Reconsideration of Science and Technology I: Reflection on Marx’s View 9781032294339, 9781032298962, 9781003302544

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Reconsideration of Science and Technology I

This volume analyzes Karl Marx’s understanding of science and technology and how it is associated with his focus on the perspective of history and human practice, seeking to illuminate a renewed understanding of science and technology from a Marxist angle. As the first volume of a three-volume set that proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to an ever-changing world, the book delves into Marx’s analysis of scientific and technological problems and phenomena across five chapters. The authors explain the positioning of science and technology and the Marxist theoretical perspective of history and practice from which Marx’s views on science and technology derive before an examination of three focal dimensions pertaining to science and technology: productivity, technological alienation and liberty. Not always viewed as central to Marx’s works, discussions on science and technology are often underdeveloped – but a reinterpretation of Marx’s thoughts on the issues corroborates the efficacy of Marxism in terms of understanding today’s world and especially the development of science and technology. The volume will appeal to scholars and students interested in Marxist philosophy, the philosophy of science and technology and topics related to scientific culture. Liu Dachun is Distinguished Professor at Renmin University of China and also a pioneer and leading scholar of Chinese philosophy of science and technology. He specializes in philosophy of science, STS (science, technology and society) and history of scientific thought. Wang Bolu is Professor of Philosophy at Renmin University of China. He specializes in philosophy of science and technology, especially philosophy of technology. Ding Junqiang is Associate Professor at the School of Marxism, Hunan University, China. He specializes in philosophy of science and technology and history of science and technology. Liu Yongmou is Professor at the School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China. He specializes in philosophy of science, philosophy of technology and STS.

China Perspectives

The China Perspectives series focuses on translating and publishing works by leading Chinese scholars, writing about both global topics and Chinarelated themes. It covers Humanities & Social Sciences, Education, Media and Psychology, as well as many interdisciplinary themes. This is the first time any of these books have been published in English for international readers. The series aims to put forward a Chinese perspective, give insights into cutting-edge academic thinking in China, and inspire researchers globally. To submit proposals, please contact the Taylor & Francis Publisher for China Publishing Programme, Lian Sun (Lian​.Sun​@informa​​.com) Titles in philosophy currently include: A Hope for Philosophy I The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan A Hope for Philosophy II The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan Reconsideration of Science and Technology I Reflection on Marx’s View Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou Reconsideration of Science and Technology II Scientism and Anti-Scientism Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili Reconsideration of Science and Technology III An Open World Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan For more information, please visit https://www​.routledge​.com​/China​-Perspectives​ /book​-series​/CPH

Reconsideration of Science and Technology I Reflection on Marx’s View

Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou

First published in English 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou The right of Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. English Version by permission of China Renmin University Press. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-29433-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-29896-2 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-30254-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003302544 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Introduction PART I

1

Science and Technology in Marx’s Texts

39

1 Positioning of Science and Technology

41

2 Science and Technology in Historical Practice

76

PART II

Focuses of Reconsideration

121

3 Science, Technology and Productivity

123

4 Alienation of Science and Technology

155

5 Science, Technology and Liberty

183

Bibliography Index

209 220





Introduction

The reconsideration of science and technology is multifaceted. It is not only about how to treat science and technology but also about how to treat the existing philosophy of science and technology. The more important question is how this philosophy responds to the changes in the world and keeps abreast of the times. When we start this reconsideration, we should not forget that a great philosopher – Karl Marx – has done this before and left us invaluable ideological assets. So, we need to go over Marx’s view of science and technology and bear his penetrating thoughts in mind; only in this way can our reconsideration head in the right direction. Now let us expand on these points in the following paragraphs.

I.1  How to Treat Science and Technology I.1.1  Three Approaches In modern society, we cannot live without science and technology even for a moment. But we don’t have much consensus on how to treat science and technology. In the circle of philosophy, the misunderstandings and contests between scientism and humanism have never faded. As Gadamer has commented, in the two centuries following the death of Hegel and Schelling, philosophy was actually constructed amid the defense of science,1 and defenders of science have kept fighting against those critics during that period. How should we treat science? Or how should philosophy reflect on science? There are three approaches to this question in the past and at present. The first approach is to defend science. This is a basic standpoint of philosophical reflection on science and also a traditional mainstream view. To defend science is to explain why science is reasonable and why scientific knowledge is so accurate and predictable. For example, before launching the Shenzhou spacecraft, scientists could figure out the precise time when it would enter the preset orbit. This can only be done with scientific knowledge. The second approach is to criticize science. With the continuous socioeconomic development over the centuries, the importance and greatness of science have become increasingly prominent. Now science and technology are the backbone of economic development in modern society. However, apart from being extolled, DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-1

2 Introduction science has come under strong criticism. Being deeply concerned about the countless problems in the course of human development, some major schools of philosophy – the initiator of the so-called “alternative philosophy of science” – obstinately blame the problems on the development of science. The third approach is to reconsider science. In recent years, while science is still being defended and criticized, a new approach for reflection on science has emerged, that is, “reconsideration” (the theme of this book). The basic standpoint of this approach is that neither pure defense nor pure criticism is impeccable, so we should reconsider science from a diverse, rational and tolerant perspective. In this day and age, the philosophical reflection on science ought to be reconsideration instead of defense.2 I.1.1.1  Orthodox Approaches The purpose of standard or orthodox philosophy of science is to prove the rationality of science. Some well-known philosophers (e.g., Carnap and Hempel) and scientists have provided rich evidence for this purpose, but their reasoning for the rationality and reliability of science is based on nothing but on its own attributes. The first is objectivity, that is, non-subjectivity, testability and repeatability. For example, the effect of a drug must be verified through rounds of tests, and it is the positive feedback of a majority of users that can prove the drug is effective. This is what objectivity means. The second is universality, that is, abstractness, non-locality and borderlessness. For example, British physicist Newton is said to be the father of modern physics, but it doesn’t mean that physics is British. Chinese physics and British physics are essentially the same thing, which is a manifestation of the borderlessness of science. The third is constructiveness, that is, logicality and mathematics. The so-called “constructiveness” indicates that all parts of scientific knowledge are logically related and mathematically connected. For example, Galileo put forward the “law of free fall,” arguing that the height of the falling body is irrelevant to its mass, but only directly proportional to time squared, which can be expressed by mathematical relations. Before Galileo, the great thinker Aristotle once alleged that the speed of the falling body is determined by its mass, which is now taken as a fallacy since it is neither constructive nor empirically verified. The aforesaid three points happen to be the basis for defending science. I.1.1.2  Alternative Approaches The doubts about the rationality of science have not ended. After World War II, all sorts of alternative philosophies of science that either oppose science or criticize scientific tendency have cropped up, spread rapidly and widely, becoming an ideological trend that cannot be ignored. In the opinion of alternative philosophers, science is not a selfless and sacred pursuit of truth, but a power to collude with politics, a game running on money, a tool for flattering patrons and an accomplice of humans in their savage rule over nature.

Introduction  3 Science is lively, rich and colorful. It cannot be simplified into static logic, formulas and symbols. Logicism and positivism are valuable tools for us to understand science, but in essence, they only have “one-sided profundity.” Historicism has blazed the trail for dynamic research on the evolution of science, but it is still confined to the framework and language system of analytic tradition. The new force that suddenly rises is nothing else except the alternative philosophy of science. Although “alternative” is not mainstream, it is very eye-catching and influential. Generally speaking, the alternative philosophy of science can be classified into three types: (1) The European anti-scientism theory that has gradually penetrated into the field of philosophy of science since the 1970s. It mainly includes existentialism represented by Martin Heidegger, the Frankfurt School represented by Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas and postmodern philosophy of science represented by Foucault and Lyotard. (2) The rebellion from the traditional or orthodox philosophy of science to its opposite, mainly represented by Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty. (3) The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) studies, which, by absorbing alternative ideas, break up with the science, technology and society (STS) studies, represented by radical feminism, post-colonialism and ecological philosophy of science, which are taken to justify emerging political movements. As an ideological trend, the alternative philosophy of science is not an integral whole, but a collection of heterogeneous reflections on science. They focus on the relationship between science and other social practices, what they have in common is the attitude of criticizing science or anti-science, and strong suspicion of the value of science and technology. As the “other” to the analytical tradition, the European philosophy, especially the philosophy of France and Germany, doesn’t go short of the philosophy of science (i.e., “philosophical reflection on science”). In fact, the philosophy of science can be traced back to French philosopher Auguste Comte, while Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze are all his successors. In Germany, as a critic of positivism, Edmund Husserl asserted that there was a crisis in European science, and his followers Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas never stopped the philosophical reflection on modern science and technology. These ideological resources for the philosophy of science, which belong to the humanistic ideas, are not echoes or criticisms of logical positivism, but a reflection on science according to their own rationale. Therefore, they have been excluded from philosophy of science by the mainstream analytical tradition. So far, they have not yet received enough attention. Inside the analytic tradition, the philosophy of science seems to have moved toward self-denial, with “rebels” turning around and striking one after another. Feyerabend and Rorty are typical examples of them: the former completely denies the existence of a unique scientific methodology, while the latter vows to have

4 Introduction the scientific epistemology uprooted. Although the rebels still use the language of analytic philosophy, they have cast their eyes on the broad European philosophy. Of course, the rebels are borderliners and targets of public criticism, which partly explains why Rorty devoted himself to literary criticism later. Since then, the foundation of the orthodox philosophy of science is no longer unbreakable. Outside the realm of pure philosophy, the reflections on contemporary science and technology have remained impressive. In the middle of the 20th century, the negative effects of science and technology became so manifested that the Western social movements no longer defended science, but turned against it. By following the new ideological trend of social constructivism, the SSK, radical feminism, ecologism and post-colonialism started criticizing the orthodox philosophy of science extremely violently. The “others,” “rebels” and “laymen” against the orthodox philosophy of science are collectively known as “alternatives.” The reason why they are “alternative” is not only because their opinions, interests and approaches are widely different from the mainstream but also because they make entries in the “other register” of the philosophy of science. In fact, the alternative philosophy of science has always been by the side of the mainstream philosophy of science, just like a supporting role complements a main character on the same stage. Whenever the spotlight upon the head of the main character is fading, the supporting role stands out to show its charm, and then this cycle continues as if the two are dancing a “tango” with different rhythms. In view of its creativity, profundity and enlightenment, the alternative is not inferior to the mainstream. In order to understand contemporary science more comprehensively, philosophers of science should pay enough attention to the alternative, incorporate it into the philosophical discipline as soon as possible and probe into the alternative ideas. In the process of reconsideration of science, the author of this book tries to fully depict the basic features of the alternative and roughly clarify the basic clues and interconnections of the alternative evolution. I.1.1.3  The Approach of Reconsideration It must be pointed out that the position of logical positivism in praising the natural sciences, which is represented by physics, is certainly undesirable. However, most alternative ideas that thoroughly negate mainstream science have gone to the other extreme. Among the defenses and criticisms of science at present, there are of course insightful opinions, which may have a far-reaching impact on the development of science in the future. Objectively speaking, both orthodox and alternative philosophies are likely to go to extremes. Although extremes may be profound, they are certainly unfair and unjustifiable. Extreme thoughts may be inspiring, but extreme actions are sure to lead to mistakes and even disasters. Therefore, it is particularly important for those in the debate to give up their extreme viewpoints. Generally speaking, the high-level development of science and technology will drive people to continuously reflect on science. Since Western scientific concepts

Introduction  5 and spirits are deeply entrenched, the extreme opposition to science may somewhat correct the limitations of the prevailing scientism, help people regain a proper understanding of science and maintain the freedom, equality and tolerance of the entire society. It can be said that although most Western postmodern intellectuals are critical of science, they have been acting in a forward-looking role. But for us in China, we should treat the alternative philosophy of science more carefully. We cannot vigorously preach this philosophy, because a large number of Chinese people are not yet fully aware of science; they only take it as a tangible tool rather than something of institutional, ideological or spiritual significance. When the scientific foundation remains fragile and the scientific spirit is not carried forward, we cannot blindly follow the Western theories and thoughts to criticize science, or else we may descend into the ignorant state of the prescientific ages. Extreme scientism idealizes and purifies science, making it difficult to explain the sophisticated scientific world. Extreme criticism totally repudiates the objectivity of science, but endorses pluralism of truth, rejects the delimitation standard of science, and even mixes science up with mythology and witchcraft, which obliterates the important position of science in the entire society and its great contribution to human life, and one-sidedly exaggerates the negative effects of science in modern society. The right thing to do is to transcend the defense and criticism of science and reconsider it, that is, support the development of science on the one hand and remain vigilant to it on the other hand. This is the basic standpoint that we have extracted from diverse and complex reflections on science. In a nutshell, the right way to conduct philosophical reflection on science is to reconsider it. This is not to compromise, but to integrate opposite views. In fact, the fierce rebuttal between defenders and critics of science has brought forth a more tolerant and peaceful philosophy of science which still has its own insistences. From a historical point of view, the theory of science has undergone a transformation from defense of science to criticism of science and finally to reconsideration of science. When the theory of science just came into being, its main purpose was to defend science, that is, to prove the rationality of natural science and transform humanistic and social science with scientific approaches. However, in the second half of the 20th century, the questioning of science became fashionable in the academic circle; there were even voices embracing the “theory of anti-science.” But in any case, the total repudiation of science, which is apparently against common sense and practical needs, is sure to cause a backlash, which is already proven by the “science war” in the late 20th century. Among the three approaches to treating science, this book endorses the approach of reconsideration. I.1.2  How Does Marx Reconsider Science and Technology? So, how does Marx treat science? Marx never treats science and technology as a simple issue. Instead, he reconsiders them with the insight and wisdom of an outstanding thinker. He has

6 Introduction been generous in praising science and technology, and outspoken against their negative consequences. What he has left us is a precious ideological legacy. Marx is one of the greatest thinkers in human history and a rare encyclopedic scholar in modern times. He read extensively throughout his life, and never stopped exploring. He made so many creative contributions in the fields of economics, philosophy, politics, sociology, history, religion and anthropology, especially in the field of humanistic and social science, and left us a rich ideological and cultural heritage. How does Marx treat science? Frankly speaking, most of us had no idea of this in the past. It is some statements of Marx that have impressed us: “At the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, must ask: this must eradicate all hesitation; here all cowardice are of no avail.”3 “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits,”4 and science is a “direct productive force.”5 These comments are undoubtedly thought-provoking, but they are far from enough for representing Marx’s view of science and technology. It is true that the previous studies on Marxism have simplified, or even ignored or distorted his scientific and technological thinking, not to mention there is no proper summary of his view of science and technology. In recent years, there have been studies on Marx’s view of science and technology, but they are not profound, systematic or comprehensive, because some scholars themselves are scientifically narrow-minded, confined to a single disciplinary background, and inaccessible to the original documents of Marx. In the context of reexamination of science and technology, it is quite necessary to enter the Marxist world of science and technology and systematically study how Marx reconsiders science and technology. I.1.2.1  Marx’s View of Science and Technology The so-called “view of science and technology” refers to people’s positioning of science and technology, and the results of their rational thinking on the issues such as scientific and technological structure, activities and functions. To pay attention to Marx’s thinking of science and technology and probe into his ideological legacy in this regard is the premise for studying his view of science and technology; this is also the first step for us to access his theoretical realm of science and technology. Of course, the academic circle is divided on whether Marx has his own philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. For example, Chen Changshu, a Chinese philosopher of technology, argues that when discussing Marxist philosophy from the perspective of the generation of philosophy of technology, we will first encounter a definitional (or at least superficial) barrier, that is, Marx and Engels have contributed incisive thoughts to philosophy of technology, but they have never used the term ‘philosophy of technology’ in their works. So, it can be deduced that Marx and Engels have never admitted to any philosophy of technology of their own. In this sense, the concept or notion of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’ is untenable.

Introduction  7 But Prof. Chen promptly adds that although Marx and Engels have never used the term ‘philosophy of technology’ in their works, it is not ample enough to deny the existence of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’. At the very least, we should admit that their holistic and fundamental viewpoints, which were already consciously demonstrated by them, are hard to be clearly distinguished from philosophy.6 In fact, the same argumentation is also applicable to philosophy of science. Perhaps we do not have to assert that Marx is a philosopher of science or technology, or insist that his theory of science and technology is so good (or bad), but only recognize that “Marx’s thought of science and technology” is undoubtedly existent and abstruse, and his view of science and technology embodied in it is realistic and enlightening. Marx’s time, the 19th century, was an era of a fast-rising capitalist economy. This period witnessed the first technological revolution, which was marked by the invention of textile machinery and the improvement of the steam engine, taking great strides forward. Moreover, the second technological revolution, which was marked by the application of electric power and chemical engineering technology, had started to sprout. In this period, many fields of natural science represented by classical physics were in full swing, while in the field of social production, handicraft workshops based on manual labor were being replaced by large-scale mechanized industry. As a result of the constant development of mechanized industry, there had been a pressing demand for applying scientific and technological achievements in production activities. It was in this context that Marx took an interest in and followed up the new discoveries and theories of natural science, as well as the new technological inventions and their application in production. As Engels put it: Science was for Marx a historically dynamic, revolutionary force. However great the joy with which he welcomed a new discovery in some theoretical science whose practical application perhaps it was a yet quite impossible to envisage, he experienced quite another kind of joy when the discovery involved immediate revolutionary changes in industry and in historical development in general. For example, he followed closely the development of the discoveries made in the field of electricity and recently those of Marcel Deprez.7 Throughout his life, Marx had been dedicated to finding solutions to realistic problems. A great concern for reality is both the starting point and destination of his theoretical explorations. In short, Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, which is more profound than the theoretical attainments of ordinary people, has all along been closely connected with realistic problems. In those years when the development of science and technology was in a boom and vigorously advanced social production, Marx took an interest in science

8 Introduction and technology, and started paying attention to and thinking about scientific and technological matters. This is recorded in the works of Marx, and in his biographies and other related materials. As early as the 1840s, Marx had devoted himself to contemplating the status and role of science and technology in social production, the internal connection between the development of science and technology and that of production and the impact of science and technology and machines on the working class, laying an ideological basis for creating the Marxist theory. In the process of exploring the law of development of capitalist society and the path of proletarian revolution, and making preparations for writing the book Capital, Marx had made painstaking effort in examining scientific and technological issues and left a large quantity of manuscripts. From 1850 to 1858, while spending time on learning political and economic works, Marx also read the treatises of John Beckmann, J.H.M. Poppe, Justus von Liebig, Johnson, Lightmayer, A. Ure and Charles Babbage on science and technology, workmanship and natural science, which had greatly improved his knowledge structure, broadened his theoretical horizon, and made him fully prepared to interpret the relationship between science and technology and productive forces in the future political economic research. To sum up, although Marx did not leave any treatise on science and technology, he has explored so many scientific and technological issues, analyzed and interpreted scientific and technological phenomena and left us a valuable ideological legacy in this regard. The existence of Marx’s view of science and technology is an indisputable fact. I.1.2.2  Main Literature on Marx’s Ideas of Science and Technology A comprehensive study of Marx’s writings is the basis of teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology, which are mainly revealed through a vast number of monographs, manuscripts, notes, letters and conversations he has left behind. The literature that is usually accessible is only the tip of the iceberg of Marx’s whole writings. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic made the joint decision that the Marxism-Leninism research institutes of the two countries edit and publish together a new international, historical-critical edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe), for which more than 130 volumes were planned.8 It is thus clear that the Russian, Chinese and German editions of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, which are commonly seen, are in fact not complete. Among the tens of thousands of pages of manuscripts, notes and letters left by Marx, as well as the notes, commentaries and annotations in the books he collected, not all have been edited and published. Such a deficiency is bound to limit our comprehensive understanding and in-depth research today of Marx’s ideas

Introduction  9 of science and technology. The ongoing huge project of a new edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels will improve the conditions of our research. Marx’s documents are the primary source of Marx’s ideas. Studying Marx’s texts is the basic way to grasp Marx’s ideas about science and technology. Comprehensive and accurate uncovering of these ideas should be realized through a systematic exploration of Marx’s ideas in his writings based on his original texts. In his discussion of the significance of reading Marx’s writings, Derrida points out: It will always be a fault not to read and reread and discuss Marx – which is to say also a few others – and to go beyond scholarly “reading” or “discussion.” It will be more and more a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility.9 Teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology is also a process of reconsidering Marx’s view of science and technology. The first challenge in this process is to appropriately identify Marx’s ideas on science and technology and related documents. Scholars with different views of science and technology see these ideas and documents differently. As the Chinese saying goes, “the benevolent see benevolence and the wise see wisdom.” Therefore, the discovery and study of documents need to be combined with contemporary research of theories of science and technology. The two processes should supplement and promote each other. Marx’s analyses of phenomena of science and technology and his ideas on questions of science and technology are relatedly concentrated in writings represented by Capital, but some manuscripts and writings before and after this monograph are significant as well. “Marx went through long-term hard struggles writing Capital. Based on his studies of political economy starting from the beginning of the 1840s, he wrote the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, and later the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863”10. These two Economic Manuscripts are preparations for the monumental work A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (the plan of “six books”).11 On the basis of the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, Marx published the first volume of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy; in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863, Marx changed his original plan of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and decided to publish it separately with the title Capital. These two manuscripts are both in-process works. As incipient formulations of Marx’s ideological system of political economy, they offer records of abundant original information, which of course contains rich ideas about science and technology. In particular, the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 is later known as the “technology manuscript.” It is an important text systematically documenting Marx’s ideas about science and technology. Machinery: Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science,12 which is familiar to many Chinese scholars, is a part of Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863: “(γ) Machinery. Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science.”

10 Introduction Capital is a masterpiece to which Marx dedicated his life. As an unfinished academic tome, its writing continued for more than 40 years. Only the first volume of Capital (1894) was published in Marx’s lifetime (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 23); Engels collated and published the second volume (1885) and the third volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 24, 25); Bernstein collated and published the fourth volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 26). The Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858 is collected into The Complete Works of Marx and Engels as the 46th volume, with the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 in the 47th and the 48th volumes and “Wages” in the sixth volume, etc. It should be noted that lots of the unpublished writings by Marx record his scientific and technological thoughts. For instance, in his letter on 28 January 1863 from London to Engels, who was far away in Manchester, Marx wrote: I am inserting certain things into the section on machinery. There are some curious questions which I originally failed to deal with. To elucidate these, I have re-read all my note-books (excerpts) on technology and am also attending a practical (purely experimental) course for working men given by Prof. Willis (in Jermyn Street, the Institute of Geology, where Huxley also lectured). For me, mechanics presents much the same problem as languages. I understand the mathematical laws, but the simplest technical reality that calls for ocular knowledge is more difficult for me than the most complicated combinations.13 The notebooks (excerpts) on technology mentioned by Marx here have not yet been collated and published. These notebooks (excerpts) are abstracts of works by other writers, including J.H.M. Poppe’s Geschichte der Technologie seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Vols. 1–3, Göttingen, 1807–1811), A. Ure’s Technisches Wörterbuch (ed. Bearbeitet von Kramarsch and Heeren, Vols. 1–3, Prag, Erster Band, 1843–1844), and J. Beckmann’s Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erfindungen (Vols. 1–5, Göttingen, 1782–1805).14 These writings are sources of Marx’s “Notebooks (Excerpts) on Technology” – abstracts of his readings on technology – and are of great value as historical materials for understanding the formation and development of Marx’s scientific and technological thoughts. As more and more works by Marx are published and about to be published, we will have a more solid literature basis for completely and accurately understanding his scientific and technological thoughts. It should also be pointed out that science and technology exist in all aspects of social life. They are important sociocultural phenomena. In his discussions and expositions of many theoretical issues, Marx often talks about science and technology. These ideas can be found in many different writings by Marx. For example, Marx refers to the issue of technology and makes special arguments on it when he discusses “man’s essential nature,” “alienization” and “division of labor” in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, when he

Introduction  11 expounds on “instrument,” “labor” and “purpose” in The German Ideology and when he elaborates on “competition” and “the poverty of the working class” in “Wages.” In general, these documents are accepted widely by diverse schools and paradigms. We should go beyond the narrow sense of “views of science and technology,” broaden our theoretical horizon, examine Marx’s writings on science and technology in a broad sense and strive for comprehensive and accurate reconsideration of Marx’s ideas of science and technology. I.1.2.3 Several Issues to Note in Studying Marx’s Ideas about Science and Technology Strictly speaking, Marx expounds on science and technology mainly on the level of specific scientific and technological activities. These expositions include records and reports of historical facts about science and technology, excerpts from past monographs on ideas of science and technology and contemplations on multiple aspects of issues of science and technology. It is appropriate and apropos to sort through Marx’s lifetime achievements of his inquiry into scientific and technological activities and phenomena under the category of “ideas of science and technology.” Such work is helpful for comprehensively and accurately grasping Marx’s views of science and technology and their formation. For example, a systematic reading of Marx’s original works would clearly show that the term “technology” does not appear frequently in The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Chinese, 1st edition). There are merely 40 entries and over 160 references directly related to “technology.”15 On the surface, in comparison with entries like “capital,” “labor,” “division of labor,” “value,” “the working class,” etc., “technology” is not a subject keyword in Marx’s theories. However, this judgment is superficial and not in accordance with the facts. In terms of the daily use of natural language, the linguistic phenomenon of polysemy and that of several different words referring to the same meaning are both very common. There are usually multiple terms and ways to refer to an object. We should not assume that only one certain word, and not its “synonyms,” refers to a certain object. John Dewey, the founding father of the Dewey school in modern philosophy of technology, points out in his reflections on the expression of his own academic ideas: “It is probable that I might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used ‘technology’ instead of ‘instrumentalism’ in connection with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.”16 Isn’t it the same with Marx’s formulation of his ideas of science and technology? Therefore, we should pay attention to what Marx has said, but no less to what he has intended to express. As a matter of fact, technology is an important constituent element in human civilization, existing in various aspects of social life. There is no doubt that the 19th century, in which Marx spent his life, witnessed not merely the widespread presence of technological phenomena, but also the rapid advancement of technology. Technology continuously deepened its influences on various aspects of

12 Introduction social life. Marx started to pay attention to these technological phenomena very early and conducted specific research on multiple levels. A distinctive feature of Marx’s accounts of technological phenomena is that he uses a number of subordinate concepts of “technology,” which means that he tends to discuss the constituent units, operational mechanisms and various consequences of technology in special technological systems and seldom uses the abstract and unified category of “technology” and its theoretical systems to make generalizations and statements. In June 1853, Marx points out in “The British Rule in India”: It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons…This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry.17 Although there is no mention of the specific word “technology,” terms such as “cotton,” “hand-loom,” “spinning-wheel,” “steam,” “science” and “the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry” are direct references to technological products, equipment and processes. These terms profoundly demonstrate the marginalization of traditional Indian handweaving techniques by mechanical textile technologies. In fact, such expressions are ubiquitous in Marx’s writings. In terms of its subtlety and flexibility, Marxism, as a mode that translates and negotiates among different languages, is much superior to other systems. This is true for all those great systems with universality…Marxism is indeed the only all-encompassing skill or mechanism of translation and transition. If we say that Marxism is a unique and advantaged mode of thinking, the reason is just that, instead of your own claim that you have discovered truth. The “privilege” of Marxism lies in the fact that it always intervenes into and mediates among various theoretical codes, which cannot compete with it in terms of depth and comprehensiveness.18 Technicians who are occupied from day to day with specific tasks work in a linguistic context featuring professional vocabularies such as lathe, motor, vernier caliper, blueprints, software and contract. They seldom see the term “technology,” but we cannot deny the technological nature of their work on the basis of the absence of this term. Marx’s view of science and technology is structured by his analyses following the clear trajectory of the advancement of production technology: “individual handicraft techniques, workshop handicraft techniques, and large-scale mechanized industrial technologies.” Citing W. Schulz’s ideas in Die Bewegung der Production, Marx depicted this trajectory explicitly.

Introduction  13 Period of manufacture…of handicraft activity subdivided to the highest degree, which is at the same time an activity in which one hand cooperates with another for one and the same purpose of production. The continued division of labor finally leads to the employment of a more perfected machine system, and thereby to the fourth stage (first hand labor, then handicraft labor, then manufacture, then fabrication) of actual fabrication by machines.19 Furthermore, Marx maintained that there are progressive and derivative relations, instead of absolutely clear boundaries, among various forms of technology. In the womb of handicrafts, manufacture develops in its initial stage and even machinery is employed here and there, in individual spheres and for individual processes; the latter point is especially true in the period of real workshop handicraft since water and wind power are adopted in some handicraft processes (or human and animal power is used to substitute water and wind power). The general law at work here is that the material possibilities of the latter (production) form – both the technological conditions and their corresponding corporate economic structure – are created within the bounds of the former form.20 Marx’s study of significant issues such as capital and the fate of the working class under capitalist conditions forms the theoretical context of his exploration of scientific and technological issues. Although science and technology are not the ultimate concerns in Marx’s research, ideas of science and technology can be clearly identified in his numerous writings. In these texts, there are both analyses of internal features such as specific elements, structures and properties of technological systems and tracking and investigation of external features such as the operational effects of technologies. Such comprehensive analyses, with technology considered as an element of social systems, are conducted from perspectives of sociology, economics and historical materialism. They aim at revealing the inner connections between technology and other social elements. Therefore, this kind of exploration, based on analysis of internal features of technology and devoted to the uncovering of social properties and functions of technology, serves the purpose of founding the theoretical system of Marxism. This is an important feature of Marx’s examination of science and technology. Overall, Marx’s analyses of scientific and technological issues contribute directly to his study of the social structure and patterns of development of capitalism, as well as his seeking of the way of proletarian revolution. Hence, although Marx’s ideas of science and technology do not dominate the mainstream in the system of his thoughts, they still form an indispensable part of it. We shall not be limited to the level of contemporary philosophical theories and be overcritical of Marx for his fragmentary, crude, primitive, biased expressions based on experience. Instead, we need to see the whole picture through observation of details. We shall be adept in retrieving and extracting Marx’s ideas of science and technology from his individual expositions of many specific scientific and technological phenomena, and in uncovering the internal connections among these individual opinions on technology, methodizing these scattered ideas and integrating them into a unified logical system.

14 Introduction Unlike texts of natural sciences, which are distinguished by a definiteness of connotation, the significance of texts of humanities and social sciences are generated through readers’ reading processes. Different readers, and even a single reader, when reading the same text with different states of mind and in different times and spaces, may acquire different gains and inspirations. “Home and abroad, there are many different and even completely opposite contexts of various commentators’ understandings of the true meaning of Marxist philosophy. It is confusing that these commentators all rely on the original primary texts by Marx.”21 That is also why the significance and connotation of many canonical texts are constantly renewed and these texts can be passed down through centuries. We should object to interpretations that disregard the system of Marx’s original texts and take fragmentary writings of Marx out of their contexts. We should also object to interpretations that neglect the specific historical scenarios of Marx’s time, construe Marx’s texts only based on contemporary sociocultural backgrounds, arbitrarily expand and extend the texts’ original meanings and simply transplant or transfer contemporary understandings of science and technology to Marx’s writings. It is of great importance in today’s study of the history of Marx’s thoughts to go back to Marx’s time and into his world of science and technology, reread his original texts and retrieve his ideas of science and technology. Marxism, as a source of many modern Western academic schools, has farreaching impacts on the development of Western thought. Western scholars often develop their theories on the basis of citing or criticizing the classical arguments of Marx. “In postwar France, more than 80% of intellectuals considered themselves as Marxists, or at least they considered Marxist problems – problems about base and superstructure, the nature of ideology, and representation – as basic elements in their respective topics.”22 In fact, Western scholars’ research of Marx’s thought has never ceased for over a century. They have put forward plenty of brilliant ideas and produced a multitude of important achievements. Nonetheless, due to factors such as ideological disagreements, we have usually maintained negative or rejective attitudes toward their research. It now appears that such attitudes are against the pattern of academic development and harmful to the study of Marx’s thought. Marx’s thought belongs to mankind, but in terms of origin, it inherits from Western cultures instead of oriental cultural traditions. Therefore, in order to make in-depth research into Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, it is necessary to be familiar with Western cultural traditions and their developments and to understand the multifold images of Marx in Western academic views.

I.2 How to Understand Existing Philosophy of Science and Technology I.2.1  The Tradition of Western Theories of Science and Technology The rise of the theory of science and technology was due first of all to the positivist movement emerging in 1830s France. After the emergence of Newtonian

Introduction  15 mechanics, natural science advanced significantly. Science and technology entered all fields and levels of human society through the Industrial Revolution and the Power Revolution, fully demonstrating their power of transforming the world. Positivism advocated the reform of philosophy, considering previous philosophy as completely “metaphysical” instead of “scientific” and contending that philosophy should acquire a truly scientific nature through evolution. After Auguste Comte’s positivism, the field of theories on science and technology generally involves philosophical schools such as Machism, logical atomism, logical empiricism, operationalism, process philosophy, logical pragmatism, falsificationism, historicism, scientific realism and scientific antirealism. Among these schools, the most important one is logical empiricism, which burgeoned in the 1930s. Logical empiricism has contributed considerably to the spread and formation of theories of science and technology. This school inherited the empiricist tradition from David Hume and Ernst Mach, and logical analysis from Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It emphasizes the complete transformation of philosophy into scientific philosophy or “standard philosophy of science” (in the terminology of logical empiricism) with science as its mode, logic as its means, and physics as its unified language. Logical empiricism discusses new developments and epistemological questions in modern physics, mathematics and logic. In terms of problematics, it is the philosophical study of science. At the same time, it imitates natural science and, in particular, physics in such studies, which endows its approaches of response with a scientific nature. That is to say, there are two most prominent features of “standard theories of science,” represented by theories of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel: considering science as its problematics (scientific problematics) and striving for responding to the problematics scientifically (scientific responses). Orthodox theories of science take science as their problematics, which does not mean that they study questions of specific sciences. Logic empiricism argues that the task of philosophy is not to put forward propositions or establish systems of proposition-theory, which are the tasks of science. The mission of philosophy is to logically analyze and clarify the significance of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions in science, in order to clear confusions of ideas generated therefrom.23 There is no doubt that, according to the logic of logical empiricism, the “standard theory of science” is no longer conventional, meaningless metaphysics, but can be seen as a part of science. In a certain sense, the orthodox theory of science can be seen as “meta-science.” It concentrates on clarifying the significance of propositions and endeavors to explain the relationship between the logical structure and the empirical basis of science, and that between justification and discovery. Its essence lies in delimiting the range of scientific discussions (i.e., identifying meaningful propositions), dealing with the relationship between two kinds of propositions (i.e., theoretical propositions and empirical propositions),

16 Introduction as well as the relationship between two stages of the production of scientific knowledge (i.e., justification and discovery). In modern intellectual history, the emergence and development of an orthodox theory of science are closely connected with the epistemological turn and linguistic turn of the whole philosophy. It is generally acknowledged that a main thread running through ancient Greek philosophy is ontology, which is the research of “what is the origin of the world.” After René Descartes, the central problem of philosophy in the modern period became “how do human beings acquire knowledge,” which signifies the epistemological turn. With the rise of natural science, the idea that natural science is the perfect form of knowledge created by mankind was gradually accepted. Scientific epistemology, the orthodox theory of science, became the most important form of epistemology in the 20th century. The linguistic turn afterward centers around the question of “how does language function as a reliable instrument of cognition.” As a result, methodologies of linguistic analysis and logical analysis gradually entered the field of scientific epistemology studies. I.2.2 Alternative Theories of Science and Technology Deviating from Convention Philosophy of science is still the fundamental theory of philosophy of science and technology. Nevertheless, great changes have taken place in its philosophical background, which means that the philosophical basis of science today is no longer the same as that of science in the past. On the one hand, logicism advances toward historicism, and significant theoretical progress has occurred within the orthodox philosophy of science. On the other, methodologies of phenomenology and postmodern “deconstructive” methodologies penetrated into the philosophy of science after the mid-20th century. In this way, ontology, pragmatics and contextualism have together opened a new type of philosophy of science. The world of science and the world of human life have become fields that cannot be neglected in philosophy of science. Various methodologies and theories demonstrate their validity of certain kinds. Contemporary philosophy of science, built on the previous basis, understands, judges and defends science from various aspects and with a broad horizon. Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty are the two well-known figures contributing to the significant transformation of philosophy of science. They severely criticized and even completely subverted the nature of analytical philosophy and science. Some people argue that Feyerabend changed from a fanatical positivist into “the worst enemy of science.” Seen as a heretic, he negates all logicism, going even farther than historicism. He was at first a positivist following the tradition of analytical philosophy, but before long, he turned positivism on its head. He is a rationalist, but his ideas have caused huge damage to rationalism. He is a realist, but his theories have greatly threatened realism. At the same time, he is a relativist, but he does not promote all forms of relativism.24

Introduction  17 He opposes methodologies, but simultaneously he advocates plural methodologies. He is neither rational nor irrational. Some see in his style similarities with sages of ancient Greece and also elements of postmodernism. There are mixed opinions about Feyerabend. It is exactly because he is so different and rich that his contribution to philosophy of science is distinctive and ground-breaking. The characteristics of every aspect of science seem to be demonstrated clearly by Feyerabend. Undoubtedly, it is precisely his restraint from judging right and wrong that allows philosophy of science to turn away from logicism and incomplete historicism to relativism, irrationalism, and even anti-scientism. However, he has also thereby inspired diverse perspectives of contemplating science and unfolded a broad horizon. Similarly, Rorty grew up in the convention of analytical philosophy but later turned his back on it. Unlike Feyerabend, however, Rorty mainly attempts to deconstruct the tradition of Western philosophy, promoting a “post-philosophy culture.” Therefore, his study of science is integrated into his construction of “postphilosophy culture” and his criticism of scientism. According to him, in Willard Van Quinn, the later Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson, analytical philosophy transcends and invalidates itself, and the transformation of philosophy into science and the pursuit of certainty in philosophy end in failure. On such a basis, Rorty promotes “conversational philosophy” that goes beyond scientism, opposes fundamentalism, objects to the pursuit of certainty in philosophy of science and turns toward pragmatism, intending to remove the antagonism between science and humanities and integrate them. Of course, he has been criticized as a relativist in the end, though he called such criticism “ethnocentrism,” expressing his objection to essentialism and to the “strong rationality” of science that pursues universality and inevitability. Feyerabend and Rorty focus on different problems in different fields of research. Rorty attempts to break through conventional philosophy, while Feyerabend tries to go beyond conventional concepts of science. In terms of science, they reach the same destination through distinct routes, putting forward perspectives and methods for considering science that are completely different from conventional and “orthodox” ones. These perspectives and methods involve the so-called antiessentialism, anti-fundamentalism, relativism and irrationalism. Scholars such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean Francois Lyotard, who have been explicitly categorized as postmodernists, “deconstruct” science and culture in more radical ways. “Deconstruction” starts not with Foucault, but Edmund Husserl, and really with Derrida. The fact is, however, that the process and effect of Foucault’s criticism of knowledge and science are exactly what “deconstruction” intends to achieve. Science and knowledge are what concern Foucault. The tradition of French scientific history forms the basis of his ideas and influences his lifetime career in philosophy. His writings appeared primarily in the forms of history of knowledge, history of thought and history of science. His ideas are demonstrated mainly through his research of the history of science. Therefore, science is a basic theme in Foucault’s philosophy. He expounds on philosophical issues such as the

18 Introduction birth of disciplines and the collective production of scientific knowledge. As he contends, disciplinary division leads to the categorization of scientific knowledge into disciplines, making science, with its distinctive characteristics, independent from culture, and separating science from philosophy. From then on, philosophy has ceased to play any practical role in science, and science has rejected philosophy and moved toward scientism. The production of scientific knowledge is an outcome of collective practice. Nonetheless, Foucault takes a standpoint of anti-subjectivity, which clearly distinguishes his epistemology from conventional scientific epistemology. His archaeology aims at demonstrating that science is merely a collection of discourses formed through discursive rules, explaining how discourses form various sciences in history. In this way, archaeology cancels the distinction between science and non-science, as well as the subject. It thereby transforms conventional epistemology. At the same time, the progressiveness of science and the correspondence theory of truth are refuted. Instead, the discontinuities in the development of science and the incommensurability among sciences of different periods are emphasized. As a result, Kuhn’s paradigm appears similar in some respects to gestalt theory. In a word, in his archaeology of knowledge, Foucault conducts completely new discursive analyses of psychiatry, madness, hospitals, clinical medicine and even the whole humanities. He forms new understandings of the history of knowledge, thought and science, and criticizes the concepts of continuity and subjectivity, cognitive rationality in traditional history of thought, as well as concepts such as the objectivity and gradualness of science. He uncovers the deep-seated “unconsciousness” or a certain structure behind science, knowledge and thought, and summarizes and elaborates on the epistemology and methodology of the archaeology of knowledge.25 In addition, Foucault pays attention to the political status and ideological function of science, ascribing them to knowledge and power. He maintains that modern science and knowledge turn society into a controlling machine, making the modern people voluntarily accept the guidance of science and knowledge and “give power over to the discourse of truth.” As a result, people are enslaved by knowledge and power. The way of life and death becomes the way of “producing truth,” science and knowledge. Modern knowledge and science thus construct the modern man as a homogeneous subject. As a matter of fact, Foucault intends to criticize modern Western culture, especially the standardization and its “general will” through his analysis of modern knowledge and power, looking for the way of individual liberation. The one who explicitly claims a stance of “deconstruction” is Derrida. In terms of their starting points, Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger appear very similar, as they all attached great significance to the approach of “deconstruction,” though their understandings of “deconstruction” are of different depths. Husserl carries out the “deconstruction of thought” in the modern world of science in the sense of modernity, which means deconstructing the conceptual system that constitutes the world of science. However, such “deconstruction” mainly appears as a kind of “restoration” and “suspension,” with characteristics of modern subjectivist philosophy. Heidegger questions existence, intending to deconstruct the tradition

Introduction  19 of ontology. The primary agenda of Derrida’s deconstructivism is to deconstruct “logocentrism,” which dominates the Western tradition of philosophy. He maintains that there is no absolute truth, universal law, transcendental meaning or absolute spirit in this world. He names as “the metaphysics of presence” and deconstructs systems of thought which are founded on specific principles and foundations and with a grand systematic structure. His work is essentially concerned with opposing the tendency of making truth absolute and transcendental. What he intends to deconstruct is Western rationalism manifested as “logocentrism” and “phonocentrism.” That is to say, his deconstruction is aimed at the tradition of Western rationalist thought and the central position of rationalism. Derrida has not made elaborate arguments on the specific “deconstruction” of science. However, his methodologies of thinking, together with other postmodernist ideas, have radiated into the field of science. His “deconstruction” has resulted in radical relativism in the philosophy of science, allowing the relativist trend, in which science is suspected, to prevail among intellectuals of his time. Science is thus seen as a rule made by political power. Science became a power, a game and a means of serving sponsors. Logical standards in scientific research as well as the objective truth are subject to widespread and strong suspicion. As a consequence, in the “Sokal Incident” and “science wars,” Derrida contends that the Einstein constant was not a constant, not a center, but a concept of a variable. In other words, it does not represent the understanding of an object – the center of this field of research that the researcher is able to grasp. It is the concept of a game. Consequently, in Western postmodernism, philosophy of science is generally characterized by anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, desubjectification, nonscience-centrism or anti-scientism. Naturally, such completely deconstructive views of science have also been accused and severely criticized by many scholars, especially scientists. I.2.3 Persistent Concerns in Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated earlier, in intellectual history, the philosophy of science and technology has been closely related to the epistemological turn and the linguistic turn of philosophy. It has exerted great impacts on the development of the whole of philosophy and human thought through 19th-century positivism and 20th-century logical empiricism. Today, in the form of historicism, sociologicalization and post-philosophical culture, it has moved away from pursuing definiteness and building a reliable empirical and logical foundation for science and technology to enthusiastically deconstructing all tendencies of absolutization and foundationalism. It has also moved away from a preference for action and pursuit of goals of operability toward questioning certain cultural institutions and making social criticism. In China, the philosophy of science and technology has been the pioneer of thought liberalization, the window of opening-up and the starting point of modernization at several critical points.

20 Introduction Philosophy of science was introduced into China together with science at the beginning of the 20th century. Its impacts in China have far exceeded its own significance. It was introduced and imported here not merely as a branch of philosophy, but more importantly, as a kind of ideology and research into the methodologies and epistemology of science. It provides epistemological support for science to take root and develop in China. It is of extremely important ideological, cultural and social value for the advancement of science here and for the progress of the Chinese society itself. The methodology of logical analysis, which is contained in pragmatism, especially Russell’s mathematics and philosophy, was a brand-new, unprecedented method of thinking in early 20th-century China. It was a new element brought by Western science and philosophy into China’s repertoire of thought. As Feng Youlan points out, a lasting contribution of Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy is the method of logical analysis. It offers Chinese people a completely new method of thinking, which leads to great changes in the entire Chinese thought. This thinking methodology directly offers modern Chinese philosophy a primary method of construction that is clear and explicit. It also provides Chinese scholars with a new method of considering contemporary issues of democracy, science and social development. At the end of the 1970s, science and technology and education were on the cutting edge of the movement of rectification to restore order and reform and opening-up. At that point, philosophy of science and technology, a famous part of which is the dialectics of nature, showed its unique power. The first step in the rectification of Chinese society’s previous incorrect ideas about science and technology was the acknowledgment and extension of Marx’s proposition about science being “direct productivity.” Later in the critical debate on the criterion of truth, facts and methods from science played significant roles as evidence. Philosophy of science and technology, with its rational and positivist spirit, suited Chinese society’s welcoming attitude toward science and its demand for and spirit of developing social economy and education with science. It met the era’s need for reform and opening-up. Therefore, philosophy of science became not only the point on which philosophy participated in China’s enterprises at that point, but more importantly, a window of thought through which China established connections with the world. Under the impacts of two global trends – reform and opening-up, and the revolution of science and technology – the research framework of philosophy of science and technology has experienced new changes and its content has been expanded. On the basis of breaking the relatively closed condition of research of dialectics of nature, five main branch subjects have been established: philosophy of nature, philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, science, technology and society studies (STS) and history of scientific and technological thought. Through research in these branch disciplines, philosophy of science and technology reflects on science and technology philosophically, demonstrates the general picture of the development of scientific and technological thought and clarifies the connections between science and nature, science and philosophy, science and technology, as well as science, technology and society. It teases out the general process of

Introduction  21 scientific understanding and the methods and methodological principles applied to this process. It explores and analyzes the philosophical implications of the construction, testing, explanation and evaluation of scientific theories, as well as the common features of technology and the driving forces and modes of the development of technology. I.2.3.1  Philosophy of Nature Philosophy of nature deals primarily with the view of nature, the relationship between mankind and nature and the idea and strategies of sustainable development. It is a basic subject in philosophy of science and technology. In terms of the view of nature, academia has paid considerable attention to natural nature and artificial nature. Discussions on these topics focus on the definition of the concepts of “natural nature” and “artificial nature,” their characteristics and their coordinated development. The primary purpose of defining and distinguishing artificial nature and natural nature is to understand their patterns of development in order to coordinate their relations. Fundamentally speaking, since the beginning of the 20th century, the crisis in the relationship between mankind and nature has been in essence the crisis of artificial nature. Therefore, the key to the coordinated development of mankind and nature is the coordinated development of natural nature and artificial nature. Artificial nature should be culturally controlled, with a certain kind of balance kept between human beings’ transformation of natural nature and their protection of it. At the same time, awareness about the equality of rights between mankind and nature should be reached. With the progress of science and technology, the living conditions of mankind have run into various problems. Through research on the relationship between mankind and nature, scholars have posed questions about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism holds that human beings are the center of the relationship between mankind and nature. Non-human existence has only instrumental value for human beings. The ultimate purpose of protecting the environment is to protect mankind. On the contrary, non-anthropocentrism maintains that human beings are not the sole source of value. They are not the center of the relationship between mankind and nature, and environmental protection is not merely for protecting mankind. Academic discussions on this issue concentrate on the basic connotations and manifestations of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, as well as on whether the former should be left behind. Research related to sustainable development is an important part of philosophy of nature. Discussions on this topic are made in many aspects. In terms of fundamental theories, there are discussions about the theoretical basis and basic connotations of sustainable development. In terms of value, scholars have discussed environmental ethics, the ethical foundation and standards of value in sustainable development. With respect to method, discussions focus on the basic methodologies, systematic dynamics, strategy and management, as well

22 Introduction as technical support of sustainable development. As for evaluation, discussions center around the methods of evaluation and the index system of sustainable development. For China, the issue of sustainable development is of particular significance, because in the 21st century, the pressure from the successive advent of three population peaks (the peaks of gross population, gross employed population and gross aging population), the unusually heavy exploitation of natural resources, the increasing deterioration of the ecological environment, the rapid advancement of industrialization and urbanization and the intensification of regional inequalities will all lead to bottlenecks in future development. Therefore, we must insist on the principle of coordinating environmental protection and economic development and implement strategies for sustainable development. I.2.3.2  Philosophy of Science Philosophy of science is the philosophical study of science itself and systems of basic questions such as the pattern of scientific advancement. It focuses primarily on issues such as the ontology, epistemology and methodology of science. Since the 1990s, there has been a climax of the spread and studies of scientific realism and anti-realism in China. The number of related literature amounts to over a hundred. Specialized research on scientific realism has progressed rapidly as well. For example, Guo Guichun, in his Contemporary Scientific Realism, Postmodern Scientific Realism and Postmodern Philosophy of Science, makes a detailed introduction to and comments on the origin, development and trends of scientific realism. In addition, Companion to Masterworks of 20th-Century Western Philosophy, edited by Qiu Renzong, Li Xingmin’s “Summary of Studies of Modern Scientific Realism,” Zhang Zhicang’s “From Anti-Realism to QuasiRealism” and Zheng Xiangfu’s Van Fraassen and Postmodern Philosophy of Science introduce and comment in detail on scientific anti-realism. On the basis of introducing and commenting on scientific realism and anti-realism, domestic scholars have formed their own opinions of “scientific realism.” As Zhang Xihai points out in “Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism,’” there are as many as eight different kinds of such opinions.26 Furthermore, progress has also been made in studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge, the relationship between science and philosophy, analytical philosophy, linguistic philosophy, postmodernist philosophy of science and philosophy of social sciences, etc. Methodologies and epistemology have witnessed new developments, such as Bayesianism, experimentalism, embodied cognition theory and feminist theory of knowledge. With the fast advancement of science and technology, the trend of development of philosophy of science has become a hot topic in academia in recent years. Zeng Huan argues in “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology” that 21st-century philosophy of science will return to the purpose and approach of the critical school of thought. It will carve out its own way while maintaining necessary tension with modern philosophy of science and postmodernist philosophy of science. It will probably achieve innovation in methodology and paradigm.27

Introduction  23 I.2.3.3  Philosophy of Technology Philosophy of technology generally studies the universal patterns of technology and its development, inquiring into the essence and structure of technology, the internal mechanisms of technological advancement and innovation and methodologies of technology. Its research involves topics such as technology and nature, technology and science, technology and economics, technology and society, technology and culture, technology and psychology, as well as the evaluation of technology. The ontology of technology, technological innovation and axiology of technology have become hotspots in Chinese scholars’ discussions in recent years. In terms of ontological studies, “what is technology” has always been a focus of debate among scholars. Related opinions in the early days can be summarized as “theory of material means,” “theory of the combination of material means, ways and methods,” “theory of practical (operational) knowledge system,” “theory of activity (process)” and “theory of mode of activity.” New developments in recent years include theories of broad definitions of the concept of technology and the idea that human beings’ purposeful activities provide the new hotbed breeding technologies. In terms of how human beings achieve their purposes, technology can be understood in a broad sense as the sequence or manner of the purposeful activities that subjects constantly create and apply, centering on the practical problem of “how to achieve purpose effectively.”28 Wu Guolin, in “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology,” contends that technology is a complicated system with complexity in itself. Its nature is not the sum of various technological elements, but the result of the emergence and interactions of these elements and the result of transcendence. Technology cannot be reduced to technological elements. It is the application of intellectual, substantive and empirical elements to practice, prompting the transformations of natural objects or technical artifacts.29 The perspectives of early research on technological innovation are related to economics, management and sociology. There have been significant changes in the research perspectives recently, as scholars have been increasingly studying technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy. Some scholars, based on the principles of practical materialism, define technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy as “a kind of practice in which enterprises, as the subject of innovation, under conditions of innovation and through certain mediation, transform the object of innovation and realize market value.” According to Chen Qirong, there are five basic features of technological innovation: innovativeness, practicality, sociality, historicity and uncertainty.30 Xiao Xinhua, in “A Philosophical Rational Study of Technological Innovation,” uses the methodology of paradigmatic thinking. Starting with research of the characteristics, mechanisms, methods and approaches of technological innovation, they put forward three pairs of categories: inevitability and coincidence, possibility and reality and form and content.31 The issue of “value of technology” in philosophy of technology is mainly embodied in the debate between the “value neutrality of technology” and the

24 Introduction “value-loadedness of technology.” Recently, the latter has gradually superseded the former and become the focus of research. The advancements of technology and the value it is loaded with have given rise to a series of ethical questions and encouraged the discussion of technological ethics. Consequently, ethics of technology, a new branch subject, is on the rise. In their reflections on questions such as the negative effects of technology, scholars have put forward new concepts like green technology, the rationality of the value of technology, the double-helix structure of the value of technology, social control of technological development, global value, humanistic concerns and the good of technology. These works have not only deepened the studies of the value of technology, but also promoted the advancement of ethics, philosophy of value and other related subjects. I.2.3.4  Research of Science, Technology and Society (STS) Science, technology and society is a burgeoning subject that studies the patterns and application of interconnections among science, technology and society, and involves multiple disciplines and fields. Since the 1980s, there have been nationwide trends of STS studies in China. In recent years, prominent topics in this subject have involved the demarcation of science and technology and philosophical questions regarding engineering technology. There are two contradictory ideas about the distinction between science and technology. The first is that it is not necessary to distinguish between science and technology, while the second is that we should draw boundaries between the two. Scholars holding the first kind of idea think that it is very not easy to make clear distinctions between science and technology if we consider only the internal structures of scientific and technological activities. The division of science and technology as a whole into basic sciences, applied sciences and engineering technology exactly shows that it is difficult to draw a clear line between science and technology. Moreover, as Lei Yi points out, in the time of the technologization of science and the scientization of technology, it would be impossible for science to function normally if technological elements are excluded from it.32 What the term “science and technology” indicates is the intimate connections between modern science and technology. There is a lack of real understanding of the nature of technology and science in the consideration of “science and technology” only from the angle of social functions. Such consideration takes “science and technology” mainly as “technology,” and science as only a secondary part of “science and technology.” At least, we can say that the first idea has not really grasped the essence of science and technology. The second idea maintains that the demarcation of science and technology is of necessity. First of all, there are differences between the purpose of science and that of technology. The purpose and value of science lie in clarifying the facts and rules of nature or the real world and the growth of human knowledge. Technology is devoted to the increase of social wealth and the social welfare of human beings through the designing and manufacturing of various artifacts. Secondly, the object of research is different between science and technology. The object of scientific

Introduction  25 research is nature – the natural system objectively independent from mankind. The object of technological research is the system of artificial nature, that is, the artificial systems that have been processed by human beings for human purposes. Thirdly, science and technology differ significantly in the questions they cope with and the vocabularies they use in answering these questions. Lastly, science and technology are dissimilar in terms of social norms. The basic norms of scientific communities include universalism (cosmopolitanism), public ownership of knowledge, absence of private interests and methodical skepticism. These four basic principles, however, are not fully applicable to technological communities.33 With regard to developments in reality, the demarcation of science and technology is primarily related to two problems. Firstly, there will be confusion in the relationship between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology, if we do not make any distinction and consider technology as the application of science. Secondly, neglecting the relative independence of scientific advancement and blindly demanding science to satisfy social needs as technology does will harm the development of science and thus lead to numerous social problems. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the two on the levels of theory and practice. Philosophical study of engineering technology is another progress in philosophy of technology. With the deepening institutionalization of philosophy of engineering in China, related philosophical questions have gained attention in academia. Recent focuses in the field of philosophy of engineering include issues of ethics of engineering activities and engineering talents. I.2.3.5  History of Scientific and Technological Thoughts History of science and history of technology are both specialized subjects, generally beyond the purview of philosophy of science and technology. Nonetheless, the history of scientific and technological thought is an important and indispensable aspect of philosophy of science and technology. Related academic topics include the relationship between the history of science and philosophy of science, the Whig interpretation of history, case studies (of scientists or scientific discoveries) in the history of science, the intellectual history of scientific knowledge, ancient Chinese scientific thoughts, comparative studies of Chinese scientific thoughts, studies of the lives and thoughts of famous scientists, studies of the “Needham Problem,” transitions in modern Chinese institutions of science and technology and transitions in modern Chinese institutions and ideas of education. A series of achievements have been made in the research of the history of scientific and technological thoughts. Early scholarships include the second volume of Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilization in China, Dong Yingzhe’s 1990 work Intellectual History of Science in China, Li Yao’s 1995 work Intellectual History of Science and Technology in Ancient China, Zhu Yazong’s 1995 work History of Criticisms of Science and Technology in China and Zeng Jinyi’s 1995 work Comparison between Ideas on Science and Technology in China and the West. Achievements since 2000 have been even richer, too numerous to mention here.

26 Introduction The publication of these monographs offers good materials for studies of the history of scientific thought as well as more platforms for research of philosophy of science. Xi Zezong has summarized the content of philosophy of scientific thought in five aspects: first, studying the view of nature and the view of science, focusing on various stages in the development of natural science; second, studying thoughts of scientists, focusing on the people; third, studying the formation and development of basic concepts in science; fourth, studying the formation of scientific theories and the problems these theories face today; fifth, studying methods of establishing scientific concepts and applying scientific theories.34 A conventional approach in the research of the history of scientific thought is to begin with scientific concepts and study the history of scientific thoughts through examinations of the evolution of these concepts. Nevertheless, there was no modern system of science in ancient China. What should be the object of research on the history of scientific thought during that period? Some studies maintain that such research should involve all the intellectual achievements that are inspiring and instructive in history and in reality, and that the goal of such research is reached by examining intellectual achievements. If the methodology of Chinese intellectual history is limited to the framework of Western logical analysis and concentrates merely on concepts and categories that match their Western counterparts, there will be “concealment” in understanding. Chinese history of scientific thought should be closely connected with research on traditional Chinese cognitive patterns. Studies of these two fields should promote each other in order to deepen understanding in this aspect.35 It should be noticed that the development of philosophy of science and technology must start with urgent problems in the contemporary time. Strong academic cohesion must be based on diversity.

I.3 How Should Philosophy of Science Respond to Changes in the World in Order to Face the Future of Science and Technology? I.3.1 Broaden the Horizon of Studies of Philosophy of Science and Technology With advancements in science and technology today, human beings have entered the time of intelligence revolution on the one hand, and seen increasing difficulties in containing the negative effects in the future of science and technology on the other. A broad survey of philosophical research of science and technology shows that against the broad background of the contemporary time, scholars’ concerns with theories of science and technology have been characterized by a wide horizon that involves diverse methods, multidimensional perspectives and various models. In terms of content, there are scientific philosophy and philosophy of science. In terms of methodologies, there are linguistic analysis and phenomenological studies. In terms of value orientations, there are scientism and humanism. In terms of epochal characters, there are modernist and postmodernist studies. Additionally, more and more scholars have paid attention to the various forms

Introduction  27 and appearances of science and technology. Philosophers with scientific literacy or scientists with philosophical literacy no longer monopolize the right to conduct research. An increasing number of pure humanists and common people who are concerned have participated in the research of philosophy of science and technology. A diversity of thoughts and ideas compete and interweave with each other. The constant entanglement of various figures and schools blurs their boundaries. The previously orthodox “philosophy of science and technology” has thus been transformed into a kind of research conducted in the broad sense and with a broad horizon. It has become a typical contemporary study of theories of science and technology that is concerned with future progress. Theories of science and technology have always played a critical role in the modern trends of thoughts that rose with modernization. Marx considers science and technology as the revolutionary forces that spur social advancements. Theories of science and technology are an important foundation of historical materialism. In particular, theories of science played a significant part in the enlightenment of modern China. What greatly struck Chinese intellectuals and philosophers were in effect theories of science, for instance, the theory of natural selection. During the May Fourth period, foreign philosophers John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, who were among the most influential figures in the emancipation of mind and the development of philosophy in China, made several speeches to intellectuals and the general public there. Their comprehensive speeches centered on theories of science. Holding high the banner of “science,” representative figures in the New Culture Movement called for defeating “ghosts of metaphysics.” Their view of science approximated radical scientism. Studies of theories of science have experienced new prosperity since the start of reform and opening-up at the end of the 1970s. Scientific education is on the cutting edge of rectification for restoring order. Issues related to theories of science are of particular vitality and appeal, becoming one of the most important “growth points of theory” among Chinese intellectuals. After nearly 40 years of growth, orthodox, or “standard,” theories of science have significantly expanded. Moreover, as science today always influences the society and human beings through the revolution of technology, orthodox theories of science and technology have won popular support in China. At the same time, however, another trend of theories of science and technology, characterized by a critical attitude, has emerged. This is the deconstruction of orthodox theories of science and technology. It can be called the “alternative theories of science and technology.” Endless deconstruction has given rise to much confusion, but its impacts cannot be neglected. Some opinions and thoughts from it are also meaningful. In comparison with orthodox theories of science and technology, alternative theories of science and technology have very different themes and foundations. Breakthroughs have been made in their horizon, discourse domain and methodology. Alternative theories of science and technology have both positive and negative influences. Generally speaking, contentions among different ideas could create an atmosphere that is more tolerant, equal and diverse. These contending

28 Introduction ideas demonstrate to us that theories of science and technology at present are experiencing important changes and reorientation. We should endeavor to grasp their trends of development and take the initiative to respond accordingly to the changes. I.3.1.1 Turning from Logicism to Historicism, Sociologicalization and Philosophy of Culture Among the many schools of theories of science, those before Karl Popper’s theory of falsification are usually called logicism, and those afterward are called historicism. Popper’s philosophy can be seen as an in-between link in the transition from logicism to historicism. In a certain sense, logicism focuses primarily on static logical analysis of science, while historicism focuses on dynamic research of the development of science. Thanks to the efforts of scholars like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Larry Laudan, the fundamental significance of historicism in contemporary theories of science has been increasingly noticeable, and historicism has been moving further toward sociology and culturology. Constructivism, which has risen in recent years, concentrates on breaking the subject-object binary and emphasizes the primacy of practice and social construction. Contemporary theories of science and technology no longer dwell upon epistemological issues such as criteria of meaning, the logical structure, and the discovery and defense of science. Instead, they point to general philosophical questions behind science and technology, such as the world view, values and the view of history in human society. For instance, Martin Heidegger’s study of technology, Jürgen Habermas’s study of the relationship between science, technology and ideology and Foucault’s theory of knowledge-power have all been substantially different from conventional philosophy in method and ambition. Nowadays, theories of science and technology attempt to depict the real course of scientific and technological developments through studies of the actual history of science and technology. Cases in the history of science and technology have attracted more attention. The sociologicalization of theories of science and technology can be traced back to Robert Merton, after whom scientific sociology has become an important branch in theories of science and technology. The newly emerging sociology of knowledge applies sociological methodologies to the analysis of the production of scientific knowledge. Moreover, studies of philosophy of culture have been growing vigorously. For example, Richard Rorty’s “post-philosophy culture” emphasizes equality among science, arts, philosophy and politics. Theories of science and technology are no longer unique and independent. Instead, they intertwine with philosophical studies of other cultural types. I.3.1.2 The Deconstruction of Essentialism and Fundamentalism and the Rise of Constructivism and Pluralism With the ebbing of scientism, questions have been raised regarding fundamentalism, which insists that natural science has its objective foundations, and essentialism,

Introduction  29 which insists that natural science grasps the essence of objects through external phenomena. The idea that knowledge of natural science is objective truth and that the advancement of science is linearly accumulative and continuous has waned. The extreme advocacy of mathematics and physics is receding. Methodologies have switched from emphasizing the establishment of systems to deconstructing fundamentalism and all tendencies of absolutization. The standpoint has changed from insistence on the objectivity of truth in the subject-object binary to constructivism which insists on the unity of subject and object and their continuous interactions in practice. In the time of positivism and logical empiricism, theories of science and technology attempted to distill common standards, norms and methods of scientific and technological knowledge from philosophical studies of natural science and general technology. These theories strongly advocated the transformation of all human knowledge, philosophy included, using the basic mode of scientific knowledge. Postmodernist theories of science strive for studying the specifically and historically constructive process of the mode of natural science, which is one of the options, and for dissolving the inevitability, uniqueness and particularity of natural science as a mode of understanding. Basically speaking, alternative theories of science and technology do not consider existing theories and methods as problematic or attempt to replace them with something new. Instead, the alternative theories contend that theories and methods are always in the process of development and thus never definite. They can be only temporarily identified in constant negation. With pluralism permeating into theories of science and technology, natural science has been increasingly viewed as one of the diverse cultures. Epistemological studies of science and technology are becoming one of the various philosophical reflections. The overall opinions about science become increasingly diversified: from scientism to mild scientism, then to a variety of conciliatory views and finally to anti-scientism. I.3.1.3 The Permeation of “Deconstructive” Methods and the Popularity of Criticism Since the 1970s, some scholars, starting with Husserl’s later work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, have applied Husserl’s phenomenological and hermeneutical methods to problems in theories of science and technology. Afterward, structuralist philosophy and postmodernism have become growingly influential. Deconstructive methods have entered theories of science and technology, greatly transforming mainstream views of science and technology, as well as conventional understandings of science and technology. Orthodox theories of science and technology see knowledge of natural science as the paragon of human knowledge, stressing not merely its nature as truth, but also its actionability and operability. It promotes not merely natural science’s mode of understanding, but also the mode of practice based on natural science. It aims at not just transforming nature scientifically, but also transforming society and even human beings scientifically. However, as deconstructive methods become increasingly popular, challenges to natural science grow. Theories of science and

30 Introduction technology are no longer subjects merely for defending natural science. They have gradually become an onlooker that maintains a distance from science. Because people have acknowledged that they cannot deal with all current problems according to procedures, the mode that favors action and pursues operability no longer dominates. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising at all that it has become a fashion to challenge and make social criticism of scientific and cultural institutions. Defense has become mediocre, unable to arouse sympathy. The trend of criticism prevails, the baby thrown out with the bathwater. I.3.1.4 The Purpose and Interest Turn to the Integration of Scientific and Humanistic Cultures There have been some prominent changes in the purpose, interest and trend of current research on theories of science and technology. First of all, in alternative theories of science and technology, science is seen as the ontological existence that determines the essence of human beings. It thus becomes an entity that is connected with its “contexts.” Pragmatics has been introduced into theories of science and technology. Understandings, explanations and applications of scientific knowledge demonstrate indispensable reliance on contexts. Secondly, unlike orthodox theories of science and technology, which emphasize the neutrality of value of natural science and focus only on nature instead of human beings, alternative theories of science and technology reconsider science as the science of human beings, and the world of science and technology as a part of the human world. Science and technology, as well as their interrelations with people’s lives, have become the center of theories of science and technology. Thirdly, science has been increasingly viewed as a kind of practice and a cultural phenomenon. In orthodox theories of science and technology, science is basically understood as knowledge. The critical question is how to establish a system that is standardized and free of contradictions. In alternative theories of science and technology, however, science is in the first place a kind of practice. It is the transformation of the world guided by certain goals, as well as the spiritual and material wealth, that is, culture, gradually accumulated in this process. Last but not least, at the turn of the century, natural science fell off its pedestal and no longer represented absolute correctness. Calls for the integration of science and humanities have been increasingly prevailing, and how to bridge the gap between them has become an important question in contemporary theories of science and technology. Needless to say, scientism is the “spiritual disposition” of orthodox theories of science and technology, and the “ideology” sustaining the social and research institutions of the tradition of natural science. The basic concept of scientism is the dichotomy between science and humanities. Nevertheless, theories of science and technology nowadays view themselves with more inclusiveness and even self-reflection. In all fairness, science’s struggles with theology and superstition in the history of the Renaissance and Reformation have shown that the discovery of science has been the discovery of humanities. Science used to be

Introduction  31 in keeping with humanities. Therefore, we should not stick blindly to the view of science in scientism, as the problems science deals with are growing more and more complicated along with the great changes taking place in the world. The integration of scientific and humanistic cultures will naturally become the theme of the time. As a matter of fact, the significant transformations of theories of science and technology during the contemporary period have happened against profound theoretical and sociocultural backgrounds. As far as the internal developments of the discipline are concerned, logical empiricism has not established once and for all an empirical principle of justification. Although the principle has been modified several times, it has eventually fallen into a predicament. Popper’s falsification principle is of great innovativeness and imagination. Empirical falsification, however, is not clear or explicit. Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” and his notion of “incommensurability” rebuke the optimism about the linear accumulation and continuous progress of natural science. Feyerabend’s “anything goes” gives a deadly strike to the defense of the uniqueness of natural science in terms of methodology. At that point, all the orthodox central questions have been dissolved and transformed, and the dogma of orthodox theories of science and technology that emphasize the supremacy of natural science is no longer reliable. As far as the broader history of scientific and social progress is concerned, the new trends in theories of science and technology are not the result of the advancement of philosophy. Rather, they are the result of cultural reflections of scientific practices. Without the rise of natural science, positivism and logical empiricism could not have become powerful philosophical movements, and it would be even more difficult for orthodox theories of science and technology to be a prestigious subject of the 20th century. As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out: Since the seventeenth century…what we today call philosophy is found to be in a changed situation. It has come to need legitimation in the face of science in a way that had never been true before; and for all of two centuries right down to the death of Hegel and Schelling, it was actually constructed in such a self-defense against the sciences.36 Because of such a relationship between philosophy and science, the rise and prosperity of orthodox theories of science and technology, as an “ideology” of natural science, have been inevitable. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 20th century, the negative effects of natural science, especially those of technologies of heavy industry, have been gradually exposed. In particular, the two World Wars and the resource shortage and ecological crisis today have wakened people from their dream of scientism. The questioning of science has prevailed. Under new circumstances, the relationship between philosophy and science and technology has experienced subtle changes. The new trends in alternative theories of science and technology and their “anti-science” tendency are less an attack on orthodox theories of science and technology than their reflections on the negative effects of science and technology.

32 Introduction I.3.2 Look for New Growth Points in Theories of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated, new perspectives and themes continue springing up in contemporary theories of science and technology. Orthodox theories of science and technology have gradually lost their central position and become merely one of the multiple poles in pluralized discussions. Those new studies that differ greatly from orthodox in approach and purpose have not only broken through the limits of orthodox in terms of either problematics or responses, but they have also considerably changed the basic forms and appearances of theories of science and technology. Our time is both a time of globalization and one of cultural diversity. Now that theories of science and technology have started their diversified explorations, any philosophical reflection on science and technology is possible. With academic concerns “traversing” science and technology and pointing to the society and to more general philosophical questions such as freedom, value and existence, there will appear some kind of “philosophy that starts with science.” Such a change means that moving from reflecting on science to transcending science, we will naturally come across the question of freedom, which fascinates Feyerabend, the question of culture, to which Rorty turns, the question of historical existence, which Foucault discusses, and so on and so forth. In the specific case of China, increasing pragmatism and secularization, which come with industrialization and globalization, have caused the inevitable marginalization of philosophy. Such marginalization has given rise to much confusion and the repeated emergence of alternatives. It has also forced traditional studies to confront challenges and open new paths. Particular debates on issues like pseudoscience, traditional Chinese medicine and folk science never cease and diverse interpretations abound. We have to reconsider philosophical questions such as the demarcation of science. Theories of science and technology need to advance along with the times. Some branches of theories of science and technology that used to be unacknowledged or unformed in the orthodox period are becoming, or have become, new growth points drawing contemporary attention. These growth points include typical subjects such as scientific epistemology and cognitive science, sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, ethics of science and technology and cultural philosophy of science. I.3.2.1  Scientific Epistemology and Cognitive Science Sociology of scientific knowledge is the expansion of sociology in the field of science and technology. It is founded on criticism of traditional philosophy of science. It proposes to examine the dynamic process of the production of scientific knowledge from the perspective of social construction and thereby establish new scientific epistemology. Since the 1980s, sociology of scientific knowledge has made significant achievements and attained important academic status. The strong program, i.e., SSK, is one of its comparatively influential schools. The main point of view in sociology of scientific knowledge is that social factors form an indispensable

Introduction  33 dimension in scientific knowledge, influencing all stages of the production of scientific knowledge, such as the choice of subjects, observation and experiment, the proposition of theories and the selection and evaluation of theories. In this whole process, science is not able to offer itself criteria of judgment. However, SSK denies the uniformity of nature and the objectivity of scientific knowledge, considering scientific knowledge as merely the result of scientists’ negotiation and manufacture. Such a radical viewpoint has been severely criticized. At present, the positive studies and sociological studies in sociology of scientific knowledge have been emphasizing elements of the objective dimension of science, such as the significance of facts, instruments, equipment and the organizational system of experiment. These studies attempt to make comparatively comprehensive explanations of the relationships among various elements in scientific events, including the objective, technological, social, metaphysical and epistemological elements. They thereby restore, to certain degrees, the realistic characteristic of scientific practice. Scientific epistemology is a return to epistemology under the condition of widespread questioning of epistemology. Having abandoned the propensity for transcendence in epistemology, it transforms studies of knowledge into studies of the experience of the actual process of knowledge production. Ancient philosophy mainly discusses what the world is, while modern philosophy focuses on how people know. Contemporary philosophy pays more attention to the significance and background of knowledge itself. Therefore, cognitive science has become the leading subject in cognitive studies, turning away from previous epistemological discussions on how to know and toward psychological and physiological analyses of cognition, and holding a criticizing attitude toward traditional arguments that are empty. For example, cognitive science uses various methods, such as psychological, physiological, logical and philosophical ones, to study how the human brain produces ideas and knowledge, no longer arguing about whether these ideas and knowledge are the truth. Contemporary cognitive science tends to go beyond pure philosophical speculations and evolves into typically interdisciplinary studies that combine various methods and center around the question of knowledge. I.3.2.2  Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Scientific Anthropology Since the 1980s, sociology of scientific knowledge has obtained important achievements and academic status. Its representative scholars include Bruno Latour, Karin Knorr Cetina, Michael J. Mulkay, Barry Barnes, etc. According to Lin Juren, its main idea, called “constructivism,” is that “there is no essential difference between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge” and that “scientific knowledge is a social construction, which is inevitably influenced by socio-cultural factors.”37 Related to this idea, as anthropological methods are applied to studies of modern developed societies, science and people who engage in scientific activities also become objects of anthropological studies. For example, anthropologist Sharon Traweek, in Beamtimes and Lifetimes, makes positive research on the community of high-energy physicists.38 The research

34 Introduction methods of sociology of scientific knowledge have also changed, starting to use anthropological methods to study the social characteristics of science. Latour’s Laboratory Life, a study of the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, is a case in point.39 SSK emphasizes the influences of field research, academic environment and social factors in scientific laboratories on science. For instance, issues including the paradigm of the scientific community, scientists’ ideas, policies regarding science and technology, resource allocation in science and technology, administration, as well as bureaucracy in academia, are all subjects of concern on the philosophical level. Scientific anthropology is a branch that has newly emerged in recent years. In addition to field research, ethnography, the comparative method, the study of literature and the historical method have been increasingly emphasized and applied in anthropological studies of science. Science is a kind of activity of human beings, as well as a kind of fact that can be described historically. Studying science with the theories and methods of anthropology and the posture of philosophy will produce true and concrete descriptions of scientific knowledge and activities, reveal their profound relations with the society and acquire inspirations therefrom. I.3.2.3  Ethics of Science and Technology Academic concerns about the ethics of science and technology are well justified. Firstly, due to the integration of science and technology and the gradual evolution of scientific research into large-scope and large-organization “mega-science,” scientific activities’ nature of being social becomes increasingly apparent, and the pragmatic characteristics of scientific and technological institutions become increasingly prominent. The neutrality of the values of science is subject to question. The idea that science is heavily loaded with values and is permeated with ethical judgment gradually emerges. Therefore, studies of scientific ethics deal with not merely the morality and social responsibility of scientists, but also the ethics of scientific research, the load of values in science, the absence of forbidden zone in science, as well as the responsibility of technology. Secondly, a contemporary revolution of science and technology is flourishing. Information technology, biotechnology, space technology and material technology are rapidly advancing and widely applied. While contributing to the great achievements of human beings, they have also caused a series of crises of survival. As a result, problems such as the relationships among science, technology and ethics, as well as their coordinated development, have risen to the surface. The ethics of nuclear weapons, information, human cloning and organ transplantation has become the focus of ethical studies. Studies of the ethics of science and technology have no other option but to reconsider the interactions between practices of science, technology and the reconstruction of ethics. Thirdly, the negative effects of scientific and technological advancements have gradually emerged on the social level. The shortage of energy resources, environmental pollution, and overpopulation have become global crises, leading to reflections in ethics of science and technology on subjects like human–nature relations, environmental ethics and sustainable development.

Introduction  35 I.3.2.4  Philosophy of Scientific Culture In recent years, studies of philosophy of scientific culture have become another focus in the response of philosophy of science and technology to future changes. In modern society, scientific culture is rising to be the dominant form of culture. Conflicts and contradictions have thus emerged between scientific culture and other cultural traditions, especially humanistic culture. As a consequence, the relationship between science and other forms of culture has raised concerns in academia. Philosophy of scientific culture is the philosophical exploration of science as a kind of culture or cultural activity. Philosophy of scientific culture still takes science as its object of study. However, as it studies science as a form of culture or cultural activity, instead of limiting itself to epistemology, it is different from both traditional theories of science and the common philosophy of culture. Representative works in philosophy of scientific culture include C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures, Joseph Agassi’s Science and Culture, Andrew Pickering’s Science as Practice and Culture and Maurice N. Richter Jr.’s Science as a Cultural Process. Issues that have aroused wide attention in recent years, such as the debate on the preservation or abolishment of traditional Chinese medicine, the relationship between science and ideology, the relationship between scientism and humanism, as well as Michael Frayn’s drama Copenhagen, are all within the ambit of philosophical studies of scientific culture. During our time, which is called the time of globalization and cultural diversity, philosophy of science and technology, with its characteristics of this time period, is on its way to diversity and better integration of scientific culture and humanistic culture. It is both unwise and impossible for people to limit their concerns about philosophy of science to the interiority of science. Philosophy of science and technology should strive to demonstrate the huge impacts of spirit and thought on society.

Notes 1 H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al. Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5. 2 Liu Dachun ed. From Advocacy to Reconsideration: Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009. 3 Selected works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:35. 4 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:24. 5 Selected works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:785. 6 Chen Changshu. Introduction to Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: Science Press, 1999:32. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:777. 8 Nie Jingfang. Clearing and Transcending: Rereading the Intentions, Basis and Methods in Marx’s Texts. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005:3. Some other sources

36 Introduction indicate that 142 volumes were planned for The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (International Edition). See Jin Huiming, “The Giant of the Millennium,” Scientific Socialism, 2000(1). 9 J. Derrida. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. Translated by P. Kamuf. New York: Routledge Classics, 2006. 10 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 49). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982: I. 11 The whole (presentation) is divided into six books: 1. On Capital (contains a few introductory chapters). 2. On Landed Property. 3. On Wage Labor. 4. On the State. 5. International Trade. 6. World Market (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 29. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:531). 12 People’s Press, 1978, separate edition. 13 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:199. 14 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:735. 15 Index of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1–39). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986:629. 16 J. Dewey. Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946:291. 17 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:680–81. 18 F. Jameson. The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:601. 20 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works. Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 2009:340. 21 Zhang Yibing. Return to Marx: Philosophical Discourses in the Economic Context. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 1999:13. 22 F. Jameson. The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. 23 Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:98. 24 Lan Zheng. “Translator’s Foreword”. In Science in a Free Society, edited by P. Feyerabend. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1990:5. 25 Liu Yongmou. Foucault’s Journey of Deconstructing the Subject. 2005. People’s University of China, PhD dissertation, 2005:15. 26 Zhang Xihai. “Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism’”. Philosophical Trends, 1996(8). 27 Zeng Huan. “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology: Reflections between History and Future—A Review of the ‘Symposium on 21st-century Philosophy of Science and Technology’”. Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2006(4). 28 Wang Bolu. What Is Technology: Theoretical Interpretation of the Technological World in a Broad Sense. Beijing: Science Press, 2006:28–32. 29 Wu Guolin. “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology”. Research of Technology and Philosophy, 2005(2). 30 Chen Qirong. “The Philosophical Horizon of Technological Innovation”. Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), 2000(1). 31 Xiao Xinhua. “Philosophical Rational Research of Technological Innovation”. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2000(7). 32 Lei Yi. “Science should Pay Attention to Ethics”. Science and Technology Daily, 15 Dec. 2000. 33 Zhang Huaxia and Zhang Zhilin. “Understanding the Guiding Principles in Research of Philosophy of Technology from the Angle of the Demarcation of Science and Technology”. Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2001(2).

Introduction  37 34 Guo Jinbin and Kong Guoping. Intellectual History of Traditional Chinese Mathematics. Beijing: Science Press, 2004: ii. 35 Wang Qian. “Several Issues in Research of the Intellectual History of Chinese Science”. Journal of Dalian University of Technology, 2003(3). 36 H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al. Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5. 37 Translator’s Foreword. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Edited by M. Mulkay, translated by Lin Juren et al. Beijing: Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. 38 S. Traweek. Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists. Boston: Harvard UP, 1992. 39 B. Latour and S. Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (2nd ed.)., Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986.

Part I

Science and Technology in Marx’s Texts The 19th century, in which Karl Marx lived, was a period of rapid differentiation and comprehensive development of modern natural science. It was about this time that empirical natural science made such tremendous progress and yielded such brilliant results that it became possible to fully overcome the one-sidedness of the 18th-century mechanism, and natural science itself changed from empirical science to theoretical science by proving the connections between the fields of study (mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) which exist in nature itself. As a result of summarizing all research results, natural science was transformed into a materialist system of natural knowledge.1 Compared with the comprehensive and rapid development of natural science, social science in this period was still in its infancy, yet the prosperity of natural science also provided models, methods and tools for the study of social phenomena. In the middle of the 19th century, people began to imitate the natural science model, referring to the methods of natural science to explore social issues. Consequently, social sciences (economics, sociology, history, political science and pedagogy) that examine specific social activities began to be separated from religion, philosophy and other humanities in succession, and gradually developed from then on. It was under this historical background that Marx launched his own theoretical research and construction. He attached great importance to and followed up the new discoveries and theories of natural science, new inventions in technology and new applications in production. Friedrich Engels once commented that no one was more delighted than Marx when a new scientific achievement was made anywhere, regardless of whether it could be applied in practice. But Marx took science above all as a great historical lever and a revolutionary force in the most obvious and literal sense. And it was in this sense, and to this end, that he used the profound knowledge in his possession, especially in all the fields of history.2 Marx’s writings, including his manuscripts, notes, letters and conversations, that focus on scientific and technological issues are rich materials telling the history of scientific and technological thoughts.

DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-2

40  Science and Technology in Marx’s Texts

Notes 1 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:894. 2 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:592.

1

Positioning of Science and Technology

The accelerated development of science and technology in the 19th century had a more and more prominent impact on people’s economic and social life. At the same time, these issues also entered Marx’s theoretical vision. He examined and analyzed the phenomena of science and technology in many dimensions, thereby providing the positioning of science and technology.

1.1 Science and Technology with Blurred Boundaries Although the 19th century was an era of rapid development of science and technology, the characteristics of the times of “small science” remained obvious. First, science and technology began to move from separation to integration, during which the interactive mechanism gradually formed. Second, many subjects began to get rid of the influence of natural philosophy and transformed from empirical science to theoretical science. Third, the scientific social structure was still in the process of formation, with the number of personnel specializing in scientific research remaining small, and self-employment dominating the scientific means of labor. Fourth, the relationship between science, technology and production was under adjustment: the previous loose mode of “production → technology → science” was to be broken, but the mode of “science → technology → production” had not been established yet. It was against this historical background that Marx explored scientific and technological issues, hence his thinking bears a clear brand of the times. 1.1.1  Rapid Growth and Constant Differentiation of Knowledge: Philosophy-Science-Technology As a sequence, mode or mechanism of human purposeful activities, technology is closely related to production activities from the very beginning. Its origin can be traced back to the hunter-gatherer activities at the beginning of the birth of mankind. At that time, people lived by hunting, fishing, herding or, at best, farming.1 At the end of primitive society, industrial technology began to evolve into the main means for human technological activities as the hunter-gatherer economy gave way to the agriculture and animal husbandry economy. The vast DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-3

42  Positioning of Science and Technology number of craftsmen who were directly engaged in production were developers and inheritors of new technologies, but they were mostly manual workers at the lower levels of society. With priorities of producing material products, craftsmen seldom studied technical activities. Some of the new technological achievements were mainly obtained through long-term experience and repeated experiments, during which they seldom appealed to the knowledge of natural philosophy at that time. Compared with the development of technology, the birth of science is much later. In the long-lasting primitive society, human cognition remained in the naive stage dominated by perceptual cognition, with systematic scientific knowledge completely out of the question. At most, there was scattered and perceptual scientific knowledge, but it was mixed with religious experience and philosophical perception. Natural phenomena, such as the movement of the sun, the moon and the stars, the alternation of spring, summer, autumn and winter and the cycle of birth, aging, illness and death, are closely related to people’s daily life and production practices, hence becoming the soil for breeding empirical science. Feuerbach is convinced that it is sensible data that must become the foundation from which philosophy will proceed. Science only starts from two forms of sensibility: perceptual consciousness and perceptual need. Therefore, science is realistic science only when it starts from nature.2 Systematic scientific research activities came into being relatively late, it was about 2,000 years ago that the primitive forms of astronomy, mathematics, mechanics, medicine, agriculture and other disciplines were successively formed in ancient Greece, China and other places. In contrast to today’s sophisticated experimental sciences, these primitive sciences were mostly attached to religion or philosophy, often in the guise of natural philosophy or “ancilla theologiae.” Among them, there were abundant elements of intuition, speculation, conjecture, imagination and determination, which were far from being able to establish a relatively independent experimental basis and a scientific method. People who were studying scientific problems were mostly intellectual workers with strong curiosity, who tended to be upper-class freelancers. Before the European Renaissance, science had been developing independently along a rational path separate from technology, mainly driven by curiosity and thirst for knowledge. Besides, most scientific researchers despised production practice and workmanship; they were neither interested in exploring technical and scientific problems in production processes nor applying their research results to industrial production. Philosophy is an ancient science, with its origin traced back to the Axial Age of eastern and Western civilizations. Before the European Renaissance, except for mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, medicine and other relatively developed disciplines, most categories of natural science were still in their infancy, remaining in the stage of empirical science for collecting and sorting materials. In this historical period, natural philosophy, the science which seems to override and encompass all specialized sciences,3 was the dominant way in which people understood natural phenomena; the philosophical methods of intuition,

Positioning of Science and Technology  43 speculation and imagination were the main means through which people revealed the mysteries of nature. Natural science, which was mainly developed in the ideological system of natural philosophy, had not obtained a legal independent status, namely, to paint such a general picture was formerly the task of the so-called natural philosophy, while natural philosophy could only be described in this way: substituting conceptual and fanciful connections for unknown and realistic connections, using imagination to supplement the missing facts and filling in the gaps of reality with pure imagination.4 Science in its proper sense did not appear until the European Renaissance. Galileo introduced experiment and mathematics into the study of physics, and Bacon and Descartes then generalized and refined this method philosophically, laying the foundation of modern experimental science. Bacon is the true originator of English materialism and the whole modern experimental science. In his view, natural philosophy is the true philosophy, and physics based on perceptual experience is the most important part of natural philosophy. According to his doctrine, sense experience is truly reliable, and it is the only source of knowledge. All sciences are based on experience, and science consists of the application of rational methods to the materials provided by the senses. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation and experiment are typical forms of rational methods.5 Since then, scientific knowledge has been based on strict logical reasoning and supported by experimental facts. This new development mode of knowledge enabled modern experimental science to break away from natural philosophy and enter the track of comprehensive and rapid development. The emergence of experimental science declared the end of the ruling era of natural philosophy and marked the birth of natural science. The study of natural phenomena in natural philosophy is an extension of philosophical activities as well as an act of overstepping. Philosophy has always been as distant from natural science as natural science has been from philosophy; it was actually a quaint fancy to combine them temporarily in the past. The will to combine them does exist, but the ability to do so is absent.6 Experimental science has profoundly changed the pattern of human reasonable knowledge in the past, making science the only legal form of reason and gradually replacing theology as a new knowledge legislator. Since then, humans’ understanding of nature had stepped into the era of scientific reason, while the deepening and differentiation of disciplines had begun to accelerate. At the same time, the new science based on experiments also had great practical value. The scientific research or philosophical thinking that used to be pursuing pure knowledge now began to pay attention to the practical problems in the production and development of industrial technology; a group of new scientists interested in production practice emerged, such as Leonardo Da Vinci, Galileo Galilei, Simon Stevin and Christian Huygens. With the rapid development of industry and commerce at that time, capitalist production relations began to be conceived in Italy, the Netherlands and other European feudal societies. The positivist, reasonable and critical spirits of modern science were sharp weapons against religion and theology, hence becoming an important front for the bourgeoisie to oppose feudal autocratic rule in the

44  Positioning of Science and Technology ideological field. Science could destroy the foundations of religious belief, or it could strip feudal lords of their privileges by unifying laws with reason, and replacing scattered and sentimental local decrees with unified laws. Therefore, the bourgeois revolution and the scientific revolution became fellow travelers, with the former removing social obstacles to the development of productive forces, and the latter providing theoretical support for the development of productive forces. Capital and science are natural allies: capital depends on science to expand production scale, while science needs to be funded by capital. Thus, with the rise of the middle class, science was vigorously revitalized; the study of astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy and physiology revived accordingly. In order to develop industrial production, the bourgeoisie needed science to ascertain the physical properties of natural objects and find out how the forces of nature work. Now science rebelled against the church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and therefore had to join in rebellion.7 In the 18th century, all sciences had their own scientific form, so they were finally combined with philosophy and practice.8 Apart from direct observation and practical experience, scientific knowledge before modern times was closely related to researchers’ intuition, speculation, imagination and other natural philosophical methods. But since the emergence of modern natural science, scientific research methods and ways of thinking had undergone significant changes.9 Scientists attached great attention to experimental results, theoretical thinking of analysis, induction and deduction, and continuous improvement of experimental equipment. Therefore, scientific research was no longer a general, empirical and passive way to understand and reflect on natural things, but a positive and active way to intervene in natural phenomena. Supported by a variety of advanced experimental techniques, scientific research used precise mathematical tools to construct elaborate theoretical models or hypotheses; systematization, theorization and logicalization had become the goal of natural science. At the same time, scientific research had gradually changed from an individual activity of free exploration into an organized, planned and collaborative cognitive activity of an established system, which was supported and controlled by capital and advances rapidly and directionally according to the will of capital. In this period, with the complication, diversification and precision of textile, smelting and mining industries, it became increasingly urgent to differentiate and separate technology development from production practice, absorb technological activities into the scope of scientific research and employ scientific theories and methods to analyze technical processes, thereby preparing the conditions for the birth of technical science. On the basis of summarizing the practical experience of production, technical science has widely absorbed the research results of various natural sciences, standardized and guided the development of specific technological practices, hence enabling invention to become a special occupation.10 As Marx pointed out, in mechanized production, the question of how each local process is accomplished and combined with each other is solved by the technological application of mechanics, chemistry, etc.11 From then on, the technological development based on technical science began to be carried out purposefully

Positioning of Science and Technology  45 and in a planned way according to scientific research norms, scientific theories and technical principles, thus breaking the traditional technological development mode dominated by experience exploration and changing the situation of production activities. Thanks to the platform provided by modern capitalist production practice, science and technology were able to develop rapidly, draw close to each other, promote each other, and blend well with each other. The development of natural science itself, on which all knowledge is based, like that of all knowledge connected with the process of production, was still based on capitalist production; this capitalist production created for the first time, to a considerable extent, the physical means of research, observation and experiment for natural science.12 In this regard, when discussing the interactive promotion mechanism between science and technology, Marx pointed out that capital’s possession of live labor is directly realistic in the machine system: on the one hand, the decomposition and application of mechanical and chemical laws directly derived from science make it possible for machines to perform the same work as workers in the past. However, it is only when great industry has reached a higher stage and all sciences are put to the service of capital that the machine system begins to develop along this path. On the other hand, the existing machine system itself already provides plenty of means. In this case, invention will become a profession, and the application of science to direct production will become a decisive and driving focus of science.13 1.1.2 Connotation and Extension of Science and Technology Strictly speaking, Marx did not undertake the task of normative study of science and technology. His concern and exploration of science and technology issues were carried out at multiple levels simultaneously and sporadically. His scientific and technological thoughts seem like “original ecology” thoughts in the embryonic state. Marx mostly talked about science and technology at the level of specific scientific and technological activities. Regarding his works, there are records and reports of the historical facts of science and technology, excerpts of special works on the history of science and technology and multi-level reflections on specific scientific and technological issues, but they have not yet shown a unified philosophical basis and a clear outline of a system. In the Complete Works of Marx and Engels, a unified and accurate definition of the concepts of “science” and “technology” by Marx and Engels does not exist at all. On the one hand, this shows that Marx and Engels’ exploration of science and technology was still in the process of formation and development and was not standardized. On the other hand, it reflects the complex, multi-dimensional and dynamic nature of scientific and technological phenomena, as well as the universality of the concepts of “science” and “technology.” In fact, it is not easy to define the concepts of “science” and “technology” in a way that everyone can agree on, and the work is far from complete to this day. At first glance, the meaning of the word “technology” seems quite clear, for technological devices, instruments and processes are found everywhere and accepted as “second nature.” But when it

46  Positioning of Science and Technology comes to defining the concept of technology, people immediately get into trouble. Such situation is similar to that of the concepts that are also highly general. Even though everyone thinks they know the meaning of “science,” “politics” or “society,” it is hard for them to agree on an exact definition of each.14 As such, it is difficult to generalize the universality of the concepts of “science” and “technology” and show their rich connotations simply by the definition of an additional species. Science and technology constitute an important element of human civilization, which is reflected in many aspects of sociocultural life. Marx’s exploration of science and technology can be divided into two aspects: first, analysis of the structure and attributes of science and technology; second, the revelation of the interactive mechanism between science and technology and other aspects of sociocultural life. The former relates to the connotation and extension of the concepts of “science” and “technology,” and forms the basis of Marx’s thoughts on science and technology; the latter is the multi-sided investigation of the phenomena of science and technology, which forms the central content of Marx’s thoughts on science and technology and helps to understand his attitude in this regard. Although it is difficult to find an accurate definition of “science” and “technology” in Marx’s texts, it does not mean that he had not developed any viewpoint on these concepts. It is certain that we can extract and summarize the connotation and extension of the concepts of “science” and “technology” from his rich scientific and technological thoughts. 1.1.2.1 Concept of Science Among Marx’s propositions about “science,” two propositions are particularly important. The first is that science is a way for man to grasp the world. In his Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (1857), Marx pointed out that concreteness, generally as the entirety of thought and the concreteness of thought, is in fact the product of thinking and understanding; it is by no means the product of selfgenerated concepts which are thinking outside or overriding intuition and appearance, but the product of the process by which intuition and representation are transformed into concepts. Entirety, when it appears in the mind as the whole of thought, is the product of the thinking mind; the mind holds the world in its own way, and this way is different from the mastery of the artistic spirit, the religious spirit and the practical spirit of the world.15 Here, Marx identifies four main ways in which humans can “master” the world: theory appeals to logic, religion to faith, art to emotion and the spirit of practice to will. For Marx, the way of theoretical thinking is a scientific (including philosophical) way, and it reveals the essence hidden behind things through phenomena. As Marx pointed out in criticizing vulgar economists for their wrong understanding of the law of value: vulgar economists think they have made a great discovery when they arrogantly preach that things are phenomenally different, rather than revealing the inner connections of things. In fact, what they preach is that they cling to appearance and treat it as final. What is the use of science then?16

Positioning of Science and Technology  47 The second is that science is the exploration of the unknown. Engels once pointed out that science is to study what we do not know,17 namely, to understand unknown areas, reveal the essence of things, and the result is systematic knowledge of science. The objects of natural science include matter and objects in motion, and the study of these different forms of movement is the main content of natural science.18 Early scientific research mainly focused on unknown phenomena in nature, so it was known as natural science. Later, the exploration of artificial objects and their creative activities entered the field of scientific research, and the so-called technological science and engineering science emerged. Marx believed that technics was formed under this background, and it was the early form of technological science and engineering science. The principle of great industry is, in the first place, to decompose every process itself into its constituent elements, regardless of the human hand, thus creating the wholly modern technics. The variegated, seemingly disconnected, and fixed forms of the social process of production are decomposed into the consciously planned and systematically classified applications for desired useful results of natural science.19 In addition, these propositions, such as science is a productive force, science is intellectual production, science is the product of the general process of historical development, science is the product of labor and natural science is the theoretical relationship between man and nature, have revealed the rich connotation of the concept of “science” from different aspects. The social science of the 19th century was far less developed than the natural science. Although Marx discussed scientific issues from the perspectives of philosophy, economics and history, he transcended the limitations of the times to understand and use the concept of “science” in a broad sense. In his opinion, anything in the objective world can be examined under scientific reason and analyzed with scientific methods; science includes natural science, social science and thinking science, etc., which are unified in essence. As Marx pointed out in Das Kapital that in Germany political economy has been a foreign science until now.20 In a letter to Kugelman, Marx wrote that the task of science is precisely to explain how the laws of value are carried out; if we are to “explain” all phenomena that seem to contradict the law at the beginning, then science must be provided before science.21 Science here refers to political economy, mainly in the sense of social science. Engels talked about the classification of science in Dialectics of Nature: every science is to analyze some individual form of motion or a series of interrelated and reciprocal forms of motion; therefore, classification of science is the classification and sorting of these motion forms according to their internal sequence, which tells why classification of science is so important.22 In line with this idea, in Anti-Duhring, Engels pointed out that there are three types of science: we may divide the whole field of knowledge into three parts in a way already known. The first consists of all the sciences that deal with the non-living world and can be treated more or less mathematically, namely, mathematics, astronomy, mechanics, physics and chemistry. The second type of science is that of living organisms. The third type is historical science which studies human living conditions, social

48  Positioning of Science and Technology relations, the form of law, the form of the state and the conceptual superstructure composed of philosophy, religion, art, etc.23 The first and second types of science here mainly refer to the natural sciences, while the third type refers to the humanities and social sciences. In addition, Engels also believed that there is a science of thinking. He said we could have listed the sciences that study the laws of human thinking, namely, logic and dialectics.24 The theoretical thinking of every age, including our own, is a product of history. It has a completely different form at different times, and at the same time has a completely different content. Therefore, the science of thinking, like all other sciences, is a historical science, and a science of the historical development of human thinking.25 1.1.2.2 Concept of Technology Compared with “science,” the word “technology” appears much less frequently in the Complete Works of Marx and Engels (the first Chinese edition); there are only about 40 entries directly related to “technology.”26 Moreover, these concepts of “technology” are obviously different from those of today’s philosophy of technology in both connotation and extension. There are at least two reasons for this difference. One is caused by the translation of works by Marx and Engels. In the daily use of language, polysemy and sylleptic pun are common linguistic phenomena; the same thing can often be expressed in many words and ways. As equivalents to “technique” and “technology” in English, there are “technik” and “technologie” in German, and “teхника” and “teхнология” in Russian. The former word refers primarily to a craft, skill, specific operation, or specialized method, while the latter word refers roughly to systematic technology, such as process, industrial technology, etc. In fact, the content of the former is the basis for the development of the content of the latter, while the content of the latter is a systematic study of the content of the former, which is closer to the research object of technology development and technology philosophy. In the translation of Marx’s works, the former word is sometimes replaced by craft or skill, while the latter word may be expressed as technics or technical research. We cannot ignore Marx’s discussion of technological issues because of different expressions in translation.27 The other is that Marx used some inferior concepts of “technology” when describing technological phenomena, that is, the unit, structure, operation and effect of technology in special technological systems are often talked about, while the unified category of “technology” is seldom used for generalization or narration. For example, in his article The British Rule in India (1853), Marx stated that the British invaders broke up India’s handlooms and destroyed its spinning wheels. They first drove Indian cotton out of European markets, then exported cotton yarn into Hindustan, and finally made this home of cotton goods flooded with British goods. Yet the decline of Indian cities, once famous for their textiles, was by no means the worst consequence of British rule. British steam engines and science destroyed the combination of agriculture and manufacturing throughout

Positioning of Science and Technology  49 Hindustan.28 Although the word “technology” is not mentioned in Marx’s text, “cotton goods,” “handlooms,” “spinning wheels,” “steam,” “science” and “combination of agriculture and crafts” are all direct expressions of technical products, equipment or processes. This is like dissecting different tree species from the perspective of plant physiology, while forests are rarely described from the perspective of ecology. Like the concept of “science,” Marx understood technology in a broad sense. He examined technology from the perspective of human activity, placing more emphasis on its formation and meaning than on its composition. The following three points are at the heart of its concept of “technology.” First, technology is the foundation of human nature. Marx believed that the understanding of human nature should be sought in productive activities. How individuals live their lives is what they are. What they are, therefore, is in accordance with what they produce – as well as with how they produce. What individuals are depends on the material conditions under which they produce.29 That is to say, human nature is mainly determined by the mode of production, while “certain mode of individual activities,” “what to produce,” “how to produce” and “material conditions for production” that are closely related to the mode of production are all specific forms of industrial technology. Human nature depends not only on people’s material production activities, but also on the form of industrial technology. Second, technology is the foundation of social life. In Marx’s view, industrial technology not only sustains the operation of the production system but also distinguishes economic times and reflects social relations. The difference between various economic ages does not lie in what is produced, but in how it is produced and with what means of labor it is produced. Means of labor are not only a measure of human labor force development but also an indicator of the social relations through which labor takes place.30 That is to say, the industrial technology characteristics of “what to produce” and “how to produce” directly determine the realization pattern of material production and social needs, and then indirectly shape the appearance of social superstructure. Industrial technology is not only the foundation of human nature but also the basic way to understand human nature and human life. The structure of animal remains has important implications for understanding the anatomy of extinct animals, and the remains of means of labor are equally important for judging the social form of a dead economy.31 Third, the concept of meta-technology is the starting point for Marx to analyze problems and express his thoughts. In his analysis of the role of Asiatic, Ancient Roman and Germanic ownership in the development of human society, Marx was wondering which form of land tenure is the most productive and able to create maximum wealth. No one in ancient times has ever studied this problem. In ancient times, wealth was not expressed as the purpose of production, even though Cato was well able to study which method of land cultivation is most advantageous, and Brutus was even able to lend money at the highest interest rate. People were usually studying which form of ownership produces the best citizens

50  Positioning of Science and Technology of a country.32 At that time, what people were studying are actually technological problems, and their pursuit of “maximum productivity,” “maximum wealth,” “most advantageous land cultivation method,” “highest interest rate for lending money” and “best citizens of the country” are the embodiments of the concept of technological efficiency. In fact, only when we fully understand Marx’s multilevel analysis and multi-expression about technology can we accurately grasp this concept. From the perspective of extension, Marx believed that technology exists widely in all fields of human purposeful activities; there are as many different types of technology as there are different areas of activity. In his scope of study, technology mainly includes labor technology, machine technology, industrial technology, military technology, social technology and so on. 1.1.3  Practitioner of Scientific Research and Advocate of Scientific Methods Marx was a rare encyclopedic figure in modern times. He took interest in a wide range of fields and made creative contributions to economics, philosophy, jurisprudence, sociology, history, military science, anthropology and other fields of social science, leaving a rich ideological legacy for later generations. Moreover, Marx also attached great importance to the development of science and technology and worked hard to study scientific and technological knowledge and explore scientific and technological problems, which laid a solid foundation for the establishment of Marxist theory. 1.1.3.1 Practitioner of Scientific Research During the 65 years of his life, Marx dealt with all problems with a scientific attitude, made unremitting efforts to pursue truth, and discovered “historical materialism” and “law of surplus value” successively. Marx carefully studied a variety of scientific and human activities in all sectors: economic and political developments in society, military, art history, mathematics, history of technology and technology of his time;33 he is a true practitioner of scientific research. Engels spoke highly of Marx’s contribution, saying that it is enough to have two such discoveries in one’s lifetime. If only one such discovery can be made, it is bliss. But Marx made unique discoveries in every field he studied, even in the field of mathematics, and he was not satisfied with a smattering of knowledge in any of the fields.34 This comment clearly shows the important contribution of Marx, as well as his foundational role in the future development of natural and social sciences. Das Kapital is a monumental work of economics that Marx devoted all his life to completing. Guided by a materialistic conception of history, this work provides an in-depth analysis of the capitalist mode of production, reveals the basic law of the development of capitalist society and proves that the evolution of social form is a natural historical process independent of human will. Marx was trying

Positioning of Science and Technology  51 to do just one thing: to prove the inevitability of a certain order of social relations through accurate scientific research, and at the same time to point out, as best as possible, the facts that serve as his starting point and basis. Marx took social movements as natural historical processes governed by certain laws, while these laws do not depend on, but determine people’s will, consciousness and intention.35 Das Kapital, to which Marx devoted 40 years of energy, is a model of scientific analysis of capitalist society. While writing this book, Marx read extensively and collected all kinds of materials. He even studied the “blue book” issued to MPS by the British Parliament, since it recorded the economic reports and policies of Britain in various periods, and was deemed as the first-hand data to study capitalist economic activities. According to statistics, in the collection of books of the British Museum alone, Marx read more than 1,500 kinds of books, leaving more than 100 tallies of excerpts and notes. It was Marx’s scientific and rigorous style of work that delayed the printing of the second and third volumes of Das Kapital. However, the revolution in France had not come to an end, and it could not be over until it had achieved what the philosophical revolution in Germany and the social revolution in England should have achieved.36 Had it not been for so much American and Russian material (Russian statistics books alone were as many as two cubic meters and more), the second volume would have been printed long ago. Such detailed research delayed the publication of volume two for years. As he always did, he wanted to gather all available materials until the last day.37 Engels praised Marx’s diligence and talent in this way: “his genius, his almost too serious attitude to science, his extraordinary depth of knowledge, surpassed all of us, anyone who insists on criticizing his findings is asking for trouble.”38 In this process, Marx also read extensively about science and technology. From his letter to Engels dated 3 January 1868, we can get a glimpse of the depth and breadth of Marx’s scientific research. To write the chapter on land rent, Marx said in the letter that he had to ask Carl Schorlemmer if there were any best books (in German) on agricultural chemistry recently or the conflict between the mineral fertilizer and nitrogen fertilizer parties, and whether he knew anything about the German authors who had recently rejected Liebig’s theory of soil impoverishment or was aware of the alluvial soil theory of Munich agronomist Frass (professor of Munich University).39 According to Engels, Marx would examine the historical origins and premises of everything he studied, therefore, every problem he studied would naturally produce a series of new ones. The reason why he studied the history of primitive times, agriculture, Russian and American land relations, geology, etc., was mainly to write the chapter on land rent in volume three of Das Kapital as best as he could.40 It is because of the rich accumulation of knowledge and the support of scientific research and practice that Das Kapital and Marxist theory have withstood the test of history and become immortal. Like Marx, Engels also devoted himself to scientific research; Dialectics of Nature and other works were outcomes of his study of natural science. In the preface of Anti-Duhring, Engels explained the reason and process of his study of natural science. He said that to establish a dialectical and materialistic view of nature, a knowledge of mathematics and natural sciences was needed. Marx

52  Positioning of Science and Technology was well versed in mathematics, but in the field of natural sciences, we could only conduct sporadic, fitful and fragmentary studies. He went further to say that after he retired from business and moved to London, he had time to do his research, so he gave himself a thorough “waxing” in mathematics and science, as Liebig would call it, and he spent most of the eight years doing research in this regard.41 Engels believed that the study and research of natural sciences are an inevitable trend of the times. Just as today’s natural scientists are irresistibly compelled, whether they like it or not, to examine the general conclusions of theory, everyone who studies theoretical problems is irresistibly compelled to study the results of modern natural science. There’s some kind of mutual compensation going on here.42 At the same time, he was clearly aware that arming oneself with natural scientific theories was also the inevitable choice of proletarian theorists. According to Engels, by no means should we turn new scientific achievements into thick books, only to confide in the academic community; we’re obliged to demonstrate our views scientifically, but it is equally important for us to win over the European proletariat and, above all, the German proletariat to our convictions.43 1.1.3.2 Advocate of Scientific Methods As a by-product of scientific research activities, scientific methods are formed on the basis of refining and summarizing scientific research experiences and lessons. As proletarian theorists, Marx and Engels were engaged in scientific research and theoretical exploration all their lives. In this process, both of them not only attached importance to the refinement and generalization of scientific methods but also actively advocated their popularization and application. First, they paid attention to the application of dialectics. With the decline of natural philosophy and the rapid development of natural science, scientific research methods such as experiment, induction and mathematics have been deeply rooted in people’s minds, while the philosophical method has been gradually forgotten. Natural scientists believe that they can only be freed from the bondage of philosophy by ignoring it or insulting it. However, they cannot go any further without thinking, and thinking must have logical categories.44 Natural scientists, therefore, though they may adopt any attitude they wish, are at the mercy of philosophy. The only question is whether they would prefer to be governed by some bad modern philosophy or by a form of theoretical thought based on a thorough knowledge of the history of thought and its achievements.45 In this case, Marx and Engels emphasized the importance of philosophical thinking and dialectics, which had very important practical significance. Dialectics happens to be the most important form of thinking for modern science, for it is dialectics alone that provides analogies, and thus explanations, for the processes of development that take place in nature, for the connections which are universal, for the transition from one field of inquiry to another.46 Moreover, since there is no other way out and there is no clear thought to be found, one has to return in one form or another from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.47

Positioning of Science and Technology  53 In fact, one of the most important reasons why Marx made many important achievements in economics and other fields is that he consciously used dialectics to analyze problems and developed dialectical thinking methods. In this respect, Marx’s merit is that he stood in contrast to the resentful, conceited, mediocre imitators who command the German intelligentsia today; he was the first to bring back the forgotten dialectical method, its connection with and difference from Hegelian dialectics, and to apply it in Das Kapital to the facts of empirical science (i.e., political economy). He was so successful that the modern German school of economics only got the better of the vulgar free traders by copying Marx (and often wrongly) under the pretext of criticizing him.48 In fact, the logical structure and research method of Das Kapital are the product of the organic combination of materialist epistemology and dialectical logic method, and it has set up a model of successful application of a dialectical logic method for later generations. Although Marx did not leave behind the “Logic,” he left behind the logic of Das Kapital, and we should make full use of this logic to solve this problem. In Das Kapital, materialistic logic, dialectics and epistemology are applied to a science, and this materialism absorbs all the valuable things from Hegel and develops them.49 Marx’s whole worldview was not doctrine but method. It does not provide ready-made dogmas, but the starting points for further research and the methods used for such research.50 It was in Das Kapital that Marx developed dialectical thinking methods, such as contradiction analysis, advancement from the abstract to the concrete, unification of history and logic and principle of integrity, which have a profound influence on later generations. Second, they emphasized the importance of scientific methods. Although Marx and Engels were not natural scientists, they attached great importance to the extraction and generalization of natural scientific methods. In their view, natural science is the real science, and sensible physics is the most important part of natural science. Science is the science of experience, and science consists of the application of rational methods to sensible materials. Induction, analysis, comparison, observation and experiment are the main conditions of the rational method.51 In his works such as Dialectics of Nature and Anti-Duhring, Engels emphasized the important role of scientific methods in scientific research activities. For example, he noted the importance of comparative methods by saying that he (Sancho) was naturally ignorant of such sciences as comparative anatomy, comparative botany and comparative linguistics; these sciences have achieved great success by comparing and identifying the differences between the objects being compared, and comparison is of universal significance in these sciences.52 In discussing the fundamental position of the method of hypothesis, Engels pointed out that as long as natural science uses thinking, its development form is hypothesis. Once a new fact has been observed, the previous way of describing the same kind of fact cannot be used. From this moment on, a new method of specification is needed – originally based on a limited number of facts and observations. Further observation materials will purify these hypotheses, ruling out some, revising others, until finally the law is formed in pure form. To

54  Positioning of Science and Technology wait until the materials are purified enough to form laws is to suspend the study of the application of thinking until then, and in that case, there would never be any laws.53 Third, they preferred mathematical methods. Mathematics is an ancient science, Marx and Engels had a deep understanding and research on mathematics. Pure mathematics is based on the spatial forms and quantitative relations of the real world, that is, on very real materials. These materials appear in an extremely abstract form, which only superficially covers their origins in the external world. Pure mathematics, in the same way, was later applied to the world, though it was derived from it and represented only a part of its constituent form. It is only for this reason that it can be applied.54 The law of mass alternation shows that the development of things begins with quantitative change, and when such change reaches a certain point, the properties of things will change, and the old things will evolve into new things. Therefore, the mathematical methods to study the quantitative relationship have a wide range of applications. At the same time, quantitative analysis is an advanced stage of scientific research; the application of mathematical methods is the concrete embodiment of deepening scientific research. It is in this sense that Marx said that a science is not truly perfect until it has successfully applied mathematics.55 While doing economic research, Marx always tried to depict and explore economic relations with mathematical methods. In his 31 May 1873 letter to Engels, Marx talked about a vexing problem: I told Moore something I had been working on for a long time, but he didn’t think the problem could be solved, at least for the time being. Here is the thing: the prices and discount rates in statistical tables, which change over the course of a year, are shown by rising and falling curves. In order to analyze a crisis, I have more than once tried to calculate these rises and falls as irregular curves, and attempted to mathematically derive the main laws of the crisis from them (and now I think it is possible, given enough collated materials). As I said, Moore didn’t think the problem could be solved for the time being, so I decided to put it aside.56 In analyzing the size of profit and profit margin, Marx believed that when profit and surplus value are regarded as equal in quantity, the size of profit and the profit margin are determined by pure quantitative relations determined or determinable in each case; therefore, the study should first be carried out within the scope of pure mathematics.57 It can be seen that the use of mathematical methods has become a conscious behavior for Marx when analyzing problems.

1.2 Multiple Relationships between Science and Technology From a historical point of view, science and technology have different origins and have been in separate and parallel development for a long time. It was only in modern times that the two gradually merged on the basis of production

Positioning of Science and Technology  55 practice, and played a more and more important role in social life. It was under this background that Marx analyzed and revealed the multiple relations between science and technology and elucidated many important thoughts in this regard. 1.2.1  Technological Orientation of Scientific Research Scientific research, which mainly answers “what,” “why” and “how” questions, has the methodological function of guiding practical activities, and it can act as the basis and premise of solving technological problems such as “how to do” and “how to do more effectively,” and serve technological practical activities. Since modern times, with the confluence of science and technology, the potential practical value of science has gradually emerged and been strengthened by capital operation. Under the conscription and guidance of capital, science, which used to pursue knowledge as its development direction, has taken a major turn to run toward the direction of creating economic value, thus becoming the right-hand man of capital in pursuit of surplus value.58 The development and history of science show that the early scientific research was driven by curiosity and thirst for knowledge, and most of it was individual or irregular amateur behavior. At that time, the emergence of scientific problems, the process of inquiry and the expression of scientific research results all had obvious personality traits, which were mostly individual behaviors without goals or plans. Since modern times, with the comprehensive and rapid development of science, the professional roles of scientists have been gradually differentiated, professional groups engaged in scientific research have emerged and scientific exchanges and cooperation have become increasingly active. At the same time, individual labor in scientific research began to give way to collective labor. Especially after the involvement of capital in scientific activities, the technological problems of pursuing scientific research effect and efficiency were put on the agenda. Steiner proclaimed the uniqueness of scientific and artistic labor, but here he was far behind the bourgeoisie. Now it was necessary to organize such activities of the “One.” In the field of astronomy, Arago, Herschel, Enke and Bessel all thought it necessary to organize their observations together, and only then did they achieve some good results.59 The technological orientation of scientific research is to pay more attention to and pursue the practical value of cognitive activities. This value orientation has made scientific research mainly oriented toward production practice and social life and then gave birth to technological science and engineering science. Marx outlined this trend in a commentary on Wagner’s Textbook of Political Economy: due to a change in one’s perception of the properties of belongings, there may be an “increase in property” in a good case, for example, the loss of forests around 1620 that threatened the continued existence of iron-making, when coal was used to make iron in England; chemical discoveries such as iodine (use of iodine-containing salt sources); calcium phosphate used as fertilizer; anthracite used as fuel; gas-based lighting materials and photographic materials; dyes and medicines being invented; Gutta-percha rubber; plant ivory (made from

56  Positioning of Science and Technology Phytelephas macrocarpa); creosote; candle; use of asphalt, pine needles (pine wool) and blast furnace gas; coal tar-based aniline; and use of waste hair and sawdust. In a bad case, the usefulness is compromised and therefore the value is reduced, for example, Trichinella spiralis was found in pigs and poisons in dye and plants. Upon the discovery of minerals in the land, their new useful properties and new uses increased the properties of the landowner.60 For another example, the development of science has changed people’s understanding of the fertility of the land. Rent is not a fixed indicator of the fertility of a piece of land, because the modern application of chemistry is constantly changing the soil, and geology is now overturning past estimates of relative fertility. Fertility is not a natural quality as people think; it is closely related to current social relations.61 The consideration of scientific research from the perspective of economic value is bound to lead scientific research to economic operation, and give priority to production and technology problems in the scope of scientific research. Technology-oriented scientific research is a special purposeful activity aimed at exploring unknown fields. The technology problem of scientific research is how to organize and promote scientific research so as to achieve the expected research effect or improve the efficiency of scientific research. People have made positive attempts to solve this problem from three aspects. First is the refinement and extension of scientific research methods. In the complex process of exploring unknown areas, there are both tangible experimental activities and intangible thinking activities, and there are thinking activities either regular logical or irregular non-logical. Non-logical thinking has no rules to follow and only relies on imitation and experience, while logical thinking is regular and can be programmed or popularized. The experimental rules, logical analysis procedures and techniques all belong to the category of research methods. Marx believed that science is an empirical science, and science lies in the application of rational methods to perceptual materials; induction, analysis, comparison, observation and experiment are the main conditions of the rational method.62 When criticizing Sancho, Marx also pointed out the universality of comparison methods. He said Sancho was naturally ignorant of such sciences as comparative anatomy, comparative botany and comparative linguistics; these sciences have achieved great success by comparing and identifying the differences between the objects being compared, and comparison is of universal significance in these sciences.63 Scientific methods are a by-product of scientific research activities and need to be refined and summarized in time. The paths, procedures and experiences of successful scientific research activities, as well as the lessons of failed scientific research activities, are the basic ways to form scientific methods. Scientific research activities carried out by employing scientific methods are usually easier to achieve success and have higher research efficiency. At the same time, the summary, exchange and imitation of non-logical thinking experiences are also important ways to improve the efficiency of scientific research activities. Second is organization and planning of scientific research activities. Through the baptism of two scientific revolutions, modern science based on experiment

Positioning of Science and Technology  57 gradually realized the transformation from decentralized and free individual research to centralized and planned cooperative research, and there emerged research groups, research institutes, schools and societies as well as corresponding academic norms. Scientific research activities no longer develop spontaneously and disorderly, but advance in an organized, purposeful, planned and self-conscious manner. Natural science is used by capital as a means of getting rich, and science itself becomes a means of getting rich for those who develop science, so, people working in science compete with each other to explore the practical applications of science. At the same time, invention has become a special profession. Therefore, with the expansion of capitalist production, scientific factors have for the first time been consciously and extensively developed, applied and reflected in life, on a scale unimaginable in previous times.64 Under the background of deepening scientific research and increasingly fine disciplinary differentiation, people’s professional fields are becoming narrower and narrower. However, practical scientific problems are always complex and dynamic, often involving multiple disciplines, which requires the organization of multidisciplinary experts to solve the key problems. This is also the specific embodiment of division of labor and cooperation in scientific research activities. Moreover, it is necessary to formulate scientific research plans and build corresponding guarantee systems and facilities based on the development trend of disciplines and the demands of social production, which is an important way to improve the efficiency of scientific research. Third is the technological molding of scientific research. Since the confluence of science and technology, the technologization process of science has quietly begun. In other words, more and more advanced experimental instruments, technical equipment and development practices are used in scientific research, which provides an increasing number of subjects for scientific research. In fact, this is only part of the technologization process. The essence of technicalization of science lies in the organization (institutionalization) and operation (normalization) of scientific research in accordance with technological principles, or the standardization and transformation of traditional scientific research activities in accordance with technological principles, so as to improve the efficiency of scientific research activities. A complete set of reasonable and effective systems and mechanisms have been formed, including the formulation of scientific research plans, fundraising, personnel collocation, project organization and implementation, achievement appraisal, award submission, promotion and application. Marx believed that technological development and production development have provided equipment for scientific experiments and promoted the technologization of science. It was capitalist production that first created, to a considerable extent, the physical means of study, observation and experiment for natural science.65 Since science, recruited to serve capital, has been subject to capital, the technicality of capital operation urgently requires the technologization of scientific research, so as to efficiently support capital to pursue surplus value. In fact, it has become the basic orientation and conscious behavior of contemporary scientific research to serve or explore the way for technological development; subordination to technological development and to

58  Positioning of Science and Technology the will of capital has become the basic characteristic of scientific development since modern times. 1.2.2 Scientization of Technological Development Human technological activities have a long history, but before merging with science, technological development mainly relied on craftsmen’s accumulation of experience and long-term exploration, which was somewhat blind, slow and inefficient, and technological achievements were mainly passed down from generation to generation between masters and apprentices or materialized technological forms. In fact, in the process of technological development, the understanding of technological activity itself sprouted from the very beginning. Unlike natural science, the objects of this technological understanding were mainly artificial objects and their creation process, rather than pure natural phenomena. And this kind of technological understanding was application-oriented, mostly staying at the perceptual level of knowledge according to the case; the results of cognition also appeared in the form of experience and later evolved into an important source of science and technics. The clock was the first automat to be used for practical purposes, it is on this basis that the whole theory of uniform production has been developed. By its very nature, it is based on a combination of semi-artistic craftsmanship and direct theory. The development of the clock shows how different the relationship is between knowledge and practice on the basis of handicrafts from that between the two in major industry.66 Technics at the beginning was not only the product of scientific technology, but also a bridge between science and technology: on the one hand, it brought technological activities into the field of scientific research, explored the structure, attributes and process of technological systems and put forward new topics for scientific development. On the other hand, it standardized and guided the development of technology, refined the purpose, direction and procedure of technology development and improved the consciousness and efficiency of technology development. Driven by the confluence of science and technology, the traditional technology development mode began to evolve and became more and more regulated by scientific achievements, demonstrating a scientization trend of technology. The scientization of technology is mainly reflected in three aspects. First, technology development pays more attention to the progress of scientific research, seeks the rudiments of technology principles from scientific results and promotes technology development purposefully. According to Marx, in the age of machine industry, the entire production process is not subordinate to the direct skills of workers, but is manifested in the application of science to the production process; the tendency of capital is to give scientific quality to production while direct labor is reduced to a mere element of the process.67 The design and construction of machines need not only technics but also the guidance of mechanics, thermology, chemistry, electrology and other basic sciences. The failure of the design and development of the first and second perpetual motion machines fully illustrates this point. How do we use machines for production? This is the

Positioning of Science and Technology  59 main problem to be solved by technological process development, which is also inseparable from science. The principle of machine production is to break down the production process into its constituent stages and apply mechanics, chemistry, etc., that is, natural science is employed to solve the problems arising therefrom. This principle is everywhere decisive.68 The attributes and laws revealed by scientific research have potential economic value and can be transformed into technical products. On the basis of chemical research, many new chemical processes have been formed. Chemical industry provides the most striking example of waste reuse: it has provided new ways to use wastes produced by itself and by a wide variety of other industries. For example, coal tar, previously almost useless, has been converted into aniline dyes, alizarin dyes (alizarin) and, more recently, even medicines.69 Besides, following the process technology to produce can reduce production costs and improve production efficiency, for the use of machines, which complies with strict scientific rules, can economize on its components and its consumption materials.70 Second, technology development consciously uses scientific theories and research methods. The technology development based on scientific research is carried out on the basis of science and technology principles and in accordance with scientific research norms in a purposeful and planned manner, thus breaking the traditional technology development mode dominated by experience exploration. Technology development always deals with objects and their interactions, which cannot be separated from relationship description, quantity calculation and graph drawing; basic sciences such as physics, chemistry and life science provide a theoretical framework for analyzing and explaining technological phenomena. Physics is credited with the creation of the steam engine and the telegraph – these inventions are entirely products of physics.71 Mathematics, cartography, information science, etc., provide ready tools of analysis and description for technology development. The exact geometric shapes necessary for the parts of machines, such as straight lines, planes, circles, cylinders, conical shapes and spheres, are also produced by machines. Now with this device, it is possible to create the geometrical shapes of machine parts.72 In particular, scientific research methods directly affect people’s thinking of analyzing the attributes and laws of technical objects. It can be seen how the old form of the means of production initially dominated its new form. Perhaps the most convincing, however, is the pre-modern locomotives which had two “legs” and moved like a horse. With the further development of mechanics and the accumulation of practical experience, the form of machines was entirely determined by the principles of mechanics, thus completely breaking away from the traditional form of the tools that had already become machines.73 Third, focus on refining and cultivating new technological forms from scientific experiments. As the basic means of scientific research, scientific experiments are also the main feature of modern science. Many natural phenomena can only be accurately observed and analyzed in a laboratory with the help of perfect instruments and equipment. Although the direct purpose of scientific experiments is to obtain scientific facts and test scientific hypotheses,

60  Positioning of Science and Technology many new ideas and discoveries are often produced in the process of scientific experiments, which is an important source of inducing technological inventions. For example, chemical experiments in modern times not only discovered many new elements, but also found new uses for coal, oil, natural gas and other natural resources, and artificially synthesized plastic, rubber, fiber, fertilizer and other new materials, hence becoming the parent body of chemical technology. Each step forward in chemistry not only increases the number of useful substances and the uses of known substances, but also expands the field of investment as capital grows. Moreover, it also teaches people to put the wastes from production and consumption processes back into the recycling process, thus creating new capital materials without prepaid capital.74 Marx maintained a keen interest in scientific experiments, technological experiments and emerging technologies throughout his life, and he had kept following Deprez’s high-voltage transmission experiments before his death.75 1.2.3 Integration of Science and Technology From the perspective of the history of science and technology, in the long social development process before the European Renaissance, most of the technological development activities were subordinate to social production practice. Expanding product types, improving product performance and production efficiency is the goal and driving force of technological innovation. Industrial technological innovation in this period was the main form of technological development, in which all links of technological development and application were integrated and there was almost no detailed division of labor. In this period of technological development, the new technological achievements, with manual operation as the basic feature, were mainly reflected in production tools and labor products. The external physical and chemical technology was relatively simple in form and structure, and highly dependent on developers’ internal technology as well as users’ physical strength and intelligence, and technological innovation mainly depended on the long-term exploration and accumulation of production experience. Science in this period was the “handmaid” of theology, since it had not yet been separated from philosophy and theology. The development of production and technology was always ahead of science, so production practice and technological innovation had been important sources of scientific knowledge. As Marx pointed out, the increase in the size of transmission gear was in conflict with the lack of hydraulic power, which was one of the reasons for people to study the friction law more accurately. Similarly, in the case of a mill pushed and pulled by a mill rod, its power was not uniform, which gave rise to the flywheel theory and application, and flywheels later played a very important role in major industry. The original scientific and technological elements of major industry were thus developed during the period of workshops and handicraft industry.76 Insensitive chemical balance, defective lens construction, inaccurate temperature score or inaccurate circumfluence of theodolite had impaired the experiments carried out with these instruments. Contemporary physics had achieved pre-eminence and continued to

Positioning of Science and Technology  61 advance; much of this was due to the amazing precision and skill with which philosophical instruments were produced.77 On the contrary, the scattered scientific knowledge with the basic characteristics of experience at that time played a weak role in promoting technological progress, which was mostly indirect and accidental. The transmission mode of leading role among production, technology and science could be summarized as follows: production → technology → science. After the European Renaissance, constantly systematized and theorized science finally got rid of the bondage of religion and theology. In the era of the rise of capitalism, science had entered a period of comprehensive and rapid development because of an established experimental foundation and employment of the method of mathematical quantitative analysis. At the same time, driven by the first technological revolution marked by the mechanization of production and vaporization, the complexity and high speed of the production process and the precision and large scale of product technical form enabled technology development to separate from the production field, and then a relatively independent field for professional technology development came into being. With the separation of scientific experiment from production practice, the original leading role transfer mode between production, technology and science began to be broken, the historical position of technology was raised, and the interplay between them entered into a period of complex adjustment. Mechanics, the true scientific foundation of great industry, was perfected to a certain extent in the 18th century; the sciences – chemistry, geology and physiology – which were more directly (compared with industry) specialized foundations of agriculture, were developed only in the 19th century, and especially in the latter decades of that century.78 And the interaction between science and technology had also increased. If technology depends to a great extent on the state of science, then science depends to a far greater extent on the state and needs of technology. When society has a need for technology, that need can move science forward more powerfully than ten universities. For example, the whole of hydrostatics (Torricelli et al.) arose out of the need to harness mountain rivers in Italy in the 16th and 17th centuries; as for electricity, it was only after discovering its technical utility that we learned something rational about it.79 According to Marx, the development of capitalism urgently needs science and technology to solve the practical problems cropping up in the process of production, thus promoting the division of science and technology. For it is only in this mode of production that the arising practical problems can be solved by scientific methods. It is at this moment that experiment and observation – and the exigencies of the production process itself – are achieved on a scale that makes the application of science possible and necessary. Now, science and advances in human theory have been exploited. Capital does not create science, but it uses it and occupies it for the needs of the productive process. In this way science as applied to production is at the same time separated from direct labor; in the previous stage of production, however, the limited range of knowledge and experience was directly connected with labor itself and did not develop into an independent force separate from labor, thus the whole story never went beyond the accumulation of

62  Positioning of Science and Technology traditional crafts, and this accumulation is replenished from generation to generation and expands very slowly, bit by bit. The secrets of every craft are learned by experience, and hands and head haven’t separated yet.80 In the second technological revolution marked by the application of electric power, the development of science began to surpass the actual needs of production and technology, and went ahead of technological development, becoming the main driving force of technological innovation. Science was increasingly applied to technology consciously,81 transformed to technology, and played a normative and guiding role in technological innovation; technology was created according to scientific theory, which got rid of the traditional way of experience exploration and reduced the blindness in the process of technological innovation. Means of labor obtained the way of material existence as the machine, calling for the replacement of manpower by the forces of nature, and for the conscious application of natural science in place of rules derived from experience.82 Although Marx mainly studied the positive effects of science and technology on production from the perspective of production, he had already foreseen the leading role of scientific research in the development of technology and production. A superficial comparison of the modern steam loom with the old one, and of the modern blast tools of the iron foundry with the clumsy mechanical bellows which were at first made after ordinary bellows, will show how the old form of the means of production initially dominated its new form. With the further development of mechanics and the accumulation of practical experience, the form of the machine was entirely determined by the principles of mechanics, thus completely breaking away from the traditional form of the tools that had become machines.83 The creation of the steam engine and the telegraph should be attributed to physics – these inventions are entirely the product of physics.84 Under the background of this era, “science → technology → production” rose to be the dominant mode of action in this period. This mode fully reflects the logical progressive relationship that knowledge innovation leads to technological innovation, while technological invention leads to industrial technological innovation, thus spawning new industries or transforming traditional industries. The result of technologization of science and scientization of technology is the integration of science and technology. In the 20th century, especially driven by the new technological revolution, science and technology were highly differentiated on the one hand and highly integrated on the other, thereby forming a three-dimensional and networked science and technology system, which is mainly composed of basic sciences, technology science and engineering science, and is run through by edge disciplines and cross disciplines. The speed of transformation from scientific theoretical breakthroughs to technological inventions and then to practical applications has been accelerating, and the cycle has been shortening day by day. Of course, the emphasis on the leading mode of “science → technology → production” does not deny the existence of the reverse mode of “production → technology → science.” In fact, even in contemporary times, there is also a complex two-way interaction between science, technology and production.

Positioning of Science and Technology  63

1.3 Evolution of Science and Technology The historical development view is the basic view of Marxism, and the process of development and evolution of things is history. For Marx, science and technology are in constant evolution. Like the historical process of all sciences, there are always twists and turns before they reach their true starting point.85 Therefore, the summary and review of the development history of science and technology are helpful to deeply understanding the status quo, structure, attributes and function of science and technology. 1.3.1 Examine Science and Technology from the Historical Perspective The method of unifying history and logic is an important way of dialectical thinking; historical analysis is also a basic research method often used by Marx and Engels. Any form of science and technology does not come out of thin air, but has undergone a process of generation and development. Tracing the development of science and technology helps us to better understand the status quo of science and technology and reveal the cultural roots of social development. In this regard, Marx especially pointed out that in order to understand a limited historical period, we must jump out of its limitations and compare it with other historical periods.86 It is based on the importance of science and technology and their evolution process; Marx and Engels spent a lot of effort studying the history of science and the history of technology. Generally speaking, Marx paid more attention to studying the history of technology, while Engels was more interested in exploring the history of science. 1.3.1.1 Trace the History of Scientific Development The history of science is an important part of the history of human civilization. Marx and Engels discussed the history of science in many fields. In his works such as Dialectics of Nature and Anti-Duhring, Engels systematically combed the development history of natural science. In the “Plan 1878” of Dialectics of Nature, Engels tried hard to explain the reasons for the formation of the metaphysical view of nature and the inevitability of the establishment of the dialectical materialist view of nature through the investigation of the evolution of various categories of natural science. According to Engels, in the case of natural science, the metaphysical view has become impossible because of its own development.87 Also in Dialectics of Nature, by summarizing the emergence and evolution of natural science and its sociocultural background, Engels described to us the origin and development of modern natural science. The modern study of nature, as opposed to the intuition of natural philosophy of ancient genius, and to the discoveries of Arabs which were important, but scattered and almost vanished fruitlessly, is the only one that has achieved scientific, systematic and comprehensive development.88

64  Positioning of Science and Technology Although Marx and Engels were not experts in the history of science and technology, their theoretical research was based on the investigation of the history of science and technology. For example, Engels believed that the emergence and development of natural science were attributed to the development of social production. This was the basic feature of scientific development before the second technological revolution. Therefore, the progressive development of various branches of natural science must be studied. The first was astronomy – nomads and agricultural peoples absolutely need it in order to determine the seasons. Astronomy can advance only with the help of mathematics, so mathematics began to develop. Later, at a certain stage of agriculture and in some areas, especially with the emergence of cities and large buildings and the development of handicrafts, mechanics came into being. Soon mechanics became necessary for navigation and warfare. Mechanics also needed the help of mathematics, so it pushed the development of mathematics. It can be seen that the birth and development of science are decided by production at the very beginning. If, after the dark Middle Ages, science sprang up again with an unexpected force and grew with a miraculous speed, we owe this miracle again to production.89 Many important conclusions of Engels’ philosophical research on natural science are drawn on the basis of summarizing the historical facts of science. For example, regarding the historical background of the formation of metaphysical thinking, Engels pointed out that the precise study of nature began only with the Alexandrian Greeks and was carried forward by the Arabs in the Middle Ages; real natural science, however, began only in the second half of the 15th century, and since then it has made increasingly rapid progress. The decomposition of nature into its parts, the division of natural processes and objects into certain classes and the study of the interior of an organism according to its various anatomical forms have been the basic conditions for the great advances in the understanding of nature in the last 400 years. However, this practice also left us with a habit: isolate the objects and processes of nature and examine them apart from the grand general relation, therefore, the investigation is not from a dynamic state, but from a static state; not from things that change in nature, but things that never change; not from the state of life, but from the state of death. When this method of investigation was transplanted from natural science into philosophy by Bacon and Locke, it resulted in the limitation peculiar to the recent centuries, namely the metaphysical way of thinking.90 The same is true of the relativity of knowledge. Engels said that truth is in the cognitive process itself and in the long historical development of science, while science rises from a lower stage of knowledge to a higher and higher stage, but never reaches this point through the discovery of so-called absolute truth; it can go no further on this point, and it has nothing to do but stare at the acquired absolute truth in amazement.91 It was after reviewing the history of science and combing the KantianLaplacian nebular hypothesis, Lyell’s theory of geological gradient, the law of conservation and transformation of energy, Wohler’s theory of synthetic urea and cell, biological evolution and other scientific achievements that Engels formed the dialectical materialist view of nature. Until the end of the 18th century,

Positioning of Science and Technology  65 natural science was primarily the science of gathering materials, and the science of what was done, but in the 19th century, natural science was essentially the science of organizing materials; it was about processes, how these things happen and develop, connections and the combination of these natural processes into a larger whole. The first is that three major discoveries have made great strides in our understanding of the interconnectedness of natural processes. As a result of these three discoveries and other great advances in natural science, we can now depict the relationships not only between processes in various fields of nature but also between fields in general; in this way, we can draw a clear picture of the connections of nature in a systematic manner by relying on the facts provided by empirical natural science itself.92 As the metaphysical view of nature was continually broken by scientific progress, by the middle of the 18th century, the new view of nature was complete in terms of its basic points: all that is rigid has dissolved, all that is fixed has dispersed, everything special that is supposed to be permanent has become fleeting, the whole of nature is proven to move in perpetual flow and circulation.93 1.3.1.2 Trace the History of Technological Development Marx’s exploration of technological activities served his need for analyzing capitalist economic activities. At the same time, the rigorous style of study prompted Marx to learn and understand the actual production process and trace the development of the division of labor, machinery and other technical forms. Therefore, to study the connection between spiritual production and material production, we must first examine the material production itself not as a general category, but in a certain historical form.94 Since 1851 at the latest, Marx began to systematically study technology and its history. In his letter to Engels, Marx asked Engels to inform him of what he thought of Proudhon, a French economist and one of the founders of anarchism, because he was doing research on economics and took a particular interest in technology. And he kept going to the library to read about technics and its history, as well as agriculture, hoping to get at least a general understanding of technology.95 The result of Marx’s study and research on the history of technology is the famous Notes of Technology. In fact, Marx’s research on technology and its history lasted for more than 20 years, which can be reflected in his late works and letters, such as 1857–1858 Economics Manuscript, 1861–1863 Economics Manuscript, and the second and third volumes of Das Kapital. In addition to studying the literature seriously, Marx always had a modest attitude toward specific technological problems and asked others for advice modestly. Sometimes he went to listen to lectures in universities to enrich his technological knowledge. For example, in his 24 January 1863 letter to Engels, Marx said that he got perplexed while writing about machines; he could not figure out how the spindle spinning machine changed the spinning process, or in other words, now that steam power had been used, what was the power function of spinners apart from steam power?96 Four days after sending this letter, Marx wrote to

66  Positioning of Science and Technology Engels to further clarify the points mentioned: before the invention of the spindle spinning machine, how did spinners operate the spinning machine? How was the ordinary spinning machine operated before the emergence of the automatic spindle spinning machine?97 From these letters, it is not difficult to see Marx’s strong interest in technological issues and a spirit of unrelenting pursuit. Marx believed that technology has kept evolving since its birth. Generally speaking, before the industrial revolution, the demand for industrial technology stimulated and guided the development of science; after the second technological revolution marked by the application of electric power, science began to surpass the actual needs of industrial technology development and became the locomotive pulling production and technology development. It is by these inventions that science drives the forces of nature into the service of labor, and the social or cooperative nature of labor is also developed by these inventions.98 Especially with the expansion of capitalist production, scientific factors were for the first time consciously and extensively developed, applied and reflected in life, with a scale hardly imagined in previous times.99 The confluence of science and technology on the basis of capitalist production was premised on the differentiated development of science, technology and production. Science becomes an independent force in the service of capital as opposed to labor, and it generally belongs to the category where production conditions become an independent force opposite to labor. And it is precisely this separation and independence of science (initially beneficial only to capital) that become the condition for tapping the development potential of science and knowledge.100 N. Rosenberg, a famous contemporary American scholar, remarked that Marx is a conscientious student of technology, which is a major reason for his successful analysis of social changes. Marx was not only fully aware of, but insisted on, the historical significance and social consequences of technology. He devoted much extra time and energy to clearly expounding the salient features of technology, striving to reveal and examine the internal logic of individual technologies. He maintained that technology constitutes an interesting subject not only for technologists but also for students of society and social pathology.101 From 1850 to 1858, Marx not only studied a large number of works on political economy, but also studied in detail the works of Beckmann, Poppe, Liebig, Johnson, Reitmeier, Yule, Babbage and others on science and technology, technics and natural science,102 which had greatly improved his knowledge structure, broadened his theoretical horizon, and prepared him ideologically and materially for analyzing the relationship between science and technology and productivity in economic manuscripts in the future. 1.3.2 Review of the Disciplinary History and the Academic History The discussion of the history of science and the history of technology by Marx and Engels is not only on the level of general history but also on that of the history of natural science, as well as the history of disciplines and the history of social science. The review of the disciplinary history and the academic history not only

Positioning of Science and Technology  67 enriched their thoughts on the history of science and technology but also laid a solid foundation for their theoretical research. According to Marx and Engels, starting from the disciplinary history is a shortcut to understanding the attributes, characteristics and development status of disciplines, as well as the basis for academic research. They paid attention to tracing the history of each discipline, which is reflected in some extracts from Marx’s Mathematical Manuscripts (which contain a passage from Pope’s History of Mathematics from Antiquity to the Latest Age) and other works.103 Marx’s interest in the history of mathematics is evident in his letter to Leon Phillips dated 14 April 1864. In this letter, he talked about the ancient abacus, which was used almost throughout the Middle Ages and is still available in modern China; the ancient Roman multiplication table and Pythagorean table; and the contribution of Archimedes, an ancient Greek physicist.104 Besides, Marx and Engels also traced and combed the history of physics, chemistry, astronomy, biology, geology and other disciplines and even subdisciplines. The academic research of Marx and Engels is based on the investigation of the academic development history and inheriting the excellent achievements of predecessors. It was on the basis of absorbing and transforming all the outstanding cultural heritages of mankind, including the German classical philosophy, the British classical economics and the three utopian socialist theories of the 19th century, that they created the Marxist theoretical system. For example, Marx spent almost 40 years preparing and writing Das Kapital. In this process, he combed and traced the changes in various schools, representative figures and viewpoints of bourgeois political economy. All the works, such as the fourth volume of Das Kapital (Theory of Surplus Value),105 The Critique of Political Economy (draft 1857–1858),106 the abstract of James Mill’s Principles of Political Economy and comments on Friedrich Liszt’s National System of Political Economy,107 can reflect the depth and breadth of Marx’s understanding of the history of political and economic theory. It is precisely because he critically absorbed the positive results of British classical economics, and acquired abundant academic materials, that Marx dissected the capitalist mode of production, formed the scientific theory of labor value and surplus value and thereby founded Marxist political economy. For another example, from the end of 1850, Engels embarked on studying military issues, achieved a lot and won a reputation as “philosopher and strategist.” Engels’ military academic career also began with learning military knowledge and sorting out the history of military development, which can be seen in his letter of 19 June 1851 to Jo Weidmeier. In this letter, Engels said he was studying materials on the Napoleonic wars and some revolutions and needed to know a lot of historical details beforehand, but he knew nothing or only a little in this regard. So he was forced to be familiar not only with the basic knowledge about each branch of the military, but also with the details for understanding and correctly evaluating military facts, such as basic tactics, principles of fortification, fieldwork and other military engineering issues.108 Besides, he still needed to know the general history of military science, the changes caused by the development and improvement of weapons and their use, as well as the science of artillery.109

68  Positioning of Science and Technology 1.3.3 Carding and Investigation of the History of Technology Different from the German “technik” or English “technic” or “technique,” the meaning of German “technologie” or English “technology” is more complicated, which sometimes indicates “science and technology,” “technological science,” “industrial technology,” “technological equipment,” “technological method” or “technological application.” This may be related to the fact that Westerners’ early understanding of the process of technological activities mainly comes from handicraft production practice. In fact, in the Western cultural tradition, “technology” and “technological science” are semantically inseparable and available to be interchanged. From a broad technological perspective, technology has technical attributes and is a specific form of technique. Technology is a kind of method, procedure, standard or norm that processes raw materials or semi-finished products, so as to transform them into final products. From the perspective of the technological history, technology originates from handicraft; it is formed and developed on the basis of the practical experience and skills of handicraft production, and is the product of standardized and scientific production process. In the stage of handicraft production, handicraft was mainly manifested as the operation experience and skills accumulated by workers in the process of production, with non-standardized and individualized characteristics. For example, it is the special proficiency accumulated from generation to generation that gives the Indians spider-like skills.110 Since modern times, with the complexification of industrial production process and product structure, as well as the emergence of machine-centered technological process, the traditional handicraft based on experience gradually loses its advantage and craft activities begin to be transformed into the cognitive object of technology. At the same time, the development of science and its penetration into the field of production make technology gradually become an important field of scientific application, and technological activities have gradually transformed into the object of scientific research, and then evolved into comprehensive technics. Marx said he was expecting someone would write a critique of the history of technology with the theory of evolution as a reference. A critical history of technology would prove that very few inventions of the 18th century were the work of a single person, but such work had not come out yet. Darwin once talked about the history of natural technology, that is, how the organs of plants and animals are formed as tools of production in their lives. Then how about the history of the formation of the productive organs of social man, that is, the history of the formation of the material basis of each particular social organization, doesn’t it deserve the same attention?111 From 1848 to 1863, in order to reveal the secret of capital multiplication, Marx took the British industrial revolution and the machine industry as the background, spent a lot of time studying the history of technology, machine, labor, division of labor and other specific technological issues, and read and studied a large number of historical documents of technology.

Positioning of Science and Technology  69 In a letter to Engels dated 28 January 1863, Marx wrote that he was replenishing his account of machines. Trying to figure out all relevant issues, he reread all his notes (excerpts) on technology and even attended college lectures.112 It can be seen that Marx attached great importance to the issue of technology and made a lot of notes about it. Marx’s notes (excerpts) on technology are detailed abstracts of the work of other authors, such as J.H.M. Poppe’s Geschichteder Technologie seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Bd. 1–3, Göttingen, 1807–1811), A. Ure’s Technisches Wörterbuch (Bearbeitet von Kramarsch und Heeren, 3 vol., Prag, 1843–1844. Erster Band), and J. Beckmann’s Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erfindungen (Bd. I–V, Göttingen, 1782–1805).113 In Marx’s view, the emergence of technology resulted from the joint action of three factors: the first is the theoretical generalization of technological experience, which is the inherent requirement of the development of technological understanding. The second is the penetration and transfer of scientific research achievements to the field of technology, which is the external inducement for the birth of technology. The application of science consists, on the one hand, in the concentration of knowledge, observations and professional recipes handed down by experience, and, on the other, in the development of them into science.114 The third is that the rapid development of capitalism has prepared social conditions for the emergence of technology. Only with this mode of production do practical problems come out to be solved by scientific methods. It is at this moment that experiments and observations – and the exigencies of the production process itself – have reached the scale that makes the application of science possible and necessary. Now, science and advances in human theory have been exploited. Capital does not create science, but uses it and occupies it for the needs of the production process.115 After in-depth explorations of the development history of industrial technologies, Marx collected rich content for his Notes of Technology. For example, through examining the history of the clock and mill, he noted that there were two material bases within handicraft workshops that prepared for the machine industry, namely, the clock and mill (originally the mill, also the water mill, for grinding grain), both of which were descended from ancient times.116 He thought that in the mill there was already a more or less independent, developed and coexistent basic element of machinery, namely, power, which acts on the transmission mechanism – wheel drive, lever or gear – between the prime mover and working machine.117 Many later machines were invented on the basis of the mill. However, the mill was not easy to come by but experienced a long process of development. We may first list out all the kinds of power which are adopted successively in a certain order and used simultaneously over a long period of time: manpower, animal power, water power, boat mill, windmill, carriage mill (a carriage mill was mounted on a wagon, driven by the movement of the wagon and used in times of war, etc.) and steam mill. In the history of mills, we can see that from the introduction of the first water mills from Asia in Roman times (shortly before the age of Augustus) to the mass construction of the first steam mills in

70  Positioning of Science and Technology the United States at the end of the 18th century, it was an extremely slow process of development; the progress here was simply the accumulation of generations of experience. Moreover, the results of this progress were only used piecemeal in the future and did not overturn the old mode of production.118 It can be seen that in the evolutionary process of this mill technology, without the technological accumulation of predecessors, the invention and creation of later generations would lose the basis of reality. Marx also looked deeply into the development of machines from the perspective of evolution. In Marx’s view, the transformation of the mode of production begins with the labor force in handicraft workshops, and with the means of labor in major industry. Therefore, we should first study how the means of labor are transformed from tools to machines, or what the difference is between machines and hand tools.119 Marx believed that machines did not come out of thin air, but gradually developed on the basis of hand tools. The whole history of machines can be traced to the history of flour mills; even now the English word for a factory is “mill.” In the German technological literature of the first decades of the 19th century, the word “mühle” (mill) referred not only to any machine driven by natural forces but also to any manual workshop using machinery.120 For another example, the machine is a collection of tools of labor, but it is by no means a combination of the labor of workers themselves. From simple tools, accumulated tools and synthetic tools that are created by man and driven by the forces of nature, to machines, a mechanical system with one engine and finally to a mechanical system with an automatic engine – this is the development process of machines.121 Marx believed that machine technology experienced at least three stages of development: general tool, specialized tool and machine tool. Given this, the workshop handicraft period also gave rise to one of the material conditions for machines, because a machine is a combination of many simple tools.122 In handicraft workshops based on the division of labor, the division, specialization and simplification of the tools of labor, which are only suitable for simple operations, is one of the technological and physical preconditions for the development of machines. If by division of labor, a single tool is used for each individual operation, then the combination of all these tools, driven by a single engine, becomes a machine.123

Notes 1 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Publishing House, 2012:148. 2 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: 2002:308. 3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Publishing House, 2012:248. 4 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Publishing House, 2012:252. 5 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Publishing House, 2012:753–54.

(Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s People’s Publishing House, (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s

Positioning of Science and Technology  71 6 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:307. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:761. 8 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:536–37. 9 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 9). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:436. 10 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:437. 12 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358–59. 13 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:99. 14 F. Rapp, Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology. Translated by Liu Wu et al., Shenyang: Liaoning Science and Technology Publishing House, 1986:20. 15 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:42. 16 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:474. 17 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:916. 18 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:508–509. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:559. 20 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:473. 21 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:473. 22 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 9). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:504. 23 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:464–65. 24 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:467. 25 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:873–74. 26 Index of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1–39). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986:629. 27 Wang Bolu, The Outline of Marx’s Technological Thoughts. Beijing: Science Press, 2009:12. 28 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 12). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:141. 29 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:147. 30 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:210. 31 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:179. 32 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:479.

72  Positioning of Science and Technology 33 “Marx and The Issue of Technology.” Selected Translations of Science of Science, 1981(1). 34 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:597. 35 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:20–21. 36 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:530–31. 37 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 36). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:47. 38 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 35). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1971:221. 39 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:5–6. 40 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 22). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1965:400. 41 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:385. 42 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 20). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1971:382. 43 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:203. 44 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 20). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1971:551. 45 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:899. 46 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:874. 47 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:876. 48 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:878–79. 49 Complete Works of Lenin. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990:290. 50 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:664. 51 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:331. 52 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:518. 53 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:932. 54 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:413–14. 55 P. Lafargue, Moore and the General. Translated by the Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982. 56 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:389–90. 57 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:58. 58 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:570. 59 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:459.

Positioning of Science and Technology  73 60 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 19). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1963:424. 61 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:310. 62 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:331. 63 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:518. 64 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 65 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 66 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:446. 67 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:94. 68 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:531. 69 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:117. 70 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:445. 71 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:599. 72 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:442. 73 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 23). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:420. 74 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 23). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:698–99. 75 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:602. 76 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:433. 77 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:599. 78 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 34). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2008:119–20. 79 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:648. 80 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:357. 81 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:874. 82 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:443. 83 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 23). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:420. 84 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:599. 85 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:451. 86 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1982:287.

74  Positioning of Science and Technology 87 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:259. 88 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:260. 89 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:279–80. 90 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:387. 91 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:222–23. 92 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:251–52. 93 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:855–56. 94 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 33). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004:346. 95 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007:412. 96 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:313. 97 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:444. 98 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:184. 99 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 100 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:366. 101 N. Rosenberg. Inside the Black Box. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982:34. 102 “Marx and the Issue of Technology.” Selected Translations of Science of Science, 1981(1). 103 K. Marx, Mathematical Manuscript of Marx. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1975:85–137, 204–29. 104 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:650. 105 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 26, Ⅰ, Ⅱ, Ⅲ). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, 1973, 1974. 106 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 26, Ⅰ, Ⅲ). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972, 1974. 107 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 42). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:5–42, 239–71. 108 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007:292. 109 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2007:292. 110 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:395. 111 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:428–29. 112 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:444. 113 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:735.

Positioning of Science and Technology  75 114 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358. 115 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:357. 116 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:445–46. 117 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:445–46. 118 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:333–34. 119 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:427. 120 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:445–46. 121 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:245–46. 122 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:396. 123 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:326.

2

Science and Technology in Historical Practice

Science and technology are highly permeable sociocultural activities, which have a complex interaction and symbiosis with other sociocultural forms. On the one hand, science and technology activities are always carried out in a certain sociocultural environment, which is inevitably affected by various cultural factors. On the other hand, the development of science and technology, as a cultural form, will have a broad impact on other aspects of sociocultural life. It is from this basic concept that Marx began to analyze the form of science and technology and their development process.

2.1 Science and Technology in Production Practice Production practice is the most primitive form of human practice; it is not only the “parent body” that incubates science and technology but also the “fertile soil” for the growth of science and technology. In the history of human development, production practice has been based on technology from the very beginning, so its development also benefits from the progress of science and technology. 2.1.1 Division of Labor, Collaboration and Labor Technology The view of labor is the most important view of Marxism. The scientific category of labor is the cornerstone of the theoretical system of Marxism, the junction of the unified three parts of Marxism and the real origin of historical materialism and technological thought. As every child knows, if any nation ceases to work, it will perish in a few weeks, let alone a year. Children also know that it takes different and certain amounts of total social labor to get the quantities of products that are compatible with different needs.1 It can be said that a history of social development is a history of labor development. It was in the history of labor that Marx found the key to understanding all social history.2 The emergence and development of technology are determined by labor from the very beginning, while labor is based on technology at the outset and develops with the progress of technology. DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-4

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  77 2.1.1.1 Division of Labor and Its Technology Division of labor is an important way of human labor, and it is also the cornerstone for Marx to explore the law of social development. Marx attached great importance to the study of division of labor and often took the analysis in this regard as the logical starting point of his theoretical system. His important works of different periods contain special discussions on division of labor. For example, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (“Need, Production and Division of Labor”), The Poverty of Philosophy (“Division of Labor and Machine”), German Ideology (“Feuerbach”) and Das Kapital (Vol. 1, “Collaboration,” “Division of Labor and Handicraft Workshops”) discuss the division of labor issues from different angles. Marx’s analysis of division of labor is based on the formation and establishment of the capitalist mode of production. In works such as Das Kapital, he discussed in detail the development from cottage craft and handicraft workshops to large-scale mechanized industry, while the main thread running through this analysis process is the development of division of labor, which is also the condition and path for the transition from handicraft workshops to large-scale mechanized industry. We usually use the noun form “division of labor” and the verb form “divide the work,” with the former regarded as a result of the movement of the latter. The term “division of labor” has two meanings: the basic form of all production hitherto has been division of labor, which is, on the one hand, within society and, on the other, within each individual production facility.3 The first type of division of labor is that social labor is divided into different labor departments; the second type of division of labor occurs in the production of a commodity, and it is therefore not within society but within the same factory.4 The former is the so-called social division of labor (general or special division of labor), while the latter especially indicates the division of labor process (individual division of labor). In fact, the two are closely related, and the former is based on the latter. Firstly, individual division of labor presupposes social division of labor. It is only by the division of social labor which develops in the exchange of goods that the different sectors of labor are separated from each other, and each particular sector is engaged in specialized labor; within this specialized labor there will be division of labor and decomposition of specialized labor. Secondly, it is evident that the second type of division of labor is bound to, in turn, expand the first type of division of labor. In the first place, the second type of division of labor has something in common with all other productive forces, that is, it shortens the labor required to produce a certain use value, thus freeing up labor for a new sector of social labor. In the second place, as is its own peculiarity, the second type of division of labor can divide a profession into parts through its decomposition process; the result is that the components of the same use value can now be produced as separate commodities, or it may be said that the different types of the same use value, which used to belong to the same field of production, now belong to different fields of production due to the decomposition of individual fields of production.5

78  Science and Tech in Historical Practice Throughout the history of human development, the labor mode can be divided into three basic forms: individual labor mode, simple cooperative labor mode and division-of-labor cooperative labor mode. Human productive labor has been a social activity from the very beginning; while division of labor is the socialization form of human production labor, it unfolds under conditions such as laborers’ physiological differences, social commodity exchange patterns and improvement of means of production, exists in social production activities and evolves with the development of social production. In the process of production labor, division of labor, which revolves around the question of “how to divide and optimize the labor process,” is that laborers are engaged in a variety of different but interrelated and complementary work, which then gives rise to the technological form of division of labor. It sets out from the specific characteristics of laborers and means of production, divides them reasonably, combines them optimally and connects them organically, in order to achieve the purpose of labor efficiently. Division of labor is the collaboration of many workers who produce different parts of the same commodity under the direction of one capital; each particular part of the commodity requires a particular kind of labor, namely, a particular operation, meaning that each worker, or group of workers, performs a particular task, while others perform other tasks.6 Here, division and combination of labor are mutually conditional. The entire production process of a commodity is represented by some combination of operations or a mixture of multiple operations, and these operations do not depend on each other, but complement each other and coexist. Here, various processes complement each other not in the future but in the present, while the result is that a commodity manufactured at one end will obtain its finished form at the other.7 It can be seen that division of labor and collaboration have the characteristics of labor mode; it involves not only the material and technical basis of labor, worker skills, but also the organization and combination between workers, so it is a more advanced technical form than machine technology and labor skills. We can not only pay attention to the tools, machines, labor skills and other technical factors in the production process, nor can we only see the specific phenomena of division of labor, but see the technical attributes of division of labor and take it as a form of organizational technology. According to Marx, it is based on the understanding of the technical attributes and efficiency of division of labor that capitalists consciously retain and promote the development of division of labor technology. Collaboration or handicraft workshops, both based on division of labor, were initially spontaneously formed. Once division of labor was consolidated and extended to a certain extent, it became the conscious, planned and systematic form of the capitalist mode of production. The history of handicraft workshops shows that the division of labor peculiar to handicraft workshops was at first based on experience, as if taking proper form secretly, but later, just like what the guilds had done, they tried to preserve the available forms of division of labor, in some cases for hundreds of years.8

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  79 2.1.1.2 Collaboration and Its Technology In Marx’s view, when many people work together in a planned way in the same process of production, or in different but interrelated production processes, this form of labor is known as “collaboration.”9 Collaboration is an ancient way of collective work, which can be traced back to ancient times. In the early days of human culture, among hunting-gathering peoples, or in the agriculture of the Indian communes, the kind of collaboration that dominated the process of labor was based, on the one hand, on public ownership of the conditions of production, and on the other hand, just as a single bee is inseparable from a hive, it was based on the fact that individuals had not yet left the umbilical cord of the clan or commune. These two points make this collaboration different from capitalist collaboration. Large-scale collaboration, occasionally employed in colonies in the ancient world, the Middle Ages and modern times, is based on direct relations of domination and slavery, and mostly based on slavery.10 There are two basic forms of collaboration, namely, simple collaboration and complex collaboration (or division of labor). Simple collaboration is based on individual labor; its characteristic is that many workers participate and cooperate in the same production process where there is no detailed division of labor. Complex collaboration, which is based on division of labor, is characterized by the reasonably and orderly divided labor process or object, thereby forming fixed division of labor. Marx systematically analyzed collaboration, especially the simple ways of collaboration in the early days of capitalism, pointing out that collaboration has many advantages over individual labor. For example, the same thing can be produced in less time by collaboration than by the same number of people working separately, or that collaboration can produce use value that in other cases is simply impossible to produce.11 In the case of the same number of working days, collaboration among workers can produce more use value than their separate work, thus reducing the labor time necessary to produce some utility.12 Collaboration is a specific labor mode created by people in order to effectively achieve a certain labor purpose; it has technical attributes and characteristics and can be called a form of collaborative technology. For example, several bricklayers stand in a row and pass the bricks from the bottom of the scaffold to the top; everyone is doing the same thing, and these individual operations constitute a continuous part of an overall operation, becoming specific stages of the entire labor process that each brick must pass through.13 Compared with today’s conveyor belt, the two types of transport systems are functionally identical despite the differences in operating principle, materials and composition. Why do we refer to the successor as a technical system and not affirm the technical attributes of the predecessor? From the perspective of technology composition, collaboration technology can be expressed as: in order to achieve certain production objectives, a large number of workers are deployed and arranged in parallel in a certain proportion according to the attributes of the labor object or the needs of the production process, so as to

80  Science and Tech in Historical Practice form a collective work mechanism of collaborative efforts. Collaboration is first of all a direct collaborative action – not mediated by exchange – implemented by a number of workers for the production of the same outcome, the same product or the same use value (or the same utility). In this way the workers are concentrated in the same place, working at the same time, performing the same operation instead of different ones, but they must act simultaneously in order to achieve a certain result (or at a certain time).14 In the process of simple cooperation, many workers participate in the same production activities and make concerted efforts for the same production purpose, but the actions performed by each laborer are not substantially different from those performed by them when doing the same kind of labor on their own. Many craftsmen engaged in the same or the same kind of work (e.g., paper making, typecasting or needle making) are employed simultaneously in the same workshop by the same capitalist – this is collaboration in its simplest form. Each of these craftsmen (perhaps with a helper or two) manufactures the whole commodity and thus performs sequentially the various operations required to produce it. He continues to work in the original handicraft mode.15 Collaborative technology has created new organizational mechanisms and productivity on the basis of a single worker completing the whole process of production independently. The issue here is not just that individual productivity is increased through collaboration, but that productivity is created; the productivity itself must be collective, a new force created by the fusion of many forces into one total force.16 Marx cited Aberthnot’s work to prove his point, that is, at harvest time or any emergencies, the work would be done better and faster if a large number of laborers could work together. For example, at harvest time, in addition to two laborers driving, two loading, two carrying and two harrowing, all the others are working on the heaps or in the barns, and what they’ve done will be twice as much as the work done by the same number of people working separately on individual farms.17 What matters in simple collaboration is the sum total of manpower; it seems like a giant monster with multiple pairs of eyes and arms replaces an individual with only one pair of eyes and arms.18 That’s why the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, while the reason is that the operation mechanism of synergetic coupling is formed between each labor unit. Just as the mechanical structure of bow and arrow is different from the simple superposition of bow, string and arrow, collaboration also goes beyond the simple accumulation of individual laborers and forms a new mechanism and function of collaboration technology. The superiority or effect of collaboration is endowed by the mechanism of collaboration technology. In Marx’s view, collaboration technology, with a simple structure, is the basis for the development of social technologies such as division of labor. Collaboration is a general form, which is the basis of all social combinations aimed at increasing the productivity of social labor, and further professional divisions are found in any of them. But at the same time collaboration itself is a special form that coexists with its more developed and specialized form (just as it is a form of development beyond its previous stages). As a form distinct from and separate from its own further stages of development or division of profession, collaboration is the most

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  81 primitive, simplest and the most abstract; as far as its simplicity and simple form are concerned, collaboration remains the basis and prerequisite of all its more advanced forms.19 2.1.1.3 Form of Labor Technology Labor is always carried out on a certain technological basis. How to work? How to work most efficiently? That in itself poses a technological problem. Labor technology revolves around the solution of these practical problems. The “sequence” of activities that labor presents in time, or the “mode” or “mechanism” of activities formed in space, is the form of labor technology. Labor is a process where multiple factors advance in a collaborative manner, and labor technology is the collaborative and interactive mechanism for these factors. The simple factors of labor process include purposeful activities or labor itself, objects of labor and means of labor.20 Purposeful laborers are the core factor of labor technology. In the process of labor, human activities with the aid of means of labor will bring predetermined changes to the objects of labor. The labor process disappears into products. Labor is combined with the objects of labor. Labor is objectified and objects are processed.21 The laborer is the originator of the labor process, and he organizes and controls the labor process with his physical strength and intelligence. Real labor takes tools as its own means and materials as its own activities. Real labor is the process of taking these objects as living organisms and organs of labor itself.22 It is through the organization and control of these labor factors that the laborer has formed realistic productivity. Means of labor are the material basis of labor development. Labor capacity works because it is in contact, process and connection with object factors; without these factors, labor capacity is impossible to achieve. These factors may be collectively referred to as means of labor. But it is necessary to divide the means of labor into the objects of processing (known as the materials of labor) and real means of labor. These objects (which need not be an instrument, but can be, for example, a chemical process) are placed as a means of human labor and activity between themselves and real means of labor to conduct human activity.23 Means of labor are also a component of productivity. Labor productivity is determined by a variety of conditions, including the average level of proficiency of workers, the level of development of science and its technological application, the social integration of production processes, the scale and efficiency of means of production and the natural conditions.24 In Marx’s view, the objects of labor can be divided into two categories: naturally existing objects of labor and raw materials. All those which, by labor, are only separated from the earth in its immediate connection, are naturally existing objects of labor, such as fish caught from water, trees cut down in virgin forests and ore mined from underground mines. In contrast, the objects of labor which have been “filtered” by previous labor are called raw materials, such as the ore that is being washed after being extracted. All raw materials are objects of labor, but not all objects of labor are raw materials. The objects of labor are

82  Science and Tech in Historical Practice the raw materials only when they have changed through labor.25 In terms of the social labor process, the product of one labor process can also be the object of another labor process. In addition to raw material production, the material itself has always gone through the previous labor process. What appears as materials of labor in one sector of labor, and thus as raw materials, may appear as results in another sector. Even most of what is regarded as a natural product, such as the plants and animals in their present form, which are now used and reproduced by man, are the result of changes over many generations, under human control and with the help of human labor.26 As the organizer and implementer of labor, laborers devote themselves to the labor process, which requires not only physical effort, but also the coordination and participation of factors such as intelligence, will and skills. No individual can act on nature unless his muscles are in action under the control of his own mind. As in the natural body, the head and hands are an organic whole; the process of labor unites mental labor with manual labor.27 If we set aside the specific nature of productive activity, thus putting aside the useful nature of labor, there’s just a little bit of labor left: it is the cost of human labor. Although sewing and knitting are different kinds of production activities, they both cost laborers’ brains, muscles, nerves, hands and so on; both of them are human labor in this sense.28 In fact, labor can be divided into simple labor and complex labor; there are obvious differences between them in physical and intellectual consumption and value creation. The more complex labor is only self-multiplication or rather a multiplicity of simple labor, therefore, a small amount of complex labor equals a large amount of simple labor.29 Actually, this difference root is rooted in the difference of labor technology. Labor is a purposeful and planned activity of human beings, with intelligent features such as conception, design and error correction. We are examining the form of labor that is exclusively human. The activities of spiders are similar to those of weavers; the ability of bees to build hives has put many architects to shame. But the worst architect, from the very beginning, is superior to the most dexterous bee since he has conceived the hive in his own mind before building it with bee wax. The results obtained at the end of the process of labor already exist in the representation of laborers, in other words, ideologically exist at the beginning of the process.30 The intelligence of laborers is not only embodied in the organization and optimization of labor, but also in the structure and function of labor products. The labor of producing exchange value is realized in the identity of goods as general equivalents; as a purposeful productive activity, labor is realized in the infinite diversity of the use value of commodities.31 The infinite variety of labor products is the fruit of the wisdom of laborers. Labor also requires laborers to have necessary operating skills, and these skills can be obtained through acquired learning and training. A certain amount of education or training is required to change the nature of ordinary people so that they can acquire certain skills and techniques in the labor sector and become developed and specialized labor forces, and this costs more or less some commodity equivalents. The cost of educating labor forces varies with the complexity of their

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  83 nature.32 At the same time, laborers also need the support of non-intellectual factors such as will and perseverance to ensure the effective realization of the purpose of labor. In addition to the organs which are needed while working, there is also a need for a purposeful will, which is expressed as attention, throughout the working hours. Moreover, if the content of work and its ways and methods fail to attract the laborer, and he cannot enjoy it as his own physical and intellectual activity, then this purposeful is especially needed.33 2.1.2 Industrial Technology and Management Technology What to produce? How to produce? These two questions have been the axis of social material production, as well as the hotbed of breeding and promoting industrial technology. The technological system built by material production activities is industrial technology, which is the realistic foundation of social production practice, and directly determines the economic benefits of economic activities. Starting from the characteristics and development law of capitalist production, Marx emphatically analyzed the forms of agricultural technology, handicraft technology and industrial technology, as well as the forms of industrial technology such as animal husbandry technology, transportation technology and construction technology, thereby forming a relatively complete industrial technology thought. 2.1.2.1 Industrial Technology Marx lived in a period of historical transformation from agricultural civilization to industrial civilization. The supporting function of agriculture to industrial development made Marx pay attention to agricultural problems from the very beginning. Agricultural production is to change and control the factors that affect the growth of crops and to simulate and create a good natural environment conducive to the high yield of crops. Agricultural technology is gradually created through the long-term agricultural production practice, and it is the condensation and externalization of agricultural production experience. In terms of its connotation, agricultural technology is an organic system that, based on the climate, soil and other natural conditions and the law of crop breeding, implements artificial intervention in the crop breeding process or germplasm, and consists of the links of cultivation, farming, management, protection and harvesting. Agriculture is a special type of production because organic processes have been added to mechanical and chemical processes, while the natural reproduction process needs only supervision and guidance.34 Marx talked about people’s technological intervention in crop growth on many occasions. For example, to control the natural force for the sake of making economical use of it, and to occupy or tame nature by constructing large-scale projects with manpower – this necessity plays the most decisive role in the history of industry, just like the water control projects in Egypt, Lombardy and the Netherlands, or in places such as India and Persia, where artificial channels are used to irrigate the land, not only to

84  Science and Tech in Historical Practice provide the soil with adequate water but also to allow mineral fertilizers to flow down the mountains along with silt. Irrigation was the secret to the industrial prosperity of Arab Spain and Sicily.35 In terms of its extension, agricultural technology is manifested in a variety of specific forms due to different factors such as crop species, region and climate. Although there are many differences between various forms of agricultural technology, they can always be classified into two categories: agronomic process technology and variety technology. Agronomic process technology, which takes the crop growth process as an organizational clue, is an organic system composed of cultivation, farming, management, protection, harvesting and other links based on production materials; it features a loose structure, strong plasticity and periodicity, as well as complex and trivial contents. Variety technology refers to the organic system composed of seed selection and breeding methods for improving crop germplasm, as well as instruments and equipment and their operating procedures; it has the characteristics of the agronomic process and technical form, with relatively high intensity and strong scientific nature.36 With the development of capitalism, the smallholder mode of production had become outdated, hindering the development of industrial production and the popularization and application of advanced agricultural technology. Under the small-piece land system, land is purely a means of production for its owners, but the fertility of the land decreases with the extent to which it is divided. The use of machines to cultivate the land, the division of labor and large-scale soil improvement measures (e.g., drainage and irrigation canals) are becoming increasingly impossible; however, the non-productive cost of tilling land increases in proportion to the fragmentation of the means of production itself.37 According to Marx, the industrialization of capitalism, marked by the machine, was the advanced productive force of the time, for it required that the smallholder mode of production should be replaced by the mode of large-scale agricultural production, and a new form of agricultural technology marked by mechanization should be constructed, so as to realize the industrialization of agricultural production.38 It was major industry that provided a firm foundation for capitalist agriculture by means of machines, which disenfranchised the vast majority of the rural population, separated agriculture from rural cottage industry and destroyed the foundation of the rural cottage industry – spinning and weaving. In this way, it conquered the entire domestic market for industrial capital.39 There were fewer people working in the fields, but the land produced was much or more than it used to be, for the revolution in land ownership was accompanied by improvements in farming methods, expansion of collaboration, accumulation of means of production and so on.40 The handicraft industry, which is based on the private possession of the means of production and individual labor, uses simple tools and relies on manual labor to produce goods in small batches. In addition to the processing of agricultural and animal husbandry products, the handicraft industry mainly organizes production to satisfy the social demand for means of production, daily necessities, handicrafts, luxury goods, etc. It is characterized by a wide range of production fields, a great variety of products, a low degree of standardization, simple labor materials, high

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  85 production costs, low efficiency, long cycle and low organic composition of capital. As the predecessor of the modern machine industry, the handicraft industry experienced two historical stages: small (cottage) industry and workshop industry. Handicraft technology is formed and developed in the long process of manual labor. It is driven by human, animal or natural forces, with the scale of the technological system mainly limited to the scale comparable to the human body, and difficult to expand into ultra-small or ultra-large activities. Handicraft technology can be divided into production technology and product technology. Production technology, which is developed on the basis of workers’ operational skills, is characterized by a small proportion of external physical and chemical technological factors and is the result that sporadic physical and chemical technological factors are gradually incorporated into the sequence of operational skills. Physical and chemical technological factors with tools as the core have replaced people’s body parts and their motor skills and changed the operation sequence or mode of people’s original purposeful activities, thus a loose diachronic structure is constructed which takes the process of goal realization as the organizational clue. Handicraft technology, which is based on the physical skills of workers, features a simple, flexible and adaptable system structure. The degree of dexterity with which a tool is operated marks the level of handicraft technology. Improving handicraft technology is nothing more than finding a new way to make a product with fewer laborers or in less time than before.41 In the stage of small handicraft industry, craftsmen were engaged in multiple processes of product production with simple tools, and production technology was mainly represented by the craft or operating skill of craftsmen. A craftsman who completed each process successively for manufacturing a product had to change workstations and tools from time to time. However, switching from one operation to another would interrupt his workflow and create gaps in his working hours. Labor productivity depended not only on the skill of laborers but also on the perfection of their tools.42 At this stage, the division of labor was underdeveloped; every worker must be familiar with the whole process and do everything that can be done with his tools. Therefore, anyone who wanted to be a master must be aware of everything about his trade.43 In the stage of the workshop handicraft industry, simple collaboration was replaced by division of labor. The operations were no longer performed by the same craftsman in chronological order, but separated, isolated and spatially juxtaposed; each operation was assigned to a craftsman, and all operations were performed simultaneously by collaborators.44 In this period, the craft of workers began to specialize, and production technology was manifested as the division of labor and collaboration in the production process, as well as workers’ operation of special tools (machines), which promoted the directional and diversified development of production tools and created conditions for the emergence of machines. In the stage of workshop handicraft industry, tools of labor became simplified, improved and diversified, as well as specialized for workers engaged in separate production process, creating one of the material conditions for manufacturing of machines, since a machine is a combination of several simple tools.45

86  Science and Tech in Historical Practice The large-scale mechanized industry was conceived and grew up in the “matrix” of workshop handicraft industry. Starting from the middle of the 18th century, the industrial revolution, with large-scale mechanized industry replacing handicraft workshops as the core, took place in succession in some major capitalist countries in Europe, as well as in the United States. The division of labor, the use of water power and especially steam power, and the application of machinery are the three great levers with which industry had shaken the foundations of the world since the middle of the 18th century.46 The industrial revolution was accompanied by a series of major changes in labor technology and production organization: handicraft technology was replaced by industrial technology and handicraft workshops by factories using machines, thus forming a large-scale mechanized industry. Industrial technology, which was formed and developed on the basis of handicraft technology, can be divided into process technology and industrial product technology. Machines or machine systems were incorporated into the sequence of production activities, constantly replacing the functions of body movements or simple tools in technological processes and forming an industrial-technological system with machines or machine systems as the skeleton. The characteristics of the industrial-technological system include the continuity of production (i.e., the continuity of the stages through which raw materials are processed), automation (workers are needed only for accidental troubleshooting) and fast operation. Thanks to the use of machines, it’s possible for all laborers to work simultaneously. For example, when making the nib of a pen, the machine could cut, perforate and slit the billet in a single run.47 In the industrial-technological system, which is different from handicraft technology, the skills of workers gradually took a secondary position, while the machine or machine system representing the materialization of skills began to play a dominant role. Machine technology originates from the imitation of manual labor skills, and it is the product of ingenious conception, elaborate design and precise manufacturing of technological developers. As Marx said, the skill of manual workers in using the tools of labor is transferred from workers to the machine with the tools of labor. The efficiency of tools is liberated from the physical constraints of human labor.48 Marx also revealed the similarity between machine tools and manual tools by means of comparison and analogy on the basis of the analysis of handicraft technology. In his view, if we look closely at the machine tools, what then appears before us is largely the same apparatus and tools used by craftsmen, although they vary greatly in form; however, they are not the tools of men, but the tools of a facility or machine. So, a machine tool is a mechanism that, after obtaining the proper movement, uses its own tools to perform the operations previously performed by workers with similar tools.49 In the process of industrial revolution with the mechanization of operations as the core, worker skills were constantly externalized into the delicate structure of machines, and the mechanical operation of machines replaced the manual operation of workers, which is one of the characteristics of the industrial process technology. At the same time, the emergence of a large number of machine inventions urgently required a strong and stable driving

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  87 force. The improvement of the steam engine and its incorporation into a variety of machine systems was another important characteristic of the industrial process technology at that time. Industrial process technology, which is a multi-link technological system that follows the product formation process, contains more physical and chemical technological factors and features weaker dependence on the operational skills of workers. The formation and development of industrial process technology, which has undergone a long term, is always around the realization of mass production of new products, or improvement of the production efficiency of old products. In Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 and other works, Marx had specially examined grinding, spinning, paper-making, casting, pen manufacturing and other technological processes and their evolution. Industrial process technology not only reduces industrial production costs and increases output, but also stimulates the expansion of industrial product types and specifications. A wide variety of industrial products with perfect functions has enabled mankind to put an end to the handicraft era where goods were scarce and expensive and to enter the era of industrial civilization where there is abundant supply and colorful life. 2.1.2.2 Management Technology In the process of simple individual labor, the organization and coordination of production is not an outstanding problem. However, for the socialized labor process, the organization and management of production become an indispensable condition, since socialized production requires a great number of workers to use the means of labor, and there shall be interlinked production processes and interactive businesses. At the same time, the human, financial and material resources used for production also need to be rationally allocated through the market. It is in this sense that Marx said that all large-scale direct social labor or collective labor requires more or less direction so as to coordinate the activities of individuals and carry out production activities as a whole. It’s just like how a fiddler is a conductor himself, but a band needs a separate conductor. Once the labor subordinated to capital becomes collaborative labor, the function of management, supervision and regulation becomes the function of capital. As a special function of capital, this management function therefore acquires a special property.50 How to organize and manage production activities effectively becomes the core problem to be solved by management technology. Management is the main type of human purposeful activity; it widely exists in many fields of social life and is indispensable for a state and countless families. The opposition between capital and wage labor determines that the organization and management of capitalist production are aimed at extracting the surplus labor of wage workers, which was the value direction of the construction and operation of the production management system at that time. The management of capitalists is not only a special function generated by the nature of social labor and belonging to it, but also a function of exploiting the social labor process, thus determined by the inevitable confrontation between the exploiter and the material he exploits. As

88  Science and Tech in Historical Practice the means of production, as the property of others in opposition to wage workers, increases in size, the need to supervise the rational use of these means of production has also increased. If the management of capitalism is dualistic in its content (because the production process under its management is dualistic: there is a social labor process of making products, and a process of increasing the value of capital), then it is autocratic in its form. With the development of large-scale collaboration, this autocracy developed its own peculiar form: capitalists transfer the direct and constant supervision of individual workers and groups of workers to specialized wage workers. Just as an army needs officers and sergeants, large numbers of workers working together for the same capital also require the command of officers (managers) and sergeants (overseers) in the course of labor.51 It can be seen that production management technology is necessary for socialized mass production and also the fundamental guarantee for capital to extract surplus value effectively. In Marx’s view, the capitalist production management technology mainly has four characteristics. Firstly, it supervises the whole process of production. The nature of capital to obtain surplus value as much as possible makes the antagonism of capitalist production particularly prominent. So, the supervision of workers’ labor has become a necessary link and an important function of production management technology for ensuring the efficient and orderly progress of the production process. Workers work under the supervision of the capitalist, and their labor belongs to him. The capitalist watches over the operation of workers, so as to ensure the proper use of the means of production, that is, raw materials are not wasted, tools of labor are cherished and the damage of these tools is limited to the extent necessary to wear out when they are used in work.52 Modern industry has, so to speak, transformed the little paternalistic workshops into the great factories of industrial capitalists. The masses of workers packed into factories are managed like soldiers, and they are common soldiers of the industrial army, watched over by sergeants and officers of all ranks.53 Secondly, it organizes and schedules the production process. With the transition from cottage industry to machine industry, the means of production, the division of labor and the process of production have become increasingly complex, and the procurement of raw materials and product sales involve varied and changeable market factors, thus presenting an urgent need for a production plan that organizes production activities on time, dynamically adjusts production activities according to the specific situations of raw materials, product sales and production progress and improves production efficiency. In the early days of the machine industry, a pyramid management organization, with the owner at the apex, different partners in charge of each department and a small number of skilled workers controlling the labor process, is initially formed to adapt to the division of labor, collaboration and specialization among workers in the direct labor process. With the collaboration of many wage workers, the command of capital develops into the necessary condition for the progress of the labor process, and also into the actual conditions of production. Now the orders from the capitalist cannot be absent in the

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  89 workplace, just like soldiers must obey the orders of their general on the battlefield.54 In the process of production, capital develops into the command of labor, that is, the working force or the workers themselves. The personified capital, or the capitalist, supervises the workers to work regularly and with due intensity.55 Thirdly, it standardizes workers’ labor. The division of labor, which is established on the basis of large-scale mechanized industry, simplifies the labor of workers but increases the requirements for the standardization of various types of work. As a result, workers must be trained, each type of work must be standardized and in strict accordance with the operating rules and all processes are connected as precisely as machines. To work on a machine, workers need to be trained from an early age to adapt their movements to the uniform and continuous motion of the machine. So long as the general machine itself is a system of various machines acting simultaneously and being joined together, the collaboration based on it requires the assignment of different groups of workers to different machines.56 The main difficulty of automated factories is to establish necessary disciplines, so as to get workers out of irregular working habits and harmonize them with the consistent regularity of large automata.57 Fourth, it establishes and improves the factory system. If in the early stage of capitalist development, the organization and management of the production process are still empirical and irregular, then with the continuous improvement of the degree of socialization of labor, the standardization and scientific degree of production management technology will be significantly enhanced. With the simple collaboration between machines or the popularization and application of machine systems, the production organization and management tend to be complicated, thus giving birth to a new form of production organization – the factory. The factory system is the product of systematization, normalization and institutionalization of production management technology, the embodiment of the capitalist will and also a social technological system for organizing and managing largescale machine production. The advanced labor organization compatible with the machine system based on capitalism is the factory system, which is dominant even in modern large-scale agriculture, but more or less deformed due to the characteristics of agriculture.58 From a socio-technological point of view, a factory is a giant machine, every production unit and every worker are a part of it with their own tasks and responsibilities. These parts, or components, must work hard and in concert with each other to do what the machine is supposed to do so that the giant machine of the factory can run efficiently. To perfect the factory system, the first thing to do is to establish the corresponding labor organization according to the objective operational requirements of the machine system. After the separation, independence and isolation of operations, workers are separated, classified and grouped according to their specialty.59 Second, all kinds of rules and regulations shall be established and improved. Production activities need to be organized and promoted according to rules and regulations, so as to clarify the job responsibilities of workers, and then standardize worker operations and production organization. Third, standardization construction of factories shall be promoted. It is an

90  Science and Tech in Historical Practice important aspect of factory system construction and the basic content of scientific production management to establish and introduce various production standards, strengthen workers’ technical training and carry out serial production according to the standards. 2.1.3 Conscious Application of Technical Science Upon the birth of technical science, which is an epoch-making event in the history of industrial technology, the popularization and application of technical achievements gradually became a conscious action of the bourgeoisie in pursuit of profit. As the product of technological scientization, technical science is a form of knowledge that focuses on the effect and efficiency of technical process and exists in all kinds of specific production processes. Technical science of different types, which elaborates on all kinds of technical processes in production, reflects people’s understanding of concrete processes and links in production. Technical science reveals human’s dynamic relationship to nature, the direct production processes of human life, as well as the direct production processes of humans’ social life relationships and the resulting spiritual concepts.60 From an epistemological point of view, technical science directly answers “how to do it” and “how to do it more effectively,” and features the unity of knowledge and practice. Science pursues knowledge and an understanding of natural laws, while the purpose of scientific knowledge is to practice. Technology, which is based on knowledge, pursues practice and strives for the unity of knowledge and practice. Since practice contains knowledge, it is thus more concrete than knowledge. The principle of machine production is to break down the production process into its constituent stages and employ mechanics, chemistry and other natural sciences to solve the resulting problems. This principle is decisive everywhere.61 In the realm of technical science, the transformation of scientific knowledge into technological knowledge is a movement from abstraction to concreteness. Originating from production practice, technical science is a practical science that takes industrial technology as the research object and orients toward production and application. The principle of large-scale industry is, first of all, to decompose every production process into its constituent elements, thereby creating a completely modern technical science. The forms of the social production process, which are variegated, seemingly disconnected and fixed, are broken down into the applications of natural sciences which are self-consciously planned and systematically classified for achieving desired effects.62 The research results of technical science, which are mainly manifested in the design of technological systems and the disclosure of the relationship between technological units in the production process, will give rise to optimal procedures, methods and operating rules, so as to standardize and guide the development of production activities. Technical science also reveals some basic forms of motion; in spite of a variety of tools being employed, all production activities of humans must take place in these forms of motion, just like machines, no matter how complicated they are, are in the repetitive motion of simple mechanical forces.63 In short, reasonable and outstanding

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  91 technologies, which are developed on basis of technical science, can fully guarantee the quality of products and improve production efficiency. According to Marx, technical science is the purposeful and planned application of science. Its emergence is a major event in the history of industrial technology, marking the fusion of science and technology and their wide application in production. Since then, the evolution of industrial technology began to get rid of the old way of experience groping and embarked on the road of conscious exploration under the light of reason. The rationalization of society inevitably requires the scientization of production, which in turn leads to the rise of technical science. Since modern times, technical science has become an important means to adapt to social development and deal with industrial competition. In fact, any social production activities, despite their respective procedures and methods, are beset by the universal problems of pursuing the best effect and the highest efficiency. This implies that the principles of technical science derived from industrial production activities can be extended and applied to other fields of production, so as to transform the production process into the application of science in technology64 and guide and support the continuous optimization of various production activities. In the process of scientization of technology, different production sectors, such as machinery manufacturing, chemistry, metallurgy, paper-making, construction, agronomy, horticulture and animal husbandry, have come up with diverse types of technical science, thereby showing the development trend of industrial technology. For example, agronomy is an applied science that studies crop cultivation. In the era of capitalism, with the rapid development of chemistry, biology and other related disciplines, agronomy has gradually gotten rid of the traditional mode of experience exploration and embarked on the road based on scientific theory, becoming a hotbed of breeding new agricultural techniques. With the development of natural science and agronomy, the fertility of the land is changing because of the changes in the means by which the various factors of the land can be put to immediate use. Some land is considered bad not because of its chemical composition, but because of mechanical and physical obstacles to its cultivation. So, once the means are found to overcome these obstacles, it becomes a good plot of land.65 One of the great achievements of the capitalist mode of production is that, on the one hand, it has transformed agriculture from the empirical and rigid methods of management inherited from the least developed parts of society into the conscious scientific application of agronomy, so far as it is generally possible under conditions of private ownership; and on the other hand, it has rationalized agriculture and made it possible to operate in a socialized manner.66 In short, the development of agronomy has promoted the conscious development of agricultural technique, and large-scale mechanized industry has provided advanced technical equipment for the construction of new agricultural technical system; in this way, smallholder production is transformed into socialized large-scale production and industrialization of agricultural production is realized. Technical science is the product of the confluence of science and technology, as well as the predecessor of contemporary technological science and engineering

92  Science and Tech in Historical Practice science. Considering this disciplinary property of technical science, Marx sometimes referred to technical science directly as science. For example, when there is machine-based spinning, there must be machine-based weaving, and then both of them will trigger mechanical and chemical revolutions in bleaching, printing and dyeing.67 In fact, the terms “mechanical” and “chemical” here are primarily of the implications of technical science. Since the start of the 20th century, in the context of highly differentiated and highly integrated science and technology, technical science has spawned technological science and engineering science, while technical science in the modern sense is only a specific category of engineering science that has been incorporated into the overall scientific and technological system.

2.2 Science and Technology under Capital Violence The emergence of capital is an epochal event in human history, with enormous penetration and integration force changing the picture of science and technology, and affecting their development process. As the “yeast” of value multiplication, capital has found an effective way to fulfill its mission in science and technology, and through technicalization, capital is able to operate efficiently according to scientific and technological rules. It can be said that it is capital that “kidnaps” modern science and technology, which are forced to join in partnership with capital. 2.2.1 Science and Technology: “Married” to Capital and “Kidnapped” by Capital The formation of capital and its comprehensive penetration into all fields of social life are the basic characteristics of capitalist society. The capital operation, with the aim of obtaining surplus value, impacts the traditional social system and requires the integration of resources and the construction of a capitalist social operation system according to the purpose of capital. The constant aim of capitalist production is to produce the maximum surplus value or product from the minimum advance capital. In cases where the results are not obtained by the excessive labor of workers, one trend of capital is to try to produce a given product with as little cost as possible – saving labor and expense; in other words, this is a trend toward capital conservation, and this trend teaches man to expend his energy sparingly and to produce with the least amount of data.68 In the development process of capitalism, not only social production activities have been incorporated into the operation system of capital, but also the development of science and technology has been modulated and integrated by capital, becoming the main “helper” of capital expansion, and resulting in the so-called capitalization tendency. There is an identity between capital pursuing surplus value and technology pursuing efficiency: increased awareness and technical efficiency will inevitably create more value than before, which is what capital craves; capital operation in pursuit of surplus value will give priority to scientific research and technological development and bring science and technology into its orbit, which is what the development of science and technology seeks. Marx revealed the inner

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  93 connection between science and technology and capital: just as the exploitation of natural wealth can be enhanced by increasing the intensity of labor, science and technology give functional capital a capacity for expansion that does not depend on its quantity.69 Based on this natural connection, capital and science and technology soon got “married,” and their integration and interaction prompted human society to step into the era of capitalism. The connection between capital and science and technology is the basic relationship of capitalist society. The exploration of capital issues is the starting point and destination of Marx’s investigation of science and technology. It is in the process of exploring capital and its movement rules that Marx analyzed the internal relationship between capital and science and technology, and revealed many important attributes of science and technology under the capitalist system. Science and technology were cultural phenomena long before the formation of capital. Science is the product of man’s understanding of the objective world, and it has multiple cultural functions such as satisfying people’s desire for knowledge and enriching spiritual life. Technology is the sequence, mode or mechanism of purposeful human activities; it can effectively realize people’s various purposes and support the healthy operation of human society. Science and technology have multiple social functions and embody multidimensional value orientation. However, since modern times, in the process of capital penetration and expansion, the development of science and technology has been gradually brought into the orbit of capital, selected and modulated by capital, showing the characteristics of the era of capitalism. Only capitalist production transforms the process of material production into the application of science in production, but this is done only by subjecting labor to capital, only by suppressing the intellectual and professional development of the workers themselves.70 It should be noted that industrial technology is at the final stage of transformation from science and technology to real productive forces, and the application of science in production is also realized indirectly through the form of industrial technology. Capitalization of science and technology is, from the concept of capital value, the process of evaluating and regulating the development of science and technology according to the amount and speed of surplus value that can be brought. In other words, it is a process in which science and technology consciously serve capital operation and adjust their own development direction according to the need of obtaining surplus value. Yule once defended the capitalization of science by arguing that science, after being recruited to serve capital, forces the unconditional surrender of workers in all conflicts between capital and labor, guarantees capital the legitimate right to act as the head of the factory and reduces workers to a status with neither mind nor will; however, the science recruited by capital is not used to suppress the “oppressed.”71 But Marx refuted that science recruited by capital has been capitalized and used to suppress the working class. In the process of capitalization of science and technology, the economic function of science and technology was put in the first place, while other cultural functions were suppressed or emasculated. Since then, whether it is beneficial for promoting the development of productive forces, exploiting the market, creating profits and

94  Science and Tech in Historical Practice maintaining the dominant position of capital has evolved into the main basis for capital to select and support the development of science and technology. The capitalization of science and technology has changed their original process and appearance. When discussing the capitalization of science and technology, Marx pointed out that the development of natural science itself (on which all knowledge is based), like that of all knowledge connected with the process of production, was still based on capitalist production which created for the first time, to a considerable extent, the physical means of research, observation and experiment for natural science. Natural science was used by capital as a means of getting rich, and science itself became a means of getting rich for those who develop science, so, people engaged in science were competing with each other to explore the practical applications of science. Besides, invention became a special profession. With the expansion of capitalist production, scientific factors were for the first time consciously and extensively developed, applied and reflected in life, with a scale that was unimaginable in the past.72 Marx also pointed out that capitalization has further reinforced the tendency of science and technology to serve production, while the expansion of production in turn stimulated the development of science and technology. In this way, the process of production becomes the application of science, and science in turn becomes the factor of the production process, which is known as function. Each discovery forms the basis for a new invention or improvement in a production method. Only the capitalist mode of production first put natural science at the service of the direct production process; at the same time, the development of production in turn provided the means for the theoretical conquest of nature. The mission of science is to become the means to produce wealth and get rich.73 Marx further pointed out that the capitalization of science and technology has reduced them to the accomplices of capital to exploit workers’ labor and pursue surplus value. Yule once said that science at the service of capital brings the rebellious hand of labor to heel – which is particularly evident in the inventions arising from strikes.74 The inventions that Yule talked about refer to the activities of technological creation. Here machines are referred to as the master’s machines, and the machine function is said to be that of the master in the production process; the same is true of the science embodied in these machines, production methods or chemical processes. Science, to labor, manifests itself as an alien, hostile and ruling power.75 At the same time as the capitalization of science, technology is also recruited by capital as its accomplice, jointly extracting the surplus value of workers. When describing the “accomplice” role of machines – one of the technological achievements, Marx said that capitalists would use machines for the sake of confrontation. The machine has directly become the means of shortening the necessary hours of labor, a form of capital, a power of capital to control labor and a means of capital to suppress the claims of labor for independence. Here, the machine, for its own purposes, has become a form of capital hostile to labor. For example, in the cotton industry, the spinning mule and carding machine replaced the hand-spinning machine – all these machines were invented to suppress strikes.76 What needs to be explained here is

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  95 that machinery was a typical representative of the technological achievements at that time, and the capitalization of machinery was the main form of technological capitalization. According to Marx, in the process of capitalization of science and technology, the differentiated development of science and technology independent of production has inhibited the overall development of workers’ intelligence and deprived them of their basic rights of survival and development. Science becomes an independent force serving capital in opposition to labor, which generally belongs to the category in which conditions of production become independent forces opposed to labor. And it is precisely the separation and independence of science (initially beneficial only to capital) that simultaneously become the condition for tapping the development potential of science and knowledge.77 The application of science is, on the one hand, manifested as the concentration of knowledge, observation and professional secrets handed down by experience, and on the other hand, as the development of them into science for analyzing production processes and applying natural science to material production processes. The application of science is based on the separation of the intelligence of the production process from the knowledge, experience and skills of individual workers, just like the concentration and development of the production (material) conditions and their conversion into capital are based on the separation of these conditions from workers. Moreover, factory labor only acquits workers with certain methods of operation. With the spread of factory labor, apprenticeship was abolished. The struggles for child laborers to at least learn to write and read show that the application of science to the production process is consistent with the suppression of workers’ intelligence at the same time. In this case, a small number of highly skilled workers will emerge, but they are far less than those who are deprived of knowledge. 2.2.2 Capitalist Application of Machines In the process of industrialization, the emergence of machines and machine systems transformed the traditional mode of labor based on manual work and formed the mechanized mode of labor dominated by machines, hence promoting the rapid development of capitalism. However, the capitalist application of machines has produced a series of contradictory social phenomena. There is no contradiction or confrontation inseparable from the capitalist application of machines, for these contradictions and confrontations arise not from machines themselves, but from their capitalist application. The machine itself shortens working hours, while its capitalist application lengthens the working day; the machine itself reduces the intensity of labor, while its capitalist application increases labor intensity; the machine itself is the triumph of man over the forces of nature, while its capitalist application enslaves man to the forces of nature; the machine itself increases the wealth of producers, while its capitalist application turns the producers into paupers in need of relief.78 These issues drew great attention from Marx and constitute an integral part of his thought on science and technology.

96  Science and Tech in Historical Practice 2.2.2.1 Machines’ Rejection of Workers The widespread use of machines brought about major changes in the capitalist labor process, replacing manpower with natural force and empirical rules with conscious application of natural science and technical norms. Labor is thus simplified, and manpower and craftsmanship are no longer necessary. In the production process of large-scale mechanized industry, the finer the division of labor, the simpler the labor. Workers themselves, with special skills not valuable anymore, have become a simple and monotonous productive force that requires no intense physical or mental effort, and one’s work can be done by anyone else. As a result, workers are squeezed out by competitors on all sides.79 In Marx’s view, because machines replace independent skilled craftsmen with the labor which is identical, simple and at best differentiated in age and gender, and because division of labor has led to specialization of labor, all labor capacity is turned into simple capacity, and all labor into simple labor, then the total amount of labor capacity is devalued.80 Machines substitute unskilled workers for skilled ones, women for men, and children for adults; where machines were first used, they cast masses of manual workers into the streets, and where machines were improved or replaced by more efficient ones, they crowded out workers in droves.81 Through the analysis of surplus value production, Marx revealed the inherent inevitability of machines crowding out workers. Using machines to produce surplus value involves an inherent contradiction: of the two factors of surplus value provided by a given amount of capital, the only way for the machine to increase one factor (rate of surplus value) is to decrease the other factor (number of workers).82 In this regard, Marx also pointed out that the economists of the industrial age opposed a prejudice that prevailed in the industrial age, that is, it seems to be in the interest of the state, in this case, the capitalist class, to employ the maximum number of workers. Instead, the task here is to minimize the number of workers needed to produce surplus labor and to create surplus population.83 The capitalist system of production is based on workers selling their labor, while the division of labor makes this labor one-sided with only specific skills for manipulating local tools. Once the tools are operated by machines, there will be a lot of labor force left over, and the exchange value of the labor force will disappear along with its use value, thus making many workers surplus population. Some of them are to be destroyed in the struggle of the old handicraft industry against large-scale mechanized industry, and others may flock to the more accessible industrial sectors, which then increases the quantity of labor force available for capital to exploit at will and makes them much cheaper. Every improvement in machines will take away the jobs of workers, and the greater the improvement, the more workers will lose their jobs. Each improvement, therefore, is like a business crisis, with severe consequences for certain workers, such as deprivation, poverty and crime.84 Under the conditions of capitalist production, as the means of labor are gradually replaced by machines, they are transformed into capital in the course of labor and stand in opposition to the workers as dead labor, dominating and sucking the

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  97 living labor. According to Marx, the formula for the use of machines is not to shorten a working day relatively or an essential part of it, but to reduce the number of workers, that is, reduce the total working day that consists of a number of concurrent working days, and reduce the essential part of the total working day. In other words, it is to discard and get rid of a certain number of workers as surplus workers, not to mention the elimination of the specialization which develops as a result of the division of labor and the consequent devaluation of labor capacity.85 Thus, the capital properties of machines indicate that the increase in the number of machines and the decrease in the number of workers unfold simultaneously. The separation of intelligence from physical labor in the process of production, coupled with the transformation of intelligence into the power of capital to dominate labor, is accomplished in large industrial production based on machines. In front of science, in front of the great force of nature and in front of the socialized collective labor, the local skills of an empty machine laborer are as insignificant as an appendage. 2.2.2.2 Alienation of Machines as an Accomplice to Capital Chasing surplus value is the absolute law of capitalist production. Capital always tries to incorporate all factors of production into its orbit and into its governing system, so as to make them serve the fundamental purpose of obtaining maximum surplus value. In the capitalist economic system, as the means of labor, the machine is subordinate to the capitalist, branded by capital, incorporated into the capital operation system, and acts as an accomplice to the rule of capital. According to Marx, the capitalist mode of production makes labor conditions and products independent and alienated from workers, and even become mutually contradictory with the development of machines. Thus, with the advent of machines, there was the first violent revolt of the workers against the means of labor, and means of labor killed workers.86 Here the antagonism between machine (capital) and wage labor grew to the point of no return. Under the capitalist system, machines are owned by the capitalists, and the actual benefits brought by the technological progress of machines are monopolized by the capitalists, while the status of workers is declining and their situation is getting worse. The resistance of workers is undermined by the transfer of their skills to machines. Now that workers have lost the skills that predominate under the conditions of handicraft workshops, they cannot stand up to it, while capital can replace skilled workers with unskilled ones at its mercy.87 The finer the division of labor, the simpler the labor will be. Workers’ special skills are not valuable anymore, and workers themselves become a simple and monotonous productive force that requires no intense physical or mental effort. One’s work can be done by anyone else. As a result, workers are squeezed out by competitors on all sides.88 As the development of machine technology speeds up, capitalists’ dependence on machine technology is further strengthened, while their dependence on workers, especially skilled workers, tends to weaken. In the process of machine production,

98  Science and Tech in Historical Practice workers have seen their superb skills lose their place of use, and the advantage of fighting against capitalists no longer exists. When talking about the invention of the new loom, Yule said that although a band of malcontents thought they had built an impenetrable fortification on the old division of labor, they had been surrounded at the flanks, since modern machine tactics rendered their means of defense useless. They had to surrender unconditionally.89 Machine-based division of labor leads to one-sided development of workers’ talents, and further deepens their dependence on machines, factories and capitalists. As the labor capacity of workers is transformed into the simple functions of some part of the general structure which, taken as a whole, constitutes a factory, workers are no longer producers of goods. They are no more than the producer of some one-sided operation, and such operation can generally produce something only if it is linked to the whole structure that makes up the factory. Therefore, the worker is the living part of the factory, he himself becomes an adjunct to capital by the means of his labor, for his skill can only be used in a factory, and it only works as a representative of capital as opposed to workers.90 The purpose of the misuse of the machine is to transform the worker himself from an early age into a part of the local machine. In this way, not only are the costs necessary for the reproduction of the worker himself greatly reduced, but the worker has no choice but to depend on the whole factory, and hence on the capitalist.91 In the process of machine technology, what happens simultaneously with the decline in the status of workers is the continuous consolidation of capital’s dominance. Wage labor is the basis of capitalist relations of production. In possession of the means of production, the capitalist is the organizer and manager of production activities and occupies a dominant position. On the one hand, he can further replace workers’ labor skills through innovation of machine technology, so that workers will continue to lose the foundation and strength to compete with capital; on the other hand, the crowding out of workers by machines creates a relative surplus of labor and intensifies competition among workers, so that the capitalist is free to capture more of workers’ surplus labor by lengthening the working day and increasing labor intensity. At the same time, the machine-based division of labor has led to the one-sided development of workers’ ability, deepened their dependence on capital and consolidated the dominance of capital. Thus, the business owner holds the means of employment, that is, the means of livelihood of workers, meaning that the livelihood of workers depends on him; it is as if workers have reduced their life activities to mere means of making a living.92 Capitalists drive means of production to produce goods and create surplus value through the labor of wage workers, while workers themselves have nothing, but sell their labor force and labor skills to obtain the means of living, and remain in a dominated position. Under the capitalist system, productive forces and productive relations are in antagonistic contradiction. However, Marx noted that the invention of machines and their widespread application weakened the capitalists’ dependence on workers and alleviated their losses from strikes, thus reversing the passive situation of capitalists responding to workers’ resistance. Capitalists must resort to machines to fight. Here machines are a direct means of shortening the necessary labor hours,

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  99 and they have become the form of capital, the power of capital to control labor and the means by which capital suppresses all the demands of labor for independence. Machines, for their own purposes, have become a form of capital hostile to labor. All these machines are invented to suppress strikes.93 Thus, machines have become the instrument of suppressing and destroying the demands of living labor, and directly manifested as a weapon that is used partially to make workers redundant and throw them into the streets, partially to strip workers of their expertise and eliminate professional-based requirements and partially to subject workers to the tyranny and military discipline of capitalism carefully established in factories.94 Under capitalist conditions, as the labor product of workers, machines are alienated from workers to act as the ruling tool of capitalists to deal with the resistance of workers. In capitalist relations of production, machines as a means of production are owned by capitalists, the superiority of machines is used by capitalists, and then transformed into a sharp tool to suppress workers’ resistance to capitalist autocracy. Machines are not only a formidable competitor to “oversupply” wage workers at any time, but also openly and consciously declared and employed by capital as a force hostile to wage workers. Machines are the most powerful means of suppressing workers’ periodic uprisings and strikes against capitalist tyranny. In Gaskell’s words, the steam engine was from the beginning the enemy of manpower, because it enabled capitalists to crush the rising demands of workers that threatened to plunge the fledgling factory system into crisis. A whole history could be written to show that many inventions since 1830 were made only as weapons of capital against worker insurrection.95 Therefore, under capitalism, machines are the most powerful tool in the hands of the capitalist class for despotism and extortion.96 This is one of the main reasons that workers would destroy machines in the early days of capitalism. 2.2.3 Technological Form of Capital Exploitation The exploitation of wage labor by capital is achieved through the exploitation of technology. These exploitation activities have clear objectives, stable operation procedures or methods and obvious technical characteristics in accordance with technical principles and norms. Marx pointed out that only capitalist commodity production has become an epoch-making mode of exploitation which, in its historical development, has revolutionized the entire economic structure of society by the great achievements in the organization and technology of the labor process, and has surpassed all previous periods incomparably.97 Here, although Marx did not explicitly put forward the concept of “exploitative technology,” he revealed the mechanism and form of capitalist exploitative technology. Capitalists, consciously or unconsciously, exploit workers through these technological models. 2.2.3.1 Technology for Exploiting Surplus Value The construction of the technological system of capital exploitation revolves around seizing surplus labor. In terms of extracting surplus value, capitalists are

100  Science and Tech in Historical Practice always doing everything they can. Producing absolute surplus value is the basis of the capitalist system while prolonging the working day is the basic goal of the construction of a technological system that exploits absolute surplus value. In order to get as much surplus value as possible, capitalists are always trying to lengthen the working day in a variety of ways and measures, thus extending surplus labor time absolutely and extracting more surplus value. For example, because of working overtime, the labor supply can be increased without increasing the number of workers; or, some workers work overtime while others do nothing at all or do part-time work. This artificially creates an oversupply of labor, moreover, the supply of unemployed workers because other workers are overworking always depresses wages, including those of employed workers.98 There are various forms of technology that exploit absolute surplus value. The foundation of today’s wealth is the theft of other people’s labor time.99 In the chapter on the “working day” of Das Kapital (Vol. 1), Marx drew on first-hand accounts to detail the contemptuous ways in which capitalists in various industries contrived to prolong the working day, from which we can see the mechanism and outline of many forms of exploitative technology. For example, the factory owner cheated his workers to start work a quarter before 6 a.m., sometimes earlier, sometimes a little later, and get off work at a quarter past 6  p.m., sometimes earlier, sometimes a little later. Moreover, he encroached five minutes of each worker before and after his nominal half hour for breakfast, and ten minutes before and after the one hour for lunch. Every Saturday afternoon, workers could not get off work until a quarter past two, sometimes a little earlier, sometimes a little later. So he would earn an extra five hours and 40 minutes each week, adding up to a total of 27 working days on the basis of 50 working weeks per year (excluding two weeks as holidays or suspended work for some reason). Each working day was five minutes longer than the standard working hours, adding up to two working days per year. By stealing a little time here and there, the factory owner gained an extra hour each working day, hence prolonging 12 months in a year to 13 months.100 For another example, the temptation to earn extra profits by overworking beyond the legal working hours was too great for many factory owners to resist. They hoped to remain undetected and figured that even if their bad act was found out, they could still turn a profit despite a small amount of fines or legal fees. An inspector would then encounter almost insurmountable difficulties in finding evidence of the illegality of these factory owners. Capitalists “stole” the mealtime and rest time of workers in a piecemeal fashion, which was described as “stealing minutes” by factory inspectors, and “biting our mealtime” by workers. A factory owner once said that if his men could work ten more minutes a day, he would get 1,000 pounds a year. The atom of time is the element of profit.101 Marx also took London’s sewing industry as an example to show how capitalists extracted absolute surplus value by concentrating labor. For several months of the year, the working days were lengthened to the maximum, and there had been a feverish rush to work. During the rest of the year, most workers had no work at all or very little work. The necessary working hours, and hence wages,

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  101 were not determined by the working hours during this period of prosperity, but by the average working hours; the wages thus obtained (during the months of labor concentration and extension) accounted for a great part of the annual wages. Here, the concentration of labor was combined with the extension of the working day, but all such periods of labor did not exceed a few months or weeks. It was one of the most terrible forms of labor exploitation.102 Shortening the necessary working hours is the starting point of constructing the technological system of exploiting relative surplus value. In terms of the production of relative surplus value, the working day is divided at the beginning into two parts for necessary labor and surplus labor, respectively. In order to extend the time for surplus labor, the time for necessary labor must be shortened by producing the equivalent of wages in less time.103 To shorten the necessary working hours, the value of labor force must be reduced. To this end, it is necessary to improve the labor productivity of the departments producing means of livelihood and means of production. Capital must transform the technical and social conditions of the labor process, so as to change the mode of production itself, reduce the value of labor by increasing labor productivity, thus shortening the portion of the working day necessary to reproduce the value of labor.104 In fact, in capitalist production, the development of labor productivity is intended to shorten the portion of the working day in which the worker must work for himself, in order to extend the remaining portion of the working day in which the worker can work for the capitalist without pay.105 In real life, the shortening of necessary working hours is often achieved by pursuing excess surplus value. The direct purpose of individual businesses to improve labor productivity is to obtain excess surplus value, while the result of all businesses doing so is that capitalists generally obtain relative surplus value. The capitalist using the improved mode of production occupies a larger portion of the working day for surplus labor than his counterparts in the same industry. What he does individually is what capitalists as a whole are doing on the occasion of producing relative surplus value.106 In Marx’s view, collaboration, division of labor and machines are all part of a technological system that exploits relative surplus value. The production of relative surplus value is premised on the special capitalist mode of production. This mode of production, together with its methods, means and conditions themselves, originated and developed spontaneously on the basis of the formal subordination of labor to capital.107 In addition, hourly wages and piece-rate wages are also the specific manifestations of technology to exploit surplus value. 2.2.3.2 Technology for Speeding up Capital Turnover Capital produces surplus value only when it is in motion; the faster the motion, the more surplus value it brings, the greater the energy of capital multiplication and the higher the degree of multiplication. Marx analyzed the operation of industrial capital from the aspects of capital circulation and capital turnover, revealing the technological path for capitalists to maximize surplus value. The circulation of

102  Science and Tech in Historical Practice capital must go through two stages (i.e., production field and circulation field), spend a certain amount of time in each stage, and the two stages alternate chronologically. Circulation time and production time are mutually exclusive, that is, as the circulation time of a certain amount of capital is prolonged, the production time is shortened, then the part that performs functions as productive capital shrinks. On the contrary, the shorter the circulation time, the stronger the productive function of capital is, and the more it multiplies itself. The circulation time of capital, in general, limits the production time of capital and thus its value multiplication process. The degree of limitation is proportional to the duration of circulation.108 It can be seen that the length of each stage of the capital cycle has a direct impact on the acquisition of surplus value. Therefore, the basic technical path to maximize surplus value is to shorten circulation time and rest time of the labor process as much as possible, and to prolong labor time. The capital circulation that goes round and round and repeats ceaselessly is capital turnover. The time for capital to turn over once is the turnover time, which includes two parts: production time and circulation time. The shorter the time of capital turnover, the more times of capital turnover in a year, the faster the turnover rate, and the greater the surplus value brought by a certain amount of capital; otherwise, the surplus value is smaller. Marx pointed out that the factors affecting capital turnover speed mainly include the composition of productive capital and the length of capital turnover time. The former refers to the ratio of fixed capital to current capital in productive capital, and it is the primary factor that affects capital turnover speed. Generally speaking, fixed capital turnover is slow and current capital turnover is fast. Given a certain amount of capital, the larger the proportion of fixed capital is, the slower the total turnover of prepaid capital is, and the faster it is vice versa. The latter consists of the production time and circulation time of capital, and these two have many components. The turnover time of each component of different capital is different, which will affect the velocity of capital movement to different degrees. The main means for capitalists to speed up capital turnover are to extend working days, implement a day-and-night shift work system and improve workers’ labor intensity. In addition, the adoption of new production technology, the improvement of labor productivity, the improvement of transportation and communication facilities, the development of a commercial organization and credit system, the strengthening of market information collection, etc., can greatly shorten the production and circulation time, thus speeding up capital turnover. Collaboration, division of labor, and the use of machines can increase the output of a working day and shorten the working hours in interconnected production activities. For example, machines shorten the construction time of houses, bridges and so on; harvesters and threshers shorten the working hours for transforming ripened grain into finished goods; improvements in shipbuilding technology have increased ship speed and thus shortened the turnover time of investment in the shipping industry. However, these improvements to shorten the labor period, especially the advance time of working capital, are usually associated with increases in fixed capital expenditure. On the other hand, in some sectors, the length of working

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  103 hours can be shortened simply by expanding collaboration. For example, a large army of laborers working in several sites concurrently can shorten the time it takes to build a railway. Here, the turnover time is reduced by the increase in advanced capital. On all these occasions more means of production and more labor must be combined under the command of the capitalist. Credit causes, accelerates and magnifies the accumulation of capital in the hands of individuals; at this point, it will lead to shorter labor periods and thus shorter turnover times.109 Of course, these technological means are often accompanied by the improvement of labor intensity of workers, and they can directly or indirectly deepen the capitalist exploitation of workers. 2.2.3.3 Technology for Saving Constant Capital The capital turnover principle shows that in the composition of productive capital, the larger the proportion of constant capital is, the slower the capital turnover speed will be, and the higher the advance capital of capitalists will be. Therefore, in order to seek more surplus value, capitalists always try to reduce the use of constant capital and build a technological system for saving constant capital. At the same time, capital achieves this saving at the expense of workers’ health. The increase of surplus value rate is limited by the means of subsistence and the labor productivity of related sectors, and the saving of constant capital in any sector of production will increase profit margins. Extending the working day, on the one hand, increases the production of absolute surplus value; and on the other hand, it relatively reduces the expenditure of constant capital, thus saving fixed capital. The expansion of the scale of production resulting from the extension of the working day requires only an increase in constant capital expenditure on raw materials, not on machinery and plant which are the most expensive constant capital. For the same amount of profit produced, the cost of constant capital decreases and the profit margin increases, compared to the situation where the working day is not extended. According to Marx, given constant variable capital, that is, paying the same nominal wage for the same number of workers, an increase in absolute surplus value, or an increase in surplus labor resulting from longer working days – no matter what workers are paid for the extra working hours – will reduce the value of constant capital relative to total capital and relative to variable capital, and thus increasing the rate of profit.110 Under certain conditions, the only way to exploit a large amount of labor is to increase the number of workers, increase the intensity of labor or improve labor productivity, but these circumstances are inevitably accompanied by a corresponding increase in fixed capital. Although the increase of surplus value may contribute to the improvement of profit margin, the resulting increase in constant capital will reduce profit margin. If the proportion of constant capital increase exceeds that of surplus value increase, the profit margin may further decrease. The extension of the working day not only saves fixed capital and increases profit margins, but also speeds up the reproduction of capital value, saves non-productive expenses such as supervision costs, taxes, insurance premiums and wages of

104  Science and Tech in Historical Practice regular staff and reduces invisible wear and tear on machinery and equipment. Therefore, with the increase in the organic composition of capital and in the proportion of fixed capital in constant capital, it will be more and more important to save fixed capital by extending the working day to improve profit margin. Technological progress also contributes to saving constant capital. The decrease in constant capital value is related not only to the scale of social labor in the sector but also to the condition of products and labor productivity in the sector that supplies it with the means of production. First, the savings are caused by the continuous improvement of machinery. (1) Being made of improved materials, machines have become more solid and durable. (2) Improvements in manufacturing methods have made machines much cheaper. (3) Improvements in the power and transfer engines that propel and drive machines have made the use of existing machines cheaper and more efficient. (4) Improvements in machinery have reduced waste.111 These technological improvements will reduce the cost of constant capital in the production process. At the same time, stronger and more durable machines need less repair and maintenance, which in turn reduces the price of these machines. According to Marx, for the savings resulting from machine improvements in the aforementioned aspects, in most cases, it is only possible in the presence of workers, and it’s often done on a much larger scale of labor; therefore, workers are required to achieve a larger scale of integration directly in the production process.112 That is to say, the savings brought about by the continuous improvement of machines are also premised on the large-scale social labor of workers; because the direction and method of machine improvement can only be determined by combining with the practical experience of workers, and large-scale improvements in machines can only be achieved by the hands of workers, then the good performance of machines will inevitably promote the development of socialized labor. Second, improvements in labor productivity in sectors that provide the means of production also result in the saving of constant capital. For example, the development of labor productivity in the sectors, such as iron, coal, machine manufacturing and construction, will bring along cheaper products, thus reducing the value of constant capital in the sectors in which these products are used as means of production, which will in turn boost profit margins in those sectors. This saving of constant capital resulting from the advance of industry has the following characteristics: the improvement of profit margins in one sector is due to the development of labor productivity in another sector.113 Obviously, the benefits to capitalists are still the product of social labor, that is, the product of the social division of the labor system. This development of productive forces is always, in the end, attributed to the social nature of the labor at work, to the division of labor within society, and to intellectual work, especially the development of natural sciences.114 The other way to increase profit margins comes not from the saving of labor in the production of constant capital, but from the saving in the use of constant capital itself.115 Large-scale collaboration of workers can save the means of production for common consumption, such as plants, warehouses, heating equipment

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  105 and lighting equipment. So as the common use of a capital in its own sector, its saving includes two aspects: one is the saving of living labor, that is, the reduction of paid labor of workers; and the other is the saving of materialized labor, that is, the use of the means of production in the most economical way. That is to say, in a given scale of production, to achieve the greatest possible occupation of the unpaid labor of others with the least cost.116 The saving in the use of constant capital is either directly caused by the collaborative labor in the sector or by the machine’s use value (that is, its efficiency increases faster than its value). Capitalists fervently economize on means of production, which is also proved by their adulteration of factors of production. This adulteration benefits the capitalists doubly: they can reduce constant capital value to increase profit margins, as well as sell goods above their actual value to rob consumers. Workers spend most of their lives in the production process, so the production conditions are mostly the conditions or living conditions of workers’ active life process. To achieve savings in such conditions, which are able to increase profit margins, capitalists usually pay no regard to the health and life of workers. In Das Kapital (Vol. 1), Marx revealed the endless extension of the working day, the extremely narrow workplace, the lack of safety equipment, poor working conditions and serious harm to the health and life of workers. Capitalist production is more wasteful of men and living labor than any other mode of production; it is not only a waste of blood and flesh but also of wisdom and nerves.117 Marx cited many examples to show that although the capitalist mode of production is economical with the means of production, it is wasteful to the life of producers. The capitalist mode of production, according to its contradictory and antagonistic nature, regards the waste of the life and health of workers and the degradation of their living conditions as the savings in the use of constant capital, and thus as a means of increasing profit margins.118 From a social perspective, destroying and wasting the labor force fundamentally destroys productivity, causing a huge loss and waste, but for an individual capitalist, it is an important means to increase surplus value production and profit margins.

2.3 Science and Technology in the Vision of Freedom From his youth, Marx established the noble ideal of striving for the happiness of mankind. His social goal is to realize the liberation of the proletariat and all mankind and finally establish a communist society. For Marx and Engels, science and technology are the basic path for mankind to pursue development and freedom, while scientific and technological progress is a powerful driving force of human liberation. The end result of Marxism lies in the pursuit of human freedom and social progress, the pursuit of human liberation and the ultimate realization of the leap from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. 2.3.1 Science, Technology and Human Nature Marx’s exploration of human nature went through a process of development, and the achievements in this regard laid the foundation of his theoretical system.

106  Science and Tech in Historical Practice Influenced by Hegel’s thought in his early years, Marx defined the essence of man as the free labor of self-consciousness and subject spirit to transform the object; later he accepted Feuerbach’s idea of man’s categorical nature. In his Criticism on Hegel’s Legal Philosophy (1843), Marx argued that man is “real man and we must grasp the essence of man in certain material production relations.” In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx stated that the fundamental difference between man and animals lies in labor. The general characteristic and class characteristic of a species lie in the nature of life activities, while free conscious activity is precisely the class characteristic of man.119 In 1845, with the publication of Thesis on Feuerbach and The German Ideology, Marx fundamentally solved the problem of human nature and laid a foundation for the establishment of historical materialism. Human nature is the sum of all kinds of common attributes possessed by human beings as social beings, the unity of social and natural attributes and the basis that distinguishes man from animals. In Marx’s view, human nature comes into being with the birth of human beings and is constantly enriched with the development of human beings, and there is no solidified eternal human nature. The history of human society is the history of human nature, and the entire history is nothing more than the constant change of human nature.120 To evaluate all man’s actions, movements, relations, etc., in accordance with the principle of utility, we must first study the nature of man in general, and then his nature which has changed historically in each age.121 Man not only has multiple characteristics of the physical nature, but also the characteristics that the physical nature does not have and transcends the physical nature. The particularity of human nature is precisely constituted by these special elements beyond physical nature. Consciousness and practicality are the core part of human nature and the foundation of the essential power of human nature. According to Marx, the inquiry into human nature should be found in people’s material production activities. How individuals live their lives is what they are. So, what they are like is consistent with their production – what they produce and how they produce. What individuals are depends on the material conditions under which they produce.122 For Marx, human nature is determined primarily by modes of production, while “what to produce,” “how to produce” and “material conditions for production,” which are closely related to the mode of production, are the specific forms of industrial technology. In other words, human nature depends not only on the mode of production, but also on the form of industrial technology constructed by people, so it cannot be separated from the progress of science and technology. Industrial technology is not only the foundation of human nature but also an important way to understand human nature. The structure of animal remains has important implications for understanding the anatomy of extinct animals; similarly, the remains of labor materials are also important for judging the social shape of an extinct economy.123 The history of industry and the existence of the generated objectivity of industry is an unfolded book about the essential power of man, and the psychology of man appearing in front of us emotionally. This psychology

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  107 has not been understood in terms of its essential relation to man but has always been understood only in terms of its external usefulness.124 As Robert E. McGinn, a contemporary American philosopher of technology, has pointed out, Marx’s understanding of technology is from human activities, placing more emphasis on its formation and meaning than on its composition; Marx saw technology as a specific part of the practitioner’s mental system, and associated with all aspects of human activity and existence, including the results, objectives, knowledge resources, methods and cultural environment of technical practice.125 Marx’s exploration of human nature is on the basis of the simplified reductive thinking: the essence of man is rooted in his sociality which comes from material production activities, while these activities develop on the basis of certain scientific background and technology. That is to say, human nature and power should be interpreted in labor, production, industry and their historical evolution. Technology (here synonymous with technics) reveals the dynamic relationship between man and nature, the direct production process of man’s life, and then the direct production process of human social life relations and the resulting spiritual concepts.126 Scientific and technological progress is bound to promote the development of productive forces. As new productivity is acquired, people will change their mode of production; with the change of the mode of production (i.e., the way of making a living), people will change all their social relations.127 The change in social relations is bound to bring about the enrichment and development of human nature. In Marx’s human theory, if there is a so-called human nature, it refers to people’s transformation of the world with technological production labor; on the contrary, the technological form and its corresponding social organization structure are the external manifestation of human nature. It is in the process of transforming the object world that man truly proves himself to be a species-being. This kind of production is an active human life. It is through this production that nature manifests itself in man’s works and reality. Thus, the object of labor is the objectification of human life: man not only doubles himself mentally as he does in consciousness but also actively and realistically doubles himself, so as to visualize himself in the world he has created.128 It is based on the in-depth insight into the fundamental position of technology in human nature that Marx formed the so-called concept of meta-technology. Any individual is always born in a certain social system and artificial nature and grows up in a specific world of science and technology. From basic necessities of life, transportation and consumption to the realization of spiritual and cultural needs, each of them is either directly or indirectly influenced by science and technology. Therefore, people must consciously or unconsciously learn scientific knowledge, adapt to, introduce and construct a variety of technological forms. In this process, the natural man is molded into the technical man, and the technological model is internalized into people’s ideas and behaviors. In fact, the introduction of every new technology requires the establishment of a new relationship between people, between people and nature and between people and society. Each new technology opens a door to a new field and changes people’s ideas. From this

108  Science and Tech in Historical Practice point of view, the technicalization of man is the basis of his socialization, and the two are unfolded simultaneously and advance together through interaction. On the issue of the technicalization of man, Marx paid more attention to the alienation of human nature under the capitalist system. For Marx, machine-centered industrial technology belongs to and serves the technological system for capital operation, and the objectification of workers’ labor results in alienation from their own labor products. Within the capitalist system, all means of increasing the social labor productivity are achieved at the expense of individual workers; all means of developing production are transformed into means of ruling and exploiting producers, thereby deforming the development of workers, debasing them as an appendage to machines, subjecting them to the torture of labor, depriving labor of its content, and alienating the intellect of labor process from workers as science is incorporated into the labor process as an independent force. All of these means make working conditions worse for workers, subject workers to the vilest and most abhorrent despotism in the labor process, convert their living time into working time and throw their wives and children under the Jagannath’s wheel of capital.129 The increasingly technicalized workers have become victims of the prosperity of capitalist societies. 2.3.2 Technological Path to Human Liberation The words “liberation” and “liberty” have the same root and the same origin, and “liberation” means to “have liberty.” Here, “liberty” indicates the adaptation and grasp of necessity, meaning the transcendence of various restrictions or fetters. The pursuit of liberty has always been the axis of human life, and also the ultimate goal of scientific research and technological invention. “Liberation” is the process of getting rid of bondage and gaining freedom and progress, and “liberty” is always relative to bondage. Therefore, “liberation” and “liberty” are concepts of the same degree. The so-called liberation of human beings is to free human beings from all kinds of fetters, and it is the historical process of increasing human freedom and happiness. However, without the bearing and restraint of the real relationships in nature, society, and ideology, there is no such thing as human liberation or liberty. As Engels put it, liberty does not lie in the illusion of independence from the laws of nature, but in knowing them and thus being able to make them serve certain ends in a planned way. Liberty consists in governing ourselves and external nature according to the knowledge of its necessity, therefore, it must be the product of historical development. The first man, separated from the animal kingdom, had no more liberty in all essential respects than animals themselves; but every advance in culture is a step toward liberty.130 When we have no idea about the laws of nature, they exist and operate independently of our knowledge, making us slaves to “blind necessity.” Once we are aware of these laws, which operate independently of our will and consciousness (as Marx had talked about a thousand times), we become the masters of nature.131 It can be seen that liberation and liberty are not to get rid of necessity in fantasy, but to consciously recognize, utilize and

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  109 dominate necessity. Science and technology are the basic links to complete this task. In general, the more people understand necessity, the more they control it; the more technological inventions and innovations, the higher the efficiency, and the more liberty and liberation people will get. In fact, human liberation is always carried out simultaneously in many areas of real life; it is a systematic evolutionary process of three-dimensional propulsion, involving a wide range of contents. Putting aside all of these rich cultural connotations, their common foundation is to replace backward science and technology with advanced science and technology, expand the field of human activities and improve the efficiency of purposeful activities. When discussing the positive significance of technological inventions and their application in human evolution, Engels pointed out that a meat diet gave rise to two new and decisive advances, that is, the use of fire and the domestication of animals. The former shortened the process of digestion, for people could chew the food, as it were, already halfdigested, while the latter diversified the sources of meat in addition to hunting and provided people with new food such as milk and dairy products which are at least as nutritious as meat. For man, these two advances were directly new means of liberation.132 In the early days of human civilization, the making of stone tools, the invention of bows and arrows, the use of fire and the domestication of animals not only drove the evolution of the human body and brain but also freed mankind from the multiple bondages and slavery of nature. Technology is an essential attribute of man and is always accompanied by human beings. Technology’s instrumental role suggests that it is the scaffolding on which human civilization is built, and the technological world is the realistic basis on which human liberation must depend. This basic position and positive role of technology in human life determine that it is the basic path to promoting social development and seeking human liberation. When criticizing Feuerbach’s views on human liberation, Marx pointed out that true liberation can only be achieved in the real world and with real means; slavery could not be eliminated without steam engines and “Spinning Jenny”; serfdom could not be abolished without improved agriculture; when people fail to make their own food, drink, shelter and clothing fully guaranteed in terms of quality and quantity, their liberation is nothing more than an empty talk. “Liberation” is a historical activity, not an ideological one; “liberation” is brought about by historical relations, industrial conditions, commercial conditions, agricultural conditions and communication conditions.133 Here Marx clearly pointed out that human liberation is a practical activity and an ongoing historical process, which can’t be done in a short period of time or all at once. At the same time, he believed that technology is a realistic basis for human liberation, and technological progress is the fundamental path of human liberation; without the support and promotion of technological progress, social productive forces are hard to achieve significant development, industry, commerce, agriculture and even the patterns of communication between people are hard to develop and renew, and the progress of society and the liberation of mankind are out of the question. In the broad view of technology, technological progress, as a sequence, mode or mechanism that serves as the subject’s purposeful activities, is closely related

110  Science and Tech in Historical Practice to social development and human liberation. Technology not only embodies the attributes of productivity and promotes social development and human liberation through the approach of basic social contradictions, but also, through the threedimensional penetration into various fields of human activities and the basic approach to improving the efficiency of human activities, liberates people from the bondage of nature, society and backward ideas in all directions and in many aspects. The history of social development shows that every liberation of mankind is based on technological inventions and improvements, and realized in the leap of productive forces and the reform of the social system. For example, the invention of electric light freed people from the bondage of darkness; the telephone, the Internet and other technological inventions liberated people from the space barrier and confinement of information; the development of mass media technologies such as radio, television and WeChat has freed people from the mystery of leaders and their political activities; the achievements of scientific understanding obtained on the basis of scientific experimental technique emancipated people from the blindness of religious superstition; the emergence of expert groups, consulting teams and other forms of social division of labor freed people from the narrow confinement of their respective disciplines. If we do not see the great liberating role of technology, we will inevitably ignore the achievements of human liberation and social progress. In real life, the liberating effects of science and technology can be seen everywhere. As Einstein pointed out, the most outstanding practical effect of science is that it makes possible the invention of things that enrich life, although these things also make life complicated, such as the steam engine, railway, electric power and light, telegraph, radio, automobile, airplane and explosives. To this must be added the achievements of biology and medicine in preserving life, especially the production of analgesics and the preservation methods for food storage. As for the greatest practical benefit of all these inventions to mankind, it indicates that they have liberated people from strenuous manual labor, and such manual labor was once necessary to make a bare living. The abolishment of slavery, if it could be claimed so at this moment, owes to the practical effects of science.134 Here Einstein vividly illustrates the liberating effects of technology. It is not hard to understand that human liberation and social progress are reflected in the historical process of constantly breaking free from bondage, creating new ways of life and improving the quality of life, and technology plays the role of supporting platform and engine. Although modern Western humanists hold a critical attitude toward science and technology, they do not deny the liberating role of technology. E.M. Schurman, for example, has pointed out that liberating technology will then heal the difficult circumstances in which people live “by nature.” It will provide an expansion of life opportunities, ease the pain from and difficulties in work, guard against natural disasters, conquer diseases, improve social security, expand contact, increase information, extend responsibility, greatly increase material prosperity in harmony with mental health and eliminate natural, cultural and human alienation. Technology has liberated human time and promoted the development

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  111 of new possibilities. With these possibilities, culture will progress to new revelations, and technology will also make room for multifaceted work – careful, creative and caring work.135 According to Marcuse, mechanized and standardized technological processes can release individual energy into an unknown realm of freedom beyond inevitability. The structure of human existence will be changed; the individual will be liberated from the world of work in which alien needs and alien possibilities are imposed upon him. The individual will be free to exercise autonomy over his own life. If the production mechanism can be organized and directed to meet fundamental needs, then its control can be well concentrated; this control will not impede individual autonomy but make it possible.136 In addition, many other scholars have made similar arguments. The history of mankind shows that every major breakthrough in science and technology means the advent of greater freedom, but human beings also tend to feel some kind of new unfreedom from this great freedom. Despite the negative effects or servility of technology in real life, technology itself is not the root of all evil. The idea of abandoning modern technological achievements and returning to primitive and simple life advocated by anti-scientists is a childish act of giving up eating for fear of choking. It is a huge regression of human liberation and social development in exchange for the partial elimination of modern technological dilemmas or servility. However, recognition of the emergence of new technological dilemmas is the beginning of the struggle for greater freedom. This open and ever-expanding trend of free evolution suggests that human beings have always maintained a value orientation of seeking development and consciously pursuing freedom and liberation. Therefore, the goal of human liberation is not to give up technology but to solve the problem of how to develop and use technology rationally and in good faith. In the process of technological progress, people will gradually expand the capabilities or positive effects of technology, mitigate technological risks and negative effects, and seek more freedom, happiness, dignity and development. 2.3.3  A Tortuous Journey beyond Technological Dilemma The history of social development is the history of mankind from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, and the progress of science and technology is the ladder to human freedom. Human liberation and transcending technological dilemmas are gradually realized in the process of increasing freedom and decreasing bondage. Due to the limitations of the times, Marx and Engels focused their thinking on the problem of technological alienation, and their analysis of technological alienation and technological dilemma began in the context of human liberation. Marx always looked at the attribute and development trend of technology objectively and dialectically from the perspective of concrete technological forms. For example, when explaining the necessity of division of labor, he fully affirmed the positive role of division of labor technology in improving production efficiency, and at the same time pointed out the negative effects of such technology. That is to say, the technology of division of labor is not only the basic

112  Science and Tech in Historical Practice way to improve the efficiency of human activities, but also bound to enslave and restrict human beings by the division of labor. This is the technological dilemma of human division of labor. For Marx, the technological dilemma is formed and evolved in the process of social development, and it is the specific expression of technological contradiction, with the characteristics of times and regions. In the age of capitalism, all our inventions and advances seemed to make the material force into intelligent life and reduce human life to the dull material force. The confrontation between modern industry and science on one side and modern poverty and decline on the other, as well as the confrontation between the productive forces and social relations of our time, are obvious, inevitable and indisputable facts.137 At the same time, the technological dilemma is a real problem that humans as a species have to deal with, and its replacement and dissolution will be a long historical process. In the long run, it is an inevitable trend of historical development that the proletariat overthrows the rule of the bourgeoisie and socialism triumphs over capitalism. The political liberation of the proletariat is the basis and premise of eliminating technological alienation and getting out of the predicament of technological slavery. When society becomes the master of all the means of production and can make planned use of them within society, it means that society has eliminated the hitherto enslavement of man by his own means of production. It goes without saying that society cannot be liberated unless every individual is liberated. Therefore, the old mode of production must be overhauled and, in particular, the old division of labor must be eliminated. Instead, there should be a production organization like this: in this organization, on the one hand, no individual can offload his share of productive labor, the natural condition of human existence, onto another; on the other hand, productive labor offers everyone an opportunity to fully develop and display all his physical and mental abilities, thus productive labor ceases to be a means of enslaving man, but becomes a means of liberating him, and ceases to be a burden, but becomes a joy.138 Marx pointed out that political liberation is the basis and important form of human liberation. With the demise of class, private ownership and the state, technological alienation is expected to disappear in communist societies. Political liberation is certainly a big step forward; although it is not the final form of human liberation in general, it will be the final form of human liberation in the hitherto universal system.139 The conclusion can be further drawn from the relationship between alienated labor and private property: the liberation of society from private property and from slavery was expressed in the political form of the liberation of workers. This is not because it’s just about the liberation of workers, but because the liberation of workers also includes the liberation of the general man; in fact, this is because the whole of human slavery is contained in the relation of workers to production, and all servitude is but the transfiguration and consequence of it.140 When discussing the progressive significance of the Paris Commune, Marx pointed out the historical mission of the proletariat to liberate science and technology. Scientists felt that only the working class could free them from the rule of the monks, turn science from an instrument of class rule into a power of the

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  113 people, transform scientists themselves from peddlers of class prejudice, parasites of the state in pursuit of fame and fortune, allies of capital, into free thinkers; only in the republic of labor could science play its real role.141 That is to say, political liberation creates necessary conditions for overcoming the alienation of science and technology under the condition of capitalism. Alienation caused by division of labor technology is an important form of technological alienation. Marx held that with the demise of capitalism and the rise of communism, the alienation of division of labor technology is expected to ease, and this technological dilemma is expected to be gradually eliminated. In the higher stages of communist society, after the situation of forcing individuals to obey the division of labor like slaves has disappeared, and thus the opposition between mental work and manual work has also disappeared; after labor is not only a means of earning a living, but also becomes the first need of life; after all sources of collective wealth have fully flowed with the overall development and improved productivity of individuals – only at that time could man completely transcend the narrow horizons of bourgeois rights, and could society write on its banner that each does his best and takes what he needs!142 Also, as technology continues to advance, when the division of labor technology develops to the stage of free division of labor, the alienation of the division of labor technology is expected to be resolved. The division of labor in automatic factories is characterized by the complete loss of the professional character of labor. But as soon as all specialized development stops, individual demand for universality and the trend of comprehensive development will come out.143 Especially in communist societies, no one has a particular sphere of activity, but develops in any sector; society regulates the whole production, thus making it possible for the individual to do one thing today and another tomorrow, hunt in the morning and fish in the afternoon, raise livestock in the evening, start criticizing after supper, so that he may be a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman or a judge.144 That is to say, on the basis of technological progress and productivity development, the future development of society will create necessary technical conditions for the demise of the fixed division of labor. From the perspective of productive labor, Marx discussed the basic conditions for mankind to move toward the kingdom of freedom. He said that this kingdom of natural necessity will expand as man develops because the need will expand; but the capacity to meet this need will also expand. Freedom in this realm can only be like this: socialized men and united producers will reasonably regulate the physical transformation between themselves and nature, bring it under their collective control, instead of letting it rule over themselves as a blind power; this physical transformation is carried out with the least exertion of force under conditions most worthy of and best suited to their human nature.145 That is to say, to enjoy freedom in the realm of material production, on the one hand, it should be based on advanced industrial technologies that consume the least amount of energy; on the other hand, the development and operation of industrial technology should be reasonably adjusted and jointly controlled. And it’s not easy to achieve that ideal state, for it requires highly developed science and technology, a sound

114  Science and Tech in Historical Practice social system and the sublimation of human nature and the unity of will. These conditions are difficult to meet in a class society but only available in a communist society. According to Marx, the liberation of human beings and the overcoming of technological alienation must be based on the highly developed productive forces, on the premise of the perfection of human nature, and oriented toward the establishment of the communist system. He insisted that communist society is the advanced form of human liberation and transcending the technological dilemma. At that time, the all-around interdependence of individuals, and the original form of their common activities that are historical and naturally formed, will translate into the control and conscious mastery of the following forces because of this communist revolution; these forces are created through human interaction, but so far for human beings, these forces have been used as completely alien forces to deter and control them.146 Engels also pointed out from the height of human liberation that only the establishment of the communist system could finally lift human beings out of the animal state in terms of social relations, and achieve the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. That is, only then will man finally become the master of his own social union, and thus the master of nature and of himself – free man.147 The laws of man’s own social action – these laws of nature, which have always been alien and dominant to man, are in opposition to him – will then be expertly applied, and therefore be subject to his command. People’s own social union has always been opposed to them as something imposed on them by nature and history; now it is their own freedom to act. The objective and alien forces which have hitherto dominated history are now under the control of men themselves. It is at this time that men become fully conscious of making their own history; and it is at this time that the social causes which men make work achieve for the most part and more and more the results they desire. This is the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom.148 Marx believed that the technological dilemma and its evolution should be viewed dialectically and historically. In his discussion of the Jewish liberation, he pointed out that as long as Jews and Christians took their rival religions only as different stages of human spiritual development, as the different snakeskins that history has torn off, and took man himself as a snake that sheds his skin, only in this way could their relationship be no longer religious, but critical, scientific and human; and science would be their unity at that time. And scientific opposition will be eliminated by science itself.149 Of course, science here also includes technology as an applied part of science. In Marx’s view, if the specific technological dilemmas from which mankind has escaped are taken as different snakeskins torn by history, then man is a snake that sheds its skin. After going through the trials and tribulations of technological dilemmas, mankind will grow more mature, more capable of rational use of technology, and move toward a free and bright future together. Marx’s discourse on science and technology contains a wealth of scientific and technological critical thoughts. In particular, he explored the relationship between science and technology and productivity, the relationship between science and technology and alienation, and the relationship between science and technology

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  115 and freedom, as well as the resulting critique of science and technology, all of which are one of the greatest spiritual treasures in the history of mankind. Many of these ideas are the essence of Marx’s examination of science and technology, and they have very important reference significance for how to correctly view science and technology in modern society.

Notes 1 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:473. 2 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:265. 3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:677. 4 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:305. 5 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:304. 6 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:301. 7 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:317. 8 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:421. 9 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:378. 10 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:388. 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:292. 12 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:382. 13 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:379. 14 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:289. 15 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:391. 16 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:378–79. 17 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1985:475. 18 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:293. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:289. 20 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:208. 21 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:211. 22 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:64.

116  Science and Tech in Historical Practice 23 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:61. 24 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:53. 25 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:209. 26 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:62. 27 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:582. 28 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:57. 29 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:58. 30 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:208. 31 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:428. 32 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:200. 33 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:208. 34 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:124. 35 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:587–88. 36 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 26, I). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:175. 37 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:212. 38 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 5). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1958:504. 39 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:858–59. 40 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:855. 41 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:392. 42 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:395. 43 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:187. 44 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:392. 45 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:396. 46 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:406. 47 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:443. 48 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:483. 49 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:429–30.

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  117 50 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:384. 51 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:384–85. 52 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:216. 53 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:407. 54 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:384. 55 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:359. 56 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:484. 57 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:488. 58 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 2009:313. 59 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:484. 60 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:429. 61 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:531. 62 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:559. 63 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:559–60. 64 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:720. 65 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:870. 66 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:696–97. 67 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:440. 68 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 34). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2008:619. 69 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:699. 70 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:363. 71 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:363. 72 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358–59. 73 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:356–57. 74 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 75 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358. 76 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:387.

118  Science and Tech in Historical Practice 77 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:322–25. 78 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:508. 79 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:355–56. 80 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:348. 81 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:356. 82 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:468. 83 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:352. 84 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1957:421. 85 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:351–52. 86 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:497. 87 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:376. 88 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:355–56. 89 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:301. 90 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:319. 91 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:486. 92 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 6). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1961:643. 93 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:387. 94 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:353. 95 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:501. 96 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:457. 97 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 45). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:44. 98 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:322. 99 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:101. 100 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:278–79. 101 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:281. 102 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:322–25. 103 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:583.

Science and Tech in Historical Practice  119 104 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:366. 105 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:373. 106 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:370. 107 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:237. 108 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 45). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:142. 109 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 45). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:261–62. 110 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:91. 111 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:95. 112 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:95–96. 113 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:96. 114 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:96. 115 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:96. 116 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:97. 117 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:405. 118 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:101. 119 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:56. 120 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:252. 121 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:704. 122 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:147. 123 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:210. 124 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:306. 125 R. McGinn, “What is Technology.” In Research in Philosophy and Technology, edited by P.T. Durbin. Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1978:178–98. 126 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:429. 127 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:222. 128 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:57. 129 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:743. 130 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:491–92.

120  Science and Tech in Historical Practice 131 Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:152–53. 132 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:994–95. 133 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:154. 134 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:135. 135 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Zhang Feng et al. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 1988:4. 136 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Zhang Feng et al. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing House, 1988:4. 137 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:776. 138 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:644. 139 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:174. 140 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:61. 141 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:149–50. 142 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:364–65. 143 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:249. 144 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:165. 145 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:928–29. 146 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:169. 147 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:817. 148 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:671. 149 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:23.

Part II

Focuses of Reconsideration

In the works of Marx on science and technology, there are abundant thoughts shedding light on criticism of science and technology. In particular, he delved into the relationship between science, technology and productive forces, the relationship between science, technology and alienation and the relationship between science, technology and liberty, and the resulting criticism of science and technology has become one of the most precious spiritual treasures in human history. Many of the ideas in this regard are the essence of Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, and they are of great reference significance for how to correctly view science and technology in modern society.

DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-5

3

Science, Technology and Productivity

Science and technology constitute a primary productive force, which is one of the most familiar tenets of Marxism. From the strategy of rejuvenating the country through science and education at the national level to the technological innovation and high-tech industrialization at the enterprise level, science and technology are playing an increasingly important role in China’s economic and social development, and they have become the most powerful driving force for building a harmonious socialist society and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. However, in the development of socialism, the principle that science and technology are productive forces had long been underappreciated, and the productive function of science and technology had been intentionally or unintentionally obscured by our Chinese. It was not until 1978 that Deng Xiaoping quoted Marx at the opening of the National Conference on Science and Technology that “science is also included in productivity” and pointed out that science and technology constitute a primary productive force, that the theory of scientific and technological productivity has become the theoretical consensus and action guide of the Chinese people. That science and technology constitute a primary productive force, as pointed out by Deng Xiaoping, is the consistent view of Marx. The Manuscript of Economics and Philosophy in 1844, Das Kapital, as well as other works and manuscripts of Marx, contain a wealth of scientific and technological ideas. Marx made it clear long ago that science and technology are a productive force, play a decisive role amid the various factors of productivity and are a supreme revolutionary force.

3.1 Science, Technology and the Conquest of Natural Force More than 400 years ago, Francis Bacon (1561–1626), who was called “the real progenitor of English materialism and all modern experimental science” by Marx, called out the strongest voice of the era that “knowledge is power.” From then on, with the roar of steam engines and the rapid growth of social wealth, the role of science and technology in the transformation and conquest of nature has gradually entered the view of observers of economic and social development, especially economists. But only Marx correctly grasped the relationship between science DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-6

124  Science, Technology and Productivity and technology and the forces of nature. He examined science and technology in a broader social context, making them an important element in the framework of his great plan for social change. Only Marx realized the mutual restraint between natural history and human history. Moreover, he also noticed the reality of the transformation and domination of nature by science and technology and industry, emphasized the priority of the external natural world and, on this basis, pointed out that the essence of science and technology and industry is the theoretical and practical relationships between man and nature. 3.1.1 Nature and Man: Material Preconditions of Human Social History As we all know, human society evolved from nature and is the product of the long-term development of nature, while nature is the material prerequisite for the emergence and development of human society. After the birth of human beings, their own production and material production have also become the basic factors for the existence and functioning of human society. In interpreting Marx’s view of the relationship between nature and man, there have been two different paradigms of far-reaching impact. Firstly, the Marxists employing the Soviet model regard the world as a purely objective existence that only moves according to its own laws and has nothing to do with human social practice. Secondly, Western Marxists believe that the world is mediated by the subject, while objects in reality are “objects of thought” or “objects of sensibility” which begin to be perceived and transformed by human beings only after human activities have been stripped of their “spontaneous independence.” In fact, Marx never denied the foundational characteristic of nature but emphasized the priority of nature. In his German Ideology, Marx, through Feuerbach’s eyes, showed the great changes that natural science and industry have made to nature, and convincingly stated that human perceptual labor, creation and production activities are the profound foundation of the entire existing perceptual world. But Marx also told us very clearly that even if in this case the primacy of external nature will remain, the whole point does not apply to primitive, naturally occurring human beings.1 Marx, however, was by no means a saint who worships nature; he used to tease nature worshippers with a touch of irony: nature worship is nothing more than when a small-town dweller walking on Sundays, as surprised as a child, learns that cuckoos lay their eggs in the nests of other birds or that tears can keep eyes moist, and finally recites Klopstock’s ode to spring to his child with trembling awe.2 Soviet-style Marxists upheld and magnified the primacy of nature, but ignored or obscured Marx’s practical thought, and as a result, turned Marxism into something otherworldly like a sacred icon in the temple. Western Marxists, on the contrary, emphasized the understanding of things as practice from the subjective aspect. Georg Lukacs, the founder of Western Marxism, reiterated repeatedly that nature is a social category.3 Alfred Schmidt also pointed out that what sets Marx’s concept of nature apart from other similar concepts in the beginning is the socio-historical nature of his concept.4 Indeed,

Science, Technology and Productivity  125 Marx had said that the entire so-called history of the world is nothing more than the process by which man was born by his labor and the process of the generation of nature for man.5 Marx also said that the natural world generated in human history, that is, during the formation of human society, is the real natural world of man; thus, the natural world formed through industry, albeit in the form of alienation, is the real, humanistic natural world of man.6 Western Marxists found the shortcomings of the Soviet model and attempted to approach Marx by criticizing this paradigm of interpretation and showing Marx for who he really was. But because they abdicated or even denied the primacy of nature, the result was to turn Marxism into a little girl who can be dressed up, hence going from one extreme to the other. In fact, Marx had always looked at the relationship between man and nature dialectically. History can be investigated from two aspects, that is, natural history and human history. But the two are inseparable; as long as there have been people, natural history and human history will restrict each other.7 On the one hand, Marx introduced human practice into ontology, believing that human perceptual activities are the foundation of the existing world, emphasizing understanding things subjectively and taking things as human practical activities; on the other hand, Marx always emphasized the priority of external nature, and that nature and man are the material preconditions of human social history. William Petty, the classical British economist, once said that “labor is the father of wealth, land is the mother of wealth.” Like Petty, Marx was never stingy with his admiration for nature and its values. As a dialectical materialist, Marx always believed that nature and man are the material preconditions of human social history, and nature is the basic condition of labor. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx pointed out with great certainty that without nature, without the perceptual external world, workers can create nothing. It is where the labor of workers is realized, where and through which workers produce their own products. Here Marx revealed the threefold role of nature: nature is the basis on which workers’ labor can be realized – workers cannot do anything without nature; nature is the labor environment and site where workers do their job; nature (natural substances) constitutes the labor products of workers and the basic material of labor products. Marx went further to say that not only is productive labor inseparable from nature, but human life is even more inseparable from nature: on the one hand, nature furnishes labor with the means of subsistence, that is, without the object of labor processing, labor cannot exist; on the other hand, it also provides the means of subsistence in a narrower sense, that is, the means of maintaining the physical survival of the workers themselves.8 Marx also emphasized the importance of nature in a more general sense: the first premise of all human existence, or the first premise of all history, is that people must be able to live in order to make history. But in order to live, people need food, shelter, clothing and other things first. The first historical activity, therefore, is the production of materials to satisfy these needs, that is, the production of material life itself.9 Marx emphasized that nature is not only the basic condition of labor but also the source of materials and objects of labor, as well as the source of wealth. In

126  Science, Technology and Productivity response to the view that “labor is the source of all wealth” put forward by vulgar economists and capitalists with ulterior motives, Marx delivered a severe criticism: it is a mistake to think that labor, in so far as it creates and uses value, is the only source of what it creates, that is, material wealth. Since it is an activity that adapts matter to one kind or another purpose, it must have matter as a prerequisite.10 In his Annotations to the Programme of the German Workers’ Party, Marx pointed out more clearly that labor is not the source of all wealth; nature is the source of use value just like labor (material wealth is made up of use value), and labor itself is nothing but a manifestation of natural force, that is, human labor. The preceding remark can be found in all children’s literacy textbooks, and it is correct provided that the labor has the corresponding objects and materials.11 Here we can see that Marx has rigorously distinguished wealth and use value, and affirmed that material goods (i.e., nature) are an organic part of wealth and the primary source of all labor materials and objects. For labor, only once man, from the very beginning, treats nature (the primary source of all means and objects of labor) as the owner, and treats nature as his own, is his labor able to become the source of use value, and therefore also the source of wealth.12 3.1.2 Modern Natural Science, Together with Industry, Has Transformed the Entire Natural World Man is the most advanced and complex form of life in our material world and is a kind product of nature, but he also has particularities different from ordinary natural objects. Man not only utilizes the existing substances in nature to serve himself, just like animals, but also actively transforms the natural world by altering the shape, structure and functions of natural objects, and even creating new objects and new species that are not found in nature. In this way, man only spent a few hundred years turning the natural world upside down after the Industrial Revolution. Just like Marx had commented, although Feuerbach only saw factories and machines in Manchester, there was nothing but spinning wheels and looms a hundred years ago; although he only found pastures and marshes in Campania, Rome, there was nothing but vineyards and villas of wealthy Romans in Augustus’s time.13 Through Feuerbach’s eyes, Marx described the nature that is changed by human activities and pointed out the causes of these changes – modern natural science and industry. Nature is the source of human wealth and the means of production and livelihood which are indispensable for human survival. But nature has never automatically become a means of production and living for human beings, only with the help of science, technology and industry can nature change its form and structure to be endowed with new values and functions. In Das Kapital (Vol. 1, “Section 4: The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof, Chapter One: Commodities”), Marx remarked that The form of wood, for instance, is altered, by making a table out of it. Yet, for all that, the table continues to be that common, every-day thing, wood.

Science, Technology and Productivity  127 But, so soon as it steps forth as a commodity, it is changed into something transcendent. It not only stands with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities, it stands on its head, and evolves out of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than “table-turning” ever was.14 Although Marx appreciated Feuerbach’s materialistic attitude, he was critical of the latter’s inability to see the changes in nature brought about by industry and science, so he once complained that Feuerbach failed to see that the perceptual world around him is by no means something that has existed directly and consistently since the dawn of time, but the outcome of industrial and social conditions, the product of history, and the result of generations of activities, and each generation builds on the foundations laid by the previous generation, continues to develop its industries and contacts and changes its social systems to cater to the needs. Even the simplest objects of “sense-certainty” are made available to him only by social development, by industrial and commercial intercourse. Cherry trees, like almost all fruit trees, were transplanted to our area only a few centuries ago because of commerce. Thus, it can be seen that cherry trees are perceived by Feuerbach’s “sense-certainty” only because of such activities of a certain society in a certain period.15 So it is evident that Marx was discontented with Feuerbach’s intuitive materialism and criticized his understanding of the world, matter, feeling, mind and spirit by putting aside people’s social life, science, technology and industry. Such ideas pervade Marx’s writings in his positive evaluation of the thought of senior scholars or in his negative critique of bourgeois scholars at that time. In his review of G.Fr. Daumer’s Die Religion des neuen Weltalters. Versuch einer combinatorisch-aphoristischen Grundlegung, Marx unapologetically criticized Daumer’s ignorance of the role of science, technology and industry. According to Marx, Daumer mentioned nothing about modern science, although modern science and modern industry have revolutionized the entire natural world, and put an end to people’s childish attitudes and practices toward nature. On the contrary, what we’ve heard were mysterious hints, the prophecy of Nostradamus, the Scots’ foreboding, animal magnetism and other unintelligible philistine speculations. But the backward rural economy of Bavaria, on which monks and Daumer alike thrived, will be turned over one day with modern farming methods and modern machines.16 3.1.3 Material Production: Man’s Dominion over Natural Forces with the Help of Science Since ancient times, science and technology have been the instrument and means by which man transforms nature. A history of human development is a process in which human beings exert influence on nature with the help of science and technology, constantly change nature and enlarge humanized nature. From ashes to cave paintings in early primitive settlements; from rocky roads to horse-drawn carriages of the Middle Ages and to the steam engines in modem times, man has created an incomparable and brilliant material world with the help of science

128  Science, Technology and Productivity and technology and modern industry. In this process, man has deepened his understanding of nature, strengthened his ability to transform nature and expanded his scope of activity; so much so that in modern times, man has the power over nature, has become the ruler and conqueror of nature and has left his mark on every place he could reach. Francis Bacon is the first thinker to recognize and promote this historical process. While the whole of Europe admired and even worshiped ancient Greek civilization, Bacon dealt a blow to the ancient Greek worldview. In his monumental work, The New Organon, Bacon dismissed the oeuvres of Plato, Aristotle and Homer as controversial learning. He criticized the Greeks for pure conversations all day and doing nothing; he accused the Greeks of sitting and prattling about the general principle instead of conducting any experiment for improving the human condition. In Bacon’s view, science should be regarded as a new way to transform the world, expand the territory of the human empire, and control natural things. He was the first to tell people that science would be omnipotent. The Greeks only wanted to make sense of the world through science and achieve spiritual happiness, while Bacon surpassed the Greeks in his desire to utilize science to change the world and advance material civilization. Unlike Bacon who preferred induction, René Descartes emphasized the decisive role of deduction in acquiring knowledge, but he was no less than Bacon in advocating that man should be the master of nature. What Descartes believed is [i]nstead of the speculative philosophy taught in the Schools, a practical philosophy can be found by which, knowing the power and effects of fire, water, air, the stars, the heavens and all the other bodies which surround us, as distinctly as we know the various trades of our craftsmen, we might put them in the same way to all the uses for which they are appropriate, and thereby make ourselves, as it were, masters and possessors of nature.17 Marx undoubtedly inherited the glorious traditions of Bacon and Descartes, but he was more fortunate to live in the 19th century when technology was more prosperous and powerful, so his understanding of science and technology is also more profound than that of Bacon and Descartes. Marx witnessed the appropriation of nature by man armed with science and technology. “All production is the possession of nature by the individual within and through a certain social form.”18 To transform nature, man must first possess natural objects and materials because any labor process is inseparable from land and means of labor which serve as the objects of labor. Means of labor are objects or complexes of objects placed between themselves and the objects of labor and used to transmit their activities to the objects of labor. Laborers use these objects, with mechanical, physical and chemical properties, as a means of exerting power, and then act upon other things for their own purposes. According to Engels, hidden behind these artificial words and sentences is such an immortal discovery: people have to eat, drink, etc. in any state. Man should, in any state, seek out ready-made external objects in nature for

Science, Technology and Productivity  129 his own satisfaction and possess them, or make things with the objects found in nature.19 Marx also told us that with the help of science and technology, human beings can have the power to dominate and control nature. Marx took it as his duty to criticize and overthrow the bourgeoisie and establish socialism and communism, but this does not affect his objective evaluation of capitalist society. Marx saw that in the age of capitalism, people turned material production into domination of the forces of nature with the help of science and technology. The historical period of the bourgeoisie has the mission of creating a material foundation for the new world and turning material production into a scientific rule over natural forces. Bourgeois industry and commerce were creating these material conditions for the new world, just as geological change created the surface of the earth. Only when the great social revolution dominates the achievements of the bourgeois era, dominates the world market and modern productive forces and subordinates all these to the common supervision of the most advanced nations, the progress of mankind will no longer be like the terrible pagan gods who used the head of the murdered to make a wine glass and drink the sweet wine syrup.20 Alexander Pope has a well-known epitaph on Isaac Newton: “Nature, and Nature’s Laws, lay hid in Night. God said, Let Newton be! and All was Light.” In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx also described the immense power of industry and natural science in this way: “[i]f the more man subjugates nature through his labor and the more divine miracles are made superfluous by the miracles of industry.”21 Marx once said any mythology uses imagination and is with the help of imagination to conquer, dominate and visualize the forces of nature, which is the nature and social situation itself that has already been processed by an involuntary way of art through people’s fantasy.22 With science and technology, man will have God-like power over nature, and then wealth is to be the full development of man’s dominion over the forces of nature – both the usual “natural” forces and those of man himself. Isn’t wealth the absolute display of people’s creative talents?23 In addition, Marx explained why man has the power to control nature, that is, only by understanding the laws of nature can we make use of them and gain control over nature. Marx took ancient people’s understanding of the laws of water conservancy and soil fertility as an example. After an investigation of the water control projects in Egypt, Lombardy and the Netherlands, the history of irrigation through artificial channels in India and Persia and the secrets of industrial prosperity in Arab Spain and Sicily, Marx pointed out that these nature-learning activities not only provide the land with essential water but also allow mineral fertilizers to flow down the mountains along with silt. Socially controlling natural forces so as to make economical use of them and to occupy or tame them by constructing large-scale projects with manpower – this necessity plays the most decisive role in the history of industry.24

130  Science, Technology and Productivity Marx rhapsodized about the achievements of natural science and industry, and praised science, technology and industry for transforming, utilizing, even dominating and conquering nature, but it would be wrong to regard Marx as a technological determinist because Marx was the first thinker to find the negative effects and alienation of science and technology, which is to be elaborated in the following. 3.1.4 Natural Science and Industry Represent Theoretical and Practical Relations between Man and Nature The roar of steam engines broke the silence of the Middle Ages and made even the most conservative people feel the power of science and industry, and the natural science and industry received unrivaled praise, thereby giving rise to one after another of the most beautiful utopian visions: from Thomas More’s Utopia (1515) to John Andrea’s Christianopolis (1610), from Tommas Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1620) to Francis Bacon’s The New Atlantis (1626), all these show the indispensability of scientific and technological progress to society. As Joseph Glanvill put it in 1688 in defense of the newly formed Royal Society, the goal of the new natural philosophy is to make sure to understand nature, so that it can be controlled, managed and used for the service of human life.25 In fact, this idea was prevalent before Marx, to be specific, the idea of gradually controlling and even ruling the earth through the development of natural science and industry had become increasingly popular, and even become a self-evident fundamental belief. Marx’s sagacity lies in revealing the essence of natural science and industry earlier and more deeply than any other preceding and contemporary thinkers. He successfully linked natural science with industry, man and nature and pointed out that natural science and industry represent the theoretical and practical relations between human beings and nature. First, natural science and industry are always linked with human history. Natural science is man’s science and practice, while industry is man’s industry and practice; only with man can there be what is called natural science and industrial activity. Hearing that Bruno Powell, an influential young Hegelian at that time, separated thought and feeling, soul and body, self and the world, and separated history from natural science and industry, Marx and Engels asked rhetorically whether critical criticism thinks that it can achieve, if only preliminarily, an understanding of historical reality, so long as it excludes man’s theoretical and practical relations to nature, and excludes natural science and industry from historical movements. Does critical criticism think that without a clear understanding of, say, the industry of a certain historical period, namely the immediate mode of production of life itself, it can really recognize that period?26 From this, we can see that Marx and Engels disagreed with Powell. They further pointed out where Powell went wrong: once history is separated from natural science and industry, it is thought that its birthplace is not in the rough material production of the earth, but in the clouds of the sky. Second, natural science and industry are the process between man and nature, the process of adjusting and controlling the material transformation between man

Science, Technology and Productivity  131 and nature and the reflection of the practical relationship between man and nature. It is no longer that the worker puts the changed natural object as an intermediate link between himself and the object, it is that the worker puts the natural process that he changed into an industrial process as an intermediary between himself and the inorganic nature controlled by him.27 In response to St. Max’s prosaic and timeless God-created universe in his German Ideology, Marx quipped that St. Max was dissatisfied that he could not make the sun dance the cancan, troubled by his inability to calm the sea and angry at having to let the mountains rise into the sky. For him, whenever the world needed to play an important role, it immediately became natural. The only natural science admitted its impotence from the very beginning’ it did not examine man’s real relation to nature as determined by industry and natural science but announced man’s imaginary relation to nature.28 Third, taking industry and natural science as the intermediary, Marx put forward the dialectics of man and nature. Nature is the place of all human activities and the universal basis of all social labor processes. Man has changed both the natural world and himself in his activities. In this transition, man is freed from heavy and simple labor by the use of machines and becomes a new kind of man. And this infinitely creative human being, with the help of science, technology and industry, is able to apply and transform nature on a larger scale and to a larger extent. Natural science and industry are reflections of this theoretical and practical relationship between man and nature, while natural science and industry in the 19th century represented the highest form of man’s theoretical and practical relationship to nature.

3.2 Science and Technology Constitute a Primary Productive Force Throughout the history of human thought, it is not difficult to find that few ideas have been accepted and spread as soon as they are put forward. In either China or the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the productive function of science and technology has long been obscured, but revolutionary thinking and revolutionary paradigm have been in vogue. As commented by Deng Xiaoping, chief architect of China’s reform and opening-up, “science and technology constitute a primary productive force” is the consistent position of Marxism, and Marx put forward rich and profound thoughts in this regard. He examined the historical context of the mutual advancement of science and technology and productive forces, came up with the conclusion that science and technology are a productive force, analyzed the decisive effect of science and technology on various factors of productivity and revealed the realistic way that science and technology can be transformed into productive forces. All this has substantially proven the basic principle that science and technology are a primary productive force. 3.2.1  Driving Effect of Science and Technology on Productivity in History Any serious thinker will construct his theory on indisputable historical facts, and Marx is a model of this. To write Das Kapital and investigate the relationship

132  Science, Technology and Productivity between science, technology and productivity, Marx had read a great deal about the history of science, technology, craft and economics, and conducted detailed textual research on the history of science and technology in promoting productivity. Marx had examined the science and technology of the ancient handicraft age. He had made a professional survey of the mill’s history, showing us all the kinds of power that have been adopted successively and used simultaneously over a long period of time: manpower, animal power, water power, boat mill, wind mill, carriage mill and steam mill. Then, he took the mill as an example to strongly illustrate the great effect of science and technology on the improvement of instruments of labor as productive forces. After studying the origin and history of the watch industry, Marx wrote that clocks and watches are based on artisanal production and academic knowledge that marks the dawn of bourgeois society, clocks and watches provide ideas about automata and the use of automatic motion in production, what parallels with the history of clocks and watches is the history of the uniform motion theory. In addition, Marx also examined other forms of technology in the manual age, such as oil pressing, glass making, cab service and spinning. For our Chinese, we are most familiar with Marx’s high appraisal of the four great inventions: gunpowder, the compass, papermaking and printing, which were among the most influential scientific and technological achievements in ancient China, and made outstanding contributions to the development of Chinese civilization and the world civilization. When talking about the spread of gunpowder, the compass and printing in Europe and their role in promoting the productivity of European countries, Mark put it that they were “the three great inventions which ushered in bourgeois society. Gunpowder blew up the knightly class, the compass discovered the world market and founded the colonies, and the printing press was the instrument of Protestantism and the regeneration of science.”29 For a variety of reasons, Marx did not attribute the invention of papermaking to the Chinese, but after reading I.H.M. Poppe’s Geschichte der Technologie seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, he pointed out that the papermaking process is the combination of a mechanical process and a chemical process, and the combination of science, technology and industrial production. In the age of modern mechanical industry marked by the steam engine, the impact of science and technology on productivity has reached an unparalleled height, which is the most important source of Marx’s theory that science and technology are productive forces. Marx certainly did not ignore this great era. In examining this historical period, he followed his usual style of tracing back to the source. He firstly investigated the development of the two inventions that marked the beginning of handicraft workshops – the spinning machine and the original Newcomen steam engine (for Marx, the steam engine was both a product of the age of handicraft workshops and a symbol of the coming age of machine industry), and pointed out that these two great inventions and some other inventions were the products of science and technology in this period. The manufacture of

Science, Technology and Productivity  133 spinning machines and steam engines was also based on the handicraft industry and handicraft workshops that make these machines, as well as the science of mechanics that had been developed during the aforementioned period.30 Marx always believed in data. He had already shown the power of numbers when he inspected the phenomenon that science and technology promoted the rapid development of productive forces in the age of machine industry. While working on the book Machine, Natural Force and the Application of Science, Marx made a detailed survey of the development of British industry after the application of the steam engines improved by James Watt, consulted a large number of books, newspapers and government documents, acquired a great deal of first-hand knowledge of the British industry and showed us the role of science and technology in promoting productivity in the era of big machines with irrefutable data. The cotton industry in the United Kingdom, which was the most advanced in terms of scale, employees and mechanization, is shown as an example in Table 3.1. These data not only demonstrate the role of machine industry in promoting productivity and social development, but also suggest that in the age of machine industry, the entire process of production is not subordinate to the direct skill of laborers, but manifested in the technological application of science. The tendency of capital is to endow production with the quality of science, while direct labor is reduced to a mere factor of the production process.31 With the development of social production, if direct labor is reduced to a negligible proportion in quantity, then it is also essential in quality, but on the one hand, compared with general scientific labor, the technological application of natural science and the general productive forces which arise from the organization of society in aggregate production and are manifested as the natural endowments of social labor (though products of history), it becomes a subordinate factor.32 The biggest difference between modern science and pre-modern science lies in the changes in methodology and a major shift in attitudes toward nature. From Aristotle onwards, until the Middle Ages, the scientific outlook that had ruled people had focused on explaining the “what” and “why” of natural objects, while the top concern of modern scientists has become “how” to produce more and better things. Being keenly aware of this change, Marx described the historical track of the development of productive forces driven by science and technology, explained that science, great natural forces and social mass labor are embodied in Table 3.1 Development of Cotton Mills in the United Kingdoma

Total number of factories Total number of workers Service horsepower Total number of mechanical looms

1838

1850

1856

1861

1,819 259,104 59,803 108,751

1,932 330,924 82,555 249,627

2,210 379,213 97,132 298,847

2,887 451,569 294,100 399,992

Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:496–98.

a

134  Science, Technology and Productivity the machine system,33 and proved that labor productivity is developing with the continuous progress of science and technology. 3.2.2 Science and Technology Are a Direct Productive Force Productivity is the actual ability of people to solve the contradiction between society and nature, and the sum of all the material and technical factors that man utilizes and transforms nature to suit his needs. Objectively speaking, in Marx’s time, and even before Marx, many thinkers had already noticed the role of science and technology in promoting productivity, but Marx was the first to carry on a thorough and comprehensive theoretical analysis of the productive nature of science and technology and took the lead in clearly putting forward the idea that science and technology is a productive force. In his Economic Manuscript of 1857–1858, Marx stated that the further development of capital presupposes certain, existing and historical development of productive forces – including science – and concurrently pushes and promotes the development of productive forces, while the same thing happens when value is converted into capital.34 The difference is that science is people’s understanding of nature and the laws of nature and human society, and appears mostly in the form of knowledge. As long as science is applied to the field of production and transformed into the actual effect of production activities, more material wealth can be created. To understand Marx’s thought that science and technology are a productive force, we should first learn about his theoretical analysis of social productive forces and their composition, because “productive force is a category that marks the actual degree and actual ability of human beings to transform nature, and fundamentally reflects the realistic relationship between man and nature.”35 According to Marx, there are direct and general productive forces: the productive forces directly entering into the production process, such as the labor force, tools and objects, are direct productive forces; the general productive forces consist of the skills that have not manifested into the labor force, the scientific knowledge that has not been materialized into labor tools and the productive forces that have not entered the direct production process, such as the children in reserve for the workforce. According to the aforementioned division, when science exists in a general form of knowledge or theory, it is a general productive force: science is the development of both the wealth of ideas and the wealth of practice, but it is merely an aspect, a form, of the development of man’s productive forces, that is, the development of wealth.36 When science is transformed into the skills of laborers or materialized into the tools of labor, it becomes a direct productive force: the development of fixed capital shows the extent to which general social knowledge has become direct productive forces and to what extent the conditions of the social life process are themselves controlled and modified by the general intelligence. It shows the extent to which social productive forces have been produced not only in the form of knowledge but as direct organs of social practice, as direct organs of the actual life process.37 So, science is a latent, ideologically productive force;

Science, Technology and Productivity  135 only when it is directly or indirectly applied to the production process, participates in value creation activities and improves productive factors and structure can it be transformed into a direct real productive force. Some scholars have argued that Marx only said that science can “become” a direct productive force, but he never said that science “is” a direct productive force; this view is certainly wrong. Marx clearly told us in many of his works that science and technology are a productive force. In the analysis of the relationship between capital and science, Marx said that the power of science is one of the productive forces that cost capitalists nothing. When talking about the fact that the wealth of workers does not increase in tandem with the wealth of society, Marx explicitly categorized science and invention as productive forces. He said that all the progress of civilization, or to put it another way, all growth in social productive forces or in the productive forces of labor itself, such as the results arising from science, invention, division and combination of labor, improvement of means of transportation, opening up of world markets and machines, do not enrich the workers, but only the capital; that is, it only increases the power over labor, and only increases the productivity of capital.38 More importantly, Marx treated science and technology as an independent force, an independent factor from the other components of productivity, a means of production, and an instrument of enrichment: the application of natural factors coincides with the development of science as an independent factor in the production process. The process of production becomes the application of science, and science in turn becomes a factor (i.e., function) in the process of production. And the mission of science is to become the means of producing wealth.39 Marx’s theory that science and technology are a productive force is not only abundant in Das Kapital, Machine, Natural Force and the Application of Science and his later manuscripts, but the germ of this idea can also be found in his early works. As early as 1845–1846, Marx and Engels linked science and technology with productive forces when writing the German Ideology: the kind of labor that was associated with machines from the beginning, even the most primitive machines, soon showed that it was the most capable of development.40 The book The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) proves that Marx not only found the great effect of science and technology on productive forces but also had the vague idea that science and technology are a productive force: “[t]he hand‐​mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam‐​mill society with the industrial capitalist.”41 In criticizing Proudhon’s confused logic and erroneous views, Marx quipped that if Prometheus had merely taught us that division of labor, use of machines and harnessing of the forces of nature and science could increase man’s productivity and produce more surplus than isolated labor, then this new Prometheus had the misfortune of being born too late.42 Here, Marx expressed the idea that science and technology are a productive force in a rhetorical way. The preceding discussion fully shows that “science and technology is a productive force” is Marx’s consistent viewpoint and a logical conclusion from his investigation of the mutual evolution of science, technology and productive forces. Marxism is profound and beyond the times. After Marx, many thinkers

136  Science, Technology and Productivity also focus on the relationship between science, technology and productive forces, but few of them have actually broken new ground. The real value of Marx’s theory that science and technology is a productive force lies in the fact that it has opened up a new theoretical field, laid a foundation for this scope of research, built the basic framework of this theoretical edifice, and pointed out the development direction and space of this theory, so much so that later Marxists and thinkers in favor of Marx can find in his writings a sufficient source of thought for them. 3.2.3  Decisive Effect of Science and Technology on Productivity Today, we say that science and technology are the primary productive force, which means that science and technology are the most important and decisive factors in productive forces. Reading the works of Marx, we can find that he had made it clear long ago that science and technology are independent factors in productive forces, and they are both general and direct productive forces. More importantly, science and technology are the most active and revolutionary factors in productive forces and play a decisive role in their development. After studying the counteraction of the factory system to handicraft workshops and household labor, Marx pointed out that the development of science and technology has not only led to the expansion of production scale but also changed the process and the nature of production. The principle of machine production is to break down the process into its constituent stages, and to apply mechanics, chemistry and so on; in short, natural science is applied to solve all resulting problems. This principle plays a decisive role everywhere.43 Creating more wealth is the eternal theme of human society and the most important purpose of social production; the development of science and technology makes the creation of wealth increasingly dependent on science and its application. With the development of great industry, the creation of real wealth depends less on the hours worked and the amount of labor expended but depends more on the forces of agents employed during the working hours, and the agents themselves – their enormous efficiency – are out of proportion to the direct hours of labor spent producing them, but dependent on the general level of science and technological progress, or dependent on how science is applied to production.44 Marx had studied in great depth the components of productive forces, and concluded that “the ‘simple’ elements of the labor process are the work itself, the object onto which work is performed, and the instruments of that work.”45 The decisive role of science and technology in productive forces is reflected in the following aspects: science and technology can make the three major elements of productive forces – labor force, objects of labor and instruments of labor – undergo qualitative transformation and optimization; they continuously improve the industrial structure, and accelerate the development of productive forces on the whole. A detailed analysis is as follows. (1) The decisive effect of science and technology on the elements of productive forces.

Science, Technology and Productivity  137 Firstly, science and technology can arm workers, so as to continuously improve their quality and the ability to work. A worker is a person who has a certain labor ability and is engaged in production practice. Among all elements of productive forces, the worker is the main body of the production process and the active and leading element in productive forces, while other factors can only play their roles through the worker. With the development of science and technology, the improvement of workers’ labor skills and labor quality increasingly depends on the level of scientific and technological development. Intelligence in the process of production is separated from manual labor, and intelligence is transformed into the power of capital over labor. Science, great natural forces, and mass labor of society are all embodied in the machine system, and together with the machine system, constitute the power of the master.46 In his analysis of the economization of constant capital use in Das Kapital, Marx pointed out that the development of labor productivity in the production sector is always linked with natural science and its application: this development of productive forces is always, in the end, attributed to the social nature of labor at work, to the division of labor within society and to the development of intellectual work and especially of natural science.47 Here we must be careful not to confuse the decisive role of science and technology with the leading role of workers because they do not indicate the same thing: the former refers to the relationship between the intellectual and physical elements in production, especially in workers themselves, while intelligence element is becoming more and more important, and ranking first; the latter is that, in terms of the relationship between man and object in productive forces, workers are the main body of productive forces and the only element with initiative, thus occupying the first place. In the final analysis, the two propositions are actually consistent.48 That is to say, the development of productive forces basically depends on the improvement of workers’ scientific and technological quality, and the workers that have mastered science and technology are the main body of productive forces. Secondly, science and technology have led to the rapid development of the means of labor. The means of labor refer to the material goods or material conditions that people use to change or influence the objects of labor in the process of labor, among which the most important is the instrument of production. Such an instrument is the intermediary between workers and labor objects, and an important measure of the development level of human productivity. To some extent, the history of human development is the history of the constant improvement of the instrument of production, which is the direct outcome of continuously developing science and technology. From the Stone Age to the Bronze Age, from the Iron Age to the Steam Age, from the age of craftsmanship to the age of workshop craftsmanship, and then to the age of big machines, the evolution of instruments has greatly increased the efficiency of labor and the level of human production. After investigating the situation that the technical improvement of the spinning

138  Science, Technology and Productivity frame had greatly improved the production efficiency, Marx stated that the industrial revolution, peculiar to the capitalist mode of production, arose from the transformation of that part of the instrument which had direct contact with processed materials, and it paved the way for increasing the number of spindles installed on each spinning machine from six to 1,800.49 Finally, science and technology have brought about the expansion and advancement of the objects of labor. The objects of labor, which involve all the objects that can be processed in the process of labor, are usually divided into unprocessed natural objects and processed man-made objects. Thanks to the development of science and technology, man is able to utilize more and more unprocessed natural objects. For example, the development of bronze smelting technology has turned the previously neglected copper ore into usable resources, and the invention of submersible pumps makes it possible to mine coal in areas with high water tables. As Marx put it: apart from natural matter, natural forces, which cost nothing, may be incorporated into the process of production as elements, with greater or lesser efficiency, and the extent to which they are effective depends on methods and scientific advances that cost the capitalist nothing.50 The development of science and technology has made processed man-made articles increasingly multitudinous, with more and more complicated structures, better quality and more powerful functions. After an investigation of the improvement of textile machinery and its power, Marx pointed out that what was once a stand-alone instrument now functions only as part of a set of similar instruments, or current instruments, with the increase in power, have acquired an incomparably large scale.51 Marx also noticed that, as a result of the development of science and technology, people can even create new materials, new objects of labor, or turn old fertilizer into treasure. Each advance in chemistry not only increases the number of useful substances and the uses of known substances but also expands the field of investment as capital grows; at the same time, it teaches people to put waste from production and consumption back into the recycling process, thus new capital materials can be created without any prepaid capital.52 Moreover, due to the development of science and technology, the importance of the object of labor in the elements of productivity has kept mounting, and it is still the case to date. (2) Science and technology keep improving the industrial structure, making the productive forces on the whole present an accelerated development trend. Industrial structure refers to the interchange relationship and connection mode of the various elements that constitute an industry. The upgrading of industrial structure refers to the process in which low-level industries are gradually replaced by high-level industries, and the role and status of high-level industries in the industrial structure are constantly improving; to put it simply, it is the advancement process of industrial structure. Today, we often can’t help but say that the progress of science and technology makes society develop rapidly. In fact, Marx took notice of this phenomenon long ago. After examining the rapid development of modern science and technology,

Science, Technology and Productivity  139 and the resulting greatest industrial revolution in history – the Steam Revolution, and witnessing the great achievements of modern scientific and technological revolution in Europe, especially in Britain, Marx pointed out that the productivity of a working day in British society increased by 2,700% in 70 years, that is, 27 times as much was produced every day in 1840 as in 1770.53 “The bourgeoisie in its rule of less than one hundred creates productivity, more than all the productivity of the whole past generations, bigger.”54 However, in contrast to the rapid growth in productivity driven by science and technology, Marx believed that more importantly, science and technology have led to the upgrading and advancement of the industrial structure, and this is the fundamental reason for the rapid development of social productive forces. Marx divided the stages of social development into the age of gathering and hunting → the age of agriculture → the age of industry → the age of automation, which is a typical way of division measured by the level of scientific and technological development. Any division of the development stages of social industry is based on the overall grasp of social development, and such division is undoubtedly the best manifestation of Marx’s thought that science and technology promote the change of economic structure and industrial structure. In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx clearly expressed this idea: as new productivity is acquired, people will change their mode of production; with the change of the mode of production, that is, the way of making a living, people will change all their social relations. “The hand‐​mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam‐​mill society with the industrial capitalist.”55 It may not take much creativity to accurately assess the effects of existing science and technology on the industrial structure, but Marx was so creative that he could see the great value of nascent science and technology and predict the resulting social and economic changes. The unusual attention to the electric revolution shows Marx’s keen insight and foresight. By the late 1840s, although new discoveries and inventions in electricity had not entered the practical stage, Marx began to pay attention to these technologies and saw in them the dawn of the coming age of electricity. As Wilhelm Liebknecht recalled, one day in 1850 Marx excitedly talked about the significance of new developments in electricity, that the steam King turned the world upside down in the last century, now that his reign had come to an end, and even greater revolutionary force—the spark of electricity—would take its place…The consequences of this were incalculable. Any economic revolution must be followed by a political revolution, for the latter is only the expression of the former.56 In 1882, a year before Marx died, at the International Electric Show in Munich, French engineer Marcel Deprez (1834–1918) exhibited the world’s first electric transmission line between Misbach and Munich. Marx, though gravely ill, was very concerned about it; he asked his grandson Edgar Longuet to get him Deprez’s long-distance transmission report and invited Engels to evaluate this creation. Engels spoke highly of Deprez’s achievement based on Marx’s opinion:

140  Science, Technology and Productivity Deprez’s latest discovery…If at first it is just good for the city, in the end, it will be the most powerful lever to eliminate the urban-rural confrontation; and it is quite evident that the productive forces will thus be so greatly expanded that bourgeois management will be increasingly unnecessary.57 3.2.4 Basic Way of Transforming Science and Technology into Direct Productivity Science and technology can build up man’s ability to transform nature to suit his needs; science and technology can satisfy man’s desire to control nature more than any other force. This issue has all along been taken for granted by most people, hence they are no longer interested in exploring it. Marx, on the other hand, was able to see what people haven’t seen, think what people haven’t thought and discover the general laws hidden in places that ordinary people don’t look for. He first recognized that science and technology are endogenous variables of economic development and pointed out the basic way of transforming science and technology into direct productivity, which is one of Marx’s most important legacies to future generations of economists. Today, when talking about the relationship between economic growth and science and technology, we may think of the Cobb-Douglas production function and its improved model. The traditional production function can be expressed as:

Y = A( K, L)

(3.1)

Where Y represents yield, K represents capital, L represents labor force and A represents advancement of technology. In this traditional model, science and technology are exogenous variables that function through two internal factors, that is, capital and labor force. Later, American economist Paul M. Romer classified science and technology as an endogenous variable and introduced labor force (human capital) into the production function, so this model becomes:

Y = AK a Lb B g

(3.2)

In Formula 3.2, B is human capital, α, β and γ stand for the yield elasticity of capital, labor and human capital, respectively. Here, science and technology become the endogenous variable of the production function, and they are an element of production that plays a role simultaneously with land, capital, labor and human capital. In fact, Marx had long regarded science and technology as the same element of production as capital and labor. He conducted a systematic investigation of the formation mechanism of wages, prices and profits in capitalist society. When the effects of science and technology on production were far less obvious than they are today, he keenly grasped the endogenous nature of science and technology to production. Marx made it clear that apart from the differences in innate abilities and acquired production skills, labor productivity should depend primarily on:

Science, Technology and Productivity  141 first, the natural conditions of labor, such as the fertility of land and the abundance of mines; second, the progressive improvement in the social power of labor, which is caused by mass production, accumulation of capital, union of labor, division of labor, machinery, improved methods, application of chemical forces and other forces of nature, reduction of time and space by means of transportation and all sorts of other inventions. It is by these inventions that science drives the forces of nature to serve labor, and the social or cooperative nature of labor is also developed by these inventions.58 In Das Kapital, Marx made the same point that labor productivity is determined by a variety of conditions, including the average level of proficiency of workers, the level of development of science and its technological application, the social integration of production processes, the size and efficiency of the means of production and the natural conditions.59 There is no doubt that Marx was the originator of this idea. Joseph A. Schumpeter, the American economist recognized as the founder of the economics of technological innovation, declared that Marxism was an important source of his thinking because Marx saw the role of technological innovation in promoting economy earlier than any other Western scholar. Although Schumpeter often consciously distanced himself from Marx, even at one point distancing himself from Marx by attacking him. But Schumpeter was apparently a Marxist; his economic theory is probably unique in the history of modern economics in terms of the independence of the system and the universality of the scope involved. If there is any economics that can be compared with his, it must be Marxism.60 The aforementioned comparison between Schumpeter and Marx, although not indicating their fundamental differences, is certainly true to some extent, since Marx was indeed the first economist that took science and technology as an endogenous variable of economic development. On the one hand, Marx emphasized that science and technology are an independent element in the production process, productivity that cost capitalists nothing, and means of producing wealth and becoming rich. On the other hand, Marx also pointed out the basic conditions – capitalist mode of production and basic way – for the ideological productivity or general productivity – materialization, personalization and scientific management – to enter the production system and transform into direct productivity. The times produce their heroes; Marx’s success in making such a great forward-looking discovery was inseparable from his life in the 19th century when science and technology were developing rapidly. Science exuded a bright light of reason in the Greek era, but did little to improve the welfare of the Greeks. In the Middle Ages, the primitive economy had no need for science and technology, nor did it provide opportunities for their great advancement. The Renaissance was also a revival of science, but the gap between scientific theory and production practice remained large. It was not until the age of capitalism that the needs of industry, for the first time, made it possible for science to play a decisive role in the transformation of industrial production methods.61 In the 19th century, as the industrial revolution flourished, science became an indispensable and independent element of production, the production process became the process of scientific application, and each discovery became the basis for a new invention

142  Science, Technology and Productivity or method of production. Just like what Marx had said, it was the capitalist mode of production that first made natural science serve the direct production process. Here Marx actually pointed out the basic conditions for the transformation of science and technology into direct productive forces. A craftsman in feudal times, for example, had many wonderful ideas, but they were of no use if he didn’t put them into practice, but a design scheme, or just an idea, in the head of an engineer in the capitalist era was worth a fortune. Moreover, Marx pointed out that the capitalist mode of production made it possible for science and technology to enter production, and made them a necessary element in production, the process of production became the application of science, and science in turn became the element (i.e., the function) of the process of production, the means of producing material wealth and the decisive element that could not be left aside. Only in this mode of production do practical problems arise to be solved only by scientific methods. Only now have experiments and observations – and the exigencies of the production process itself – reached the scale that makes the application of science possible and necessary.62 The appearance of the capitalist mode of production made it possible and necessary for science and technology to enter production and become direct productivity. The next question to be discussed is how science can be translated into direct productivity. Science is to a large extent a productive force of ideology, or spiritual productivity; Marx sometimes called science and technology the general productive force. Laborers, objects of labor and means of labor are usually taken as the three elements of productivity.63 The way of transforming science and technology into a direct productive force is to transform them into objects of labor and means of labor through materialization. In the process of labor, workers who master certain skills and techniques make predetermined changes in objects of labor with the help of means of labor and produce products of labor. In essence, the products of labor are natural substances going through changes in form and adapted to human needs, representing the materialization of skills and techniques in the process of human labor. Therefore, labor is combined with the objects of labor, with labor objectified and objects processed. What was once expressed in the form of movement on the part of laborers is now expressed in the form of existence as a static attribute on the product side. When the laborer spins, the product is the textile.64 Means of labor, with instruments of labor as the core, are indispensable material conditions for production. The instruments of labor before the industrial revolution were mostly manual tools, representing the materialization of long-term labor experience and manual skills, and containing little scientific component. After the industrial revolution, manual tools were gradually replaced by machines and machine systems, and means of labor are mainly embodied in the materialization of scientific achievements. In this way, science has become a materialized power of knowledge. Now that the use of machines should follow strict scientific rules, it can save more of its components and means of consumption,65 therefore, the scientific use of machines can reduce costs and improve efficiency.

Science, Technology and Productivity  143 Another way of transforming science and technology into direct productivity is to arm workers and improve their skills and techniques through personalization. Specialized vocational training is an important way of personalization of science and technology. This process was defined by Marx as a reproduction of labor force. According to Marx, the value of labor force is determined by the amount of labor necessary to produce it, including the means of livelihood necessary to support the laborer himself, raise his children and continue the race; in order to develop his labor force by acquiring a certain skill, an additional amount of value also needs to be spent.66 Therefore, through pre-job training, on-the-job training, re-education and other ways, science and technology are incorporated into the production process to become direct productivity. In addition, Marx also noticed that science and technology can arm business managers and improve their educational level, scientific and technological level and management ability. For example, the development of science and technology enables individual capitalists to make plans for production, improves their ability to predict, make decisions and coordinate, carry out planned production (although anarchy is inevitable in the capitalist stage), reduce waste and loss in production and operation, make capitalists optimize the technical process, adjust the production structure and improve the production efficiency of their business on the whole.

3.3 Science, Technology and Philosophical Culture Like other elements of civilization, such as religion and art, science and technology have been profoundly influencing the course of civilization on our planet. But the status and role of science and technology in the civilizations we’ve experienced have been a matter of opinion. Since the Renaissance, the view that science and technology are the dominant force of human civilization was once deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, but since the 1970s this view has been challenged as never before; the claims such as the “end of objectivity,” “end of reason” and even “end of science” have put the education of young people, public understanding of science and access to science funding at risk. One of the fine traditions of Chinese civilization is to seek wisdom from the thoughts of our predecessors. To return to the world of Marx and go over his insightful thoughts on the relationship between science, technology and civilization is undoubtedly beneficial for us to deal with today’s predicament. 3.3.1  Science Is the Most Significant Revolutionary Force Civilization is the sum total of the material and spiritual achievements made by mankind to get out of ignorance and continuously understand and transform the world. A history of human civilization is a history of the continuous evolution of human material and spiritual civilization. Material civilization, which is the sum total of all material achievements created by human beings, is manifested by the progress of material production and the improvement of material life. Spiritual civilization, which integrates all the fruits of human spiritual production and life, is manifested as the progress of ideological, moral and political levels.

144  Science, Technology and Productivity Looking at the history of the evolution of human civilization, the progress of civilization and the development of science and technology are quite isomorphic. To some extent, the development course of science and technology is an epitome of the progress of human civilization. Science and technology have created one brilliant marvel after another in material civilization, leading mankind from the Stone Age to the Bronze Age, from the iron civilization to the age of steam and from the electrical civilization to the information age. At the same time, science and technology have also brought the prosperity of spiritual civilization: from the age of ignorance to the age of myth, from the light of reason, love and wisdom sparkled in Greece to the flowers of benevolence, justice, loyalty and filial piety that bloomed in China, from the birth of the idea of a democratic contract in Europe to the spread of the voice of justice around the world, the progress and development of science and technology have been playing an indispensable role in this entire process. Science and technology also determine the change of social, political and economic structure: no matter whether it is the succession of productive relations from primitive society, slave society and feudal society to capitalist society and socialist society, or the successive rise of world hegemons such as Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States, it is science and technology that have played an irreplaceable role in this process. Marx was not strictly a scientist, but he gave unparalleled attention to science and technology. Marx’s lifelong ideal was to build a fair, just, free and happy communist society, while science and technology are one of the most important means of realizing communism, and also part of this supreme civilization. From this point of view, Marx and his forerunner Bacon and some famous utopian socialists had one common soul. Thomas More was one of the most important utopian thinkers. In his famous book Utopia, More described the picture of an ideal society in his mind: it may be an isolated, beautiful and fertile island that consists of 54 cities, and it is characterized by a democratic and equal political system, all property in public ownership, planned economy and distribution according to one’s needs. In More’s Utopia, he gave great prominence to science and technology. Firstly, science and technology are the guarantees of spiritual freedom and spiritual perfection of utopians. More believed that true happiness includes both physical health and spiritual enjoyment, and this kind of happiness should be obtained from science, art, music and so on. The common and only goal of utopians is written into their constitution: insofar as public needs are not impaired, all citizens should have as much time as possible for spiritual freedom and development, besides physical labor.67 Secondly, More emphasized the improvement of utopians’ scientific and cultural quality. His vision was that utopians should devote as much time as possible to academic discussion after work, sleep and meals. Those with good personalities, superior intelligence and a keen interest in learning may enjoy special treatment as full-time academic researchers. In utopia, since all residents participate in social production, the overall working hours are greatly shortened, and everyone can be assured of adequate supplies by working only six hours a

Science, Technology and Productivity  145 day. The rest of the time is at the disposal of individuals, and leisure time is usually reserved for academic discussion.68 In The City of the Sun, Tommas Campanella described what an ideal social system is. Through a conversation between a Genoese navigator and the keeper of a pilgrim’s hostel, Campanella depicted a wonderful society where there is no private property, no exploitation, and everyone works and lives happily. Science and technology are as important in the City of the Sun as those in More’s utopia. The supreme leader of the city, “the Sun,” must be someone who is well versed in the history, customs, religious rituals and laws of various peoples, and proficient in physics, mathematics, astronomy and astrology. The three assistants of the Sun must be aware of the sciences within their jurisdiction, and they should be philosophers, historians, politicians or physicists. In this city, great importance is attached to the education of children, and scientific knowledge is a must for children; everyone does both manual and mental work, but they only work four hours a day (more relaxed than those utopians) and spend their spare time in academic research, reading, seminars, walking and physical activities. In terms of the emphasis on science and technology and the reliance on their power, The New Atlantis by Francis Bacon is unrivaled. The New Atlantis is a society in which science dominates everything, and science is the foundation of governance. In Bacon’s view, with science, inventions and discoveries, and with their application to industrial and agricultural production and everything else, the wealth of society is bound to increase, and the happiness of local residents will be within reach. Bacon devoted his life to the study, practice and promotion of science, and to the combination of natural science and social practices, hence vigorously promoting the progress and prosperity of science. The vision of the future society of these great thinkers shows that science and technology are no longer a pure human activity, nor are they a common, optional puzzle; instead, they have become the essence and core of human civilization, and the most important element, such as liberty, justice and happiness, to realize the best ideals of human civilization. In Plato’s Republic, only philosophers (scientists were philosophers in Plato’s day) were qualified to serve as kings; in Campanella’s The City of the Sun, the supreme leader “the Sun” and his assistants must be learned scientists; in almost all utopian civilizations, everyone must study science and technology, and science is so closely related to civilization. Marx noticed all of this; of course, he did not believe that science and technology are simply productivity, but a means and instrument by which man has transformed nature, and he examined science and technology by putting them in the context of the evolution of human civilization. For Marx, science is a driving and revolutionary force in history,69 a historically powerful lever and a supreme revolutionary force.70 Although Marx took the critique of capitalism and the establishment of socialism and communism as his mission, he spoke highly of the science and technology in capitalist civilization. Due to the development of science and technology, “[t]he bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.”71

146  Science, Technology and Productivity In Marx’s view, however, the power of science and technology is far from being fully exercised in a capitalist society, because under capitalism, science and technology are enslaved by the brute force of capital, making their role greatly diminished. Marx believed that only in the civilization of communism, science and technology can play a real role and enjoy real development and prosperity. Marx praised the science and technology in the communist period by saying that only the working class could free them from the rule of the monks, turning science from an instrument of class rule into a power of the people, and transforming scientists themselves from peddlers of class prejudice, parasites of the state in pursuit of fame and fortune and allies of capital, into free thinkers. Only in the republic of labor can science play its real role.72 In the communist society, the revolutionary nature of science is revealed, the revolutionary power of science is released, production is turned into the conscious technological application of science, and scientific achievements are fully realized in practice. 3.3.2 Science, Technology and Globalization Man is a kind of relationship animal; there have been communicative behaviors since human beings and human society came into being. Feuerbach believed that isolated individuals do not have truthfulness; the essence of man can only be attained through interpersonal communication. Marx believed that “the essence of man is the sum total of all social relations.”73 More broadly speaking, communication is not only a medium of interpersonal interaction but also a way of survival and living. From Dilthey’s “Philosophy of Life,” Husserl’s “Life World,” Wittgenstein’s “Form of Life” and Heidegger’s “Being in the World” to Gadamer’s “Fusion of Horizons,” thinkers of different ages thought about the way of social communication with their own special concepts. Today, globalization is no doubt the most eye-catching issue. The way of social communication is concrete, historical and constantly developing. According to Hegel, the universal relationship of people is a process in which individuals’ subjectivity has experienced the intermediary forms of the universal individual existence, such as contract, morality, ethics (family and civil society), national and world history, to achieve the unity of universal freedom and individual subjective freedom. After going over the historical changes in people’s way of communication, Marx revealed the inner connection between the changes in social communication mode and the development of science and technology and formed a unique social communication theory. Marx described the picture of the development of human communication mode in a dialectical manner. According to him, the change of social communication mode generally goes through three major stages: first, communication based on human dependence or subordination; second, personal communication of all products, capabilities and activities based on exchange values; third, communication between individuals as members of a consciously united association of free men.74 In the long agricultural civilization before the First Industrial Revolution, language, writing and printing had been the main means of communication.

Science, Technology and Productivity  147 Due to the relative backwardness of science and technology, the corresponding dominant way of communication was mediated by ties of blood and geography, this period was described by Marx as the pre-modern period characterized by human dependence. With the advent of industrial civilization, the means of communication marked by transportation and communication have broken through the restrictions of regional and blood ties, hence expanding the space and scope of exchanges, and forming a civil society characterized by what Marx called “dependence on things.” In the third stage, as divided by Marx, due to the further development of science and technology, the way of communication has changed from material communication to spiritual communication, from regional communication to global communication, from individual communication to group communication, hence known as the stage of individual all-around development. In Marx’s time, the trend of regional history turning into global history had already shown; people could directly experience this real-world connection. Faced with this trend, Marx and Engels pointed out that in this development process, the scope of activities that interact with each other is becoming wider and wider, and the primitive isolation of the nations is extinguished more thoroughly by the everperfecting modes of production, by communication and by the division of labor naturally formed between these nations; history is more likely to become world history.75 In an era of increasingly globalized and interconnected communication, the history of isolated nations and countries has become a thing of the past, and the world is increasingly becoming a whole. Marx reviewed the historical changes in the ways of human communication and saw the evolution of the means and ways of communication as a result of scientific and technological progress, particularly the worldwide trend of social interaction in the 19th century arising from improved means of transportation and communication, and the possibility of “world history” being made. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels pointed out that large-scale industry established the world market prepared by the discovery of America, then the world market led to a massive expansion of navigation, commerce and land transportation, making production and consumption of all countries worldwide, and the internationalization of production, exchange, consumption and distribution will inevitably lead to universal communication worldwide. In Marx’s view, the formation of world communication and world history is the inevitable result of the development of social productive forces and modern science and technology. Firstly, the development of science and technology has changed people’s concept of time and space, forming the concept of social interaction facing the world. Generally speaking, the greater the distance of social communication, the more time it takes. The solution is that, in Marx’s view, “space must be annihilated by time.”76 This means developing fast means of transportation and communication. The inventions and continuous improvement of modern means of transportation and communication represented by the steamship, railway and telegraph just meet people’s requirements. These new means of transportation and communication

148  Science, Technology and Productivity have greatly shortened the geographical distance between people and greatly facilitated their communication, and shorter geographical distance expands the space for people to communicate. So much so that the Pacific will serve as the great world waterway, and the Atlantic will be reduced to an inland sea, just like the Mediterranean.77 The shortening of time and space and the expansion of communication will make people get rid of the long-closed manor economy and small-scale peasant consciousness, go to the world and develop a concept of the world. The development of means of transportation and communication created world history for the first time because it makes the needs of every civilized nation, and of every individual in those nations, dependent on the world as a whole, and because it eliminates the natural isolation of nations.78 Secondly, the development of science and technology has promoted the internationalization of production and consumption, making production and consumption become the real history of the world. In the 19th century, the transformation of ways of communication caused by the development of science and technology promoted the great development of the commodity economy and established worldwide economic relations in terms of production and consumption. The labor of an individual exists only as an exchange of value. The production of each individual depends on the production of all others; similarly, the conversion of his products into his own means of livelihood also depends on the consumption of all other people.79 Advances in science and technology have exacerbated this trend, making production and consumption increasingly worldwide. As Marx put it: the telegraph has turned all of Europe into a stock exchange, while railroads and steamships have expanded transportation and exchange a hundredfold.80 Thirdly, modern science and technology have accelerated the spread of civilization across the globe, leading to more and more common world communication. The changes in the ways of communication caused by the development of science and technology have not only contributed to the formation of the world production and consumption market but also promoted the global spread of spiritual culture such as language, social order, freedom and justice, thus resulting in more and more common social communication. Language is one of the most important vehicles for social communication. The development of international trade and postal communications has promoted the convergence of languages, and many multilingual geniuses have emerged. For example, both Marx and Engels could read and write fluently in English, German, French, Latin and Greek. In a letter to Marx, Engels wrote that “some Danish farmers in certain places could interchangeably speak Danish, low German and high German dialects, while in other places, I talked to people in Danish and they always replied in German.”81 The result of this constant convergence of languages is the emergence of universal languages such as English and French. Changes in the ways of communication have also accelerated the disintegration of traditional societies and promoted the establishment of bourgeois democracy and the general acceptance of the concept of freedom and justice. In the Middle

Science, Technology and Productivity  149 Ages, Europe was dominated by manorial landlords, with manorial divisions, numerous small states and checkpoints everywhere. After the Industrial Revolution, itinerant businessmen constantly challenged this situation, while the truly revolutionary changes might come from the immense power of modern technologies such as steamships, railways and telegraph. In Marx’s view, the advent of railroads even forced countries with less developed capitalism to build superstructures that were not commensurate with their traditions, so that the socioeconomic relations of these countries had undergone a transformation from pre-modern to modern. There is no doubt that the laying of railways accelerated social and political disintegration in these countries.82 Nowadays, globalization has caused a wave of controversy today. From European countries, the United States and other developed capitalist countries to the primitive tribes of Africa, the voice of opposition to globalization incessantly lingers on. But we have to admit that globalization is an objective fact; what we can do first is to face up to its existence, and then study its laws, discuss its advantages and disadvantages and find the right countermeasures. In the process, of course, we should not ignore the wisdom of Marx and Engels; their thoughtfulness at the rise of globalization should be the source of our ideas for solving problems today. 3.3.3  Scientific and Technological Determinism and Historical Materialism Marx is perhaps the most controversial scholar of all time. His followers interpret his ideas from radically different perspectives, while his opponents attack him with words taken out of context. Scientific and technological determinism is one of the controversies about Marxism. At a time when the power of science was growing and its side effects were not yet apparent, people were full of unreserved admiration for science: almost everyone was convinced of the omnipotence, invincibility and supremacy of science. It was in this context that Edward Bernstein successfully linked science and technology to Marxism, and he even turned Marxism into science. Because in his view, only in this way can he express his admiration for Marxism and shows its advanced nature. When science and technology have fallen into crisis because they are away from humanity, and anti-science, ecologism, social constructivism and postmodernism become fashionable, one of the charges made against Marx by his opponents is that he was a scientist, and his view of history is economic determinism and scientific and technological determinism. K.R. Popper is a typical representative of these opponents, and E.G. Mesthene also classified the Marxist view of technology as technological determinism.83 There is still no accepted definition of scientific and technological determinism. To put it simply, it is the view that science and technology are the determining force or even the only determining force for social and economic development. There are many schools of this view today, such as technological optimism and technological pessimism.

150  Science, Technology and Productivity As previously mentioned, Marx really valued the social function of science and technology. He believed that science and technology are a productive force, a decisive element in productive forces and the most significant revolutionary force. But after reading Marx carefully, we can see that ne is not a scientific and technological determinist. Even some sociologists of scientific knowledge (SSK) acknowledge this. In Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, Michael Markey summarized Marx’s view of science as follows: the central point of Marxist scientific analysis is to take science as a social creation and emphasize that the understanding of its results, applications and development directions should be associated with the wider social context. And Marx tended to think that the laws of natural science were also a means of achieving social goals.84 First, scientific and technological determinism equates science and technology with all productive forces and obliterates the role of other elements in productive forces. Marx’s historical materialism emphasizes that productivity determines the relations of production, the economic basis determines the superstructure, social being determines social consciousness and social productive forces are the real driving force of social development. But this dynamic is an organic whole; science and technology are a productive force, while productive forces are not exactly equivalent to science and technology, which are only an element in productive forces. There are other elements in productive forces, such as workers with subjective initiative, and objects and instruments of labor. For this issue, Engels made a clear statement. In a letter to Joseph Broch, a student at the University of Berlin, Engels pointed out that the occurrence of historical events seems like an infinite number of forces interlocking, a parallelogram with an infinite number of forces. And they are the products of forces at work.85 This view of Engels is certainly true. According to historical materialism, the decisive factor in the course of history is the production and reproduction of real life. Anyone who distorts it and says that economic factors are the only decisive factor is turning the proposition into meaningless, abstract and absurd nonsense. The economic situation is the foundation, but it has an impact on the course of historical struggle and in many cases mainly determines the form of this struggle, as well as various factors of the superstructure.86 Second, scientific and technological determinism attempts to replace the materialistic historical view with the idealist historical view. Marx’s historical materialism denies the existence of some absolutely unchanging essential basis in the process of social and historical development, but it does not deny the objective law of social history, and this law is not “predetermined essence,” it only exists in social and historical activities. Social history can only be the history of human beings, and only human beings are the subject of history. Human beings must seek and discover ways to make themselves survive better in the tension between freedom and necessity. This requires people to seek freedom and create their own future on the premise of grasping the objective necessity. But techno-determinists have left man’s fate and future in the hands of nonhuman machines, subject not only to the inevitability of the past but also to an immutable future. This is actually an idealist fatalism. As Marx put it: it is not that history uses man as a means to its

Science, Technology and Productivity  151 own end, as if history were a fascinating individual. History is nothing more than the activity of men pursuing their own ends.87 Looking at history, we will find that science and technology seem like a mountain hidden with endless treasures; no visitor will leave empty-handed, but how much you can achieve in the end depends on your scientific and technological savvy. The more profound the understanding is, the greater the gain will be. Some 2,500 years ago, the Greeks, who advocated reason and romance, harvested the earliest and most brilliant scientific civilization of mankind. Then 2,000 years ago, the utilitarian Romans built a technological empire of unparalleled luxury. The Chinese, who combined pragmatism with humanity, were 1,500 years ahead of the world. More than 400 years ago, when the reputation of Greece was at its peak, Bacon made the Europeans who had experienced the gorgeous Renaissance turn around to re-embark on the pursuit of practical science and technology, thus creating the brilliant modern civilization. More than 100 years ago, Marx, keenly aware of the double-sided nature of science and technology, devoted himself to the rescue of the enslaved masses and the alienation of science and technology, and to building a free, just, happy and joyful communist society. Today, we are still chasing a new life of happiness; we still need the wisdom of Marx and his predecessors, as well as our own consciousness and efforts. Only by re-examining the nature of science and technology, grasping the law of its development and formulating correct action plans can we move toward a better tomorrow.

Notes 1 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:157. 2 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:254. 3 G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971:234. 4 A. Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx. London: Nib., 1973:15. 5 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:310. 6 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:307. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:146. 8 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:269. 9 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:158. 10 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:428–29. 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:8. 12 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:357. 13 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:156.

152  Science, Technology and Productivity 14 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:88. 15 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 155–56. 16 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:254–55. 17 R. Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by Wang Taiqing, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001:49. 18 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:28. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 19). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1963:419–20. 20 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 12). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:251–52. 21 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:275. 22 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:52. 23 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:479–80. 24 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:587–88. 25 W. Leiss. The Domination of Nature. Translated by Yue Changling et al. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing Group, 2007:71. 26 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:350. 27 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:100. 28 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:202. 29 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:338. 30 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:340. 31 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:94. 32 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:94. 33 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:487. 34 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:94. 35 Li Xiulin, et al. Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism (5th edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2004:101. 36 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:539. 37 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:102. 38 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:267. 39 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:356–57. 40 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:62.

Science, Technology and Productivity  153 41 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:222. 42 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1958:134. 43 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:531. 44 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:100. 45 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:208. 46 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:487. 47 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:96. 48 Liu Dachun. Introduction To Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2005:50. 49 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:329. 50 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 45). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:394. 51 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:331. 52 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:698–99. 53 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1958:135. 54 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:405. 55 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:222. 56 W. Liebknecht. Karl Marx zum Gedächtnis. Ein Lebensabriß und Erinnerungen. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1973:35. 57 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:556. 58 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:184. 59 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:53. 60 Schumpeter’s Economics. Translated by Lin Junnan et al. Beijing: Peking University Press, 1996:35–36. 61 J.D. Bernal. Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:52. 62 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:357. 63 Marx himself had never defined instrument of labor, object of labor, and means of labor as the three elements of productivity, but took them as the three elements of labor process. Marx’s understanding of the elements of productivity was rather broad, he even regarded consumption, distribution and exchange as components of production. See Liu Dachun. An Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2005:447. 64 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:211. 65 Liu Dachun. An Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2005:445.

154  Science, Technology and Productivity 66 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:189. 67 T. More. Utopia. Translated by Dai Liuling, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:57. 68 T. More. Utopia. Translated by Dai Liuling, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:60. 69 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:597. 70 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 19). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1963:372. 71 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:405. 72 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:149–50. 73 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:139. 74 Liu Ben. “Contemporary Scientific and Technological Revolution and the Change of Communication Means.” In Along Marx Goes with Us. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003:327. 75 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:168. 76 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:521. 77 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 19). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2006:152. 78 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:194. 79 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:105. 80 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1962:653. 81 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:7. 82 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:532. 83 Chen Wenhua, Li Lisheng. “Marxist View of Technology is Not Technological Determinism.” Science, Technology and Dialectics, 2001(6):34. 84 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al. Beijing: Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:10–11. 85 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:605. 86 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:604. 87 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:295.

4

Alienation of Science and Technology

In materialist dialectics, there is nothing purely good in this world; it is the same with science and technology. In essence, science and technology are a revolutionary force that promotes social progress – the keynote of Marx’s theory of science and technology. But in specific historical situations, especially in capitalist societies, science and technology do not benefit mankind completely, but firstly yield to the logic of capital and serve capital. In capitalist societies, capital is king, despite the importance of science and technology. Therefore, science and technology, which are operating by following the logic of capital, or operating in a capitalist society, oppress the working class at the will of capital while promoting the great development of social productive forces. This is an alienation of science and technology in the opinion of Marx. The idea of alienation even goes back to the Bible and then becomes diversified and intriguing after elucidation by Rousseau, Hobbes and others thinkers. The Marxist “alienation” is largely in the tradition of Hegel and Feuerbach. The Hegelian alienation refers to the unity of opposites of the absolute spirit, in which the subject is alienated from the object opposed to itself. The Feuerbach alienation mainly involves religious alienation, that is, religion is a division between man and himself; he puts a god on the opposite side of himself, as a being opposite to himself.1 Essentially speaking, “alienation” is used by Marx to describe an absurd and helpless dilemma: man creates something, which in turn confronts him, even oppresses and enslaves him. Creators are bound by creation, which can be seen everywhere in reality. For example, we build high-rise buildings, but become mortgage slaves; we create all kinds of knowledge, but have to go through the agony of earning a degree. It can be said that in reality, alienation happens around everyone. Despite all complexities of alienation, Marx placed focus on labor alienation and regarded it as the most fundamental alienation, which is consistent with Marx’s stance that conscious and free labor is human nature. In a sense, Marx’s whole theory is a well-founded indictment of capitalism and the search for a possible future of capitalism based on it. From the point of view of criticizing capitalism, Marx’s analysis of labor alienation and science and technology alienation serves to accuse capitalism. In a word, Marx’s theory of labor alienation is an indictment of the following facts: capitalism has turned people DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-7

156  Alienation of Science and Technology into workers, and they exist as nothing more than labor force (goods) that can be driven by capital, thus losing all their richness and possibilities. Marx believed that the whole character of a species, the class character of a species, lies in the nature of life activities, and free conscious activities are precisely the class characteristic of man.2 As workers, people no longer have freedom, only forced labor; human nature becomes one-dimensional. This is the result of capitalist labor alienation. Who makes this happen? It’s capital and capitalists. Thus, the theory of labor alienation ultimately indicts capitalist ownership and productive relations; they maintain the capital and capitalist cruel exploitation and ruthless oppression of the proletariat. Therefore, alienation is fundamentally an issue about human beings, especially the historical situation of human beings in capitalist society. What role do science and technology play in alienation of labor? In the logic of capital, science and technology are materialized into the means of labor, especially machines and the factories in which they are located, thus helping capital oppress workers. In Marx’s theory, the alienation of science and technology is actually a link in the alienation of working conditions, manifested as the antagonistic relationship between the means of labor materialized by science, technology and workers. Science and technology are originally the creation of human beings, but now they shackle, oppress and enslave human beings, which is the alienation of science and technology. In Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The German Ideology, Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 and Das Kapital (Vol. 1), Marx and Engels made a detailed and vivid analysis of the alienation of science and technology, especially the alienation of machines, and left a wealth of ideological and historical materials about alienation of science and technology. In fact, Marx’s theory of science and technology alienation is based on capitalist society and the social material conditions in the era of free capitalism. Today, many things have changed in capitalist society, but Marx and Engels are still right in criticizing capitalism for distorting science and technology. Although the situation of workers in capitalist society is better today, we must be soberly aware that the socialist movement and the trade union movement, which are inspired by Marxism, play a vital role in forcing the bourgeoisie to partially compromise with the working class.

4.1 Materialization of Science and Alienation of Technology In Marx’s time, the integration of science and technology, though in its infancy and far from taking shape, had drawn the attention of Marx. However, whether in the real world or in the theoretical world of Marx and Engels, science and technology are still two separate concepts. Therefore, scientific alienation and technological alienation are two different fields. But Marx and Engels did not deliberately distinguish these two concepts when analyzing the alienation of science and technology, since they were concerned about the application of science and technology in capitalist industrial production, rather than focusing on science and technology as a theoretical form. Generally speaking, the alienation of science

Alienation of Science and Technology  157 mainly refers to the instrumentalism tendency of science, and science becomes the ruling tool of capitalists and capital. The alienation of technology mainly refers to the totalitarian tendency of technology, and people become the slaves and appendages of technology. Like alienation of labor, Marx’s theory of scientific and technological alienation is to discuss the problem of human beings, specifically the relationship between science, technology and human beings in capitalist society. 4.1.1 Development of Social Division of Labor and Exchange Why does alienation of science and technology appear? It is attributed to the development of division of labor and exchange. Generally speaking, Marx’s analysis of division of labor includes two interrelated fields: social division of labor and productive division of labor, and both of them are related to the emergence of scientific and technological alienation. Firstly, from a social point of view, the division of labor has led to the development of ownership, that is, it gave birth to private ownership and capitalist ownership, which is the realistic background of the emergence of large-scale scientific and technological alienation. It is generally believed that Marx traced the origin of the alienation of science and technology to “the capitalist application of machines.” An unquestionable fact is that the machine itself is not responsible for the worker’s “dissociation” from the means of livelihood. The machine makes the sector it occupies produce cheaper and more products, and at first it does not change the quantity of means of livelihood produced by other industrial sectors. Thus, apart from the huge portion of annual output that is squandered by non-workers, with the application of machines, society has as the same or more of the means of livelihood for dismissed workers as before. And that is the main point of justification of economics. There is no contradiction or confrontation inseparable from the capitalist application of the machine, for these contradictions and confrontations arise not from the machine itself, but from the capitalist application of the machine.3 Further speaking, the capitalist system is the inevitable outcome of social division of labor. In German Ideology, Marx and Engels made a detailed analysis of the division of labor that promotes the development of history, especially the development of ownership forms. They believed that the level of division of labor is an important sign of the productivity level – the development level of a nation’s productivity is most obviously reflected in that of its division of labor.4 Moreover, the different stages of the division of labor are at the same time the different forms of ownership. That is to say, each stage of the division of labor also determines the relations between individuals and materials, instruments and products of labor,5 which are known as the productive relations; the most important of these is the ownership relation, that is, who owns the means of production. Therefore,

158  Alienation of Science and Technology according to the logic of Marx and Engels, all ownership including capitalist private ownership is the product of division of labor. The contradiction between productive forces, social conditions and consciousness caused by division of labor is the cause of ownership. According to Marx, division of labor makes it possible for material and spiritual activities, enjoyment and labor, production and consumption to be shared by different people. At the same time, it has become a historical reality and given rise to conflicts of interest. Division of labor is accompanied by distribution, while unequal distribution leads to conflicts of interests – thus came ownership; its beginnings and earliest forms were present in the family, where the wife and children were the slaves of the husband.6 Some people use their hands, some use their brains; some work, some enjoy; some produce, others consume – work without gain and gain without work coexist, which is the normal state of the real society, and also the source of all social conflicts of interest. Marx and Engels conducted research on the history of division of labor and how to give birth to capitalist ownership. The original division of labor was just between men and women in sexual intercourse and reproduction; later, the natural division of labor emerged due to different talents (such as physical strength) and needs of each person. For example, those physically strong are engaged in heavy manual labor. However, the division of labor did not become the genuine division of labor until material labor and spiritual labor were separated.7 That is to say, the division of labor since that time is no longer for natural reasons, but for social reasons. In the social sphere, first of all, industrial and commercial labor was separated from agricultural labor, which led to the separation and confrontation between urban and rural areas, and the biggest division of material labor and spiritual labor was the separation between urban and rural areas.8 Then, in urban areas, there was a separation of commercial and industrial labor. Within different sectors, the division of production between different individuals working together was becoming more and more detailed. These detailed divisions of production were actually determined by the different modes of operation of agricultural, industrial and commercial activities. As the division of labor and productivity continued to advance, tribal ownership and ancient commune ownership were gradually replaced by state ownership, feudal or hierarchical ownership. The bourgeoisie is the result of division of labor and differentiation of citizens in cities. The emergence of cities requires basic public political institutions, such as administrative agencies, police departments, and tax bureaus. As a result, two classes of ordinary residents and managers appeared on the stage in cities. Then, with the separation of commerce and production, came the commercial class. Later, commercial activities expanded and their influence exceeded a certain city, the civic class began to rise and was gradually split into the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. With the emergence of handicraft workshops, the disappearance of guilds and their replacement by industry, capitalist ownership emerged. In capitalist society, science and technology are alienated and to some extent become the opposite of workers.

Alienation of Science and Technology  159 Secondly, from the point of view of individuals, the division of labor restricts people’s free and conscious activities, which leads to the emergence of alienation in capitalist society, and science and technology play a role in promoting it. The division of labor provides us with the first example, showing that as long as people are still in a naturally formed society, as long as there is a split between special interests and common interests, and as long as the division of labor is not voluntary, but naturally formed, then the activities of man himself become a kind of alien and antithetical force for him, and this force oppresses man, but man does not harness it. It turns out that, as soon as division of labor appears, every man has his own particular sphere of activity, and this sphere is imposed upon him, and he could not go beyond it: he is a hunter, a fisherman, or a herdsman or a critic, as he should always be, so long as he does not want to lose his means of livelihood.9 In other words, involuntary division of labor is itself a kind of alienation. The primitive man is man himself, with his abundant determinations and infinite possibilities. Labor should be man’s conscious and free activities. In different labors, man exhibits a certain aspect of his nature; the whole of the various activities in which he participates is an expression of his complete nature, and he also develops different aspects of his nature in different conscious and free activities. Fixed occupations are themselves the product of alienation; man cannot be a hunter, a fisherman, a herdsman or a critic; any occupational regulation promoted by the division of labor is a constraint on human nature. Of course, it cannot be denied that the division of labor has greatly promoted the development of productivity, but this development is accompanied by the alienation of man. These are the dialectics of division of labor. In capitalist society, division of labor and capital stimulate each other, and alienation reaches its extreme. Marx said that the accumulation of capital expands division of labor, and division of labor increases the number of workers. In turn, the increase in the number of workers expands the division of labor, which increases the accumulation of capital. With the expansion of the division of labor, and with the accumulation of capital, workers are increasingly dependent on labor, dependent on a certain, extremely one-sided, machine-like labor. And this condition of workers reached its climax under the factory system.10 The accumulation of capital, the increase of workers and the expansion of division of labor are three results of the same historical practice process, which promote and support each other. More capital means more workers can be hired, more workers mean more detailed division of labor, and vice versa. In such a situation, machines – embodiment of science and technology machines – held the candle to the devil, and intensified the alienation of workers in capitalist production. Marx pointed out that the division of labor makes workers more and more one-sided and dependent, and division of labor leads to competition not only among men but also among machines. Now that the worker is reduced to a machine, the machine can compete against him as a competitor.11 “Rival competitor” is the alienated role played by science and technology in capitalist production.

160  Alienation of Science and Technology 4.1.2 Materialization of Science The most basic state of science is to exist as knowledge and as the result of intellectual activity. As truth, science has its own epistemological value. But the power of science derives more from its power to transform the world. Of course, according to materialist dialectics, understanding the world and transforming the world should support and promote each other. The reason why science can play a great role in the process of human transformation of the world lies in its conversion from the form of knowledge and intelligence into a concrete and material form. For example, the mass-energy formula E = MC2, which describes the relationship between energy and mass, has a certain aesthetic simplicity, but only when this formula is presented in the physical form of the atomic bomb or nuclear power plant can the power of science be directly expressed. The transformation of science from spiritual form to material form is the process of science materialization. In this regard, Marx pointed out that nature has not made any machine, locomotive, railway, telegraph and self-acting mule; they are the products of man’s industrial labor, parts of the human brain created by the human hand and the objectified power of knowledge.12 Specifically, there are many channels through which science can be materialized. Science can be materialized into production tools such as the computer, excavator, forklift, blender and steel furnace; it can be materialized into objects of labor and raw materials, such as plastic, ethanol, foam and artificial hybrid rice; it can be materialized into experimental instruments and scientific equipment, such as the microscope, spectrometer, high-energy particle accelerator and Hubble Telescope; or it can be materialized into daily appliances, such as a juicer, washing machine, air conditioner and refrigerator. The materialization of science is not the transformation of science into material form alone, but the solidification of scientific knowledge by combining it with a substance. Obviously, the materialization of science is the inevitable fate of science, for what makes science as it is and not some other spiritual product is its basic tendency to enter human practice through materialization. If science is not materialized, it is a myth, not a science. And human practice is open to the materialization of science. The history of civilization for thousands of years shows that materialized science has greatly promoted the practical ability of human beings and made great contributions for human beings to get rid of the control of nature. Although we say that “science and technology is the primary productive force,” it is only when science is materialized that it can become a real productive force, otherwise it can only be an illusory spiritual force. However, the materialization of science is not only a simple combination of natural and spiritual forces but also a social process. In other words, specific social and historical conditions have a decisive influence on the materialization process of science. Human cloning, for example, is now scientifically possible, however, under the current religious and moral cultural environment, most countries are opposed to the practical application of human cloning technology. Therefore, in different social and historical stages, the materialization of science shows

Alienation of Science and Technology  161 different basic tendencies and frames. Therefore, we must combine natural and social attributes to analyze the materialization process of science. Marx analyzed the materialization of science in capitalist society and pointed out that the alienation of science is the basic characteristic of its materialization of science under the logic of capital; that is, capitalism dissimilates science as a tool for capital, helps capital extract more profit and helps capitalists fight workers. Science thus becomes an alien force and oppresses man. In Marx’s view, the development of science is closely related to the era of capitalism. His argument is as follows. The application of natural elements – the incorporation of natural elements into capital to some extent – coincides with the development of science as an independent element in the production process. The process of production becomes the application of science, and science in turn becomes the element in the process of production known as “function.” Each discovery forms the basis for a new invention or improvement in a production method. It was only the capitalist mode of production that first put natural science at the service of the direct production process, while the development of production in turn provided the means for the theoretical conquest of nature. The mission of science is to become the means to produce wealth, to become the means to get rich.13 Historically, the rise of capitalism and the rise of modern science are synchronized. On the one hand, the development of capitalism provides good conditions for the development of modern science. Capitalism has provided science with practical problems to solve, as well as with the materials, means and money for research, observation and experimentation. The steam engine, for example, began to take shape in ancient Rome in the Greco-Roman Period, but by the time of Robert Watson-Watt, it was the capitalist urge for “universal power” that led to the steam engine’s rapid development. Capitalism provides a powerful impetus for scientific development, that is, science is consciously applied to capitalist production to create more profits. At the same time, scientists also have the desire to make a fortune, so the process of scientific professionalization developed with the rise of capitalism, which greatly promoted the development of science. No matter whether it is the “amateur sciences” and the Royal Society in Britain or the “national sciences” and the Collège de France in France, they were associated with the support of the emerging bourgeoisie.14 Scientific development has helped capitalism gain more power, and helped capitalists extract more profits and surplus value. Marx pointed out that capital has added the fact that it uses all the means of technique and science to increase the remaining working hours of workers, for its wealth lies directly in the possession of surplus labor, and because its immediate purpose is value, not use value.15 Science has helped capital gain more power, especially over labor. Marx said that all the progress of civilization, or, to put it another way, all the growth of the productivity of society, or all growth of the productivity of labor itself, such as science, invention, division and combination of labor, improvement of means of transportation, opening up of world markets and machines, do not enrich workers, but only the capital. That is, it only increases the power over labor, as well as the productivity of capital.16

162  Alienation of Science and Technology Marx even regarded the “development of man’s productivity and the transformation of material production into the scientific rule over the forces of nature” as another historical mission of the bourgeoisie besides “the creation of universal communication based on the interdependence of all mankind and the instruments for such communication.”17 In capitalist society, capital occupies science, and science becomes a functional factor in the capitalist production process, which is the most fundamental relationship between capital and science. Marx pointed out that capital does not create science, but it uses science and occupies science for the needs of the production process.18 In other words, in capitalist society, especially in capitalist production, science is essentially a hired hand of capital, rather than a pure truthseeking activity, and capitalists’ support for science is like a master’s love for obedient slaves. After being employed by capital, science becomes an alien force against labor and workers. According to Marx, intelligence in the process of production is separated from physical labor, and the transformation of intelligence into the power of capital to dominate labor is accomplished in large industries based on machines. The partial skills of a single machine worker become empty and vanish as an insignificant appendage in front of science, the great forces of nature and the mass labor of society. Science, great natural forces and mass labor of society are all embodied in the machine system, and together with the machine system constitute the power of “master.”19 Science becomes an independent force serving capital in opposition to labor; generally speaking, it belongs to the category where conditions of production become independent forces opposed to labor. And it is precisely this separation and independence of science (initially beneficial only to capital) that simultaneously becomes the condition for the development of the potential of science and knowledge.20 Science is used by capital and becomes master together with capital, while workers and labor are reduced to slaves. Moreover, the development of science in capitalist society is due to its standing in the opposite of the proletariat! However, natural science, through industry, is increasingly entering people’s lives in practice, transforming their lives and preparing for man’s liberation, although it has to be directly dehumanized to the fullest.21 What a painful alienation! Science was originally the result of idealism, curiosity about nature and love for truth, which can help people liberate themselves from the rule of nature, but now it stinks of money, helping capital to make profit and squeeze workers, so it is inevitable to deepen social contrast and intensify social confrontation.22 4.1.3 Alienation of Technology According to historical materialism, technology is the application of science in practice. For the issue of science and technology, Marx is most concerned about the technological application of science in capitalist production activities. Industry is the historical relationship between nature and man, and therefore between natural science and man.23 To make clear the relationship between nature, science

Alienation of Science and Technology  163 and man, we must explore it in the context of industry. In terms of the application of science to industry, Marx and Engels mainly studied two aspects, namely machine and technology: the former is the conquest of natural forces, while the latter points to the control of the labor process; the former is the most direct material embodiment of technology, namely “machine technology,” while the latter is the embodiment of technical principles in labor operation, namely “labor technology.” Both of them are guided by the scientific principles of industrial production. Marx believed that the principle of machine production is to break down the production process into its constituent stages, and to apply mechanics, chemistry and so on, to solve the resulting problems by applying natural science. This principle is everywhere decisive.24 For Marx, the machine is the most visible manifestation of technology in capitalist production, and many machines work together to form a huge machine system – the body of the factory, namely the structure of the machine system,25 while many factories make up the great industry of capitalism. Therefore, the machine is the unit and core of the whole capitalist industry, everything capitalism produces must revolve around the machine and the machine swallows everything. The worker facing the machine is no longer a dominator, but an appendage of the machine, and he works according to the principles of mechanical capitalist technology. Opposite the worker is the machine that binds him, oppresses him and enslaves him. Machines, originally man-made and supposed to serve people, are now the supreme “masters” – machine alienation is what Marx called technological alienation. Why are capitalists keen to adopt machines? Marx made it very clear that it is not all for lightening the labor of workers. Like all other means for developing the productivity of labor, machines are designed to make goods cheap, shorten the part of the working day that the worker spends for himself, so as to extend the part of the working day which he gives to the capitalists without compensation. Machines are the means of producing surplus value.26 In capitalist society, machines serve more as tools to make money, but actually promote the development of social productivity – this is the dialectic of the machine. In essence, machines belong to constant capital, and the pursuit of profit is the nature of capital. Marx pointed out that all advanced machines are essentially made up of an engine, transmission mechanism, toolroom machine or working machine. The emergence of the toolroom machine is the most critical to the development of machines on the whole and has the greatest impact on workers. After the advent of the toolroom machine, man exercised his muscle power only in the field of power, which was easily replaced by wind, water, steam, etc. Moreover, the toolroom machine improves man’s ability to directly deal with raw labor materials and requires for power a machine that is more powerful than manpower, so it is necessary to get rid of manpower. Therefore, the development of toolroom machines directly threatens the position of workers in labor. In other words, in capitalist society, the machine stands against the worker. Marx commented that science, realized in machines, stands as capital against workers. As a matter of fact, all these applications of science, the forces of nature, and the massive

164  Alienation of Science and Technology products of labor, on which social labor is based, are themselves shown only as means of exploitation of labor, as means of possessing surplus labor and thus as forces belonging to capital and opposed to labor.27 In addition, the emergence of machines intensified the opposition between capital and workers and also turned opposition into a fierce contradiction of direct confrontation. Thus, in Marx’s time, there was a constant movement of workers to destroy machines. But in capitalist society, the struggle between workers and machines is doomed to fail, because the logic of machine-based division of labor makes workers a part of the machine and at its mercy. In handicraft workshops, division of labor is formed because some special work can only be done by a specialized labor force, therefore, laborers should be allocated to these specialized groups, and true division of labor among these specialized groups should be executed. In contrast, in machine plants, machines are specialized, and the work performed by machines is simultaneous; though performing successive stages of the same general process, it requires the assignment of special groups of workers, and each group always performs the same and equally simple function. This is not so much a division of specialized labor, but a division of workers for specialized machines. In the former case, it is the labor force using special instruments of labor that are specialized, but in the latter, specialized machines are handled by special groups of workers.28 In other words, the division of labor in the workplace is subject to the logic of labor, while the mechanical division of labor is subject to the logic of machines. Only in capitalist society does the division of labor reach an unprecedented level, so much so that the apparent division of labor is shrinking or even disappearing. In the days of handicraft workshops, apprentices had to learn skills and techniques for years before they could work on their own, but today workers can start working with only a short period of training, or without training at all. Under the logic of mechanical division of labor, the worker becomes a complete slave. In this regard, Marx pointed out that in both handicraft workshops and the handicraft industry, it is workers who use tools, but in factories, it is workers who serve machines. In the former case, the movement of the means of labor starts from the workers, and in the latter case, it is the movement of workers following the means of labor. In handicraft workshops, workers are members of a living organization. In factories, dead institutions exist independently of workers, and workers are treated as living appendages and incorporated into dead institutions.29 The machine has become the master of the worker. Here, the machine is said to be the “master’s machine,” and the machine function is said to be the function of the master in the production process (in “production affairs”), the same is true for the science embodied in these machines or production methods, chemical processes and so on.30 The dead has become the master of the living! But how can one be the master without thinking? The real master is the capital behind the machine, the personification of capital – the capitalist. Therefore, the confrontation between machines and workers is essentially the confrontation between the capitalist and the proletariat, the oppression of workers by machines is actually the oppression of the proletariat by capitalists and the power of machines over workers is actually

Alienation of Science and Technology  165 the economic power of the capitalist over the working class and other powers based on it. Here, Marx returned to his critique of all evil capitalism and the idea of eliminating capitalism. In fact, whether it is scientific alienation, technological alienation or labor alienation, in Marx’s view, it can only be solved by eliminating capitalism. Capitalism is the source of all evil, and the end of capitalism is also the end of evil.

4.2 Critique of the Alienation of Science and Technology Marx and Engels made a very detailed critique of the alienation of science and technology, especially that of machines. Their analysis was carried out mainly in the context of industrial labor, that is, they analyzed the alienation of science and technology in the process of concrete production of capitalism. In general, their specific analysis mainly focuses on three aspects: the first is how machines oppress workers in the process of labor, the second is how scientific and technological labor itself is alienated and the third is the negative role of science and technology in the deterioration of the relationship between man and nature. In capitalist production, science and technology are materialized into machines, becoming means of production, especially tools of production, in the process of labor. This means of production is essentially just a kind of commodity, which becomes part of constant capital after being purchased by capitalists. In the same labor process, the proletariat sells their labor power as a commodity, becomes workers and becomes variable capital after being purchased by capitalists. In capitalist labor, man is independent of any other possibility. Except for the existence of the working ability at play, there is no other existence.31 Therefore, when the alienation of labor appears, labor becomes a kind of torture, the product of labor is no longer owned and opposed by workers, the nature of human beings is alienated and the relationship between people is alienated. In alienated labor, the object of labor and the instrument of labor have become the opposite of the laborer. As a production tool, the machine has nothing to do with scientific truth, but only exists as a tool for making money. It was originally a creation of man, but now it oppresses man in turn. It is purely a form of existence that does not depend on the worker but dominates the means of labor of the worker and is opposed to a single worker.32 In capitalist production, science, technology and labor were originally commodities purchased by capital and were slaves of capitalists, but machines were alienated as accomplices of oppressors. 4.2.1 Machines’ Dominance over Workers Marx and Engels had made a detailed analysis of the oppression of workers by the capitalist machine. In Das Kapital, Marx has a concluding remark: within the capitalist system, all methods to improve social labor productivity are realized at the expense of individual workers; all the means of developing production have been transformed into means of dominating and exploiting the producers, and they have caused workers to develop abnormally and become partial people, degraded

166  Alienation of Science and Technology them as appendages of the machines, tortured them by the labor and deprived their labor of content, and as science is incorporated into the labor process as an independent force, the intelligence of the labor process is alienated from workers; these means make the working conditions of workers even worse, make them subject to the vilest and most abhorrent despotism in the course of their labor, convert their living time into working time and throw their wives and children under the wheel of capital.33 (1) Machines crowd out workers. Obviously, machines require natural forces to replace manpower, and machines are hundreds of times more efficient than workers. It will take fewer people to produce the same number of products after using machines, and the use of advanced machines will directly cause workers to lose their jobs. In this regard, Marx took an example that in 1829, there were 1,088 spinners in 36 factories in Manchester; by 1841, there were only 448 spinners in total, but they could handle 53,353 more spindles than the 1,088 workers in 1829. Assuming that the number of laborers would increase with the development of production capacity, the number of workers should reach 1,848 by the year 1841, meaning that the improvement of machinery caused 1,100 workers to lose their jobs.34 In the agricultural field, this phenomenon was quite obvious. The industrialization of agriculture has almost eliminated the traditional farmers in Western developed countries and replaced them with a small number of hired agricultural workers. (2) Machines belittle workers. In the machine industry, the machine is the protagonist of labor, and with the development of large-scale industry, the creation of actual wealth depends less on labor time and the amount of labor expended, and more on the force of the agents applied during the working time, and the agents themselves – their great efficiency – are out of proportion to the direct hours of labor that go into producing them, but dependent on the general level of science and technological progress, or on how this science is applied to production. The worker is no longer the principal actor in the production process but stands beside it.35 When the worker’s position in capitalist production is at stake, he will be unable to demand anything more, and his mere value as a labor force declines sharply in the capitalist order. Machines replace the laborer, and the laborer is directly devalued. Machine production makes it cheaper to reproduce labor goods that provide workers with the necessary means of livelihood, and the laborer is indirectly devalued. (3) Machines hire women and children. Machine labor does not require laborers to have great power. As far as the machine makes muscle power superfluous, it has become a means of using workers who are not muscular or physically mature but with flexible limbs. Therefore, the first

Alienation of Science and Technology  167 slogan of capitalist use of machines is women’s labor and children’s labor! In this way, this powerful means of replacing labor and workers is immediately transformed into such a means that makes all family members into workers, regardless of gender or age, under the direct rule of capital, thereby increasing the number of hired workers.36 In order to survive, more and more women and children enter the factories, women have little time to take care of their families and children do not have much time for learning and playing games. At the same time, women and children are paid less than adult male workers and are more likely to be bullied and more obedient. So capitalists prefer hiring women and children, and the adult male labor force is devalued by competition from women and children. (4) Machines extend working hours. According to Marx, if the machine is the most powerful means of increasing labor productivity, that is, reducing the time necessary to produce goods, then it is, as the bearer of capital, in the industries which it occupies directly, the most powerful means of extending the working hours beyond all natural limits. On the one hand, it creates new conditions that allow capital to develop its usual tendency at will; on the other hand, it creates new incentives that make capital greedier for the work of others.37 Firstly, machine production makes the worker the only natural factor in the whole capitalist production chain, which arouses the capitalist impulse to conquer this last natural factor. Secondly, in order to reduce the invisible wear and tear of machinery, capitalists want to extend working hours. Intangible loss refers to the depreciation of the original machines due to the invention of newer and more advanced machines. So, before the new machine makes the old machine obsolete, the capitalist tries to transfer more value from the old machine and avoid intangible loss. Thirdly, in machine production, extending working hours can raise the surplus value rate. If the time is not extended, a doubling of profits will employ twice as many workers in the presence of constant capital, such as machinery and factories. However, if the working day is extended, the wage expenditure will increase, but the constant capital such as machinery and plant will remain the same. Thus, the rate of surplus value is higher and the expenditure necessary to extract surplus value is reduced. Fourthly, if it is the first to adopt new machines in the whole society, excess surplus value can be extracted, and more production will be required before others follow up, so there is a need to lengthen the working hours. Finally, the contradictory attitude of capitalist machine production toward variable capital leads to longer working hours. The use of machines to produce surplus value contains an inherent contradiction: among the two factors of the surplus value provided by a certain amount of capital, if the machine is going to increase one factor (the rate of surplus value), it can only reduce another factor (the number of workers).38 However, surplus value is created by workers, and only more workers can create surplus value.

168  Alienation of Science and Technology Once the value of the goods produced by the machine becomes the social value of all similar goods that play a regulatory role as the machine is widely used in an industrial sector, this internal contradiction will manifest itself. It is this contradiction that capital is unaware of that pushes capital back into a desperate effort to lengthen the working day, so as to increase not only the relative surplus but also the absolute surplus, and make up for the relative decline in the number of exploited workers.39 In short, the capitalist machine has a tendency to extend working hours indefinitely. (5) Machines increase labor intensity. The tendency of machines to extend the working day is bound to be restricted by the physical condition of workers. When the lives of workers are threatened, it will inevitably cause resistance from the whole society, therefore, increasing labor intensity becomes another reasonable choice. In the first place, although machines do not require much strength from laborers, with technological progress, the efficiency of the machine is getting higher and higher, and the labor intensity of the workers who cooperate with the machine is also larger and larger. Secondly, under the conditions of machine production, it is easy to improve the labor intensity of workers. At this point, the capitalist does not need more supervisors, he only needs to increase the speed of the machine, or increase the number of workers to handle the machine, so the intensity of labor increases. Finally, the factory, revolving around the machine operation norms, standardizes the continuous and uniform operation modes for workers; on this basis, strict discipline is formed, then the labor intensity of workers is greatly increased. (6) Machines are a hit to strikes. Strikes are the main means for workers to resist capitalist exploitation, but machines help capitalists to resist workers’ strikes. Marx pointed out that strikes are mostly about preventing wage cuts, fighting for higher wages or asking for boundaries for the normal working day. The problem here is always to limit the absolute or relative amount of surplus labor time, or it’s about transferring some of that extra time to the workers themselves. To fight back, capitalists use machines which are a direct means of shortening the necessary labor hours. At the same time, the machine became the form of capital, the power of capital to control labor and the means by which capital suppresses all the demands of laborers for independence. The machine, for its own purposes, has become a form of capital hostile to labor. In the cotton textile industry, the spinning mule and the carding machine replaced the hand-spinning machine (this was also the case in the wool textile industry) – all these machines were invented to suppress strikes.40 With new machines, the number of workers needed has been greatly reduced, making strikes easier to be suppressed. And when workers’ strikes do not threaten the capitalists, their dependence on the capitalists becomes stronger.

Alienation of Science and Technology  169 (7) Machines deteriorate workers’ lives. Machines make workers lower-paid and poorer. Where machines gradually occupy an area of production, they cause chronic poverty for the classes of workers who compete with them. Where the transition has been rapid, the impact of machines has been widespread and acute.41 Machines make the lives of workers turbulent. The life of an industry is constantly changing in the order of the periods of vitality, prosperity, overproduction, crisis and stagnation. Because of this periodic shift in the industrial cycle, machine production makes it normal for workers to experience insecurity and instability in their employment and thus in their living conditions.42 Machines make workers bored and depraved. Compared with manual labor, machine labor is very mechanical and monotonous. It is not real labor, but pure boredom, the most tormenting and boring boredom in the world.43 Moreover, workers, regardless of gender, young and old, gather in one workplace; they will inevitably approach each other; people who have not received any intellectual or moral education gather together; and people who are uncultivated gather in one place – all of this is unique to the machinery factory,44 which leads to the moral degradation of workers. At the same time, the machine-based factory system established the most stringent labor discipline. Workers are technically subject to the uniform movement of the means of labor, together with the special composition of a workforce consisting of men and women of all ages, which has created a barracks-style discipline. This discipline has evolved into a complete factory system, which fully develops the supervisory labor mentioned earlier, as well as the phenomenon of dividing workers into laborers and supervisors, and into soldiers and sergeants in industry.45 (8) Machines harm the health of workers. All these problems eventually lead to great damage to the workers’ bodies. Machine labor extremely damages the nervous system, and it also suppresses the movements of the muscles, taking away all physical and mental free activities. Even alleviation of labor has become a means of torture, because machines do not free workers from labor, but make their labor contentless.46 Here we only mention the material conditions for factory labor. Man-made high temperatures, air full of raw material fragments and deafening noise damage all human senses, not to mention the danger to life in the middle of densely installed machines.47 It is worth noting that the machines’ destruction of workers is essentially the oppression of capitalists against the proletariat. Apparently, the inanimate machines themselves do not oppress workers; it is the “capitalist application of machines” that does so. In communist society, the machine will change from an oppressor to a powerful, revolutionary tool. Therefore, Marx sympathized with but disapproved of workers’ actions to destroy machines. He pointed out that workers must learn to distinguish between machines and their capitalist applications, in

170  Alienation of Science and Technology order to learn to turn his attack from the material means of production itself to the form of social use of material means of production, but it takes time and experience.48 The preceding analysis of Marx and Engels is based on the social and historical conditions of the era of free capitalism. Admittedly, much has changed in capitalist societies over 100 years later, and some of these specific conclusions may not be so accurate. For example, workers displaced by industry are more accepted by the tertiary sector; manual labor has become expensive in advanced capitalist countries, while machine products have become cheap; child labor has long been outlawed, and women have fought for equal labor rights rather than being forced to work. It is not surprising that Marx could not foresee events 100 years later. But his basic judgment still holds: the capitalist application of machines is bound to hinder the liberation of man; machines, in the hands of capitalists, serve more to exploit the proletariat than to work voluntarily for the freedom of everyone. 4.2.2 Invention Became a Profession Science and technology are the creations of man and the products of the work of millions of scientific and technological laborers. In capitalist society, all labor is alienated, including scientific labor and technological labor. From this point of view, alienation of science and technology includes that of scientific and technological labor, that is, scientific labor and technological labor become antagonistic to human beings. Marx pointed out that in capitalist society, the fruits of scientific and technological labor are occupied by the bourgeoisie without compensation. Historical materialism holds that science and technology are fundamentally created by the masses. In this regard, Marx wrote that the millions of workers of Great Britain were the first to lay the real foundations of the new society – the destructive powers of nature were turned into the human productivity of modern industry.49 If there is a textual history of craftsmanship, it will prove that any invention in the 18th century rarely belonged to a certain individual.50 Engels wrote that he often heard workers, who were wearing ragged coarse cloth jackets, talking about geology, astronomy and other subjects; they were more knowledgeable than some educated German bourgeois in these fields.51 However, the division and combination of labor in the production process is an institution that does not cost the capitalist a penny. What capitalists pay is only a single labor force, not their combination, not the social force of labor. The power of science is another kind of productivity that does not cost the capitalist a penny.52 In other words, capitalists only need to pay for the purchase of machines and do not need to directly pay for the purchase of scientific and technical labor. Capitalism makes scientific labor and technical labor professional, which is to suppress the proletariat’s scientific labor and technical labor. Marx pointed out that only when large-scale industry has reached a higher stage and all science is used to serve capital, the machine system begins to develop on this road; on the other hand, the existing machine system itself has provided a lot of

Alienation of Science and Technology  171 means. In this case, invention will become a profession, while the application of science in direct production itself has become a decisive and driving force for science.53 In other words, the strong demand for science and technology in industrial development directly contributes to the specialization of scientific and technological labor, that is, scientific and technical labor is carried out by specialized personnel, and is separated from industrial labor and workers. In this regard, Marx pointed out that for labor, science is manifested as an alien, hostile and ruling power; the application of science is, on the one hand, manifested in the concentration of knowledge, observation and professional secret recipes passed down through experience, and on the other hand, they are developed into sciences to analyze the production process and apply natural sciences to the material production process. The application of science is based on the separation of the intelligence of the production process from the knowledge, experience and skills of individual workers, just as the concentration and development of the (material) conditions of production and the conversion of these conditions into capital are based on the loss of these conditions to the workers, so as to separate workers from these conditions. Moreover, factory labor allows workers to only gain knowledge of certain operating methods. So, with the spread of factory labor, apprenticeship laws were abolished, and the struggle of states for child laborers to at least learn to write and read shows that this application of science to the production process is compatible with the suppression of any intellectual development in the process. Of course, this will give rise to a small number of advanced workers, but their numbers must not be compared with the large number of workers who are “deprived of knowledge.”54 When working with machines, workers do not need to master any special skills, they only need to carry out simple operations on the machine. They don’t need to learn any advanced knowledge or develop any specialty. Scientific and technological labor is done by specialists, and the secrets of machines are held in the hands of a few, and eventually by capitalists. A certain “equality” emerged among factory workers, that is, everyone is part of the machine, except for a very few advanced workers who can repair the machine. Most of the children employed in modern factories and craft workshops were chained to the simplest operations from the earliest age and exploited for years, yet they did not learn any skill that they might use later in the same craft workshop or factory.55 Lenin commented on this situation that there are countless talented people, but capitalism destroys, suppresses and suffocates them by the thousands and even millions.56 Science and technology shall be enjoyed by the rich and the possessed; capitalism gives culture to only a few people.57 In capitalist society, scientific and technological labor itself is no longer controlled by an impulse to pursue the truth, but by money, hence becoming a kind of restraint to scientific and technological laborers. According to Marx, since natural science is used by capital as a means of getting rich, science itself then becomes a means of getting rich for those who develop science; no wonder people engaged in science compete with each other to explore the practical applications of science.58 When money controls scientific and technological activities, the

172  Alienation of Science and Technology desire to become rich will blind the eyes of scientific and technological workers, triggering the cruel competition between them and all kinds of unscrupulous cheating and deviant behaviors. In capitalist society, most scientific and technological workers are not consciously and freely engaged in scientific research, but working to earn a living. Therefore, such a worker is not affirming himself in his work, but denying himself; not feeling happy, but feeling unhappy; not freely exerting his physical strength and intelligence, but suffering physical torment and spiritual destruction.59 That is to say, scientific and technological workers have also gone through alienation. In Marx’s view, conscious life activities directly distinguish the life activities of humans and animals; it is precisely because of this that humans are a particular species-being. In other words, just because man is a kind of speciesbeing, he is a conscious being, that is, his own life is an object to him. For this reason alone, his activities are free activities. Alienated labor reverses this relationship so that it is precisely because man is a conscious being that he turns his life activities, his own essence, into just a means of maintaining his own survival.60 In capitalist society, the labor of scientific research has been degraded as “a means of maintaining one’s own survival.” Therefore, as long as physical coercion or other coercion ceases, people will evade labor like the plague,61 and such a situation remains widespread in today’s capitalist scientific and technological activities. Like other alienated labor, alienation of scientific and technological labor is ultimately the alienation of interpersonal relationships. First of all, the relationship between scientific and technological workers has been alienated, and the cruel competition and the desire to get rich have distorted their relationship: struggle, squeeze and crackdown have been everywhere. Second, the relationship between scientific and technological workers and other members of society is alienated: they have little communication but hold strong hostility against each other; intellectuals despise workers, and workers hate intellectuals. Finally, the relationship between scientific and technological workers and capitalists is alienated, and they no longer have an equal dialogue. The capitalists are aloof, they are the bosses of the capital, and the intellectuals must obey their will. The bourgeoisie has erased the sacred halo of all venerable and awe-inspiring professions and turned doctors, lawyers, priests, poets and scholars into wage laborers it pays to hire.62 In fact, the professionalization of scientific and technological labor has also caused a certain alienation for capitalists. Capital is annexing others’ science just like the labor of others. However, the capitalist appropriation of science or material wealth and the personal appropriation are two completely different things. Dr. Ure himself lamented that his beloved factory owners who use machines do not know anything about mechanics. Liebig stated that the British chemical factory owners are surprisingly ignorant of chemistry.63 There has never been a more ignorant person than our modern bourgeoisie.64 In other words, the capitalist institutional arrangements for scientific and technological activities have also turned capitalists into fools in science and technology.

Alienation of Science and Technology  173 When workers are deprived of the right to scientific and technological activities, and the bourgeoisie has become ignorant of scientific and technological research, capitalism has caused a certain obstacle to the development of science and technology. Therefore, Lenin said that capitalism has solved extremely complex technical problems, but because of the poverty and ignorance of millions of people, and because of the stupid stinginess of a handful of millionaires, it hindered the realization of technological improvements.65 Capitalism provides a huge impetus to the development of modern science and technology, but also creates resistance. This is the dialectic of the relationship between science, technology and capitalism. 4.2.3 Resistance of Nature Marx and Engels noticed that in capitalist society, the relationship between man and nature has deteriorated, and science and technology have played a role in fueling the flames. The deterioration of the relationship between man and nature will eventually endanger the creators of science and technology. Therefore, the negative role of science and technology in environmental issues also belongs to the category of science and technology alienation. Therefore, the negative role of science and technology in environmental issues also belongs to the category of scientific and technological alienation. In his Dialectics of Nature, Engels made a widely circulated comment: Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first. The people who, in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor and elsewhere, destroyed the forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that by removing along with the forests the collecting centers and reservoirs of moisture they were laying the basis for the present forlorn state of those countries. When the Italians of the Alps used up the pine forests on the southern slopes, so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they had no inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the roots of the dairy industry in their region; they had still less inkling that they were thereby depriving their mountain springs of water for the greater part of the year, and making it possible for them to pour still more furious torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons. Those who spread the potato in Europe were not aware that with these farinaceous tubers they were at the same time spreading scrofula. Thus at every step we are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign people, like someone standing outside nature – but that we, with flesh, blood and brain, belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and

174  Alienation of Science and Technology that all our mastery of it consists in the fact that we have the advantage over all other creatures of being able to learn its laws and apply them correctly.66 Here, Engels described the resistance of nature encountered by human beings while they are conquering nature with the help of science and technology. According to dialectics, everything has its opposite. Humans need to be liberated from the rule of nature, but their conquest of nature is accompanied by harm to humans themselves. According to Engels, nature is not something alien to man; instead, man is a natural thing standing in nature. As Marx said: [t]he universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means of life and (2) as the matter, the object, and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man’s inorganic body – that is to say, nature insofar as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature – i.e., nature is his body – and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To say that man’s physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature.67 In the view of Marx, the natural world is the inorganic body of man, and capitalist labor conquers the natural world as a foreign thing, which is itself an alienation of human nature; man’s conquest of nature is essentially the conquest of his own inorganic body, and the enslavement of nature is ultimately the enslavement of man to himself. “At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance.”68 The development of history has proved the correctness of Marxism. Entering the second half of the 20th century, as the control, conquest and enslavement of nature have gone to extremes, global disasters, such as environmental pollution, depletion of energy sources, climate change and population explosion, have become increasingly prominent, and become a great challenge that threatens the survival of the entire mankind. On the surface, these issues are only about the protection of nature, but in essence, they are about the relationship between people, groups of people and nations, especially the relationship between the poor and the rich, underdeveloped and developed countries. This can be seen in the energy shortage of most people in the world and the waste of energy in the United States, and in the quarrel at the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in 2009. There is no doubt that if the natural ecosystem completely collapses, it will be hard for humans to survive; at least they have no chance of survival at the current height of civilization. In Marx’s view, the only concern of capital is profit, not anything else, and it destroys the environment recklessly in order to proliferate. Light, air, etc. – the simplest animal cleanliness – ceases to be a need for man. Dirt – this pollution and putrefaction of man, the sewage (this word is to be

Alienation of Science and Technology  175 understood in its literal sense) of civilization – becomes an element of life for him. Universal unnatural neglect, putrefied nature, becomes an element of life for him.69 In the 1960s and 1970s, the environmental protection movement rose on a global scale, and the bourgeoisie also joined in this tide, but it is just because they realized that environmental degradation would destroy not only the proletariat but all mankind. So, Marx’s judgment that capital takes profit before nature is not wrong, but for capitalists, life comes before profit. Marx and Engels proposed two related approaches to deal with the deterioration of the natural environment. Firstly, we must rely on science and technology to understand the laws of nature, so as to solve environmental problems. As Engels put it: in fact, with every day that passes we are learning to understand these laws more correctly and getting to know both the more immediate and the more remote consequences of our interference with the traditional course of nature…But the more this happens, the more will men not only feel, but also know, their unity with nature, and thus the more impossible will become the senseless and antinatural idea of a contradiction between mind and matter, man and nature, soul and body.70 Understanding the laws of nature and acting in accordance with these laws are the basis for restoring the natural environment. Secondly, to solve environmental problems ultimately, we must let the proletariat master science and technology and overthrow the capitalist system. The sharp deterioration of the environment in the past 200 years is the result of the capitalist application of machines. Owing to the profit-seeking motive of capital, it is inevitable that nature will be ignored, polluted and abandoned. In order for the new forces of society to properly play their role, machines can only be mastered by these new forces, and they are destinated to be workers. Workers, like machines themselves, are the products of modern times.71 People are aware of the laws of nature, but they may not act according to these laws, which is the actual situation in capitalist society. In fact, relying on science and technology and overthrowing capitalism are interrelated. To guarantee the healthy development of science and technology, the capitalist system must also be overthrown, since capitalism has alienated science and technology. According to Marx, labor alienation, scientific and technological alienation, environmental crisis and the relationship between man and nature are actually different results of the same historical practice process, so there is only one fundamental solution, that is, the realization of communism. In communist society, by acting in accordance with the laws of nature, realizing the interests of the overwhelming majority of people and eliminating classes, all environmental issues will be easily solved.

176  Alienation of Science and Technology 4.2.4 Reconstructing the Science with Unity of Subject and Object The subject and the object are dialectically unified in objective activities. From the perspective of the subject, the subject first belongs to the natural world. Humans have natural attributes and cannot exist without leaving the natural world. “A being which has no object outside itself is not an objective being.”72 The subject is an objective being, and only through objective activities can its own essential power be objectified. It not only creates historical objects but also makes itself a realistic and historical subject. “A being which does not have its nature outside itself is not a natural being, and plays no part in the system of nature.”73 From the perspective of the object, the natural world, where people lead their life, has social attributes, and the natural world without a subject is nothing. “Nature is man’s inorganic body, that is to say, nature in so far as it is not the human body.”74 The objective activity of the subject in nature is humanized and becomes a historical being. Therefore, the subject and object are unified in Marx’s theory. However, under the capitalist system, the relationship between subject and object is alienated, and the relationship between man and nature is not unified, but confrontational. When the relationship between man and nature is alienated, not only the object is threatened, but also the subject. Therefore, Marx pursued the restoration of human nature. The so-called restoration of human nature does not mean that people should return to the age of ignorance, instead, it means that people should advance toward communism on the basis of thorough and conscious preservation of all the rich fruits of past development. Communism is a real solution to the contradiction between man and nature. Through the production activities of human society, and through industry, nature has become a completely human nature, namely the nature that meets the essential needs of man. So, naturalism is finished, and finished naturalism is also finished humanism. In capitalist society, science is controlled by capitalists to exploit workers, thus deepening the alienation and confrontation between the subject and the object. Marx commented that large-scale industry separates science as independent productivity from labor, and forces science to serve capital.75 Therefore, it is necessary to rebuild a science of the unity of subject and object, that is, the science of communism. This kind of science is based on the restoration of human nature, and it is the finished science of naturalism and humanism. The science of the unity of subject and object must completely eliminate the division of labor, including the division of mental and physical labor, and turn labor into a truly conscious and free activity. In Marx’s view, the division of labor is nothing more than the alienated and externalized setting of human activities as real species activities or activities of humans as a species-being.76 Division of labor means the split of capital, labor and means of labor. The more developed the division of labor, the more intense the split. In the production process, science and technology are mainly present in the mechanical form of means of production, the division of labor separates laborers from science and technology and science and technology are alienated into things that oppress laborers. Only when the division of labor is completely eliminated can science be truly integrated with labor and

Alienation of Science and Technology  177 become a revolutionary force that is owned and developed by laborers to promote the development of productive forces. When the consequences of division of labor come to the extreme, the historical conditions for eliminating the division of labor gradually appear. Marx pointed out that this “alienation” can only be eliminated after having two actual premises. To make this alienation an “unbearable” force, that is, a force that the revolution is against, it must turn the majority of mankind into completely “propertyless” people, and at the same time, these people are opposed to the existing rich and educated world, while the two conditions are premised on the huge growth and high development of productivity.77 Although the division of labor resulted in alienation, it greatly promoted the development of social productive forces at the beginning of capitalism. As far as science and technology are concerned, after the division of labor is eliminated, they will be completely integrated with laborers to really become a people’s science and technology. In communist society, science not only becomes something for everyone but also frees from the shackles of state repression and class prejudice.78 In communist society, division of labor is completely eliminated, and everyone can study science and become a scientist – of course, they can be someone else at the same time, or in other words, to be a scientist is to be everything that is possible, that is, to be themselves. Marx pointed out: [i]n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. This immobilization of social activities, that is, our own products converging into a material force that rules us, is out of our control, makes our desires unfulfilled and frustrates our plans, is one of the major factors in the development of history so far.79 The science of the unity of subject and object means that science restores human nature, becoming a truly humanized science. Science is originally a creation of man, but the alienation of science makes it stand on the opposite side of man. Humanized science is to restore the original position of science and technology. Firstly, science is based on people’s lives. To say that there are other foundations for life or other foundations for science is simply a lie. The natural world generated in human history, that is, during the formation of human society, is the real natural world of man; so, the natural world formed through industry – albeit in the form of alienation – is the real, human-oriented nature.80 Secondly, science is based on human nature. In any case, science is a manmade thing, so it is a display of human nature or the essential power of man. “Natural science will, in time, incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one

178  Alienation of Science and Technology science.”81 That is to say, human nature is the common basis of natural science and human science. Finally, science is based on the purposeful needs of man. The reason why people create science is to serve people in the final analysis. Therefore, science is human, alienated science is inhuman and the science of the unity of subject and object is to make science both “artificial” and “human.” After Marx, Marcuse, a Western Marxist, developed Marx and Engels’ scientific viewpoint of the unity of subject and object and put forward the viewpoint of the unity of natural liberation and human liberation. He believed that the liberation of science and technology in the future is not only a matter of science and technology itself but also the liberation of human nature and the natural world. As an independent subject, nature itself has the power of liberation; emancipated technology can turn nature, which was a tool of governance in the capitalist era, into an ally of revolution, creating a new and harmonious relationship between man and nature. In Marcuse’s view, advanced capitalism transfers people’s guilt through instinctive management of people and increases people’s offensiveness; the bourgeoisie relied on the conquest and control of nature to achieve powerful manipulation of people. Human beings no longer believe that they can rediscover themselves in nature, nor that they can live with nature as an independent subject. However, although nature has become a controlled tool and a medium for ruling people in the capitalist world, the liberating power contained in nature itself cannot be ignored, and it plays an important role in the process of building a free society. Marcuse believed that the liberation of nature is the means of man’s liberation.82 As a place for human existence and an important constituent of social changes, nature is an important ally in the struggle of human beings against exploitation. Moreover, the purpose of natural liberation is not to return to the former state of technology, but to push it forward and use the fruits of technological civilization in different ways to achieve the liberation of man and nature, and free science and technology from the destructive misuse of them in the service of exploitation.83 Marcuse also proposed three specific solutions: the humane possession of nature, the relationship with things for the sake of things and the formation of the object world in accordance with “the laws of beauty.”84 Feinberg, one of the students of Marcuse, inherited and developed the views of his tutor, and put forward the idea of “redesigning technology” in the field of philosophy of technology. He believed that technology is part of the history of social civilization and cannot exist independently of society, so it is planned by the overall civilization of a specific era. Therefore, in any social relationship where modern technology is the intermediary, it is possible to introduce more democratic control and redesign technology, so that technology can accommodate more skills and initiative.85 Feinberg believed that an essentially different form of civilization will emphasize other attributes of technology that are consistent with the wider distribution of cultural qualifications and power. These attributes exist in both pre-industrial handicrafts and modern occupations. They include the professional investment of technical subjects in their

Alienation of Science and Technology  179 work, the form of equal power to organize trade unions, and the large-scale technical integration that is not just to pursue profit or power, but to improve the value of life. Today, these aspects of technology can only function in the context of the democratic reorganization of industrial society, and this situation is made possible by these aspects of technology.86 In other words, existing technological planning conflicts with democracy, and new civilizations can plan technology as a whole and change the current alienated planning in order to serve a more democratic society.

Notes 1 Feuerbach. Selected Works of Feuerbach (Vol. 2). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1962:60. 2 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:273. 3 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:508. 4 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:147. 5 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:148. 6 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:163. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:162. 8 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:184. 9 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:165. 10 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:228. 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:229. 12 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:102. 13 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:356–57. 14 J.B. David. The Role of Scientists in Society. Translated by Zhao Jialing. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1998. 15 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:103. 16 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:267. 17 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 12). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:251. 18 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:357. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:487. 20 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:366.

180  Alienation of Science and Technology 21 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:307. 22 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:10. 23 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:307. 24 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:531. 25 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:481–82. 26 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:427. 27 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:851. 28 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:524. 29 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:486. 30 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358. 31 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:60. 32 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:850. 33 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:743. 34 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 1), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:753. 35 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:100. 36 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:453–54. 37 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:463. 38 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:468. 39 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:469. 40 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 32). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:387. 41 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:496. 42 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:522. 43 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:532. 44 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:528. 45 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:488. 46 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:486–87. 47 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:490.

Alienation of Science and Technology  181 48 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:493. 49 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 13). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:134. 50 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:428–29. 51 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:131. 52 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:553. 53 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:99. 54 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:358. 55 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:557–58. 56 Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:375. 57 Complete Works of Lenin (Vol. 36). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1985:48. 58 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:359. 59 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:270. 60 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:273. 61 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:270–71. 62 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:403. 63 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:444. 64 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:200. 65 Complete Works of Lenin (Vol. 24). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1990:19. 66 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:998. 67 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:272. 68 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:776. 69 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:341. 70 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:998–99. 71 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:776. 72 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:325. 73 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:325. 74 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:272. 75 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:418.

182  Alienation of Science and Technology 76 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:353. 77 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:165–66. 78 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:168. 79 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:165. 80 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:307. 81 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:308. 82 H. Marcuse et al. Industrial Society and the New Left. Translated by Ren Li. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:127. 83 H. Marcuse et al. Industrial Society and the New Left. Translated by Ren Li. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:128. 84 Xiang Wei. “Human Alienation and Liberation under the Rule of Modern Science and Technology—Study on Marcuse’s Humanistic Thought”. Beijing Institute of Technology Master Thesis, 2010. 85 A. Feenberg. Critical Theory of Technology (preface 2). Translated by Han Lianqing et al. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005. 86 A. Feenberg. Critical Theory of Technology. Translated by Han Lianqing et al. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005:40.

5

Science, Technology and Liberty

The relationship between science, technology and liberty is an important issue that cannot be ignored in the research of science and technology, and researchers of all generations have paid great attention to it, especially Marx. In fact, how to realize the free and all-around development of human beings to the greatest extent is a core issue in Marx’s thought from the beginning. Proceeding from the nature of human beings, exploring the state of human existence and future development under the effect and influence of science and technology is the basic theme of Marx’s thought on science, technology and liberty.

5.1 Science, Technology and the Generation of Human Nature The Chinese have never been so entangled in their own identity and their identification by the outside world as they are today. Within China, politicians are talking about Chinese characteristics, businessmen are chasing Chinese style and scholars are constructing Chinese schools; such concepts and expressions show Chinese people’s self-affirmation of their achievements in recent decades, as well as their expectations and confidence in a bright future, but they have also exposed the eagerness of the Chinese, who had been bullied and despised, for recognition and respect. In a sense, this is a kind of cultural consciousness in today’s China and a process of identity recognition expressed by the Chinese collectively. Behind this issue of identity is the questioning of the essential attributes of human beings – the most complicated questions since the emergence of mankind: what is man? What is the nature of man? How is human nature formed? They are what we should be concerned about. 5.1.1 Science, Technology and Identity Identity is a trait or attribute that distinguishes a person from others or is able to do so. In modern society, everyone has many attributes and traits to let others know who they are. This identity can vary by gender, religion and ethnicity; it can be defined by region, nationality and occupation; even hobbies, marriage, age, etc. can become a broad identity. Identity recognition refers to the process in which a certain characteristic or attribute of identity is recognized and explained by other DOI:  10.4324/9781003302544-8

184  Science, Technology and Liberty individuals or groups. This process can be active display, passive identification, or interactive negotiation. Historically, this process of identity recognition is closely related to science and technology and their development. Through continuous development, science and technology have gradually become an important element that affects people’s identities, promoting the formation and strengthening of personal identity. In modern society, the development of science and technology also provides good conditions for the display and dissemination of personal identity traits and attributes. Being increasingly involved in personal identity, science and technology have become two of the most important indicators of personal identity, and two of the most important factors for personal identity and identification. “The difference between humans and apes begins with grinding stones for making tools and performing labor,” which is the insight of Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, from reading history. As Mao Zedong said, making and using tools is the dividing line between humans and animals. Whether it is an ape or ape-man, whether it can walk upright or run upright, it can only become a human when it picks up a rock on the ground to cut meat, or when it picks up a rock on the ground or breaks a branch to fight a beast. Using stones or branches is the earliest labor behavior of mankind; stones or branches are the earliest labor tools of mankind, while ground stone knives and axes are the earliest technological products of mankind. Engels wrote brilliantly about this process in his work On the Part Played by Labor in the Transition from Ape to Man, and Marx also had an in-depth analysis of this technological behavior of distinguishing between apes and humans. Seeing the role of processed stones, wood, bones and shells in the early stages of human history, Marx pointed out that the use and creation of means of labor are inherent to certain animals in their embryonic state, but this is after all a unique feature of the human labor process. So Franklin defined humans as “a tool-making animal.” Means of labor are not only a measure of the development of human labor but also an indicator of the social relations through which labor is carried out.1 This passage of Marx shows that means of labor, no matter how simple they are, have been materialized to become a part of human beings and become an important identity sign that distinguishes humans from animals. In the process of development, science and technology not only logically become a part of personal identity, but also strengthen this identity day by day. For example, early humans quickly discovered the great value of making and using tools, because these tools, such as stone artifacts, fishing hooks, bows and arrows, established their superiority over animals and greatly enhanced their hunting capabilities. This motivated them to continuously manufacture, use and improve tools, so there have been natural stone tools, chipped stone tools, polished stone tools, pottery, and jade. More and more kinds of tools have become more sophisticated and more powerful, making people more distinguishable from animals. This phenomenon of marking identities with scientific and technological achievements also occurs at the tribal, ethnic and even national levels. The ancient

Science, Technology and Liberty  185 Chinese civilization was dominated by the Han nationality, and it was much more advanced than the civilizations in surrounding regions. So, the Chinese have long called their country “China” which in Chinese is pronounced “Zhong Guo” (the Middle Kingdom). Of course, the title of “Zhong Guo” cannot be used casually, since it is an expression of the central concept and superiority of the early Chinese. The ancient Chinese thought their country was more advanced than any neighboring countries; they called their country the Middle Kingdom and belittled other countries as barbarians. This kind of thinking has such far-reaching influence that Matteo Ricci had to deliberately adjust China to the center of the map which was a tribute to the emperor of the Ming Dynasty, so as to cater to the central idea of the Chinese. Such a story later repeated itself in Europe. After the Renaissance and the industrial revolution, Europeans who re-emerged also regarded themselves as the center of civilization, calling other countries according to their geographical distance: the Turkish region is the Near East, the Arab region is the Middle East, while China and Japan are the Far East. Columbus sailed to the American continent, making Europeans so cheerful to discover a new world. In fact, the history of the American continent is as old as that of Europe; native Americans have lived there for tens of thousands of years or even longer. Why would it be necessary for Columbus to discover it? This is clearly a Eurocentric argument based on advanced ships and armaments. More broadly speaking, this is also a feature of the later identity construction, that is, emphasizing the superiority of the identity that one has, and repelling people and groups who are different from oneself. Identity construction is an important means to maintain European imperial hegemony and colonial rule; the Western powers imposed imaginary images of “others” on colonial countries and peoples, which became ideological shackles that enslaved and oppressed them. Edward Said discussed these issues in detail in his Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism. If the emergence and development of primitive technology distinguish humans from animals and then form and strengthens human identities, then the further development of science and technology provides good conditions for people to display and disseminate their identity, and also makes the process of identity recognition easier to complete. After analyzing Marx’s discourse on the distinction between humans and animals, J. Elster summarized the viewpoints of Marx: the most distinctive feature of human beings is their knowledge of themselves and their use of language…Only human cognitive ability can explain how their ability to make and use tools, which is shared by other animals, can achieve greater development – able to provide necessary and appropriate environmental conditions.2 This shows that when people’s cognitive and language abilities continue to improve with the advancement of science and technology, the characteristics and

186  Science, Technology and Liberty identities that distinguish people from other animals are correspondingly more obvious, and they are reflected in real social life. Generally speaking, the signs of individual or ethnic identity include architecture, language, clothing, behavior, handicraft, festival etiquette, ancestral origin and migration legend. Most of these signs are the materialized results of science and technology. For example, today, we can identify Muslims, Buddhists or Christians from the different styles and appearances of church buildings. We can also determine which ethnic group they belong to from the costumes of ethnic minorities in public places, such as the venues of the National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, or television media. For an attribute to become an identity, to a large extent, it is due to the repeated display of this attribute. After a period of time, it will be fixed as a habit, tradition or common sense. But personal identity is never fixed. Identity recognition is a process, a diverse and ever-changing experience and a product of history. When discussing social relations, Marx said that people establish corresponding social relations according to their material productivity; it is these people who have created corresponding principles, concepts and categories in accordance with their social relationships. Therefore, these concepts and categories are not eternal, just like the relationships they show. They are historical and temporary products.3 Identity recognition is complicated by the emergence of postmodernism characterized by “de-centering.” Since the Enlightenment, the stable, coherent and “complete self” has been suspect; first of all, it met the challenge from Nietzsche who believed that the subject is not given but that it is something added, invented and projected behind the existing things. The psychoanalysis master Freud questioned the impracticality of the complete subject from the perspective of psychology. Structuralism denied the status of the subject as the creator of meaning, while post-structuralism further divided and disintegrated the subject’s overall consciousness, and intensified the subject’s identity crisis. Foucault proposed that the subject can be constructed, the individual is not a given entity, but a captive of the operation of power. The individual, including his identity and characteristics, is the structure through which power relations exert an effect on the body. Habermas insisted that identity is partly our own design. In fact, most of the time, identity recognition is a process of negotiation, and identity is the result of negotiation and game between the individual and the “other” in the surrounding environment. It is in this interaction that identity is established. Marx believed that the social production process is not only the production process of the material living conditions of human beings, but also the process of production and reproduction of productive relations, and the bearer of this process of production and reproduction, their material living conditions and their mutual relations, that is, the process of their certain social and economic forms. These material conditions are, like these social relations, on the one hand, the premise of the capitalist production process, and on the other hand, the result and creation of the capitalist production process; they are produced and reproduced by the capitalist production process.4 In other words, identity recognition is an interactive process of productivity and productive

Science, Technology and Liberty  187 relations, as well as a production and reproduction process of social relations and material conditions. 5.1.2 Science, Technology and Human Socialization Most modern countries have undergone a transformation of civilization, that is, from a traditional society to a modern society. Some countries started this transformation on their own initiative, such as the European and American powers that first entered capitalism, while others were forced to do so, such as most countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The transformation of civilization is a cultural issue, but science and technology undoubtedly play a very important role in it. Science and technology have not only led to the collapse of traditional society and traditional families but also accelerated the process of human modernization. As Marx put it: the capitalist powers that took the lead in mastering modern technology forced all nations – if they did not want to perish – to adopt the bourgeois method of production, and forced them to promote so-called civilization in themselves, that is, to become bourgeois.5 Modern China has an unbearable history: Western powers forced open the door of China with strong ships and guns, and the ancient pastoral-style manor economy collapsed under the encroachment of the machine industry. The first shock came from the machine textile industry. Under this impact, the picture of male farming and female weaving that has lasted for thousands of years was torn a little bit, and the family cotton spinning industry – a self-sufficient manor economy – was precarious. Marx examined this period of history and described the tragedy of the ancient Chinese empire as follows: thousands of British and American ships headed to China; the country was soon flooded with cheap industrial products produced by machines in Britain and the United States. Chinese industry based on manual labor could not withstand the competition from machines, and the entrenched Chinese empire suffered a social crisis.6 In this way, the old economic system, that is, the small peasant economy (peasants themselves also made industrial products for their own use under this system), as well as the entire outdated social system that could accommodate a relatively dense population, were gradually disintegrating.7 The crisis of traditional China’s political, economic, cultural and social structure became increasingly serious. Finally, China was thrown into the modern world by Western powers and was forced to embark on a difficult quest for modernization. Modernization refers to the historical process and changes from traditional society to modern society since the industrial revolution in the 18th century. This transformation is mainly reflected in four aspects: first, the transformation from agricultural society to industrial society or from agricultural civilization to industrial civilization; second, the transformation from a society ruled by man to a society ruled by law; third, the transformation from subject society to civil society, that is, the improvement of people’s identity and social status; and fourth, the transformation from monism to pluralism, that is, the change in people’s thoughts and thinking from simplification to complexity. Most modern countries

188  Science, Technology and Liberty have experienced this kind of civilization transition from traditional society to modern society. The development of science and technology has not only brought about the modernization of things but also the modernization of people. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, the issue of “human modernization” was first put forward by the German sociologist Max Weber, but it did not attract enough attention at that time. With the unfolding of the third scientific and technological revolution, this issue has come to the fore. American sociologist Inkeles organized a group of sociologists to carry out investigation and research of modernization in 1962–1964 and published the works Toward Modernization and On Individual Modernization. In these works, he proposed 12 characteristics of modernization, among which there are three most important characteristics: being open, willing to accept new things; being autonomous, initiative and creative; and having a sense of trust in society and treating yourself and others properly. Today, the problems of modern people have drawn great attention. Although countries in the world have different national conditions and different values and cultural traditions, the following aspects have won people’s basic recognition. First, modernization of concepts and ways of thinking. Concepts are made up of value concepts, legal concepts, information concepts and talent concepts; ways of thinking include systematization, accuracy, agility, creativity and predictability. Second, modernization of behavior, meaning that modern people should have autonomy, creativity, efficiency and the spirit of competition and cooperation, especially the ability to participate in competition, meet challenges and strive for mutual benefit and win-win results. Third, modernization of lifestyle, which manifests in material and spiritual aspects: people should pursue both material prosperity and spiritual enrichment. The development of science and technology, on the one hand, requires people to have a higher moral standard and a civilized way of life, and on the other hand, has brought new problems and puzzles to people’s ethics, marriage and family, for example, test-tube babies and human cloning. Human modernization is not only a spontaneous and natural endogenous process but also a process of conscious, exogenous dynamic selection and pursuit. Starting from the “realistic individual” with “active life,” Marx, by employing the scientific method of unifying logic and history, objectively and comprehensively examined the four factors and four aspects of the original historical relationship,8 summarized the practical commonalities of various social forms and people living in them and revealed the dialectical relationship between production activities and social life: the “production and reproduction of real life” determines and promotes the formation and development of man and his social production activities, and the development of social production activities and other activities restricts and enriches the social life, and then restricts the development of human connotation. This thought from Marx sketches a basic outline for modern society and modern man; that is, with the improvement of social production and the reform of the social system, people will not only be able to fully control the industrial

Science, Technology and Liberty  189 production, but also enjoy all the achievements created by themselves, and in the end fully possess their own essence and achieve all-around development. From this statement by Marx, we can see that: firstly, human modernization is, in the final analysis, the enrichment of human connotation and the great improvement and optimization of real life, and it is the better and more suitable survival and development of human beings in real life. People must start from their real life and active real social life, grasp the ultimate goal, basic standards and realistic orientation of human modernization, otherwise, human modernization will lose its due value and significance. Secondly, modernized people want to actively adapt to and create modernized social production, and in the process constantly enrich themselves, realize themselves, fully possess their own essence, and truly and effectively live in the modern social life. To improve and optimize their real social life, they must determine the specific content and characteristics of modernization of humans in real life from the various conditions, possibilities and practical requirements provided by the production activities in modern society and other social activities decided by them. Thirdly, if people in modern life want to better participate in modern life and production, and possess their own essence more comprehensively, they must completely abandon narrow cultural nationalism or regionalism and look for common factors that represent social progress and human development from various social forms and their development history. Man in real life, as a kind of real social being of unified objectivity and subjectivity, is a living entity that organically combines certain needs and corresponding abilities. In fact, people’s existence is their real-life process.9 Through the process of constantly using certain abilities to control certain tools and techniques, and through cooperation between individuals and the transformation and utilization of the natural world, a certain amount of social wealth is created to meet certain needs, thus constituting the main content and basic process of people in real life and their active life. The continuous use of abilities and the continuous satisfaction of needs have led to the continuous renewal and development of people’s needs and abilities, thus forming a continuous history of survival and development of people in real life. Real life tells us irrefutably that how individuals express their lives tells what they are.10 In other words, what kind of needs and abilities an individual has and how he uses this ability to meet such needs can tell what he is. In other words, for people in real life, their different personalities and abilities are determined by the needs and requirements of specific eras and types of society. Therefore, actively participating in, creating and enjoying the production of modernized society has become the characteristic personality of modernized people, which is different from the previous ages and societies. Firstly, modernized man can correctly understand and grasp the objective being, status, function and value of human needs with scientific and technological reason. He knows that rich and reasonable needs are not only the basic form of individual human existence, the main content and leading aspect of real life and the driving force of individual human action, but also the initial growth point of the emergence, development and modernization of human society. As Marx said, people must first eat, drink, live and wear before they can engage in politics,

190  Science, Technology and Liberty science, art, religion, etc.11 It is in order to live and meet the needs of food, drink, shelter, clothing and other things12 that people in real life directly produce material means of life and engage in their own production activities. The first need that has been met itself, the activities to meet the need and the tools that have been acquired to meet the need will generate new needs,13 which leads people to create newer tools and richer activities. This cycle progresses until a modern life and production are created. Without ever-growing needs, people in real life will not struggle, pioneer, innovate or compete, and they will not tap into their own potential and resources to discover, manufacture and improve tools; if so, there would have been no gathering, no animal husbandry, no industrial civilization and no modernization of society and people. Modernized people can differ rich and reasonable needs from instinctive impulses and greed, understand the unreasonable nature of instinctive impulses, either good or evil, and are aware that the rich and reasonable needs are the highest manifestation of scientific rationalization of instinctive impulses and also the result of the standardization, guidance and control of desire by scientific and technological reason. Greed is precisely the uncontrolled explosion of instinct, the betrayal, compulsion and distortion of scientific and technological reason by desire and the result of the weakening and evolution of scientific and technological reason. Secondly, modernized people can treat the needs and desires of others and themselves with scientific reason. They can frankly admit their rich needs and eternal desires and fully engage in work and actions to meet their needs and desires openly. At the same time, they can sincerely respect and treat the needs and desires of others as equals, and will never unreasonably obstruct others’ actions to satisfy rich and reasonable needs and desires. Modernized people will not arbitrarily despise, restrict or suppress the needs and desires of individuals or others and promote asceticism, nor will they abuse or indulge the needs and desires of individuals or others at will and pursue indulgence. Instead, they treat all needs, those of themselves and of others, equally, without favoring one over the other. A modernized man not only pays attention to the satisfaction of instinctive needs such as food, clothing, shelter, travel and sex,14 but also strives to enrich and realize reconstructive needs such as tools and activities. Modernized people are more able to actively explore advanced needs, strictly regulate the needs of luxury, affirm new needs that represent the direction of development in social life, production and a high level of development, assimilate these needs into the structure of their needs, infuse their personality with vigorous nourishment and develop a modern personality that values self-respect, equality, innovation and wealth-making. Finally, modernized people enjoy abundant and reasonable needs. They not only have the basic instinctive needs of human beings that have repeated millions of years, such as food, clothing, shelter and travel, but also make themselves better satisfied and realized through the creation of material wealth, and expansion of the objects that satisfy their needs. They have been making their instinctive needs non-scarce, non-animal, enjoyable, novel and humanistic. For example, clothing

Science, Technology and Liberty  191 should not only cover the body, keep out the cold and prevent the sun, but also be decent, fashionable and of high quality; food should not only stop hunger and replenish energy, but also be delicious, nice-looking and elegant; a house should not only keep out the wind, but also be spacious, comfortable and livable; and travel, which is no longer for foraging, escaping and migrating, has become convenient, safe and comfortable. 5.1.3 Holistic Science and All-Around People “The all-around development of people” is the eternal pursuit of human beings but a never-ending goal, the inherent yearning of human nature and the natural pursuit of instinct and the external requirements of social progress and development. Marx pointed out that it is a universal law of social production to recognize the development of workers in as many aspects as possible. Modern production is bound to require the replacement of the partial individual, who performs only one partial function of society, with the fully developed individual, who takes different social functions as alternating modes of activity.15 Under the condition of socialized mechanical mass production, if workers cannot become individuals with various abilities to be developed freely, they cannot adapt to the alternating functions of modern production and extremely different labor needs. Therefore, the all-around development of human beings is a matter of life and death in modern production. According to Marx’s theory on the all-around development of man, the allaround development contains three levels of connotation: complete development, harmonious development and free development. “Complete development” means that the basic or the most basic qualities of human beings must be developed in an all-around manner. We can take it as the complete development of “being a man” and “doing things”; the complete development of “body” and “mind”; the complete development of morality, intelligence, physique and aesthetics; and the complete development of truth, goodness and beauty. “Harmonious development” refers to the coordinated development of various basic human qualities. Individuals should pursue the multifaceted development of personal qualities and abilities as much as possible under possible conditions, according to the needs of personal development and the requirements of social life, so as to avoid one-dimensional development. “Free development” refers to the independent, unique and individualistic development of man. In Marx’s theory of human development, comprehensive development and free development are two closely related concepts. He sometimes referred to “the all-around development of man,” sometimes to the “free development of man” and sometimes to “the all-around and free development of man.” The difference between “complete development” and “free development” lies in that the former mainly refers to the integrity, unity and harmony of human development, while the latter mainly refers to the autonomy, uniqueness and individuality of human development. Just because of this, Marx regarded “the all-around and free development of each person” as the basic principle of the future society; he especially emphasized “the

192  Science, Technology and Liberty original and free development of individuals” and strongly advocated the “free personality” of human beings. “All-around development of man” is a relative concept, and all-around is relative to one-sided. The essence of human one-sided development refers to the compulsion and enslavement of human development, as well as the resulting split, imbalance, distortion and deformity of human development. In the state of onesided development, people feel pain, suffering and destruction, which is the loss of freedom and autonomy. In contrast, the essence of “all-around development” refers to the freedom, autonomy, harmony, enrichment, flow and change of human development. In the state of all-around development, people feel happiness and joy, and they can realize and establish their self-value and dignity. In Marx’s view, large-scale industrial production not only puts forward objective requirements for the all-around development of man but also provides possibilities to do so. Marx noticed the importance of science and technology in realizing man’s all-around development. Firstly, science and technology provide a material premise for realizing humans’ all-around development. The development of science and technology has created abundant material wealth for human beings. The development of productivity has created increasingly rich materials for livelihood, enabling talents to pursue spiritual enjoyment and free personality development on the premise of getting rid of poverty and meeting life needs. Secondly, the elimination of private ownership and old-fashioned division of labor by scientific and technological development is the fundamental condition for realizing people’s all-around development. Under capitalist private ownership, the capitalists own the means of production and the workers have nothing but labor force. Workers are forced to sell their labor force in order to seek means of living, resulting in one-sidedness and passivity of human development. The division of labor turned one man into a farmer, another into a shoemaker, a third into a factory worker and a fourth into an exchange speculator. So long as he did not want to lose his means of livelihood, he remained such a man. This old division of labor was the result of the development of productive forces at a certain stage and was determined by private ownership. To some extent, it promoted social development at the cost of sacrificing people’s all-around development opportunities. Therefore, the difference between urban and rural areas, between workers and peasants, between mental and manual labor, can be eliminated only if private ownership and the old-fashioned division of labor are eliminated, so as to make labor a truly free activity and realize the comprehensive and free development of laborers. Thirdly, the increase of free time brought by technological development is the foundation of all-around personal development. Free time refers to the time that people can freely spend, that is, the time that can be used for non-material production activities such as science, art and social activities. With sufficient free time, individuals can develop in an all-around way. Marx believed that time is the space for human development. A man who has no free time at his disposal, and whose whole life is devoted to the service of capitalists except for such purely

Science, Technology and Liberty  193 physiological interruptions as sleeping and eating, is no better than a loaded animal.16 A man who is confined to material production to satisfy his physiological needs cannot be fully developed. Pure material labor can only cultivate unilateral ability. To achieve all-around human development, society must provide all individuals with the conditions and opportunities to engage in various spiritual activities. To this end, we must reduce material labor hours and increase free labor hours. As in the presence of a single person, social development, social enjoyment and the comprehensiveness of social activities all depend on the saving of time. All saving boils down to saving time.17 Saving working time is equal to increasing free time, that is, increasing the time for the full development of the individual.18 In this way, when society needs less time to produce wheat, livestock, etc., the more time it will earn for other production, material or spiritual production.19 Marx’s aforementioned ideas show that the all-around development of individuals must depend on reducing the necessary labor time to a minimum and increasing free time for all. He believed that the more human society progresses, the less time there will be for socially necessary labor for material production in order to meet the needs of survival, and the more time there will be for culture, education, recreation and scientific research. In a communist society, labor productivity will be greatly improved; material wealth created in shorter working hours can meet people’s material and spiritual needs. The reduction of working time and the reduction of labor intensity will liberate workers from heavy physical labor, and give them more time and energy to learn scientific and technological knowledge, cultivate their sentiments and various interests, and engage in diverse and creative activities, thus, they can enrich and improve themselves more freely and realize their own value. Because of this variety of creative activities, people’s potential is developed to the maximum, and people’s comprehensiveness is also shown. As Marx said, a man, for example, whose life includes a wide range of diverse activities and practical relations to the world thus leads a multifaceted life; the thought of such a person is as comprehensive as any other manifestation of his life.20

5.2 Science, Technology and People’s Life Worlds As a huge force closely related to human’s essential production and life, science and technology have been doomed to intertwine with humans’ real lives and their life worlds since their births. From the way of life to the state of existence, from groups of human beings to individuals, science and its technological application are continuously improving the way of life and living state of real man, and also changing the status of man in the life world. 5.2.1 Sein or Seienden From ancient times to the present, thinking about existence has exhausted the energy and passion of philosophers and thinkers. What is existence? And existence for what? How do we recognize and understand existence? What is the

194  Science, Technology and Liberty value and meaning of existence? These questions have formed the main line of the history of philosophy. Of course, some people don’t see it that way. For example, Heidegger, the most famous opponent, thought that the history of philosophy is the history of “existence” being forgotten. Heidegger’s view is based on the distinction between sein (existence) and seienden (existent); namely, he said sein is not seienden. Anything in the world can be called seienden; the universe is a kind of seienden – the biggest seienden, it can produce sein, but cannot be simply equated with it. Sein is the most universal concept, but it is not the “universality of species,” but a “transcendent,” beyond all seienden. Sein is undefinable, and anything definable in the world is just seienden. Man is a special kind of sein, which Heidegger called dasein. Man can know everything because he has merged with everything in the world. This is what distinguishes man from other seienden. In Heidegger’s opinion, seienden is beyond our grasp, we can only face seienden, and philosophy needs to understand how sein is transformed into seienden. Heidegger’s thought is unique and profound. His philosophical-historical viewpoint and his carding of the history of Western philosophy provide us with a new perspective and train of thought for us to re-understand the history of Western philosophy. Heidegger pointed out that traditional Western philosophy has been exploring sein and seienden, however, since Thales, from Plato to Hegel, the Western traditional philosophy mostly takes seienden as sein. In the history of Western thought, although people thought about seienden, with focus placed on sein, from the beginning, the truth of sein has never been thought of. It is not only concealed from thought as a possible experience, but also, Western thought itself, in metaphysical form, specifically, but ignorantly, covered up this concealment.21 We live in this real world; we hope to understand the world, change the world and let the world serve us. But when we face this seienden, we are often confused and even pained: is there an objective world outside of us that is independent of us? Can we know this objective world outside us? When the ancient Greek natural philosophers of the Miletus school began to think vaguely about philosophy, they had a stronger conviction: man and the universe are homogeneous and isomorphic, and any nature is an element in the chain of sein; the philosopher’s task is to find its one and only source, water, air, seeds, atoms and even numbers. But Heidegger argued that ancient Greek philosophy confused the difference between sein and seienden at the very beginning of its foundation. Most ancient Greek philosophers explored seienden; only Anaximander (the beginning is “infinite”) and Parmenides (existence and non-existence) explored sein. Therefore, Heidegger regarded Thales, Anaximander and Parmenides as the three great philosophers in the pre-Socratic era who took “whole existence itself” as their research object. However, Aristotle’s “conceptualism” and “pure form” have become the mainstream of Western philosophy. Modern rationalist philosophy became the mainstream. Empiricists after Bacon began to pay attention to the sensible and experiential concrete seienden; Locke discussed the relevant issues of epistemology in depth from the empirical level. However, since they couldn’t go beyond the boundaries of experience, they failed to make a definite judgment on the essence of seienden, let alone paid attention

Science, Technology and Liberty  195 to the sein of each seienden. Theorists saw the limitations of empiricism and tried to find a way to guarantee the universal necessity of knowledge from outside experience. Descartes regarded “thinking” and sein as two entities; Spinoza reduced “thinking” and sein from two entities to two attributes subordinate to god; Leibniz then used his “monad” to correspond to the sein. The German classical philosophy starting from Kant, who was followed successively by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, “the master of all,” pushed the dominant rationalist philosophy in the Western tradition to its peak. Kant had both the “empirical” principle and the “theoretical” principle, and on the basis of integrating the two, he reconstructed the epistemological system and posed the question of ontology. Hegel replaced Aristotle’s formal logic with his own original dialectical logic, echoed Plato’s idea of ​​objectification with a completely objectified absolute idea, becoming the master of rationalist philosophy and one of the important sources of modern phenomenology and existential philosophy. But in Heidegger’s view, the entire modern Western philosophy from Descartes to Hegel is also thinking about seienden and forgetting about sein. In the process of questioning from sein (transcendental) to seienden (experience), natural philosophy has become the biggest beneficiary, and science and technology have developed greatly. On the basis of Hegel, the ideological trend of scientism excavated and magnified the pillars of classical rationalism, carried on the empiric transformation to it and established the mansion of positivist science. Although there have been controversies between subject and object, phenomenon and essence, determinism and non-determinism, realism and antirealism, holism and reductionism, the joint efforts of scientists, technical engineers and scientific and technological workers have made the tree of science flourish. Science and technology have become a way for mankind to pursue the essence of the universe and life, a concrete embodiment of man’s inquiry of sein and seienden, and a way for human beings to inquire about the ultimate value and meaning. As Heidegger said, as long as the sein of the seienden within the scope of modern metaphysics is defined as the will, and therefore the selfwill, and the self-will itself is self-knowledge, then the seienden (the basis and the general subject) becomes its essence in the form of self-knowledge. The seienden manifests itself and presents itself to itself in the form of self-thinking. This self-presentation, namely the expression (or appearance), is the sein of the seienden as the general subject. Self-knowledge becomes the absolute subject. In self-knowledge, all knowledge and what can be recognized are gathered. It is the gathering of knowledge, just like the mountain is the gathering of hills. As the metaphysics of subjectivity, modern metaphysics considers the sein of the seienden in the sense of will.22 5.2.2 Science, Technology and Life Worlds Since Husserl put forward the concept of the “life world,” this term has been frequently used in modern philosophy. Husserl tried to use the “life world” to dissolve the pre-existing and arbitrary “material world” and “spiritual world” of

196  Science, Technology and Liberty modern science, destroy the eternal, free and absolutely supersensible existent hidden behind things and pull science back into the “life world” of human beings. Many modern philosophers have used this concept to a certain extent and in certain circumstances. Although some philosophers have not explicitly put forward the concept of “life world,” they have used similar concepts in their context. Modern scientism believes that to grasp the life world should rely on demonstration, analysis and logic; the value criteria for the life world are practicality, convenience and effectiveness, and the display of the life world is language. This concept of “life world” has been criticized for its lack of humanistic interest. Modern humanism advocates taking man himself as the standard, and the human instinct, emotion, will and poetic feeling are used to grasp the life world; the criterion for judging the value of the life world is the embodiment of meaning, poetic feeling and humanity; and the expression of the life world depends on language. This view of the life world has been repeatedly questioned because it obscures people’s reason and intellect. Only Marx really opened the door to the “life world,” allowing science to dwell poetically in it. Marx’s life world, which is unified with reason and meaning, is a life world of real man. In German Ideology, Marx pointed out that the premise of his philosophical criticism is that this method of investigation is not without premise; it starts from the premise of reality, and it does not depart from this premise for a moment. Its premise is person, but not the person in an illusioned isolated and fixed state, but the person in the process of development that can be observed through experience under certain conditions. As long as this dynamic life process is depicted, history is no longer a collection of dead facts, as those abstract empiricists think, and no longer the imaginary activity of the imaginary subject, as the idealists think.23 Marx also pointed out that this kind of philosophical criticism does not start from ideas or abstract people, but from people with flesh and blood: we do not start from what people say, assume or imagine, nor do we start from those who are talked about or imagined, to understand people of flesh and blood. Our starting point is people who are engaged in practical activities, and from their real-life processes we can also describe the ideological reflection and response of the development of this life process. Even the fuzzy illusions in people’s minds are the inevitable sublimation of their material life processes that can be confirmed through experience and connected with material premises.24 Marx’s life world is the meaningful world of practice. Marx always paid attention to the value and meaning of real man. In fact, since the age of middle school, Marx had established the ideal of working for all mankind, and he had been fighting for socialism and communism all his life. As an important element in the framework of communism, science and technology should be combined with people and laborers. Only in this way can science and technology get out of slavery and gain freedom and greater development. In Theses on Feuerbach, Marx wrote that the main shortcomings of all previous materialisms, including Feuerbach’s materialism, are as follows: object, reality and sensibility are understood only in the form of object or intuition, not as a perceptual activity, not as practice, not as subject. Therefore, the result is actually like this: contrary to

Science, Technology and Liberty  197 materialism, idealism develops the dynamic aspect, but in an abstract way, because idealism certainly does not know the actual and perceptual activities themselves.25 Heidegger once criticized Marx for remaining in Hegel’s metaphysics.26 But this critique is obviously sloppy. Heidegger sought transcendence, but failed to understand the transcendence connotation in Marx’s thought; Heidegger was good at speculation, but he did not approve of the consistent realistic speculation in Marx’s thought. Marx’s life world is dialectically unified. Marx’s life world is the unity of subject and object. Marx emphasized that practice is the intuition and confirmation of man’s essential power. Man has changed the form of material existence through productive labor and realized his intended purpose, thus putting natural living conditions under his own control and becoming the master of nature. Marx once put it: “in my personal activities, I directly confirmed and realized my true nature, that is, my human nature and my social nature.”27 Here, Marx told us that the motivation of practice includes that people want to break through and surpass the limits of nature. People start from their own needs, dominate and use external things and make things exist, develop and change according to their wills. The process of creative practice and its products make the essential power of human beings presented in an intuitive way. It is in the process of transforming the object world that humans truly prove that they are species-beings. The object of labor is the objectification of human life: man not only doubles himself spiritually, as in consciousness, but also actively and realistically, so as to visualize himself in the world he created.28 Therefore, man is realizing his own existence while carrying out the creative activities of transforming the objective world. Moreover, creative practical activities make people become masters of society. Social relations are not something external; they are the condition of an individual’s autonomous activity, and they are produced by this autonomous activity.29 Man is the sum of all social relations and is restricted by social relations, but man is an active subject, and he can create new social relations through labor practices and make himself the master of society. Creative practice is the realistic driving force for social development. Social relations and social facilities are not things beyond human beings. They are created by humans in the service of human survival and development, and humans are the masters of society.

5.3 Science, Technology and Human Liberation Liberty is the cognition of necessity and the transformation of the objective world. Marx never talked about abstract liberty, but insisted that it is the liberty of real man and the liberty of the union of free people. Human liberty in reality is always concrete and historical. The concept of liberty and the realization of liberty are constantly developed with the improvement of human cognitive and practical abilities, the development of productivity and the transformation of social systems. The history of civilization for thousands of years is a history of man’s struggle for liberty. The first was the victory of the anti-slavery social revolution, which enabled the majority of slaves to obtain personal freedom; the second was the

198  Science, Technology and Liberty victory of the anti-feudal democratic revolution, which enabled the broad masses of people to gain political freedom; and the last was the victory of anti-capitalist socialism, which enabled the broad masses of people to gain full freedom, and what has promoted this historical process is the continuous progress of science. 5.3.1 Road to Liberty “Liberty” is one of the few concepts for which no consensus has been reached since ancient times. Throughout the ages, almost every master of thought has commented on liberty. From Socrates and Epicurus in ancient Greece to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, from Locke and Mill in England to Constant and Tocqueville in France, and then to modern Berlin, Lord John Acton, and Rawls, these masters of thought have deduced one concept after another with different meanings. Liberty is also one of the most important values that everyone has been pursuing since ancient times. More than 2,000 years ago, people in ancient Greece, hailed by Westerners as the cradle of liberty, had already begun to enjoy their free and democratic life, so that when they rose up against the Persian army, the most inspiring slogan of the people was “Fight for Freedom.” More than 500 years ago, Renaissance giants reawakened people’s once-suppressed thoughts of liberty; afterward, Enlightenment leaders and free thinkers continued to motivate people to pursue a new kind of free life. Today, bourgeois scholars are constantly advocating their ideas of freedom around the world. Hayek regarded capitalism as the road to liberty, while Friedman directly equated capitalism with liberty. Through the reinterpretation of liberty, Marx aroused the strong yearning of generations of proletarians for the freedom and comprehensive development of human beings. Looking at the evolution of the thought of liberty, we find that thinkers are concerned about what liberty is on the one hand, and on the other hand, they are more concerned with how liberty is possible, that is, how people achieve liberty. All roads lead to Rome. Based on different understandings of liberty, there are thousands of roads to liberty designed by thinkers. Religious believers who preach the afterlife believe their liberty is in the kingdom of heaven; visionaries have constructed one free and happy utopia after another; moralists look for liberty and happiness in this world, believing that as long as they surpass pure self-interest and animal desires, they can move toward liberty; institutionalists believe that the realization of liberty cannot be achieved without the regulations of the system, and the road to liberty is hidden in the tension between liberty and the system. However, Marx believes that to explore the issue of liberty, we must first take the perspective of humans – the subjects of society – and dialectically examine the relationship between the subject and the object, that is, the relationship and interaction between man and nature, and between man and society. That is to explore the question of how much people – the subjects of liberty – can do in the face of nature and in the process of social and historical development, and how much room for action there is in the face of objective historical inevitability.

Science, Technology and Liberty  199 Marx has always maintained that the issue of liberty is accompanied by the emergence of human beings, and liberty is a human thing. Only those who have subject consciousness and engage in practical activities are the real subjects of liberty. Marx asserted that the subject of liberty is a real person, a person with social history under certain social and historical conditions and a person engaged in the creative practice of transforming the world. On the subject of liberty, Marx drew a clear line between all idealist views of liberty and old materialist views of liberty. Therefore, liberty is the embodiment of human nature. The liberty created by humans through practical activities is unique to humans and is the difference between humans and other existences in nature. Marx pointed out in his Manuscript of Economics and Philosophy in 1844 that free conscious activities are precisely the species characteristics of human beings. Why did Marx say that? It is because humans are different from animals, and animals are directly the same as their life activities; they have no rational consciousness and cannot distinguish themselves from their own life activities. People turn the essence of their life activities into their own will and the object of their will. With rational consciousness, man not only regards the objective world as the object of cognition, but also regard the mutual connection and interaction between man and the objective world and the whole world as his own cognitive object, and then carries out practical activities to transform the object. In this way, humans are not passively enslaved and manipulated by the objective environment like animals, and humans can act as active subjects of knowledge and practice, making the natural world behave as a creation shaped by humans in accordance with the laws of beauty. As the subject of practical activities, humans can only actively exert their subjective initiative, constantly use existing conditions to fight against the constraints of inevitability and surpass or get rid of the various restrictions formed by their history. Human liberty can only be revealed and realized by properly solving various practical contradictions in human life based on reality and understanding of necessity. It is for this reason that human activities are free activities, and liberty becomes the species characteristic of humans. From Marx’s analysis of the ways to realize liberty, people find that science and technology also help people move toward liberty. The development of science and technology can make individual liberty better achieved, and the realization of social liberty cannot do without science and technology. 5.3.2 Science, Technology and Achievement of Personal Liberty Marx was a revolutionist, a great philosopher, a first-class economist and the founder of scientific socialism. Many Western scholars regard Marx as a preeminent sociologist, and literary writers relish his elegant style. Marx was equally successful in the field of natural science; his insight into the progress of science at that time, his original viewpoints about mathematics, especially calculus, and his friendly exchanges with scientists of his time made many professional scientists envy him. After Marx’s death, his best friend Engels said in front of his grave, with great sadness but full of reverence:

200  Science, Technology and Liberty [t]wo such discoveries would be enough for one lifetime. Happy the man to whom it is granted to make even one such discovery. But in every single field which Marx investigated – and he investigated very many fields, none of them superficially – in every field, even in that of mathematics, he made independent discoveries.30 Engels regarded Marx’s basic ideas about natural science as important as his other two discoveries. This remark of Engels not only vividly depicts Marx’s lifelong scientific feelings, but also highly appraises his scientific achievements in seeking truth and pragmatism. Reviewing Marx’s thoughts, we can find that his journey of science is actually a journey of pursuing liberty. In scientific activities, Marx pursued liberty, experienced liberty and enjoyed liberty. Liberty is the knowledge of necessity, and the law of the objective world must be recognized in order to obtain it. The liberty of the subject cannot be based on ignorance of the object. As Hegel put it, “[t]he ignorant man is not free, because what confronts him is an alien world.”31 Engels once pointed out clearly that liberty does not lie in the illusion of independence from the laws of nature, but in understanding these laws so as to make natural laws serve certain purposes in a planned way.32 That is to say, there is no liberty when one does not know necessity, and only when necessity is known can there be any liberty to speak of. The more consistent one’s understanding is with necessity, the more consistent one’s actions are with necessity, and the more initiative and liberty one will have. In Marx’s mind, liberty is the essence of science and the eternal pursuit of mankind. Therefore, in his Confessions, Marx regarded Spartak and Kepler as his favorite heroes. Spartak was a slave leader and an unfulfilled hero who fought for the freedom of personality; Kepler was a master of science who fought for spiritual freedom and a hero who made legislation for the sky. Through mathematical research, Marx mastered the quantitative methods of economic analysis and realized the freedom of scientific research methodology. Mathematics is an indispensable tool for Marx’s scientific career. He believed that a science can only be considered to be truly perfect when it successfully uses mathematics.33 Therefore, when Marx mastered the method of calculus and freely used this method in economics research, he got extremely happy, because he was liberated and freed in the face of the former constraints of mathematics in economics research. Through mathematics research, Marx wrote Mathematical Manuscripts, which in his own view can be compared with Das Kapital, and experienced the freedom of scientific innovation. Among all natural sciences, Marx had a special liking for mathematics. Because of the need of writing Das Kapital, Marx entered the kingdom of mathematics, and he soon had a kind of almost religious conversion. Mathematics became an element in Marx’s life and even integrated into his blood. In mathematical research, Marx fully experienced the joy of free scientific research. His high level of mathematics, and his profound understanding of mathematics, especially calculus, even surpassed many professional mathematicians of his

Science, Technology and Liberty  201 time. Marx cherished his mathematical research manuscripts very much during his lifetime, and still remembered them before his death. He especially told Engels and his daughter Elena to care about the publication of Das Kapital and Mathematical Manuscripts. Through extensive research, from physics to chemistry, from astronomy to geography and to biology, also including some emerging and interdisciplinary subjects, such as agricultural chemistry, electricity, geology, physiology and climatology, Marx accomplished the writing of Das Kapital with ease. In his Karl Marx zum Gedächtnis. Ein Lebensabriß und Erinnerungen (Remembrance of Karl Marx: Life and Memories), Liebknecht wrote that Marx paid special attention to and valued every new thing and new achievement in the fields of natural sciences (including physics and chemistry) and mathematics. The names of Moraishot, Liebig and Huxley were often mentioned by us, just like Ricardo, Adam Smith, McCulloch and other economists in Scotland and Italy. When Darwin made a conclusion of his own research and made it public, for several months in a row, apart from talking about Darwin and the revolutionary power of his scientific achievements, we almost said nothing.34 Mathematics is also Marx’s unique way of spiritual recuperation. Marx poured a lot of emotions into mathematics, and it even became one of his spiritual sustenances. For Marx, mathematics was leisure during work breaks, the best comfort in sickness and even one of the motivations for life and work in adversity. In his illness, Marx also insisted on studying mathematics. Engels had a special account of this: after 1870, there was another intermittent period, which was mainly caused by Marx’s illness, but he still insisted on studies as usual. Agronomy (especially the land relations in the United States and Russia), money market and banking, as well as natural sciences, such as geology and physiology, especially independent mathematical research, became the main content of his notebooks of this period.35 Even when his wife Jenny was seriously ill, Marx still cared about mathematics. To be more precise, mathematics became one of Marx’s spiritual pillars at this time, and a cure for him and Jenny, who were both ill and depended on each other. Paul Lafarge wrote in Reminiscences of Marx that in addition to reading poetry and novels, Marx also had a unique way of spiritual rest, which was to do his favorite mathematics. Algebra was even his spiritual comfort; in the most painful moments of his turbulent life, he always took this to comfort himself. In those days when his wife was critically ill, he could no longer continue to engage in scientific work. In such a sad mood, only by immersing himself in mathematics did he find any semblance of peace.36 In the long-term scientific research, Marx established a good relationship with many natural scientists at that time, enjoying the fun of scientific communication and the freedom of spiritual communication. There was the chemist Scholema, the amateur mathematician Sam Moore, the biology giants Darwin and Huxley and the zoologist Rey Longcaster; they inspired each other in academic discussions and exchanges and helped each other in daily life and communications. After Darwin’s On the Origin of Species was published, it caused great controversy,

202  Science, Technology and Liberty but Marx rejoiced and felt extremely pleased. In the letters to Engels and Lasalle, Marx expressed his praise for Darwin without hesitation and took the initiative to send the first volume of Das Kapital to Darwin. Upon receiving this gift, Darwin wrote an enthusiastic reply to Marx. Isn’t the mutual understanding and sincere friendship of the two scientific giants the best portrayal of scientific freedom! 5.3.3 Realization of Science, Technology and Social Liberty According to Aristotle, science began with leisure and surprise. Science is the free exploration of natural phenomena and laws by free people, and a thinking activity that people carry out in order to answer the doubts in their hearts and get rid of the unknown fear. Scientists (philosophers), by the strong cognitive impulses in their hearts, have penetrated the surface of accidental phenomena woven together in a narrative way, thereby tearing the gap between deep and superficial structures, between essence and phenomenon, and for the first time giving mankind the freedom of reflection and the ability to distance from the abyss of directness,37 and freeing people from the arbitrary will of the descent chain and mysterious power. For ancient Greeks, science is open, with its free nature unconcealed. Thales only took interest in the stars in the sky and ignored the deep pits in the ground, Euclid paid a few copper coins to students who tried to make a fortune in geometry and Archimedes begged atrocious soldiers not to mess up his geometric figures. At that time, science was science; it was just an ordinary being in society, enjoying no superior status or power over society; it had nothing to do with value, transcended practical utility and secular illusion and was not subject to social intervention and control. As a result, science continued to thrive and grew in its community, forming a prosperous Greek science. In this kind of liberal scientific research, the inner and deep life consciousness and humanistic meaning of the Greeks echoed, showing the external actions of the Greeks striving for freedom and liberation. After the first century A.D., as Romans shifted their interest from science to technology, coupled with the development and growth of Christianity that preaches faith and obedience, the space for rational and critical science was being squeezed, and the invasion of backward barbarians made the situation of science even worse. Finally, many forces had made science the handmaid and slave of religion; once science went beyond the limits set by religion, it would incur ruthless blows. Science lost its freedom and space for survival and development and became the object of slavery. Science is free, and it is the spiritual and material power for people to understand and transform nature. Science once led the Greeks out of ignorance, prospered the Roman culture through technological application and served as a powerful weapon for Europeans out of the Middle Ages. At the time that Francis Bacon shouted the slogan “knowledge is power,” science was already the driving force for Europeans to expand their territory and achieve success. When Newton unified the motion of objects in the universe and on the ground, thus exposing the laws of nature, science was the pillar for Europeans to promote free will and

Science, Technology and Liberty  203 self-spirit. When Watt introduced the steam engine to the world, science become a magic weapon for Europeans to march toward nature. People have been looking forward to science, expecting the development of science to bring more well-being and freedom to mankind. However, a powerful monster of capital was born. It integrates all resources in the society with unprecedented great power and destroys all forces in the society in an unprecedented and brutal way, and science cannot escape its control. Under the violence of capital, science deviates from itself to become alienated. Marx was the first scholar to study the alienation of science in capitalist society. With his extraordinary insight, he saw the enslavement and alienation of free science to capital. Marx saw the power of capital. It is capital alone that creates capitalist society and the universal possession of nature and social connections themselves by its members, hence the great civilizing effect of capital. Compared to this social stage, all previous social stages were characterized only by man’s local development and worship of nature. It is only under capitalism that nature is nothing more than an object or a useful thing; it is no longer considered a force for itself; the theoretical knowledge of the independent laws of nature is itself merely a sly attempt to make nature (as consumer goods or as means of production) subservient to human needs. Capital destroys all impediments to the development of productive forces, enlarges demand, diversifies production, and breaks through the limitations of the use and exchange of natural and spiritual forces. It is under the powerful violence of capital that science is alienated step by step. Capital leads to the separation of science and labor, overshadows the free and independent nature of science, and makes science a force in the service of capital. Capital not only alienates science but also deprives scientists of free position and makes them official scholars on behalf of the bourgeoisie. While analyzing the alienation and enslavement of capital to science, Marx fully affirmed the development and progress of science in the era of capitalism. He believed that only in places where capital is highly concentrated and production is highly developed can science truly develop. In the 18th century, advances and discoveries in mathematics, mechanics and chemistry reached almost the same level in Britain, France, Sweden and Germany. The same was true of inventions, for example, in France. At that time, however, their capitalist application was confined to Britain, for it was only in Britain that the economic relations were developed enough for capital to take advantage of scientific advances.38 Without the bourgeoisie, without capital, it would be difficult for science to achieve such rapid development as it has today. The bourgeois period has the mission of creating the material basis for the new world: on the one hand, it is necessary to create universal contact based on the interdependence of all mankind and the instruments for such contact; on the other hand, it is also necessary to develop human productivity and turn material production into scientific rule over the forces of nature.39 Science under capitalism, of course, is not the real science in Marx’s mind. Just as his vision for communism – an ideal society for the proletariat – Marx

204  Science, Technology and Liberty also envisioned a truly free science in an ideal state in the future. He wanted to reconstruct the science of the entire society while reconstructing the economic foundation of the entire society, so that science could regain the freedom it always had. According to Marx, only the working class could liberate them from the rule of the monks, turn science from an instrument of class rule into a power of the people and transform scientists themselves from peddlers of class prejudice, parasites of the state in pursuit of fame and fortune, into allies of capital and free thinkers! Only in the republic of labor can science play its real role.40 The so-called reconstruction is a process of both deconstruction and construction. Marx believed that capitalist science should be thoroughly deconstructed, and the process of deconstruction is actually a process of unmasking and removing all kinds of forces that cover science. The main force that shields science is of course capital, which in turn suppresses and enslaves science through government power, class prejudice and religious influence. Thus, the main way of deconstruction is to free science from the shackles of class prejudice, religious influence and governmental power. With the abolition of the standing army and the government police, the material power of oppression was destroyed; no church should possess property; all state schools abolished religious education (provided free education at the same time), and made religion part of people’s private life and sustained by the charity of believers; all educational institutions were freed from government guardianship and slavery – with the realization of all this, the oppressive power of the spirit was destroyed, and science became not only for everyone but also freed from the shackles of government oppression and class prejudice.41 Science becomes liberal science when the forces that shade it are removed. Marx had no doubt of this, because, in the Paris Commune, Marx had seen the rudiments of this liberal science. Marx spoke highly of the new atmosphere brought about by the commune since it enables people to enjoy the benefits of modern agronomy, which is generated by social needs and currently infringing on their interests as a hostile factor, without compromising their status as truly independent producers.42 What follows is a process of constructing a liberal science. How to construct it? Marx thought the answer lies in the organic combination of science and labor. Truly liberal science can only be realized in the new type of socialist labor, that is, cooperative labor. Marx said that the real reason for the enslavement and alienation of science by capital is the separation of science and labor. Science has become an independent force that is opposed to labor and serves capital. Generally speaking, it belongs to the category of production conditions becoming an independent force that is opposed to labor. And it is this separation and independence of science (initially only beneficial to capital) that at the same time becomes a condition for the development of the potential of science and knowledge.43 In other words, the separation and independence of science from labor is what causes the alienation of science. When science is separated from labor, it has to prostrate itself at the feet of capital and become its imperial tool, and scientists become scholars and official spokespersons in the service of capitalists and allies of interests. Therefore, to be liberated, science must first be separated

Science, Technology and Liberty  205 from capitalist labor and escape from the power of capital. Marx pointed out dialectically that the way of scientific liberation is hidden in the phenomenon that once led to scientific slavery. Man is the sum total of all social relations, and science is also a social activity of man. As Marx put it: even when I’m engaged in activities such as science, that is, an activity in which I can only have direct contact with others under very few circumstances, I’m also social because I act as a human being. Not only the materials needed for my activities – even the language used by thinkers to conduct activities – are given to me as a product of society, but my own existence is a social activity. Therefore, what I make from myself is what I make for society from myself, and realize that I am a social being.44 Science as a human activity can only play a role when it is organically combined with people. Based on this, Marx pointed out that communist science is a science of cooperation and organization. And he believed that science, like art, must be organized, because excessive division of labor has caused artists to succumb to local and ethnic limitations. In the future communist society, due to cooperation, there are no pure painters, only people who regard painting as one of their multiple activities.45 Marx highly affirmed the role of science when analyzing the forming factors of commodity value. Science has achieved savings of both time and space through technological application and driven natural forces to serve labor through various inventions. The social or collaborative nature of labor has also been developed due to these inventions. Marx keenly saw the great significance of cooperative labor to the development of science. In his view, for the significance of the cooperative factory established by the workers themselves, no matter how high the valuation is, is not excessive because this is the way to freedom of science, and also the way to the liberation of society with the help of science. In the International Workers Association Establishment Declaration, Marx pointed out that the workers did not just talk about it, but proved it with facts: mass production, and production carried out in accordance with the requirements of modern science, can be carried out without the participation of the employer class who employs the laborers of the working class; and they proved that in order to produce effectively, instruments of labor should not be monopolized as tools for ruling and plundering workers; employment labor, like slave labor and serf labor, is only a temporary and lowlevel form, and it is destined to give way to joint labor voluntarily carried out with excitement and joy.46 In the communist stage, once true science is constructed, it will become a powerful driving force for the construction of material and spiritual civilization, and an important tool for people to get rid of the shackles of blind inevitability and move from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. “Communism,” Marx argued,

206  Science, Technology and Liberty is the “positive transcendence of all estrangement”; the abolition of private property, communism: is the genuine resolution of the conflict between man and nature – the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and knows itself to be this solution.47 The development of science has greatly improved labor productivity and created more and more material wealth, which is of great significance to lifting the material scarcity of mankind. For this, Marx even gave unsparing praise to the production in the age of capitalism: “the bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together.” But those familiar with Marxism know that what Marx really advocated is organized, planned and socialized mass production under socialism and communism, as well as organized and collaborative science, which makes production more efficient. The development of science has led to the saving of physical materials and production resources, reduced the worries of mankind about the shortage of means of production, and promoted the sustainable development and prosperity of society. In Marx’s time, resources were relatively abundant, but he was so farsighted that he accurately predicted the lack of resources that may be caused by the development of production, and therefore offered appropriate solutions. The development of science has greatly saved the time spent on labor so that people have more leisure time to engage in scientific research and artistic creation. In the capitalist stage, the saving of labor time has been a common social phenomenon. This process, which began with capitalism, will continue in the socialist and communist phases, and more people will truly benefit from it. Science is the most exquisite intellectual achievement in human civilization, and the most important means to lead people out of the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom. While tool-making techniques are an important marker of the difference between humans and animals, the evolution of the human spirit is the result of science and technology. Astronomy teaches people the secrets of the heavens, geography enables people to explore the mysteries of the earth, scientific achievements accompany people through the vicissitudes of life and scientific spirit leads people to freedom.

Notes 1 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:210. 2 J. Elster. Making Sense of Marx. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994:68. 3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:222. 4 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 46). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:927. 5 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:404.

Science, Technology and Liberty  207 6 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:277. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:655. 8 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:160. 9 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:152. 10 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:147. 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:594. 12 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:158. 13 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:159. 14 A.H. Maslow. Motivation and Personality. Translated by Xu Jinsheng et al. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1987:89. 15 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:561. 16 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:204. 17 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:123. 18 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 31). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:107–108. 19 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:123. 20 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:296. 21 M. Heidegger. Holzwege. Translated by Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1997:219. 22 M. Heidegger. Holzwege. Translated by Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1997:249. 23 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:153. 24 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:152. 25 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:137. 26 Zhang Xianglong. Heidegger’s Thought and Chinese Dao of Heaven. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996:446. 27 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 42). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:37. 28 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:274. 29 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:203–204. 30 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:597. 31 Hegel. Aesthetics (Vol. 1). Translated by Zhu Guangqian. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:125. 32 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:491.

208  Science, Technology and Liberty 33 W. Liebknecht. Karl Marx zum Gedächtnis. Ein Lebensabriß und Erinnerungen. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005:191. 34 W. Liebknecht. Karl Marx zum Gedächtnis. Ein Lebensabriß und Erinnerungen. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005:64. 35 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 45). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:7. 36 W. Liebknecht. Karl Marx zum Gedächtnis. Ein Lebensabriß und Erinnerungen. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005:191. 37 J. Habermas. A Conversation About God and the World: Interview with Eduardo Mendieta; J. Habermas. Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002:158. 38 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:367. 39 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 12). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:251. 40 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 12). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1998:251. 41 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:167. 42 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:147–48. 43 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 8). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:366. 44 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:301–302. 45 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:460. 46 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 21). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2003:13. 47 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:297.

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I. Works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin Peking University. Mathematical Manuscript of Marx. Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 1975. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Complete Works of Lenin. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984–1990. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1–48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995–2007. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Index of Complete Works of Marx and Engels. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Marx and Engels’ Collected Works. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Reminiscences of Marx and Engels. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1–4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC. Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 1–4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012.

II. Other Foreign Literatures Fritz Allhoff ed. Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide. London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010. A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Gollancz Ltd., 1936. A.J. Ayer. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982. A.J. Ayer. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan, 1940. J.R. Brown ed. Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. London, New York: Continuum, 2012. R. Carnap. Die Aufgable der Wissenschaftslogik. Wien: Gerold & Co, 1934. 

210 Bibliography R. Carnap. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. R. Carnap. Logische Syntax der Sprache. Wien: Springer, 1934a/1968. R. Carnap. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Kegan Paul, 1935. R. Carnap. The Unity of Science. Translated with an Introduction by M. Black. London: Kegan Paul, 1934. R. Carnap. Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik, in Actes de Congres International de Philosophie Scientique I. Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936. Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley eds. Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford University Press, 2003. R.S. Cohen ed. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrechat-Boston-London: Kluwer, 1963. R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan eds. Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis. Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. Dordrechat-Boston-Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983. R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky ed. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume Two: In Honor of Philipp Frank. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. J.B. Conant. Science and Common Sense. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Martin Curd & J.A. Cover. Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues. W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998. H. Feigl. Inquires and Provocations. Selected Writings, 1929–1974. Ed. by Robert S. Cohen. Dordrechat-Boston-Lancaster: Reidel, 1981. H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck eds. Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. H. Feigl and M. Scriven eds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. P.K. Feyerabend. Zeitverschwendung. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1995. P.K. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell eds. Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966. S. Fuller. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Time. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. Peter Godfrey-Smith. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Theory a Reality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. P.M.S. Hacher. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009. Edward J. Hall. Philosophy of Science: Metaphysical and Epistemological Foundations. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Rom Harre. The Philosophy of Science an Introductory Survey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. F.A. Hayek. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge, 1944. Christopher Hitchcock. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004. G. Holton. Science and Anti-Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. G. Holton. Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought. Kepler to Einstein. Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. H.S. Hughes. The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1965. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975. Robert Kill. The Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams. Oxford: Oxford University, 1997.

Bibliography  211 P. Kitcher. Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Theo A.F. Kuipers. General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Amsterdam, Boston: Elsevier/North Holland, 2007. John Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Fourth Edition. Oxford: Oxford University, 2001. Peter Machanmer and Michael Silberstein eds. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002. P.D. Magnus and Jacob Busch. New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen P. Stich eds. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Seymour Mauskopf and Tad Schmaltz eds. Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problem and Prospects. Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2012. Timothy McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly, and Fritz Allhoff eds. The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Chienkuo Michael Mi and Ruey-lin Chen eds. Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2007. E. Nagel. Logic Without Metaphysics and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956. Anthory O’hzar. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd eds. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. Ahmad Raza. Philosophy of Science Since Bacon: Readings in the Ideas and Interpretations. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2011. Alex Rosenberg. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2012. B. Russell. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Allen & Unwin,1940. Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer eds. The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, New York: Routledge, 2006. C.P. Snow. The Two Cultures: And a Second Look: An Expanded Version of the Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959/1963. Benton Ted and Craib Ian. Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought. Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

III. Chinese Literatures J. Agassi. Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. L.P. Althusser. For Marx. Translated by Gu Liang. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. Translated by Yin Dayi. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1981. A.J. Ayer. Philosophy In the Twentieth Century. Translated by Li Bulou et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987. A.J. Ayer. The Revolution in Philosophy. Translated by Chen Shaoming et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1985. F. Bacon. Advancement of Learning. Translated by Liu Yuntong. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2007.

212 Bibliography F. Bacon. The New Organon. Translated by Xu Baokui. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. B. Barber. Science and the Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin et al. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991. I.G. Barbour. Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al. Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993. B. Barnes. About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong. Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. Translated by Lu Xudong. Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. U. Beck. Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter: Neue weltpolitische Ökonomie. Translated by Jiang Renxiang et al. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004. D. Bell. Post-Industrial Society (Brief Version). Translated by Peng Qiang, Beijing: Popular Science Press, 1985. D. Bell. The Coming of Post-industrial Society. Translated by Wang Hongzhou et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. D. Bell. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Translated by Zhao Yifan et al. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989. D. Bell. The Social Sciences Since the Second World War. Translated by Fan Dainian. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1988. H. Bergson. Introduction à la Métaphysique. Translated by Liu Fangtong. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1963. J.D. Bernal. Science in History. Translated by Wu Kuangfu et al. Beijing: Science Press, 1959. J.D. Bernal. Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. W.I.B. Beveridge. The Art of Scientific Investigation. Translated by Chen Jie. Beijing: Science Press, 1979. A. Bird. Philosophy of Science. Translated by Jia Yushu et al. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008. D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery. Translated by Ai Yan. Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. T.D. Boer. The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Translated by Li He. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1995. Wang Bolu. The Outline of Marx’s Technical Thought. Beijing: Science Press, 2009. R.H. Brown. The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin. Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998. M. Bunge. Scientific Materialism. Translated by Zhang Xianglun et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1989. V. Bush. Science: Endless Frontier. Translated by Fan Dainian. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2004. H. Butterfield. The Origins of Modern Science: 1300–1800. Translated by Zhang Liping et al. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1988. F. Capra. The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Translated by Zhu Runsheng. Beijing: Beijing Publishing Group, 1999. F. Capra. The Turning Point—Science, Society and the Rising Culture. Translated by Wei Saying et al. Chengdu: Sichuan Publishing House of Science and Technology, 1988. R. Carnap. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Zhang Huaxia. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007.

Bibliography  213 R. Carnap. The Philosophy of Scientific Methodology. Translated by Jiang Tianji. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1990. R. Carson. Silent Spring. Translated by Lv Ruilan et al. Beijing: Jinghua Press, 2000. N. Cartwright. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Translated by Wang Wei et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. E. Cassire. An Essay on Man. Translated by Gan Yang. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003. E. Cassirer. Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Gu Weiming et al. Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988. A.F. Chalmers. Science and Its Fabrication. Translated by Jiang Jinsong. Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007. A.F. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? Translated by Qiu Renzong. Shijiazhuang: Hebei Science and Technology Education Press, 2010. I.B. Cohen. The Newtonian Revolution. Translated by Yan Feng et al. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999. R.G. Collingwood. The Idea of Nature. Translated by Wu Guosheng et al. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1999. P.H.T. D’Holbach. Le Bon Sens, On Idees Naturelles Opposees Aux Idees Surnaturelles. Translated by Wang YinTing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1966. Liu Dachun and Liu Yongmou. The Offense and Defense of Thought: The Rise and Evolution of Alternative Philosophy of Science. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2010. Liu Dachun. A Review of the Research on Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. Liu Dachun. General Theory of Philosophy of Science. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1998. Liu Dachun. Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd Edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2005. R.A. Dahl. On Democracy. Translated by Li Boguang et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999. W.C. Dampier. History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001. J​.O.​​de La Mettrie. L’Homme Machine. Translated by Gu Shouguan. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. G. Deleuze. Pourparlers. Translated by Liu Hanquan. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000. R. Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by Wang Taiqing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001. B. de Spinoza. Ethica in Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. Translated by He Lin. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997. J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Translated by Xu Chongqing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1958. J. Dewey. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action. Selected Materials of Bourgeois Philosophy (Vol. 9). Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1966. M. Dierkes and C. Groth. Between Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology. Translated by Tian Song et al. Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 2006. W. Dilthey. Introduction to the Human Sciences. Translated by Zhao Xifang. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2004.

214 Bibliography L. Dollot. Individual Culture and Mass Culture. Translated by Huang Jianhua. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987. Xing Dongmei. Science and Objectivity Regression of Practice. Beijing: Science Press, 2008. A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1–3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2010. Liu Fangtong. A New Compilation of Modern Western Philosophy. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2000. A. Feenberg. Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Translated by Lu Jun et al. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003. A. Feenberg. Critical Theory of Technology. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005. Xiao Feng. The Human and Inhuman Aspects of Technology. Beijing: Scientific and Technological Literature Press, 1991. P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Translated by Zhou Changzhong. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2007. P. Feyerabend. Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007. P. Feyerabend. Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002. P. Feyerabend. Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005. M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Liu Beicheng et al. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1999. M. Foucault. Dits et Ecrits. Translated by Yan Feng. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1997. M. Foucault. Faut Defendre La Societe. Translated by Qian Han. Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999. M. Foucault. Selected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen. Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998. M. Foucault. The History of Sexuality. Translated by She Biping. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000. S. Fuller. Governance of Science: Ideology and the Future of the Open Society. Translated by Liu Dun. Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al. Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988. D.R. Griffin. The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang. Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004. Wu Guosheng. Lectures on Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2009. S. Haack. Defending Science Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Translated by Zeng Guoping. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008. J. Habermas. Technology and Science as “Ideology”. Translated by Guo Guanyi. Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 2002. S. Harding. Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002. P. Harrison. The Territories and Science and Religion. Translated by Zhang Butian. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2016. F. Heer. Europaische Geistesgeschichte. Translated by Zhao Fusan. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2008.

Bibliography  215 G.W.F. Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by Wang Taiqing. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Heidegger. Translated by Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996. M. Heidegger. The Forest Road. Translated by Sun Zhouxing. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1997. O. Hoffe. Morality as the Price of Modernity. Translated by Deng Anqing et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005. G. Holton. Science and Anti-science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999. K.S. Hook. Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. Translated by Jin Ke et al. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1965. M. Horkheimer. Works of Horkheimer. Edited by Cao Weidong. Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1997. M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Liang Jingdong et al. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003. Liu Huajie ed., Readings in the Science Communication. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007. D. Hume. A Treatise on Human Nature. Translated by Guan Wenyun. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1980. Charles E. Hummel. The Galileo Connection: Resolving Conflicts Between Science and the Bible. Translated by Wen Renjie et al. Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Publishing House, 2008. E. Husserl. Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Li Youzheng. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. E. Husserl. Phenomenology of Life-world. Translated by Ni Liangkang et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002. E. Husserl. Selected Works of Husserl. Edited by Ni Liangkang. Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997. E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Zhang Qingxiong. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1988. E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Wang Bingwen. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001. W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979. K. Jaspers. Man in the Modern Age. Translated by Wang Defeng. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003. K.T. Jaspers. Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Translated by Wei Chuxiong et al. Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House,1989. Xia Jisong. Modern Western Philosophy. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006. H. Kahn et al. The Next Two Hundred Years: A Scenario for America and The World. Translated by Shanghai CPPCC Compilation Committee. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1980. I. Kant. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. Translated by Quan Zengxia. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001. I. Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by Pang Jingren. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1978.

216 Bibliography M. Kline. Mathematics in Western Culture. Translated by Zhang Zugui. Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2004. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Translated by Wang Shanbo et al. Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. A. Koyre. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Translated by Wu Botao. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2003. A. Koyre. Newtonian Studies. Translated by Zhang Butian. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2003. T.S. Kuhn. The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research. Translated by Fan Dainian et al. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004. T.S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Translated by Jin Wulun et al. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2012. J.A. Labinger and H. Collins. The One Culture?: A Conversation about Science. Translated by Zhang Zengyi et al. Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. J. Ladriere. Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997. I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. Translated by Lan Zheng. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986. B. Latour and S. Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Translated by Zhang Bolin. Beijing: Orient Press, 2004. L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991. L. Lear. Witness for Nature. Translated by He Tiantong. Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1999. W. Leiss. The Domination of Nature. Translated by Yue Changling et al. Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing Group, 2007. S. Lelas. Science And Modernity: Toward an Integral Theory of Science. Translated by Yan Zhongzhi. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2011. J. Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Qiu Renzong et al. Wuhan: Huazhong University of Science & Technology Press, 1982. J.F. Lyotard. Post-modernism. Translated by Zhao Yiji. Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1999. J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Che Jinshan. Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997. E. Mach. Analysis of Sensations. Translated by Hong Qian et al. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. J. Macquarrie. 20th Century Religious Thought. Translated by He Guanghu. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1989. H. Marcuse. Industrial Society and the New Left. Translated by Ren Li. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. H. Marcuse. Modern Civilization and Man’s Quandary. Translated by Wang Congxia et al. Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989. H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006. S.F. Mason. A History of the Sciences. Translated by Zhou Xuliang et al. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1980.

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Index

Absolute truth 19, 64 Adorno, Theoder 215 Agassi, Joseph 35, 211 alienation 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 121, 125, 130, 151, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 165, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 203, 204 alienation of science 113, 130, 151, 155, 156, 157, 161, 165, 170, 177, 204 alternative 2, 3, 4, 5, 27, 29, 30, 31 analytical philosophy 16, 17, 22 anthropocentrism 21 anthropology 6, 34, 50 anti-science 3, 5, 31, 149 anti-scientism 3, 17, 19, 29 Aristotle 2, 128, 133, 194, 195, 202 astronomy 42, 44, 47, 55, 64, 67, 145, 170, 201 Ayer, Alfred Jules 209, 211 Bacon, Francis 43, 64, 123, 128, 130, 144, 145, 151, 194, 202, 211, 212 Barber, Bernard 212 Barnes, Barry 33, 212 Bell, Daniel 212 Bergson, Henri 212 Bernal, John Desmond 153, 212 Bloor, David, 212 Brown, Hanbury 209, 212 Campanella, Tommas 130, 145 capital 11, 13, 44, 45, 55, 57, 58, 60, 66, 68, 78, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 113, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 203, 204, 205

capitalism 13, 61, 69, 79, 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 95, 99, 112, 113, 129, 141, 145, 146, 149, 155, 156, 161, 163, 165, 170, 171, 173, 175, 177, 178, 187, 198, 203, 206 capitalist 7, 8, 13, 43, 45, 50, 51, 57, 65, 66, 67, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 108, 129, 135, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 186, 187, 192, 198, 203, 204, 205, 206 Carnap, Paul Rudolf 2, 15, 209, 210, 212, 213 Carson, Rachel Louise, 213 Cartwright, Nancy 213 Cassirer, Ernst 213 certainty 17, 125, 127 Cetina, Karin Knorr-, 33, 216 Chalmers, Alan 213 cognitive science 32, 33 collaboration 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 89, 101, 103, 104 Collins, Harry 216 common sense 5, 186 communism 113, 129, 144, 145, 146, 175, 176, 196, 203, 206 communist 105, 112, 113, 114, 144, 146, 151, 169, 175, 177, 193, 205, 206 complementary 78 complexity 23, 61, 82, 187 Comte, Auguste 3, 15 construction 17, 20, 21, 39, 58, 60, 69, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 99, 102, 104, 185, 204, 205 constructivism 4, 29, 33, 149

Index  221 context 6, 7, 12, 13, 92, 111, 124, 131, 145, 149, 150, 163, 165, 179, 196 convention 16 cultural philosophy 32 cultural philosophy of science 32 Dahl, Robert A. 213 Dampier, William Cecil, 213 Darwin, Charles Robert 68, 201, 202 deconstruction 17, 18, 19, 27, 204 deconstructive 29 deduction 44, 128 defense 1, 2, 5, 28, 30, 31, 98, 130 demarcation of science 24, 32 Descartes, René 16, 43, 128, 152, 195, 213 Dewey, John 11, 27, 36, 213 dialectics 20, 48, 52, 53, 131, 155, 159, 160, 174 Dilthey, Wilhelm 146, 213 diversification 44 division of labor 10, 11, 13, 57, 60, 65, 68, 70, 77, 78, 79, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 101, 102, 104, 110, 111, 112, 113, 135, 137, 141, 147, 157, 158, 159, 164, 176, 177, 192, 205 ecological crisis 31 Einstein, Albert 19, 110, 120, 210, 214 empiricism 15, 19, 31, 195 Engels, Friedrich 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 35, 36, 39, 40, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 105, 108, 109, 111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 128, 130, 135, 139, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 163, 165, 170, 173, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 209 epistemology 4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 32, 33, 35, 53, 194 essentialism 17, 19, 28 evolution 3, 4, 15, 26, 50, 63, 64, 68, 70, 87, 91, 107, 109, 111, 114, 135, 137, 143, 144, 145, 147, 190, 198, 206 existentialism 3 exquisite 206 falsification 28, 31 Feenberg, Andrew 182, 214 feminism 3, 4 Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas 42, 77, 106, 109, 124, 126, 127, 146, 155, 179, 196 Feyerabend, Paul Karl 3, 16, 17, 28, 31, 32, 36, 210, 214

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 195 foodness 191 Foucault, Michel, 3, 17, 18, 28, 32, 36, 186, 214, 217 freedom 5, 32, 105, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 144, 146, 148, 150, 156, 170, 192, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206 Fuller, Steve 210, 214 fundamentalism 17, 28, 29 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 1, 31, 35, 37, 146, 214 Griffin, David R. 214 Haack, Susan 214 Habermas, Jürgen 3, 28, 186, 208, 214 handicraft workshops 7, 69, 70, 77, 78, 86, 97, 132, 133, 136, 158, 164 Harding, Sandra 214 Hegel 1, 31, 53, 106, 146, 155, 194, 195, 197, 200, 207, 215 Heidegger, Martin 3, 18, 28, 146, 194, 195, 197, 207, 215 historicism 15, 16, 17, 19, 28 history 6, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 39, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 58, 60, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 76, 78, 83, 91, 92, 99, 106, 110, 111, 114, 115, 121, 124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 157, 160, 170, 174, 177, 178, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 194, 196, 197, 199, 206 history of scientific and technological thought 20, 25, 39 holism 195 Holton, Gerald,210, 215 Horkheimer, Max 215 humanism 1, 26, 35, 176, 196 humanities 14, 17, 18, 30, 31, 39, 48 Hume, David 15, 215 Husserl, Edmund 3, 17, 18, 29, 146, 195, 212, 215 hypothesis 53, 64 incommensurability 18, 31 individuality 191 induction 44, 52, 56, 128 industrial civilization 83, 87, 187, 190 Industrial Revolution 15, 126, 149 industrial society 179, 187 industrial technology 41, 43, 48, 49, 50, 66, 83, 86, 90, 91, 93, 106, 108, 113

222 Index inevitability 17, 23, 29, 51, 63, 96, 111, 150, 198, 199, 205 instrumentalism 11, 157 integration of science and technology 34, 62, 156 intervention 83, 202 irrationalism 17 James, William 67, 133, 215 Jaspers, Karl Theodor 215 Kahn, Herman 215 Kant, Immanuel 195, 215 Kepler, Johanns 200, 210 knowledge-power 28 Kuhn, Thomas Samuel 18, 28, 31, 210, 216 labor 7, 11, 13, 41, 45, 47, 49, 50, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62, 66, 67, 68, 70, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 148, 150, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 175, 176, 177, 184, 187, 191, 192, 193, 197, 203, 204, 205, 206 Lakatos, Imre 216 Latour, Bruno 33, 34, 37, 216 Laudan, Larry 28, 210, 216 law 2, 8, 13, 19, 46, 47, 48, 50, 53, 54, 60, 64, 77, 83, 97, 150, 151, 187, 191, 200 Lear, Linda 216 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 195 Lenin, Vladimir 72, 120, 173, 181, 209 Liberty 108, 109, 121, 145, 183, 197, 198, 199, 200 Liebig, Justus von 8, 51, 52, 66, 172, 201 locality 2 Locke, John 64, 194, 198 logical empiricism 15, 29, 31 logicism 3, 28 Lukacs, Georg 124, 151 Lyotard, Jean-Francois 3, 17, 216 Mach, Ernst 15, 216 machine 13, 18, 45, 50, 58, 59, 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 78, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 104, 105, 108, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, 142, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 187

machinery 7, 10, 13, 65, 69, 70, 86, 91, 95, 103, 104, 138, 141, 166, 167, 169 Marcuse, Herbert 3, 111, 120, 178, 182, 216 Marx, Karl Heinrich 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 27, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212 materialism 13, 23, 27, 43, 50, 53, 106, 123, 127, 150, 162, 170, 196, 197 mathematics 2, 15, 20, 29, 42, 43, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 64, 67, 145, 199, 200, 201, 203 Maxwell, James Clerk 210 Meadows, Dennis L. 217 mechanics 10, 15, 39, 42, 44, 47, 58, 59, 62, 64, 90, 136, 163, 172, 203 mechanism 12, 39, 41, 45, 46, 69, 80, 81, 86, 93, 99, 100, 109, 111, 140, 163 medicine 18, 32, 35, 42, 110 Merton, Robert King 28, 217 metaphysics 15, 19, 27, 195, 197 modernism 216 Mulkay, Michael 33, 37, 154, 217 natural philosophy 41, 42, 43, 52, 63, 130, 195 natural science 4, 5, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 43, 44, 45, 47, 51, 52, 53, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 104, 124, 126, 129, 130, 131, 133, 136, 137, 142, 145, 150, 161, 162, 163, 171, 177, 178, 199, 200, 201 naturalism 176 Needham, Joseph 25 neutrality 30, 34 new technological revolution 62 Newton, Issac 2, 129, 202, 217 non-science 18

Index  223 objectivity 2, 5, 18, 29, 33, 106, 143, 189 ontology 16, 19, 22, 23, 125, 195 operationalism 15 optimism 31, 149 orthodox 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 17, 27, 30, 31, 32 Ostwald, Friedrich Wilhelm 217 paradigm 18, 22, 31, 34, 125, 131 perfection 85, 114, 144 pessimism 149 phenomenology 16, 195 philosophy of science 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 35 philosophy of science and technology 1, 16, 20, 21, 25, 27, 35 physics 2, 4, 7, 15, 29, 39, 43, 44, 47, 53, 59, 60, 62, 67, 145, 201 Pickering, Andrew 35, 217 Plato 128, 145, 194, 195 pluralism 5, 29, 187 Polanyi, Michael 217 Popper, Karl 28, 31, 149, 217 popularization 52, 84, 89, 90 positivism 3, 4, 15, 16, 19, 29, 31 positivist 14, 16, 20, 43, 195 post-colonialism 3, 4 practice 18, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 39, 44, 46, 51, 55, 58, 64, 76, 90, 107, 124, 125, 130, 134, 142, 145, 146, 159, 160, 162, 174, 175, 196, 197, 199 pragmatics 30 pragmatism 15, 17, 20, 32, 151, 200 production practice 42, 43, 44, 45, 55, 60, 61, 68, 76, 83, 90, 137, 141 productivity 20, 50, 66, 80, 81, 85, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 113, 114, 123, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 150, 153, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 165, 167, 170, 176, 177, 186, 192, 193, 203, 206 profit 54, 90, 100, 103, 104, 105, 161, 162, 163, 174, 175, 179 proletarian revolution 8, 13 pseudoscience 32 rationality 2, 5, 17, 18, 24 realism 15, 16, 22, 195 reconsideration 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 14, 121 reduction 141, 193 regularity 89 relativism 16, 17, 19

relativity 64 religion 6, 39, 42, 43, 46, 48, 61, 143, 155, 183, 190, 202, 204 Renaissance 30, 42, 43, 60, 61, 141, 143, 151, 185, 198 repeatability 2 representation 14, 46, 82 Richter, Maurice N. 35, 218 Rorty, Richard McKay 3, 4, 16, 17, 28, 32, 218 Rouse, Joseph 218 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 155, 218 Russell, Bertrand 15, 20, 27, 211, 218 Sarton, George 218 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 1, 31, 195 Schlick, Friedrich Albert Moriz 15 Schopenhauer, Arthur 218 Schumacher, E.F. 218 scientific and technological determinism 149, 150 scientific anthropology 32 scientific culture 35 scientific ethics 34 scientific methodology 3 scientific realism 15, 22 scientific revolution 44, 56 scientism 1, 5, 17, 18, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 35, 195, 196 scientization 24, 58, 62, 90, 91 seeking truth 200 simplicity 81, 160 Snow, C.P. 35, 211, 219 social construction 22, 28, 32, 33 social science 5, 6, 14, 22, 39, 47, 48, 50, 66 Socrates 198 Sokal incident 19 Spinoza, Baruch de 195, 213 standardization 18, 57, 84, 89, 190 subjectivity 2, 18, 146, 189, 195 superstition 110 surplus value 50, 54, 55, 57, 67, 88, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 161, 163, 167 sustainable development 21, 22, 34, 206 technics 47, 48, 58, 65, 66, 68, 107 technological alienation 111, 112, 113, 114, 156, 157, 163, 165, 173, 175 technologization 24, 57, 62 testability 2 Thales 194, 202 theology 30, 43, 60, 61

224 Index theory of science and technology 7, 14, 155, 156 Toffler, Alvin 219 uniformity 33 uniqueness 29, 31, 55, 191 universality 2, 12, 17, 45, 46, 56, 113, 141, 174, 194 value neutrality 23 view of science and technology 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12

wages 100, 101, 103, 140, 168 Weber, Max 188, 219 Westfall, Richard S. 219 White, Andrew Dickson, 219 Whitehead, Alfred North 219 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann 15, 17, 146, 210 working class 8, 11, 13, 93, 112, 146, 155, 156, 165, 204, 205