Reconsideration of Science and Technology II: Scientism and Anti-Scientism 9781032294346, 9781032298993, 9781003302568

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Reconsideration of Science and Technology II

In reviewing and reconsidering the intellectual history of scientism and antiscientism, the authors assess the process of reasoning and prejudices of these contrasting viewpoints, while discussing the repercussions of scientific hegemony and its contemporary criticism. As the second volume of a three-volume set that proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to an ever-changing world, this title focuses on ideological trends centering around scientism and anti-scientism since the 19th century. The six chapters look into the emergence of scientism, instrumental reason, scientific optimism, scientific pessimism, scientific crisis and irrationalism and finally the deconstruction of scientism. The authors provide insight into the connections and biases of these disparate views and critiques, explore the influences of the hegemony of science and contemporary critique of science and evaluate the value of postmodernism and deconstructivism. The volume will appeal to scholars and students interested in the philosophy of science and technology, the ideology of scientism and anti-scientism, modernism and postmodernism, Marxist philosophy and topics related to scientific culture. Liu Dachun is Distinguished Professor at Renmin University of China and also a pioneer and leading scholar of Chinese philosophy of science and technology. He specializes in philosophy of science, STS (science, technology and society) and history of scientific thought. Ai Zhiqiang is Professor at the School of Marxism, Liaoning University of Technology, China. He specializes in the study of Marxism and contemporary scientific and technological developments, particularly in the field of STS. Yang Huili is Lecturer of Philosophy at the School of Humanities, Southwest Jiaotong University, China. She specializes in the research of philosophy of science, STS and engineering ethics.

China Perspectives

The China Perspectives series focuses on translating and publishing works by leading Chinese scholars, writing about both global topics and Chinarelated themes. It covers Humanities & Social Sciences, Education, Media and Psychology, as well as many interdisciplinary themes. This is the first time any of these books have been published in English for international readers. The series aims to put forward a Chinese perspective, give insights into cutting-edge academic thinking in China, and inspire researchers globally. To submit proposals, please contact the Taylor & Francis Publisher for China Publishing Programme, Lian Sun ([email protected]) Titles in philosophy currently include: A Hope for Philosophy I The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan A Hope for Philosophy II The European Path and Chinese Opportunity Ye Xiushan Reconsideration of Science and Technology I Reflection on Marx’s View Liu Dachun, Wang Bolu, Ding Junqiang and Liu Yongmou Reconsideration of Science and Technology II Scientism and Anti-Scientism Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili Reconsideration of Science and Technology III An Open World Liu Dachun, Yang Huili and Fan Shanshan For more information, please visit https://www.routledge.com/China-Perspectives /book-series/CPH

Reconsideration of Science and Technology II Scientism and Anti-Scientism

Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili

First published in English 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili The right of Liu Dachun, Ai Zhiqiang and Yang Huili to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. English Version by permission of China Renmin University Press. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-1-032-29434-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-29899-3 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-30256-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

Introduction PART I

1

Paradox of Scientism

39

1

The Rise of Scientism

41

2

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason

78

3

Optimism: The Omnipotence of Science and Technology

119

4

Pessimism: Hopeless “Fleurs du Mal”

159

PART II

Origin of Anti-Scientism

189

5

Crisis of Science and the Burgeoning of Irrationalism

191

6

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism and Its Reflection

221

Bibliography Index

259 271

Introduction

The reconsideration of science and technology is multifaceted. It is not only about how to treat science and technology but also about how to treat the existing philosophy of science and technology. The more important question is how this philosophy responds to the changes in the world and keeps abreast of the times. When we start this reconsideration, we should not forget that a great philosopher – Karl Marx – has done this before and left us invaluable ideological assets. So, we need to go over Marx’s view of science and technology and bear his penetrating thoughts in mind; only in this way can our reconsideration head in the right direction. Now let us expand on these points in the following paragraphs.

I.1 How to Treat Science and Technology I.1.1 Three Approaches In modern society, we cannot live without science and technology even for a moment. But we don’t have much consensus on how to treat science and technology. In the circle of philosophy, the misunderstandings and contests between scientism and humanism have never faded. As Gadamer has commented, in the two centuries following the death of Hegel and Schelling, philosophy was actually constructed amid the defense of science,1 and defenders of science have kept fighting against those critics during that period. How should we treat science? Or how should philosophy reflect on science? There are three approaches to this question in the past and at present. The first approach is to defend science. This is a basic standpoint of philosophical reflection on science, and also a traditional mainstream view. To defend science is to explain why science is reasonable and why scientific knowledge is so accurate and predictable. For example, before launching the Shenzhou spacecraft, scientists could figure out the precise time when it would enter the preset orbit. This can only be done with scientific knowledge. The second approach is to criticize science. With the continuous socioeconomic development over the centuries, the importance and greatness of science have become increasingly prominent. Now science and technology are the backbone of economic development in modern society. However, apart from being extolled, DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-1

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Introduction

science has come under strong criticism. Being deeply concerned about the countless problems in the course of human development, some major schools of philosophy – the initiator of the so-called “alternative philosophy of science” – obstinately blame them on the development of science. The third approach is to reconsider science. In recent years, while science is still being defended and criticized, a new approach for reflection on science has emerged, that is, “reconsideration” (the theme of this book). The basic standpoint of this approach is that neither pure defense nor pure criticism is impeccable, so we should reconsider science from a diverse, rational and tolerant perspective. In this day and age, the philosophical reflection on science ought to be reconsideration instead of defense.2 I.1.1.1 Orthodox Approaches The purport of standard or orthodox philosophy of science is to prove the rationality of science. Some well-known philosophers (e.g., Carnap and Hempel) and scientists have provided rich evidence for this purpose, but their reasoning for the rationality and reliability of science is based on nothing but on its own attributes. The first is objectivity, that is, non-subjectivity, testability and repeatability. For example, the effect of a drug must be verified through rounds of tests, and it is the positive feedback of a majority of users that can prove the drug is effective. This is what objectivity means. The second is universality, that is, abstractness, non-locality and borderlessness. For example, British physicist Newton is said to be the father of modern physics, but it doesn’t mean that physics is British. Chinese physics and British physics are essentially the same thing, which is a manifestation of the borderlessness of science. The third is constructiveness, that is, logicality and mathematics. The so-called “constructiveness” indicates that all parts of scientific knowledge are logically related and mathematically connected. For example, Galileo put forward the “law of free fall,” arguing that the height of the falling body is irrelevant to its mass, but only directly proportional to time squared, which can be expressed by mathematical relations. Before Galileo, the great thinker Aristotle once alleged that the speed of the falling body is determined by its mass, which is now taken as a fallacy since it is neither constructive nor empirically verified. The aforesaid three points happen to be the basis for defending science. I.1.1.2 Alternative Approaches The doubts about the rationality of science have not ended. After World War II, all sorts of alternative philosophies of science that either oppose science or criticize scientific tendencies have cropped up and spread rapidly and widely, becoming an ideological trend that cannot be ignored. In the opinion of alternative philosophers, science is not a selfless and sacred pursuit of truth, but a power to collude with politics, a game running on money, a tool for flattering patrons and an accomplice of humans in their savage rule over nature.

Introduction 3 Science is lively, rich and colorful. It cannot be simplified into static logic, formulas and symbols. Logicism and positivism are valuable wealth for us to understand science, but in essence, they only have “one-sided profundity.” Historicism has blazed the trail for dynamic research on the evolution of science, but it is still confined to the framework and language system of the analytic tradition. The new force suddenly rising is nothing else except the alternative philosophy of science. Although “alternative” is not mainstream, it is very eye-catching and influential. Generally speaking, the alternative philosophy of science can be classified into three types. (1) The European anti-scientism theory has gradually penetrated into the field of philosophy of science since the 1970s. It mainly includes existentialism represented by Martin Heidegger, the Frankfurt School represented by Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas and postmodern philosophy of science represented by Foucault and Lyotard. (2) The rebellion from the traditional or orthodox philosophy of science to its opposite, mainly represented by Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty. (3) The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) studies which, by absorbing alternative ideas, break up with the science, technology and society (STS) studies, represented by radical feminism, post-colonialism and ecological philosophy of science which are taken to justify emerging political movements. As an ideological trend, the alternative philosophy of science is not an integral whole, but a collection of heterogeneous reflections on science. They focus on the relationship between science and other social practices; what they have in common is the attitude of criticizing science or anti-science, and strong suspicion of the value of science and technology. As the “Other” to the analytical tradition, the European philosophy, especially the philosophy of France and Germany, doesn’t go short of the philosophy of science (i.e., “philosophical reflection on science”). In fact, the philosophy of science can be traced back to French philosopher Auguste Comte, while Michel Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas, Lyotard and Gilles Deleuze are all his successors. In Germany, as a critic of positivism, Edmund Husserl asserted that there was a crisis in European science, and his followers Martin Heidegger, Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas never stopped the philosophical reflection on modern science and technology. These ideological resources for the philosophy of science, which belong to the humanistic ideas, are not echoes or criticisms of logical positivism, but a reflection on science according to their own rationale. Therefore, they have been excluded from the philosophy of science by the mainstream analytical tradition. So far, they have not yet received enough attention. Inside the analytic tradition, the philosophy of science seems to have moved toward self-denial, with “rebels” turning around and striking one after another. Feyerabend and Rorty are typical examples of them: the former completely

4

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denies the existence of a unique scientific methodology, while the latter vows to have the scientific epistemology uprooted. Although the rebels still use the language of analytic philosophy, they have cast their eyes on the broad European philosophy. Of course, the rebels are border-liners and targets of public criticism, which partly explains why Rorty devoted himself to literary criticism later. Since then, the foundation of the orthodox philosophy of science is no longer unbreakable. Outside the realm of pure philosophy, the reflections on contemporary science and technology have remained impressive. In the middle of the 20th century, the negative effects of science and technology became so manifested that the Western social movements no longer defended science, but turned against it. By following the new ideological trend of social constructivism, the SSK, the radical feminism, ecologism and post-colonialism started criticizing the orthodox philosophy of science extremely violently. The “others,” “rebels” and “laymen” against the orthodox philosophy of science are collectively known as “alternatives.” The reason why they are “alternative” is not only because their opinions, interests and approaches are widely different from the mainstream, but also because they make entries in the “other register” of the philosophy of science. In fact, the alternative philosophy of science has always been by the side of the mainstream philosophy of science, just like a supporting role complements a main character on the same stage. Whenever the spotlight upon the head of the main character is fading, the supporting role stands out to show its charm, and then this cycle continues, as if the two are dancing a “tango” with different rhythms. In view of its creativity, profundity and enlightenment, the alternative is not inferior to the mainstream. In order to understand contemporary science more comprehensively, philosophers of science should pay enough attention to the alternative, incorporate it into the philosophical discipline as soon as possible, and probe into the alternative ideas. In the process of reconsideration of science, the author of this book tries to fully depict the basic features of the alternative, and roughly clarify the basic clues and interconnections of the alternative evolution. I.1.1.3 The Approach of Reconsideration It must be pointed out that the position of logical positivism in praising the natural sciences, which is represented by physics, is certainly undesirable. However, most alternative ideas that thoroughly negate mainstream science have gone to the other extreme. Among the defenses and criticisms of science at present, there are of course insightful opinions, which may have a far-reaching impact on the development of science in the future. Objectively speaking, both orthodox and alternative philosophies are likely to go to extremes. Although extremes may be profound, they are certainly unfair and unjustifiable. Extreme thoughts may be inspiring, but extreme actions are sure to lead to mistakes and even disasters. Therefore, it is particularly important for those in the debate to give up their extreme viewpoints.

Introduction 5 Generally speaking, the high-level development of science and technology will drive people to continuously reflect on science. Since Western scientific concepts and spirits are deeply entrenched, the extreme opposition of science may somewhat correct the limitations of the prevailing scientism, help people regain a proper understanding of science, and maintain the freedom, equality and tolerance of the entire society. It can be said that although most Western postmodern intellectuals are critical of science, they have been acting in a forward-looking role. But for us in China, we should treat the alternative philosophy of science more carefully. We cannot vigorously preach this philosophy, because a large number of Chinese people are not yet fully aware of science, they only take it as a tangible tool rather than something of institutional, ideological or spiritual significance. When the scientific foundation remains fragile and the scientific spirit is not carried forward, we cannot blindly follow Western theories and thoughts to criticize science, or else we may descend into the ignorant state of the prescientific ages. Extreme scientism idealizes and purifies science, making it difficult to explain the sophisticated scientific world. Extreme criticism totally repudiates the objectivity of science, but endorses pluralism of truth, rejects the delimitation standard of science, and even mixes science up with mythology and witchcraft, which obliterates the important position of science in the entire society and its great contribution to human life, and one-sidedly exaggerates the negative effects of science in modern society. The right thing to do is to transcend the defense and criticism of science and to reconsider it, that is, support the development of science on the one hand, and remain vigilant to it on the other hand. This is the basic standpoint that we have extracted from diverse and complex reflections on science. In a nutshell, the right way to conduct a philosophical reflection on science is to reconsider it. This is not to compromise, but to integrate opposite views. In fact, the fierce rebuttal between defenders and critics of science has brought forth a more tolerant and peaceful philosophy of science which still has its own insistences. From a historical point of view, the theory of science has undergone a transformation from the defense of science to criticism of science and finally to reconsideration of science. When the theory of science just came into being, its main purpose was to defend science, that is, to prove the rationality of natural science and transform the humanistic and social science with scientific approaches. However, in the second half of the 20th century, the questioning of science became fashionable in academic circles, there were even voices embracing the “theory of anti-science.” But in any case, the total repudiation of science, which is apparently against common sense and practical needs, is sure to cause a backlash, which is already proved by the “Science War” in the late 20th century. Among the three approaches to treating science, this book endorses the approach of reconsideration. I.1.2 How Does Marx Reconsider Science and Technology? So, how does Marx treat science?

6

Introduction

Marx never treats science and technology as simple issues. Instead, he reconsiders them with the insight and wisdom of an outstanding thinker. He has been generous in praising science and technology, and outspoken against their negative consequences. What he has left us is a precious ideological legacy. Marx is one of the greatest thinkers in human history and a rare encyclopedic scholar in modern times. He read extensively throughout his life, and never stopped exploring. He has made so many creative contributions in the fields of economics, philosophy, politics, sociology, history, religion and anthropology, especially in the field of humanistic and social science, and left us with rich ideological and cultural heritages. How does Marx treat science? Frankly speaking, most of us had no idea of this in the past. It is some statements of Marx that have impressed us: “At the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, must ask: this must eradicate all hesitation; here all cowardice are of no avail.”3 “There is no royal road to science, and only those who do not dread the fatiguing climb of its steep paths have a chance of gaining its luminous summits,”4 and science is a “direct productive force.”5 These comments are undoubtedly thought-provoking, but they are far from enough for representing Marx’s view of science and technology. It is true that the previous studies on Marxism have simplified, or even ignored or distorted his scientific and technological thinking, not to mention there is no proper summary of his view of science and technology. In recent years, there have been researches on Marx’s view of science and technology, but they are not profound, systematic or comprehensive, because some scholars themselves are scientifically narrow-minded, confined to a single disciplinary background, and inaccessible to the original documents of Marx. In the context of reexamination of science and technology, it is quite necessary to enter the Marxist world of science and technology and systematically study how Marx reconsiders science and technology. I.1.2.1 Marx’s View of Science and Technology The so-called “view of science and technology” refers to people’s positioning of science and technology, and the results of their rational thinking on the issues such as scientific and technological structure, activities and functions. To pay attention to Marx’s thinking of science and technology and probe into his ideological legacy in this regard is the premise for studying his view of science and technology, this is also the first step for us to access to his theoretical realm of science and technology. Of course, the academic circle is divided on whether Marx has his own philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. For example, Chen Changshu, a Chinese philosopher of technology, argues that when discussing Marxist philosophy from the perspective of the generation of philosophy of technology, we will first encounter a definitional (or at least superficial) barrier, that is, Marx and Engels have contributed incisive thoughts to the philosophy of technology, but they have never used the term “philosophy of technology” in their works. So, it can be deduced that Marx

Introduction 7 and Engels have never admitted to any philosophy of technology of their own. In this sense, the concept or notion of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’ is untenable. But Prof. Chen promptly adds that although Marx and Engels have never used the term ‘philosophy of technology’ in their works, it is not ample enough to deny the existence of ‘Marxist philosophy of technology’. At the very least, we should admit that their holistic and fundamental viewpoints, which were already consciously demonstrated by them, are hard to be clearly distinguished from philosophy.6 In fact, the same argumentation is also applicable to the philosophy of science. Perhaps we do not have to assert that Marx is a philosopher of science or technology, or insist that his theory of science and technology is so good (or bad), but only recognize that “Marx’s thought of science and technology” is undoubtedly existent and abstruse, and his view of science and technology embodied in it is realistic and enlightening. Marx’s time, the 19th century, was an era of fast-rising capitalist economy. This period witnessed the first technological revolution, which was marked by the invention of textile machinery and the improvement of the steam engine, taking great strides forward. Moreover, the second technological revolution, which was marked by the application of electric power and chemical engineering technology, had started to sprout. In this period, many fields of natural science represented by classical physics were in full swing, while in the field of social production, handicraft workshops based on manual labor were being replaced by large-scale mechanized industry. As a result of the constant development of mechanized industry, there had been pressing demand for applying scientific and technological achievements in production activities. It was in this context that Marx took an interest in and followed up the new discoveries and theories of natural science, as well as the new technological inventions and their application in production. As Engels put it: Science was for Marx a historically dynamic, revolutionary force. However great the joy with which he welcomed a new discovery in some theoretical science whose practical application perhaps it was a yet quite impossible to envisage, he experienced quite another kind of joy when the discovery involved immediate revolutionary changes in industry and in historical development in general. For example, he followed closely the development of the discoveries made in the field of electricity and recently those of Marcel Deprez.7 Throughout his life, Marx had been dedicated to finding solutions to realistic problems. A great concern for reality is both the starting point and destination of his theoretical explorations. In short, Marx’s reconsideration of science and

8

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technology, which is more profound than the theoretical attainments of ordinary people, has all along been closely connected with realistic problems. In those years when the development of science and technology was in a boom and vigorously advanced social production, Marx took an interest in science and technology, and started paying attention to and thinking about scientific and technological matters. This is recorded in the works of Marx, and in his biographies and other related materials. As early as the 1840s, Marx had devoted himself to contemplating the status and role of science and technology in social production, the internal connection between the development of science and technology and that of production, and the impact of science and technology and machines on the working class, laying an ideological basis for creating the Marxist theory. In the process of exploring the law of development of capitalist society and the path of proletarian revolution, and making preparations for writing the book Capital, Marx had made painstaking effort in examining scientific and technological issues and left a large quantity of manuscripts. From 1850 to 1858, while spending time learning political and economic works, Marx also read the treatises of John Beckmann, J.H.M. Poppe, Justus von Liebig, Johnson, Lightmayer, A. Ure and Charles Babbage on science and technology, workmanship, and natural science, which had greatly improved his knowledge structure, broadened his theoretical horizon, and made him fully prepared to interpret the relationship between science and technology and productive forces in the future political economic research. To sum up, although Marx did not leave any treatise on science and technology, he has explored so many scientific and technological issues, analyzed and interpreted scientific and technological phenomena, and left us a valuable ideological legacy in this regard. The existence of Marx’s view of science and technology is an indisputable fact. I.1.2.2 Main Literature on Marx’s Ideas of Science and Technology A comprehensive study of Marx’s writings is the basis of teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology, which are mainly revealed through a vast number of monographs, manuscripts, notes, letters and conversations he has left behind. The literature which is usually accessible is only the tip of the iceberg for Marx’s whole writings. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union and the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic made the joint decision that the Marxism-Leninism research institutes of the two countries edit and publish together a new international, historical-critical edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe), for which more than 130 volumes were planned.8 It is thus clear that the Russian, Chinese and German editions of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, which are commonly seen, are in fact not complete. Among the tens of thousands of pages of manuscripts, notes and letters left

Introduction 9 by Marx, as well as the notes, commentaries and annotations in the books he collected, not all have been edited and published. Such a deficiency is bound to limit our comprehensive understanding and in-depth research today of Marx’s ideas of science and technology. The ongoing huge project of a new edition of The Complete Works of Marx and Engels will improve the conditions of our research. Marx’s documents are the primary source of Marx’s ideas. Studying Marx’s texts is the basic way to grasp Marx’s ideas of science and technology. Comprehensive and accurate uncovering of these ideas should be realized through a systematic exploration of Marx’s ideas in his writings based on his original texts. In his discussion of the significance of reading Marx’s writings, Derrida points out: It will always be a fault not to read and reread and discuss Marx—which is to say also a few others—and to go beyond scholarly “reading” or “discussion.” It will be more and more a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility.9 Teasing out Marx’s ideas of science and technology is also a process of reconsidering Marx’s view of science and technology. The first challenge in this process is to appropriately identify Marx’s ideas of science and technology and related documents. Scholars with different views of science and technology see these ideas and documents differently. As the Chinese saying goes, “the benevolent see benevolence and the wise see wisdom.” Therefore, the discovery and study of documents need to be combined with contemporary research of theories of science and technology. The two processes should supplement and promote each other. Marx’s analyses of phenomena of science and technology, and his ideas on questions of science and technology are relatedly concentrated in writings represented by Capital, but some manuscripts and writings before and after this monograph are significant as well. “Marx went through long-term hard struggles writing Capital. Based on his studies of political economy starting from the beginning of the 1840s, he wrote the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, and later the Economic Manuscripts 1861–1863.” These two Economic Manuscripts are preparations for the monumental work A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (the plan of “six books”10). On the basis of the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, Marx published the first volume of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy; in the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863, Marx changed his original plan of A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy and decided to publish it separately with the title “Capital.” These two manuscripts are both in-process works. As incipient formulations of Marx’s ideological system of political economy, they offer records of abundant original information, which of course contains rich ideas of science and technology. In particular, the Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863 is later known as the “technology manuscript.” It is an important text systematically documenting Marx’s ideas of science and technology. Machinery. Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science (People’s

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Press, 1978, Separate edition), which is familiar to many Chinese scholars, is a part of Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863: “(γ) Machinery. Utilization of the Forces of Nature and of Science.” Capital is a masterpiece to which Marx dedicated his life. As an unfinished academic tome, its writing continued for more than 40 years. Only the first volume of Capital (1894) was published in Marx’s lifetime (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 23); Engels collated and published the second volume (1885) and the third volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 24, 25); Bernstein collated and published the fourth volume (1894) (The Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 26). The Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858 is collected into The Complete Works of Marx and Engels as the 46th volume, with the Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863 in the 47th and the 48th volumes and “Wages” in the sixth volume, etc. It should be noted that lots of the unpublished writings by Marx record his scientific and technological thoughts. For instance, in his letter on 28 January 1863, from London to Engels, who was far away in Manchester, Marx wrote: I am inserting certain things into the section on machinery. There are some curious questions which I originally failed to deal with. To elucidate these, I have re-read all my note-books (excerpts) on technology and am also attending a practical (purely experimental) course for working men given by Prof. Willis (in Jermyn Street, the Institute of Geology, where Huxley also lectured). For me, mechanics presents much the same problem as languages. I understand the mathematical laws, but the simplest technical reality that calls for ocular knowledge is more difficult for me than the most complicated combinations.11 The notebooks (excerpts) on technology mentioned by Marx here have not yet been collated and published. These notebooks (excerpts) are abstracts of the works by other writers, including J.H.M. Poppe’s Geschichte der Technologie seit der Wiederherstellung der Wissenschaften bis an das Ende des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Vol. 1–3, Göttingen, 1807–1811), A. Ure’s Technisches Wörterbuch (ed. Bearbeitet von Kramarsch and Heeren, Vol. 1–3, Prag, Erster Band, 1843– 1844), and J. Beckmann’s Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erfindungen (Vol. 1–5, Göttingen, 1782–1805).12 These writings are sources of Marx’s “Notebooks (Excerpts) on Technology” – abstracts of his readings on technology – are of great value as historical materials for understanding the formation and development of Marx’s scientific and technological thoughts. As more and more works by Marx are published and about to be published, we will have a more solid literature basis for completely and accurately understanding his scientific and technological thoughts. It should also be pointed out that science and technology exist in all aspects of social life. They are important socio-cultural phenomena. In his discussions and expositions of many theoretical issues, Marx often talks about science and technology. These ideas can be found in many different writings by Marx. For

Introduction 11 example, Marx refers to the issue of technology and makes special arguments on it when he discusses “man’s essential nature,” “alienization,” and “division of labor” in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, when he expounds on “instrument,” “labor” and “purpose” in The German Ideology, and when he elaborates on “competition” and “the poverty of the working class” in “Wages.” In general, these documents are accepted widely by diverse schools and paradigms. We should go beyond the narrow sense of “views of science and technology,” broaden our theoretical horizon, examine Marx’s writings on science and technology in a broad sense, and strive for comprehensive and accurate reconsideration of Marx’s ideas of science and technology. I.1.2.3 Several Issues to Note in Studying Marx’s Ideas about Science and Technology Strictly speaking, Marx expounds on science and technology mainly on the level of specific scientific and technological activities. These expositions include records and reports of historical facts of science and technology, excerpts from past monographs on ideas of science and technology, and contemplations on multiple aspects of issues of science and technology. It is appropriate and apropos to sort through Marx’s lifetime achievements of his inquiry into scientific and technological activities and phenomena under the category of “ideas of science and technology.” Such work is helpful for comprehensively and accurately grasping Marx’s views of science and technology and their formation. For example, a systematic reading of Marx’s original works would clearly show that the term “technology” does not appear frequently in The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Chinese, 1st edition). There are merely 40 entries and over 160 references directly related with “technology.”13 On the surface, in comparison with entries like “capital,” “labor,” “division of labor,” “value,” “the working class,” etc., “technology” is not a subject keyword in Marx’s theories. However, this judgment is superficial and not in accordance with the fact. In terms of the daily use of natural language, the linguistic phenomenon of polysemy and that of several different words referring to the same meaning are both very common. There are usually multiple terms and ways to refer to an object. We should not assume that only one certain word, and not its “synonyms,” refers to a certain object. John Dewey, the founding father of the Dewey school in modern philosophy of technology, points out in his reflections on the expression of his own academic ideas: “It is probable that I might have avoided a considerable amount of misunderstanding if I had systematically used ‘technology’ instead of ‘instrumentalism’ in connection with the view I put forth regarding the distinctive quality of science as knowledge.”14 Isn’t it the same with Marx’s formulation of his ideas of science and technology! Therefore, we should pay attention to what Marx has said, but no less, to what he has intended to express. As a matter of fact, technology is an important constituent element in human civilization, existing in various aspects of social life. There is no doubt that the 19th century, in which Marx spent his life, witnessed not merely the widespread presence

12

Introduction

of technological phenomena, but also the rapid advancement of technology. Technology continuously deepened its influences on various aspects of social life. Marx started to pay attention to these technological phenomena very early and conducted specific research on multiple levels. A distinctive feature of Marx’s accounts of technological phenomena is that he uses a number of subordinate concepts of “technology,” which means that he tends to discuss the constituent units, operational mechanisms, and various consequences of technology in special technological systems and seldom uses the abstract and unified category of “technology” and its theoretical systems to make generalizations and statements. In June 1853, Marx points out in “The British Rule in India”: It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began with driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons…This decline of Indian towns celebrated for their fabrics was by no means the worst consequence. British steam and science uprooted, over the whole surface of Hindostan, the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry.15 Although there is no mention of the specific word of “technology,” terms such as “cotton,” “hand-loom,” “spinning-wheel,” “steam,” “science” and “the union between agriculture and manufacturing industry” are direct references to technological products, equipment and processes. These terms profoundly demonstrate the marginalization of traditional Indian handweaving techniques by mechanical textile technologies. In fact, such expressions are ubiquitous in Marx’s writings. In terms of its subtlety and flexibility, Marxism, as a mode that translates and negotiates among different languages, is much superior to other systems. This is true for all those great systems with universality…Marxism is indeed the only all-encompassing skill or mechanism of translation and transition. If we say that Marxism is a unique and advantaged mode of thinking, the reason is just that, instead of your own claim that you have discovered truth. The “privilege” of Marxism lies in the fact that it always intervenes into and mediates among various theoretical codes, which cannot compete with it in terms of depth and comprehensiveness.16 Technicians who are occupied from day to day with specific tasks work in a linguistic context featured by professional vocabularies such as lathe, motor, vernier caliper, blueprints, software and contract. They seldom see the term “technology,” but we cannot deny the technological nature of their work on the basis of the absence of this term. Marx’s view of science and technology is structured by his analyses following the clear trajectory of the advancement of production technology: “individual handicraft techniques, workshop handicraft techniques, and large-scale

Introduction 13 mechanized industrial technologies.” Citing W. Schulz’s ideas in Die Bewegung der Production, Marx depicted this trajectory explicitly. Period of manufacture…of handicraft activity subdivided to the highest degree, which is at the same time an activity in which one hand cooperates with another for one and the same purpose of production. The continued division of labor finally leads to the employment of a more perfected machine system, and thereby to the fourth stage (first hand labor, then handicraft labor, then manufacture, then fabrication) of actual fabrication by machines.17 Furthermore, Marx maintained that there are progressive and derivative relations, instead of absolutely clear boundaries, among various forms of technology. In the womb of handicrafts, manufacture develops in its initial stage and even machinery is employed here and there, in individual spheres and for individual processes; the latter point is especially true in the period of real workshop handicraft, since water and wind power is adopted in some handicraft processes (or human and animal power is used to substitute water and wind power)…The general law at work here is that the material possibilities of the latter (production) form – both the technological conditions and their corresponding corporate economic structure – are created within the bounds of the former form.18 Marx’s study of significant issues such as capital and the fate of the working class under capitalist conditions forms the theoretical context of his exploration of scientific and technological issues. Although science and technology are not the ultimate concerns in Marx’s research, ideas of science and technology can be clearly identified in his numerous writings. In these texts, there are both analyses of internal features such as specific elements, structures, and properties of technological systems, and tracking and investigation of external features such as the operational effects of technologies. Such comprehensive analyses, with technology considered as an element of social systems, are conducted from perspectives of sociology, economics and historical materialism. They aim at revealing the inner connections between technology and other social elements. Therefore, this kind of exploration, based on analysis of internal features of technology and devoted to the uncovering of social properties and functions of technology, serves the purpose of founding the theoretical system of Marxism. This is an important feature of Marx’s examination of science and technology. Overall, Marx’s analyses of scientific and technological issues contribute directly to his study of the social structure and patterns of development of capitalism, as well as his seeking of the way of proletarian revolution. Hence, although Marx’s ideas of science and technology do not dominate the mainstream in the system of his thoughts, they still form an indispensable part of it. We shall not be limited to the level of contemporary philosophical theories and be overcritical of Marx for his fragmentary, crude, primitive, biased expressions

14

Introduction

based on experience. Instead, we need to see the whole picture through observation of details. We shall be adept in retrieving and extracting Marx’s ideas of science and technology from his individual expositions of many specific scientific and technological phenomena, and in uncovering the internal connections among these individual opinions on technology, methodizing these scattered ideas and integrating them into a unified logical system. Unlike texts of natural sciences, which are featured by definiteness of connotation, the significance of texts of humanities and social sciences are generated through readers’ reading processes. Different readers, and even a single reader, when reading the same text with different states of mind and in different times and spaces, may acquire different gains and inspirations. “Home and abroad, there are many different and even completely opposite contexts of various commentators’ understandings of the true meaning of Marxist philosophy. It is confusing that these commentators all rely on the original primary texts by Marx.”19 That is also why the significance and connotation of many canonical texts are constantly renewed and these texts can be passed down through centuries. We should object to interpretations that disregard the system of Marx’s original texts and take fragmentary writings of Marx out of their contexts. We should also object to interpretations that neglect the specific historical scenarios of Marx’s time, construe Marx’s texts only based on contemporary sociocultural backgrounds, arbitrarily expand and extend the texts’ original meanings, and simply transplant or transfer contemporary understandings of science and technology to Marx’s writings. It is of great importance in today’s study of the history of Marx’s thoughts to go back to Marx’s time and into his world of science and technology, reread his original texts, and retrieve his ideas of science and technology. Marxism, as a source of many modern Western academic schools, has farreaching impacts on the development of Western thoughts. Western scholars often develop their theories on the basis of citing or criticizing classical arguments of Marx. “In postwar France, more than 80% of intellectuals considered themselves as Marxists, or at least they considered Marxist problems—problems about base and superstructure, the nature of ideology, and representation—as basic elements in their respective topics.”20 In fact, Western scholars’ research of Marx’s thoughts has never ceased for over a century. They have put forward plenty of brilliant ideas and produced a multitude of important achievements. Nonetheless, due to factors such as ideological disagreements, we have usually maintained negative or rejective attitudes towards their research. It now appears that such attitudes are against the pattern of academic development and harmful to the study of Marx’s thoughts. Marx’s thoughts belong to mankind, but in terms of origin, it inherits from Western cultures instead of oriental cultural traditions. Therefore, in order to make in-depth research into Marx’s reconsideration of science and technology, it is necessary to be familiar with Western cultural traditions and their developments and to understand the multifold images of Marx in Western academic views.

Introduction 15

I.2 How to Understand Existing Philosophy of Science and Technology I.2.1 The Tradition of Western Theories of Science and Technology The rise of the theory of science and technology was due first of all to the positivist movement emerging in 1830s France. After the emergence of Newtonian mechanics, natural science advanced significantly. Science and technology entered all fields and levels of human society through the Industrial Revolution and the Power Revolution, fully demonstrating their power of transforming the world. Positivism advocated the reform of philosophy, considering previous philosophy as completely “metaphysical” instead of “scientific” and contending that philosophy should acquire a truly scientific nature through evolution. After Auguste Comte’s positivism, the field of theories on science and technology generally involves philosophical schools such as Machism, logical atomism, logical empiricism, operationalism, process philosophy, logical pragmatism, falsificationism, historicism, scientific realism and scientific antirealism. Among these schools, the most important one is logical empiricism, which burgeoned in the 1930s. Logical empiricism has contributed considerably to the spread and formation of theories of science and technology. This school inherited the empiricist tradition from David Hume and Ernst Mach, and logical analysis from Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It emphasizes the complete transformation of philosophy into scientific philosophy or “standard philosophy of science” (in the terminology of logical empiricism) with science as its mode, logic as its means and physics as its unified language. Logical empiricism discusses new developments and epistemological questions in modern physics, mathematics and logics. In terms of problematics, it is the philosophical study of science. At the same time, it imitates natural science and in particular physics in such studies, which endows its approaches of response with a scientific nature. That is to say, there are two most prominent features of “standard theories of science,” represented by theories of Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel: considering science as its problematics (scientific problematics) and striving for responding to the problematics scientifically (scientific responses). Orthodox theories of science take science as their problematics, which does not mean that they study questions of specific sciences. Logic empiricism argues that the task of philosophy is not to put forward propositions or establish systems of proposition-theory, which are the tasks of science. The mission of philosophy is to logically analyze and clarify the significance of concepts, hypotheses, and propositions in science, in order to clear confusions of ideas generated therefrom.21 There is no doubt that, according to the logic of logical empiricism, “standard theory of science” is no longer conventional, meaningless metaphysics, but can be seen as a part of science. In a certain sense, orthodox theory of science can be seen

16

Introduction

as “meta-science.” It concentrates on clarifying the significance of propositions and endeavors to explain the relationship between the logical structure and the empirical basis of science, and that between justification and discovery. Its essence lies in delimiting the range of scientific discussions (i.e., identifying meaningful propositions), dealing with the relationship between two kinds of propositions (i.e., theoretical propositions and empirical propositions), as well as the relationship between two stages of the production of scientific knowledge (i.e., justification and discovery). In modern intellectual history, the emergence and development of orthodox theory of science are closely connected with the epistemological turn and linguistic turn of the whole philosophy. It is generally acknowledged that a main thread running through ancient Greek philosophy is ontology, which is the research about “what is the origin of the world.” After René Descartes, the central problem of philosophy in the modern period became “how do human beings acquire knowledge,” which signifies the epistemological turn. With the rise of natural science, the idea that natural science is the perfect form of knowledge created by mankind was gradually accepted. Scientific epistemology, the orthodox theory of science, became the most important form of epistemology in the 20th century. The linguistic turn afterward centers around the question of “how does language function as a reliable instrument of cognition.” As a result, methodologies of linguistic analysis and logical analysis gradually entered the field of scientific epistemology studies. I.2.2 Alternative Theories of Science and Technology Deviating from Convention Philosophy of science is still the fundamental theory of philosophy of science and technology. Nevertheless, great changes have taken place in its philosophical background, which means that the philosophical basis of science today is no longer the same as that of science in the past. On the one hand, logicism advances toward historicism, and significant theoretical progress has occurred within orthodox philosophy of science. On the other, methodologies of phenomenology and postmodern “deconstructive” methodologies penetrated into the philosophy of science after the mid-20th century. In this way, ontology, pragmatics, and contextualism have opened together a new field of philosophy of science. The world of science and the world of human life have become fields that cannot be neglected in philosophy of science. Various methodologies and theories demonstrate their validity of certain kinds. Contemporary philosophy of science, built on a previous basis, understands, judges and defends science from various aspects and with a broad horizon. Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty are the two well-known figures contributing to the significant transformation of the philosophy of science. They severely criticized and even completely subverted the nature of analytical philosophy and science. Some people argue that Feyerabend changed from a fanatical positivist into “the worst enemy of science.” Seen as a heretic, he negates all logicism, going

Introduction 17 even farther than historicism. He was at first a positivist following the tradition of analytical philosophy, but before long, he turned positivism on its head. “He is a rationalist, but his ideas have caused huge damage to rationalism. He is a realist, but his theories have greatly threatened realism. At the same time, he is a relativist, but he does not promote all forms of relativism.”22 He opposes methodologies, but simultaneously he advocates plural methodologies. He is neither rational nor irrational. Some see in his style similarities with sages of ancient Greek and also elements of postmodernism. There are mixed opinions about Feyerabend. It is exactly because he is so different and rich that his contribution to the philosophy of science is distinctive and ground-breaking. The characteristics of every aspect of science seem to be demonstrated clearly by Feyerabend. Undoubtedly, it is precisely his restraint from judging right and wrong that allows the philosophy of science to turn away from logicism and incomplete historicism to relativism, irrationalism, and even anti-scientism. However, he has also thereby inspired diverse perspectives of contemplating science and unfolded a broad horizon. Similarly, Rorty grew up in the convention of analytical philosophy but later turned his back on it. Unlike Feyerabend, however, Rorty mainly attempts to deconstruct the tradition of Western philosophy, promoting a “post-philosophy culture.” Therefore, his study of science is integrated into his construction of “post-philosophy culture” and his criticism of scientism. According to him, in Willard Van Quinn, the later Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson, analytical philosophy transcends and invalidates itself, and the transformation of philosophy into science and the pursuit of certainty in philosophy end in failure. On such basis, Rorty promotes “conversational philosophy” that goes beyond scientism, opposes fundamentalism, objects to the pursuit of certainty in the philosophy of science and turns towards pragmatism, intending to remove the antagonism between science and humanities and integrate them. Of course, he has been criticized as a relativist in the end, though he called such criticism “ethnocentrism,” expressing his objection to essentialism and to the “strong rationality” of science that pursues universality and inevitability. Feyerabend and Rorty focus on different problems in different fields of research. Rorty attempts to break through conventional philosophy, while Feyerabend tries to go beyond conventional concepts of science. In terms of science, they reach the same destination through distinct routes, putting forward perspectives and methods for considering science that are completely different from conventional and “orthodox” ones. These perspectives and methods involve the so-called antiessentialism, anti-fundamentalism, relativism and irrationalism. Scholars such as Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jean Francois Lyotard, who have been explicitly categorized as postmodernist, “deconstruct” science and culture in more radical ways. “Deconstruction” starts not with Foucault, but Edmund Husserl, and really from Derrida. The fact is, however, that the process and effect of Foucault’s criticism of knowledge and science are exactly what “deconstruction” intends to achieve. Science and knowledge are what concern Foucault. The tradition of French scientific history forms the basis of his ideas and influences his lifetime

18

Introduction

career in philosophy. His writings appeared primarily in the forms of history of knowledge, history of thought, and history of science. His ideas are demonstrated mainly through his research of the history of science. Therefore, science is a basic theme in Foucault’s philosophy. He expounds on philosophical issues such as the birth of disciplines and the collective production of scientific knowledge. As he contends, disciplinary division leads to the categorization of scientific knowledge into disciplines, making science, with its distinctive characteristics, independent from culture, and separating science from philosophy. From then on, philosophy has ceased to play any practical role in science, and science has rejected philosophy and moved toward scientism. The production of scientific knowledge is an outcome of collective practice. Nonetheless, Foucault takes a standpoint of anti-subjectivity, which clearly distinguishes his epistemology from conventional scientific epistemology. His archaeology aims at demonstrating that science is merely a collection of discourses formed through discursive rules, explaining how discourses form various sciences in history. In this way, archaeology cancels the distinction between science and non-science, as well as the subject. It thereby transforms conventional epistemology. At the same time, the progressiveness of science and the correspondence theory of truth are refuted. Instead, the discontinuities in the development of science, and the incommensurability among sciences of different periods are emphasized. As a result, Kuhn’s paradigm appears similar in some respects to Gestalt Theory. In a word, in his archaeology of knowledge, Foucault conducts completely new discursive analyses of psychiatry, madness, hospital, clinical medicine, and even the whole humanities. He forms new understandings of the history of knowledge, thought, and science, and criticizes the concepts of continuity and subjectivity, cognitive rationality in the traditional history of thought, as well as concepts such as the objectivity and gradualness of science. He uncovers the deep-seated “unconsciousness” or a certain structure behind science, knowledge, and thought, and summarizes and elaborates on the epistemology and methodology of the archaeology of knowledge.23 In addition, Foucault pays attention to the political status and ideological function of science, ascribing them to knowledge and power. He maintains that modern science and knowledge turn society into a controlling machine, making the modern people voluntarily accept the guidance of science and knowledge and “give power over to the discourse of truth.” As a result, people are enslaved by knowledge and power. The way of life and death becomes the way of “producing truth,” science and knowledge. Modern knowledge and science thus construct modern man as a homogeneous subject. As a matter of fact, Foucault intends to criticize modern Western culture, especially the standardization and its “general will” through his analysis of modern knowledge and power, looking for the way of individual liberation. The one who explicitly claims a stance of “deconstruction” is Derrida. In terms of their starting points, Derrida, Husserl and Heidegger appear very similar, as they all attached great significance to the approach of “deconstruction,” though their understandings of “deconstruction” are of different depths. Husserl carries

Introduction 19 out the “deconstruction of thought” in the modern world of science in the sense of modernity, which means deconstructing the conceptual system that constitutes the world of science. However, such “deconstruction” mainly appears as a kind of “restoration” and “suspension,” with characteristics of modern subjectivist philosophy. Heidegger questions existence, intending to deconstruct the tradition of ontology. The primary agenda of Derrida’s deconstructivism is to deconstruct “logocentrism,” which dominates the Western tradition of philosophy. He maintains that there is no absolute truth, universal law, transcendental meaning or absolute spirit in this world. He names as “the metaphysics of presence” and deconstructs systems of thought which are founded on specific principles and foundations and with a grand systematic structure. His work is essentially concerned with opposing the tendency of making truth absolute and transcendental. What he intends to deconstruct is Western rationalism manifested as “logocentrism” and “phonocentrism.” That is to say, his deconstruction is aimed at the tradition of Western rationalist thought and the central position of rationalism. Derrida has not made elaborate arguments on the specific “deconstruction” of science. However, his methodologies of thinking, together with other postmodernist ideas, have radiated into the field of science. His “deconstruction” has resulted in radical relativism in the philosophy of science, allowing the relativist trend, in which science is suspected, to prevail among intellectuals of his time. Science is thus seen as a rule made by political power. Science became a power, a game and a means of serving sponsors. Logical standards in scientific research as well as the objective truth are subject to widespread and strong suspicion. As a consequence, in the “Sokal Incident” and “science wars,” Derrida contends that the Einstein Constant was not a constant, not a center, but a concept of a variable. In other words, it does not represent the understanding of an object – the center of this field of research which the researcher is able to grasp. It is a concept of game. Consequently, in Western postmodernism, the philosophy of science is generally characterized by anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, de-subjectification, nonscience-centrism or anti-scientism. Naturally, such completely deconstructive views of science have also been accused and severely criticized by many scholars, especially scientists. I.2.3 Persistent Concerns in Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated above, in intellectual history, the philosophy of science and technology has been closely related with the epistemological turn and the linguistic turn of philosophy. It has exerted great impacts on the development of the whole philosophy and human thought through 19th-century positivism and 20thcentury logical empiricism. Today, in the form of historicism, sociologicalization and post-philosophical culture, it has moved away from pursuing definiteness and building reliable empirical and logical foundation for science and technology to enthusiastically deconstructing all tendencies of absolutization and foundationalism. It has also moved away from a preference for action and pursuit of goals

20

Introduction

of operability towards questioning certain cultural institutions and making social criticism. In China, the philosophy of science and technology has been the pioneer of thought liberalization, the window of opening up, and the starting point of modernization at several critical points. Philosophy of science was introduced into China together with science at the beginning of the 20th century. Its impacts in China have far exceeded its own significance. It was introduced and imported here not merely as a branch of philosophy, but more importantly, as a kind of ideology and research into the methodologies and epistemology of science. It provides epistemological support for science to take root and develop in China. It is of extremely important ideological, cultural and social value for the advancement of science here and for the progress of the Chinese society itself. The methodology of logical analysis, which is contained in pragmatism, especially Russell’s mathematics and philosophy, was a brand-new, unprecedented method of thinking in early-20thcentury China. It was a new element brought by Western science and philosophy into China’s repertoire of thought. As Feng Youlan points out, a lasting contribution of Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy is the method of logical analysis. It offers to Chinese people a completely new method of thinking, which leads to great changes in the entire Chinese thought. This thinking methodology directly offers modern Chinese philosophy a primary method of construction that is clear and explicit. It also provides Chinese scholars with a new method of considering contemporary issues of democracy, science and social development. At the end of the 1970s, science and technology and education were on the cutting edge of the movement of rectification to restore order and reform and open up. At that point, the philosophy of science and technology, a famous part of which is the dialectics of nature, showed its unique power. The first step in the rectification of Chinese society’s previous incorrect ideas about science and technology was the acknowledgment and extension of Marx’s proposition about science being “direct productivity.” Later in the critical debate on the criterion of truth, facts and methods from science played significant roles as evidence. Philosophy of science and technology, with its rational and positivist spirit, suited Chinese society’s welcoming attitude towards science and its demand for and spirit of developing social economy and education with science. It met the era’s need for reform and opening up. Therefore, philosophy of science became not only the point on which philosophy participated in China’s enterprises at that point, but more importantly, a window of thought through which China established connections with the world. Under the impacts of two global trends – reform and opening up, and the revolution of science and technology – the research framework of the philosophy of science and technology has experienced new changes and its content has been expanded. On the basis of breaking the relatively closed condition of research of dialectics of nature, five main branch subjects have been established: philosophy of nature, philosophy of science, philosophy of technology, science technology and society studies (STS), and history of scientific and technological

Introduction 21 thought. Through research in these branch disciplines, philosophy of science and technology reflects on science and technology philosophically, demonstrates the general picture of the development of scientific and technological thought, and clarifies the connections between science and nature, science and philosophy, science and technology, as well as science, technology and the society. It teases out the general process of scientific understanding and the methods and methodological principles applied to this process. It explores and analyzes the philosophical implications of the construction, test, explanation and evaluation of scientific theories, as well as the common features of technology, and the driving forces and modes of the development of technology. I.2.3.1 Philosophy of Nature Philosophy of nature deals primarily with the view of nature, the relationship between mankind and nature, and the idea and strategies of sustainable development. It is a basic subject in the philosophy of science and technology. In terms of the view of nature, the academia has paid considerable attention to natural nature and artificial nature. Discussions on these topics focus on the definition of the concepts of “natural nature” and “artificial nature,” their characteristics, and their coordinated development. The primary purpose of defining and distinguishing artificial nature and natural nature is to understand their patterns of development, in order to coordinate their relations. Fundamentally speaking, since the beginning of the 20th century, the crisis in the relationship between mankind and nature has been in essence the crisis of artificial nature. Therefore, the key to coordinated development of mankind and nature is the coordinated development of natural nature and artificial nature. Artificial nature should be culturally controlled, with a certain kind of balance kept between human beings’ transformation of natural nature and their protection of it. At the same time, the awareness about the equality of rights between mankind and nature should be reached. With the progress of science and technology, the living conditions of mankind have run into various problems. Through research of the relationship between mankind and nature, scholars have posed questions about anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrism holds that human beings are the center of the relationship between mankind and nature. Non-human existence has only instrumental value for human beings. The ultimate purpose of protecting the environment is to protect mankind. On the contrary, non-anthropocentrism maintains that human beings are not the sole source of value. They are not the center of the relationship between mankind and nature, and environmental protection is not merely for protecting mankind. Academic discussions on this issue concentrate on the basic connotations and manifestations of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, as well as on whether the former should be left behind. Research related to sustainable development is an important part of the philosophy of nature. Discussions on this topic are made in many aspects. In terms of fundamental theories, there are discussions about the theoretical basis

22

Introduction

and basic connotations of sustainable development. In terms of value, scholars have discussed environmental ethics, the ethical foundation, and standards of value in sustainable development. With respect to method, discussions focus on the basic methodologies, systematic dynamics, strategy and management, as well as technical support of sustainable development. As for evaluation, discussions center around the methods of evaluation and the index system of sustainable development. For China, the issue of sustainable development is of particular significance, because in the 21st century, the pressure from the successive advent of three population peaks (the peaks of gross population, gross employed population, and gross aging population), the unusually heavy exploitation of natural resources, the increasing deterioration of the ecological environment, the rapid advancement of industrialization and urbanization, and the intensification of regional inequalities, will all lead to bottlenecks in future development. Therefore, we must insist on the principle of coordinating environmental protection and economic development and implement strategies of sustainable development. I.2.3.2 Philosophy of Science Philosophy of science is the philosophical study of science itself and systems of basic questions such as the pattern of scientific advancement. It focuses primarily on issues such as the ontology, epistemology and methodology of science. Since the 1990s, there has been a climax of the spread and studies of scientific realism and anti-realism in China. The number of related literature amounts to over a hundred. Specialized research of scientific realism has progressed rapidly as well. For example, Guo Guichun, in his Contemporary Scientific Realism, Postmodern Scientific Realism, and Postmodern Philosophy of Science, makes a detailed introduction of and comments on the origin, development, and trends of scientific realism. In addition, Companion to Masterworks of 20th-Century Western Philosophy, edited by Qiu Renzong, Li Xingmin’s “Summary of Studies of Modern Scientific Realism,” Zhang Zhicang’s “From Anti-Realism to QuasiRealism,” and Zheng Xiangfu’s Van Fraassen and Postmodern Philosophy of Science, introduce and comment in detail on scientific anti-realism. On the basis of introducing and commenting on scientific realism and anti-realism, domestic scholars have formed their own opinions of “scientific realism.” As Zhang Xihai points out in “Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism’,” there are as many as eight different kinds of such opinions.24 Furthermore, progress has also been made in studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge, the relationship between science and philosophy, analytical philosophy, linguistic philosophy, postmodernist philosophy of science and philosophy of social sciences, etc. Methodologies and epistemology have witnessed new developments, such as Bayesianism, experimentalism, embodied cognition theory, and feminist theory of knowledge. With the fast advancement of science and technology, the trend of development of the philosophy of science has become a hot topic in the academia in recent years. Zeng Huan argues in “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and

Introduction 23 Technology” that the 21st-century philosophy of science will return to the purport and approach of the critical school of thought. It will carve out its own way while maintaining necessary tension with the modern philosophy of science and postmodernist philosophy of science. It will probably achieve innovation in methodology and paradigm.25 I.2.3.3 Philosophy of Technology Philosophy of technology generally studies the universal patterns of technology and its development, inquiring into the essence and structure of technology, the internal mechanisms of technological advancement and innovation, and methodologies of technology. Its research involves topics such as technology and nature, technology and science, technology and economics, technology and society, technology and culture, technology and psychology, as well as the evaluation of technology. The ontology of technology, technological innovation, and axiology of technology have become hotspots in Chinese scholars’ discussions in recent years. In terms of ontological studies, “what is technology” has always been a focus of debate among scholars. Related opinions in the early days can be summarized as “theory of material means,” “theory of the combination of material means, ways, and methods,” theory of practical (operational) knowledge system,” “theory of activity (process),” and “theory of mode of activity.” New developments during recent years include theories of broad definitions of the concept of technology, and the idea that human beings’ purposeful activities provide the new hotbed breeding technologies. In terms of how human beings achieve their purposes, technology can be understood in a broad sense as the sequence or manner of the purposeful activities that subjects constantly create and apply, centering on the practical problem of “how to achieve purpose effectively.”26 Wu Guolin, in “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology,” contends that technology is a complicated system with complexity in itself. Its nature is not the sum of various technological elements, but the result of the emergence and interactions of these elements and the result of transcendence. Technology cannot be reduced to technological elements. It is the application of intellectual, substantive and empirical elements to practice, prompting the transformations of natural objects or technical artifacts.27 The perspectives of early research on technological innovation are related to economics, management, and sociology. There have been significant changes in the research perspectives recently, as scholars have been increasingly studying technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy. Some scholars, based on the principles of practical materialism, define technological innovation from the perspective of philosophy as “a kind of practice in which enterprises, as the subject of innovation, under conditions of innovation and through certain mediation, transform the object of innovation and realize market value.” According to Chen Qirong, there are five basic features of technological innovation: innovativeness, practicality, sociality, historicity and uncertainty.28

24

Introduction

Xiao Xinhua, in “A Philosophical Rational Study of Technological Innovation,” uses the methodology of paradigmatic thinking. Starting with research of the characteristics, mechanisms, methods, and approaches of technological innovation, they put forward three pairs of categories: inevitability and coincidence, possibility and reality, form and content.29 The issue of “value of technology” in the philosophy of technology is mainly embodied in the debate between the “value neutrality of technology” and the “value-loadedness of technology.” Recently, the latter has gradually superseded the former and become the focus of research. The advancements of technology and the value it is loaded with have given rise to a series of ethical questions and encouraged the discussion of technological ethics. Consequently, ethics of technology, a new branch subject, is on the rise. In their reflections on questions such as the negative effects of technology, scholars have put forward new concepts like green technology, rationality of the value of technology, the double-helix structure of the value of technology, social control of technological development, global value, humanistic concerns, the good of technology. These works have not only deepened the studies of the value of technology, but also promoted the advancement of ethics, philosophy of value, and other related subjects. I.2.3.4 Research of Science, Technology and Society (STS) Science, technology and society is a burgeoning subject which studies the patterns and application of interconnections among science, technology, and society, and involves multiple disciplines and fields. Since the 1980s, there have been nationwide trends of STS studies in China. In recent years, prominent topics in this subject have involved the demarcation of science and technology, and philosophical questions regarding engineering technology. There are two contradictory ideas about the distinction between science and technology. The first is that it is not necessary to distinguish between science and technology, while the second is that we should draw boundaries between the two. Scholars holding the first kind of idea think that it is very not easy to make clear distinctions between science and technology if we consider only the internal structures of scientific and technological activities. The division of science and technology as a whole into basic sciences, applied sciences, and engineering technology exactly shows that it is difficult to draw a clear line between science and technology. Moreover, as Lei Yi points out, in the time of the technologization of science and the scientization of technology, it would be impossible for science to function normally if technological elements are excluded from it.30 What the term “science and technology” indicates is the intimate connections between modern science and technology. There is a lack of real understanding about the nature of technology and science in the consideration of “science and technology” only from the angle of social functions. Such consideration takes “science and technology” mainly as “technology,” and science as only a secondary part of “science and technology.” At least, we can say that the first idea has not really grasped the essence of science and technology. The second

Introduction 25 idea maintains that the demarcation of science and technology is of necessity. First of all, there are differences between the purpose of science and that of technology. The purpose and value of science lie in clarifying the facts and rules of nature or the real world and the growth of human knowledge. Technology is devoted to the increase of social wealth and the social welfare of human beings through the designing and manufacturing of various artifacts. Secondly, the object of research is different between science and technology. The object of scientific research is nature – the natural system objectively independent from mankind. The object of technological research is the system of artificial nature, that is, the artificial systems that have been processed by human beings for human purposes. Thirdly, science and technology differ significantly in the questions they cope with and the vocabularies they use in answering these questions. Lastly, science and technology are dissimilar in terms of social norms. The basic norms of scientific communities include universalism (cosmopolitanism), public ownership of knowledge, absence of private interests and methodical skepticism. These four basic principles, however, are not fully applicable to technological communities.31 With regard to developments in reality, the demarcation of science and technology is primarily related to two problems. Firstly, there will be confusion in the relationship between the philosophy of science and the philosophy of technology if we do not make any distinction and consider technology as the application of science. Secondly, neglecting the relative independence of scientific advancement and blindly demanding science to satisfy social needs as technology does will harm the development of science and thus lead to numerous social problems. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish the two on the levels of theory and practice. The philosophical study of engineering technology is another progress in the philosophy of technology. With the deepening institutionalization of the philosophy of engineering in China, related philosophical questions have gained attention in the academia. Recent focuses in the field of philosophy of engineering include issues of ethics of engineering activities and engineering talents. I.2.3.5 History of Scientific and Technological Thoughts History of science and history of technology are both specialized subjects, generally beyond the purview of philosophy of science and technology. Nonetheless, history of scientific and technological thought is an important and indispensable aspect of the philosophy of science and technology. Related academic topics include the relationship between the history of science and philosophy of science, the Whig interpretation of history, case studies (of scientists or scientific discoveries) in the history of science, intellectual history of scientific knowledge, ancient Chinese scientific thoughts, comparative studies of Chinese scientific thoughts, studies of the lives and thoughts of famous scientists, studies of the “Needham Problem,” transitions in modern Chinese institutions of science and technology, and transitions in modern Chinese institutions and ideas of education.

26

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A series of achievements have been made in the research of the history of scientific and technological thoughts. Early scholarships include the second volume of Joseph Needham’s Science and Civilization in China, Dong Yingzhe’s 1990 work Intellectual History of Science in China, Li Yao’s 1995 work Intellectual History of Science and Technology in Ancient China, Zhu Yazong’s 1995 work History of Criticisms of Science and Technology in China, and Zeng Jinyi’s 1995 work Comparison between Ideas on Science and Technology in China and the West. Achievements since 2000 have been even richer, too numerous to mention here. The publication of these monographs offers good materials for studies of the history of scientific thoughts as well as more platforms for research of philosophy of science. Xi Zezong has summarized the content of the philosophy of scientific thoughts into five aspects: first, studying the view of nature and the view of science, focusing on various stages in the development of natural science; second, studying thoughts of scientists, focusing on the people; third, studying the formation and development of basic concepts in science; fourth, studying the formation of scientific theories and the problems these theories face today; fifth, studying methods of establishing scientific concepts and applying scientific theories.32 A conventional approach in the research of the history of scientific thoughts is to begin with scientific concepts and study the history of scientific thoughts through examinations of the evolution of these concepts. Nevertheless, there was no modern system of science in ancient China. What should be the object of research on the history of scientific thought during that period? Some studies maintain that such research should involve all the intellectual achievements that are inspiring and instructive in history and in reality, and that the goal of such research is reached by examining intellectual achievements. If the methodology of Chinese intellectual history is limited to the framework of Western logical analysis and concentrates merely on concepts and categories that match their Western counterparts, there will be “concealment” in understanding. Chinese history of scientific thoughts should be closely connected with research of traditional Chinese cognitive patterns. Studies of these two fields should promote each other in order to deepen understanding in this aspect.33 It should be noticed that the development of the philosophy of science and technology must start from urgent problems in contemporary time. Strong academic cohesion must be based on diversity.

I.3 How Should Philosophy of Science Respond to Changes in the World in Order to Face the Future of Science and Technology? I.3.1 Broaden the Horizon of Studies of Philosophy of Science and Technology With advancements of science and technology today, human beings have entered the time of intelligence revolution on the one hand, and seen increasing difficulties

Introduction 27 in containing the negative effects in the future of science and technology on the other. A broad survey of philosophical research of science and technology shows that against the broad background of contemporary time, scholars’ concerns with theories of science and technology have been characterized by a wide horizon that involves diverse methods, multi-dimensional perspectives, and various models. In terms of content, there are scientific philosophy and philosophy of science. In terms of methodologies, there are linguistic analysis and phenomenological studies. In terms of value orientations, there are scientism and humanism. In terms of epochal characters, there are modernist and postmodernist studies. Additionally, more and more scholars have paid attention to the various forms and appearances of science and technology. Philosophers with scientific literacy or scientists with philosophical literacy no longer monopolize the right to conduct research. An increasing number of pure humanists and common people who are concerned have participated in the research of philosophy of science and technology. A diversity of thoughts and ideas compete and interweave with each other. The constant entanglement of various figures and schools blurs their boundaries. The previously orthodox “philosophy of science and technology” has thus been transformed into a kind of research conducted in the broad sense and with a broad horizon. It has become a typical contemporary study of theories of science and technology that is concerned with future progress. Theories of science and technology have always played a critical role in the modern trends of thoughts that rose with modernization. Marx considers science and technology as the revolutionary forces that spur social advancements. Theories of science and technology are an important foundation of historical materialism. In particular, theories of science played a significant part in the enlightenment of modern China. What greatly stroke Chinese intellectuals and philosophers were in effect theories of science, for instance, Theory of Natural Selection. During the May Fourth period, foreign philosophers John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, who were among the most influential figures in the emancipation of mind and the development of philosophy in China, made several speeches to intellectuals and the general public there. Their comprehensive speeches centered on theories of science. Holding high the banner of “science,” representative figures in the New Culture Movement called for defeating “ghosts of metaphysics.” Their view of science approximated to radical scientism. Studies of theories of science have experienced new prosperity since the start of reform and opening up at the end of the 1970s. Scientific education is on the cutting edge of rectification for restoring order. Issues related with theories of science are of particular vitality and appeal, becoming one of the most important “growth points of theory” among Chinese intellectuals. After nearly 40 years of growth, orthodox, or “standard,” theories of science have significantly expanded. Moreover, as science today always influences society and human beings through the revolution of technology, orthodox theories of science and technology have won popular support in China. At the same time, however, another trend of theories of science and technology, characterized by a critical attitude, has emerged. This is the deconstruction of orthodox theories

28 Introduction of science and technology. It can be called the “alternative theories of science and technology.” Endless deconstruction has given rise to much confusion, but its impacts cannot be neglected. Some opinions and thoughts of it are also meaningful. In comparison with orthodox theories of science and technology, alternative theories of science and technology have very different themes and foundations. Breakthroughs have been made in their horizon, discourse domain, and methodology. Alternative theories of science and technology have both positive and negative influences. Generally speaking, contentions among different ideas could create an atmosphere that is more tolerant, equal, and diverse. These contending ideas demonstrate to us that theories of science and technology at present are experiencing important changes and reorientation. We should endeavor to grasp their trends of development and take the initiative to respond accordingly to the changes. I.3.1.1 Turning from Logicism to Historicism, Sociologicalization and Philosophy of Culture Among the many schools of theories of science, those before Karl Popper’s theory of falsification are usually called logicism, and those afterward are called historicism. Popper’s philosophy can be seen as an in-between link in the transition from logicism to historicism. In a certain sense, logicism focuses primarily on static logical analysis of science, while historicism focuses on dynamic research of the development of science. Thanks to the efforts of scholars like Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Larry Laudan, the fundamental significance of historicism in contemporary theories of science has been increasingly noticeable, and historicism has been moving further towards sociology and culturology. Constructivism, which has risen in recent years, concentrates on breaking the subject-object binary and emphasizes the primacy of practice and social construction. Contemporary theories of science and technology no longer dwell upon epistemological issues such as criteria of meaning, logical structure, and discovery and defense of science. Instead, they point to general philosophical questions behind science and technology, such as the world view, values, and the view of history in human society. For instance, Martin Heidegger’s study of technology, Jürgen Habermas’s study of the relationship between science, technology and ideology, and Foucault’s theory of knowledge-power, have all been substantially different from conventional philosophy in method and ambition. Nowadays, theories of science and technology attempt to depict the real course of scientific and technological developments through studies of the actual history of science and technology. Cases in the history of science and history have attracted more attention. The sociologicalization of theories of science and technology can be traced back to Robert Merton, after whom scientific sociology has become an important branch in theories of science and technology. The newly emerging sociology of knowledge applies sociological methodologies to the analysis of the production of scientific knowledge. Moreover, studies of the philosophy of culture have been growing vigorously. For

Introduction 29 example, Richard Rorty’s “post-philosophy culture” emphasizes equality among science, arts, philosophy and politics. Theories of science and technology are no longer unique and independent. Instead, they intertwine with philosophical studies of other cultural types. I.3.1.2 The Deconstruction of Essentialism and Fundamentalism and the Rise of Constructivism and Pluralism With the ebbing of scientism, questions have been raised regarding fundamentalism, which insists that natural science has its objective foundations, and essentialism, which insists that natural science grasps the essence of objects through external phenomena. The idea that knowledge of natural science is objective truth, and that the advancement of science is linearly accumulative and continuous have waned. The extreme advocacy of mathematics and physics is receding. Methodologies have switched from emphasizing the establishment of systems to deconstructing of fundamentalism and all tendencies of absolutization. The standpoint has changed from insistence on the objectivity of truth in the subject-object binary to constructivism that insists on the unity of subject and object and their continuous interactions in practice. In the time of positivism and logical empiricism, theories of science and technology attempted to distill common standards, norms and methods of scientific and technological knowledge from philosophical studies of natural science and general technology. These theories strongly advocated the transformation of all human knowledge, philosophy included, using the basic mode of scientific knowledge. Postmodernist theories of science strive for studying the specifically and historically constructive process of the mode of natural science, which is one of the options, and for dissolving the inevitability, uniqueness, and particularity of natural science as a mode of understanding. Basically speaking, alternative theories of science and technology do not consider existing theories and methods as problematic or attempt to replace them with something new. Instead, the alternative theories contend that theories and methods are always in the process of development and thus never definite. They can be only temporarily identified in constant negation. With pluralism permeating into theories of science and technology, natural science has been increasingly viewed as one of the diverse cultures. Epistemological studies of science and technology are becoming one of the various philosophical reflections. The overall opinions about science become increasingly diversified: from scientism to mild scientism, then to a variety of conciliatory views, and finally to anti-scientism. I.3.1.3 The Permeation of “Deconstructive” Methods and the Popularity of Criticism Since the 1970s, some scholars, starting with Husserl’s later work The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, have applied Husserl’s phenomenological and hermeneutical methods to problems in theories of science and technology. Afterward, structuralist philosophy and postmodernism have

30

Introduction

become growingly influential. Deconstructive methods have entered theories of science and technology, greatly transforming mainstream views of science and technology, as well as conventional understandings about science and technology. Orthodox theories of science and technology see knowledge of natural science as the paragon of human knowledge, stressing not merely its nature as truth, but also its actionability and operability. It promotes not merely natural science’s mode of understanding, but also the mode of practice based on natural science. It aims at not just transforming nature scientifically, but also transforming society and even human beings scientifically. However, as deconstructive methods become increasingly popular, challenges to natural science grow. Theories of science and technology are no longer subjects merely for defending natural science. They have gradually become an onlooker that maintains a distance from science. Because people have acknowledged that they cannot deal with all current problems according to procedures, the mode that favors action and pursues operability no longer dominates. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising at all that it has become a fashion to challenge and make social criticism of scientific and cultural institutions. Defense has become mediocre, unable to arouse sympathy. The trend of criticism prevails, the baby is thrown out with the bath water. I.3.1.4 The Purpose and Interest Turn to the Integration of Scientific and Humanistic Cultures There have been some prominent changes in the purport, interest and trend of current research of theories of science and technology. First of all, in alternative theories of science and technology, science is seen as the ontological existence that determines the essence of human beings. It thus becomes an entity that is connected with its “contexts.” Pragmatics has been introduced into theories of science and technology. Understandings, explanations, and applications of scientific knowledge demonstrate indispensable reliance on contexts. Secondly, unlike orthodox theories of science and technology, which emphasize the neutrality of the value of natural science and focuses only on nature instead of human beings, alternative theories of science and technology reconsider science as the science of human beings, and the world of science and technology as a part of the human world. Science and technology, as well as their interrelations with people’s lives, have become the center of theories of science and technology. Thirdly, science has been increasingly viewed as a kind of practice and a cultural phenomenon. In orthodox theories of science and technology, science is basically understood as knowledge. The critical question is how to establish a system that is standardized and free of contradictions. In alternative theories of science and technology, however, science is in the first place a kind of practice. It is the transformation of the world guided by certain goals, as well as the spiritual and material wealth, that is, culture, gradually accumulated in this process. Last but not least, at the turn of the century, natural science fell off its pedestal and no longer represented absolute correctness. Calls for the integration of science and humanities have been

Introduction 31 increasingly prevailing, and how to bridge the gap between them has become an important question in contemporary theories of science and technology. Needless to say, scientism is the “spiritual disposition” of orthodox theories of science and technology, and the “ideology” sustaining the social and research institutions of the tradition of natural science. The basic concept of scientism is the dichotomy between science and humanities. Nevertheless, theories of science and technology nowadays view themselves with more inclusiveness and even self-reflection. In all fairness, science’s struggles with theology and superstition in the history of the Renaissance and Reformation have shown that the discovery of science has been the discovery of humanities. Science used to be in keeping with humanities. Therefore, we should not stick blindly to the view of science in scientism, as the problems science deals with are growing more and more complicated along with the great changes taking place in the world. The integration of scientific and humanistic cultures will naturally become the theme of the time. As a matter of fact, the significant transformations of theories of science and technology during the contemporary period have happened against profound theoretical and socio-cultural backgrounds. As far as the internal developments of the discipline are concerned, logical empiricism has not established once and for all an empirical principle of justification. Although the principle has been modified several times, it has eventually fallen into predicament. Popper’s falsification principle is of great innovativeness and imagination. Empirical falsification, however, is not clear or explicit. Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm” and his notion of “incommensurability” rebuke the optimism about the linear accumulation and continuous progress of natural science. Feyerabend’s “anything goes” gives a deadly strike to the defense of the uniqueness of natural science in terms of methodology. At that point, all the orthodox central questions have been dissolved and transformed, and the dogma of orthodox theories of science and technology that emphasize the supremacy of natural science is no longer reliable. As far as the broader history of scientific and social progress is concerned, the new trends in theories of science and technology are not the result of the advancement of philosophy. Rather, they are the result of cultural reflections of scientific practices. Without the rise of natural science, positivism and logical empiricism could not have become powerful philosophical movements, and it would be even more difficult for orthodox theories of science and technology to be a prestigious subject of the 20th century. As Hans-Georg Gadamer points out: Since the seventeenth century…what we today call philosophy is found to be in a changed situation. It has come to need legitimation in the face of science in a way that had never been true before; and for all of two centuries right down to the death of Hegel and Schelling, it was actually constructed in such a self-defense against the sciences.34 Because of such a relationship between philosophy and science, the rise and prosperity of orthodox theories of science and technology, as an “ideology” of natural science, have been inevitable. Nevertheless, since the beginning of the 20th

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century, the negative effects of natural science, especially those of technologies of heavy industry, have been gradually exposed. In particular, the two world wars, and the resource shortage and ecological crisis today have wakened people from their dream of scientism. The questioning of science has prevailed. Under new circumstances, the relationship between philosophy and science and technology has experienced subtle changes. The new trends in alternative theories of science and technology and their “anti-science” tendency are less an attack on orthodox theories of science and technology than their reflections on the negative effects of science and technology. I.3.2 Look for New Growth Points in Theories of Science and Technology As has been demonstrated, new perspectives and themes continue springing up in contemporary theories of science and technology. Orthodox theories of science and technology have gradually lost their central position and become merely one of the multiple poles in pluralized discussions. Those new studies that differ greatly from orthodox in approach and purport have not only broken through the limits of orthodox in terms of either problematics or responses, but they have also considerably changed the basic forms and appearances of theories of science and technology. Our time is both a time of globalization and one of cultural diversity. Now that theories of science and technology have started their diversified explorations, any philosophical reflection on science and technology is possible. With academic concerns “traversing” science and technology and pointing to society and to more general philosophical questions such as freedom, value, and existence, there will appear some kind of “philosophy that starts with science.” Such a change means that moving from reflecting on science to transcending science, we will naturally come across the question of freedom, which fascinates Feyerabend, the question of culture, to which Rorty turns, the question of historical existence, which Foucault discusses, so on and so forth. In the specific case of China, increasing pragmatism and secularization, which come with industrialization and globalization, have caused the inevitable marginalization of philosophy. Such marginalization has given rise to much confusion and the repeated emergence of alternatives. It has also forced traditional studies to confront challenges and open new paths. Particular debates on issues like pseudoscience, traditional Chinese medicine and folk science never cease and diverse interpretations abound. We have to reconsider philosophical questions such as the demarcation of science. Theories of science and technology need to advance along with the time. Some branches of theories of science and technology that used to be unacknowledged or unformed in the orthodox period is becoming, or have become, new growth points drawing contemporary attention. These growth points include typical subjects such as scientific epistemology and cognitive science, sociology of scientific knowledge and scientific anthropology, ethics of science and technology and cultural philosophy of science.

Introduction 33 I.3.2.1 Scientific Epistemology and Cognitive Science Sociology of scientific knowledge is the expansion of sociology in the field of science and technology. It is founded on criticism of the traditional philosophy of science. It proposes to examine the dynamic process of the production of scientific knowledge from the perspective of social construction and thereby establish new scientific epistemology. Since the 1980s, sociology of scientific knowledge has made significant achievements and attained important academic status. The strong program, i.e., SSK, is one of its comparatively influential schools. The main point of view in the sociology of scientific knowledge is that social factors form an indispensable dimension in scientific knowledge, influencing all stages of the production of scientific knowledge, such as the choice of subjects, observation and experiment, the proposition of theories, and the selection and evaluation of theories. In this whole process, science is not able to offer itself criteria of judgment. However, SSK denies the uniformity of nature and the objectivity of scientific knowledge, considering scientific knowledge as merely the result of scientists’ negotiation and manufacture. Such a radical viewpoint has been severely criticized. At present, the positive studies and sociological studies in the sociology of scientific knowledge have been emphasizing elements on the objective dimension of science, such as the significance of facts, instruments, equipment, and the organizational system of experiment. These studies attempt to make comparatively comprehensive explanations of the relationships among various elements in scientific events, including the objective, technological, social, metaphysical, and epistemological elements. They thereby restore, to certain degrees, the realistic characteristic of scientific practice. Scientific epistemology is a return to epistemology under the condition of widespread questioning of epistemology. Having abandoned the propensity for transcendence in epistemology, it transforms studies of knowledge into studies of the experience of the actual process of knowledge production. Ancient philosophy mainly discusses what the world is, while modern philosophy focuses on how people know. Contemporary philosophy pays more attention to the significance and background of knowledge itself. Therefore, cognitive science has become the leading subject in cognitive studies, turning away from previous epistemological discussions on how to know toward psychological and physiological analyses of cognition, and holding a criticizing attitude towards traditional arguments that are empty. For example, cognitive science uses various methods, such as psychological, physiological, logical and philosophical ones, to study how the human brain produces ideas and knowledge, no longer arguing about whether these ideas and knowledge are the truth. Contemporary cognitive science tends to go beyond pure philosophical speculations and evolves into typically interdisciplinary studies that combine various methods and center around the question of knowledge. I.3.2.2 Sociology of Scientific Knowledge and Scientific Anthropology Since the 1980s, the sociology of scientific knowledge has obtained important achievements and academic status. Its representative scholars include Bruno

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Introduction

Latour, Karin Knorr Cetina, Michael J. Mulkay, Barry Barnes, etc. According to Lin Juren, its main idea, called “constructivism,” is that “there is no essential difference between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge” and that “scientific knowledge is a social construction, which is inevitably influenced by socio-cultural factors.”35 Related to this idea, as anthropological methods are applied to studies of modern developed societies, science and people who engage in scientific activities also become objects of anthropological studies. For example, anthropologist Sharon Traweek, in Beamtimes and Lifetimes, makes positive research of the community of high-energy physicists.36 The research methods of sociology of scientific knowledge have also changed, starting to use anthropological methods to study the social characteristics of science. Latour’s Laboratory Life, a study of the Salk Institute in La Jolla, California, is a case in point.37 SSK emphasizes the influences of field research, academic environment, and social factors in scientific laboratories on science. For instance, issues including the paradigm of the scientific community, scientists’ ideas, policies regarding science and technology, resource allocation in science and technology, administration, as well as bureaucracy in the academia, are all subjects of concern on the philosophical level. Scientific anthropology is a branch that has newly emerged in recent years. In addition to field research, ethnography, comparative method, study of literature and historical method have been increasingly emphasized and applied in anthropological studies of science. Science is a kind of activity of human beings, as well as a kind of fact that can be described historically. Studying science with the theories and methods of anthropology and the posture of philosophy will produce true and concrete descriptions of scientific knowledge and activities, reveal their profound relations with society, and acquire inspiration therefrom. I.3.2.3 Ethics of Science and Technology Academic concerns about the ethics of science and technology are well justified. Firstly, due to the integration of science and technology and the gradual evolution of scientific research into large-scope and large-organization “mega-science,” scientific activities’ nature of being social becomes increasingly apparent, and the pragmatic characteristic of scientific and technological institutions becomes increasingly prominent. The neutrality of the value of science is subject to question. The idea that science is heavily loaded with value and is permeated with ethical judgment gradually emerges. Therefore, studies of scientific ethics deal with not merely the morality and social responsibility of scientists, but also the ethics of scientific research, the load of value in science, the absence of forbidden zone in science, as well as the responsibility of technology. Secondly, the contemporary revolution of science and technology is flourishing. Information technology, biotechnology, space technology and material technology are rapidly advancing and widely applied. While contributing to the great achievements of human beings, they have also caused a series of crises of survival. As a result, problems such as the relationship among science, technology and ethics, as well as their

Introduction 35 coordinated development, have risen to the surface. The ethics of the nuclear weapon, information, human cloning, and organ transplantation has become the focus of ethical studies. Studies of the ethics of science and technology have no other option but to reconsider the interactions between practices of science, technology and the reconstruction of ethics. Thirdly, the negative effects of scientific and technological advancements have gradually emerged on the social level. The shortage of energy resources, environmental pollution, and overpopulation have become global crises, leading to reflections in ethics of science and technology on subjects like human-nature relation, environmental ethics, and sustainable development. I.3.2.4 Philosophy of Scientific Culture In recent years, studies of the philosophy of scientific culture have become another focus in the response of the philosophy of science and technology to future changes. In modern society, scientific culture is rising to the dominant form of culture. Conflicts and contradictions have thus emerged between scientific culture and other cultural traditions, especially humanistic culture. As a consequence, the relationship between science and other forms of culture has raised concern in the academia. Philosophy of scientific culture is the philosophical exploration of science as a kind of culture or cultural activity. The philosophy of scientific culture still takes science as its object of study. However, as it studies science as a form of culture or cultural activity, instead of limiting itself to epistemology, it is different from both traditional theories of science and common philosophy of culture. Representative works in philosophy of scientific culture include C.P. Snow’s The Two Cultures, Joseph Agassi’s Science and Culture, Andrew Pickering’s Science as Practice and Culture, and Maurice N. Richter, Jr.’s Science as a Cultural Process. Issues that have aroused wide attention in recent years, such as the debate on the preservation or abolishment of traditional Chinese medicine, the relationship between science and ideology, the relationship between scientism and humanism, as well as Michael Frayn’s drama “Copenhagen,” are all within the ambit of philosophical studies of scientific culture. During our time, which is called the time of globalization and cultural diversity, philosophy of science and technology, with its characteristics of this time period, is on its way to diversity and better integration of scientific culture and humanistic culture. It is both unwise and impossible for people to limit their concerns about the philosophy of science to the interiority of science. Philosophy of science and technology should strive for demonstrating the huge impacts of spirit and thoughts on society.

Notes 1 H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5.

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Introduction

2 Liu Dachun ed. From Advocacy to Reconsideration: Scientific View of Marxism and Modern Science Studies. Beijing: Capital Normal University Press, 2009. 3 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:35. 4 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 44). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2001:24. 5 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:785. 6 Chen Changshu. Introduction To Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: Science Press, 1999:32. 7 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995:777. 8 Nie Jingfang. Clearing and Transcending: Rereading the Intentions, Basis and Methods in Marx’s Texts. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005:3. Some other sources indicate that 142 volumes were planned for The Complete Works of Marx and Engels (International Edition). See Jin Huiming, “The Giant of the Millennium.” Scientific Socialism, 2000(1). 9 J. Derrida. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International. Translated by P. Kamuf, New York: Routledge Classics, 2006. 10 The whole (presentation) is divided into six books: 1. On Capital (contains a few introductory chapters). 2. On Landed Property. 3. On Wage Labor. 4. On the State. 5. International Trade. 6. World Market (Complete Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 29, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1972:531). 11 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 10). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:199. 12 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 30). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1974:735. 13 Index of the Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1~39). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1986:629. 14 J. Dewey. Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946:291. 15 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works (Vol. 2). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:680–81. 16 F. Jameson. The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. 17 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 47). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1979:601. 18 Marx and Engels’ Collected Works. Beijing: Beijing People’s Publishing House, 2009:340. 19 Zhang Yibing. Return to Marx: Philosophical Discourses in the Economic Context. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 1999:13. 20 F. Jameson. The Cultural Logic of the Late Capitalism: Selected Works of Jameson’s Criticisms and Theories. Edited by Zhang Xudong, translated by Chen Qingqiao, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:3. 21 Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:98. 22 Lan Zheng. “Translator’s Foreword.” Science in a Free Society by P. Feyerabend. Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1990:5. 23 Liu Yongmou. Foucault’s Journey of Deconstructing the Subject. People’s University of China, PhD dissertation, 2005:15. 24 Zhang Xihai. Recent Domestic Studies of ‘Realism’. Philosophical Trends, 1996(8). 25 Zeng Huan. “The Road of Chinese Philosophy of Science and Technology: Reflections between History and Future—A Review of the “Symposium on 21st-Century Philosophy of Science and Technology.”” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2006(4).

Introduction 37 26 Wang Bolu. What Is Technology: Theoretical Interpretation of the Technological World in a Broad Sense. Beijing: Science Press, 2006:28–32. 27 Wu Guolin. “On the Elements, Complexity, and Nature of Technology.” Research of Technology and Philosophy, 2005(2). 28 Chen Qirong. “The Philosophical Horizon of Technological Innovation.” Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition), 2000(1). 29 Xiao Xinhua. “Philosophical Rational Research of Technological Innovation.” Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2000(7). 30 Lei Yi. “Science should Pay Attention to Ethics.” Science and Technology Daily, 15 December 2000. 31 Zhang Huaxia and Zhang Zhilin. “Understanding the Guiding Principles in Research of Philosophy of Technology from the Angle of the Demarcation of Science and Technology.” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2001(2). 32 Guo Jinbin and Kong Guoping. Intellectual History of Traditional Chinese Mathematics. Beijing: Science Press, 2004:ii. 33 Wang Qian. “Several Issues in Research of the Intellectual History of Chinese Science.” Journal of Dalian University of Technology, 2003(3). 34 H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5. 35 Translator’s Foreword. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge, by M. Mulkay, translated by Lin Juren et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. 36 S. Traweek. Beamtimes and Lifetimes: The World of High Energy Physicists. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992. 37 B. Latour and S. Woolgar. Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts (2nd ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Part I

Paradox of Scientism

In the history of scientific and technological progress, the birth of science in modern Europe and the great achievements science has achieved since the 17th century demonstrate the continuous growth of the power of science and the increasing expansion of science’s influences. As a new cultural and social power, science has not only greatly extended human knowledge, but also allowed human beings to achieve glorious successes in their transformation of nature. Instrumental myths of science are consequently fabricated. With the widespread scientistic trend, the instrumentalist feature of science has been highlighted to the utmost.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-2

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The Rise of Scientism

The rise and development of scientism can be traced back to the start of modern science. In other words, the formation and unceasing growth of modern natural science, as well as science’s acquisition of its independent status and the great achievements it has accomplished, have not only made science one of the most powerful cultures in human history but also foreshadowed the birth and growth of the scientistic trend of thought.

1.1 Bid Farewell to Theology, Break away from Philosophy and Move toward the Center Stage The prosperity of science is the external cause of the birth of scientism, which came into being along with the rapid advancements of modern science. The formation of modern science is the history of science breaking away from the authorities of religion and philosophy, and increasingly freeing itself from the ideological restraints of theology and conventional metaphysics. Prior to the birth of modern science, the general picture of the whole Western society was theologized, as religious and mythologized trends of thought dominated the mainstream of Western culture. Especially in medieval times, when the religious world view became the dominating, leading world view, “Strict Hebrew morality, the gospel of love in Christianity, the Greek faith in reason, and the asceticism in the Hellenistic time – all these factors and powers are integrated into a grand view of the world.”1 Veneration of God and piety toward the church acquired fundamental social identification. Against such historical background, science, in order to break free from theology, experienced not only struggles against theology, but also a tug of war with conventional metaphysics. It is through these experiences that modern science was able to grow with difficulty from the soil of theology, become independent from philosophy and stand at the center stage of mankind. 1.1.1 Study Nature While “Praising” God The study of nature had already started in ancient Greece. Out of curiosity for the world they lived in, ancient Greek thinkers “regarded the presence of mind in nature as the source of that regularity or orderliness in the natural world,”2 DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-3

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striving to explore its essence and laws, and established the philosophy of nature. When it came to medieval times, however, the ideological rule of religion led to the decline of the mysterious color of early philosophy of nature and ancient science. Exploration of nature was thus suppressed. Nonetheless, in the late medieval period, it regained legitimacy from God, and thereby started a new stage in the development of modern science. In a word, extolling the greatness of nature – the work of God – was allowed and encouraged in the name of God. Yet objectively speaking, such work promoted scientific understandings and empirical studies of nature, so it would undoubtedly lead to the breakaway from the original God. Examination of the realities of human civilization and social progress would show that the general picture of the premodern world was mysterious, with various cultures such as religion, philosophy, superstition and science mixed together, and religion being especially prominent. This is particularly apparent in the Western world. After entering the medieval period, religion soon rose to dominance. God was seen as the master of the world. Belief in God and piety in the church thus became leading values of the society. At the same time, as religious and political authorities integrated with each other, the church became a giant authoritative institution that controlled various aspects of society such as politics, economics, ideology and culture. Consequently, doctrines of Christianity, as a kind of ideology, established absolute domination in the field of spirit. The Bible thus became the only doctrine that was considered correct, and the church became the only legitimate institution of rulership. The medieval period of Western Europe is seen as the “dark age” in the history of human society mainly because the ideological rule by the Christian church resulted in severe suppression of individual freethinking and almost a standstill of the progress of civilization. Hope is usually bred in darkness. The dawn of science was fostered by medieval times when civilization nearly came to a stop. Although medieval religion and society appeared generally depressing and hopeless, there emerged opportunities and conditions for the rise of modern science. The “firm belief in the rationality of God,” the belief that the whole world has been well arranged by God according to some kind of order and that the world, as the product of the rationality of God, operates following certain rules. In fact, the precondition of the existence of modern science is “an instinctive belief that conviction in the existence of an Order of Things, and, in particular, of an Order of Nature.”3Christian theology offered modern science such a presupposition. Therefore, Alfred Whitehead, in his discussion of the origin of modern science, argues that “the faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from medieval theology.”4 With the revival of scholarship since the late medieval period, research of nature was again put on the agenda. In particular, the Renaissance and Reformation, both of which happened in Western Europe, made a breach in the all-encompassing and unified Christian worldview and offered ideological foundation and freedom for the study of nature.

The Rise of Scientism 43 The Renaissance aimed at reviving Greek knowledge. It not only revitalized the cultural legacies of Greece, but also rediscovered man, freeing him from theology and establishing the spirit of respecting nature. This is highly significant for studies of nature. Morris Kline points out that [t]he Greek works restored confidence in the sovereign powers of human reason and encouraged the Renaissance man to apply that faculty to the problems besetting his age. The love of a dispassionate search for truth was reborn and the search itself redirected to nature’s laws instead of divine pronouncements gleaned from the Scriptures, to the universe of God instead of God. As if awakened from a long slumber Europeans discovered a “brave new world” teeming with life and wondrous creatures, among which man himself stood forth as a biological and physical phenomenon worthy of observation and study. Men looked with enlivened curiosity at the heavens and were enthralled by the strange stories of those who sailed the seas and explored new lands. Beauty so long condemned to hell as a pagan goddess of the flesh was rediscovered both in literature and in the physical world, and in place of sin, death, and judgment men sought beauty, pleasure, and joy. The dignity of man, who had therefore been denounced as a worthless sinner, was reaffirmed. Above all, the human spirit was emancipated and encouraged to roam freely over the universe.5 Driven by the Renaissance, the general revolutionary and free atmosphere promoted the advancement of science, typically demonstrated by the publication of Copernicus’s Six Books Concerning the Revolutions of the Heavenly Orbs in 1543. The significance of this work lies not only in signaling the start of the revolution in astronomy but also in declaring the divorce of natural science from theology and the former’s independent development thereafter. The Reformation indirectly promoted the rise of modern science. Guiding people to praise God for his “power, wisdom, and benevolence,” it built up the belief that the world created by God was orderly and could be grasped with rationality. Such a belief is of particular importance for the rise of modern science, but its effects on science were only latent in the Reformation. Take as an example Calvinism, which was one of the most prominent schools at that time. According to the doctrines of Calvinism, the purpose of the whole quotidian world was the glory of God. Therefore, Calvinism required its followers to serve God through their social activities and thereby contribute to the organization of social life in accordance with the holy commandments of God. The 17th-century Calvinism attached great importance to the devotion of science to religious courses. In particular, British Puritans always emphasized that the duty of religion was to do “beneficial things” and considered scientific activities as a kind of work that benefited human beings.6 Merton’s discussions about the relationship between Puritanism and science also demonstrate the significant influences of Puritanism, as one of the branches of Calvinist Protestantism, on the advancement of science in Scotland. Most

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importantly in his discussions, the core values of Puritanism appealed well to the need for scientific development at the time, especially “Puritanism’s unabashed utilitarianism, interest in the quotidian, methodical and persistent actions, thorough empiricism, right and even responsibility of free studies, as well as antitraditionalism – the synthesis of all these is in accordance with the values of science.” It both guided people who had hitherto resorted to theology, rhetoric or philosophy to the way of science and promoted a kind of utilitarian and positive science.7 As a result, “[s]cience was enlisted in the service of individual, society and deity…They comprised not merely a claim to legitimacy, they offered incentives which cannot be readily overestimated.”8 This is more important for the advancement of modern science. Generally speaking, during the medieval period, the dominance of theology led to the subtle and nearly unrecognizable development of natural science in the process of proving the wisdom of God. Andrew White has a most vivid depiction of such a condition. He points out that in the early Church and throughout the Middle Ages all such studies were cast in a theological mold. Without some purpose of biblical illustration or spiritual edification they were considered futile; too much prying into the secrets of Nature was very generally held to be dangerous both to body and soul; only for showing forth God’s glory and his purposes in the creation were such studies praiseworthy.9 In other words, no research of natural science was possible without being conducted in the name of God, and studying nature along with “praising” God thus became a unique mode of development at the early stage of modern science. Exactly because of such a situation, although the power of science and rationality had already surfaced, in medieval ideas, “[r]eason is and remains the servant of revelation (tanquam famula et ministra); within the sphere of natural intellectual and psychological forces, reason leads toward, and prepares the ground for, revelation.”10 That means that during that period, science was only the means instead of the goal, and scientific research into natural phenomena was only an effective way that the religious believers praised the greatness of God as the Creator. Most of the scientists at the early stage of modern science were pious Christians. The primary intention and fundamental goal of their research were thus to sing praise to God. For example, Copernicus “devoted his love for the God to the love for science,” and strove to extoll the greatness of this “creator of the supreme good and order.” Kepler, after summing up the three laws of planetary motion, says that “since we astronomers are priests of the highest God in regard to the book of nature, it befits us to be thoughtful, not of the glory of our minds, but rather, above all else, of the glory of God.” Boyle also points out that God loving, as He deserves, to be honour’d in all our Faculties, and consequently to be glorified and acknowledg’d by the acts of Reason, as well as by those of Faith, there must be sure a great Disparity betwixt that general,

The Rise of Scientism 45 confus’d and lazy Idea we commonly have of His Power and Wisdom, and the Distinct, rational and affecting notions of those Attributes which are form’d by an attentive Inspection of those Creatures in which they are most legible, and which were made chiefly for that very end.11 Leiss pointed out that science is the proven of religion. Christianity still retained a powerful hold on the European mind during the formative years of modern technology and science; the received imagery of their faith provided the protagonists of the new science with some readymade categories through which to interpret their accomplishments. Science conceived as the winning of mastery over nature seemed to be the natural fulfillment of the Biblical promise that man should be lord of the earth.12 Nevertheless, although the pursuit of truth was not yet clear during that period, the so-called “glory of God” in this process was reflected by studies of nature and it thus encouraged further development of these studies. 1.1.2 Subverting Metaphysics In terms of natural science, although modern science developed on the basis of metaphysics and its existence was inseparable from the ideological foundations provided by metaphysics, the relationship between modern science and metaphysics is characterized by subtleties: sometimes appearing as tension and sometimes interdependence, it generally demonstrates the trend of science subverting and reversing metaphysics. Natural science is markedly different from metaphysics. Undoubtedly, belonging to different systems of concepts, they represent different modes of thinking. Generally speaking, natural science is featured by empirical research and analysis and is the fruit of exploring nature on an empirical basis. Unlike natural science, metaphysics understands the world in a purely speculative way. As a core concept in philosophy, metaphysics has a long history. In ancient China, there was the saying “those above form is called the Way, and those below form is called instruments.” In the West, “metaphysics” means “after physics.” What is commonly referred to as the conventional “metaphysics,” which dates to a time before the birth of modern science, is the ancient Greek philosophical system inaugurated by Aristotle. It centers around discussions about topics such as “being” and “existence,” and seeks what is behind objects. According to Aristotle, metaphysical knowledge is knowledge of the highest level. It is a non-utilitarian kind of knowledge, instead of knowledge formed for other things, or for certain external purposes. It is pure knowledge that exists on its own. It has nothing to do with experience. Before medieval times, due to the limit of human thinking and knowledge, purely speculative metaphysics was the chief way to acquire knowledge. The mode of thinking that dominated metaphysics was the metaphysics of classical Western

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philosophy, developed by Plato and Aristotle in the early days. It evolved into the scholastic philosophy that was characterized by transcendence and rigorous logic in the prevailing theological atmosphere of medieval times. Descartes’s metaphysical dualism, which he put forward according to the demand of his time, led to the split of philosophy, which actually accelerated the “ending of traditional metaphysics,” even though the endeavors of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel rescued it temporarily out of crisis. The growth of modern natural science repeatedly challenges the thinking mode of metaphysics, and unceasingly subverts the once deep-rooted concepts and ideas. With the gradual advancement of studies of natural science, metaphysics has fallen into a general decline. Because of this, Isaac Newton warned that “Physics, beware of metaphysics!” and Engels points out at the beginning of Dialectics of Nature that “the metaphysical conception has become impossible in natural science owing to the very development of the latter.”13 In terms of the development of natural science, the rational belief in God during medieval times and the naturalism that rose later offered the precondition of the existence of natural science and an interest in nature itself. After that, science also borrowed from mathematics the ability of reasoning, which it originally lacked. As a result, modern science acquired an important feature: the mathematization of nature. This ability, however, is “a surviving relic of Greek rationalism.”14 The idea that “number” is the origin of the world, which originated from the Pythagorean school of ancient Greece, was carried forward by Plato. “Plato used mathematics to replace physics, to replace nature itself, and thereby pushed mathematics to a supreme status.”15 Such an idea that the essence of nature lies in its mathematization had important impacts on people like Copernicus and Kepler. The most prominent characteristic of Copernicus’s heliocentric theory is its mathematical simpleness. After Copernicus, Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion became the model that model science follows in its mathematization of nature. Later, Galileo, the founder of modern scientific approaches, put forward the research mode of “experiment plus mathematics,” which marked the real beginning of the mathematization of science. It not only brought science out of the obsolete mode of traditional metaphysics, which highly emphasizes speculation, but also made quantitative study one of the most striking features of modern science. Consequently, the 16th- and 17th-century Scientific Revolution, which was rooted in the mathematization of science, overturned the authority in science not only of the middle ages but of the ancient world – since it ended not only in the eclipse of scholastic philosophy but in the destruction of Aristotelian physics – it outshines everything since the rise of Christianity and reduces the Renaissance and Reformation to the rank of mere episodes, mere internal displacements, within the system of medieval Christendom.16 Since the 18th century, the giant leaps of natural science continuously expanded the field of science, while the dominion of philosophical metaphysics shrank.

The Rise of Scientism 47 Marx and Engels, depicting the tendency of science to break away from the restraints of metaphysics, point out that [t]he positive sciences broke away from metaphysics and marked out their independent fields. The whole wealth of metaphysics now consisted only of beings of thought and heavenly things, at the very time when real beings and earthly things began to be the center of all interest.17 Since then, modern science has gradually separated itself from philosophy and moved forward in a way different from that of traditional metaphysics, acquiring its own independent form. When it came to the 19th century, especially the end of it, the relationship between science and metaphysics became increasingly strained. New discoveries in natural science even once subverted the fundamental ideas in metaphysics. A common phenomenon at that time was that the natural scientists themselves feel how much they are dominated by this incoherence and confusion, and that the so-called philosophy now current offers them absolutely no way out. And here there really is no other way out, no possibility of achieving clarity, than by a return, in one form or another, from metaphysical to dialectical thinking.18 For example, Kant’s nebular hypothesis powerfully challenged, for the first time, the mechanical view of nature, which is characteristic of metaphysics. This instance also demonstrates in a certain sense that the thinking mode of metaphysics and that of science are completely incompatible. As Engels points out, metaphysics was still able to survive with difficulty before the end of the 18th century, because the development of science at that time had not gone beyond the scope of mechanics. Once science expanded beyond mechanics and gained new growth, the previous metaphysics, which had served as an ideological basis, became no longer applicable. A new kind of philosophical thinking, taking the place of metaphysics, became the foundation of natural science. That is the idea of dialectics. Auguste Comte, the master of positivism, divides human intellectual development into three successive stages – the theological stage, the metaphysical stage and the positive stage – and makes scientific explanations about the relationship between science, religion and metaphysics. The theological or fictitious stage is the primary stage of the development of human intellect and thinking. On this stage, people attempt to explore the internal nature of everything and the causes behind happenings. Nonetheless, because they are afraid of the power of nature and certain phenomena in nature, they resort to supernatural powers and explain nature through belief and worship. The metaphysical stage, or the abstract stage, is a transformed phase of the theological stage. In this transitional stage in human intellectual development, people try to substitute supernatural power with metaphysical and abstract concepts in their explanations of all phenomena and acquire absolute knowledge of the nature of things. They also arbitrarily

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consider these abstract concepts as absolute knowledge. The positive stage is the scientific stage. It is the highest stage of human intellectual development, as well as the highest stage of the development of human knowledge. At this stage, people become aware that absolute knowledge is impossible, and thus give up their pursuit of all original causes and ultimate purposes. Instead, they turn to “studies of the laws of phenomena – the stable relationships of succession and similarity among phenomena.”19 That is, they explore the relations among various things by intellectual means of reasoning and observation, and on the basis of positive facts and experiences. With such division, Comte believes that the progression from the theological stage to the metaphysical stage, and then to the positive stage, demonstrates the pattern of the advancement of knowledge and science. The replacement of metaphysics with science, and that of the speculative method of philosophy with the positive method of science, are inevitable steps in the progress of ideas and society. Therefore, it is inevitable that modern science has superseded theology and metaphysics and grown and advanced as a new stage in the development of knowledge. The task that Comte set for himself was to separate science from metaphysics and theology. As the successors of Comte and the representatives of new positivism, local empiricists have pushed forward the rejection, deconstruction and subversion of metaphysics. The primary task of the new kind of scientific philosophy they have developed is to ostracize metaphysics from science, explicitly declaring “the rejection of metaphysics.” They “consider all ontological studies that are speculative and that seek for the essence or origin of things as not beneficial at all.”20 On the basis of logical analysis and empirical principle and through their linguistic and logical analysis of the meanings of concepts and propositions in science, they see metaphysics as completely meaningless, and thereby exclude it from natural science, entirely removing its influence from science. Their work shows that the rise and advancement of science have been accompanied by the negation, criticism and subversion of the absolute and non-pluralistic philosophical thinking mode. It also shows that the overemphasis on empirical science will inevitably lead to its separation and alienation from speculative philosophy. As soon as modern science was born, as it were, the split between science and metaphysics, especially traditional metaphysics, began. As natural science advanced, science’s tendency of separating from philosophy became increasingly apparent: the works of Galileo, Kepler and Newton allowed physics to separate from metaphysics as a discipline. Darwin’s On the Origin of Species separated biology from philosophy. In the 20th century, psychology split from philosophy as an independent discipline. Philosophy has been concerned with logic for thousands of years, and such concern eventually resulted in the birth of computer science. It is through this process that science has achieved its independence and growth. Regarding the development of science and philosophy, Gadamer put it succinctly: Since the seventeenth century, therefore, what we today call philosophy is found to be in a changed situation. It has come to need legitimation in the face of science in a way that had never been true before; and for all of two

The Rise of Scientism 49 centuries right down to the death of Hegel and Schelling, it was actually constructed in such a self-defense against the sciences. The systematic edifices of the last two centuries are a dense succession of such efforts to reconcile the heritage of metaphysics with the spirit of modern science. Thereafter, with the entry into the positive age, as it has been called since Comte, one seeks to save oneself upon solid land from the storms of mutually conflicting world views with a merely academic seriousness about the scientific character of philosophy. And so philosophy entered into the bog of historicism, or got stranded in the shallows of epistemology, or goes back and forth in the backwater of logic.21 1.1.3 From the Margin to the Center Modern science’s continuous growth, seen from the angle of culture, actually reflects improvement of the status of science in human civilization and its movement from the margin to the center. The divorce of science from philosophy is accompanied by its liberation from theology and the gradual replacement of religious culture’s rule by science. At its early stage, modern science was obviously on the margin in comparison with religion and other forms of culture. On the eve of modern science, “[t]he Middle Ages had attached to theology all the other forms of ideology – philosophy, politics, jurisprudence – and made them subdivisions of theology.”22 Such a situation was also true for the academia. At that point, because of the rule of religion and church culture, especially the Christian culture’s heavy suppression and strict control in the domain of ideology and culture, it was extremely difficult for other forms of culture other than religion to survive. As a result, natural science, of which the chief task is the study of nature, had no option but looking for chances and possibilities of survival, under the disguise of religion, around mainstream religious culture. From the 14th to the 16th century, the European Renaissance and Reformation, while challenging traditional Christian culture, did not fundamentally change the dominant position of religion. They merely accomplished the capitalist transformation of Christianity, and adapted Protestantism to the demand of the development of capitalism. It was in such a historical context and against such cultural background that modern science managed to grow in the name of God. Nonetheless, due to the differences in method and values between science and religion, modern science, at its birth, more or less challenged traditional religious concepts while attesting “the glory of God.” The earliest challenge came from the modern Scientific Revolution, triggered by Copernicus’s heliocentric theory. Before Copernicus, the belief in the theory of the universe which considered the earth as the center was widespread, as Ptolemy’s geocentric model was not only approved by the Bible, but also more in accordance with people’s daily experience. Copernicus’s On the Revolution of the Heavenly Spheres, published in 1543, recognizes that the sun is the center of universe, and that the earth surrounds the sun, instead of the other way around.

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It thus completely subverted the long-lasting worldview in which human beings were considered as the universe’s center, and it contradicted the ideas in the Bible. Moreover, it marks the independence of natural science as well as the beginning of modern science. The emancipation of natural science from theology dates from this…Thenceforward…the development of the sciences proceeded with giant strides, and, it might be said, gained in force in proportion to the square of the distance (in time) from its point of departure.”23 In spite of such progresses, it was still difficult for the advancement of science at the point to subvert religious culture’s dominant position. Due to the further development of science, however, the statuses of science and religion began to change. The scientific research of Newton, one of the greatest scientists and the most devout believers, appeared at the beginning to confirm some core elements in traditional religious teachings, especially creationism. Yet as his theory developed, “it began to take on anti-religious tones, most notably in that it was interpreted as implying that there was no further need for God in the working of the universe.”24 Darwin’s theory of evolution made the deadliest impact on Christianity. With regard to the origin of human beings, Darwin believes that human beings, just like other animals, evolved from apes. There is no difference between human beings and other animals in terms of origin. Such a theory presented the severest challenge to creationism, substituting the creationism in the Bible with “theory of evolution” and directly denying the idea that God created human beings, which is the foundation of the Bible. Since then, science has started to break free from the restraints of religion and theology and entered a period of rapid advancement. The Bible is no longer absolutely reliable, while science acquires validity. In fact, ever since the first Scientific Revolution, in which a large group of scientists, represented by Newton, established the system of modern natural science, the replacement of the central position of Christian culture by scientific culture had already started. In academia, Newton’s methods were increasingly applied to the whole of natural science, leading to the crucial integration of the rational tradition and the empirical tradition. In the field of social life, science and technology grew closer, their combination increasingly applied to the industrial production of the society. The social status of science was thus improved. Therefore, at the end of the 17th century, the success of science had already overshadowed religion, and the authority of the Bible was no longer of absolute convincingness. This process shows “that far had science moved in the rejection of authority and the elevation of unaided human faculties, that is to say, the elevation of itself, to the seat of authority (of religion) now vacant.”25 As Richard Westfall points out, [b]y the end of the 17th century, modern natural science had become a prominent factor on the European scene. The day of the solitary investigator, such as

The Rise of Scientism 51 Copernicus pursuing his studies in the isolation of East Prussia, had passed, and the continued growth of the scientific movement was guaranteed now by the organized societies it had created. Already its influence was being felt in other aspects of European culture, pointing towards the Enlightenment of the 18th century, when the example of science would suggest the possibility of remodeling western civilization as a whole. It is not too much to suggest that Western history since that time can be summarized in the steady expansion of the role that science has played, transforming what was originally a culture organized around Christianity into our present one centered on science. The transformation was under way already before the scientific revolution was complete.26 There is no doubt that the rapid advancement of modern science, its replacement of traditional cultural forms such as religion and philosophy and its rise to a mainstream cultural form in the society have all benefited from the practical needs of the society for progress. The primary reason is that modern science satisfied the needs of capitalism in its rise and development and catered to the internal demands of capital expansion. Through its long-term struggles with the feudalistic church and the bourgeois political revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries, the newly emerging capitalist class eventually seized political power and established the capitalist system. For the capitalist system, the goal of priority is to ensure the maximization and realization of surplus value. Taking the lead in developing or introducing advanced technologies not only enables individual capitalists to gain excessive surplus value, but also allows all capitalists to obtain more relative surplus value. It is thus supported and encouraged by the capitalist system. Secondly, the rise of modern science was promoted by a competitive atmosphere. Survival of the fittest, as the law of the jungle, is the rule of the game in capitalist society. All capitalists desire to get advantages in economic life. Developing science and technology is the most effective way to improve competitiveness. Therefore, fierce economic competitions become the hotbed of the fast advancement of science and technology. At the same time, expansion and development of new markets are the intrinsic demands of the advancement of capital. These processes are usually accompanied by invasions. Science and technology, especially military science and technology, reliably guarantee military triumphs. They will certainly be developed as a key point and a priority. Last but not least, the advancement of modern science is the practical need of productive practice. Productive labor is the most fundamental form of practice for human beings. It is also the fertile soil in which science and technology grow. As increasingly broad and complicated productive practices encounter problems that cannot be solved with experience, science and technology prosper in response to these problems. Exactly as Engels argues: “If, after the dark night of the Middle Ages was over, the sciences suddenly arose anew with undreamt-of force, developing at a miraculous rate, once again we owe this miracle to production.”27 Even after the progress of science has gone beyond the practical needs of technology and production, science and technology, which are still restrained and modulated by capital, are still at the heart of production and economic activities.

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Having obtained their legitimacy of existence on the level of society, science and technology have also continuously improved their status in social life. In the 19th century, the further advancement of science and its great achievements in social production and social life allowed the status and role of science in human society to be acknowledged at the national level and gradually rise to the peak of human culture. Although the instrumental reason of science has been repeatedly criticized by some philosophers, the increasingly advantageous position of science in culture is not threatened. Depicting the conditions of the time, Immanuel Wallerstein sighs: “science (physics) was everywhere placed on a pedestal and in many countries philosophy was relegated to an ever smaller corner of the university system.”28 It is thus clear that science, at that point, had already substituted traditional cultural forms such as religion, arts and ethics, become the primary determining force in human life and social advancement and entered the core of the development of the whole human beings. In particular, since the beginning of the 20th century, the economic and social functions of science and technology have been remarkably strengthened. They have gradually superseded religion as a leading culture and risen to a dominant position.

1.2  Confidence    and Power Come from the Subject-Object  Dichotomy The thinking mode of subject-object dichotomy, which is established in philosophical dualism, coincides and corresponds with the progress of modern natural science, offering new philosophical and metaphysical foundations for modern natural science. It is not an exaggeration to say that the subject-object dichotomy is a deep-rooted and fundamental factor in the birth of modern science in the West and in science’s rapid development. Modern science had achieved rapid development and legitimacy of existence soon after its birth, largely because of the philosophical idea about the separation between subject and object as well as the thinking mode of subject-object dichotomy demonstrated by such separation. In fact, it is exactly this thinking mode that has promoted the utilitarian effectiveness of science and thus provided the theoretical precondition and basis for the development of modern science. 1.2.1 The Recession of the Subject and the Prominence of the Object Subject, object and their interrelations have always been a focus in philosophy. Although discussions about subject-object relations have risen only in the modern time, the birth of the concept can be traced back to the time of ancient Greek philosophy. The thinking mode of subject-object dichotomy burgeoned with Aristotle. In his well-known work Organon, Aristotle discusses “substance,” the most fundamental category among the ten pairs of categories in existence, and distinguishes between form and matter. He thereby establishes the ontological subject, which is an independently existing substance and the carrier and undertaker of the properties, conditions, movements and transformations of objects. Famous

The Rise of Scientism 53 sayings such as “Man is the measure of all things,” “know yourself” and “man is a rational animal” all reflect the emphasis on the status of man as subject. In medieval times, because of the absolute authority of God and the suppressive rule of the feudalist theocracy, man’s subjectivity was overshadowed and gradually lost in the mysterious atmosphere of religion. However, the philosophical idea of subject-object dichotomy still progressed under the guise of theology. For instance, Neoplatonism’s mysticism and Augustine’s theological theories are all based on the epistemological mode of subject-object dichotomy. The series of ideological emancipation movements between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment movement rediscovered “man,” holding high the banner of humanism and establishing the subjectivity of man in modern society. Unfortunately, subjectivity had not grown prominent because of these changes. On the contrary, it went over to the opposite side along with the advancement of science and technology and the establishment of capitalism, even resulting in “the recession of the subject.” Although the idea of subject-object dichotomy and its gist – the principle of subjectivity – had been developed to certain degrees during the period from ancient Greece to the Renaissance, the real awakening of the principle of subjectivity was after the founding of modern philosophy. Due to the development of modern natural science, human beings’ knowledge grew deeper, and epistemology became an urgent concern of science and philosophy because when the advancement of scientific knowledge reaches a certain stage, it is difficult for scientific knowledge to move forward without further understanding about the subject of knowing. As a result, the principle of subjectivity is not only the basic principle of modern science, but it also constitutes the fundamental concept of Western civilization. It is still making influences nowadays.29 On the philosophical level, the awakening of the principle of subjectivity is based on the subject-object dichotomy. The separation and antithesis between subject and object are a chief characteristic and a common tendency of modern Western philosophy, particularly in epistemology. At the same time, they offer the necessary basis for the growth of natural science. What is the most important is that out of the principle of subjectivity, there grew a kind of anthropocentric theory which has been repeatedly questioned by 20th-century Western philosophers. This theory does not only inherit the rational spirit and ancient science from ancient Greece but also adds to them a new dimension – the subject’s conquering of the object. The formation of the subject-object dichotomy and its entrance into specialized philosophical discussions began with Descartes. As an important representative of modern Western philosophy, Descartes held high the two Renaissance banners of “science” and “man,” and ascribed to “self” extremely important status and significance. In particular, his idea of “I think, therefore I am” takes “I think” as the subject of cognition and endows rationality and subject with unprecedented priority. Man is also divided into the rational (spiritual) subject and the substantive

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(material) subject. Such a division leads to the conclusion that the nature of humanity lies in thinking (thought), that spirit and material (mind and body) are fundamentally separated and that subject and object are in opposition to each other. It is apparent that starting from distinguishing subject (“conscious substance,” that is, spirit) and object (“corporeal substance,” that is, material), Descartes strictly separated subject and object and established the philosophy of subjectivity in epistemology, as well as the thinking mode and cognitive framework of subject-object dichotomy. Therefore, generally speaking, Descartes’s rationalist epistemology of subject-object dichotomy has deepened the separation of subject and object, and increased the ability of the subject, highlighting the power of rationality. The rationality here is no longer the unity of Logos and Nous advocated by the ancient Greek philosophers. Instead, it is the scientific rationality promoted by modern philosophers. It gives birth to the mechanically determinist view of nature in philosophy. When philosophers attempt, on the basis of such a view of nature, to apply scientific methods to all fields of human knowledge and expect to change metaphysics into science, they inevitably equate man with natural objects and consider man and natural objects to follow commonly shared laws of nature. They believe that there is no difference between man and natural objects, and that man is no more than a machine that is a little more complex than natural objects. These ideas not only problematize the freedom, value and dignity of man, but more seriously, it is exactly the metaphysics’ ambition to become science that has created a kind of scientific mode of thinking and the concept of the omnipotence of science. Although this ‘scientific view of the world’ promotes the advancement of natural science, it also forces us into the predicament in which our freedom is lost and humanity dies out.30 In this way, a new, incomplete and abstract subject is created, while the real subject has already “recessed.” If Descartes started to awaken the subject, it was Kant who really established and completely clarified the principle of subjectivity. The question faced by Kant had remained unsolved in modern philosophy, namely, the question of whether the man, who strictly sticks to natural laws, has value and dignity. As far as Kant is concerned, the question is related to the question of knowledge. Therefore, he starts with the question of knowledge and takes a different path. He deals with the question, which Descartes has failed to answer, by means of a “Copernican revolution” that subverts the subject-object relation, that is, to make the object correspond with knowledge (i.e., the subject). This is not a simple subversion, but a real one: before Kant, the correspondence theory of truth emphasized that knowledge must correspond with the object, which means that the subject should be centered around the object. For Kant, object corresponds with subject, which means that the object should be centered around the subject. This unique way of Kant proving the universal necessity of scientific knowledge highlights the status and initiative of the subject in knowledge. In order to achieve this goal, Kant on the one hand establishes the universal necessity of scientific knowledge

The Rise of Scientism 55 based on the innate form of the subject’s knowledge, and on the other paves the way for man’s freedom, value and dignity by limiting the ability to know. Through his criticism of human rationality, Kant ascribes to rationality two kinds of major powers: “knowledge makes law for the nature,” and “reason makes law for itself.” The former, separating the lawmaker and law observer, demonstrates the limitations of the subject. The latter highlights the initiative of the subject by unifying the lawmaker and law observer. In this way, Kant extends the previous question about the subject-object relationship in epistemology to the field of practice. By highlighting man’s subjectivity, he again raised man to a dominant position as a rational subject. As a consequence, the subject enjoys a prioritized and leading status in the subject-object relationship, while the object is placed in a subordinate position. At the same time, however, there is also the threat of transcendental rationality overshadowing the freedom of the subject in Kant’s idea. Later, particularly in Hegel, absolute spirit becomes the highest subject, and the unity between thinking and existence, subject and object, is also achieved. Nevertheless, because the subjectivity of man has been absolutized, abstracted, objectified and mythologized in a transcendental category, the so-called unity of subject and object in fact becomes the unity of the subject as a spiritual object and the object itself. The subject has lost its rich connotations and become abstract and absolute. The problem of subjectivity, which started with Descartes and was resolved by Kant, has been further elaborated. The principle of subjectivity interpreted by Kant highlights the subjective initiative in the ethical sense. Kant attempts to make philosophy pay attention to the “recession of the subject.” Nonetheless, the content of the principle of subjectivity potentially facilitates the divorce and antagonism between subject and object in the field of natural science and in the process of natural science’s development. Generally speaking, the following principles of subjectivity propel transformations of subject-object relationship in natural science. (1) The principle of rationality. The philosophy of subjectivity maintains that man is the animal of rationality. Rationality is the inherent definitive property that makes man higher than animals. It is where man’s nature lies. The relationship between man and nature, and that between man and society, as well as interpersonal relationships can all be constructed according to the principle of rationality. According to this principle, only man can be the creator of science and man is the only subject that knows and transforms nature as an object. (2) The principle of the centrality of man. The philosophy of subjectivity argues that only man can be the center and master of the world. Only man is the purpose of all things in the world. Nature exists for man, and for the realization of the purpose of man’s survival and development. (3) The principle of self-improvement. In the philosophy of subjectivity, man as the subject can improve and create himself. In order to realize his

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The aforementioned principles of subjectivity correspond with modern science and technology’s demand for knowing and transforming nature. Along with the changes in people’s understandings about the relationship between human ability and the external nature, the separation between the subject and the object becomes more evident. Nature has been externalized as a pure object that is irrelevant to the subject. Fredrich Heer points out in An Intellectual History of Europe that Darwinism makes the universe lose its spiritual charm and leads to the disappearance of the conditions under which the ancient society existed. In the place of these conditions, there emerges the antagonism between spirit and material…man is severed from the world of things, which is seen as pure material. The individual is separated from others, becoming an isolated man.32 After God had been exiled from the human stage, supported by the principle of subjectivity, [n]o longer was the human being to be considered as part of a divinely directed organism. Now, men and women became just what Bacon, Descartes, and Newton had made of nature: mere physical phenomena interacting with other bits of matter in the cold, mechanical universe.33 In this way, a trend of mechanical, purely objective philosophical thinking emerged, providing a basis and supporting the growth of modern science. As Einstein points out: “belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural sciences.” This famous saying underscores the importance of the subject-object dichotomy for science. This dichotomy unceasingly intensifies the antagonism between human beings and nature. The subject as a concrete, actual and rich existence thus gradually recesses, superseded by an abstract entity from which richness is removed. At the same time, the object is repeatedly highlighted. The rapid advancement of science continuously demonstrates the power of human rationality. Pragmatic instrumentalist ideas thus acquire a reliable philosophical foundation. In fact, after the birth of modern science, the objectification of science has steadily deepened. Continuously intensifying separation and antagonism happen between man as the subject and nature as the object, as well as man as the subject and man as the object. As Husserl explicitly argues, [i]n his view of the world from the perspective of geometry, the perspective of what appears to the senses and is mathematizable, Galileo abstracts from the subjects as persons leading a personal life; he abstracts from all that is in

The Rise of Scientism 57 any way spiritual, from all cultural properties which are attached to things in human praxis. The result of this abstraction is the things purely as bodies; but these are taken as concrete real objects, the totality of which makes up a world which becomes the subject matter of research.34 It follows that the increase of man’s subjectivity is actually accompanied by the objectification and abstraction of man. Strictly speaking, the rise of the subject’s status in modern times is merely a result of the emphasis on the “abstract subject.” Scientific activities that aim at strengthening and highlighting man’s subjectivity end up in the recession of subjectivity and the gradual disappearance of man in the activities he is engaged with. It is precisely because of such recession of the subject that Foucault puts forward the so-called “death of man” and that Manfred Frank claims that in postmodern conditions, the so-called subjectivity is merely a fiction of metaphysical thoughts, and in fact, real subjectivity does not exist.35 This is not the place to discuss whether this view of the postmodernists is overly extreme. However, it is an incontrovertible fact that the advancement of science and technology has resulted in the recession of the subject: attention on things as objects continuously promotes the development of science and expands the scope and territory of scientific activities. As for man himself, it seems that he is no longer so important. The withdrawal of the subject to the back of the human stage and the unceasing emphasis on the power of the object constitute a paradox in the development of modernity. They are also an inevitable consequence of the advancement of science and technology. It is exactly the great progress of science and technology, the consequent expansion of the power of rationality and modern philosophers’ call for extending scientific methods to all fields of knowledge that the subject experiences relative recession. On the other side of the coin, the expansion of the power of rationality and the emphasis on the object have also promoted the growth of science and technology. The mutual promotion between these two sides actually forms the basic situation of the development of modern science and technology. 1.2.2 “Knowledge Is Power” If the philosophy of subjectivity, which started with Descartes, has endowed modern science with the power of subjectivity, Francis Bacon, another founder of modern science, has offered the methodological tool for modern science. Their different paths merge on the same point of realizing the transition from ancient science to modern science. The key to this transition lies in the turn from the previous emphasis on the advocation of pure knowledge to the pursuit of the instrumentality and power of knowledge. The concept of “knowledge is power” originates from Bacon, the real founder of modern British materialism and the whole of modern experimental science. It not only subverts the previous concepts about pure science but also legitimizes natural science and related studies from the angle of pragmatic value.

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As the founder of British experimental science, Bacon was born in an aristocrat-bureaucrat family. He received a very fine education in his early years. In the process of learning, he gradually realized the shortages of scholasticism and Aristotelian philosophy, which had dominated the mainstream of thoughts at the time. He laughed at the medieval scholasticism that mainly consisted of theology and featured tediously detailed arguments. He despised the Aristotelian philosophy which focused on metaphysical and mysterious things. He proposed that the duty of philosophy should be to study and control nature, and on such basis, to serve human beings to the highest degree. It was against such an ideological background that Bacon put forward his idea of “knowledge is power.” The proposition of “knowledge is power” is consistent in Bacon’s ideas. As early as in his 1605 work De Augmentis Scientiarum, Bacon elaborated on the great functions of knowledge and comprehensively demonstrated the effects of knowledge. In his view, knowledge does not merely have decorative and beautifying functions, or the functions of prompting people to extol the glory of God more effectively and offering extraordinary salvation, prevention and cure for the lack of belief and other mistakes. It is also very important for the quotidian life and individuals in it. In terms of the rule of the country, the value of knowledge lies in “repressing the inconveniences which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from nature.”36 In particular, in the case of government officials such as senators and counselors, knowledge enables them to better stick to reliable and stable principles in their work, instead of relying only on their experience, and thus to better improve people’s lives and serve public welfare. In terms of wars and military matters, “the glory of learning in sovereignty”37 often provides the best weapon for winning wars. In terms of individual morality and character, the effect of knowledge is even more unignorable. First, it “taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness of men’s minds…[and] vain admiration of anything.”38 Second, there are “particular remedies which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind: sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations.”39 Third, knowledge gives morality and humanity power, because “there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.”40 Fourth, it brings fortune and advancement to individuals. Fifth, it offers people emotional happiness with “(the interchanges between) satisfaction and appetite.”41 In the end, Bacon concludes that with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, which is immortality, or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this tend buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect the strength of all other human desires.42

The Rise of Scientism 59 In the 1620 monograph New Instrument, the proposition of “knowledge is power” is formally coined. At the beginning of this monography, Bacon points out explicitly that “man is nature’s agent and interpreter; he does and understands only as much as he has observed of the order of Nature in work or by inference; he does not know and cannot do more.”43 In this way, he clarifies the importance of knowing nature and the status and function of human beings in nature. Following this argument, Bacon points out that “those two goals of man, knowledge and power, a pair of twins, are really come to the same thing, and works are chiefly frustrated by ignorance of causes.”44 The prototype of the idea “knowledge is power” thereby takes form. This idea leads to two results. On the one hand, it proves to the world that “modern science is a science of power. Modern science is a science of use.”45 On the other hand, it also shows people that in order to bring the power of knowledge to full play and to effectively realize human welfare, human beings must first conquer nature. In order to conquer nature, they must first submit to nature. In order to submit to nature, they must first get to know nature. How to know? You should not merely sit aside, watching nature, but arrest it, interrogate it with torture and make it reveal its secrets. Therefore, Bacon’s idea actually provides modern experimental science with an important philosophical basis. The precondition for human beings’ control and mastering of nature is to accurately grasp nature and its laws. On that basis, Bacon reestablishes the goal of scientific activities. He maintains that “[t]he true and legitimate goal of the sciences is to endow human life with new discoveries and resources.”46 In the past, science only achieved very tiny progress, because people failed to establish this goal of science. In this way, Bacon formally determines science’s purpose as to conquer nature and benefit human beings. In addition, Bacon also puts forward the scientific methods of conquering and knowing nature. He criticizes the syllogism in Aristotle and subsequent scholasticism, which is overly reliant on deduction. He emphasizes experimental induction as the new instrument for scientific knowledge, and thus builds science on the basis of experiment, making it into real experimental science. Besides, he criticizes scholasticism and the authority of theology by revealing the origin of the fallacies in knowledge – the four falsehoods: the idols of the tribe, cave, marketplace and theater. He also points out that the “[f]ormation of notions and axioms by means of true induction is certainly an appropriate way to banish idols and get rid of them”47 and thereby establishes induction as a real scientific method. In other words, nature and objective things can only be studied on the basis of experience. Real knowledge comes exclusively from the studies of objective facts. This is what Bacon means by “the way of the bee: it takes material from the flowers of the garden and the field; but it has the ability to convert and digest them.”48 At the time of modern science’s difficult growth from the soil of medieval theology, Bacon’s argument of “knowledge is power” made a huge impact. Seveteenth-century Europe was dominated by the empty and tediously detailed scholasticism and the idea of “scholarship for scholarship’s sake.” Although the power of modern natural science had already emerged, science was still generally

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overshadowed by theology. Nonetheless, Bacon broke the chains of theology and the widespread conventional view that knowledge “is only for the exploration of the whys and wherefores behind everything in the world.” He looks at the world from a unique perspective and strives for a way to conquer nature. He firmly believes that scientific knowledge about the patterns of development of nature would be a giant force, and he attempts to establish “a kind of science that serves for understanding ‘what it is.’” In this way, he declares the significance of science in human lives and its promotion of human welfare, highlighting the instrumental power of science. The declaration of “knowledge is power” changed long-lasting opinions on knowledge that had originated from ancient times. Underscoring the pragmatic function of knowledge for the development and growth of human society, it has endowed knowledge with a new kind of legitimacy. At the same time, it has established the tradition of empiricism in modern science and offered an empiricist and practical basis for science. Thereby, it has influenced the later development of science. As a consequence, for the forerunners of modern science, “[their] biggest wish is that this new science, which is highly practical, will be different from old knowledge in books; the new knowledge will endow human beings with power and make people the master of nature.”49 Such a wish of these scientists actually also demonstrates the groundbreaking influence of Bacon in the advancement of modern science, which determines his special and important position in the history of science. The British scholar Maurice Cranston comments on Bacon as the first philosopher of science, which is not to say that he has made any scientific discovery by himself, but merely that he has come up with the creed that science is able to save us. Once people get hold of how nature works, they can take advantage of nature to benefit themselves, such as overcoming agricultural shortages through scientific revolution, fighting disease through scientific research and generally improving people’s lives through various advancements in technology and industry.50 It should be noticed, however, that the emphasis on the pragmatic effects of science has not only pushed forward modern science, but its optimism about science has also given rise to a scientist mentality. It is exactly based on the unconditional trust in the power of knowledge and science that Bacon, in The New Atlantis (1627), depicts a utopia that is completely dominated by science and predicts that science, machines and technology would control history and improve human life. The target of this “Solomon’s palace” anticipated by Bacon is “(to explore) the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.”51 This type of society is an ideal envisioned by Bacon, as well as the goal of scientific development. In a word, at the birth of modern science, the concept of “knowledge is power” greatly promoted the advancement of science and encouraged human beings to continuously bring into play their own rational abilities and the power of rationality. Simultaneously, however, the concept of “power” in “knowledge is power” has also been strengthened as human beings’ confidence in transforming nature

The Rise of Scientism 61 increases and the power of rationality manifests itself. This is also why “modern science is completely different from Greek science. The relationship between the two is one between the source and the course. Modern science, however, offers a new dimension…which is the dimension of power, conquest, and experiment.”52 Since then, the abilities of science have been repeatedly acknowledged and celebrated and its social status has risen unceasingly. Simultaneously, a culture of the object has been highlighted. 1.2.3 Retreat in Order to Advance, Progress in One Way or Another After its pragmatic functions were discovered by Bacon and, by virtue of such pragmatic features, it became an important force influencing the progress of the society, science started to make giant leaps on its journey forward. Especially nowadays, science has already grown into a great force of the strongest revolutionary character and the highest creativity in social advancement. Nonetheless, before then, the evolution of science has not always been smooth, and science has often been under subtle conditions. In medieval times, when God was the ruler, it was very difficult for science to win a chance of survival. Although, under the name of God, some preliminary studies of nature had been accomplished with certain achievements acquired, science was still in an awkward position regarding its status in society. On the one hand, it had to make explorations actively for the sake of extolling the glory of the great God and play the role of the “loyalist maid of theology” in order to seek the legitimacy of its own existence. On the other, out of its irrepressible curiosity and desire for exploration, it did its utmost to develop its own unique system of rules. At that time, science was like a contemptible scoundrel looking all around for a place to survive. In terms of religion, the church began with disdain and then continued with hostility toward all those who attempted to explore the knowledge of nature with the help of independent rationality.53 The so-called rational explorations and scientific investigations were not allowed by religion. Therefore, science could only look for a space for survival under the name of God and without claiming objection to or attack against other forms of culture such as religion. Some of these preliminary studies, however, had already begun to appeal to the needs of human beings. Moreover, as the fields related to science expanded, the force of science grew. Under the name of “celebrating the greatness of God,” science was actually opening up new fields for itself, and thus accomplished a kind of “covert growth.” At that time, coordinated development and peaceful coexistence were achieved between science and religion. Aside from medieval Christianity’s ideological rule and its suppression of other forms of culture, objectively speaking, science and religion formed a kind of interactive and mutually promoting relationship. On the one hand, science’s exploration of nature provided hard evidence for proving the greatness of God as the Creator and in a certain sense supported the rulership of the Christian church. On the other hand, religion provided necessary material instruments, equipment, workplaces and other kinds of hardware support for

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scientific investigations. More importantly, it allowed science to make analytical research into nature, and thus promoted, in an objective sense, the advancement of natural science during that period. Such an interactive relationship appeared on the surface in the way that science played the role of the “maid” of religion while maintaining its positive significance for individuals. Even so, the dictatorship of later scholasticism still restricted the growth of science. When scholastic philosophy triumphed and permeated into all aspects of human learning, the independence of ideas and the spirit of experimentation, which had characterized Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon, were restrained and suppressed, and authoritarianism replaced free research.54 Under such conditions, the pioneers of science stood firm against decadent scholasticism and worthless faith in authority. They detested ontological speculations and the fabrications of rationalistic deduction.55 Later, with the proposal of Francis Bacon’s empiricism and Descartes’s dualism, on the one hand, the first light of dawn came upon modern science, and on the other, nature was gradually objectified. Due to these changes, “In nature, there is not any plan of God for salvation, nor any plan of the devil for destruction. There are only nonhuman laws.” The quantitative method kills the spirit in nature, making it a fact and giving rise to a new relationship between man and nature. Nature becomes senseless.56 The differentiation between subject and object has not only led to the objectification of nature but has also highlighted the identity of man as a subject of knowledge and the dominating status of man relative to nature. The philosophical thinking mode of subject-object dichotomy has offered new opportunities for the development of modern science. That is because the growth of science, which takes nature as its chief object of study, usually depends on people’s understanding of nature. Therefore, on the surface, the objectification of nature under the thinking framework of the subject-object dichotomy raises man to the status of the subject while lowering nature to the position as the object, which seems like the former will be advocated while the latter will be objectified and marginalized. This, however, is not true. When nature is transformed into a pure and abstract object, it loses its mysteriousness. It is no more than a homeland God prepares for human beings. Therefore, although studying nature was considered as an unpromising and profanatory work, a view that seriously hindered the development of natural science, these studies have dispelled the mysteriousness of nature in the way of “disenchantment” and have thereby paved way for the mechanical view of nature in modern science and philosophy.57 In this way, the objectified nature has satisfied the need of modern natural science and evolved into a more abstract object in further development, which has intensified the split between man and nature.

The Rise of Scientism 63 For man as the subject, the thinking mode of subject-object dichotomy highlights his position as the subject of knowing and places him in the leading position within his relationship with nature. Nonetheless, the full play of human rational abilities and the objectification of nature result in the disappearance of the subject as an existence with rich connotations, while the excessive emphasis on the object underlines the power of science. Consequently, man, the subject which should have been highlighted and recognized, gradually withdraws to the backstage of human activities, while the rationality of the object, that is, the rationality of science and technology, is brought to the front. Depending on instrumentality and the pragmatic nature of the rationality of science and technology, science progresses, while man himself experiences recession.

1.3 Instrumentalism: the Declaration of Independence of the Kingdom of Science The 19th century is called by historians of science, such as William Dampier, “the century of science,” which indicates that science during that period achieved its independence and legitimacy of existence. Nevertheless, although the publication of Copernicus’s great work On the Revolutions of Heavenly Spheres has always been seen as the mark of science’s independence, it should not be neglected that science’s utilitarian nature and its instrumentality have played critical roles in its acquisition of independence and the rapid raising of its social reputation. Especially in most of the days after the birth of science, “[t]he instrumental mode dominates all other forms of science in its use of human and material resources, and in its direct impact on society. It governs the conception that many wellinformed and influential people actually have of science.”58 1.3.1 God = I Don’t Know “God = I don’t know” is the brief summary Engels has made about the view of nature in fideist epistemology. According to theological teleology, God creates for the purpose of man. It is the ignorance of man that determines the existence of God. Therefore, “the will of God” becomes the reason for all things, only because people are ignorant of all other reasons. For example, Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d’Holbach points out in his analysis of the origin of religion that it is precisely man’s ignorance that has given rise to religion and his fear has created the omnipotent God. Ignorance and fear are the two hinges of all religions. The uncertainty in which man finds himself in relation to his God is exactly the motive that attaches him to religion. Man is fearful in the dark – moral and physical darkness. His fear becomes habitual, which makes it natural; he would think that he wanted something if he had nothing to fear.59 Spinoza criticizes this viewpoint. In the appendix to the first part of Ethics, he argues that

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The Rise of Scientism men do all things for an end, namely, for that which is useful to them, and which they seek. Thus it comes to pass that they only look for a knowledge of the final causes of events, and when these are learned, they are content, as having no cause for further doubt…[Therefore,] they come to look on the whole of nature as a means for obtaining…conveniences. Now as they are aware, that they found these conveniences and did not make them, they think they have cause for believing, that some other being has made them for their use. As they look upon things as means, they cannot believe them to be self-created; but, judging from the means which they are accustomed to prepare for themselves, they are bound to believe in some ruler or rulers of the universe endowed with human freedom, who have arranged and adapted everything for human use.60

An “ignorant God” thus takes form in people’s minds. Nevertheless, ignorance is not an adequate reason. In other words, the existence of the unknown does not suffice to prove the existence of God. In the history of human beings, the concept of God has been deep-rooted. Therefore, the first step in science’s acquisition of independence is to expel God from the field of epistemology so that the knowledge people acquire can be complete and scientific. This task first got ahead in Newton’s scientific work. As the greatest scientist of the 17th century, the most significant achievement among Newton’s works is his discussions about the whole universal system and its laws as well as the basic laws of mechanical motion, on the basis of which he sums up the laws of mechanics. After Galileo, Newton, based on his systematic summary of the works of Galileo, Kepler and Christian Huygens, comes up with the famous law of universal gravity and the three laws of motion and thereby offers a purely mechanical explanation of the operation of the universe and nature. According to Newton’s theory, the operation of the whole universe follows strict laws of causality, and there is no room for God’s intervention in the concrete process of the operation of material. In this way, Newton has “for the first time put forward a model of the dynamics of the universe that does not resort to the power of God” and thereby excluded God from the system of the operation of the universe and nature. That is what is usually referred to as the “first push.” As Alexandre Koyré points out in his comment on Newton’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, [o]nce more the book of nature seemed to reveal God, an engineering God this time, who not only had made the world clock, but who continuously had to supervise and tend it in order to mend its mechanism when needed (a rather bad clockmaker, this Newtonian God, objected Leibniz), thus manifesting his active presence and interest in his creation. Alas, the very development of the Newtonian science which gradually disclosed the consummate skill of the Divine Artifex and the infinite perfections of his work left less and less place for divine intervention. The world clock more and more appeared as needing neither rewinding nor repair. Once put in motion it ran for ever. The work

The Rise of Scientism 65 of creation once executed, the God of Newton – like the Cartesian God after the first (and last) chiquenaude given to matter – could rest. Like the God of Descartes and of Leibniz – so bitterly opposed by the Newtonians – he had nothing more to do in the world.61 Therefore, by considering God as merely the “first push” and excluding him from the concrete, real process of the universe’s operation, Newton naturally weakens God’s ruling power and narrows his dominion. This is significant in the history of natural science’s struggle for independence. As Engels argues, Copernicus, at the beginning of the period, shows theology the door; Newton closes the period with the postulate of a divine first impulse. The highest general idea to which this natural science attained was that of the purposiveness of the arrangements of nature.62 Since then, God has ceased to exist as the purpose, because nature itself becomes the purpose, a being for itself. This also shows that natural science in the 17th century had already started to form a kind of idea that sought patterns characterized by certainty and purposiveness. God, on the contrary, was gradually exiled out of this realm. Nonetheless, while magisterium had begun to decline at the time of Newton, the widespread social influence of religion had not decreased. Some of the famous scientists at the point, such as Newton and Boyle, were devout religious believers. The concept of God was deep-rooted in their minds, and it was impossible to directly remove it. As a result, in Newton’s system, God was not entirely inoperative but merely seen as the first push. Newton argues in his depiction of the universal system: “though these bodies may, indeed, persevere in their orbits by the mere laws of gravity, yet they could by no means have at first derived the regular position of the orbits themselves from those laws.”63 In the last chapter “General Scholium” in Mathematical Principles of Natural Science, Newton makes explanations about the God that he recognizes as the origin: It is the dominion of a spiritual being which constitutes a God: a true, supreme, or imaginary dominion makes a true, supreme, or imaginary God. And from his true dominion it follows that the true God is a living, intelligent, and powerful Being; and, from his other perfections, that he is supreme, or most perfect. He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; that is, his duration reaches from eternity to eternity; his presence from infinity to infinity; he governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done. He is not eternity or infinity, but eternal and infinity; he is not duration or space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is every where present; and by existing always and every where, he constitutes duration and space.64 Generally speaking, Newton has made an utmost effort to eradicate the influence of God in the purely mechanical universe he constructs. Although such influence

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is still discernible at the origin of this law of causality, God merely plays a role in an unknown domain at the very beginning of the universe. He plays no part at all in the concrete operations of the universe. In this sense, Newton practices the creed of “God = I don’t know.” After Newton, Kant further removes God from the position as the first push. Against the background of the great achievements of natural science, Kant points out that for many materialist natural scientists in the 17th and the 18th centuries, if people can discover natural reasons for all the order in the cosmic structure, reasons which can bring this into existence from the most universal and essential characteristics of matter, then it may be unnecessary to invoke a highest Ruling Power.65 On the one hand, Kant’s comment demonstrates that the absolute authority and holy aura of God has declined with the deepening of natural science studies and the continuous expansion of their fields of research. On the other hand, his words also indicate that God is no longer very important in his mind. Even so, Kant has still left room for God and acknowledged the existence of God. He maintains that “the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature through understanding and will (and hence is its originator), i.e., God.”66 In the domain of morality, we cannot deny the existence of God. Although Kant has criticized various previous justifications of the existence of God, including the ontological justification, the cosmological justification and the teleological justification, he has also put forward his own justifications and evidence of the existence of God – “God = I don’t know” – though his God is already different from the God advocated by theologians. In Kant’s view, the empirical, substantive God in previous arguments has already died. The existing God is a personified God that exists outside the empirical world and inside the moral world and people’s inner wishes. In this way, Kant ascribes God to the category of morality and belief. The omniscient and omnipotent God as the Savior has ceased to exist. Kant does not agree with Newton’s idea that God is the original cause of the universe and the first push. He believes that the acknowledgment of the existence of the original cause of the world means the acknowledgment of the existence of God. In the studies of natural science, however, there is no proof of God’s existence. On the other side, acknowledgment of the nonexistence of the original cause of the world means the denial of God’s existence, which also lacks proof in perceptual experiences. Therefore, the only possible conclusion is “God = I don’t know.” God must be placed in a domain unknown to human beings. It is thus clear that in natural science, Kant is a more dyed-in-the-wool practitioner of the creed of “God = I don’t know.” As the aura of God has faded and his dominion has shrunk, man’s rational abilities raise his status in the universe, making him the dominator of the universe.

The Rise of Scientism 67 At this point, God remains responsible for and maintains control over only the things that man’s rationality is not able to deal with or comprehend. Nonetheless, these parts about which man has no knowledge cannot be used as evidence in science either. After Kant, God has gradually withdrawn to the back of the historical stage of human beings. It is only when scientists encounter problems that they are not able to explain by themselves that they usually invite God out. Most of the time, God does not interfere with quotidian affairs. In the end, “the mighty, energetic God of Newton who actually ‘ran’ the universe according to His free will and decision, became, in quick succession, a conservative power, an intelligentia supra-mundana, a ‘Dieu faineant.’”67 As the scientists, who are themselves devout Christians, have made continuous efforts for the purpose of “extolling the glory of God,” the concept of God has paradoxically blurred, and God’s domain has narrowed. No wonder Engels says that God is nowhere treated worse than by the natural scientists who believe in him…In the history of modern natural science, God is treated by his defenders as Frederick William III was treated by his generals and officials in the Jena campaign. One division of the army after another lays down its arms, one fortress after another capitulates before the march of science, until at last the whole infinite realm of nature is conquered by science, and there is no place left in it for the Creator.68 1.3.2 “Give Me Space and Movement, and I Will Construct the Universe” At the same time that the domain of God in the field of knowledge grew smaller, it was increasingly clear that man acquired the position as the master of the universe. Descartes’s famous saying “Give me space and movement, and I will construct the universe” is a powerful manifesto, as it directly declares the existence of a universe that does not need the existence of God. The exploration of the origin of the universe has always been a dream of human beings. In the 17th century, especially before the Renaissance, God had been considered the omnipotent being that had created everything. He had been seen as the ultimate cause of movements, changes and developments. Everything was determined by God. After the Renaissance, however, modern philosophers’ criticism of theological determinism considerably weakened people’s obsession with pursuing the origin of the universe and the motivity of changes. Although people still believed that the motions and changes of the material world had their own causes, they considered these causes more singular, linear and mechanical. Such an attitude offered an important basis and precondition for the formation of the mechanical view of the world. Specifically speaking, the first person who supported and advocated mechanical determinism was Bacon, the founder of modern experimental science. In his 1620 work “New Instrument,” Bacon exhorts people to transform the world according to what it originally looked like and promotes the method of getting

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to know nature through scientific experiments. In this way, Bacon directly challenges Aristotle’s instrumentalism, and points out the way for the operational laws of the universe in “mechanism.” The real establishment of the mechanist view should be attributed to Descartes. On the basis of dividing materials into subject and object, Descartes depicts a picture of the world from a mechanistic view of nature. In this picture, nature and man are of two completely different kinds. The whole nature and universe, including man, is seen as a machine, in which specific objects are constituted by lifeless material particles. All things in nature are formed according to the law of causality. Their disassembly and assembly constitute the whole world. There is only material and movement in nature. The motions and changes of everything follow the law of mechanical movement in mechanics. On such basis, Descartes explicitly declares: “Give me extension and motion, and I will construct the universe.” In this way, “Descartes had succeeded in turning all of nature into simple matter in motion. He reduced all quality to quantity and then confidently proclaimed that only space and location mattered.”69 After Descartes’s declaration, the universe and nature are no longer God’s creation that is determined by God and loyally obeys God’s arrangements. Instead, they are characterized by strict order and can be understood and transformed according to mathematical models and mechanical laws. God gradually fades into oblivion. The Creation, which had been a work exclusively belonging to God, has thus lost all its connections with God in Descartes’s declaration. It becomes a kind of work that human beings are able to understand and master. Descartes’s declaration not only demonstrates the mechanistic mode of the world’s operation but also builds for human beings the confidence in “conquering the world and becoming the master of the world,” acknowledging human rationality’s abilities to understand and transform the world. In Descartes’s opinion, we can make ourselves the “master and ruler of nature” with the help of natural philosophy, instead of resorting to God’s power. His idea corresponds with Bacon’s ideal of “conquering nature” for the sake of human welfare. Conquering and controlling nature has therefrom become the primary purpose and task of the rational activities of human beings. It is not an exaggeration to say that since the 17th century, Western history…can be summarized in the steady expansion of the role that science has played, transforming what was originally a culture organized around Christianity into our present one centered on science. The transformation was under way already before the scientific revolution was complete.70 If metaphysics still to some extent exists in Descartes’s mechanistic view, Kant’s nebular hypothesis creates a gap in such a metaphysical view of nature. In addition, on the basis of more careful examination of the laws of the universe and human rationality, Kant further elevates the abilities of rationality. He is not satisfied with Newton’s considering God as the “first push” and he firmly believes that “when people can derive useful and purposeful arrangements from the most general and simplest natural laws…we have no need for the special

The Rise of Scientism 69 rule of a Highest Wisdom.”71 Therefore, Kant has always endeavored to find a pattern of the motion of the universe that does not rely on God’s push. He intends to discover the systematic arrangement linking large parts of creation in its entire infinite extent and to bring out by means of mechanical principles the development of the cosmic bodies themselves and the cause of their movements from the first state of nature.72 As far as Kant is concerned, planetary motions have never had anything to do with God. They are processes from the genesis to the perishing of planets themselves, demonstrating that “there is a certain natural principle that everything which has a beginning gets steadily closer to its dissolution and that much closer to destruction the further it is from its origin.”73 His nebular hypothesis, which he has put forward on the basis of empirical evidence collected in astronomical observation and the dynamics law of the interaction between gravity and repulsive force, is one of the greatest achievements of his endeavor. According to this hypothesis, the universe was originally permeated with various primitive particles of material, that is, the “primitive nebular.” They continuously amalgamated due to mutual attraction and rotated because of mutual repulsion. They gradually concentrated on a single plane, and in the end, formed an orderly celestial system in which planets surround the sun. In this way, Kant explains the universe’s law of operation with pure dynamics without “God’s direct intervention” and thereby excludes God’s interference and manipulation of celestial operations. It is based on these conclusions that Kant makes the bold claim that we could say here with certain understanding and without presumption: Give me the material, and I will build a world out of it! That is, give me the material, and I will show you how a world is to come into being out of it. For if there is material present which is endowed with an inherent power of attraction, then it is not difficult to establish those causes which could have led to the arrangement of the planetary system, considered on a large scale.74 He even points out that the highest legislation for nature must lie in our self, i.e., in our understanding, and that we must not seek the universal laws of nature from nature by means of experience, but, conversely, must seek nature, as regards its universal conformity to law, solely in the conditions of the possibility of experience that lie in our sensibility and understanding.75 This is the first expression of the concept of “man makes law for nature,” which has actually further raised the abilities of human rationality. The subjectivity of human beings, especially the great power of human rationality, has received high appreciation from Kant.

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In addition, such a slogan reveals a determinist idea: as long as there is space and motion, we can know the future of the universe. The concept of speculating about the universe’s future based on its original state is brought to the extreme by Laplace. In the introduction to Theory of Probability, Laplace states explicitly that we should see the current state of the universe as the consequence of its previous states and the cause of its future states. Let us assume that there is a deity who is able to know all the acting forces exerted on nature and the respective positions of all constituents of nature, and who is able to analyze these data rather comprehensively, then this deity will be able to include the motions of the heaviest objects and the lightest atoms in the universe into the same formula. To this deity, there is no longer anything that is uncertain. The future and the past are both presented to it.76 The past and future of the universe both follow strict mechanical determinism and causality. Coincidence and indeterminacy play no part in the spinning gears of the world. This is a view of extreme determinism. In fact, mechanical determinism existed not just in modern times. As early as the ancient Greek period, the physicist Archimedes once confidently asserted, according to the lever principle, that “Give me a firm place to stand and a lever and I can move the earth.” Such a claim not only demonstrates the great power of man but also shows the idea that the operation of the universe follows the laws of mechanical movements. Moreover, as the fundamental guiding ideology, the mechanist view promotes the independence of science, as well as the fuller exertion of man’s rationality. Dictated by this mechanist view, natural science has stridden forward since then and achieved great success in various fields again and again. 1.3.3 Usefulness Is the Truth “Usefulness is the truth” indicates that we should evaluate the truthfulness of theories or concepts according to empirical effects and consequences. It emphasizes that the truthfulness of knowledge is determined by its effectiveness. On the contrary, useless things are not truths, but fallacies. This idea is a reflection of the pragmatic view of science on the question of truth. It is also a fundamental view of modern pragmatism regarding truth. The instrumentalist view of science that equals truth with effectiveness emerged and developed along with the birth of modern science. As early as the 17th century, when modern science had just emerged, Bacon explicitly argued that “truth and usefulness are (in this kind) the very same things, and the works themselves are of greater value as pledges of truth than for the benefits they bring to human life.”77 In other words, the truthfulness of knowledge is closely associated with its effects. Its pragmatic effects directly determine its truthfulness. In this way, Bacon connects the truthfulness of knowledge with its instrumentality and makes instrumentality an important criterion for judging truth. There is no doubt that this view of Bacon has been very influential and important in the development of modern science. Such pragmatism had significant

The Rise of Scientism 71 influences on the advancement of science as early as modern science was just born, and it has become a prominent feature of modern science. As I. Bernard Cohen points out, a revolutionary feature of the new science was the additional pragmatic goal of bettering everyday life here and now through applied science. The conviction that had been developing in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, that a true goal of the search for scientific truth must be to affect the material conditions of life, was then strong and widely shared, and constituted a novel and even a characteristic feature of the new science.78 In addition, the calculability of science and related technology has even provided rationality for modern Western capitalism. On the one hand, it is “dependent on the peculiarities of modern science, especially the natural sciences based on mathematics and exact and rational experiment.” “On the other hand, the development of these sciences and of the technique resting upon them now receives important stimulation from these capitalistic interests in its practical economic application.”79 This means that while science has created huge economic profits and pragmatic effects, these benefits have also promoted the growth of science in turn. Therefore, in a certain sense, at the early stage of the development of modern science, it was the pursuit of the effectiveness of science that secured the social status of science by demonstrating its material power. The triumph of science in its competition with religion and other forms of ideology, and its growth into independence, were largely facilitated by its pragmatic value and the instrumentalist propositions therein. It was these factors that paved the way for science’s independence and served as the most powerful declaration in the process that science becomes independent and rises to the status of a main social force. Such instrumental and pragmatic features of science have been further highlighted by modern pragmatism and developed into a widespread trend of philosophy. It started with Charles Sanders Peirce and was pushed forward by William James. With Dewey’s theories, it has grown into a widely influential view of truth. Peirce is the founder of pragmatism. Regarding the issue of truth, he argues that “the real is no more than what offers satisfaction in cognition.” He claims that truth is “effect,” a belief leading to success in action, or the kind of belief that results in actions that fulfill our wish at the time. His emphasis on the actual effects of the meaning of things and ideas sets the basis for the pragmatic view of truth. He argues that the meaning of an idea or belief cannot be fixed through examination of simply itself. On the contrary, we need to explore its meaning in the actual process of operation. The question of the meaning of an idea is first the question about what kind of actions a specific idea leads us to make, and then about what kind of perceptible effects these actions will give rise to in experience.80 As James maintains, [t]o attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object…we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve – what

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It is thus clear that Peirce has formed the basic idea of pragmatism that one should judge whether an idea is truth or not according to its results. He has thus started the trend of pragmatism. William James is an important figure in the development of pragmatism. He has striven for the systematization of pragmatism, established the pragmatic view of truth and put forward the basic idea and principle of truth in pragmatism: usefulness is the truth. James maintains that the effect or value of a true concept is reflected by the concept’s satisfaction of man’s needs, such as bringing certain benefits to people or enabling people to achieve certain kinds of success. In his view, [t]ruth…is simply a collective name for verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued because it pays to pursue them. Truth is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.82 Therefore, [y]ou can say of it then either that “it is useful because it is true” or that “it is true because it is useful.” Both these phrases mean exactly the same thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function in experience.83 It shows that “usefulness,” in James’s idea, is the proof of “truth” and the verification of the truthfulness of theories based on the theories’ pragmatic effects on the empirical level. Moreover, James has also explicitly come up with the concept of “instrument,” arguing that “all our theories are instrumental, are mental modes of adaptation to reality, rather than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted world-enigma.”84 In this way, he emphasizes the instrumentality of theoretical knowledge and truth. Such an instrumentalist view has been deep-rooted and fully promoted. In James’s opinion, any idea that meets the needs of individuals should be acknowledged. As he contends, [pragmatism] has in fact no prejudices whatever, no obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof. She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she will consider any evidence…Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or the senses and to count the humblest and most personal experiences. She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of private fact.85

The Rise of Scientism 73 James’s instrumentalist tendency undoubtedly offers a favorable ideological ground for the maximization of the pragmatic effect of science and technology. Dewey epitomizes pragmatism, not only developing its basic theories but also realizing in-depth development of the pragmatic view of truth on an instrumental level. He explicitly points out that “truth as utility means service in making just that contribution to reorganization in experience that the idea or theory claims to be able to make.”86 Therefore, Dewey even names pragmatism and its view of truth as instrumentalism. Its basic connotation is that concepts, ideas and theories are instruments that people use to make their actions successful, and thus whether they are able to make people succeed in their actions becomes the standard for judging their truthfulness. If ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems are instrumental to an active reorganization of the given environment, to a removal of some specific trouble and perplexity, then the test of their validity and value lies in accomplishing this work. If they succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true.87 At the same time, Dewey emphasizes that all knowledge is featured by instrumentality. Concepts, ideas and theories, “as in the case of all tools, their value resides not in themselves but in their capacity to work shown in the consequences of their use.”88 In addition, instruments and means are as important as purposes and consequences. Dewey argues that “knowledge is instrumental. Nevertheless, the purport of this book is to celebrate instruments and means, which are of equal value as purposes and consequences, because without instruments and means, purposes and consequences are all coincidental, chaotic, and unstable”.89 In this way, he endows all knowledge, including science, with instrumentality, and all knowledge acquires truthfulness because of its effects. Furthermore, Dewey generalizes the instrumentalist feature of science, repeatedly underscoring that instrumentalism boils down to the truthfulness of scientific concepts and theories – not to their facilitation of individual benefits or success, but to that of collective and public benefits and success. He points out that when truth has been thought of as satisfaction, it has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need. But the satisfaction in question means a satisfaction of the needs and conditions of the problem out of which the idea, the purpose and method of action, arises. It includes public and objective conditions. It is not to be manipulated by whim or personal idiosyncrasy.90 It is thus clear that Dewey, while turning away from the satisfaction of individuals to the satisfaction of the public, does not mean that scientific knowledge reflects objective reality. In this way, he has not only vulgarized scientific knowledge but also pushed science to the extreme of instrumentalism, thereby blurring the dimension of value in scientific knowledge and contributing to the prevalence of scientism.

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Unlike James, Dewey has not merely held an instrumentalist view, but also attempted to associate himself with science and experiment through the concept of “instrument,” and thereby demonstrates a scientific characteristic. In such instrumentalist and pragmatic views of truth, science, experience, instrumentality and truthfulness are unified. The scientistic, instrumentalist ideas in such union are thus exposed, and scientism advances with the help of the pragmatic ideology.

Notes 1 W.H. Werkmeister. A Philosophy of Science. Translated by Li Derong et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1996:1. 2 R.G. Collingwood. The Idea of Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945. 3 A.N. Whitehead. Science and the Modern World. New York: New American Library, 1948. 4 A.N. Whitehead. Science and the Modern World. New York: New American Library, 1948. 5 M. Kline. Mathematics in Western Culture. London: Oxford University Press, 1953. 6 S. Mason. A History of the Sciences. Translated by Zhou Xuliang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1980:164. 7 I. Cohen and Bernald ed. Puritanism and the Rise of Modern Science. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990:122. 8 R.K. Merton. Science, Technology & Society in Seventeenth-Century England. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1938. 9 A.D. White. A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (Vol. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 10 E. Cassirer. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated by F.C.A. Koellin and J.P. Pettegrove, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. 11 R.K. Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure, enlarged ed. New York: The Free Press, 1968. 12 W. Leiss. The Domination of Nature. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994. 13 Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by Yu Guangyuan, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984:3. 14 A.N. Whitehead. Science and the Modern World. New York: New American Library, 1948. 15 Yang Shoukan et al. 20th-Century Western Philosophy: Scientism and Humanism. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2003:152. 16 H. Butterfield. The Origins of Modern Science, revised ed. New York: The Free Press, 1957. 17 Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009:329. 18 Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by Yu Guangyuan, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984:48. 19 Comte. Courses of Positive Philosophy. Quoted in Classical Texts of 20th-Century Philosophy (Preliminary Volume). Edited by Wu Xiaoming, Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 1999:305. 20 Chang Jian et al. Comprehensive History of European and American Philosophy. Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2003:21. 21 H.G. Gadamer. Reason in the Age of Science. Translated by Xue Hua et al., Beijing: China Int’l Culture Press Limited, 1988:5–6.

The Rise of Scientism 75 22 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 4). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:262. 23 Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by Yu Guangyuan, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984:7–8. 24 A.E. McGrath. Science & Religion: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999. 25 R.S. Westfall. Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 26 R.S. Westfall. Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. 27 Selected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:865. 28 V.Y. Mudimbe ed. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996. 29 Zhang Zhiwei and Qian Ouyang eds. Wisdom of Western Philosophy. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2000:77. 30 Zhang Zhiwei ed. History of Western Philosophy. Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 2002:536–37. 31 Zhang Zhiwei ed. History of Western Philosophy. Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 2002:536–37. 32 F. Heer. Europaische Geistesgeschichte. Translated by Zhao Fusan, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2008:414. 33 J. Rifkin and T. Howard. Entropy—A New World View. Translated by Lv Ming et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987:20. 34 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by Zhang Qingxiong, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1988:71. 35 J.F. Lyotard. Post-modernism. Translated by Zhao Yiji, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press (China), 1999:38. 36 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:35. 37 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:40. 38 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:45. 39 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:46. 40 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:47. 41 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:48. 42 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:49. 43 F. Bacon. The Advancement of Learning. London: Dodo Press, 2006:24. 44 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:24. 45 Wu Guosheng. Lectures on Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: Press of People’s University of China, 2009:201. 46 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:66. 47 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:41. 48 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:79. 49 A. Wolf. A History of Science Technology and Philosophy in the 16 and 17th Centuries. Translated by Zhou Changzhong et al., Beijing: Commercial Press, 1985:48. 50 M. Cranston. Philosophers and Pamphleteers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 51 F. Bacon. The New Atlantis. The Floating Press, 2009:51. 52 Wu Guosheng. Lectures on Philosophy of Technology. Beijing: Press of People’s University of China, 2009:203. 53 A. Wolf. A History of Science Technology and Philosophy in the 16 and 17th Centuries. Translated by Zhou Changzhong et al., Beijing: Commercial Press, 1985:13. 54 W.H. Werkmeister. A Philosophy of Science. Translated by Li Derong et al., Beijing: Commercial Press, 1996:11.

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55 W.H. Werkmeister. A Philosophy of Science. Translated by Li Derong et al., Beijing: Commercial Press, 1996:14–15. 56 E. Schuurman. Technology and the Future: A Philosophical Challenge. Translated by Li Xiaobing et al., Beijing: Orient Press, 1995:139. 57 Zhang Zhiwei ed. History of Western Philosophy. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press, 2002:335. 58 J. Ziman. Real Science: What It Is, and What It Means. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:16. 59 B. D’Holbach. Le Bon Sens, On Idees Naturelles Opposees Aux Idees Surnaturelles. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1966:26. 60 B. Spinoza. Ethica in Ordine Geometrico Demonstrata. Translated by He Lin, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1997:37–38. 61 A. Koyré. Newtonian Studies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965:21. 62 Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by Yu Guangyuan, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984:10. 63 I. Newton. Newton’s Principia: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Translated by Andrew Motte, New York: G.P. Putnam, 1850:504. 64 I. Newton. Newton’s Principia: The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. Translated by Andrew Motte, New York: G.P. Putnam, 1850:505. 65 I. Kant. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by Ian Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008:10. 66 I. Kant. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002:159. 67 A. Koyré. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957:276. 68 Engels. Dialectics of Nature. Translated by Yu Guangyuan, Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984:33. 69 J. Rifkin and T. Howard. Entropy—A New World View. Translated by Lv Ming et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1987:16–17. 70 R.S. Westfall. Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977:119. 71 I. Kant. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by Ian Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008:11. 72 I. Kant. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by I. Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008:8. 73 I. Kant. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by I. Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008:145. 74 I. Kant. Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. Translated by I. Johnston, Arlington: Richer Resources Publications, 2008:17. 75 I. Kant. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. Translated by G. Hatfield, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004:71. 76 Li Jingge and Wang Yumei. “The Origin and Historical Status of Laplace’s Determinism.” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 1998(9). 77 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000:96. 78 I.B. Cohen. The Newtonian Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980:5. 79 M. Weber. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Peng Qiang et al., Xi’an: Shaanxi Normal University, 2002:23. 80 Chang Jian et al. Comprehensive History of European and American Philosophy. Tianjin: Nankai University Press, 2003:29. 81 W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:27.

The Rise of Scientism 77 82 W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:112. 83 W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:105. 84 W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:100. 85 W. James. Pragmatism. Translated by Chen Yulun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1979:44. 86 J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920:157. 87 J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920:156. 88 J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920:145. 89 J. Dewey. The Pursuit of Certainty. Translated by Fu Tonghian. Edited by Philosophical Studies, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1966:226. 90 J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920:157.

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The Expansion of Instrumental Reason

In the modern period, on the basis provided by Bacon and Descartes, the scientific tradition founded by Newton announced the advent of the classical period of natural science studies and established its ideal of objectivity which it has constantly pursued. The universality, objectivity and accuracy of science have become the fundamental principles and orientations of scientific activities. Nonetheless, such an ideal of objectivity has continuously enhanced the belief in scientism. Combined with the scientific aspirations of philosophy and the scientistic tendency of instrumentalism, this ideal has raised the status of science in social life. At the same time, as human beings’ abilities to understand and transform nature improve through their pursuit of the ideal of objectivity, human rationality has gradually leaned toward instrumental reason, which has led to the loss of values.

2.1  Aspiration    for Universality and Objectivity For modern science, the ideal of objectivity is not an empty concept but a principle and foundation of natural science studies. It not only permeates all fields of natural science but even once influenced the field of social sciences as its guiding principle. Whether in natural science or social sciences, however, the aspiration for universality and objectivity is the primary characteristic that regulates specific scientific studies. This is prominently demonstrated by science’s features of uniformity, universality, objectivity and neutrality, as well as by its pursuit of proceduralization and standardization. 2.1.1 Uniformity and Universality From the very beginning, natural science has considered its duty the exploration of the uniformity and universality of the universe and nature, aspiring to seek uniformity in both knowledge and science. This is fundamentally because what is true in physics must be logically simple. In other words, it is fundamentally unified.1 Therefore, realizing the uniformity of science has always been the goal of scientists and philosophers in many fields. The pursuit of scientific uniformity is first of all built on the idea that all things are universally connected. The efforts to realize the uniformity of science have DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-4

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 79 in turn enhanced the universality of these connections. As Karl Jaspers points out, this “striving after the interconnexion of all knowledge out of the idea of the unity of the sciences is visible.”2 This is also a basic pattern followed by classical scientific studies. In the history of scientific advancement, Newton, in the 17th century, established the basic theoretical system of classical mechanics on the basis of the law of universal gravitation and the three laws of motion, organizing all knowledge of mechanics into a deductive system and thereby establishing the basic structure of the edifice of classical physics. This is the first time in the history of science that the synthesis and unification of knowledge have been realized. It also demonstrates the concept of the basic uniformity of the universe on all levels. Since then, establishing an all-encompassing, unified scientific theory and building an impregnable edifice of science have been the goals of scientists. The several syntheses achieved in 19th-century science, such as the establishment of unified electromagnetic theory, the unification of knowledge about chemistry and elements in the periodic law of elements and the synthesis of biological knowledge in Darwin’s theory of evolution all contributed to the uniformity and confidence of science. In the early 20th century, Einstein attempted to unify the electromagnetic field and the gravitational field based on the belief that all types of forces can be explained by a single theory. Although his efforts did not pay off, they anticipated scientists’ attempts to explain the four different kinds of forces with a unified theory: the gravitational force, the electromagnetic force, the weak (nuclear) force and the strong force. The electroweak theory is an important product of these efforts. Even today, many scientists in the field of theoretic physics are still exploring assiduously, trying to establish a consistent and unified theory about physical interaction force and explain all phenomena with a unified law and scientific system. Their endeavor vividly demonstrates their constant pursuit of the uniformity of science. In philosophy, such faith in the uniformity of science and the aspiration for unifying science are most clearly reflected by positivism. Various positivist ideas of philosophers from Comte to Ernst Mach have all aimed at the establishment of a unified system of science. As early as the 1830s and 1840s, Comte had attempted to unify all subjects of science with his idea of scientific classification, which is presented in his The Positive Philosophy and A Discourse on the Positive Spirit. On the basis of the positive spirit, Comte emphasizes that science is an organism and that the classification of science should be founded on observation. Various special series should be differentiated within the universal interconnections among things, and they should be classified and arranged in order. At the same time, the organic connections among different sciences should be noticed, especially the classification methods of botany and biology. In his specific process of scientific classification, Comte borrows the idea of biological evolution from Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, dividing science into six subjects: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology. Comte believes that from mathematics to sociology, there is a pattern in which universality decreases and complexity increases. Such a

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classification method is formed in conformity with the real kinship among various subjects. Among the four subjects in the middle, each of them is interlinked with the one before it in terms of its simplest phenomenon and interlinked with the one after it in terms of its most complicated phenomenon.3 Based on his “law of three stages,” Comte argued that in his time, the five subjects from mathematics to biology had all entered the positive stage, while sociology alone was still staying at the metaphysical stage. The long-term disturbance of French society lay in such hysteresis. Therefore, Comte sees it as his historical task to establish positive sociology, establish positive philosophy on the basis of positive science and make positive philosophy an indivisible system of knowledge. Comte’s pursuit of unified science and his endeavors were inherited by Mach, who considered the unification of science an effective way to solve the crisis of natural science from the 1860s to the beginning of the 20th century. In response to mechanical materialism and organicism – the two ways of solving this crisis at the time – Mach came up with a third way, which was to unify the world of science with the theory of monism of elements. Mach points out that any one who has in mind the gathering up of the sciences into a single whole, has to look for a conception to which he can hold in every department of science. Now if we resolve the whole material world into elements which at the same time are also elements of the psychical world and, as such, are commonly called sensations; if, further, we regard it as the sole task of science to inquire into the connection and combination of these elements, which are of the same nature in all departments, and into their mutual dependence on one another; we may then reasonably expect to build a unified monistic structure upon this conception, and thus to get rid of the distressing confusions of dualism.4 On account of this theory, Mach, starting from studies of physics, psychology and physiology, establishes the line of research that unifies the physical world, the physiological world and the psychological world on the basis of “elements.” He completely eradicates the previously unbridgeable gap between the psychological world and the physical world by considering elements as the common basis of the two worlds.5 After classifying elements, Mach explicitly declares that [t]here is no rift between the psychical and the physical, no inside and outside, no ‘sensation’ to which an external “thing,” different from sensation, corresponds. There is but one kind of elements, out of which this supposed inside and outside are formed – elements which are themselves inside or outside, according to the aspect in which, for the time being, they are viewed.6 In this way, he makes elements into the starting point of all scientific studies because “such a view stabilizes various scientific studies, showing no difference

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 81 in different fields of research. For instance, when we move beyond physics into the fields of physiology and psychology, such a view can still be our starting point”.7 Eventually, different fields of science acquire the same basis, and the goals of the commensurability of all these fields and the uniformity of science are reached. As the staunchest defender of science, logical positivism makes more efforts in pursuing uniformity of science and attempts to unify science on the basis of the language of physics. In logical positivists’ view, the establishment of a unified world of science is very important, not only because it is a critical weapon for removing metaphysics from philosophy, but also because it is an important weapon for eliminating the opposition between spirit science and natural science. Earlier positivists, mainly Comte and Mach, have not accomplished this task, primarily because they were not able to find a fundamental language to deal with the “intersubjectivity” (that is, the commonality between subjects) and “universality” in scientific statements. In other words, this language must be in the first place a language between subjects. It must be comprehensible to everyone, and its symbols must have the same meanings for everyone. Secondly, it must be a universal language, capable of expressing any fact. Therefore, in order to unify science, the unification of the language of science must first be achieved. On this matter, logical positivists advocate the unification of science with physicalism on the basis of the language of physics. Physicalism means to restore psychological phenomena to physical phenomena and translate psychological propositions into physical propositions on the basis of physics, using the methods of behaviorist psychology and the language of object from physics, and in this way, unify the psychological, the physical, the corporeal, and the spiritual, and further restore all empirical sciences to physical science.8 In Carnap’s words, [t]he thesis of physicalism maintains that the physical language is a universal language of science – that is to say, that every language of any sub-domain of science can be equipollently translated into the physical language. From this it follows that science is a unitary system within which there are no fundamentally diverse object-domains, and consequently no gulf, for example, between natural and psychological sciences. This is the thesis of the unity of science.9 The “intersubjectivity” and “universality” in the communication and unification of all scientific subjects are thereby achieved. The exploration of the uniformity of science mentioned earlier indicates a belief in the universality of science. The pursuit of the uniformity of science also contributes to the realization of its universality. The aspirations for the uniformity and universality of science are eventually compatible. As Jaspers points out,

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The Expansion of Instrumental Reason [m]odern science, devoted to the most individual phenomenon, looks for its own universal interconnexions. It is not able to apprehend the cosmos of Being, but it is able to apprehend the cosmos of the sciences. The idea of the coherence of all the sciences brings about dissatisfaction with every isolated cognition. Modern science is not only universal but lives for the unity of the sciences, though it never attains it.10

Strictly speaking, however, in comparison with uniformity, universality is a more fundamental characteristic of science and a more common aspiration. Alan Chalmers maintains that no matter if we see science as material control or the understanding it offers, universality is a unique property of it. Universality can be considered as the goal of science because science can be, and it often has already been and is being now, practiced in a way that serves the purport of knowledge production, instead of being subordinate to other individual, class and ideological interests.11 Universality is not only a basic characteristic of science but also a goal of it. Specifically speaking, the aspiration for the universality of science can be divided into two aspects. On the one hand, there is the pursuit of the universality of science itself. That is to say, science is intrinsically characterized by universality. It is universal truth. There is also universality in the use of scientific methods. In general, science follows universal scientific methods. It acquires and is expressed by the language of mathematics and the rules of logic. Therefore, it has a kind of universality that is impersonal and independent of individual will. On the other hand, scientific conclusions are also universal. Although science is always produced under certain socio-historical conditions, science and the effects of its application, in the mainstream view, do not alter by socio-historical conditions such as nation, ethnicity, religion and era. Science is universally applicable under all conditions. Moreover, [i]n spirit, modern science is universal. In the long run nothing can elude it. Whatever takes place in the world is subject to observation, enquiry and investigation, no matter whether it involves the facts of nature, the actions and statements of men, or their creations and destinies. Religion, too, and every kind of authority, is investigated. And not only every reality, but also every intellectual possibility becomes an object of investigation. There are no limits to enquiry and research.12 Science is not only universal but also limitless and never-ending in terms of its scope. Positivism and logical positivism have offered the methodologies of unifying science rather than the theories and ideas of unified science. From Comte to Carnap, philosophers were essentially engaged in discussions about the way to methodologically unify science. These discussions reveal the intention to invalidate metaphysics and to advocate the omnipotence of scientific methods. In other

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 83 words, behind the various ideas about the unification of science, there has been the belief in the omnipotence of science, which is the belief that the methods of natural science, in particular the methods of mathematics, logical analysis and physics, can be models for other subjects. These methods are of universality. They are the only correct and effective way for man to know the world. They should be applied to all fields including humanities and social sciences. They can even be the basic methods of all cultures. Such a belief is apparent in the theories of logical positivism. Logical positivists have two presuppositions: “the first is that experience is the ultimate criterion for evaluating science and rationality, and the second is that logic is the basic form of rationality.”13 Logical positivism makes logistic explanations of science, seeing the structure of scientific theory as the core topic of scientific philosophy. It concentrates exclusively on all possible logical structures of statements and the formal framework of theories. The so-called structure of scientific theory is in essence the logical relationship between scientific concepts and propositions. Logical positivism simplifies scientific methodology into inductive logic and simplifies the confirmation of theories or hypotheses as well as the extent of such confirmation into the logical relationship between observational statement (evidence) and the theories or hypotheses under test. It attempts to demonstrate that all scientific theories have an immutable axiomatical structure and that there seems to be a kind of invariable methodology that transcends history. This methodology can be applied to fields outside science. The methods and processes of scientific discoveries are not part of their discussions. The task of scientific methodology is to analyze and prove knowledge that has been formed. The process of the discovery of such knowledge is the object of psychologists’ and sociologists’ studies. The responsibility of science lies in verifying, instead of discovering various scientific laws. Unlike the trend nowadays of discussing both the methodology of justifying logic and that of discovering logic, such exclusive promotion of scientific methodology by the logical positivists touches upon only one aspect. In addition, such a view overlooks the human, historical, social and cultural soil of the growth of science. Even inside science, the idea of the omnipotence of science has been objected to by some biologists and psychologists, while it has been criticized by humanistic scholars outside the field of science. There is no doubt, however, that the logical positivists’ efforts to unify science also reflect the permeation of instrumental reason and its deep influences on humanities and social sciences. 2.1.2 Objectivity and Neutrality The objectivity of science, as an irrebuttable ideal, has been the goal and direction pursued by science, especially classical science, during the modern period. The uniqueness of science also lies primarily in its objectivity. As Israel Scheffler emphasizes: the ideal of objectivity is the most fundamental characteristic of science. This ideal demands that all scientific statements must undergo independent,

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The Expansion of Instrumental Reason unbiased, and standard tests and that we should realize that there is no personal authority in the field of cognition.

Then, what on earth is the objectivity that people have been pursuing? Generally speaking, we can consider the claims and ideas of objectivity to involve two basic aspects: the first is the ontological objectivity to which the object points on the ontological level, and the second is the objectivity in an impersonal, epistemological sense.14 The claims in the first aspect mean that different scientific studies can use a shared object of knowledge. Under such circumstances, objectivity is formed in the subject-object dichotomy, and scientific knowledge is interpreted as the representation of independent objects.15 In the second aspect, scientific knowledge cannot be understood from any perspective that is special or heterogeneous. In the antitheses between individuals and the public, and between individual, subjective opinions and shared, public opinions, scientific knowledge must demonstrate a kind of objectivity that does not take any side, or in other words, neutrality.16 Therefore, objectivity first of all refers to the objective characteristics of science as a kind of knowledge. As a unique system of knowledge, science is the correct reflection of objects and their patterns, so its content is objective and characterized by objective truthfulness. The objectivity of science and its truthfulness are closely related. The first index of scientific objectivity is science’s correct reflection of the reality of nature as a knowledge system of truth. In this sense, the ideals and aspirations of scientific objectivity actually presuppose the objectivity of objects. The object becomes the theme of scientific research only when it is endowed with an objective existence that is independent of the subject. It is only under this premise that we can consider scientific understandings and knowledge as objective instead of subjective. In other words, for all people with rationality, scientific knowledge is objective and effective only when the object of knowledge is objective. This is a shared idea that philosophers have adhered to since the time of ancient Greek philosophy. In order to protect this idea, philosophers have made intense debates and defenses. It was not until the birth of modern natural science that philosophers proposed to solve this problem with scientific methods. It is with the methods of modern natural science that the modern ideal of absolute scientific objectivity is created with new originality: scientific and effective things should break free from their respective relativity in terms of any subjective givenness. The existence-in-itself of the world that is knowable to science is understood as a kind of complete irrelevance to the horizon of subjective experience.17 In this sense, the objectivity of science is in fact a presupposed, absolute objectivity. It is generated from a kind of rationalistic presupposition, focusing on seeking for the guarantee for inevitability and the conditions that lead to “truth.” With a strong style of metaphysics, it believes in the inherent order of the

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 85 world – this order is determined by the sacred rationality, or considered to be a kind of absolutely fundamental demand that is consistent with the most urgent calls in the mind.18 Therefore, it is a priori and unconditioned. When the objectivity of science is reflected on the level of value, it is prominently manifested by the neutrality of value and unbiasedness of science, which is unrelated to value and thus has only instrumental significance. Therefore, objectivity also means that in processes of observation, proposing theories and making justifications, scientists are always impartial and undisturbed by any subjective factors. Ideally, scientists are always unbiased arbitrators who are endowed with superhuman moral qualities. The strong faith in the neutrality of science in the field of morality and in science’s neutrality of value is an idea that many scientists and even philosophers recognize and strive to prove. As Albert Einstein points out, there is another characteristic of the scientific mode of thinking. The concepts that it uses to establish its consistent system do not express any emotion. For scientists, there is only “existence,” and no wish, no value, no good, no evil and no goal. As long as we stay in the field of science itself, we will never encounter sentences like “you cannot lie.”19 In addition, science directly produces knowledge and indirectly produces the means of actions. If definite goals are established beforehand, they will lead to organized actions. As for the establishment of goals and the statements about values, they are beyond the range of its functions.20 Russell also excludes from science the ability to make moral judgments of good and evil. He argues that [s]cience has nothing to say about values, and cannot prove such propositions as “it is better to love than to hate” or “kindness is more desirable than cruelty.” Science can tell us much about the means of realizing our desires, but it cannot say that one desire is preferable to another.21 It is thus clear that the acknowledgment that science is unrelated to value and neutral “has stood variously for a separation of theory and practice, for the exclusion of ethical concerns from science, and for the disenchantment of nature.”22 Specifically speaking, the consideration of objectivity as a unique feature of science and the aspiration and basic criterion of scientific activities starts with Descartes. In the 17th century, by distinguishing “corporeal substance” from “thinking substance” and excluding God and “thinking substance” from the range of natural science, Descartes has defended the sacredness and objectivity of natural science, and at the same time established the tradition of modern natural science that pursues the classical idea of objectivity. Moreover, the basic hypothesis, which serves as the starting point of classical physics, represented by Newtonian mechanics, is exactly founded on Descartes’s “corporeal substance,” and it highlights Descartes’s classical ideal of objectivity. In the thinking mode of modern natural science, the material world or the “corporeal substance” follows strict laws of mechanics. When depicting the world, we should be able to exclude the

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influence of “thinking substance” or the subject. Therefore, it is absolutely possible to realize the classical ideal of objectivity. Admittedly, the precondition of such realization is the guarantee offered by correct scientific methods. Any subject of knowledge that intends to be the lawmaker of scientific knowledge and scientific methods must stick strictly to the principle of causality and use correct scientific methods. Traditional scientific philosophy, represented by logical positivism, has made the most powerful defense of the objectivity of science and directly made the pursuit of objectivity one of the most important standards for distinguishing science from non-science. Based on the justifiability of science, logical positivism argues that the pursuit of objectivity in scientific knowledge should in the first place premise on the justifiability of science. Unjustifiable knowledge is not scientific knowledge. In this way, it establishes objectivity on the basis of the justifiability of science. According to logical positivism, the ultimate goal of science is to discover the truth of the external world. Scientific research is conducted by impartial researchers, who carry out scientific activities in ways determined by logic and empirical facts. In addition, the achievements of scientists’ works are openly examined by the public. Their objectivity and correctness are thus ensured through examination and criticism.23 In this way, the objectivity of science is guaranteed by repeatable testability, and science becomes the most objective, correct and impartial system of knowledge that is characterized by truthfulness. Corresponding with this pursuit of “strong” objectivity, the U.S. scholar of sociology of science Robert Merton, in the same period, has put forward several norms that the operation of science must comply with. He explicitly points out, “universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized skepticism…are taken to comprise the ethos of modern science.”24 Among these norms, the norm of universalism and communism mainly reflect science’s characteristic of universality and its pursuit of the ideal of universality. Universalism explains the universality of science’s origin using the criteria of scientific knowledge and the fact that science is completely independent of nation, ethnicity and belief. Universalism finds immediate expression in the canon that truth-claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria: consonant with observation and with previously confirmed knowledge. The acceptance or rejection of claims entering the lists of science is not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist; his race, nationality, religion, class, and personal qualities are as such irrelevant.25 Communism explains the universality of the ownership of science by pointing to the shared possession of science by social groups or individuals. “The substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited.”26 Disinterestedness and organized skepticism epitomize science’s pursuit of objectivity and neutrality. Disinterestedness refers to the insistence on neutrality. It is the guarantee for realizing objectivity.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 87 “The demand for disinterestedness has a firm basis in the public and testable character of science and this circumstance, it may be supposed, has contributed to the integrity of men of science.”27 Organized skepticism refers to the endeavor to avoid possible influences of personal subjective authority on objectivity at the level of institutions. Therefore, these norms actually demonstrate science’s aspiration and efforts for realizing objectivity on the social level. Nonetheless, according to logical empiricism, the pursuit of objectivity is based upon the reliability of experience. It is exactly the neutrality and unbiasedness of observation that guarantee the objectivity of scientific knowledge. However, the discovery that “observation is laden with theory” and observation is not neutral has made this basis problematic. The foundation of objectivity is no longer firm. Even so, the pursuit of objectivity has not ended there. As the representative figure of critical rationalism, Popper, after his comprehensive discussions of the objectivity of science, has not given up his aspiration for objectivity, and even come up with the theory of “objective knowledge.” As far as Popper is concerned, pursuing objectivity does not mean completely excluding non-rational, subjective factors from knowledge. As he argues, “by an objective theory (he means) a theory which is arguable, which can be exposed to rational criticism, preferably a theory which can be tested: one which does not merely appeal to our subjective intuitions.”28 Although Popper is against absolute objectivity, he does not deny the existence of objectivity in science. He goes in a direction opposite to that of positivism, justifying the objectivity of science through falsification. It is thus clear that since the establishment of the ideal of objectivity in the mechanical view of the world and until Popper, this ideal has been taken for granted as a completely correct aspiration. Even in the field of social sciences, objectivity has also been the goal of social scientists. They believe that knowledge is not a priori, that research can teach us things that we did not know, can offer surprises vis-à-vis our prior expectation…[T]here is another meaning to objectivity. Objectivity can be seen as the outcome of human learning, which represents the intent of scholarship and the evidence that it is possible.29 The pursuit of objectivity and neutrality have actually accompanied the expansion of science in all fields. It is of course undeniable that this ideal of objectivity and the aspiration for neutrality established by classical scientific studies have been overly absolute and idealized, and thus they have been criticized by philosophers of science after Kuhn. They are even questioned and deconstructed today, which has caused the crisis of classical science. Sociologists and historians have realized the contextual nature of scientific research and started to reject the essentialist belief in universal rules and value. They have understood objectivity as intersubjectivity, or some kind

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The Expansion of Instrumental Reason of scientific communication or participation, or simply the objective background of individual belief and cognitive behaviors.30

Although scholars outside the field of natural science have reasonably questioned the objectivity of scientific knowledge, most scientists consider their questions long-winded, tedious and even puzzleheaded. Scientists’ faith in the decisive factor of all progress of modern science – that scientific knowledge is characterized by objectivity – has not been shaken, because they consider the aspiration for the objectivity of scientific knowledge as a necessary attitude of scientists, and firmly believe in the positive effects of scientific attitudes. According to Roger G. Newton, attacked by cynics and dreamers, objectivity is an unignorable constituent goal. Although personal preferences do exist, scientists must overcome these difficulties and fight for objectivity. The idea of pursuing truth and objectivity, that is, the realistic purpose and value that scientists take without much explanation, is not always evidently successful. Perhaps this can be called the “scientific attitude.” Although currently faced with constant criticism, the scientific attitude has still greatly promoted civilization. It is thus clear that the firm belief in the objectivity and neutrality of scientific knowledge has been extremely deep-seated among scientists. 2.1.3 Proceduralization and Standardization Proceduralization and standardization are the most prominent and most influential aspects of science’s aspiration for universality and the ideal of objectivity. They are also at the core of the ideal of scientific objectivity. Since the beginning of the modern period, science has continuously made achievements in research and widespread impacts on society, which have repeatedly demonstrated the objective universality of scientific methods as well as the superiority of science, and further promoted people’s pursuit of the ideals of proceduralization and standardization. As a result, such pursuit is ubiquitous both in and outside the field of scientific research. The pursuit of proceduralization in science starts first with scientists’ concern for scientific methods and is mainly demonstrated by their pursuit of scientific methods. In specific scientific explorations, a correct method is often the precondition of and guarantee for success and has an impact on the smoothness of the whole scientific process. In most people’s opinion, as long as one masters the correct method, one is able to solve all problems and overcome all difficulties. Therefore, the aspiration for a method actually represents the pursuit of proceduralization. In this sense, such pursuit is mainly the expectation for the proceduralization of the scientific method. In fact, it is exactly in the process of seeking increasing precision, perfection and standardization of the scientific method that the pursuit of proceduralization is demonstrated to the fullest, because, as the famous Soviet physiologist Ivan Pavlov argues, the method is the primary and the most basic thing. The leap of science is often determined by achievements in methods. Every time research methods move a step forward, it seems as if we rise to an upper level along

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 89 with it. From above, we can see the broad distance and many things that we have not been able to see. Therefore, our task of first priority is to determine the research method.31 In the history of science, beginning from the time of Galileo at the latest, people have started the pursuit of proceduralization. Aristotle’s syllogistic deduction aside, in the history of modern science, Galileo was the first to start from Aristotle’s methodology and comment on scientific procedures with examples such as the method of decomposition, the method of combination and experiment confirmation. In this way, he has discussed the issues of the scientific method and the proceduralization of science in a modern sense. Nevertheless, it was Francis Bacon, the founder of modern experimental science, who really started the pursuit of the proceduralization of science and put the exploration of and emphasis on method onto the agenda. Starting from Bacon, science has been recognized as a formularized enterprise and devoted to seeking an ultimate, once-and-for-all scientific method. Bacon attaches particular significance to method in scientific research. It is not an exaggeration to say that he is a prophet of new scientific methodology. On the basis of his criticism of Aristotle’s method, he comes up with the well-known “induction” method, and his Novum Organum is devoted to the theme of exploring methodology. In this monograph, Bacon explicitly points out that the existing methods at his time are too narrow, which would inevitably limit people’s understanding of things. Therefore, in order to go deep into things and explore their nature, people must have a “better and more accurate method.” This “new” scientific method is the “gradual, progressive inductions, and a method of exclusion.”32 At that time, Bacon’s discussion of induction as a scientific method was very important. It not only pushed forward science but also offered the foundation of inductive logic. It seems, however, that Bacon’s ideas about method and procedure are too absolute. He even claims that [t]here are, and can be, only two ways to investigate and discover truth. The one leaps from sense and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles and their settled truth, determines and discovers intermediate axioms; this is the current way. The other elicits axioms from sense and particulars, rising in a gradual and unbroken ascent to arrive at last at the most general axioms; this is the true way, but it has not been tried.33 Bacon’s ideas about the scientific method to a certain extent reflect the element of scientism in his thoughts. From Bacon’s inductive view of procedure to the end of the 19th century, modern science had matured and the transition to contemporary science had started. The modernist term “procedural” was coined, the idea of procedure became more mature, and the procedural method became more sophisticated as its regularity (normativity), artificiality, analyticity, formality, orderly nature and transparency grew clearer and richer. The idea of proceduralization in modern science was on the horizon.

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In the 20th century, not only has the ideal of proceduralization been highlighted to a higher extent by logical empiricism, but science, as standardized knowledge, has also been justified according to stricter logic. As Mach, a philosopher of empiricist empirio-criticism, argues, “we must admit that without method, no scientific achievement can be completely made in terms of its main points.”34 As a new stage of positivism, logical empiricism has gone further in its emphasis on method. Based on logic and experience, logical empiricism demonstrates the characteristics of proceduralization and standardization in science through its arguments about and emphasis on inductive logic and the principle of verification, and it ensures the rationality of science. In the eyes of orthodox philosophers of science and defenders of science, the ideal of proceduralization and the pursuit of standardization, as the goals of the exploration of methodology in the development of science, epitomize the superiority of science in comparison with other non-science knowledge. They are also what science endeavors to achieve. Science is a kind of systematic knowledge and method. Its studies inevitably follow certain procedures and use certain methods and are subject to certain standards, which constitute the primary precondition of the pursuit of proceduralization and standardization. This “inductive view of procedure in scientism” not only dominated the 19th century but was still greatly influential in the first half of the 20th century. Nearly at the same time as the logical empiricists, the American experimental physicist Percy Bridgman, inspired by the crisis of classical physics and its ideas, put forward the operationalist view of procedure through reflections on his experimental works. Bridgman considers it unnecessary to lose faith in science and truth because of the crisis of classical physics and its concepts. “[I]f we adopt this point of view…that the proper definition of a concept is not in terms of its properties but in terms of actual operations, we need run no danger of having to revise our attitude towards nature.”35 According to this idea, Bridgman believes that as long as the idea that physics reflects objective reality is abandoned, and all scientific concepts are connected with the empirical processes and operational36 processes, the conceptual crisis of classical physics could be solved by establishing the idea that “a concept is synonymous with its corresponding set of operations.” On such a basis, Bridgman has come up with the operational standard of the meaning of concept: the meaning of a concept is determined by corresponding operations: concepts to which there are corresponding operations are meaningful; those without corresponding operations are meaningless. The feasibility of operations becomes the criterion for judging the meaning of a concept. The meaning of a concept is determined by the kind of operations corresponding to it. Based on this criterion for the meaning of concept, The Logic of Modern Physics [Bridgman’s 1927 work] further points out that the meanings of formula, descriptions, propositions (or questions), knowledge and even social actions all depend on the criterion of actual operation.37 According to Bridgman, scientific truth would not be a category in which subjectivity corresponds to objectivity, if a physical phenomenon, that is, concept,

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 91 is seen merely as an operational activity. For example, the replacement of “action-at-a-distance theory” with “field theory” is not a result of the latter’s more accurate reflection of objective reality in comparison with the former, but simply because the latter is more convenient than the former. Apparently, Bridgman’s operational standard for the concept of science is too absolute, and he has thus been criticized by Carnap, Einstein and others. However, as a scientist, Bridgman holds a firm belief in the significance and effect of his operationalist view of procedure for scientific research, to the extent that he even believes that such a formularized method of scientific knowledge could be applied to the social field. For instance, as early as 1935 and 1936, he had attempted to promote this operationalist view of procedure to the field of social life (such as law and thinking activities).38 Although Bridgman later mentioned that people should use the term “operationalism” carefully and suggested terms such as “the aspect of operation” and “operational analysis,” his scientistic tendency has been undoubtedly clear. Criticizing the proceduralization of science, Herbert Marcuse contends that institutionalized and formularized science has become an ideology that leads to the intensification of social crises (including economic crisis and spiritual crisis) and social alienation, as well as the suppression of freedom and creativity by high-extent mechanization and automation.39 In the mid-20th century, the advent of the electronic computer, which operates based on programs, pushed the pursuit of proceduralization in science to the extreme and to perfection. As the newest achievement of modern science, the electronic computer is a product of proceduralization itself. It completely excludes the influence of man from its concrete operational process, and autonomously deals with all sorts of complicated information following pre-stored and pre-set programs. Fixed programs and rules and set orders and systems are what computer is all about. The extent of its precision, however, is comparable to that of the human brain, and it is featured by speed and efficiency that the human brain cannot achieve. Because of this, the electronic computer and its application are everywhere in human life nowadays. Artificial intelligence, which was developed based on computers, has also become a new part of people’s pursuit of proceduralization. Generally speaking, the history of pursuing proceduralization and standardization is in fact the process of simplifying and reshaping the world through induction and logic on the basis of a mechanical understanding of the world. The process from methodological explorations starting from inductive logic to the appearance of the products of proceduralization, symbolized by electronic computers, has basically followed this logic. Liu Dachun argues that the ideal of proceduralization has been promoted by the following two powerful trends: first, the tradition originated from Plato attempts to sum up all reasoning into clear rules and specify the world as a kind of atomic fact to which these rules can be applied without explanation; second, the invention of [the] electronic computer, a general-purpose device for information

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This argument is very knowledgeable. Aspirations for proceduralization and standardization have been consistent throughout human history. Proceduralization has been emphasized and become the dream of human beings thanks to the success of scientific methods. It has further entered all fields with its pursuit of regularization, systematization and standardization. Therefore, the ideals of proceduralization and standardization have even been extended into a kind of aspiration for proceduralization and standardization in the social field. All social matters and works are required to be transformed in accordance with certain formulas, rules and methods. A kind of standardized result is sought, while all possible variations and differences are to be removed to the utmost. Consequently, social issues such as the construction of public facilities and the management of factory personnel all conform to rational standards and objective principles of this modernized society. These processes, standards and principles together create a dry, mechanized and rational modern society. The proceduralization and standardization of productive processes are the most striking examples. The production of commodities is required to follow a standardized productive mode and be carried out following normalized procedures. Consequently, assembly-line works are imitated by various industries and thus widely spread. However, on the assembly line, “man disappeared, and all that remained was ‘hands’ and ‘things’ arranged on the basis of minute scientific examination along a detailed division of labor.”41 The proceduralization and standardization of education has even become a social defect nowadays. As school education is confined by a set of educational standards based on fixed procedures, and the evaluation of educational achievements is often determined by standardized answers, the autonomy and creativity in learning have thus been suppressed, which is very harmful to the advancement of human civilization.

2.2 Pursuit of Exquisiteness and Completeness Just like the objectivity and universality of science, exquisiteness, rigorousness and completeness have also been the main aspirations of science all the time. The biggest difference between modern science and ancient Greek science is that modern science has always taken as its fundamental principle to “pursue statements that are as accurate and quantitative as possible, as well as the ideal of laws.”42 Such persistent endeavor makes science a unique kind of knowledge, as well as a kind of knowledge that is of the highest extent of rigorousness and the most potential. 2.2.1 Principle of Economy of Thought In terms of striving for scientific exquisiteness and rigorousness, the Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach’s “principle of the economy of thought”

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 93 is a very representative theory. For a time, as the primary expression of the simplicity of science, it has developed into a principle of fundamental importance in scientific methodology. Influenced by Darwin’s evolutionary theory, especially the idea of the survival of the fittest, Mach put forward the theory that human thought must follow the principle of economy. In his 1872 book History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy, Mach for the first time came up with the idea of economy of thought, which considers the most economical thought the assumption that in this world, there is only me and my sensations. In “The Development of Mechanics,” Mach explicitly proposed the principle of “the economy of thought” and used it to refer to a kind of simplicity. As man’s life is short and his memory is limited; there is no genuine knowledge that can be acquired without the highest extent of economy of thought. At the anniversary conference of the Imperial Austrian Academy of Sciences on 25 May 1882 in Vienna, Mach made a speech titled “The Economic Nature of Physics Studies.” He pointed out at the very beginning that when human thinking, with its limited abilities, attempts to reflect the varieties of life in this world, and itself being merely a tiny part of this world, obviously, it is incapable of exhausting this knowledge. Due to this, people have to think economically. Therefore, philosophers of all times have shown the same tendency of grasping the essential features of the reality through a few fundamental ideas. In this way, Mach highlights again the importance and necessity of the principle of the economy of thought and demonstrates the inevitable trend of the development of human thought and knowledge. In fact, the idea of “economy of thought” had already emerged in medieval times. William of Ockham, a well-known Scholastic philosopher at the time, put forward the philosophical proposition of “entities are not to be multiplied more than is necessary,” which can be considered an early version of economy of thought. According to this principle, we should remove useless redundancy in our thinking just like shaving off hair with a sharp razor. This principle is thus called “Ockham’s razor” in philosophy. Such a principle aspiring for logical simplicity and economy in thinking is very significant for the efficiency of the pursuit of knowledge. Mach has paid much attention to the importance of economy of thought in science. As far as he is concerned, economy of thought should be regarded as a fundamental principle of our civilization in a special form. He appeals that “in science…we should be concerned with the convenience and economy of thought.” He claims that “the purpose of science is to replace or save experience with the replication or prediction of facts in thought.”43 In addition, such economy of science is consistent throughout the whole life of science. Mach has also emphasized economy of thought in education. His opinions on economy of thought actually come from his philosophical generalization of the

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practical experience in scientific research of both himself and many other scientists, as well as that of his own teaching practices. He says that “[his] conception of economy of thought was developed out of [his] experience as a teacher, out of the work of practical instruction. [He] possessed this conception as early as 1861, when [he] began [his] lectures as Privat-Docent.”44 He further points out that all sciences replace and save experience with the replication or prediction of facts in thought. This kind of replication is simpler and easier in comparison with direct contact with experience, and it is able to represent experience under certain circumstances. Such economical function that is consistent in the whole nature of science can be explained with a most common example, and such an economical understanding excludes all mysteries from science. Scientific education means to pass on one’s experience to another and thus to save the latter’s experience. It means to pass on the experience of a whole generation through library preservation to the next generation, also to save the next generation’s experience.45 Mach’s principle of economy of thought is very rich. It is related to the purpose of science, as well as to methodological principles and evaluation criteria of theory in science. For example, John T. Blackmore categorizes the economy of thought into 11 types: economy of thought, economy of energy, economy of work and time, economy of methodology, economy as mathematical simplicity, economy as abbreviation, economy as abstraction, economy as incomplete logic, economy of ontology, economy that is absent in nature and economy of language. What Mach has highlighted the most, however, is the simplicity and logicalness of thought. According to Mach, the economy of thought is actually a very clear logical ideal which retains its value even after its logical analysis has been completed. The systematic form of a science can be deduced from the same principles in many different manners, but some one of these deductions will answer to the principle of economy better than the rest.46 The higher the degree of the simplicity and economy of the logical structure of a scientific theory, the richer the axioms and content it contains, the more significant the theory becomes and the higher extent the theory’s completeness and depth achieves. There is no doubt that such an ideal for the logicalness and simplicity of thought is very important for the realization of the rigorousness and precision of science. Einstein names the principle of economy of thought “Mach’s principle of economy” – the principle of logical simplicity. He was inspired by this principle in his development of the theory of relativity. Mach uses the principle of economy of thought as a powerful weapon in his philosophical challenge against “metaphysics.” According to this principle, Mach argues that anything that is separated from sensational experience and cannot be restored to experience in science should be abrogated. For instance, the thingin-itself behind phenomena and things related to the concept of causality are all

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 95 “negative,” leading merely to confusion in people’s thought. Therefore, these “metaphysical” elements should be completely removed from science according to the principle of economy of thought. Of course, in addition to the effects that theory’s requirement of economy of thought may achieve, this principle also has a positive influence on specific modes of thinking and the choice of methodology in science. Because “language itself is an economical invention and means,” symbols with a higher degree of simplicity and practicality will better demonstrate the simplicity and economy of a thinking mode. In terms of scientific methodologies, the principle of economy of thought requires scientists’ ideas to be as concise as possible, their thinking mode as economical as possible, their methods and experimental procedures as simple as possible and the knowledge they acquire to be as abundant and complete as possible. The goal of the principle of economy of thought in knowledge is to achieve the most exquisite and the most complete knowledge and to improve the efficiency of knowing through consideration of the economy of thought in the whole scientific process. 2.2.2 Computationalism The concept of computationalism is attracting attention in both science and philosophy nowadays. Generally speaking, it is the philosophical proposition that all fields from the physical world, from the life process to the human intellect, can all be computed with algorithms, and even the whole universe is completely dominated and controlled by algorithms. Therefore, computationalism proposes the examination of everything, the understanding and grasping of the world from the perspective of computation. The “computationalism” we talk about today first emerged as the guiding principle in cognitive science. It originated from the trend of “computationalism” in the field of cognitive revolution from the 1950s to the 1970s. It is a theory on mind or cognition in contemporary cognitive science and the field of artificial intelligence. The basic idea of computationalism is that mental states, activities and processes are all computational status, activities and processes. To put it another way, cognition is computation. The advancement of computer science and technology and its widespread application in various social fields make modern society a world controlled by and full of computation. Algorithms and computation become the core concept, as well as methods that are pursued and used, in almost all disciplines and fields. Computationalism and its emphasis on the idea of “numbers,” however, can be traced to Pythagoras’s idea of “all things are numbers” and the tradition of mathematics and mathematization established by Pythagoras. The faith in numbers has always been the best expression of the pursuit of exquisiteness and the best tool for the realization of precision. Therefore, the tradition of the computability of nature or the world has lasted a long time in the history of human beings. As early as more than 2,000 years ago, during the time of ancient Greece, the Pythagorean School had already emphasized numbers as the origin of everything. According to Pythagoras, the world is constituted by

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numbers. All things originate from numbers and return to numbers. As a kind of reality, numbers are the origin of everything. Only through mathematics can the representation of harmonious relationships be perfect. Therefore, only mathematics can be the cause of all changes. More than 300 years ago, Galileo explicitly declared the mathematical characteristic of nature, claiming that “The Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics.” Kepler, surprised at the perfection and self-consistency of planetary motion, acclaimed that: “God must be a Geometer!” Descartes, in the 17th century, offered an effective mathematical model for the emerging mechanical view of the world, believing that all things are related to quantification and can be boiled down to mathematics in order to be precise and error-free. The science thereafter has basically followed the tradition of classical science established by Newton and advanced within the general picture of the world according to the mechanical world view. In this picture of the world in the mechanical world view, the whole machine of the universe operates by fixed and unified physical patterns. These patterns can be known by human, written into mathematical equations, and these equations can be computed. Mathematical and physical sciences attempt to intervene with nature through computation. Nature thus becomes the object of human research, analysis, computation, control, transformation, and reconstruction. Nature has lost its previous status, becoming a pure object. Human beings believe that they have the ability and the authority to control and transform nature.47 The tradition of experimental science, which emphasizes numbers and evaluates the development of science with a quantitative index, has thereby been carried on and forward. It is thus clear that the advancement of science since the beginning of modern times has demonstrated that “the power of modern science lies in studying nature from the perspective of quantity and making mathematical depiction of the operation of the material universe through measurement and calculation.”48 As a result, not only have measurement and numbers become tools and means for scientific research and been widespread in the whole field of science, but the advancement of science has also allowed computation to dominate our life, penetrating deep into every corner of social life. The French poet Paul Valéry has vividly depicted such a condition, showing that the whole of science has been conquered by measurement, and even the unmeasurable scientific departments are subject to measurement. Applied science has almost been completely conquered by measurement. Life itself has been half conquered, limited, integrated and abased to a status of submission. As a result, it cannot protect itself from being ravaged by timetables, statistics, quantitative measurement and precision meters. Such a process is continually decreasing the diversity and mutability of life, and at the same time contributing to the inflexible advancement of whole life following fixed paths.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 97 That is to say, since Descartes, a “mode of transcendental rationality” has become a dream of human beings, who have therefore devoted themselves to establishing a mode of the world’s operation that is based upon mathematical and physical rationality and scientific rationality. Even in the society, [a]rguments, considerations, counsels that can claim to be based on this kind of calculation have great persuasive power in our society, even when this kind of reasoning is not really suited to the subject matter, as the immense… saliency of this type of thinking in social sciences and policy studies attests. Economists dazzle legislators and bureaucrats with their sophisticated mathematics, even when this is serving to package crude policy thinking with potentially disastrous results.49 The trend of computationalism which rose in the field of cognition in the mid-20th century offered support for the philosophical theory of the aforementioned ideas. Numbers evolve into computation and as computation, they control the whole society, catering to natural science’s aspiration for exquisiteness and precision. Since the 1980s, with the successive appearances of new subjects such as artificial life science, genetic algorithm theory, bioinformatics, quantum theory of gravity and DNA computers, computation, as a philosophical concept and method, has permeated into various disciplines and fields like bioscience and physical science. Most of these disciplines take computation as the concept and method of their research, claiming that life is a kind of algorithm, a program. It is an algorithm that is able to realize self-replication, self-construction and self-evolvement. They also attempt to answer questions about life and the nature of reality with computation, and thereby extend the concept of computation to the field of bioscience. In particular, in fields like genome and artificial life, which are receiving considerable attention nowadays, the concept of computation even determines the form and quality of life, because not only the brain and the life system, but even the whole world is a giant computational system that follows the laws of computation. More spectacularly, as Nicholas Negroponte claims, “[c]omputing is not about computers any more. It is about living. The giant central computer, the so-called mainframe, has been almost universally replaced by personal computers.”50 In his term, human beings have entered the time of “Being Digital.” Stephen Wolfram, one of the founders of cellular automaton theory, in a passage on computationalism, makes a detailed description of its current condition. He points out that in the process of knowing the world scientifically, human beings have begun to use the idea of computationalism to uniformly grasp and solve the most fundamental problems such as the mind, life, and the nature of reality. Apparently, this trend of computationalism did not come from nowhere: on a deeper level, it is the continuation and new development of the intellectual tradition in which human beings understand the world. A more direct cause is the advent, widespread application, and huge success of electronic computer.

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The Expansion of Instrumental Reason In today’s world, computation is everywhere and has become the basic characteristic of our time. This is not only shown in the fact that computation has permeated into every aspect of human society on the basis of computer and network technology, changing the ways of learning, working, and living. It is also demonstrated by the fact that the concept and methods of computation have transformed or is transforming perspectives from which we know the world and the basic process of scientific research. Its influences are undoubtedly revolutionary. In history, significant changes in science and technology have often altered human beings’ basic understandings about the world and themselves. For example, the great success of Newtonian mechanics has led to the understanding of the universe as a huge clock and formed the world view of mechanical determinism. Similarly, the revolution triggered by electronic computer has directly resulted in the rise and advancement of the trend of computationalism. Consequently, such a fundamental view of the world has begun to emerge in people’s mind: “every physical system in the universe, from the rotating galaxies to the colliding proteins, is specialized computers in some sense: each of them performs computation of one kind or another.”51

It is clear that as the development of science grows deeper, especially as computer science progresses, the belief that the whole world is controlled by algorithms and evolves according to rules established by algorithms has become a premise of scientific research. Consequently, “numbers” and “computation” gradually take control of our whole life. Since then, the world has been dominated by the rules of numbers and computation. The pursuit of ultimate exquisiteness and mathematization results in the change of Galileo’s “The Book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics” into “The Book of Nature is written in the language of algorithm.” This change is accompanied by breakthroughs and predicaments in philosophical understandings. On the one hand, computationalism makes philosophy and natural science connect with each other more closely. The advancement of computational theory from “cognition = computation” to “cognition = algorithm” shows that “human beings are machines” – the fundamental faith in the development of artificial intelligence and computer science – and finds not only philosophical support but also theoretical support in computationalism. That is, computationalism reveals the commonality between organisms and machines and discovers data structures in mental representation that are similar to those in computer. The Pythagorean prime in mind is similar to computer algorithm, which paves ground for our use of computer for studying cognition and computation.52 On the other hand, computationalism is also faced with predicaments and limitations. Although “man = machine,” an idea in the mechanical view of nature, has acquired a certain degree of modern development in computationalism, that is, “man = robot” and “man’s cognition = algorithm,” we are still unable to enter

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 99 the human brain to directly study the interiority of human beings. We can only understand such interiority indirectly by studying the segments of algorithms and programs in the intellectual activities of human beings. As a consequence, the problems of representing and computing human consciousness and emotions and the differences between machine intelligence and biological intelligence become the most serious predicament and limitation in computationalism. “Since the day computationalism came into being, from Penrose’s ‘the emperor’s new mind’ to Searle’s ‘the Chinese room,’ various questions about the computability of cognition keep ringing in our ears. The guiding principle of computationalism is faced with unprecedented challenge.”53 2.2.3 Perfectionism An important goal in classical science studies is to establish an all-encompassing and universally applicable, complete system of natural science. At the same time, this system must be established on the basis of rigorous logic and be as exquisite and precise as possible. Achieving the completeness of science and making science reach perfection have thus been the goals of scientists in their research since the beginning of modern times. The pursuit of exquisiteness and completeness in science is noticeably demonstrated as the pursuit of perfectionism in scientific processes. Beauty has indeed been an aspiration of unfailing popularity for thousands of years of human history, and scientific research has not been an exception. No matter in early science or modern and contemporary science, pursuing its own perfection has always been a fundamental principle in scientific explorations. However, the pursuit of perfectionism in science is more based upon science. It is premised on the perfect combination of scientific rationalism and aesthetics, and its ultimate goal is to realize the most complete and accurate possible explanations of the universe.54 That is to say, the aspired perfectionism in science is a kind of completeness, comprehensiveness and correctness closely related to science itself. It involves the pursuit of the precision, definiteness and completeness of science. The perfection of science first means that science is featured by precision. Such precision refers to the fact that science is a rigorous and precise system of conceptual categories, and it can usually be expressed by mathematical formulas, graphics and data. Therefore, in the tradition of classical science, for any specific established system, when conceptual frameworks of physical science are applied to it, it will generate a precise system of differential equations. These equations offer a depiction of the current state of the system. They also make it possible to derive elements of deterministic statements about any part of the system experiencing changes due to subtle changes in any other part of this system.55 Secondly, the perfection of science means it is characterized by definiteness. In classical science, which takes as its basic guide strict mechanical reductionism and accurate methods of mathematical experiment, definiteness is not only its goal but also one of its most fundamental features. In other words, definite predictions can be made when we know the initial conditions under which things or

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phenomena happen. In this way, the pursuit of definiteness, as a topic of unfailing heat in human history, offers the basic faith that scientific knowledge is definite. At the same time, because of the law of causality it contains, it offers a reliable premise and foundation for the aspiration of perfectionism in science. Lastly, the perfection of science indicates that science is characterized by completeness. Science is a system of knowledge that consists of a series of concepts, judgments and reasoning with a strict systematic and logical nature. Science is complete. It has been an unchanged goal of science to look for a theoretical system that is unified and encompasses all knowledge and explains all questions. The system of classical mechanics founded by Newton is a striking example of science’s perfectionism. As a primary symbol of modern science, Newtonian mechanics unifies cosmic motions with motions on the earth, constructing a complete system of knowledge and thereby realizing the ideal of perfectionism in science. The pursuit of perfection in the development of science is usually crystallized by the pursuit of the formal aesthetics of scientific theory and the demand for scientific theory’s completeness. Enterprises on these two levels proceed respectively, contributing together to the aspiration for the perfection of science. In terms of form, such aspiration is mainly demonstrated by the pursuit of simplicity, rigorousness and self-consistency in scientific theory. Simplicity is realized primarily through the succinctness of the form of theoretical expression and is usually demonstrated in the form of mathematics. The feature of rigorousness requires that the whole scientific theory appears as a rigorous system with strict logic. Self-consistency requires that there is no conflict among different parts of the theory, which forms a harmonious unity. The pursuit of perfection in scientific form is reflected by these principles of simplicity, rigorousness and selfconsistency. For instance, inspired by the achievements of James Clerk Maxwell, Einstein and other scientists have self-consciously striven for self-consistency and completeness in mathematical expression and thereby made their theories into formal systems with a higher extent of symmetry and a perfect structure. The main reason for science to pursue beauty in form is that the chief purpose of scientific theories is to express the harmony that is discovered in nature. Therefore, we immediately understand that these theories must have aesthetic value. The evaluation of the achievement of a scientific theory is the evaluation of its aesthetic value.56 Exactly because of that, beauty has received special attention in history and become one of the main criteria for judging scientific theories. More than 2,500 years ago, the Pythagorean School came up with the aesthetic idea that “beauty is harmony and correct proportion.” Euclid discovered that the beautiful and harmonious mathematical proportions in nature were usually near 1:1.618, that is, the principle of the Golden Section. Afterward, “Ockham’s Razor” realized the beauty of simplicity in science. In specific scientific judgments, the attainment of beauty has become a principle that must be taken into consideration in scientific processes, and it is mainly embodied by the principle of simplicity in theoretical judgment.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 101 In terms of content, perfectionism in science is primarily reflected by the faith in theoretical completeness and the trust in the absolute correctness of the application of science. The so-called completeness of theory refers to the requirement that scientific theories should be perfect and complete. Theories should both attempt to complete knowledge in all fields and strive to achieve their own comprehensiveness. Before the rise of science, the unified physics established by Aristotle in ancient Greece pushed ancient Europeans’ aspiration for completeness to the limits. After the birth of modern science, the unified system of classical mechanics established by Newton offered a basis for the edifice of physics and realized the perfect unification of science. The founding of 20th-century quantum theory and Einstein’s theory of relativity are the new glories of modern science. The comprehensive systems of science of various periods all reflect the pursuit of completeness and perfection in science. The trust in the correctness of the consequence of the application of science reflects the attitude of perfectionism in science on the practical level. The social application of science, regardless of its field and extent, should always be expected and given the responsibility to promote human welfare and social progress. The success that science has already achieved makes people believe that science is omnipotent and always prevails, which has thus become the goal of all sciences. Science endeavors to realize its goal of perfection by demonstrating the absolute correctness of the application of science with its correct social applications. The pursuit of perfection in science is a continuously developing and everlasting process and trend. Each time period has its own theory that represents perfection. Stephen Hawking argued that, although Einstein’s general theory of relativity had been celebrated as a “classical theory” in the early 20th century, it was not an “eternal perfect truth.” With the appearance of more scientific, more perfect theories, it would gradually become a part of history and tradition and part of its content had already turned into defects. Even Einstein himself said that in order to discover the complete laws and orders of the world, he wished that “someone would find a method that is more in accordance with realism than my fate allows me to. Or, more to be more appropriate, to find a more definite foundation.”57 Today, the pursuit of perfection and completeness has to a large extent evolved into the dream of a “perfect machine.” According to this dream, the important scientific ideal that things be perfectly regular, despite the apparent randomness of much in crude experience, suggests the image of the Perfect Machine. By it the universe is thought and felt in terms of an ideal clockwork mechanism in which nothing ever goes awry and in which every part is determined by the springs and gears which require its every motion.58 The whole world is thus an exquisite and rigorous system guided by strict mechanical laws.

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Of course, not everyone holds a positive attitude toward such pursuit of perfection in science. For example, Feyerabend argues that the “ad-hoc” in modern physics nearly covers and even completely excludes the difficulties in qualitative studies and thereby “(creates) a false impression of the excellence of our science.”59 In fact, however, modern science is more ambiguous and more deceiving than 16th- and 17th-century science. The social constructivist claims of science aside, the goal of perfection, in terms of just scientific theory itself, is destined to be a “dream.” On the one hand, regarding the perfectionist goal in the content of scientific theories, Popper and his followers have spoken frankly about the fallibility of scientific knowledge, emphasizing that scientific theories and their assertions about various entities in this world have already been falsified and replaced by completely different, more excellent theories. “[T]he very fact that we can declare past theories to be false indicates that we have a clear idea of the ideal that those past theories have fallen short of.”60 On the other hand, in terms of scientific theories’ ways of making descriptions, Pierre Duhem has raised the objection that “theories cannot be taken as literal descriptions of reality because theoretical descriptions are idealized in a way that the world is not.”61 For example, “[w]e will all recall that the science we learnt at school involved such things as frictionless planes, point masses and in extensible strings and we all know that there are no items in the world that match these descriptions.”62 These arguments have indeed pointed out the problem of idealization in the descriptions made by scientific theories, which has also been proved by the history of science. For example, Newton describes planetaries as dots or homogeneous spheres in his scientific theory. Quantum mechanics, in its derivation of the nature of the hydrogen atom, sees the hydrogen atom as an electronegative atom moving near an electropositive proton and thereby separates the hydrogen atom from its environment. Similarly, the ideal gas in the Carnot cycle has no counterpart in reality. Therefore, “in various ways, theoretical descriptions are idealizations that cannot correspond to real-world situations.”63 The perfectionist aspiration of science is of course inevitable, but this idealized aspiration is doomed to be only a pursuit “always on its way.”

2.3 Prominence of Instrumental Reason and Loss of Value Reason Instrumental reason and value reason are the two dimensions of human rationality. The former emphasizes instrumentality and scientific characteristics, while the latter underscores humanistic and spiritual levels. In the development of science during modern times, instrumental reason has continuously increased but value reason has gradually declined. The ideal of objectivity promotes the growth of the profundity of science. The progress and widespread application of science bring prosperity to society. The power of human rationality has been exerted and highlighted to the utmost. At the same time, however, value reason is gradually lost in such prosperity.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 103 2.3.1 Science Ascending to the Holy Temple Although science budded in the primitive period and achieved a certain degree of development in the ancient Greek era, science in the modern sense emerged only in the late medieval period. The science that has brought about the great advancement of society and created the myth of modernity appeared only after the 18th century. As the great scientists of the 17th century achieved unprecedented success in their exploration of nature, human beings’ confidence in knowing and transforming nature was thus established. In particular, the great achievements of classical science, represented by Newtonian mechanics, including the formation and preliminary perfection of Francis Bacon’s method of induction, Descartes’s method of deduction and Galileo’s methods of experiment and mathematics, allowed science to gradually evolve into a kind of sophisticated knowledge. Bacon’s claim of “knowledge is power,” while reminding people of the great practical effects of scientific knowledge on the progress of human society, also improved the status of science in the greater system of society. Therefore, as the achievements of scientific and technological studies kept permeating into social life, science acquired a certain degree of social reputation. In addition, as the rational ability of human beings found a way to exert its power, it received fuller attention and emphasis. When it came to the 18th century, which is known as “the era of rationality,” the critical nature of enlightenment rationality led to the ruthless criticism of all aspects of the whole society, including politics, economics, religion and culture. Having destroyed the authority of religion and theology, rationality established its supreme quotidian authority and the foundation for science’s advancement into various fields of nature. In his analysis of scientific development during that period, Engels points out that the sciences had assumed their scientific form in the eighteenth century and were consequently connected on the one hand with philosophy and on the other with practice. The result of taking philosophy as the point of departure was materialism (for which Newton was just as much a prerequisite as Locke), the Enlightenment and the French political revolution. The result of taking practice as the point of departure was the English social revolution.64 It is thus clear that since the 18th century, science has risen to the status of an indispensable power in politics and society. Starting from that period, the rationalist faith in science has gone beyond the scope of pure knowledge and has been demonstrated more often in social production and life. The unknowable, mysterious authority of religion has been replaced by the visible and practical authority of science in reality. Especially in the golden era of science during the 19th century, the practical value of the achievements of scientific research was widely demonstrated. The kind of pure science that advocated “science for science’s sake” got ahead of technological inventions and applications. The globalization of scientific research and the popularity of scientific application highlighted the special social status of science. Therefore, the

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huge theoretical progress of science and the increasing broadening and deepening of its technological application have extended the achievements of science to all aspects of society. Science was thus widely recognized in scientific and social fields. Since then, science has ceased to be the avocation of a small group of the leisure class. Technology is no longer handicrafts passed on across generations and receiving little respect. Instead, it becomes academic studies and practices of application that are widely respected. This is obviously very different from the situation in the early days of science. When mathematics and other rational sciences developed among the Greeks, scientific truths did not react back into daily experience. They remained isolated, apart and super-imposed. Medicine was the art in which perhaps the greatest amount of positive knowledge was obtained, but it did not reach the dignity of science. It remained an art. In practical arts, moreover, there was no conscious invention or purposeful improvement. Workers followed patterns that were handed down to them, while departure from established standards and models usually resulted in degenerate productions.65 Nowadays, in comparison with early science, modern science has been significantly improved in terms of its scope, content and status. The famous U.S. sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein points out in Open the Social Sciences that “in the beginning of the nineteenth century, the triumph of science was ensconced linguistically. The term ‘science’ without a specifying adjective came to be equated primarily (often exclusively) with natural science.”66 Wallerstein’s words demonstrate that with repeated successes in its conquest of nature and the increase of the significance of its roles in society, science has ascended the supreme throne and become a cultural force that is attracting the most attention and making the greatest impact. No matter in the aspect of theory or in the field of practice, the success science brings about has proven again and again the greatness of its power, won it social respect and perpetuated the temple myth. It is the huge success that science has achieved that has created the myth of rationality about “the omnipotence of science,” and science is at the core of this myth. As science has reached the status of supremacy in the whole of society, its power has been fuller demonstrated and its influences have been spread across all fields of the society. In particular, the unstopping successes of science have established a positive image of it as all-conquering, omnipotent, correct and reliable. With orthodox philosophers of science, such as those of logical empiricism, reinforcing such an image, this mainstream idea prevails, virtually adding to the glory of science and offering it support. The “holy” and “omnipotent” image of science has thus been established, and science has thus gained a bigger social stage on which it plays its roles, creating a modern world that is based upon science, technology and instrumental reason. Therefore, science in the 20th century appeared very different from what it had been. The U.S. historian of science Derek John de Solla Price contends that

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 105 not only the hardware of modern science is so glorious and enduring, comparable to the Pyramids in Egypt and the Medieval churches in Europe, but the national expenditure of manpower and material resources on scientific enterprises have also suddenly made science a critical part in national economy. People extol modern science with the term “mega-science” because of its great scope, its new appearance, its strength and power. In terms of social impacts, in modern society, science is an important – in our time, probably the most important – foundation of power. This power is the power to rebuild the world, the power to shake off the jinx of death, the power to bring people wealth and comfort, and the power to escape to our best from the inescapable fate.67 Science becomes the most important and most powerful means to create social wealth. It also becomes an important way to improve individual social status and win social respect. Science is ubiquitous and widely influential. The respect and status science has acquired are also demonstrated in social sciences in addition to natural studies and social life. In the 20th century, experimental science has become the paradigm of “science.” All judgments of other academic disciplines and even non-academic social practices are made with reference to it.68 In the fields of knowledge and academic research, science, as a holy enterprise, becomes the standard of scholarship and wins admiration and respect from all subjects. This standard is usually applied uncritically as if the ideal knowledge in natural science can be simply recognized as standardized and acceptable.69 As the sociologist Emile Durkheim argues: “[i]f bearing the seal of science is usually enough today to gain a sort of privileged credibility, that is because we have faith in science.”70 It seems that science has become a criterion for evaluating all things and behaviors. It is clear that in comparison with all previous cultural traditions, science has been endowed with too much holiness and extraordinary power. To most people, science is not a plain, where everyone stands at the same height of the general ability of society. Rather, it is a mountain crest of which the foundation has been significantly raised.71 Its intrinsic empirical basis, positive method and mathematical and physical conventions, as well as the scientific knowledge and methods it demonstrates, have all been characterized as objective, correct and complete. As a result, it becomes a force that not only controls society and human beings but also dominates the whole society and culture and even human beings. This is the consequence of the endeavor of the so-called guards of science, especially scholars of logical empiricism, to defend the “scientific temple” of objectivity, universality and unfailing correctness. Such holy dreams, however, appear extremely vulnerable and full of loopholes in the eyes of sociological researchers of science and postmodernists. The glory of this “temple” is thus weakened. As the historian of science, W.C. Dampier, maintains:

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After science ascended to the holy temple and achieved great reputation and social respect, the abstract law of objectivity, as an important symbol of it, has gradually established domination over the whole society and culture. The demonstrations of instrumental reason highlight the pragmatic functions of science but also in turn even makes it into an enormous force that suppresses human beings. The excessive emphasis on instrumental reason has led to the exaggeration and generalization of it, creating rationalized technologies, politics, economics, and cultures. In terms of economics, the equation of development with economic growth and the evaluation of the level of modernization and development according to various indexes related with material and desire have given rise to a latent spirit that pursues maximized material benefit and the possession of maximum material enjoyment. In terms of politics, bureaucracy excludes from its organization and arrangement unmeasurable elements that offer value and belief, conventional habits, and charm of personality. It realizes functional division according to rational index of technology and ignores the ultimate concern for human beings, resulting in not only the failure in realizing freedom and democracy, but also the confinement of thoughts and behaviors. In terms of culture, rationalism overrides value and cancels its legitimacy. Rationality becomes an absolute principle free from any restraint by values. The arbitrariness of rationality makes culture one-sided, stereotypical, and impoverished.73 The crisis of science lies behind all these phenomena. 2.3.2 From Analytical Philosophy to Quantitative History Starting from the 19th century, especially after the beginning of the 20th century, the authority and rational abilities of natural science have been continuously highlighted, leading, in academic studies, to the proposal and tendency of exclusively respecting (natural) science. Science, especially physics, is seen as the only and standard science. Scientific methods are seen as the only correct methods to realize knowledge. All sciences, including social sciences, must be based on it. Such an idea results in the rise of positive studies in social sciences. All scientific studies, even those in social sciences, have begun to imitate natural science, and take positive science as their standard, attempting to transform themselves with the rational methods of positivism and realize the “scientization” of various subjects with science as the paradigm and the positivist spirit and analytical methods as

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 107 the basis. This is the so-called trend of “scientization of academic research.” The “scientization of philosophy,” “scientization of politics,” “scientization of arts” and “scientization of historiography” are all signs of this trend. Analytical philosophy is a chief representative of the scientization of social sciences in its early stage. It is primarily characterized by logic and linguistic analyses and is a product of the scientization of philosophy. It emerged at the turn of the 20th century and gradually became a dominant philosophical trend in Anglo-American philosophy and one of the main trends in 20th-century Western philosophy. As a result, the 20th century is called “the era of analysis.” According to the ideas of the main advocators and early representatives of analytical philosophy, such as George Moore and Russell, analytical philosophy is the overthrow of and rebellion against conventional metaphysical philosophy. It abandons the previous methods that were purely speculative and turns to positive and analytical methods for philosophical explorations. It discards the conventional metaphysical mode of thinking, which it replaces with logical and conceptual analyses. Borrowing from the achievements of modern mathematics, especially mathematical and physical logical studies at the turn of the 20th century, it brings mathematics and logic into philosophy, endeavoring to build philosophy on a scientific and reliable basis. Therefore, analytical philosophy is actually a kind of positivist philosophy corresponding with modern positivist science. It is a kind of scientized philosophy. As one of the founding fathers of analytical philosophy, Russell was absolutely certain about this. In the last chapter of History of Western Philosophy, “The Philosophy of Logical Analysis,” he explicitly expresses his attitude about introducing scientific methods into philosophy and endowing analytical philosophy with scientific characteristics: Modern analytical empiricism, of which I have been giving an outline, differs from that of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume by its incorporation of mathematics and its development of a powerful logical technique. It is thus able, in regard to certain problems, to achieve definite answers, which have the quality of science rather than of philosophy. It has the advantage, as compared with the philosophies of the system-builders, of being able to tackle its problems one at a time, instead of having to invent at one stroke a block theory of the whole universe. Its methods, in this respect, resemble those of science. I have no doubt that, in so far as philosophical knowledge is possible, it is by such methods that it must be sought; I have also no doubt that, by these methods, many ancient problems are completely soluble.74 According to this passage, Russell is not only absolutely certain about the scientization of philosophy but even believes that the formation of any philosophical knowledge is only possible by this means. It is thus clear how firm Russell’s faith in scientism has been. Unlike traditional philosophy, analytical philosophy categorizes philosophy studies directly as linguistic studies, opening a new era and new stage of philosophy. The analytical method of philosophy created by philosophers like Russell

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became the primary method of philosophy. Later, with the publication of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the Vienna School gradually took form, and 20th-century philosophy advanced further. Marked by such progress, analytical philosophy entered its heyday of comprehensive development. Doctrines represented by logical empiricism became the primary philosophical ideas at the time. Metaphysics was removed from this new system of philosophy, in which the clarification and justification of meaning became the most important tasks and goals of philosophy. The nature of philosophy also changed. Philosophy was no longer a system of knowledge, but one of activities. This change positively demonstrates features of the great transformation of the contemporary time. Philosophy comprises the kind of activities that identify or discover the meanings of propositions.75 Based on such a faith, in the 1930s and the 1940s, analytical philosophy, represented by logical empiricism, made glorious achievements. It even widely influenced all branch fields of philosophy. Nevertheless, analytical philosophy declined after the 1950s. After the 1970s, analytical philosophy entered the time of “postanalytical philosophy.” Nevertheless, in terms of its concerns and the ideas it discusses, postanalytical philosophy is still characterized by some of analytical philosophy’s features. Generally speaking, analytical philosophy after logical empiricism “has basically advanced following the way of scientism. Its belief is that philosophy is the continuation of science. It is not concerned with the construction of theory, but with adding to human knowledge about reality.”76 This characteristic reflects the profound influence of positivist science. After analytical philosophy, the subject representative of the scientization of social sciences is quantitative historiography. As an achievement of the scientization of historical studies, quantitative historiography combines mathematics from natural science, statistics and computer technologies and applies them to studies of history, realizing the scientization and mathematization of historical studies. The rapid progress and widespread influence of quantitative historiography strongly suggest the trend of scientization of social sciences. Starting from the mid-1960s, a large group of scholars of quantitative historiography appeared in the U.S., and a historiographical school that used statistical methods to analyze historical facts and do historiographical studies thus took form. In 1963, the American Historical Association established the Committee of Historical Quantitative Data, which was in charge of collecting quantitative data about the U.S., Europe, Asia and Latin America. Since then, quantitative historiography has been popular in Europe and the U.S. and spread to the whole world. Compared with conventional historiography, the most prominent feature of quantitative historiography is that it uses mathematical methods in natural science to do quantitative analysis of historical data, and it uses electronic computers as the primary means for quantitative studies of history. In addition, the methods of quantitative historiography have become increasingly complicated, transitioning from general descriptive statistics to correlation analysis, regression equations, trend inference, measurement of meaning, linear programming, dynamic series, hypergeometric distribution, input-output analysis, factorial analysis,

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 109 mathematical models such as the Markov chain, fuzzy mathematics, as well as game theory, curve topology theory, so on and so forth. Furthermore, on the foundation of quantitative mathematics, a series of new branch subjects of historiography have been formed, such as new economic history, new political history, new demographical history and new social history. The goal of quantitative historiography has always been to transform traditional historiography and to shift the emphasis from new theory in historiography to new methods. In scientized historical studies, computation and mathematics have already become the new characteristics, new methods and new tools of research. The rapid burgeoning of new subjects of quantitative historiography has on the one hand pushed historiography toward an increasing extent of precision, examining and modifying some conventional ideas on the basis of quantification and reflecting the trend of integration between contemporary social sciences and natural science as well as its positive effects on the development of disciplines. On the other hand, however, this trend of scientization in social science also shows the continuous expansion of natural science and the scientific and technological rationality it represents, as well as the tendencies of instrumentalization, scientization and technologization in social development. In fact, it is the effectiveness and utility of scientific and technological rationality as well as the incessant prosperity of science and technology that demonstrate the superiority of science and the accuracy and reliability of positive methods. The transition from early analytical philosophy to contemporary quantitative historiography clearly shows the permeation of the positivist spirit, represented by natural science, into social science. This may not be bad for the development of the discipline itself, because such permeation facilitates the methodological overlap of natural science and social sciences. The interdisciplinary studies and fields rising therefrom are beneficial for the whole of human knowledge. Nonetheless, such a trend of scientization in social science also in fact indicates the ideal of unifying all subjects with natural science, an ideal that has always been pursued by advocates of scientism. It demonstrates the expansion of positivism and rationalism, which is very likely to lead to the monotony of understanding and the hegemony of science in the field of knowledge and will eventually threaten the healthy and balanced development of the whole society and human culture. Science advances abreast with rational abilities. This is both a pattern and a result of scientific development. Unfortunately, however, the progress and glory science has achieved again and again only highlight the instrumental side of rationality. Scientific and technological rationality has thus become a synonym for instrumental reason in reality. The expansion of the scope of scientific studies and the extensiveness of the influences of science and technology actually only show the instrumental reason in modern society. John Tomlinson points out in Cultural Imperialism that “the failure to develop and institutionalize in a balanced way all the different dimensions of reason opened up by the modern world.”77 As a result, although rationality has extended to all fields of the society, it gives rise to merely instrumental reason, which are unidimensional “rationalizations of economic life, of technique, of scientific research, of military training, of law

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and administration.”78 Therefore, in addition to the generalization of science in the field of knowledge and the academia, the influence of instrumental reason is already everywhere in political life, economic activities and ideology and culture. 2.3.3 Loss of Value Reason The process of pursuing the ideals of objectivity and completeness reflects the goals of science for which it has been constantly making efforts since its birth in modern times. In this process, the instrumental reason contained in scientific rationality has been repeatedly demonstrated and promoted, bringing concrete benefits to human beings. The rapid advancement of science and technology continuously highlights the glory of human rationality and the enormous power of science and technology, leading to the permeation of instrumental reason into various fields of society. From academic studies to social progress, from political dominance to modes of economic development, society during the time of science and technology has become a world built on the basis of science and technology and ruled by scientific and technological rationality or instrumental reason. As has been implicitly mentioned, however, the incessant expansion of instrumental reason inevitably results in excessive advocation of the instrumental dimension of rationality and the decline, confusion and loss of the dimension of value reason. Unlike instrumental reason, value reason, as another important dimension of human rationality, is primarily concerned with the spiritual and humanistic world outside the world of instrumentality. It underscores the exploration of the significance of life and the aspirations in life. Instrumental reason and value reason play their roles respectively and complement and bring out the best in each other. This is the basic premise of and fundamental guarantee for the harmonious development of human beings, nature and society. Nevertheless, this era, dominated by instrumental reason, has destroyed such balance and caused the loss of value reason. Human beings are rational animals. Rationality endows human beings with the status as the subject among all creatures in this universe and sets the goals and significance of human life. As the way human beings grasp the world, rationality can be divided into instrumental reason and value reason. Instrumental reason is the means by which human beings improve their living conditions and acquire benefits, while value reason is the foundation on which human beings settle down and get on with their pursuits. The relationship between these two kinds of rationality can be called for short the relationship between “instrument” and “goal.” Instrumental reason is the scientific eye with which human beings observe the world. Value reason is the humanistic eye with which human beings observe the world. Only when balance is reached between these “two eyes” will human beings be able to see a “rational” world – a world in which the nature of things and that of human are unified.79

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 111 The reality, however, is that the excessive emphasis on instrumental reason leads to the gradual decline of value reason. Human beings have been pushed into the “iron cage” of instrumental reason made by science and technology, becoming experts with no spiritual pursuit or pure hedonists who do not understand emotions. Thanks to science and technology, in this scientized and technologized era, “[m]an seems to be undergoing absorption into that which is nothing more than a means to an end, into that which is devoid of purpose or significance,”80 and humanity has thus gradually been lost in the prosperity of material desire and the emptiness of spirit. Therefore, the individual is either overcome by a profound dissatisfaction with himself, or he delivers himself up in self-oblivion to become a functional component of the machine, to abandon himself unthinking to his vital existence, which has become impersonal, to lose the horizon of past and future and shrink into a narrow present, untrue to himself, barterable and available for any purpose asked of him, under the evil spell of unquestioned, untested, static, undialectical and easily interchangeable pseudo-certainties.81 On the level of the society, due to the expansion of instrumental reason brought by the advancement of science and technology, [t]echnology has wrought a radical transformation in the day-by-day existence of man in his environment; it has forced his mode of work and his society into entirely new channels: the channels of mass-production, the metamorphosis of his whole existence into a technically perfect piece of machinery and of the planet into a single great factory. In the process man has been and is being deprived of all roots. He is becoming a dweller on the earth with no home. He is losing the continuity of tradition. The spirit is being reduced to the learning of facts and training for utilitarian functions.82 The mechanical mode of operation becomes the basic pattern of social operation. Economy and efficiency become the ultimate considerations in all places and all fields. On a broader level, the rapid development of science and the expansion of instrumental reason give rise to the trend of social specialization, in which the emphasis on instrumental reason and the deficiency of value reason are more clearly shown. Take the progress of mega-science and the consequent bureaucratization of science as an example. The bureaucratic system guarantees the resources demanded by science and the appearance of its quantitative index. There lies, however, the danger of losing the real significance of science. An important reason is that bureaucratization of science makes scientists subject to the threat of autonomy, that is, it results in the loss of control of the goals and methods of scientific studies, as well as the loss of control of products of intellectual activities. At the same time, it leads to the loss of meaning in people’s daily life.83

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Science, which is supposed to serve human beings, eventually loses its meaning for humans. This is a major paradox in the development of modern science. The progress of science and technology and the excessive promotion of instrumental reason have caused the loss of value reason and various problems in human society, mainly because the advancement of science and technology has been directed all the time toward a kind of material progress. An instrumental power is highlighted while the pursuit of the meaning and value of life is neglected. In other words, science has not saved a space for human beings’ values, purposes, ethics or hopes. Science has alienated itself from what is the most important for the daily life of human beings.84 The science developing in this way is of cause a kind of “unmanned” science, which is a kind of monotonous, pure science deprived of the richness of human beings. To put it another way, with science superseding the authority of God and deities and becoming the new, omniscient and omnipotent “savior” of human beings, the whole world is dominated by science. As the magic of God disappears, the world loses its past dignity and beauty, its poetic quality and charm. Since then, human beings have been living in a material, mechanical world where spirit and value are absent. It is thus clear that the root of the deviation of science and technology from value reason and the loss of rationality lies in the mechanical mode of thinking based upon technological rationality. It is the purely pragmatic pursuit on the basis of mechanization that distances us from the consideration of the value dimension of rationality. As Marx points out, [t]he bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation.85 Jaspers, in his analysis of the order of life, points out that when the whole world is under the rule of machines, the value and dignity of human beings are gradually lost, even becoming pure means to achieve certain goals. Human beings are reduced to things without a purpose or meaning. In other words, “[w]hen all has been reduced to the purposiveness of life-interests, the consciousness of the substantiality of the whole has been destroyed.”86 The technological force and instrumental reason brought by machines’ rulership thus become the determining factors in society. Considering the perspective of rationality, the Enlightenment movement, which started in late 17th-century Britain and later expanded to other Western European countries, is a powerful and influential movement of ideological emancipation in the history of the development of human rationality. Inheriting the ideological and cultural achievements since the Renaissance, it held high the banner of rationality and thereby freed rationality from religious beliefs. It even

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 113 established the important status of the method of natural science, which is based on empirical observation. After the Enlightenment, the status of rationality has become more prominent. With the continuous progress of science and technology, however, Enlightenment turned toward its own opposite. The spirit of Enlightenment, which advocated the emancipation of man and the freedom of spirit, is now testifying to the validity of instrumental reason. As M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno argue, the Enlightenment spirit, which aimed at conquering nature and freeing rationality from the fetters of myth, has gone toward its opposite because of its own intrinsic logic and become a new myth. The Enlightenment movement has gone the way of suicide, while the fully enlightened world is full of great misfortunes.87 Instrumental reason thus demonstrates itself as “the most advanced version of modern rationalism.” Under its rule, [t]reating] seriously the innumerable concepts, values, beliefs, norms, and institutions placed in this unwanted category has been deemed unscientific. In many cases, the very existence of these alternative worldviews and their proponents has been forgotten, suppressed from the collective memory of modern societies.88 Therefore, as scientific and technological rationality and instrumental reason begin to ascend to the dominating forms of rationality, impulses of separation, caprice, dominance and the division of power all expose the defect of rationality, which is subject to no restraint. As rationality leaves behind value and advances wildly on the road of instrumental reason, it acquires the qualities of condescendence, self-importance, and all-exploiting-ness.89 Because of its one-sided development and continuous expansion on the dimension of instrumental reason, human rationality, as a kind of progressive power, becomes a power of alienation and thus loses the positive connotations it used to have. In particular, the alienation of value reason leads to not only the split of rationality itself but also the loss of human value and value reason in the scientific and technological society. Looking back into history, we will see that rationality has been constituted by instrumental reason and value reason from the very beginning. These two parts have been coexisting in the Western tradition of rationality. There is no pure and independent instrumental reason. Nor is there any pure and independent value reason. All kinds of instrumental reason intrinsically have certain goals of value, while the realization of any goal of value is inseparable from the support of instrumental reason. This is the basic theoretical premise for reshaping instrumental reason and value reason in the contemporary time.90

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Therefore, we should both recognize the value of value reason and the validity of instrumental reason. Between the two, however, we need to determine their primary and secondary positions. Man is the foundation. The value reason which represents “man is the purpose” is the core and essence. Therefore, we should rectify and guide “instrumental reason” and correct the errors in current cultural ideas with “value reason,” so as to make “value reason” a cultural idea that chimes with the “instrumental reason” in the time of globalization.91 As E. Schuurman argues: in the history of modern civilization, there has always existed two powerful trends of thoughts that are contradictory and complementary, the decline of one leading to the rise of the other. The first is scientism, which reveres the realistic orientation of science-progress-development; the second is humanism, which pursues the perpetual theme of spirit-value-significance. If scientism and instrumental reason constitute the driving system of modern society just like the engine and the wheels, then humanism and value reason constitute its operation system just like the steering wheel and the brake. If there is only the driving system and no operation system, the society will stay in the same place, unable to move forward, or it will lose control and its direction.92 Therefore, it is of the highest priority to establish value reason and use it to guide instrumental reason in the contemporary development of science and technology.

Notes 1 A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:299. 2 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by M. Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:86. 3 A. Comte. A Discourse on the Positive Spirit. Translated by Huang Jianhua, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1996:70–71. 4 E. Mach. The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959:312. 5 Mach categorizes elements into three types: elements that constitute the complex of object, those constituting the complex of body, and those constituting the complex of will, memory, and impression. These three types of elements distinguish the physical world, physiological world, and psychological world of the object. 6 E. Mach. The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of the Physical to the Psychical. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959:310. 7 M. Schlick, “Philosopher Mach.” Translated by Hong Qian. Journal of Dialectics of Nature. Beijing,1988(01): 17.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 115 8 Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:103. 9 R. Carnap. Logical Syntax of Language. Oxon: Routledge, 2000:320. 10 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by Michael Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:85. 11 A. Chalmers. Science and Its Fabrication. Translated by Jiang Jingsong, Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific & Technical Publishers, 2007:29, 42. 12 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by Michael Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:83. 13 Liu Dachun. From the Center to the Margin: Reflections on Science, Philosophy, and Humanities. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2006:31. 14 N. Rescher. Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997:3–4. 15 L. Daston. “Objective and the Escape from Perspective.” Social Studies of Science, 1992(4):607. 16 Zhou Liyun. Comparative Studies of Contemporary Western Views of Science. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 2007:172. 17 E. Husserl. Phenomenology of the Life-World. Translated by Ni Liangkang et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2002. 18 J. Ladriere. Challenge Presented to Cultures by Science and Technology. Translated by Lv Naiji, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1:88. 19 A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:280. 20 A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 3). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:253. 21 B. Russell. Religion & Science. London: Oxford UP, 1974:175–76. 22 S. Sismondo. An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies (2nd ed.). Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2010:139. 23 P. Riggs. Whys and Ways of Science: Introducing Philosophical and Sociological Theories of Science. Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 1992:10. 24 R.K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Edited by Norman W. Storer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973:270. 25 R.K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Edited by Norman W. Storer, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1973:270. 26 R.K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Edited by Norman W. Storer, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1973:273. 27 R.K. Merton. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. Edited by Norman W. Storer, Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1973:276. 28 K. Popper. Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography. London: Routledge, 1992:160. 29 V.Y. Mudimbe ed. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996:90–92. 30 Zhou Liyun. Comparative Studies of Contemporary Western Views of Science. Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2007:175. 31 I. Pavlov, Selected Works of Ivan Pavlov (Chinese version 1). Translated by Wu Shenglin et al., Beijing: Science Press, 1955:4. 32 J. Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (4th ed.). Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001:58. 33 F. Bacon. The New Organon. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000:36. 34 E. Mach. “The Development of Mechanics.” Modern Western Philosophical Treatises. Edited by Hong Qian, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1993:41. 35 P.W. Bridgman. The Logic of Modern Physics. New York: the MacMillan Company, 1958:6. 36 By “operation,” Bridgman refers mainly to experimental operations, as well as nonequipment operation, that is, mental operation. He divides mental operations into two categories: one is the “operation of paper and pen,” which means arithmetical operation

116 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63

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and logical operation; the other is “word operation,” which involves not only scientists’ all activities of speech, but also their activities of thinking. Tu Mingjun. Philosophical Interpretations of Proceduralization. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 2008:174. P.W. Bridgman. The Nature of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1936:5–7. H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in The Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Translated by Liu Ji, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1989:101–5. Liu Dachun. Philosophy of Science. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 2006:255. D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:376. A. Wolf. A History of Science Technology and Philosophy in the 16 and 17th Centuries. Translated by Zhou Changzhong et al., Beijing: Commercial Press, 1985:9. E. Mach. “The Development of Mechanics.” Modern Western Philosophical Treatises. Edited by Hong Qian, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1993:35. E. Mach. “The Development of Mechanics.” Modern Western Philosophical Treatises. Edited by Hong Qian, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1993:46. Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:227. E. Mach. “The Development of Mechanics.” Modern Western Philosophical Treatises. Edited by Hong Qian, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1993:48. Song Tian. Be Alert to Science. Shanghai: Shanghai Scientific and Technical Publishers, 2014:153. C. Hummel. The Galileo Connection: Resolving Conflicts between Science and the Bible. Translated by Wen Renjie et al., Yinchuan: Ningxia People’s Publishing House, 2008:124. C. Taylor. The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2003:102. N. Negroponte. Been Digital. Translated by Hu Yong, Haikou: Haikou Press, 1996. Li Quanmin. “Computation and Reality: Analysis of Contemporary Trend of Computationalism.” Philosophical Studies, 2006(3):82–90. Ren Xiaoming and Yu Zhang. “Gains and Losses of the Programme of Computationalism.” Science, Technology, and Dialectics, 2008(6):10. Ren Xiaoming and Yu Zhang. “Gains and Losses of the Programme of Computationalism.” Science, Technology, and Dialectics, 2008(6):58. J.W. Mcallister. Beauty and Revolution in Science. Translated by Wei Li, Changchun: Jilin People’s P, 2000:4. B. Barber. Science and the Social Order. Translated by Gu Xin, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1991:15. S. Chandrasekhar. “Aesthetics and Motivations in Science.” Translated by Zhu Zhifang, Science and China Youth Technology, 2001(2):40–41. A. Einstein. The Essential Scientific Works of Albert Einstein (Vol. 1). Translated by Xu Liangying et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1976:415. D.R. Griffin. The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Albany: State U of New York P, 1988:88. P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). London: Verso, 1993:49. A. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? (3rd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999:240. A. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? (3rd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999:241–42. A. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? (3rd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999:242. A. Chalmers. What Is This Thing Called Science? (3rd ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1999:242.

The Expansion of Instrumental Reason 117 64 Complete Works of Marx and Engels (Vol. 3). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2002:536–37. 65 J. Dewey. Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920:93. 66 V.Y. Mudimbe ed. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996:5. 67 N. Levitt. Prometheus Bedeviled: Science and the Contradictions of Contemporary Culture. Translated by Dai Jianping, Nanjing: Nanjing UP, 2005:20–21. 68 S. Fuller. The Governance of Science: Ideologies and Future of Open Society. Translated by Liu Dun, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2004:10. 69 S. Fuller. The Governance of Science: Ideologies and Future of Open Society. Translated by Liu Dun, Shanghai: Shanghai Science and Technology Education Press, 2004:10. 70 E. Durkheim. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by K.E. Fields, New York: The Free Press, 1995:439. 71 N. Levitt. Prometheus Bedeviled: Science and the Contradictions of Contemporary Culture. Translated by Dai Jianping, Nanjing: Nanjing UP, 2005:3. 72 W.C. Dampier. History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. Translated by Li Heng, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2001:21. 73 Ai Zhiqiang. “The Distortion and Absence of Rationality: Development of Technology in Risk Society.” Academic Journal of Guizhou University (Social Sciences Edition), 2007(28). 74 B. Russell. History of Western Philosophy. London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2004:879–80. 75 Hong Qian. On Logical Empiricism. Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1999:9. 76 Liu Fangtong. A New Collection of Modern Western Philosophy. Beijing: People’s Press, 2000:297. 77 J. Tomlinson. Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction. London: Continuum, 1991:146. 78 M. Weber. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Yu Xiao et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987:15. 79 Li Zhengang and Fang Guogen. Harmony and Concordance: Chinese Philosophy and the 21st Century. Shanghai: Eastern China Normal UP, 2001:68. 80 K. Jaspers. Man in the Modern Age. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957:83. 81 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by M. Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:98–99. 82 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by M. Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:98. 83 S. Cotgrove and S. Box. Science, Industry and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Science. London: Routledge, 2008:4. 84 N. Levitt. Prometheus Bedeviled: Science and the Contradictions of Contemporary Culture. Translated by Jianping Dai, Nanjing: Nanjing UP, 2005:20. 85 Selected works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2012:402–3. 86 K. Jaspers. Man in the Modern Age. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, Garden City: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1957:84. 87 M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Translated by Hong Peiyu et al., Chongqing: Chongqing Press, 1990:26. 88 V.Y. Mudimbe ed. Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1996:87. 89 Li Gongming. Enslavement and Struggles: Dialogue between Science and Arts. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2001:90.

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90 Liu Dachun. Review of Studies of Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 2006:75. 91 Liu Dachun. Review of Studies of Dialectics of Nature. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 2006:75. 92 E.M. Schurman. Technology and the Future. Translated by Li Xiaobing et al., Beijing: Beijing: Orient Press, 1996:61–62.

3

Optimism The Omnipotence of Science and Technology

Since the beginning of modern times, with the increasing profundity and specialization of science’s progress and the expansion of corresponding technological applications, science has established its authoritative position in economic and social fields, from which the hegemony of scientism is derived. As a result, the assertion that science is omnipresent and omnipotent seems to have become an idea of great popularity. One of the most striking demonstrations of the hegemony of scientism is the optimistic faith in the myth of the omnipotence of science. Such a faith emerged along with modern science and corresponds to its progress. To some extent, it upholds people’s positive desire for and belief in science. It is very easy for such a myth to prevail in a modern society shaped by science and technology.

3.1  The    Scientific View of Progress: a Defense of the  Rationality of Science With regard to scientific optimism, “progress” is a primary concept that matches it. In philosophy of science, the scientific view of progress has always been an important topic because a scientific theory without progress would go against people’s belief in science. In the developmental process of philosophy of science, questions about scientific progress are often intertwined with the rationality of science. Since logical positivism, many discussions by philosophers of science have been devoted to questions about the progress and rationality of science. They attempt to tell people that science is progressive and progress is rational. All these theories more or less reflect scientific optimism. Their ideas about scientific progress outline for us the basic characteristics of scientific theories in their evolution.    Debate between Induction and Falsification: from Static  3.1.1  The Structure to Dynamic Development In orthodox philosophy of science, there are two paths of studying the question of scientific progress: first, the logicism-oriented modes of justification and falsification; second, historicism-oriented historicism and neo-historicism. DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-5

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The main representative of the mode of justification is logical positivism. Not only has logical positivism inherited positive ideas since Comte, but also “British empiricism, Russell’s logic atomism, and Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus.”1 Logical positivism has not explicitly come up with the mode of scientific progress, but it has made explanations about the characteristics of the growth of scientific knowledge according to ideas of inductivism. Logical positivists describe the mode of scientific development as static, considering scientific development as an accumulative process that is mild, linear, and continuous. They are concerned with the internal structure of scientific theory, which they summarize as logical relationships among various statements that constitute theories. Only those empirically justified theories are scientific theories, and the progress of science is the accumulation of justified scientific theories. The successors of logical positivists call this mode of theory development the “Chinese boxes” mode. For example, Newtonian mechanics was established through the incorporation of theories such as Galileo’s mechanical rules and Kepler’s laws. According to Thomas Nagel, this mode is in line with the general pattern of the history of science. Nagel points out that “the phenomenon of a relatively autonomous theory becoming absorbed by, or reduced to, some other more inclusive theory is an undeniable and recurrent feature of the history of modern science.”2 The accumulative mode of logical positivism is grounded in the continuity of the development of scientific theories. In logical positivists’ opinion, the progress of science is always continuous instead of intermittent, no matter during regular times or the periods of scientific revolution. Nevertheless, logical positivism is in essence inductive and there is no absolutely necessary logical trajectory from singular statements of empirical fact to scientific theories of strict, universal and mature forms. Therefore, such an accumulative mode of scientific progress grounded in inductive logic has been criticized by Popper. Looking back into history, we can see that the rationality of inductive reasoning has been questioned since Hume, though Reichenbach believes that the principle of induction should be “accepted without reservation,” and Kant sees it as “a priori correct.” Popper, however, argues that the rationality of the inductive principle cannot be confirmed. He points out explicitly: “Induction is invalid, because it leads to either infinite regress, or to apriorism.”3 Based on the logical asymmetry between universal statement and singular statement, Popper proposes abandoning induction and turning in the opposite direction by using the principle of deductive falsification in the study of scientific theories. He thus makes the proposition to use “falsifiability” as the criterion for judging whether a theory is scientific. He contends that “the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability.”4 Popper’s theory of falsifiability has been to a large extent inspired by Einstein. In his autobiography, he writes: In May 1919, Einstein’s prediction about solar eclipse was successfully verified by two British expeditions. Because of such verification, a new theory of gravitation and a new cosmology suddenly appeared not merely as a kind

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of possibility, but as a real revolution of Newtonian theory of gravitation that better approaches truth.5 Popper believes that “this means that all theories, no matter what kind of success they have achieved, or how strictly they have been tested, are likely to be overthrown.”6 Inspired by Einstein, Popper considers the falsification of theory much more important than the justification of theory because the principle of justification in logical positivism aims at theoretical verification based on high logical probability, according to which non-science such as astrology can also be justified by plenty of empirical evidence. In fact, high probability does not mean that there is little false content in a theory. Astrology is a counterexample of the principle of justification. Therefore, in Popper’s eyes, logical probability pursued under the principle of justification in logical positivism cannot be the measure of the scientific nature of a theory. On the contrary, only theories that are characterized by logical or factual falsifiability belong to science. Theories with no falsifiability are non-science. In this way, Popper makes falsifiability the logical starting point of his philosophy. The difference in starting point leads to the difference between the concerns of Popper and that of logical positivists. Unlike the logical positivists who are concerned with the internal structure of scientific theory, Popper pays more attention to the external connections among scientific theories, that is, how scientific theories acquire dynamic development through continuous falsification. This shift of focus in philosophy of science from the static structure of scientific knowledge to its dynamic development is a major contribution of Popper to philosophy of science. Not only has he promoted this shift, but he has also summarized the dynamic mode of scientific development as a four-stage scheme: P1 – TT – EE – P2 With this scheme, Popper argues that science starts not from observation or theory, but from a certain problem P1. In order to solve the problem, people attempt tentative answers or theories TT. TT may be partly or completely wrong, so it must go through a stage in which errors are eliminated EE. EE may consist of critical discussions or experiments. In this stage of falsification, people’s creative activities allow problems P2 to spontaneously emerge in new fields. In comparison with the old problem, the new problem is deeper and richer. Popper points out that we can best gauge the progress made in any science by the distance in depth and unexpectedness between P1 and P2: the best tentative theories (and all theories are tentative) are those which give rise to the deepest and most unexpected problems.7 It is clear that in Popper’s vision, science advances through the recurrence of this scheme in which continuous falsification stimulates the emergence of new problems.

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There are often multiple tentative theories about one single problem. Therefore, in Objective Knowledge, Popper further expands this four-stage scheme and expresses it in a different way:

This four-stage scheme shows that where possible, we can put forward many theories as attempted answers and discover new problems triggered by each of these theories by critically examining each tentative solution. If a new problem, for example, P2b, is only the transformation of the old problem P1, we can critically dismiss the tentative theory TTb under certain circumstances. Popper believes that although some theories may be negated through falsification, progressiveness is one of the things we demand of a good tentative theory: and it is brought out by the critical discussion of it: the theory is progressive if our discussion shows that it has really made a difference to the problem we wanted to solve; that is, if the newly emerging problems are different from the old ones.8 While his standpoint is different from the positivist position of logical positivism, Popper still believes in the progressiveness of science. In Popper’s four-stage scheme, the question about how the critical discussions in the error-eliminating stage EE should be made is of the most importance. Same as logical positivists, Popper agrees to critically judge theories according to the relationship between empirical evidence and theory. Nonetheless, Popper is more concerned with how to guarantee the quality of evidence, for which he comes up with the methods of “a priori confirmation”9 and “posterior confirmation.”10 A priori confirmation is closely related to the empirical content and the actual explanatory ability of a theory. The more content there is, the stronger the explanatory ability is, and the higher extent of falsifiability the theory acquires. Posterior confirmation refers to the situation in which a theory goes through strict and subtle confirmation. The stricter the confirmation the better, as strict confirmation means strong support of empirical evidence for the theory. Thus the a posteriori evaluation of a theory depends largely upon it’s a priori value: theories which are a priori uninteresting – of little content – need not be tested because their low degree of testability excludes a priori the possibility that they may be subjected to really significant and interesting tests.11 A major difference between falsification and justification lies in their understanding of the purpose of science. According to justificationists, the purpose of science is to pursue the truth. To Popper, however, “[t]o say that the aim of science is verisimilitude has a considerable advantage over the perhaps simpler formulation

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that the aim of science is truth.”12 Therefore, in Popper’s eyes, verisimilitude is a more realistic goal in comparison with truth. Although people cannot reach the truth, they are able to make progress in approaching the truth. Therefore, as far as Popper is concerned, the advancement of science is people’s approaching scientific truth. The so-called verisimilitude refers to a statement “increasing with its truth content and decreasing with its falsity content.”13 In order to describe the extent a theory approximates the truth, Popper introduces a measure, that is, the measure of verisimilitude. According to the concept of verisimilitude, this measure contains the following two parts of content: The quantity of truth-content: ctT(a) The quantity of falsity-content: ctF(a) Using VS(a) to represent the degree of verisimilitude of theory a, we can come up with the following formula: VS ( a ) =ctT ( a ) -ct F ( a ) That is to say, the degree of the verisimilitude of theory equals the difference between the quantity of its truth content and the quantity of its falsity content. According to Popper, for two theories T1 and T2, if the truth content of T1 is less than that of T2, or the former is no more than the latter, and the falsity content of T1 is more than that of T2, we can say that T2 is closer to truth or more approximate to truth than T1. According to the concept of verisimilitude, the progress of scientific theory actually means the increase of a theory’s verisimilitude, that is, the theory increasingly approaches truth. To sum up, the progress of science in Popper’s view is in essence new theories’ continuous incorporation and naturalization of old theories. Different from the accumulative, continuous and linear process described by logical positivists, the progress of science according to Popper is an intermittent, leaping and mutational process. Obviously, the presuppositions of science’s purpose, methods, and mode of progress are also one-sided in Popper’s falsificationism, which pays attention to only the intermittent and revolutionary side of the advancement of science and neglects the side of continuity and gradualness in the process.14 Such deficiency leaves space for criticism by historicism.    Views of Scientific Progress: Transcending Induction  3.1.2  Historicist and Falsification In philosophy of science, another track of defending the rationality of scientific progress is historicism. This track was created by Kuhn in the 1960s. The starting point of Kuhn’s idea is the actual condition of development in the history of science. It was exactly from the actual condition of scientific progress of his own

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time that he started to build his own philosophy of science. What was the condition of scientific development at the time of Kuhn? On the one hand, in comparison with the development of science during modern times, the period from the 1940s to the 1960s is a transitional period of scientific and technological progress. During this period, modern high-tech such as computer technology, space technology and automatic control technology all acquired significant development. New technologies were closely combined with system theory, control theory and information theory, leading to the increasing comprehensiveness, interdisciplinarity and collectivity of science and technology. Comprehensiveness refers to the fact that with the emergence of many marginal subjects and comprehensive subjects, the solid boundaries among subjects inside natural science are continuously broken. The intersection among various subjects attracts sufficient attention from researchers, and the trend of integration of the system of scientific knowledge becomes increasingly stronger. Interdisciplinarity refers to the fact that the development of science is demonstrated by not only intersections inside of natural science but also the increasing intersections of natural science and humanities and social sciences. The image of science is changing as well. It is no longer seen simply as a system of knowledge, but as a kind of social activity of knowledge production. Collectivity refers to the fact that the institutionalization of science is approaching maturity. Scientific and technological activities are no longer personal businesses of scientists, but collective enterprises. Many significant scientific discoveries rely on group efforts. The trend of socialization of science and technology has gradually taken form in society. With insight into these features of scientific and technological development, Kuhn realizes that philosophical study of science can no longer focus merely on logical, empirical and rational interpretations from the inside of science, just like what logical positivism and falsificationism have done. Instead, it should pay adequate attention to the influences of socio-historical factors, the community of scientists and the personal psychology, morals and personalities of scientists on the development of science. Only in this way can philosophers probe deep into the socialized characteristics of science. On the other hand, since the mid-20th century, with the outbreaks of crises such as the explosion of atomic bombs, global environmental pollution, ecological crisis, energy and resource crisis and the spiritual crisis of human beings, the negative impacts of science and technology have gradually emerged. The role of science and technology as a “double-edged sword” is gradually recognized. The one-sidedness of the scientistic view of science is increasingly demonstrated. Faced with such a situation, people have to reconsider these questions: does science bring to human beings welfare or more harm? Do human beings have the power of unlimited exploitation of nature? Is science humanistic? In this predicament, neither the celebration of the truthfulness of science in the scientistic view of science nor falsificationism’s effort to save the good of science is able to give an objective explanation of the nature of science. Previous views of scientific progress and criteria for the rationality of science cannot explain the new developments and changes in science. Therefore, science is in sore need of a new paradigm that reestablishes the rationality of science.

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It is in such a context of science and for such philosophical demands that Kuhn deviates from the tracks of logical positivism and falsificationism. Based on the actual condition in scientific history, Kuhn incorporates a wide range of newest achievements in gestalt psychology, Piaget’s child psychology, historiography and sociology, and opens a new path that significantly differs from old theories, that is, the path of historicism in philosophy of science. According to Kuhn, considering scientific events or facts merely as a kind of descriptive acquisition obtained by scientists or scientific communities and further claiming that they are unrelated to philosophy demonstrates a narrow view of philosophy in logical positivism. In fact, empirical science is also related to philosophy. Arguing for the rationality of his own theory, Kuhn points out that [h]istory, we too often say, is a purely descriptive discipline. The theses suggested above are, however, often interpretive and sometimes normative. Again, many of my generalizations are about the sociology or social psychology of scientists; yet at least a few of my conclusions belong traditionally to logic or epistemology.15 Kuhn believes that neither the inductive model of logical positivism nor Popper’s mode of falsification offers a reasonable explanation for the growth and advancement of scientific knowledge. Logical positivism neglects the non-cumulative historical facts in the history of science, is blind to the influence of scientific revolution and excessively emphasizes the continuity of scientific development. Popper sees scientific revolution as what science is all about without noticing the impacts of regular scientific activities, and he attaches too much significance to the intermittence of the progress of science. Therefore, both these two modes deviate from the actual modes of development in the history of science. In particular, they fail to correspond to the new conditions in the progress of science. Responding to the deficiency of these two modes, Kuhn proposes a historical and dynamic understanding of the evolution of science, which centers on “paradigm,” and takes the form of the alternation between regular science and scientific revolution. Kuhn’s mode of scientific progress can be represented with the following scheme. Pre-science (no paradigm)→normal science (the establishment of a paradigm)→scientific crisis (the shaking of a paradigm)→scientific revolution (the shift of a paradigm)→new normal science (new paradigm). In this mode, the center is the “paradigm.” This concept of paradigm is closely related to the scientific community. In order to understand the paradigm, it is necessary to understand the scientific community first. The so-called scientific community refers to the collective of factional characteristics formed by scientists who have received the same education and training, focus on the same research topics and pursue the same goals using the same languages. In scientific research, the scientific community is characterized by multiple levels. In the broadest sense, it refers to the whole of natural scientists. Below this level, there are professional scientific groups, such as the community of physicists, the community of chemists, the community of biologists, the community of astronomists, etc.

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The common factor that brings these scientific communities together and allows them to make academic communications and studies is paradigm. In Kuhn’s works, paradigm has multi-layered connotations. It is a complex involving scientific, philosophical and social elements. In a certain sense, paradigm can be seen as the synonym for “norm.” We can divide its content into three aspects: “paradigm in the sense of science,” including the convention of research, theoretical framework, mode of science and the models of actual application in the scientific community; “paradigm in the sense of philosophy,” including views of science and views of the world with which scientists guide their scientific research and their understanding of the world; and “paradigm in a sociological sense,” which refers to the social factors influencing scientists’ research, including value standard, social needs, social psychology, as well as the principles, rules and standards of judgment on which scientists have reached consensus. According to the content of paradigm, the “pre-modern” period in Kuhn’s mode of scientific progress is the stage in which a unified paradigm of science has not taken form. This is a process of contention and competition among many scientists. The period of “normal science” refers to the period in which the scientific community, through development during the pre-science period, has determined a generally recognized paradigm as the basis of professional research and the development of science has reached periodic maturity. Scientists solve mysteries under the guidance of paradigm and come up with various scientific methods to tackle problems, thereby promoting the perfection of the paradigm. In the stage of normal science, anomalous phenomena also grow. When an existing paradigm cannot deal with the many anomalous phenomena, people gradually lose confidence in it and search for new paradigms. Science encounters crisis and scientific revolution thus breaks out. “Scientific revolution” means that new paradigms take the place of the old ones and establish dominance. As a result, science, led by the new paradigms, enters the stage of “new normal science.” In Kuhn’s philosophical view, the progress of science is the process in which normal science and scientific revolution alternate with each other and the cycle keeps repeating itself. Such evolution of scientific theory shows that Kuhn’s description of the mode of scientific progress is closer to the history of science. It goes beyond the mode of inductivism, which makes one-sided emphasis on continuity, and the mode of falsification, which singularly highlights intermittence. In particular, Kuhn’s emphasis on the influence of normal science and scientific revolution on the development of science underscores the combination of quality and quantity in scientific progress, demonstrating the dialectical nature of this process. It should be noted, however, that there are also deficiencies in Kuhn’s mode of scientific progress, which are mainly reflected in his argument for the “incommensurability” regarding the continuity between old and new paradigms. Kuhn points out that paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their researchengagement differently…after revolution scientists are responding to a different world…What were ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution

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are rabbits afterwards…at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific tradition changes, the scientist’s perception of his environment must be reeducated – in some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has done so the world of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the one he had inhabited before.16 Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability involves three layers of meanings: first, advocates of competing modes have different standards and definitions of science and their lists of the problems that candidate paradigms must solve at any time are usually different. Second, the interrelationships among the connotations of the same terminology, concepts and experiments differ between old and new paradigms. In the scope of a new paradigm, old terminology, concepts and experiments develop new relations with other things. Although terminologies are not absolutely correct, it is inevitable that we must consider them as the misunderstandings between two competing schools. Third, the advocators of competing paradigms usually engage in their enterprises in different worlds, so their views of the world differ. It should be clarified that Kuhn’s concept of incommensurability between old and new paradigms is mainly demonstrated by the shift of gestalt in terms of scientists’ intuition, vision, psychology and whole view of the world. There is no doubt that the incommensurability between old and new paradigms indeed exists according to Kuhn’s theory. Nevertheless, exaggerating their difference to the extent of incommensurability, he is wrong in splitting the inheritance of scientific knowledge and innovation. For a time, his theory was considered by colleagues in philosophy of science as relativism and irrationalism. Although Kuhn defended his theory with the help of linguistics and lexical taxonomy in his later thoughts, he was still not able to clarify the incommensurability between old and new paradigms. As a result, he later replaced “paradigm” with “disciplinary matrix” (including the summary of symbols, models and examples) in his explanation of the evolution of science. The shift from paradigm to disciplinary matrix reveals Kuhn’s retreat to some extent, but Kuhn has always maintained his optimistic attitude toward the progress of science. His defense of scientific development and the rationality of science demonstrates his purpose of summarizing the whole process of scientific development with a fixed framework or a single model. Is it possible to use a single model to describe science, which is a complex culture? Neo-historicism, another track in historicism, has a different answer to this question.    View of Scientific Progress in Neo-Historicism: Criticism of  3.1.3  The Historicism 3.1.3.1 The Combination of Logic and History: Lakatos’s View of Scientific Progress Inductivism and falsification, which follow a logical path, and Kuhn’s model of scientific revolution, which follows a historical path, both analyze the progress

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of science from the angle of the confrontation between logic and history. As a complex cultural phenomenon, science is always under the influence of various factors including logic, history, society and culture. The attempt to clearly outline the evolution of science with a single model is obviously not in line with the actual development of science. The deficiency of simplifying the process of scientific evolution exists in all the three models mentioned previously. With insight into this deficiency, philosophers of science, such as Lakatos and Laudan, with “neo-historicism,” endeavor to bring Western philosophy of science out of the predicament of confrontation and break a new path on which logic is integrated with history. According to Lakatos, the key to interpreting the mode of scientific development is the question of how to explain the rationality of scientific progress. In order to answer this question, one should pay close attention to the history of science. When the history of science does not prove theories about the rationality of science, there are two options. First, to give up the attempt at rationally explaining the success of science. Kuhn’s response to this problem is to give explanations through the incommensurability of paradigms with the help of social psychology. Second, to continue Popper’s path, but at the same time to make efforts to reduce the conventional part of falsificationism, give up naïve falsificationism and replace it with a kind of new falsificationism that is able to provide falsificationism with new theoretical bases. Lakatos has chosen the second path. The theoretical goal he makes for himself is to save scientific methodologies, maintain the rational judgments of scientific theories and give rational explanations for scientific progress. On the basis of modifying Popper’s naïve falsificationism and Kuhn’s model of scientific revolution, Lakatos comes up with the methodology of scientific research programs in sophisticated falsificationism. His modification of Popper and Kuhn is mainly reflected in two aspects: firstly, he criticizes the mode of Popper’s falsificationism and its alienation from the history of science but inherits its idea of “discovering logic,” which is based upon rationalism. Secondly, he criticizes Kuhn’s “irrationalism,” but integrates its historicist methodologies. Generally speaking, Lakatos’s scientific research program consists of three parts: hard core, protective belt and heuristic. First of all, one of the key points in the methodology of the scientific research program is to replace individual theories with “hard core” as the basic unit in the evaluation of scientific progress. In Lakatos’s opinion, Popper’s mode of the evolution of scientific theories is characterized by naivety, which is primarily shown in Popper’s use of individual theories as the units in evaluating scientific progress and consideration of the test of theory is a “bipolar confrontation” between theory and experience. The only result of this confrontation is falsification, which is not in accordance with the history of science because the actual development in the history of science has shown to us that such a test is at least a “tripolar confrontation” among competing theories and experiments. In addition, in some cases, the result of the test of theory through experiment is justification instead of falsification. Moreover, scientific theories do not go through tests on their own, but together with its auxiliary hypotheses and primary conditions. In

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particular, the tested theories must be judged along with their advanced theories. Therefore, it is obviously not appropriate to consider individual theories as units of evaluation of scientific progress. Lakatos thus argues that the unit for evaluating scientific progress cannot be individual theories, but a series of theories, including basic hypotheses, primary conditions, basic principles of science, etc. This series of theories is called by Lakatos the “hard core.” In comparison with naïve falsificationism, [s]ophisticated falsificationism thus shifts the problem of how to appraise theories to the problem of how to appraise series of theories. Not an isolated theory, but only a series of theories can be said to be scientific or unscientific: to apply the term “scientific” to one single theory is a category mistake.17 The second key point in the methodology of the scientific research program is to guarantee the autonomy of scientific theories with the “protective belt.” The so-called “protective belt” refers to the flexible zone surrounding the hard core. It consists of various “auxiliary hypotheses” and functions to protect the hard core from refutations. “[A]nomalies are not taken as refutations of the hard core but of some hypothesis in the protective belt.”18 There are two ways in which the protective belt makes adaptations: first, to modify the auxiliary hypotheses. For example, when Copernicus’s hardcore “heliocentric theory” was found to conflict with its prediction of the planetary orbits as circular, “epicycle” and “deferent” were introduced as modifications. Secondly, to add more auxiliary hypotheses. For instance, when people realized the contradiction between the orbit of Uranus and Newton’s theories, they did not consider the latter wrong but protected its hard core by adding the new hypothesis of the perturbations of Neptune. According to Lakatos, modification, addition and complication of the auxiliary hypotheses in the protective belt can to some extent guarantee the relative autonomy of scientific theories and the independent development of the hard core of the research program. The third key point in the methodology of the scientific research program is to guarantee the continuity of programs with a “heuristic.” In comparison with Kuhn, Lakatos is more advanced in that he has put forward the methodological rule for guaranteeing the continuity of programs of research. In Kuhn’s theory, science is always surrounded by “anomalies” but scientists, out of their faith in “paradigms,” often disregard these “anomalies.” Therefore, Kuhn does not have methodologies responding to the “anomalies.” Inspired by Popper’s ideas about normative methodology and the “mathematical heuristic” he has discovered in his research on philosophy of mathematics, Lakatos comes up with two methodological rules for dealing with “anomalies.” The first rule is a “negative heuristic,” which is a prohibitive rule preventing people from directing modus tollens toward the “hard core” in the program and at the same time instructing people to avoid certain research paths. In this way, it protects the hard core from refutations. For example, in Newton’s program, the negative heuristic prohibits people from directing modus tollens to the three laws of Newtonian mechanics and the law of

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universal gravitation because “[t]his ‘core’ is ‘irrefutable’ by the methodological decision of its proponents: anomalies must lead to changes only in the ‘protective’ belt of auxiliary, ‘observational’ hypotheses and initial conditions.”19 The second rule is a “positive heuristic,” which “consists of a partially articulated set of suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the ‘refutable variants’ of the research-programme, how to modify, sophisticate, the ‘refutable’ protective belt.”20 The positive heuristic tells people which path to follow so that scientists will not be confused by anomalies. It sets out a program, which “lists a chain of ever more complicated models simulating reality: the scientist’s attention is riveted on building his models following instructions which are laid down in the positive part of his programme. He ignores the actual counterexamples, the available ‘data.’”21 Therefore, according to Lakatos, what determines scientists’ choice of problems is a positive heuristic instead of anomalies. Only when the driving force of the positive heuristic weakens will scientists pay more attention to anomalies. The last key point in the methodology of the scientific research program is to use diversified standards to evaluate the progress and setbacks of science. As he determines to use the research program (series of theories) as the unit of evaluation of scientific progress, Lakatos transforms the evaluation of individual theories into the judgment of the research program. Responding to this question, he puts forward the mode of the research program in scientific evolution. The stage of progressive research program→the stage of degenerate research program→new progressive research program replaces old degenerate research program→the stage of new progressive research program. In this model, Lakatos puts forward three criteria for judging the overall progress, degeneration or elimination of research programs. The first is the criterion of progressiveness in theory. The predictive power of theory: “such a series of theories is theoretically progressive (or ‘constitutes a theoretically progressive problem shift’) if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact.”22 The second is the criterion of progressiveness in experience. A theoretically progressive series of theories is also “empirically progressive (or ‘constitutes an empirically progressive problem shift’) if some of this excess empirical content is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to the actual discovery of some new fact.”23 The third is the criterion of progressiveness in heuristic. If a research program has a set of detailed and comprehensive heuristics which makes it more heuristic than competing programs, this research program is progressive. “[M]ature science – unlike pedestrian trial-and-error – has ‘heuristic power.’”24 According to these three foregoing criteria of progressiveness, the progress of science is multilevel in Lakatos’s theory. First, the criterion of progressiveness in theory is the fundamental criterion, which forms the first level of the progress of science. “We ‘accept’ problem shifts as ‘scientific’ only if they are at least theoretically progressive; if they are not, we ‘reject’25 them as ‘pseudoscientific.’”26 Secondly, when a research program acquires progress of theory and

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when it is justified by the excess content of part or the whole of experience, that is, when it achieves progress of experience, theory reaches progress on the second level. “[L]et us call a problem shift progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not.”27 Lastly, when a research program not only achieves progress in theory and experience but also demonstrates greater heuristic power than its competitors, the research program has eliminated the competitors and achieved progress on the highest level. “[S]uch an objective reason is provided by a rival research programme which explains the previous success of its rival and supersedes it by a further display of heuristic power.”28 Lakatos considers theory’s ability to predict empirical facts as the fundamental criterion for evaluating the progress of science. This is in accordance with the predictive power of scientific theory. Nevertheless, the history of science has demonstrated that it usually takes a long time for the empirical facts predicted by scientific theory to be confirmed. Therefore, the judgment of whether a certain research program is better than another is more often post factum, which adds to the operational difficulty of evaluating the progress of scientific theories. Fully aware of this point, Lakatos maintains, [i]t is very difficult to decide, especially since one must not demand progress at each single step, when a research programme has degenerated hopelessly or when one of two rival programmes has achieved a decisive advantage over the other. In this methodology, as in Duhem’s conventionalism, there can be no instant – let alone mechanical – rationality. Neither the logician’s proof of inconsistency nor the experimental scientist’s verdict of anomaly can defeat a research programme in one blow. One can be “wise” only after the event.29 In fact, this is also why Lakatos objects to instant crucial experiments. Therefore, in comparison with Popper, Lakatos’s attitude toward scientific theory is more tolerant. He emphasizes that we should consider those research programs that cannot be proven right instantly with a historical perspective and leave the judgment to the history of science – in Lakatos’s words, make it “shelved.”30 This tolerant attitude of Lakatos reveals his optimistic mentality regarding the progress of science and his confidence in the rationality of scientific development. Lakatos is basically successful in the way of a new philosophy of science that combines logic and history. 3.1.3.2 The Combination of Progress and Problem-Solving: Laudan’s View on Scientific Progress Starting from Popper, philosophers of science have been paying attention to the importance of problems in science. Inheriting this tendency, Laudan associated the progress of science with the problem-solving ability of scientific theories, came up with the problem-solving model of scientific progress in the 1970s and

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thereby established his position in philosophy of science. This model can be represented by the following formula: Problem 1— theory 1— problem 2— theory 2... In this scheme, although the basic point of Laudan’s theory is also science, he differs from Popper in that he considers the purpose of scientific progress not as truth or approaching truth (i.e., successor theory is closer to truth than precursor theory) but as the ability of successor theory to solve more problems than precursor theory, or in other words, successor theory has a stronger problem-solving ability than precursor theory. According to this understanding, Laudan makes two basic arguments. Thesis 1: the most important test for any theory is to see whether it offers acceptable answers to problems of interest – to put it another way, to see whether this theory offers satisfactory answers to important problems. Thesis 2: in the evaluation of the value of theories, it is more important to ask whether the theories form appropriate solutions to significant problems than to ask whether the theories are “true,” “corroborated,” “well-confirmed” or otherwise justifiable within the contemporary epistemological framework.31 If the progress of scientific theory is based on the problem-solving ability of theories, then what kind of problems does science need to solve? This is an important question Laudan’s view of scientific progress deals with. Laudan divides the problems of science into empirical problems and conceptual problems. Empirical problems are mainly about things in nature. As long as people are curious about anything in nature or make explanations about it, an empirical problem is formed. Laudan further divides empirical problems according to their different functions in the evaluation of theory: first, problems solved, i.e., problems that are considered solved by all theories in the same research field; second, problems unsolved, i.e., problems that have not been effectively solved by any theory; third, anomalies, i.e., problems that have not been solved by a certain theory, but solved by its competitor theories. These kinds of problems form anomalies to the former theory. In Laudan’s view, problems solved offer support for a theory, anomalies form counterevidence to a theory, while problems unsolved point to the direction in which a theory should endeavor to advance. The emphasis on conceptual problems is a significant contribution of Laudan to philosophy of science. According to Laudan, if empirical problems are the “first-order problems” about material entities, conceptual problems are the “highorder problems” about the sufficient reason of conceptual structures such as theories. There are two kinds of conceptual problems. One is internal conceptual problems. This type of problems originates from the inconsistency of internal logic or the ambiguities in the basic categories of analysis. The other is external conceptual problems, which arise due to three reasons: first, the conflicts and contradictions between two theories in the same field or from different fields;

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second, the methodological conflicts regarding scientific community within a single theory; third, the conflict between a theory and the dominant view of the world at the time. The division of scientific problems into empirical problems and conceptual problems is the important basis of Laudan’s model of the progress of science. In particular, his emphasis on conceptual problems constitutes a new dimension in his establishment of the standard of scientific progress. In Laudan’s view, the symbol of scientific progress differs according to different problems. Specifically speaking, regarding empirical problems, “transforming unsolved into solved problems is one…way in which progressive theories establish their scientific credentials.”32 In terms of conceptual problems, the symbol of the progress of science is the elimination and solution of conceptual problems. Combining these two kinds of symbols of scientific progress, Laudan puts forward the core hypothesis in his model of the progress of science: the solved problems – empirical or conceptual – form the basic unit of scientific progress; the purpose of science is to maximize the scope of solved empirical problems and minimize the scope of anomalies and conceptual problems.33 In other words, the condition of the progress of a single theory is determined by the difference between the total quantity of the problems solved by this theory and that of the problems unsolved. The bigger this difference is, and the more problems are solved, the more advanced this theory is. In Laudan’s words, “[T]he overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by assessing the number and importance of the empirical problems which the theory solves and deducting therefrom the number and importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory generates.”34 Furthermore, Laudan has come up with the criteria for the progress of science by comparing multiple theories with the evaluation criteria of a single theory. Similar to Lakatos’s multi-level criteria for scientific progress, Laudan combines the evaluation of the progressiveness of scientific theories with the continuity and intermittence of scientific development and puts forward two criteria of evaluation. Criterion 1: regarding scientific theories developed through a relatively long period of history, “progress can occur if and only if the succession of scientific theories in any domain shows an increasing degree of problem-solving effectiveness.”35 Criterion 2: regarding scientific theories developed within a certain period of time, “any time we modify a theory or replace it by another theory, that change is progressive if and only if the later version is a more effective problem solver… than its predecessor.”36 After offering these two criteria, Laudan attaches special significance to the difference between the problem-solving model and other models of progress. Such difference is mainly reflected in the ways to evaluate progress. There are primarily three ways of evaluation in the problem-solving model. Way 1: under the condition that only the scope of empirical problems solved is expanded and all other factors in rating remain unchanged, if theory 2 solves more empirical problems than theory 1, it is progressive to replace theory 1 with theory 2.

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Way 2: when the scope of empirical problems solved is not expanded and is even reduced, progress of theory can be made by eliminating anomalies or conceptual problems by modifying theories. Way 3: if a new theory gives rise to more acute anomalies or conceptual problems than previous theories do, even if the index of problems solved increases with the new theory, it can still be viewed as unprogressive or degenerating. As far as Lauden is concerned, as most philosophers underscore only empirical problems and their solutions, their models of progress highlight only the first way of evaluation of scientific progress while neglecting the other two. The criteria and methods of evaluation put forward by Lauden show that he has paid more attention to anomalies and conceptual problems in addition to the solution of empirical problems. This feature distinguishes Laudan from others and becomes his important contribution to the model of scientific progress and its evaluation. Offering the basic hypothesis of the problem-solving model of scientific progress is merely the first step of Laudan’s work. In his view, the model of progress on this level is still sketchy and rough, because in the foregoing discussions, he refers to those “theoretical complexes” as theory, and the problem-solving abilities of these complexes should be evaluated as well. Therefore, in addition to discussing the categorization of scientific problems, it is also very important to discuss theories and their compounds. Such discussions form the other half of the problem-solving model. According to Laudan, the purpose of establishing theories is to offer solutions to the empirical problems they explore and avoid or eliminate the anomalies and conceptual problems generated by previous theories. Therefore, the test of any theory should involve the evaluation of its problem-solving ability. Such evaluation should in the first place be a comparative evaluation, that is, the comparison among scientific theories. What is a scientific theory, then? Laudan argues that “scientific theories” in the general sense can be divided into two types. One is the doctrines (usually referred to as “hypotheses,” “axioms” or “principles”) that are very concrete and able to make concrete experimental predictions and offer explanations for natural phenomena – for example, Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory and Einstein’s photoelectric effect theory. The other is the theories representing more general and less testable doctrines and hypotheses, such as “atomism,” “theory of evolution,” “kinetic theory of gases,” so on and so forth. The second type of theory is called by Laudan “bigger theories,” which means that they are not single theories, but the whole pedigree of single theories. Laudan considers research traditions as the basic means to understand and evaluate the progress of science. On that point, he agrees with Kuhn’s and Lakatos’s “holistic” concepts. Nevertheless, he points out that these two’s models of scientific progress have not offered satisfactory explanations for questions such as what those “greater theories” are and how they develop. Therefore, Laudan proposes the substitution of “paradigm” and “research program” with “research traditions.” The so-called “research tradition” refers to a set of ontological and methodological rules about “what to do” and “what not to do.” It offers guidelines for specific theories. The ontological

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guideline explains the types of basic entities in a research tradition. The specific theories in a research tradition explain empirical problems by “restoring” all the empirical problems in the research tradition to the ontology of the tradition. The methodological guideline explains certain modes of procedures, which form the acceptable and legitimate research methods in the research tradition, such as the modes of experimental techniques, the test of theories and the evaluation of theories. Ontological guidelines and methodological guidelines are closely related to each other. People’s opinions about appropriate research methods usually agree with their opinions about research objects. For instance, according to the mathematical ontology of Descartes’s research tradition, all physical changes are changes in quantities. Therefore, it adopts mathematically derived deductivism and self-evident methodologies. In Laudan’s eyes, all research traditions have the following features: first, all research traditions contain a great many specific theories, which explain and partly form the research traditions; secondly, all research traditions demonstrate a certain extent of belief in metaphysics and methodology, which distinguish a certain research tradition as an integral whole from other traditions; lastly, all research traditions have been expressed in detail and in various ways, and all of them have rather long histories. In terms of the relationship between research traditions and theories, a theory is used to give detailed expositions of the ontology of the research tradition to which it belongs and to explain or satisfy the tradition’s methodology. Within a research tradition, various theories may disagree and compete with each other. Generally speaking, these theories can be tested through experience, but the research tradition is not explanatory or predictive, nor is it directly testable. The effect of research tradition on theories is that it can defend the claims made by the theories it contains, indicate whether certain theories are allowed by the research tradition, influence the evaluation of the empirical problems and conceptual problems of its formative theories, and offer inspiring instructions to the generation or modification of specific theories. Laudan argues that it is exactly because research traditions are historical that they are able to evolve, and it is such evolution that promotes the progress of science. There are two major ways of the evolution of a research tradition: first, it achieves evolution through the evolution of the specific theories that constitute the tradition. When scientists find that a theory demonstrates significant improvement from previous theories, they abandon previous ones and replace them with the new one. Secondly, it achieves evolution through the evolution of its fundamental core parts: ontology and methodology. When scientists find that they cannot eliminate empirical problems and conceptual problems through modification of specific theories, they do “small surgeries” on the ontology and methodology on the deeper level of the research tradition. When the hypothesized modifications and supplements of the research tradition do not lead to the elimination of anomalies and conceptual problems, scientists will give up the old research tradition. Laudan names such evolution as the “natural evolution” in the research tradition.37

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Laudan’s discussions of the aforementioned problem-solving model mentioned show that problem-solving ability is the central measure in the evaluation of scientific theories. Nonetheless, it is often difficult to calculate the quantity and weight of the scientific problems solved by a theory in specific evaluation. Such difficulty weakens the operability of Laudan’s problem-solving model, which has given rise to criticism from many philosophers. In order to defend his problem-solving model and overcome the difficulty, Laudan adjusted this model in the late 1980s. He no longer saw the solution of problems as the only value and expanded the concept of research tradition, adding the dimension of axiology to the dimensions of ontology and methodology and further putting forward the “reticulational model” of scientific rationality. In this model, Laudan gives up his holistic view and places the ontology, methodology and axiology of research tradition in a reticulational structure that is featured by mutual restraints and coordination. He argues that change in science does not happen holistically, but step by step, and the progress of science demonstrates a multi-stage picture. Adding the dimension of axiology does not break the predicament faced by the problem-solving model. Laudan himself has admitted that even the reticulational model does not solve the problem of low operability of the evaluation of scientific progress. It is undeniable, however, that Laudan’s model of scientific progress points out a new direction for our research. His emphasis on conceptual problems had been neglected by philosophers of science before him. His exploration of the new position of the model of scientific progress between formalization and informalization is worth learning. Through a general survey of the view of scientific progress in Western philosophy of science, from the logical model to the historical model, and then to the model that combines logic and historiography, we can see that the evaluation of scientific progress has advanced from being static to being dynamic. Although these models involve confrontations and conflicts among different philosophical ideas, they all reveal the optimistic attitude of philosophers of science toward the progress of science, as well as their common appeal for defending the rationality of scientific development. Such optimism comes not only from their confidence in the progress of science but also from the rapid changes science brings to the real world. The deficiencies of each model aside, their explanations and defense of scientific progress are all very important. It should not be neglected, however, that the defense of scientific progress and its rationality is not merely the explanation of progressing scientific theories and their methodologies. More importantly, a more significant purpose of philosophical examination of science is to better promote scientific practices.

3.2 Advent of Post-Industrial Society A typical demonstration of the optimistic faith in science on the level of social reality is the advent of the post-industrial society such optimism has given rise to. In 1973, one of the most influential contemporary sociologists and futurists, Daniel Bell, combined the optimistic attitude toward science with the faith in technocracy and thereby formed the influential theory of “post-industrial society.”

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According to this theory, the development of human society includes three different stages: pre-industrial society, industrial society and post-industrial society. It has now entered the stage of post-industrial society. In The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, Bell makes in-depth discussions of the post-industrial society and its characteristics brought by the development of science and puts forward a view of history characterized by scientific and technological determinism. The thought-provoking ideas of scientific and technological determinism in this book can be summarized into three aspects. 3.2.1  Theoretical    Knowledge: the Axis of Post-Industrial Society In previous studies of social problems, sociologists had usually adopted determinism that emphasized a single causality or the influences of main factors. As a result, their methods appeared too naïve and mechanical. Disagreeing with this research method and sublating it, Bell puts forward the ideas of “axial principle” and “axial structure.” The essence of these ideas is an effort to specify not causation (this can only be done in a theory of empirical relationships) but centrality. Looking for the answer to the question how a society hangs together, it seeks to specify, within a conceptual schema, the organizing frame around which the other institutions are draped, or the energizing principle that is a primary logic for all the others.38 The advantage of this method is that it explains the transformations of social structures from multiple angles and at the same time pays attention to the influences of major factors. In Bell’s axial principle, the most prominent feature is that theoretical knowledge becomes the axis of post-industrial society. Bell points out that “[i]n capitalist society the axial institution has been private property and in the post-industrial society it is the centrality of theoretical knowledge.”39 According to Bell, knowledge is necessary to the operation of any society, but [w]hat is distinctive about the post-industrial society is the change in the character of knowledge itself. What has become decisive for the organization of decisions and the direction of change is the centrality of theoretical knowledge – the primacy of theory over empiricism and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that, as in any axiomatic system, can be used to illuminate many different and varied areas of experience.40 Based on the transition of axial institution to theoretical knowledge, Bell considers technology, which most clearly demonstrates the changes in theoretical knowledge, as the axis, and divides the society into three forms: pre-industrial society, industrial society and post-industrial society. In comparison with the former two, post-industrial society is obviously different (see Table 3.1). Their differences demonstrate the huge impacts of scientific knowledge and technological knowledge on the society.

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First of all, post-industrial society is a society of knowledge. In Bell’s view, regarding the close connections between knowledge and the society, “[t]he postindustrial society, it is clear, is a knowledge society in a double sense.”41 On the one hand, research and exploitation have become the source of innovation in postindustrial society, and theoretical knowledge has thus acquired the central position. The advancement of scientific theories continuously promotes the progress of technology. On the other hand, how to train a large number of professional talents with knowledge is a major problem in post-industrial society. As plentiful social forces gather in the field of knowledge in post-industrial society, science and technology determine the Gross National Product and employment. Therefore, “[t]he chief resource of the post-industrial society is its scientific personnel,”42 including engineers, teachers, technicians and, most importantly, scientists. Secondly, the primary problem of post-industrial society is the organization and management of scientific activities and the chief institutions engaged in scientific activities such as universities and research institutions. The critical point in this change is World War II, after which scientific abilities have become a decisive factor in national development. The state’s emphasis on research and exploitation after World War II has been significantly greater than that on industrial production before World War I. “Research and exploitation” symbolize the organic structure of science, technology and economy, of which the combination has given birth to industries based on science, such as computer, electronic, optical and polyester industries. These industries have overridden manufacturing sectors of the society and become the forerunners of production in developed industrial societies. Therefore, the central political problems in post-industrial society include the state’s attitude toward science and the ways it supports scientific activities, Table 3.1 General Table of Social Changes* Name

Pre-industrial society Industrial society

Professions

Farmer, miner, unskilled laborer Raw materials Game against nature

Technology Design Methodology

Common sense, experience

Semi-skilled worker, engineer Energy sources Game against fabricated nature Empiricism experiment

Time perspective

Post-industrial society Professional, technician, scientist Information Game between persons Abstract theories: models, simulations, decision theory, systems analysis Future orientation, forecasting

Orientation to the Specific responses, past, specific forecasting responses Axial principle Traditionalism: limits Growth of economy: The central status of land/resources state or privately of theoretical controlled knowledge and its investment decision codification According to the index of Bell’s general table.

*

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the politization of science, and the effective organization and management by scientists of scientific work. Thirdly, the change of axial institutions demonstrates the “organizational constraining force” in intellectual work. Such a force is reflected by the increasing pressure imposed on young people. The majority of people want to be admitted into college and become “intellectuals.” Choosing good colleges and good majors and entering graduate schools become the aspirations of young people in post-industrial society. Consequently, the number of scientific and technological personnel grow significantly, and the post-industrial society thus become a society of talents. Technological abilities become what economists refer to as “human capital.” These phenomena cause an obvious fear in people’s minds: The explicit fear created by a post-industrial society is that the failure to get on the educational escalator means the exclusion from the privileged places in society. A meritocratic society is a “credentials society” in which certification of achievement – through the college degree, the professional examination, the license – becomes a condition of higher employment.43 Last but not least, knowledge becomes the basis of the acquisition of power and forms an alliance with power. The interactions between knowledge and power become a necessary “technique” in the development of post-industrial society. Technology is the state of knowledge production. All parts of social advancement inevitably base their legitimacy on knowledge that is being generated. Such an understanding of the value of knowledge is the basic way postmodernist thinking exists in post-industrial society.44 In post-industrial society, the value of knowledge is more significantly illustrated by the fact that it has become the basis of the acquisition of power. Therefore, in post-industrial society (knowledge society), knowledge becomes more important. Nonetheless, although knowledge is transformed into the primary power in post-industrial society, “the relationship of knowledge to power is essentially a subservient one.”45 Government continuously intensifies its control over academic institutions through its power. “In post-industrial society, academic institutions demonstrate high reliance on the government. Under such circumstances, the allocation of academic resources depends not on the market but on the government. Differences exist between political considerations and academic considerations.”46 Therefore, Bell argues that the center of power in post-industrial society is not knowledge structures, but political structures. 3.2.2   Science and Technology: the Leading Forces in the Change of  Social Structure The second concentrated expression of Bell’s view of history of scientific and technological determinism is that he believes that the significant changes in social structure are all rooted in science and technology. These changes are products of

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modern scientific and technological revolution. Bell examines diachronically the changes brought by science and technology to social structure. In pre-industrial society, the level of technology is low. In the struggles between human beings and nature, the majority of the labor force, relying on its muscle strength, is devoted to extraction works such as mining, fishing, forestry and agriculture. An agricultural society formed in the traditional way is thus created. In industrial society, the level of technology is greatly improved. The world becomes technologized and rationalized. Mechanical technology dominates, determining the tempo of people’s lives. In the struggles between human beings and environment, the advancement of technology makes into reality the replacement of muscle with energy and resources in the supply of labor force. Engineers and semi-skilled labor supersede craftsmen. The relationship between human beings and machine becomes the center. Mechanized technology makes people’s lives more coordinated and makes the world operate according to plans and timetables. Man is operated as object. What organizations care about is the demands of roles instead of those of man. “Maximization” and “optimization” become mottos. All these changes shape the technological features of industrial society. In post-industrial society, science and technology become the leading forces that push society forward. Their leading role is most saliently reflected in their transition of the economy of production in industrial society into the service economy in post-industrial society. A post-industrial society is based on services. Hence, it is a game between persons. What counts is not raw muscle power, or energy, but information. The central person is the professional, for he is equipped, by his education and training, to provide the kinds of skill which are increasingly demanded in the post-industrial society.47 Service economy is closely related to science and technology, coming from three main influences of science and technology. The first is the significant increase in the number of scientific and technological personnel. In post-industrial society, the most important force consists of professionals and technicians. According to Bell’s estimate, in 1980, the number of employed professionals and technicians in the U.S. would reach 1.55 million, occupying 16.3% of the total employed population, with an increase of 5.3% in comparison with that in 1958. In the U.S., the class of professionals and technicians includes the following four groups: teachers in public and private schools are the biggest group, accounting for a quarter of the whole class of professionals and technicians; engineers; engineering and scientific and technology personnel (including cartographers and surveyors); and scientists (including natural scientists and social scientists), which is the most important group. The second is the rise of a group that may grow into a new ruling class of the society – the class of scientific and technological experts. In post-industrial society, as technological abilities become the basis of acquiring authority, education becomes the precondition for such acquisition. Those who rise to authority in this

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way are scientists, engineers and intellectuals. They are no longer single entities of the industrial society. Instead, they form alliances with figures from other fields, especially political groups, which makes the post-industrial society one in which “the state is ruled by science and technology.” The technicians working in governmental and economic departments make decisive influences. Therefore, Bell maintains that there are two prominent features of the systematic changes of post-industrial society:48 the first is that political processes must consider scientists, and more broadly technical intellectuals, as a social stratum; the second is that science itself is characterized by an intrinsic spirit that is dominant and differs from those of other major social groups. This intrinsic spirit makes scientists tend to act in a political way that is different from that of other groups. The third is the integration of technical decisions and policy decisions. Decisions are a matter of power. In post-industrial society, the rise of the stratum of scientific and technological experts makes scientists and researchers central figures who master new methods of decision such as systematic analysis, linear programming and project budgeting. This stratum becomes the fundamental force that puts forward designs of decisions and makes decision analyses, which is “essential to the formulation and analysis of decisions on which political judgments have to be made, if not to the wielding of power.”49 Under such circumstances, technological intellectuals have dual functions: on the one hand, they form a new group of voters based on their research expertise and their status in society, and their influence is demonstrated by a complex bureaucratic system of administration; on the other hand, technical experts are indispensable management advisors to political authorities. Therefore, Bell sees technical and political decisions as the most critical issues in the public decisions of post-industrial society. The members of this new technocratic elite, with their new techniques of decision-making (systems analysis, linear programming, and program budgeting), have now become essential to the formulation and analysis of decisions on which political judgments have to be made, if not to the wielding of power.50    Guides Instinct: Technological Reflections on Industrial  3.2.3  Intellect Society The third illustration of Bell’s idea of scientific and technological determinism is his belief in the omnipotence of science and technology. Bell considers the development of science and technology in industrial society to be blind. The production in industrial society, in which science and technology are the main forces, leads to the breakdown of the harmony between human beings and nature and transforms their relationship into one of confrontation. The harmful side effects of the advancement of technology lead to secondary and tertiary consequences that have been ignored by people and remained totally unexpected. For example, the increase in the amount of cheap chemical fertilizer, while raising agricultural

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productivity, has caused the discharge of nitrogen into rivers, which has become the most harmful pollution. Pesticides save crops but kill wild animals and birds. Internal combustion engines are more effective than steam engines, but they smog the air. Bell argues that “[t]he point is that the introduction of technology was uncontrolled, and its initiators were interested only in single-order effects.”51 His insights into the negative effects of science and technology in industrial society are objective. These are the important problems threatening contemporary people. He considers science and technology absolutely competent for solving these problems, proposing two solutions. The first is to solve these problems through technological planning and control. Bell maintains that the blindness of technology can be avoided by making “evaluation” before the application of technology. He also realizes, however, that such control and planning should be combined with the political system. He points out that “[t]echnology assessment is feasible. What it requires is a political mechanism that will allow such studies to be made and set up criteria for the regulation of new technologies.”52 Therefore, he suggests that specialized institutions of technology assessment should be established and offer services to the government. The duties of these institutions involve the evaluation and selection of sciences according to certain criteria prior to the application of technology, that is, technical appraisal. There are two ways of technical appraisal: the economic way and the sociological way. In terms of the economic way of technical appraisal, Bell considers it highly significant in modern Western society: Economizing is the science of the best allocation of scarce resources among competing ends; it is the essential technique for the reduction of “waste” – as this is measured by the calculus stipulated by the regnant accounting technique. The conditions of economizing are a market mechanism as the arbiter of allocation, and a fluid price system which is responsive to the shifting patterns of supply and demand.53 In technical appraisal in the economic way, people should avoid the fallacies in pure economic pragmatism. Such appraisal should not only evaluate economic goods but also “free wealth.” It should consider the influence of technology on the human environment after it is transformed into products. It should also pay attention to the spillover factors (or external costs) of technology and avoid shifting such costs to society. It should take into view the balance between private commodities and public commodities that technology produces instead of focusing merely on satisfying the private consumption of individuals. Regarding the sociological way of technological appraisal, Bell stresses that it “(judges) a society’s needs in more conscious fashion, and…to do so on the basis of some explicit conception of the ‘public interest.’”54 This way of appraisal has two key points: first, social justice should be consciously established by integrating all people into the society, and second, social objects for public service should comply with public or political demands, instead of with individual demands. Bell points out that according to the sociological way of technological appraisal, companies, as

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the application of technology, should not merely adopt the economic way, but must also pay attention to realizing the sociological way of appraisal. The consciousness of “social responsibility” must be established in companies, which, while pursuing economic interests, should take into full consideration the sense of satisfaction of workers, the employment of minorities and the responsibilities for communities and the environment. When economic interests are in conflict with these problems, companies should comply with public interests. In terms of the effects of the economic way and the sociological way of technological appraisal, Bell emphasizes that decision-makers should attach more significance to the latter. It is important in technological planning and control to correctly predict the influences of social and technological changes and offer alternatives according to the different costs of their targets. The second is to invent new “intellectual technology.” “Intellectual technology” refers to “the substitution of algorithms (problem-solving rules) for intuitive judgments.”55 “What is distinctive about the new intellectual technology is its effort to define rational action and to identify the means of achieving it.”56 In postindustrial society, the complex relationship between science and technology and economic development leads to risks and uncertainties in the decision-making environment. Decision-makers always strive for the optimization of decisions in their decision-making processes, that is, the maximization of achievements and the minimization of loss. With its advantages in the aspect of systematic analysis, intellectual technology will be playing roles similar to those of machine technology in industrial society. Bell’s emphasis on new intellectual technologies comes from the new achievements in science and technology since 1940. New research fields such as information theory, control theory, game theory, decision theory, utility theory and random process have emerged. Achievements in these fields have been continuously applied to organized complex problems, giving rise to specific decision-making methods such as linear programming, statistical decision-making theory, the application of the Markov chain, the Monte Carlo randomization process and minimal and maximal solutions. These methods operate on computers, and thus endow technologies with an “intellectual” characteristic, avoiding the deficiencies in intuitive judgment. Bell is very confident in new intellectual technologies, believing that they will provide effective planning and decisions in social development in post-industrial society, and overcome multiple problems in the application of science and technology. There is no doubt that Bell’s predictions about the effects of new intellectual technologies in decision-making are reasonable. The development of modern science and technology has proven that science and technology contribute to the solution of many social problems. It should be noticed, however, that intellectual technologies only play an instrumental role in the scientization and rationalization of decision-making. The objectivity and comprehensiveness of facts and the collective nature and rationality of interests are also important factors influencing decision-making. Even if we consider it from the angle of technology, the simulation of social systems with tools such as mathematic models and computer often leave out useful variables and distort the relationships among certain variables.

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As a result, it is not fully competent for dealing with the complexity of social decision-making. Through an examination of Bell’s analysis of the influences of science and technology in post-industrial society, we can clearly identify his determinist idea of scientism and technicism. On the basis of integrating the ideas of Comte de Saint-Simon, Max Weber, Thorstein B. Veblen, Werner Sombart, Joseph Alois Schumpeter and William James, he draws the conclusion that science and technology reshape the relationships and structure of contemporary society. The numerous nomographs, statistical tables and comparison diagrams of various indexes in Bell’s The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society reflect his emphasis on empirical facts and the principle of objectivity. It is by applying deduction to various data that Bell makes clear descriptions of the connections among diverse social phenomena. Nevertheless, we should also note that he has abandoned the factor of value and normative judgment to different degrees in these analyses, which leads to the lack of humanistic concern in his theories. As a philosopher who grew up in the 20th century, Bell witnessed the earth-shaking changes modern scientific and technological revolution has brought to the world. His ideas reflect the optimistic attitude of many Western intellectuals toward science and technology. Although like many Western intellectuals, Bell has realized the negative impacts of science and technology on human beings and put forward pertinent solutions, the optimism about science and technology in his thoughts is still very clear.

3.3  Scientific    and Technological Salvationism amid the Crisis of  Modernity At the beginning of The Turning Point, Fritjof Capra writes: At the beginning of the last two decades of our century, we find ourselves in a state of profound, world-wide crisis. It is a complex, multidimensional crisis whose facets touch every aspect of our lives – our health and livelihood, the quality of our environment and our social relationships, our economy, technology, and politics. It is a crisis of intellectual, moral, and spiritual dimensions; a crisis of a scale and urgency unprecedented in recorded human history.57 This passage vividly describes the crises threatening human society at present. Faced with such crises caused by modernity, advocates of scientific and technological salvationism turn back to science and technology. They believe that the power of science will save us from the current predicaments. 3.3.1   Split of Reason: Culprit of the Crisis of Modernity The 18th-century Enlightenment movement is usually seen as the real start of modernity. In the movement, the ideal of modernity was established, after which

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a “new” global system emerged along with the view of development as continuously progressive, purposeful and irreversible. The movement of modernity is one in which rationalism is embedded. It benefits from the promotion of rationality by thinkers of the Age of Enlightenment, who clearly realized that the development of human beings in the new era could only depend on the building of a “perfect world” with rationality. Science and technology, as the basis of the rationalist view of progress, are entrusted with the mission of building that “perfect world.” In this modernist movement, people firmly believe that the progress of civilization is demonstrated by the accumulation of scientific knowledge and the advancement of technology. Only by transforming the potential of science and technology into the development of the economy can modernity realize the beautiful dreams of human beings. Since then, human beings have achieved success in their selfcentered conquest of nature. While bringing pleasure to human beings, modernity has also given rise to crises that confuse the world. A striking demonstration of the crises of modernity is the one-sided development of rationality, which is taken as merely “instrumental reason” or “scientific and technological rationality.” Thinkers of rationalism establish the foundation of the progress of society and that of other cultures with such rationality and defend their “legitimacy.” Nonetheless, it should be noted that it is unfair to attribute the one-sidedness of rationality merely to the 18th-century philosophers of the Enlightenment. In fact, at the beginning of the development of philosophy and science and technology, a split had already happened in rationality. It is people’s split understandings of rationality that result in today’s crises of modernity. The understanding of rationality, as a tradition formed in human cultures, can be traced back to ancient Greece. During that period, the purpose of rationality is the study of the origin of the world. This is a kind of non-pragmatic, pure and wisdom-loving pursuit, of which the most prominent feature is the seeking for the absolute nature of the universe. Among the ancient Greek philosophers, Pythagoras and Plato have significant influences over later scholars. Pythagoras firmly believes that the origin of the world is numbers, thus drawing the conclusion of the mysterious mathematization of nature, according to which “all things are numbers.” Numbers represent a kind of certainty, demonstrating to people that nature is characterized by certainty, order and knowability. Such speculation about the certainty of nature encouraged Plato’s pursuit of the absolute idea. Plato firmly believes that ideas are supreme, absolute and eternal. All things in the world exist because of their sharing of ideas. Everything is a copy of ideas, which create everything but are not created by things.58 As rational beings, human beings grasp the world not with sensations, but with concepts, judgment and reasoning. In other words, they get to know the world with a system of universal and abstract concepts generated from mathematics and deductive logic. In this way, Plato establishes the system of truth centered on the core category of absolute ideas. It creates the tradition of Western rationalist philosophy, which transcends facts and natural objects, pursues absolute truth and the ideal spiritual life that is characterized by free thinking and self-determination. In this tradition,

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Starting from the 14th century, European society entered a new stage of development. The fire of the Renaissance, which started in Italy, soon spread to other countries in Europe. The movement of ideological emancipation, which advocated humanities and opposed divine forces, enabled science to defeat theology and led to the collapse of scholastic philosophy. Modern rationality thus came into being. Galileo, Descartes and Newton made huge contributions to the formation of modern rationality. Nevertheless, they paid attention merely to the mathematization of nature, disregarding visual, auditory, taste, tactile and olfactory senses and exiling aesthetics, morality, value, quality, courtesy, emotions, motivation, intentions, consciousness and spirit from the domain of science. What was left was merely the abstract rationality of mathematics. As a result, “explorations for the certainty, positiveness, and universality of scientific knowledge were associated with the demand for the practical, utilitarian, and instrumental nature of scientific knowledge”60 because “as the covert structure and repeated patterns of all things can be understood precisely, it is possible, in principle, to rationally design a goal of operation based on such understandings and to copy or manufacture it by technological means.”61 In this way, technology obtained the rational tools for harnessing and controlling nature, and rationality itself acquired a strong instrumentalist feature due to its alliance with technologies. At this point, the absolute rationality inherited from ancient Greek had evolved into the instrumental reason that pursued utilitarian purposes. On the basis of the alliance between rationality and technology, the hegemony of instrumental reason in human society was soon established, allowing human beings to advance from the time of handicrafts to the time of mechanical industries that is characterized by the mechanical nature of technology. It also resulted in the appearance of various technological crises on the stage of human history. These crises were distinct from those in the time of traditional handicrafts. In the 1760s, the Industrial Revolution started in Britain. At the same time, the first modern technological revolution, that is, the steam-engine revolution, took place. Marked by the widespread application of steam engines, the revolution was swiftly expanded to all industries. This revolution liberated the physical power of human beings and increased material forces of production, contributing to the success of the Industrial Revolution. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Industrial Revolution had been successively accomplished in France, the United States, Germany, Russia and Japan after Britain. The direct consequences of the Industrial Revolution include the concentration of capital, the formation of the modern market economy and factory system, the significant urbanization of rural areas and the rapid economic development in Western capitalist countries. The changes brought to human beings by the Industrial Revolution, which was led by technology, are still arousing people’s surprise and acclaim nowadays. Nonetheless, while technology brings capital to Western countries, the various crises it presents to human beings are also turning into reality. Encouraged by

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Bacon’s slogan of “knowledge is power,” technology demonstrates more clearly its instrumental feature in its alliance with mathematical rationality. In capitalist production, technology is taken as the only effective tool for capitalists’ competition for surplus value. Driven by the maximization of interest, technology advances by pushing itself forward blindly and unlimitedly. Nature is considered merely as a tool subordinate to human beings’ goal of producing surplus value and an object of conquest and control. Human beings have been blindly demanding too much from nature and controlling it. The split and confrontation between humans and nature have thus been intensified. The various negative impacts of technological crises have also gradually emerged through the process of industrialization: human beings have descended to being slaves of machines and started to lose their subjectivity and creativity in labor; urbanization has speeded up and the gap between the rich and the poor has enlarged; class contradictions have increased, and labor movements have stormed; ecologic balance is destroyed, and environmental pollution becomes increasingly serious. Starting from the 19th century, with the rapid advancement of science and technology, human beings have entered the era of informational technology. Electrical and electronic facilities enable people to dwell in an artificial world that is safe, comfortable and convenient. Automobiles, trains, ships, and airplanes speed up people’s lives; the development of biology and chemistry greatly alleviate people’s sufferings; computers and the Internet shorten the distances between people. All these changes illustrate a colorful world of technology, in which people have formed a new lifestyle. Nonetheless, [m]odern technology and science are not the main generators of the new mode of living. The opposite is true; they are brought about by it…“[C]alculative thinking” is rather an expression of, and a condition for, the modem human mode of living, [and a condition] for the modern “life-world” [to] emerge.62 Calculative thinking is a kind of rational consciousness that the “rational modern man” has acquired after the replacement of belief with knowledge. It demonstrates people’s optimism about rationality and their ability to use rationality. With such optimism, modern people continuously shape the world in which they live through science and technology. “[T]he modern ‘life-world’ that has emerged from the real historical processes of transformation of artefacts and human capacities into commodities, and of human technological strategy into marketing strategy.”63 In this historical process, “an ‘objectified’ world is only a domain of knowledge for people, waiting for people’s conquest. Therefore, ‘science,’ as the tool with which people get to know the objectified world, becomes a new ‘belief.’”64 One cannot help but marvel at the omnipotence of science and technology. Behind the success of science and technology, however, some latent dangers gradually emerge. Not only has the advancement of science and technology not solved the plenty of problems in the era of mechanical industry, but the development of high-tech is giving rise to more new problems now: global warming, environmental deterioration, urban congestion, explosion of population, the spread of

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diseases and the infinite intensification of pressure in social competition. Human beings have been living in the crises brought by movements of modernity. They have to face these questions: do science and technology bring to human beings welfare or greater harm? Do human beings have the authority of unlimited exploitation of nature? Are science and technology able to solve all problems faced by human beings? What kind of future are human beings heading for? 3.3.2  Science    and Technology Change the Future: Optimistic Complex  of Scientific and Technological Salvationism Faced with the crises of modernity, many Western scholars hold an optimistic attitude toward the future development of the world. Such optimism mainly comes from their belief in scientific and technological optimism. Scientific and technological optimism has emerged under the specific historical condition that human beings have obtained some knowledge of the social functions of science and technology but still lack rational understanding of them. Its essence is “worship of science and technology,” or “scientific and technological salvationism.” Its basic characteristics include the idealization, absolutization and sanctification of science and technology, as well as the consideration of scientific and technological advancement as the decisive factor and fundamental driving force of social development. Most scientific and technological optimists firmly believe that in the development of science and technology, the social functions of science and technology are more significant than the social problems they create. They believe that all the social problems arising in the application of science and technology can be solved with scientific and technological innovations. Therefore, they hold an optimistic attitude toward establishing a better society through the development of science and technology. The American physicist and mathematician Herman Kahn is a representative of this view. Kahn is a famous American physicist, mathematician and representative of the optimists studying the future society. Devoted to studies of culture, politics, economics and technology, he wrote plenty of academic works, among which The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World has been very influential. In this book, Kahn and his research team put forward the theory of “the Great Transition” to cope with crises of modernity. This theory expresses the cautious optimism of Kahn and his team. 3.3.2.1 Human Beings Will Enter Post-Industrial Society in the Future In Kahn’s view, the 400 years between 1800 and 2200 can be divided into two stages, the first 200 years starting with the “pre-industrial stage” and the second 200 ending with the “post-industrial stage.” In The Next 200 Years, Kahn states at the very beginning his optimism about the future development of human society: 200 years ago almost everywhere human beings were comparatively few, poor and at the mercy of the forces of nature, and 200 years from now, we

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expect, almost everywhere they will be numerous, rich and in control of the forces of nature.65 According to Kahn, in the “great transition” that lasts for 400 years, every country will find its own way of economic advancement thanks to scientific and technological progress. They will fully accomplish, or accomplish to a large extent, the tasks of economic development, and will all eventually grow into industrial and post-industrial societies. Kahn considers the agricultural revolution, which happened around 10,000 years ago in the Near East’s Fertile Crescent, and the Industrial Revolution, which started in the Netherlands and Britain 200 years ago, as two watersheds in human history. In his opinion, similar to the expansion of the Agricultural Revolution to every corner of the world, the Industrial Revolution would expand to all countries around the world, and the process of such expansion would not last for 10,000 years. It would finish within 400 years, which means that human society would reach a hyper-industrial state in the late 20th century and post-industrial society in the early 20th century, and the whole expansion would be completed in the late 22nd century when human society develops into a new and appropriate form. In order to elucidate the nature of these changes, Kahn distinguished four kinds of economic activities. The first is primary economic activities, which refer to the extraction of natural resources, mainly including agriculture, mining, forestry and fishing. In this kind of economic activity, technology is very underdeveloped, and people mainly “play games with and against nature.”66 The ratio of rural population to urban population is 20:1. The second is secondary economic activities, including construction and manufacturing industries. The society and culture corresponding to this kind of activity are basically urban. Technology is relatively developed. People are organized primarily through “their cooperation and confrontations with material supplies and their confrontation with nature.” At the same time, science and technology progress through organized wars. The third is tertiary economic activities, which acquire some features of service economy, offering service to primary and secondary economic activities. The tertiary economic activities include transportation, insurance, finance, management, governmental activities, education, training, etc. Due to the advancement of science and technology, nature becomes a controllable variable. The limit of supplies is no longer important. This kind of economic activity corresponds with societies and cultures in which suburbanization exceeds urbanization. An important part of people’s activities is “cooperation and confrontation with organizations.” In the distribution of power and status, organizational and professional considerations become more significant, and knowledge becomes a primary kind of possession. The fourth is quaternary economic activities or the real post-industrial economy. This is a kind of service economy that is expected to be realized in the 21st century. The realization will be attributed primarily to the substantial development of science, technology and economy. The quaternary society, in which “cooperation” is more common than “confrontation,” will be the third watershed in human society. People will be able to fully control the world and will seek exploration of extraterrestrial space, not simply because

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of economic and technological reasons, but also because people see it as a new psychological and moral frontier.67 3.3.2.2 Science and Technology Are the Fundamental Forces to Solve Various Problems and Realize the Post-Industrial Society In contrast to Kahn’s scientific and technological optimism, there is the scientific and technological pessimism, represented by the “zero-growth” school. People with such an idea believe that the advancement of science and technology will deplete resources and subject human beings to plenty of problems. For example, environmental problems are brought on by technologies or technicians. Further development of science and technology will endanger the future of human beings. Technological advancement will not change the limits that limited resources put on population and industrial growth. Kahn is resolutely opposed to this kind of view. He argues that people with such views have misunderstood the significance of current science and technology for the future. Using technological advancement as the axis, Kahn refutes the idea of “zero-growth” by discussing the pros and cons of the advancement of technology. On the one hand, Kahn analyzes the bright future of energy sources, crop production and the environment promised by technological progress. As far as he is concerned, technological progress will enable the exploitation of diverse energy sources and renewable energy, and thus ensure the sufficiency of energy sources. Supported by technological advancement, “there is an abundance of raw materials for future generations as well as the present one.”68 As technology is combined with high-level crop production, “a more reasonable projection would be in the direction of an eventual abundance of food.”69 Thanks to technology, the next 200 years will see more clear air, clean water and a beautiful environment.70 On the other hand, Kahn admits that in the progress of human society, science and technology have indeed caused certain risks, such as the problems of energy sources, raw materials and pollution. Nevertheless, the surfacing of these problems is mainly due to the fact that scientific and technological advancement has not been advanced enough. Scientists, technicians and engineers have not taken these problems into consideration when they design scientific and technological plans. Advocates of “zero-growth” theory exaggerate these crises and ignore that there are still plenty of unexploited spaces in nature surrounding human beings, such as seas and oceans, the deep interior of the earth and cosmic space. They neglect the deep processing of exploited resources and energy sources, as well as “reducing expenditure” and “repairing and recycling.” Therefore, Kahn believes that the problems of pollution and resource exhaustion can be remedied by more advanced science and technology, such as better technological processes. The continuous growth of production will lead to the potential for more production. Using the pollution caused by automobiles and power plants as an example, Kahn argues: “Normally, one cannot change automobile pollution by more than a factor of 2 or 3 by self-restraint, while technological improvement seems likely to yield a factor of 5 to 50.”71 At the same time,

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people can turn to clean fuels by adopting certain technologies, using improved exhaust systems or simply replacing oil-fueled automobiles with electric automobiles. Pollution caused by power plants can be solved with new technologies that exploit solar energy and geothermal power, or the technologies of nuclear fission or fusion reactors that provide new nuclear power. The problem of pollution can be solved with good management and new technologies. Therefore, Kahn believes refutes the idea that science and technology have presented a widespread threat to the continuation of our civilization. Any attempt to stop science and technology from progressing will definitely end in failure or arouse disastrous resistance. 3.3.2.3 “Faustian Bargain”: Future Tasks Kahn compares the development of science and technology to a “Faustian Bargain.”72 People in the trend of modern science and technology are like Faust. Once science and technology begin advancing, they are forced to use them and to make unceasing experiments and designs, otherwise, they are “damned” forever. In fact, here Kahn emphasizes more of the intrinsic logic of science and technology. The development of science and technology brings much more benefits than problems to human society in the future. In Kahn’s view, rather than giving up scientific and technological development, people should speed it up. As long as we maintain a cautious and alert attitude, the various social problems scientific and technological progress may bring can be solved. In Kahn’s words, “the effort to achieve a postindustrial society is on balance a worthwhile one; and further, that priorities which emphasize technological advancement and economic growth, but with prudence and care, are likely to be acceptable and largely beneficial.”73 These words show Kahn’s cautious optimism toward the future advancement of science and technology. At the same time, Kahn notices the multiple risks science and technology present in the development of future society. Regarding how to deal with these risks, he objects to evaluation of technology because it is very difficult to realize such evaluation in actual operations. In Kahn’s view, if technological evaluation had been considered a general rule and subject to high criteria, a lot of important programs of technological innovation would not have been devised. It is often impossible to make a comprehensively positive judgment of complicated technological programs because it is unlikely that people predict all consequences of the new technologies. Kahn argues that the problems that the future development of science and technology may bring can be solved with the establishment of a reasonable lobby and a “warning system.” The first purpose of this warning system is to keep alert the circle of science and technology, government and other related elites. Of course, the establishment of the reasonable lobby and the “warning system” is not aimed at limiting the connections between scientists and the public, but at allowing the public to judge as early as possible issues of their immediate interests and thus ensure their own advantages. If the public can know experts’ and elites’ opinions on a certain technological program or problem through the

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warning system or lobby, they will be able to express their different views, and in this way guarantee their vital interests. Kahn is optimistic that these measures will allow society to deal with any technological problem in time. 3.3.3  New    Technological Revolution: Panacea for the Crisis of  Modernity In addition to Kahn’s “Great Transition,” Alvin Toffler and John Naisbitt have anchored the hope for salvation from crises of modernity on a new technological revolution, considering the revolution as an “elixir” to cure these crises. American sociologist and futurist Alvin Toffler, in his famous work The Third Wave, borrows American historian Norbert Elias’s term and compares graphically to “waves” the agricultural revolution, industrial revolution, informational revolution and various radical changes they have triggered. On this basis, he divides the development of human civilization into three periods: the first wave – the agricultural stage – which lasted for several thousands of years; the second wave – the industrial stage – which is no more than 300 years; and the third wave – the informational stage – marked by the advent of electronic computers and symbolized by the exploitation of solar energy and the emergence of spatial technologies, marine engineering and genetic engineering. This third stage is also called the stage of new technological revolution. In The Third Wave, Toffler’s insights into the crises of modernity faced by human society, especially the various problems the second wave has brought to human society, are undoubtedly profound. He reveals the negative effects of second-wave technologies on society. According to Toffler, societies of various natures in the second wave share something in common, including the exploitation of unrenewable fossil fuels as the basis of energy sources, the rapid advancement of technology and large marketing systems. The combination of these three features gives rise to and pushes forward the technological developments in the second wave. Because of the great lure presented by the combination of technology and economy, “Second Wave governments around the world entered into a blind race to increase GNP at all costs, maximizing ‘growth’ even at the risk of ecological and social disaster.”74 Such blind pursuit on the one hand has brought about industrial civilization, which is superior to agricultural civilization, but on the other hand has also caused multiple crises in human society: crises of energy sources and mineral products, the environment, ecology and humanities. Toffler argues that it is not the fault of science and technology that human beings are faced with these crises, but because individuals and national governments in the second wave hold “shortsighted and selfish criteria”75 and a kind of “indust-reality”76 that is particular to industrial societies. Indust-reality was the overarching set of ideas and assumptions with which the children of industrialism were taught to understand their world. It was the package of premises employed by Second Wave civilization, by its scientists, business leaders, statesmen, philosophers, and propagandists.77

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The industrial view of reality involves mainly three beliefs: the belief of conquering nature – nature is an object waiting for the exploitation by human beings; the belief of social evolution – human beings not only change nature but also advance continuously, able to reach the apex through evolution; and the faith that combines the conquest of nature and the evolution of society – the historical trend leading human beings to a better future is unstoppable. The industrial view of reality, which involves these three beliefs, offers a powerful weapon for people who are engaged in industrialization to know and explain the world. Toffler maintains that in order to solve the crises of human beings, we need to not only overthrow the technologies in the second wave, but more importantly, change the industrial view of reality: turning from “the conquest of nature” to “harmonious coexistence with nature,” endowing the concept of evolution with new connotations and advocating a comprehensive view of social progress that involves the concurrent progress of technology, materials, morality, aesthetics, politics and the environment. Toffler entrusts this task to the “techno-rebels” in the third wave, which is a core group that consists of nuclear engineers, biochemists, physicists, officials of public health, scholars of genetic research and millions of common citizens. Not only will they contribute to the advancement of the new technologies in the third wave, but more importantly, they have a new kind of view of science and technology that is distinct from the industrial view of reality: Firstly, techno-rebels are not against science and technology per se, but against their growth out of control, which means that they are against incorrect objections to science and technology and irresponsible abuse of science and technology. In their view, the uncontrolled new technologies that would threaten the earth and the survival of human beings should be controlled and supervised. People need to introduce an ecological dimension to technological control in order to make new technologies subject to stricter ecological restraints than those in the second wave. Secondly, techno-rebels ask for the democratization of technological decisions. Techno-rebels no longer consist of merely a few scientists, engineers, politicians and entrepreneurs, but a wider group of the general public. Therefore, the public’s voice demanding control over technology will grow louder and their passion for democratization of technological decisions will increase to an unprecedented degree. Thirdly, techno-rebels promote “appropriate technologies.” They believe that “sophisticated” technologies do not need to be excessively big, costly and complex. New appropriate industrial designs should create jobs, avoid pollution, spare the environment and produce for individuals or local areas instead of merely for national or global markets.78 Fourthly, techno-rebels maintain that science and technology around the world should achieve balanced development. They favor devoting more technological attention to the needs of the world’s poor, and a more equitable sharing of the resources of outer space and the oceans. They recognize that not only are the oceans and skies part of the common heritage of the race, but that advanced technology itself could not

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Fifthly, techno-rebels demand revolution in the production system. On the way toward the third wave, human beings must move away from the production system in the second wave which leads to the wasting of resources and pollution and to a production system that is more metabolic. A so-called metabolic production system refers to one in which the output and by-product of each industry can be exploited as an input for the next stage. The products of an early stage can be directly used in further processing in the next stage without any waste or pollution.80 Here we can see a bit of recycling economy. Unlike the pessimists, Toffler, while revealing the various problems in the industrial period of industrial civilization, firmly believes that the new technological revolution will solve the confusion brought to human beings by the crises of modernity and lead people to a better future. He points out that [there] will come sensible technologies matched to the new, sustainable energy system towards which we are beginning to reach. Plugging the new technologies into this new energy base will raise to a wholly new level our entire civilization. At its heart we will find a fusion of sophisticated, sciencebased “high-stream” industries, operating within much tightened ecological and social controls, with equally sophisticated “low-stream” industries that operate on a smaller, more human scale, both based on principles radically different from those which governed the Second Wave techno-sphere. Together, these two layers of industry will form tomorrow’s “commanding heights.”81 Similar to Toffler’s view, American sociologist John Naisbitt, in Megatrends: Ten New Directions Transforming Our Lives, discusses the changes brought to social life by the rapid advancement of science and technology and the informatization of the society. He summarizes the trends of future development of the United States after industrial society into ten aspects: the transitions from industrial society to information society, from forced technology to a balance between high tech and high touch, from national economy to world economy, from social structures based on short-term considerations to ones based on long-term considerations, from centralization to decentralization, from institutional help to self-help, from representative democracy to participatory democracy, from hierarchies to networking, from the northern U.S. as the living area to the southern U.S. and from “either/or” to multiple choices. With the summary of these ten trends, Naisbitt fully recognizes the invigoration of economic development by the new technological revolution and emphasizes the role of information in economic growth, pointing out the superior significance of knowledge renewal in an information society. Toffler’s and Naisbitt’s view that a new technological revolution will save human beings from crises of modernity has a somewhat rational basis. In Toffler’s case, first, science and technology have changed the appearance of human society,

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bringing various benefits to human beings and demonstrating to us their great power. This is the foundation of Toffler’s arguments. Secondly, Toffler’s insight into the social problems in the time of industrial civilization is accurate. He criticizes anthropocentrism, changes the traditional value of “the conquest of nature” which centers on human beings and thereby underscores the harmonious development of humans and nature. This is a giant leap in understanding. Lastly, he introduces the ecological criterion of scientific and technological progress, and thus forms a comprehensive view of progress. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that there are deficiencies in Toffler’s and Naisbitt’s theory of new technological revolution. Their expectations for the future are based on new technological achievements. They attribute all achievements of human beings to science and technology, replacing social forms with technological forms and seeing new technological revolution as an elixir to cure social problems. The logical consequence is that science and technology are inevitably responsible for the various problems faced by human beings. As a result, when the public, in their understanding of practical problems, encounters social problems that science and technology cannot solve, they tend to slip from optimism into pessimism about science and technology. The aforementioned propositions of scientific and technological optimism demonstrate the optimists’ penetrating insights. They have identified the promoting effects of scientific and technological progress on economy, society and human civilization, and have made cautious or optimistic affirmations. Nonetheless, while recognizing that scientific and technological advancement will provide salvation for crises of modernity, they optimistically simplify the complex relationships between the development of science and technology and the progress of the society. A striking example is that they neglect the important influences of changes in spiritual domains such as morality and ethical values on science and technology, and downplay, intentionally or not, the impacts of social factors other than science and technology on their development. They make a one-sided overstatement of the potential of scientific and technological progress and thus fall into the trap of scientific and technological determinism. Although Marxists acknowledge the role of science and technology as a lever as well as their decisive influences on the improvement of productivity, it does not mean that we have to identify with scientific and technological determinism, or that the development of science and technology is the whole content of the progress of human society. Regarding the limits of scientific and technological optimism, we shall combine science with philosophy; “we can…bring science and philosophy together, and with their help change our mode of living in a deliberate and controlled fashion.”82

Notes 1 Shen Qingsong ed. An Introduction to Philosophy. Guiyang: Guiyang People’s Publishing House, 2004:105. 2 J. Losee. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Translated by Qiu Renzong et al., Wuhan: Huazhong University of Science & Technology Press, 1982:193.

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3 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:86. 4 K. Popper. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, 1962:37. 5 Zhang Qingxiong et al. British and American Philosophy in the 20th Century. Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2005:512. 6 K. Popper. Theory of the Evolution of Scientific Knowledge. Translated by Ji Shuli, Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1987:51. 7 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:287. 8 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:288. 9 Not the “a prior” in Kant’s sense, but meaning that the judgment of competing theories is to some degree anterior to confirmation. 10 Not the “posterior” in the sense of its effectiveness. It means that the judgment of competing theories is to some degree posterior to confirmation. 11 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:144. 12 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:57. 13 K. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979:48. 14 Liu Dachun. General Theory of Philosophy of Science. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 1998:307. 15 T. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970:8. 16 T. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970:111–12. 17 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:34. 18 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:179. 19 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:48. 20 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:50. 21 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:50. 22 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:33. 23 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:34. 24 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:88. 25 According to Lakatos, rejection is the elimination of previous research program. However, when research programme achieves progress in theory, that is, the progress on the first level, previous research programme should not be completely eliminated. Therefore, rejection should be delimited with quotes, which shows its specific reference. “scientific” and “pseudoscientific” are quoted for the same reason. 26 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:34. 27 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:34.

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28 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:95. 29 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:113. 30 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:112. 31 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:5–6. 32 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:11. 33 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:65. 34 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:65. 35 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:66. 36 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:67. 37 L. Laudan. Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Translated by Fang Zaiqing, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1991:100. 38 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:96–97. 39 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:183. 40 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:104. 41 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:266. 42 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:272. 43 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:428–29. 44 Zang Fengyu and Ying Yao. “Technical Reflections on the ‘Conceptual Scheme’ of Post-Industrial Society.” Theory and Reform, 2006(4). 45 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:125. 46 Liu Dachun and Yongmou Liu. Intellectual Attacks and Defenses: The Rise and Evolution of Alternative Philosophy of Science. Beijing: P of People’s U of China, 2010:71. 47 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:193. 48 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:384. 49 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:387. 50 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:388. 51 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:108. 52 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:111. 53 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:310000. 54 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:318. 55 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:113. 56 D. Bell. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1999:113. 57 F. Capra. The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture. Toronto: Bantom Books, 1983:21. 58 Chen Huaxing. “Absoluteness: From Plato to Hegel.” Zhejiang Social Sciences, 1999(5):110.

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59 Wang Cuiying. “Spiritual Evolution of Modern Continental Philosophy.” Science, Economics, and Society, 2006(2). 60 Zhang Chenggang. “Technology, Rationality, and Criticism of Modernization.” Journal of Dialectics of Nature, 2004(8). 61 Zhang Fengyang. “Technical Rationality and Modern Man’s Way of Experience.” Journal of Nanjing University, 1995(2). 62 S. Lelas. Science and Modernity: Towards an Integral Theory of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000:197. 63 S. Lelas. Science and Modernity: Towards an Integral Theory of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000:197. 64 Huang Qisong. “Knowledge or Belief: Exploration of the Origin of the Crisis of Modernity.” Tribune of Social Sciences, 2010(21). 65 H. Kahn et al. The Next Two Hundred Years: A Scenario for America and The World. Translated by Shanghai CPPCC Compilation Committee, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1980:1. 66 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:21. 67 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:21–25. 68 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:85. 69 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:106. 70 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:44. 71 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:151. 72 Faust is a protagonist in Goethe’s opera. He makes a deal with the devil for knowledge and power. The devil promises him knowledge and power. Once he is satisfied, his soul is the devil’s. 73 H. Kahn. The Next 200 Years: A Scenario for America and the World. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1976:20. 74 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:72. 75 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:165. 76 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:114. 77 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:114. 78 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:168. 79 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:170. 80 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:169. 81 A. Toffler. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980:169– 70. 82 S. Lelas. Science and Modernity: Towards an Integral Theory of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000:279.

4

Pessimism Hopeless “Fleurs du Mal”

While scientific and technological optimism enjoyed its popularity, another trend of radical thought emerged in Western society, that is, scientific and technological pessimism. The pessimistic belief of scientific and technological pessimists, no matter whether they are scientists of natural science or humanists from the humanities, usually comes from their worries about the future of human beings and their confusion about the ecological crises caused by scientific and technological progress. Their discussions of these problems faced by human beings nowadays and their criticism of science and technology on such basis have significant impacts on contemporary practices and have become the origin of the trend of postmodern anti-scientism.

4.1 The Limit of Increase Demonstrates the Crisis in the Heyday Scientific and technological pessimism is first of all shown in the ideas of many futurists, whose focus of analyses is on the living environment and future development of human beings. Scientific and technological pessimists usually demonstrate a kind of cautious criticism of science and technology, objecting to the blind worship of science and technology and promoting changes to existing modes of production. As a result, they engage in heated debates with the scientific and technological optimists over whether there is a limit to future development. 4.1.1 Silent Spring: a Wake-up Call in the Heyday of Science and  Technology In the second half of the 20th century, when people were enchanted by the prosperity in the heyday of science and technology and paid numerous compliments to science and technology, and when scientific and technological optimists were evaluating the progress of society with science and technology, a different voice emerged in the U.S. In 1962, American biologist Rachel Carsen published Silent Spring, a work of popular science. Its publication sounds a cautionary note, reminding people that human beings will eventually be punished by nature for DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-6

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their destruction of the environment. In the words of U.S. vice president Al Gore, who wrote an introduction to the 1992 edition of the book, Silent Spring came as a cry in the wilderness, a deeply felt, thoroughly researched, and brilliantly written argument that changed the course of history. Without this book, the environmental movement might have been long delayed or never have developed at all.1 In the 1960s, although there had been some discussions on the negative influences of science and technology, “environmentalism” had not attracted sufficient attention. In scientific and technological journals at the time, there was no discussion about the growing but invisible threats of pesticides and chemicals such as DDT. The author of this book, Rachel Carson, was born on 27 May 1907, in the Allegheny Valley, Pennsylvania, U.S., and passed away on 14 April 1964, in Silver Spring, Maryland. She studied biology in her early years and was fond of literature. Inspired by her college professor, she was determined to be a biologist. The poverty of her family and worldly bias, however, made it very difficult for her to realize her dream. Her experience of working at the fishery department allowed her to access documents about the ocean and also to find the best way to demonstrate her talent – popular science writing that combined her aspirations as a biologist and her gift of literature. At the beginning of Silent Spring, Carsen depicts a frightening picture for her readers: the spring has come, but the birds that used to sing are at their last gasp. The apple trees are going to bloom, but there is no droning bee transferring pollen to the flowers. On the farm, hens brood, but no chicks hatch. Pigs look sickly, and piglets die a few days after they get sick. The spring, which should have been full of life, is now unusually silent with no air of life.2 What has caused all these changes? The author argues that it is not magic or enemies’ activities that have prevented the damaged world from reviving. It is human beings that are destroying themselves. The heavy use of organic pesticides such as DDT makes the spring as silent as death. DDT, dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane in chemistry, was first synthesized in 1874, but it was not until 1939 that the Nobel Prize winner, Swiss chemist Paul Muller, rediscovered it as a neurotoxin effective in insects. In World War II, DDT was used in large quantities to fight insect-borne infectious diseases such as yellow fever, typhus fever and filariasis. After the war, DDT was widely used for the prevention and control of infectious diseases and agricultural production as a panacea that kills mosquitoes and other pests in large numbers while being safe for human beings and livestock. For example, in India, DDT decreased the number of malaria cases from 75 million to five million within ten years. At the same time, the use of DDT on livestock and crops doubled their production. In 1962, the incidence of malaria had already dropped to a very low level in the world. Therefore, countries around the globe responded to the advice of the World Health Organization and issued the World United Against Malaria stamp on World Health Day that year. This is the stamp published by the largest number

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of countries on the same topic. In these stamps, many countries used the design of killing mosquitoes by spraying DDT. Nevertheless, throughout its application, plenty of evidence of DDT destroying the environment and poisoning other creatures in nature was being discovered continuously. The heavy use of DDT was increasingly questioned and criticized. In addition, because governments and related institutions neglected these problems, intentionally or not, and alliances of interest were formed in chemical industries, the public was exposed to pesticides only on small scales, and it was difficult for common people to associate the negative effects of pesticides with the use of pesticides based on evidence of certainty. It was under such circumstances that Carsen seriously questioned organic pesticides such as DDT in Silent Spring. She argues that DDT, after entering the food chain, eventually concentrates in animals such as birds like peregrine falcons, bald eagles and fish hawks. Chlorinated hydrocarbon interrupts the metabolism of calcium in birds, leading to a disorder of the birds’ reproductive function. Eggshells thin and some birds that feed on meat or fish become endangered. Some insects have also gradually developed resistance to drugs to fight against human beings’ endless plunder of nature due to the unlimited growth of the population. Carsen supports her arguments with plenty of facts and at the same time expresses her profound ecological ideas. Firstly, nature is a self-sufficient and balanced ecological system characterized by ubiquitous interconnections. Human beings are not superior to nature. Carsen argues that “in nature nothing exists alone.”3 The killing of pests can be realized through the delicate balance among the amounts of various creatures, that is, pests can be killed if we, with the help of nature’s wisdom, breed their predators. The extinction of a species simply because it is harmful to human beings is a demonstration of human beings’ hubris. Quoting Canadian entomologist G.C. Ullyett to support her own argument, Carsen maintains that [w]e must change our philosophy, abandon our attitude of human superiority and admit that in many cases in natural environments we find ways and means of limiting populations of organisms in a more economical way than we can do it ourselves.4 In fact, Carsen’s emphasis here is on that science and technology should not destroy ecological balance. Instead, the coordination of ecology should be achieved through the self-organization of nature. Once human beings become self-centered and willfully disturb and destroy the balance of the ecological system, they will have to face nature’s heavy revenge. Secondly, Carsen argues against anthropocentrism. In Silent Spring, she opposes the cliches left by the early scientific revolution that man (primarily males) is the center and ruler of all creatures and that the history of science is a history of man’s rule. In Carsen’s view, such ideas have reached an absolute condition in contemporary American society. As a matter of fact, this view of Carsen was attested after the publication of Silent Spring. Robert White-Stevens, an opponent of Carsen at the time, contradicted her arrogantly:

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Pessimism The crux, the fulcrum over which the argument chiefly rests, is that Miss Carson maintains that the balance of nature is a major force in the survival of man, whereas the modern chemist, the modern biologist and scientist, believes that man is steadily controlling nature.5

Former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, in a letter to Dwight Eisenhower, wondered: “Why a spinster with no children was so concerned about genetics?”6 Obviously, Carsen’s objection to anthropocentrism was right to the point. Lastly, the intervention of science and technology into nature should not be made at the cost of the harmony between human beings and nature. Nature is the basic condition of human beings’ survival. Human beings are themselves an inseparable part of the general ecological system of nature, as has been demonstrated by ancient people. Nevertheless, since the beginning of modern times, the development of industry, the progress of science and technology and the popularity of anthropocentrism have made human beings lose themselves. Human beings have begun their conquest of nature. In this process, although human beings have achieved unprecedented material glory, they have also destroyed the material basis on which human survival depends. Carsen expresses her deep concerns about these circumstances of human beings. She argues that damages made by human beings to nature could not be completely avoided in the development and application of science and technology even if people have maintained a highly cautious attitude. “[S]he recognized that even the most enlightened conservation policies would not always and everywhere protect wild nature from the engines of industrial progress or from human greed and ignorance.”7 The key to the problem is that we should not turn a blind eye to the damages that science and technology and their inappropriate applications have already done to nature or even deliberately cover these facts to protect vested interests. Carsen could not tolerate these attitudes, which was an important reason why she was criticized by the government and industries later. Silent Spring demonstrates Carsen’s worries about the biological damages that science and technology brought to the environment and human beings and the message that she passed to the public about a consciousness of environmental crises. On a deeper level, we can see her doubts about the rationality of the idea of “conquering nature,” which had been established since the start of modern times, as well as her relentless criticism of contemporary people’s arrogance toward nature. As she points out at the end of Silent Spring, [t]he “control of nature” is a phrase conceived in arrogance, born of the Neanderthal age of biology and philosophy, when it was supposed that nature exists for the convenience of man. The concepts and practices of applied entomology for the most part date from that Stone Age of science. It is our alarming misfortune that so primitive a science has armed itself with the most modern and terrible weapons, and that in turning them against the insects it has also turned them against the earth.8

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If advocates of scientific and technological optimism have not paid sufficient attention to the reflection on science and technology on the level of morality and ethics, Carsen has filled in that gap. Silent Spring warns people that they must make complete introspection on the dimensions of the view of nature and morality, and they must consciously increase their naturalistic demands for the balance of ecological system and improve the awareness of environmental morality that aspires for equality, justice, and continuity.9 When human beings, who have let the devil out of the bottle, are no longer able to put the devil back in,10 changes in ideology and consciousness and reflections on moral and ethical levels must be put on the agenda. The harmonious coexistence of human beings and nature, a fundamental value that had been covered and forgotten by modern industrial civilization, was awakened by Carsen’s call. Such consciousness requires that human beings make thorough reflections on the views of science and technology and development that have been formed in the industrial society. The question of how to establish a completely new concept about scientific and technological progress that highlights the coexistence and mutual benefits of man and nature, economy and environment, science and technology and the world of living is of compelling urgency nowadays. 4.1.2 Limits to Growth: Limits to Industrial Civilization If Silent Spring marks the beginning of a deep ecological movement, Limits to Growth, which was published ten years after Silent Spring, pushed the ecological movement to a deeper level. Limits to Growth is a research report submitted to the Club of Rome by a member of the club, American scientist Donella Meadows, in 1972. It is considered by some Western media as a “sensational masterpiece” of the 1970s. It sold a million copies and was translated into 37 languages, becoming one of the most influential research reports to date. At the time of the publication of Limits to Growth, the economic development of Western society was in its “golden era.” The progress of science and technology and the rapid growth of the economy led to people’s optimistic confidence in and beautiful expectations for the future. Therefore, at that point, Meadows’s pessimistic prediction of the unprecedented predicaments faced by human beings was widely unaccepted. Nonetheless, after 40 years, when the concept of sustainable development has won popular support, a review of this classical book will offer us more inspiration. In Limits to Growth, Meadows first starts from the five factors of population, food production, industrialization, non-renewable resources and environmental pollution, and establishes an analytical model using systematic dynamics. According to him, these five factors are growing exponentially every year. After a comparatively long period of concurrent growth of these five different factors within a single system, the growth of each factor would in turn influence the

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system itself, and a vicious cycle would thus be formed. Extreme conditions of the cycle include the exhaustion of non-renewable resources on earth, the insolubility of environmental pollution, and the cessation of the increase of food supply. In the end, man and nature would suffer devastating impacts in their bidirectional interactions. In this report, in addition to drawing the conclusion about the limits to growth, Meadows also specifically refutes scientific and technological optimism, expressing his pessimistic attitude toward science and technology. First of all, high-tech does not solve the problem of pollution. According to optimists, the dynamic development of technology enables new high-tech to solve pollution caused by production. In Meadows’s view, however, technology is not a pure variable, and it is impossible to gather and generalize the dynamic connotations of technology. Taking nuclear technologies as an example, Meadows argues that even if these technologies are able to offer new energy sources and resources, research with the dynamic model would show that the emergence of nuclear power neither increases nor decreases the average pollution caused per unit of industrial products. Certain by-products of consumption of mineral resources, such as CO2 and SO2, would decrease, while radioactive by-products would in contrast increase. Even if industrialized areas develop new technologies for pollution control on large scales and thereby strictly curb environmental pollution, the economic expense would significantly rise. On the other hand, industrial progress would take plenty of arable land and industry would thus squeeze agriculture, leading to a drop in food production. When food per capita sinks to the subsistence level, the death rate would increase and eventually population growth would come to an end.11 Therefore, Meadows contends that it is impossible to realize scientific and technological optimism’s expectation for technology to change or extend the limits to growth because technology has basically no impact on problems of a complex system that is limited and grows exponentially. Secondly, technologies have side effects. In Meadows’s opinion, all new technologies have side effects on the material and economic systems of this world, and their side effects on society are particularly strong. Agricultural technology is a case in point. Technologies of green agriculture can greatly improve food production, but new technologies are usually first applied adventurously by major farm owners with capital. For instance, in India, a country with serious economic inequality, major farm owners with vast lands are often those who have vested interests. As a result, the green revolution is not only unable to solve the problem of food, but it even tends to enlarge inequalities and thus lead to various social problems. The green revolution in Mexico has increased food production, but with the improvement of technology, a large labor force has failed to be employed and income has thus fallen significantly. Even before the application of new technologies, we can predict their side effects on society. Such prediction, however, takes much time, let alone that reforms of political systems and social systems usually lag behind the progress of technology. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to remove the side effects of technology.

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Lastly, there are problems that technologies are not capable of solving. According to Meadows, the technological solution can be defined as “one that requires a change only in the techniques of the natural sciences, demanding little or nothing in the way of change in human values or ideas of morality.”12 In this sense, technological changes cannot deal with or solve many social problems, such as crime, poverty, drug addiction in downtown areas, nuclear arms race, racial tension and unemployment. Furthermore, Meadows argues pessimistically that “[e]ven if society’s technological progress all expectations, it may very well be a problem with no technical solution, or the interaction of several such problems, that finally brings an end to population and capital growth.”13 Although Meadows objects to scientific and technological optimism, he does not entirely oppose science and technology. He is only against the unthinking acceptance of the benefits of technology. In his words, [w]e strongly believe…that many of the technological developments mentioned here – recycling, pollution control devices, contraceptives – will be absolutely vital to the future of human society if they are combined with deliberate checks on growth. We would deplore an unreasoned rejection of the benefits of technology as strongly as we argue here against an unreasoned acceptance of them.14 On such a stance, Meadows proposes three kinds of considerations about the progress of technology and society: first, the consideration of the physical and social side-effects of new technologies before introducing them on a large scale; second, the consideration of what social changes are necessary and how long such a reform takes before achieving technological advancement; third, with the former problems solved, the consideration of what kind of limits that a growing system pushed forward by scientific and technological advancement would further encounter and whether the society will prefer its pressures to the ones this development is designed to remove.15 A review of Meadows’s ideas about the limits to growth will demonstrate that he has been accurate in his exposure of the realistic problems faced by human beings. In particular, his advocation for identifying problems as early as possible and making efforts to take precautions before problems emerge offers a forward-looking way of solving global problems nowadays. Nevertheless, these contributions do not overshadow his pessimistic attitude toward the future of human beings and science and technology. In comparison with scientific and technological optimists, Meadows has gone to another extreme, denying the social value of science and technology and the rapidity of their advancement, underestimating the potential of the development of human beings and neglecting man’s agency and his breakthroughs beyond existing developments. He suggests that we make comprehensive considerations of scientific and technological progress and social development as if human society will always be troubled by the problem of the limits to growth. His suggestions generalize problems of industrialized society and reveal an excessively pessimistic attitude toward the progress of science and technology and society.

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4.1.3 How Is Growth without Limits Possible The Limits to Growth, after its publication, was criticized by many people. Even the Club of Rome, the book’s sponsor, held a completely negative attitude toward it, considering its conclusions to be incorrect and contending that they would mislead the public and make people overly anxious. More serious criticism came from The Ultimate Resource, a famous work by American futurist Julian Lincoln Simon published in 1981. This book was later edited and translated by Chinese scholars and published under the title Growth without Limit. In this book, Simon responds to The Limits to Growth and expresses his ideas on issues such as resources, population and environment, and puts forward the question about how growth without limits is possible. First of all, Simon criticizes Meadows’s method of studying the future development of human beings, arguing that both history and reality have shown that the prediction of the future using the method of technological analysis usually differs vastly from the real conditions in history. Using the problem of resources as an example, Simon contends that Meadows has come to the conclusion that there are limits to growth because he has used the method of technological prediction, which adds the presupposition that human beings’ resources are “known reserves.” Simon considers it a wrong judgment for two reasons: first, the reserves of resources on earth are unknown at all times no matter how strictly we define them because all resources get explored and exploited by human beings only when they are needed; second, even if we know the precise reserves of resources, there is not much economic significance of such knowledge, because we are able to satisfy human needs in other ways with the help of science and technology, such as replacing timber and metal with plastic, using new methods and technologies to mine low-grade ore which seems useless at present, and developing cheap nuclear plants to exploit this kind of ores. Therefore, Simon maintains that it is not very likely to make correct predictions using the dynamical method in engineering.16 He suggests that the most practical way to make predictions is to make speculations based on history. In other words, predictions based on technological analysis are not as convincing as speculations of the historical tendency of cost.17 Second, Simon points out that human beings’ resources will never be exhausted. His argument is based on four reasons.18 First, with other conditions unchanged, the cost of extracting resources increases with the usage of resources. Second, in order to cope with the increase in the price of resources, engineering technicians will voluntarily improve technologies of exploitation. Third, scientists and businessmen will look for alternative resources. For example, they may replace fossil fuels and resources with solar energy and nuclear power. With the help of science and technology, there is no doubt that people will discover – and they have been discovering – new materials and new resources. There are inexhaustible natural resources that can be exploited by human beings. Fourth, even if the price of resources increases, the cost of energy sources in the world will not increase to the extent that the Western economy is destroyed. The power of the economy

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will hold the market price of energy sources to a level approximate to their cost of production. Last, the growth of the population will push forward science and technology. The additional population’s power of production is stronger than its power of consumption. According to Simon, the so-called “exponential growth” is merely a product of numerical hypothesis. The combination of a large population with a strong economy will inevitably give rise to a growing number of creators of knowledge so that human beings will have powerful weapons to prevent and control factors that threaten their life and environment. In Simon’s words, man’s brain. In comparison with his mouth and hands, are more influential for economy. In the long run, the most important influence of the scope and growth of population on economy is the additional population’s accumulation of knowledge. In the long term, the contributions of knowledge accumulation are enough to compensate for the cost of population growth.19 He maintains that the extent of technological progress is determined by the number of people who use their brains. If the population of human beings had been large very early, the speed of the progress of technological application could have been higher. Population growth not only stimulates the invention of new technologies, but also promotes the application of existing technologies.20 According to Simon’s argument, the larger the population is, the more advanced science and technology will be. Why, then, are China and India, both of which have large populations, underdeveloped countries? Simon argues that it is because these two countries are poor and only a small part of their populations are educated. Therefore, there is no powerful scientific group there. If underdeveloped countries maintain middle-level growth of population, they will achieve relatively high living standards in the remote future. “In a word, big population means the creation of much knowledge. A larger number of people generate more new ideas. The comparison among different countries prove that population has positive impacts on the creation of science and technology.”21 To sum up, according to Simon, the so-called limits to growth in Meadows’s view do not exist. On the contrary, in human society, growth is without limit: natural resources are inexhaustible, the ecological environment is improving, food is not going to be a problem in the future, and the population will naturally achieve balance in the future. In Simon’s The Ultimate Resource, there are few philosophical arguments but many graphs, curves and data, which makes his work similar to Meadows’s. Both of them emphasize the application of the methods of natural science and social science to specific analyses, which is a desirable feature that adds to the convincingness of their arguments. In comparison with Meadows’s pessimism, Simon is more optimistic. He highlights the significance of scientific, technological and social factors in the process of growth, conscious of factors

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such as the speed of scientific and technological progress, and the potential of human beings. These ideas are justified in Simon’s work. Nevertheless, Simon is biased in arguing that the solution to problems faced by human beings in their development relies only on the progress of science and technology and the regulation by the market. In fact, economic activities are subject to limits in three aspects: the limitedness of nature, the second law of thermodynamics, and the carrying capacity of the ecological system. Although the advancement of technology and the increased exploitation of unrenewable resources will break these limits to some extent, they will not completely overcome these limits. It is impossible that economy grows limitlessly.22 Therefore, Simon has ignored the problem of limits that is indeed present in all existing societies. The breaking of limits relies not merely on scientific and technological advancement and market regulation, but also on the reform of social forms, the perfection of morality and ethics, as well as global cooperation. The development without limit in Simon’s sense will not be realized. His optimism will inevitably lead to pessimistic results.

4.2  Ecological    Crises and Scientific and Technological  Pessimism Unlike the Club of Rome, which focused its analyses on the living environment of human beings, humanists make romantical criticism of science and technology from the aspects of rationality, humanity and ideology, targeting directly at science and technology themselves. In their view, although science and technology have brought material prosperity to human beings, they have also severely destroyed the stability and orderliness of the earth’s ecological system, leading to ecological crises and existential crises for human beings. Science and technology are like a double-edged sword, of which one edge has created modern material civilization while the other has offered efficient means to destroy the civilization.    Crises and Criticism of Scientific and Technological  4.2.1  Ecological Reason The various problems science and technology have caused to human survival and development at present can be attributed fundamentally to the striking emergence of ecological crises, that is, the destruction and imbalance of the living environment of human beings caused by science and technology and their applications. The root of this crisis can be traced back to the birth of modern science. In the 17th century, after Bacon had recognized the significance of reforming and controlling the world, Descartes further made this idea possible. He first established the absolute subject-object dichotomy based on the dualism of body and mind and then mathematized the world as a universe characterized by purely

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mechanical operations. In this way, he highlighted the rational abilities of human beings while intensifying the confrontation between man and nature. Catalyzed by dualist thinking, the awareness of human subjectivity was underscored, and human civilization evolved. Nonetheless, in the enchantment with the glory of industrial civilization and the promotion of the omnipotence of science and technology, some people have neglected human beings’ dependence on natural resources and natural environment, blindly holding a pragmatic and utilitarian attitude toward science and technology. As a result, the antithesis between man and nature has been intensified and human beings are trapped in the dilemma of choosing between ecological crisis and existential crisis. Consequently, the modern society, which is based on modern industrial civilization, falls into a major paradox: human beings have surely achieved great success in their struggles against nature, but the success has been made at the cost of the destruction of external nature (ecological crisis) and the loss of internal nature (existential crisis). The dichotomy, while freeing man from being limited and suppressed by nature, has also allowed man to pose significant threats to nature and in turn doubled nature’s revenge on man.23 It is the subject-object dichotomy between man and nature, which has been formed in the modern time, that gives rise to the paradox of modern society: the development of industrial civilization has both improved human beings’ abilities to transform nature and intensified the confrontation between man and nature. Western Marxism attributes the double crises faced by human beings to capitalist exploitation of science and technology, as well as to the influences of incorrect concepts about nature under capitalism. For example, György Lukács, one of the founders of Western Marxism, points out that under capitalism, as the relationship between man and nature is characterized by alienation, ecological crises are doomed to emerge. This argument of Lukács to some extent started the theories in Western Marxism regarding the analysis of the root of ecological crisis. The Frankfurt School, an inheritor of Lukács, continued to explore this topic, and further considered scientific and technological rationality as the culprit of existential crisis. According to the Frankfurt School, science and technology are no longer neutral in developed industrial societies, because critical rationality has been replaced with instrumental reason and scientific and technological rationality, which are formed through the combination of science, technology, and rationality. As a consequence, the criticalness and negativity of thinking are removed. Scientific and technological rationality has permeated into the general structure of society as well as social life, becoming the new foundation of society’s comprehensive rule of man. Of course, scientific and technological rationality does not suddenly become the dominating thinking mode in contemporary developed industrial societies, but through a long historical period. This is in fact the inevitable consequence of the promotion of the Enlightenment spirit, the transformations of concepts about rationality and the development of science and technology.

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Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno point out in Dialectic of Enlightenment that while conquering nature with science and technology, human beings have not become the master of nature. Instead, the conquest has led to the destruction of the relationship between man and nature and nature’s crazy revenge on human beings. Still worse, it has caused conflicts among human beings and the domination of certain groups of people by other groups. Science and technology are human beings’ tools to conquer nature, but similarly, they are also the means of certain people’s rulership over others. In developed industrial societies, the principles of rulership have changed. The previous kind of rulership based on savage powers has given way to a more subtle kind of rulership, which resorts to technological means. The will and orders of the ruler are internalized as social and personal psychology, and science and technology have established their control over all fields of social life. Such internalization of the ruling will be mainly achieved by technological means. The advancement of technology and the improvement of economic productivity have increased society’s domination of nature to an unprecedented degree. On the one hand, individuals submit to the machines they serve. On the other hand, they enjoy benefits brought by technology more effectively in comparison with the past. The public’s lack of power and their state of being controlled intensify with the increase in the quantity of objects allocated to them. The materially considerable and socially paltry rise in the standard of living of the lower classes is reflected in the hypocritical propagation of intellect. Intellect’s true concern is a negation of reification. It must perish when it is solidified into a cultural asset and handed out for consumption purposes. The flood of precise information and brand-new amusements make people smarter and more stupid at once.24 At the same time, Horkheimer and Adorno argue that science and technology have permeated into the cultural industry in Western society, resulting in the technologization and industrialization of culture industries. As a consequence, instrumental reason has taken control of all fields of society. While mediating public life, cultural industries also control private life and infiltrate people’s psychological structures. Therefore, the progress of instrumental reason causes the intensification of dehumanization and the existential crises of man. Herbert Marcuse, in One-Dimensional Man, clarifies the process in which rationality turns from critical rationality into scientific and technological rationality, and further points out that totalitarian scientific and technological rationality is the newest result of the evolution of the concept of rationality. According to Marcuse, in industrial society, there are two causes behind the transformation of rationality into scientific and technological rationality. First, the progress of science and technology progress is promoted by the double effects of scientific and technological rationality, which are demonstrated in two aspects. On the one hand, the scientific management and division of labor greatly improve the productivity of economic, political and cultural enterprises, and living standards

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rise correspondingly. On the other hand, such a rational enterprise gives rise to a mode of action that defends and exculpates the most destructive and suppressive characteristics of the enterprise. Combined with manipulation, scientific and technological rationality becomes a new form of social control. Second, formal logic and mathematics form the methodological foundation of technological rationality. Through mathematical and logical analyses, nature is quantified and formalized, and separation happens between reality and all inherent purposes, between the true and the good, and between science and ethics.25 With such methodology, scientific and technological rationality emerges as essentially neutral. All explorations of nature are scientifically rational only within the scope of physical, chemical or biological laws. Values, isolated from objective reality, become subjective. Metaphysics is merely hypothetical. Humanism, religion and morality are only “ideal.” In the extreme form of scientific and technological rationality, nature is no more than a quantifiable world, and all questions of natural science are dissolved into mathematics and logic. There is a realistic basis for the formalization, abstract universality and elimination of contradictions in formal logic. Formal logic becomes the foundation of technological rationality and develops into the logic of rule. Marcuse also analyzes the danger of scientific and technological rationality. He contends that scientific and technological rationality is formed on the basis of science and technology, rationality and logic. It evaluates knowledge with the mode of natural science. In particular, it considers quantification and formalization as the standards of knowledge and sees the world as a tool. It is concerned with pragmatic purposes and strictly distinguishes between facts and value. In a word, technological rationality is a unidimensional or affirmative mode of thinking. Therefore, technology or instrumental reason applies a priori to the maintenance of the ruling system, excluding the criticalness and negativity of thinking. Its essence is the rationality of rule. 4.2.2 Crisis of Humanity and Struggles for Survival in Reality Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, expresses his concerns and worries about the crisis of humanity in Europe. He argues that it is the positive view of science popular in Europe that leads to the crises of science and humanity there. According to Husserl, the popularity of a positive view of science is the direct root of crises of culture, philosophy, science and humanity in Europe. First, positivism’s denial of metaphysics makes philosophy itself problematic. Philosophy is faced with the danger of being overwhelmed by skepticism and irrationalism. Such danger is mainly demonstrated by the skepticism about the possibility of metaphysics, which is related to the possibility and significance of all questions regarding rationality. Such skepticism results in the collapse of the new generation’s faith in universal philosophy, which represents a collapse of the belief in “reason.”26 This faith is replaced by a new kind of philosophical thinking, that is “objectivism.” The characteristic of objectivism is that “it moves upon the ground of the world which is pregiven, taken for granted through experience, seeks the

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‘objective truth’ of this world, seeks what, in this world, is unconditionally valid for every rational being, what it is in itself.”27 The new generation considers the universal realization of this goal as the task of knowledge, rationality and philosophy. Second, the crisis of philosophy gives rise to the crisis of science in positivism, a branch of philosophy. Such a crisis is mainly reflected in two aspects. First, positivism’s denial of metaphysics results in its denial of factual science itself. The question of the possibility of metaphysics inevitably involves the question of the possibility of factual science, as factual science acquires its related significance (the significance as truth in the domain of pure existence) exactly in the indivisible unity it forms with philosophy. Human rationality is inseparable from facts. Theories about factual science are ultimately established through human rationality. It is human rationality that determines what is fact and what is not. Human rationality endows the existent with meaning. Second, positivist science’s rejection of the philosophical concept of general science inevitably leads to the loss of the utmost internal motivation for scientific research. From ancient Greece to the rise of positivist science, Europeans had always taken universal existence as the ultimate goal of their philosophical and scientific studies. The progress of philosophy and science was achieved in the process of pursuing this goal. After the 18th century, however, with the continuous success of positivist science in theory and practice and the repeated failure of metaphysics, scientists and philosophical scholars outside the field of science began to doubt and even gave up this goal. The motivation for advancement of scientific research disappeared consequently.28 The disappearance of this inner driving force of scientific research also means that “all modern sciences drifted into a peculiar, increasingly puzzling crisis with regard to the meaning of their original founding as branches of philosophy, a meaning which they continued to bear within themselves.”29 Although this crisis did not affect the special and specific successes of science in theory and practice, it completely shook the whole significance of these successes as truth. Lastly, the positivist view of science, which has abandoned rational and general philosophical ideas, inevitably results in the crisis of humanity in Europe. In Husserl’s view, [i]t is reason which ultimately gives meaning to everything that is thought to be, all things, values, and ends – their meaning understood as their normative relatedness to what, since the beginnings of philosophy, is meant by the word “truth” – truth in itself – and correlatively the term “what is” – ovrws ov.30 Nevertheless, due to the limit posed by positivism, scientific and philosophical ideas changed. People lost their faith in rationality, the “absolute” rationality that endows the world with meaning. They also lost their faith in the meaning of history, the meaning of man, and no less man’s agency that is the foundation of the rational meaning of man’s existence. Such loss of faith prevents man from making decisions by himself naturally in his interactions with his surroundings which consist of human and nonhuman, and from rationally shaping himself and

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his surroundings with freedom among the multiple possibilities of him. In this way, the positive view of science has led to the crisis of humanity in the whole of Europe, in which “[m]erely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.”31 If there are still residues of rationalism in Husserl’s ideas, rationalism has been expelled from its last shelter by existentialism. It is replaced by the existentialistic ideas of existentialists. Martin Heidegger considers the essence of science and technology from the perspective of existentialism. By inquiring into the nature of technology as “gestell,” Heidegger uncovers the existentialistic circumstances of the technological world under which human beings, existences and nature are ruled by technology. According to him, on the one hand, human beings, as the intermediary of technology, challenge and demand objects and nature. Such challenges and demands by modern technology “make overbearing claims on the nature, requesting it to offer exploitable energies that can be stored.”32 Such challenges and demands make technology a demonstration of materialization, in which the authoritarian will of technology is fully displayed: all things turn in advance and thus afterward into materials through which production runs, the earth and its environment turning into raw materials, and human beings turning into labor source, used for prescribed purposes. On the other hand, man himself becomes the bestand of technology and thus loses his independence, personality and dignity. Modern technology challenges and demands people, requiring people to attack nature as the object of study, until the object disappears into the objectlessness of bestand. As a result, even man himself becomes pure material, a kind of labor force. For necessary purposes, people willfully manipulate people as pure material. Everything that can be manufactured with man and man’s nature is manufactured, and man thus loses independence, dignity and all the other authentic existence and nature of him in the material demonstration of technology. Heidegger argues that the ultimate root of all these problems is the modern Western philosophy’s pursuit of the absolute existences (God, body, absolute idea, materiality) external to man, which leads to man’s oblivion of existence. Therefore, Heidegger strives to summon “existence” with the duet of “thinking” and “poetry,” and thereby overcome the split and antithesis between object and subject, nature and man, freeing man and nature from the technological world and enabling man to dwell poetically on earth. Karl Jaspers, another representative of existentialism, profoundly reveals the negative influences of science and technology on human beings. Similar to Heidegger, Jaspers maintains that science and technology limit man’s existence, humanity and freedom. Because people are concerned with only the pragmatic effects of science and technology and the purely pragmatic value of technology, science and technology are alienated, bringing tremendous danger to modern society. Jaspers points out that in comparison with the Axial Age before the era of science and technology, we are now in a position to say with certainty: the present is no second Axial Period. In the most pronounced contrast to the latter, it is a period

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Although the greatness of science and technology has brought happiness to discoverers and inventors, man is not functioning as one with an all-encompassing great soul in modern technology. On the contrary, man’s soul has been swallowed by technological processes. Even science has to submit to technology. Therefore, “[t]he importance of the irruption of modern technology and its consequences for absolutely all the problems of life cannot be overestimated.”34 4.2.3  Reflections    from the Social Horizon The existential predicament and various crises caused by science and its technological applications raise concern from scholars in humanities and social sciences, especially the humanists. Starting from the general situation of science, technology and social development, they make in-depth reflections on and criticism of the rapid progress of science and its widespread technological applications. Among these scholars, the Frankfurt School’s reflections and criticism of science and technology on the ideological level are very representative. Formed by humanists concerned about social reality, the Frankfurt School’s criticisms of science and technology are mainly targeted at the various social problems brought by science and its technological applications. They consider science as a new form of control and the root of alienation in developed industrial society or late capitalist society, and thereby make criticism of science. According to these scholars, the one-sidedness, positivity, pragmatic nature, anti-dialectical nature and compliance to existing things in sciences of developed industrial society make them tools for political rule and make them ideology. As Marcuse points out, [i]n the face of the totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of the “neutrality” of technology can no longer be maintained. Technology as such cannot be isolated from the use to which it is put; the technological society is a system of domination which operates already in the concept and construction of techniques.35 In other words, science and technology have become a new ideology and perform the function of ideology. Therefore, it is important for the Frankfurt School to criticize scientific and ideological ideology. Starting from such understandings, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Habermas and other important representatives of the Frankfurt School have criticized the ideological functions of science. The idea that science and technology are ideology was first put forward by Horkheimer. In “Notes on Science and the Crisis,” Horkheimer points out, not only metaphysics is ideology, but science, which is criticized by metaphysics, is also ideology, because science maintains a form that prevents it

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from discovering the real causes of crises. Of course, referring to science as ideology does not mean that those who practice science are not concerned about pure truth. Any human behavior that covers the real nature of the society as built on contradictions is ideology. The proposition that philosophy, morality, beliefs such as religion, scientific theories, laws, regulations, and cultural systems all have such a function does not reveal the character of these culprits, but merely offers a statement of the social functions of these behaviors.36 This passage clearly shows that Horkheimer considers all human behaviors that hide the real essence of society as ideology. In his view, science is exactly a kind of such behavior. In One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse further expounds on his ideas about ideology being integrated into reality along with the advancements in science and technology. He maintains that [t]his absorption of ideology into reality does not, however, signify the “end of ideology.” On the contrary, in a specific sense advanced industrial culture is more ideological than its predecessor, inasmuch as today the ideology is in the process of production itself. In a provocative form, this proposition reveals the political aspects of the prevailing technological rationality.37 There are two levels of meaning in this passage. First, Marcuse believes that in developed industries, with scientific and technological advancement, not only that ideology does not come to its end, but it even dominates people’s ideas to a higher extent because it is already integrated into the process of production. Second, science and technology are capable of performing ideological functions because current technologies contain elements of politics. In other words, in Marcuse’s view, science and technology as productivity are apolitical. Nevertheless, when they are exploited by capitalism as tools for dominating people, they acquire the characteristics of ideology. On the basis of these opinions of the seniors in the Frankfurt School, Habermas discusses the main characteristics of science and technology as a kind of new ideology. Specifically speaking, there are three aspects of these characteristics. First, they are less ideological. Similar to previous ideologies, science and technology are also delusive. In comparison with other ideologies, however, their domination of man is more direct. Habermas points out that “[t]echnocratic consciousness is…‘less ideological’ than all previous ideologies. For it does not have the opaque force of a delusion that only transfigures the implementation of interests.”38 Being less ideological enables the ideological features of science and technology to remain implicit. They always appear as non-ideology, and it is difficult for the public to see their ideological nature. Second, they are more irresistible. As science and technology have created rich material wealth for the public, their nature as productivity has been fully demonstrated and their status in the public’s eye increases day by day as if they

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have become the second “God.” Science and technology have permeated into every aspect of people’s lives and thus taken control over people in their lives. As Habermas argues: today’s dominant, rather glassy background ideology, which makes a fetish of science, is more irresistible and farther-reaching than ideologies of the old type. For with the veiling of practical problems it not only justifies a particular class’s interest in domination and represses another class’s partial need for emancipation, but affects the human race’s emancipatory interest as such.39 Third, they are more defensive. According to Habermas, in late capitalism, science and technology as ideology make a much stronger defense for the status quo and its suppression of man in comparison with previous ideologies. This is a new characteristic of technocratic consciousness. Unlike old ideologies, which based suppression on collective suppression, technocratic consciousness separates people’s interactions from the standards of conduct that dominate social life and makes them apolitical. In this way, it covers its destruction of people’s interactions and man’s nature. Due to the non-obligatory characteristic of this method, people usually accept it uncritically under its imperceptible and unobtrusive influences. Regarding this new feature, Habermas explains: First, the capital-labor relation today, because of its linkage to a loyaltyensuring political distribution mechanism, no longer engenders uncorrected exploitation and oppression. The process through which the persisting class antagonism has been made virtual presupposes that the repression on which the latter is based first came to consciousness in history and only then was stabilized in a modified form as a property of the system. Technocratic consciousness, therefore, cannot rest in the same way on collective repression as did earlier ideologies. Second, mass loyalty today is created only with the aid of rewards for privatized needs. The achievements in virtue of which the system justifies itself may not in principle be interpreted politically. The acceptable interpretation is immediately in terms of allocations of money and leisure time…and mediately in terms of the technocratic justification of the occlusion of practical questions. Hence the new ideology is distinguished from its predecessor in that it severs the criteria for justifying the organization of social life from any normative regulation of interaction, thus depoliticizing them. It anchors them instead in functions of a putative system of purposiverational action.40 Generally speaking, scientific and technological pessimists refute ideas about the supremacy of rationality and the omnipotence of science and technology. These ideas have been popular since the beginning of modern times. The pessimists warn people to turn away from blind worship of technology to cautious use of it. These warnings are undoubtedly of positive significance. Nonetheless, their attribution of

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ecological crises exclusively to science and technology, which leads to the negation of science and technology, is too absolute and to some extent biased. Science and technology as the intermediate between man and nature are of dual properties: on the one hand, they are the externalization and objectification of the essential power of man; on the other hand, science and technology are always playing the role of an effective intermediate that coordinates the relationship between man and nature. When man’s abilities to know and transform nature are insufficient, science and technology are primarily demonstrated as the “natural” process of selection. With the improvement of man’s abilities to know and transform nature, the development of science and technology is increasingly determined by man’s choices of “values.” Man’s views of cultural value become the leading power in regulating science and technology.41 Therefore, science and technology cannot and should not be responsible for human beings’ existential predicament. On the contrary, it is human beings themselves that have inescapable responsibilities. People’s understandings of the pragmatic, utilitarian, economic and political values of science and technology have long blinded them. As a result, while enjoying the prosperity brought by science and technology, human beings have to bear negative values that are against the higher purposes or values of man. These values are generated from the fact that people have been trapped for a long time in the values that highlight the domination of nature.

4.3 Where Is the Milk Tomorrow? A similarity between scientific and technological optimism and pessimism is that both of them absolutize science and technology, which means that both of them belong to scientific and technological determinism. They are the two opposites in a contradiction. The existence of one opposite is premised on that of the other. They develop together while contradicting each other. Nevertheless, until now, optimists still need to face various global problems that confuse human beings, while pessimists have not really found a way out of human beings’ predicaments. We have to wonder, where is human beings’ milk tomorrow? This has become a global problem in the 21st century. All countries are actively looking for solutions. Although countries differ from each other in their conditions and stances, they have basically reached a consensus on one point: if human beings want to survive sustainably, they must realize the ecological transformation of modern civilization. Such transformation is possible only when it is supported by transformations in values, the mode of development and the mode of civilization. 4.3.1 From the Omnipotence of Science and Technology to Ecological Values There is always a diversity of options of values when man is faced with nature. Nevertheless, under the dominance of anthropocentric values, such diversity in

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the options of values has been eclipsed. It seems that all values in nature have to be based upon human needs and interests. All people can see is the consequences of the transformation of nature through which the instrumental application of science and technology satisfies various needs of human beings. The attribution of human beings’ existential predicaments to science and technology is thus biased. The culprit of the double predicaments of human beings (ecological crisis and existential crisis) is human beings’ own values that dominate the application of science and technology. Ecological crisis and existential crisis are essentially caused by the crisis of values. Therefore, if human beings want to find a way of ecologically transforming modern civilization, the first step is to transform their values. Since the start of industrial civilization, science and technology have been widely used in social production. Human beings are genuinely experiencing all the time the power with which science and technology endow them to conquer nature. The invincibility of science and technology seems to convince human beings that as long as they have science and technology, their conquest of nature will be smooth and straightforward. The idea of the omnipotence of science and technology, which is based on anthropocentrism, leads to the ego inflation of some people. They ignore the dependence of human beings on the natural environment and blindly hold a pragmatic attitude toward science and technology. Such ignorance and blindness intensify the antagonism between man and nature, resulting in global problems such as environmental pollution, resource exhaustion and ecological imbalance. Ecological crises endanger human survival, which was not expected at the start of human beings’ conquest of nature. The survival crisis eventually makes human beings aware of the deficiencies in science and technology. They start to adopt a cautiously critical attitude, oppose blind use and worship of science and technology and propose to change existing modes of production. Criticisms are initiated incessantly. The idea of the omnipotence of science and technology declares its bankruptcy in such endless waves of criticism. This bankruptcy calls forth human beings’ reflections on the traditional values of human domination of nature. Ecological values have emerged in these reflections. Unlike traditional values, which consider nature as the object of conquest and transformation, ecological values see nature as the good and helpful friend of human beings. Ecological values view the synergetic evolution of man and nature as the starting point and ultimate purpose, asking for the replacement of the views advocating excessive consumption with those advocating moderate consumption, the replacement of the desire to possess nature and actions of conquering nature with respect and love for nature. While acknowledging man’s rights to and interests in nature, they require human beings to take corresponding responsibilities and duties for nature…Ecological values object to the indiscriminate application of all technologies and the deliberate pursuit of the instrumental efficacy of technologies. They promote explicit value options regarding technology: the application of technology should

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not merely start from considerations of the health and well-being of man’s material and spiritual lives and highlight the value and significance of man’s life, it should also demand the commensurability between choices of technologies and the ecological environment.42 At the same time, “the basic values of ecological consciousness allow various justified interests of human and nonhuman interact with each other in a system characterized by a dynamic balance.” Due to such interactions, “[t]he world is portrayed neither as a mere resource pit to be mined nor as a sheer wilderness to be shunned, but as a complex garden to be tended, respected, harvested, and loved.”43 Ecological values are not a restricted concept, but a broad one. They involve both the value orientation on the national level and that on the personal level. On the national level, on the one hand, countries should develop deep understanding of the relationship between ecological values and social systems and strive for organic agreement between the two under specific national conditions; on the other hand, governments and communities of science and technology should correctly understand the relationship between scientific and technological progress and the ecological environment, insist on an ecological view of science and technology, realize “ecological” transformation of science and technology in their development and enable science and technology to play more significant roles in human–nature relations. On the personal level, ecological values should involve the ecological view of life and the ecological view of individual practices. On the one hand, individuals should establish an ecological view of life, in which the central value is the protection of the ecological environment. Such a view of life indicates that individuals should acquire the concept of moderate consumption, the spirit of active ecological participation and a strong consciousness of ecological democracy. On the other hand, the implementation of an ecological view of life throughout various aspects of individual life such as clothing, food, housing and transportation gives rise to an ecological view of practice, which indicates that we should demonstrate our ecological view of life in every aspect of our lives and thereby give our lives more ecological implications and tastes. 4.3.2 From the Limits to Growth to Sustainable Development The second condition that gives important support to the ecological transformation of modern civilization is the transformation of the mode of economic development from one that one-sidedly emphasizes the traditional mode of GDP increase to one that promotes sustainable development. Sustainable development has become the consensus on the development of the economy and society. Since the beginning of industrialization, economic activities have become the vital precondition for human beings’ survival and development. Especially after World War II, postwar countries brought economic progress to the utmost fore. Both developing countries and developed countries believed that economic growth would certainly lead to the improvement of their overall national strength.

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As a result, the increase in GDP undoubtedly became a goal pursued by many countries. That economic growth equals social progress became a “truth” that everyone agreed on. Nevertheless, development includes not merely the development of economy but also that of society, which means the coordinated development of population, resources and environment. After the 1960s, as the environmental crisis and a series of social problems caused by inappropriate applications of science and technology became more and more obvious, people began to actively summarize and reflect on the disadvantages and contradictions in traditional modes of economic development, realizing that development is not only about the growth of “quantity,” but more importantly the improvement of “quality,” and that development indicates not just “overcoming poverty and achieving prosperity,” but also the harmonious unity of man’s living environment and his spiritual world. In terms of its essence, the so-called “development” refers to the pluralist and multi-level progress of economy, science and technology, industrial structure, social structure, social life, people’s quality, and ecological environment. It is the overall advancement of the whole social system and ecological environment.44 After the painful experiences, reflections eventually started in 1962. From the first wake-up call made by Rachel Carsen’s Silent Spring to the Conference on the Human Environment hosted by the United Nations in Stockholm in June 1972, which involved representatives from 114 countries and released the declaration titled “Only One Earth,” calling for protecting the environment and saving the earth, the idea of sustainable development acquired its primary form. Later, the publication of The Limits to Growth deepened the process. The formal establishment of the concept of sustainable development and its being put forward should be attributed to three landmark events. First, the formal approval and publication of the report Our Common Future, drafted by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987. Gro Harlem Brundtland, Premier of Norway at the time and one of the book’s authors, gave an explicit definition of sustainable development for the first time: “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”45 This has become a classical definition widely quoted today. It clarifies that the key to sustainable development lies in correctly dealing with the relationship between contemporary people’s interests and the interests of future generations, of which the bottom line is that the development of contemporary people should not harm the development of future generations. At the same time, contemporary people shall create more and better conditions for future development. As Mihajlo Mesarovic and Eduard Pestel point out: “If human beings are to continue their survival, they must develop the sense that they share weal and woe with their progenies and be ready to trade for the interests of their progenies with their own.”46 The second event is the publication of Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living, co-edited by the United Nations Environment Programme,

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the World Conservation Union and the World Wildlife Fund. The most prominent feature of this book is that it raises questions about the morality of sustainable living, making ethical arguments for sustainable development, and thus enriching the connotation of the theory of sustainable development. The third event is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The conference attracted attention from all over the world. Delegations of 183 countries and representatives of 70 international organizations such as the agencies of the United Nations attended the conference, and 102 heads of state and governments made speeches. At the conference, consensus was reached regarding the following issues: the inseparability between environment and social advancement; the negation of “treatment after pollution” as a way of development and “high production, high consumption, high pollution” as a mode of development since the industrial revolution; the proposal to build “new global partnership” in the process of establishing the mode of sustainable development; and expression of special concerns and preferences in policy for the conditions and interests of developing countries while underscoring global goals and responsibilities. At the same time, the conference passed and signed a series of documents including the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Declaration on the Principles of Forest Management. This conference is a landmark in human history, indicating human beings’ transition from the conventional mode of development to sustainable development. After the establishment of the theory of sustainable development, scholars from various disciplines have come up with different concepts of sustainable development. A widely accepted consensus among these concepts is that sustainable development should involve the harmonious development of relationships between man and nature, between man and man and between man and society. Correspondingly, the sustainable development of nature, economy and society should be realized. The ultimate goal of these three kinds of development is their common contribution to the sustainable development of ecology. As for the relationships among these three kinds of development, generally speaking, it is of the utmost importance that nature, economy and society should all achieve development, and then, the three types of development should be sustainable. In terms of their specific interrelationships, first, the sustainable development of nature refers to making nature satisfy the needs of the other two kinds of development under the precondition of protecting nature. The sustainable development of nature is an important basis for the development of economy and society. Second, the sustainable development of economy refers to maintaining the continuous and stable increase of economy, maximizing the growth of national income, and imbuing the environment and resources with prominent economic implications, without destroying the natural environment and resources. The sustainable development of economy is the “hard core” of the strategy of sustainable development. Remaining mutually promotive with the sustainable development of nature, it simultaneously ensures the sustainable development of society. Lastly, the sustainable development of society refers primarily to the satisfaction of basic social

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needs, and the realization of fair distribution of resources and income within the same generation of people and among different generations. Principles of sustainable development generally involve the following four. First is the principle of fairness, which indicates fairness in terms of the opportunity to make choices. Specifically speaking, this principle has three aspects of implications. First is the fairness among different generations, that is, the fairness between the contemporary generation and future generations. Second is the horizontal fairness within the same generation. Third is the fair distribution of limited resources among different countries. Second is the principle of sustainability. Sustainable development requires people to adjust their lifestyles according to the conditions of sustainability, determine the standards of their own consumption to the extent allowed by ecology and thus ensure the balance of development among different generations. Third is the principle of public participation and global cooperation. Public participation is an important basis for social progress and the implementation of the strategy of sustainable development. Global cooperation overcoming differences in social systems and boundaries among nation-states is an important guarantee for the strategy of sustainable development. Fourth is the principle of commonality. In order to ensure the implementation of the strategy of sustainable development, all countries are commonly subject to the principles of fairness, sustainability, public participation and global cooperation. Of course, the principle of commonality does not mean that all countries are equally responsible for the generation of global problems and for their solution. To sum up, “sustainable development does not mean to give up development but means to abandon irrational development. It does not limit development passively, but pursues rational, coordinated, and more effective development.”47Although sustainable development, as a global strategy, applies to all countries in the world, the forms of its demonstration and realization inevitably differ among various countries. For developed countries, adjusting the mode of development is a must. For developing countries, however, what is of the utmost significance in their development is to avoid the obsolete way of “treatment after pollution” which was adopted by developed countries and to look for new modes of development. 4.3.3 From Industrial Civilization to Ecological Civilization The ultimate goal of establishing ecological values and changing modes of development is to realize the ecological transformation of civilization and to move on to ecological civilization from industrial civilization. Since the beginning of the modern period, the main appeal of industrial civilization has been to conquer nature. In the industrialization of the world, the value of conquering nature has not only given rise to the rapid advancement of science and technology but also pushed the cultural ideal of anthropocentrism to an extreme. Reflections on global ecological crises from perspectives of philosophy, humanities and society have established a solid foundation for the ecological transformation of civilization. Nevertheless, it should be understood that the transition from industrial

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civilization to ecological civilization cannot be really realized overnight. In addition to changes in values and modes of development, we should have a correct understanding of ecological civilization itself and at the same time accurately determine the orientations of economic development, the public’s consumer culture and the development of science and technology in ecological civilization. Only in this way will a kind of ecological civilization that moves beyond industrial civilization be possible. Ecology usually refers to the interrelationships between living creatures and nature as well as their states of being, that is, natural ecology. Natural ecology has its patterns of development in esse and in posse. A natural system is a complicated self-organized system. Human society changes these patterns and brings nature into the range of things that human beings are able to transform. Civilization thereby takes form. People have not reached an agreement on their understanding of ecological civilization, but the following concepts are usually accepted by most: ecological civilization is a new type of civilization that replaces industrial civilization under the conditions that human beings are faced with the deterioration of the ecological environment and the double predicaments of ecological crisis and existential crisis. It refers primarily to the sum of the material and spiritual achievements that human beings make following the objective law of the harmonious development of man, nature and society; it refers to cultural and ethical forms of which the basic purposes are the harmonious coexistence, virtuous cycle, comprehensive advancement and continuous prosperity of man and nature, man and man and man and society. It gives rise to not merely transformations of ethical values and modes of development, but also fundamental changes in the form of human society. On this level, ecological civilization is the sum of material, spiritual and institutional achievements that human beings achieve with the improvement of the ecological environment and sustainable development. Different people have different views regarding how to realize ecological civilization. In terms of the mode of sustainable development itself, however, emphasis on the sustainable development of economy is of fundamental significance. In order to build a mode of economy featured by sustainable development, the primary step is to establish a new index system of green GDP that indicates the comprehensive strength of a country. Traditional GDP highlights the changes in prices of labor and products that are visible in the market while often ignoring invisible labors. In addition, from the perspective of traditional GDP, nature is seen as unlimited. In economic production, people seldom give consideration to problems of resource exhaustion, environmental pollution and overpopulation that such production may give rise to. Green GDP is the residual part of GDP after deducting the depletion of natural resources and the loss caused by environmental pollution. It is usually called the GDP of sustainable development. Green GDP reflects the level of economic growth and the extent of harmony and unity between such growth and the natural environment. In essence, it represents the net positive effect of the growth of national economy. A larger part of GDP for which green GDP accounts indicates smaller negative effects of the growth of national economy on nature and a higher degree of harmony between economic

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growth and the natural environment. Green GDP accounting, which deducts from GDP the loss caused by environmental pollution and the value of resource depletion, both of which result from economic growth, is a direct demonstration of the overall planning of “harmonious development of man and nature” and a powerful push for “overall planning of regional development” and “overall planning of domestic development and opening up.” Simultaneously, green GDP accounting helps us to measure and evaluate the real effects of economic growth, overcome the tendency to blindly pursue higher speed in economic growth, promote the transformation of the way to realize economic growth, fundamentally change the concept of political achievement that singularly prioritizes GDP and improve the public’s awareness of the protection of environment and resources. In the specific process of economic development, in addition to establishing the index system of green GDP, we should also realize the steady progress of economy with a scientific outlook on development. This means to be disenchanted with continuous growth of economy, to make overall plans for economic development, population growth, wealth distribution, social development and natural development with people put first and to realize harmonious development of economic, natural and social systems. We should follow ecological rules in economic and social development, bring the concept of ecology, the mode of circular economy and the principles of sustainable development into all activities of human beings, consider the development of the ecological system from the perspective of the coordinated development of man, nature and society and establish harmonious relationships of man–society–nature. The development of economy cannot be separated from individuals’ consumption. The formation of a mode of green consumption characterized by sustainable development is also of critical importance for ecological civilization. The establishment of the mode of green consumption first requires the transformation of values and the permeation of ecological values into individual lives and practices. Industrial civilization has used various methods to stimulate people’s desire for consumption, such as advertisements, television, magazines, newspapers, the Internet and other kinds of media. At the same time, cultural resources such as cultural significance, goals, values and ideals that concern consumers run through these stimulating methods imperceptibly. The combination of culture and consumer goods greatly promotes consumption. In their purchase of commodities, consumers not only buy the use value of commodities but also pay growing attention to the commodities’ cultural value for individuals, which inevitably results in the consumers concerning more about the commodities’ iconic and cultural symbolic value. In consumption, people consume not merely or primarily the physical functions of commodities, but their iconic symbolic value as well. This feature of consumption results in the alienation of consumption in consumer society: squander, emotional consumption, conspicuous consumption, and excessive consumption. All these conditions inevitably lead to serious resource crisis and environmental crisis.48

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At present, most people have paid attention to reflecting on consumerist culture and establishing a new and green culture of consumption. Green consumption, or sustainable consumption, refers to the new types of activities and processes of consumption fundamentally featured by moderate consumption, avoidance or reduction of destruction of the environment, respect for nature and protection of ecology. It involves not just purchasing green products, but also the recycling and reusing of materials and resources, the highly efficient exploitation of energy sources and the protection of our living space and species surrounding species. In the specific process of consumption, green consumption is mainly demonstrated in three aspects. First is advocating transformation of the idea of consumption from alienated consumption to the respect for nature and the pursuit of health and comfort in life. Second is advocating choices of green products that generate no pollution or those beneficial to health in consumption. Third is emphasizing the coordination among economy, ecological benefits, reduction of unnecessary consumption, reuse and recycling. The realization of ecological civilization puts forward higher requirements for science and technology. Therefore, science and technology in the future should be in the first place humanized and put man first. After the advent of the era of mega-science, science and technology have become the mainstream of the time. Scientists and technological experts have become social elites. The roles of science and technology are changing. The relationships among science, non-science and pseudo-science are becoming increasingly complicated. So are the relationships among science, technology, man, nature and society. The development of science and technology is not only the concern of scientists, engineers and philosophers, but is also related to different subjects in various fields such as politics, economy, culture and religion. In addition to scientists, engineers and philosophers, economists, sociologists, religious people, literati, politicians and common people in society all can express their opinions on science and technology. The foci in different subjects’ understandings of science and technology also differ greatly. The relationship between science, technology and society, the transformation of scientific and technological achievements and their impacts on economic development, the ecological consequences of science and technology and the relationship between scientific knowledge and secular knowledge all influence the development of science and technology directly or indirectly and bear on the sustainability of such development. We need to pay attention to humanity and the real world in which human beings live. Science and technology should promote economic growth not only in “hard” ways such as solving resource problems, environmental problems and population problems, but also contribute with their progress in “soft” ways to the cultivation of people’s tastes, the training of people’s thinking, instilling into people’s mind the spirits of science and innovation. Science and technology should thereby allow people to correctly understand the rules in the process of knowing and transforming nature and to consciously coordinate the relationships between man and man, man and nature and man and society. Only in this way will we be able to promote harmony among science, technology and society and their smooth progress.

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Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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29 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:12. 30 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:13. 31 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:6. 32 M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Martin Heidegger (Vol. 2). Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996:932–33. 33 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by M. Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:96–97. 34 K. Jaspers. The Origin and Goal of History. Translated by M. Bullock, New York: Routledge, 2010:99. 35 H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London: Routledge, 1991:xivi. 36 M. Horkheimer. Works of Horkheimer. Edited by Cao Weidong, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1997:161–62. 37 H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London: Routledge, 1991:13–14. 38 H. Marcuse. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. London: Routledge, 1991:111. 39 J. Habermas. Towaryd a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics. Translated by J.J. Shapiro, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987:257. 40 J. Habermas. Technology and Science as “Ideology”. Translated by Guo Guanyi, Shanghai: Xuelin Press, 2002:70. 41 Liu Dachun. From the Center to the Margin: Reflections on Science, Philosophy, and Humanities. Beijing: Beijing Normal UP, 2006:269. 42 Liu Dachun. From the Center to the Margin: Reflections on Science, Philosophy, and Humanities. Beijing: Beijing Normal University Press, 2006:271. 43 F. Ferré, “Religious World Modeling and Postmodern Science.” The Reenchantment of Science: Postmodern Proposals. Edited by David Ray Griffin. Albany: State University of New York, 1988:87–97. 44 Liu Dachun. Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd ed.). Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 2005:130. 45 WCED. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987:43. 46 M. Mesarovic and E. Pestel. Mankind at the Turning Point. Translated by Liu Changyi et al., Beijing: China Peace Press, 1987:135. 47 Lin Dehong. Fifteen Lectures on Philosophy of Science and Technology. Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004:305–6. 48 Liu Dachun. Introduction to Philosophy of Science and Technology (2nd ed.). Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 2005:137.

Part II

Origin of Anti-Scientism

The hegemony of scientism, reaching an extreme, leads to the rise and expansion of anti-scientism. For nearly half a century, the trend of doubting and denying science has attracted increasing attention. Especially at the end of the 20th century, such doubt of science even turned into total denial of science. “Endism” made great clamors in various fields. Therefore, once the hope for scientific progress turns into despair for the future of human beings and faith in rationality goes to its opposite, anti-scientism begins. Correspondingly, the defense of science in orthodox philosophy of science gradually diminishes. The conventional image of science suffers a severe attack.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-7

5

Crisis of Science and the Burgeoning of Irrationalism

As science and technology progress rapidly, human beings, while enjoying the prosperity and welfare brought by science and technology, are also faced with the emerging crisis of science. Not only is the traditional utopia built by science collapsing, but the once latent threats in modernity and the predicaments of human reason are also emerging. Responding to these situations, irrationalism in the field of epistemology burgeons and grows.

5.1  Crisis    of Science and the Collapse of the Scientific Utopia In the history of scientific development, crisis is not unique to the modern period. It is very common that various difficult problems and paradoxes give rise to scientific crises, only that in the 20th century, scientific crises became highly visible, directly exposing the deepest problems of rationality in science, and thus raising wide concerns in and outside the field of science. For example, Russell’s paradox in mathematics and the “etheric paradox” and “ultraviolet catastrophe” in physics are all major crises of science at the turn of the century. More severe crises, however, are the various negative consequences of the applications of science in social fields and the related existential crises of man and society. It is this latter level of crisis that has raised concerns and discussions among scholars.    Coining of “Scientific Crisis” and Its Implications 5.1.1  The Husserl is the first to explicitly come up with the concept of “scientific crisis” and make in-depth discussions about this crisis and its origins. In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,1 a book that he wrote in his later years, Husserl discusses the crisis of European sciences and ways of salvation, coming up with the concept of the “life world” and starting the switching of focus from analysis of the essential structure of transcendental consciousness to life world. According to Husserl, “the crisis of a science indicates nothing less than that its genuine scientific character, the whole manner in which it has set its task and developed a methodology for it, has become questionable.”2 It means that because of the emergence of a scientific crisis, not only will the tasks that science has set for itself DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-8

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not be accomplished, but the scientific methods on which the completion of these tasks depends also become impossible. Correspondingly, Husserl elaborates on scientific crisis in two aspects: the first is the function of science, and the second is the basis and methods of science. Generally speaking, however, Husserl’s elaboration of scientific crisis in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology mainly originates from his concerns with “man’s life.” What he refers to as scientific crisis is the occurrence of problems not in the accuracy of specific natural sciences, but in the scientificity of all sciences. Specifically speaking, the positivist science of the modern period does not include metaphysical questions such as “whether there is meaning in the whole life” into its scope of research. Such science deviates from the science of ancient Greece that sees all existences as objects of study. As a consequence, positive science leads to “crisis” of science, which is demonstrated by the loss of science’s significance for life. What Husserl has discerned is not simply the crisis of European sciences, but a crisis in general: the crisis of European culture and that of humanity. Scientific crisis is exactly a symptom of these two kinds of crises. Starting from facts in European history, Husserl makes a penetrating analysis of scientific crisis. On the basis of his arguments, Kuhn uses “scientific crisis” in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to describe the psychological states of scientists who lose confidence in old theoretic paradigms, which are attacked in their encounter with anomalies. In Kuhn’s view, crisis is the precondition for the appearance of new paradigms. Because there is crisis, there is creation. However, Kuhn does not make in-depth discussions about “scientific crisis” as the precondition of scientific revolution. Afterward, John Bernal, George Sarton, Charles Snow, Daniel Bell, Habermas and Marcuse have all made analyses of this issue. How to better define scientific crisis? Is it necessary, before making a deep analysis of scientific crisis, to clarify questions such as whether scientific crisis, technological crisis and life crisis are the same. What are the differences between the crisis of Europe, the crisis of European sciences and the crisis of science? What kind of facts or theories should be included in the scope of scientific crisis, and why should facts or theories of other kinds be excluded from related discussions? In fact, only a clear definition of scientific crisis can provide people with a logical and rational starting point for discussing this question. For this purpose, we can divide the connotation of scientific crisis into the following aspects. First is the crisis of truth in scientific theories. In the late 19th century, systems of scientific theories seemed to have reached a high extent of rigorousness and completion. Therefore, a popular view at the time in science was that science had climbed to its apex. What was left to be done was only to pursue accuracy “to another place of decimals.” Nevertheless, when people were celebrating the completion of the edifice of scientific theories, a series of discoveries and problems confused them and attracted attention. Crisis emerged in science, especially in physics and mathematics. For example, in 1875, Heinrich Friedrich Weber, by measuring the molar heat of diamond, graphite, boron and silicon, found that the specific heat of solids lowers with the decrease of temperature. According to traditional physics, which is based on the equipartition of energy, the specific

Crisis of Science 193 heat of solids is unrelated to temperature. Moreover, Heinrich Hertz discovered the photoelectric effect, Johann Balmer discovered the spectral line formula for hydrogen spectrum, Wilhelm Roentgen discovered X-rays and Russell’s paradox was put forward in mathematics. This is what Husserl means by “the real scientificity of science.” In this sense, John Hogan’s claim of “the end of science” can also be included in the crisis of truth in science. Additionally, the demonstration of scientific crisis in this aspect can be summarized with Kuhn’s theory: a theory becomes onerously complicated and imprecise in its explanation of experimental phenomena; multiple variations of a theory appear in order to adapt to new experimental phenomena; a theory loses its uniqueness in its field and multiple competing theories emerge; the phenomena predicted by a theory directly contradict empirical facts and cannot be explained with logical ad hoc hypotheses. Second is the existential crisis of science itself. The emergence of various antiscientific behaviors pushes science to a moment of life and death. This has been a long-standing crisis, which accompanies the value crisis of science. Science is alienated, resulting in behaviors that oppose science, forbid science and even destroy science. In The Social Function of Science, John Bernal mentions such a crisis several times. At the beginning of After Virtue, Alasdair Macintyre makes an alarming image of science being destroyed. Morris Goran, in Science and Anti-Science, discusses a number of examples of this crisis. These are profound insights into this crisis of science. Hogan published The End of Science under the contemporary condition of the split and antagonism between “two cultures” and the popularity of anti-scientific trends. This book is often considered an antiscience declaration and an epitome of anti-scientific trends. Due to its strong tendency toward scientific pessimism, it can also be categorized as a part of the existential crisis of science. Third is the crisis of value-freedom in science and the crises of life and humanity it causes. In the past, empirical natural science sought only facts. The scientific world was thus seen as a world of value neutrality. Science was seen as value-free. Nevertheless, “[m]erely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.”3 Although positive science has achieved huge success and greatly enhanced our control over nature and improved the prosperity of society, “In our deep need… this science has nothing to say to us.”4 According to positivism, the object of scientific studies is objective facts and rules. Science is value-free. Questions related to the subject and rationality are beyond the scope of purely factual science and cannot be verified by experience. These ideas subject the value of science to serious doubt, and lead to the destruction of nature and human beings by science, though science is originally supposed to serve human beings. The crisis discussed by scholars like Husserl, Snow, Sarton, Abraham Maslow and Marcuse involves this aspect. French philosopher Roger Garaudy argues: Husserl’s phenomenology is generated on the connection point between two stages of crisis: the first is the stage of crisis in scientific progress in which many of the most certain truths are doubted; the second is the crisis in human history, when people question many of the most certain “values” and ask

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Heidegger’s exposure and criticism of scientific crisis are mainly directed at the alienation of science, that is, the value crisis of science. In addition, he contends that modern science has been encompassed by technology, becoming the basis and vassal of technology. Moreover, it is against the background of the intensification of ecological and environmental crises that Carsen’s Silent Spring and Meadows’s The Limits to Growth were published. In a word, “scientific crisis” is the predicaments, problems and paradoxes that science faces in its development. Generally speaking, scientific crisis refers in the first place to science’s encounter with bottlenecks in the development of theories, which impacts its further growth. At the same time, it refers to the problems caused by the application of science in social fields as well as the potential crises it may cause to human beings’ survival and social advancement. Nonetheless, no matter in which aspect, the emergence of scientific crisis demonstrates that it is impossible for science to grow without limit. Science does not always lead to good consequences. Therefore, scientific crisis directly announces the collapse of people’s utopian imagination about science.    Origin of Crisis and the Collapse of Scientific Utopia 5.1.2  The What, then, are the causes of scientific crisis? Let us review the different ideas of various philosophers. 5.1.2.1 Husserl: Objectivism’s Deviation from the Rational Spirit In Husserl’s view, the European spirit which originates from ancient Greece is the intrinsic unity of science, humanity, philosophy, rationality and existence. Therefore, in order to understand the essence of the crises of Europe and humanity, people must make a thorough reflection on and clarification of the rationality that originates from ancient Greece. Only such rationality can function as the source of the revitalization of humanity, and it is only in such rational spirit that people can find the right way to salvation from the crisis of humanity or culture in Europe. Through a thorough search, Husserl locates the root of crises of European culture and humanity in the rationality of ancient Greece. He further points out: “the crisis of European culture has its root in mistaken rationalism.”6 The so-called “mistaken rationalism,” in Husserl’s view, is the distortion of the rationality of ancient Greece. Such distortion involves two aspects: the alienation of ancient Greek rationality by modern natural science, which is based on mathematics, and the replacement of rationalism with positivism. First is the alienation of ancient Greek rationality by modern science which is based on mathematics. In the modern period, Galileo established the traditions of precision and numerical calculation in modern science. Mathematics was commissioned with generalized tasks. Ancient Greek rationality was alienated.

Crisis of Science 195 Significant changes happened in the concepts and tasks of generalized philosophy. From the beginning of the modern period, the thirst for knowledge about “the origin of the cosmos” in ancient Greek rationality has been discarded by the rationality of modern mathematical natural science. Galileo combined Euclidean geometry, as the pure concept about the general forms of time and space, with concrete experience, and turned Pythagoras’s pure theory into a kind of “applied geometry.” Mathematical methods enabled people to overcome subject relativity in their experience of the world, thereby unifying the world of various representations in ancient Greek ideas into an objective world and making it possible to pass on this objective world among different subjects. This new mathematical method soon extended to natural science, creating for it a brand-new concept of mathematical natural science. “As soon as [this idea] begins to move towards successful realization, the idea of philosophy in general [as the science of the universe, of all that is] is transformed.”7 According to Husserl, “as early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically subtracted world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable – our everyday life-world.”8 This replacement not only tailored an idea to our life world, that is, the idea of “mathematics and mathematical natural science,” but also made us consider things with only one method as real existence. As a result, the subject who lives human life as a human being, all things spiritual, as well as all cultural characteristics of objects in human practice, are all excluded through abstraction.9 Second is the replacement of rationalism with the spirit of positivism. If the 17th- and 18th-century Enlightenment rationalism, which insisted on naturalism and objectivism, is a primary representation of the alienation of rationality, then the positivist view of science, rising in the 19th century, advocates mathematical natural science and physics, which have lost their “significance for life” in the modern time, and makes them into “real” embodiments of science. Such advocation involves the following aspects: first, positivist science puts limits on the tasks of science. In Husserl’s idea, positivism contends that scientific research should be targeted only at objective facts. This stance deviates from the tradition of ancient Greek science, which considers all existence as objects of its own study. According to ancient Greek science, the scope of scientific study involves things from both the objective field and the subjective field. Issues related to significance, value and rationality are important objects for scientific study. Therefore, the tasks of science should not be limited to studying “purely” objective facts. Arguing that science should study only objective facts, positivists put limits on the tasks of science.10 Second, positivism makes natural science oblivious to its own basic significance. In Husserl’s opinion, the method of natural science promoted by positivism results in the representation of real dependency with dependency in formulas. In other words, once people grasp mathematical formulas, they can make predictions about facts in the concrete, actual, intuitive life world. These predictions are needed in practice and featured by empirical certainty. Husserl further points out, however, that with the advancement of technology and the application of methods, a split between the meaning on the surface

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and the original meaning happens in the “significance of formula” promoted by the positive view of science. [A]ll the occasional (even “philosophical”) reflections which go from technical (scientific) work back to its true meaning always stop at idealized nature; they do not carry out the reflection radically, going back to the ultimate purpose which the new science, together with the geometry which is inseparable from it, growing out of prescientific life and its surrounding world, was from the beginning supposed to serve.11 Therefore, mathematical-physical nature is considered the objective, real nature. The pre-science, intuitive life world, which is the basis of the meaning of natural science, is cast to complete oblivion. Third, positivism’s rejection of metaphysics inevitably leads to crisis of science itself. As far as Husserl is concerned, because positivism rejects metaphysics, philosophy itself becomes problematic. The possibility and significance of all the questions about rationality involved in philosophy lose their space of existence due to the bigotry of the positive view of science. Doubts about the possibility of metaphysics cause the collapse of faith in general philosophy among the new generation, which indicates the loss of faith in rationality.12 In the place of this faith, a new mode of philosophical thinking emerges. That is the “objectivist” mode of thinking. “[I]t moves upon the ground of the world which is pregiven, taken for granted through experience, seeks the ‘objective truth’ of this world, seeks what, in this world, is unconditionally valid for every rational being, what it is in itself.”13 This leads to people’s loss of faith in the “absolute” rationality that endows the world with meaning, as well as their loss of faith the meaning of history, the meaning of man. Moreover, people have also lost faith in man’s ability to endow individual and general life existence with a rational meaning. The loss of these faiths indicates that people have lost faith in themselves, the faith in their real existence. 5.1.2.2 Heidegger: Science Does Not Think In Heidegger’s view, the cause of modern scientific crisis can be summarized in one sentence: “science does not think.”14 “The essence of thinking is to the exploration of meaning.”15 Thinking requires us to break free from the objectifying mode of thinking in scientific rationality, to face things themselves and to know the in-esse nature of things. That “science does not think” is demonstrated by the following problems. First, modern science, as “the theory of real things,” can never realize complete aletheia of the inevitable. All sciences depend on the inevitable of them (for example, nature is the inevitable of natural science, which is represented by physics) but at the same time cannot achieve complete revelation of the nature of the inevitable. This is not really because all sciences are “on their way,” but because the objectifying mode of thinking in science is merely one among the many ways to make the inevitable reveal themselves. Second, the aletheia of the inevitable by modern positive science is a kind of “concealed

Crisis of Science 197 aletheia.” It is undeniable that science always means some extent of aletheia of the inevitable. Nonetheless, when people see science’s aletheia as unique, such aletheia becomes a kind of concealment at the same time as its un-concealment, because it excludes other possibilities of aletheia.16 Third, modern positive science’s aletheia of the inevitable is always narrow and one-sided, always revealing the inevitable as the bestand. Once the unconcealed concerns man not as an object but singularly as the bestand, and once man becomes merely one who bestellen the bestand, man comes to the edge of a cliff, where man himself is seen as a bestand.17 5.1.2.3 Kuhn: the Unavoidable Limits of Theory Itself In Kuhn’s view, scientific crisis happens because theory encounters empirical facts that do not agree with it, i.e., the anomalies. Science enters crisis when it loses confidence in paradigms due to the attack of theoretical paradigms by anomalies, though Kuhn admits that not all anomalies give rise to scientific crisis. Plenty of facts in the history of science show that when a scientific theory is progressing, it is not so afraid of anomalies as asserted by Popper, a theorist of falsification, because it does not easily become trapped in crisis under the attack of anomalies. On the contrary, it does not care about anomalies, often transforming adverse anomalies into evidence favorable to itself and thereby continuously developing itself. For instance, the heliocentric theory, for a long time after its birth, had been accompanied by the anomaly that there was no observation of stellar parallax. For 60 years after Newton’s preliminary calculation, the motion of lunar perigee he predicted had remained merely half of what was observed. It was not until 1750 that the mathematical methods applied here were proved to be wrong. Another case in point is that while the difference between calculations according to Newtonian theories and the actual motion of Mercury had been long recognized, there was no serious doubt of Newtonian theories on this basis. It is not just acceptable, but sometimes correct, for science to tolerate the existence of serious anomalies. Even when there are anomalies instead of mistakes, the continuous existence and acknowledgment of anomalies do not necessarily lead to crisis. Kuhn argues that scientific theories are not the whole truth. This shows that Kuhn explains only the abstract cause of scientific crisis without making further analysis of its emergence.18 5.1.2.4 Harms Caused by Science in Practice Contemporary German philosopher Otfried Hoffё maintains that as the Prometheus that improves human power, science has also indeed abnormally led human power to arrogance.19 As human beings’ abilities to intervene with and control nature gradually improve, a global and irreversible crisis emerges. Industrial production, brought by modern science, not only destroys the biosystem on which human survival relies and the balance of the biosphere, but also intensifies the exhaustion of natural resources and energy sources, stretching

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biological capacity to its extreme. It is not an exaggeration to say that “all the knowledge and exploration of the secrets of nature today are a kind of manipulation of nature.”20 It has been proven by facts that human beings’ control of nature with modern science and technology for more benefits eventually harms the sustainable development of human beings ourselves. The unlimited expansion of modern science not only leads to damage to human–nature relations, but also causes a crisis in humanity, that is, the loss of subjectivity, creativity and values. Man is integrated into technology, “arranged and demanded by a power that emerges from the nature of technology and stays outside man’s control.”21 In the socioeconomic field, the unlimited expansion of science is especially reflected by the one-sided pursuit of economic growth. People see industrialization as the fundamental driving force that promotes social progress and see economic growth as the basic goal of social progress, neglecting the significance of the harmonious coexistence of man and nature for the existence and development of human society, as well as the comprehensive optimizing function of man’s subjectivity and social and cultural factors in development. As Marx Wartofsky contends, on the one hand, we know that science is the crowning achievement of rationality and human culture. On the other, we are afraid that science has become an immoral and inhumane tool of which the development has gone beyond human control, and a soulless ferocious machine, which swallows everything in front of it.22 Such social progress that aims only at economy while maintaining prosperity on the surface actually accelerates the exhaustion of natural resources. Eventually, it inevitably turns modern science from the internal driving force of social advancement to a fundamental obstruction to social harmony, which also leads to the crisis of science itself. In a word, there is no doubt that analyses of the root of scientific crisis in positivism have seriously challenged the utopian dream of science regarding modern society. Ever since Bacon realized that “knowledge is power” and built the “New Atlantis” with the central ideal of science, it has been a dream of people to establish an ideal modern society on the basis of science. The successes of science since the 19th century in various fields of society have further promoted the pursuit of this dream. To transform the world and social order on the basis of science and technology has become the goal that most optimists set for themselves. Nevertheless, the emergence of modern scientific crisis and the high frequency and intensification of the negative social effects of science and its technological applications cast a shadow on the beautiful vision of the ideal future. In some people’s eyes, the scientific utopia is even going toward its opposite, becoming the “dystopia” of science. On the level of epistemology, positivism is the theoretical basis of modern science. Therefore, when Husserl, through his criticism of positivism, looks for the root of the existential crisis caused by science, he essentially shakes the theoretical edifice of modern science, completely destroying the

Crisis of Science 199 “scientific utopia” founded on positivism. In a word, human beings’ dream of scientific utopia collapses in front of scientific crisis. 5.1.3 Remedies for the Crisis of Science In the face of the scientific crisis that has already happened, the first question to consider is how to save science from its predicaments. Although different philosophers differ in their ways of dealing with crisis, through their endeavors we can solve the crisis by working on various aspects, such as the content and methods of scientific studies and the rules and ethics of scientific communities. Among plenty of methods, however, the method of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is the most influential one. The following section is thus devoted to a discussion of his solution. According to Husserl, now that the root of all these problems lies in positivism and its oblivion to the life world as the basis of its meaning, in order to solve scientific crisis and the consequent crises in culture and humanity, we need to go back to the life world – the basis in oblivion – and bring the metaphysical questions such as the psychological characteristics of the subject and the significance of man’s existence, which have been neglected by positivism, back to the horizon of science. Going back to the life world is the solution Husserl offers to scientific crisis. The logic and steps of this solution include the following. 5.1.3.1 Phenomenology Returns to the Primitive Spirit of Rationality In his analysis of the causes of scientific crisis in Europe, Husserl deeply realizes that the methods of natural science during the modern period and the principles upheld in positivism both deviate from the primitive rationality of ancient Greece. Therefore, the return to primitive rationality is the logical starting point of Husserl’s solution of crisis. In this way of return, only phenomenology, which suspends all presuppositions, including the faith in existence and scientific theories, is able to open a completely new and unlimited field of spirit. It is the task of general philosophy to study this unlimited field. This unlimited task of general philosophy is the task of rationality itself, and phenomenology is such general philosophy. Its uncovering of the unlimited field of spirit is exactly a return to the rational spirit of ancient Greece. This return is a task that modern philosophy has attempted but failed to accomplish. Therefore, Husserl maintains that “phenomenology is a secret yearning of all modern philosophy.”23 Here, phenomenology refers to transcendental phenomenology. In Husserl’s opinion, only transcendental phenomenology is the most general philosophy and the hope of completely solving the scientific crisis in Europe. 5.1.3.2 Two Ways to Transcendental Phenomenology: the Life World and Psychology In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl argues that there are two ways leading us to transcendental phenomenology: the

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first is to trace back from the life world to transcendental phenomenology, and the second is to enter transcendental phenomenology from psychology (the psychology of phenomenology). Husserl gives no clear definition of the concept of “life world” in his writings, but we can gain a rough understanding of its basic connotations from his later works. Husserl mainly uses the concept of “life world” in two senses: the surrounding world, and the world of spiritual life. The surrounding world refers to a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavors – this refers to a fact that occurs purely within the spiritual realm. Our surrounding world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life.24 The world of spiritual life is a world among subjects, or in other words, an intersubjective world. According to Husserl, when we perceive others through intentionality, we perceive the selves of others, the “intersubjective world” between our own selves and others’ selves, as well as the existence of the “object world” related to this. In other words, this intersubjective world is the world of spiritual life in which the self and others’ selves live together or the world of spiritual life that is formed by the pure consciousness of the self and the other. Therefore, there are two steps in the return to life world. First, we need to return from the scientific world to the surrounding world. In order to study the life world as a theme and thus explain how the self-evidence of objective science acquires its meaning and legitimacy in the life world, phenomenological suspensions need to be made. The first is the suspension of science, which means not only to disregard all sciences, but also to suspend any consensus among the knowledge of various sciences as well as any of their criticism on truth and fallacy, and even to suspend their attitude of guiding ideas with knowledge about the objective world. In short, such suspensions of objective science mean that “we carry out an epoche in regard to all objective theoretical interests, all aims and activities belonging to us as objective scientists or even simply as [ordinary] people desirous of [this kind of] knowledge.”25 Suspension is not abolishment. In such suspension, sciences and scientists do not disappear. They are still some facts given beforehand in the life world. Only due to suspension, people function no longer as persons sharing common interests, but as cooperators. When people realize the interests that give rise to a specific habit in people’s minds, they suspend other interests in life, though these interests are still their own and still exist. This total phenomenological attitude and the epoche belonging to it are destined in essence to effect, at first, a complete personal transformation, comparable in the beginning to a religious conversion, which then, however, over and above this, bears within itself the significance of the greatest existential transformation which is assigned as a task to mankind as such.26 Second, returning to the world of spiritual life from the surrounding world. This is related to how the latter becomes an achievement of the world of the former and

Crisis of Science 201 is connected with the former. In Husserl’s view, this is accomplished by activities of intentionality. Developing the “psychology of intentionality” of his teacher Franz Brentano, Husserl comes up with the intentionality of “self-consciousness” or “pure consciousness.” According to him, intentionality consists of the subject (ego) of activities of intentionality, the activities of intentionality and the object of these activities. Because of activities of intentionality, the object is bound to be involved in self-consciousness or pure consciousness, which not only contains the object but also endows it with meaning. Specifically speaking, a certain thing becomes itself due to the effects of intentionality in self-consciousness. Selfconsciousness gives specific meaning to a certain thing. It is consciousness that constructs the object of consciousness in its activities of intentionality. That the consciousness points to (intend) a certain object means that it implies a certain object with certain materials and meanings. Husserl maintains that this is true not merely for certain individual things, but for the whole objective world. Husserl regards psychology as another important way toward transcendental phenomenology. He argues that previous empirical psychology, influenced by naturalism and objectivism, sees consciousness as a natural property of human beings and animals and thus considers psychology as a branch discipline subordinate to anthropology or zoology.27 In fact, however, psychology should be unified with transcendental philosophy. The basis of such unification is the uniformity of “ego” itself because both the naive ego in psychology and the reflective ego in phenomenology originate from the same “ego-pole,” that is, the transcendental ego. Therefore, as long as we turn from the natural attitude in psychology to a transcendental attitude, we are able to find “a way whereby a concretely executed psychology could lead to a transcendental philosophy.”28 Husserl intends to realize the phenomenology-psychology restoration, hoping to uncover the general and essential connections between the mind and real things and endowing objects with “meaning (Bedeutung),” and thereby construct the life world of intersubjectivity and the language-meaning community. In this process, the pure and subjective things in the life world enter the field of psychology, thus ridding psychology of its objectivist tendencies. 5.1.3.3 Reconstruction of Transcendental Phenomenology and Philosophy Husserl contends that general philosophy, that is, transcendental phenomenology, is the foundation of all sciences. The salvation of science from crisis depends on the reconstruction of philosophy. In his opinion, in order to solve the crisis, we need to make thorough reflections, reconstructing philosophy into a strict science, from which other sciences find their own meanings. Philosophy is in essence a science about the real beginning, the origin, and the nature of everything. Metaphysics, which is the science about the highest and ultimate questions, should be honored as the queen of science. Its spirit determines the ultimate meanings of the knowledge provided by all other sciences.29 This is the great ideal of philosophical science consistent throughout Husserl’s whole life. Husserl asks himself how to establish a philosophy that is strictly scientific and commensurate with modern precise sciences,

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under the conditions of modern science. The purpose of phenomenology is to save absolute validity, without which philosophy cannot become science. This purpose is in accordance with the basic characteristics of modern philosophy. Validity implies the three principles of precision, self-evidence and universality. From the perspectives of teleology and history, arriving at transcendental phenomenology from the life world and from psychology are both ways of reconstructing the philosophy of human beings’ own contemplations. The two ways lead to the same destination – the “Archimedean point” in the construction of the world, that is, the world of spiritual life formed by pure ego and pure consciousness. Both the two ways point ultimately to “the self-realization of rationality.” Husserl thereby saves certainty using the methods of transcendental phenomenology, first by establishing the real standards of validity through aletheia, and second by establishing indisputable validity. It is clear that Husserl, putting forward the above two ways, offers a prescription for solving the crisis of European science, philosophy and humanity (culture) – the return to the life world. Apparently, the significance of this return lies in that we, after having left the life world, go back to it with a completely new perspective. Returning to the world of real life does not mean that people have to indulge themselves in it but instead indicates the maintenance of a new philosophical attitude or concept. This is a fundamental change in the philosophical horizon. It means that philosophy, in order to develop or grasp its own time, must hold a view of the world that underscores real life, or establish an attitude of returning to the world of real life. The life world in this view of science is no longer the life world in the natural attitude that is threatened by crisis. Instead, it is a life world based on transcendental phenomenology, a total world involving ego-pole and others’ ego-poles. It is a “system of poles” that presents the world as subjective.30 In this system, we on the one hand live in this world with a natural attitude, and on the other, experience life in the natural and objective world as merely a special part of the transcendental life that constitutes this world. Only by maintaining the natural attitude and the transcendental attitude at the same time will we be able to be conscious about making changes to our whole lifestyle and living condition, transcend all life experiences hitherto and really overcome the crises of science and humanity. The firm belief in the spirit of rationality runs through Husserl’s later ideas. It is because Husserl sees this spirit of rationality as a fundamental characteristic of Western civilization that he criticizes positivism’s biased understanding of rationality. With this belief, he underscores that in addition to the world of science, the life world also includes a diversity of cultural forms such as the ethical world, the religious world, the artistic world and the philosophical world. He emphasizes that all these cultural forms, just like science, are featured by actuality and that each of them should also enter the life world and people’s horizon of study as a whole, just like science. Husserl insists on the rational tradition of Western civilization, but he, while highlighting the return to the life world, also underlines the phenomenological method of “essential intuition” and thus gives an irrational tint to his philosophy. As a result, the relationship between rationalism and irrationalism becomes a major problem that Husserl faces. When he defends rationality with the irrational method of intuition, he inevitably falls into a paradox.

Crisis of Science 203 In a word, faced with various crises of modern science, insightful philosophers, including Husserl, Heidegger, Kuhn and Bernal, all realize that the essence of scientific crisis is the crisis of philosophy. It should be noted that while exposing and criticizing the positivist trend, which leads to the crisis of humanity in Europe, Husserl also criticizes the trend of irrationalism which deepens such crisis. In a certain sense, Husserl’s criticism of irrationalism is even more severe than his criticism of positivism. The positivist view of science is incomplete, but it is still rationalism, though a kind of narrow rationalism that is limited to the study of factual science. If the basic task of philosophy is the rational understanding of the world which includes both life and nature, then positivism has given up half of this task. Irrationalism, however, due to its rejection of rational methods, has given up the whole task. Irrationalism is indeed concerned with the meaning of life. For instance, existentialists criticize logical positivists for not studying man and history. Their view is in contrast to positivism but agrees to a large extent with Husserl. Nevertheless, because it uses irrational methods to study the meaning of life, it deviates from the “goal of rationality” even farther than positivism, though it goes in a different direction from positivism. Therefore, the objection irrationalism, such as existentialism, raises to positivism is in essence an objection to rationalism using irrationalism. In Husserl’s objection to positivism, however, he uses complete rationalism to oppose incomplete rationalism.

5.2 The Emergence of Irrationalism and Its Main Forms When Husserl was appealing for defending the rationalist tradition of Western philosophy, an irrational trend of philosophy crept in. This trend emerged in its particular historical contexts. On the one hand, the advocators of irrationalism, just like Husserl, witnessed the existential predicaments that the two world wars and serious economic crisis led Westerners into, and thus began to doubt the Western civilization that they built with rationality and science. On the other hand, thinkers of irrationalism noticed the global problems that science and technology brought to human beings together with benefits, such as the threat of nuclear war, energy source crisis, environmental pollution, ecological crisis and population explosion. At the same time, they began to pay more attention to the alienation of humanity, personality split and indifference in the process of modernization. All these problems made them suspicious of rationalism and scientism, which celebrate the “omnipotence of science,” and encouraged them to make thorough reflections on these beliefs. 5.2.1 The Rise of Irrationalism and the Change in Philosophical Perspective People often target their criticism toward irrationality when it comes to irrationalism. This is not really fair. Irrationality and irrationalism are two different concepts. Irrationality appears on people’s horizons as a form of idea. It involves spiritual factors in man’s consciousness that differ from rational thinking, such

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as emotion, intuition, illusion, subconsciousness and inspiration. Advocating for irrational thinking does not mean rejecting rational thinking. On the contrary, irrational thinking and rational thinking form a unity of opposites. They coexist in the development of human thinking. As a kind of idea, irrationality has its own process of development. In the ideas of ancient philosophers, irrational thinking was reflected more often as a kind of irrational view. The earliest irrational view can be traced back to Plato’s theory of soul in ancient Greece. According to Plato, there are three virtues in man’s spirit: reason, will and desire, among which the latter two are irrational factors. In modern times, there have been Descartes’s “innate ideas,” Kant’s “synthesis of reproduction in imagination” and “practical reason,” all of which involve rich irrational ideas. After Kant, Hegel combined irrationality and rationality with the help of dialectics, but he saw irrational elements such as passion, will and desire as necessary parts in the development of absolute rationality, and thus made his valuable ideas about irrationality overshadowed in his system of rationalistic philosophy. In comparison with irrationality, irrationalism also belongs to the irrational view, but it is “a kind of systematic and extreme irrational view.”31 Scholars usually see Schopenhauer’s voluntarism, which was established in the mid-19th century, as the beginning of the Western philosophy of irrationalism. After that, irrationalism has gone through a series of stages including the philosophy of life, existentialism and Freudianism. It is not only an important basis of contemporary philosophical trends of humanism but also deeply influences many postmodernist thinkers. Compared with the rationalistic tradition of Western philosophy, the philosophical tradition of irrationalism has completely different philosophical perspectives and problematics. First, a philosophical stance of anti-rationalism is generally adopted in irrationalism. In the rationalistic tradition of Western philosophy, the function of rationality is paramount. Since ancient Greece, the mainstream of traditional Western philosophy has been pursuing rationality. This dominant view usually sees rationality as not merely the primary way to know the essence of the world, but also the main medium through which man knows himself. Nonetheless, the philosophical trend of irrationalism makes sharp criticism of traditional ideas that advocates “the supremacy of rationality.” First, most thinkers of irrationalism believe that neither perception nor reason is able to reveal the nature of the universe. Only through will, desire, emotion and intuition can we have insight into the nature of all things. Rationality is merely a tool of intentions. The internal intention of man is the nature of the world and the reality of all beings. Such nature and reality must be grasped through people’s psychological experience and intuition. Second, irrationalism not only denies the effect of rationality to some degree but also considers irrational elements as the nature of man and concludes that man’s mind and behaviors are both dominated by irrational elements. Therefore, only an irrational view of the world is in accordance with humanity. Reason and science are not only external to man’s nature, but also suppress man’s nature. Third, irrationalism, highlighting rationality’s incapability of fully knowing the world, argues that rationalism uses rationality merely as a tool for knowing the world, which applies only to the field of life practice. The world that one gets to know

Crisis of Science 205 using rationality is only a world of representations. Without the help of “will,” “intuition,” “instinct” and “life impulses,” rationality is unable to correctly understand the world and the relationship between man and the world. Second, irrationalism considers man as the subject and main content of study. Although thinkers of irrationalism differ from and even contradict each other in specific theories, they share a common concern with the existence of man, the value of life in real society and the significance of existence. In terms of the task of philosophy, unlike rationalistic philosophy, which focuses on the cognitive relationship between man and the world, philosophy of irrationalism deals with questions regarding the existential relationship and the relationship of significance between man and the world. Regarding the goal of philosophy, rationalistic philosophy strives to grasp the intrinsic nature and laws of things, achieving understanding and making an explanation of the world through its pursuit of objective truth. Philosophy of irrationalism intends to revive man’s freedom, which has been suppressed by rationality, to settle down man’s soul, and thus establish man’s unique status in the world and the meaning of life through reflections on the existential condition of man, man’s desire and emotion, feelings of happiness and pain. In terms of mode of thinking, rationalistic philosophy pursues knowledge and truth, whereas philosophy of irrationalism pursues value and meaning.32 Lastly, irrationalism advocates the understanding of man and the world using irrational methods. In terms of epistemology, the rationalistic tradition of Western philosophy strongly advocates the effects of scientific methods, arguing that the precision of scientific methods not only generally applies to the field of natural science, but can also be extended to humanities and social sciences. To use this method of certainty to understand the world and man’s relationship with the world is the primary theoretical orientation of rationalistic philosophy. Philosophy of irrationalism, however, makes epistemological criticism of scientific methods, especially the claim of these methods’ omnipotence. It argues that knowledge is man’s own experience achieved with the help of irrational elements, emphasizing that irrational methods such as instinct, intuition, experience and emotion are the correct ways to know the world and the relationship between man and the world. For instance, in Schopenhauer’s view, the grasp of will, which is the essence of the world, can be achieved only through instinct, because instinct does not rely on concepts and reason to understand ideas. Instead, it is external to space and time and depends on pure intuition. Nietzsche objects to the absolute knowledge promoted by traditional philosophy, contending that knowledge is relative because there are different perspectives of “seeing” the same object according to the different purposes and needs of different people. Differences in perspective lead to differences in the results of knowing and thus different knowledges and truths. Similarly, Henri Bergson sees intuition as the superlative method of knowing, superior to rationality. Generally speaking, the development of irrationalism involves the following stages: irrational views in ancient Greece, irrational views featured by religious belief, modern irrationalism characterized by humanism, irrationalism in philosophy of science and postmodernist irrationalism. The first two stages constitute

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the infancy of rationalism, while postmodernist irrationalism goes beyond the boundary of philosophy, being closer to literature, history, arts and even social realities. Therefore, in what’s following, we are going to analyze modern irrationalism, as well as irrationalism in philosophy of science. 5.2.2 Typical Forms of Modern Irrationalism There is a diversity of schools in the trend of modern irrationalism, and debates have been made regarding what are the typical forms of modern irrationalism. Generally speaking, most scholars agree that voluntarism, represented by German philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Nietzsche, philosophy of life, represented by Wilhelm Dilthey from Germany and Bergson from France, psychoanalytical theory, represented by theories of Sigmund Freud from Austria and Carl Jung from Switzerland, and existentialism, represented by Heidegger from Germany and Jean-Paul Sartre from France, all belong to irrationalism. In terms of ideas, these various schools of irrationalism differ from each other, but at the same time they share something in common as they belong to the same trend. Such commonality is mainly shown in the shared topics they study with their respective theories. For example, the questions about the origin of the world, the nature of man and epistemology. Here we focus on voluntarism, philosophy of life and psychoanalytical theory, while discussions about existentialism will be made later. A common feature of voluntarism, philosophy of life and psychoanalytical theory is that they all downplay people’s knowledge of the empirical world and emphasize the grasp and understanding of self, man’s will and life through irrational experience. In this way, they sharply contrast scientism, which advocates rationality. 5.2.2.1 Voluntarism Voluntarism is a philosophical school of idealism that exaggerates man’s emotion and will and considers them as the essence of all existence. It emerged in 19th-century Germany, and has been rather widely influential in Britain, France and Northern Europe. It was founded by German philosopher Schopenhauer, and its main representatives include Eduard von Hartmann, Nietzsche and Søren Kierkegaard. Although there are variances in theoretical forms within voluntarism, theories of this school share the following characteristics. First, they see will as the origin of the world or the essence of all existence. Unlike positivism, philosophers who hold voluntarism view do not limit the understanding and explanation of the world to the phenomenal world that can be accessed through experience and rationality. Instead, they pay attention to the existential issues of the world of reality that is outside the empirical world. They object to traditional Western philosophy’s pursuit of “the world in posse,” which is outside the dichotomy of subject and object and outside that of mind and substance. They see emotion and will, unconscious psychological instinct or life of the irrational man as the basis of all existence. At the beginning of The World as Will and Representation,

Crisis of Science 207 Schopenhauer points out: “‘The world is my representation’: this is a truth valid with reference to every living and knowing being, although man alone can bring it into reflective, abstract consciousness.”33 Schopenhauer’s explanation of the phenomenal world follows Kant’s ideas, but Kant considers things in posse as an unknown world and attempts a specific explanation of it. A unique feature of Schopenhauer is that he demands for going beyond the epistemology characterized by the subject-object dichotomy in order to explore the secrets of the world of things in posse, finding that things in posse are irrational will, which he sees as the ultimate origin of the phenomenal world.34 Similarly, Nietzsche considers will as the origin of the world and the essence of man. However, he disagrees with Schopenhauer, who views will as something external to phenomena. Nietzsche maintains that will exists in phenomena. At the same time, he contends that the will he refers to is not the will that purely pursues existence, as argued by Schopenhauer. Instead, it is a kind of will that represents, expands and transcends itself with exuberant vitality – that is, the will to power. Second, in terms of epistemology, voluntarism sees will as the master of rationality, and rationality as the tool of will. Philosophers who hold voluntarism view do not completely deny the effects of rationality and science, but they generally consider the epistemological forms featured by the subject-object dichotomy and the sciences and theories constituted by these forms as impediments to knowing the real world. This idea is inseparable from their propensity for elevating irrationality and debasing rationality. In his irrationalist theory of experience, Schopenhauer starts by elevating intuition and arts and further debases rationality and science. In his view, science, as an enterprise of rationality, is only capable of knowing various representations while incapable of knowing reality. Science and rationality are merely the tools of the will to live. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche compares rationality to Apollo, the Olympian god of the sun, and irrationality to Dionysus, the god of wine. Based on the spirit of Dionysus, Nietzsche argues that philosophy should not be centered on epistemology in the way traditional philosophy of rationality is. Instead, it should concentrate on man’s life and behavior and makes philosophy into the philosophy of practice in the ethical sense. It is on the basis of this position that Nietzsche criticizes the epistemology of traditional philosophy. He contends that all knowledge involves human purpose and is thus not pure. Scientific theories are merely tools with which scientists explain the will to power in phenomena on the basis of their subjective needs. In this way, Nietzsche denies the objectivity of scientific truth and views it as a product of subjective fabrication. He writes straightforwardly: “Only I am in control of the criteria of ‘truth.’ I am the only arbiter.”35 5.2.2.2 Philosophy of Life Philosophy of life is a philosophical trend of irrationalism popular in Germany and France from the end of the 19th century to the first half of the 20th century. It

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can be traced back to Schopenhauer and Hartmann’s voluntarism. The theoretical objects and topics of philosophy of life involve man and man’s life. Its main theoretical purpose is to achieve reflection on the surroundings of man by focusing on people’s lives, life and psychological status. According to the taxonomy promoted by Liu Fangtong in Modern Western Philosophy, there are two kinds of philosophy of life: the first is concerned with the evolution of organisms and demonstrates a biological tendency, and the second is concerned with historical-cultural studies and centers on the objection to positivism and absolute idealism. The former is represented by Bergson from France, while the latter is represented by Dilthey from Germany. The commonality of these two types lies in their shared emphasis on the spiritual creation of life and the uniqueness of the mind. Both of them highlight the unique features of scientific methods in humanities. Bergson uses intuition as his tool, while Dilthey uses explanation and comprehension.36 Although these two types of philosophy of life differ in methods and theoretical orientations, they are both characterized by irrationalism, and Bergson’s philosophy of life is especially typical in this aspect. The next part focuses on Bergson’s philosophy of life. First, Bergson is devoted to establishing “scientific metaphysics.” Overtly advocating irrationalism, Bergson further biologizes Dilthey’s philosophy of life. He maintains that the nature of the universe is a “flow of life,” that is, a life impulse that is blind and irrational and flows unceasingly. This life impulse is a kind of autonomous flow through time. Bergson names it duration or the flow of life. It is a kind of mental experience. Bergson’s philosophy of life centers on the issue of time-life, putting forward ideas different from scientism and rationalism. In Bergson’s view, philosophy and science differ in object and method. Science is concerned with spatial objects, whereas philosophy pays attention to temporal objects. Science seeks knowledge about the appearance of life and the material world in which life exists. Philosophy, however, seeks to know the essence of life and the internal world of spiritual life. Science and philosophy have their respective values. On this point, Bergson’s theory clarifies the respective ranges of application of science and philosophy, appearing more rational than voluntarism. However, when he endeavors to overthrow all the understandings about reality in traditional Western philosophy and establish a kind of “scientific metaphysics” that centers on life impulse, he slides toward irrationalism again, because he excludes science from philosophy and considers philosophical study to be targeted only at irrational elements such as spirit, consciousness and life impulse. Once science is clearly divorced from philosophy, the former loses the dimensions of values, ontology and methodology, while the latter also loses its basis in reality. Second, Bergson advocates the theory of experience. In his view, only with intuition can we grasp the life impulse and absolute truth about reality. All scientific findings since the beginning of the modern period have been products of intuition. Science acquires only illusory knowledge about nature. There are two reasons behind his arguments. First, observation and experiment in natural science apply to the acquisition of knowledge about the material world in space because

Crisis of Science 209 the spatial causalities in the material world can be observed and experimented with. Nevertheless, the flow of life exists in the duration of time instead of in space, and observation and experiment are no longer applicable. Second, science cannot grasp truth because it is based on an analytical mode of thinking. Analysis applies merely to the material world, which exists in space and is dividable, and it is ineffective for undividable life in time. Third, scientific knowledge is pragmatic. People are usually motivated by pragmatic concerns and selectively acquire sporadic knowledge, unable to know the entire flow of life. Therefore, Bergson concludes that rationality and science can know only the illusory material world and obtain relative truth, while only intuition is capable of knowing the eternal flow of life and grasping the nature of the world. He writes: The function of positive science is to analyze, which means to make research with symbols. Therefore, even if the most concrete science in natural sciences, that is, the science about life, is limited to the visible forms of creatures – their organs and anatomical elements…Natural sciences will never be able to understand the essence of life.37 What, then, is intuition? According to Bergson, intuition is direct consciousness. It is the extension of self-introspection deep into life. He points out that “[b]y intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible.” “Intuition…in a certain sense, is life itself.”38 5.2.2.3 Psychoanalytical Theory Psychoanalytical theory is a kind of theory and method for discussing psychology and the treatment of mental diseases. At the beginning of the 20th century, the famous Austrian psychologist and psychiatrist Sigmund Freud, on the basis of studying and treating mental disease, established psychoanalytical theory, which is also called Freudianism. Freud argues that man’s behaviors are determined by suppressed intuition and desires in unconsciousness. Premised on this argument, he establishes his basic theoretical system and psychoanalytical techniques. The main object of his theory is the spiritual process of unconsciousness. Freud attributes the so-called “desire” to man’s sexual impulse, which he sees as the only important motivation of human behaviors and the “psychological driving force” that dominates all psychological activities. At the same time, Freud contends that habits in social life and ethical and moral concepts suppress desire, especially sexual desire, which is the root of mental disease. He comes up with psychanalytical techniques, which mainly aim at allowing patients to expose their unconsciousness and achieve transference through free association. The therapist then makes an explanation, making patients restore their early memories of or bring in consciousness about their suppressed impulses and experiences. In this way, symptoms can be eliminated, self-consciousness can be improved and personality can be profoundly corrected. Freud has significantly contributed to psychanalytical

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studies, but in his system of psychological theory, his pansexualism and instinct theory result in the mistakes of historical idealism and biological determinism. Psychoanalytical theory has been modified and developed after Freud. In the 1930s, a group of psychoanalysts formed a new school of psychanalysis, known as Neo-Freudianism. They criticize Freud’s pansexualism and theory of instinct while inheriting from him concepts about unconsciousness and suppression as well as techniques such as psychoanalysis, emphasizing the impacts of cultural and social factors on personality and the function of the ego. The preceding discussions demonstrate that modern irrationalism brings the issue of man to the center of philosophy and discusses the contradictions between man and his living environment. It is in essence philosophical reflections on the view of life, values, life ideals and beliefs. Although its conclusions are passive and pessimistic, it has after all touched upon various contradictions and crises in modern Western society. The essence of modern irrationalism is the reflection of social contradictions and crises of the modern West in philosophy. It plays a positive role in criticizing modern Western society and revealing man’s condition and living status in capitalism and under scientific and technological conditions nowadays. 5.2.3 Irrationalism in Philosophy of Science In the late 1950s and especially the 1960s, the philosophical trend of irrationalism gradually permeated into the philosophy of science, forming a strong power challenging orthodox philosophy of science in the West. The greatest impact of irrationalism on orthodox philosophy of science is on the level of methodology. The goal of orthodox philosophy of science is to examine and plan scientific development and the overall structure of science in progress according to specific methodological principles. This goal demonstrates a pursuit of the ideal of proceduralization. A typical representative is logical empiricism. The time of logical empiricism witnessed the prevalence of Classical physics and mathematical and physical logic, the development of which gave rise to rationalism and positive methods. Projected onto the philosophy of logical empiricism, rationalism and positive methods give logical empiricism strong characteristics of rationalism and positivism. That is, logical empiricism strives to demonstrate, by making logical and linguistic analyses of scientific propositions and theories, that the meaning of a scientific proposition equals the nature of its method. Based on empirical and positive methods, it excludes illogic, non-positive and irrational elements from scientific study and denies the influences of irrational forms such as intuition and inspiration in scientific discoveries. Regarding this aspect, A.J. Ayer explicitly points out that what seems intuitively certain to one person may seem doubtful, or even false, to another. So that unless it is possible to provide some criterion by which one may decide between conflicting intuitions, a mere appeal to intuition is worthless as a test of a proposition’s validity.39

Crisis of Science 211 At the beginning of the 20th century, the newly appearing quantum mechanics and theory of relativity overthrew the dominance of classical physics. This new background offered new opportunities for the development of philosophy of science. For example, Einstein, in the process of establishing the theory of relativity, elaborates on the illogical ways in which perceptual experience is developed into basic concepts and principles, and gives full acknowledgment of the important influences of convention in the establishment of theoretical systems. As a result, not only has he challenged the method of induction, but he has also allowed people to see the importance of irrational factors in scientific discovery. Since then, irrational methods such as intuition and inspiration have entered the horizon of philosophers of science, many of whom have developed the theoretical propensity for criticizing positive methods and advocating irrational methods. This change undoubtedly cast a shadow of irrationalism on traditional science featured by rationality and positivism. Critical rationalism is the primary representative of irrationalism. It is the first school to start irrationalism in philosophy of science. Karl Popper, the founder of critical rationalism, replaces justification with falsification and argues that traditional induction is no longer applicable. What scientists need is creation. Furthermore, he argues that science needs not merely experience and speculation, but also irrational inspiration and intuition. In this way, he makes the first breakthrough in methodology. Imre Lakatos contends that “instant rationality,” which is a mark of traditional epistemology, is merely a utopian dream. It is impossible to judge whether the scientific guiding principle has degenerated with judgmental experiments. At the same time, he argues that there is no rational standard for the choice of guiding principle of research. The only rational way to choose scientific theory is through examination and proof ex-post. Lakatos’s rationalist retreat is shown by his conversion of the judgment of the guiding principle in research into the standards of scientific rationality. Unlike Popper and Lakatos, who still preserve a space for rationalism in philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, two representatives of irrationalism, push philosophy of science further toward the direction of irrationalism. Kuhn emphasizes the significant influences of social and psychological factors in scientific communities on scientific discovery. In this way, he confronts logical and empirical methodologies. Kuhn uses as many as 21 definitions to explain “paradigm,”40 which is his central theory. Nevertheless, the core of the whole concept of “paradigm,” in Kuhn’s view, is the idea that paradigm is the shared belief of scientific communities and the product of scientists’ inspirations and intuitions. Furthermore, he maintains that it is through paradigms, which contain rich irrational elements, that scientific communities maximize the number of problems solved and the precision of solutions. Feyerabend, the representative of radical irrationalism, brings these ideas to an extreme, introducing irrational methods into his methodology of pluralism and putting forward the principle of “anything goes” in scientific methodology. On the basis of serious criticism of scientific chauvinism and authoritarianism, and the denial of any ultimate significance of methodology, Feyerabend sees science as an anarchic enterprise.

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From Popper’s questions of the rationalism and positivism in logical empiricism to Feyerabend’s “anything goes,” a series of criticisms and reconstructions have shaken the foundation of orthodox philosophy of science, and eventually given rise to the influential trend of irrationalism in modern Western philosophy of science. The confrontation between rationalism and irrationalism in philosophy of science has not retained the mode of “two-wheel drive” of rationality and irrationality in scientific development. Instead, it has broken the linkage between the two and eventually pushed science toward irrationalism.

5.3  Debates    on the Legitimacy of Irrationalism Irrationalism in philosophy of science exaggerates the irrational elements in the history of scientific development and further describes science as an irrational enterprise. In this way, it not only subverts the rationalistic tradition of science but also completely takes the place of rationality. It is understandable that it inevitably gives rise to plenty of criticisms. For instance, later scholars call Kuhn a typical “irrationalist” (though Kuhn himself has never acknowledged this title) and see the radical irrationalist Feyerabend as “the worst enemy of science.” J. Preston and others even edited The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend. The various criticisms of irrationalism from philosophers of science indicate the strong impacts that irrationalism has made on orthodox philosophy of science and the doubts irrationalism is subject to. As irrationalism is faced with severe challenges, it becomes an important task of irrationalists to defend their own legitimacy. 5.3.1  Scientific    Observation and the Legitimacy of Irrationalism The first theoretical foundation of defense of the legitimacy of irrationalism is the “theory-ladenness of observation.” The relationship between observation and theory has always been an important topic in philosophy of science. According to logical empiricists, science starts with observation. On the basis of separating scientific justification from scientific discovery, they intend to make an absolute distinction between direct observation and theory. Through such distinction, logical empiricists try to prove that the basis of scientific knowledge is offered by observation by observers who have no prejudice or bias. Theory is meaningful only when it can be justified by direct observation. Therefore, that the explanation of observation language exists independently in science and remains theory-free is the critical foundation of the view of science in logical positivism. Nevertheless, after American philosopher of science Norwood Hansen came up with the proposition of “theory-ladenness of observation,” people have realized that no observation is purely objective. Observers with different knowledge backgrounds, when they observe the same thing, reach different conclusions about their observations. The “theory-ladenness of observation” destroys the legitimacy of science which logical positivism pursues. Hansen’s idea of “theory-ladenness of observation” has deeply influenced the irrationalist Feyerabend, who has not only accepted Hansen’s view but also

Crisis of Science 213 pushed it to its limits. Feyerabend first objects to logical empiricism’s absolute separation of scientific discovery from scientific justification, arguing that [t]he results obtained so for suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification, norms and facts, observational terms and theoretical terms. None of these distinctions plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences.41 On this basis, Feyerabend contends that observation and theory are inseparable. Fact is the result of observation instructed by theory. “It then asserts that observations (observation terms) are not merely theory-laden (the position of Hanson, Hesse and others) but fully theoretical (observation statements have no ‘observational core’).”42 Furthermore, Feyerabend denies the idea that justification after discovery is logical and rational, maintaining that theory is a critical element influencing everything at the beginning, in the middle of and after observation. Justification ex-post that is pure and involves no theory does not exist. He points out that the attempt “to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories”, far from being irrelevant for the standards of test, actually leads to a criticism of these standards – provided the two domains, historical research and discussion of test procedures, are not kept apart by fiat.43 In this way, Feyerabend fundamentally negates the idea in logical empiricism that science starts with observation, and weakens the influence of observation in scientific activities, thereby elevating the status of theory in science. In his opinion, not only do theory and experience accompany each other, but it is also impossible for any scientific activity to be understood and known without theory. Therefore, experience is useless. “[A] natural science without experience is conceivable. Conceiving a science without experience is an effective way of examining the empirical hypothesis that underlies much of science and is the conditio sine qua non of empiricism.”44 It is clear that there is some truth in Feyerabend’s use of scientific observation to defend the legitimacy of irrationalism. The background knowledge of the subject of knowledge in scientific activities does play a constructive role to some degree. Nevertheless, he goes to another extreme by over-exaggerating the influence of theory and downplaying that of experience in scientific activities. It should be noted that while theory plays an important part in scientific activities, observation is the foundation of theory. The formation of any theory is inseparable from the arrangement, processing and abstraction of substantive observational facts. At the same time, the truthfulness of theory has to be experienced and justified through observational facts. Theory is based on observation, while observation is

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guided by theory. It is in such interrelationship that observation and theory obtain their progress respectively. There is a circular relationship between the articulation of scientific facts and scientific theory. This is not to deny the influence of objective facts, but to point out the difference between scientific facts and objective facts, let alone that such circular relationship only reveals itself when observation and science progress to a certain level. At the same time, the circular relationship is not closed, but open to the external world. Therefore, scientific theory is evolutionary.45 5.3.2  Scientific    History and the Legitimacy of Irrationalism The second basis of the defense of irrationalism’s legitimacy lies in the history of science. Regarding the categorization of the history of science, Lakatos raises the question of “the rational reconstruction of the history of science.” According to him, the history of science can be divided into the internal history and external history of science. Internal history is usually defined as the history of knowledge, that is, the history of the evolution of scientific theory. The external history is defined as social history, that is, the history of the changes in social, psychological and cultural backgrounds of scientific studies. Lakatos maintains that the history of science and philosophy of science should learn from each other. Such mutual learning is mainly demonstrated in three aspects. First, the history of science is established under the guidance of philosophy of science. Lakatos points out that “[t]he vital demarcation between normative-internal and empirical-external is different for each methodology.”46 “[For the historian of science,] what constitutes for his internal history, depends on his philosophy, whether he is aware of this fact or not.”47 Therefore, “philosophy of science provides normative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs ‘internal history’ and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of objective knowledge.”48 Second, philosophy of science makes rational judgment and selection of competitive scientific theories through analysis of cases in the history of science. “[T]wo competing methodologies can be evaluated with the help of (normatively interpreted) history.”49 Third, the external history of science is a necessary supplement to the internal history of science. “[A]ny rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psychological) ‘external history.’”50 Nonetheless, Lakatos further points out that the internal history of science is primary and rational, while the external history is secondary and irrational. He argues that rational reconstruction or internal history is primary, external history only secondary, since the most important problems of external history are defined by internal history. External history either provides non-rational explanation of the speed, locality, selectiveness, etc. of historic events as interpreted in terms of internal history; or, when history differs from its rational reconstruction, it provides an empirical explanation of why it differs.51

Crisis of Science 215 Rationalism still dominates Lakatos’s ideas, in which science is seen as a rational enterprise and the history of science as the record of the historical facts of the establishment of this enterprise. In this process of establishment, science moves toward general rationality. In comparison with logical empiricism, however, Lakatos has paid attention to the impacts of irrational external elements on the development of science. If Lakatos simply concedes to irrationalism in the history of science, then Kuhn, a major representative of historicism in philosophy of science, furthers such concession. He is similar to Lakatos in admitting the mutual influences between the internal and external histories of science. His distinction is shown in his emphasis on the critical roles of irrational psychology and social factors in the progress of science. Such emphasis is shown in two ways. First, Kuhn objects to the idea that internal history plays the primary role while external history is secondary. On the contrary, the development of science is a process of transitioning from a state in which external history plays the primary role to one in which internal history plays the primary role. Kuhn points out that [e]arly in the development of a new field…social needs and values are a major determinant of the problems on which its practitioners concentrate. Also during this period, the concepts they deploy in solving problems are extensively conditioned by contemporary common sense, by a prevailing philosophical tradition, or by the most prestigious contemporary sciences.52 Therefore, at this stage, among all the factors that influence scientific communities, social factors play the major part. It is with the gradual unification of ideas that scientific communities turn from external history to internal history. On the other hand, Kuhn underlines that paradigm is a historical category. He maintains that from the pre-science stage to the normal-science stage, the scientific community form conventions on paradigms. Yet no paradigm is universal. All paradigms have only relatively stable structures because they are formed under certain sociohistorical conditions and are historically rational only under these conditions. Therefore, according to Kuhn, all paradigms in the history of science are “incommensurable.” The selection of scientific theory is irrational. In comparison with Kuhn, Feyerabend is a radical historicist. In Farewell to Reason, he explicitly puts forward the slogan of “return to history”53 and thereby pushes the history of science to the cliché of irrationalism. Feyerabend first criticizes Lakatos’s division of the internal history and external history of science. In his view, there are more irrational elements and methods in the progress of science, so it is meaningless and impossible to distinguish internal history and external history according to the standard of rationality. He uses Copernicus’s theory as an example. Copernicus’s theory belongs to the internal history of science, but Galileo, in his arguments for his theories, uses irrational methods such as tactful persuasion skills, writing in Italian rather than Latin and resorting to people who demonstrate a disposition that objects to old ideas and related academic rules. Therefore, Copernicus’s theory belongs to the external history according

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to Lakatos’s standards. Not only does Feyerabend oppose Lakatos’s ideas, but he also refuses to acknowledge Kuhn’s arguments about the relatively stable structure of science at the stage of normal science. In Feyerabend’s opinion, scientific development is unceasing historical changes without any relatively stable general “structure” that is not overwhelmed by historicity.54 He explicitly contends that even the most abstract theory, while being ahistorical in its intention and exposition, is still historical in its application; science, as well as its philosophical predecessor, is part of a special historical tradition, instead of an entity that transcends all history.55 Therefore, Feyerabend concludes that irrational elements cannot be excluded from the development of science. Science’s triumph often relies on the support of irrational methods. 5.3.3   Scientific Boundary and the Legitimacy of Irrationalism Defense of the legitimacy of irrationality is also related to the alternative opinions regarding the boundary of science. In logical positivism and critical rationalism, the determination of the boundary of science follows a kind of monistic standard that is logical and rational. In terms of determining the boundary of science, logical positivism adheres to the standard of “justifiability” while radical rationalism adheres to “falsifiability.” From Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel to Popper, these philosophers all acknowledge the monistic standard that distinguishes science and non-science. They all believe that experience is absolutely reliable, that there is an “either/or” relationship between science and metaphysics and between science and pseudoscience, and that irrational elements play no part in distinguishing science and non-science. The rise of historicism leads to the relativization and irrationalization of the standards for determining the boundary of science. According to Kuhn, the socalled “justifiability” and “falsifiability” appear only in abnormal periods in the development of science. There is no such “fundamental” judgment and examination in regular research under normal conditions. Therefore, external standards are not sufficient to distinguish science from non-science. Instead, the establishment of a paradigm is the only mark of the maturity of science and the only standard for distinguishing science from non-science or pseudoscience. Paradigm involves metaphysical beliefs and other social, psychological and value elements, so it is difficult to clearly discern the boundary between science and metaphysics and that between science and non-science. It is in the clarification of doubts at the stage of normal science that science and non-science can be temporarily distinguished. During the time of “scientific revolution,” previous boundaries are blurred. Standards for determining the boundary of science change with the replacement of paradigm. In each specific historical period, the distinction between science and non-science mainly relies on scientific communities. Things that scientific communities consider as scientific and reasonable are scientific and reasonable. If Kuhn’s paradigm standard blurs the boundary of science, the difference between science and non-science completely disappears in Feyerabend’s theory,

Crisis of Science 217 in which the boundary of science becomes meaningless. Feyerabend pushes the influence of irrational elements in the progress of science to an extreme, coming up with methodological “anarchism.” He argues that the distinction between science and nonscience is not only artificial, but also harmful to the progress of knowledge. If we are going to understand nature and master our natural environment, we must take advantage of all ideas and all methods, instead of making narrow selections of them. Nevertheless, the assertion that “there is no knowledge outside science” is no more than another cheapest fairy tale.56 According to Feyerabend, in the development of science, it is difficult to compare competitive theories and determine which is more scientific because all theories play some roles in scientific activities. Simultaneously, Feyerabend sees science as a kind of culture among various cultures in the tradition of cultures. There is no difference in pluses and minuses between this culture and other kinds of culture. He points out that all statements, theories, opinions and proofs contribute to pushing culture toward pluralism. Even if they oppose each other, there is a reason for all of them to consider themselves real. There is not a single real story that replaces the reality of conflicting stories. Science no longer equals objective truth and rationality. It is merely one of various cultural traditions. There is no unique methodology. The boundary between science and non-science is illusory. Science, non-science and even pseudoscience are all cultural traditions, none of which is superior or inferior to others.57 The defenses of irrationalism demonstrate that philosophers of irrationalism, in their debates centered on scientific observation, the development of science and the boundary of science, have clarified the restrictedness of orthodox philosophy of science, especially logical empiricism. The contradiction between rationalism and irrationalism in the development of philosophy of science highlights the internal crisis of orthodox philosophy of science. The emphasis on metaphysics and irrational elements by philosophers of irrationalism is undoubtedly inspiring for challenging the purely static, logical and linguistic analysis in orthodox philosophy of science. Philosophers of irrationalism see the development of science as a dynamic and historical process characterized by plural methods. This view is more in accordance with the actual form of scientific progress. Nevertheless, we should also notice that philosophers of irrationalism one-sidedly overexaggerate the impacts of irrational elements on the level of methodology and completely debase the influences of rational methods, thereby pushing irrational methods to the limits. Overemphasis on the discontinuities among theories and the denial of even the stable structure of scientific theories in the development of science obliterate the objectivity of scientific theory and the relationship of inheritance among different theories. In terms of determining the boundary of science, although Feyerabend emphasizes that he does not object to science itself but only advocates cultural pluralization, his removal of the boundary between science and non-science leads to the interference of scientific progress by religion, wizardry and superstition and

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to the public’s confusion. As a result, philosophers of irrationalism go to another extreme in their criticism of logical empiricism.

Notes 1 There are two translations of this book in China. The first is The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by Zhang Qingxiong. It includes the first and second parts in the Crisis published by Husserl in his lifetime. The second is The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by Wang Bingwen. This version includes, in addition to the two parts published before Husserl’s death, the manuscripts of the third part that was unpublished. 2 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:3. 3 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:6. 4 T.D. Boer. The Development of Husserl’s Thought. Translated by Theodore Plantinga, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978:347. 5 R. Garaudy. The Future of Man. Translated by Xu Maoyong et al., Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1965:22. 6 E. Husserl. Selected Works of Edmund Husserl (Vol. 2). Edited by Ni Liangkang, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1997:966. 7 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:23. 8 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:48–49. 9 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:48–59. 10 Zheng Lan. “Translator’s Foreword.” Science in a Free Society, by P. Feyerabend, Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1990:9. 11 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:50. 12 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:12–13. 13 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:68. 14 M. Heidegger. What Is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968:8. 15 M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Martin Heidegger (Vol. 2). Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996:944. 16 M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Martin Heidegger (Vol. 2). Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996:944. 17 M. Heidegger. Selected Works of Martin Heidegger (Vol. 2). Translated by Sun Zhouxing, Shanghai: Shanghai SDX Joint Publishing Company, 1996:944. 18 T. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970:43–76. 19 O. Hoffё. Morals as the Price of Modernization. Translated by Deng Anqing et al., Shanghai: Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005:256. 20 Guo Guangyin and Yang Ming. Explorations of Heated Topics in Applied Ethics. Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2004:346. 21 Institute of Foreign Philosophy at Peking University. Documents of Foreign Philosophy (Vol. 5). Beijing: Commercial Press, 1980:178. 22 M. Wartofsky. Conceptual Foundation of Scientific Thoughts. Translated by Fan Dainian, Beijing: Qiushi Press, 1982:3.

Crisis of Science 219 23 E. Husserl. General Theory of Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Li Youzheng, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1996:160. 24 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:272. 25 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:135. 26 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:137. 27 E. Husserl. General Theory of Pure Phenomenology. Translated by Li Youzheng, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1996:49. 28 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:206. 29 E. Husserl. Philosophy as a Strict Science. Translated by Ni Liangkang, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1991:69. 30 E. Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970:177. 31 Zhang Yuanhong and Bai Xuehui. “The Historical Evolution of Philosophy of Irrationalism.” Study & Exploration, 2005(3). 32 Yang Ying. “Outline of the Thinking Mode of Philosophy of Irrationalism.” Journal of Xinjiang Normal University, 1998(1). 33 A. Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Representation (Vol. 1). Translated by E.F.J. Payne, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1969:3. 34 Liu Fangtong. Modern Western Philosophy (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Press, 1981:79. 35 Liu Fangtong. Modern Western Philosophy (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Press, 1981:91. 36 Liu Fangtong. Modern Western Philosophy (Vol. 1). Beijing: People’s Press, 1981:196. 37 Xia Jisong. Modern Western Philosophy. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2006:101. 38 H. Bergson. Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Liu Fangtong, Beijing: Commercial Press, 1963:65, 67. 39 A.J. Ayer. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Penguin Books, 1971:108–9. 40 According to Margaret Masteman’s study, Kuhn uses “paradigm” in not less than 21 different senses. See Imre Lakatos, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970:61–65. 41 P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). London: Verso, 1993:147. 42 P. Feyerabend. Realism, Rationalism & Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 43 P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). London: Verso, 1993:148. 44 P. Feyerabend. Realism, Rationalism & Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers (Vol. 1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981:135. 45 Liu Dachun. General Theory of Philosophy of Science. Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 1998:69–70. 46 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:102. 47 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:118. 48 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:102. 49 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:102. 50 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:102.

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51 I. Lakatos. The Methodology of Scientific Programmes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978:118. 52 T. Kuhn. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977:118. 53 P. Feyerabend. Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:318. 54 P. Feyerabend. Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:317. 55 P. Feyerabend. Farewell to Reason. Translated by Chen Jian et al., Nanjing: Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 2002:134. 56 P. Feyerabend. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). London: Verso, 1993:266. 57 Xiong Rui. The Conflicts and Integration of Two Cultures. Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2000:132.

6

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism and Its Reflection

The advancement of science and technology and their applications have given rise to a growing number of increasingly serious problems. The blind defenses of science in the past have been questioned. They have been replaced by the deconstruction and criticism of science, as well as the dismemberment and stripping of the scientific concepts shaped by orthodox philosophy of science. These ideas, which are established on the basis of criticism of science, reflect on and question modern science, once resulted in an anti-science trend. Scientism has rich contents, such as the views that science is unified, science has no boundary, scientific methods are objective, science is beneficial to human beings, etc. Among all these views, the most fundamental content is the idea that natural science is the only correct and objective method, of which the application can be extended to all fields including humanities and social sciences. Absolute uniqueness, the neutrality of value and restricted instrumental rationality are the basic characteristics of scientism.1 The deconstruction of scientism started along with the development of the philosophy of science itself from defense to criticism and then to reconsideration.2 In the history of philosophy of science, there are generally two ways of such deconstruction. First, deconstruction in the aspects of epistemology and methodology. Theories including W. Quine’s “two dogmas of empiricism,” Popper’s falsification and Feyerabend’s anarchism all criticize and deconstruct conventional methods of justification and the view that science is perfect. Second, deconstruction in the aspect of values. Theories such as Heidegger’s phenomenological view of science, Habermas’s arguments about “invisible ideology,” the Frankfurt School’s theories of social criticism and Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge criticize from different angles the theory of science being value-free. Even so, previous analysis of deconstruction is historical and vertical, discussing the ways of deconstruction through analysis of various periods and views of various schools. This chapter, however, attempts a deep analysis of the way of deconstructing scientism in a horizontal manner, focusing on various problems. Although there is a great diversity of ways of deconstruction in the philosophy of science, the main ways can be categorized into the following types.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003302568-9

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6.1  The    Disappearance of Scientific Objectivity After Western philosophy of science entered the period of “post logical positivism,” irrationalism rose in the philosophy of science along with the decline of logical positivism. Social constructivism is a relatively typical representative of such irrationalism. Starting from the 1970s, analyses of the causes, status and effectiveness of knowledge in natural science using theories of social constructivism have become the mainstream in Western academia. Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which originated from the University of Edinburg in Britain, brought social constructivism to its extreme. SSK is also known as the Edinburg School. Its main representatives include Bloor, Barnes, Shapin and early Pickering. Their representative works include Knowledge and Social Imagery, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge, Leviathan and the Air-Pump and About Science. SSK, though connected with previous sociology of science and sociology of knowledge, is not exactly the same as them. It attempts to extend Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge to natural science, analyze the social causes of scientific knowledge and further make SSK into an empirical science of naturalism. These are the main goals of this school. In terms of its theoretical tendency, SSK denies opinions of traditional philosophy and the general standards of rationality, objectivity and truth, and further deconstructs the conventional “standard view of knowledge.” It usually takes the positions of skepticism and agnosticism regarding science, claiming that it exposes and criticizes the “orthodox view of science” which has long dominated the philosophy of science, replaces descriptions of the objectivity of science with the social constructedness of science, and further makes explanation of the social, cultural, political causes of science. In order to achieve this goal, the first step of SSK is to deconstruct the objectivity of science. In orthodox philosophy of science, the objectivity of science is mainly shown in the objectivity of objects of science, scientific methods and criteria for judging scientific theories. SSK’s deconstruction of scientific objectivity is exactly targeted at these three aspects: the deconstruction of the objectivity of scientific objects with the social constructedness of science, the deconstruction of the objectivity of scientific methods with diversity in belief, and the deconstruction of the objectivity of criteria for judging science with the collectively negotiating nature of scientific communities. 6.1.1   The Deconstruction of the Objectivity of Scientific Objects with the  Social Constructedness of Science That scientific knowledge is characterized by objectivity is the center of the view of scientific objectivity that has been established on the basis of classical mechanics since the beginning of modern time. According to traditional views of scientific objectivity, scientific knowledge is the subject’s subjective reflection of natural objects. It is the result of subjective knowledge matching objective reality. Scientific knowledge is featured by objectivity that goes beyond the subject’s consciousness and by neutrality in values. Such understanding is extended to the idea

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 223 that scientific knowledge is “the mirror of nature.” It is empirical facts and logical rules that determine what is real science. Nature, as the primary and ultimate arbitrator and authenticator of scientific debates, plays a critical role. Theories from positivism to logical positivism all involve following theoretical presumptions: scientific facts are facts about the external objective world; scientific knowledge is positive knowledge, involving nothing that is unjustifiable; scientific facts do not rely on or reflect social reality.3 Nevertheless, SSK scholars argue that scientific knowledge is socially constructed. People do not select scientific theories according to principles of justification or falsification. Nature plays a very insignificant role, even no role, in the production of scientific knowledge. According to Barnes, the hypothesis in the standard view of science that fact is “endowed by experience” is not true. There are two reasons. First, for all the natural, obvious character of this assumption (that the facts are given by experience), it is beset by serious difficulties. The most serious of these arise because beliefs or statements are verbal formulations; hence, for them to arise from experience, experience must be categorized.4 Independent, pure observation language does not exist. “Their usage embodies some theoretical position or point of view, or else is so context dependent that (factual statement) needs explication in other terms if it is to become generally intelligible.”5 Barnes’s idea is similar to Hansen’s “theory-ladenness of observation.” Their difference is that Barnes pays more attention to the influence of social factors. In Barnes’s view, all scientific terms can be understood only in specific contexts. Contexts are collectively shared, and private language has no meaning. He points out that “observation languages, like other languages, are created, sustained and modified in interaction processes by negotiation in the sociological sense.”6 Therefore, “it will be valuable to reveal the social element in the definition of what are accepted facts.”7 Second, Barnes maintains that scientific knowledge is a kind of theoretical knowledge. It is acquired completely through theory instead of experience. The actual condition of scientific development is that facts rely on theory, instead of that theory comes from facts. He points out that “science is something entirely, instead of to some extent, theoretical. Scientific knowledge is the theories we or our predecessors invent. It is the theories that we still agree to use as the basis of our understanding of nature.”8 David Bloor, another representative of SSK, holds similar views and pushes them further. According to Bloor, all knowledge, including knowledge of natural science and that of social sciences, are socially constructed beliefs. He writes that [t]he knowledge of a society designates not so much the sensory experience of its individual members, or the sum of what may be called their animal knowledge. It is rather, their collective vision or visions of Reality. Thus the knowledge of our culture, as it is represented in our science, is not knowledge of a reality that any individual can experience or learn about for himself.9

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Therefore, Bloor contends that “[k]nowledge then, is better equated with Culture than Experience.”10 Not only does Bloor equal scientific knowledge with other forms of culture, but he also denies that scientific knowledge reflects objective reality. In the 1970s, in addition to the Edinburg School, SSK also included the Bath School, which was known for its micro-level method, and the Paris School, known for its anthropological method. Both of these two schools share commonalities with the Edinburg School. Harry Collins from the Bath School argues that nature plays a negligible role, and even no role, in the construction of scientific knowledge. It is the coincidental negotiations among scientists that really influence the construction. In The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science, Collins and Trevor Pinch point out that “[s]cience works the way it does, not because of any absolute constraint from Nature, but because we make our science the way that we do.”11 Previous understandings of scientific knowledge generally demonstrate the belief in the internal stability and consistence of nature. Based on such a view, people believe that science is able to make precise descriptions and explanations of the stable connections among things and processes in nature. Nonetheless, Michael Mulkay contends that the stability and consistency of nature, which science strives to explain, are not really the features of nature itself, but the results of scientists’ construction. Therefore, Mulkay believes that the consistence and stability of nature cannot function as the basis of scientists’ summary of nature. Scientists’ statements of facts are neither independent from theory nor eternally invariable in meaning. [T]he meaning of given factual statements will often differ for different sections of the scientific community…depending on how far these social groupings operate with divergent interpretative frameworks. Thus not only is the factual “basis” of science theory-dependent and revisable in meaning, but it also appears to be socially variable.12 Although SSK scholars differ from each other in their research methods and ideas, they share at least the following understandings: nature has no say in the knowledge of truth; science is not a highly subjective enterprise built upon empirical justification or falsification; nature does not determine the formation of scientific knowledge – instead, the social behaviors of scientists determine how to define natural laws.    of the Objectivity of Scientific Methods with  6.1.2  Deconstruction Diversity in Belief In the development of science, the objectivity of science is guaranteed by scientific methods and corresponding rules. Value factors such as morality do not have any influence in scientific methods. Since the rise of modern science, scientific methods have been playing the “holy” role of guaranteeing the objectivity of science. Traditional scientific methods have been established in modern

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 225 science. Conventional scientific methods can be summarized as rational methods and experimental methods.13 Specific methods of rational understanding include observation, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis. Scholars have summarized the features of these traditional scientific methods into two. The first is the separation between mind and substance, knowledge and value, and the introduction of causality and mechanism into science, most clearly demonstrated by the application and solid establishment of the experiment method. The second is the combination of experiment and observation with mathematical reasoning.14 In orthodox philosophy of science, the rational methods and experimental methods of science are to a large degree objective. Such objectivity is clearly shown particularly in the observation of facts and experiment data. In particular, in logical positivism, the objectivity of science is unquestionable. Based on the objectivity of scientific method and its effectiveness in natural science, scholars of logical positivism advocate the idea that methods of natural science are omnipotent and believe that they can be extended to all fields outside natural science and solve problems in these fields. Such an opinion has always been an important basis of the belief in logical positivism about the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, this opinion is questioned and even denied by SSK scholars. SSK scholars deconstruct the objectivity of scientific methods based on the diversity of beliefs. According to SSK scholars, scientific knowledge is a general belief that is social, just like other beliefs such as religion. In comparison with Kuhn’s emphasis on the influence of social factors in scientific discovery, SSK scholars advocating strong program push the argument further and maintain that social factors play the primary and decisive role in the formation of scientific theory. Bloor points out: “the ‘power’ that is implied by the term ‘strong’ indicates following concepts: all knowledge involves a certain social dimension, which will never be removed or transcended”15 On the basis of underscoring that knowledge has a social dimension, Bloor emphasizes that all scientific theories, methods, and acceptable scientific conclusions are accepted because people have accepted them as a kind of social convention, and they have thus lost the dimension of reflection. In fact, “These conventions are neither self-evident, universal or static. Further, scientific theories and procedures must be consonant with other conventions and purposes prevalent in a social group”.16 Apparently, Bloor denies the universality of scientific methods. In his view, all specific social environments impose conventional requirements on all sciences. “They are what we take for granted as the scientific method as it is practised in the various disciplines.”17 Nevertheless, Bloor contends that accepting scientific methods as a kind of convention is actually imposing a very strict rule of behavior on the process of spiritual construction, and such rules have formed a kind of convention. The problem is that the acceptance of scientific theory and its methods by a social group does not mean that the theory or its methods can become true. “There is nothing in the concept of truth that allows for belief making an idea true.”18 On the contrary to the “conventionality” of scientific methods, Bloor argues that scientific knowledge and its methods all come from beliefs in certain social construction. These beliefs are relative and determined by society, because due to the differences of time, social groups and

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ethnicity, people form different beliefs based on different “social imageries” and thereby acquire different kinds of knowledges. Therefore, Bloor maintains that “[s]cience is a set of concrete practices rather than an activity with an explicit methodology in the last analysis science is a pattern of behaviour and judgment whose grounds do not lie in any abstract verbal statements of universal standards.”19 Thereby, Bloor denies the objectivity of scientific methods on the basis of the diversity of beliefs. Barry Barnes, another representative of the Edinburg School, holds opinions similar to Bloor: there is no universal scientific methodology. According to Barnes, people consider diverse beliefs about nature as science, because they usually think that science contains a set of independent conventions of procedure and those of methodology. Barnes, however, denies this idea, pointing out that “[b]elief in the real existence of a universal ‘scientific method’ is the product of constant idealization; it cannot be sustained in the face of concrete accounts of the diversity of science.”20 Of course, he is not denying the general characteristics of science as a whole, that is, the mathematized, quantified, unique, abstract and theoretical features of modern science. Yet Barnes contends that although these features have methodological implications, and go some way towards describing a “scientific approach” to problems, they do not amount to a general methodology for science, since they do not get anywhere near a full specification of how scientific knowledge claims are to be evaluated.21 Barnes further argues that now that people intend to prove in this sense that there is a kind of general “scientific method,” scientists, as a whole, accepted and employed a set of methodological conventions or prescriptions such as, say, Popper’s. Or, at least, it would be necessary to show that the acceptance of our presently constituted scientific knowledge was intelligible in terms of such a set of conventions.22 Unfortunately, people are not able to achieve this goal, because there has always been a diversity of beliefs in existing scientific cultures. As a result, it seems that any convention people propose would inevitably lead to the loss of such a status in a rather large part of acknowledged science. This is not just because some sciences have coincidental causes that are not experimental, but also because scientific statements are not observable. “It is simply because scientists themselves do not possess any shared single set of conventions, whether for procedure or evaluation.”23 Barnes concludes that all attempts to make comprehensive descriptions of scientific methods are doomed to failure, because people always have diverse beliefs regarding methodology and procedure in their scientific practices, which result in diversified conventions. Eventually, [s]cientific activity is simply unintelligible in terms of distinctive general conventions; scientific knowledge claims have not been sifted by the application

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 227 of a single set of general standards. That the opposite is so often thought to be the case is a result of prior conviction, rather than detailed examination of scientific activity as it is conceived and performed.24 These opinions regarding scientific methods in strong program show that SSK scholars deny the objective and normative methodological rules in scientific activities by emphasizing the irrational element of scientific communities’ beliefs in scientific activities. The emphasis on the influence of irrational elements on scientific method has positive significance for a comprehensive understanding of the rationality of science. Nonetheless, exaggeration of the diversity of beliefs and the further denial of the relatively general significance of will undoubtedly push SSK to the quagmire of relativism. 6.1.3 Deconstruction of the Objectivity of Criteria for Evaluating Science with the Collectively Negotiating Nature of Scientific  Communities According to orthodox philosophers of science, the objective evaluation of scientific knowledge gives science a rational characteristic. From criteria of justification to criteria of falsification and then to the guiding principles of research, philosophers of science have always endeavored to provide a rational criterion for the evaluation of scientific knowledge. In their view, it is self-evident that scientific knowledge has objective, explicit and predetermined criteria. This is also the basic theoretic presumption of their study of the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, all these ideas appear problematic to SSK scholars. As far as the SSK scholars are concerned, it is no longer self-evident that the criteria for evaluating science are objective and predetermined. Scientific knowledge bears interests and social negotiations. The evaluation of scientific knowledge is in fact the result of collective negotiation among scientists and game among interests. In terms of the evaluation of scientific knowledge, criteria such as empirical facts, repetitive experiments, logical analysis, consistence with established knowledge and consistence with evidence do not offer rational defense for the correctness of scientific knowledge. On the contrary, the evaluation of science is more the result of collective negotiations among scientists based on their own interests. Negotiations under different circumstances are to some degree contingent. At the same time, they require scientists to have a certain level of literacy in rhetoric, linguistic skills, authority and the abilities to explain and use various symbolic and cultural resources. According to SSK scholars, the social negotiations in scientific knowledge have been neglected in previous sociology of knowledge and sociology of science. In the sociology of scientific knowledge, this issue should be a theme, so that the social causes of the formation of scientific knowledge can be studied. As Mulkay points out, “the social negotiation of knowledge in various kinds of scientific research context is a legitimate, indeed a fundamental and as yet largely unexplored, topic for the sociology of knowledge.”25

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Barnes, who is from the Edinburg School, maintains that the evaluation of scientific products, just like that of cultural products, demonstrates the purposes and demands of the actor. It also shows how these purposes and demands constitute specific norms of various groups. He points out that evaluation occurs by actors asking what the cultural products do, or they are simply found appropriate to particular needs and purposes and accepted without reflection. So it is within science; evaluation depends on actors’ purposes and requirements, and the way these cohere into normative patterns characteristic of different groups.26 First, Barnes contends that there is no general criterion for the evaluation of science at the stage of normal science in Kuhn’s theory of “paradigm.” He writes: a particular model, and its associated exemplars, may become evaluative standards in themselves, as a discipline passes into a period of “normal science”…But there is no uniformity either in the standards used in the original assessment of basic models and exemplars.27 Second, when existing scientific theory is attacked by anomalies, scientists, because they “cherish” their own accomplishments and aspirations, do not react to the anomalies in science, but expect that the problems will automatically be removed in the future. “Real, self-conscious, evaluations face the scientist only in choice situations.”28 Nonetheless, more realistically, the criteria, to which scientists resort under such circumstances, are still relative and subject to the limitations of the scientists’ own purposes. “Faced with such choices, a scientist’s response is not to be understood in terms of any general context-independent criteria.”29 Therefore, Barnes maintains that there is no general explanation for causalities in scientists’ evaluation of beliefs, purposes and actions in scientific theories and processes. Scientists understand the social causes of these beliefs, purposes and actions only according to their own reasons. He points out that “[i]n understanding the choices of scientists, it is apposite to examine their social role rather than the ‘logic’ of their situation.”30 Mulkay, another SSK scholar, expresses opinions similar to Barnes’s, maintaining that there is no general criterion for scientific knowledge, because criteria of evaluation are not independent from social environment. These criteria usually have different explanations, and they are endowed with meanings according to the particular academic tendencies, presuppositions and goals of particular scientists. Mulkay points out that the criteria used in evaluating theoretical claims, like those applied to particular observational reports, seem to vary in meaning in accordance with the context in which they are used. They cannot be regarded, therefore, as providing a means of assessing knowledge-claims which is independent of specific analytical commitments.31

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 229 Although certain broad conceptions have been identified in the philosophical literature as common bases for accepting or rejecting claims, these conceptions are necessarily interpreted by scientists in terms of particular theoretical ideas and specific analytical repertoires. The rules of evidence, criteria of consistency, and so on, in science are not rigid. They are certainly flexible enough to allow scientists considerable leeway in interpreting evidence so as to support well-entrenched assumptions… In short, contrary to the standard view, it seems that scientific knowledge is not stable in meaning, not independent of social context, and not certified by the application of generally agreed procedures of verification.32 Having denied the existence of general criteria for evaluating science, Mulkay further argues that so-called criteria for evaluating scientific theories are merely results of negotiations on social meanings within scientific communities. It involves influences from various subjective and social factors. Criteria for evaluating science are not objective. They are products of social construction. He writes: we cannot regard the production of knowledge as a simple consequence of conformity to any particular set of normative formulations. I have suggested instead that it is more appropriate to treat the norms of science as vocabularies which are employed by members in negotiating meanings for their own and their colleagues’ actions.33 The extent to which one interpretation rather than another becomes accepted by participants is the outcome of processes of social interaction or negotiation; that is, as members exchange views and attempt to convince, persuade and influence each other, these views may be modified, abandoned or reinforced… its outcome is influenced by such factors as members’ interests, their intellectual and technical commitments, members’ control over valued information and research facilities and the strength of their claim to scientific authority.34 SSK scholars do not think that there is any criterion for judging the truthfulness of scientific knowledge or for evaluating scientific theories, because any criteria for evaluation are imbued with various social factors such as scientists’ purposes, demands, interests and values. So-called criteria for evaluation are all socially constructed and involve “consensus” that scientists reach in their negotiations. Unlike orthodox philosophy of science, which considers scientific progress to be based on the contrast among the explanatory powers of successive theories regarding their explanations for nature, strong program deconstructs the orthodox criteria of scientific advancement through an epistemology that highlights social factors and group conventionalism. Such deconstruction further serves the deconstruction of the objectivity of science.

6.2  Questions    about Absolute Views of Science While different schools of SSK have different opinions, generally speaking, they all clearly demonstrate a relativist tendency, and SSK members openly admit

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it. Strong program is particularly notable in this respect. In the development of strong program, its members not only deconstruct the objectivity of science, but also challenge scientific realism, scientific positivism and scientism. They raise doubts from various perspectives such as social constructivism, conventionalism and cultural pluralism, and thereby deconstruct the above views of science. 6.2.1 Questioning Reality with Construction Scientific realism is a kind of realism. Its revival originates from the reflections on and criticism of the tradition of analytical philosophy. It develops on the basis of ontological realism. Scholars of scientific realism have diverse perspectives in their studies, including the perspectives of ontology, epistemology, semantics and convergence theory. While perspectives in studies of scientific realism are too numerous to enumerate, there are certain agreements among them. These agreements are demonstrated mainly in two aspects. First, the acknowledgment of connections between science and reality. All concepts in science point to corresponding existences in the external world. Second, science is closely connected with truth. Scientific theories truthfully or approximately describe the external world.35 It is in these two aspects that scientific realism and SSK are involved in debates. Specifically speaking, typical scientific realism contends that there is only one kind of truth that people obtain through true description of the objective world. These are the scientific theories that demonstrate the agreement between subjective knowledge and objective reality. There are one-to-one correspondences between scientific theories and objective reality. The truthfulness of a proposition is determined by whether it makes statements about the truth of things as it originally is. These opinions belong to the correspondence theory of truth, which acknowledges that linguistic truth and non-linguistic reality not only correspond with each other, but also agree with each other. According to this view, the only thing that determines scientific truth is the objective things that exist independently from people’s ideas or experiences. People’s beliefs do not play any role in truthfulness. No matter what kind of beliefs a scientist holds and what kind of methods he or she adopts, his or her beliefs and methods do not influence the truthfulness of propositions and statements about the external world. These ideas of scientific realism are challenged by SSK scholars, who, though they do not deny truth directly, disagree with the view of truth in scientific realism. First, Bloor attacks the relationship of signification between theory and reality. He argues that the concept of truth in scientific realism is blurry. There are no one-to-one correspondences between theory and reality. When people describe the correspondences between theory and reality, they often use terms such as “fit,” “match” and “picture.” There is not a more accurate or superior one among these terms. “The relation of correspondence between knowledge and reality on which it hinges is difficult to characterize in an illuminating way.”36 Therefore, Bloor proposes that sociologists of scientific knowledge should not be obsessed with defining the concept of truth but change their research perspectives and adopt new

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 231 research methods. These new research methods do not focus on the definition of truth or the relationship of signification between theory and reality, but explore what people do with the concept of truth and how the concept of “correspondence” actually functions. Second, Bloor argues that the so-called truth is not the correspondence between theory and reality, but that between theory and theory. He points out that [t]he indicator of truth that we actually use is that the theory works. We are satisfied if we achieve a smoothly operating theoretical view of the world. The indicator of error is the failure to establish and maintain this working relationship of successful prediction.37 These words demonstrate Bloor’s acknowledgment of the fact that people do actually use the correspondence theory of truth. The problem, however, is that “[t]his is not the correspondence of the theory with reality but the correspondence of the theory with itself.”38 People usually consider the judgment of a theory as an internal process, which Bloor views as a mistake. Truth is not the product of the correspondence between theory and reality. Therefore, the consideration of the judgment of theory as an internal process covers up the “real” relationship of the correspondence between theory and theory. Third, Bloor maintains that not only correspondence does not exist between theory and reality, but their relationship is actually blurry, because “[a]t no stage is this correspondence ever perceived, known or, consequently, put to any use. We never have the independent access to reality that would be necessary if it were to be matched up against our theories.”39 Last, Bloor objects to the argument of scientific realism and contends that truth is not unrelated to beliefs. On the contrary, truth is a kind of belief, of which the uniqueness lies merely in the fact that it is the belief of scientists. The processes of scientific thought can all proceed, and have to proceed, on the basis of internal principles of assessment. They are moved by the perception of error as it crops up within the terms of our theories, purposes, interests, problems and standards.40 As people’s beliefs are diverse, scientists have diverse purposes and demands. As a result, “[t]here are as many forms of correspondence as there are requirements.”41 Therefore, Bloor proposes that “we should sort and select beliefs, that we should affirm them and garland consensus with authority, and that we should instinctively relate beliefs to an external environment of causes is all very easy to accept.”42 His words show that he does not only deconstruct, from a stance of relativism, the view of truth in scientific realism, but also demonstrates the theoretical tendency of strong program, which considers truth as socially constructed. SSK’s deconstruction of the view of truth in scientific realism from the stance of relativism is shown not only in its deconstruction of the correspondence theory

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of truth, but also in its question of the view of truth in the convergence theory of truth. According to the convergence theory of truth, the development of science is the process in which theories continuously approach objective truth. This is obviously a lesser version of scientific realism in terms of the view of truth. Nevertheless, this lesser view of truth is still not accepted by SSK scholars. Social constructivists believe that, just like the manufacture of products in factories, science is an activity of manufacturing knowledge (concepts, theories, ideas, and facts). The scientific faiths which scientists form in the process of manufacturing knowledge are determined by social factors. Scientific knowledge is the product of social construction instead of social discovery. Therefore, the verisimilitude of science is not verisimilitude in the real sense, but an appearance and a phenomenon. It is the verisimilitude fabricated artificially. It is formed with theoretical trends, social metaphors, and specific psychological prejudices. To be more specific, the emergence of verisimilitude is actually a kind of self-satisfaction of scientists. It is arguments made with unproved hypotheses.43 SSK scholars’ understanding of science from the perspectives of sociology of scientific knowledge, anthropology and culturology has merit. It reveals the deficiencies in modern views of science, that is, the uncertainties of empirical facts in comparison with theory, and to some extent explains the causes of relativity in scientific theory. Nevertheless, they overemphasize the influences of social factors (including many irrational factors) in the construction of scientific knowledge and downplay the objectivity of scientific theory. In this way, thy contribute to the rise of anti-science sentiments. 6.2.2 Question Certainty by Examining Its Contextual Nature Traditional views of science usually consider scientific knowledge to be characterized by certainty. For example, positivism pursues the meaningfulness and justifiability of propositions. In positivism, as long as science meets these two standards, it is featured by certainty and effectiveness. Although other schools of philosophy of science have opinions different from those of positivism, defending the certainty of scientific knowledge has been the ardor of many Western philosophers of science. Nonetheless, SSK scholars deconstruct certainty, which orthodox philosophy of science defends. Karin D. Knorr-Cetina from Austria is very accomplished in this respect. The contextual nature of scientific cognition is Cetina’s powerful weapon for deconstructing the certainty of scientific knowledge. “Context” refers to a thing’s internal connections and connections with things before and after it. In Cetina’s view, the concept of “context” in sociology of scientific knowledge refers to “the fabric of situated variables.”44 Scientists make decisions based on these variables. According to Cetina, contextual variables mainly include the social and cultural environments of individual scientists and groups of scientists. “Contexts” formed

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 233 by these kinds of variables constitute the internal and external environments in which individual scientists or groups of scientists construct scientific knowledge. These environments do not rely on the structure of nature. They are the determining elements in the ever-changing and dynamic “networks of cognition” in social construction. Cetina argues that the production of scientific knowledge is a process with a contextual nature, or in other words, a process based on a contextualized model. Scientific knowledge is not, as traditional views of science argue, characterized by certainty. On the contrary, in this contextualized model, scientific knowledge is more featured by uncertainty. Such uncertainty is mainly demonstrated by the constructed nature of scientific facts, the contingence of the context of discovery, and the selectivity of choices of theory. Cetina, starting from micro studies of laboratories, deconstructs the certainty of scientific knowledge from these three aspects. First, the constructed nature of scientific facts. With regard to scientific facts, traditional views of science, such as the views of philosophers of science in logical empiricism and some of those with a positive stance, consider the world as constituted by facts. The goal of scientific knowledge is to provide explanations for the reality of the world. The empirical laws and theoretical propositions in science are the theoretical representations of this goal. According to these views, realistic reflections of objective facts are the important precondition and foundation of the formation of scientific theories. The examination of scientific laws and theoretical propositions is about explanation and justification. It is the construction of the world according to the logic of scientific procedure. Cetina, however, does not consider scientific facts, which traditional views of science see to be dependent on nature, as the basis of scientific theories. “[F]acts are not something we can take for granted or think of as the solid rock upon which knowledge is built.”45 In contrast, scientific theories are not descriptive, but constructive. Scientific facts are not acquired through observation but manufactured by scientists in laboratories. Cetina points out that [r]ather than considering scientific products as somehow capturing what is, we will consider them as selectively carved out, transformed and constructed from whatever is. And rather than examine the external relations between science and the “nature” we are told it describes, we will look at those internal affairs of scientific enterprise which we take to be constructive.46 In such studies, “the problem of facticity is relocated and seen as a problem of (laboratory) fabrication.”47 Through micro studies of laboratories, Cetina concludes that most of the entities that scientists deal with are not “nature” or “realities,” but are completely artificial or largely prefabricated. The vocabulary with which scientists analyze these constructed facts is merely obtained from conversations in laboratory, which is a context of knowledge workshop. It is through conversations that scientists instrumentally manufacture knowledge. Their concerns with such “artificial” facts are stronger than their concerns with “truth” and “nature,”

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which become the victims in the context of laboratory. As Cetina argues, “the products of science are contextually specific constructions, which bear the mark of the situational contingency and interest structure of the process by which they are generated, and which cannot be adequately understood without an analysis of their construction.”48 Second, the contingency of the context of discovery. In terms of the justification and discovery of scientific theory, traditional views of science usually consider the context of justification and that of discovery as separate and independent from each other. Justification is the process of the formation of consistency within the scientific community. Scientific discovery does not have to rely on related external environments. Nevertheless, Cetina sees such a view as incorrect. In her idea, the contextual nature of scientific discovery is highly contingent. On the one hand, scientists are influenced by scientific communities and external social environments in their production of knowledge. [I]f we look at the process of knowledge production in sufficient detail, it turns out that scientists constantly relate their decisions and selections to the expected response of specific members of this community of ‘validators’, or to the dictates of the journal in which they wish to publish…In short, the discoveries of the laboratory are made, as part and parcel of their substance, with a view towards potential criticism or acceptance (as well as with respect to potential allies and enemies!).49 On the other hand, the achievements in scientific discovery are closely related with the environment of discovery, instead of scientific facts. The achievements of discovery that scientists accomplish in laboratories are determined by who comes up with the results, and where and how research is conducted. Scientists speak about the motives and interests which presumably gave rise to the “finding”, about the material resources available to those who did the research, and about “who stands behind” the results. They virtually identify the results…with the circumstances of their generation.50 Therefore, scientific facts do not play a decisive part in the response to arguments about scientific knowledge. Instead, scientific communities themselves attach decisive significance to the context of discovery. Third, the selectivity of choice of theory. Regarding the choice of scientific theory, traditional views of science consider the acceptance or justification of a theory by scientists to be a process in which consistency is formed. Such consistency is usually seen as the collective of individual scientists’ views, and the process of forming consistency is seen as a “rational” process. In fact, this is related to the understanding about the process of justification. Many orthodox philosophers of science tend to consider justification to be outside the laboratory. In this aspect, Cetina holds a contrary view. She argues that the justification of theory not only happens in the laboratory, but it is also related with an

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 235 important step – selection. She points out that “[t]o view scientific investigation as constructive rather than descriptive is to see scientific products as highly internally constructed in terms of the selectivity they incorporate.”51 Cetina contends that if we see scientific achievements as constructive, the most important step of it is selection. In the laboratory, scientists construct scientific achievements through selection. The process in which scientists continuously make selections is restricted by factors such as the environment, previous scientific theories, and the interests of scientific communities. Therefore, scientists’ choices of theory are selective, which makes scientific theory uncertain. First, scientists’ choice of experimental equipment is uncertain. For instance, when we ask why scientists choose a specific kind of scientific equipment, their answers are full of uncertainty. Possible responses may include “Because it’s expensive and rare,” “It’s more economical in terms of energy” and “John suggested it and showed me how to use it.” Some scientists may even respond by asking “Well, what else could you do?”52 Second, scientists are influenced by various contexts in their choices of certain scientific arguments: “lunchtime chats, discussions following a speech, or in regard to an article which someone has just read and found reason to comment on.”53 Scientists’ choices of opinions are exactly determined by arguments in the context of articulation, which do not necessarily stay consistent in different contexts. Lastly, scientists are influenced by existing theories when they construct scientific knowledge. “[S]cientific knowledge is progressively reconstructed knowledge based upon the integration or elimination of earlier results, and that this reconstruction is a process of complexification.”54 “Previous scientific selections become a resource for further selections, and thus give rise to both a selective solidification and a diversification of scientific products.”55 In Cetina’s view, it is not certainty but uncertainty that plays a significant role in the construction of scientific knowledge. [W]ithout indeterminacy there could be no such increase of information…It becomes manifest in the observer’s inability to specify in detail a small set of criteria or a principle of rationality according to which (the construction after existing theories are integrated or deconstructed in scientific knowledge) proceeds.56 In other words, Cetina maintains that the construction of scientific knowledge is fundamentally social. In this process, various factors such as the social characteristic of the interactions among discourses, the social interactions and negotiations in scientific communities, and the contextual nature of the construction of laboratories make scientific knowledge full of uncertainties. 6.2.3 Question the Authority of Science with Cultural Relativism SSK demonstrates a strong tendency of relativism, which is demonstrated by not only SSK scholars’ emphasis on the relativity of the form of scientific knowledge,

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but also their emphasis that all knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, is relative. Knowledge is beliefs based on social imageries. SSK scholars underscore the close connections between scientific knowledge and social situations, contending that there is no essential difference between scientific knowledge and other forms of knowledge. They argue that only with relativist explanations of the content of scientific knowledge and analyses of its relationship with sociocultural factors can we really grasp the image of modern science. In order to achieve this goal, some SSK scholars see science as a kind of culture. They question the authority of science by means of cultural relativism. Main representatives in this aspect include Barnes and Mulkay, who raise relativist questions about the authority of scientific culture from the following three aspects. First, the formation of scientific knowledge is restricted by other cultural resources. Barnes argues that science is a highly divided culture. The continuity throughout changes and the cultural cohesiveness in science make it a system of social control above other cultures. He points out that “science itself, as a culture, is very highly differentiated into disciplines and specialties. Increasingly, the scientific specialty is being treated as a relatively autonomous sub-culture with an extensively differentiated system of social control.”57 Nevertheless, in his view, there is no significant difference between scientific culture and other cultures. Science is a part of culture. The formation of scientific knowledge is not purely achieved in scientific research, but to a large extent depends on other cultural resources. Scientific theories formed on the basis of effective exploitation of existing cultures are only a kind of metaphor. He explicitly argues that “a theory is a metaphor created in order to understand new, puzzling or anomalous phenomena, either in terms of a familiar, well ordered part of existing culture, or in terms of a newly constructed representation or model.”58 By pointing out the metaphoric nature of science, Barnes clarifies science’s dependence on other cultures. In his words, “[t]o show the metaphorical nature of thought is to show the culture bound nature of thought.”59 In terms of the dependence of scientific culture on other cultures, Mulkay holds a view similar to Barnes’s. He pays much attention to the influences of cultures on science in the general social environment. According to Mulkay, scientific knowledge is a cultural product contingent on situations. It is inseparable from the general environment of society. [T]he supposed scientific ethos is merely part of the cultural repertoire of science, and by no means necessarily the most important part of the creation of scientific knowledge. There is no longer, therefore, any reason to expect that science is best created in a social vacuum where institutionalized democratic values allow disinterested researchers to formulate the “one correct account of the physical world.”60 “There is in practice a continual cultural exchange between science and the wider society.” The explanatory resources of external cultures enter science mainly through informal thinking.

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 237 They are refined and modified in the course of informal negotiation; and they are allowed into the public annals of science only after appropriate reformulation. These interpretative resources are not generated by the “facts of nature”, nor by the social life of a segregated research community alone. They must be understood at least in part as products of the social processes of society at large.61 In terms of the metaphoric nature of science, Mulkay completely agrees with Barnes. He further maintains that it is exactly because that scientific knowledge is restricted by other cultures, scientific culture is not so effective as positivists assume. On the contrary, scientists legitimize scientific knowledge precisely because they exploit explanatory resources in non-scientific external cultures such as philosophy, theology, and social debates. The major interpretations proposed were not based directly on observation of biological phenomena. Rather they were taken over from practical activities and from the wider realm of philosophical, theological and social debate to provide the framework within which observations were given their scientific meaning.62 Second, the absence of difference between the transmission of scientific culture and that of other cultures. Barnes maintains that from the perspective of cultural transmission, the transmission of scientific culture, like that of other cultures, aims at convincing people of the knowledge that scientists diffuse. In the process of transmission, scientists simplify scientific knowledge in order to make it more convincing. In addition, scientists always spread successful examples in scientific theories. They do not instruct to people the rational rules and general methods of science or the standards of construction of theories. As a result, the cultural transmission of science is not significantly different from the process of the transmission of other cultures. “Like the prophet, the astrologer and the witch-doctor, the teacher of science will have to deal with the problem of his own credibility; he is faced with the task of transmitting lore.”63 Even so, “within science itself, devices to maximize credibility, and lubricate the mechanisms of culture transmission, have become institutionalized, and remain of interest.”64 In other words, [s]cience is not a special kind of knowledge source; it has to face the problem of credibility, and the technical constraints facing the transmission of culture in any context. The context of scientific training comprises an interlinked system of models, exemplary procedures and techniques meaningful only in combination. There is no attempt to transmit rationality rules…Neither is there any attempt to teach a general “scientific method”…there is no attempt at any level of training to discuss formally what makes a good theory, or what general criteria can be employed in the assessment of new work.65 Third, the application of scientific culture is restricted by external political backgrounds. In traditional analysis of science and politics, scientific culture is seen

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as a set of standard social norms and knowledge unrestricted by environment. Mulkay strongly objects to such a view. He advocates historical study of the relationship between science and politics, and insists on a kind of revisionist view of scientific culture, which “(shows) that when scientists have entered the political context they have drawn selectively on their cultural repertoire in a way which has furthered their collective interest.”66 With such a view, Mulkay contends that scientists’ typical explanations of the nature of science and values of science are highly insufficient. The standard norms that scientists use in political environment are not the mode of knowledge that they see as the only correct and viable one with internal value. On the contrary, scientists are restricted by political environment and collective interests when thy use this mode of norms. Mulkay points out that “[w]e would expect…that scientists occupying differing positions in a political context would often bring different presuppositions to bear and that their informal reasoning would be subtly influenced by the assumptions of the group to which they were affiliated.”67 Therefore, scientists’ explanations of scientific and technological knowledge are often restricted by their political stances. Specifically speaking, scientists’ entry into the political arena affects their interpretation of their technical culture in three ways: it influences their definition of technical problems; it influences the choice of assumptions introduced in the course of informal reasoning; and it subjects scientists to the requirement that their conclusions be politically useful.68 Mulkay concludes that all fields of scientific research are characterized by a contextual nature. In specific contexts, scientists may have several different rational opinions about the same theory or the same technological culture, but there is not an opinion that is more correct than others. Political responsibilities and stresses from the political environment play the most prominent role in scientists’ choices of these opinions.

6.3 Confront Modernism with Postmodernism In contemporary philosophy of science, in which numerous schools contend with each other, postmodernist intellectuals’ views of science are an unmissable landmark. Postmodernism, as a trend of thinking, rose in the 1960s and 1970s and became extremely popular in academia after the 1980s. Postmodernism was born on the basis of criticisms of modernity and modernism. It started in literature and arts and gradually permeated into sociology, history, political studies and philosophy. The trend of postmodernism has made destructive impacts on the ideological and cultural fields and the traditional mode of thinking in contemporary Western society. In the broad sense, postmodernism is also a kind of humanism. Nevertheless, this kind of humanism is very different from traditional humanism. If traditional humanism sticks to spiritual features such as

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 239 progressiveness, ideal, a high state of ideas, profundity, sublimity, and ultimate concerns, postmodernism deconstructs all these features under the names of pluralism, absence of center, anti-metadiscourse, anti-metanarrative, anti-essentialism, and anti-system.69 Such a prominent feature is fully demonstrated by the postmodern view of science. Postmodernism, in its attempt to deconstruct the authority of scientific knowledge, the epistemology of science and traditional studies of the history of science, highlights the spirit of criticism and deep anxieties about the fate of human beings. At the same time, postmodernism’s reflections on and criticisms of science demonstrate the unique and heretical perspectives with which postmodern intellectuals view science. Their basic understandings about science make subversive impacts on orthodox philosophy of science and force contemporary philosophers of science to confront the challenges postmodern views of science pose to orthodox philosophy of science. 6.3.1 Heretical Views of Science in Postmodern Philosophy of Science As a movement of philosophy, postmodern philosophy aims to deconstruct and subvert theories of modernist philosophy. “The consciousness of ending” is the common propensity shared by postmodern philosophers, who intend to not only end all traditional philosophy, but end all traditional cultures, which of course include scientific culture. It is in this postmodernist movement, which advances towards the ending of modernism, that postmodernism joins the philosophy of science and thereby gives rise to the postmodern philosophy of science. In comparison with orthodox philosophy of science, postmodern philosophy of science does not constitute a school, because postmodern philosophers of science do not concentrate on a specific problematic and have no unified line of research. Nonetheless, with the consciousness of ending and faith in subverting everything, they use similar methods of deconstruction. The prominent feature of postmodern philosophy of science can be summarized as “family resemblance,”70 which is epitomized by the heretical views with which postmodern philosophers of science examine science. 6.3.1.1 Anti-Fundamentalism Fundamentalism believes that knowledge has its objective basis and criteria for evaluation, which are powerful guarantees for knowledge to approach truth. For instance, experience is the objective basis of knowledge recognized by empiricism. Rationality is the objective basis of knowledge recognized by rationalism. Meaning and justification are the effective criteria with which logical empiricism evaluates science. Falsification is the effective criterion critical rationalism uses to evaluate science. Paradigm is the effective criterion historicism uses to distinguish normal science and scientific revolution. Nevertheless, postmodern philosophers of science argue that no one is able to find the Archimedean point which functions

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as the objective basis and criterion of evaluation of scientific knowledge. The pursuit of the so-called oneness in scientific epistemology kills people’s creativity and imagination. Only by seeking for incommensurability, uncertainty, difference and diversity, and by advocating a pluralist epistemology, can we restore the original complexity of the world. 6.3.1.2 Anti-Essentialism Essentialism believes that in this world, phenomenon is different from essence. There is always a unified, general, shared and unique essence of things behind diverse and varied phenomena. The task of science is to reveal the essence of things behind complicated phenomena. When people’s subjective knowledge matches objective reality, the knowledge they achieve is scientific truth, otherwise, it is false knowledge or fallacy. In logical empiricism, essentialism is shown by the pursuit of “real knowledge” which is justified to a certain degree. The progress of science is the accumulation of this “real knowledge.” Postmodern philosophy of science, however, argues that there is not an essence of things, nor is there any “truth” in an objective sense. Scientific knowledge, which essentialism considers to be objective and reflective of the essence and laws of things, is merely a kind of “discourse” or “metanarrative.” It changes along with history and contexts and goes beyond specific history or contexts. Scientific knowledge does not provide any knowledge about entities. The so-called scientific knowledge is merely “consensus” that people reach through negotiations. Therefore, the antiessentialist approach of ideas in postmodern philosophy of science denies scientific “discourse” and “metanarrative,” and advocates the rules of the language game and small narrative. 6.3.1.3 Advocation of “Crisis of Representation” and Denial of the Existence of Truth To “represent” means to bring the object to thought, that is, to represent the object by man. This process requires the participation of a medium, because it is impossible for the subject to directly integrate the object into thought. In modern philosophy, “concept” plays the role of medium. After the linguistic turn in modern philosophy, language has replaced concept to be the medium between man and the representation of object. Western philosophy of science, in which the linguistic turn originated, inherits the paradigm of representationalism, seeing science as the representation of the external world, and considering theories and propositions that have been logically and linguistically analyzed as the representational medium between the subject and the external world. Such a view of science in representationalism has dominated Western philosophy of science for a long time. Logical positivism, historicism and scientific realism can all be categorized as representationalism, because they all consider science as the activity of understanding the representational world, and see theory, statements, concepts and propositions as objects of priority for examination. Nevertheless, the postmodern philosophy of

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 241 science objects to this representationalist view of science and instead emphasizes the “crisis of representation.” Its approach of thought involves cognitive activities from an anti-subject, or in other words, de-subject, angle. In this way, postmodern philosophers of science have denied not only the objectivity of scientific knowledge, but also the truth. Now that science cannot be viewed as a representation of the external world, truth in cognition is completely deconstructed. For example, Feyerabend argues that there is no distinction between true and false or between good and bad in scientific theory. Arthur Fine strongly claims that truth is basically fabricated by realists who insist on representationalism. Van Fraassen also maintains that the essence of scientific activities is not to acquire truth through the representational media of theory and faith. 6.3.1.4 Reject Metaphysics and Promote the Ending of Philosophy of Science Anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism and anti-representationalism in postmodern philosophy of science inevitably lead to the rejection of traditional philosophy or metaphysics, because the pursuit of truth in traditional Western philosophy can be realized only on the basis of ontology and epistemology that are certain. Once philosophy is denied, philosophy of science comes to its end, because the philosophy of science is inseparable from philosophy, which has been proved by history. For instance, Einstein points out that science, without the help of philosophy, will become primitive and chaotic. Max Born also realizes that science is intertwined with ideas of philosophy. Inadequate understandings about philosophical literature results in the failure of scientific work. Engels points out more explicitly: natural scientists, no matter what kind of attitude they hold, are always dominated by philosophy. 6.3.2   Deconstruction of Science: Coexistence of Knowledge and Power The view of science in postmodern deconstructivism has a unique theoretical propensity to understand and reflect on science from the dimension or construction of power. French philosopher Michel Foucault has made particularly significant contributions in this aspect. Foucault’s approach is to associate science with power and deconstruct the authority of scientific knowledge. Specifically speaking, Foucault’s scientific knowledge/power view involves the following aspects: 6.3.2.1 Biopower Replaces Sovereign Power: The Rise of Knowledge/ Power Coexistence According to Foucault, the association between knowledge and power starts with the transition of power. Specifically speaking, at the same time when biopower replaces sovereign power, knowledge and power form a relation of coexistence. The so-called biopower is defined in contrast to sovereign power. In Foucault’s

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view, sovereign power is the power that determines life and death. It is a power that “makes” others die or live. “Power in this instance was essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it.”71 Nevertheless, starting from the classical period,72 the mechanism of power has been profoundly changed. This change is mainly shown in the replacement of sovereign power, which stresses killing and acquisition, with biopower, which emphasizes life. The so-called biopower is “the positive power that improves, manages, reproduces, controls and regulates life. It plays its role on the levels of life, human beings, races, and population.”73 6.3.2.2 The Essence of Knowledge/Power Coexistence What is the “coexistence” of knowledge and power? We can approach its implications from three aspects. First, “coexistence” is shown by the mutual dependence between knowledge and power. Foucault contends that knowledge and power are mutually dependent. As long as we exert power, we have to consider scientific knowledge; in turn, our consideration of scientific knowledge inevitably involves the exertion of power. In modern society, knowledge and power have formed a knowledge/truth-power “symbiote.” Like conjoined brothers, they form a structure of “one body with two sides.” Second, “coexistence” is demonstrated by the fact that power guarantees the environment for the production of scientific knowledge and that scientific knowledge itself functions as power. “coexistence” does not mean mutual production. It does not mean that power produces truth, or that knowledge is power. Instead, it means that power guarantees the environment for the production of knowledge. “A power is not related with ignorance. On the contrary, it is connected with the whole series of mechanisms of the constitution, investment, accumulation, and growth of knowledge.”74 In addition, scientific knowledge itself functions as power. It is not enough to say that science is a set of procedures by which propositions may be falsified, errors demonstrated, myths de mystified, etc. Science also exercises power: it is, literally, a power that forces you to say certain things, if you are not to be disqualified not only as being wrong, but, more seriously than that, as being a charlatan.75 Last, “coexistence” is demonstrated by truth’s defense for the legitimacy of power. The operation of power requires truth to provide the basis for its rationality. Foucault points out that “to a large extent, our society is ‘marching towards truth’. What I mean is that this society produces and circulates discourses that function as truth and thereby sustains its operation and acquires certain power.”76 “Without certain economics of the discourse of truth in power, starting from power, and operating through power, power cannot be exercised.”77

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 243 6.3.2.3 “The Discipline of Knowledge”: The Formation of the Scientific Knowledge/Power Mode Foucault argues that the functional form of knowledge/power came into being in the 18th century. This is the “discipline of knowledge.” The so-called “discipline of knowledge” is a kind of “massive and complicated combats, not between knowledge and ignorance, but between some knowledge and others—knowledges oppose each other through their own forms, their antagonist masters, and the consequences of their internal powers.”78 It means that the “discipline of knowledge” is demonstrated by the struggles among different kinds of knowledge. The essence of these struggles is merely the operation of power and the division and conflicts among different subjects that master knowledge. The “discipline of knowledge” is the struggle among powers, because it is accomplished mainly through the state’s direct or indirect interference. The state’s interference is achieved primarily through the selection of knowledge, the regularization of knowledge, the determination of the hierarchy of knowledge and the concentration of knowledge. Through these four ways, the discipline of knowledge remained underway throughout the whole 18th century. Before the 18th century, there had been no “mathematic” but only “mathematics,” knowledge and philosophy. After the beginning of the 18th century, however, science was born as the result of the discipline of knowledge. Science became the policeman who, under the name of truth, examined various accounts of knowledge according to scientific norms, and correspondingly divided knowledge into forms such as natural science and humanities, science and non-science, science and pseudoscience, formal science and experimental science. Such division led to the thawing of epistemology and gave birth to new forms and new rules that gave rise to the prosperity of knowledge. Most importantly, it produced a new mode of relationship between knowledge and power, that is the scientific-power mode, which replaced the truth-power mode. Since then, science has established its hegemony. 6.3.2.4 The Regime of Truth: The Product of Scientific Knowledge/Power Practice According to Foucault, after the emergence of the scientific knowledge/power mode, the coexistence between science and power eventually led to the formation of the regime of truth in modern society. What is the regime of truth? This is first related with Foucault’s understanding of truth. In Foucault’s opinion, “truth is the whole set of regular procedures related with the production, laws, distribution, circulation, and functions of discourses.”79 “Truth” in Foucault’s opinion is not the truth in the correspondence theory of truth according to traditional scientific epistemology. It is a kind of truth that is based on discourse. For Foucault, the sole criterion for testing truth is not social practice, but the power of discourse. In fact, Foucault does not acknowledge at all that there is any “purely objective” fact that is external to consciousness and functions as the criterion of truth. In his idea, the so-called “fact” is no more than the construction by dominant discourses.

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The development of truth is the result of struggles among subjects who master knowledge. Foucault’s idea is a kind of “anti-science” view of truth. Based on his understanding of truth, Foucault contends that all societies have their own regimes of truth. They all have their general policies about truth, that is, the general policies about various discourses that are accepted by the societies and allowed to function as real things. They all have regimes and institutions functioning to distinguish true and false discourses, as well as methods to determine true and false discourses. They all have technologies and procedures for acquiring truth. They all have the responsibility to tell the status of people who function as true things”.80 “Truth is connected through circulation with certain regimes of power that produce and support it, and it is connected with the effects of power that is triggered by it and allows it to continue its circulation. This is the regime of truth.81 The regime of truth is the product of the mutual permeation and mutual support between science and power in institution and practice. Regarding the politicaleconomic characteristics of truth in history, Foucault points out the following five features: truth is centered on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions that produce this discourse; it receives continuous stimulation from economy and politics (the demand of economic production and political power for truth); it becomes the object of wide spread and consumption in various forms (it circulates in a relatively wide range of educational institutions or news agencies in the social body); it is produced and transmitted under the exclusive but dominant supervision by certain massive political or economic machines (universities, armies, news media); last, it is the stake in the whole political struggles and social conflicts (ideological struggles).82 The regime of truth plays an extremely critical role in modern society. Foucault argues that this regime of truth is not only characterized by the nature as ideology or superstructure. It is a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. It is exactly this regime that functions in most socialist countries—with some adaptations (I’m not familiar with the case of China. I’ll leave it aside for now).83 Foucault’s ideas about the relationship between the regime of truth and scientific knowledge/power as well as his view of truth show that his genealogical studies are made on the dimension of discourse-power, or in other words, scientific knowledge/power. Foucault’s genealogy associates this discursive practice with non-discursive practice. Its examination of scientific knowledge is not limited to the spiritual level but goes deep into the levels of social system and practice.

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 245 Although his views are to some extent biased, they provide a new perspective for the history of science and the epistemology of science. 6.3.2.5 Techniques of Discipline: The Supporting System of Scientific Knowledge/Power’s “Discipline” of Modern “Man” In his analysis of the micro mechanism of the operation of scientific-power, Foucault pays special attention the techniques of power. According to him, power operates through “discipline.” Discipline is “a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology.”84 The micro techniques of power demonstrate that power’s discipline must rely on certain technical supporting systems. In Foucault’s opinions, such technical supporting systems of power involve micro and macro levels. The micro technical supporting system of power includes excruciation, punishment and prison. The macro technical supporting system of power includes discipline, bureaucracy, normalized judgment and examination. These technical supporting systems are exploited for “discipline.” They are logical and powerful systems in which several techniques cooperate with each other. In Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison, The Birth of the Clinic and The History of Sexuality, Foucault examines how various technical supporting systems influence and construct individuals’ identification, desire, body and “soul,” and produce disciplined subjects that are in accordance with social norms. In Foucault’s view, wherever these supporting systems function, there is the operation of power. More precisely speaking, it is these supporting systems of power that guarantee the operation of power and thereby construct knowledge. 6.3.2.6 Specific Intellectual: Irreplaceable Role in Resisting Scientific Knowledge/Power Rule Foucault maintains that intellectuals are very important in the pursuit of individual emancipation and the resistance against scientific knowledge/power rule. He divides intellectuals into two types: universal intellectuals and specific intellectuals. Universal intellectuals are those who consider themselves to have mastered universal, canonical knowledge that is correct and true for all people. They are valued by power because they have mastered universal truth, as those who master truth are able to exert power over people. They fight for justice. Specific intellectuals nowadays are experts and scholars who merely consider themselves to have mastered professional knowledge in certain fields. Specific intellectuals are valued by power because they interfere with the political struggles of their times using local scientific truth. Specific intellectuals play an irreplaceable part in contemporary struggles against scientific knowledge/power rule. For an intellectual, the main political problem is not the criticism of ideological contents, which may be associated with science, or attach certain correct

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The Path of Deconstructing Scientism ideology to his scientific practice. Instead, it is about knowing whether it is possible to establish a new policy of truth. The question is not about changing people’s consciousness, that is, things in people’s mind. It is about changing the institutions, politics, and economic rules related with the production of truth.85

“Intellectuals’ political questions must be considered from the angle of truth and power, instead of that of science and ideology.”86 Therefore, specific intellectuals who are familiar with the reality of the operation of scientific knowledge/power in certain fields are of a critical position in local struggles against scientific knowledge/power. In such local struggles, specific intellectuals are not the spokespeople or advisors of the mass. Instead, they play the role of consultants. Foucault’s view of scientific knowledge/power shows that he views scientific knowledge and power to be mutually inherent to each other. This is a prominent characteristic that distinguishes his view of scientific knowledge/power from traditional studies of science and power. In Foucault’s view, science turns from knowledge to power. Scientific epistemology is replaced by the view of scientific knowledge/power. According to this view, scientific knowledge is no longer “objective knowledge” about nature, but the result of people’s negotiations and conventions and the product of the construction by power. 6.3.3 Language Game and the Reconstruction of Criteria for the Legitimacy of Scientific Knowledge Another important way in which postmodernists deconstruct modern ideas of science is to reconstruct criteria for the legitimacy of scientific knowledge through the transformation of discursive systems. This is the primary strategy used by French postmodernist thinker Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924–1998). In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge and other related works, Lyotard focuses on the conditions of knowledge in contemporary Western society, attempting to explain the social variations and cultural symptoms in contemporary capitalism. He makes profound arguments about the decline of “metanarrative,” which is the sustaining network and basis of cognition for Western civilization and about the consequent questions about on legitimacy of scientific knowledge. Among Lyotard’s ideas, the poststructuralist concepts emphasizing the “incommensurability” of knowledge and highlighting differences among languages are the theoretical base point in his postmodernist view of science. 6.3.3.1 Conditions of Postmodern Knowledge In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard first examines the current condition of postmodern knowledge. He concludes that since the Western society entered postindustrial society and its culture entered the postmodern period in the 1950s, the status, nature and condition of knowledge have changed. Scientific knowledge has become a kind of discourse. Most cutting-edge science and technology

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 247 are related with language. For example, Nikolay Sergeyevich Trubetskoy’s phonological and linguistic theories, Norbert Wiener’s communication problems and cybernetics, John von Neumann’s computer and computer language, studies of linguistic translation and the compatibility of machine language, the problem of storage and database, telecommunications and artificial intelligence, the study of paradox, etc. Although this list of new fields of studies does not exhaust the development of modern knowledge, it proves that the advancement of modern science and technology is closely related with language. Lyotard argues that the linguistic turn of modern science and changes in related technologies have important influences over two main functions of knowledge: research and transmission. On the one hand, the way of research of knowledge has changed as it becomes easier for people to understand profound knowledge. On the other hand, the extensive use of informational technology brings new changes to the channels and speed of the transmission of knowledge. In these universal changes, the nature of knowledge has experienced two fundamental changes as well. The first is the informatization of knowledge. Knowledge becomes usable and operatable document only after being translated into computer language. Anything that constitutes knowledge, if not informatized, will be discarded. The second change is the commercialization of knowledge. Traditional knowledge is external to the knower. The acquisition of knowledge is inseparable from the cultivation of spirit or personal education. These principles, however, are outdated now. The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers to the commodities they produce and consume—that is, the form of value.87 The purpose of producing knowledge is selling. The purpose of consuming knowledge is proliferation in new life. The “exchange value” of knowledge supersedes the “use value” of knowledge to be the purpose of knowledge itself. The change of the nature of knowledge also gives rise to changes in the social status and function of knowledge, which are reflected in three aspects: knowledge becomes the primary productivity; knowledge plays an important part in the relationship between economic structure and the structure of the state; the mode of the circulation of knowledge in the society has changed as well. 6.3.3.2 Legitimization of Knowledge and the Game of Language First, the legitimization of knowledge. After examining the basic conditions of postmodern knowledge, Lyotard contends that changes in the nature of knowledge highlight the problems of the legitimization or legitimacy of knowledge.

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What is legitimization? Lyotard maintains that the connotation of his “legitimization” is broader than that of contemporary German theorists (specifically speaking, broader than Habermas’s “legitimization”). He clarifies the connotation of “legitimization” with two examples. First, in the case of the Civil Codes, legitimization refers to the fact that particular kinds of citizens must make particular kinds of behaviors. Such legitimization is a process, that is, the legal procedure of the promulgation of norms by a recognized legislator. Second, in scientific statements, legitimization refers to scientific statements’ obedience to rules. That is, a statement must meet a series of conditions in order to be acknowledged as scientific. Under such circumstances, legitimization is the procedure of the “legislator” of scientific discourses setting public conditions which determine whether a statement can be accepted by scientific communities as a scientific discourse. (Generally speaking, these conditions are about the inner consistency and empirical verifiability of statements.) According to Lyotard, although the legitimization of knowledge has been closely related with the legitimization of legislator since Plato, these two examples show that the power to determine what is “real” and the power to determine what is “legitimate” are interdependent. In other words, Lyotard considers the legitimization of knowledge as a problem of “double legitimization,” that is, the legitimization of knowledge and that of power. Knowledge and power are the two sides of a coin. This idea demonstrates the similarity between Lyotard and Foucault. The application of such a concept of legitimization to knowledge gives rise to two questions. First, “what is knowledge” or “how to judge whether an utterance is scientific or not.” An utterance must meet a set of established conditions in order to be accepted as scientific. These conditions determine whether an utterance can be included into the discourse set by scientific communities. Second, “who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be decided?”88 In Lyotard’s opinion, in the information era, knowledge is more about power than it used to be in any previous period. Second, a critical methodology: language game. In his analysis of postmodern knowledge, Lyotard integrates Wittgenstein’s method of language game, especially the method of pragmatics, which is demonstrated in Wittgenstein’s later ideas about language game. Pragmatics emphasizes that the meanings of words and phrases lie in the ways they are used. There are as many meanings of a word as the ways they are used. The various utterances found through this method are called language games. These utterances include denotative utterances, performative utterances, and prescriptive utterances. Denotative utterance locates the addresser (the one who makes the utterance), the addressee (the one who receives the utterance) and its referent (the thing that the utterance is about) in special ways. Performative utterance is also called “utterance that acts.” Its influences on the referent happen at the same time with its act of utterance. Prescriptive utterances include orders, commandments, instructions, suggestions, demands, prayers and implorations. In Lyotard’s view, the concept of language game means that it should be possible to determine the category of any utterance according to certain rules that

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 249 identify its nature and use, just like a chess game determines the move of all pieces with rules. There are three features of language game. First, the rules of the game do not determine the legitimacy of language game, which can only be a contractor among gamers. Second, there is no game without rules. Even the slightest change to a rule will change the nature of the game. “Moves,” or utterances, that are not in accordance with game rules do not belong to the game defined by these rules. Third, every type of utterance should be seen as a kind of “move” in the game. Lyotard derives two principles from these three features. First, to speak is to fight in the sense of game. Speech act is similar to wrestling and athletics in the general sense. Second, observable social ties are constituted by “moves” in language. The second principle is a supplement to the first. 6.3.3.3 Narrative Knowledge and Legitimacy What is knowledge? Lyotard maintains that knowledge is not limited to science, not even to learning. Learning, science and knowledge are concepts with different denotations. Learning includes all utterances that refer to or describe objects. Utterances that belong to learning can be judged as true or false. Science is a subset of learning. It consists of denotative utterances which meet two conditions. First, the objects that these utterances refer to can be obtained repeatedly, which means that these objects should be accessible under observable conditions. Second, judgment can be made regarding whether the language used in each of such utterances belongs to related languages recognized by experts. The denotation of knowledge is the widest. It involves not only all denotative statements, but also notions of “know-how,” “know how to live” and “how to listen.” Therefore, knowledge is a question of competence. It goes far beyond the simple determination and application of the criterion of truth. It extends to the criterion of efficiency (technical qualification), that of justice and happiness (ethical wisdom) and that of the beauty of a sound or color (auditory and visual sensibility).89 It involves fields of the true, the good and the beautiful. After examining the concept of knowledge, Lyotard divides knowledge into two types: narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge. He contends that narrative knowledge, with its internal legitimacy, plays a dominant role in traditional knowledge, because narratives “define what has the right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that culture, they are legitimated. The simple fact that they do what they do.”90 Therefore, in a sense, the people are only that which actualizes the narratives: once again, they do this not only by recounting them, but also by listening to them and recounting themselves through them; in other words, by putting them into “play” in their institutions—thus by assigning themselves the posts of narratee and diegesis as well as the post of narrator.91 Lyotard points out that such folk pragmatics of narrative and Western language game (the issue of legitimacy, or in other words, the legitimacy as the referent

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of question game) are incommensurable. The latter is the object referred to in exploration games. 6.3.3.4 Scientific Knowledge and Legitimacy Scientific knowledge is different from narrative knowledge. Scientific knowledge needs only denotative utterance and excludes other utterances. Research game requires the addresser, not the addressee or the referent, to have certain abilities. The effectiveness of scientific utterances is not based on the factors they utter but needs to be justified through arguments or demonstrations. Science game is diachronic. It is a kind of storage and memory. The science game with such diachronic nature and premised on the storage of memory and the pursuit of innovation is basically an accumulative process. Its “tempo” is uncertain. Regarding the legitimacy of scientific knowledge, Lyotard argues that while science and narrative are two different kinds of knowledge with their respective game rules and criteria for judgment, science has to resort to narrative knowledge in order to solve its own problems of legitimization. He points out that “the recourse to narrative is inevitable, at least to the extent that the language game of science desires its statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own.”92 What Lyotard means here is that the goal of science is truth. The acceptability of its propositions is determined by the truth-value of these propositions. Therefore, science needs to be tested by empirical facts outside science. Its legitimacy needs to be argued through debates and demonstrations. Debates and experience both resort to narrative knowledge. Lyotard maintains that in the modern period, with the development of modern science, two new factors have appeared regarding the problem of legitimacy. First, people have given up metaphysics, which looks for primary evidence or a prior authority. Instead, they focus on the question of “who determines the conditions of truth.” People realize that the conditions of truth, or in other words, the rules of science game, is internal to the game. They can be established only within debates that are already scientific. Only the rules on which experts in science game have reached an agreement are good rules. In this way, the legitimacy of science comes from scientists’ “narrative.” Second, the explicit reliance on narrative in terms of knowledge is accompanied by the condition of the bourgeoise breaking free from traditional authorities. Although emphasis on the narrative forms of knowledge had existed in the ancient time, it was after the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and with the bourgeoise freeing themselves from restraints established by feudal aristocracy that narrative became recognized as the main form of knowledge. In his discussions on narrative knowledge, scientific knowledge and their legitimacy, Lyotard contends that scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge should be of equal status. Scientific knowledge is not superior to narrative knowledge. At the same time, he reintroduces narrative knowledge as a kind of effective knowledge and argues for narrative knowledge’s function of legitimizing

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 251 scientific knowledge. In this way, he boils discussions about the legitimacy of scientific knowledge to those about the legitimacy of narrative knowledge. 6.3.3.5 Deconstruction of Metanarrative If the legitimacy of science needs to resort to narrative knowledge, is the legitimacy of narrative knowledge acknowledgeable? Lyotard gives a negative answer to this question. In his view, all eras have their dominant “narratives,” which he names as “grand narratives” or “metanarratives.” These “grand narratives” or “metanarratives” are the “narratives with legitimate functions.” They are absolute knowledge that does not need to be argued for and proved and that are unquestionable. Lyotard examines two primary modes of legitimate narrative in modern time: one of them demonstrates a strong political characteristic, the other philosophical. The former can be summed up as the grand narrative about the emancipation of human beings in the Enlightenment Movement, and the latter can be summed up as the grand narrative of speculative reason in philosophy. The grand narrative of speculative reason is offered by German classical idealism, epitomized by Hegelianism. The grand narrative of human emancipation is offered by modern Enlightenment thought, epitomized by liberalism. Lyotard argues, however, that both the “speculative narrative” and the “narrative of emancipation” are going through a process of “delegitimization” in contemporary (postmodern) society and culture. Their statements about the legitimization of knowledge have lost convincingness. He points out that [i]n contemporary society and culture—postindustrial society, postmodern culture—the question of the legitimation of knowledge is formulated in different terms. The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation.93 According to Lyotard, the primary reason for metanarratives to lose legitimacy is that the explosive development of science starting from the end of the 19th century has given scientific knowledge great potential to replace narrative knowledge, and thereby led to the internal corrosion of the principles of the legitimacy of metanarrative. “There is erosion at work inside the speculative game, and by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its place, it eventually sets them free.”94 At the same time, [t]he classical dividing lines between the various fields of science are thus called into question—disciplines disappear, overlappings occur at the borders between sciences, and from these new territories are born, The speculative hierarchy of learning gives way to an immanent and, as it were, “flat” network of areas of inquiry, the respective frontiers of which are in constant flux. The old “faculties” splinter into institutes and foundations of all kinds, and the universities lose their function of speculative legitimation. Stripped of the

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The Path of Deconstructing Scientism responsibility for research (which was stifled by the speculative narrative), they limit themselves to the transmission of what is judged to be established knowledge, and through didactics they guarantee the replication of teachers rather than the production of researchers.95

In Lyotard’s view, the advancement of science has made metanarratives lose the basis of their general and dominating legitimacy. He sighs that [w]e may form a pessimistic impression of this splintering: nobody speaks all of those languages, they have no universal metalanguage, the project of the system-subject is a failure, the goal of emancipation has nothing to do with science, we are all stuck in the positivism of this or that discipline of learning, the learned scholars have turned into scientists, the diminished tasks of research have become compartmentalized and no one can master them all. Speculative or humanistic philosophy is forced to relinquish its legitimation duties, which explains why philosophy is facing a crisis wherever it persists in arrogating such functions and is reduced to the study of systems of logic or the history of ideas where it has been realistic enough to surrender them.96 6.3.3.6 Reconstruct Criteria of the Legitimacy of Scientific Knowledge: Paralogy With the loss of the legitimacy of metanarratives, the basis of the legitimacy of scientific knowledge, which resorts to metanarratives, disappears. Lyotard is not pessimistic about this change and offers the new criterion for the legitimacy of scientific knowledge: paralogy. Lyotard denies this criterion to be his own imagination and sees it as an unavoidable conclusion based on discoveries in plenty of important theories of modern science. He writes that [p]ostmodern science—by concerning itself with such things as undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts characterized by incomplete information, “fracta,” catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes—is theorizing its own evolution as discontinuous, catastrophic, non-rectifiable, and paradoxical. It is changing the meaning of the word knowledge, while expressing how such a change can take place. It is producing not the known, but the unknown. And it suggests a model of legitimation that has nothing to do with maximized performance, but has as its basis difference understood as paralogy.97 Lyotard does not give a clear definition of paralogy, but makes some analyses with comparisons. First, paralogy is not a grand narrative but a small one. Lyotard maintains that as the legitimacy of scientific knowledge no longer resorts to metanarratives, the exploration of the legitimacy of modern scientific discourses cannot rely on spiritual dialectics – not even on human emancipation – but should rely on “small narratives.” In Lyotard’s opinion, in the open system of science, there is no universal

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 253 metalanguage that transcribes and evaluates all languages. Science game cannot be assimilated with other language games.98 Equating science game and other language games, Lyotard eventually denies the idea that there is any absolute truth or method that prescribes and evaluates scientific studies and their theories. Second, paralogy is not consensus. Lyotard divides “consensus” into two types. The first is the consensus that becomes a factor, which the social system manipulates in order to maintain and improve its performance. It functions as a means to enable the social system to acquire the power of legitimacy. The second kind of consensus is the agreement that people with cognitive wisdom and free will achieve through conversation. Lyotard contends that both these two types of “consensuses” are a “horizon that is never reached.”99 In terms of the first type of consensus, Lyotard argues that the pursuit of it inevitably leads to the suppression of heterogeneous discourses and eventually to terrorism,100 because in homogeneous discourses that are based on consensus, as soon as heterogeneous discourses appear, contradictions emerge. When heterogeneous discourses eventually become strong, decision makers may even deprive them of the right to speak by administrative means. With regard to the second type of consensus, Lyotard maintains that its consequence is also the state of terrorism, because such consensus is based on the agreement among all conversers on the rules or meta-regulations that are effective for all language games. Nevertheless, such consensus is obviously impossible considering the heterogeneity of language games, because these rules or meta-regulations contradict the heterogeneous diversity of language games. Furthermore, the purpose of conversation is consensus. Yet analyses of scientific pragmatics show that consensus is only a state of discussion instead of its end. “Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy.”101 Third, paralogy is not innovation. Lyotard believes that paralogy in a strict sense should be distinguished from innovation. Innovation is what a system controls or uses in order to improve its efficiency. It is usually conducted in the homogenous logical structure of the system. Paralogy is the “moves” made in the pragmatics of knowledge. Its importance is seldom understood immediately. It is usually demonstrated as logical relationships of which the nature is different from that of the system. In Lyotard’s idea, the legitimizing criterion for the “production of new ideas” by scientific knowledge is not “innovation,” but “paralogy,” because the former does not bring new impacts and energy to the system as the latter does. Lastly, paralogy is not the only method. In terms of scientific methods, Lyotard insists on a kind of “anti-method discourse.” He agrees with Feyerabend, contending that “there is no ‘scientific method,’ and that a scientist is before anything else a person who ‘tells stories.’ The only difference is that he is duty bound to verify them.”102 In his view, scientific method does not exist, which does not mean that science has no method, but that scientific methods are plural. He objects to rigid insistence on some unchanging methodology in scientific studies. Through these comparisons, Lyotard further emphasizes the three purposes of his idea of “paralogy.” First, to distinguish among various language games; second, to provide rules for the language game of science; third, to emphasize

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the equality and plurality among the language game of science and other language games. In order to achieve these goals, Lyotard underlines the following five points: first, to admit the heteromorphous nature of language games; second, to admit that there is no real consensus and that consensus, even if it exists, is local and cancellable; third, to admit there are a multiplicity of finite meta-arguments, which are the arguments restricted in time and space about metaprescriptives; fourth, to admit that temporary contracts are supplanting permanent institutions in various social domains;103 fifth, to admit the legitimization of “reality” and have the courage to take responsibility: “knowledge of language games as such and the decision to assume responsibility for their rules and effects. Their most significant effect is precisely what validates the adoption of rules—the quest for paralogy.”104 These ideas show that it makes little sense to strictly explore the concept of “paralogy.” In fact, Lyotard’s view of science is that we should respect scientific knowledge, allow different reasonings, and respect various opinions with an open attitude. Science game is not to seek commonalities, but to reserve differences. Foucault’s and Lyotard’s views of science demonstrate an alternative dimension for understanding and reflecting on science: power. The commonality between Foucault and Lyotard is that they both examine science from the angle of language, seeing science as a practice of discourse, a language game. Their main approach of thought is to associate science with power and to deconstruct the authority of scientific knowledge. In the postmodern view of science, language games are not inherently privileged. Truth belongs only to those who construct power. This view of science in essence deconstructs science, scientific epistemology, and traditional studies of the history of science. It is prone to extreme relativism. Seeing science as an irrational enterprise that is not essentially different from astrology and witchcraft obliterates the rational characteristics of science.

Notes 1 Chen Qirong. “Scientism: Basic Features, Rationality, Limitations, and the Transcendence of the Limitations.” Forum of Philosophy of Southern and Northern China & Symposium of Contemporary Significance of Philosophy, 2005. 2 Liu Dachun and Liu Yongmou. Intellectual Attacks and Defenses: The Rise and Evolution of Alternative Philosophy of Science. Beijing: People’s University of China Press, 2010. 3 Zhao Wanli. The Social Construction of Science. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publishing House, 2002:60. 4 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:16. 5 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:16. 6 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:16. 7 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:19. 8 B. Barnes. About Science. Translated by Lu Xudong, Beijing: Orient Press, 2001:91. 9 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:15–16.

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 255 10 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:16. 11 H. Collins and P. Trevor. The Golem: What You Should Know about Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998:138. 12 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:35. 13 Hao Ningxiang. “Questions about the Effectiveness of Scientific Methods.” Academic Journal of Jinyang, 1994(3). 14 Li Xingmin. “Features of Scientific Methods.” Hunan Social Sciences, 2009(1). 15 Ai Yan. “Translator’s Foreword” 2. Knowledge and Social Imagery by D. Bloor. Beijing: Orient Press, 2001. 16 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:43. 17 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:44. 18 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:43. 19 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:59. 20 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:45. 21 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:46. 22 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:46. 23 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:46. 24 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:47–48. 25 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:119. 26 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:60. 27 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:60. 28 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:61. 29 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:62. 30 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:62. 31 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:53. 32 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:59. 33 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:93. 34 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:93– 94. 35 Li Jianhua. Philosophy of Science. Beijing: Press of the Party School of the Central Committee of CPC, 2004:284–85. 36 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:37. 37 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:38. 38 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:38–39. 39 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:40.

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40 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:40. 41 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:40. 42 D. Bloor. Knowledge and Social Imagery (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991:42. 43 Guo Guichun and Cheng Sumei. “Predicaments of Contemporary Scientific Realism and the Solutions.” Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2002(2). 44 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:11. 45 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:1. 46 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:3. 47 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:3. 48 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:5. 49 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:7. 50 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:7. 51 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:7. 52 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:9. 53 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:9. 54 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:11. 55 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:12. 56 K. D. Knorr-Cetina. The Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1981:11. 57 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:48. 58 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:49. 59 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:57. 60 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:97. 61 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:99. 62 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:108. 63 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:64. 64 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:64. 65 B. Barnes. Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory. London: Routledge, 2009:67–68. 66 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:111. 67 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:114. 68 M. Mulkay. Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Routledge, 2015:114. 69 Meng Jianwei. The Humanistic Values of Science. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2000:22.

The Path of Deconstructing Scientism 257 70 Wittgenstein’s words. Regarding the “family resemblance” of postmodernism, Francis Seeburger comes up with four “family resemblances,” including anti-essentialism, absolute relativization, the historicization of concept, anti-fundamentalism, and questions about sources and origins. Francis Seeburger. “General Theory of Postmodernist Philosophy,” in Speeches on Postmodernist Philosophy. Translated by Feng Jun et al., Beijing: The Commercial Press, 2003. 71 M. Foucault. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Translated by R. Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books, 1978:136. 72 Foucault divides modernity into two parts: the classical period (1660-1800) and the modern period (1880–1950). 73 Wang Min’an. Foucault’s Boundaries. Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2002:229. 74 M. Foucault. The Abnormal. Translated by Han Qian, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2003:49. 75 M. Foucault. Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977– 1984. Edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman, New York: Routledge, 1990:106–7. 76 M. Foucault. The Eyes of Power: Interviews of Michel Foucault. Translated by Yan Feng, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1997:37. 77 M. Foucault. Must Defend the Society. Translated by Qian Han, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999:23. 78 M. Foucault. Must Defend the Society. Translated by Qian Han, Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1999:169. 79 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:447. 80 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:445–46. 81 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:447. 82 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:446. 83 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:447. 84 M. Foucault. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by A. Sheridan, New York: Vintage Books, 1995:215. 85 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:447. 86 M. Foucault. Collected Works of Michel Foucault. Edited by Du Xiaozhen, Shanghai: Shanghai Far East Publishers, 1998:446. 87 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:4. 88 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:9. 89 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:18. 90 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:23. 91 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:23. 92 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:28. 93 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:37. 94 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:39.

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95 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:39. 96 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:41. 97 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:60. 98 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:64. 99 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:61. 100 Here by “terrorism,” Lyotard refers to the efficiency achieved through the exclusion of a converser from the language game that people used to play with him or her or the exclusion of threat. 101 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:65–66. 102 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 60. 103 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:66. 104 J.F. Lyotard. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984:66.

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Index

absolute truth 19, 145, 208, 253 Adorno, Theoder 113, 117, 170, 265 Agassi, Joseph 35, 261 alienation 48, 91, 113, 128, 169, 174, 184, 194, 195, 203 alienation of science 194 alternative 2, 3, 4, 5, 28, 29, 30, 32, 113, 166, 216, 254 analytical philosophy 16, 17, 22, 107, 108, 109, 230 anthropocentrism 21, 155, 161, 162, 178, 182 anthropology 6, 34, 201, 232 anti-science 3, 5, 32, 221, 232, 244 anti-scientism 3, 17, 19, 29, 159, 189 Aristotle 2, 45, 46, 52, 59, 68, 89, 101 assumption 93, 223 astronomy 43, 79 Ayer, Alfred Jules 210, 219, 259, 261 Bacon, Francis 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 67, 68, 70, 75, 76, 78, 89, 103, 115, 147, 168, 198, 261, 262 Barber, Bernard 116, 262 Barnes, Barry 34, 222, 223, 226, 228, 236, 237, 254, 255, 256, 262 Bell, Daniel 116, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 157, 192, 262 Bergson, Henri 205, 206, 208, 209, 219, 262 Berkeley, George 107 Bernal, John Desmond 192, 193, 203, 262 Bloor, David 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 254, 255, 256, 262 Brown, Hanbury 259, 262 capital 11, 13, 51, 139, 146, 164, 165, 176, 244 capitalism 13, 49, 51, 53, 71, 169, 175, 176, 210, 246

capitalist 7, 8, 13, 49, 51, 137, 146, 147, 174 Carnap, Paul Rudolf 2, 15, 81, 82, 91, 115, 216, 259, 260, 262 Carson, Rachel 160, 162, 186, 263 Cartwright, Nancy 263 Cassire, Ernst 263 causality 64, 66, 70, 86, 94, 100, 137, 225 certainty 17, 65, 145, 146, 161, 173, 195, 202, 205, 232, 233, 235 Cetina, Karin Knorr- 34, 232, 233, 234, 235, 256, 266 Chalmers, Alan 82, 115, 116, 263 cognitive science 32, 33, 95 Collins, Harry 224, 255, 266 common sense 5, 215 communism 86 complementary 114 completeness 92, 94, 99, 100, 101, 110 complexity 23, 79, 144, 240 computationalism 95, 97, 98, 99 Comte, Auguste 3, 15, 47, 48, 49, 74, 79, 80, 81, 82, 114, 120, 144 construction 17, 20, 21, 92, 97, 108, 149, 174, 202, 224, 225, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 243, 246 constructiveness 2 constructivism 4, 29, 34, 222, 230 context 6, 7, 12, 13, 49, 125, 213, 223, 227, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238 convention 17, 126, 211, 225, 226 Copernicus 43, 44, 46, 49, 51, 63, 65, 129, 215 cultural philosophy of science 32 cultural relativism 236 Dahl, Robert A., 263 Dampier, William Cecil 63, 105, 117, 263

272

Index

Darwin, Charles Robert 48, 50, 79, 93 deconstruction 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 48, 221, 222, 229, 231, 239 deduction 59, 62, 103, 144, 225 defense 1, 2, 5, 28, 31, 49, 86, 127, 136, 176, 189, 212, 214, 221, 227, 242 demarcation of science 24, 25, 32 Descartes, René 16, 46, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 62, 65, 67, 68, 78, 85, 96, 97, 103, 135, 146, 168, 204, 263 Dewey, John 11, 27, 36, 71, 73, 74, 77, 117, 263 dialectics 20, 47, 204, 252 Dilthey, Wilhelm 206, 208, 263 diversification 235 diversity of beliefs 225, 226, 227 division of labor 11, 13, 92, 170 ecological civilization 182, 183, 184, 185 ecological crisis 32, 169, 178, 183, 203 ecological value 178, 179, 182, 184 Einstein, Albert 19, 56, 79, 85, 91, 94, 100, 101, 114, 115, 116, 120, 121, 134, 211, 241, 260, 264 empiricism 15, 31, 44, 60, 62, 90, 107, 108, 120, 137, 210, 213, 215, 221 Engels, Friedrich 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 36, 46, 47, 51, 63, 65, 67, 74, 75, 76, 103, 117, 241, 259 enlightenment 51, 53, 74, 103, 112, 113, 117, 144, 145, 169, 170, 186, 195, 250, 251, 263, 265 epistemology 4, 16, 18, 20, 22, 32, 33, 35, 49, 53, 54, 55, 63, 64, 125, 191, 198, 205, 206, 207, 211, 221, 229, 230, 239, 240, 241, 243, 245, 246 essentialism 17, 19, 239, 240, 241, 257 evolution 3, 4, 15, 26, 34, 50, 61, 79, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 135, 153, 170, 178, 208, 214, 252 existentialism 3, 173, 203, 204, 206 exquisite 95, 99, 101 falsification 28, 31, 87, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 197, 211, 221, 223, 224, 227 Feenberg, Andrew 264 feminism 3, 4 Feyerabend, Paul Karl 3, 16, 17, 28, 31, 32, 36, 102, 116, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 241, 253, 260, 264 Foucault, Michel 3, 17, 18, 28, 32, 36, 57, 221, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 254, 257, 264, 267

freedom 5, 32, 42, 54, 55, 64, 91, 113, 173, 193, 205 Fuller, Steve 117, 260, 264 fundamentalism 17, 29, 257 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 1, 31, 35, 37, 48, 74, 264 Garaudy, Roger 193, 218 Griffin, David R., 116, 187, 264 Haack, Susan 264 Habermas, Jürgen 3, 28, 174, 175, 176, 187, 192, 221, 248, 264 Hanson, Norwood Russell 213 Harding, Sandra 264 Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich 1, 31, 46, 49, 55, 157, 204, 264 Heidegger, Martin 3, 18, 19, 28, 173, 187, 194, 196, 203, 206, 218, 221, 265 historicism 15, 16, 17, 19, 28, 49, 119, 123, 125, 127, 128, 215, 216, 239, 240 history of science 18, 25, 28, 41, 79, 89, 102, 123, 125, 126, 128, 131, 161, 197, 214, 215, 239, 245, 254 history of scientific and technological thought 25 Holton, Gerald 260, 265 Horkheimer, Max 113, 117, 170, 174, 175, 186, 187, 265 humanism 1, 27, 35, 53, 114, 204, 205, 238 humanities 14, 17, 18, 30, 31, 83, 124, 146, 152, 159, 174, 182, 205, 208, 221, 243 Hume, David 15, 107, 120, 265 Husserl, Edmund 3, 17, 18, 29, 56, 75, 115, 171, 172, 173, 186, 187, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 218, 219, 262, 265 hypothesis 47, 68, 69, 72, 85, 129, 133, 134, 167, 213, 223 incommensurability 18, 31, 127, 128, 240 induction 59, 89, 91, 103, 120, 211, 225 industrial civilization 152, 154, 155, 163, 169, 178, 182, 183 industrial society 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 149, 154, 170, 174 inevitability 17, 24, 84 instrumentalism 11, 68, 73, 78 integration of science and technology 34 intervention 64, 69, 162 irrationalism 17, 127, 128, 171, 191, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 222

Index James, William 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 100, 144, 265 Jaspers, Karl Theodor 79, 81, 112, 114, 115, 117, 173, 187, 265 Kahn, Herman 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 158, 265 Kant, Immanuel 46, 47, 54, 55, 66, 67, 68, 69, 76, 120, 156, 204, 207, 265, 269 Kepler, Johanns 44, 46, 48, 64, 96, 120, 260 knowledge-power 28 Kuhn, Thomas Samuel 18, 28, 31, 87, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134, 156, 192, 193, 197, 203, 211, 212, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 225, 228, 260, 266 labor 7, 11, 13, 51, 140, 147, 164, 173, 176, 183 Lakatos, Imre 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 134, 156, 157, 211, 214, 215, 216, 219, 220, 266 language game 240, 248, 249, 253, 254, 258 Latour, Bruno 34, 37, 266 Laudan, Larry 28, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 157, 260, 266 law 2, 8, 13, 19, 51, 55, 64, 66, 68, 69, 79, 80, 91, 100, 106, 109, 129, 168, 183 legitimacy 42, 44, 52, 60, 61, 63, 106, 139, 145, 200, 212, 213, 214, 216, 242, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 64, 65 Lenin, Vladimir 259 Liebig, Justus von 8 life-world 147, 195 limits to growth 164, 165, 166, 167 locality 2, 214 Locke, John 103, 107 logical empiricism 15, 19, 31, 87, 90, 104, 105, 108, 210, 213, 217, 218, 233, 239, 240 logicism 16, 17, 28, 119 Lyotard, Jean-Francois 3, 17, 75, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 257, 258, 266 Mach, Ernst 15, 79, 80, 81, 90, 92, 93, 94, 114, 115, 116, 266 machine 13, 18, 54, 68, 96, 98, 99, 101, 111, 140, 143, 198, 247 Mannheim, Karl 222 Marcuse, Herbert 3, 91, 116, 170, 171, 174, 175, 186, 187, 192, 193, 266 Marx, Karl Heinrich 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 27, 36, 47, 74, 75, 112, 117, 198, 259, 261, 262

273

mathematics 2, 15, 20, 29, 46, 79, 80, 82, 83, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103, 104, 107, 108, 109, 129, 145, 146, 171, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 243 Maxwell, James Clerk 100, 134, 260 Meadows, Dennis L. 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 186, 194, 267 Merton, Robert King 28, 43, 74, 86, 115, 267 metaphysics 15, 19, 27, 41, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 68, 81, 82, 84, 94, 135, 171, 172, 174, 196, 208, 217, 241, 250 modernism 75, 238, 239, 266 Mulkay, Michael 34, 37, 224, 227, 228, 229, 236, 237, 238, 255, 256, 267 Naisbitt, John 152, 154, 155 natural philosophy 68 natural science 5, 7, 8, 15, 16, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 62, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 88, 97, 98, 99, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 113, 124, 159, 165, 167, 171, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 205, 208, 213, 221, 222, 223, 225, 243 naturalism 46, 195, 201, 222 neutrality 30, 34, 78, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 174, 221, 222 new technological revolution 152, 154 Newton, Issac 2, 46, 48, 50, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 76, 78, 79, 88, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 129, 146, 197, 267 non-science 18, 86, 90, 121, 185, 216, 217, 243 objectivity 2, 5, 18, 29, 33, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 102, 105, 106, 110, 143, 144, 207, 217, 222, 224, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 241 omnipotence of science 54, 83, 104, 119, 141, 147, 169, 176, 178, 203 ontology 16, 19, 22, 23, 94, 135, 136, 208, 230, 241 operationalism 15, 91 optimism 31, 60, 119, 136, 144, 147, 148, 150, 151, 155, 159, 163, 164, 165, 168, 177 orthodox 2, 3, 4, 15, 16, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 90, 104, 119, 189, 210, 212, 217, 221, 222, 225, 227, 229, 232, 234, 239 Ostwald, Friedrich Wilhelm 267 paradigm 18, 23, 31, 34, 105, 106, 125, 126, 127, 134, 211, 215, 216, 219, 228, 240

274

Index

Peirce, Charles Sanders 71, 72 perfection 88, 91, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 126, 168 perfectionism 99, 100, 101 pessimism 150, 155, 159, 167, 177, 193 phenomenology 16, 193, 199, 200, 201, 202 philosophy of science 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 132, 189, 206, 210, 211, 212, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222, 225, 229, 232, 238, 239, 240, 241 philosophy of science and technology 1, 16, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 35 physicalism 81 physics 2, 4, 7, 15, 29, 45, 46, 47, 48, 52, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 85, 90, 101, 102, 106, 174, 191, 192, 195, 196, 210, 211, 245 Pickering, Andrew 35, 222, 267 Plato 46, 91, 145, 157, 204, 248 pluralism 5, 29, 211, 217, 230, 239 Polanyi, Michael 267 Popper, Karl 28, 31, 87, 102, 115, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 156, 197, 211, 212, 216, 221, 226, 267 positivism 3, 4, 15, 17, 19, 29, 31, 47, 48, 79, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 90, 106, 109, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 172, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 202, 203, 206, 208, 210, 211, 212, 216, 222, 223, 225, 230, 232, 240, 252 positivist 16, 17, 20, 79, 106, 107, 108, 109, 122, 172, 192, 195, 203 post-colonialism 3, 4 practice 18, 23, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 51, 55, 82, 85, 103, 104, 172, 175, 179, 195, 204, 207, 213, 236, 243, 244, 246, 254 pragmatism 15, 17, 20, 32, 70, 71, 72, 73, 142 proceduralization 78, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 210 productivity 20, 142, 155, 170, 175, 247 pseudoscience 32, 216, 217, 243 Ptolemy, Claudius 49 Puritanism 43, 44, 74 rationality 2, 5, 17, 18, 24, 42, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 61, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 78, 83, 84, 85, 90, 97, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109, 110, 112, 113, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 131, 136, 143, 145, 146, 147, 162, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176,

189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 211, 212, 215, 217, 221, 222, 227, 235, 237 realism 15, 17, 22, 101, 230, 231 reconsideration 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 14, 221 reduction 142, 185 regularity 41, 89 relative truth 209 relativism 17, 19, 127, 227, 231, 235 relativity 84, 195, 211, 232, 235 religion 6, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 61, 62, 63, 65, 71, 82, 86, 103, 171, 175, 185, 217, 225 Renaissance 31, 42, 43, 46, 49, 53, 67, 112, 146, 250 repeatability 2 representation 14, 84, 96, 98, 195, 207, 236, 240, 241 representationalism 240, 241 research programme 131, 156 Richter, Maurice N., 35, 268 Rorty, Richard McKay 3, 4, 16, 17, 29, 32, 268 Rouse, Joseph 268 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 268 Russell, Bertrand 15, 20, 27, 107, 115, 117, 120, 191, 193, 261, 268 Sarton, George 192, 193, 268 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 1, 31, 49 Schlick, Friedrich Albert Moriz 15, 114, 216 Schopenhauer, Arthur 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 219, 268 Schumacher, E.F., 268 science and humanity 171, 202 science and politics 237, 238 science and religion 49, 50, 61 scientific and technological determinism 137, 139, 141, 155, 177 scientific anthropology 32 scientific crisis 125, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 203 scientific culture 35, 50, 226, 236, 237, 238, 239 scientific ethics 34 scientific methodology 4, 83, 89, 93, 211, 226 scientific objectivity 84, 88, 222 scientific observation 217 scientific rationality 54, 97, 110, 196, 211 scientific realism 15, 22, 230, 231, 232, 240

Index scientific revolution 51, 60, 68, 120, 125, 126, 127, 128, 161, 192, 216, 239 scientific utopia 198, 199 scientism 1, 5, 17, 18, 27, 29, 31, 32, 35, 41, 73, 74, 78, 89, 90, 107, 108, 109, 114, 119, 144, 189, 203, 206, 208, 221, 230 scientization 24, 106, 107, 108, 109, 143 simplicity 93, 94, 95, 100 Snow, C.P., 35, 192, 193, 261, 269 social construction 22, 28, 33, 34, 225, 229, 232, 233 social science 5, 6, 22, 78, 83, 87, 97, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 124, 167, 174, 205, 221, 223 sociology of science 86, 227 spinoza, Baruch de 63, 76, 269 standardization 18, 78, 88, 90, 92 subjectivity 2, 18, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 69, 147, 169, 198 subject-object dichotomy 52, 53, 54, 56, 62, 84, 168, 207 superstition 31, 42, 217 surplus value 51, 147 sustainable development 22, 35, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184 technological salvationism 148 technologization 24, 109

275

testability 2, 86, 122 theology 31, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 50, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 65, 103, 146, 237 theory of relativity 94, 101, 211 theory of science and technology 7, 15 Toffler, Alvin 152, 153, 154, 155, 158, 269 traditional culture 239 unified science 80, 82 uniformity 33, 78, 79, 81, 82, 201, 228 uniqueness 29, 31, 83, 193, 208, 221, 231 universality 2, 12, 17, 78, 79, 81, 82, 86, 88, 92, 105, 146, 171, 202, 225 value neutrality 24, 193 value reason 102, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114 verify 253 verisimilitude 122, 123, 232 view of science and technology 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 153 view of scientific progress 132, 136 Weber, Max 76, 117, 144, 192, 269 White, Andrew Dickson 44, 74, 161, 269 Whitehead, Alfred North 42, 74, 269 Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann 15, 17, 108, 120, 222, 248, 257, 260 working class 8, 11, 13