Women, Peace and Security in Nepal: From Civil War to Post-Conflict Reconstruction 9781138067349, 9781315158723

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Women, Peace and Security in Nepal

This book sheds new light on the important but diverse roles of women in the civil war in Nepal (1996–​2006), and the post-​conflict reconstruction period (2006–​2016). Engaging critically with the women, peace and security literature, Women, Peace and Security in Nepal questions the potential of peace processes to become a window of opportunity for women’s empowerment, while insisting on the vital importance of a gender perspective in the study of conflict, security and peace. After the signing of the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Accord, Nepal experienced a huge leap in women’s political representation in the subsequent Constituent Assembly, often portrayed as a landmark victory for women’s empowerment in the context of South Asia. Nepali women’s mobilization played a key role in this success story, though similar mobilization has failed to produce the same outcomes elsewhere in South Asia. How does Nepal differ from the other cases? Presenting studies of war-​time and post-​conflict Nepal through a gender lens, this book critically assesses the argument that war and peacebuilding can add momentum to the transformation of gender roles. Contributing new knowledge on women’s disempowerment and empowerment in conflict and peacebuilding, the book also offers insights for contemporary debate on gender and political change in conflict-​affected societies. This book will be of great interest to students of peace and conflict studies, gender security, South Asia and international relations in general, as well as policy-​makers and NGOs. Åshild Kolås is Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway.

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Women, Peace and Security in Nepal From Civil War to Post-​Conflict Reconstruction Edited by Åshild Kolås

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First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 selection and editorial material, Åshild Kolås; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-​in-​Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-​1-​138-​06734-​9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​315-​15872-​3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out of House Publishing

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Contents

List of tables Acknowledgements Abbreviations Notes on contributors

Introduction: Women, Peace and Security in review

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Å S H ILD KO LÅ S A ND TO RUNN L.   TRYGGES TAD

1 The road to parliament: women in Nepal’s representative assemblies

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BI S HNU R A J UP RETI AND GI TTA S HRES THA

2 Female Maoist combatants during and after the People’s War

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LO R INA S THA P IT A ND PHI LI PPE  DO NEYS

3 Troubled identities: women ex-​combatants in post-​conflict Nepal

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A M R ITA P R ITA M   GO GO I

4 Nepali women’s mobilization for peace: transforming activism into policy change

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VANES S A  DAUR E R

5 Does international aid help women peacebuilders in Nepal?

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A N J O O S HA R A N UPADHYAYA AND JAS O N MI KL I AN

6 Women, Peace and Security: the case of Nepal

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GIT TA S HR E S THA, BI S HNU R AJ UPR ETI AND ÅSH I L D   KOL ÅS

Index

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Tables

1.1 Results of elections for the House of Representatives (1991, 1994) 1.2 Women elected to the House of Representatives (1991) 1.3 Women elected to the House of Representatives (1994) 1.4 Women elected to the House of Representatives (1999) 1.5 Women’s participation in the Interim Legislature (2006–​2007) 1.6 Male (M) and female (F) members of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–​2013) 1.7 Women in Committees of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–​2013) 1.8 Women in Legislative Committees (2008–​2013) 1.9 Women elected to the second Constituent Assembly (2014) 1.10 Women in Committees of the second Constituent Assembly (2014–​2016) 6.1 Gains and challenges in Nepali women’s empowerment

12 13 13 16 17 19 20 21 22 23 112

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Acknowledgements

This volume presents findings from a project entitled ‘Making Women Count for Peace: Gender, Empowerment and Conflict in South Asia’, funded by the Research Council of Norway (2013–​2016) and hosted by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). The project was a collaborative effort by researchers in South Asia and Europe who investigated women’s participation in local governance and politics in Northeast India and Nepal, focusing on women’s participation in peacebuilding and the conditions for greater post-​conflict gender equality. Throughout the project, the researchers attempted to capture a diverse range of local perspectives on gender equality, empowerment and political participation, and to explore emic understandings of women’s empowerment in a variety of culturally and historically unique settings. The editor would like to thank colleagues and associates in ‘Making Women Count for Peace’ in Europe, India and Nepal for their invaluable contributions to this research project, and especially the authors of the chapters of this volume.

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Abbreviations

CBREPN CPN-​M CPN-​ML CPN-​UML CPN-​Unified CPN-​United DJP MJF MJFG MJFL MJFN NC NJD NLSD NMK NMKP NPD NRP NSP-​A RJ RJM RJP RMSP RPPN RPP SLRM

Chure Bhawar Rastriya Ekta Party Nepal Communist Party of Nepal-​Maoist Communist Party of Nepal-​Marxist-​Leninist Communist Party of Nepal-​United Marxist Leninist Communist Party of Nepal-​Unified Communist Party of Nepal-​United Dalit Janajati Party Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Ganatantrik Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Loktantrik Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal Nepali Congress Nepali Janata Dal Nepal Loktantrik Samajbadi Dal Nepal Majdoor Kisan Nepal Majdur Kishan Party Nepal Pariwar Dal Nepal Rastriya Party Nepal Sadbhawana Party-​Ananadidevi Rastriya Janamukti Rastriya Jana Morcha Rastriya Janashakti Party Rastriya Madhesh Samajbadi Party Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal Rastriya Prajatantra Party Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch

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List of abbreviations  ix SLRM-​Tharuhat SPJP-​N SSP SSPN TMLP TMSP TTPN

Sanghiya Loktantrik Rastriya Manch-​Tharuhat Samajbadi Prajatantrik Janata Party-​Nepal Sanghiya Sadbhawana Party Sanghiya Samajbadi Party Nepal Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party Terai Madhesh Sadbhawana Party Tharuhat Terai Party Nepal

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Contributors

Åshild Kolås is a Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Oslo. Her core research interests are ethnicity, identity politics, governance and representation. She has carried out fieldwork in Tibet, Nepal, Inner Mongolia and Northeast India, and has written extensively on governmentality, cultural politics, and identity. She is the author of Tourism and Tibetan Culture in Transition: A Place Called Shangrila (2008) and co-​author (with Monika P. Thowsen) of On the Margins of Tibet: Cultural Survival on the Sino-​Tibetan Frontier (2015). Among her latest edited volumes is Women, Peace and Security in Northeast India (Zubaan Publishers, 2017). Vanessa Daurer received her Master’s degree from the Department of International Relations and European Studies at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. Her research interests cover gender studies, particularly women in security, conflict and peace, as well as development studies. During fieldwork in Peru, she explored the concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, and investigated donor relations with local Peruvian civil society organizations. In Nepal, she carried out a study on women’s movements and mobilization during the civil war and its aftermath. Vanessa Daurer has also worked on human rights and security policy in the United Nations and European Union. She now works as a civil servant on welfare policies in her native country, Sweden. Philippe Doneys works as Associate Professor of Gender and Development Studies at the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand. He specializes in gender and politics with a focus on Southeast and South Asia. His research interests include human rights

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Notes on contributors  xi and gender, women’s empowerment, gender-​based violence, migration and human trafficking laws and policies, human security and women’s political participation in Asia. Philippe Doneys is co-​editor of the volume Gendered Entanglements: Rethinking Gender in Rapidly Changing Asia (2014). Amrita Pritam Gogoi is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dibrugarh University in Assam, India. She completed a Master’s degree in Political Science at Gauhati University in 2008, and an MPhil at the Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 2012. Currently she is pursuing a PhD in Social Sciences at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Guwahati, on Ideologies, Institutions and Women Combatants in the People’s War of Nepal. Her research interests include the dynamics of violence, and the construction and deconstruction of body and agency in conflict-​ridden societies. Jason Miklian holds a PhD in Development Studies from the Norwegian University of Life Sciences, and an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science,  UK. He is a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Norway, exploring the arenas where conflict and commerce meet. Jason Miklian’s research covers the politics and economics of conflict with a particular focus on India, Nepal, and Colombia. His main research focus is on South Asian conflict resolution and security, having published on media and foreign policy in Nepal, the Maoist insurgency in India, political ecologies of war, and conflict diamonds. Jason Miklian has conducted extensive fieldwork in South Asia since 2005, and has written for or been cited in an expert capacity by the New York Times, Foreign Policy, The Economist, The Hindu, Agence France Presse (AFP), BBC, France 24, NRK (Norway), and National Public Radio (New York) among various media outlets. Gitta Shrestha is a postgraduate of Geographical Development Studies, and holds a Master of Philosophy (MPhil) degree in Resources and Human Adaptations from the University of Bergen, Norway (2009). Currently, she works as an independent researcher for Wageningen University in the Netherlands and the International Water Management Institute in Kathmandu, Nepal. Her core research interests include inequality, social norms and gender justice. Gitta Shrestha has extensive experience with research on gender and social difference. Her current research is on the topic of masculinities and hydropower in India.

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xii  Notes on contributors Lorina Sthapit works as Team Leader of the Gender Justice Programme in Oxfam, Nepal. She holds a Master’s degree in Gender and Development Studies from the Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok, Thailand. Her research interests include women’s rights, gender-​based violence, women’s economic empowerment, migration, peace and conflict, and gender mainstreaming. Lorina Sthapit has worked with the International Fund for Agricultural Development on gender mainstreaming, monitoring and evaluations in Nepal, Uzbekistan and at the organization’s headquarters in Rome. She has also worked at the Padma Kanya Campus, Kathmandu, as a part-​ time teacher for the Postgraduate Diploma in Women’s Studies. She is passionate about gender and humanitarian work, and is also a trained Kathak dancer. Torunn L. Tryggestad is a Senior Researcher at PRIO and director of the PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security, Norway. She holds a PhD in Political Science (University of Oslo) on International Norms and Political Change: ‘Women, Peace and Security’ and the UN Security Agenda. She has extensive experience of teaching, training and providing policy advice to Norwegian ministries, the Norwegian Armed Forces and the justice sector, with a particular focus on the United Nations (UN) Women, Peace and Security initiative, and gendered dimensions of conflict resolution, conflict management and peacebuilding. Torunn Tryggestad has also been engaged in High-​ Level Seminars on Gender and Inclusive Mediation Processes in cooperation with the UN Department of Political Affairs and the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI). She was one of the principal authors of the Norwegian government’s first National Action Plan on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2006). In 2015, she was appointed a member of the UN Secretary General’s fourth UN Peacebuilding Advisory Group for 2015–​2016. She was recently also appointed as a member of the Core Group of the NATO Civil Society Advisory Panel on Women, Peace and Security (2016–​2017). Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya is a Professor of Political Science at Banaras Hindu University (BHU), India and has served as director of the Centre for the Study of Nepal at BHU (2006–​2011) and Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), and as India Chair at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu (2011–​2013). She has conducted postdoctoral research at the London School of Economics and Politics (1986, 1990), and Brown University (1997), and has been a guest scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Centre for International Scholars, and Henry

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Notes on contributors  xiii L. Stimson Centre, Washington D.C. (1993, 1999), the Peace Research Institute Oslo (2016) and Karlstad University, Sweden (2015–​2016). Anjoo Upadhyaya has lectured and published extensively on issues related to ethnicity, gender, conflict and peace. She is currently serving as ICCR Chair, Professor, at Dublin City University in Ireland. Bishnu Raj Upreti holds a PhD in Conflict Management (2001), an MSc in Knowledge Systems Management (1998) from Wageningen University, the Netherlands, and an MA in Sociology (1994) from Tribhuvan University, Nepal. He leads the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), where he is engaged in research and teaching as well as administrative and policy work. Dr. Upreti has been a research fellow at the University of London and the University of Surrey, and worked with the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and several other organizations. He was the South Asia Regional Coordinator of NCCR North-​South (a global research network) for eight years. He also served as Adjunct Professor at the Agriculture and Forestry University, Nepal, and Senior Researcher at Kathmandu University. He has written and edited numerous monographs and edited volumes, published in international peer-​reviewed journals, and authored many chapters in anthologies, and is currently engaged in research projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

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Introduction Women, Peace and Security in review Åshild Kolås and Torunn L. Tryggestad

In November 2006, a decade of civil war ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord by the government of Nepal and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The large share of women in the Constituent Assembly (33 per cent in the 2008 election) was seen as outstanding in the South Asian context, and many viewed the post-​conflict scenario in Nepal as a promising opportunity for women’s increased political participation. After a decade-​long process of constitution-​ making amid political turbulence, further women’s empowerment landmarks were proclaimed in September 2015. As the new Constitution finally came into effect, the Nepali Parliament elected the country’s first female President, Bidhya Devi Bhandari, and its first female Speaker, Onsari Gharti Magar. These developments have given Nepal status as a post-​conflict country to look to, in terms of implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda (Abdela 2011). The time is now ripe for a review of women’s political empowerment through peacemaking in post-​war Nepal. Researchers have argued that compared to non-​ conflict states on the continent, post-​conflict countries in Africa have experienced a much faster trajectory in adopting policies for women’s rights and women’s political empowerment (Tripp 2015). The extent to which similar post-​conflict trajectories can be found in other regions of the world is still under-​researched. The studies presented in this volume add new perspectives to the existing body of knowledge on opportunities for women’s political empowerment in conflict and post-​conflict situations. Documenting and assessing women’s political agency as a key dimension of social transformation, the volume explores political empowerment among three different categories of Nepali women: female ex-​combatants; women activists; and women participants in post-​conflict Nepali politics. Comparing the discourses and practices of Nepali women’s empowerment, we engage with

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2  Åshild Kolås and Torunn L. Tryggestad the policy debate on women’s post-​conflict gender equality as expressed in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda put forward by the United Nations (UN). This introductory chapter gives an overview of the WPS agenda and related literature, situating the case of Nepal within this literature. In recent decades there has been a growing interest in women’s political agency in societies in conflict and post-​war political transformation. Following the seminal work of Cynthia Enloe (1989, 1993) and Ann Tickner (1992), an increasing number of scholars have gradually recognized that gender is fundamental to international politics and, therefore, it is inseparable from conflict, political participation, and decision-​making (Porter 2007, Harris 2011: 3, Basu 2016). Researchers, development practitioners, and policymakers now seek to understand the gendered nature of war, and the potential of female participation in peacemaking for the prevention and resolution of future wars (Advisory Expert Group 2015, UN Women 2015). Women’s increased representation in decision-​making and mechanisms for conflict prevention, management, and resolution is also a key objective of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (UNSC 2000). UNSCR 1325 was adopted in October 2000, after months of intense lobbying by a transnational network of women’s organizations, advocates within the UN system, and champions among UN member states (Tryggestad 2009). For the first time in the history of the UN Security Council, a resolution was passed that acknowledged women’s important contributions to conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding. It called for women’s inclusion and representation in all matters of international peace and security, at all levels. While focusing particularly on women’s political agency, it also acknowledged the need for better protection from conflict-​related sexual violence. There is a pervasive discourse on women’s post-​ conflict political empowerment and the need to reconfigure gender relations in more egalitarian ways through post-​war reconstruction measures (Anderlini 2007, Porter 2007, Olsson 2009, Pratt and Richter-​Devroe 2011). This applies not least to processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and transitional justice (Hauge 2016). Moreover, scholarship on the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding has highlighted the positive contributions of women in establishing a just and peaceful society. According to a study of women’s inclusion and influence in peace negotiations (Paffenholz et al. 2016: 5–​6), the direct inclusion of women does not per se increase the likelihood of more

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Introduction  3 peace agreements being signed or implemented. What seems to make a real difference is the influence that women have on a process; meaning that it is more important that women count than merely counting the number of women included in a process. The study found that the strength of women’s influence is positively correlated with peace agreements being reached and implemented. Furthermore, it is shown that the presence of women also strengthens the influence of other actors (besides the conflict parties) on the peace process. Since UNSCR 1325 was adopted more than 16 years ago, there has been considerable progress in developing the normative framework on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). While WPS issues in the early 2000s were relegated to the margins of UN peace and security politics, WPS has now become a formal item on the Security Council agenda. An additional seven Security Council resolutions have been adopted under the WPS umbrella, a number of which address the issue of conflict-​related sexual violence in particular. The first resolution to do so was UNSCR 1820 (2008). While UNSCR 1325 was vague in terms of concrete commitments, the language of the subsequent resolutions has gradually become more specific and binding. However, the Global Study on WPS (UN Women 2015: 28) expressed a deep concern about the lack of progress with implementation in practice. This applies both to the UN as organization and the member states. At the time of writing (March 2017), 63 UN member states have adopted National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions (PeaceWomen 2017), though the quality and effective implementation of these plans are mixed. Progress has been particularly slow on women’s inclusion in formal peace and transitional processes. The under-​representation of women in such processes is significant. A study by UN Women (2012) of 31 major peace processes showed that only 2 per cent of chief mediators; 4 per cent of witnesses or signatories; and 9 per cent of negotiators were women. Among the many action points of UNSCR 1325, the resolution encouraged all those involved in the planning of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes to take the different needs of female and male combatants into consideration (action point 13). This is an action point of particular relevance to Nepal, with its high share of women among the demobilized Maoist forces (Falch 2010). According to the National Women’s Commission, women made up one-​ third of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in some districts, and as many as 50 per cent in the most highly mobilized areas, assuming roles ranging from combatants to members of cultural troops. In the post-​conflict disarmament and demobilization process, the United

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4  Åshild Kolås and Torunn L. Tryggestad Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) concluded that women made up 19.63 per cent of the total verified PLA ex-​combatants, 3,846 out of 19,602 PLA ex-​combatants (Dahal 2015: 187).

Women, Peace and Security comes to Nepal Women’s participation in political decision-​making is recognized as an instrument as well as a goal of women’s empowerment. Hence, UN bodies and other international agencies advocate against gender discrimination through international legal instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions are categorized as ‘soft law’ and are as such not as legally binding to member states as covenants and conventions. Nevertheless, the government of Nepal has signed on to many of these instruments, and has developed and adapted national policies in line with them. CEDAW was signed and ratified by Nepal in 1991; so was the ICCPR. Following these ratifications, Nepal revised some of its previously discriminatory laws to ensure gender equality, inserting elements of ICCPR into domestic legislation, institutional arrangements, and policies. In the post-​conflict scenario, the 2007 Interim Constitution of Nepal also addressed the concerns of ICCPR. Further, in 2011 –​as the first country in South Asia –​Nepal adopted a National Action Plan on the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 (Government of Nepal 2011). Bilateral, multilateral and regional institutions have provided substantial support for women’s rights and political participation in Nepal. The UN, European Union (EU), and international non-​ governmental organizations (INGOs) have provided technical and financial support to develop new policies and guidelines related to CEDAW, the Millennium Development Goals, and the National Action Plan on UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820. Technical and financial support has also been provided bilaterally by a number of countries. Through its chairmanship of the Peace Support Working Group in Nepal, Norway provided considerable support to the process of developing Nepal’s National Action Plan on UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820. National NGOs and civil society organizations have also played an important role in promoting women’s rights (Pant and Standing 2011), peace and reconciliation (Upreti 2009) and socio-​ economic transformation in Nepal, leading the work on the National Action Plan on UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820, as well as psychosocial counseling, peace awareness, and livelihood generation

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Introduction  5 for conflict victims (Baechler 2010). Local organizations working on women’s issues have been instrumental in linking local issues with the broader provisions of CEDAW (National Women’s Commission 2011). Women’s organizations have been active in lobbying, networking, and launching awareness programs on women’s rights and equality, and in monitoring of the state’s compliance to international instruments, which has been vital to the strengthening of democracy (Nepali and Pyakurel 2009). Moreover, women’s organizations played a significant role in advocating for a strong female representation in the Constituent Assembly, recognizing the importance of the making of the new Nepali constitution. Nepali women’s organizations have increasingly used UNSCR 1325 as an advocacy tool to put pressure on the government and political parties to include women in the peace process and constitution-​ drafting. The combined work of the Women’s Alliance for Peace, Justice and Democracy, and the Women’s Alliance for Peace, Power and Constituent Assembly played a crucial role in promoting women’s participation in peace-​and constitution-​making (Justino et al. 2012). Sancharika Samuha, Shantimalika, Sankalpa, and many other organizations devoted to the empowerment of women were critical for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, encouraging women’s inclusion in peacebuilding and reconstruction, legislative reforms, and transitional justice (Tomovcik and Reichrath 2011). The significant work of women’s organizations, networks, and alliances such as Mahila Adhikar Manch, National Alliance of Women’s Human Rights Defenders, and Women for Human Rights should also be acknowledged (Justino et al. 2012). Despite a substantial literature on the civil war in Nepal, there is not much scholarly documentation of its wider repercussions on gendered power relations. Nor do we find any sustained research on the post-​war political participation of Nepali female ex-​combatants, or even their political role during the war. There is a wealth of journalistic articles and NGO reports presenting challenges faced by female Maoist ex-​ combatants, but we cannot find research that critically assesses their empowerment, whether through integration into the security forces, or as political activists or politicians. Nepal’s National Action Plan on UNSC Resolutions 1325 and 1820 does address the needs of female ex-​ combatants, although primarily as individuals in need of humanitarian assistance or social rehabilitation. The political agency of female ex-​ combatants is hardly mentioned in the National Action Plan, nor was there any emphasis on women’s empowerment or agency in the process of reintegrating the Maoist ex-​combatants into society.

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6  Åshild Kolås and Torunn L. Tryggestad In this volume, the chapter by Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha (Chapter 1) traces the history of women’s participation in Nepal’s parliamentary assemblies, including the two post-​war constituent assemblies (2008–​2013 and 2013–​2015). The chapters by Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys (Chapter 2) and Amrita Pritam Gogoi (Chapter 3) offer important insights into the political agency of female ex-​combatants in post-​conflict Nepal. Significantly, these chapters not only question the empowering effects of female participation in the Maoist insurgency, but contextualize these questions within the larger debate about the empowerment of women in the post-​conflict political scene of Nepal. The chapters by Vanessa Daurer (Chapter 4) and Anjoo Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian (Chapter 5) offer perspectives on Nepali women’s post-​conflict empowerment through activism. The final chapter by Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti, and Åshild Kolås (Chapter 6) presents a summary of key findings, and attempts to assess whether the case of Nepal actually represents a successful transition to post-​conflict women’s empowerment. Have Nepali women been empowered in the transition from war to peace? Has Nepal been transformed into a more gender-​equal society? This will become more evident as we unpack the post-​war fate of female ex-​combatants, and the role of women in constitution-​making and post-​ war politics, to critically review alleged post-​war women’s empowerment gains by way of increased female participation in the party politics and the governance of Nepal.

References Abdela, L. 2011. ‘Nepal and Implementation of UNSCR 1325’, in F. Olonsaki, K. Barnes and E. Ikpe, eds, Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 66–​86. Advisory Expert Group. 2015. The Challenge of Sustaining Peace. Report of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. New York, NY: United Nations. Anderlini, S. N. 2007. Women Building Peace. What They Do, Why It Matters. Boulder; CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Baechler, G. 2010. A Mediator’s Perspective:  Women and the Nepali Peace Process. Women at the Table:  Asia Pacific 2010 Opinion Series, No. 1. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Basu, S. 2016. ‘Gender as national interest at the UN Security Council’, International Affairs, 92(2): 255–​273. Dahal, S. 2015. ‘Challenging the Boundaries: The Narratives of the Female Ex-​ Combatants in Nepal’, in S. Shekhawat, ed., Female Combatants in Conflict and Peace:  Challenging Gender in Violence and Post-​Conflict Reintegration, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 185–​199.

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Introduction  7 Enloe, C. 1989. Bananas, Bases and Beaches:  Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. —​—​—​. 1993. The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Falch, Å. 2010. Women’s Political Participation and Influence in Post-​Conflict Burundi and Nepal. PRIO Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo. Government of Nepal. 2011. National Action Plan on Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325  & 1820 (2011/​12–​2016/​ 2017). Harris, C. 2011. What Can Applying a Gender Lens Contribute to Conflict Studies? A Review of Selected MICROCON Working Papers. MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 41. Brighton: MICROCON. Hauge, W. I. 2016. Gender Dimensions of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). PRIO Paper. Oslo: Peace Research Institute Oslo. Justino, P., Müller, C., Mitchell, B. and Cardona, I. 2012. From the Ground Up:  Women’s Roles in Local Peacebuilding in Afghanistan, Liberia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sierra Leone. Action Aid, Institute of Development Studies and Womankind. [online] Available at:  www.actionaid.org/​sites/​files/​actionaid/​ from_​the_​ground_​up_​-​_​full_​report.pdf National Women’s Commission. 2011. National Implementation Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Independent Report prepared by the National’s Women’s Commission of Nepal to supplement the Combined 4th and 5th Periodic Report Submitted to the CEDAW Committee by the Government of Nepal. Kathmandu: National Women’s Commission. Nepali, R. K. and Pyakurel, U. P. 2009. A Study of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly Election: The Influence of Civil Society and the Multilateral System. Paper presented at Forum International de Montreal, Delhi [online] Available at: http://​fimforum.org/​en/​library/​RNepali2009.pdf Olsson, L. 2009. Gender Equality and United Nations Peace Operations in Timor Leste. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Paffenholz, T., Ross, N., Dixon, S., Schluchter, A-​L. and True, J. 2016. Making Women Count –​Not Just Counting Women: Assessing Women’s Inclusion and Influence on Peace Negotiations. Geneva:  Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative (The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) and UN Women. Pant, B. and Standing, K. 2011. ‘Citizenship rights and women’s roles in development in post-​conflict Nepal’, Gender & Development, 19(3): 409–​421. PeaceWomen. 2017. WILP’s Women, Peace and Security Project. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF). [online] Available at: www.peacewomen.org/​member-​states. Porter, E. 2007. Peacebuilding:Women in International Perspective. London: Routledge. Pratt, N. and Richter-​Devroe, S. 2011. ‘Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, 13(4): 489–​503.

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8  Åshild Kolås and Torunn L. Tryggestad Tickner, J.A. 1992. Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Tomovcik, G. and Reichrath, S. 2011. Women’s Political Participation in Post-​Conflict Transitions. Background brief. Ottawa, Canada:  Peacebuild/​ Paixdurable. Tripp, A. M. 2015. Women and Power in Post-​ conflict Africa. New  York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Tryggestad, T. L. 2009. ‘ “Trick or treat?” The UN and implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security’, Global Governance, 15: 539–​557. UNSC (United Nations Security Council). 2000. Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, 31 October 2000, UN Doc S/​RES/​ 1325(2000). UN Women. 2012. Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations:  Connections between Presence and Influence. Internal study by Pablo Castillo-​Diaz and Simon Tordjman. New York, NY: UN Women. —​—​—​. 2015. Preventing Conflict. Transforming Justice. Securing the Peace. A  Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. New York, NY: UN Women. Upreti B. R. 2009. Nepal from War to Peace. Legacies of the Past and Hopes for the Future. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers.

9

1 The road to parliament Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha

The decade-​long armed conflict in Nepal (1996–​2006) was a time of grave human rights abuses, economic disruption, and destruction of infrastructure, which also unsettled the status quo of patriarchal social relations. Unprecedented events such as the April 2006 Peoples’ Movement paved the way for landmark achievements in women’s political participation, promising a new direction to Nepali politics. A major milestone was the post-​conflict benchmark of 33 per cent women’s representation in the legislature. In April 2008, for the first time in the history of Nepal, 197 women were elected to the Constituent Assembly, taking up the vital task of writing a new constitution for Nepal. Unfortunately, due to incessant political strife, the first Constituent Assembly failed to promulgate a constitution, and efforts by female members of the Assembly to draft a gender friendly and inclusive constitution were also frustrated. The second Constituent Assembly finally accomplished its task, nearly a decade after the November 2006 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA). The aim of this chapter is to review the conditions, dynamics, and factors affecting the participation of women in the constitution-​making process of post-​conflict Nepal. Our review is framed by three questions:  How have women made their way into Nepali politics? How has their political participation, as articulated in the CPA and Interim Constitution, evolved in the post-​conflict scenario? Has women’s post-​ conflict political inclusion translated into policymaking in support of gender equality? We investigate these questions through exploratory and analytical research, including content analysis of relevant publications and archival records, discussions with key women activists, politicians, analysts and gender experts, and in-​depth interviews with politicians (male and female), female Maoist ex-​combatants, and members of Nepali civil society.

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10  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha

The context: women’s struggles for political participation Several studies have documented Nepali women’s activism for equal rights, political participation and social change (Aziz 2001, Dhungana 2014, Hutt 2013, Upreti 2006; 2009; 2010, Upreti and Muller-​Boeker 2010). Here we present only a brief summary of the historical role of women and women’s movements in Nepali politics. The first democratic era (1951–​1960) Prior to 1950, Nepali women were barred from electoral politics, deprived of political rights due to oppressive cultural, religious and social traditions (IDEA 2012). Equal rights for women was a key demand of the emerging Nepali women’s movement, spearheaded by the Nepal Women’s Association, Nepal Mahila Sangh. In the 1940s, the women’s movement became involved in the people’s uprising against the Rana oligarchy. This escalated during the tripartite negotiations between the King of Nepal, the Rana prime minister, and the Nepali Congress Party, known as the Delhi Agreement because of its facilitation by India’s prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Some viewed these negotiations as an attempt to crush the people’s uprising against the Rana regime. A  group of female activists from Nepal Mahila Sangh organized a protest against the Indian prime minister’s visit to Nepal. As Jawaharlal Nehru arrived at the airport, they waved black flags at the prime minister. Eight of the protesters were arrested. An era of important political change began in 1951 with the elimination of the Rana regime and introduction of democracy. Although there were no women among the 35 members of the constitution advisory assembly, women’s right to vote was granted in the Interim Constitution of 1951. The Interim Constitution provided suffrage for women, though it was still heavily gender-​biased and made no provision to allow women the right to stand for election. In a groundbreaking victory for the women’s movement, Nepali women cast their ballots for the first time in the 1952 election. In 1952, a new women’s organization was established under the name All Nepal Women’s Association, Akhil Mahila Sangh. Together with Nepal Mahila Sangh, Akhil Nepal Mahila Sangh staged peaceful protests (satyagraha) in front of the royal palace, demanding the right of women to stand for elections. In 1954, a number of women were nominated to the Consultative Assembly (Sakya 2003). Women participated actively in the pro-​democracy movement, and in the brief 18  months of multi-​party parliamentary democracy in 1959–​1960 (Ghimire 2000).

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Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  11 The struggle of women for political participation was to some extent successful, as 15 women were elected in the first parliamentary general election in 1958, out of a total of 105 constituencies. The Panchayat era (1960–​1990) In 1960, the King of Nepal regained power and imposed an autocratic party-​less Panchayat system. Dwarika Devi Thakurani from the Nepali Congress became the first female minister in Nepal (RSN 2009). Her family was well placed in the national economic and political elite. Thakurani was appointed as Deputy Minister of Health and Local Government. The 1962 Constitution of Nepal institutionalized the Panchayat system. The King appointed a drafting committee for a women’s bill, which was asked to prioritize equal rights for women in paternal property. To address the issues and concerns of women and help to increase women’s income, security, and literacy, the King created a new women’s association, named Nepal Women’s Organization, Nepal Mahila Sangathan. However, there were restrictions on other political organizations and gatherings, and a ban on political parties and the women’s organizations affiliated with them. In the new political system, the Nepali women’s movement was taken over by a development agenda sketched by the government. Programs were focused on improving women’s economic conditions without addressing their traditional role, ignoring women as agents of change (Rana 2012). Formally, the 1962 Constitution provided equal rights for men and women, and a few women were also appointed to ministerial posts (Malla 2011, Wejnert 2012). Women were still severely underrepresented in politics, both at the local and national level. In an effort to ameliorate this situation, a constitutional amendment ordered at least one woman to serve as a representative in each village Panchayat, either by selection or nomination. However, women’s organizations criticized this provision for favoring village elites, or panchas (Malla 2011, Yami 2006). Women activists continued their struggle, actively opposing the regime and demanding the restoration of multi-​party democracy. As a result, many were detained and imprisoned (Ghimire 2000). The era of parliamentary democracy (1990–​1996) Multi-​party democracy was restored in Nepal in 1990, providing more space for women in politics (Pradhan 2004–​2005). Women’s fundamental right to political representation was recognized with the provision

12

12  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha of universal adult franchise. Making use of newly won political freedoms, grassroots organizations such as women’s forest user groups, women’s water user committees, mother’s groups, women’s saving and credit groups, community awareness centers, women’s cooperatives, and women’s development groups sprung up across the country to empower their members and take action on issues of concern. Women’s groups started to demand equal property rights, social security rights, citizenship rights, and women’s representation in constitution-​making. Women’s participation in voting was less than 20 percent on average in the local elections of 1990 (Lawoti 2010). As of 1991, a provision was introduced to ensure 5 percent women’s candidacy in elections to the House of Representatives, Pratinidhi Sabha. Although the reservation for women’s candidacy was small, it opened up political space for women, providing an opportunity for a few women to join politics. In both the first and second parliamentary elections, held in 1991 and 1994, women secured 7 out of 205 seats. Women’s representation in the Pratinidhi Sabha thus reached 3.4 percent. An overview of women’s candidacy and success in these elections is presented in Table 1.1. Thanks to the reservation for women’s candidacy in parliamentary elections, the participation of women in politics increased. In 1991 there were 80 female parliamentary candidates, rising to 86 in 1994, and 143 in 1999. Although female candidates gained only a few electoral victories, women were encouraged to enter politics. This also provided women a new opportunity to organize. However, the political participation of women varied by region. As shown in Table 1.2 and 1.3, no female candidates were elected from the mid-​western and far-​western development regions, whether in the 1991 or 1994 parliamentary election. In its Eighth Five-​Year Plan (1991–​1995) the government of Nepal incorporated policies to increase women’s representation in decision-​ making in the governmental and semi-​governmental sectors. The Plan’s empowerment approach included mandatory representation of women Table 1.1  Results of elections for the House of Representatives (1991, 1994) Year

Candidates Elected

1991

1994

Male

Female Total Women Male Female in %

Total Women in %

1265 198

80 7

1442 205

1345 205

Source: Election Commission (1999)

5.9% 3.4%

1356 198

86 7

5.9% 3.4%

13

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  13 Table 1.2  Women elected to the House of Representatives (1991) Region

District

No. of candidates

Name of Representative

Eastern Central

Morang Kathmandu Dhanusha Sarlahi Gorkha Myagdi Parbat

5 4 2 2 2 1 2

Shailaja Acharya Sahana Pradhan Lila Koirala Urmila Nepal Maiya Devi Shrestha Yam Maya Pun Uma Adhikari

Western

Source: Election Commission (2006)

Table 1.3  Women elected to the House of Representatives (1994) Region

District

No. of candidates

Name of Representative

Eastern Central

Morang Kathmandu Kathmandu Dhanusha Sarlahi Sunsari Gorkha

7 6 2 2 2 1 2

Shailaja Acharya Sahana Pradhan Vidyadevi Bhandari Lila Koirala Mina Pandey Lila Shrestha Subba Kamala Devi Panta

Western

Source: Election Commission (2006)

in the formulation of policies and programs. In 1991, the government of Nepal ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This gave further impetus to the Nepali women’s movement, especially on the demand for equal rights to ancestral property. In 1995, the government established a Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare to address women’s issues and concerns. In ministries, gender focal points were created. Women’s engagement grew, in government as well as academia, politics, and business (Bächler et al. 2008, Upreti 2009). Throughout the 1990s, international organizations were eager to promote gender equality in Nepal. Increasingly, international donor-​ funded projects and programs started integrating gender in their work. Influenced by the global discourse on women’s empowerment, donors emphasized women’s overall development as a priority. Nepali women’s organizations also started uniting to address women’s concerns more strategically. The Women’s Pressure Group was formed by 84

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14  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha non-​governmental organizations (NGOs) working on issues of concern to women, to advocate for gender equality. At the end of the 1990s there were as many as 4,175 women’s NGOs in different sectors, collaborating with donors to address discrimination against women (Mahat 2003). Despite the efforts of women’s rights activists, under-​representation of women continued in the cabinet, Supreme Court, and other courts, as well as in the parliament and central committees of major political parties. Women’s representation in the bureaucracy also remained low. The armed conflict (1996–​2006) The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) started an armed insurrection in 1996, while the elected government was still learning to practice multi-​party democracy. Political parties were new to governance, their performance was poor, and they were unable to meet public expectations (Upreti 2009). Within the various political parties, women were still struggling to promote women’s rights and political participation. The Maoist approach to women’s liberation was entirely different from the women’s development approach practiced by the government. The Maoists introduced attractive slogans of liberating women from all forms of discrimination and establishing equal rights, as spelled out in their 40-​point political reform agenda. Consequently, thousands of women from rural areas supported the Maoists, with a dream of ending prevailing inequalities (Mahat 2003). During the decade-​ long armed conflict between the government and the Maoists, women were actively engaged in the quest for political change, participating both in the military, the Maoist ‘People’s Liberation Army’ (PLA), and Maoist political organizations. Most of the female members were from rural areas, joining the revolution to put an end to discrimination and to challenge gender-​based violence (Ariño 2008, Mazurana 2010). Although some argue that the significant participation of women in the conflict was due to coercion, as in the ‘one house, one cadre’ compulsory participation, the Maoist mobilization of women was remarkable (Upreti 2010; see also Gogoi in Chapter 3 of this volume). The backdrop was the widespread experience of marginalization and social exclusion, which the Maoists tapped into (Ariño 2008, Gautam et al. 2003, Upreti and Muller-​Boeker 2010). The Maoists enforced a ‘dry law’ in rural areas of Nepal in order to reduce alcoholism among men, and established a parallel justice system under which men accused of abusing their wives were to be punished. They also ran anti-​polygamy campaigns (Adhikari 2006). In remote rural areas the Maoists provided women with unprecedented access

15

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  15 to justice, addressing the problem of domestic violence. Maoist advocacy for abolition of gender inequalities in inheritance and property rights gave young women a glimpse of a better future, where women would achieve liberation from inequality and discrimination. Arguably, the Maoists capitalized on discrimination against women to win their support, but their campaigns were also vitally important for women’s empowerment. In the past, Nepali women who entered into politics tended to be widows, wives or daughters of well-​known male politicians (Karki and Seddon 2003). However, as the Maoist insurgency escalated, ordinary women from both urban and rural areas started to participate in their politics, and even in the Maoist armed forces. For the first time, women were taking up grassroots political activities, ultimately radicalizing the discourse of women’s participation in politics and the important role of women in Nepali government institutions. In its Ninth Five-​Year Plan (1997–​2002), the Nepali government adopted gender mainstreaming to address the political concerns of women and to empower women through clearly defined targets and programs, allocation of resources, and monitoring mechanisms. The aim was to eliminate gender inequality in laws, and to create affirmative action policies and programs to reduce socio-​economic inequalities. There was also an effort to create stronger laws and enforcement mechanisms to counter all kinds of violence against women, and to introduce gender-​awareness campaigns for the public sector. When the third parliamentary election was held in 1999, women’s representation reached an unprecedented 5.9 percent—​an increase of 2.5 percent as compared to the general elections of 1991 and 1994. For the first time, women were also elected from the mid-​western and far-​western regions (see Table 1.4 below). Women were thus able to secure 12 seats out of the total 205 in the House of Representatives. The 1999 Local Self-​Governance Act gave another boost to women’s local participation in decision-​making, reserving 20  percent of ward-​ level posts for women. Thanks to this law, about 3,600 women were elected into local government across the country. This was the highest number of women ever participating in Nepali politics. Meanwhile, the Maoists obstructed the government’s programs, taking advantage of local governance weaknesses and strategically filling the vacuum with their own programs. The government was hence unable to implement its gender mainstreaming programs or ensure the 20  percent reservation for women in local elections. The activities of NGOs were also obstructed. The Maoist demand was “political settlement first and then only development” (Upreti 2007; 2009). Any reform program, be it in

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16  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha Table 1.4  Women elected to the House of Representatives (1999) Region

District

No. of candidates

Name of Representative

Eastern

Sunsari Saptari Siraha Kathmandu Kathmandu Lilitpur Parsa Chitwan Gorkha Rukkum Bardiya Kailali

1 3 2 2 6 1 4 1 2 2 1 1

Kanta Sharma Renu Kumari Yadav Chitralekha Yadav Bidyadevi Bhandari Asthalaxmi Shakya Bohara Sushila Nepal Urmila Nepal Savitri Bogati Kamala Panta Tirtha Gautam Kashi Paudel Susila Suwar

Central

Western Mid-​western Far-​western

Source: Election Commission (2006)

poverty alleviation, gender mainstreaming, health, food security, or education, was severely affected. After the June 2001 massacre at the royal palace, King Gyanendra became the new monarch. He soon started weakening the political parties by manipulating their leaders. In 2002, he dissolved the parliament, imposing direct rule under his chairmanship. Nevertheless, the government continued its efforts towards women’s political participation in its Tenth Five-​Year Plan (2002–​2007), where a Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper emphasized increased women’s access to governance structures and positions. The National Women’s Commission was established in 2002 to advise the government on effective implementation of international human rights instruments and to develop policies and plans aimed at advancing women’s rights. Despite all the efforts, progress was exceedingly slow in addressing deep-​rooted gender-​based discrimination and exclusion. Due to the pervasiveness of patriarchal norms, the share of women in central committees of major political parties remained less than 10 percent (Wejnert 2012). In this regard, the Maoist party was not much different from the rest, giving little space for women within the party leadership. In the Maoist party structures there were very few women at the top decision-​making level and the central committee, nor at the levels of the commanders of their armed forces. Despite all their campaigns for women’s rights, the Maoists failed to include women in their negotiation teams during the 2001, 2003, and 2006 peace talks with the Nepali government.

17

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  17 The 2006 People’s Movement and the end of war In 2006, a People’s Movement (Jana Andolan) was launched in Nepal in a concerted effort to restore democracy and peace. Women’s participation in the movement was strong, especially as organizers of peace rallies, and lobbyists for conflict parties to engage in dialogue. As one of the provisions of the subsequent negotiations, the King re-​instated the previously dissolved parliament in April 2006. Another demand of the women’s organizations was to include their leaders in the peace process. Consequently, two women were included in a 31-​member National Peace Process Monitoring Committee, and six women were added to the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee. A  total of 57 women (17.3  percent) participated in the Interim Legislature (IDEA 2011; see Table 1.5). The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed on November 21 2006. The CPA covered many of the issues and concerns of women, Dalit and marginalized communities, and ethnic groups. The CPA preamble states that both parties to the Peace Agreement (the Maoists and the government of Nepal) commit to the progressive restructuring of the state by resolving prevailing problems related to class, ethnicity, regional and gender differences, to ensure civil liberties, fundamental rights, human rights, complete press freedom, rule of law, and all other norms and values of a democratic system. It also included commitments to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international humanitarian laws, values and principles of human rights, guaranteed the fundamental rights of the Nepalese people, and recognized the need for democracy, peace, prosperity, and progressive social and economic transformation as the central focus of the state. The Interim Constitution (IC) was promulgated on January 15 2007. The IC made special provisions for the political inclusion of Table 1.5  Women’s participation in the Interim Legislature (2006–​2007) Political party

Nepali Congress CPN-​UML CPN-​Maoist Others Total

Total membership

133 83 83 31 330

Female membership No. of women

Percentage (of total)

10 12 31 4 57

7.5% 14.5% 37.4% 12.9% 17.3%

Source: IDEA (2011). Adapted from and published with permission of International IDEA.

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18  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha women. Article 63 of the IC stipulated at least 33 percent women to be appointed in state structures, whereas article 142 (3) (C) directed compulsory representation of women in the executive posts of political parties (Acharya 2011, Maskey 2011). Article 20 of the 2007 IC specifically dictated the rights of women. These were foundations for women’s engagement in the constitution-​making process. The Civil Service Act of 1993 was subsequently amended, providing that 45 percent of seats in Civil Service positions should be filled through reservation and 55  percent through open competition. Of the 45  percent reserved seats, women should fill 33 percent and other disadvantaged groups should fill the rest. Representation of women in the Constituent Assembly was also ensured, requiring 33 percent women’s candidacy and reservation for women in the Assembly through a combination of the First-​Past-​the-​Post (FPTP) and Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems.

Women in post-​war politics In the 2008 Constituent Assembly election there were 3,500 candidates, of which one third were women. When the 601-​member assembly was formed, 197 (32.8 percent) of its members were women. Representing 20 political parties, and from diverse ethnic and geographical backgrounds, 30 women had been elected through the FPTP and 161 through the PR system, comprising 12.5 and 48 percent respectively of the total of each category (see Table 1.6). Among the female Constituent Assembly members were 45 widows, six wives of missing husbands, and 20 Dalit (low-​caste) women, some of whom were appointed as chairs of thematic committees of the Assembly (IDEA 2011; see Tables  1.7 and 1.8). Among the 30 women elected through FPTP, 24 were from the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), two each were from Nepali Congress (NC) and Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal (MJFN), and one each were from the Communist Party of Nepal-​ United Marxist Leninist and Tarai Madhesh Democratic Party (TMDP). In the PR category, the CPN-​Maoist party selected 50 women, while three women were selected by special nomination (RSN 2009). The Cabinet formed in 2009 had four female minister – t​ he highest number in the history of Nepal (Wejnert 2012). In the Second Constituent Assembly (also 601 seats in total), the share of female members was reduced. In the November 2013 election, only ten women (4.16  percent of the FPTP total) won seats through FPTP, among them six from NC, three from CPN-​UML and one from the Maoists. Out of the 335 PR seats nominated by different parties,

19

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  19 Table 1.6  Male (M) and female (F) members of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–​2013) Political party

CPN-​M NC CPN-​UML MJF TMIP RPP CPN-​ML CPN-​United Sadbhawana Janamorcha RPP-​Nepal RJP RJM NMK RJ CPN-​Unified NSP-​A NJD SLRM SPJP-​N DJP NPD NRP NLSD CBREPN Independent Total

Women Total Women in %

First-​Past-​the-​Post

Proportional representation

Cabinet nominees

Candidates

Elected

Elected

Nominated

M

F

M

F

M

F

M

F

197 214 212 100 90 210 105 49 83 175 196 184 107 71 76 126 91 30 43 43 49 –​ 5 11 21 774 3262

43 26 27 3 4 22 11 6 4 28 8 14 15 27 8 10 13 10 2 7 1 –​ 1 0 1 42 333

96 35 32 28 8 0 0 0 4 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –​ 0 0 0 2 210

24 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 –​ 0 0 0 0 30

50 37 35 11 6 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 174

50 36 35 11 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 161

6 4 3 2 1 –​ 1 –​ –​ 1 –​ –​ –​ 1 –​ –​ 1 –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ 20

3 1 2 0 0 –​ 0 –​ –​ 0 –​ –​ –​ 0 –​ –​ 0 –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ 6

Total

229 115 108 54 21 8 9 5 9 8 4 3 4 5 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 601

Candidates

FPTP elected PR elected

Nominated

Elected

333 3595 9.3%

30 240 12.5%

6 26 23.1%

197 601 32.8%

161 335 48.1%

Source: IDEA (2008). Adapted from and published with permission of International IDEA.

women won 162 of them (48.35 percent of the PR total). Among them, 45 were from NC, 42 were from CPN-​UML, 27 from CPN (Maoist), 11 from Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal (RPPN), and the remainder were from 19 different smaller parties. Of the 26 seats to be nominated by the government, only three were offered to women (see Table 1.9).

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20  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha Table 1.7  Women in Committees of the first Constituent Assembly (2008–​2013) Committees of the First Constituent Assembly Constitutional Committee Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles Committee on Rights of Minorities and Marginalised Communities Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution of State Power Committee for Determining the Structure of Legislative Bodies Committee for Determining the Form of the Governance of State Judicial System Committee Committee for Determining the Structure of Constitutional Bodies Natural Resources, Financial Rights and Revenue Sharing Committee Committee for Determining the Base of Cultural and Social Solidarity National Interest Preservation Committee Civic Relations Committee Public View Collection and Coordination Committee Capacity Building and Resource Management Committee Total

No. of women 16 15

Name of chair* Binda Pandey

17 12 11 12 16 15 7 19 9 15 14

Amrita Thapa Magar Navodita Chaudhary Mina Pandey

18 196

*Name of chair of Committees chaired by women. Adapted from and published with permission of International IDEA. Source: IDEA (2011)

The political parties struggled hard to finalize their nomination of 26 members, submitting their list of nominees in August 2014, nine months after the election. The list then included 17 nominees (eight from NC, eight from CPN-​UML and one from RPPN) but only two of them were women.1 In October 2014, the government further nominated four CPN (Maoist) members, including one woman. Consequently, women’s participation in the second Constituent Assembly was slightly less than the constitutionally mandated 33 percent. The first Constituent Assembly had 14 thematic and procedural committees, of which women headed four committees. These were the Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles (led by Binda Pandey), the Committee on Natural Resources, Financial Rights

21

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  21 Table 1.8  Women in Legislative Committees (2008–​2013) Committees of the Legislature Legislative Committee Finance and Labour Relations Committee International Relations and Human Rights Committee Committee for Natural Resources and Means Development Committee Committee for Women, Children and Social Welfare State Management Committee Public Accounts Committee Security Special Committee Parliamentary Hearing Special Committee Total

No. of women

Name of chair*

25 15 19

Yashoda Subedi Sushila Kandagwa

18 15 38

Shanta Chaudhary Sandhya Devi Dev

19 15 13 23 200

*Name of chair of Committees chaired by women. Adapted from and published with permission of International IDEA. Source: IDEA (2011)

and Revenue Sharing (led by Amrita Thapa Mangar), the Committee for Determining the Base of Cultural and Social Solidarity (led by Navodita Chaudhary), and the Civic Relations Committee (led by Mina Pandey) (see Table  1.7). In addition, four women headed legislative committees (see Table  1.8). Three important thematic committees with women Chairs completed their preliminary drafts and reports on time, overcoming differences in ideologies and party interests. The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles Committee, one of the most important committees, recommended several rights for women and other marginalized groups. Likewise, the Committee on Natural Resources, Financial Rights and Revenue Sharing proposed equal rights for women in economic opportunities. Female Constituent Assembly members also led sub-​committees formed under the thematic committees, performing their tasks conscientiously and on time. Despite the important role of women in the first Constituent Assembly, the role of women in the second Constituent Assembly was less visible. Rather than increasing political participation of women as might be expected, the result of the second Constituent Assembly election shows a decrease in the share of women: 30 percent in the second Constituent Assembly as compared to 33 percent in the first Constituent Assembly. Only ten women (4.16 percent) were elected to the second Constituent Assembly in open competition through the FPTP system, as compared to 30 (12.5  percent) in the first Assembly. The target of 33  percent

22

22  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha Table 1.9  Women elected to the second Constituent Assembly (2014) Political party NC CPN-​UML CPN-​M RPPN RPP MJFL MJFN TMLP CPN-​ML Sadbhawana SSPN RJP CPN-​Unified NMKP RMSP NPD RJP DJP TMSP TTPN SLRM-​Tharuhat MJFG SSP Women Total Women in %

First-​Past​the-​Post 6 3 1

10 240 4.2%

Proportional representation 45 42 27 11 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 162 335 48.4%

Nominees

Total

3 26 11.5%

51 45 28 11 5 5 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 175 601 29.1%

Source: Compiled by authors from public documents

women’s participation mandated by the 2007 Interim Constitution was not achieved (see Table 1.9). It is also noteworthy that only two of the second Constituent Assembly’s female members became committee heads (see Table 1.10). Moreover, the 2013 Interim Government responsible for the election had only one female minister, which is perhaps even more surprising considering that it was led by the ‘women-​friendly’ Maoists.2 Post-​conflict, decision-​makers had to be heavily pressurized on the target of 33  percent women’s participation in the constitution-​making process. The Election Commission was tasked with enforcing the provision, employing the Proportional Representation (PR) system to ensure women’s representation in the Constituent Assembly. Political parties

23

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  23 Table  1.10  Women in Committees of the second Constituent Assembly (2014–​2016) Committees of the Second Constituent Assembly Statute Drafting Committee Committee on Constitutional Political Dialogue & Consensus Building Committee on Citizen Relations & Public Opinion Collection Committee to Study & Determine Constitutional Records Committee on Capacity Enhancement of Lawmakers & Resource Mobilisation Total

No. of women

Name of chair*

2 7 44

Pramila Rana

11 1

Laxmi Chaudhary

65

*Name of chair of Committees chaired by women Source: Compiled by authors from public documents

were also forced to adopt measures to include women in their respective party agendas and organizational structures (Yami 2010). Under the PR system, political parties were mandated to include 50 percent of candidates from women in their closed list. The Election Commission also issued a mandatory 50 percent to be maintained in selection processes or 50 percent selection of women out of the total seats of each party. Non-​ fulfillment of these requirements by the parties would lead them to lose their winning seats. There was no minimum requirement for the political parties to provide a strong women’s share of candidacy for First-​Past-​ the-​Post (FPTP) election. Nevertheless, political parties with candidates in both FPTP and PR were required to fulfill an additional inclusiveness quota requirement with regard to women, amounting to at least one-​third women candidates in total.3 The Constituent Assembly Member Election Act, 2007 divided the seats under PR within the five major groups based on their existing population: Madhesi (31.2 percent), Dalits (13 percent), indigenous (37.8  percent), backward regions (4  percent), and others (30.2 percent). Once again, to ensure the representation of women from all these sub-​groups, it was mandated that from each group 50 percent must be women. Despite having committed to reach these targets, none of the large political parties reached the quota of 33  percent women’s representation in their party structures.4 Moreover, by the time of the second Constituent Assembly election, party gatekeepers had developed a strategy of fielding weak females against stronger male candidates.

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24  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha

Women’s engagement in the Constituent Assembly What was the extent of engagement of women in the Constituent Assembly (CA)? For women CA members, this was their first real opportunity to make an impact on the situation of women through the new constitution and laws. Female CA members decided to work collectively to address women’s issues. In 2009, they formed a ‘Women Caucus’ within the Assembly to exert pressure on the different CA committees to consider women’s issues in their reports (IDEA 2011). A key contradiction these women faced was whether to be loyal to Party obligations or to work in the spirit of the Caucus. Despite different hurdles, they managed to unite for the greater cause of women’s rights and lobbied for citizenship rights, inheritance rights, and equal rights to participate in politics. Unlike other Caucuses of the CA, the Women’s Caucus was moderate in their approach but firm in providing a united platform to their members, exerting substantive pressure to ensure women’s rights in the new constitution and implement the gender provisions of existing acts and laws.5 The Women’s Caucus came up with a common position on gender for the draft constitution, new bills in parliament on domestic violence and inheritance, and a charter on women. Female CA members also worked to develop special provisions and measures to uplift women, with an emphasis on employment for women, free and compulsory education up to high school, and special health services. According to Amrita Thapa Magar, then Chair of one of the thematic committees of the first Constituent Assembly, major efforts were made on special rights ensured by the state restructuring committee, provision for citizenship on the basis of descent, and the formation of a women’s commission as a constitutional body. Women’s networks and female CA members also advocated for changing unequal laws related to the right to property, rights in education, health and employment, rights of reproduction, right to motherhood and rights against any sort of violence (physical, psychological, sexual, customary, traditional, cultural, or any other form). When women CA members became members of different thematic committees of the CA, they advocated for issues like proportional and inclusive representation of women, equality in citizenship rights and rights of inheritance, elimination of the dowry system and the customary practice of ghumto6 and kamalari,7 equal pay for equal work, and preferential rights for women over natural resources. CA members also raised a strong voice for providing at least one position to a woman from the top political posts of Head of State, Head of Government, and Speaker of the Parliament (IDEA 2011). Women CA members played

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Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  25 an instrumental role in bringing the gender dimension into Assembly discussions. Four committees of the first Constituent Assembly had women as Chairpersons, while six political parties had women as party whips, also contributing to their decision-​making role in the CA. As a result, most of the reports and preliminary drafts of the thematic committees included proportional inclusive representation in all state mechanisms and many were quite progressive in relation to the social, economic, and cultural rights of women (IDEA 2011). Various organizations supported women CA members in carrying out their role. The Inter Party Women’s Alliance, established on International Women’s Day, March 8 2006, provided a common political forum to ensure inclusive participation of women in political parties and to pursue the implementation of all national and international treaties and agreements in favor of women’s rights.8 Similarly, the Women’s Democratic Network was formed in 2007 as a forum of women politicians,9 working to identify the difficulties, challenges and solutions in the field of women’s political representation, and to enhance the qualifications, capacities, and knowledge of women leaders. Under a UNDP project entitled ‘Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal’, four women’s networks (National Network of Indigenous Women, National Indigenous Women’s Federation, Women Act, and Women’s Democratic Network) demanded a 16-​point agenda to be incorporated into the constitution. Major highlights of the 16-​point agenda included the right to citizenship, 15 percent of the budget for women, right to health services, right to 50 percent representation, and freedom from all forms of violence (UNDP 2014). The memorandum identified women’s rights and gender issues to be included in the new Constitution for Nepal, as outlined in a review of the Constituent Assembly from a gender perspective, ‘Gender Equality Guaranteed Constitution’ (Laingik Samanta Sunischit Sambhidhan).10 When the first Constituent Assembly failed to produce a new constitution, the support of multilateral agencies such as the UNDP was subjected to heavy criticism. The key argument was that multilateral agencies and international NGOs had engaged female CA members in activities that took them away from actual work on the constitution. Though we can discern many positive outcomes of the constant efforts of women CA members in addressing women’s issues, their achievements were limited by a wide gap between commitment and delivery. The main reasons for this were opportunistic behavior among politicians, hypocrisy in male-​dominated political parties, and politicization of gender concerns.

26

26  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha

Obstacles faced by women Constituent Assembly members Despite affirmative efforts by women in the CA, women’s political participation continued to face challenges. Patriarchal attitudes and behavior continued to create obstacles for women’s contributions in both the first and second Constituent Assembly. Media reports, interviews, and discussions with female CA members and different reports of the CA thematic committees all recognize the importance of patriarchal attitudes and behavior as a major hurdle for female CA members to achieve their objectives.11 Several of our respondents (women CA members, women’s rights activists, and professional women) said that Nepali women still suffer from patriarchal behavior within political parties, inside the parliament, and in other political units. This is also confirmed by other studies. For instance, Abdela (2010) concludes that key obstacles to women’s political agency (nationally as well as locally) are cultural stereotypes, attitudes and traditions, lack of capacity and skills, institutional barriers, contemptuous views of the abilities of lower-​caste women, difficulties juggling the competing interests of family and party with CA responsibilities, and finally corruption. Discriminatory traditional and patriarchal attitudes are accepted because of a perceived lack of the ‘3Es’ (i.e. experience, exposure and education) of many female CA members, accompanied by lack of confidence and knowledge to counter and convince male counterparts. Male politicians who also lack the ‘3Es’ have not been questioned. Bhatt (2013) confirms this argument as she documents the experiences of CA members in a political environment she describes as inhospitable and full of challenges for female members. Many of her interviewees show the dark side of women’s success in politics, including the dismissal of their contribution as token and their nomination resulting from affirmative action rather than personal achievement. Bhatt (2013) observes a general lack of trust in women’s capacity for leadership in state restructuring. Similar observations are also presented in a report by IDEA (2008: 21), which identifies obstacles such as ignorance of women’s efficiency and voice in decision-​making. Because of the central role of political parties, their actions are key to women’s ability to participate in electoral politics. Despite gender equality being a core agenda, political parties are often less enthusiastic in their efforts to address obstacles to women’s meaningful political inclusion and access to decision-​making positions in the government. For example, female party members are rarely appointed to high-​profile positions or leadership roles in party structures. Krämer (1999) argues that the attitude of political gatekeepers trying to restrict women from

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Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  27 entering politics is the result of the socio-​political context embedded in the legacy of the Hindu State. Although women have gradually gained leadership positions in the second or third tiers of Nepali governance, studies confirm that in local peace committees, women have often been ignored or faced blatant discrimination (Abdela 2010). According to some of our interviewees, political parties are reluctant to give women candidature because they are assumed to be weaker in political rivalries. This situation was also broadly covered by the media before the election to the second Constituent Assembly.12 In the election it was noted that female candidates were sent to contest in the most hostile constituencies, where their chances of winning were weak. Women were asking their mother parties to send all female candidates to particular constituencies, so that whoever won would be a woman. Party leaders disagreed. If they had accepted this proposal, they would also have fulfilled the constitutional requirement of 33 percent women’s participation in the CA. However, sending women to the weaker constituencies was their strategy to secure more votes in party strongholds.13 Sapana Malla Pradhan, a female member of the First Constituent Assembly, indicated a conservative and traditional mindset as the main obstacle, which meant that women were faced with numerous difficulties while targets for women’s participation were met, not only in the CA but also in various committees and sub-​committees (Bhatt 2013). The low confidence of male political decision-​makers in women as potential leaders is visible from their resistance to involve 33 percent women in the Constituent Assembly and other political structures. Similarly, when a dispute committee was formed, it had no female representation. Later, after severe criticism from women’s groups, Sapana Malla Pradhan was sent to the committee. Women CA members strongly believe that the right of women to participate based on the principle of proportional inclusion should be established as a fundamental right. However the proposal of 33  percent representation of women, although prepared with the consensus of the leaders of the major political parties, did not pass and remained under discussion (Rai 2011). Despite the claim of the CA being gender-​sensitive, the CA infrastructure lacked a gender-​friendly socio-​cultural environment, as it was difficult for women to attend late-​hour meetings. Further, women were burdened with dual expectations: to act as a caring female at home and to be as competent as a male in the parliament. Furthermore, women’s voices continued to be affected by disproportional representation of women and men in the parliament.14 Despite all these obstacles, there were gradual to moderate improvements in the opening of political space to women. This is evident in the

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28  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha increasing political representation, growing awareness of gender issues, and cohesive efforts to establish women’s rights. Gradually, women have also gained prominence in the committees of major political parties, suggesting a need to nuance the view that most critical decisions are still made by a handful of senior male leaders.

Concluding remarks Women’s entry into Nepali politics has not been easy. In the initial stage, women of elite families led the struggle for women’s rights. Due to widespread inequalities based on caste, class and ethnicity, women from disadvantaged sections of society were doubly marginalized in politics. The participation of women from these categories was therefore less prominent compared to high-​caste elite women with strong connections. The relatively greater and more diverse participation of Nepali women in constitution-​making and post-​conflict politics required the collective action and concerted efforts of politicians, the government, the media, INGOs and multilateral agencies, as well as civil society and particularly the women’s movement itself. A range of different factors and actors contributed to increasing women’s participation in Nepali politics. Women’s tireless efforts to end discrimination, mobilization during the decade-​long armed conflict, the powerful people’s movement for political change in 2006, effects of global changes towards gender-​ friendly politics, and a general realization of the need for women’s empowerment were some of the key contributing factors. The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) and subsequent Interim Constitution served as powerful instruments for women to advocate for their qualitative and quantitative participation in state affairs. This raised awareness on women’s equal participation at all levels of political structures and decision-​making processes. In the post-​conflict period, the Nepal Army also opened up for recruitment of females in combat roles (ICTJ 2010). Despite huge improvements towards gender equality in Nepal, the struggle is not yet over. This can be seen from the obstacles faced by women CA members due to widespread patriarchal attitudes, and the fierceness of debates on the remaining discriminatory laws such as inheritance and citizenship laws. The political marginalization of women can again be seen from their lesser numbers in the central committees of political parties. Furthermore, women’s political struggle is still concentrated in urban centers and the capital, and is yet to reach rural and peripheral areas in meaningful ways. Discourse on gender equality is still dominated by educated and elite women. As the study by Abdela (2010)

29

Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  29 shows, resentment among women leaders at the village and district level is widespread, especially for their lack of recognition by donors and even the Nepali mainstream women’s organizations. Finally, female politicians and development practitioners carry differences over agendas, where politicians are limited by their party, and practitioners are limited by donor requirements. Increased awareness of democratic principles can be seen from the electoral turnout of women, who have been voting in higher numbers than men (51.85 percent versus 48.15 percent in the 2008 election).15 Due to the presence of and pressure from election observers, constitutional provisions were implemented to ensure the inclusive representation of women. In 2008, the targeted 33  percent female CA membership was achieved thanks to the PR system. However, female candidates who entered the Constituent Assembly through the PR system may have suffered a loss of credibility (Nepali and Pyakurel 2009). While the PR system was highly effective in increasing female membership in the Constituent Assembly, the method itself is debatable. The post-​conflict scenario provided opportunities for Nepali women to organize and act collectively for women’s empowerment. This is evident in the formation of various women’s networks within the Constituent Assembly and among different political parties. The success of networking among several women’s groups is an achievement, for it has succeeded in bringing women to the forefront. However, continuous efforts are needed to achieve women’s equal representation in parliament, political structures and key institutions. Deep-​rooted traditional and paternalistic power structures continue to be a structural impediment to women’s access to decision-​making in Nepal. Hence, it is important to address deeply entrenched patriarchal institutions and hierarchies in terms of education, resources and experiences, in addition to age and caste barriers that still prevent Nepali women from meaningful participation in political decision-​making.

Notes 1 See www.ekantipur.com, 30 August 2014. 2 ‘Women’s representation in CA’, The Kathmandu Post, 21 February 2014. 3 See www.election.gov.np 4 ‘At a programme organised in Kathmandu on Thursday by Sankalpa, an alliance of diverse organisations working on women’s issues’, The Kathmandu Post, 31 May 2013. 5 On the women’s rights agenda to be incorporated in the new constitution, see http://​womencaucus.gov.np

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30  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha 6 This is the practice of covering the face with a piece of cloth or the end length of a sari. 7 System of indentured servitude in which girls from desperately poor families are sent into domestic slavery. 8 For an introduction to the Inter Party Women’s Alliance, see their official website: http://​ipwanepal.org/​introduction.php 9 The establishment of an informal caucus of women parliamentarian, of a separate Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, separate Women Cell in police headquarters and districts, and formation of the National Women Coordination Committee under the Chairpersonship of the Minister for Woman, Children and Social Welfare are also major breakthroughs in the institutional framework. 10 See www.np.undp.org/​content/​nepal/​en/​home/​presscenter/​articles/​2011/​04/​ 05/​women-​s-​network-​present-​16-​point-​memorandum.html 11 ‘Nepal’s women have a voice in politics, but no one is listening’, The Guardian, 27 May 2011. 12 Cabrudi, Chin, ‘The right vote’, The Kathmandu Post, 12 November 2013. 13 Kamat, Ram Kumar, ‘Constituencies ditched to ensure victory’, The Himalayan Times, 31 October 2013. 14 See interview with Amrita Thapa Magar, CA member, 2013 in ‘Support to participatory Constitution building process in Nepal’ (SPCBN), Kathmandu, Nepal. www.ccd.org.np/​index.php?action=interview&conid=9 15 See ‘Women voters outnumbered men voters in 2013 elections’: www.jagarannepal.org/​voter-​registration-​and-​its-​importance

References Abdela, L. 2010. Women’s Meaningful Participation in Peace-​ building and Governance: Case Study –​Nepal, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. Vienna/​Kathmandu:  Australian Development Cooperation and Care International. Acharya, M. 2011. Approaches to Development and Gender: An Impact in Nepal’s Policies. Kathmandu: Tanka Prasad Acharaya Memorial Foundation. Adhikari, I. 2006. ‘Women in Conflict:  The Gender Perspectives in Maoist Insurgency’, in L. R. Baral, ed., Nepal Facets of Maoist Insurgency. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, pp. 60–​84. Ariño, M. V. 2008. ‘Nepal: A gender view of the armed conflict and the peace process’, Escola de Cultura de Pau [online] Available at: http://​escolapau.uab. cat/​img/​qcp/​nepal_​conflict_​peace.pdf Aziz, B. N. 2001. Heir to a Silent Song: Two Rebel Women of Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies, Kathmandu. Baechler, G., Acharya, N., Dammann, P., Rajbandhari, R., and Upreti, B. R. 2008. Nepal Building New Roads to Peace. Lalitpur, Nepal: Jagadamba Press. Bhatt, N. P. 2013. ‘Interview with Sapana Malla Pradhan:  Women’s Political Participation in Nepal’, Kathmandu. Dhungana, R. K. 2014. ‘Nepali Hindu Women’s Thorny Path to Liberation’, Journal of Education and Research, 4(1), 39–​57.

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Women in Nepal’s representative assemblies  31 Election Commission. 1999. Pratinidhisabha Sadasya Nirwarchan 1999 [1999 Election to the House of Representatives]. Kathmandu: Election Commission. —​—​—​. 2006. Nepalko Sansadiya Nirwachan Darpan 2006 [Record of the 2006 Nepali Parliamentary Election]. Kathmandu: Election Commission. —​—​—​. 2008. Sambidhan Sabha Sadasya Nirwarchan 2008 [2008 Election to the Constituent Assembly]. Kathmandu: Election Commission. Gautam, S., Banskota, A., and Manchanda, R. 2003. ‘Women in the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’, in D. Thapa, ed., Understanding the Maoist Movement in Nepal. Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, pp. 93–​124. Ghimire, D. 2000. Staying Alive:  Memories of Women in Prison. New Delhi: Mass Printing Press. Hutt, M. 2013. ‘The Disappearance and Reappearance of Yogmaya: Recovering a Nepali Revolutionary Icon’, Contemporary South Asia, 21(4), 382–​397. ICTJ (International Centre for Transitional Justice). 2010. Across the Lines: The Impact of Nepal’s Conflict on Women. Kathmandu:  Advocacy Forum and International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance) 2008. The Constituent Assembly of Nepal:  An Agenda for Women. Kathmandu: IDEA. —​—​—​. 2010. Women’s Rights and Agenda to be Incorporated in the New Constitution. Stockholm: IDEA. —​—​—​. 2011. Women Members of the Constituent Assembly:  A  Study on Contribution of Women in Constitution Making in Nepal. Stockholm: IDEA. —​—​—​. 2012. Women’s Rights and Agenda to be Incorporated in the New Constitution. Kathmandu: IDEA. Karki, A. and Seddon, D. 2003. The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspective. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. Krämer, K. H. 1999. ‘Democratization and political parties in Nepal’, paper presented at the South Asia Seminar, Harvard University, Cambridge. [online] Available at: www.nepalresearch.com/​publications/​harvard_​9903.htm Lawoti, M. 2010. ‘Informal Institutions and Exclusion in Democratic Nepal’, in M. Lawoti and A. Guneratne, eds., Ethnicity, Inequality, and Politics in Nepal. Kathmandu: Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, pp. 18–​54. Mahat, I. 2003. ‘Women’s Development in Nepal: The Myth of Empowerment’, The Fletcher Journal of International Development, 17, 67–​72. Malla, M. V. 2011. Political Socialisation of Women. New Delhi:  Adroit Publishers. Maskey, J. 2011. Overview of Legal System in Nepal. London: Womankind. Mazurana, D. 2010. Understanding the Gendered Legacies of Armed Conflict:  Women’s Rights and Lives during Armed Conflict and Transition Periods and Governance. London: DFID and IDRC. Nepali, R. K. and Pyakurel, U. P. 2009. ‘A study of Nepal’s Constituent Assembly Election:  The influence of civil society and the Multilateral System’, paper presented at Forum International De Montreal, Delhi [online] Available at: http://​fimforum.org/​en/​library/​RNepali2009.pdf

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32  Bishnu Raj Upreti and Gitta Shrestha Pradhan, P. 2004–​2005. ‘The Status of Women in Political Participation in Nepal’, The Himalayan Review, 35–​36, 65–​77. Rai, U. K. 2011. The Principle of Proportional Inclusive Representation. Kathmandu:  International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Nepal. Rana, G. 2012. Hidden Women: The Ruling Women of the Rana Dynasty. New Delhi: Indiaink. RSN (Renaissance Society Nepal) 2009. Women’s Political Participation, Empowerment and Inclusion in Nepal. Survey report and strategic action plan. Bhaktapur: Renaissance Society Nepal. Sakya, S. 2003. ‘The Maoist Movement in Nepal:  An Analysis from the Women’s perspective’, in A. Karki and D. Seddon, eds., The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspective. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, pp. 375–​404. UNDP (United Nations Development Program). 2014. Support to Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal. Annual Progress Report 2014. Kathmandu: United Nations Development Program. Upreti, B. R. 2006. Armed Conflict and Peace Process in Nepal:  The Maoist Insurgency, Past Negotiation and Opportunities for Conflict Transformation. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. —​ —​ —​ . 2007. ‘Sustaining Peace through Conflict Sensitive Development Approach’. Participation. Nepalese Journal of Participatory Development, 9(9), 19–​23. —​—​—​. 2009. Nepal from War to Peace: Legacies of the Past and Hopes for the Future. New Delhi: Adroit Publishers. —​—​—​. 2010. Political Change and Challenges of Nepal:  Reflection on Armed Conflict, Peace Process and State Building. Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing. Upreti, B. R. and Muller-​Boeker, U. (eds.) 2010. Livelihood Insecurity and Social Conflict in Nepal. Kathmandu: NCCR North-​South. Wejnert, B. 2012. Linking Environment, Democracy and Gender (Research in Political Sociology). Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing. Yami, H. 2006. People’s War and Women’s Liberation in Nepal. Kathmandu: Janadhwani Publication. —​—​—​. 2010. ‘Women’s Role in the Nepalese Movement:  Making a People’s Constitution’, Monthly Review, 8 March 2010. Kathmandu, Nepal.

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2 Female Maoist combatants during and after the People’s War Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys*

Stereotypical perceptions of armed conflicts often peg men as soldiers and women as victims or a weaker group (Byrne 1996). However, evidence from around the world suggests that women and girls too have fought and/​or provided military support in conflicts. For example, in Sri Lanka, women comprised one third of the fighting forces; in El Salvador, one quarter of the fighters of Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) were women and girls; and in Nicaragua, 30 per cent of soldiers and leaders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front were women (Lindsey 2000). Women and girls are not only cooks, nurses, teachers, drivers and secretaries, they are also combatants who are involved in fighting, and perpetrate violence just like male combatants. In the Gulf War, for instance, some 20,000 women were involved in the launching of missiles (Vickers 1993). Over the last decades, women and girls took part in fighting forces in at least 55 countries and were involved in internal armed conflicts in 38 of these countries. Women also participated in international conflicts, including those in Lebanon, Macedonia, Uganda and Sudan (Mazurana and McKay 2004). In Nepal, women played a significant role in the decade-​long armed conflict, as Maoist fighters and also in the Nepal Army. This chapter focuses on the female Maoist fighters. The People’s War waged by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) mobilized a significant number of women as fighters. According to some accounts, 20 per cent of the Maoist forces were women (3,846 out of total verified People’s Liberation Army of 19,602) (Ariño 2008). This was unprecedented in a society that holds rigid patriarchal norms, where women are associated with sickles not bombs, where they are preferred to be silent rather than shouting slogans and firing rifles, and deemed as the second sex rather than the protagonists.

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34  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys In most cases, wars can involve both forms of empowerment and disempowerment. There are cases where conflicts have empowered women, ‘effecting structural and social transformations and producing new social, economic and political realities that redefine gender and caste hierarchies’ (Manchanda 2001: 99), although wars inevitably cause considerable suffering (Murguialday 2000). With a focus on the divergent impacts of war on women, this chapter explores the experiences of female Maoist ex-​combatants in Nepal to uncover the nature and extent of their participation, and to assess whether the war brought about the change they dreamed of and fought for. The chapter discusses the following key research questions: What was the women’s situation before the war? Why did they join the war? What were their contributions? How did they experience reintegration? This chapter is divided into four parts:  the first part discusses the causes and consequences of the armed conflict; the second part describes women’s participation in the conflict, their reasons, roles and contributions; the third part discusses the impact of the war on female ex-​combatants in terms of personal as well as political gain and loss and the obstacles to their reintegration process. And finally, the chapter ends with a conclusion. To find answers to the research questions, twelve women ex-​ combatants were interviewed in Rolpa, Kabhrepalanchok and Kathamandu districts, between October 2012 and February 2013. In the beginning, a purposive sampling method was used to identify the respondents. Subsequently, as new connections and referrals were made, a snowball sampling method was adopted. Because the ex-​combatants had left the cantonments to restart their lives, some in their own communities and some in new localities, it was difficult to gain access to them. This was especially so because some were not comfortable in revealing their identity as ex-​combatants. While many male ex-​combatants were actively involved in party campaigns and were accessible, we found that female ex-​combatants were more difficult to reach and comparatively more hesitant to share their stories. Access to the respondents was first gained through the Maoist party offices in the respective districts. However, to gain access to more grassroots-​ level ex-​combatants, a backdoor approach was used through journalists and reporters and Maoist-​led local institutions. Combatants from both lower rank and file and leaders were interviewed. In addition, articles and research papers were also reviewed to better understand the gender dimensions of the Maoist movement. The privacy, consent and safety of the informants and respondents were considered to be of paramount importance. Respondents were therefore kept anonymous and were told that the

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Female Maoist combatants   35 information they provided would be presented under pseudonyms. The participants were not put under any direct or indirect coercion, and no promises were made for the sake of extracting information.

The People’s War: causes and consequences Nepal has suffered political instability and class domination for centuries. Under the Rana Regime (1846–​1950), the entire country was structured into a socio-​political framework of diverse castes and ethnic categories based on the division of work theory under the Muluki Ain (Civil Code) in 1854. Under this code, Brahmins, Chettris and Thakuris were given nobility and accumulated state resources, in particular land, because of their political engagements, whereas Magars, Limbus and other groups suffered encroachment on their lands (Regmi 1971). This created boundaries and restrictions on social and political freedom. The Ranas continued to rule and forced their extreme autocracy for 104 years. After the fall of the Rana regime, the Panchayat1 system took over. However, discrimination remained. Under the Panchayat system, the country was declared a Hindu kingdom, Nepali was made the only official language throughout the country with the motto ‘One Nation, One Language’, Christianity was prohibited, and press freedom, political freedom and right to expression were controlled. Ethnic issues were ignored, and with the centralization of power and resources, a feudalistic system was established throughout the country. The first major democratic mobilization was instigated in 1990 through the Maoist-​influenced People’s Movement. The aim was to eliminate the Panchayat system and establish a multi-​party democracy. The Maoists capitalized on the history of domination and discrimination to launch the People’s War in February 1996, after the then government ignored their 40-​point demands: People’s war was initiated with a proclaimed aim of establishing a new democratic socio-​economic system and state by overthrowing the present socio-​economic structure and state […]. The people’s war is the inevitable instrument for overcoming the oppressive situation in the process of the historic new democratic revolutionary transformation. (Bhattarai 1998) Several studies have highlighted inequality, lack of opportunity, and landlessness reinforced by social-​cultural discrimination, poverty and underdevelopment as major reasons for the Maoist conflict (Bray et al.

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36  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys 2003, Thapa and Sijapati 2004, Do and Iyer 2007). As a result, the CPN (Maoist) party was very popular in the poorer parts of the country and among marginalized and disadvantaged groups. As described by Hachhethu (2008: 12): It is through contextualizing the ideology of class war with poverty, injustice and exploitation and through ethnicizing the insurgency, the CPN (Maoist) has strengthened its capacity of popular mobilization and ability of armed fighting. The 40-​point demand submitted by the CPN (Maoist) party was categorized into three themes: nationality (9), democracy (17) and livelihood (14). The first nine demands related to nationalism, including, amongst other points, the removal of all unequal treaties with India, and the end of the monopoly of foreign capital in Nepali industry. The seventeen demands related to democracy included the right to draft a new constitution by the people’s elected representatives, abolishment of all the special rights and privileges of the King and the royal family, declaration of Nepal as a secular state, elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and suppression, and equal property rights for daughters and sons. The remaining fourteen demands related to people’s livelihoods, including the handing over of land controlled by feudal lords to the landless and the homeless, employment for all, elimination of corruption, and exemption from repayment of debt for poor farmers. The People’s War caused significant economic loss, estimated between 8 and 10 per cent of the GDP, while more than 13,000 people had lost their lives by the end of 2006 of which approximately two thirds were killed by State security forces and one third by Maoists (Dhungana 2007). Records show that out of the total (verified) number of people killed during the period of the Maoist insurgency, 10,297 were men and 1,013 were women, while 2,034 people were unverified. Similarly, 84,969 people were abducted, out of which 2,087 were identified as women while the identity of 69,403 people abducted during the period remains unknown.2 There are few records of the countless crimes, sexual violence and human rights abuses committed during the insurgency. The war officially ended on 21 November 2006 when the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA)3 was signed by the government of Nepal, represented by the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) and the CPN (Maoist) party. The CPA paved a roadmap for holding elections to a Constituent Assembly. The CPA was an outcome of the 12-​point Understanding signed by SPA and CPN (Maoist) in Delhi on 22 November 2005, which was followed by a 19-​day People’s Movement in April 2006 when

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Female Maoist combatants   37 the then King Gyanendra declared that the national sovereignty rests with the people and reinstated the House of Representatives (dissolved in 2002).

Women’s participation in and contribution to the People’s War According to the 40-​point demand submitted by the Maoists to the government of Nepal in 1996, the movement denounced all forms of discrimination, including those against women, and vouched for gender equality. Their nineteenth demand specifically calls for gender equality: ‘Patriarchal exploitation against women should be stopped. Daughters should be allowed access to parental property’. Similarly, during the insurgency, Maoist programs emphasized issues such as elimination of patriarchal exploitation, the end of gender discrimination, equal access to inheritance rights, equal pay, and addressing the sexual vulnerability of so-called lower class women. Other promises included the eradication of prostitution and human trafficking, authorization for abortion, and marriage only by mutual consent as well as special attention to women in divorce proceedings. Similarly, the Maoists led campaigns that were important for Nepali women such as the campaign against alcohol. A  ‘dry law’ was promoted by the Maoists in rural areas of Nepal, in an effort to reduce alcoholism among men, as alcohol abuse was commonly related to domestic violence (Bharadwaj et al. 2007). Nepali women experience various forms of gender inequality, though the most common are early marriage and discrimination in education. Considering the Maoists’ emphasis on gender equality, the war was an opportunity for women to experience freedom from strict gender roles and limited agency. Many women joined the revolution with the aim of improving women’s status in society, attracted by the emancipatory potential of the Maoist ideology that promises equality for women. ‘I was very fascinated by the communist ways under which boys and girls were entitled equal rights and equal opportunities […] something that I  was deprived of ’, said Kamala Roka.4 However, women’s involvement and abilities in the People’s War itself were curtailed by criticisms based on perceived psychological and socio-​cultural beliefs associated with women, for instance, that integrating women soldiers in armed conflicts would disturb the cohesion, focus and strength of the male soldiers. Although the Maoist force claimed equal responsibility for both men and women, according to Kamala Roka, female ex-​combatants initially faced considerable discrimination and doubt. In the beginning, they were only

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38  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys assigned stereotypical tasks based on the traditional division of labor such as cooking and cleaning. According to Roka, it was only after they could display their bravery and courage during trainings and mock-​ups that they were entrusted with arms and chosen to fight in the forefront. In many armed forces and rebel groups, women are simply not allowed to operate as fighters (Weber 2007). Findings of the present research also suggest that gendered perceptions prevent women from attaining the role of fighters. While both male and female bodies need to be trained as fighters, in the case of Nepal, only women who could prove their strength and bravery were able to secure positions as fighters in the guerrilla force. Men generally did not need to prove their prowess, because the image of a fighter tends to be based on masculine traits. As expressed by one of the interviewees:5 At first we were not chosen to fight in the field because we were considered weaker than men. But we protested and questioned the commanders regarding this discrimination. We assured them that we could fight. Only after much persuasion were we allowed to fight in the forefront. We could see that the male fighters were hesitant to fight together with us because they were not sure if we could play such a role: use a gun or fight in a war. To them we were reproducing machines not fighting machines. They were worried that we would cause trouble and that we would be a burden in their group. But this mentality changed eventually. While women like Kamala Roka joined the guerrilla force voluntarily, many were also coerced and forced. Many of the women respondents had joined the force when they were young schoolgirls. Some of them were forced to join the revolution under the ‘One Household One Maoist’ campaign. During the campaign, every house had to provide the Maoists with one member to join the force. Failure to abide resulted in demands for monetary compensation or gave rise to life-​threatening situations. Those who could afford to do so usually paid the money, but those who could not pay sent one of their children to join the Maoist force. In many cases where families considered sons more valuable, they sent their daughters to join the war. ‘Who joins the force willingly? I  joined because I  had no choice’, said Uma,6 interviewed in Rolpa. Though she did not say it directly, family and neighbors explained during interviews that she could have been a victim of the ‘One Household One Maoist’ campaign. According to her, she met several other women with a similar story.

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Female Maoist combatants   39 Likewise, some joined the Maoist force after experiencing repeated accusations and threats from the police and army, based on the interviews with ex-​combatants and local community members in Rolpa and Kabhre. At a time when both the police and Maoist forces were involved in the disappearance, murder and rape of civilians in the name of war, women were among the most vulnerable. While it was relatively easy for men, given their freedom of mobility, to escape from the village, it was difficult for women to find security. Women were taken to barracks for interrogation, often for no apparent reasons. Upon return, they were frowned upon by the society who suspected that they must have been raped and abused. As explained by Sujata:7 I had to pass the Army barracks to go to school. They always stopped me on the way and asked me questions. They questioned me as if I  were a Maoist spy. One day when I  was in grade six, they dragged me and some of my seniors (all female) to their barracks. I was very young, so they didn’t do anything to me but the elder sisters who were taken to the barracks were kept there for days. Society used to doubt our virginity and purity when we were released by the army after days, even if we were not raped. Another respondent, Anu, joined the Maoist force along with her elder sister because the police ‘did not let them live in peace’ after their eldest brother became a Maoist: The men could easily go to the cities or go to India to work but we were left behind with no security. We couldn’t leave the village or the country. We had no choice. The police would accuse us of sending our brothers to the Maoist force and ask us in humiliating tones ‘what are you girls doing here after sending your brothers to the Maoist force?’ We had no other option but to join the Maoist force […] A more common reason for women’s participation was what Manchanda (2004: 243) calls ‘emancipatory impulse’, whereby women would join the force in response to a patriarchal society that restricted their capacity for agency.8 The Maoists also used the lack of equality and equity as a way to encourage women to participate in order to increase their agency and eliminate patriarchy. Both Kamala Roka (interviewed in Kathmandu) and Gyanu (interviewed in Kabhrepalanchok) emphasized their yearning for education and the desire to escape early marriage and family duties as reasons for joining the war. Both of them wanted

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40  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys to complete at least the School Leaving Certificate (SLC)9 before getting married. ‘I didn’t want to get married so soon and close all doors of opportunity in my life. I knew that once I got married I would be tied up with family and children. My life would be limited to household chores and child rearing. So I escaped the trap’, said Gyanu.10

Unclear gains from the People’s War for female ex-​combatants For rural women who hoped to overcome patriarchy, the People’s War was like ‘the opening of the prison gates’ (Manchanda 2004:  224). Despite all the hardships, they felt a sense of achievement in fighting alongside men and for taking a radical step on behalf of all Nepali women. When asked if she regretted joining the war, Geeta answered:11 ‘This is the least I  could do for the liberation of Nepali women. We didn’t succeed entirely, but we did try and spread our wings.’ However, many others who quietly drifted back into their families and communities had to accept returning to their previous gender roles, bearing the stigma of women who went against societal rules, which was especially the case for women who engaged in inter-​caste marriage and were abandoned by their husbands after the war. These women had to make major compromises and many felt betrayed by the Maoist party. ‘I really don’t know what I  have achieved’, said Amrita,12 whose eyes were severely damaged in a bomb explosion. Amrita’s major concern now is the difficulties of raising her child and doing household chores with damaged eyesight: What did we get? I am confused. Yesterday we were fighting in the forests with guns and bombs, and suddenly today we are back in our homes, cooking, cleaning, and looking after children. We were back to where we started, but this time with a disability. Similar was the frustration of women stigmatized as ayogyas.13 Out of 19,602 ex-​combatants, 30 per cent of the verified female combatants were categorized as Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR) during the verification process stipulated by the Peace Accord and carried out by the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) in December 2006 under the three-​way agreement between the government of Nepal, United Nations and Maoist party. The VMLRs were ‘disqualified’ on the basis of two criteria: those under the age of 18 at the time of recruitment, and those who joined after the first ceasefire (26 May 2006)  to participate in the reintegration process and were thus not entitled to full monetary remuneration and other benefits of the voluntary retirement

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Female Maoist combatants   41 package. The word ‘disqualified’ translates as ayogya in Nepali, a term that has negative connotations of being incompetent. Although the term was changed from disqualified to ‘verified minors and late recruits’, the damage was already done. Uma,14 listed as a VMLR, says: I fought in so many wars along with the ones who have been verified but still I became ayogya. My sacrifice and hard work was not recognized. I returned home empty-​handed. I regret joining the force because I feel I have failed and I have been humiliated. For Uma it is even more disheartening when the community uses her experience of being ayogya as an example of the inability to restore women’s place and roles in society; ‘This revolution and fighting is not a woman’s job. Now see you have proven it.’ From the experiences of the ex-​combatants, there is clear inequality in gains within the Maoist force itself. While the lower rank guerrilla fighters felt they had not achieved much, the higher rank officials who later went on to become ministers such as Hisila Yami and Kamala Roka, claimed that the war resulted in significant gains for women in Nepali society. Hisila Yami (a.k.a. Comrade Parvati) asserted that the Maoist movement has raised awareness among women about their rights and the basis to fight for justice:15 We have awareness and courage to fight for our rights today. We are no more the silent victims. Like in the case of Sita Rai16 and Bindu Thakur,17 so many women are on the street today protesting and pressuring the government to take action and bring justice. Yesterday, all these cases went unnoticed and unresolved. However, today the perpetrators are no longer spared. Those who plan to commit crime against women are compelled to think again and again. The Maoist Movement was the biggest contributor to this change. Similarly, the 2007 reinstated parliament passed a resolution ensuring 33 per cent female representation in every government and political sector. However, available evidence and statistics show that implementation of these laws remains poor. While the First Constituent Assembly (CA) elected in 2008 had secured 33 per cent female representation through proportional representation, the highest in the history of Nepal, women’s representation in the second CA election in 2013 had declined. The overall nomination of women under the First-​Past-​the-​ Post (FPTP)18 election was less than 10 per cent. The UCPN (Maoist)

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42  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys party itself nominated only 27 women out of 240 constituencies (11.2 per cent). Although gender equality is mentioned in party manifestos, in reality, little has been done to put this into practice. As claimed by Hisila Yami (alias Comrade Parvati) (2003), male cadres are hesitant to transfer their positions ‘bestowed on them by the patriarchal structure’. In the political sphere there is still a fear that ‘pursuing the goal [of integrating gender into nation-​building] too soon may rock the boat, and that dealing with a boat so shaky that it may capsize anyways, you just cannot take the risk’ (Bernard et al. 2008: 3). Nepali politics has always been influenced by what Connell calls hegemonic masculinity, which explains why ‘the most powerful groups of men usually have few personal incentives for gender change’ (Connell 2002: 36). This situation did not change much after the People’s War. For female ex-​combatants, the period following the peace agreement did not bring an end to the conflict, but rather forced them into a new phase of struggle to find their place in the post-​conflict peace and political agenda. The United Nations Security Council adopted United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325  ‘Women, Peace and Security’ (UNSCR1325) on 31 October 2000. UNSCR 1325 places specific emphasis on the participation of women in all processes of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding, and legally binds decisions that focus on the recognition of different gender needs as an integral element of post-​conflict development. A core area of focus of the UNSCR 1325 is the representation and participation of women in peace negotiations. The Nepali peace process was not in line with the resolution as women’s representation and participation remained negligible during the entire process, with the exception of Ms. Anuradha Koirala,19 who was the only woman in the nine-​member committee on the 2003 ceasefire between the government and the Maoists. As noted by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in their Media Kit on UNSCR 132520, there was no women’s participation during negotiations on the 12-​point understanding between the Maoists and the seven political parties signed in New Delhi in November 2005, nor the 8-​point understanding in June 2006. Likewise, there was only one woman present at the agreement on the 25-​point Code of Conduct held in May 2005 and no women participated in the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in November 2006. In addition, there were only four women in the 16-​member team during the approval of Nepal’s Interim Constitution in January 2007. The country endorsed the National Action Plan on 1 February 2011, which recognized women as both victims and participants in the conflicts. This

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Female Maoist combatants   43 was an important step towards gender equality in peace building, giving activists and organizations access to international legal norms that could be used to pressure the government. However, even after this took place there were few efforts to translate and institutionalize gender into effective policies. Thus, the question remains, has the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820 benefitted rural women and female Maoist ex-​combatants? Although the topic is beyond the scope of this research, interviews with the ex-​combatants and the local communities indicate that the ground reality remains unchanged. ‘I have given up on the political path because nothing good has come out of it in all these years and our representation is not acknowledged. I  am exhausted’, said Sudha,21 who was active in the political arena during the insurgency. Despite their extensive engagement in the People’s War, women were subsequently marginalized from formal peace negotiations and newly formed governance institutions and processes alike. The patriarchal norms are still working strongly against women. Their roles as leaders and decision makers are still devalued and their participation remains unheeded. ‘These [resolutions] are for the high-​ranking fighters and leaders and richer people, for us it makes no difference. We have not felt it trickling down to us, yet’, reiterated Sudha.

Conservative backlash and patriarchal resurgence after the People’s War The People’s War was unable to transform the patriarchal norms of the Nepali society and as a result, female ex-​combatants returned to status quo ante bellum (or the pre-​war status). This has posed serious obstacles to the social reintegration of the female ex-​combatants, some even becoming victims of violence. The majority of female ex-​combatants quietly drifted back into their families and communities, accepting conventional gender roles to secure a future in society. Almost all the respondents, except those who migrated to the cities with their husbands, were living in their maternal home rearing their children while their husbands were working away in the cities. The mobility of men has further contributed to the women having to deal with social reintegration on their own. Many female ex-​combatants were stigmatized as ‘impure’ because of what was perceived as ‘sinful cohabitation’ with male ex-​combatants during the war (Bleie 2012). Many were rejected by their family members for betraying their line of caste by committing ‘revolutionary marriages’,22 and many were later rejected by their in-​laws for being lower

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44  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys caste or for other reasons. There were also extreme cases where war husbands were using divorce to escape the socially disapproved inter-​caste marriages in order to reintegrate into their families and communities. In more conservative Nepali circles, even today an inter-​caste marriage is not viewed positively. These norms are often explained as a strategy to avoid the mixing of women from different groups to control their sexuality and preserve the pure caste line. According to Astha,23: Inter-​caste marriage without the approval of the family and the community is a taboo but during the war, it seemed like the right thing. Now when both my maternal family and in-​laws are not happy, I sometimes regret my decision. Even though they disapproved of sex before marriage, the Maoists encouraged marriages in the cantonments when both the man and the woman consent, irrespective of caste and ethnicity. They called such marriages Janabadi marriages, meaning ‘revolutionary marriages’. As explained by Abha:24 At that time we did not think about caste and ethnicity. We didn’t know how long we would live and so we married the person we loved with no second thoughts. But now we face rejection. It is so easy for men to leave their wives and start anew, for us it is a shame […]. It did not seem like a problem for those couples in times of war when they were uncertain of the future and were fighting for equality. However, after the war their revolutionary marriages and ideologies clashed with the traditional social norms that the war failed to change. All of the female respondents who were interviewed had been in Janabadi marriages, though not necessarily inter-​caste. Most of them were not living with their in-​laws but mentioned that they had a difficult time adjusting or being fully accepted in the family of their inter-​caste husbands. One of the respondents from a Dalit family said that she was shocked to hear about her war husband’s second marriage without her knowledge. When she called her husband for an explanation, he replied saying ‘I went back to my own caste’. This was related by the Nepali journalist Aruna Rayamajhi, when we interviewed her for this study.25 Paraphrasing the experiences of the women ex-​combatants she had interviewed, Aruna explained: Men don’t need to worry about these issues. They can just divorce their current wife and marry another one easily. It is only us who

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Female Maoist combatants   45 have to bear the loss of a husband who we thought loved us and the stigma of a woman who went against the societal rules and engaged in inter-​caste marriage and another stigma of a woman abandoned by her husband. Various studies have emphasized the double stigma that female ex-​ combatants face. Firstly, they are stigmatized for having been associated with armed opposition groups, and secondly, for having transgressed social norms of female behavior that extend to questions about their roles as ‘ “good” wives and mothers’ (UNDPKO 2006). The journalist Aruna Rayamajhi also confirmed several such cases. In her article ‘Bibahko naam ma barbadi’, which roughly means ‘destruction in the name of marriage,’ Aruna mentions that one female ex-​combatant was severely beaten by her ‘war husband’ and in-​laws because she refused to sign the divorce papers (Rayamajhi 2011). Another was threatened by her husband saying, ‘anything even life-​threatening “accidents” could happen’ if she did not sign the divorce papers. He also accused her of sorcery, claiming that ‘She is a witch. She has done black magic on me and made me bald’.26 Abuses resulting from the charges of witchery are one of the worst forms of violence possible against women since the woman accused of being a witch is beaten, tortured, fed human excreta and even burnt alive. Hence, she was eventually forced to sign the divorce papers. Immediately after the divorce papers were signed, he remarried another woman from his own caste circle (Rayamajhi 2011). The marriages took place with the consent of the Maoist party but after the war ended, many husbands decided to cancel the marriage. Nearly 700 such cases had been filed in the All-​Nepal Women’s Union (Revolutionary), a Nepali women’s political organization that is aligned with the UCPN (Maoist) (Rayamajhi 2011). According to the president of the union, Jayapuri Gharti Magar, the issue had not been taken into serious consideration in the Maoist party leadership and the subject was not discussed in the central committee (Rayamajhi 2011). As described by Sita,27 a member of All Nepal Women’s Association (Revolutionary), ‘We are helping these women in every way we can but sadly, we do not get enough support from the government side’. Moreover, when the son of Prachanda (a.k.a. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, chairperson of the Maoist party) abandoned his wife whom he got married to during the war, and married another woman, Prachanda called it ‘the fusion of old and new’ (Rayamajhi 2011). In lack of support, many female ex-​combatants facing similar situations were seeking support from their families. ‘They are your family, your mother and father. They will accept you eventually and especially

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46  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys when you are in need’, said a female respondent interviewed in Rolpa, who was abandoned by her ‘war husband’ and is now living with her parents.28 Clearly, Janabadi marriages have posed a serious obstacle to the social reintegration of many female ex-​combatants. The gatekeepers are generally family members and in-​laws, who oppose violations of the caste rules of marriage (Bleie 2012). The use of culture to restrict women’s sexuality, mobility and independence is one of the biggest challenges Nepali women have been facing because they are considered ‘the transmitters of group values and traditions […] and are elevated to the status of symbol of the community and are compelled to assume the burden of the reproduction of the group’ (Moghadam 1994: 18). The war, even with its break from an older gender order, did not abolish this conservatism against women, and this was felt most strongly by women ex-​combatants.

Concluding remarks The aim of this chapter has been to explore the reasons behind women joining the Maoist movement as combatants, and the consequences and accomplishments they experienced. While some women ex-​combatants claim to have gained a greater sense of empowerment and are now more confident to demand equality, the feminist analysis of the post-​war context of the respondents suggests a different scenario. Although some of their issues were institutionalized through reformed policies and new laws, these have not been fully exercised because the policies were created without the recognition of deeply embedded social differences and the power relations that sustain these differences. The peace process and the reintegration support have clearly marginalized female ex-​combatants, as socio-​economic inequalities, exclusions and injustice that excessively affect women were not taken into consideration. Moreover, the negligible representation of women in peace processes has also resulted in the disregard of women’s issues. To some extent, this chapter echoes many other studies of women in war that reveal how women gain some form of empowerment and freedom as fighters and combatants, in contexts where gender relations are often more flexible, only to lose these gains when the conflicts end. It adds to this literature by showing how peace and reintegration processes can be a deeply gendered process whereby women may not only lose out, but may be left in a much more marginalized position. Thus, women do not necessarily gain equality through their active engagement in war,

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Female Maoist combatants   47 but in fact their situation could get even worse in post-​conflict periods due to stigma, rejection and lack of support during reintegration.

Notes * The views expressed by the authors are their own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations with which they are associated. 1 This was a party-​less system in which people could elect their representatives while power remained in the hands of the monarch (1960–​1990). 2 www.inseconline.org/​index.php?type=opinionforums&id=25&lang=en 3 Unofficial translation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement:  www.usip. org/​sites/​default/​files/​file/​resources/​collections/​peace_​agreements/​nepal_​ cpa_​20061121_​en.pdf 4 Interviewed in Kathmandu, 22 December 2012. 5 Kamala Roka, interviewed in Kathmandu, 22 December 2012. 6 Except for Hisila Yami and Kamala Roka, the interviewed female ex-​combatants are given pseudonyms to protect their privacy. ‘Uma’ was interviewed in Rolpa, 18 October 2012. 7 Interviewed in Rolpa, 20 October 2012. 8 Here we employ Naila Kabeer’s definition of agency as the ‘ability to define one’s goals and act upon them’. 9 The School Leaving Certificate is obtained after the final examination in secondary school. 10 Interviewed in Kabhrepalanchok, 29 December 2012. 11 Interviewed in Kabhrepalanchok, 28 December 2012. 12 Interviewed in Rolpa, 16 October 2012. 13 Meaning incompetent or incapable, the term ayogya was used in Nepali to translate the word ‘disqualified’. 14 Interviewed in Rolpa, 18 October 2012. 15 Hisila Yami was interviewed at the Prime Minister’s official residence, in Kathmandu, 4 January 2013. 16 Sita Rai, a returnee migrant worker from Saudi Arabia, was robbed and raped by police on her arrival at the Tribhuvan International Airport. 17 18-​year-​old Bindu Thakur was burnt alive and murdered by her family members in a so-​called honour killing. 18 Voting takes place in single-​member constituencies and the candidate with the most votes in the constituency wins. 19 Then State Minister of Women, Children and Social Welfare. 20 www.fokuskvinner.no/​PageFiles/​2996/​Media_​Kit_​on_​UNSCR_​1325.pdf 21 Interviewed in Kathmandu, 21 December 2012. 22 Inter-​caste marriages were encouraged by the Maoists in the cantonments as an expression of equality and freedom of choice in the name of ‘revolutionary marriages’ (Janabadhi Bivah in Nepali). 23 Interviewed in Rolpa, 15 October 2012. 24 Interviewed in Kathmandu, 27 December 2012. 25 Interviewed in Kathmandu, 27 December 2012. 26 Aruna Rayamajhi was interviewed in Kathmandu, 27 December 2012. 27 Interviewed in Kathmandu, December 2012. 28 Interviewed in Rolpa, 20 October 2012.

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48  Lorina Sthapit and Philippe Doneys

References Ariño, M. V. 2008. ‘Nepal: A Gender View of the Armed Conflict and the Peace Process’, Escola de Cultura de Pau [online] Available at: http://​escolapau.uab. cat/​img/​qcp/​nepal_​conflict_​peace.pdf Bernard, C., Jones, S. G., Oliker, O., Quantic Thurston, C., Stearns Lawson, B. and Cordell , K. 2008. Women and Nation-​ Building. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation. Bharadwaj, N., Dhungana, S. K., Hicks, N., Crozier R. and Watson., C. 2007. Nepal at a Crossroads:  The Nexus between Human Security and Renewed Conflict in Rural Nepal. Kathmandu:  Friends for Peace and International Alert. Bhattarai, B. 1998. ‘Politico-​Economic Rationale of the People’s War’, The Worker, 4.  [online] Available at:  www.bannedthought.net/​Nepal/​Worker/​ Worker-​04/​Bhattarai-​RationaleOfPW-​W04.htm Bleie, T. 2012. Post-​war Moral Communities in Somalia and Nepal:  Gendered Practices of Exclusion and Inclusion. Tromsø:  Centre for Peace Studies, University of Tromsø. Bray, J., Lunde, L. and Murshed. S. M. 2003. ‘Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist Insurgency’, in K. Ballentine and S. Jake (eds), In the Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 107–​132. Byrne, B. 1995 (revised 1996). Gender, Conflict and Development, Vol I: Overview. BRIDGE Report, no.  34. Brighton:  BRIDGE/​ Institute of Development Studies. Connell, R. W. 2002. ‘Masculinities, the Reduction of Violence and the Pursuit of Peace’, in C. Cockburn and D. Zarkov (eds), The Postwar Moment: Militaries, Masculinities and International Peacekeeping. London:  Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 33–​40. Dhungana, S. K. 2007. ‘Security Sector Reform and Peacebuilding in Nepal:  A  Critical Reflection’, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 3(2): 70–​78. Do, Q. and Iyer, L. M. 2007. Poverty, Social Divisions and Conflict in Nepal. Policy Research Working Paper no. 4228. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Hachhethu, K. 2008. ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal:  An Overview’, in P. V. Ramana (ed), The Naxal Challenges: Causes, Linkages, and Policy Options. Delhi: Dorling Kindersley. Lindsey, C. 2000. ‘Women and War. An Overview’, International Review of the Red Cross, 839: 561–​579. Manchanda, R. 2001. ‘Ambivalent Gains in South Asian Conflicts’, in S. Meintjes, A. Pillay and M. Turshen (eds), The Aftermath:  Women in Post-​ Conflict Transformation. New York: Zed Books, pp. 99–​121. —​—​—​. 2004. ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Radicalizing Gendered Narratives’, Cultural Dynamics, 16: 237–​258. Mazurana, D. and McKay, S. 2004. Where are the Girls? Girls in Fighting Forces in Northern Uganda, Sierra Leone and Mozambique: Their Lives During and

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Female Maoist combatants   49 After War. Montreal, Québec: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Moghadam, V. M. 1994. ‘Introduction:  Women and Identity Politics in Theoretical and Comparative Perspective’, in V. M. Moghadam (ed), Identity and Politics and Women: Cultural Assertions and Feminisms in International Perspective. San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, pp. 3–​26. Murguialday, C. 2000. ‘La construcción de la ciudadanía de las mujeres después del conflicto’ [‘Building the Citizenship of Women after Conflict’], in D. Wyatt and D. Saillard, eds, Guerra y Desarrollo:La Re-​construcción Post-​conflicto [War and Development:  Post-​ conflict Reconstruction]. Bilbao: UNESCO Etxea. Rayamajhi, A. 2011. ‘Love in a time of war’, Nepali Times, 22–​28 July, p. 563. [online] Available at: http://​nepalitimes.com/​news.php?id=18398 Regmi, M. C. 1971. A Study in Nepali Economic History. New Delhi: Manjushree Publishing House. Thapa, D. and Sijapati, B. 2004. A Kingdom Under Siege:  Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003. Kathmandu: The Print House. UNDPKO (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). 2006. Integrated Disarmament, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New  York:  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Vickers, J. 1993. Women and War. London: Zed Books. Weber, A. 2007. ‘Barbarian Beasts or Mothers of Invention? Relation of Gendered Fighter and Citizen Images, with a Specific Case Study on Southern Sudan’. Ph.D. dissertation. Berlin: Freie Universität. Yami, H. 2003. ‘The Question of Women’s Leadership in People’s War in Nepal’, The Worker, 8. [online] Available at: www.bannedthought.net/​Nepal/​ Worker/​Worker-​08/​WomensLeadershipInPW-​ Parvati-​W08.htm

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3 Troubled identities Women ex-​combatants in post-​conflict Nepal Amrita Pritam Gogoi

In the People’s War in Nepal, fought to uproot the monarchy and all other feudal patriarchal structures from Nepali society, almost one third of the Maoist combatants were women. In the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) war effort, women were recruited in all the three instruments of the revolution, viz. the party, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the mass organizations. Apart from opening up its folds to women cadres, the Maoists tried to do away with the traditional gendered division of labor in the camps. Traditional institutions and festivals too were reformed, in the attempt to create new men, new women and a new society. For example, marriages were instituted in a progressive manner, and festivals like Teej were transformed into a day to build support for the People’s War. The party tried to eliminate other forms of patriarchal practices such as polygamy, arranged marriage and untouchability in times of menstruation. In a survey conducted by the women’s department of the CPN-​M in 2002–​2003, amongst 574 female cadres it was found that 64.98 per cent of them joined the movement to fight against class oppression, while 16.20 per cent joined to rebel against gender discrimination, and 9.08 per cent joined for their ideological commitment (Yami 2005). Hundreds of women who joined the PLA fought hand in hand with their male counterparts against the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), taking the party leadership and the state aback by their vigor and sacrifice. Almost 2,500 of these female cadres became martyrs of the New Democratic Revolution. However, in the discourse on the causes of the war, women are hardly discussed as agents of change. They are generally depicted as victims of wartime crimes and as suffering mothers and wives. Female fighters, on the other hand, are often portrayed as violating gender norms, but still in need of special protection. They are seen as unable to escape their gendered mold, even

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  51 when they handle a gun and wear a uniform (Sjoberg 2010). Such an idea reflects systematic non-​recognition of their contributions and abilities. Women combatants are furthermore doubly burdened because apart from fulfilling their combat responsibilities, they are also bound to carry on with their socio-​cultural responsibilities of being a woman. Tazreena Sajjad argues that ‘in fact, the aspect of motherhood in essentializing the social and cultural understanding of femininity becomes increasingly significant in the context of war even for those women who serve on the frontlines’ (Sajjad 2004: 4). This dual life and responsibility creates difficulties for the female combatants, not only during war, but also in the aftermath in interpreting their lives, reliving memories and consolidating their empowering experiences. They face a lot of difficulties in trying to locate where their contributions stand in the larger socio-​political processes as their combat role and identity are often disrespected. It should be noted that this rejection and disrespect of their combat roles and identities is more directed towards women cadres, as their lives and responsibilities shatter traditional ideas and values to a much greater extent than their male counterparts. In her attempts to understand the militarization of women’s lives, Cynthia Enloe claims that considering women’s service to military as women’s ‘liberation’ is the latest form of maneuver (Enloe 2000: 45). Influences from the home and its all-​pervasive familial setting do not disappear from a woman’s body, even when she is away from home. However, a woman may nevertheless be able to develop a new kind of agency while she is away from home. On the other hand, this structuring often disposes them towards different vulnerabilities and constitutes a new gendering when they come back home. Under this backdrop, this chapter will analyze the multiple levels of hierarchies women combatants are subjected to in terms of their career, marriage, motherhood etc. in different social and political settings. Agency, for the purpose of this study, will also be understood in terms of their corporeal integrity as the body kept moving through these bifurcated zones of the home and the outside time and again. This chapter is an attempt to understand the ways through which certain gender constructs had been challenged in the People’s War, and how these violations provided new arenas of maneouvering for the combatants in Nepal. The chapter also tries to locate the shifts and changes in the lives of ex-​combatants in the post-​ conflict situation, and how they see and recount their life in the party within this context.

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52  Amrita Pritam Gogoi

Marriage, metaphor and the dilemma of a home The Maoist movement in Nepal, with its commitment towards the left ideological apparatus, tried to alter various traditional power equations and raised significant questions about women’s rights. For example, within the Maoist movement, the approved practice of marriage was somewhat different or ‘non-​traditional’. Arranged marriage was strictly prohibited. Willing cadres approached the leader of the unit to legalize their relationship, after which the unit made arrangements for the couple’s wedding. Generally, important dates relating to the Maoist movement were taken up for marriages. A number of couples could get married at the same function, and women wore their commando dress without bangles, jewelry or other ornaments. The couples would light candles, exchange garlands and apply abir. Exchanging their weapons, the couple vowed that ‘our marriage is for the people’. Interestingly and in a very revolutionary style, others would congratulate the couple but not bless them. The newly wedded couple would be given leave for two or three days, but most often couples did not go for leave and asserted that they would celebrate their honeymoon by fighting. Although parents were informed and invited (if the couple wished), parent’s consent for the marriage was never essential. Apart from this, the party also made efforts to bring an end to taboos associated with widowhood by encouraging widow remarriage within the party.1 Practice against patriarchal cultural structures was not limited to the question of marriage and widowhood alone. In the base areas, the party established villages called ‘women’s exploitation free villages’. In these villages the party ensured women had an equal share of parental property. They also tried to make these villages free from domestic violence, child marriage, forced marriage and polygamy. They built crèches and supported infrastructure. The Maoists also formulated a new legal code used in the People’s Courts. In this new legal code, a separate law regarding women and family was formulated. Women were given basic legal training to appear as lawyers in these people’s courts. In addition, the movement successfully changed the civil code and entitled women to inherit ancestral property in 2001, and guaranteed them the right to abortion in 2003 (Gautam et al. 2001). When Prachanda, chairman of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), was asked about the socio-​ political urgency of including women within the movement, he replied: The people were not only fighting with the police or reactionary, feudal agents, but they were also breaking the feudal chains of

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  53 exploitation and oppression and a whole cultural revolution was going on among the people. Questions of marriage, questions of love, questions of family, questions of relations between people. All of these things were being turned upside down […] our party has tried to develop the leadership of women comrades. There have been problems in doing this, but now we are, step-​by-​step, working to solve this problem […] And we had a plan right from the beginning that the women and the men comrades should be in the same squad, the same platoon and that all things should be done in this way. We have worked to make new relations between men and women—​new relations, new society, new things […]. (Interview with journalist Li Ornesto, 2000) When asked about the plans and policies of the party to build women’s leadership and responsibility, Prachanda responded that as Marxists, the party was well aware that the women question had to be seriously debated. But until the initiation, it was not done in a concrete and serious sense. Therefore, women were not visible at the forefront of the movement: Then right after initiation the question came up—​it boldly came up. And especially in my experience, I was very thrilled when, during the first year after initiation, I saw the sacrifice women were making in the main region, in the struggling zones—​their militancy, their heroism, and their devotion. When I saw women masses come into the field, then we started to debate seriously the woman question. And now the situation in the party, more or less, has mainly changed to seeing the woman question from a proletarian viewpoint. From different angles, we try to understand the woman question—​what is the meaning of the woman question, what is the political and theoretical importance, and what are the practical implications in the class struggle and the whole historical perspective. (Prachanda, quoted in Ornesto 2000) In fact, a striking significance of the People’s War of Nepal was that Maoist ideology and policy specifically reached out to girls and women. Nepal also challenged the generally preconceived notion that women combatants are made to perform only secondary roles like cooking, repairing clothes and spying. In an encounter with two women Maoists during the war, Shneiderman and Pettigrew (2004) recount how the two were busy cleaning their rifles and did not have to prepare food or repair uniforms. They concluded that in the Maoist movement of Nepal, a lot

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54  Amrita Pritam Gogoi of efforts were made to do away with a number of patriarchal structures and practices (Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). Under such circumstances it might appear that the Maoist movement in Nepal is an armed class struggle in which women did not have to wait till the end of the war to address their grievances and unravel various sources of exploitation. Moreover, it might also appear that the Maoist movement removed patriarchy from at least within the movement, and their cadres were free from the clutches of patriarchal structures. However, though it seems that the Maoist movement went some way to address patriarchy, serious questions on the credibility of the argument have been raised. In trying to unleash the various ways in which patriarchy crept into and sustained itself within the party and its workers, Hisila Yami, alias Comrade Parvati, an active member of the party who later became a Constituent Assembly member, observes that the patriarchal construct of marriage and the pressure on young women in the movement to marry and take on a gendered burden of child bearing and child rearing significantly affected their career as combatants. This in turn to a significant extent inhibited women combatants from taking leadership roles within the movement. Yami further argues that apart from falling prey to unplanned motherhood and taking up the burden of child bearing and child rearing, women combatants often followed their husband’s political line blindly, affecting their independent political life. Another issue was that women combatants became willing partners of their husband’s field of work and accepted the traditional division of labor, covertly becoming vehicles of conservatism. Another very interesting phenomenon that has been pointed out by Yami is that ‘while men are continuing to develop in the military field even when they have reached beyond 40 years of age, women are hardly seen to continue in the field beyond 25 years’ (Yami 2003). Most of the female cadres, particularly from rural areas, joined combat units at quite an early age. In such cases, marriage can be seen as a means of controlling female cadres. After marriage, it would become difficult to leave the party, which in turn helped the party produce more loyal cadres (Manchanda 2004). It can also be argued that, as the Maoist movement in Nepal became increasingly militarized, it was more hierarchically structured, which further led to diminishing participation of women in the top policymaking councils. It is true that women became area commanders and party committee secretaries, but significantly few women were present in policymaking positions in the central leadership (Gautam et al. 2001). In 2001, when people’s governments were set up in twenty-​one districts, only one district was

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  55 female-​headed, while in four others, women served as Vice Chairs (Manchanda 2010). On the issue of sexuality, too, the Maoists appear to have maintained a conservative code of conduct. The Party imposed strict discipline and punishment against sexual misconduct. It assured that sexual involvement led to marriage if both of the cadres involved were unmarried. Cadres were often demoted from their ranks as punishment. Punishment for such cases was harsher for married couples than for the unmarried.2 Pointing at such control of the party leadership over the private lives of its members, Hisila Yami questions whether it signified the reproduction of traditional gender relations even within the camps (Gautam et  al. 2001). Again, on the recruitment of women in every unit of the PLA, certain popular media asserted that the purpose was to keep the male folk sexually satisfied. Though these were unsubstantiated claims, they also reflect how gendered norms are employed in the domain of power politics. The Maoist response to this allegation was that the presence of women in every unit was maintained to ensure discipline and restraint during any action. This also, in a certain sense, reflects the uncritical gendered stereotyping that has been practiced within the Maoist party (Gautam et al. 2001).

Lives and worlds of female combatants: corporeality as agency The end of war is a period when combatants experience significant change, both socio-​ politically and economically. They experience change not only in terms of their labor, but also in terms of their dress and the way they use their body. Their relationship and attachment with colleagues, lovers and husbands undergo many changes. In the social reproduction of their life, at this stage, with new relations and productive forces at play, combatants’ visions of life are considerably redefined. It is in this context that this section attempts to uncover some of the multiple truths women combatants live with, and the constant negotiation and re-​negotiation they have to engage in their everyday lives with the different selves they actualized in different phases of their lives. One of the sites where the impact of gender norms and regulations are significantly witnessed is a woman’s body: the way she uses her body, the temperament she carries, and the kind of efforts she makes in the accomplishment of a task. In trying to understand the body of a woman and what constrains her from using her own body, Iris Young (1980), contradicting the generally accepted belief that women are physically

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56  Amrita Pritam Gogoi weaker than men, argues that women use their bodies differently than men do because in their case: a space surrounds us in imagination that we are not free to move beyond; the space available to our movement is a constricted space […]. Women often approach a physical engagement with things with timidity, uncertainty, and hesitancy. Typically we lack an entire trust in our bodies to carry us to our aims. (Young 1980: 143) Perhaps in war zones, during combat, women are able to move beyond that constricted space to a certain extent and use their bodies with greater confidence. In their article, Women in the Maobadi: Ideology and Agency in Nepal’s Maoist Movements, Shneiderman and Pettigrew (2004) provide an account of one of the combatants they encountered. They observed that the 16-​year-​old Chettri woman spent much of the morning cleaning her gun. Shortly after beginning, the cork she inserted to clean the barrel became stuck. She tried several physically demanding methods to dislodge it herself, which involved using her body in ways which would have been unacceptable for a woman within most other social contexts. After several attempts she realized that she needed someone with greater physical strength to help. Only then did she request assistance from her male colleagues. They did not seem to consider her exertions as anything culturally inappropriate and paid no attention to her (Shneiderman and Pettigrew 2004). The account reflects the liberation of the body of a woman in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) experienced during her combat life. It also suggests that during preparations for combat, as war bodies, the bodies of women PLA cadres excelled and experienced bodily forms of liberation. Their performance thus affected the status of their bodies, which were otherwise considered as weak and inappropriate to undertake certain forms of responsibilities. But what happens to these bodies post-​conflict? Do the women continue to use their bodies in the same way as during war, or with lesser or greater freedom? What structures and factors direct these changes? I met combatant X, whom I will call Maya, in 2014 in the month of Shrawan (mid-​July to mid-​August), in her cosmetics shop-​cum-​gift gallery.3 She was sitting in the midst of cosmetics, bangles and nail paints, welcoming me warmly. Maya joined the movement when she was barely sixteen, after sitting for her intermediate exam. During her vacations at the time she attended three cultural programs of the Maoists and was really attracted by their ‘Sidhanta’ (ideology) that called for a society free from all patriarchal structures. What also attracted her was the

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  57 dress and uniform of the PLA. Maya saw a number of female PLA cadres in their commando dress and this appealed to her immensely. During her nine-​year stay in the movement, she married a fellow PLA in the janabadi way. On asking how acceptable to her the progressive form of marriage in the PLA was, Maya replied: This was easily acceptable. Because one can get married without dowry and to the person you like. Moreover, there is no need of decorating and beautifying oneself like a butterfly. No show off to the society. However, when asked if she faced any difficulty in changing her attire after coming out of the PLA, she replied: There is not much difficulty as we already get habituated. When I was a child I always liked wearing bangles. So even after coming back one can wear the ornaments. No, it is not difficult to change. You might think that it is difficult, but in reality it is not. However, Maya has still kept her commando uniform. She looks at it from time to time. She said, ‘it feels good to look at them at times’. Although she emphasized that there was no difficulty in adapting to changes and shifts in society, her contradictory claims on various issues suggests that she lives in three different times. Once in a while, the politically correct, rational and vocal combatant shifts to an unquestioning passive recipient of values and regulations, and this understanding actually influences her to see or re-​imagine the past she has left behind. Talking about marriage and the question of caste in the PLA, Maya emphasized that the caste question was never a problem. However, when asked differently, she said that for some of them this might be a problem when they came back home. Maya was herself in an inter-​ caste marriage. She belonged to a caste higher than her husband. When asked how difficult it was for her to go for an inter-​caste marriage, she replied: To me there are only two types of human, man and woman. Everything else is equal. Therefore, inter-​caste marriage with my husband has never been a problem. Caste and class differences do not make any sense. What are required are only good manners and that one should be able to take care of each other. Within the PLA, inter-​caste marriage was never a problem.

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58  Amrita Pritam Gogoi When I questioned Maya about what has led to separation of couples during and after the conflict or on what grounds a couple can claim divorce, she replied: I have not come across such cases myself. But if any of the married couples are found dating somebody else then the other might claim a divorce. Again, in the camps inter-​caste marriages are not a problem. But if husband is of high caste then it becomes a problem because the wife is not accepted back in the society. Moreover, they can get divorced if the wife cannot bear children. According to Maya, if the girl is from a lower caste she assumes there might be a problem in the relation. This suggests that neither the society at large nor the members within the movement are able or willing to move beyond the limitations of caste and patriarchal constructs. The second challenge Maya assumes is a possible cause of marital problems, that is, the inability to give birth to a child, also depicts how women combatants were not free from the roles expected of a woman in a patriarchal society. It has to be noted that although Maya said that she had not seen such a case yet, her belief that under such circumstances divorce or separation could be claimed reflects her understanding of caste, womanhood and motherhood —​if not when she was a combatant then at least in the present time and context. Moreover, on asking her if any of her friends have been through it, she replied that she was not in touch with a lot of her comrades, but had heard from two such friends who were having troubles in their family life because of inter-​ caste marriage. In both cases she elaborated that the wives belonged to lower castes than their husbands, and faced rejection from their in-​laws. During my interaction with one of the Maoist war-​journalists, he said that many of the couples at the end of the war, while leaving their camps, were really scared to go back with their partners of different castes. He said ‘a lot of them changed their partners for fear of rejection by their families’.4 The insecurities of female combatants belonging to lower castes than their husbands is also reflected in Gayer’s reference to an inter-​caste marriage where he quotes comrade Namuna who justifies or defends her marriage by describing it as ‘not that much of inter-​caste’ because, ‘I am Chetri… My family had been downgraded from Paudel to Chetri… He is Brahmin… So it’s not as if a Dalit was marrying a Chetri’ (Gayer 2013: 350). The experiences of the ex-​combatants who went for inter-​caste marriages, and particularly the ones who had to leave their former partner and marry someone from their own caste, not only reflect the difficulties

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  59 of doing away with patriarchal structures but also unfold multiple layers of suffering and discrimination which women combatants in Nepal specifically undergo owing to their gender, irrespective of the socio-​ political setting and context. After taking into account Maya’s understanding and her unproblematic inter-​caste marriage where she is from a higher caste, her ideas on divorce and motherhood and the experience of inter-​caste marriage of her friends clearly reveals the continuous negotiation and re-​negotiation she and her friends have been engaging with in terms of their life, identity and ideology. It further raises significant questions as to why people coming from revolutionary practices, and living with high ideals, could not carry on with their struggles in the aftermath of the war in the familial and social spaces. From my interaction with Maya it seemed that combatants no longer live with a sense of pride for their commitment and sacrifice for the nation. She is full of guilt for having left her studies and joining the war: Life is very difficult. I am not capable of doing a lot of work. Life is full of struggle. This is the feeling of many of my friends as well. We have no education. We have no other experience but the experiences of war alone. There is a feeling of getting paralysed. It feels like our life has been damaged.5 Moreover, she continued: I can’t reply to people’s accusations. People ask, what are you capable of doing? You can break other’s leg and make someone blind. But what actually can you do? I do not have a reply to it. So bored and tensed all the time. I feel parajit [defeated]. Nonetheless, there is always space to question if she would have pursued her studies further, and if she would have had a better life, and how victorious she would have felt had she not joined the movement. And perhaps, the inability to reply, the rejection of her combatant identity in the community, the disrespect for her combat role and responsibilities in the present has forced her to look back at her past with regret. Undoubtedly, such rejection and disrespect is more directed towards women combatants whose combat life and responsibilities shatters traditional ideas and values to a much greater extent than their male counterparts. If this is the case, then the question arises as to how she identifies herself now. What are the means and methods she has adopted to live her life when she finds herself at an unanswerable end? As she said:

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60  Amrita Pritam Gogoi I identify myself as a shopkeeper only. I  do not keep telling people to support this party or that. I  completely conceal my political affiliation and identity from the people. I  do not give them political suggestions. Even if I talk to people about politics I never impose my views on them. I live like a normal shopkeeper. And, that is why I  am respected. I  like to identify myself as a shopkeeper only […]. I call myself an ordinary person. That has helped me gain respect and a legitimate position in the society I live in. When asked if she has been given extra respect for her contribution to the nation, she said ‘No, no extra respect.’ She further added: If the party would have done good after coming to power than I would had been given extra respect for being an ex-​PLA. But now I  am not given extra respect. What was the outcome of so much bloodshed and suffering? The value of time, so much time was wasted in the name of war. That is the case. So what can I say? That she questions the credibility of the party time and again in giving meaning to their lives not only points at certain drawbacks of the party, but also suggests that is the only available space to which she can look for answers to her questions, the little space to place her grievances and complaints and to assert her free self. Perhaps other social, familial and political structures do not provide her with the psychological and emotional space to express herself, or maybe she does not see them as spaces through which her ‘self’ can be expressed and realized.

The many war bodies The experiences of all women are not the same. Combatant Y,6 whom I  will call Nirmala, was not in the fighting front as Maya was, but worked in the student organizations, radio and later in the people’s courts. She looks differently at the end of war, as she explained, ‘I gained all my leadership qualities from the party. It is entirely because of the party that I could develop my personality and confidence. I miss that life now’. Nirmala elaborated further, ‘I worked for unity and integrity of Nepal and wanted the war to end. Therefore, my comrades and I bravely embraced the change. It was essential for the war to come to an end’. The only change she felt was that now there is no war. But the movement has not come to an end, it will continue; ‘To bring peace, war needs to be continued.’ Nirmala added, ‘I feel that my happiness is

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  61 incomplete because Nepal is still lacking in many fields. I feel that my contribution is incomplete. Unity of Nepal is essential. Therefore I am not that happy.’ Nirmala now owns a cloth store and is actively involved with the activities of the party. Even on the day I went to meet her she had attended a meeting of the party, unlike Maya who no longer trusts her party and has not been to the party office for the last two years. She said that she and her husband still continue to be members of the party because they have done so much for it. Her husband almost broke his leg during one of the battles with the Royal Nepal Army. Maya, on the other hand, wanted to open a pharmacy or train as a staff nurse. In the PLA she was in the medical department. Her husband was a 12th pass and was not eligible to apply for most jobs. Therefore he left for Dubai to work as a security personnel in a mall. As under the given circumstances Maya had to parent her baby, she preferred to take the money she received as a part of the rehabilitation program, rather than spending time and money on being educated as a trained nurse.7 The participation of both the cadres here are not the same and therefore the way it shaped and affected them too will be different. Because Nirmala worked in the radio, student organizations and in the people’s court, at the end of the war her world is not much different. But for Maya, whose war experience was the only experience, the end of war meant parting with a considerable amount of her work, which is intrinsically related with one’s identity. While Maya had to walk through the hills, valleys and rivers of at least 35 districts with a backpack that included necessities like food, clothing, weapons and medicine for the whole group, Nirmala did not have the experience of traversing the terrain, and did not work in more than five districts. Maya says that there had been times when she and her comrades had walked for 39 hours at a stretch. When asked what they talked about and did in their leisure time, she replied that at that time there was no leisure time: ‘We were always busy. I didn’t even have time to meet and talk with my husband’. It was perhaps in the busy schedule, in the sacrifice and in the difficulties and pain of combat life that she experienced liberation and exercised agency. Revealing her sense of discontentment in the way she describes her labor now, she kept on telling me that life has become very boring. Sitting amidst the cosmetics she said, ‘At times, I just feel like discarding them all’.

Experiences and identities in negotiation Thus we see that women combatants experience a lot of change in terms of their identity. They experience significant change in the way they see

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62  Amrita Pritam Gogoi themselves. They find themselves at the edge of the same structures they fought against and continuously engage in difficult negotiations with conflicting ideas and identities. They become a part of the same irreversible power structures after fighting physically, emotionally and psychologically demanding wars. Change in the perception of life and various codes of conduct that regulate life leads to change in one’s vision and aim in life too. Negotiation of past and present identities and principles is also accompanied by the negotiation of dreams. A ‘New Nepal’ was the only dream Maya dreamt of when in the PLA. When asked what else she dreamt of, she replied clearly, ‘No, there was no other dream. There was no time to think of something else. New Nepal was the only dream. New Nepal, where everyone would be equal, nobody discriminated owing to their caste or class. Everybody would have the right to get educated’. Her eyes dampen and she halts for a while and continues: ‘Now I have other dreams; a home in Kathmandu with my child and husband. But that is not realizable. I want to be together with my family. Life is full of struggle, now.’ I then asked her if New Nepal was a realizable dream, to which she replied ‘yes’, as she wiped another teardrop. For a moment I felt she is now deprived of the entire agency she had once acquired at the time of war. But the very fact that she still believes in the strength and viability of realizing the dream of New Nepal depicts the hierarchy in which she places her priorities, dreams and also the strength she carries within herself. Unlike Nirmala, Maya is not associated with the party, yet she has found her own ways to exercise agency. When I asked if she was trained to give speeches during the war, she said: I did give speeches at that time. I talked on education, and the revolution and the movement to the villagers. The Commander used to teach us how to give a speech. We were also given articles to read. We would read them and then listen to the radio. This helped us gather a lot of information on various issues.8 When asked what it felt like to give speeches to the people, she replied, ‘I want to give a speech even now but I cannot because people will not accept me. But at times I do give whenever there is a gathering in the shop and the crowd discusses an issue.’ Maya participates actively in such discussions. Dress, the caste system and education are issues that she talks about. She teaches people about these things. Later during our conversation she also said that at times she rejoices the fact that she can do every kind of work. This sense of contentment and confidence, however, contradicts her previous reflection that at present she never engages in political discussions and identifies herself solely as a

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  63 shopkeeper. This ambiguity in interpreting and recognizing her own political engagement points towards the continuous conflict of ideas (of self, labor, politics and the like) and identities women combatants live through post-​conflict. Maya believes that her only limitation is that she cannot do anything that requires academic qualifications. But apart from that she believes she can do everything, which makes her feel good. Although it feels good to see and believe that women combatants have retained their agency even after the end of the war, the truth remains that patriarchy is a constant in all societies. The agency that women acquired during war is constantly at risk, challenged by forces from both within and outside the party. For example, Rita Manchanda (2010) describes Sarala Regmi, who was one of the first 60 women combatants to be recruited by the PLA: During the people’s war the party had arranged for Sarala Regmi’s marriage after her husband was killed in war. But the irony stands such that during the constituent assembly elections, Bam dev Gautam had used her violation of tradition i.e. widow re-​marriage to reduce her reputation. Nonetheless, she won the election. (Manchanda 2010)

During my fieldwork in Nepal, as per the advice of an earlier respondent, I decided to meet with one particular female Maoist ex-​combatant. According to another respondent, this particular cadre was very articulate and had great insights into issues of womanhood, femininity and wartime experiences. He shared with me his own encounter with her and how articulate she was in expressing the dual burden of being a mother and a Maoist in the jungles at the same time. She worked with the Maoist radio. I obtained her number and very excitedly called her for an appointment. She denied my request to meet her. I was saddened but kept wondering what this rejection reflects. What did it mean, that an articulate, vocal activist refusing to meet a student? A day later I went to Martin Chautari to work in their library and interact with the researchers there. And it was there during my interaction with Kailash Rai, who had also written on motherhood and the Maoists, that I was informed that this particular cadre was having problems in her personal life. After the war she wanted to join a radio station but her husband, also a PLA cadre, did not allow her to continue with it and for reasons such as this he filed for divorce. Kailash, who met her around six months ago, said that she was at a very bad stage in her life and was fighting with her husband in court on child and property rights.9

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64  Amrita Pritam Gogoi Despite certain initiatives being taken by the Maoist party to emancipate women from traditional power structures, in Nepali society, both within the fold of the Maoist party and outside, it is clear that Nepali women continue to be discriminated against through various laws, practices and norms. However, for the female ex-​combatant these patriarchal standards, glances and criticisms are harsher, as she had formerly trespassed many gendered territories during her combat life, challenging established ways. After the war, she has had to constantly negotiate and re-​negotiate her multiple lives, experiences and identities. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to see the female ex-​combatant merely as lacking, of a voice, body and life of her own, under all circumstances. Perhaps it is more important to highlight how she still retains and exercises her strength and agency.

Notes 1 Interaction with Surya Kiran, 12 July 2014. 2 Interaction with Dama Sharma, 19 July 2014. Dama Sharma was a Central Committee member of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) during the war. In the 2008 Constituent Assembly elections she was elected from Dang 2 constituency. 3 Interactions with Combatant X, 13 and 15 July 2014. 4 Conversation with the journalist on 12 July 2014. 5 Interactions with Combatant X, 13 and 15 July 2014. 6 Interaction with Combatant Y, 19 July 2014. 7 Interactions with Combatant X, 13 and 15 July 2014. 8 Interactions with Combatant X, 13 and 15 July 2014. 9 Conversations with Satish Jung Sahi of AFN and Kailash Rai of Martin Chautari.

References Enloe, C. 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Gautam, S., A. Banskota and R. Manchanda. 2001. ‘Where There Are No Men:  Women in the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal’ in R. Manchanda, ed., Women, War and Peace in South Asia:  Beyond Victimhood to Agency, New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 214–​251. Gayer, L. 2013. ‘Love-​Marriage-​Sex in the People’s Liberation Army:  The Libidinal Economy of a Greedy Institution’ in M. Lecomte-​Tilouine, ed., Revolution in Nepal:  An Anthropological and Historical Approach to the People’s War, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, India, pp. 333–​366. Manchanda, R. 2010. ‘Women’s Question in Nepal’s Democratic Post Conflict Transition: Towards A Policy Research Agenda’, Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, 3(1): 1–​18.

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Women ex-combatants in post-conflict Nepal  65 —​—​—​. 2004. ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Radicalizing Gendered Narratives’, Cultural Dynamics, 16(2/​3) (27 October 2004): 237–​258. Ornesto, L. 2000. ‘Red Flag Flying on the Roof of the World: Interview with Prachanda’, The Worker, 20 February 2000. Sajjad, T. 2004. ‘Women Guerrillas:  Marching Towards True Freedom? An Analysis of Women’s Experiences in the Frontlines of Guerrilla Warfare and in the Post-​War Period’, Agenda, 18(59): Women in War: 4. Shneiderman, S. and J. Pettigrew 2004. ‘Women and the Maobadi’, Himal Southasian, 17(1): 19–​29. Sjoberg, L. 2010. ‘Women Fighters and the “Beautiful Soul” Narrative’, International Review of the Red Cross, 92(877): 53–​68. Yami, H. 2003. ‘The Question of Women’s Leadership in People’s War in Nepal’, The Worker, 8. [online] Available at: www.bannedthought.net/​Nepal/​ Worker/​Worker-​08/​WomensLeadershipInPW-​Parvati-​W08.htm —​ —​ —​ . 2005. ‘Women in People’s War in Nepal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(50): 5234–​5236. Young, I. 1980. ‘Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment Mobility and Spatiality’, Human Studies, 3(2): 137–​156.

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4 Nepali women’s mobilization for peace Transforming activism into policy change Vanessa Daurer Are you not ashamed of this? Look around and see who is sitting around the table, only men? Are you not ashamed of yourselves?

The above questions were posed quite forcefully by a woman who intruded at a High Level Task Force meeting during Nepal’s peace process. The meeting was composed of 12 to 15 men.1 Although women were heavily involved in bringing the Maoists and the Nepali government to the peace table in 2006, they were absent from the peace talks. Once again there seemed to be a concerted effort to exclude women from formal peace negotiations and ‘push them back into the kitchens’ in the aftermath of conflict, as observed in post-​conflict settings in countries such as El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kumar 2001, Manchanda 2001, Meintjes 2001). However, women in Nepal refused to be silenced, but instead raised their voices, mobilized, rallied in the streets, and demanded what they perceived as their right, namely, representation in the peace process and decision-​ making at large. Women not only raised their voices, but advocated successfully for several policy changes during Nepal’s post-​conflict transition. Based upon women’s collective efforts, a legal reform and provision ensuring 33 per cent female representation in the Constituent Assembly was included in Nepal’s Interim Constitution. This achievement stood out as unique in a post-​conflict setting, especially in a country where patriarchy and gender bias seemed to prevail. My motivation to conduct fieldwork in Nepal was thus to find out how the exceptional post-​conflict success of the Nepali women’s movement was achieved. How had the activists gone about reaching their goals? How did Nepali women achieve such remarkable accomplishments, when in many other countries women had been excluded from peace processes?

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  67 The success of the Nepali women’s movement is neither a conflict nor a post-​conflict story. Rather, it is a story about women persisting through several decades in their commitment to achieving a better and more gender-​equal society. I found that the agency of the Nepali women’s movement was profoundly rooted in society, dating as far back as a century (IDEA 2011). This was a movement not merely about raising voices for women’s rights, but for the equal value of every human being. Since the mid-​twentieth century, Nepali women’s organizations have achieved many remarkable legal reforms, in areas such as universal adult franchise, women’s citizenship rights, justice for victims of domestic violence, and non-​discriminatory property laws (Abdela 2011). Women’s inclusion in Nepal’s peace process should thus be understood within the context of other major achievements by the Nepali women’s movement. This chapter traces the impressive agency of the Nepali women’s movement during and after the civil war. During the conflict women developed new mechanisms for demanding political change, and what I will henceforth refer to as a repertoire of actions of contentious politics that ultimately led to changes in several national policies. This was mainly spurred by factors such as women’s skills in effective mass mobilization, their ability to formulate concrete legal demands, and their strategy of direct engagement with policy-​makers. The women’s movement also managed to unite across some of the key political and social divides, giving women’s activism unity and a stronger voice. This chapter discusses the Nepali women’s movement’s strategies and forms of activism, its repertoire of actions, as well as its ability to garner international support. I specifically aim to address which factors significantly contributed to the success of women’s mobilization in Nepal’s post-​conflict setting as a reaction to the imminent exclusion from the transition to peace. What made women stand up strongly in the post-​conflict setting, push back patriarchal prejudice and demand policy changes for gender equal peacebuilding? The following analysis predominantly provides insights into the compelling case of Nepali women’s agency, and how their activism translated into a mechanism for policy change. My data consists of semi-​structured interviews with female Nepali activists, parliamentarians and staff of NGOs, complemented by written material, informal conversations and observations during fieldwork in 2014. My emphasis is not on evaluating the ‘success’ of the Nepali women’s movement in terms of changing gender roles, but rather to discern which factors were significant to the women’s movement’s persistent activism and expansion of the momentum of transition, rather than a retreat in the difficult post-​conflict transition.

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Women’s activism in Nepal As mentioned earlier (see also Upreti and Shrestha, Chapter 1 of this volume), Nepali women’s political activism has a long history. The deep-​ rooted history of women’s activism was indeed an important condition for women’s organizations to be heard in Nepal’s transition from war to peace. Historically, women had organized around a broad range of political concerns, such as suffrage and democracy in the 1950s. Hence, women’s activism was not limited to the stereotypical women’s issues. Moreover, I found two further vital pre-​conditions for the sustained post-​ conflict activism of the Nepali women’s movement, namely the strong commitment of women leaders, and the capacity to network effectively across societal and ethnic divisions. In deeply divided societies, women’s organizations may serve as platforms for dialogue across ethnic, societal and political divisions, focusing instead on commonalities (Porter 2003: 252). The Nepali women’s movement built a strong organizational infrastructure when multiparty democracy was reinstated in the 1990s. As the armed conflict escalated in the late 1990s, women’s organizations were united on issues critical to security, specifically women’s security in armed conflict. Two critical issues or junctures (Pierson 2000) that made women unite despite their differences were, firstly, incidents of rape and violence against women, and secondly, the political environment during the decade-​long armed conflict (1996–​2006). The first of these junctures can be dated back to a tragic incident in 1991 when a six-​year-​old girl was raped. This incident outraged female activists and pushed women’s organizations to unite for collective action. The six-​year-​old girl had been at a stadium with her relative when she suddenly disappeared. Two days later, the girl was found in the Thamel district of Kathmandu, and it was discovered that she had been raped. Women activists across political affiliations subsequently united in a common forum where they decided to work together for women’s rights. This resulted in the formation of the Women’s Security Pressure Group (WSPG) in 1991, one of the first women’s networks established in Nepal.2 The founding chairperson of WSPG, Sahana Pradhan, had led the mobilization of women against the Rana regime in the 1940s, but came to the WSPG forum emphasizing her identity as a woman. In WSPG, women came together from different backgrounds, from civil society as well as the women’s wings of various political parties, uniting as women and leaving differences in political ideology aside.3 Importantly, this network existed before the armed conflict began, which again demonstrates the strength and rootedness of the Nepali women’s movement.

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  69 The second critical juncture that made women mobilize and organize in networks was the decade-​long armed conflict, which started to escalate in the late 1990s. Since early 2000, violence escalated amid a series of failed efforts to initiate peace talks. After the Royal Massacre in 2001, the Maoists again intensified their war effort (Whitfield 2012). In late 2001, a ceasefire was announced by the government and the Maoists, but the agreement collapsed after a few months. Formal talks resumed in 2003, following informal talks between the monarchy, the Maoists and civil society, including the women’s movement. Women had started to unite for peace, moving beyond existing organizational efforts that focused on relief to victims. The success of the Jana Andolan movement for democracy in 1990 had taught them the importance of collaborative mobilization.4 In 2003, a group of more than one hundred such women formed Shantimalika Women’s Network for Peace and Justice, aiming to raise women’s demands collectively (ADB 2013). In February 2005, King Gyanendran regained power through a coup. Activists were no longer able to leave their homes without being arrested, and the leaders of political parties were detained (Von Einsiedel et al. 2012). The Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance came together against the monarchy with massive popular support in the second Jana Andolan in 2006. The women’s movement participated enthusiastically, as people from all over the country took to the streets of Kathmandu (Pokharel and Rana 2013). The King tried to stop the mass rallies by cutting mobile phone and internet services, and blocking the media, isolating Nepal from the outside world.5 However, civil society kept mobilizing, and finally, the King resigned. During the 2006 popular movement, the contribution of women activists and organizations was remarkable. In the previous such movement, the first Jana Andolan in 1990, women had only taken part as supporters. This time they contributed with human resources, logistically and through their own campaigns. Women organized independent initiatives calling for peace such as the ‘white flower campaign’ and ‘paint for peace’ campaign (DidiBahini 2013). Women activists, wives, Janajati (ethnic) community women, artists, members of civil society and female ex-​combatants all expressed solidarity for peace through symbolic initiatives and rallies. Women staged a mass rally with the slogan ‘Lay down weapons and join us’ and ‘Stop violence and cooperate with the pro-​democracy movement’ (DidiBahini 2013). Wives of army officers and police officers gave white flowers to their husbands, telling them to ‘Stop it’. Mothers, sisters, and daughters from both sides of the conflict supported the Jana Andolan rallies. As participants explained, ‘Everyone gathered for peace, women from factories, from household

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70  Vanessa Daurer levels, female students. It was very emotional, it did not matter who was fighting, we told them all to “stop” ’.6 Many organizations contributed with support and assistance in the rallies, by providing free first-​aid services and water to the protesters (DidiBahini 2013). As the second critical juncture, the Jana Andolan rallies demonstrated that women were capable of coordinated action for a broader national security agenda, beyond equal rights and women’s issues. This highlighted the ability of the Nepali women’s movement to network across divisions and beyond women’s interests and agendas, which was also to become vital to their ability to engage strongly in the peace process. Clearly, the conflict itself and the extraordinary security threats had made women unite for peace, as a goal beyond individual leadership interests, organizational interests or party politics. The women’s networks set the precedent for cooperation, even between people who had previously never cooperated, providing the Nepali women’s movement a strong and united voice. This then facilitated network-​building for future gender-​related work and policy influence.

Strategic responses to women’s exclusion from peace talks Towards the end of the civil war, women’s organizations played an active role in bringing the opposing sides, the Maoists and the Nepali government, to the peace table through dialogue meetings, workshops and backdoor channels where they invited both sides. In November 2005, a 12-​point agreement was concluded between the Nepalese government’s Prime Minister, Girija Prasad Koirala and the Maoist leader, Prachanda. However, women were not consulted during the drafting of the agreement, not even female Maoist combatants. In fact, not a single woman was invited to the negotiating table. Discussed in a little apartment in New Delhi, the 12-​point agreement was signed by men only (Pokharel and Rana 2013). The mass rallies of Jana Andolan started in April 2006. As a result of their engagement in these events, women’s organizations contributed substantially to the ending of the civil war. In June 2006, however, the Maoists and the seven political parties signed an eight-​point understanding without any women being included in the negotiation. Women were highly dissatisfied with their continuous exclusion from the peace talks and in response started mobilizing, gathering signatures and standing in front of the city hall demanding inclusion in the peace process.7 Well aware of the risk of women being excluded from the peace process, another women’s network was formed under the name of Sankalpa

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  71 Women’s Alliance for Peace, Justice and Democracy. It was first formed informally in 2006, and was registered formally as an organized network in 2011 (Sankalpa 2014). Sankalpa included various women’s organizations that came together in a network to ensure the equal representation of women at all decision-​making levels. The vision of the network was to make diverse groups of women visible in the Constituent Assembly and the peacebuilding process (Sankalpa 2014). In 2006 and 2007, Sankalpa engaged eleven different women’s networks in advocacy and lobbying for women’s political representation (ADB 2013). The Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed in late 2006. An Interim Constitution was to be drafted, and the Drafting Committee was again to exclude women. Women’s organizations gathered in a sit-​ in rally, protesting in front of the Prime Minister’s office until it was announced that women were being included in the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee. During the sit-​in rally, women sat in front of the government building despite restrictions in the area, with placards stating their demands, while leaders of different networks and organizations entered to talk to the ministers and political parties about the inclusion of women. Combined with lobbying and advocacy, this form of activism proved crucial for the movements’ success, demonstrating that the women had adopted an effective repertoire of action for influencing decision-​making. Thanks to these collective efforts, four women were included among the sixteen people forming the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee. Most of these women had a law background, such as Pushpa Bhusal, nominated for the committee by her political party, the Nepal Congress. Further, the women’s mobilization induced the inclusion of marginalized groups of Dalits, Muslims and Madeshis.8 According to Pushpa Bhusal, the women included in the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee succeeded in including some radical changes such as a binding article on mothers’ right of transferal of citizenship to her children,9 as well as 33 per cent representation of women in the Constituent Assembly (as compared with a previous parliamentary reservation of 5 per cent).

Translating activism into mechanisms for producing policy change In contrast to many other conflicts, where research has often demonstrated women’s mobilization peaking during the conflict and later decreasing (Kumar 2001), women in Nepal responded strongly against their exclusion from the peace process. They mobilized in a strategic response, made possible by their previous experiences in uniting for

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72  Vanessa Daurer a collective and strong voice through networks. The advanced repertoire of action of women’s organizations and the persistence of their involvement in the peace process was demonstrated by the Women’s Campaign for Peace and Constitution (WOREC 2012), which took place between April 2011 and June 2012. It demonstrated the effective strategy that the women’s movement had developed during previous years. The campaign was composed of five different stages. The first included different walkathons, workshops, trainings and demonstrations, hunger strikes, and mass rallies. In the second stage, different lobby and advocacy programs were launched. The third stage involved media attention and letters submitted to the different political parties. The fourth stage included networking at a local, regional and national level, pressuring for a women-​friendly and timely constitution. The final stage was yet another series of rallies to create pressure from the streets (WOREC 2012). In order to understand the meaning of mobilization and its context-​ specific features, we need to analyse explanatory variables for mobilization. For instance, Baldez (2010:  37)  suggests three explanatory variables for women’s mobilization during political transitions: organizational infrastructure (formal and informal networks), direct contact with the international feminist community, and exclusion from realignment processes. Similarly, in Nepal, women were excluded from the peace process when men sought to go back to business as usual (Kumar 2001). However, the Nepali women’s movement had developed efficient strategies of mobilization during their property rights campaign (1994–​2002), when uniting for peace and ceasefire (2005), and during Jana Andolan II (2006). Following these experiences, the women’s movement recognized that working collectively through networks between the grassroots and national-​level civil society and political institutions was an important way of raising their voices effectively for political impact.10 The process under which they had operated during previous mobilizations entailed several steps on how to ultimately achieve their goals, which was another characteristic of the women’s organization. They had tangible legal goals upon which they acted, thus providing concrete changes that they aimed to achieve. The repertoire of action also had benefits for the development and reinforcement of a sense of unity through gathering and engaging with activists, and gaining media attention and active engagement with policymakers. Finally, their direct engagement with the international feminist movement provided liberal discourses of rights and peacebuilding (Miklian et al. 2011).

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  73 The repertoire of action The repertoire of action of the women’s movement had several characteristics unique to its context, such as concrete and tangible goals in terms of legal provisions and broader political goals beyond a mere feminist agenda. Women’s organizations urged for a socially inclusive agenda and fostered networks and relationships with policymakers and amongst themselves, developing several steps for effective mobilization. Firstly, the leader needed clear vision and a participatory approach, building consensus so as to include everyone. Secondly, communication had to be efficient. The agenda or vision, and step-​by-​step approach, had to be communicated through phone calls and e-​mails. Typically, such steps might start with a rally, then a sit-​in rally, thirdly a concept note, position paper or letter to ministers, and finally a letter to the prime minister. Women’s organizations would contact their counterparts and networks both at the national level and the grassroots level, as most had their own networks both in the districts and around Kathmandu. This could lead to a large-​ scale mobilization within days. For instance, a rally could be called within three to four days from when the decision was first taken.11 As a further step, there might be round-​table discussions or dissemination of publications on women’s issues (Asian Development Bank 2013). Within only a few days, the women’s organizations were able to gather thousands of women rallying through the streets of Kathmandu. Mobilization for inclusion in the peace process was almost ‘mob-​ like’ (Ansari 2014), made up of a crowd of people with enthusiasm and great aspiration for change. During participant observation I noticed the enthusiasm and confidence of the women marching in the streets during one of the rallies, in May 2014. Women had a pre-​decided route and marched in long lines throughout Kathmandu’s highly trafficked streets. Despite the heavy traffic, women showed great enthusiasm, were not disorganized by the traffic and shouted even more loudly over the noise.12 Turning to the specific characteristic of women’s mobilization in Nepal, it shows several characteristics of an efficient social movement such as unity, large numbers and commitment (Tilly 2004). The women demonstrated strong efforts in network formation, engaging women across the divide between urban centers and the rural grassroots. Each organization had its own networks at the grassroots level that would be mobilized, and these would respectively protest in their communities for the same cause at the same time that the political advocacy was on-​ going at the central level.

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74  Vanessa Daurer The number of mobilized women was amplified dramatically by the grassroots mobilization efforts. Within the repertoire of action, it was clear how much effort activists put into both achieving high participation numbers and communicating those numbers clearly. For example, during rallies, participants would form a single file line to make it easier to estimate the number of people involved. In another example from the peace and ceasefire movement, women walked in a long row with banners containing signatures of the leaders of political parties. The high levels of participation could easily then be communicated in the media, increasing public awareness of the movement’s efforts. The commitment of mobilized women was most evident in their willingness to disrupt when they needed to be heard. According to Ranju Thakur (Member of the Constituent Assembly for the Communist Party of Nepal  –​Unified Marxist Leninist) (CPN-​UML), willpower is the ultimate driving force of change. Seemingly, the Nepali women’s movement was fuelled during political instability, and in extraordinary conditions women would even break curfews and restrictions. However, these violations were used selectively and only when the situation was perceived to demand it, as in 2010, when several female activists were imprisoned for advocating a women-​friendly constitution. Engagement with policymakers The state is composed of various actors engaged in diverse relationship with women’s organizations, through which the women’s movement can influence policymaking (Rucht 2003, Tilly 2005). Translating strong mobilization into policy influence is facilitated by direct engagement with policymakers. This was a clear goal of Nepali women’s mobilization, approached through several channels. The women’s movement interacted with representatives of the state through identified contact persons who would raise their demands and speak for them in the political forum. This was an important feature of their repertoire of action. According to Durga Ghimire, ‘networking is important, because only then one can achieve success’, and a key was to identify ‘your friend’ amongst officials, and politicians who would voice the issues of women in their respective forums.13 Thus, networking with politicians and policymakers is as vital as networking among women’s organizations for a strong voice. Often, the mobilization of women through rallies and campaigns is complementary to meetings with government officials, ministers and politicians. These activities are inevitably interrelated

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  75 in the women’s movement’s strategy of achieving change. Networking between different women’s organizations and civil society organizations increases the movement’s strength, but networking and dialogues with political parties, politicians, and policymakers are vital to achieve policy change. An example of this was the movement’s successful demand for 33 per cent female representation in parliament. The process that achieved this demonstrated how the movement engaged intentionally with decision-​makers. Importantly, it also shaped future potential for engagement, as women parliamentarians became contact points. This kind of networking built on ties between female parliamentarians and officials and the women’s movement, both carrying the long-​term goal of gender equality (Tilly 2005). The Nepali women’s networks launched several initiatives such as consultancy meetings with representatives of political parties, and meetings of the Inter-​Party Women’s Alliance within the political parties. The networks also submitted various petitions and position papers to the parties and politicians in their campaign for 33 per cent women’s representation in the Constitution Assembly (CA). Once a legally binding provision was included in the Interim Constitution, women’s networks started to lobby government stakeholders and political parties for the implementations of the provision in the CA elections. Although the networks had many challenges to overcome, they were able to organize many campaigns, rallies, and sit-​in demonstrations. Several campaigns were covered extensively by the media. In 2007, for instance, women’s networks gathered and held two large national conferences with women from the districts to advance their strategy on how to make peace work for women (Abdela 2011). In 2010, the organization Nagarik Aawaz launched a 42-​day campaign to pressure the government to formulate a women-​friendly constitution.14 In 2010, the women’s movement along with the government developed a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 and 1820, as the first country in South Asia. This was a very inclusive process, as women from all different sectors, parties, locations and abilities participated. As Saloni Singh explained: Working together with the government we had about sixty consultations in the country, five regional consultations and two to three national consultations before it was finalized. This we call “our baby”. Women proactively work on helping the government implement the NAP by activating district groups and local peace committees, and continuously monitoring. We have a NAP monitoring group and the civil society organizations are involved in the

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76  Vanessa Daurer monitoring process. The strategy is to work with government and political parties, but be a critical ally at the same time.15 Evidently, interaction with the state has been an important feature of the women’s movement in Nepal. At the same time, the networks and organization established at central level engaged in capacity-​building and leadership training in the rural areas of Nepal. Bottom-​up demands together with international support As part of the aid industry that established itself in Nepal during the conflict, many international organizations and multilateral agencies were ready to promote a liberal rights agenda in the post-​conflict setting. For instance, the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was mandated to promote a women’s agenda. UNMIN was thus engaged extensively with civil society efforts to promote gender equality (UNMIN 2007). However, the demand for 33 per cent female representation in the CA was driven primarily by the Nepali women’s organizations, and was achieved thanks to their dedication and efficient use of their repertoire of action. While female activists initiated and sustained their efforts to achieve women’s participation in Nepali politics and decision-​making, the international community played an influential supportive role. Here I  discuss three areas of international influence on the efforts of the Nepali women’s movement, while keeping a focus on the decisive role of the women’s movement itself. Firstly, I  discuss inspiration and solidarity through direct contact with the international feminist movement. Secondly, I  describe the normative framework, with its emphasis on legal recognition of women’s identity and rights. Finally, I discuss international support in terms of capacity building and funding. The international women’s movement was in several ways influential for the women’s movement in Nepal. The United Nations organized the first World Conference on Women in 1975, followed by the UN Decade for Women (1975–​1985). This gave inspiration to some Nepali organizations and researchers to investigate women’s social, economic and political status, followed by the establishment of women’s sections in different ministries and women’s wings in donor organizations (Subedi 2010). Consequently, in the 1975–​1985 decade the first research study on the status of women was carried out, followed by many further studies. As a result of the intense and newly emerging research, Nepal’s Sixth Five-​Year Plan (1980–​1985), a development plan conducted by the government since 1956 (National Planning Commission Nepal 2003),

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  77 addressed women’s issues for the first time (Subedi 2010). Following this, the fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995)  had an even greater impact at a time when Nepal had recently returned to multiparty democracy, and women’s organizations were becoming an increasingly important part of the political scene. Women participating in the conference became aware of their rights and learned different strategies on how to advocate for women’s rights. In addition, international solidarity amongst like-​minded women provided strength and inspiration to fight injustices against women. Nepal contributed to the 1995 Beijing Conference with a delegation of over 300 women from the government and NGO sector, some of whom were from rural areas.16 After the conference, women went back to their communities to voice issues related to women such as violence against women, human rights, the girl child and education. Moreover, the conference attendees were vibrant women who started thinking along similar lines, providing mutual strength and inspiration.17 In the words of Meena Sharma, ‘if we can see and feel the presence, and feel the solidarity of women’s movements throughout the world, it really inspires us, encourages and motivates us. For me this is a type of model support’.18 International conventions and instruments had an impact on women’s activism and legal identity in Nepal. In 1991, the Nepali government had ratified the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) without reservations (Subedi 2010). This provided a legal system that established an identity for women in law.19 These instruments that the government started to adopt are perceived by NGO leaders to have set a framework within the state for women’s rights to be acknowledged, although this required women’s active engagement and demands for its implementation. For instance, during the Property Right Movement in 1994, two law students, Meera Dhungana and Meera Khanal, filed a petition to the Supreme Court in Kathmandu, stating that the current law entailed discriminatory legal provisions and was against the provisions of CEDAW (IDEA 2011). It referred to the Civil Code of 1963, which had been slightly amended in 1975 thanks to the women’s movement led by professionals within and outside the government. However, there were no changes towards equal property rights at that time (Acharya 2010). In 1994 a new attempt to achieve equal property rights was started with a petition calling for equal rights for daughters’ parental property inheritance (IDEA 2011). The Supreme Court responded in the petitioners’ favour, urging the government to change the legal provision. This success gave women strength and inspiration to continue their fight for equal property rights, organizing meetings and

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78  Vanessa Daurer programmes, and forming networks. As Durga Ghimire explained, ‘At that time we did not know what works and what does not. What had worked in India we did not know would work in Nepal or not’. The women tried several activities: they rallied, spoke to parliamentarians, involved human rights organizations and conducted research surveys on the need for daughters’ property rights.20 There was strong criticism against the campaign for daughters’ property rights. Some claimed that women in rural areas did not need property rights. Another argument was that the women’s organizations had support from international donors, and were allegedly speaking for the international donors’ agenda. According to Durga Ghimire, however, the movement was not driven by international donors, but constituted a bottom-​up effort to address gender inequality in Nepal. Facing false accusations of being donor-​driven, the women’s organization was led to show their motivation even more, and had to work hard to demonstrate that this was not a hegemonic concept from the international community, but rather an urgent issue to be addressed in Nepal’s unequal society. It took more than seven years and hundreds of rallies before the Civil Code 1963 was finally amended in 2002, ‘to provide unmarried daughters with equal rights to parental property’ (IDEA 2011: 41). This was a result of women coming together for a common agenda.21 Another significant aspect of international support of women’s organizations was efforts such as capacity building and resources in terms of funding opportunities. However, it is important not to underestimate the significance of the women leaders’ aspirations and the efforts of the women’s movement after the restoration of democracy in 1990. Several features and characteristics of the women’s movement indicate that women played the decisive role, such as their will to self-​ sustain, the centrality of their aspirations for the common good and a socially inclusive agenda. For instance, women had mobilized already before conflict, as in the property rights campaign. As such, the women’s repertoire of actions was developed before the armed conflict started, and was context-​specific to the women’s aspirations in Nepal. Among the women I interviewed, some insisted on their financial independence, engaging in local fundraising and philanthropy, while others did consultancy work on the side to help fund their organization.22 Women were not only committed to gender equality, but also social justice. They were hence careful to remain independent of donors’ assistance alone. International donors were certainly supportive. However, the Nepali women’s movement had already developed their repertoire

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  79 of action by trial and error, before and during the armed conflict, well before international donors entered the scene to promote the discourse of liberal women’s rights. International organizations such as IDEA have assisted women’s organizations in policy writing and provided space for discussion. At Nepal’s National Women’s Commission, Mohana Ansari mentioned the significance of international organizations’ impact for creating a space or platform for trainings. She was herself supported in training through the UN and EU, but mostly through the regional Asian foundations. The central organizations in Kathmandu were engaged in capacity building, forwarding to the grassroots what they had learned themselves. Several of the women leaders gained opportunities to conduct training with international organizations, organize seminars and undertake education abroad. As debated locally, international funding was not emphasized, as the foreign aid industry in Nepal is criticized for fuelling corruption and feeding NGOs that merely showcase political agendas. Thus, women’s organizations were often quite explicit on their affiliation, or rather non-​affiliation, with foreign donors. More critical voices might argue that international funding was more influential than described here. The importance of international funding is undeniable, but my point is rather that local efforts are decisive. This can be concluded from the fact that Nepali women organized and mobilized at a very early stage of the peace process, as part of a context-​ dependent strategy developed by women themselves. This is not to say that Nepal’s women’s movement emerged in an isolated vacuum. Rather, it took the opportunities and tools given in the globalized context, using international conventions to fight for equal rights and joining worldwide movements on women’s issues, using a liberal rights discourse adapted to its context. Clearly, there is evidence of international influences on the repertoire of action of the Nepali women’s movement, but these emerge as supporting factors that would not likely have had such a strong influence without the historical legacy of activism, women’s concrete legal demands, and well-​developed networks between women’s organizations.

Conclusion and future implications At the outset of this chapter, I  posed a two-​fold question. Firstly, I  asked what significant factors contributed to women’s strategic response against their exclusion from the peace process in Nepal.

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80  Vanessa Daurer In contrast to other countries such as Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kumar 2001), women in Nepal did not retreat from activism in the aftermath of war, nor was their activism during conflict sporadic. Rather, women in Nepal stepped up their work, shouldering even more responsibility and uniting for extraordinary mobilization, breaking curfews and restrictions in order to be included in post-​ conflict decision-​ making and in the Interim Constitution Drafting Committee. The case of Nepal demonstrates that women’s pre-​established and well-​rooted activism prior to armed conflict, committed and conscious women leaders, and strong networks across societal divisions gives a women’s movement a strong and united voice. Secondly, I asked what factors influenced women’s sustained activism and the use of momentum for political transition in the aftermath of conflict to push through policy change. The findings suggest two decisive factors. One is the pre-​existing repertoire of action developed before and during conflict, including direct engagement with policymakers and concrete claims which can lead to greater impact. The repertoire of action was supported by the international community, but was dependent on internal factors. International support refers primarily to the international feminist movement’s solidarity, the international normative framework recognizing women’s rights, and capacity building and international exposure providing concrete skills on how to write policy documents and advocate for women’s rights. Internal factors refer to the pre-​existing repertoire of action, context-​specific mobilization, women’s aspirations and their unity across societal divisions. The women’s movement retained ownership over its activism, its aspirations and demands. Some women even refused to be dependent on international donors. International support was indeed influential, but is not a sufficient explanation for the success of the women’s movement in Nepal. What really mattered was the commitment and repertoire of the Nepali women’s movement. The mobilization of women in Nepal demonstrates how strong activism can be in the aftermath of conflict, and shows how international and local efforts may be successfully coordinated. We still ought to explore whether gender roles really changed and what the reforms have meant. Nonetheless, the case of the Nepali women’s movement demonstrates that women may overcome post-​ conflict barriers and challenge gender hierarchies during transition. Committed, dedicated and passionate women leaders adapted what they had learned from the

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  81 international community to the context of Nepal and its society. Their efforts were highly context-​specific and developed through a repertoire of action characterized by specific legal goals, systematic mobilization and direct engagement with policymakers, as well as unity across political and social divisions.

Notes 1 Interview with Deepti Khakurel, Kathmandu, April 2014. 2 Interviews with Durga Ghimire, 19 May 2014 and Sharada Pokharel, 12 May 2014. 3 Interview with Durga Ghimire, 19 May 2014. 4 Interview with Kapil Kafle, 29 April 2014 and Susan Risal, 23 April 2014. 5 Interview with Shobha Shrestha, founder of Women, Democracy and Peace-​Nepal, 14 May 2014. 6 Interview with Saloni Singh, 19 April 2014. 7 Interview with Susan Risal, 23 April 2014. 8 Interview with Pushpa Bhusal, 1 May 2014. 9 Before this was enacted in the Interim Constitution, Nepal had a practice and law whereby only men could transfer citizenship and their identity to their children. Women were legally deprived of this right. 10 Interview with Susan Risal, 23 April 2014. 11 Interview with Sadhana Shrestha, 13 May 2014. 12 Participant observation at the National Anti-​ Rape Campaign rally in Kathmandu on 15 May 2014. 13 Interview with Durga Ghimire, 19 May 2014. 14 Interview with Susan Risal, 23 April 2014. 15 Interview with Saloni Singh, 19 April 2014. 16 Interview with Bandana Rana, 30 April 2014. 17 Interview with Durga Ghimire, 19 May 2014. 18 Interview with Meena Sharma, 28 April 2014. 19 Interview with Pushpa Bhusal, 1 May 2014. 20 Interview with Durga Ghimire, 19 May 2014. 21 Ibid. 22 Interviews with Saloni Singh, 19 April 2014, and Rita Thapa, 13 May 2014.

References Abdela, L. 2011. ‘Nepal and Implementation of UNSCR 1325’, in F. Olonisakin, K. Barnes, and E. Ikpe, eds, Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice. London: Routledge, pp. 66–​87. Acharya, M. 2010. ‘Diversity and Unity of Feminist Movement in Nepal’, International Association for Feminist Economics Annual Conference, Buenos Aires, 22 July 2010. Buenos Aires: Tanka Prasad Acharya Memorial Foundation.

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82  Vanessa Daurer ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2013. The Role of Women in Peacebuilding in Nepal. Kathmandu: Asian Development Bank. Baldez, L. 2010. ‘Women’s Movements and Democratic Transition in Chile, Brazil, East Germany and Poland’, in M. L. Krook and S. Childs, eds, Women, Gender and Politics:  A  Reader. Oxford:  Oxford University Press, pp. 37–​45. DidiBahini. 2013. Women’s Participation in the Movement. Kathmandu: DidiBahini. IDEA (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance). 2011. Women Members of the Constituent Assembly:  A  Study on Contribution of Women in Constitution Making in Nepal. Kathmandu: IDEA. Kumar, K. 2001. Women and Civil War:  Impact, Organizations, and Action. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Manchanda, R. 2001. ‘Ambivalent Gains in South Asian Conflicts’, in S. Meintjes, M. Turshen, and A. Pillay, eds, The Aftermath:  Women in Post-​ Conflict Transformation. London: Zed Books, pp. 97–​121. Meintjes, S. 2001. ‘War and Post-​War Shifts in Gender Relations’, in S. Meintjes, M. Turshen, and A. Pillay, eds, The Aftermath:  Women in Post-​Conflict Transformation. London: Zed Books, pp. 63–​77. Miklian, J., Lidén, K. and Kolås, Å. 2011. ‘The Perils of “Going Local”: Liberal Peace-​ Building Agendas in Nepal’. Conflict, Security & Development, 11(3): 285–​308. National Planning Commission Nepal. 2003. Tenth Plan 2002–​ 2007. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. Pierson, P. 2000. ‘Not Just What, But When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes’. Studies in American Political Development, 14(1): 72–​92. Pokharel, B. and Rana, S. 2013. Nepal: Votes for Peace. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Limited. Porter, E. 2003. ‘Women, Political Decision-​ Making, and Peace-​ Building’. Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change, 15(3): 245–​262. Rucht, D. 2003. ‘Interactions between Social Movements and States in a Comparative Perspective’, in L. A. Banaszak, K. Beckwith, and D. Rucht, eds, Women’s Movements Facing the Reconficured State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 242–​274. Sankalpa. 2014. ‘About Us’. [online] Available at: www.sankalpa.org.np/​index. php/​about-​us/​sankalpa Subedi, P. 2010. Nepali Women at the Crossroads:  Gender and Development. Kathmandu: Sahayogi Press. Tilly, C. 2005. Trust and Rule. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. —​—​—​. 2004. Social Movements, 1768–​ 2004. Boulder, CO:  Paradigm Publisher. UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal), 2007. Implementing commitments to women’s equal participation. Kathmandu: United Nations Mission in Nepal.

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Nepali women’s mobilization for peace  83 Von Einsiedel, S., D. M. Malone, and S. Pradhan, eds. 2012. Nepal in Transition: From People’s War to Fragile Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whitfield, T. 2012. ‘Nepal’s Masala Peacemaking’, in S. Von Einsiedel, D. M. Malone, and S. Pradhan, eds, Nepal in Transition:  From People’s War to Fragile Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–​174. WOREC (Women’s Rehabilitation Center). 2012. ‘Advocacy Update’. [online] Avail­able at : www.worecnepal.org/​sites/​default/​files/​Advocacy-​Update-​April2011-​ June2012.pdf

Interview list Ansari, Mohana, National Women’s Commission, Government of Nepal. Interview, 28 April 2014. Basnet, Babita, President of Media Advocacy Group (MAG) and current chairperson at Shantimalika. Interview, 8 May 2014. Bhusal, Pushpa, Member of the Nepali Congress Party and Member in the Constituent Assembly, and former Member in the Interim-​Constitution Drafting Committee (2007). Interview, 1 May 2014. Ghimire, Durga, Founder of ABC-​Nepal. Interview, 19 May 2014. Jnawali, Sharada, Peace Building Advisor at the Asian Development Bank. Interview, 13 May 2014. Kafle, Kapil, Executive Director for Institute of Human Rights Communication Nepal (IHRICON) and Editor-​in-​Chief for e-​Nepalkhabar Online News-​ portal. Interview, 29 April 2014. Parajuli Gautam, Irada, Founder and Chairperson of Aawaaj. Interview, 12 May 2014. Pokharel, Sharada, President of the Women’s Security Pressure Group. Interview, 12 May 2014. Rana, Bandana, President of Saathi and Founder Member. Interview, 30 April 2014. Risal, Susan, Chief Executive Officer of Nagraik Aawaz. Interview, 23 April 2014. Saloni, Singh, Executive Chair of DidiBahini. Interview, 19 April 2014. Sharma, Meena, Project Manager Women, Peace and Security, Search for Common Ground. Interview, 28 April 2014. Sheikh, Chandtara, Chairperson of National Women’s Commission, Government of Nepal. Interview, 28 April 2014. Shrestha, Sadhana, Executive Director of Tewa. Interview, 13 May 2014. Sob, Durga, Founding President of the Feminist Dalit Organization. Interview, 23 April 2014. Shrestha, Shobha, Founder and Executive Chair of Women for Peace and Democracy –​Nepal (WPD-​Nepal). Interview, 14 May 2014. Thakur, Ranju, Current Member in the Constituent Assembly, Member of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) (CPN-​UML). Interview, 26 April 2014.

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84  Vanessa Daurer Thapa, Lily, Founder of Women for Human Rights (WHR). Interview, 1 May 2014. Thapa, Rita, Founder of Nagarik Aawaz and Tewa. Interview, 13 May 2014. Thapolyia, Anita, Lawyer at Legal Aid and Consultancy Center. Interview, 18 April 2014.

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5 Does international aid help women peacebuilders in Nepal? Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian

The inclusion and empowerment of women is a primary target or entrance point into post-​conflict societies across the Global South, usually pinned from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In Nepal, this has contributed to the belief that a foreign agenda is driving societal change. Critics have lamented the development of ‘the Nepali woman’ as a single overarching category, one that has been (and continues to be) artificially constructed by foreign donors but damaging to the women’s movement in Nepal through its forced consolidation of radical ethnic and cultural diversities (Tamang 2009). This lens has tended to offer over-​simplifications of gender roles in politics and conflict in Nepal, especially regarding women fighters and assumptions of fighting as ‘empowerment’ (Leve 2007). Further, over-​representation of upper-​caste Hindu women as ‘key native informants’ in most gender projects of international aid and development organizations has done significant damage to both international and local perceptions of what a ‘Nepali woman’ is, irrespective of the project’s outward ‘efficiency’ or operational success (Tamang 2011). Aid tensions are not limited to Western sources. South–​South aid is growing in Nepal given its strategic location between India and China, although most Nepalis do not view Indian aid as either benevolent or reciprocal (Mawdsley 2011). Actors in Kathmandu assume that aid from any actor carries statist agendas, and recipients including government agencies assess project participation based upon these calculations. This condition is seen elsewhere in aid-​heavy environments, and tends to lead to further contestation, divisiveness and political fractionalization over political inclusiveness (Wright and Winters 2010). In Nepal, this unattractive baseline is exacerbated by the fact that nearly all civil society organizations in the country have official or unofficial affiliations with

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86  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian particular political parties (Bhatta 2012), requiring donors to partition funds across the political spectrum regardless of individual capacity for fear of seeming partial. While these political affiliations were essential in allowing civil society access during Nepal’s 1996–​2006 Civil War and in the related banning of most political activities (Shrestha and Adhikari 2011), their continued presence has calcified creativity, stagnating forward capacity for women’s groups in particular. In this chapter we illustrate the tensions that exist within the operational frameworks of many women’s organizations in Nepal, as directors and staff are torn between public support for the programmes that ensure their financial viability, while privately expressing concern that the projects do not take into account local needs, wishes or realities. Despite the need for resources, some organizations have elected to forego international aid precisely because of the risk that their agendas are subverted by International Non-​Governmental Organizations (INGOs) with their own wishes and mandates to ‘help’. We examine how these relationships have influenced public perceptions of the women’s movement in post-​conflict Nepal, and how insider/​outsider relationships influence the capacity and functionality of women’s organizations in determining domestic agendas for and of social change. Finally, we argue that tensions and complexities between local women’s organizations and international funders have become so negatively perceived in Nepali society that some local organizations choose to forego this massive funding source altogether for fear that it is now counter-​productive to positive societal change.

Aid, peacebuilding, and Nepal’s ‘gender agenda’ In hosting over six decades of international aid development projects that have pumped tens of billions of dollars into the country’s coffers, Nepalis have a complex love-​hate relationship with international donors and foreign aid. ‘It is both a good thing and a bad thing’, says Professor Lok Raj Baral of the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies (NCCS), with an air of understatement.1 ‘Without international funding, institutions like the NCCS (largely funded by the US-​based Ford Foundation) would not exist’. Yet, ‘aid makes unnecessary interventions in our lives’ as Nepali citizens, says Baral, reflecting upon his experiences as a former Ambassador of Nepal to India.2 Others agree. While the funding itself is appreciated, it is deeply felt that ‘the funders have their own agenda and therefore research here is largely oriented towards the funders’ agenda’, says Mrigendra Karki of the Centre for Nepal and

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Does international aid help?  87 Asian Studies (CNAS).3 With a cornerstone of today’s agenda concentrated on the empowerment of women in both politics and society, we take a brief exploration of women’s issues in Nepal. Broadly, Nepal is a country where patriarchy is prevalent, cutting across religion, region, caste and ethnicity. Although women contribute to the development of the economy in various ways, they are viewed as ‘service providers’ whereas men are commonly looked upon as ‘protectors’ (Upadhyaya 2014: 144). Thus the dominance of men remains the acceptable societal norm. Generally women’s role is confined to the domestic sphere and their prime duties are that of domestic care provider (Singh 2012:  1). There are both religious and ethnic diversities related to the legal and social reforms that women wish to bring about. For instance, many Muslim women feel they are better off in the Sharia law when it comes to rights to inheritance. Yet their aspirations concerning conjugal rights are that the Nepali Civil law protects them. Similarly, indigenous women who contributed enormously to the armed conflict must often choose between custom and law for their own rights (Upadhyaya 2014: 155). Initiatives by political parties in the 1990s to raise awareness about the exploitative relationship of women and their male counterparts, and with the state in general, served as a powerful platform for the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) movement to build consensus and support among women across caste and ethnic lines. As is well documented, women  –​especially those from indigenous groups  –​contributed in large numbers to resisting the government during the 1996–​2006 Civil War (Yami 2005).4 Some women took up arms as members of the People’s Liberation Army, while others offered their services in diverse capacities. Relief work was one such alternative avenue, and was heavily supported by the international community. For instance, Nagarik Awaaz (People’s Voice), with the help of Action Aid, supported youth who sought refuge from the war. Upon completion of their training, these young people were sent across the country for what was called ‘peace work’. This motivated other grassroots and district-​level organizations that wished to make peace by and from women a central component to their work, such as in Sahakarya Shantiko (Joint Initiative for Peace) (Upadhyaya 2014: 148). Based on interviews with several long-​time activists for women’s rights, we find that bringing women into politics was a voluntary experience, and one that contained several structural obstacles to equality that have continued to the present day. In this chapter we draw upon the ‘typical’ experiences of several women, including:5 Renu Raj Bhandari, a medical doctor from the plains of Nepal who runs an NGO with branches

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88  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian across the country inspired by Rosa Luxembourg; Radha Gyawali, a politician from the Communist United-​Marxist-​Leninist (UML) party who was inspired by her father, a trade union leader in the Indian region of Shillong; Durga Sob, a leading Dalit activist from Doti district who found inspiration for public work from her mother and in the discriminatory nature of Nepalese society6 and Pradip Giri, a former member of the Constituent Assembly from the Congress Party of Nepal and respected political activist.7 The beginning of women’s ‘peace work’ in Nepal was concurrent with the larger expansion of the ‘women’s agenda’ globally by INGOs who funded a plethora of activities during the conflict period. Although there was initially tremendous enthusiasm for such relief work, it started losing credibility as projects got bogged down in questionable accounting standards, lack of transparency and operational inefficiencies. (Shneiderman and Turin 2004) For example, the Inter-​Party Women’s Alliance (IPWA) was set up in 2006 to strengthen the voices of women across parties.8 Funded by the Norwegian Embassy, the IPWA raised issues concerning women’s entitlements and their rights in the new constitution. The IPWA supported women parliamentarians, but given the very weak position that women enjoyed within their own party structures, achievements were limited. Consequently, a slow erosion of the credibility of other, less visible, women’s aid-​supported activities began to take place, relegating their status to that of ‘just another’ foreign development initiative, with an increasing part of the platform for women’s participation seen to be not only social activism but also in the struggle for grant money.9 Concurrently, political deadlock and stasis had deleterious effects. Even a senior politician like Radha Gyawali, chairperson of IPWA and veteran politician of CPN-​UML, was continually marginalized by her own party. She worked for the party from childhood. Growing up in Shillong and with inspiration from her father, a trade union leader, Radha had tremendous concern for the ‘have-​nots’. Returning to Nepal after completing her degree, she was sent by her political party to live and work with the locals to appreciate real-​life situations in the plains of Nepal (Terai). However, when election time came she was not allowed to contest the elections from her own workplace. She recalled painfully that the party did not give her a ticket to contest from the Terai constituency where she had put in such hard work. Thus the hopes of the members of the constituency were dashed when she was not allowed to appeal for their support and thus be in a position to fulfil her promises. Even as politicians like Gyawali tried to strengthen the case of women in the national Parliament and the Constituent Assembly, this has been

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Does international aid help?  89 mostly unsuccessful to date as the existing patriarchal mindset was little moved.10 Many of the best-​funded organizations insist that their agendas are entirely their own. Renu Raj Bhandari is the founder and Executive Chairperson of Women’s Rehabilitation Centre (WOREC), a women’s health NGO. As a medical doctor she was motivated by the poor health conditions of women who were subjected to sexual violence, trafficking and the deplorable status of women’s rights. Starting her work in 1992, she has largely focused on preventive health and treatment programmes for rural and marginalized women. As of today, Renu has started focusing more on human rights issues and violence against women. Even though WOREC is one of the most favoured NGOs for funding bodies like the UNFPA, Renu’s largest concern remains how to keep securing local funding, which remains a perpetual challenge.11 Like many in her position, Renu would be happier if international funders were ‘less bureaucratic, emphasized programs rather than projects, encouraged flexibility in project implementation and forged long-​term partnerships’.12 Similarly, Mohammadi Siddiqui, a former member of the Constituent Assembly from the Nepali Congress and also a member of the Minority and Marginalised Committee of the CA, was a pioneer in Muslim women’s awareness work in Nepal. She is also a social activist, mainly concerned since the 1990s about women’s education in the southwestern plains’ city of Nepalganj, work that remains largely unacknowledged in Kathmandu. Mohammadi established the Fatima Foundation in 2003 to ensure Muslim women’s rights and enable Muslim women to fight discrimination. She believed that the source of this discrimination was the use of religion as an instrument of oppression, so she translated the Koran into the local language. During her efforts to bring about social change in the Muslim women’s lives, she was threatened by the Mullas and Maulvis of her community, and also from across the border in India. She faced Fatwas from Lucknow religious elites that she resisted with the help of local support. More often than not, her organization was overlooked by grant-​making bodies until 2006 when she received the Ashoka Award for outstanding social activists. However, this award came as too little, too late for her NGO work, as by then she was entering politics. As a consequence, the award that was strictly meant for social activism was withdrawn. In contrast, Seema Khan has stationed herself in Kathmandu for her work with Nepal’s Muslim community, as President of the UNDP-​funded banner of the Nepal Muslim Women Welfare Society (NMWWS).13 Khan states that it is much easier to be recognized by aid communities if one is based in Kathmandu instead of continuing to be

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90  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian stationed in a remote part of Nepal. This aid need not be from Western INGOs either. Although the organization does not disclose funding sources, it appears from the set up, human resources and the projects implemented that it has reached a comfortable position in funding, which is likely to be from West Asian Muslim donors too. A staunch believer in Madrasa education, Seema aims to improve the quality of teachers and screen them for any ‘anti-​social’ activity, an expression that clearly seems to come from the training she receives through her donors. Although her main concern is women’s education, the funding that her organization received was largely for work on reproductive health. While this was a deviation from her initial interests, she now supports the change. Although women’s work in peace and peacebuilding in Nepal appears cohesive when reading INGO reports and other Global North outputs, there are significant local contestations. Mohna Ansari, a well-​ respected member of the Women’s Commission of Nepal, is critical of Mohammadi’s social activism. She believes that nothing will change in Nepal unless women’s rights are made a top-​level political issue. Mohna is the only Muslim woman lawyer in the country and takes pride in the fact that she is an active member of the Woman’s Commission. Mohna does not give much credence to the social welfare approach that Mohammadi follows. ‘The real change can come only when women become politically active’, she says, adding that:14 Politics is where things change, and any effort other than political will not bear fruit. [Furthermore] beyond merely addressing the ‘male mindset’, the training, educating and motivating of women for effective political participation is essential to success, especially given the relative absence of male counterparts who wish to involve women as equals in politics. The Sankalpa15 alliance is a high-​profile network of women’s organizations that is instructive to highlight. Sankalpa defined its mission as 50/​50, implying proportionate and representative participation of women at all levels of the state structure and the peace process. It strives to ‘give voice, genuine space, dignity and respect to Nepali women’, and is dedicated to ‘ensure women’s equal opportunity in the state-​ making process irrespective of caste, ethnicity, religion, language, occupation, or degree of physical ability’.16 Its objective is that diverse groups of women are visibly engaged at all levels of the Constituent Assembly and peacebuilding processes.17 They argue that no amount of development work will bring them political power,

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Does international aid help?  91 so they must make an organized political intervention as a women’s political party. The first meeting to accomplish this goal took place in July 2012 (Upadhyaya 2014: 149).

Local peace committees Women’s role in peace processes in general and in local peacebuilding in particular has gained momentum internationally ever since the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women and the priority that it placed on making peace inclusive for women. This was followed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security, and the various follow-​up resolutions that came in its trail. In post-​conflict Nepal, there was international pressure to include women in grassroots peace initiatives. There was also a commitment to make peacebuilding efforts inclusive, open and transparent, fair and even-​handed and owned by the people. A poignant case of how these norms influenced initiatives in Nepal is the founding of Local Peace Committees (LPCs). Established to provide and support local-​level infrastructures of peace, LPCs were established under the Nepal Transition to Peace (NTTP) initiative.18 To ensure women’s participation, at least 30 per cent of representatives of every LPC are reserved for women. As per the Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction LPC manual of September 2007 (NMPR 2007: 1), the ‘LPC is a committee of representatives of district organizations and individuals that has the task to promote peace and reconciliation in the district’. The manual establishes various tools for operation to best promote the peace process: People in the districts have suffered most because of the violent conflict and are probably more in need of a just peace –​that is, a peace based on the foundation of justice. It is therefore necessary to conduct the peace process not only at national level, but also at the level of the people in the districts […] In order to secure the national peace process at local level, it is necessary to rely on local knowledge and experience. The national peace process, therefore, has to adapt to the reality of each district in order to become relevant at that level. It is therefore necessary to initiate a peace process in each district that will be owned and driven by local communities and organizations. (NMPR 2007: 3–​4) When the LPCs were established, the presumption was that since similar committees have worked fairly successfully in countries such

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92  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian as South Africa, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, and Guyana (Hillyard et al. 2006), such committees would be successful in Nepal too (Odendaal and Olivier 2008). However, right from their inception the LPCs in Nepal ran into problems. The process was engineered to be owned by local communities, but political cleavages were evident from the start, influencing meeting agendas and the interpersonal relationships between those tasked to build community bridges after a decade of war. These affiliations made the inclusion of other issues –​like those related to women’s empowerment –​next to impossible to raise in most LPCs. Further, with all seats at the table usually occupied by actors already beholden to particular political parties, the inclusion of new community voices is rare. The utter lack of financial and political support was another major hurdle that led many to abandon participation. Above all, the belief that the LPCs were a foreign import has led bureaucrats and politicians in Kathmandu to attempt to sideline their role in achieving larger peacebuilding goals. With the exception of some committees in the far eastern region of Nepal (where local activism was strong prior to the setting up of these bodies), successes were few. INGOs including USAID and others have found the LPCs to have a potentially useful role, but also to be under-​ utilized  –​even as transitory mechanisms  –​due to a lack of support at the national level and a complete lack of enforcement capability (Odendaal and Olivier 2008). What is still worse is that foreign aid has made women even more dependent than before. ‘It is the donor that rules in Nepal’ (Donor le bari raj chalcha Nepal main), says Srijana Shreshta, member of the LPC of Kathmandu:19 There is so much political instability and the only way of getting things done here is to approach the government through donors […] it is just a game of money here. A single woman like me cannot think of making an impact […] It is very natural that we chase the donors. In the process we lose our dignity […] Yes it is tough to work without money, but then there should have been an investment in the development of human resource here […] it is right to say that we have lost our capacity to take initiative. Financial support for Nepal’s post-​2006 peace process by INGOs has been publicly welcomed, but privately criticized. The civil society organizations that have been recipients of these funds are criticized for indulging in dollar kheti (harvesting dollars). This has been one sweeping way of discrediting their work, eroding credibility of both their

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Does international aid help?  93 activities and value as institutions. In response, some local activists have taken the previously unfathomable step of refusing any international aid in order to maintain local legitimacy. For instance, rape was very recently considered a non-​issue in many Kathmandu high caste circles as a ‘Western obsession’, constructed by funders to keep their ‘shops open’.20 Following this, the protest movement by a handful of young, mostly Western-​educated women and men against the rape and robbery of a migrant worker, Sita Rai (name changed), in 2013 was brushed aside by many in Nepal as merely a form of ‘profile enhancement’ by foreign-​connected individuals.21 In a unique decision, activists staging protests against the inaction of the state in the Sita Rai case repeatedly rejected any offer of support that came their way from various international organizations including the United Nations. Popularly known as the ‘Occupy Baluwatar’ movement, this protest lasted 107  days in the capital Kathmandu, wherein young people of Nepal staged their resentment against the government’s inaction not only on the rape and robbery of Sita Rai, but also of other similar cases of violence against women and related impunity. Their position was taken to protect the movement from being discredited, as was their impression of the fate of other organizations that were supported by such bodies. As the leader Bidushi Dhungel, a former journalist from Kathmandu Post and daughter of a university professor, stated:22 It proved to donors we don’t need millions –​we just need a core of dedicated people. Our accounts too were transparent. This was in sharp contrast with the NGO work that is being done by so many politically active women here. If you scratch the surface each of these NGOs are linked to some political party or the other, and with the aid money the organization then messages the constituency in place of doing the work for which the money is actually meant. This statement speaks to the degree to which aid money is seen by many within Nepal’s activist community (and public) as just as tainted by association as money coming from any political party would be. And despite the lack of such words explicitly, conceptualizations and considerations of power relations between local NGOs and their funders are matters of deep local reflection (Eyben 2008). Assessing the movement’s impact, Dhungel said:23 Overall it questioned the donor agencies. Millions are spent in Nepal, but very little impact is made by this investment. But within

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94  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian two months all are talking about this movement. It exposed the corruption that goes hand in hand with the political parties. This feeds each other. Political parties take this money and spend it to enhance their profiles to make it handy for electoral returns. No real development takes place, so much so that the movement had to decline any external help that was offered. Unfortunately, perhaps the most significant outcome of this protest movement was that no established political party would associate with the cause of women, as all of the primary players were considered to have political ties, despite the importance of the case and topic in the eyes of both national organizations and agendas of international funders. This case was also not unique, as a number of other cases of violence against women were brought to the streets. Kin of many women who were missing, raped, or killed joined the protesters and asked for answers from the government. Since perpetrators of most of these cases were linked with powerful politicians, Nepal’s political parties were loath to express solidarity with the issue in question. Still, almost all the major players in Kathmandu’s INGO scene continued to offer financial and logistics assistance. Despite the dire need for resources and powerful partnerships to legitimate the cause, this aid was universally declined by the protesters. The leaders of the movement were clear on one issue, that they did not want to align themselves with any foreign funding agency, lest it is construed that the entire movement is motivated by ‘a foreign hand’. It is in this decision that we can see how the crux of the dynamic between local, national and international women’s advocacy groups and organizations begins to unravel in today’s Nepal. Many local organizations feel that international support is so tainted by foreign agendas, and so laden with foreign frames, that they consider it better to go it alone in an attempt to create positive change rather than have their own agenda potentially subverted by INGOs, or to have the agenda itself subsequently dismissed by policymakers as yet another foreign intervention of social engineering (Bonino and Donini 2009). While this movement underscores the tensions and difficulties that local women’s activists feel in associating with INGOs, it is too soon to call it a harbinger of a broader attempt to fully pull back from their agendas and funding sources. Thus the issue remains: do international women’s organizations currently help or harm women in Nepal? As is usually the case in such sweeping questions, the reality is a mixed bag. In countries like Nepal where projects are so numerous and expansive, one can easily find examples to support both positive and negative

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Does international aid help?  95 interpretations. While more women are given voices and public opportunities through international INGOs, this publicity can backfire, undermining the legitimacy of those very voices that the international aid community claims to most want. This fits with the well-​researched tendency for aid INGOs to actually decrease local (individual) agency and the ability to engage in local initiatives in some circumstances, supplanted by the agendas of the more powerful donor. The donor agencies are now more sequestered with the gender aspect of development work. The Busan Declaration (Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-​Operation 2011) especially focuses on women’s inclusiveness in post-​ conflict reconstruction and development work. It is a relief to know that the parties involved are addressing this challenge throughout and it can be hoped that situations on the ground will improve from here.

Concluding remarks Our examples speak to the importance of unpacking the relationship between ‘autonomy’ and ‘empowerment’ in post-​conflict and other fragile zones throughout the Global South where international women’s organizations work. Structural barriers to social change are both pervasive and difficult to crack in Nepal. However, foreign pushes to alter the agenda are increasingly construed as ‘social engineering’ by a ‘foreign hand’ rather than empowering elements. While this is a common complaint by the powerful politicians and male societal leaders (who have the most to lose) throughout the developing world, in Nepal it is increasingly the activist community itself that sees these sorts of ties as more harmful than helpful. Whether this decision has been made in order to pre-​empt political fallout and secure local legitimacy or is rooted in another cause is a subject worth further study. Also, the relationship between capability and functionality in determining domestic agendas for and of societal change remains murky. The nature of the donor-​implementer relationship can be the primary component of how projects are viewed locally, with their ultimate success or failure dependent on if and how local communities ‘opt-​in’ to them. Beyond the dilemmas for women’s organizations to take or decline international funding to maintain their legitimacy (or not), less has been written to explain how this is affecting the capacity and functionality of women’s organizations in determining domestic agencies for and of social change. Assessing capacity fits within the framework of aid effectiveness, and when we talk about the capacity of organizations to fulfil what many call the 5Cs of organizational ability (capacity to

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96  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian commit, capacity to relate, capacity to adapt, capacity to cohere and capacity to achieve).24 This is a topic of key interest for further study. With gender roles in Nepal increasingly influenced by the very meaning of ‘women’s political participation’ at different levels of local, regional and national politics, our discussion takes on a deeper significance. Part and parcel of the broader societal aid–​dependency dynamic, many women’s organizations in Nepal feel that they are left with one of two unenviable choices:  either accept foreign funding and assume their agendas and perhaps alienate themselves with local society, or refuse funding to stay ‘legitimate’ and relevant but at the expense of having no operational funding. This situation need not be dichotomous, but if local actors continue to see it in those terms then it is likely that both funders and recipients will continue to grapple with this difficult agency-​based problematic for the foreseeable future.

Notes 1 The NCCS was set up in 1995 as a non-​partisan non-​governmental organization, undertaking research on issues of national and transnational dimensions. 2 Interview in Kathmandu, January 2013. 3 CNAS is a Tribhuvan University research centre, but for research resources it is highly dependent on grants from international bodies. 4 This observation is also based on authors’ interactions (March/​ April 2013)  with members of the erstwhile PLA, like Jayashree Gharti, Onsri Gharti, Tara Gharti Thapa: ‘There was tremendous ignorance in the Parties on women’s issues.[…] We were the only ones to have raised it’. 5 While it is hard to generalize based upon a limited interview set, we have highlighted these experiences to illustrate how the early activist community has contributed to framing the contemporary agenda. 6 These observations are based on open-​ended interviews with women leaders in Lalitpur/​Kathmandu/​Bhaktapur in their respective offices in the months of September/​October 2013. 7 Renu Rajbhandari, Usha Rawat and many other activist women referred to ‘Pradip ji’ as he is popularly known, for being the motivational figure behind much of the social and political work done today. 8 The Inter Party Women’s Alliance was established on International Women’s Day, 2006, as a common political forum for Women in Nepal. Initially the alliance was comprised of women leaders from seven political parties: Nepali Congress, CPN-​UML, CPN-​ML, Nepali Congress-​Democratic, Jan Morcha Nepal, Bammorcha, Nepal Sadbhawana Party Anandadevi and PRP. 9 Author observation based on interactions with women in the aid community. 10 Interview with Radha Gyawali, October 2013. 11 Interview with Renu Raj Bhandari in Kathmandu, October 2013. 12 Ibid.

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Does international aid help?  97 13 NMWWS’s areas of expertise are advocacy, human rights, democracy, women’s political participation, violence against women, non-​formal education for adult women, skill training for income generation and community development activities. Interview with Seema Khan in Kathmandu, January 2013. 14 Interview with Mohna Ansari in Kathmandu, September 2013. 15 Sankalpa is an alliance of eleven women’s organizations that have worked together since 2006 as the Women’s Alliance for Peace, Power and Constituent Assembly (WAPPDCA). Associated organizations include the Feminist Dalit Organisation (FEDO), established in 1994 and concerned with the empowerment of Dalit women, the National Coalition Against Racial Discrimination (NCARD) and the National Indigenous Women’s Federation (NIWF), which works to end class and racial discrimination. 16 www.gnwp.org/​ i ncident- ​ report/ ​ s ankalpa- ​ % E2%80%93-​ women%E2% 80%99s-​alliance-​peace-​justice-​and-​democracy 17 ‘Peace NGO’ is a term that has come into vogue in Nepal, often referring to any NGO that was registered after Nepal’s peace process was concretized in 2006. 18 NTTP consisted of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction, senior-​level representatives of the main political parties in Nepal, including the rebel movement (CPN-​Maoist), civil society representatives and the UN Mission in Nepal. 19 Interview with Srijana Shreshta in Kathmandu, April 2014. 20 Observed as a participant in multiple interactions during the period 2011–​2013. 21 Some comments from activists otherwise attuned to ‘equality and peace’ would say, ‘Oh it was a minor episode that has been blown out of proportion by the donors to malign the Nepali society’, or ‘the whole movement was with an eye to enhance the individual profile of the agitators’. 22 Interview with Bidushi Dhungel in Kathmandu, September 2013. 23 Ibid. 24 Thanks to Bishnu Raj Upreti for this point.

References Bhatta, C. 2012. ‘Unveiling Nepal’s Civil Society’, Journal of Civil Society 8(2): 185–​199. Bonino, F. and A. Donini. 2009. Aid and Violence:  Development Policies and Conflict in Nepal. Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center. Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-​ Operation. 2011. Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Busan:  Republic of Korea, 29 November to 1 December. [online] Available at: www.oecd.org/​dac/​effectiveness/​49650173.pdf Eyben, R. 2008. ‘Power, Mutual Accountability and Responsibility in the Practice of International Aid:  A  Relational Approach’, Institute of Development Studies Working Paper 305. Brighton: IDS. Hillyard, P., M. McWilliams and M. Ward. 2006. Northern Ireland Gender Audit. Belfast: Economic and Social Research Council. [online] Available at:

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98  Anjoo Sharan Upadhyaya and Jason Miklian www.qub.ac.uk/​ s chools/ ​ S choolofSociologySocialPolicySocialWork/​ FileStore/​Filetoupload,117195,en.pdf Leve, L. 2007. ‘“Failed Development” and Rural Revolution in Nepal: Rethinking Subaltern Consciousness and Women’s Empowerment’, Anthropological Quarterly 80(1): 127–​172. Mawdsley, E. 2011. ‘The Changing Geographies of Foreign Aid and Development Cooperation:  Contributions from Gift Theory’, Transactions 37(2): 256–​272. NMPR (Nepal Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction). 2007. A Manual for the Establishment and Functioning of Local Peace Committees in Nepal. Kathmandu: Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction. Odendaal, A. and R. Olivier. 2008. Local Peace Committees: Some Reflections and Lessons Learned. Kathmandu:  The Academy for Educational Development. [online] Available at:  http://​unpan1.un.org/​intradoc/​groups/​ public/​documents/​UN/​UNPAN032148.pdf Shneiderman, S. and M. Turin. 2004. ‘The Path to Jan Sarkar in Dolakha District:  Towards an Ethnography of the Maoist Movement’, in M. Hutt, ed., Himalayan ‘People’s War’: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion. London: Hurst and Company, pp. 79–​111. Shrestha, C. H. and R. Adhikari. 2011. ‘NGOization and De-​NGOization of Public Action in Nepal: The Role of Organizational Culture in Civil Society Politicality’, Journal of Civil Society 7(1): 41–​61. Singh, M. 2012. ‘Women’s Participation and Peace Building in Nepal’, Mini Research Report of CNAS-​HiPeC. Hiroshima: Hiroshima University. Tamang, S. 2009. ‘The Politics of Conflict and Difference or the Difference of Conflict in Politics: The Women’s Movement in Nepal’, Feminist Review 91(1): 61–​80. —​—​—​. 2011. ‘The Politics of “Developing Nepali Women”’, in K. Visweswaran, ed., Perspectives on Modern South Asia:  A  Reader in Culture, History and Representation. London: Wiley-​Blackwell, pp. 280–​288. Upadhyaya, A. S. 2014. ‘Women and the Peace Process in Nepal’, in P. Upadhyaya and S. S. Kumar, eds., Peace and Conflict: The South Asian Experience. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, pp. 140–​59. Wright, J. and M. Winters. 2010. ‘The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid’, Annual Review of Political Science 13: 61–​80. Yami, H. 2005. ‘Women in People’s War in Nepal’, Economic and Political Weekly, 40(50): 5234–​5236.

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6 Women, Peace and Security The case of Nepal Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås

This chapter offers a summary of the book’s key findings on Nepali women’s political agency in the transition from war to peace. It also represents an effort to assess whether Nepal deserves its reputation as a case of successful transition from war to post-​conflict women’s empowerment. As indicators of women’s political agency, we consider women’s representation in the Constituent Assembly, party committees, and local government bodies (Local Peace Committees). We also look at the post-​war fate of female ex-​combatants, as this gives an indication of the gendered nature of the post-​conflict transition. Should we understand the post-​war transformation of Nepal as a shift towards a more gender-​equal society, or was it a return to the ‘normality’ of pre-​conflict gender relations? In order to answer this question, we need to unpack a series of theoretical assumptions about the road to gender equality, and especially the connection between women’s empowerment, agency and female participation in the political sphere.

Theorizing gender, conflict and empowerment A central theme of research on women’s political participation is concerned with the historically evident and widespread gender imbalances in decision-​making power and the implications of this imbalance for women’s access to resources, rights, and entitlements for women (Vogel 2011). Assuming that the gendered nature of the state has much to do with persistent gender imbalances in decision-​making, a common assertion is that these imbalances can be corrected by the greater participation of women in decision-​making (Lewis 1992). Following this, researchers started to investigate how policies affect men and women differently, and to what degree the equal presence of women can impact on the policymaking process. Imperative to this research was the

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100  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås concept of ‘intersectionality’, which highlights the combination of factors that effect the legislative representation of women, and contribute to the reinforcement or redefinition of inequalities. The reproduction of gender inequality was also a key topic of research as scholars turned their attention to the gendered nature of war. A basic assumption was that, at best, men and women are equally affected by conflict, though women are more prone to suffer from conflict-​related marginalization due to women’s general economic, cultural, and political marginalization (Lindsey 2001). However, this has been challenged by another line of thought that highlights the potential opportunities for women during and after conflict, including the potential for women to contribute to the establishment of a more egalitarian post-​war gender order through participation in peace processes and post-​war constitution making. This line of thought typically focuses on women’s increased opportunities as a result of the war-​time reshaping of gender roles. Feminist research on women and conflict resolution stresses the equal involvement of women in all aspects of society as a prerequisite for building an increasingly peaceful world. Peacebuilding processes and related transitions have been viewed as potential sites for women to advance their rights and take on a greater role in governance and politics, especially by way of constitutional revisions. Peacebuilding is thus perceived as a unique opportunity for enhancing women’s empowerment in post-​conflict reconstruction. During the last two decades, the literature on gender and conflict has built on two major strands of thinking. One strand of theorization is concerned mainly with the ways in which war affects women differently from men, the particular vulnerabilities and capacities that women develop in the conflict and post-​conflict phases, and the different ways in which relief and other forms of assistance can affect men and women (Thompson 2006). The ensuing debate on women and conflict deals specifically with women’s heightened vulnerabilities due to conflict, often with a focus on sexual and gender-​based violence at times of war (UNFPA 2001: 4, USAID 2007: 1). The popular view, casting women primarily as victims of war, is contradicted by empirical evidence of women joining revolutionary forces (Ariño 2008: 7, ICTJ 2010: 26). In fact, across the world women often play active roles during and after conflict as combatants, heads of households, community leaders, and peace-​builders. Acknowledging the agency of women in war, the more recent strand of research revolves around the changes and opportunities that favour women’s empowerment in situations of conflict and post-​conflict reconstruction. Examples from the Philippines, Indonesia,

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The case of Nepal  101 Cambodia, and Sri Lanka have shown that women living in conflict communities rated higher on empowerment measures than women living in conflict-​free zones (Petesch 2011). Once a modicum of security was restored, the communities that experienced the most rapid recovery from conflict were most likely to empower women. While the negative consequences of conflict remain undisputed, researchers have shown that conflict disturbs established norms, which may have positive effects on the status and role of women in their societies. Studies have also documented political changes brought about by strong women’s organizations acting dynamically in post-​conflict peace and reconstruction processes, and how war-​time changes in the division of labour have given women new skills and the capacity for new economic roles (El Bushra 2000). War-​time accentuation of women’s social and economic responsibilities has been widely documented. Studies from countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (Walsh 2000: 5), Sudan (Lindsey 2001:  30), Rwanda (USAID 2007:  10), Kosovo (UNFPA 2001: 82), and Nepal (Abdela 2010: 10) all suggest that conflict places added burdens of responsibility on women while also increasing their opportunities to access the political sphere and exert leverage on decision-​making. During conflict, women are commonly obliged to take over the responsibility of supporting their households. Often this requires learning new skills that enable women to perform jobs previously held by men, or prepare them for entrepreneurial income-​generating activities, potentially leading to long-​term changes in the gendered division of labour (Moser 2007, Rana, et al. 2011). In war-​time Nepal, for example, women shouldered guns, cut their hair short, and wore male clothes, challenging customary notions of womanhood. In the absence of men, women also took on unconventional jobs such as ploughing, and some began looking after household affairs, thus becoming relatively independent. During the decade-​long civil war in Nepal, women not only carried a heavier burden of household responsibilities but frequently also replaced men in the workforce. Women and girls also participated in the armed struggle in large numbers. These should be acknowledged as significant changes in gender roles during the decade-​long civil war. The important questions, however, are whether we can expect war-​time changes to continue after the transition to peace, and more importantly, whether war-​time changes in gender roles are indicative of greater gender equality. Afshar (2003: 179) describes the dilution of gender barriers in the military and the creation of a sense of gender equality when women attend similar military training as men; wearing similar uniforms, doing

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102  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås the same chores, and attending the same physical fitness, engineering, and map-​reading courses as men. Nonetheless, the sustainability of such gains is a matter of fierce debate. The changes are often short-​ lived, as women are expected to withdraw from politics when the community returns to the pre-​war status quo (Lindsey 2001: 31, Rehn and Sirleaf Johnson 2002: 2, Moser 2007). As argued by Afshar (2003:182), although war may erase gender differences, women are often pushed back to pre-​war marginality after the conflict is over. Making ample reference to examples across Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Israel, Afshar (2003) supports the argument that even if war may provide a path towards equality, it can also cause a further decline in women’s status in society. This may happen because women’s participation in war is seen as an aberration, and thus not taken to the level of policy-​making. Often, female combatants are viewed as mere assets and expected to return to a subservient role after the war. In addition, women who do succeed in achieving a position of leadership often feel vulnerable and need to continuously prove their commitment and valour. Similarly, Cock (1992) investigates the South African case with regard to the durability of patriarchy and fragility of war-​time gains for women, highlighting the South African Army’s exclusion of women from combat roles, and their under-​representation in positions of leadership and authority, despite progressive incorporation of women into the Army.

Women, conflict and empowerment in Nepal According to an unpublished report by the National Women’s Commission from 2003, women made up one-​third of the Maoist militia in some districts, and as much as 50 per cent in the most highly mobilized areas. Female Maoist cadres reportedly assumed roles ranging from combatants, organizers, mobilisers, trainers, transporters, scouts, spies, porters, cooks, nurses, messengers, care givers, and members of cultural troops. The Maoists themselves claimed that 40 per cent of their combatants were women, but this is countered by information collected in the United Nation Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) verification process. According to UNMIN there were 3,846 (19.63 per cent) female ex-​combatants from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), out of the UNMIN verified 19,602 total Maoist ex-​combatants. A total of 4,008 Verified Minors and Late Recruits were grouped as ineligible for integration into the Army and were offered special rehabilitation packages. A third of the Verified Minors and Late Recruits were young girls (Dahal 2015).

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The case of Nepal  103 Some believe that the Maoists exaggerated the female participation in the war in an effort to showcase the movement’s egalitarianism and intentions to empower Nepalese women (Colekessian 2009:  6, ICTJ 2010: 25, Sharma and Prasain 2004: 153).1 Evidently, the presence of women in the Maoist army supported the idea that the Maoists were fighting for all marginalized sections of the population. Apart from the studies that highlight the voluntary recruitment of females in the Maoist Army, cases of involuntary recruitment should not be overlooked. Young girls and women were at times abducted and forced to join the militia. In Jumla, where the Maoists used the recruitment method of ‘one house, one Maoist’, daughters were sometimes forced to join the insurgency in order to save the son of the house (Shrestha-​ Schipper 2008–​2009). While reviewing media sources, we found stories of female combatants being kept out of the demobilization process by commanders who hid away abducted women and girls for fear of legal and social consequences. There were also stories of female combatants who were unwilling to disclose their participation in the war due to fear of rejection from society (Colekessian 2009: 14, Pun 2006). As suggested by Ariño (2008: 6), the risk of stigmatization often results in self-​exclusion from benefits that might have been obtained in the post-​ conflict security sector reform. Against this backdrop, the verified 20 per cent female participation in the Maoist forces is highly significant, and especially so in the context of Nepal, where women were previously not allowed to serve in the armed forces. Many women who joined the People’s War were from marginalized Dalit, ethnic and indigenous communities (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004, ICTJ 2010: 24). The reasons they stated for joining the Maoists are varied, ranging from socio-​political to economic factors (Manchanda 2004, see also Sthapit and Doneys, and Gogoi in Chapters 2 and 3 of this volume). Researchers believe that the Maoist-​led campaigns to advance women’s issues, such as domestic and sexual violence, alcoholism, equal rights and opportunity, and easy and quick justice (such as the ‘dry law and parallel justice system’), had a huge impact and attracted immense support from women (Ariño 2008:  7, Sharma and Prasain 2004: 152). Thus, the supportive reaction to the Maoist war by thousands of women is widely considered as an action against women’s oppression, exclusion, and gender inequality. According to the Maoist woman leader Hisila Yami (alias Comrade Parvati), women joined the Maoists as a result of their desire to change their subordinated position in relation to men. Yami especially mentions the particularly pressing issues of the low status of women in society, women’s double burden of work and care of the home, early marriages, and a feudal legal system

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104  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås allowing multiple marriages for men as reasons for women’s favourable views of the Maoists. Explaining why the majority of Maoist women cadres were from particular ethnic groups, Yami writes: ‘if Indo-​Aryan women joined the PLA in protest of early marriage, Tibeto-​Burman women were basically against the vicious circle of rigorous, monotonous reproductive life.’ She also adds that the war offered a platform for traditionally exploited bonded labourers and Dalits (Yami n.d.). As Colekessian (2009) opines, the context and the process in which ex-​combatants (especially women and young girls) are reintegrated post-​ conflict is important in consideration of transgressed values or gender roles, and ultimately its wider implications for women’s empowerment and gender equality. In the context of Nepal it is thus important to question the sustainability of the gained sense of empowerment by the women ex-​combatants and to find out where female fighters stand amid the discourse of post-​war social and political gains. Of the verified total of 19,602 Maoist ex-​combatants, only six ex-​ combatants (all male) opted for rehabilitation, while 15,624 (12,170 males and 3,454 females) opted for voluntary retirement with a cash package. Depending on rank, the government provided an amount ranging from NPR 500,000 to 800,000 to each combatant opting for voluntary retirement. Out of the remaining ex-​combatants, a total of 1,422 officially joined the Nepal Army on 4 July 2013,2 of which 1,318 were male and 104 were female ex-​combatants. However, out of the 70 ex-​ combatants who joined the Army as officer cadets on completion of nine months of basic training, only four were women (Nepal Institute for Policy Studies 2013). Initially more than 3,000 female ex-​combatants showed readiness to join the armed forces. However, in post-​war cantonments, female combatants were encouraged to marry, and consequently, by the time of reintegration a majority were pregnant or had children, and were therefore considered practically ineligible for army service despite being qualified (Shah 2012). Despite their initial willingness to join the Nepal Army, most of the unmarried women later opted for rehabilitation, while most of the married women chose voluntary retirement. There were several reasons for this. Firstly, motherhood actually disqualified many of the female ex-​combatants, as child-​care was considered their primary responsibility. Secondly, many female ex-​ combatants were rejected by the armed forces due to their failure to meet obligatory educational, age, and health criteria.3 Thirdly, many female ex-​combatants failed to disclose their participation in the war, due to fear of rejection from society. Therefore, they remained in exile, or opted for relocation outside their community, or migration to India.

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The case of Nepal  105 While women left their children in order to fight during the civil war, after the war, child-​care and motherhood returned as the ‘unavoidable destiny’ or even the ‘duty’ of women (Afshar 2003: 183). Strikingly, the Maoist leadership reinforced gender typecasts by opting for a conservative maternity policy instead of prioritizing child-​care services in cantonments. As Bleie (2012: 12) argues, by reinforcing this gender role the Maoist leadership retained the traditional idea of motherhood within their ranks (mothers as prime care-​givers and fathers as peripheral figures). As the empirical evidence from Khadka (2012: 54) indicates, this had a deleterious effect on women combatants’ rank and mobility, and hindered women from benefitting equally from reintegration packages. Though the data shows an active enrolment of female ex-​combatants in different post-​conflict skills and training packages, the media’s ‘success stories’ of female ex-​combatants revolve around conventionally gendered work and training, i.e. women with sewing machines and men in repairing jobs (motorcycles, bicycles, electrician).4 These stories focus largely on economic rehabilitation, discrediting the discourse on changes in gender roles and ideologies. Other stories illuminate the various cases of gender-​based violence against the same ex-​combatants who once enjoyed more egalitarian gender relations during the war. While men did not report difficulties, some women spoke of being shunned by their families when they returned to their native home. Ostracization for refusing to embrace traditional gender roles is evident from the experiences of many female ex-​combatants as gender roles and social norms were expected to return to the pre-​war status quo. Based on mere news reports it would be inappropriate to draw definite conclusions about the success or failure of the rehabilitation programmes. Nevertheless, the case of Nepal seems to corroborate the ‘reintegration story’ of other post-​war societies such as Sierra Leone, described by Mackenzie (2007) as a return to gender-​biased ‘normality’. Furthermore, it appears that the UNMIN-​led reintegration process has emphasized economic reintegration (i.e. vocational training and entrepreneurship development skills) rather than social reintegration of ex-​combatants. Although economic reintegration is vitally important, the shared future of the ex-​combatants and the community very much relies on social reintegration. The wider discussion on the social reintegration of female ex-​combatants, including those not verified, has been ignored in the midst of a contentious debate on the integration of verified ex-​combatants into the Nepal Army. In particular, there is a need to take seriously the social threats faced by female ex-​combatants when they return to entrenched patriarchal communities. As combatants, these women challenged gendered social norms and disrupted gender

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106  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås binaries associated with warfare by actively participating in armed conflict. Many community members would therefore view the returning ex-​combatants as aggressive and overtly sexual, a stigma which, according to Colekessian (2009:14), has been applied to both female ex-​ combatants and Verified Minors and Late Recruits. Her findings suggest that, as a strategy to escape stigmatisation and pressure to return to a conventional gender role, female ex-​combatants opted to relocate to different communities or urban centres rather than to return to their respective native communities. Fear of rejection and loss of empowerment is of concern to female ex-​ combatants (Colekessian 2009:  12). A  Saferworld survey (2010) establishes evidence of the transitory nature of social change acquired by the female Maoist cadres during the war, suggesting that their relatively empowered status was most often rejected in post-​conflict society. During the war, the Maoists encouraged inter-​caste marriages among combatants.5 There were also cases where female combatants were forced to marry fellow male combatants (Khadka 2012, Yami 2007). However, this highly promoted socio-​political change faced post-​war rejection, and consequently emerged as a serious challenge to social rehabilitation.6 The transitory nature of the transformation of gender roles is evident in the many cases of sexual and gender-​based violence among married combatants (Colekessian 2009:  13).7 This indicates that ideologies tend not to change during war; they are simply temporarily suspended (Afshar 2003: 185). A gap between ideology and practice is also visible in an interview with the widow of a senior Maoist cadre undertaken by Pettigrew. According to the interviewee, her husband expected her to take full responsibility for all domestic activities after the war (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004: 3). What remains unanswered is why women who were supposedly empowered during the war were unable to muster the courage to fight against the stigma and rejection caused by their inter-​caste marriages. If their unconventional marriage symbolizes their defiance to stereotypical gender norms, their post-​conflict stigmatization illustrates that the ‘gains’ are still ambivalent. The demobilization and reintegration process in Nepal appears highly gender-​biased, if not disempowering for women. Firstly, despite being involved in various capacities during the war, female ex-​combatants have been side-​lined from formal peace negotiations and policy-​making regarding the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants (ICTJ 2010:  94). Secondly, there are reports that the special needs of female ex-​combatants have not been taken into proper account (ICG

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The case of Nepal  107 2011: 7). Nor have female ex-​combatants been included in the post-​war constitution-​making process.

Women in post-​conflict politics The political mobilization of women was amplified in Nepal as a result of the Maoists’ successful mobilization of women during the conflict. Research suggests that the majority of female Maoist combatants were mobilized from poor Tibeto-​Burman and non-​Aryan communities, e.g. Magars, Tamang, Kamis, and Gurungs. Also, the revolt was supported by other oppressed castes, such as Dalits and Tharus (Manchanda 2004). Women were again mobilized in the April 2006 People’s Movement, when a number of female activists, women’s organizations and other civil society groups marched through the streets demanding democracy. This women’s movement not only paved the way for greater participation of women in parliament, but also raised questions about women as a homogenous category. Owing to the greater movement for collective representation, women from various ethnic and indigenous communities began to express their identities as not just women, but as Janajati, Madhesi, Muslim, or Dalit women. Ethnicity and womanhood not only became sources of political identification, but were also used to garner political resources and claim rights (Cozic 2004). The post-​war ‘race’ for identity-​based representation has in many ways reshaped gender as an issue of representation. This has had vast implications for women’s representation and negotiation of women’s rights post-​war. Soon after the end of the civil war, the three-​year interim plan (TYIP) 2007–​2009 adopted the concept of inclusive and proportional representation and planned a target to increase women’s presence in the state decision-​making structures to 42 per cent by the end of the first TYIP. Article 63 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007) stipulated 33 per cent candidacy for women in the election for the Constituent Assembly through the First-​Past-​the-​Post and Proportional Representation electoral systems. Article 142 (3) (C) directed compulsory representation of women in the executive posts of political parties (Maskey 2011). This was a big change as compared with the earlier constitution (Article 114, 1991), which stipulated only 5 per cent reservation of women in the lower house of parliament, the House of Representatives, and three seats in the upper house. The 2007 Interim Constitution also raised the reservation for women at the district and ward levels from 20 per cent as stipulated under the Local Self-​Governance Act (1999) to 33 per cent under the new legislative framework.

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108  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås Although no woman was elected to the executive posts of Mayor, Deputy Mayor, or District Development Committee Chairperson, 36,000 women made their entry into local governance following the adoption of the Interim Constitution (RSN 2009: 40). Moreover, for the first time Dalit, Janajati/​Indigenous, Madhesi, Muslim, and other disadvantaged communities were represented in the Constituent Assembly and legislature. According to IDEA (2011: 63), the majority were Janajati or indigenous people (35.7 per cent), followed by Brahmins (22.4 per cent), Madhesi (15.8 per cent), Dalits (10.7 per cent), Chhetris (10.7 per cent), Muslims (2.6 per cent), and others (including Kirat) (2 per cent), all of which were nearly proportionate to the national average. Despite this, gender equality was by no means the only issue at stake. For instance, almost all the Madhesi women Constituent Assembly members were mobilized for the greater cause of ‘Madhesi’ identity politics. On the other hand, a 2.6 per cent representation of Muslim women is in itself evidence of huge post-​war gains, furthering the notion of gender equality within the Muslim community, which has the lowest human development ranking in the country (DFID 2011). Nevertheless, against the backdrop of these achievements and opportunities there is still the fundamental question of women’s autonomy in asserting their voice. While 197 women were elected into the first Constituent Assembly, the number of women members in central committees of political parties nearly doubled (from 8 to 15 per cent). However, the stipulated 33 per cent representation of women in all key organs of the state and political parties was not met in practice (National Women’s Commission 2011). The share of females in the central committees of the major five political parties ranged from 6–​21 per cent,8 and from 5–​11 per cent in the central committees of regional parties.9 The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) was no different, despite its revolutionary ideas on the need to abolish gender inequality. As Adhikari (2006) opines, this proves the inherent patriarchal attitudes of the Maoists since, although they claim to fight for the rights of women, they are instead obstructing women’s rights by setting higher expectations for women Constituent Assembly members: a woman must overcome the stigma of being like a ‘woman –​indecisive and emotional’ (ibid.), and still maintain integrity. In 2007, a survey by the Renaissance Society Nepal showed that women made up only 55 out of 443 members of political parties’ central-​level working committees, 860 out of 8,250 members in district-​level working committees, 510 out of 1,524 members in central-​level sister organizations, and 6,277 out of 19,329 members in district-​level sister organizations. Altogether, women comprised 26 per cent of membership in party politics. However, the figures alone give a false impression of women’s

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The case of Nepal  109 growing political empowerment, if their impact on decision-​making is not also considered. The same study shows that only one of 11 (9.1 per cent) party chiefs was female at the central level and only six among 394 (1.5 per cent) at the district level, which in fact reveals the limited access of women to decision-​making positions within political parties. Regardless of commitments of political parties towards women’s empowerment and gender equity, there appears to have been a large gap in the implementation process, indicating that men remained in the majority and held most of the decision-​making power. According to the Centre for International Private Enterprise, women’s contribution to the constitution-​building process was hindered by deeply embedded values reinforcing patriarchy, preventing women from meaningful participation during decision-​making processes. Moreover, this contributed to the continued marginalization of female politicians,10 corroborating the analysis of Lawoti (2008) on the interaction of formal and informal institutions and the resultant political exclusion of women due to embedded patriarchal norms, even after democratization. As Lawoti argues, because of the longstanding existence of informal institutions (e.g. social norms which guide behaviour and attitudes), continued exclusion of the marginalized may persist even if changes are introduced in formal institutions. Lawoti’s assessment of women’s exclusion is based on women’s participation in the 1990 local elections. Interestingly, scholars continue to argue that the efficiency in decision-​making of female members of the Constituent Assembly is underrated, and that their voice in decision-​making is ignored (IDEA 2008: 21). In the 2013 election to the second Constituent Assembly, only ten women were able to win seats through First-​Past-​the-​Post election. This suggests that women still lack resources to access elite political networks, while men continue to act as the real gatekeepers who decide which women are to be nominated.11 The Civil Society Monitoring Report on Nepal tracks women’s political participation in Nepal at three levels:  in parliament, in the cabinet, and in decision-​making positions in local governance. In 2011, it reported that in the new cabinet reconstituted in September that year, the share of women dropped significantly, from 11.6 per cent to 7.6 per cent. Women’s participation in local governance was also severely low, with zero Chief District Officers (CDO) and only 1.3 per cent of Local Development Officers (LDO) being women (Rana et al. 2011). After the appointment of Dwarika Devi Thakurani as Assistant Minister for Health and Governance in the first Nepalese cabinet in 1951, no other woman was appointed to the Council of Ministers until the first popular movements. Discouragingly, there were only 43 female members (4.8 per cent) in all 41 cabinets formed between the first and

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110  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås second popular movements (RSN 2009:  41). Until 2015, the highest government post held by a Nepalese woman was that of Deputy Prime Minister (Shailaja Acharya and Sujata Koirala) and Deputy Speaker of the Parliament (Onsari Gharti Magar). It was only after the promulgation of the new constitution in September 2015 that women were elected as both President (Bidya Devi Bhandari) and Speaker (Onsari Gharti Magar). Bhandari previously served as vice-​chair of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist) and chair of the All Nepal Women’s Organization, and was the Minister of Defence from May 2009 until February 2011. She was elected in a parliamentary vote, defeating the nominee of the Nepali Congress Party, Kul Bahadur Gurung. While Bhandari is well known as a campaigner for women’s rights, she has been criticized for supporting a legal provision that bars Nepali single mothers and women married to foreigners from passing on citizenship to their children. Onsari Gharti Magar was the first female Speaker of the Parliament of Nepal. Nominated by Bidya Devi Bhandari, she was the only candidate and was elected unanimously. Onsari Gharti Magar is a former Maoist Army combatant, and was elected to the Constituent Assembly from Rolpa in the second Constituent Assembly election. Her husband Barsha Man Pun is secretary of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). While the pace has been slow, some departure has been made post-​ war in the tendency to assign gender-​stereotyped portfolios to women. This can be seen from the traditionally male positions of Defence Minister, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister being conferred to women in the cabinet (Moser 2010: 9). However, what appears critical is the way we measure political empowerment. For instance, the election of a female President, formally the head of the state of Nepal, could be interpreted as an important sign of women’s empowerment. In fact, the post is largely ceremonial, with limited power. Does a mere increase in the share of women in parliament, in local governance, or in the cabinet provide evidence of women’s political empowerment? Contributors to women and gender studies assert that a constitutional revision may not translate into actual women’s leadership (Porter 2011: 129). Studies on Nepal (Falch 2010) confirm that the presence of women in LPCs and the Constituent Assembly is by no means conclusive evidence of their empowerment. This is also supported by Moser (2010: 9), who maintains that in Nepal ‘women’s representation is politically correct, rather than reflecting a deep-​rooted will to realize change’.The share of the population who exercise their voting rights could be another indicator for measuring the level of women’s political participation. However, the post-​war change in women’s participation

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The case of Nepal  111 was negligible, increasing from 49.5 per cent in 199912 to 49.6 per cent in 2008.13

An analysis of women’s post-​conflict empowerment in Nepal An analysis of the above review clearly indicates a continuation of women’s under-​representation at all levels of decision-​making during the crucial post-​conflict period. The election of 33 per cent women into the first Constituent Assembly (2008–​2013) has been portrayed as a landmark for Nepali women’s political participation. However, others have questioned the alleged gains of the election, in terms of ensuring an effective voice for women in the constitution-​making process (Savinovich 2012). The 74 Maoist women who had won seats in the first Constituent Assembly were expected to raise women’s rights issues. Surprisingly, they did not even lobby for the rights of female Maoist ex-​ combatants. Some believe that lack of education, experience, and training restricted them from making effective contributions, while some think the failure was more due to ‘participatory exclusion’ (Manchanda 2010:  8).14 It is noteworthy that women combatants’ voices were not included in the agreements on the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-​combatants, despite the fact that for the first time in Nepal’s history, women participated actively in the conflict and made up a considerable share of the Maoist armed forces. Their lack of voice can be seen from the absence of gender-​specific facilities such as maternal health care in the cantonments. The exclusion of female ex-​combatants happened because the women, peace and security agenda was neither taken seriously nor prioritized by officials (Colekessian 2009). Organization of the reintegration process and top-​level decision-​making continued to be the domain of male party leaders. A major issue of concern is the repetitive use of women’s issues as an agenda by the political parties during and after conflict. Women were given inadequate space in party committees and kept far from important decision-​making processes, and not a single woman was included in high-​level political committees, in and across parties. Ironically, even after the numerical achievement in the Constituent Assembly, women seem to have been distant from the actual decision-​making, even in areas typically defined as ‘women’s issues’. As illustrated in Table 6.1, war-​time changes are often understood as signs of women’s political empowerment in post-​conflict Nepal. Firstly, women took up arms and fought side by side with men, and secondly, gender roles were loosened in the villages due to the absence of men. Although both occurred extensively during and after the war, none of the above had

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112  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås Table 6.1  Gains and challenges in Nepali women’s empowerment Gains (during conflict)

Challenges (post-​conflict)

Women’s rights became an agenda

Women’s rights remained as an agenda Female ex-combatants struggled to become a force for change Women became overburdened with work

Women were recruited as combatants Women took on conventionally male roles in the household in the absence of male family members Women’s movements and women’s political participation gained a platform A 33 per cent reservation for women in all mechanisms of governance and political parties

A stark absence of women from the key fora where decisions are made In-​grained patriarchal gender ideology obstructs women’s use of political resources

strong implications for post-​war women’s empowerment. During the post-​ conflict reconstruction, it appears that Nepali women were by and large expected to make ‘necessary’ practical and emotional adjustments to go back to their traditional role of home-​makers, care-​givers and mothers. Re-​integration of former combatants was important for the culmination of the peace process. However, as scholars like Ariño (2008: 6) observe, the decade-​long conflict was gendered not only in its origins and consequences, but also in the ideologies and discourses generated around it. The significant female participation in the Maoist army was displayed prominently on the official Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) website, and distributed worldwide in materials produced by the Revolutionary International Movement (Pettigrew and Shneiderman 2004). The media also highlighted the female Maoist combatants, both in Nepali coverage and abroad. For the first time, oppressed rural women were brought to the forefront. After the settlement, however, they were propelled back to the erstwhile status quo. The publicity they received during the conflict turned into ‘no publicity’ after the war was over, as women were excluded from decision-​making on their reintegration. Even the research is lacking, particularly on the situation of female ex-​combatants after reintegration. The large participation of women in the Maoist army has been the base of the Maoist claim of establishing relative gender equality, empowerment, and overall radical social transformation in Nepali society. However, scholars such as Pettigrew and Shneiderman (2004), and Bleie (2012) point out noticeable gaps between rhetoric and practice with regard to the Maoist claim of fundamental changes in gender

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The case of Nepal  113 relations. The special needs of female Maoist ex-​combatants were rendered insignificant even in plans to implement the National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 and 1820 (Government of Nepal 2011). Women’s participation in the Maoist army is considered significant in terms of promoting women in political agendas and the role of women in institutions, as is the historical recruitment of women into the Nepal Army infantry since 2003 (ICTJ 2010:  27).15 Nevertheless, we still lack reliable empirical data to measure the positive impact of the decade-​long conflict on women and girls in rural areas, considering the fact that 80 per cent of women in Nepal live in rural areas and most female Maoist combatants were from rural areas. Since Nepal is still undergoing transition, it appears too early to draw concrete conclusions. However, as the available literature suggests, despite a rise in consciousness about women’s rights, the gender biases against which the female ex-​combatants fought during the war will return in the absence of a new definition of reintegration or a change in how Nepal defines ‘normal’. Reintegration and rehabilitation processes were no exception. Despite the presence of female commanders in the Maoist forces, the Special Committee for Reintegration of Maoist Combatants failed to include a single woman in either the technical committee or the secretariat (Pradhan 2011). Praised for its fast and significant progress, the 2006 peace negotiations failed to involve key stakeholders. There was an absence of women in the negotiations. The outcome is apparent in the ignorance or trivial importance given to gender-​based persecution and violence in subsequent agreements, which was not taken into account either in their interpretation or implementation. Women’s exclusion from the peace process highlights the lack of recognition among the negotiators of women’s differing experiences and needs during and after conflict (ICG 2011, Moser 2010). Rape, torture, and violence against women were widespread problems in Nepal, both during and after the Civil War. The state still lacks adequate mechanisms to provide justice to victims who have faced gender-​based violence, whether during conflict or in the post-​conflict period, suggesting a rising impunity for these types of crimes (National Women’s Commission 2011:  8). The Maoists claimed to defend the rights of women. However, ensuring access to justice for victims of gender-​based violence in the cantonments was never on their political agenda. Along similar lines, Local Peace Committees (LPCs) in Nepal have also been considered a failure (Sapkota 2009). As observed by the Carter Centre in 2011, most of the LPCs were inactive. The well-​functioning

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114  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås LPCs were for the most part dominated by party politicians. Although LPCs were to ensure women’s representation, their ability to promote gender concerns or address protection from and prevention of gender-​ based violence was questionable (Rana et al. 2011). Moreover, the LPCs were supposed to provide compensation to victims of the war, but a large number of victims received no assistance (Odendaal 2011). Affirmative and positive discrimination under UNSCR 1325 and 1820 have no doubt proven critical for creating a gender-​sensitive political environment in Nepal. However, the majority of Nepali women are unaware of these instruments, and nor have they benefitted from them in practical terms. The pace of women’s inclusion and empowerment is slow. The monitoring report on UNSCR 1325 implementation highlights the failure of the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction to address gender considerations with regard to relief and reparation, while the formation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Disappearance Commission have been stalled for many years.16 Some changes have been observed in women’s leadership in post-​ conflict Nepal. Unlike the first generation of women leaders, whose elite status and connections brought them to power, the 2008 Constituent Assembly (CA) election brought a number of women to political echelons devoid of any familial ties. A report published by IDEA (2011) shows that the majority of women CA members joined mainstream politics after working in student unions (45.9 per cent); many were involved in social service (16.8 per cent), women’s associations (22.4 per cent), the academic sector (4.6 per cent), or had professional backgrounds (1.5 per cent). The report states that only 39.6 per cent of the female CA members had prior experience as politicians. An examination of the report’s biographical data suggests that more than half of the female CA members were either married to politicians or had political connections via family members before joining politics or student unions. Interestingly, in the majority of cases these women belong to relatively elite families and have been supported and encouraged by the male members of their family to enter politics. Despite CA representation by women from marginalized groups such as Dalits and Janjati, the reservation of 33 per cent of seats for women appears to have benefitted mainly the elite, higher-​middle class and well-​ to-​do Nepali women. The female CA members who had participated in the Maoist revolution were similarly well connected to Maoist leaders. Few of these women were widowed in the conflict, and probably none were coercively recruited into the war. More than the issue of political pedigree, the argument here is about whether kinship affects women’s efforts to achieve tangible political

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The case of Nepal  115 goals. Potential remedies for the promotion of women’s rights were definitely put forward, especially by the 13 per cent of female CA members who had served as members of parliament in the past (IDEA 2011: 70). Nevertheless, policies made so far are designed to achieve gender equality within the reality of a patriarchal structure. For instance, when the Nepal Citizenship Act 2063 (2006) was revised from its original 1964 form, it was supposed to provide equal rights to women for obtaining citizenship and granting citizenship to children on a maternal basis. However, the 2015 Citizenship Act in the new Constitution of Nepal has overridden the clause in the 2006 legislation, discriminating against women’s right to pass Nepali citizenship on to their children. The new Act makes it difficult for a single mother to pass her citizenship to her child, and moreover, the Act states that if a Nepali woman marries a foreigner, their child cannot become Nepali unless the man first takes Nepali citizenship. If the father is Nepali, on the other hand, his child will also be Nepali, regardless of the mother’s nationality.17 Similarly, the chapter on Partition Share of the National Code 2020 had discriminatory legal provisions, which the 21st session of the Parliament amended (11th Amendment). However, women’s property rights continue to be overtly and covertly guided by Hindu jurisprudential concepts and therefore they are discriminatory in practice (Subedi 2009). Thus, these interventions have been largely irrelevant to the lives of ordinary Nepali citizens, and at best effective only for the wealthy and powerful. Although slow-​ paced, the rise in women’s participation in community-​level projects such as forest user groups, and the formation of women’s groups at the grassroots level, is noteworthy. The mandatory law of keeping 33 per cent seats for women in every user group has certainly affected women’s leadership and participation in development. Nevertheless, it would hardly be unfounded to speculate that the beneficiaries are again mainly the comparatively well-​off women. As mentioned elsewhere, a number of women’s organizations and NGOs evolved from their strong affiliation with political parties comprised of politically conscious and active women. As we argue here, even the mandatory 33 per cent representation of women in the CA failed to ensure an effective voice for women in decision-​making. Though women remained an important agenda of the struggle to root out the royal autocracy, no women were involved at key post-​war negotiation tables at the national level. At the local level, though many women experienced greater flexibility in gender roles (loosening of gender roles due to absence of men), women continued to suffer from various forms of gender-​based violence, domestic

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116  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås violence (usually ignored), trafficking, sexual harassment, and exploitation. Again, at the national level it has been found that patriarchal norms prevail, making it hard to accept women as decision-​makers.18 Despite a freer economic and social status, women’s subordination remains. Therefore, as the country returns to ‘normality’, so do deep-​ rooted patriarchal norms that represent serious obstacles to women’s empowerment. Evidently, Nepal’s decade-​long civil war was loaded with the emancipatory impulse that attracted thousands of women. Leadership positions are considered an important indicator to measure shifting gender roles. However, few women held leadership positions in the Maoist Army. Also, women did not form a part of peace negotiating teams in 2003 and 2006. As discussed, the inherent patriarchy is also reflected in the organizational structure of the various political parties and government bodies. Although ‘women fighters’ created attention during the war, in post-​conflict Nepal female ex-​combatants as a group never became a political force for change, nor did their rehabilitation become a serious issue, neither for development practitioners, the media, the academicians, nor female ex-​Maoist commanders turned CA members. Similarly, it is debatable if we can describe as a ‘success’ a change of gender roles among the most recruited Janajati or Dalit women, as these women already enjoyed relative freedom as compared with other Hinduized groups before the start of the war. Nevertheless, changes in gender relations have undoubtedly taken place, as evidenced by the loosening up of the division of labour and the emergence of stronger women’s organisations. Push and pull factors of women’s recruitment during the Maoist insurgency included the Maoist agenda of gender equality, the people’s courts, and the liquor control, as well as reactive measures such as massacres by the security forces. This served to mobilize thousands of female combatants who, armed with guns, were pictured as ‘empowered’ due to the changes in gender roles. Ironically, a majority of the same women were forced back to face the traditional gender barriers after the war, except a very few who made their way into politics, and about 130 who made it through the reintegration process into the security forces. A number of female ex-​combatants never returned to their place of origin due to fear of stigma, and a few were even displaced to India. The provision of rehabilitation packages (offered by the state in cooperation with the UN) has also failed to address the particular concerns of female ex-​combatants. The question that should be raised is why such well-​advertised gender equality propaganda could not function as the base for a more egalitarian post-​conflict society.

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The case of Nepal  117 Why were the interested female ex-​combatants not provided with child-​ care so that they could hold on to the empowerment they had fought so hard to achieve? The darker side of the picture concerns the women who were taken as sexual objects during the war. When will their stories surface? In rural Nepal, the scholarly notice of a shift in gender roles is largely due to changes in the number of female-​headed households, which is rarely an advantage to women. No doubt, there is a comparative increase of women in national politics as well as the security forces in post-​conflict Nepal. The contributions of various women’s organizations as well as external intervention cannot be ignored, especially the change in the political landscape of Nepal through reservations for women, and current demands for a 50 per cent reservation for women in all sectors. However, while the civil war itself may have created opportunities for women, this was not the result of intentional strategies by key political actors, but rather emerged as an unintended consequence of the armed conflict and women’s participation in it. As described in the chapters of this volume, the participation of women in the Constituent Assembly and post-​conflict politics did not arise as a result of changes in gender relations during war-​time. The post-​conflict fate of female ex-​combatants suggests that the post-​war return to ‘normality’ has primarily meant a return to pre-​conflict gender roles and relations, rather than a major shift towards gender equality or women’s empowerment.

Notes 1 Sharma and Prasain (2004:  153)  report that between 1998 and 2001 the media were given photographs of women constituting a large proportion of the participants in Maoist processions, many of them dressed in combat fatigues or wearing red scarves and carrying guns in a casual manner. 2 ‘1352 Ex-​combatants now army personnel’, The Kathmandu Post, 5 July 2013. www.ekantipur.com/​the-​kathmandu-​post/​2013/​07/​05/​top-​story/​1352-​ ex-​combatants-​now-​army-​personnel/​250813.html 3 According to Ingdal and Holter (2010: 14), many female soldiers were not selected for integration into security services, special training or provided with placement opportunities. 4 See UNDP, ‘Success Stories’, www.np.undp.org/​content/​nepal/​en/​home/​ operations/ ​ p rojects/ ​ c losed- ​ p rojects/ ​ p eacebuilding- ​ a nd- ​ recovery/ ​ u nirp/​ success-​stories.html. Also, Khadka (2012) shows all her 15 respondents working as beauticians and tailors. See also Gogoi in Chapter 3 of this volume. 5 Ingdal and Holter (2010:  14)  report that female combatants who left the Maoist Army and did not opt to live in camps have been rejected by their communities because of the stigma resulting from their inter-​caste marriages

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118  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås or because they had suffered gender-​based violence. These women were then left without a support network. Many fled to urban areas or to India, with some ending up in the sex industry. 6 Saferworld (2010) demonstrates the threat of heightened vulnerability to emotional, psychological and physical domestic abuse, and in some cases, homicide (often registered as suicide), that women in inter-​caste marriages experience upon return to their husband’s families. 7 See also ‘Sorry soldiers’, Nepali Times, 28 July 2011, http://​nepalitimes.com/​ news.php?id=18387 8 Kamal Dev Bhattarai, ‘The illusion of inclusion’, The Kathmandu Post, 16 February 2013. 9 Meghraj Raisaily. ‘Inclusion in political parties: Is it merely a popular slogan?’ Republica, 17 May 2013. 10 CIPE (Centre for International Private Enterprise) ‘Women and Their Participation:  The Nepalese Context’, www.cipe.org/​essay/​Women%20 and%20their%20participation%20in%20the%20Nepalese%20Context.pdf 11 Lhamo Yangchen Sherpa, ‘Token representation’, The Kathmandu Post, 7 November 2013. 12 CAPWIP (Centre for Asia-​Pacific Women in Politics), Country report on the state of women in urban local governments in Asia and the Pacific, www. capwip.org/​readingroom/​nepal.pdf 13 UNMIN (United Nations Mission in Nepal), Archive, www.un.org.np/​ unmin-​archive/​?d=activities&p=electoral 14 Also see, ‘Nepal’s women have a voice in politics but no one is listening’, The Guardian, 27 May 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/​global-​development/​poverty-​ matters/​2011/​may/​27/​nepal-​women-​in-​politics 15 The Nepal Army started recruiting women in 1962. The initial recruitment of women in the Army was for nursing and medical units. They were later recruited in the infantry in 2003. 16 Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, ‘Peace accords matrix’, https://​peaceaccords.nd.edu/​matrix/​status/​67/​truth_​ reconciliation_​mechanism. 17 See Part 2, Citizenship Act, Article 11 (2,3,4,5,6,7) –​Constitution of Nepal, 2072 (2015). 18 IDEA, ‘International IDEA supports women Caucus in Nepal’, 25 September 2005, www.idea.int/​asia_​pacific/​nepal/​womens_​caucus_​in_​nepal.cfm

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120  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås Khadka, S. 2012. Female Combatants and Ex-​Combatants in Maoist Revolution and Their Struggle for Reintegration in Post-​War Nepal. Master’s thesis in Peace and Conflict Transformation. University of Tromsø, Norway. Lawoti, M. 2008. ‘Informal Institutions and Exclusion in Democratic Nepal’, Himalaya 28(1–​2): 17–​32. Lewis, J. 1992. ‘Gender and the Development of Welfare Regimes’, Journal of European Social Policy 2(3): 159–​73. Lindsey, C. 2001. Women Facing War. ICRC Study on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross. MacKenzie, M. 2007. ‘Reconstructing Women? Post-​conflict Security and the Return to “Normal” in Sierra Leone’, paper presented to the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Saskatchewan, 30 May to 1 June 2007. Manchanda, R. 2004. ‘Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, Radicalizing Gendered Narratives’, Cultural Dynamics, 16(2): 237–​58. —​—​—​. 2010. Nepali Women Seize the New Political Dawn:  Resisting Marginalisation after Ten Years of War. Geneva:  Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Maskey, J. 2011. Overview of the Legal System of Nepal. London: Womankind Worldwide [online] Available at:  www.womankind.org.uk/​wp-​ content/​ uploads/​2011/​11/​Country-​section-​Nepal2.pdf Moser, A. 2007. ‘The Peace and Conflict Gender Analysis: UNIFEM’s Research in Solomon Islands’, Gender & Development 15(2): 231–​39. —​—​—​. 2010. Women Count. Security Council Resolution 1325 Civil Society Monitoring Report. Global Network for Women Peace-​ builders [online] Available at:  http://​gnwp.peacegeeks.org/​sites/​default/​files/​resource-​field_​ media/​Global%20Report.pdf National Women’s Commission. 2011. National Implementation Status of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). Independent report prepared by the National’s Women’s Commission of Nepal to supplement the Combined 4th and 5th Periodic Report Submitted to the CEDAW Committee by the Government of Nepal. Kathmandu: National Women’s Commission. Nepal Institute for Policy Studies. 2013. Nepal’s Peace Process:  A  Brief Overview. Policy Paper 8(1). Kathmandu:  Nepal Institute for Policy Studies. Odendaal, A. 2011. An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level: A Comparative Study of Local Peace Committees. UNDP Discussion Paper [online] Available at:  www.un.org/​en/​land-​natural-​resources-​conflict/​ pdfs/​UNDP_​Local%20Peace%20Committees_​2011.pdf Petesch, P. 2011. Women’s Empowerment Arising from Violent Conflict and Recovery: Life Stories from Four Middle Income Countries. USAID [online] Available at:  www.usip.org/​sites/​default/​files/​Gender/​Petesch_​Women_​and_​ Conflict.pdf Pettigrew, J. and Shneiderman, S. 2004. ‘Women and the Maobaadi: Ideology and Agency in Nepal’s Maoist Movement’, Himal Magazine, 17(1): 19–​29.

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The case of Nepal  121 Porter, E. J. 2011. ‘Why Bother with a Gender Perspective in Peace Building?’, in B. Offord and R. Garbutt, eds., A Scholarly Affair: Proceedings of the Cultural Studies Association of Australasia 2010 National Conference, Byron Bay, NSW 7–​9 December, Southern Cross University. Lismore:  Southern Cross University Press, pp. 125–​34. Pradhan, S. 2011. ‘Women’s Exclusion from the Peacemaking Process in Nepal’, Blog post. Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. Pun, J. B. (2006) ‘Certified Problem’, Nepali Times, 14 December 2006 [online] Available at: http://​nepalitimes.com/​news.php?id=12923#.Vma1Rb9y0sQ Rana, B., Rana Singh, P. and Kachhyapati, S. 2011. Security Council Resolution 1325. Civil Society Monitoring Report 2011:  Nepal. Global Network of Women Peacebuilders [online] Available at: www.peacewomen.org/​assets/​file/​ gnwp_​monitoring_​nepal.pdf Rehn, E. and Sirleaf Johnson, E. 2002. Women, War and Peace: The Independent Experts: Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-​Building. New  York:  United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). RSN (Renaissance Society Nepal). 2009. Women’s Political Participation, Empowerment and Inclusions in Nepal. Survey Report and Strategic Action Plan. Kathmandu: Women’s Democratic Network. Saferworld. 2010. Common Ground? Gendered Assessment of the Needs and Concerns of the Maoist Army Combatants for Rehabilitation and Integration. [online] Available at:  www.saferworld.org.uk/​downloads/​pubdocs/​ Common%20ground_​%20LR.pdf Sapkota, B. 2009. Local Peace Committees in Nepal:  A  Lost Opportunity? Kathmandu: Asia Foundation, Nepal. Savinovich, M. 2012. ‘Power and Empowerment. Struggle for Gender Equality in Nepal’, The WIP [online] Available at:  http://​thewip.net/​2012/​06/​01/​ power-​and-​empowerment-​struggle-​for-​gender-​ equality-​in-​nepal/​ Shah, A. 2012. ‘Integration of Maoist Combatants in Nepal: The Challenges Ahead’, ORF Issue Brief 39. New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation. Sharma, M. and Prasain, D. 2004. ‘Gender Dimensions of the People’s War: Some Reflections on the Experiences of Rural Women’, in M. C. Hutt, ed., Himalayan People’s War, London: Hurst & Co. Ltd., pp. 152–​65. Shrestha-​Schipper, S. 2008–​2009. ‘Women’s Participation in the People’s War in Jumla’, European Bulletin of Himalayan Research, 33–​34: 105–​22. Subedi, N. C. 2009. ‘Elimination of Gender Discriminatory Legal Provision by the Supreme Court of Nepal with Reference to Women’s Rights to Property’, Tribhuvan University Journal, 26(1): 37–​54. Thompson, M. 2006. ‘Women, Gender and Conflict: Making the Connections’, Development in Practice, 16(3): 342–​53. USAID. 2007. ‘Women and Conflict: An Introductory Guide for Programming’ [online] Available at: www.usaid.gov/​sites/​default/​files/​documents/​1865/​toolkit_​women_​and_​conflict_​an_​introductory_​guide_​for_​programming.pdf UNFPA. 2001. ‘The Impact of Conflict on Women and Girls:  A  UNFPA Strategy for Gender Mainstreaming in Areas of Conflict and Reconstruction’.

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122  Gitta Shrestha, Bishnu Raj Upreti and Åshild Kolås Bratislava:  UNFPA [online] Available at:  www.unfpa.org/​sites/​default/​files/​ pub-​ pdf/​impact_​conflict_​women.pdf Vogel, K. J. 2011. ‘Gender and Politics’, in J. T. Ishiyama and M. Breuning, eds, 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 233–​42. Walsh, M. 2000. Aftermath:  The Impact of Conflict on Women in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Working paper 302, Centre for Development Information and Evaluation. Washington DC: US Agency for International Development. Yami, H. 2007. People’s War and Women’s Liberation in Nepal. Kathmandu: Janadhwani Publications. —​—​—​. n.d. ‘Women’s Participation in People’s Army’ [online] Available at: www. bannedthought.net/​Nepal/​Worker/​Worker-​09/​W9_​WomensParticipation InPeoplesArmy.htm

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Index

Abdela, L. 1, 26–​8, 67, 75, 101 Acharya, M. 18, 77 activists 43, 66, 69, 72; female Nepali 67; local 93–​4; political 5; social 89 Adhikari, I. 13–​14, 86, 108 Afshar, H. 101–​2, 105–​6 All-​Nepal Women’s Union 45 Ansari, Mohana 73 Ariño, M.V. 14, 33, 100, 103, 112 Ashoka Award 89 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 69, 71 Assembly 9, 18, 21, 24–​5 Aziz, B.N. 10 Beijing Conference 1995 77, 91 Bhandari, Bidhya Devi 1, 110 Bhandari, Bidya Devi 110 Bhatt, N. 26–​7 Bhusal, Pushpa 71 Bleie, T. 43, 46, 105, 112 Brahmins (caste) 35, 58, 108 Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-​Operation 2011 (Busan Declaration) 95 cabinet 14, 18, 109–​10; first Nepalese 109; new 109; nominees 19 Chettris (caste) 35, 108 China 85 Citizenship Act 2015 115 Civil Service Act 18 The Civil Society Monitoring Report on Nepal 109

civil war 1, 5, 67, 70, 86–​7, 105, 107, 113, 117; decade-​long 101, 116 Cock, J. 102 Code of Conduct, 25-​point 42 Colekessian, A. 103–​4, 106, 111 Committee for Natural Resources 21 Committee for Women 21 Committee on Capacity Enhancement 23 Committee on Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles 20 Committee on Rights of Minorities and Marginalised Communities 20 Committee on State Restructuring and Distribution 20 Committee to Study & Determine Constitutional Records 23 Communist Party of Nepal 1, 14, 18, 33, 50, 52, 74, 108, 110, 112 Comprehensive Peace Accord CPA 1, 9, 17, 28, 36, 42, 71, 109 Congress Party of Nepal 10, 17–​20, 22, 88–​9, 110 Constituent Assembly 1, 5, 9, 22, 24–​9, 71, 74–​6, 88–​90, 107–​11, 114–​17; committees 24; elections 18, 21, 23, 41, 63, 75, 110; infrastructure 27; members 24–​6, 116; representation by women 114; responsibilities 26; thematic committees 26 Constitution 9–​11, 25, 42, 66, 72, 74–​5, 107; draft 24; inclusive 9; new 1, 9, 24–​5, 36, 88, 110, 115; new Nepali 5

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124  Index Constitution Assembly 75 Constitution of Nepal see Constitution Constitutional Committee 20 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 4 CPN-​Maoist party 17–​18 CPN-​ML 19, 22 CPN-​UML 17–​20, 22, 74, 88 Dalits 17–​18, 23, 58, 71, 104, 107–​8, 114; activists 88; families 44; marginalized 103; women 107, 116 Daurer, Vanessa 6, 66–​81 Dhungana, R.K. 10 Dhungana, S.K. 36 Dhungel, Bidushi 93 DidiBahini 69–​70 Doneys, Philippe 6, 33–​46, 103 Dwarika Devi Thakurani 11 Eighth Five-​Year Plan (1991-​1995) 12 empowerment 46, 95, 99, 102, 104, 106, 110, 112, 114, 117; analysis of women’s post-​conflict 111; and conflict 102; fear of rejection and loss of 106; and forms of loss of power 34; and freedom 46; political 1–​2, 110–​11; of women 5–​6, 85, 87; and women’s inclusion 114; women’s post-​conflict 111 Enloe, Cynthia 2, 51 Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) 33 Fatima Foundation 89 female activists 1, 9–​11, 68–​9, 74, 76, 107 female CA members 24, 26, 114–​15; see also women CA members female ex-​combatants 6, 40, 43, 46, 117; Maoist 5, 33–​5, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 111, 113; political agency of 5; revolve around conventionally gendered work and training 105; showed readiness to join the armed forces 104; social reintegration of 105

First Constituent Assembly 9, 19–​21, 24–​5, 27, 41, 108, 111 First-​Past-​The-​Post electoral system 18, 21, 23, 41, 107, 109 The Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles Committee 21 Gautam, S. 14, 52, 54–​5 Ghimire, Durga 10–​11, 74, 78 Gogoi, Amrita Pritam 6, 14, 50–​64, 103 Gyanendra, King 10–​11, 16–​17, 36–​7, 69 Gyanu 39–​40 Herzegovina 66, 80, 101 Hindu State 27, 35, 115–​16 House of Representatives 12–​13, 15–​16, 37, 107 IDEA 10, 17–​21, 24–​6, 59, 62–​3, 67, 77–​9, 108–​9, 114–​15 India 10, 36, 39, 78, 85–​6, 89, 104, 116 Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance see IDEA Inter Party Women’s Alliance 25 Inter-​Party Women’s Alliance 75, 88 Interim Constitution 1951 4, 9–​10, 17, 22, 28, 71, 75, 80, 107–​8 Interim Government 2013 22 Interim Legislature 17 International Centre for Transitional Justice 28, 100, 103, 106, 113 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 4 International Non-​Governmental Organizations 4, 28, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94–​5 Jana Andolan Movement 17, 69–​70, 72 Janajati (ethnic) community women 69, 107–​8, 116 Kabhrepalanchok 34, 39 Kathamandu, districts 34, 69, 73 Kathmandu 13, 16, 62, 68, 73, 77, 79, 85, 89, 92–​3; INGO scene 94; LPC 92; Supreme Court in 77

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Index  125 Kathmandu Post 93 King Gyanendra 10–​11, 16–​17, 36–​7, 69 Koirala , Anuradha 42 Kolås, Åshild 1–​6, 99–​117 Kumar, K. 66, 71–​2, 80 Lindsey, C. 33, 100–​2 Local Development Officers 109 Local Peace Committees 27, 75, 91–​2, 99, 110, 113–​14 Luxembourg, Rosa 88 Madhesi community 23, 107–​8 Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal 18, 22 Magar, Amrita Thapa 20, 24 Magar, Jayapuri Gharti 45 Magar, Onsari Gharti 1, 110 Malika, Shanti 5 Manchanda, Rita 34, 39–​40, 54–​5, 63, 66, 103, 107, 111 Maoist Army 3, 33, 37–​9, 41, 50, 103, 107, 110, 112–​13, 116 Maoist Movement 34, 41, 46, 52–​4, 56 Maoist Party 16, 34, 40, 45, 55, 64 Maoists 14–​20, 35–​9, 41–​2, 44–​5, 50, 52, 69–​70, 102–​4, 106–​8, 110–​13; advocacy for abolition of gender inequalities 15, 116; approach to women’s liberation 14, 111; claim of establishing relative gender equality 112; and female fighters 33; ideology of 37, 53; leadership 105; mobilization of women 14, 37, 53, 104 Maoists insurgency 6, 15, 36, 116 Martin Chautari 63 Mazurana, D. 14, 33 members of civil society, and female ex-​combatants 69 Miklian, Jason 6, 72, 85–​96 Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction 114 Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare 13 Moser, A. 101–​2, 110, 113 Muluki Ain (Civil Code) 35

Muslim women 87, 89, 108; awareness work 89; lawyers 90; rights of 89 Muslims 71, 107–​8 Nagarik Awaaz (People’s Voice) 87 National Action Plan 4–​5, 42, 75 National Indigenous Women’s Federation 25 National Network of Indigenous Women 25 National Peace Process Monitoring Committee 17 National Women’s Commission 3, 5, 16, 79, 102, 108, 113 natural resources 20 Nepal 1–​6, 9–​19, 25–​9, 33–​8, 40–​6, 50–​7, 59–​64, 66–​81, 85–​96, 101–​17; post-​conflict transition 66–​7; and respected political activist 88; women’s movement 79 Nepal Army 28, 33, 104–​5, 113; see also Royal Nepal Army Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies 86 Nepal Institute 104 Nepal Mahila Sangh 10 Nepal Muslim Women Welfare Society 89 Nepal peace process 66–​7, 79, 92 Nepal Transition to Peace 91 Nepal Women’s Association 10, 45 Nepal Women’s Organization 11, 110 Nepali, R.K. 5, 29 Nepali Congress see Congress Party of Nepal Nepali Congress Party see Congress Party of Nepal Nepali government 15–​16, 66, 70, 77; institutions 15; role of women in 15 Nepali Parliament 1; see also Parliament Nepali peace process 42 Nepali politics 9–​10, 15, 28, 42, 76; post-​conflict 1; women and women’s movements in 10 Nepali society 41, 43, 50, 64, 86, 112 Nepali women 1, 5–​6, 10–​11, 13, 28–​9, 37, 40, 66–​81, 111–​12, 114; and changing gender roles 67;

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126  Index Nepali women (cont.) empowerment gains and challenges in 112; empowerment of 1, 112; experience of 37; liberation of 40; mobilization 74; mobilization for peace 66–​7, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81; movement, and equal rights 10; movement of 11, 13, 66–​8, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78–​80; organizations of 5, 13, 67, 76; strategies and forms of activism 67 Nepal’s Representative Assemblies 27 non-​governmental organizations 14–​15, 67, 86–​7, 93, 115; favoured 89; international 25; local 93; reports 5; and women’s health 89 Pandey, Mina 21 Parliament 1 peace process 3, 5, 17, 46, 66–​7, 70–​3, 79, 90–​2, 100, 112; highlights 113; national 91; Nepal 66–​7, 79, 92 Peace Support Working Group in Nepal 4 People’s Liberation Army 3–​4, 14, 33, 50, 55–​7, 61–​3, 87, 102, 104 People’s Movement (Jana Andolan) 9, 17, 36, 107 People’s War 33, 35–​7, 40, 42–​3, 50–​1, 63, 103; in Nepal 33, 50, 53 Petesch, P. 101 Pettigrew, J. 53–​4, 56, 103, 106, 112 Pokharel, B. 69–​70 policies 1, 4, 13, 16, 46, 53, 79, 99, 115; affirmative action 15; conservative maternity 105; effective 43; incorporated 12; national 4, 67; new 4; and programs 13; reformed 46; for women’s rights and women’s political 1 political agency of female ex-​combatants 5 political empowerment 1–​2, 110–​11; in conflict situations 1; growing 109; in post-​conflict Nepal 6, 99, 111 Porter, E. 2, 68, 102, 110 post-​conflict Nepal 6, 50–​1, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 114, 116–​17 post-​war Nepal 1

Prachanda (Maoist leader) 45, 52–​3, 70 Pradhan, Sapana Malla 11, 27, 113 Proportional Representation electoral system 18–​19, 22–​3, 27, 41, 107 Pyakurel, U.P. 5, 29 Rai, Sita 27, 93 Rana, G. 10–​11, 35, 69–​70, 101, 109, 114 Rana Regime 10, 35, 68 Rastriya Prajatantra Party Nepal 19–​20, 22 Rayamajh, Aruna 44–​5 Renaissance Society Nepal 108 Revolutionary International Movement 112 Roka, Kamala 37–​9, 41 Royal Nepalese Army 50 Sapana Malla Pradhan 27 Second Constituent Assembly 9, 18, 20–​3, 26–​7, 109 Security Council Resolution 3 Shantimalika Women’s Network for Peace and Justice 69 Sharia law 87 Shrestha, Gitta 6, 9–​29, 99–​117 Singh, M. 87 Sri Lanka 33, 66, 92, 101 Sthapit, Lorina 6, 33–​46, 103 Supreme Court, Nepal 14, 77 Thakurani, Dwarika Devi 11, 109 Thakuris (caste) 35 Thapa, D. 36 Tickner, Ann 2 Tarai Madhesh Democratic Party 18 Tryggestad, Torunn L 1–​2, 4, 6 UCPN Maoist Party 41, 45 Unified Communist Party of Nepal 110 United Nations 2, 40, 76, 93; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 13, 77; Mission in Nepal 40, 76 United Nations Development Program 25; funded banner of the

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Index  127 Nepal Muslim Women Welfare Society 89; project 25 United Nations Security Council 2, 42 UNSCR 1325 2–​5, 42–​3, 75, 113–​14 UNSCR 1820 43 Upadhyaya, Anjoo Sharan 6, 85–​96 Upreti, Bishnu Raj 4, 6, 9–​29, 68, 99–​117 Verified Minors and Late Recruits (VMLR) 40–​1, 102, 106 Wejnert, B. 11, 16, 18 women 1–​34, 36–​56, 60, 63–​85, 87–​97, 99–​122; CA members 24–​8, 114; Constituent Assembly members 26, 108; entry into Nepali politics 28; ex-​combatants in post-​conflict Nepal 50–​1, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63; gains in Nepali society 41; in LPCs and the Constituent Assembly 110; and Maoists 22; movement in

post-​conflict Nepal 86, 112; in Nepali government institutions 15; upper-​caste Hindu 85; well-​to-​do Nepali 114 Women, Peace and Security 1–​4, 42, 85, 91, 99, 111 Women Act (women’s network) 25 Women for Human Rights 5 Women’s Alliance for Peace Justice and Democracy 5 Women’s Caucus 24 Women’s Democratic Network 25 women’s empowerment 4–​5, 13, 15, 28–​9, 92, 99–​100, 104, 109–​10, 116–​17; enhancing of 100; landmarks 1; post-​war 112 Women’s Rehabilitation Centre 72, 89 Women’s Security Pressure Group 68 workers 54 Yami, Hisila (a.k.a. Comrade Parvati) 11, 23, 41–​2, 50, 54, 87, 103–​4, 106 Young, Iris 55

128