Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria, 1960-1995 [1 ed.] 9780773568259, 9780773520226

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Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria 1960-1995

Series: Comparative Charting of Social Change Series Editor: Simon Langlois

Recent Social Trends in the United States 1960-1990 Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, Bruce A. Chadwick Recent Social Trends in Quebec 1960–-1990 Simon Langlois, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, Jean-Pierre Simard Recent Social Trends in West Germany 1960-1990 Wolfgang Glatzer, Karl-Otto Hondrich, Heinz Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, Barbara Worndl Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990 Michel Fors6, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, Jean-Hugues D6chaux Recent Social Trends in Russia 1960-1995 Irene A. Boutenko, Kirill E. Razlogov Recent Social Trends in Italy 1960-1995 Alberto Martinelli, Antonio Chiesi, Sonia Stefanizzi Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies Simon Langlois, Theodore Caplow, Henri Mendras, Wolfgang Glatzer (eds) Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria 1960-1995 Nikolai Genov, Anna Krasteva In preparation Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960-1995 Dimitris Charalambis, Larra Alipranti, Andromaque Hadjiyannis Grading Leviathan: The Performance of National States Theodore Caplow (ed.) Recent Social Trends in Canada 1960-1995 Lance Roberts, Rod Clifton, Barry Ferguson New Structures of Inequality Yannick Lemel, Heinz Herbert Noll (eds)

Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria 1960-1995 EDITED BY NIKOLAI GENOV AND ANNA KRASTEVA

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

McGill-Queen's University Press 2001 ISBN 0-7735-2022-8 Legal deposit second quarter 2001 Bibliotheque nationale du Qu6bec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP) for its activities. It also acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for its publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Recent social trends in Bulgaria, 1960-1995 (Comparative charting of social change) ISBN 0-7735-2022-8 1. Bulgaria - Social conditions. 2. Quality of life Bulgaria. I. Genov, Nikolai II. Krasteva, Anna III. Series. HN623.5.R43 2001 949.903 C00-901508-6

Contents

Preface

xi

International Project

xiii

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995: The Challenge of Two Transformations 0

Context 0.1 Demographic Trends

33

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

42

0.3 Macro-technological Trends 1

2

1

54

Age Groups 1.1

Youth

62

1.2

Elders

68

Microsocial 2.1 Self-identification

72

2.2 Kinship Networks

77

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types 2.4 Local Autonomy

91

2.5 Voluntary Associations 2.6

Sociability Networks

99 104

83

vi

Contents 3

Women 3.1 Female Roles

107

3.2 Childbearing

112

3.3 Matrimonial Models

116

3.4 Women's Employment

122

3.5 Reproductive Technologies 4

Labour Market 4.1 Unemployment 4.2

138

Skills and Occupational Levels

4.3 Types of Employment 4.4

Sectors of the Labour Force

158

162

5.2 Personnel Administration 5.3

Social Stratification 6.1

Occupational Status

6.2

Social Mobility

6.4

166

Sizes and Types of Enterprises

180

192

6.3 Economic Inequality

7

153

Labour and Management 5.1 Work Organization

6

142

147

4.5 Computerization of Work 5

136

Social Inequality

Social Relations 7.1

Conflict

218

7.2

Negotiation

224

206

198

173

vii

Contents 7.3 Norms of Conduct 7.4 Authority

235

7.5 Public Opinion 8

230

243

State and Service Institutions 8.1 Educational System 8.2

Health System

254

8.3 Welfare System 8.4 The State 9

247

259

265

Mobilizing Institutions 9.1 Labour Unions

269

9.2 Religious Institutions 9.3 The Military

281

9.4 Political Parties 9.5 Mass Media 10

276

289

294

Institutionalization of Social Forces 10.1 Dispute Settlement

302

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions 10.3 Social Movements 10.4 Interest Groups 11

311

317

Ideologies and Beliefs 11.1 Political Differentiation

325

11.2 Confidence in Institutions 11.3 Economic Orientations 11.4 Radicalism

341

331

336

307

viii

Contents 11.5 Religious Beliefs 12

347

Household Resources 12.1 Personal and Family Income 12.2 Informal Economy

353

359

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth 13

362

Life-Style 13.1 Market Goods and Services 13.2 Mass Information

367

375

13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices 13.4 Time Use

386

13.5 Daily Mobility

389

13.6 Household Production

392

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression 13.8 Mood-altering Substances 14

395 401

Leisure 14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time 14.2 Vacation Patterns

409

413

14.3 Athletics and Sports

415

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices 15

418

Educational Attainment 15.1 General Education

426

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education 15.3 Continuing Education 16

382

439

Integration and Marginalization

431

ix

Contents 16.1 Ethnic Minorities

440

16.2 Crime and Punishment

448

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviour 16.4 Poverty 17

465

Attitudes and Values 17.1 Satisfaction

470

17.2 Perceptions of Social Problems 17.3 Orientations to the Future 17.4 Values

483

17.5 National Identity

489

479

476

459

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Preface

Bulgarian society is going through a profound transformation. There are two major ways to describe and explain its conditions, course and results. The first one requires a focus on global and regional trends which deeply influence small societies. The second one lays stress on the continuities and discontinuities of the national path of historical development. Full scale explanation of orientations, decisions and actions of relevant actors, of structural changes and historical events could be established by combining both approaches. However, the enormous complexities preventing this optimal solution usually condition more limited goals. Thus, the major goal of the present volume is to search for relevant descriptions and explanations of those trends in Bulgarian society which are mainly determined by domestic factors. Given this limitation, the task is only seemingly simple. First of all, social development is being materialised by a large variety of specific trends. Somewhat arbitrarily, they are reduced to 78 in the following analysis. Moreover, the national path of development between 1960-1995 is quite uneven and might be divided into rather specific periods. The sixties and the early seventies were still marked by an extensive upward development. The eighties increasingly provided evidence that the dominant patterns of social and economic organisation were unable to master the challenges of the emerging information society. After 1989, the painful transformation offered a series of new openings together with sobering closures of life chances. The systematic study of social trends during these different periods was facilitated by the use of conceptual models applied in similar research projects covering social development in the USA, Germany, France, Spain, Russia, Italy and some other societies. The Bulgarian team profited very much from this international experience. However, the specific path of the national social development had to be made transparent by using the expertise of Bulgarian social scientists. The editors are deeply grateful both to the members of the international team working on the project Comparative Charting of Social Change and to the Bulgarian

xii

Preface

researchers. The former were very generous in sharing their theoretical, methodological and organisational expertise. The latter did not refrain from taking the burden of time consuming data collection and of theoretically instructed interpretations. The results cannot be even approximately identical in the analyses of all trends under scrutiny. Some of them are relatively well conceptualised and empirically studied. Others are not. Most of the trends require interdisciplinary approaches which are not common among specialists. Last but not least, the results of some trends like the establishment of democratic governance and market relations are still being stabilised in Bulgarian society. Whatever the limitations of specific articles, as well as of the present volume as a whole, this is a pioneering work in the systematic study of a crucial historical period in the development of Bulgarian society. Hopefully, the articles will meet the information needs of domestic and foreign audiences. The editors are very much indebted to Professor Tatiana Bouroudjieva for her organisational support in attracting competent authors to the project. We are grateful to Mrs. Karen Kampen from the University of Manitoba who improved the translation into English. Mrs. Elissaveta Ignatova deserved our respect for her patience and skills in preparing the manuscript for publication. Nikolai Genov Anna Krasteva

International Project

Comparative Charting of Social Change The present volume on Bulgaria offers an empirical description and theoretical analysis of radical changes occurring in a former socialist state. This welldocumented work is closely linked to other publications of the International Research Group on Comparative Charting of Social Change. This is the eighth volume prepared by the Group containing a national profile of major social trends. The previous ones dealt with the United States, Quebec, West Germany, France, Spain, Russia, and Italy. Additional volumes are in preparation on Greece and Canada, others are planned. They have been published in several languages and in English by McGill-Queen's University Press (Montreal) and Campus Verlag (Frankfurt am Main). The CCSC Group has also published comparative works on social change based on these national profiles. Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies appeared in 1994. Two other comparative volumes are in preparation: Changing Structures of Inequality and Grading Leviathan. The Performance of Nation States. The philosophy and the organizational scheme of the International Research Program on Comparative Charting of Social Change has been presented in detail by Theodore Caplow and Henri Mendras (1994). It started as an initiative of a French group doing research on social development (Dim, 1990) and then expanded with international collaboration which is becoming more and more intensive. The general purpose of this collective effort is to prepare a comprehensive and empirically well substantiated analysis of social trends in particular countries and to identity similarities and differences amongst them. The CCSC Group also plans to work on theoretical models of social change in order to facilitate the systematic explanation of empirical findings. The research carried out on the Bulgarian society will contribute to the development of systematic cross-national comparisons which are certainly full of pitfalls, but deserve taking the risk. Interdisciplinary comparative analysis of social trends is certainly the most promising research perspective in social sciences.

xiv

International Project

This present work will be an indispensable reference book for everybody who is interested in the development of the Bulgarian society over the last decades. An added value is that the changes which occurred in Bulgaria after 1989 are part and parcel of a wider process which has affected not only all societies in Central and Eastern Europe (Genov, 1998), but the whole of the Continent as well as all of the Western civilization. It is for this reason that Nikolai Genov, in his informative introductory essay, raises problems relevant to broad theoretical and practical contexts. The failure of the state socialist experiment will continue to attract the attention of researchers and politicians alike as the experience of the recent transformation is still to be analyzed in detail. For instance, could one expect sustainable social development under conditions of deepening economic differentiation? Are individualism and weak governments the best response to the challenge of the upcoming global competition? Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria 1960-1995 will help scholars and experts outside Bulgaria to gain a better understanding of the social, cultural, and economic changes in the country, and of the challenges raised by a difficult transition toward a future still seen as problematic by many observers. REFERENCES Caplow, Theodore and Henri Mendras (1994) Convergence or Divergence? In: Simon Langlois, Theodore Caplow, Henri Mendras and Wolfgang Glatzer, Eds. Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies. Frankfurt am Main and Montreal: Campus Verlag and McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 1-21. Dim, Louis (1990) La sociiti frangaise en tendances. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. Genov, Nikolai, Ed (1998) Central and Eastern Europe. Continuing Transformation. Paris and Sofia: UNESCO-MOST and Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Simon Langlois Laval University, Canada

BULGARIAN SOCIETY 1960-1995: THE CHALLENGE OF TWO TRANSFORMATIONS Nikolai Genov In the half century after the Second World War Bulgarian society experienced two profound, yet radically different types of change. The first was the state socialist experiment. At the beginning of the sixties, many people in the country still viewed the experiment as promising. Thirty years later it ended in a failure. The second one is the current transition to a market economy and pluralist politics. Major steps in the development of both institutional frameworks were accomplished. It is obvious, however, that the expected fast and easy transformation did not come about. The situation of Bulgarian society resembles recovery from a severe military defeat (See Trend 0.2). The process will take decades. This complicated path of societal development invites a variety of descriptions and explanations. One might focus on causes, reasons and effects in the national framework, which is an entirely legitimate approach. However, processes in Bulgarian society depend very much on broader trends. The development of the country after the Second World War was strongly influenced by decisions taken in Yalta and Malta. That is why the elaborated explanations of trends in the national society should bridge the domestic processes with the dynamic global and regional contexts. The Context of Evolutionary Universals If a society neglects or consciously suppresses evolutionary universals like market mechanisms or functions of state, then there will be unavoidable negative effects on society's adaptive capacity. This explanatory scheme facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the course and consequences of the two transformations which Bulgarian society experienced after the Second World War.

2

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

In the beginning of the nineties, it was easy to interpret the national development after 1944 as a clear case of de-modernization, since the first transformation undoubtedly included de-differentiation. However, bearing in mind the bitter experience of the nineties, we are anxious to analyze the period objectively, wie es eigentlich gewesen ist, according to Meinecke's famous requirement. This is necessary also because of the fact that the transformation after the Second World War allowed Bulgaria to join the industrialized and urbanized world. According to the census of 1946, urban dwellers comprised 24.7% of the country's population. The census of 1965 registered 46.5% urban dwellers, and the census of 1992 - 67.2% (Statistical Reference Book, 1996: 27). With this level of urbanization, Bulgaria fares well in international comparisons (Human Development Report, 1996: 202). The shift in the structure of villages and towns took a clear path towards the typical urban predominance in modern society (Table 1). The major agent of this development was the state. More precisely, between 1960 and 1989, it was the state merged with structures of the ruling Communist Party. By the late eighties, its membership approached a million in a country of only nine million. In the specific case of Bulgaria, the state socialist authoritarian government drew its legitimacy from a number of sources: First, it could rely on the strong egalitarian and statist political tradition of the country. On this cultural basis, leftist parties had a substantial influence on domestic politics inbetween the two world wars. After 1944, the egalitarian appeal of the communist ideology as well as the policies of overcentralization and state paternalism were strengthened by the prestige of one of the major winning parties in the war. Second, the authoritarian rule after the Second World War was not an exception in modern Bulgarian history. After the re-establishment of the Bulgarian state in 1878, truly democratic regimes were rare exceptions rather than the rule. Coming to power in the wake of a series of national military defeats, coup d'etats, and civil wars, the state socialist regime promised and then established domestic peace. The price was the reprisal of political opponents and the curtailing of democracy. But many felt the price was worth paying in order to cope with the material and cultural backwardness of the continental periphery. The changes after 1956 prolonged the

3

Two Transformations

cultural backing of the regime since they raised hopes that it was taking a democratic path. Third, the capacity of the overcentralized regime to allocate scarce resources to strategic projects brought about some visible results. Because of the inherited backwardness, the period of state socialism coincided with the wave of rapid modernization. Industrialization and urbanization went hand in hand with improvements in the standard of living and with other achievements (Oshavkov, 1976). They affected all aspects of social life from production (Minkov, 1984) and communication to family (Kyuranov, 1986), medical care, education and cultural development (Table 2). The effects of modernization were attributed to the capacity of the state socialist regime to bring about material prosperity and to bargain it against conformity. In reality, the accomplishments could not match promises and expectations in many ways. But the real crisis of legitimacy would gain momentum later in the eighties when the bargaining power of the regime was undermined by deepening economic inefficiency. Fourth, unlike the situation in most other Eastern European countries, the Soviet dominance on the regime was typically not perceived as a major problem in Bulgaria. The traditional positive attitude of Bulgarians towards Russia, due to its role in the re-establishment of the Bulgarian state, could be used as an asset for political legitimacy. Moreover, there was no Soviet military presence in the country after 1946. At the same time, Soviet political and military backing provided international stability and security. In economic terms, Bulgaria profited from trade with the Soviet Union. The country imported cheap raw materials and energy and could export large quantities of goods to an unsatiated Soviet market. Fifth, in historical retrospection, the ability of the ruling groups to maneuvre among complicated domestic and international circumstances shaped by the Yalta agreements should be recognized. On the other hand, one also has to recognize the brutal and clientelistic forms of the rule. The personal flexibility of Todor Zhivkov, who resided at the top of the party and state hierarchy from 1956 till 1989, can be viewed as political opportunism with strong authoritarian features. These personal qualities also contributed to the stability of the regime. The combined influence of these factors together with a survivalist national psychology help to explain why the regime was able to successfully cope with the accumulating economic, political and cultural tensions. They

4

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

were caused mainly by restrictions imposed on personal initiative and responsibility. As a result, the party-state could be blamed for all deficiencies at all levels of social life. The crucial one, however, was the rather limited ability of the overcentralized regime to keep pace with rapid technological and organizational innovations world-wide (Genov, 1986). As a result, the efficiency of investments was steadily declining. This trend was evident during the eighties (Table 3). By the mid-seventies, the potential for extensive development was exhausted. Thus, in 1990 the level of industrial production was only 116% of the level of industrial production in 1980 (Statistical Reference Book, 1996: 224). The low technological level of the majority of industrial plants limited their capacities to simple processing of raw materials, using large quantities of energy in a country poor in natural resources and sources of energy (See Trend 03). The major reason for the economic inefficiency was the elimination of market mechanisms. As a result, price formation could not follow the requirements of economic and environmental rationality. The foreign debt of 10.9 billion USD which was accumulated during the second half of the eighties is the clearest indicator of the destructive effects of overcentralization. Practical steps at decentralizing and introducing market mechanisms have been on the agenda of the Bulgarian government since the late sixties. Because of domestic and international circumstances, the critical being the events following the Prague Spring of 1968, the badly needed liberalization of economy and democratization of politics could not come about. The introduction of team-work or self-management in enterprise were small-scale reforms doomed to failure. In the second half of the eighties it was too late to introduce far reaching changes because of unfavourable international circumstances. The evolutionary universals of market economy had to be hastily re-introduced in the nineties. Thus the suppression of evolutionary universals in the development of Bulgarian society after 1944 could not lead to sustainable development meaning long-term stable development oriented towards need satisfaction but also towards strengthening social integration in its various aspects. In fact, major conditions of sustainable development were eroded, setting the stage for the coming crisis. The accumulation of potential for crisis took specific form in the towns and villages. The rapid increase in educational attainment took place in the towns. There the economic, political and cultural resources of social dy-

5

Two Transformations

namics were concentrated and the limitations imposed on private initiative were severe. The first dissident groups which appeared at the end of the eighties, then, had a clear urban origin and focused on urban environmental calamities. However, for intellectuals participating in the movement the problem was not simply the right to a healthy environment. The major issue was quality of life. It generally involved post-material values typical of educated circles in the big cities. The key factor of long-term social tensions country-wide was rooted differently. It was the widening discrepancy between the desire for a higher standard of living and the realities of everyday life. This potential for conflict was concentrated for the most part in towns. Mass migration from rural areas overburdened their infrastructure. They offered unsatisfactory habitation in every way - housing, services, environment, leisure time, and transportation. The discrepancy between ideological promises and harsh reality was clear. Criticism focused on the inefficiency of the centralized structures of government. More precisely, more often the major reason for the inefficiency of economic structures was seen in the merging of party-state structures and economic management. Thus the very legitimacy of the social and economic organization was questioned. In the rural areas development showed some similarities, but a number of differences as well. In the course of a few decades the state policy concerning villages and agriculture was dominated by efforts to bring towns and villages closer together. At the beginning, the issue concerned overcoming low productivity and hidden unemployment which were characteristic of Bulgarian rural areas between the two world wars. Later, the major issues became the standard of living and infrastructure. The strategy seemed to be clear: collectivization and mechanization of agriculture, bringing the motivation for agricultural work and the rural way of life closer to the universal patterns of industrial work organization and the urban way of life. These policies led to contradictory results. The establishment of large agricultural enterprises and the transfer of patterns of industrial organization to them were basically seen as evolutionary achievements from the technological and economic perspective. These innovations corresponded to longterm trends in all advanced countries. They had civilizational consequences as well. A large group of trained agricultural workers emerged who could command relatively modern technologies. The infrastructure of most villages was substantially modernized (Evrev, 1995). To a great extent, this

6

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

was achieved due to the incomes from privately cultivated plots. In 1980 they produced 33.2% of maize, 53.3% of potatoes, 39,0% of meat and 26% of the milk the country consumed (Statistical Reference Book, 1996: 24). The products could be offered to the market. Nevertheless, agriculture and rural areas suffered from a lack of investments. The administrative creation of huge agro-industrial complexes during the seventies practically eliminated the co-operative ownership and organization of work, thus eroding work motivation. The disproportionally high share of private production clearly shows that in the labour-intensive agricultural work the dominant form of ownership and organization failed. Despite the modernization of rural areas, infrastructure differences between towns and villages remained tangible (Genov, 1996b: 64). This was the major reason for the continuing migration of young people from villages to towns. Thus, the first transformation, ending in 1989, provokes rather controversial assessments. Most importantly, it did not succeed in establishing the conditions of a stable economic, political and social reproduction of Bulgarian society, necessary for sustainable development. Did the change after 1989 bring about the conditions for the desirable and necessary sustainability? A negative response to this question is shared by the public mind in Bulgaria. This coincidence in negations to both transformations deserves a careful and detailed explanation. Controversies of the Second Transformation The transformation after 1989 strengthens evolutionary achievements which potentially have many positive impacts on Bulgarian society. The democratization of political institutions and pluralization of cultural life, the economic as well as the political and cultural opening of the country to continental and global processes are promising trends. In times of globalization, national isolation is not an option. However, the economic decline concomitant to the second profound transformation placed severe limitations on the conditions of sustainable development. This may be clearly seen from the dynamics of major economic indicators of the country during the nineties (Figure 1). Domestic investments are minimal. Mass unemployment and impoverishment, value-normative concentration on survival models, inten-

7

Two Transformations

sive mistrust of major institutions and the crime wave add negative influences to the conditions of sustainability. How do we explain this development? Some decrease in labour productivity within the context of drastic change of ownership, in the organization of work, market strategies and way of life, etc., is obviously unavoidable. It might be understood as part of the "technological costs" of the transformation. Other negative effects have their explanation, however, in insufficient civilizational competences. One might clearly state that the transformation which has been implemented in Bulgaria since 1989 was poorly planned and not implemented effectively, bringing about a new wave of suppression and negligence of evolutionary universals - mainly major functions of the modern state. Radical liberalization of prices and foreign trade in 1991 aimed to drive the state out of the economic sphere in the quickest way possible. However, the hope that the market would automatically establish and maintain its own equilibrium was based on archaic conceptual models. The impact of increased imports of cheap industrial goods and of subsidised agricultural products on the local producers was barely calculated. They were technologically, organizationally and financially unprepared to cope with the dramatic shift in the macroeconomic conditions. In the foreseeable future there will be less advanced technologies in Bulgaria than in previous decades. One of the reasons for this trend is rooted in an influential view from the early nineties asserting no state intervention in the fields of science and technological development. Towns and rural areas are severely affected by these processes, although in different ways. The structural reforms in industry, including technological innovation, changes in production priorities, in market strategies, and in privatization - were postponed because of domestic and international events. Contrary to naive expectations, foreign investors did not rush to participate in the privatization of enterprises. The financial capacity of the local investors were rather limited. Political polarization delayed the working consensus on strategies and tactics of mass privatization. Despite the professed strategy of liberalization, major enterprises had to be subsidised in order to keep industrial branches functionally intact and to avoid additional unemployment. In the larger cities the opportunity to find other jobs or to move to private entrepreneurship are broader than in the villages. This explains the lower rate of unemployment there. Sofia, for instance, accounts for about

8

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

14.5% of the labour force of the country, but contained only 6.9% of the country's unemployed in October 1995 (Statistical Reference Book, 1996: 71). One positive trend during the nineties is a declining environmental pollution in the big cities. However, this trend is only in small measure due to technological and organizational innovations. The decline is much better explained by the decrease in industrial output, reaching half the 1989 level in the mid nineties. The irony of current processes consists in the fact that technologically advanced branches such as electronics are the most severely affected by the economic crisis. The partial recovery of the economy in 1995 was achieved with the full use of the capacities of the metallurgical and heavy chemical industries. Under these conditions it would be irresponsible to speak about sustainability in environmental terms. However, the key issue in the given context concerns the quality of Bulgaria's participation in the international division of industrial labour. In agriculture, the process took a different direction. The Law on the Ownership and Use of Arable Land of 1991 and its subsequent amendment in 1992 were intended to replace collective farming with private agriculture. The result is the large share of the private sector in agriculture. It is the largest, compared to the other branches of the economy (Table 4). However, the strategy of fast privatization in agriculture did not take into account an important series of circumstances. The complicated legal problems concerning the ownership of arable land were underestimated. Given the available technology, the lack of credit, the unresolved ownership problems and the age structure of the rural population, private agriculture did not come about as fast as it was intended. The fundamental issues concerning the technological and economic efficiency of agriculture based on small land ownership were barely addressed. The major technological problem is evident when one acknowledges the fact that the average agricultural plot will comprise about 0.35 ha after the restitution of arable land. Thus, the politicians for whom the state of Bulgarian agriculture in 1939 was the guiding ideal, missed the fact that neither the Bulgarian villages nor agriculture in general have remained the same since that time. They ignored the fact that in the advanced national economies the state pays special attention to production and price building in agriculture and to foreign trade with agricultural products. On the contrary, Bulgarian agriculture was weakened in financial and organizational respects by the beginning of the reforms.

9

Two Transformations

Later on it was left to compete with imported agricultural products which were subsidised. The politicians overlooked the fact that the development of large agricultural enterprises is the typical reaction to the challenge of international competition in the field of agriculture. Thus, two evolutionary universals, namely state support for agriculture and the concentration of agricultural production, were neglected or suppressed. These unfavourable circumstances will affect the economic, political and cultural development of Bulgarian villages in the coming decades. The situation is conflict-ridden. From the available data, there are about 970 thousand in the rural labour force and 187 thousand of these were unemployed in October 1995 (Statistical Reference Book, 1996: 72). This fact, together with demographic and educational reports, explain the substantial difference in the opinions of rural and urban dwellers about life in 1995 as compared to the situation before the start of the changes (Figure 4). The substantial differences between the rural and urban population involve major cultural issues. In a relatively short period of time, both the towns and villages had to adopt the ethical principles of a market economy. A consensus on the free economic initiative has practically been achieved. However, as to the next step in developing market ethics, namely the right of economically successful individuals to enjoy the fruits of their success, the views of rural and urban dwellers diverge dramatically. The clash of traditional and modern, individualist and collectivist, liberal and egalitarian value systems is most evident here (Figure 3). One of the major reasons for the failure of the first stage of reforms was the negligence of the influential egalitarian and statist value orientations. Indeed, the reform was adjusted poorly to the local economic, political and cultural realities. That is why it brought about destructive effects on the conditions of sustainable economic, social and environmental development. Many other processes in Bulgarian society could be better understood, however, if properly placed in the explanatory context of current global trends. Global Trends and National Transformation The structural and cultural changes in Bulgarian society after World War II might be interpreted as a deviation from the major patterns of Western European modernization. A closer inspection reveals, however, that industrialization, urbanization, growing consumption and rise of education

10

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

marked the modernization both of Western Europe and the Eastern parts of the continent. The situation after 1989 is even more conspicuous. The changes in Bulgaria and all over Eastern Europe have one common denominator - the transfer of institutional patterns which have shown their efficiency in managing industrialized societies (Wiesenthal, 1996). These institutions first emerged in Western Europe and North America. The transfer basically involves four types of value-normative orientations and institutional patterns which embody the most fundamental trends in the development of modern societies (Genov, 1997a). First, the transfer includes value-normative ideas and institutional configurations of instrumental activism. The focus is the concentration on instrumental values and behavioural patterns which lie at the core of modern industrialism. The key to it is the Western type of Weltbeherrschung, if Max Weber's terminology is used. Second, the institutional transfer involves modern forms of individualization. It shows various modifications under specific historical conditions. In Western Europe and North America, the innovations in market economy, competitive politics and in pluralist culture made it the major feature of institutions in the form of institutionalized individualism, as Talcott Parsons called it. A third global trend which guides recent developments in Eastern Europe is the upgrading of organizational rationality. First, it concerns the timely and sufficient differentiation of social structures and functions. Another characteristic of this trend is the upgrading of social integration. The underlying assumption of the following analysis is that both achievements and failures in implementing this trend might be registered in Bulgaria before and after 1989 as was the case all over Eastern Europe. Fourth, during the last few decades we have experienced world-wide universalization of value-normative systems. The process is effectively being pushed forward by the electronic media. However, the deeper roots of the trend are connected with the universal technological standards of industrialization and urbanization, the globalization of economy, and the global political interdependencies as well as with the globalization of culture and life styles. How are these trends manifested in the current transformation of Bulgarian society?

11

Two Transformations

The Challenges of Instrumental Activism The dominant ideology guiding the transformation of Bulgarian society after 1944 had two focal points. The first integrated the ultimate values of social justice, mass welfare and personal development. The second was the stress on the instrumental ends of industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture and the development of the infrastructure of a technologically advanced society. Gradually, the moral impetus of the first set of values became lost in everyday concerns dominated by instrumental ends. The industrialization became dominant and understood as a precondition for economic development. In fact, during the sixties and seventies, Bulgaria experienced a particulary high rate of economic growth. As a region, Eastern Europe had the highest rate of GDP growth in the world and managed to reduce the GDP per capita distance to Western Europe (Table 5). However, the state socialist version of social and economic organization did not succeed in stabilizing the initially high rate of technological and economic development. During the eighties the growth rate sharply declined in the region and its peripheral position to the core of modern civilization was again strengthened. For the first time in history, the GDP per capita in Eastern Europe fell below that of Latin America (Berend, 1997: 12). This development, less the problem of human rights, became the driving factor behind the decay, eventually bringing about political collapse in the region. After 1989, the solution was sought in the development of private initiative and market institutions. More specifically, the solution may be found in rapid privatization. The process is under way all over the region, with Bulgaria falling in the middle range of the scale (Figure 4). The shift in the structure of property, however, has not brought about the positive changes expected. After a modest improvement in the economic indicators of Bulgaria in 1994-1995, high inflation rates and the decline of GDP followed in 1996. For larger groups, it is even more important that the smaller GDP has been distributed in a less and less egalitarian manner. In 1990 the ratio of incomes of the richest 20% to that of the poorest 20% was 2.7:1. By the end of 1995, it had increased to 6.5:1 (Genov, 1997b: 38). This development as well as the trend towards commercialization of all activities, result in intensive value-normative tensions and conflicts as they clash with influential traditional notions of social justice. These contradictions lead to moral disorientation, undermining the cultural integration of

12

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Bulgarian society. The division of society between rich and poor is the perception of specific risk the intensity of which increases most rapidly in the course of the profound changes (Figure 5). The second problem is also connected with ultimate values but in the context of environmental sustainability. The commercial instrumentalization of social life is short-sighted. In principle, it puts limitations on the market's connections to the practices of sustainable development. The problem is particularly serious in the context of imperfect markets which rarely indicate the true environmental impact of production and consumption. This result is even more distorting when economic crises suppress environmental issues and push them to the periphery of the public interest. Briefly summarised, the market oriented instrumentalization of action brought about destabilization in the balance between instrumental and ultimate values. Thus, the development of the ultimate value-normative system of sustainable technological, economic, political, cultural and environmental development was postponed. However, no sustainable social order is possible if action is dominated by instrumental values. The present day social disintegration of Bulgarian society distracts it from the global trend bringing together instrumental activism with ideas and practices of sustainable development. Contradictions of Rapid Individualization It is often assumed that Eastern Europe has been isolated from global processes of individualization due to collectivist ideology which dominated the region after the Second World War. In reality, through rapid industrialization and urbanization, together with an increase in general well-being, all forms of modern individualization emerged in the region. The increasing number of alternatives for personal realization coincided with enhancement of personal capacities to make well-founded selections. In a parallel manner, potential for conflicts also increased since state interventionism into economic, political and cultural life put narrow limits on individual initiative and responsibility. The beginning of the nineties brought about a new wave of rapid individualization in the region. The establishment of half a million private firms in Bulgaria is an impressive illustration of the scale of the process. The registration of more than two hundred political parties and about 5000 non-

13

Two Transformations

governmental organizations would have been impossible without the initiative of individuals who seek new forms of personal initiative and realization. No doubt, this development can be interpreted in terms of the triumph of individualization as an evolutionary achievement (Beck, BeckGernsheim, 1994). The close analysis reveals, however, both the achievements and the tensions of the process. More often than not the strengthening of individualities comes about at the expense of the common good. The most impressive example is the looting of state property which has been accumulated since the Second World War. Undoubtedly, the state did not effectively manage the property of an increasingly differentiated industrialized society. This is why the introduction of market mechanisms became unavoidable. The real problem is the ongoing transfer of state property into private hands without any compensation to the national community, as the state machinery has been substantially weakened. The mechanisms of the transfer are numerous. They range from the legalized low rate selling of state property to managerial teams to clear cases of criminal plundering. This development has a negative impact on the economic situation of a large strata of the population as well as on the ability of the country to adequately react to new individualization opportunities. For large groups, the changes are in the direction of restricting the field for individual development and realization as compared to the situation during the eighties (See Trend 12.1). Under these precarious conditions individual aspirations and the time horizon of personal planning shrunk substantially. Moreover, the minimized time perspective stabilized itself for the vast majority of the Bulgarian population (Figure 6). This is a clear indication of helplessness which is in sharp contrast to the requirements of a conscientious government concerned with personal development and realization. Emancipation from the restrictive official ideology imposed on individuals was an evolutionary achievement. But the high level of personal disorientation and insecurity indicates that the Bulgarian national transformation included a severe disruption in community bonds. A stable social order cannot be established, however, on the basis of extreme individualization. The question remains as to the proper mechanisms which should represent and strengthen the common good together with support for individualization. It is clear that the necessity of communitarian reintegration of the national society is paramount. Bearing in mind the experience from previous

14

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

decades, it is also important that this reintegration is achieved without returning to authoritarian political and cultural patterns of over-integration. Upgrading of Organisational Rationality During the eighties it became clear that the Eastern European societies were losing the global race to upgrade organizational rationality. A series of cultural and institutional factors blocked the innovations in the region. The crucial moment for the adaptation of organizational structures to the complexity of industrial societies passed at the end of the sixties. The best opportunity to introduce economic liberalization, political democratization and pluralization of culture, as other authoritarian regimes successfully did (Genov, 1994b), was lost. The adaptation could be carried out later but with substantial difficulties and higher social costs. The processes during the second half of the eighties clearly reveal this pattern. The problem refers mainly to the necessity of successfully managing postponed differentiation. The crucial point is the differentiation of economy, politics and culture, which have been kept in a monolithic structure for decades by the political over-integration of the party-state. Another key issue involves differentiated political representations of specific interests. In the long run, the differentiation of markets acquires a growing importance as well. These and many other types of differentiation of action spheres and in action spheres materialize the global process of organizational rationalization. At the regional level in Eastern Europe, the process is so complex that it cannot free itself of tensions and paradoxes (Glatzer, 1996). They are rather intensive and put its very purpose under question. The most important paradox concerns the role of the state. At the core of the differentiation process is the withdrawal of the state from its domination over economy and culture. However, under the given civilizational conditions, there is no other agency which can effectively manage this withdrawal other than the state itself. Numerous misunderstandings and lack of co-ordination in this respect brought about consequences which indicate a degradation rather than an upgrading of organizational rationality (Genov, 1994a). This holds true particularly for the first stage of the radical economic reforms. In Bulgaria the latter were marked by a lack of fundamental legal arrangements of whole segments of market institutions as well as of knowl-

15

Two Transformations

edge and skills for managing the introduction of market mechanisms. All this led to destructive institutional outcomes which put the very legitimacy of political and economic reforms at stake (See Trend 11.2). The withdrawal of the state from control over the banking system turned out to be especially explosive. The catastrophic development in 1996 can be explained - other major factors notwithstanding - by the fact that large resources were reallocated to excessive consumption or drained abroad via the liberalized banking sector of the national economy. It was deprived of vitally important capital flows. This development is a manifestation of political irrationality which has far-reaching effects on the major economic indicators of the country. It is no wonder that trust in major state institutions reached remarkably low lavels in the mid-nineties (Table 6). The organizational rationalization is not characterized solely by the inefficient or non-existent state intervention. Some processes exceed the capacities of the Bulgarian national state. Nevertheless, the major problem remains: Can the stabilization of social order be accomplished without the active participation of the nation state in the transformation? The question is intellectually provocative but aims mainly at key practical issues. The intellectual answer became clear when obstacles in the way of the institutional development of market economy were manifest. The processes all over Eastern Europe reveal the necessity of active participation of the state in the regulation of the economic transformation (Eatwell et al., 1995: Ch.7). The search for an optimal solution to this problem will certainly dominate political debates in Bulgaria in the years to come. Value-normative Universalization In their development after the Second World War, the Eastern European countries did not manage to effectively adapt to the ongoing world-wide process of value-normative universalization. The major reason for this failure was their position under the conditions of a polar division of spheres of influence in the world. Eastern Europe was practically isolated from global markets as well as from other fundamental political and cultural processes. This isolation substantially contributed to the paralysis of innovations in the region which were needed in order to adapt effectively to global trends. The dissolution of extreme political and military confrontation sped up the development of universalistic value-normative systems in the region.

16

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Universal rights of the individual are at the core of the new constitutional arrangements. Ways of thinking with respect to ideological, political and military confrontations have not disappeared but they have been pushed to the periphery of the value-normative orientations. The strengthening of a universalistic value system does not imply, however, an end to the conflictual history of struggling particularistic views. On the contrary, we witness a general value-normative uncertainty. Facing a similar situation at the end of the First World War, Max Weber noted the decline of large ideological systems but also predicted the rise of competing value orientations in everyday life (Weber, 1992[1919]: 101). The new potential for cultural conflicts makes the illusions connected with the "end-of-history" thesis manifest. Indicators of a number of future conflicts can be easily recognized in the diverging opinions of rural and urban populations as well as in rapidly progressing economic differentiation. The potential for conflict is also present when considering ethnic and religious differences. Events in the former Yugoslavia clearly demonstrated this. Nationalism, regarded as a remnant of traditionalism, has re-established itself as a major factor determining value orientations. The revival of traditional religions and the intrusion of non-traditional sects indicate that religiously based cultural conflicts have a future - a rather significant one at that. In the Bulgarian national context this potential for future conflicts can be recognized in the substantial and stable social distances between the major ethnic groups in the country (Table 7). Thus, tensions between universalized value-normative structures and specific ethnic, religious and other identities which incorporate the diversity of cultures will certainly leave their imprint on the future of Bulgarian society. Bulgaria in South-Eastern Europe The peripheral status of Bulgarian society includes another important dimension as the country belongs to a rather specific political, ethnic and religious mixture in the South-Eastern corner of the European continent. The Western European Reformation and the organic growth of the modern world passed by this sub-region. What remained was the permanent necessity to catch up in terms of modernization. One might illustrate this point by referring to the Human Development Index (HDI) and its components as used by the United Nations Development Programme. The picture becomes quite

17

Two Transformations

telling when comparing with countries which represent other regions and levels of development (Table 8.). With the exception of Greece, Bulgaria and other countries from SouthEast Europe belong to the group with mid-level development. The group includes the countries which rank from 58 (Brazil) to 126 (New Guinea) at a scale of 174 countries. The countries from this group have a GDP per capita in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms of 3,044 USD. The most developed 57 countries have a GDP of 14,922 USD in PPP terms. Bulgaria is much below this level. It is also below that of the economic achievements of the newly industrialized countries of East Asia, represented by South Korea. Bulgaria's economic parameters are best comparable with those of typical Latin American countries which belong to the periphery in the contemporary global economic, political and cultural systems. The general problems due to belated modernization in South-East Europe are being amplified by ethnic and religious tensions in these countries. It is not by chance that the expression "balkanization" has come to mean division, suspicion, animosity and latent conflicts both in the colloquial and in the diplomatic language all over the world. This association is supported by historical accounts but also by events in the very recent past. On the other hand, countries from the subregion are well known for their traditional dependence on advanced patrons. Thus, their development and relations often have indications for broader international relations and processes. The analysis of this complicated geostrategic situation, in which the development of Bulgarian society takes place, should be supported with its historical background and by mentioning some prospects. Once more, orientations in both directions might be provided by the concepts of social differentiation and social integration. Contradictory Trends in Social Differentiation The explanatory perspective which seeks to explain acute national and international conflicts in South-East Europe should be firmly grounded in the belated differentiation of nation-states in the region. Over the centuries, this subregion has been at the centre of conflicts concomitant to the decay of three empires - the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Russian. The historical price of all this has been paid by all ethnic groups in these multinational

18

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

conglomerations. However, the highest price has been paid and is being paid, by the peripheral areas and ethnic groups of the empires. The major problem in this context is that the establishment of states of particular ethnic groups cuts across confrontation lines among the former great powers. This type of state building is always loaded with potential conflicts, and they did not take long to appear in the past. They are still alive with us. While the potential of nationalist mobilization for violent resolution of economic and political conflicts seems to be basically exhausted in Western Europe, recent events in South-East Europe strengthen the notion that this is not the case in the subregion. The reason for the existence of this potential is not the delay of technological, economic or educational development alone. In broader terms, the major problem is belated social differentiation. The key is the belated differentiation of action spheres but also within specific action spheres. First, through the twentieth century, societies from this region have been dominated by politics. All are societies in which state intervention in the economy and culture is the normal state of affairs. The forms of interventionism vary from country to country and from period to period. It reached its pinacle in the cases of complete economic nationalization and cultural control as it was the case in Bulgaria. The major way to achieve individual economic success under such conditions is the use and abuse of political power. The development of this subregional model of domination of politics over economy has historical roots. The countries of South-East Europe do not and have not had the time to historically develop their modernization via industrialization in an organic way. Having just appeared on the political map, these countries faced divided shares of economic and political influence. Their only hope was to react with state governed modernization. The intellectual and emotional driving force behinf modernization was nationalism. This model of modernization has retained its validity in the region for a long period of time (Mouzelis, 1987). Second, as seen from a social-structural point of view, the major reason for the domination of politics in the South-East European societies in most cases was the weakness of the middle class and of the civil society. Moreover, in large parts of the subregion the civil society was suppressed during the development of their industrial base. Thus, the de-differentiation of economy and politics has been implemented to the extreme. One of the ma-

19

Two Transformations

jor reasons for this is the effort to maximally concentrate the scarce national resources needed to achieve rapid advances in economic modernization. In this way relatively rapid industrialization has taken place. However, in the long run, the de-differentiation of the economy and politics turned out to be unproductive since it suppressed economic initiative and responsibility. Thus, in several countries of the subregion, including Bulgaria, the future differentiation of economy and politics will depend significantly on the development of the middle class. Third, societies in South-East Europe are still dominated by politics due to international circumstances. The great powers exert influence on the subregion through the local political elites. They readily assume the function of intermediators since foreign patronage advances their own position. There are numerous examples of economic and political backing to ruling political groupings precisely because of their role as implementing agents of foreign interests. Fourth, the political domination furthers the tradition of paternalistic political culture and practices which were inherited from the medieval empires. The various forms of political paternalism combined with a strong familial traditionalism remain in the political fabric of the subregion. The similarities with political structures in the Mediterranean and in Latin America are obvious. Fifth, the lack of differentiation of politics from other action spheres goes hand in hand with a lack of differentiation in the sphere of politics itself. The most extreme case is manifest in the elimination of the division of powers which was practiced in most countries of the subregion after the Second World War. Bulgaria is a typical example in this respect. The unclear differentiation of political interests and processes is the other side of the coin. It is not by chance that, national specifics notwithstanding, dictatorial traditions of suppressing the differentiation in politics are shared throughout the South-East Europe. Sixth, paradoxical as it may seem, the domination of society by politics is one of the major causes of permanent political instability in the subregion. The overconcentration of political power is not the most effective responce to the economic, ethnic, religious and other challenges. More flexible forms of government are needed. Among other things, this means leaving economy and culture to develop in terms of their own logic and not to

20

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

subject them to the logic of politics. This also means sufficient differentiation in the sphere of politics itself. The Bulgarian case ilustrates how urgent and complicated task it is to continue the differentiation of social systems. This is a challenge to other countries in the subregion as well. Another common task is to connect the differentiation with strengthening the domestic and international mechanisms of social integration. Paths of Social Integration The complicated historical past of South-East Europe and its current situation usually provoke the idea of disintegration. Nevertheless, integration is at work in the subregion as well. The process has many specific steps. First, the dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires opened the way to relatively well-integrated nation-states. Whatever the prospects of each one in particular, the existing state boundaries will most likely remain relatively stable - at least in the majority of cases. This means national division of labour, national markets, national politics, and national culture. In other words, modernization will continue in the framework of the technological, economic, political and cultural development of nation-states. Their roots are rather stable in South-East Europe. Second, there is a trend towards integration of the states from the subregion in European structures. Most attractive in this respect are the structures of the European Union. Bulgaria is very much involved in this integration process, which will probably follow in the direction of the Euro-atlantic structures. However, the differences in work productivity, in economic organization, in the stability of democratic institutions and in the dominating value-normative orientations are too substantial to be overcome in the short run(Riedel, 1996). Third, the memories from past and present-day suspicions caused by unresolved territorial and other problems are too influential. They do not make mutual understanding between countries in the region an easy task. However, there is no alternative to bilateral co-operation. Whatever mutual reservations and suspicions may exist, the small states of South-East Europe are doomed to cooperate in all spheres of economy, politics and culture. Because of its location, Bulgaria will play an important role in this respect.

21

Two Transformations

Fourth, remnants from the past thwart multilateral subregional cooperation as well. It is hardly realistic to expect rapid development in this field. Traditional and recent rivalries (Wagenlehner, 1993) are too substantial to be underestimated. Nevertheless, proper understanding of the relationship between national and regional security is gaining momentum. This implies a reorientation of the efforts to develop the mechanisms of national security in terms of the stabilization of regional security. The common technological, environmental and political problems (Genov, 1991; Genov, 1993; Genov, 1996a), together with the need to implement joint communication and transport projects, in which Bulgaria is very much interested, will facilitate subregional cooperation and integration. Naturally, the course of this process will depend upon the further development of broader international relations. The general conclusion concerning the subregional aspect of the development of Bulgarian society might simply be that there is a continuing instability and uncertainty. All countries from South-East Europe claim that they have deep roots in subregional history. In reality, they are young, and in some cases, exeptionally young nations. This fact may fuel hopes that the accumulation of historical experience will promote domestic and international integration. Differentiation along ethnic and religious lines remains in some cases. However, the general direction and possible outcomes are becoming clear. The belated but continuing modernization will be marked by differentiation of economy and culture from politics and by continuing differentiation of powers, of political identities and groupings. The predominance of differentiation will be stronger in former state socialist countries such as Bulgaria. In general terms, differentiation cannot occur without complications. We will witness new tensions and conflicts at both the national and international levels. Substantial efforts will be needed in order to avoid serious confrontations. On the other hand, the efforts to develop national and international integration will be intensive as well. The prospects for integration at the national level are promising. In particular, the newly established states will invest much energy towards this effort. South-East Europe still lives in the epoch of nation-states which belongs to the past for other parts of the world. Indeed, the strengthening of nation states seems to be outdated when compared to the backdrop of ongoing globalization in economics, politics and

22

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

culture. Nevertheless, attempts at political overintegration of societies at the expense of openness to regional and global co-operation is still entirely possible in the region. Sustainable Development Requires a Multidimensional Social Integration Throughout the world central and local governments are attempting to solve difficult problems in order to cope with contradictory global trends and their local manifestations and to practically apply the principles of sustainable development. In Bulgaria this universal task faces complicated problems in the course of the ongoing transformation: First, taking the form of an all-pervasive commercialization, instrumental activism becomes an obstacle in terms of long-term oriented sustainable development, which can be only materialized on the basis of ultimate values in reference to the common good. The positive aspect of this trend is the strengthening of the idea and the practices of sustainable development without stifling the innovative potential of instrumental activism. Second, there is no doubt that modern individualism has no alternative. However, its negative effects should be minimized by the effective functioning of mechanisms of communitarian solidarity. Sustainable development is not possible under the conditions of value-normative and institutional predominance of individualism, as it is the trend in Bulgaria at present. Its clash with traditional and prospective forms of communitarianism continues to exist with much intensity. The results of the clash will determine the future of sustainable development in the country. Third, the underestimation of evolutionary universal s of the state government brought about a series of tensions and conflicts. The crash of financial pyramids is only one of the numerous examples of deviation from the patterns of organizational rationalization which threaten sustainable development in the country. The increasing rationalization of organizational structures and processes requires institutional changes in order to reduce the potential for organizational pathology. Fourth, together with the rapidly proceeding universalization of values and norms one can observe various forms of particularism as well. So far, the most relevant among them is the particularism of political confrontation. Many others are still latent, however. As the experience of neighbouring

23

Two Transformations

countries clearly shows, they could be easily activated. That is why one of the most important tasks is to preserve universalistic solidarity in order to cope with the extremes of particularism. Against this background, the concluding thesis might be formulated as follows: Sustainable development of Bulgarian society will be possible when the destructive trends after 1989 are replaced by a multidimensional trend of social integration. The consolidation of the national economy by means of integrating market mechanisms is a priority in this respect. The technological restructuring of the economy cannot be postponed any longer. Its impact on unemployment and living standards will be manifested in the years to come. Another source of uncertainty is the notion of mass privatization. Only after five or ten years it will be possible to assess its economic and social consequences. The continuing uncertainty as to the future organizational forms of agriculture is another major challenge. It is extremely advisible that the nation mobilize political will and organizational capacities in order to reduce this uncertainty. This is still another precondition for the sustainable development of the country. The outlined complexity and unpredictability of many of these processes require careful and long-term management. The re-establishment of social integration in general, and of value-normative integration in particular will certainly be a protracted and difficult process. In agriculture, particularly, the second wave of catch-up modernization went too far in a direction, which advanced countries left far behind long ago. That is why the disintegrating social trends will likely be the most strengthened in two directions. First, the differentiation between towns and villages, between rich and poor, will intensify. Second, in the global and regional respects the peripheral position of Bulgaria will be stabilized. In both scenarios one can hardly expect a reduction of conflicts. Coping with these conflicts will gradually become the domain of supranational organizations. So far, however, it remains primarily the job of national governments. That is why they are being forced to develop and to apply various forms of strategic planning. It is precisely in this way that the most serious problem of present day Bulgaria is laid out. The major reason for the continuing critical processes is the helplessness of state institutions. That is why the way out of economic, political and value-normative crises, including a severe crisis of sustainability as well, requires a stabilization of the state institutions first and foremost. Only under this condition is the recovery of the national economy

24

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

managed and cultural resources mobilized to favour sustainability (Genov, 1995: Ch. 8). The effects of these efforts depend on many circumstances. The field of free choice has narrowed substantially, however. What remains is the historical experience that persistence is a major trait of the national character. The hope remains also that this trait is shared by living generations as well.

REFERENCES Beck, U., E. Beck-Gersheim. Eds. (1994) Riskante Freiheiten. Individualisierung in modernen Gesellschaften. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Eatwell, J., M. Ellman, M. Karlson, D. M. Nuti, J. Shapiro (1995) Transformation and Integration: Shaping the Future of Central and Eastern Europe. London: Institute for Public Policy Research. Evrev, P. et al. (1995) Development of Settlements in the Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia: National Center for Territorial Development and Housing Politics (in Bulgarian). From Plan to Market (1996) World Development Report. Oxford etc.: Oxford University Press. Genov, N. (1986) Rationality and Sociology. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1991) Society and Technology in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1993) Society and Environment in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1994a) Risks of the Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. (1994b) The Rise of the Dragon. The Modernization of South Korea. Sofia: Sofia University Press (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1996a) Society and Politics in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: National and Global Development. Genov, N. (1996b) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP.

25

Two Transformations

Genov, N. (1997a) Four Global Trends: Rise and Limitations. International Sociology, Vol. 12, N 4, pp. 409-428. Genov, N. Ed. (1997b) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Glatzer, W. Hrsg. (1996), Lebensverhdltnisse in Osteuropa. Prekdre Entwicklungen und neue Konturen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus. Human Development Report (1996) New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kyuranov, Ch. Ed. (1986) The Contemporary Bulgarian Family. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Minkov, M. Ed. (1984) Work Capacities and Work Realization of the Bulgarian Population. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Mouzelis, N. (1987) Politics in the Semi-Periphery. London: Macmillan. Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Riedel, Sabine (1996) Konzepte der Osterweiterung der Europaischen Union. Eine kritische Analyse am Beispiel Bulgariens. Sudosteuropa, 6-7, 417-450. Shishmanova, M. (1995) Trends and Problems in the Development of the Settlement Structure in the Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia: National Centre for Territorial Development and Housing Politics (in Bulgarian).. Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Wagenlehner, G. (1994) Konflikte, Konfliktlosungen und Friedenssicherung in Sudosteuropa. Miinchen: Sudosteuropagesellschaft. Weber, Max (1992[1919]) Wissenschaft als Beruf. In: Max Weber. Gesamtausgabe. Bd. 17. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Wiesenthal, Helmut, Hg. (1996) Vergleichende Perspektiven aufdie Transformation Ostdeutschlands. Frankfurt/New York: Campus. Wolf, H. (1994) Sudosteuropa und die europdische Integration. Miinchen: Sudosteuropagesellschaft.

26

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Table 1. Types of population centres according to the number of inhabitants (censuses of 1946, 1965 and 1992) Types of settlements below 200 200-499 500-999 1 000-1 999 2 000-4 999 5 000-9 999 10 000-24 999 25 000-99 999 100 000-499 999 500 000 and more Total

Number of settlements /Number of inhabitants 1946 1965 1992 1 294 1 129 294 1 403 1 118661 1988 1 150 077 1 261 1 432 308 1 257 1 432 311 1 274 1 427 786 1 463 1 1 064 356 1 306 1 943 047 977 1 691 003 1 304 1 1 810 408 1 071 1 1485 250 646 1 897 697 591 1 1 668 131 490 / 1 410 545 292 1 853 759 80 1 515 477 94 / 647 236 72 1 502 932 26 1 381 913 34 / 523 281 45 1 669 575 12 1 464 276 27 / 1 228 803 33 1 1675 386 2 1 563 186 4 / 637 621 8 / 1 499 895 1 / 801 111 1 / 1 107 613 6 033 / 7 029 349 5 687 / 8 227 866 5 336 / 8 475 723

Source: Shishmanova, M. (1995) Trends and Problems in the Development of the Settlement Structure in the Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia: National Centre for Territorial Development and Housing Politics, p. 22 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Changing conditions of human development 1960-1995 Year

Telephones (thousands)

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

171.7 279.2 473.0 777.1 1 255.8 1 946.3 2 634.9 3 030.3

Child mortality (till 1 year, per 1000) 45.1 30.8 27.3 23.1 20.2 15.4 14.8 16.1

Source: Statistical Yearbooks. Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

27

Two Transformations

Table 3. Gross product on 100 leva fixed capital in the state owned and co-operative enterprises Year

1981

1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988

Gross product (lv.)

134

129

125

123

120

112

117

109

Source: Genov, N.. Ed. (1991) Society and Technology in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development, p. 17.

Table 4. Relative share of the private sector in the production of economic branches (1991-1995, in per cent) Branches

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Industry Construction Agriculture Transport Trade

1.6 13.5 27.6 4.8 24.6

2.6 23.7 49.9 13.3 42.4

6.4 39.3 63.7 17.0 54.2

8.0 50.5 76.1 22.9 6.7

13.8 62.4 76.3 34.9 70.3

Source: National Statistical Institute, Sofia.

Table 5. Central and Eastern Europe's per capita GDP as percentage of the various regions of the world 1913-1973 Western Europe Overseas West Southern Europe Latin America Asia World average

1913

1938

1973

42.0 29.7 88.8 102.8 209.8 97.8

44.1 34.9 107.9 105.5 238.3 108.3

46.6 35.7 95.2 120.9 341.8 132.6

Source: Berend, I.T. Ed. (1997) Long-Term Structural Changes in Transforming Central & Eastern Europe. Munchen: Sudosteuropa Gesellschaft, p. 11. The calculations are made by Angus Maddison on the average of sample countries. Western Europe is represented by 12 countries; the Overseas West is the aggregate of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the US. Southern Europe is the average of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey; Central and Eastern Europe consists of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia; Latin America is represented by seven countries; Asia by eleven countries, including China, India, Bangladesh, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea; Africa is represented by ten countries; and the world average is composed by the average of the above 56 countries.

28

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Table 6. Degree to which major institutions contribute to the governance of the country (National surveys, five points scale, positions 1 and 5) To a very low extent (1)

Institutions

To a very high extent (5)

Oct. 1994

Nov. 1996

Oct. 1994

Nov. 1996

- The Parliament

58.6

46.1

1.7

1.8

- The President

34.9

43.0

3.4

1.8

- The Government

52.4

53.4

1.4

1.1

- Courts and Prosecutors' offices

50.1

51.8

1.9

0.7

Source: National surveys Risks in Modern Society carried out by a team headed by the present author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

Table 7. Would you accept a representative of another ethnic group for: (National surveys, position "No", percent) A Turk

A Gypsy

1993

1996

1993

1996

- Neighbour

35.2

30.2

71.0

67.9

- Colleague at the work place

31.5

25.5

63.1

60.8

- Close friend

51.7

48.2

78.7

79.6

- Member of the family

77.0

78.9

90.2

90.0

Source: Annual surveys Risks in Modern Society carried out by a team headed by the author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

29

Two Transformations

Table 8. Basic indicators and ranking along the Human Development Index of selected countries (data of 1993) Country

Albania Brazil BULGARIA Ethiopia Germany Greece Korea, Rep. of Romania Turkey USA WORLD

GDP per capita (PPP, USD)

Life expectancy (years)

Involvement in education %

Ranking according HDI

2 200 5 500 4 320 420 18 840 8 950 9710 3 727 4 210 24 680 5 428

72 66.5 71.2 47.8 76.1 77.7 71.3 69.9 66.7 76.1 63.0

59 72 65 16 79 78 81 62 62 96

104 58 62 168 18 21 29 74 84 2 -

60

Source: Human Development Report (1996) New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 135-136. Figure 1. Major economic indicators of Bulgaria 1989-1996, 1989=100

Source: Data from the National Statistical Institute and author's calculations.

30

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Figure 2. How does the person live as compared to 1989? (National survey, June 1995, in per cent)

Source: Annual survey Risks in Modern Society carried out on a random nationwide sample of 1216 by means of home interview in June 1995 Figure 3. It is natural that the incomes differ substantially (National survey, June 1995, in per cent)

Source: Annual survey Risks in Modern Society carried out on a random nationwide sample of 1216 by means of home interview in June 1995.

31

Two Transformations

Figure 4. Private sector output as a share of GDP in the Central and Eastern European countries (end of 1995, per cent)

Source: From Plan to Market. World Development Report (1996) Oxford etc. Oxford University Press, p. 15.

32

Bulgarian Society 1960-1995

Figure 5. Perceptions of risks facing Bulgarian society (National surveys, only position 5 "Very serious problem", per cent)

Source: National surveys on Risks in Modern Society carried out by a team headed by the present author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Figure 6. Time perspective of personal planning (per cent)

Source: National surveys on Risks in Modern Society carried out by a team headed by the present author at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

0 CONTEXT

0.1 Demographic Trends

The trend of a decreasing birth rate started as early as in the first half of the century and continued in the second half. Through the eighties infant mortality dropped and then increased. The death-rate has been increasing since the end of the sixties. As a result of the lessening birth rate and the increasing mortality rate on the one hand, and of the emigration on the other, in 1992 the first drop of the population between two censuses was registered. In the first half of the century the number of men exceeded the number of women, but after the fifties the sex ratio reversed in favour of women. In Bulgaria the population is growing old. More than a half (67%) live in towns. According to the census of December 1992, the population of Bulgaria numbers 8,487,317 persons. Throughout the last 30-year period it has remained relatively constant, tough compared to the end of last century it has increased 2.7 times (Table 1). There has been a persistent trend of a declinng average annual population growth In the period 1966-1975 it was 2.8%, during the period 1976-1985 it approached to zero, and then decreased further (Table 2). For the first time in the country's demographic history there was a drop in the population in a period between two consecutive censuses (461 thousand persons between 1985 and 1992). Bulgaria is one of the most sparsely populated Eastern European countries. Only Hungary has registered lower demographic growth after the Second World War. Bulgaria's demographic growth (+27.3% during the same period) is the lowest in the Balkans (+35% in Greece despite three decades of emigration; +150% in Albania).

34

Context

The dynamics of population growth is conditioned by the interaction between high mortality and low birth rate Through the end of the sixties the death rate decreased and then began to grow: 8.1 per thousand in 1965, 9.1 in 1970, 10.3 in 1975, 11.6 in 1986, and 12.9 in 1993 (see Fig.l). An important case of the increasing death rate is the demographic aging of the population. The following factors also contribute: the availability of risk factors including ecological ones; stressful conditions in the production environment and daily life; the prevalence of a number of chronic diseases; the growth of transportation related injures and daily traumas; the decline of good nutrition and healthy way of living. The economic crisis and growing uncertainty of life in recent years have also had unfavourable impact. For years infant mortality (deaths of children up to one year of age) declined. In 1988 it reached its lowest level - 13.6 per a thousand newborns. After 1989 it has started to increase, reaching in 1993 15.5 per a thousand babies born alive. Also alarming is an ongoing trend of an increasing death rate in the active ages between 40 and 59 years, and recently between 30 and 39 years. There are two major reasons for the low demographic growth, leading to depopulation: the mutually interacting trends of dropping birth rate and increasing mortality, on the one hand, and the emigration, on the other. In the beginning of the century the birth rate in Bulgaria like in the other Balkan countries was high (about 40%). As early as after the end of the second decade this rate started to decline (Fig.l). In 1910 a woman typically gave birth to 7 children. In 1934 she bore 3.5 on the average. During the second half of the century the natality rate growth continued to dramatically drop. In 1966 it was 14.9 per thousand, the lowest rate in the world after Hungary. In 1991 it reached 10.7 per thousand, and in 1992 - 10.4 per thousand. This is the lowest birth rate in the history of Bulgaria. Increasing numbers of women with two children This category increased from 40.7% in 1965 to 54.4% in 1985 (Table 3). The group of women with three children decreased from 12.1% to 10.0% during the same period. The women with 4 and more children became an exception (they dropped from 10.8% to 3.8%). Several reasons for the drop of birth rate could be pointed out: the getting old of the fertile contingent;

35

0.1 Demographic Trends

normative support of a family model with two or only one child; insufficient financial security; and small homes. Essential factors are the rate of female employment (one of the highest in Europe) and women's pursuit of education (more than half of the university students are women). The reasons are complex - cultural, demographic, economic, healthrelated. They are not yet completely clarified. Scientists prefer to speak of a "Bulgarian demographic oddity" (M.Billaut) or "Bulgarian anomaly" (R.J.MacIntyre). Mention is made of a number of factors which should act in the reverse direction. Since the beginning of the century pattern of early marriages has persisted. It has not considerably changed in recent decades for women: 21.2 years in 1956; 21.0 years in 1975; 21.4 years in 1985; and 20.6 in 1990. A number of measures have been tried to encourage births In 1967 a decree was adopted for increasing the child allowances, and certain restrictions were imposed on abortions. The Family Law of 1985 guarantees a two-year paid maternity leave for any parent, even for grandmothers or grandfathers. It favours grants of housing loans and facilitates loan payments in the cases of a second and third baby. Emigration is another estimated significant factor for demographic dynamics The number of those who left the country after 1986 is about 476 thousand. A vast part of the emigrants belong to the Turkish ethnocultural group (see Ethnic minorities). In the years of transition lots of young people also pursued opportunities outside the country. The decline in the population in the period between the latest two censuses is generally attributed to emigration. Two additional circumstances enhance the negative impact of the latter on birth rate. First, women from the Turkish ethnocultural community usually have more children. Second, the other major contingent of the emigration stream, namely the young, are also relatively fertile. The aging of the population proceeds at a high rate This trend is reflected in the progressive decline in the proportional representation of the young and the proportional increase of the middle-aged and old. During the first 46 years of the century the population over "active" age increased 2.2 times, and in the next 46 years - 2.5 times more. In 1956 it

36

Context

represented 13% of the whole population, in 1975 it was 18.4% and reached 23.7% in 1992 (Table 5). Until the middle of the fifties there was a trend of increasing number of people of "active" age. In 1956 the proportion reached its maximum - 58.9%. After 1965 it began to decline, reaching 55.8% in 1992. There is a lasting trend of a decline in the share of the young in the overall structure of the population. At the end of 1992 persons under 16 years of age numbered 1736 thousand, approximately as the average for the period 1905-1910, while the difference in the total population between 1910 and 1992 was 4150 thousand. Bulgaria ranks among the countries with lowest share of children and adolescents and with highest share of the aged in the population structure. Haifa century ago the number of men exceeded the number of women This pattern lasted until 1956 (with the exception of 1920), after which women outnumbered men (Table 4). In the beginning of the century the women's mortality rate was higher. Around 1934 the death-rate coefficients for both sexes almost equalized. After 1970 the already outlined trend of hypermortality for men has deepened. In 1993 the average life expectancy was 67.6 years for men and 74.4 years for women. Since the beginning of the century people have tended to migrate from villages to towns In 1900 the urban population was 19.8%, in 1946 it was 24.7%. In 1956 more than half of the population (58%) lived in towns and today 67.2% do so (Table 6). High rates of urbanization can explain the drop in the migration from villages and the rise of the migration from towns. Nevertheless, the decrease of the rural population is distinctly marked. Just during the period 1956-1992 its number dropped by 2275 thousand persons. The reason is that migration from villages to towns has been always outnumbered the reverse flux. The restoration of land property in the last years on the one hand, and the high extent of unemployment in towns on the other, has stimulated some migration from towns to villages. While the share of the population over sixty was 20.8% for the country as a whole in 1992, the same share in the rural population was 30.5%. The death rate in villages is 1.5 times higher than in towns. The trend of declining birth rate is higher within the urban population (15.7 per thousand in

37

0.1 Demographic Trends

1980 and 10.2 per thousand in 1993) than the rural population (respectively, 12.4 per thousand and 9.5 per thousand). In the last decade the natural growth in towns has considerably decreased, but still remaining positive. In the villages a negative natural growth occurred as early as 1975. This rate reached 9.4 per thousand in 1993. The main reason for the negative features of the rural demographic structure is the high nimber of old people. Anna Krasteva

REFERENCES Billaut M. (1992) Problemes de population en Bulgarie. HistoriensGeographe. 1992, N 337, 109-124. Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Results of the census of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

38

Context

Table 1. Number of population per years of censuses

Year of census 1880*

Total

In towns

In villages

In percentage compared to the census of 1887

In percentage compared to the former census

2 007 919

336 102

1 671 817

942 680

224 105

718 575

1887

3 154 375

593 547

2 560 828

100.0

100.0

1892

3310713

652 328

2 658 385

105.0

105.0

1900

1884**

3 744 283

742 435

3 001 848

118.7

113.1

1905

4 035 575

789 689

3 245 886

127.9

107.8

1910

4 337 513

829 522

3 507 991

137.2

107.5

1920

4 846 971

966 375

3 880 596

153.7

111.8

1926

5 478 741

1 121 131

4 348 610

137.7

113.0

1934

6 077 939

1 302 551

4 775 388

192.7

110.9

1946

7 029 349

1 735 188

5 294 161

222.8

115.6

1956

7 613 709

2 556 071

5 057 638

241.4

108.3

1965

8 227 866

3 822 824

4 405 042

260.8

108.1

1975

8 727 771

5 061 087

3 666 684

276.7

106.8

1985

8 948 649

5 799 939

3 148 710

283.7

102.5

1992

8 487 317

5 704 552

2 782 765

269.1

94.8

* Northern Bulgaria ** Eastern Roumelia Source: Results of the census of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.X (in Bulgarian).

39

0.1 Demographic Trends

Table 2. Growth of population in periods between censuses Residence Total In towns In villages Average annual growth (number) In towns In villages Average annual growth (in %) In towns In villages

19211926 631770 163 756 448 014

19271934 599 198 172 420 426 778

19471956 584 360 820 883 236 523

-738 358

19761985 220 878 738 852 -517 974

19861992 -461 332 -95 387 -365 945

105 295 27 293 78 002

74 900 21 553 53 347

58 436 82 088 -23 652

49 991 123 826 -73 835

22 088 738 855 -51 797

-65 904 -13 627 -52 277

2.1 2.6 1.9

1.3 1.8 1.2

0.8 3.8 -0.5

0.6 2.8 -1.8

0.2 1.4 -1.5

-0.8 -0.2 -1.8

19661975 499 905 1 238 263

Source: Results of the census of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.XI (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Distribution of women according to the number of children 1965

1975

1985

None 1 child 2 children

9.2% 27.2% 40.7%

6.9% 27.9% 48.9%

7.1% 24.7% 54.4%

3 children 4 and more

12.1% 10.8%

10.0% 6.3%

10.0% 3.8%

Number of children

Source: Billaut M. (1992) Problemes de population en Bulgarie. Historiens-Geographe. 1992,N337,p.ll5.

40

Context

Table 4. Correlation between the number of population of both sexes Years of censuses

Women per 1000 men

1887 1892 1900 1905 1910 1920 1926 1934 1946 1956 1965 1975 1985 1992 Source: Results of the census tute, p.XIII (in Bulgarian).

Relative growth (+/-) (in % against the former census) Men Women

965 958 5.3 961 13.0 962 7.7 966 7.2 1002 9.7 997 13.3 990 11.3 999 15.2 1004 8.0 1 000 8.3 1 003 5.9 1 019 1.7 1 035 -6.3 of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National

4.6 13.2 7.8 7.7 13.9 12.8 10.5 16.2 8.6 7.8 6.2 3.3 -4.6 Statistical Insti-

Table 5. Distribution of the population according to age Age Total Under active age In active age Over active age

number % number % number % number %

1900 3 744 283 100.0 1 607 440 42.9 1 769 484 47.3 367 359 9.8

Years of censuses 1905 1926 4 035 575 5 478 741 100.0 100.0 2 036 665 1 686 393 37.2 41.8 1 942 574 2 912 600 53.2 48.1 529 476 406 608 9.6 10.1

1934 6 077 939 100.0 2 275 767 37.4 3 231 058 53.2 5711 14 9.4

1985 8 948 649 100.0 2 046 709 22.9 5013 161 56.0 1 888 779 21.1

1992 8 487 317 100.0 1 735 712 20.5 4 734 275 55.8 2 017 330 23.7

continued Table 5 1946 1 029 349 100.0 2 092 504 29.8 4 117 001 58.6 819 844 11.6

1956 7 613 709 100.0 2 136 681 28.1 4 486 795 58.9 990 233 13.0

1975 8 727 771 100.0 2 061 143 23.6 5 058 511 58.0 1 608 117 18.4

Source: Results of the census of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.XIV (in Bulgarian).

41

0.1 Demographic Trends

Table 6. Number of population Residence Total In towns In villages

31.12.1900 3 744 283 742 435 3 001 848

31.12.1905 4 035 575 789 689 3 245 886

Available population 31.12.1910 31.12.1920 4 846 971 4 337 513 966 375 829 522 3 880 596 3 507 991

31.12.1926 5 478 741 1 130 131 4 348 610

31.12.1934 6 077 939 1 302 551 4 775 388

continued Table 6 Permanent population

31.12.1946 7 029 349 1 735 188 5 294 161

31.12.1956 7 613 709 2 556 071 5 057 638

1.12.1965 8 227 866 3 822 824 4 405 042

2.12.1975 8 727 771 5 061 087 3 666 684

4.12.1985 8 948 649 5 799 939 3 148 710

4.12.1992 8 487 317 5 704 552 2 782 765

Source: Results of the census of 4. December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.2 (in Bulgarian). Figure 1. Marriage, birth and death rate per 1000 of the population (1950-1995)

Source: Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, p. 83.

42

Context

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

The social product rose steadily under the conditions of centrally planned economy from 1960 to 1990. It was produced mainly by state-owned industrial enterprises. National income grew constantly too. Most of it went to consumption. Capital investments were concentrated in the state sector at the start of the period. Later, parts were transferred to the private sector. Industry was the first capitalinvestment priority. Since 1990, production and the real income of the population have tended to decrease, with urgent expenses and staple foods accounting for a growing proportion of household spending. Social differentiation is intensifying. The international pattern of Bulgaria's foreign trade is also changing, with a growing share involving countries from Western Europe in export and import. The main trends in Bulgaria's socioeconomic development differ considerably in the 1960-1990 and 1991-1996 periods. There are substantial differences in the processes of a centrally planned economy typical of the first period, and the processes of the post-1989 transition to a market economy. In the second period, Bulgarian statistics were adjusted to world standards, enabling international comparisons (Tables 1 and 2). The share of industry in GDP grew steadily before 1989 The social product in the first period grew from 10,310 million leva (at current prices) in 1960 to 94,715 million in 1990. The per-capita social product rose too, from 1,304 to 10,537. This growth of both indicators was more pronounced in the 80s (Table 3). The bulk of the social product came from state-owned enterprises. Their contribution to the social product peaked at 91.2% in 1985 (Table 4). The share of industry grew, whereas that of agriculture fell by half. The contribution of ancillary, private and other farms to the social product leveled off, with slight differences from year to year. The

43

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

share of the other branches of material production remained comparatively small (Table 5). A measure of gross domestic product was introduced in national statistics in 1991. GDP rose both in general - from 135,711 million leva in 1960 to 1,660,237 million in 1996, and per capita, from 15,677 to 198,538 leva. Between 1991 and 1994, services were the leading sector in terms of gross value added, followed by industry, agriculture and forestry. In the next two years, services kept their lead, whereas the share of industry fell and that of agriculture and forestry rose. As a result, agriculture and forestry became the second largest sector (Table 6). After 1989, services became the leading sector in GDP The 1996 GDP approximated 1,700,000 million leva (at current prices), or close to USD 9,000 million. In real terms, there was a 10.9 per cent decrease from 1995. In 1995 and 1996, produced GDP exceeded consumed GDP due to the substantial net foreign transfers as part of foreign debt servicing. Despite the growth of GDP from 1993 to 1994, the actual volume of its components - final consumption and gross accumulation - fell, especially in the case of accumulation. Accumulation sagged, and the share of final consumption exceeded 90% in 1995. It is expected to decrease so as to ensure resources for economic recovery (The Economy..., 1997: 49). The changes in the branch structure of GDP varied depending on the specificity of the branch. Over the years, these changes were more pronounced in agriculture and services. The changes in industry were weaker and more stable. The GDP proportion of industry is stabilizing. The negative rate of industry came a year later than that of GDP. The lowest rate was in 1991. The lowest rate in agriculture and forestry was in 1996, although GDP decreased tangibly earlier too, in 1983, 1985 and 1987. There were also fluctuations in services, even though the changes were not so great. Generally speaking, services tended to grow. Those changes in services were the positive factor which prevented a stronger decline in GDP rates. However, the service sector also had a negative rate in 1996. Like GDP, national income (newly created value) grew steadily, from 4,716 million leva (at current prices) in 1960 to 34,481 million in 1990. National income is distributed between the Accumulation Fund and the Consumption Fund. The latter has been larger, varying between 67% and 88%, and the share of the Accumulation Fund decreased, from 33% to 12%. The

44

Context

trends changed over the years: in 1975, the Accumulation Fund grew, relative to the Consumption Fund. Between 1975 and 1990, this trend reversed, with personal consumption accounting for 90% to 96% of the Consumption Fund. In 1965, the bulk (67%) of the absolute growth of national income came from changes in labour productivity per worker in material production. The remaining 32.6% were due to changes in the number of employees in material production. In 1980, their proportions reached 97.6% and 2.4%. Capital investments grew substantially between 1960 and 1989 In 1960, capital investments totaled 1,364.5 million leva, growing by a factor of more than seven in the next 30 years. By form of ownership, most capital investments went to state-owned enterprises between 1960 and 1990. In 1960, the proportion of capital investments in cooperative enterprises was 19%, dropping to 1.5% in 1990 (Table 7). The public sector kept its lead by inertia until 1992. The post-1989 reforms in the Bulgarian economy started a new trend, with the share of the public sector dropping to 48%. The emerging private sector grew fast, from 2.6% to 51.9% (Table 8). The breakdown of capital investments by branch shows that industry has the highest share. Industry remains a priority, its share rising until 1991 but falling thereafter. Capital investments in agriculture and forestry had the highest share in 1980, later decreasing steadily. The share of transport, communications and trade grew consistently until 1994, and somewhat declined in 1995 and 1996. The share of construction, housing and utilities from the non-material sphere changed little if at all (Table 9). The share of construction and assembly fell from 60% in 1960 to 37.9% in 1996. Machines and installations emerged as the leading sphere of capital investments after 1990, rising to 53.5% in 1996. Prospecting accounted for 0.4% to 2.5% in these years. Incomes and spending increased until 1990 and decreased thereafter Incomes and spending (average per household and per capita) rose steadily between 1960 and 1990 (Table 10). Savings deposits increased in number from 6,483,000 in 1960 to 10,667,000 in 1990, and in value from 841.7 million to 16,817 million leva. The main trends in incomes, spending, consumption and social differentiation have changed substantially since the start of marketization in Bulgaria. They are the following:

45

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

- decreasing real incomes of the population as a result of growing inflation and, in particular, of the prices of staple consumer goods; - decreasing number of monetary income recipients and, especially, of wage earners; - a growing number of welfare beneficiaries, mostly of those receiving pensions, unemployment indemnification and benefits and, in particular, welfare; - a decrease or cancellation of a series of in-kind and monetary payments to workers in various enterprises and organizations (free or discount holidays and treatment, transport, health services, etc.); - decreasing provision of so-called free services (education, health care, etc.), and their transformation into costly and rising paid services; - restructured and falling consumption of staple foods by the majority of the population; - restructured household spending, with a priority on essential expenditures on food, heating and lighting, transport, taxes and rates; - intensifying social differentiation in society - rising number and proportion of people with low incomes and consumption under the poverty line, and increasing incomes and property for a small part of society; - growing pauperization of the majority of the population (The Economy..., 1997: 138-139). The share of the Western European countries is growing in export and import Foreign trade (in million leva, at current prices) grew by a factor of more than 19 between 1960 and 1990. Exports grew faster than imports, a factor of 20-plus versus a factor of 19 (Table 11). Between 1991 and 1996, foreign trade rose by a factor of 16: exports, by a factor of 14, and imports, by a factor of 10 (Table 12). In the 1960-1990 period, foreign trade accounted for 13% to 37% of the social product, and 31% to 84% of the national income. The proportion of exports to imports was the same in 1960 and 1996, 47.5 to 52.5, creating a trade deficit. There was a trade surplus in some years (1970, 1980, 1990 and 1991) (Table 13). Between 1960 and 1990, means of production made up 50.5% to 78% of exports, and 82.6% to 90.1% of imports, and consumer goods, respectively, 22% to 49.5% and 9.9% to 22%. The commodity structure of exports varied in the 1960-1990 period. Industrial goods were the top exports item, their

46

Context

share increasing from 84.2% to 97.8%. Export of unprocessed farm produce dropped from 15.8% in 1960 to 2.2% in 1985. In the group of industrial commodities, the share of industrial goods of agricultural origin tended to decrease between 1960 and 1990. After 1975, industrial goods of nonagricultural origin took the lead. In the first period under consideration (1960 to 1990), Bulgaria's main foreign-trade partners were the socialist countries, which accounted for 70% to 84% of exports and imports. Next came the developed countries, followed by the developing countries. Following the collapse of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), the volume and structure of foreign trade changed considerably between 1991 and 1996. The loss of East European markets throttled a series of mostly export-oriented markets. The initial expectations that the free exchange rate, liberalized foreign trade regulations and growing private sector would compensate for the loss have failed to come true (Bulgaria at the Beginning..., 1995: 95). Distortions in Bulgaria's pattern of foreign trade were apparent by the late 80s and early 90s. Two were particularly important. First, the regional structure of trade was seriously deformed. A single group of countries, those of CMEA, had an excessive share. At the same time, the other countries, in and outside Europe, played a secondary role in Bulgaria's trade. Western Europe accounted for about 6% of exports and about 13% of imports. The non-European countries made up approximately 13% of exports and 10% to 11% of imports. The lop-sided orientation of Bulgaria's foreign trade threatened the national economy with isolation, limited opportunities for trade in high-quality and high-tech commodities, and impeded development of hightech production. Second, the commodity structure of trade, and of exports in particular, was also seriously deformed. Under the influence of the import needs of the then leading partner, the USSR, Bulgaria's export was dominated by mechanical engineering products, about 60%. The other commodity groups accounted for the remaining 40%: foods, 14% to 16%; industrial consumer goods, 13% to 14%; fuels and metals, 7% to 8%; and chemical engineering, 3% to 4%. In the 1991-1994 period, the value of exports (in million dollars, calculated on the basis of value in leva at the year's lev/dollar average exchange rate) to three groups of countries fell: Central and Eastern Europe, by up to 75%; the countries from the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), by up to 92%; the Arab countries, by up to 78% of the base level (1991). By

47

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

contrast, export to another three groups of countries rose, especially to the European Union, by a factor of 2.6; to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), by a factor of 1.8; and to the rest of Asia, Africa and America (excluding the Arab countries), by a factor of 1.9. In contrast, the value of imports (in millions of dollars) from all groups of countries (except the Arab world) increased between 1991 and 1994. There was a marked growth in imports from the European Union, by a factor of 2.6, and from the non-European OECD countries, by a factor of 2.3. Imports from Central and Eastern Europe, EFTA, Asia, Africa and America, grew slower, by a factor of about 1.3 in all. Notably, the changes in imports from all groups of countries were the same as those in aggregate imports. Here are the main trends in the regional structure of Bulgaria's exports/imports between 1991 and 1994: - tangible re-orientation of European foreign trade partners: from Central and Eastern Europe to Western Europe. The intensity of this reorientation is stronger in the case of exports; - equalization of the shares of Western, and Central and East European countries, which together make up 72% of exports and 80.6% of imports; - growing role of non-European versus European countries in exports and the reverse trend in imports. Darina Rouscheva Margarita Shivergeva

REFERENCES Angelov, I. (1985) Problems of the Economic Growth of the P[eople's]R[epublic] of Bulgaria and the European Socialist Countries. Sofia: Naouka i Izkoustvo (in Bulgarian). Angelov, I. (1988) Structural Changes in the Socialist Economy. Sofia: Partizdat, 1988 (in Bulgarian). Bulgaria at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Macro-economic Trajectory and Policies.(1995) Sofia: Gorex (in Bulgarian). Economic Policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party (1974) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). The Economy of Bulgaria by 1999 (1997) Sofia: Gorex (in Bulgarian).

48

Context

Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Intensification of Economic Growth: Problems, Trends, Solutions.- (1984) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). P[eople's]R[epublic] of Bulgaria '89, a Concise Statistical Collection.(1990) Sofia: Central Statistical Administration (in Bulgarian). Radoulov, L. Ed.(1984) Economy and Policy of Socialist Bulgaria Varna: Georgi Bakalov (in Bulgarian). Socioeconomic Development of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 19441984: Figures and Facts (1984) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian).

Table 1. Average annual growth of main indicators of Bulgaria's socioeconomic development (1961-1990) (%) Period

Indicator 1. Social product 2. National income 3. Per-capita national income 4. Per-capita Consumption Fund 5. Per-capita nominal income 6. Per-capita real income 7. Total output of all industry 8. Total output of construction 9. Total output of agriculture 10. Foreign trade

1961 1965

1966 1970

1971 1975

1976 1980

1981 1985

1986 1990

8.6 6.7

9.5 8.7

1.1

5.9 6.1

3.9

-0.2

7.2

5.7

8.0 6.4

6.5

5.7 3.7

3.7 3.5

-1.3

5.8

3.7

6.7

7.8

6.7

6.8

4.8

1.9 10.2

4.6

5.7

2.6

11.7

6.0 10.9

9.1

6.0

7.4

12.0

5.7

5.9

3.7 4.3 3.9

3.2

3.5 11.2

2.9

0.9

12.0

8.5

14.6

7.8

-0.6 6.6

-1.4

2.6

-1.3 -2.8 0.1

-5.1

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 24 (in Bulgarian).

49

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 2. Changes in the main macro-economic indicators (1991-1994, 1991=100) Indicator

1992

1993

1994

1. Gross domestic product, mln leva, current prices 2. Gross value added, mln leva. 3. Gross national income, mln leva 4. Per-capita gross domestic product 5. Per-capita national income 6. Disposable income 7. Spending on final consumption 8. Savings, gross

147.9

220.3

403.8

134.2 162.0

193.4 240.8

353.1 440.6

150.0

225.1

414.0

164.2 159.3 173.9 101.1

246.0 263.7 278.1 70.8

451.7 434.0 483.1 237.5

Source: Main Macro-economic Indicators (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, pp. 8081 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 168-189 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Social product and national income, 1960=100 Social Product

National Income

Total

Per capita

Total

Per capita

1965

154.9

148.8

135.0

1970 1975 1980 1985

254.5 359.4 561.6

236.3 325.4 500.2 644.0

140.7 223.2 303.0 434.8 539.6

207.0 274.0 387.1 476.4

808.0

731.1

659.3

1990

729.0 918.7

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

50

Context

Table 4. Structure of social product (by forms of ownership, %) Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

State-owned enterprises 67.4 71.0 76.0 86.7 91.0 91.2 89.3

Cooperative enterprises 25.5 22.0 18.0 7.9 3.5 3.1 3.1

Others 7.1 7.0 6.0 5.4 5.5 5.7 7.6

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria (1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 5. Structure of social product (by branch, %) Year

Industry

Agriculture

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

58 62 62 66 67 70 68

24 21 16 14 11 10 11

Construction 9 8 9 9 9 9 7

Transport and communications 3 3 5 5 6 5 6

Trade

Others

5 4 5 4 5 4 5

1 2 3 2 2 2 3

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 6. Structure of Gross Value Added (at base prices, by sector, %) Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Sector Agriculture and forestry 14.5 12.0 10.6 11.8 23.0 19.5

Industry 37.4 40.5 35.0 35.5 19.5 19.3

Services 48.1 47.5 54.4 52.7 57.5 61.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995, 1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

51

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 7. Structure of capital investments (by form of ownership, %), 1960-1990

Year

State-owned enterprises

Cooperative enterprises

Population

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

68.2 76.6 81.4 91.6 92.5 92.1 94.7

19.1 13.8 12.1 4.1

12.7 9.6 6.5 4.3 6.2 7.0 3.8

1.3 0.9 1.5

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 8. Structure of capital investments (by sector, %) Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Public 97.4 97.9 77.2 61.0 55.6 48.1

Private 2.6 2.1 22.8 39.0 44.4 51.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995, 1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

52

Context

Table 9. Structure of capital investments (by branch, %), 1960-1996 Year

Industry

Construction

Agriculture andforestry

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

34.2 44.8 45.2 39.9 41.9 46.8 48.4 56.1 51.4 45.9 36.7 30.5 35.3

1.6 2.7 2.9 4.1 2.5 3.7 4.5 2.6 3.1 4.4 2.0 3.9 3.8

29.7 19.7 15.8 14.7 12.4 8.1 9.8 7.9 4.5 2.7 1.8 2.3 1.1

Transport, communications, trade 8.0 9.8 12.2 14.9 14.1 13.1 14.3 14.3 22.4 22.6 35.4 20.8 21.8

Housing and utilities 19.2 16.9 15.8 15.3 20.2 19.5 16.4 14.1 11.1 12.1 7.3 15.2 11.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of Bulgaria (1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 10. Incomes and spending, 1965=100 Year

Incomes

Spending

Average per household

Average per capita

Average per household

Average per capita

1970

147.8

150.3

145.8

148.1

1975

188.6

202.4

183.9

196.1

1980

236.6

267.6

249.3

281.7

1990

433.4

497.1

436.2

500.0

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

53

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

Table 11. Changes in trade, export and import, 1960=100 Year Trade Import Export 1965 195.5 186.2 205.8 1970 318.5 350.7 289.5 1975 694.0 679.2 707.4 1980 1331.4 1 119.2 1 220.0 1985 1 974.0 2 055.0 1 900.6 1990 1 393.7 1481.8 1 579.0 Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 12. Changes in trade, export and import, 1991=100 Year Trade Export Import 1992 231.0 191.0 159.6 291.4 1993 238.7 179.3 1994 432.4 376.8 503.0 1995 721.6 841.9 626.9 1996 1681.9 1 426.4 2 006.6 Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 307 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of Bulgaria (1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 142 (in

Bulgarian).

Table 13. Changes in trade, export and import ( %) Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

Trade 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Export 47.5 50.0 53.1 46.4 51.8 49.4 50.6 55.9 46.7 43.9 48.8 48.6 47.5

Import 52.5 50.0 46.9 53.6 48.5 50.6 49.4 44.1 53.3 56.1 51.2 51.4 52.5

Source: Statistical Yearbook oj Bulgaria (1961, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995) Solia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian); Statistical Reference Book of Bulgaria (1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

54

Context

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

In the period from 1960 till the middle of the eighties, a constant growth of power consumption has occurred. Since 1986, this trend has reversed. This is not due to rationalization of consumption but because of the deepening socio-economic crisis. The expanding scientific potential and inventive activity characteristic until the end of the eighties has not managed to considerably decrease the dependence of the national technological development on the utilization of foreign scientific and applied achievements. Productivity, both in industry and agriculture, increased until the end of the eighties, but this was a slow process. The distance in the level of productivity between Bulgaria and the most developed economies has expanded. From 1960 until the middle of the eighties the total power consumption increased more than 5 times This aggregate development means an increase of 4.4 times per capita. The decline in power consumption after the mid-eighties has returned the country to the level of the second half of the sixties. The drop of power consumption was related to the general crisis having gripped the countries from the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). During the nineties, the decline of power consumption has been mostly related to the reduced or completely stopped production activities of a vast part of the production enterprises in the country and to the self-restrictions in consuming power for everyday needs due to the rise of prices. Although the petrol crises during the seventies and eighties did not much affect total consumption, they had an impact on the proportional use of the major power sources. The growth of the relative share of liquid fuels in the structure of power consumption ended around the middle of the seventies. This was followed by a considerable increase of the relative share of natural gas and electricity (mostly due to the development of nuclear power production).

55

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

The data show a steady increase of inventions Nevertheless, the country's technological development has remained dependent on the utilization of foreign scientific and technological achievements. The USSR, and to a lesser extent other countries from the CMEA, had been a major source of these achievements till the end of the eighties. Since the middle of the seventies there has been an increase of the technical novelties imported from Western countries. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained basically dependent on Soviet technologies. Until the end of 1987 there has been an increse in the number of scientists and scholars The ratio of scientists in natural sciences (including medicine and agriculture) to those in engineering sciences has approximately been 1:1. After 1990 the decrease of the number of scientists in engineering sciences has been greater than the decline within the scientific community as a whole. This has mostly been related to the degradation of a number of production activities that provided jobs to many researchers. The decrease in the number of scientists has been the least among those with scientific degrees (doctors and doctors of sciences). This indicates a relatively good preservation of the most qualified nucleus of researchers. However, there has been an outgoing tide of young cadres from research activities and a great reduction of the activities of applied sections where scientific degrees have been less common, as in the research institutes of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences and in the higher educational institutions. Despite the crisis, no dramatic change has occurred in the general trend of publishing books in the natural and technical sciences - both in absolute number and as a relative share of all published titles. Until the end of the eighties there was a consistent growth of industrial production From 1975 till 1990 the number of those directly engaged in industrial production has remained relatively constant. At the same time, there has been a trend of decreasing annual of hours worked by each person directly engaged in industrial production. This indicates a general growth of productivity. In the period 1954-1965 the average rate of growth of labour productivity was higher than in the majority of developed countries (Development of Industry, 1990: 337-338). However, productivity remained low. During the period

56

Context

1965-1989 the average annual rate of growth of labour productivity in Bulgaria was lower than in most countries from the CMEA. At the same time Bulgaria (together with the countries from CMEA) lagged behind the level of labour productivity both of the developed Western economies and of a number of rapidly developing countries from the Third World (Development of Industry, 1990: 504-505). After 1989 the lack of investments for technological innovation has been among the most important reasons for the deepening economic crisis. Between 1960 and 1990 there was a relative growth of productivity in agriculture During the whole period since 1960 there was a steady decrease of the relative share of the active population in agriculture. After comparatively rapid growth of the agricultural production till 1980, it stabilized at an approximately constant level through the eighties. However, in this case there also has been a considerable gap in favour of the most developed countries. After 1989 productivity in agriculture dropped because of the organizational disarray caused by a destruction of the availlable agricultural technology. Innovations in the field have been rare during the nineties (Genov, 1997: 20). Zhivko Nedev

REFERENCES Development of Industry in Bulgaria (1990) Sofia: Committee for Standardized Social Information (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1991) Society and Technology in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP.

57

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

Table 1. Total consumption of power and consumption per head of population in equivalent coals (in millions of metric tons and in kilogrammes, 1960 -1992)

Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Total consumption '000 000 10 248 21 114 33 462 36 404 47 503 43 467 52 659 46 157 44 157 40 503 45 491 40 444 38 779 37 493 29 344 31 195 28 099

Consumption per head of population kilogrammes Source 1 1303 1 2 575 1 3 941 1 4 195 3 5 360 2 4 851 5 780 3 5 137 3 4 909 3 4 4 503 3 5 053 4 4 495 4 304 3 4 4 170 4 3 270 3 476 5 3 139 5

Sources: (1) World Energy Supplies 1950-1974.(1916) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Office. Statistical Papers, Series J, N 19, p. 109 (2) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1986 (1988) New York: United Nations. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Office, p. 23 (3) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1990 (1992) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Development. Statistical Office, p. 33. (4) Energy Statistics Yearbook 799/(1993) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical Division, p. 23. (5) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1992 (1994) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical Division, p. 57.

58

Context

Table 2. Power consumption in equivalent coals in millions of metric tons and in percentage according to the power source (1960 - 1992) Year

Solidfuels '000 000

Liquidfuels %

•000 000

Natural gas %

•000 000

%

Electricity •000 000

Source

%

1960

8 545

83.4

1 468

14.3

-

-

0 235

2.3

1

1965

15 604

73.9

5 167

24.5

0 097

0.5

0 246

1.2

1

1970

20 133

60.2

12 444

37.2

0 631

1.9

0 255

0.8

1

1975

18 607

51.1

16 657

45.8

0 240

0.7

0 870

2.4

1

1980

21033

44.3

19 604

41.3

5 181

10.9

1 684

3.5

3

1985

22 932

52.8

11 919

27.4

6 208

14.3

2416

4.9

2

1986

23 960

45.5

18 680

35.5

7 764

14.7

2 255

4.3

3

1987

24 674

53.5

11 975

25.9

7 133

15.5

2 376

5.1

3

1988

22 729

51.5

11 647

26.4

6 984

15.8

2 797

6.3

3

13 970

34.5

11 557

26.4

8 165

20.2

6812

16.8

4

22 556

49.6

12 125

26.7

8 110

17.8

2 700

5.9

3

14 205

35.1

12 021

29.7

7 937

19.6

6 281

15.5

4

21 269

54.8

7 164

18.5

7 988

20.6

2 358

6.1

3

12 947

34.6

10 667

28.5

7 707

20.6

6 144

16.4

4

10 982

37.4

6315

21.5

6 596

22.5

5 452

18.6

4

11 150

37.7

7 990

25.6

6 596

21.1

5 459

17.5

5

10 683

38.0

6 730

24.0

5 810

4 877

17.4

5

1989 1990 1991 1992

20.7

Sources: (1) World Energy Supplies 1950-1974 (1976) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Office. Statistical Papers, Series J, N 19, p. 109. (2) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1986 (1988) New York: United Nations. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. Statistical Office, p. 23. (3) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1990 (1992) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Development. Statistical Office. United Nations, p. 33. (4) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1991 (1993) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical Division, p. 23. (5) Energy Statistics Yearbook 1992 (1994) New York: United Nations. Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. Statistical Division, p. 57.

59

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

Table 3. Researchers in the country Year 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Total number 22 601 26 891 27 898 30 146 30 200 31611 31 704 29 060 26 598 26 284

Natural sciences* number % 46.5 10 520 41.3 11 108 11 208 40.2 12 366 41.0 11 715 38.8 12 234 38.7 38.2 12 121 12 059 41.5 44.0 11 711 11655 44.3

Technical sciences number % 7 641 33.8 10 208 38.0 39.9 11 120 39.3 11 861 42.2 12 733 40.5 12 799 12 905 40.7 10 541 36.3 9 339 35.1 32.7 8 583

Source 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 9 10

Notes: Including medical and agricultural sciences Sources: Statistical Yearbooks (1981, 1987, 1988) Sofia: Committee for Standardized Social Information (in Bulgarian). Scientific Workers and Post-graduate Students (1986, 1989,1990, 1991, 1992, 1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Research Work and Post-graduate Study 1993 (1994) Sofia: National; Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Persons engaged in sciences having scientific degrees Engaged in sciences persons with Year

scientific degree*

1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

number 10 632 11 694 11 863 11 894 11949 11 570 11 794

Engaged in natural sciences

persons with

scientific degrees

number 5311 5 716 5 806 5 702 5 869 5 933 5 961

% 50.0 48.9 48.9 47.9 49.1 51.3 50.5

Engaged in technical sciences persons with scientific degrees

number 3 125 3 546 3 399 3 468 3 299 3 234 3 235

% 29.4 30.3 28.7 29.2 27.6 28.0 27.4

Notes: * Number of masters and doctors of sciences. ** Including the medical and agricultural sciences. Sources: Scientific Workers and Post-graduate Students (1986,1989,1990, 1991, 1992, 1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

60

Context

Table 5. Man-hours worked off in industry and index of the total industrial production

Year

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

Directly engaged in production (WO)

737,3

911,3 1 016,6 1 102,2 1 135,6 1 140,3 1 148,5 1 157,6 1 249,9 1 163,9 948,5

Man-hours worked off ('000 000)

1511,1 1 806,3 1 904,1 2 044,6 2 092,5 2 070,0 2 049,3 2 030,6 2 162,5 2 014,8 1 549,6

Source

1 1 1

2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3

Worked off man-hours per each directly engaged in production

Index of the industrial production (1980=100)

2 049,5 1 982,1 1 873,0 1 855,0 1 842,6 1 815,3 1 784,0 1 754,2 1 730,1 1 733,6 1 633,7

28.9 48.6 74.8 100.0 123.7 128.6 134.0 140.8 139.2 115.9 90.0

Source

4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5

Sources: (1) Industrial Statistic Yearbook 1975, (1977) New York: United Nations. Vol. 1 General Industrial Statistics. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2) Industrial Statistic Yearbook 7957,(1989) New York: United Nations. Vol. 1 General Industrial Statistics. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs. (3) Industrial Statistic Yearbook 1991 (1992) New York: United Nations. Vol. 1 General Industrial Statistics. Department of Economic and Social Information and Political Analysis. (4) Statistical Yearbook 1987 (1988) Sofia: Committee for Standardized Social Information (in Bulgarian). (5) Statistical Yearbook 1991(1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

61

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

Table 6. Active population in agriculture and index of the agricultural production

Year

Active population in the country

Active population in agriculture

Source

Index of the agricultural production 1985=100

number('OOO)

number('OOO)

%

1965

4 408

2 272

51.5

1

69.7

1970

4 535

2 113

46.6

1975

4 495

1 192

26.5

1 1

95.5

1980

4 480

810

103.0

4 499 4 487

670 644

18.1 14.9 14.4

1

1985 1986

2

100.0

2

1987

4 479

618

13.8

2

111.7 106.0

1988

4 468 4 460

591 566

13.2 12.7

3

106.1 107.0

539

12.2

3 4 4

100.3

4

88.3

1989 1990

4 430

1991

4 416

519

1992

4 406

503

11.8 11.4

82.6

100.6

Sources: FAO Yearbook of Production (1980, 1981, 1988, 1990, 1992) Rome: FAO. Statistical Yearbooks (1982, 1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 7. Books published Total number of pubYear

lished titles

1965

2 789

Published titles in natural sciences * and engineering sciences number

%

877

31.4 21.9 6.2 24.4

1970

2 919

640

1975 1980

3 669 3 860

227

1985

3 876

1986 1987

4 106 3 412

1988

3 690

1990

940 1017

26.2

972

23.7

737 534

21.6

2 915

819

28.1

1991

2 659

660

24.8

1992

4 045

667

16.5

14.5

Notes: ""Including the medical and agricultural sciences Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook (1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991, 1992) Paris: UNESCO. Statistical Yearbook 1990 (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

1 AGE GROUPS

1.1 Youth

The past 30 years have seen a substantial change in the demographic, economic, social and cultural characteristics of the generations. The increase in the duration of studies, as well as career and employment problems, have led to later maturity and to alienation of youth. Young people are less inclined to make social or political commitments and to mobilize themselves, and their values become more and more universalistic. The 1960-1995 period is characterized by a negative demographic trend in Bulgarian society The natural growth of the population dropped to -2.2% in 1992 (Table 1). Declining birth rates are another aspect of the negative age pyramid. The age of mothers has not changed drastically, but the number of births out of wedlock and abortions have increased (Table 2). These factors, along with the rise in divorce rates, have had a negative impact on the socialization of the younger generation. The educational status of young people has also changed. In 1985, 13.7% of young people below 30 had university and college education. By 1992 the percentage had risen to 19.4%. Young people tend to study longer There are two main factors for the prolongation of studies. The first is the passage of legislation making secondary education mandatory. The second is the rising employment rate of university graduates as opposed to people with lower education. By the end of 1992, 69.1% of job-holders had secondary or college education, up from 52.1% in 1985. In addition, the employment rate is very high among people with university and college education

63

1.1 Youth

(72.5% and 70.7% respectively), and lower among those with primary or lower education (35.4% and 9.2% respectively). In the nineties, young people have also tended to study longer because of rising unemployment, which is particularly high among the less educated. Unemployment is highest in age cohorts that have recently finished secondary school Acute economic problems since 1990 have led to rising unemployment. Among people with college, secondary, primary or lower education, unemployment is highest for 16-to-19 year-olds, wherein every second is jobless. Unemployment is higher among women and the rural population, especially those who are relatively less educated. Since 1990, young people have also had problems in signing contracts of employment with full social security coverage. An increasing number of young people tend to work part-time or on contracts of personal service. There has been no significant change in the age at which young people marry and have their first child The number of marriages and births has tended to decrease (Table 3). The age at which young people leave home indicate that different generations still tend to live together. The motives that make young people live with their parents are related to career and employment problems, as well as problems in providing for their own family. There is an increasing reluctance on the part of young people to commit themselves to social or political organizations Under the state socialist regime, young people were wholly integrated within the youth communist league. There were various forms of organized activities and various levels of organization by interest: sports societies, holiday camps, workshops and clubs. After 1989, young people were granted freedom of association in political and social formations. The figures on the past five years, however, show a steadily declining interest among youth in the country's socio-political problems. Young people are regular readers of the sports dailies, but devote little time to news on the radio or television. Young activists in political organizations are few. Elections data have shown that young people are becoming less interested in

64

Age Groups

taking an active political position. Notably, young people are increasingly interested in various forms of religious activity. The changes after 1989 have had an ambiguous impact on youth On the one hand, flexible economic relations, market structures and new career opportunities provide openings for entrepreneurship and material prosperity. On the other, young people are faced with a number of grave problems, the most important of which is unemployment. These changes are associated with instability and insecurity, both economic and political. Reactions are manifested in emigration and drug addiction. It is still difficult to determine the impact of these factors on political culture and the family milieu that shapes the young generation. Tatiana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Table 1. Population Population by Dec. 31 ('000) Total annual increase /o/ \ (/o)

Natural /o/ \ (%)

increase

Coefficient of age dependence (%) Median age of population (years)

1960

1970

1980

1990

1991

1992

7 905,5

8 514,9

8 876,6

8 669,3

8 595,5

8 484,9

9.7

6.0

3.4

-11.3

-8 .6

-13.0

9.7

7.3

3.4

-0.4

-1 .7

-2.2

50.5

48.0

51.7

50.4

50 .2

49.9

32,4

34,4

35,8

37,5

37 ,8

38,1

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

65

1.1 Youth

Table 2. Fertility rates Birth rate (%) Median age of mothers (years) birth first birth

1960 17.8

1970 16.3

1980 14.5

1990 12.1

1991 11.1

1992 10.4

25,3 22,2

24,4 21,9

24,0 21,9

23,9 22,0

23,6 21,8

23,6 21,8

8.0

9.4

10.9

12.4

15.6

18.5

Still births (%)

12.2

9.9

7.6

6.1

6.3

7.3

Abortion:birth ratio (%)

52.3

101.7

120.8

136.7

143.4

148.0

Illegitimate births (%)

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

Table 3. Marriage rates Marriage rate (%) Median age upon marriage (years) men women Median age upon first marriage (years) men women Divorce rate (%) Marriage:divorce ratio (%) Median age upon divorce (years) men women

1960 8.8

1970 8.6

1980 7.9

1990 6.9

1991 5,6

1992 5.2

26,8 23,4

26,4 23,4

26,4 23,5

26,3 23,2

26,3 23,2

26,2 22,9

24,7 21,7 0.9 9.8

24,4 21,7 1.2 7.4

24,5 21,7 1.5 5.3

24,7 21,7 1.3 5.3

24,7 21,7 1.3 4.4

24,4 21,3 1.1 4.7

34,4 32,1

36,1 32,6

35,5 32,2

37,1 33,7

36,9 33,5

36,8 33,4

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

Table 4. Marriages by age of spouses Year

Total

Age of women (completed years) under 20

20-24

25-29

30-39

40-49

50-50+

1985

66 682

24 011

26 353

7 814

5 753

1644

1 107

1990

59 874

22 765

24 627

6 379

4 073

1334

696

1991

48 820

18 457

20 541

4 902

3 186

1091

643

1992

44 806

16 740

19 061

4 608

2 922

937

538

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

66

Age Groups

Table 5. Labour force participants: employed and unemployed by economic activity, main occupational groups, age and education Main occupational group Economic activity Age Total under 16

Education

Total

3 932 488 1 178

higher

college

488 839 -

secondary vocational

202 189

high school

primary*

elementary

pre-elementary

illite-rate

1 024 183 -

916 672 -

1 053 710

182 296

34 102

-

495

512

119

52

149

22 775

46 199

53 633

11 128

2 308

1 768

30 477

16-19

137 960

20-24

440 429

12 679

18 120

138 176

165 437

87 296

13311

2 952

2 458

25-29

481 372

67 261

22 821

142 726

148 661

82 748

12 160

2 682

2313

30-39

1 102 728

178 018

64 910

319 516

276 071

221 765

31 054

6 387

5 007

40-49

1 115 438

149 857

290 858

203 367

346 727

45 729

8 623

7 905

50-54

394 938

46 850

62 372 23 639

72 410

52 396

157 123

31 668

5 324

5 528

55-59

179 711

24 230

7 951

30 598

17211

73 140

20 094

3 312

3 175

60-69

62 731

8 265

1 914

5 856

6 000

24 970

12 383

1 703

1 640

70+

15 983

1 679

313

1 268

1 330

5813

4 257

692

631

3 286 655

448 730

188 747

883 820

748 303

839 654

134 440

22 948

2 013

1 178 61 121

-

101

9 846 104 821

19310 12 064

25 398 54 763

512 4 735

119 960

52 771 1311

Employed labourforce participants under 16 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-39 40-49 50-54 55-59 60-69 70+ Unemployed labour-force participants

495

314 686

9 182

14 888

119 864

120 162

57 909

7 514

1 543

386 160

57 910

20 239

282 239

236 282

171 769

7 271

1 511

1 294

943 830 985 451

165 850

60 762

264 852

181 581

294 379

20 232

3 858

2 838

139 897

66 578 28 496

137 720

34 104

5 810

4 984

43 222

59 844 22 951

47 038

350 831

15 936

66 438

25 570

3 934

3 818

164 684

22 725

7 735

5 856

6 000

24 970

17 862

2818

2 674

62 731

8 265

1 914

1268

1 330

5 813

12 383

1 703

1 640

15 983

1679

313

4 257

692

631

645 813

40109

13 442

10 464

3 497

16-19

76 839

20-24

125 743

140 363

168 369

214 056

47 856

11 154

48

12 929

26 889

28 235

6 393

1 384

997

3 232

33 355

44 773

32 533

5 797

1 409

1 147

25-29

95 212

9 351

2 582

22 862

25 499

54 839

4 889

1 171

1 019

30-39 40-49

158 898 129 987

12 168

37 277

2 169

52 348

10 822 11 625

2 529

26 006

39 789 21786

49 996

9 960

4 148 2 528

2 813

50-54

44 107

3 628

688

5 832

5 358

19 403

6 098

1 398

2 921 1 710

55-59

15 027

1 505

216

2 102

1275

6 702

2 232

494

501

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

Table 6. Percentage of population employed by age and sex,

67

1.1 Youth

Table 6. Percentage of population employed by age and sex, 4 December 1992 Total

Age Total under 16 16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60 and more

total

M

F

38.7 0.1 12.0 53.1 72.7 79.7 83.0 83.9 81.8 71.0 30.7 4.5

40.9 0.1 7.2 50.6 73.9 81.0 83.6 84.6 82.3 75.6 52.2 6.6

36.6 0.1 16.9 55.7 71.4 78.4 82.4 83.2 81.4 66.7 10.7 2.8

Source: Census Results, vol. 1, Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

68

Age Groups

1.2 Elders Life expectancy increased until the end of the eighties. There have been trends towards deteriorating health and financial conditions of the elderly thereafter. Senior citizens live "from hand to mouth". Their life strategy is that of survival. There are unclear prospects for improvement of their living conditions. Life expectancy increased steadily until the end of the eighties The ageing of Bulgaria's population is an obvious trend, especially in the countryside (see Demographic Trends). The increase in life expectancy until the end of the eighties was steady. In 1960/1962, life expectancy averaged 69.6 years. In the nineties, both male and female life expectancy have tended to go downward (Table 1). Average adult life expectancy in Bulgaria was 71.2 years in 1993. The decline is due foremost to the drastic impoverishment of the population and to the inefficient health care. Female and male life expectancy differ. In 1993, it was 75 years for females and 67.4 years for males, respectively. The health of the elderly has tended to deteriorate in the nineties The economic crisis and institutional insecurity are having an adverse effect on public health. The health care system is in a critical situation. Increased mortality among the elderly is due to unfavourable changes in nutrition, high stress, minimized prophylaxis and recreational activities. Diseases of poverty (e.g. tuberculosis) have resurfaced after they were almost eradicated in the country. Permanently disabling diseases tended to decline until 1990, when the number of disabled persons started to rise - reaching 6.33 per 1,000 in 1993. While the per capita level of medics and paramedics is reasonable and there have been no negative trends in that respect, the activities of health establishments have been declining and the equipment is depreciated.

69

1.2 Elders

The income of the elderly has been declining steadily in the period of transition From 1960 to the 1980s, consumer incomes were relatively stable. The government policies of social equality guaranteed the living standards and security of people in retirement age. Senior citizens could continue to work fulltime after retiring at the age of 55 for women and 60 for men. Guaranteed post-retirement employment (especially for some occupational categories such as the military and miners) provided the elderly with decent income and a chance to remain socially active. The elderly supported their own family as well as their children's family. Since 1989, the income of the elderly has been dropping steadily due to the high inflation. In 1994, 88% of the people in retirement age were under the poverty line and 67% under the subsistence level. High unemployment is an important factor in making pensions a main income source for 2.4 million elderly people (28% of the country's population). The average pension fell from 44.7% of the average wage in 1991 to about 36% in 1994. Throughout the first half of the 90s, the average pension was under the subsistence level. For the majority of the elderly, passing retirement age spells real poverty. This means that the most vulnerable strata of the population whose income is fixed and comes from the national budget - are bearing the brunt of the economic crisis. One in five pensioners grades himself or herself lowest on the income ladder and 52.8% qualify their income as "low" (Genov, 1994: 87). The elderly live "from hand to mouth", their life strategy being that of survival The figures in Table 2 show that having a "peaceful life" is of prime importance to the elderly. The importance assigned to this value is associated with economic survival but also with the problems of crime and public security. Economic security remains of vital importance for the elderly. The impossibility of ensuring a dignified life in old age and dropping to the bottom rung of society has prompted the elderly to embrace a distinct survival strategy. Living "from hand to mouth" is associated with a trend towards nostalgia for previous decades. This nostalgia leaves its mark on the political allegiance and activity of senior citizens. The high level of unemployment is maintaining a trend towards a younger retirement age. At the same time, the state's helplessness in pro-

70

Age Groups

viding for retirees is prompting the legislature to keep (and even raise) the retirement age. The 1993 amendments to the Labour Code set the retirement age at 60 for women and 65 for men. This provides partial relief for some of the elderly but cannot help solve the problems of youth unemployment and the dramatic drop in income upon retirement. The elderly have been losing their traditional status in the relationship between the generations Elements of the traditional family survived in Bulgarian society until the eighties. Elderly people often remained heads of households in financial but also in moral and psychological terms. They provided support to young people even after they have married. The bonds between children and parents were stable, based on traditional attitudes and economic support. After 1989, the downward trend in the economic conditions of the elderly upset this relationship between the generations. The elderly are no longer capable of supporting their children. On the contrary, it is increasingly necessary for young people to ensure the survival of their parents. This reversal in role relationships and family status is a serious problem in Bulgarian society. For the elderly, loss of economic position entails loss of traditional roles and functions, which has also made the economic crisis a psychological one for them. In developed countries, elderly people are consumers of goods and services while the elderly in Bulgaria are closer to those in the underdeveloped world The elderly cannot afford to spend their leisure time enjoyably. The greater part of them are underprivileged, lonely, and alienated from society. The economic plight of the countryside does not give senior citizens a chance to retire from costlier life in the big cities and help revive rural areas. Even though some of the elderly have moved out of the big cities to the countryside, they are managing to ensure just their own survival. This economic situation is affecting their involvement in the public and cultural sphere. Prospects of improving the conditions of elderly people - financial conditions and health, in particular - are hardly feasible before the end of the current economic crisis. Tatiana Bouroudjieva

71

1.2 Elders

REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Risks of the Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Health and Demographic Situation of the Population in Bulgaria in the 1980-1991 Period (1993) Sofia: National Health Information Centre (in Bulgarian) Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1993 (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Population (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (In Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian) Table 1. Male and female life expectancy (years) 1962 67,2 72

male female

1985 75,9 79

1975 69 75

1993 61,4 75

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian)

Table 2. Age/value orientations (%) values power independence money creativity peaceful life total

age (years) 41-50 51-60

18-30

31-40

0.9

1.1

0.7

1.2

23.5 28.1

21.0 15.0

19.9 16.9

11.8 11.4

over 61

5.6

4.1

2.4

2.8

1.1 5.8 6.3 0.5

41.9 100.0

58.8 100.0

60.1 100.0

72.8 100.0

86.3 100.0

Source: Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Risks of Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development (in Bulgarian).

2 MICROSOCIAL

2.1 Self-identification

More than one third of Bulgarian citizens are incapable of identifying themselves within the political framework of left-centre-right. In the mid-nineties, one fifth identified themselves as leftist, one tenth as rightist, and one third as centrist. There are various ethnic identities in the country: the majority are Bulgarians, but there are also Turks, Gypsies, Armenians, Jews, Karakachans, Vlachs, etc. The two main types of religious identity are Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam. Political preferences are statist and egalitarian A recent national sociological survey (Genov, 1996) found that 34.7% of Bulgarian citizens polled were incapable of identifying themselves within the political framework of left-centre-right. At the same time, 21% identified as leftist, 10% as rightist, and 33.9% as centrist. It would be wrong to assume that the so-called "centrists" comprised the majority of Bulgarian citizens with political self-identification. Closer examination of their political preferences reveal that they are basically statist and egalitarian. Ethnic self-identification meets tolerance In Bulgarian society there are various ethnic and religious communities. According to the census of December, 1992, Bulgarian citizens (about 8.5 million in all) identify with several ethnic communities: 85.7% consider themselves ethnic Bulgarians, 9.4% as Bulgarian Turks, 3.7% as Gypsies (Roma), and 1.3% as "others," including Armenians, Jews, Karakachans, Vlachs and Russians. Ethnic Bulgarians are plainly in the majority. Ethnic and religious tolerance is typical of this community. Even though the country was an ally of Germany in World War II, people prevented the extermi-

73

2.1 Self-identification

nation of Bulgarian Jews. In recent times, ethnic Bulgarians have been rather tolerant of the establishment and activity of an impressive number of non-Bulgarian ethnocultural, as well as ethnopolitical, formations (Kertikov, 1995). Religious self-identification is predominantly Eastern Orthodox Atheism is one of the distinctive features of the spiritual constitution of Bulgarians. Atheism appeared as a trend already during the National Revival (18th and 19th century), culminating in the decades following the Second World War. At that time, atheism official state policy. Sociological surveys show the prevalence of atheism in Bulgaria (Oshavkov, 1965: 291-333; Mihailov, et al. 1986: 221-230; Mitev, 1994: 165-197). However, "atheist" self-identification did not figure in the questionnaire of the latest census (1992). This flawed statistical matrix produced the following religious selfidentifications (%): A. Professing or belonging to the tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity ("Christians"): 98% of ethnic Bulgarians, 1.1% of Bulgarian Turks, 60.4% of Gypsies, 71.8% of members of the other ethnic communities. B. "Muslims": 98.8% of Bulgarian Turks, 39.2% of Gypsies, 11.4% of the other ethnic communities, 2% of ethnic Bulgarians. C. "Other denominations": a total of 0.2% of all Bulgarian citizens. There are tensions in national self-identification There are substantial contradictions in the sphere of national selfidentification. Three types are of particular importance: blurring national and ethnic identity; confusing religious and ethnic identity; and confusing ethnic and ethnographic identity. During state socialism, the national self-identification of any Bulgarian citizen was regarded as self-evident. In the course of transition to political pluralism, however, it has become a controversial public issue. Several variants of a possible solution have emerged. 1. Ethnic and national identity (respectively self-identification) are "identical." In this view, the Bulgarian nation includes all foreign members of the Bulgarian diaspora yet excludes ethnically different citizens who were born and have lived in the country for centuries. Taking this extreme approach, certain circles assume that the contemporary Bulgarian nation

74

Microsocial

comprises ethnic Bulgarians only and a priori excludes Bulgarian Turks, Roma, Armenians, Jews etc. 2. The second trend, confusing ethnic and religious identity in individual self-identification, is valid foremost for descendants of Bulgarians converted to Islam in the past. They are not bilingual as other communities in the country. They identify within three frames of reference. Firstly, those aware of their original Bulgarian ethnogenesis were first to overcome illiteracy and religious practices during the previous decades. They embraced the secular way of life, being most open to economic and political reforms in the change of political system. Secondly, many ethnic Bulgarians who have remained Muslim have tended to identify as Turks. On a spiritual, ethnic and national plane, they are gravitating towards Turkey. Conservative lifestyles and religious fanaticism are pronounced in this group. Thirdly, a distinct group claims that it has some sort of "autonomous" ethnicity other than either the Bulgarian or the Turkish variety. They call themselves "Pomaks", profess (or claim they do) Islam and speak almost standard Bulgarian. Some members of the group have called for the recognition of a Pomak nation. 3. The third controversial trend in Bulgarian ethnic and national selfidentification is towards Macedonization of ethnic Bulgarians. It is found among some of the ethnic Bulgarians in the Mt Pirin region. This is actually a typical ethnographic, i.e. pseudo-ethnic group. The number of Bulgarian citizens identifying themselves as "Macedonians" is insignificant. This is proved by the very limited membership of the ethnopolitical parties advocating Macedonism in the country. Conclusions Analogous to the situation in other neighbouring countries, the ethnoreligious sphere in contemporary Bulgaria has conflict-generating potential. Some researchers (Mitev, 1994) think that this potential is weak on the religious plane. Others associate the "otherness" with the ethnic and religious difference (Krasteva, 1995). Still others, however, believe that what are regarded as typical ethnic tensions actually have a dormant confessional determinant (Kertikov, 1993, 1995). The third hypothesis is justified by the fact that except for a single case of self-proclaimed "Macedonians", all other community tensions are between Muslims and Eastern Orthodox Christians.

75

2.1 Self-identification

For example, there is unconditional compatibility between the Bulgarian Karakachans (whose mother tongue is a Northern Greek dialect and whose traditional religion is Eastern Orthodox Christianity) and the other Bulgarians. Also evident is the case of atheist and Christian Roma, many of whom have irreversibly accepted the Bulgarian name system and expressly demand being classified as ethnic Bulgarians, not Gypsies, in censuses. The attitude of Christian Bulgarians to Muslim Bulgarians is also typical: in a series of surveys, Christian Bulgarians have voiced suspicions of Muslim (Mohammedan) Bulgarians (Mitev, 1994). This suggests that the post-1989 religious democratization of society, the rejection of atheism as state doctrine and its replacement by the reclericalization of society could also have some questionable effects. For reclericalization of public affairs usually leads to replication and escalation of religious and ethno-religious controversies. Kiril Kertikov

REFERENCES Genov, N. (1996) Left, Center, Right: What Does it Mean in Bulgaria Today? Society and Politics in South-East Europe, Sofia: National and Global Development, pp. 151-168. Kertikov, K. (1993) Bulgarian Karakachans in the Conditions of Democratization. Sofia: Archives of the Institute of Sociology (in Bulgarian). Kertikov, K. (1995) Ethnocentrist Structure and Processes in Bulgaria. Metamorphoses of Power. Sofia: pp. 161-194 (in Bulgarian). Krasteva, A. (1995) Ethnicity, National Identity, Citizenship. Identities. Sofia: ICMCIR (in Bulgarian). Mihailov, S. et al. (1986) The Town and the Village '86 Empirical Sociological Survey. Sofia: National Statistical Office. Vol. Ill, pp. 221-230 (in Bulgarian).

76

Microsocial

Mitev, P.-E. (1994) Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria. In: Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria Sofia: ICMCIRpp. 165-197 (in Bulgarian). Oshavkov, Zh. (1965) The Experience of a Sociological Survey on Religious Communities in Bulgaria. Experience and Methodology of Particular Sociological Surveys. Moscow, pp. 291-333 (in Russian) Results of the Census by 4. December 1992. Demographic Characteristics. (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

77

2.2 Kinship Networks

2.2 Kinship Networks

The customary-normative type of regulation of kinship networks is being replaced by a value-dispositional regulation. It is marked by an increasing role of personal and cultural-symbolic elements. Kinship norms, conventions, and rituals are being simplified. Financial assistance between relatives is declining, but remains comparatively high. Confidential communications between relatives beyond the immediate family circle is intensifying. The relative weight of the extended family, spouses and self-identity as regulators of family behaviour varies by generation Amongst the older generation, spouses are the priority regulator. In families from the younger generation, it is self-identity. The family-kinship dualism is manifested in competition between spousal and extra-familial, including kinship, duties. The aspiration of the individual to distance himself from the immediate family milieu has led to a renewal of the regulative role of other identities as a result of free choice and categorization of kinship distances (Radoeva, 1988: 43). Young families generally want to live alone but, in most cases, close to their parents. Territorial separation of generations stabilizes kinship networks. In 1977, 36.9% of families lived with either one or both sets of parents of the spouses. In 1986, this was valid for 22.07% of family respondents and 27.79% of households {The Present-Day..., 1987: 233; The Town and... ,1988: 24, 33). Relations between spouses and their parents were studied in a 1977 survey on the family (Table 1). The financial and status functions of the kinship network are weakening compared to the traditional type of kinship, with humanistic-moral-cultural functions increasing. Still, financial assistance between related families remains considerable. The older generation helps relatives more (96%) and receives less help (50%) from them than the next generation (79.7% and 73.1% respectively). At that, the "frequent" financial assistance by the older generation to their married children (89.1%)

78

Microsocial

is far more considerable than vice versa (37.5%). For its part, the younger generation "frequently" helps the older one in just 17.2% of the cases, and gets "frequent" help from the latter in 45.3% of the cases. Assistance in work and services exceeds financial assistance in kinship networks In the second generation, which is resolving major problems of individual realization, family welfare and socialization of children, "giving" and "taking" are distributed between parents and siblings. In the first generation, they are oriented towards the children. This type of assistance plays a significant role in the stabilization and organization of intra-generational cohesion. A third integrative factor in kinship networks is "social assistance" in the resolution of certain vital personal or family problems, even though the second generation has sought such assistance less (43.8%) than the previous one (54.7%) (Radoeva 1988: 47). Personal contact, frequency of encounter and confidential communication are conditions and indicators of maintained relationships The generation gap (Tables 2 and 3) is ambiguous. For the younger generations "personal contact" is more formal in character, and the frequency of encounter is assessed on an annual basis. The older generation assesses frequency on a monthly basis. The second generation is definitely less inclined to confine confidential communication to the closest circle, whereas the first generation does that in 56.3% of the cases. Following the territorial dispersal of kinship networks, personal contact, encounter and communication with more distant relatives is increasingly becoming a matter of subjective attitude and free choice. The family is becoming independent of the broad circle of relatives, which is narrowing Distinctions between paternal and maternal networks are thinning out, along with those associated with inheritance of paternal and maternal social status. Collateral relations on both sides are less and less differentiated (for instance, paternal and maternal uncle). Narrowing, depersonalization, formalization and universalization of the vocabulary of spousal kinship are particularly intensive among the youngest, i.e. third generation. This is a sub-

79

2.2 Kinship Networks

stantial change in the context of the rich vocabulary of the traditional kinship network in Bulgaria and an expression of the modernization of relationships based on "the human individual" as a value and regulative principle, with elimination of collective regulative functions of kinship. Another trend is the expansion of cultural links as a basis of kinship networks vs the dated pragmatic-everyday model of kinship The latter, however, remains influential on the basis of secondary exchange of goods and services through "connections." The family has not abandoned the tradition of respecting relatives out of pragmatic considerations. This is a barrier to civic and ethical motives in kinship relationships. The customary-normative type of regulation of kinship networks is being replaced by a value-dispositional regulation, along with simplification of kinship norms, conventions, and rituals. They are now confined to several simple principles such as "don't harm relatives" and "respect kinship of the living." The post-1989 transition has placed kinship networks in a radically different context Lasting anomie could be expected to increase the role of the primary person-to-person network. Satisfaction with kinship networks remained relatively high in 1996, and that is a certain indicator thereof: 76.8% of respondents were satisfied with kinship networks, 19.6% not entirely and just 3.7% were dissatisfied {Bulletin Y,1996: 40). Ivan Minov REFERENCES Bulletin of the National Centre for the Study of Public Opinion (1996) Sofia, No. 4 (in Bulgarian). Draganov, M. (1985) Kinship Networks: A Major Element in the Human Community. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 1. (in Bulgarian). The Present Day Bulgarian Family (1987) Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Radoeva, D. (1988) The Kinship Network of the Contemporary Bulgarian. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 2. (in Bulgarian). Pesheva, R. (1961) The Family and Family-Kinship Relations in West Central Bulgaria. Expedition to Western Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village '86 (1988) Sofia: Committee of Standard Social Information, vol. I (in Bulgarian).

80

Microsocial

Table 1. Assistance between related families: financial and in work and services (%)

Financial takes

gives

Work and Services takes gives

50 .00

96 .00

81.30

93 .80

73 .10

79 .70

89.10

96 .90

37 .50

89 .10

65.60

89 .10

6.30 seldom (emergency) parents-children, second generation 45 .30 frequently

4 .70

15.60

4 .70

17.20

57.80

53 .10

seldom (emergency) siblings, first generation frequently

21 .90

15 .60

10.90

17.20

9 .20

14.80

16.70

24 .10

seldom (emergency) siblings, second generation frequently

18.50

20 .40

25.90

27 .80

6.60

10.60

42.60

34 .00

seldom (emergency)

25 .30

18.10

34.00

46 .80

Between: relatives, first generation relatives, second generation parents-children, first generation frequently

Source: Radoeva, D. "The Kinship Network of the Contemporary Bulgarian".- In: Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 2, 1988, p. 45 (in Bulgarian).

81

2.2 Kinship Networks

Table 2. Frequency of encounter between relatives (%

first generation frequently never second generation frequently never

with siblings

with first cousins

54.70

28.0

10.90

15.0

58.80

40.0

4.70

12.0

Source: Radoeva, D. (1988) The Kinship Network of the Contemporary Bulgarian. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 2, p.48 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Confidential family relations (%) second generation

first generation

with siblings

-

-

40.0

with parents

26.60

-

-

with children's families

-

43.8

-

Not beyond the range of immediate kinship ties

29.7

56.3

43.0

Yes, with other related families

35.9

26.6

31.3

Yes, with other nonrelated families

29.0

17.2

23.4

total

Source: Radoeva, D. (1988) The Kinship Network of the Contemporary Bulgarian. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 2, p. 49 (in Bulgarian).

82

Microsocial

Table 4. Desire of spouses in 1977 to live with or away from other generations (%) with married children

with wife's parents

with husband's parents

11.30 27.60 9.70

15.90 9.70 29.40

32.10 9.10 16.60

Wife favours living together

11.30

18.80

7.30

Husband favours living together

12.30

9.90

23.90

One favours living close, the other farther away

17.10

15.70

10.30

Both spouses favour - living together - away, but close - away and farther

Source: The Present-Day Bulgarian Family (1987) Sofia: Naouka I izkustvo, p.336 (in Bulgarian).

83

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

In about two decades, from the 50s to the 70s, Bulgaria changed from a predominantly agricultural to an industrialized country with a primarily urban populace. The population today is distributed comparatively evenly across the country. The nation is ageing, especially in the countryside and border regions. Concentration ofyoung people in and around big and medium-sized cities is a prerequisite for substantial social, demographic, infrastructure and economic problems. The transition to democracy and market economy has complicated the solution of problems in the urban milieu. Except for certain border areas, mostly in the mountains, the country is comparatively evenly populated The population density in the Republic of Bulgaria averages 76.4 persons per sq km. The density is highest in the capital city of Sofia (907.7 persons per sq km), and the Plovdiv and Varna regions - 89.5 and 76.8 per sq km respectively. It is lowest in Sofia Region (52 per sq km), Montana Region (59.4 per sq km) and Bourgas Region (58.1 sq km). Density as an indicator gives only a relative idea of the population distribution throughout the country since there are substantial differences in the size of the separate regions (Table 1). In twenty years, from 1956 to 1975 Bulgaria became an urbanized country In 1956, the year of the first major administrative reform in Bulgaria after World War II, close to two thirds of the population lived in the countryside. By 1975, this proportion had reversed. This resulted from at least two factors: accelerated migration and change in the legal status of many population centres from village to town. Despite the development of agriculture in this period, accelerated economic growth and industrialization increased the demand for a work force in the towns and subsequently generated intensive migration processes. The proportion between urban and rural populations

84

Microsocial

changed dramatically: the urban population increased from 21.4% in 1939 to 53% in 1971, while the rural population respectively decreased from 78.6% in 1939 to 47% in 1971. The next twenty years saw a gradual rise in the urban population, to 67.23% in 1992. The migration flows (Table 6) show that most people moved from the countryside to towns. Nevertheless, the first period was characterized by a higher percentage of village-tovillage migration, and the second by town-to-town migration. Migration is motivated by the desire to attain fundamental objectives in life such as finding an appropriate job, starting a family and acquiring housing. Migration processes are at the core of the country's urbanization Urbanization was quite strong between 1946 and 1965, when substantial changes in both the number of population centres and concentration of population in them took place (Tables 3, 4 and 5). Industrialization and the district form of government established in the country by the 1956 administrative reform (the district existed for more than 30 years) were conducive to stable regionalization. The former district centres attracted migrants not only with their job vacancies but also with their better infrastructure, communications, urban environment, health care, education, culture and sports. Today only six former district centres have a population under 50,000, and that is due mostly to the unfavourable emigration trends. As a result of a post-1989 exodus and negative trends in natural growth, the rural population has decreased by about 500,000. The general trend of ageing of the Bulgarian nation has left a negative mark on the age structure of the rural population. Most young people live in the towns. This is conducive to development of entrepreneurship and optimization of the urban environment. Two problems associated with the presence of minority groups are typical of Bulgaria One is the regionalization and concentration of the Muslim population in Northeastern and Southwestern Bulgaria. Ethnic regionalization is seen as a problem of national political relevance (see 16.1 Ethnic Minorities). The other stems from the existence of Romany quarters in the towns. This definitely creates and will continue to create problems with facilities and the way of life of those groups of the population. A consistent policy is needed pursuing cultural integration in order to reduce crime rates and morbidity and to improve their education and labour integration.

85

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

Accelerated industrialization and urbanization have bred a series of negative phenomena They are associated mainly with imbalanced development of separate parts of the country, lack of comfort in solution of problems of the urban milieu, lower standards of living conditions provided, etc. Accelerated concentration of people in the cities left a deep mark on the pace of construction and led to rash architectural designs. Building giant residential areas on the outskirts of the old cities created considerable urban developmental, economic and social problems for local government. The "bedroom quarters" - uniform and inefficient pre-fabricated blocks of flats - were populated before health care, education, culture and sports establishments were built. The area around the buildings was not designed appropriately. The lack of places for contacts between groups of the population had an unfavourable effect on the socio-cultural behaviour of urbanized peasants. Bulgarians have not severed their bonds with the countryside to the present day, and this is a prerequisite for the formation of a mixed type of culture which prevails in most fast-growing cities. The period of transition to market economy and democracy has seen several trends which are expected to change the townscape substantially in the short term. The retailing network is expanding. We witness the creation of new types of entertainment and leisure-time establishments. The nouveaux riches are investing in construction of single-family houses, preferably in the suburbs where the environment is clean and there is peace and quiet. Posh quarters have started appearing in the big cities. Home ownership is a distinctive feature of Bulgarian ethnopsychology Bulgarians are inclined to live a settled and peaceful life. During the rapid industrialization and urbanization of the country, home ownership rose considerably. Construction of mostly pre-fabricated housing in the cities sold to the population was a state policy. In the small towns and villages, the initiative for construction has always been individual. Thus in 1986, 83.84% of all households owned a home, the percentage being highest in the villages. From 1945 to 1973, about 60% of the country's housing was renewed. The Town and The Village 1986 national representative sociological survey shows that 29.94% of the population lived in ramshackle houses and 69.92% in solid housing, of them 10.17% in blocks of flats. According to the same survey, 65.75% of the Bulgarian population lived in houses and

86

Microsocial

33.75% in blocks of flats, the percentage of apartment-dwellers being highest in Sofia (77.48%), and in the former district centres (68.1%). Most residents of medium-sized and small towns lived in houses. The last decade has seen comparative stability in the structure of dwellings by number of rooms. Dwellings with three-plus rooms have tended to increase slightly in the past few years (Table 6). In 1986, about 16% owned cottages and/or land lots in the countryside. This comparatively high percentage includes owners of any form of real estate beyond the place of residence. People who owned a land lot only are also in that category. Typically, there has been a substantial redistribution of property in the last decade. These processes have been particularly dynamic since 1990, when political reforms ushered in restitution of urban property and agricultural land, privatization and a real estate market. Intensive construction is under way, primarily of single- and two-family houses, as well as private and comparatively small apartment buildings. Due to the economic crisis and acute shortage of money, construction has been left mostly to members of the public and private entrepreneurs. Local and central governments have had an insignificant share in the construction of housing in the past five years. The opportunities for unrestricted change of place of residence, rising unemployment and other transitionrelated economic and social phenomena have led to fresh concentration of the population in the bigger cities. Thus despite the high percentage of home ownership and comparatively high percentage of housed people, cities are suffering from a housing shortage, while villages have wholly or partly vacant houses suitable for living. As a result of the crisis, the state of the urban environment has drastically deteriorated. Almost all elements of urban infrastructure such as water supply, sewage, lighting, roads, transport and communications, need to be updated. Structural adjustment of the economy and mass privatization are being delayed mainly for political reasons, and this makes reassignment of tasks in providing quality public services extremely difficult. Milena Stefanova

87

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

REFERENCES Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village '86 Sociological Survey 1988) Selected Tables, vol. I. Sofia: Committee for a Standard Social Information (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1979) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Population, area and population density by 31 December 1992

Region

Population by 31 December 1992 villages

Area in

density

all

towns

1 189 641

1 138 421

51220

1310.8

907.7

Bourgas

851 669

575 622

276 047

14 724.3

58.1

Varna

915 949

646 725

269 224

11 928.6

76.8

1016 391

653 112

363 279

15 150.0

67.1

Montana

630 313

356 983

273 330

10 606.8

59.4

Plovdiv

1 220 402

786 584

433 818

13 585.4

89.5

Rousse

768 271

419 466

348 805

10 842.5

70.9

Sofia

985 952

588 741

397 211

19 021.1

52.0

Haskovo

906 275

539 169

367 106

19 021.1

65.2

8 484 863

5 704 823

2 780 040

110 993.6

76.4

Sofia City

Lovech

All

sq km

Population

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 349 (in Bulgarian).

88

Microsocial

Table 2. Population of the Republic of Bulgaria by type of settlement 1956

1965

1975

1985

1990

1991

1992

Towns

2 556 071

3 822 824

5 061 087

5 807 493

6 114 254

6 122 310

5 704 823

Villages

5 057 638

4 405 042

3 666 684

3 142 387

2 874 911

285 551

2 780 040

All

7 613 709

8 227 866

%12111\

8 949 880

8 989 165

8 974 861

8 484 863

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1979, 1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Population centres in Bulgaria by size of population Population centre

1946

1956

1965

1975

1985

1990

1991

1992

All

6 033

5 903

5 687

5 373

5 383

5 312

5 336

5 336

under 200

1294

1 310

1403

1483

1 774

1905

1925

1981

200 to 499

1260

1272

1257

1239

1265

1 276

1301

1274

500 to 999

1464

1459

1 306

1 184

1 113

1013

1002

983

1 000 to 1 999

1304

1 187

1071

882

717

351

643

646

2 000 to 4 999

591

540

490

412

345

302

30

293

5 000 to 9 999

80

79

94

85

75

68

68

72

10 000 to

26

35

34

52

53

53

53

45

12

18

27

29

31

34

33

33

2

2

4

6

9

9

9

8

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

24 999 25 000 to 99 999 100 000 to 499 999 over 500 000

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1979, 1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

89

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

Table 4. Towns in Bulgaria by size of population 1946

1956

1965

1975

1985

1990

1991

1992

106

112

175

214

111

in

238

238

under 1 000

1

1

3

2

1

2

3

1

1 000 to 1 999

4

1

1

3

7

9

8

11

2 000 to 4999

27

20

35

48

70

70

70

74

5 000 to 9 999

35

37

70

73

65

59

61

65

10 000 to 24 999

25

32

34

52

53

53

53

45

25 000 to 99 999

12

18

27

29

31

34

33

33

100 000 to 499 999

2

2

4

6

9

9

9

8

over 500 000

-

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

ALL

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1979, 1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 5. Villages in Bulgaria by size of population 1946

1956

1965

1975

1985

1990

1991

1992

ALL

5 927 5 791 5 512 5 159 5 146 5 075 5 098 5 098

under 200

1294

1483

1774

1905

200 to 499

1260 1272 1257 1238

1264

1274 1298 1 273

500 to 999

1463

1458

1 000 to 1 999

1300

1 186 1070

1310 1403

1303

1925

1981

1 183 1 113 1013

1002

983

879

710

642

635

635

2 000 to 4 999

564

520

455

364

275

232

231

219

5 000 to 9 999

45

42

24

12

10

9

7

7

1

3

10 000 to 24 999

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1979, 1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

90

Microsocial

Table 6. Migration flows (% Period

Village to town

Village to village

Town to town

Town to village

1961-1965

51.36

30.48

13.89

All

1966-1970

53.60

15.25

22.82

8.33

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 146 (in Bulgarian). Table 7. Housing 1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

3 152

3 363

3 387

3 406

3 396

1906

2 103

2 123

2 138

2 127

1246

1260

1264

1268

1269

All Dwellings in '000 In towns Dwellings in '000 In villages Dwellings in '000

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 184 (in Bulgarian). Table 8. Dwellings by number of rooms (%) 1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Single

15.6

15.6

15.6

15.6

11.8

Double

31.5

31.8

31.8

31.9

29.9

Three

29.7

30.2

30.2

30.2

31.0

Four-plus

23.2

22.4

22.4

22.3

27.3

All

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 185 (in Bulgarian).

91

2.4 Local Autonomy

2.4 Local Autonomy

Since 1991, the rights of municipalities to local self-government and entitlement of local authorities to take full charge of the settlement and regulation of local problems have been constitutionally and legislatively guaranteed. Nevertheless, in the 1991-1995 period, local self-government could be qualified as rather nominal due to the high degree of centralization retained in thefinanc ial sphere. The legislation regulating the country's administrative-territorial division, local election system and local finance is to be amended substantially. Two sweeping administrative reforms were carried out in 1956-1959 and 1987 Coming to power in 1944, the Communist Party inherited a highly centralized administrative system from the monarchic regime. The administrative reforms of 1956-1959 and 1987 were carried out with the prime objective of improving the efficiency of the administration so as to increase opportunities for centralized control. Municipalities were regrouped on a territorial basis and okoliya were eliminated as the smallest units of economic administration. Small divisions (rayons) were instituted in the big cities. Until 1987, Bulgaria had a two-tier system of administrative division: urban and rural municipalities, and districts (okrug). The law passed in 1987 consolidated the existing 28 districts into nine regions (oblast). The governing bodies of local and county territorial units were the people's councils, whose members were actually elected by the leadership of the Communist Party and its local chapters. The party exercised full control over local authorities, which were devolved subsidiaries of the central party and administrative power. Since 1991, the introduction of democratic principles in local government has vested broad powers in municipalities The municipalities have constitutional and legislative guarantees as the sole territorial communities exercising local self-government. The fundamental competence, rights and responsibilities of local authorities have been elabo-

92

Microsocial

rated within the context of asserting the principles of democracy in their constitution and functioning; public openness of actions; professionalism and efficiency of operation. Local authorities are elected on the municipal level only, while mayors are elected directly by majority voting, and councillors by proportional representation. Bulgaria has adopted a comparatively high rate of representation. Municipal councils have from 9 to 101 members depending on the size and population of the municipality. More than 11,000 municipal councillors were elected in the 1991 local elections. Powers between municipalities and regions are distributed on the basis of function, competence and territory In Bulgaria, there is a far greater distribution of power between the executive and the representative authorities in local communities than in a number of West European countries. Under the adopted system, powers are distributed between mayor and council on the "weak mayor-council" principle. Municipal councils are entitled to delegate broad powers to the mayor in terms of separate functions, as well as the entire mandate. The democratic principles adopted in the establishment of the local government system have enabled Bulgaria to join (in 1995) the European Charter of Local SelfGovernment 1985. The region (oblast) is the highest administrative level. Regional governors are appointed by the Council of Ministers and have limited functions in the pursuit of effective government policy at the regional level. They are facilitated by a small administrative staff. The distribution of power is based on decentralization of government functions and activities to various levels of administration, and non-interference with the higher level of decisionmaking at the lower level of territorial administration. Table 4 shows the functions of local and regional authorities that derive from the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and the Local SelfGovernment and Local Administration Act 1991. All other functions that are not included in the Table are performed at present by a decentralized government administration of ministries and agencies, organized for groups of municipalities. In most cases, these authorities are continuing to function in the former district capitals. State authorities in charge of tax administration and land ownership have newly constituted units of decentralized territorial government admini-

93

2.4 Local Autonomy

stration on the local level. Their functions are related to the objectives and tasks of the ongoing reforms in taxation and agricultural land tenure. Municipal responsibilities cover a broad range of tasks in the sphere of local policies They concern the economy, environmental protection, health care, education, social and cultural affairs, public utilities, regional planning, municipal property, road traffic safety and public order. The central government has kept only regulatory and controlling functions necessary to maintain the balance of interests of local communities and the nation as a whole. Gradual and prudent steps are being taken towards effective functional decentralization. Municipalities in Bulgaria have the right to own property and to prepare their own budgets independent of the central government budget. (Tables 2 and 3 show the structure of local budgets and municipal expenditure.) This, along with their rights to economic activity and freedom of association with other economic and territorial-administrative entities for the attainment of common objectives, is a prerequisite for enhancing the efficiency of local policy. In line with the provisions of the European Charter of Local SelfGovernment, municipal councils in Bulgaria are authorized to set the amount of local taxes and rates within the limits defined in the Local Taxes and Rates Act. Two types of local rates are collected - inhabited house duty and inheritance tax, along with charges on public utility services provided by local authorities. Municipalities cannot levy other types of local rates. The share of local taxes and rates in the municipal budget is not significant even though municipalities are entitled to retain the full amount as collected. In 1992, municipalities counted on subsidies from the national budget for slightly over a third of their expenditure. Slightly less than two-thirds of municipal expenditure was funded by distributed revenue. Borrowing has a comparatively small share, since prior to 1992 municipalities were not allowed to borrow from creditors in the private sector. Education and health care are the two basic items of municipal expenditure In 1992, they account for 32.3% and 29% of total expenditure respectively. The bigger and more substantial part of public utility services is financed by municipal budgets. This, however, does not entitle municipalities to full

94

Microsocial

control over the quality of the services provided, since they have little influence on their budget revenue, whereas expenditure is still largely controlled by decisions of senior officials in central government. Municipalities have less control over revenue than over expenditure in their budgets The reform in local self-government was initially hindered by a series of important factors: the general economic crisis in the country, high inflation rates, increasing budget deficit, rising unemployment, restructuring of ownership in the country as a whole, political instability, influx of underqualified personnel in the sphere of government etc. The hardships facing local authorities will impede self-government. The preservation of a high degree of centralization in the financial sphere is a key factor in this respect. There are no hard-and-fast rules on recruitment of personnel in local administration Since the start of the reform in local self-government, there has been a process of replacement of the personnel employed in local administration. As the right to determine the structure of local administration belongs to municipal councils, the latter have made considerable changes in the structure and personnel of local administration. Only mayors and deputy mayors are elected. The Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act grants local administration employees the rights of civil servants, but no Civil Service Act has been passed in Bulgaria to date. In 1991, about 20,000 were employed in regional and municipal administration. The majority, about 99%, work in municipalities. This figure does not include doctors, teachers and other employees who also get their salaries from the municipal budget. Milena Stefanova

95

2.4 Local Autonomy

Table 1. Types and total number of units of territorial administration, 1949 and 1992 Type of unit Municipalities (obshtina) Smallest units (okoliya)* Districts (okrug)** Regions (oblast)

Total in 1949 2178 117 14

Total in 1992 255 9

Note: * The okoliya unit regulated by the Local Self-Government and Local Administration Act 1991 have not been instituted. ** The 28 districts (okrug) were abolished in 1987 and replaced by regions.

Table 2. Sources of municipal expenditure financing A. Amount (mln leva) 1990 Budgeted revenue 4,922.5 National budget subsidies 867.6 Borrowing 0.0 (471.5) Contribution to national budget (163.4) Transfer of excess revenue to Treasury 5,155.2 Total financing of expenditure

1991 11,299.0 3951.7 5.3 (355.7) (392.8)

1992 16,332.2 9340.2 643.7 (117.1) 0.0

14,507.5

26,199.0

B. As v6 of total municipal expenditure 1991 1990 Total financing of expenditure 100.0% 100.0% Budgeted revenue 77.9% 95.5% 22.1% Net transfers from national budget* 4.5% Borrowing 0.0% 0.0% C. Net increase (%) 1990-1991 1991-1992 Total financing of expenditures -35.2% -1.1% Budgeted revenue -47.1% -20.8% Net transfers from national budget* 217.2% 57.7% Borrowing 6551.3%

1992 100.0% 62.3% 35.2% 2.5% 1990-1992 -36.3% -68.0% 274.9%

Note: * Subsidies minus contribution to national budget, minus transfers of excess revenue to Treasury Source: National Budget of the Republic of Bulgaria in 1992 and 1993.

96

Microsocial

Table 3. Items of revenue designated for municipalities A. Amount (mln leva)

B. As % of total revenue designated for municipalities

C.Net increase

1991

1992

1991

1992

Aggregate income tax

4 868.2

7 626.7

43.1%

46.7%

-14.2%

Contributions from profit to municipal councils

3 679.9

2 709.6

32.6%

16.6%

59.7%

Profits tax Turnover tax Property and inheritance tax

591.8

565.3

5.2%

3.5%

17.7%

1 248.8

2 256.7

11.1%

13.8%

-1.0%

72.2

140.9

0.6%

0.9%

6.9%

Excise duty*

0.4%

70.3

0.3%

Agricultural land tenure tax* Payroll tax* Rates

55.2 244.7

Acquisition of property

552.4

0.3% 2.2%

189.3

Transport vehicles Education Health Social welfare 593.4

Rent tax

3.4%

52.5

1.2% 0.3%

130.1

0.8%

17.3

0.1%

117.2

0.7%

46.1

Other rates Others

1991-1992

2313.9

23.6%

0.3% 5.3%

14.2%

117.5

0.7%

602.8

3.7%

113.5%

Brought forward from prior years Others, not on separate costaccounting basis Total

1,593.6 11 299.0

Note: *In 1991, listed in revenue as "Others". Source: Ministry of Finance

16 332.2

9.8% 100.0%

100.0%

-20.8%

97

2.4 Local Autonomy

Table 4. Distribution of powers between central Government and the various local and regional authorities (1992) Functions and activity 01. General administration 0.2 Law enforcement, police and justice 0.3 Education

0.4 Health care

0.5 Social welfare

0.6 Housing and urbanization

0.7 Environment

0.8 Economy and finance 0.9 Culture, recreation, sports

Delegated powers Municipality (obshtina) District (okoliya) 1.1 Public records 1.2 Public administrative services 2.1 Law enforcement, enlists police cooperation 3.3 Facilitation in coordina3.1 Local educational policies, preschool education tion of municipal vocational 3.2 Primary education. Maintenance of training policies municipal school facilities 3.5 Career guidance for students 4.2 Local health policies. Peripheral 4.1 Coordination of municipal activities in operation and health network (polyclinics) maintenance of municipal hospitals 5.1 Social assistance for physically and 5.5 Coordination of municimentally handicapped children pal registration and social 5.2 Welfare for socially disadvantaged, assistance for the unemyoung married couples, young people ployed without income 5.3 Fund raising, management at socialcare institutes (old people's homes, public care) 6.1 Registration of housing needs. Co6.3. Drafting and adoption of operation in housing of socially disadurban development plans of vantaged groups. Construction and use groups of municipalities of municipal housing 6.2 Urban planning on municipal territory 7.1 Water supply and waste treatment 7.1 Coordination of mu7.2 Undertaker and cemetery services nicipalities with shared 7.3 Municipal fire department water sourceand shared installations 7.3 Coordination, methodological guidance of municipal fire departments 8.1 Administration and managementof municipal property 8.2 Municipal budgeting. Setting amount of local taxes and rates 9.1 Municipal theatres 9.2 Municipal libraries, museums and collections 9.3 Municipal parks, gardens and greenery areas 9.4 Municipal system of ceremonies (weddings etc.) 9.5 Municipal-owned sports facilities

98

Microsocial

Continued Table 4 Functions and activity 01. General administration 0.2 Law enforcement, police and justice

Delegated powers Central government 1.1 Methodological guidance and coordination 1.2 Methodological guidance and coordination 2.1 Administration of public order 2.1 Coordination of law enforcement Region (oblast)

0.3 Education

3.1 Coordination of municipal activities in development of regional schools (sports, art and other schools)

0.4 Health care

4.2 Facilitation of regional sanitation control

0.5 Social welfare 0.6 Housing and urbanization 0.7 Environment

6.3. Formulation and adjustment of strategies, regional programmes and town plans in region 7.5 Facilitation of regional environment protection inspectorates

0.8 Economy and finance 0.9 Culture, recreation, sports

9.2. Assists in the activities of the regional libraries, museums and galleries

3.1 Coordination, recruitment of teachers. Methodological guidance of schools of all types 3.4 Management and coordination of establishments of higher education 4.1 Methodological guidance of municipal hospitals. Management of medical institutions and other health organizations of national importance 5.6 Implementation of national incomes, employment and socialsecurity policies 6.3 Methodological guidance, coordination in housing and urbanization 7.5 Methodological guidance and coordination. Organization and management of national system of environment monitoring and control 8.2. Guides, control and regulated the fiscal policy of municipalities and exercises financial control 9.2. Implements a policy of encouraging cultural activities, recreation and sports. Coordinates the overall activities in the field of culture, recreation and sports. Performs methodological functions in the area of culture, recreation and sports.

Source: Structure and Functions of Local and Regional Bodies ofSelf-Government in the Republic of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Centre for Regional Development and Housing Policy (in Bulgarian).

99

2.5 Voluntary Associations

2.5 Voluntary Associations

Under socialism, voluntary associations were developed and supported by the state. They were under full political control, but also had beneficial educational and socializing functions. With the liberalization of society in the early 90s, the sector has been undergoing relatively autonomous transformation along liberal and market lines without particular assistance from the state. Many non-governmental organizations emerged and operated before 1989 From 1960 to 1989, a number of non-governmental organizations operated without registering in court even though there was a relevant statutory framework for them. Voluntary associations were often incorporated on the initiative of the authorities and always in coordination with them. It was impossible to have more than one association in the same sphere and, respectively, with the same type of activity. The 1971 Constitution bound the functions of voluntary associations to socialist construction and moral education, and envisaged ever closer cooperation with the state. Among the voluntary associations there were mass political organizations like the Fatherland Front (see 10.4 Interest Groups); youth organizations (the Comsomol and the pioneer children's organization); economic organizations (cooperatives); trade unions (see Interest Groups); cultural and educational (community culture clubs, philatelists, associations for protection of cultural heritage); amateur art activities (music and dance ensembles); sports (sports clubs, hiking clubs, union of motorists, union of hunters); military; creative (writers, composers, actors, movie-makers, architects); scientific and technological unions; professional (teachers, journalists, lawyers, translators); health and welfare (Red Cross, handicapped); international relations (peace committee, movement for Bulgarian-Soviet friendship, society for Afro-Asian solidarity); national-cultural (Armenian, Jewish), paramilitary and para-state (organization for defence assistance, voluntary law enforcement units, comrades' courts, commissions on labour safety, traffic safety, public control, green patrols). They were funded by

100

Microsocial

membership dues, donations, their own fundraising and, in particular, the exchequer. Centralization and nationalization of the cooperative sector increased after the late 60s. The number of music, ballet, literary, photography, movie and other clubs, and workshops at community cultural clubs, enterprises and educational establishments rose progressively in the 60s and 70s (Table 3). Generously subsidized by the state, amateur art activities peaked in 1983 617,332 performers in 29,174 companies - and then started declining (Table 2). The situation with hiking and sports clubs (Tables 5 and 6) was identical. Mass membership was not indicative of the actual sports activities of the public. The funds provided by the exchequer via the Bulgarian Union for Physical Culture and Sports were funnelled mostly into professional sport (The Town.., 1988:153). The idea of the so-called state-cum-public principle of government was promoted on a large scale in the 70s The state recruited the public in a number of mixed bodies of cultural management, law enforcement and other forms of social control. By the mid708, there were reportedly 7,000 "voluntary units of the working people" with two million members, 500 commissions against juvenile delinquency, 19,205 commissions and 2,579 groups for popular control with 220,000 inspectors, and 3,000 comrades' courts (Smatrakalev, 1976). In the early 80s, however, public participation in government diminished. Serving a particular sphere of interests, voluntary non-governmental organizations also played an important educational, integrative, and partly representative role. They also facilitated the training and promotion of cadres for the party and state apparatus. A number of new non-governmental organizations have been registered since November 1989 They often are rivals who engage in the same type of activity. About a third are practically non-operational. Obstacles come foremost from the effective laws, and from the socio-economic and political situation (Nikolov, 1994). At the same time, national tradition and culture are largely conducive to the development of non-governmental organizations in Bulgaria. Most NGOs are into education, research, culture, international relations and environmental protection (see Interest Groups). A series of religious

101

2.5 Voluntary Associations

cults have registered as NGOs (see Religion). The withdrawal of state support in the late 80s and early 90s throttled public amateur art activities, art and educational workshops, as well as voluntary citizens' associations for the combat of crime and for law enforcement. The non-governmental sector now gets far less state support and relies mostly on foreign funding. Ivan Minov REFERENCES Daynov, E. (1995) The Non-governmental Sector in the Mirror of Sociology. Sofia: First National Meeting ofNon-Profit Organizations (in Bulgarian). Nikolov, S. (1994) The Value System and Motivation of "Entrepreneurs" in the Bulgarian "Third Sector". Sotsiologicheski Pregled, N 1-2 (in Bulgarian). Oszavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Smatrakalev, M. (1976) The Public in the Combat of Crime and Other Ofences. Sofia (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village '86 (1988) Empirical Sociological Survey. Selected Tables. Vol. II, III. Sofia: Committee for Standard Social Information (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Community culture clubs and their members

1960 clubs members

1970

1980

1989

1993

4 502

4 399

4 256

4 269

4 246

779 000

1091 000

1 087 000

984 000

247 000

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

102

Microsocial

Table 2. Amateur art activities I960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1989

Ensembles

12 772

14 592

12 347

11774

24 713

28 255

20 793

Performers

394 842

461509

397 727

362 902

552 917

591192

449 267

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Schools and workshops

Music Ballet Visual Arts Decorative Arts Literature Photography Cinema Total

workshops 297 52 191

1961 members

32 993 4 696 13 122

1979 workshops 706 95 735

375

6 663

431

8 568

383

7 279

468

588

9 836

1 813

28 376

1 825

178 2 428

3 107 61655

316 4351

4 637 97 766

288 4 548

1970 members 30 454 3 435 4 682

workshops 694 92 678

92

1 573

13 442

471

-

-

-

-

29 624 2 879 3 764

workshops 808 77 214

48

962

703

1978 members

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Homes of culture and volunteers at the homes

Homes of culture Volunteers at homes of culture

1965

1970

1979

1980

72 1324

139 3 045

266 2 790

287 1592

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

103

2.5 Voluntary Associations

Table 5. Hiking clubs 1960 Clubs Members

1970

1965

1980

1975

1989

1985

404

708

755

946

878

1115

433

492 504

855 989

874 449

1 373 996

2 432 468

2 655 020

1 339 815

249 470

942 257

1 587 561

1 715 924

2 896 237

3 229 139

2 899 433

0,5

1,1

1,8

1,2

1,2

1,2

2,2

Overnights at chalets Overnights per member

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 6. Sports clubs 1965 Clubs Members

1979

1970

1980

2 088

2 153

1906

1697

2 023 700

1 447 100

3 047 100

3 951 300

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994 etc.) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 7. Bulgarian Hunting and Angling Union 1980

1985

1989

Chapters

141

145

123

Members

159 128

182 313

182 100

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1980 etc) Sofia: Central Statistical Office.

Table 8. Organization for Defense Assistance 1980

1985

1989

Chapters

2 115

2 824

2 753

Members

43 808

76 663

76 898

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1980 etc) Sofia: Central Statistical Office.

104

Microsocial

2.6 Sociability Networks

Sociability networks were de-traditionalized in the period of accelerated industrialization and urbanization under the conditions of centralized economy and ideological control. They stimulated collective and secular forms of socializing, with limited spontaneity. In the early 1990s, ideological constraints have been lifted, creating opportunities for development of new forms of interpersonal communication in a new social context. In the conditions of accelerated industrialization and urbanization the traditional forms of sociability were replaced by new ones The new patterns of sociability developed within the context of growing atomization of the individual and weakening family, neighbour and community networks. Yet even though they lost their traditional form, those networks were largely reproduced and transformed in a new modernizing family and reinforced by the new politicized networks in socialist society. Collectivization in agriculture rendered the old forms of labour sociability in the countryside meaningless. However, family and neighbour support survived in everyday life; for instance, when building a family house in the village. Within the context of nationalized economy, monopoly in the public sphere and dominant collectivistic ideology, new collectivistic forms of sociability were cultivated. Labour sociability shifted mostly to the work collective leaving individuals alienated (Draganov, 1974:303). On the level of settlements, enthusiasm for public events started chilling even in the 60s Public events lost their spontaneity and came to be initiated mainly by public organizations and local governments. New customs emerged spontaneously like large weddings or farewell parties for conscripts and school-leavers. That evidenced a need for new forms of social contacts (Tables 1, 2 and 3). The extended family remained the main sociability network, with the importance of friends and colleagues growing. The

105

2.6 Sociability Networks

authorities attempted to develop a new system of rituals to fill the void and replace the old church rituals. In 1978, the Communist Party leadership approved "Guidelines for the Development and Perfection of Socialist Rituals and Customs." The so-called voluntary "community work" performed by a considerable part of the population in their leisure time, could also be regarded as a form of social contact. In fact, 18.7% of females and 28.6% of males did community work, with spouses claiming that 41.7% of females and 49.9% of males were actively involved in community work (The Bulgarian Family..., 1987:164). Alienation increased between party and administrative officials and ordinary people There are no surveys on the degree to which the new class-based collectivism surmounted or compensated the alienation growing in the course of urbanization and in the new industrial relations. Nor are there any studies on sociability networks and contacts since the liberalization of society in the early 90s. Free private enterprise in the economic and public sphere definitely increases opportunities for group entertainment and socializing. However, those opportunities are limited by the drastic impoverishment of a large part of the population and by the absence of a developed non-governmental sector. Still, the "third sector" is now building a new sociability and self-support network. Ivan Minov REFERENCES The Bulgarian Family Today (1987) Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Draganov, M. (1974) The Heart and Mind of the Bulgarian Peasant. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Radoeva, D. (1988) The Family Networks of the Contemporary Bulgarian. Sotsiologicheski Problems, N 2 (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1980) 'The Time Budget and the Socialist Way of Life'. The Socialist Way of Life - Subject of Complex Research. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1989) Study on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). The Time Budget of the Population of the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1970/71 (1973) Sofia (in Bulgarian).

106

Microsocial

Table 1. Confidential family relationships beyond the circle of immediate kinship ties, 1986

None Yes, with other relative families Yes, with other non-relative families

Second generation

First generation

Total

29.7 35.9 29.0

56.3 26.6 17.2

43.0 31.3 23.4

Source: Radoeva, D. (1988) 'The Family Relationships of the Contemporary Bulgarian'. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, N 2 (in Bulgarian). Table 2. Visiting and eating out, 1986

visits almost every day at least once a week rarer never

5.15 28.35 53.86 12.63

entertains at home 8.93 36.86 46.70 7.48

eats out 2.36 5.66 35.06 56.90

Source: The Town and the Village '86. Empirical Sociological Survey, vol. I, Regional Communities (1988) Sofia: Committee for Standardized Social Information, pp. 153-155 (in Bulgarian). Table 3. Time for contacts and socializing (average % in 24 hours) With extended family, friends and acquaintances With neighbours % of leisure time Restaurants, bars, cafeterias Socializing games, cards, chess etc. Conversations and visitors Visiting Entertaining at home Conversations

1970

1977

7.0 1.0 0.5 0.3 2.8 -

1.0 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.8 0.4 1.8

Source: The Time Budget of the Population of the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1970/71.- Sofia, 1973; Staikov, Z. "The Time Budget and the Socialist Way of Life1. The Socialist Way of Life - Subject of Complex Research. Sofia, 1980.

3 WOMEN

3.1 Female Roles

Female roles changed markedly between 1960 and 1995. There was an influx of women in production and services. The high female labour force participation rate was facilitated by enormous privileges for working women and mothers, despite changes in family roles. A break with traditional lifestyles and a move towards egalitarian and democratic family relationships was implemented. However, women's liberation has had a series of negative impacts such as a double workload, mental stress and exhaustion, deteriorating health, low sexual and reproductive awareness and irresponsible parenthood. Men enjoy considerable advantages in the professional arena, financial remuneration and power resources. Rapid industrialization, urbanization and migration in Bulgarian society have led to modernization of family Significant changes in the social status and marital roles of women have occurred during the 1960-1995 period. Birth rates started decreasing steadily in the 1960s, plummeting in the 1980s and dropping to critically low levels in the 1990s (Table 1). Low female fertility rates maintained by couples' low desires and expectations for having children (two children on average) are characteristic of the period. Under the conditions of a high female participation in the labour force, motherhood roles got enormous state support The period is notable for its consistently high female labour force participation rates. Nearly half of all labour force participants in the past four decades were women (Table 5). The proportion of working-age women who

108

Women

were employed was quite high in the first three decades (92.1% in 1965, 96% in 1975 and 86.1% in 1985). The period till 1989 saw the establishment of a public day-care system for small children which made it possible for working women to resume their career after the maternity leave. The state support enabled young mothers to work full-time. Both the conditions of employment and day-care for children are undergoing negative changes during the nineties. The decline in women's employment is due to high overall unemployment since the early 1990s. In 1993, there were 109 jobless women for every 100 jobless men (Genov, 1995). The specific nature of women's unemployment is based upon the prevalence of low skills and low schooling (55.4% of unemployed women are unskilled), and long-term unemployment (56.2% of jobless women have been unemployed for more than one year) (Genov, 1995). Due to an underdeveloped system of public services, Bulgarian women spend a lot of time on housework This additional work amounts to an average of 4.4 hours a day {The Situation..., 1995:4). The uneven division of housework between the sexes is due foremost to traditional stereotypes of "women's chores." Those stereotypes are widely shared by women as well. Sociological surveys from the 1980s show that many men (especially university graduates and residents of large cities) support the notion of equal division of housework in the family, even though that is only true of their attitudes rather than their behaviour {The Bulgarian Family..., 1987). Women have a high level of education due to the equal access of both sexes to educational institutions The percentage of women with higher education has risen steadily in the period under consideration (Table 4), with the proportion of female university students even exceeding that of males in recent years (51% in 1991/1992, 55% in 1992/1993, 57% in 1993/1994 and 60.7% in 1994/1995). Working away from home is a priority for women The dominant model in the period in question has been that of the working married woman. It has become a stereotype. Sociological surveys from the 1970s and 1980s revealed how important jobs were for women: 23.8% of

109

3.1 Female Roles

the wives polled in a national survey on the family in the late 1970s assigned priority to job satisfaction {The Bulgarian Family..., 1987). Besides, economic considerations are by far not women's leading motivation to work. The leading motives are the activity of working, liking one's profession, reluctance to confine oneself to domestic concerns only, fear of boredom, etc. (Spassovska, 1986). Men also think that women should work, even though their priority is foremost on economic interests. Still, the high female labour force participation rates in the past five decades are due mostly to the extensive development of the socialist economy. As a result, female employment is not a matter of personal choice, but rather of coercion. Within this context, the women's liberation and the means of solving women's problems are entirely grounded in the socialist ideology of women's emancipation and the equality of the sexes. That ideology preconditioned the deliberate concentration on the positive aspects of the new female roles while underrating or ignoring the negative consequences of the hyperbolized professional role of women (Kotzeva and Todorova, 1994). The problem of the double workload, conflicts between family and professional roles, bringing up children, leisure time, mental and physical exhaustion and stress, deteriorating health and other deficits of the female role configuration established in the past few decades have become subject to public debate, questioning the "success" of the present model. Nevertheless, a survey of unemployed female university graduates showed that 94% of them were not inclined to devote themselves to household chores alone (Gencheva and Kotzeva, 1993). Mass employment of women in low-paid and low-productive jobs is a corrective of the myth of equal pay The figures for 1993 show that women's wages were on average equal to 84% of men's (similar to the figure of 80% to 85% in most European countries) {The Situation..., 1995). Even though there are no statistics on the percentage of women in the economic elite, supplementary calculations and indirect findings of polls show that the percentage is comparatively low. Calculations of figures in the 1991 Statistical Yearbook indicate that 13.1% of all executives in the state sector were female. The share of female employers and self-employed women was 7.3% of all working women (vs 11.9% in the case of men) {Survey on the Work Force,... 1993). Women held 13% of the seats in Parliament and 13% of senior positions in the administration,

110

Women

making up 8% of all mayors of large municipalities and 23% of mayors of small and depopulated municipalities (The Situation..., 1995:26). Tatyana Kotzeva

REFERENCES Burke, R., I. Todorova, T. Kotzeva and C. McKeen (1994) Career Priority Patterns Among Managerial and Professional Women in Bulgaria. The InternationalJournal of Career Management, vol. 6, No. 3. Gencheva, E., T. Kotzeva (1993) Unemployed University Women: Prospects for Re-entry on the Professional Field. Sofia: BAUW (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Kotzeva, T., I.Todorova (1994) The Bulgarian Woman: Traditional Images and Changing Realities. Sofia: Krakra (in Bulgarian). Kyuranov, Ch. Ed. (1987) The Contemporary Bulgarian Family. Sofia: Nauka i Izkoustvo (in Bulgarian). Spassovska, L. (1986) The Family and the Socio-Professional Activity of Spouses. Naselenie, vol. 3 (in Bulgarian).

Table 1. Birth rates (per 1,000 population)

1960 1970 1980 1990 1993 1994

17.8 16.3 14.5 12.1 10.0 9.4

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Ill

3.1 Female Roles

Table 2.Children in kindergarten (per 1,000 children aged 3 to 6) 1960 1965 1970 1980 1985 1975 542 628 680 1A1 751 797

1988 791

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1960-1989) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Number of kindergartens, 1989 to 1993 1989 4 562 4 590 1990 1991 4 465 1992 4 429 3 856 1993 Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria,^ 990-1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. University graduates by sex Year 1964 1970 1978 1980 1986 1988

Total 117 975 163 218 251 182 274 977 323 575 336 530

Inch Women 34 686 56 951 110 433 124 581 161 918 172 890

Women, % 29.4 34.9 44.0 45.3 50.0 51.4

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1964,1970,1978,1980,1986, 1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Employment of women (number in thousands and %) Year 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991

Total 4 608 4 786 4 934 5 050 5 084 5 018 5 017 5 021

Women 2 190 2 263 2 331 2 421 2 385 2 359 2 358 2 362

% 47.52 47.28 47.24 47.94 46.91 47.01 47.00 47.04

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

112

Women

3.2 Childbearing

Female fertility rates have been decreasing steadily since the 1940s, with a growing number of them being first and second births. The age of mothers has been dropping. Most women have their children before they reach the age of 24. The size of the average family remains small. The 1960-1995 period saw an increase in births out of wedlock. In Bulgaria, births out of wedlock result mostly from low sexual and contraceptive education. Female fertility rates have been decreasing ever since the 1940s The process is marked by a growing number of first and second births and a reduction in third or more births (Table 1). The percentage of births which are first births has been growing and that of second births falling since the 1990s, thus contributing to the prevalence of the single-child model. The decreasing desire of Bulgarian families to have children is due to the demographic transition and the peculiarities of modern society. The radical social changes in the early 1990s have led to substantial pauperization and insecurity which additionally reduce the desire to have children. The spread of the small family is due to the earlier completion of women's childbearing Most women have their children in their 20 s. Fewer and fewer births occur at the age of 30 to 40. The fertility age has been dropping, most women having their children while they are under 24. In 1994 the average age of childbearing women was 23.95 years, and 22.07 years for first-time mothers. Notably, the fertility rate is high in the youngest age group, women under 20. This rate has actually been growing: in the past five years. By that indicator, Bulgaria is first in Europe. In 1990 there were 9.1 births per 1,000 women under 20 in France, 10.3 in Germany, 31.5 in Poland, 52.1 in Romania and 69.9 in Bulgaria.

113

3.2 Childbearing

The decrease in family size is due to a downward trend in fertility and to a general tendency for different generations to live separately The average size of the family has remained low in the past four decades (3 members in 1965, 2.9 in 1975 and 2.9 in 1994). The percentage of nuclear families has been rising at the expense of extended multi-generational families. The ageing of the population is an important factor in this development. The 1992 census shows that two-member families prevail (44.6%), followed by three members (26.8%) and four members (24.7%). Families with more than five members are a mere 3%, and with more than six, 0.9%. The drop in marriage rates and rise in divorce rates have also been contributing to the small average size of families. Births out of wedlock tended to increase in the 1960-1995 period Table 3 shows that prior to the late 1980s, every tenth child was born to a single mother on average. In the early 1990s, it was every third to fourth child (366 vs 750 per 1,000 births in 1994). Like married mothers, the overwhelming majority of single mothers have their children before age 25. Surveys show that births out of wedlock result from low sexual and contraceptive education and, in most cases, from unintentional and irresponsible decisions of the future parents. A survey from the 1970s found that just 6.2% of single mothers actually wanted to have a child (46.8% wanted to only if they got married), while 92.8% of the fathers did not want the child, and just 27.4% of the parents of single mothers approved of birth out of wedlock (Popova, 1977). The stigmatization of single mothers in the Bulgarian tradition thus proves a strong factor in determining the parameters of the phenomenon. Just 27.8% of the single mothers kept their children, whereas the majority (72.2%) sent them to care and adoption centres (Popova, 1977). Twelve percent of children at full-time public care centres in 1994 were born to single mothers. Children born out of wedlock generally have poorer health, physical underdevelopment and high rates of prematurity, still births and congenital disorders. The undesired pregnancy and attempts to terminate it, as well as the deliberately careless attitude of the future mother to her own and her future child's health, places those children in a high-risk physical and mental health group. Tatyana Kotzeva

114

Women REFERENCES

Kindergartens and Full-Time Public Care Centres (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Men and Women in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Popova, S. (1977) Medico-Social Aspects of Births out of Wedlock. Unpublished doctoral thesis (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1960-1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 1. Births in wedlock by mother's fertility rate (% Birth is:

Total

first

second

third

1962

100

40.4

38.6

10.2

1965

100

44.5

36.4

9.3

1970

100

44.2

38.0

11.5

1975

100

41.4

43.8

9.5

1980

100

46.0

39.8

9.2

1985

100

44.0

41.7

9.3

1990

100

47.0

39.4

8.3

1993

100

53.5

34.9

6.6

*The difference to 100% comes from the fourth-plus births Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1963-1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

115

3.2 Childbearing

Table 2. Births in wedlock by mother's age (% Year

Age margin under 20

20 to 24

25 to 29

30 to 34

55 to 39

40 to 44

1962

13.0

39.3

28.5

12.9

4.9

1.2

1965

14.9

41.8

25.3

12.2

4.5

1.2

1970

13.4

47.9

24.5

9.8

3.6

0.7

1975

12.7

46.6

28.5

8.9

2.7

0.6

1980

14.9

48.4

25.0

8.9

2.2

0.5

1985

14.9

46.9

25.5

9.5

2.7

0.5

1989

16.3

46.9

24.4

9.1

2.9

0.4

1993

14.2

47.4

24.7

9.8

3.1

0.7

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1963-1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Births out of wedlock (% of births in wedlock)

Year

%

1960

8.0

1970

9.4

1980

10.9

1990

12.4

1992

18.5

1993

22.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

116

Women

3.3 Matrimonial Models

The 1960-1995 period is characterized by consistently high marriage rates, low remarriage rates and early first marriage for both women and men. Family and marriage remain a priority. There has been a slight increase in divorce rates and singleness. Unconventional forms of family-conjugal arrangement such as common-law couples are a rare exception. Bulgaria may be classified as a country with traditional conjugal and family behaviour The demographic indicators of this type of behaviour are high marriage rates, early first marriage, stability of the conjugal union, low divorce rates and low frequency of alternative forms of cohabitation such as marriage without legal status (also called cohabitant or common-law couples, nonconjugal cohabitation or free union). In the context of a worsening demographic situation (Genov, 1996: 83), the 1960-1995 period was characterized by stable conjugal and family behaviour with a slight trend towards marital instability as indicated by an increase in divorce rates and singleness. Marriage remains a way of life for the majority of the Bulgarian population and is the most common form of cohabitation As the figures from the last four censuses show (Tables 1 and 2), the proportion of the population who are married is very high: 56.6% in 1965, 57.7% in 1975, 71.2% in 1985 and 67.7% in 1992 (the 1985 and 1992 figures are higher because the definition of this population by marital status includes people aged over 15 only.) Sociological surveys of the period confirm that marriage and family remain priority values in the life of Bulgarians. Albeit at a weaker pace than in Western European countries, marriage rates in Bulgaria have also been dropping slightly since the 1960s (Table 3). Nevertheless, Bulgaria remains the country with the highest marriage rates in Eastern Europe: only 5% of all women aged 30 to 34 have never married,

117

3.3 Matrimonial Models

a stable percentage over the past three decades. Marriage rates of men have regressed somewhat. While in the 1960s, 6.2% of men and 5.1% of women aged 30 to 34 had never married, by the early 1990s the figure was the same for women (5.4%), but double for men, at 13.7% (Sougareva 1996). The proportion of divorcees and widows/widowers also rose slightly, and was higher for women, who are less likely to remarry and more likely to live longer than men (Tables 1 and 2). Early marriage rates vary by ethnicity. They are highest in the Gypsy community - 65% of all men and about 80% of women in this ethnic community married under the age of 25, vs 23% and 59% in the Bulgarian community, and 50% and 73% in the Turkish community. Rather early marriage rates particularly differ by ethnicity: 40% of women from the Gypsy community marry under 20, compared to about 10% of Bulgarian women (Sougareva, 1995: 1-2). The average age at first marriage is 21.7 years and has remained stable over 30 years (Table 3). Men also marry young - just over 24. This trend has been stable over the years (Table 3). Divorce rates have tended to rise since the 1960s Unlike Western European countries where divorce rates were low in the 1960s and shot up in the following decades, divorce rates in Bulgaria were relatively high even in the 1960s and have remained there. The cumulative index of divorce rates (percentage of marriages ending in divorce) in Bulgaria was 10 in 1965, 15 in 1975, 21 in 1985 and 19 in 1990; in Hungary respectively it was 23, 28, 33 and 31; in the United Kingdom, 11, 32, 44 and 42; in Sweden, 18, 50, 46 and 44; and in France, 11, 16, 30 and 31 (Sougareva, 1996). Table 4 illustrates the increase in divorce rates and their several-fold higher proportion in towns vs villages. The trend of broken marriages ensues from processes associated with the modernization of Bulgarian society (urbanization, industrialization, high level of women's employment, etc.) that destabilize the traditional form of family. On the other hand, the family remains a very high value, as a result of which public disapproval of divorce is common. The period under consideration has not seen radical changes in remarriage rates, which have remained very low: 0.9 in 1989, 0.8 in 1990, 0.6 in 1991 and 0.5 in 1992. By contrast, in 1989 they were 26.3 in Denmark, 19.9 in Germany, 8.1 in Greece, 3.1 in Italy and 14.4 in the Netherlands (Women in the World..., 1994). Men remarry more often than women, and this is one

118

Women

reason for the larger number of widows compared to widowers (Table 1 and 2). Concubinage (or common-law union) is still rare -just 5% of all couples in the country are not formally married, vs over 50% in countries such as Sweden and Denmark. There are serious economic, legal and psychological barriers to this type of cohabitation which is popular in the West. .

Tatyana Kotseva

REFERENCES Demographic and Economic Profile of the Population of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1972) Sofia: Committee of Standard Social Information (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Sougareva, M. (1995) Marriage and Divorce of the Ethnic Groups in Bulgaria. Nasselenie, No. 1-2 (in Bulgarian). Sougareva, M. (1996) The Bulgarian Family in the Transition to Market Economy. Sofia: The Free Initiative Foundation (in Bulgarian). Spassovska, L. (1995) Singles. Sofia: Prof. M. Drinov Press (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1960-1995 (in Bulgarian). Women in the World and in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Institute of Demography (in Bulgarian).

119

3.3 Matrimonial Models

Table 1. Population according to censuses (1965 and 1975) by marital status (% 1965 1975 Total Single

36.9

34.7

Married

56.6

57.7

Divorced

1.0

1.6

Widowed

5.5

6.0 Men

Single

40.0

38.2

Married

56.7

57.8

Divorced

0.7

1.1

Widowed

2.6

2.9 Women

Single

33.7

31.3

Married

56.6

57.6

Divorced

1.3

2.0

Widowed

8.4

9.1

Source: Demographic and Economic Profile of the Population of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.- KESSI, vol. I, Sofia, 1972 (in Bulgarian).

120

Women

Table 2. Population aged over 15 by legal marital status according to censuses (1985 and 1992) (%) 1985

1992 Total

Single

16.5

18.5

Married

71.2

67.7

Divorced

3.3

3.7

Widowed

9.1

10.0 Men

Single

20.7

22.9

Married

72.3

69.5

Divorced

2.6

3.0

Widowed

4.3

4.5 Women

Single

12.4

14.2

Married

70.0

66.1

Divorced

3.9

4.4

Widowed

13.7

15.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

121

3.3 Matrimonial Models

Table 3. Marriage rates Marriage rates (%)

1960 8.8

1970 8.6

1980 7.9

1990 6.9

1994 4.5

Average age at marriage (years) men women

26.8 23.4

26.4 23.4

26.4 235

26.3 23.2

27.3 24.0

Average age at first marriage men women

24.7 21.7

24.4 21.7

24.5 21.7

24.7 21.7

25.6 22.5

Divorce rates (%)

0.9

1.2

1.5

1.3

0.9

Total coefficient of divorce rates

0 .1

0.14

0.18

0.17

0.13

Marriage: divorce ratio in respective year (%)

9 .8

7.4

5.3

5.3

4.7

35 .4 32 .1

36.1 32.6

35.5 32.2

37.1 33.7

36.9 33.6

Average age at divorce (years) men women

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Divorce rates Year (%) Total In towns In villages 1962 100.0 65.5 34.5 100.0 29.2 1965 70.8 73.7 1970 100.0 26.3 100.0 22.4 1975 77.6 79.2 1980 100.0 20.8 82.4 1985 100.0 17.6 1990 100.0 86.2 13.8

per 1000 of the population Total In towns .In villages 10.1 16.9 5.8 5.7 10.6 16.3 6.4 16.4 11.7 6.8 12.6 16.9 8.1 14.8 18.8 8.2 16.0 20.1 5.4 12.6 16.1

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of Bulgaria (1963-1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

122

Women

3.4 Women's Employment

The female labour force participation rate in Bulgaria in the past few decades has had the following distinctive features: a very high participation rate which reached its highest level by the mid-1980s; employed women possess a higher level of education, but lower training, than employed men; steady feminization of certain sectors of economy, foremost in the non-material sphere. In the years of transition to a market economy, women have constituted a risk group with regard to unemployment. Bulgaria has one of the highest female labour force participation rates in Europe The participation rate of women increased steadily until the mid-1980s. The ratio of employed men to women changed from 580:420 per thousand labour force participants in 1956, to 520:480 in 1985. Thus, there were 912 women for every 1,000 men in the labour force. For comparison, in 1965 there were 785 women per 1,000 men, and in 1975, 880 women (1985 Census). Women's employment peaked in 1986, at a labour force participation rate of 88.3%, and in the 25-49 age group, at its highest recorded levels of 94.0% for women and 95.0% for men (Town and Village '86). These figures show that there was full employment in Bulgaria in the 1980s and that it was partly due to the over-employment of women, including mothers. The high employment rate of women in Bulgaria until 1989 resulted from the shortage of labour resources in an economic system that was developing extensively It was also an indicator of the ineffective management applied to employment. Economic coercion combined with an absence of alternative models of labour and social behaviour (such as flexible forms of employment, and lack of different opportunities for child care) turned women into victims of full employment. This is underscored by the fact that by 1986, 52.2% of

123

3.4 Women's Employment

employed women had been exposed to noxious agents (Town and Village '86, 88). The economic activity of women past working age was high before 1989 By 1986, 40.7% of men aged 60 to 64 were employed, compared with 32.8% of women in their 50s. Changes in the age of the work force, which largely determine the women's vitality and ability to work, are an important feature in the development of the work force in general and the female work force in Bulgaria in particular. The work force has tended to age progressively in the past few decades. In the 1900-1985 period, the number of women aged 40 to 54 and men aged 40 to 59 as a percentage of the whole working-age population rose by more than 10 points, while that of people aged 16 to 39 declined. There is a trend towards feminization of certain sectors of the labour force The figures in Table 1 indicate a steady increase of female participation in all occupational areas (except for agriculture and forestry). Especially trade, education, finance and management along with health care, have emerged as mostly "female" sectors. In 1988, women constituted 49.9% of all jobholders (both blue-collar and white-collar); they accounted for 45.6% of those in material production and 67.8% of those employed in the nonmaterial sphere. The feminization of a number of sectors is particularly evident in urban areas. Sociological surveys conducted in 1993 found that women comprised 82.8% of all people employed in health care, 75.2% of those in education, 70.6% of those in communications and 59.0% of those in science (Atanassov et al, 1994). Comparison of annual incomes in a number of feminized sectors shows that working women earn less than their male counterparts, i.e. there is a tendency for higher female participation in sectors paying a lower average wage. The educational level of employed women is higher than that of employed men According to the 1986 census, 54.2% of employed men and 48.3% of employed women have primary or lower education. The figures on the educational level of employed women show that a steadily increasing share of them have an advanced education (Tables 4 to 7). Of all salaried employees

124

Women

with higher, college and secondary vocational education, women accounted for 22.0% of this group in 1957, 47.6% in 1983, and 54.6% in 1986. Women are also climbing up the executive ladder. In 1975, 14.3% of the managers and deputy managers of business enterprises, offices and other organizations were women; by 1983, this figure rose to 23.4%, and up to 29.8% in 1988. Although employed women are better educated than men, on the whole they have less training. By 1986, 56.3% of all low-skilled workers were women. This is largely due to the predominance of low-skilled occupations in certain feminized sectors, such as the textile and food industries. Working conditions are on the whole unfavourable for the female labour force Women's careers are often associated with manual labour, hazardous jobs, and shift work. A 1988 sociological study {Problems of the Realization of Women) found that 34.9% of the female respondents were employed in uncongenial manual labour jobs. The figures showed that 52.2% of employed women were exposed to noxious agents and that more women than men worked in shifts (respectively 26.3% vs 20%). Women were prevailing among all shift workers: 56.7% were women while 43.3% were men (Town and Village '86, 88). By 1968, this ratio was 55.8% to 44.2%. Most women work in two shifts, with fewer than 1% of them working in night shifts (since by labour law, women may work in night shifts only in certain jobs.) The relatively higher rate of shift work among women is due foremost to the occupational specificity of female employment. In education, health care and public utility services, the percentage of women working in shifts is double or triple that of men. Before the late 1980s, labour and social laws related to women's reproductive functions and careers did not play a substantial role in their labour force participation rates. By 1988, with a three-year maternity leave - of which the first two years were paid leave, the equivalent of the minimum national wage - 70% of the mothers of children under the age of three started work before the end of their maternity leave, mainly because of financial reasons. In the transition to a market economy, women have tended to become a risk group with regard to unemployment

125

3.4 Women's Employment

In 1989, the percentage of working-age women who were actively employed was 93%, with entire sectors largely feminized. The winding up of production units in a time of economic crisis edged many women out of the labour market, i.e. women make up the majority of the unemployed (Table 12). Young women are in an especially disadvantaged position, along with better-educated women. The latter prevail among unemployed women aged 31 to 55. About 25% to 30% of employed women are under 30 years old, but 48.3% of the unemployed are in that age group. Women are overrepresented among the long-term unemployed (Genov, 1997: 32). Flexible employment (as opposed to the full-time work done by 90% of women at present) is a possible alternative to women's unemployment. Galina Koleva REFERENCES Atanassov, A. et al. (1988) Employment and Unemployment in the Towns of Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Census of the Population and Housing Stock in PR of Bulgaria by 4. December, 1985 (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Demographic and Socio-Economic Profile of White-Collar Workers, vol. 4 (1989) Sofia, Central Statistical Office (n Bulgarian). Dilova, S. (1991) Problems of Employment in Sociological Studies. Sotsiologicheski Pregled, No. 3 (in Bulgarian) Dilova, S. (1994) On Certain Substantial Problems of our Society in the Period of Transition to a Market Economy. Sotsiologicheski Pregled, No. 6 (in Bulgarian). Employment and Unemployment (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, No. 1 (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Methodology and Main Results. Census of the Population and Housing Stock in the PR of Bulgaria by 4 December, 1985 (1986) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Minkov, M. Ed. (1984) Profile of the Bulgarian Population Job Opportunities and Careers. Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Problems of Realization of Women in Work, Public and Political Life (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

126

Women

Results of the Census of the Population and Housing Stock by 4 December, 1992 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the PR of Bulgaria 1988 (1989) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Town and Village '86 (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, vol. Ill (in Bulgarian). Women in the PR of Bulgaria (1975) Sofia: Ministry of Information and Transport (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Women as a percentage of total employed in the national economy, by occupational branch (1) Branch Total Branches of material production Industry Construction Agriculture (2) Forestry Transport (3) Communications (4) Trade, Supply and Purchasing Other branches of material production Non-material sphere Public utility services(5) Science and research services Education, culture and the arts Health care, social welfare and sports Finance, lending and insurance Management Others

1961 39.6 38.4 35.6 9.5 47.9 58.0 8.7 42.7 39.9 35.1 48.0 30.0 49.6 57.7 65.4 51.6 25.5 17.7

1971 44.4 41.9 45.3 14.9 48.1 47.6 15.8 53.2 55.4 41.7 58.5 41.3 49.1 65.9 73.0 70.9 39.4 32.3

1980 47.1 47.6 17.8 45.3 44.1 17.3 59.1 62.7 49.9 48.3 50.3 74.3 54.4 74.3 77.8 49.4 44.0

1988 49.9 49.4 20.5 47.5 41.3 21.6 62.3 65.1 56.8 48.9 54.0 75.8 58.0 73.8 82.3 57.2 57.3

(1) By December 31, excl employed in subsidiary arms and private artisans. (2) For cooperative farms, number of cooperative farm members employed in December. (3) Incl passenger transport. (4) Incl communications servicing the public, enterprises, offices and organizations in the non-material sphere. (5) Incl employed in plumbing. Source: Women in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1975) Sofia: Ministry of Information and Transport (in Bulgarian); Statistical Yearbook (1990) Sofia: Committee for Standardized Statistical Information (in Bulgarian).

127

3.4 Women's Employment

Table 2. Population by residence, sex, working age group and economic activity Age

Year of cen-

Total

sus

Women

Under working age Of working age Postworking age

1975 1985 1992 1975 1985 1992 1975 1985 1992 1975 1985 1992

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Economic activity economically active, incl employed tempora- unemployed rily not employed 47.6 48.7 36.6 0.6 0.2 0.1 82.4 86.4 68.0 8.3 14.6 4.6

0.8 0.0 1.4 0.1 -

7.5 14.4 -

economically inactive

not indicated

52.4 50.5 55.8 99.4 99.8 99.8 17.6 12.5 17.4 91.7 85.3 95.3

-

0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Source: Results of the Census of the Population and Housing Stock by 4 December 1985. Socioeco nomic Profile, vol. 2, part 1 (1995) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Working women by age and economic activity (%) Unemployment Labour-force par- Employment rate ticipation rate rate Women 50.5 39.4 22.0 64.1 27.4 9.8 15-19 37.1 60.2 37.9 20-24 25.8 57.4 77.4 25-29 20.2 68.7 30-34 86.1 17.6 75.8 35-39 92.0 15.6 40-44 90.8 76.6 14.5 74.2 45-49 86.8 14.5 50-54 61.5 71.9 22.8 13.4 55-59 17.3 16.2 60-64 6.8 5.7 11.6 4.0 3.5 65-69 1.4 10.7 70plus 1.5 Source: Employment and Unemployment (1994) Results of empirical research, vol.1. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

128

Women

Table 4. Skilled labour force participants by sex, type of education completed and occupational branches of non- production sphere Sex Type of completed educational establishment Men

Year of census

Branches of non-material production total in nonpublic science and education, culmaterial utility research ture and the arts sphere services services

1975 1985

100.0

2.5

9.2

27.9

100.0

2.7

10.0

23.8

Higher establishments of

1975

100.0

0.7

12.6

23.1

education

1985

100.0

0.7

22.3

Semi-high schools

1975

100.0

0.7

14.5 1.2

100.0

1.0

1.3

59.6

Technical colleges and

1985 1975

100.0

4.4

8.3

20.5

schools of arts

1985

100.0

4.2

8.7

17.0

1985

100.0

5.7

9.1

30.1

64.6

Unified secondary polytechnical

schools

with

training-and-production complex (1) Secondary

vocational

1975

100.0

6.9

1985

100.0

7.1

8.0 5.0

19.1

schools Vocational schools

1975 1985

100.0 100.0

12.8 14.3

5.3 3.7

13.6 11.7

Women

1975

100.0

2.8

7.0

45.2

1985

100.0

3.0

8.5

42.3

Higher establishments of

1975

100.0

0.8

15.2

education

1985

100.0

0.9

16.9

43.7 44.1

Semi-high schools

1975

100.0

0.9

91.3

1985

100.0

1.0 1.1

63.3

1975 1985

100.0 100.0

2.9 3.5

0.8 5.7 8.7

1985

100.0

7.0

8.5

41.8

Technical colleges and schools of arts Unified secondary polytechnical schools with training-and-production

11.6

25.5 23.2

complex (1) 1975

100.0

13.8

8.1

32.3

schools

1985

100.0

16.2

6.0

31.3

Vocational schools

1975

100.0

26.1

2.7

1985

100.0

18.1

2.6

30.5 37.9

Secondary

vocational

129

3.4 Women's Employment

continued Table 4 Sex Type of completed educational establishment

Men

Year of census

Branches of non-material production health care, other finance, mansocial wellending and agebranches of insurance ment fare, sports non-material sphere

1975

13.2

1985

12.8

Higher establishments of

1975

14.8

education

1985

13.2

Semi-high schools

1975

4.2

1985

15.6 15.1

Technical colleges and schools of arts

not indicated

1.6 1.2

38.7 44.0

6.9 5.5

0.0 0.0

1.7 1.4

39.3

7.8

0.0

40.4

7.5

0.0

0.3 0.3

25.2

3.8

0.0

18.8

3.4

0.0

2.3

7.7 4.6

0.0 0.0

11.4

1.5

41.7 52.6

1985

10.5

1.0

38.3

5.3

0.0

1975

11.5

0.6

47.7

6.2

0.0

0.5

61.6

2.5

0.1

0.8

51.3

2.3 2.0

0.2

1975 1985

Unified secondary polytechnical schools with training-and-production complex (1) Secondary

vocational

schools

1985

Vocational schools

1975

11.6 13.7

1985

15.0

0.8

52.5

Women

1975 1985

27.8 28.6

3.3 3.1

11.5 11.8

2.4 2.7

0.0 0.0

Higher establishments of

1975 1985

18.5 18.7

1.7

16.2 13.0

3.9 4.4

0.0

2.0

1975

2.9

0.3

2.5

1.1

0.0

education Semi-high schools

0.0

0.0

1985

31.4

0.3

2.2

0.9

0.0

Technical colleges and

1975

46.1

5.3

12.4

2.1

0.0

schools of arts Unified secondary polytechnical schools with training-and-production complex (1)

1985

38.0

6.3

17.6

2.7

0.0

1985

10.1

6.9

22.3

3.3

0.1

Secondary schools

1975

14.3

5.4

22.4

17.0 22.7

4.9

21.9

3.6 2.6

0.1

1985

3.3

12.8

1.8

0.1

vocational

Vocational schools

1975

0.1

0.1 1.7 1985 2.2 12.3 25.1 (1) Unified secondary polytechnical schools (edinno sredno politechnichesko ouchilishte, ESPOU) with training-and-production complexes were introduced as a form of education in the period between the last two censuses. Source: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of Salaried Employees (1989). Sofia, Central Statistical Office.

130

Women

Table 5. Skilled labour force participants by sex, type of education completed and occupational branch of material production Sex

Branches of material production

Type of completed educational establishment Men

Year of

industry cinstruction

census

total in material production

1975

100.0

54.4

15.2

11.0

1985

100.0

54.8

15.2

9.6

agriculture

Higher establishments of

1975

100.0

43.9

18.3

16.4

education

1985

100.0

45.7

13.6

Semi-high schools

1975

100.0

29.6

17.6 8.3

1985

100.0

32.8

9.9

7.5

1975

100.0

59.3

1985

100.0

59.6

15.8 15.4

7.7

1985

100.0

59.5

8.9

13.9

1975 1985 1975

100.0 100.0

63.7 56.7

11.1

8.0 9.4

100.0

1985

100.0

49.6 47.4

1975

100.0

1985

100.0

Higher establishments of

1975

education Semi-high schools

Technical

colleges

and

schools of arts Unified secondary technical schools

polywith

3.0 8.3

training-and-production complex Secondary

vocational

schools Vocational schools Women

Technical

colleges

schools of arts Unified secondary technical schools

and polywith

13.9 15.5 18.3

16.3 15.0

54.7

9.6

8.5

55.0

7.9

8.0

100.0

40.2

19.0

14.0

1985

100.0

42.8

100.0

33.0

17.0 8.4

10.9

1975 1985

35.5

5.3

10.7

1975 1985

100.0 100.0 100.0

51.8 53.7

11.2 9.6

8.8 8.4

1985

100.0

57.1

3.0

8.3

3.7

training-and-production complex 1975

100.0

64.9

4.0

6.2

schools

1985

100.0

62.6

3.0

6.2

Vocational schools

1975

100.0

70.9

1.9

5.3

1985

100.0

66.9

2.6

6.0

Secondary

vocational

131

3.4 Women's Employment

continued Table 5 Sex Type of completed educational establishment

Men

Year of census

forestry

Branches of material production other commutrade, suptransport nicaply, purbranches of tions chasing material production

1975

0.4

10.9

1.0

6.3

1985

0.4

11.5

0.9

6.5

1.1

Higher establishments of

1975

0.4

7.3

0.6

10.0

education

1985

0.4

7.9

0.7

9.7

3.1 4.4

Semi-high schools

1975 1985 1975 1985

0.1 0.2

41.1

10.3

6.8

0.8

5.9 0.8 0.9

7.4

0.3 0.4

35.5 8.8 9.1

6.2 6.2

0.8 0.5 0.7

1985

0.3

7.4

0.7

8.4

0.9

Technical colleges and schools of arts Unified secondary polytechnical schools with training-and-production

0.8

complex 1975

0.2

11.2

0.6

4.9

0.3

schools

1985

0.2

13.0

5.8

0.4

Vocational schools

1975 1985 1975

0.5 0.4

12.8

0.6 0.4

4.7

0.2

0.5 2.2

4.5 19.2

0.3 1.2

2.1 0.7

20.6 16.9

2.1 5.4

Secondary

vocational

0.1 0.2

13.6 4.5 4.1

1985

0.1 0.2

3.7 4.1

1975

0.1

8.5

1985

0.3

1975

schools of arts Unified secondary polytechnical schools with

Women Higher establishments of education Semi-high schools Technical

colleges

and

1985 1975

1.0

16.1

7.9

19.3

2.0

5.6

25.0 11.4

29.0

2.2

0.1

5.5

2.0

19.9

0.7

1985

0.2

5.0

2.1

19.5

1.5

1985

0.1

3.2

1.6

24.4

2.3

1975

0.1

3.8

18.7

0.3

22.8

0.6

training-and-production complex Secondary

vocational

schools Vocational schools

3.0

1975

0.1 0.1

2.0 1.7

1.7

0.9

19.1

0.1

1985

0.1

1.9

1.4

20.9

0.2

1985

Source: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of Salaried Employees (1989). Sofia, Central Statistical Office.

132

Women

Table 6. Distribution of women aged 15 and above by education and economic activity (%) Labour force participation rate

Employment rate

Unemployment rate

Women

50.5

39.4

22.0

Higher Semi-high

80.7 74.4 76.2

72.4 67.8 62.5

10.3 8.8 17.9

64.6 30.6

49.7

23.0

20.9

31.6

Secondary vocational Comprehensive secondary Primary and lower

Source: Employment and Unemployment (1994) Results of empirical research, vol.1. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 7. Working-age women by education and economic activity (%)

Labour-force participation rate

Employment rate

Unemployment rate

Women

75.2

58.6

22.1

Higher

90.5

Semi-high Secondary vocational

91.1

81.3 83.6

10.1 8.2

85.5

70.4

17.6

Comprehensive secondary

77.3

59.5

23.1

Primary and lower

61.0

40.8

33.1

Source: Employment and Unemployment (1994) Results of empirical research, vol.1. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

133

3.4 Women's Employment

Table 8. Working-age women by marital status and economic activity (%) Labour-force participation rate

Employment rate

Unemployment rate

Women

75.2

58.6

22.1

Single

48.0

27.7

42.3

Married

80.9

65.0

19.6

Divorced

88.0

70.6

19.8

Widowed

79.5

68.6

13.8

Source: Employment and Unemployment (1994) Results of empirical research, vol.1. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 9. Employed persons by age, residence and sex (1993) (%) Age

In villages

In towns

total Total

M

F

Total

M

F

Total

M

F

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

15-19

1.4

0.8

2.2

1.3

0.7

1.9

1.9

0.9

3.1

20-24

7.9

7.9

7.9

7.5

7.4

7.5

9.1

9.1

9.2 10.4

25-29

10.8

11.2

10.4

10.7

11.0

10.4

11.1

11.7

30-34

13.5

13.2

13.8

13.9

13.6

14.2

12.4

12.2

12.7

35-39

15.0

13.9

16.3

16.0

14.8

17.3

12.2

11.5

13.1

40-44

16.6

15.6

17.8

17.6

16.8

18.4

13.7

12.5

15.2

45-49

15.1

14.5

15.9

15.4

14.8

16.1

14.4

13.8

15.2

50-54

10.9

10.7

11.1

10.5

10.4

10.7

12.0

11.7

12.3

55-59

5.3

7.7

2.6

4.7

7.1

2.1

7.0

9.2

4.1

60-64

1.9

2.6

1.2

1.4

2.0

0.8

3.5

4.4

2.4

65-69

0.9

1.2

0.6

0.7

0.9

0.4

1.6

1.8

1.2

70-plus

0.6

0.8

0.4

0.4

0.6

0.2

1.1

1.2

1.1

Source: Employment and Unemployment (1994) Results of empirical research, vol.1. Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

134

Women

Table 10. Population by residence, sex and economic activity (inactive, employed, temporarily not employed and unemployed persons) (%) Economic activity Year Sex

Total

Men

Women

of census

economi total

economically active

cally inactive

total

em-

temporarily

unem-

ted

not employed

ployed -

-

1.3

-

-

16.4 -

0.1 -

100.0

49.0

100.0

47.6

51.0 52.4

100.0

1985 1992

100.0

53.6

46.3

83.6

1975

100.0

45.7

54.3

100.0

1985

100.0

44.7

55.3

1992

100.0

51.2 52.4

48.7 47.6

99.0 84.1

50.5 55.8

49.5 44.1

1975

100.0 100.0

1992

100.0

indica

ployed 1975

1985

not

incl:

98.7

100.0 98.3

1.0

-

-

1.7

15.9 -

0.1 -

17.0

0.1

83.0

Source: Results of the Census of the Population and Housing Stock by 4 December 1985. Socioeconomic Profile, vol. 2, part 1 (1995) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 11. Labour force participation by sex and year of census (%) participation rate

Year of census M

F

1946 1956 1965

63.5 63.3 58.1

51.3 45.7 47.7

1975

54.3

47.6

1985

55.3 48.7

49.5

1992

44.1

Source: Results of the Census of the Population and Housing Stock by 4 December 1992. Socioeconomic Profile, vol. 2, part 1 (1995) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

135

3.4 Women's Employment

Table 12. Registered unemployed in Bulgaria by age and sex Age

By Dec. 31, 1991 total

incl women

By Dec.

31, 1992

By Sep.

30, 1993

total

incl women

total

incl women

total

419 123

228 400

576 893

302 392

598 563

316511

under 29

203 769

110851

258 360

134 040

265 787

140 173

30-49

192 489

109 553

277 510

154 932

282 030

158 171

22 865

7 996

41023

13 420

50 746

18 167

50-plus

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 62 (in Bulgarian).

136

Women

3.5 Reproductive Technologies

Natural family planning methods are generally preferred to contraception. Abortion is legal, and its rates are high. Abortion is generally regarded as a private matter that is not subject to political debate. Contraceptives were not in popular use until the early 1990s This was due to a number of different reasons, including: pro-birth policies; absence of educational programmes on sexual development in schools; and, a limited choice of contraceptives available on store shelves. Most women of childbearing age resorted to abortion and natural family planning. There have been substantial changes since the beginning of the 1990s. A wider range of contraceptives are now available. Their prices, however, remain high. The majority of Bulgarian females (55%) still do not use any form of contraception. Thirty-eight per cent of males use condoms. Abortion rates are high They have reached the level of 130 per 100 live births (Genov, 1995: 51). One of the reasons is that most Bulgarian females tend to regard abortion as a contraceptive method. There are no legal restrictions and any female may have an abortion. By law, only state (and not private) clinics are authorized to perform abortions. Females under the age of 18 must have written parental consent. Most people think of abortion in terms of personal choice and the right to make personal health decisions. There is a liberal inclination to associate abortion with civil freedoms rather than public sanctions (crimepunishment). Logically, in a national survey three quarters of the respondents were against outlawing abortion. Just 18% believed that abortion ought to be banned. Responses to the question "Is abortion morally reprehensible" were similar: two-thirds said "no" and just over one quarter said "yes" (Georgiev, 1994). Abortion is not subject to political or broad public debate.

137

3.5 Reproductive Technologies

Sterilization is banned, and fertilization is expensive Both male and female sterilization are banned by Bulgarian law. All obstetric clinics have non-fertility consulting rooms. Bulgaria has four state and one private in vitro fertilization centres. Patients in either type of centre must pay an exorbitant fee for the service (Vatev, 1992). Iliya Vatev, Todor Chernev, Anna Krasteva REFERENCES Genov, N. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Georgiev, E. (1994) Sociological Surveys: Ways of Usage. Sofia: MBMD (in Bulgarian). Vatev, I. (1992) Development of IVF Technology in Bulgaria. ARTA, No. 3 (in Bulgarian).

4 LABOUR MARKET

4.1 Unemployment

In the conditions of centralized socialist economies subordinated to a state plan, being unemployed and seeking work was an exceptional circumstance. Socialist society regarded labour as a right and as a duty of the individual. Those who did not perform socially useful labour were subject to administrative measures. The policy of full employment was accompanied by hidden unemployment, associated with under-utilization of working hours, lax labour discipline and underpayment. Official statistics registered only the number of employed persons, providing no data on hidden unemployment. During the nineties this situation changed abruptly. Following the period of full employment during socialism, the 1990s saw radical changes in the state of the labour force and employment Economic decline, irrational economic structures, ineffective distribution of the work force, loss of external markets and other factors led to snowballing mass redundancies of working-age people at the beginning of the 1990s. The rise in the unemployment rate preceded privatization. This is particularly alarming since privatization is expected to trigger stronger waves of unemployment. In the first years of the nineties the absolute number of unemployed persons registered at job centres has been rising steadily till the end of 1993 and then started to decline (Table 1). The figures only cover those people officially registered as unemployed. There is a considerable number of jobless persons who, for one reason or another, are not registered. In addition, experts estimate that 50,000 to 60,000 job-holders are de facto potentially unemployed since they have been on an unpaid leave for a long period of time. The number of vacancies is entirely insufficient. The percentage of vacancies with permanent employment contracts has been decreasing and

139

4.1 Unemployment

there is a trend towards short-term contracts and contracts for specific services with independent contractors. Unemployment is very high among young people In the under-30 age group, every other young person has never had a chance to start work. The annual peak periods of unemployment coincide with the end of the school year and the discharge of conscripts from the army. Among unemployed young people, recent secondary school graduates are in the highest risk group; 30.1% of them have failed to find a job upon completion of their secondary education, followed by recent university graduates, at 25.1%. The reasons for their difficulties stem from qualifications demanded by employers: length of service and previous relevant experience. The second main subgroup of the unemployed comprises former jobholders who have been made redundant or who have resigned voluntarily. Structural adjustment of the economy, entailing the closure of a of moneylosing enterprises, underlies the prevalence of redundancies in industry. The absolute number of redundancies in the services has tended downwards. Indicators such as education, occupation and skills level are of particular relevance to the analysis of the current changes in unemployment. It is worst among the undereducated. A thorough survey on the unemployed at the end of 1992 found that 42.6% of respondents had primary education or less, 26.4% and 22.7% respectively had comprehensive secondary education and vocational training, whereas the percentage of jobless people with higher education was only 6.2%. Most unemployed white collar workers have engineering or technical degrees They are followed by degrees in economics, education and agriculture. These figures are supplemented by those on the ethnic identity of the unemployed. Since most people with Gypsy and Turkish ethnic identities have a low level of education, their job prospects prove to be the most limited of any ethnic group. The rate of unemployment is over 80% among the Gypsy ethnic group. The duration of unemployment has also proved closely dependent on education. The lower the education, the less the likelihood of finding a job within a year of becoming unemployed. Hence the share of persons unemployed for more than one year is highest among those with

140

Labour Market

primary education or lower (54.8%), and lowest among those with higher education (42.8%). Sex plays an insignificant role in the structure of unemployment Unemployed women comprise 16.9% of the female labour force, whereas jobless men make up 15.9% of the male labour force. This factor plays a stronger differentiating role when considered in combination with other factors such as education. As a personal problem, unemployment has various impacts depending on the education, training, occupational preferences, job motivation, marital status and other personal characteristics of the individual. Representative sociological surveys have found that financial problems associated with unemployment depress families more than all other factors such as low self-esteem and social isolation. The overwhelming majority of the unemployed and their families live at, or under, the subsistence level despite the system of welfare and unemployment benefits effective since 1990. The very limited number of vacancies, ineffective and underdeveloped information on job openings, a passive, "wait-and-see" position of the jobless and other factors extend the duration of unemployment to the point where the recipient is no longer entitled to welfare benefits. Significantly, 30.5% of the unemployed, especially people with higher and vocational training, are not inclined to take merely any job, but to wait one for which they are qualified. In their job preferences, the unemployed also focus on remuneration and decent working conditions. In their job-hunting strategies, the unemployed prioritize classified advertisements in the press and help from relatives. Job centres play a thoroughly insignificant and ineffective role as mediators in the process of personnel recruitment and finding jobs. A mere 1.0% of the unemployed are looking for opportunities to start their own business as an alternative to unemployment. Potential migration and emigration of the unemployed is also indicative of their dispositions and preferences About 45% of the unemployed do not rule out moving to another part of the country in order to find work, with 27.2% ready to accept the job promptly and 17.9% on certain terms only. Unemployed university graduates and residents of Sofia are the least inclined to move. Some 28.9% of the unemployed are ready to leave the country; of these, 3.9% are already arranging

141

4.1 Unemployment

the formalities to do so, while every fourth unemployed individual would work abroad if he/she could. Among the latter, men predominate, especially those under 30 (Atanassov et al., 1994). Tatyana Kotseva REFERENCES Atanassov, A. et al. (1994) Employment and Unemployment in the Towns of Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Kotseva, T. (1993) The Social Environment of the Unemployed. Sotsiologicheski Problemi, No. 3 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Dynamics of the labour force, unemployment, and long-term unemployment in Bulgaria Indicators Labour force (Thousands) Unemployment Long-term unemployment

Sept. 1993

June 1994

Oct. 1994

March 1995

June 1995

Oct. 1995

March 1996

June 1996

3 809. 3

3 676.1

3 608.9

3 566.8

3 602.6

3 552.3

3 512.4

3 626.0

814. 7

734.1

740.2

683.6

564.6

520.8

536.1

488.7

438. 2

439.9

444.4

432.2

378.3

341.9

339.1

316.3

Source: Genov., N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, p. 30.

Table 2. Relative share of the unemployment of young people in general unemployment and in long-term unemployment Indicators

Sept. 1993

June 1994

Oct. 1994

March 1995

June 1995

Oct. 1995

March 1996

June 1996

Unemployed Unemployed youth Long-term unemployed Long-term unemployed youth

814.7

734.1

740.2

683.6

564.6

520.8

536.1

488.7

248.8

197.3

214.8

190.1

163.8

157.3

142.7

135.0

438.2

439.9

444.4

432.2

378.3

341.9

339.1

316.3

112.9

97.1

102.1

80.2

84.7

77.2

74.4

70.1

Source: Genov., N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, p. 31.

142

Labour Market

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

Between I960 and 1990 employment changed positively by the growing number of jobs available as well as by the increase of the level of education and occupational training. The post-1990 transition to a market economy is characterized by a shift in employment and by high unemployment, especially among low-skilled workers. There is now the need to improve the educational, training and retraining system in order to enhance the flexibility of the labour force and its adaptability to the new labour market conditions. The changes in the occupational levels of Bulgaria's labour force cover two periods From 1960 to 1990, employment rose by 2,072,000 jobs. This trend was more pronounced until 1980, subsequently levelling off. The proportion of female workers among all salaried employees rose from 33.5% in 1960 to 49.6% in 1990. The changes in the structure of the national economy by economic sectors changed the structure of employment. Towards the end of the period, the proportion of workers and salaried employees in services increased slightly compared with those in industry and agriculture. The application of new technologies in industry, construction and transport led to a decrease in the number of workers and salaried employees. The proportion of workers and salaried employees who continued their education tended to grow, from 16.2% in 1960 to 24.4% in 1980. The changes in technology called for new knowledge as well as improved skills and work habits of those employed in production (Table 2). There was a long-term upward trend in the total number of professionals and in their educational level The proportion of female professionals was high, varying between 1980 and 1988 from 53% to 56% of all of them, 45% to 51% of those with higher education, 70% to 72% (semi-high, college) and 52% to 55% (secondary vocational education) {Statistical Yearbook, 1991: 74). The first period was

143

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

also characterized by growing compartmentalization. The number of comprehensive secondary schools decreased, contrary to that of technical colleges, colleges and higher establishments of education. Since 1990 the Bulgarian economy has undergone major structural changes which are changing the structure and training of the labour force Decentralization is breaking the links in the chain of training, distribution and realization of labour force potential. Structural adjustment and closure of enterprises is increasing unemployment. Marketization is imposing new requirements in regard to the flexibility and adaptability of the labour force. Plurality in the forms of ownership has led to a shift in employment within the two main sectors of the economy: public and private. The restructuring of employment by sector follows structural adjustment of the economy. Private employment is tending to grow - from 22.4% of total employment in September 1994 to 28.9% in June 1995 (The Economy of Bulgaria, 1996: 114). Agriculture and trade prevail in the private sector. There is also a trend towards redistribution of employment by branch. The proportion of employment in industry has tended to decrease, versus an increase in services. The quality of the labour force is a particularly important factor for the state and for changes in supply and demand on the labour market. During the period of marketization, close to a third of Bulgaria's labour force has been low-schooled and low-skilled. In the structure of unemployment, the proportion of unskilled and low-schooled workers prevails and is constantly growing. Specialists are in greatest demand on the labour market. This calls for special attention to the training and skills of both the employed and the unemployed (The Labour Market, 1996: 120). There are substantial differences in employment and unemployment rates of the labour force by educational level At the end of 1994, 91.9% of people with higher education were employed while 8.1% were unemployed. This proportion was quite different in the case of people with primary or lower education: 69% vs 31% (The Labour Market, 1996: 103). In June 1995, the employment rate of labour force participants with higher education was 75%; of people with secondary vocational education, 66.3%; of people with comprehensive secondary education, 52.8%; and of those with primary or lower education, 24.8%. The last

144

Labour Market

group, however, includes students. This decreases the proportion of employment in that group {The Economy of Bulgaria, 1996: 114). The proportion of the unemployed who had taken training courses was highest in 1991, at 4.8% of all unemployed persons, dropping to 2.9% in 1992, and rising slightly to 3.5% or 17,130 people in 1994 {The Labour Market, 1996: 118). The unemployed have been slow in continuing their education and improving their skills and occupational levels. The high proportion of under-educated employed as well as changes by occupational branch necessitate development and improvement of the educational system in order to improve the quality of the labour force. These changes presuppose streamlining the training and retraining system to local demand and policies on reducing unemployment. The ongoing transition in Bulgaria calls for parallel development and funding of education, along with the training and retraining programme in view of present and future economic development. Occupational Training and Unemployment Fund outlays almost tripled from 1991 to 1994. In 1994, the structure of expenditure (excluding maintenance of job centres) was as follows: 88.2%, unemployment benefits; 8.8%, welfare; 1.6%, training and retraining; 1.4%, child and other benefits {The Labour Market, 1996: 116). Subsidizing employment is an important tool in labour market policies, but so are training programmes as well. The latter are conducive to greater productivity, flexibility and adaptability of the labour force in a market economy. Darina Rouscheva

REFERENCES Dencheva, R. (1986) Occupational Training and Professional Realization of Young Cadres in Branch Science. Sotsiologicheski Problemi. No. 4 (in Bulgarian). The Economy of Bulgaria Until 1998 (1996) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). The Labour Market. A Reflection of the Controversial Economic Realities. (1996) Sofia: Gorex Press (in Bulgarian).

145

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

Table 1. Employment in the economy by branch, annual averages, ('000) Branch Material Production industry construction agriculture transport Non-Material Sphere public utility services education, culture, the arts science and technology health care, social welfare, physical culture, sports finance, lending, insurance government Total

1960

1970

1980

1990

1994

767 161 148 144

1 156 304 271 194

1 370 341 982 260

1472 315 651 230

943 192 738 188

47 134 15 64

80 201 47 111

53 286 62 185

58 276 86 218

75 296 30 195

10 50 1774

16 58 2 748

20 61 3 997

25 49 3 846

44 75 3 242

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1962, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1995) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Training of workers and salaried employees ('000) 1960

1970

1980

1 .Workers and employees with training courses

89

115

105

incl. workers

89

111

103

2. Workers and employees with continuing education

199

490

871

incl. workers

184

456

814

Training

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1962, 1971, 1981) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

146

Labour Market

Table 3. Workers with manual jobs as a percentage of total employed by branch 1980

1990

Branch

63.8

50.4

Total

51.9

41.7

incl. Industry

65.3

60.4

agriculture

81.8

68.6

transport

32.9

28.4

communications

68.6

50.0

trade, supply, purchasing

82.6

62.2

public utility services

78.5

54.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1981, 1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Table 4. Employment by educational level (October 1994) total

employed

unemployed

3 608.9

2 868.8

740.2

Total

461.9

424.6

37.4

incl.high

203.9

185.9

18.0

semi-high

766.0

644.8

121.2

secondary vocational

1 073.4

851.4

222.0

primary and lower

1 103.7

762.0

341.6

Educational level

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 94 (in Bulgarian).

147

4.3 Types of Employment

4.3 Types of Employment

Before 1989, there was a policy of full employment, supplemented by hidden unemployment. The labour market was replaced by administration. Most employees worked in the state and cooperative sectors full-time under non-fixed-term contracts of employment. All were members of the official trade unions. Since 1989, changes in employment have been associated with changes in ownership, as well as with deteriorating health and ageing of the population. Employment in the private sector is growing. There has been a rise in part-time employment and contracts of services which are actually hidden contracts of employment. Moonlighting is on the increase. These factors have led to substantial deterioration in social security. Employment in Bulgaria rose steadily until 1985, when it began to decline The post-1989 shocks in the economy accelerated the decline in employment, leading to profound changes in labour force participation (Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5). Employment dropped from a rate of 49.2% in 1989 to 36.4% in 1993 (Genov, 1995: 31). The number of employed declined by 30% between 1989 and 1993 (Dimitrov, 1994). The following trends occurred between 1985 and 1992, as confirmed by data on the socio-economic profile of Bulgaria's population from the 1985 and 1992 censuses: 1. The level of employment was higher among the urban than the rural population (62.7% vs 53.1% respectively); 2. The labour force participation rate of men was slightly higher than that of women; 3. employment was highest in the 35-to-44 age group (78%), compared with 4% among those aged over 65 in 1992. The developing private sector is the principal factor compensating for the loss of jobs in the public sector

148

Labour Market

The share of private employment during state socialism was negligible 5.5% of the total in 1989. Private employment rose to 34.9% of all jobs in 1994 (Table 4). Of all people employed in the private sector in 1993, 11.2% were hired workers, 9.8% were self-employed, and the rest were unpaid family workers (Table 5). Within the general decline of employment, labour force participation rates of women are lower than those of men. Women get paid less since the majority of them are employed in the public sector. The labour force participation rate is highest in the 24-to-49 age group. The rate is lowest among those with primary and lesser education {Bulgaria... 1995: 32). Economically inactive persons of working age are a considerable problem for the country This group comprises those who are not employed because they a) have been entitled to an early pension ; b) have been certified as handicapped; c) cannot work for health reasons; d) are looking after children and household chores; e) are financially secure and do not feel the need to work; f) have other private reasons not to work. Unemployed people of working age are not in this category {Economically Inactive..., 1993). The breakdown of economically inactive persons by age (22.6% under 30, 31.7% aged 30 to 39 and 45.7% over 50 in 1992) indicates two aspects of the problem. Inactivity in the 50-plus age group can plainly be attributed to the decrease in labour force participation mostly because of old-age retirement. The other inactive people of working age who are neither employed nor students are an indicator of grave problems stemming from deteriorating public health and increasing prevalence of handicaps. Four main reasons have emerged for economic inactivity among working-age people In 1992, the main reason was early retirement at 40.8% of all inactive persons. There were almost twice as many retired males than retired females (51% vs 26.9%). Poor health was the second reason for inactivity, accounting for about 27.5% of the total; of these, 19.6% were certified as handicapped and 8.9% were ailing. Women were more inclined to stay at home because of generally poor health than men (11.2% vs 7.2%). The last group, those bringing up children or who were well off, was the smallest: just

149

4.3 Types of Employment

8.4%. Naturally, most of them (86%) were women (Statistical Yearbook..., 1992). Data on the main sources of income of economically inactive persons indirectly concern types of employment without employment contracts. In 1992, about 8.2% of inactive persons actually worked part-time rather than technically being inactive: of these, 1.6% worked under a service contract, 4.4% did seasonal farm work, and 2.4% found other casual work. The data suggest a gradual segmentation of the labour market. The share of those employed under a service contract (full- or part-time) - which provides less legal and social security than the fixed-term or non-fixed-term contract of employment - rose substantially between 1990 and 1994. The service contract provides no social security benefits or protection against unjust dismissal. Workers get no social insurance and the time served does not count towards their general length of service; as a rule, wages are lower than those under contracts of employment. A survey on the flexibility of labour in Bulgaria found that in 1990 and 1991, close to two thirds of all companies hired workers under service contracts as casual employment (The Bulgarian Challenge, 1994:87; Table 8). About one third of all employed people work in conditions that do not meet safety and health standards That has not changed in the past 15 years on record. "Manual labour" covers regular physical work or work performed in monotonous and other unpleasant emotional and psychological conditions. The past 15 years have seen a consistent decline in the number of manual workers: from 63.8% of all employed in 1981 to 42.6% in 1991 (Table 6). Tanya Chavdarova REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. The Bulgarian Challenge (1994) Budapest: ILO. Economically Inactive Persons in Working Age (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Socio-Economic Profile of the Population of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

150

Labour Market

Socio-Economic Development of the Republic of Bulgaria in the 1990-1994 Period (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Chavdarova, T. (1995) Die verdeckten Arbeitsverhaltnisse in der sich veranderten bulgarischen Gesellschaft. Siidosteuropa, No. 44 Employment Observatory Central and Eastern Europe (1995) Bruxelles: Commission of the European Communities, No. 8. Table 1. Employment in the national economy by sex (thousands) Year

Total*

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991

4 363 4 459 4 096 3 564

Personnel employed in national economy 1 774 2 196 2 748 3 676 4 024 4 094 3 846 3 204

Females 631 932 1247 1744 1917 1979 1875 -

*No figures available on total employment between 1960-1975. Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Employment: total, working-age, post-working age, by sex thousands Employment °/ 1985 4 459 3 436 2 199

total Males Females Working-age total 4 276 Males 2 248 2 027 Females Post-working age 3 454 total 1752 Males 1659 Females

1992 3 269 1 708 1 561

1995/2 3 603 1 899 1 703

1965 -

1975 -

1985 51.7 54.7 48.7

1992 38.6 41.0 36.2

3 152 1 649 1503

3 491 1 840 1651

92.1 92.4 92.1

95.3 94.7 96.0

85.3 84.6 86.1

66.9 66.4 67.4

7.6 7.4 7.5

4.5 5.1 3.7

18.3 24.2 14.6

5.6 7.1 4.6

1 155 5 774 5 777

Sources: For 1985 and 1992, Socio-Economic Profile of the Population of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 10-11 (in Bulgarian). For 1965 and 1975, Demographic and SocioEconomic Profile of Labour Force Participants (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, vol. II, p. 8. For 1995, Employment Observatory Central & Eastern Europe (1995) Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, No. 8: 32-33.

151

4.3 Types of Employment

Table 3. Population by working age (thousands) Year 1965 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Pre-working age Total Females 2 084 1013 2 056 1001 1957 9 537 1913 9 319 1742 1697 1651 -

Working-age Total Females 2 190 4 608 4 786 2 263 2 331 4 934 2 421 5 050 5 084 2 385 2 359 5 018 2 358 5 017 2 362 5 021 2 237 4 733 2 246 4 739 4 741 2 253

Post-working age Total Females 1701 1056 1881 1 159 2 021 1 244 1 255 2 038 2 010 2 024 2 036 -

* Male working age defined as 16 to 59 completed years, female working age 16 to 54 completed years. Post-working age: 60-plus, males; 55-plus, females. Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian); On 1992 to 1994, Employment Observatory Central & Eastern Europe (1995) Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, No. 8, p. 31-32.

Table 4. Changes in the private sector during the transition period Private employment (°/o of employment)

Year

Employment (% of population)

1989 1990 1991

49.2 47.0 41.2

5.5 5.9 10.1

1992

17.7

1993

38.3 36.4

28.3

1994

-

34.9

Source: Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria Human Development Report 1995. Sofia: National and Global Development.

152

Labour Market

Table 5. Employment by sex and status, %, 1993 Status Total Hired workers: - all - in state enterprises - in private enterprises Employers and self-employed Unpaid family workers No response

Total 100.0 88.7 77.4 11.2 9.8 1.4 0.1

% Males 100.0 86.9 75.1 11.8 11.9 1.0 0.1

Females 100.0 90.7 80.1 10.6 7.3 1.9 0.1

Source: Survey on the Labour Force in the Republic of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

Table 6. Percentage of workers employed in manual labour or under hazardous conditions Year

% of manual workers

% of workers in hazardous conditions

1981 1985 1989 1990 1991

63.8 58.5 47.3 50.5 42.6

65.5 71.2 71.9 71.8 68.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic ofBulgaria. (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

153

4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force

4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force

After the Second World War, Bulgaria embarked on industrialization. Employment in the branches of the mining, heavy and light industries grew steadily. The tertiary sector remained underdeveloped. Since 1989, changes in the structure of employment have been associated with a substantial decline in total employment and development of the private sector. Prior to the Second World War, over 80% of the population made their living in agriculture. The percentage of employment in material production (industry, construction, transport and agriculture) was 96.7%, and 4.3% in the non-material sphere (Table 1). In the course of postwar industrialization, employment in the branches of the heavy and light industries grew steadily By 1989, employment in agriculture was down to 18.1% of all employed persons, and in industry up to 37.7% (cf. 7.9% in 1948). Employment in the tertiary sector also rose to 19.1% in 1989, especially in education, health care and public utility services. The concentration of the labour force in labour-intensive branches of the primary and secondary sectors was paralleled by underdevelopment of the tertiary sector. It was marked by low efficiency of employment, feminization of education, health care and public utility services and by over-staffed administration. Employment in the branches of material production exceeded that in the non-material sphere, which placed Bulgaria in the group of countries with an undeveloped infrastructure of services. Most of the labour force was employed in the state sector. In the years prior to 1989, the cooperative sector gradually shrank as a result of nationalization. The private sector was insignificant and confined to retail, catering and agriculture. The post-1989 changes have formed new parameters of the distribution of the labour force. Changes in the structure of employment have two main

154

Labour Market

sources. On the one hand, aggregate employment dropped by more than 30% as the result of the dismantling of centralized economy. On the other, changes are due to the formation and development of the private sector. The decrease in employment by economic sector after 1989 was strongest in industry and weakest in the agricultural sector Employment has dropped the most in construction (by over 40%), and to a lesser extent in transport and trade. There has been a considerable rise in the number of people employed in financial services. The decline is least significant in the predominantly state-subsidized spheres - health care, education and administration. Within industry, employment has declined mostly in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and electronics. The proportion of those employed in metallurgy, chemical engineering and power generation has risen. Similar to agriculture, food processing has increased its share of aggregate employment. There is a tendency towards continual increase in private sector employment The structure of employment in the private sector shows a concentration in agriculture, trade and construction, the share of private business on the branch level being highest in retailing, catering and hoteliery, road transport and public utility services. Typically, the emerging structure of employment in the private sector basically parallels that in the state sector. The reason is in the more active transfer of jobs from the state to the private sector as a result of privatization and restitution, rather than in job creation from newly established private enterprises. Help-wanted advertisements are mostly for waiters, barmen and shop assistants; job applications are predominantly in the area of consumer and administrative services. Distribution of employment by economic status shows a prevalence of hired labour, with an increasing share in private enterprises (Table 4). Galina Koleva

155

4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force

REFERENCES Employment and Unemployment in the Towns of Bulgaria (1994) National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. National and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. UNDP. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1994, 1995) National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Sofia: Sofia: Sofia: Sofia:

Table 1. Percentage of employment in the national economy by branch

Total Branches of material production Industry Construction Agriculture Forestry Transport Communications Trade, Supply and Purchasing Other branches of material production Non-material sphere Public utility services Science and research services Education, culture and the arts Health care, social welfare, sports and tourism Finance, lending and insurance Management Others

1970

1980

1990

1993

1994

100 86.9 30.3 8.4 35.2 0.5 5.2 0.8 6.1 0.4 13.1 2.1 1.1 5.0

100 83.0 35.2 8.2 23.8 0.4 5.9 0.9 8.0 0.6 17.0 2.1 1.5 6.7

100 80.1 36.6 8.2 17.9 0.6 5.9 1.1 9.1 0.7 19.9 2.2 2.2 7.9

100 77.8 30.4 6.5 21.7 0.4 6.1 1.4 10.3 1.0 22.2 2.0 1.1 9.5

100 77.5 29.6 5.8 21.7 0.4 5.9 1.4 11.7 1.0 22.5 2.1 1.0 9.5

2.7 0.4 1.5 0.3

4.3 0.5 1.5 0.4

5.4 0.6 1.3 0.3

6.2 1.1 2.1 0.2

6.3 1.3 2.1 0.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

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Table 2. Distribution of employment by economic sector Economic sector Industry Agriculture Services Total

1989 46,6 18,6 34,8 100,0

1990 45,5 18,5 36,0 100,0

1991 42,4 19,5 38,1 100,0

1992 39,7 21,2 39,1 100,0

1993 37,6 23,0 39,4 100,0

1994 36,7 22,1 41,2 100,0

Source: N. Genov, Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development, p. 31. Table 3. Percentage of employment in private sector of the economy by branch Branch Total Branches of material production Industry Construction Agriculture Forestry Transport Communications Trade, Supply and Purchasing Other branches of material production Non-material sphere Public utility services Science and research services Education Culture and the arts Health care, social welfare, sports and tourism Finance, lending and insurance Management Others

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

5,9

10,1

17,7

28,3

36,0

0,5 0,3 3,9 0,2 0,6 0,0

0,1 0.7 4,8 0,5 2,4 0,2

1,2 0.9 9,7 0,5 4,3 0,3

2.4 2.1 14,4 0.0 1,2 0,0 5,8 0,5

3.6 2.5 17,9 0.0 1,3 0,0

0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0

0,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 0.0

0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1

0,4 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,2

0,6 0,0 0,1 0,4 0,2

0,0 0,1 0,1

0,1 0,1 0,1

0,1 0,2 0,0

0,2 0,4 0,2

0,4 0,5 0,1

7/,58

0,6

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

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4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force

Table 4. Employment by status 1994

1993

total Employers and self-employed Hired - in private enterprises

total

inch women

total

inch women

100,0 9,8 88,7

46,6

100,0 8,6 90,4

46,6 5,8 92,8 14,3

80,1

16,1 74,3

1,9

0,9

0,1

0,1

7,3 90,7 10,6

11,3 77,4

- in state enterprises Unpaid family workers

1,4 0,1

Status not mentioned

78,5 1,2 0,2

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1994, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Percentage distribution of full-time public sector employment, by category

Total Workers Specialists Executives

1989

1991

1992

1993

1994

100 73.6

100 70.9

100 68.3

100 63.1

18.6

20.5 4.6

22.5 4.6

100 64.9 24.7

2.6

3.0

3.7

4.8 4.1

1.4

1.6

2.0

2.1

Assistant Personnel

4.5 2.1

Security

1.2

4.7

25.9

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

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4.5 Computerization of Work

Computerization started as one of the state priorities in the 1980s. Substantial results were achieved in a short period of time: dynamic development of the electronic industry, programmes and curricula teaching young people how to use the new technologies, and training of highly skilled engineers and researchers. Computerization was quite uneven. It accelerated where it was easiest to control - in administration and government. It was slower where it could trigger unpredictable effects. After 1989, the state struck informatization off its list of priorities, which led to a drastic decline in electronic production, loss of important markets, and brain drain of computer experts. There are two distinct periods in the development of information technologies: before and after 1989 This political periodization is applied to technological development on the basis of the following considerations: - the development of the electronic industry advanced steadily until 1989, and plummeted thereafter; - informatization was at the top of state priorities in socioeconomic development, and was replaced by the withdrawal of the state; - there was a substantial change in the logic of computerization, its principal economic agents, and the forms of application of information technologies; Within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), Bulgaria specialized in the production of personal computers. Given the country's relatively small size, a considerable electronic industry was established. In the 1980s, electronics was one of the fastest developing branches of the Bulgarian economy. In 1989, it provided 14% of its industrial production. The production of electronics rose from 4,951 million leva in 1985 to 8,613 million in 1989 (Table 1). Almost the entire output was exported to the USSR. In return, the country imported Soviet energy sources

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for domestic consumption or re-export, raw materials and equipment for the defence industry, licences and industrial goods. A network of computer clubs and other forms of training young people to work with information technologies was established. A highly skilled scientific work force was developed, amounting to 6,000 to 7,000 academics in the electronic sphere. There were substantial achievements in informatization but, on the whole, the process was slow and one-sided The leading agent of the administrative model of informatization was power. Electronic components were bought in the West and Far East, then personal computers were assembled in Bulgaria and then sold in the USSR and other CMEA countries. The state played a major role both in terms of the "input" and the "output" of this process. It was the state that gave the foreign exchange for the purchase of components and ensured market availability on the basis of its political contacts. An authoritarian state stands to gain from the centralization of and control over information flows. This logic can be discerned in the quite uneven application of information technologies in the various action spheres. It accelerated in administration and government but was rather slow in science, production, and education, and was restricted in private life. Informatization was dominated by the contradiction between the wish for modernization and the aspiration to keep its consequences within the limits set by the state The free circulation of information was restricted. There were no independent information services and centres. Most automated workstations were functioning as local area networks. The development of computer networks that could intensify communications was avoided. The use of PCs in the private sphere was restricted by prohibitive prices. Technological innovation was partially encouraged, but it was not allowed to turn into social innovation. After 1989, informatization was dropped from the priorities of the state Bulgaria lost its traditional markets, which led to a drastic decline in the output of major industrial branches (Genov, 1996: 23). In 1991, the produc-

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tion of electronic industry was just 34% of that in 1988. In only two years its share in the aggregate industrial output dropped rapidly - from 15.8% in 1989 to 9.2% in 1991. However, there have been certain positive changes as well. The entrepreneurship and innovative drive of autonomous economic agents are becoming an increasingly important factor in computerization. As the state sector drastically loses ground, private companies are moving into the liberalized market economy A second substantial change is the reorientation from big to personal computers. In the previous decades, large computer centres were set up, but their capacities remained largely under-utilized. The PC market is now surging upwards, and currently holds about 90% of the computer market. In 1993, sales almost doubled from the previous year, reaching 38,550 PCs. The information sphere is also recovering in a qualitative manner. The perspective on the forms of application of information technologies is broadening. They are increasingly regarded as a medium of new and more flexible forms of communication. Imports of telephone, telegraph and telecommunications equipment doubled between 1993 and 1994. The third major change is the transition from local workstations to development of networks. Thirty per cent of the computers sold in 1993 were networked. There are also projects on the development of large networks interlinking autonomous computers and local networks so as to maximize utilization of available resources. Thus, two crucial factors are currently optimizing the development of informatization: pragmatic rather than strong power, and autonomous economic agents as principal subjects of technological development. Anna Krasteva REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996: Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Krasteva, A. (1988) The Mythologized Informatics. Filosofska misul, No. 6: 10-14 (in Bulgarian). Mitov, P. (1986) The Electronic Society. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian).

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Table 1. Electrical engineering and electronic industry Year 1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Aggregate industrial output by branches (mln leva*) electrical engineering and electronic industry

4 951

6 334

7 387

8 613 6 369

13 303

Percentage of agjgregate industrial output** electrical engineering and electronic industry

11.0

13.1

14.5

15.8

12.6

9.2

Notes: * At prices in the respective year ** At comparable prices Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 122 (in Bulgarian).

5 LABOUR AND MANAGEMENT

5.1 Work Organization

The nature of work has changed substantially under the influence of technological, economic and social factors in the past few decades. A tendency of enlargement and sharing of functions, specialties and occupations (job enlargement) has appeared. Collective forms of work organization have developed, and multi-machine operation has gained ground. Improvement of workplace organization has produced changes in socio-technical systems. During the nineties the changes in work organization took a new path, the results of which are not clear yet. The 1960-1990 period saw considerable changes in the content and structure of work. They were influenced by technological, organizational, economic and social factors. The technological factors were associated with the increase in mechanization and automation, robotization and computerization of production processes and the introduction of new technologies The mechanization of technological processes eliminated manual operations. Automation eliminated simple managerial functions and, in some cases, took over control and transport operations. The introduction of programme-controlled machines enabled automated control of entire production lines. There, human activities were confined to setting-up, control and regulating functions in complicated production situations calling for unconventional decisions. These processes were marked by the capacity of the centralized system to concentrate scarce resources and by its inability to reach the optimal economic and social benefits of technological innovations.

163

5.1 Work Organization

The technological changes necessitated a new kind of personnel training The introduction of new technologies changed the structure of work processes. Implementation of effective technologies in the pre-assembly stage in mechanical engineering led to a higher quality product and to a reduction in the need for fitting and finishing operations. The main trend in improvement of discrete production lines was towards greater continuity, where one of the factors is improvement of the organization of work. This corresponds to a decrease in ancillary operations and manipulations. Mechanization, automation and robotization alleviated work, reducing or eliminating monotonous jobs that were a mental and physical strain. These changes bore upon the occupational structure and skills of the labour force. To improve flexibility and reliability, work had to be restructured and reallocated which, in turn, called for broader training and interchangeability of workers. Workers had to be trained how to set up, maintain, regulate and repair the improving machinery. Social factors were associated with the growing requirements concerning the content of work processes Expectations of worker independence, responsibility and participation in decision-making developed. The elimination of disproportions in worker skills and the content of work processes called for new methods of organization. Under the influence of all those changes in work processes, several tendencies in the development of work organization in the areas of division of work, forms of work organization and work design emerged in the pre-1990 period. First, there was a tendency towards job enlargement and job enrichment. The functional division of labour has decreased. Automated and robotized complexes and systems have enabled the integration of production functions. Higher standards of continuity of processes, efficient working hours and quality implied that the main workers have had to take over certain ancillary functions (transport, setting-up and control). This has also ensued from the efforts to improve the content of work and job satisfaction. The decrease in functional divisions of labour has had an immediate impact on work sharing. It has increased steadily in the interaction between basic and ancillary functions and occupations.

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Second, the development in the division of labour was associated with the development of collective forms of organization. The structure of work teams changed. The proportion of composite teams grew. Integration of basic, setting-up, control and other jobs ensured skilled performance. Job enrichment was conducive to interchangeability of workers in teams, which improved flexibility in operational management of production and greater reliability of production systems. However, the development of team work did not proceed smoothly. As a result of command-and-control administration, many teams operated formally and did not yield the expected results. Practice eventually regulated those processes and the composition and structure of teams improved. Third, multi-machine operation was growing steadily. Changes in the structure of technological operations and increase in machine automated time have made it possible for a few operators to service and control groups of machines or entire systems. As a result, the multi-machine operation, which was confined to the textile industry for years, found application in mechanical engineering enterprises as well. Fourth, changes in workplace organization were associated with changes in the nature of socio-technical systems. The introduction of multimachine operation turned the basic human-machine systems into humanmachines systems. Work in those systems takes a greater physical, sensory and psychological effort. To reduce strain, projects for improving furnishing, layout, working methods and service of the socio-technical systems were elaborated. Development of ergonomics in Bulgaria played an important role in this respect. These trends have slowed down since the start of marketization, when industrial production nosedived and unemployment became a major social problem. Diversification of production stagnated in the conditions of painful transition and almost complete lack of investments. Thus despite the trends in the past few decades, developments in work organization have been very limited since 1990. In the present conditions of privatization and economic uncertainty, collective forms of organization cannot play their stimulating role. The massive privatization and the future investments will certainly shape new forms of work organization. Their content and their implications under the current conditions in Bulgaria are not clear yet. Borislava Kolchagova

165

5.1 Work Organization REFERENCES

Dimitrova, D. (1994) The World of Work in Transition. In: N. Genov, Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition. Sofia: Regional and Global Development, pp. 65-76. Genov, N. Ed. (1991) Society and Technology in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Staikov, Z., S. Todorova, K. Petkov (1986) Bulgaria. In: A.Tannenbaum, T. Rozonyi, Eds. Authority and Reward in Organizations. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

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5.2 Personnel Administration

Political, economic, social and technological factors have influenced the functions and activities of personnel administration. The statutory framework of and approaches to personnel planning and staffing, and labour remuneration have changed. There are contradictory trends in the development of human resources. Provision of healthy and safe working conditions is seriously underemphasized. There have been radical changes in industrial relations. Albeit slowly, personnel administration has been acquiring an increasingly important place and role. The functions and activities of personnel administration have changed substantially in the past few decades The environment has changed considerably under the influence of political, economic, social and technological factors. This has had an enormous impact on the operation of businesses and personnel management in particular. The situation has been especially dramatic in the years of transition to a market economy. Businesses are operating in a rather risky political and economic environment. They work under constant threat of political crisis due to the confrontation between various economic and political groups. The economic conditions are generally unfavourable because of inflation, unemployment, corporate indebtedness, etc. The political and economic situation in most countries of South Eastern Europe is also unstable. All of this has not been conducive to the attraction of foreign investments that could help Bulgarian economic recovery. Many markets have been lost altogether or in part. The country has opened itself up to international markets, but most Bulgarian companies are not competitive. The economic crisis and delayed structural adjustment have weakened the potential of businesses to fulfil their main purpose, namely production of marketable goods and services. High unemployment, low standards of living of the majority of the population, and enormous pressure for change have faced the administration

167

5.2 Personnel Administration

with intricate problems. However, effective changes have not been implemented, and this breeds constant fear and insecurity. Technological innovations intended to improve competitiveness and stabilize companies run up against insurmountable financial barriers This leads to loss of valuable engineering and technological potential and lack of information. The result impedes decision-making in personnel management. Problems in this respect date back to the traditions and practices of the past few decades. The statutory framework of and approaches to personnel planning and staffing have been changing Until 1990, job descriptions and personnel specifications were formulated by government and institutional acts, some of which were based on insufficient research and analysis of work processes. As a rule, they were formulated by the labour and wage departments, sometimes with the participation of immediate superiors, but were often not coordinated with personnel departments. Under a planned economy and absence of a proper labour market, the information from those descriptions was not very relevant. In the period of transition approaches have not changed in any particular way, even though job descriptions and personnel specifications in certain businesses have been developed. Under the conditions of a planned economy, needs were planned at the discretion of managers. In industry, jobs were usually calculated on the basis of output. Yet the statutory framework was not justified in the majority of enterprises, which in many cases led to over-staffing. The number of jobs in the administration was determined mostly by managers, many of whom were inclined to demand an unjustified increase in full-time jobs. As production dropped in the course of marketization, the personnel needs of many businesses have dwindled. The task of identifying needs has been transformed instead into the task of applying a case-by-case approach and justified redundancy. The few efficient state-owned and private production and services companies have switched to planning on the basis of orders and projected sales determining output. The attitudes of heads of administrative departments, who can no longer afford to increase the staff insofar as corporate economic performance has an immediate impact on labour remunera-

168

Labour and Management

tion, have also changed. Executives in state-subsidized organizations with very restricted funding have adopted a similar approach. Earlier, recruitment followed simplified procedures. Industrial workers were recruited mainly by advertising and recommendation. Specialists were also recruited from educational institutions. Many businesses signed preliminary contracts under which students got grants and were appointed upon completion of education. Personnel were selected mainly from applications. Interviews were introduced on a larger scale in the 1980s. The establishment of state and private employment agencies has meant a substantial change in recruitment The specific conditions stemming from the transition to a market economy have had an impact on that area as well. State employment agencies facilitating the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs concentrate on placement of the unemployed. They also arrange training and retraining courses, increasing the chances of finding a job. Student employment agencies in particular have a special role, since quite a few students work to help pay for their studies. Private employment agencies are confined to the recruitment of certain categories of personnel only (seasonal workers, performing artists, etc.). Interviews are now far better prepared due to the surplus of manpower on the labour market. They have been a basic method of personnel recruitment in the past few years. Aptitude and achievement tests are also applied in some cases. There have been contradictory trends in human resources development The situation is most complicated in the case of personnel development. Many initiatives were developed in this respect in the past few decades. Vocational training centres were set up in medium- and large-scale industrial enterprises. Training of executives, many of whom attended improvement courses, became a priority by the late 1980s. Most businesses, however, lacked an elaborate assessment system as the basis of executive decisionmaking in personnel development. Personnel were assessed periodically (every few years) by a set of standards. Some of those standards were quite removed from performance and personal qualities. Insofar as there was promotion planning, it was strongly influenced by the public activity of workers and employees.

169

5.2 Personnel Administration

The application of a current assessment system has not been feasible since 1990. Conclusions on the needs of personnel development cannot be drawn on that basis. Many companies cannot afford personnel training nor create the appropriate prerequisites for promotion. Development of managerial potential is an exception. Even though it is not entirely market-based, the new system requires new managerial knowledge and skills. The former type of managers had appropriate technological competence. Yet they did not have appropriate conceptual skills (definition of organizational objectives, development of strategies and strategic plans, analysis of business, assessment of resources etc.). Managers also need new social skills on the basis of a corporate philosophy free of ideological cliches. The cult of machinery typical of many former executives has had to be replaced by respect for the employee. This is particularly important in the present difficult period when people are unmotivated and disillusioned. Despite underfunding, various initiatives of executive improvement have been taken in some industries over the past few years. This became possible thanks to projects funded by international institutions (such as the European Union's PHARE Programme) facilitating the transition to a market economy. The present circumstances have forced some executives to learn on the job in order to be capable of managing their businesses, departments or units. Approaches to and systems of labour remuneration are improving Labour remuneration is an acute problem in personnel management at present. The difficulties stem from a variety of factors, starting with flaws in the statutory framework. Standards of labour costs were unrealistic and unjustified, in most cases set by statistical methods or on the basis of trial and error. This affected the adequacy of remuneration of industrial workers which was pegged to performance. On the other hand, wages of white-collar employees, which were pegged to working hours, were based on universal indicators. A campaign for the introduction of a points-based assessment system was launched in the 1980s, but it was formal and reflected the status quo without suggesting any substantial changes. Approaches to remuneration have changed since 1990. A number of companies have reverted to the points-based assessment system. This system, however, is now applied on the basis of standards adjusted for industrial workers and white-collar employees after analysis by competent expert

170

Labour and Management

groups. There is also a tendency to standardize the pay systems on the basis of payment by time worked for all categories of personnel. The peculiarities of marketization have produced a set of problems concerning personnel administration The low solvency of many businesses is a particular problem. Insofar as the priority is on stabilization, businesses need funds for market, product, technological or organizational innovation in order to recover from their present plight. At the same time, they are under strong unionist pressure to raise wages. High unemployment notwithstanding, the trade unions have comparatively strong positions mainly due to two factors. The first factor is rising inflation and the cost of living. The second one is the substantial difference in pay between the state and private sectors, as well as in businesses within the state sector. As a rule, wages in the private sector are higher. The situation of state-owned companies also varies. There is a handful of wellperforming companies that pay high wages and a large number of businesses that can barely afford even minimum wage. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to develop a well-structured and justified remuneration system. The provision of healthy and safe working conditions has been underemphasized by many businesses under the conditions of marketization The provision of healthy and safe working conditions is one of the main social responsibilities of businesses. Those conditions depend on physicochemical and psychosocial factors. There are rules and standards which corporate and government inspectors are bound to supervise and control so as to avoid risks related to unfavourable factors in the physicochemical environment. The recession in production in the past few years has created preconditions for avoiding safety measures. Control is lax and problems of safety are ignored. This is illustrated by the rise in industrial accidents. Psychosocial factors have had a serious impact. This is an objective consequence of the manner of operation and nature of work in certain businesses: absence of clear prospects, job insecurity, random instructions, which leads to de-qualification, low pay etc. Matters are made worse by the subjectively inappropriate social skills of certain executives who do not ensure that well developed, normal communications with personnel occur, and

171

5.2 Personnel Administration

who intensify the sense of insecurity and lack of future prospects. Certain people are distressed, which has various negative consequences. Industrial relations have changed radically Industrial relations have perhaps changed more than anything else. Trade unions were formal for decades. Their representatives took part in bargaining on issues of procedures or specific matters (settlement of individual industrial disputes, pay systems etc.). In many cases, however, they sided with the management rather than the people they represented. The unions had a weak position and an insignificant role in industrial relations. Democratization and the socio-economic hardships of market transition have affected industrial relations strongly. Several unions have been set up, the largest being the Podkrepa [Support] Labour Confederation and the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria. They are upholding distinct political, economic and social objectives within the framework of tripartite cooperation. They are actively involved in collective bargaining on the corporate level which, due to the clash of management and unionist interests, is often not as cloudless as it used to be. Personnel participation in management has also grown - in certain cases, to unreasonable proportions under the influence of the insufficient experience and unfavourable economic and political situation in the country. Unionist pressure for changes in management and boards of directors in the first years of transition was typical in this respect. Industrial relations have been eventually regulated on the corporate level. On the national level, however, there is often confrontation that has also led to withdrawal from tripartite negotiations. Unionist activity has gradually waned. Despite the dismal situation resulting from high inflation and all-out pauperization of society, the unions have failed to win from the Government any benefits which would reduce the social cost of structural adjustment to bearable levels. The place and role of personnel administration has been changing, albeit slowly There are two major problems impeding the improvement of personnel management. First, personnel managers (heads of functional departments of personnel) plainly need to coordinate efforts and cooperate in order to pursue a

172

Labour and Management

single personnel policy. In many businesses, however, those departments do not have close ties and are headed by different people. Labour remuneration, the provision of healthy and safe working conditions, and social security are still within the jurisdiction of different departments that have weak ties with personnel departments and managers. This does not guarantee purposeful and co-ordinated action in personnel management. Those departments, even though independent, have common management in few businesses for the time being. Second, the status of personnel managers (vice president, director or deputy director) has been changing along with the integration of all personnel management activities. Earlier, personnel managers had a lower status and limited powers to effect administrative procedures on personnel management. Personnel departments had limited functions too. That was due to the pre-1989 political and economic system. Their status in betterperforming, modern businesses now equals that of other senior executives (marketing, production and other managers). This is essential if they are to be consulted in defining business strategies in view of their ties with human resources and if they are to actively participate in the formulation of personnel strategies and policies. In the years of transition to a market economy and the stagnation in production, closure of enterprises and structural adjustment, few businesses can afford to develop strategies on personnel development and increased fringe benefits. The majority of those who can are in the banking and information sectors. Borislava Kolchagova

REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Dimitrova, D. (1997) The Economic Reform and the Work of Women. In: N.Genov, Ed. Bulgaria - Today and Tomorrow. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, pp. 187-196 (in Bulgarian).

173

5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises

5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises

The period under consideration has seen substantial changes in the size and type of enterprises. They are the result of the impact of political and economic factors on the development of the Bulgarian economy by and since 1989. Among them, the changes in ownership are the most relevant. Production structures, types of production and market systems have changed. There have been substantial changes in the ownership of enterprises For decades, the vast majority of enterprises were state-owned, with a small proportion of cooperative businesses. There were state-owned enterprises in all leading sectors of the national economy: industry, construction, communications, transport, agriculture and forestry. Most cooperative enterprises were in light industry, food processing and agriculture, and were largely state-regulated. Following the passage of the Commercial Code and other statutory acts since the start of marketization, the structure of ownership has changed. The proportion of state enterprises is still large. Despite the launch of privatization, the reform is trudging along at a slow pace. Collective and individual firms have been set up as partnerships and sole proprietors. They are into various branches of production and services: housing construction, road transport, tourism, food-processing, finance and lending etc. Private trade, in particular, has flourished.. Following the initial growth in the private sector, enterprises have been faced with grave financial problems due to unfavourable political and economic factors The major problems concern economic legislation, inflation, unreliable markets, and government policies. As a result, some private businesses have gone bankrupt and others have merged - building companies, banks, hotels, restaurants, etc. The same factors have affected state-owned enterprises, which have run into grave financial troubles because of the high interest

174

Labour and Management

rate, foreign exchange rate and exorbitant production costs. Many are losing money and are heavily indebted, as a result of which some enterprises have been scheduled for liquidation. Despite the slow pace of privatization, the proportion of private businesses is tending to rise. The volume of output and services is of particular importance. In the decades prior to 1989, state enterprises had comparatively stable output. They accounted for almost the entire gross domestic product. Following the loss of traditional markets and due to the low competitiveness of many commodities, state production has plummeted and, in some cases, ground to a halt. Industrial enterprises in the fields of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and the electronics industry have been affected the worst. Meanwhile, newly established partnerships and sole proprietors have intensified their operations. Private companies in light industry and food processing are now rivalling state businesses in those sectors. More and more private companies are going into transportation, tourism, repair, insurance and other services. Most enterprises are small, but as a result of their large number and drop in production in the state sector, their share of output has grown and they have started playing a more important role in the economy. Many large enterprises have regressed to medium size because of declining production while the proportion of small private enterprises has increased With the change of ownership, the structure of enterprises by size has changed too. Size is estimated on the basis of various indicators: number of personnel, authorized capital, value of fixed assets, sales, etc. Inflation and post-1991 price liberalization have made it very hard to compare figures in a thirty-year period, therefore trends could be estimated mainly on the basis of number of personnel. This indicator is not very precise either, because of the role of automation. However, the level of automation has not changed much due to the lack of investment in the past few years. Under the statutory acts effective in Bulgaria, an enterprise qualifies as small if the number of personnel is under 50, and as medium-sized if it is under 200. Production grew between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s, thereby increasing the proportion of large enterprises. By 1987, many enterprises were integrated into state economic corporations that were virtual conglomerates. In the next two or three years, the separate enterprises gained economic independence. Quite a few of them employed 2,000 or

175

5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises

3,000 workers or even more. Some were medium-sized, and small enterprises were insignificant in number. Enterprises gradually started changing in size in the late 1980s. Declining production has forced many to cut jobs - in some cases, to a fraction of their pre-1989 level. As a result, those enterprises have regressed to medium size. Certain businesses with dwindling production are cutting working hours and laying workers off, but they are still over-staffed. Closure of money-losing enterprises will decrease the number of large and mediumsized operations. The number of small enterprises has increased in the course of development of the private sector. Nevertheless, they are still fewer than in the Western European countries, where small business employs more than 50% of job-holders. The situation varies from one industry to another: from 4% or 5% in some to less than 1% in others. The share of services has increased while industrial production has dropped Even though structural adjustment has yet to be launched, there have been pronounced industrial structural changes in the national economy in the years of marketization. The share of production in GDP has dropped in inverse proportion to that of services. From 1990 to 1993, the share of production decreased from 51.3% to 42.3%, whereas that of services rose from 31% to 48.4%. This trend stems from the growth in services and decline in industrial production. Notably, production structures in industry have tended to change for years. Surveys conducted between 1978 and 1990 show that the share of those employed in manufacturing fell from 43.3% to 38.4%, while that of services rose from 47.8% to 54.9%. These tendencies correspond to the growth in employment in services that started in the industrialized countries decades ago. Due to the drastic fall in industrial production, the past few years have also seen a rise in the share of employment in agriculture from 17.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1995. Mass and large-batch production has dwindled The type of production has also changed in the long period under consideration. For years, chemical and mechanical engineering plants manufactured uniform products in a large series. Other enterprises (manufacturing electric

176

Labour and Management

engines, gear pumps, etc.) put out a large variety of products. Most, however, were engaged in medium-batch and even small-batch production. Despite the short products list and smaller series, the aggregate output of many was large - hence the considerable proportion of large enterprises. The general stagnation in industrial production since the late 1980s has changed the type of production in many enterprises. The loss of solid markets, confusion of managers in the new economic conditions, terms of lending, fiscal policy and many other political and economic factors have forced many enterprises to struggle for survival. Some still have chances to sell certain products. Others are managing to produce on a haphazard basis. Enterprises with mass and large-batch production have almost died out. Small-batch and piece production has gradually come to prevail. Trends in the improvement of production systems that emerged in the late 1980s have held only in certain industries There are contradictory trends in the development of the type of production systems. Production grew in the 20 years after 1965, acquiring mass and large-batch proportions in certain industries. This enabled the introduction of assembly lines specializing in the manufacture of uniform products, their components being installed in the sequence of the production process. Manual labour originally prevailed in assembly lines, the majority of which were in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and the electronic industry, as well as in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries and food processing. With the growth of automation, automated assembly lines were introduced in other industries as well. Certain enterprises engaged in largeand medium-serial production fitted out sections which resembled assembly lines by specialization and spatial arrangement but, due to lack of synchronization, were not as effective. In line with the prevalent medium-batch and small-batch type of production, many enterprises had technological sections comprising uniform elements handling uniform technological processes. Prerequisites for changes in the types of production system appeared in the mid-1980s. They were associated with the growing mechanization and automation of production processes, changes in the nature of work, the increase of continuity of discreet product lines, the reliability and flexibility of production systems, the high quality of output and the diversification of industrial labour. Their development proceeded from the need to surmount the disadvantages of assembly lines (low flexibility, monotony, pace of the

177

5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises

conveyor belt, etc.) and of technological sections (strong discontinuity of processes, long cycle time, sizeable work-in-progress production, etc.). Production systems changed in several directions. Flow-line production was improved through automation, increasing the proportion of automated assembly lines. There was no substantial progress in this respect. Assembly lines were replaced by so-called cluster assembly, where production systems were made up of individual models with large sets of operations in assembling individual units. These changes diversified labour and increased their level of independence and responsibility. Those systems were also applied only to certain types of products (such as metal tools, etc.). The introduction of programme-controlled machines and robotization enabled enterprises to introduce flexible production systems Even though they numbered a only few dozen, they varied considerably from individual flexible modules to comprehensive production systems processing cylindrical and prismatic-corpus units, as well as flexible assembly lines. Notably, certain designs were not appropriate and the efficiency of part of the flexible production systems was not high. The unfavourable changes in industrial production have affected the state of production systems themselves. Those in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering and the electronics industry (with several exceptions) have not developed further and, moreover, are under-utilized. Production systems in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries have remained at the same level, and new automated assembly lines have been introduced with the growth of private food processing. Improvement of production systems has been very limited since 1990. Borislava Kolchagova

178

Labour and Management REFERENCES

Chankova, L. (1995) Structure of Accumulations in Bulgaria: Trends, Problems and Prospects. Ikonomicheska Misul, No. 4 (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Genova, T. (1995) Tolling Polls' or How CEOs Form Their Responses in Regular Official Polls in Industry. Statistika, No. 6 (in Bulgarian). Ivanova, L. (1995) Small Enterprises and Their Place in the Structure of the Pharaceutical Industry. Statistika, No. 1 (in Bulgarian). Matev, M. (1995) Material Resources and Branch Structural Changes in the Economy of Bulgaria. Ikonomicheska Misul, No. 2 (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Registered Business Entities by Legal Status and Type, by December 31 Type Total, inch Sole trader (sole proprietorship) Single-member limited liability company Single-member joint-stock company General pertnership (including juristic persons) General partnership (natural persons only) Limited liability company (including juristic persons) Limited liability company (natural persons only) Joint-stock company (joint-stock firm) Cooperative State-owned firm (Decree 56) Municipal firm (Decree 56) Public-organization firm (Decree 56) Joint-venture firm (Decree 56)

1993

1994

368 703 273 194

454 963

508 429

341 818

7711

12 025

383 328 17 021

392 414 36 728

508 418 36 769

547 344 34 439

1 189

1 882

2416

11 867 941

20 005

28 655

1391

1983

4 545 1458 1515 1 558 597

5 739 1 097 1036 778

6 495 776 459 554

878

402

1995

Source: Statistical Handbook 1996 (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.200 (In Bulgarian).

179

5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises

Table 2. Registered Business Entities with Majority Public Interests by December 31 * Branch 1993 1994 1995 Total 38 779 42 087 41984 Industry 3 971 3 972 3 798 Construction 1270 1 313 1 106 Agriculture and forestry 4 499 5 549 5 367 641 594 Transport and communications 651 Trade 3 386 3 433 3 422 Other branches of material production 654 627 558 Public utility services 281 289 408 Science and technology 833 787 643 Education 9 110 962 8 902 Culture and the arts 5 051 5 158 5 043 Health care, social welfare, physical culture, 4 024 4 174 4 210 sports and tourism Finance, lending and insurance 792 838 938 Other branches in non-material sphere 4 107 6 394 6 995 * incl. business entities with mixed and other form of ownership (excl. private) Source: Statistical Handbook 1996(1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 202 (in Bulgarian). Table 3. Registered Business Entities with Majority Private Interests by December 31 Branch Total Industry Construction Agriculture and forestry Transport and communications Trade Other branches of material production Health care, social welfare, physical culture, sports and tourism Public utility services Other branches in non-material sphere

1993 329 924 40 160 13 889 10 762 29 633 204 630 7 409

1994 412 562 52 194 18 193 10 643 36 146 256 490 9 846

1995 466 445 61 121 22 422 9 963 40 441 285 543 12 692

3 523

4 444

5 195

7 941 11977

10 270 14 336

12 672 16 396

Source: Statistical Handbook 1996 (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 203 (in Bulgarian).

6 SOCIAL STRATIFICATION

6.1 Occupational Status

The period between 1960 and 1995 was marked by two radically different stratification systems. Between 1960 and 1989 the stratification system was relatively stable. Its major groups were the industrial and agricultural workers, the salaried employees and the intelligentsia. The share of private entrepreneurs was insignificant. The major changes in these decades were connected with the intensive urbanization. Territorial mobility was due to the metamorphosis of agricultural into urban workers. Changes in status were associated mostly with the relatively better living conditions in bigger settlements. Substantial changes in the occupational status and stratification hierarchy came about during the nineties. The size of the economically active population decreased. The share ofpeople employed in trade and finances increased. A new stratum of private entrepreneurs appeared. Social structures and processes had a double status between 1960 and 1989 Three decades (1960-1989) of Bulgaria's contemporary history have the basic features of development dominated by a state socialist regime. This lends the country specificity that makes it hard to apply classical stratification approaches used in Western societies (Lemel et al., 1993). At the same time, it would be wrong to ignore any considerable stratification changes and to regard Bulgarian society as simply being divided in a party-and-state nomenklatura and everything else. Social structures in the period were not entirely paralyzed and petrified. Thus, in the early 1960s the official version claimed that there was "victory of collectivization in agriculture and socialist production relations". Decoded, this also entailed formal equalization of the status of "collectivized farmers" and that of state industrial workers, insofar as land became de

181

6.1 Occupational Status

jure and de facto state property. However, what is of greater relevance to social stratification of Bulgarian society in those thirty years is the simultaneous existence of the stratification system on three levels: propagandaideological, pragmatic or stratal, and class-conflict. The propagandaideological level was presented in the reports and speeches of party and state leaders. This doctrine survived right until the end of the 1980s: the working class is "hegemon", the peasants are its "comrade and ally", and the stratum of the "intelligentsia" "gravitates" to them. The actual social stratification was thus distorted and concealed, and the thesis of so-called socialist "equality" was advanced. The level of stratal inequality presents the social pyramid as a hierarchical sequence of social strata, from the party-and-state elite down to unskilled manual workers in industry and agriculture (Tilkidjiev, 1989: 168-175, 200-220). This is a rational, pragmatic view, even though in essence it is largely a social-occupational classification of employees in the state sector. This is natural insofar as the "second" and the "shadow" economies were either wiped out or underdeveloped. According to a representative national survey, in early 1986 a mere 0.61% of the population aged over 16 had the status of private business persons (Towns and Villages, 1986). The third, class-conflict level of stratification focuses on the dichotomous social-class antagonism between ruled and rulers, superiors and subordinates, privileged and disenfranchised etc. The main axis of stratification is in this case evident in the quite different social status of and conflict between the party-and-state nomenklatura and the mass of subordinate intellectuals, workers, salaried employees, private businessmen, etc. Revealing deep mechanisms and layers of the previous society, this concept came into open or covert conflict with the official propaganda-ideological doctrine. The class model of Soviet-type society was described with documentary precision (Voslensky, 1984), even though the idea of the birth of "the new class", of the nomenklatura as successor to the organization of "professional revolutionaries" was also implied at least by Lenin in What Is To Be Done? Although it "simplifies" the complicated stratification picture, the class-conflict variant discloses the axis of the conflict and makes inequality more comprehensible to the mass consciousness, along with the possible course and outcome of the conflict. This variant is updated at times of acute crisis and deficit of social trust. The clash between the interests of nomenklatura and intellectuals played an important part in the climaxing of the stratification conflict (Dahrendorf, 1992). An unambiguous distinction

182

Social Stratification

should be made between the three variants of stratification in order to get a more accurate picture of the society that existed until recently. In the mid nineties it is still difficult to make an unambiguous appraisal of the transformations in the stratification system At least the overthrow of the monopoly of political power as the definitive stratification factor remains unquestionable, along with the transition to more autonomous social structures. The transition is also marked by destruction of the guaranteed, albeit low, consumption and by mass pauperization of broad social strata - in particular, pensioners and public employees. In their overwhelming majority, the former middle strata have descended to and below the poverty line. Among the present small elite, reproductive processes categorically prevail over circulatory processes, i.e. the stratification privilege has in most cases been inherited from the previous society. Figuratively speaking, in the mass consciousness of Bulgarians the social pyramid of stratification is like an oval brandy bottle with a short slender neck. In other words, there is a tiny elite on the top, few people from the top to the middle, and a majority of all the others distributed in several equal levels from the middle to the bottom. Along with the 11% who identify themselves with the lowest position, over 85% of the population said in 1993 that they belong to the strata under the presumed mean of prosperity, from 5 to 9 on a vertical scale of 1 to 10 (Social Inequality, 1993). Before 1989, the majority of the Bulgarian population had the social status of immediate producers of material goods According to the representative survey on "Towns and Villages - 86" conducted in the mid-1980s, this status had 73.7% of the Bulgarian population. These were the workers in industry, construction, agriculture, forestry, trade, transport and other branches of the economy. More than two thirds of the whole population (70.2%) had the status of medium- and low-skilled workers. Compared with 1968 and an analogical representative survey, there is a relatively high increase of urban workers. Their percentage of the whole population rose by 17.2%, whereas that of agricultural workers (or, rather, those registered in 1968 as "cooperative-farm members") declined by 20%. This is due to the nationalization of cooperative property and the respective transformation of cooperative farms, or TKZS, to agro-industrial complexes, or APK), as well as to the substantial shift of manpower away from agricultural and into industrial labour in particular. These processes were condu-

183

6.1 Occupational Status

cive to the deterioration of employment in agriculture (depopulation of the countryside) and to the development of a specific "semi-rural" image of a number of urban social groups, as well as of workers in industry and trade, and groups of salaried employees. By 1986, agricultural and forest workers comprised half of the workers in the other branches of the economy. Considering that 14.4% of those agricultural and forest workers were pensioners, the group constituted a mere 8.9% per cent of working-age persons vs the total labour force. The ratio of rural to urban population was inverted: from 75.3:24.7 in 1946 to a "mirror" ratio of 32.9:67.1 in 1992 (Table 1). This was mainly due to the accelerated industrialization of the country in line with the Eastern European model of exclusive priority of heavy industry. Agricultural workers may be aptly presented and analyzed in two main groups: the first includes all unskilled and low-skilled workers in agriculture and forestry (19.3% by 1986), and the second, all medium- and highlyskilled agricultural and forest workers, or in brief, "skilled agricultural workers": 4.04%. The third relatively largest social category after workers are salaried employees. There are two distinct categories of "salaried employees" depending on the nature and content of their labour and, respectively, their social status. Low-qualified salaried employees are people with executory routine ancillary jobs of an elementary nature, usually with secondary education or less (e.g. cashiers, clerks, secretaries, technical assistants, booking clerks etc.). The survey found that they were 3.5% of the population. "Skilled salaried employees" are also people of executory ancillary labour but of a more complicated nature, covering a wider range and independent decision-making in concrete situations; as a rule, they have secondary or college education (laboratory assistants, nurses, accountants, mechanics, programmers, planners, librarians, bibliographers etc.). In 1986, 14.4% of Bulgaria's population had this social status. The fourth relatively largest social category is the intelligentsia. In 1986 it comprised 7.5% of the population. Those are the people of complicated creative intellectual (including organizational or managerial) labour that creates, propagates and applies certain intellectual products and values, and who generally have higher education (doctors, teachers, engineers, architects, economists, journalists, executives etc.). It is a shortcoming in this case that the intelligentsia is regarded as an integral whole, not by its princi-

184

Social Stratification

pal groups or strata (no distinction is made between the executive and the cultural elite). The percentage of private producers, artisans and dealers in the mid1980s was insignificant. For details on the ratios between the separate categories and groups in relative and absolute terms see Tables 2, 3 and 4. The differences in the figures from the representative survey and statistical censuses are due to differences in the criteria of distinguishing between categories, as well as to the fact that the figures from the representative survey cover both the economically active and the unemployed over age 16, whereas the statistical findings are representative of the whole economically active population. Upward vertical social mobility was comparatively low after the Second World War About 90% of the low- and medium-skillled agricultural and forest workers, and 86% of medium-skilled urban workers (who made up 70.2% of the entire Bulgarian population) by 1986 came from the same groups of low- and medium-skilled urban and rural workers. In the period, a mere 13.2% changed their status substantially - those who were born to blue-collar families and acquired the status of skilled salaried employees or intellectuals. In this sense, the myth of "the progressive prosperity of ordinary people" does not have a solid empirical basis. The major change in these decades was the intensive urbanization and, respectively, the change of residence: i.e. especially territorial mobility, the metamorphosis of agricultural into urban workers. The change in status was associated mostly with the relatively better living conditions in bigger settlements (supply and trade, transport, greater job and wage security, cultural and educational establishments, better-developed infrastructure etc.). There was a social group homogeneity of persons vis-a-vis their family partners and milieu. The most closed and self-reproductive groups were the two polar opposites in the social hierarchy: the intelligentsia and the lowskilled workers. Substantial changes in the occupational status and stratification hierarchy came about during the nineties 1. A considerable decrease took place in the.economically active population, the employed included: from 51.7% in 1985 to 38.6% in 1992. The main reasons are the ethnic emigration of Bulgarian Turks to the Republic

185

6.1 Occupational Status

of Turkey, economic emigration to the West, closure of a number of production units, as well as the processes of ageing (cf. Table 8, as well as Tables 5 and 7). The number of people employed in science and research services has plummeted, a considerable part having emigrated to the West or changed occupation. 2. A parallel increase took place in the branches of trade, as well as finance, lending and insurance. In 1992, 9% of the employed were occupied in finance, lending and insurance, and 8.3% in trade, both figures having risen since then (Table 5). 3. A gradual increase was registered in the percentage of people employed in the private sector. In 1992, the latter accounted for 14.1% of all employed - mostly in agriculture and trade (Table 6). The share of the privately employed in banking, lending and insurance has risen markedly in the past few years. 4. A dramatic rise in the percentage of working-age unemployed marked the 1990-1994 period. By 1989, that category practically was not registered - there were only "temporarily not employed" (officially 0.7% by 1985). By 1993, 16% of the economically active population qualified as unemployed. More than half of them had secondary education and were aged 20 to 48. High unemployment may be expected to exist further, insofar as there have been no fast and radical structural reforms in the economy. 5. Along with unemployment, unquestionable pauperization of quite broad social strata came about. Declining living standards are particularly typical of the former middle strata (mass professions of the intelligentsia and salaried employees in state budget-subsidized offices). Pauperization is most dramatic in the case of the retired, who approximate a quarter of the nation. At the same time, the present poverty of Bulgarians specifically has two or three levels of internalization in the mass consciousness. Except for about 11% who think they have hit "rock bottom", the lowest level on the scale of prosperity, the poverty of the others consists of the lack of income above the subsistence level (sustenance and housing bills) that would have ensured a better quality and style of life. This widespread shortage of money and impossibility of living a fuller and more comfortable life have been fuelling mass feelings of uncertainty, insecurity and nostalgia for the erstwhile "provision" of the guaranteed minimum standard of living. 6. Different groups are represented in the small elite of present social stratification, but the former party-and-state nomenklatura dominates by a

186

Social Stratification

wide margin. In more abstract terms, the self-reproductive processes of the elite, the result of continuity and inheritance of a former stratification privilege, prevail over the circulatory processes. In a survey on the economic elite conducted in 1994, a total of 77.2% of these respondents openly declared their previous or recent membership of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (successor to the former communist party), about 19% said they have no political commitments, and just 3% noted that they were in other political organizations1. The empirical findings indicate the substantial presence (via the transformation of political into economic power) of that "new" (old) elite, naturally in the appropriate externally legitimate form (this elite is not infrequently represented officially by confidants, other relatives, former security service agents, etc.). Among other, far less significant, groups in the elite are owners of restituted property and leaders of the main political forces represented in Parliament. Insofar as a proper market economy has not been developed yet, the administrative and bureaucratic elite, i.e. the managements of the central institutions of the executive and judiciary, also have quite considerable influence, income and prestige. 7. At present, almost all Bulgarians rate themselves somewhere between the "middle class" and the "needy". Less than 1% think they belong to the "upper class". About one in four have the self-confidence of the middle class, whereas the majority (63%) identify with the low scale of society (Table 9). The hierarchy of socio-occupational prestige is topped by the categories of high-paid but also highly responsible and skilled intellectual labour that is also associated, in an officially authorized and legitimate way, with a high, leading position of power (this dispels suspicions of the source of high income which, for instance, "mar" the prestige rating of private business persons). Thus the most prestigious categories are those of Supreme Court judges, lawyers, CEOs or owners of big companies, and government ministers. Yannick Lemel's rule that in France liberal professions (e.g. lawyers) are held in high esteem and that there is a correspondence between the hierarchy of workers in terms of training and of prestige is valid for Bulgaria as well. Nikolai Tilkidjiev

187

6.1 Occupational Status NOTES:

^The survey polled a representative sample of directors and deputy directors of production units and almost all bank governors, government ministers, deputy ministers and department heads at the economic ministries.

REFERENCES Darendorf, R. (1992) The Modern Social Conflict. Oxford. Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of the Economically Active Population, vol 2 (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, (in Bulgarian). Empirical Social Survey "Towns and Villages" , March 1986. Lemel, Y., T. Caplow, H. Noll, W. Glatzer (1993) Semi-annual meeting of the International Research Group Comparative Charting of Social Change Group, Berlin, pp.2-16. Social Inequality. A Representative Survey (1993). Socioeconomic Profile of the Population of Bulgaria (Findings from a 2% Sample) (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book (1993) National Statistical Institute, Sofia, (in Bulgarian). Tilkidjiev, N. (1989) Social Groups. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Towns and Villages. Empirical Sociological Survey, Vol. 2 (1986) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Voslensky, M. (1984) Nomenklatura. London.

188

Social Stratification

Table 1. Population by census Year of census 1887 1900 1934 1946 1955 1965 1975 1985 1992

Total (WO)

M('OOO)

F (WO)

3 154 3744 6078 7029 7614 8228 8728 8949 *8473

1605 1909 3054 3517 3800 4 114 4358 4432 4163

1 549 1835 3024 3512 3814 4114 4370 4516 4310

% of urban from total population 18.8 19.8 21.4 24.7 33.6 46.5 58.0 64.8 67.1

Note: * The decrease is due to the 1989 exodus ot Bulgarian citizens or Turkish ethnic selfidentity to the Republic of Turkey and the economic emigration to the West after late 1989. Source: Statistical Reference Book (1993) National Statistical Institute, Sofia, p. 30 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Population by social categories Social category Social group Workers incl: Low- skilled workers Medium-skilled workers Highly-skilled workers Agricultural and forest workers include: Low-skilled and unskilled agricultural and forest workers Skilled agricultural workers Salaried employees incl: Low-skilled salaried employees Skilled salaried employees Intelligentsia Private business persons Others (incl liberal professions and not indicated) Total: Source: Empirical Social Survey "Towns and Villages", March 1986. Economically Active and Unemployed.

% 50.38 16.14 31.03 3.21 23.28

19.27 4.04 17,88 3.47 14.41 7.51 0.61 0.34 100.00

189

6.1 Occupational Status

Table 3. Percentage of labour force by sex and social group Social group

Workers Salaried employees (incl intellectuals) Cooperative-farm members * Others Total:

1965

1975

1985

total

M

F

total

M

F

total

M

F

41.1

46.0

34.9

65.2

68.4

61.5

68.5

73.3

63.4

16.2

16.9

15.3

26.2

24.3

28.5

29.7

25.4

34.3

38.7 4.0 100.0

32.9 4.2 100.0

46.2 3.6

6.7 1.9

5.7 1.6

7.9 2.1

1.8

1.3

2.3

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Note: * The "extinction" of this category is associated with the transformation of cooperative farms (collectively owned) into agro-industrial complexes (de facto state-owned), in the course of which former cooperative-farm members are classified in the general group of workers. Source: Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile of the Economically Active Population, vol 2 (1988) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p. 11 (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Employment in National Economy by Branch Branch

1985

1990*

1991

1992

Total

4459530

4 096 848

3 564 037

3 112900

Material production incl: industry construction agriculture Non-production sphere incl.: public utility services science and research services finance, lending, insurance

3 664 893 3 279 993 1 662 167 1 498 323 374 652 336 657 735 159 909 961 794 637 816855 91 710 97297 81237 90918 24579 22123

2816 153 1 229 898 252619 679 009 747 884 80163 67418 27044

2 403 400 1 056 800 205 700 541 900 709 500 74000 52900 33600

Note: * The decrease in the number of employed is due foremost to emigration to the Republic of Turkey and the West, as well as the closure of a number of productions and production units after 1989. Source: Statistical Reference Book (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Sofia, p. 62 (in Bulgarian).

190

Social Stratification

Table 5. Population under, of and post working age (by 4 Dec. 1992)*

%

Population Under, of and Postworking Age* Total Under working age Of working age Postworking age In towns Under working age Of working age Postworking age In villages Under working age Of working age Postworking age

19.9 55.7 24.5 21.3 59.6 19.1 16.9 47.5 35.5

Number

Incl. women

8 472 724 1 682 057 4715364 2 075 303 5687013 1210450 3 391 454 1 085 109 2785711 471 607 1323910 990 194

4 309 447 814613 2 230 036 1 264 798 2902918 586 326 1 646 536 670 056 1 406 529 228 287 583 500 594 742

Note: * Under working age: males and females under 15; of working age: males 16 to 59, females 16 to 54; postworking age: males over 60, females over 55. Source: Statistical Reference Book (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Sofia, 1993, p. 31.

Table 6. Population by residence, sex and economic activity Economic activity Residence and sex Total Men

Women In towns Men

Women In villages Men

Women

Year of census

Total

Employed

1895 1992 1895 1992 1895 1992 1895 1992

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

51.7 38.6 54.7 41.0 48.7 36.2 53.9 41.3

1895 1992 1895 1992 1895 1992 1895 1992 1895 1992

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

56.1 43.3 51.7 39.4 47.6 33.0 52.1 36.4 43.2 29.7

Temporarily not employed 0.7

Unemployed

7.4

0.6 7.4 0.8 7.3 0.6

7.1

0.5 6.9 0.7 0.8

7.3 7.9

0.7 8.4 0.9 7.3

Inactive

47.6 54.0 44.7 51.6 50.5 56.4 45.5 51.6 43.4 49.8 47.6 53.2 51.6 59.1 47.1 55.2 55.9 63.0

Source: Socioeconomic Profile of the Population of Bulgaria (Findings from a 2% Sample) (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 28 (in Bulgarian).

191

6.1 Occupational Status

Table 7. Group self-identification Main classes (self-identification) Low class Working class Middle class Upper class

Of them Total

Labour-force participants

Unemployed

Retired

19.6 43.0 28.5 0.8

17.6 57.2 53.1 *

19.7 10.2 9.5

57.1 29.5 24.6

Won't say

0.3

Don't know

6.0

Didn't answer

1.8

Total

100.0

Note: * Breakdowns of other categories omitted as statistically irrelevant. Source: Social Inequality. A Representative Survey (1993).

192

Social Stratification

6.2 Social Mobility

Social mobility between 1960 and 1995 is in line with the general trends in the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. They are mainly determined by four groups of factors: 1) collectivization, nationalization and augmentation in agriculture; 2) nationalization of industrial property; 3) intensive Soviet-type industrialization, and 4) growth of bureaucracy in all spheres of public activity and the establishment of a specific administrative-executive apparatus specializing in the political-ideological and economic domination of society. Total and structural mobility culminated at the start of the 1960-1995 period Mobility dropped to a record low by the mid-1980s, then rose slightly in the 1990s. Circulation (net) mobility remained relatively steady throughout the period. It, too, was lowest in 1986. The openness of the whole structure developed along similar lines as total mobility, but at a lower level. The least open (most self-reproductive) group was that of intellectuals, and the most open one (with hardly any status inheritance), was that of proprietors. Studies of social mobility in Bulgarian sociology, as in the other exsocialist countries except Hungary and Poland, lagged behind international standards and did not correspond to the role they play in research on social structure (Dimitrov, 1988). The lag was due foremost to the fact that the problem of social mobility appeared and developed in sociology within the paradigm of the functionalist theory of social stratification, which was in contradiction with the Marxist theory of classes and class struggle. Hence its relatively late and slow application in studies of the social structure of Bulgarian society. This led to a lag in methodology and empirical research. Either way, after a specialized statistical survey on social mobility conducted by the central statistical office in 1967 (Atanassov, Mashiakh, 1969), indicators of it were present in all major national representative surveys on the social structure. The analysis of the data was biased, the prime objective

193

6.2 Social Mobility

being to prove the thesis of the approximation of classes and social groups under socialism. There is considerable empirical information revealing social mobility as mechanism of social inequality The analysis of social mobility in the period can be based on four surveys, carried out in 1967, 1977 and 1986 (secondary analysis), and primary analysis of data from 1990 (Figure 1). We will consider mobility in an intergenerational manner, comparing the social status of respondents with that of their fathers, and on the level of macrosocial groups: intellectuals, salaried employees, workers, peasants and proprietors. 1. The main indicators of social mobility (Chart 1) show that total, structural and circulation mobility peaked in the first period. This is also true of mobility gauged by the indicator of the hypothetical level of total mobility calculated by the equal-opportunity method (Rogoff, 1953). By that indicator, more than three quarters of all respondents have not inherited their parent's social status. This percentage almost equals the hypothetical level of total mobility (95% of the latter), which is the highest indicator in all four periods under consideration. This is largely due to the highest level of structural mobility in those years, 50.4%, or more than 65% of total mobility. In 1977 and 1986 it was 28%, rising in 1990 to 61.4%. This resulted from the completion of the processes of nationalization and collectivization and Stalinist-type intensive industrialization precisely by the mid-1960s. In terms of social group structure, the main implication of those results was the annihilation of the largest group in traditional Bulgarian society, private peasants, followed by private dealers and artisans. In 1968, those groups comprised 1.7% of the whole social structure (Dimitrov, 1974:35). The indicators of circulation mobility are consistent with those trends. They are quite close, on a level that is slightly above one quarter of the population (except 1986). The insignificant changes in the indicator over this quite long period of time evidently suggest a clear trend in society during socialism. The free exchange between the categories in the structure, based on personal and individual qualities and achievements, did not intensify and, except in 1977, was lower than structural mobility as a rule All of the figures indicate two plain trends. Mobility plunged in the 19671986 period. This trend was more pronounced in the first half of the period.

194

Social Stratification

Circulation mobility also dropped to a record low in 1986. Notably, the figures for 1977 and 1990 were almost equal. Besides, there was a certain period during socialism when there were greater opportunities for individual achievement independent of the structural transformations. The reverse trend in 1990 is due not only to the change of November, 1989 but also to the various pre-1989 forms of "perestroika" that at least partly opened certain channels of mobility through the drive for reform of the system. 2. The link between the processes of change in the social structure and total mobility can be measured more or less accurately (Charvat, 1972). The first period, until 1967, saw intensifying asymmetry, the main destination of outflow from all other categories being those of workers and co-operative farmers: by a concentration of mobility. Emigration and immigration indicators suggest that intergenerational outflow from the categories of parents in that period was more even among all categories than inflow in the categories of "children." In the second period, the changes in structure were again asymmetrical, but to a lesser extent. Typically, emigration from the categories of fathers was more even, whereas immigration remained concentrated. The trends generally remained the same in 1986, except for the decrease in emigration of the concentrated type. By 1990, the asymmetry in the structure of respondents exceeded that of their parents. The tendency towards asymmetry of the structures flagged considerably, whereas social mobility became less concentrated as a result of increasing evenness in inflow in the categories of "children." Application of Charvat's method to the four periods in question indicates three interconnected trends. First, whereas in 1967 the mobility structure of parents outstripped that of children, in time they were not only equalized, but the ratio eventually reverted "in favour" of "children." Second, changes in the structure were directed towards diminishing asymmetry (with a slight fluctuation in 1986) throughout the 1960-1995 period. At the same time, for this trend towards slow down to have taken place, inflow in certain categories of respondents ought to have been more concentrated. 3. We can measure the changes in the openness of social groups and the whole structure between 1960 and 1995 by the Yasuda index (Yasuda, 1964). The index is based on circulation mobility only, i.e. it eliminates the part of mobility due to structural changes. The index equals 1 when the exchange of persons of a certain origin with the other socio-occupational categories equals that in the perfect-mobility model. Table 1 shows the index by

195

6.2 Social Mobility

social group and for the whole structure. The figures indicate that the whole structure was quite open in three of the four periods under consideration. The very high level in 1967 dropped steadily, the 1986 index of approximately 0.5 suggesting a rather low level of openness. It subsequently intensified, reaching the 1977 level by 1990. The opportunities for free intergenerational exchange between macrosocial groups were greatest in the early 1960s and diminished thereafter On the social group level, the most open group was that of proprietors as a result of its annihilation in the first period of socialism and subsequent marginalization. Of the real groups in the period, the most open one was that of workers due to its pronounced growth as a result of intensive industrialization with a priority on heavy industry. The high openness of the group of salaried employees is also very typical of developments in the country in the period. On the one hand, this could be attributed to the normal growth of the services sector in the second half of the 20th century. Yet, on the other, it ensued from the way in which socialism functioned and materialized: total control over all spheres of public affairs. This would be impossible without the establishment of a specific bureaucratic stratum. Ultimately, both workers and salaried employees were the groups that were most indicative of and epitomized the social-group structure of socialism. The group of intellectuals lagged noticeably behind the above two categories, with comparatively low openness. The group of peasants was the least open of all groups (and very low in absolute terms as well). Interestingly, it started with very high openness in 1967, eventually decreasing to a very low level in 1990. At the start of the period this was due to nationalization in agriculture, and subsequently to its recession and collapse. The figures show another interesting fact too: the white-collar groups (intellectuals and salaried employees) were the most open in 1977 when intergenerational barriers between the groups of manual and non-manual labour were lowest. The last typical trend is the steady upward mobility of workers, with a slight fluctuation in 1986. This is the group of origin from which it was relatively easiest to move to another group. At the same time, the group of workers was the easiest destination of the other groups. Tsocho Zlatkov

196

Social Stratification

REFERENCES Atanassov A., G. Mashiakh (1969) Social Origin of the Employed. Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Dimitrov, K. (1974) Changes in the Social-Class Structure in the Years of People's Power. Sotsiologichesli Problemi, p.35-40 (in Bulgarian). Charvat, F. (1972) Towards a Theory and Qualitative Expression of Social Mobility. International Review of Sociology, series II, Vol. VIII, Nl. Rogoff, N. (1953) Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility. Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press. Yasuda, S. (1964) A Methodological Inquiry into Social Mobility. Americal Sociological Review, N 1.

Table 1. Major social groups in Bulgarian society 1967-1990 1967

1977

1986

1990

Workers

0.55

0.74

0.64

0.89

Peasants

1.05

0.57

0.28

0.30

Salaried employees

0.55

0.82

0.69

0.70

Intellectuals

-

0.61

0.47

0.53

Proprietors

-

0.94

0.79

1.00

0.85

0.70

0.53

0.70

Whole structure

197

6.2 Social Mobility

Figure 1. Major types of social mobility

Sources: Statistical representative survey on the social origin of the employed conducted by the State Statistical Administration in 1967. A survey on the social-class structure of Bulgarian society conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1977). The Town and the Village '86 Empirical Sociological Survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Social-Group Differences and Social-Group Identity Survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in 1990.

198

Social Stratification

6.3 Economic Inequality

Until the late 1980s, the main determinants of economic inequality were the positions in the structure of power, the governmentregulated wages and income from the family plot. Economic inequality has increased in the transition to a market economy since 1989. The changed socio-economic situation has added factors with a potential to create greater inequality. Against the background of largescale pauperization, a fraction of society has grown rich. Economic inequality did not stem from inequality in ownership of the means of production, but from inequality in the ownership of consumer goods State ownership prevailed in Bulgaria from the end of the Second World War to 1989. Private ownership was basically abolished in industry, services and agriculture.The state was the sole employer, and the main source of employment was the public sector. Labour force participation of individuals and households, along with the bulk of their incomes, were determined and regulated by the state. It guaranteed both the incomes and the employment of the able-bodied population. The state was not guided by economic criteria only, but also by the political objectives and interests of the ruling nomenklatura, as well as by the values of the dominant ideology. The priorities in the separate branches of the national economy were relevant, along with the political and ideological importance of each class and social group. The position in the structures of power was a major factor determining the economic resources of individuals and groups in that period Under the conditions of state ownership of the means of production and total state regulation of the economy, the position of each individual and group in the structure of power was an important resource that also defined their economic status. This factor was relevant for the access it ensured to

199

6.3 Economic Inequality

wealth which was off-limits to those outside power, rather than for the wages it provided. The incomes of the social stratum that practically ruled Bulgaria - the party elite, economic and administrative nomenklatura - were classified and not reported in statistical sources. The nomenklatura got a large part of their income in the form of various funds, benefits and privileges rather than wages - the purchase of food, cars, housing, convertible currency, holidays at recreation homes etc., at lower prices than the rest of the population. The wage was an important source, regulator and indicator of economic inequality by the late 1980s The actual wage was, on the one hand, based on market principles and economic mechanisms and, on the other, was strongly influenced by ideological considerations. It was the state that distributed the national wealth, set and regulated wages in all categories of employment and the economic inequality between them. The dominant ideology maintained that the working class was the pillar of society and its wages corresponded to the high appraisal of its labour. That held good for workers in the heavy industries and construction, in particular. Yet ideological theses notwithstanding, it was not the workers but the ruling circles who got the highest wages. Despite certain fluctuations, from 1980 to 1992 average annual wages were consistently higher in the following branches of the national economy: government, construction, transport, other branches of the non-material sector, other branches of material production, and industry. Farm labour was regarded as less prestigious than industrial labour, and unlike industry, agriculture was not a priority in economic development. That is why farm workers were among the worst underpaid (Table 1). The "intelligentsia" was seen as a social stratum which came from the working class and peasants, and whose vocation was to serve their interests. Hence intellectuals were paid considerably less than quite a few groups of industrial workers. The figures on the general income of households show (Table 3 in 12.1 Personal and Household Income) that the households of salaried employees and intellectuals counted principally on their wage as their main source of income. The wage had a higher share in the general income of households of salaried employees and intellectuals, and respectively the lowest share in that of farmer households. This confirms the economic inequality between the abovementioned households, based on the difference in their income sources.

200

Social Stratification

The private sector survived mostly in the area of services, but its share was negligible. There are few, if any, figures on the incomes of the privately employed and free-lancers. Despite the tough restrictions imposed by the state, those incomes were comparatively higher than wages in the public sector. Income from the family plot of land was an important source of economic inequality The family land plot, albeit strictly controlled and regulated by the state, was an important source of income in the centralized planned economy. Agricultural workers got sizeable proceeds from the family plot, which increased their incomes notably. That was valid not only for households of agricultural workers, but also for the other groups of rural households that got income from their family plots. That gave social strata with the above source of income an advantage over the others. The trend has gathered momentum since the start of the painful transition to a market economy in 1989. The 1993 figures on distribution of households by place of residence and per capita annual income show that the share of peasants in the highest income brackets exceeds that of urban residents (Statistical Yearbook, 1992:23). This difference is due to the income from the family land plot. The place of residence and family plot ownership thus proved relevant to economic inequality in Bulgarian society. Property, along with wages, was an important indicator of the economic status of indi-viduals, social groups and classes, and the inequality among them Until the late 1980s, there was relative equality of property owned by the majority of the population. The economic welfare of the different strata of the population was more or less stable. To illustrate the trends in property ownership, let us take house ownership. In the Bulgarian tradition, households own rather than rent their dwelling. According to the censuses, the average number of persons sharing a dwelling was 4 in 1965, dropping to 3.5 in 1975, 3.1 in 1985 and 2.8 in 1992 (Main Results..., 1993: 119). In 1992, there were 98.4 households per 100 dwellings. The only exception to the relative equality in property ownership by the separate social strata was the property of the nomenklatura. The dominant inequality in ownership of consumer goods was between the nomenklatura

201

6.3 Economic Inequality

and the others who did not have the privileges of power as a source of wealth. Differentiation of incomes and consumption has increased in the period of deep economic crisis and transition to a market economy Economic inequality increased in the nineties (Table 2). The lowest income brackets are in group one, average-income in group seven, and high income brackets in group ten. Table 3 confirms the growing polarization by income. In 1992, the gap between low income and average income households approximated a factor of 3, and between low income and high income, a factor of almost 8. By 1994, that difference had increased to a factor of 3.6 in the former and about 11 in the latter. The gap between average and high income households is likewise opening: from a factor of about 2.5 in 1992, to close to 3 in 1994. Tables 4 and 5 indicate that low income brackets rely primarily on public funds and wages. The share of the former is equal to, and in certain years even bigger than the latter. Average income households count mainly on their wages (almost half of their income) and less on public funds, which account for about a fifth of their income (Tables 4 and 5). According to the same source, the wage share of incomes in the high income households dropped from 35.7% in 1992 to 25% in 1994. Those households are least dependent on public funds. To make ends meet, low income and some of the average income households rely on their savings, as well as on income from the family land plot. Part of the average and most of the high income households are as a rule engaged in private business. In the period of transition to a market economy, the surest way to get into the high-income brackets is through successful enterprise Openings for successful private businesses depend mostly on participation in the management, distribution and redistribution of public property, in its privatization and in restitution. Clandestine privatization of public property is possible in an environment of social, economic and legislative instability. A series of political, economic and financial conglomerates, as well as structures of the "shadow economy," hold key positions in that process.

202

Social Stratification

The growing economic inequality in the period of transition takes the form of drastic pauperization of large strata of the Bulgarian population Table 6 shows that in 1992 more than half of the expenditures of lowincome households were for food. Those households comprise 20% of Bulgaria's population. They are in dire economic straits, living under the subsistence level (by international standards, households whose spending on food exceeds 50% of the general income are under the subsistence level, and from 40% to 50%, under the poverty line). About 60% of the population (people in groups one to six in Table 6) are under the poverty line. The increasing differentiation by income is not due to the regulation and redistribution of wages alone. It also ensues from the speculative redistribution of incomes and property between individuals and groups within an increasingly poor economic climate. The high share of pauperization and insignificant share of economic prosperity is not only an indicator of economic inequality in society but also a symptom of social destabilization. The problems in the formation and growth of a middle class show that the aforementioned trend could be expected to gather momentum in future. Maya Kelian REFERENCES Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Main Results from the Census of the Population and Housing Stock in the Republic of Bulgaria by 4, December, 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

203

6.3 Economic Inequality

Table 1. Average annual wages of the personnel employed in the national economy, by branch (leva) Branch Total Industry Construction Agriculture Forestry Transport Communications Trade and Purchasing Other branches of material production Science and research services Education Culture and the arts Health care, social welfare, sports Tourism Finance, lending and insurance Management Others branches of non-material sphere

1980

1985

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991*

7992**

2 185 2288 2516 1 970 1 808 2494 1 968 1 949

2464 2724 2827 2286 2077 2871 2369 2 188

2812 3031 3 172 2513 2426 3083 2588 2360

3025 3256 3352 2815 2598 3261 2739 2572

3292 3475 3670 3232 2833 3580 3039 2788

4329 4199 4758 4857 3443 4670 4 146 3794

11 508 11 570 13427 11 269 9249 12577 12060 10341

24600 26916 27000 19800 17556 28200 26004 23304

2255

2659

2964

3258

3545

4269

12858

30996

1 990 2433 2075

2299 3013 2396

2555 3302 2590

2731 3535 2650

2955 3720 2770

3912 4614 3858

11434 11 699 10508

24804 24000 19848

2081 2001

2348 2387

2480 2519

2646 2595

2944 2702

3750 4207

10115 10625

18600 20904

1 996 2569

2513 2984

2720 3 143

2949 3384

3219 3550

4614 4777

16124 12808

38904 25596

2483

2664

3040

3019

3084

4125

10778

23904

*Incl. cost-of-living adjustment **Excl. persons on maternity leave Sources: Statistical Yearbook (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 54 (in Bulgarian); Statistical Reference Book (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 8 (in Bulgarian).

204

Social Stratification

Table 2. Share of income of groups of people in general income, 1992tol994(%) No. of group by progressive % of group's income of general income average per-capita income of all households 1992 1994 1993 1 3.3 2.7 3.0 2 5.0 4.9 4.5 6.0 3 6.0 5.6 6.8 4 6.9 6.5 7.8 5 7.8 7.4 6 8.9 8.4 8.6 7 10.2 10.2 9.8 11.6 11.9 8 11.9 14.8 9 14.6 14.7 10 25.4 25.8 28.8 100.0 total 100.0 100.0 Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XV. (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Changes in general income of certain groups, 1992 to 1994 (%) Year Group Seven Group One Group Ten 1992 313.5 100.0 778.5 343.5 1993 100.0 868.6 1994 100.0 363.5 1070.5 Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XVI (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Share of wage in general income of certain groups, 1992 to 1994(%) Group Ten Year Group One Group Seven 1992 30.5 52.3 35.7 30.3 49.6 36.1 1993 47.4 1994 32.5 25.0 Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XVI (in Bulgarian).

205

6.3 Economic Inequality

Table 5. Share of wage in income from public funds in general income of certain groups, 1992 to 1994 (%) Year 1992 1993 1994

Group One 44.8 35.8 31.1

Group Seven 18.6 20.5 19.7

Group Ten 8.5 9.0 7.9

Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XVI (in Bulgarian).

Table 6. Share of food costs in general expenditures of certain groups, 1992 to 1994(%) Year 1992 1993 1994

Group One 74.6 76.6 79.5

Group Seven 35.9 36.7 38.8

Group Ten 21.6 22.2 20.1

Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XVII (in Bulgarian).

206

Social Stratification

6.4 Social Inequality

Social inequality under socialism was studied from the perspective of surmounting class inequalities left over from capitalism. The ongoing period of transition is characterized by volatile, transitional social structures which reflect the new stratification of society. During state socialism, social inequality was discussed in the context of the legacy of class inequality All studies proceeded from Lenin's orthodox definition of classes. In line with it, the differences in relations between people in terms of ownership of the means of production, the former's place in the social organization of labour and the respective differences in the amount and manner of consumption, were considered to be the main socially differentiating features of social inequality. In this perspective, the social structure of socialist society was basically regarded as constituted by three large groups - working class, cooperated peasants and intelligentsia, as well as certain vestiges of the former private-ownership structure (Table 1). The other factors of social inequality - age, regional, gender and ethnic factors - were conceived mostly as subordinate factors differentiating people within each of the three macrogroups. This structure eventually underwent further differentiation. Agricultural workers (employed in state-owned farms) were added as a relatively sovereign group. The intelligentsia was divided into intelligentsia proper and salaried employees. Lastly, the group of small private producers (peasants and artisans) was preserved (Table 2). A main trend in the development of the socialist social structure was said to be the consistent approximation of the friendly classes The basis of the approximation was supposed to be the intensifying nationalization of property, industrialization of agriculture, approximation of intellectual and manual labour, and rising general level of education. A thesis that the societies of "developed socialism" were on the threshold of social

207

6.4 Social Inequality

homogeneity was promoted in the early 1980s. However, this interpretation of the structure of social inequality under socialism had substantial gaps and contradictions. The large group of intelligentsia was originally not considered to be a proper class. Until the late 1970s, it included employees in public and economic administration - from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy - the police, the army, as well as intellectuals such as doctors, teachers, people in the arts and university professors. In time, a distinction was made between the group of salaried employees (the administration) and the intelligentsia, but the ruling state-and-party elite thus posed as belonging to the so-called "political intelligentsia." The purpose was to blur the distinctions within the groups of salaried employees and the intelligentsia so that the nomenklatura would always remain beyond sociological analysis. The first attempts at differentiating the latter as a relatively sovereign stratum was made only at the end of the 1980s, with the introduction of the indicator of "institutional privileges" which, however, applied to other groups as well. In addition, agricultural workers belonged to the working class by form of ownership but were closer to the class of cooperated peasants by nature and conditions of labour. The theoretical issue of "workers" in the area of services remained outstanding. If by form of ownership they also ought to belong to the working class, by place in the social organization of labour, attitudes and values they were far from the "nucleus" of the class as represented by its industrial component. The class of cooperated peasants ought to have disappeared when cooperative farms were practically nationalized in the 1970s - regardless of the considerable differences between towns and villages, industrial and agricultural labour, lifestyle, etc. Predictably, the so-conceived macro-structure of socialist society was capable of grasping only certain macro-social inequalities and their trends. For instance, it was established that the main reason for the radical quantitative changes in those macro-groups by the late 1970s was urban migration due to accelerated industrialization. Beginning in the early 1950s, the increasing numbers of workers, salaried employees and intelligentsia came mainly from Bulgaria's rural population. Consequently, these groups were concentrated in the towns which, in turn, created a series of problems in the urban infrastructure: a housing shortage, poor public transport, and consumer good shortages. The effect on the countryside proved even worse: depopulation, an ageing rural population, underdeveloped services, and a shortage of cultural institutions (Tables 3 and 4).

208

Social Stratification

The macro-social structure of state socialist society started to stabilize in the mid-1970s as intra-group self-reproduction and self-isolation intensified, unlike inter-group mobility This process was particularly pronounced among workers and the intelligentsia, as the number of university students by social origin shows (Dimitrov 1986: 167). The major contradiction in this concept is that intra-group differences are seen as more relevant to social inequality than the inter-group ones. This brings into question the main focus on the class structure of society. The contradiction is plain in the analyses of stratification by income. The average income per household member, differences in housing, and the other aspects of social inequality were almost identical for all macro-groups, but much more pronounced within each group (Table 5). At the same time, differences by educational level, training and structure of cultural interests remained stronger among the major macro-groups rather than within them. The education level of peasants remained very low, and there were substantial differences in education by age within each macrogroup. The educational structure of the macro-groups corresponded almost fully to the structure ofunequal consumption of products of culture (Dimitrov, 1986: 42, 190-192, 288, 304, 317). This contradiction evidenced a marked status incompatibility of education, income and prestige which was most obvious among the intelligentsia. This particular group was characterized by an almost inverse proportion of education to training and income, which was also the main reason for the general level of dissatisfaction accompanied by a retreat from the traditionally prestigious professions (Table 6). On the whole, the structure of social inequality was meritocratic However, it was based not on education and training, but on party merits. All determinants of social inequality typical of modern society - education, training, origin, age, profession, etc. - were regarded from the perspective of membership in and loyalty to the party. Thanks to control over the state economy and its re-distributive functions, the ruling upper crust got far more public wealth - however, not on the basis of the official standards of income from wages, but by a hidden system of nomenklatura privileges.

209

6.4 Social Inequality

All this eventually called the orthodox view of social inequality into question. The professional (Dimitrov, 1986) and stratified structures of society started emerging as a more realistic manifestation of existing inequality. By using these concepts, attempts were made to solve the controversies focusing on the indicator of "nature and conditions" of labour as more relevant to social stratification than the form of ownership. In combination with other factors such as type of settlement, availability of ancillary farms, income apart from main occupation, involvement in "the third economy" and institutional privileges, this indicator offers another, more realistic picture of the social strata (Tilkidjiev, 1989: 214-216). The post-1989 transition to a democratic, market-oriented society has changed statuses, roles and values dramatically The transition to the new type of social organization was launched "top down" and effected in a negotiated (rather than revolutionary) way. As a result, a series of the former practices, mechanisms and social inequalities survived. On the one hand, many people from the former nomenklatura, the secret services, managers of enterprises, workers from the former state-run trade and others, had a privileged start in the race for key positions in the emerging market economy. The inherited cultural capital and information proved crucial in taking top positions in business despite certain attempts at restricting the activity of those formerly in power. An economic elite made up of members of the former nomenklatura, part of the new administrativepolitical personnel and people from banking and trade emerged (Kostova, 1994). On the other hand, for the overwhelming majority of the public, economic liberalization meant shocking price rises, high unemployment, inflation, devaluation of savings and, ultimately, mass pauperization (Tables 7 and 8). The poor became even poorer, incomes declined, whereas the few rich became very rich The slow pace of economic reforms, high taxes on private business, disintegration of the former statutory and legislative system and rising crime lengthened the odds against the emergence of the much heralded middle class. Statistical data and public opinion suggest that there is a middle class, but only relative to living conditions in Bulgaria and certainly not by the standards of the industrialized countries. It is estimated to be approximately

210

Social Stratification

25% of the population and includes most people in small and medium-size business, part of the cultural elite, as well as households with a member working abroad. This middle class is insignificant in size, especially compared to the vast majority - over 65% of the population - who both objectively and subjectively belong to the ever poorer losers in the course of transition. The new forms of social inequality are strongly dependent on participation in government, proximity to power and social origin The determinants of new inequality include a household member/members working abroad, especially in Western Europe. Considering the wide margins in labour remuneration in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, this factor greatly affects differentiation. Social stratification of households is also largely dependent on involvement in small or medium-scale business, and in the legal and illegal informal economy. Having more than one job and extra income such as rent and inheritance is another important factor. This factor played a major stratifying role in the course of restitution of mostly large urban property nationalized by the former regime. Completion of agricultural land restitution is expected to have a similar effect1 (Table 9). Other traditional factors such as number of breadwinners, number of children and watershed events in life have proved far less relevant to social inequality. They are important for the easier or harder survival in the conditions of economic crisis, but are not definitive in terms of social mobility. Certain social groups are in a particularly vulnerable situation Young people top this list. Employment approached maximum levels even in the late 1970s - especially in the administration and the intellectual sector. The post-1989 collapse of production and unprecedented unemployment deprived young people of many job opportunities. Only a small proportion of experts with higher education - mainly lawyers, economists and engineers - managed to integrate well under the new conditions, whereas most young people turned to small business, "the invisible economy" or emigration as a means of survival. Insecurity and poverty among the elderly and retirees reached exceptional levels. The steadily shrinking national budget and their relatively large numbers have made it hard to adjust pensions to the cost of living2.

211

6.4 Social Inequality

Gender-based social inequality was legally abolished under socialism. Females worked in almost all sectors on an equal footing with males - even in typical male occupations. In this sense, there is no gender-based difference in wages, nor are there any legal or moral obstacles to equal access to positions in public administration and business. Females, however, continue to devote more time to household chores than males. As in the other industrialized countries, this is typical of older couples - as a rule, younger couples share domestic chores and family duties. The emergence of the private sector has generated a new form of social stratification among females. Those who went into business or politics right from the start of the transition have risen to particularly high positions in the status and income hierarchy (Table 10). The collapse of the former system has also produced new forms of ethnic inequality. The end of state-guaranteed jobs and social security has dealt a particularly severe blow to the Gypsy population. Despite their specific way of life, many Gypsies have been hit by unprecedented poverty - consequently, the majority of "petty" offenders and criminals are Gypsy. The crisis in tobacco growing, purchasing and sales (as part of the general economic crisis) has also affected many Bulgarian Turks, for whom tobacco is a traditional livelihood. The new social stratification is based on participation in government, private business, work abroad and involvement in the "shadow economy" There is exceptional status incompatibility in Bulgaria today - with certain new dimensions compared to the inherited status incompatibility. Many of the old, traditionally prestigious professions have lost their importance in the new socioeconomic context, whereas the new progressive positions have not been ideologically and morally legitimized yet. This is valid for doctors, teachers, lecturers, army officers, police and other prestigious but underpaid occupations. At the same time, traditionally non-prestigious professions such as bank clerks, accountants, insurers, lawyers and bodyguards are now coming to the foreground mainly because they are far better paid. Social inequality of the present dimensions cannot have anything but a transitional, volatile and fast-changing structure. However, there is a tendency towards its stabilization and eventual legitimation in the public eye. Zhelyo Vladimirov

212 1

Social Stratification

NOTES

"Notably, these sources of income for households have appeared in the past two or three years, which rules out more specific conclusions about the trends in their development. Nevertheless, there is a certain absolute and relative increase in income from entrepreneurship and property, as well as from interest and sources other than the traditional wage". (The Social Reform, 1996: 51-52). 2 "The number of pensioners is rising in both absolute and relative terms vis-a-vis the total population... With 1989 as base year, the index of the number of pensioners rose to 102 in 1990, 108 in 1991, 111 in 1992 and 1993, and 110 in 1994. The proportion of pensioners to the total population has likewise increased: from 24.6% in 1989 to 28.9% in 1994. This period also saw a considerable change in the proportion of employed to pensioners. From 100 to 51 in 1989, this proportion reached 100 to 55 in 1990, 100 to 66 in 1991, 100 to 75 in 1992, 100 to 76 in 1993, and 100 to 77 in 1994. By the expenditure-covering principle of funding, this means that in 1994, 100 employed were supporting 77 pensioners. Due to the growth in the number of pensioners and the inflationary situation in the country, expenditure on pensions has also grown." (Ibid., p. 142).

REFERENCES Avramov, P. (1966) The BCP and Formation of the Socialist Intelligentsia. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Population of the PR of Bulgaria. Vol. 1 (1977) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Dimov, D. (1978) Communist Instruction of Working Class. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Dimitrov, K. (1976a) Social-Class Structure. In: Zh. Oshavkov, Ed. The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, pp. 83-114. Dimitrov, K. (19976b) Theoretical-Methodological Problems of SocialClass Structure. In: V. Dobriyanov, Ed. Sociological Cognition. Theoretical-Methodological Problems. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, pp. 46-76. Dimitrov, K. (Ed.) (1986) The Social-Class Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Trends and Problems. Sofia: Naouka i izkusrvo. Findings of the 1. December, 1965 Census. Vol. I (1967) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

213

6.4 Social Inequality

Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Ivanov, V. (1969) The Socialist Revolution and the Working Class in Bulgaria. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, V. (1971) Class Structure and Social Unity. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, V. (1977) Social Structure. Theoretical-Methodological Problems in the Building of a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, V. (1978) Social Structure. The Working Class in the Building of a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, V. (1979) Social Structure. The Class of Cooperated Peasants in the Building of a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, V. (1981) Social Structure. The Intelligentsia in the Building of a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Kostadinov, Y (1976) Socialist Ownership and Social-Class Structure in the Conditions of the National Agro-Industrial Complex. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Markov, M. (1960) On the Question of Class Changes in the PRB in the Period of Building a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Markov, M. (1965) Social-Class Changes in the PRB in the Period of Building a Developed Socialist Society. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Minkov, M. (1976) Population and Main Social Structures. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Petrov, Z. (1977) The Social-Class Structure of the Contemporary Bulgarian Village. Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). Principle Findings of the 2. December, 1975 census (1977) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Rutkevich, M. (1982) Establishment of Social Homogeneity. Moscow: Naouka (in Russian). The Social Reform (1996) Sofia: Siela Press (in Bulgarian). Spassovska, L. (1976) The Worker's Lifestile (Sociological Aspects). Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Tilkidjiev, N. (1989) The Social Groups. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

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Tilkidjiev, N. (1995) Social Stratification in Postcommunist Bulgaria (The Drama of Crystallization). Sofia: Free Initiative Foundation (in Bulgarian).

Table 1. Changes in the social class structure of socialist society In the People's Republic of Bulgaria (%) Social groups

1946

1956

1965

1975

Workers Cooperated peasants Private farmers Salaried employees Others Total

19.0 3.0 65.0 7.0 6.0 100.0

29.2 35.8 15.9 14.7 4.4 100.0

42.0 37.5

60.6 14.4

16.7 3.8 100.0

23.2 1.8 100.0

Source: Findings of the 1 December 1965 Census. Vol. 1 (1967) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p. 13(in Bulgarian); Principal Findings of the 2 December 1975 Census (1977) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p. XXXIX (in Bulgarian); Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Population of the Pfeople's] Republic] of Bulgaria. Vol. 1 (1977) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p. 90 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Social class structure of the employed according to 1968 and 1978 surveys (%) Social groups Workers Agricultural workers Cooperated peasants Cooperated artisans Salaried employees Intelligentsia Private farmers, artisans, dealers Others (incl. no answers) Total

1968

1978

32.0 7.1 36.2 1.3 4.7 17.0 1.3 0.4 100.0

51.2 8.9 12.8 1.3 14.9 10.7 0.2 100.0

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 90 (In Bulgarian). The differences in the methods make the findings of the surveys, as well as the surveys and statistics, only partly comparable.

215

6.4 Social Inequality

Table 3. Social groups by town and village and by type of population centre according to the 1968 and 1978 Surveys (%) 1968

1978

Social groups

Towns Town

Workers

63.9 18.6

Village

36.1 81.4

Total

Sofia

72.3 18.3

10.3

Villages

District

Other

centers

towns

37.9 2.2

24.2

Total

27.7 81.7

Village- mu-

Vil-

nicipality

lage

14.7

12.9 34.1

8.2

81.8

10.1

0.1

2.0

15.7 8.0

89.9

47.5 50.9

Cooperated artisans

63.6

36.4

87.3

6.4

57.2

23.7

12.7

9.3

3.4

Salaried employees

52.9

47.1

19.2

15.7

9.4

80.0

20.0

26.5 20.2

38.6

Intelligentsia

84.3 88.7

48.1

20.4

11.3

7.7

6.3 3.6

Agricultural workers Cooperated peasants

0.4

39.0

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Table 4. Migration flows (in %) Directions of migration 1966-1975

Periods 1976-1985 1986-1992

1994

100.0 100.0 Total 100.0 100.0 44.7 From town to town 30.2 38.9 38.3 17.7 24.2 From town to village 9.9 13.3 From village to town 42.7 22.6 23.9 34.3 17.2 13.0 13.0 From village to village 14.1 Source: Genov, N. ,Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996.Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, p. Table 5. Stratification by income Income per household member under 80 leva 81 to 150 leva over 1 50 leva

Social groups workers

cooperated peasants

51.6% 43.3 % 5.0 %

61.1 % around 35.0 % 3.9 %

intelligentsia

42.5 % 51.6% 5.8 %

salaried employees

46.5 % 36.3% to 120 Iv 1 7.2% over 1201v

Source: Dimitrov, K. Ed. (1986) The Social-Class Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society.- Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo, pp. 125, 137, 152, 176, 253 (in Bulgarian).

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Social Stratification

Table 6. Relationship between intelligentsia's training and income Training high average low

Income low (under 80 leva) - 42.5 % average (80 - 150 leva.) - 51.6 % high (over 150 leva.) - 5.9 %

Source: Dimitrov, K. (Ed.) The Social-Class Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society.Sofia, 1986: pp. 177-178 (in Bulgarian).

Table 7. Consistent trends towards pauperization 1990

1991

Year 1992

1993

1994

34

57

62

65

88

38

43

67

Indicators % of population with incomes under poverty line % of population with incomes under subsistence level % of population with incomes under 50% of average income

8

10

19

19.5

19.6

Source: The Social Reform (1996) Sofia: Siela, p.48 (in Bulgarian).

Table 8. Average monthly real and nominal general income per household member, 1990 to 1995 Year leva

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

216 259 693 1337 1986 3297 4880

Nominal income vs previous year vs previous leva in 1989 year, in % prices 209 119.9 128 267.6 137 192.9 132 148.5 116 166.0 106 148

Real income vs previous year vs previous 1990=100 year in % 100.0 61.2 61.2 107.0 65.6 96.4 63.2 87.9 55.5 91.4 50.7

Source: The Social Reform (1996) Sofia: Siela (in Bulgarian). "The following trend has emerged in practice: nominal incomes of the population are rising but, adjusted to inflation, are actually falling in real terms."The Social Reform, p.48

217

6.4 Social Inequality

Table 9. General income of households by source, 1992 to 1995 Year Sources General income Wage Extra income Entrepreneurship Property Unemployment benefits Pensions Child benefits Social welfare Grants Private farm Property sales Insurance Others Savings Loans and credits Repaid loans

%

1 337

100.0 44.3

594 28 29 3 7 215 33 19 2 283 15 2 107 106 19 3

1994

7993

7992

leva

2.1 2.2 0.2 0.6 16.0

2.5 1.4 0.2 21.2

1.1 0.2 8.0 -

%

leva

%

1 00.0 42.9

3297

100.0 38.2

4880 1 854

100.0

1 259

2.5 2.4 0.6 0.8

93 103 21 20 516 49 39 3 855 27 4 308 279 44 8

2.8 3.1 0.6 0.6

%

\ 986

852 49 48 12 15 342 40 30 2 400 15 3 178 172 27 4

7995

leva

leva

17.2

2.0 1.5 0.1 20.2

0.7 0.1 9.0 -

38. 3.0 2.9 0.6 0.4

1.5 1.2 0.1

146 144 27 20 703 68 49 2

25.9

1 345

27.6

0.8 0.1 9.5 -

44 4 474 392 57 7

0.9 0.1 2.7 -

15.6

14.4

1.4 1.0 0

Table 10. Employers and self-employed (% from all those employed) Time-period

Total

% of men

% of women

June 1994

9.9

12.1

7.3

June 1995

10.4

12.9

7.5

Source: Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, p. 44

7 SOCIAL RELATIONS

7.1 Conflict

The main feature of social conflict in Bulgaria is that it is manifested in a political form. After state socialism eliminated political opposition in the 1940s and 1950s, a relatively "soft" variant of political conflict resolution was asserted in the 1960s. The Prague Spring of 1968 was followed by a new wave of hard-line policies. The 19841985 name change of Bulgarian Turks triggered an intense ethnic conflict. The late 1980s saw the first forms of citizen, industrial and environmental protests. Open expression of political and social conflicts was legitimized in the 1990s. They have not deteriorated into violence and disruption.

Social conflict in Bulgaria (1960-1995) cannot be considered outside of the global context of contemporary social conflict Albeit isolated for years in the "socialist camp", Bulgaria was also affected by certain general trends in the development of social conflict. Its various forms are not simple derivatives of economic, class, racial, generational, gender or other social differences defining social conflict as just a controversy between interests which needs a final and unquestionable resolution. As seen from another point of view, in the contemporary world, ethnic, intergenerational, religious, cultural and other differences could hardly be derived from the economic structure of society alone. The far greater diversity and flexibility of society makes modern social conflict a controversy between cultural values and associated ideas as well. Today, conflict between class interests is increasingly superseded by conflict between different identities.

219

7.1 Conflict

This shift has led experts to believe that conflicts cannot be settled by economic levers and by doctrinal means. To judge from experience, those means are ineffective even in the case of economic conflicts. Contemporary social conflict has proved to have a long-term basis involving cultural differentiations which are insurmountable. For instance, ethnic conflicts have proved to be of a more durable axiological importance than social class differences, even in the case of the conflict between rich and poor. The particular contemporary importance of socio-cultural, domestic, religious or gender conflicts based on awareness of different social identities is even more complicated. The awareness of different social identities has proved more conflictual than abstract notions of class or international solidarity. On the methodological plane, contemporary social conflict can be defined as controversy between due and available rights, between needy and satisfied social groups, and between civil rights and economic growth (Dahrendorf 1993: 7). The arena of conflict is the controversy between civil rights and available opportunities for their expression. This does not mean a conflict of "objective" interests, but of rationalized, internalized needs which cannot be satisfied by anybody or at any particular moment. The huge economic growth in the past few decades, and the leap in the exercise of political rights and education are not sufficient enough to surmount conflict; for this conflict is based on awareness of insufficient spirituality in an increasingly alienated and psychologically disagreeable world rather than on purely economic, material satisfaction. At the same time, the supply of material goods is limited and, due to its unevenness, generates further economic, environmental, religious and or civic controversies. The desire for ever more political rights under the conditions of acute economic underdevelopment in countries undergoing marketization is triggering new and lasting social conflicts which certainly cannot be resolved unilaterally. The globalized modern social conflicts are manifest in Bulgaria The conflict associated with value discrepancies between different generations became topical in Bulgaria because of controversy surrounding the post-1968 sexual revolution. Conflicts were fuelled by the transition from an isolated to an open society, from "totalitarianism" to "democracy," etc. This variety of modern forms of conflict has found different expression in the period under consideration (1960-1995).

220

Social Relations

A common characteristic of social conflict during the whole period under scrutiny was that it acquired a predominantly political nature Since the state totally dominated civil society in the socialist period, every social conflict was treated by society as political. Official ideology banned scientific discussion of the issue of social conflict under socialism. Bulgaria was regarded as a socialist society which had overcome all of the conflicts and antagonisms of capitalism. There were no reports of social and industrial conflicts, ethnic controversies, the ever more glaring contradiction between official ideology and social practice, and social class differentiation. Even youth, family and birth rate issues were relegated to the background and subordinated to the idea of building "the most just society" which was supposed to settle all controversies. If any were admitted, they were attributed to the legacy of capitalism, the "period of transition", or "errors of youth." The system of state socialism in its post-Stalinist (post-1956) softer, "liberalized" Zhivkovist variant of "the April thaw" was established in Bulgaria in the early 1960s. This system left no room for the expression of any form of social conflict. That was the time when the last labour camps officially closed down, when all political opposition upholding non-socialist social views was eliminated, and the system of "soft" settlement of political differences was asserted within the communist party. Unlike the Stalinist age of the late 1940s and 1950s, political differences with the party leadership were no longer seen as the gravest crime and were not punished by maximum sentences, but led only to dismissal from executive positions while keeping certain privileges to which the entire party elite was entitled. Perhaps the only exception was the suppression of the military plot of discontented orthodox Stalinist army officers in 1965 (Ivanov 1992). The "legitimate" form of conflict resolution in this period was intra-party discussion on the country's problems, decisions on them being made on the basis of the principle of democratic centralism. The mid-1960s saw the beginning of a gradual ideological thaw, especially in the literary, artistic and cultural community, along with gradual deideologizing of the technical sciences. By 1965, formerly "untouchable" writers like were translated and published in Bulgaria. Bulgarian writers benefited from the thaw of the 1960s.

221

7.1 Conflict

The Prague Spring of 1968 was followed by another wave of hard-line policies which lasted until the mid-1970s An objective basis of the superficial surmounting of social conflict during the 1960s came from rapid economic growth, increased material prosperity of the public, and improved working and living conditions. Large-scale industrialization was effected in Bulgaria. The 1970s can be defined as a period of the "ultimate victory" of socialism, as a supreme stage in its progressive establishment and development, but also as the start of its decline and "ultimate defeat". The state socialist relations in which no social conflict could be manifested in public and, even less so, discussed in the media, was in place by the mid-1970s. The ideology of "the unity of the people around the policy of the party and the government," which covered up all social conflicts, remained dominant. Nevertheless, writer Georgi Markov's emigration and his "correspondent despatches about Bulgaria," aired by Radio Free Europe, sent waves across society. Bulgaria's economy and foreign policy remained wholly Soviet-dependent as well. Todor Zhivkov tried to capitalize on this dependence by procuring cheap energy deliveries to the country. This was not insignificant, considering the international oil crisis. Yet this very fact prevented people from realizing the actual dimensions of ineffectiveness of the planned economy and the looming, grave crisis that resulted from the inefficiency of Bulgaria's economy. While Hungary and Poland launched economic reforms, Bulgaria continued to count upon economic ties with the Soviet Union and its ineffective industrial system. The merger of cooperative farms (TKZS) into "agro-industrial complexes" (APK) generated a crisis in agriculture. This eliminated whatever independence Bulgarian peasants previously had, de-motivating them to improve and develop farm products. The Bulgarian economy continued to survive, thanks to cheap resources and the almost pay-free labour of elderly agricultural producers. Their children left the countryside en masse, moving into the towns where they joined the industrial army - not particularly skilled, undisciplined and just as underpaid. All labour conflicts in Bulgaria were quelled A spiritual withdrawal of the working class from the communist party and its policy started in the late 1970s. Meanwhile a young, far better educated and skilled generation joined in material production. The platitudes of communist ideology no longer meant anything to them. In the 1980s, this generation

222

Social Relations

would more persistently demand its civil and political rights, building - but also criticizing - the existing system in which it started feeling increasingly uncomfortable. In the 1980s, the regime began making feverish attempts at surviving under the new conditions. A series of "new concepts" was produced, among other things, on the perfection of socialism. Socialism proved unreformable, and any attempt at reform practically undermined the system even further With the start of the Soviet perestroika, things became uncontrollable. Zhivkov and the old guard felt threatened but could not do anything about it. Time was no longer on their side. Social conflicts started surfacing increasingly. There were the first attempts at strikes and work stoppages. Environmental protests escalated, especially after Chernobyl and the gassing of the town of Rousse on the Danube River. The first "informal" civic associations appeared - an environmental committee for the protection of Rousse, the Podkrepa independent trade union, the Club in Support of Glasnost and Perestroika, and others. The 1980s saw the first ethnic conflict in the past 40 years when the Bulgarian authorities tried to change the birth names of the Turkish ethnic minority to Bulgarian ones. This conflict was actually based on generational rather than ethnic problems - there were apprehensions that the rapid ageing of Bulgarians against the background of the high birth rates of Gypsies and Turks might eventually trigger serious conflicts. That is why the "Revival Process" had generational rather than nationalistic motives. The crisis of summer 1989 forced about 300,000 Bulgarian Turks to leave the country. This dealt a severe blow to Bulgarian agriculture (and tobacco growing in particular), the livelihood of the Turkish minority in the Loudogorie area and Eastern Rhodopi Mountains. In late autumn 1989 the social conflict came out in the open in Bulgaria for the first time since 1947 On November 10 Todor Zhivkov resigned, and the state socialist regime fell with him. People openly and freely took to the streets and squares to pour out social tensions that had accumulated for decades. Open expression of social conflict was legitimized. The entire public life became an arena of mounting social conflicts. The multiparty system, parliamentarianism and the free press were revived. Across-the-board social critique came to dominate the press, radio and television. Demonstrations, strikes and street protests swept

223

7.1 Conflict

over the big cities. Party and political values have been openly advocated with people fighting for their occupational, ethnic, economic and religious rights. Intensified social conflict during the Bulgarian "velvet" revolution has not deteriorated into public violence and disruption The only notable manifestation of violent political conflict was the break-in at the former communist party headquarters which were set on fire in 1990, and the attempt at invading Parliament in January 1997. All political, economic, ethnic and religious conflicts have been settled by civilized and peaceful means. The conflict between the forces upholding radical social reforms and those trying to preserve the status quo has been the main political conflict in the period of transition "from totalitarianism to democracy." The dramatic pauperization of the overwhelming majority of Bulgarians, combined with the "rags-to-riches" story of an insignificant minority, has been the source of economic conflict. Rising unemployment has also generated conflict situations. Strikers blocked roads, railroads, etc. Religious conflicts were confined to those within rather than between religious communities. In 1992, Bulgaria ended up with two holy synods and two chief mufti's offices and, in 1996, with two patriarchs. The ethnic conflict stimulated by the Turkish name change plan has eventually subsided after periods of mounting tensions, especially in winter 1989/1990, with nationalist fervour gradually dying down. Judging from the many barred windows and doors of private houses and offices, and overstocking with self-defence weapons, soaring crime and the failure to track down and punish criminals have been generating a series of conflicts. The transition has also seen certain modern conflicts such as environmental protests and conflicts stemming from a sense of unexpressed identity. On the whole, however, they have remained "secondary" to the grave economic problems with which Bulgarian society is faced. Momchil Badjakov REFERENCES Crampton, R. (1994) A Brief History of Bulgaria. Sofia: Open Society (in Bulgarian). Dahrendorf, R. (1993) The Modern Social Conflict.Sofa: Center for the Study of Democracy (in Bulgarian). Chakurov, K. (1990) The Second Floor. Sofia: Plamuk (in Bulgarian).

224

Social Relations

7.2 Negotiation The development of labour relations in Bulgaria has been very dynamic in the past three decades. Prior to 1989, there was a series of attempts to overcome the shortcomings of centralized planning, and to decentralize and humanize labour. Since 1989, there have been radical changes associated with the process of institutionalization of a new system of industrial relations. This process is not free of tensions due to both structural and cultural barriers. Broad public support is of crucial importance to the implementation of reforms which have high social costs Considering the need for social integration, the pivotal question is how social conflicts are settled: through pressure and coercion, or through consensus. This is particularly important in the countries in transition where expectations of an extensive provision of social safety nets, inherited from socialism, exert strong pressure on governments which, in turn, have quite limited resources to meet the needs of the various sectors of the public. The only democratic means thereof is the establishment of social dialogue and the institutionalization of conflicts. The existence of industrial conflicts was not recognized during socialism The central ideological assumption was that they had been eliminated along with the elimination of private property. The interests of the individual worker and those of the working class presumably coincided, therefore close to 100% of all employees were in the country's only trade union, and strikes were banned. That model was transferred by the USSR to Bulgaria since it was the only one available (Petrov, 1987). Thus, in the 1950s the market was replaced by centralized planning, which mobilized available resources for a "catching-up industrialization." The common good was represented by the party-state, which formulated the strategy of socio-economic development vested in plan targets. Decision-making was centralized to the utmost and lacked any dynamic grassroots contribution.

225

7.2 Negotiation

Attempts at overcoming the limitations of the centralistic model of government date back to the 1960s State Economic Corporations were set up to intermediate between the government ministries and enterprises. The idea was to achieve a certain degree of decentralization by assigning part of the planning and coordination of whole groups of enterprises to that intermediate level. Attempts at boosting grassroots initiative continued in the 1970s. They focused on the need for organizational change on that corporate level. The new organizational design was based on counterplanning and "brigade organization" of work (team work). They were meant to combine top-down pressure with grassroots initiative, pegging individual performance to the performance of the enterprise. The purpose of counterplanning was to utilize the potential that enterprises deliberately concealed in order to be sure that they would cope if their plan targets were raised the following year or if they had problems with supply (Kornai, 1990). The New Economic Mechanism introduced in 1982 gave brigades (work teams) greater financial autonomy and "freedom" to propose their own plan targets through counterplanning by drawing on that "hidden potential." This was encouraged by leaving a large part of the extra profit to the brigade. The mechanism, however, did not live up to expectations. First, it was because of the tacit rule that counterplan targets proposed by the brigade had to be higher than the state plan targets set on the government level. Counterplanning thus became a government mechanism of raising plan targets. Second, because the extra profit was centralized, the financial perks were eroded. Despite the series of attempts to change labour relations, centralized planning failed to surmount the shortcomings of top-down decisionmaking That model was grounded on coercion, which is incompatible with negotiation. Negotiation means reciprocal recognition of the legitimacy of interests and the existence of procedures for harmonization of interests through dialogue. Formally, negotiation in enterprises dates back to the early 1950s (collective bargaining was codified by statute even in 1936). Collective agreements were signed by the manager of the enterprise and the shop steward. The agreements were social in substance. They covered retraining, working conditions, housing, recreation, leave and other social provisions,

226

Social Relations

the bill being footed by a special Social Fund. Remuneration was not subject to bargaining. The sanctions for violating the agreement were by far not heavy. In the 1980s, some patterns of negotiation were introduced. Under the new norms, collective agreements were to be signed by brigades and corporate management. This was consistent with the new regard for the role of social funds amidst greater financial independence of brigades and their greater autonomy in organizing their work. However, insofar as brigades had to bargain their plan with the manager who, in turn, was to ensure the supply of raw materials, the model was up against massive obstacles. They ensued from the shortages of raw materials which was typical of socialism, which made it impossible for both workers and managers to uphold their part of the agreement. Thus there were lapses in the agreements which were acceptable to both parties. Against the background of that "tacit agreement" between workers and managers, the lack of sanctions against the managers, and existing arbitration procedures, it is hardly surprising that this became the successive formal procedure. The mechanism failed because of the partial scope of decentralization and limited autonomy of both managers and brigades. The logic of centralized planning per se runs counter to the manner of negotiation that is based on the idea of reciprocal rather than unilateral dependence of the parties involved. Thus the unions played the role of transmission belt for management instead of representing the workers' interests. They facilitated both plan fulfilment and social welfare (Petkov and Thirkell, 1991). Despite the official claims, labour relations were not free of internal tensions and covert conflicts. Considering the absence of legitimate channels for the expression of labour's interests, passive resistance and withdrawal reached substantial levels and undermined productivity. The 1989 upheaval cut short the evolutionary change. It initiated radical reforms in ownership and labour relations. Bulgaria is implementing radical reforms during a time of economic crisis which entails serious social problems One cannot expect profound reforms to be carried out without the participation of the most affected groups or broad public support. Achieving that presupposes consistency in the harmonization of conflicting interests and the establishment of sustainable social dialogue. Tripartite cooperation mecha-

227

7.2 Negotiation

nisms are a reliable means of doing this. The statutory framework of achieving social dialogue and building a new system of industrial relations was set in Bulgaria. Three mechanisms of coordination of interests were introduced: tripartite cooperation, collective bargaining and procedures of settling collective industrial disputes. The Constitution passed in 1991 sets the legal framework of industrial rights and social security. A series of amendments to the 1986 Labour Code were introduced in January 1993 focusing on classical principles of worker protection. They gave tripartite cooperation legal status for the first time and affirmed collective bargaining as a basic mechanism regulating labour relations. Article 3 of the Code binds the Government to consult and cooperate with the representative organizations of employers and workers in settling social policy and employment problems. The representativeness of those organizations is acknowledged by the Council of Ministers. The principles, procedures and terms of acknowledging the representativeness of workers' and employers' organizations on the national level are regulated by Council of Ministers Decree 7 of January 1993. An important prerequisite for regulation of the new system of labour relations was put in place by Council of Ministers Decree 51 of March 1993, which sets the rules of national tripartite cooperation. It regulates development of tripartite cooperation on the national level, the level of industrial branches as well as on regional and municipal levels. The National Tripartite Cooperation Council is a body of consultancy and partnership handling the problems of labour, as well as social security and living standards. The Council is made up of representatives of the Government, trade unions and employers' organizations. Council decisions are made by consensus. The following areas are subject to regulation: the labour force, in particular employment, unemployment, training and retraining; incomes, prices, and living standards; collective industrial disputes; social security and social welfare; international labour law; working conditions; privatization and structural adjustment of the economy; financial lending and tax relations; and specific problems of employees in the public sector. Collective bargaining is regulated by articles 50 to 59 of the Code. Collective agreements are signed on the level of the individual enterprise, group of enterprises, sector, occupation, and unit of territorial administration. Collective agreements are signed by the respective bodies of the representative organizations of employers and trade unions, and bargaining is con-

228

Social Relations

ducted on the basis of a motion moved at a general meeting of workers. If there is more than one representative trade union in the enterprise, the motions are put to a vote. Collective agreements cannot contain provisions less favourable to workers than those established by law. This makes collective agreements an independent legal instrument supplementing national legislation and international accords (The Bulgarian Challenge, 1994: 142). Bargaining has had a short record and it is too early to draw conclusions. With regard to statutory framework, such important institutions as labour courts and conciliation services are yet to be put into place. Institutionalization of the new system of industrial relations is a long process facing structural and cultural barriers Structural barriers ensue from incomplete economic reform and the fact that the state retains the title to most industrial assets. This predetermines its dual function of employer and regulator. On the one hand, faced with the problem of conducting reforms with negative social consequences, governments soon become unpopular. Hence there is a real danger of chronic political instability. On the other hand, extensive state ownership delays the process of crystallization of employers' interests and does not facilitate their autonomous operation. Organizations of employers do not enjoy public prestige since conventional wisdom goes that capital has been accumulated by unlawful means, and due to deep-rooted egalitarianism. In the transition period the former trade unions have undergone profound structural changes. From being a mouthpiece for the state's interests under socialism, they have evolved into independent organizations capable of upholding the interests of workers. With the emergence of new trade unions, unionist pluralism has become a fact. This process is not free of internal controversies manifested in unionist infighting. The absence of legitimate channels of expressing the interests of workers during socialism, as well as the problems stemming from the scale of the economic crisis, often lead to confrontation and attempts at settling problems from the position of force, through pressure and industrial action. Despite those tensions, the brief experience with reformed and new trade unions has shown that tripartite cooperation mechanisms are working, and that harmonization of conflicting interests and finding a formula of compromise are a reliable means of attaining social integration and national prosperity. Dimitrina Dimitrova

229

7.2 Negotiation

REFERENCES The Bulgarian Challenge: Reforming Labour Market and Social Policy (1994) Budapest: ILO-CEET. Kornai, J. (1990) The Road to a Free Economy: Shifting from a Socialist System. London: Norton and Company. Petkov, K. and J. Thirkell (1991) Labour Relations in Eastern Europe: Organizational Design and Dynamics. London: Routledge. Petrov, T. (1987) Rise and Establishment of the Brigade Organization of Work in Bulgaria (1944-1949). Istoricheski Pregled, No. 9 (in Bulgarian).

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Social Relations

7.3 Norms of Conduct

Norms of conduct have changed markedly since the 1960s. The value of the individual and respect for individual autonomy has tended to increase. Transforming these values into practice, however, has lagged behind their verbal declaration. The concrete direction and intensity of the changes in norms, as well as tolerance for deviations from them, vary substantially in the different areas of activity. Liberalization is particularly noticeable in sexual and family relations. By contrast, new regulations and restrictions have been imposed on conduct relevant to public wealth or human rights. On the whole, changes have not moved in a single, universally valid and consistent direction. They have gone beyond simple liberalization or stronger restrictiveness, varying in time and meaning, retailoring the normative system. The period since the 1960s has seen intensive and complex changes in normative systems and attitudes to them In a number of areas of human activity, general and more specific norms of conduct and binary assessments of right and wrong have been replaced by heterogeneous socially acceptable norms of conduct. As a value, tolerance has acquired greater importance, becoming "one of the principal objectives of moral instruction in the education system" under the 1991 National Education Act (Genov, 1995: 46). Norms themselves, as well as attitudes to them, have changed specifically in the years of transition from single-party government and centralized economy to political pluralism and market relations. Within the context of macrosocial transformation, many existing norms were rejected due to their inconsistency with the newly adopted objectives, values and principles of social development. A substantial number have not been replaced by new ones, leaving a void in their wake. Meanwhile, the rapid and radical social changes fuelled axiological disorientation and a general moral crisis in society. Concepts of good and evil, of permis-

231

7.3 Norms of Conduct

sible and impermissible conduct were confused. Extreme forms of disrespect for norms, bordering on anarchy, developed as a spontaneous reaction to the former restrictions. Consequently, norms - including legal ones - were violated en masse. State institutions were seriously destabilized, especially in the first years of economic transition, and proved powerless to combat infringement of the law. Now that building a state committed to the rule of law and guaranteeing its unquestionable authority have become a task of primary importance, attitudes to lawful conduct are not universal. The majority (79.3%) of adults aged over 18 say that the law must be observed unconditionally, but 7.9% think that the law could be broken in certain cases, whereas 4.1% claim that one's conduct should be guided by one's interests and objectives (and 8.7% don't know) (Genov, 1995). Notably, the percentage of those who are ready to compromise with the law is highest in the under-30 age group. A detailed picture of the changes in norms in the different areas of human activity over the past three decades could be derived from a case-bycase analysis of their operation. However, hardly any empirical information is available on the pre-80s period, and this is a severe handicap. Analyses and conclusions could be drawn only on the basis of single surveys on separate topics and theoretical studies on the conduct of social actors. Sexual and family relations are an area in which norms of conduct have changed substantially since the 1960s Parent-child relationships are quite different from what they were three or four decades ago. As children grow up, they have come to be regarded increasingly as partners rather than subordinates. In 1988, for instance, 75.4% of adults said that the dignity of a child aged 10 or 12 was as important as that of an adult (Gornev, 1990: 134). The expectation of unconditional obedience is metamorphosing into a view that differences between the ideas of parents and children are normal. Forty-six per cent of adults thought that children should not necessarily have the same views as their parents (Table 2). The thesis of the development of a partnership between parents and children is also evidenced by the fact that more than half of the latter said that their parents consult them and respect their opinion (Family..., 1982: 90). Another substantial trend in family relationships is the abandonment of the male-leadership family model and increasing tolerance for the female partner in making important decisions.

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Social Relations

The value-normative changes are more on the declarative than on the practical plane The verbally expressed values and behavioural models are not wholly consistent with actual practice. There are still cases of child abuse and wife battering. Double standards for men and women are also quite stable. The traditional disposition that the husband is "naturally entitled" to his circle of friends, which is not desirable in the wife's case, is still rather commonplace. Despite the liberalization of sexual norms, double standards for premarital and extramarital sex for males and females remain. The lack of comparable data from the previous decades is partly offset by the available information on the opinions of three generations. While one in three grandparents unconditionally condemns premarital sex, just 4.8% of their grandchildren think so in regard to males and 8% in regard to females (Table 1). A closer examination of opinions reveals the substance and stages of change. In the two extreme positions - permissibility of sex with any attractive male (female) and absolute impermissibility of sex - the positions of the middle generation are closer to those of the grandparents. In accepting premarital sex as permissible on certain restrictive terms - the partner must be the loved one or future spouse - parents are closer to the positions of their children, demonstrating considerable tolerance. Parallel to the liberalization of certain norms, new forms of behavioural activity are being subjected to normative regulation, while existing ones are tightened and pressure to conform to them mounts Actions related to a public asset such as the environment are a good example in this respect. Bulgaria has had laws regulating this aspect of people's conduct, penalizing environmental polluters since the mid-1970s. The importance attached to these norms has tended to grow, the norms themselves becoming ever more restrictive. Indicatively, punishments for environmental offences were increased in 1980 and, later, by the 1991 Environment Act, the problem itself being incorporated into the Constitution adopted in 1991. There has been an identical trend regarding individual privacy. The status of protective norms and their indisputableness has risen. It is noteworthy that despite the present heavy crime rates, the public is very sensi-

233

7.3 Norms of Conduct

tive to and sharply protests calls for curtailing the privacy of correspondence and telephone conversations. The trends in normative change and behavioural models of interethnic relations have been heterogeneous They are quite dependent on situational, socio-political and economic factors. Until the 1980s, the official policy encouraged Bulgarians to "open up" to the other ethnic groups. Surveys conducted in the early 1980s found considerable interaction between Bulgarians and Turks in labour relations, but a marked distance in their establishment of interpersonal and family relationships. Certain political actions and events in the mid- and late 1980s, however, triggered a dramatic change in the situation, generating aloofness and even hostility among them. In the nineties, interethnic tensions have subsided. With regard to the Gypsy ethnic group, they have always been more aloof and distanced due to a series of factors such as lifestyle, culture and character traits. As various objective and subjective factors accumulated in the past five or six years, these dispositions have amplified and are manifested in isolated but extreme forms of hostility. This summary of the changes in norms and models of conduct in the past 30 years invites the conclusion that changes have not moved in a single, universally valid and consistent direction. They have gone beyond simple liberalization or stronger restrictiveness, varying in time and meaning, and retailoring the normative system. Anna Mantarova REFERENCES Family, Demographic Development and Reproduction of Main Social Structures (1982) Manuscript (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed., (1995a) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Risks of the Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development. Gornev, G. Ed. (1990) The Individual in the Changing Society. Processes of Individual Modernization in Contemporary Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Spassovska, L. (1989) Celibacy. An Attempt at a Sociological Analysis. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

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Social Relations

Table 1. Is premarital sex permissible for males and females? (%) students

mothers

1 . Yes, with any female they like 2. Yes, but only with a loved female 3. Yes, only with the future wife 4. No

33,0 48,9 13,3 4,8

3,5 41,7 29,7 25,1

3,4 15,3 49,2 32,2

for females 1 . Yes, with any male they like 2. Yes, but with a loved male 3. Yes, only with the future husband 4. No

20,2 52,1 19,7 8,0

1,2 39,0 33,1 26,7

1,2 15,3 49,6 33,9

grandparents

for males

Source: L. Spassovska (1989) Celibacy. An Attempt at a Sociological Analysis. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

Table 2 Do you think that children should always have the same opinions as their parents? (%)

22,0% 32,0% 46,0%

Yes, on all or most matters On certain matters only They don't have to have the same opinions

Source: Gornev, G. Ed. (1990) The Individual in the Changing Society. Processes of Individual Modernization in Contemporary Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Which of the following assertions is closest to your opinion? (%)

1 . The law must be observed unconditionally 2. The law may be broken in certain cases 3. One should be guided by one's interests and objectives rather than by the law 4. Don't know

average

1830

3140

4150

5760

61 +

79.3

70.9

75.0

80.4

80.8

84.4

7.9

10.9

12.7

9.0

6.7

3.6

4.1 8.7

7.4 10.8

5.4 6.9

5.1 5.5

3.3 9.2

1.5 10.5

Source: Genov, N., Ed. (1994) Risks of the Transition.Sofia: National and Global Development (in Bulgarian).

235

7.4 Authority

7.4 Authority

Authority was unilateral, over-concentrated, alienated from society and had declining legitimacy in the 1960-1989 period. The political and economic liberalization in the nineties has changed certain parameters in the relationship between authority and society only partly and temporarily. The individual remains alienated from and insecure about authority. No profound qualitative changes in this respect have been registered to date. At the family level, the transitional and modern type of family prevails. The long-term trends in the development of authority in Bulgaria after 1960 are manifested within two substantially different institutional frameworks Prior to 1990, there were no regular empirical surveys of authority. The authority of the incumbents, in particular, was a "taboo" for the media, science and literature. That is why the analysis is confined to several sociological and public opinion surveys limited in time or scope (Kyuranov, 1987; Public Opinion..., 1994, 1995; Oshavkov, 1976; Contemporary Sociology..., 1978). In addition, there is a series of secondary sources with low information content including official political literature and censored or deliberately allegorical fiction, and even scientific literature. After a period of consolidation in the 1950s, by the early 1960s the state socialist model was already functioning in Bulgaria in its completed form under a relatively liberal post-Stalinist political regime The Party-State had full monopoly on all sources of power. Neither a significant private economic sector nor even any relatively autonomous public institutions (e.g. the Church) survived in Bulgaria. Political power was concentrated within the top of the ruling elite and was entirely beyond public control. After 1956 and in the 1960s, immediate and consistent repression was replaced by other forms of coercion. They were effected by the total prevention of nonconformist thinking and behaviour, achieved through overt

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Social Relations

threats and instilling fear by a system of control and surveillance. Until 1989, about 300,000 secret police informants were recruited (Assenov, 1994: 127). Conformity was enforced by the personal and material dependence of the individual on the State and the ruling party, as well as by psychological pressure on and corruption of intellectuals to ensure cooperation with the regime. The range and forms of coercion were actually "adjusted" to suit the mass psychological characteristics of Bulgarians shaped over the centuries. These include patience, resignation, mutual mistrust and atomization within a broader social context, and a priority of sheer survival (neglecting or "ignoring" the loss of other values). These characteristics were utilized as a specific resource of power to achieve mass acquiescence "by inertia" or "by habit." New features of power relations emerged as an inevitable consequence of the total etatisation of life. They included paternalistic dependence, indiscrimination, and loyalty by counting on the benevolence of the patron as represented by the Party-State. The system of political control was effective in throttling oppositional ideas, sentiments and attempts at organizing oppositional activity in utero Attempts at underground activity were uncovered swiftly, repression being selective and distinctly harder on "rightists" (of all members of the 35 leftist oppositional groups uncovered between 1963 and 1989, only 50 people were sentenced to an average of three or four years in prison, 66 were exiled, and 1,033 got administrative and party punishments) (Ivanov, 1992). Opposition to the regime was confined to isolated individual or group acts of protest, criticism and resistance against the system, and was often allowed as a political safety valve, manipulated by the regime itself as an outlet for public discontent. The absence of mass oppositional action is due mainly to the monopoly of the authorities over all the resources of power and, to a lesser extent, to the ethnopsychology and deficits in political culture, democratic experience and traditions. In addition, the discontent with the low degree of prewar economic and political modernization (incomplete industrialization, high social differentiation, mass illiteracy, and authoritarian policies) was certainly a source of legitimacy for the regime for some time. However, the "old new" alienation, mistrust of and hostility to authority, which was once again perceived as "alien," were restored after the mid1960s. Yet this time the totalitarian power, armed with a modern system of

237

7.4 Authority

surveillance and control, effectively eliminated avenues of open dissent, discontent and resistance. That is why the latter were manifested on an individual scale either as passive resistance - "hiding" from authority and circumventing the law, or expatriation - 19,000 fled abroad from September 1944 to 1985 (Assenov, 1994: 139). The petty encroachments on "law," "order" and public property became the rule. Direct though conspiratorial and mostly anonymous criticisms against the system were posted to foreign embassies and international organizations, or illegally disseminated by leaflets in Bulgaria. The number of leaflets was estimated by the political police at 15,792, written by 4,894 authors between 1968 and 1984. The absence of regular surveys impedes the identification of long-term trends in public attitudes to authority. Nevertheless, a major sociological survey from the late 1960s indicates strong alienation from the established "law and order". Just 18.6% of all citizens who were not members of the Communist Party or the Comsomol (the Youth Communist League) consciously abided by the law. Among Communist Party and Comsomol members, the percentage of consciously law-abiding citizens reached 26.5. The rest of the public abided by the law out of fear or "by habit". Insofar as one could judge from a similar survey, in the 1980s the number of law-abiding citizens increased. The legal awareness expressed in the first survey is distinctly political, i.e. law and order is valuable not per se but is due to ideological, hence pragmatic, considerations. This generates relativism and latent legal nihilism since in the ruling party itself, 41% abided by the law by habit or out of fear (Oshavkov, 1976: 296; Contemporary Sociology..., 1978). The historical legacy of disrespect for any (including worthy, legitimate) authority, for leaders of any (including justified and necessary) hierarchy and elite, and the absence of any subordination and acquiescence as an element of modern organization remained indefinite Furthermore, the germ of such attitudes (of respect for hierarchy) were "wiped clean" by socialist egalitarianism. Albeit hypocritically, it did its best to cultivate the illusion and appearance of universal equality. This trend was strengthened by the promotion of unworthy, unaccountable pretenders as ruling "elite." In fact, the confusion between democracy and the absence of hierarchy and discipline, resulting from the absence of an indigenous elite

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Social Relations

during the Turkish domination, has been constantly revived by the "antigovernment" of alienated elites since the winning of national independence. Here are the major stages and trends in the relationship between political authority and Bulgarian society in the past 35 years: 1956 to 1967: Rejection of the Stalinist methods of rule, relative liberalization within the framework of a state socialist political regime, relatively higher legitimacy of power, isolated oppositional pro-Chinese underground groups. 1967 to 1976: Total etatisme, economic ineffectiveness, corruption of authority, alienation from authority which, however, stopped short of rebellion, reformist movement or split at the top; cracks in legitimation (not admitted yet - "the negative phenomena" allegedly being "a manifestation of capitalist anachronisms"). 1976 to 1983: Official admission of economic ineffectiveness and, indirectly, of the crisis in the legitimation of socialism ("exhaustion of the present model of socialism"); designing a "new model" of socialism ("developed," "mature," "under construction"). Economic reforms started from the top, no political pressure for reforms was exerted from the bottom. 1983-1989: Manipulative quest of new sources of legitimacy of the regime in the spirit of perestroika, i.e. a "restructuring" of socialism (through democratization and "socialist self-management") and in nationalism (assimilation campaign against the Bulgarian Turks); emergence of organized opposition at the very end of the period. Since 1989: Abandoning of perestroika by the incumbents themselves (without any particular pressure from the bottom) as an inadequate strategy of their survival in power, plus rejection of the totalitarian model itself as also inadequate to reinforce the authority of the same elite, and an orientation towards a new model, appearing as oligarchical so far. The years since the rejection of the totalitarian model have seen the emergence of trends which might be short-term and transitional, but might just as well be a manifestation of yet another cycle of alienation from authority Confidence in the new state institutions, formed on a pluralist basis, has been generally declining since 1992 (Public Opinion..., 1994; see 11.2 Confidence in Institutions), reaching a "stable" state of crisis in 1994. Quite a few people (about a third) still think there is political persecution and that it

239

7.4 Authority

is not safe to openly voice one's opinion. This proportion even rose slightly between June 1992 and May 1993 (Public Opinion..., 1995: 208). By mid1994, most people in Bulgaria thought that real democratic changes had not been launched. Political loyalty is to parties rather than to institutions, even though confidence in politicians as a whole is dropping. Public opinion polls show growing disillusionment with democracy (39% were wholly unhappy with democracy in October 1993, and 54% in May 1994), while in October 1994, 31.2% were hesitant and 17.5% were in favour of a possible strong nondemocratic regime (Public Opinion..., 1995: 192, 198). Paternalistic attitudes have persisted in the post-totalitarian period too: 80% expected the state to find a job and to provide a certain income to everybody (Public Opinion..., 1994: 25, 27). This paternalism, however, is an abstract one towards the state as a whole. As before the war, there is no political clientelism and distinct personalism in party orientation - values and symbols are appreciated more than personalities. Characteristic of the period is a weakening of authority and even a withdrawal from law enforcement, which are closely connected with the trend of unlawful redistribution of public property Blind adulation of the Taylorist "scientific organization of work" (which, at the same time, was not applied adequately in practice) and respectively of the authoritarian-centralist methods was dominant in the management of industrial enterprises by the mid-1970s. Then a move towards greater independence of economic subjects and their shop-level units was declared. The implementation of the programmes and models designed to that end was dropped after it became clear that in their logical completion they threatened the authority of the centre and the top economic nomenklatura. The trend of redistribution (de-hierarchization) of authority at lower levels in the production sphere via an element of participation (team-work organization, self-management) culminated in the passage of a new Labour Code. It formally gave producers broader rights, including the right to information. This was intended as a means of enhancing the efficiency of production and providing a new legitimating basis of the regime. This trend in institutional development was brought to an abrupt end after 1989, when it was condemned and entirely rejected as a "totalitarian manipulation" by the same agents that had introduced it several years earlier. Authority in production organizations is characterized by low effectiveness in enforcing

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Social Relations

production and labour discipline, which is actually an expression of the typical paternalistic relationship between the state as employer and citizens as employees. In the family context, long-term trends towards democratization, equality and tolerance took shape A large-scale survey on 6,000 families in the mid-1970s established longterm trends. The survey found that a sizeable proportion (48.8%) of the families were in transition from a traditional to a modern type. Male and female roles were becoming more homogeneous, with real power in decision-making being distributed in a more equal way. This was not valid for the actual distribution of household chores. Despite their highly positive orientations toward equality, women bore the brunt of housework (65.9%). Dialogue with children in decision-making had definitely increased, even though in most cases (58.2%) parents imposed their will unilaterally, without compromise. The considerable proportion of families wherein both or either parent was insecure of his or her authority (32%) is also a symptom of transition. The collectivist normative system dominant in society was projected on the education system, the focus being on the rule-sanction system and the teacher's authoritarian position The result was passiveness and inefficiency of both parties in the education process, and not merely suppression but also deformation of individual identity. The socializing effect of the system declined markedly over the years, and remains low at present. The old system kindled deep alienation between teachers and students that remains strong even though the authoritarian position of teachers has tended to decline in the past few years. Ivan Minov REFERENCES Assenov, B. (1994) By the Sixth, About the Sixth. Sofia: Poligraph (in Bulgarian). Contemporary Sociology in Bulgaria (1978) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Donev, R. (1975) Sociological Aspects of Education in Socialism. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian).

241

7.4 Authority

Draganov, M. (1989) Way of Life and Public Mentality. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Ivanov, D. (1992) The Plots Against Todor Zhivkov. Sofia (in Bulgarian) Ethnopsychology of the Bulgarians (1984) Sofia (in Bulgarian). Kyuranov, Ch. Ed. (1987) The Bulgarian Family Today. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Our Way of Life. Socio-Psychological Aspects (1978) Sofia (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Motives for abiding by the law, 1968 (%) popu-

pen-

lation

sioners

peasants

wor-

all

emp-

kers

aged under

loye-

es

Communist Par-

all ex.cl.Com

ty

mol mem-

mem-

bers*

28

munist Party and Comso-

bers

fear habit consciously

21.4 49.4 26.5

25.6 57.9 16.5

33.4 46.9 19.7

26.5 45.2 28.3

24.8 40.6 34.6

9.4 38.2 52.5

5.3 35.5 59.0

23.7 45.7 20.2

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of the Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, pp. 280-298.

Table 2. Distribution of authority between husband and wife husband is head of family joint decision-making and discussion with children if necessary

women 74.7%

men 74.1%

16.7%

16.5%

Source: Kyuranov, Ch. Ed. (1987) The Bulgarian Family Today Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

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Social Relations

Table 3. Parental authority (according to children) unconditional imposition of parental will imposition of parental will even after talking with the children

13.2% 45.0%

Table 4. Types of families by level of democracy men 0.6% 6.4% 47.6% 34.8% 6.2%

women 0.6% 7.1% 50.0% 31.1% 6.3%

traditional traditional-transitional transitional transitional-democratic democratic

Source: Kyuranov, Ch. Ed. (1987) The Bulgarian Family Today Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Anonymous anti-government materials Years

1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 annual average 1969-74. 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 annual average 1975-79 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 annual average 1980-84 annual average 1969-84 All

anonymous materials

authors of anonymous materials

2698 676 843 1086 546 737 757 774 323 398 1 048 1244 1 136 910 705 982 1099 530 584 780 818 15792

Source:tAssenov,

543 158 230 193 336 294 284 267 187 258 369 337 425 315 275 331 239 231 204 256 272 4894

243

7.5 Public Opinion

7.5 Public Opinion

Studies on public opinion have been gaining grounds since 1960 as a means for legitimizing political decisions. Public opinion polls started to play a major role only after 1990 when the activity of the population became a major factor in Bulgarian political life. Public opinion is being mainly monitored by competitive private agencies focusing on political preferences and electoral behaviour. There is a tendency for these agencies to give rise to political speculations with regard to the social and economic characteristics of Bulgarians. Studies on public opinion were gradually legitimized after 1960 Before 1989, public opinion was formally given considerable attention. The research was put under the tight control of the ruling party. The results were not an issue for public debates. Nevertheless, sociology was institutionalized as a science and studying public opinion was legitimized. The studies were carried out by institutions at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the Bulgarian Trade Unions, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Defense, etc. The information was typically used to enforce party decisions. Public opinion polls were carried out for scientific purposes as well. Their quality level was good enough to reveal the actual state of public opinion and to support the adjustment of political decisions to changing environments. A large proportion of the data was classified, but the research helped build a community of well qualified professional scholars. The major topics of research included: problems of youth, of workers, the mass media, party life, etc. The samples were usually representative and discovered a variety of existing social tensions and trends nationwide. Until the late 1980s the channels for expressing public opinion were strictly controlled There was a formal opportunity to express opinion within the party organizations, but every attempt at seriously questioning the established order resulted in sanctions. The public debates on the 1972 Constitution and other

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Social Relations

party decisions and programmes were in fact mere formalities and intended to draw public support for policies already in operation. Censorship was organized in the form of strict control over recruitment in mass media institutions. Management of television, radio and printed media was practically appointed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. It had a special unit for ideology and propaganda, which determined the content of strategic media messages. Publishing houses had black lists of books and authors forbidden for publishing. At the end of the period there were a couple of instances of confiscation of the entire circulation of newspapers and books. Public demonstrations and rallies were controlled by the party organizations. After 1986 there were sporadic gatherings, rallies and processions, organized by the clubs for glasnost and perestroika and by ecological movements. These were followed by arrests and setting bans on mass events not authorized by the party. During the period 1960-1989 public opinion existed on two different levels The first was the official one which had legitimacy. Its content fully supportive to the ideas and policies of the ruling party, and typically expressed satisfaction with the existing economic and political status quo. Maintaining the transparency of criticism was counteracted by mechanisms which exhaust critiques on the long way up the hierarchy. The second level of opinion was unofficial and was channelled through rumours and jokes. It was usually expressed before close circles of friends. Maintaining the illusion that there were leaders of the party who express and protect independent personal opinion was one of the fundaments for the political longevity of Todor Zhivkov. In reality, every party leader who was tolerated for a while as the most favourite in the public eye got ousted. After 1989, public opinion became a major factor in transformation processes After the start of the transformation, research has been carried out through dozens of competitive sociological agencies. Some of them have monthly schedules of representative surveys and large personnel. They extend their services to major companies in the country. They also serve the state-owned Public Radio and Television stations. By a decree, the National Assembly

245

7.5 Public Opinion

set up a National Centre for Research of Public Opinion in 1991. This is the only agency which can be considered partially independent from political interference due to the fact that it is directly subjected to the Parliament. The major concern of the numerous small agencies is survival rather than making profits. Their strategy is to keep active enough until the time when economic stagnation will be over and the market for sociological services expands. This makes them constantly reduce the prices of their services, often not charging at all for public opinion research studies. As a result, their research of public opinion turns into series of polls, often part of market research. The existing system of offering and purchasing sociological services is set up in a way that damages the quality of public opinion research There is a clear tendency towards increasing the dependence of public opinion research on political and special group interests. Every major political parry tends to run a supportive agency. This tendency is maintained by the unfair competition between agencies as well as by the unfavorable economic environment, which requires non-market strategies to survive. Despite the large number of registered political parties [see Trend 11.1], public opinion remains divided between the two principal parties, BSP and UDF. There is a tendency that at every next election about 25% of voters use to turn their votes which allows both parties to change in ruling the country. The political elite tends to perceive public opinion as a reference point for political decisions and action. Public opinion polls are increasingly looked at in order to provide the proper orientation for political decisions as well as a source for argumentation in political debates. Long term assessment might be optimistic because of the tendency towards creating a professional political elite which is able to analyze public opinion and to use the results of the analyses. Tatyana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES Chakalov, B. (1988) Research on the Dynamics of Public Opinion. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Draganov, M. (1973) Problems of Public Opinion. Sofia: Naouka i izkustvo (in Bulgarian).

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Social Relations

Dimitrov, L. (1975) Public Opinion and the Education of the Young Personality. Sofia: Narodna Mladezh (in Bulgarian). Venedikov, J. (1993) Public Opinion. Epistemological Problems. Sofia: Sofia University Press (in Bulgarian). Bulgarian Elections : Results, Analyses, Trends (1997) Sofia: Democratic Traditions - Demetra (in Bulgarian). Initiative for Civil Society Building in Bulgaria (1997) Sofia: ACCESS. Table 1. Change in the distribution of voters' attitudes (%) parties UDF BSP MRF

1993 23 26 4

1994 46 37 5.1

1995 19 39 8

1996 35 22 4

Source: Political and Economic Index (1994,1995,1996,1997) Sofia: BBSS Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

Table 2: Attitudes towards "state-private" (%) The state has to guarantee the major incomes Entirely agree Entirely disagree

1993

1994

1995

1996

80 11

80 15

70 24

48 35

Source: Political and Economic Index (1994,1995,1996,1997) Sofia: BBSS Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

Table 3: Attitudes towards democratic changes(%) Satisfaction by democracy Entirely satisfiesd Entirely dissatisfied

1993 8 39

1994 1 37

1995 10 25

1996 3 83

Source: Political and Economic Index (1994,1995,1996,1997) Sofia: BBSS Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

8 STATE AND SERVICE INSTITUTIONS

8.1 Educational System

The educational system underwent structural, organizational and curricular reforms between 1960 and 1995. The general trend was towards progressive institutional differentiation, diversification of curricula and specialization. These reforms were also associated with substantial quantitative changes. The scope of the separate levels of education broadened considerably. The number of students and teachers rose markedly, especially in secondary schools and establishments of higher education. This growth was stimulated by intensifying social and, in particular, economic needs, as well as institutional changes in the educational system. The general trend in education was towards progressive institutional differentiation, diversification of curricula and specialization In the past few decades, the educational system has developed on the basis of principles combining national tradition and contemporary achievements in education. The main tenets of educational policies in this period are compulsory education for those under age 16 (primary education), and the right of every citizen to secondary and higher education, with a guaranteed free choice of school. There are no constraints by race, nationality, gender, ethnic or social origin, denomination or social status. Education is secular and free of charge at state-owned and local council schools. The educational system underwent a series of structural, organizational and curricular reforms between 1960 and 1995. The objective was to improve and streamline education according to changing social requirements and growing individual needs.

248

State and Service Institutions

The reforms varied by level of education Pre-school educational structures are part of the educational system even though they enjoy a high level of organizational autonomy. They are networked in a comprehensive system of half-day, day and week kindergartens in which children are grouped by age. The number of children attending kindergartens changed substantially during the period in question. In the first two decades it rose steadily, increasing by a factor of 1.5 from 1960 to 1980. This trend reversed in the early 1980s. The number of children at kindergartens has declined consistently, especially in the past few years. If 756 out of 1,000 children aged 3 to 5 attended kindergartens in 1989, by 1994 this had decreased to 550. This regression is due foremost to falling birth rates and rapidly rising fees which are unaffordable for a number of young families. In the context of deteriorating economic conditions, underfunding is emerging as a especially negative factor that has affected the quantitative parameters and conditions of pre-school education. The number of teaching staff at kindergartens more than doubled between 1960 and 1995. Considering the decreasing number of children, this increase produced a positive change in the number of children per teacher: from 25:1 in 1960, to 16:1 in 1975 and 9:1 in 1994. There was a consistent rise in the proportion of teaching staff with higher (university) education. There were comparatively insignificant fluctuations in the number of primary school students. The student population varied inconsiderably, mainly due to changes in the age cohorts subject to education. Certain social and, especially, economic factors have come into play along with the demographic indicators since the early 1990s. Due to economic factors in particular, the number of school dropouts has grown. In many cases, students terminate their studies to help support their families, entering the labour market prematurely. Considering the growing economic differentiation of society, this faces the educational system with a serious problem. That problem cannot be resolved unless the economic crisis is overcome and economic differentiation, which generates substantial educational inequalities, is restricted. The growth in teaching staff at schools has been supplemented by an intensifying tendency towards feminization

249

8.1 Educational System

The teaching staff at schools has increased in the past four decades. This increase has been faster and larger in scale in secondary schools, where teachers have doubled. Meanwhile, the number of primary school teachers has increased by a factor of 1.35. The tendency towards feminization has been particularly strong in the nineties, when the proportion of female teachers rose by an average of about 1 per cent per year, reaching 75 per cent in the 1994/95 school year. The proportion of teachers with higher (university) education has also increased. Secondary education has two main forms based on organization and content: secondary comprehensive and vocational. Both forms expanded in scope throughout the period in question. This general trend is evidenced by the increase in the number of secondary-school graduates. Compared with 1960, in 1994/95 graduates from secondary comprehensive schools increased by a factor of 1.5, and from vocational schools, by a factor of 2.4. This increase took place in the context of specific changes in the two types of schools. Within the context of changing social needs and educational policy priorities, vocational training developed extensively between 1960 and 1975 and declined in the nineties Comprehensive education peaked in the second half of the 1980s. Since 1990, the student population at secondary comprehensive schools has stabilized, while that of vocational schools has droppied considerably. The latter's decrease is due to two main reasons. The first is the economic recession and subsequent decline in employment. Industrial production has plummeted since the start of social and economic reforms. There have been closures of enterprises or their subsidiaries, and redundancies of workers and specialists. At the same time, there is no clear prospect of rapid recovery and intensive development of the industrial sectors targeted by vocational training. This situation does not boost young people's interest in specialized secondary schools and explains the former's preference for secondary comprehensive schools. The considerable rise in admission rates at establishments of higher education is the other factor influencing secondary vocational training. This situation motivates a growing number of young people to go on to university. Vocational schools, however, prioritize vocational training over general subjects which are essential in entrance examinations. This also enhances

250

State and Service Institutions

the appeal of secondary comprehensive schools whose curricula offer more options for further education. Post-1990 changes in secondary education have reduced the number of trainees (both workers and specialists) for strategic industries. The imbalance following the pronounced decrease in vocational school students is intensified by the small number of skilled newcomers to the labour force from the other secondary schools. Vocational training has been practically marginalized in most secondary comprehensive schools since 1991. As a result, comprehensive school-leavers who do not go on to university enter the market unskilled. They are seriously threatened by unemployment and social marginalization, and that questions the economic and personal efficiency of education. The number of private schools has been growing, but is still insignificant compared with the network of public schools The establishment of private schools was regulated by law in the early 1990s. With 31 schools and 2,516 students in 1994/95, private education contributes mainly to the diversification of educational structures, greater choice and improvement of training. Considering the high tuition fees, however, private schools are not competitive in regard to the number of students - nor are they likely to be in the short term . Higher education is among the institutional subsystems that have developed the most in the past few decades The main trends have been towards intensive differentiation, rapid expansion and stable growth throughout the period under consideration, and especially since 1990. Between 1960 and 1994/95 the number of university-level students increased by a factor of 3.6, and the teaching staff by 5.5. The proportion of female students rose notably, along with that of professors and associate professors vs other lecturers. The latter trend is conducive to improving quality of higher education. Decentralization and academic autonomy have been basic principles of higher education since the early 1990s. They determine the structure and management of the higher educational system. In this new organizational context, changes in curricula and syllabi have intensified. The forms of education and research at post-secondary schools have diversified. Access to higher education, including paid forms, has increased sizebly.

251

8.1 Educational System

These reforms have led to impressive growth and expansion of the higher educational system. In just five years, the number of students almost doubled, reaching 223,260 in 1994/95. There were 41 establishments of higher education in 1995. Their network of off-campus departments and centres has grown rapidly. This gives more and more young people who live outside the traditional university centres access to higher education. Besides, the decentralization of educational structures brings education and research closer to regional needs and particularities of social and economic development. This stimulates the pragmatic orientation of training and boosts development of a local teaching and academic potential. Most changes in higher education to date have concerned organization and quantity Few steps have been taken towards real improvement of education, which has been faced with enormous challenges in a changing society. Hence the development of higher education since the late 1980s cannot be regarded as an integral homogeneous process. Key areas have lagged behind, and this calls for further reform. Mariana Zakharieva

REFERENCES Continuity and Change in the System of Education. In: N. Genov., Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development, pp. 37-49. National and Regional Processes in Education and Science. In: N. Genov., Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP, pp.105-119. Stanev, S. Reforms in Education and the Structure of the Educational System (1878-1991). In: Strategies of Educational and Scientific Policies, 1994, 4, pp. 63-71 (in Bulgarian). Zakharieva, M. Innovations in Education. Sofia, National and Global Development, 1995 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1995) Sofia, Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

252

State and Service Institutions

Table 1. Kindergartens year 1960/1961 1965/1966 1970/1971 1975/1976 1980/1981 1985/1986 1989/1990 1994/1995

children 298 790 362 093 331 960 392 625 420 804 360 395 317559 246 608

teaching staff 11 873 16392 18 185 24137 28996 28864 28312 24091

year

graduates

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994

105 424

teachers 43046 49442 47798 48445

Table 2. Primary education

114051 110997 113482

103 763 118840 117460

103 880

51 648 61 153 62437 58067

Table 3. Secondary comprehensive education year

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994

graduates 25309 27459 28323 31984 30033 39854

41 892 37344

teachers 8021 6969 6270 7637 7419 9392 9873 12420

253

8.1 Educational System

Table 4. Secondary vocational education year 1960/1961 1965/1966 1970/1971 1975/1976 1980/1981 1985/1986 1989/1990 1994/1995

students 136 067 261 399 283210 286 995 248 775 211 148 241 580 216595

teachers 8 142 14425 17499 19408 18850 17459 18241 19019

graduates 22949 64030 65631 86057 67758 58330 59 110 54772

Table 5. Students at higher educational establishments by gender year

total

male

female

1961/1962 1965/1966 1970/1971 1975/1976 1980/1981 1985/1986 1989/1990 1994/1995

61444 84467 89331 106 055 85330 101 507 133 184 196 046

36337 50422 45823 49184 39983 47691 64273 80504

25 107 34045 43508 56871 45347 53816 68911 115542

percentage of females 40.9 40.3 48.7 53.6 53.1 53.0 51.7 58.9

Table 6. Lecturers at higher educational establishments by title year

total

professors

associate professors

1961/1962 1965/1966 1970/1971 1975/1976 1980/1981 1985/1986 1989/1990 1994/1995

4230 5905 7125 11248 12622 14409 19213 21227

405 471 666 871 857 1067 1246 1754

432 683 899 1551 2073 2584 3372 4657

percentage ofprofessors and associate professors 19.8 19.5 22.0 21.5 23.2 25.3 24.0 30.2

254

State and Service Institutions

8.2 Health System

A broad network of health establishments developed on the national, regional and municipal level until 1989. It provided comparatively high qualit,y pay-free medical services. The health care system has changed considerably since 1989. Private medical services, which were banned in the early 1970s, have been restored. The past decade has seen a decrease in the funding of public health care and an increase in morbidity. Since the Second World War, the public health care sector has rapidly developed at the national, regional and municipal levels The network of establishments rendering medical services (diagnosis, treatment, convalescence, and certain types of prevention) is well developed and has an adequate stock of buildings and staff (Tables 1, 2 and 3). At the national level, there are the clinics of the five universities of medicine, as well as the clinics of the national medical centres of cardiovascular diseases, haematology, oncology, treatment of drug addicts, physiotherapy and convalescence, and the Pirogov National Institute of Emergency Aid. This level also covers the health establishments of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Genov, 1996: 95.). There are several periods in the development of national health care: until the late 1960s, the 1970s and 1980s, and since the early 1990s. In the first period, health care developed on the basis of Council of Ministers Decree 2658 of October 1950. This decree introduced a new nomenclature and classification of health establishments, and merged inpatient and outpatient establishments and polyclinics. Decree 18, dated March 1951, introduced free and universal medical services. The priority was on prophylaxis. There was a substantial growth in health care. From 1950 to 1970, the number of doctors increased from 5,164 to 15,819; dentists, from 1,550 to 3,111; nurses, from 2,304 to 25,265; hospital beds, from 28,387 to 56,009; and sanatorium beds, from 6,045 to 16,310. Between 1956 and 1970, the number

255

8.2 Health System

of therapeutic centres rose from 444 to 646; pediatric centres, from 106 to 568; and obstetric and gynaecological centres, from 64 to 150 (The Social Policy..., 1980: 383). Public health care services improved. From 1957 to 1970, the average number of doctor visits per capita grew from 3.27 to 5.04, and to the dentist, from 0.9 to 1.31. Per capita house calls rose from 0.2 to 0.37. Between 1957 and 1967, hospitalization per 1,000 population increased from 104.6 to 133.3 (The Social Policy..., 1980: 384). In the late sixties, an imbalance between the development of health care and other social changes (such as urbanization) became evident Between 1956 and 1965, the number of urban residents rose by 41%, versus a 33% increase in that of urban therapeutic centres. In the following decade, the urban population grew by another 14%, and therapeutic centres by 8% (The Social Policy..., 1980: 385). A National Health Act, passed in 1973, banned private medical services and emphasized public health care. The period till 1989 saw further positive changes. Infant mortality dropped. At 1.8 per 1,000, maternal mortality was comparatively low by international standards. The incidence of a series of contagious diseases decreased, and so did deaths from them, which dropped by a third. Disability declined by a factor of almost 1.8. Newly diagnosed tuberculosis cases decreased from 79 to 49 per 100,000. In the nineties, some trends in health and health care were reversed Certain negative trends emerged in the nineties. After a long period of decrease, the incidence of tuberculosis has been showing a clear upward trend. Between 1989 and 1994, the newly diagnosed cases of tuberculosis increased from 25.6 to 37.5 per 100,000. This is due to weakening immunity as a result of many economic and social factors. The current crisis has affected the mental health of the public. The number of psychiatric outpatients is rising steadily: from 2,529.7 per 100,000 population in 1989, to 2,771 in 1994(Genov, 1996:96). Deteriorating health is an direct effect of declining standards of living and mounting stress associated with the transition and economic crisis. Life expectancy is decreasing, whereas morbidity is increasing. The incidence of respiratory diseases is highest among all illnesses, 41.8%, followed by that of nervous and sensory disorders, 13%, and cardiovascular diseases. Cancer

256

State and Service Institutions

rates are rising, but are still below those in the industrialized countries (Doulev, 1996: 168). The number of medics per 10,000 population remains comparatively high: 33.3 doctors, 6.6 dentists, and 96.6 paramedics. At the same time, there have been negative quantitative and qualitative trends in medical services. Health care establishments have been doing less work in the 1990s. There have been fewer house calls, prophylactic examinations, inpatients, pregnancies and infants followed by maternity welfare and child health centres, and fewer occupied hospital beds. The gravest problems in health care are: * acute underfunding impeding the supply of medication, consumables and the introduction of new technologies. At the same time, the available funds are not used effectively; * unjustified, incidental and, to some extent, arbitrary changes since 1990: rescinding statutory acts without their prompt substitution; upsetting organizational, methodological and consultancy relations at the various levels of health care; disorder in the administration and management without the appropriate balance between centralization and decentralization; absence of codified relations between the public and the private sector (Genov, 1996). The reform of health care prioritizes transition from state subsidies to development of a state-of-the-art health insurance system and private medical services (Table 5); regulated pharmaceutical market and state-funded research; medical training and the development of a health infrastructure of national relevance (Doulev, 1996: 168). Darina Rouscheva Anna Krasteva REFERENCES Doulev, S. (1996) Social Problems Generated by the Transition in Bulgaria. In: Topical Problems of Economic Transition in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Skopje, pp. 167-173. Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. The Social Policy of the BCP (1980) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian).

257

8.2 Health System

Table 1. Health care network I960 numbeds ber

1970 Beds number

1980 numbeds ber

1990 number

beds

Health establishments (total) Hospitals Maternity hospitals

1357 461 886

41334 36912 2922

200 194 OGH *4

56009 54973 642

248 184 OGH *4

78470 64501 642

256 191 4

88027 71818 896

Outpatient establishments and polyclinics

2160

2949

3588

7362

3695

1013

3747

1954

*OGH, Obstetric and gynaecological hospitals Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria Sofia: National Statistical Office, 1962: 352-353; 1971:386; 1981:442; 1991: 375-376 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Hospital beds per 10,000 population 1960

1970

1980

1990

72 56 16

94

111 90 21

125 100 25

Total Incl. hospital beds sanatorium beds

75 19

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria.- Sofia, National Statistical Office, 1961: 354; 1991: 378 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Medics Doctors Dentists Pharmacists Medical auxiliaries Obstetricians Nurses

1960

1970

1980

1990

1995

11051 2393 2865 3364 12502

15819 3 111 2382 4994 5839 25265

21796 4839 3648 7355 7897 45449

28497 6109 4366 7617 7544 53810

29384 5437 1948 6946 6621 50763

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria.- Sofia: National Statistical Office, 1962: 355; 1970: 354; 1991: 378; 1996: 36 (in Bulgarian).

258

State and Service Institutions

Table 4. Health services 1960

1970

1980

1990

Population per 1 doctor

715

538

407

315

Population per 1 dentist

3304

2737

1 834

1471

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1961, 1971, 1981, 1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Private medics registered by 31 December 1995 1992

1993

1994

1995

Doctors

4124

7423

9424

10230

Dentists

2594

3669

4556

4640

572

952

1265

1320

Paramedics

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 37 (in Bulgarian).

259

8.3 Welfare System

8.3 Welfare System

There are two periods in the development of Bulgaria's welfare system. The first period is characterized by a high level of centralization and strong dependence on the national budget, with the welfare system covering a large part of the population. Beneficiaries were entitled to long-term generous payments which did not necessarily have an adequate economic and social effect. The transition to a market economy calls for adjustment of the welfare system to new realities. The deep economic crisis has been affecting public prosperity, with an increasing number of social groups needing social protection. Bulgaria has an advanced social security system with a long history and tradition Social insurance (the first social security net), which is a key element of social security, became effective upon passage of the 1881 Assistance of the Disabled Act and the payment of pensions to public employees. A Compulsory Social Insurance Act was passed in 1924. The main branches of social insurance were thus in place by the Second World War. The principal features of Bulgaria's welfare system between 1960 and 1990 were the following: * high level of centralization and dependence on the national budget which, in past periods of budget surplus, led to the relocation of funds; * broad coverage of the needy, along with irrational (excessive and inexpedient) welfare payments; * lack of optional forms of social insurance - the available forms of social insurance were limited and uniform; * incomplete coverage of insurance risks; * strong concentration of the insurance system which practically lumped together all insurance risks; * uniform social security contribution (tax-like in character) in which the distinction between risks was blurred;

260

State and Service Institutions

* extravagant and long-term payments which were ineffective and inconsistent with the requirements of either economic or social efficiency. (Social Protection... 1995: 15-16). Public consumption funds tended to grow steadily, from 700 million leva in 1960 to 10,821 million in 1990 They accounted for more than 70% of the national income in the 1980s. Public consumption funds were financed primarily by the insurance institutes and the national budget. The bulk of their expenditure was on health care, social security, physical culture, sports and tourism. Welfare payments likewise increased steadily, from 134 million leva in 1960 to 1,697 million in 1990. The main areas of state socialist social security were: * temporary disablement benefits; * maternity and child benefits; * pension schemes (The Social Policy of the BCP..., 1980: 405-406). The Pensions Act enforced in January 1958 overhauled pension law (diversifying pension schemes, offering a number of concessions, raising pensions considerably, etc.). In the 1960s, the proportion of cooperative farmer pensions was larger than that of any other pensions. In the 1980s, their proportion decreased dramatically, contrary to that of retirement, disablement and other pensions. "Social" (means-tested welfare) pensions were instituted after 1980. In 1975, pension expenditures constituted 7.4% of the national income, 9.9% of the consumption fund, 32% of public consumption funds and 11.3% of national budget outlays (The Social Policy of the BCP..., 1980: 418). The change of the system of ownership and management called for reconsideration and a substantial change in the welfare system This system has acquired new dimensions. One of the most important requirements of government concerns the projection, specification and organization of the welfare system according to economic and social realities (Social Protection..., 1994: 10-11). The changes in society, politics and the economy require changes in the welfare system. In line with the endorsed strategy, reforms in the welfare system should ensure continuity, conform to market principles, democratize management and meet European standards. The reform started with the

261

8.3 Welfare System

separation of national social insurance from the national budget. A two-tier National Social Security Institute was set up. The Institute has four autonomous funds: pensions, health insurance, unemployment, and industrial accidents and occupational diseases. National insurance remains compulsory and is funded by social security contributions by employers and beneficiaries, along with state subsidies. At the same time, a free insurance market has been created. Seven insurance joint-stock companies are currently operating on that market. They offer voluntary pension schemes in addition to the state pension. The reform should establish the tax-funded welfare system as a separate institution (Doulev, 1996: 172). The changes in the welfare system have been uneven, uncoordinated and ambiguous This could impede the implementation of reforms. There is popular discontent with the low welfare payments - pensions, benefits, allowances - as well as their delayed payment. Budgetary constraints curtail fundamental constitutional rights of citizens. Divestment of welfare activities is another major area of decentralization and deconcentration. Nongovernmental organizations have a particularly important role in this respect, and that calls for express legislation and special government support. The measures for social protection of unemployed young people target the consequences of large-scale redundancies. The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs has developed a special programme promoting youth employment which includes training and retraining of unemployed young people, encouragement of newly established private businesses, and incentives for creating jobs for this high-risk group (Social Protection..., 1995: 72). The priorities in the social protection of unemployed women in the period of marketization are: job protection (insofar as possible in the course of structural adjustment) and creation, improved organization of work in production units, assistance to unemployed women starting their own businesses in the arts and crafts, trade, etc. (SocialProtection..., 1995: 88-98). Social insurance and protection of children from high-risk families is an important indicator of the course of economic and social reforms. Creation of an adequate security system is imperative in the period of transition. This

262

State and Service Institutions

system should be effective and efficient. For this reason, it should rest on the following principles: * targeted social protection; * differentiated attitude to beneficiaries; * priority implementation. The major factors determining the efficiency of the system in the present socioeconomic conditions are the following: 1. Limited financial and other public resources. 2. Fast rate of impoverishment and constant increase in the number of people needing social protection (Social Protection..., 1995:118). The largest high-risk group is that of pensioners There are many reasons for the low living standards of retirees. First, pensions are pegged to previous incomes and therefore indirectly depend on the development of the economy. Second, a number of problems accumulated over the course of the centrally planned economy. When financed out of the national budget, the retirement insurance system was chronically underfunded and failed to solve many problems. The present large budget deficit has intensified their negative influence. Third, the legislature has been very slow to respond to the changes. Between 1989 and 1994, the average pension reached 31% to 44% of the average wage, which is far below international standards. The average pension constitutes 78% to 96% of the minimum wage. The minimum pension is very low: about 63% to 67% of the minimum wage. The margin between the average and the minimum pension is tending to decrease. The minimum pension has risen from 60% to 65% of the average pension, which indicates a distinctive tendency towards equalization (Social Protection..., 1995: 139-140).. The number of pension beneficiaries has tended to drop in recent years from 4.18 million in 1989 to 2.87 million in 1993, or 68.7% of the base level. Marketization and the general crisis have affected the social protection of pensioners. There are a number of reasons for this trend, starting with rising unemployment, non-payment of social security contributions by private companies and emigration by people of working age. Darina Rouscheva

263

8.3 Welfare System

REFERENCES Doulev, S. (1996) Social Problems Generated by the Transformation in Bulgaria. In: Topical Problems of the Economic Transition in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Skopje, pp. 167-173. Social Protection of the Poor, Unemployed and Consumers in the Transition to Market Economy (1994) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Social Protection of the Main High-Risk Groups of the Population (1995) Sofia: Prof. Marin Drinov Press (in Bulgarian). The Social Policy of the BCP and Bulgaria's Development (1980) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Public consumption funds

Total, mln leva incl. health care, social insurance, physical culture, sports and tourism % of total

1960 700

1970 2 131

1980 5286

1990 10821

468 66.7

1438 67.5

3528 66.7

7531 69.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1971, 1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Public consumption funds (by Source of Funding) (%)

Total incl. from national budget from insurance institutes from enterprises, institutions and organizations

1980 100.0 40.6 47.8 11.6

1990 100.0 40.9 49.3 9.8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

264

State and Service Institutions

Table 3. Welfare payments (in mln leva)

Total

1960

1970

1980

1990

134.0

369.3

891.5

1 697.3

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1971, 1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Pensions by type, by 31 December (%)

Total incl. retirement, disablement, war veterans, special merits, etc. cooperative farmers artisans, traders and people with free professions social

1960

1970

1980

1990

100.0 27.7

100.0 37.0

100.0 61.4

100.0 83.8

71.9

62.3

36.0

13.2

0.4 -

0.7 -

0.7 1.9

0.8 2.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1971, 1991) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

265

8.4 The State

8.4 The State Bulgaria has a republican rule. The 1971 Constitution legitimized the abolition of private property and proclaimed the Bulgarian Communist Party a leading role in society and the state. A well pronounced tendency is the strong role of the state in the economy. On one hand, nihilistic attitudes to the state are shared. On the other hand, there are expectations of mandatory state resolution of every single problem. The 1991 Constitution established a republic with parliamentary rule, a division of powers, and local self-government typical of Western liberal democracies. Political traditions and belated modernization determine a strong role of the state in economy and society Under the 1879 Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria, the Principality was a hereditary and constitutional monarchy, with the legislature elected by popular vote. The Prince was head of state. Bulgaria had a multi-party system, a Parliament limiting the rights of the monarch, and executive power divided between the Prince and the Council of Ministers. There was an independent judiciary. The Turnovo Constitution was in force from 1879 to 1946, although in various periods it was suspended or abridged. The regional peculiarities, lack of natural resources, economic infrastructure and political traditions are factors determining the need to a strong role of the state in the economy. The state granted privileges to the national capital and was bound, through a developed and flexible tax system levied on all subjects, to provide funds for education, health care, culture, national defense and internal security. The post-1944 nationalization of industry ensured over 90% state ownership of industry in Bulgaria, plus over 90% state-conducted trade and thus an absolute dominance of the state in economic relations. The state determined both the participation of its subjects in the production of the gross national product and the consumption of citizens. The tax system and social security funds were replaced by the size of wages. Taxes became formal to a large extent. Until the end of the 1970s, the individual contribution to the

266

State and Service Institutions

gross national product was hardly, if at all, proportional to the individual wage. The low economic activity of citizens was compensated by the very high economic activity of the state. The entire economic activity was practically concentrated in state bodies. For its part, the state provided health care, education, welfare benefits, etc. The funds in the national budget were not directly dependent on the size of taxes. The national income was mainly formed from the direct revenue of state-owned enterprises. The system of distribution of wealth was wholly controlled by the political elite. The exclusive state management of the economy suppressed the initiative and responsibility on the part of citizens The 1971-1990 period was judicially regulated by the 1971 Constitution, which legitimized the abolition of private property in Bulgaria's socialisttype economic system. Democratic mechanisms were blocked by Art. 1, Para 2, which proclaimed the Bulgarian Communist Party the leading force in society and the state. Party bodies dominated state bodies. The state was governed by a party nomenklatura. Statehood in Bulgaria is associated with certain traditional factors in Bulgarian political and economic life that influence the state's ability to control civil relations. Patriarchal relations, egalitarian dispositions and a nihilistic attitude to the state have survived in Bulgaria in a particularly acute form. In many cases, citizens preserved individual autonomous relations close to the private ones, without conforming to the letter of, or directly skirting the law. The ideological character of government in the 19441989 period and Bulgaria's subordination to the Soviet Union did not succeed in prevailing entirely over social relations as prescribed by the Constitution and the law. At the same time, the long period of exclusive state management of the economy stripped citizens of economic enterprise and affirmed stereotypes such as lack of initiative and responsibility on the part of citizens, expectations of mandatory state resolution of every single problem, of state responsibility for employment, pensions, wages, etc. The development of the statutory framework of market economy and democratic politics has not been completed yet The 1991 Constitution established a republic with parliamentary rule, with a division of powers and local self-government typical of Western liberal democracies. Art. 8 divides the powers into legislative, executive and judici-

267

8.4 The State

ary. The legislative power is administered by a National Assembly made up of 240 MPs with a four-year mandate. The head of the state is the President of the Republic, directly elected by the electorate for term of five years, who does not have the right to initiate legislation and to dissolve Parliament, nor has direct executive functions. Executive power is exercised by the Council of Ministers, who are elected and controlled by the National Assembly. The judiciary is independent. The application of the Constitution is ensured by an independent Constitutional Court. Chapter 2 of the Constitution regulates fundamental rights and duties of citizens typical of a liberal political system. Art. 17 decrees that property shall be inviolable. Under Art. 19, the economy of the Republic of Bulgaria is based on free private enterprise. The law must guarantee equitable legal conditions for economic activity to all economic actors. The process of separation of the state from the management of the economy is being conducted gradually, and by the state itself The liberal role of the state, affirmed by the Constitution, has been gradually endorsed by a series of laws enacted in the 1990-1996 period. The Restitution Act, the Act on the Property of Agricultural Land and the Privatization Act are playing a leading role in the introduction of private property supported by administrative and court procedures. During socialism, the role of the state was assigned to an enormous bureaucratic apparatus. The post1989 decline in the role of the state demands the dismissal of a large part of this apparatus, its depoliticization and its assumption of the sole role of conductor of the will of the state. A system of state control over private economic actors has also been created. A new financial and tax administration system and system of financial and state control are being into place. The National Assembly has yet to enact fundamental laws on social security, health care, education and insurance which will relieve the state of these functions, leaving to it the controlling and regulating role. The state budget policy since 1990 has been characterized by a gradual decline in outlays for education, health care and culture in the national budget. Expenditure on transport remains comparatively stable. The tendency is to finance education and health care from municipal and private sources, as well as from public social funds. The country's sizable public and foreign debt has left a deep mark on the budget policy since 1990, and

268

State and Service Institutions

this tendency will continue for the next 30 years - the term of payment of Bulgaria's foreign debt. Municipalities have state functions in the sphere of regional development, public administration, public law and order, defense and protection of the population in disasters. Municipalities have been delegated state functions in the conduct of elections, referendums and others. Under the effective system of territorial administration, the country has nine regions. As part of the state administration, they are subordinated to the Council of Ministers and ensure that the state policies reflect on the execution of the decisions of the President and the Prime Minister, law enforcement and defense of national interests. Territorial administration is expected to be reformed in order to give more power to local and regional government. Maria Pirgova REFERENCES Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, 1995 (in Bulgarian). Structure and Activity of Local and Regional Government in Europe (1993) Sofia: Ministry of Regional Development (in Bulgarian).

9 MOBILIZING INSTITUTIONS

9.1 Labour Unions

The labour unions in Bulgaria were initiated in the 19th century for defending the economic interests of workers. They were influenced by the Western European syndicate tradition and the developing social democracy at the beginning of the 20th century. The syndicates in the textile, miners' and transport industries were traditionally strong. The most powerful autonomous movements were organized by the syndicates in Bulgaria in the period 1906-1921. During the bulk of their existence they have been tied with the political regimes. After 1944 they represented typical government-subjected organizations. After 1989, the labour movement in Bulgaria has become pluralistic, manifesting itself in typical syndicate forms. The party and free syndicalism have been determining factors in the syndicate traditions The organized labour movement in Bulgaria was created and developed later than in the Western European countries, influenced by their experience and traditions. The national development of trade unions has been characterized by all trends of syndicalism - free, party, autosyndicalism (anarchist syndicalism), Christian and government-subjected syndicalism. In the very beginning, two main syndicate seats were established, closely linked with the two wings of social democracy - the General Workers' Syndicate Union (GWSU), created in 1904 and linked with the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (narrow socialists - later communists) and the Free GWSU (also formed in 1904) which was under the influence of the Bulgarian Workers' Social Democratic Party (wide socialists - later the social democratic party). State dominated unified organizations appeared two times. First, the offi-

270

Mobilizing Institutions

daily supported Bulgarian Workers' Union was established after 19 May 1934. The General Workers' Labour Union was formed after 9 September 1944 and later renamed as the Bulgarian Labour Union. Syndicalism in its pure form in Bulgaria has never existed Some tendencies in this direction and some centrist stands in the syndicate activities were manifested only by the syndicates of civil servants which united in 1911 and formed the centrist syndicate grouping named Union of Unions. The character of the syndicate movement was basically determined by the two main syndicates - GWSU and the Free GWSU, which never united. The two major syndicate trends were differentiated in strategy and tactics. The Free GWSU maintained the line of syndicate struggle for improving the social and material situation of workers through economic strikes, protests and petitions. It represented the typical social democratic orientation. The other trend - GWSU, always connected the economic struggle with the political one and subjugated economic ways of fighting to political ones. After 1919 the GWSU closely linked its activities with the communist party. In international terms the labour unions in Bulgaria have had different orientations and appurtenances untill 1944. During the period 1960-1989 the labour unions in Bulgaria represented party and state policy The workers were organized in industry-specific labour unions. For several years, even the membership dues were paid in a centralized way, deducted directly from monthly salaries. All decisions of the labour unions loyally followed the decisions of the congresses and forums of the communist party. The labour union and party nomenclaturas were closely tied. The beginning of the eighties marked a kind of liberalization in labour relations. It influenced the labour unions in terms of searching for forms of self-management of the working teams and tying workers' salaries with their productivity. These measures remained within the frames of the oneparty system and the total state property. In practice, they did not change the government-subjected character of the labour unions. A pluralistic syndicalism appeared again in Bulgaria after 1989

271

9.1 Labour Unions

The first informal labour union was formed in the spring of 1989 and was legalized after 10 November of the same year. This was the Confederation of Labour "Podkrepa" which declared itself as a public non-party organization uniting representatives of the intelligentsia, industrial and agrarian workers, civil servants and students. Upon registering, "Podkrepa" announced its minimal membership of 50000 persons but in 1992 it reported to have 500 000 members. The Confederation is represented in many service industries. In 1990 it participated jointly with the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) in the elections. Until January 1992 it manifested a strong level of political activity together with the UDF. After breaking its close ties with the UDF, "Podkrepa" oriented itself towards realizing its economic influence in the metallurgical, petrol and chemical industrial sectors. Immediately after the political change of 1989, the governmentsubjected labour union BLU declared its independence from the Communist Party and stated that its major goal was to defend the social and economic rights of its members. In February 1990 the Confederation of Independent Syndicates in Bulgaria (CISB) was established. CISB has preserved its place as the biggest syndicate organization, though with considerably fewer members than the former labour union. After conducting an internal census in the beginning of 1993, CISB reported 1 663 821 members in 76 industrial and professional formations comprising 12 500 local organizations, enterprises and establishments. The CISB's opponents in the labour movement regard it as the direct inheritor of the party-subjected labour unions and call into question the character of its reforms. By 1994 CISB already played an independent role in the territory of the enterprises and in political relations. Ever since its establishment, CISB has been acting on the issues of legislation and national economy without being visibly linked with political parties. It sticks to a pragmatic, cautious and constructive approach. In the beginning of 1994 it organized a wave of strikes among miners, the biggest in its history. The CISB actively cooperates with syndicate organizations from Central and Western Europe. CISB has a status of observer in the European Confederation of Trade Unions (ECTU) and maintains active contacts with the International Organization of Labour. There are several other independent syndicate organizations with national or local significance:

272

Mobilizing Institutions

-The National Labour Union was established in 1992, claiming to have about 30 000 members in the transport (basically sailors and dockers), metal-working, and chemical and power engineering industries. It has been consistently supporting the political manifestations of the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF); - The Association of Democratic Labour Unions was formed by organizations that left or were expelled from CL "Podkrepa" in December 1992. They are not registered as a national representative organization and maintain close links with the UDF; - The Commonwealth of Bulgarian Free Syndicates is in principle different from the remaining syndicates. It unites 6 organizations whose members predominantly come from the private sector. It was founded by the Free Business Labour Union and includes as members the Labour Union of Power Engineering Workers, the Academic Labour Union, the Union of Professional Sailors - Varna, the Union of Bulgarian Actors, and the Federation of University Syndicates. The CBFS has been registered with over 70 000 members in 11 industrial sectors; - The labour union "Edinstvo" was formed by organizations having left the CISB. Its organizations are predominantly comprised of pensioners. The new syndicalism in Bulgaria is a function derived of political and economic changes that occurred after 1989 The labour union movement is being gradually oriented at modern forms of defending the workers' interests. Successful application is performed of the strike forms in the enterprises at regional and national level. The labour unions have powerful political contacts. Their political activities are still a priority compared to their defending functions. They successfully compete with the greatest political powers. They have deeply penetrated private economic structures and relations. The syndicate activities are intermingled with the management of property, often with corruption. The labour unions have strong lobbying positions in Parliament and in other higher state institutions. Since 1990, attempts have been made at applying and realizing the tripartite system At the Council of Ministers, establishment has been made of the Council for Cooperation including representatives of CL "Podkrepa", CISB, representa-

273

9.1 Labour Unions

tives of the employers and of the state. During 1991 and 1993-1994 the tripartite system gave good results in the course of the economic reform. The labour unions take part in the Council for Cooperation as well as in the sessions of the Council of Ministers as observers and render a real influence on the formation of prices and incomes. A particularly significant role is played by the Council for Cooperation when compensating the workers' incomes that were reduced by inflation. The efforts of the labour unions are focused on the struggle with unemployment. Their resistance to the liquidation of a number of unprofitable and uncompetitive enterprises leads to their confrontation with the executive authorities. The labour unions are very active in concluding collective labour contracts and individually defending workers' rights. In this respect, CISB and CL "Podkrepa" already have a good amount of experience. The politicization of labour unions, the promotion of private business and the difficulties of the economic reform are factors which around 1994 brought about a real drop of the activeness of the big labour union groupings and the outgoing tide of their members. The labour unions represent an important part of the democratic system of industrial and political relations in Bulgaria. They tend to be among the more active social subjects. Maria Pirgova Hristo Atanassov Development of the syndicate movement in Bulgaria 1879 - 1994 syndicate organizations till the establishment of syndicate main seats Free General Workers' Syndicate Union (Free GWSU) - 1904 General Workers' Syndicate Union (GWSU) - 1904 Confederation of Labour (CL) - 1919 GWSU- 1919 Union of Unions (UU) - 1911 (Syndicates of Civil Servants) Free General Workers' Syndicate Union (FGWSU) Independent Workers' Labour Unions (IWLU) -1925 Bulgarian Workers' Union (BWU) - 1935 Branch Associations of Civil Servants (BAGS) - 1935

274

Mobilizing Institutions

General Workers' Labour Union (GWLU) - 9.09.1944 Bulgarian Labour Unions (BLU) - 1961 Independent Bulgarian Labour Union (IBLU) - 25.11.1989 Union "Podkrepa" (UP) - 8.11.1989 Confederation of Labour "Podkrepa" (CL "Podkrepa") - 28.10.1989 Confederation of Independent Syndicates in Bulgaria (CISB) - 11.1990 People's Labour Union "Edinstvo" (PLU "Edinstvo") -1991 Commonwealth of Bulgarian Free Syndicates (CBFS) - 1992 Confederation of Labour "Podkrepa" (1989) National Labour Union (NLU) - 01.1991 Association of Democratic Labour Unions (ADLU) -12.1992 Table 1. Membershio in syndicates 1960-1994 Years 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1977 1982 1988

Men

992 320 1 034 003 1 091 685 1 149 894 1 187790 1 258 445 1 342 575 1 401 266 1 449 966 1 472 420 1 522 247 1 593 112 1 635416 1 725 835 1 968 400 2063 194 2 109 897

Women 479 476 495 006 544 299 611 379 682458 749 725 856114 908 048 967 306 1 014646 1 063 954 1 148 346 1 204 020 1 356 670 1 83 1 600 1 919806 1 963 264

Total number of members 1 471 796 1 529 009 1 635 984 1 761 273 1 870 248 2008 170 2198689 2309314 2417272 2 487 066 2586201 2 741 458 2 839 436 3 082 505 3 800 000 3 983 000 4073 161

- CISB: in 1993 reported 1 663 821 members; - CL "Podkrepa": in 1990 on registering announced 50 000 members (in November 1992 K.Trenchev declared the availability of 500 000 members); - PLU "Edinstvo": in 1991 claimed to have 184 000 members; - CBFS: in 1993 reported 70 000 members; - National Labour Union: in 1992 claimed to cover 30000 members; - Association of Democratic Syndicates: in 1993 claimed to comprise 30 000 members.

% of affiliation 94.3 94.4 94.9 94.3 94.9 95.0 95.9 96.0 95.2 95.8 96.4 96.6 97.8 97.2 98.4 99.3

275

9.1 Labour Unions

Table 2. Membership in the different syndicates in 1992 (percentage) Total number of persons affiliated with syndicates

From them in CISB

From them inCL "Podkrepa"

From them in National Labour Union

From them in PLU "Edinstvo"

From them in other syndicates

77.8

74.4

22.2

1.2

0.4

1.8

276

Mobilizing Institutions

9.2 Religious Institutions

The Orthodox Church is pervasive in Bulgarian society. This has been a steady and consistent trend since the late 19th century. The ratio of the other religious denominations - Muslim, Protestant, Catholic, Judeo-Gregorian etc. - has not changed either. In the past few decades, the traditional bond between the Orthodox Church and state power has been gradually replaced by a trend of independence and sovereignty of the religious institutions. The state has retained control through partial funding and sanctioning of the decisions of all religious institutions. The Church is traditionally regarded as the guardian and exponent of national identity Mutual understanding and alliance between state and Church are typical of Orthodox Christianity. As the new Bulgarian State emerged in 1878, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was in a privileged position compared with the other religious denominations. The Constitution of 1879 separated the Church from the State and acknowledged Orthodox Christianity as the official religion. The State subsidized the Church. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church owned real estate worth about 800 million leva prior to the 1947 nationalization. In the decades after the Second World War the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was deprived of its freedom. The Church lost its importance, financial might and positions in Bulgarian society. The main reasons lay in the profound and consistent atheistic activity that evolved from party to state policy and was pursued with the involvement of state bodies and organizations. This atheistic activity targeted the Orthodox Church itself. After 1960, religious matters were regulated in line with the International Bill of Human Rights and the Vienna 1989 Concluding Document. There was formally declared freedom of religion and constitutionally guaranteed religious rights and freedoms. This prevented the outbreak of conflicts between state and Church. During the period of state socialism, the

277

9.2 Religious Institutions

Church continued to receive state subsidies, with the state also covering part of the conservation expenses of churches and monasteries designated as monuments of culture. Serious blows were dealt to the Church They included: - a large part of its land was handed over to cooperative farms ; - in 1951, the Faculty of Theology at the St Kliment Ohridski State University of Sofia awarding university degrees in theology was turned into a theological academy, subordinate to the Holy Synod; - the Plovdiv Seminary merged with the Sofia Seminary and was moved to Cherepish Monastery; - publishing was minimized to the publishing house of the Holy Synod; - the numerous religious brotherhoods, children's, school and student Christian societies stopped operating; - there was a permanent downward trend in the number of priests and Faculty of Theology alumni (Table 2). Within the context of these changes, there were no changes in the number of churches and monasteries, but many of them practically stopped operating (Table 3). The other religious denominations were also affected by the state atheistic policy, but the changes in them were not as notable because of the irrelatively smaller share of believers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church succeeded in conducting activity within the limits imposed by the totalitarian regime. The settlement of the schism issue (the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was recognized by the Constantinople Patriarchate in 1961) was a major achievement, along with the steady upward trend in the number of religious funerals, weddings and baptisms, as well as the increasing number of church-goers. The number of applicants for the Faculty of Theology rose from about 60 students in the 1960s, to 200 full-time and about 70 extramural students in the 1980s. Even though this did not change the clergy dramatically, the average age of priests tended to decrease. In addition, in 1982 the Holy Bible was published in Bulgarian for the second time since 1925. Finally, revenue has exceeded expenditure in the past 20 years, and this has contributed to the financial stabilization of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.

278

Mobilizing Institutions

The Muslim denomination is represented by the Chief Mufti's Office in Bulgaria, the Supreme Muslim Theological Council, regional mufti's offices, regional imams and mosque boards of trustees. The role of those structures definitely tended to decrease in the period after 1944, but picked up after 1985 when the state tried to change the names of Bulgarian and Turkish Muslims by force. The period of democratization of Bulgarian society has emerged as one of religious euphoria that has remained directly associated with political euphoria There have been positive developments: the Union of Clergymen has been restored; the Sofia Seminary is moving back to its original building; and the Plovdiv Seminary and the Faculty of Theology at the St Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia are reopening. Since the start of the democratic changes, the Muslim religious institutions have been granted considerably more funds than the Orthodox Church, as well as state approval of their activity. The Statutes of the Muslim Community seated in Sofia, passed in May 1992, were endorsed by the Council of Ministers. On that basis, the Muslim community was acknowledged as a separate legal entity. Earlier, in 1990, a post-secondary Theological Islamic Institute was set up - the only institution training Muslim clergy in Bulgaria. In 1992, there were 750 district imams, as many mosque boards of trustees, and seven regional imams. The Koran has been published in Bulgarian for the first time. The post-1989 period will also be remembered for the conflict within the religious communities in Bulgaria Two successive governments recognized two different holy synods and two different chief muftis. This triggered a permanent schism within the religious institutions. It has been impossible to find a reasonable solution to the conflict so far because of the following reasons: - the effective Religious Denominations Act, inherited from the state socialist regime, has not been amended and runs counter to the new Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. This enables indefinite postponement of ambiguous legal cases; - the political forces have failed to contribute to a settlement and practically used institutional religious conflicts to promote their own political interests, thus aggravating the schism;

279

9.2 Religious Institutions

- its apparently limited powers notwithstanding, the Directorate of Religious Affairs at the Council of Ministers, set up back in the 1960s, has inherited the functions of state control over religious communities which it used to have as a subsidiary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a body of executive power, this Directorate plays a substantial, albeit not overt, role in religious disputes. Once political bias and financial problems are dealt with, the religious institutions will acquire their real place and role in Bulgarian society. The nascent, but still quite weak cooperation between state and religious institutions is the possible safeguard of the democratic development and free operation of religious denominations in Bulgaria. Tatiana Bouroudjieva Radoslav Gulubov REFERENCES Results from Censuses. Demographic Characteristics. (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Stanoev, B. (1992) Orthodox Christianity in Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Population by religious denomination Year of census

1881 1888

1910 1920 1926 1934 1946 1992

Population of Bulgaria

2 007 919 3 154375 4337513

4 846 971 5 478 741 6 077 939 7 029 349 8 472 724

Orthodox (%)

Cathol ic (%)

69,94 76,86

0,28 0,59 0,74 0,70 0,74 0,75

0,02 0,04 0,15 0,12 0,12 0,14

0,60

0,20

84,01 83,81 83,40 84,39 84,89 86,20

Protestant (%)

Moham- Jewish medan (%) (%) 28,79

21,44 13,88 14,25 14,41 13,51 13,35 12,70

0,71 0,77 0,92 0,89 0,85 0,80 0,62 0,02

ArmenianGregorian (%)

0,17 0,07 0,28 0,22 0,46 0,39 0,09

Source: Results from Censuses. Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

280

Mobilizing Institutions

Table 2. Priests, monks and faculty of theology alumni year

priests

monks/nuns

alumni

1962

1900

109/230

60

1981

1 720

130/180

200

1992

1550

105/160

270

Source: Stanoev, B. (1992) Orthodox Christianity in Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Churches, monasteries and mosques in Bulgaria

year

churches, chapels

monasteries

mosques

1890

1 882

90

600

1936

3 176

101

680

1992

2980

98

750

Source: Stanoev, B. (1992) Orthodox Christianity in Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian).

281

9.3 The Military

9.3 The Military

During most of the period under consideration, from 1955 to the changes in 1989, the Bulgarian Army was a constituent of the armed forces of Warsaw Pact member countries. During state socialism, national and international defence of the socialist social system was at the core of the army's role definition. The Bulgarian Army has not been in any military blocs since 1989. Under the conditions of a pluralist society, defence of national sovereignty is at the core of the army's role definition. In the period of transition to democratic institutions and a market economy, the army has always been the highestrated public institution. Between 1945 and 1990, personnel training and instruction in the Bulgarian Army had a distinct ideological orientation Under state socialism, national and international defence (internal and external missions) of the socialist social system was at the core of the army's role definition. The Army participated in power through a hierarchic structure. A system of restrictions and privileges was applied vis-a-vis the command personnel, ensuing from the latter's role as custodian of the established socio-political system. In line with the dominant ideology, a distinct policy on building and maintaining the public image of the Army as "guardian of peace and socialism" was pursued. From 1955 to 1989, the Bulgarian Army was a constituent of the armed forces of Warsaw Pact member countries Even though Bulgaria was a member of that Pact, foreign troops, allied troops included, have never been deployed on its territory except during two military exercises in 1967 and 1982. The Bulgarian Army has not been employed in combat since the Second World War (Encyclopaedia Bulgaria, vol. 1: 515-519). By obligation of its duties as a Warsaw Pact member country, Bulgaria recruited two regiments with light armaments, which were employed in the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia. They had guard missions

282

Mobilizing Institutions

and were not employed in repressive action. Prior to 1989, despite the Army's officially proclaimed internal mission, it was never employed in repressive action, in the so-called 1984-1987 "Revival Process" (See 16.1 Ethnic Minorities) included. In the pre-1989 period, the Army played its role in the constitution, on an ideological-political basis, of a specific society into which the young generation had to be integrated. We might call it "camp" or "bloc" society. Socialization in the bloc society was contrasted with socialization in the universal human society and aimed at maximum unity and uniformity on the basis of a common ideology and political orientations (Mitev, 1991). The Bulgarian Army has not been in military blocs since the 1989 changes The 1990 Political Parties Act effectively banned political activity in the Bulgarian Army. As a result the parallel structures placing training on an ideological basis were eliminated. The Act bans the command personnel and the ranks from membership of parties and political organizations. It also bans political propaganda and campaigning in units. The majority of the officer corps approved that Act (Bongalova et al, 1995). Art. 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria binds the Army to guarantee the country's territorial integrity. In peacetime, the Army is manned in line with the Defence and Armed Forces Act whereby conscription is mandatory for all young men in good health. The new socio-political environment has triggered qualitative changes in the Army's mission as an institution of socialization. As a state supra-party institution, the Army has been turning into a major factor of political socialization of young people in the new system. A key aspect of the political socialization of young people in the transition from "bloc" to democratic society is the dismantling of the enemy image and change from confrontation to partnership (Yanakiev, 1995). It helps optimize the social integration of young Bulgarians on the national level. Service in the Army is conducive to instilling a sense of national ideals and patriotism. It helps overcome the present crisis in young people's set of values. The Army also plays a substantial role in the process of social integration of young people from minority groups. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Army, respectively, have been faced with radically new tasks. It has been fulfilling hitherto unprecedented missions: employment in peacekeep-

283

9.3 The Military

ing operations under UN aegis. In 1992 volunteers were recruited in an infantry battalion that was employed in the UN peacekeeping forces in Cambodia. Later on Army units were employed in Bosnia as well. The Bulgarian Army is the key component of the armed forces of the Republic of Bulgaria The Army consists of a General Staff, Land Forces, Air Force and Navy, which incorporate service branches and special forces, units of Military Intelligence and Military Police, the Military Academy and military schools, formations, units and activities under central jurisdiction. Besides the Army, the armed forces include the Border Guards and the Interior Ministry Troops, the National Security Service, the National Intelligence Service, the National Bodyguard Service and the troops under the jurisdiction of ministries and departments (Construction Corps, Transport Ministry Troops and Posts and Telecommunications Committee Troops). From 1960 to 1990, the strength of the Bulgarian Army was around 120,000, plus/minus 3,000. Until 1990, the period of conscription was two years. A 1990 amendment to the Universal Conscription Act reduced conscription to 18 months. As a result, the strength of the Bulgarian Army was trimmed to 104,000. The Bulgarian Army has the following principal missions during peacetime: • to accomplish missions, ordered by the state leadership, in effecting cooperation with the armed forces of neighbour and other countries for establishment of lasting peace, political and military stability in the Balkans and in Europe; • to maintain a defensive combat potential and combat readiness sufficient to deter a potential aggressor; • to perform guard missions on the international border, in the territorial sea and the airspace of the Republic of Bulgaria; • to share in the preparation of transport routes and a communications system within the territory of the country ensuring the placing of the country and the national economy on a war footing; • to render assistance to the public and to the state institutions in the event of natural disasters and industrial accidents;

284

Mobilizing Institutions

• take part in bilateral, regional and Europewide initiatives and understandings on confidence-building, arms control and military activities and fostering of openness in the military field. In the event of a military conflict, the Bulgarian Army has the following missions: • to deploy the relevant forces and place them in readiness for bat-

tle; • to repel the aggression launched in all possible forms and under any conditions of the situation; • through resolute and active defence to prevent large-scale military operations in depth of the country's territory, to block any further incursion of the aggressor and, through counteraction, to restore the integrity of the international borders (Military Doctrine..., 1994). For the fulfillment of these tasks, the Bulgarian Army is manned and supplied with armament and equipment in accordance with the requirements for defence sufficiency, within the international commitments assumed by the State. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on 19 November 1990 included provisions for a scheduled reduction of armament and equipment of the Bulgarian Army from 1990 to 1995 The following are the levels that should not be exceeded after 14 November 1995: • strength: 104,000 • tanks: 1,475 • armoured combat vehicles: 2,000 • 100 mm-plus artillery units: 1,750 • combat aircraft: 235 • strike helicopters: 67 After 1990 the defence budget of the Republic of Bulgaria tended to decline. The registered downward trend in defence spending results from the present state of the national economy. Despite the emerging imbalance of forces in the Balkans following the enforcement of CFE, as Table 2 shows,

285

9.3 The Military

this trend is likely to continue in the short term (Security in the Balkans..., 1995). In the period of transition to democratic institutions and a market economy, the army has always been the highest-rated public institution Public opinion polls found the confidence in the Army as an institution to have varied between 63% and 70% from 1990 to 1995, and lack of confidence, between 10% and 12%. (To compare confidence in the Army with that in the other state institutions, see 11.2 Confidence in Institutions.) The high rating of the Army compared with other state institutions is due to several factors. First, in the six years of transition to democratic government, the Army has come to be seen as a truly national institution. It has remained separate from politics. It is unanimously acknowledged to have functions of vital importance for the nation. This acknowledgement is independent of party allegiance, sex and age of respondents. Second, the ongoing process of differentiation of political and professional ranks in the top echelons of military administration has raised the Army's public prestige. A system of civilian control over the Ministry of Defence and the Bulgarian Army has been established and is developing. Third, there is the current process of humanization of relations in the Army. Indicatively, an officers' legion, Rakovski, was set up in 1990. Its main task is to provide professional protection to commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the armed forces. In the years since its foundation, the legion has contributed substantially to the protection of the rights of the officers as citizens in uniform. Admission to EUROMIL in 1993 is an acknowledgement of the Rakovski's achievements. An organization protecting the rights of Bulgarian Army conscripts, set up in 1993, was subsequently admitted to the European Council of Conscript Organizations (ECO). An express order by the Defence Minister legitimizes the organization and defines the status of spokespersons for conscripts in each Army unit (company). Fourth, the Army accomplishes new functions such as employment in humanitarian operations under UN aegis and joint exercises within NATO's Partnership For Peace initiative. The Army is thus helping to accelerate Bulgaria's integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures.

286

Mobilizing Institutions

In the process of transition to a civil society in Bulgaria, interaction between society and the Army is being established today Taking into account the changes in the military-political situation in the world and in the Balkans, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Bulgaria and the General Staff are reconsidering the principles of development of the Army as a steward of national security. The groundwork for that process was laid with the passage of a Concept of Reform of the Bulgarian Army by the Council of Ministers in 1992. The ultimate objective is to restructure, relocate, modernize and rearm the Army in accordance with international agreements (Vassilev, 1994). The Army is associated with new expectations. They could be summarized as follows: First, the Army should be relieved of all untypical activities and concentrate on the accomplishment of its immediate missions. Second, the Army should be separated from politics and trade. Third, the Army should always be under civilian control. This control expresses the desire of society to help cultivate in the military a sense of identity with and integration into society in order to facilitate their arduous and responsible profession and as a constant reminder of the respect it owes them. Fourth, the Army should strictly abide by its national character: traditions, training, instruction and, if possible, armament. For its part, civil society consciously assumes a single commitment: mobilization of its spiritual, material, and intellectual potential for the sake of national security, defence and the armed forces (Gindev, 1995). The Concept of Reform of the Bulgarian Army envisages cardinal reconsideration of the principles and system of recruitment, with eventual transition to a professional army The first stage in this respect will be the application of a mixed recruiting method (through volunteer service and conscription). This means recruiting professionals in all positions handling complicated equipment and armament, and conscripts for small arms and simpler logistic activities (Totomirov, 1995). The further establishment and development of the Bulgarian Army as a modern European army is put in place by the new Defence and Armed Forces Act which the National Assembly assented to in 1996. Yantsislav Yanakiev

287

9.3 The Military

REFERENCES Bongalova, St. N. Genkova, Y. Yanakiev (1995) Bulgarian Army Officers as a Socio-Professional Group: State and Prospects. Bulgarian Military Review, vol. 1 (in Bulgarian). Encyclopaedia Bulgaria (1978) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, vol. 1,515-519 (in Bulgarian). Gindev, E. (1995) Civil Society and the Armed Forces: Practical Aspects. Voenen Journal, N 1, 18-24 (in Bulgarian). Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Bulgarian Military Review, 1994, vol. 3-4, 3-15 (in Bulgarian). Mitev, P (1991) Society, Socialization, Socialism. In: N.Genov., Ed. Social Changes and Sociological Approaches, Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, 132-135 (in Bulgarian). Petrov, L. (1994) The Military Doctrine of the Republic of Bulgaria. Ministry of Defence Bulletin, N 3, 5-10 (in Bulgarian). Security in the Balkans and the Balance of Armed Forces and Armaments After the Enforcement of the CFE (1995) Voenen Journal, N 3, 21-30 (in Bulgarian). Totomirov, T (1995) The Professional Army: Problems and Prospects. Voenen Journal, N 3, 52-55 (in Bulgarian). Vassilev, H. (1994) Force Development in the Republic of Bulgaria. Ministry of Defence Bulletin, N 3, 53-58 (in Bulgarian). Yanakiev, Y. (1996) Socializing Functions of the Army Institution under the Conditions of Rapid Political Change. In: N.Genov, Ed. Society and Politics in South-East Europe. Sofia: National and Global Development, /•% ^"i r\ ^ r\ r\

Table 1. Military budget of the Republic of Bulgaria 1990 to 1994 Number 1 2 3 4 5

Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

% of GDP 3.70% 3.01% 2.69% 2.51% 2.58%

288

Mobilizing Institutions

Table 2. Balance between forces and armaments in the armies of Bulgaria, Turkey, Greece and Romania after CFE Strength and armaments

Bulgaria: Turkey

before

after

Bulgaria : Greece

before

after

Bulgaria: Romania

before

Strength

1 : 5.09 1 : 5.09 1 : 1.61 1 : 1.50 1 : 1.45

Tanks

1 : 1.19

Armoured combat vehicles

1.2: 10

lOOmm-plus artillery

1 : 1.29

Combat aircraft Strike helicopters

1.4: 10

after 1 :2.2

1 : 1.17 1 : 1.18

1.07: 1

1 : 1.56 1.08: 1

1 : 1.20

1: 1.55

1 : 1.05

1 :2.0

1.27: 1

1 : 1.07

1:1.54

1.18: 1

1 : 1.52

1 :3.2

1 : 1.24 1 : 2.76 1 : 1.05

1 : 1.8

44 : 00

1.5 : 10

44 : 00

1: U

1 : 1.9

1 : 1.49

1 : 2.36

289

9.4 Political Parties

9.4 Political Parties

Restoration of party pluralism is a distinctive feature of the transition to democracy. Under the 1991 Constitution, Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic. Responsibility for implementation of reform lies exclusively with political parties. Their role is rivalled only by the directly elected parliament. Political parties proliferated in Bulgaria from 1879 to 1934 Political parties multiplied from two, conservative and liberal in 1879, to 40, of which about ten had actual influence. Until 1919, the political parties played a leading role in the evolution of liberal and democratic statehood. After the First World War, they served the monarch (the actual centre of government) or were in parliamentary, legal and underground opposition to him. The left-wing forces, the biggest among them being the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU, alternatively known as the Bulgarian Agrarian Party) - gathered momentum until 1947. BANU was a left-wing populist party whose positions were a specific Bulgarian contribution to political ideology. In the 1920s, BANU covered the entire leftist spectrum and stunted the growth of social democracy. In 1934 all parties were banned. After 1944 a Party-state political system was established Party pluralism was restored after 1944. Using repression and offering certain people jobs in the administration, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) eventually became the dominant political force after 1947. Its leading role in society was vested in the 1971 Constitution. The only other party to survive was BANU. Its role was relegated to that of a BCP ally and satellite. The restoration of party pluralism marked the changes after 1989 Certain traditional parties such as the Social Democratic (BSDP), the Radical Democratic (RDP), the Democratic Party (DP) and the Nikola Petkov Bulgarian Agrarian National Union were restored in 1989 and 1990. New political parties also emerged - Ecoglasnost, the Green Party (GP) and the

290

Mobilizing Institutions

Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the latter supported mostly by the ethnic Turkish group. All except the MRF aligned in the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). In 1991, the UDF split in three: UDF, UDFCentre and UDF-Liberals. The latter two failed to win any seats in the 1991 parliamentary elections. Consequently, BANU, the Green Party, the Nikola Petkov BANU and others have a minimal influence on politics. More or less eponymous formations without any real independent influence were set up within the UDF. In 1990, the BCP was renamed Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), eventually shifting towards democratic socialism and European social democracy in terms of ideology, organization and practice. Four weak communist parties emerged on the extreme left of the political spectrum. Right-wing extremism is currently represented by non-influential nationalists. The party scene remained amorphous until 1996 Compared to the established democracies, Bulgaria still has proto-party formations. Under the Political Parties Act, parties must register in court. About 200 party formations were registered by 1996. The overwhelming majority were insignificant or phantom parties. Under the 1991 Election Act, parties must register with the Central Electoral Commission if they want to run in elections. Forty parties and coalitions ran in the 1991 parliamentary elections. Only the UDF coalition, the BSP and allies, and the MRF won seats. Splinter groups such as the Alternative Social Liberal Party (ASP), the Centre for New Policy (CNP), the Christian Republican Party and independent MPs left the Parliamentary UDF in 1993. A centrist faction walked out of the BSP, establishing the Civil Alliance for the Republic (CAR). The December 1994 general elections ushered the following political forces into parliament: the BSP, left-wing Agrarians and Ecoglasnost, the so-called Democratic Left, which had a majority; the UDF, the MRF, the Bulgarian Business Bloc (BBB), and the UDF-affiliated right-wing Agrarians and Democratic Party, aligned in the Popular Union. In the 1994 to 1996 parliamentary, local and presidential elections, CAR was close to but ultimately failed to clear the 4% barrier and was therefore not represented in the upper echelons of power.

291

9.4 Political Parties

The political forces are organized on the same pattern of central (national) leadership, regional coordinating structures and local cells Bulgaria's political parties and forces are mass- rather than class- or casteoriented. All major political parties have a democratic orientation. In the context of relative de-ideologizing of society, they uphold values - socioeconomic, cultural-ethnic and religious - rather than interests. The central leaderships largely overlap with the parliamentary floor leaderships. The UDF is the most notable exception. There were two rival trends within the Union: the formation of a political coalition dominated by the big traditional parties such as the Democrats and Radical Democrats, and the centralized structure subordinate to the apparatus of the UDF National Coordinating Council. In late 1996, power in the UDF was concentrated in seven or eight parliamentary floor leaders. They steered the UDF towards the establishment of a single party which superseded the coalition. The BSP and the MRF remain the best organized in terms of membership and structures regardless of their specific problems. By tradition, Bulgarians identify the party with its leader. The party press has a very important role. The party paper is sometimes more important than the cell. It is the paper rather than the cell that integrates the electorate. The records on party membership in Bulgaria have not been reliable since 1989 This is due to the rapid changes in society, as well as the fact that the Political Parties Act does not bind the former to report their membership. All parties have been overstating their membership in an effort to gain political clout and justify expenditure by membership dues. Until 1989, the BCP had over 800,000 members. In 1994, the BSP reported 406,000, but actually had 200,000 members. The Socialist electorate approximate 1.6 million (in the November 1996 presidential elections, down from more than two million in 1994). As a coalition, the UDF does not have its own members. In elections, it garners about 2.3 million votes. The actual members of the MRF do not exceed 50,000. In elections, about 350,000 to 400,000 or 5 % of the electorate vote for the Movement. In the 1994 general elections, the Bulgarian Business Bloc cleared the 4% barrier to parliament. It has a potential of about 10% in a majority vote.

292

Mobilizing Institutions

Certain opinion polls indicate that pro-monarchist formations may win 2% to 3% of the vote. The public is aware of the difference between the social democratic and environmentalist positions but cannot identify them with particular political parties capable of garnering 3% to 4% of the vote. All other political parties and coalitions have a rather limited independent electoral potential. Ageing of the electorate is a trend common to all political forces. Young people, as well as a social group aged 28 to 45 - about 500,000 of them employed in private business - do not have any particular political allegiance and are increasingly preoccupied with the problems of their personal and family prosperity. In 1996, young people, especially students, supported the opposition UDF. Political parties are funded by donations, by independent financial activity with tax breaks, and membership dues. Under the Election Act, political parties running in elections are entitled to interest-free loans from the central bank which they must repay upon winning seats in parliament. The ideological and organizational identity of political parties is still evolving The BSP has succeeded in controlling the Stalinist and pro-communist electorate, gradually re-orienting it towards left-of-centre positions and upholding socialist and social democratic positions, parliamentarianism, broad national consensus, protectionism of private business and mass privatization. The geopolitical views of the Socialist leadership include preserving national neutrality, upholding Bulgaria's European identity, keeping traditionally good and economically expedient relations with Russia, restoring and increasing influence on the Middle East market, and expanding ties with the Far East. The BSP takes most of the credit for the establishment and preservation of the parliamentary liberal democratic regime in Bulgaria since 1989. Its influence sagged in 1996. The UDF's integrative potential comes from its anticommunist and noncommunist ideology, with a priority on restorationist theses. There have been attempts to uphold right-wing values. The thesis of preserving the republican constitutional model prevails in the UDF leadership. On the whole, the UDF integrates different groups with more extremist views and controls them within the parliamentary model, but finds it hard to restrain supporters within the boundaries of tolerance. This is due to, among other things, the

293

9.4 Political Parties

rejection of the possibility of broad national consensus. The UDF's geopolitical orientation has a Euro-Atlantic priority, with a particular focus on ties with the US. Since the failure of the Socialist government, the public has had high expectations of the UDF. Even though it is based foremost on the ethnic Turkish group, the MRF is a political party of national relevance, and it has proved that by controlling ethnic extremism and forming an expert government on the MRF mandate in 1992. The MRF is a left-of-centre and social liberal party, with a general left-wing trend stemming from the social characteristics of its electorate. The MRF is a unique attempt to integrate an ethnic group into the structures of a unitary state in the conditions of painful transition. It upholds Bulgarian statehood and parliamentary rule. Apart from the BSP, UDF, MRF, BBB and certain extra-parliamentary forces such as CAR and the communists, the other political parties have little if any integrative potential and minimal influence on politics. They are either groups of intellectuals or phantom parties taking advantage of tax shelters, with no platforms or political activity. Vassil Penev REFERENCES Antova-Konstantinova, E. (1990) The UDF Leaders. Sofia: Sofia Press (in Bulgarian). Elections '91.- Interdisciplinary Survey on the 1991-1992 Election Campaign (1992) Sofia: St. Kliment Ohridski University of Sofia's Centre for Election Studies (in Bulgarian). Karasimeonov, G. (1993) Sea-Changes in the Bulgarian Party System The Journal of Communist Studies, September. Mitev, P.-E. (1992) From Communism to Democracy. The Structure of Political Space. Bulgarian Quarterly, Spring. Penev, V. (1992) Political Parties in Bulgaria after 1989: Establishing, Functions, Organizational Structures and Interaction. Bulgarian Quarterly, Autumn-Winter. Penev, V. and G. Karasimeonov (1997) The Emergence of Political Parties in the 1990 Election to the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly and the 1991 to the Bulgarian National Assembly. Berlin. Political Parties, Movements and Organizations in Bulgaria and Their Leaders (1990) Sofia: Sofia Press (in Bulgarian).

294

Mobilizing Institutions

9.5 Mass Media

The development of mass media in Bulgaria between 1960-1990 was characterized by two contrasting trends. On the one hand, the state socialist regime ensured its domination to a large extent because of a well elaborated system of propaganda requiring the use of most modern means of influencing the public conscience. On the other hand, the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution were introduced into the overall economic and cultural atmosphere in a slow and inefficient way. Since 1990 there has been a boom in the electronic media and newspapers. In the period after 1944, the Bulgarian press was unified and controlled by the political line of the communist party Each public organization or political power possessed editions of its own at central, regional and local levels. In 1973 the single daily circulation of newspapers in Bulgaria amounted to 8,074,033, providing daily concentration of 0.943. The newspapers was a total of 52 major with a completed circulation of 4,734,693 copies. After 1976 they were 85, exceeding 5 000 000 circulation. The central magazines numbered 268 with a combined circulation of 2 793 030 copies and a ratio in 326 per 1000 persons. Besides the editions in Bulgarian, newspapers were also published in Turkish, Armenian and Hebrew. Together with these quantitative characteristics, the state socialist regime provided highly qualified cadres and expanded the professionalism in journalism and the press. Ironically for history, the regime prepared a comparatively good basis for the democratic press. As a result of the isolation of Bulgaria from Western Europe, in the middle of the eighties only 3.1% of Bulgarians got their information from Western newspapers, and not on a regular basis at that.

295

9.5 Mass Media

The modern history of the democratic press began in 1990 At the end of the eighties there appeared some illegal dissident magazines like "Most" (Bridge) and "Izbor" (Choice). In 1990, under the pressure of the then-democratic opposition, the National Round Table decided to provide state aid to the opposition press. A real boom of opposition and independent printed editions occurred. As a whole, they expressed anticommunist and noncommunist leanings and started forming a pluralistic political forum. In the period 1990-1993 in Bulgaria there were 2219 periodicals registered. A part of the government-supported newspapers disappeared under the conditions of the market economy and others considerably changed their shape. The strongest central newspapers since 1990 have belonged to financial and bank conglomerates and their combined circulation amounts to 250-300 000 copies. They are followed by the party editions of the greatest political powers - "Douma" (Word) of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and "Democratsia" (Democracy) of the Union of Democratic Forces, respectively with 160 000 and 120 000 copies of daily circulation. The unbelievable increase of the newspapers' numbers in the country also affects regional levels. For instance, the region of Vidin (North-Western Bulgaria), with about 120 000 inhabitants, consumes 14 local weeklies together with the national daily newspapers. The tendency of increasing the editions' numbers is combined with a total decrease in their circulation - almost 50% less were registered in 1991. The press entirely changed the government-imposed or official language of the period before 1989 with a new newspaper jargon close to everyday language. Together with the distribution of the newspapers on the political scale of "left - right", some specialized editions were also formed, covering exclusively financial or minority issues. Newspapers are being issued simultaneously in the Bulgarian and Turkish languages, while others are committed to the issues of women, youth, etc. The consumption of printed editions throughout the whole period 19601993 has shown a lasting trend of a directly proportional link between educational level, property and social status, and the reading of printed media. At the end of 1993, newspapers were systematically read in the capital by 91% of the population, in the big towns - by 87%, in the small towns, by 77%; and in the villages by 58%.

296

Mobilizing Institutions

The trend of increasing the number of radio receivers proved to be lasting during the whole period 1960-1995 By 1944 in Bulgaria there had been three radio transmitters with a total power of 32 kW, 3 radio studios in Sofia, Stara Zagora and Varna, and 183 000 radio receivers. In 1974 the country had 35 radio transmitters with a total power of 1 100 kW. According to statistics for the end of 1973, 1 464 688 radio receivers were registered. However, sociological data from 1976 revealed that their real number amounted to over 2 700 000 radio receivers by that time. During the whole period under scrutiny, there has been one state radio station with three or four national programmes and five regional ones. Practically the whole territory of the country is covered by radio signal on middle and long waves. In comparison to Western European standards, Bulgaria has an insufficient coverage of its territory by radio signal, but compared to its neighbours in the Balkans it can be qualified as good. Bulgarian state radio broadcasts in the Bulgarian language. Until the middle of the eighties there had been Turkish language programmes for the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. The transmissions in Turkish were resumed in 1992. In addition, the national radio station broadcasts transmissions in the major European languages and in the languages of the neighbouring countries. By 1988 less than 2.5% of the population listened to foreign radio stations. For the first time in Bulgaria's history, in 1992 the Parliament adopted regulations allowing private radio stations to operate Since 1994, 40 private radio stations have actually been functioning, licensed by Parliament. All of them have a regional character. Some of the private radio stations rebroadcast at particular hours of the day or night programmes of the BBC or of Radio "Luxembourg" in English. Since 1990, Bulgarian retransmitters have been broadcasting the programmes of VGA, France inter and Deutsche Welle (Tables 3,4,5,6 and 7). Since 1959, television has become the fastest expanding form of mass media The first television signals in Bulgaria were established in 1955. At the end of 1959 Bulgarian Television was instituted, which in 1974 disposed of 10 television transmitters with a total power of 44.7 kW, and 120 retransmitters

297

9.5 Mass Media

covering 72% of the country's territory. After reconstructing the transmitters in the eighties, the signal now covers nearly 90% of the country's territory. In Bulgaria there is one state television station with two programmes. Since 1974, colour transmissions have been realized by the SECAM-DK system. This system limits the capacity for Bulgarian television to be received outside the country's territory with the exception of Romania, as in the remaining neighbouring states their receivers are not adapted to the SECAM-DK system or they receive picture with no sound. Bulgarian National Television makes use of equipment generally renewed between 1979 and 1981. The latest renovation was partial, accomplished in 1989-1991. In 1994, Bulgarian television started broadcasting a part of its programmes by the PAL system. Since 1984, particular regions of Bulgaria - the capital, Plovdiv, Rousse and the Black Sea coast - have been able to receive of the Russian programme "Ostankino". It covers about sixty percent of the country's territory. Since 1990, in the capital and in Plovdiv there have been rebroadcasts of the French television channel TV-5. Since 1994, CNN has been received. These two television stations cover about 25% of the country's territory. From the television stations of the neighbouring countries, a certain influence is exercised by Serbian television - in the Western part of Bulgaria's territory, and by Turkish television covering 1/3 of Bulgaria's territory and broadcasting on the same channels occupied by the two Bulgarian state programmes, which is in violation of the international norms. Since 1987, the purchase and use of a satellite antenna has required neither permission nor any commitments of the owner to the state. Practically all European programmes can be received via satellite. In 1993 the Parliament gave the private company "Globo" a licence to form of a unified system of cable television in the country, admitting the switching in of several operators. Practically all big towns and over 60% of the small municipalities already possess cable television. Several private television channels in Bulgaria have already been licensed by Parliament. All of them have a regional character. In the region around the capital CNN and the Bulgarian "New television" are registered as private television stations. Private television exists in the region of Kurdzhali (South-Eastern Bulgaria) and in the Dobrich region (NorthEastern Bulgaria) (Tables 8,9 and 10). Vassil Penev

298

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REFERENCES Penev, V. (1996) The Public Opinion between the Media and the Power, between the European Models and the Bulgarian Realities. Bulgarian Mass Media Studies. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1990-1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Dynamics of the number of newspapers and magazins published in Bulgaria Year Newspapers (titles) Magazines (titles) continued Table 1

1950

1956

1960

1965

1970

1975

63

80

164

105

1980

83

590

695

498

477

151

449

839

830

1014

Year Newspapers (titles) Magazines (titles)

1985

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

394

540

727

917

910

1059

959

834

728

681

768

Table 2. Dynamics of the annual circulation of newspapers and magazines Year 1950 _

Newspapers (circulation) Magazines 6 Jfi2 (circulation) continued Table 2 1980 1985

1956

3J9 9 443

1960

1965

6Q2 602813 2Q 923

1990

1991

902179

1100414

1098632

519700

64253

69598

47960

18700

25 3g4

1992

1970

81672o 843603 45 J25

1993

616000 615000 23800

1975

24200

49 %J

1994

611500

299

9.5 Mass Media

Table 3. Dynamics of the radio transmission

1975 Hours of transmission

Years 1980

1979

37Q51

4M98

1984 1985

43 n2

44gl2

442g4

continued Table 3

1990 Hours of transmission

Years 1992

1991

48718

47946

1993 1994

52833

161278

237483

Table 4. Dynamics of the number of radio transmitters Year 1960 1970 1980 1985

1948 Radio transmitters continued Table 4

Radio transmitters

26

56

76

1989

5

7

83

1990 85

Year 1991 1992 19931994994 85 149 150 157

Table 5. Dynamics of the power of the radio transmitters Year

1948 KW

1960 1970 1980 198519891989

109

570

1317 5310

5858

5987

continued Table 5

Year

1990 KW

6002

1991 1992 19931994199T 6002

8001

7607

7631

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Mobilizing Institutions

Table 6. Dynamics of the radio translaters

1948 Number 41 continued Table 6

Number

1990 2490

1960 1347 1991 2501

Year 1970 1980 1820 2019 Year 1992 2485

1985 2155

1993 2562

1989 2451 1994 2439

Table 7. Dynamics of local radio stations in towns and villages Year

1948 Number 41 continued Table 7

Number

1990 2854

1960 1 905

1970 2 489

1980 2 656

Year 1992 2917

1991 2861

1985 2 694

1993 2879

1989 2 846

1994 2848

Table 8. Dynamics of the TV transmitters Year

1948 Number continued Table 8

1960 1

1970

1980

7

24

1985 1989 34

44

Year

1990 Number

44

1991 44

1992 69

1993 107

1994 ~ 113

301

9.5 Mass Media

Table 9. Dynamics of the number of TV translators

1948

1960

Number

Year 1970 1980 85 374

1985 710

1989 923

continued Table 9

Number

1990 991

1991 1033

Year 1992 1 059

1993 1 073

1994 1 152

Table 10. Dynamics of the hours of TV transmission per year

Hours TV transmission incl. colour Bulgarian imported

1975 3887 1076 2005 886

1979 5207 3948 2792 1055

Year 1980 5 182 4365 2437 1 181

1984 5 103 5065 2743 1 183

1985 4545 only col.

1991 5998 only col.

Year 1992 6933 only col.

1993 6509 only col.

1994 7178 only col.

continued Table 10

Hours TV transmission incl. colour Bulgarian imported

1990 6248 only col.

10 INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL FORCES

10.1 Dispute Settlement

The model of centralized government of social processes, adopted after the Second World War, was connected with non-recognition of industrial conflicts under socialism. That changed the nature of dispute settlement. It was confined to the settlement of individual labour disputes. The post-1989 democratic changes unleashed accumulated discontents, triggering a wave of industrial disputes. The new legislation provides legal mechanisms for settling collective industrial disputes, with a focus on harmonization of interests. Dispute settlement under state socialism reflected the overwhelming power of the state in the system of labour relations The nature of dispute settlement under state socialism ensues from the adopted tenet on the nature of labour relations. This tenet claimed that the abolition of antagonistic classes following the 1947 nationalization of property eliminated the raison d'etre of labour conflicts. Under these circumstances, emerging controversies were presumably temporary and nonantagonistic. Following the enforcement of the 1951 Labour Code, which was strongly influenced by the Soviet labour relations model, dispute settlement mechanisms acquired a specific form. They reflected the new role of the state as supreme owner and employer, and the loss of original identity of trade unions whose role was reduced to transmission of the interests of the state. That ensured full employment and a number of other social benefits. Yet it ultimately limited individual civil and labour rights: both by narrowing the range of issues about which workers had the right to complain, and by limiting legal provisions on expression of discontent. First, regarding the nature of controversies, only labour disputes were acknowledged,

303

10.1 Dispute Settlement

considered to be disagreement between the parties to the contract of employment, namely worker and enterprise (Article 133 of the Labour Code). Labour conflicts were not legitimized. Second, in terms of type, only individual disputes were recognized, but not collective ones. Third, as regards subject, fundamental issues such as remuneration and working hours were not subject to labour dispute. They were specified by the state in a separate law. All those restrictions reflected on the means of expression and procedures applied in dispute settlement. Under state socialism, the law allowed the use of only peaceful means of dispute settlement Conciliation procedures were envisaged. There was a three-part structure of dispute settlement. The first two instances were on the enterprise level: the Conciliation Committee and the Trade Union Committee. They were inefficient mainly for two reasons. One reason was that their members did not have the appropriate legal competence. The other was that those members were dependent on the enterprise management. As a result of their handicapped protective function under state socialism, trade unions practically could not make decisions which were adverse to enterprise management. Nor were dispute settlement mechanisms such as mediation envisaged by the law. Even though the conciliation and trade union committees were mandatory, low efficiency ultimately prompted their replacement by a Committee on Labour Disputes in the 1986 Labour Code. However, that was a face-lift only, since it was not supplemented by respective changes in the nature of labour relations. The civil court was the third part. There were no specialized labour courts. The Arbitration Committee at the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in charge of disciplinary punishment of workers, existed until 1982. It did not satisfy the requirement of including an independent arbitrator. Insofar as there were no industrial conflicts according to the embraced social philosophy, workers were not entitled to settle disputes by pressure (by non-peaceful means). Throughout the period (1948-1990), the right to strike was not codified by law. According to the dominant ideology, the right to strike was incompatible with the nature of socialist labour relations. Discontents could thus acquire only individual, not collective form. Hence the focus was on preventing possibilities of transformation of individual into collective disputes. The mechanisms of timely settlement of emerging disa-

304

Institutionalization of Social Forces

greements were assumed to be enough. Moreover, it was assumed that disagreements could be ironed out through preventive control by specialized state and trade union controlling bodies (for instance, the Labour Inspectorate). Instruction of managers and workers in socialist law was also a priority. Industrial peace was achieved in that way - to the detriment of the individual's labour rights. The right to strike would have meant acknowledgement of social tensions which, in turn, would have eroded the status quo. Under state socialism there were no adequate channels of expressing accumulated discontents They were usually manifested in two ways. The official procedure was to raise the problems at meetings of the working collective, meetings with the management, etc. All too often, however, there was no follow-up. That was because meetings did not have the mandate to make binding decisions; nor did managers have autonomy to decide on crucial aspects of working conditions. This inevitably spawned a growth in informal mechanisms whereby discontents remained unexpressed on the formal level. The individual was often forced to find a settlement of his or her problem by "skirting" the law. The poor efficiency of institutional channels of expression of discontents and dispute settlement thus led to alienation and tacit tensions over working conditions, social security and living standards. The post-1989 democratization of labour relations saw the start of a balance of interests of the parties to dispute settlement which evolved into a mechanism of harmonization of interests The 1989 democratic changes unleashed accumulated tensions. Latent conflicts transmuted into overt ones. As a wave of industrial actions swept across the country threatening to blow up civil peace, the issue of collective industrial dispute settlement acquired particular significance. The spontaneous and unregulated wave of industrial actions between December 1989 and February 1991 necessitated reconsideration of the nature of industrial conflicts and their role in society. Labour conflicts triggered social tensions which accelerated the process of adoption of adequate legislation. The new statutory framework of dispute settlement is based on the 1991 Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, the 1991 Settlement of Collective Industrial Disputes Act and the 1992 amendments to the Labour Code. It provides key prerequisites for democratization of labour relations. First, the new laws

305

10.1 Dispute Settlement

acknowledge labour conflicts. Second, they regulate both individual and collective industrial disputes. Third, three kinds of issues are subject to labour dispute: labour relations (remuneration and working hours included), social security and living standards. Although the emphasis is on peaceful means of dispute settlement, the new laws regulate non-peaceful means as well. The right to strike is expressly acknowledged (Article 50 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria) as "a fundamental right of workers and employees to defend their economic and social interests." The Settlement of Collective Industrial Disputes Act sets standards of procedure expedient to a mutually acceptable outcome for the two parties to the dispute. The main form of mitigation of disagreements are direct negotiations between workers and employers or their representatives by a procedure which they are free to choose (Article 3, Para. 1 of the Disputes Act). If the parties fail to reach an agreement, other forms of dispute settlement are envisaged. Labour arbitration is part of the mechanisms of voluntary settlement of collective labour disputes. Under the Disputes Act, arbitration decisions are binding for the parties involved. Notwithstanding the legislative framework, however, labour arbitration is not a common form of dispute settlement yet. The popular mechanisms are direct negotiations (Article 3 of the Disputes Act) and, if they fail, strikes. Bulgaria does not have specialized labour courts dealing with individual and collective labour disputes without unnecessary delay. Without labour courts, though the institutionalization of the new dispute settlement system is incomplete. Industrial actions have been taken on an impressive scale in the course of the ongoing transition. That is due, on the one hand, to tensions fuelled by the economic crisis. On the other, it is rooted in the poor legal culture of and hard-to-build confidence between social partners. Building a tradition in prevention and voluntary settlement of collective labour disputes is an important condition for the efficiency of social dialogue and the achievement of public consensus. Implementation of the tripartite cooperation mechanisms (1993 Labour Code) has been a major legislative step in that respect. Stefan Dimitrov

306

Institutionalization of Social Forces

REFERENCES Anchev, D. (1982) Industrial Disputes and Procedures of Settlement. Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Ararski, V., I. Chavdarov (1990) Industrial Conflicts and the Wave of Strikes in Winter 1989-1990 Sindikalna Praktika, N 5-6 (in Bulgarian). Conciliation and Arbitration Procedures in Labour Disputes (1989) ILO: Geneva. Labour Code (1967) Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Labour Code (1986) Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Labour Code (1992) Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian) Mruchkov, V. (1992) Collective Industrial Disputes and the Right to Strike. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Salamon, M. (1992) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice. PrenticeHall: New York etc.

307

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions The nature of labour unions depends on industrial relations, which have undergone profound changes since the Second World War. During the period, two models of industrial relations in Bulgaria have produced two types of labour unions, and respectively two types of union Institutionalization. The first is characterized by direct control over labour unions by the state and the absence of union pluralism. The development of the second model started in 1989. It is marked by a process of emancipation of labour unions from state dictate, and of a building of a new union identity. Labour unions lost their identity under state socialism, where industrial relations were under direct state control The post-World War II process of institutionalization of labour unions in Bulgaria was determined by the type of industrialization, which was based on the principles of centralized planning. Influenced by the Soviet model of social organization, labour unions were dominated by the ruling party which proclaimed that state property belonged to the working people after nationalization. The vocation of the state itself was to express the interests of one and all. Unlike the so-called classical model of union evolution, this led to the incorporation of the single labour union by the state. The role of the unions was to implement state policies in the sphere of labour relations. This role was associated with redefinition of the functions of the parties to industrial relations since the state assimilated one of the parties in the classical model. The employer - worker relations, in which the State acts as regulator (when and if it interferes), was thus replaced by the model of relations between state (as owner, employer and regulator) and worker (labour organizations). The state, which centralized the management of all processes in society, industrial processes included, took full charge of the issues of economic security, provided through a policy of full employment, and remuneration. The absence of a concrete employer as a party to industrial relations, insofar as managers of enterprises represented state interests, left no room for labour unions, whose protective function atrophied. Key issues such as la-

308

Institutionalization of Social Forces

hour remuneration and working hours remained beyond the reach of labour unions. They were set by the state via separate laws independent of the 1951 Labour Code. Vis-a-vis those laws, the unions did not have the right to initiate legislation. Their protective functions boiled down to the right to defend workers' interests when the enterprise defaulted on contracts, but only when an individual manager had breached state standards on labour safety, working conditions, etc. They had a say on social provisions such as annual leaves, recreation and housing. As their functions changed in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, labour unions assumed roles that were not inherent to them. In production, they sought to increase the productivity of labour, mostly through socialist emulation and counter-planning. Unions thus lost their identity as representatives of the interests of labour, becoming part of the system of government, a transmitter of the ruling party's policies in the sphere of labour relations. Even though the law did not explicitly ban the existence of more than one labour union, there was practically no union pluralism in Bulgaria prior to 1989. There was a single labour organization, the Bulgarian Trade Unions (BTU), which incorporated labour organizations in all sectors of the national economy. The level of unionization was approximately 100%. The BTU was a bureaucratized institution. In the eighties, the trade unions were assigned a more active role vis-avis their productive functions In an effort to halt the decrease in labour productivity, in the early 1980s the state implemented the brigade organization of work. The state entitled them to take part in the drafting of legislation on organization of work on the national level (Labour Code), as well as on the sectoral (development of the respective statutory framework) and enterprise (internal rules) levels. Those attempts were cosmetic only and the centralistic administrative model of industrial relations remained intact. The absence of legitimate vents for discontent in the realm of labour led to the escalation of tensions. Insofar as the right to strike was not codified, discontent took the form of passive resistance and accumulated latent conflicts which flared up after 1989. The quest for new labour union identity was effected by winning independence from the state

309

10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions

Since 1989, labour unions have operated under the conditions of a transition to a market economy and democratization, which created prerequisites for their return to unions' genuine functions and the emergence of union pluralism. Their pressure forced the state to gradually change the rules in the course of recognizing the unions as a partner in industrial relations. Independent unions were institutionalized in two ways. One, exemplified by the BTU, was emancipation from the state, starting right after November 1989. The February 1990 extraordinary congress of the BTU became a constitutional congress of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB). The other way consisted of an emergence of alternative labour organizations. The Podkrepa Confederation of Labour was set up by a group of intellectuals in February 1989 as a dissident organization. Hence this determined the duality of its objectives: as a movement targeting the change of the political system, and as an organization with genuine trade union functions. There are two stages in the institutionalization of the new trade unions Stage one is notable for high unionist activity, pressing for both economic and political demands. The activity stemmed from the unresolved labour problems, but also from the void in protection of labour interests following the state's withdrawal from active regulation of social issues. The wave of industrial conflicts, which were often political, led to a series of agreements with the governments in 1990 and 1991. Those agreements became the guarantor of social peace, a sine qua non of reform. Developments outstripped the adoption of the new labour legislation which was needed to regulate relations between labour unions, the state, and the newly founded independent employers' associations. The profound 1992 amendments to the Labour Code laid the statutory groundwork for the introduction of tripartite cooperation and prompted labour unions to resume their classical functions in industrial relations. The transition to the second stage is characterized by primarily economic demands. It is frought with difficulties. The state still owns the larger portion of industrial assets. Under these circumstances, industrial conflicts with economic demands inevitably become politicized. Stage two is characterized by the surmounting of centralism in the regulation of industrial relations through amendments to the statutory framework and the application of tripartite cooperation mechanisms. Demo-

310

Institutionalization of Social Forces

cratic principles of protection of labour's interests have been introduced. This model of indirect influence of labour unions through negotiations, paralleled by a refusal of direct participation in the political structures of government and state administration, put new requirements upon them. Labour unions must master new skills in order to utilize the potential of tripartite cooperation, thus adjusting to the Western European social experience, norms and standards. The building of labour union pluralism is not free of tensions Several new unions have been formed in the past five years. Within the context of profound change in the nature of labour unions, pluralism has ambiguous implications. The sharp conflict between the reforming and alternative labour unions has helped to build the CITUB's new identity. In other cases, the competition has been eroding basic solidarities. Despite the increased number of unions and the fact that the level of unionization remains higher than in the developed countries, unionization has been generally declining. The private sector is not unionized. The influence of labour unions in Bulgaria depends on both the high level of unionization and their becoming an important corrective of social policy. Unions have a key role in keeping industrial and civil peace in the course of societal transformation, since they channel mounting social tensions. At the same time, labour unions must comply with the country's scarce economic resources given the deep recession, refraining from speculative and populist actions and short-term effects. Stefan Dimitrov REFERENCES Labour Code (1967) Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Labour Code (1986) Sofia: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Labour Code (1992) Sofa: Naouka i Izkustvo (in Bulgarian). Moerel, H. Ed. (1994) Labour Relations in Transition. Nijmegen. Mruchkov, V., D. Kamenov, M.Sotirova (1993) The Employer in Industrial Relations. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Shopov, D. (1994) Industrial Relations in Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Petkov, K., J. Thirkell (1991) Labour Relations in Eastern Europe. London. Salamon, M. (1992) Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice. New York etc.: Prentice Hall. Trade Unions and the ILO (1988) Geneva: ILO.

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10.3 Social Movements

10.3 Social Movements Grassroots civil movements started appearing in Bulgaria only in the late 1980s, largely inspired by perestroika in the former Soviet Union. The biggest one was the movement protecting the identity of the Turkish ethnic group. The environmental movement emerged in the cities ofRousse and Sofia in 1986-87. The first organizations for the protection of human rights which appeared before 1989 split or disappeared afterwards. After 1991, new human rights groups were set up on a more professional basis. Powerful religious and women's movements did not emerge. Bulgaria has a sustainable tradition of statism in social life As in other Balkan countries, the roots of this tradition can be traced back to the genesis of new state formations in the region in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In Bulgaria, this tradition largely evolved on the basis of egalitarianism. That is a natural social-psychological disposition in a society which preserved its petty-owner social structure, which lacked distinct internal differentiation, decades after the 1878 Liberation from the Ottoman rule. The idea of the state as a balance of common interests which leaves a broad field for group initiative, has never been particularly popular in the eyes of most of the public. Even the periods of democratic development of society have seen strong tendencies towards identifying state with community. The state used to "assign" functions to state-organized services (e.g. education) but also to informal public groups and activities. These efforts have been supported by the dominant trends in the public sphere since the debates were oriented mostly toward top-level state policies. In this context social movements have very often been effectively co-opted by state policies, or have been politicized soon after their emergence as grassroots civil initiatives. The regime established after World War II only fuelled state centrist trends in Bulgarian society both through its official ideology and through suppression of any grassroots civil initiative, especially when it was critical of the status quo. The legitimacy of the regime in Bulgaria was never ques-

312

Institutionalization of Social Forces

tioned by anything like the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the Prague Spring in 1968 or Poland's Solidarity movement. In the 1960s and 1970s, the semilegal small opposition groups were effectively broken. Grassroots civil movements started appearing in Bulgaria only in the late 1980s They were largely inspired by the events occurring in the former Soviet Union. Despite the intensive and various attempts at taking control, the authorities failed to eliminate them. November 10, 1989 was followed by a short period of civil euphoria. Soon after, the general restoration wave revived many of the dispositions and traditions of the past, and grassroots civil initiatives were marginalized to a large extent. The movement protecting the identity of ethnic groups, particularly the Turkish groups, was doubtless the biggest civil movement in Bulgaria in the late 1980s. It emerged in response to the assimilation policy, which culminated in the forcible name change of close to one million Muslims in 1984 and 1985. Its forms of expression came across the whole range from sporadic terrorist acts to mass peaceful public protests. Smaller organized groups were formed and operated within the broader movement based on popular discontent with the name change. The Turkish National Liberation Movement and the League for the Protection of Human Rights had broad action platforms that covered certain other aspects of the defence of ethnic identity such as freedom of religion, public use of the Turkish language, and forms of cultural expression. The movement defending ethnic Turkish identity culminated in May 1989, when mass protest demonstrations were held in several parts of the country on the eve of the Paris meeting on the CSCE human dimension. The authorities responded by provocations, violence and expulsion of several thousands of ethnic Turks. Those protests were the principal factor that contributed to the opening of the Bulgarian-Turkish border in June 1989 and the subsequent exodus of more than 300,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey. After the fall of the regime, the movement defending minority identity continued to exercise public pressure on the institutions for full restoration of violated ethnic rights. Other minority communities such as Bulgarian Muslims and Roma joined the movement. It scored its first success in early 1990, with the start of restoration of the names of those who had been forcibly renamed in the past, and restoration of their religious rights.

313

10.3 Social Movements

Beyond the influential movement defending ethnic identity, several other movements also emerged in the late 1980s. Their membership and activities were confined foremost to intellectuals. The environmental movement was the most active among them. It emerged in the cities of Rousse and Sofia in 1986 and 1987, after public demonstrations ensued in Rousse against chlorine pollution from the neighbouring chemical works in Romania. A Committee for Environmental Protection of Rousse was set up in March 1987. The authorities were hostile and that was the main reason why the Committee's activities were confined to several protest declarations. The objectives of the environmental movement were eventually universalized. Ecoglasnost, an association whose members hip did not exceed one hundred, most of them in Sofia, appeared in late 1988. In 1989, the group organized signature-collecting campaigns against projects on the diversion of rivers and against polluters in Sofia and in other parts of the country, conferences, public debates, posters, leaflets etc. In October 1989, Ecoglasnost organized a series of initiatives in Sofia during the CSCE environmental conference, including two public talks and a demonstration handing in a petition to the National Assembly. The Independent Association for Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria and the Podkrepa Trade Union were founded in early 1988. Both were initially small. Some of their members were former long-serving political prisoners. The groups promptly raised a series of fundamental issues associated with the character of the political system in Bulgaria at that time: the status of political prisoners, persecution of people because of their beliefs, freedom of conscience, of expression, of peaceful assembly and of association, and violence against members of ethnic groups in the course of the name change. The gravity of these problems and the commitment with which they were raised determined the authorities' attitude to those groups. A wide spectrum of repressive measures were used against them: arrest of the leading activists, pressure on members to emigrate, infiltration by secret service agents, denial of any opportunity for assembly, and illegal searches and confiscation. Western radio stations provided the only opportunity for public expression for a long time. Committee 273, a watchdog group concerned with the situation of political prisoners, was set up in August 1989. The Committee gathered and publicized information, attended trials and organized signature-collecting campaigns for the release of people sen-

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Institutionalization of Social Forces

tenced or detained on political charges, including ethnic Turks sentenced or exiled because of resistance to the name change. Informal groups discussing political issues appeared in intellectual circles in the last year of the state socialist regime, largely inspired by processes in the former Soviet Union. They associated in the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika in Bulgaria, which organized several public debates and two petitions to Parliament which, albeit worded in moderate terms, clashed with official policies. Thanks to its moderate position, the Club had greater freedom of operation than the other groups. Despite the many structural prerequisites and social tensions, powerful religious and women's movements did not emerge in Bulgaria. Those that existed were absurdly inadequate to the objective situation. In the case of the religious movements, their lack of emergence was due mostly to their lack of a coordinated and centralized effort. A Committee for Protection of Religious Freedom, Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values was founded by junior clerics from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Veliko Turnovo during the eighties. The period after 1989 saw the movements' active politicization The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, a political organization of Bulgarian Turks, comprised in part of Bulgarian Muslims and in part of Muslim Roma, was set up in January 1990. The Movement subsequently continued taking part in Bulgarian politics as a parliamentary party and effectively channelled civil initiative into party affairs. The associations of the other ethnic groups, most of which were formed right after the collapse of the state socialist regime - Roma, Armenian, Jewish, Karakachan, Vlachs, Macedonians - remained active as public organizations, even though they remained quite marginal. Immediately following the changes in 1989, the environmental movement grew quickly. Its civil initiatives covered all aspects of environmentalism nationwide. At its zenith in March 1990, Ecoglasnost had more than 70,000 active members. The environmental movement, however, was soon politicized too. Ecoglasnost joined the coalition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), then the biggest oppositionary political force. The Green Party, which also joined the UDF, was set up on the basis of part of the Ecoglasnost structures. Eventually, fragments of the environmental movement joined various political formations, compromising on aspects of the envi-

315

10.3 Social Movements

ronmentalist ideals but also introducing an environmental component in political platforms. Environmental groups which can be traced back to Ecoglasnost in one way or another are now to be found across the political spectrum in Bulgaria. After 1989 some of the groups for the protection of human rights continued operating independently while joining the UDF. Very soon, however, their activity transcended human rights. Podkrepa became an influential trade union. The Independent Association for Protection of Human Rights split several times, ultimately surviving on paper only. Committee 273 terminated its activity with the release of the last political prisoners in Bulgaria in autumn 1990. Several new human rights groups set up after the end of 1991, developing their activity on a more professional basis. They became active participants in public debates over the next few years. After the start of the political changes many activists of the Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika in Bulgaria became active politicians, forming part of the new political elite across the political spectrum. However, the Club soon disbanded as an organized structure. The Committee for Protection of Religious Freedom, Freedom of Conscience and Spiritual Values catalyzed a religious Renaissance for a very short period after the fall of the regime in 1989 because of its extreme politicization. Senior Orthodox clergy did not have the appropriate moral authority due to the long tradition of collaboration with the atheist communist regime. The activity of the other religious communities, foreign missionaries included, was strongly restricted very soon after the start of the democratic changes. In the case of the women's movement, some of the reasons for such low activity are to be found in the strong anti-feminism dominant in public discourse in the first years of democracy, as a backlash against what was seen as excessive feminization of many public spheres during the previous regime. Besides, there was strong pressure from the sustainable patriarchal tradition in Bulgarian - as in the other Balkan societies. Thus the severe problems of Bulgarian women (such as domestic violence and discrimination in the family, ouster from major spheres of economic and public life, and a decline in female health care) were not adequately addressed by the handful of lame-duck women's groups which, for their part, were also politicized. Krassimir Kunev

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REFERENCES Destroying Ethnic Identity. The Expulsion of Bulgarian Turks (1989) New York: Helsinki Watch. Dimitrov, R. (1991) Formation of the Bulgarian Opposition 1989-1991. Bulgarian Quarterly, N 1,2. Genov, N. Ed. (1993) Society and Environment in the Balkan Countries. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Kiuranov, D. (1991) Non-Governmental Environmentalism in Bulgaria. In: A Voice in the Wilderness: Ecology, Politics and Environmental NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe. Sofia: The Ecological Studies Institute. Mitsuda, H., D. Pashev (1995) Environmentalism as Ends or Means? The Rise and Political Crisis of the Environmental Movement in Bulgaria. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, vol. 6(1), March. Mueller, F.N. (1993) Gender Politics and Post-Communism. New York and London: Routledge.

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10.4 Interest Groups

10.4 Interest Groups

Until 1989, various group interests were expressed and protected by official or government-dependent public, professional, cultural and other special interest organizations. Along with their positive socializing functions, those organizations suppressed the cultivation of civic expertise in the expression and protection of group interests. Liberalization after 1989 has generated the formation of an independent non-governmental sector, which is still developing. Following a period of high activity, politization and polarization in the public sphere (1990-1992) and a stage of disillusionment and passivization (19931995), there are symptoms of the surmounting of partisanship and an ebb of involvement in public affairs, even though atomization and mistrust towards public activism are still high. During the 1960-1995 period, the expression and protection of various group interests took place within two radically different institutional contexts: totalitarian and post-totalitarian. The latter is transitional and de facto reflects and facilitates the formation of a type of social and economic organization that remains indefinite. Until 1989, non-governmental organizations expressed specific interests but also served as instruments of the official policies There were three types of organizations covering the various group and professional interests: public, professional and special. Set up by the authorities themselves or emerging independently, their autonomy was limited. They served to protect interests in a given sphere at the grassroots level, but also were instruments of control and implementation of governmental policies in that sphere. The expression and protection of various group and professional interests was confined to the framework of paternalistic dependence between superiors and subordinates. The latter's interests were expressed, considered and materialized in a manner that to a degree was determined "at the top", and insofar as was necessary for the maintenance of social peace. The

318

Institutionalization of Social Forces

official interest organizations studied, expressed, formulated and organized compliance with the various group interests. Under these conditions, there was a trade union, a youth communist organization, a pioneer children's organization, a nationalized and centralized "cooperative" union (which united over 3,200 cooperatives), a number of professional associations (of writers, composers, actors, movie-makers, translators, scientists, architects, journalists, Esperantists, teachers, lawyers and others), a women's organization, a Slavic and Bulgarian-Soviet society, an educational society with a national network, sports, hiking, hunting-andangling and other amateur societies. Trade unions as an institution never could and actually never did challenge the authority of the communist party Yet, even though they were official, at least on the local level they had certain protective and mobilizing functions. Those functions included partial integration of the personnel into the process of economic management. At the same time, however, the trade unions were assigned a bulk of untypical para-partisan, para-state, economic and social functions: "school" of communist indoctrination; organization of emulation between economic actors; organization of innovative activities; mobilization of labour activity, discipline and diligence; steward of technological discipline; occupational training; implementation of economic reforms; provision of and control over labour safety; jurisdiction - as the primary authority on industrial disputes; and recreation. The Youth Communist League (Comsomol) was wholly subordinated to the party. It had ideological, controlling and economic functions: ideological indoctrination ("formation of a communist worldview and class consciousness"), involvement of young people in public and political activities, provision of pay-free labour through school, student and other "brigades," and organization of youth techno-scientific endeavours. Yet the Comsomol also had a number of positive functions in the socialization and enhancement of the general cultural level of young people, in catering for their interests and organizing their recreational activities. Almost all adults who were not in the communist party were members of the Fatherland Front. It was set up on the basis of the multiparty coalition which seized power after the Second World War. In the aftermath of the war the coalition was practically liquidated and replaced by an eponymous pub-

319

10.4 Interest Groups

lie organization with individual membership, whose basic function was to cover the non-communist political arena and facilitate the establishment of a single-party monopoly in politics. For this purpose, that umbrella organization incorporated all autonomous local civil structures, e.g. community culture clubs (chitalishte), of which there were 2,610 before the war. The Fatherland Front was openly defined as a grassroots political bulwark of the Bulgarian Communist Party which should "rally various strata of the people around the party policy." Its specific functions were patriotic and international instruction, monitoring of public attitudes, organization of recreational activities, provision of pay-free labour and combat of negative offences (among the subordinates). The regime aspired towards broad involvement of the population in public affairs Membership in the trade unions and youth league was de facto mandatory. The Fatherland Front incorporated almost the entire adult population. Between 1968 and 1986, the percentage of non-members in a public or political organization dropped from 10.84% to 3.92% (Table 1). In 1986, 41.9% of the population went down on record as having medium, 31.9% high and 15.8% very high "social activity beyond the labour process." (The Town..., 1986: 343). Considering that autonomous civic activity was out of the question at that time, these figures indicate high involvement in various forms of mutual assistance, amateur art activities and moral control. Participation in socially beneficial activities was encouraged, albeit within the narrow framework of the monopoly on political activity. Apart from the power reproduction process, interest organizations played a certain positive role as well. They cultivated public commitment, and partly stimulated civil initiative and talent. Various clubs, workshops and ensembles catered to a wide range of interests. The so-called "comrades courts" in the Fatherland Front were a form of moral control and mutual assistance on the neighbour level. The number of community culture clubs, by 1960 almost double the pre-war level, declined slightly in the 1970s and 1980s. However, their members hip increased to one million in the 1980s (Table 2). All shortcomings notwithstanding, the Movement for TechnoScientific Endeavour in the Comsomol rallied a substantial creative potential of young people.

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Institutionalization of Social Forces

In any case, the 40-year communist party monopoly almost atrophied the already underdeveloped civil dimensions of activities in the nongovernmental sphere. The latter took the form of self-catering by interest, but not as civil initiative and lobbying - despite the constantly fostered illusions of participation and growing self-government demagoguery in the 1980s in that respect. The first manifestations of open autonomous civil initiative appeared in the 1980s For instance, they were manifest in the display of paintings in the streets, independent of official organizations. Under the conditions of total control and exclusion of any "uncoordinated" action in the public sphere, such initiatives drew the attention of the police and artificially acquired a political dimension. The early 1980s saw the emergence of the first semi-legal autonomous groups for civil initiative and lobbying. In January 1988, the Independent Society for the Protection of Human Rights in Bulgaria was set up, and in March of that year, an informal environmental organization called Nationwide Committee for Environmental Protection of Rousse was formed - the first precedents of both interest and political pluralism. In 1989, public environmental and human rights demonstrations took place. The formation of a nongovernmental and non-party network of voluntary organizations is still under way Along with the new parties and trade unions, more than 700 non-profit organizations were set up between November 1989 and 1995. By the end of 1995, about 470 of them were actually operational. It is hard to identify long-term trends. The strong initial politicization and polarization of society has had an adverse effect on that process. In the 1990-1993 period, partisanship ousted and blocked authentic group interest issues and policies, repelling autonomous civil participation. That the nongovernmental sector is underdeveloped is obvious from its symbolic rather than interest-based structure. Plummeting living standards and the struggle for survival are another reason for forcible seclusion within the private sphere and self-restriction of interests. The quadruple decline in community culture club members is indicative of this fact (Table 2). Since 1993, civil initiatives have been gradually shedding partisanship and targeting non-party forms of public activity (Krustev, 1995). By late

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10.4 Interest Groups

1995, the period of politicization and seclusion was drawing to a close, as other expert appraisals also confirm. People came out and started seeking contacts with each other, and 68% were inclined to organize other people for the attainment of a particular common goal (Daynov, 1995:15). Educative, research, cultural, international and environmental activities prevail in the NGO functional orientation at this stage (Table 3). Lobbying for certain demands or projects is not very popular in the public sphere yet. A 1995 poll found that just 3% had ever signed petitions to state institutions (Daynov, 1995:15). There is arguably a potential of direct civil activity in the public sphere, but it is largely blocked by the hardships of transition. The state has yet to develop a favourable statutory framework promoting the development of the nongovernmental sector and is still retaining some control of NGOs. In the nongovernmental sector, only donations and inheritance qualify for tax relief, but not profit from economic activity, real estate, increase in the market value of capital and added value (turnover). The state takes the liberty of openly criticizing some and patronizing other nongovernmental organizations (Krustev, 1995). For the time being, NGOs get most of their funds from abroad. Attitudes to that funding are quite controversial (Table 4). Unionist pluralism is manifested in the appearance of a number of trade unions and a non-unionized majority of the population The non-unionized majority (55% to 60% of the population) is, to some extent, a reaction to the previous forcible unionization, but also an expression of civic immaturity during a time of persisting atomization and mistrust of the public sector. There are two dominant labour organizations: the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) and the Podkrepa Labour Confederation. Beyond them a mere 1% or so of the labour force is unionized. There are no alternatives to the two, but their authority vis-a-vis the Government and employers is weak. Public confidence in both of these unions is waning, especially in the right-of-centre Podkrepa, of whose members, from one third (early 1994) to one fifth (end of 1994) belong to CITUB (Public Opinion..., 1985:80-82). Ivan Minov

322

Institutionalization of Social Forces REFERENCES

The Bulgarian Trade Unions 1904-1984 (1984) Sofia: Profizdat (in Bulgarian). First National Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations (1995) Sofia (in Bulgarian). Daynov, E. (1995) The Nongovernmental Sector in the Mirror of Sociology. In: First National Conference.(\n Bulgarian). Krustev, I. (1995) The State of Civil Society. In: First National Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations, (in Bulgarian). Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarain Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria. Annual Review (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria. Annual Review (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village-86. Empirical Sociological Survey. Vol. II (1988) Sofia: Committee for Standard Social Information (in Bulgarian).

Table 1. Membership in public organizations 1968 to 1986

Comsomol Fatherland Front (excl party members) non-members

1968

1974

1986

19.24% 56.65% 10.84%

17.51% 56.75% 12.62%

20.10% 59.91% 3.92%

Sources: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The Town and the Village-86. Empirical Sociological Survey (1988) vol.11, Sociological Interactions (selected charts). Sofia: Committee for Standard Social Information.

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10.4 Interest Groups

Table 2. Community culture clubs and their members clubs members

1960

1970

1980

1989

1993

4502

4399

4256

4269

4246

779 000

1 091 000

1 087 000

984 000

247 000

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria 1994. (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Nongovernmental organizations 1995 Registered NGOs (approx) Operational NGOs incl foundations Field of activity Education international cooperation Culture science and research Ecology Information the arts health care human rights and minority groups social services Talents Economics Media Innovations Information Science and information technologies Religion Sports Business State and law Agriculture trade unions Facilities

700 458 Organizations 224 . 177 176 147 143 142 124 114 93 90 82 65 56 48 45 44 37 33 27 27 26 26

% of total 48.91% 38.65% 38.43% 32.10% 31.22% 31.00% 27.07% 24.89% 20.31% 19.65% 17.90% 14.19% 12.23% 10.48% 9.83% 9.61% 8.08% 7.21% 5.90% 5.90% 5.68% 5.68%

Source: Non-Profit Organizations in Bulgaria. Guide (1995) Sofia(in Bulgarian).

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Institutionalization of Social Forces

Table 4. Public opinion about interest groups and civil participation NGOs make sense (Members of the public, organized in groups, are capable of exerting an influence on government) convinced of the possibility of civil participation

46%

don't think civil participation is possible

17%

indifferent

37%

SUPPORT FOR NGOs would protest ban on civil associations

35%

would support ban on civil associations

8%

NGO VOLUNTEERS(% of NGOs with) under 10 volunteers

13%

11 to 55

40%

over 50

32%

no answer

15%

ATTITUDES TO FOREIGN FUNDING of NGOs The foreign organizations assisting us: pursue their own corporate interests

26%

promote interests of foreign countries

12%

promote interests of transnational associations help individual groups and transition in Bulgaria

4% 17%

Source: Daynov, E. (1995) The Nongovernmental Sector in the Mirror of Sociology. In: First National Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations. Sofia (in Bulgarian).

11 IDEOLOGIES AND BELIEFS

11.1 Political Differentiation

During the period 1960-1990, political differences could not translate into election results due to the totalitarian political model established in the country since the 1940s. After November, 1989 political pluralism was promptly established and, until the end of 1996, five consecutive free elections were held. During the first election (June, 1990) the vote was polarized. It gradually became less so during the parliamentary elections of October, 1991 and December 1994, and the presidential elections of January, 1992 and October - November, 1996. During the period 1960-1990, the political differentiation in Bulgaria could not translate into election results Freedom of association, including the freedom of political association, was practically abolished. Nevertheless, differences in the political process existed. They were reflected in cultural life, in the change in participation in the established forms of political development, in the structuring of everyday lives, but not in free electoral behavior. After November, 1989, the new developments brought about the restoration of old and the creation of new political parties The legal regime for establishing a political party in Bulgaria is quite liberal. The law on Political Parties requires only 50 supporters in order to register a party. The first free election for a Constitutional Assembly was held in June 1990 on the basis of a majoritarian-proportional system (50%:50%) with a 4% threshold for the parties offering party lists in the multi-mandate constituencies and with a possibility for independent candidates to run only in single-mandate constituencies. Only 5 parties succeeded in passing candidates in the Constitutional Assembly: the Bulgarian Social-

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Ideologies and Beliefs

ist Party (BSP), heir of the former Communist party; the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a political coalition of many parties and movements with various ideologies; the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union (BANU) which during the 45 years of totalitarian rule shared the power with the Communist party; the Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF), which won the votes of the majority of the Bulgarian Turks; and the Motherland Party of Labour (MPL), which won in only one single-mandate constituency with a nationalistic platform (Table 1). BSP formed a one-party government immediately after the election and ruled until the end of 1990 when a coalition government was formed, supported by all parliamentary groups. It ruled until the election of October, 1991. During and after the adoption of the new Constitution, serious restructuring within UDF and BANU took place. The possibility for MRF to participate in the political process was questioned before the Constitutional Court since the Constitution of 1991 forbids political parties organized along ethnic or religious lines. The Constitutional Court failed to consolidate the necessary amount of votes either in favour or against a decision forbidding MRF to participate in the next election. The second parliamentary election was held in October, 1991 together with local ones on the basis of a proportional system with a 4% threshold for both political parties and coalitions. Independent candidates were also allowed to run on equal basis. Thirty-eight parties and coalitions and 17 independent candidates were registered. The UDF split into three factions running separately. BANU was represented with two lists of the moderate BANU-United and of the anti-communist BANU-Nikola Petkov. The 4% threshold was passed only by UDF, BSP and MRF (Table 2). Soon after the parliamentary elections in January, 1992, a direct election for President and Vice-President was held. Twenty-two candidates ran but the main role in the elections had the candidates of UDF and BSP. The UDF pairing of Zheliu Zhelev / Blaga Dimitrova won in the second round with 52.85% of the vote (Table 3). During all of the elections in Bulgaria after 1989, ideological discourse was dominated by the struggle between the "renewed old" represented by BSP, and the "new" represented by UDF. Both parties had consensus on the necessity for a transition to pluralistic democracy and a market economy. The politics of UDF put stronger emphasis on the liberation of the market mechanisms and the domination of private property. In other respects, how-

327

11.1 Political Differentiation

ever, the two political forces demonstrated an image which significantly differed from the classical Western model. Despite its declared pro-left orientation, BSP relied on a more conservative value orientation and succeeded in mobilizing votes mainly among the older generation, among the village and small town inhabitants, and among people with more traditionalist attitudes. UDF had better success among younger people and inhabitants of the big cities. Public opinion research shows that political differentiation after the beginning of the democratization process in Bulgaria has more personal than ideological meaning, a tendency which is traditionally stable in the Balkan societies. Splittings and marginalization mark the political process Among the 38 parties and coalitions registered for the October, 1991 elections, UDF, BSP and MRF received 75.05% of the votes. The share of voters who voted for parties other than the mainstream ones was larger as compared with the elections of June, 1990. This marginalized vote could be divided into four main groups: 1. Centrist formations: The majority of them were groups which split from UDF during the big constitutional debate in the summer of 1991. In this group also fall the former agrarian union (BANU-United), the Bulgarian Business Block (BBB) and some other smaller parties. 2. Extremist anti-communist formations (Liberal Congress Party, Confederation "Bulgarian Kingdom", Coalition for the Turnovo Constitution "Liberty", Bulgarian Democratic Party, National Democratic Party, and the Bulgarian National Union). They had demands such as: restoration of the Bulgarian Constitution before the Second World War, repression against former and present communists, confiscation of property acquired during the communist regime, etc. 3. Extremist communist formations (Bulgarian Communist Party, Bulgarian Communist Party - Marxists, and Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party). These were splinter groups from the BSP (former Communist Party), united by the refusal to accept the direction of its reformation. 4. Extremist nationalistic formations (Bulgarian National Radical Party, National Patriotic Union, Christian Radical Party, and Liberal Party Pernik). The basis of their politics were the values of the nation state. Their demands included: unification of all ethnic Bulgarians into one state (including those living outside the borders of Bulgaria); eviction of ethnic mi-

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Ideologies and Beliefs

norities; adoption of an obligatory unified name-system for all Bulgarian citizens; and "national unification". In both politically mainstream parties (BSP and UDF), extreme political tendencies could also be observed. Political extremism was more prevalent among the sympathizers of UDF and the nationalism - among those of BSP. The general tendency from the elections of October, 1991 also dominated the presidential elections of January, 1992. After the first tour of the presidential elections the two main candidates, supported by UDF and BSP, got 75.1% of the vote. The rest of the votes were distributed even more unevenly as compared to the elections of October, 1991. Self-identification on the left-right political scale in Bulgaria differs significantly from the Western value models This difference could be observed also in other countries in the Balkan region. Usually, BSP sympathizers identify themselves as being on the "left", and those of UDF as being on the "right". Attitudes toward the economic reform show a stronger pro-market orientation among the UDF sympathizers. The latter are more inclined to accept the division of society into rich and poor as "normal". The BSP sympathizers, however, are more restrictive with respect to civil rights, family morality and marginal groups, revealing a tendency towards greater connection with regional, family and ethnic. Krassimir Kanev REFERENCES Bulletin about the Results of the Elections for Members of Parliament held on 13. October, 1991 (1991) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian). Bulletin about the Results of Elections for President and Vice-President, held on 12 and 19 January, 1992 (1992) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian). Elections for a Grand National Assembly 10-17 June (1990) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

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11.1 Political Differentiation

Table 1. Results from the parliamentary elections of June, 1990 majoritarian Parties, coalitions candidates l.BANU 2.UDF 3.BSP 4.MRF 5. Patriotic Union 6.Socialdemocratic Party (nonmarxists) T.Motherland Party of Labor 8. Independents total:

number of mandates

proportional

% ofmajorit. mandates

total

number of mandates

% of prop. mandates

number of mandates

% of all mandates

-

-

69 114 11 2 1

34.50 57.00 5.50 1.00 0.50

16 75 97 12 -

8.00 37.50 48.50 6.00 -

16 144 211 23 2 1

4.00 36.00 52.75 5.75 0.50 0.25

1

0.50

-

-

1

0.25

2 200

1.00 100.0

200

100.00

2 400

0.50 100.00

Source: Elections for a Grand National Assembly 10-17 June (1990) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Results from the elections of October, 1991 Parties, coalitions, independent candidates l.UDF 2.BSP 3.MRF 4.BANU-United S.BANU-Nikola Petkov 6.UDF-Center 7.UDF-Liberals

% of the votes 34.36 33.14 7.55 3.86 3.44 3.20 2.81

mandates won 110(45.8%) 106 (44.2%) 24 (10%) -

Source: Bulletin about the Results of the Elections for Members of Parliament held on 13. October, 1991 (1991) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian).

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Ideologies and Beliefs

Table 3. Results of the presidential elections of January, 1992 Candidates

% I round

% II round

44.66

52.85

2.24

-

Velko Vulkanov / Rumen Vodenicharov

30.44

47.15

Georgi Petrushev / Petar Beron

16.78

-

Zhelio Zhelev / Blaga Dimitrova Blagovest Sendov / Ognian Saparev

Source: Bulletin about the Results of Elections for President and Vice-President, held on 12 and 19 January, 1992 (1992) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Mandates of the major political forces from the parliamentary elections (December, 1994) and the elections for local governments (Oct.-Nov., 1995) December, 1994 MPs

BSP and coalition UDF and coalition Popular Alliance - BAU, DP Movement for Rights and Freedoms Bulgarian Business Bloc

October-November, 1995 Municipal councillors

Number

%

Number

%

125 69 18 15 13

52.1 28.6 7.5 6.3 5.4

3291 1365 671 669 229

46.8 19.4 9.5 9.5 3.3

Source: Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996: Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP.

331

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

Bulgarians lived without a state of their own for centuries, developing powerful patriarchal structures of social interaction as substitutes for public institutions. Byzantine and Eastern Orthodox traditions have also played a role in this respect. Modern development is characterized by an absence of the Protestant ethic of individualism, a long absence of Western-type law and order and institutions, and an absence of civil society and social contracts. These contribute to a pronounced nihilism in public attitudes to institutions of the state. By tradition, the state is rather alien, something "distant and superior" in Bulgaria By tradition again, politics is perceived foremost as an occupation of people eager to gain a personal advantage from their participation in the exercise of state authority. The state ought to be resorted to only in contingencies. "Cheating the state" (by evading taxes, preventing the tax collector from doing his or her duty, or misappropriating something that is "state-owned") is traditionally seen as a show of common sense. This traditional mistrust towards institutions intensified in the years after the Second World War. Distance from "the authorities" was a substantial element of the Bulgarian mentality in this period. Counter to the seemingly high politicization of society, citizens remained apolitical. Rehabilitation of the institutions of democracy has been one of the major objectives of post-1989 changes The feeling that things depend on personal participation was very strong in the first years of transition. The transition itself, however, has been effected by attacks and pressure on the established institutions of statehood. The old institutions have been accepting their new democratic role slowly and painfully, starting to operate within the context of political pluralism. The first multiparty elections for a Grand National Assembly since 1946 were held in 1990. A multiparty and freely elected parliament was established. The As-

332

Ideologies and Beliefs

sembly subsequently elected a new president. The first multiparty government was formed. Thus attitudes to public institutions have been ambiguous right since the start of the new Bulgarian democracy. Institutions are accused of as ensuing from the former regime, yet they are also new as a result of democratic expression of will. Despite the strong politicization after 1990, the public generally remains rather skeptical and wait-and-see in regard to institutions. Attitudes to the institutions are marked by traditional nihilism and political prejudice Confidence in public institutions could be expected to rise in the course of democratic practice. Such a general tendency, however, is not obvious in Bulgaria. Party self-identification precedes civic constitutional patriotism. Confidence in institutions is normally a function of their party composition. In this sense, institutions are regarded as an instrument of attaining certain party and political objectives rather than as permanent material foundations of democracy. The government is regarded in the same way as the party-political process Most approvers of the government come from the electorate of the parties in the government majority. People who disapprove are supporters of the opposition. Governments without a distinct party identity, such as the Dimiter Popov Cabinet in 1990 and 1991, and the Lyuben Berov Cabinet in 1993 and 1994, are something of an exception. They were formed during an acute political crisis. The public saw their very formation as an achievement in that they avoided extreme confrontation. Regardless of the reason for a change of government (resignation, loss of confidence in parliament, end of term in office), confidence in all post-1989 governments in Bulgaria had fallen dramatically by the end of their term. The public sensed and at the same time predetermined their end. The loss of confidence in parliament is usually supplemented by a growing desire for new parliamentary elections As a rule, every new parliament sets out with a high degree of confidence. The opposition does not necessarily have to disapprove of parliament, just as the majority does not necessarily have to trust the incumbent parliament.

333

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

The 36th National Assembly is a case in point. By the end of 1993, confidence in it was down to 10% and remained at that level right until the early elections in December, 1994. The general public judged the 36th National Assembly on the basis of its ability to convince them that it was looking for solutions to real political and social problems. In many cases, confidence in the government is on average double that in parliament. The government enjoys - to a larger extent - the general "confidence in power" typical of the political mentality in Bulgaria. The general public regards parliament as a stage for political speeches rather than an epitome of the people's sovereignty. On the whole, the public is skeptical of MPs. A July 1994 poll found that two out of three thought that most MPs were incompetent politicians. This public image of MPs depends on the general attitude to parliament and its possible replacement by means of new elections. As a rule, confidence in the president is higher than that in the parliament and government Party bias is strong in confidence in the president as well. Notwithstanding, the presidency is on average rated higher than any other senior institution of power. More than half of the respondents have said they trust the president almost throughout the period since the February 1992 presidential elections. With the exception of certain periods, the declared confidence in the president is not strongly dependent on party allegiance. Between 1992 and 1994, more than 45% of respondents said that the president succeeded in being unbiased, i.e. remained aloof from party scrambles. Obviously this is precisely with what the public associates the head of state's function. Attitudes to the president polarize when the head of state's activity is perceived as involvement in the political struggle. Confidence in the president usually rises when the public sees him as a symbol of the nation and its integrity. Comparatively low confidence in local institutions of power is typical of present-day Bulgaria This is primarily an expression of the awareness that local government does not have the appropriate resources to cope with the local problems of citizens. Typically, confidence in local institutions is not distinctly partybiased.

334

Ideologies and Beliefs

By tradition, the army and the police enjoy high confidence among Bulgarian society The army is consistently trusted by more than 60% of respondents. Party bias is not pronounced in this case either. Citizens who are critical of traditional hierarchies and values (for example, students) are more skeptical. The public is more divided over the police. Those who trust the police are equal in number to those who do not (between 35% and 45% on average). Unlike attitudes to the army, the public is more reserved in this case. An average of 20% would rather not define their attitudes to the police. This hesitation is associated with the problem of crime and widespread opinion that the police are helpless to cope with it. Attitudes to the judiciary (the courts and prosecutors' offices) are the same. Mistrust towards those institutions has prevailed since early 1992 (an average of 40% to 45% in the case of courts and 35% to 40% in that of prosecutors' offices). Mistrust towards the judiciary has been intensifying with the growing threat of crime. These attitudes were strongly politicized in the beginning of the transition, but they are now no longer as distinctly party-biased. More and more people are inclined to accept a "strong authority" that would be capable of coping with crime. The Church has been respected in Bulgaria as the nation's first autonomous institution even prior to national independence. Confidence in the Church almost equals that in the president. However, this confidence instead expresses a widespread belief that the Church is not simply "neutral," but that it is powerless to change anything. Skepticism about the Church is manifested in the fact that few people think that it could play an important role for the nation. On the whole, confidence in institutions does not depend only on the assessment of their "usefulness," which is associated with party allegiance, but also on that of their real power. Antonii Todorov Maria Pirgova

335

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

REFERENCES Public Opinion in Bulgaria: Annual Review (1994) Sofia: BBSS Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria: Annual Review (1995) Sofia: BBSS Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Table 1. The extent to which major institutions contribute to managing national problems (National surveys, five point scale, positions 1 and 5) Institutions - The Parliament - The President - The Government - Law Courts and Prossecution

To a very low extent (1) Oct. '94. Nov. '96

To a very high extent (5) Oct. '94 Nov. '96

58.6 34.9 52.4

46.1 43.0 53.4

1.7 3.4 1.4

1.8 1.8 1.1

50.1

51.8

1.9

0.7

Source: N. Genov. Transformation Risks: Structure and Dynamics. In: H. Best, U. Becker and A. Marks. Eds. (1996) Social Sciences in Transition. Bonn: Informationszentrum Sozialwissenschaften, p. 46.

336

Ideologies and Beliefs

11.3 Economic Orientations

The number of qualified economists and publications on economic problems has been growing. Public opinion surveys indicate the need for economic reforms in the course of marketization. However, many economic actors are not ready to take the respective risks. Two indicators illustrate the prevalent economic orientations in Bulgaria. First, there is the number and structure of qualified economists (by gender, age and educational level). Second, another indicator is the number of publications (books and brochures) on economic problems. There are two periods of different economic orientations: that of a centrally planned economy, and since 1990, one of transition to a market economy. In the first period, state-owned enterprises (Table 1) accounted for the bulk of the gross domestic product - a record 91% in 1980. By the late 1980s, their proportion had dropped slightly. Next came auxiliary and private farms and private enterprises. The share of cooperative enterprises in the gross domestic product slumped from 25.5% in 1960 to 3.1% in 1990. Between 1960 and 1990, the number of professionals with higher, semi-high and secondary vocational education employed in the national economy rose steadily Economists comprised 16% to 17% of all professionals, 18% to 20% of those with higher education, 14% to 20% of those with secondary vocational training, and just 0.6% of professionals with semi-higher education. The number of female economists employed in the national economy increased: by 1980, to 69% of a economists and 81% of economists with secondary vocational training (Table 2). Most economists were of working age (Table 3). Notably, professionals with secondary vocational training prevailed over university graduates in the under-25 age group - 14% or 15% versus 3% or 4%, included females aged under 25. Books and brochures on general economics were gradually replaced by publications on management and finance

337

11.3 Economic Orientations

A total of 3,799 publications were released in 1970, including 2,919 books and 880 brochures. Seventeen per cent of the total dealt with general economics (15% of the books and 26% of the brochures). In terms of subject matter, most publications dealt with: Marxism-Leninism; the communist parties; international politics and economics; and planning, statistics, and accounting. Publications on political economy and finance brought up the rear (Statistical Yearbook, 1971: 381). In 1990, the total number of publications decreased slightly, to 3,412. This decrease came mainly from brochures (497), the number of books remaining virtually the same (2,915). Publications devoted to general economic problems also declined, to 10% or 15%. The subject matter also changed. The number of publications on Marxism-Leninism and communist parties plummeted and that on political economy levelled off. By contrast, more and more publications, especially books, were devoted to finance, law and management (Statistical Yearbook, 1991: 370). Marketization heightened the interest in economic studies and publications Pluralism in the forms of ownership was conducive to the emergence of a private sector which provided 33.4% of the 1994 gross domestic product (Statistical Yearbook 1995: 152-153). Economists have come to play an increasing role in the course of marketization (Table 4). Between 1990 and 1994, the proportion of socioeconomic literature rose, varying between 20% and 24% of all books and brochures published (Table 5). In 1994, 17.4% of all publications, 16.2% of all books and 12.7% of all brochures dealt with economic matters. The priority was on three groups of subjects: a) political economy; b) philosophy, psychology, sociology and statistics; c) law, public administration, social security and insurance (Statistical Yearbook, 1995: 378). Public opinion polls in the 1990s have established changes in economic orientations The changes in economic orientations reflect the contradictory general trends in culture (Genov, 1997: 59). In late 1993, just 15% of respondents in the survey denied that an economic reform was being pursued in Bulgaria. However, the public was very critical of the way this was done: 56% said that the reform was too slow (Public Opinion, 1994: 35). An international

338

Ideologies and Beliefs

poll in four Balkan countries in 1995 found that 40% of the respondents preferred the free market to the state-regulated economy. Still, the majority opted for state rather than private ownership. These are controversial attitudes to economic realities. The desire for a free market, assumed to be a textbook truth at the beginning of economic transition, has been declining under the pressure of impoverishment. Thus the paradoxical preference for a "free market with prevalent state ownership" is still widespread (Public Opinion, 1995: 246, 248). The transition to a market economy is typically qualified as wrong by the low-schooled strata of the population who have little if any chance of mobility and are incapable of taking the risks of the free market. Darina Rouscheva REFERENCES Avramov, R. and V. Antonov. Eds. (1994) The Transition. Sofia: Agency for Economic Coordination and Development (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Metamorphoses of Power (1994) Sofia: Peroun (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1991-1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Table 1. Structure of the Gross Domestic Product (by form of ownership) (%) Gross domestic product incl. State-owned enterprises cooperative enterprises auxiliary and private farms and private enterprises

1960 100.0 67.4 25.5

1970 100.0 76.0 18.0

1980 100.0 91.0 3.5

1990 100.0 89.3 3.1

7.1

6.0

5.5

7.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1962, 1971, 1981, 1991) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

339

11.3 Economic Orientations

Table 2. Employed professionals with higher, semi-high and secondary vocational education ('000)

Total incl. Those with higher education with secondary vocational training Economists, total incl. Those with higher education with secondary vocational training with semi-higher education Of the females, total incl. with higher education with secondary vocational training with semi-higher education

1960

1970

1980

257.2 92.6 164.6 44.3 19.2 25.1 15.8 2.9 12.9 -

521.4 163.2 358.2 83.5 30.4 53.1 45.3 8.8 36.5 -

858.4 275.0 443.6 141.9 49.8 91.1 0.9 98.0 23.7 73.8 0.5

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1962, 1971, 1981) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Qualified economists (by educational level, gender and age) 1970 total

Higher education, total incl. under 25 26 to 54 55 to 59. over 60. Secondary vocational training, total incl. Under 25 26 to 54 55 to 59 over 60

1980

females

30405

8820

978

783

27025 1972

430

53107 8375 37611 1302 340

7936

44 7

36547 12344 24074 118 11

total

49807 1 892 43030 4044 841

91153 12861 75425 2368 493

females

23704 1 584 21 774 331 15

73826 11730 61654 409 33

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1971, 1981) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian)

340

Ideologies and Beliefs

Table 4. Personnel in the social sciences

1 . With secondary vocational school of economics 2. With semi-higher degree in economics 3. With university degree in economics 4. Academics in social sciences by December 3 1 .

1992

1993

1994

1995

4325

3667

3237

4265

308

459

478

520

3245

3466

3724

5 173

5548

6046

6271

6238

Source: Statistical Reference Book (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, pp. 47,49-51.

Table 5. Published books and brochures (by subject matter)

Titles, total incl. socio-political % of total

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

3412

3260

4773

5771

5925

797

776

976

1 277

1 396

23.36

23.80

20.45

22.13

23.56

Source: Statistical Yearbook of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 377 (in Bulgarian).

341

11.4 Radicalism

11.4 Radicalism

As in all other South-East European countries, Bulgaria has a long record of political radicalism of various types. From the 1878 Liberation to World War II, there were mass anti-democratic movements, often generated and encouraged by the anti-democratic practices of the governments themselves. The establishment of state socialism in the 1940s was a sequel to those trends and, on the other hand, an education in anti-democracy. For its part, that has cleared the way for political radicalism since the start of democratic changes. Right-wing radicalism was strong in the first years of democratic transition It took various forms: a) "Street pressure" on institutions and attempts at repressive action, as well as "street justice," mostly against former functionaries of the communist regime, but occasionally against communists in general as well; b) Efforts to enforce erstwhile constitutional forms; c) Efforts to restore pre-World War II radical organizations and movements and their ideology in "original form." As ideology and policy, these three trends were often at cross-purposes on key issues in Bulgarian society (e.g. nationalism). Their common denominator at all stages has been anti-communism. Right-wing radicalism merged with the mass democratic movement at the very start Certain extremist anti-communist parties managed to garner some, albeit minimal, electoral support (Table 1). Those results should be taken with caution since the bulk of the final anti-communist votes in all elections have gone to the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) - just as the bulk of the final left-wing vote has gone to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). Calls for repressive measures and "street justice" against functionaries of the former communist regime were a substantial part of the mass protest

342

Ideologies and Beliefs

movement. The metaphor of the "blue [UDF] broom" acquired broader meaning than a simple sweep of communist functionaries from the civil service. The anti-communist pathos subsequently passed through street barricades and "The Town of Truth," flaring up in the fire at Communist Party Headquarters and the mass protest actions in the runup to the resignation of the first BSP government (1990). Under the UDF government (1991-1992), that pathos was substantiated in a series of acts and bills on "decommunization." In many cases, anti-communist radicalism was influenced by leftwing ideology. Anti-communist radicalism started fading once the economic reform began producing results. It ceased being a platform of a mass movement in 1993, but has continued uniting a hard-core group of supporters in Sofia and some other big cities. Monarchism has been a distinct trend in right-wing radicalism since 1990 In its extreme form, the demand for restoration of monarchy came with a demand for restoration of the Turnovo Constitution of 1879. The former has become a platform of several small political formations, as well as of many UDF supporters and politicians. The monarchist formations first became a significant political force in the October 1991 elections. Their platforms combined economic and political conservatism with a measure of anticommunism. Anti-communism faded in the 1994 elections due, among other things, to public statements by Tsar Simeon II, the king-in-exile. Two organizations have tried reviving pre-World War II structures and ideas They are the Bulgarian Democratic Forum (BDF) and the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) succeeding the Union of Bulgarian National Legions (UBNL) and the historical paramilitary IMRO respectively. They set out as independent organizations and subsequently joined the UDF (in the case of IMRO, there is no formal merger) at a different time. Both combined nationalism with anti-communism. The BDF was the product of the effort and ambitions of former UBNL members to take part in politics. However, anti-Semitism - the backbone of UBNL ideology - was almost absent from the BDF platform. Hence the party's nationalism was often token, as was most of its political activity. IMRO emerged on the basis of real policies to a much larger extent. IMRO was restored as an organiza-

343

11.4 Radicalism

tion whose main task was the affirmation of "Bulgarianism" in the Republic of Macedonia - which was also the task of its predecessor. The brunt of IMRO's nationalism concerned that particular aspect of politics. The organization, however, launched several anti-Turkish actions even at the very start, joining the campaign against "sects" in 1993. Even though IMRO activists have said that they are ready to use the methods of the former organization, neither IMRO nor its members have been charged with illegal activities. Seven parties with communist or para-communist ideology are formally registered in Bulgaria They are the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Bulgarian Revolutionary Youth Party from Varna (the most extremist communist formation), the Bulgarian Unified Communist Party and another four marginal formations. On the whole, the public influence of the communist parties has remained stable since 1992 (Table 2). There is a strong semi-communist trend within the BSP itself which has an organizational and political exponent, the Marxist Platform, a stream in the Socialist Party. The public clout of that trend is hard to measure since the Marxist Platform has never run independently in an election, but it is in any case bigger than that of all non-BSP communist parties. The general ideological and political orientation of the communist formations is a concoction of restorationist, traditionalist, nationalist and opportunistic concepts. Some formations accept the general principles of a market economy even though they impose, as a rule, important restrictions (ban on exploitation of man by man, of sale of work force, control by the working people over economic development and privatization). Others wholly reject the market orientation, regarding it as a historical anachronism or as feasible only in the developed industrial countries. All parties embrace Marxism as their ideological basis, with a focus on class struggle, and some, on Marxism-Leninism and the class-party approach. They refer to Bulgaria's past as an incomplete process of socialist construction or a generally appropriate socio-political tendency which had been corrupted in certain periods. In their economic policies, the communists demand consolidation of public ownership, price cuts, especially of staples, expropriation of illegally acquired funds, and a ruthless drive against corruption and the assignment of non-administrative functions to the administration. In most cases, the com-

344

Ideologies and Beliefs

munist parties regard the BSP as "bourgeois-reformist." Almost all communist formations are ultra-nationalist. The anarchist movement was restored after the start of democratic changes It has two main ideological sources and political circles: the old anarchists, united in the Federation of Anarchists in Bulgaria (FAB), and the Federation of Anarchist Youth (FAY), based on the youth subculture of the 1980s and trade unionism from the first months of democratization. The supporters and members of both groups do not exceed 500. The radicalism of anarchist ideology includes opposition to the state institutions, non-participation in politics, anti-militarism and anarcho-communism, which has been traditionally strong in Bulgaria. Similar to left- and right-wing radicalism, nationalism has likewise served as a political resource of the principal political forces ever since the start of democratization At the very beginning, that resource was used by the BSP more than the other leading parties. Unlike the countries in ex-Yugoslavia, however, nationalism never became the cornerstone of any of those parties' policies. Radical nationalist movements emerged on the eve of the State Council's December 1989 decision restoring the names of Bulgarian Turks and ending the assimilation campaign. The protest movement of Bulgarians in mixed communities was largely politically instigated. It gave birth to several nationalist organizations, the biggest one being the National Committee for Defence of National Interests. That organization soon found more conventional political forms of expressing its ideas, becoming a leading actor in regional policy in mixed communities. Ultra-nationalist ideas emerged in the UDF too. IMRO is a political ally of the UDF. The Bulgarian National Radical Party (BNRP) is the most extremist nationalist formation registered in court. The BNRP's main demand in the 1990 and 1991 elections stemmed from the concept of "national unity" and the "single national character" of the Bulgarian state. That concept included a single name system for all Bulgarian citizens and expulsion of those who did not accept it. In the December 1994 elections, the party retailored its policy, running on an extremist anti-communist platform that largely explains its poor performance. The BNRP broadened the concept of "national

345

11.4 Radicalism

unity" by incorporating Eastern Orthodox values. Various types of "skinheads" have emerged in many big cities since 1993. They are fighting foreigners and Bulgarian Roma. Besides the majority nationalisms, there are also various types of minority nationalism The Independent Macedonian Organization Ilinden, renamed United Macedonian Organization (UMO) Ilinden in 1990, was set up in 1989. Its objectives were the "protection of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria," which included both development of Macedonian culture and political representation of Macedonians. Ilinden was regarded with open hostility by the Bulgarian public right from the start. Government officials, all national media and, in particular, the nationalist formations, vehemently denied the very possibility of there being a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria and, even less so, of its having an organization. UMO Ilinden was never formally registered, even though it applied repeatedly to the Bulgarian courts. It is estimated to have had under 2,000 or 2,500 members in September 1991, the probable number approximating 1,500. The number of activists is 200 to 300. Despite their separatist demands, UMO Ilinden activists have never resorted to violence or any other illegal action. Their usual forms of political and cultural expression are joint celebrations, through various cultural events, of what they regard as red-letter days in the history of Macedonians. Apart from UMO Ilinden, several other formations are likewise propagating minority nationalism. Among them is the autonomist Turkish Democratic Party whose public influence, however, is negligible. Krassimir Kunev REFERENCES Bulletin on the Results of the 13. October 1991 Parliamentary Elections (1991) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission. Bulletin on the Results of the 12 and 19 January, 1992 Presidential Elections (1992) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission. Bulletin on the Results of the 18. December, 1994 Parliamentary Elections (1994) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission. Grand National Assembly Elections, June 10 to 17 (1990) Sofia: Central Electoral Commission (in Bulgarian).

346

Ideologies and Beliefs

Table 1. Election results of extremist anti-communist formations Elections Parliamentary elections -June 1 990(proportionalrepresentation) Parliamentary elections - October 1991 Presidential elections - January 1992 Parliamentary elections - December 1994

% of Votes Cast 0. 1 8 3.59 0.83 3.11

Table 2. Election results of communist formations Elections

% of Votes Cast

Parliamentary elections -June 1990(proportional representation) Parliamentary elections - October 1991 Presidential elections - January 1992 Parliamentary elections - December 1994

0.01 1.00 2.07 1.79

Table 3. Election Results of BNRP Elections

% of Votes Cast

Parliamentary elections -June 1990(proportional representation) Parliamentary elections - October 1991 Presidential elections - January 1992 Parliamentary elections - December 1994

0.06 1.13 0.38 0.54

347

11.5 Religious Beliefs

11.5 Religious Beliefs A discrepancy between the idea of religion (as a "field" of official propaganda) and the idea of religiousness (as an "area" of intimate personal experience) is emerging in Bulgarian public life. Religious beliefs have every chance of being exploited for political purposes, but the effect appears to be weaker than expected. Skeptical of all attempts at manipulation, Bulgarians are behaving almost like traditional atheists. Yet a large propoption of Bulgarian society, in the quest for new axiological beacons, is inclined to grasp with hope at the very idea of religiousness - whatever the religion in question might be - as long as it offers spiritual support. This is why a number of people today are credulously expecting salvation, which they are supposed to get by all sorts of means -from black magic to supreme spiritual revelation. This vast range of diverse dispositions, swinging from atheism to religious ecstasy and back, is a result of both the contemporary cultural situation and the specific historical traditions in Bulgaria. In their eleven centuries-long Orthodox history, Bulgarians have regarded their creed with pragmatic rationalism In this sense, Bulgaria has not had a full-fledged religious life in terms of spiritual experience. At the same time, the Bulgarian ethnos survived as many as five centuries under an alien religious and political system precisely due to the very idea of allegiance to Christianity. In this respect, the idea of religion has arguably played a more significant role in Bulgaria's historical destiny than the actual idea of religiousness. During the 45 years of communist rule, the principal trend in the various religious beliefs in Bulgaria was a steady decrease in the number of believers. As a result of the policy of atheism, believers withdrew into comparatively consolidated groups and there was "crypto-religiousness".

348

Ideologies and Beliefs

Since the start of democratic changes in 1990, there has been a religious boom, with each denomination striving to win back its traditional areas of influence in society Along with the traditional denominations, there has been an influx of various sects and non-traditional beliefs, which is part of the world trend of secularization. The idea of having a religious belief - be it Orthodox or Hindu, Protestant or Taoist, Catholic or Buddhist - has become something of a "hit", targeting an uninitiated public eager to taste what it could not quite understand or had been denied for years. Flaunting one's religiousness has become a fad. At the same time, the trend is towards growing separation between denominations and the state but with a new trend of association between religion and various political interests. The democratic changes have led to manifestations of Christian crypto-religiousness The nation experienced quite a steep decline in the number of believers during the totalitarian period - about 35% of the entire population in all identified themselves as believers (Table 1). According to other estimations approximately 50% were believers. The main factor that explains the difference between the percentages of people identifying themselves as Christians and as believers is the form of mundane religiousness that is a commonplace practice. The latest census showed that the Orthodox Church is again dominant in Bulgarian society and is restoring its traditional status and level of influence (Table 2). A total of 86.2% of the public, particularly in the towns, belong to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Besides, this denomination is immediately associated with indicators such as mother tongue and ethnic identity. The majority of Orthodox Christians identify themselves as Bulgarian, Gypsy or Greek, and a small portion are Turkish. The association with the state, typical of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, has been diminishing steadily. The state, as represented by the Directorate of Religious Affairs at the Council of Ministers, still controls and partially funds religious affairs. The 1991 national budget had outlays of 1,119,000 leva for the Muslim denomination and 1,000,000 leva for the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. From 1990 to 1994, the state interfered in religious affairs mostly insofar as it extended political support to the two holy synods. This schism in the Orthodox Church started after the Directorate recognized a

349

11.5 Religious Beliefs

new Holy Synod in 1992. Denominational problems are politicized because of a desire to break with the communist legacy in the Orthodox Church and the Chief Mufti's Office. Typically, Eastern Orthodox Christianity in Bulgaria has remained closely bound to traditions. Belief in God is directly associated with both historical tradition and the desire of Bulgarians to counter the decade-long ban on public expression of that belief. The financial plight of the Orthodox Church, delayed restitution of its property, as well as the invasion of various sects and non-traditional beliefs, have also prompted the consolidation of the Orthodox community (Table 3). The Muslim denomination in Bulgaria now has equal status with the other religious denominations This comes after more than 40 years of blackout and the forcible name change of ethnic Turks in 1985. Islam has broken out of the straitjacket of conformism it was forced into for purely political reasons, and is now becoming ever more of a safeguard of political ambitions. Political interests have caused a schism in this denomination as well. The existence of two chief muftis was recognized by two different governments. However, as a result of the democratization of Bulgarian society, several major steps have been taken: - Statutes of the Muslim Community in Bulgaria (see Religious Institutions) were endorsed in 1992; - the Muslim denomination has restored its traditional influence among approximately 12% of the population who are believers; - albeit off the record, state support for that denomination is evident in a series of acts that indicate preferential treatment (see Religious Institutions). The Muslim denomination has considerably stronger influence in villages - about 24%, than in towns, a mere 6%. Free practice of Muslim customs and celebration of feasts, along with the growing number of mosques, and the allocation of new land plots for cemeteries and other purposes, have stabilized the Muslim denomination. This trend is also encouraged by the compact geographical location of the Muslim population. Non-traditional denominations and sects are ganing ground The comparative isolation of society and state atheistic policy during the period of communist rule were not conducive to the development of relig-

350

Ideologies and Beliefs

ious beliefs and sentiments. At the same time, the taste for heresy typical of the Bulgarian environment is actually an expression of a non-conformist spirit, of an explicitly declared free attitude to what is official. The strongest and most widely spread heresies in Bulgarian history are the Bogomils in the Middle Ages, and the Dunovites today. Bulgaria's historical development, however, has created conditions for the manifestation of that nonconformist spirit, mainly as a sort of religious negligence. As a result of comparatively liberal legislation and practical recognition of the freedom of conscience and religion since the changes in 1989, Bulgarian society has radically opened itself up to various ideas and beliefs. At the same time, the collapse of social structures and established values and norms, along with the absence of new ones, have caused grave problems. A number of social groups, particularly children and young people, have ended up in an axiological vacuum while the traditional denominations argued over the political and moral record of their leaders. From 1990 to 1995, more than 60 foreign sects were registered in Bulgaria. The problems stemming from the influx of sects in Bulgarian society vary: - first, the economic instability of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the traditionally limited denominational and ethnic framework of the Muslim denomination; - second, the financial power of the sects, supplemented by the opportunities that they have to register as profit and non-profit companies by Bulgarian law; - third, the state-of-the-art, flexible and updated methods of recruiting sect followers. The sects are seen as a threat by a large part of Bulgarian society This is mostly because of their appeal to young people and the rising suicide rate among their members. Negative dispositions have prompted a longterm trend manifested in a government policy against sects in Bulgaria and the banning of a number of sects. Unlike the sects, non-traditional beliefs the paranormal, reincarnation, as well as the spread of ancient cults such as Buddhism and Yoga - do not arouse fears and mistrust. Following the boom of itinerant preachers and healers in the early 1990s, the public has been increasingly skeptical about such non-traditional beliefs, and followers have withdrawn into relatively limited and isolated groups.

351

11.5 Religious Beliefs

In conclusion, there have been positive trends in the traditional denominations: Eastern Orthodox Christianity and Islam have been restoring their historical influence in Bulgarian society. At the same time, the ongoing period of transition in Bulgaria has brought instability in the religious field. This instability is a source of religious euphoria as well as of opportunities for intensive propagation of non-traditional beliefs in Bulgaria. The process of political and social stabilization of society will doubtlessly calm down religious passions and hence inevitably weaken the influence of religious beliefs on people's everyday lives. Tatiana Bouroudjieva, Radoslav Gulubov REFERENCES The Process of Surmounting Religion in Bulgaria (1968) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Publishing House (in Bulgarian). Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria. (1995) Sofia: ICMSIR. Results of the Census. Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Results of the Census. 2% sample (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1 .Religiousness of the population Persons polled

42,664 (through questionnaire filled in by interviewer) 20,675 (through anonymous poll)

Believers %

Nonbelievers %

Not indicated

Regular church- goers

35,51

64,44

0,05

21,57

^ Q6 '

62,12

4,82

Praying at home

17,39

Source: The Process of Surmounting Religion in Bulgaria (1968) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Publishing House (in Bulgarian).

352

Ideologies and Beliefs

Table 2. Religious denomination of the populationby residence and sex Residence Sex

Total %

Eastern Orthodox

Catholic

Protestant

Sunni Muslim

Shiite Muslim

Others

100.0%

86,2%

0,6%

0,2%

11,8%

0,9%

0,2%

M

100.0%

85,8%

0,6%

0,2%

12,2%

0,9%

0,3%

F

100.0%

86,6%

0,6%

0,2%

11,5%

0,9%

0,2%

Total

100.0%

92,5%

0,6%

0,3%

5,8%

0,5%

0,3%

M

100.0%

92,2%

0,6%

0,3%

6,0%

0,6%

0,3%

F

100.0%

92,7%

0,6%

0,3%

5,5%

0,5%

0,3%

100.0%

73,4%

0,6%

0,1%

24,2%

1,6%

0,1%

M

100.0%

72,9%

0,5%

0,1%

24,7%

1,7%

0,1%

F

100.0%

73,9%

0,5%

0,1%

23,7%

1,6%

0,1%

In towns

In villages

Source: Results of the Census. Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Population by mother tongue and religious denomination Total

Christian

Muslim

Others

Total

100.0%

87,0%

12,7%

0,2%

Bulgaria

100.0%

97,7%

2,2%

0,1%

Turkish

100.0%

1,3%

98,6%

0,1%

Gypsy

100.0%

64,7%

34,8%

0,5%

Others

100.0%

73,7%

9,9%

16,4%

Mother tongue

Source: Results of the Census. 2% sample (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

12 HOUSEHOLD RESOURCES

12.1 Personal and Family Income

In the nineties, personal and household income rose in absolute terms but declined in real terms. This trend has gained momentum as a result of the hardships associated with marketization. Wages remain the number-one income source of Bulgarian families. Following the start of the transition to a market economy, the importance of other income sources such as entrepreneurship and self-employment has been growing steadily. Real income has dropped In the nineties, both personal and household incomes have been increasing every year in absolute terms. If the 1990 average total annual income 1 per household member rose by 85.8% from 1980 , in 1991 it rose by 317.6% from 1985 or approximately quadruple (Household Budgets..., 1992:13), and in 1994, about twenty-fold the 1985 level (Household Budgets..., 1995:11). This growth is due to galloping inflation. While nominal per capita income quadrupled between 1987 and 1991 (from 111.1 to 443.6, taking 1985 as a baseline), real income dropped from 106.9% to 71.2%, or by more than a third (Table 1). In December 1991 alone, the average income per household member approximately tripled, the consumer price index2 increasing to 573.7% or more than 5.5-fold (Household Budgets..., 1992:14). Although the population's real income continued to decrease in the next few years, inflation slowed down. In the 1990-1994 period the total income per household member rose by 1,275.3% and the average annual consumer price index by 2,842.1%, which means that real income dropped by about half (Household Budgets..., 1995:12). The economic structures that were kept alive for decades have crumbled in the years of marketization. However,

354

Household Resources

they have not been replaced by effective new structures, which has triggered a drastic disparity between the rise of prices and incomes. Wages remain the number-one income source of Bulgarian families Household incomes have been rising, mostly due to the nominal wage rise. The relative share of wages in total income, however, has tended to move downward. In 1965, it was 64.6%, dropping to 60.5% in 1985, 57.3% in 1990 and 38.2% in 1994 (Table 2). This trend is due both to growing unemployment and to the increasing importance of other income sources (e.g. private business) in the period of transition to a market economy. The second most important income sources are pensions, welfare payments and scholarships which rise in relative terms The relative share of pensions, welfare payments and scholarships in the total household income was 9.6% in 1965, growing to 19.4% in 1985 and 22.7% in 1991, then dropping to 19% in 1994 (Table 2). This trend results, on the one hand, from the socio-demographic changes in Bulgarian society: ageing of the population and the rising percentage of pensioners. On the other hand, the size of welfare payments is related to the rise in unemployment. This group of income sources is relatively more important in households of agricultural workers than those of all other employed^, which is due to the ageing of the rural population. The family plot of land is a substantial source of income By tradition, agricultural workers have derived a large part of their income not from the wages they get for their full-time job but from sideline work on their family plot of land4. Table 3 shows that the relative share of the family land plot in the total income of agricultural workers almost equals their wage. This trend has gained momentum in the past few years. The share of income sources beyond the public sector and the family plot of land has been increasing during the period of transition to a market economy Those income sources include non-public employment, entrepreneurship, private business, rent, sales and others^. As Table 2 shows, those income sources have soared since 1989, i.e. since the start of marketization which has been conducive to their growth. If they accounted for 8.3% of the total

355

12.1 Personal and Family Income

Bulgarian household income in 1965, they dropped to a record low of 5% in 1980, only to rise to 9.4% in 1990 and 14.1% in 1994. Maya Kelian

NOTES Total household income includes both monetary income and the monetary equivalent of their in-kind income. 2 The National Statistical Institute has been calculating a consumer price index since May 1990 on the basis of a monitored consumer basket of 1,500 goods and services. 3 The National Statistical Institute classifies households by social group depending on the family head. Households are classified as follows: blue-collar workers (where the family head is employed in manual labour in industry); salaried employees and intellectuals (employed in non-manual labour); and agricultural workers (employed in agriculture). 4 The family plot of land is arable land that cooperative farms granted free-of-charge to employees, villagers and other classes of the employed for meeting their personal needs, as well as for the sale of farm produce. After 1988, the size of family plots was not restricted, but they seldom exceeded 0.5 hectares. 5 They figure as "others" in Tables 2 and 3 since their share was insignificant until recently and they were regarded as untypical of the centralized planned economy. 1

REFERENCES Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1965-1987) (1989) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria (1985-1991) (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (In Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

356

Household Resources

Table 1. Per capita nominal and real income (1985=100) Year

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Nominal income

111.1

116.7

122.9

163.1

443.6

Real income*

106.9

110.4

109.1

113.6

71.2

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.53. Note: *At comparable prices

Table 2. Total household income by source (%)

1965

Year Source Total Wages Sidelines Pensions, Welfare payments and scholarships Family plot Others

1970

1975

1980

1985

1987

100.0 64.6 -

100.0 62.5 -

100.0 64.1 -

100.0 64.6 0.4

100.0 60.5 0.4

100.0 60.3 0.5

9.6

13.2

13.9

18.3

19.4

20.8

17.5 8.3

15.9 8.4

13.4 8.6

11.7 5.0

14.3 5.4

12.5 5.9

continued Table 2 Year Source Total Wages Sidelines Pensions, welfare payments and scholarships Family plot Others

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

100.0 58.7 0.6

100.0 55. .9 0.6

100.0 57.3 0.4

100.0 45.4 0.4

100.0 44.3 2.1

100.0 42.9 2.5

100.0 38.2 2.8

21.1

21.2

18.8

22.7

20.7

21.6

19.0

13.5 6.1

14.7 7.6

14.1 9.4

21.4 10.1

21.2 11.7

20.2 12.8

25.9 14.1

Sources: Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria.(1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 21. Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 20. Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 5.

357

12.1 Personal and Family Income

Table 3. Total household income by source and social group of household head (%) year source blue-collar workers total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others intellectuals and salaried employees total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others agricultural workers total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others

1982

1985

1987

100.0 63.9 0.4 17.0 13.8 4.9

100.0 61.1 0.4 19.3 14.1 5.1

100.0 61.8 0.4 20.6 11.3 5.9

100.0 71.5 0.8 16.6 5.5 5.6

100.0 69.7 0.6 19.0 5.4 5.3

100.0 66.7 0.8 20.0 6.2 6.3

100.0 46.4 0.2 21.0 29.1 3.3

100.0 42.3 0.1 21.2 30.9 5.5

100.0 42.6 0.1 22.6 30.0 4.7

358

Household Resources

contnued Table 3 year source blue-collar workers total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others intellectuals and salaried employees total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others agricultural workers total wages sidelines pensions, welfare payments and scholarships family plot others

1988

1989

1990

100.0 59.6 0.5 21.0 12.8 6.1

100.0 57.0 0.5 21.2 14.1 7.2

100.0 57.7 0.4 19.3 13.6 9.0

100.0 67.1 0.9 20.6 5.2 6.2

100.0 62.7 1.0 20.2 7.8 8.3

100.0 64.8 0.5 17.1 8.6 9.0

100.0 36.2 0.2 23.2 35.5 4.9

100.0 37.2 0.1 24.7 32.6 5.4

100.0 36.5 0.1 24.0 33.7 5.7

Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 121.

359

12.2 Informal Economy

12.2 Informal Economy

A second economy developed parallel to Bulgaria's mainstream economy in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1990s the second economy developed into an informal economy. The conditions of state socialism were conducive to the development of a second economy, whose proportion increased The production of goods and services whereby the fruits of labour are appropriated without payment of a general income or profits tax is defined as second economy. Under state socialism, there was a second economy in both production and turnover. It was better developed in the sphere of services since it was impossible to replace some of them. It is very hard to estimate the size of the second economy since there is no reliable information about it. The estimates of second-economy incomes (Todorova et al., 1988) are based on the figures on employment, average annual individual income, expert evaluations and survey findings. Specific socialist economic factors are taken into account: monopoly over production and commercial enterprises; shortage of raw and prime materials, goods and services; underdeveloped markets and market infrastructures; underdeveloped legislation, legal awareness and business ethic; underdeveloped tax system and tax-inspection authorities; and an open economy and tourism. On that basis, Bulgaria's second economy is estimated at 20% to 25% of the GNP. Considering that the GNP was in the range of 35 billion leva at that time, the second economy is theoretically estimated at 7 to 8,75 billion leva. The second economy under state socialism evolved into an informal economy during the process of marketization The post-1989 economic and social conditions have been conducive to the transformation of the second economy under state socialism into an informal economy. There are all three components of an informal economy: domestic, unregulated and black-market (underground). The main forms of informal economy are employment or self-employment without regulation

360

Household Resources

of employer/employee relations by a employment contract, with both sides concealing the existence of such relations; a lack of regulation of civil-legal relations between assigner and assignee by a contract of personal services, both sides concealing the presence of such relations; and a lack of registration under the Commercial Code and by the procedure set by the Council of Ministers (for the self-employed), and without social insurance for unpaid family workers. According to surveys from the mid-1990s (Hristoskov et al., 1996), the percentage of the unemployed participating in the informal economy probably approximates 13%, and that of "self-employed" unemployed working for their own or family business without social insurance, 2%. At the same time, 23% of the unemployed said that they turn out farm produce for their own private needs, and 3.3%, for private needs and for the market. The survey found that the self-employed are also involved in the informal economy. About 80% of them have not registered their business and do not declare their incomes. Attitudes to taxation are particularly indicative of the growth of the informal economy A sociological survey conducted in 1992 and 1994 (Kostov, et al.) found that attitudes to taxation are increasingly negative. The analysis of social and demographic factors shows growing negativism among younger and better educated respondents. Attitudes to taxation as a civil duty improved progressively by age margin in all areas where the survey was held. In Sofia, 83.3% of the respondents aged 70 and over, and just 33.3% of those aged 26 to 30, approve of taxation. Attitudes to taxation vary by education too. The better educated tended to be more disapproving. This trend is more pronounced in small towns and villages. Pensioners were less disapproving than the employed. By contrast, 75.8% of the unemployed in Sofia disapproved of taxes, and in the small towns almost all unemployed (87.5%) considered taxes to be a burden. Sasha Todorova

361

12.2 Informal Economy

REFERENCES Chavdarova, T. (1995) Attitudes to Taxation. In: Strategies for Economic Activity. Sofia: Scientific Archives of the Institute of Sociology (in Bulgarian). Hristoskov, Y., G. Shopov, I. Beleva (1996) Non-Institutionalized Employment. Sofia: Institute of Market Economy (in Bulgarian). Kostov, G. et al. (1994) Sociological Problems of Poverty. Empirical Surveys 1992 and 1994. Sofia (in Bulgarian). Todorova, S. et al. (1988) The Second Economy and the Quality of Life of Those Employed in It. Sofia: Institute of Trade Union Studies (in Bulgarian).

362

Household Resources

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

By the mid-1980s, family wealth had reached levels typical of average industrialized societies. This was indicated by the rate of home ownership and conveniences. Family wealth has decreased under the conditions of economic crisis and transition, and this is evidenced by declining real incomes and savings in the 1990s. Family income, one of the principal indicators of wealth, was particularly volatile in the 1990s The savings index increased from 100 in 1960 to 24,502 in 1994 (Table 1). Nominal incomes also soared in the 1990s, when inflation shot up to 3,065%. The nominal rise in general income comes foremost from increasing wages. Wages rose by a factor of more than 15 between 1989 and 1995. However, their proportion of the general family income has been declining steadily. In 1989, wages accounted for 55% of the average monthly income per family member, and 38% in 1995. Total average annual inflation decimated the average monthly real income by half between 1991 and 1995 (Figure 1). Savings are another indicator of family wealth. The figures show that Bulgarians save a large part of their incomes even when there is no growth in real income. The savings index rose especially in the years of highest inflation and, respectively, highest interest rates. Indebtedness is also indicative of family wealth. Compared with 1989 (100% baseline), indebtedness peaked in 1992 (358.5), and then decreased in the next two years mainly because of plummeting real income. The indebtedness: savings ratio was 7.44% in 1989, and 1.90% in 1994. Most Bulgarians live in small dwellings by local standards; the housing is low quality and lacks adequate utilities Housing is a major component of wealth (Census, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1992). The 1975 census showed a 20.3% increase in housing compared with 1965.

363

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

In 1985, the number of dwellings was 15.3% higher than in 1975, and in 1992, just 6.2% higher than in 1985. Most dwellings are privately owned: 91.2% in 1965, 88.5% in 1975, 83.6% in 1985, and 94.2% in 1992. The percentage of state-owned housing is higher in the towns. It was highest in 1985, at 23.7% of all dwellings in the country, and lowest in 1992, at 8%. State-owned housing in the countryside varied from 3.3% in 1965 to 1.7% in 1992. Home ownership prevails. The percentage of rented housing varies: from 18.2% in 1985 to just 8.2% in 1992. The size of the dwelling is an indicator of family wealth. The figures show that 0.8% of households live on 110-plus sq m, 1.8% on 90 to 100 sq m, 3.7% on 75 to 80 sq m, 10.4% on 60 to 74 sq m, 23.4% on 45 to 59 sq m, 37.8% on 30 to 44 sq m, 19.4% on 15 to 29 sq m, and 2.7% on less than 15 sq m. One in five households (20.9%) have running water, sewerage and central heating indoors. Their percentage is higher in the towns, 30.5%, and almost insignificant in the countryside, 1.44%. A total of 63.8% of all households have running water and sewerage, including 64.2% in the towns and 63% in the villages. About one in 20 households, 4.5% of the total, have neither running water nor sewerage: 1.9% in the towns and 9.8% in villages. Most households have the standard conveniences: washing machine, refrigerator, electric cooker, etc. Almost half have motor cars. Fewer own cottages, land in the countryside or homes beyond their permanent place of residence (Table 2). Most households have TV sets, and comparatively fewer, tape-recorders, cassette-players, VCRs and other hi-fi equipment (Rostov, et al. 1992-1994). Women have substantially contributed to growing family wealth Working women are making a tangible contribution to the family budget despite the pronounced gender-based inequality of pay in the past few years. In 1960, 33.5% of the employed were female. This percentage rose by 10 points in the early 1970s, to 43.3%. By the early 1980s, almost half of all job-holders were female (49% in 1983), and in 1989, 49.9%. The figures on women's employment and unemployment show their sizeable contribution to family wealth and income. Bulgarian women are also increasing family wealth through unpaid labour. In the present conditions of economic crisis and mass pauperization, there is a growth in women's unpaid labour as a

364

Household Resources

survival strategy in some cases, and in others as a strategy to retain their previous level of wealth. Sasha Todorova REFERENCES Kostov, G. et al. (1992-1994) Sociological Problems of Poverty. A Survey. Sofia: Institute of Sociology (in Bulgarian). Socio-economic Development of the Republic of Bulgaria (1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1960-1996) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

365

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

Table 1. Income and savings index 1960-1995 Year 1960 - base 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Savings index 100 117 130 156 176 202 237 284 315 368 423 482 553 643 728 801 863 920 960 1049 1 132 1216 1323 1449 1 547 1 802 1880 1974 2124 2185 2265 4565 9185 15775 24502

Family general income index 100 125 137 148 165 173 185 191 193 207 218 272 284 279 281 298 330 335 362 369 410 400 389 414 431 480 624 1651 2887 4282 7 143

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1960-1996) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian).

366

Household Resources

Table 2. Family ownership of consumer durables and conveniences Item Washing machine Vacuum cleaner Refrigerator Cooker VCR Motor car Cottage, land House, flat beyond permanent place of residence Radio and casette player, tape recorder

Figure 1. Average monthly real general income per household member, 1990 to 1995

1992

1993

76.1 63.1 91.3 86.4 16.9 44.9 14.8 12.7 43.2

71.4 60.1 90.1 81.7 16.4 40.1 12.2 10.5 41.5

13 LIFE-STYLE

13.1 Market Goods and Services

Bulgarian household consumption has been declining steadily since 1989, while spending on food has increased considerably. This is an indicator of the impoverishment of Bulgarian households. There has been a decrease in consumption of all traditional foods as well as of goods and services. These processes suggest a deterioration in the quantity and in the structure of Bulgarian household consumption. Models of consumption vary by social group. Monetary expenditure of Bulgarian households has exceeded their monetary income in the past few years. The changes in Bulgarian household expenditure and consumption in the period after 1989 have been negative Decreasing production has had an adverse effect on the market. Prices of prime necessities have risen, which has restricted household consumption. Table 1 shows a decline in consumption between 1985 and 1991. Taking 1985 as a baseline (=100), 1991 household expenditure rose to 323.3% of the personal family budget (Household Budgets..., 1992:14). In 1994, total household expenditure was nominally seventeen-times that of 1985's (Household Budgets..., 1994, 1995:12). Spending on food by all social groups of households 1 has risen in both absolute and relative terms, while actual consumption of staple foods has decreased From 1965 to 1975, food expenditures dropped from 43.6% to 38.8% of all household expenditures (Table 2). It rose to 42.6% in 1980. The decrease in food expenditure to 36.3% in 1990 is due to the economic crisis, which took

368

Life-Style

the form of an acute food shortage that year. In 1991, when the shortage was already surmounted, spending on food reached 47.4%, or close to half the aggregate household expenditure. In 1992 and 1993, that expenditure dropped slightly, but still remained relatively high; in 1994, it started rising again, reaching 45% (Table 2). In 1996 the expenditures on food reached 48.2% of all household expenditures (Genov, 1997: 105). According to internationally acknowledged criteria, households which spend more than 40% of their total income on food are under the poverty line. Bulgarian households are plainly in a very difficult economic situation. Actual consumption of foods essential for Bulgarian households has been declining in the first half of the nineties Consumption of bread and pastries is traditionally high in the Bulgarian diet. The relative share of bread in staple food consumption shrank between 1965 and 1988, growing again from 1989 to 1991 (Table 3). However, the economic crisis and rising inflation left their mark. In 1992, 1993 and 1994, Bulgarian household consumption of bread not only declined steadily, but actually reached a record low for the period since 1965. Households from the various social groups have different models of consumption and, in particular, a different diet Consumption of bread is highest in the households of agricultural workers, followed by those of blue-collar workers, and comparatively lowest among salaried employees and intellectuals. A comparison of figures on bread consumption in urban and rural households highlights these differences. Bread consumption rose in both of these social groups after 1990 - in rural households, however, by just 8.4 percent, and in urban households, by 24.4 percent, or approximately triple that of their rural counterparts (Household Budgets..., 1992:23). The different rates are due to the fact that rural households have greater opportunities for diversifying their diet with products from their family plot of land^, while urban households make up for their rising expenditure by changing their dietary pattern. Households living in the countryside traditionally spend less money on food than town-dwellers. In 1990, urban food expenditure was 3.3% higher than rural spending on food (Household Budgets..., 1992:24). That difference equals the relative expenditure by rural households on housing and

369

13.1 Market Goods and Services

household energy. Rural households spend money on their family plot of land which, however, yields substantial proceeds. The past few years have seen a relative increase in the consumption of canned meat and vegetables, as well as of potatoes, in all social groups of Bulgarian households (Statistical Yearbook 1992, 1993:38). Agricultural workers consume more meat, eggs and milk than blue-collar workers, salaried employees and intellectuals. In turn, blue-collar households consume more than those of salaried employees and intellectuals. Consumption of dairy products and fruit is higher in households of salaried employees and intellectuals than in the other social groups. By increasing consumption of dairy products and fruit, intellectuals and salaried employees make up for decreasing consumption of meat and meat preparations. Those differences in food consumption by social group are mainly due to differences in income. Bulgarian household consumption of most non-food staples has been declining in the past few years Spending on clothes and footwear dropped from 13% of total household expenditure in 1965 to 10% or 11% in the following few years. From 1980 to 1989, it approximated 9.9%, plummeting after 1990 - to 7.4% in 1994 (Table 2). This tipe of expenditure is higher for urban than for rural households. It is also higher for blue-collar workers, salaried employees and intellectuals than for agricultural workers. The annual margin exceeds 2 points (Household Budgets..., 1992:29). Housing, heating and lighting expenditure throughout the period under consideration was relatively higher in urban than in rural households. As Table 4 shows, non-food purchases do not suggest growing prosperity. Consumption of cotton and wool fabrics and footwear has plunged significantly in the past few years (Table 4). Household spending on mail and transportation has changed substantially. While it constituted a mere 2.6% of total household expenditure in 1965, by 1985 it had risen to 7% and by 1990, to 8%. In 1994, however, it was down to 7.7%. Those expenditure items are traditionally higher for urban than for rural residents. In 1985 and 1991 the margin was 2 points, rising to 3 points in 1988, 1989 and 1990 (Household Budgets..., 1992:29). Households of salaried employees and intellectuals spend about 4% to 5% more on transportation and communications than those of agricultural workers. That margin equals the latter1 s expenditure on taxes and fees. The trans-

370

Life-Style

portation and communications expenditure of households of salaried employees and intellectuals are about 2% higher than those of blue-collar workers. In the period under consideration, the former have higher expenditure on taxes and fees, education and recreation, as well as on hygiene and health care than the households of blue-collar and agricultural workers. Household expenditures on taxes and fees have tended to increase in the 30 years in question (Table 2). Following the start of marketization, government financial institutions have had problems collecting taxes and fees. The flawed legal framework enables certain social groups such as private entrepreneurs, the self-employed and some free-lancers to conceal their income and evade taxes. The tax burden is thus assumed by public employees, which increases their expenditure and substantially restricts their consumption. In 1991 and 1994, monetary expenditure of households exceeded their monetary income This was due to the escalating economic crisis and price liberalization in 1991. Table 5 indicates that most Bulgarian households used their savings to cover everyday expenses. The average consumption aptitude of households^ confirms the economic instability of Bulgarian households. In the 19891991 and 1993-1994 periods, the rise in expenditure exceeded the rise in income because prices of goods and services increased more than the income of the population. Maya Kelian NOTES 1

On the National Statistical Institute's classification of households by social group see Note 4 in 12.1 Personal and Household Income. 2 On family plots, see Note 5 in 12.1 Personal and Household Income. 3 Average consumption aptitude is the ratio of monetary expenditure to disposable monetary income. Maximum consumption aptitude is the ratio of extra monetary expenditure to disposable extra income.

REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

371

13.1 Market Goods and Services

Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (n Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Per-capita consumption (at comparable prices) baseline year

1985 1986 1987

1988 1989 1990 1991

1985 100.0 103.6 108.2 110.5 113.6 109.9 73.3

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

100.0 104.4 106.6 109.6 106.0 70.7

100.0 102.1 105.0 101.5 67.7

100.0 102.8 99.4 66.3

100.0 96.7 64.5

100.0 66.7

100.0

Source: Statistical Yearbook 1992 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Sofia, p.53 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Total household expenditure by item Year Expenditure Total Food Spirits Tobacco products Clothes and footwear Housing, household energy Furnishings Education and recreation Personal hygiene and health care Transportation and communications Taxes and fees Others

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1987

1988

100.0 43.6

100.0 38.8 3.0 2.0 11.3 7.5

100.0 42.6

100.0 40.9

7.2

4.0 2.6 9.7 7.2

100.0 40.4 3.4 2.5 9.7 7.4

100.0 39.5

8.7

100.0 40.6 3.6 1.6 11.4 9.2

3.6 4.8

5.7 4.6

5.2 4.3

4.4 3.0

4.4 3.2

4.3 3.4

4.5 3.5

1.2

1.5

1.8

1.8

2.1

2.1

2.3

2.6

4.9

6.9

6.4

7.0

6.8

7.2

4.3

5.1 11.8

6.7 12.5

6.2

7.1

11.3

11.8

7.4 12.6

13.0

4.5 1.7 13.0

12.0

4.7 2.2 10.2

3.4 2.3 9.9 7.4

7.0

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continued Table 2 Year Expenditure Total Food Spirits Tobacco products Clothes and footwear Housing, household energy Furnishings Education and recreation Personal hygiene and health care Transportation and communications Taxes and fees Others

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

100.0 38.1 3.4 2.3 9.9 7.4 4.6

100.0 36.3 3.3 2.2 11.9 7.3 4.3

100.0 47.4 3.2 2.9 8.6 7.3 3.0

100.0 43.4 2.3 1.9 8.3 7.3 3.9

100.0 42.9 2.1 2.2 8.1 8.0 4.0

100.0 45.0 2.0 2.4 7.4 7.5 3.7

3.7

4.6

3.3

3.3

3.2

2.7

2.2

2.0

1.8

2.5

3.0

3.7

7.3

8.0

6.7

7.7

7.9

7.7

6.9 14.2

6.8 13.3

6.0 9.8

8.6 10.8

7.8 10.8

7.3 10.6

Sources: Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.22 (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 29 (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.7 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p.71 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Household consumption of staple foods (average per capita) item Bread, pastries Rice Haricot beans Meat Sugar Milk Dairy products Eggs Vegetables Potatoes Canned vegetables Fruit

in kg kg kg kg kg kg kg number kg kg kg kg

1965 270.6 5.4 8.0 32.4 11.1 83.9 10.3 124 83.1 23.4 16.7 43.3

1970 252.2 6.0 6.7 32.8 11.9 92.8 11.3 156 85.7 23.8 17.8 47.5

1975 232.2 6.2 5.7 38.8 12.8 112.1 13.4 172 88.0 24.7 21.3 40.6

1980 231.8 6.9 5.6 39.4 14.3 116.3 13.9 180 67.4 29.2 22.4 37.9

1985 179.7 5.8 3.1 32.3 12.5 110.3 14.3 157 59.5 25.8 18.4 33.9

1987 172.6 5.3 2.8 33.9 12.5 110.8 15.2 161 62.6 25.2 18.3 33.2

373

13.1 Market Goods and Services

continued Table 3 item 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 in Bread, pastries 173.0 181.7 191.8 173.2 169.5 167.3 kg Rice 5.0 5.0 5.3 4.0 5.2 5.0 kg Haricot beans 3.2 3.8 2.8 3.1 4.0 3.5 kg 30.2 Meat 36.5 26,2 31.4 25.8 35.8 kg Sugar 9.2 8.2 12.0 9.3 7.9 10.6 kg Milk 121.2 102.6 70.5 69.7 116.7 78.3 kg 14.1 Dairy products 15.2 12.2 12.9 12.6 15.5 kg 154 166 153 148 146 Eggs 170 number 64.6 62.7 57.5 66.1 Vegetables 59.8 61.1 kg 28.2 26.0 25.6 Potatoes 28.8 26.8 28.3 kg 19.1 14.6 13.6 Canned vegetables 19.0 18.4 17.0 kg 28.9 22.3 Fruit 35.4 32.2 22.9 25.3 kg Sources: Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1987 (1989) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p.48 (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Sofia, p.39 (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994(1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 8(in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Household consumption of non-food staples item Cotton fabrics* Wool fabrics* Silk fabrics* Hempen and linen fabrics* Socks Footwear Incl leather TV sets** Washing machines** Refrigerators** Watches and clocks** Vacuum cleaners** Soap and detergents*** Tobacco products Timber*** Coal Naphtha, fuel oil and gas

in m m m m pair pair pair number number number number number

kg kg kg kg 1

1968 23.2 2.4 1.0 0.2 9 8 4 2 4 1 12 1 16.6 3.0 1611 1234 -

1970 13.6 3.2 1.0 0.2 10 9 5 7 4 6 16 2 19.6 3.5 1040 828 122

1975 9.4 3.1 1.5 0.4 10 9 6 2 4 5 15 2 21.3 3.7 756 6132 199

1980

1984

5.8 3.0 1.0 0.3 17 9 6 3 2 2 20 3 25.4 3.8 658 632 204

3.0 1.9 0.9 0.1 13 7 5 4 5 2 18 2 37.7 3.3 509 443 77

1985 3.0 1.7 1.0 0.1 13 6 4 5 5 3 19 2 36.6 3.2 594 465 97

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continued Table 4 item 1988 1987 1986 in 1991 1989 1990 m 2.8 3.0 2.8 Cotton fabrics* 5.2 3.3 2.0 m Wool fabrics* 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 m Silk fabrics* 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.2 m Hempen and linen fabrics* 0.1 0.2 0.1 14 pair 13 13 Socks 9 18 15 pair Footwear 7 7 7 6 5 8 pair Incl leather 5 5 5 4 6 5 number 6 5 6 5 TV sets** 5 7 4 5 5 5 number Washing machines** 2 3 3 2 3 number 2 2 3 Refrigerators** 19 17 19 number 24 16 Watches and clocks** 18 2 2 number 1 2 3 3 Vacuum cleaners** 34.6 32.7 33.7 33.6 Soap and detergents*** 37.1 34.6 kg 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.1 Tobacco products 3.5 3.5 kg 512 476 456 446 428 Timber*** 958 kg 389 554 493 440 407 4177 Coal kg 72 81 65 1 22 60 67 Naphtha, fuel oil and gas Sources: Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1965-1987 (1989) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p.60 (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1985-1991(1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, Sofia, p.48 (in Bulgarian). Notes: * After 1970, excl. household fabrics. ** Per 100 households *** Incl. home-made

Table 5. Disposable monetary income and expenditure and average maximum consumption aptitude per household member, 1985 to 1994 (leva) Year

Disposable monetary income*

Monetary expenditure*

Average consumption aptitude

Maximum consumption aptitude

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

1 1 1 1

1455 1536 1 623 1 740 1 901

0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.95 1.01 0.97 0.98 1.01

0.94 0.81 1.03 0.93 1.16 1.05 0.93 0.99 1.09

618 704 811 925

2099

2518 5951 11 088

6001 10781

16732 25437

16346 25818

2386

Source: Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. XVIII (in Bulgarian). Note: *Excl. taxes and fees.

375

13.2 Mass Information

13.2 Mass Information

There are two periods in the development of mass media. The first, until 1989, has two distinct trends: modernization of the media and strong party control over production and consumption of mass information. The post-1989 period has seen growing diversification of the media by type of ownership (the influx of private capital has broken up the state monopoly). Media of a specific nature have emerged, targeting diverse rather than uniform tastes. The essential changes in the development of the media are associated with politics rather than the introduction of new technology Researchers identify two periods: before and after 1989. The pre-1989 period had two distinct trends: accelerated modernization of the mass media and aspiration towards full control over the dissemination and consumption of mass information and culture. The first trend involved almost universal literacy among the active population, growth and modernization of the radio broadcasting system and telecommunications network, universal electrification, and the start of Bulgarian television services (1959). Prior to 1944, a majority of the mostly rural population was excluded from the media system. The following years saw a revolution in communications as the mass media covered the whole country. A film industry of impressive proportions developed. Three thousand cinemas were built in towns and villages. In 1939, annual newspaper circulation totalled 13,027,000. By 1973, one-time circulation was 8,047,033. There were 52 national papers with a one-time circulation of 4,734,693, which increased to 5,000,000 after 1976. By the early 1980s, Bulgaria was the country with the greatest number of telephone subscribers per thousand population in Eastern Europe, and one of the first in the region to develop a national computer industry These policies raised the cultural level of the "average" Bulgarian. The official ideology and dreary political affairs were countered by a thirst for

376

Life-Style

genuine, exciting and significant cultural products. Visitors could see things that were inconceivable in the West like long queues for works of fiction outside bookshops. The second trend in the development of mass information was increased control by the disciplining and penalizing authorities. The opposition press was banned right after the Second World War, and this limited the genre and the thematic variety. While there were 302 papers and 121 magazines in 1944, by 1954 their number was down to 70 and 96 respectively. The discrepancy between the would-be freedom of the press vested in the Constitution and the actual state of affairs deepened. Censorship and self-censorship became distinctive features of media communications. The style was uniform, monotonous and flat. There were quotas for Soviet and other East European films in the cinema and TV programming. A number of ethnic groups in the country were allowed to publish their own newspapers. However, tough restrictions were imposed on the media of the Turkish ethnic group, in particular after the mid-1980s. The prevalent trend was towards centralization of media output. Free access to information was restricted. Photocopying machines were few and located mostly in the administration. Their use was subject to strict control. Western radio stations were jammed until 1975, when the resolutions of the Helsinki Conference came in to force. Bulgaria virtually had a double standard towards information. Among the privileges of the nomenklatura was access to classified information: classified bulletins and information materials. Many libraries had two funds: an open, universally accessible stock of books, and a classified one available to "the initiated" only. So did the archives. Control over the media culture relaxed during Lyudmila Zhivkova's term in office as minister of culture. She contributed to the assertion of national self-identification and self-esteem, as well as to Bulgaria's cultural and communicational opening up to the world. There was no alternative communications system practically until the end of the 1980s. The intellectual responsibility for that definitely lies with the "authors" rather than the users of mass information. The latter found non-ideologized mass culture mainly in Western pop music in the 1960s and 1970s and, after the end 1980s, in Western videotaped films. Serb and Greek popular music was enjoyed by wide strata of the population.

377

13.2 Mass Information

The changes started with perestroika and a soaring interest in Soviet media Communications virtually boomed after 1989. The figures are impressive: over 1,000 newspapers and magazines were started between 1990 and 1995. Hundreds failed to survive, and by 1995 there were about 500 newspapers and 300 magazines: one newspaper and one magazine for every 10,000 people, which is a very high indicator by international standards. The breakup of the state monopoly is a major aspect of the changes to mass information. A new form of ownership has been asserted: private newspapers, radio and TV stations. The first private weekly, 168 Chassa [168 Hours], was released in April, 1990, and the first private daily, 24 Chassa [24 Hours], in April, 1991. The first private electronic medium, Radio FM+, went on the air in October, 1992. A private TV station, Nova Televizia [New Television], was started in July, 1994. The relationships between media, economic interests and information are complicated and ambiguous Media emancipation from political power often takes the form of (excessive) alignment with economic power, to the point where the prime-time news programme on national state television is sponsored by private companies. Private shows form the core of prime-time national television: Kanaleto, Plus-Minus, Vsyaka Nedelya [Every Sunday] and Nablyudatel [Observer]. TV analysts talk of "paid-for journalism," commissioned investigative journalism using customized facts and conclusions, precedents of economic censorship and self-censorship. The application of market principles in the area of culture occasionally generated negative trends in consumption Cinema is a case in point. Cinema attendance declined by a factor of 7.5% between 1988 and 1993. The number of cinemas also plummeted in the same period, by a factor of 11.6% - to 271 in 1993. The decline was most pronounced in villages, where the number of cinemas dropped by a factor of 46.9% (Culture 1994). Cinema attendance has been decreasing steadily since the 70s, particularly in the past few years (Table 4). Going to the cinema, once a popular form of entertainment, has now become a luxury. One of the paradoxical results of the rather chaotic marketization of culture is

378

Life-Style

that by the mid-1990s, prices of cinema tickets were higher than those for live theatre. There have also been substantial changes in the qualitative dimensions of the new situation Media are becoming the "Fourth Power". Indicatively, former president of the Republic Peter Mladenov was ousted because of a videotape. This trend has only just begun. A number of researchers underline the close ties between politics and media, concluding that the media landscape is under government control. Even Bulgarian National Radio and Bulgarian National Television have failed to uphold their national character, promoting the authoritative positions of the ruling circles rather than providing up-to-date information to the nation. To quote a politician and former chief of the number one electronic medium, "television follows the winners." The development of alternatives within the media is becoming a major trend Prior to the start of economic reform, there was a single national radio station with two quite similar services. Local state radio stations had token air time (six hours a day in two parts, in the morning and in the evening) and rather unified shows. Six years after the change, "there have never been so many radio stations," an analyst concluded (Dimitrov, 1996: 258). The new private radio stations - FM+, Darik Radio, Viva, Express, Radio 99 - are trying to develop their own specific identities. The general trend is towards dialogue, constant feed-back and live phone-ins. Political allegiance is another trend in certain radio stations even though they are private: Darik Radio is a typical example. Jammed no longer, the Voice of America, the BBC, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle and Radio France Internationale are on the air as well. Television has also tended to diversify. Between 1994 and 1996 alone, two private TV stations were started in Sofia and nine in the rest of the country. Each targets a specific audience. Nova Televizia is rather elitist and caters to particular tastes. Its most loyal viewers are aged 18 to 29 and 50 to 59, the majority of them with university education. 7 Dni [Seven Days] is mainly a film channel catering to the popular tastes of the average Bulgarian. Local television is watched by 25% of the residents of the respective cities, the majority of viewers aged 30 to 60 (Pesheva, 1996).

379

13.2 Mass Information

The press has been diversified by pornography and ESP, which were outlawed under the former puritan regime Diversification also introduced religious programmes on radio and television in 1992 (Table 3). The diversified press presumes - and cultivates - a new type of readership: from the unarticulated uniform readership under communism to the idea of a multitude of individuals with different and often opposite tastes and preferences. Postcommunism has replaced the Russification of the media landscape with Americanization. Russian Television was the only foreign television broadcast in Bulgaria before the democratic changes. Today, CNN and TVS are also available (Table 2). This trend stems from the shift from "ideology" to "box office," along with the desire of mass consumers to taste Western culture. The figures on bookpublishing show that contemporary foreign writers prevail, 34.3%, followed by classical foreign writers, 28.6%. Contemporary Bulgarian writers hold the same proportion of the book market, whereas classical Bulgarian writers account for just 8.6%. Judging by these figures, while Bulgarian culture spreads in the normal waves - the classics are staple, hence the higher interest in new writers and titles - the present opening up to Europe and the world strives to fill the gaps in Western classical literature. The style of the media has changed dramatically: standard literary Bulgarian has been replaced by colloquial and, in some cases, even street language This phenomenon has two opposite aspects. On the one hand, it demonstrates a careless attitude to the purity of language, precision of writing, and elegance of style. On the other, it is an expression of a new freedom - free everyday speech counters stilted ideological language. Communication culture has increasingly tended to change The role of computers in public and private life is growing progressively. Young Bulgarians - and their seniors - are as thrilled about the Internet as other people across the world. Fax machines and e-mail are integrating Bulgaria into "the global village." Cellular phones are still a symbol of the nouveaux riches, but they also show that the latter regard communications as a vital component of their image. Anna Krasteva, Tatiana Bouroudjieva

380

Life-Style REFERENCES

Raycheva, L. (1991) The Creative Process in the Television. Sofia: Sofia University Press (in Bulgarian). Tabakova, V. Ed. (1995) The Tolerance in Journalism. Sofia: Friedrich Ebert (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Published newspapers Total Years

Titles

Annual circulation

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

83 590 692 498 477 394 301 540 727 917 928 1059 1058

602 813 602 178

816720

843 603 902 179

1 100414 895 265 1 098 632

519718 616030 654 187

611358 505 004

Dailies One-time circulation

Titles

Annual circulation

One-time circulation

3837 4026 5971 6049 6396 7189 6397 12415 9491 10456 9697 11 882 9989

12 12 13 14 14

472 469 455 382 604 503 625 058 670 442 830 345 687 638 804 964 334 857 393 284 423 471 389 699 339 380

1433 1367 1 857 2109

17 17 24 31 46 54 68 58

2244 2626 2389 4065

1358 1464 1417 1449 1 179

Source: Culture (1994, 1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 42 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Television broadcasts (hours) 7975

1980

1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

Total

3887

5182

4545

6412

6248

5998

6933

6506

7178

32884

Bulgarian

2005

2437

2673

3601

3356

3537

3743

3203

3902

11361

886

1181

1026

1544

2010

1785

2360

2715

2618

18903

Foreign*

"Until 1989, Central Soviet Television, and after, TVS and CNN too. Source: Culture (1994, 1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 43 (in Bulgarian).

381

13.2 Mass Information

Table 3. Radio broadcasts (hours) 7975

1980

1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

7993

1994

Total

37051

43 172

44284

48498

48718

47946

52833

161 278

237483

News

7019

13247

18579

26154

24167

24348

24440

53817

72358

663

1025

1239

1039

1444

1 266

1 818

3 194

2857

2530

2645

2 194

2314

2275

3585

3884

5931

9391

28

486

459

Educational Cultural Religious Commercials

673

882

1028

923

891

1078

1268

7004

12490

Entertainment

25532

24383

20685

17585

16869

16236

19376

82417

120 109

634

990

559

483

3072

1433

2019

8429

19819

Others

Source: Culture (1994, 1996) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 44 (in Bulgarian). Table 4. Cinemas

1970

1980

1990

1 515

3 170

3453

2 174

247

Urban

231

423

511

498

205

Rural

1 284

2747

2942

1676

42

112075

112608

95851

47692

6551

1960 Total

Attendance, in '000

1994

Source: Statistical Yearbook (1972) Sofia: Central Statistical Office, p: 379 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 270 (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 375 (in Bulgarian).

382

Life-Style

13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices

The previously predominant pattern giving the state the key role in organizing health care is currently being replaced by a trend towards self care. The increased attention towards health care comes of a time when the health status of the nation has been deteriorating. Along with the economic differentiation of the population, a market for health care and fitness services is developing. Untill the end of the 1980s health care was one of the major concerns of the state In the period 1960-1989, the policy of the Bulgarian state was directed towards keeping high health care standards so that people could work for the common good. In this context, medical services, sports activities for youth and organized recreation activities were basically free of charge. The result was an increase in the average life expectancy and a decrease in the rate of sickness (see trend 8.2). The political and economic changes after 1989 were accompanied by the deterioration of the health status of the population and by the change in personal attitudes in this regard. Social groups like businessmen, bankers, politicians, art elite, etc. started paying serious attention to their health care and fitness (see Table 1). A new tipe of service industry emerged New services in the area of health care and fitness tended to develop rapidly, replacing traditional sporting events. Unions emerged which aimed at creating sports elites (see Table 2). Beauty parlors and fitness gyms are appearing which provide services like massage, body building, aerobics, and calisthenics stretching. The opportunities to go to sports centres free of charge decreased. No official statistics are available on the subject since services offered at many facilities are not officially registered. Along with the methods of traditional medicine, the so called "people's medicine" and fortune tellers have become rather popular. Their popularity

383

13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices

is mainly due to the low credibility given to traditional medicine, on one hand, and to the official support for such "medicine" people on the other. The health care system and sport services have to go through a most intricate change. The legal vacuum and the high cost of medication make it very difficult to get guarantees for quality control and for the protection of human rights in health care activities. The low levels of health status indicators seriously affect life expectancy Health is perceived as a value of top priority (see Table 2). However, it becomes increasingly difficult to take care of it due to the increasing costs of health care. On the other side, no matter how well informed people are about the dangers of smoking, alcohol consumption and drug abuse, there is no trend towards changing their consumption habits. There are substantial differences in the amount of time used for health care and beauty practices Despite the economic hardships, Bulgarians spend a substantial amount of time on health care and beauty practices. The tendency is to spend time on activities which are not expensive like walks, trips, hiking, and riding bicycles. The two groups which are prominent in this respect are youth and women. They are the ones who make substantial expenditures on fitness and cosmetics. The number of people who take special care of their eating habits has also increased. A special interest in ecologically clean products developed in the nineties. It remains determined by the financial capacities of people. There is a clearly outlined tendency towards buying such products if the price is relatively low. Tatiana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES Staikov, Z. (1973) The Time Budget. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian) Staikov, Z.(1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

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Table 1: Consumption of foods and non-foods per capita Products

1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

Bread and bakery products - kg

194.2

192.0

194.6

179.9

-

Rice - kg

4.4

4.2

4.5

3.0

2.3

Dry beans - kg

3.0

3.3

2.8

2.4

3.0

Meat - kg

72.5

77.8

77.8

57.8

64.5

Fish - kg

8.5

7.8

4.6

2.3

-

23.1

23.4

22.3

19.6

16.4

192.7

192.8

194.5

157.2

176.0

Eggs - number

256

255

239

192

180

Sugar - kg

35.1

34.0

26.0

16.0

17.5

Vegetables - kg

102.8

117.1

113.7

96.1

100.0

Fruits - kg

105.6

84.8

98.8

84.5

90.0

Spirits reduced into 50 - litres

14.1

14.6

14.3

13.4

11.4

Cotton fabrics - sq.m.

26.9

27.9

27.3

13.6

-

Wool fabrics - sq.m.

4.9

4.7

4.3

2.0

-

Silk fabrics - sq.m.

4.2

4.6

4.7

1.7

-

Knitwear - number

13.3

13.1

13.4

5.0

-

2.3

2.8

2.7

1.3

-

Vegetable and animal fats - kg Milk - litres

Footwear - pears

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 73 (in Bulgarian).

385

13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices

Table 2: Sporting unions in 1990 and 1992 Sporting unions Bulgarian Sporting Union Bulgarian Touring Union Bulgarian Hunting and Fishing Union Union of Bulgarian Motorists Bulgarian Football League

Societies, clubs, councils

Sportsmen

Sportscontests

1990

1992

1990

1992

1990

1992

282 444

274 394

178 842 67483

130

121

10836

90160 20 168 4615

24926 1 424 836

1075

275

207

5471

3 443

1 536

957

342

400

49865

40471

74367

49290

691

continued Table 2 Sporting unions Bulgarian Sporting Union Bulgarian Touring Union Bulgarian Hunting and Fishing Union Union of Bulgarian Motorists Bulgarian Football League

Participants

Cadres(coaches, organizers)

1990

1992

1990

1992

904319 53782

19762

12 049 4524

1 983 1 774

24429

26799

258

568

29463

17251

3803

3 024

408 175

232 235

1 873

1 323

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 323 (in Bulgarian).

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Life-Style

13.4 Time Use

The proportion of time which Bulgarians devote to work has decreased in the past 20 years. Free time has increased, but at the expense of time devoted to physical needs. There is a long-term trend towards growing differences in individual time budgets by social category. At the national level, the total time devoted to work dropped gradually Until the early 1970s, research on time use was haphazard and was impeded by considerable differences in working hours. The five-day work week came into force between 1970 and 1977. The total time devoted to work amongst all citizens (excluding children aged under 6) dropped gradually. In 1970 and 1971, the employed worked 318 minutes a day, and in 1977, 299 minutes. All pre-1989 studies include the indicator of "social activity" (mainly political activities), which averaged 138.72 minutes a day in 1977 and, in the case of students, 207.10 minutes. There has been a distinct trend towards codification of decreasing working hours and increasing free time: a reduction of the work week and the daily working hours (from nine to eight and a half hours); and an increase in paid annual leave from 14 to 20 working days. On the whole, however, there are considerable differences by occupational category, length of service and branch. Even though they have more free time, Bulgarians are devoting less and less of it to leisure, physical relaxation and recreation. This trend has intensified in the past few years. It is immediately associated with the plummeting purchasing power of wage earners, rising unemployment and general economic destabilization in the country. Between 1980 and 1989, the time devoted to household tasks per day dropped by six minutes. In villages, however, it increased by four minutes. The growing number of urban residents spent two more minutes a day on shopping and services, or practically the same amount of time as before.

387

13.4 Time Use

The time devoted to sleep and physical needs decreased During the eighties, the time devoted to sleep and physical needs per day decreased by an average of 10 minutes. This trend is typical of both villages and towns. Even though free time generally increased (by 15 minutes daily on average), it actually decreased for a series of groups. This decrease was most visible in some activities such as going to the theatre and opera, and dining out. All social categories spent more time on household chores. The economic crisis has reduced time for leisure and physical relaxation In the past 20 years, the total time devoted to household tasks (per person per average day of the year) has been longer than that devoted to work: in the early 1980s, Bulgarians devoted 196 minutes to work and 227 minutes to household tasks and in the 1990s, 179 and 221 minutes respectively. These trends have continued after 1989, with certain changes in particular cases. Given the general decrease in time devoted to work and the increase in free time, the latter has tended to be devoted to work again. In 1990, Bulgarians slept seven hours and 45 minutes in 24 hours: workers and students, seven hours and 25 minutes, and people with higher education, seven hours and 15 minutes. There are no differences by gender. On the other hand, people devoted more time to part-time jobs, work on the private farm, homework, etc. There are marked gender differences in the amount of time devoted to household tasks The increase in time devoted to household tasks includes an increase in the average time spent on shopping, from 13 to 29 minutes. For some social categories - for instance, pensioners - this time has increased substantially. The employed devote 41 minutes to household chores, rural residents 140 minutes, salaried employees 25 minutes, and pensioners 90 minutes (Nikolov, 1990). There are marked differences by gender. In 1990, females devoted 108 minutes a day to household tasks, and males just 32 minutes. From 1970 to 1977, the ratio was 264 vs 21 minutes respectively. Alarmingly, Bulgarians are devoting less time to bringing up their children: just 12 minutes a day in 1990, vs 36 minutes in the 1970s. Time for meals has also tended to decrease: from 97 minutes for males and 102 minutes for females in 1977, down to respectively 81 and 87 minutes in 1990. Tatiana Bouroudjieva

388

Life-Style

REFERENCES The Screen Reality (1990) Sociological survey. Staikov, Z. (1973) The Time Budget. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 1: 24-hour individual time budget by activity (minutes) Social status

Workers Fanners Officials Highly educated Students Housewives Retired

Activity Free time

Gardening

Shopping

Services

Social activity

Child care

10 32 8 12 12 14 29

31 108 17 9 6 28 61

24 22 25 19 5 23 31

2 1 4 7 5 15 2

2 0 6 5 2 1 9

12 5 17 20 1 35 9

Source: The Screen Reality (1990) Survey, p. 132 (in Bulgarian).

389

13.5 Daily Mobility

13.5 Daily Mobility

Daily mobility has increased in absolute terms as a result o fthe development of the national transport infrastructure over the years between 1960 and 1990. Since then, new processes have been underway in the infrastructure following the transformation of Bulgarian society. There has been a downward trend in the mobility of certain categories of travellers. The transport infrastructure is being reoriented Between 1960 and 1989, mobility increased in absolute terms as a result of priority development of the transport infrastructure. The road and transport networks were appropriate enough to ensure travel within the country, although they did not provide opportunities for high speed travel. Since 1989, the transport infrastructure has had to be reoriented as Bulgaria proceeded to integrate into the Balkan and European road infrastructure. This process, which is supported by international funding, is still underway. The inland road and railroad network is in a critical technological and financial state, and that affects mobility. There have been controversial trends in mobility Until 1989, mobility by various means rose in absolute terms (Table 1). There has since been a noticeable decline, especially in air and river transport. Mobility within the population centres and in the cities, in particular, has remained relatively stable. This is also valid for intercity transport. Between 1980 and 1990, household spending on transportation and and purchase of vehicles rose: from an average of 6.4% to 8%. In 1990, every other household owned a car. Between 1985 and 1990 alone, the number of privately owned cars rose from 1,030,089 to 1,276,751. The family budget share of car maintenance and repair costs has grown rapidly in the nineties. Public transportation is relatively well developed Most commuters use public transportation (Table 2). There is a noticeable difference in the organization and operation of public transportation in Sofia

390

Life-Style

and the other cities. Commuting to/from work takes an average of 39 minutes a day in Sofia, and 56 minutes in the other cities (30 minutes in villages, mostly via intercity transport). Short-distance travelling time has generally increased. In the towns, inefficient public transportation accounts for loss of time. Mobility has been decreasing steadily in the nineties Mobility decreased steadily between 1992 and 1996: * spending on transport dropped by almost two thirds; * increased spending on the maintenance of private cars and intercity transport was due mainly to the dramatic price rise; * the total number of bus, trolley-bus and train seats declined. The general economic stagnation has been affecting family income and, hence, the structure of spending and mobility. Tatiana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES Staikov, Z. (1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian) Table 1: Passengers carried (thousand) mode of transport total railway tr. road tr. incl. public tr. inland water tr. seatr. airtr. trolley-bus tr. tramway tr.

1985

1989

1990

3 114 276 3 142 236 2 948 762 105 429 102 399 98950 2 392 137 2491 561 2 358 037 2 174 642 2 283 203 2 167090 102 26 285 240 587 392 2722 2606 2564 251 141 154203 275 952 272 557 459 029 234 355

1991

1992

1 957 145 1 912 351 72787 75909 1 530 867 1425411 1359310 1 306 667 13 11 115 66 1217 1460 170 362 199 848 181 784 209 646

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. .225 (in Bulgarian).

391

13.5 Daily Mobility

Table 2: Public transportation (number) Public transportation bus

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

24659

25 128

25560

25631

24842

24516

trolley-bus

303

439

584

795

795

836

tramway

396

389

401

407

418

444

469 023

470 852

478 226

490214

500 495

506 803

1 063 959

1 117676

1 173578

1 220 784

1 269 958

1 317437

motors cars

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 254 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3: Traffic activity of automobile transport for public use

transported passendgersthousand work carried outmil, pass. km average distance of runkm aver, twenty-four-hour distance-km

1985

1989

1990

1991

1992

2 174 642

2 283 203

2 167 090

1 359310

1 306 667

24725

26816

25955

19026

16957

11.4

11.7

12.0

14.0

13.0

226

233

228

196

195

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 231 (in Bulgarian).

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Life-Style

13.6 Household Production

The most popular type of household production in Bulgaria comes from the family plot of land. The family plot is an important source of income for agricultural workers and rural residents, as well as for those employed in the other branches of the economy and urban residents. The role of the family plot as a source of extra income has been growing during the state of economic crisis and the transition to amarket economy. So far the family plot has been non-marketoriented and a source of income in kind rather than in cash. The family plot is the most important component of household production in Bulgarian society Under the conditions of a centralized planned economy, the only form of agricultural economic activity that was not associated with paid work was sidelining on the family plot . Agricultural workers and rural residents have been earning a large part of their incomes from extra work on the family plot rather than from wages from their permanent job. The share of the family plot in the total income of agricultural workers is almost equal to that of their wages (Table 1 in 12.1 Personal and Family Income}. That share has been growing in the past few years: by 1991, family-plot income accounted for 39.2% of the total income of rural residents, and wages, for 31.1% (HouseholdBudgets..., 1992:23). The family plot is a substantial source of income for those employed in both agriculture and the other branches of the economy As Table 3 in 12.1 Personal and Family Income shows, the share of that income is higher for workers than for salaried employees and intellectuals. In the conditions created by marketization, work on the family plot is the best alternative of in-kind and in-cash income for a large proportion of households. Family-plot proceeds of Bulgarian households rose by a factor of more than 36 from 1985 to 1994 (Household Budgets... 1995:XIII). Family-plot income in kind has had a sizeable share in the general income of

393

13.6 Household Production

households in the past few years of economic crisis and transition. In 1965, family-plot income made up 17.5% of the total income of households. Certain fluctuations notwithstanding, that income gradually decreased to 14.3% in 1985, and to 14.1% in 1990. It shot up to 21.4% in 1991 and 25.9% in 1994 (Table 2 in 12.1). In the transition to a market economy, the family plot is an extra source of income and is the basis of the survival strategy for many Bulgarian households. The family plot remains a form of non-market-oriented household production and is a source of income in kind rather than in cash The deteriorating economic crisis and inflation, of food prices in particular, have led to steady, and long-term growth in the share of income in kind over the past few years. Preserves, a traditional item in Bulgarian household production, are made from part of the meat, vegetables and fruit from the family plot. Another part of the farm produce and of the preserves is given to friends and family living in town and often helping produce and make them. The absence of an appropriate purchasing and processing infrastructure is a major reason for the difficult marketing and still low monetary income from family-plot produce. Maya Kelian NOTE The "family plot" is a certain plot of arable land which farmers get from farming cooperatives for private use and for sale of farm produce. The land is granted to agricultural workers and rural residents. The agricultural enterprises provide certain production services to family-plot workers in exchange for which the latter are bound to sell them their output at government-set prices. The surplus remains at the farmer's disposal. Some industrial enterprises have contracts with farming cooperatives, and the former's employees are also entitled to use arable land as family plots. Family plots flourished due to a work-force shortage in agriculture and the need of ensuring farm produce for the market. There have practically been no restrictions on the size of the family plot since 1988. Plots seldom exceed 0.5 hectares.

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REFERENCES Household Budgets in the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1965-1987) (1989) Sofia: National Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria (1985-1991) (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Household Budgets in the Republic of Bulgaria 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Share of monetary and in-kind income from family plot in general* and monetary income of agricultural workers Year

Share of in-kind income from family plot in general income

Share of monetary income from family plot in monetary income

1982

29.1

9.0

1985

30.9

12.0

1987

30.0

10.2

1988

35.5

15.7

1989

32.6

13.6

1990

33.7

15.7

*The general income combines the monetary income of the family and the income from the family plot. Source: Household Budgets... 1989 p. 17; 1992, p. 21

395

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression

Pornography has been increasingly invading the life of the different generations as a vehicle of a pathological desire for self-expression. Pornography-related violence is becoming part of the everyday life of both teenagers and their parents. Opponents argue that pornography conveys the ideology of the subordination of women in society underscoring, in particular, the proved thesis that pornography is a form of violence against the person. That is especially valid for advertising, which promotes the "attractiveness" of various aspects of deviant behaviour: exhibitionism, pedophilia, and sado-masochism. At the same time, some progress has been made in the break with sexist stereotypes. Pornography is becoming increasingly available The post-1989 democratic changes in Bulgarian society generally found Bulgarians unprepared for the Western standards that started filling in the newly created social vacuum. In this context, pornography has become available to everybody: from children and teenagers to their parents. Puritan attitudes to sex and the secrets of sex have been replaced by mounting curiosity. Invading the cities, pornography moved into villages and towns. Apart from TV pornography (mostly by satellite and available Western TV channels), many Bulgarians started buying VCRs. Unfair competition and pirated Western video-cassettes flooded the market. Until recently, there was virtually no control and censorship, and pornography became universally available. Pre-1989 taboos on blue videos evaporated, and pornography becoming nothing short of family entertainment and leisure activity. Scenes of sodomy, pedophilia, sado-masochism, anal and oral sex became available to almost all members of the public. A survey found that most viewers of this type of pornography were aged 9 or 10 and over 50. A large proportion of viewers are also lonely, divorced or people with sexual problems. Exploitation of female and male nudity has generated new social codes. This type of

396

Life-Style

non-differentiation includes a set of codes referring to specific social models of behaviour: possession and domination, violence, sexism and machismo. Prior to 1990, pornographic materials - mostly magazines and videocassettes - used to be smuggled into the country and were available to a comparatively limited number of people. The first erotic newspapers, published in 1990, now seem innocuous compared to the growing number and ever more aggressive pornographic magazines sold at almost every newsstand and occupying about a third of the stall. Freely speculating with its own ideas of democracy, the "flesh market" is trying to defend its output, qualifying it as normal sexual education. The deficit in sexual literature and ignored sexual education before 1989, on the one hand, and the opportunity for free self-expression, for shedding inferiority complexes and doing away with censorship, on the other, are at the core of the unprecedented interest in pornographic publications. There has been mounting public concern about the uncontrolled dissemination of pornography The public started reacting in a spontaneous, unorganized and poorly effective way. Public indignation has exclusively targeted the pornographic press. Blue novels and video-cassettes have been almost entirely ignored. CD-roms are yet to come in fashion (Margaritova-Vouchkova, 1993:23). Legislation against pornography does not cover the full range of definitions of pornography. Nor does the effective Criminal Code provide a precise definition. The inadequacies in the interpretation of the provisions actually proceed from inadequacies in attitudes to the norm itself. This has been all the more obvious since 1989, now that the norm is ever harder to apply. The focus is on the indecency of the description. Opponents argue that the destructive nature of pornography degrades identity and frustrates the Ego Coming of reproductive age, young people are still incapable of loving in the way that binds only a couple with adequately formed identities which they can offer each other. Hence the psycho-social moratorium on pornography seems encoded in human development. However, the gross explicitness of pornography confuses identity and wreaks havoc in behavioural roles when they are demonstrated in practice. Pornographic magazines or films raise the libido, transform personification and increase the aggressive

397

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression

urge. They build inadequate models of public life in which women are seen as exchangeable toys and male potency boils down to frivolous promiscuity rather than a quest for satisfying and moral sex. In the case of asthenic and mentally unstable people, pornography also brings alienation. They resort to masturbation and project their Ego on the picture, since they are incapable of integrating with the community, of finding a partner and a normal psychological vent for their sexuality. The natural consequence is either to find comfort in "contact" with pornography or in violence against strange women. This phenomenon is especially typical of small towns and villages with limited opportunities for promiscuous sex. Nevertheless, there has been a rise in rape in the countryside over the past five or six years (Table 1). Most rapists are aged under 29, and that generally stems from their higher social, labour and sexual activity. Constant use of pornography and alcohol are important factors in rape: an average of 36% of the rapists had had one or more drinks (1995 Report..., 1996:310). Pornography offers many models of sexual behaviour that were not familiar in this country before Prior to the mid-1980s, "casual rape" - of acquaintances after some sort of preliminary contact - was prevalent in Bulgaria. That contact could be entirely casual. The pre-rape behaviour of the victim is rather important in this case. A new phenomenon has appeared today: abduction and rape of complete strangers. This kind of rape is typical of the Western countries, where casual rape of acquaintances is very rare and usually resolved by a settlement on damages. The invasion of pornography and pornographic stories especially through video-cassettes - has brought the Western model home. Supporters argue that pornography provides sexual education, showing what relationships between the sexes should be like They claim that pornography is especially good for people with sexual problems (pedophiles, sado-masochists, exhibitionists etc.), since they could thereby get sexual satisfaction without breaking the law. Many teachers, pediatricians and crime experts think that pornography helps children and teenagers shed their inferiority complexes, cultivating models of female and male behaviour which they cannot learn anywhere else. Pornographic publications thus have a healing potential in dealing with accumulated aggression and sexual fantasy. As regards the impact of pornography on the rest of the

398

Life-Style

public, supporters say that most people today are in contact with the widely available non-pornographic sex: in advertising, papers, cheap and costly novels, magazines, TV, fashion, and radio. They think that it is hopeless to believe that this influence could be eradicated. Supporters claim that puritanism is far worse than pornography and is traditionally forced on young people. Most parents (advocates say) are reluctant to teach their children to enjoy sex and therefore consistently apply various means to desexualize them. As a result, the new generation is growing up with countless sexual neuroses. Pornography has won a firm foothold on the Bulgarian market Interest in it is still high for obvious reasons. The first Bulgarian pornographic film, financed by the country's biggest video company, was released in 1992. There are many papers and magazines offering pornographic advice, with pictures copied from Western magazines and of very poor moral and typographic quality. All research is based on the thesis that pornography is almost always fatal for young people and children, in particular, who cannot distinguish between pornography and trivial ideas of sex nor are old enough to control their sexual drive when it appears. In the academic world, this phenomenon is known as "Pygmalionism": a pathological syndrome that substitutes the copy of the living being as an object of desire. Pornography and the perversion that generates it are thus midway between the mirror (as obsession) and the statue (as compulsion) in the museum of perversity. Pornography triggers aggressive behavioural reactions The rise in crime in the past few years is objectively associated with the influence of pornography, as well as film violence. "Opening up" to the world, Bulgaria has become an attractive and cheap place to make money in all sorts of ways. Foreign companies are scouting the local pornographic market, eager to learn the laws and regulations on the opening peep shows, private video booths, "full escort services" etc. There is a legal vacuum at present. Statutory frameworks regulating production and dissemination of indecent information are absent. Analyzing the state of the Bulgarian pornographic market and developments in other countries, it is obvious that passage of a statutory act on production and dissemination of pornography is imperative. The traditional ethnopsychology of Bulgarians, who are very conservative and puritan

399

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression

about the influx of pornographic information, should also be taken into account in this respect. Fads upset the small community and tempt the young generation. They eventually pass, coming into contact with tradition. If the temptations of the new forms of communication through the peculiar codes of civilization are exciting, the asthenia and introversion typical of the Bulgarian mentality prove crucial in the face of the aggressive flesh trade. Deprived until recently of the opportunity to experience sexist and macho illusions through TV, Bulgarian society is now quenching its informational and cultural thirst for such shows. Ultimately, however, pornography remains an illusion that does not correspond either to the extreme pragmatism of one part of Bulgarian society or the revived religious values of another part. Hence the influx of pornography in this country is a pure and simple liberal venture in the transition to a market economy. Pornography will soon be channelled and confined to the needs of a group of people suffering from an identity crisis or problem puberty, or with deviant mental attitudes to the world. Borislav Ninov

REFERENCES Margaritova-Vouchkova, S. (1993) Pornography and Children. Obshtestveno Vuzpitanie, NO 4 (in Bulgarian). Ninov, B. (1984) Photography and Eroticism. Sotsiologicheski Pregled, NO 8 (in Bulgarian). 1995 Report by the Council on Criminal Studies at the Republic of Bulgaria's Prosecutor's General Office (1996) Sofia (in Bulgarian).

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Table 1. Rapists by ethnic identity (per 100,000 population) Year

Bulgarians

Turks

Gypsies

1993

6

13

88

1994

6

13

95

1995

9

11

83

Source: 1995 Report by the Council on Criminal Studies at the Republic of Bulgaria's Prosecutor's General Office (1996) Sofia (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Relative share of sexual crimes in all crimes

19955

Registered crimes Number

%

169 173

100.000

Sexual abuse

308

0.150

Rapes (completed)

752

0.380

Rapes (attempted)

172

0.090

Procuring

49

0.020

Homosexualism

31

0.015

Total

Source: 1995 Report by the Council on Criminal Studies at the Republic of Bulgaria's Prosecutor's General Office (1996) Sofia (in Bulgarian).

401

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

Consumption of alcoholic beverages almost quadrupled between 1961 and 1990. Drinking has been increasing steadily among young Bulgarians, with first experiences starting at an average age of 13 or 14. Smoking usually starts at age 13 to 15, becoming a regular habit by age 15 or 16. Polls in secondary schools show that 22.4% of all students have experimented with drugs including alcohol. The majority of them have tried medications with or without alcohol. The number of registered drug addicts rose more than twenty-fold from 1960 to 1986. Drug abuse has gathered particular momentum since 1985. We will use the term "drug" for the whole class of mood-altering substances: "A drug is any psychoactive substance which could cause a change in perceptions, mood, behaviour or psychomotory functions upon reception by the living organism" (WHO Technical Report 1992:8). The term could be specified with a focus on the ability of the substance to create psychological dependence: "A drug is any toxic substance acting on the central nervous system capable of causing psychological dependence, in other words producing an irrepressible desire to take a drug even against a person's wiir (Ferrer et al. 1994). The term "drug" thus covers alcohol, tobacco, medications, industrial substances (volatile substances and other solvents) and illegal psychotropic substances. The past ten years have seen a considerable decline in production of wine and beer, and a slight growth in that of brandy The figures in Table 1 give by no means a full picture of the production and marketing of alcoholic beverages in Bulgaria for the following reasons: - post-1989 influx of imported spirits dodging customs, tax and any other control; - large-scale home-made production which has traditionally been off the record;

402

Life-Style

- growth of big-time industrial bootlegging, including substandard drinks. Consumption of alcoholic beverages, in 100% alcohol per capita, almost quadrupled from 1961 to 1990 (Lazarov et al. 1994). A 1993 poll among students aged 14 to 18 in four big cities found that 77% drank alcohol. Of them: 70% drank on special occasions; 6% took every chance to drink alcohol; and 1% drank every day. Most drinkers usually start at the age of 13 to 16. The majority drink beer (23%), wine (22%) and spirits (20%) (Lazarov et al. 1993). Consumption of alcohol has been growing considerably among children and teenagers, first experiences usually starting at the age of 13 or 14. Polls in 10 of Sofia's best schools (1,111 students, of them 300 in grades 5 to 8 [age 12 to 15]) found that 10% of higher-school students are regular drinkers and 45% have been drunk at least once; 16.1% of the regular drinkers admitted that they "had a dependence on alcohol" (Lazarov et al. 1995). By tradition, Bulgarians drink in hedonistic style and prefer the typical local grape wines and brandy. This style has been changing distinctly in the past 10 or 15 years. Consumption of imported beer and hard liquor has increased markedly The past three or four years have seen a rise in consumption of alcohol in combination with psychotropic medications. Public and institutional attention to alcohol-related problems has been waning since 1989. At the same time, there are a number of direct and indirect indicators that alcohol consumption is rising steadily, along with the health and social problems stemming from alcohol abuse. (See 16.3). A sizeable share of tobacco products sold and smoked in Bulgaria in the nineties have been smuggled and sold illegally in the country. According to the aforementioned 1993 poll among students, 33% of the respondents aged 14 to 18 smoked, 21% per cent of them from 10 to 20 cigarettes a day. Most people light their first cigarette at the age of 13 to 15, developing the habit by 15 or 16. A similar poll in ten schools in Sofia in 1995 confirmed that unfavourable trend (Lazarov et al. 1995). Psychotropic substances have been much easier to find in the nineties This is due to the absence of effective control and widespread breach of statutory regulations at pharmacies.The following changes took place in the

403

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

use of psychotropic medications, made and sold by pharmacists in the country, between 1986 and 1992: - morphine, from 2.4 kg in 1987 to 4.458 kg in 1992; - benzodiazepines, from 287 kg to 119 kg, down from a soaring 397 kg in 1989. The 1993 poll among students showed that 22.4% of them had experimented with psychotropic substances. The majority had used pharmaceuticals with or without alcohol. There are three main groups using psychotropic medications without prescription: Group one: persons over 18, on the whole well integrated into society, eager to find a way of relaxing from stress. Group two: minors, most of them comparatively well integrated into the education system and families, who take medications without prescription in combination with alcohol as a group norm in or around school. Group three: young people regularly using Pharmaceuticals as a drug or as a component of illegal narcotics. Volatile substance (glues, petrol or propane-butane, paint and polish solvents, bronze etc.) are used mostly by minors from the Roma minority (See 16.3). The use and abuse of illegal drugs came in three successive waves Narcotic drugs became a problem among young Bulgarians in the mid1960s, as an echo of youth movements in the West. A small group of about 100 to 150 young people started using psychotropic substances, mostly opiates (morphine, codeine and others) out of curiosity and a desire to be part of the world youth movement. They were given medical treatment and were prosecuted for criminal behaviour. Their number rose by about 20 or 30 per year. The second wave appeared in the mid-70s. Abusers were motivated mostly by personal problems in communicating with families and friends. They again preferred certain opiates and medications with codeine, benzodiazepines, hallucinogenic medications (antiparcinsonics) and volatile substances (especially acetone glue). In the mid-1980s, the number of registered drug addicts rose to 1,400. They were treated mostly at psychiatric clinics across the country. The majority came from social groups equivalent to the middle class and from the big cities. Typically, drug abusers started associating in groups. They usually procured drugs through criminal action in pharmacies, hospitals and pharmaceutical enterprises. In both waves, the

404

Life-Style

opiates were usually injected and the medications swallowed. The third wave started in the mid-1980s, when social control slackened and a series of social norms no longer mattered. A drug subculture emerged. Stratification by favourite drug is an indicator of affiliation with a certain group. This wave is also linked to the boom of heroin in Bulgaria (Lazarov 1995) (See 16.3). Table 2 shows the drug hauls made by the customs officers from 1992 to 1994. Notably, the 1993 haul exceeds the total amount of smuggled drugs caught between 1986 and 1991. These figures are supplemented by the average size of a single haul (Table 3) and the hauls made by the Interior Ministry (Table 4). In addition, police caught a total of 367,340 psychotropic pills in 1994, among them 316,500 pills of codeine, 24,080 of Glutemide and 26,760 of Rochinol. The fields of narcotic crops, discovered by police, should be added. They show that domestic production is picking up. In 1994, there were eight cases: 0.87 hectares and 2,070 roots of Indian hemp (cannabis) in all. Six and a half tonnes of dry leaves were destroyed. In addition, 185 persons cultivated 20 hectares of opiate poppy. There is no other reliable evidence yet on the level of production of precursors of illegal drugs. Opiate poppy has been traditionally grown in some parts of Southwestern Bulgaria (Blagoevgrad region). Experts estimate that the bulk is used as "poppy straw" for "poppy tea." Before the advent of heroin, that was one of the main products used in Bulgaria. Drug trafficking has intensified in the nineties This makes the situation rather unfavourable. Heroin is winning ground on the domestic market. The street price of a dose of heroin (0.250 g) was 3.4 USD in 1993, and approximately 14 USD/g. Heroin wholesaled at about 13,500 USD/kg in the same year. In 1994 the street price of heroin rose, to about 16 or 17 USD/g. Cocaine appeared on the market, retailing at about 100 DEM/g. In 1994 the average purity of street heroin varied from 6% to 9%, and of cocaine, from 25% to 30%. Public attitudes vary from permissive in the case of alcohol and cigarettes to repressive in the case of illegal narcotic drugs Use and even abuse of alcohol is regarded as normal in Bulgaria. Smoking is still in fashion. Public attitudes to illegal narcotic drugs are quite differ-

405

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

ent. Repressive attitudes to users prevail. The bio-medical approach to youth drug addiction has not been surmounted yet. Drug policy and legislation are developing Prior to 1993, all drug-related activities were performed by different institutions more or less independently. Prevention, treatment and rehabilitation were conducted by psychiatric institutions without cooperation with police, who were combating drug trafficking. The first preventive school programme was written and implemented by the National Centre for Addictions (formerly a clinic) in 1988 (Lazarov et al. 1988). A media campaign was launched in 1985-1986. Programmes restricting demand for and supply of narcotic drugs took off in 1992 and 1993. The establishment of a National Council against Narcotic Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking was an important step in that respect. The first ever methadone programme started operating in Sofia in 1995. Bulgaria is a signatory to all international conventions restricting the marketing and use of narcotics (1961, 1971, UN 1988). Post-1989 changes and the supplementary duties ensuing from the 1988 UN convention necessitated the streamlining of Bulgarian drug laws to international standards. The most important amendments since 1989 have decriminalized ownership of small amounts of drugs for private use. Production, trafficking and marketing of illegal drugs are subject to criminal persecution. Forty-one persons were arrested for breaking the laws against illegal narcotics in 1993 and 44 in 1994. Table 5 shows the number of investigations and trials associated with drug crimes between 1992 and 1994. Only five people were sentenced and jailed in 1994. The number of sentences is much smaller than that of arrests and trials, which shows that the judiciary is not efficient enough. Under the National Health Act, the Ministry of Health controls the production, processing, storage, import and export, and accountability of psychotropic substances and their precursors. It also controls the fulfillment of commitments under international agreements. The Health Ministry's National Narcotics Service is in charge of this. The Service supervises application of Art. 14 of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The Department of International and Domestic Trafficking of Illegal Drugs and Precursors at the Central Service for Organized Crime Control and the Finance Ministry's Department against Drug Trafficking also play a part. Under the new laws, the Minister

406

Life-Style

of Health must license producers of and dealers in Pharmaceuticals, psychotropic substances included. Philip Lazarov Yantsislav Yanakiev REFERENCES Ferrer, X. et all. (1994) What Have I Done Not to Deserve This. Barcelona: ABS Intersalus. WHO Experts on Drug Dependence 8 (1992) WHO Technical Reports Series 836. Lazarov, Ph. et al. (1994) National Report, Phare DDR Programme. Barcelona: ABS Intercalus. Lazarov Ph., I. Kutsenok, M. Vassilev (1993) Use and Abuse of Psychotropic Substances by Children and Teenagers. Sofia: Sociological Survey Report (in Bulgarian). Lazarov Ph., R. Sedefov, M. Vassilev, D. Metodiev (1995) Use of Cigarettes, Alcohol and Drugs by Students. Sociological survey, unpublished report (in Bulgarian). Lazarov Ph. (1995) City Report Sofia. Strassbourg: Joint Pompidou Group / UNDCC Project: Extension of the Multi-City Network to Central and Eastern Europe. Lazarov Ph. D. Vladimirov, G. Yonchev, R. Angelov (1988) Programme on Prophylaxis of Drug Addictions among Students. Sofia: Ministry of Science, Culture and Education (in Bulgarian).

407

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

Table 1: Average annual production of alcoholic beverages in Bulgaria,

1985 to 1994 Wine Brandy Beer

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

304 303

325 942

334 101

314987

240 728

34565

31682

24389

26864

26203

583 834

602 345

621 197

633 159

671 966

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

219875

244 063

200 786

152 369

164 680

22418

29511

36797

39345

39010

650 659

487 985

469 455

424 718

479 163

continued Table 1

Wine Brandy Beer

Source: Statistical Yearbooks. Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Table 2: Average drug haul made by the Republic of Bulgaria's customs officers from 1992 to 1994, kg Heroin

Marijuana

Hashish hauls

hauls

hauls

1992

kg 158.652

28

62.371

4

22.300

2

1993

545.911

48

33.312

-

-

1994

376.984

26

0.040

3 1

399.285

9

kg

kg

continued Table 2 Opium

Total

Cocaine hauls

1992

kg 1.154

1993

0.280

1994

-

kg

hauls

hauls

-

2

0.175

kg 244.652

1

579.678

54

-

3.445

2

779.754

40

3

Source: Ministry of Finance, General Customs Directorate

36

408

Life-Style

Table 3: Psychotropic substances hauled by the police from 1992 to 1994, kg Year

Heroin

Hashish

Marijuana

Opium

1992

5.658

1993 1994

Cocaine

Total

15.592

11.150

0.514

-

6.769

11.373

11.104

-

0.140

0.175

10.735

14.499

0.040

44.365

-

1.723

20.519

Source: Ministry of Interior, Central Service for Organized Crime Control

Table 4: Psychoactive substances hauled by the police, kg Phenit iline

Amphetamine

1992

290

1993

711

11

1994

-

-

610

Heroin

Opium

.

Hashish

Codeine

Phenobarbital

.

.

.

.

9

0.050

4.370

3.100

3

42.660

0.750

0.750

-

-

Source: Ministry of Interior, Central Service for Organized Crime Control

Table 5: Investigations and trials on drug crimes, 1992 to 1994 Year

Investigations

Trials

1992

70

78

1993

157

85

1994

149

52

Source: Ministry of Interior, Central Service for Organized Crime Control

Marijuana

7.850

14 LEISURE

14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time

In the past 35 years the major patterns of organizing free time have remained relatively stable. The major structural changes have taken place around the increased time for watching television. The amount of free time of Bulgarians has been decreasing during the nineties. There has been no significant change in the distribution of free time of Bulgarians over the past 35 years The home remains the centre of free time activities. Within the household the distribution of free time is done through gender patterns. Women deal with housekeeping, while men spend time in repairs of appliances, cars, etc.(see trend 13.4). The only significant change took place in the predominant distribution of free time of young people. In the nineties it shifted towards entertainment and acquiring a profession. During the nineties the time spent on socially useful activities has been abruptly decreasing. Social activities are restricted to passive occupations at home While the beginning of the period is marked by socially useful activities, such as reading and raising children, in the following years the mass media, including television, radio, press, computers and cinema, gained a predominant role. During the nineties the cultural activities of Bulgarians decreased abruptly. This fact can be explained by the financial difficulties of households and the decreased family budget, as well as by increasing working hours, spending more time for getting to work, and passive rest. It is only the younger population that is more active in the social field by acquiring new professional skills, studying foreign languages, seeing friends, and playing sports.

410

Leisure

Television dominates Bulgarians' free time About 80% of the population watches television irrespective of their age group. Only in the age group of 60 and over does the percentage get lower. Bulgarians who have lower education tend to watch less television. They are spending more time on sleeping and recreation due to the fact that this group is usually involved in jobs which require hard physical labour. Increasing the time spent on watching television is facilitated by the processes of alienation in the big cities. An additional factor for this tendency is the expansion of cable operators, as well as the emergence of local TV stations in major cities in the nineties. The development of the private sector determines a new tendency towards cutting down the time spent on watching television because of spending more time on social and cultural activities. This group of the Bulgarian population is still relatively small, amounting to about 5% of the adult population. The economic situation of the lowest income groups strongly impacts their distribution of free time. Half of the people with a monthly income below the poverty line give no answer to any question connected with their distribution of free time. The amount of free time of the average Bulgarian has substantially decreased during the nineties The decreased amount of free time is not solely connected with an increase in the amount of time spent at work, transportation or rest. There is also the tendency of Bulgarians to do nothing in their free time. Table 3 shows the rather high percentage of respondents - between 6 and 30% - who don't give any specific answer as to what they do in their free time because they are not able to identify their activity with the patterns listed in the questionnaire. Tatiana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES The Screen Reality (1990) Sofia (survey, in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1973) The Time Budget. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian).

411

14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time

Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994-1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1: Habits and preferences of Bulgarians (%) Usual free time activity

Watching TV Seeing friends Reading: fiction non-fiction magazines Driving Listening to music Playing games (chess, cards, computer games) Doing sports Riding bicycle Hanging out in bars Going to movies Going to the theater, opera Going to concerts (classical music) Going to concerts (pop, rock music) Going to museums, galleries Skiing

Age group

Gender Total Male

Female

7524

2534

3544

4554

5564

65+

73 25

73 27

74 23

75 53

78 36

78 26

80 17

70 14

60 8

13 9 9 15 14

10 9 7 27 15

16 10 11 5 13

22 16 16 13 43

20 16 14 26 24

15 14 12 24 13

13 8 8 20 6

7 2 4 8 2

2 *

10

14

6

20

15

11

9

4

3

7 6 6 2 1

10 9 7 2 1

5 3 5 2 1

22 13 16 9 2

10 6 10 2 1

6 6 6 1 1

4 5 3 1 1

3 5 1 *

2 2 1 *

1

1

1

*

1

1

*

1

*

*

*

1

*

1

3

-

*

-

*

-

1 1

1 2

1 1

1 2

1 2

1 2

1 1

1 -

-

1 2 *

Source: Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994-1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

412

Leisure

Table 2: Time use (in minutes) Activity Cooking Shopping Cleaning, doing dishes Washing, ironing Sowing, embroidery Looking after kids, housekeeping Other Total

Men

Women

7 40 20 7 2 57 126 259

90 42 104 92 22 47 61 458

Source: Staikov, Z. (1978) The Annual Vacation of Working People in People's Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian).

Table 3: Habits and preferences of Bulgarians (%) Gender

Most interested in Male

Female

Not responded

8

76

33

Cars

34

3

22

Sports

16

7

18

Trips, tourism

14

12

19

Professional qualification

21

17

21

6

6

11

Healthy lifestyle

21

30

27

Investing

12

7

15

Beauty keeping

10 27

28 12

28

30

51

21

Health care

17

30

12

Fashion

10

28

26

Interior design

19

29

22

Books

13

22

21

Housekeeping

Computers

Home improvement Raising children

14

Source: Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994-1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

413

14.2 Vacation Patterns

14.2 Vacation Patterns

The stable vacation patterns of Bulgarians between 1960 and 1989 have changed considerably in the nineties. There has been a substantial decline in the number of people taking active vacations, in recreation facilities and in household spending on vacations. Between 1960 and 1989, the number of vacationers rose steadily Vacation patterns diversified reaching a peack in the mid eighties (Table 1). The broad network of rest homes, sanatoria and children's camps provided opportunities for active vacationing within the country. Vacations abroad were comparatively rare (Table 2). Paid annual leave increased from 14 to 30 work days or longer depending on the length of service, the category and type of job, and education. Vacation patterns did not vary by gender. Spending vacations at home was also a widespread pattern. After 1989, vacation patterns changed substantially On the one side, the new trend that has been gradually emerging is towards diversification of vacations, including travel to international holiday destinations. On the other side, the aggravation of the economic crisis has generated major negative changes in vacation patterns: * privatization and restitution of most rest homes has increased vacation costs, adversely affecting the structure of vacationers; * plummeting incomes have forced many Bulgarians, young people in particular, to use their vacations for earning supplementary income; * high transportation fares became a serious problem for Bulgarians, who would rather spend their holiday at home or at short-distance destinations. The economic situation has had the most adverse effect on young people and children. They have been spending most of their four-month holiday at home watching TV, reading or playing with neighbour children in the street. Tatiana Bouroudjieva

414

Leisure

REFERENCES Staikov, Z. (1973) The Time Budget. Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994-1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1: Rest houses Rest houses (number) Available maximum bed capacity (number) Persons rested (thousand) Short-time stay Long-time stay

1985 1553 119789

1989 1512 118586

1990 1327 104067

1991 884 65415

1992 892 65677

1298.2 340.7 957.5

1202.0 288.2 913.8

1011.0 213.0 798.0

440.9 152.9 288.0

499.3 177.9 321.4

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 2: Travels abroad Total

7955 533367

1989 921987

1990 2394873

1992 2610090

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1994, 1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3: Occupancy Activity Work Housekeeping Looking after kids Shopping Physical needs Study Social activities Passive recreation Active recreation incl. sports Communications

Active population Hours 2 427 1 062 1 06 176 3633 34 42 260 232 14 788

% 27.7 12.1 1.2 2.0 41.0 0.4 0.5 3.6 2.6 0.2 9.0

Source: Staikov Z. (1989) Studies on the Time Budget. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 128 (in Bulgarian).

415

14.3 Athletics and Sports

14.3 Athletics and Sports

Interest in physical activities has been growing steadily. However, the economic crisis has negatively affected both professional sports and private physical activities in the nineties. Development of mass physical culture and sports was a government priority between 1960 and 1990 The authorities took special measures to advance the most popular sports. As a result of these policies, an extensive network of organizations, institutions and associations was set up to develop or facilitate sports. On the other hand, a large part of the public was integrated into sports schools and teams. Professionalization has succeeded in preserving the basis for the development of sports in the nineties, but does not enable mass involvement The economic crisis has not left a deep mark on the established network of organizations, institutions and schools. It has maihly affected the maintenance and development of the facilities which actually provide opportunities to practice sports and physical activities. The age structure of people involved with sports has changed. The number of children and the elderly engaged in physical activities is decreasing. People aged 15 to 24 are the most actively engaged in sports: 32% of them are involved in physical activities. Just 10% of those aged 35 to 40 practice sports. Females have given up sports on a large scale: just 7% of them can spare the time for physical activities. This negative trend is best illustrated by the fact that a mere 11% of all Bulgarians are involved with sports. Traditionally, Bulgarians have had positive attitudes to hiking and trips. The structure of these activities has not changed substantially in the past few years. Most people prefer trips in the country and hiking independently outside resorts and holiday villages as the cheapest option.

416

Leisure

Interest in spectator sports has grown Eighteen percent of all Bulgarians go to sports contests and games. Most of them are males. Just 8% of the females, and only those aged under 20 at that, are interested in sports. A mere 1% of Bulgarians go skiing in their leisure time, 6% bike and 7% are actively involved with sports. Today Bulgarians would rather watch TV (73%), see friends (25%), and read (32%). Football is the main participatory sport. Hunting and angling are next. Sports developed by the Bulgarian Hiking Union (mountaineering, orientation, cave exploration and hiking) come third. Tatiana Bouroudjieva REFERENCES Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995). Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Staikov, Z. (1989). Time Budget Studies. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1993). Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Table 1. Personal interests of Bulgarians Interested in:

Gender

Total 42

M

F

7524

2534

Age (years) 354544 54

5564 51

8 50 41 46 Household chores 76 24 Bringing up chil64 41 30 62 dren 47 51 20 28 Wholesome lifestyle and diet 26 21 30 30 33 28 22 22 Health care, medi24 17 cal problems 30 28 25 29 23 19 24 Furnishing 19 29 28 41 36 12 24 Beaty care (incl. body care) 10 28 46 34 23 19 4 10 24 13 New books 22 26 27 16 18 9 29 Spectator sports 18 26 23 8 33 17 8 14 14 Trips and hiking 12 30 16 13 6 11 16 7 32 Practising sports 11 17 10 6 4 Source: Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

65+

41 18 20 21 5 2 4 4 3 1

417

14.3 Athletics and Sports

Table 2. Habits and preferences of the Bulgarians (%) Gender

/ most often

ylge (years)

Total

M

F

15-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-64

65+

Watch TV

73

73

14

75

78

78

80

70

60

Read

32

26

37

54

50

41

29

13

3

See friends

25

27

23

53

36

26

17

14

8

Practise sport

7

10

5

22

10

6

4

3

2

Bike

6

9

3

13

6

6

5

5

2

Ski

1

2

1

2

2

2

1

-

-

Source: Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

Table 3 Sports unions in 1992 (number) Associations, clubs, councils

Athletes

Competitions

Participants

Bulgarian Sports Union

274

90160

-

-

1 983

Bulgarian Hiking Union

394

20168

691

19762

1 774

Bulgarian Hunting and Angling Union

121

4615

1 075

26799

568

Union of Bulgarian Motorists

207

3443

957

17251

3024

Bulgarian Football Union

400

40471

49290

232 235

1 323

-

6686

542

8071

2219

Sports unions

Regional centers for preconscription training

Staff (coaches, organizers)

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

418

Leisure

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices

There have been divergent trends in the various forms and stages of cultural activities. By the end of the 1980s, culture was heavily subsidized, public facilities expanded and more or less consistent policies of aesthetic education were pursued. All this led to relatively common and stable practice of cultural activities, and to an eventual decrease in regional and social-group differences. A long and severe economic crisis since the start of the 1990s has affected culture and the arts, their state and development, as well as public involvement with them. During the 1980s, the state paid considerable attention to the development of culture and the arts. Thanks to budget subsidies, a number of theatres, orchestras, opera houses, art galleries, museums, community culture clubs (chitalishte) and libraries were set up and maintained. Many public facilities were built and equipped both in cities as well as in villages. Facilities varied in quality from one population centre to another. However, the very fact that they were there made various arts accessible to the general public, expanding the range of people practicing cultural activities. There was a substantial increase in these types of activities. Bulgaria had implemented a Programme on National Aesthetic Education for years. It failed to reach its ambitious goals, but contributed to the development of essential cultural values. The political and social changes since late 1989 have had a strong impact on culture. The arts are no longer subject to political and ideological constraints. Private enterprise in these fields has been given a green light. Ideological restrictions and standards have been dropped. Yet in many cases so have moral as well as aesthetic standards. New works of art which have won broad critical acclaim now come to Bulgaria soon after their release. At the same time, so do commercial box-office hits of questionable artistic merit. Culture has suffered very strongly from the economic crisis Subsidies have plummeted. Maintenance of facilities has deteriorated, and many have had to be closed down. The decrease in movie theatres is drastic:

419

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices

from 3,081 in 1989 to 247 in 1994. The number of people employed in the arts has also contracted dramatically. There has been an increase in the past few years, primarily due to the growth of the private sector. Still, that cannot make up for the decline, and amount of people working in the arts is lower than the pre-crisis level. On the whole, the practice of cultural activities was relatively stable by the late 1980s. This is evidenced by both figures on attendance and sociological surveys profiling and differentiating consumers. The number of people not practising any cultural activity dropped slightly in this period, but then soared several-fold. There are various reasons for this pattern. Some are associated with the appearance of new forms of communication and consumption, and others with changes in the value system prioritizing material wealth. Last but not least, there are economic reasons. The financial situation of the general public has deteriorated drastically. People are finding it increasingly impossible to spend money on cultural entertainment. With respect to differentiation in cultural activities, sociological surveys indicate a tendency towards decreasing cultural differences between the main social groups. Although they have diminished, however, there are still differences by social group and region. A closer look at the separate cultural activities shows specific developments in each. Reading books, especially fiction, is quite popular. Sociological surveys have found an increase in the number of readers and the intensity of reading. Public libraries play an important role in increasing access to fiction. Their number has not decreased substantially at present, but underfunding has severely limited the purchase of new books. In publishing, the number of titles and copies of books rose steadily until 1985. It then dropped slightly, only to nose-dive in 1990. Growth in private publishing has led to another increase, yet publishing is still below pre-1990 levels. However, many of the books published in the past few years are of questionable aesthetic value. Bulgarian writers are almost entirely ignored. Movies are the most popular form of cultural activity. Despite certain fluctuations, commercial cinema attendance was consistently high until the late 1970s. A downward trend followed. It was weak initially, but became increasingly pronounced towards the late 1980s. The early 1990s saw a real crisis in cinema attendance: from 47,692,000 in 1990 to 6,551,000 in 1994. That was just over 5% of attendance in 1960. There are many reasons for

420

Leisure

that. Since the second half of the 80s, cinema has been up against stiff competition from videotaped feature films. More and more people acquired videocassette recorders. Videotape rental firms offering a wide range of films have mushroomed across the country since the 1990s. There has also been competition from satellite television in the past few years. Those factors even more important considering that Bulgarians definitely prefer to practice cultural activities at home. Furthermore, cinema has suffered worst from a closure of movie theatres. A sizeable portion were housed in nationalized buildings that were reverted to their former owners under the Restitution Act and turned into gaming-houses and shops. This large-scale closure has made it impossible for the public, mostly in small towns and villages, to go to the movies. The theatre is quite popular, with relatively high attendance. The number of theatres almost doubled in the period under consideration. The opening of theatres in quite a few population centres, as well as touring and various theatre festivals, increased the potential audience. By the late 1980s, the number of theatre productions rose steadily. The decline registered in the early 1990s soon ended, with productions stabilizing in 1994 and 1995. With regard to attendance, it peaked in the first half of the 60s and the second half of the 1970s, then declined slowly but steadily. This decline was particularly pronounced from 1990 to 1992, after which attendance stabilized - but at less than half the 1989 level. There have been divergent trends in music listening. In absolute terms, folk and pop music have enjoyed the greatest, albeit slightly declining, popularity. While the latter is popular mostly among young people, folk music listeners come from a wider spectrum. On the whole, folklore is very popular in the country. There are regular folk music and dance festivals, with heavy attendance and numerous performers - professional folk companies as well as many amateur performers and groups. Regarding symphony and chamber concerts, attendance has increased, albeit slightly. This trend is evidenced by statistics. Following a decrease in concerts and concert-goers in the mid-1960s, there was a consistent rise until the late 1980s. The subsequent general decrease in cultural activities has been very slight in this case. That is probably due to the fact that the relatively small audience throughout the period is made up of connoisseurs with lifelong interests that are hardly subject to external factors.

421

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices

Opera and operetta attendance is close to overall trends in music listening. The number of people who have never been to an opera or operetta was relatively stable and decreased slightly by the late 1980s. There was a pronounced decline of attendance after 1989, followed by stabilization - but at a very low level - in 1994 and 1995. Attendance at art exhibitions and galleries has been relatively poor throughout the period. Their limited number and their location - most art galleries are in the capital and the big cities - has made them accessible to only a certain part of the public. The findings of sociological surveys in 1968 and 1986 do not indicate any changes in the percentage of spectators and frequency of visits. The past few years have seen a positive change distinct from the general trends: an increase in both art galleries (mostly private) and their attendance levels. Community culture clubs are a specific centre of various activities. Their number has remained practically the same in the past few years, but membership has decreased visibly. Underfunding is plainly a problem in this case as well. Yet community culture clubs, which have workshops and amateur companies, are primarily a centre of amateur art activities. Amateur art activities developed on a broad scale in the previous decades, especially among students and young people. There were about 11,000 amateur companies and workshops, more than half of them in villages. Over half a million performers would take part in amateur art festivals, which were held on a regular basis. However, this trend has died out in the recent years. This widely accessible form of creative art has been replaced by expensive, mostly private, schools and workshops. Anna Mantarova

REFERENCES Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia: Central Statistical Office, National Institute of Statistics (in Bulgarian). Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Sofciety. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village '86 (1988) Sofia. Empirical Sociological Survey, vol. 1-3 (in Bulgarian).

422

Leisure

Table 1. Attendance at cultural events Attendance Events Theatre Opera and operetta Symphony concerts Pop concerts Folk concerts Mixed shows Museums Exhibitions and art galleries continued Table 1 Attendance Events Theatre Opera and operetta Symphony concerts Pop concerts Folk concerts Mixed shows Museums Exhibitions and art galleries

Never 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986

28.57 27.55 64.61 61.44 81.46 79.12 41.26 43.28 43.85 43.90 50.37 50.56 43.28 43.57 58.15 57.03

1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986 1968 1986

4 3.41 3.56 0.50 0.74 0.25 0.23 2.57 2.27 1.14 0.82 0.90 0.81 1.41 1.44 1.89 1.82

Formerly 37.51 36.61 25.24 26.27 15.25 16.67 29.63 30.71 37.29 39.08 34.14 34.39 34.31 34.65 22.34 22.33

Attendance per year 1 2 3 9.12 7.70 6.59 7.62 9.82 6.66 4.54 2.97 0.97 3.64 4.88 1.55 1.12 0.84 0.42 1.57 1.00 0.50 7.34 10.12 5.81 7.02 9.08 4.80 7.72 6.52 2.42 7.11 6.01 2.13 6.54 5.09 1.94 6.11 5.03 1.95 7.08 6.50 3.13 7.29 5.70 3.38 5.32 5.01 3.07 5.27 5.43 3.38

Attendance per year 7 6 5 1.20 0.34 2.76 3.10 1.66 0.39 0.34 0.13 0.06 0.32 0.07 0.53 0.02 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.08 1.60 0.57 0.19 0.14 1.39 0.51 0.42 0.06 0.23 0.04 0.36 0.24 0.40 0.17 0.46 0.05 0.16 0.21 1.77 0.53 0.19 1.53 0.57 1.30 0.80 0.29 1.58 0.27 0.65

8+ 2.19 3.02 0.53 0.55 0.42 0.54 0.90 0.78 0.34 0.31 0.44 0.46 1.77 1.66 2.15 2.23

No answer 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Publ. House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). The Town and the Village W(1988) Sofia. Empirical Sociological Survey, vol. 1-3 (in Bulgarian).

423

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices

Table 2. Reading of fiction in 1968 Reading

%

Doesn't read No longer reads Seldom At least once a month At least once a week

48.60 6.80 13.10 13.91 16.64

Source: Oshavkov, Zh. Ed. (1976) The Sociological Structure of Contemporary Bulgarian Society. Sofia: Publishing House of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Reading of fiction in 1986 Reading

%

43.49

Doesn't read Seldom Occasionally Regularly

126712.67

18.85

24.98

Source: The Town and the Village '86 (1988) Sofia. Empirical Sociological Survey, vol 1-3 (in Bulgarian).

Table 4. Book publishing Year

Titles

Copies (WO)

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991

3369 3634 3799 3669 4681 5 171 4924 4583 4379 4543 2659 3260

30244 39282 41029 46099 53929 63 106 58985 60078 58943 57987 34695 40880

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia: Central Statistical Office, National Institute of Statistics (in Bulgarian).

424

Leisure

Table 5. Libraries in Bulgaria Year

Number

1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

7619 10813 10960

11047 11 109 11066 10952 10500

10191 9800 9680

9519 9488 9347

9167 8367 8587 8854

8166

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia. Table 6. Cinema Year

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

Movie Theatres

Attendance ('000)

1515

112075

2403

126 362

3 170

112608 114295 95851 96375 67984 47692 25712 20282

3689 3453

3314 3081 2 174 979 383 270

11083

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia: Central Statistical Office, National Institute of Statistics (in Bulgarian).

425

14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices

Table 7. Theatres Year

Theatres

Seats

Shows

Attendance

(WO)

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993

46 36 46 55 58 65 65 66 67 70 74 78 77 81

22048 18233 22283 26673

26111 27240 27304 27065 27395 28083 27612

27 162 27457

29112

6011 4951 5409 6027 6405 6026 5999 5912 2632 5410 3700 2647 2593 2437

13570

1 150 12750 14695 17847 18469

18613 18302 17822

16517 14226 12786 12967 13367

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia: Central Statistical Office, National Institute of Statistics (in Bulgarian). Table 8. Community culture clubs Year

Number

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

4502 4513 4399 4267 4256 4297 4269 4248 4255 4257 4246 4228

Members (WO)

779 953 1091 1051 1087 1088 984 887 297 219 247 222

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria 1960-1995. Sofia: Central Statistical Office, National Institute of Statistics (in Bulgarian).

15 EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

15.1 General Education

Bulgarian general education enjoys prestige and international acknowledgement of its high quality. At the same time, it is not sufficiently pragmatic. The consistent decrease in the number of students is due mainly to demographic factors. By the early 80s, schooling delay (dropping out or failing grades) dipped, but subsequently rose. Most dropouts are from the Roma ethnic group. There has been keen interest in higher education throughout the period, admission having increased in the nineties thanks to newly opened private establishments of higher education. Between 1960 and 1995, education in Bulgaria proceeded from overcentralized administration and ideologization to decentralization and new strategies of modernization Two laws legislated secondary education in this period: the 1959 Law on Closer Links between the School and Life; and the 1991 National Education Law, which sought to approximate Bulgarian education to that of Western European. Bulgarian education prioritizes free access, high standards and relevance to individual and social needs. Those priorities have been highlighted in the period of transformation. Standards in universally accessible education have improved thanks to systemic reforms. There have been divergent trends in general education in Bulgaria between 1960 and 1995 (Table 1). The 1959 Law increased compulsory schooling by a year, to eight years. Compulsory schooling has not increased since, and the average number of years Bulgarians aged 25-plus have spent in education is 9.5 (1992). This places Bulgaria ahead of countries such as Greece, Poland and Russia, but way behind the US (12.4 years), Canada

427

15.1 General Education

(12.2 years), Switzerland (11.6 years), Germany (11.6 years), France (12 years), and the UK (11.7 years). School attendance has decreased across the educational system Birth rates have been steadily decreasing since 1960, dropping to negative levels since 1990. Birth rates hit 7.6% in 1995. This is the main reason for constantly decreasing school attendance in the whole educational system. This trend has been heightened by intensive emigration since 1989, when almost half a million people left the country. The total number of students dropped from 1,147,408 in 1989/1990 to 980,491 in 1994/1995. There has been a consistent decline in elementary school attendance. In 1960/1961 there were 620,971 elementary school students. By the early 1990s, there were 392,374. Their number is expected to decrease further. This will have severe consequences for the educational system. High school attendance has fluctuated due to the general decline in birth rates; to structural changes as a result of reforms in general secondary education in the 1980s and to the contracted network of vocational schools. At the same time, interest in and preference for vocational education, and secondary technical schools in particular, has intensified. The average percentage of high-school students dropped from 13.1 in 1960/1961 to 9.2 in 1979/1980. High-school attendance rose in the 1980s, and this upward trend has continued in the 1990s. Interest in special secondary schools has increased markedly This is evidenced by the constantly rising number of applicants for secondary schools of languages, mathematics, other natural sciences and the humanities. Bulgarian education has a strong tradition in the humanities and is highly academic. As such, it enjoys broad national and international prestige. This orientation, however, clashes with the need of pragmatic teaching. The upset balance between the academic and the pragmatic principle has eroded the prestige of general secondary education. There has been substantial feminization in general secondary education In 1981/1982, 66.8% of students were female, declining to 56 % in 1993/1994. General education proves more attractive to females rather than males, i.e. there is differentiation by sex. This differentiation corresponds to the priority on the humanities prevalent in secondary comprehensive schools. Males prefer secondary vocational education.

428

Educational Attainment

Rural school attendance has decreased in inverse proportion to urban school attendance In the mid-1960s, 53.8% of all students attended rural schools. By 1979/1980 they decreased to 34.5%, and were down to 25% in 1993/1994. This is due both to the rapid increase in the urban population following several waves of migration, and to higher birth rates in the towns. The number of children of school age dropped in the villages as a result of the rapid outmigration of people of working age, young people in particular. Schooling delay and drop-out declined, but then rose again between 1983 and 1994 From 1983 to 1994, 83.3% of young people completed their elementary education on time, and 64.4%, their secondary education. Respectively 16.7% and 35.6% (1994/1995) were delayed. There are many reasons for this, starting with the crisis in values that has changed the status of secondary education in the hierarchy of values. Schooling delay is on the rise among students from the Roma ethnic community. The majority of students who do not complete school on time or drop out are Roma. Most of the children who dodge compulsory schooling are also Roma. Their percentage varies from 20% to 58% in different parts of the country. That is why measures have been taken to bring those children back to school through special curricula and changes in teaching strategies. Females have had longer school life and school survival expectancies than males The main reason for this difference is the earlier leaving age of males, who leave the compulsory and secondary educational system to join the labour force. This differentiation by sex stems from, among other things, the better job opportunities of males, as well as the higher academic achievement of females who therefore go on to higher education in greater numbers. The number of applicants for establishments of higher education is increasing, the majority of them being female At the same time, there has been increasing feminization of certain types of professions such as teachers, economist', and universitiy lectures. The number of university students rose from 101,507 in 1985/1986 to 188,000 in 1994/1995. The rise in university attendance is due to the intro-

429

15.1 General Education

duction of paid courses and intensified interest (contrary to that in secondary education) in higher education as a sort of antidote for the increasing threat of high unemployment. Unemployment is lowest among university graduates. University attendance is highest and rising steadily, unlike the fluctuations in engineering, technical, medical and other establishments of higher education The past ten years have seen the number of university students double (from 29,688 in 1985/1986 to 67,382 in 1993/1994). The number of female students at universities and teacher-training establishments rose from 21,022 in 1985/1986 to 46,385 in 1993/1994. Sixty percent of those admitted in 1987/1988 had attended comprehensive secondary schools, 25.3% secondary technical schools, and 14.7% secondary vocational schools. This trend is typical of the whole period under consideration and is largely associated with the prime orientation of general secondary education towards preparing students for higher education. Paid attendance is on the rise The implementation of a statutory framework legislating paid school and university attendance has increased admission rates, and this could be used as an extra indicator in gauging the level of openness and democratization of education. The opening of private and non-state secondary and higher schools has led to a rise in attendance. Developments in secondary and higher education have generally improved the educational level of the nation Secondary school and university graduates have increased by a factor of 10 in the past 50 years, the percentage of the illiterate decreasing by a factor of 11. At the same time, there is still a wide gap in the schooling of urban and rural residents. The percentage of urban residents with higher education is larger by a factor of 8.5. The number of illiterate in the countryside are double those in the towns. Julieta Savova

430

Educational Attainment

REFERENCES General Education (1979) Sofia: Committee of Unified System of Social Information (in Bulgarian). General Education (1989) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). General and Vocational Education 1992/1993 (1993) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). General and Vocational Education 1993/1994 (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Kindergarden and General Education (1970) Sofia: State Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Savova, J. (1985) Socio-Pedagogical Problems of Education. Sofia: Narodna Prosveta (in Bulgarian). Education '95 (1995) Sofia: Second National Conference "Education in a Changing". Strategies and Priorities in Development (1995) Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. World Education Report (1995) Paris: UNESCO. Table 1. Distribution and changes in student population by level of comprehensive school School year

Total

1960/61 1964/65 1970/71 1975/76 1979/80 1985/86* 1990/91 1993/94

212383 273 779 154630 098 889 075 960 244 396 110733 987 999

Elementary school

%

Secondary school

%

High school

%

620 971 592 522 542 445 495 645 387733 429 912 335315 423 808

51,2 46,5 47,0 45,1 36,0 34,5 30,1 42,8

433 408 562 448 511 236 486 658 589 477 651067 622 735 412288

35,7 44,2 44,3 44,3 54,8 49,4 56,0 41,7

158004 119009 100 949 116586 98750 163417 152683 151 903

13,1 9,3 8,7 10,6 9,2 13,1 13,7 15,3

The 1985/1986 and 1993/1994 increase is due to structural changes in the system Table 2. School life expectancy and school survival expectancy (1992) School life expectancy M F 11,9 11,4

School survival expectancy M F 12,2 12,6

431

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education

The 1960-1995 period has seen an intensive development of vocational and professional education at the secondary and tertiary level. There has been a substantial increase in the number of educational institutions, students and graduates, as well as a diversification of the fields of institutionalized education. Until the late 1980s, the expansion of vocational and professional education was stimulated mainly by industrialization and modernization in the conditions of a centralized planned economy. The post-1989 growth in higher education is associated with increasing access to education and with the rising importance of education within the context of developing market structures. The past few decades have seen a substantial development in vocational and professional education The network of educational institutions on the secondary and tertiary level (secondary and higher education) has expanded significantly, and the number of secondary school and university students and graduates has increased. There is a trend towards the expansion of vocational and professional education. Secondary vocational education developed most rapidly between 1950 and 1975 Increased demand for skilled labour within the context of rapid industrialization resulted in an intensive rise in the number of secondary vocational school students. They tripled, their relative share of all secondary (general and vocational) school students rising from 46.2% in the 1950/1951 school year to 71.2% in 1975/1976. By the 1980s, a balance had been achieved between the demand for skilled personnel and the number of workers and experts graduating from secondary vocational schools. This resulted in stabilization of both the number of secondary vocational school students and their ratio to students at secondary general schools. Approximately 60% of

432

Educational Attainment

secondary school-leavers completed their education at vocational schools and about 40% at general schools. This ratio has remained stable despite the general decrease in the number of students following the decline in the size of the school-aged cohort. By the mid-1960s, the secondary vocational education system was distinctly dual in character It included two types of vocational schools. Type one focused on practical field training, and type two, on theoretical courses. This organizational distinction and its results in education were effective in the initial stage of industrialization. They were instrumental in surmounting the acute shortage of skilled workers and the comparatively lower demand for technicians. As the demand for occupational skills adequate to the production-technological conditions of rapid modernization of the national economy rose, the dual system decreased in relevance. This necessitated a series of reforms meant to change the structure and substance of vocational education. Within this context, the role of education focusing on field training declined radically. The number of schools offering such courses dropped from 288 in 1965/1966 to nine in 1994/1995. So did their student body: to one seventeenth of the 1965/1966 level. Meanwhile, vocational education providing general and special theoretical training has intensified. It is offered at threeyear secondary vocational schools and four- or five-year secondary technical and art schools. The general trend by the late 1970s was an increase in their student body. Besides, rising demand for mostly skilled workers boosted a rapid and considerable growth in the number of secondary vocational school students. As the national economy prioritized high-tech product lines in the 1980s, the number of highly skilled jobs grew substantially. Applicants needed a certificate of secondary technical education. Hence the propoption of students at secondary technical schools rose, exceeding that of students at secondary vocational schools by the end of the decade. Tertiary (post-secondary) professional education has also expanded and grown in the past four decades This trend is typical of semi-high and higher education, and is indicated by the changes in the number and occupational differentiation of educational institutions, students and graduates. From 1960 to 1994, the number of semi-high institutes tripled. At the same time, there was progressive diversi-

433

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education

fication of educational establishments by occupational profile. Until 1970, about three in four of them trained teachers. Growing demand for skilled experts in various fields, however, necessitated a gradual spread of the professional education system to other branches too. Accordingly, in the 1980s the network of semi-high educational institutions expanded mostly by the establishment of new institutes, the majority of them technical and medical. The number of the traditional institutes for teachers remained constant, whereas that of technical and medical institutes increased. In 1994/1995 the latter were respectively 31.2% and 29.2% of all semi-high educational institutions and, along with the institutes for teachers (25%), provided the three main occupational profiles of education in semi-high institutes. On the whole, their student body grew considerably, in 1994/1995 to 4.1-times the 1960/1961 level. This indicates both a rising demand for experts with that level of education and occupational training, as well as interest of young people in it. The major changes concern the higher education The period saw a steady growth, which has accelerated since the late 1980s. The post-1989 institutional changes have markedly increased access to and boosted higher education. Legalization of privately paid edication parallel to state-subsidized education has increased the number of students at higher educational institutions dramatically. In the first half of the nieties alone, they have increased by 62,862, vs a total increase of 78,219 between 1960 and 1989. Within this context, there has been a trend of a rise in the relative share of students whose education is not paid by the exchequer. If in 1990/1991 as many as 96.5% of all freshmen were admitted under a government quota, the figure dropped to 47.6% by 1994/1995. Expectations that structural adjustment and developed market relations will prioritize demand for highly skilled experts and that higher education will become a prime factor in the acquisition of high professional and socio-economic status are the strongest booster of rising interest in training at higher educational institutions. The figures on the development of higher education in the past few decades show substantial structural changes By the late 1980s, the lion's share of higher educational institutions, students and graduates belonged to engineering and technical institutions. They had

434

Educational Attainment

the biggest and fastest growing student body. In 1960, engineering and technical students made up 33.3%, in 1980 35.1% and in 1989 39.4% of all students. This was due mainly to the priority of industry in economic development. The start of economic reform in the early 1990s and the subsequent lasting recession in industrial production has retailored the occupational differentiation of higher education. Rising demand for economists and lawyers, associated with the development of the private sector, has led to a boom in those fields. The number of students at higher educational institutions of economics has doubled in just five years. Eleven new departments of law have opened, and the number of law students has increased ten-fold. Considering the market-style orientation of paid education, this situation is very likely to cause serious imbalances. However public demand might develop, the present policies will arguably lead to a surplus of economists and lawyers in just a few years. There will also be a surplus of teachers, insofar as the number of higher educational institutions for teachers is rising steadily, whereas the number of children is dropping due to declining birth rates. The shrinking number of medical students will, in all likelihood, increase the gap between local standards and those in the industrialized countries. Within this context, the post-1989 development of higher education is ambiguous and has controversial consequences. Mariana Zakharieva REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1995 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1966 (1967) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1971 (1972) Sofia: State Office of Information (in Bulgarian). Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, 1981 (1982) Sofia: Committee of Standard Social Information System. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1991 (1992) Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Bulgaria, 1994 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute.

435

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education

Table 1. Vocational schools by type Type Vocational Secondary vocational Secondary technical Secondary schools of arts

1980/81

1989/90

1994/95

1960/61

1965/66

1970/71

236

288

132

3

4

9

-

41

196

297

241

228

210

262

237

221

250

226

12

8

9

13

14

19

Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the Republic of Bulgaria (1966-1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Vocational school students by type of school Type Vocational Secondary vocational Secondary technical Secondary schools of arts

1960/61

7965/66

1970/71

42 123

71 008

47253

-

15324

90778 3 166

1980/81

1989/90

1994/95

1 514

2008

4194

83038

149 686

103 966

100355

172 807

150539

94320

132472

108 157

2260

2380

3255

3 134

3889

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Vocational school graduates by type of school Type Vocational Secondary vocational Secondary technical Secondary schools of arts

I960

1965

1970

10438

29336

22687

824

577

876

-

1 516

9261

40756

29506

27942

10383

32691

33 170

25494

28370

25259

2128

487

513

684

657

695

1980

1989

1994

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

436

Educational Attainment

Table 4. Semi-high institutes by occupational profile Type

1960/61

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

1994/95

15

13

16

12

12

Technical

-

-

15

15

Medical

-

-

14

14

Others

3

7

5

7

For teachers

8

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Students at semi-high institutes by occupational profile 1960/61

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

1994/95

4203

6921

7609

7558

4891

Technical

-

-

-

9791

6141

Medical

-

-

-

8444

7228

1984

3344

6 150

6901

Type For teachers

Others

6415

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 6. Higher educational institutions Total

1960/61

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

1994/95

20

26

28

30

40

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

437

15.2 Vocational and Professional Education

Table 7. Students at higher educational institutions

Total

1960/61

1970/71

1980/81

1990/91

1994/95

54965

106055

101507

133184

196046

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 8. Students at higher educational institutions by field of study

1960/ 61

1970/ 71

1980/ 81

1990/ 91

1994 /95

18286

44417

52428

50568

50012

Agriculture

8700

3839

6191

5327

4599

Medicine

5541

10191

11909

10814

10383

Economics

8094

19086

20245

29505

40948

The arts

1069

2987

2114

2335

2657

13275

25535

40297

57722

82088

-

-

-

5738

5359

Field of study Engineering and technical

Universities and institutions for teachers Others

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

438

Educational Attainment

Table 9. Graduates from higher educational institutions by field of study Field of study

1960/ 61

1970S 71

1980S 81

1990S 91

1994S 95

Engineering and technical

1480

5880

5467

7157

5985

Agriculture

1088

903

859

1031

894

Medicine

911

1 101

1814

2129

1754

Economics

889

2961

2553

3245

3669

The arts

268

463

321

356

381

1 153

3353

8073

8706

7 199

-

-

-

1262

1353

Universities and institutions for teachers Others

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971. 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

Table 10. Students per 10,000 population

Students

1960

1970

1980

1988

1992

77.7

117.3

112

168

229

Source: Statistical Yearbook of the People's Republic of Bulgaria (1966, 1971, 1981, 1991, 1994) Sofia: Central Statistical Office (in Bulgarian). Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian).

439

15.3 Continuing Education

15.3 Continuing Education

The fortunes of continuing education have varied in the past 35 years. Institutions and forms of continuing education have been modified. There have been fluctuations in the categories of applicants for continuing education and differences between males and females. There was a pronounced growth in correspondence (extramural) and evening (part-time) courses in the 1960s, followed by a drop in evening courses in the 1970s Correspondence courses remained open and widely accessible, with differentiated attitudes to them depending on the subject appearing only in the early 1990s. Correspondence courses were reduced significantly in 1996, since the training was found to be substandard. In the late 1960s, 17,225 students attended evening courses, or 20% of all secondary school students. Their number has since declined considerably. There is an insignificant number of students taking evening courses at village comprehensive schools, and this intensifies the inequality of educational opportunity of urban and rural residents. That number has been decreasing parallel to the changes in the educational system, whose network has been intensively expanding in the towns. Julieta Savova Table 1. Students in general education schools

IX - XIII grade incl. evening and correspondence

1993/94

1994/95

7995/96

7996/97

151903

158701

158968

153 234

3953

3682

3398

157

Source: Statistical Reference Book of the Republic of Bulgaria (1997) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 24 (in Bulgarian).

16 INTEGRATION AND MARGINALIZATION

16.1 Ethnic Minorities

Bulgaria is not a country of immigration. The process of emigration is much more manifested. In the present century there have been several big migration waves (mostly to Turkey). However, the ethnic composition of the population has remained relatively constant. Around 5/6 is the Bulgarian majority; the biggest minority groups are the Turks, Gypsies and Muslim Bulgarians (Pomaks). The policy of the Bulgarian state towards the minority groups was varied from a positive attitude to highly restrictive measures. The ethnocultural communities have worked out moduses ofco- existence, avoiding the escalation of conflicts. Bulgaria has a relatively homogeneous population According to the census of December, 1992, 85.7% of the country's population are Bulgarians. The two major ethnic groups - the Turks and the Gypsies, represent correspondingly 9.4% and 3.7% of the whole population. The ethnic picture has not changed considerably during the analyzed period. One should take into consideration that the census was based on the principle of self-identification. It exerts an influence upon the numbers of the less favoured groups, some of which identify themselves with other communities. It is in this light that we should consider the rather irregular dynamics of the Gypsy group - 1.8% in 1965, 0.2% in 1975, and 3.7% in 1992. Since the beginning of the twentieth century one can observe a gradual increase in the relative size of the Bulgarian and Gypsy communities and a decrease in the Turkish one, while the size of the other groups has remained relatively stable

441

16.1 Ethnic Minorities

The number of Jews has decreased - both in absolute and relative figures, due to the departure of about 45,000 people for Palestine in 1948 (Carter, 1994). Bulgaria is one of the few countries in Europe to have saved its Jewish community during World War II. No Jews from Bulgarian lands were deportated to Nazi concentration camps. The most widespread religion is Orthodox Christianity. Appurtenance to the Christian cultural tradition is declared by the vast majority of Bulgarians, around 60% of the Gypsies and 1% of ethnic Turks. The second significant religion is Islam, professed by the Turks, the Muslim Bulgarians (the so-called Pomaks) and 39% of the Gypsies. All Bulgarians speak their mother tongue. It is practically the same situation with the Turkish community. One third of Turkish families also speak Bulgarian at home (Georgiev et al., 1993). The Turks are basically concentrated in two regions - in North-eastern Bulgaria around Razgrad and in the Rhodopes region near Kurdzhali. The Turkish population is rural for the most part: 68% of them live in the villages, and 32% in the towns. With ethnic Bulgarians this relationship is the opposite - 28:72, while with the Gypsy community the respective proportion is 52:48 (Results..., vol.1, 1994: XXIII). The Bulgarian state has not had a consistent policy toward the Turkish ethnic group The periods of recognizing the rights for lingual, religious and cultural selfidentification and development of the Turkish community have alternated with periods of highly restrictive measures, breaching rights and freedoms. The first one found expression in a powerful educational campaign; in reserved quotas for minority representatives in the governing bodies of a number of organizations; and in stimulating the process of integration, for instance through their admission to communist party membership. In the 1960s the percentage of ethnic Turks who were communist party members increased from 2.9% to 4.9%, however remaining lower than the average for the country - respectively 6.5% in the beginning of the decade and 7.3% at its end. A positive result of the policy of integration was the eradication of illiteracy in the Turkish community. Even after the nationalization of education in 1946, the Turkish schools' special status was preserved and their number increased to 1,199 in 1950.

442

Integration and Marginalization

After the end of the fifties, a series of restrictive measures were launched against the Turkish minority group In 1964, teaching of the Turkish language in schools was suspended. In 1974, the Turkish Philology Department of the University of Sofia was closed down. The most extreme expression of the discrimination policy was the forcible change of Turkish and Arabic names in the winter of 1984 1985. The official explanation was that the descendants of the Bulgarians who were forcibly converted to Islam during the Ottoman yoke must regain their Bulgarian identity, whence the name "process of revival". The social sciences have not yet explained completely the reasons for this violent political action. An often quoted reason was the fear of the rapid demographic growth of the Turkish community and the potential danger of cantonization. More generally, the revival process was inspired by the willingness of the communist state to focus public opinion on ethnic problems, in order to divert their attention away from the political legitimacy of its own rule. It was an attempt at mobilizing the Bulgarian people on the grounds of the national consolidation. Forcible assimilation was prohibited by the Constitution of 1991 One of the first acts of the state after 1989 was to condemn the "revival process". On 15 January 1990 the National Assembly adopted a declaration on this national issue, assessing the forcible name change as one of the greatest crimes of the previous regime. Legal arrangements were made for each Bulgarian citizen to be voluntarily able to restore his/her former name. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms is the political representative of the Turkish community. It has had its representatives in all freely elected parliaments (see Political Parties). The third largest ethnic group is the Gypsies. According to the last census, they numbered is 313,396. These figures should be treated with caution. Some Muslim Gypsies present themselves as Turks. Some of the Christian Gypsies identify themselves as Bulgarians; and a third small portion - as Vlachs (Roussanov 1992). The variety of empirical references of selfidentification is manifested in regard to both the ethnic appurtenance and denomination, and to language. Most Gypsies speak more than one language at home, the most preferred being the Gypsy language (67%), secondly the Bulgarian language (51%), followed by the Turkish language (34%).

443

16.1 Ethnic Minorities

The analysis of the Gypsies' situation illustrates predominantly negative tendencies: • poor living conditions. Despite the fact that at the end of the seventies about 15000 Gypsy families obtained long-term low-interest loans for constructing houses, today a lot of them still live in poor quarters resembling ghettos. The child mortality rate is higher than for ethnic Bulgarians (240 per 1000 versus 40 per 1000). Some diseases like tuberculosis occur three times more often among Gypsies than among Bulgarians; • dire economic situation, and high degree of unemployment (see Unemployment). The Gypsy community is characterized by a lower level of education, which makes its representatives less economically competitive. The deteriorated economic situation of the country during the last few years has been contributing to this negative trend. • strong prejudices against the Gypsies, shared by the Bulgarian majority as well as by the other minorities. The mass media play a considerable role in reproducing and expanding negative attitudes. Attention is focused on negative facts, their causes being overlooked. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that the Gypsies have a higher criminality rate than the other ethnic groups, with no reference to the fact that some of them are only on the edge of survival (Genov, 1997: 49). There are positive tendencies in the efforts to internally mobilize the Gypsy community They have found expression in the establishment of numerous Gypsy organizations and groups for human rights. If the distinction between Bulgarians, Turks and Gypsies is on an ethnic basis, on a religious basis we could distinguish two more groups: Pomaks (Bulgarian-speaking Muslims) and Gagaouz (Turkish-speaking Christians). The Pomaks are not listed in the census. Their number is estimated at about 200,000 to 280,000. The Muslim Bulgarians have been subject to efforts at integration in two directions. On the one hand, the studying of the Turkish language has been stimulated, as well as its perception as a mother tongue 6% of the respondents in a sociological study maintained they knew it well and 18% presented it as their mother tongue (Georgiev, 1993). The opposite action is being undertaken by the Movement for Christianity and Progress "St. John Precursor" founded in 1990. It aims at returning the descendants of the Islamized Bulgarians to the Christian faith. As a reaction to the two

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Integration and Marginalization

attempts at assimilation the case is being made to declare the Pomaks as an independent ethnic group. The issue of the Macedonians is rather controversial. One thesis defines them as a regional community on the basis of the argument that they are an Eastern Orthodox population speaking a Bulgarian dialect. On the basis of the right for self-identification, a contrary thesis defines them as an ethnocultural community. Both views have political expression, respectively in the activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), and the United Macedonian Organization (OMO - Ilinden). The Bulgarian state's policy towards this population has been swaying in two extremes. In the forties when support was given to the idea of creating a Balkan federation, the population of the Pirin region was stimulated to declare itself as Macedonian: 187,789 according to the census of 1956. Later policy took a sharp turn and the Macedonians disappeared from the official statistics and they have not turned up there until today. Their number now is estimated at 10000. The panorama of co-existence of the ethnic and religious communities is relatively peaceful Traditional moduses of co-existence have been worked out and achieved, such as the "komshoulouk" (neighborhood relations) which have been contributing to preserving comparatively normal personal contacts, even when the intergroup relations were deteriorated (as during the forced name change). Tolerant attitudes exist towards the rights of the ethnic minorities to profess religions of their own (81%), as well as to speak in their mother tongue (68%). On the other hand, pronounced attitudes of restriction are also visible with respect to civil and political freedoms of minorities, such as the right to have their own TV and radio programs (73%), their own schools (67%), and their own political parties (65%) (Public Opinion, 1995: 162). There are episodic acts of xenophobia Sometimes their manifestations are assault on foreign citizens. It is indicative that they have the character of "anticipating a reaction". In Bulgaria there are foreigners, and some tensions are instigated and enhanced by the media - especially those related to asylum-seekers and to foreign citizens staying in the country illegally (estimated at 10,000-30,000). There have not

445

16.1 Ethnic Minorities

yet been serious problems concerning immigrants. Of 50,000 illegal aliens between 1993 and 1996, a total of 1,585 applied for refugee status. The National Bureau of Territorial Asylum and Refugees at the Council of Ministers complied with 209 out of 237 applications filed. Most applicants for refugee status came from Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia, followed by nationals of Iraq, Ethiopia, Armenia, Turkey, Iran, Algeria, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Bangladesh, Angola, Lebanon and other countries. Anna Krasteva REFERENCES The Ethnic picture of Bulgaria (1993) Sofia: Club 1990 (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Georgiev, Zh. et al. (1993) Certain Aspects of the Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria. Sotsiologicheski Pregled, N 3, pp. 54 -81 (in Bulgarian). Krasteva, A. (1995) Ethnocultural Panorama of Bulgaria. Balkan Forum. Vol.3, N 3, pp. 235-253. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Results of the Population Census. Vol.1 Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute. Rousanov, V. Ed. (1992) Aspects of the Ethnocultural Situation in Bulgaria and the Balkans. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy. Table 1. Population by religion and mother tongue Mother tongue

Religion Orthodox Christianity Catholicism Protestantism Islam (sunnites) Islam (shi-ites)

Bulgarian

Turkish

Gypsy

7031929 47043 13792 170 934 5753

8755 1 116 843 744 127 58060

176 773 1581 6514 104831 18342

Source: Results of the Population Census. Vol.1 Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 222.

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Integration and Marginalization

Table 2. Ethnic composition of the population of Bulgaria (1900 - 1992) Ethnic

Year

Total Bulgarians Turks Gypsies Tatars Jews Armenians Others*

1910

1900

group

1934

1956

number

%

number

%

number

%

number

3 744 283 2888219 531 240 89549

100 77.1 14.2 2.4

100 85.6 9.7 2.5

0.9 0.4 5.0

100 81.1 10.7 2.8 0.4 0.9 0.3 3.7

6 077 939 5204217 591 193 149 385

— 33661 14581 187033

4 337513 3 518756 465 641 22296 18228 40133 12932 159527

— 48565 25963 58616

0.8 0.4 1.0

7613709 6 506 541 656 025 197865 5993 6027 21 954 219307

continued Table 2 Year

Ethnic group Total Bulgarians Turks Gypsies Tatars Jews Armenians Others*

1956

7975

1965

%

number

%

100 85.5 8.6 2.6 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.9

8 227 966 7231243 780 928 148 874 6430 5 108 20282 35 101

100 87.9 9.5 1.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4

number

% 12111 1 1 930 024 730 728 18823 5963 3076 14526 25 131

1992

%

number

%

100 90.9 8.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.3

8487317 7271 185 800 052 313396 4515 3461 13677 81031

100 85.7 9.4 3.7 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0

* "Others" include also those who did not identify their ethnicity. Source: Results of the Population Census. Vol.1 Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, pp. 106, 109.

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16.1 Ethnic Minorities

Table 3. Bulgaria: ethnic composition Total

8487317

Bulgarians Turks Gypsies Tatars Jews Armenians Circassians Gagauz Albanians Arabs English Africans Vietnamese Vlachs Greeks Kurds Germans Poles Russians Roumanians Slovaks Slovenes Hungarians Ukrainians French Czechs Serbians Creates Bosniaks Karakachans Others No answer

7271 185 800 052 313396 4515 3461 13677 573 1478 3 197 5438 1578 718 1969 5 159 4930 128 879 1218 17139 2491 452 66 1864 343 56 588 418 71 365 5 144 16288 8481

Source: Results of the Population Census. Vol.1 Demographic Characteristics (1994) Sofia: National Statistical Institute, p. 194.

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Integration and Marginalization

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Crime has been rising steadily since the 1960s, but at different rates. Until 1990, the rise in crime was comparatively slow. In the following two years alone, crime soared 3.5-fold, the gravity of offences increased and juvenile delinquency rose. Since their leap in the early 1990s, crime levels have stabilized. Crimes against property are in line with the general trend, but their rise has exceeded the general rise of crime. After the slow increase by the late 1980s, violent crimes have shot up, although not as severely. Until the late 1980s the trend in punishment was parallel to that in crime. It has swung back since then, with the number and relative proportion of crimes and convicted criminals. Statistics on crime are quite detailed, but they are not an entirely reliable source of information. Until the late 1980s, not all recorded offences were included in the official figures. The 1991 changes in the recording methods rule out full comparability between pre- and post-1991 figures. Besides, the statistics exclude a number of offences which for one reason or another remain unknown to law enforcement. This especially concerns economic crimes, thefts and certain other offences. The boom of crime in the nineties is obvious The watershed period for crime rates was 1990-1991. Until then, crime in Bulgaria was comparatively low and rose slowly. That trend was interrupted repeatedly as a result of amendments to the legislation. For instance, the passage of the Comrades Courts Act and the Combat of Anti-Social Offences by Minors Act in 1961 struck a series of juvenile crimes, civil and other offences less dangerous to society off statistical records. Hence 1962 saw a radical drop in crime. Decriminalization of certain petty offences such as theft and misappropriation of public property in the mid-1980s had a similar, albeit weaker effect.

449

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Despite projections of rising crime in the early 1980s and certain adverse trends mostly in regard to serious offences, crime rates were relatively stable until the late 1980s. Recorded offences increased from 502 per 100,000 population in 1980 to 663 in 1989. In 1991, offences almost tripled from the previous year. Admittedly, the recording system changed in 1991 and that had a certain impact. However, the considerable, although lower, increase in crime in 1992 confirmed that soaring rates were real. Following the 1991-1992 boom, crime rates more or less levelled out. That is indicative of stabilization. Notably, this stabilization is at a level almost quadruple that of four years ago. The wave of crime that has swept across the country in the nineties has immediately affected a considerable part of the Bulgarian nation It has left a tangible mark on public behaviour and consciousness. A series of polls show that soaring crime has left a deep mark on public opinion. Grading the country's problems by urgency, public opinion promoted crime from the third most serious problem in 1993 (18.3%), to the first in 1994 (29.5%), and 1995 (32%). The percentage of people who regard it as a very serious problem remains high (83.8% in 1995). People feel insecure, under constant threat of victimization. More than 75% are completely or very discontented with their personal safety. The period of transition has seen not only a rise in crime but also changes in the structure and distinctive features of crime Serious offences have increased. Organized crime, hardly known before, has become part of everyday life. Hitherto unknown offences are now committed on a large scale. Extortion has acquired particularly threatening proportions. Juvenile delinquency is becoming more and more of a problem. The proportion of juvenile criminals among detected criminals is rising: from about 9% until the late 1980s to about 16% in the early 1990s. There have been two opposite trends in the age structure of criminals in the past few years. Their age is rising in the case of economic offences, and falling for traditional offences. Of all convicted thieves in 1994, 59.9% were aged 14 to 30. Close to 16% of the total were under 18, and 2.6% under 14. Of the convicted burglars, 64.4% were young people, and 71.6% of convicted car thieves were in the 14-to-30 age bracket.

450

Integration and Marginalization

The ratio between male and female criminals has been tipping towards the former. In the 1980s, 14% to 16% of convicted criminals were female, and in 1994, just 6.5%. The structure of female crime differs substantially. Typical of women are malfeasance in office, fraud, embezzlement, and theft. Typically, women are much less likely to be repeat offenders than men. Among the reasons for soaring crime in the nineties, hesitant government counteraction comes first There is no comprehensive, consistent state policy on the combat of crime nor coordination between the separate specialized bodies. The weakening of state and, in particular, of law enforcement institutions bears the brunt of the blame for the rise in crime. Just when they had to improve their operation, they proved destabilized in organization and personnel, with a very limited potential and without the appropriate interaction and coordination. Clearance rates, which have nosedived and steadied at an unsatisfactorily low level, as well as the widening gap between detected crimes and crimes that have led to convictions, are indicative of the low efficiency of law enforcement institutions. The delay in amending the legislation in order to ensure effective combat of crime has also contributed to the rise in crime. The economic crisis, the considerable and permanent pauperization and marginalization of large groups of the population, is another powerful factor. Last but not least, there are cultural factors like the loss of axiological orientation and the profound moral crisis. Offences against property have risen steadily - in both absolute and relative terms - throughout the 35-year period Since the early 1990s, the steady curve has shot up, mostly due to soaring crime against private property. For their part, offences against public property have dipped considerably. Theft constitutes the bulk of all recorded offences (72.9% in 1994). Moreover, disillusioned with the helplessness of the police, more and more victims are reluctant to report theft. Most cases of theft (in the range of 60%) are burglaries. Robberies have also risen more than 5.5-fold between 1990 and 1994. Robberies resulting in death or grievous bodily harm are increasing every year. That type of crime is an exception from the general trend towards stabilization in the past several years, and has continued to rise. Car thefts have increased much more than the

451

16.2 Crime and Punishment

general rise in crime. They have become a very lucrative business with a minor risk. The situation has deteriorated sharply in the case of economic offences, which remain largely hidden. The official figures show a drop in economic crimes from 1989 to 1993, even though the situation is plainly the opposite. The trends in violent offences against the person - premeditated murder, assault and rape - vary First-degree murders were relatively steady for years, rising slightly in 1990 to 1992. In 1994, however, the number of contract murders rose as part of the gangland wars. After long-term relative stability, rape doubled between 1990 and 1992. In the long term, assault had tended to stabilize or even decline slightly, but has been rising steadily since 1990. Although there are no separate figures on white-collar crime, it has undoubtedly been spreading rapidly in Bulgarian society Highly educated and well-positioned perpetrators of economic crimes, senior executives included, have been increasing constantly in both absolute and relative terms over the past few years. Due to the low clearance rate of economic crimes and lack of an adequate method of statistical recording, the exact proportions of the phenomenon are not known. Statistics on law enforcement suggest two alternative and opposing trends Until 1986, the number of crimes that led to convictions rose except for the years of amnesties and of amendments to legislation. However, the decline recorded in 1962, 1981 and 1984 was incidental and only served as a new lower baseline for the continuing rise. There were certain fluctuations between 1974 and 1976, but the trend remained steady in the long term. The ratio of recorded to punished crimes has remained a stable 2:1 in this period. Since 1987, the number of crimes that have led to convictions has been declining. The 1989 and 1990 amnesties are of secondary importance. The prime factor is destabilization of state institutions. The number of punished crimes reached a record low of 5,949 in 1993. The ratio of recorded to punished crimes has also deteriorated. In 1990, it was 5.6:1, and in 1993, a drastic 40:1. The number of crimes which led to convictions rose distinctly

452

Integration and Marginalization

(by 33.2%) in 1994. It is too early to say whether this is the start of a new trend. The trend in changes of the number of convicted persons is close to that in crimes that have led to convictions. From 34,682 in 1983, they drastically declined to 12,403 convicted persons in 1990, reaching 6,690 in 1993. By sex, the percentage of male offenders has increased The relative share of convicted females has been dropping consistently: from 14% to 15% of all offenders in the late 1980s to 6.8% in 1994. Throughout this period, the majority of convicted persons (in both absolute terms and per 100,000 population) were aged from 18 to 29, followed by those in their 30s and 40s. In the past few years, the absolute number of convicted minors (under 18) has come ahead of the 50-to-59 age bracket, approaching the 40-to-49 bracket; per 100,000 population, it has outstripped both groups, placing third. With regard imposed sentences, the trend is towards a rising percentage of imprisonment - from 59.2% in 1969 to 72.5% in 1990. Meanwhile, the number of conditional sentences has increased markedly: from 30.2% of all sentences in 1969 to 46.7% in 1990. The general conclusion invited by statistics is that crime has been rising steadily, especially in the ongoing period of transition. At the same time, law enforcement has failed to meet the challenge. The judicial system, in particular, has been quite ineffective and urgently needs substantial amendments to criminal law and policies. Anna Mantarova REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1995) Bulgaria 1995. Human Development Report. Sofia: National and Global Development. Risks of Transition (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) Annual public opinion polls conducted by a team at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences under the supervision of N. Genov. Stankov, B. (1992) A Book on Crime in Bulgaria. Sofia (in Bulgarian). State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

453

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Table 1. Recorded offenses

Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Number 41349 41612 43 195 42713 44853 34609 46826 49879 49261 48330 55851 60464 62086 59642 68569 176 189 224 196 220 767 222 828 206 103

Per 100,000 population 471 472 490 483 502 502 525 557 550 540 622 677 691 663 763 2042 2646 2606 2664 2446

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

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Integration and Marginalization

Table 2. Offenses that have led to convictions Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Number 33343 30500 17365 17564 19509 19845 21098 25557 24339 24332 26695 25838 28321 30140 28469 26144 26776 27756 26206 26121 26295 20724 22119 23411 19683 22467 25 101 24 145 20322 19224 12048 11 561 9400 5949 7925 9544

Per 100, 000 population 422 382 216 217 239 241 255 307 290 287 314 302 330 349 327 299 305 315 298 295 296 233 248 262 219 251 280 269 226 214 134 128 106 67 91 111

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

455

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Table 3. Convicted persons Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Number

35756 31994 18382 18658 21034 21313 22799 27358 27003 27255 29961 28977 32147 34682 32588 29941 30568 31290 29397 29359 30012 23419 24651 26371 21788 24763 27444 26495 22170 20413 12403 12417 10421 6690 9 176 11765

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

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Integration and Marginalization

Table 4. Convicted persons by sex Year

Male

1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

25696 18633

4316 3 155

21 120

3643 4205

Female

23239 22315 18832

4 180 3338 2962

17451

1748 1408 1036 505 623

10655

11009 9809

6185 8553

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

Table 5. Convicted persons by age Year

Under 18

18 to 29

30 to 39

40 to 49

50 to 59

1980 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1994

2232

12835 9428 10508 10793 10434

7737

4335 2965 3220

2198 1 531 1 685

3951 3761 3 157

2000

7900 6345

8585 5286 5589

5571

2779

3405

5 136

2642 2376

1683 1621 1299 1 148

1211 1589 1 849 1913 1541 1734 985 1079 1002 677

9158

4588

6157 7 128 8071

3 171

1 830 1451 1234 712 666 491 447

Over 60

675 496 633 730 657 518 510 332 495 275 240

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

457

16.2 Crime and Punishment

Table 6. Imposed sentences Convicted persons Type of sentence Convicted persons Incl conditional sentences Non-custodial sentences Incl public censure internal exile fine corrective labour Imprisonment, total Incl under 6 months 6 months to 1 year 1 to 3 years 4 to 5 years 5 to 10 years 10 to 15 years 15 to 20 years Internment in reform school Death

7969 Number 27255 8227 20811 327 113 3240 7 131 16140 8216 4595 2696 358 144 73 58 282 22

% 100.0 30.2 39.7 1.2 0.4 11.9 26.2 59.2 30.1 16.9 9.9 1.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.0 0.1

1983 Number 26371 8964 7239 112 665 2535 3927 19029 4482 7646 5252 956 486 114 93 81 22

% 100.0 34.0 27.4 0.4 2.5 9.6 14.6 71.6 15.6 29.2 21.0 3.4 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.1

continued Table 6 Convicted persons Type of sentence Convicted persons Incl conditional sentences Non-custodial sentences Incl public censure internal exile Fine corrective labour Imprisonment, total Incl under 6 months 6 months to 1 year 1 to 3 years 4 to 5 years 5 to 1 0 years 10 to 15 years 15 to 20 years Internment in reform school Death

1987

number 26495 10420 7280 155 789 2554 3882 16963 4131 7728 5563 895 444 115 87 236 16

% 100.0 39.3 27.4 0.5 3.0 9.3 14.6 71.6 15.6 29.2 21.0 3.4 1.7 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.1

7990 Number 12403 5788 3337 108 374 1 262 1 543 8990 2310 3268 2678 442 172 54 66 74 2

% 100.0 46.7 26.9 0.9 3.0 10.2 12.8 72.5 18.6 26.4 21.6 3.6 1.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 -

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian).

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Integration and Marginalization

Table 7. Clearance rate of crime Year

% of detected crime

1981 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996

86.0 84.6 63.5 44.3 36.8 35.6 35.9 37.3 84,8

Source: State and Structure of Crime in the Republic of Bulgaria (Annual Reports) Sofia: Council on Crime Studies at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Republic of Bulgaria (in Bulgarian). Table 8. Appraisal of crime in Bulgaria as a very serious problem Year

1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

% 81.9 78.0 86.3 83.8 17,3

Source: Risks of the Transition (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) Annual public opinion polls conducted by a team at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences under the supervision of N. Genov. Table 9. Appraisal of crime as the most serious problem in Bulgarian society today Year Rank % of respondents rating crime first

1993 1994 1995

3 1 1

18.3 29.5 32.0

Source: Risks of the Transition (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) Annual public opinion polls conducted by a team at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences under the supervision of N. Genov.

459

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviours

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviours

Registered mental illness increased by 3.75% between 1985 and 1994. A series of direct and indirect indicators show a growth in the abuse of alcohol. The number of registered cases of alcoholic psychoses rose by 2.3-fold in this period. Deaths from cirrhoses of the liver have been increasing steadily since 1970. Smoking is a grave problem, especially for young people. The number of registered drug addicts soared more than 20-fold from 1960 to 1986. The unfavourable trend has gathered particular momentum since 1985. Suicide rates tended to increase between 1981 and 1992. The past decade has seen a visible increase in suicide rates in the 15-to-19 age group. Cases of anomie in the form of behavioural and emotional disorders may be regarded as a reaction to dramatic changes in social stratification since the early 1990s. Table 1 illustrates the cases of mental illness in Bulgaria in the past ten years, including the most important general changes. Table 2 breaks down mental illness by type of disorder per 1,000 people between 1985 and 1994. Table 1 indicates an increase in registered mental illness by 2.4% from 1989 to 1994 and by 3.75% in the ten years between 1985 and 1994 According to Table 2, that increase comes foremost from affective psychoses (0.87%), schizophrenia (0.82%), oligophrenia (0.77%), other psychoses (0.36%), epilepsy (0.28%) and chronic alcoholism (0.24%). The structure of those illnesses remained the same from 1989 to 1994. In describing emotional and behavioural disorders attributable to psychotropic substances, the key term is "harmful use", i.e. "a pattern of psychoactive substance use that is causing damage to health - physical [e.g. hepatitis after intravenous use of psychoactive substances] or mental" (ISD10 1992).

460

Integration and Marginalization

Despite the downward trend in registered production of alcoholic beverages (see 13.8), a series of direct and indirect indicators suggests that harmful use of alcohol actually rose between 1985 and 1994 The first indicator is the number of registered persons with alcohol-related problems. Registered cases of alcoholism rose in the course of ten years, from 25,652 to 27,073. The number of hospitalized persons remains relatively stable. Notably, cases of alcoholic psychoses, a more reliable indicator, increased every year - by more than 2.3-fold in the ten years from 1985 to 1994. The figures on record are much smaller than the actual number of people with alcohol-related problems. Presumably, Griffith Edwards's formula (1:10) is applicable in Bulgaria too. In that case, there are about 300,000 to 350,000 people with alcohol-related problems in Bulgaria today. The second important indicator of harmful use of alcohol are deaths from cirrhoses of the liver. Deaths from cirrhoses of the liver per 100,000 population have been on the increase since 1970: from 8 per 100,000 in 1970 to 18.5 per 100,000 in 1992, and from 1,570 in 1992 to 1,696 in 1993. No surveys on alcohol-related problems and damages have been conducted in Bulgaria in the past few years. Here are some findings of earlier surveys: - the average life expectancy of registered alcoholics was 10 years lower than the national average in 1980, including deaths from cardiovascular diseases and malignant formations. According to the same survey, one of the main causes of death among registered alcoholics was suicide (Stankoushev etal., 1980). Smoking is a very serious problem, especially for young people One in nine students says that s/he is a regular smoker. As many say they have quit smoking. Another 13.3% declare that they smoke with friends only. The figures cover all respondents (both secondary and high school). There are considerably more smokers among high-school students. Almost one third (30.4%) are regular or casual smokers (Lazarov et al., 1995). Almost one in three smokers says that s/he feels a strong need for cigarettes. Close to half (46.4%) believe that smoking occasionally is not bad for the health. A 1993 poll in ten secondary schools in Sofia found that one in ten students (11.6%) had tried some medication without prescription for non-

461

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviours

medical purposes. Among high school students (in the last two grades, aged 17 and 18), the percentage rose to 15.4. Benzodiazepines and certain hallucinogenic pharmaceuticals, usually in combination with alcohol, are taken by teenagers as a group norm of conduct. They are also taken by heroin addicts as a supplementary drug (Lazarov et al., 1995). Use and abuse of volatile substances is also noteworthy, since it often starts before the age of 10. Volatile substances are particularly common among Roma children. The number of volatile-substance users is very hard to establish. Experts usually put it at 2,000 to 5,000 (Lazarov and Yanakiev, 1994). Registered drug addicts in Bulgaria increased from 50 in 1960 to 1,028 in 1986, or more than twenty-fold Drug abuse has been spreading particularly fast since 1985, and experts estimate that today there are about 5,000 persons addicted to heroin to varying degrees, and about 12,000 to 16,000 casual users. Drug use starts at a very early age Sociological surveys conducted in the past two or three years show that the age of beginners has been dropping. A 1986 survey found that the average age of the first experience with illegal drugs (mostly hashish, marijuana and heroin) was 18.5 years. By 1993, that age had dropped to under 16, according to a similar survey (Lazarov and Yanakiev, 1994). For instance, 28.4% of the respondents in the 1993 survey, who had been treated at the National Drug Addiction Centre, said that they had first tried a drug before age of 15. The majority (44.4%) had experimented when aged 16 to 18. Another 16.1% had their first experience at the age of 19 or 20. The remaining 11.1% became addicted when they were 21 to 33. Marijuana abuse usually starts at the age of 14, peaking at 16. Experimentation with heroin starts in most cases at the age of 15 to 17. Use of heroin is typically intravenous. Sharing needles and syringes is typical of beginners and group users. Sharing has become a group norm. This increases the danger of AIDS and other blood-transmitted diseases. Some hard-core heroin addicts have switched to smoking because of physical problems (such as, vein obliteration). Some of the beginners are also smokers (Lazarov et al., 1995). Cocaine is a newcomer on the Bulgarian market. Due to its high price, cocaine is used only by a very limited group of young business persons and

462

Integration and Marginalization

well-paid members of private security companies. Sniffing is the preferred option. Because of difficult access to those groups, not even approximate figures on cocaine use are available at present (Lazarov, 1995). Suicide rates have increased: from 13.6 per 100,000 in 1981 to 17.3 per 100,000 in 1993 Bulgaria is twelfth among 23 countries for male suicides and eleventh for female suicides. There were 1,200 to 1,500 suicides a year between 1981 and 1992. Teenage (15 to 19) suicides have been on the rise in the nineties. A 1995 survey in four population centres (Sofia, Elin Pelin, Bourgas and Dobrich) found that Bulgaria had the highest suicide rates of boys under 14 in Europe. Suicide rates are highest among senior citizens (over 80). The male:female ratio in that age group is 136.11:48.03 per 100,000 (Population '94, 1995). Philip Lazarov Yantsislav Yanakiev REFERENCES International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems (ISD-10) (1992) Geneva: World Health Organization. Tenth Revision, vol. 1, tablet list. Lazarov, Ph., I. Kutsenok, M. Vassilev (1993) Use and Abuse of Psychotropic Substances by Children and Teenagers. Sofia: Sociological Survey Report (in Bulgarian). Lazarov, Ph., R. Sedefov, M. Vassilev, D. Metodiev (1995) Use of Cigarettes, Alcohol and Drugs by Students. Sociological survey, unpublished report (in Bulgarian). Lazarov, Ph. (1995) City Report Sofia. Strasbourg: Joint Pompidu Group/UNDCP Project: Extension of the Multi-city Network to Central and Eastern Europe. Lazarov, Ph., Y. Yanakiev (1994) 'Drug Addiction Among Young People as a Risk Factor'. In: N.Genov, Ed. Sociology in Society in Transition, pp. 203-210. Population '94 (1995) Sofia: National Statistical Institute (in Bulgarian). Stankoushev, T., D. Perpenova, Ph. Lazarov (1980) 'Survey on the Average Life Expectancy of Registered Alcoholics'. NINPN Bulletin (in Bulgarian).

463

16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviours

Table 1. Changes in major indicators of mental illness in Bulgaria, 1985 to 1994 1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

214358

220 622

224 541

227719

227 479

23.95

24.61

25.01

25.34

25.30

15366

16788

15565

15603

12749

Newly registered per 10,000 population

17.17

18.72

17.34

17.36

14.18

New cases that year

4098

5755

4597

4282

4257

4.58

6.42

5.12

4.76

4.73

178

203

187

221

214

0.78

0.88

0.79

0.92

0.89

Registered mental patients Illness per 1 ,000 population Newly registered mental patients

Incidence per 10,000 population Suicides by mental patients Suicides per 10,000 registered mental patients

continued Table 1 1993

1994

229 117

23 148

23305

26.40

27.00

27.32

27.70

11 526

8955

8458

1071

8503

Newly registered per 10,000 population

13.30

10.42

9.97

12.67

10.09

New cases that year

2927

2644

2876

3175

3 134

3.77

3.08

3.39

3.75

3.72

144

166

126

113

-

0.60

0.70

0.54

0.47

-

Registered mental patients Illness per 1 ,000 population Newly registered mental patients

Incidence per 10,000 population Suicides by mental patients Suicides per 10,000 registered mental patients

1990

1991

1992

230 304

226 926

26.57

Source: Psychiatric Care in the Republic of Bulgaria.- Medical Academy scrolls 1984-1994 (in Bulgarian).

464

Integration and Marginalization

Table 2. Mental illness per 1,000 population, by type of disorder, 1985 to 1994 Schizophrenia

Affective psychoses

Other psychoses

Neuroses

Chronic alcoholism

1984

2.93

1.99

1.90

2.70

2.90

1985

2.99

2.10

2.00

2.74

2.97

1986

3.07

2.19

2.06

2.79

3.06

1987

3.14

2.25

2.09

2.78

3.11

1988

3.20

2.32

2.14

2.73

3.13

1989

3.21

2.36

2.18

2.62

3.15

1990

3.41

2.53

2.31

2.76

3.26

1991

3.46

2.61

2.18

2.77

3.16

1992

3.58

2.74

2.28

2.82

3.19

1993

3.72

2.87

3.32

2.80

3.17

1994

3.81

2.97

2.36

2.77

3.21

continued Table 2 Epilepsy

Oligophrenia

Other non-psychotic

Total

1984

2.84

5.68

2.61

23.54 23.95 24.61 25.07 25.34 25.30 26.57 26.40 27.00 27.32 27.70

1985

2.86

5.57

2.72

1986

2.90

5.67

2.87

1987

2.90

5.75

2.98

1988

2.89

5.82

3.11

1989

2.85

5.83

3.10

1990

2.93

6.11

3.26

1991

2.95

6.13

3.13

1992

3.02

6.24

3.13

1993

3.09

6.27

3.08

1994

3.14

6.34

3.09

Source: Psychiatric Care in the Republic of Bulgaria.- Medical Academy scrolls 1985-1994 (in Bulgarian).

465

16.4 Poverty

16.4 Poverty

The deep economic crisis, ongoing structural reform, high unemployment and inflation during the transition to a market economy have intensified social stratification, leading to drastic impoverishment. More and more people need social protection. The large budget deficit limits the financial resources of the welfare system. Poverty is generally defined as a lack of material resources. The problems of poverty in Bulgaria are particularly topical in the transition to a market economy. The period is characterized by declining production, rising unemployment and high inflation. They have dealt a strong blow to the welfare of the population. Social stratification is intensifying. The number of poor people is growing, and there are drastic margins between the material and social status of the rich and poor The emergence of a powerful middle class is impossible under these circumstances (Bogdanov, 1996: 20-27). There is a polarization between the handful of nouveaux riches (about 5% of the population) and the overwhelming majority of impoverished people with incomes around or below the assumed poverty line (Doulev, 1996: 173). The proportion of people whose incomes are below the subsistence level doubled from 38% in 1992 to 67% in late 1994. The 1993 real wage, minimum wage and minimum pension were respectively 68.5%, 56.8% and 56.9% of 1990's (Genov, 1996: 131-140). The "poverty line" in Bulgaria is the base minimum income which qualifies an individual for social assistance. According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, the proportion of persons whose income was lower than the base minimum exceeded 10% in 1993. This has led to an increase in welfare payments by a factor of more than 6 between 1991 and 1993. The decrease in the absolute amount of social security expenditure is very alarming, along with that in the proportion of social security outlays of the national budget, from 0.9% to 0.8%, and of the gross domestic product, from 0.6% to 0.4% (Social Protection..., 1995: 29).

466

Integration and Marginalization

The proportion of household consumer expenditures of GDP rose from 55.8% in 1990 to 71.3% in 1993. Food costs per household member increased from 36.3% in 1990 to 47.4% in 1991, the first year of shock therapy. It levelled off at about 43% in the subsequent few years, rising again in the mid-1990s, to 45% (The Economy of Bulgaria..., 1996: 106). This very high percentage could increase even further as a result of the inflation, rising electricity prices and shrinking solvency. The high food costs are associated with another very negative trend towards a decrease in annual staple food consumption The average annual per capita consumption dropped as follows between 1990 and 1993: bread and past products, from 170 to 150 kg; meat, from 36.4 to 30.2 kg; of meat preparations, from 18 to 15.9 kg; and milk, from 120 to 70.5 kg. This shows that high food costs are not associated with growing food consumption. Households are forced to cut down and change their consumption patterns (resorting to lower-quality and unhealthy foods), saving money for other essential costs such as housing maintenance and household electricity (up from 7.3% to 8% from 1990 to 1993), transport rates (up 8%), rates and taxes (from 6.8% in 1990 to 7.8% in 1993) (Social Protection..., 1994: 30). The main factors with a direct bearing on pauperization are the state of real incomes, the labour market situation and belonging to a high-risk social group. The level of incomes will remain a major factor for impoverishment The level of impoverishment will largely depend on the rate of hard-core unemployment and structural unemployment (by sector, area and training). Belonging to a high-risk social group (disabled, senior citizen, youth, ethnic minorities, etc.) predetermines the powerful influence of the aforementioned factors, which is increasing the number of the poor in those groups. The formation of minimum incomes is very important in the social protection of the needy. The poverty line is the main criterion thereof. There are three main forms of minimum income depending on the source: a) from work; b) social, from social insurance funds; and c) social, from central and local government budgets (Social Protection..., 1994: 58). In the course of economic transition, insurance funds should be separated from the national budget. This would make them more flexible in adapting to the changing market conditions. An April 1995 sociological sur-

467

16.4 Poverty

vey covering a sample of 3,000 households nationwide, found that about 58% of Bulgaria's households are under or around the poverty line considering their current incomes. The percentage is actually lower if we take into account moveables and immovables; available funds and savings of household members; in-kind incomes in the course of the year. Taking these circumstances into account, about 20% of Bulgaria's households presumably need urgent social assistance. About 33% to 41% of respondents to BBSS Gallup International polls in 1995 claimed they lived normally, versus 39% to 47% who said their life was hard. The majority of those who said they had a "normal life" were private business persons and students. Between one-quarter and one-third of all pensioners and farmers, and one-third of the unemployed, could barely make ends meet Notably, most of the people with a "hard life" in 1995 were Sofia residents. Slightly more than one-quarter of the rural residents claimed they could barely make ends meet. More than two thirds said they could not afford to save money, and just 9% said they saved money every month (Public Opinion, 1995: 123-124, 127). Wages are the source of real income of nine in ten Bulgarians. The level of naturalization of income should also be taken into account. A substantial proportion of Bulgarians produce their own food. Two thirds of them live in the countryside. Responses about the role of the government in the social sphere are noteworthy. Traditional attitudes are slow to change and this is evidenced by the fact that almost 80% expect the government to ensure universal employment, one in ten think that the government should do so to a certain extent, and only 5% disagree (Public Opinion, 1994: 15, 25). In discussing measures and programmes to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty in Bulgaria, it should be kept in mind that everything depends on the country's economic potential. The economic reform and its instruments should induce reforms in the social sphere which would ensure the funds guaranteeing an acceptable minimum standard of living. Measures for the reduction of poverty should have priorities: 1. Significant acceleration of reforms in the social sphere on the basis of new standards which, in turn, will require new institutions and forms of social insurance, social assistance and protection against poverty.

468

Integration and Marginalization

2. Improvement of social protection of the poorest strata of the population, by: improving the formula of income supplements for the needy; priority subsidizing of high-risk groups; larger outlays for welfare payments; active measures for reintegration of the poor; and building a system of control over the income and property status of welfare applicants. 3. Effective measures to decrease unemployment in Bulgaria. 4. Improvement of the mechanism of adjustment of minimum incomes to inflation (Genov, 1996: 127-128). Darina Rouscheva

REFERENCES Bogdanov, B. (1996) Surveying Poverty via Indicators of a State of Deprivation. Statistika, N 1: 10-24 (in Bulgarian). Doulev, S. (1996) Social Problems Generated by the Transformation in Bulgaria. In: Topical Problems of the Economic Transition in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Skopje, pp. 167-173. The Economy of Bulgaria until 1998 (1996) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. Genov, N. , Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Household Budgets of the PR of Bulgaria (1981) Sofia: KESSI. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Social Protection of the Poor, Unemployed and Consumers in the Transition to a Market Economy (1994) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Social Protection of the Main Risk Groups of the Population (1995) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

469

16.4 Poverty

Table 1. Structure of the total expenditure of households by item (%) Total Food Alcoholic beverages Pastries Clothing and footwear Housing Furnishing Culture and social life Hygiene Postal services, transport and purchase of transport vehicles Taxes and rates Others

7965 100.0 43.6 4.5 1.7 13.0 8.7 3.6 4.8 1.2

1970 100.0 40.6

1975 100.0 38.8

3.6 1.6

3.0 2.0

11.4

11.3

9.2 5.7 4.6 1.5

7.5 5.2 4.3 1.8

100.0 42.6 4.7 2.2 10.2 7.2 4.4 3.0 1.8

2.6

4.9

6.9

6.4

4.3 12.0

5.1

6.7

11.8

12.5

6.2 11.3

1980

Source: Budgets of the Households in the People's Republic of Bulgaria 1965-1980 (1981) Sofia: KESSI, p. 38 (in Bulgarian).

Table 2. Structure of the general income of households (1990-1995) (%) General income Wage Extra incomes Independent economic activity Pensions, welfare payments Private farms

1990 100.0 57.3

1991 100.0 45.4

0.4 -

0.4 -

18.8 14.1

22.7 21.4

1992

1993

100.0 44.3 2.1 2.4 20.7 21.2

100.0 42.0 2.5 3.0 21.6 20.22

1994 100.0 38.2

2.8 3.7 45.0 25.9

Source'. The Economy of Bulgaria Until 1998 (1996) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 102 (in Bulgarian).

Table 3. Structure of total expenditure by household member (%) Total Food Clothing and footwear Housing Furnishing Leisure time Hygiene Transport Taxes and rates Others

7997 100.0 47.4

7992 100.0 43.4

7993 100.0 42.9

1994 100.0 47.5

7.3 4.3 4.6 2.0 8.0 6.8

8.6 7.3 3.0 3.3 1.8 6.7 6.0

8.3 7.3 3.9 3.3 2.5 7.7 8.6

8.1 8.0 4.0 3.2 3.0 7.9 7.8

3.7 2.7 3.7 7.7 7.3

18.8

15.9

15.0

15.1

7990 100.0 36.3 11.9

15.0

7.3 15.0

Source: The Economy of Bulgaria Until 1998 (1996) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p. 106 (in Bulgarian).

17 ATTITUDES AND VALUES

17.1 Satisfaction

In the three decades since the 1960s, the level of satisfaction was not associated with any high expectations. State socialism ensured a modest, but comparatively stable way of life. People were more satisfied with the aspects of life that depended on them like family relationships, and less satisfied with their standards of living and housing. The changes since the late 1980s have reflected on the level of satisfaction in two opposite ways. People approve the abolition of single-party monopoly and the establishment of a democratic political system marked by free and fair elections, independent press, freedom of speech and of religion. At the same time, dissatisfaction with the standard of living has tended to intensify, along with the emergence of unemployment and poverty, rising crime and the spread of information about burning environmental issues. The high social mobility following the establishment of state socialism had slowed down by the 1960s The new social structure and the political regime were stabilized. This social situation reflected on the level of satisfaction in two ways. First, the state socialist conditions did not engender high expectations insofar as the system was not particularly dynamic. Second, when society succeeded in living up to those modest expectations, this was experienced as satisfaction on the subjective level. This feeling was strengthened by the official propaganda which was constantly accentuating that all changes were made in the name of Man. This was not taken literally in the everyday consciousness, in which people kept an ironic and critical distance. At the same time, the fact that Bulgaria did not have a strong dissident movement could be interpreted as

471

17.1 Satisfaction

an absence of the drama of individual dissatisfaction expressed in sharp intellectual and political criticism of the regime. Table 1 shows that people were more satisfied with the aspects of life that depended on them than with those over which they had limited control. Satisfaction with the core family and people in general was higher than that with housing and with their financial situation. Satisfaction with leisure, employment and level of education was rated mid-way on the scale of satisfaction with various aspects of life in the 1980s. Sociological surveys found relatively high job satisfaction right until the end of the 1980s. At that time, 78% of the respondents rated their job satisfaction as high or very high, (16.6% as average), and just 4.2% as low and 1.2% as very low (Topalova, 1988: 123). Notably, the sub-responses varied. People were satisfied with those aspects of their job that were of least importance to them (relationships with colleagues, 77.8%, and superiors, 68.2%). However, just 35.8% were satisfied with their pay, and 26.6% with their career prospects. Better educated people were less satisfied. Young people tend to have higher expectations and a greater desire for making a career, and are hence inclined to be less satisfied than older people. The transformation in the late 1980s lived up to public expectations of radical changes in overall public life The expectations were particularly intensified by perestroika in the second half of the decade. A series of aspects of the transition get strong approval. Among them are the abolition of the single-party monopoly and the establishment of political pluralism, the holding of free and fair parliamentary and presidential elections, the separation and relative autonomy of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, the independent press, and the freedom of religion. A number of other aspects of the change, however, are breeding and intensifying dissatisfaction. The strongest factors of dissatisfaction are inflation, unemployment, the economic collapse, the chaos in agriculture, mass pauperization, stratification of society into very rich and very poor people, and the absence of a middle class (Genov, 1997: 4). Table 2 shows that people are worried about all principal aspects of life, from the economy to political confrontation to moral aspects such as a crisis in the notions of good and evil. The state of the environment and interethnic relations in the country are another source of dissatisfaction.

472

Attitudes and Values

There is a high level of dissatisfaction with the standard of living The proportion of people who think their living standard is normal varies between 33% and 41%. It is consistently lower than those who say their life is hard - from 39% to 47%. About one in five invariably declare they can barely make ends meet. Most of them are pensioners, the unemployed and workers. The majority have secondary or lower education, and/or are of retirement age. Residents in the countryside (almost half) and the big cities (one third) prevail in this category. Notably, those who say their life is "hard" come from all social groups. More than a third of all workers and farmers, almost half of the salaried employees and intellectuals, half of the pensioners and unemployed, and one third of private business persons qualify their situation as "difficult" (Public Opinion... ,1994, Public Opinion...., 1995). Those who are satisfied with their standard of living are statistically insignificant in terms of both percentage and social composition. The high level of private ownership of housing - close to 100% in the countryside - was one of the features of Bulgaria's socialist regime. Housing ownership was restricted by law: to one permanent place of residence per family, up to 120 sq m (or more than one, but no more than 120 sq m in all), and one impermanent place of residence (e.g. weekend cottage) per family. The situation has changed in two respects since 1989. On the one hand, restrictions have been lifted, and now every Bulgarian citizen may own as many permanent and impermanent residences as they can afford. A housing market has appeared. In 1992, 94.2% of the housing was privately owned, and just 5.8%, was public. On the other hand, a new grievous phenomenon has appeared in society, namely homelessness. The general reasons for eviction are high unemployment, privatization of housing, exorbitant interest rates on mortgages, declining construction, growing number of orphans and marginalized people, dilapidated housing and underfunded maintenance, overcrowded dwellings, etc. (Dandolova, 1994: 197). The fact that there are many homeless children, most of them Roma, who have parents but the latter sometimes turn them out on the street, is particularly alarming. Growing dissatisfaction is also expressed concerning poverty The notion of poverty is culture-based. The most commonplace ideas in this country (40.1%) are associated with a "socializing representation of poverty", i.e. when a person cannot meet his/her own and his/her household's

473

17.1 Satisfaction

staple needs and approaches friends, relatives or the social services for help (see 16.4. Poverty). Paradoxically, the number of those who are really poor is considerably higher than those who feel poor: about 90% of the Bulgarian population could be regarded as poor, but just one third actually consider themselves poor, and slightly over a third as somewhat poor. A total of 43.1% of those who spend almost their entire monthly income on food (who comprised 38.8% of all Bulgarian households in 1993) feel poor. Almost a third (30.6%), of those who spend the bulk of their income on food (or 39.55% of all households) feel poor. About a quarter, (26.5%) of those who spend half of their income on food (14.3%) consider themselves poor (Rakadjiiska, 1994: 190). A major source of dissatisfaction with the quality of life is associated with rising crime as part of everyday life In this respect there is a drastic difference between the start and the end of the period in question. In the 1960s, life in the big cities was peaceful and ordinary people did not feel their homes and property threatened. That was even more valid for small population centres and villages. In the 1990s, crime has literally invaded the everyday life of broad strata of the population, becoming one of the main sources of public concern. Four in five citizens invariably qualify crime as a "very serious" problem: 81.9% in 1992, 78% in 1993, 86.3% in 1994 and 83.8% in 1995 (Mantarova, 1996: 194). Environmental protection was not a priority concern of everyday consciousness for most of the period in question The main reason for this was the lack of public information. It was a policy to impose a news blackout on the state of the environment. The public "sobered up" after the Chernobyl accident spotlighted both the hazards of nuclear power and the irresponsibility of the Bulgarian authorities, providing late and inaccurate information about the scale of the hazard and appropriate precautionary measures. The debates on the safety of Bulgaria's nuclear power station in Kozlodoui and the environmentalist movements and organizations that appeared even on the eve of the changes have catalyzed public concern about environmental hazards. Even though Bulgaria does not have a feasible alternative for nuclear power yet, development of the latter is approved by just 31.4%, and 39.6% are firmly against. The major difference in attitudes is

474

Attitudes and Values

gender-based: approving females number half as many as the approving males, 23.5% and 40.6% respectively (Nedev, 1994). Anna Krasteva REFERENCES Dandolova, I. (1994) Housing and Social Exclusion: The Vulnerability of Young People. In: Genov N., Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Regional and Global Development, pp.191 - 202. Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Sociology in a Society in Transition. Sofia: Regional and Global Development. Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Mantarova, A (1996) Effects of Spontaneous Change: The Crime Wave in Bulgaria. In: Genov N., Ed. Society and Politics in South-East Europe, Sofia: National and Global Development, pp. 189-199. Nedev, Zh. (1994) Technology and Environmental risks: Mass Perceptions and Evaluations.- In: Genov N., Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Regional and Global Development, p. 87 - 96. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International. Rakadzhiyska, T. (1994) Social and Economic Identity of the Bulgarian Households According to the Status "Rich-Poor". In: Genov N., Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Regional and Global Development, pp. 183-190 Topalova, V. (1988) The Significance of Labour for Man. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Zakharieva, M. (1994) Changing Identities. Value Systems in a Transitional Period. In: Genov N., Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Regional and Global Development, pp. 131 - 143.

475

17.1 Satisfaction

Table 1. Satisfaction with various aspects of life Aspect Family relations Relationships with people in general Health Living conditions in the population centre Leisure Job Education Family's financial situation Housing Total average assessment of satisfaction with various aspects of life Satisfaction with life in general

Median assessment workers

engineers

4,54 4,26 3,80 3,80 3,57 3,54 3,40 3,17 2,29

4,41 4,09 3,91 3,59 3,26 3,29 4,21 3,35 3,21

3,61

3,68

3,69

3,47

Source: Topalova, V. The Significance of Labour for Man (1988) Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, p.138.

Table 2. Assessment of society's problems "Grave " and very "grave "problems Job opportunities People's inability to distinguish between good and evil Political opposition Interethnic relations The state of the economy The state of the environment Society's division into rich and poor Crime rates

1992 84.2 48.2 71.4 61.1 87.9 66.9 64.1 94.1

1993 79.4 46.8 66.2 43.9 84.3 68.0 67.5 89.8

Source: Zakharieva, M. (1994) 'Changing identities. Values systems in a transitional period'. In: Genov, N. Ed. Sociology in a society in transition. Sofia: Regional and global development, p. 135.

476

Attitudes and Values

17.2 Perception of Social Problems

In the post-World War II period, authorities identified elimination of exploitation, building a homogeneous society and reducing the difference between manual and intellectual labour, as well as between towns and villages, as the main social problems. Since 1990, public opinion has been unanimous that crime, unemployment and inflation are the prime concerns. Between 1960 and 1990, social problems tended to be examined through the perspective of the ruling power The party-state rather than the public opinion formulated, prioritized and tackled social problems. "Elimination of exploitation, development of new social relations, constant improvement of the social structure of society attainment of social homogeneity" were identified as the main social problems, along with "overcoming the differences between towns and villages, intellectual and manual labour" (Social Policy, 1980: 21). The individual was largely relieved of any responsibility insofar as the party-state took care of employment, education, health care, housing and welfare. The average Bulgarian's prime concerns were getting a flat for which s/he had to apply for years in advance; educating the children since higher education was payfree but admission rates at universities were limited; the quality of health care, which was also pay-free but patients could not choose their own doctors. Since the start of the 1990s, the focus has shifted to new problems After 1989, public opinion changed its focus towards unemployment, inflation, crime, political confrontation and cultural disintegration (Doulev, 1996: 167; Genov, 1996: 18; Genov, 1997: 4; Zakharieva, 1996: 230). The scale and acuteness of those problems are unprecedented. That is why the public is unanimous about their importance. On the whole, attitudes to the country's gravest problems do not vary by political allegiance.

477

17.2 Perception of Social Problems

The drastic decline in living standards has been painful. The proportion of those who believe they lead a normal life varies between 30% and 40%, and is consistently lower than that of those with a hard life, from 40% to 50%. Most of those who claim to "live normally" are private business persons and students, whereas about one in three unemployed people can barely make ends meet. The majority of Sofia residents have a "hard life." More than a quarter of all rural residents also qualify their life as quite hard (Public Opinion..., 1995: 123-124). Bulgarians are traditionally thrifty. The devastating economic crisis has forced them to live "from day to day," and this is a blow to their self-esteem. More than two thirds cannot afford to save any money, 22% to 23% do so from time to time, and just 9% save money every month. Three quarters of Bulgarians over 60, as well as 70% of those in the youngest age margin cannot afford to save money (Public Opinion...,\995: 127). Excessive income- and property-based differentiation by means of accumulation of capital (redistribution of available wealth or circumventing the law) is seen as a negative trend. The gap between the handful of nouveaux riches (about 5% of the population) and the overwhelming majority of impoverished people whose incomes are about or under the poverty line, is widening. There are still no signs of the emergence of a "middle class" (Doulev, 1996: 173). Public attitudes to social problems are shaped by two groups of factors. First, they are influenced by the real social weight and relevance of the problem. Second, attitudes are shaped by the individual's lack of psychological readiness to cope with hardships that are novel to society and to the individual. Attitudes to unemployment are a typical case of this duality. People in their 40s are the most apprehensive about losing their jobs, whereas most of the unemployed are young people: close to a third of all jobless persons are aged 18 to 20. With regard to unemployment by education, most people without jobs have primary education, yet those with semihigh and secondary technical training feel most threatened (Public Opinion..., 1995: 128-129). Table 1 shows that concern about the environment is subsiding: if almost 70% of the population were worried about pollution in 1992, by 1995 this had decreased to about 50%. This arbitrary relief comes from the shift to other concerns which immediately endanger everyday security. Crime

478

Attitudes and Values

and inflation stand out. Practically all Bulgarians are alarmed by their rise and by the lack of effective counter-measures. Even in the context of the deep economic crisis and serious political problems, people are still concerned about ethical questions and the perennial dilemma between good and evil. Anna Krasteva REFERENCES Doulev, S. (1996) Social Problems Generated by the Transition in Bulgaria. In: Topical Problems of Economic Transition in Bulgaria and Macedonia. Skopje, pp. 167-173. Genov, N. Ed. (1996) Bulgaria 1996. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Genov, N. Ed. (1997) Bulgaria 1997. Human Development Report. Sofia: UNDP. Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). The Social Policy ofBCP (1980) Sofia: Partizdat (in Bulgarian). Zakharieva, M. (1996) Value Change in Social Transformation. In: N. Genov. Ed. Society and Politics in South-East Europe. Sofia: National and Global Development. Table 1. Problems qualified as "serious" or "very serious"

Finding a job Inability to distinguish between good and evil Political confrontation Interethnic relations The state of the economy The state of the environment Social stratification into rich and poor Crime National security

1992

1993

1994

1995

84.2 48.2 71.4 61.1 87.9 66.9 64.1 94.1

79.4 46.8 66.2 43.9 84.3 68.0 67.5 89.8 46.6

83.5 46.9 64.3 29.3 88.0 59.3 76.5 94.0 43.8

86.5 46.1 48.6 24.5 78.6 51.2 74.2 93.0 35.4

Source: Zakharieva, M. Value change in social transformation. In: Genov, N. Ed. Society and Politics in South-East Europe. Sofia: National and Global Development, p. 231.

479

17.3 Orientations to the Future

17.3 Orientations to the Future

The passage of social time varies. The revivification of the 1950s slowed down and stagnated in the timelessness of the 1970s and the 1980s when perestroika rekindled hopes for change. The transformation after 1989 has accelerated social time markedly, filling it with many unpredictable events. Typically, the 1990s have seen a transition, from the optimism of the effected change to the pessimism of a present of hardships and a future of insecurity. Future dominated the present "Future" has been one of the key subjects of political discourse and social sciences throughout the period under consideration. As with all teleological social doctrines, official Marxist ideology is basically future-oriented. It perceives the future as transparent, predictable, "heralded," and brings it under control in several ways: * by the definition of the guidelines of historical development and its supreme objective, namely communist society. It was not described as a model of social justice and equality but as a real state towards which society was inevitably evolving; * by the delineation of the stages in which communist society will be attained. Several medium-term social theories were advanced during the period in question, for instance that of the developed socialist society (DSS) in the late 1960s, and of the scientific and technological revolution (STR) in its various forms in the early 1980s. The wave of perestroika came from the USSR in the mid-1980s; * by the application of the planning principle at all levels - from the state government to the smallest production, cultural, medical, and educational unit. All kinds of plans were developed - both long-term and shortterm. The future was divided into five-year plan periods. Paradoxically, executive efforts did not target improvement of the rather low efficiency and implementation of the adopted programmes, but the introduction of ever newer forms of planning. A case in point were the "counter-plans" which

480

Attitudes and Values

every single organization and every single worker were supposed to draw up as a programme of fulfillment and over-fulfillment of the general plans; * presentation of the future as a subject of scientific cognition. Unlike disciplines such as sociology and political science, whose institutionalization was late, the official attitude to futurology was benevolent. "The future" construed by communist political discourse has several distinctive features: * it is a monopoly of power and its guidelines are set at party plenums; * it is one and only. Perceptions of the guidelines varied from one period to another, but one and the same guideline was invariably used at a given point in time. Thinking in terms of alternatives was not encouraged, nor were social sciences stimulated to develop different scenarios and models; * being one and only, the future is naturally mandatory for one and all. Indicatively, the social life was conceived of in terms such as "law," "history" and "model." The term "social actors" was thematized in a restricted context. The "subjective factor" was recognized but it was always countered by the determination of "the objective." Liberty was perceived mainly as "realized necessity." The accelerated social time of the 1950s and 1960s slowed down to the timelessness of the 1970s and 1980s The early 1960s were dominated by revivification and hopes for change kindled by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. At the end of the decade those hopes were dashed by the suppression of the Prague Spring. A long period of stagnation followed. The new terms coined by official discourse as promises for change did not translate adequately at the level of everyday consciousness. The future itself had lost its mobilizing function. If in the early days of the state socialist regime the idea of the bright future did make up for deprivations and lack of freedom in the present, by the end people had lost their faith in the future. The perestroika of the mid-1980s rekindled their hopes. It was feasible to think that social time could be filled by things that were actually happening. The changes in the late 1980s inspired elation about the future which turned out to be short-lived The future was defined in new terms: "political pluralism", "democracy," "market," and "Europe." The passage of time accelerated at a breakneck

481

17.3 Orientations to the Future

pace and was filled with events: the first parties, first free elections, first independent newspapers, first clashes with the shock of a free market, and unemployment. "The speed of processes exponentially outstripped the ability of large masses of the population to take in information and find their bearings in the sweeping changes" (Genov, 1994: 26). The state socialist timelessness was experienced as the inability of individuals to fill the time void with significant events. After the initial euphoria, postcommunist accelerated time paradoxically started to be experienced as helplessness once again, as result of the inability of a growing number of people to rationalize and take control over the consequences of the change. Pessimism is tending to outweigh optimism in everyday attitudes. In 1993, 35.2% of the electorate expected the country's economic situation to deteriorate in the following year, while only 19% were optimistic (Genov, 1994: 29). Bulgarians have since remained pessimistic about the country's future. Asked if they thought their future would improve, just one in five answered in the affirmative, and more than half in the negative. Optimism and pessimism vary among supporters of the two leading political forces, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF). Just one fifth of the UDF electorate think their future financial circumstances will be worse than those at present, whereas more than half of the Socialist electorate are pessimistic. More than half of all optimists are pro-UDF, and just one in ten are pro-Socialist. The proportion of optimistic UDF supporters is triple that of pro-Socialist optimists. The UDF electorate see the future as better than the present, and the BSP electorate see it as unclear and problematic (Public Opinion..., 1994: 18-19). On the whole, Bulgarians are pessimistic about their country's immediate future, but there is some optimism too - more than half of all respondents expect things to improve in three or four years' time (Public Opinion..., 1995: 144). Another expression of insecurity is the preference for security and peace of mind rather than for change and risk - champions of the predictable future outnumber those of risky change by a factor of 3.5. Anna Krasteva

482

Attitudes and Values

REFERENCES Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Risks of the Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian).

483

17.4 Values

17.4 Values

The micro-community of the family is a permanent and consistent value in Bulgarian society. Child care and spousal relations are valued even more than personal health and welfare. Work is also traditionally high on the value scale of Bulgarians. State socialism intensified the preference for easier albeit underpaid work. The current transition is stimulating the change from the traditional value of work per se to a more instrumental attitude to work as a source of higher income. The entire period under scrutiny is dominated by egalitarian dispositions. Bulgarians value education highly as a status symbol rather than a pragmatic step towards better career opportunities. The positive attitude to the family micro-community does not carry over to macro-communities The family ranks high on the value scale of Bulgarians. It comes before prosperity and work (Table 1). The thesis that "the family is not all there is to life and, if necessary, may be sacrificed in the interest of work" was rejected in sociological surveys (Topalova 1988: 88). The family is valued by everybody, but males and females have different priorities. Females prioritize children, whereas males regard spousal relations as the most important. Senior citizens consider their own health and prosperity less important by almost half (36.1%) than relations with children (69.8%) and spouses (62%). Bulgarian children leave their families comparatively late for both economic and socio-psychological reasons. Parents feel responsible long after their children have come of working age. Pensioners in the 1980s were more than twice as likely to be inclined to be of financial and moral assistance to their next of kin (69.4%) than to enjoy retirement from years of work (30%) (Topalova, 1988). Bulgarians are attached to their neighbourhood, but their attachment declines in inverse proportion to the "size" of the community Confidence in institutions is quite low (see 11.2 Confidence in Institutions). Duties to them like paying taxes are seen as coercion rather than civic re-

484

Attitudes and Values

sponsibility. At the same time, the state is expected to take good care of its subjects: 78% of the respondents believe that the state should pay all or most of unemployment benefits, health-care charges (67.9%), and education allowances (58.2%) (Zakharieva, 1994: 140). There is a tendency to view the resolution of social problems as an externalization of responsibilities assigned to the top echelons of power (Genov, 1994:24). Bulgarians have had a traditionally positive attitude toward work. Two opposite trends developed under state socialism. The political and ideological discourse assigned labour a leading place in the value system of the socialist individual. On the other hand, the mismanagement of state property cultivated a careless attitude to work. Findings of sociological surveys from the period should be interpreted in the context of those opposite trends. Pollsters have found that acquisition of power and influence, social status and carefree life were very low in the value hierarchy, unlike work.. Valorization of work is more pronounced among better-educated, high-skilled and intellectual groups (Topalova, 1988). Materialistic values have come to outweigh spiritual ones for the longterm The communist discourse, which accentuated the spiritual, the creative, the altruistic, and the devotion to the collective, has failed to change value dispositions in this respect. A survey on the value aspects of work and motives of work shows that remuneration comes first (coefficient 0.269), way ahead of work that is for the public good (0.159), is interesting (0.111) and is creative (0.044). Workers have firmer views on the matter than engineers: if the former think that any job is good as long as it is well paid, the latter do not underrate remuneration but are more concerned with the nature of the job (Topalova, 1988: 97, 116). Materialistic values have been thriving, particularly in the 1990s The economic crisis has brought material security strategies to the fore of everyday dispositions. The standards of living, employment, order, security and calm dominate mass aspirations (Table 3). Personal self-fulfillment and self-affirmation, humanized forms of communication, and harmonious relations between people and nature do not play a major role in everyday behaviour (Zakharieva, 1994: 137). Preocupations with the problem of shortterm objectives will have long-term negative consequences. It intensifies the

485

17.4 Values

reluctance to engage in any activity which is of benefit to the common good (Genov, 1994: 24). Egalitarianism is typical of Bulgarians Under state socialism, there was substantial stratification by property, but official ideology prioritized the value of equality and advocated the idea of social justice as decreasing differences between people - economic, social, educational, and cultural. The post-1989 political discourse has been accentuating liberalism. On the value level, most Bulgarians accept the ideas of transition to private ownership, market economy and individual enterprise, but at the same time, egalitarian dispositions remain prevalent among the majority on the everyday level. More than 60% of respondents agreed that "the highest-income brackets should not be more than triple the lowestincome bracket." More than half of the members of all social groups except students and intellectuals believe that there should not be big differences in the financial status of people. Notably, even one third of private business people accept this thesis. It is firmly upheld by more than two thirds of the electorate of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and more than half of that within the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) (Public Opinion.., 1994: 4344). Value attitudes are not consistent but, rather, are internally controversial: Bulgarians generally want American-type private enterprise and Scandinavian-type governmental protection of the underprivileged. The tacit principle is: "If I win from personal enterprise, I alone am the winner; if I lose, the state must cover the risks" (Genov, 1994:24). Security tends to be preferred to risk, safety and calm - to the unpredictability of change These dispositions (Table 2) are both a result of and a socio-psychological prerequisite for the specific type of modernization effected under the state socialist regime. Modernization was implemented top down, with the authorities assuming full responsibility. There was no market environment to integrate risk-taking into the life strategies of individuals. Society was relatively stable. This cultivated a sense of security and predictability. Table 1 shows the comparatively high dispositions for a peaceful and quiet life free of risks and conflicts. The dull everyday life, however, generated a desire for risk-taking and ground-breaking in the young and well-educated. At

486

Attitudes and Values

the end of the 1980s the expectations for changes became widely shared and strong. The current transformation has produced three substantial changes. It has accelerated social change, increased the unpredictability of development; and made risk a part of everyday life in the context of rising crime, economic insecurity, and bankruptcies. The following paradox has emerged on the level of values: on the whole, democratic changes are approved of, but risk-taking and change are not accepted as dimensions of personal existence and everyday life. The majority of postcommunist Bulgaria's citizens (50.9%) prefer gradual changes, and just one third (36%) are in favour of prompt and radical reform (Zakharieva, 1994). Most people favour slower reforms and lower efficiency but higher benefits for the socially disadvantaged. Just one in five believe that the social costs of swifter economic development and effectiveness - freezing incomes of the socially disadvantaged - ought to be paid. Those who are not exposed to the risks of the free market are more inclined to take risks: readiness for risk-taking grows as the financial situation improves. One in three intellectuals, private business people and salaried employees support the liberal variant of economic reform. Pensioners and the unemployed opt for the social variant of economic policies (Public Opinion .., 1994: 46-47). In terms of political preferences, 80% of the BSP, over 40% of the UDF and almost half of the Popular Alliance electorate counts on state support. Liberal values are embraced mainly by private business people (Public..., 1995:174). A sociological survey held in two consecutive years (1992 and 1993) shows a long-term and high preference for security and calm (78.3% and 78.5% respectively). Only one in five are ready to stake themselves on risk and change (21.2% and 20.3%) (Zakharieva, 1994). These dispositions are evident in the idea of a "good job" - 65% think that a good job is a safe (albeit underpaid), job, and just 35% would rather be well-paid, even at the risk of losing their job (Public Opinion..., 1994: 47). Security is valued in both the economic and political spheres. In the former, preference for state-guaranteed income is twice as strong as that for freedom of private enterprise. In regard to the latter, despite the risk of authoritarian rule and non-guaranteed civil rights, 60% prefer law, order and security. Older and less-educated people are more approving of strong-arm policies (Public Opinion..., 1995: 174-175).

487

17.4 Values

Education has been traditionally high on the value scale of Bulgarians This value aspect prevails over the pragmatic one, insofar as there is no direct link between level of education and income: certain categories of highly-skilled workers, taxi drivers etc. have considerably higher incomes than university graduates. The advantages of higher education are rated as follows in 1994: higher social prestige (78%), and greater freedom and independence (62%). Next come "higher income" and "being of use to people" (59%), and "finding a job abroad" (51%). Forty-six per cent are not indifferent to the access to political power that a university degree could provide. In the new economic conditions, attitudes to education are tending to be instrumentalized. On the whole, the value rather than the pragmatic attitude remains dominant (Dimitrov et al., 1996). Anna Krasteva

REFERENCES Dimitrov, G., Kabakchieva P., D. Nenkova (1996) Value Attitudes to Higher Education in a Period of Transition. Strategies in Educational and Scientific Policies, N» 2, 65-74 (in Bulgarian). Genov, N. Ed. (1994) Risks of the Transition. Sofia: National and Global Development (In Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1994) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Public Opinion in Bulgaria (1995) Sofia: Gallup International (in Bulgarian). Topalova, V. (1988) The Meaning of Work for the Individual. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (in Bulgarian). Zakharieva, M. (1994) Value Systems in the Conditions of Transition. Politicheski Izsledvaniya, 1994, N 2, 126-132 (in Bulgarian). Zakharieva, M. (1994) Changing Identities. Values Systems in a Transitional Period. In: Genov, N. Ed. Sociology in a Society in Transition, Sofia: Regional and Global Development, 1994, 131-142.

488

Attitudes and Values

Table 1. Coefficients of relative importance of values Family happiness Prosperity To be of public use with your work Intolerance to shortcomings and injustice Peaceful and quiet life free of risks and conflicts Improvement and expression of skills through creative work Social status Easy and carefree life

0,190 0,150 0,149 0,143 0,131 0,114 0,076 0,047

Source: Topalova, V. (1988) The Meaning of Work for the Individual. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of Sciences.

Table 2. Basic value preferences (%)

1992

1993

Safety and calm

78.3

78.5

Change and risk

21.1

20.03

0.5

1.2

Preferences

Not answered

Source: Zakharieva, M. (1994) Changing identities. Values systems in a transitional period. In: Genov, N. Ed. Sociology in a society in transition. Sofia: Regional and global development, p. 132.

Table 3. Societal values (1993, %) Assessment of the country 's topmost objective

Bulgaria

Sofia

Impact of people on government's decisions

11.2

13.1

Fight rising prices

37.2

25.5

6.4

8.0

44.4

52.7

0.8

0.7

Right of people to freely expression their views Calm and order in the country No answer

Source: Genov, N. (1994) Sociology in a Rapidly Changing Environment. In: Genov, N. Ed. Sociology in a society in transition. Sofia: Regional and Global development, p. 14.

489

17.5 National Identity

17.5 National Identity

The sense of belonging to the Bulgarian people is combined with long-term discontent with the country's economic and political development. Points of reference are the centuries-long history of the Bulgarian state, the Bulgarian language and culture, the Slavonic alphabet, Eastern Orthodox Christianity and achievements in sports. Patriotism does not degenerate into nationalism. Critical dispositions seldom deteriorate into national nihilism. The cultivation of a sense of national dignity marked the decades before 1989 Two trends in national identities stand out in the 35 years under consideration. The first one is the cultivation of a sense of pride in Bulgarian history and culture. This trend is evident in the activities of key institutions such as the school and the mass media. It has occurred throughout the period in question, but doubtlessly culminated in the pre- and post-1981 celebrations of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian State. Whether it was education, the arts, science, the media, or the townscape, every sphere used its specific resources to beam the message about the achievements of Bulgarian culture and the role of small peoples in world civilization. A number of monuments were erected. Films telling a heroic-romantic story of the foundation of the Bulgarian state, its military and political assertion, integration into European civilization via conversion to Christianity, were produced with huge box office success. Efforts were made to integrate Bulgarians living abroad into the celebration of Bulgarian culture. The Bulgarian public was introduced to the academic and cultural achievements of Bulgarian expatriates. The trend towards integrating the nation into regional and global processes dominated the nineties The second trend has been evidently at the forefront since the start of democratic reform in the 1990s. It is associated with a greater opening up to Europe and the world. The accent in the formation of national identity has

490

Attitudes and Values

shifted from the return to one's own roots to the need of integration into the regional and global economic, political and cultural realities. The intellectual and political discourse is balanced in a number of cases: we should join Europe with our own identity; Europe does not need marginal but dignified and self-respecting nations. Occasionally, in the mass media in particular, openness sounds as an appeal for emulation, and interest in the others, as underrating one's own specificity and even as national nihilism. Bulgarian national identity has traditionally been structured around few poles of reference Major ones include the 13-century-long history of the Bulgarian State; the Slavonic alphabet, Bulgarian language and culture; and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. A key subject in the national narrative is the foundation of the Bulgarian state in 681, which makes it one of the oldest states in Europe. Bulgaria's destiny was dramatic: it included two centuries under Byzantine and five centuries under Ottoman domination. Notwithstanding the ups and downs of history, however, Bulgaria has managed to survive and to find a permanent place on the political map of the Balkans and Europe. The pride of the motherland's ancient history is alive in the collective memory. The Bulgarian language and Slavonic alphabet are another dimension of national identity. May 24th, the Day of the Slavonic Script and Culture, has been celebrated as a national holiday since the mid-19th century. It expresses pride in that the Bulgarian people disseminated the Cyrillic alphabet now used by other peoples as well. Bulgarians take pride in the fact that their people realized the need for conducting church services and writing in their own language at a very early stage in their cultural history. Eastern Orthodox Christianity is another axis of national identity. Between 1960 and 1990 education was wholly secularized, with an emphasis on atheism. Even at that time, however, Christianity did not fade to the point where it would have no longer been a dimension of national specificity. Socializing institutions such as the school underscored the importance of religion in certain cases, especially when the nation was endangered. Textbooks of history and literature devoted special attention to Islamization during the Ottoman rule. Bulgarians who preferred to die rather than change their Christian faith were canonized as heroes and saints. The arts and education promoted them as role models. Since the democratic changes of 1989 and 1990, Eastern Orthodox Christianity has been highlighted as a funda-

491

17.5 National Identity

mental dimension of Bulgarian identity. Religious rites have become part of political rituals. There are two permanent metaphors of Bulgarianhood They are the Balkan Range and the mother (Krasteva 1996). The Balkan Range is not merely the mountain after which the entire peninsula is named and which lies in the central part of the country. In folk mythology, the Balkan Range is a symbolic space "saturated with the blood of ancestors and forefathers, crossed by the centuries of the national spirit; the wrath of the gods has flashed over it" (Why We Are What We Are, 1994: 345). Balkandjiya, meaning 'highlander', is not a regional but a spiritual identity, a designation of the lofty in Bulgarian spirituality. The mother has another key role in the Bulgarian national narrative. This symbol is multi-layered: it refers to a motherland, a parent, and an ideal. The frequency of the mother metaphor expresses the sustainable tendency of perceiving the people as a family, the nation as an organism. Land, people, family, and the individual cohere in a single "organism." In this perspective, the welfare of the individual is conceived as impossible without the welfare of the community, and only the latter is described with the attributes of completion and perfection: "the nation is the fullest and most perfect community... The welfare of each one of its members is conceivable and possible only as part of its welfare" [italics added, A.K.] (Moutafchiev, 1994: 392). The sense of national identity and pride in being Bulgarian is typical of the majority of Bulgarian citizens. "I would rather be a citizen of Bulgaria than of any other country," 85% of all adult residents declared in late 1995 (Dimova, and Tilkidjiev, 1996: 22). Seventy per cent of the population feel strongly attached to Bulgaria, and one in five are attached to some extent (ibid., 15). Everyday consciousness acknowledges Bulgarian language and Eastern Orthodox Christianity as important axes of national identity. The role of the latter is considerably weaker in mixed Christian-Muslim communities (around Razgrad) or mostly Turkish communities (around Kurdjali). Curiously, sports achievements are very important to the national pride of many Bulgarians. With an impressive track record in sports such as wrestling and modern rhythmic gymnastics, Bulgarians have achieved considerable success in track-and-field, tennis and, in particular, football in the

492

Attitudes and Values

past few years, making the country famous. The joy in these achievements sometimes occasions spontaneous nationwide celebrations, boosting national dignity. Bulgarians find other important reasons to feel proud in their centuries-long history. A small people can also be gifted - the arts foster national fulfillment, along with certain academic achievements. The sense of national pride is not uncritical It is typically associated with distancing and rejection of negative phenomena in the operation of institutions and various spheres of public life. Discontent with the country's economic and political situation has prompted some people to feel ashamed of being Bulgarian. This is one of the motives for emigration. The view that national identity is a matter of destiny rather than choice one is born Bulgarian and remains Bulgarian regardless of any decision to live in their own country or to emigrate to another - is quite popular in Bulgarian culture and is consistently cultivated in education. This view fits into the paradigm of ethnic national identity based on "blood" rather than "land." Sociological surveys illustrate those attitudes, revealing the importance of the line of descent for more than one generation of Bulgarians, yet at the same time they indicate an increasing importance of elements of the civic concept of national identity. Self-determination, and "the sense of being Bulgarian" are more important to the majority of the population than language and religious confession. National identity correlates - sometimes on a competitive but more often on a complementary basis - with the sense of regional identity, on the one hand, and European identity on the other. More than half of all Bulgarian citizens feel strongly attached to their immediate place of residence - the neighbourhood, population centre and region. Bulgaria's geographical location in Europe "translates" on the level of everyday consciousness as European identity. A positive attitude to Europe is declared by 52% of all people, and just 4% are of the opposite mind set (Dimova and Tilkidjiev, 1996: 53). Most people think that Bulgaria stands to gain from joining the European Union. The sense of European identity is strongest among intellectuals and toplevel cadres, weaker among workers and weakest among peasants. Educational level and European identity are in direct proportion to one another. European orientation also varies by ethnocultural origin: people of Jewish

493

17.5 National Identity

and Armenian origin have the strongest European identity, with Bulgarians coming next. This orientation is weaker among Turks and weakest among Gypsies (Topalova, 1995: 104-106). Attitudes to Europe are strongly differentiated by generation. This differentiation concerns the extent of openness to Europe, as well as the message which younger and older people "read" in it. The former are twice as interested in life in Western Europe than the latter. This interest involves various dimensions of life: "Young people are most strongly impressed by European businessmen, while the older generation - by politicians" (Mitev, andRiordan, 1996:21). In the 35 years under consideration, patriotism has avoided the extremes of both national nihilism and nationalism. The communist regime in Bulgaria was definitely loyal to the Soviet Union and the socialist community without, however, going as far as rejecting national identity and the need for preserving and handing it down to the next generations. Postcommunist Bulgaria remains open to the world, the referent of geopolitical orientation now being Europe, "The West," NATO, rather than Russia, even though the latter is not ignored. Ultra-nationalism is not typical of Bulgarian national identity There was only one exception in the 1984-1985 period when the state socialist regime forcibly changed the names of Muslims. The regime was seeking support among the Bulgarian community on the basis of a nationalist campaign regarding the Bulgarian origin of Muslims in the country and the duty of preserving the "purity" of their Bulgarian origin. On the present pluralistic political scene there are no influential parties staking themselves on a strong nationalist card. A typical nationalist formation such as the Bulgarian National Radical Party won just 0.54% of the votes in the parliamentary elections in December 1994. Anna Krasteva

494

Attitudes and Values REFERENCES

Dimova, L., N. Tilkidjiev (1996) Profiles of National Identity: Between Localism and Ethnocentrism. Sofia: Free Initiative Foundation (in Bulgarian). Krasteva, A., N. Bogomilova, I. Katzarski, N. Dimitrova (1996) Universal and National in the Bulgarian Culture. Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations (in Bulgarian). Moutafchiev, P (1994) Present-Day Bulgaria and the Spirit of Our National Revival. In: Why We Are What We Are, Sofia: Prosveta, pp. 391-400 (in Bulgarian). Mitev, P.-E., J. Riordan (eds). Europe. The Young. The Balkans. Sofia: ICMSIR, 1996. Topalova, V. (1995) L'identite europeenne dans une societe balkanique en transition. In: Les Balkans el I'Europe face aux nouveaux defis, Paris: UNESCO, 1995: 102-107.