has to be accompanied by political inclusion of Dalits.

References Aggarwal PC (1983) Halfway to equality. Manohar, Delhi Ambedkar B (1991) What Congress and Gandhi have done to the untouchables. In: Moon, V (ed) Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar writings and speeches, vol 9. Government of Maharashtra, Bombay Baral LR (1978) Village politics and development: a study of three village panchayats (Monograph). CNAS, Kathmandu Basnet P, Darnal S (eds) (2007) Politics of privilege and reservation. Jagaran Media Centre, Kathmandu (in Nepali Language)

28 The

concept of new middle class has been used by Ram (1999: 451) to mention the socially mobile Dalits. According to him, the socially mobile Dalits cannot be similar to the old middle classes as the first are not easily accepted by members of the latter group due to their “stigmatized” caste background.

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Bennett L (2005) Gender, caste and ethnic exclusion in Nepal: following the policy process from analysis to action. World Bank, Washington, DC. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRAN ETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/Bennett.rev.pdf Bennett L, Sijapati B, Thapa D (2013) Gender and social exclusion in Nepal: Update. Himal Books, Lalitpur Bennett Lynn, et al (n.d.) Unequal citizens: the on-going struggle for an inclusive state in Nepal (2002–2010): gender and social exclusion assessment up-date, vol I. World Bank & DFID, Kathmandu Berreman GD (1979) Caste and other inequities: essays on inequality (No. 2). Folklore Institute, Meerut Bhatta G (2007) Dalit Muktiko Sawalma Rajnitik Dalharu (Political Parties on Dalit Emancipation). NDN, Dhangadi (in Nepali Language) Bhattachan KB (2005) Nepal: from absolute monarchy to “democracy” and back—the need for Inclusive Democracy. Int J Incl Democr 1(4) Bishwakarma AY (2009) Samabesikaran ko Kashi ma Yemaleko Nya Netritwa (New Leadership of the UML in the context of Social Inclusion). Nayayug Monthly, March (in Nepali Language) Biswakarma T (2006) Dalit Samudaya ko Siksha ma Pahunch (Access of Dalit community in education). In: Bidhyanath K, Khadka R, Baral R (eds) Rajyako Punarsamrachanama Dalit Sahabhagita (Dalit participation in the state restructuring). The Editors, Kathmandu (in Nepali Language) Bobbio N (2005) Liberalism and democracy (Vol. 4). Verso, New York (Translation first published by Verso in 1990) Burnheim J (1985) Is democracy possible? University of California Press, Berkeley, CA Callenbach E, Phillips M (1985) A citizen legislature. Banyan Tree Books/Clear Glass, Berkeley/Bodega, California Dahl R (1989) Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press, New Haven and London Darnal S (2009) A land of our own: conversations with Dalit Members of Constituent Assembly. Samata Foundation and Jagaran Media Center, Kathmandu Darnal L (n.d.).Dalit andolan: Upalabdhi dherai, karyanyan kamjor (Dalit movement: Big achievement with weak implementation). Gorkhapatha https://gorkhapatraonline.com/mainnews/201911-10-3938; http://dalitonline.com/archives/6143 (in Nepali Language) Das B (1963) Thus spoke Ambedkar. Dalit Today Prakashan, Lucknow Dirks NB (2001) Castes of mind: colonialism and the making of modern India. Princeton University Press, Princeton FEDO/IDSN (2018) Report OF Dalit women OF Nepal on CEDAW Convention. Review of Nepal. Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO) and International Dalit Solidarity Network (IDSN). https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/ NPL/INT_CEDAW_CSS_NPL_32516_E.pdf Goodwin A (1992) Dancing in the distraction factory: music television and popular culture. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Hasan Z (ed) (2002) Parties and party politics in India. Oxford University Press, Oxford INSEC (1993) Nepal human rights year book 1993. Informal Sector Service Centre, Kathmandu Isaacs HR (1965) India’s ex-untouchables. John Day Company, New York Jaffrelot C (2009) Introduction. In: Jaffrelot C, Kumar S (eds) Rise of the plebeians?: the changing face of the Indian legislative assemblies. Routledge, Delhi Joshi BL, Rose LE (1966) Democratic innovations in Nepal: a case study of political acculturation. Univ of California Press Khanal K, Gelpke FS, Pyakurel UP (2012) Dalit representation in national politics of Nepal. Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organization, Lalitpur Kisan YB (2005) The Nepali Dalit social movement. Legal Rights Protection Society, Kathmandu Kumar V (2002) Dalit leadership in India. Kalpaz Publications, Delhi Kumar V (2008) Changing trajectories of Dalits assertion in Uttar Pradesh. In: Ram N (ed) Dalits in contemporary India: discrimination and discontent. Siddhant Publications, New Delhi Kumar S (2010) Caste and politics in modern India. Third Concept 24(277), March

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Lijphart A (1984) Democracies: patterns of majoritarian and consensus government in twenty-one countries. Yale University Press, Yale Margadarshan (2007) Pratakshya Ummedwarima Dalit Bived (Dalits Discriminated in the First Past the Post Candidacy). http://www.fedonepal.org/files/listingfiles/Magadarshan-Magsir.pdf Mill JS (1966) On liberty. In: A selection of his works. Palgrave, London Morgan ES (1993) Power to the people? Review of Books, New York Opello WC Jr, Rosow SJ (2005) The nation-state and global order: a historical introduction to contemporary politics, 2nd edn. Viva Books Private Limited, New Delhi Parvathamma C (1989) Scheduled Castes at the cross roads. Asish Publishing House, New Delhi Phillips A (1995) The politics of presence. Clarendon Press, New York Pitkin HF (1967) The concept of representation, vol 75. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA Pyakurel U (2006) State restructuring and the question of identity. Kantipur, November 6 Pyakurel UP (2007) Maoist movement in Nepal: a sociological perspectives. Adroit Publishers, New Delhi Pyakurel UP (2010) Dalit assertion and democratic transition. Nepali J Contemp Stud XX(2), October Pyakurel UP (2011) A Debate on dalits and affirmative action in Nepal. Econ Polit Weekly 46(40), 01–07 October Pyakurel UP (2012) Social inclusion and exclusion: a sociological study of Dalits in Nepal. An unpublsihed PhD thesis submitted to Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Racine JL (2009) Caste and beyond in Tamil politics. In: Jaffrelot C, Kumar S (eds) Rise of the plebeians?: the changing face of the Indian legislative assemblies. New Delhi, Routledge Rai AK (2009) Netritwa ko Aabhutpurba Samabeshi Swaroop (extraordinary inclusive structure of leadership). Nawayug Monthly, March (in Neplali language) Ram N (1999) Social mobility and status-identification among the Scheduled Castes: a synoptic view. In: Sharma KL (ed) Social inequality in India: profiles of caste, class, power and social mobility. Rawat Publications, Jaipur Ram N (2008) Introduction. In: Ram N (ed) Dalits in contemporary India: discrimination and discontent. Siddhant Publications, New Delhi Schattschneider EE (1942) Party government. Rinehart and Company, New York, p 60 Sharma P (2008) Unravelling the mosaic: spatial aspects of ethnicity in Nepal. Himal Books, Kathmandu Singh P (1982) Equality, reservation, and discrimination in India: a constitutional study of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes. Deep & Deep, New Delhi Sinha S (1977) The Harijan Elite: a study of their status, networks, mobility and role in social transformation. Thompson Press, Faridabad Smith A (1976) An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, vol 1, Edwin, C (ed). University of Chicago Press, Chicago Srinivas MN, Shah AM, Baviskar BS (1990) Kothari’s illusion of secular upsurge’. The Times of India 17 The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2063 (2007) Government of Nepal, Ministry of Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affiairs. Law Books Management Board www.cpnuml.org www.nepalicongress.org Zerinini J (2009) The political elite in Uttar Pradesh. In: Jaffrelot C, Kumar S (eds) Rise of the plebeians?: the changing face of the Indian legislative assemblies. Routledge, Delhi

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Introduction Since social exclusion and inclusion are ‘contested concepts,’ defined from the perspective or framework of different social science paradigms and disciplinary and theoretical perspectives, political ideologies and even national discourses (Silver 1994-6; de Haan 1999; de Haan and Maxwell 1998), questions have always been raised as to whether it is possible to define these terms in a manner acceptable to all. Though varieties of exclusions have been exemplified from many domains or spheres of society, the exclusions that have been faced by the Dalits elsewhere in the world can be considered ‘hard-core exclusion’ (Kabeer 2008) as they are disadvantaged economically, politically and culturally, and considered unequal citizens and looked down upon as unsuitable for maintaining any kind of relationships. Inclusion is about access to socio-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions in equal terms with other mainstream communities and not just accommodation under reservations and affirmative action at all levels to include all different castes, genders, indigenous, marginalised and minority groups. In this respect, the situation has not changed much for Dalits. As mentioned in the earlier chapters, exclusion in socio-cultural dimension for Dalits has existed since the past. But sociopolitico-economic dimension of exclusion for Nepali Dalits was further extended after the westernisation of governance during the 1960s as the Dalits had no tradition of attaining education (reading and writing). Today, the most visible progress has been witnessed in the inclusion of Dalits in politics, but their representation is still far short in proportion to the size of their population. Moreover, they are mostly in lower level (local government level) unlike the non-Dalits who are both in higher and lower level in the socio-political dimension of the country. Their actual ability to influence party decisions is even smaller as the leadership of political parties is not open to address the issue of Dalit inclusion by bringing the community on board.

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9_5

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Ram (2008: 23) rightly argues “all the components of beneficiaries, i.e., educated, employed, and political leaders of the Dalit communities, are not free from the various types of social discrimination and the resultant discontent” even after several years of governmental and non-governmental efforts in mainstreaming them in the society. Regarding Nepali Dalit’s access to education, not much change has been witnessed from that of recent past in case of Surkhet district. It is true that the literacy rate of Dalits has drastically increased but it cannot be seen as an achievement unless we observe how it is happening. The trend of schooling in rural Nepal shows a paradigm shift in the Dalit student’s enrollment, but the shift seems to be less effective in terms of their performance according to the expectation by the society and the state. In other words, the proportion of Dalit children going to school has increased significantly, but they are still far behind compared to Non-Dalits. Those who used to send their children to schools for education till two decades ago are now sending their children to English medium boarding schools either in the cities or abroad. People of those communities who were not sending their children to schools earlier are now sending their offspring to government-run public schools. If we analyze the categorization, the earlier school-goers who now are enrolled in private and English medium schools are the children from lower-middle class to upper class strata. Obviously, most of them belong to middle and higher caste families. And those new school-goers enrolled in government-run schools today belong to the lower class families. Regarding the number of students on the basis of community or caste, most of the Dalits and Janajatis tend to send their children to government schools, mainly because Dalits and Janajatis living in rural areas do not understand the value of education since, except Newars, they did not have the tradition of reading or writing. Whereas the upper castes have the tradition of reading and writing from the past, the lower class children go to government schools, while the lower middle class and upper class children are sent to private schools. If one observes the classrooms in a government school, mostly non-Dalit children from lower class are present, whereas children from Dalit and Janajati communities are from all the lower and upper classes. However, nowadays, some wealthy families from Dalit and Janajati communities are also sending their children to private schools. These students are in smaller number compared to ‘upper caste’ children. One finds that the concern of ‘upper caste’ families regarding education is deeper than that of Dalits or Janajatis. In Surkhet, this scenario is clearly visible as most of the children in government schools are from the marginalized communities. But these schools cannot provide quality education that the society requires today. The most serious concern is that the society as a whole started considering those government-run schools as an instrument to produce low quality of educated people who have no future in the market today. That is why, the ratio of English medium school-goers has been increasing day-by-day, which has resulted in further decline of ‘quality’ education in government-run schools. As a result, the gap between government-run schools and privately-run English medium schools has become wider, and the number of unemployed youths educated in government-run schools has been increasing. Thus, it can be said that since mostly Dalits are in government schools in Surkhet,

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this has not helped Dalits to emancipate themselves from the margins though some Dalits have understood the value of education as the doorway to many opportunities. In terms of the access of Dalits to ‘modern’ technological work and employment, the situation seems to be improving after the recent move of Nepali state to make civil service inclusive by amending various laws. Nepal has changed laws to include reservations and proportional representation of Dalits, but often there are not enough ‘qualified’ candidates to benefit from those positions. This is mainly because highly educated Dalits do not stay in Nepal, but go to Western countries like the USA and Canada. Moreover, there are many college dropouts or undergraduate students who prefer to work rather than study because they do not understand the value of education or degrees from universities. When Nepal started sending a large amount of labours to work abroad from 1990s, Dalits also joined in going to Gulf countries and Malaysia. Poorer members of Non-Dalit communities are also going abroad, but in case of Dalits both undergraduates and uneducated or semi-educated people like school dropouts go to these countries. The only way to increase those numbers—because the applicants would have to obtain at least the minimum marks to pass—would be to refocus attention on creating a mechanism that would produce a steady “supply” of new candidates to take up new positions. Private sector enterprises which provide more than half of the employment do not have to follow the policy of reservations. Those Dalits who still rely upon their traditional occupation, seem to suffer badly as rare attempts have been made by the government to help them by offering grants to modernize those occupations. Once the open market policy was implemented, their traditional occupation had to face severe crisis which even affected their source of livelihood. They are helpless, as neither do they have the expertise to go for other professions, nor the financial strength to continue the same occupation with modern instruments and skills. While talking about Nepali Dalit’s representation in political parties, their presence is very low not only in the NC—a social democratic party that has been in government for the longest period after 1990, but also in the Leftist parties, which claim to represent the downtrodden. Another contradiction is the very existence of the Dalit organizations, especially in parties that claim to be fighting to end the disparities between classes. Leaders of Dalit-only “wings” of the party organizations are not considered leaders of all sects of society but only of Dalit community. This tendency remains a major barrier to social inclusion within parties because it not only constricts the development of their leadership qualities, but also prevents intermingling of the Dalits with other groups. It also reduces the probability of the acceptance of Dalits as leaders by the society in general. Division of Dalits along ideological lines, a phenomenon that can be seen even in civil society organizations, and their ideologically guided positioning regarding each socio-political issue, have also reduced the effectiveness of Dalits as a group even if they constitute more than 13% of the population of Nepal. The most critical facts that have emerged from the study are the negative repercussions resulting from the practice of untouchability and caste-based discrimination seen in all three aspects discussed above. And such discriminations and practices are not seen in a traditional fashion, but in new forms. In other words, it is true

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that the continued struggle for democracy, and its very concern on inclusive policy within the system helped make different provisions to ensure Dalits’ participation in politics and other mobility-related institutions. It is also true that a good number of Dalits, by capitalizing such inclusive provisions, managed to enter many such institutions. But they are not freed from the kind of torture which comes all the way from the centuries-old caste-based discrimination. Some of them are now ‘included’ in the new system of governance along with the policy of reservation and affirmative action; they still face the discrimination similar to that experienced by their ancestors. The only difference one finds is that the practice of untouchability and caste-based discrimination was internalized by most of the Dalits in the past as it was considered legal and could be openly practiced about half a century ago. But at present, people who want to continue such a practice, have to search for different ways and pretexts as it has not only been made illegal but also considered a heinous crime. Some cases help substantiate this statement: ‘we find a good number of Dalits have been included/have entered into different mobility-based institutions but the discrimination they have been facing has not changed even today’. Those ‘included’ Dalits of my study area acknowledge the fact that the modus operandi of discriminations have changed drastically, which for them, is transformed from the practice of untouchability to “Savya Chhuwachhut (civilized practice of untouchability),” “Nadekhine Chhuwachhut (unseen untouchability),” “Sikshit Bhedbhabh (educated discrimination),” “indirect practice of untouchability,” “unobservable untouchability,” etc. Since Nepali Dalit movement got due recognition by the general public and politicians at the turn of the twenty-first century, it is too early to observe the real change in livelihood status of the Dalits. But there is an awareness that the process has begun. However, caste-based discrimination still remains entrenched, which is evidenced by some of the more blatant cases reported by the media. No doubt, discrimination has been reduced in the public sphere and especially in urban centers, but it remains in the mindset of a majority and continues in the private spheres. The earlier law, which was silent about the caste-based discrimination in the private sphere, was responsible for its inability to address discrimination that takes place in the private sphere. Let us hope that the law—Caste-based Discrimination and Untouchability (Crime and Punishment) Act—passed on 24 May 2011 with an objective to end discrimination addresses all sorts of discriminations that take place even in the private sphere. More than that, people’s mindset needs to be targeted for radical change, which is where the real transformation begins. There are many Dalit groups which occupy the lower rungs of the hierarchy even within the Dalit community. Without working out a model of representation that can accommodate all Dalit groups within the Dalit community, Nepali Dalit movement cannot take all the Dalits on board for a vibrant and successful assertion of Dalits. It is disappointing to note from this study that more than 90% of respondents who married out of caste had married upper caste spouses rather than those of their own caste. It means that they are still not inclined to accommodate the lower strata of their own society; rather they are following the Sanskritization process even if they say that they are, in lip service, against caste-based discrimination. The study reveals the

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fact that local people still give preference to the higher castes while renting/hiring houses/rooms (21% respondents say so). Also, 45% respondents believe that access to public places, i.e., temples, restaurants and schools is relatively difficult for Dalits even today. These are enough evidences which show that caste-based discrimination is still being practiced in Nepali society. Social institutions such as marriage is still instrumental in excluding Dalits even if they are in the mainstream as far as their participation in education, politics and economic activities is concerned. The incident (occurred in 23 May 2020) of Soti village in Chaurjahari Municipality, Rukum (West), where there was massacre of Navaraj BK and his five other friends, could be taken as an example of existing marriage-related caste-based discrimination in Nepal. Most of the positive changes that have taken place for Dalits—especially the moves to increase their participation in political leadership, even ministerial appointments—have all been ad hoc. There is, therefore, a need for institutionalizing the changes through proper laws, systems and mechanisms. This is true because the once seemingly united Dalit movement has weakened, or rather fractured along party lines weakening their effectiveness for lobbying for common concerns. As Nepal has been passing through a very significant socio-political transitional phase, the very concern of all disadvantaged groups, including the Dalits, depends upon how smoothly Nepal can handle the transition. There is no doubt that such a transitional phase is also the phase of assertion of various groups in the society to put forward their demands. However, the more crucial factor would be the response of the state against the assertion. In other words, how the Nepali state will be restructured will have a major impact on outcomes for Dalits in the coming years. In a country where there is no social group with a majority in any region, there are strong demands for forming identitybased territorial federations. This is an area to which Nepali Dalits need to draw attention of the drafters of the new constitution because their inability to factor in the population mix and make adequate arrangements for all minorities—including the Dalits—could result in more tensions and complicate the transition to a new state structure. Today, the demand for identity-based territorial federations comes mainly from the Janajatis, who are more vocal and better organized than the Dalits. Since Nepal’s Dalits are spread across the country and include both the larger, more articulate groups and small communities, Dalits as a whole could also face major organizational challenges in mobilising and forging a unified voice as a constituency since voters will be spread across the country in different federal units once they are established and begin functioning as autonomous units. Eventually the Constitution of Nepal promulgated in 2015 gerrymandered provinces avoiding the concept of didentity-based federalism. The new Constitution also could not provision any autonomous units for Dalits and other minorities. Again the concepts of protected, special, and autonomous units were envisioned while restructuring the local government. But the Local Level Restructuring Commission had submitted its report to the government in March 2017 without recommending any areas as ‘special’, ‘protected’ and ‘autonomous’ within the Rural Municipality and Municipality.

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Although some Dalit leaders and activists expressed concerns that they could be losers in such an arrangement, for now they do not have to worry because identitybased provinces were not formed. Had provinces been formed on the basis of dominant ethnic identities, the Dalits were afraid that the dominant ethnic identity could have used state machinery to impose their language, culture, traditions and identities onto the Dalits. They have yet to forcefully present an alternative that has been thoroughly discussed and agreed even among themselves. However, Dalits who are in the rank and file of one or another political party, were advocating ethnicity-based federal set-up stating that it is their party line. There are institutions such as NDC to be represented only by Dalits, but it remains ineffective due to lack of wise leadership on the top of the government. The Commission which was upgraded through the 2015 Constitution as a constitutional body with an objective to oversee Dalit issues and hold the state accountable, has remained toothless with no chief commissioner or office bearers as of today (10 July 2020). Questions regarding the inclusive nature in terms of accommodating all Dalit categories in the Commission have been raised from within the Dalits. Addressing this very concern is another challenge before the Dalit community. In fact, only an independent and inclusive body with adequate authority, autonomy and resources can play the catalyzing role needed for bringing all Dalits into the “mainstream” of society. Otherwise, institutions like NDC will remain subservient to politics and may be unable to emerge as a body committed to and fully capable of uplifting all the Dalits. Also, no serious effort has been made in the pending issue of defining who are the Dalits among the Newars—if there are Dalits, as claimed by some and denied by a majority. Most Newar organisations want all Newars listed as Janajatis but there are communities within Newars such as Deula, Nakarmi, Khadgi, etc. who face discrimination as Dalits within Newar community and want to be enlisted as Dalits. The political nature of the dispute—as alleged by one of the groups seeking to be listed among the Dalits—has made the resolution more complex. Once they have not been formally listed as Dalits, they are barred them from the support the state has been providing to Dalits, and as they have not been listed as Janajatis, they have also been denied benefits that could otherwise have been given to them as marginalised ethnic groups. Having gone through the narratives of Dalits, and government’s effort to overcome the marginalisation and exclusion of Dalits, it has become clear that the problem cannot be solved through a simplistic approach, i.e., introduction of affirmative actions regarding such a reservation. Since caste system is complex and one of the deep-rooted problems in the society, it has to be handled with short-term and longterm comprehensive programmes. Programmes such as affirmative action should be introduced for short-term; and equitable education for all with the objectives of annihilating the caste should be the long-term programmes. Added to these, there is a need of socio-cultural interaction programmes to unify and create solidarity among the non-Dalits and Dalits. Such programmes can be sports and games, music concerts or dance competitions, fashion shows, etc. Let me discuss how such plans help to overcome the society from the caste-based exclusion, especially in affirmative action and education.

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5.2 Affirmative Action After narrating different arguments, and after going through the various affirmative action related provisions introduced by the government of Nepal, I feel that, only affirmative action in general and reservation in particular cannot resolve all the problems faced by Nepali Dalits today. Nepal is fortunate, in the sense that it could assess various facets of affirmative action programmes practiced in the world, and introduced a new one based on the best practices. Even if Nepal is lately talking about the affirmative action programme—decades later than that of India, and other countries. In other words, we learn from at least three models—India, the USA, and Malaysia— before introducing a suitable model in Nepal. However, we have to acknowledge that the affirmative action is an absolute necessity at this historical period in Nepal to overcome the enormous problems related to exclusion and marginalisation (Middleton and Shneiderman 2008; Sunam and Shrestha 2019). As discussed earlier, there are various proposals forwarded by NGOs, movement groups, scholars and activists in this regard. Most of those proposals suggest replicating the Indian reservation policies without any critical engagements though different names such as ‘especial rights’, ‘progressive reservations’, etc., are given by them. There is a debate on whether policy of affirmative action is to be provisioned as a ‘compensation’ for the historically discriminated and marginalised communities. One may advocate it as a compensation for past mistakes. However, such argument, in the long run, does not help garner support of the people of privileged groups, but has put such programmes into unnecessary controversy. Either today’s generation wonders how long it has to pay for the sins of its ancestors or it accepts reservation as a compensation for their past injustice (Chandhok 2005: 309). Here, it is better to argue in the line of Darity and others (1997: 301–305), who observe that affirmative action does not, in general, rest on the goal of compensation for past injustices, nor does it provide a vehicle for redressal of wealth disparity. “Affirmative action programmes largely have been designed to address the questions of present discrimination” (ibid.). In my opinion, such programmes are needed due to present social reality. Everyone agrees to the fact that the caste-based customary rules related to right to property, occupation, employment, wage, and education left no choice to the ex-untouchables except serving the higher caste as wage labourers (Thorat and Deshpande 1999). The opponents should be convinced that de facto and de jure reservation is already accepted and practiced by all the societies in many different ways in the past as well. And the rich and middle classes have benefited from it till today1 (Parthasarathy 2005). This is a time to reverse it to the marginalised and excluded groups. Society seems to have survived in the past in a different manner as there was at least mutual community feeling among the groups. However, today it has changed as we 1 D.

Parthasarathy observed that there are many educational institutions, where there is reservation on the basis of the ability to pay, which no one opposes. Students get admission in the engineering colleges with 35% as the minimum marks. Those who have low percentage, and enough money, get the seats.

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are in transition from traditional systems to modernity. Rather, what has remained is only the division of occupation in ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ or ‘graded’ and ‘degraded’ categories. Surprisingly, most of the work/occupations traditionally assigned to the ‘higher caste’ people are considered superior occupations and engaging in the same occupation assigned to the ‘lower caste’ is considered ‘polluting’, ritually ‘impure’ or ‘degraded’ work (this pollution was considered contagious). Hence they have been exploited in terms of their labour because they have negligible exposure to the ‘outside’ world and continue to remain ignorant. Attempts to enter into any temple have infuriated the communities against Dalits. It seems that there is a nexus among the old middle- and upper-class people and new middle classes of the marginalised groups to continue the beliefs. It may be because the former want to continue their superiority and the latter also want to show their newly ascribed status as extremely different from their own community. In fact, the trend was sensed by Ram Manohar Lohia almost six decades ago in India, and he termed the trend as a disease. “It has been a disease with low-caste Dvijas to look towards their superior counterparts. The wheel of the caste will be broken when the low-caste Dvijas begin to look towards backward castes,” he says. According to him, the backward class people have to have awareness against their tendency “to ape the bad habits and manners of the high castes as soon as they [the backward classes] become prosperous and powerful” (Lohia 1964). Whatever the causes and logics that contributed for such perceived superiority and inferiority, it has impacted the society in a strong manner resulting in the tendency of people who want to move upwards as ‘superior.’ As there is no controlling mechanism to regulate society as per the caste, and, as the caste-based prejudice is still alive in localities, especially in the villages, the people from earlier depressed castes also want to be superior by adopting the superior occupation/work. But it is not an easy task for them to compete with the people who are born and brought up with the so-called “superior” culture. That is why affirmative action is needed for them as short-term policy, as it makes it possible to shift a person from a traditional ‘inferior’ group to a ‘superior’ group. While dealing with it, Ambedkar says: There are many occupations in India, which on account of the fact that they are regarded as degraded by Hindus provoke those who are engaged in these occupations. There is a constant desire to evade and escape from such occupations, which arise solely because of the blighting effect, which they produce upon those who follow them owing to the slight and stigma cast on them by the Hindu religion.

Talking about Nepal, agricultural workers, for example, have a skill which should be conserved and given high value, as Nepal is chiefly dependent on its agriculture. But we give it a low value and the wages paid to the agricultural labourers would also be low. If they were paid higher wages, over a period of time their socio-economic situation would improve, their children would be educated, and there would be no need for reservations. But, because of the past and current discriminations, and given the present devaluation of essential skills, a certain section of the population continues to be poor, illiterate, etc. D. Parthasarathy observes:

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The differential valorisation of skills in India is related to who performs these jobs and how much profit is to be made from it. So, since leather was considered to be a polluting occupation, it was left to the Dalit castes, but when export market made leather work profitable, the technology no longer required one to touch leather with one’s hands, Brahmins and upper castes also got into it.

Also, it is worth quoting Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy of Supreme Court of India, who observes: What is merit? Is not a child of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes who has been brought up in an atmosphere of penury, illiteracy and anti-culture, who is looked down upon by tradition and society, who has no books, newspapers or magazines to read at home, no radio and TV to listen and watch, no private tuition, no one to help him with his home work and no one to advise him because his parents themselves are illiterate and ignorant and who has to trudge to the nearest local board schools or colleges, has not this child got merit, if he with all his disadvantages, is able to secure the qualifying marks of 40% or 50% of the total at a competitive examination, whereas the children of the upper classes who have all the advantages, go to the Sacred Heart Convent and St. Stephen’s college and who have perhaps been especially coached for the examination may secure 70, 80 or even 90% of marks. Surely a child who has been able to jump over so many obstacles may be expected to do better and better as he moves along in life. (Kannabiran 2013: 182)

It seems that Nepal needs to opt for a different model of reservation policy rather than follow other established models. The author does not discount the importance of numerical inclusion (without the division of the “creamy layer” and others) that gives a positive message to the marginalised community that a member of such a community can be a physician, engineer, professor, Chairperson of a Municipality, party president, minister or even the prime minister. However, such a message seems to have reached those marginalised communities as they knew the fact that there has been symbolic representation of those groups not only in the parliament but also in the cabinet, civil service, security agencies and even in the judiciary. That is why the focus should be given to a new policy for avoiding future criticism2 which basically comes through questioning the target groups; benefits of affirmative action do not reach the ‘real’ beneficiaries, but are cornered by the better-off sections of the target groups. To address the criticism and to extend the benefits to the target, reservation should be made available only for a single generation of the particular family, as 2 Critics

of reservation policies in India have claimed that the beneficiaries of reserved seats are increasingly second and third generation people from the families which have already benefited from positive discrimination to become middle or upper-middle or ‘new-middle’ classes. As a result, reservation increased inequalities within these groups as children from more backward sub-caste and tribes find it difficult to compete. Rao (2001: 51) is categorical to mention that “reservation tends to reproduce within the beneficiary class”. He further argues that reservation helps those “among the beneficiaries who already enjoy the greatest advantages and obtain disproportionately large shares of the benefits”. Supporting other’s view, i.e., reservation has created privileged Dalit elites. Sachhidananda concludes that the “creation of a more privileged group among untouchables could well be benefited to the general untouchable population” by enabling them to play a stronger and more independent role as leaders of their own community, see Sinha (1977: 255) cited in Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Some Aspects of Reservation in Higher Education” in Sukhadeo Thorat, Aryama and Prashant Negi (eds.) Reservation and Private Sector: Quest for Equal Opportunity and Growth. Jaipur: Rawat, 2005:394–395.

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suggested by Pyakurel (2008). If so, it will be expanded much faster than today, and will not be confined to the families which have already benefited from positive discrimination.

5.3 Education as an Ultimate Policy Indeed, the first target of the long-term policy should be to provide more and more spaces and opportunities in the education for the grassroots level people of the marginalised communities. It is because educational opportunities are basic capabilities to lead life with elementary freedom, and exclusion from this basic capability further contributes to make the process of economic growth less participatory (Sen 2000: 25). Experiences reveal that each developed country including today’s Japan3 has passed through a basic education system that helps in minimizing the exclusion. The US and Malaysian policies of affirmative action were successful only due to education. Since the Blacks and other minorities of the USA capitalized the educational opportunity and became conscious citizens, they succeeded in increasing the presence of the Black members in each and every sector largely through “communitybased economic pressures” (Omvedt 2005). Hence, business houses are compelled to provide opportunities to the Blacks in America. In Malaysia also, the primary focus of the New Economic Policy 1971, which has been considered an affirmative action, was to get educated Malaya community, which was marginalised for long, despite the fact that the community was in majority in terms of its population size. There is always a kind of correlation between opportunity and education (ibid.). Education is now primarily linked with employment, especially the white collar jobs and both education and employment together determine the nature and degree of social change and social mobility among the people in India (Ram 1995: 22). That is why Ambedkar had greatly emphasised on education of the Dalits with the view that only education could liberate them from their traditional bondage and subordination to the upper castes and classes. Education, in his opinion, would enlighten them and expose them to the outside world (ibid.). It, for him, would sensitize them to realize their long-cherished goals of embracing equality, liberty, fraternity and justice. Besides, it would also prepare them to collectively strive for achieving a respectful social identity (ibid.). In fact, educated people search the opportunity in any case. If they do not get it, they not only protest on the spot but also raise the issue through media, academic write-ups, etc. However, an uneducated person easily internalises the same thing considering it a matter of fate or fortune (Pyakurel 2007). And if such practice of disparity and discrimination continues, educated people have the capacity to convert it into the movement as Gandhi, Ambedkar and others did in history.

3 According

to Amartya Sen, Japan has become the model of market economy in the world only because of the priority given to education by the Meji Era (1868–1911) though it was economically still quite underdeveloped. For details, see, Sen (2000: 25).

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Talking about the concern of Nepali Dalits about access to education, for them free education and scholarships are also listed in their demands. However, no detail is worked out about how to go ahead so that every student from the marginalised community could easily compete with the rest in the given reality of two types of educational institutions.4 Generally, “different schools for different people” is responsible for increasing and spreading inequality in the society (Tomlinson 2004). At this juncture, our focus should be to deconstruct the image of two different educational institutions, and also to eradicate the notion of superior and inferior school enrolment. Since these are time-consuming processes, we should deal with the problem by providing more opportunities for educating Dalit children from the better institutions—the private institutions. Otherwise, the Dalit who gets educated from the public school can never be as competent as his counterpart who comes from the private school. It is not only due to the inequality in the access of resource materials and information, but also due to the social constructs which regard the products of English medium schools as superior, and the public school-goers as inferior. In fact, the notion of superiority and inferiority based on school education is becoming the leading cause in their case for further exclusion, which is isolating the children of marginalised groups from day-to-day interaction with their counterparts. Such exclusion and isolation further decline the self-confidence of a person. Regarding In Nepal a significant portion of the budget5 has gone to the government schools in the name of educating the marginalised community. It has brought a substantive change in the educational level of marginalised groups as both the literacy rate and enrolment rate has increased. Besides, the number of dropouts from among the students of the Dalit community has also been reported.6 Such a high proportion of dropout is due to two main causes: (1) the Dalit community could not see their future even after they were educated in government schools; and (2) they found the process a lengthy one and therefore lost their patience to wait for such a long period. Here, it can be said that the government, through various means and policies, succeeded in increasing the marginalised group’s presence on education. However, they are yet to be assured that education helps change their whole lifestyle. It is because they, being newcomers in the education system, are not confident enough 4 One is a private educational institution which offers so-called quality education in English medium

with a high fee, and another is public or government-funded educational institution that provides ‘poor quality’ education in local or national language but the fee is very nominal or only for namesake. 5 The budget of fiscal year 2016–2017 provisioned scholarships with the amount of NRs. 400 per year to all Dalits up to class 10. And Student Bank scholarship in intermediate level and Rs 2000 per month for higher studies in the special categories. 6 Banke district of mid-western region of Nepal can be a good example which shows a kind of disastrous situation of Dalit youths where the dropout rate of Dalit students from primary to secondary level education is more than 95%. According to the report, only 882 Dalit students can continue till the secondary level of education even if 15,317 Dalit students were enrolled at the primary level. Again, only 2336 students (around 15%) out of the total 15,317 primary students were enrolled in the lower-secondary schools. For details, see Regmi S (2007) Dalit Samudaya ko Siksha ma Pahunch Ajhai Neuna [Still a meager access of Dalits in the education]. Rajdhani, 24 December 2007.

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to rely on opportunities related to education and feel the lack of ‘cultural capital’.7 Also, they lose their confidence due to the disparities created by the trend of ‘different schools for different people’. If one follows the social composition of two different schools, he/she finds that the composition is somewhat similar to the composition in government schools in the past just before the introduction of English-medium private schools when education was not accessible to all except to the high-caste people. It meant that those who had access to education in the past have now shifted to the privately-run English-medium schools. And those who are the first-generations to go to school are now with the government-run schools. The government data shows that there are 19.7, 14.4 and 11% students studying in privately-run primary, lower secondary and secondary schools, respectively (DoE 2016). This study also reveals the fact that a good number of students from Dalit community are now in English medium boarding schools. Who are those Dalit students? The answer is simple— those Dalits from “new middle class”. Why they have chosen that option is primarily because they want to show that they are different from the common Dalits. It is said that the trend is common inside the country. This is the general trend in all semi-urban areas of Nepal. The situation of the capital city Kathmandu and other major cities is worse. One hardly finds children of any influential politician or bureaucrat or business person studying in government-run schools or colleges. They are either studying abroad or in the privately-run expensive schools and colleges. The trend has not been decreasing; rather it has been rapidly increasing in the country. A similar situation has been found in India even if it protects people through various mechanisms of affirmative action. And such a situation is likely to continue in Nepal even if it replicates one or another form of affirmative action without trying to bring changes in contemporary educational system. The 2006–2007 fiscal budget of Nepal after the Jana Andolan II tried to initiate the scholarship provision in every private school in the name of Public-Private Partnership Programme keeping Dalits in high priority to enjoy the facility. One out of every 15 students of each private school was entitled to get education there with scholarship (GoN 2006). It was not enough, but it was a good initiative for offering quality education to the marginalised groups in the long run. However, from the year following, the government failed to continue such an excellent provision. On the contrary, the Maoist-led government came up with the proposal to commercialise the education by provisioning certain percent taxes on the schools too.

7 According

to Beteille, each family has a stock of cultural capital comprising its command over knowledge, skill, tastes, etc., that are part of its distinctive way of life. It has also its own social capital in the form of networks of relationships, partly acquired from the past and partly constructed through the initiatives of its members. According to him, “family, particularly in the service class, does succeed in transmitting its cultural and social capital to its younger members” to grasp the available best opportunities. For details, see Betellie A (1999) The reproduction of inequality: occupation, caste and family. In: Sharma KL (ed) Social inequality in India: profiles of caste, class, power and social mobility. Rawat Publications, Jaipur, p 44.

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Introduction of a Common School System (CSS)8 can be a long-term policy towards minimising the gaps and feeling of social segregations between the two schools, without which none of the developed countries would have reached their present level of economic progress and prosperity. It was the CSS which enabled the countries not only to forge national unity and social cohesion essential for modernisation but also directly contributed to nation-building and economic progress.9 Scholarship programme will work successfully only after disparities within the educational institutions are removed, and the affirmative action policy followed bringing the marginalised community under the CSS. Another important factor to consider is about the nature of education the state offers to its young generation. Generally, those who are “well educated” from relatively ‘credible’ educational institutions show their reluctance to understand the problem of the marginalised people today, and it is the case in Nepal as well. Most of them are quite critical about the affirmative action policy initiated by state and society. It is not due to other reasons but only because of the conviction transferred to them in the name of education. Had they been taught about historical injustice imposed to those marginalised by the society and state in the past, the situation could have been such that all the section of the society would work together to empower the most marginalised. Contrary to this, it is Nepali education system which has not allowed students to study major historical facts with a greater impact on social relations today. It was Civil Code of 1854 which had served to the country for 112 years being the only main national law of Nepali state. But the law was neither made a part of legal studies discourse, nor included in the social science curriculum by the modern education system. The copy of such a dominant law of twentieth century is hardly available in any library even if one wants to read it casually. I tried hard to access the original copy of it which was published in 1954 with the seal of the then King Surendra Bikram Shah, but could not succeed. Eventually I had to analyze it relying on the text reproduced after 112 years in 1964 by Surya Bahadur Thapa, the then Prime Minister and Minister of Law. People may state different reasons behind the unavailability of the copy of the law, but what looks true is that the book could be easily available if it was made part of curriculum right from school education to higher level. Once people read the reality of the past, educated population not only could have known the reasons behind the existing gap amongst the marginalised and dominant group, but also engaged further to suggest many options to address the problem. This attempt to hide the historical realities has helped build negative attitudes towards any government policies such 8A

common School System is a system of education, providing education of an equitable quality to all children irrespective of their caste, creed, community, language, gender, economic condition, social status and physical and mental ability. The system calls for the application of common minimum norms of quality education by all schools in the system so that no parent would ordinarily feel any need to send his/her child to the institution outside the system. For details, see an unpublished report submitted by the Common School System Commission to the Government of Bihar, June 8, 2007. 9 For details, see an unpublished report submitted by the Common School System Commission to the Government of Bihar, June 8, 2007.

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as affirmative action targeting the marginalised section of the society. The tendency could be seen amongst most of the Nepali youth today to look at marginalized focused activities as if they are against the spirit of equity and equality. It is, as stated earlier, due to the knowledge policy of the state not to teach the reality of the society but to offer only choreographed facts convenient to the regime in the name of education.

5.4 Annihilation of Caste as Social Policy As mentioned in the previous sections, caste is a very deep-rooted reality even today in various South Asian countries. And Indian experience shows that it cannot be removed simply by the introduction of affirmative action or reservation policy. It is said that India’s affirmative action has not been very effective in the grassroots to change the structure of the society. This has resulted in a hierarchy among the beneficiaries and others of the same community. It is also argued that most of those have started replicating the elite culture when they entered into the “new-middle class”.10 The most dangerous aspect one finds in India is that the “new middle classes,” after reaching there from the marginalised community, seem to be interested in limiting the benefit of reservation to their own offspring. Interestingly, the new middle-class Dalits feign they are with the Dalit masses. It has become possible as “their caste members look at them as their positive reference for achieving upward social mobility” (Ram 1995: 24). That is why they still behave like the sole representatives of the Dalit masses even if they do nothing for the benefit of the grassroots Dalits. In fact, many government and non-government bodies, like in Nepal, were established to empower the marginalised community in India. But most of the discourses are confined by the new elites to secure the reservation or quota for higher level education and job sector. When one student could not get admission in All India Institute of Medical Studies or Institute of Information and Technology or if a “new middle class” faced discrimination, there will be hue and cry among them. But they are hardly concerned about the problem which grassroots Dalits are facing. Many of the provisions offered by the government are yet to be implemented at the local level. For example, the government has provisioned a certain quota for the marginalized community at primary level education in the public schools. Also, the government has provided land in a token money to the hospitals in Delhi with the condition to

10 Middle-class parents have become increasingly career conscious, and this consciousness is implanted in their children at a young age. The idea that the child will step automatically or effortlessly into his/her parent’s occupation has ceased to be a secure basis for socialisation: a different kind of preparation is now required for his/her success in the future. The school has emerged as a major institution for mediating the relationship between the family and the new occupational system, and it also plays a major part in the reproduction of inequality. For details, see Celeman (1990); Jencks (1975) cited in Betellie A (1999) The reproduction of inequality: occupation, caste and family. In: Sharma KL (ed) Social inequality in India: profiles of caste, class, power and social mobility. Rawat Publications, Jaipur, pp 143–144.

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offer 20% free treatment facilities to the poor and down-trodden community. A very less concern has been given by the activists and others even if it is not implemented. Many Dalit activists, especially with the leftist ideology, use the terms ‘caste’ and ‘class’ interchangeably. They also claim that the crux of the caste is class. The notion was brought forward by many respondents11 during my fieldwork as well. It seems that there is a strong confusion among them to see caste as class or things other than class. Let us take an example of Bimal Nepali. He, on the one hand, claims that Dalit is the class identity rather than the other saying, “why Kamis of Nepal claim to be superior among Dalits is not because of other things like tradition and spiritual beliefs, but just because of their higher socio-economic status than the rest of the Dalits.” On the other hand, he himself expresses that he is yet to be accepted by the community even if he has good academic qualification and has become the principal of one of the reputed schools. If it was related only to the class, why has he still suffered from one or another model of practice of caste-based prejudices even if he is not only economically well-off but also educationally brilliant and well-posted in the job as a principal? The same question may be asked to others who make such statements. However, no one has an answer to this. Thus, eventually they all come to a conclusion that economic self-sufficiency cannot help overcome the caste prejudices. Ram (1995: 24) mentions the real situation of an ‘upwardly mobile Dalit member’. He says: The upwardly mobile Dalits mostly living in urban areas have accepted values and behaviour pattern(s) of the middle classes as their positive reference of emulation though they are not yet fully absorbed in their reference groups. In the process, they have largely cut off their final ties with the Dalit masses. They are, thus, neither part of the ‘out group’ or their reference group nor of ‘in group’ of the Dalit masses. Hence, not being a member of either group, they are marginalised though for some reason or other they still continue their allegiance to the latter group. Their ‘in group’ is also apparent as their caste members look at them as their positive reference for achieving upward social mobility.

It seems that some great thinkers of India, i.e., Ambedkar and Lohia, were aware of the various limitations of any kind of affirmative action for the emancipation of Dalits from caste-based social order. That is why they came up with a conclusion that no reform is possible unless the problem of caste is tackled. There would be “no economic reform without first bringing about a reform of the social order” (Ambedkar 2008: 12). Ambedkar states, “It is certain that without first tackling this problem [caste], no reconstruction of the country is possible, not to say anything about the advent of socialism” (Lohia 1964). While reading both Ambedkar and Lohia, what one finds in common is that they were very keen for the eradication of caste so that caste-based prejudice could be eliminated and other social reform programmes could be implemented in a systemic manner in combating class-based disparity and inequality. Also, they both were together advocating one or the other model of reservation policy. At the same time, they were convinced that such a policy would not be helpful for the depressed 11 Bal

Krishna Sunar, Ganesh Nepali, Bimal Nepali, Sanju B.K., Tara Nepali, and Karna Bahadur Nepali all mention the problem of Dalit as a class problem.

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classes to overcome the caste-based atrocities and prejudices. That is why Ambedkar published an essay titled ‘Annihilation of Caste’, in which he defined caste as something similar to a monster, and said, “You turn in any direction you like, caste is the monster that crosses your path. You cannot have political reform; you cannot have economic reform; unless you kill this monster” (Ambedkar 2008: 14). He further stated: There is no doubt, in my opinion, that unless you change your social order you can achieve little by way of progress. You cannot mobilise the community either for defense or for offence. You cannot build anything on the foundations of caste. You cannot build up a nation; you cannot build up a morality. Anything that you will build on the foundations of caste will crack and will never be a whole. (Ambedkar 2008: 14)

Both suggested that inter-caste marriage and inter-dinning would be the first and foremost step for the purpose of annihilating the caste system. In fact, Lohia proposed to enhance the trend of out-caste marriage by providing government jobs “only to those who marry out of caste” along with the Jati-Todo12 (break caste barriers) campaign. Ambedkar wanted to dismantle the hereditary priesthood along with popularisation of the trend of inter-caste marriage and inter-dinning. Only after the early 1930s, he gave up any hope of reforming Hinduism as he felt that those suggestions would not be acceptable to Hindus (Rodrigues 2002: 27–27). Subsequently, he attempted to construct a separate identity of ‘untouchables’ during the second half of the 1940s. Then he kept on advocating for the quota for the depressed classes in the economic and socio-political arenas along with the separate electorate until his death. To conclude, Nepal has to handle its disparities with comprehensive packages, and a “strong political will” to fulfill the objectives. Since there are different marginalised groups with different scales of marginalities, Nepal has to come up with policies and programmes to tackle all the problems simultaneously, and on priority basis. There is no doubt that the Dalits, as the most marginalised groups with multiple sources of marginalities, should be given priority to bring the Dalits in the mainstream by removing all hurdles faced by them. As narrated earlier, caste seems to be the most powerful hurdle to overcome before making them as equal as their counterparts. And, neither of the policies and laws (except the awareness which comes through education) introduced till today seems to be helpful in ‘annihilating’ the caste from the society. That is why, Nepal must introduce a new policy with the priority to dismantle the concept of “different school for different people,” and create CSS with the objective to provide same education for all. Also, it seems better for Nepal to follow the model of affirmative action policy implemented in the USA and Malaysia, which have fixed a target rather than the quota like in India. The former seems to be less controversial than the quota. It helps in creating less disparity between members of marginalised groups as no one from such a group would be stopped from capitalizing the opportunity referring to the quota fixed for them. In fact, Nepal has already introduced and practiced such a policy in the educational sector. Dalit students have been enjoying scholarship up 12 Lohia’s main message was jati-todo (break caste barriers) which included not wearing the sacred thread and dropping caste names.

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to higher education. They get free education in the government schools in Nepal with allowance of Rs 400 per annum. Also, those studying in classes 11 and 12 are privileged with Student Bank Scholarship. And for higher education they have been receiving Rs 2000 depending upon the economic status and physical ability. If there was 20% quota, many Dalit students, at least one third of them, would be likely to lose this scholarship in the districts where the enrolment ratio of Dalit students is more than 30%. This policy has also faced less criticism from the opponents. If quota system has to be introduced in jobs, there should be conditions which provide priority to those who are new comers in the field without ‘social and cultural capital.’ Finally, following Ambedkar, Lohia and Indian experiences, Nepal should consider going for programs to ‘annihilate’ the caste from the society, as it is the root cause of caste-based prejudices and marginality. For that, Budhanilkantha School model, which discourages the students from disclosing and mentioning their surname after their first name, may be taken as a model of Surname Avoid Abhiyan (Campaign to avoid surname) and proceed further in defying the caste order. That, ultimately, helps in the process of inter-caste marriage and other forms of meaningful interactions among people belonging to different castes. Only then, the caste-based taken-forgranted prejudices, along with the marginalisation based on caste, would be wiped out and a complete cultural change can be ushered in by building good relationships, giving recognition and identity to Dalit by ‘we the people’.

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Index

A Achhut, 93 Adivasis, 14 Affirmative action, 167 Agriculture, 168 Alienation, 8 Amartya Sen, 48 Anti-culture, 169 Asylum seekers, 9 Aurobindo, 56, 57 Autocratic, 2

B Backward, 3 Bad health, 9 Betrayed, 143 Big caste, 21 Bishendra Paswan, 129 Blair government, 8, 9 BP Koirala, 93 Brahmins, 4

C Caste, 14 Caste-based discrimination, 2 Caste degradation, 23 Caste system, 14, 15 Centre/periphery, 2 Chhetris, 4 Citizenship, 153 Civil Code, 26, 28 Class structure, 103 Common School System, 173

Community-based economic pressures, 170 Compensation, 167 Constitution of Nepal, 27 Constitution of 1990, The, 26 Contemporary, 1 Contested concepts, 161 Core/periphery, 2 Crime, 164

D Dalit teachers, 60 Deep-rooted reality, 174 Demands, 146 Democratic, 1 Depressed, 6 Deprivation, 2 Deregulators, 8 Development, 12 Disease, 168 Dislocation, 9 Distant or border culture, 3 Dominant, 2 Drop-out, 61

E Economic hardship, 98 Effective laws, 125 Employment, 163 Enslavable, 15 Equality, 1 Equal opportunity, 112 European concept, 8 Exclusion, 1

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 U. Pyakurel, Reproduction of Inequality and Social Exclusion, Evidence-Based Approaches to Peace and Conflict Studies 2, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8908-9

181

182 Exclusion in education, 47, 49 Exploitation, 3, 4

F Family breakdown, 9 Farsighted, 1 Filthy, 16

G Gender and Social Exclusion Assessment (GSEA), 5 Government of humans, 10

H Hard-core exclusion, 161 Hesitation, 152 Hierarchy, 3 High-caste, 5 High crime, 9 Hinduisation, 2 Humane governance, 10

I Illiterate, 50 Immiseration, 12 Impure, 15, 16 Inclusion, 5 Inclusive, 2 Indigenous, 5 Inequalities, 2 Inferior, 82 Injustices, 167 Interim constitution of 2006, 26

J Jaat-paat or jaat-bhaat (caste system), 14 Janajatis, 17 Jati-Todo, 176 John Galbraith, 53 Josmani cult, 25

K Karmajan, 6 King Mahendra, 26

L Levelers, 8

Index Literacy, 50 Lower castes, 21–23 Low income, 9

M Made holy, 16 Madhesis, 4 Mahsine, 15 Mainstream, 1 Marginal culture, 3 Marginalized, 1, 2 Marginal/marginality, 2 Mathilo jaat, 21 Matwali, 15 Menstruation, 93, 94 Merit, 169 Middle-class, 63 Mijars, 24 Minority, 2 Mis-recognition, 3 Monolith, 10 Moral Underclass Discourse (MUD), 9 Muluki Ain (civil code), 4

N Nadekhine Chhuwachhut, 164 Nagarchis, 24 Namahsine, 15 Nepali Congress, 126, 127 Nepali Dalit movement, 129 Nepalisation, 2 Newars, 4 New-middle class, 174 Non-democratic, 2 Non-enslavable, 15 Non-Hindus, 15 Non-traditional security, 1

O Outsiders, 11

P Pani nachalne, 6 Pani Nachalne Chhoi chhito halnya naparne, 15 Pani Nachalne Chhoi chhito halnya parne, 15 Patriarchal, 10 Penury, 169 People-centric, 1

Index Political liberties, 12 Political participation, 121 Political representation, 121 Poor housing, 9 Poor skills, 9 Poverty alleviation, 1 Powerlessness, 9 Prof. Chaitanya Mishra, 101 Progressive reservation, 143 Purified, 16

Q Qualitative, 40 Quantitative, 40 Quota system, 177

R Ram Manohar Lohia, 168 Redistributions, Egalitarian Discourse (RED), 9 Refugees, 9 Representatives in the National Panchayat, 130 Reservation, 143, 166, 167

S Saharshanath Kapali, 123 Sarbajit Biswakarma, 123 Savya Chhuwachhut, 164 Scheduled castes, 6 Scheduled Tribes, 6 Scholarships, 60 Shudra, 21 Sikshit Bhedbhabh, 164 Sinful untouchables, 16 Slaves, 15 Small caste, 21 Social Integration Discourse (SID), 9 Socialization, 13 Social justice, 1, 2 Social security, 1 Special rights, 143

183 Srijansil, 6 Stephen Ball, 62 Stigmatized identity, 156 Strict enforcement, 125 Subjugated, 4 Subordination to the upper castes and classes, 170 Sun-Pani, 16 Superstition, 57 Suppression, 3 Surkhet, 34 Syano jaat, 21

T Tagadhari, 15 Tallo jaat, 21 Teachers, 57 Tenth National Plan, 5 Thakuri, 15 Think globally and act locally, 10 Think locally and transform globally, 10 Thulo jaat, 21 Tibeto-Burman, 4 Torture, 164 Traditional bondage, 170 Traditional occupation, 88–92 Traditional security, 1

U Underdevelopment, 12 Unemployment, 9 United Marxist Leninist Party, 126 Unobservable, 164 Untouchables, 5, 6 Upper castes, 16, 21, 22 Upper House (Rashtriya Sabha), 131

V Varnas, 15 Vedic, 15 Vulnerable, 36