Reconsideration of Science and Technology III: An Open World 1003302599, 9781003302599

Citation preview

Reconsideration of Science and Technology III

Drawing on debates from traditional and postmodern thoughts on science and technology, the title builds a new theoretical framework to reconsider science and technology, integrating the opposing viewpoints that either justify science or negate it. As the third volume of a three-volume set that proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to an ever-changing world, this final volume seeks to restore the cultural implications of science. Across the six chapters, the authors probe the prospect of a pluralistic scientific culture, including discussions of diversified value choices, the tension between reason and unreason, other binary characteristics of scientific knowledge, including objectivity and uniqueness, universality and locality, as well as the loss, awakening and reconstruction of scientific culture. The authors call for a transformation of scientific culture from a dominant culture to an affirmative one and envision a free and open world of science and technology. The volume will appeal to scholars and students interested in the philosophy of science and technology, the ideology of scientism and anti-scientism, modernism and postmodernism, Marxist philosophy and topics related to scientific culture. Liu Dachun is a Distinguished Professor at Renmin University of China and also a pioneer and leading scholar of Chinese philosophy of science and technology. He specializes in philosophy of science, STS (science, technology and society) and history of scientific thought. Yang Huili is a Lecturer of Philosophy at the School of Humanities, Southwest Jiaotong University, China. She specializes in the research of philosophy of science, STS and engineering ethics. Fan Shanshan is a Lecturer at the School of Marxism, Capital Normal University, China. She specializes in the research of philosophy of science, dialectics of nature and Marx’s view of science and technology.

China Perspectives

The China Perspectives series focuses on translating and publishing works by leading Chinese scholars, writing about both global topics and Chinarelated themes. It covers Humanities & Social Sciences, Education, Media and Psychology, as well as many interdisciplinary themes. This is the first time any of these books have been published in English for international readers. The series aims to put forward a Chinese perspective, give insights into cutting-edge academic thinking in China, and inspire researchers globally. To submit proposals, please contact the Taylor & Francis Publisher for China Publishing Programme, Lian Sun ([email protected]) Titles in philosophy currently include: A Hope for Philosophy I The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan A Hope for Philosophy II The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan Reconsideration of Science and Technology I Reflection on Marx’s View Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou Reconsideration of Science and Technology II Scientism and Anti-Scientism Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili Reconsideration of Science and Technology III An Open World Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan For more information, please visit https://www.routledge.com/China-Perspectives /book-series/CPH

Reconsideration of Science and Technology III An Open World

Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan

First published in English 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan The right of Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. English Version by permission of China Renmin University Press. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-29435-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-29900-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-30259-9 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Introduction PART I

1

Complementary Value Choices

39

1

Diversified Value Choices

41

2

Objectivity and Uniqueness

70

3

Universality and Locality

97

4

Reason and Unreason

PART II

125

Scientific Culture and Cultural Science

157

5

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

159

6

Openness Reconstruction of Cultural Science

198

Postscript Bibliography Index

235 240 251

Introduction

The reconsideration of science and technology is multifaceted. It is not only about how to treat science and technology but also about how to treat the existing philosophy of science and technology. The more important question is how this philosophy responds to the changes in the world and keeps abreast of the times. When we start this reconsideration, we should not forget that a great philosopher – Karl Marx – has done this before and left us invaluable ideological assets. So, we need to go over Marx’s view of science and technology and bear his penetrating thoughts in mind; only in this way can our reconsideration head in the right direction. Now let us expand on these points in the following paragraphs.

I.1 How to Treat Science and Technology I.1.1 Three Approaches In modern society, we cannot live without science and technology even for a moment. But we don’t have much consensus on how to treat science and technology. In the circle of philosophy, the misunderstandings and contests between scientism and humanism have never faded. As Gadamer has commented, in the two centuries following the death of Hegel and Schelling, philosophy was actually constructed amid the defense of science,1 and defenders of science have kept fighting against those critics during that period. How should we treat science? Or how should philosophy reflect on science? There are three approaches to this question in the past and at present. The first approach is to defend science. This is a basic standpoint of philosophical reflection on science and also a traditional mainstream view. To defend science is to explain why science is reasonable and why scientific knowledge is so accurate and predictable. For example, before launching the Shenzhou spacecraft, scientists could figure out the precise time when it would enter the preset orbit. This can only be done with scientific knowledge. The second approach is to criticize science. With the continuous socioeconomic development over the centuries, the importance and greatness of science have become increasingly prominent. Now science and technology are the backbone of economic development in modern society. However, apart from being DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-1

2

Introduction

extolled, science has come under strong criticism. Being deeply concerned about the countless problems in the course of human development, some major schools of philosophy – the initiator of the so-called “alternative philosophy of science” – obstinately blame the problems on the development of science. The third approach is to reconsider science. In recent years, while science is still being defended and criticized, a new approach for reflection on science has emerged, that is, “reconsideration” (the theme of this book). The basic standpoint of this approach is that neither pure defense nor pure criticism is impeccable, so we should reconsider science from a diverse, rational and tolerant perspective. In this day and age, the philosophical reflection on science ought to be reconsideration instead of defense.2 I.1.1.1 Orthodox Approaches The purpose of standard or orthodox philosophy of science is to prove the rationality of science. Some well-known philosophers (e.g., Carnap and Hempel) and scientists have provided rich evidence for this purpose, but their reasoning for the rationality and reliability of science is based on nothing but on its own attributes. The first is objectivity, that is, non-subjectivity, testability and repeatability. For example, the effect of a drug must be verified through rounds of tests, and it is the positive feedback of a majority of users that can prove the drug is effective. This is what objectivity means. The second is universality, that is, abstractness, non-locality and borderlessness. For example, British physicist Newton is said to be the father of modern physics, but it doesn’t mean that physics is British. Chinese physics and British physics are essentially the same thing, which is a manifestation of the borderlessness of science. The third is constructiveness, that is, logicality and mathematics. The so-called “constructiveness” indicates that all parts of scientific knowledge are logically related and mathematically connected. For example, Galileo put forward the “law of free fall,” arguing that the height of the falling body is irrelevant to its mass, but only directly proportional to time squared, which can be expressed by mathematical relations. Before Galileo, the great thinker Aristotle once alleged that the speed of the falling body is determined by its mass, which is now taken as a fallacy since it is neither constructive nor empirically verified. The aforesaid three points happen to be the basis for defending science. I.1.1.2 Alternative Approaches The doubts about the rationality of science have not ended. After World War II, all sorts of alternative philosophies of science that either oppose science or criticize scientific tendency have cropped up, spread rapidly and widely, becoming an ideological trend that cannot be ignored. In the opinion of alternative philosophers, science is not a selfless and sacred pursuit of truth, but a power to collude with politics, a game running on money, a tool for flattering patrons and an accomplice of humans in their savage rule over nature.

Introduction 3 Science is lively, rich and colorful. It cannot be simplified into static logic, formulas and symbols. Logicism and positivism are valuable tools for us to understand science, but in essence, they only have “one-sided profundity.” Historicism has blazed the trail for dynamic research on the evolution of science, but it is still confined to the framework and language system of analytic tradition. The new force that suddenly rises is nothing else except the alternative philosophy of science. Although “alternative” is not mainstream, it is very eye-catching and influential. Generally speaking, the alternative philosophy of science can be classified into three types: (1) The European anti-scientism theory that has gradually penetrated into the field of philosophy of science since the 1970s. It mainly includes existentialism represented by Martin Heidegger, the Frankfurt School represented by Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas and postmodern philosophy of science represented by Foucault and Lyotard. (2) The rebellion from the traditional or orthodox philosophy of science to its opposite, mainly represented by Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty. (3) The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) studies, which, by absorbing alternative ideas, break up with the science, technology and society (STS) studies, represented by radical feminism, post-colonialism and ecological philosophy of science, which are taken to justify emerging political movements. As an ideological trend, the alternative philosophy of science is not an integral whole, but a collection of heterogeneous reflections on science. They focus on the relationship between science and other social practices, what they have in common is the attitude of criticizing science or anti-science, and strong suspicion of the value of science and technology. As the “other” to the analytical tradition, the European philosophy, especially the philosophy of France and Germany, doesn’t go short of the philosophy of science (i.e., “philosophical reflection on science”). In fact, the philosophy of science can be traced back to French philosopher Auguste Comte, while Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze are all his successors. In Germany, as a critic of positivism, Edmund Husserl asserted that there was a crisis in European science, and his followers Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas never stopped the philosophical reflection on modern science and technology. These ideological resources for the philosophy of science, which belong to the humanistic ideas, are not echoes or criticisms of logical positivism, but a reflection on science according to their own rationale. Therefore, they have been excluded from philosophy of science by the mainstream analytical tradition. So far, they have not yet received enough attention. Inside the analytic tradition, the philosophy of science seems to have moved toward self-denial, with “rebels” turning around and striking one after another. Feyerabend and Rorty are typical examples of them: the former completely denies the existence of a unique scientific methodology, while the latter vows to have

4

Introduction

the scientific epistemology uprooted. Although the rebels still use the language of analytic philosophy, they have cast their eyes on the broad European philosophy. Of course, the rebels are borderliners and targets of public criticism, which partly explains why Rorty devoted himself to literary criticism later. Since then, the foundation of the orthodox philosophy of science is no longer unbreakable. Outside the realm of pure philosophy, the reflections on contemporary science and technology have remained impressive. In the middle of the 20th century, the negative effects of science and technology became so manifested that the Western social movements no longer defended science, but turned against it. By following the new ideological trend of social constructivism, the SSK, radical feminism, ecologism and post-colonialism started criticizing the orthodox philosophy of science extremely violently. The “others,” “rebels” and “laymen” against the orthodox philosophy of science are collectively known as “alternatives.” The reason why they are “alternative” is not only because their opinions, interests and approaches are widely different from the mainstream but also because they make entries in the “other register” of the philosophy of science. In fact, the alternative philosophy of science has always been by the side of the mainstream philosophy of science, just like a supporting role complements a main character on the same stage. Whenever the spotlight upon the head of the main character is fading, the supporting role stands out to show its charm, and then this cycle continues as if the two are dancing a “tango” with different rhythms. In view of its creativity, profundity and enlightenment, the alternative is not inferior to the mainstream. In order to understand contemporary science more comprehensively, philosophers of science should pay enough attention to the alternative, incorporate it into the philosophical discipline as soon as possible and probe into the alternative ideas. In the process of reconsideration of science, the author of this book tries to fully depict the basic features of the alternative and roughly clarify the basic clues and interconnections of the alternative evolution. I.1.1.3 The Approach of Reconsideration It must be pointed out that the position of logical positivism in praising the natural sciences, which is represented by physics, is certainly undesirable. However, most alternative ideas that thoroughly negate mainstream science have gone to the other extreme. Among the defenses and criticisms of science at present, there are of course insightful opinions, which may have a far-reaching impact on the development of science in the future. Objectively speaking, both orthodox and alternative philosophies are likely to go to extremes. Although extremes may be profound, they are certainly unfair and unjustifiable. Extreme thoughts may be inspiring, but extreme actions are sure to lead to mistakes and even disasters. Therefore, it is particularly important for those in the debate to give up their extreme viewpoints. Generally speaking, the high-level development of science and technology will drive people to continuously reflect on science. Since Western scientific concepts

Introduction 5 and spirits are deeply entrenched, the extreme opposition to science may somewhat correct the limitations of the prevailing scientism, help people regain a proper understanding of science and maintain the freedom, equality and tolerance of the entire society. It can be said that although most Western postmodern intellectuals are critical of science, they have been acting in a forward-looking role. But for us in China, we should treat the alternative philosophy of science more carefully. We cannot vigorously preach this philosophy, because a large number of Chinese people are not yet fully aware of science; they only take it as a tangible tool rather than something of institutional, ideological or spiritual significance. When the scientific foundation remains fragile and the scientific spirit is not carried forward, we cannot blindly follow the Western theories and thoughts to criticize science, or else we may descend into the ignorant state of the prescientific ages. Extreme scientism idealizes and purifies science, making it difficult to explain the sophisticated scientific world. Extreme criticism totally repudiates the objectivity of science, but endorses pluralism of truth, rejects the delimitation standard of science, and even mixes science up with mythology and witchcraft, which obliterates the important position of science in the entire society and its great contribution to human life, and one-sidedly exaggerates the negative effects of science in modern society. The right thing to do is to transcend the defense and criticism of science and reconsider it, that is, support the development of science on the one hand and remain vigilant to it on the other hand. This is the basic standpoint that we have extracted from diverse and complex reflections on science. In a nutshell, the right way to conduct philosophical reflection on science is to reconsider it. This is not to compromise, but to integrate opposite views. In fact, the fierce rebuttal between defenders and critics of science has brought forth a more tolerant and peaceful philosophy of science which still has its own insistences. From a historical point of view, the theory of science has undergone a transformation from defense of science to criticism of science and finally to reconsideration of science. When the theory of science just came into being, its main purpose was to defend science, that is, to prove the rationality of natural science and transform humanistic and social science with scientific approaches. However, in the second half of the 20th century, the questioning of science became fashionable in the academic circle; there were even voices embracing the “theory of anti-science.” But in any case, the total repudiation of science, which is apparently against common sense and practical needs, is sure to cause a backlash, which is already proven by the “science war” in the late 20th century. Among the three approaches to treating science, this book endorses the approach of reconsideration. I.1.2 How Does Marx Reconsider Science and Technology? So, how does Marx treat science? Marx never treats science and technology as a simple issue. Instead, he reconsiders them with the insight and wisdom of an outstanding thinker. He has been

6

Introduction

generous in praising science and technology, and outspoken against their negative consequences. What he has left us is a precious ideological legacy. Marx is one of the greatest thinkers in human history and a rare encyclopedic scholar in modern times. He read extensively throughout his life, and never stopped exploring. He made so many creative contributions in the fields of economics, philosophy, politics, sociology, history, religion and anthropology, especially in the field of humanistic and social science, and left us a rich ideological and cultural heritage. How does Marx treat science? Frankly speaking, most of us had no idea of this in the past. It is some statements of Marx that have impressed us: “At the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, must ask: this must eradicate all hesitation; here all cowardice are of no avail.”3 “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits,”4 and science is a “direct productive force.”5 These comments are undoubtedly thought-provoking, but they are far from enough for representing Marx’s view of science and technology. It is true that the previous studies on Marxism have simplified, or even ignored or distorted his scientific and technological thinking, not to mention there is no proper summary of his view of science and technology. In recent years, there have been studies on Marx’s view of science and technology, but they are not profound, systematic or comprehensive, because some scholars themselves are scientifically narrow-minded, confined to a single disciplinary background, and inaccessible to the original documents of Marx. In the context of reexamination of science and technology, it is quite necessary to enter the Marxist world of science and technology and systematically study how Marx reconsiders science and technology. I.1.2.1 Marx’s View of Science and Technology The so-called “view of science and technology” refers to people’s positioning of science and technology, and the results of their rational thinking on the issues such as scientific and technological structure, activities and functions. To pay attention to Marx’s thinking of science and technology and probe into his ideological legacy in this regard is the premise for studying his view of science and technology; this is also the first step for us to access his theoretical realm of science and technology. Of course, the academic circle is divided on whether Marx has his own philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. For example, Chen Changshu, a Chinese philosopher of technology, argues that when discussing Marxist philosophy from the perspective of the generation of philosophy of technology, we will first encounter a definitional (or at least superficial) barrier, that is, Marx and Engels have contributed incisive thoughts to philosophy of technology, but they have never used the term ‘philosophy of technology’ in their works. So, it can be deduced that Marx and Engels have never admitted to any philosophy of technology of their own.

Introduction 7 In this sense, the concept or notion of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’ is untenable. But Prof. Chen promptly adds that although Marx and Engels have never used the term ‘philosophy of technology’ in their works, it is not ample enough to deny the existence of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’. At the very least, we should admit that their holistic and fundamental viewpoints, which were already consciously demonstrated by them, are hard to be clearly distinguished from philosophy.6 In fact, the same argumentation is also applicable to philosophy of science. Perhaps we do not have to assert that Marx is a philosopher of science or technology, or insist that his theory of science and technology is so good (or bad), but only recognize that “Marx’s thought of science and technology” is undoubtedly existent and abstruse, and his view of science and technology embodied in it is realistic and enlightening. Marx’s time, the 19th century, was an era of a fast-rising capitalist economy. This period witnessed the first technological revolution, which was marked by the invention of textile machinery and the improvement of the steam engine, taking great strides forward. Moreover, the second technological revolution, which was marked by the application of electric power and chemical engineering technology, had started to sprout. In this period, many fields of natural science represented by classical physics were in full swing, while in the field of social production, handicraft workshops based on manual labor were being replaced by large-scale mechanized industry. As a result of the constant development of mechanized industry, there had been a pressing demand for applying scientific and technological achievements in production activities. It was in this context that Marx took an interest in and followed up the new discoveries and theories of natural science, as well as the new technological inventions and their application in production. As Engels put it: Science was for Marx a historically dynamic, revolutionary force. However great the joy with which he welcomed a new discovery in some theoretical science whose practical application perhaps it was a yet quite impossible to envisage, he experienced quite another kind of joy when the discovery involved immediate revolutionary changes in industry and in historical development in general. For example, he followed closely the development of the discoveries made in the field of electricity and recently those of Marcel Deprez.7 Throughout his life, Marx had been dedicated to finding solutions to realistic problems. A great concern for reality is both the starting point and destination of his theoretical explorations. In short, Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, which is more profound than the theoretical attainments of ordinary people, has all along been closely connected with realistic problems.

8

Introduction

In those years when the development of science and technology was in a boom and vigorously advanced social production, Marx took an interest in science and technology, and started paying attention to and thinking about scientific and technological matters. This is recorded in the works of Marx, and in his biographies and other related materials. As early as the 1840s, Marx had devoted himself to contemplating the status and role of science and technology in social production, the internal connection between the development of science and technology and that of production and the impact of science and technology and machines on the working class, laying an ideological basis for creating the Marxist theory. In the process of exploring the law of development of capitalist society and the path of proletarian revolution, and making preparations for writing the book Capital, Marx had made painstaking effort in examining scientific and technological issues and left a large quantity of manuscripts. From 1850 to 1858, while spending time on learning political and economic works, Marx also read the treatises of John Beckmann, J.H.M. Poppe, Justus von Liebig, Johnson, Lightmayer, A. Ure and Charles Babbage on science and technology, workmanship and natural science, which had greatly improved his knowledge structure, broadened his theoretical horizon, and made him fully prepared to interpret the relationship between science and technology and productive forces in the future political economic research. To sum up, although Marx did not leave any treatise on science and technology, he has explored so many scientific and technological issues, analyzed and interpreted scientific and technological phenomena and left us a valuable ideological legacy in this regard. The existence of Marx’s view of science and technology is an indisputable fact. I.1.2.2 Main Literature on Marx’s Ideas of Science and Technology A comprehensive study of Marx’s writings is the basis of teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology, which are mainly revealed through a vast number of monographs, manuscripts, notes, letters and conversations he has left behind. The literature that is usually accessible is only the tip of the iceberg of Marx’s whole writings. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic made the joint decision that the Marxism-Leninism research institutes of the two countries edit and publish together a new international, historical-critical edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe), for which more than 130 volumes were planned.8 It is thus clear that the Russian, Chinese and German editions of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, which are commonly seen, are in fact not complete. Among the tens of thousands of pages of manuscripts, notes and letters left by Marx, as well as the notes, commentaries and annotations in the books he collected, not all have been edited and published. Such a deficiency is bound to limit

Introduction 9 our comprehensive understanding and in-depth research today of Marx’s ideas of science and technology. The ongoing huge project of a new edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels will improve the conditions of our research. Marx’s documents are the primary source of Marx’s ideas. Studying Marx’s texts is the basic way to grasp Marx’s ideas about science and technology. Comprehensive and accurate uncovering of these ideas should be realized through a systematic exploration of Marx’s ideas in his writings based on his original texts. In his discussion of the significance of reading Marx’s writings, Derrida points out: It will always be a fault not to read and reread and discuss Marx – which is to say also a few others – and to go beyond scholarly “reading” or “discussion.” It will be more and more a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility. Teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology is also a process of reconsidering Marx’s view of science and technology. The first challenge in this process is to appropriately identify Marx’s ideas on science and technology and related documents. Scholars with different views of science and technology see these ideas and documents differently. As the Chinese saying goes, “the benevolent see benevolence and the wise see wisdom.” Therefore, the discovery and study of documents need to be combined with contemporary research of theories of science and technology. The two processes should supplement and promote each other. Marx’s analyses of phenomena of science and technology and his ideas on questions of science and technology are relatedly concentrated in writings represented by Capital, but some manuscripts and writings before and after this monograph are significant as well. “Marx went through long-term hard struggles writing Capital. Based on his studies of political economy starting from the beginning of the 1840s, he wrote the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, and later the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863.” These two Economic Manuscripts are preparations for the monumental work A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (the plan of “six books”).9 On the basis of the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, Marx published the first volume of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy; in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863, Marx changed his original plan of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and decided to publish it separately with the title Capital. These two manuscripts are both inprocess works. As incipient formulations of Marx’s ideological system of political economy, they offer records of abundant original information, which of course contains rich ideas about science and technology. In particular, the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 is later known as the “technology manuscript.” It is an important text systematically documenting Marx’s ideas about science and technology. Machinery: Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science,10 which is familiar to many Chinese scholars, is a part of Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863: “(γ) Machinery. Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science.”

10

Introduction

Capital is a masterpiece to which Marx dedicated his life. As an unfinished academic tome, its writing continued for more than 40 years. Only the first volume of Capital (1894) was published in Marx’s lifetime (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 23); Engels collated and published the second volume (1885) and the third volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 24, 25); Bernstein collated and published the fourth volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 26). The Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858 is collected into The Complete Works of Marx and Engels as the 46th volume, with the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 in the 47th and the 48th volumes and “Wages” in the sixth volume, etc. It should be noted that lots of the unpublished writings by Marx record his scientific and technological thoughts. For instance, in his letter on 28 January 1863 from London to Engels, who was far away in Manchester, Marx wrote: I am inserting certain things into the section on machinery. There are some curious questions which I originally failed to deal with. To elucidate these, I have re-read all my note-books (excerpts) on technology and am also attending a practical (purely experimental) course for working men given by Prof. Willis (in Jermyn Street, the Institute of Geology, where Huxley also lectured). For me, mechanics presents much the same problem as languages. I understand the mathematical laws, but the simplest technical reality that calls for ocular knowledge is more difficult for me than the most complicated combinations.11 The notebooks (excerpts) on technology mentioned by Marx here have not yet been collated and published. These notebooks (excerpts) are abstracts of works by other writers, including J.H.M. Poppe’s Geschichte der Technologie seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts.12 These writings are sources of Marx’s “Notebooks (Excerpts) on Technology” – abstracts of his readings on technology – and are of great value as historical materials for understanding the formation and development of Marx’s scientific and technological thoughts. As more and more works by Marx are published and about to be published, we will have a more solid literature basis for completely and accurately understanding his scientific and technological thoughts. It should also be pointed out that science and technology exist in all aspects of social life. They are important sociocultural phenomena. In his discussions and expositions of many theoretical issues, Marx often talks about science and technology. These ideas can be found in many different writings by Marx. For example, Marx refers to the issue of technology and makes special arguments on it when he discusses “man’s essential nature,” “alienization” and “division of labor” in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, when he expounds on “instrument,” “labor” and “purpose” in The German Ideology and when he elaborates on “competition” and “the poverty of the working class” in “Wages.” In general, these documents are accepted widely by diverse schools and paradigms. We should go beyond the narrow sense of “views of science and technology,” broaden

Introduction 11 our theoretical horizon, examine Marx’s writings on science and technology in a broad sense and strive for comprehensive and accurate reconsideration of Marx’s ideas of science and technology. I.1.2.3 Several Issues to Note in Studying Marx’s Ideas About Science and Technology Strictly speaking, Marx expounds on science and technology mainly on the level of specific scientific and technological activities. These expositions include records and reports of historical facts about science and technology, excerpts from past monographs on ideas of science and technology and contemplations on multiple aspects of issues of science and technology. It is appropriate and apropos to sort through Marx’s lifetime achievements of his inquiry into scientific and technological activities and phenomena under the category of “ideas of science and technology.” Such work is helpful for comprehensively and accurately grasping Marx’s views of science and technology and their formation. For example, a systematic reading of Marx’s original works would clearly show that the term “technology” does not appear frequently in The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Chinese, 1st edition). There are merely 40 entries and over 160 references directly related to “technology.”13 On the surface, in comparison with entries like “capital,” “labor,” “division of labor,” “value,” “the working class,” etc., “technology” is not a subject keyword in Marx’s theories. However, this judgment is superficial and not in accordance with the facts. In terms of the daily use of natural language, the linguistic phenomenon of polysemy and that of several different words referring to the same meaning are both very common. There are usually multiple terms and ways to refer to an object. We should not assume that only one certain word, and not its “synonyms,” refers to a certain object. John Dewey, the founding father of the Dewey school in modern philosophy of technology, points out in his reflections on the expression of his own academic ideas: “It is probable that I might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used ‘technology’ instead of ‘instrumentalism’ in connection with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.”14 Isn’t it the same with Marx’s formulation of his ideas of science and technology? Therefore, we should pay attention to what Marx has said, but no less to what he has intended to express. As a matter of fact, technology is an important constituent element in human civilization, existing in various aspects of social life. There is no doubt that the 19th century, in which Marx spent his life, witnessed not merely the widespread presence of technological phenomena, but also the rapid advancement of technology. Technology continuously deepened its influences on various aspects of social life. Marx started to pay attention to these technological phenomena very early and conducted specific research on multiple levels. A distinctive feature of Marx’s accounts of technological phenomena is that he uses a number of subordinate concepts of “technology,” which means that he tends to discuss the constituent units, operational mechanisms and various consequences of technology in

12

Introduction

special technological systems and seldom uses the abstract and unified category of “technology” and its theoretical systems to make generalizations and statements. In June 1853, Marx points out in “The British Rule in India”: It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons…This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry.15 Although there is no mention of the specific word “technology,” terms such as “cotton,” “hand-loom,” “spinning-wheel,” “steam,” “science” and “the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry” are direct references to technological products, equipment and processes. These terms profoundly demonstrate the marginalization of traditional Indian handweaving techniques by mechanical textile technologies. In fact, such expressions are ubiquitous in Marx’s writings. In terms of its subtlety and flexibility, Marxism, as a mode that translates and negotiates among different languages, is much superior to other systems. This is true for all those great systems with universality…Marxism is indeed the only all-encompassing skill or mechanism of translation and transition. If we say that Marxism is a unique and advantaged mode of thinking, the reason is just that, instead of your own claim that you have discovered truth. The “privilege” of Marxism lies in the fact that it always intervenes into and mediates among various theoretical codes, which cannot compete with it in terms of depth and comprehensiveness.16 Technicians who are occupied from day to day with specific tasks work in a linguistic context featuring professional vocabularies such as lathe, motor, vernier caliper, blueprints, software and contract. They seldom see the term “technology,” but we cannot deny the technological nature of their work on the basis of the absence of this term. Marx’s view of science and technology is structured by his analyses following the clear trajectory of the advancement of production technology: “individual handicraft techniques, workshop handicraft techniques, and large-scale mechanized industrial technologies.” Citing W. Schulz’s ideas in Die Bewegung der Production, Marx depicted this trajectory explicitly. Period of manufacture…of handicraft activity subdivided to the highest degree, which is at the same time an activity in which one hand cooperates with another for one and the same purpose of production. The continued division of labor finally leads to the employment of a more perfected machine

Introduction 13 system, and thereby to the fourth stage (first hand labor, then handicraft labor, then manufacture, then fabrication) of actual fabrication by machines.17 Furthermore, Marx maintained that there are progressive and derivative relations, instead of absolutely clear boundaries, among various forms of technology. In the womb of handicrafts, manufacture develops in its initial stage and even machinery is employed here and there, in individual spheres and for individual processes; the latter point is especially true in the period of real workshop handicraft since water and wind power are adopted in some handicraft processes (or human and animal power is used to substitute water and wind power). The general law at work here is that the material possibilities of the latter (production) form – both the technological conditions and their corresponding corporate economic structure – are created within the bounds of the former form.18 Marx’s study of significant issues such as capital and the fate of the working class under capitalist conditions forms the theoretical context of his exploration of scientific and technological issues. Although science and technology are not the ultimate concerns in Marx’s research, ideas of science and technology can be clearly identified in his numerous writings. In these texts, there are both analyses of internal features such as specific elements, structures and properties of technological systems and tracking and investigation of external features such as the operational effects of technologies. Such comprehensive analyses, with technology considered as an element of social systems, are conducted from perspectives of sociology, economics and historical materialism. They aim at revealing the inner connections between technology and other social elements. Therefore, this kind of exploration, based on analysis of internal features of technology and devoted to the uncovering of social properties and functions of technology, serves the purpose of founding the theoretical system of Marxism. This is an important feature of Marx’s examination of science and technology. Overall, Marx’s analyses of scientific and technological issues contribute directly to his study of the social structure and patterns of development of capitalism, as well as his seeking of the way of proletarian revolution. Hence, although Marx’s ideas of science and technology do not dominate the mainstream in the system of his thoughts, they still form an indispensable part of it. We shall not be limited to the level of contemporary philosophical theories and be overcritical of Marx for his fragmentary, crude, primitive, biased expressions based on experience. Instead, we need to see the whole picture through observation of details. We shall be adept in retrieving and extracting Marx’s ideas of science and technology from his individual expositions of many specific scientific and technological phenomena, and in uncovering the internal connections among these individual opinions on technology, methodizing these scattered ideas and integrating them into a unified logical system. Unlike texts of natural sciences, which are distinguished by a definiteness of connotation, the significance of texts of humanities and social sciences are generated through readers’ reading processes. Different readers, and even a single reader, when reading the same text with different states of mind and in different

14 Introduction times and spaces, may acquire different gains and inspirations. “Home and abroad, there are many different and even completely opposite contexts of various commentators’ understandings of the true meaning of Marxist philosophy. It is confusing that these commentators all rely on the original primary texts by Marx.”19 That is also why the significance and connotation of many canonical texts are constantly renewed and these texts can be passed down through centuries. We should object to interpretations that disregard the system of Marx’s original texts and take fragmentary writings of Marx out of their contexts. We should also object to interpretations that neglect the specific historical scenarios of Marx’s time, construe Marx’s texts only based on contemporary sociocultural backgrounds, arbitrarily expand and extend the texts’ original meanings and simply transplant or transfer contemporary understandings of science and technology to Marx’s writings. It is of great importance in today’s study of the history of Marx’s thoughts to go back to Marx’s time and into his world of science and technology, reread his original texts and retrieve his ideas of science and technology. Marxism, as a source of many modern Western academic schools, has farreaching impacts on the development of Western thought. Western scholars often develop their theories on the basis of citing or criticizing the classical arguments of Marx. “In postwar France, more than 80% of intellectuals considered themselves as Marxists, or at least they considered Marxist problems – problems about base and superstructure, the nature of ideology, and representation – as basic elements in their respective topics.”20 In fact, Western scholars’ research of Marx’s thought has never ceased for over a century. They have put forward plenty of brilliant ideas and produced a multitude of important achievements. Nonetheless, due to factors such as ideological disagreements, we have usually maintained negative or rejective attitudes toward their research. It now appears that such attitudes are against the pattern of academic development and harmful to the study of Marx’s thought. Marx’s thought belongs to mankind, but in terms of origin, it inherits from Western cultures instead of oriental cultural traditions. Therefore, in order to make in-depth research into Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, it is necessary to be familiar with Western cultural traditions and their developments and to understand the multifold images of Marx in Western academic views.

I.2 How to Understand Existing Philosophy of Science and Technology I.2.1 The Tradition of Western Theories of Science and Technology The rise of the theory of science and technology was due first of all to the positivist movement emerging in 1830s France. After the emergence of Newtonian mechanics, natural science advanced significantly. Science and technology entered all fields and levels of human society through the Industrial Revolution and the Power Revolution, fully demonstrating their power of transforming the world. Positivism advocated the reform of philosophy, considering previous

Introduction 15 philosophy as completely “metaphysical” instead of “scientific” and contending that philosophy should acquire a truly scientific nature through evolution. After Auguste Comte’s positivism, the field of theories on science and technology generally involves philosophical schools such as Machism, logical atomism, logical empiricism, operationalism, process philosophy, logical pragmatism, falsificationism, historicism, scientific realism and scientific anti-realism. Among these schools, the most important one is logical empiricism, which burgeoned in the 1930s. Logical empiricism has contributed considerably to the spread and formation of theories of science and technology. This school inherited the empiricist tradition from David Hume and Ernst Mach, and logical analysis from Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It emphasizes the complete transformation of philosophy into scientific philosophy or “standard philosophy of science” (in the terminology of logical empiricism) with science as its mode, logic as its means, and physics as its unified language. Logical empiricism discusses new developments and epistemological questions in modern physics, mathematics and logic. In terms of problematics, it is the philosophical study of science. At the same time, it imitates natural science and, in particular, physics in such studies, which endows its approaches of response with a scientific nature. That is to say, there are two most prominent features of “standard theories of science,” represented by theories of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel: considering science as its problematics (scientific problematics) and striving for responding to the problematics scientifically (scientific responses). Orthodox theories of science take science as their problematics, which does not mean that they study questions of specific sciences. Logic empiricism argues that the task of philosophy is not to put forward propositions or establish systems of proposition-theory, which are the tasks of science. The mission of philosophy is to logically analyze and clarify the significance of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions in science, in order to clear confusions of ideas generated therefrom.21 There is no doubt that, according to the logic of logical empiricism, the “standard theory of science” is no longer conventional, meaningless metaphysics, but can be seen as a part of science. In a certain sense, the orthodox theory of science can be seen as “meta-science.” It concentrates on clarifying the significance of propositions and endeavors to explain the relationship between the logical structure and the empirical basis of science, and that between justification and discovery. Its essence lies in delimiting the range of scientific discussions (i.e., identifying meaningful propositions), dealing with the relationship between two kinds of propositions (i.e., theoretical propositions and empirical propositions), as well as the relationship between two stages of the production of scientific knowledge (i.e., justification and discovery). In modern intellectual history, the emergence and development of an orthodox theory of science are closely connected with the epistemological turn and linguistic turn of the whole philosophy. It is generally acknowledged that a main thread

16

Introduction

running through ancient Greek philosophy is ontology, which is the research of “what is the origin of the world.” After René Descartes, the central problem of philosophy in the modern period became “how do human beings acquire knowledge,” which signifies the epistemological turn. With the rise of natural science, the idea that natural science is the perfect form of knowledge created by mankind was gradually accepted. Scientific epistemology, the orthodox theory of science, became the most important form of epistemology in the 20th century. The linguistic turn afterward centers around the question of “how does language function as a reliable instrument of cognition.” As a result, methodologies of linguistic analysis and logical analysis gradually entered the field of scientific epistemology studies. I.2.2 Alternative Theories of Science and Technology Deviating from Convention Philosophy of science is still the fundamental theory of philosophy of science and technology. Nevertheless, great changes have taken place in its philosophical background, which means that the philosophical basis of science today is no longer the same as that of science in the past. On the one hand, logicism advances toward historicism, and significant theoretical progress has occurred within the orthodox philosophy of science. On the other, methodologies of phenomenology and postmodern “deconstructive” methodologies penetrated into the philosophy of science after the mid-20th century. In this way, ontology, pragmatics and contextualism have together opened a new type of philosophy of science. The world of science and the world of human life have become fields that cannot be neglected in philosophy of science. Various methodologies and theories demonstrate their validity of certain kinds. Contemporary philosophy of science, built on the previous basis, understands, judges and defends science from various aspects and with a broad horizon. Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty are the two well-known figures contributing to the significant transformation of philosophy of science. They severely criticized and even completely subverted the nature of analytical philosophy and science. Some people argue that Feyerabend changed from a fanatical positivist into “the worst enemy of science.” Seen as a heretic, he negates all logicism, going even farther than historicism. He was at first a positivist following the tradition of analytical philosophy, but before long, he turned positivism on its head. He is a rationalist, but his ideas have caused huge damage to rationalism. He is a realist, but his theories have greatly threatened realism. At the same time, he is a relativist, but he does not promote all forms of relativism.22 He opposes methodologies, but simultaneously he advocates plural methodologies. He is neither rational nor irrational. Some see in his style similarities with sages of ancient Greece and also elements of postmodernism. There are mixed opinions about Feyerabend. It is exactly because he is so different and rich that

Introduction 17 his contribution to philosophy of science is distinctive and ground-breaking. The characteristics of every aspect of science seem to be demonstrated clearly by Feyerabend. Undoubtedly, it is precisely his restraint from judging right and wrong that allows philosophy of science to turn away from logicism and incomplete historicism to relativism, irrationalism, and even anti-scientism. However, he has also thereby inspired diverse perspectives of contemplating science and unfolded a broad horizon. Similarly, Rorty grew up in the convention of analytical philosophy but later turned his back on it. Unlike Feyerabend, however, Rorty mainly attempts to deconstruct the tradition of Western philosophy, promoting a “post-philosophy culture.” Therefore, his study of science is integrated into his construction of “post-philosophy culture” and his criticism of scientism. According to him, in Willard Van Quinn, the later Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson, analytical philosophy transcends and invalidates itself, and the transformation of philosophy into science and the pursuit of certainty in philosophy end in failure. On such a basis, Rorty promotes “conversational philosophy” that goes beyond scientism, opposes fundamentalism, objects to the pursuit of certainty in philosophy of science and turns toward pragmatism, intending to remove the antagonism between science and humanities and integrate them. Of course, he has been criticized as a relativist in the end, though he called such criticism “ethnocentrism,” expressing his objection to essentialism and to the “strong rationality” of science that pursues universality and inevitability. Feyerabend and Rorty focus on different problems in different fields of research. Rorty attempts to break through conventional philosophy, while Feyerabend tries to go beyond conventional concepts of science. In terms of science, they reach the same destination through distinct routes, putting forward perspectives and methods for considering science that are completely different from conventional and “orthodox” ones. These perspectives and methods involve the so-called antiessentialism, anti-fundamentalism, relativism and irrationalism. Scholars such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean François Lyotard, who have been explicitly categorized as postmodernists, “deconstruct” science and culture in more radical ways. “Deconstruction” starts not with Foucault, but Edmund Husserl, and really with Derrida. The fact is, however, that the process and effect of Foucault’s criticism of knowledge and science are exactly what “deconstruction” intends to achieve. Science and knowledge are what concern Foucault. The tradition of French scientific history forms the basis of his ideas and influences his lifetime career in philosophy. His writings appeared primarily in the forms of history of knowledge, history of thought and history of science. His ideas are demonstrated mainly through his research of the history of science. Therefore, science is a basic theme in Foucault’s philosophy. He expounds on philosophical issues such as the birth of disciplines and the collective production of scientific knowledge. As he contends, disciplinary division leads to the categorization of scientific knowledge into disciplines, making science, with its distinctive characteristics, independent from culture, and separating science from philosophy. From then on, philosophy

18 Introduction has ceased to play any practical role in science, and science has rejected philosophy and moved toward scientism. The production of scientific knowledge is an outcome of collective practice. Nonetheless, Foucault takes a standpoint of anti-subjectivity, which clearly distinguishes his epistemology from conventional scientific epistemology. His archaeology aims at demonstrating that science is merely a collection of discourses formed through discursive rules, explaining how discourses form various sciences in history. In this way, archaeology cancels the distinction between science and non-science, as well as the subject. It thereby transforms conventional epistemology. At the same time, the progressiveness of science and the correspondence theory of truth are refuted. Instead, the discontinuities in the development of science and the incommensurability among sciences of different periods are emphasized. As a result, Kuhn’s paradigm appears similar in some respects to gestalt theory. In a word, in his archaeology of knowledge, Foucault conducts completely new discursive analyses of psychiatry, madness, hospitals, clinical medicine and even the whole humanities. He forms new understandings of the history of knowledge, thought and science, and criticizes the concepts of continuity and subjectivity, cognitive rationality in traditional history of thought, as well as concepts such as the objectivity and gradualness of science. He uncovers the deep-seated “unconsciousness” or a certain structure behind science, knowledge and thought, and summarizes and elaborates on the epistemology and methodology of the archaeology of knowledge.23 In addition, Foucault pays attention to the political status and ideological function of science, ascribing them to knowledge and power. He maintains that modern science and knowledge turn society into a controlling machine, making the modern people voluntarily accept the guidance of science and knowledge and “give power over to the discourse of truth.” As a result, people are enslaved by knowledge and power. The way of life and death becomes the way of “producing truth,” science and knowledge. Modern knowledge and science thus construct the modern man as a homogeneous subject. As a matter of fact, Foucault intends to criticize modern Western culture, especially the standardization and its “general will” through his analysis of modern knowledge and power, looking for the way of individual liberation. The one who explicitly claims a stance of “deconstruction” is Derrida. In terms of their starting points, Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger appear very similar, as they all attached great significance to the approach of “deconstruction,” though their understandings of “deconstruction” are of different depths. Husserl carries out the “deconstruction of thought” in the modern world of science in the sense of modernity, which means deconstructing the conceptual system that constitutes the world of science. However, such “deconstruction” mainly appears as a kind of “restoration” and “suspension,” with characteristics of modern subjectivist philosophy. Heidegger questions existence, intending to deconstruct the tradition of ontology. The primary agenda of Derrida’s deconstructivism is to deconstruct “logocentrism,” which dominates the Western tradition of philosophy. He maintains that there is no absolute truth, universal law, transcendental meaning or absolute spirit in this world. He names as “the metaphysics of presence” and

Introduction 19 deconstructs systems of thought which are founded on specific principles and foundations and with a grand systematic structure. His work is essentially concerned with opposing the tendency of making truth absolute and transcendental. What he intends to deconstruct is Western rationalism manifested as “logocentrism” and “phonocentrism.” That is to say, his deconstruction is aimed at the tradition of Western rationalist thought and the central position of rationalism. Derrida has not made elaborate arguments on the specific “deconstruction” of science. However, his methodologies of thinking, together with other postmodernist ideas, have radiated into the field of science. His “deconstruction” has resulted in radical relativism in the philosophy of science, allowing the relativist trend, in which science is suspected, to prevail among intellectuals of his time. Science is thus seen as a rule made by political power. Science became a power, a game and a means of serving sponsors. Logical standards in scientific research as well as the objective truth are subject to widespread and strong suspicion. As a consequence, in the “Sokal Incident” and “science wars,” Derrida contends that the Einstein constant was not a constant, not a center, but a concept of a variable. In other words, it does not represent the understanding of an object – the center of this field of research that the researcher is able to grasp. It is the concept of a game. Consequently, in Western postmodernism, philosophy of science is generally characterized by anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, desubjectification, nonscience-centrism or anti-scientism. Naturally, such completely deconstructive views of science have also been accused and severely criticized by many scholars, especially scientists. I.2.3 Persistent Concerns in Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated earlier, in intellectual history, the philosophy of science and technology has been closely related to the epistemological turn and the linguistic turn of philosophy. It has exerted great impacts on the development of the whole of philosophy and human thought through 19th-century positivism and 20th-century logical empiricism. Today, in the form of historicism, sociologicalization and post-philosophical culture, it has moved away from pursuing definiteness and building a reliable empirical and logical foundation for science and technology to enthusiastically deconstructing all tendencies of absolutization and foundationalism. It has also moved away from a preference for action and pursuit of goals of operability toward questioning certain cultural institutions and making social criticism. In China, the philosophy of science and technology has been the pioneer of thought liberalization, the window of opening-up and the starting point of modernization at several critical points. Philosophy of science was introduced into China together with science at the beginning of the 20th century. Its impacts in China have far exceeded its own significance. It was introduced and imported here not merely as a branch

20

Introduction

of philosophy, but more importantly, as a kind of ideology and research into the methodologies and epistemology of science. It provides epistemological support for science to take root and develop in China. It is of extremely important ideological, cultural and social value for the advancement of science here and for the progress of the Chinese society itself. The methodology of logical analysis, which is contained in pragmatism, especially Russell’s mathematics and philosophy, was a brand-new, unprecedented method of thinking in early 20th-century China. It was a new element brought by Western science and philosophy into China’s repertoire of thought. As Feng Youlan points out, a lasting contribution of Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy is the method of logical analysis. It offers Chinese people a completely new method of thinking, which leads to great changes in the entire Chinese thought. This thinking methodology directly offers modern Chinese philosophy a primary method of construction that is clear and explicit. It also provides Chinese scholars with a new method of considering contemporary issues of democracy, science and social development. At the end of the 1970s, science and technology and education were on the cutting edge of the movement of rectification to restore order and reform and opening-up. At that point, philosophy of science and technology, a famous part of which is the dialectics of nature, showed its unique power. The first step in the rectification of Chinese society’s previous incorrect ideas about science and technology was the acknowledgment and extension of Marx’s proposition about science being “direct productivity.” Later in the critical debate on the criterion of truth, facts and methods from science played significant roles as evidence. Philosophy of science and technology, with its rational and positivist spirit, suited Chinese society’s welcoming attitude toward science and its demand for and spirit of developing social economy and education with science. It met the era’s need for reform and opening-up. Therefore, philosophy of science became not only the point on which philosophy participated in China’s enterprises at that point, but more importantly, a window of thought through which China established connections with the world. Under the impacts of two global trends – reform and opening-up, and the revolution of science and technology – the research framework of philosophy of science and technology has experienced new changes and its content has been expanded. On the basis of breaking the relatively closed condition of research of dialectics of nature, five main branch subjects have been established: philosophy of nature, philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, science, technology and society studies (STS) and history of scientific and technological thought. Through research in these branch disciplines, philosophy of science and technology reflects on science and technology philosophically, demonstrates the general picture of the development of scientific and technological thought and clarifies the connections between science and nature, science and philosophy, science and technology, as well as science, technology and society. It teases out the general process of scientific understanding and the methods and methodological principles applied to this process. It explores and analyzes the philosophical implications of the construction, testing, explanation and evaluation of scientific theories,

Introduction 21 as well as the common features of technology and the driving forces and modes of the development of technology. I.2.3.1 Philosophy of Nature Philosophy of nature deals primarily with the view of nature, the relationship between mankind and nature and the idea and strategies of sustainable development. It is a basic subject in philosophy of science and technology. In terms of the view of nature, academia has paid considerable attention to natural nature and artificial nature. Discussions on these topics focus on the definition of the concepts of “natural nature” and “artificial nature,” their characteristics and their coordinated development. The primary purpose of defining and distinguishing artificial nature and natural nature is to understand their patterns of development in order to coordinate their relations. Fundamentally speaking, since the beginning of the 20th century, the crisis in the relationship between mankind and nature has been in essence the crisis of artificial nature. Therefore, the key to the coordinated development of mankind and nature is the coordinated development of natural nature and artificial nature. Artificial nature should be culturally controlled, with a certain kind of balance kept between human beings’ transformation of natural nature and their protection of it. At the same time, awareness about the equality of rights between mankind and nature should be reached. With the progress of science and technology, the living conditions of mankind have run into various problems. Through research on the relationship between mankind and nature, scholars have posed questions about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism holds that human beings are the center of the relationship between mankind and nature. Non-human existence has only instrumental value for human beings. The ultimate purpose of protecting the environment is to protect mankind. On the contrary, non-anthropocentrism maintains that human beings are not the sole source of value. They are not the center of the relationship between mankind and nature, and environmental protection is not merely for protecting mankind. Academic discussions on this issue concentrate on the basic connotations and manifestations of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, as well as on whether the former should be left behind. Research related to sustainable development is an important part of philosophy of nature. Discussions on this topic are made in many aspects. In terms of fundamental theories, there are discussions about the theoretical basis and basic connotations of sustainable development. In terms of value, scholars have discussed environmental ethics, the ethical foundation and standards of value in sustainable development. With respect to method, discussions focus on the basic methodologies, systematic dynamics, strategy and management, as well as technical support of sustainable development. As for evaluation, discussions center around the methods of evaluation and the index system of sustainable development. For China, the issue of sustainable development is of particular significance, because in the 21st century, the pressure from the successive advent of three population peaks (the peaks of gross population, gross employed population and gross aging

22

Introduction

population), the unusually heavy exploitation of natural resources, the increasing deterioration of the ecological environment, the rapid advancement of industrialization and urbanization and the intensification of regional inequalities will all lead to bottlenecks in future development. Therefore, we must insist on the principle of coordinating environmental protection and economic development and implement strategies for sustainable development. I.2.3.2 Philosophy of Science Philosophy of science is the philosophical study of science itself and systems of basic questions such as the pattern of scientific advancement. It focuses primarily on issues such as the ontology, epistemology and methodology of science. Since the 1990s, there has been a climax of the spread and studies of scientific realism and anti-realism in China. The number of related literature amounts to over a hundred. Specialized research on scientific realism has progressed rapidly as well. For example, Guo Guichun, in his Contemporary Scientific Realism, Postmodern Scientific Realism and Postmodern Philosophy of Science, makes a detailed introduction to and comments on the origin, development and trends of scientific realism. In addition, Companion to Masterworks of 20th-Century Western Philosophy, edited by Qiu Renzong, Li Xingmin’s “Summary of Studies of Modern Scientific Realism,” Zhang Zhicang’s “From Anti-Realism to QuasiRealism” and Zheng Xiangfu’s Van Fraassen and Postmodern Philosophy of Science introduce and comment in detail on scientific anti-realism. On the basis of introducing and commenting on scientific realism and anti-realism, domestic scholars have formed their own opinions of “scientific realism.” As Zhang Xihai points out in “Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism,’” there are as many as eight different kinds of such opinions.24 Furthermore, progress has also been made in studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge, the relationship between science and philosophy, analytical philosophy, linguistic philosophy, postmodernist philosophy of science and philosophy of social sciences, etc. Methodologies and epistemology have witnessed new developments, such as Bayesianism, experimentalism, embodied cognition theory and feminist theory of knowledge. With the fast advancement of science and technology, the trend of development of philosophy of science has become a hot topic in academia in recent years. Zeng Huan argues in “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology” that 21st-century philosophy of science will return to the purpose and approach of the critical school of thought. It will carve out its own way while maintaining necessary tension with modern philosophy of science and postmodernist philosophy of science. It will probably achieve innovation in methodology and paradigm.25 I.2.3.3 Philosophy of Technology Philosophy of technology generally studies the universal patterns of technology and its development, inquiring into the essence and structure of technology, the

Introduction 23 internal mechanisms of technological advancement and innovation and methodologies of technology. Its research involves topics such as technology and nature, technology and science, technology and economics, technology and society, technology and culture, technology and psychology, as well as the evaluation of technology. The ontology of technology, technological innovation and axiology of technology have become hotspots in Chinese scholars’ discussions in recent years. In terms of ontological studies, “what is technology” has always been a focus of debate among scholars. Related opinions in the early days can be summarized as “theory of material means,” “theory of the combination of material means, ways and methods,” “theory of practical (operational) knowledge system,” “theory of activity (process)” and “theory of mode of activity.” New developments in recent years include theories of broad definitions of the concept of technology and the idea that human beings’ purposeful activities provide the new hotbed breeding technologies. In terms of how human beings achieve their purposes, technology can be understood in a broad sense as the sequence or manner of the purposeful activities that subjects constantly create and apply, centering on the practical problem of “how to achieve purpose effectively.”26 Wu Guolin, in “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology,” contends that technology is a complicated system with complexity in itself. Its nature is not the sum of various technological elements, but the result of the emergence and interactions of these elements and the result of transcendence. Technology cannot be reduced to technological elements. It is the application of intellectual, substantive and empirical elements to practice, prompting the transformations of natural objects or technical artifacts.27 The perspectives of early research on technological innovation are related to economics, management and sociology. There have been significant changes in the research perspectives recently, as scholars have been increasingly studying technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy. Some scholars, based on the principles of practical materialism, define technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy as “a kind of practice in which enterprises, as the subject of innovation, under conditions of innovation and through certain mediation, transform the object of innovation and realize market value.” According to Chen Qirong, there are five basic features of technological innovation: innovativeness, practicality, sociality, historicity and uncertainty.28 Xiao Xinhua, in “A Philosophical Rational Study of Technological Innovation,” uses the methodology of paradigmatic thinking. Starting with research of the characteristics, mechanisms, methods and approaches of technological innovation, they put forward three pairs of categories: inevitability and coincidence, possibility and reality and form and content.29 The issue of “value of technology” in philosophy of technology is mainly embodied in the debate between the “value neutrality of technology” and the “value-loadedness of technology.” Recently, the latter has gradually superseded the former and become the focus of research. The advancements of technology and the value it is loaded with have given rise to a series of ethical questions and

24

Introduction

encouraged the discussion of technological ethics. Consequently, ethics of technology, a new branch subject, is on the rise. In their reflections on questions such as the negative effects of technology, scholars have put forward new concepts like green technology, the rationality of the value of technology, the double-helix structure of the value of technology, social control of technological development, global value, humanistic concerns and the good of technology. These works have not only deepened the studies of the value of technology, but also promoted the advancement of ethics, philosophy of value and other related subjects. I.2.3.4 Research of Science, Technology and Society (STS) Science, technology and society is a burgeoning subject that studies the patterns and application of interconnections among science, technology and society, and involves multiple disciplines and fields. Since the 1980s, there have been nationwide trends of STS studies in China. In recent years, prominent topics in this subject have involved the demarcation of science and technology and philosophical questions regarding engineering technology. There are two contradictory ideas about the distinction between science and technology. The first is that it is not necessary to distinguish between science and technology, while the second is that we should draw boundaries between the two. Scholars holding the first kind of idea think that it is very not easy to make clear distinctions between science and technology if we consider only the internal structures of scientific and technological activities. The division of science and technology as a whole into basic sciences, applied sciences and engineering technology exactly shows that it is difficult to draw a clear line between science and technology. Moreover, as Lei Yi points out, in the time of the technologization of science and the scientization of technology, it would be impossible for science to function normally if technological elements are excluded from it.30 What the term “science and technology” indicates is the intimate connections between modern science and technology. There is a lack of real understanding of the nature of technology and science in the consideration of “science and technology” only from the angle of social functions. Such consideration takes “science and technology” mainly as “technology,” and science as only a secondary part of “science and technology.” At least, we can say that the first idea has not really grasped the essence of science and technology. The second idea maintains that the demarcation of science and technology is of necessity. First of all, there are differences between the purpose of science and that of technology. The purpose and value of science lie in clarifying the facts and rules of nature or the real world and the growth of human knowledge. Technology is devoted to the increase of social wealth and the social welfare of human beings through the designing and manufacturing of various artifacts. Secondly, the object of research is different between science and technology. The object of scientific research is nature – the natural system objectively independent from mankind. The object of technological research is the system of artificial nature, that is, the artificial systems that have been processed by human beings for human purposes.

Introduction 25 Thirdly, science and technology differ significantly in the questions they cope with and the vocabularies they use in answering these questions. Lastly, science and technology are dissimilar in terms of social norms. The basic norms of scientific communities include universalism (cosmopolitanism), public ownership of knowledge, absence of private interests and methodical skepticism. These four basic principles, however, are not fully applicable to technological communities.31 With regard to developments in reality, the demarcation of science and technology is primarily related to two problems. Firstly, there will be confusion in the relationship between philosophy of science and philosophy of technology, if we do not make any distinction and consider technology as the application of science. Secondly, neglecting the relative independence of scientific advancement and blindly demanding science to satisfy social needs as technology does will harm the development of science and thus lead to numerous social problems. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the two on the levels of theory and practice. Philosophical study of engineering technology is another progress in philosophy of technology. With the deepening institutionalization of philosophy of engineering in China, related philosophical questions have gained attention in academia. Recent focuses in the field of philosophy of engineering include issues of ethics of engineering activities and engineering talents. I.2.3.5 History of Scientific and Technological Thoughts History of science and history of technology are both specialized subjects, generally beyond the purview of philosophy of science and technology. Nonetheless, the history of scientific and technological thought is an important and indispensable aspect of philosophy of science and technology. Related academic topics include the relationship between the history of science and philosophy of science, the Whig interpretation of history, case studies (of scientists or scientific discoveries) in the history of science, the intellectual history of scientific knowledge, ancient Chinese scientific thoughts, comparative studies of Chinese scientific thoughts, studies of the lives and thoughts of famous scientists, studies of the “Needham Problem,” transitions in modern Chinese institutions of science and technology and transitions in modern Chinese institutions and ideas of education. A series of achievements have been made in the research of the history of scientific and technological thoughts. Early scholarships include the second volume of Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilization in China, Dong Yingzhe’s 1990 work Intellectual History of Science in China, Li Yao’s 1995 work Intellectual History of Science and Technology in Ancient China, Zhu Yazong’s 1995 work History of Criticisms of Science and Technology in China and Zeng Jinyi’s 1995 work Comparison between Ideas on Science and Technology in China and the West. Achievements since 2000 have been even richer, too numerous to mention here. The publication of these monographs offers good materials for studies of the history of scientific thought as well as more platforms for research of philosophy of science.

26

Introduction

Xi Zezong has summarized the content of philosophy of scientific thought in five aspects: first, studying the view of nature and the view of science, focusing on various stages in the development of natural science; second, studying thoughts of scientists, focusing on the people; third, studying the formation and development of basic concepts in science; fourth, studying the formation of scientific theories and the problems these theories face today; fifth, studying methods of establishing scientific concepts and applying scientific theories.32 A conventional approach in the research of the history of scientific thought is to begin with scientific concepts and study the history of scientific thoughts through examinations of the evolution of these concepts. Nevertheless, there was no modern system of science in ancient China. What should be the object of research on the history of scientific thought during that period? Some studies maintain that such research should involve all the intellectual achievements that are inspiring and instructive in history and in reality, and that the goal of such research is reached by examining intellectual achievements. If the methodology of Chinese intellectual history is limited to the framework of Western logical analysis and concentrates merely on concepts and categories that match their Western counterparts, there will be “concealment” in understanding. Chinese history of scientific thought should be closely connected with research on traditional Chinese cognitive patterns. Studies of these two fields should promote each other in order to deepen understanding in this aspect.33 It should be noticed that the development of philosophy of science and technology must start with urgent problems in the contemporary time. Strong academic cohesion must be based on diversity.

I.3 How Should Philosophy of Science Respond to Changes in the World in Order to Face the Future of Science and Technology? I.3.1 Broaden the Horizon of Studies of Philosophy of Science and Technology With advancements in science and technology today, human beings have entered the time of intelligence revolution on the one hand, and seen increasing difficulties in containing the negative effects in the future of science and technology on the other. A broad survey of philosophical research of science and technology shows that against the broad background of the contemporary time, scholars’ concerns with theories of science and technology have been characterized by a wide horizon that involves diverse methods, multidimensional perspectives and various models. In terms of content, there are scientific philosophy and philosophy of science. In terms of methodologies, there are linguistic analysis and phenomenological studies. In terms of value orientations, there are scientism and humanism. In terms of epochal characters, there are modernist and postmodernist studies. Additionally, more and more scholars have paid attention to the various forms and appearances of science and technology. Philosophers with scientific literacy

Introduction 27 or scientists with philosophical literacy no longer monopolize the right to conduct research. An increasing number of pure humanists and common people who are concerned have participated in the research of philosophy of science and technology. A diversity of thoughts and ideas compete and interweave with each other. The constant entanglement of various figures and schools blurs their boundaries. The previously orthodox “philosophy of science and technology” has thus been transformed into a kind of research conducted in the broad sense and with a broad horizon. It has become a typical contemporary study of theories of science and technology that is concerned with future progress. Theories of science and technology have always played a critical role in the modern trends of thoughts that rose with modernization. Marx considers science and technology as the revolutionary forces that spur social advancements. Theories of science and technology are an important foundation of historical materialism. In particular, theories of science played a significant part in the enlightenment of modern China. What greatly struck Chinese intellectuals and philosophers were in effect theories of science, for instance, the theory of natural selection. During the May Fourth period, foreign philosophers John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, who were among the most influential figures in the emancipation of mind and the development of philosophy in China, made several speeches to intellectuals and the general public there. Their comprehensive speeches centered on theories of science. Holding high the banner of “science,” representative figures in the New Culture Movement called for defeating “ghosts of metaphysics.” Their view of science approximated radical scientism. Studies of theories of science have experienced new prosperity since the start of reform and opening-up at the end of the 1970s. Scientific education is on the cutting edge of rectification for restoring order. Issues related to theories of science are of particular vitality and appeal, becoming one of the most important “growth points of theory” among Chinese intellectuals. After nearly 40 years of growth, orthodox, or “standard,” theories of science have significantly expanded. Moreover, as science today always influences the society and human beings through the revolution of technology, orthodox theories of science and technology have won popular support in China. At the same time, however, another trend of theories of science and technology, characterized by a critical attitude, has emerged. This is the deconstruction of orthodox theories of science and technology. It can be called the “alternative theories of science and technology.” Endless deconstruction has given rise to much confusion, but its impacts cannot be neglected. Some opinions and thoughts from it are also meaningful. In comparison with orthodox theories of science and technology, alternative theories of science and technology have very different themes and foundations. Breakthroughs have been made in their horizon, discourse domain and methodology. Alternative theories of science and technology have both positive and negative influences. Generally speaking, contentions among different ideas could create an atmosphere that is more tolerant, equal and diverse. These contending ideas demonstrate to us that theories of science and technology at present are

28

Introduction

experiencing important changes and reorientation. We should endeavor to grasp their trends of development and take the initiative to respond accordingly to the changes. I.3.1.1 Turning from Logicism to Historicism, Sociologicalization and Philosophy of Culture Among the many schools of theories of science, those before Karl Popper’s theory of falsification are usually called logicism, and those afterward are called historicism. Popper’s philosophy can be seen as an in-between link in the transition from logicism to historicism. In a certain sense, logicism focuses primarily on static logical analysis of science, while historicism focuses on dynamic research of the development of science. Thanks to the efforts of scholars like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Larry Laudan, the fundamental significance of historicism in contemporary theories of science has been increasingly noticeable, and historicism has been moving further toward sociology and culturology. Constructivism, which has risen in recent years, concentrates on breaking the subject-object binary and emphasizes the primacy of practice and social construction. Contemporary theories of science and technology no longer dwell upon epistemological issues such as criteria of meaning, the logical structure, and the discovery and defense of science. Instead, they point to general philosophical questions behind science and technology, such as the world view, values and the view of history in human society. For instance, Martin Heidegger’s study of technology, Jürgen Habermas’s study of the relationship between science, technology and ideology and Foucault’s theory of knowledge-power have all been substantially different from conventional philosophy in method and ambition. Nowadays, theories of science and technology attempt to depict the real course of scientific and technological developments through studies of the actual history of science and technology. Cases in the history of science and technology have attracted more attention. The sociologicalization of theories of science and technology can be traced back to Robert Merton, after whom scientific sociology has become an important branch in theories of science and technology. The newly emerging sociology of knowledge applies sociological methodologies to the analysis of the production of scientific knowledge. Moreover, studies of philosophy of culture have been growing vigorously. For example, Richard Rorty’s “post-philosophy culture” emphasizes equality among science, arts, philosophy and politics. Theories of science and technology are no longer unique and independent. Instead, they intertwine with philosophical studies of other cultural types. I.3.1.2 The Deconstruction of Essentialism and Fundamentalism and the Rise of Constructivism and Pluralism With the ebbing of scientism, questions have been raised regarding fundamentalism, which insists that natural science has its objective foundations, and essentialism, which insists that natural science grasps the essence of objects through

Introduction 29 external phenomena. The idea that knowledge of natural science is objective truth and that the advancement of science is linearly accumulative and continuous has waned. The extreme advocacy of mathematics and physics is receding. Methodologies have switched from emphasizing the establishment of systems to deconstructing fundamentalism and all tendencies of absolutization. The standpoint has changed from insistence on the objectivity of truth in the subject-object binary to constructivism which insists on the unity of subject and object and their continuous interactions in practice. In the time of positivism and logical empiricism, theories of science and technology attempted to distill common standards, norms and methods of scientific and technological knowledge from philosophical studies of natural science and general technology. These theories strongly advocated the transformation of all human knowledge, philosophy included, using the basic mode of scientific knowledge. Postmodernist theories of science strive for studying the specifically and historically constructive process of the mode of natural science, which is one of the options, and for dissolving the inevitability, uniqueness and particularity of natural science as a mode of understanding. Basically speaking, alternative theories of science and technology do not consider existing theories and methods as problematic or attempt to replace them with something new. Instead, the alternative theories contend that theories and methods are always in the process of development and thus never definite. They can be only temporarily identified in constant negation. With pluralism permeating into theories of science and technology, natural science has been increasingly viewed as one of the diverse cultures. Epistemological studies of science and technology are becoming one of the various philosophical reflections. The overall opinions about science become increasingly diversified: from scientism to mild scientism, then to a variety of conciliatory views and finally to anti-scientism. I.3.1.3 The Permeation of “Deconstructive” Methods and the Popularity of Criticism Since the 1970s, some scholars, starting with Husserl’s later work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, have applied Husserl’s phenomenological and hermeneutical methods to problems in theories of science and technology. Afterward, structuralist philosophy and postmodernism have become growingly influential. Deconstructive methods have entered theories of science and technology, greatly transforming mainstream views of science and technology, as well as conventional understandings of science and technology. Orthodox theories of science and technology see knowledge of natural science as the paragon of human knowledge, stressing not merely its nature as truth, but also its actionability and operability. It promotes not merely natural science’s mode of understanding, but also the mode of practice based on natural science. It aims at not just transforming nature scientifically, but also transforming society and even human beings scientifically. However, as deconstructive methods become increasingly popular, challenges to natural science grow. Theories of science and technology are no longer subjects merely for defending natural science.

30

Introduction

They have gradually become an onlooker that maintains a distance from science. Because people have acknowledged that they cannot deal with all current problems according to procedures, the mode that favors action and pursues operability no longer dominates. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising at all that it has become a fashion to challenge and make social criticism of scientific and cultural institutions. Defense has become mediocre, unable to arouse sympathy. The trend of criticism prevails, the baby thrown out with the bathwater. I.3.1.4 The Purpose and Interest Turn to the Integration of Scientific and Humanistic Cultures There have been some prominent changes in the purpose, interest and trend of current research on theories of science and technology. First of all, in alternative theories of science and technology, science is seen as the ontological existence that determines the essence of human beings. It thus becomes an entity that is connected with its “contexts.” Pragmatics has been introduced into theories of science and technology. Understandings, explanations and applications of scientific knowledge demonstrate indispensable reliance on contexts. Secondly, unlike orthodox theories of science and technology, which emphasize the neutrality of value of natural science and focus only on nature instead of human beings, alternative theories of science and technology reconsider science as the science of human beings, and the world of science and technology as a part of the human world. Science and technology, as well as their interrelations with people’s lives, have become the center of theories of science and technology. Thirdly, science has been increasingly viewed as a kind of practice and a cultural phenomenon. In orthodox theories of science and technology, science is basically understood as knowledge. The critical question is how to establish a system that is standardized and free of contradictions. In alternative theories of science and technology, however, science is in the first place a kind of practice. It is the transformation of the world guided by certain goals, as well as the spiritual and material wealth, that is, culture, gradually accumulated in this process. Last but not least, at the turn of the century, natural science fell off its pedestal and no longer represented absolute correctness. Calls for the integration of science and humanities have been increasingly prevailing, and how to bridge the gap between them has become an important question in contemporary theories of science and technology. Needless to say, scientism is the “spiritual disposition” of orthodox theories of science and technology, and the “ideology” sustaining the social and research institutions of the tradition of natural science. The basic concept of scientism is the dichotomy between science and humanities. Nevertheless, theories of science and technology nowadays view themselves with more inclusiveness and even self-reflection. In all fairness, science’s struggles with theology and superstition in the history of the Renaissance and Reformation have shown that the discovery of science has been the discovery of humanities. Science used to be in keeping with humanities. Therefore, we should not stick blindly to the view of science in scientism, as the problems science deals with are growing more and more complicated

Introduction 31 along with the great changes taking place in the world. The integration of scientific and humanistic cultures will naturally become the theme of the time. As a matter of fact, the significant transformations of theories of science and technology during the contemporary period have happened against profound theoretical and sociocultural backgrounds. As far as the internal developments of the discipline are concerned, logical empiricism has not established once and for all an empirical principle of justification. Although the principle has been modified several times, it has eventually fallen into a predicament. Popper’s falsification principle is of great innovativeness and imagination. Empirical falsification, however, is not clear or explicit. Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” and his notion of “incommensurability” rebuke the optimism about the linear accumulation and continuous progress of natural science. Feyerabend’s “anything goes” gives a deadly strike to the defense of the uniqueness of natural science in terms of methodology. At that point, all the orthodox central questions have been dissolved and transformed, and the dogma of orthodox theories of science and technology that emphasize the supremacy of natural science is no longer reliable. As far as the broader history of scientific and social progress is concerned, the new trends in theories of science and technology are not the result of the advancement of philosophy. Rather, they are the result of cultural reflections of scientific practices. Without the rise of natural science, positivism and logical empiricism could not have become powerful philosophical movements, and it would be even more difficult for orthodox theories of science and technology to be a prestigious subject of the 20th century. As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out: Since the seventeenth century…what we today call philosophy is found to be in a changed situation. It has come to need legitimation in the face of science in a way that had never been true before; and for all of two centuries right down to the death of Hegel and Schelling, it was actually constructed in such a self-defense against the sciences.34 Because of such a relationship between philosophy and science, the rise and prosperity of orthodox theories of science and technology, as an “ideology” of natural science, have been inevitable. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 20th century, the negative effects of natural science, especially those of technologies of heavy industry, have been gradually exposed. In particular, the two World Wars and the resource shortage and ecological crisis today have wakened people from their dream of scientism. The questioning of science has prevailed. Under new circumstances, the relationship between philosophy and science and technology has experienced subtle changes. The new trends in alternative theories of science and technology and their “anti-science” tendency are less an attack on orthodox theories of science and technology than their reflections on the negative effects of science and technology. I.3.2 Look for New Growth Points in Theories of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated, new perspectives and themes continue springing up in contemporary theories of science and technology. Orthodox theories of science

32

Introduction

and technology have gradually lost their central position and become merely one of the multiple poles in pluralized discussions. Those new studies that differ greatly from orthodox in approach and purpose have not only broken through the limits of orthodox in terms of either problematics or responses, but they have also considerably changed the basic forms and appearances of theories of science and technology. Our time is both a time of globalization and one of cultural diversity. Now that theories of science and technology have started their diversified explorations, any philosophical reflection on science and technology is possible. With academic concerns “traversing” science and technology and pointing to the society and to more general philosophical questions such as freedom, value and existence, there will appear some kind of “philosophy that starts with science.” Such a change means that moving from reflecting on science to transcending science, we will naturally come across the question of freedom, which fascinates Feyerabend, the question of culture, to which Rorty turns, the question of historical existence, which Foucault discusses, and so on and so forth. In the specific case of China, increasing pragmatism and secularization, which come with industrialization and globalization, have caused the inevitable marginalization of philosophy. Such marginalization has given rise to much confusion and the repeated emergence of alternatives. It has also forced traditional studies to confront challenges and open new paths. Particular debates on issues like pseudoscience, traditional Chinese medicine and folk science never cease and diverse interpretations abound. We have to reconsider philosophical questions such as the demarcation of science. Theories of science and technology need to advance along with the times. Some branches of theories of science and technology that used to be unacknowledged or unformed in the orthodox period are becoming, or have become, new growth points drawing contemporary attention. These growth points include typical subjects such as scientific epistemology and cognitive science, sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, ethics of science and technology and cultural philosophy of science. I.3.2.1 Scientific Epistemology and Cognitive Science Sociology of scientific knowledge is the expansion of sociology in the field of science and technology. It is founded on criticism of traditional philosophy of science. It proposes to examine the dynamic process of the production of scientific knowledge from the perspective of social construction and thereby establish new scientific epistemology. Since the 1980s, sociology of scientific knowledge has made significant achievements and attained important academic status. The strong program, i.e., SSK, is one of its comparatively influential schools. The main point of view in sociology of scientific knowledge is that social factors form an indispensable dimension in scientific knowledge, influencing all stages of the production of scientific knowledge, such as the choice of subjects, observation and experiment, the proposition of theories and the selection and evaluation of theories. In this whole process, science is not able to offer itself criteria of

Introduction 33 judgment. However, SSK denies the uniformity of nature and the objectivity of scientific knowledge, considering scientific knowledge as merely the result of scientists’ negotiation and manufacture. Such a radical viewpoint has been severely criticized. At present, the positive studies and sociological studies in sociology of scientific knowledge have been emphasizing elements of the objective dimension of science, such as the significance of facts, instruments, equipment and the organizational system of experiment. These studies attempt to make comparatively comprehensive explanations of the relationships among various elements in scientific events, including the objective, technological, social, metaphysical and epistemological elements. They thereby restore, to certain degrees, the realistic characteristic of scientific practice. Scientific epistemology is a return to epistemology under the condition of widespread questioning of epistemology. Having abandoned the propensity for transcendence in epistemology, it transforms studies of knowledge into studies of the experience of the actual process of knowledge production. Ancient philosophy mainly discusses what the world is, while modern philosophy focuses on how people know. Contemporary philosophy pays more attention to the significance and background of knowledge itself. Therefore, cognitive science has become the leading subject in cognitive studies, turning away from previous epistemological discussions on how to know and toward psychological and physiological analyses of cognition, and holding a criticizing attitude toward traditional arguments that are empty. For example, cognitive science uses various methods, such as psychological, physiological, logical and philosophical ones, to study how the human brain produces ideas and knowledge, no longer arguing about whether these ideas and knowledge are the truth. Contemporary cognitive science tends to go beyond pure philosophical speculations and evolves into typically interdisciplinary studies that combine various methods and center around the question of knowledge. I.3.2.2 Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Scientific Anthropology Since the 1980s, sociology of scientific knowledge has obtained important achievements and academic status. Its representative scholars include Bruno Latour, Karin Knorr Cetina, Michael J. Mulkay, Barry Barnes, etc. According to Lin Juren, its main idea, called “constructivism,” is that “there is no essential difference between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge” and that “scientific knowledge is a social construction, which is inevitably influenced by socio-cultural factors.”35 Related to this idea, as anthropological methods are applied to studies of modern developed societies, science and people who engage in scientific activities also become objects of anthropological studies. For example, anthropologist Sharon Traweek, in Beamtimes and Lifetimes, makes positive research on the community of high-energy physicists.36 The research methods of sociology of scientific knowledge have also changed, starting to use anthropological methods to study the social characteristics of science. Latour’s Laboratory Life, a study of the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, is a case in point.37 SSK

34

Introduction

emphasizes the influences of field research, academic environment and social factors in scientific laboratories on science. For instance, issues including the paradigm of the scientific community, scientists’ ideas, policies regarding science and technology, resource allocation in science and technology, administration, as well as bureaucracy in academia, are all subjects of concern on the philosophical level. Scientific anthropology is a branch that has newly emerged in recent years. In addition to field research, ethnography, the comparative method, the study of literature and the historical method have been increasingly emphasized and applied in anthropological studies of science. Science is a kind of activity of human beings, as well as a kind of fact that can be described historically. Studying science with the theories and methods of anthropology and the posture of philosophy will produce true and concrete descriptions of scientific knowledge and activities, reveal their profound relations with the society and acquire inspirations therefrom. I.3.2.3 Ethics of Science and Technology Academic concerns about the ethics of science and technology are well justified. Firstly, due to the integration of science and technology and the gradual evolution of scientific research into large-scope and large-organization “mega-science,” scientific activities’ nature of being social becomes increasingly apparent, and the pragmatic characteristics of scientific and technological institutions become increasingly prominent. The neutrality of the values of science is subject to question. The idea that science is heavily loaded with values and is permeated with ethical judgment gradually emerges. Therefore, studies of scientific ethics deal with not merely the morality and social responsibility of scientists, but also the ethics of scientific research, the load of values in science, the absence of forbidden zone in science, as well as the responsibility of technology. Secondly, a contemporary revolution of science and technology is flourishing. Information technology, biotechnology, space technology and material technology are rapidly advancing and widely applied. While contributing to the great achievements of human beings, they have also caused a series of crises of survival. As a result, problems such as the relationships among science, technology and ethics, as well as their coordinated development, have risen to the surface. The ethics of nuclear weapons, information, human cloning and organ transplantation has become the focus of ethical studies. Studies of the ethics of science and technology have no other option but to reconsider the interactions between practices of science, technology and the reconstruction of ethics. Thirdly, the negative effects of scientific and technological advancements have gradually emerged on the social level. The shortage of energy resources, environmental pollution, and overpopulation have become global crises, leading to reflections in ethics of science and technology on subjects like human–nature relations, environmental ethics and sustainable development. I.3.2.4 Philosophy of Scientific Culture In recent years, studies of philosophy of scientific culture have become another focus in the response of philosophy of science and technology to future changes.

Introduction 35 In modern society, scientific culture is rising to be the dominant form of culture. Conflicts and contradictions have thus emerged between scientific culture and other cultural traditions, especially humanistic culture. As a consequence, the relationship between science and other forms of culture has raised concerns in academia. Philosophy of scientific culture is the philosophical exploration of science as a kind of culture or cultural activity. Philosophy of scientific culture still takes science as its object of study. However, as it studies science as a form of culture or cultural activity, instead of limiting itself to epistemology, it is different from both traditional theories of science and the common philosophy of culture. Representative works in philosophy of scientific culture include C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures, Joseph Agassi’s Science and Culture, Andrew Pickering’s Science as Practice and Culture and Maurice N. Richter Jr.’s Science as a Cultural Process. Issues that have aroused wide attention in recent years, such as the debate on the preservation or abolishment of traditional Chinese medicine, the relationship between science and ideology, the relationship between scientism and humanism, as well as Michael Frayn’s drama Copenhagen, are all within the ambit of philosophical studies of scientific culture. During our time, which is called the time of globalization and cultural diversity, philosophy of science and technology, with its characteristics of this time period, is on its way to diversity and better integration of scientific culture and humanistic culture. It is both unwise and impossible for people to limit their concerns about philosophy of science to the interiority of science. Philosophy of science and technology should strive to demonstrate the huge impacts of spirit and thought on society.

Notes 1 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5. 2 Liu Dachun ed., From Advocacy to Reconsideration: Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009. 3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:35. 4 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:24. 5 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:785. 6 Chen Changshu, Introduction To Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: Science Press, 1999:32. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:777. 8 Nie Jingfang, Clearing and Transcending: Rereading the Intentions, Basis and Methods in Marx’s Texts. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005:3. Some other sources indicate that 142 volumes were planned for The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (International Edition). See Jin Huiming. “The Giant of the Millennium.” Scientific Socialism, 2000(1). 9 The whole (presentation) is divided into six books: 1. On Capital (contains a few introductory chapters). 2. On Landed Property. 3. On Wage Labor. 4. On the State. 5.

36 10 11 12

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

Introduction International Trade. 6. World Market (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:531). People’s Press, 1978, Separate edition. Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:199. (Vols. 1–3, Göttingen, 1807–1811); A. Ure’s Technisches Wörterbuch (ed. Bearbeitet von Kramarsch and Heeren, Vols. 1–3; Prag, Erster Band, 1843–1844); and J. Beckmann’s Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erfindungen (Vols. 1–5, Göttingen, 1782– 1805); also Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30), Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:735. Index of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1~39). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986:629. J. Dewey, Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946:291. Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:680–81. F. Jameson, The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:601. Marx and Engels’ Collected Works. Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 2009:340. Zhang Yibing, Return to Marx: Philosophical Discourses in the Economic Context. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 1999:13. F. Jameson, The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. Hong Qian, On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:98. Lan Zheng, “Translator’s Foreword.” Science in a Free Society by P. Feyerabend. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1990:5. Liu Yongmou, Foucault’s Journey of Deconstructing the Subject. People’s University of China, PhD dissertation, 2005:15. Zhang Xihai, “Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism’.” Philosophical Trends, 1996(8). Zeng Huan, “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology: Reflections between History and Future—A Review of the “Symposium on 21st-century Philosophy of Science and Technology.” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2006(4). Wang Bolu, What Is Technology: Theoretical Interpretation of the Technological World in a Broad Sense. Beijing: Science Press, 2006:28–32. Wu Guolin, “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology.” Research of Technology and Philosophy, 2005(2). Chen Qirong, “The Philosophical Horizon of Technological Innovation.” Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), 2000(1). Xiao Xinhua, “Philosophical Rational Research of Technological Innovation.” Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2000(7). Lei Yi, “Science Should Pay Attention to Ethics.” Science and Technology Daily, 15 December 2000. Zhang Huaxia and Zhang Zhilin, “Understanding the Guiding Principles in Research of Philosophy of Technology from the Angle of the Demarcation of Science and Technology.” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2001(2). Guo Jinbin and Kong Guoping, Intellectual History of Traditional Chinese Mathematics. Beijing: Science Press, 2004:ii. Wang Qian, “Several Issues in Research of the Intellectual History of Chinese Science.” Journal of Dalian University of Technology, 2003(3).

Introduction 37 34 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5. 35 Translator’s Foreword. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, by M. Mulkay, translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. 36 S. Traweek, Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992. 37 B. Latour and S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Part I

Complementary Value Choices

The world of modern science and technology looks colorful and intricate: traditional views are mixed with and competing against constructivist and postmodern views. What will the world of science and technology look like in the future? It is a question that captures people’s imagination. But in any case, it should be liberal, open and tolerable for diversified and complementary value choices; that is, proper tension should be maintained between one-dimensionality and diversity, objectivity and uniqueness, universality and locality, rationality and irrationality, instrumental reason and value reason.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-2

1

Diversified Value Choices

The orthodox philosophy of science is inclined to treat the world as an inhuman machine, dismembering it, stripping it of humanity and presenting it to people in a mathematically precise way. However, this is just a single perspective, which not only gives prominence to human subjectivity but also sets a limit to human initiative. From singularity to multi-complementarity and from abstraction to richness, the value choice and the evaluation scale of science have undergone significant transformations.

1.1 Formation and Transformation of Scientific and Technological Value Tendency With the emergence of science and its continuous development, mankind almost directly entered the age of industrialization from the age of ignorance; the universe full of mysteries was no longer unsearchable all of a sudden, and the world had become easier to understand and grasp since then. However, when science interprets and transforms the world in a mechanized way, it keeps penetrating into the entire social life through the application of technologies, and even transcends its own boundary to intrude into all areas of human life. 1.1.1 Disenchantment of Nature and Its Richness Reduction by Science The emergence of science is a revolutionary milestone in the history of human civilization, and this process is always thought to proceed simultaneously with the disenchantment of nature. In the vision of modernity, especially postmodernity, a basic consensus is that science and disenchantment go hand in hand: on the one hand, it assumes that science is only applicable to things that have been disenchanted (i.e., with life removed). On the other hand, the fact that the scientific approach is applied to everything is assumed to validate the viewpoint of disenchantment. Besides, it also assumes that purely dehumanizing vocabulary is enough for people to understand science because such vocabulary doesn’t include any self-determination that is creative and based on values or norms, as well as all things that are taken as sacred.1 DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-3

42 Diversified Value Choices “Disenchantment,” literally, refers to the dispelling of demons and mysteries, which is derived from Max Weber’s notion of “the disenchantment of the world.” According to Weber, with people becoming more intellectualized and rationalized, mysterious and uncalculated force, in principle, can no longer take effect, and people can master everything through calculation. This means that the world is disenchanted; people do not have to resort to magic or pray to the gods for control over the world, as savages who believed in the existence of this mysterious power. Technology and computing are performing such functions, which indicates more intellectualization than anything else.2 In a deeper sense, “disenchantment” comes into play simultaneously with the deprivation of the experientiality and subjectivity of nature by mechanistic philosophy. Postmodernists have made it clear that the disenchantment of nature is, fundamentally speaking, to deny that nature has any subjectivity, experience and feeling. Because of this, nature is deprived of its peculiarity; that is, nature does not have any peculiarity, and without experience, peculiarity is unimaginable. Moreover, this worldview of disenchantment is not only the basis of modern science, but also a prerequisite for the emergence of modern science, and it is almost unanimously regarded as the result and premise of science itself.3 Under the guidance of this disenchantment thought, the mechanistic worldview replaces the evidence obtained by our sense organs with a formal map of time and space that predicts the movement of material particles assumed to be hidden behind all external experiences. Mathematics and geometric figures are no longer conceived as intrinsic to nature. Theories no longer reveal perfection or contemplate the harmony of creation. Henceforth, “pure” mathematics, which used to be the key to unlocking the secrets of nature, has been strictly separated from the mathematical application of formulas that express the experiential law. Geometry has become a discipline of abstract space and retreated to transcendental realms together with “pure” mathematics after Descartes introduced analytical geometry. Mathematics embodies all reasonable thinking that seems to be inevitably true, while reality is summed up from events that are regarded as accidental.4 Since then, abstract mathematical forms have become the basic starting point for describing everything, and at the same time established a logically positive way of knowing. In fact, in the long process of figuring out the relationship between their existence and nature, human beings had realized early that the world is running in an orderly manner and they could acquire the divine power to control nature through communication with the gods. Before the emergence of modern science, people took nature as a living and soul-filled organic whole (including both men and gods) and a divine being with rich meaning. Specifically, in primitive times, people were neither experienced nor knowledgeable; they could not comprehend a variety of irresistible forces of nature and tended to make explanations or guesses with their innate intuition and critical thinking, believing that gods took charge of everything and nature was mysterious and awe-inspiring. In the Greek period when human civilization entered a new stage and science had sprouted, people began to understand nature in a speculative and intuitive way. For example,

Diversified Value Choices 43 Thales’s assertion that “everything comes from water,” Anaximander’s “air monism” and Anaxagoras’s “theory of seeds” are quite speculative, not just an intuition based on divinity. But in the eyes of ancient Greeks, nature is still a sacred, living and organic whole, and their purpose of exploring the secrets of nature is simply to understand it better. In the Middle Ages, the entire human race and the natural world seemed to be reduced to servant girls offering services to theology and religion; nature was not as mysterious as before but remained as a divine being that was venerable and awe-inspiring. However, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the modern scientific revolution redrew the picture of the universe and nature in an entirely new way. Science tries to discover what is hidden behind nature, and it expels God from the realm of human life while exploring the mystery of nature. For example, Newtonian mechanics unifies the movement of celestial and terrestrial bodies in one theory, expelling gods (God) from the field of inanimate research. Darwinism defines variation and natural selection as the primary factor of biological origin, proving that there is no need for a creator (God) from the perspective of biological evolution. At this point, the task of expelling God was finally accomplished, not only ending the dominance of God but also revealing the perceptual properties of nature, society and people, as well as their material connections, thus opening the mind and removing ignorance. Later, the Cartesian dualism “was to excise every trace of the psychic from material nature with surgical precision, leaving it a lifeless field knowing only the brute blows of inert chunks of matter.”5 Being deprived of mysteries, nature is no longer a divine being since then, but a machine working well in a mechanized way. Human beings, without sacredness and mystery, are one of the species in the vast universe with a body running like an ingeniously designed machine. Likewise, society becomes a mechanism that runs properly in a certain mechanized way. It can be said that science continues to grow and develop in the process of the disenchantment of nature, human beings and the whole society. Modern science restores and simplifies nature and describes nature in a digital way, thereby realizing the disenchantment of nature. In this process, the scientific quest not only manifests as something positive, or an endeavor leading to the discovery of new objects, new characteristics and new relationships, but contains strong negative components. It does not accept the phenomena as they appear, but changes them ideologically (through abstraction) and materially (through experiments). These changes are a kind of simplification: abstraction removes certain characteristics (which distinguish one object from the others) and some common properties such as smell and color; experiments go further to remove or try to remove the connections that link each process to the surrounding environment – they create an artificial and somewhat barren environment to examine some of its characteristics. In both cases, things are separated from or closed off from the overall environment around us.6 It can be seen that science, which is based on the disenchantment of nature, has gradually abandoned the richness and diversity of nature and turned to understanding nature in a mechanical and unitary manner. It believes that the world, which is a machine composed of inert objects, moves according to physical necessity and

44

Diversified Value Choices

has nothing to do with all kinds of being of thinking.7 According to this thought, experience does not occupy a truly important place in nature and the entire world at large. Therefore, the purpose, value, ideal and possibility in the universe are not important, and there is no freedom, creativity, temporality or divinity. Norm or truth does not exist at all, and everything turns out to be meaningless in the end.8 Looking back to the scenes of ancient times before the emergence of science, the ever-changing Greek mythology was rich and colorful, not only reflecting poetic and artistic beauty but also absorbing and coming up with new ideas at any time, hence endowing academic viewpoints with a free and cheerful spirit which the medieval consciousness did not have.9 This is utterly different from rigorous and single-minded scientific exploration and academic purport in the modern era. It can be said that Descartes had developed Aristotle’s thought and created a more pure and abstract scientific approach, reducing nature from man’s intimate partner in ancient times to an objective entity of scientific research. Since then, nature is no longer mysterious, obscure, ethereal, animate and affinitive as being around people all the time, but becomes a dead thing that is dull, mechanical, inanimate and purely material.10 Accordingly, respect and reverence for life gradually disappeared, and all life, including man, is treated as a species in an infinite universe that develops and evolves according to laws. In this disenchanted world, everything becomes cognizable and understandable, and the ability of mankind to control nature and even the entire universe has been improved in an unprecedented way. The advancement of science has liberated mankind from the bondage of nature and ushered them into an era where they can take control of nature. 1.1.2 Manifestation of Subjectivity and Formation of Anthropocentrism The status of human subjectivity is gradually formed in the long historical process. The emergence of modern science and the application of technologies have finally strengthened and established the subjectivity of man relative to nature, giving prominence to human subjectivity but at the same time separating man from nature and placing them in opposition to nature. At first glance, the rise and development of science and technology firstly drove our earth out of the center of the universe and then reduced human beings to general creatures in the universe that have no particularity compared with other species. Our status in the universe seems to be lowered step by step. According to La Mettrie, man is nothing more than an ingenious machine; the human body is a clock, only that it is a large-sized, sophisticated and extremely ingenious clock,11 hence making people a passive group of beings. However, this new scientific concept has failed to fundamentally overturn man’s belief in their superior status in nature; on the contrary, it caters to people’s need to transform nature and builds up their confidence in their own subject status. In particular, the continuous promotion and application of science and technology have improved man’s ability to transform nature and boosted the development of social productivity, thereby giving prominence to their subject or master status in nature. Since then, most people

Diversified Value Choices 45 have been steadfast in their goal to control nature and even the entire universe through the power of reason. At the same time, in the field of ideology, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment broke the dominance of medieval theology and rescued people from the slavery of religion, thus awakening their self-consciousness and liberating their individuality. Renaissance thinkers held high the banner of humanism, opposing religious theology and the subjectivity of God, trying their best to promote human subjectivity and speaking highly of human dignity and value. Through the advocacy of human nature and the opposition to divinity, the spiritual development of mankind entered the stage of subject consciousness: with their external authority being shaken, human beings have discovered their inner strength. Since then, the subject status of man has become increasingly evident in the field of ideology and culture. In the field of philosophy, the priori generalization of subjectivity made by modern idealist philosophers further demonstrated and established the subject status of human beings. Descartes’s philosophical proposition about “I think, therefore I am,” for the first time, established the rational characteristics of man as a spiritual being and declared the “awakening of subjectivity” of man. Kant advocated “human being’s legislation for nature,” which highlights the subjective initiative of man in cognition, exalts their subjectivity and centrality to nature and liberates them from the bondage of nature. Hegel’s “entity that is subject” raises human subjectivity to the level of ontology, thereby abstracting and rationalizing human subjectivity into “self-movement of absolute spirit.” But more importantly, the way of thinking contained in and established by these philosophical notions not only caters to the needs of modern scientific development but also provides a mechanical view of nature and a reductionist approach that dismember nature and separate it from human beings. Thanks to the powerful promotion of the ideological emancipation and the scientific and technological revolution, human subjectivity has been brought into full play, and the subject status of man is guaranteed to the utmost extent. Since then, human beings are not only regarded as the subject of historical activities, but also as the subject of philosophical thinking. Human dignity and status have been elevated to unprecedented heights, and human personality is respected before development. Man has become the true master of nature and created endless wealth in the process of transforming nature. But at the same time, due to the excessive display of human subjectivity and the excessive deviation of human subjectivity from rationality, in the process of willfully conquering, transforming and enslaving nature, human beings have seen their relationship between nature becoming tense and their individual consciousness getting rampant, which brings hidden dangers to their own survival and the long-term development of society. In their reflection, some Western scholars even discovered that the development of scientific rationality seems not to publicize human subjectivity, but to suffocate it. This is because the subjectivity that has been manifested since the modern technological revolution is not a kind of complete and conscious subjectivity, but a kind of abstract subjectivity that has lost the pursuit of human life and the meaning of

46

Diversified Value Choices

existence. Although the expansion of scientific rationality has brought wealth, prosperity and order to people, it cannot satisfy their spiritual pursuit of aesthetics, morality and faith. As for the achievements of scientific rationality, people cannot enjoy freedom and liberation, but great restraint and repression. A core ideological presupposition of such subjectivity is that man is the center. All human activities should be carried out for man and with man as the center. As science and technology continue to build up man’s ability to control nature, this “egocentric” concept has been gradually ingrained in the mind of man. When humanism and human subjectivity under the dominance of this concept are brought into full play, all kinds of “anthropocentrism” have come into being, such as cosmic anthropocentrism and theological anthropocentrism. Despite different forms, anthropocentrism has always been adopted as a value and measure of value, with human interests taken as the origin of value and the basis for moral evaluation, and only man as the only subject of value judgment. From the perspective of the view of nature, anthropocentrism is a value formed on the basis of the mechanical view of nature of subject-object dichotomy in modern times, as well as the code of conduct for humans to coexist with modern science and technology. Unlike the prevalent organic view of nature, which respects, loves and awes nature, the mechanical view of nature holds that man is no longer in a passive position in their relationship with nature, but takes initiative to “legislate for nature.” Being deprived of its own purpose, nature has become a tool for people to achieve their own goals and an “energy pool” that provides resources. From the material realm to the spiritual realm and from economic development to political life, nature seems to exist solely to satisfy the various needs of mankind. In a certain sense, anthropocentrism is the natural tendency of human nature. Since the beginning of human history, man has placed himself at the center of all things and kept transforming and conquering nature for his own survival. Protagoras of Abdera, the ancient Greek philosopher, is most famous for his claim that “Of all things the measure is Man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not,”12 affirming the priority and dominance of human beings relative to other things. Plato believes that the conceptual world is the real existence, arguing that the human mind plays a decisive role in all its manifestations; the mind legislates for nature as well as for man, which puts human beings, especially the human spirit, at the core of everything decisive. For hundreds of years, the European concept of development has always been centered on man and regarded nature as an object to be conquered and utilized. To a certain extent, it can even be said that self-centeredness is the natural disposition of human beings. As White has pointed out, man has long had the illusion of being omnipotent, and this illusion makes them feel satisfied and comfortable. In ancient times, man believed that the weather could be controlled, which explains why primitive peoples resorted to rituals to pray for rain, calm the wind and prevent blizzards, and many tribes held special rituals in the hope of controlling the journey of the sun through the heavens. With the advancement of science, man is no longer convinced that they are omnipotent, but they are still sure that they can control their own civilization.13

Diversified Value Choices 47 Science is the cognitive activity of man to explore the mysteries of nature, and technology is the endeavor of man to constantly explore for their own survival and to achieve a high level of development on the basis of science. Therefore, it is understandable that science and technology should serve human beings. But the problem is that in the process of transforming nature and the world with science and technology, people tend to overemphasize their immediate and local interests while ignoring the long-term interests of mankind as a whole; they care too much about personal gains and losses and enjoyment but ignore the carrying capacity of nature and the right of other non-human groups to exist. They seem to forget that human beings are just a member of the big family of nature, and they are the children of nature just like other species. If nature is completely under the control of man and subject to their will to power, it will bury hidden dangers for the destruction of the natural environment, and ultimately bring about a survival crisis for human beings. This situation is just like what Schumacher has commented: Modern man does not experience himself as a part of nature but as an outside force destined to dominate and conquer it. He even talks of a battle with nature, forgetting that, if he won the battle, he would find himself on the losing side.14 In fact, it is impossible for human beings to completely manipulate and control nature. Their utilization and transformation of nature are not always successful, and nature is not always powerless to resist. In a sense, it is this overly narrow anthropocentrism that worsens the predicament that science and technology may encounter in the process of promoting the development of human society. 1.1.3 Social Penetration of Science and Technology and Single Value Choice Technology is arguably the most tangible and powerful result of science, and the impact of science on social life is therefore mainly realized through the application of technology. In this process, the utilitarian value and material utility of science have been brought into full play, enabling mutual promotion between science and the development of society. Since the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th and 19th centuries, the world has undergone tremendous changes, and our scientific theories about the entire material world have been gradually applied to every aspect of human life. As a result, in terms of production technology, factories replaced manual workshops, and machines took the place of manual labor; in terms of social relations, the owner-peasants (a symbol of a backward mode of production) disappeared, and the industrial bourgeoisie and proletariat came into being and grew up. After that, with the continuous development of science and the widespread application of technology, the entire society was reshaped by science and technology in a new way, which not only improved the production capacity of society and our living standards, but also altered our workstyle and lifestyle, for example, efficient

48 Diversified Value Choices assembly-line working modes, new and more convenient means of transportation and modern means of leisure and entertainment have filled modern people’s lives. It is no exaggeration to say that science and technology have penetrated into all areas of social production and life, and play an indispensable role in economic development, cultural progress, political rule and the solution of various social problems. However, when we are enjoying the great benefits of science, we have failed to notice that due to the widespread application of technology and its constant penetration into the social field, science and technology and their functions are no longer just instrumental. They are not only an object passively controlled by man, but also a part of the social subject, and even in control of our lives to a certain extent. According to Feenberg, the thorough permeability of machines has made it impossible to fix their influence on special applications. The devices that were originally designed for certain purposes have become so aggressive that they have destroyed the natural landscape and imposed their own requirements on the humans who have created them. In short, modern tools have changed the world “inwardly,” without being constrained by their intended purpose. Our tools have evolved into a living environment, and we have been gradually integrated into the devices that we have created and started catering to their rhythms and requirements.15 It is so ironic that the very things which were created to serve man have gained control over man and made man submit himself to their rule. To make matters worse, the various social negative effects produced by science and technology have become prominent and intensified, making people more and more worried. From the devastating consequences of the atomic bomb explosion after World War II to the discovery of the serious ecological and environmental hazards of DDT, and then to the great danger that may be caused by the application of transgenic technology in agriculture, science and technology have ushered us into a risky society. The environmental destruction and ecological crisis caused by their wanton invasion have become increasingly serious, making people’s daily lives, such as clothing, food, housing and transportation, full of risks. It can be said that science and its technological applications are likely to get out of control. At the ideological and cultural level, with the great success of science and technology in all fields of society and the steady rise in their social status, science has gradually become the mainstream and dominant culture in society, with advantages that other non-scientific cultural forms do not have. When this cultural superiority is exerted to an extreme, science goes beyond its boundaries to intrude into the humanistic fields of religion, culture and art, rejects and abandons other non-scientific cultural forms, thus leading to a single human culture and loss of civilization. As Marx pointed out more than 100 years ago, In our days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary: Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labor, we behold starving and overworking it; The newfangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want; The victories of art

Diversified Value Choices 49 seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted.16 Unfortunately, this situation has not yet turned for the better even today but tends to be aggravated due to the wider application of science and technology. While giving impetus to the development of productivity and social progress, the application of science and technology is harming our world at the same speed and scale. We have to admit that our society has become more secular than ever because science has developed by leaps and bounds and the application of technology has intruded into every aspect of life. Science and technology, which seem like a de facto new religion, are deemed as the source of all freedom and all material enjoyment. What’s more, some people argue that medicine will eventually rid the world of all diseases. In this context, it is logical to believe that science can set foot in the field of morality and society and even in the interpretation of art and its evolution. Everything can be measured, and it is becoming more and more inopportune to hold that life has a spiritual component.17 Science and technology have penetrated into all areas of human society, and their potential risks are increasingly threatening our lives. But we cannot simply abandon them, since they have become an indispensable part of the entire society in this day and age. All kinds of material and spiritual wealth created by science and technology are essential conditions for our survival and for the benign operation of society. Feyerabend commented that this is a situation where we are good for nothing without science. Our world has been transformed by the material, spiritual and intellectual achievements of science and science-based technology, making us get stuck in an environment of science. We need scientists, engineers, scientific philosophers and sociologists to deal with this situation.18 As for this inevitable paradox in the technological society, Dolby pointed out that science is the victim of its own success. It has transformed the world into a harsher one judged by the way scientific knowledge is created, maintained and applied. And scientific knowledge has also become easier to be created and criticized. We are now living in a world that seems to have reduced the countless dangers that were once beyond the boundary of our knowledge but made the risks intrinsic to the behavior guided by our knowledge more worrying. Although science continues to eliminate past mistakes while increasing the accuracy and widening the scope of scientific knowledge, it has brewed up a rare revolution that abandons the earlier obvious certainties. Science gives us increasing power to make the world fit our desires, but fails to give us the knowledge to make the best use of this power.19 Given this, in order to solve all the problems brought about

50

Diversified Value Choices

by science and its technological application, our effort must be made from science itself at all events. Besides, in order to get more of what we need and less of what we don’t need, we must improve our control of scientific applications because these applications will eventually be manifested in the form of new technologies.20 Therefore, we need to change the current situation where human beings are controlled by technology, and stop the overstepping development of science and technology in all fields of society. A basic approach for doing so is to strictly control every link of scientific research and application and keep their influence within the permissible limits. So, how can man realize the control of science and technology? The efforts can be made from two aspects. One is the control from the policy-making aspect to reduce the occurrence of undesirable results through technology assessment, that is, predict and evaluate the consequences of scientific research and its technological application in advance. In foreign countries, this activity of technology assessment focuses on systematic identification, analysis and evaluation of potential secondary results (either beneficial or harmful) of technology and its impact on society, culture, politics and environment, so as to provide decision-makers with neutral and factbased information.21 The other is the control from the moral aspect, which is mainly a non-mandatory means of controlling science and technology by relying on the conscience and moral responsibility of scientists and technologists themselves. Of course, what is more fundamental is that science and technology must be accurately positioned on the ideological level, that is, we must realize that science and technology are merely one of the outstanding achievements of human civilization, and that they cannot and should not become the whole of human culture and social life.

1.2 From One-Dimensional Man to Multiple Perspectives The science developed on the basis of modern mechanical philosophy has not only achieved great success in the field of human material life but also caused homogenization and one-dimensionality of society and individuals. This phenomenon aroused the attention and criticism of many scholars in the 20th century, especially after the 1930s and 1940s. Let’s talk about how the Frankfurt School scholars developed a modern critique of science and technology from the perspective of the alienation of society and man, and how these critical analyses require a shift in value consideration from narrowly one-dimensional man to realistic man with multi-perspectives. 1.2.1 One-Dimensional Society and One-Dimensional Man The concept of “one-dimensionality” was first proposed by Herbert Marcuse, the main representative of the Frankfurt School. In his most prestigious work, One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse introduced this concept to show that the modern advanced industrial society has successfully suppressed the negative, critical

Diversified Value Choices 51 and transcendent dimensions in people’s minds, making the whole society a onedimensional society and the people living in it one-dimensional man. According to Marcuse, “one-dimensional society” is the current capitalist industrial society. In such an advanced industrial society, “technological rationality” has demonstrated its political characteristics, becoming a powerful tool for more effective governance and creating a real totalitarian realm; instead of using terror and violence to subdue those centrifugal forces, it uses science and technology, a new form of control, to conquer and assimilate all social forces, integrate all true opposites and assimilate all different choices.22 The one-dimensionality of the current society is mainly reflected in four aspects: first, the obvious unanimity or convergence between opposing factions in the field of politics. As a result of the ever-developing technology productivity and the ever-expanding conquest of man and nature, there has been the assimilation of the bourgeoisie and the working class, hence making the latter lose its revolutionary, negative and critical nature. Second is the assimilation of people’s lifestyles in the field of life. Advanced industrial society has created a new lifestyle to control people’s material life, making their thought and behavior fit in the existing society and replacing their real needs with false needs in modern society. Third is the integration of high-level culture and reality in the field of culture. By succumbing to the popular trend of secularization in the developed areas of contemporary industrial society, the advancement of “technological rationality” has gradually eliminated the opposite and transcendental factors in high-level culture and promoted the assimilation of high-level culture and popular culture and of the ideal and reality in high-level culture. Fourth is the victory of the one-dimensional way of thinking and one-dimensional philosophy in the field of ideology. The popularity of positivism and analytic philosophy has converted multi-dimensional language into onedimensional language; moreover, the use of everyday language has been restricted and interfered with, and concepts have lost their linguistic expressiveness. Therefore, the “one-dimensional society” described by Marcuse is first of all a “society without opposition.” In his view, the progress of science and technology and their successful control of the entire society have made the advanced industrial society a new type of totalitarian society without opposition. In this society, production equipment tends to become totalitarian, determining not only the occupations, skills and attitudes of individuals required by the society but also their needs and desires. It eliminates the antagonism between the private and the public, as well as between the needs of individuals and the needs of society; it effectively suffocates the need for freedom (i.e., the need to get out of a tolerable, beneficial and comfortable situation), and at the same time tolerates and condones the destructive power and inhibitory function of an affluent society. Through the application of technology, the advanced industrial society has assimilated all opposite factions and silenced all voices that were not in harmony with it. Technology has thus become a new form of social control and social solidarity, which is more effective and more enjoyable.23 Besides, the “one-dimensional society” is also a society of ideological and cultural unicity. In advanced industrial societies, the ideological and moral values

52 Diversified Value Choices that high-level culture once possessed in industrial societies, as well as the dimensions of accusation and denial of commercial order, have disappeared. The highlevel culture has lost a greater part of its truth and reinvented itself as a replica of the existing social order and ideas, hence becoming an “affirmative culture,” that is, a culture that affirms reality. One-dimensional man accepts the existing system and order, suppresses his individual soul and makes it obedient to the universal value and existence; he is no longer fancy about another way of life but imagines different types or deformities of the same way of life. He affirms the established system, instead of denying it.24 Consequently, because of the intermediary role of technology, culture, politics and economy are all incorporated into an omnipotent system, which has engulfed or rejected all historical alternatives. The productivity and growth potential of this system has stabilized society and included technological progress in the framework of governance. Technological rationality has become political rationality.25 The most prominent feature of “one-dimensional society” is the existence of “one-dimensional man,” which refers to someone who has lost the ability to deny, criticize and transcend. Anyone like this is no longer able to pursue or just imagine a different life from the real one.26 Marcuse has analyzed the specific production processes of “one-dimensional man”: first, mechanization and automation in the era of modern science and technology continue to reduce the intensity of physical labor and destroy the freedom to keep secrets deep in one’s heart. Second, in terms of occupational levels, the blue-collar workforce in important industrial sectors is becoming more and more like white-collar workers. The number of non-productive workers has increased, and laborers, with occupational autonomy being gradually deprived, have been integrated into the mechanical system. Third, the automation brought about by science and technology has changed the way of manual labor and reduced labor intensity, but at the same time exacerbated technological unemployment and convinced workers of resigning themselves to their fate. Fourth, the new world of technical work has forcibly weakened the negative status of the working class, and they no longer seem to contradict established society. Through these processes, the advanced industrial society has fostered myriads of people who are ideologically “one-dimensional.” Their satisfaction with material needs is illusory, looking like “happiness in misfortune.” They are “slaves,” although being “appreciated,” who are unable to control various decision-making issues about life and death, personal safety and national security. In the view of postmodernists, the formation of “one-dimensional man” is determined by the way we think about and perceive the world, that is, if we see the world as separate from us and made up of unrelated parts that are manipulated by calculations, then we will become isolated people, and our motivation for getting along with others will be nothing but manipulation and calculation.27 In fact, it is with the development of modern science and technology, as well as the overemphasis on the mechanized viewpoints and analytical thinking formed in the process of disenchantment of nature, that rational abstraction has gradually surpassed people’s pursuit of perceptual concreteness and has human thinking all occupied; that’s why human beings have gradually lost themselves and their

Diversified Value Choices 53 existence as men in the conquest of nature. Looking back on the course of scientific development, it can be seen that in the second half of the 19th century, the whole worldview of modern people was only governed by positive science and only befuddled by the prosperity brought about by science. This uniqueness means that people have shunned the issues that determine true humanity with indifference. Science, which is purely factual, produces people who are purely factual. This kind of science, in principle, excludes the very urgent issues for people who are subject to fundamental and fateful changes in this unfortunate age, that is, the issues that are meaningful and meaningless for their survival. For these issues that are of universality and necessity for every one of us, science, which only deals with objects, has no say at all, and it even takes no account of subjective things.28 To be precise, the “one-dimensional society” and “one-dimensional man” created by science and technology are not fully in tune with the “loss of critical dimensions” as brought forth by Marcuse, because the “one-dimension” in advanced industrial society, which is attributed to the control of science and technology over society, is more reflected in the alienation of people caused by the abstraction, symbolization and impersonalization of people brought about by science and technology, as well as the loss of individual independence and autonomy, and the loss of richness and meaning at the spiritual level. The one-dimensional scene presented by the advanced industrial society is just like what Horkheimer and Adorno have described, that is, all artistic, ideological and negative factors have disappeared, and all contradictions have gone. People are completely separated from each other, as well as away from nature. In this way, all of them only know their own demands and hurts. Everyone has become a factor, and this factor may be the subject or object of a certain practice, or something that is not worth mentioning. In this world free of fantasy, people have lost the ability to reflect and become the most intelligent animals again; they are busy enslaving other things in the universe (they always believe that these things are indecomposable); they no longer regard respect for animals as emotional, but as a betrayal of progress.29 The one-dimensional and tenacious world shaped by the development of science and technology is the dominant vision of industrial society. 1.2.2 Look at the Real Man from Multiple Perspectives The real man is the opposite of the abstract man. Starting from the Western Renaissance, the understanding of man has been one of the main themes in human research. But at that time, the understanding of man, which was accompanied by the awakening of rational sense, was mainly to understand the rational and abstract man. For example, the philosophical proposition of Descartes, namely “I think, therefore I am,” has established the existence of a spiritual subject at the level of abstract concept; Kant divided man into the perceptual existence in the phenomenal world and the rational existence in the ontological world; and Hegel distinguished the objectivity and reality of man. After that, to cope with

54 Diversified Value Choices the development of modern science and technology and from the philosophical perspective, man is mainly regarded as a product of knowledge and a kind of abstract individual with his own concrete richness being removed. The alienation of man produced by science and technology is largely due to the overemphasis on the abstract understanding of man, as well as the neglect of the existence of man as the real man. The exploration of the concept of “real man” should be traced back to Feuerbach. In his view, man himself is a unity of thinking and being, so it must be admitted that man has thought, but his thought cannot be separated from his perceptual material basis and living conditions. For this reason, he put forward the principle of sensibility objectivity, arguing that the reality of sensual and individual being is a truth stamped with our blood, and from this, the content and definition of the realistic subject were derived, and a kind of inherent and silent commonality that connects individuals purely and naturally was abstracted out in the end.30 In spite of this, while he emphasized perceptual factors such as intuition, desire, emotion and experience, he ignored spiritual and rational elements and gave no consideration to man’s subjective initiative and practical creativity. Therefore, the “man” in this sense is not the so-called “real man.” By contrast, the Real Man Hypothesis of Marx is more comprehensive. From the perspective of Marxism, a real man is first of all a man in practice, that is, a man who not only takes part in practice but also develops and evolves only through practice. For us human beings, “consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process.” In view of this, practicality is said to be a unique mode of production of men. At the same time, practice is also the starting point of realistic individuals. We do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process.31 Secondly, a real man is also a man in social relationships. In the process of carrying out certain material production activities, realistic individuals have to deal with the natural world and finish production and product exchange activities in a combination of ways, thereby forming certain social and political relationships. In other words, men in reality must be men in society. This is not only because human activities can only be carried out in a certain social relationship, but also because society constitutes the way and state of existence of individuals. Sociality is the fundamental attribute of human beings. Man cannot live as man, without society, as Marx wrote that “the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”32 It is precisely because of their existence in a given historical condition and a given social relationship that men can become concrete, conditional and realistic individuals.

Diversified Value Choices 55 Real men can be analyzed from different perspectives for a better understanding of their characteristics. From the perspective of human consciousness, rich spiritual attributes are the main characteristics of real men. As living beings unlike animals, men have a special psychological structure including knowledge, feelings and intentions, so they have a rich inner world, or an internal subjective world that differs from the external objective world, and this endows them with spiritual life, spiritual needs and spiritual capacities, as well as subjective initiative. Therefore, men can use these rational factors (through abstract deduction), as well as emotion, will, intuition, desire and other irrational factors, to grasp nature. Men also have rich sensory abilities. They like to perceive the state, essence, law and other characteristics of objects in varying degrees through different senses, so as to understand things. Therefore, the richness of human feelings is mainly manifested through the objectification of human nature. The reason why the objectification of human nature is necessary, which is based on theoretical and practical considerations, is to make human feelings hominine and to create human feelings that are compatible with all the richness of the essence of man and the natural world.33 From the perspective of human activities, the richness of practices is a concentrated expression of the richness of real men. Spiritual practices reflect the richness of men’s consciousness and sensibility; material practices, including agricultural and industrial practices, display to the full the richness and diversity of manpower, thereby forming a rich and diverse society for the survival of real men. Moreover, these human activities are a kind of universal and realistic practice that constantly pursues creativity, comprehensiveness and perfection. From the perspective of human needs, the needs of real men are complex and diverse. There are material needs and spiritual needs according to men’s social functions; there are physical, psychological and intellectual needs according to men’s life activities; there are overall needs and partial needs according to the scale; there are current needs and long-term needs as divided by time; and there are realistic needs, ideal needs and fantasy needs according to their realizability, etc. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory, humans are highly motivated in order to fulfill their needs, which is based on hierarchical order. There are five different levels of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: (1) Physiological needs: the physiological needs are regarded as the most basic of the needs that humans have. These are needs that are very crucial for our survival. Examples of physiological needs are food, shelter, warmth, health, homeostasis, water, etc. In addition to all the above needs, Maslow also included sexual reproduction as one of the most common needs as it is essential for the survival of the species. (2) Safety needs: at this level, the needs for security and safety become primary. People want control and order in their lives. So, this need for safety and security contributes largely to behaviors at this level. Some of the basic security

56

Diversified Value Choices

and safety needs include financial security, health and wellness and safety against accidents and injury. (3) Social needs (also known as love and belonging needs): the social needs in Maslow’s hierarchy include such things as love, acceptance and belonging. At this level, the need for emotional relationships drives human behavior. Some of the things that satisfy this need include friendships, romantic attachments, family, social groups, community groups and churches and religious organizations. (4) Esteem needs: at the fourth level in Maslow’s hierarchy is the need for appreciation and respect. In addition to the need for feelings of accomplishment and prestige, esteem needs include such things as self-esteem and personal worth. (5) Self-actualization needs: this is the final level of the theory of hierarchy of needs as proposed by Maslow. It is the highest level of needs and is known as the self-actualization needs. It relates to the need of an individual to attain or realize the full potential of their ability or potential. The preceding division of human needs into different levels, which examines men’s multiple needs and their interrelationships from the perspective of hierarchy, fully demonstrates the complexity and diversity of human needs. Marcuse criticized the one-dimensional society for most of the current needs, such as rest, entertainment, way of life and mode of consumption as advertised, love and hate what others love and hate, are actually falling under the category of false needs.34 But the fact is that the needs of real men exist objectively. Marx commented that as an identified person and a realistic person, you have definitive property, missions and tasks, and it doesn’t matter whether you’ve realized this or not; this task arises out of your needs and your connection to the existing world.35 Generally speaking, people in modern society are not isolated individuals who have grown up in an abstract and single environment; they are real humans with richness and diversity. According to Marx, just as the diverse definitive property of humans and their activities, their realities are also varied.36 This also means that humans must develop themselves into those who have increasingly abundant and comprehensive definitive property. 1.2.3 Liberty and All-Around Development of Man Realizing the free and all-around development of man is a long-term goal of the development of human society, and it is also the ultimate goal of the development of science and technology. Well, what is the free and all-around development of man? As far as freedom is concerned, the free development of man is, first of all, the understanding of inevitability in social practice activities. Engels once pointed out clearly, “Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends.”

Diversified Value Choices 57 Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom.37 Therefore, based on their understanding of the objective world and its laws, people take part in social practice activities and change objects actively, for the purpose of further understanding and transforming the world. This is the embodiment of human freedom. In this sense, the advancement of science and technology has improved man’s ability to understand and grasp nature, continuously expands the free space of human activities and extends the free time at man’s disposal, hence becoming an important driving force to realize the free development of man. At the same time, as real humans living in social relationships of different nature, their subjective initiative and free development are bound to be restricted. Therefore, while mankind keeps improving their abilities to conquer nature, they must also fight for rights in political, economic, cultural and social life, as well as freedom in politics, thought, speech, choice of occupation and migration, so as to realize free and all-around development. In other words, the free development of people is to get rid of the status of being oppressed and enslaved in capitalist society. That’s why Marcuse hopes to establish a “new society,” so that people’s instinctive desire, spiritual autonomy, creative talent and other aspects can be completely liberated, and restore the “independence of thought, autonomy, and the right to political opposition” that “are being deprived of their basic critical function in a society which seems increasingly capable of satisfying the needs of the individuals through the way in which it is organized.”38 Regarding the all-around development of man, it generally refers to the allaround development of their comprehensive quality, including not only physical quality, but also ideological, moral, scientific and cultural qualities, which can be summed up as moral, intellectual, physical and aesthetical qualities. In this sense, the all-around development of people means continuously improving their comprehensive quality. From the perspective of the “one-dimensional man” created by advanced industrial society, the all-around development of people should at least make up for their one-sided and abnormal development in capitalist “onedimensional society,” that is, to achieve multi-faceted development of people, involving their abilities, activities, social relationships (including communication) and spiritual world. To put it simply, in addition to satisfying people’s material needs, it is also necessary to promote the healthy development of their spiritual life in an all-around manner. The communist society envisioned by Marx is an ideal social state in which capitalist social relations are eliminated and human freedom and all-around development are realized. At that time, “in place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”39 However,

58

Diversified Value Choices

the all-around development of human beings is not an easy goal to achieve. Engels once said that the all-around development of individuals is no longer an ideal or a responsibility until the impetus of the external world to the actual development of individual talent is under the control of individuals themselves.40 Therefore, the free and all-around development of human beings is the process and state of life in which every real man gets rid of and surmounts all kinds of internal and external restrictions and fetters, thus achieving universal improvement and coordinated development in relation, ability, quality, personality and other aspects. In the words of Marx, it is “Man, in a comprehensive way, that is, as a complete person, fully possesses of his essence.”41 The realization of the free and all-around development of man requires the vigorous development of science and technology; it is because when society takes possession of the means of production, commodity production will be eliminated, and with it the domination of the product over the producer. Anarchy within social production will be replaced by planned and conscious organizations, and the struggle for survival of individuals will come to an end. In a certain sense, human beings will finally separate from the animal kingdom, with the living conditions of animals replaced by those of real man. The surrounding living conditions, which hitherto have people under control, are now subject to their domination and control. It is the first time that people have become conscious and true masters of nature since they have become masters of their own social bonds. The laws of people’s own social action, which have always been in opposition to them as alien and dominant laws of nature, will then be expertly applied by people and subject to their command. The social bond of people themselves, which has always been opposed to them as something imposed by nature and history, now becomes their own free action. The objective and alien forces which have hitherto dominated history are now under the control of people themselves. It is only from this time that people begin to create their own history fully consciously, and it is only from this time that more and more social causes that people make at work begin to meet their expectations. This is the leap of mankind from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.42 The ultimate value orientation of science and technology is to realize the free and all-around development of man, which is manifested in three aspects. Firstly, science should promote the realization of human freedom. Freedom is not only an important value orientation pursued by human society but also an essential condition for people to seek the meaning of their own existence and selfdevelopment. Human freedom is a multi-level and multi-faceted unified whole, which generally includes freedom of will, freedom of movement (further split into freedom of reason and freedom of politics), freedom of personality and freedom of life. For science and technology to promote the free and all-around development of man, the five types of freedom in question shall be achieved with great efforts. Secondly, science should promote the all-around development of man and realize the richness of human nature to the greatest extent. The biggest difference

Diversified Value Choices 59 between man and other species is that he seeks both material and spiritual satisfaction. Therefore, science and technology must meet and cater to people’s spiritual needs in addition to their material needs. To make it clear, the realization of man’s all-around development is premised on human freedom, so modernized and socialized mass production, which creates favorable material conditions for the all-around development of man, cannot be limited to the freedom of the minority, or else human development will continue to be one-sided and malformed. Finally, the ultimate goal of science is to realize the harmonious development between man and nature, man and society, as well as between man themselves. Man is concurrently a kind of natural being and social being, meaning that they are closely related to both nature and society. In recent years, as people have become increasingly aware of the environmental problems brought about by science and technology, it has almost become a social consensus to harmonize the development of man, nature and society. Undoubtedly, the healthy and harmonious development between man themselves will also provide spiritual security for their free and all-around development.

1.3 Diversity and Complementarity In this age of globalization, exchanges between cultures have increased remarkably, with “diversity” and “diversification” becoming hot words in many fields. As diversification has become the goal of the times, diversity and complementarity are taken as important value selection criteria in scientific research and technological application. 1.3.1 Plural Values of Science The value of science has always been one of the core issues concerned by the humanistic researchers of science. Generally speaking, value embodies the meaning of things to people. Likewise, the value of science embodies the meaning of science to people. So, what kind of value and significance does science have for people? It’s not easy to answer this question clearly and thoroughly. If distinguished by the status and role of objects of science in human activities, science has instrument value and purpose value. If we look at it from the science itself and the outside world, science has intrinsic value and extrinsic (social) value. From the perspective of the function of science, it also has cognitive, aesthetic and moral values. This subsection examines the multiple values of science from its varied manifestations. That is to say, the values of science are manifested in its plural forms, such as a body of knowledge, a form of ideology and culture and a kind of social public service. As a special body of knowledge in the history of human culture, science has very important knowledge value. Unlike religion, philosophy, logic and culture,

60

Diversified Value Choices

science comes to know the world through definite logical proofs and experimental tests and is therefore the most developed and the most reasonable, reliable and rigorous form of cognition. For the purpose of exploring the truth of the universe and discovering the laws of nature, science has built a huge and ever-growing body of knowledge about the world and about how it works over its long course of development. Taking the pursuit of certainty and universality of knowledge as its own responsibility, science has specifically answered the questions about natural evolution and motion of matter with exact proofs, so that people have fully mastered the truthful knowledge necessary for understanding and transforming nature. At the same time, as an intellectual undertaking, science grows out of the everyday inquiry into things, extending the range of evidence for human independence, broadening their independent imagination, reinforcing their independent respect for evidence and refining their judgment of evidence through statistical techniques, controlled experiments and double-blind experiments, so it is an important expression of human cognitive ability. Science expands and improves human cognitive ability, transcends the limits of human cognition, and effectively enhances our inquiry ability. It depicts not only the extraordinary performance of human cognitive potential but also what people can achieve when they use their minds and try their best. In short, science not only strives to produce some of the most brilliant intellectual results within people’s reach but also tries to reflect the expansion and improvement of human cognitive ability.43 The important knowledge value of science in terms of knowledge content and knowledge capability cannot be replaced by any other academic or cultural achievement. As a special cultural ideology in the history of human culture, science is the final step in man’s intellectual development and can be regarded as the highest and most unique achievement of human culture. In our modern world, there is no second power that can rival that of scientific thought. It is taken as the acme of all human activities, the last chapter of human history and the most important theme of human philosophy.44 Therefore, the cultural or spiritual value of science cannot be underestimated. Generally speaking, science always exists in a certain cultural environment, and it affects that cultural environment in one way or another. On the one hand, science has been trying to change the culture in which it exists during its development, and even trying to eliminate all the factors that hinder scientific progress in traditional culture, so as to promote both material and cultural development at the same time. On the other hand, science continues to pay attention to and promote the development of man and culture from the spiritual dimension, thereby injecting more complete and profound meanings into man’s survival, development, freedom and liberation. This is the basic aspect of the cultural or spiritual value of science. Specifically, the cultural or spiritual value of science is embodied in its cognitive value, aesthetic value, moral value and belief value. The cognitive value of science indicates that science, as a kind of culture, has the value of satisfying people’s cognitive needs and enhancing their cognitive ability. To be specific, science satisfies people’s curiosity, brings them intellectual

Diversified Value Choices 61 enjoyment and keeps improving their creativity and thinking ability; it also broadens people’s knowledge and understanding of themselves and the nature in which they live, thereby providing them with definite and universal explanations, enabling them to predict unknown things and transform nature successfully. The aesthetic value of science indicates that science, as a kind of culture, has the value of pursuing beauty and satisfying people’s aesthetic needs. Scientists often regard themselves as an artist, engaging in scientific creation and evaluation in accordance with the law of beauty. In the course of its development, science is sometimes employed by people as a tool to pursue harmony, simplicity and perfection. In short, the aesthetic value of science is fairly rich, not only expressed as the harmony, symmetry, simplicity and other sensory beauty of artwork but also embodied in the rational beauty (i.e., to improve the aesthetic perception, appreciation and creativity of individuals) that cannot be found in artwork. The moral value of science indicates that science, as a kind of culture, has the value of improving the moral standards and cognition of existing society. Generally speaking, the moral value of science may include many aspects such as promoting moral perfection and moral education, destroying old morals and creating new ones, but the fundamental thing is that it enhances the value of life itself. According to German physicist Planck, science improves the moral value of life because it deepens our love for truth and sense of respect: the love for truth is manifested in a continuous effort, that is, to continue trying to acquire a more accurate understanding of the world of mind and matter around us; the deepened sense of respect means that every step forward in cognition makes us closer to the mystery of our own existence.45 The belief value of science indicates that science, with its spiritual and cultural transcendence, provides people with an optimistic mentality and a positive attitude toward life. In other words, science gives people a relatively stable and correct belief about the eternal world and makes their minds free and peaceful, thus becoming one of the fulcrums for them to settle down.46 As for the scientific beliefs based on conscious knowledge, they are more consolidated than the beliefs established by any other means because they provide universally true and definite knowledge that can be tested by experiments. As a social public service created by mankind, science has particularly important practical and utilitarian value. In this day and age, utilitarian value has almost become one of the most important evaluation criteria among the values of science. Just after the emergence of modern science, scientists believed that the value of science was first embodied in a correct understanding and reasonable explanation of the objective world. However, Francis Bacon, as the real progenitor of English materialism and the entire modern experimental science, emphasized the utilitarian value of scientific knowledge in the 17th century and firmly believed that scientific knowledge based on the development laws of nature would be a great power. More than 100 years ago, Marx also made it clear that science is a driving force and a powerful lever in history, as well as a revolutionary force in the highest sense. At the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the combination of science and industry produced huge economic benefits. After the second half

62

Diversified Value Choices

of the 19th century, science, through increasingly close combination with technology and industry, not only promoted the progress of material production but also penetrated into all areas of human life as a social public service, thereby exerting a great influence on the political, economic, cultural, educational, military and other fields of society. Nowadays, science keeps improving the well-being of people and extending to more and more fields of human activities. Regarding the utilitarian value of science in contemporary society, it at least involves economic value, political value and military value. 1.3.2 Diversity of Cultural Vision With the rise of science and technology – the most powerful cultural form in the history of human culture – the wild expansion of Western thought and technology has made monotony, rather than diversity, the basic theme of the times, and once made the exclusive respect of science the mainstream trend of cultural development. Furthermore, as the oneness of Western industrial civilization spreads across the globe, the resulting negative consequences have become more and more serious; that’s why the analysis and investigation of the diversity of science and technology from the cultural perspective has gained widespread attention from society. Some postmodern thinkers also try to demonstrate that diversity is beneficial when oneness reduces our happiness and our (intellectual, emotional and material) wealth.47 At present, the issue of cultural diversity has been raised to the height of global cultural development. The Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity released by UNESCO endorses that respect for cultural diversity, tolerance, dialogue and cooperation are among the best guarantees for international security. Looking at the entire historical process of human cultural development, we can find that the development of culture has never been simple. From the primitive times when our ancestors ate raw meat, drank blood and survived upon slash-and-burn farming, and then to the scientific and technological society which is flooded with information and automation, people keep forming and developing varied cultural types and cultural patterns under different natural, historical and social conditions. Despite different times and the ever-changing contents of culture, diversity has remained an important manifestation of the development of human culture. It can be said that the diversity of cultural existence is not only the basic law of cultural development but also the driving force for the sustainable development of culture. According to Weber, diversity is our cultural destiny, and the struggles between plural values in modern society have no difference from the ancient world which is not yet freed from the magic arts of gods and ghosts, except for different meanings. As he depicted, those ancient gods, who have lost their magic power, climb out of their graves to display power to us, but at the same time get caught in endless struggles again. The Greeks sacrificed to Aphrodite or Apollo from time to time, and also to the gods of their own city-states; today’s situation is exactly the same, except that the rites and customs are already disenchanted.48 Besides, Weber also pointed out that the ancient Greek gods are not any abstract worldview; they are

Diversified Value Choices 63 not sovereigns beyond earthly life, time and space and of equal status, neither can they be dispatched at any time and place. On the contrary, they are the embodiment of concrete “living beings” confined to a given time and place, that is, they are gods in one place at a time and amid the diversified life of all kinds of people. However, although they have inherent eternal power, they are mutually restricted; they are united in their single, common and “ecumenical” divinity, just like people united in a single, common and “ecumenical” community.49 Even in the dark medieval period when religions were holding sway, the richness and diversity of culture were still remarkable. As Whitehead once pointed out, the early medieval period was a period of symbolism. It was not only an era of rich and colorful ideas but also an era of primitive technologies. There was little to do with nature at that time, except for struggling for survival under harsh natural conditions. However, both philosophy and theology at that time had ideological fields waiting to be developed. Primitive art could symbolize the ideas that occupy the minds of thinkers. The art of the early Middle Ages had an incomparable and gripping charm: its mission went beyond the scope of art itself to achieve aesthetic purposes and became a symbol of things deep within nature, thereby enhancing its intrinsic qualities. In this period of symbolism, medieval art prospered with nature as a medium.50 It is against this rich and diverse social and cultural background that science and technology, a new type of intellectual activity and social and cultural undertaking, has come into being. While inheriting the tradition of cultural diversity, it keeps developing new diversity adapted to social development. Joseph Needham’s research on the history of science and technology also shows that science and technology are not a product of a single culture, but a comprehensive product of multiple cultures. On the one hand, both the distinctive European civilization and Eastern civilization have given rise to scientific and technological achievements that have a far-reaching impact on human development. Different cultural traditions have kept communicating, integrating and complementing each other; it is in this dynamic process that science and technology develop continuously. On the other hand, the centers of scientific knowledge, which transferred from Babylon and Egypt to Greece, Arabia and then Western Europe, set the tone for modern Western science to emerge in this or any other forms. For example, a variety of theological and philosophical systems are conducive to breaking free from doctrinal consistency; these systems compete with each other because they seek support from the same group of people and uncompromisingly claim that they are incompatible. A variety of potential practical applicability is beneficial to liberate from practically useful requirements.51 Therefore, the modern scientific revolution in Europe, which is essentially based on multiple cultures, is the result of the integration of multiple cultures and a comprehensive product of all human beings. It can be said that science has provided a kind of diversity from the very beginning, not only promoting its own diversified development but also enriching the culture of mankind. More than that, science and technology also incorporate a variety of different cultural traditions and ways of thinking. It originated and develops on the

64

Diversified Value Choices

basis of the cultural tradition of modern Western mechanism, and at the same time absorbs the organic holistic view of ancient China; it not only excels at the analysis and rational thinking which are attributed to ancient Greece civilization but also embraces perceptual ways of thinking, such as intuition and inspiration. From a postmodernist perspective, this diversity of scientific and technological culture is more fully reflected. Harding pointed out that the so-called modern European science and technology research projects and similar research projects in other cultures, whether in the past or at present, are an indivisible unity in several major aspects, and now they are merely a component of the global knowledge system.52 In her view, modern European science has absorbed many scientific and technological traditions from other cultures and continues doing so up to this day through development programs. In this sense, modern European science is already multicultural. Besides, she also analyzed the factors that led to the cultural diversity of science from the theoretical perspective of post-colonialism and feminism: first, different cultures are located in different parts of a heterogeneous natural order, and their environments are always local. Second, culture is interested in everything that can be counted as its environment, but even in the same environment, they often raise questions about the world around them for different social interests. Third, through culturally unique inference resources such as metaphors, models and narratives, knowledge models of different cultures are organized and formed. Fourth, knowledge production is organized in unique ways, and different cultures often use these ways to organize social activities more extensively.53 From a cultural perspective, diversity is deeply rooted in the current era of globalization and science and technology. According to Feyerabend, without cultural diversity, the nature of science is null and void. Cultural diversity is not in contradiction with science, which is regarded as free and unrestrained exploration. Instead, it is contrary to rationalism, scientific anthropologism, a kind of force (sometimes called a force of reason – using rigid and distorted scientific imagination to win supporters for their old beliefs), and kindred philosophies.54 Therefore, correct understanding and treatment of all kinds of cultural diversity, especially those of science, are of great significance for globalization and crosscultural communication across the world, and for the development of science and technology and society in the future. 1.3.3 Diverse and Complementary Cultural Choices of Science The preceding analysis clearly tells that science is a modern culture that originates from a multicultural background and has multicultural characteristics. That is to say, diversity constitutes the living conditions and state of existence of science culture and promotes the progress of society and culture. Science is a cultural existence of diversity. It is true that the objective world is unitary (for the sake of prudence, we’d better not rule out the possibility of pluralism), but the subjective world constructed by people is pluralistic, and it should be so, otherwise, our existence will be meaningless and our life will be monotonous. Scientists, theologians, philosophers, poets, painters and musicians use metaphors

Diversified Value Choices 65 (and mathematical symbols), beliefs, concepts, words, colors and musical notes to outline a simplified and easy-to-understand image of the world, and use it as a substitute for their feelings and experiences. But their work only touches a certain aspect or a certain level of the objective world; it is the synthesis of their working achievement and process (they are part of this world) that can describe the objective world profoundly and comprehensively. In this sense, their work is more or less meaningful.55 Therefore, although science itself embodies the diversity of human culture, science alone cannot represent the diversity of human culture and adapt to the inevitability of cultural development. In fact, in the history of cultural development, the advancement of science and technology, especially the emergence of science and technology culture and the rise of its status, seems to wear away the pluralistic nature of our world to some extent. As Cassirer once pointed out, the analytical spirit of modern science has conquered all reality for a century and a half, and now it seems that it has finally accomplished the mission of reducing the diversity of natural phenomena to a single universal law;56 from the very first, the development of science is to pursue unity and universality, which is also its ultimate direction and goal. In this era of globalization, as far as the development of science and technology is concerned, people have again placed their attention and emphasis on the characteristics of cultural diversity. Just like what Feinberg has said, in contrast to the shattered illusion of technocracy of the previous generation, a new social interpretation of science and technology is becoming active. Tradition, to the extent that it supports cultural diversity to counter the “false universality” of the West, is now regarded as an uncertain suspension. The differences between race, religion and gender that have lost their importance in the universal melting pot of reason are restored.57 Especially among postmodern thinkers, a growing number of them emphasize the value and right of existence of non-scientific human cultures other than science and technology. They have realized that many traditions and cultures, although some of them are unscientific (people should pray to the gods, seek divine advice and hold some unintelligible rituals to make their life sublimate), are somewhat successful since they can guide members to lead a full and complete life.58 Therefore, the development of scientific culture in the future should be based on the coexistence and compatibility of diverse cultures and conducive to their common development. At the level of value, science is more than a body of knowledge; its value and significance are not limited to the search for truth. As mentioned earlier, science has multiple values: as a special body of knowledge in the history of human culture, science has great knowledge value. As a special cultural ideology in the history of human culture, science has multiple values such as cognitive value, aesthetic value, moral value and belief value. As a social public service created by mankind, science also has practical and utilitarian values. Generally speaking, since the socialization of science in the 19th century, the scientific research activities that are purely for the sake of science no longer exist but have become a culture with multiple values. In fact, science has never been used only to meet lower-order needs before today, although some major scientific problems arise

66

Diversified Value Choices

from daily needs (they were not lower-order needs in earlier times). Science is not just for its own sake, not just for building a pure body of knowledge about facts. Science stands for the path to real existence, real art, real God and real happiness – and all of this is properly interpreted as the path to real life.59 Therefore, while sustaining the development of science, we should retain the pluralistic cultural choices of science and carefully make trade-offs and choices between different value orientations in science, balance various values and promote the healthy and sustainable development of science. Regarding the issue of ultimate value orientation of science, monism and pluralism are the most representative viewpoints. The conventional wisdom is generally in favor of monism, believing that science is dedicated to seeking the universality and unity of science. Those upholding pluralism claim that there is no definitive consensus, and the current diversity of methods that characterizes scientific investigation in many fields does not necessarily lead to deficiencies. At present, as the pursuit of diversity and pluralism has become the future direction and basic norm of the development of scientific culture, the viewpoint of pluralism has gained the upper hand in the realm of thought and won more and more support. For example, Agassi advocates deliberate pluralism, holding that diversity as a means of reasonable argument is an ideal thing. In his view, scientism is based on the desire to eliminate disputes by resorting to universal consent, while relativism and Pyrrhonism are based on the desire to eliminate disputes by resorting to narrow thoughts. Pluralism allows the unquestionable and the doubtful to join the debate. Therefore, pluralism is a combination of the best part of scientism and relativism. It is tolerant and therefore conforms to the promise of relativism; it eliminates isolation and therefore conforms to the promise of scientism.60 In fact, the pursuit of diversity has never been absent in the history of scientific development. In modern times, Leibniz constructed a pluralistic universe with “monads,” in which each monad is a living energy center, and the infinite richness and diversity of monads constitute the unity of the world. Today, we still hope to maintain cultural diversity and richness while pursuing the unity and universality of knowledge and realize the consistency and harmony of scientific diversity and unity in the pursuit of pluralistic values. But the question is: how do we achieve this goal and bring science into the horizon of cultural diversity? According to the Human Development Report 2004 produced by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), if an individual wants to become a member of a diverse society, he must abandon the paranoia and rigidity on the issue of identity, uphold tolerant global values and respect a wide range of human rights. Similarly, if science is to be truly integrated into the cultural trend in the era of globalization and diversification, it must abandon its paranoia and stubbornness toward its own dominance and superiority, support tolerant global values and respect the right of survival of other non-scientific cultures. Therefore, while taking multiple and complementary values as a guide and adhering to the principle of truth of science itself, the multiple values of science as a social culture also need to be taken into account. While developing a science culture, sufficient living

Diversified Value Choices 67 space should be preserved for other cultures. This is a cultural and value choice made by science for its own survival in this age of diversity. Feyerabend once commented that the world we live in is not static, but inhabited by some “ants” capable of thinking; they have gradually discovered its characteristics but have not affected it in any way. It is a dynamic and multi-faceted existence, influencing and reflecting the activities of its explorers. There used to be gods everywhere, but then it became a monotonous material world, and it may change again, as long as its inhabitants have the determination, wisdom and passion to do so.61 Back to the reality of science and technology, if we give up the single pursuit of consistency and unity in the development of science and technology, and adhere to the complementation of one-dimensionality and diversity, rigor and tolerance, we can restore a rich and diverse world.

Notes 1 D.R. Griffin, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004:10. 2 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:29. 3 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:29. 4 M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Translated by Xu Zemin, Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press, 2000:12. 5 R.S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Translated by Peng Wanhua, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000:32. 6 P. Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007:5. 7 R.S. Westfall, The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Translated by Peng Wanhua, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000:34. 8 D.R. Griffin, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004:4. 9 W.C. Dampier, History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001:12. 10 Jiang Qing, “Mind of Confucianism and Future Century.” Chinese Culture, 1995(11):63. 11 J.O.de La Mettrie, L’Homme Machine. Translated by Gu Shouguan, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:65. 12 Teaching & Research Office for History of Foreign Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Greco-Roman philosophy, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1957:138. 13 L.A. White, The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. Translated by Shen Yuan et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988:331. 14 E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics. Translated by Yu Hongjun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984:1–2. 15 A. Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Translated by Lu Jun et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003:28. 16 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:776. 17 B.K. Ridley, On Science. Translated by Li Bin et al., Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2007:57. 18 P. Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007:140.

68

Diversified Value Choices

19 R.G.A. Dolby, Uncertain Knowledge: An Image of Science for a Changing World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996:1. 20 R.H. Brown, The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin, Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998:111. 21 J.F. Coates, “21st Century Agenda for Technology Assessment.” Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 2001, 67(2):303–8. 22 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:18. 23 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:7–8. 24 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:55. 25 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:9. 26 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:2. 27 D.R. Griffin, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004:94. 28 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Wang Bingwen, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001:15–16. 29 M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Liang Jingdong et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003:289. 30 Gao Guang et al., A Study of the Early Works of Marx and Engels: From “Doctoral Dissertation” to “Germany Ideology,”. Beijing: CPC Central Party School Press, 1992:464–66. 31 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:152. 32 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:135. 33 K. Marx, Economics and Philosophy Manuscript in 1844. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005:88. 34 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:6. 35 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:329. 36 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:189. 37 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:491–92. 38 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:4. 39 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:647. 40 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:330. 41 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:189. 42 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:671.

Diversified Value Choices 69 43 S. Haack, Defending Science Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Translated by Zeng Guoping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008:308, 311. 44 E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man. Translated by Gan Yang, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1985:263. 45 J. Macquarrie, 20th Century Religious Thought. Translated by He Guanghu, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1989:300. 46 Li Xingmin, On the Value of Science. Guangming Daily, 2007-02-16 (11). 47 P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:1. 48 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:40–41. 49 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:148. 50 A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. Translated by He Qin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:13–14. 51 M.N. Richter, Jr., Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989:104–5. 52 S. Harding, Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002:170. 53 Liu Dachun ed., Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies: From Advocacy to Reconsideration, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009:239. 54 P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:12. 55 Li Xingmin, “What is Science?” Democracy & Science, 1998(2):45–47. 56 E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Gu Weiming et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988:7. 57 P. Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007:192. 58 P. Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007:192. 59 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:144. 60 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:173. 61 P. Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007:140.

2

Objectivity and Uniqueness

The pursuit of objective truth was once regarded as the ultimate goal of science; that’s why science as a kind of truth is inevitably characterized by objectivity and neutrality. Especially in the realm of classical scientific tradition, to realize and achieve the objectivity and absoluteness of truth has become the ultimate goal of all scientific research. However, when the individual and subjective factors in science arouse people’s attention, and when the concreteness and relativity of truth become prominent, the original pursuits of science will become less taken for granted. How to strike a balance between objectivity and uniqueness, and between absoluteness and relativity, has become a problem that must be paid attention to in the course of scientific inquiry at present.

2.1 Objectivity Parallels with Uniqueness Science is considered to be the most objective knowledge, and is often used as a synonym for “truth,” but there is no doubt that science is acquired through individual efforts and is inseparable from its background and subjectivity, which leads to questions about the objectivity of science. This is the main reason why the individuality and uniqueness of contemporary science are prominent and strongly affect the image-building process of contemporary science. 2.1.1  Multiple    Meanings and Nature of Scientific Objectivity Objectivity is the essential feature and one of the most basic attributes of science. From the ideal of objectivity pursued by the traditional philosophers of science to the attack and subversion of objectivity by postmodernists such as Rorty, philosophers of science have kept debating and discussing the objectivity of science. This not only affects the communication between cultures but also goes against the healthy development of science. According to the traditional viewpoint, scientific knowledge is an objective reflection of natural objects, with objectivity and value neutrality transcending subjective consciousness. This viewpoint usually ignores the social nature of science and ensures the objectivity of science in content through strict distinction from metaphysics and objective observation, and by following the principles DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-4

Objectivity and Uniqueness 71 confirmed by experience. However, when Hansen’s observation of penetration theory showed that observation is not an objective and neutral process, and Kuhn’s historicism introduced social and historical factors into the scientific process, the objectivity of science began to be questioned and challenged. Postmodernists go further to dispel the objectivity of science. Some of them hold that science is composed of pure scientific language, denying the objectivity of scientific knowledge from the perspective of meta-narrative; some of them regard objectivity as power, claiming that objectivity reflects the power of certain individuals or social groups, and the scientific community is more objective than other groups. It can be seen that objectivity is a complex, polysemous and indefinable concept. The competing meanings of objectivity have been discussed:1 objectivity can be described as an ability of individuals to make selfless and impartial judgments; sometimes objectivity is taken as the nature of a method, that is, a disciplinary judgment that influences knowledge and rules for the study of contingent forces. On a more professional and technical level, when there is a strong covariation between each other and the repeated measurement separately done by multiple investigators is passed, the measurement is objective and that measurement credibly shows a theory entity. As a nature of knowledge, objectivity means grasping some independent and externally tangible claims. At last, objectivity can be boiled down to a social and cultural system that is in some way more reliable and durable than individual beliefs. These explanations of objectivity, despite different emphases due to the multiple perspectives of method, knowledge and system, all give prominence to the “negativity” of science. Harding also noticed the complexity of objectivity. In her view, the old issue of objectivity requires taking a side with objectivity or relativism; while the new issue of objectivity is to take the issue itself as a subject to be explored, and a historical and cognitive issue to be explained. The new issue of objectivity can be interpreted from at least four dimensions: first, objectivity or non-objectivity is considered to be the attribute of certain individuals or groups, because people in certain groups and factions are too emotional to remain unprejudiced. Second, objectivity is considered to be the attribute of a knowledge hypothesis or of a statement. Third, objectivity is considered to be an attribute of methods or practices that people feel are fair. Fourth, objectivity is considered to be the structural attribute of certain knowledge quest communities, especially those dedicated to modern natural science research. In spite of this, the above four meanings of objectivity are merely the “tip of the iceberg.”2 Vollmer has established several criteria for the objectivity of science and holds that they are sufficient only when they are combined. First, comprehensibility between subjects: science is not a private affair, and vital scientific statements must be communicated to each other, so they must be expressed in some universal language. Second, independent of the frame of reference: the individual observer does not matter, nor does his position, state of consciousness and angle of view. Third, verifiability between subjects: anyone can verify the correctness of scientific statements with appropriate measures. Fourth, independent of methods: the correctness of a statement has nothing to do with the verification methods.

72

Objectivity and Uniqueness

Fifth, non-conventionality: the correctness of a statement is not based on a certain arbitrary action (such as a resolution or agreement).3 In a word, the objectivity of science means that it is closely related to the real world, and it is about the objectivity of reality. Based on these different understandings and characteristics of scientific cognitive activities, we can generally explain the objectivity of science from the categories of ontology, epistemology and axiology. The objectivity of ontology, namely the objectivity of objects, means that scientific theory takes objective reality, especially objective natural existence, as the research object, and its own substantiveness is independent of people’s perception of it. In other words, the objects of science are outside and independent of human consciousness. Whether people know it or not, it is a free and objective existence. The objectivity of epistemology mainly refers to the objectivity of methodology, that is, how to evaluate and judge some given aspects of substantiality, especially the objectivity related to cognition. It means that in the process of scientific inquiry, the objectivity of theory is attached to reality or object, not to a cognitive subject. Through empirical and rational methods which are fairly objective, as well as aesthetics methods which are objective to some extent, a scientific theory consistent with reality or experience is finally formed. In fact, it emphasizes a kind of intersubjectivity and conformity between subjectivity and objectivity. The objectivity of axiology mainly refers to the objectivity of scientists’ codes of conduct and value standards, meaning that scientists must use objective criteria and mechanisms to evaluate scientific theories and remain objective and neutral in the process of evaluation. In the process of knowing the world and seeking truth, scientists should always uphold an objective, fair and neutral position and attitude, and try to eliminate and mitigate the influence of personal interests and prejudices. This accords with Merton’s vision of science: disinterestedness is a norm of scientific inquiry, that is, scientific activities start from facts rather than from the subjective desires of individual scientists. In a certain sense, the objectivity of science in these categories has encountered challenges and doubts. For example, the factual load theory attempts to deny the ontological objectivity; social and cultural factors (such as prejudices and interest sects) in scientific activities weaken the epistemological objectivity and scientific misconduct (such as falsification) makes axiological objectivity severely criticized. However, this cannot and will not fundamentally shake and deny the objectivity of science, and objectivity will remain the most fundamental attribute and characteristic of science. This is because the object of science is always an objective reality independent of man; although scientific theory is the mental creation of scientists, it is not random or willful but reflects the objective characteristics of the research object, and thus has a certain degree of objectivity. Moreover, the repeatability, controllability and testability of scientific activities also provide support for and guarantee the objectivity of science. Therefore, the factual load theory cannot change the existence of things, the influence of social and cultural factors on the objectivity of science is relative and limited and the emotions or experiences of individual scientists will not fundamentally shake the

Objectivity and Uniqueness 73 objectivity of scientific theories. In short, the ideal and pursuit of objectivity are the foundation of all branches of science. Science is not made up without foundation, but based on fact; it is the objectivity of science that guarantees its reliability and predictability. To make it clear, objectivity of science is not an abstract philosophical quality but is deeply rooted in the cultural norms for social practices. Just like Karl Popper has pointed out, objectivity of science is not the product of the impartiality of individual scientists, but the social or public characteristics of the scientific approach; the impartiality of individual scientists is not the source of the objectivity of this social or institutionally organized science, but the result.4 According to his point of view, repeated experiments of such public experience will promote the objectivity and impartiality of science, and people should express their opinions based on their conjectures and from their respective standpoints, and then meet with others’ refutation, which is the only way to objectivity of science. Fundamentally speaking, the pursuit of objectivity of science is an effort to achieve consistency between theory and cognitive objects, between objectivity and subjectivity, on the basis of facts (or reality). 2.1.2 Individuality and Subjectivity of Science Individuality and subjectivity are attributes corresponding to objectivity. In the realm of cognition, subjectivity and objectivity are often abstractly separated and opposed, and they are considered to be two different knowledge claims and ways of being. In reality, subjectivity and objectivity, which are always given utterly different missions, are hard to coexist. For example, the discipline of natural science is characterized by a stylized research method and a pursuit of universal laws, so it is naturally endowed with the characteristics of objectivity; but the discipline of humanities, which is based on individual things, takes unique individuals as the object of cognition, and often achieves the comprehension and knowledge of their characteristics through experience, so individuality and subjectivity are considered to be attributes of the humanities. In spite of this, science, as a cognitive activity of people with subjective initiative, is bound to have subjective arbitrariness of individuals in the process of understanding and reflecting nature, so it also has a certain degree of individuality and subjectivity. As the fundamental attribute of science, objectivity is not only the basis and guarantee for the functioning of science but also an important feature that distinguishes science from other forms of cognition. There is no doubt about this. However, scientific practices and many studies on science have shown that science or scientific theories cannot be purely objective. Science is bound to have subjectivity, and this subjectivity or subjective factor is irreducible or indestructible in science and may be an inherent attribute of science in a sense. Nevertheless, objectivity holds a dominant position in science, hence making science assume the “guise” of objectivity, and subjectivity is often overlooked intentionally or unintentionally. All in all, the subjectivity of science exists objectively, or it is a

74

Objectivity and Uniqueness

kind of objective existence. It is not only embodied in scientific inquiry and social institution but also permeated in the structure of scientific theories.5 Moreover, no matter how we look at subjectivity in science, the existence of subjective factors is a fact and has long been recognized by people. When talking about objectivity and personal involvement in science, I.G. Barbour commented that the public holds a stereotyped idea that scientific research is objective, because it is determined by cognitive objects, not by cognitive subjects. However, for the sake of actual scientific work, this viewpoint about objectivity must be changed so that the media as experimenters, creative thinkers and scientists with their own personalities can play their role. The existence of research objects cannot be known without the intervention of observers, since they are under the influence of observers during the measurement process. The evaluation of theories is not done through the employment of formal rules, but through the personal judgment of scientists. Therefore, the concept of objectivity should not be discarded; instead, it should be reinterpreted in combination with the subjective role, so that objectivity could be reinterpreted as the testability between subjects and the recognition of generality.6 Regarding the specific scientific research process, from the acquisition of empirical facts to the establishment of scientific theories, and from the testing of theories to their evaluation, subjective factors are present everywhere. Scientific facts are the premise for the establishment of scientific theories and the starting point for scientific activities. They are generally obtained through observation and experiment. As far as observation is concerned, the objectivity of science is guaranteed by direct sensory observation in the natural state or observation with the aid of scientific instruments (independent of the object). But in this process, observation is a purposeful and planned activity, which is influenced by the observer’s theoretical background and way of thinking. The images that scientists observe in nature are closely related to the images in their minds, their concepts, thoughts and values;7 the scientific facts thus obtained will necessarily contain subjective factors and may not be purely objective. As far as experiments are concerned, their design and implementation are activities where people intentionally interfere, control or simulate natural things or phenomena. Each specific link demonstrates the subjective initiative of human beings, giving more prominence to the subjectivity of individuals. As the result of activities of subjects, scientific facts are inevitably characterized by subjectivity. In the process of sorting out scientific facts by scientific methods (such as induction, deduction and analogy) and forming scientific hypotheses, creating scientific concepts and theories on this basis, non-logical methods (such as imagination, intuition, modeling and metaphor) give full play to individuals’ subjective initiative, creativity and imagination. This is a process in which logical and non-logical methods interact in people’s minds, as well as a process in which individual thinking is free to create, which directly affects the formation of the final scientific theory. To be specific, the process of proposing scientific hypotheses is the stage where individual creativity is given play to the fullest extent, and it is also a critical stage for making creative scientific achievements; both

Objectivity and Uniqueness 75 the individuality and subjectivity of science play the most prominent role in this process. As for the subsequent selection of hypotheses and theories, interpretation of data and translation, in addition to objective evaluation criteria, imagination and a certain degree of personal preference and interest will also play a role. Finally, scientific theory, which is created on this basis, also has certain individuality and subjectivity. Besides, in the examination and evaluation stage after the formation and establishment of scientific theories, there is also a certain degree of subjectivity. It can be said that in the entire process of scientific research, methods such as imagination, intuition, inspiration and ideal experiments give free and full play to the subjective initiative of individuals. The choice of research objects and scientific hypotheses are directly related to individuals’ background knowledge, thinking ability, subjective experience and information sources. The combined effect of all this gives science the characteristics of individuality and subjectivity. Conversely, it is the existence of individuality and subjectivity that makes science not fall into monotonous unity while pursuing the ideal of objectivity and provides both power and source for scientific creation. Here, the individuality and subjectivity of science do not refer to the subjectivity of a single and isolated individual, but that of society, history and groups. Therefore, the individuality and subjectivity in science do not mean that science has a tendency to be purely private, individual and unreliable; and the free creation of thinking of individuals in the specific scientific research process does not obliterate the objectivity of science at all because no scientist creates scientific facts out of thin air; they only use unprocessed facts to create scientific facts. In other words, no scientist produces scientific facts freely and arbitrarily. What he has created with regard to facts is nothing but his language for expounding the facts. When he predicts a fact, he will use this language, and for those who speak and understand this language, his prediction is free of ambiguity. Moreover, such a prediction, once made, is clearly independent of scientists, whether or not it can be realized.8 In addition, while recognizing the individuality and subjectivity of science, we must also pay attention to the moderate balance between objectivity and subjectivity, and avoid overemphasizing the subjective dimension of science. For example, some postmodernist schools (including irrationalism, methodological anarchism, post-Kuhnism, strong programs of sociology of scientific knowledge, social constructivism and feminism) have pushed the subjectivity of science to extremes, not only denying the objectivity of science, but also claiming that scientific theories are subjective, fictitious, fabricated and irrelevant to the natural world, hence falling into the trap of subjectivism. This is extremely undesirable. 2.1.3 Unity of Objectivity and Uniqueness in Science The preceding analysis shows that science is not only objective but also individual and subjective. These characteristics are indispensable in scientific activities, and there is no opposition or contradiction between them. To be exact, it is

76

Objectivity and Uniqueness

the combination of objectivity and subjectivity that makes science possess unique attributes while pursuing unity and objectivity. Although the existence of subjective factors in scientific cognitive activities is an objective fact, this does not deny the objectivity of scientific knowledge. In specific scientific activities, the results of each scientific research are influenced by the memory and experience of individual scientists and restricted by their physical-psychological structure. So, when a scientist chooses and supports a scientific hypothesis, it may be purely from scientific considerations or from his preference for a theoretical form, or even from his intuition, which seems to be determined entirely by subjectivity. However, when he is about to put forward this hypothesis, he must provide corresponding evidence to prove its truth. It is this evidence related to facts that ensures the objectivity of science. When analyzing the relationship between the subjective experience of individuals and the objectivity of science, F.W. Ostwald pointed out that concepts always depend on individuals or subjective factors. In any case, this does not mean that an individual has added novel parts which are not found in experiences; on the contrary, it means that he makes different choices from among what has been discovered in experiences. If each individual could absorb all parts of experiences, then the personal or subjective differences will disappear. As more and more experiences are absorbed to complement diverse memories, the subjective deficiency in individual memories may be made up, and the subjective clearance in experiences may be filled, hence preventing subjectivity from doing harm.9 The uniqueness of science is closely related to individuality and subjectivity. When comparing scientific with non-scientific activities, the main implications of the uniqueness of science include: first, science is a body of knowledge with testability and objective truth. Second, science mainly employs the basic methods of observation, experiment, induction and deduction, with irrational methods serving as supplements. Third, science advocates the spirit and attitude of being practical and realistic, critical and skeptical, pioneering and innovative, rational and empirical, as well as free and open. As far as science itself is concerned, its uniqueness means that although science mainly pursues objectivity and universal laws, every research object is unique, and every scientific achievement, which is a creative result of individual subjective initiative, is utterly different from other scientific theories. Besides, the uniqueness of science does not affect or exclude the existence of objectivity because every event is unique in some respects, and no event – even those in physics labs – can be reproduced without the slightest error. But this does not rule out the existence of regular and reproducible factors.10 In fact, the pursuit of scientific objectivity is to find common regularities among things with different characteristics and to reproduce the unchanging elements in them. This is similar to the relationship between individuality and generality, particularity and universality. The two are mutually inclusive, permeable and interdependent. Individuality, subjectivity and uniqueness’s most prominent manifestation in science is creativity or originality. Based on the consistency viewpoint in the realm of science, Polanyi combines the originality and preciseness of science,

Objectivity and Uniqueness 77 arguing that there is no disharmony between the two. In his view, originality is the main characteristic of science, and the revolutionary characteristic of scientific progress is a well-known fact. At the same time, science has the tradition of closest integration with professions; this tradition is comparable to the Roman Catholic Church and the profession of law in terms of the continuity of doctrines and the power of collaborative spirit. The preciseness of science is as well-known as the radicalism of science. Science not only cultivates maximum originality but also imposes a special degree of strict criticism. The combination of personal creative passion with the desire to obey tradition and regulation is an inevitable result of the spiritual reality of science. When a scientist explores and discovers out of his intuition, what he seeks is contact with such a reality in which all other scientists can participate in his work. It is his most personal behaviors, which are from his intuition and conscience, that make him closely integrated with the universal system and norms of science. The advancement of science on the whole is attributed to the power of individual impulse, but this impulse is only respected by science when it is devoted to scientific tradition and obeys scientific standards.11 Here, through combination with regularity, the originality of science unites with individuality, subjectivity, uniqueness, universality and objectivity, and promotes the development of science. I.G. Barbour has tried to show that subjectivity and objectivity play an important role in all research; there is personal involvement of subjects in every field, and it is untenable to set universal events against unique events. According to him, any generalization is abstracted from the individuality and wholeness of specific individuals. When dealing with the issues of objectivity and personal involvement, regularity and uniqueness, we must avoid making mistakes arising from either positivism or existentialism. Objectivity, as inter-subject testability, does not exclude personal involvement, while uniqueness, as a concern for special gestalts, does not exclude recognition of regular patterns. Both subject and object contribute to knowledge in all fields, and all events can be regarded as unique or regular.12 And the standpoint of Whitehead in this regard, which is expressed in his theory of critical realism, explicitly reveals the unity of objectivity and uniqueness in science. He acknowledges the role of subject and object in knowledge, both uniqueness and regularity are important concepts in his thoughts. He takes reality as something truly pluralistic, even though every entity is constituted by its interrelationships. At every moment, every entity is creating itself, and all of them have characteristics and individuality. However, this spontaneity and novelty are produced in a regular structure. Scientists can abstract and select these regular patterns from concrete scenarios of the world and create symbolic systems to represent them.13 In other words, uniqueness is formed on the basis of objectivity, and objectivity is abstracted from a multitude of concrete peculiarities. In actual scientific activities, objectivity and uniqueness are intersected and unified with each other. For the sake of objectivity, John Ziman also makes wide-angle close-ups of natural sciences and humanities from a naturalistic standpoint, not only acknowledging their unique value, but also revealing their own rationality, credibility and

78

Objectivity and Uniqueness

limitations of universality. According to him, academic science strives to achieve the objectivity of consensus by integrating these interests into a collective process. Therefore, disinterested norms naturally combine communitarian and universalist norms to eliminate subjective factors in scientific knowledge and turn it into a real public product.14 In short, no matter from the perspective of specific scientific research activities or from the basic standpoint, a consensus has been reached on the unity of scientific objectivity and uniqueness. The combination of the two will also become an important principle to be followed for promoting the development of science.

2.2 Objectivity and Relativity of Truth Objectivity, absoluteness and relativity of truth are major topics in philosophical and scientific epistemology. How to look at absoluteness and relativity of truth is an important foundation for correctly grasping objectivity of science. 2.2.1  Objectivity    of Scientific Truth The objectivity of scientific truth involves the understanding of truth itself and whether science is truth, as well as the understanding of scientific truth and its objectivity. But the first question is how to look at truth and scientific truth. Truth is the core issue of philosophical epistemology, and there are three representative viewpoints in this regard: the first is the correspondence theory of truth which, on the basis of the relationship between knowledge and object, defines the essence of the truth of knowledge as the correspondence between knowledge and its object. The second is the coherence theory of truth which, on the basis of the logical relationship between knowledge (propositions), defines the essence of the truth of knowledge as the coherence of all parts of an entire belief or propositional system. The third is the pragmatic theory of truth which, on the basis of the relationship between knowledge and humans, defines the essence of the truth of knowledge as the usefulness of knowledge to humans. Among them, the first viewpoint (the correspondence theory of truth) is currently accepted by the majority of people, because it explains the meaning of truth from subject and object of cognition, and implies that truth is the objective content that transcends the desires and needs of specific individuals and groups in human cognition. Therefore, truth can be generally understood as conformity and consistency between the subjective and the objective. So, is science a truth? To what extent is it a truth? Traditional logical positivism holds that science is for the purpose of pursuing truth, and only truth can give us actual facts. As a cognitive system, science is considered to have nothing to do with value, apart from its own fundamental value of pursuing truth. The falsificationism of Karl Popper describes science as a process of trial and error. He believes that it is impossible for science to acquire absolute truth and that the process of scientific understanding is to constantly approach truth. Thomas Kuhn of historicism introduces social psychological factors into his view of scientific

Objectivity and Uniqueness 79 truth, arguing that scientific knowledge and theories are not reflections of objective truth, and scientific understanding is not a process of approaching truth, but the result of choices made by scientific communities and influenced by social and psychological factors. When it comes to postmodernists, science becomes an explanatory knowledge, no longer an ontological knowledge that reveals objective truth as held by those of scientism. The truth of scientific theory only exists in a certain context and relationship, and it is only a comprehensive and temporary dialogue. However, although later scholars go further and further on exploring the truth of science, even denying the objectivity and progress of science, and falling into relativism and subjectivism, they cannot obliterate one fact, that is, science has always been aimed at the pursuit of truth, and it has learned more and more about the laws of nature and the workings of the universe, and on this basis led to the rapid development of human society and the sharp increase of social wealth. So, there is no doubt that science is truthful. However, it cannot be said that science is equivalent to truth. In fact, science is not the whole truth, since scientific truth is only a result of people’s search for truth. In addition to science, people can obtain truth through other non-scientific methods. Scientific truth is an empirical fact obtained by using logical scientific methods or through verification. Unlike non-scientific truth, its criterion is a high degree of confirmation, that is, a high degree of agreement between experience and theory, and thus can be expressed as a high degree of probability. Scientific truth, like logical and mathematical truths, must be established in a theoretical system, so there is no separate scientific truth. When talking about scientific truth, Einstein pointed out that it is difficult to give an accurate meaning to the term “scientific truth.” The meaning of the word “truth” varies depending on whether we are talking about empirical facts, mathematical propositions or scientific theories.15 According to Einstein, empirical facts as truth are people’s correct understanding of objective facts in the external world. In the field of science, a scientist’s knowledge of a certain objective fact is based on his perception of external objective facts and on his rational construction of such sensory experience, thus forming a scientific concept of this objective fact. Therefore, only empirical facts expressed in scientific concepts can become scientific truths. The objectivity of scientific truth is largely determined by the objectivity of science. For example, regarding the objectivity of truth evaluation criteria, although scientific methods (such as observation and experiment) – mainly for testing the objectivity of scientific truth – are inevitably influenced by the infiltration of theories and ideas of thinking, the repeatability of observation and the repeatability and controllability of experiment can greatly reduce the interference of subjective factors, hence ensuring the objectivity of scientific truth. As far as the objectivity of truth content is concerned, the objectivity of scientific knowledge and truth is mostly manifested in the rules and laws of natural events, which is most obvious in basic sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology. At the same time, on the basis of these objective scientific truths, the further development and widespread successful application of science also demonstrate the objectivity of scientific

80 Objectivity and Uniqueness truths. Therefore, it can be said that the basis of the objectivity of scientific truth lies in the fact that scientists do not create scientific facts out of thin air; they only use unprocessed facts to produce scientific facts, that is, scientists cannot freely and arbitrarily produce scientific facts.16 However, between objectivity and truthfulness of science, we must make it clear that objectivity of science is nothing but a shared subjectivity, and it cannot provide a guarantee for the truthfulness of science because the truth of science has an extremely subjective root, that is, image. The objectivity of these truths is only real in the sense that they have been critically tested against other subjective phenomena, but they are by no means predestined or completely unchanged. These truths only form a reliable foundation for different groups to carry out more in-depth research activities. They can never absolutely guarantee the reality of a phenomenon, the explanations given by science and the strict conformity between people’s imagination of this reality. In this regard, the role of knowledge is more like a symbol system proposed for reality. As to whether this system is the only suitable one, or whether it strictly conforms to the interpretation of reality required by people, it does not need to be delved into. In any case, there is always something fishy about the basis of scientific claims; it seems that the cloth of knowledge may be torn apart at any time, and when it is woven again, we seem to be one step closer to reality.17 Finally, it needs to be noted that there have always been two different positions on the objectivity of scientific truth. One is the support and affirmation of scientists. For example, Schrödinger is a firm supporter of the objectivity of scientific truth. He insists that scientific theory is the description of objective existence, emphasizing the objectivity of scientific truth. He pointed out that once this truth is clarified in the end, it can be tested by experiments by anyone in the world, and always produce the same result; he went further to say that physics is the carrier of absolute objective truth. In his view, although modern science, especially quantum mechanics, highlights the subject factor in scientific truth, this new development has not changed the objectivity of scientific truth, which is still the basic aspect of the truth of scientific theory. The other one is postmodernist doubt or denial of the objectivity of science. For example, Rorty pointed out that science only has affinity, not objectivity. He believes that the so-called objectivity is actually an outdated concept based on essentialism and fundamentalism, and science and objectivity cannot be mixed together. The reason why science is highly trusted by people is that it has strong affinity, that is, science convinces people by reasoning, instead of overwhelming people by its power, and also by satisfying people’s curiosity. Similarly, the so-called truth does not have objectivity; it is nothing but a belief that one feels best and most credible or the nominalization of an adjective that expresses satisfaction. The preceding two different positions represent, to a certain extent, the debate between the current scientist camp and the postmodernist camp.

Objectivity and Uniqueness 81 2.2.2 Relativity of Concrete Truth Truth is always concrete. It means that truth is the conformity of the subjective to the objective at a certain time, place and condition. It is conditioned and changes with conditions. Without concrete time, place and condition, truth is abstract and meaningless. In terms of the notion, truth is a correct reflection of the laws of objective things which are always concrete, so truth is also concrete. Just like Lenin’s comment, “one of the basic principles of dialectics is that there is no such thing as abstract truth, truth is always concrete.”18 Scientific truth, as the main form of truth, is also concrete, historical and conditional. Each specific scientific truth always represents the level of understanding and spiritual essence of people at the time and therefore is not impeccable or perfect enough. In concrete scientific truths, and in concrete scientific concepts, laws and theoretical systems, although there are differences between truth and fallacy, their opposition is only relative. With the development of practice, the boundaries between them are constantly changing: a truth decays and another truth rises; a truth becomes a fallacy, and another truth emerges from a fallacy. The dynamic alternation and constant transformation of truth and fallacy is the process of truth formation and the development law of scientific truth. Marx pointed out that “the concrete concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects.”19 Similarly, Marx also affirmed that concrete truths should have the characteristics of “unity of diverse aspects,” which mainly stems from the diversity of objective cognition objects and the complexity of the environment to which they belong. Nothing is single or isolated, they always exist in mutual restriction and universal connection with other things. Therefore, concrete truth, which truly reflects the nature and regularity of things, cannot be a one-sided, separated and abstract definition, but should be the unity of various definitions of objective things. In other words, concrete truth is a comprehensive understanding of the inherent characteristics of things, their contradictions and aspects of contradictions, as well as various connections. The concreteness of truth is thus embodied in its systematicness and comprehensiveness, as well as in its procedurality. This kind of systematicness, comprehensiveness and procedurality also runs through concrete scientific truths. That is to say, when understanding the nature and laws of nature, science must reflect, as far as possible, all aspects relating to objects, so as to gain a unified understanding of multiple definitions of nature. At the same time, scientific cognition is a process of continuous evolution, and in this process learning about and understanding truths. As for the concreteness of truth, now that truth is people’s understanding of the objective material world to a certain extent under certain historical conditions, it only reflects people’s knowledge of a stage and a part of the complex and developing objective world, meaning that it has not and cannot be exhausted. Moreover, with the change in conditions and the improvement of people’s cognitive ability, truth will also change or grow to a certain extent. In this sense, truth is always relative, and it is impossible for people to obtain absolute and ultimate truth.

82 Objectivity and Uniqueness Besides, the so-called objectivity of scientific truth does not mean that science has absolute truth. Many famous scientists have reached consensus in this regard a long time ago. For example, Einstein acknowledged the existence of scientific truth, believing that perceptual experiences and materials are the basis for the formation of laws and truths; but he also stressed that laws can never be exact because we express them by means of concepts, which, even if they develop, will prove to be inadequate in the future. There are traces of absolutely correct dogma at the bottom of any topic and any proof.20 Moreover, perceptual experience is a given material; it is hypothetical and always subject to questioning and doubt, and it will never be the final conclusion. In his view, although science pursues reality and truth, there is only one way from perceptual material to reality and to reason, that is, the way of conscious or unconscious intellectual construction, which is completely free and arbitrary.21 In short, in the opinion of Einstein, scientific truth can also be understood as a phased or approximate truth. Concrete scientific truths are relative. This means that a concrete scientific conclusion cannot be always correct. As the result of scientific activities, scientific knowledge is simply the best explanation for a scientific problem or natural phenomenon that has not yet been falsified at that time; it is relatively stable and also temporary and variable. Therefore, although Popper does not deny the objectivity of truth, he insists that we cannot claim that we possess truth. In his view, we are searching for truth, but we don’t know when we will find it. For example, a climber has to conquer the difficulties in climbing, and he has no idea when he can reach the peak; it is possible that he can’t distinguish primary and secondary peaks, but this does not affect the existence of the peak.22 Looking at the history and law of scientific development, science is never intended to draw an absolute conclusion but to establish a relative frequency and a possible outcome. According to Popper’s falsificationism and critical rationalism, the process of scientific discovery is a process of constant trial and error; any scientific theory is tentative, temporary and speculative; it is a tentative hypothesis, and it will remain so all the time.23 According to his critical rationalist view of science, all scientific theories are relative and have no absolute authority. No matter how successful they are, and no matter how rigorously they are tested, they are all tentative hypotheses, and they are all fallible. Therefore, the development of science is a dynamic process of continuous revolution in which people constantly put forward new theories, discover and correct their mistakes and replace them with new and more suitable theories. What science provides can only be relative truths. The relativity of concrete scientific truth also means that the truth, which is obtained through the process of scientific cognition, is only relatively truthful. The objectivity and truth of science cannot ensure that the truths obtained by science are absolutely correct. In the process of scientific cognition, in addition to the subjective influence of individual scientists on specific experimental processes and on the formulation, selection and testing of hypotheses, which may weaken the absoluteness of scientific truth, the involvement of various social factors also makes it impossible for scientific truth to be absolute. Science is not value-neutral, so the process of scientific research is bound to be affected by various social

Objectivity and Uniqueness 83 factors such as politics, economy and even religion. As Bernard Barber pointed out, science may be affected by different social factors at different times; some factors are favorable, while others are not. This is an inevitable law. For science, nothing is separated from society.24 Being affected by different social factors of different degrees, scientific truth cannot fully and absolutely reveal the laws of the workings of nature and the universe. The repeatability of science is not absolute, either. Therefore, scientific truth is only a relative truth, and the objectivity of science only ensures the universality of the relative truth, but not the absolute truth. However, the fact that science is not absolutely truthful does not mean that the truth of science is denied. Science is still a correct reflection of the laws of objective things that are not transferred by human will and represents the highest achievement of the current level of human knowledge. At the same time, the relativity of scientific truth does not affect the value and significance of science. On the contrary, just because scientific truth is relative, it needs to be deepened and developed constantly, which provides power for science to seek progress and transcendence. In fact, the value of science lies not only in the fact that it provides truthful knowledge but also in the fact that such knowledge is constantly revised and improved. According to Harding, science always promises something better than truth; it makes a hypothesis a scientific judgment, rather than a quality of political dogma or religious belief; and it allows correction, possible negation, observations based on a scientific conceptual framework and/or all possible revisions in the future.25 2.2.3 Absolute Truth and Relative Truth According to the common point of view, absolute truth and relative truth are two philosophical categories in the dialectical development process of mankind to grasp objective truth, and they are used to indicate the degree of human knowledge of the objective world. “Absolute” generally means objective, universal, eternal and infinite, while “relative” means special, concrete, limited and conditional. Therefore, as a correct reflection of objective truth, absolute truth usually refers to people’s infinite and universal correct understanding of the objective world, while relative truth represents people’s limited, concrete and correct understanding of the objective world. In terms of the relationship between absolute truth and relative truth, dialectical materialism holds that truth is not only objective but also absolute and relative. As for the content of truth, it is objective; as for the process of knowing truth, it is a process of gradual deepening and infinite development from relativity to absoluteness. Engels once commented that absolute content is always contained in relative knowledge. In fact, all real and inquisitive knowledge lies in the fact that we raise individual matters in our thought from individuality to particularity, and then from particularity to universality. We seek out and ascertain the infinite from the finite, seek out and ascertain the permanent from the temporary. However, the form of universality is self-fulfilling, and therefore it is infinite; it combines

84 Objectivity and Uniqueness many finite things into one infinite thing. All the real knowledge of nature, as the knowledge of eternal and infinite things, is therefore absolute in nature.26 At the same time, relative truth can be transformed into absolute truth. Truth is a never-ending process of development from relativity to absoluteness. Any understanding of truth is a link in the process of transforming from relative truth to absolute truth. The dialectical unity of absolute truth and relative truth is closely related to the dialectical unity of supremacy and non-supremacy of human thinking ability and cognitive ability. According to Engels, on the one hand, the nature of human thinking must be regarded as absolute; on the other hand, human thinking is realized by individuals who are thinking in a completely limited way. This contradiction can only be resolved in the course of infinite progress, in what is, for us at least, a virtual interminable succession of human generations. In this sense, human thinking is supreme, but at the same time it is not supreme; its cognitive ability is infinite, but it is also limited. It is supreme and infinite according to its nature, mission, possibility and the ultimate purpose of history, while it is not supreme and limited according to its individual realization and the reality of each time.27 Therefore, in his view, absolute truth is defined on the basis of the nature, mission and ultimate goal of human thinking, while relative truth is based on the individual realization of human knowledge. In science, the relationship between absolute truth and relative truth actually reflects the relationship between the absoluteness and relativity of scientific truth. Most scientists have developed appropriate views and dialectical concepts in this regard. They acknowledge the relativity and absoluteness of truth; they are aware that truth has a process of development, that is, there must be a process for the understanding and mastery of truth, which is neither overnight nor impotent. Regarding the positive scientific results, they acknowledge their unequivocal truth and inevitable limitations. Therefore, the scientific truths that mankind can obtain are constantly developing with the times and the progress of scientific practice. For example, Mendeleev believed that science is infinite and the knowledge of truth is a process. He called the equivalent of absolute truth the “objective truth of God,” and the equivalent of relative truth the “objective truth of humans.” The two aspects, which are both objective, must be examined in a unified manner. Yukawa Hideki also believes that truth is a process without an end point, any truth is the result of a certain stage in the development of human cognition, and there is no absolutely unchanging knowledge in science. Heisenberg also acknowledges the relativity and absoluteness of scientific truth, as well as the unity of the two. As one of the founders of quantum mechanics, Heisenberg does not deny classical mechanics but stresses its applicable scope because it is no longer applicable outside this scope, and scientific knowledge always has applicable limits.28 Specifically, the relativity of scientific truth means that science always has a certain scope, a certain stage and a certain degree of knowledge. It is neither absolutely true nor fixed. Moreover, the process of scientific understanding is always affected by various personal and social factors, so it is impossible to achieve absolute objectivity. The absoluteness of scientific truth refers to the

Objectivity and Uniqueness 85 fact that the truth of science is always objective, and it will not change because of changing external conditions and people’s ideas. Moreover, science is a correct understanding based on empirical facts that reflects the laws of nature and the operation of things. In the process of understanding scientific truth, relativity and absoluteness exist at the same time, and their ultimate goal is to pursue the truth. The history of the development of science has shown that science is constantly approaching the truth. Early forms of science were the internal, self-consistent subjects of fabled knowledge, but as new facts were discovered and they lost their coherence with the outside world, they were about to be replaced. Undoubtedly, our science will lose its current consistency after future scientists make their discoveries. This is why today’s science is closer to the truth than the science of the Middle Ages, and the science of the 22nd century will be even closer. We are indeed closer to the truth than ever.29 The pursuit of objectivity and truth has always been the goal of science, and it is profoundly affecting the operation of the entire society. In the final analysis, searching for truth (undiscovered) relentlessly and taking objectivity (never attained) as our beacon have created an attitude that pervades the lives of scientific men and women. However, all scientific truths are temporary. In the opinion of Roger G. Newton, we are not seeking ultimate truth and eternal truth, but looking for temporary truth and approximate truth. We must admit that there are important differences between facts, theories, models, metaphors and analogies.30 In the field of philosophy of science, the understanding of scientific truth has undergone a transformation from absolute truth to relative truth. For a long time after the emergence of modern science, scientific empirical principles have occupied a dominant position. Consequently, an absolute view of scientific truth had kept prevailing until the 20th century; that is, there had been a general belief that observation, experiment and induction can enable people to obtain certain scientific knowledge and discover absolute scientific truths. After the scientific falsification principle was put forward by Karl Popper in the 1930s, the concept of absolute scientific truth was abandoned, and the relativity of scientific truth gained support in the process of continuous trial and error and falsification. Thanks to Popper, the absoluteness and relativity of scientific truth are unified. From a broader perspective, facts have shown that all scientific theories are relative truths, and they are only applicable within a certain scope. With the continuous expansion of the scope of knowledge and the constant development of science itself, they will one day be falsified when they are beyond the scope of application. However, we must not rule out the absoluteness of truth just because we approve the relativity of truth. Science is always the unity of absolute truth and relative truth, the unity of absoluteness and relativity of truth. Therefore, absolute truth and relative truth realize dialectical unity in concrete truth. As far as science is concerned, it is absolute and relative at the same time. As the result of human cognitive activities, science is the dialectical unity of absolute truth and relative truth, and it is constantly approaching absolute truth.

86

Objectivity and Uniqueness

2.3 Cultural Foundation of the Life World Science is always a product of culture, and at the same time, it must reflect the cultural environment and realistic foundation on which it depends. Therefore, it is impossible for scientific cognition and technical applications to exist without or beyond a certain social and cultural environment and objective foundation. 2.3.1  Context    of Scientific Understanding and Its Cultural Diversity According to the traditional view of science, scientific understanding is the academic activity of explaining the things, processes and relationships that occur in the natural world; through rational methods (such as observation, experiment and induction), the scientific knowledge obtained from this is completely determined by the natural world, so it is a pure and ideal thing free from being influenced by social processes and social variables. This completely isolates scientific cognition from value and sociocultural context, making it a single, abstract activity seeking objective truth. This concept lasted until the 1950s when Hansen’s observation of penetration theory began to challenge the ideal of objectivity pursued by the traditional view of science. After that, various irrational social and cultural factors were gradually introduced into the analysis of science. This is apparently different from the previous view that scientific cognition is fully regarded as an objective process independent of the social context. In the paradigm theory of scientific revolution proposed in response to the shortcomings of traditional positivism, Kuhn was the first to explicitly introduce social and psychological factors into science. In his view, the formation of new science is related to social, historical and psychological factors (such as the social and historical background of the new paradigm, the nationality and prestige of the proposer and the value evaluation criteria employed by scientific communities) and the new paradigm makes people feel perfect and therefore gives rise to aesthetic feelings. Therefore, when studying the choice of theory or paradigm, social, historical and psychological factors must be taken into account, even though scientists are rational. A system of values or ideologies must be described, and the institutions that deliver and reinforce it must also be analyzed. Therefore, in Kuhn’s view, the development of science is not only an inevitable result of rational knowledge itself but also affected by many accidental factors (historical and psychological). These accidental factors are not rational or logical, but irrational. From the second half of the 20th century, the social study of science has increasingly become an important subject in philosophy of science. A very important aspect is to pay attention to the social factors and cultural context of scientific knowledge. The main idea is that science is only an accidental and historical culture or form of life – there are no privileged communal and regional linguistic games that lead to objectivity and truth. Scientific knowledge is very much like the construction of other knowledge; it is regional and contextual, and may also be gendered and politically dubious.31 Specifically, after the early 1970s, science and

Objectivity and Uniqueness 87 technology studies (STS) began to examine the behavior of scientific communities and the relationship between scientific knowledge and social and cultural background from the perspective of “external history.” It shows that the production or manufacturing of science and technology is a social process, and social factors shape the production of all science and technology. In modern society, science is institutionalized, and the term “science” therefore includes institutions, networks and other social aspects related to the production of scientific knowledge.32 Sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), which was born in the United Kingdom, is the most prominent representative of the current social context analysis of scientific knowledge. Since the 1970s, SSK scholars have conducted in-depth research on the formation mechanism of human knowledge (including scientific knowledge) based on naturalism and relativism. SSK scholars replace preconceived theoretical analysis and normative research with practical observation, analysis and description of scientists and the process of scientific research, and oppose retrospective realist interpretations of scientific concepts. Moreover, with the “social construction of knowledge” as the core, they put forward a series of propositions against traditional rationalism and objectivity of knowledge, thus posing a powerful challenge to the traditional scientific outlook. At present, SSK is mainly divided into two major schools: one is dedicated to the “macroscopicdirectional consistent research,” which mainly studies the relationship between scientific knowledge and political, economic, cultural and other macro-social variables in a traditional way. The other is engaged in the “microcosmic-propensity genetic research,” caring about how scientists work on and talk about science and the role of social factors in the production of scientific knowledge. The latter school also deals with laboratory research, scientific debate research, conversation analysis research and reflexivity research. Take Michael Mulkay’s analysis of the social and cultural context of scientific knowledge as an example. Through the external cultural analysis of the scientific community, Mulkay has proven that the content of science is affected by social and cultural factors that arise outside of science and tried to illustrate the use of external cultural resources by science. In his view, the principle of uniformity in nature is best seen as part of the resources used by scientists to construct their interpretation of nature, rather than as assumptions made by sociologists about nature. The content of scientific facts should not be regarded as a reflection of the eternal external world that is not subject to cultural regulation. Social environmental factors connect with and influence science, which is sometimes established through direct social contact between scientists and outsiders, but it can also be established in very different ways by scientists in a specific period through the selection and interpretation of cultural resources generally obtained from a specific social member or a specific social class. Moreover, scientists’ knowledge claims are influenced by their status in a political environment, while political environment factors can be incorporated into scientists’ views on the natural world.33 It needs to be noted that there is an extreme tendency in the view of SSK; that is, it is believed that scientific facts are artificially constructed, they are the

88

Objectivity and Uniqueness

product of society and have nothing to do with nature, thus denying the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Such a viewpoint is wrong. Stephen Cole criticized this constructivist thinking from three aspects: first, they cannot explain why some results are accepted as core knowledge while others are ignored or rejected. Second, when analyzing problems, they confuse the influence of society with that of perception, so that their views are superfluous. Third, they cannot explain the connection between specific social factors and specific cognitive results, they just rest on general arguments, which need to be supported by concrete explanations.34 But in any case, scientific knowledge is dependent on social and cultural context, which has been confirmed. Social and cultural context of scientific knowledge is always non-singular, but of a kind of cultural diversity, which to some extent determines the cultural diversity of science and affects our understanding of science. Generally speaking, scientific content is organically constructed from materials produced from different cultures and integrated with scientific construction, but scientific content also comes from a variety of histories – regardless of whether they are shared by various nationalities – or from these historical backgrounds or their relationship with the world; it is in this organic way that it is possible to understand the full complexity of problems. For science, the cultural diversity of a cognitive context not only enriches scientific knowledge, but also puts forward higher requirements for the development and progress of science. It is precisely because of the diversity of cultural environments that science avoids monotony in the pursuit of objectivity, and gives rise to plural scientific forms in different societies. Moreover, now that scientific activities feed on cultures that have developed at different times and places, then the universality of science, which has acquired its meaning in contemporary science rooted in the West, should manifest itself not only in broadening the field of knowledge (especially through research on other disciplines), but also in deepening the logic peculiar to other different worlds of meaning (or knowledge).35 Through the analysis of the knowledge of life world and its diverse culture, Ziman stated that a neat mind finds cultural diversity is messy and “illogical.” But it is not an obstacle to science (not even an obstacle to humanities) that should be quickly removed in the name of reason and progress. On the contrary, it is a great glory of the world we live in, a natural phenomenon to be praised, maintained and explored.36 Similarly, for science, the cultural diversity of scientific knowledge context is also commendable. It will be very useful for enriching and developing our scientific knowledge. 2.3.2 Realistic Concern of Science and Return to the Life World As a human activity to explore the unknown on the basis of practice and experimentation, science and reality have always been closely related. Even in ancient times when knowledge was simply for knowledge’s sake, science entered people’s vision on the basis of a certain reality. In particular, with the expansion of the scale of scientific development and the improvement of the degree of institutionalization after the 20th century, science is no longer the work of curious

Objectivity and Uniqueness 89 gentlemen and some talented men sponsored by the rich, but becomes a business supported by giant industrial monopolies and the state.37 In this way, the relationship between science and the real society is closer, and even the entire research process is restricted by society. Regarding the purpose of scientific research, science is owned by mankind and ultimately for the benefit of mankind. As Bacon once said, the true and reasonable purpose of science is to benefit human life and enrich human life with new inventions and wealth. Einstein also pointed out that in order for labor to contribute to the development of human welfare, it is far from enough to thoroughly interpret practical science. When studying all technological improvements in detail, we should put the destiny of human beings at the first place. In order to make our intelligent creation a blessing to mankind, not a disaster, we should not ignore the unsolved problems in labor and welfare distribution. Don’t forget these practical problems because of our sketches and equations. In fact, science has indeed promoted the development of society with its immense power and brought convenience to real life. After the birth of modern natural science, the capitalist mode of production and Industrial Revolution not only accelerated the development of natural science, but also contributed to the occurrence of the first technological revolution. It can be said that with the expansion of capitalist production, scientific factors were consciously and widely developed, applied and reflected in our life, and their scale had been unimaginable in the past.38 The scientific and technological revolution has fundamentally changed the nature and structure of production, transportation, communication and information, and changed the way of life, daily life and human understanding of the world itself. The new material foundation it provides has greatly fueled the growth of social labor productivity, promoted remarkable social progress, and also made possible the development of personality. To date, the influence of science and technology has spread throughout all areas of human activities, from material life to spiritual enjoyment, from politics and economy to society and culture; science is ubiquitous. However, modern scientific knowledge, that is, the kind of knowledge created, preserved and used by scientists themselves, has become a holistic and organized knowledge, which is used as the required expertise for a specific set of professional roles. No one cares about its relationship to our ordinary culture and everyday understanding.39 Therefore, when we are enjoying what science has brought to us, the relationship between man and nature, man and man, as well as man and himself becomes tense. The reality is quite worrying: the nature that human beings have conquered and plundered by means of science and technology is now in a disastrous state, unable to realize its own virtuous cycle and renewal; what’s worse, it directly rewards human beings with various disasters caused by global problems such as environmental pollution and ecological imbalance. The contemporary society dominated by the logic of capital has been fully materialized and commercialized, and the relationship between people is even instrumentalized at the same time. High-tech life sciences such as cloning and genetic modification have caused moral crises. Mechanized and monotonous work and lifestyle have

90 Objectivity and Uniqueness caused people’s mental depression and pathological survival, making more and more people get lost and unable to find the meaning of survival. The science of seeking progress has given rise to the survival and spiritual crisis of human beings. Husserl described this situation as science in crisis and analyzed this crisis caused by European science. In his view, the popularity of positivism in the second half of the 19th century has caused modern people to be confused by the superficial prosperity of empirical science and let their entire worldview be dominated by empirical science. As a result, those issues that are vital to people are erased. The scientific world, which is idealized and deified by people, has deviated from the rationalist tradition that centers on life issues, and excluded human issues from the scientific world, hence leading to the domination of one-sided rationality and objectivity. Of course, this so-called crisis of science does not refer to the crisis of specific disciplines such as physics or mathematics, but refers to the cultural crisis caused by the social role of science. Fundamentally, it is a crisis of philosophy and a crisis of man himself. The essence is that science is separated from the existence of human beings, and therefore loses its meaning and even does harm to mankind. People who are superstitious in empirical science also lose the world of meaning and value.40 In a sense, it is precisely the development and prosperity of natural sciences that keep people away from the real life world. Returning to the life world is exactly what Husserl proposed to solve the current European scientific crisis. In his view, the life world is the forgotten basis of meaning in natural sciences. The existential meaning of the existing life world is the construction of the subject, the result of the empirical and pre-scientific life. The meaning of the world and the identification of its existence are self-formed in this life. Therefore, the most important world worthy of attention is the only real world that is actually given, experienced and able to be experienced through perception, namely our daily life world, which was surreptitiously replaced by Galileo with the conceptual world which is mathematically constituted.41 However, this world of daily life does not cover all of the life world; it is just a picture of people’s material existence because the most general structure of the form of the life world is things and the world on the one hand, and consciousness of things on the other hand;42 the two together constitute the fundamental validity of the life world. In other words, the so-called life world refers to the world of daily life and the world of spirit/meaning, and these two worlds were foreseen long before science came into being. Husserl believes that the return from the ideal scientific world to the pre-scientific life world is not only a return to the world of daily life, but also a return to the world of human spirit/meaning. In order to overcome the current scientific crisis, we want to put the primitive intuition in the first place, that is to say, we want to give priority to the life world, pre-scientific and outside science, which includes all practical life (including the scientific life of thought) and serves as a source of nourishment for the formation of technological meaning.43 The slight difference is that naturalism positions science in the life world, and believes that scientific knowledge actually exists in all the things that man knows about the world in which he lives, and life-world knowledge is omnipresent.

Objectivity and Uniqueness 91 This shows that the life world is directly related to the daily life reality, and the knowledge of the life world is even hidden in the reality. Therefore, to return to the life world is to return to reality. To be more precise, it is to return to the life world that starts from and ends with real people; only in this way can people get out of the current predicament of survival and development and solve scientific crises. 2.3.3 Science and Technology in the Perspective of Multiculturalism From a cultural perspective, science is always in a certain cultural context, and its generation and development cannot be separated from its own era and cultural background. In this sense, it can be said that science is the product of the culture of the times. Correspondingly, technology as a form of scientific application is always closely related to a specific culture. Different cultural backgrounds and different cultural choices determine the purpose and direction of technology application, and therefore also affect the specific form and development trend of science and technology. According to the historical logic of the evolution of science and technology, the development of science and technology has generally gone through several different cultural stages: the primitive period, the modern period, the contemporary period and the so-called postmodern period. Looking at the development of science and technology from these different cultural periods, it will be possible to have a deeper understanding of science and technology and find out its distinctive characteristics in different eras. 2.3.3.1 Primitive Period The science and technology we are talking about today originated from the survival practice of primitive people and was born in primitive culture. At that time, science had not been separated from other cultural traditions such as witchcraft and religion, and it was not an independent form of culture. Like religion and witchcraft, science was also created by human beings in the process of fighting for survival in the harsh natural environment. It was a product of man’s conquest of nature, and also a tool of conquest. Due to the backward productivity and the poor human intelligence, science was entangled with religion and witchcraft in most cases, so it was full of mystery. However, these three cultural forms are all products of the development of human civilization, and they all have the same significance to primitive humans. For example, the anthropologist Malinowski compares witchcraft, religion and science to the “the Triangle Constellation” of primitive humans: witchcraft gives people the courage to face the mysterious nature, religion empowers people to contend against nature and science has accumulated valuable experience in opening the way to nature. The mixing and interaction of science, witchcraft and religion constitute almost all of the empirical knowledge of primitive mankind. And the seeds of science began to be bred in the activities of primitive humans.

92

Objectivity and Uniqueness

Compared with science, the emergence of technology in primitive culture was more natural, and it was considered to be the inevitable result of primitive people’s survival practice. While science continued to grow in the interlocking relationship with witchcraft and religion and improve people’s spiritual living standards, the development of simple crafts, the discovery of fire and the improvement of tools laid another foundation for science through a less romantic but more reliable path.44 These techniques and skills, which were used in people’s real life and developed by primitive humans to fight for survival, constitute primitive knowledge as a form of skills and help form a material (or technical) tradition of science. From the perspective of primitive culture, science and technology are mainly embodied in spiritual things based on witchcraft and religion, as well as material things based on primitive skills. As the products of social progress, they can also satisfy the basic needs of human survival. 2.3.3.2 Modern Period Compared with primitive culture, modern culture is more scientific and rational, and science and technology began to grow and develop accordingly. After the Renaissance and the Reformation, modern science gradually broke through the suppression and shackles of religion and church, broke ground in the imprisoned medieval ideological and cultural field and opened a new page in the history of human civilization. As a result, science had made a lot of achievements, and technology began to grow and improve accordingly. Since the Enlightenment, rationality, freedom, equality and progress have become the new guiding principles of human activities, while science and rationality have become the most powerful means for human beings to pursue freedom, equality and progress. Especially since the 18th and 19th centuries, because of the great development of science and its extensive technical application in industrial production, as well as the increasing integration of science, technology and production, science, together with technology, has become a tool and means for mankind to obtain wealth and improve living standards. Therefore, in the modern period when science and rationality gradually eliminated the ignorance and mystery left from the primitive age, they ushered the entire mankind into a new period of civilization. More than that, science and rationality have become the basic characteristics of human culture. The science and technology that once existed for the needs of survival now has a new mission – to work for the welfare of mankind. 2.3.3.3 Contemporary Period In a less strict sense, contemporary culture and modern culture can be regarded as a kind of industrial culture, which regards scientific culture as the mainstream culture and uses it to seek the progress and development of human civilization. The slight difference is that contemporary culture is more mature than modern culture, and the cultural elements contained in it are more complex and diverse. When mankind enters the contemporary era, the achievements of science and

Objectivity and Uniqueness 93 its technology application have become more and more evident, the superiority of scientific culture has gradually gained universal recognition and has been regarded as one of the most outstanding cultural achievements of mankind. But at the same time, the dominance of science and the continuous emergence of negative effects caused by technology application have made people begin to doubt the superiority and effectiveness of science and technology. A paradox of modernity arises from this: the expansion of the scope, scale and depth of science promotes the development of human civilization, but the ethical and moral issues involved, as well as the negative consequences of technology application, seem to hinder the process of modern civilization. It can be said that people are full of confusion about science and technology in the contemporary period. Is it a means to promote social production and progress, or a tool to destroy mankind? In a word, science is not simplistic at all; there is no doubt about this. 2.3.3.4 Postmodern Period Postmodern culture, which is also known as postmodernist culture, post-industrial culture, information society culture, late-developed or transnational capitalist culture and post-capitalist culture, is a rebellion and sublation of contemporary culture. Strictly speaking, postmodern culture is not completely behind contemporary culture, but a new culture that arises in the soil of contemporary culture and coexists with it at the same time. It arises from thinking about various social problems in contemporary industrial society, and tries to deny and surpass the mainstream scientific culture of the contemporary period. In terms of its view of science, it opposes fundamentalism, essentialism, rationalism and centralism and declares that science is at the end of the contemporary era. In the opinion of those postmodernist thinkers, science itself is realist, trying to describe the true colors of things; it is also imperialist, intending to provide the only true statement. After all, the meaning of the word “science” is knowledge. What is not recognized by science is not considered to be knowledge in our culture.45 Therefore, in the perspective of postmodern culture, science and technology, which differs from the ignorant and mysterious primitive culture, and the utilitarian and instrumental modern culture, is to question the objectivity, universality and consistency of contemporary science, in order to seek pluralistic development and return to wholeness. Regarding the regional characteristics of the emergence, existence or development of science and technology, there can be Eastern science and Western science, colonial and post-colonial science and science of different religions and national cultures. The science we usually refer to is the modern and contemporary science that emerged and developed in the context of Western culture. To date, it has gone beyond the scope of Western culture and become an important way for countries and regions to seek development, and is widely respected and valued. As a special cultural and civilizational achievement of mankind, this science has the characteristics of objectivity and universality, and its results and applications are not restricted by time and space. In other words, as far as general science is

94

Objectivity and Uniqueness

concerned, it is universal, and there is no distinction between Eastern culture and Western culture. It is undeniable that science bred from the soil of the West is inevitably imprinted by Western culture. For example, the rational thinking that emphasizes analysis and verification, logical deduction and the scientific spirit of critical suspicion, truth-seeking and innovation is even regarded as the basic characteristic of Western culture represented by modern science. However, in different living conditions and cultural backgrounds, science and technology will inevitably absorb beneficial elements from different cultures, and its future development is bound to be influenced by different cultural traditions, hence there is science and technology in different cultural perspectives. For example, when science (here it refers to modern and contemporary Western science) was introduced to China in the 19th century, it grew and developed in the soil of Chinese traditional culture, and it began to have certain characteristics of Chinese traditional culture. Combining the holistic and dialectical thinking pattern of traditional Chinese culture with Western science, developing science and technology with Chinese characteristics, and then promoting the progress and development of the entire society, it has become our basic guideline on scientific and technological issues. The science and technology in Eastern culture combines traditional Chinese culture and specific national conditions and practices; it therefore has cultural characteristics that are different from analytical thinking in the context of Western culture. In short, it is richer, more substantial and diverse. In a nutshell, science and technology, as a special form of human culture, certainly has the characteristics of objectivity and universality. However, this universality does not affect the diversity of science and technology and its diversified development. On the contrary, it is necessary for every country and every region to absorb the beneficial elements of different traditions and cultures and develop science and technology with their own characteristics.

Notes 1 U. Segerstrale, Beyond the Science Wars: The Missing Discourse about Science and Society. Translated by Huang Ying et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:172–73. 2 S. Harding, Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002:171–72. 3 Shu Yuanzhao, Look at Cognition from the Perspective of Evolution – Study on Evolutionaere Erkenntnistheorie. Changsha: Hunan Education Publishing House, 2000:59–60. 4 K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. 2). Translated by Lu Heng et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1999:334, 336. 5 Li Xingmin. “On the Inevitable Subjectivity of Science.” Social Science, 2009 (1):111– 22. 6 I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al., Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993:226, 261–62.

Objectivity and Uniqueness 95 7 F. Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Translated by Zhu Runsheng, Beijing: Beijing Publishing Group, 1999:3. 8 H. Poincaré, The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988:320–21. 9 F.W. Ostwald, Grundrisse der Naturphilosophie. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2000:15. 10 I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al., Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993:250. 11 M. Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty. Translated by Feng Yinjiang, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2002:43–44. 12 I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al., Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993:226, 261–62. 13 I.G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al., Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993:263. 14 J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Translated by Zeng Guoping et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2002:189. 15 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:244. 16 H. Poincaré, The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988:320. 17 J.F. Doucet, “Scientific Objectivity is Simply a Shared Subjectivity.” Translated by Bai Jianming, Impact of Science on Society, 1984(2/3):31–35. 18 Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1960:507. 19 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:18. 20 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:205. 21 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:512. 22 Qiu Renzong. Scientific Method and Scientific Dynamics. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2006:65. 23 K.R. Popper, Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987. 24 B. Barber, Science and The Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991:36. 25 S. Harding, Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002:194. 26 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:937–38. 27 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:463. 28 Cai Canjin, The Truth View of Foreign Natural Scientists. Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, 2001:6. 29 R.G. Newton, The Truth of Science: Physical Theories and Reality. Translated by Wu Jike, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2001:214–15. 30 R.G. Newton, The Truth of Science: Physical Theories and Reality. Translated by Wu Jike, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2001:224. 31 U. Segerstrale, Beyond the Science Wars: The Missing Discourse about Science and Society. Translated by Huang Ying et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:174. 32 D.J. Hess, Science and Technology in a Multicultural World: The Cultural Politics of Facts and Artifacts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995:1.

96

Objectivity and Uniqueness

33 M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:156–57. 34 S. Cole, Making Science: Between Nature and Society. Translated by Lin Jiancheng et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2001:39. 35 Bonaventure MV-ONDO, “Scientific Rationality and Cultural Diversity.” Translated by Xiao Junming, Diogenes, 2009(1):25–39. 36 J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Translated by Zeng Guoping et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2002:369. 37 J. D. Bernal, Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2003:xiii. 38 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:572. 39 B. Barnes, About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:29. 40 Yi Junqing, “The Return of Reason to the Life World – An Important Turn of Philosophy in the 20th Century.” Social Sciences in China, 1994(2):115–27. 41 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Zhang Qingxiong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1988:58. 42 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Wang Bingwen, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001:171. 43 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:70. 44 W.C. Dampier, History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001:22. 45 D.R. Griffin, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004:8.

3

Universality and Locality

Among the characteristics of scientific knowledge, universality and locality are two extremes. The traditional view emphasizes that science is universal, unified and complete, with the pursuit of universality as the ultimate value orientation; the current alternative view advocates the local and individual characteristics of science, holding that the main task of science is to investigate local characteristics. How to find a balance between these two seemingly different value pursuits is what science needs to pay special attention to in the development process. In addition, the status of science in human culture is also changing in this process. How do universality and locality affect the cultural status of science, and what is the relationship between tradition and modernity? This is also worthy of attention.

3.1 Connection between Universality and Locality Is science a universal truth, or just a kind of local knowledge? The answer to this question has become a hot topic on the nature of science in the field of philosophy of science in recent years. To ensure that the debate could be carried out in a healthy way, we must first clarify what the universality or locality of science is and why science becomes universal or local. 3.1.1 Universality of Science Universality is an important scientific feature and principle closely related to objectivity. Like objectivity, it is also a core concept of the traditional view of science and is often used as an important representation of the superiority of science to other non-scientific cultural forms. So, what is the universality of science? According to Robert K. Merton, universality ranks first in the spiritual temperament of science, and together with publicity, selflessness and organized skepticism, constitutes the spiritual temperament of modern science. The universality of science is first manifested in this way: claims of truth, regardless of their origin, must obey predetermined impersonal standards, that is, be consistent with observations and previously proven knowledge. In this sense, the expressions that are confirmed by science involve objective results and interrelationships, and this situation is in conflict with any attempt to impose special validity standards on DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-5

98 Universality and Locality others.1 From this point of view, universality is fundamentally an impersonal feature, and it also includes related features such as scientific internationality and actual anonymity. Another meaning of universality is that various occupations should be open to talented people. In other words, everyone should have an equal opportunity to strive for scientific success and evaluation should be based on the quality of their work, instead of being biased. In this way, Merton divides the universality of science into the universality at the level of knowledge (the universality of science as a body of knowledge) and the universality at the level of sociology (the universality of science as a social system). In the field of science, the universality of science is generally interpreted from the dimensions of epistemology and sociology. In terms of epistemology, scientific universality is to say that scientific theories and results are obtained by employing universal scientific methods, and they are expressed in mathematical language and theoretical terms; the same understanding can be gained from everyone, while the objective consistency and testability with the cognitive objects provide a guarantee for this. As mentioned in the previous analysis of objectivity, individual and subjective factors always impose a certain influence on the process of scientific understanding. Repeatability and testability only guarantee the objectivity of science based on facts, but cannot guarantee absolute objectivity. Likewise, absolute universality without particularity and difference is impossible to achieve in scientific understanding. Therefore, from the perspective of epistemology, what the universality of science expresses is not a fact, but an ideal and pursuit. The possibility of this ideal becoming a reality largely depends on the amount of knowledge that humans have. From a sociological perspective, the universality of science requires people to have equal rights to conduct scientific research and express academic opinions. People’s contributions to science cannot be excluded because of race, country, religion, social status or other irrelevant criteria. Although science may be elite and self-interested to the layman, the scientific community is keen to treat its members democratically and fairly.2 It also means that science does not belong to the category of superstructure and ideology; it insists on scientific practice standards, so it is free and independent, which is directly related to the truth and objectivity of science. The place of universality in science is undoubtedly very important. The rapid development of science and its status as the first productive force to promote social development owes much to universality. To a certain extent, it is this universal spirit of science without borders that promotes the continuous progress of science under the impetus of its technological application. In particular, when the value of internal motivation for cultural and social development is correctly emphasized, when the rich content brought by differences to the common cultural property are properly highlighted and when the particularities of social groups, languages and organizational structures are revealed as the collective strengths of humans that cannot be abandoned (for the first time in human history, precisely as a result of scientific and technological activities, people can and should consider their destiny in universal solidarity), the universality of science is particularly important. At the same time, the universality of science not only plays an important role at

Universality and Locality 99 the practical level but also benefits the progress and development of knowledge. Chalmers said that whether we think of science as the control of matter or the understanding it provides, universality is one of its unique characteristics.3 It is the universality of theories that makes science distinct and far stronger than medieval technology. It is also science that has led us to improve the means by which we actually control the physical world, which is hard to deny in the modern world of computers, heart transplants and nuclear power. He also defined the goal of physical science as the establishment of universal knowledge, believing that universality can be the goal pursued by science because science can be, and has been, practiced in a way that serves the purport of intellectual production rather than in a manner subordinate to other individuals, classes and ideological interests.4 However, this does not mean that the universality of science is pure, without any conditions and restrictions, nor does it mean that we can magnify it infinitely. On the contrary, overemphasizing the universality of science is not a good thing for the development of science because it will suppress the originality of science and may create an abstract single world. The traditional view of universality in philosophy of science is one of universalism. It regards universality as the inherent quality of science itself, opposes the description of science as local and practical knowledge, claims that scientific knowledge removes contextual references and can be extended beyond the laboratory and is unconditionally applicable to all fields. The awareness of the locality of science that has emerged in recent years has greatly challenged this universalist view. Among them, the most representative is the micro-science research conducted by social constructivism and the philosophy of scientific practice. In their view, universality is not the innate nature of scientific knowledge, but only a kind of “local universality” obtained by extending the strategy of standardization outside the laboratory. For example, the American philosopher of science Joseph Rouse regards universality as a kind of standardization, that is, the standardization of scientific issues, tools, procedures and structures. On the one hand, it is to realize the transformation of things themselves, so as to become usable outside the initial laboratory scene; on the other hand, it is to develop more general explanations so as to be accepted by laymen. Here, universality is no longer unconditional, but the result of standardization of local knowledge. The study of universality and locality of scientific knowledge from the perspective of constructivism has become the subject of discussion on the issue of scientific knowledge, which helps people form a new understanding of the universality of science. Therefore, in order to fully and accurately understand the universality of science, it is necessary to understand the constructional and local characteristics reflected in the generation process of scientific knowledge, and on this basis to clarify the relationship between the two characteristics. 3.1.2   Constructiveness of Scientific Knowledge The construction of scientific knowledge mainly involves the sociocultural construction at the macro level and the laboratory (or situational) construction at the

100

Universality and Locality

micro level. In the preceding analysis of the context of scientific knowledge from the sociocultural level, we have briefly explained the construction characteristics of scientific knowledge at the macro level; such construction characteristics at the micro level are to be unfolded as follows. Unlike the traditional view of science which regards science as an activity of discovering facts, the viewpoint of constructivism holds that science is a process of constructing scientific knowledge, in which it is no longer a passive discoverer, but an active participant in the whole process of knowledge production. In the specific process of knowledge generation, the constructiveness of scientific knowledge is mainly reflected in the laboratory – the place for constructing the microcosm of phenomena.5 Moreover, scientific progress is largely consistent with the successful construction of new phenomena by scientists. As one of the important representatives of SSK, the viewpoints of Karin D. Knorr-Cetina have attracted considerable attention. In her classic book The Manufacture of Knowledge, she tries to show that in addition to scientific theories, scientific facts – a solid foundation of scientific knowledge – are also constructed by scientists in laboratories, and this kind of construction is permeated by decisions. In her view, the production process of scientific knowledge is constructive, not descriptive; it is a chain of decisions and negotiations. Specifically, scientific achievements are concrete constructions in terms of context; these constructions bear the signs of circumstance contingency and interest structure in the process of creating scientific achievements. Without analyzing these constructions, it is impossible to fully understand these scientific achievements.6 Furthermore, this construction of scientific knowledge can be divided into two successive processes, namely, the construction of knowledge in a laboratory (or the construction of scientific facts) and the construction of scientific papers. The construction of knowledge in a laboratory is the production and reproduction process of research. Constructivists generally do not recognize the existence of original, naked facts, nor do they recognize the existence of such facts as scientific objectivity and reality, and maintain that facts are constructed in a laboratory. For example, Knorr-Cetina believes that the construction of knowledge in a laboratory is permeated by decisions and characterized by strong contingency and uncertainty; science is embedded in society and the environment, and scientists’ decisions have become a part of this context. It is in this complex process of reconstruction of scientific knowledge that science has the ability to innovate on the one hand, and it is increasingly able to construct and rebuild itself on the other hand. So, it can be said that scientific facts are constructed by scientists in a laboratory. The realization of this process is mainly carried out through major mechanisms such as decision-making, negotiation and discourse interaction. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar also conducted on-the-spot investigations of laboratory life, and after discourse analysis of the conversations, they believed that the scientific facts produced in the laboratory are constructed by scientists based on the marks of scientific instruments and are artificial facts.

Universality and Locality 101 The construction of scientific papers mainly involves the complex construction process from the first draft to the final draft. Published papers are usually multihybrids created by the author and his target readers. Moreover, a published paper is not a final work in any reasonable sense of the word “final.” Scientific papers not only conceal but also proactively and falsely describe what has happened in the laboratory. Therefore, published papers, which are final drafts, often conceal literary intentions, conceal the discussions between the author and others and conceal the interference of power. Here, the integration and division of interests always play an important role, because the choice of laboratory not only pre-sets a combination of interests for those scientists who establish research as a resource but also pre-sets a possible split of interests for those scientists whose research activities themselves depend on their resources.7 Judging from the concrete occurrence of this constructive activity in the laboratory, it mainly achieves this result through two different forms. First, through a series of scientific practices such as isolation, intervention and tracking in the laboratory, the objects of scientific activities are constructed in a consistent situation and separated from other influences. Among them, “isolation” is the internal isolation of all elements of the laboratory, so as to isolate the experiment from any related external causal influences, so that we can manipulate it in a specific way; “intervention” is the intentional introduction of new objects or systemic environments with causal effects into the control environment, thereby creating new research fields; “tracking” involves the control of the entire experimental process from the beginning of construction. “Tracking” is not only about monitoring the results of experiments but more importantly about monitoring the normal operation of things. Designing an experiment so that it can be tracked is an important part of the process. The actual monitoring activities are not so much thematic perceptual behaviors as they are the sight-seeking attention to the entire process of the event.8 Through a series of operations on the experimental object, an unnatural object with a certain kind of human prescriptiveness is constructed. The scientific knowledge gained from the knowledge of this object in the laboratory is thus the knowledge of the constructive object through human intervention. Second, the constructiveness of scientific knowledge is also embodied in the aspect of obtaining scientific knowledge by creating new laboratory objects that do not exist. Existing studies have shown that a lot of scientific knowledge is not just discovered, but generated in the laboratory. Knorr-Cetina agrees with Roy Bhaskar’s “transcendental realism” about the constitutive role of science, believing the experimenter is the causal agent of a series of created events, and the correlation between events is not provided to us in advance but created by us.9 According to Knorr-Cetina, laboratory studies have shown that scientific objects are not only technically created in the laboratory, but also symbolically and politically constructed. In the process of reaching the goal, research has not only intervened in the natural world but also deeply intervened in society. The scientific achievements have finally been regarded as cultural entities rather than things discovered by science and purely given to people by nature.10 It can be seen that what

102 Universality and Locality is created in the production process of scientific knowledge not only includes the objects of scientific knowledge but also creates the connections between objects and between objects and other things. The generated scientific knowledge is the constructive knowledge about these created objects and relationships. Constructivists have examined the process of scientific knowledge generation from laboratory practice, which deepens and expands our understanding of scientific knowledge. However, the overemphasis on the constructiveness of scientific knowledge and the questioning of the objectivity and universality of science also put it at risk of slipping into relativism. In addition, through the constructive study of the process of scientific knowledge generation at the micro level (and the attention paid to the sociocultural construction of scientific knowledge at the macro level), the constructiveness of scientific knowledge is emphasized and the thinking of locality on scientific knowledge is triggered. 3.1.3  Locality    of Scientific Knowledge and Its Significance Locality is a scientific feature opposed to universality. Through the analysis of the constructiveness of scientific knowledge, constructivists have come to the conclusion that scientific knowledge is of locality. Therefore, the locality of scientific knowledge is first determined by the constructiveness in the process of its generation. The analysis of the constructiveness of scientific knowledge has shown that the construction made in the laboratory is a construction of locality. As scientific knowledge produced in the laboratory, it is bound to bear an imprint of locality. In different philosophical contexts, “local knowledge” often means different things. Generally speaking, its meaning can be divided into three types: “colonial” (corresponding to “Western”), “premodern” (corresponding to “modern”) and “contextualized” (corresponding to “universal”). The locality in the philosophy of scientific practice is mainly “contextualized,” which means that knowledge is always generated and defended in a specific situation. Therefore, instead of focusing on general guidelines, our investigation of knowledge should focus on how to form specific contextual conditions of knowledge. These specific situations include specific cultures, values, interests and the resulting positions and perspectives, etc.11 According to Joseph Rouse, scientific knowledge is fundamentally local knowledge, which is embodied in practices. These practices cannot be completely abstracted into theories or rules independent of context for use. Science is not so much about the decontextualized understanding of isolated things, but rather it must be carefully grasped in the world of hands-on tools.12 This is because laboratory operations that create or transform phenomena through the practice of isolation, intervention or tracking always reflect the local, accidental and characteristic scenarios of knowledge production. From the perspective of laboratory practice and the specific process of knowledge production, this local characteristic is more

Universality and Locality 103 obvious: first of all, local laboratory sites are places where empirical characteristics of science can be constructed, and such construction is achieved through the local and practical knowledge of experimenters. The knowledge generated in the laboratory is extended beyond the laboratory not through generalization of universal laws (which can be exemplified in other places), but through the application of practices in a local context to another local context. Secondly, scientific discourse and its evaluation are also local and subordinate to a specific social situation. Through consultations within the scientific community capable of self-determination in behavior, scientific propositions have gained meaning and epistemological status. The reasonable acceptability standard varies with the circumstances in which scientific claims appear and with the practical interests that govern them. In addition, the application of scientific knowledge also involves local and existential knowledge, which is in the exploratory grasp of shaping institutions, social roles, tools and practices, making science an understandable activity in our world.13 Knorr-Cetina agrees with Rouse that science must be carefully grasped in the world of hands-on tools, and believes that the self-other-things reconstruction in the laboratory is a local reconstruction. This “reconstruction” not only shows that the power of the laboratory is the power of local things but also means the reconstruction of local methods and resources, surrounding instruments, existing chemical materials and skills and experiences to be offered on site.14 Therefore, the choice of laboratory is local; it depends on both the research context and the specific research. Many studies have shown this. For example, the dependence on local materials, the replacement of instruments and chemical materials and the thoughts implied by local events or materials can prove the “opportunism” of this kind of research. In addition, Knorr-Cetina also gave a “local” account of the scientific method that traditionalists are so proud of. In her view, the scientific method is not a non-local universal paradigm but a practical form of local positioning and local diffusion. The scientific method is contextual, not metacontextual. Just like other forms of social life, it can also be seen as rooted in the scene of social action.15 In addition to the construction of scientific knowledge at the micro level of the laboratory that may lead to the locality of science, at the macro level of social culture, the specific sociocultural background from which science is generated will also produce the locality of science. Although traditional scientific viewpoints do their best to eliminate the interference of social factors to ensure the objectivity and universality of science, they cannot avoid the local socio-cultural influence in the process of scientific knowledge generation. From the selection of research subjects to the final knowledge construction, the production and development of scientific knowledge are inseparable from certain sociocultural conditions, so it will always be affected by the sociocultural environment where it is produced and will be deeply stamped with the local social imprint. In a certain sense, it can be said that scientific knowledge itself is the cultural product of a specific society, and it is a reflection of culture.

104

Universality and Locality

From the post-colonialist and feminist perspectives, Sandra Harding’s sociocultural analysis shows that the knowledge system is always “local,” echoing and carrying the traces of interests and concerns; such interests and concerns may or may not be shared by people in other cultures. Fortunately, enough of this part is usually shareable and can promote fruitful dialogue and exchange of useful information between different cultures. Also fortunately, we are now beginning to realize that those cultural differences often function as toolboxes for organizing the production of knowledge, rather than merely as cages in the traditional philosophy of science. It is also in this sense, like the systemic knowledge traditions of other cultures, that modern science and technology is a local knowledge system in several important respects.16 Both the micro-research in the laboratory and the macro-analysis at the sociocultural level have shown that scientific knowledge is local. For the long-held view of scientific universality, this understanding is undoubtedly very shocking, but at the same time, it also provides a new perspective for our understanding of scientific knowledge. Therefore, scientific knowledge is local. The primary significance of this understanding is that it blatantly challenges the traditional view that scientific claims are standardized and universally effective, so that science is brought back from myth to reality with irrefutable facts, which provides epistemological support and a basis for restricting the hegemonic behavior of science and gives other non-scientific cultures the right to survive. Its significance is that the shaping of locality gives birth to special advantages and opportunities so that scientific objects have the advantages and opportunities for greater success in a broader context. More importantly, locality also tells us that knowledge comes from practice, and practice is concrete. Past attempts to replace local practices with science may encounter setbacks and challenges. In short, for the long-term development of science in human culture and the growth of its own knowledge, this understanding of the locality of scientific knowledge is quite beneficial. 3.1.4 Science Is the Unity of Universality and Locality Regarding the understanding of the universality and locality of science, the traditional philosophy of science believes that scientific propositions and procedures are universally valid, from which various local characteristics can be deduced, while the local environment is only an accidental factor that produces particular results. In contrast, the philosophy of scientific practice and social constructivism believe that the scientific knowledge born in the laboratory is not universal; the extension of knowledge generated in the laboratory beyond the laboratory is not a deductive application of universal laws, but the application of knowledge in a new local context. The former claims the standardization and universal validity of scientific knowledge but rejects its locality, while the latter emphasizes the local choices contained in fact construction and the particularity of the laboratory in which the understanding takes place. It seems that the two characteristics of universality and locality cannot coexist in science, but this is not the case.

Universality and Locality 105 It needs to be pointed out that the universality of science does not conflict with its locality. As mentioned earlier, the universality of science does not deny the particularity and difference but indicates the impersonality and sociological fairness of science based on universal laws. In fact, since scientific knowledge is always produced in a particular social and cultural environment, it is inevitable to have local and difference components. In this sense, universality is based on locality. This local universality emphasizes that universality is always based on practical work, and arises from the localized negotiation process and the preexisting institutional, basic and material connections. At the same time, universality is always local universality. The realization of this local universality depends on how the standard manages the tension between transforming work practices and taking these practices as a basis.17 This is consistent with the view of Joseph Rouse on the standardization of local knowledge. However, although standardization eases the relationship between universality and locality to a certain extent, it is biased to regard the nature of scientific knowledge as locality. Moreover, although the locality of science is inevitable and is of great significance to universality, the universality of science cannot be denied because knowledge generated in a particular laboratory is to be accepted by the scientific community, not only inseparable from the application of standardized technology, but also in need of the help of abstract theories. These standardized technologies are essentially the results of transforming the abstract theories from early molecular biology experiments into conventional tools. Finally, the knowledge accepted by the scientific community is a non-contextual theoretical representation system, which is universal knowledge.18 In fact, it is precisely because science reflects objective laws based on facts that it can be shared and understood by all mankind and has universal applicability to all mankind, hence ensuring its universal validity. Universality remains the fundamental characteristic and inherent nature of science, which is consistent with the objective nature of science. From a cultural point of view, science is both local and universal. According to Susan Haack, science is culturally special in a sense: modern science emerged from a particular part of the world at a particular time, and for science to thrive, or even survive, it needs the right kind of cultural environment. However, science is not, in a sense, what Oswald Spengler imagined and what neo-cynics have recently re-hyped; it is just one of many cultural phenomena. Science remains universal, and more than just one kind in many senses: it is more or less a demonstration and amplification of the inquiry ability possessed by all human beings to some extent. Moreover, scientific discoveries of lasting importance can also emerge from local and temporary cultural endeavors.19 Science is not only a knowledge system with universal characteristics, but also inevitably bears the traces of the environment where it is born and has regional cultural characteristics. It is also for this reason that although modern science clearly belongs to Europe, it also has a universality that transcends Western culture. Science is the dialectical unity of universality and locality. Most scientific knowledge is both universal and not universal. Man-made and abstract scientific knowledge is not firmly rooted in a particular place, so it is universal in this sense.

106

Universality and Locality

Theoretical knowledge faces an idealized world; the manufacture of laboratory knowledge must be decontextualized and can be easily transferred from one place to another. The direct scope of scientific knowledge is limited to man-made and abstract fields – it comes from such a field, and in this sense, scientific knowledge is not universal, although it is always possible to extend.20 The ideal of universality is the most important representation of science as science, but this does not deny the uniqueness and significance of each region and nation in the process of developing science. Similarly, the characteristics of the locality are not meant to deny the universality of science.

3.2 Transmutation of Center and Edge Since science has become a kind of human culture, its status in society has been rapidly promoted, and it has surpassed other non-scientific cultures to become the dominant cultural form. However, with the growing importance of science as a center, criticism of all sorts has followed, and the call for multiculturalism is growing louder. But where exactly should science be located? 3.2.1 Science at the Center of Culture: a Traditional Perspective Today, science has a very prominent position in the entire human culture. But the formation and independence of science in human culture have gone through a long historical process. In the early stages of human civilization, science was not separated from religion, mythology, art, philosophy, etc., and the primitive and chaotic integrated culture was the characteristic of the culture at that time. Around the Middle Ages, a unified Christian cultural system was formed with religious theology as the center, and religion became the center of the entire cultural system. The Renaissance movement from the 14th to the 16th century made the humanities such as literature and art the center of human culture, science began to grow, and religious theology began to decline. By the 18th and 19th centuries, the social status of science and technology had rapidly promoted and achieved its own independent status. This was because, on the one hand, the establishment of Newtonian mechanics provided humans with the first knowledge system that describes the causal connection of nature in a quantitative form, showing the great power of scientific reason, thus establishing the independent image of science in the cultural system; on the other hand, the Industrial Revolution triggered by the technological revolution had ushered human society into a new period of civilization, demonstrating the great effect of science and technology in social progress, and thus establishing the independent image of science and technology in social civilization. In the 19th century, instead of toiling away in the hidden corners of empirical technology, science had begun to move ahead of it, thus opening the age of science. In the following century, the development of science and technology was faster than before, and the second and third industrial revolutions were of greater scale and influence than before. It can be said that by the first

Universality and Locality 107 half of the 20th century, the influence of science and its technology application had spread to all aspects of social production and life, and even dominated the development of social politics, economy and culture. These great achievements in science have never been realized by any culture in the history of human culture. Because of this, the status of science in society has rapidly been promoted, not only being respected but also becoming a driving force for the advancement of society. Compared with other non-scientific cultures in the history of human culture, science naturally has its advantages. The stimulus given by early capitalism to science ensures that the new science has an overwhelming advantage over everything that may come from the development of knowledge from all parties in the older cultural center. Take India and China for example; despite their earlier cultural achievements, they have not made any significant progress since the 16th century; being blocked by the economic and political encroachment of some foreign capitalist countries, they were not blossoming in later periods. From the 17th century to the start of the 20th century, science and intellectual culture became European patents and increasingly concentrated in those heavy industrial centers. Today we are seeing the beginning of the opposite process, that is, science and technology are widely scattered everywhere; this means that despite all efforts to keep it in the hands of the master of the Western Christian civilization, its benefits can still be accessed by people of all races and traditions. The problems in the relationship between science and society must be understood from the conflict between binding forces and liberating forces in today’s world, not from any imagined ideals and countries outside of time.21 It can be said that, as a universal knowledge system, science has become a real force in different cultures and has played a role. Of course, logical empiricists (or logical positivists) are still indispensable in constructing and establishing the position of science in culture. As the most loyal guardian and defender of science, logical empiricists first regarded science as the object of philosophical thinking and research, and also took it as the center of human culture and the model of civilization. Based on the principle of experience and verification, logical empiricists believe that science is empirical and about the knowledge of facts verified; the basis of science is empirical facts or observation statements, and observation is independent of theory; science has no value load and is value-neutral; the language of science is related to facts, it is a descriptive language, and therefore it is cognitively meaningful. In the view of logical empiricism, natural science is the only kind of science, and the only cognitively meaningful culture. They use a completely logical and empirical point of view to examine the entire science and the entire culture and emphasize the independence and importance of science. Starting from strict positivism, logical positivists construct a strong ideal scientific view of scientism for science and adhere to a basic position of scientism. It emphasizes that science is a unique culture, which has a clear boundary with other cultures such as literature and art; at the same time, it rejects metaphysics and insists that science and non-scientific cultures belong to two different worlds.

108

Universality and Locality

In this way, science is defined as the supreme center of the entire human culture, the only meaningful culture, and other non-scientific cultures must be based on it; the scientific method has become a universally applicable method in all disciplines including humanities and social science. According to this traditional positivist scientific view, the characteristics of testability and repeatability seem to ensure the completeness and absoluteness of the objectivity and universality of science, and “scientific” means “reasonable.” But the fact is that science is deified. Jean-François Lyotard of postmodernism knows this well. When examining the relationship between scientific knowledge and non-scientific knowledge (what he called narrative knowledge) from the perspective of pragmatics, he found that the two sometimes do not understand each other due to the different rules of the game, and this is quite normal. The forms of narrative knowledge usually do not use argumentation and evidence as the main means of actual communication, so they do not understand scientific discourse and adopt a tolerant attitude toward it, and regard it as a kind of narrative culture. But the reverse is not true; when scientific knowledge examines narrative knowledge, it will find that the latter has never been proven, and then put it in “another register” which is composed of public opinions, customs, authority, prejudice, ignorance and fantasy, and in an ideological state which is savage, primitive, underdeveloped, backward and alienated, and there is nothing but fables, myths and legends that are only suitable for women and children. This shows how egotistical scientism is. Richard Rorty also pointed out that since the age of enlightenment, especially since Immanuel Kant, natural science has been regarded as a paradigm of knowledge, and other fields of culture must be measured according to this paradigm. Here, science becomes a kind of detached and independent thing; only it can provide purely objective hard facts. Natural science is all the truth, and other humanities have to imitate science and get close to science, otherwise, they will find it difficult to occupy a place.22 As a result, the links between science and art, literature, religion, etc., were severed, and scientific methods have been widely used in the fields of humanities and social sciences, that is, the empirical method of science has become a respected method in all disciplines and even in social life. This is unfavorable for the long-term development of culture because the concept of centrism is fundamentally contrary to the principle of interaction of the social system, and it also excludes the most basic characteristics of culture – communication activities of social groups. The nature of culture determines its close connection with the social system, while the model of cultural genetics reveals that the root of culture lies in the expansion and extension of the use of symbols in groups or society. From the perspective of symbols as a medium for communication groups, they embody the most basic feature of culture – communication activity, which is marked by the collective and equal use of symbols, and only one purpose of communication: to understand and be understood by the other party.23 Scientific egotism fundamentally eliminates the possibility of such communication.

Universality and Locality 109 3.2.2 Critique of Science and Technology and Prominence of Multiculture The consequences of taking science as the sole center of human culture have aroused people’s deep concern. According to a report on the relationship between science and culture submitted by UNESCO in 1974, for more than a century, scientific activity in the surrounding cultural space has grown to such an extent that it seems to be replacing the entire culture itself. Some people believe that this is just a phantom due to its rapid development, and the force of this culture will soon reaffirm itself and bring science back to the service of mankind. Others think that the recent victory of science will ultimately give it the qualification to rule the entire culture, and the reason why culture can continue to be known to everyone is only that it is spread through scientific devices. There are also some people who are frightened by the danger of being manipulated as long as people and society are under the dominance of science; they can even sense the specter of cultural catastrophe looming in the distance.24 In fact, all kinds of problems caused by the application of science and technology, which are about ethnics, values, beliefs and other issues related to the meaning of human existence, have long attracted people’s attention. Out of farreaching concerns about the future of mankind, many intellectuals in the field of culture and philosophy have launched fierce attacks on science from the perspectives of social and humanities, as well as epistemology and methodology. The cultural critique of science and technology can be traced back to Rousseau. As early as the period of the Enlightenment, Rousseau was sensitively aware that people who are born free are always in the shackles, and science constitutes a part of the shackles, thus placing science on the opposite of culture. In his view, the development of science is annihilating humanity and suppressing human nature, which will lead to moral corruption, luxury, corruption and inequality between people. Following Rousseau’s critical tradition, the humanistic thinkers at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries reconsidered and criticized science and technology based on the living conditions of contemporary humans, holding that the extreme development of science and technology and its rule over people had made people lose their spiritual life and even led to the degeneration of culture and the barbarization of life. For example, Nietzsche said that science and technology cannot provide purpose and meaning for life, but serve as a tool subordinate to the search for meaning in life; Husserl claimed that the “Crisis of European Sciences” has led to the emptiness of the human spirit and the loss of human value and meaning in life; Heidegger argued that modern science and technology is not something neutral, it naturally contains the plunder of nature and the coercion of people, and it has caused the decline of human thinking and the loss of human nature. The Frankfurt School is said to be a group that has carried out the most comprehensive and thorough critique of science and technology in the 20th century. The first is a critique of scientific and technological reason. For example, in Horkheimer and Adorno’s view, reason has freed human beings from myths, but

110

Universality and Locality

the modern manifestation of reason – technological reason – has created new myths in modern life, making people abandon any search for meaning in the path to modern science, replace concepts with formulas and replace causes and motivations with rules and probabilities.25 The second is the ideological and cultural critique of science and technology. Those who hold this view believe that science and technology has become a new ideology, which has replaced the previous political power to be a new form of control. For example, Marcuse probed into the relationship between scientific reason and governance rationality, believing that science and technology itself has become an ideology, and its instrumental and servile nature plays the social functions of ruling and enslaving people, hence resulting in a one-dimensional man and society; Habermas emphasized that science and technology, as a new form of legitimacy, has lost the old form of ideology and has become a new type of ideology with science as its idol, that is, the ideology of technocracy. Compared with the humanistic and social critique of science, the critique of postmodernist philosophers from the perspective of epistemology and methodology has highlighted their dissatisfaction with science as a cultural center and their pursuit and desire for the coexistence of multiple cultures. As a radical representative of historical philosophy of science, Feyerabend particularly emphasized the cultural status of non-scientific traditions. Through the deconstruction of the superiority of science, Feyerabend attacked scientific hegemonism and scientific chauvinism that regard science as the only cultural center and advocated that all traditions should be given equal rights to survive. In his view, no matter the scientific method or the research results, science has no inherent superiority. Myths, religions and procedures have vanished or degenerated to give way to science only because the situation at that time is more conducive to the survival of science. In fact, as long as non-scientific ideologies, practices, theories and traditions are given a fair opportunity to compete, they can become powerful competitors of science and expose major shortcomings of science.26 In fact, science has all along been using non-scientific methods and results to enrich itself, but the procedures that are regarded as necessary parts of science are often cast aside. If science is praised for its achievements, then myth must be praised a hundredfold more enthusiastically because its achievements are unparalleled. Inventors of myth created culture, while rationalists and scientists only changed culture, and not always for the better.27 Those cultures that are different from ours are not a mistake, but an adaptability to a particular environment. They have discovered rather than missed the secret of a good life.28 From this point of view, all other cultural traditions should have the same status as science and have the same rights to survival and development. As the birthplace of science, Western culture is no higher than the culture of other nations. In their critique of science and technology, postmodernists particularly emphasize the diversity and richness of human culture, as well as the connection between non-scientific cultures and science and their value and significance. They regard science as a knowledge of interpretation and believe that there will be no central and unique description of the same fact, but there will be non-central

Universality and Locality 111 and multiple descriptions; they question and criticize the objectivity, universality and completeness of science endowed by the traditional view of science and emphasize the subjectivity, constructiveness and fallibility of science, which have been placed outside of science; they oppose examining and judging humanities, social sciences and other cultures purely with the views, methods and standards of natural science or epistemology, holding that different theories are perspectives of things from different angles; they are equal, and different theories have their own value, thus insisting on the same social status of different cultures. French philosophers Foucault and Derrida contend that science is nothing more than a kind of discourse and discourse power; scientific knowledge has no superiority compared to other forms of discourse. In the view of Lyotard, scientific discourse has always been regarded as a meta-discourse and has become a standard for measuring other discourses; the absolute truth status of scientific knowledge no longer exists, instead, it is in the same position as other narrative patterns, such as myth, language and folklore. From the perspective of postmodernists, scientific truth is no different from myth, superstition and witchcraft. In addition, the critique of science and technology from the perspective of feminism and post-colonialism has also formed a huge force. Feminists have, from social and humanistic perspectives, criticized the gender inequality prevailing in actual scientific activities and structures and attributed this to the opposition and separation of male and female, masculinity and femininity in patriarchal culture, and to the gendered tendency caused by the combination of science and patriarchal culture, thereby regarding science and humanities in reality as the product of masculinization, and combining critique of science with critique of male-centered culture. Post-colonialists have criticized the Western centralist viewpoints such as Orientalism, cultural imperialism, Western mythology and Oriental fables, emphasizing ideological discourse criticism and cultural-political criticism, advocating the elimination of centrality authority and multiculturalism. Although these critiques of science and technology are too extreme and anti-scientific, they have provided support for advocating the coexistence of multicultures. Among all critiques of science, especially postmodernist revelation and critique of the cultural hegemonism of science, the central position of science as the only mainstream culture in contemporary society has begun to shake. At the same time, pre-modern things such as mythology, religion, superstition, art, philosophy and non-scientific cultural forms have once again entered people’s sight and begun to be valued and highlighted. Since then, humanistic culture has also become the focus of people’s attention and coexists with scientific culture against the multicultural background. 3.2.3   Efforts to Defend the Central Position of Science In the face of critiques and doubts about science and technology from all sides (mainly from humanistic and postmodern perspectives), the vast number of supporters in the science camp do not accept it passively but hold up the banner of reason to defend the social status of science.

112

Universality and Locality

In 1994, American biologist Paul Gross and mathematician Norman Levitt copublished a book titled Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels With Science, in which they strongly criticize the trend of “science studies” in the name of postmodernism, cultural studies and scientific studies, thus kicking off the prologue of a science defense war launched by scientists. In the summer of 1995, scientists, social scientists and other scholars got widely united; one of their meetings known as “The Flight from Science and Reason,” held in New York and sponsored by the New York Academy of Sciences, was the most successful. But the most extreme event was none other than the Sokal Hoax. In 1996, the physicist Alan Sokal perpetrated a hoax on the academic journal Social Text, intending to fight against the cultural studies and “science studies” amid the trend of relativism at that time, in an effort to defend the special status of science. Sokal admitted that the purpose of this science defense war is to defend science, truth, objectivity, logic and scientific methods, and to oppose the distortion of science from a sociological perspective. Besides, he also pointed out that the scholars engaged in “science studies” are not capable of fully analyzing the scientific fields in which they are working.29 As soon as his article was published, it triggered “science wars” between the guardians of science (scientists and positivist philosophers) and postmodern thinkers that swept the world. Science wars are said to be the fiercest and most extensive confrontation between defenders and critics of science, and they are also a concentrated expression of the contradiction between the two cultures of science and humanities. The essence of science wars is that scientists are trying to defend science as a progressive cultural force, face up to the social value of science and restore the social status of science. After the Sokal Hoax in 1996, this controversy has been widely reported by news media all over the world and has attracted the attention of the public. It involves the nature of science, objectivity and rationality of scientific truth, scientific method, technology application, politics, military, economy and other social factors. Many scientists, including physicists, biologists, mathematicians and chemists, have thrown themselves into the struggle to defend science and reason, whereas the researchers engaged in scientific culture and sociology (including sociology of science, STS, feminism, post-colonialism, ecological philosophy and scientific ethics) have kept “deconstructing” scientific rationality by employing “external social factors,” and even tried to eliminate the objectivity and truth of science. This is a real conflict between science and humanities. To a certain extent, this controversy in defense of science embodies a conflict about the cultural connotation of science; that is, postmodernists, relativists and constructivists believe that science is only a cultural concept or consensus, and it is the opposite of a special and rational cultural concept. But for guardians of science, science represents a crucial and important aspect of culture and reflects important social values, and they feel that this advantage of science is being threatened. In contrast, humanists believe that science is not a rational liberating force, it is in fact restricted by authoritative dogma, or it represents a repressive intellectual power system as described by Michel Foucault.30 Different positions and attitudes have caused mutual attacks on both sides.

Universality and Locality 113 At present, after decades of controversy, both defenders and critics are much calmer, and the two sides are seeking a truce and dialogue instead of acrimony. For example, the Western left has realized that Western native knowledge needs to be supplemented by other types of knowledge, such as other native and traditional cultures. In the view of B.H. Hopyc, what is really needed is peopleoriented science.31 After analyzing and summarizing various views on science wars, Jay Labinger and Harry Collins (the former is a scientist, the latter is a sociologist) concluded that science is a hugely successful way of understanding the world, not a perfect worldview; we firmly believe that science is the best way to solve many problems so far – but these problems are not all of them, and they are not necessarily the most important.32 It can be said that scientific critics are no longer so blatantly opposed to science, and dispelling science is no longer their ultimate goal. On the side of the guardians of science, the way and attitude of defending science are also much gentler. Although they are still defending science from a basic standpoint, they are more inclined to maintain the status of science in a gentle way. They no longer simply claim the perfection and sacred superiority of science but defend the position of science in culture on the premise of acknowledging the imperfection and possible errors of science. For example, Joseph Agassi insists that science is the most rational intellectual activity, but not the only intellectual activity; he not only affirms that the uniqueness of science lies in understanding things systematically, and maintains a persevering and critical attitude toward the results of one’s own creation, but also recognizes the status of science as one of the human cultures. He opposes both scientism and relativism, but he advocates a thoughtful pluralist critical rationalism. In Susan Haack’s view, science is neither sacred, nor is it a trick to be trusted; in any case, in all the endeavors of human cognition, natural sciences are indeed the most successful; science is a social enterprise as well as a reasonable one; science is the expression of human ability, and its purpose is to seek substantive, meaningful and explanatory truths. In a mild and eclectic way, Haack makes no secret of her admiration for the scientific and rational way of knowing in her basic stand but insists that science is not the only legitimate form of inquiry, nor the only source of truth. She acknowledges the superiority of modern science but believes that this is definitely not a cultural preference for expressing modern science over traditional non-scientific practices. She acknowledges the real benefits brought by science but also sees its shortcomings and dangers. Therefore, although science is valuable, it does not mean that there are no other values, nor does it mean that scientific progress is always above all else. However, in Haack’s view, although science is error-prone and imperfect, it is an expression of the human mind striving to expand its cognitive potential.33 In general, the current camps of science guardians and postmodern thinkers have eased a lot in their understanding of science. Although their views on science are still very different, the former no longer strives to gain absolute and central advantage for science, and the latter no longer blindly criticizes science and tries to dispel science. The common aspiration of both sides is to let religion, culture,

114

Universality and Locality

art and other non-scientific cultures enjoy the same rights of existence as science, and to advocate the peaceful coexistence and inclusiveness of diverse cultural forms.

3.3 Chinese Medicine, Feng-Shui and Others Chinese scholars have been discussing the universality and locality of science, and quite a number of them take interest in the influence of the things that have grown up in traditional Chinese culture, such as traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) and Feng-Shui. So, how scientific are they? How should we look at the relationship between traditional culture and modern science? 3.3.1 Locality and Universality of Traditional Chinese Medicine TCM is a medical system gradually formed and developed through long-term medical practice under the background of Chinese traditional culture and under the guidance of ancient simple materialism and dialectics, carrying the experience and theoretical knowledge of ancient Chinese people’s struggle against diseases. Born in the ancient Chinese culture, TCM is a summary of the experiences and theories acquired by Chinese people in fighting against diseases for thousands of years. As a medical theoretical system developed and tested by long-term practices in China’s particular cultural context, TCM is undoubtedly a local knowledge system. The local knowledge proposed by American cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz mainly refers to the knowledge related to regional and ethnic folk and cognitive patterns. The view of the philosophy of scientific practice is that the process of knowledge generation and defense has specific contexts, so the nature of knowledge is bound to be local. Therefore, the “local knowledge” we often talk about does not refer to any particular knowledge with local characteristics, but a new concept of knowledge. “Locality” or “local” is not only in a specific geographical sense, it also involves a specific context formed in the generation and defense of knowledge, including the values of cultural and subcultural groups formed under specific historical conditions, as well as standpoints and perspectives determined by specific interest relationships.34 From this point of view, people living in different regions and under different social and cultural backgrounds will inevitably use different ways to understand and explain the world they live in and the problems they face, thus creating “local knowledge” that depends on its environment. The locality of TCM is mainly reflected in its strong national characteristics. In the theory of TCM, many concepts and theoretical principles are direct applications or extensions of ancient Chinese philosophy, such as Yin-Yang, Five Elements, Tai Chi and Vitality (Yuan Qi). These non-medical categories have been a model for summarizing medical experiences. This is the historical logic with the special characteristics of a national traditional culture when the objective and universal medical experience rises to the theoretical form. In addition to philosophy, knowledge of other aspects of traditional Chinese culture has also

Universality and Locality 115 been widely introduced into TCM. For example, the knowledge of astronomy, calendar and meteorology entered TCM and led to the generation of the Five Movements and Six Qi theory, and the Meridian Flowing theory. Even patriarchal traditions, ethics and religious ideas have penetrated into TCM. In short, the ancient traditional philosophy, science, ethics, religion and other aspects of knowledge penetrated, influenced and even directly participated in the construction process of TCM theory, hence becoming an integral part of TCM theory.35 For example, the meridian theory and acupuncture technique embody the characteristics of traditional Chinese thinking, the dialectical treatment embodies the tradition of “Yi-ology” in Chinese culture, and the four procedures of TCM diagnosis (observing, smelling, consulting and pulse-taking) embody the Chinese cultural tradition of valuing experience. As a medical system that has affected our lives for thousands of years, TCM not only has its unique national and local characteristics but also reflects the realities of life as birth, old age, illness and death, so it is universally effective. As the theoretical basis of TCM, the Yin-Yang and Five Elements theories run through the entire theoretical system of TCM. As far as Yin-Yang is concerned, TCM treats the human body as a unity of opposites and uses the Yin-Yang theory to explain the tissue structure, physiological functions and pathological changes of the human body to guide clinical diagnosis and treatment. Yin-Yang represents not only two kinds of opposite material properties, but also two kinds of opposite motion tendency or state. As far as the Five Elements are concerned, the theory that the five elements (wood, fire, earth, metal and water) are mutually promoting and restraining not only helps explain the intricacies of nature and their interrelationships, but also guides disease prevention and treatment and has yielded good results. Although the concepts of Yin-Yang, Five Elements and Vitality do not have any corresponding concrete substances; their value as a guiding ideology cannot be denied. Especially when ancient medicine was indistinguishable from philosophy and other kinds of knowledge, it was these concepts that guided TCM to get rid of witch religion, so their historical inevitability and rationality should not be underestimated.36 Moreover, the general laws about development and change contained in the concepts of Yin-Yang and Five Elements are also universally applicable to TCM. In terms of therapeutic effect, although TCM is not yet as pervading as Western medicine, its treatment effect has long been recognized by Chinese people, including overseas Chinese, and it is now gradually going global. For example, Shennong’s Classic of Materia Medica, the earliest pharmacy monograph in China dated back to more than 2,000 years ago, records that Artemisiae annuae herba can treat malaria. And the anti-malarial effect of this herb has been proved by the practices of countless doctors since ancient times. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, artemisinin was extracted from Artemisiae annuae for the treatment of malaria. It was assessed by the Chinese Medical Association and the All-China Association of Traditional Chinese Medicine as a major medical sci-tech achievement in the 35 years since 1949.37

116

Universality and Locality

When atypical pneumonia (SARS) ravaged the world in 2003, the Western medical community did everything possible to “catch” the coronavirus with a microscope, and then looked for ways to kill the virus. However, such treatment means that targeting individual patients is not conducive to the disease control, diagnosis and treatment in case of serious outbreaks. Chinese TCM doctors did not look for or locate the coronavirus but managed to determine that this plague was induced by “damp evil” according to the climatic, environmental and geographic conditions at that time, in combination with the symptomatic manifestations of patients, and on this basis conducted syndrome differentiation and treatment and achieved satisfactory treatment effect. The fatality rate of SARS patients in China was the lowest in the world, while Guangzhou City, Guangdong Province, had the lowest fatality rate in China for taking the lead in adopting TCM treatment. In terms of effectiveness, the Four Diagnostic Methods and Eight Principal Syndromes of TCM are equally applicable to Chinese and foreigners, and dialectical therapy is of no essential difference in the treatment of patients of different races, namely, there is no national boundary limit for the treatment of disease.38 Even so, doubts and denials of TCM still exist. In recent years’ debates on TCM, those who are in favor of the abandonment of TCM usually take modern Western medicine as the norm, arguing that TCM theory should not be retained for failing to meet the requirements of modern science, and the theories of modern science and modern medicine should be given full play to reconstruct TCM theory and explain the curative effect of Chinese herbs, acupuncture and moxibustion. Some people even claim that TCM theory is problematic, and suspect the curative effect of Chinese herbs of being exaggerated and deified. So, they call for abandoning TCM and running strict tests for the reliability and objectivity of the curative effect of Chinese herbs. However, Western medicine is also a local knowledge system, just like TCM, so how can we judge one kind of local knowledge against another? In fact, it implies a position and attitude of scientism to judge the scientificity of TCM and determine its existence according to the principles and standards of Western science. Modern science, which grew up in Western cultural traditions, is not the only way for humans to recognize and understand nature. Likewise, Western medicine based on this is not the only way for humans to understand their bodies and cure diseases. Although they represent two different human cultures, TCM and Western medicine are both local knowledge, so they should enjoy the same right to survive, and one of them cannot be used to suppress or transform the other. The transformation of TCM according to the standards of Western medicine or even the abandonment of TCM according to the standards of modern science determines that the development of TCM in the future will not have an ideal prospect. In that case, TCM will lose the national characteristics and special habits of thinking as a traditional Chinese cultural heritage and lose the diversity and richness of human culture. But this does not rule out the possibility of mutual learning and a combination of TCM and Western medicine in practice. In fact, since non-Western medical

Universality and Locality 117 traditions are often rooted in religious rituals, and these rituals are closely linked to the entire social order; therefore, even if Western medicine is available, people may still prefer their local medical practice. As a result, in quite a number of non-Western contexts, clinicians that are trained in Western medicine predict that non-Western medicine will gradually disappear, which is utterly wrong. On the contrary, a landscape of medical pluralism is to unfold. Today, most medical systems in the world are a complex mixture of Western medical systems and local or non-Western medical systems. This situation is not only true in poor non-Western countries, but also increasingly apparent in rich Western countries.39 3.3.2 Science, Feng-Shui and Superstition Feng-Shui or geomancy is an important part of ancient Chinese arts of necromancy and an important traditional Chinese culture. In addition to TCM, Feng-Shui is currently the most concerned and controversial content in traditional Chinese culture. The earliest definition of Feng-Shui (“Feng” is “wind,” and “Shui” is “water”) can be found in the Book of Burial by Guo Pu of the Jin Dynasty: wind disperses Chi (source of all creatures), but water makes a limit to block the flow of Chi. People gather Chi to prevent it from being lost and make it not exceed the limit despite its flow, which is the essence of the Feng-Shui technique. In modern Chinese dictionaries, the term “Feng-Shui” is defined as the geographical situation of residential bases, graves, etc., such as the geographical position and coordinates of mountains and waters. Those who are superstitious believe that the quality of Feng-Shui can affect the fortunes of their families and children. In daily life, the term “Feng-Shui” can be interpreted in two ways: one is relatively broad, referring to the natural environment such as nearby space, mountains, water and trees; the other is relatively narrow, specifically referring to Yin residence (ancestral grave) and Yang residence (housing). Feng-Shui has all along been playing a special and important role in the development of Chinese culture. From ordinary people to nobles, from housing construction to funeral arrangements, Feng-Shui is almost ubiquitous in architecture, site selection, planning, design, construction and other activities. Today, these influences are still deeply embedded in people’s daily life; especially in rural areas, the selection of house location and cemetery is mostly determined by Feng-Shui. One of the focal points of the current domestic discussions on Feng-Shui is whether it is science or superstition. The research conclusions of domestic science scholars can be roughly divided into three types: “science and aesthetic folklore,” “aesthetic folklore but not science” and “overall superstition.”40 3.3.2.1 Science in Feng-Shui From a scientific point of view, Feng-Shui is actually a kind of knowledge that specializes in the study of human settlements in ancient China, and Feng-Shui contains scientific elements.

118

Universality and Locality

Feng-Shui has two theoretical bases: one is the grand system theory of “unity of heaven and man.” Taking heaven, earth and man as a grand system, Feng-Shui theory emphasizes that cities and houses must be built according to topography; the law of nature is inherent and unchangeable, the law of development of things is endless and the law of people’s coexistence cannot be without order; the most ideal state is the harmony between man and nature (heaven and earth). The second is the core idea of “Chi.” Feng-Shui theory believes that Chi determines the quality of site selection and that all environments where Chi gathers are auspicious. Therefore, we must pay attention to vital Chi and avoid deathly Chi. Feng-Shui theory is to cater, guide and conform to the Chi of the universe, so that the Chi of the residence can be harmonious with it, thereby helping to improve the living environment and ensuring the physical and mental health of human beings. The functions of Feng-Shui are also scientific, which are mainly reflected in four aspects: first, the harmonious view of the unity of man and nature. In other words, the goal is to pursue natural and harmonious existence, so that the building is in harmony with the natural environment. Second is the beauty based on the combination of techniques and arts, taking into account architectural techniques and aesthetics and making techniques and arts perfectly combined in architectural construction. Third is a sense of scale with both terrain and topography – to emphasize the harmony between the whole settlement and the mountain topography and pay attention to the coordination between individual buildings and the surrounding environment. Fourth is the ethical principle of complementary rites and music – to combine the spatial order of a building to form a rigorously symmetrical living space, which features distinction between the important and the lesser one and between superiors and inferiors. Fifth is the sense of security of seeking advantages and avoiding disadvantages. That is to give people spiritual comfort and produce a certain sense of psychological security.41 Therefore, the choice of Feng-Shui is not arbitrarily specified, but a decision made on the basis of a certain natural environment, and Feng-Shui is indeed scientific. 3.3.2.2 Feng-Shui Is Not Superstition Despite Containing Superstitious Elements But in reality, Feng-Shui is often mixed with superstition and even equated with superstition. Some people think that Feng-Shui is essentially superstition. The main purpose of people’s obsession with Feng-Shui is not for the comfort of their homes, but for the belief that the quality of Feng-Shui in residences and ancestral graves can affect the fortunes of themselves and their descendants. Therefore, even if the content of Feng-Shui is not superstitious on the whole, it is a superstition in essence.42 Feng-Shui indeed contains superstitious elements: on the one hand, FengShui has superstitious elements in its form. During the operation of Feng-Shui, the long-term natural residence selection of primitive mankind provides the

Universality and Locality 119 original and ideal Feng-Shui model; choosing residential land through divination marks the beginning of the superstitious activity of choosing one’s residence, while determining residence adds scientific content to one’s residence selection. Therefore, before the emergence of Feng-Shui, people’s residence selection included superstition and science. But Feng-Shui took the first step to embark on the wrong path based on the theories of Yin-Yang, Eight Diagrams, Five Elements and Chi, instead of embarking on the path of using scientific theories to explain the living environment. Therefore, as soon as Feng-Shui theory came into being, it contained scientific content and was covered by superstition.43 On the other hand, Feng-Shui often spreads some superstitious ideas. Feng-Shui masters believe in the existence of a supernatural mysterious power and even hope to change the original appearance of things or improve people’s destiny. For example, the layout of “siting in the north facing the south” architecture often achieves the goal of warming in winter and cooling in summer. This truth is simple and easy to understand, but Feng-Shui masters like to make a fool of believers. In order to adapt to the widespread psychological requirements of avoiding bad luck, Feng-Shui masters deliberately weave a variety of complex lies in order to adapt to the universal psychological requirements of avoiding evil, which makes the original simple scientific principles more complicated and confusing. Do not say that Feng-Shui is superstition, because superstition means ridiculous and empty beliefs and prejudices, and all things are attributed to supernatural will. Superstition is widespread in real society and takes on various forms: some have appeared directly in the face of superstition, and some go about cheating under other names or even under the guise of science. Feng-Shui–related superstition often deduces the fortunes of the house owner and his descendants according to the location of the residence and ancestral graves. Feng-Shui in such a form of superstition is naturally unscientific. 3.3.2.3 A Local Knowledge System As a part of traditional Chinese culture and a product born in a particular social and cultural context in ancient China, Feng-Shui is naturally a kind of local knowledge. It is developed in the unique geographical environment of China, satisfying certain needs of Chinese people, hence it has been accepted by Chinese people for a long time. Being deeply influenced by Chinese Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism, Feng-Shui is closely related to the living conditions of Chinese people. It is a kind of non-standardized local knowledge. The situation of Feng-Shui in current Chinese culture is somewhat similar to that of astrology in the West. Feng-Shui came into being in the specific cultural context of the pre-scientific age, then formed and developed its own relatively complete theoretical system through the long-term accumulation of practical experiences. Therefore, it plays an indispensable and important role in people’s daily life. But on the other hand, it is not just a kind of knowledge, but full of subjective mysteries and conjectures.

120

Universality and Locality

From the perspective of modern scientific theories, Feng-Shui contains scientific elements, namely, it is a special architectural theory, which is related to geophysics, hydrogeology, environmental landscape science, arcology, cosmology, geomagnetic field orientation, meteorology and information science, and able to constitute a comprehensive discipline. Feng-Shui, a traditional Chinese cultural phenomenon, is also a widespread folk custom, a technique of choosing good luck and avoiding evil and a kind of knowledge about the environment and people. 3.3.3 Traditional Culture and Modern Science Today, when diversification has become the development trend of the world, how to correctly look at the relationship between traditional culture and modern science is of great significance to the future development of science. Tradition usually means a kind of historical accumulation or sociocultural heritage. In connection with this, traditional culture mainly refers to the national culture inherited from history, including customs, morals, thoughts, art, systems, lifestyles and other organic complexes of all material and spiritual cultural phenomena. Compared with foreign culture, traditional culture is parent culture or indigenous culture, which contains tangible material culture, but it is more reflected in the intangible spiritual culture, including people’s lifestyle, customs, psychological characteristics, aesthetic tastes and values, and internalized, accumulated and penetrated into the psychological depths of every generation of social members. Geographically, traditional culture is mainly divided into Eastern and Western cultures. The biggest difference between the two is that traditional Western culture is characterized by its outward logical reasoning, and therefore science has emerged from natural philosophy; traditional Eastern culture is a cultural form that contains both philosophical and non-philosophical intuitive experiences and is based on intuitive experience. This led to the result that modern science was born in Europe, but its home is the whole world. In the last two centuries, ways of Western culture have long and chaotically influenced Asian culture. It is not surprising that the sages of the East extremely cherish their cultural heritage. In the past and present, they have never understood that the secrets governing life can be transmitted from West to East without tampering with the heritage they themselves so rightly cherish. It is becoming increasingly clear that the greatest influence from the West on the East is its science and scientific thoughts. As long as there is a sensible society, this kind of thing can spread from one country to another, from one nation to another.44 It can be seen that, compared with the pursuit of universal ideals by modern science, traditional culture was produced in a specific era and a specific cultural background, so it has national and local characteristics. At the same time, traditional culture is a whole composed of many cultural factors, so it has the characteristics of complexity and diversity. Conflicts and confrontations are naturally inevitable between traditional culture characterized by local and national images and modern science with universality as

Universality and Locality 121 the ultimate pursuit. Looking back on the historical trajectory of scientific development, we can see that the conflicts between traditional culture and modern science always exist, and they usually occur when science and technology are transferred and introduced into other regions. Fundamentally speaking, science and technology tend to conflict with the traditional culture of developing countries; the root cause is that, in terms of economy, while importing advanced technology, developing countries also put their own economy in a subordinate position; but in terms of culture, import of advanced technology is closely related to people’s daily life. Therefore, cultural differences make people not only feel that developed countries are economically plundering and exploiting them through technology transfer, but also make people in developing countries feel a certain kind of cultural aggression. Maurice Richter Jr. analyzed the relationship between science and other cultural traditions by comparing the cultural distribution of science and family: science is a relatively new phenomenon; originating in the West, its dissemination around the world did not enter other cultures through “diffusion” as commonly understood, but as a force to destroy other forms of cultural tradition, and it in turn acts equally destructively on the traditional institutions of the West.45 In fact, in the encounter between traditional culture and modern science, traditional culture will inevitably be impacted and challenged by modern science. Of course, between traditional culture and modern science, the consistency and mutual promotion of the two, in addition to confrontation and conflict, are also very important aspects. Their specific expressions are as follows. First of all, traditional culture provides the soil and foundation for the growth of science. Beyond question, there is always an inseparable “kinship” between science and the cultural background from which it was born, and it bears the cultural imprint of the native place. Maurice Richter Jr. takes science as a developmental extension of the traditional cultural knowledge system. Some of these traditional systems have a high degree of internal consistency – every component of the system is ingeniously integrated into the system to form a whole – and a high degree of rationality; all the facts that are thought to be explained by these systems can actually be explained in a satisfactory manner within the framework of the system. Science does not need to make further improvements on these achievements of the traditional knowledge system, but to introduce new standards of achievement; however, these new standards are only special extensions of the original ones. The system contained in science is beyond the level of the traditional cultural knowledge system in terms of abstraction and testability. And science includes a series of alternative processes among these systems based on the standards of simplicity and predictive power.46 It can be seen that science not only originated from a certain traditional culture but also surpassed traditional culture. Therefore, Maurice Richter Jr. commented that the starting point of scientific development is traditional cultural knowledge.47 Secondly, traditional culture and modern science are consistent in many cases, and the two are unified in the reality of human culture and practice. As two cultures that are formed and developed one after another on the basis of human practices, traditional culture and modern science often show great similarities, and

122

Universality and Locality

at the same time, they have shown a certain degree of inheritance. For example, the knowledge system of certain primitive cultures, including some witchcraft and magic systems, is very similar to the cultural knowledge system of modern science in the characteristics of certain general structures: they all have a beautiful internal organization model, and under certain circumstances, they have an extraordinary effect in making no matter what kind of understanding of the true reality.48 Levi-Strauss also believes that witchcraft, as a manifestation of prescience, may sometimes succeed naturally and show the nature of science and preview methods or results that will only be employed until science reaches an advanced stage. Finally, the progress of modern science in ideological innovation and other aspects often provides new opportunities for the inheritance and development of traditional culture; the heritage of human culture contained in traditional culture is also of great significance to the development and progress of modern science. On the one hand, modern science affects all levels of culture through the transformation of production mode, lifestyle and thinking mode, leading to drastic changes in all levels of culture, thus realizing the transformation and modernization of traditional culture. On the other hand, traditional culture is quite beneficial to the development of modern science. Traditional culture can provide new research perspectives and non-scientific ways of thinking for modern science, and make up for the deficiencies of modern science. For example, compared with the characteristic Western scientific thought, the Eastern natural view, which is represented by organic wholeness, multiple logical thinking, vagueness or permeability, dialectics, introspection and mysticism, is an important supplement to make up for the shortcomings of modern Western science in over-emphasis on analysis. In short, although the conflict between traditional culture and modern science is inevitable, the mutual promotion of the two finds new ways for their respective development and shows the possibility of peaceful coexistence and common development between tradition and modernity, non-science and science. The combination of the advantages of traditional culture and modern science will surely create a more splendid civilization.

Notes 1 R. K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir. Translated by Lu Xudong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003:365–66. 2 J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Translated by Zeng Guoping et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2002:47–48. 3 A. Chalmers, Science and Its Fabrication. Translated by Jiang Jinsong, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007:29. 4 Liu Dachun ed., Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies: From Advocacy to Reconsideration. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009:42. 5 J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:106. 6 Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Translated by Wang Shanbo et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:8–9.

Universality and Locality 123 7 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:226–27. 8 J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:107. 9 Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Translated by Wang Shanbo et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:5. 10 Liu Dachun ed., Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies: From Advocacy to Reconsideration, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009. 11 Liu Dachun and Zhao Junhai, “A New Construction of Empiricism in Philosophy of Science.” Social Sciences in China, 2016(8):47–65. 12 J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:113. 13 J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:129–30. 14 S. Jasanoff, Handbook of Science and Technology Studies. Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 2004:121. 15 Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Translated by Wang Shanbo et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:88. 16 S. Harding, Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002:1–2, 74. 17 S. Timmermans and M. Berg, “Standardization in Action: Achieving Local Universality through Medical Protocols.” Social Studies of Science, 1997 (V.27, N.2):273–305. 18 Ma Bailian, “Appropriately Adhere to The Locality of Scientific Knowledge.” Philosophical Research, 2009(1):103–9. 19 S. Haack, Defending Science Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Translated by Zeng Guoping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008:348. 20 S. Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies. Translated by Xu Weimin et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007:209. 21 J.D. Bernal, Science in History. Translated by Wu Kuangfu et al., Beijing: Science Press, 1959:691. 22 Huang Ruixiong, The Conflict and Integration of Two Cultures: A Study on Scientific Humanism. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2000:109–10. 23 Zhou Jun, “The Predicament of Cultural Centralism.” Academic Monthly, 1995(6):38. 24 I. Prigogine and I. Stengers, Order Our of Chaos. Translated by Zeng Qinghong et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2005:32–33. 25 M. Horkheimer and T.W. Wistuqrund Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Liang Jingdong et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003:3. 26 P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:125. 27 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:128. 28 P. Feyerabend, Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:3–4. 29 A. Sokal et al., Sokal Affair and the War of Science: A Postmodern View on Quarrels between Science and Humanities. Translated by Cai Zhong et al., Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2002. 30 U. Segerstrale, Beyond the Science Wars: The Missing Discourse about Science and Society. Translated by Huang Ying et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:115, 117.

124

Universality and Locality

31 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:125. 32 J.A. Labinger and H. Collins, The One Culture?: A Conversation about Science. Translated by Zhang Zengyi et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006:352. 33 S. Haack, Defending Science Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Translated by Zeng Guoping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008:334. 34 Sheng Xiaoming, “Structure of Local Knowledge.” Philosophical Research, 2000(12):36–44. 35 Chang Cunku, “Discussion on The Scientific and National Nature of Traditional Chinese Medicine.” Medicine & Philosophy (Humanistic & Social Medicine Edition), 1987(11):15–17. 36 Chang Cunku, “Discussion on The Scientific and National Nature of Traditional Chinese Medicine.” Medicine & Philosophy (Humanistic & Social Medicine Edition), 1987(11):15–17. 37 Jiao Zhenlian, Traditional Chinese Medicine in This Day and Age, Shanghai: Shanghai University of Traditional Chinese Medicine Press, 2007:47; Zhu Qingshi, “Scientific Connotation and Reform Ideas in Traditional Chinese Medicine.” Chinese Journal of Nature, 2005(5):47. 38 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:15. 39 D.J. Hess, Science and Technology in a Multicultural World: The Cultural Politics of Facts and Artifacts. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995:194–95. 40 Hu Yicheng. “Feng-Shui Contains Scientific Elements: A Review of Feng-Shui Studies at Home and Abroad.” Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology (Social Sciences), 2009(3):16–20. 41 Chen Li and Guan Ruiming, “Dialectical Thinking of Feng-Shui: The Core of Science and the Cloak of Superstition.” South Architecture, 2001(2):4–6. 42 Fang Zhouzi, “Is Feng-Shui Science or Superstition?” Beijing Sci-Tech Report, 200509-28(F02). 43 Wang Liming and Wang Li, Science and Superstition in Feng-Shui. Chongqing: Southwest Normal University Press, 1991:32. 44 A.N. Whitehead, Science and The Modern World. Translated by He Qin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:3. 45 M.N. Richter Jr., Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989:13. 46 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:78–79. 47 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:87. 48 M.N. Richter Jr., Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989:69–70.

4

Reason and Unreason

The concept of “reason” runs through the entire development process of science. From the awakening of rational spirit to the acknowledgment, affirmation and publicity of human reason, this process, to some extent, represents the entire development course of science, and it even determines the future destiny of science. However, when the division of reason arising from the rapid development of science led to the prominence of instrumental reason and the decline of value reason, irrationalism took the opportunity to break in and put reason to a great test. Since science is the main manifestation of reason, its healthy development is, in the first place, to find and maintain appropriate tension between reason and unreason, instrument and value, as well as between science, technology and humanity.

4.1 Contest between Reason and Unreason Rationalism is the mainstream value of the Renaissance and Enlightenment. However, there had been excessive publicity of people’s subject consciousness since the 19th century; on the one hand, it caused humanism to gradually deviate from the track of reason. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bergson, Freud and Heidegger bid farewell to the rational tradition of philosophy and threw themselves into the arms of irrationalism. On the other hand, the technicalization tendency of science led to the excessive expansion of instrumental reason, and the hegemony of scientific culture manifested by scientism gradually deviated from its humane and rational tradition. The contest between reason and unreason had intensified. 4.1.1 Science and Awakening of Rational Spirit The awakening of the modern rational spirit began with the Italian Renaissance in the 14th century. As an innovative movement in the field of human thought and culture, the Renaissance centered on the revival of the Greco-Roman literary, artistic and scientific traditions, restored the rational spirit of the ancient Greeks, highlighted human dignity and the value of thinking and destroyed the rigid system of scholasticism. It advocated scientific methods and experiments and created a wealth of fascinating works of art in an unprecedented state of mind. By upholding the secular ideas, democratic thoughts, rationalism and exploratory DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-6

126 Reason and Unreason spirit contained in Greek culture, the Renaissance resisted despotism, obscurantism and asceticism in religious theology. As a symbol of an era, the Renaissance created a new situation of unprecedented cultural prosperity for mankind. On this basis, the German religious Reformation, which began in the early 16th century, further promoted the maturation of the human rational spirit. It started from the inner spirit of humans, replacing their faith in the Pope and the church with their faith in God. In other words, humanists tried to achieve human liberation by criticizing the feudal system and the magisterium, while Martin Luther wanted to criticize and overthrow the spiritual foundation of the feudal system and the magisterium to achieve human liberation. During this period, Calvin developed a new theological theory in the Protestant Reformation. In this way, secular life became religious practice, and religious practice was fully integrated into secular life, providing a theoretical basis for the bourgeoisie to pursue material wealth and spiritual enjoyment (this is the “Protestant Ethics” mentioned by Max Weber). While the Reformation accelerated the process of secularization of religion itself, the Protestant Ethics provided a broad space of thinking for the liberation of the human spirit and the generation of modern reason. By that time, the rational spirit had awakened, science and reason had gradually become the criteria for criticism, and the development of politics, economy and culture had entered a new stage. People therefore came to a stage where they know they are free, they strive for their liberty to be recognized and have enough power to act for their own interests and purposes. The human spirit was awakened again, and it could see its own reason, as clear as it was watching its palm.1 Of course, whether it is the humanism advocated by the Renaissance or the Faithism advocated by the Reformation, they contain limited rational elements and only provide certain prerequisites and conditions for the formation of rational spirit. Thanks to the Renaissance and the Reformation, the divinity of God and the privileges of the church were completely broken, and the human personality was completely liberated. Humanity, human rights, liberty and equality had become the consensus of the society, and individual subjective initiative and creativity had been fully demonstrated. Coupled with the rise of capitalism, the conditions for the formation of modern science had matured. Starting from the 16th century, the rational spirit of mankind was formally awakened, thus unveiling the curtain on the rapid development of modern natural science. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the Enlightenment reason advocated by the Enlightenment movement took Locke’s empiricism and Newtonian mechanics as the model of reason, as the criterion for measuring everything, and directed against religious superstition and feudal autocracy. In the Enlightenment movement, with the continuous maturity of the human rational spirit, science was finally recognized, and the rational spirit officially entered people’s real social life. The 18th century, when reason became so important that it could determine whether everything is reasonable or not, is usually known as the Century of Reason. Since then, reason has been developing at an unprecedented pace, and further promoted along with the progress of natural science. In Britain, the rational tradition of empirical knowledge, pioneered by Bacon, Locke and

Reason and Unreason 127 Newton, triggered a steam engine revolution – the Industrial Revolution – that changed the fate of mankind. In France, the Great French Revolution, which was supported by Descartes, Voltaire and other enlightenment rational thinkers, made modern reason an irresistible force and discovered “man” in the rational sense. During this period, the marriage of science and philosophy not only updated people’s views about the world but also changed their understanding of themselves. Cassirer made an accurate description of this great period. He remarked that the 18th century was immersed in a belief that reason is unified and immutable, and reason remains the same in all thinking subjects, all nations, all times and all cultures. Religious creeds, moral maxims and beliefs, theoretical insights and judgments are variable, but a solid and everlasting factor can be extracted from this variability. This factor itself is eternal, and its identity and eternity reflect the true essence of reason. Moreover, during this period, the power of reason is not to enable us to break through the limitations of the empirical world but to make us learn to feel at home in the empirical world. Every activity of reason convinces us that we have something to do with the essence of God, and opens the door to the mental world and the absolute world of super-sensation for us. Reason is no longer the sum of “innate ideas” that precede all experiences and reveal the absolute essence of things. It is an ingenious intellectual force that guides us to discover, establish and confirm truth. The truth confirmed in this way is the seed and indispensable prerequisite of all true certainty. Throughout the 18th century, reason was understood in this sense, that is, it is not taken as a container of knowledge, principles and truth, but a kind of ability and power that can be fully understood only through its function and effectiveness. The nature and power of reason cannot be fully measured only by its results, but by its function. The most important function of reason is to combine and decompose. It decomposes all simple facts, all simple empirical materials, and everything that people believe based on revelation, tradition and authority; it will never give up unless it breaks down all of this into the simplest components and breaks down beliefs and opinions about these things into final factors. Construction begins after decomposition.2 It was under the joint promotion of the Renaissance and the Reformation that modern reason destroyed the ideology of traditional society and greatly promoted the progress of social productivity and the development of social material civilization. It not only gave birth to a new attitude toward nature and a new way of looking at nature, that is, it no longer worships and reveres nature as something mysterious and inscrutable, but allows nature to be completely exposed to us, dissects and decomposes nature from an analytical perspective. Moreover, in combination with technology, reason began to slowly invade all social fields, while continuously expanding the scope of its own instrumental reason. 4.1.2 Science, Reason and Rationality As far as the formation process is concerned, “reason” is an important philosophical concept that emerged simultaneously with ancient Greek philosophy. For example, Heraclitus said that “reason” (“logos” in Greek) is the law behind the

128 Reason and Unreason changes and oppositions in all things; Anaxagoras’s “reason” is one of the infinite elements that make up the world; Plato claimed that reason is the truth produced by thinking, and it is the soul of people who have already existed by recalling the existence of ideas; Aristotle put forward the ultimate logical point of view, that is, equating reason with thought and spirit. It can be said that in ancient Greece, reason mainly refers to law, or the ability to find law. During the Renaissance and the Reformation, advocating reason, promoting science and pursuing knowledge were the dominant ideological tendencies. Reason was mainly used as a powerful weapon to resist feudalism and religion and appeal for building a kingdom of reason with political democracy and freedom of personality. This not only activated the modern spirit of seeking free development but also laid the foundation for the emergence of modern science. In the opinion of Enlightenment thinkers, “reason” is synonymous with philosophy because they believe that philosophy comes from reason, and it is the practical application of reason. Here, “reason” mainly refers to all the intellectual abilities of people who are opposed to religious beliefs. In his Encyclopedia, Denis Diderot pointed out that “reason,” in addition to other meanings, has two meanings that are relative to religious beliefs: one is the natural ability of human beings to know the truth; the other is that the human spirit can acquire a series of truths without the help of faith. Enlightenment scholars preferred these two meanings of reason. With the word “reason,” they wanted to express a certain innate rational ability coming from man himself; at the same time, this reason is guided by the concepts of freedom, justice and humanity. In practice, the reason of the Enlightenment period was combined with bourgeois human rights, on the one hand, reflecting the political and economic needs of the bourgeoisie; on the other hand, reason and natural science were becoming more and more closely integrated, and the resulting scientific and technological reason had become a spiritual force that adapted to the development of Western industrial civilization. With the intensifying integration of science, technology and industry, reason not only swept through all obstacles, comprehensively promoted itself and liberated individuals, but also became the master of everything with the help of science and technology. The enlightening reason eliminated the myth that God rules man, but its transformation to scientific reason means that the enlightening reason was moving toward the myth that man controls nature. The remarkable success in social production and people’s daily life has greatly elevated the social status of science and technology, people generally believe that the methods of natural science can solve all problems, which gave great prominence to human reason and the utilitarian nature of science and technology. As Engels pointed out that the great figures who had enlightened people of the coming revolution in France were themselves revolutionary. They did not recognize any outside authority, whatever that authority might be. Religions, natural views, society and national systems were criticized most ruthlessly; everything must defend its existence before a court of reason or renounce its right to exist.3 From ancient Greece to the period of Enlightenment, the connotation of “reason” continued to be generalized and valued, but it was always a mark of human

Reason and Unreason 129 spiritual ability. At the same time, due to the excessive utilitarian manifestation of reason and the orientation of instrumental reason, reason had become allinclusive, and even became synonymous with “rationality”: what is reasonable is rational and valuable, and vice versa. However, this implies that reason, which is guided by the mechanistic view of nature and represented by science and technology, will inevitably bring about the division of reason itself and the opposition between man and nature and trigger new crises. In particular, when scientific spirit and technological reason permeate all areas of human life, natural science has exceeded its limits and been pushed to the position of faith to become an absolute existence. Consequently, reason is one-sidedly transformed into natural science, becoming a narrow rationalism confined to the field of experience advocated by natural science. The universal meaning of reason that once represented the human spirits of freedom, equality, fraternity, human rights and justice, and took the pursuit of natural science as its own responsibility, has gradually disappeared. Universal reason began to give way to empirical reason, which further led to the crisis of reason and the reversal of the spirit of enlightenment. The rationality of science and reason is also in question. The question of rationality was first brought forth by Weber. He believes that social actions are divided into the categories of rational and irrational, while rationalization is decomposed into two types as value-rational (wertrational) and purposive-rational (zweckrational). The value-rational action refers to the subjective conviction of the absolute and exclusive value of the current action itself, so this action must be completed regardless of the consequences and conditions. The purposive-rational action refers to the action that achieves the purpose on the condition that it can calculate and predict the consequences, so it is the action that excludes value judgment or value neutrality. In Weber’s view, all the achievements and problems of modern civilization stem from the tension and opposition between value rationality and purposive rationality, and their dynamic evolution reflects the evolution process of rationalism. In fact, every action contains both rationality and purposive rationality. According to Habermas, the concept of rationality is only associated with the use of knowledge. According to different application methods, it can be divided into the instrumental rationality control and the communication rationality understanding. The former refers to the effectiveness of knowledge as a tool to adapt to and dominate the external world; the latter refers to the central experience of mutual understanding, coordination and voluntary association between knowledge subjects through communication. By absorbing this central experience, the participants in the communication can overcome their initial subjective opinions and obtain a certain consistency, that is, the two eventually reach agreement on the communication rationality. It can be said that the concept of rationality actually revolves around reason. Reason usually expresses a kind of basis and logical ability, while rationality can be regarded as the ability to evaluate thoughts and actions based on reason. The consistency of the two is more obvious in science, that is, it is reflected in the consistency between scientific reason and scientific rationality.

130

Reason and Unreason

However, the one-sidedness and monotonization of human nature caused by the excessive publicity of reason, and the emergence of various social problems, have triggered people’s introspection and thinking on science and reason. Irrationalism took the lead to challenge the authority and status established by rationalism for a long time. 4.1.3 Challenge from Irrationalism The emergence of irrationalism is not accidental. It is not only related to the reality of social history and the development of natural sciences but also the result of the long-term accumulation of defects in traditional rationalism. In fact, since the Renaissance and especially the Enlightenment, humanism has gradually deviated from the track of reason. In the 17th century, humanists such as Pascal and Rousseau raised the banner of opposing reason. By the 20th century, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger and Bergson reversed the trend from rationalism to irrationalism. Usually, the irrationalism represented by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s rebellion against the modern rationalist tradition can be called humanistic irrationalism. The reason why they are “humanistic” is mainly that their main starting point for opposing traditional rationalism is the loss of people and their meaning and value. Therefore, this type of irrationalism mainly starts from people themselves, stressing the decisive role of people’s irrational activities (such as their emotion, will and instinctive impulse) in their spiritual and material existence. In particular, irrationalism emphasizes the irrational element in human factors on the basis of questioning the so-called “rational man” in modern science. Schopenhauer is said to be the originator of modern irrationalism. He has made a fierce criticism of the traditional system of philosophy with rationalism as its mainstay, thus destroying the sacred status of rationalism. In terms of human reason, he does not deny that reason is the main characteristic of human beings. He believes that reason is the difference between human consciousness and animal consciousness. Because of this difference, what man does on earth is so different from other irrational species.4 But he does not think it is the nature of human beings. As one of the most outstanding representatives of irrationalism after Schopenhauer, Nietzsche strongly emphasized or affirmed the decisive role of unreason in the content of thoughts and even the expression of thoughts, marking the beginning of irrationalism. From the perspective of ontology, Nietzsche emphasized that the whole world is an accidental pile of impulses of the will, and there is no inevitability at all. From the perspective of epistemology, he emphasized that reason is only a tool of strong will, which cannot understand the true colors of things and the real world, and truth is just a subjective belief, a conviction and evaluation of a certain judgment. “God is dead” expresses his thought of irrationalism to the fullest extent. The intuitionistic irrationalism represented by Bergson, taking it as its responsibility to break through traditional rationalism, claims that it must overcome the defects of empirical and rational methods and treat the phenomena of life as

Reason and Unreason 131 objects beyond reason that can be comprehended only by introspection. These philosophers believe that the rigid and static method of traditional reason cannot recognize and grasp the endless life phenomena, and the mechanical and dry logical form cannot describe the vagaries of life and must be changed. Therefore, Bergson, on the one hand, criticizes the traditional philosophy for interpreting the world as a closed and frozen world and insists that mechanism is undesirable and mechanical sequentiality and causality cannot be used to explain spontaneity and creativity. On the other hand, he abandons the solidified category, breaks the rigorous logical system, gets rid of all the restraints that contain human nature, pursues the living, changeable and continuous life impulse in the heart of individuals and thereby puts forward such irrational concepts as “continuation,” “life impulse” and “basic self.” Irrationalism from the perspective of psychoanalysis, represented by Freud, emphasizes the irrational component of human consciousness. According to Freud, in people’s spiritual or psychological structure, there are very few conscious parts, and most of them are unconscious or subconscious mental activity processes that people do not realize. He completely abandoned the traditional rationalism, and put forward a series of psychological analysis theories about unconsciousness, dreams and sexual desire, regarded such unconscious and sexual desire as the root of all spiritual phenomena, and further used this irrational instinct and desire to explain the origin and development of society, as well as human behavior and activities. From this point of view, reason cannot control unreason; on the contrary, all reasonable activities are governed by unreasonable factors, and all rational activities are influenced by irrational spiritual activities. The irrationalists of existentialism have made the most violent criticism of science and technology and the rational thinking it represents. By employing phenomenological methods, they reduced the existence of human beings to pure consciousness activities prior to the separation of subject and object, mind and matter, in an attempt to distinguish it from idealism. Their ultimate goal is to reveal the meaning and way of existence from the starting point of revealing the meaning of human existence, and then reveal the relationship between individuals and others and the world. Jaspers and Heidegger directly criticized the modern rational analysis for failing to give an idea of a person as a whole, ignoring the existence of a complete person and forgetting the existence of man. Unlike humanistic irrationalism, postmodern irrationalism no longer replaces reason with unreason, but directly and explicitly wants to bid “farewell to reason” and “deconstruct logos” (to deconstruct traditional reason). Postmodernists take anti-fundamentalism, anti-centrism and relativism as their main characteristics, pointing out that reason is the root cause of all social problems, and therefore reject the dominant position of reason. They believe that any form of reason is a symbol of power and a compromise of interests, they are no more than instruments of domination. They are committed to the dissolution of meaning, identity, centrality, universality and continuity, disseminating discontinuous, fragmented, relative and playful ideas. For example, Derrida and Rorty highlighted the self-deconstruction of reason, allowing reason to deconstruct itself

132

Reason and Unreason

in the operation of its own critical function, and fully demonstrate its destructiveness, game nature, uncertainty and incommensurability. In addition, the main representatives of this kind of irrationalism also include Lyotard, Lacan, Foucault and Feyerabend who are also dedicated to the dissolution of reason. Following Nietzsche’s claim that “God is dead,” Foucault came up with a proposition of “death of men,” which is also quite impactful in postmodern irrationalism. According to Foucault, “episteme” determines knowledge and society, and thus determines man. Therefore, man plays no part in the development of knowledge and society. He therefore asserted that man is dead, thus value has no place to cling to because value is always associated with the subject (man). In human history, according to Feyerabend, the proliferation of rationalism has spawned tyranny and dictatorship in the ideological field, all things regarded as unreasonable are excluded and suppressed, and there is no democracy or personal freedom, with the negative effect lasting to date. The only philosophy that eliminates this “curse” is relativism. The famous slogan put forward by Feyerabend is “anything goes,” clearly showing his basic standpoint of irrationalism and relativism. Although postmodern irrationalism and humanistic irrationalism claim to be “against reason,” the former undoubtedly goes further and denies reason more thoroughly. For the development of modern science, it has even become quite a devastating threat and power. 4.1.4 Conjunction of Reason and Unreason in Science The relationship between reason and unreason has always been a core topic in science-related fields. At present, between the traditional scientism that emphasizes inductive logic and the irrationalism that emphasizes unreason, the relationship between reason and unreason is still an issue in dispute. In terms of basic connotation, the so-called reason in science is usually understood as the ability of man to grasp the laws of the objective world through conscious logical (rational) thinking, and the activities of using this ability to know the world. Unreason is a kind of ability and activity corresponding to reason. The so-called unreason generally refers to the instinctive consciousness or unconsciousness in the mental structure and an illogical form of cognition. The former includes imagination, emotion, will and belief, while the latter includes intuition, inspiration and insight. As a psychological phenomenon, unreason is a kind of instinctive consciousness or unconsciousness, meaning that it is not controlled by reason or cannot be analyzed by reason. As a form of cognition, unreason cannot be definitively decomposed and differentiated. This is not only the unique feature of unreason but also the cause for being excluded by reason. In terms of functioning, reason often plays an indispensable and even instructive key role in scientific research activities. There is no doubt about this. As we all know, since the emergence of science in modern times, the procedure thought of scientific knowledge, characterized by epistemological rationalism and methodological deductivism, has taken shape. In the past few hundred years, this tradition

Reason and Unreason 133 of rational analysis in science has become the dominant mode of understanding in theoretical natural sciences, and many great scientific achievements have been made. However, according to the viewpoint of irrationalism, since reason is only a negative instrumental thing, it does not have the power to be active. Without the drive of lust, instinct and impulse, reason is a form of rigidity, and reasonable activities can only rely on unreasonable energy. This kind of energy includes Schopenhauer’s will to live, Nietzsche’s will to power, Bergson’s life impulse, and Freud’s libido (energy of sexual desire); these unreasonable factors are very important energy for reason. In terms of the relationship between reason and unreason, the traditional view of scientism holds that reason is supreme over unreason; the scientific reasonable methods are absolute and unconditionally extended to the study of non-natural subjects and social issues. In fact, it is denying the positive role of unreasonable methods in cognition. The opposite view of irrationalism insists that unreason is supreme to reason, and it even has unreasonable methods absolutized, claiming that they are the only way to achieve the essence of man and the world, but regards reasonable methods as obstacles in the process of cognition. In fact, as far as the specific process of scientific cognition is concerned, reasonable and unreadable methods have their own characteristics, while reasonable and unreadable factors often play a role together in cognition. In the actual scientific practice activities, reason and unreason are coordinated and compatible with each other. This conjunction is first manifested in the fact that reason and unreason are never separable, but permeate and depend on each other. Therefore, there is neither pure reason nor pure unreason. As Husserl has asked how can we seriously explain the simplicity and absurdity of rationalism? How can we seriously account for the much-vaunted reason of the anti-rationalism that we have hoped for? When we listen to it, doesn’t it also try to convince us with rational thinking and reasoning? Isn’t its unreason, in the final analysis, a kind of narrow-minded bad rationalism, worse than any old rationalism in the past? Isn’t it a kind of lazy reason? This kind of reason evades the struggle which explains the final material and from which it finally and correctly predefines the goal and path of reason.5 In the specific process of cognition, the formation and development of reasonable factors depend on unreasonable factors, while the formation and development of unreasonable factors also depend on reasonable factors, so the two can promote each other. Take intuition as an example. In scientific cognition, intuition is the way of thinking from fact to experience and from experience to theory; it is directly related to human sensibility and human reason and is formed with the help of reason. This is a non-mysterious way of thinking that is connected with facts and people’s realistic mental activities. There are perceptual intuition and reasonable intuition. Perceptual intuition is the direct experience of theory, which is related to the choice of theory. As a theoretical creative activity, reasonable intuition is about the order and relationship between logical elements; it is logical, comprehensive and conscious. Because of this, intuition as an unreasonable factor is often classified as reason.

134

Reason and Unreason

In addition, the combination of reasonable and unreasonable factors is more manifested in the mutual promotion and complementation of specific scientific activities. On the one hand, the realization of the role of reasonable factors depends on the participation of unreasonable factors. This is not only reflected in the fact that unreasonable factors (such as belief, passion and will) provide the strength and psychological support for reason to maintain its direction in cognition, but also that unreasonable factors (such as intuition and inspiration) provide motivation and support for reason in cognition. Regarding the role of reasonable factors, Kuhn once said that neither Sir Carr nor I are inductive, we don’t believe that there are any rules that can lead to a correct theory by inducing facts, and we don’t even believe that a theory, whether it is correct or not, can be derived entirely from induction. On the contrary, both of us regard theories as imagined hypotheses, invented for use in nature.6 Specifically, intuition, imagination and inspiration all play a unique role in scientific cognition. Among them, the main function of intuition is to break the thinking pattern and realize the transition of cognition; extraordinary imagination is the most valuable quality of the subject’s ability, and it is also the source of creativity; inspiration is an important supplement to reasonable knowledge and provides an opportunity for creative cognition. The role of these unreasonable methods in scientific cognition cannot be ignored. For example, Einstein attached great importance to the role of intuition, and he talked about “intuition” many times on different occasions. In a speech in memory of Madame Curie in 1935, he said that her great scientific feat of proving the existence of the radioactive element and separating it out was not only based on her tenacity and enthusiasm for work, but also due to her “bold intuition.” When examining scientific methods in 1936, Einstein pointed out that the connection between the basic concepts of daily thinking and the compound of sensory experience can only be understood intuitively, and the logical rules of science are not applicable. In 1952, he said in a letter that there is no inevitable logical connection between direct experience and axiom system, but there is only one intuitive (mental) connection which is not inevitable, and this step is actually beyond logic (intuitive).7 These indicate that in their creative research work, scientists have deeply experienced that intuitive thinking does exist; it is an indispensable factor of thinking in scientific research and theoretical creation and is of great significance to scientific exploration. In fact, scientists do not rely solely on logic and objectivity to obtain new knowledge; unreasonable factors (such as clever arguments, propaganda and personal prejudices) also play a role. Science should not be regarded as the guardian of reason in society, but only as an important way of its cultural expression.8 Scientists do not rely solely on reasonable thinking, and reasonable thinking is not their monopoly. On the other hand, the realization of unreasonable factors also depends on the role of reasonable factors. As far as unreasonable factors (such as will, belief and

Reason and Unreason 135 conviction) are concerned, any positive will, belief or conviction that can effectively play a role in human activities must rely on reason to set goals and directions and be expressed in reasonable forms. Obviously, although irrationalism has launched a fierce attack on reason and tried to dispel reason, it cannot deny that whether “will” or “emotion” is the experience and attitude of the subject toward external things as triggered by their needs, it is bound to be cognitive to some extent. Any choice made by man based on his wishes is naturally full of reasonable factors, even though he claims that this is just a will to live or life impulse. Of course, it is undeniable that cognition, in the realm of reason and the realm of unreason, will be very different. But we should not reject the exploration of the unreasonable field. The knowledge that explores the unreasonable field is not all unreasonable, but many theories that explore the realm of reason are in fact unreasonable.9 Reason and unreason are never completely separated. In short, reason and unreason are mutually infiltrated and promoted in specific scientific activities. Both play important and irreplaceable roles. It is the combination of logical and illogical, reasonable and unreasonable thinking modes that promotes the continuous development and progress of scientific knowledge.

4.2 Growth and Decline of Instrumental Reason and Value Reason In the course of the development of science and technology, there has always been the growth and decline of instrumental reason and value reason. From separation to integration, from fracture to unity, it vividly embodies the changes in the status of science and technology in society and the changes in people’s attitudes toward science and technology. 4.2.1 Instrumental Reason and Success of Science Since modern times, the status of science in knowledge and social life has been continuously improved. Especially with the Industrial Revolution that began in the 18th century, human society was ushered into a new era of industrial civilization. Politically, the Industrial Revolution fundamentally shook the foundation of the old world, thereby providing a prerequisite for the consolidation and development of the capitalist system. Economically, the rapid development of technology and engineering in the Industrial Revolution has resulted in tremendous progress in productivity, and an unprecedented increase in labor productivity, enabling the pursuit of profit to become the main driving force for social and economic development. Technically, the factory system replaced the manual workshop, completing the transformation from a traditional agricultural society to an industrial society. This influence then spread to all fields of society, resulting in the all-around development and progress of human society. At the same time, with the help of science and its technology application, human aspirations have been fulfilled. People can not only transform and control nature according to their own wishes, so

136

Reason and Unreason

as to meet their interests and requirements to the greatest extent; they can also create numerous things that do not exist in nature to satisfy their curiosity and desire for control. The combination of science and capitalist production has greatly promoted the development of productive forces and the progress of society, and the resulting social consequences are incomparable to any other stage in the course of human history. This not only confirms Bacon’s assertion that “knowledge is power,” but also offers the best proof of instrumental reason. Marx and Engels once lamented the great role of science and technology in modern capitalist economic life: [t]he bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together. Subjection of nature’s forces to man, machinery, application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization or rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground – what earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labor?10 These great scientific achievements not only fully demonstrated the powerful functions and infinite superiority of scientific knowledge, but also awakened people’s rational spirit. Since then, the power of scientific reason has been regarded as the supreme power of man, natural sciences, especially physics and mathematics, have become the most respected disciplines, and science has become a theme of modern culture and social life. The Industrial Revolution and the tremendous progress of productivity in the 18th century contributed to the overall prosperity of the natural sciences in the 19th century. Major progress had been made in thermodynamics, optics, electromagnetics, chemistry, geology, biology, anthropology and other disciplines, and mankind had entered a scientific era. As the classical mechanistic worldview reached its peak at the end of the 19th century, the inherent instrumental purpose in the mechanistic philosophy was further strengthened, making the instrumental reason continue to expand. By the Second Industrial Revolution in the middle of the 19th century, the emergence of electric technology changed the energy power structure of the entire society, and fundamental changes occurred in all areas it could reach; the application of electric power had provided a new technological basis for the development of monopoly capitalism and accelerated the concentration of capital. Since then, science has gone ahead of production and become the leader of technology, and the production process is gradually based on natural science. The two-way interaction between science, technology and production has enhanced the “science-technology-industry” chain effect, the power accumulated by science and technology has been repeatedly strengthened and expanded, affecting every corner of society. Instrumental reason has since gained supremacy, while value reason has been marginalized. In just 200 to 300 years, science has achieved such a huge success, largely due to the promotion of its utilitarian and practical values. Francis Bacon, the

Reason and Unreason 137 main proponent of scientific utilitarianism in the 17th century, spoke highly of the practical utility of scientific knowledge. He believed that one of the main reasons for the minimal advances in science in the past was that goals were misplaced. He criticized the research method of the vast majority of people at that time as empty talk. In his view, even if someone happens to pursue the truth with sincerity, what he does is nothing more than justifying the things that have been discovered so as to make people feel content with their understanding, rather than the new luminous truth that leads to new guarantees and principles of achievements. That’s why he insisted that “the true and lawful goal of the sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers.”11 In the 17th century, the marriage of Protestant ethics, capitalist spirit and economic utilitarianism promoted the prosperity of British science. At the same time, it also provided evidence for the “utility” and “instrumental reason” of science and made the utilitarian value and instrumental value of science and technology application increasingly prominent. Engels once pointed out that the birth and development of science are decided by production from the very beginning. He also said that after the dark Middle Ages, science suddenly reemerged with an unexpected force and developed at a miraculous speed, then we must once again attribute this miracle to production.12 This shows that the combination of science and production has an important influence on the expansion of science and instrumental reason. With the rapid development of science and its great success in social production and life, the utilitarian and instrumental functions of science have been brought into full play. Reason has become the criterion and even the only yardstick to measure everything. However, due to the excessive reinforcement of utilitarian stimulus since modern times, the development of science has deviated from the original good intentions. The strengthening of utilitarianism has induced scientific reason and the pursuit of truth into historical errors. The pursuit of quick results and instant benefits makes reason show signs of deviating from rational principles.13 In this regard, Engels commented that they recognized no external authority of any kind whatever. Religion, natural science, society, political institutions – everything was subjected to the most unsparing criticism: everything must justify its existence before the judgment-seat of reason or give up existence. Reason became the sole measure of everything.14 At the same time, reason has become instrumentalized, and instrumental reason has therefore become one of the most respected forms of reason in human culture. Instrumental reason has grown up with a transcendent model of human beings that has a firm grip on our imagination. It depicts an ideal picture of the human mind: this kind of human thinking has become pure and self-verifying reason and has escaped from our body composition, state of conversation, emotions and the mess of our traditional lifestyle.15 This emphasis on the instrumental value of science, on the one hand, provides a good external environment support for the further

138 Reason and Unreason development and progress of science; but on the other hand, it makes the development of science deviate from the track of human nature and seem to be moving toward pure utilitarianism. As a result, instrumental reason has not only expanded its scope in real life but also threatened to control our lives. In the fields where science works, this process is mainly achieved through its technology application. Therefore, the expansion of scientific/instrumental reason is mainly manifested through technological reason. Our lives are increasingly regulated by this man-made technological environment; the publicity of instrumental reason has also become increasingly apparent through the ubiquity of technology, and even reached its peak in the 20th century. Hans-Georg Gadamer pointed out with concern that the 20th century was the first era that is redefined in a technologically decisive way, and since then technical knowledge is being extended from mastering natural forces to mastering social life; all of this is a sign of maturity, or it can be said that it is a sign of our civilization crisis.16 In fact, since the Enlightenment, instrumental reason has begun to expand to all levels of society. All modern societies operate according to a particular and narrow view of reason, namely, what Weber calls “instrumental reason.” This view of reason occupies the core of the main institutions of society: economy, social control by bureaucratic organizations, science and technology. In the view of some Western scholars, the historical task of reason is to liberate mankind. The political and historical records so far show that the result is a terrible failure. Modern society is far from the promised ground of reason.17 The expansion and domination of instrumental reason is precisely the root cause of our current predicament. 4.2.2 Rupture between Instrumental Reason and Value Reason With the continuous promotion of instrumental reason, reason has achieved unprecedented victories in the fields of politics, economy, and social culture, and the social status of science has also improved accordingly. But at the same time, reason is increasingly split into two parts, namely, instrumental reason and value reason, and is accompanied by the decline and marginalization of value reason. The expression of instrumental reason and value reason was first seen in Max Weber’s Economy and Society. In this famous book, Weber, from the perspective of social behavior classification, classified the behaviors of employing means and technology to pursue utilitarian purposes as purposive-rational action, that is, behaviors of instrumental reason and technological reason, and classified the behaviors that insist on ethics, aesthetics, religion or any other interpretation – unconditional inherent value of pure belief regardless of what it has achieved – as value-rational action. Weber took the lead to decompose “rationality” into the two opposite concepts of “instrumental rationality” and “value rationality.” Later, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas of the Frankfurt School made further elaborations on this. For example, Horkheimer clearly distinguished two types of reason: subjective reason (instrumental reason) and objective reason (critical reason) – the former emphasizes means and their possible coordination with ends, while

Reason and Unreason 139 the latter emphasizes the criticism and transcendence of reality. Marcuse further developed it into an expression of technological reason and value reason. Among them, instrumental reason (subjective reason) and value reason (objective reason), which are the main dimensions of human reason, are unified in reason. Before the Enlightenment, instrumental reason and value reason, as the two indispensable organic components of human reason, were unified in the whole of reason without differentiation, and the two presented a primitive and harmonious state. However, with the rapid development of science and technology and industry initiated by the Enlightenment, instrumental reason has over-expanded and occupied a dominant position in human spiritual culture, resulting in the decline of value reason and the loss of human value. Modern people are confused by the prosperity created by empirical science, let their entire worldview be dominated by empirical science and, in the end, carelessly erase those issues that are truly important to humans and obscure the meaning of human existence.18 In Weber’s view, in our era, because of its unique rationalization and intellectualization, the most important thing is that the world has been disenchanted; those ultimate and noble values have disappeared from public life; they may escape into the transcendent realm of mystical life or into the camaraderie of direct personal communication.19 The split of reason into instrumental reason and value reason, as well as the overriding and concealing of instrumental reason relative to value reason, has made modern science and technology a new myth for modern people, but in the end, it triggered a scientific crisis and made people once again fall into a state of mental embarrassment. In other words, when empirical science dominates the entire worldview, it means that universal reason has fully evolved into positive reason. As a result, related to the collapse of this belief in reason, the belief in the absolute reason that gives meaning to the world, the belief in historical significance, the belief in the meaning of life and the belief in freedom, that is, all the beliefs in the capacity of man to give reasonable meaning to particular and general menschliches Dasein, are lost. If a person loses these beliefs, it means that he has lost his beliefs in himself and beliefs that are really Sein. At the same time, the split of reason caused instrumental reason to suppress and replace value reason, which in turn caused various problems in Western society. In the economic field, the preference for performance and efficacy, and the emphasis on material desire and possession, inadvertently constrained the trend of human social activities, that is, the pursuit of maximal material benefits and enjoyment took up almost all of people’s lives; metaphysical issues such as the existence and essence of human beings and the ultimate meaning of life and the world were pushed aside. In the field of social production, human beings were reduced from the main body that plays a leading role in production activities to objects that could be used and calculated, and from the purposeful existence in production activities to production tools, and they were reduced to the appendages of the capitalist machine production system and no better than the machine parts. With subject status being lost, man has gradually been alienated into a “one-dimensional man.” In the cultural field, the positivist approach of logic and experience was arbitrarily promoted

140

Reason and Unreason

as a universal approach, with humanities and other disciplines being excluded from science. As a result, the arbitrariness of reason has led to cultural unity and poverty, and instrumental reason has become the criterion for measuring everything. Marcuse summed up the problems caused by the era of instrumental reason as the alienation of one-dimensional man and the contradiction between man and nature. The alienation of one-dimensional man has led to the consequences of one-sided pursuit of technology while ignoring the human dimension of oneself as a person. The contradiction between man and nature has intensified, that is, human beings just ask for, conquer and make nearly crazy use of nature. As a result, it has led to a variety of global issues such as climate warming, destruction of the ozone layer, a sharp decline in biodiversity, environmental pollution, resource depletion and population expansion; in the end, the contradictions between countries, between people and between mankind and society have been exacerbated, resulting in a crisis of human survival. This seems to be the norm in an advanced industrial society. As the separation and opposition between instrumental reason and value reason become more and more serious, various social, political, economic and cultural issues have become increasingly prominent, which has triggered various criticisms against instrumental reason. Especially with the increasingly strengthening trend of science and technology, people have gradually shifted attention from the value reason of science to its instrumental reason, and science has gradually lost its humane and reasonable tradition. After that, all kinds of doubts and criticisms against scientific reason gradually appeared amid the division and confrontation between science and humanities. As Bernal said, people not only oppose the concrete results of science but also question the value of scientific thought itself. At the end of the 19th century, due to the crisis of the social system, anti-intellectualism began to rise, which is reflected in the philosophical thoughts of Georges Sorel and Henri Bergson. To a certain extent, it was the philosophers and metaphysical theorists who first paved the way and made it possible to defend fascist ideas – the ideas of using brutal means under the guidance of god-like leaders.20 Among these criticisms, the more representative one is the Frankfurt School’s special discussion on instrumental reason and value reason from the perspective of technology and science. Starting from the criticism of Enlightenment reason, they carried out in-depth criticism of the survival dilemma caused by instrumental reason and technological reason, issues of political-ideological control, cultural commercialization and industrialization with an aim to reveal the repression of human nature and the obstacles to the free development of human beings by the development of reason. In fact, as early as the middle of the 18th century, when science and reason chanted triumphs and showed their brilliance, Rousseau, who was in the Enlightenment camp, seemed to have insight into the possible negative effects of instrumental reason and science and technology. He said Astronomy was born of superstition, eloquence of ambition, hatred, flattery, lying; geometry of avarice; physics of vain curiosity; all of them, even moral

Reason and Unreason 141 philosophy, of human pride. Thus, the sciences and the arts owe their birth to our vices; we would be less in doubt about their advantages if they owed it to our virtues.21 4.2.3 Integration of Instrumental Reason and Value Reason Excessive publicity of instrumental reason and the break and conflict between instrumental reason and value reason have resulted in various social problems, and critics of science and technology have started criticizing the arrogation of scientific reason, which has shown the necessity of the integration of instrumental reason and value reason at present. Therefore, integrating instrumental reason and value reason and realizing the unity of the two have become a necessary choice in the current development of science and technology. In theory, both instrumental reason and value reason are indispensable and important components of human reason, so it is possible for them to achieve integration and unity. Instrumental reason (also known as “functional reason” or “efficiency reason”) confirms the usefulness of instruments (means) through practical means, so as to pursue the maximum effect of things and help realize certain utilitarian purposes of people. It is the reason that achieves the goal most effectively through precise calculation of utility, and the value that takes tool worship and technologism as the goal of survival. Value reason (also known as “substantive reason”) is the pure belief in the unconditional inherent value of a particular action – ethical, aesthetic or religious – through conscious effort, regardless of achievement. In other words, people only assign “absolute value” to selected behaviors, regardless of whether they are for ethics, aesthetics or religion, or for responsibility, honor and loyalty. Therefore, value reason is that the perpetrator pays attention to the value represented by the behavior itself, that is, whether to achieve social fairness, justice, loyalty, honor, etc. and does not even care about the means and consequences, rather than the result of selected behaviors. It focuses on the reason for behaviors from the perspective of certain substantive and specific values. On the whole, value reason determines the purpose, while instrumental reason achieves the purpose. From the perspective of specific behavior, instrumental reason emphasizes “yes,” which is the grasp of things that exist in reality, taking regularity as the criterion. Value reason, which is based on “should,” is the pursuit of an ideal state, taking purposiveness as the criterion. In the ultimate sense, instrumental reason pursues “truth,” while value reason pursues “goodness.” Logically speaking, value reason can provide spiritual motivation for instrumental reason, and instrumental reason can provide practical support for value reason, and the two are unified in human social practice. From this point of view, as the pursuit of human reason at different levels and perspectives, there is no conflict between instrumental reason and value reason; instead, they can achieve peace and harmony and promote the reason of behaviors. Frankly speaking, there is no practical unified model for how to achieve the integration and unification of instrumental reason and value reason. But we should

142 Reason and Unreason first realize that the integration of instrumental reason and value reason is not a reconciliation of two fundamentally opposed political values; rather, it is trying to criticize instrumental reason and its hegemonic values under its leadership and take into consideration the interests of mankind and the long-term and healthy development of science and technology and human society, so as to carefully examine the possible consequences of instrumental reason and its connection with value reason, thereby establishing a kind of value reason that can guide mankind to control instrumental reason and lead the human world onto a humanized development track. Therefore, to fundamentally change the human spiritual crisis and moral crisis brought about by the overstepping of instrumental reason, and to realize the return of value reason and the return of human meaning, it is necessary to change the past attitude and principle in dealing with the relationship between man and nature, man and society, man and others, in order to finally realize the coordination and unity of instrumental reason and value reason, and then achieve the harmony of instrumental considerations and value considerations in concrete behaviors. This mainly includes the following. First, it includes the harmony between man and nature. The relationship between man and nature is an important factor that must be considered when mankind conducts all social activities, especially scientific and technological activities. In fact, as for the loss of value dimension caused by the excessive expansion of instrumental reason, and the catastrophic environmental pollution and ecological imbalance caused by the wanton conquest and transformation of nature, the most fundamental reason for these problems is that people have ignored the principle of harmony between man and nature. Therefore, in order to achieve the coordination and unity of instrumental reason and value reason, and to solve the various ecological, social and spiritual problems faced by mankind, we should first reexamine the relationship between man and nature, so as to realize the harmonious development of man and nature as the fundamental foothold and starting point of all behaviors. As the main body and the bearer of the consequences of their own practical activities, people must consciously integrate themselves into nature, respect nature and obey the requirements of natural laws in practice. Nature has the highest and absolute subjectivity; humans should coordinate their production and lifestyle with the carrying capacity of the natural system, on the premise of respecting nature, and achieve the goal of development in harmony with nature. Second, it includes the simultaneous development of economic development and ecological optimization. Economic development is a prerequisite for the development and progress of human society, and it is also an important material basis for all human activities. Therefore, development is the absolute principle, and a very important purpose of scientific and technological activities in reality is to promote economic progress. At the same time, human survival always depends on certain environmental conditions and social-cultural environments; the maintenance and optimization of environmental ecology actually constitute a part of

Reason and Unreason 143 human development and directly determine the quality of human life. Therefore, any overly optimistic utopian development model of “economic growth = environmental optimization” will cause greater losses in human development due to its one-sidedness and narrowness, and it may even lead to environmental and ecological diseases that are difficult to cure. Therefore, in such a technological behavior of pursuing economic development while optimizing the ecology (at least not causing ecological deterioration), instrumental reason and value reason have achieved a harmonious unity. Third, it includes the co-prosperity of material abundance and spiritual improvement. The ultimate goal and end result of the development of science and technology is to serve people. The needs of real people are rich and comprehensive, with both material satisfaction and spiritual needs, both realistic satisfaction and value pursuit, both predictable achievements and unseen surprises. The satisfaction of diverse human needs and the urgent demand for the perfection and development of human nature all require modern people, while improving their material living standards, to pay attention to the influence of the development of science and technology and its achievements on both spiritual and cultural dimensions, and enrich their inner life, so as to create a modern society with an abundance of materials and continuous improvement of cultural and spiritual significance. Fourth, it includes the balance between short-term and long-term interests. Driven by instrumental reason, people often “see only the trees but not the forest,” and only care about the small interests at hand, but fail to see the greater interests that may be realized in the future, let alone the huge harm that may be caused to the future. There is a Chinese saying that “worries will soon appear if one gives no thought to a long-term plan”; such blindness and narrow-mindedness always make people see the evil results it brings soon. The harm caused by the shortsightedness of anthropocentrism and economic supremacy is obvious to all today. These narrow-minded approaches have been fiercely criticized by many thinkers. In the field of philosophy, the attack on anthropocentrism has successively experienced the death of the subject and the death of people, and then deconstructive criticism in the field of language in the postmodern period. Economic development does not necessarily mean an improvement in the quality of life; that kind of economic activity, which seems like draining the pond to get all the fish, may put mankind in a desperate situation of development. Nowadays the sustainable development of all aspects of economy and society has become the consensus of people. In fact, the integration and unification of instrumental reason and value reason means that people should realize the consistency of instrumental and value considerations of their own activities related to science and technology, the harmony between material creation and spiritual production and personal satisfaction and social needs. Such integration and unification are not immediate or established, but an ultimate pursuit and long-term goal, a goal that still requires continuous efforts in the future of social development and technological progress.

144

Reason and Unreason

4.3 Cultural Consciousness and Return of Humanistic Value in Science and Technology Cultural consciousness is a mentality of cultural development. It means that people not only have full knowledge of and respect for their own culture but also have a clear understanding of the relationship between their own culture and other cultures, which is reflected in the practice of cultural development. At present, the cultural consciousness in the development of science and technology is to clearly recognize the cultural characteristics of the emergence, formation and development of science and technology itself, and to realize the return of science and technology to cultural traditions and human nature on the basis of combing and reflecting on the status quo of the development of science and technology, so as to promote the civilized development of science and technology. 4.3.1   Scientific Reason and Humanistic Spirit On the whole, the human spirit contains two closely related aspects, namely, scientific reason and humanistic reason, and the two should be unified in specific human activities. Scientific reason is human reason and wisdom embodied in scientific theories or principles and is a necessary prerequisite for the development of science. As a reasonable spirit developed on the basis of science, it must be a human reasonable spirit guided by the basic characteristics of science, such as universality and objectivity. Therefore, what scientific reason embodies is mainly the universal scientific spirit of truth-seeking, reason, norm, fairness, tolerance, criticism, innovation, efficiency and collaboration. The modern world of scientific reason described by Gerald Holton has such characteristics: “objectivity” has a high status; it prefers quantitative rather than qualitative results and impersonal and generalized results (where there are such results); it is an intellectual, abstract, sensational world away from direct experience (as opposed to Mach), non-erotic and non-anthropomorphic; it uses reasonable rather than moralistic thinking (where reason is operationally limited by some boundary conditions such as skepticism and consensus); it has problemorientation (contrary to mystical orientation and purpose orientation) and prooforientation (requiring verification or falsification inspection); it leans toward the functionality of elite rule, “reason and routine” and specialization; it is relative to authoritative skepticism and seeks autonomy; it is based on reason and enlightenment and opposes the sanctification of any person or thing; it tends to accommodate opposing opinions (as long as it is proven), but still allows arguments and new experiences; scientific knowledge leads to power; there are levels in the knowledge field, and the more basic levels are used to illustrate the roots of other levels; it publicly declares itself secular, anti-metaphysical and “disenchanting”; it prefers evolution (“revolution”) to stagnation or discontinuous change; it is better not to be self-aware than not to be reflexive; it is active and progressive (that

Reason and Unreason 145 is, scientific progress → material progress → moral progress in the evolution of human rights).22 In this picture of the modern world, objectivity and universality based on disenchantment and abstraction have become the cornerstones and important pillars of this great building of reasonable science. However, it cannot be ignored that the reasonable characteristics that humans are trying to explore are by no means abstract and isolated. It is always historically and specifically combined with the politics, economy, culture and ideology of a country or a nation, and it is vividly displayed as a country and nation’s specific laws, policies, systems and universal values. Therefore, this universal reason must not be externally attached to a nation or country; instead, it must be used as an indispensable element in the overall structure of this nation or country, so as to be internally integrated into the national spirit, and then takes root, blooms and bears fruit in its special form or method in the soil of this particular ethnic group.23 Therefore, although scientific reason is universal and objective, it is not rigid and single; it is always clearly and concretely manifested in different social and cultural regions and in different historical periods, so it always has the national characteristics of the culture in which it is located. As far as the humanistic spirit is concerned, the term “humanistic” mainly contains two meanings: one is “human” and the other is “being humane.” “Human” is the concept of ideal man and ideal humanity, which is usually equivalent to “humanity.” “Being humane” is a discipline and curriculum set up to cultivate this ideal human, which is consistent with “humanities.” The two meanings are always combined: the humanities in the sense of discipline always serve the humanities in the sense of ideal humanity, or complement each other. For example, language, literature, art, logic, history and philosophy are always regarded as the basic disciplines of humanities; they are always connected with the understanding and use of language, the identification of ancient cultural traditions and the cultivation of aesthetic ability and rational reflection ability, so as to cultivate ideal humanity of people and equip them with education and culture, wisdom and virtue, understanding and critical ability. Therefore, the humanistic spirit is mainly the thinking about the existence of people reflected in humanity and activities similar to humanities, and the concern about the value of people and the meaning of life, as well as a reflection and exploration of human destiny, pain and liberation of life. Compared with scientific reason, humanistic spirit is more metaphysical, belonging to the ultimate care of man, and showing man’s ultimate value. As two different manifestations of the human spirit, scientific reason and humanistic spirit should be mutually unified. However, throughout history, scientific reason and the humanistic spirit have broken and conflicted. When the edifice of modern science was basically established in the 17th century, the great success of science in various fields had nurtured a kind of worship for the ideal itself. A scientism-only thought took science and technology as the only source of progress in the entire society, namely, human needs can be met only with the help of science and technology, and it will be the most reasonable that the

146 Reason and Unreason development of science and technology will inevitably lead to the governance of society by scientific and technological experts. People only paid attention to the areas that science can touch, while people’s emotions, beliefs and other spiritual factors that play a very important role in human life, as well as people themselves, were excluded; anything that is unreasonable was regarded as incomprehensible or even absurd. Conflicts and crises between man and nature, man and man, man and society and the breeding of anti-scientific thoughts are the best examples of the break between scientific reason and humanistic spirit. The British novelist C.P. Snow raised the issue of “two cultures” in the 1950s, and the Chinese ideological circle launched the great debate on “science and metaphysics” (here “metaphysics” refers to the humanities with traditional culture as the core) in the early 1920s, are explanations of this break in the human spirit to some extent. However, the rift in history does not mean that scientific reason and humanistic spirit are two different things. In fact, scientific reason and humanistic spirit are always unified. Both of them take the objective nature as the source, take the human as the starting point and the final destination and constitute a complete human value system together; they are internally consistent since they depend on and promote each other. In actual human practice, scientific reason and humanistic spirit have reached perfect unity. We have no reason to believe that scientific reason and humanistic spirit are two different things, and there is no reason to believe that modern Western society is always facing an either-or dilemma. Westerners have always been shaping their own humanistic spirit based on scientific reason. Without scientific reason, one cannot understand the humanistic spirit of the West. Especially in modern and contemporary times, the position of scientific reason in the humanities has been further strengthened; how can we think that “tyrannical” reason has enslaved the humanities?24 Moreover, scientific reason itself embodies a certain humanistic spirit. George Sarton believes that science contains a humanity factor. The new humanism he advocates does not exclude science; it will include science, or it will be built around science. Science is the center of our spirit; it is also the center of our civilization. It is the source of our wisdom and health, but not the only source. No matter how important it is, it is absolutely inadequate. We cannot live by the truth alone. This is why we say that the new humanism is built around science. Science is its core, but nothing beyond. The new humanism does not exclude science; on the contrary, it will maximize the development of science. It will reduce the danger of abandoning scientific knowledge to science’s own profession. It will praise the human meaning of science and reconnect it with life. It unites scientists, philosophers, artists and saints into a single sect. It will further confirm the unity of mankind, not only in its achievements but also in its ambitions.25 The unity of scientific reason and humanistic spirit will be the fundamental requirement and main direction of the development of human spirit and culture.

Reason and Unreason 147 4.3.2 Practical Turn of Science and Its Return to Tradition The cultural consciousness in the development of science and technology, on the one hand, manifests itself in taking science and its technology application as a practice, and examining science and technology from the perspective of practice and culture; on the other hand, it is concentratedly reflected in the trend of returning to tradition in the development of science and technology, not only returning to its own spiritual and cultural traditions but also actively seeking dialogue and communication with other non-scientific cultural traditions in order to construct a consensus on the overall development of culture. 4.3.2.1 Practical Turn of Science Historically, at least until the end of the 1950s, the concept of taking science as a body of knowledge and a collection of theories and empirical propositions of the world had received extensive attention and support; therefore, various studies on science mainly characterized it as a kind of static knowledge. However, the research philosophy of understanding science, on the basis of scientific practice, emerged quietly in the 1990s. It explores from the perspective of science as a practice, thereby turning the understanding of scientific representationalism and “theory priority” to an interventionist understanding of “practice priority.” As a result, practice gradually replaced knowledge and theory, and became the core of the understanding of science and its nature. This practice transition of science is prominently embodied in two different representative research approaches: one is the research approach of new experimentalism represented by Ian Hacking; the other is the research approach of hermeneutics of scientific practice represented by Joseph Rouse. New experimentalism is a school of scientific philosophy that has emerged since the 1980s. It breaks the “theory priority” assumption in the traditional philosophy of science, and instead hopes to find a relatively reliable basis for science from the field of experiment rather than observation; it emphasizes that experiment has its own life, and it is not completely dependent on theory. As a pioneer of new experimentalism, Ian Hacking made clear the transition of science from representation to intervention and from theory to practice in his book Representing and Intervening (1983). He pointed out that science is said to have two purposes: theory and experiment. Theory tries to explain what the world is like, while experiment and corresponding technologies change the world. We represent, and we intervene. The purpose of our representation is to intervene, and our intervention is based on representation.26 It can be seen that representation and intervention are actually mixed together in the view of Ian Hacking. But he also emphasized that science is more of an intervention in the world, not just a representation of the world with words and thoughts. In this way, science has moved from representation to intervention, from theory to practice, and the traditional presupposition of “theory priority” has also been replaced by “practice priority.”

148

Reason and Unreason

Post-SSK is a field where the practice transition of science is more obvious. As an important representative of scientific practice research, Andrew Pickering pointed out in his book Science as Practice and Culture (1992) that there is a shift of science from being knowledge to being practice in SSK study. He believes that one of the most prominent features of the research shifts that occurred within SSK in the late 1980s is the shift to “scientific practice.” For example, Bruno Latour’s “Science in Action,” Karin Cetina’s “Laboratory Study,” Michael Mulkay and Henry Gilbert’s “Reflexivity” and “New Literary Form” studies, and other anthropological studies, show a kind of attention to the practical connotation of science. The basic viewpoints of practice emphasize the instrumental meaning of scientific knowledge and the power of scientific actors, that is, knowledge is for use, not just for contemplation. Actors have their own interests; scientific knowledge, as a kind of instrument, can promote or hinder the realization of such interests. Especially with the introduction of the concept of interest and scientific sociological analysis based on it, on the one hand, it can be considered that the actor seeks to expand the scientific culture in a way that suits his own interests and not in other ways; on the other hand, for which kind of extended result can be obtained and which kind of conceptual network can be obtained, interests can serve as the criterion for selection. The best expansion result of the network should be able to fully satisfy the interests of the relevant scientific community.27 As a result, science is no longer primarily a transparent representation of nature but becomes knowledge relative to a specific culture, which can be portrayed through conceptual analysis of interests. Not only that, but Andrew Pickering also clearly pointed out that the theme of the new scientific landscape is practice rather than knowledge, and advocated the use of the term “mangle of practice”28 to express understanding of science. In the field of scientific hermeneutics, the transition of science from knowledge to practice is mainly explained through the interventional and operational characteristics of laboratory practice. For example, Joseph Rouse believes that science is not an expression and observation of the world, but an interaction with and intervention in the world. In his view, the traditional image of science regards science as a representation system that accurately describes the world, and observation is the only channel connecting the world represented and the world itself. However, this is not the case in reality. In specific scientific activities, the problem is not how we arrive at the represented world itself from the language representation of the world. We have participated in the world in practical activities, and the world is the thing in which we participate. The problem of access to the world (appealing to observation is a response to this problem) will no longer arise.29 In fact, only by intervening in the world can we discover what the world is like. The world is not beyond the reach of our theories and observations. It is what appears in our practice, what it resists or accepts us when we act on it. Scientific research, along with other things we do, has changed the world, and it has also changed the way the world is known. We do not understand the world in the way of the subject’s representation of the object, but as an actor to grasp and comprehend the possibility that we can discover ourselves. The transition from representation to

Reason and Unreason 149 operation, from knowing to knowing, does not deny the common-sense view that science helps to reveal the world around us.30 In general, the practice transition of science can be said to be from science as knowledge to science as practice and culture. 4.3.2.2 Return of Science to Tradition The return of science to tradition is mainly manifested in the following two aspects. (1) Return to the tradition of science itself. British historian of science Stephen F. Mason once pointed out that science has two main historical roots. The first is the technological tradition, which passes down practical experiences and skills from generation to generation and enables their continuous development. The second is the spiritual tradition, which inherits and develops human ideals and thoughts.31 This shows that science has two most important traditions throughout its history: one is the technical tradition that emphasizes utilitarianism, and the other is the spiritual tradition that emphasizes ideals. The former mainly refers to human experiences and practical skills handed down from generation to generation, while the latter mainly refers to human ideals and thoughts passed down from generation to generation. The independent existence of these two traditions has emerged since the Bronze Age of human civilization. However, it was not until the late medieval times and the early modern period that the components of these two traditions began to converge in Western Europe, forming a new tradition, namely, the scientific tradition. In the relevant discourse of the sociologist of science Merton on the spiritual temperament of science – universalism, publicity, selflessness and methodical skepticism – there is the unity of technological tradition and spiritual tradition in modern science. However, such unity is Merton’s ideal of the development of science. In the actual process of scientific development, with the rise of the modern scientific revolution and the great achievements made by the industrial-technological revolution that it triggered, science is more and more biased toward the one dimension of technical tradition while marching forward, with the elements of spiritual tradition being concealed or ignored. Just like Cohen pointed out that a revolutionary feature of the new science is the addition of a practical purpose, that is, to improve local daily life through science. A true purpose of seeking scientific truth must have an effect on the material living conditions of mankind. This belief has been developing in the 16th and 17th centuries, and it has become more and more intense and widely spread in the future, forming the new discipline itself and its characteristics.32 The spiritual tradition that once existed as the nature of science seems to have been forgotten. At the same time, precisely this deviation from the scientific tradition directly led to the excessive display of instrumental reason and utilitarianism in the development of science, thus ignoring the value and spiritual dimensions, and resulting in a series of social problems.

150 Reason and Unreason Seeking a balance between instrumental reason and value reason in science is to ensure the healthy development of science itself and its normal operation in real society, which has become an important consideration in the development of science. The most fundamental of these is to retrieve the value dimension and spiritual tradition that science once lost and return to the scientific tradition where technical tradition and spiritual tradition coexist. It can be said that the current focus on the humanistic value of science and the emphasis on the social responsibility of science are concrete manifestations of the return of science to its own comprehensive tradition. (2) Return of science to concrete social and cultural traditions. After hundreds of years of development, science has gradually established a dominant position in both society and in the spiritual and cultural field, thus eclipsing other non-scientific traditions. However, since the 20th century, the various social problems caused by the application of science and technology have made people doubt the inherent superiority of science, and science is no longer the only measure of social reason and legitimacy. At the same time, people are increasingly aware that science does not reject tradition, and reason does not deny sensibility and difference; religion, literature, art and other non-scientific traditions not only strengthen the human spirit of free exploration, but also correct our scientific and technological reason, and reverse the mistaken path that we used to be too biased toward instrumental reason and utilitarianism while ignoring humanistic reason and responsibility ethics. Science needs to seek support for its own healthy development from tradition in order to restore its cultural nature, which has gradually become the consensus of social development. As a result, science began to actively seek wisdom and help from traditional religion, literature and art, strive to eliminate the barriers between different cultural traditions and then construct a grand cultural view in which science advances harmoniously with other social and cultural traditions. Feinberg gave a clear explanation of such a development trend of returning to tradition. He said that the naive belief in reason supported the distinction between modernity and tradition in the past; modernity was said to be reasonable, with particular emphasis on its cognitive foundation – science and technology – superior to any earlier society. From the perspective of positivism, reason is universal and not restricted by social and historical conditions. Suspicion or criticism of reason is not only a challenge to the legitimacy of the present age but also undermines the only reliable position for evaluating the world. But in recent years, this kind of legitimacy has become increasingly doubtful, and reason has increasingly been interpreted as a cultural effect. Today, new social interpretations of science and technology are coming alive in the illusion of statecraft that was shattered by the previous generation of technologists. Tradition, as far as it supports cultural diversity against the false universality of the West, is now regarded as a “dubious reprieve.” The differences between race, religion and gender that have lost their importance in the universal melting pot of reason are restored.33

Reason and Unreason 151 It can be seen that returning to traditional social and cultural factors, and absorbing nutrients and raw materials from traditional culture as a useful supplement to its own development, has become an important aspect of current scientific and technological development. In such a trend, the cultural consciousness of the development of science and technology is clearly embodied. 4.3.3 Return of Humanistic Value of Science and Technology Throughout the entire history of human culture, no matter what stage of cultural development or what kind of cultural form, human nature is the most fundamental among them. Cassirer’s study has revealed that human culture as a whole can be called a process of continuous self-liberation. Language, art, religion and science are different stages in this process. In all these stages, people have discovered and confirmed a new force – the force to build one’s own world, an ideal world. Philosophy cannot give up its exploration of the basic unity of this ideal world, but it does not confuse this unity with oneness and does not ignore the tension and friction, strong opposition and deep conflict between these different forces of man. These forces cannot be reduced to a common denominator. They tend to be in different directions and follow different principles. But this diversity and dissimilarity do not mean inconsistency or disharmony. All these functions are complementary. Each function opens a new horizon and shows us a new aspect of human nature.34 Similarly, technology is also inseparable from human nature. George Sarton believes that science is full of human nature; regardless of its origin, development process or results, human nature is the fundamental characteristic of science. Therefore, he proposed that we must humanize science, and it is best to explain the diverse relationships between science and other human activities – the relationship between science and our human nature. This is not to belittle science; on the contrary, science is still the center of human evolution and its highest goal. To humanize science is not to make it unimportant, but to make it more meaningful, moving and cordial.35 However, with the intensification of social changes triggered by the modern Industrial Revolution and the excessive expansion of instrumental reason, people have gradually lost their value dimension and can no longer feel any satisfaction or joy in production. At the same time, the destruction of nature by science and technology puts people on the opposite side of nature, leading to the alienation of technology and people. In this way, people are lost in the huge material power that they have created, and science and technology deviate from their original intentions and go to the opposite side. Technology gradually loses its humanistic dimension and becomes an inhuman existence. This is undoubtedly a retrogression for the long-term development of technology and society, and even for people themselves. Hume once said that all sciences are always more or less related to human nature. No matter how far away any discipline seems to be from human nature, it will always return to human nature in one way or another. Even mathematics, natural philosophy and natural religion

152

Reason and Unreason

are all sciences that depend on humans to some extent.36 In the final analysis, the value of science and its technology application must ultimately be reflected in the lives of real people and in people themselves. Realizing the return of science and technology to human nature has thus become an important aspect of the current development of science and technology. The so-called humanization of technology is to make technology humanistic and humanized. This kind of humanized technology overcomes the shortcomings of technology and human beings or even ignores the existence of human beings, and instead builds science and technology on the basis of humans, and always develops science and technology around human survival; it takes people as the center and purpose, and fundamentally creates a comfortable life and a good living environment for people through non-destructive development of nature, economical and effective use of nature, so that science and technology become truly human science and technology. Here, technology and reason, nature and people are unified in humanized technology. The realization of humanized science and technology mainly involves two ways of culture and social practice. First, through various cultural ideologies other than science, we promote the humanization of science and human culture from the cultural level. For example, through the development of humanistic cultures such as art, philosophy and religion, we rediscover the meaning and value of sensibility, aesthetic culture and art on the natural platform in order to find a space for the unification of technology and humanities outside of science and technology, and realize the humanization of science and technology. In this regard, Sarton uses the history of science to combine science and humanism, so as to realize humanized science and technology. He stated that the only way to humanize scientific work is to inject some historical spirit and respect for the past into scientific work – respect for goodness as a witness to all ages. No matter how abstract science may become, the essence of its origin and development is human. Every scientific result is the fruit of human nature and a confirmation of its value. The unimaginable infinity of the universe revealed by scientists does not make people smaller in terms of pure matter but gives people a deeper meaning to life and thoughts. As our understanding of the world gradually deepens, we also appreciate our relationship with the world more enthusiastically. There is no natural science as opposed to the humanities. Once formed, every branch of science or knowledge is both natural and human. Please prove the profound human nature of science, so that the study of science becomes the best medium of humanism that people can imagine. Excluding this meaning, teaching scientific knowledge only for the purpose of obtaining information and vocational training, then this kind of learning of useful scientific knowledge from a purely technical point of view loses all educational value. Without history, scientific knowledge may be harmful to culture; combining with history and reconciling with admiration, it will cultivate the noblest culture.37 Second, in order to humanize science and technology, it is necessary to develop new and different science and technology and truly achieve the application and

Reason and Unreason 153 popularization of humanized technology in the field of social practice. In this regard, the “intermediate technology” and “democratic technology” proposed by Schumacher are quite enlightening. Starting from the practical consideration of scientific and technological practice, Schumacher advocated the development of a humanized technology. He believes that modern technology deprives people of the creative work of using hands and human brains, so he suggested creating a technology that makes our hands and brain more productive. This kind of technology is known as “intermediate technology” or “democratic technology.” This technology can make full use of modern knowledge and experience, adapt to the laws of ecology and serve people instead of making people the servants of machines.38 Specifically, what we need is another technology, a technology with human nature; it does not make human hands and brain redundant but makes the human brain more productive than ever before. M.K. Gandhi said he was not in favor of mass production but instead he wanted production by the masses. That’s not how the world works. The mass production system is based on highly capital-intensive, energy-dependent and labor-saving technology. The prerequisite is to be rich because setting up a workplace requires a lot of investment. The mass production system is to mobilize the invaluable resources that everyone has, that is, smart human brains and dexterous hands, and use first-class tools to assist them. The technology of mass production is inherently violent and destroyable. From the perspective of non-renewable resources, it is self-destructive and makes people useless. Since the technology of mass production utilizes the best modern knowledge and experience, it is easy to disperse, adapt to the laws of ecology and moderately use scarce resources. The purpose is to help people, not to make people slaves to machines. This kind of technology may be referred to as “intermediate technology,” meaning that it is much better than the original technology of previous years, and at the same time, it is much simpler, much cheaper and much freer than the super technology of rich countries. It can also be known as “self-reliant technology,” “democratic technology” or people’s technology – a technology that everyone can use, not the proprietary technology of the rich and powerful.39 In a nutshell, the return of the human nature of science and technology and the realization of humanized science and technology should not only focus on promoting the unity and connection of science and technology and humanities from the conceptual and ideological level, but also pay attention to the development of humanistic technology in specific practices and the injection of the democratic into the creation process of instruments. This is quite necessary for the healthy development of current scientific and technological culture.

Notes 1 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by Wang Taiqing, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:334. 2 E. Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Gu Weiming et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988:4, 11.

154

Reason and Unreason

3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:775. 4 A. Schopenhauer, Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung. Translated by Shi Chongbai, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:70. 5 Husserl, Selected Works of Husserl. Complied by Ni Liangkang, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:993. 6 T.S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:272. 7 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:339, 343, 541. 8 W.J. Broad and N. Wad, Betrayers of the Truth: Fraud and Deceit in the Halls of Science. Translated by Zhu Jinning et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2004:iv 9 Ji Xianlin et al., National Studies and Oriental Culture. Beijing: Peking University Press, 1994:53. 10 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:36. 11 F. Bacon, The New Organon. Translated by Xu Baokui, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984:59, 58. 12 Selected works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:865. 13 Xu Jian, “Scientific Development and Utilitarian Spirit.” Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Social Sciences), 1990(3):84–87. 14 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:775. 15 C. Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity. Translated by Cheng Lian, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2001:117–18. 16 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: World Culture Books, 1988:63. 17 John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism. Translated by Feng Jiansan, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999:273–74. 18 E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Wang Bingwen, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1988:5. 19 M. Weber, Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005:48. 20 J.D. Bernal, Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2003:5. 21 J.J. Rousseau, Discourse of the Science of the Arts. Translated by He Zhaowu, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:16. 22 G. Holton, Science and Anti-Science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999:216–17. 23 Guo Guichun, “Scientific Reason and Comparison of Chinese and Western Culture.” Theoretical Exploration, 1989(2):19–22. 24 Wang Jinzhong. “Thoughts on Scientific Reason and Humanistic Spirit.” Magazine of Dialectics of Nature Science, 1998(1):43–45. 25 G. Sarton, The History of Science and the New Humanism. Translated by Chen Hengliu et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007:132–33. 26 I. Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983:31. 27 A. Pickering, Science as Practice and Culture. Translated by Ke Wen et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:4–5. 28 “Mangle of practice” emphasizes that the basic characteristic of scientific practice lies in its dialectical nature, that is, the “mangle” between human factors and non-human

Reason and Unreason 155 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

factors. The general characteristic of scientific practice is the dialectics of resistance and adaptation which are practical, goal-oriented, and goal-modified. J. Rouse, Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:152. H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:23–24. S.F. Mason, A History of the Sciences. Translated by Zhou Xuliang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1980:1. I.B. Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999:5. A. Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Translated by Lu Jun et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003:24–25. E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man. Translated by Gan Yang, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003:357. G. Sarton, The Life of Science. Translated by Liu Junjun, Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007:57. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature. Translated by Guan Wenyun, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1980:6. G. Sarton, The History of Science and the New Humanism. Translated by Chen Hengliu et al., Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1989:49. E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics. Translated by Yu Hongjun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984:2. H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:104.

Part II

Scientific Culture and Cultural Science For a long time, science always looked like something high and hard to reach because of its unique superiority, and it has developed into a powerful scientific culture. But since the 20th century, science has gradually lost its original positive and revolutionary power due to a series of bad results caused by its cultural hegemony. Science began to become autocratic and dogmatic; scientific culture is no longer purely scientific and cultural, and its cultural connotation has been declining. At present, the main direction of the development of science is to recover its lost cultural connotation, cultivate a kind of cultured science and finally move toward a free and open future.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-7

5

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

Science is one of the greatest cultures that man has ever created. However, the dominant position of science in human culture, as well as the hegemony of scientism formed on this basis, has intensified the opposition between scientific culture and humanistic culture. To a certain extent, science even leads to cultural loss in scientific culture. It is worth pondering why science, once one of the most outstanding achievements of human civilization, has lost its cultural connotation.

5.1 Orthodox Forms of Scientific Culture and Loss of Human Nature At present, the scientific culture based on the standard view of science has gradually deviated from its original intention, resulting in the so-called loss of culture and humanity. The progress of human civilization created by the modern scientific and technological revolution has in turn caused the loss of human nature. 5.1.1 What Happened After Science Became the Dominant Culture What is culture anyway? There is no universal definition. British anthropologist Edward Taylor once made a classic definition of culture, “culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”1 From this point of view, culture is the description of the whole way of life in a certain society, which is closely related to the development of the entire human society. The so-called mainstream culture refers to the culture that occupies a dominant position and plays a leading role in a society; it guides the development of the whole society and influences the other cultural functions of the society. Throughout the development of human civilization, the form of mainstream culture has kept changing constantly. Looking at the history of human civilization, at the time of Pericles, a large number of people took interest in philosophy and art. For most of the Middle Ages, religion and theology remained the focus of interest. A striking emphasis on literature, ethics and the arts was a general characteristic of the Renaissance. In modern times, and DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-8

160

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

especially in the past three centuries, the center of interest seems to have shifted toward science and technology.2 Science (and technology) has developed into a kind of culture, which is unique and dominant among many cultural forms of human beings and has experienced a long evolutionary history of human civilization. In the pre-scientific Greek era, science in its infancy was mixed with religion, philosophy, art, mythology and other cultural forms, and there was neither real science nor independent cultural form of science. Throughout the Middle Ages, the power of the church pervaded the whole European society. As the dominant cultural form, religion controlled the political and economic life of the society and suppressed all other cultural forms. After the Renaissance, the prestige of the church in European society gradually declined, and the mainstream cultural status of religion began to give way to science. To be precise, as an independent cultural form, scientific culture officially formed after the Industrial Revolution. Thanks to the Newtonian revolution of the 17th century, science began to establish its own status, and the Christianitycentered culture was gradually replaced by the science-centered culture. In the field of academic research, Newton’s method was increasingly applied to the whole natural science, the rational tradition and the empirical tradition realized the decisive integration. In social life, the combination of science and technology was increasingly close and applied to industrial production, so the social status of science kept rising. In the following three or four centuries, not only did natural science develop rapidly in Europe, but science and technology became indispensable to people’s daily life. By the 18th century, science had become an important cultural factor for the first time, and it even had an impact on politics. It provided new intellectual tools for criticizing the old dominion and used mechanized industry to carry out the means of remaking man. The possibility of a world ruled by reason and equality, not prejudice and privilege, became an aspiration, and this movement spread throughout Europe and the New World.3 After that, owing to the baptism of modern scientific revolution that broke out at the turn of the 19th century and the 20th century, especially the far-reaching influence of science in politics, economy, military and other fields since the early 20th century, the dominant position of science in the whole social culture was gradually established. Then, how can the scientific culture, which is formed on the basis of the modern scientific and technological revolution, occupy a dominant position in modern society for a long time? This is inseparable from the characteristics of scientific culture itself, as well as the special position and important role of science and technology in the development of human society. Science, as a kind of culture, is not only in the sense of intelligence, but also in the sense of anthropology, so it has characteristics and spiritual temperament different from politics and religion. Therefore, the cultural nature of science is not only embodied at the cognitive level but also involves the social level. In the traditional view, science is based on logic and experience and is endowed with a kind of objectivity and universality based on empirical observation. The cultural source of this standard view of science is the tradition of rationalism and empiricism since the Renaissance, while the formal formation of the standard view of

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 161 science is the combination of cultural scientism and sociological positivism.4 Therefore, the scientific culture formed on the basis of this scientific view is inevitably centered on scientism and positivism. According to Mulkay, in traditional analysis of science and politics, scientific culture is regarded as a set of standard forms of social norms and knowledge unconstrained by circumstances. These norms are typically thought of as a set of rules that explicitly define a particular type of social behavior. In the field of political science, they have been interpreted as requiring scientists to adopt a disinterested and neutral attitude toward objective factual data.5 This is the true picture of the scientific culture formed on the basis of the traditional scientific view. Compared with other dominant cultural forms in history, the formation of science as a mainstream culture has its particularity. In terms of its origin, it originated in the West, then spread all over the world in a way which is not common, that is, it did not diffuse into other cultures but invaded other cultural traditions as a destructive force, and it in turn destroys the Western traditional system.6 For traditional culture, science is not only a new cultural phenomenon but also a revolutionary cultural power. It overturns the concept of nature formed by humans since ancient times. First, it drives the earth where human beings live out of the center of the universe, then it moves human beings from the center of nature, and knows and transforms the whole world in a new way. It overwhelms the religious culture that has long occupied the central position in Western culture, disintegrates the rule of the church and strongly impacts the traditional ethical and religious ideas. The enormous material force created by it makes it an important symbol of modernity and solidifies its position as the mainstream culture. At present, the social and cultural influence of science as a mainstream culture has been fully manifested. It not only gradually dominates the cultural development direction of the whole society but also has an increasing influence on the development of the whole human society with the progress of science and technology. Therefore, Marx Wartofsky said that the purely theoretical and formal reflections of scientific thought have produced results that have caused revolutions not only in the way of thinking but also in the foundations of our ordinary everyday existence itself. The knowledge of truth is itself a means by which man has consolidated the position of being and successfully fulfilled the task of survival.7 Perhaps scientific culture is not the most ideal form of culture, but we cannot deny that it is indeed the most fruitful cultural creation in the history of human beings and the most influential in the development of the whole human society. Cassirer spoke highly of the special status of science as a culture; he said that science is the final step in man’s intellectual development and can be regarded as the highest and most unique achievement of human culture. In our modern world, no second force can rival that of scientific thought. It is regarded as the culmination and acme of all our human activities, the last chapter of human history and the most important theme of human philosophy.8 As a mainstream culture, science not only provides the basis and guarantee for the development of human society but also determines and even controls our way of living, as well as our birth, sickness and death. Today, science is no longer just

162

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

a means of acquiring knowledge or a body of knowledge, but an extremely important cultural phenomenon that determines the fate of modern society and poses the most serious questions to us, because, even now, science has reached certain limits. Perhaps the most profound impact of science on modern society comes not primarily from the statement of reality that science provides, but from the external projection it creates in the form of a multitude of devices and practices; our own existence is trapped in it, whether we like it or not; it directly determines our way of life and indirectly determines our statements of value and value systems.9 At the same time, the increasingly prominent status of scientific culture makes it surpass other cultural forms to become the dominant cultural form in the social culture, and the highest value yardstick and measurement standard in the entire social culture. Science becomes everything and surpasses everything. Scientism and determinism permeate the whole society step by step. 5.1.2 Science and Culture Drift Apart in Cultural Hegemony With the establishment of the mainstream cultural status of science in human society, especially since the 19th century, science and technology applications are involved in more and more fields, with its influence going deeper and deeper. At present, science, as the mainstream culture, has obtained the supreme authority, holds huge social resources and has the absolute advantage of discourse power. As a result, the attitude of almost all members of society, including scientists, toward science has changed from the belief in the superiority of science to the worship of science, taking science as a universal and effective knowledge and method that can solve all problems. When this pattern of thinking goes to extremes, it negates or even replaces non-scientific forms of knowledge and culture with scientific culture, especially negates the status and role of humanistic culture and attempts to unify and control everything with the ideology of science. This has not only strengthened the idea of scientism, but also caused the expansion of rationalism and instrumentalism, and the tendency of the cultural hegemony of science and technology was gradually bred. The formation of the hegemony of science in culture is accompanied by the emergence of scientism, the hegemony of science is also established and consolidated by the wide spread of scientism. Basically, the idea of scientism was born in the time of Bacon, but it was not until the 19th century that scientism gradually transformed from a trend of thought into a system of ideas. At that time, in terms of economic development, science and technology became the leading force to promote social and economic development, and its role as the first productive force became increasingly obvious. In political life, the role of science and technology experts in political decision-making had kept growing, and science and technology knowledge gradually became an important factor in political operation. In the field of culture, science and technology surpassed all other cultural forms to dominate the development direction of culture, and scientification even became the goal pursued by some cultures. According to Dampier, the historian of science, in the last 100 or 150 years, our idea of the

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 163 natural universe had completely changed because we realize that human beings are subject to the same physical laws and processes as the world around them and cannot be considered in isolation from the world, while the scientific methods (such as observation, induction, deduction and experiment) are applicable not only to the original subjects of pure science but to almost all the different fields of human thought and behavior.10 Science has become an indispensable part of social production and life and has begun to occupy an absolute dominant position. Since then, the whole society has increasingly respected science, the perfection of science has improved, and people believe that scientists can solve any problem. Thus, science has become more of a standardized knowledge than a cognitive activity for human beings to pursue truth, the best way for man to understand nature, and the only way for man to know the truth. Further success of science is based on three basic conditions: first, the construction of the counterfactual condition and the same condition for other circumstances; second, the establishment of mathematical formalization; third, being based in a laboratory.11 Cartwright pointed out that science is a kind of knowledge and practice that is constructed when all other things are equal, and under the same conditions, science can be promoted around the world by moving labs from place to place.12 In the field of scientific research, from Galileo to Newton, modern scientific ideas and scientific methods (or mathematical and experimental methods) have been deeply rooted in people’s hearts. At the beginning of the 20th century, logical positivism and other philosophical schools of science made great efforts to render the objectivity, certainty and universality of science, and shaped the perfect myth of science. The history of science, which emphasizes only success and opportunity in science teaching, has produced legendary scientists. Their dramatic exaggeration of scientific findings amplifies the role and status of the scientific method. In real life, science has become an important force to promote social development and an important standard of social progress, as well as the best way to solve all social problems, and thus encourages the thought of science in social life. In the eyes of scientists, the general public and politicians, science is omnipotent, which also establishes the hegemony of science in culture. The cultural hegemony of science caused by the expansion of scientism has caused the uncultured nature of science and the overall distortion of culture, thus moving science away from culture step by step. Under the cultural background of scientific hegemony, the gap between science and other non-scientific cultural forms began to widen. When the status of science as a mainstream culture is one-sidedly pushed to the extreme, science becomes the only form of human culture. The core connotation of scientism is that it tries to expand the scope of science without limit, invade and dominate other fields, and entrusts science with excessive or undue value and authority.13 Therefore, some extreme scientists completely reject the value and significance of other non-scientific cultural forms. In their view, non-scientific cultural forms are not necessary for the development of human civilization, while modern science is the only standard to measure all knowledge.

164

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

Since science gained its independence in the 17th century, it has been expanding its territory in a variety of ways: born with the scientific and technological revolution, and acquired special social status through the Industrial Revolution, science and technology are increasingly closely combined with industrial production and commercial fields in the process of mutual promotion, and continue to expand their ruling power in the entire society. At the same time, after overthrowing the political rule of church and religion, due to its powerful social function and its technological application, science found the capital to combine with political power, and went further to become a kind of ideology, hence solidifying its power as a cultural belief. It can be said that science and science-driven technology have penetrated into the whole trinity of power, production and belief. In fact, scientific culture has become an authoritative discourse and ideology, occupying absolute priority and dominance in the political, economic and cultural fields of the society. Therefore, the hegemony of scientific culture aroused great antipathy from other cultures in the Western society as soon as it emerged. Just like Gerald Holton has said, 17th-century scientists demanded that they be taken seriously, not so much for their ability to better calculate the orbits of planets and cannonballs, but for their role in displacing entire pre-scientific belief systems. In the more than three centuries since then, they have laid out their grand agenda for an irresistible, all-encompassing world view based on reasonable science. Such arbitrary schemes have certainly antagonized Western society’s former chief cultural masters, who have long resisted those scientists.14 Since then, all kinds of nonscientific cultural forms have begun to fight against science. However, the cultural hegemony of science has been strengthened rather than weakened, while other non-scientific cultural forms have either been suppressed or gradually surrendered to science. Although common cultural confrontation does not lead to the thorough elimination of a culture, science has an overwhelming advantage because of its dominant position, and in the long run, it is bound to become the only form of culture. This abnormal development of culture is detrimental to the development of human civilization and society. Owing to the cultural hegemony of science, another aspect of the alienation between science and culture is revealed through the trend of intensifying specialization caused by the hegemony of science in the cultural field. Determined by the professionalism of science and technology, the cultural hegemony of science is bound to make the whole society under a kind of professional rule, so the function of technology becomes the criterion of all considerations. The increasing trend of specialization, on the one hand, limits the development of disciplines to narrow research areas, and on the other hand, widens the cognitive gap between social elites and the general public. Furthermore, this makes science gradually separated from culture, and the meaning contained in scientific culture is therefore increasingly poor. The overemphasis on what is called scientific culture as the only useful, though this overstatement is not sufficient to alter the nature of culture, may have somewhat suppressed and impoverished it at present. This is mainly because a lot of knowledge is poorly absorbed, and specialization or technocracy is going to the extreme. Although there are

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 165 more educated people now, it seems that they are not as literate as their predecessors. Therefore, experts with comprehensive and broad knowledge of culture are urgently needed now more than ever.15 The popularization of the effectiveness of science and technology resulting from specialization makes the professional training of science, especially technology, become an important means for people to make a living in society. What people care about is enhancing their ability to survive and compete through specialized training in science and technology. The level of scientific intelligence and technical proficiency determines people’s living conditions, making other non-scientific or humanistic cultural considerations become unimportant. When discussing two cultures, Charles Snow pointed out that there are two main reasons for the separation of scientific culture and humanistic culture: one is our cult of specialized education and the other is a tendency for our social model to ossify. The entrenched pursuit of specialization and the growing tendency to rigid patterns cannot be easily changed by any social force. In the end, specialized training improves people’s survival ability and living standards, but makes people more and more confined to the narrow cognitive and technical areas of individuals. The public is increasingly alienated from science, and even detested and opposed to science. In this way, the specialization of science not only makes science suffer, but more importantly, it makes science lose its cultural implication and power, and constantly specialized science and culture gradually drift away. The cultural hegemony of science makes it obtain the honor that no cultural form has ever had, but also widens the gap between science and culture. Science, once a cultural form, has gradually turned to its opposite and deviated from its original intention as a culture. Frolov said that not only scientism, but also its extreme form of technocracy, arrogantly rejects the humanities and culture as a whole. Their dangerous and anti-humanist role is right here, and that role has grown along with the authority of science and technology in society.16 5.1.3   Conflict between Science, Technology and Humanity Humanity refers to the nature or essence of man, which distinguishes man from all other things and is the essential determinacy of man, and is the attribute shared by all people. Science and technology, in essence, is an externalized product of human nature, an aspect of people’s own way of being, and an active expression of their internal functions, not only expressing a certain aspect of human nature but also realizing this aspect of human nature. Therefore, science and technology certainly become the object and tool of human nature, serving the health, harmonious existence and uplifting evolution of human nature itself.17 Therefore, in the relationship between science and technology and human nature, the latter plays a dominant role. Regardless of its development level, science and technology should always be subordinate to human nature. The needs and process of human development and perfection dominate the development and application of science and technology, which should be the basic principle and starting point of their relationship.

166

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

Unfortunately, science and technology, as the greatest cultural creation in the history of mankind, has greatly promoted the improvement of human material and cultural living standards, but in the process of development and application, it often acts against people’s good intentions and causes some conflicts with the requirements of human nature. In particular, with the expansion of the application scope of science and technology and the continuous improvement of its social status, the success and arrogance of scientific reason make instrumental reason continue to expand; the inherent human connotation of science and technology has been gradually swallowed up, and it treats everything including people with empirical method and instrumentalist value. In this way, people are completely treated as crops and as inanimate and unconscious general things, which inevitably leads to the conflict and opposition between science and technology and human nature. The conflict between science and technology and humanity seems inevitable. As early as the 18th century, Rousseau made a fierce criticism of industrial civilization, believing that the development of science and technology had deprived and suppressed human nature, but few people paid attention to it at that time. Today, the conflict between science and technology and humanity is more reflected through the application of technology. It is through the application of technology that the hegemony of science becomes more and more consolidated. Therefore, when the development of science and technology in the 19th century reversed its previous tradition and law, the development mode (from scientific theory and discovery to technology application) gradually transformed into the one that determined the content of scientific research according to the realistic political, economic and military needs, the relationship between science and technology also changed accordingly. Since then, technology to some extent began to define the direction of scientific development, and even decided everything; in reality, technology has surpassed science to become a powerful ruling power in human society. The power of technology may drive us to inadvertently build a new prison in which perhaps everyone will be imprisoned from now on, there is nothing but boredom, tedium and mental death.18 (1) From the perspective of survival, the conflict between science and technology and humanity is mainly reflected in the fact that it causes and intensifies the crisis of human survival and threatens the most basic needs of human survival. Since entering the 21st century, mankind is facing a series of survival crises (including population expansion, environmental pollution, food shortage, energy exhaustion, resource scarcity and ecological imbalance); there is also poverty in developing countries, global nuclear threat, international terrorist activities, drug abuse, the spread of AIDS, as well as intensifying regional cultural and religious opposition and wars. Among them, the most prominent is the ecological environment crisis caused by environmental destruction and pollution, which is also the biggest crisis facing mankind at present. Of course, we can’t say that all survival

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 167 crises, especially ecological crises, are caused by science and technology, but the environmental problems are more prominent, and environmental pollution has never been worse, which just happened since the rapid development of technology application in the 1950s. On the one hand, with the increasingly extensive application of science and technology in industrial and agricultural production, chemical pollution, gradual depletion of water sources, greenhouse effect, destruction of the ozone layer and abuse of nuclear energy have caused unprecedented destructive effects on the natural ecological environment. It is the quickening expansion of the application scope of science and technology that breaks the ecological balance of the whole of nature. In addition, with the increasing expansion of population, human existence is threatened in terms of resources and space. In this sense, it can be said that in order to satisfy our quest for a better life, warm houses, sustained economic growth and efficient agriculture that can liberate the majority of the population from the heavy labor of farming, we create carbon dioxide and we are killing nature.19 On the other hand, science and technology have penetrated into all aspects of human life and become the way of existence of contemporary people. With the continuous development of science and technology, income polarization, wealth disparity and new social inequality exist among different groups and even countries. At the same time, technology itself and individuals are indifferent to moral norms, while cloning and other high-tech life science technologies strongly impact the existing ethical norms. In addition, the application of science and technology can easily lead to high-tech crimes, which may cause harm to individuals’ right to life, right to physical and mental health, right to privacy and patent rights, and even pose challenges to national security and raise the threat of war. All of these technological applications may threaten human existence and lead to conflicts between science and technology and humanity. It can be said that science and technology have fundamentally changed the way of human production and life, and transformed all human existence into a part of a technologically perfect machine. However, when the role of science and technology is played without man, that is, man has gained increasing influence on nature with the help of technology, if they recklessly abuse this ability, it is bound to break the original harmony and balance of nature and change the natural conditions to which man has been accustomed for millions of years. The relationship between man and nature deteriorates, and the environment around man is increasingly detrimental to his healthy and peaceful existence. Man, in turn, uses technology to push himself into an atmosphere of inhumanity.20 (2) From the perspective of spirit, the development of science and technology has caused the dehumanization and loss of humanity to some extent. The development of science and technology first causes the split between man and himself: science-based technologies have a place in production systems organized for producing more products, thus they provide the human environment with

168

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

a myriad of objects and man-made products; these things form an increasingly larger screen between man and nature, and even in a sense between man and human nature.21 The development of science and technology has also resulted in the loss of human autonomy and independence. Individuals have lost their free will as human beings. In the age of technology, whether it’s individual specialization, group specialization or institutional specialization, it’s not just the improvement of skills and abilities related to specialized jobs. It is also a loss of competence related to other work. This inevitably leads to situations like this: to do some things well, do others badly or not do them at all. As a result of this specialization, society as a whole has benefited enormously in terms of overall benefits, but its individual members are no longer versatile or self-sufficient. As individuals, we are little more than infants compared with the most primitive members of society. Unlike us, all members of the most primitive societies have always been able to maintain their own independent existence. We are totally dependent on others, but they are not.22 In the opinion of Erich Fromm, industrial society will reduce man to an appendage of a machine, even at the mercy of its rhythms and demands. It turns people into those who spend money, or customers in general. The only goal of man is to have more and use more. Man, as a cog in the production machine, has become a thing, not a man. He seems like a baby waiting to be fed, making no effort or doing no activity of his own. To prevent people from getting bored, industry imposes all sorts of things on them (such as tobacco, alcohol, film, television, sports and lectures), but gives them no choice and forces them to accept. Man is in a completely passive state in modern industrial society; this becomes the greatest and most pathological characteristic of man. He receives and waits to be fed, but he does not move or set about doing something; he cannot digest the food given to him. He does not want to replace the mode of production he has inherited but keeps hoarding or consuming. He is suffering from a general nutritional deficiency, not so different from someone who is severely depressed.23 Moreover, in addition to this pathological feature rooted in passivity, there is a serious split between the rational function of the brain and the emotional experience, the split between thought and emotion, the split between brain and heart and the split between truth and passion. What cannot be ignored is that when science and technology infiltrate into people’s real life and become their way of living or even a part of people, it will indirectly cause the loss of humanity. Man is losing all his foundations and is about to be homeless on earth. He is losing the continuity of tradition. The spirit has been reduced to just knowing facts and training for practical functions.24 The development of science and technology has created a world full of material desires, making material needs surpass spiritual needs. In this state, people not only indulge in the material world but also lose the goal of life and become a purposeless existence. In this way, the abundance of materials and the improvement of living standards have not only failed to promote the development of human nature and the satisfaction of human needs but have raised more questions about people’s

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 169 spiritual pursuits. The loss of meaning and humanity has become a problem for some people in modern society. When science and technology, the force that once promoted progress, eventually acts on people in turn, people will lose their humanity because they are in a dominated position. Just as Marx thought, natural science, like capitalism, was a liberating force at the beginning, liberating people from the ideological confusion of superstition and religious thought. But in this process, science must become a way of exploitation by the bourgeoisie. Especially in the field of industrial production, science has significantly contributed to the dehumanization of mankind. Objectivity knowledge is increasingly being used to create economic and administrative management technologies, and these technologies limit people’s activities and creativity to only being “operatives.”25 As Einstein said, it is not enough for you to understand the application of science itself. Caring for people themselves should always be the main goal of all technical struggles.26 Achieving the perfect combination of science and technology with human nature and humanizing the development and application of science and technology is the development direction necessary for it as a culture.

5.2 Rise of the Cultural Idea of Tolerance The so-called cultural idea of tolerance means that in the fields of religion, politics, law, literature and art, we should adhere to the policy of “let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend,” create a relaxed atmosphere and allow different views and voices. In the field of science, tolerance means not only tolerating one’s own mistakes but also allowing the existence and development of other cultural forms, thereby creating a more relaxed and freer cultural atmosphere for the development of science. It is conceivable that taking tolerance as the basic attitude and basic criterion of daily behavior will inevitably give science more room for free development than before. 5.2.1  Religious    Tolerance and Scientific Tolerance The English word “tolerance” is borrowed from the Latin words tolerare and tolerantia, meaning to allow or tolerate something that one does not approve of, out of generosity and patience, without prohibiting, obstructing or demanding; or it refers to the inner emotions of allowing and tolerating other people’s different feelings, thoughts, habits and behaviors. Its initial application was relatively narrow, confined to the realm of religion, which meant tolerating people with different beliefs. Therefore, in terms of concept, “tolerance” in the modern sense is developed from religious tolerance. The germination of tolerant thought can be traced back to the Bible and even earlier human thought. But it was until the 16th century’s Reformation that the thought of religious tolerance really formed and attracted social attention. When the doctrinal controversy triggered by the Reformation got entangled with the complicated political factors of European countries, it triggered a protracted

170

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

religious war. By the middle of the 17th century, the signing of the Peace of Westphalia not only ended the 30-year religious war but also ended the era of religious despotism. Since then, religious tolerance has replaced religious conflicts and become a universal spirit of the times. Thanks to the promotion of Locke, Bayle and Voltaire in the 17th century, and the advocacy of freedom and rationalism by the leaders of the European Enlightenment in the 18th century, religious tolerance began to enter political and legal procedures, and scattered laws and regulations regarding religious tolerance emerged. It can be said that religious tolerance is a religious policy proposed by the church to maintain its political dominance and avoid religious wars. Therefore, the idea of tolerance emerged and developed amid religious disputes. The great defenders of tolerance, from Locke to Voltaire, fought against all the different forms of intolerance that had stained Europe with blood for centuries.27 But fundamentally speaking, the medieval religion, which flaunted the virtue of tolerance of others, was ultimately based on whether others believed in its teachings. At that time, reason was only the servant of faith, reason was subordinate to faith, faith was superior to reason, and faith dominated reason. Any doubt about faith was not allowed, let alone scientific reasonable knowledge that would shake the foundations of religious belief. Only on the premise of firmly maintaining religious belief could people talk about tolerating others and implement religious tolerance.28 There is no doubt that this religious tolerance was confined at first to denominations within Christianity and later to Christian and non-Christian (pagan) faiths. But as the idea of religious tolerance continued to expand, it also provided good conditions and atmosphere for the generation of new thought. Under the condition that religious tolerance became the spirit of the times, the freedom of belief greatly promoted the revival of European learning, and religious tolerance became the hotbed for the growth of modern science and philosophy in the West, thus making the 17th century a period of rapid development of science and philosophy. In England where the religious atmosphere was more liberal, Newton had replaced God as the master of the material world. The Netherlands, which was religiously tolerant and intellectually free, attracted scientists and thinkers from all over Europe, and many scientists promoted the development of science and technology and ushered the country into the 17th century’s golden age. In his analysis of the role of Puritanism in promoting scientific development in England in the 17th century, Merton said that Puritanism gradually showed tolerance for science; it not only tolerated but also needed the existence of scientific undertakings, so the Puritans not only praised God but also supported productive science. The analysis carried out by Westfield and other scholars on this basis further showed that although some factors in Puritan ethics (such as the principle of utilitarianism, and God is in its works) benefited the development of science, there were also many creeds (such as fanaticism, dogmatism, authority worship and sectarian consciousness) that were not conducive to the progress of science at that time. However, the rapid development of science at that time was not so much related to Puritanism as it was to the British tolerant and enlightened religious beliefs at that time. These analyses are often used to show how religion

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 171 and science have historically interacted and promoted each other, but more accurately, they reflect the positive role of religious tolerance in the development of science. Today, the spirit of tolerance has long gone beyond the scope of religion and become a universal spirit of the time. As a modern culture that has won the struggle against religion and benefited from the spirit of religious tolerance to some extent, science has formed a spirit of tolerance with its own characteristics. Different from religious tolerance, scientific tolerance is not tolerance and acceptance in a passive state, but actively facing other views, attitudes and methods outside oneself. It is not a passive occurrence, but a scientific spirit consistent with its own characteristics formed in the process of fighting for independence and freedom. Michael Walzer, a contemporary American scholar, believes that tolerance is understood as an attitude or a state of mind, which describes some potential values. First, a potential value reflecting the origins of religious tolerance in the 16th and 17th centuries is purely peaceful and submissive acceptance of differences. Second, it shows that the possible attitude toward differences will be passive, easy-going and non-malicious indifference: to incorporate things of diverse nature and unify them. Third, it holds a kind of tolerance with moral significance: to recognize in principle that those people have various rights, although they realize these rights in all sorts of obscure ways. Fourth, it involves being frank, curious and respectful of others, willing to listen to and learn from others. Fifth it actively supports differences. If differences reflect the breadth and diversity created by God or the natural world in cultural form, then this support has aesthetic or practical significance.29 Analyzing from Walzer’s perspective, tolerance in science is mainly consistent with the latter two attitudes. In other words, scientific tolerance is not only about passive acceptance, but also about fully respecting different cognitive methods and different scientific or non-scientific views, allowing different cultural forms to have the same freedom and rights to exist. Guided by the idea of tolerance, we can have our own thoughts, and at the same time we can also back up the views of others.30 Scientific tolerance is not only a basic ideological principle of scientific spirit, but also an important feature of scientific culture, which embodies the scientific spirit of freedom, equality, democracy and criticism. This spirit of tolerance is embodied as follows. First, as far as the development of science is concerned, scientific tolerance is a kind of tolerance for mistakes, a kind of tolerance for diversity. Science is a process of exploring the unknown; it is bound to face twists and turns and unexpected results, as well as mistakes and failures; it is never a linear or quasi-linear process as imagined by some people. In a sense, science is a process of learning from mistakes. Therefore, we’d better look at these mistakes and failures with a tolerant attitude, admitting that they are inevitable in science. This epistemological tolerance is determined by the nature of cognition and comes from the core concept of the fallibility of human cognition. Second, allow different opinions in scientific research. In the process of scientific understanding, it is inevitable for different subjects to have different opinions

172

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

and viewpoints on the same thing due to the reasons of the subject itself and the restriction of social and cultural conditions. Moreover, of these different opinions and viewpoints, it is often difficult to judge which is right or wrong, or it is impossible to do so at that time. For example, there was a dispute between the “particle theory” and the “wave theory” about the nature of light that began in the 17th century; and there were controversies between “neptunian theory” and “plutonic theory,” “catastrophic theory” and “incremental theory” in the field of geology at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century. Both sides of the dispute held their own words, and both reflected the essence of the phenomenon from a certain aspect. Therefore, the correct attitude to promote scientific progress is to provide space for different academic viewpoints to freely debate, give these different opinions equal development opportunities, and then seek views and descriptions that truly conform to the phenomenon in the process of continuous exploration and testing. Third, it is necessary to respect cultures other than science, and allow the existence of different cultural forms. In addition to science, cultural forms such as literature, art, religion, law and politics are all products of human cognition, and each reflects the nature and characteristics of the world from different aspects. Studying and respecting different cultural forms is not only a need to avoid scientific arbitrariness and hegemony but also a basic principle to promote the harmonious development of culture as a whole. Science will also break through the limitations of a single culture and find new inspiration and growth points in the process of merging with various ways of understanding. George Sarton’s argument is worth pondering: without tolerance and charity, our civilization, no matter what it is now, is very unstable. For human civilization, science is necessary, but far from enough.31 Viewed in this way, intolerance is not only sinful but also stupid. 5.2.2 Science Is Open to Criticism Popper believes that science is critical in nature. It is made up of guesswork and regulated by criticism. This critical attitude includes not only the criticism of the past, but also the requirements for any new theory, while the new theory should at least reach the height of the old one. Only through criticism and refutation in the process of constant competition can science advance. Therefore, a scientific attitude is a critical attitude, and a scientific method is a critical method. In the field of knowledge, nothing is not open to criticism. Science should be open to criticism, meaning that science is not an established theory, but always ready to accept all kinds of challenges and tests. The opening of science to criticism began to become a scientific concept, which is first related to the recognition of errors in science and the presentation of fallibility of science. From the perspective of logical empiricism and previous traditional scientific viewpoints, the development of science is a gentle, linear and continuous accumulation process. Science is to conduct inductive argumentation, the theory

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 173 confirmed by experience is the scientific theory, and this process of continuous accumulation of proven scientific theories is also the history of science. This forms the image of scientific correctness, universality and unity, while mistakes and criticism seem to be insulated from science. For example, Bacon thinks that criticism is useless because it is easy to prove one’s own hypothesis to his own satisfaction. People also generally believe that mistakes in science can be avoided, and all criticism is equivalent to rude rebuttal. However, in the 1930s and 1940s, Popper challenged logical empiricism and the correctness and infallibility of science consistent with it. In his view, science is fallible knowledge, and the history of scientific development is a process of trial and error. He believes that any scientific theory is tentative, temporary and speculative: they are all tentative assumptions, and they always will be…Our theory, however successful it may be at present, is not entirely true; it is only an approximation of the truth. Moreover, in order to find a better approximation, we have no choice but to rationally criticize the theory32 The proposition of fallibility of science and the claim that science advances through criticism and refutation was deafening at the time, although critical consciousness and critical methods had been an old story. According to Popper’s view of falsifiability, all scientific theories contain potential errors and will one day be falsified, while specific scientific methods will also change as science progresses. He resolutely rejected the arrogance of scientific chauvinism and looked at the value of science from a higher level. This is the way of activity, the mode of thinking, the state of mind that has “evaporated” from scientific activities, that is, the attitude of bold conjecture and strict criticism, and the most fundamental is the attitude of rational criticism. This means that any theory, method or other scientific knowledge can be criticized and is open to criticism. The reason why science is science is not that it provides perfect knowledge, but that it can accept criticism, can be improved and thus can progress, develop and keep approaching objective truth and absolute truth. It is precisely because of criticism that science can provide knowledge that is relatively reliable and useful.33 It is through Popper’s work that the critical spirit of science has achieved the greatest development. Popper emphasized that the attitude of openness to criticism is scientific, and the more open, the more scientific. He even took “openness to criticism” as the only criterion for evaluating theoretical and scientific progress, and regarded the openness to criticism, that is, the ability to find contradictions, as the sole measure of the ability to contribute to (scientific) progress (or to the progress of thought in general). He declared the discovery of these contradictions to be progress. Even the discovery of a new theory, although future evidence may contradict it, is progress. We need to look for a theory that is consistent with known empirical information and is open to the refutation of future empirical information and look for this information; Popper sees this as the only effort dedicated to (scientific) progress. The epistemological significance of this criterion

174

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

cannot be underestimated. Agassi, while not accepting this as the sole criterion of knowledge, nevertheless stressed the importance of openness to criticism in science. He believes that it is enough to note that everyone takes the criterion of openness to criticism as a necessary meta-criterion. We may abandon the openness to criticism as a criterion, and only regard openness to criticism as a pure meta-criterion.34 In fact, science has never been closed or completed once and for all, but fallible, open and developing. Popper constructed a dynamic model of scientific development of falsificationism from the logic of conjecture and refutation: P1-TT-EE-P2 (question-guess-refute-question). Kuhn established the structural model of the scientific revolution on this basis: pre-science→conventional science→abnormalities and crises→scientific revolution→new conventional science. Lakatos further proposed the model of the scientific research program: evolutionary stage of scientific research program→degraded stage of scientific research program→new research program falsifies and replaces degraded research program→evolutionary stage of new research program. Even Feyerabend’s anarchism shows that science is an open and evolving system. In the development history of science, Copernicus and Galileo questioned and criticized the Ptolemy system and Aristotelian mechanics and established new celestial mechanics, Lavoisier created the redox theory by criticizing the traditional phlogiston theory, Darwin criticized creationism and created the theory of evolution and Einstein made a reflection and criticism of the Newtonian mechanics system and established the theory of relativity. All of these scientific advances and developments are based on the criticism and reflection of the old doctrines. Science is an open knowledge system. It does not claim to reveal absolute truth, and in fact it does not possess absolute truth. The formulation of scientific theories is a very complicated process, and there are far more uncertain factors in science than we can think of. Popper pointed out that science is not a definite and accepted system of statements, nor is it a system that steadily advances to a certain ultimate state. Our science is not knowledge: it can never claim to have acquired the truth; it can even be replaced by words such as probability.35 Robert Brown advised to acknowledge that we can only have very little certainty in this world, and uncertainty has absolute effects, such as flexibility and open-mindedness, which are not only essential for the advancement of understanding, but also the cornerstone of tolerance.36 Although science pursues theoretical rigor, it often leaves room for the proposal of new ideas. It is in the process of being open and tolerant of all possible criticisms and doubts that science has become more mature and continues to improve. When the principle of science should be open to criticism extends to the outside of science, this means that science must accept criticism, reflection and questioning from different fields and realms other than science. This will help contain scientism and the scientific hegemony formed on this basis and the possible harms that may be caused by it. Since the Renaissance, the Enlightenment greatly admired the power of human reason and science and technology, and humanism has gradually deviated from the track of reason, and evolved into a superstition

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 175 and worship of scientific omnipotence, forming a cultural trend of scientism. The dominance of science established on this basis in social and cultural life not only made science arbitrary and authoritarian, but also accelerated the application of science and technology, and brought about increasingly serious social problems. Various critical thoughts on science have emerged as the times require. Various schools, including humanism, the Frankfurt School and ecologism, criticize science from different angles and have become a powerful force against scientism. Although these thoughts inevitably have anti-scientism tendencies, as far as the development of the entire society is concerned, they are very useful for breaking the myth of science, reducing the dogmatic and authoritarian nature of science and its harm. Science should be open to criticism, which means that there should be a humble attitude and a tolerant spirit in scientific research. Science is a knowledge system that is open to criticism, and it continues to develop and improve through such open criticism. The openness of science to criticism is a kind of self-knowledge of its own limitations and fallibility. Instead of rejecting doubt and criticism, it actively seeks progress from self-doubt and self-reflection. True scientists do not jealously oppose criticism but welcome it as a chance to make improvements. In this context, criticism is not an obnoxious process that likes to be critical but finds errors with the purpose of eliminating them.37 At the same time, openness to criticism also makes science inevitably face questioning and hectoring from non-scientific fields and brings diversity and inclusiveness of understanding. Therefore, science should treat different opinions with tolerance while remaining inclusive and seeking common ground regardless of differences, and respect different opinions and even opposing opinions. The openness of science to criticism not only helps to avoid autocracy and dogmatism but also reflects the spirit of humility and tolerance. Adhering to the openness of science to criticism will help create an attractive, tolerant and harmonious cultural atmosphere for promoting the progress of science. 5.2.3 Science Coexists with Other Traditions Since its emergence, science has shown tremendous vitality and material power. By the 19th century, relying on Newtonian physics at its peak and the mechanized technology created by the first Industrial Revolution, scientism, which greatly respects science and its value, began to become an important trend of thought. Through logical positivism’s vigorous pursuit and exaggeration of the objectivity and correctness of science, the special advantage of science in the field of epistemology and social life has been strengthened. However, the superiority of science does not mean that it can transcend and prevail over other traditions. Criticizing and challenging the special superiority that science seems to be born with mainly stems from the reflection on the dilemma of human existence and social morbidity caused by the application of science and technology. As a result, many humanist intellectuals and even scholars in the field of natural sciences began to reflect on science and reason in many aspects. They questioned

176

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

and dispelled the admiration of the superiority and sacredness of science in the vision of scientism, challenged the hegemony and authority of science in modern society and insisted that, compared with other cultural ideologies, science has no special superiority. Among them, the work of postmodernist philosophers of science is the most eye-catching. Postmodernism entered the stage of history as a force that denies and transcends modernity, but its core is not a simple opposition to the basic principles and dominant values of modernism. Instead, it revolves around pluralistic equality, ecologism, philosophy of others and views of pluralistic evolutionary practice. Postmodern philosophers of science not only criticize the various negative consequences of science in modern society, but also question the special superiority of science and advocate a pluralistic cultural outlook. In their view, there is no special difference between scientific truth and myth, superstition and witchcraft. In the postmodernist camp, the French structuralist philosophers Foucault and Derrida tried to prove that science is far from being as objective and credible as people think. They thought that science is just a kind of discourse and discourse power, and scientific knowledge has no superiority compared to other discourse forms. Lyotard criticized the privileged position of science from the knowledge level. Scientific discourse has always been regarded as a meta discourse and has become a criterion for measuring other discourses. Now the absolute truth status of scientific knowledge no longer exists; it is in the same position as other narrative modes, such as myths, language and folklore. In his view, scientific knowledge does not represent the whole knowledge; it always coexists, competes and conflicts with other kinds of narrative knowledge. Therefore, science has no special authority or power to manage other language games. The only real foundation of knowledge is that the voice of one kind of knowledge cannot overwhelm the voice of another knowledge. We all live in a diverse, fragmented and incoherent world, various language games should tolerate each other and avoid terror and violence, and science is not a privileged game that can override other activities. From the perspective of post-philosophical culture, Rorty believes that science does not have a special epistemological status; it is only a form of discourse. The division between science and other cultural sectors is not sufficient to constitute a unique philosophical question. Therefore, the opposition between science and other disciplines can be canceled. Since scientific activities are not superior to other human activities, science should not be a model for other disciplines. Just as philosophy is not the basis of future culture, so science is not the basis of future culture.38 Also from the perspective of meta-narrative, advocates of post-academic science pointed out that, in contrast to traditional heritage, science is not the only privileged way to understand things better than all other ways of understanding, and its foundation is no better than other human cognitive patters.39 Scientific knowledge is not value-neutral but permeated by social interests. Among the various critical thoughts, Feyerabend’s fierce attack on the superiority of science is the most prominent. He asserted that the superiority of science is assumed and has not been studied and demonstrated. The assumption of the

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 177 inherent superiority of science went beyond science and became an article of faith for almost everyone. Moreover, science is no longer a special institution; it is now part of the basic fabric of democracy, just as the church was once part of the basic fabric of society.40 Feyerabend believes that science does not have special superiority, and its superiority is only given by state power. First, methodological arguments do not establish scientific superiority. No single procedure or single set of rules can form the basis of all research and guarantee that it is scientific and reliable. Today, most of the rules that scientists and philosophers of science regard as constituting a unified scientific method and defend are either useless or weak. In other words, they have failed to produce the results they should have done so.41 Second, science has not gained a special status because of its achievements. Science has the supreme sovereignty and has become the only ideology known to have valuable results, it is not for its relative merits, but because the situation has been manipulated in favor of it, that is, some of its past successes have led to institutional measures (education, the role of experts, the role of power groups such as the American Medical Association) to prevent rivals from staging a comeback; the superiority of science is also not the result of research and demonstration, but the result of political, institutional and even military pressure.42 Finally, from an ideological point of view, science is one of the many ideological forms that mankind has developed, but it is not necessarily the best one. It reigns over everything because its practitioners fail to understand and are unwilling to tolerate different systems of thought; they have the power to impose their wishes on others, and their ancestors all used their power to impose Christianity on the people they met in the war.43 But in fact, science does not have greater authority than any other form of life; it should not and has no right to restrict the lives, thoughts and education of members of a free society because in a free society, everyone should have the opportunity to shape his own soul and live according to the social beliefs he considers most desirable. Therefore, in the view of Feyerabend, the superiority of science is nothing but a fairy tale. It needs to be explained that the criticism of the special superiority of science does not mean denying the important role of science. This is just to show that the role played by science is changing, and science should not transcend other cultural forms to be the whole of human culture. As Feyerabend pointed out, in the 17th, 18th and even 19th centuries, science was only one of many competing ideologies; the state had not yet announced its support for science, so science as a liberating force made a lot of sense. However, with the great success of science since the 19th century and the state’s support, science as an ideology began to degenerate, and even became a dogmatic religion, moving toward hegemony. This undertaking, which gave people ideas and strength to get rid of the fears and prejudices of autocratic religion, now turned people into slaves to its interests;44 the emphasis on the superiority of science at this time would make science play the opposite role. Of course, these criticisms of the special status and superiority of science from the perspective of postmodernism, while breaking the myth of science and

178

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

emphasizing the importance of other non-scientific cultural forms, inevitably have some relativistic tendencies. In particular, Feyerabend’s methodological rule of “anything goes” and exaggeration of the relativity of the boundary between science and non-science, as well as the position that science and non-science are completely mixed together, are even more extreme. However, the criticism of the special superiority of science in the field of human culture and epistemology is undoubtedly of great significance for breaking the hegemony of science and for advocating a multicultural view of mutual promotion and common development of science and human culture. Obviously, the criticism of the special superiority of science implies the desire and pursuit of the coexistence of science with other human cultures and traditions. Science, religion, literature and art are all important parts of human culture, and they cannot enjoy special advantages over other cultures and traditions because of their important role in social development. Science also has its limitations and deficiencies, as well as its applicable scope and field. Science cannot solve all problems in society. We do not degrade science, but we cannot deify science and regard it as everything. As Vannevar Bush said, science by itself cannot provide a panacea for personal, social and economic maladies. Whether it is in a war or not, science only plays a role in the welfare of a country as a member of the entire team. But if there is no scientific progress, no amount of achievements in other areas can guarantee our prosperity and security as a country in the modern world.45 Therefore, science should not be treated as a privileged example of sociology, and it should not be distinguished from other cultural achievements. On the contrary, every effort should be made to study how scientists are affected by the large social environment and to explain the complex connection between scientific and cultural achievements and other areas of social life.46 As only one of human cultures and traditions, science coexists with other cultural traditions in the real society, including the coexistence of scientific and non-scientific traditions, as well as the coexistence of Chinese and Western cultural traditions (the latter is represented by modern science). This is the free society described by Feyerabend, that is, a society in which all traditions have equal rights, equal access to education and access to other rights. Moreover, as long as non-scientific ideologies, practices, theories and traditions are given a fair opportunity to compete, they can become powerful competitors to expose major shortcomings of science.47 But in any case, it is necessary to re-examine our attitudes toward mythology, religion, magic and witchcraft, as well as our attitudes toward all thoughts that idealists want to disappear from the ground forever.48 Agassi said that we should absorb the essence of different cultural traditions and repair them to suit our own tastes, especially when we refuse to accept the view that human beings are good or evil. We should not judge whether we are good or evil; on the contrary, we should judge whether we want to slip back into our old ways or make progress, and how we should act in order to achieve our goals.49 This shows that with the tolerant concepts of freedom, criticism, openness and democracy that have emerged in the development of science, the myth of the

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 179 omnipotence of science has been broken. Within science, the pursuit of rigorous and objective single standards has gradually moved to a tolerant and pluralistic open model, which adapts to today’s pluralistic development trend.

5.3 New Trend in Cultural Confederation The process of the rise of science as a culture is, to a certain extent, the history of science becoming independent from human culture and conquering other human cultures. When scientific culture continues to consolidate its status as the mainstream culture of society, it gradually surpasses other cultures and enjoys superior particularity, and the conflict between scientific culture and other cultures has also become prominent. However, human culture is originally a “magnificent garden” in which science, religion, literature and art are all gorgeous flowers; they are mutually reinforcing and should not be antagonistic. At present, there is a trend of dialogue and integration between science and religion, art and the entire humanities and culture. 5.3.1 Dialogue between Science and Religion Regarding the relationship between science and other cultural ideologies, the relationship between science and religion is undoubtedly the most noticeable and the most concerning. Historically, at least since the Middle Ages, there has been a subtle tension between science and religion. In the ancient period when science in the strict sense had not yet formed, science and religion had not been clearly distinguished. Religious thoughts and activities often contained a large number of simple science, culture, art and other factors, so there was no struggle and conflict between science and religion. In the Middle Ages, the church monopolized beliefs, and religion’s control over science had been a typical feature of society at that time. As a result, the relationship between science and religion was seriously out of balance, and any ideas that conflicted with the Christian faith were regarded as heretics. Disastrous incidents, such as organized persecution of scientists and destruction of scientific research under the name of faith, occurred from time to time. In modern times, science gradually took shape in a religious background, and conflicts with Christianity had become increasingly fierce. Galileo’s trial for propagating heliocentric theory in 1633 and the conflict between Darwin’s theory of evolution and Christian creationism were concrete manifestations of the conflict between science and religion. In the contemporary period, the social status of science has been continuously improved, hence expelling the position of God and threatening the existence of religion. In the entire human history, conflict and confrontation seem to be the main theme of the relationship between science and religion. However, a careful analysis of the history of the relationship between science and religion reveals that there is also a period of cooperation and mutual promotion between the two. In the 17th century, religious defense provided the most

180 Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture powerful support for science; it not only created a social atmosphere in which scientific achievements were accepted but also provided the purpose, support and source of motivation for the work of scientists. It can be said that it is in the praise of religious gods that scientific activities have found the legitimacy of their existence. According to Robert Boyle, knowledge of God’s masterpieces is directly proportional to the degree to which we admire these masterpieces. These masterpieces participate and show the inexhaustible perfection of their creators. The more deeply we meditate, the more perfect footprints and imprints of the Creator we find. Our preeminent science will only give us more reason to worship God’s omniscience.50 Peter Harrison analyzed the reasons for the rise of Western science from the perspective of Western religious traditions. He concluded that the specific elements of Christianity, such as the concept of creation, the principles of natural laws and the commands of the Bible to govern the natural world, all provide extremely important motivations for scientific activities.51 It can be seen that science and religion are also harmonious; not only can they coexist, but there is also a positive relationship between the two. The growing rift between science and religion is accompanied by the rising status of science. With the role of science in human social life getting prominent, the overvaluation of the reliability of scientific results is not limited to philosophers. This has become a common situation in modern times, that is, from Galileo to present day. Believing that science can answer all questions – if someone needs technical advice, falls ill or has a mental problem that cannot be solved, he can simply ask a scientist for an answer; this simply makes science take over a social function previously held by religion: the function of providing ultimate security. The belief in science has largely replaced the belief in God. Even where religion is considered to coexist with science, religion is also changed by the mental state of people who believe in scientific truths.52 Science gradually crossed the boundaries and assumed the responsibility of belief that originally belonged to religion, becoming a substitute for religion and a spiritual pillar of people. When science becomes the kingdom of hegemony and even attempts to usurp human knowledge, religion is forced to demand a duel for self-defense. After the blast of force, religion naturally demands that the war be brought into the enemy’s territory. As a result, a habit of suspicion and hostility has formed between scientific and religious sects. They have become enemies of generations.53 However, the opposition and conflict between science and religion are detrimental to the development of the two and the entire culture. Just like Albert Einstein has said, “science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.”54 Therefore, in the development of science and religion, the general trend is toward harmony and dialogue. Of course, there were also some unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation, such as distorting the nature and meaning of new scientific achievements, trying to incorporate science into the theological system or using the negative effects of scientific development to require science to replace religion to provide spiritual salvation. Discussions on the relationship between science and religion in the academic field in the past 30 years mainly focus on the dialogue between science and religion.

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 181 From the perspective of religion, religion has never given up its efforts to reconcile with science. Facing the impact of scientific development, religion adjusted its strategy accordingly, seeking dialogue and compromise with science. This trend has been particularly pronounced since the second half of the 20th century. In 1962, the Second Vatican Conference of the Roman Catholic Church declared that praising technological inventions and praising God are not contradictory, and that science and faith are not opposites. In 1979, Pope John Paul II issued a statement at the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Einstein’s birth, expressing his willingness to improve relations with the scientific community and working to eliminate the distrust between the scientific community and the church. In 1983, 350 years after Galileo was sentenced to life imprisonment, the Vatican authorities formally apologized for this tragedy. In June 1988, at the international conference, with a theme of Dialogue on Contemporary Theology and Science, held in the Vatican, Pope John Paul II stated that these two fields of human experience and inquiry are interdependent. Their current relationship should be characterized by cooperative exchanges, rather than misunderstandings and conflicts that have prevailed in the past. Science can save religion from fallacy and superstition, while religion can save science from idolatry and false absolutism. They can draw each other into the wider world, in which both can get prosperous. In 1992, the Pope officially admitted that the theory of evolution was not just a hypothesis.55 In terms of science, technology and reason have greatly enhanced people’s ability to understand and transform the world, create increasingly rich material civilizations and improve people’s living standards and quality of life. But on the other hand, with this development and progress, it is the confusion of human beings in the spiritual realm of their own survival value and meaning of life and the loss of life pursuit, as well as the sense of crisis in the realm of survival brought about by the destruction of ecology, deterioration of living space and a variety of social evils. This requires spiritual support to fill and meet the spiritual needs of mankind, thereby providing a broad space for religion to play a role. In contemporary society, religion not only finds the meaning of existence for many lone travelers who are lost in the modern technology castle, but also finds a sense of security for those who find it difficult to settle down and have nowhere to go in the process of modernization. The theoretical basis for the dialogue between science and religion is that science and religion are not fundamentally in conflict. The only difference is that they choose to understand the world in different ways, from different levels and angles. Science is committed to the pursuit of truth, while religion focuses on the consideration of value. Hanbury Brown pointed out that both science and religion try to explain the same mysterious world. Organized religions systematically interpret the world with the help of the meaning of life, and connect us to the world through awe, reverence, love and concepts of good and evil. Science aims to create impersonal and objective knowledge. It uses this knowledge to systematically explain the world to us and connects us to the world through reasonable knowledge and surprises.56 In reality, science and religion are both related to the destiny and trend

182 Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture of human society, and both take the fundamental needs of people as the ultimate consideration. For example, neither science nor religion advocates destroying and plundering nature. The Bible says that God handed over the world to man to repair, not destroy it; it asked people to guard and manage, rather than plunder and squeeze. The ultimate goal of the development of science is also for the survival of mankind, so it is necessary to protect nature and the environment. In fact, the conflict between science and religion is often not irreconcilable. There are many examples of conflicts between science and religion in history. The real contradictions behind them are the contradictions between new and old views of science, between new science and philosophy (like Aristotle’s view of the universe) and even between scientists and politicians for power. For example, in the trial of Galileo in 1633, the challenge to the authority of the church and the Bible was only one accusation against Galileo. Another factor that really contributed to the condemnation of Galileo was the authority of Aristotle because his scientific works (including those expressing support for Ptolemy’s astronomy) had been greatly respected since the 12th century. In other words, this conflict was more representative of the conflict between new science and old science,57 while the church just played the role of the patron saint of old science. This does not show the conflict between science and religion but shows that religion can accommodate science because it was self-recommended to be the patron saint of old science. Therefore, Whitehead pointed out that when there is a conflict between science and religion, we should wait, but we should not wait passively or disappointedly. Conflict is only a symptom. It shows that there are broader truths and better prospects, where deeper religion and subtler science will reconcile each other. Therefore, in a sense, the conflict between religion and science is just an innocuous thing, but people overemphasize it. If it is only a logical conflict, reconciliation will be enough; maybe the changes on both sides will not be too great. We must remember that religion and science deal with things of different nature. Science observes some general conditions that control physical phenomena, while religion is completely immersed in the mystery of moral and aesthetic values.58 It can be said that the main trend of the current relationship between science and religion is to transcend the conflict between science and religion, move toward dialogue and actively seek cooperation under the background of modern science and technology. 5.3.2 Fusion of Science and Art Science and art, as two basic forms of human civilization, coexist in the history of human culture. The evolution of the relationship between the two has generally gone through a process from unity to separation, and then to fusion. Science and art were integrated in ancient Greece. At that time, skill was a general term for human crafts, tricks and technical arts. Therefore, “skill” and “art” were combined to form a means of survival for humans. Science was integrated with art and other forms of knowledge under the name of philosophy. In other words, art had not been separated from the fields of technology, science and

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 183 religion. Sculpture, architecture, mathematics, music, painting, poetry and other cultural achievements at that time all reflected the pursuit of artistic beauty. During the period of the European Renaissance, science and art achieved a perfect combination under the guidance of reason and humanistic spirit. After the long feudal rule in the dark Middle Ages, human consciousness began to awaken, human reason began to recover and humanistic thought became the spirit of the time. The field of art perfectly combined a reasonable scientific attitude with art and created scientific laws such as chiaroscuro, scenography and anatomy, and applied these laws to painting and other arts, thereby creating a solid and real space on the plane and establishing a complete set of a scientific modeling system for painting. During this period, the combination of science and art drew an infinitely magnificent cultural landscape. One of the best manifestations of this perfect combination was the most famous representative of the time – Leonardo da Vinci from Italy. As a representative figure in the Renaissance, Leonardo was famous for his painting Mona Lisa, his works have become classics copied by generations of art school students and he is also one of the pioneers of human anatomy and architectural engineering; he is not only an artist but also a philosopher and scientist. The separation of science and art began in the modern Industrial Revolution. After the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution promoted the rapid development of science and technology, and the specialization of the production process also led to the division of science and technology into more and more detailed disciplines. Therefore, science and art were separated into two different forms of human cognition. With the rapid development of science and technology, there have been disciplinization and specialization of knowledge, and more detailed division of labor between technology and occupation, so the separation between science and art has become more and more distant, and there were even contradictions and antagonism between them for a long time. In China, there was a time when science and art were never dealing with each other and were even completely isolated from each other. With the rapid development of science and technology, especially since the beginning of the 20th century, science and art have shown a unified trend of mutual penetration and integration. Moreover, the mutual penetration between the two has made greater breakthroughs in speed and scale than before. As the French writer Flaubert said in the 19th century, art is becoming more scientific and science is becoming more artistic, the two break up at the foot of the mountain, and one day they will meet again at the peak. At present, science and art are moving toward unification that is closer than before. On the one hand, art is increasingly using the achievements of science and technology to present itself with newer meanings and content, and with a broader vision and perspective; on the other hand, science also increasingly gives itself more artistic pursuit of beauty. Digital art is the best embodiment of the integration of modern science and art. As a myth combining art and modern technology, it is bred in the development of computer multimedia, including the entire process of using digital technology to create art forms, such as digital animation, digital film, digital music and digital

184

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

painting. In this digital age, almost all artistic content has been scientificized to some extent, and digital technology has also been promoted to the greatest extent. So it can also be said that the artistic and scientific characteristics in the respective development of science and art most intensively reflect the future trend of the integration of modern social science and art. In terms of the scientization of art, with the continuous development of science and technology, artistic creation methods, expression methods and forms and content have all undergone tremendous changes compared with traditional art, and tend to be scientifically developed. The first is the scientization of artistic expression forms and techniques. Modern art not only uses the results of scientific research to express itself, but some scientific and technological achievements are even art themselves; mass media such as movies, television and photography are themselves new forms of artistic expression based on science and technology. The use of scientific methods to enhance and improve the effects of art greatly enhances the appeal of art in terms of vocal music, colors, lighting, scenery and props. The second is that the concept of artistic creation is becoming more and more scientific and consistent with scientific concerns. In the context of modern science and technology, the pursuit of rationalization in art has gradually surpassed perceptual considerations, and scientific methods have occupied an increasingly important position in artistic creation. Art is no longer content to perform its original functions of cultivating temperament, recreation, entertainment or moral education, but to play the overall function of culture, such as the function of improving intelligence and creativity, the function of changing people’s way of thinking and values and the function of encouraging experiment and exploration.59 In film, television and literary and artistic creations, there is more and more content involving major issues such as science and technology and the relationship between man and nature, as well as issues concerning the future prospects of mankind with the continuous development of science and technology. The last is the scientization of artistic research. Traditionally and modernly, art is a subject that pays more attention to sensibility. Compared with science, art cares more about life-oriented social problems. The difference is that the development of modern art disciplines has adopted more scientific standpoints, attitudes and methods, and has begun to treat art with scientific standards. The artification of science is mainly reflected in the pursuit of beauty by science and scientists. As the entity of science and technology, various objects that were originally practical will be unified with the law of beauty and the shape of beauty. All entities of scientific research, invention and creation must pay more attention to design and modeling in accordance with the law of beauty without violating the law of science. This is not only the harmony and complementation of science and art, but also the embodiment of the enhancement and popularization of people’s aesthetic consciousness and artistic concepts. It means that human life and living environment will tend to be more free, beautiful and ideal.60 In concrete practices, science begins to express itself in an artistic way. Artistic forms, creation methods, concepts and thinking have gradually penetrated into science. For example, some esoteric scientific theories are expressed in symbolic images through artistic

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 185 forms. At the same time, art can provide new inspiration and creative power for scientific research. The image thinking that art is good at often complements the scientific logical thinking and then promotes the progress of science. The integration of science and art is an inevitable trend in the development of human culture. This is mainly because science and art are basic forms of human civilization, although each has its own characteristics, styles, specific goals and values, they have never been and cannot be strictly separated. As Li Zhengdao said, the relationship between science and art is closely linked to the duality of wisdom and emotion. Both the aesthetic appreciation of art and the understanding of scientific concepts require wisdom, and the subsequent sublimation of feeling is inseparable from emotion. Science and art are inseparable, and both are seeking the universality of truth. Universality must be rooted in nature, and the exploration of nature is the noblest expression of human creativity. In fact, like the two sides of a coin, science and art originate from the noblest part of human activities, and both pursue something profound, universal, eternal and meaningful.61 There is a belief that once art gets involved in science, it will deprive science of the requirements for objectivity; similarly, once art becomes wise in thinking to a certain extent, it loses the right to pursue beauty. It is in fact an attempt to separate science from art, which is too outdated. In fact, one field can borrow an achievement or a skill from another field.62 The integration of science and art is also because science and art promote and encourage each other. On the one hand, science can provide a variety of material equipment for the development of art and promote the depth of artistic thinking through logical thinking. On the other hand, art can promote scientific thinking and form new concepts and relationships through image thinking, establish new theoretical models and promote creative thinking in science. Therefore, the integration of the two is beneficial to the development of science and the entire culture. For example, contemporary emerging systems science, management science, ecological science, life science and engineering technology science are scientific, humanistic and artistic. On the one hand, they themselves are produced by interdisciplinary and infiltration of contemporary science. On the other hand, all knowledge about mankind and knowledge used by mankind must fit the characteristics of human nature, such as exploratory and aesthetic.63 In the fusion of science and art, scientists not only use numbers and formulas but also use metaphors and analogies to describe nature vividly. Artists not only prefer colors and forms but also explore a world composed of various information and formulas and create more imaginative and better living methods and spaces. The combination and integration of science and art are becoming the mainstream of human thought and cultural development in the new century, and human culture will therefore move toward a more brilliant future. 5.3.3 Coordination of Science and Politics Looking at the development history of science and society, the interaction between science and politics has always been a major feature of the development

186 Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture of human society. Specifically, on the one hand, science and technology workers always live in a certain social environment, belong to a certain class, group, nation and country, and have evident political inclination. On the other hand, the political demands of society always influence the development direction, speed and scale of science and technology through the channels of systems, laws, policies, rewards, project approvals, financial appropriations and fund grants. Therefore, how to prevent the political alienation of science and technology while also making science and technology work for the well-being of mankind and take the road of development to achieve justice is an ideal state that science and politics must strive to achieve during the development process. Based on this consideration, the relationship between science and politics will develop in a coordinated way. (1) At the political level, the coordinated development of science and politics is mainly reflected in the science technicalization of political life. The so-called science technicalization of political life refers to the process in which scientific and technological achievements penetrate into the field of political life, and the political process is shaped in accordance with scientific methods and technical principles, thereby realizing the rationalization and routinization of political life and improving the efficiency of political activities. The specific manifestations are shown in the following four aspects. First is the formation, development and differentiation of political disciplines. In the process of the expansion of scientific and technological culture, reasonable tradition and scientific spirit are deeply rooted in the hearts of people. They have also begun to examine political activities from a scientific perspective and attitude, use scientific theories and methods to analyze political issues and explore the characteristics and laws of political life, thus giving birth to the political discipline. Today, political science, as an important category of social sciences, has developed into a large group of subjects. Moreover, it has become the theoretical basis of social and political life, regulating and guiding political activities. When dealing with realistic political issues, people always tend to put it in the field of political science, use their own theories and methods to analyze, explore the root causes, reveal characteristics, predict trends and formulate countermeasures. This is the scientization of political life, which transcends the limitations of experiential vision and emotion and strives to achieve the rationalization and scientization of political life. The continuous rationalization of society is linked to the institutionalization of technological progress.64 Second is the legalization of political life. Political life always revolves around the struggle for political interests, and the Law of the Jungle is the basic law of political life. That’s why Clausewitz once said, “modern war is bloodless.” Political life led by the ruling class can be divided into two categories as “rule of man” and “rule of law”: the former is shifted by the arbitrary will of the ruler and featured by irregularity and instability of political life; while the latter, from the starting point of safeguarding the interests of the ruler, fixes the ruler’s will

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 187 in the form of law, regulates and guides political life and then shapes a relatively stable social order. The transition from “rule of man” to “rule of law” is an inevitable trend for the progress of political civilization. In this development process, the influence of science, technology and culture on political life is very obvious. Legalization is the concrete manifestation of reasonable tradition in the field of social life, and can be regarded as the inherent requirement of the scientization of political life. Compared with science, the rule of reason, which contains the value of rationality, constitutes more of the foundation of our society, although it is certainly the most memorable embodiment in science.65 At the same time, the legal system is also a social-technical system with the goal of maintaining fairness and justice, which can be regarded as a manifestation of the technicalization of political life. Third is the technicalization of political life. The so-called technicalization of political life is the continuous penetration of new technological achievements into the political field, which has caused professional differentiation and specialization in the political field, patterned and formalized political operations, as well as refined, standardized and rigidized political behaviors. It has freed contemporary politics from the subjective randomness, mystery and personality tendency of traditional politics, making it develop in a direction that can be accurately foreseen and measured. Marcuse has a deep insight into this process: as a technical field, the advanced industrial society is also a political field and the final stage for realizing a special historical plan, that is, at this stage, the experiment, transformation and organization of nature are only used as materials for governance.66 Today, technology has fully penetrated into all aspects of social and cultural life. In real political life, people always turn to technological methods in order to realize and maintain their own political interests. This has led to the technicalization of political life. On the one hand, the penetration of new technological achievements into all aspects of the political activity process is the most apparent and easy to understand. On the other hand, with the expansion of technology, instrumental reason and technical thinking are becoming more and more inflated; people tend to think and deal with political issues in a technical way, and the so-called power tactics are said in this sense. Fourth is the construction and improvement of military technology systems. War is a continuation of politics and bloody politics, while military technology is a special form of political technology. Without military strength based on military technology, any political group and its propositions will be unsustainable. When conflicts of interest between political groups are difficult to reconcile, the problem is always solved by force, thereby inducing war, and military technology is the basic guarantee for winning the war. For this reason, all political groups put the development of military technology in the first place, and ensure the development of military technology and the need to update weapons in the investment of human, financial and material resources. For example, during the Cold War, more than two-thirds of Soviet scientific and technological personnel directly or indirectly served the defense industry.

188

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

(2) In scientific and technological activities, the prominent manifestation of the coordinated development of science and politics is the standardization of scientific and technological activities and the reform of the scientific and technological system. Scientific research activities have been carried out in certain social scenarios from the beginning, involving interests of multiple sides, and subject to political interference and control. As the axis of social life, politics always incorporate science and technology into its own system, shape science and technology according to political needs and serve the effective realization of political goals. Especially since the beginning of the 20th century, with the advent of the era of great science, the socialization of science and technology is accompanied by the scientization and technicalization of society, so there is an urgent need for the state to further regulate and manage scientific and technological activities. At present, the integration and regulation of political science and technology activities are mainly achieved through the following channels. First is construction of a scientific and technological system. Scientific and technological activities are first of all social activities, which have spontaneously given rise to many small social organizations, such as mentor-apprentice sects, schools and invisible colleges. However, these organizations are scattered, smallscale and interest-oriented, so it is difficult for them to be incorporated into the political system. The outstanding problem in scientific and technological activities is the lack of organization and coordination and low efficiency. Therefore, many political groups have begun to intervene in scientific and technological activities by creating social organizations, such as societies and scientific research institutions, so as to promote academic exchanges. This form of organization is large in scale, relatively concentrated and closely related to each other, and they conduct research activities based on plans and tasks, which are easily controlled by political groups. The political group regulates and guides science and technology activities to serve politics through channels and mechanisms such as personnel arrangements, financial appropriations, science and technology planning, fund support, rewards, title evaluation and legal constraints, thereby shaping the prevailing science and technology operating system. Once this system takes shape, it remains relatively stable and is mostly fixed in the form of institutions or conventions. Second is the statute of science and technology legislation. Like the law that regulates people’s daily behavior, science and technology legislation regulates and guides people’s scientific research activities and restricts the abuse and malicious use of science and technology. For example, the patent law stimulates invention and creation and avoids duplication of labor. Various laws related to scientific and technological activities have clearly provided for the organization and operation of scientific research activities, as well as the promotion and application of the research results, defining what is to be supported, opposed, developed and restricted. They reflect the will and interest demands of the ruling class, and they are the institutional arrangements for scientific and technological

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 189 activities. Compared with science and technology policies, the normative role of science and technology laws is more basic, playing a long-lasting and stable strategic role. Of course, due to the advancement of scientific research activities and the lagging nature of legislation, the frontiers of science and technology are often blank areas of the law and need to rely on ethical norms and the guidance of public opinion. For example, the study of human cloning not only harms human dignity but also causes a series of ethical issues, but it is difficult to form corresponding legal norms for a while. It depends on the moral consciousness of scientific researchers and the supervision of public opinion. Third is the leadership of science and technology policy. A policy, which is prescribed in an authoritative form, involves objectives to be achieved, principles of action to be observed, methods of work to be carried out and general steps and specific measures to be taken in a certain historical period, so as to facilitate a political group to realize its own interests and will. Compared with the law, policy is at a lower level, with obvious specificity, pertinence and short-term characteristics. The science and technology policy is the basic code of conduct formulated to achieve the scientific and technological tasks in a certain historical period. It is the guideline and strategic principle for the political group to formulate scientific and technological strategic plans, determine the direction of scientific and technological development and regulate scientific and technological activities in an aim to ensure that science and technology could follow the correct line and advance in an orderly manner toward the established goals and better serve the needs of current political development. The science and technology policy enables the efficient operation of science and technology activities by guiding, intervening and controlling the operation, output and transformation of relevant activities, and finally transforms the will of the political group into the behavioral norms of the subjects of science and technology activities, hence ensuring the realization of political interests. Due to its relative stability and great inertia, the science and technology system has a more profound impact on the development of science and technology, which makes the reform and reshaping of the science and technology system on the agenda. Generally speaking, science and technology policies are always designed within the framework of the current science and technology system to make them feasible and flexible. However, the regulatory role of science and technology policies is always limited, and it is often ineffective and out of order for institutional problems. Under this circumstance, to effectively intervene in scientific and technological activities, it is necessary to start with reforming the current scientific and technological system. At the same time, because of the fundamental position of science and technology in social life, reforms in many fields will inevitably involve reforms in the scientific and technological system. New scientific and technological systems are always designed and constructed under the leadership of political groups, aiming to efficiently meet the needs of political activities. For example, China’s scientific and technological system reform was carried out under the political task of centering on economic construction in the new era.

190

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

From the very beginning, it established that the guiding principle of economic construction must rely on science and technology, and science and technology must be geared toward economic construction. All the scientific and technological work is pressed ahead by following the way of thinking of maintaining overall stability and seeking breakthroughs and giving full play to scientific research institutions and personnel. While breaking the old technology system characterized by instructions and plans, we began to build a new market-oriented technology system to guide science and technology to achieve new development in the service of economic construction. The reform of the scientific and technological system is carried out under the impetus of both internal and external forces, and it is a transformation of scientific and technological activities. This profound social change is generally based on extensive research and full demonstration. After a reform program is formed, small-scale experiments are firstly conducted to reduce the impact of the reform on the operation of science and technology and reduce the necessary social costs. Then, according to the experience and lessons of the experiments, adjust and improve the reform program, and prepare for pressing ahead the reform in all respects. This process is carried out under the intervention and control of state power. It is a future-oriented mechanism shaping action, which reflects the wishes and interests of the ruling class. Therefore, we should not only outline the blueprint for the operation of the new technology system in the future but also determine the route, steps and measures for the transition from the old system to the new system. We should not only properly handle the various relationships within the field of science and technology, which is conducive to the sustained and healthy development of science and technology, but also deal with the interrelationships between science and technology, society, economy and culture, so as to promote the coordinated development of various social undertakings. From this, we can deduce two criteria for testing the effectiveness of the reform of the science and technology system: one is whether it is conducive to the comprehensive, rapid and coordinated development of science and technology, and the other is whether it is conducive to creating a social environment that promotes the development of science and technology and giving full play to its social functions. In addition, the transformation of the relationship between power and justice represented by science and politics, and between elites and the masses, also vividly reflects the trend of coordinated development and harmonious progress between science and politics. Usually, due to the power attribute of science and technology, the close relationship between science and technology and politics always reflects a distinctive power feature. In politics, because of its institutional and practical effects on social life, it always plays the role of justice messenger. At present, the interaction between technology and politics has formed mutual constraints, thus restricting the activities of both parties in their respective fields. Regardless of the power possessed, both must take the realization of justice as the ultimate code of conduct. Similarly, between the elites, the main bearers of science and technology, and the masses, the main stakeholders of political activities, there has also been a trend of mutual understanding due to the emergence of

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 191 movements such as “science popularization” and “public understanding of science” (this is to be explained in detail later). 5.3.4 Interaction between Science and Humanities The dialogue between science and religion, the integration of science and art and the harmony between science and politics mentioned earlier are actually vivid reflections of the relationship between science and humanities. To some extent, this has shown the trend of the future relationship between science and humanities toward interaction and integration. As the two basic forms of human culture, science and humanities are not in opposition from the beginning. In the pre-scientific period, the boundaries between science, philosophy, religion and other humanities and cultures were quite blurred. Almost all knowledge of ancient Greece was concentrated in natural philosophy, and the science and humanities of the Renaissance were as intimate as a couple. In previous human cultures, science and humanities were either integrated or blended with each other, and they were never in opposition to each other. When science was conceived in ancient Greek culture and European religious culture and was born under the baptism of the modern scientific revolution, the spirit of scientism and rationalism it promoted gradually separated from humanities and established a scientific culture that is different from humanistic traditions. With the great success of the modern scientific revolution in interpreting nature and the great victory in transforming nature, the belief in scientism that “science is omnipotent” began to emerge, and it tried to suppress and dominate the development of the humanities, while humanities scholars were bound to fight back, which created a conflict between science and humanities. Since the 20th century, the rapid development of science and technology has made various social negative effects increasingly prominent, issues such as resource shortage, energy crisis, ecological destruction and moral decay have aroused people’s profound reflection and humanists have become more active in their criticism of science and technology, which has intensified the division and confrontation between the two cultures of science and humanities. It was C.P. Snow, a famous physicist and novelist at the University of Cambridge, who first realized the division between science and humanities and clearly raised this issue. In 1959, Snow gave a lecture entitled “Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution” at Cambridge University, which is also known as “The Rede Lecture.”67 In his lecture, he pointed out that there are two opposing cultures in modern society; one is humanistic culture and the other is scientific culture. There are differences and conflicts between scientific culture and humanistic culture, and the split between the two cultures is not only a very common phenomenon in Britain, it exists in the entire Western society. The spiritual life of the entire Western society is increasingly split into two extremes: one is literary intellectuals, the other is scientists. Due to the differences in educational background, discipline training, research objects and methods between the two, their basic cultural ideas and value judgments are often in opposite positions. And

192

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

people in both camps are indifferent to each other, unwilling to understand each other. Over time, there is a possibility that everyone stays away from each other and lives in peace, looks down on each other or even attacks each other. The hostility and resentment that exist between the two types of intellectuals create a gap of mutual incomprehension between the two cultures, which is not conducive to the development of the entire society. Once the issue of “two cultures” was raised, it has aroused widespread and fierce disputes in the academic community, and it has never ceased for nearly half a century, with new disputes cropping up from time to time. It can be said that for more than half a century, the issue of “two cultures” triggered by the dispute between science and humanities has accounted for almost all of the discussion on human culture. The “Sokal incident” that occurred in the United States at the end of the 20th century and the resulting “science war” are the latest manifestations of the debate on the relationship between science and humanities between the two camps of scientists and humanistic intellectuals. In this debate, scientists and humanistic intellectuals from almost all countries in the world have participated; the focus of the debate shifted from the relationship between science and humanities (including religion, politics, economy and ethics) to the confrontation between modern and postmodern, scientism and anti-scientism. Those who resolutely defend science despised humanities, while those who promote humanities criticized the various undesirable consequences of science. The antagonism and contradiction between science and humanities seemed to have intensified. Faced with the issue of “two cultures,” in 1963, Snow proposed a “third culture” solution, that is, humanistic intellectuals and scientists understand each other and develop direct and harmonious exchanges. In 1991, to deal with the dilemma of “two cultures,” American writer John Brockman proposed that scientific and technological experts may bypass humanistic intellectuals to directly communicate with the public. In fact, the American historian of science George Sarton proposed and advocated a new kind of humanism in the 1930s, that is, to emphasize the double revival of science and humanities and the establishment of humanized science. Generally speaking, more and more scholars are beginning to reach a consensus on how to solve the issue of “two cultures”; that is, through the interaction and integration of science and humanities, the antagonism between the two can be fundamentally solved. This is mainly for the following reasons: on the one hand, the transformation of nature and the control of society by science and technology have led to ecological problems such as environmental pollution and resource depletion and caused spiritual crises such as loss of human nature and loss of meaning, forcing people to face the limitations of science and come to know the value and significance of humanistic culture, while humanistic culture has been actively learning from science and reason. On the other hand, although science and humanities are two different aspects of human culture, they share the same goal of exploring the unknown, and both of them promote the all-around development of human beings in the end. Therefore, there is a foundation for their integration. At the same time, the two complement each other in human practice. As Friedrich Rapp pointed out,

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 193 only science and technology can tell us the facts and the consequences that should be foreseen when engaged in certain activities. And all discussions on norms are inseparable from the humanities including philosophy. Due to the division of labor among various disciplines, the knowledge of these two categories is unable to solve problems in all fields alone.68 Strictly speaking, science and humanities are not diametrically opposed. The so-called conflict between two cultures is actually the conflict between extreme scientism and extreme humanism caused by the imbalance in the relationship between science and humanities. In fact, the interactive development trend between science and humanities has appeared since the first half of the 20th century. It is mainly manifested in the following two fields. In the field of scientific research, a large number of emerging interdisciplines and marginal disciplines formed by the interaction of science and humanities have begun to appear, thereby expanding the field of human knowledge, enriching and promoting the development of science and humanities. In fact, as early as the 1940s and 1950s, scientists began to consciously open up new areas where science and humanities intersect so as to combine natural sciences with humanities for research. For example, Schrödinger first introduced the entropy in physics into life systems and social phenomena in his work What Is Life, thus affecting the scientific careers of many Nobel Prize winners. The information theory, cybernetics and system theory that emerged in the middle of the 20th century, as well as the information economics, technical economics, medical sociology, educational ecology, architectural aesthetics, technical aesthetics and other disciplines that have come out after that, are all the products of the intersection of natural science, humanities and social science. In the field of education, equal emphasis on science education and humanities education has become an important educational concept, and scientific literacy education and humanistic quality education have also become the focus of school teaching. Due to the increasing specialization of science, the gap between the two cultures is also widening. In order for people to adapt to this rapidly changing world, one of the responsibilities of education is to communicate these two cultures.69 When Snow raised the issue of “two cultures,” he pointed out that the only way to bridge the gap between the two cultures and between scientists and nonscientists is to re-examine our education.70 Therefore, carrying out the education balancing liberal arts and science, infiltrating the humanistic spirit in professional curriculum, improving humanistic literacy of students and cultivating rounded people have become the most basic way in the interaction between science and humanities. Due to the conceptual complementarity of science and humanities, some scientists have begun to consciously think about the natural sciences they are studying, and actively promote the interaction between science and humanities. For example, the famous mathematician Whitehead in the 20th century actively explored the internal consistency between mathematics and goodness and wrote that the pursuit of mathematics and goodness is essentially the same, and they pursue the same thing, that is, the perfection of reason. For Einstein, he found the most profound reason

194

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

and the most brilliant beauty in the harmony of the laws of nature he explored, which gave him rich feelings such as awe, humility, ecstasy, surprise and some kind of religious emotion. It can be seen that in some outstanding scientists, the trend of interaction and integration between science and humanities has already emerged. The future development trend of the two cultures of science and humanities will be based on their interaction. It is not only the interaction between scientific culture and humanistic culture but also the interaction between scientific spirit and humanistic spirit. This is the inevitability of the development of science and humanities, and also that of the development of human civilization. Human culture is a cultural whole composed of multiple cultural forms, and science is one of the modern cultural forms. Religious scientist He Guanghu believes that the covenant between different cultures and civilizations should contain four basic principles: peaceful living and coexistence, free choice and development, equal dialogue and exchanges and tolerance and complementarity. They are respectively related to the life and death of culture, the choice of culture and the right to development, whether there is a gap between cultures, and the foundation and goals of culture, which is very important for the cooperation between different cultures and the development of culture.71 As the greatest and most material-rich cultural form ever created by mankind, science does not exist solely in society but coexists with other non-scientific cultural forms. The exchange and complementarity between science and other cultural forms jointly maintain the development and balance of human culture. At the same time, the trend of interaction and integration between science and religion, science and art and science and humanities provides a model for the coexistence of different cultures and also provides a mechanism for the overall development of human culture. Therefore, allowing science and other cultures to coexist peacefully in a free, equal, open and tolerant cultural atmosphere will be an important approach and basic requirement for the overall development of human culture in the future. As George Sarton said, let us slowly, steadily and humbly use all means to develop our methods, improve our intellectual training, continue our scientific work and, at the same time, let us become generous people, always pay attention to the beauty around us, pay attention to all the charms in people like us and perhaps in ourselves.72

Notes 1 Zhuang Xichang et al., Cultural Theory in the Multidimensional Vision. Hangzhou: Zhejiang People’s Publishing House, 1987:99–100. 2 R.K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000:30. 3 J.D. Bernal, Science in History. Translated by Wu Kuangfu et al., Beijing: Science Press, 1959:308–9. 4 Xing Dongmei, Science and Objectivity Regression of Practice. Beijing: Science Press, 2008:32–33. 5 M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:145.

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 195 6 M.N. Richter Jr., Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989:13. 7 M.W. Wartofsky, Conceptual Foundations of Science Thought – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Beijing: Qiushi Press, 1982:35–36. 8 E. Cassire, An Essay on Man. Translated by Gan Yang, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003:357. 9 J. Ladriere, Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997:2–3. 10 W.C. Dampier, History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001:175. 11 Wu Tong, “Re-discussion on Two Types of Local Knowledge - Differences in Locality between Modern Science and Local Natural Knowledge.” A Study of Dialectics of Nature, 2014(8):51–57. 12 N. Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Translated by Wang Wei et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006:97–98. 13 Li Xingmin, The Cultural Implication of Science. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2007:404. 14 G. Holton, Science and Anti-science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999:192. 15 L. Dollot, Individual Culture and Mass Culture. Translated by Huang Jianhua, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987:120–21. 16 I. Frolov. “Interaction Between Science and Humanist Values. “Social Science Today” Editorial Board.” Science As a Subject of Study. Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1987:234– 57. 17 Wu Wenxin, Science and Humanity. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2003:231–32. 18 B. Russell, Authority and the Individual. Translated by Xiao Wei, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990:70. 19 B. Mckibben, The End of Nature. Translated by Sun Xiaochun, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2000:44. 20 Xiao Feng, Human Side and Inhuman Side of Technology. Beijing: Scientific and Technological Literature Press, 1991:76. 21 J. Ladriere, Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997:72. 22 B. Barnes, About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:34. 23 Ding Donghong. The Pursuit of Free Reason (Philosophy). Beijing: Party School of the CPC Central Committee Press, 1998:249. 24 K.T. Jaspers, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Translated by Wei Chuxiong et al., Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1989:114. 25 M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:9–10. 26 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:73. 27 Xu Guoxian, “Formation of Tolerance Concept and Its Contemporary Problems.” Taiwanese Journal of Political Science, 1991(17):219–48. 28 Xu Weimin and Han Lifeng, “Scientific Tolerance: A Treasure of Scientific Culture Worth Exploring.” A Study of Dialectics of Nature, 2001(4):36–42. 29 M. Walzer, On Toleration. Translated by Yuan Jianhua, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000:10. 30 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:127.

196

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture

31 G. Sarton, Study of the History of Science. Translated by Liu Bing et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007:11. 32 K.R. Popper, Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987. 33 Huang Wansheng, Crisis and Choice. Shanghai: Shanghai Literature & Art Publishing House, 1988:203. 34 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:227. 35 K.R. Popper, Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987. 36 R.H. Brown, The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin, Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998:143. 37 F. Aicken, The Nature of Science. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1984:95. 38 Zhang Guoqing, Center and Edge. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1998:202. 39 J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Translated by Zeng Guoping et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2002:394. 40 P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:84. 41 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:119–20. 42 P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:124–25. 43 P. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Translated by Zhou Changzhong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2007:276. 44 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:86. 45 V. Bush, Science: Endless Frontier. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2004:52. 46 M. Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:158. 47 P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:24, 25. 48 P. Feyerabend, Against Method: Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Translated by Zhou Changzhong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2007:275. 49 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:14. 50 R.K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000:145. 51 P. Harrison, The Territories and Science and Religion. Translated by Zhang Butian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2016. 52 H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Translated by Bo Ni, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1966:38. 53 R.B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies. Translated by Fu Tongxian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1962:86. 54 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:182–83. 55 Zhang Zengyi, “Science and Religion: A New Emerging Field.” Foreign Essays in Social Sciences, 2000(2):11–15; Xu Yanmei, “Science and Religion: From Opposition to Dialogue.” Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2004(4):49–53. 56 R.H. Brown, The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin, Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998:161.

Loss and Awakening of Scientific Culture 197 57 I.G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion. Translated by Su Xiangui, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2004:1. 58 A.N. Whitehead, Science and The Modern World. Translated by He Qin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959:176–77. 59 Zhang Xianglun. On the Harmony of Science and Art. Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1988:171. 60 Tian Chuanliu and Liu Jialiang. Introduction to Art. Jinan: Shandong Qilu Press Co., Ltd., 2004:80. 61 Li Zhengdao, Science and Art. Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Press, 2000:8. 62 Liu Dachun ed., Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies: From Advocacy to Reconsideration. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009:361. 63 Zhang Xianglun and She Shisheng. Art, Science and Life. Nanjing: Southeast University Press, 2006:252. 64 J. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie. Translated by Li Li et al., Shanghai: Xuelin Publishing House, 1999:38–39. 65 B. Barber, Science and The Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991:74. 66 H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006:7. 67 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures. Translated by Chen Kejian et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Press, 2003. 68 F. Rapp, Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology. Translated by Liu Wu et al., Liaoning Science and Technology Publishing House, 1986:177. 69 Collected Works of Wu Daxian (Vol. 7). Taipei: Yuan-Liou Publishing Co., Ltd., 1992:34. 70 C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures. Translated by Chen Kejian et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Press, 2003:16. 71 Zhu Hanmin, The Cutting Edge of Thought—Listening to a Lecture in Yuelu Academy. Changsha: Hunan University Press, 2003:155. 72 G. Sarton, The History of Science and the New Humanism. Translated by Chen Hengliu et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007:92.

6

Openness Reconstruction of Cultural Science

When the cultural connotations of science encounters are found with deficiencies and meet with challenges, science and technology are no longer the outstanding achievements of human civilization they had been in the past. They have lost their original function and status and no longer serve as a model of human culture. Therefore, how to restore the cultural connotations of science, realize the demands of science and culture and move toward an open world of science and technology is an important direction for the development of science and technology at present.

6.1 From Strong Culture to Affirmative Culture For a time, scientific culture has been the most powerful form of culture in the world. This strong position gives science an absolute advantage in the entire social life; sometimes it even excludes other cultural forms, hence losing its cultural connotations day after day. Of course, this is undoubtedly extremely detrimental to the development of science and technology and society. Therefore, people began to call for affirmative science in the middle of the 20th century. To make science restore its original cultural connotations and make it more cultural, first of all, the cultural hegemony and cultural dominance of science should be changed, so that science can move from being strong to affirmative, and from the elite to the masses. 6.1.1 Science Down from the Altar and Its Democratization Since the emergence of modern science, science has increasingly penetrated into people’s political, economic and cultural life by virtue of its immense power. Science not only affects the political operating mechanism of the society and adjusts the economic structure, but also extends the average life span of the population, changes the look of human society and creates a scene of prosperity that has never been seen in human society, which has enabled it to gradually ascend the throne of the pinnacle of human knowledge and win the universal praise and worship of mankind. However, although science breaks superstitions and myths, gets rid of the suppression of religious theocracy and gains an independent status, DOI: 10.4324/9781003302599-9

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 199 it has caused the deification of science and technology in the process of secularization, resulting in a culture that seeks authority, finds fulfillment and establishes an order in science and technology,1 which has created a new myth while weakening the former one. As a result, science is positioned as a superior cultural achievement in the sacred palace, a spiritual force belonging to the authority class. However, since the 20th century, the development of science itself and the needs of reality have constantly impacted the deified image and authority status of science, which further challenged the myths of scientific certainty and determinism that people have always believed. In the field of natural sciences, Einstein’s theory of relativity not only reveals the relativity of time and space but also denies Newton’s view of absolute space-time, showing people how unstable the foundation we have relied on for a long time is. Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle states that the acceleration and position of any particle cannot be determined by humans at the same time to a degree of accuracy, which not only shows a certain degree of incalculability in nature but also has an impact on scientific determinism. Quantum mechanics, based on the uncertainty principle, complementarity principle and wave-particle duality, has changed the world picture of classical science in many ways; it not only makes the traditional scientific viewpoints transform from determinism to indeterminism, from reductionism to holism and from simplicity to complexity but also challenges the accurate, simple and perfect scientific image that people believe in the tradition. With these amazing results obtained in physics, the process of scientific socialization and industrialization is also accelerating. In the 20th century, the important achievements of scientific research have not only been increasingly applied to the fields of social production and life but also become an important source of warfare. Facing the unprecedented disastrous consequences brought by science, people began to reflect on the effects of science in military applications, and then considered the value of science in political activities. Since the middle of the 20th century, various negative effects brought about by the application of science and technology, such as environmental crisis, food shortage and overpopulation, have become increasingly prominent, drawing the attention of intellectuals, especially those in the field of humanities and social sciences, and stimulating them to launch a reflection and criticism of science. The Frankfurt School’s criticism of the spirit of enlightenment, instrumental reason, and science and technology is actually an attack on the alienation of science and technology, and also an attack and protest against the society’s excessive reliance on science and technology at that time. Postmodernists questioned and reflected on the social hegemony of science, criticizing scientific chauvinism and proposing that scientific knowledge is relative, uncertain and time-sensitive. Social constructivism put science as a product of social construction, dispelling the objectivity and universality that science is proud of; instead, it emphasized the relativity and locality of science and its coexistence with other cultural forms. Among these critical viewpoints, people not only doubted the functions and correctness of science but also launched an attack on the rationality of science, making scientism face the impact of harsh reality. After that, all kinds of irrational

200 Reconstruction of Cultural Science or anti-rationalism trends continued to emerge; not only did scientific expertise and the authority of experts continue to be questioned, but the image of science in the public and its social legitimacy were being threatened. It is because when objective neutrality, correctness and universality, which are the values of maintaining the sacred status of science, are being questioned, the aura surrounding science is to be fading. Correspondingly, the rationality of science based on this will inevitably encounter challenges. The process of science from being enshrined to its stepping off the altar heralds the collapse of the myth of scientific omnipotence and the decline of scientism. Facing the suspicion about the truthfulness of science and the threats to the rationality and legitimacy of science, the public outside the scientific community is confused, while the scholars in the community seek salvation in a variety of ways. Among them, democratization is one of the most important ways to ensure the legitimacy of science in society, and it is also an important development trend in science. Almost in the entire world, democratization has become an important standard and yardstick for the development of science and technology and the formulation of relevant policies. When discussing universalism, Merton emphasized that science and democracy have similar spiritual qualities and at the same time affirmed the important role of democracy in the development of science.2 Social constructivists believe that scientific knowledge is the result of social construction, and the legitimacy of politics in social life is consistent with the legitimacy of knowledge, while the legalization of politics is mainly through democratic procedures, which gives rise to people’s discussion on how the production of scientific knowledge conforms to democratic procedures. Constitutionalism regards scientific knowledge and its production process as political and requires science to be tested by democratic principles and procedures. As far as democracy is concerned, it refers to a form of governance in the sense of ancient Greek etymology. Today, it is synonymous with institutional democracy, which is embodied in the four principles of majority principle, equal political power, political participation and political freedom. Correspondingly, the democratization of science is to make the process of scientific research conform to these democratic principles, and it involves the following aspects: (1) As far as science itself is concerned, it means that the production of scientific knowledge should be democratized. Science is not only the fruit of the work of elites, but also shared by civilians, and the role of common sense should be fully emphasized. (2) As far as natural science as a discipline is concerned, it means that natural science should have the same development opportunities and the same status as other humanities and social sciences, and they can promote each other. (3) As far as the social aspect of science is concerned, which is also the most prominent aspect, it means that the general public should have the same right to participate in scientific affairs as scientists, and have a say in scientific and technological decision-making fields related to their own interests.

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 201 In short, the democratization of science is not only an important way for science to become socialized, but also a democratic procedure to restore the public’s trust in science and provide a basis and support for the social rationality of science. Although the grassroots representatives can solve anything immediately, it means that this is an institutional arrangement for rebuilding trust, and it provides the best prospects for science respected by society.3 As we all know, science and technology have become an indispensable part of contemporary social life; they not only influence people’s production and lifestyle but also deeply influence the future development direction of mankind. Therefore, when the application of science and the development of technology increasingly penetrate into people’s daily life at an unprecedented speed, the impact of science on our future becomes more and more urgent. All related affairs are no longer just scientific activities but also social and political events. For example, the issues of genetically modified foods and human stem cells that have been controversial in recent years are not only related to academics but involve the vital interests of the general public, and even important decisions involving the interests of the country and the nation. In particular, when science and technology are advancing day by day, although the progress of science and technology has made scientific knowledge more and more abundant, it often does not bring more security but causes increasing cognitive uncertainty and normative insecurity.4 With the increasing uncertainty of the consequences of scientific applications, it is difficult to accurately determine the consequences of the application of science and technology based on the existing scientific and technological knowledge; of course, there is no certainty about society’s acceptance of science that may carry these risks. However, the public is often people who are directly affected by science and technology, and they have the right to know how science and its application may affect and decide whether to accept the consequences. As required by democratic theory, in democratic countries or countries that pursue democracy, democratic procedures must ensure that all people affected by decision-making have effective opportunities to participate in the political process. And in this process, they must have equal rights and interests, sufficient information and good reason to understand what the policy may cause to them. Robert A. Dahl, an authority on contemporary political theory, believes that democracy contains at least five standards: effective participation, equal voting, fully informed, ultimate control of the agenda and adult citizenship.5 Benjamin R. Barber, a representative of the theory of strong democracy, believes that the public must not only regularly elect their own ruler (which is the core of representative democracy), but also actively participate in policy deliberations. In addition, a principle of procedural democracy is “widespread participation,” the standard of procedural justice also requires that members of society should have the opportunity to express their opinions in different social backgrounds.6 Therefore, letting the public understand science and participate in the relevant scientific and technological decision-making process through democratic procedures will be an important way for science to truly enter the lives of ordinary people.

202

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

For the development of science and technology in the future, the democratization of science and technology is of great significance. In particular, when science increasingly penetrates into all areas of social life through its technical applications, and even affects the survival of the entire human race and the operation of society, the role of democratization of science and technology becomes more obvious. It is because the democratization of technological change means empowering those who lack financial, cultural or political capital to approach the design process. Moreover, the democratization of technology does not hinder progress; it may even help avoid the problems that currently plague clinical research and nuclear energy. At the same time, it will ensure that the currently underestimated rights are fully reflected, because these rights conflict with centralized and elite control over design, such as the right of workers to exercise their skills. If elite control has left a deep mark on so many aspects of our society, the long-term significance of a more democratic design will be extremely significant.7 In a certain sense, the socialization of science is the process of democratization of science. In this process, science no longer stays at the dominant position it has occupied for a long time but begins to walk off the altar and continue to move toward the real life of ordinary people, becoming a popular science. In this way, science as a culture will not only move from a culture of power to equal rights but its mysterious image will also be completely replaced by a real-life image. 6.1.2 Elite Science, Civilian Science and Common Sense Looking at the history of science and its development process, modern science developed on the basis of modern scientific and technological revolution is undoubtedly a kind of elite knowledge and elite culture. The characteristics of this elite science are first reflected in the subject of scientific activities, that is, science has been a spiritual activity carried out by the elite groups in society from the beginning. In the pre-scientific period when science had not been separated from philosophy, the so-called scientific activities were limited to scientific thinking, debate and research carried out by idlers, politicians, philosophers and religious leaders in their spare time based on their own interests, such as Thales, Plato and Aristotle, who had a certain economic foundation and social status at that time. During the Renaissance, rationalism as the foundation of science began to revive, and scientific activities became active again. Although the people engaged in scientific activities in this period were also those with multiple identities such as craftsmen, engineers, artists and scholars, they were almost without exception from the aristocracy. In the 17th century, modern science began to take shape, and the process of professionalization and institutionalization of science had also begun. But until the late 18th century, most scientists were amateurs, mainly from the upper-middle class and freelancers such as doctors and priests. They had time and equipment to conduct private scientific experiments. For science in the modern sense, it is a highly institutionalized and specialized activity. Therefore, only those who obtain rigorous training and specialized knowledge through formal learning can become scientists. After receiving a complete and systematic higher

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 203 science education, these scientists not only have rich professional knowledge but also outstanding thinking abilities and cognitive abilities better than ordinary people. Since its emergence, science has mainly existed as a spiritual activity undertaken by a minority of elite groups in society, and it is an activity that is participated in and controlled by social elites. The important role of science in contemporary social life is another main reason for the formation of elite science. The application of science and technology has a profound impact on the politics, economy, culture and many other aspects of the entire society. Science and technology have become an important part of the mainstream culture of contemporary society, and these are indisputable facts. Because of this, science, while enjoying the supreme glory, has become a symbol and foundation of the legitimacy of human activities, and an important foundation for the ruling class to maintain their dominant position and ensure the legitimacy of their rule. Therefore, science is regarded as the most quintessential part of human culture, and it is also human culture with special strength. For ordinary people, science seems to be a sacred culture exclusive to the social elites and an elegant culture far away from our daily lives and beyond expectation. But the Spanish philosopher Ortega said that the advancement of science is largely due to the work of ordinary people, even the work of people with lower qualifications.8 If science is about to give full play to its role as the most important cultural form of human society, it cannot confine itself to the scope of elite culture. After all, the place where science will play a role is the whole society, and what science will ultimately face is the general public. If science remains an elite culture, it will gradually separate from the real life of the masses and become a purely spiritual activity. More importantly, civilians only obey science without thinking, or accept it without reflection; the final outcome is that the ruling class controls ordinary people’s thoughts and behaviors through science, hence resulting in autocracy and dictatorship. Therefore, it is necessary to transform the purely elite science into civilian science and make it truly science for the people. Only by taking off the sacred mask of scientific culture and letting it return to the common people can science play an important role in social development more fully and effectively. In the process of the popularization of elite science, special attention must be paid to common sense and its role and influence on scientific development. It is true that science and common sense are two different forms of human knowledge; each has its own uniqueness. Generally speaking, science is a descriptive and systematic system. It attempts to discover and express the conditions under which various events occur in a general terminology system, and the description of these decisive conditions is the explanation of the corresponding event. This goal can be achieved only by distinguishing or isolating certain properties of the research subject, and only by determining the repeatable dependence mode in which these properties are located. Therefore, the unique sign of scientific research is to explain and establish the interdependent relationship between seemingly unrelated propositions and systematically reveal the relationship between

204

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

seemingly intricate data.9 Common sense knowledge is neither clearly descriptive nor explanatory, nor is it clearly systematic. It neither connects its parts with all other parts, nor consciously attempts to treat it as a consistent truth system, but only a reluctant wholeness. It is a common cultural property, a set of reliable expectations about what everyone should understand in the general basic activities of daily life. Therefore, it can guarantee reliable foresight in general human actions and affairs, and will not panic unexpectedly.10 It can be seen that although common-sense knowledge is not scientifically systematic and strictly deterministic, its foreseeing effect is also very important for general work and social life. This also shows that there is no clear distinction between science and common sense. In fact, science and common sense are closely related, and common-sense knowledge is even an important channel for science to approach civilians. This is for the following reasons: first, science ultimately comes from life, so it also belongs to common-sense knowledge. For example, the rise of modern physics originated from the explanation of facts and phenomena in our daily experience, such as falling and projectile motion.11 As early as 1936, in the article “Physics and Reality,” Einstein pointed out that “the whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking.”12 Huxley also expressed that science is nothing more than specialized and systematic common sense. Although science has maintained a lofty and sacred image in the eyes of the public for a long time, it comes from life and must serve the general public. Especially in this day and age when science and technology are widely used, they cannot exist entirely apart from the realities of everyday life. In this sense, science is the product of the development of common sense to a certain stage, and it is systematic and systematic common-sense knowledge. Second, to a certain extent, the popularization of elite science is to let the public understand and accept science via common sense. In modern society, due to the rapid development of science and its continuous deepening, differentiation and precision, the alienation of science and people’s real lives seems to have become a common phenomenon. Therefore, the commonsense making of science is of great significance for its universalization and its social acceptance in a larger scope. Moreover, common sense is inseparable from us; it is the practical basis of our thoughts and actions, and our lives depend on it;13 therefore, science often obtains its own legitimacy through common sense. In the history of scientific development, a new world picture must become a new common-sense world picture by changing and replacing the old common-sense world picture, so as to enter the field of vision of more people, become an important consideration for them to understand things and get truly accepted by the society. In this way, the goal of popularizing science has been achieved. Science is neither a form of knowledge exclusive to elite groups nor a specialized knowledge that is completely different from common-sense knowledge. Science is a form of knowledge that inspires people, not a form of knowledge that has to be imposed on individuals or recognized out of gullibility. In a society of equal individuals, science is a form of knowledge that can be accepted by anyone and only obeys his or her own perception and reasoning ability.14 Science should not only be positioned as knowledge that can be engaged in, understood and

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 205 contacted by social elites, but should be regarded as a scientific culture belonging to the masses, a form of knowledge related to common sense. Only by upholding this scientific concept can the rationality of science be ensured and its social role can be brought into full play. 6.1.3 Intersection and Fusion of Natural Science, Humanities and Social Science From a disciplinary perspective, broad “science” (wissenschaft in German) can generally be divided into three basic types: natural science, humanities (geistes wissenschaften in German) and social science,15 representing the achievements of human beings in understanding the world in different ways and from different angles. However, due to the dominant position of scientific culture, natural science clearly occupies an advantage over humanities and social science. In academic research, the great achievements of natural science have led to the expansion of empirical methods, and have become the criteria, patterns and models of all sciences. For example, John Mill believes that moral science can only be successful if it uses the methods of natural science. According to Francois Comte, the progress and achievements of natural science have allowed us to see the great power of scientific methods, so we have to admit that scientific methods should be applied to all fields. Especially in social science research, the content of mathematics in a subject is often used as a measure of the perfection and maturity of the subject; the degree of modeling and mathematics has become a sign of the development and progress of the subject. Marx once asserted that a science can only be truly developed when it has achieved the ability to use mathematics. In reality, a considerable number of scholars in natural science emphasize the universality, objectivity and preciseness of natural science research, while humanities and social science are not recognized as part of science because of their individuality, subjectivity and class nature. This can also be seen from many historical facts: the Nobel Prize, the highest honor in science, has so far only awarded a prize in economics, a discipline in the field of humanities and social science, and the domestic academic circle has all along taken science more important than humanities. There is no doubt that this inequality in the status of disciplines will be harmful to the development of human civilization and culture. Since the middle of the 20th century, with the progress of society and the maturity of various disciplines, breaking the barriers between disciplines, eliminating sectarianism and promoting the intersection and integration between disciplines have gradually become an important trend in the development of disciplines. Since about the mid-to-late 20th century, natural science has gradually stepped out of its own research field and is no longer limited to the empirical methods of natural science. Instead, it began to learn from the research methods of humanities and social science, and investigate nature-related issues from the perspective of humanities and society. As a result, it has not only spawned many new interdisciplinary subjects but also provided a new impetus and sources for innovation.

206 Reconstruction of Cultural Science The strengthening of the trend of intersection and integration between disciplines is mainly for the following reason. First, the intersection and integration of natural science, humanities and social science is the need for disciplinary development. Looking at the entire history of disciplinary development, it has generally experienced a process from synthesis to differentiation, and then to synthesis again. Since modern times, especially in the past 300 to 400 years, the development of science has been characterized by differentiation, and a scientific system with disciplinary differentiation as the main feature has been formed. This continuous subdivision of disciplines has promoted the growth of human knowledge and has also expanded the depth and breadth of human understanding. The degree of differentiation of disciplines has once become an important symbol of disciplinary development. However, as the division of knowledge has become more specialized, the gap between departments has also increased. As a result, the opportunities for thorough research on each discipline have increased, yet the time devoted to general research has been reduced, and scientists also tend to see the trees and forget the forest.16 Moreover, natural science, humanities and social science have never been completely separated. To a greater extent, various psychiatric sciences do include various natural facts, and they are based on knowledge about the natural world.17 Therefore, Dilthey once said that at the two transfer points of natural science research and human society research – where nature affects spiritual development and it is also affected or forms a channel that affects other spirits – the two kinds of knowledge are always mixed. Natural science knowledge overlaps with humanities.18 Secondly, the intersection and integration of natural science, humanities and social science is the need for innovation. Nowadays, innovation is the main theme of scientific and technological development, and it is also the driving force of social progress. There are many ways to innovate. Among them, the intersection, combination and mutual penetration of humanities, social science and natural science are the dominant trends in contemporary scientific development, and the best path to producing characteristic and cutting-edge disciplines in the current era. Therefore, new theories, new ideas and new methods are most likely to be produced by interdisciplinary.19 Whether in the fields of natural science or humanities and social science, innovation is always an inexhaustible driving force for the development of disciplines, and cross-research is the driving force and source of innovation. As far as natural science is concerned, the major discovery process of natural science shows not only the exploration of natural phenomena and laws by scientists with rigorous scientific attitude and methods, keen thinking and observation, but also the integration, collision and conflict of the academic thoughts, personalities and hobbies of scientists during competition and cooperation, as well as the encouragement, tolerance and pressure from the evaluation made by society and academic communities.20 In the humanities field, the achievement of theoretical innovation and academic breakthroughs not only requires humanities and social science workers to have problem awareness and an international perspective, but also a comprehensive vision that focuses on multi-disciplinary,

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 207 interdisciplinary research and integration, and pays attention to the research intersection with the natural science field. Finally, the intersection and integration of natural science, humanities and social science is a practical need. Compared with traditional science, an important feature of modern scientific knowledge is its practicality. The production of pure knowledge is no longer enough to become the full power of natural science research, and the applicability of the knowledge produced often determines and supports the content of natural science research. However, many major contemporary scientific and technological, economic and social issues involve quite complex and comprehensive factors, such as comprehensive planning of scientific and technological development, formulation of scientific and technological policies, economic policies and national economic plans, and forecast of social development, which are hardly addressed by natural science or humanities and social science alone. Many problems in modern society need to be solved by integrating the multi-disciplinary knowledge of natural science and social science into an organic knowledge system. Some of the issues originally raised from the perspective of natural science, such as environment, energy, space and ocean, inevitably involve many social issues, even global social issues, and therefore require the participation of social science. Some issues about social science, such as population control and urban management, are becoming more and more complicated, and their study is in need of the methods of mathematics and nature science. As early as the early 20th century, Lenin had pointed out that the powerful trend from natural science to social science not only existed in the era of Petty but also in the era of Marx. By the 20th century was just as strong, if not stronger.21 At present, the trend of great crossover and great integration between natural science, humanities and social science is becoming more and more obvious, and it has received more attention and emphasis than before. In this way, humanities and social science have gradually gained the same status and development opportunities as natural science, which is beneficial for the future development of disciplines. 6.1.4 Popularization and Communication of Science The process of democratization and popularization of science is actually accompanied by the popularization of science. It is through popularization that science gradually come into the public view, from elite groups to ordinary people, and from the sacred palace into the lives of ordinary people. Popular science communication has become the most important way for science to gain public understanding and trust. Popularization is self-evident for the importance of science from hegemony to democracy, from being strong to being equal and from elite culture to civilian culture. The popularization of science is a practical activity, which has the following obvious characteristics: diversified motivation, purpose and driving force; a series of participants that are not strictly defined; and a relatively open

208

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

institutional framework. Therefore, it provides a favorable tool and foundation for more participants to take part in science-related decision-making activities. Moreover, for some problems in the current development of science and the trend of socialization of scientific development, the popularization of science also has important functions: play a role in the demarcation between science and non-science and counter superstition, folk knowledge and other non-science; bridge the gap between ignorant public and knowledgeable scientists; build social functions based on scientific principles; respond to the decline that occurs when contemporary scientists and their careers lose their prestige; and provide creative space for the development of science itself.22 In fact, scholars have long noticed the necessity of the popularization of science, especially its importance to science itself and society as a whole. In the 1930s, Bernal pointed out that “if we no longer simultaneously make true understanding of science a part of the lives of ordinary people in our time, it’ll be useless to improve scientists’ understanding of each other’s work.”23 Moreover, science has largely divorced from the consciousness of the masses, and the result is extremely detrimental to both sides. This is not good for the general public because they live in an increasingly artificial world, but they’ve gradually found that they have no idea of the mechanisms that restrict their lives. As far as science is concerned, unless the general public understands what scientists are doing, it is impossible to expect them to provide scientists with the support they need for their work. And this will strengthen scientists’ dangerous tendency to remain psychologically isolated.24 After about half a century, people generally realized the importance of what Bernal had said. While scientists are earnestly working hard to disseminate scientific knowledge to the public, relevant government departments have established a number of institutions to promote the popularization of science. For example, the national academy of sciences in many countries has set up special committees to discuss this issue and formulate guidelines and policies to achieve the purpose of popularization, and science literacy education has also become an important part of the national education series. Magazines such as The Public Understanding of Science, created by the Royal Society, aim to disseminate scientific knowledge to the public and explain the implications of scientific and technological discoveries related to daily life. The beginning of the popularization of science, specifically, can be traced back to the Victorian era in England from the mid-19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the term “popular science” put forward by scientists mainly refers to scientists’ dissemination of the amazing achievements of science to the public and the benefits it brings to mankind, with an aim to maintain the privileged position of science and increase its prestige by disseminating scientific knowledge to the public. This is closely related to the social situation and social status of science at that time. Since its inception, science has continuously provided various conveniences for the production and life of human society and has gradually occupied a special dominant position in the entire social and cultural life. Therefore, to promote this excellent culture to society, to let more people

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 209 understand it and to support it became the purpose of the popularization of science at that time. This was also known as the stage of traditional science popularization. It was based on small science, shaping and disseminating the sacred image of science, while scientists seemed like “saints”: fair and unbiased, pursuing the truth regardless of personal gains or losses. It set up a double gap in knowledge and value: experts are intelligent but the public is ignorant, science is at the top but the public is at the bottom. The public was not only inferior to scientists in terms of cognition but also far inferior to scientists in terms of ethics and social contribution. When popularization points to the promotion of the utility and sacred status of science, what the public sees is an extremely positive portrayal of science as a heroic, apolitical, inherently reasonable undertaking.25 In the 20th century, the combination of science and war has elevated the importance of science in national security and socio-economic construction to an unprecedentedly high level, and science has become a symbol of national power. But at the same time, especially since the mid-to-late 20th century, various social negative effects caused by science and its technology applications have cropped up one after another: the explosion of atomic bombs and the application of DDT have brought endless risks and disasters to people; the global environmental pollution and energy crises, the emergence of ecological crises and the possibility of nuclear winter have highlighted the negative effects of science. As a result, people’s attitude toward science has changed from worship and belief to confusion and bewilderment. This change in the public’s attitude toward science is possibly because the public is becoming more and more aware that they should have a say in important decisions about science and technology, but they sometimes receive conflicting advice from experts. The real reason is the public’s ignorance of science; they don’t know that in science, as in everything else in life, scientific experts can disagree. It is also because people are used to being overconfident that science represents certainty; they don’t know how to deal with the uncertainties and conflicting opinions in science; no wonder sometimes they don’t have the slightest doubt in science, but sometimes they don’t believe it at all.26 Moreover, the research on philosophy of science, the history of science, the sociology of science and the development of science itself in the 20th century have repeatedly shown that science does not represent absolute truth. It is just a part of human spiritual activity, not inherently more valuable than other cultural activities of human beings. Science can be doubted, understood and even criticized. As a result, the popularization of science has become a social cause, and a large-scale “public understanding of science” movement has emerged in the West. Different from traditional science popularization, the movement of “public understanding of science” advocates that every science is a recognized knowledge resource in modern society; someone who spreads his culture may want people to believe him; he may wish to be respected as an expert like astrologers or witch doctors. This was not the case in the past, a scientist usually occupied the position of predictor. His behaviors seemed to exert extraordinary influence on his followers, and people were prone to associate him with the values of

210 Reconstruction of Cultural Science ascetics, rather than the values of reality. For the later extension of the biographies and myths of the saints, he put forward his own honest and eccentric explanation. His questions were rarely as strong as those of the prophet; since he owned profound knowledge, he hardly got himself involved in the collective explanation of his society, which was critical to the reconstructing his society; his knowledge could cover the existing common sense of his time (if it had any effect, let it do the work of its own accord).27 In this way, the result of popularization is no longer pre-set, but the independent judgment of the public on the basis of understanding. Science communication is a concept that goes beyond traditional science popularization based on the requirements of scientific culture itself. Its core concept is public understanding of science, emphasizing the public’s understanding, appreciation and questioning of science as a human cultural activity, rather than just instilling specific scientific knowledge into the public. Its purpose and focus are to promote the public’s understanding of science, break down the barriers between science and the public and enhance the public’s understanding and communication of science and related issues. Regarding the science communication model, it has gone from the traditional linear model to the nonlinear model and from the “deficit model” to the “public understanding of science” model, such as the transition from Brian Wynne’s “reflexivity model” to Durant’s “democracy model.” And an important trend and characteristic of this transition is from one-way communication to interactive communication. For example, the “deficit model” expresses that scientists are knowledgeable experts, and the public (in any sense) are ignorant laymen;28 the “democracy model” enhances the public’s status in science and emphasizes the necessity of public participation in science and technology. The reason for this transition is that with the advancement of science and technology and the development of society, all sectors of society have increasingly realized that in science and technology-related activities, the public can no longer be regarded as ignorant laymen who passively accept expert opinions, but should be a group alongside experts. Traditional science popularization, public understanding of science and modern science communication are usually known as the three stages of science communication, which are actually the process of changing the image of science in the minds of the public. But in general, each stage represents a way and means to achieve popularization of science, with an ultimate goal of making science enter the view of the public, improving common people’s scientific literacy, expanding the audience of science and achieving the popularization of science.

6.2 Unity of Seeking Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Holiness At the value level, seeking truth and efficiency was once the main goal pursued by science and technology, and it is also where the value of science and technology lies. However, when the dimension of “seeking truth” is gradually covered by the pursuit of “utility,” the demands for “goodness” and “beauty” are increasingly being destroyed. Seeking the harmony and unity of “truth, goodness, beauty and

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 211 sacredness” has become the most important value orientation in the development of science and technology. 6.2.1 Pursuit of Truth and Utility in Science Truth and utility are two goals that appear simultaneously with the emergence of modern science. They are also the basic value pursuit and value orientation of science. 6.2.1.1 Seeking Truth Is the Primary Purpose of Science “True” means real, accurate and reliable; in the epistemological sense, it mainly refers to the conformity of subjectivity and objectivity, thought and reality. Seeking truth means pursuing truth and looking for an understanding of the nature of things. Science is an activity of seeking truth, which is the most common explanation of science. Regarding the original motive of scientific exploration, science is a kind of knowledge-seeking activity driven by human curiosity, and it is also the instinct of human mental growth. Believing that this world can be understood, and believing that the development of things has its own causal regularity, is the basic belief of this kind of scientific exploration. Therefore, at the knowledge level, science is essentially a knowledge system about the objective truths of the external world. The basic purpose of scientific exploration is to pursue the truth, constantly discover the mysteries of nature and better explain nature. The pursuit of truth should be the goal of our activities; it is the only goal worthy of our activities. If we hope to free people more and more of their material troubles, it is precisely because they can enjoy freedom in the study and thinking of truth.29 The important feature of science, which is different from other human activities, is that it purses truth and takes objectivity as the criterion. The effort to understand and explain nature begins with the history of mankind. Religions and mythologies and even superstition and worship are all the results of this cognition. But what science pursues is a true understanding, that is, an explanation based on discovery. Through the methods of experiment and mathematics, science has provided people with a brand-new picture of the world and realized a revolution in ideas. The real process of people’s understanding of the objective world has also changed from relying on senses to relying on experiments and scientific thinking. Therefore, Liang Shuming believes that the reason why science is science is that it stands in a quiet place to observe objectively, and it can only stand outside to observe phenomena, so everything becomes quiet. In the end, all phenomena are expressed in mathematics, that is, science is the mathematics of everything. In the activities of exploring and discovering unknown areas, science strives to explore the mysteries hidden behind nature and the essence of things, as well as the mechanisms and laws of the world, in order to better understand the mysteries of nature and the universe in which we live. In this kind of scientific research activity with “seeking truth” as the highest interest, researchers usually, from the

212 Reconstruction of Cultural Science perspective of knowledge discoverers, study things outside of themselves and the actions of others and expect to obtain knowledge that is objective and detached from reality, which is the so-called “truth.” The process of discovering truth is often painful and long. It is not easy to reveal the essence behind phenomena, since truth and falsehood often coexist. Moreover, permanent truth once and for all is always impossible to obtain. Any scientific theory is tentative, temporary and speculative, that is, they are all tentative assumptions, and will always remain so. Our theory, no matter how successful it is, is not completely true, it is only an approximation of truth.30 Truth as the fundamental meaning and ultimate goal of scientific practice is an ideal goal that mankind will never reach, but this does not mean that it is meaningless to mankind because it is the direction of human understanding and development. The truth-seeking process is not smooth but full of thorns and challenges. Especially at the beginning of the emergence of revolutionary new ideas, they often face pressure from all sectors of society. It is the firm belief in truth and the courage to defend truth that motivate generations of scientists to make unremitting efforts in creating brilliant scientific achievements. For example, Kepler spent more than 20 years in observation of planetary motion, and finally put forward a law of planetary motion that corrected the errors made by his predecessors. Galileo was persecuted by the church for his revolutionary theory of modern physics, involving dynamics, elasticity and acoustics; he never yielded for one second, even though he did not get rectified until more than 300 years later. In short, despite the difficulties in the process of seeking scientific truth, the faith and courage of not being afraid of authority provide spiritual support for the work of scientists. As the primary purpose of science, truth-seeking provides the power and source for the emergence and growth of modern science and also promotes the development of modern science in depth and breadth. The truth sought by science is not only universal, and will not change in any way due to the era, country or nation; it also has dynamic characteristics of continuous development. The search for truth is endless, and truth-seeking science is also an endless dynamic exploration. The purpose of science is not to achieve a set goal, but to proceed along a road with no end.31 6.2.1.2 Utilitarian Pursuit Is the External Dimension of Scientific Value If seeking truth is the internal goal and essence of science, then utilitarian pursuit can be said to be the external goal and external feature of science. Utilitarian pursuit and truth-seeking are different levels of value orientation of science, with the former aiming at meeting the needs of social reality. Science never evades its utilitarian side. In fact, as an important cognitive achievement of mankind, science must be applied to social practice and guide people’s behavior so as to exert its utilitarian effect. A revolutionary feature of the new science was the addition of a practical purpose, that is, to improve everyday life there and then, by means of science; the real purpose of seeking scientific truth must have an

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 213 effect on the material living conditions of mankind. This belief constitutes modern science itself and its characteristics.32 In the early days of modern science, the utilitarian pursuit of science established a solid social position for science through the display of its material power. It is largely due to its utilitarian value that science has been able to win and grow in the competition with religions and other ideologies. Bacon can be said to be the sacred patron of scientific utilitarianism. His famous saying “knowledge is power” even became the slogan of utilitarianism at that time. In the view of Bacon, the true legitimacy goal of science is to benefit human life with new development and new power. In his analysis of the emergence of science in the 17th century, Merton pointed out that these religious, economic, technical, military and even self-development utilities seem to provide an external theoretical basis for supporting and developing science that does not require further elaboration. The honor of national superiority, together with other manifestations of utilitarianism, laid a solid foundation for the legitimization of early modern science.33 This led to the fact that science has been advancing in the direction guided by utilitarianism since its birth. By the 19th century, scientific research in the pursuit of pure knowledge began to go ahead of practical applications and inventions and inspired practical applications and inventions. During this period, science and its applications had achieved great success in industry, making people feel more strongly about the revolutionary power of science as a social productive force. However, scientific research was not directly promoted by utilitarian pursuit, but by the pursuit of pure truth. After World War II, science, technology, industry and national interests have been closely integrated; with the rise of big science, the production mode of scientific knowledge has changed accordingly, that is, from the production of personal knowledge to the undertaking of the state and the government; the purpose of scientific knowledge production goes beyond the pursuit of truth-seeking and is replaced by a variety of immediate and practical intentions.34 Since then, the influence of utilitarian factors on scientific research has gradually increased. Since then, the influence of utilitarian factors on scientific research has gradually increased. Unlike utilitarianism, utilitarian pursuit is only one aspect of the pursuit of multiple values in science. Science does not evade the pursuit of utilitarian value, but it does not mean that utility can dominate the development of science. In fact, the excessive emphasis on the utilitarian pursuit may be heralding a new era that limits the scope of scientific research, which is unfavorable for the long-term development of science because a kind of immature utilitarianism is not a solid cultural basis for adopting science. The extreme form of utilitarianism narrowly interprets utilitarian norms and imposes a limit on science because it believes that science is desirable only when it is directly profitable. It is intellectually shortsighted to oppose giving any attention to fundamental research that does not provide direct results.35

214

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

It is undeniable that in the 17th century when science had not yet gained social autonomy, utilitarian criterion provided the most effective support for it. But today, it sometimes plays a certain suppressive effect on the development of science. As Merton said, utility should be an acceptable by-product of science instead of its main purpose because once usefulness becomes the only criterion of scientific achievement, a large number of issues of inherent scientific importance will no longer be studied. Therefore, the improvement of the status of pure science by scientists should be regarded as resistance to the intrusion of such norms, which limit the possible direction of the potential growth of science and threaten the stability and continuity of scientific research as a valuable social activity.36 Utility is a value pursuit of science and an important manifestation of scientific value, but it can never be the subject of science. 6.2.2 Spirit of Goodness and Aspiration for Beauty 6.2.2.1 Spirit of Goodness Goodness is the fundamental value trend of the future development of science and technology, and it is also the ultimate criterion for regulating human thought and behavior. The ultimate goal of scientific research and technology application is to achieve the greatest goodness. Goodness and science are integrated, which has already attracted people’s attention. For example, Bacon clearly affirmed the moral nature of the goodness of science and advocated a strict distinction between the inherent goodness of science and the possible adverse consequences of scientific use. Poincaré pointed out that science keeps us in constant contact with something greater than ourselves, and science shows us a vast and profound scene that is ever-changing. Behind the great vision that science provides us, it guides us to guess something greater. This kind of scene is a pleasure for us, and it is in this pleasure that we reach the state of selflessness, so that science is morally noble.37 However, the reality of scientific development has made difficulties for this. The development and application of science were originally used to improve human health and welfare, promote social progress and raise people’s material and cultural living standards, but it does not always bring the good and kind results as people expected, but also brings some bad consequences. During the initial period, the hasty application of scientific results had brought about undesirable consequences such as unemployment and economic instability; in modem times, the popularization and over-extensive application of technologies have brought about survival crises such as population expansion, ecological destruction and threat of war, as well as spiritual crises and belief crises such as loss of meaning and emptiness of life. It seems that human beings are devouring the evil fruits they have planted and facing unprecedented disasters. So, is science “good” or “evil”? What is “good” and what is “evil”? Optimists and pessimists give different answers to the above questions. In the eyes of optimists, science and technology are neutral, and the harm caused by

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 215 science and its technology application is actually attributed to humans. The development and progress of science and technology will finally solve these problems faced by mankind. In contrast, pessimists doubt and deny the positive role of science and technology, believing that people are already under the control of technology, and the development of science and technology will inevitably bring greater disasters to mankind. Fundamentally speaking, the consequences of science and technology will ultimately depend on the people who use science. After all, science and technology is merely an instrument or means, and cannot independently determine the future of mankind. Rabelais once said “science without conscience is only the ruin of the soul,” meaning that science can hardly develop healthily without moral restraint and good guidance. According to Einstein, “science is a powerful instrument. How it is used, whether it is a blessing or a curse to mankind, depends on mankind and not on the instrument. A knife is useful, but it can also kill.”38 Therefore, human beings should have a moral consciousness to reflect on scientific and technological activities from ethical and moral perspectives. The development of science and technology should pay more attention to people themselves, that is, humanization is the inevitable development direction of science and technology in the future. For example, in relation to contradictions and conflicts between technology application and traditional morality, moral considerations are consciously placed above science and technology itself. Treat the ecological environment problems caused by technology application from the perspective of human survival and development, so that science and technology will develop in a good direction. Although science cannot create morality on its own, nor can it directly weaken or eliminate traditional morality on its own, it can work through certain mechanisms.39 Whether it is the general public, government stakeholders or individual scientists, the spirit of goodwill should be the fundamental consideration for participating in or conducting scientific and technological activities. When science and technology are more closely linked with national politics, the moral conscience of scientists and their sense of social responsibility are even more important for the realization of the spirit of goodness. As the subject of scientific activities, scientists must have a strong sense of social responsibility in addition to the professional ethics necessary to be a scientist. They should always keep in mind and consciously assume their social ethical responsibilities, and seriously consider the possible social consequences of the direction and speed of the scientific research they are going to conduct, so as to ensure that science will benefit the welfare of mankind and the progress of society, which is the requirement of the scientific spirit of goodness on the basic qualities of scientists. A scientist with moral responsibility is responsible not only to himself and the individuals related to him but also to those unrelated people, future generations and the safety of the entire planet.40 Although there will be obstacles in the pursuit of goodness, in any case, goodness is the ultimate goal of the development of science and technology, and therefore should be the highest criterion and the highest moral law of all scientific and technological activities.

216

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

6.2.2.2 Aspiration for Beauty Beauty is the eternal pursuit of mankind. It contains at least two levels of concepts: the first is the direct beauty of things in their external perceptual form, and the second is the rational beauty of things due to the harmony and order of their internal structure. There is no lack of beauty in science. But the true scientific beauty is not the beauty that impresses our senses, nor the beauty of texture and beauty, but a pursuit of the meaning of the harmony of the universe and the kind of more profound beauty. This beauty, which lies in the harmonious order of the parts, can be grasped by pure reason. It is this kind of beauty that makes the object or the structure have a rainbow-like appearance that satisfies our senses. Without this support, the beauty of these fleeting dreams is imperfect because it is vague and always short-lived. On the contrary, the beauty of reason can fully achieve itself. The reason why scientists devote themselves to long-term and arduous labor may be more for this reason than for the future welfare of mankind.41 In history, the Pythagorean school, based on the belief in the harmony and perfection of numbers, was the first to put forward the genius guess that the earth is spherical. Copernicus, firmly believing in the harmonious beauty of nature, created the heliocentric theory to replace the geocentric theory. At present, the aspiration for beauty has become a major value orientation of scientific development, and the yearning for the simplicity and harmony of scientific theories is becoming more and more obvious. In modern science, simplicity, harmony and unity have become important basic principles for establishing and evaluating scientific theories. Among them, simplicity means that scientific theories should use as few formulas as possible to reveal relatively rich contents; harmony means that scientific theories should use a harmonious system to reveal the content of harmony in the natural world; unity refers to the use of more universally applicable theorems and laws to reveal the common nature of things in nature and to reveal the unity of nature. It is the pursuit of simplicity, harmony and unity of scientific theories that encourage scientists to continuously improve and develop scientific theories, thereby promoting the continuous development of science. In the field of scientific research, the pursuit of beauty is often the starting point and motivation for scientists to conduct research. In the history of science, all scientists who have achieved great achievements attach great importance to the pursuit of beauty in science. It is the ardent love of nature, which stands for simplicity, harmony and unity, that inspires scientists’ passion and motivation for exploration. For Galileo, the task of scientists is to discover the reasonable order and harmony of nature, that is, to discover beauty. Mrs. Curie said that she can find the most beautiful pleasure in scientific work. According to Poincaré, a scientist studies nature not because it is useful, but because he likes it, and he likes it because it is beautiful. If nature is not beautiful, it is not worth knowing; if it is not worth knowing, life is meaningless. It is just because simplicity is beautiful, and spectacularity is also beautiful, we would rather seek simple facts, and spectacular

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 217 facts. We are happy to follow the spectacular route of the planet; we are happy to observe extremely tiny things with a microscope, which is also a kind of spectacularity; we are happy to find the relics of the past geological era, as it is attractive because of its age. The desire for beauty also leads us to make the same choice.42 Furthermore, the pursuit of beauty also provides motivation and a source for the enhancement of scientific creativity. On the one hand, artistic imagery thinking is complementary to scientific logical thinking; on the other hand, specific unreasonable ways of thinking, such as imagination, intuition and insight, often inspire new thinking, new theories and new opinions. Mathematics can be said to be the best embodiment of the aspiration for beauty in science. As the language of science, mathematics has been regarded as a representative of beauty and harmony in science since the Pythagorean school of ancient Greece. According to Russell, mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses not only truth, but supreme beauty – a beauty cold and austere, like that of sculpture, without appeal to any part of our weaker nature, without the gorgeous trappings of painting or music, yet sublimely pure, and capable of a stern perfection such as only the greatest art can show.43 The trend toward beauty in science well reflects the unity of science and art. 6.2.3 Becoming a Harmonious Unity 6.2.3.1 Becoming Sacred: a State of Detachment “Sacredness” means a kind of holiness, transcendence and ultimateness. The “sacredness” of science is a noble and sacred emotion in scientific activities. It is an increasingly prominent value pursuit of science in modern society, and it embodies people’s attention to the ultimate meaning and ultimate care of life. Science is a sacred cause, and it is inherently sacred. Science continues to grow in confrontation with the secular. Its greatest weapon is the scientists’ firm belief in the knowability of the world, as well as their unwavering devotion and faith in their own research results. The reason why Copernicus, Galileo and other great scientists are still respected today is, to a large extent, due to their firmness and piety in their pursuit of science as the sacred truth. Almost every great achievement in the history of science has made researchers fall into a state of ecstasy with joy and piety. Modern science seems to call for a certain religious dedication from the very beginning and to preach a certain lofty ideal and sacredness in the pursuit of scientific truth. Traditionally, we always associate emotions such as “sacredness,” “transcendence” and “ultimacy” with religion and even ascribe all of them to religion, and thus believe that science is insulated from these surreal emotions. However, with the great power of “cosmic religious feeling,” scientists have provided reliable support for science to become sacred. In fact, science and religion are not always

218

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

in conflict as we intuitively feel; they are at least consistent in providing people with spiritual needs and emotional satisfaction. Therefore, for most people, making a choice between science and religion is not to believe in either of them, but to believe in one of the religions.44 Scientific inquiry activities are often dashed with religious and holy emotions, including humility, respect, mystery, surprise and awe, which can be summed up as a “cosmic religious feeling.” Throughout its course of development, science always obtains the strongest and noblest motivation for scientific research from its yearning for the mysteries of the universe and the awe of its magical laws, as well as from the religious fanatical pursuit of natural mysteries. Einstein said that a knowledge of the existence of something we cannot penetrate, our perceptions of the profoundest reason and the most radiant beauty, which only in their most primitive forms are accessible to our minds: it is this knowledge and this emotion that constitute true religiosity. In this sense, and only this sense, I am a deeply religious man…I am satisfied with the mystery of life’s eternity and with a knowledge, a sense, of the marvelous structure of existence – as well as the humble attempt to understand even a tiny portion of the Reason that manifests itself in nature. The further the spiritual evolution of mankind advances, the more certain it seems to me that the path to genuine religiosity does not lie through the fear of life, and the fear of death, and blind faith, but through striving after rational knowledge.45 This “cosmic religious feeling” that is common among scientists is actually the metaphysical pursuit or ultimate concern of scientists. It provides value support for the life of scientists, thereby indirectly providing a value foundation for their scientific activities. Just like Einstein has said, “it seems to me that science not only purifies the religious impulse of the dross of its anthropomorphism but also contributes to a religious spiritualization of our understanding of life.” From this point of view, the most exciting creations in science often stem from religious trust in the essence of real reason.46 And the development of science has been strengthening this trust continuously. In the history of science, the development driving force of modern science in its embryonic and gestation periods mainly comes from the pursuit of transcendence and ideality, rather than practical needs.47 Today, the rapid development of science and its widespread application are changing society and bringing convenience to people’s lives, but it makes humanity get lost and makes people become more anxious. This not only reflects the limits and deficiencies of science, but also forces science to pay more attention to the ultimate value of life meaning, life care and other issues, thus strengthening the trend of “becoming sacred” in science. Therefore, although science is not perfect, it does not give up the pursuit of being perfect. Although it is based on reality, it is not limited to considerations of reality but transcends the needs of reality and pursues the ultimate care of people. It pays attention to reality but does not ignore the pursuit of ultimate meaning.

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 219 As for the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty in science, its ultimate state is to achieve the state of religious “sacredness.” This religious realm is not any religious superstition about God or gods, but the highest requirement for people themselves or the conversion of religion to people. Therefore, “sacredness” is the highest “completeness.” It combines truth, goodness, beauty and other value pursuits and transcends the secular world toward an idealized sacred world, that is, a world of religious significance. 6.2.3.2 Toward the Harmony and Unity of Truth, Goodness, Beauty and Sacredness Truth, goodness and beauty are a harmonious unity with internal connections and a concentrated expression of scientific value. As the different levels of the pursuit of scientific value, truth, goodness, beauty and sacredness embody the consistency of the cognitive value, moral value, aesthetic value and belief value of science, and also embody the unity of the specific manifestations of scientific spirit at different levels. The truth-seeking purpose, which has established the knowledge nature of science as a way of human cognition, has cognitive value. The spirit of goodness, which provides science with moral prescriptiveness and ensures that science develops in a good direction, has moral value. The aspiration for beauty, which enhances scientific creativity and promotes the harmony and perfection of scientific theories in form, has aesthetic value. The trend toward sacredness endows science with a sanctified image and allows science to go further on the road of transcendence. Science is first of all seeking truth. Truthfulness is the most fundamental stipulation of science itself, and it is also the primary basic value of science. The grasp of truth enables people to gain greater freedom of behavior, so they can control their behavior more consciously, make scientific activities more in line with people’s needs and achieve the ultimate goodness. At the same time, there is no shortage of longing for beauty in the process of seeking truth, scientific theories always contain elements of beauty. The ideas of simplicity and harmony often guide scientific exploration. It can be said that truth is the prerequisite and starting point for goodness and beauty, and it provides a basis for realizing goodness and beauty in science. Goodness is the value judgment of science and technology. Science is ultimately to lead to goodness, and the purpose of seeking truth is to achieve the greatest degree of goodness, and goodness can be best guaranteed only on the basis of truth. At the same time, good things are usually beautiful, the observance of the principle of beauty in science is also in a sense for the purpose of achieving goodness. Therefore, it can be said that goodness is the purpose of truth and beauty, and it is embodied through truth and beauty. Beauty, as the spiritual realm that science must reach, has a very close interaction with truth and goodness. Beauty not only takes truth as the prerequisite, and embodies the regularity of the development of nature and society, but also takes goodness as the prerequisite, since beauty is a creation that follows human goals.

220

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

In turn, the pursuit of beauty can advance the discovery of truth. A theory put forward by a scientist with extraordinary aesthetic intuition can prove to be true even if it seems wrong at first.48 Sacredness is the sublimation and unity of truth, goodness and beauty. It is the spiritual and emotional sublimation of human beings on the basis of seeking the truth of science, the goodness of ethics and the beauty of art. The orientation of sacredness is embodied in the following aspects: in truth-seeking activities, scientists deeply appreciate the harmony and order of the universe and nature; through the pursuit of goodness in scientific activities, scientists have experienced their own meaning in life and a sense of fulfillment in the process of caring for and recognizing the meaning of life; the pursuit of beauty in science can purify one’s soul and emotions, thereby obtaining peace of mind and tranquility of the soul, as well as a kind of detached feeling. It is in the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty that science is gradually approaching a noble state of sacredness. The harmony and unity of truth, goodness and beauty are embodied in the inherent unity of multiple value orientations in scientific activities, and it also shows that the value goals of different levels to be achieved in the process of scientific exploration are consistent. The harmonious unity of truth, goodness and beauty is the unity of scientific spirit and humanistic spirit, scientific culture and humanistic culture, and an ideal state necessary for science to fully exert its cultural functions. Strictly speaking, truth, goodness, beauty and sacredness, just like utility, are only a manifestation of a value pursuit of science. In the period of modern science, originating from the two historical roots of science – technical tradition and spiritual tradition49 – the basic value pursuit of science included both truth and utility. However, the power and solace of true science lies in the hopeful and responsible exercise of the ability to realize and occasionally satisfy curiosity, and also lies in the service that science may provide to the soul.50 Historical experiences also show that if the utilitarian pursuit is overemphasized in scientific activities, the pursuit of goodness, beauty and sacredness may be ignored, which will have an adverse impact on the development of science. Regarding the current development of science and technology, there are various phenomena that go against the original intention of scientific research and technological application, which is largely attributed to this biased value pursuit. The excessive publicity of instrumental reason caused by utilitarianism has caused the alienation of human beings and the dehumanization of science and technology, making science deviate from its positive connotations as a culture. Therefore, to avoid the inhuman and non-cultural tendency in science from the point of view of value pursuit, it is to move from the pure pursuit of truth and effect to the harmonious unity of the plural values of truth, goodness and beauty.

6.3 Build a Free and Open World of Science and Technology Now that traditional science and technology encounter difficulties and blows, how to build a free and open world of science and technology to maintain the cultural

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 221 connotation of science and technology and safeguard their autonomy and openness is an important issue that must be paid attention to by the current scientific community. 6.3.1 Autonomy of Science and Free Science Autonomy is increasingly valued with the acquisition of the independent status of science, and it has become an important feature of science. In other words, the autonomy of science is a dynamic characteristic acquired in the process of continuous growth. The so-called autonomy of science, from the point of view of system theory, is mainly a kind of autonomy and independence. In the course of the development of science, modern science promotes itself: new discoveries answer some questions and raise some further questions, and also challenge the accepted answers to some old questions, which seems like an endless sequence.51 It is in this infinite sequence of evolution that science gradually develops, matures and grows into an independent and autonomous self-organizing dynamic evolutionary system. Therefore, it can be said that science is essentially a continuous process of selfrenewal. This is reflected in the fact that in modern society, science (as a whole) seems to have a trend, that is, under the influence of its own internal functions, science builds itself into a huge system composed of interacting subsystems, and develops in the direction of becoming more complex, more integrated and more autonomous.52 Of course, this autonomy of science does not mean that it will not be affected by other factors in society. Barber said that although all social influences determine the evolution of science, it always maintains a certain range of independence because the highly generalized conceptual framework of the internal development of science largely determines its independent development. Moreover, the more developed the conceptual framework at the core of science, the greater the scope of independence of science.53 The understanding of scientific autonomy is more focused on the independence associated with freedom. This kind of autonomy emphasizes the independence of science in its relations with social politics, economics and other aspects. Specifically, it is the independent status of science from the domination of other cultural ideologies in society and the freedom of scientific research activities. From this perspective, Merton pointed out that for science, the core of autonomy is embodied in the pursuit of basic research by scientists: to fulfill a complete personal purpose for a new understanding of the unity of nature and society, scientists play a social role in choosing their own research subjects and conducting research according to their own preferences; take the expansion of basic knowledge as the cultural result that overrides all purposes. Many scientists may think that basic research is more valuable than applied research, this is not because of its ability to expand basic knowledge, but because it can embody the unique requirements for scientific autonomy. Any policy concerning the relationship between science and other social systems, if this requirement for autonomy cannot be considered, will

222 Reconstruction of Cultural Science fail itself.54 Maurice Richter, Jr. demonstrated the autonomy of science through the analysis of science system and science policy: autonomy can be defined as certain conditions of a unit that is part of a larger system; this is a condition of freedom, but this freedom is limited by the requirements that need to be met due to participation in any relevant system. So what autonomy requires is not the kind of freedom that comes from self-sufficiency, but the kind of freedom expressed in a relatively favorable situation within the exchange mode between various specialized and interdependent factors. The autonomy of science shows that the various relationships between science and other parts of society allow the direction of science to develop without being completely controlled by these other components.55 From this point of view, the autonomy of science is the independence shown in the relationship between science and other aspects of society. This kind of autonomy is innate and is an inherent characteristic determined by the truth-seeking nature of science. Based on the autonomy of science, academic freedom, as the basic spirit and principle of scientific activities, has been valued and highlighted. At the epistemological level, scientists are allowed and encouraged to freely choose their own research subjects, and “science has no forbidden zone” is an important concept in scientific activities. It is generally believed that scientific research is free and the boundaries of scientific exploration are endless. Only by surpassing the limits of research fields and breaking through the shackles of thinking can we promote the growth of science. At the political level, especially in the “autonomy-for-prosperity” model, scientific freedom is even more valued. As Vannevar Bush pointed out, the advancement of science on the broad front comes from the unconstrained activities of free scholars; they are constantly researching topics of their own choice in a way dominated by curiosity to explore the unknown. Freedom to explore must be protected under any government funding scheme for science.56 Einstein distinguished this freedom into “external freedom” and “inner freedom.” The so-called external freedom must first be guaranteed by the law, and at the same time, a spirit of tolerance (respect the beliefs of others whatever they may have) must be promoted among all people in order to guarantee freedom of speech. Inner freedom means that people should not work to obtain the necessities of life to the extent that they have neither time nor energy to engage in personal activities. Therefore, science is free; as long as the answer to the question is demonstrative and is obtained in accordance with a certain systematic method, then the questioning of the cause, the explanation of the phenomenon and the solution to the problem should not be subject to any restriction or damage.57 The autonomy of science is not absolute, because science is not an isolated practice, but in the interaction with all other factors of social life.58 The results of scientific activities will inevitably have an impact on other aspects of society. Especially since entering the 20th century, the expansion of socialization of production and the advent of the era of great science have not only intensified the social impact of science and technology but also made scientific activities increasingly require social support in terms of funds and policies. Science only has truthful knowledge that can be exchanged with honor, and it has no major

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 223 financial and material sources to support scientific activities. So, the autonomy of science is relative rather than absolute. Science has never been and cannot be absolutely free from the certain control of other factors in society (including political factors). The freedom of science is a matter of degree and a particular form of self-control.59 In this way, it is necessary to consider a problem opposite to scientific autonomy and scientific freedom – scientific social control – but the relationship between the limits of scientific freedom and social interference is not to be discussed here. Today, when we talk about the science of freedom, we are not only talking about political freedom and ideological freedom but the scientific reason which is the basis of political freedom and ideological freedom.60 Similarly, free science not only refers to the freedom of thought and academics stipulated by the autonomy of science but also means that the development of science should enable people to obtain greater freedom and promote the all-around development of human beings. Science is a human activity and public undertaking that integrates the pursuit of multiple values such as truth, goodness, beauty and sacredness. Therefore, free science should also be characterized by these values and its ultimate goals, or be conducive to the realization of these goals. The science of freedom is based on responsibility. This kind of freedom is depicted by Schurman as “freedom in responsibility.” In his view, freedom is in responsibility, and human beings have the mission of freedom; freedom is to get rid of any kind of autonomy but to freely perform the service God calls the believers of Jesus Christ to do. In other words, freedom is to get rid of all the decisive fetters of any component of the existence of reality and to get rid of these fetters through faith.61 Therefore, free science should give full play to the inherent moral function of science and arouse the inherent social responsibility of scientists. Free science is also characterized by the stimulation of creativity in science. The same freedom that allows artists to follow their own creative inclinations and personal preferences must be extended to scientists, of course; the strict and basically non-authoritative discipline of the scientific method must also be obeyed because the experience of discovering all kinds of things, identifying all kinds of reasons and grasping all kinds of relationships and meanings is just as exciting as the experience in other kinds of aesthetics, and it is also intrinsically worthy of yearning.62 Therefore, it is also necessary for free science to fully demonstrate and give play to the inherent aesthetic characteristics of science and arouse the creative passion of scientists. Free science will eventually return to humans, with the goal of human freedom and comprehensive development. Freedom is the recognition of inevitability and thus governs our behavior. No matter how science develops, it should be humanized science for man, not for things. Free science, therefore, must fully embody humanistic care and ultimate pursuit in terms of meaning, thereby promoting the free and comprehensive development of human beings. The autonomy of science determines the freedom of exploration in the scientific truth-seeking process. The humanistic nature of science stimulates the pursuit of truth while restoring and exerting its moral, aesthetic and meaningful functions.

224

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

Free science, in its ultimate direction, is a science that conforms to the all-a round development of man. 6.3.2 Shape Cultural Science and Technology Characterized by Integration Science and technology are a kind of human culture, and there is no doubt about this. As a kind of culture, science and technology must have their unique cultural connotations, making them the mainstream culture in modern social life. First, as a cultural existence in a given form, science and technology include both scientific and technological knowledge and artifacts, as well as scientific spirit and methods. Second, science and technology culture, as a unique way of dealing with the relationship between man and nature, has material utilitarianism, or its core value is material utilitarianism; as an ideological culture, scientific knowledge uses external facts as a measure of its own correctness, and it has the characteristics of empiricism, logic and formality, and value neutrality. Third, science and technology culture also have characteristics of stability. From a cultural perspective, it is the sum of all material and spiritual civilizations created by mankind, and it has the characteristics of integrity, process, history, carrier and humanity.63 Therefore, to shape science and technology into a culture is to shape and enhance the cultural connotation of science and technology, that is, to make science and technology more culturally integrated and historical, and more importantly, to shape humanized science and technology. At present, the non-cultural phenomena of scientific chauvinism and hegemonism, and dehumanizing consequences that have emerged in the development of science and technology are largely derived from extreme positions, narrow views and paranoid attitudes on scientific and technological issues. It is precisely because of the one-sided emphasis on the scientific spirit, instrumental reason and Western cultural traditions in science and technology, or the paranoid criticism of the opposite attitude, that has caused the gap between science and humanities, values and traditions, hence leading to the loss of science and technology in culture, and to some extent they become uncultured. Restoring the cultural connotation of science and technology has therefore become an urgent problem before us, requiring us to shape the cultural characteristics of science and technology through transcendence and integration. To shape the cultural nature of science and technology, we must first transcend the opposition between science and technology and humanities and realize cultured science and technology in the integration of science and technology culture and humanistic culture, scientific spirit and humanistic spirit. Science and technology and humanities are the most important cultural achievements in human culture. In the Renaissance period and previous years, the two intersected and complemented each other, and jointly promoted the development of human civilization. However, since the 19th century, the utilitarian orientation and increasingly obvious technological tendency in scientific development have reinforced the notion of scientism that science and technology can solve

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 225 all problems, the resulting cultural hegemony of science has gradually deviated from its humane and reasonable tradition, with instrumental reason gradually surpassing and replacing the status of value reason. At the same time, the irrational tendency that emerged since the Renaissance, especially the Enlightenment, has developed into a kind of irrationalism under the impact of intuitionism and voluntarism in the 19th century; humanism thus gradually deviated from the track of reason, while the division and confrontation between science and technology and humanities have thus formed. As a result, on the one hand, the differentiation between natural science and humanities and social science has increased, and natural science dominates and obliterates the existence of humanities and social science. On the one hand, science and its technology application have unconsciously abandoned the pursuit and persistence of the highest value and stayed away from humanistic care. This not only leads to the cultural crisis and meaning crisis caused by the loss of culture and humanity in science and technology but also makes the development of science and technology face an existential crisis under the domination of dehumanization. In fact, science and technology culture is the sum of the intelligence, abilities and products that people obtain in the process of understanding and transforming the world, including the scientific spirit, ethics, systems, activities, methods and other aspects recognized by the scientific community, which are collectively expressed as the scientific spirit. Humanistic culture is an examination of knowledge, human beings, nature, society and the world and their interrelationships, and is embodied in the humanistic spirit. These two kinds of spirits, which are formed in the long process of understanding and transforming nature by human beings, are historical and socially normative, and regard the pursuit of truth, goodness and beauty as the highest value criterion, so they are fundamentally consistent. Moreover, the scientific spirit itself is a humanistic spirit. Therefore, to develop cultured science and technology, we must first transcend the opposition between science and technology and humanities and realize the integration of scientific spirit and humanistic spirit and the complementarity of instrumental reason and value reason. Only in this way can the rich cultural connotation of science and technology be fully embodied and guaranteed. Second, it is necessary to transcend the shackles of different cultural traditions and ideologies and create a scientific and technological world full of cultural connotations in heterogeneous cultural soil. The cultural characteristics of science and technology are inseparable from their ancient cultural traditions. As a modern culture that grew up on the basis of ancient Greek cultural traditions and has been baptized by Christian traditions, science is full of factors of reason and belief in Western culture; many people even equate modernization with Westernization. However, when science grows and expands to other non-European societies, the indigenous cultural traditions are bound to interact with Western scientific traditions and affect the development of science and technology in the country. In his cultural analysis of science, Richter Jr. once said that science is ancient; it has made brilliant achievements in ancient times and realized sustainable development for more than three centuries in its modern form. However, science, as a

226 Reconstruction of Cultural Science massively funded, large-scale undertaking, is also extremely new. The scientific cultural background is a unique Western culture, but the scientific content is universal, and it transcends the boundaries of culture.64 Therefore, we cannot confine science to a single basic civilization – Western civilization – but develop science and technology based on the integration of various cultures. A cultured science and technology are so inclusive that they transcend different cultural traditions and fully absorb reasonable ingredients. Moreover, cultured science and technology should also have the right to freely develop without being restricted and controlled by any ideology. Science is formed on the premise of abandoning the ideological framework. Science can become a free science in the inevitability of history only when it is constantly freed from the ideologies that watch, attack and entangle it.65 When it is completely swayed by ideologies, it is likely to betray people’s good wishes. The Lysenko incident, the most painful lesson in the scientific history of the Soviet Union, is a typical example showing the consequence of ideology-controlled science. Finally, it is necessary to transcend the boundaries of nations and countries and to shape cultured science and technology from a global perspective. Science is a universal cause of mankind, that is, it is an activity with impersonal characteristics. Although scientific knowledge has local characteristics, this does not affect the supranational character of science in the least, since it is an undertaking for mankind on the whole. If we overemphasize the local characteristics of science (for example, postmodernists believe that science is attached to traditional regional culture, there is no super-cultural universal science and all regional sciences are equal; feminists believe that modern Western science is just for the white race of male supremacy), we may become narrow-minded, which is neither conducive to reflecting on the unreasonable viewpoints in science nor to the development of science. In fact, science has been a cultural form with super-state and super-national characteristics since its inception. In this regard, Bernal once explained that even in an extremely primitive age, people who love science are willing to learn from other tribes or ethnic groups. In this sense, science can be said to have an international character from the very beginning. The wide spread of cultures throughout history shows how powerful this instrument of cultural linkage is. Afterward, when natural obstacles separate various civilizations or when religious or ethnic hatred splits the civilized world into hostile camps, scientists and businessmen will compete to break these obstacles. The main force of modern science shifted from Babylonians to Greeks, then to Arabs, and finally to Franks. This history shows how powerful scientists have broken various natural barriers.66 Since entering the era of great science, this requirement and performance of transcending the boundaries of states and nations have become more prominent. At present, science is often confronted with large problems of global nature and international scale beyond the scope of a country. For the long-term development of mankind, scientists from different disciplines and different cultural backgrounds must transcend state and national boundaries, and work together to deal with and resolve international issues.

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 227 The development of science and technology requires a worldwide vision and the mind of all mankind. Today, science and technology based solely on utilitarian considerations or confined to narrow national interests have caused a global crisis and brought disasters to mankind. If the whole world does not get mobilized and put global issues on their agenda, then nothing will change. Only global strategy can solve the global problem of human survival; local strategy will not play any role.67 Only in a situation of transcendence and integration can the cultural characteristics of science and technology be fully nurtured and maintained. 6.3.3 Vision of Cultural Science and Technology Cultured science and technology mean science and technology with cultural connotations. The return of cultured science and technology is to restore the cultural nature and cultural connotations of science and technology. Science and technology, in terms of their status and role in the development of human society, are a form of culture full of cultural connotations. To a large extent, it can be said that science is essentially a cultural existence. Science and technology, since their inception, are not something only with material and practical functions but have rich cultural, ethical and social implications. They not only promote the development of social, political, economic and other material aspects as the primary productive force, but also stand for the highest achievement of human culture and the highest level of human intellectual creation. By the 17th century, science and technology had occupied a central position in Western culture. It can be said that the cultural nature of science and technology lies in not only the knowledge and logic in scientific inquiry, but also the culture that it depends on; it not only focuses on the exertion of human spirit and thinking ability, but also pays attention to the real life of human beings; it contains not only reasonable elements, but also a great part of human nature and creativity. For a long time after the emergence of science and technology, these rich cultural and spiritual connotations have been accompanied by the practical activities of science and technology, and have promoted greater spiritual and material success of science and technology. However, as being gradually secularized and socialized, science has become increasingly indulged in the material glory created by the mechanical view of nature. Therefore, science has become the only superior knowledge system in the field of social culture, and it has been tested by the external world. The knowledge of philosophy, religion, literature, poetry, drama and historical science inherited from human cultural traditions gradually loses the qualifications of knowledge, which leads to the discourse hegemony of scientific knowledge. The establishment and consolidation of the hegemony have reduced science into something cold without cultural dimension and the pursuit of value and meaning. It has proven scientific theory, but at the same time distorted people’s mentality because it is out of touch with the life world related to history and traditional culture. At the same time, the application of scientific theory is the application of technological reason, which has led to the constant development

228

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

of technological reason in modern society, and the shrinking of humanistic spirit and value reason.68 This gave rise to The Crisis of the European Sciences, which is Husserl’s last and most influential book, and science therefore lost the meaning of life. This concealment and retreat of the cultural nature of science and technology mainly stem from the over-emphasis of its practicality and utilitarian tendencies, as well as the neglect of its humanistic dimension. Therefore, the return of cultured science and technology, that is, the traceback of science and technology to their cultural roots, first of all is to realize the return of science and technology to humanity on the basis of scientific and cultural criticism. The return of cultured science and technology to humanity, including the return to humanistic spirit and value and to human nature. Specifically, the first is the return of science and technology to human nature: create and develop science and technology for the needs of people’s survival and development, so as to make science and technology truly for people. The second refers to the return of science and technology to tradition: science and technology should take into account technological and spiritual traditions that exist in their own development, learn and borrow from other non-scientific and cultural traditions. The third is the return of science and technology to the reality of the life world. Science and technology must not only return to the world of daily life, which is the basis of the meaning of natural science, but also return to the world of human spirit/meaning and restore human’s comprehensive and complete nature. Furthermore, the return of science and technology to humanity means their return to the original humanistic nature, and it also means that the development of science and technology is to meet people’s needs and promote their all-around development as the ultimate direction and highest criterion. In addition, a critical proclaim rises that the cultured science and technology also need to return to nature. The loss of cultural nature and the loss of meaning in science, to a certain extent, also originate from the cognitive method established by the mechanistic view of nature in modern times and its disenchantment of nature, which leads to the loss of its true meaning. It is for this reason that constructive postmodern thinkers advocate that the original state of nature and science should be returned to, that is, to “re-enchant” the “disenchanted” science. At the same time, concepts such as the divine reality, the meaning of the universe and the enchanting nature are re-accepted by people, the world’s experience, purpose, freedom, ideals, possibilities, creativity and temporality are all restored and the intrinsic value of everything is recognized and realized. In this field of vision, the universe is charming and full of intentions. Rocks, trees, rivers and clouds are all magical and vital. All creations are part of a huge chain of creatures, and man is between angels and lower animals. The explanation of all activities is due to the will of God and the role of the activity itself in a meaningful world. The universe is a place of belonging, giving people the feeling of going home, and the universe gives meaning to life.69 It can be said that returning to the primitive nature and the perfect natural state of human nature is a banner raised with the criticism of science and culture.70

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 229 What is the future development of science and technology that have returned to their cultural nature? Different people have different opinions on this. With the end of the Cold War, the era of great science is also coming to an end. Today’s scientist may prove to be an adventurous capitalist, a patent holder, a developer or a businessman. Science has now become a kind of high technology. It can be said that eternal science has truly returned to the situation of the early modern period and to the Baconian program, and science eventually becomes a direct productivity.71 Susan Haack believes that we can’t judge how science will change in the future, but one thing is certain, that is, science is unfinished until it ends. In any case, continuous development and progress will be the most basic trend of science and technology in the future. Based on the comprehensive consideration of the characteristics of the times and the development history of science and technology, it is certain that science and technology in the future is first of all an open system. Karl Popper said that “open to criticism” was once emphasized as an important feature of scientific development and progress, and this principle is still valid to date. As Agassi once pointed out, it is possible to allow reason and experience to engage in dialogue as Popper suggested and to declare that all ideas are open to this dialectic, and dialogue between metaphysical theory and scientific theory is equally possible. Furthermore, science need not fear metaphysics; science’s hatred of any adversary is deplorable and about to pay a high price. Science must treat all selected systems as friendly as possible.72 Therefore, in the future, science and technology should enjoy the same rights of survival and development as non-scientific cultural forms such as religion, literature and art. In addition to maintaining its own internal openness, science and various other cultures can engage in dialogue and debate with each other and achieve progress and development through open criticism. How do we achieve such openness? Steve Fuller proposed to adopt a fair and democratic procedure and method to promote the development of science and technology in an open world. He pointed out that in order to realize the republican ideal of an open society in the great science era, such a forum must be provided so that all professional knowledge makers can participate in determining the development direction of their field, and the general public can influence this process in a way commensurate with their own interests.73 In today’s scientific and technological practice, such a method is already employed. For example, in the process of formulating science and technology policies, science forums and public hearings are often used to democratize science and technology. In such an era where multiple cultures coexist, diversity will also become an important trend in the future development of science and technology. Science and technology originate from Western culture and then absorb the fine characteristics of non-Western cultural traditions during their growth and development, so they are themselves a collection of multiculturalism. In addition, science and technology should coexist peacefully with other non-scientific cultural traditions in the future, and actively learn from them. This is because science and technology are not closed; they can flourish only when the culture – their cultural

230

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

background – constantly comes up with new hypotheses and goals. This in turn shows that, as culture-based activities, science and technology are no different from humanities. Like the humanities, the value of science and technology exists in the culture that gave birth to them. Therefore, in order to expand the limited reserve of human wisdom, we must pay close attention to the learning of humanities knowledge while mastering scientific and technological knowledge.74 Furthermore, this diversity is embodied in the inclusiveness and harmony of science. In terms of inclusiveness, there are obvious differences between science and technology and other cultural forms in terms of values and operating norms, which has led to the confrontation and conflict between different cultural forms. In fact, the development of science and technology is inseparable from the support of other cultural forms, and it even needs their nutrition. And as far as the progress of human civilization is concerned, other cultural forms also provide irreplaceable rich nutrition. The scientific community will become more and more conscious to examine cultural issues from a higher perspective and a more tolerant attitude. Amid the interaction and integration with other cultural forms, science and technology have begun to tolerate and absorb them. Science and technology and culture began to examine each other rationally, reflect on themselves and find an open and friendly way of getting along. Meanwhile, science and technology began to abandon their strong position in the cultural field, tolerate the value orientation and limitations of different cultures and then form a new cultural pattern in which different cultural forms are mutually inclusive and restrictive and develop side by side. In addition, although scientific and technological culture plays a very important role in contemporary social life, the process of technicalization of science in different cultures is irreversible. However, science and technology culture cannot conquer the world. A strong science and technology culture will inevitably lead to cultural abnormalities, which is not conducive to free and comprehensive human development. Science and technology culture, which is becoming more and more conscious, will gradually discover its own shortcomings and effect holding back the development of other cultures. The development of different cultures is different in speed and sequence, but there is no distinction between superiority and inferiority; they all play an irreplaceable role in social life. Only when different cultural forms perform their duties, treat each other as equals and live in harmony can they develop together and move toward prosperity, thus promoting the free and comprehensive development of mankind. Science is an open knowledge system, and also a culture that constantly seeks progress and development. As the most powerful application result of science, technology is bound to present a great development. However, today’s scientific and technological culture is becoming so overbearing that it repels and replaces other cultures and their functions, which has become the main source of many contemporary social problems. Therefore, as the most outstanding culture in human history, science and technology should adopt a broad vision and a tolerant attitude to create more splendid cultural achievements in the future. At present, returning to cultural characteristics has become an important direction for the

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 231 development of science and technology: on the one hand, they move toward a conscious science and technology culture, gradually realize their own cultural limitations and the harmfulness of a strong position and begin to re-recognize their proper position in social life; on the other hand, they should overcome arrogance and narcissism, restore their cultural role and do what they are obliged to do. It thus appears that a diverse and open world of science and technology is to take shape in the future.

Notes 1 A. McGrath, Science and Religion: An Introduction. Translated by Wang Yi, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000:144. 2 R.K. Merton, The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir. Translated by Lu Xudong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003:369. 3 M. Dierkes and C. Groth, Between Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology. Translated by Tian Song et al., Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 2006:164. 4 U. Beck, Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter: Neue weltpolitische Ökonomie. Translated by Jiang Renxiang et al., Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004:250. 5 R.A. Dahl, On Democracy. Translated by Li Boguang et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:43. 6 Joss Simon and Arthur Brownlea. “Considering the Concept of Procedural Justice for Public Policy and Decision-Making in Science and Technology.” Science and Public Policy, 1999, 26(5):321–30. 7 A. Feenberg, Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Translated by Lu Jun et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003:8. 8 S. Sismondo, An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies. Translated by Xu Weimin et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007:44. 9 E. Nagel, The Structure of Science. Translated by Xu Xiangdong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002:4, 5. 10 M.W. Wartofsky, Conceptual Foundations of Science Thought – An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Beijing: Qiushi Press, 1989:85. 11 A. Koyre. “Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.” The Philosophical Review, 1943(V.52, N.4):333–48. 12 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:341. 13 P. Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:59. 14 Li Xingmin, “Knowledge, Common Sense and Scientific Knowledge.” The Northern Forum, 2008(1):123–130. 15 Humanities and social science are not completely distinguished, and the two are often collectively referred to as “human social science.” But they are sometimes simply known as “humanities.” For example, Dilthey divides all disciplines studying social and historical realities into “humanities.” 16 W.C. Dampier, History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001:248. 17 H. Rickert, Cultural Science and Natural Science. Translated by Tu Jiliang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996:14. 18 W. Dilthey, Introduction to the Human Sciences. Translated by Zhao Xifang, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2004:18.

232

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

19 Yang Yiming, “Interdiscipline Is the Best Way to Theoretical Innovation.” Jiangsu Social Sciences, 2001(1):19. 20 Zhou Guangzhao, “Encourage Interdiscipline and Promote Original Innovation – Commemorating The 50th Anniversary of The Discovery of The DNA Double Helix Structure.” Science, 2003(3):3–7. 21 Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 25). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1988:43. 22 M. Dierkes and C. Groth, Between Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology. Translated by Tian Song et al., Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 2006:16–25. 23 J. D. Bernal, Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2003:355. 24 Liu Dachun ed., Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies: From Advocacy to Reconsideration, Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009:106–7. 25 Liu Huajie ed., Readings in the Science Communication. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007:376. 26 J.A. Labinger and H. Collins, The One Culture?: A Conversation about Science. Translated by Zhang Zengyi et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006:24–25. 27 B. Barnes, About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:87– 88. 28 J. Durant. “Participatory Technology Assessment and The Democratic Model of The Public Understanding of Science.” Science and Public Policy, 1999(V.26, N.5):313– 19. 29 H. Poincaré, The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988:187. 30 K.R. Popper, Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987. 31 J. Watkins, Science and Scepticism. Translated by Qiu Renzong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:212. 32 I.B. Cohen, The Newtonian Revolution. Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999:5. 33 R.K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000:17–18. 34 Gibbons et al., The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies. London: Sage Publications, 1994:3–4. 35 R.K. Merton, Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000:286. 36 H.G. Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:287. 37 H. Poincaré, Mathematics and Science: Last Essays. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996:120–21. 38 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:56. 39 H. Poincaré, Mathematics and Science: Last Essays. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996:120. 40 H. Gardner. Ethical Responsibilities of Scientists; J. Scheppler, S. Marshall and M. Palmisano (eds.). Scientific Literacy for the 21st Century: Essays in Honor of Leon Lederman. Aurora, IL: Illinois Mathematics and Science Academy, 2003. 41 H. Poincaré, The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988:357. 42 H. Poincaré, The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988:357–58. 43 B. Russell, My Philosophical Development. Translated by Wen Xizeng, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982:193.

Reconstruction of Cultural Science 233 44 R.H. Brown, The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin, Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998:192. 45 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:186. 46 A. Einstein, The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:525, 526. 47 Chen Fangzheng, “Between Science and Religion – The Pursuit of Transcendence.” Science & Culture Review, 2005(1):1. 48 S. Chandrasekhar, “Truth and Beauty. Aesthetics and Motivations in Science.” Translated by Zhu Zhifang, Science and China Youth Technology, 2001(2):40–41. 49 S.F. Mason, A History of the Sciences. Translated by Zhou Xuliang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1980:1. 50 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:42. 51 M.N. Richter Jr., The Autonomy of Science: A Historical and Comparative Analysis. Translated by Wu Zhong et al., Beijing: Policy Research Office, 1982:8–9. 52 J. Ladriere, Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997:29, 32. 53 B. Barber, Science and The Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991:37, 38. 54 R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. Translated by Lin Juren, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2001:249. 55 M.N. Richter Jr., The Autonomy of Science: A Historical and Comparative Analysis. Translated by Wu Zhong et al., Beijing: Policy Research Office, 1982. 56 V. Bush, Science: Endless Frontier. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2004:55. 57 H. Poser, Wissenschaftstheorie: Eine philosophische Einführung. Translated by Li Wenchao, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002:245. 58 J. Ladriere, Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997:29. 59 B. Barber, Science and The Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991:85. 60 Wu Guosheng, “Let Science Return to Humanities.” Chinese Book Review Monthly, 2003(11):47–49. 61 E.M. Schurman, Technology and the Future. Translated by Li Xiaobing et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 1995:330. 62 K.S. Hook, Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. Translated by Jin Ke et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1965:279. 63 Li Deyang, “On Culture and Science and Technology Culture.” Jianghan Tribune, 1997(12):21–26. 64 M.N. Richter Jr., Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989:171. 65 L.P. Althusser, For Marx. Translated by Gu Liang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984:143. 66 J. D. Bernal, Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2003:226. 67 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:72. 68 Gong Qun, Life and Practical Rationality: The Ethical Dimension of Hermeneutics. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2004:150. 69 D.R. Griffin, The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004:163. 70 Jin Zhengyao, “Science as a Culture and the Future of Mankind.” Studies in Science of Science, 1987(3):30.

234

Reconstruction of Cultural Science

71 U. Segerstrale, Beyond the Science Wars: The Missing Discourse about Science and Society. Translated by Huang Ying et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:144–45. 72 J. Agassi, Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006:19. 73 S. Fuller, Governance of Science: Ideology and the Future of the Open Society. Translated by Liu Dun, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006:141. 74 E.E. David, “The Future of Science.” Science Initiation, 2003(9):1.

Postscript

This book is the result of “Research on Marxist and Contemporary Views of Science and Technology,” a key project sponsored by the National Social Science Fund of China and approved in March 2008 (project number: 08AZX003). I was designated as the responsible person for this project and worked with Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili, who joined the project team successively. This research project was launched when there were debates on how we should correctly look at science and technology. In China’s academic circle, the mainstream trend in the 1980s was promoting science and technology, or defending science in the terminology of philosophy of science. However, by the end of the 1990s, rebellious voices began to be heard. With the impact of environmental pollution and spiritual crisis, people were questioning the role of science and technology, or they were criticizing science in the terminology of philosophy of science. After China walked out of the shadow of the Cultural Revolution and embarked on the path of reform and opening up in 1978, modernization, going global and looking into the future have become major trends, and respecting knowledge and talents has become the consensus of the Chinese people on the whole. Correspondingly, promoting or defending science was made a top priority. To be honest, what we were doing at that time, including writing treatises, was playing our part to defend science. However, various problems keep cropping up while our modernization drive makes great achievements: environmental pollution and ecological crisis have become the main threats to mankind; the eagerness for quick success and money worship bother people’s minds; fairness, righteousness and internal peace have become the primary appeal of the public. What’s worse, such ideas as anti-modernism and postmodernism have been spreading all over the world. These changes in both practice and theory have triggered people’s reflections, e.g., reconsideration of science and technology. Criticism of science sometimes shows up in a fierce anti-scientism posture, and the most extreme argument attributes all bad things to science and technology. Is this still true this time?

236 Postscript The consequence is that we are faced with the so-called “science war.” How about the future of contemporary science and technology? Now it is a question that must be studied and answered. In terms of our discussions, one of the most useful paths is to revisit the theoretical legacy of Karl Marx. He did not leave systematic treaties on science and technology, but he has left us a complete view of science and technology. The process of consulting a large number of works by Marx, which seems boring and painstaking, has unexpectedly brought us endless fun because almost all the problems that are perplexing us at the moment had already emerged, although not in the same forms, in the time of Marx, and this great philosopher had taken notice of them, analyzed and responded to them. His positioning of science and technology is concrete, historical, developmental, realistic and critical. He has brought forth some basic views of science and technology: science and technology is the primary productive force; alienation of science and technology is the product of the contradictions of capitalism; and development of science and technology is a necessary prerequisite for human freedom and liberation, which are guidelines that must be followed to instruct the contemporary study on the theory of science and technology. The operation of this project was a tortuous process that can be divided into four phases. Phase 1: the project plan was that our study was to focus on three topics: the basic principles of Marx’s view of science and technology, the influence of Marx’s view of science and technology on contemporary scientific and technological research and the basic situation of contemporary scientific and technological research. After the project was started, we insisted on the correct interpretation of the classic works by Marx, looked up massive works on contemporary Western science and technology and collected and absorbed the typical research results both home and abroad. For the sake of not being shackled by existing viewpoints, we managed to broaden our vision of research by holding academic seminars and by adopting other approaches. The aim of our study is, based on the scientific and technological views of Marx and contemporary scholars, to establish a basic value standpoint and research paradigm for the theory of science and technology that keeps up with the times. Phase 2: in May 2008, our research group initiated the Symposium on Marx’s View and Contemporary Thoughts of Science and Technology at Renmin University of China. Later, new research ideas were developed to focus on topics such as “Marx’s View of Science,” “Western Thoughts of Science” and “Contemporary Thoughts of Science.” In December 2008, I called up other researchers of this project to exchange ideas and determined the theme of “Marx’s View and Contemporary Thoughts of Science and Technology,” and finally drew up the research program “Towards an Open World of Science and Technology.” In March 2009, the monograph From Advocacy to Reconsideration: Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies, of which I am the chief editor, was published by Capital Normal University Press. This book, while containing some

Postscript

237

conclusions from the aforementioned symposium, reflects our ways of thinking on the theme of “Marx’s View and Contemporary Thoughts of Science.” Phase 3: our researchers were divided into four teams to work on four subtopics: (1) “Approaching Marx’s Scientific World” (Liu Dachun, Ding Junqiang); (2) “Approaching Marx’s Technological World” (Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu); (3) “World Tour of Postmodern Science and Technology” (Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang); and (4) “Reconstructing the Contemporary World of Science and Technology” (Liu Dachun, Yang Huili). Our research at this phase was completed by the end of 2010, and the entire project passed the acceptance check the following year with the result Towards an Open World of Science and Technology: Research on Marx’s View and Contemporary Thoughts of Science and Technology. The name list of researchers and their work is introduced as follows.

Volume I: Marx’s World of Science and Technology Part I: Science and Technology in Marx’s Texts (Wang Bolu) Part II: Rich Heritage in Criticism of Science and Technology (Ding Junqiang, Liu Dachun, Liu Yongmou)

Volume II: Distorted World of Science and Technology Part I: The Myth of Instrumentalism (Ding Junqiang, Ai Zhiqiang, Yang Huili) Part II: Hegemony of Scientism (Ai Zhiqiang) Part III: Origin of Anti-Scientism (Ai Zhiqiang, Liu Dachun)

Volume III: An Open World of Science and Technology Part I: An Open Form of Culture (Wang Bolu, Yang Huili) Part II: Complementary Value Choices (Yang Huili) Part III: From Scientific Culture to Cultural Science (Liu Dachun, Yang Huili) In general, the preceding research results had advanced the study of Marx’s view of science and technology and the construction of the contemporary thoughts of science and technology, although the explorations at the theoretical level were not fully satisfactory and the discussions at the practical level were not going deep enough. But fortunately, we had developed an attitude and thought for reconsidering science and technology by that time, namely, that it is not necessary to make a choice between advocacy and criticism of science and technology but to put it in a specific context for reconsideration. Phase 4: since we were not satisfied with our previous work, we decided to reflect on what we had done and reconsider our research subjects more proactively. Through almost five years of pondering, I’ve managed to transform the structure and ways of thinking of the book From Advocacy to Reconsideration, in addition to content adjustment and text modification, which gives rise to this refined and

238

Postscript

updated version Reconsideration: A Study on Marx’s View and Contemporary Thoughts of Science and Technology. Its content is outlined as follows.

Introduction Volume I: Reconsideration: Marx’s View of Science and Technology Part I: Science and Technology in Marx’s Texts Part II: Focus of Reconsideration Volume II: Scientism and Anti-Scientism Part I: Paradox of Scientism Part II: Origin of Anti-Scientism Volume III: An Open World of Science and Technology Part I: Complementary Value Choices Part II: Scientific Culture and Cultural Science The introduction of this book is newly added to set the tone for this reconsideration, and the rest is divided into three volumes, six parts and 17 chapters. Significant changes are made to reinterpret Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology and reveal its significance to modern times; respond to the problems and challenges raised by the contemporary thoughts of science and technology from different angles; and try to construct a proper theoretical framework for contemporary science and technology. Since science and technology have diverse forms, the exploration of the thoughts of science and technology is bound to be an eternal task. In this book, the authors, with a focus placed on the typical forms of science and technology and from multiple dimensions, outline a framework for constructing the contemporary thoughts of science and technology. This research only represents a direction or a way of thinking, instead of being designed to build a sophisticated theoretical system. I must extend gratitude to my colleagues in this research group. Without their collaboration and dedication, this book could hardly be finalized smoothly. Wang Bolu, Ai Zhiqiang and Fan Shanshan helped me revise and supplement the manuscript of this book, and Fan Shanshan, in particular, standardized the format of this book. It’s an honor of mine to see this book included in the “Library of Marxism Studies” of Renmin University of China Press. I’m particularly grateful to Yang Zongyuan and Fu Aixia, the main editors of this book; it is their meticulous work that makes it come out. For fear that there may be any deficiencies and

Postscript

239

immaturities in this book, I’m looking forward to advice and comments from both experts and readers. Liu Dachun Renmin University of China, Beijing, China 2017 During the process of editing and proofreading the English version of this book, Wang Wei helped me do meticulous work of revising and supplementing. Liu Dachun, 2022

Bibliography

I. Works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1–48). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995–2007. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Complete Works of Lenin. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984–1990. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Index of Complete Works of Marx and Engels. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Marx and Engels’ Collected Works. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Reminiscences of Marx and Engels. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1–4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin under the Central Committee of the CPC, Selected Works of Lenin (Vol. 1–4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012. Peking University, Mathematical Manuscript of Marx. Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 1975.

II. Other Foreign Literatures Fritz Allhoff ed. Philosophies of the Sciences: A Guide. London: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010. A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth, and Logic. London: Gollancz Ltd., 1936. A.J. Ayer. Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982. A.J. Ayer. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan, 1940. J.R. Brown ed. Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. London, New York: Continuum, 2012. R. Carnap. Die Aufgable der Wissenschaftslogik. Wien: Gerold & Co, 1934.

Bibliography 241 R. Carnap. Introduction to Semantics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942. R. Carnap. Logische Syntax der Sprache. Wien: Springer, 1934a/1968. R. Carnap. Philosophy and Logical Syntax. London: Kegan Paul, 1935. R. Carnap. The Unity of Science. Translated with an Introduction by M. Black. London: Kegan Paul, 1934. R. Carnap. Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik, in Actes de Congres International de Philosophie Scientique I. Paris: Hermann & Cie., 1936. Peter Clark and Katherine Hawley ed. Philosophy of Science Today. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. R.S. Cohen ed. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Dordrechat-Boston-London: Kluwer, 1963. R.S. Cohen and L. Laudan eds. Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis. Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum. Dordrechat-Boston-Lancaster: D. Reidel, 1983. R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky ed. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume Two: In Honor of Philipp Frank. New York: Humanities Press, 1965. J.B. Conant. Science and Common Sense. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. Martin Curd and J.A. Cover. Philosophy of Science. The Central Issues. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1998. H. Feigl. Inquires and Provocations. Selected Writings, 1929–1974. Edited by Robert S. Cohen. Dordrechat-Boston-Lancaster: Reidel, 1981. H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck eds. Readings in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953. H. Feigl and M. Scriven eds. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Volume I: The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956. P.K. Feyerabend. Zeitverschwendung. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp, 1995. P.K. Feyerabend and G. Maxwell eds. Mind, Matter, and Method: Essays in Philosophy and Science in Honor of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966. S. Fuller. Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Time. University of Chicago Press, 2000. Peter Godfrey-Smith. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science Theory a Reality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003. P.M.S. Hacher. Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2009. Edward J. Hall. Philosophy of Science: Metaphysical and Epistemological Foundations. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Rom Harre. The Philosophy of Science an Introductory Survey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. F.A. Hayek. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge, 1944. Christopher Hitchcock. Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2004. G. Holton. Science and Anti-Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933. G. Holton. Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought. Kepler to Einstein. Revised Edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994. H.S. Hughes. The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930-1965. New York: Harper and Row, 1975. Robert Kill. Malden: The Introduction to the Philosophy of Science: Cutting Nature at Its Seams. Oxford University, 1997.

242

Bibliography

P. Kitcher. Science, Truth, and Democracy. Oxford University Press, 2001. Theo A.F. Kuipers. General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Amsterdam, MA: Elsevier/North Holland, 2007. John Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Fourth Edition. Oxford University, 2001. Peter Machanmer and Michael Silberstein eds. The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 2002. P.D. Magnus and Jacob Busch. New Waves in Philosophy of Science. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, and Stephen P. Stich The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Seymour Mauskopf etc. Integrating History and Philosophy of Science: Problem and Prospects. Dordrecht, London: Springer, 2012. Timothy McGrew, Marc Alspector-Kelly, Fritz Allhoff Eds., The Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Chienkuo Michael Mi and Ruey-lin Chen eds. Naturalized Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam, New York, NY: Rodopi, 2007. E. Nagel. Logic Without Metaphysics and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956. Anthory O’hzar. Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. Stathis Psillos and Martin Curd eds. The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Abingdon: Routledge, 2008. Ahmad Raza. Philosophy of Science Since Bacon: Readings in the Ideas and Interpretations. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2011. Alex Rosenberg. Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction. New York: Routledge, 2012. B. Russell. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: Allen & Unwin,1940. Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer ed. The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge, 2006. C.P. Snow. The Two Cultures: And a Second Look: An Expanded Version of the Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959/1963. Benton Ted and Craib Ian. Philosophy of Social Science: The Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought. Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

III. Chinese Literatures J. Agassi. Science and Culture. Translated by Wu Xiaoyan, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. L.P. Althusser. For Marx. Translated by Gu Liang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. Translated by Yin Dayi, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1981. A.J. Ayer. Philosophy In the Twentieth Century. Translated by Li Bulou et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987. A.J. Ayer. The Revolution in Philosophy. Translated by Chen Shaoming et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1985. F. Bacon. Advancement of Learning. Translated by Liu Yuntong, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2007.

Bibliography 243 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Translated by Xu Baokui, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. B. Barber. Science and the Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991. I.G. Barbour. Issues in Science and Religion. Translated by Ruan Wei et al., Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1993. B. Barnes. About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. U. Beck. Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter: Neue weltpolitische Ökonomie. Translated by Jiang Renxiang et al., Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2004. D. Bell. Post-Industrial Society (Brief Version). Translated by Peng Qiang, Beijing: Popular Science Press, 1985. D. Bell. The Coming of Post-industrial Society. Translated by Wang Hongzhou et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. D. Bell. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. Translated by Zhao Yifan et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989. D. Bell. The Social Sciences Since the Second World War. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1988. H. Bergson. Introduction à la Métaphysique. Translated by Liu Fangtong, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1963. J.D. Bernal. Science in History. Translated by Wu Kuangfu et al., Beijing: Science Press, 1959. J.D. Bernal. Social Function of Science. Translated by Chen Tifang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. W.I.B. Beveridge. The Art of Scientific Investigation. Translated by Chen Jie, Beijing: Science Press, 1979. A. Bird. Philosophy of Science. Translated by Jia Yushu et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008. D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery. Translated by Ai Yan, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. T.D. Boer. The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Translated by Li He, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1995. Wang Bolu. The Outline of Marx’s Technical Thought. Beijing: Science Press, 2009. R.H. Brown. The Wisdom of Science: Its Relevance to Culture and Religion. Translated by Li Xingmin, Shenyang: Liaoning Education Press, 1998. M. Bunge. Scientific Materialism. Translated by Zhang Xianglun et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1989. V. Bush. Science: Endless Frontier. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2004. H. Butterfield. The Origins of Modern Science: 1300–1800. Translated by Zhang Liping et al., Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1988. F. Capra. The Turning Point—Science, Society and the Rising Culture. Translated by Wei Saying et al., Chengdu: Sichuan Publishing House of Science and Technology, 1988. F. Capra. The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism. Translated by Zhu Runsheng, Beijing: Beijing Publishing Group, 1999. R. Carnap. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Zhang Huaxia, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007.

244

Bibliography

R. Carnap. The Philosophy of Scientific Methodology. Translated by Jiang Tianji, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1990. N. Cartwright. The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science. Translated by Wang Wei et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. E. Cassire. An Essay on Man. Translated by Gan Yang, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003. E. Cassirer. Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by Gu Weiming et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988. A. Chalmers. Science and Its Fabrication. Translated by Jiang Jinsong, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007. A. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? Translated by Qiu Renzong, Shijiazhuang: Hebei Science and Technology Education Press, 2010. I.B. Cohen. The Newtonian Revolution. Translated by Yan Feng et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999. R.G. Collingwood. The Idea of Nature. Translated by Wu Guosheng et al., Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1999. Liu Dachun. A Review of the Research on Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. Liu Dachun. General Theory of Philosophy of Science. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 1998. Liu Dachun. Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd Edition). Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2005. Liu Dachun and Liu Yongmou. The Offense and Defense of Thought: The Rise and Evolution of Alternative Philosophy of Science. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2010. R.A. Dahl. On Democracy. Translated by Li Boguang et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999. W.C. Dampier. History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001. G. Deleuze. Pourparlers. Translated by Liu Hanquan, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000. R. Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by Wang Taiqing, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001. J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. Translated by Xu Chongqing, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1958. J. Dewey. The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action. Selected Materials of Bourgeois Philosophy (Vol. 9), Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1966. B. D’Holbach. Le Bon Sens, On Idees Naturelles Opposees Aux Idees Surnaturelles. Translated by Wang Yinting. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1966. M. Dierkes and C. Groth. Between Understanding and Trust: The Public, Science and Technology. Translated by Tian Song et al., Beijing: Beijing Institute of Technology Press, 2006. W. Dilthey. Introduction to the Human Sciences. Translated by Zhao Xifang, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2004. L. Dollot. Individual Culture and Mass Culture. Translated by Huang Jianhua, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1987. Xing Dongmei. Science and Objectivity Regression of Practice. Beijing: Science Press, 2008.

Bibliography 245 A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1–3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2010. Liu Fangtong. A New Compilation of Modern Western Philosophy. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2000. A. Feenberg. Alternative Modernity: The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory. Translated by Lu Jun et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2003. A. Feenberg. Critical Theory of Technology. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005. Xiao Feng. The Human and Inhuman Aspects of Technology. Beijing: Scientific and Technological Literature Press, 1991. P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of An Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge. Translated by Zhou Changzhong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2007. P. Feyerabend. Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being. Translated by Dai Jianping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2007. P. Feyerabend. Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002. P. Feyerabend. Science in a Free Society. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005. M. Foucault. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Liu Beicheng et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1999. M. Foucault. Dits et Ecrits. Translated by Yan Feng, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1997. M. Foucault. Faut Defendre La Societe. Translated by Qian Han, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999. M. Foucault. Selected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998. M. Foucault. The History of Sexuality. Translated by She Biping, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000. S. Fuller. Governance of Science: Ideology and the Future of the Open Society. Translated by Liu Dun, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988. D.R. Griffin. The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Translated by Ma Jifang, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2004. Wu Guosheng. Lectures on Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2009. S. Haack. Defending Science Within Reason: Between Scientism and Cynicism. Translated by Zeng Guoping, Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008. Habermas. Technology and Science as “Ideology”. Translated by Guo Guanyi, Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 2002. S. Harding. Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies. Translated by Xia Houbing et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 2002. P. Harrison. The Territories and Science and Religion. Translated by Zhang Butian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2016. F. Heer. Europaische Geistesgeschichte. Translated by Zhao Fusan, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2008. G. Hegel. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Translated by Wang Taiqing, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Heidegger. Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996.

246

Bibliography

M. Heidegger. The Forest Road. Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1997. O. Hoffe. Morality as the Price of Modernity. Translated by Deng Anqing et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005. G. Holton. Science and Anti-science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Nanchang: Jiangxi Education Publishing House, 1999. K.S. Hook. Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. Translated by Jin Ke et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1965. M. Horkheimer. Works of Horkheimer. Edited by Cao Weidong, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1997. M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Liang Jingdong et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003. Liu Huajie ed. Readings in the Science Communication. Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007. D. Hume. A Treatise on Human Nature. Translated by Guan Wenyun, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1980. Charles E. Hummel. The Galileo Connection: Resolving Conflicts Between Science and the Bible. Translated by Wen Renjie et al., Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Publishing House, 2008. E. Husserl. Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Li Youzheng, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. E. Husserl. Phenomenology of Life-world. Translated by Ni Liangkang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002. E. Husserl. Selected Works of Husserl. Edited by Ni Liangkang, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997. E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Zhang Qingxiong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1988. E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Wang Bingwen, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2001. W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979. K.T. Jaspers. Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte. Translated by Wei Chuxiong et al., Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 1989. K. Jaspers. Man in the Modern Age. Translated by Wang Defeng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2003. Xia Jisong. Modern Western Philosophy. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006. H. Kahn et al. The Next Two Hundred Years: A Scenario for America and The World. Translated by Shanghai CPPCC Compilation Committee, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1980. I. Kant. Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels. Translated by Quan Zengxia, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2001. I. Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Translated by Pang Jingren, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1978. M. Kline. Mathematics in Western Culture. Translated by Zhang Zugui, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2004. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Translated by Wang Shanbo et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001.

Bibliography 247 A. Koyre. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Translated by Wu Botao, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2003. A. Koyre. Newtonian Studies. Translated by Zhang Butian, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2003. T.S. Kuhn. The Essential Tension: Tradition and Innovation in Scientific Research. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004. T.S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Translated by Jin Wulun et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2012. J.A. Labinger and H. Collins. The One Culture?: A Conversation about Science. Translated by Zhang Zengyi et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2006. J. Ladriere. Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997. I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programs. Translated by Lan Zheng, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986. B. Latour and S. Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Translated by Zhang Bolin, Beijing: Orient Press, 2004. L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991. L. Lear. Witness for Nature. Translated by He Tiantong, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1999. W. Leiss. The Domination of Nature. Translated by Yue Changling et al., Chongqing: Chongqing Publishing Group, 2007. S. Lelas. Science And Modernity: Toward an Integral Theory of Science. Translated by Yan Zhongzhi, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2011. J. Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Qiu Renzong et al., Wuhan: Huazhong University of Science & Technology Press, 1982. J.F. Lyotard. Post-modernism. Translated by Zhao Yiji, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1999. J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Che Jinshan, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997. E. Mach. Analysis of Sensations. Translated by Hong Qian et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. J. Macquarrie. 20th Century Religious Thought. Translated by He Guanghu, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1989. H. Marcuse. Industrial Society and the New Left. Translated by Ren Li, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. H. Marcuse. Modern Civilization and Man’s Quandary. Translated by Wang Congxia et al., Shanghai: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989. H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2006. S.F. Mason. A History of the Sciences. Translated by Zhou Xuliang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1980. F. Mayor. Tomorrow is Always Too Late. Translated by Lv Chenzhong, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1993. W. McAllister. Beauty & Revolution in Science. Translated by Li Wei, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2000. A. McGrath. Science and Religion: An Introduction. Translated by Wang Yi, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000.

248

Bibliography

B. Mckibben. The End of Nature. Translated by Sun Xiaochun, Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2000. D.L. Meadows. The Limits to Growth. Translated by Li Baoheng, Chengdu: Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 1983. R.K. Merton. Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth Century England. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2000. R.K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: An Episodic Memoir. Translated by Lu Xudong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003. J.O.de La Mettrie. L’Homme Machine. Translated by Gu Shouguan, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. Wang Minan. Foucault’s Boundary. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002. M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. E. Nagel. The Structure of Science. Translated by Xu Xiangdong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002. I. Newton. Mathematical Principles of Nature Philosophy. Translated by Wang Kedi et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006. R.G. Newton. The Truth of Science: Physical Theories and Reality. Translated by Wu Jike, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2001. F.W. Ostwald. Grundrisse der Naturphilosophie. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2000. R.B. Perry. Present Philosophical Tendencies. Translated by Fu Tongxian, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1962. A. Pickering. Science as Practice and Culture. Translated by Ke Wen et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. A. Pickering. The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency, and Science. Translated by Xing Dongmei, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2004. H. Poincaré. Mathematics and Science: Last Essays. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. H. Poincaré. The Value of Science. Translated by Li Xingmin, Beijing: Guangming Daily Press, 1988. M. Polanyi. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Translated by Xu Zemin, Guiyang: Guizhou People’s Press, 2000. M. Polanyi. The Logic of Liberty. Translated by Feng Yinjiang et al., Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 2002. K. Popper. Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987. K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Translated by Shu Weiguang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987. K. Popper. Science: Conjectures and Refutations. Translated by Fu Jichong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1986. K. Popper. The Open Society and Its Enemies (Vol. 2). Translated by Lu Heng et al., Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1999. H. Poser. Wissenschaftstheorie: Eine philosophische Einführung. Translated by Li Wenchao, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2002. I. Prigogine and I. Stengers. Order Our of Chaos. Translated by Zeng Qinghong et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2005. Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999. W.V.O. Quine. From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays. Translated by Jiang Tianji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987.

Bibliography 249 F. Rapp. Contributions to a Philosophy of Technology. Translated by Liu Wu et al., Liaoning: Liaoning Science and Technology Publishing House, 1986. H. Reichenbach. The Rise of Scientific Philosophy. Translated by Boni, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1966. Qiu Renzong. Scientific Method and Scientific Dynamics. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2006. M.N. Richter Jr. Science as a Cultural Process. Translated by Gu Xin et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1989. H. Rickert. Cultural Science and Natural Science. Translated by Tu Jiliang, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. B.K. Ridley. On Science. Translated by Li Bin et al., Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2007. J. Rifkin and T. Howard. Entropy—A New World View. Translated by Lv Ming et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987. R. Rorty. Post-philosophical Culture. Translated by Huang Yong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2009. R. Rorty. Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers. Translated by Zhang Yucheng, Beijing: Huaxia Publishing House, 2003. J. Rouse. Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science. Translated by Sheng Xiaoming et al., Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004. J.J. Rousseau. Discourse of the Science of the Arts. Translated by He Zhaowu, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. B. Russell. Authority and the Individual. Translated by Xiao Wei, Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1990. B. Russell. My Philosophical Development. Translated by Wen Xizeng, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. B. Russell. Religion and Science. Translated by Xu Yichun, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. B. Russell. The History of Western Philosophy. Translated by He Zhaowu et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976. G. Sarton. Study of the History of Science. Translated by Liu Bing, Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, 2007. A. Schopenhauer. Die Welt Als Wille Und Vorstellung. Translated by Shi Chongbai, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. E.F. Schumacher. Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics. Translated by Yu Hongjun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1984. E.M. Schurman. Technology and the Future. Translated by Li Xiaobing et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 1995. U. Segerstrale. Beyond the Science Wars: The Missing Discourse about Science and Society. Translated by Huang Ying et al., Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2006. Sakata Shyoichi. Dialogues Concerning a New View of Elementary Particles. Translated by Qing Chengrui et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1973. Sakata Shyoichi. Essays On Philosophy of Science. Translated by An Du, Beijing: Knowledge Press, 1987. S. Sismondo. An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies. Translated by Xu Weimin et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2007. C.P. Snow. The Two Cultures. Translated by Chen Kejian et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Press, 2003. B. Spinoza. Ethica in Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. Translated by He Lin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997.

250

Bibliography

C. Taylor. The Malaise of Modernity. Translated by Cheng Lian, Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press, 2001. A. Toffler. The Third Wave. Translated by Zhu Zhiyan et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1984. J. Tomlinson. Cultural Imperialism. Translated by Feng Jiansan, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999. I. Wallerstein. Open Social Sciences. Translated by Liu Feng, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997. M. Walzer. On Toleration. Translated by Yuan Jianhua, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2000. Zhao Wanli. The Social Construction of Science. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2002. M.W. Wartofsky. Conceptual Foundations of Science Thought—An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Fan Dainian et al., Beijing: Qiushi Press, 1982. J. Watkins. Science and Scepticism. Translated by Qiu Renzong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991. WCED. Our Common Future. Translated by Wang Zhijia et al., Changchun: Jilin People’s Publishing House, 1997. M. Weber. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Peng Qiang et al., Xi’an: Shaanxi Normal University, 2002. M. Weber. Wissenschaft als Beruf und Politik als Beruf. Translated by Feng Keli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 2005. W.H. Werkmeister. A Philosophy of Science. Translated by Li Derong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996. R.S. Westfall. The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Translated by Peng Wanhua, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000. A.D. White. A History of The Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (Vol. 1). Translated by Lu Xudong, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2006. L.A. White. The Science of Culture: A Study of Man and Civilization. Translated by Shen Yuan et al., Jinan: Shandong People’s Publishing House, 1988. A.N. Whitehead. Science and The Modern World. Translated by He Qin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1959. A. Wolf. A History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th & 17th Centuries. Translated by Zhou Changzhong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1985. J. Wtson ed. Selected Readings of Kant’s Original Works. Translated by Wei Zhuomin, Wuhan: Central China Normal University Press, 2000. Li Xingmin. The Cultural Implication of Science. Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2007. Zhang Zhiwei ed. History of Western Philosophy. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2002. Zhang Zhiwei and Ouyang Qian eds. Wisdom of Western Philosophy. Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2000. J. Ziman. Real Science: What It Is and What It Means. Translated by Zeng Guoping et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2002.

Index

absolute truth 18, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 111, 173, 174, 176, 209 absoluteness 70, 78, 82, 84, 85, 108 Adorno, Theodor 53, 68, 109, 123, 246 affirmative culture 52 Agassi, Joseph 35, 66, 69, 113, 174, 178, 196, 229, 233, 234, 242 alienation 50, 53, 54, 140, 151, 164, 186, 199, 204, 220, 236 alienation of science 186, 199, 204, 236 alternative 2, 3, 4, 5, 27, 29, 30, 31, 97 analytical philosophy 16, 17, 22 anthropocentrism 21, 46, 47, 143 anthropology 6, 34, 136, 160 anti-scientism 3, 17, 19, 29, 175, 192, 235 Aristotle 2, 44, 128, 182, 202 assumption 147, 176 autonomy of science 221, 222, 223 Ayer, Alfred Jules 240, 242 Bacon, Francis 61, 89, 126, 136, 154, 162, 173, 213, 214, 242, 243 Barber, Bernard 83, 95, 197, 201, 221, 233, 243 Barnes, Barry 33, 96, 195, 232, 243 Bergson, Henri 125, 130, 131, 133, 140, 243 Bernal, John Desmond 96, 123, 140, 154, 195, 208, 226, 232, 233, 243 Bloor, David 243 Brown, Hanbury 68, 174, 181, 196, 197, 233, 240, 243 capital 11, 13, 89, 136, 153, 164, 202 capitalism 107, 126, 136, 169, 236 capitalist 7, 8, 13, 51, 57, 89, 93, 107, 135, 136, 137, 139, 229 Carnap, Paul Rudolf 2, 15, 240, 241, 243, 244

Cartwright, Nancy 195, 244 Cassire, Ernst 195, 244 causality 131 certainty 17, 60, 127, 163, 174, 199, 201, 209 Cetina, Karin Knorr-, 33, 100, 101, 103, 123, 148, 246 Chalmers, Alan 99, 122, 244 civilian science 203 cognitive science 33 Collins, Harry 113, 124, 232, 247 common sense 5, 200, 203, 204, 205, 210 communist 57 complementarity 41, 193, 194, 199, 225 complementary 39, 66, 118, 151, 217 completeness 108, 111, 219 complexity 23, 56, 71, 81, 88, 120, 199 Comte, Auguste 3, 15, 205 concrete truth 81 construction 17, 20, 79, 82, 86, 90, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 117, 118, 163, 187, 188, 190, 209, 237 constructivism 4, 29, 33, 75, 99, 100, 104, 199 context 6, 7, 12, 13, 49, 79, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 100, 102, 103, 104, 114, 119, 175, 184, 237 Copernicus 174, 216, 217 cultural hegemony 157, 162, 163, 164, 165, 198, 225 cultural perspective 62, 64, 91, 94, 224 Dahl, Robert A. 201, 231, 244 Dampier, William Cecil 67, 96, 162, 195, 231, 244 Darwin, Charles Robert 174, 179 deconstruction 17, 18, 19, 27, 110, 131 deduction 55, 74, 76, 94, 163 defense 1, 2, 5, 28, 31, 112, 114, 179, 180, 188

252

Index

demarcation of science 24, 25, 32 Descartes, René 16, 42, 44, 45, 53, 127, 244 Dewey, John 11, 27, 36, 244 dialectics 20, 81, 114, 122, 155 Dilthey, Wilhelm 206, 231, 244 diversification 59, 66, 120 division of labor 10, 11, 183, 193 ecological crisis 31, 48, 235 Einstein Albert 19, 79, 82, 89, 95, 134, 154, 169, 174, 180, 181, 193, 195, 197, 199, 204, 215, 218, 231, 232, 233, 241, 245 elite science 202, 203, 204 empiricism 15, 31, 126, 224 Engels, Friedrich 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 35, 36, 56, 58, 67, 68, 83, 84, 95, 96, 128, 136, 137, 154, 196, 240 enlightenment 45, 68, 69, 92, 109, 123, 125, 126, 128, 130, 138, 139, 140, 153, 170, 174, 225, 244, 246 epistemology 4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 32, 33, 35, 72, 78, 98, 109, 110, 111, 130, 178 essentialism 17, 19, 80, 93 evolution 3, 4, 15, 26, 43, 49, 60, 81, 91, 129, 145, 151, 165, 174, 179, 181, 182, 218, 221 existentialism 77, 131 falsification 28, 31, 72, 85, 144 Feenberg, Andrew 48, 67, 155, 231, 245 feminism 3, 4, 75, 112 Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas 54 Feyerabend, Paul Karl 3, 16, 17, 28, 31, 32, 36, 49, 64, 67, 69, 110, 123, 132, 174, 176, 177, 178, 196, 231, 241, 245 Foucault, Michel 3, 17, 18, 28, 32, 36, 111, 112, 132, 176, 245, 248 free development 56, 57, 128, 140, 169 freedom 5, 32, 44, 46, 49, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 92, 128, 129, 132, 139, 170, 171, 178, 200, 211, 219, 221, 222, 223, 228, 236 Fuller, Steve 229, 234, 241, 245 fundamentalism 17, 29, 80, 93, 131 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 1, 31, 35, 37, 68, 95, 96, 123, 124, 138, 154, 155, 196, 232, 245 goodness 141, 152, 193, 210, 211, 214, 215, 219, 220, 223, 225 Griffin, David R. 67, 68, 96, 233, 245

Haack, Susan 69, 105, 113, 123, 124, 229, 245 Habermas, Jürgen 3, 28, 110, 129, 138, 197, 245 Hacking, Ian 147, 154 Harding, Sandra 64, 69, 71, 83, 94, 95, 104, 123, 245 Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich 1, 31, 45, 53, 153, 245 Heidegger, Martin 3, 18, 28, 109, 125, 130, 131, 245, 246 historicism 15, 16, 17, 19, 28, 71, 78 history of science 17, 25, 28, 63, 163, 173, 174, 179, 202, 209, 216, 217, 218, 229 history of scientific and technological thought 20, 25 Holton, Gerald 144, 154, 164, 195, 241, 246 Horkheimer, Max 53, 68, 109, 123, 138, 246 humanism 1, 26, 35, 45, 46, 125, 126, 130, 146, 152, 174, 175, 192, 193, 225 humanistic spirit 145, 146, 183, 193, 194, 220, 224, 225, 228 humanistic value 150 humanities 13, 17, 18, 30, 73, 77, 88, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 140, 145, 146, 152, 153, 165, 191, 192, 193, 194, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 224, 225, 230, 231 Hume, David 15, 151, 155, 246 Husserl, Edmund 3, 17, 18, 29, 68, 90, 96, 109, 133, 154, 228, 243, 246 hypothesis 71, 76, 82, 83, 173, 181 incommensurability 18, 132 individuality 70, 73, 75, 76, 77, 83, 205 induction 74, 76, 85, 86, 163 industrial civilization 62, 128 Industrial Revolution 14, 127, 135, 136, 160, 164, 183 industrial society 50, 51, 52, 53, 57, 93, 135, 140, 168, 187 inevitability 17, 23, 56, 65, 115, 130, 194, 223, 226 instrumentalism 162 integration of science and technology 34, 224 intervention 74, 101, 102, 147, 148, 190 irrationalism 17, 75, 125, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135, 225 James, William 246 Jaspers, Karl Theodor 131, 195, 246

Index Kahn, Herman 246 Kant, Immanuel 45, 53, 108, 246, 250 Kepler, Johannes 212, 241 knowledge-power 28 Kuhn, Thomas Samuel 18, 28, 31, 71, 78, 86, 134, 154, 174, 241, 247 labor 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 47, 48, 52, 89, 135, 136, 153, 167, 188, 216 laboratory research 87 Lakatos, Imre 174, 247 language game 176 Latour, Bruno 33, 37, 100, 148, 247 Laudan, Larry 28, 241, 247 Lavoisier, Antoine-Laurent de 174 law 2, 8, 13, 18, 42, 55, 61, 62, 65, 77, 81, 82, 83, 118, 127, 128, 159, 166, 169, 172, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 212, 215, 222 legitimacy 110, 150, 180, 200, 203, 204, 213 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 66 Lenin, Vladimir 81, 95, 207, 232, 240 Liebig, Justus von 8 life-world 90 locality 2, 39, 97, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 114, 199 Locke, John 126, 170 logical empiricism 15, 19, 31, 107, 172, 173 logicism 16, 17, 28 Lyotard, Jean-François 3, 17, 108, 111, 132, 176, 247 Mach, Ernst 15, 144, 247 machine 12, 18, 41, 43, 44, 139, 167, 168 machinery 7, 10, 136 Marcuse, Herbert 3, 50, 51, 53, 56, 57, 68, 110, 138, 139, 140, 187, 197, 247 Marx, Karl Heinrich 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 27, 35, 36, 48, 54, 56, 57, 58, 61, 67, 68, 81, 95, 96, 136, 154, 161, 169, 196, 205, 207, 233, 236, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243 mathematics 2, 20, 29, 42, 90, 151, 183, 194, 205, 207, 211, 217 Maxwell, James Clerk 241 Meadows, Dennis L. 248 mechanics 10, 80, 84, 174, 199 mechanism 12, 43, 64, 87, 131, 190, 193, 198 mechanistic 42, 129, 136, 228 medicine 18, 32, 35, 49, 114, 115, 116, 117

253

Merton, Robert King 28, 72, 97, 98, 122, 149, 170, 195, 196, 200, 213, 214, 221, 231, 232, 233, 248 meta-narrative 71, 176 metaphysics 15, 18, 27, 70, 107, 146, 229 modernism 176, 247 Mulkay, Michael 33, 37, 87, 96, 148, 161, 195, 196, 248 multi-perspective 50 natural philosophy 120, 151 natural science 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 71, 77, 89, 90, 107, 108, 111, 113, 126, 128, 129, 130, 133, 136, 137, 152, 160, 169, 193, 193, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 225, 228 naturalism 87, 90 neutrality 30, 34, 70, 200 Newton, Issac 2, 85, 95, 127, 160, 163, 170, 199, 248 Newtonian mechanics 14, 43, 106, 126, 174 non-science 18, 122, 178, 208 objectivity 2, 18, 29, 33, 39, 53, 54, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, 103, 108, 111, 112, 116, 134, 144, 145, 160, 175, 185, 199, 205, 211 omnipotence of science 179 one-dimensional man 50, 51, 52, 57, 110, 139, 140 ontology 16, 18, 22, 23, 45, 72, 130 operationalism 15 optimism 31 orthodox 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 17, 27, 30, 31, 32, 41 Ostwald, Friedrich Wilhelm 76, 95, 248 paradigm 18, 22, 31, 86, 103, 108, 236 perfection 42, 55, 61, 113, 143, 163, 165, 180, 193, 205, 216, 217, 219 philosophy of science 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 34, 35, 41, 85, 86, 104, 110, 147, 209, 235 philosophy of science and technology 1, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 27, 34, 35 physics 2, 4, 7, 15, 29, 76, 79, 80, 90, 120, 136, 140, 175, 193, 199, 204, 212 Pickering, Andrew 35, 148, 154, 248 Plato 46, 128, 202 pluralism 5, 29, 66, 117 Polanyi, Michael 67, 76, 95, 248

254

Index

Popper, Karl 28, 31, 73, 78, 82, 85, 94, 95, 172, 173, 174, 196, 229, 232, 248 popularization 153, 165, 184, 191, 203, 204, 207, 208, 209, 210, 214 positivism 3, 4, 15, 16, 19, 29, 31, 77, 86, 90, 107, 150, 161, 163, 175 positivist 16, 20, 108, 112, 139 post-colonialism 3, 4, 64, 111, 112 practice priority 147 pragmatism 15, 17, 20, 32 probability 79, 174 productivity 20, 44, 49, 51, 52, 89, 91, 127, 135, 136 rationality 2, 5, 17, 18, 24, 39, 45, 46, 51, 52, 77, 90, 92, 110, 112, 115, 121, 129, 187, 199, 200, 201, 205 realism 15, 16, 22, 77, 101 reconsideration 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 14, 237, 238 regularity 77, 211, 219 relative truth 82, 83, 84, 85 relativism 16, 17, 19, 66, 71, 79, 87, 102, 113, 131, 132 relativity 70, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 178, 199 religion 6, 43, 45, 48, 49, 59, 65, 83, 91, 92, 98, 106, 108, 111, 113, 115, 126, 128, 138, 141, 150, 151, 159, 160, 164, 169, 170, 171, 172, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 191, 192, 217, 219, 227, 229 religious tolerance 169, 170, 171 Renaissance 30, 45, 53, 92, 106, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 159, 160, 174, 183, 191, 202, 224, 225 repeatability 2, 72, 79, 83, 108 representation 14, 97, 105, 106, 147, 148 representationalism 147 Richter, Maurice N. 35, 69, 121, 124, 195, 222, 225, 233, 249 Rorty, Richard McKay 3, 4, 16, 17, 28, 32, 70, 80, 108, 131, 176, 249 Rouse, Joseph 99, 102, 103, 105, 123, 147, 148, 155, 249 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 109, 130, 140, 154, 166, 249 Russell, Bertrand 15, 20, 27, 195, 217, 232, 242, 249 Sarton, George 146, 151, 152, 154, 155, 172, 192, 194, 196, 197, 249 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 1, 31

Schlick, Friedrich Albert Moriz 15 Schopenhauer, Arthur 125, 130, 133, 154, 249 Schrödinger, Erwin 80, 193 Schumacher, Ernst Friedrich 47, 67, 153, 155, 249 science and politics 161, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191 science and religion 179, 180, 181, 182, 191, 194, 217, 218 science war 94, 95, 124, 234, 249 scientific anthropology 32 scientific crisis 90, 139 scientific culture 34, 35, 65, 66, 92, 93, 104, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 114, 148, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 171, 179, 191, 192, 194, 198, 203, 205, 210, 220 scientific ethics 34, 112 scientific methodology 3 scientific objectivity 76 scientific rationality 45, 46, 112 scientific realism 15, 22 scientific revolution 43, 63, 86, 149, 160, 174, 191 scientific tolerance 171 scientific value 214, 219 scientism 1, 5, 17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 66, 79, 107, 108, 113, 116, 125, 132, 133, 145, 161, 162, 163, 165, 174, 175, 176, 191, 192, 193, 199, 224 scientization 24, 184, 186, 187, 188 seeking truth 72, 210, 211, 212, 219 simplicity 61, 121, 133, 199, 216, 219 Snow, Charles Percy 35, 146, 165, 191, 192, 193, 197, 242, 249 social construction 28, 32, 33, 87, 199, 200 social science 5, 6, 13, 22, 108, 111, 184, 186, 193, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 225, 231 sociology of science 112, 209 Spengler, Oswald 105 Spinoza, Baruch de 249 standardization 18, 99, 104, 105, 188 subjectivity 2, 18, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 111, 142, 205, 211 subject-object dichotomy 46 superstition 30, 111, 117, 118, 119, 126, 140, 169, 174, 181, 208, 211, 219 sustainable development 21, 22, 34, 62, 66, 143

Index testability 2, 72, 74, 76, 77, 98, 108, 121 Thales 43, 202 the Frankfurt School 109, 199 theology 30, 43, 45, 63, 106, 126, 159 theory of relativity 174, 199 theory of science and technology 7, 14, 236 Toffler, Alvin 250 traditional culture 60, 94, 114, 120, 121, 122, 151, 227 uniformity 33 uniqueness 29, 31, 39, 53, 70, 76, 77, 78, 106, 113, 203 universality 2, 12, 17, 39, 53, 60, 65, 66, 77, 78, 83, 88, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 114, 120, 131, 144, 150, 160, 163, 173, 185, 199, 200

255

unreason 125, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135 value choice 39, 41, 67 value neutrality 23, 70, 129, 224 value reason 39, 125, 129, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 150, 225, 228 verify 71 view of science and technology 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 236, 237 Weber, Max 42, 62, 67, 69, 126, 129, 138, 139, 154, 250 White, Andrew Dickson 46, 67, 250 Whitehead, Alfred North 63, 69, 77, 124, 182, 193, 197, 250 Wittgenstein Ludwig Josef Johann 15, 17, 241 working class 8, 10, 11, 51, 52