Convergence or Divergence?: Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies 9780773565173

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Convergence or Divergence?

Comparative Charting of Social Change Series Editor: Simon Langlois

Simon Langlois With Theodore Caplow, Henri Mendras, Wolfgang Glatzer

Convergence or Divergence? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies

Campus Verlag • Frankfurt am Main McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Main entry under title: Convergence or Divergence? (Comparative charting of social change, ISSN 1183-1952) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1264-0 (McGill-Queen's University Press) 1. Social change. 2. Social evolution. I. Langlois, Simon II. Caplow, Theodore III. Mendras, Henri IV. Glatzer, Wolfgang V. Series. HN17.S.C66 1995 303.4 C94-900290-9

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Convergence or Divergence? Comparing recent social trends in industrial societies / Simon Langlois ... - Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag; Montreal; Kingston; London; Buffalo: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1994 (Comparative charting of social change) ISBN 3-593-35189-7 (Campus Verlag) Gb. ISBN 0-7735-1264-0 (McGill-Queen's Univ. Press) Gb. NE: Langlois, Simon All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Copyright 1994 by Campus Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt/Main Published simultaneously in Canada and the United States by McGill-Queen's University Press Legal deposit second quarter 1995 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Germany

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We wish to express our gratitude for all the support provided to the International Group for Comparative Charting of Social Change. Our warmest thanks go to Kathe Roth for her editing of this book and for translation of two chapters, and to the personnel of the Institut quebecois de recherche sur la culture - Johanne Bujold, Ghislaine Marois, and Mariette Montambault - for preparing the manuscript. The Group received indispensable financial support from many institutions; without their help, the meetings necessary to produce the comparative analysis would have been impossible to organize. We express our appreciation to the Werner Reimers Stiftung (Bad Homburg), the Berliner Bank (Berlin), the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Bonn), the Senatsverwaltung fur Wissenschaft und Forschung (Berlin), and the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozialforschung (Berlin), the Centre national de la recherche scientifique, and the Observatoire frangais de conjoncture economique (France), the Institut quebecois de recherche sur la culture (Quebec), the Council for European Studies, the Cornerhouse Fund, and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, Brigham Young University (United States), and the Fundation BBV (Spain).

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CONTENTS Acknowledgments

i

1

Introduction. Convergence or Divergence? Theodore Caplow and Henri Mendras

1

2

Is There a Single Pattern of Social Evolution? Yannick Lemel and John Modell

23

3

Differing Levels of Low Fertility Gary Caldwell, Karin Stiehr, John Modell, and Salustiano Del Campo

43

4

Employment and Labour-Market Change: Toward Two Models of Growth Heinz-Herbert Noll and Simon Langlois

89

5

The Changing Bonds of Kinship: Parents and Adult Children Howard M. Bahr, Jean-Hugues Dechaux, and Karin Stiehr

115

6

Trends in Religion and Secularization Bruce A. Chadwick, Madeleine Gauthier, Louis Hourmant, and Barbara Worndl

173

7

The Reduction of Personal Authority Theodore Caplow

215

8

Conflicts and Conflict Regulation Karl-Otto Hondrich and Theodore Caplow

225

9

Institutionalization Tendencies in the Ecological Movements Guy Frechet and Barbara Worndl

247

10

Comparative Structural Analysis of Social Change in France and in Quebec Michel Forse and Simon Langlois

269

11

Lexicon Renata Hornung-Drauss

303

Author Index Subject Index The Authors

321 325 327

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1 Introduction Convergence or Divergence ? Theodore CAPLOW Henri MENDRAS

The publication of this volume opens the second phase of an intellectual enterprise begun in May, 1987, when a dozen social scientists from France, the United States, West Germany, and Quebec met in Paris to organize the International Research Group on the Comparative Charting of Social Change (CCSC). All of us had previously been engaged in the study of social change in our respective countries, and as we compared our separate bodies of work, we had the impression of seeing the bits and pieces of a new theoretical model waiting to be assembled, a model that would not view social trends as predestined and that would take account of the interplay of objective and subjective factors in modernization. Our first task was to put the bits and pieces into manageable form, and so we undertook to prepare a profile of recent social trends for our four societies, each following the same outline and using the same criteria for data. A RESEARCH PROGRAMME

Social change is, of course, too large a topic to be discussed without further specification. We were specifically interested in the period from 1960 to 1990, industrialized or partly industrialized nations, and the social structures and institutional patterns that characterize the behaviour of mass societies, especially 1

Convergence or Divergence

those associated with the family, voluntary associations, work, leisure, education, religion, government, and politics. Our unit of analysis was a trend - a series of values representing the incidence of some item of social behaviour in a given population at consecutive points in time. Most of our work was to be done with time series, ending as recently as possible, and covering such matters as family income, household expenditures, employment and unemployment, working conditions, the informal economy, marriage and divorce, household composition, kin networks, housing, migration, educational achievement, criminality, leisure patterns, health care, social movements, and so forth. Each national profile would have the same table of contents, based on a list of 78 trends and indicators. In the scholarly literature, a few trends have received the lion's share of attention: economists have looked very closely at trends in economic growth, prices, and wages; political scientists have studied twentieth-century trends in voting and party affiliation; demographers have scrutinized trends in fertility and mortality. It is no coincidence that these areas of social life lend themselves most readily to quantification and offer the longest time series. However, a description of social change that limited itself to trends in economic development, voting, and population would be incomplete indeed. Even though quantification is initially more problematic in other institutional sectors, many of the difficulties have been overcome in recent years, and the quality of data in those sectors has been steadily improving. Our national profiles are insistently empirical. Most trends are based on numerical data that can be verified with reasonable confidence, and no directionality is asserted without calculation. When only quantitative data are available, they have been used very cautiously. Where possible, we have located studies of the same tendencies by other scholars and used them to challenge our own interpretations. At all times, this predilection for reasonably hard facts creates the possibility that what we find may surprise us. And, indeed, it often does. Our preference for relatively hard data restricts most trend reports to recent decades, since many interesting statistical series do not go back very far and others lose reliability as they recede to earlier years. But with the progress of the work, it became increasingly clear that a sharp focus on the period 1960-1990 was appropriate as well as expedient. For reasons that vary somewhat from one national society to another, an astonishing number of social trends showed a point of inflection close to 1960, when the immediate effects of the Second World War had receded, and another point of inflection close to 1990, when the Cold War ended. Our group is divided into national teams that include historians, economists, demographers, and sociologists. The participation of individual scholars in the national teams, and of the national teams in the international group, is entirely voluntary. Each national team is responsible for its own funding and internal operations. The Quebec team has provided the project with an efficient secretariat, 2

Introduction

but there is no executive authority at all. Work is assigned and deadlines are set by consensus at semi-annual work sessions. This loose arrangement has worked so well that we are tempted to propose it as a model for other international projects of social research. The original group was enlarged by the addition of research teams from Spain and Greece, in 1989, a team from Russia, in 1991; and one from Italy in 1992. Others are proposed. The original programme of the Group was to prepare a comprehensive description of recent social trends in each of our societies; to identify similarities and differences among these societies with respect to ongoing social trends; to develop an innovative model of social change to accommodate these findings; and to establish benchmarks for future tracking of social trends. The first of these assignments - the preparation of a national profile of social trends - has been completed in fine style by the original teams. Four thick volumes - Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990; Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990; Recent Social Trends in Germany, 1960-1990; and Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990 - have preceded the present volume, which is volume 5. The sixth volume in this series, published jointly by Campus Verlag of Frankfurt-am-Main and McGill-Queen's University Press of Montreal, Recent Social Trends in Spain, 1960-1990, will be in press soon. Volume 7, now in preparation, will present cross-national analyses of inequality and stratification. COMPARATIVE CHARTING OF SOCIAL TRENDS

The cross-national analyses in the present volume are based on the four national profiles already published, except for the chapter on fertility, which includes some information from Spain. They mark the Group's arrival at the second stage in its research programme - the identification of similarities and differences among these societies with respect to ongoing social trends. Herein, we cover only a few aspects of this large assignment, with chapters on fertility decline, intergenerational relations, religion and secularization, ecological movements, employment and labour-market changes, the decline of personal authority, patterns of social conflict, and on two wider questions: whether there is a single pattern of social evolution among these four societies and whether there is a single pattern of causality among their respective trends. The topics of these papers were chosen by their authors and reflect the priorities of individual scholars rather than a collective decision about which trends ought to be examined first. Some of the important topics omitted here are to be covered in volume 7 of this series, which is now in preparation. Although the choice of topics was not systematic, the results of these analyses, taken together, are coherent. The decline of fertility, the entry of women into the labour market, the 3

Convergence or Divergence

dimunition of class conflict, the weakening of personal authority, and the increasing vulnerability of the environment turn out to be salient features of the advanced stage of modernization at which these societies have arrived. The convergence is unmistakeable, except in the domain of religion. But when we look at the interconnections of these trends within each national society, we encounter unexpected divergence. The prolonged historical experience that we call modernization has been under way for more than three hundred years, and no end is in sight. In its temporal dimension, it involves the application of an increasingly competent technology, based on a continuously expanding body of scientific knowledge, to a variety of human purposes. In its spatial dimension, it involves the gradual diffusion of that technology, and of the social forms associated with it, from the countries of western Europe, where the technology originated, to the rest of the inhabited world. The progress of science-based technology has been continuous, cumulative, and irreversible since the mid-seventeenth century. In every single year since 1650, for example, the accuracy of physical measurements, the efficiency of combustion devices, and the maximum speed of vehicles has increased, and during that time no significant advance in technology has been lost. The social consequences of technological progress, however, are not so easily understood. Indeed, the social changes induced by modernization - beginning with great increases in population and production — were not clearly perceived until well into the nineteenth century, presumably because of the paucity of demographic and economic enumerations. Even so acute an observer as Alexis de Tocqueville did not visualize modernization as an ongoing process. Not until mid-century, when railroads and steam-powered factories were ubiquitous in western Europe and North America, did theories of modernization begin to appear. Herbert Spencer ascribed the same inevitability to social progress as to technological progress and assimilated both into the model of biological evolution; Marx and Engels described modernization as a bourgeois achievement and prophesied its apocalyptic ending. Tonnies described the transition from primitive to modern as a transition from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Durkheim and Weber developed more sophisticated models of that transition: one using the division of labour as the motive force, the other highlighting the rational-legal mode of domination. None of these authors paid much attention to the role of technology in modernization, and, perhaps for that reason, most of their prophecies came to nought. More recently, Pareto and Sorokin, in their cyclical theories, refused to see anything unique about modern technology, while the world-system theorists viewed economic exploitation as the engine of modernization. The most creative students of the relationship between technology and social change - Jean Fourastie, W.F. Cottrell, William McNeill, Jean Jacobs - have worked outside the mainstream of social science.

4

Introduction

An understanding of this relationship is essential if we want to interpret social change in modern societies. The social trends in our national profiles seem to fall into three broad categories: those that are functions of technological progress; those that are influenced but not determined by technological progress; and those that have little or nothing to do with technological progress. Most of the trends in the first category reflect the proliferation and improvement of goods and services and the consequent amelioration of living conditions and life choices - for example, life expectancy, nutritional status, educational achievement, agricultural yield per acre, proportion of the population living in urban areas, worker productivity, income per capita, telephones per capita, appliances per household, physicians per capita, book production, media audiences, leisure activities, energy efficiency, water supply, and passenger-miles are all higher, while infant mortality, contagious disease, illiteracy, hunger, work hours, and industrial accidents have declined. These indicators - and many others - are so closely connected that any one of them can be used to measure the level of modernization attained by a national society. When national societies are arrayed on these indicators, the rank-order correlations among the arrays average more than .90. Most of the phenomena in this category are visible and unambiguous, and their trends can be extrapolated with fair confidence for the short and medium terms. The trends in the second category are much less predictable and much more difficult to interpret. The decline of fertility in our four societies was clearly influenced by the invention, around 1960, of reliable oral contraceptives, but it is impossible to measure the weight of this technological influence within a compound of nontechnological influences that are themselves intricately related, including the movement of married women into the labour force, changes in gender roles and expectations, a greater acceptance of consensual unions, a tendency toward later marriage, the legitimation of abortion and sterilization, and the rising costs of childraising. One of the most important nontechnological factors is the variation between successive cohorts of young adults in the propensity to have children, for which demographers have no explanatory model at all. Another trend that fits neatly into this category is the institutionalization of ecological movements, attributable in part to the steadily rising pressure that an advancing technology puts on the natural environment, but also to a large cluster of nontechnological factors, including the enhanced legitimacy of democratic polities and the consequent weakening of extremist parties on both the left and the right, the rising educational level of the population, the expanding influence of investigative journalism, the rapid growth of outdoor leisure activities, the development of more effective fund-raising techniques, and the successful popularization of theories about global warming, ozone depletion, resource exhaustion, and the like.

5

Convergence or Divergence

Most of the trends discussed in this volume fall squarely into the third category - that is, they are only remotely connected with technological progress, or not visibly connected at all. This is true of trends in kinship relations, in social stratification, in class and ethnic conflict, in personal authority, and in religion and secularization. This last example is notable because the imminent suppression of religious belief and practice by technological progress has been repeatedly announced but has yet to occur. Except for such marginal phenomena as the diffusion of religious messages through the electronic media, it is difficult to find any causal connection at all between technological progress and the diverse religious trends exhibited by our four societies. The major trends in the first category are not trivial - they provide the material elements in advanced industrial societies - but by themselves they explain very little about the socially constructed symbols and images that give meaning to human actions in a society. The large institutional complexes that we call family, education, work, religion, leisure, politics, and government embody symbols and images that are constantly changing but never completely disconnected from the past. In the realm of socially constructed reality, the future, even in the short term, cannot be more than partly predictable. However, since new collective representations are constructed out of old ones, the future is never completely open either. The task of social theory in the study of social change lies within these uncertain but very real limits. Comparing trends in related social systems, particularly trends in the second and third categories, helps us to fix the limits of predictability by separating the changes and continuities intrinsic to a set of social systems from those that are peculiar to a particular case. Since the end of the Second World War, our four societies have experienced the same history, but their initial situations were very different. The two European societies emerged from that conflict half destroyed. The two American societies, in contrast, clearly benefited from the war, which accelerated the economic development of the United States and liberated Quebec from British control. Economic growth, restarted by the Marshall Plan and reaching 4% or 5% a year, allowed France and Germany to close the gap with the United States. Industrial Germany had been more badly damaged than had France, but the latter had also to overcome a prior industrial lag, which it accomplished in part by an agricultural revolution that displaced the peasantry in favour of a modern and competitive organization of agriculture. Everywhere, the magnitude of the baby boom came as a surprise, although it was least marked in traditionally prolific Quebec and most spectacular in France, which emerged from a long period of demographic lethargy. These differences still make themselves felt today in differently shaped population pyramids.

6

Introduction

In 1965, this demographic and economic momentum was interrupted. For the first time since 1945, the number of births declined, while stagflation signalled a major change in the productive system. The first signs of deindustrialization appeared; service activities and information technology began to expand very rapidly. The year 1968 was marked by popular demonstrations in all of these societies, initiated by the young; the first baby-boomers were growing up. In France, a movement started by students was taken up by industrial workers and even, to some extent, by peasants and office workers. The truly popular May revolution shook the establishment. A new spirit emerged, with the slogan "small is beautiful." The demographic and economic trends of the time assumed somewhat different shapes in our four societies, but they all moved in the same direction: there were fewer marriages, more divorces, more births out of wedlock, more female employment, and more unemployment, while students stayed in school longer, entailing a rapid growth of the educational system, especially at the higher levels, and a corresponding rise in the cultural level of the general population. At the beginning of the 1970s, educational growth slackened in Europe and virtually ceased in the United States. Similarly, per-capita income stopped rising in the United States around 1972, while it continued to improve in Germany and France. This history explains why, after some hesitation, the German, American and Quebec teams in the CCSC project decided to adopt the classification of trends that had been devised by the French team. It seemed to them that, with some adjustment and amendment, the trends discovered in France would be found in their own societies; the details might differ, but there would be no major changes of direction. This agreement by a score of social scientists, each an expert on his or her own society, was reached after long discussion and deliberation; it made our co-operative enterprise possible. That the major trends were parallel in our four societies permitted comparison and facilitated the identification of differences. Had the trends in each society been unrelated to the others, cross-national comparison would have been far less informative. It is because our societies belong to the same set that they can usefully be compared. These concurrence might be taken as evidence of convergent social evolution on both sides of the Atlantic - but not so fast. Trends in the same direction may lead to very divergent consequences. Since 1965, fertility has been declining throughout Europe. For the past decade, the population replacement rate has been around 1.8 for France, around 1.3 in Germany and around 1 in Liguria and northern Spain (a rate of about 2.2 is equivalent in the long run to zero growth.) It is about the same in the United States as in France and about the same in Quebec as in Spain. The population pyramids also differ, because of differences in the amplitude of the baby boom, so that parallel trends lead to very different consequences. In France and the United States, the population continues to grow, while in the old German provinces, the 7

Convergence or Divergence

native-born population is actually declining, and decline is imminent in Quebec. The two-child family is still the norm in France, while in northern Spain and in Quebec the one-child family has become the norm. Thus, trend that is common to the societies may create more diversity in the future than existed in the past. This methodological caution needs to be sounded at the outset, lest the reader be deceived by appearances in the analyses that follow. CONVERGENCE AND SINGULARITIES

In their following essay, Lemel and Modell make the same point. Most trends are very similar for the four societies, and when there is a divergence, it usually concerns only one of the four. A few trends divide the set two by two. The prevailing parallelism is not confined to any one sector; there are parallel trends in demography, organization of production, national institutions, social practices, and life styles. The divergences are concentrated in three sectors: social inequality, social movements, and local institutions. In analyzing divergences, the authors conclude that Germany differs the most from the others, and particularly from the United States. Quebec and France seem to resemble each other in the speed and scope of their transformations. The United States has evolved more slowly than the three other countries, doubtless because it was initially ahead with respect to most indicators of modernization. The national teams agree that in all four societies, the barriers between social classes have eroded to the point that it is possible to posit that the present hierarchical structure is of a totally different nature than that in place in 1945. Paradoxically, the United States, which began its social evolution earlier and had a very large middle class by the 1920s, now has a class structure closer to that of the nineteenth century, whereas in France, Germany, and Quebec there has emerged something that might be called multidimensional stratification - multiple social groups in a constantly changing configuration. This transformation of the social structure implies a profound modification of social conflicts. As Simmel stated long ago, conflicts are a means of reinforcing social cohesion and the mechanisms of collective decision. It is through conflict that groups define their interests and identities. The mechanisms of conflict regulation assure the reduction of tensions by asserting a fundamental consensus about the major problem of social management. Two trends in our national profiles (trends 7.1 and 6.2) bear directly on this point, and starting from that point, Hondrich and Caplow sketch out an account of trends in conflict that begins with a striking hypothesis: "Societies that succeed in modernizing need a large aggregate amount of conflict, but because violent conflict is too costly for them they are automatically directed to nonviolent modes of conflict resolution." Put another way, recourse to physical violence has declined in advanced industrial societies; only undeveloped societies can 8

Introduction

now permit themselves the luxury of civil war. The recent changes of regime in Eastern Europe support this observation. Note, for example, the contrast between the "velvet revolution" in Czechoslovakia, which resulted in a peaceful divorce between two nations, and the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia, involving federations that were geographically close but far apart in level of modernization. Labour-management conflicts (trend 7.2) offer other obvious illustrations of the trend toward peaceful resolution of conflicts. They have considerably diminished in all of our societies, no matter what indicator is used, and the few prolonged conflicts that still occur rarely involve any violence. Germany was the first to develop comprehensive arrangements for resolving industrial conflicts by negotiation; France has since followed the German example. Strikes have almost disappeared from the industrial scene in the United States and have declined by far in Quebec. In recent years, mass demonstrations have been most often organized by the Greens, who brandish their doctrine of nonviolence with aggressive energy. In France, the mass student demonstrations of the 1980s involved some attacks on persons and property, but most of those incidents were attributable to marginal actors. In general, violence tends to be limited to marginalized groups: race riots in the United States, xenophobic riots in Germany, youth riots in French suburbs, ethnic riots in Corsica. France has, so to speak, legitimized the riot as a means of confronting abuses of power; although riots remain an institution in French society, they have become essentially nonviolent in recent years. As for the Germans, from 1945 until the revolution of 1989 in East Germany, not a single large-scale demonstration seems to have occurred. The disquieting resurgence of Nazi-style incidents in Germany in the past two years may or may not signify a reversal. The dimunition of violence in social conflicts implies an increasing volume of negotiation and arbitration (trend 10.1), which we have in fact found in all four societies. Nevertheless, there is one clear difference between the United States and the two European countries: arbitration usually occurs at the initiative of government in Europe, while in America discussion and negotiation among voluntary associations is a more common mode of conflict resolution. As Tocqueville once remarked, in France everything derives from the state, in England from a person of high rank, and in the United States from an association. This contrast, however, is weakening. The United States federal government has increasingly assumed the role of arbiter, while in France the state now prefers to create local associations in order to distance itself from that role. In all of our societies, the political system remains the primary mode of conflict resolution, on both the local and the national levels. In their chapter in this volume, Hondrich and Caplow maintain that "today major political conflicts are no longer defined by the antagonism of social classes but by concurrent interests." They identify a series of emergent conflicts, including: 9

Convergence or Divergence

. A conflict between the productive system and the welfare state. If a large number of citizens can no longer be employed in a productive manner, how can their existence and dignity be maintained? The question arises in the political order and separates liberals from social democrats, the former emphasizing free enterprise and individual effort, the latter equality and civil rights. . A conflict between industrial and cultural values. There is a great unresolved question regarding whether the primary goal of education is to train productive workers or cultivated and patriotic citizens. The lengthening of the period of schooling (trend 15.1) and of the gradual entry into adult life (trend 1.1) have stimulated the emergence of a youth culture that may eventually settle this question. . A conflict between economic and ecological values. This conflict has been treated quite differently in our four societies, as Frechet and Worndl show in their chapter. The United States was the first to become aware of this conflict, partly due to the initiative of traditional conservation groups and partly in response to anti-industrial preaching. In Germany, the ecological movement took political form very early and was legitimated by the election of Greens to provincial parliaments. In France, the ecological leaders are veterans of the 1968 movement. Only very recently have they been able to organize on a national scale, but they have exercised considerable influence within political parties and administrative agencies. These new sources of conflict no longer pit social classes against each other, but instead mobilize carriers of opinions and values. They can lead to passionate confrontations, but the developing spirit of tolerance seems to check any inclination to violence. The relative decline of violence in social conflicts is indirectly related to the dimunition of personal authority (trend 7.4) analyzed by Caplow. All forms of personal authority weakened concurrently in all four societies between 1960 and 1990, beginning with the authority of men over women and family headship. Children are no longer taught to obey an unassailable parental authority; instead, they are taught to engage in negotiations in which they are generally weaker but never completely without resources and are sometimes able to reverse the balance of power in their own favour. The authority of patriarchs over their descendants has completely disappeared; grandparents are typically in the position of soliciting affective gratification from their grandchildren. The authority of teachers and professors over their students suffered a decisive blow in 1968. Priests and ministers are no longer able to regulate the behaviour of communicants, who insist on a right to religious and moral self- determination. Likewise, the authority of politicians, labour leaders, and notables in general is no longer founded on anything but the consent of their followers. Even in organizations that emphasize command and discipline, the consent

10

Introduction

of subordinates is now considered essential. The French, American, and German armies clearly illustrate this transformation. The weakening of personal authority is plainly related to the erosion of the social hierarchy, occasioned in the first instance by changes in the composition of the labour force: the decline of the agricultural sector, the shift from blue-collar to whitecollar employment, the entry of married women into the labour force, and the virtual disappearance of domestic servants, along with an increase in consensual unions, an expansion of higher education, the levelling culture of the mass media, the leisure explosion, the increased volume of consumer goods, and the resulting availability of diverse life styles. The close connections that once existed between the occupation of a male who was household head and sole breadwinner, the income of that household, the class status of its members, and the customs, costumes, and routines associated with that status have all broken down or been greatly weakened. The decline of personal authority has interesting and somewhat enigmatic implications. On the one hand, it augments individual freedom. On the other hand, it requires a great expansion of bureaucracy. The locus of social control is shifted upward, so to speak, from the family, the neighbourhood, the parish and the work group to large-scale agencies, public and private, that are now responsible for the regulation of social interaction. Whether the quality of life in these societies has been enhanced or damaged by this momentous change remains a challenging question. The movement toward secularization that the West has experienced since the beginning of this century has accelerated in three of our societies over the past 30 years. In West Germany, France, and Quebec, religious practice (trend 11.5) has been declining rapidly and religious institutions (trend 9.2) have lost much of their influence. This movement can be interpreted in Durkheimian terms as an advance in the division of labour. As social activities become more diverse and specialized, functions that traditionally belonged to religion have separated and acquired autonomy. The best example may be care for the sick: hospitals have slowly become laicized as techniques of hospital care have expanded and the number of nursing nuns has declined. Theologians of different beliefs and sociologists specializing in religion agree that there are several dimensions to secularization, as Chadwick, Gauthier, Hourmant, and Worndl point out in their chapter. First, autonomy with respect to religion has gradually been acquired by government, education, welfare, and family agencies. Second, the churches themselves increasingly attend to problems of ordinary life, as concern with salvation and the Kingdom of Heaven has given way to the struggle for social justice. Third, individuals look outside religion for satisfaction of their emotional needs and for the basis of their moral principles. In applying these perspectives to our societies, however, we must take account of sharp differences in background and context. 11

Convergence or Divergence

In 1905, the French Republic rejected the Concordat and proclaimed the separation of church and state. Juridically, the situation became the same as that of the United States, although a French statesman would never swear on the Bible or invoke the aid of God, as the president of the United States must do. The religious component of American civic culture goes beyond these customary forms. The last five American presidents (Ford, Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton) have all declared themselves to be active Christians. What could be more exotic for a Frenchman? In nominally secularized Germany, a supplement on the income tax paid by citizens is allocated for support of the churches, which makes the churches rich and powerful and supports a vast network of religious schools, hospitals, and social services. Ministers of all denominations (except Muslims) are paid by the state. The number of religious vocations, attendance at church services, and the incidence of private devotions have declined in three of our societies since 1960, but at very uneven rates. Of the two Catholic societies, France was the first to record a sharp decline in religious practice; Sunday church attendance has fallen to less than 10%. In Quebec, where nearly everyone was a practising Catholic in 1960 and nearly everyone is still a nominal Catholic today, there was a sharp decline in church attendance during the 1980s. In Germany, the decline of religious practice has been similar among Catholics and among Lutherans. In contrast, the United States has seen an authentic revival of religious practice, which stands at a much higher level now than at the beginning of the century. Fundamentalists are strong in every denomination. Attendance at Catholic church declined somewhat after the Vatican II Council, then stabilized at a level that was still very high. Among Protestants in the United States, church attendance remained at the same level between 1960 and 1990, and the financial contributions of the faithful nearly tripled in constant dollars. While religious vocations declined dramatically in Europe and Quebec and in the American Catholic church, the number of Protestant ministers in the U.S. grew considerably in relation to the population of believers from 1950 to 1987. One could gather all sorts of supplementary data about beliefs and other indicators of religious influence, but the conclusion would be always the same: there is a sharp contrast between the United States and the three other societies, and there are important differences between Catholics and Protestants. The school is without question the public institution most clearly affected by the church in these four societies, but in very different ways. Religious schools are numerous in the United States and Germany, and their management poses no political problem at all, since they are independent of the government in the United States and financed by a religious tax in Germany. In France, however, religious schools have been the object of major political conflict for a century. One might even say that the political life of France had been dominated by this problem, which concretized the conflict between the church and the secular republic, and which was replicated in 12

Introduction

every village in the relationship between the schoolmaster and the priest. This conflict is now diminished and perhaps even settled. The enormous - and successful - demonstrations organized in 1984 to defend "free" religious schools against a socialist law showed that the church has retained a surprising ability to mobilize public opinion. As late as 1960, the French church presented itself as a national institution whose authority was exerted over all citizens, except for a million or so Protestants and a smaller number of Jews. Yet at no time after 1793 did more than a quarter of the French population attend Sunday mass. Since 1960, the church has changed its pastoral doctrine. It now represents itself as being at the service of believers and not as being responsible for the entire French people. At best, it is therefore a denomination of a quarter of the French population. Meanwhile, four other denominations have acquired equal legitimacy. Protestantism is no longer marginal with respect to Catholicism. Islam is the second-largest denomination in numbers, although the Muslims are as weak in religious observance as are the Catholics. The Jews have doubled in number because of immigration - principally from North Africa - and their religion has acquired total legitimacy, partly because of the Holocaust and partly because of the existence of a Jewish state. Finally, unbelievers, who were too few to be counted in 1960, now amount to about 15% of the population, according to surveys. France has therefore become, like the United States, a multidenominational society. The secularization of beliefs, practices, and institutions does not entail, as one might expect, the complete detachment of religiously inactive persons from their religious obedience. Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, and Jews who do not practise their respective religions do not, however, reject their cultural heritages; rather, they exalt them. Family religious tradition is still a major component of personal identity. The free-school demonstrators of June, 1984, in France were not, for the most part, religiously active, but they wanted their children to be able to attend schools in the Catholic tradition. The children of German atheists and of assimilated American Jews are routinely sent to religious schools. The transformation of family structure that occurred over the past 30 years is no doubt the most important and consequential change in Western civilization during this period. The chapters by Caldwell, Stiehr, Modell, and Del Campo and by Bahr, Dechaux, and Stiehr approach this major transition from two different directions the former examining trends in fertility and the latter looking at relations between parents and adult children. The comparisons among our four societies are fascinating. In their analysis of the factors responsible for the decline of fertility (trend 3.2) in France, Germany, the United States, Quebec, and Spain, Caldwell and his colleagues note, as we did above, that these declines have resulted in quite different situations. In France and the United States, with the replacement rate around 1.8 and 13

Convergence or Divergence

an age pyramid comprising numerous young adults, the average family has two children and the population is still growing slowly. In Germany and Quebec, where the replacement rate has fallen to 1.4 (even lower in South Germany) the one-child family has become the norm, and both populations would be shrinking were it not for immigration. In Spain, this trend began much later, but the decline has been so rapid that it has now passed the others. The replacement rate is around 1.0 in northern Spain, unprecedentedly low for any European population. Four of our seventy-eight trends seem to be directly tied to the decline of fertility: the falling marriage rate (trend 3.3), the increasing employment of women (trend 3.1), the increased availability of abortion and sterilization (trend 3.5), and the lengthening of the educational career (trend 15.1). The indicators that reveal the recent revolution within the institution of marriage are the marriage rate, the divorce rate, the illegitimacy ratio, and the average age at first marriage. These four trends have been moving in the same direction. Married women have a much higher fertility rate than do single women or widows, despite the incredibly rapid increase of births out of wedlock (30% in France and 43% of first births; 40% in Quebec; 70% of African-American births in the United States). In France, the fertility rate of unmarried women is about one fourth that of married women. Female employment has evolved in the opposite direction, whatever the average level of female employment may be in the particular case. The link between this trend and the fertility trend is self-evident, but the precise mechanism continues to be debated. French and American women who work full-time continue to have two children on average, while women in Germany, Quebec, and Spain who work fulltime (they are relatively less numerous) have only one. The principal difference between the old habits and the new is that women no longer quit their jobs in order to give birth, and consequently their return to the labour force after their children are grown is no longer the major transition it used to be. The lengthening of the educational career by earlier entry into the schools and the consequent proliferation of day-care centres and pre-schools seems to be a necessary condition for mothers to keep their jobs. Here too, however, international comparisons raise more questions than they answer. In France, mothers work fulltime and their children are in school from the age of three, but in the United States, where an even higher proportion of mothers work, many children do not start school until they are five or six. It is true that part-time work for women is more common in the U.S, but this does not entirely explain the difference. All of these changes were accompanied by an extraordinarily rapid modification of norms in the societies studied (trend 17.4). The revolution in family mores and institutions between 1960 and 1990 was accompanied by a profound shift of values. In the 1960s, the great majority of people believed that a woman ought not 14

Introduction

to work outside the home unless she was compelled by financial necessity, and only a small minority would allow married women a free choice between housekeeping and employment. Today, the survey results on this subject are reversed. Moreover, 'almost everyone now agrees in principle that husband and wife ought to divide household tasks, although empirical studies show that in most households, men help only a little more than they used to. The family policies of our four societies have been quite diverse. Since the 1930s, France has had a complicated and generous policy aimed at increasing the birth rate policy which should be held at least partly responsible for holding the rate close to the replacement level. Germany, which refuses to have a pronatalist family policy because it might be too reminiscent of Nazi eugenics, has a much lower replacement rate. But the birth rate in the United States, which has no family policy at all, is nearly as high as that in France. The Quebec government is recently instituted birth-rate-promotion programme may have interrupted the rapid decline of fertility there. Once again, we see how international comparisons force us to question many of the common-sense explanations that have been advanced to explain the baby boom and the decline in fertility that followed it. Why do couples decide to have children, not to have children, or to limit themselves to a single child? This remains a mystery to the social sciences. The decline in fertility tends to reduce the size of the family network (trend 2.2); on the other hand, the increasing length of life (trend 1.2), by adding another generation to each lineage, keeps collateral relatives together for a longer time, since it is well known that lineages tend to separate when their common ancestor disappears. Although the children of today have fewer brothers and sisters than those of past generations, they maintain more relationships with uncles, aunts, and cousins. The decline in fertility and the increase in divorce, consensual unions, and births out of wedlock, as well as the growing number of single-person households and single-parent families, are the familiar signs of a transformation of the conjugal unit (trend 3.3) that has occurred in all of our societies. The phenomenon has been abundantly described. In contrast, the reinforcement of the family network, which compensates in a measure for the growing fragility of the conjugal unit, has been much less studied. Bahr, Dechaux, and Stiehr present a number of interesting findings. The first is that despite all the social and economic changes that have occurred in the past 30 years, the average distance between the residences of parents and those of their adult children, married or not, has remained virtually unchanged and differs very little from one country to another. Similarly, the support and services that these generations provide for each other have not changed much in France or in the United States, the two countries for which we have information on this point. The results of local studies in all four societies tend to lead to the same conclusions. For 15

Convergence or Divergence

example, to the question "If you had more time and more money, what would you do with it?," 45% of Germans responded, "I would spend it with my family," in 1953, and 46% did so in 1979; to the question "What would you regret the most if you had to move far from here?," 38% responded, "Leaving my parents, who live close by" in 1953, and 45% gave the same response in 1979. Women play the central role in the interaction of parents and their adult children. The mother-daughter relationship is the strong axis in this system, while father-child relationships seem to be waning. The mother helps and advises her daughter on family matters, and the daughter takes care of her aged mother by providing moral support, material services, and bodily or medical care. There is no similar relationship between fathers and their sons or daughters or between sons and their elderly parents. The phenomenon is explained only in part by the greater longevity of women. The employment of women encourages them to call upon grandmothers for child care at all ages. One out of every two French children whose mothers are employed spends his or her vacation with grandparents. When the mother is a housewife, the ratio is only one in five. The direct relationship between grandparents and grandchildren plays an essential role in the transmission of values, because collective family memory is so important for the construction of personal identity. We do not have many studies on this subject, but there is no reason to suppose that the kinship system is weakening in any of these societies. The entire gamut of social change can be found in the labour market (trend 4.1). It too displays the same tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic, in obedience to the same factors, although Noll and Langlois distinguish two models of labourmarket growth, one American and the other European. On the other hand, even societies whose economies are as closely linked as those of Germany and France or Quebec and the United States exhibit somewhat different patterns. The basic constituents of a national labour market are the population of working age and the number of jobs offered to that population by the economic system. From 1966 to 1969, the population of working age grew by 38% in the United States, by around 35% in Quebec, and by 21% in France. In Germany, it grew by only 13%. Everywhere, the demand for jobs increased because large numbers of women entered the labour market and this was partly offset by the tendency of men to go to work at a later age and to retire earlier. The net effect was that in all four societies the curve of male employment declined while the curve of female employment rose. If their present trajectories continue, the curves will eventually meet and employment will be equally divided between men and women. This movement is most accentuated in France, where the proportion of women who are employed has risen most rapidly and the corresponding proportion of men has declined most rapidly. Migratory movements and the shape of the age pyramid have had different effects in each country. Immigration has been particularly strong in the two American 16

Introduction

societies. In Europe, there is a strong contrast between France, where the cohorts of young people entering the labour market continue to be large, and Germany, where they are smaller from one year to the next. The deficiency has been made up in Germany by a large stream of immigration, which has vastly increased since 1989. A new contrast between the two sides of the Atlantic is that Americans now work more hours each year and more years in their lifetimes than do Europeans. In the two European countries, the increase of available jobs has been weak: 4% in Germany and 9% in France between 1966 and 1989. In America the number of jobs created has grown more quickly than has the working-age population. Unemployment has increased everywhere, though with strong oscillations in the United States. It has grown steadily since 1980 in Quebec, and has been constantly high in France. In all of these societies, unemployment today is structural rather than frictional, a serious social problem rather than a temporary maladjustment. The cross-national differences are particularly marked for young people. In the U.S., they are characteristically employed while they pursue their studies. In Germany, they are considered employed during apprenticeship. In France, they continue their studies somewhat later and are not usually employed at the same time. There are equally striking cross-national differences with respect to long-term unemployment, which is practically nonexistent in the United States (about 6% of total unemployment), weak in Quebec (11%), but strong in Europe: 31% in Germany and 44% in France. The rates of movement in and out of the labour market are much higher in North America than in Europe. Demographic and cultural factors are partly responsible for this, but it is attributable principally to differential rates of deindustrialization. In none of these countries did the volume of secondary (industrial) production actually decline between 1960 and 1990, but while that sector remained stable, the tertiary sector (services and information processing) expanded explosively (trend 4.4), with the result that manufacturing now employs only about 20% of the labour force in France, the United States, and Quebec. The proportion seems to be higher in Germany, but the difference is a statistical artifact. Since subcontracting is less prevalent in Germany than in the other societies, tertiary activities remain within large enterprises and are counted as industrial. In any case, the growth of the tertiary sector has been slower in Europe than in America. The threshold of 50% of all employment in the tertiary sector was reached in the 1950s in the United States, in the 1960s in Canada, in 1975 in France, and not until 1982 in Germany. Europeans now work less and are more productive than Americans. The multiplication of substandard jobs in America and the persistence of endemic unemployment in Europe generate different social problems and elicit different welfare policies. Thus we begin to see the vague outline of a global picture of social change in our four societies. To sharpen the focus, Forse and Langlois undertook a 17

Convergence or Divergence

systematic comparison of matrices of social change for France and for Quebec. This remarkably innovative analysis involves measuring the density of causal relations among 78 trends recorded for Quebec and 60 trends recorded for France and grouping them into clusters of closely related trends that can be identified as "macrotrends." Using this method, they obtained 14 macrotrends for Quebec and 12 for France. Then they studied the causal relations among the macrotrends in each matrix and constructed a graphical summary of social causality for each country. The exercise led to findings that were both unexpected and enlightening. On the one hand, it is clear that the trends are substantially the same in the two societies, with slight differences in intensity and velocity. Indeed, it is only because of this resemblance that it is possible to undertake a comparative study such as this one. If there were too many major differences, comparison would be impossible. On the other hand, the analysis shows that trends formulated in analogous terms are interrelated in quite different ways in France and in Quebec. Their antecedents and consequences are not the same. Trends that have neither the same causes nor the same effects cannot really be considered identical, because they have different functions within the social structure. This is the case, for example, with the trends in union organization and in consensus. In both France and Quebec, unions have been increasingly institutionalized, but in France this is the result of a change in administrative regulations, while in Quebec it is a consequence of a decrease in industrial conflict. In both societies, there has been an abatement of the major ideological conflicts that formerly divided the entire population and helped to define the national identity. In Quebec, this macrotrend derives from trends associated with work, while in France it derives from trends in the domain of politics. At first glance the two trends are the same, but the matrix analysis shows that the mechanisms and social sectors affected are different. Convergence is somehow transformed into divergence. Each matrix can be represented by a graph of macrotrends that clearly identifies those that are primarily causal, those that are primarily caused, and those that fall in between. Even though the trends are the same, the two models are very different. The major conclusions that seem to emerge from this analysis are that operating within different structures the same trends can perform quite different functions; and that every society develops according to its own dynamics. The hierarchization of trends in these two societies, as derived by this empirical analysis, does not in either case correspond to any of the major theories that have been advanced to account for capitalist development. In France, the political order and changes in relations of production turn out to be in an intermediate position, while the institutions of the social sector (welfare, health care, education, and the associated administrative regulations) occupy the causal position. In Quebec, it is government policy and changes in micro-social relations that are primary causes. 18

Introduction

In both models, social consensus appears as a very strong exogeneous element, but with different relations to other trends in each case. The authors of this chapter conclude, Classic comparative analysts of social change discover, with some embarrassment, a mixture of convergence and divergence in the processes that they study. We see here the reason for this embarrassment. Any major divergence among industrial societies is rare and any absolute convergence among them is still more rare. More commonly, the differences conceal resemblances or what comes to the same thing - a similarity of divergence. That is what we call singularity. It is not possible to understand the phenomenon unless we relocate in a systematic way each of the elements that make up an infrastructure and identify the differences inherent in their similarities. One purpose of comparative structural analysis is precisely to permit the description of this type of singularity.

A COMMON DESTINY?

The concept of singularity helps us to visualize more clearly the subtle balance between convergence and divergence. It also provides a tentative answer to the large question that underlies our concern with this balance: Do these societies face a common destiny? The answer is yes with respect to trends so strong that they act as exogenous variables, and no with respect to the responses those trends elicit in the context of a particular society. Consider, for example, two of the strongest trends discussed in this volume: the decline of fertility and the increasing proportion of births out of wedlock. As we saw earlier, fertility declined dramatically in all four of our societies between 1960 and 1990. The same set of causal factors can be identified in each setting: improved contraceptive procedures; the entry of married women into the labour force; the equalization of gender roles; the legitimation of consensual unions; the shift from blue-collar to white-collar work, which facilitated the employment of women; the emergence of a feminist movement, which encouraged the employment of women; the development of an ideology of gender equality that, when enacted into law, facilitated the equalization of gender roles in the workplace and undermined traditional gender roles in the family; the postponement of marriage, facilitated by the legitimation of consensual unions; the increase of divorce and illegitimacy, facilitated by the increased employment of women; and the increased incidence of abortion and sterilization, stimulated by all of the foregoing. There is no way that we can unbundle these factors and assign a relative weight to each one. Nor can we assess the relative influence of mutually reinforcing factors and prove, for instance, that the development of feminist ideologies was more responsible for the increased employment of women than vice versa. We know that each of these factors was present and, indeed, highly visible in all four of our societies, but there is abundant 19

Convergence or Divergence

evidence that their interactions were not identical from one society to another. There is much more singularity in the pattern of causation than in the list of causal factors. Singularity becomes even more evident when we examine the direct consequences of fertility decline. In France and the United States, present fertility rates are close enough to the replacement level that, together with the bulges in the population pyramid created by the baby boom and moderate immigration, they predict a stable or slightly growing population for the immediately foreseeable future and a fairly stable ratio between the population of working age and their dependents at both ends of the age scale. Germany and Quebec, with lower fertility rates and less favourable age distributions, are faced with an imminent shrinkage of their native populations and the prospect of an uncomfortable surplus of dependents. Making up the demographic deficit by immigration would not be an easy solution in either case, given the ethnic basis of their national identities. Population problems loom much larger for Germany and Quebec than for France or the United States, and the responses of these societies can be counted on to accentuate singularity. Another example is the related trend of a rising proportion of births out of wedlock. Here too, the trends in the four societies are parallel, but numerical differences, combined with differences in context, lead to non-parallel consequences. Among Germans and among white Americans, this proportion, although it sharply increased in the past decade, remains under 10%, and many births out of wedlock are followed by the marriage of the parents. The traditional pattern of the conjugal family, with all of its cultural baggage, is still essentially intact. In France and Quebec, where more than a third of the women who give birth are unmarried, and among black Americans, where the ratio is twice as high as that, single-parent families and consensual unions seem to be displacing the traditional family pattern, thereby transforming the fabric of everyday life. In sum, the massive convergence of trends that we observe in these four societies does not imply that they face uniform futures. However, their differences are inextricably linked to what they have in common, and, as the following pages demonstrate, the cross-national analysis of recent social trends helps us to assess both convergence and divergence and to identify emergent singularities.

20

References Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGi 11 -Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag.

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2 Is There a Single Pattern of Social Evolution ? Yannick LEMEL John MODELL

Even a casual examination of the four national volumes so far prepared by members of the Group for the Comparative Charting of Social Change suggests that between 1960 and 1990 there has been much in common in the patterns of social change in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the United States. This is what one would have expected at the outset. But - in part because the trends are treated in essays rather than mere assemblages of data, and these do not follow exactly the same form from society to society, nor draw upon identical data - a first glance does not reveal much about the extent or structure of differences in social change in the four societies. We propose in this essay to evaluate more precisely the over-all similarity in evolution of the four societies, and to discern the degree of difference that this similarity conceals. We will then attempt to identify any patterns that are visible within these differences, both in the ways in which the societies' social change has differed, and in the focus, from society to society, in such difference. Such an analysis inevitably leads to questions both about the evolution of the four societies and about how this evolution has been described.

23

Convergence or Divergence

SYSTEMATIC AND CONTEXTUAL COMPARISON

In contrast to the other comparative essays in this volume, ours is concerned with the totality of social change and with societies as entities, rather than with any particular domain of social change. Our focus is upon the whole; subsystems are considered here only insofar as they can be understood as components of or deviations from the general course of social evolution. Our global approach will be evident in the way we treat national "context." In most of the comparative investigations reported in this volume, much of the concern is with understanding cultural distinctiveness, institutional idiosyncrasies, differing histories; the goal of these comparisons is to explain, by such contextual means, the differences in social change that have been empirically observed in the trend reports. We believe it neither practical nor theoretically sound, given our own goal in this essay, to proceed in this fashion; we seek instead to compare the structure of social change, in attempt to understand systematic change in its own terms. We also contrast our approach to that of the ongoing work of Forse and Langlois, comparing France and Quebec. They are examining the structures of social evolution within these two societies, using the empirical methodology developed by Forse. They are thus comparing considerably more intricate intra-society patterns than we are. In the first instance, we are merely counting trends and their similarities. Only then, and then only a posteriori and speculatively, do we venture any discussion of structures beyond those provided by the Louis Dirn trends themselves. It will be interesting to see whether our speculations on the structural level are consistent with the findings of Forse and Langlois, and to see if the general sense we have of the degree of shared social evolution is also reflected in their work. METHODOLOGY

In the initial stage of our analysis, we created a large table, consisting of as many columns as there are societies for which trend reports have been compiled (we deal with the first four here). There are at least two rows per trend: the trend in one direction, and its opposite; some trends have more than two rows, because upon inspection they can be divided into more than one elementary trend. In other words, each society is "coded" separately on two binary possibilities for any given elementary trend: "yes" or "no" for change in a positive direction, and "yes" or "no" for a change in a negative direction. If everything had evolved the same way in the four societies, our table would include a minimum of trends. Of course, things are much more complicated, despite the very considerable simplification we introduced by coding all trends as either reflected or not reflected in a given society, as though a trend were a straightforward, simple entity, and not a complex historical pattern. 24

A Single Pattern?

In Appendix 2, we present the table with which we worked, which we have condensed by excluding the considerable majority of logically entailed contrary trends that were in fact absent in all four nations. Let us look at a single example: the third line of the table, which corresponds to elementary trend 2.2, "Kinship grows in its significance to social ties." This perhaps surprising trend was observed in France and in West Germany, as judged by a reading of their respective trend reports. Each national team was, in effect, asked to consider, in preparing its trend report, size, spatial distribution, frequency of contact and rituals, and network support, as well as other matters that might be deemed pertinent to the general issue of trends in kinship. The French and West German reports indicate that the role of kinship had in fact grown over the 1960-90 period. Thus, the "elementary trend" that we analyze represents a fairly high-order generalization: we take up this point later on. On the other hand, Quebec showed a contrary pattern - a turning away from kinship as an organizing principle for social life, and the United States report indicated neither growth nor decline, but stability. Accordingly, the third line in our table indicates "+" in the France and Germany columns, and "o" in the Quebec and U.S. columns; the fourth line indicates "+" in the Quebec column and "0" in the France, Germany, and U.S. columns. These and the other coded elementary trends constitute the body of the table upon which we report here. As mentioned above, we are not comparing numbers or discrete statistical series. In fact, several of the four constituent sub-trends in kinship that the national teams sought to discern as they did their initial investigation were themselves composites. Even if a single indicator of the size of kinship networks could be compared over time from society to society (and it cannot, mainly due to problems of data availability; although even if data were plentiful, we would surely have arguments about what constitutes the proper comparable definition of kinship network across societies), there simply could not be a single indicator of "network support." Therefore, we are comparing high-level generalizations, derived from the systematic reading of systematically, but not identically, constructed essays, composed by different individuals from different societies. Our systematic reading of the essays followed a uniform, agreed-upon technique. Each author read about half the trends - one reader per set of four nations - upon which we base the present report. We accepted our readings as comparable only after separately reading and coding a smaller identical set and discovering no great divergence. We read in three stages. The first was to extract from each national essay the substantial sub-trends reported on (whether the trend was up, down, or level). The second involved collating what had been observed in the first stage: at this point, we had to judge where two or more sub-trends within a national report should be collapsed, and whether a sub-trend in a given society should be considered

25

Convergence or Divergence

to be equivalent to that in another, even though component indicators were likely to be somewhat different. At the conclusion of this stage, we had for each trend a table, with a modest number (perhaps between four and ten) of sub-trends as rows, and the four societies as columns. With this table in hand we carried out the third stage, which involved making one, two, or more "elementary trends" out of the rows within each trend, and judging whether each of the four societies should be coded "+" or "o" on the elementary trend and on its converse. We do not maintain that our procedure entirely prevented "coder effects," which probably would tend toward finding more similarity rather than less, particularly in the third stage. But we have sought to control our subjectivity as much as possible, consistent with the decision to compare broad, nonqualified themes rather than statistical series. The latter constitutes a more severe discipline, to be sure, but immediately loses the CCSC structure that underlies our substantive concern with change in a system. By design, the level of the trend is very broad. One would anticipate that broad, convergent trends of social change would appear especially often at this level, but that, looked at even slightly more closely, many more differences would emerge. That is, the more closely we look, the closer our comparison comes to a series of single-society expositions, each stressing the distinctive qualities of the respective society. And that is just what we are doing here. As anticipated, there was much less agreement at a detailed level than at a more agregated one.1 TWO STYLES OF TREND REPORTS: SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS AND SOCIAL INDICATORS

Our chapter is based on four societies. Specifically, it is based on the work of four national "teams," and to the extent that these teams differed from one another in their procedures, we see get a distorted view of the differences between societies. We, do not mean that any of the participants was less, or even differently, competent from the others; nor do we mean that nationalism or any other sentiment distorted the reports we read. But we share a sense that there were distinct "team styles" that must be kept in mind as we analyze the trend reports that the four teams have put together.

1 We selected a subset of trends, one from each series of trends that we have discussed above, for closer examination. They were chosen from the list of elementary trends for which there was perfect agreement among the four societies, so that we could explore the extent of difference-within-similarity of social change. Here, we coded each of the "second-stage" sub-trends from which we generalized to the trend level itself. These sub-trends rest upon and amount to generalizations of our brief characterization of each change noted in each national report within all of the trends that we coded.

26

A Single Pattern?

Two distinct, and in a sense opposed, tendencies can be discerned in the work of the four national teams.2 On the one hand, there is what we might call the "sociological essay" style, in which the various indicators that have been assembled are drawn together in such a way that global patterns can be discerned, providing summaries characterizing the domain as a whole. In extreme cases, the data serve as much to illustrate a generalization as to establish it empirically. On the other hand, there is the "social indicators" style, in which the texts are expositions of the quantitative series presented, which are generalized only reluctantly. In effect, the "sociological essay" style is designed to describe each trend, while in the "social indicators" style, the trend is used to organize a number of discrete indicators that are understood to exist in their own right and, less obviously, to interrelate to the others. Each style has its own advantages. The sociological essay is obviously more engaging to read and, in the context of cross-societal comparison, its tendency to make high-level generalizations makes high-level comparison (such as we carry out in this essay) relatively simple, in part by smoothing over internal contradictions and omissions in the data. But, in a more detailed comparison, the essay style leaves much to be desired. The social- indicators style makes detailed comparisons, offering a degree of certainty, but makes generalization correspondingly difficult, since there is less guidance in the essay itself. The team styles we have noticed are surely the product of the different scholarly tendencies brought by the members of the national teams to their task at the outset, and of the somewhat different interpretations they made of the common protocol set out by the CCSC at its first plenary meeting. The French team had already carried out a systematic, synthetic study of social change in France, and the West German group had been engaged in a variety of investigations, essentially in the social-indicators mode. It is no accident that the French team's reports most nearly fit the model of the sociological essay while the German reports more often resemble the social-indicators model. The Quebec team more nearly approached the German one in style, as it was composed of quantitatively inclined sociologists, who were engaged in a broad-gauged study of Quebec culture. The American team includes sociologists of somewhat differing methodological preferences and even a quantitatively inclined historian. Their reports vary, but on the whole fit are more in the sociological-essay style than are those of the Quebec team. We must also underscore the fact that the statistical systems of the four societies differ a great deal. France is by far the poorest in available quantitative time 2

Whereas, almost as often as not, all four societies shared trends, more sub-trends were recorded in only one society than were recorded in two societies, more in two than in three, and more in three than in four. Ignoring for the moment the above-mentioned difficulty in being sure that all sub-trends were actually searched for in the data gathered for each society, this raises the interesting question of the ontological significance of common trends based on sub-trends that are not exactly shared.

27

Convergence or Divergence

series, especially because privately produced survey data are very rare there, leaving sociologists to depend upon administrative data. As well, time series tend to be quite brief, where they exist at all. Thus, the essay style is perhaps as much a necessity in France as it is a preferred approach. In a primitive effort to assess the extent of "style" difference, we have simply counted the number of "+" entries in our overview table, which match perfectly the style differences; this is exactly what we would expect. France has 56 "+" entries, the U.S. 54, Quebec 50, and Germany 48. This may be because part of the reason for the social-indicators approach (in comparative studies) is to promote conservatism in claiming knowledge. Since to assert a trend implies a claim of knowledge, the pattern of team styles implies that the French team will assert trends more readily than will, at the other extreme, the German team. At the same time, we must note how small is the difference in number of positive trends cited in the sample of national reports: some 15% between the relatively expansive French and the detail-minded Germans. We feel that the strength of the story our analysis allows us to tell outweighs a difference this small, but we will continue our concern for differences in team style as we pursue our analysis. HOW COMMON AN EVOLUTION?

Of the 78 trends that have been charted by the four national teams whose work we draw upon in this chapter (listed in Appendix 1), we have examined an informal quota sample of some 45, after deciding to omit from consideration topics that are essentially contextual to the others (series 0) and those simply and directly reflecting opinions, attitudes, and values (series 17). From each of the remaining 16 series, we were careful to select at least one or, more usually, two of the trends that provided a number and a breadth of representation sufficient to represent the entire panorama. Of the resulting 45 trends for which we studied the final national trend reports, some contained ambiguous material in one or more national reports, and others were so substantially different in concept that no true comparison was possible. In the end, we compared 43 of the CCSC trends. In some of these, comparison was facilitated if we subdivided the general trend into two or more sub-trends and compared the national "score" for each of these. In all, then, we compared 70 dimensions, for most of which all four societies were scored. These comparisons and the value coded for each of the four societies are listed in Appendix 2. Please note that we ordinarily shy away from reporting statistical results below, electing instead to use language that suggests quantity only in an approximate fashion. We do so because our variables - the sub-trends or elementary trends - are conceptual notions, and not themselves aspects of the empirical world. However

28

A Single Pattern?

empirical they may be,3 they are not exactly equivalent to one another. Some are broad summary aspects of entire behavioural realms (e.g., "Tertiary sector and especially services grow") while others are far narrower ("Computerization of work"). If all, or almost all, are in some sense important in France, by virtue of the process that resulted in their entry into our analytic schema, we cannot simply presume the same importance in the other societies. That is, some are simply much more substantial from a comparative analytic point of view than are others, and it would falsify this fact to present exact figures and thus weight each trend equally. Thus it would make little sense to report the exact proportion of the sample of trends we have analyzed here that are common to all four societies, and we usually have not done so. Toward the conclusion of our essay, we abandon this restraint, employing more precise statistical discussion to move toward substantive speculation, but we bound this discussion with numerous cautionary statements.4 Over all, there can be no doubt that we are looking at highly parallel social trends. In the sample of trends examined across the four societies, they showed identical patterns somewhat more often than there was even one divergent trend among the four. In cases in which divergence was apparent, more often than not only one society differed from the pattern demonstrated across the other three, although, in a fairly sizeable minority, pairs of societies showed divergent trends. As a first approximation, then, we maintain that there was indeed a dominant pattern of social change since 1960 across the four societies on two continents. This change contained elements of the now-classical (and much-criticized) notion of "modernization"; however, there were slightly patterned tendencies across the four societies that diverged from what we usually understand as modernization. Table 1 reproduces the set of CCSC trends within which our reading indicated essential similarity across the four societies. The list is long and varied. Age structures and aspects of family structure obviously reflect a common evolution among the four societies, as do a large number of dimensions involving the fitting of workers to work, which is itself seen as in many ways moving in common patterns across the four societies. There are clearly common developments in the institutional

3

On this point see Lemel and Modell, "Introduction," in Caplow et al. (1991, 1-4).

4

Similarly, we have chosen not to carry out a formal factor analysis, although in theory this or a like procedure would allow us to discern any latent structure underlying the divergences from co-evolution in our data. We do so because we have at present only four data points. While it is appealing to think of constructing "factor scores" for such latent structures as might emerge from empirical factor analysis (and our statistical software would readily allow us to perform the exercise), we prefer the more modest formulation of searching for, and characterizing, the single and paired divergences from the common pattern for each of the four societies. With these noted, appropriate attention can be paid to the implications for generalizations about social change in the post-industrial world.

29

Convergence or Divergence

Table 1 Trends Examined that Are Entirely Similar in All Four Societies 1.1 1.2 3.2 *3.3 3.5 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.3 6.2 8.1 8.41 9.1 10.1 11.5 14.1 14.2 14.3 15.3 16.3 16.4

Youth Elders Childbearing Matrimonial Models Reproductive Technologies -Sectors of the Labour Force Computerization of Work Work Organization Sizes and Types of Enterprises Social Mobility Educational System The State Labour Unions Dispute Settlement Religious Beliefs Amount and Use of Free Time Vacation Patterns Athletics and Sports Continuing Education Emotional Disorders and Self-Destructive Behaviours Poverty

realm as well, involving the state and some of the most critical ways with which it addresses the citizenry: education, the legal system, and dispute settlement in general. Also very prominent in this list are aspects of the self-chosen personal life of adults, for better or for worse. We can see the similarity in change across the four societies even better by comparing the above table with a similar one listing realms in which there was anything other than complete agreement across the societies.5

5 30

Except for the absence of a codeable description for one or more society. The clear absence of a trend, or offsetting sub-trends, are treated as codeable here; if divergent from the other societies, the trend is placed in table 2, rather than in table 1.

A Single Pattern?

Three broad sets of trends show some disagreement that are absent from the dimensions detailed in table 1. (In addition, although a substantial number of personal practices are emerging similarly in all the societies, some are not, as indicated in table 2.) 1. The most obvious is stratification. Patterns of inequality are seemingly not changing in identical fashion across the four societies. (It will be noted that in table 1, trends related to work are more closely linked to the technical aspects of work, and less to the social-structural aspects, than those shown in table 2.) 2. A second realm might be called "mobilization" - the set of institutions and beliefs that link daily activities of citizens to that of the society at large. In table 2, we see that there are disparate trends in the way politics is conducted, the way citizens look at social institutions, and the way authority and normative behaviours are changing. 3. The clustering of trends in table 2 suggests that, in contrast to the relatively uniform evolution of social patterns on the society-wide level, there is a greater degree of divergence in the way that local social patterns - kinship, community and neighbourhood, daily mobility, local autonomy, and crime and punishment - have developed in the four societies. BASIC SOCIAL STRUCTURES AND FORMS OF ENACTMENT OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS

A simple way to understand the areas of similarity and difference in the evolution of the four societies is to examine the degree to which the elementary trends in which we see differences are concentrated in certain broad domains rather than in others. This exercise requires us to hold, somewhat naively, to the letter of the results, treating all differences as conclusive while ignoring nuance, and accepting the way the CCSC scheme organizes trends into larger realms as adequate to our purposes. Particular analytic restraint is appropriate to the realms in parentheses, in view of the sample of underlying trends on which they are based. Having stated these concerns, we discover perfect similarity in trends in the following realms. 1 Age groups 3 Women 4 Labour market (5 Labour and management) In contrast, divergences were particularly marked in the following realms: 2 Microsocial 13 Life style (16 Integration and marginalization)

31

Convergence or Divergence

Table 2 Trends Examined in which There Are Differences among the Four Societies 2.2 2.3 2.4 4.2 6.1 6.4 7.1 7.3 7.4 8.2 9.3 9.4 10.2 10.4 11.1 11.2 12.1 13.1 13.3 13.5 15.1 16.2

Kinship Networks Community and Neighbourhood Types Local Autonomy Skills and Occupational Levels Occupational Status Social Inequality Conflict Norms of Conduct Authority Health System The Military Political Parties Institutionalization of Labour Unions Interest Groups Political Differentiation Confidence in Institutions Personal and Family Income Market Goods and Services Personal Health and Beauty Practices Daily Mobility General Education Crime and Punishment

Slightly less marked but nevertheless noteworthy for their divergence are: 6 Social stratification 7 Social relations 8 State and service institutions 10 Institutionalization of social forces 11 Ideologies and beliefs Comparison of the three domains among which we see an overwhelming similarity among all four societies is suggestive: "age groups" and "women" call to mind underlying anthropological structures. The presence in this list of "labour market" next to "women" is the result of a substantive tie between the two. In France and the United States, for example, and presumably in West Germany, Quebec, and 32

A Single Pattern?

other societies as well, the evolutions of women's roles and the organization of work are mutually influential counterparts. On the other hand, convergence among intra-society trends is the weakest where the trends deal most directly with the operations of specifically political power; "state and service institutions" is obviously one of these. "Institutionalization of social forces" and "microsocial" may be viewed a bit less directly as different ways of recognizing the social effects of the political realm. The presence in the list of divergent trends of "ideologies" is likewise suggestive of the meaning of the list as a whole. Less obviously relevant a priori is "life style" - essentially a matter of modes of consumption, health, and mobility. Between these two extremes of convergence and divergence, the systems of social stratification - education, social hierarchies, family resources - have on the whole moved toward similarity, but have not entirely converged. We may say that trends in the basic social structures - social hierarchies, anthropological structures, and major institutions - have been more similar from one society to another than have the forms of enactment of social relations. There is a considerable degree of co-evolution, but there are many exceptions. We now address this question from the point of view of the societies, rather than from that of the trends, and examine whether there are particular pairs of societies that are evolving "more similarly" than other pairs. OVERALL DEGREE OF SIMILARITY

In the list of elementary trends for which four-fold comparisons are possible, about six in ten revealed similar trends in all four societies. Are we to consider this percentage low or high? We lack a fully appropriate criterion that might enable us to answer this question with certainty. International comparisons rarely seek the breadth of our study; moreover, they typically compare one society against a set of others, rather than seeking to describe difference and similarity in a global sense. Their purpose is to understand how a particular model functions, and each society represents a case study. Attention is thus directed immediately to the differences among societies rather than to their similarities. Our concern, being broader, favours neither similarity nor difference. We may gain some sense of how similar the overall concurrence actually is by using a classic probabilistic approach. If any given trend is equally probably increasing or decreasing in any given nation, and trends in different societies are independent of one another, the likelihood of total agreement on any given trend is 12.5% - very considerably less than 60%. In a statistical sense, with as many trends as we have examined, such a difference could hardly occur by chance alone. A less classically statistical approach would compare the 60% to subjective probabilities 33

Convergence or Divergence

before new data were gathered and arrayed. Recall of such prior assumptions is difficult, but our sense is that our eagerness to undertake international comparison was based on a sense of national systems being considerably different, and of the interrelations of given trends within a given national system likewise being rather loosely coupled: taking these together, we doubt that our prior assumptions would have held that even half the four-society comparisons would be wholly congruent. And, given the large number of trends we are comparing, this indicates that something more or less "real" is at work. But at the same time, 60% certainly diverges a great deal from the notion of unilinear "modernization," and in a direction that suggests that the process - if it is a unitary process - is less unilinear than the imagery might suggest! Without claiming perfect analogy, we can make comparison to an old study by Murdock - although his purpose was to compare the United States with a variety of other societies - that deals with some thirty cultural items. Within this data set, inter-society agreement was about 30% among non-Western societies and about 60% among Western societies. The coincidental recording of 60% must not be taken too seriously, for Murdock was counting traits, whereas we are describing trends. Nevertheless, Murdock describes a single-society-to-single-society agreement rate, and (assuming independence) the rate he found would imply about a two-in-ten rate of total agreement in four societies, far below the six-in-ten rate of total trend similarity that we observe among our four societies. HOW ALIKE IS THE CHANGE IN EACH SOCIETY?

Keeping in mind all the cautions we have made about the significance of the materials we present when treated in strictly quantitative fashion, we offer the following measure of "proximity" among societies, measured in terms of shared trends, excluding trends that are shared by all four societies under study: France-West Germany 22 France-Quebec 25 France-U.S. 21 Quebec-West Germany 19 Quebec-U.S. 24 West Germany-U.S. 13 A simple inspection of the extent of divergence in general trends between particular pairs of societies gives us our first clue. We find, in essence, that one of the four societies - West Germany - differs more from each of the other three than they do from one another. Upon closer examination, we find that the maximal extent of divergence, by far (remembering, of course, that this is within a basically common pattern across all of the societies), is between West Germany and the United States: 34

A Single Pattern?

the number of divergences is more than double that between any other pair of societies. Conversely, France is less divergent from West Germany than are the other two societies, and shares an especially close parallel in social change with both Quebec and the U.S., which are quite similar in this domain. A European pole may perhaps be opposed, in view of these results, to a North American pole, inasmuch as the pattern of trends in Germany is relatively close to that in France, and relatively distant from those in Quebec and the United States, in terms of shared trends; while Quebec and the U.S. share more trends in common than either does with West Germany.6 The distinction between the two poles, that is, depends upon the argument that the evolution of West Germany was relatively different from that of Quebec and the United States, and relatively similar to that of France. France, in this view, lies at the quite considerable juncture of the two poles, sharing much with both the distinctively "German" direction of the European pole and the distinctively "Quebecois" thrust to the North American pole. We remind readers, once again, that the modest differences that we are making much of here are swamped (in a statistical sense) by the similarities mentioned above and here eliminated from the table, and that, with a "sample" of four societies, our typological designation of "European" and "North American" poles of development is at best a hypothesis to be examined in the light of further comparative data from more societies, rather than a conclusion grounded in any theoretically derived sense of why social evolution should differ (even in degree) along this geographical dimension. The correspondence of France with West Germany points to a model that suggests that the transformation in those societies is in a sense the most perfect. In 6

We have already noted that the German team used methodology that was most tightly bound to strict criteria for quantitative trend measurement, and so, over all, found fewer trends; and we saw that France found the most trends, and had the most easy-going attitude toward quantitative evidence. Now, as we look for substantive convergence among the societies, we find that West Germany is the most divergent nation, and France the most central. Does this finding perhaps reflect that the German researchers more often refused to assert a trend where their French colleagues, for example, would have found one? We can find an answer to this question by establishing whether Germany's disagreements at least sometimes came where distinctive trends were positively asserted there. Of the eight distinctive trends (which are not merely the simple obverse of positive trends) in which Germany's results differ from those in the other three societies, only one is an instance in which the trend is visible in Germany and not elsewhere. In contrast, three of the four trends in which the French scholars' trend report contrasts with that in the other three societies are instances in which the change is reported to have occurred in France and not elsewhere. In the American case, where the researchers, whose team style placed them as close to the French approach as to the German, had eight divergent trends of which only one was positive, all others being otherwise shared patterns not visible in the U.S. Given the general predominance of positives among the trends studied, we cannot conclusively reject the possibility that our "divergence" measure is factitious, but nor can we assert it as a probable finding. The best procedure, we believe, will be to see whether the patterns of divergence taken over all indicate that measured social change in the four societies differ in a coherent way, or whether their differences seem scattered and not suggestive of other than idiosyncratic differences, possibly of measurement or interpretation

35

Convergence or Divergence

them, we have the most thorough backing away from certain trends that we identify as characteristic of classic industrialization. Most striking among these is the muting of class conflict; as well, there are the growth (perhaps a revival of considerably older patterns) of kinship as a focal point of socialization and the revival of inner cities as the residential location of choice of highly prosperous, trendy young people, whose family patterns and life style are not "bourgeois" in the older sense of the term. These social arrangements, it should be added, fit with a decline in the centrality of manufacturing (and the industrial relations that characterize it) in the economy, and a corresponding rise, especially pronounced in France and West Germany, of managers and officials in the labour force. Let us look at the distinctive German patterns directly.7 Several of the divergent trends occurred in what may on the surface be seen as arguably epiphenomenal dimensions: differences in health-care trends, leisure-time use, and daily mobility patterns. On the other hand, a cluster of aspects suggest that Germany may have undergone political change in the past three decades that is at least somewhat different from the other three societies, suggesting a difference in the way democracy has manifested itself there, with two interlocking dimensions. First, unlike the other three societies, the identification of citizen and government, especially through partisan-political participation, seems to have changed less in West Germany - to have remained, in a sense, closer to the model institutionalized in the decade following the conclusion of the Second World War. A disillusionment (expressed somewhat variously from society to society) with political rules, political institutions, and traditional electoral politics has characterized the three turbulent decades in France, Quebec, and the United States. These trends are not reported for West Germany. Moreover, the seemingly intractable, although changing, problem of poverty that has dogged transformations in the other three societies seems less present in West Germany. Nor has the state much enlarged its role in public administration as it has elsewhere. In a certain sense, then, we can speculate that although West Germany has for the most part undergone the same general transformation as have the other societies, the relatively smooth economic path it has enjoyed over the same period has removed some of the more glaring irritants that have brought the political apparatus - of both state and party - into question in the other societies. The other relatively "different" nation among the four is the United States. As in West Germany, an area of transition seems not to have occurred there as elsewhere. In this case, it seems that the class system (which was arguably never as

7

36

At the sub-trend level, too, the Germans list fewer positive aspects of change than do the other societies. This is because, although the Germans were as likely as any of the others to be joined with two or three other societies in reporting a sub-trend, they rarely exhibited sub-trends that were idiosyncratic or shared with only one society.

A Single Pattern?

strongly expressed as it was in our other societies) that changed less rapidly between 1960 and 1990. Institutions of formal education were nearly as widespread, and about as open to the socially mobile, in 1960 as in 1990; in the other three societies, advanced education has become more widespread over the period, and more egalitarian in its distribution. Class conflict - muted, as ever - remains in the U.S., and labour unions remain as conflict groups (albeit much weakened), rather than having their central functions institutionalized in nonconflictual arrangements. In a nation in which confidence in many major social institutions has declined, business continues to be held in considerable esteem. To the extent, then, that a major dimension of the shared transformation of the past 30 years conforms to the French team's conclusion for France, that class animated politics and culture in the first half of the twentieth century in a way that it no longer does, the United States is an exception. (Whether the other three societies have caught up to or surpassed the U.S. in this regard is another question.) The few French divergences have to do with lessened income inequality and with the increase in ethnic-group conflict, with immigration replacing class as a basis for social tension. Quebec's divergences also seem idiosyncratic rather than reflecting an overall difference in the evolving system. In Quebec, alone among the four societies, kinship has declined (from an unusually high level) in its significance as a basis for social life, conforming to classic social theory, but contrasting with patterns in the other three societies. An obvious explanation here is that Quebec in 1960 was the only society of the four under study that was really "traditional," in the classic sense of that term as applied to kinship patterns. It has become less so. In analogous fashion, but once again idiosyncratic as regards social change, Quebec has undergone government centralization over the past 30 years, in contrast to the other societies. But, of course, Quebec is one government among many in a national federation, and has developed a stronger "central" government at the provincial level, as other of our societies have also at the sub-national level. All in all, the divergences, as rare and limited in their scope as they are, suggest limited, but in some ways patterned, national variants, very much within the general pattern of transformation outlined above. Historical circumstances emerging from the first half of the century and the Second World War - Germany's unique economic "miracle," the characteristically muted expression of class differences in the U.S., Quebec's virtual colonial status even into the period under study - have produced elements that are distinctive to each of the societies. But the number of patterns they share, the social change they have undergone together, is much more substantial. In sum, at least in the four societies under study here, while there are reasonably coherent aspects in which pairs of societies change in concert and in contrast to the other two, these aspects are scattered. Each society has some unique correspondences with each of the others: the closest the data come to suggesting a strong divergent 37

Convergence or Divergence

model is in the area of social stratification, where France and West Germany, societies in which social class was historically more prominent in structuring inequality than in the two North American societies (in which ethnic differences were more prominent), have shown more distinctive shared trends related to the lessening of this traditional element of social structure. But the Franco-German "model" may not really represent a distinctive pattern of change so much as the common effacing (or, at least, weakening) of formerly distinctive patterns, so that the two societies now have more nearly converged with the North American pair than had been the case before 1960. To conclude, we believe that a fair account of variation within commonality has emerged from the CCSC scheme and the empirical essays of the national teams. More detailed work can be undertaken, and latent patterns of variation from pattern may be discovered by Forse and Langlois. A more causal trans-national analysis can be attempted, examining more closely the timing of change, that would enable us to begin to discern patterns of mutual influence from nation to nation.8 As well, more fully contextualized and closer focus on single trends or groups of trends could provide the basis for inter-society comparison: indeed, this approach lies at the heart of most essays in the present volume, and it is in counterpoint to them that we offer this global overview. References Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, J960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag.

8

38

Our colleague Matthias Bos has proposed that CCSC work along these lines.

A Single Pattern?

Appendix 1 List of CCSC Trends, with Those Employed in the Data Set Underlying this Essay in Boldface 0.

1. 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Context 0.1 Demographic Trends 0.2 Macro-Economic Trends 0.3 Macro-Technological Trends Age Groups 1.1 Youth 1.2 Elders Microsocial 2.1 Self-identification 2.2 Kinship Networks 2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types 2.4 Local Autonomy 2.5 Voluntary Associations 2.6 Sociability Networks Women 3.1 Female Roles 3.2 Childbearing 3.3 Matrimonial Models 3.4 Women's Employment 3.5 Reproductive Technologies Labour Market 4.1 Unemployment 4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels 4.3 Types of Employment 4.4 Sectors of the Labour Force 4.5 Computerization of Work Labour and Management 5.1 Work Organization 5.2 Personnel Administration 5.3 Size and Types of Enterprises Social Stratification 6.1 Occupational Status 6.2 Social Mobility 6.3 Economic Inequality 6.4 Social Inequality Social Relations 7.1 Conflict 7.2 Negotiation 7.3 Norms of Conduct 7.4 Authority 7.5 Public Opinion State and Service Institutions 8.1 Educational System

39

Convergence or Divergence

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

40

8.2 Health System 8.3 Welfare System 8.4 The State Mobilizing Institutions 9.1 Labour Unions 9.2 Religious Institutions 9.3 The Military 9.4 Political Parties 9.5 Mass Media Institutionalization of Social Forces 10.1 Dispute Settlement 10.2 Institutionalization of Labour Unions 10.3 Social Movements 10.4 Interest Groups Ideologies and Beliefs 11.1 Political Differentiation 11.2 Confidence in Institutions 11.3 Economic Orientations 11.4 Radicalism 11.5 Religious Beliefs Household Resources 12.1 Personal and Family Income 12.2 Informal Economy 12.3 Personal and Family Wealth Life Style 13.1 Market Goods and Services 13.2 Mass Information 13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices 13.4 Time Use 13.5 Daily Mobility 13.6 Household Production 13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression 13.8 Mood-Altering Substances Leisure 14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time 14.2 Vacation Patterns 14.3 Athletics and Sports 14.4 Cultural Activities and Practices Educational Attainment 15.1 General Education 15.2 Vocational Education 15.3 Continuing Education Integration and Marginalization 16.1 Immigrants and Ethnic Groups 16.2 Crime and Punishment 16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-Destructive Behaviours 16.4 Poverty

A Single Pattern?

17.

Attitudes and Values 17.1 Satisfaction 17.2 Perceptions of Social Problems 17.3 Orientations to the Future 17.4 Values 17.5 National Identity

Appendix II Trends Compared in This Chapter, with Coding for France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S.

F G

1.1 1.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.5 4.2 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.3 6.1 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 7.1 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.4 7.4

A new transitional phase between school and work Elders becomes more important in society Kinship grows in its significance to social ties Kinship declines in its significance to social ties Centralization declines in largest cities "Gentrification" of inner cities Centralization of political authority at national level Decentralized national political authority Fertility is reduced Marriage and childbearing are disassociated Weakening of "bourgeois" marriage model Reproduction becomes voluntary Formal manpower training grows Tertiary sector and especially services grow Computerization of work New industrial-management schemes replace Taylorism New, smaller or less centralized firms Reduced self-employment; more white-, fewer blue-collar More officials and managers Intergenerational mobility increases, because occupation redistributed Inequality among women increases Income inequality diminishes More equal access to educational opportunity Age-based inequalities grow, benefiting older citizens Class is a less salient category, especially "worker" Reduced conflict, increasingly institutionalized Growth of legal and paralegal conflict settlement More tolerance of divergent opinions and behaviours Tolerance of sexual matters increases Ethnic-group tolerance increases Devolution of centralized authority structures State of authority relations is unsettled

+ + + o + + o

+

+ + + + + + + + + +

+

+ + + o +

Q

+ + + + o o

+

0

+ + + o o o + 0 o o + + + + + + + + + + + + + o o + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + o 0

+ + + + o + + o o + 0 o + 0 + + + o + 0 + +

u

+

+ 0

+ 0 0

+ + + + + + + + + o

0

0

+ + + + 0 + o + + o

0

+

41

Convergence or Divergence

F G Q U

8.1 8.2 8.2 8.4 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.2 10.2 10.4 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.21 11.2 11.2 11.2 11.5 11.5 12.1 12.1 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.3 13.5 13.5 14.1 14.2 14.3 15.1 15.1 15.3 16.2 16.3 16.4

42

Extended education, often together with occasional work Increased production of health-care services More hospitals State more present in public administration Labour unions less important to the working class Stability of military numbers Loss of symbolic role of army Traditional left/right bipolarity weakens More new, specialized dispute-settlement mechanisms 'Labour-union apparatus treats more social needs Management includes labour in decision making Increasingly demanding interest groups New techniques of voter mobilization; party system weakens Less confidence in political institutions, politicians Less confidence in formal rules Less confidence in educational institutions Less confidence in business More confidence in business More confidence in the military Great national institutions lose symbolic significance Religious forms proliferate Religious forms decline With more income, household equipment increases Decline in differences in household income Increase in income brings change in consumption New ways of distinguishing life style by consumption More consumption of health care Development of alternative medical philosophies More daily mobility thanks to automobile Reduced gender differential in daily mobility Leisure time increases in amount and importance Growing amount of vacation time Sports are on upswing; many are democratized Growth in overall spread and extent of schooling Part-time university study increases Adult education incraeses Crime, even when not increasing, becomes focal issue Specific psychological discomforts, not anomie New forms of poverty arise, in spite of state efforts

+ + + + + + + + + + o + + o o 0 o 0 o + + o + + + + + + + + + + + + o + + + +

+ + 0 + + + o + + + o + o o + + o 0 o + + o o 0 + 0 + + + 0 + + + + o + + + o

+ + 0 + + + + + + + + + + + o 0 + 0 + o + + + 0 + 0 + + + 0 + + + + + + + + +

+ + 0 + + . . o + o o o + + o + o + . o + + + 0 + + + o o + + + + + + + + + +

3 Differing Levels of Low Fertility Gary CALDWELL Karin STIEHR John MODELL Salustiano DEL CAMPO

Our purpose in this chapter is not to explain fertility change, but to arrive at a better understanding of the societal context in which such change took place. Specifically, we want to situate fertility change within a number of transformations in the structure of women's lives in contemporary Euro-American society. Our goal is to use this contextual approach to move toward a typology of fertility behaviour in industrialized societies that can be plausibly related to other dimensions of social change in the same societies. The level of analysis is, then, macroscopic, and the nature of the discussion is inductive rather causal, the empirical perspective being provided by the comparative data (from five societies) and the time span involved (30 years). Although such an undertaking leads us to look relatively closely at changes in fertility and certain related contextual factors, we take note at the outset that even a cursory glance reveals that fertility behaviour is one realm in which a long-term trend, common to all five societies compared, obtains. However, although the prevailing direction of fertility change was an accelerated decline followed by a deceleration leading to a levelling off, there were noticeable differences in overall fertility levels, short-term variations (five-to-ten-year-period patterns), and differences in the times at which the phases of this over-all trend were realized. We want to determine whether similar observations regarding level, extent, and timing of changes 43

Convergence or Divergence

can be made with respect to the evolution of the contextual factors we have chosen to examine. Fertility, then, provides the Research Group on Comparative Charting of Social Change with a case of parallel social evolution, perhaps even with a baseline against which the degree of parallel evolution in other aspects of social change can be compared.1 Since no "historical necessity" can attach to a given trend - it is extremely unlikely that women in one society achieve the level of fertility of women in other societies by emulation alone - we will attempt to determine to what extent a common fertility trend is or is not associated with parallel trends in "contextual" factors in the five societies under study: France, West Germany, Quebec, Spain, and the United States. Consequently, the task we have set ourselves here will often lead us to emphasize modest differences rather than to re-emphasize a striking similarity in both the overall fertility trend and the contextual factors. We begin with an overview of the fertility-change pattern before invoking what we consider to be the relevant aspects of the immediate context in which fertility evolves: the contextual factors. OVERVIEW OF POSTWAR FERTILITY

The five societies differed greatly in the levels of fertility that prevailed in the early years of the postwar period.2 In the 1950s, "baby booms" that were by no means identical in degree (Lesthaeghe, 1988: 32) characterized all of the societies except Spain. But in the 1960s, each society, again with the exception of Spain - where the decline began much later in the late 1970s - underwent a precipitous fall in total fertility rate (TFR),3 near four to just above two at the end of the decade (table 1 and figure 1). After this decline of 50% in less than 15 years, a plateau developed at the approximate TFR level of 1.8 - 0.3 below the replacement level of 2.1 - in three of the societies (France, Quebec and the U.S.).

1

See the individual society trend reports available in the Comparative Charting of Social Change project. Data referred to here come from these reports and from a number of additional data series and survey data supplied by the authors and by J.-H. Dechaux of the French team.

2

Cf. the years 1950 to 1960 in table 1. Obviously, there are important regional differences whithin societies (northern and southern Spain, for instance) as well as racial differences (blacks and whites in the U.S.); however, in the CCSC project we have forsworn sub-societal analysis.

3

The TFR is a synthetic measure that represents the average number of children who would be born alive to a woman during her lifetime if during all her child-bearing years she were to conform to the age-specific fertility rates of the year in question.

44

Fertility

Table 1 Total Fertility Rate France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-1990

Year

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Note:

France

Germany

Quebec

U.S.

Spain

2,73 2,81 2,78 2,88 2,90 2,83 2,78 2,63 2,57 2,53 2,48 2,50 2,43 2,32 2,11 1,93 1,83 1,86 1,82 1,85 1,95 1,94 1,91 1,79 1,81 1,82 1,83 1,80 1,80 1,79 1,78

2,36 2,45 2,43 2,51 2,54 2,52 2,53 2,48 2,38 2,21 2,01 1,92

3,86 3,77 3,66 3,55 3,41 3,06 2,72 2,44 2,27 2,19 2,08 ,99 ,82 ,80 ,79 ,82 ,81 ,75 1,71 1,75 1,68 1,62 1,53 1,45 1,45 1,42 1,36 1,35 1,41 1,52 1,64

3,65 3,62 3,46 3,32 3,19 2,91 2,72 2,56 2,46 2,46 2,48 2,27 2,01 1,88 1,84 1,77 1,74 1,79 ,76 ,81 ,82 ,82 ,83 ,80 ,81 ,84 1,84 1,87 1,93 2,00 2,01

2,90 2,80 2,80 2,90 3,00 2,97 2,90 2,90 2,90 2,90 2,85 2,88 2,84 2,81 2,83 2,80 2,80 2,66 2,53 2,35 2,19 2,02 ,90 ,74 ,68 ,64 ,54 ,47 ,44 ,39 ,38

,71

,54 ,51 ,45 ,45 ,40 1,38 1,38 1,44 1,43 1,44 1,33 1,29 1,28 ,34 ,37 ,41 ,44 ,45

This table is the basis for figure 1. Similar tables - most of which are available in the respective trend reports - exist, but are not reproduced, for the other graphs presented here.

45

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 1 Total Fertility Rate France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

Figure 2 Age-Specific Fertility Rate: 20-24 France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

46

Fertility

West Germany and Spain, on the other hand, experienced a free fall, their TFR passing directly through the 1.8 plateau. At the time the 1.8 plateau pattern was emerging, in the early 1970s, a sustained low level of 1.4 was thought highly improbable. However, the West Germany's rate continued to fall to the 1.4 level; Quebec's level, after approximately five years at the 1.8 plateau, also fell to 1.4, at least until 1989.4 Now that Spain's TFR is in the same low range, we have, for the 30-year period, a two-plateau pattern in terms of end-of-period levels. In figure 1, the two patterns appear quite distinctively: on the one hand, France and the U.S. at the 1.8 plateau; on the other, West Germany and Quebec at the 1.4 plateau, where Spain joins them. Hence, in terms of fertility we have what we shall call near-replacementlevel - societies (France and the U.S.) and non-replacement-level societies (West Germany, Spain, and Quebec). Within the 30-year period 1960 to 1989, the threeyear period 1977 to 1980 appears to have been an important inflection point: in France, West Germany, and the U.S., the downward trend in fertility was arrested, whereas Spain (in 1977) and Quebec (in 1980) embarked on a new phase of fertility decline. In order to explore in more detail the fertility patterns just described, we have used three further fertility indicators: age-specific fertility of women near the beginning of the childbearing age range, the 20-to-24-year age-group (figure 2); age-specific fertility near the end of the range, the 30-to-34-year age-group (figure 3); and average age at first childbirth (figure 4). An overview of the comparative evolution of these three indicators reveals that both early and late age-specific fertility contributed to the initial 50% drop; enhanced fertility at age 30 to 34 was responsible for the post-1975 flattening of fertility in France and the U.S.; fertility in the 20-to-24 age group continued to decline in the 1980s, except in the U.S., where it levelled off; and in four out of the five societies, age at first childbirth has been on the rise since the early 1970s, and in Spain's case since the early 1980s. In respect to this last indicator, the similarity of the French, German, Quebec, and Spanish trends is striking, as is, inversely, the continued commitment of American women to parenthood at a markedly younger age - on average, two years earlier than in the other societies. We conclude our characterization of patterns in fertility trends with the following observation: it is principally the decline in fertility at the younger end of the childbearing range in West Germany, and at both the younger and older ends of the range in Quebec, that resulted in the emergence after 1975 of the two distinct end-of-period patterns mentioned. Spain is now repeating the Quebec pattern -

4

At this point, Quebec began to experience a rise in its TFR. The extent to which this rise is a consequence of the business cycle or a redirection in the mid-term trend like that found in Sweden and Denmark is discussed in Caldwell, Frechet, and Thibault (1992).

47

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 3 Age-Specific Fertility Rate: 30-34, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

Figure 4 Average Age at First Childbirth, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

48

Fertility

continued simultaneous decline in both the 20-to-24 and the 30-to-34 age groups - which France, West Germany, and the U.S. have managed to avoid. In West Germany, the rise in the 30-to-34 age-group rate has prevented an even more disastrous fall, given the very low 20-to-24 rate. In other words, in the post-1975 period West Germany has been distinguished by extraordinarily low fertility in the 20-to-24 age-group, and Quebec by the failure of the 30-to-34 age group to increase its fertility, as has been the case in France, West Germany, and the U.S. In Spain, the initial post-1960 50% collapse is too recent to predict how these two age groups will perform in terms of "post-collapse" fertility. Incidentally, this collapse is no doubt associated with the advent and availability of the birth-control pill, use of which was not widespread before the mid-1970s. CONTEXT

Fertility evolves, obviously, in a social context. Various dimensions of the context that social analysts hold to be directly related to fertility can be observed operationally - that is, in terms of reliable indicators on which data are collected in industrial societies. Before embarking on an interpretive effort that will draw on more qualitative data and considerations, we shall examine the comparative evolution of four of what we shall henceforth refer to as contextual factors. These factors are the prevalence and stability of marriage; female participation in the labour force; the prevalence of abortion and sterilization, which, because they require the intervention of institutional agents, are social practices; and the extent of universalization of compulsory schooling. Although we do not claim that these factors determine, for instance, value change - the reverse may in fact be the case - it has been established that they are associated with fertility levels, and because they are measurable, they are observable and comparable; hence the interest in documenting them before attempting any interpretation of the observed societal differences in fertility levels and phasing. Before proceeding to this descriptive exercise, a brief justification of the pertinence of the four contextual factors selected is in order. The prevalence and stability of marriage has been included because in contemporary industrial society the fertility of married women is still well above that of unmarried women. Even in the case of the society in our universe of five that has, by far, the highest percentage of out-of-wedlock births (40% in Quebec in 1990), the fertility of married women was still, in the mid-1980s, twice that of unmarried women (Rochon, 1989). In France, the fertility of unmarried women is still four times lower than that of married women of the same age (Calot and Leroy, 1989: 8). As for the prevalence and stability of marriage as such, we presently have at our

49

Convergence or Divergence

FigureS Birthsout of Wedlock, France, Germany,Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

Figure6 MarriageRate, France, Germany,Quebec,U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

50

Fertility

disposal four indicators: births out of wedlock (figure 5), marriage rate (figure 6), average age at first marriage (figure 7) and divorce rates5 (figures 8 and 9). The pertinence of women's participation in the labour force arises from the observation of an inverse correlation between fertility and female labour force participation that has, until very recently at least, been a constant of postwar industrial society. Although there is a wide consensus in the literature on the correlation between the two, there is not the same agreement as to the dynamics and direction of a possible relationship. Whether fewer children permit women to work more outside the home, or whether the decision to enter or stay in the labour market deters women from having more children is not an essential question here. Taken together, these decisions by women (often with husbands' or lovers' advice and concurrence) constitute an assertion of the kind of family they wish to have, both with regard to a level of material comfort vis-a-vis family size and with regard to gender roles. For our present purpose, which is to measure labour-force involvement, we have compiled the female participation rate (FPR), which is the percentage of women 16 to 64 years old who are working or looking for work (figure 10), as well as the rates for the age groups at both extremities of the age range in which most childbearing takes place, the 20-to-24 and 25-to-34 age groups (figures 11 and 12). In addition, we have the overall participation rate for women with children under three years of age (figure 13). Abortion and sterilization are two particularly effective and, in the case of sterilization, permanent brakes on fertility. The prevalence of both is widespread in contemporary industrial society, and they reflect recourse to techniques that involve the participation of agents - medical or paramedical - other than the women themselves. Their considerable role as a socially influenced brake on fertility makes them a contextual factor of the first order. Each of the two techniques has raised, and continues to raise, publicly debated moral issues related to individualism, gender, and the proper role of the medical system. As it happens, the female and male sterilization data available to us are too incomplete for consideration here. However, we do have adequate data on recorded abortions for four of the five societies in our universe (figure 14)6. Finally, we have included the universalization of schooling as a contextual factor that bears on fertility. In this respect, we draw upon the work of the social demographers John C. Caldwell, as recapitulated in his General Theory of Fertility

5

We have the gross divorce rate for all five societies (figure 8), whereas our data on the total divorce rate (TDR) (figure 9) are incomplete.

6

Fertility termination through abortion is, for historical reasons, especially closely tied to public policy, and thus validity and reliability of data are variable in time and between societies.

51

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 7 Average Age at First Marriage, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

Figure 8 Divorce Rate per 1,000 Population, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

52

Fertility

Figure 9 Total Divorce Rate per 100 Marriages, France, Germany, Quebec, and Spain, 1960-90

Figure 10 Female Labour-Force Participation rate, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

53

Convergence or Divergence

Decline (1982), and Ron Lesthaeghe, as put forward in his article "Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change", written with Johan Surkyn in 1988. For Caldwell, the mediating cause of the behaviour change that takes a society from a regime of high fertility to one of low fertility is the onset of "downward wealth flow" from parents to children. Once the direction of wealth flow is reversed, sex and age differentials associated with the upward flow begin to crumble. In Caldwell's theory, the watershed in the reversal of the wealth flow is the advent of compulsory schooling, which, in addition to physically removing children from the home production unit, undercuts the familial morality compatible with family economic production (under which system high fertility makes economic sense) and disseminates the norms and values of an individualistic morality associated with a market economy. For Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988: 22), education takes on crucial importance because it is the locus of cohort-specific socialization: "There is tangible evidence ... that the individuation process has indeed been moving along the lives of a cohort-and-education-driven model." Although compulsory primary-level schooling was initiated in many industrial societies at the end of the nineteenth century, it is only in the last quarter-century that application has been sufficiently comprehensive that the proportion of the general population with fewer than nine years of schooling has been brought down to less than a quarter (table 2). THE COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

We turn now to a detailed and comparative examination of the indicators of our first contextual factor, the prevalence and stability of marriage. In the mid-1960s, all five societies had crude marriage rates in the range of seven to ten marriages per thousand population (figure 6). Since then, all but the U.S. have experienced a steady decline, to the range of four to five per thousand. The U.S. has consistently maintained a marriage rate above ten per thousand population, or one marriage annually per one hundred population members. Hence, we have four low-nuptial-rate societies and one "marrying" society. It is also noteworthy that a reversal in the trend to ever-lower marriage rates appears to be under way in both West Germany (since 1979) and France (since 1986). The age at which young people begin marrying (figure 7) is both a factor determining the marriage pattern and a further indicator of the changing role of marriage in the life of contemporary men and women. The most impressive feature of the comparative evolution in age at first marriage is the almost lock-step similarity in the five societies: a gradual decline for 15 to 25 years beginning in 1950, and a steady and impressive rise since 1975 that has yet to subside. The only distinguishing societal performance is to be found in Spain, where the decline continued until 1980

54

Fertility

Table 2 Proportion of the Population with Fewer than Nine Years' Education France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-1990 Year

1960 1961 1965 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 a b c

France (%)

— — 25,4 18,6 11,0 18,6 15,8 15,3 14,9 14,0 13,1 15,4 14,9 13,5 13,5 12,6 12,0

Germany3 (%)

21,0 18,1 16,5 15,6 15,5 17,5 17,5 17,0 16,0 13,9 11,8 12,1 12,1 11,4 10,4 10,1 9,2 8,3 7,7 7,2 6,6 6,3 6,0 6,1 7,6 8,0

Quebecb (%)

U.S.C (%)

Spain" (%)

_ 55,2 — — 47,1 34,1 32,2 31,1 31,3 30,8 29,6 29,2 28,4 27,2 26,9 26,2 25,6 24,4 24,3 23,7 22,6

39,7 — — — — — 27,7 — — 21,9 21,2 19,9 19,3 19,2 17,5 16,7 15,8 15,1 14,3 13,9 13,3 12,7 12,1 11,6 11,2

_ — — — 16,2 16,1 16,2 15,9 15,4 14,9 15,1 ' 15,1 15,3 15,2 14,7 15,3 16,6' 16,7 -

Germany: % of school leavers without gr. 9 certification. Quebec and Spain: proportion of the population over 15 years of age. U.S.: proportion of the population over 25 years of age. 55

Convergence or Divergence

before reversing. We postulate that, in all five societies, preference for earlier marriage within the "conjugal" (J. Caldwell, 1982), "breadwinner" (Davis, 1984) pattern had been building even before the decline in marriage age set in, at which time material and other external circumstances made realization of such preferences gradually possible. In regard to the duration of these preferences and the lifting of constraints to their realization, Spain may simply have been a bit out of phase with the other societies, thus undergoing a particularly sharp discontinuity between the realization of former preferences and the brand new aspirations (with regard to marriage) that have obtained since the mid-1970s. For the most part, trends in average age at first marriage (figure 7) have paralleled those in average age at first childbirth (figure 4), but with an intriguing departure beginning in the early 1980s. The departure, apparent in all societies but Spain, is that the average age at first marriage has risen faster in recent years than average age at first childbirth: women are postponing marriage longer (or giving up on it entirely) than they are postponing childbirth. In other words, marriage timing less adequately predicts first-birth timing than it did just a decade ago: childbearing is less tied to marriage than formerly. This is so to the point that in the U.S., average age at first marriage has been higher than average age at first childbirth since 1982; in France, West Germany, and Quebec, the gap between the two is narrowing. The dramatic increase in out-of-wedlock births is a further indication of the weakening connection between childbearing and marriage. Indeed, there has been a rapid increase since the early 1960s in the proportion of births outside of marriage (figure 5). We interpret this as an additional indication both of the reduced prevalence of the "conjugal" marriage norm and of the growing incidence of women deciding to raise children independently of marriage. Such a seeming paradox is possible if, as we believe, many societies in the Western world are moving away from what we call the bourgeois model to the volitional model of reproduction (Modell, 1989). The terms bourgeois and volitional are used here to underline the normative dimensions of the two models; in a strictly operational perspective, the terms nuclear and post-nuclear - as used, for instance, by David Popenoe (1988) - would no doubt be more adequate. The supposition of a move from the bourgeois family model - the relevant elements of which are normative marriage timing, lifetime marriage, nonprostitution/non-libertine female sexuality within marriage, and terminal control of fertility - to the volitional model - the elements of which are delayed marriage until a time and circumstances of the partners' choosing, variable delay of conception within marriage, selective family building, and the elective raising of children outside of marriage - is the first of five propositions to be advanced in the course of our analysis. We suspect, incidentally, that before long the shaping of volition will become conditioned and determined by new norms, as the advantages and 56

Fertility

disadvantages of various choices become more apparent. Meanwhile, the increase in out-of-wedlock births has been considerable in all societies of our universe except West Germany; since the mid-1970s there has been a rapid acceleration in France, Quebec, and Spain. Presently, in all but West Germany and Spain, at least one-fifth of all births take place outside of marriage. The low German rate, half of this, is something we will return to later. With regard to the stability of marriage - as opposed to its prevalence - we have chosen divorce as an indicator. Since no rate is available to us for all five societies, we have used two different divorce rate measures, the crude divorce rate, CDR (figure 8), and the total divorce rate, TDR7 (figure 9), the first having as its denominator total population; the second, marriages. Overall, the frequency of divorce has clearly risen in all five societies (except, perhaps, Spain, for which there are insufficient data), and the rates are converging. Specifically, the French, West German, and Quebec rates are rising and converging (figures 8 and 9). Presently, the TDR is between 30 and 45 divorces per 100 marriages in France, West Germany, and Quebec. In the U.S., where the level of divorce is much higher, the CDR is in the range of five per 1,000 population, as opposed to two to three in France, West Germany, and Quebec. However, in the U.S. the marriage rate - partly due to frequent remarriages - is, as we have seen, much higher. Quebec, which has a higher TDR than either West Germany or France, has caught up with regard to divorce very recently. We suspect that Spain will also catch-up soon. It is apparent that, in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S., marriage as an institution is changing. We are not, however, claiming that the demographic impact of marriage on fertility explains either the rapid fertility decline common to all four societies or the differences among them. It is nonetheless plausible that in the U.S. the stabilization of fertility at a relatively high level is associated in part with younger and more frequent marriage. Our second contextual factor is female labour-force participation (figures 12 and 13).8 Here, the convergence taking place in contemporary industrial societies is once again quite striking, although the differences in pattern are also instructive. Since 1950, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S. have moved inexorably - from substantially different levels - to a state in which just over half of the female population participates in the labour force (figure 12). Spain's low rate, half that of 7

TDR is a synthetic rate representing the likelihood of a marriage ending in divorce if a couple were to experience in the course of their marriage the age-specific divorce rates of a given year; it is presented here as the number of divorces «expected» per 100 marriages.

8

Because the participation series are longer and are available by age groups, we chose to use the "national," as opposed to the OECD "harmonized," data.

57

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 11 Age-Specific Female Labour-Force Participation Rate: 20-24, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

Figure 12 Age-Specific Female Labour-Force Participation Rate: 25-34, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-90

58

Fertility

the other four societies but rapidly converging with them, is an indication of its late industrialization, and perhaps of its somewhat later experience of changes in attitudes regarding gender role, which, along with economic change, are behind the changed participation-rate pattern. West Germany stands out as a society with a long history of high female participation in the labour force. When one consults the rates for 20-to-24-year-old women (figure 13), the same convergence is apparent for younger women, except in France, where the participation rate of women in this age group has been declining since 1976. It may be that more young Frenchwomen are pursuing their studies rather than working. In West Germany, on the other hand, the 30-to-34 age-group has a significantly lower rate than France, Quebec, and the U.S. Although we can offer only a plausible explanation for the comparatively lower participation rate of young Frenchwomen, the lower participation rate of German women 30 to 34 years old is almost certainly accounted for by more of them staying at home to raise young children than is the case in France, Quebec, and the U.S. This is largely confirmed by the comparative participation rates of women with young children (figure 13): in Quebec and the U.S., the rate is in the neighbourhood of 50%, whereas in West Germany only one third of women with young children work. We turn now to the comparative examination of our third contextual factor, the prevalence of abortion and sterilization. Although we have at our disposal rudimentary data on abortion (figure 14), our coverage of the five societies is grossly inadequate with respect to sterilization. With respect to the overall (male and female) sterilization rate, the variation among the societies in our universe is rather astounding, from a total accumulated sterilized population of approximately 6% in West Germany to an annual sterilization rate of the same order, 6%, in Quebec. In Quebec, the combined annual rate of sterilization by tubal ligation and hysterectomies for women in the childbearing age range is, and has been since the early 1970s, 20 per 1,000 population, or 2% of the childbearing population a year, with a high of 3% in 1976. Were this rate to prevail for another decade (for a total of 30 years) one could assume that two thirds of a hypothetical cohort of women would be surgically sterilized at age 45. In fact, this situation is not all that different from that in the U.S.: by 1982, almost 40% of American married women were sterilized! Although we do not have the detailed data to confirm it, we know that the overall sterilization rate is much lower in France and West Germany, and lower yet in Spain. In France, sterilization for other than medical reasons is still socially unacceptable; in West Germany, it has just begun to be accepted as an effective contraceptive method, having shed its image as a coercive social-engineering technique. There are two noteworthy aspects of the recent evolution in rates of abortion per 100 live births (figure 14). First, during the 1970s the rise in recorded abortions was stupendous in France, Quebec, and the U.S. (Our data for Germany are quite 59

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 13 Labour Force-Participation rate, Women with Young Children, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Figure 14 Abortions per 100 Live Births, France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1971-90

60

Fertility

recent, and for Spain almost non-existent.) Second, after this rather vertiginous rise, rates began to stabilize at two distinct plateaus: 40 per 100 live births in the U.S. and approximately 20 per cent live births in France, West Germany, and Quebec. We now come to our last contextual factor, the universalization of schooling. Despite the fact that compulsory primary-school education was introduced in West Germany, France, and the U.S. in the second half of the nineteenth century, progress was uneven and attendance often difficult to enforce. Since the Second World War, it has become common in industrial societies to make school attendance compulsory to at least the age of 16. However, the existence of a considerable backlog of people who slipped through the compulsory-primary-school net of the pre-Second World War period, along with a still not insignificant proportion of contemporary youths who do not manage to finish eight years of schooling, result in there being a substantial proportion of the adult population with fewer than nine years of schooling. In the last quarter century, this proportion has evolved very substantially. In 1960, 60% of the adult population in Quebec and almost 50% of that in the U.S. had not completed nine years of schooling (table 2). In both cases, the change has been dramatic: down to 26% in Quebec and 14% in the U.S. by 1985. In the same period, the proportion of primary-school leavers in West Germany without grade-nine certification has fallen from 21% to 6%. It can be stated with certainty that the decline in fertility has been associated with a parallel decline in the proportion of the population with fewer than nine years of schooling. Given the universalization of compulsory secondary-school attendance, it would be of interest to monitor movements in the proportion of the population with, say, fewer than twelve (as opposed to nine) years of schooling. In Quebec, a significant rise in the secondary-school drop-out rate since the mid-1980s - almost half of teenagers now do not graduate from high school and 12% of sixteen-year-olds are not in school (Langlois et al., 1992: 504, 512) - may be associated with an apparent rise in fertility since 1988.9 In fact, since 1972 the proportion of those in the relevant age group attending college in the U.S. has been constantly declining, and more recently dropping out of high school has become more widespread (Caplow et al., 1991: 472). This could mean that "modernity," in the sense that John Caldwell uses the term - the displacement of familial morality and family-based production by Western individualism and the market economy - has inherent limits, and that a reaction to non-familial morality and market penetration of the household economy is in progress; that "individuation" of existence, in accordance with Blow's dialectics of idealization and disenchantment (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988: 17), has produced a cohort effect on those born in the early 1970s. Or perhaps, as Popenoe (1988: ch. 14) suggests, the post-nuclear family (our "volitional" model) is simply inadequate 9

With regard to this apparent rise, cf. note 4.

61

Convergence or Divergence

to the task of preparing young people for industrial society, and what we are seeing in the withdrawal from schooling is a breakdown in the socialization formerly assumed by the "bourgeois" nuclear family. We have some tentative conclusions to advance regarding fertility behaviour in contemporary industrial society. First of all, there is convergence, with regard to both fertility behaviour and the contextual factors we have chosen to examine: France, West Germany, Quebec, the U.S., and even Spain are more alike now than they were in 1960. The one notable exception is marriage, with respect to which the U.S. is now in a category apart from the other four societies. The fact of this convergence, and particularly the alignment of fertility in Quebec and subsequently in Spain - two societies that experienced late but accelerated industrialization - at a common level (the 1.4 to 1.8 TFR range), would suggest that, at least in the medium term, industrial society, at least in societies of European origin, is associated with a sub-replacement fertility rate. Within this medium-term convergence, there are also common "turning-points" (inflections of trends) at the beginning of the 1960s and in the late 1970s. However, notwithstanding these similarities, there are revealing differences with regards to fertility itself. Two distinctive end-of-period patterns have emerged: a near-replacement level in the U.S. and France, and a below-replacement level in West Germany, Quebec, and Spain. In terms of our contextual factors, the U.S. and Spain must be distinguished in several respects from the other societies. Conception at a younger age is more prevalent in the U.S., leading to earlier first childbirth and more abortions. Marriage is more prevalent, in terms of both age at first marriage and frequency of marriage. Divorce, and presumably remarriage, are more frequent in the U.S. than elsewhere. Manifestly, marriage, or at least what we have designated the volitional model of marriage, is more robust as an institution in the U.S. than in the other four societies: one marries sooner and more often. In the other four societies, the marriage rate is about half what it is in the U.S. Divorce, much more frequent in the U.S., is presumably better incorporated into the volitional-marriage model (seen as less of a trauma) than into the model that still predominates elsewhere. Differences in the proportion of out-of-wedlock births allow us to make distinctions among the four "non-marrying" societies. In France and Quebec, the proportion is higher than in the U.S., whereas in West Germany and Spain it is much lower. This might be indicative of the persistence of the bourgeois marriage model in West Germany and Spain, and its decomposition in France and Quebec in a context in which the volitional model has not yet taken hold (or been institutionalized) as it has in the U.S. Should the future bring a further spread of the volitional, or post-nuclear, model - as reflected in more frequent divorce and the raising of children outside of marriage - to non-American societies, we will have 62

Fertility

further evidence of the existence of a cultural modernization process that affects demography in which, in this case, fertility-related behaviours are disseminated from the most influential society in the Western world (the U.S.) to other already industrialized Western societies, and subsequently to the world at large. France and West Germany also differ in that they have been at different end-of-period fertility plateaus for the last 15 years (TFRS of 1.8 and 1.4, respectively). Our supposition is that, in the struggle to reconcile the participation of women in the labour force with the maintenance of a domestic establishment (bourgeois model) and having and raising children, the French and the Germans have evolved different strategies. In West Germany, in the squeeze created by the three demands, it is fertility or the number of children one will raise that has suffered; in France, it is the centrality of the domestic establishment (in terms of the time spent on its maintenance and living in it) that has suffered, as opposed to fertility. As we shall suggest below, these national differences of emphasis are also reflected in public policy. Finally, Quebec and Spain are exceptional relative to the three other societies. Our interpretation is that both - first Quebec and then Spain - have experienced late but accelerated "modernization," with the result that in the social ambiguity of a rapid transition (in a single generation), both fertility and the creation and establishment of a traditional domestic establishment (marriage) have suffered in Quebec, and will suffer in Spain. Our second proposition is then that late and accelerated modernization results in a non-replacement-level fertility rate. We conclude our review of contextual factors with a characterization of the bourgeois/volitional family-model distinction. In the U.S., a post-bourgeois familymodel society, marriage remains a pre-eminent normative force precisely because of the dynamic inherent in the volitional model. In France, the family component of the decomposing bourgeois model is still very much a normative force (Castelain-Meunier and Fagnani, 1988), whereas in West Germany the traditional domesticity of the bourgeois model retains its resilience. In Quebec - an industrial society inspired by imported models10 - where modernity reigns, the decomposition of the bourgeois model has been rapid and complete, creating an ambiguous situation in which the vestiges of the bourgeois model and the emergent volitional model co-exist. (The bourgeoisie has been quick to embrace the volitional model, while the "proletariat" clings to the bourgeois model.) It is to be expected that Spain, having

10

This is the sense given to the term in John Caldwell's work (Caldwell, 1982). Quebec and Spain are instances of «tier B» populations in his theory.

63

Convergence or Divergence

experienced the same late and accelerated modernization process as Quebec, will replicate the Quebec experience.11 All of this raises a vast range of auxiliary questions that cannot be dealt with adequately here. For instance, did Quebec and Spain experience late and accelerated modernization for the same reasons? Is the volitional model a viable one in the long term (a half-century or more)? To what extent is the emergence of the volitional model - as opposed to the bourgeois or conjugal family model - associated with the postwar change in the status of women? As a first attempt to respond to these questions, we shall review changes in values related to women's roles and aspirations, as these values are reflected both in publicly expressed attitudes and in institutions and government policy. VALUE CHANGE AND SOCIETAL SPECIFICITY

Convincing explanations for fertility change on a macrosocial level can be found in long-term change in the social structure, triggered by the processes of industrialization, urbanization, the penetration of market forces, and the crystallization of the welfare state. But if we are to look more closely at one particular time period, that since the end of the Second World War, and seek to illuminate the distinctiveness of the social patterns within a more generalized convergence, a finer-grained medium-term analysis is required. Fertility is a relationally volatile phenomenon, tied to attitudes and values as well as to material conditions. Consequently, our discussion here deals with changes in attitudes, values, and material conditions surrounding marriage and family, as well as the transformation of the female gender role; and changes with regard to women's participation in the public sphere, not just in terms of out-of-the home employment, but also in terms of the division of labour in the household. We will also consider the influence of government incentives, notably purposeful population-policy measures, and the form and extent of the out-of-home child care offered. The story of each society's recent transformation is complex and contested; to attempt a fully comparative account here would be foolish. Even the summary accounts within a single society are highly speculative as to general causes. In the U.S., one account, for example, considers secularization, in the broad sense of the word, to be central to the more general movement away from traditional authority: "As religious adherence waned, the sway of absolute religious authority over the spheres of morality and individual conduct diminished. Alternative codes based on

11

64

Other industrialized but late modernizers, such as Greece, northern Italy, the Irish Republic, and, in due time, the new market-oriented Polish society will, in all probability, suffer the same fate (unless antimodernization reaction manifests itself) of demographic destabilization.

Fertility

humanistic values, mental-health criteria, or extreme individualism (doing one's thing) surfaced and were urged by adherents as the meaningful and sensible bases for organizing life and action" (Veroff et al., 1981: 195). But other accounts, not inconsistent in their understanding of discrete aspects of the value change, offer different explanatory mechanisms - for example, the empowerment of once subordinate ascriptive groups (including those defined by gender and age) in the face of a prosperity widespread enough that subordinated groups could "afford" to ignore the prescriptions and proscriptions that formerly maintained them, securely but safely, in inferior status (Modell, 1989). In West Germany, the parallel transformation is explained by still another, more psychological mechanism: the loosening of a related set of repressions, codified as loyalty, subordination, hard work, modesty, self-control, punctuality, conformity, adaptation, and temperance (Klages, 1985: 18). The 1960s, the decade that marked the end of the postwar baby boom in France, Quebec, and the U.S. and the beginning of fertility decline in Spain, is a meaningful period in many ways. It witnessed a trans-national Wertwandlungsschub (a discontinuity in value transformation: see Klages, 1985), the cause of which has been widely discussed (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988). In all four societies, values concerning personal self-development12 registered major gains. Characteristically, the young and those with more formal education espoused the new orientation, displaying a distinctive flexibility in personal goals and means of attaining them. This was not egoism, pure and simple; rather, numerous long-standing hierarchies, most visibly those between men and women, lost some of their attractiveness as, and because, standards supporting discussion of the interests of all involved gained in importance. Normative sanctions for customs in personal relationships were less and less likely to be blindly accepted. While the traditional marriage-and-family model was comprehended as an institutional arrangement with obligations and complementary role assignment, depending on division of functions and reciprocity, mutual love and sympathy — with their dependence on voluntary, and somewhat unpredictable, emotional relations - is at the heart of the new model. A recapitulation of this secularization, and the individuation it implies, as well as a demonstration of the role of early socialization and education in determining the pace at which it takes place, is to be found in Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988). In West Germany, it took scarcely more than a decade for this change to express itself exemplarily in attitudes toward marriage and family. Between 1963 and 1978, the proportion of those polled who viewed the institution of marriage as a

12

In the field of idealistic social criticism, for example, emancipation from authority, equality and equal opportunity, democracy, civil involvement, individual autonomy; in the field of hedonism, for example, enjoyment, variety in life, letting out emotional needs; in the field individualism, for example, creativity, spontaneity, self-fulfillment, independence (Klages, 1984: 18).

65

Convergence or Divergence

necessity dropped from 89% to 61%, although the same values had remained astonishingly stable before and would stabilize again after this brief period of change (Piel, 1987: 121). In the U.S., in 1957, 53% of all those polled rejected a person opposed to the marital imperative, who was deemed to be either sick or immoral, as too egotistical or too neurotic for marriage. In 1976, only one third of the respondents stated similarly restrictive views.13 In contemporary Spain, citizens are still visibly torn by the confrontation of old and new ideas: on the one hand, according to a 1990 survey, 77% believe that marriage is not out of fashion and 66% are ready to swear to their commitment again in front of their children. On the other hand, a growing minority of men and women approve of marrying later, with the benefit of prior experience acquired by cohabitation. Pragmatically, 80% of Spaniards believe that cohabitation will increase in the future, but 33% consider it utterly immoral. When marriage roles are obvious and fundamentally complementary, there is limited negotiation on who is to fulfil them. However, if certain tasks can be performed by either partner, each task needs to be assigned and negotiated. In the course of gradual establishment of an egalitarian role model, the perception of what is fundamental for marriage and partnership is adjusted. Plural models emerge, typically with hazy, permissive boundaries, where clearcut prescriptions were once the order of the day. In open-ended polls in the mid-1960s, 52% of West Germans expressed appreciation of dutifulness, tolerance, and consideration as the basic foundation of marriage; however, these values dwindled to near-meaninglessness by 1977, adhered to by only 8%. Having children, an important reason for marriage stability for 21% of those polled in the 1960s, was named by only 9% in 1977. No normative substitute with comparable validity presented itself. Only "affection" and "sharing" registered gains, and "equality," not mentioned in the years 1964/65, achieved the leading position, with 15%, in 1977.14 A parallel tendency of diminishing rigidity regarding gender-specific role assignment seems to exist, as well. In 1974, 36% of Americans still felt that women should take care of running their homes and leave running the country to men, but only 24% held this opinion in 1986. Similarly, the proportion of those who disapproved of a married women earning money in business or industry if she has a husband who can support her decreased. The same tendency is observed in 13

The overwhelming normative power of the institution of marriage in the 1950s can be judged by the fact that the majority of respondents exhibited this sanctioning attitude independent of their own marital status (Veroff et al., 1981: 147).

14

Results of a 1981 Common Market survey point in the same direction: "One notes that for the old, the religious, the people of the right, and even married people, marital fidelity is the most important guarantee of happy marriage, but that it is placed third or fourth among the opposed groups" (Stoetzel, 1983: 127).

66

Fertility

contemporary Spain, a late starter like Quebec, in value change: 44% of the population accept that married women work outside home to the same extent as men (Tohariz 1989: 181). Only 27% are in favour of a family model in which men work to support the family and women stay at home - although the proportion is about twice as high among people 35 years and over. Conflicts within relationships are more often recognized and discussed nowadays - and seemingly more often acted upon, through marriage dissolution, for example. At first glance, it may seem surprising, in view of rising divorce rates, that satisfaction with family life is considerably higher now than that with other spheres of life, and has not, or at least not notably, dropped. Jean Stoetzel's (1983: 123) summary of results within the Common Market in 1981 concurs with this: "Only one in ten claim to never be happy. Time and time again in other surveys, the family has appeared as a refuge, as the supreme value." The growing instability of partnership relations by no means signifies a crisis in the institution of the family, but is, rather, the result of increasing individual demands with regard to the quality of family life. Marriage is judged in terms of its contribution to personal fulfillment, and much is expected of it (Nave-Herz, 1988: 85; Veroff et al., 1981: 162). Stoetzel (1983) sums this up: "The individual is no longer an element of the family; the family is a part of the individual." As in all other sectors with which the ideology underlying family is converging, the family sphere is increasingly viewed as formed on the basis of voluntary agreement: a contract between two parties, subject to continuous negotiation, in which neither the state nor the church has any special interest. Mutual affection has become the leading justification for the maintenance of social contact in all spheres. Occasionally, these negotiated, almost improvised arrangements have given fresh life to family patterns not unlike those of the preceding era, structures once expressing an ideology of mutual dependence now subtly modified to partake in the new belief system organized around the individual's needs. Thus, we do not find growing estrangement between members of extended families, but, rather, a kind of emotional closeness based on free will, mutual understanding, and respect. A tendency for families to be open to extra-familial sociability networks has been documented in West Germany and France; circles of friends and acquaintances have become larger, neighbourhood relations friendlier. The respective U.S. statistics were already at a relatively high level in the 1970s, and they have remained stable. Observations in Quebec indicate the likelihood of a decline in the size of parental networks, but from extraordinarily high levels. For large numbers of people in recent years, children represent in this context - to phrase the point provocatively - an anachronistic value. They require commitment to decade-long obligations, restriction of individual decision, mobility, and flexibility - that is, fewer chances of self-determined life plans, the realization 67

Convergence or Divergence

of which is now also granted to women. One may more readily withdraw from friends or kin or leave a spouse than turn away from one's child. The decision to have children is made less lightly than in the past. Indeed, the choice to have fewer children manifests itself in the desired number of children reported in surveys. In 1950, a family of at least four children was the ideal of a substantial proportion of the adult population (in the U.S., for 42% of women and 35% of men; in France, for 23% of both sexes; in West Germany, for 11%), while only 5% desired this number of children 30 years later, with the exception of the U.S., where 19% of women and 15% of men still desired four children. In Quebec, a similar downscaling of family-size expectations can be seen in the difference between the number of children planned by the 1926-30 and 1946-50 cohorts of parents: 3.7 and 2.4 respectively, a drop of 35% between two generations 20 years apart (Henripin et al., 1981). In 1980, a majority of Americans (51%) and Germans (59%) wanted a family with two children. Among the French, approximately equal proportions, 44% and 45%, desired families of two and three children, respectively. Conversely, in the same year 1% of Americans, 3% of the French, and 9% of West Germans preferred childlessness (Hopfinger, 1987; Simon and Landis, 1989). THE CHANGED ROLE OF WOMEN

Women in particular must (consciously or unconsciously) decide to which ties they want to submit themselves. Asymmetries in the scope of family commitments pertaining to the two genders remain: women's freedom of manoeuvre depends far more than men's on the choices they make in this regard. Two commitments with unforeseeable effects on self-determined life planning, marriage and motherhood take top priority in women's collective consciousness. In an attempt to manage these two situations, at least three unconventional strategies15 for handling these difficult choices are conceivable. First, women may decide to remain unmarried and childless, either by abandoning sexuality or by practising extramarital cohabitation; in the latter arrangement, the principle of "till death do us part" is subject to question. The probability of prolonged singleness is, as data from all societies examined indicate, on the rise for younger women, except for a recent reversal in France. Second, women may decide for marriage and against children. Intensively experienced partnership and improved career opportunities are 15

68

When "strategies" by women are mentioned here, it should not be forgotten that the women's-liberation movement has heightened sensitivity to problems: the "marriage and motherhood trap" has been since, Simone de Beauvoir, a constant ingredient of societal criticism in extended feminist circles. On the other hand, the paradigmatic effect of alternative, increasingly socially acceptable life planning, even without explicit feminist thinking as a basis, cannot be underestimated.

Fertility

the promised compensations for relinquishing motherhood. In all societies compared, the number of childless-marriage couples has risen. Finally, women may decide for children and against marriage, a decision that is a factor in the dramatic rise in the number of single-parent families and of divorces, both of which may constitute opting for family outside of marriage. The markedly higher age of unmarried mothers at the time of the birth of their children signals an increasingly conscious fulfilment of the desire for children outside of marriage. This choice is rare in the United States. To what point these strategies, which deviate from the long-standing bourgeois family model, actually reduce real pressures, facilitating the realization of modern ideals, cannot be assessed here. We know more about the contradictions in the living conditions of women who have chosen the traditional model of wife and mother. Though there are definite differences among the societies compared, the majority of children are still born within marriage, and, as stated above, societal esteem for the family is still strong in all of the societies we have studied. The problems lie below the surface. Even in the U.S., where the early and universal pattern of marriage has long been recognized as contrasting to that in most of Europe, the orientation regarding parenthood is changing. The proportion of mothers who said that all married couples should have children declined from 85%, in 1962, to 43%, in 1980, levelling off between then and 1985 (Thornton, 1989: 882). A fairly positive attitude toward having children was registered among 58% of those polled in 1957, but among only 44% in 1976. The proportion who commented negatively on the restrictiveness of parenthood in all replies rose from 30% to 45% (Veroff et al., 1981: 220). In 1976, children represented elements of "happiness," "marital completion," or "goal in life" less often than in 1957, while they were more often associated with "general responsibility" and "general restriction of freedom." While it was mainly men who felt burdened by an undefined "general responsibility,"16 it was women who put their finger on a central feature of parenthood: restriction of freedom was associated with life as a mother for 28% of them. Men, being objectively less restricted under the current marital-role structure, registered a 12.3% proportion of similar responses to this question. A very recent study on the situation in West Germany opposed the traditional division-of-labour family type (working man and housewife) to the functionally differentiated type (both partners work and share the housework), seen as modern and meaningful for the future. As expected, the proportion of those advocating general arguments on behalf of having children - they give life a purpose, they simply belong to a real family, and so on - was higher in "traditional" families than in "modern" ones. On the other hand, "traditional" housewives also expressed 16

In 1957, 23.3% and in 1916, 38.6%, as opposed to women in 1957, 18.9% and 1976, 32.4% (Modell, 1989: 284).

69

Convergence or Divergence

arguments against children, based on the fact that one was tied to the house because of them and had to restrict oneself financially. While the career plans of men were barely hampered in "traditional" families, they were also obviously less willing to restrict themselves to the home (Schumacher, 1988). The hampering of career plans is a central argument not only for working women, but also for nonemployed women. The education level of younger women has approached that of men over the past few years, and the traditional pattern of the more highly educated, bread-winning husband has accordingly lost in importance.17 Early on, women find that employment - not retreat into private life - is the outcome of educational qualification. Increasingly, employment for women has been less a short-term opportunity to earn some additional money before marriage, or a basis for temporary independence pending marriage, and more the key element in a long-term career, requiring that occupational obligations and satisfactions associated with marital duties and rewards be negotiated with their partners. We can see this new conception of employment in changes in the proportion of women gainfully employed during the so-called family-building phase, ages 25 to 34 (figure 12). In West Germany in 1950, 78% of young women between 15 and 20 years of age were working, but only 36% of the 33- to 40-year-olds were. In 1980, women entered working life relatively late due to longer training periods, but were to a notable degree (still) employed in the age cohorts up to 60 years. In the United States, 51.3% of women aged 18-19 were in the labour force in 1950, while a far smaller proportion, 34.0%, of women were working at ages 25-34, at which point in life most women were devoted strictly to the marital role. (The critical ages for this comparison differ from those in West Germany, because American women marry younger than do West Germans.) By 1988, the proportions were 62.9% and 72.7% for these age groups. Hence the new pattern of the woman's life course had been largely established: young American women were not dropping out of the labour force in order to marry, but were continuing to enter it even as they married. As well, more and more American women were extending their schooling to college, with some depressive effect on labour-force participation, and more and more were delaying marriage, although this did nothing to depress labour-force participation (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1989). The Quebec results refer only to the period after 1975, in which the most pronounced growth in the female labour-force participation rate could also be observed in the 25—44 year age group, increasing from 45.8% to 71.1%. Similarly, the age-specific proportions in France in the 1960s 17

70

In the U.S., a tendency toward homogamous marriage can be observed for whites since the marriage cohorts of 1941—45, and for blacks since the cohorts of 1951-55. A tendency toward increasing homogamy is also ascertainable for France. West Germany, however, shows no increase of homogamous marriage, but clear decreases of better-educated husbands and increases of better-educated women (Rockwell, 1976: 88; Ziegler, 1985: 90).

Fertility

represented the typical three-phase-model, with women interrupting employment in the second (family) phase. Currently however, three quarters of all French women between 25 and 35 years work - 10% more than among 20-to 25-year-olds. In Spain, labour-force participation at all ages is far below that in the other four societies, although the participation of younger women is increasing rapidly. In 1990, the overall female rate was 33%, although, according to the latest Eurobarometer (Del Campo, 1991), 95% of Spanish women want to work outside the home. The three-phase model of women's life course is also losing validity in West Germany, though German mothers of small children are very securely in last place with regard to labour-force participation. In Quebec, 68% of women with children under three years were employed in 1988, 57% of women in this position were working in the U.S., and, in 1989, 74% in France.18 But only 32% of West German mothers with children of this age had a job in 1987 (figure 13). Marriage partners in the societies compared are far from sharing household tasks equally. There is a growing tendency toward believing that marital tasks should be shared equally, and a trend toward "helping out" by younger husbands, especially when the wives are gainfully employed; but this is usually limited to particular tasks, often those of the highest prestige, such as taking care of children. In 1985, 92% of West German men living with a woman claimed not to be strained by housework - because they were doing almost nothing (Lebert, 1985). Exemplary of the differences between attitude and behaviour are the results of a recent study carried out by the Spanish Institute of Women. Although the majority of Spanish men think that men and women share domestic tasks when both work outside the home, Spanish men in fact assume a smaller share of the work than even the Germans, who do from five to nine times less domestic work than their spouses. In France, according to a 1985 survey, about 60% of both men and women were of the opinion that "household tasks devolve upon both spouses," but even in the groups advocating this egalitarian view, the amount of time devoted to household work per week amounted to 16.5 hours for women and only 6.5 hours for men. Men believing in egalitarian role structuring worked in the household only one half-hour longer than did the men who claim that housework is the woman's job. In the United States, while husbands added nearly one hour a day in house work between 1965 and 1985 (all aspects except child care gaining in the time they devoted), American wives shed fully two hours, mainly of domestic chores (Gershuny and Robinson, 1988: 542; Grignon, 1985-86: 10). "Modern" women married to "modern" men reconcile the contradiction between their husbands' normative claims and their actual behaviours by doing less housework themsleves - an arrangement in which their husbands probably concur. If the 18

The statistics for France refer to women with only one child. However, 63.2 % of mothers with two children, of whom one is under three, are employed.

71

Convergence or Divergence

bourgeois household was based on beliefs and behaviours that implied asymmetrical gender roles and reflected a visible family investment in tidiness, emergent family patterns may increasingly reconcile belief and practice by omitting the symbolic assertion of jointness that a tidy domestic establishment represents; indeed, we have suggested that this is particularly the case in France. There are national differences, to be sure. In 1986, the majority of West German women and men polled still held the view that women have the choice of either raising children or pursuing a career; realization of one goal would mean renunciation of the other (Institut fur Demoskopie Allensbach, 1986). Contrary tendencies can be seen in France. In a 1979 poll, only 40% held the opinion that mothers of small children should not work; three years later, only 29% felt this way. Characteristically, women and young people had more liberal views than men and older respondents, and the over-all pattern moved away from the model of "femmes au foyer" (the little woman in the kitchen). The proportion of American high-school students in their final year of study who endorsed the traditional notion that "it is usually better for everyone" when husbands work gainfully and wives "take care of the home and the family" declined from 58% of girls and 83% of boys, in 1976-77, to 36% of girls and 68% of boys, in 1985-86. But the translation of this trend into endorsements of the gender-symmetrical idea that "if a wife works, her husband should take a greater part in housework and child care" showed hardly any increase (it was already endorsed by about 70% of both boys and girls) over the same period (Thornton, 1989: 876). In Quebec, husbands say that they are reallocating time to family duties, as they feel they should, but there is no evidence of behavioural change. The value change we have been documenting and discussing constitutes a redefined feminine role in Western society: continued participation in the labour force during child-bearing years; a preoccupation with job security and career; redeployment of household chores among family members; a redefinition of the significance of the domestic establishment; and the necessity of extra-family child care. There are also more general concerns that result from the fact that women are now autonomous individuals and less dependent on men. With the "lifetime marriage" of the bourgeois model no longer holding, and more temporary "volitional" arrangements having emerged, increasingly self-reliant women must plan their fertility. The value change associated with this redefinition was sufficiently of consequence to promote a redirection of trends in four fertility-related behaviours in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S. between 1971 and 1976. Indeed, it was during this relatively short five-year period that women in these societies began postponing having children, putting off or forgoing marriage, and envisaging the possibility of having children outside of marriage, all of which are behaviours that 72

Fertility

Table 3 First Year of Sustained Rise (or Drop) in Average Age at First Maternity, First Marriage, Crude Marriage Rate (Drop) and Births Out of Wedlock" France, Germany, Quebec, U.S., and Spain, 1960-1990

Av. Age 1st birth (fig- 4) (1)

Av. Age 1st marr. (fig- 7) (2)

Crude % Marr. Rate (fig- 6) (3)

Births to non-married (fig- 5) (4)

Average Columns 1-4

Temporal Sequence

France

1976

1977

1973t

1977

1976

4

Germany

1972

1976

1971

1976

1974

3

b

Quebec

1972

1975

1974

1972

1973

2

U.S.

1973

1975

1973

1968

1972

1

Spain

1982

1980

1976

1980

1980

5

a As determined by visual inspection of the appropriate figure. b No data prior to 1971. c Source: INSEE, Donnees societies, 1990, p. 277.

directly influence fertility. Our third proposition is thus that the redefinition of women's role led to a turning-point with respect to the contextual factors that influence fertility patterns, and consequently fertility itself. In the already modernized industrial societies of our comparison, this happened around 1975, and in Spain around 1980. We shall call this, the second of our two turning-points, the "postfeminist revolution" turning point. We undoubtedly have here what Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1988) would call a "pure cohort" effect. Our evidence for this is to be found in figures 4 through 7, which document four of our contextual-factors indicators. In table 3, we have listed the first year of a sustained rise in average age at first maternity (figure 4) and average age at first marriage (figure 7), an increase in births out of wedlock (figure 5), and a decrease in the marriage rate (figure 6). Column 5 indicates the average year of all four trend redirections in each society. In France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S., the average year of inflection of all four indicators lies between 1971 and 1976; Spain is considerably later on all indicators, producing a four-indicator average closer to 1980. Incidentally, the time sequence in table 3 is coherent with the thesis that the changes 73

Convergence or Divergence

were the product of cultural diffusion originating in North America (Calot and Leroy, 89). ACHIEVING OR MAINTAINING NEAR-REPLACEMENT-LEVEL FERTILITY

Our fourth proposition has to do with what allows a society to maintain replacementlevel fertility in a post-feminist-revolution industrial society. In fact, of the four thoroughly modernized societies in our comparison, two have achieved this (France and the U.S.) - as has Sweden (Hoem, 1990) - and two have failed to do so (West Germany and Quebec). We propose that to maintain near-replacement-level fertility given contemporary women's roles, either a strong pro-marriage norm or extensive public support to alleviate the inconveniences to modern parents of child raising is required. What is interesting is that in the universe of five societies considered here, one, the U.S., combines near-replacement-level fertility with a strong marriage norm and the absence of public promotion of natality; France, the other society in which near-replacement-level fertility is maintained, has a low marriage rate but has been investing public resources in promoting a higher birth rate for well over a quarter century. We shall now consider the extent of such public high-birthrate promotion in the form of support to families, after which we reflect on the state of the marriage norm. In France, an emphatically pro-high-birthrate family policy makes use of a well-developed and complicated system of direct and indirect financial assistance for families with children. This assistance varies according to income level. Characteristic of the entire system is progressively increased support provided for larger families. The income-tax system also favours the traditional family model: since the incomes of the husband and the wife are always taxed as one unit, using progressive rates, the additional income of the employed wife is automatically more highly taxed. Therefore, "spouse splitting" takes an extended form in France: taxable income is divided up according to the number of family members, calculating one part per husband and wife (quotient conjugal) and 1/2 part per child (quotient familial), a formula in which children contribute considerably to tax deductions. In addition to these fiscal incentives, the French school system offers a remarkable spectrum of possibilities for child care. School lasts all day, and for over half a century there has been a voluntary and cost-free national pre-school system for children from two years of age up. The "Ecole maternelle" is open to all three- to six-year-olds, and two-year-olds are accepted when places are available (Calame and Fiedler, 1982: 45). In 1987, 35% of two-year-olds and 94% of three- to six-year-olds attended pre-school. These conditions, which certainly support a fit between childbearing and current women's roles and to which can be imputed birthrate-promotion effects, are 74

Fertility

relatively scarce in West Germany. The family is the basic taxation unit, resulting in a tax bracket with higher rates for the spouse who enters professional life later and/or who has the lower income - usually the wife. Children are subject to exempt fees that need not be taxed, but they are not included in a more emphatic "splitting system" as in France. The present form of child care in West Germany has more serious negative consequences. Its faults are universally recognized; the situation has improved somewhat (in part due to the falling number of children) in the past few years. In 1987, only 33% of three-year-olds, 70% of four-year-olds, and 85% of five-year-olds attended kindergarten. Most child-care facilities are not adapted to the working hours of the parents, who, for the most part, register children for only half-day attendance. Because there is no all-day school system in West Germany, the transfer from kindergarten to school does not improve conditions for combining parenthood and working. Although kindergartens open at standardized hours, irregular school days make it nearly impossible to manage even a part-time job without the assistance of privately organized help. In 1986, state-provided afternoon child care was available for only 3.9% of six- to fifteen-year-olds.19 The situation in the U.S. is quite another case again. With the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the "marriage penalty" - the modestly increased total amount of income taxes two workers must pay when they marry - was eliminated. This was a concession to the demand that the principle of the economic partnership of equals be placed above the conception of marriage as an economic partnership in which both partners share equal ownership of the couple's wealth. For decades, income-tax deductions of up to several hundred dollars per year were offered for each dependent in the family, most of whom are children born to the partners, the exact amount being a function of the progressive taxation rate: higher-income families thus receive higher child subsidies. However, little positive impact on the birthrate can be imputed to this measure. Complete nonconformity with European patterns is also exhibited in the field of child-care facilities. When the U.S. is compared with other industrialized countries "it is striking that there is nothing resembling a 'national policy' - there is no attempt at the federal level to meet, or even define, the needs of the some eight million children under the age of six whose mothers work" (Joffe, 1983: 168).20 The U.S. 19

All data according to information from Statistisches Bundesamt.

20

This corresponds to the fact that the U.S. government has no direct policy on fertility. Most fertility-related policies are not produced by a wish to alter the population or population parameters, but for other reasons — chiefly moral ones. There are some attempts to aid prenatal care of mothers, and to provide "sex education," which typically includes information about contraception and, since the advent of AIDS, a stronger tendency to urge abstinence.

75

Convergence or Divergence

has a tradition of governmental attention to compensatory schooling programmes for children of disadvantaged population groups. The current leading programme in this field is Head Start (approximately 375,000 children were enrolled in 1983). On the other hand, any system of massive government involvement in programmes aimed at young children inevitably raises images, alarming to Americans, of "state-controlled child-rearing." As a result, the problem of child care is solved largely by way of private initiatives. Non-government programmes include private day-care centres and nonprofit ones, family day-care homes, employer-provided child care, nursery schools and other educationally defined half-day or full-day programmes, and a vast informal network of care offered by relatives and babysitters. The proportion of three-year-olds attending pre-school, for example, increased from a minute 4.9%, in 1965, to 28.6%, in 1987, reflecting something of a re-evaluation of child-rearing preferences, as well as a market at least somewhat responsive to effective demand (U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics, 1989: 57). Multivariate analysis has revealed that a major determinant of the choice of some form of paid child care by working mothers, whether in-home, day care centres, or nursery school, was the mother's weekly wage (but not the father's), no doubt a characteristic outcome of essentially market-driven child-care provision and an indication of how social class differentially affects women's family decisions (Leibowitz, Waite, and Witsberger, 1988: 214). According to survey results from 1965, 1974, and 1984 on the child-care situation for six- to thirteen-year-old children of full-time employed mothers, the category "external child care by nonrelatives" garnered an average of 13%, with only minor variation. It is astounding for Europeans that the entrusting of child care to the private sector can be compatible with high female-employment rates - doubtlessly because it is supplemented and supported by facilities such as all-day schools. In Quebec, the state has made some efforts to encourage a rebound of fertility. Although federal tax benefits for parents have declined in real-dollar terms over the last several years, the combined effect of federal and provincial fiscal policies has been progressive and now amounts to benefits that constitute, for an average income, approximately one-quarter of the cost of caring for children. In the matter of extra-familial child care, Quebec is characterized by a similarly complex picture. There are both non-subsidized and subsidized nonprofit day-care centres, profit-making day-care centres, school day care, "stop-over centres," and nursery schools. Day-care centres have existed since the early seventies, and at present services accommodate approximately 90,000 children from birth to the end of elementary school. However, demand far exceeds the services offered: the rate at which needs are met amounts to 56% for the zero- to five-years age group, and to only 19% for children aged six to eleven years (Policy Statement on Day Care Services: 1988). These facilities - as in France and the U.S., but in contrast to West 76

Fertility

Germany - are mainly directed toward all-day care. However, the under-supply of facilities does not prevent a large proportion of mothers from pursuing employment. In 1990, in accordance with a progressive implementation of a more pro-highbirthrate policy, Quebec offered a bonus of $6,000 (Cnd.) for third children in a family. The situation in Spain is different yet again. Until 1985, the family as a whole was regarded as a single taxation unit, although this regulation has since been rejected by the courts, and today spouses may file separate returns. However, deductions for child nurseries and kindergarten, domestic help, housing, and so on are still nonexistent. In 1967, economic allowances received per family amounted to 6.13% of the minimum wage, and this deteriorated to only 0.62% in 1985. In 1967, the budget for family allowances was around 25% of the total social-security budget, whereas in 1986 it amounted to less than 1%. A comparison of allowances in Spain and the rest of the European Community showed that in 1986, to receive what a British mother got for one child, a Spanish mother would have to have 17 children. (To receive what a Belgian mother got for 10 children, a Spanish mother would have to have 675!) On the whole, the former pro-high-birthrate family policy has been replaced by a policy of war on poverty. Its goal is to decrease vertical inequalities of income, rather than horizontal inequalities derived from the fact of having children. In fact, the Spanish public - an important difference with respect to the other societies under study - sees having children as being as much a financial burden as a threat to individual life styles: 87% of those interviewed declared that economic crisis caused families to have fewer children or to delay births, while 67% thought that it resulted in not having any. In the same sample, 93% were of the opinion that government should provide kindergartens and 66% felt that the law should permit one parent to stay at home with the children although 34% still thought it should control the use of contraceptives (Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 1988). In our fourth proposition, we advanced that either extensive public support to parents or a strong marriage norm were essential to maintaining near-replacementlevel fertility. Having considered the extent of public support, we now comment on the state of the marriage norm in our five societies. In Spain, Quebec, and West Germany - non-replacement level societies - marriage and motherhood are still associated in the collective memory of women with a high degree of societally imposed rigidity. Nazi propaganda assigned women a firm place as bearers of sons - future soldiers. In the 1950s, a rehabilitation of the nuclear family led to it being considered a guarantee of happiness and peace. Both models, prewar and postwar, were fairly uncompromising on the question of female life planning outside of matrimony and children. In Spain and Quebec, in addition, there is a heritage of 77

Convergence or Divergence

a socially imposed destiny for women. Until 1968 in Quebec and until 1975 in Spain, a divorce - in accordance with the Catholic dogma of indissoluble matrimony - was next to impossible to obtain. As mentioned above, facilities for external child care were not available to any notable extent until the past few years. Both the creation and the maintenance of a traditional domestic establishment - marriage and raising children - are, for Quebec, Spanish and West German women, institutions founded upon a tradition of social pressure and constraint incompatible with their present aspirations. In the U.S., throughout the current century, there has been a very different attitude toward marriage and family, with the result that people marry sooner and more often. As we have pointed out, the marriage rate in the U.S. is almost double that in West Germany, France, and Quebec. In addition, divorce is better incorporated into the marriage institution, and is more readily resolved by prompt remarriage. Though children - thanks, in part, to a lack of government involvement in the coordination of child-care facilities - may still constitute a certain hindrance to flexible life planning for women, marriage is seen as far less of a constraint. The opposite seems to be the case in France. It would appear that the lower intensity of the French feminist movement - undoubtedly a consequence of the government institutionalizing its demands early on - has allowed gender-specific roles to persevere in a variety of everyday spheres, more than in the other societies examined. In addition, an infrastructural framework (as described above) provides a solution to the problem of external child care, freeing motherhood of many of its restrictive aspects. SEPARATING THE SHORT TERM FROM THE MEDIUM AND LONG TERMS

We come now to our last, most methodological proposition, inspired by our empirical comparative analysis: if our understanding of fertility change is to progress, we must distinguish among long-term, medium-term, and short-term trends. If we fail to separate out the simultaneous impacts of trends operating over the short term (a decade or less), the medium term (from a decade to a quarter century), and the long term (over a quarter century), we are less able to detect trends that would otherwise be interpreted as unexplained change. Of course, such reasoning assumes that the three different types of trends do in fact exist. Let us now consider our five-society fertility data with this postulate in mind. Most demographers would agree that the long-term trend in the industrialized world has been the transition from high fertility (four to six children per family) to low fertility (no more than two to three), and that this trend began in

78

Fertility

the Europeanized world (with some exceptions21) in the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Chesnais, 1986). Of our five societies, three (France, West Germany, and the U.S.) had made the transition before the Second World War; Quebec did so somewhat later, and Spain even later. The reasons for this trend, called the demographic transition, have been associated with industrialization, urbanization, and economic development. Our observation period, 1960 to 1990, is both too short and too recent to observe this long-term trend, or whether there has been a change in direction that would signal the emergence of a new long-term trend. Indeed, our observation period, although perhaps part of another long-term trend that will be recognizable and characterized in hindsight,22 lends itself best to the search for medium-term trends in industrial, urbanized Western societies; what we have called, for the purposes of this discussion, modernized societies. We suggest that there are, subsequent to the baby-boom trend period of the late 1940s to the early 1960s, two discernible medium-term trends. The first is the "fertility collapse" or "baby bust" period which began in the middle and late 1960s, observable in all societies but Spain, where it began 10 years later; the second is the post-feminist-revolution period, in which fertility behaviour was transformed in ways hitherto unknown. This trend began in the mid-1970s, except in Spain, where it manifested itself in the early 1980s. The first trend operated over a period of approximately 15 years, and the second has been with us for the same duration. With regard to the existence, generality, and causes of these two trends, we have a few remarks to make in the context of our comparative analysis. First, it is remarkable that both trends, and more particularly the second, should have made themselves felt - as did the unforseen baby boom - in four societies (France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S.) at approximately the same time. They are, indeed, the consequence of the two common turning-points we distilled from our preliminary descriptive review of the evolution of fertility in the five societies. The inescapable conclusion is that there are material circumstances and value changes that operate on these societies as a single system. The fifth society, Spain, which was not at the time a thoroughly modernized society, is now, it appears, experiencing the same trends, as its social fabric comes into "phase" with the modernized world.

21

France is the notable exception, in that the transition began there in the eighteenth century.

22

Perhaps this will be a transition from "low fertility" to "non-replacement fertility," as many early twentiethcentury commentators like Oswald Spenglar (Decline of the West, 1918) argued would be the fate of highly urbanized societies. Or, perhaps the advent of an expansionary phase in a new Kondratief cycle will produce an Easterlin effect: increased fertility from a generation that will have benefitted from its own relatively low numbers.

79

Convergence or Divergence

Nonetheless, after it has been said that these societies belong to a wider societal system, the question remains as to how such significant changes in something as fundamental as fertility behaviour could take place in such quick succession in four different societies. Although we do not pretend to be able to answer this question, let us consider separately the probable causes of our two medium-term trends, beginning with the events closest to fertility behaviour in what is obviously a complex causal chain.23 In the case of the fertility collapse of the 1960s, much of what explains the rapidity of the transition was no doubt technological - the availability of effective contraception, particularly the Pill. The rapid and widespread dissemination of the Pill in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S. is eloquent testimony to the pervasiveness of communications and product distribution in modern market economies. Obviously, there also existed a shared value system that made these populations receptive to the technology once it was available.24 With regard to the post-feminist-revolution trend, the quick country-by-country succession of immediate causes of lower fertility - delaying first inception, delaying marriage, forgoing marriage and bearing children out of wedlock - is discernible in our comparative data (see table 3). The lock-step succession of the inflection in these four very operational indicators of fertility behaviour is quite dramatic and presupposes that the revolution in gender roles swept the modernized world almost simultaneously. In the modernized world, an entire cohort - not even a generation - of women experienced the same revolution at approximately the same time, the cohort that was in its early twenties in the mid1970s - those born in the mid-1950s. In terms of Lesthaeghe and Surkyn's (1988) analysis of the cultural dynamics of post-war fertility change, we suggest that this is the next pure-cohort discontinuity after the baby-bust post-materialist discontinuity (those born 1946 to 1955). That such profound cultural change should be so rapid and so widespread both within and among societies is surprising. Surely, this is both only possible in, and characteristic of, the modernized world. One sobering element of the scientific fall-out of the existence of these medium-term trends in modernized societies is that we are probably able to foresee the course of fertility behaviour in newly modernized societies. For instance, we can be reasonably sure that the post-feminist-revolution fertility-behaviour changes that occurred in the early 1980s in Spain will further depress the fertility level in that country, as they did in Quebec; and that Greece, where the same changes took place

23

Lesthaeghe and Surkyn's (1988) analysis attempts to encompass the entire chain, incorporating, for instance the Becker and Easterlin models.

24

We recall here that cultural diffusion via schooling and the media are important elements in both Lesthaeghe and Surkyn's (1988) and John Caldwell's (1982) theories of fertility decline.

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Fertility

Figure 15 Best Trend-Fit fertility Rate,France, 1960-90

Figure 16 Short-Term Variation TFR.France, 1960-90

Source:

Data for France in table 1 and the Hodrick-Prescott smoothing technique, lambda =400 81

Convergence or Divergence

in the late 1980s, will see its already low TFR (1.52 in 1989) continue to decline for at least half a decade. And what about short-term trends? These would be trends visible in the pattern of annual variations remaining after extraction of the effect of medium- and long-term trends. As it happens, there is an extensive literature25 - ignored by demographers and sociologists but well known to economists - that documents the existence of a short-term fertility cycle correlated to the business cycle in the industrial world over the last century (Lodh, 1987). In Quebec, medium- and long-term trends have been extracted to demonstrate the existence of short-term trends related to the business cycle (Caldwell and Czarnocki, 1977; Caldwell, Frechet, and Thibeault, 1992).26 When one "detrends" the French data, what remains is a cyclical pattern that is, no doubt, a mirror image of the business cycle27 (figures 15 and 16). In figure 16, it is notable that the moments of short-term depression in fertility coincide with the 1961-62, 1973-75, and 1981-82 recessions, not to mention the less severe 1965 and 1967 "contractions."28 Those interested in the correlation between the business cycle and short-term fertility variation report that, in the post-Second World War period, as much as three quarters of the variation is accounted for by the business cycle (Kirk, 1960). Interestingly, since the relationship was first adequately demonstrated - in the United Kingdom at the end of the last century (Yule, 1906) - it has become progressively more important. The interpretation advanced is that this is a manifestation of the progressive penetration of individual decision making into a realm once more influenced by norms associated with family formation - notably, for instance, the connection between getting or being married and having children (Galbraith and Thomas, 1941). In conclusion, what can we infer from the above comparative analysis in a universe of five modernized (or modernizing) societies, over and above the five specific propositions advanced in this text? One can, we suggest, hypothesize that, despite a convergence of fertility levels in Western societies, there are two distinct fertility-level plateaus: a near-replacement level at a TFR of 1.8, and a non-replacement level in the 1.4 TFR range. Furthermore, although all modern societies are subject to the same long-term, medium-term, and even short-term trends,

25

See, for instance, Kirk (1960).

26

Using quadratic de-trending of logged data.

27

In the case of French data, we have used as a smoothing technique to simulate a long term trend: the Hodrick -- Prescott method.

28

These are the dates of the post-1960 recessions and contractions as experienced in Canada.

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Fertility

cultural and social-policy differences do make a difference - and a crucial one, in that it is these indigenous influences that determine whether a society experiences one or another of the contemporary fertility plateaus. For instance, the strong marriage norm in the U.S. and a long-standing state pro-natalism in France appear to be related to the fact that both of these societies have near-replacement-level fertility. Sweden, where efforts to raise fertility have been successful, is now undoubtedly a case of the latter (Hoem, 1990). Notwithstanding this prevalence of trends, the phasing of the medium-term trends is a function of the phasing of modernization itself, with the consequence that the turning-points involved are not necessarily simultaneous. This phasing is a question not only of sequence, but of when and how rapidly modernization takes place. Late modernization is, inevitably, accelerated modernization, and accelerated modernization has perturbing effects in terms of behaviours related to fertility. Of our three non-replacement-level societies, two, Quebec and Spain, have experienced late and accelerated modernization. As for West Germany, the fact that it has fallen to the lower, non-replacement fertility plateau is, we suspect, a consequence of the distortions in the modernizing process arising from Germany's defeat in the Second World War, a mere generation and a half ago. Finally, nothing in the evolution of the four fertility contextual-behaviour indicators (average age at first maternity, average age at first marriage, marriage rate, and the proportion of births outside of marriage), the inflection in direction of which signaled the post-feminist-revolution turning point (1971 to 1975), would indicate a reversal of the current trend of sub-replacement fertility. Indeed, fertility theorists who subscribe to the influence of the modernization or secularization process on fertility invoked in this analysis - John Caldwell (1982), Kingsley Davis (1984), Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn (1988), and Larry Bumpass (1990) - can see no reason that the present long-term trend decline should not continue! We shall content ourselves with noting that we are due for a medium-term redirection, and that this redirection will be up, not down;29 however, the medium-term is not the long term.30

29

When this article was first drafted, in 1990, the current rise in fertility in the Western world was not at all evident.

30

Indeed, we stand by our position that the current up-turn in fertility is a medium-term, and not necessarily a long-term, development.

83

References Bumpass, Larry L. 1990 "What's Happening to the Family? Interactions between Demographic and Institutional Change." Demography, 27, no. 4: 483^98. Calame, Andre, and Maria Fiedler 1982 Massnahmen zuggunsten einer besseren Vereinbarkeit von Familie und Beruf. Berlin: Discussion paper des Wissenchaftszentrum. Caldwell, Gary, and Bohdan Czarnocki 1977 "Un rattrapage rate. II. La variation a court terme." Recherches sociographiques, 18, no. 3: 367-396. Caldwell, Gary, Guy Fre"chet, and Normand Thibault 1992 "Les determinants de revolution recente de la fecondite au Quebec." Quebec: Institut quebecois de recherche sur la culture. Caldwell, John C. 1982 Theory of Fertility Decline. London: Academic Press. Calot, Grand J., and D. Leroy 1989 La population de la France. Paris: Seminaires, Groupe no. 1: Politique de 1'enfance et de la natalite, ENA. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Carlinger, Geoffrey, et al. 1980 "Female Labour Supply and Fertility in Canada." The Canadian Journal of Economics, 13, no. 1: 46-64. Castelain-Meunier, Christine, and Jeanne Fagnani 1988 "Deux ou trois enfants: les nouveaux arbritages des femmes." Revue francaise des affaires sociales, 42, no. 1: 45-66. Chalvon-Demersay, Sabine 1983 Concubins, concubines. Paris: Les editions du Seuil. Chesnais, Jean-Claude 1986 La transition demographique. Paris: Institut national d'etudes demographiques, Presses universitaires de France. Davis, Kingsley 1984 "Wives and Work: Consequences of the Sex Role Revolution." Population and Development Review, 10, no. 3: 397-417. Del Campo, Salustiano 1991 La nuevafamilia espanola. Madrid: Eudema. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag.

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Galbraith, V.L., and D.S. Thomas 1941 "Birth Rates and the Interwar Business Cycles." Journal of the American Statistical Association, 36, no. 216: 465-477. Gershuny, Jonathan, and John P. Robinson 1988 "Historical Changes in the Household Division of Labor." Demography, 25: 537-552. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glenn, Norval D., and Charles N. Weaver 1988 "The Changing Relationship of Marital Status to Reported Happiness." Journal of Marriage and the Family, 50: 317-327. Grignon, Michel 1985-86 "Famille: 1'ecume des changements n'ebranle pas 1'edifice." CREDOC Consommation, 3. Henripin, Jacques, Paul-Marie Huot, Evelyne Lapierre-Adamcyk, and Nicole Marcil-Gratton 1981 Les Enfants qu'on n'a plus au Quebec. Montreal: Presses de 1'Universite de Montreal. Hodrick, R.J., and F. Prescott 1980 "Post-war U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation." Working Paper no. 451, rev. ed. Pittsburg: Carnegie-Mellon University. Hoem, Jan M. 1990 "Social Policy and Recent Fertility Change in Sweden." Population and Development Review, 16, no. 4: 735-748. Hopflinger, Francois 1987 Wandel der Familienbildung in Westeuropa. Frankfurt. INNER 1988 Los hombres espanoles, Madrid: Institute de la Mujer. INSEE 1990 Donnees sociales, Paris: Institut national de la statistique et des etudes economiques. Joffe, Carole 1983 "Why the United States Has No Child-Care Policy." In Irene Diamond, Families, Politics, and Public Policy, 168-182. New York: Longman. Kirk, Dudley 1960 "The Influence of Business Cycles on Marriage and Birth Rate." In Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries, 241-260. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Klages, Helmut 1985 Wertorientierungen im Wandel. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Lebert, Ursula 1985 "Der Mann." Brigitte: 21-24. Leibowitz, Arleen, Linda J. Waite, and Christina Witsberger 1988 "Child Care for Preschoolers: Differences by Child's Age." Demography, 25, no. 2: 205-220.

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Lesthaeghe, R., and Johan Surkyn 1988 "Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change." Population and Development Review, 14, no. 1: 1-45. Lodh, Fran§oise 1987 "Explaining Fertility Decline in the West (with Special Reference to Canada): A Critique of Research Results from the Social Sciences." Ottawa: The Vanier Institute of the Family. Modell, John 1989 Into One's Own. From Youth to Adulthood in the United States 1920-1975. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nave-Herz, Rosemarie, ed. 1988 Wandel und Kontinuitat der Familie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Stuttgart. Piel, Edgar 1987 1m Geflecht der kleinen Netze. Vom deutschen Riickzug ins Private, Zurich. Policy Statement on Day-Care Services 1988 A Better Balance. Orientation Paper: Quebec City. Popenoe, David 1988 Disturbing the Nest: Family Change and Decline in Modern Societies. New York: Aldene de Gruyter. Revista Espanola de Investigaciones Sociologieas 1988 44, October-December. Rochon, Madeleine 1989 "La vie reproductive des femmes aujourd'hui. Le cas du Quebec." Cahiers quebecois de demographic, 18, no. 1: 15-61. Rockwell, Richard C. 1976 "Historical Trends and Variations in Educational Homogamy." Journal of Marriage and the Family, 38: 83-96. Schumacher, Jiirgen 1988 "Leistungsniveau und Leistungsbereitschaft in der Familie." In K.O. Hondrich and J. Schumacher, eds., Krise der Leistungsgesellschaft. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. Simon, Rita J., and Jean M. Landis 1989 "Women's and Men's Attitudes about a Woman's Place and Role." The Public Opinion Quarterly, 53, no. 2: 265-276. Stoetzel, Jean 1983 Les valeurs du temps present: Une enquete europeenne. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Thornton, Arland 1989 "Changing Attitudes Toward Family Issues in the United States." Journal of Marriage and the Family, 51: 873-893. Toharia, Jose Juan 1989 Cambias recientes en la sociedad espanola. Madrid: Institute de Estudios Economicos. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1989 Handbook of Labor Statistics. Bulletin 2340. Washington. U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics 1989 Digest of Educational Statistics, 1989. Washington. Veroff, Joseph, Elizabeth Douvan, and Richard A. Kulka 1981 The Inner American, a Self-Portrait from 1957 to 1976. New York: Basic Books. 86

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Yule, G.U. 1906

"On the Changes in the Marriage and Birth-Rates in England and Wales During the Past Half Century; with an Inquiry as to Their Probable Causes." Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 69: 88-132.

Ziegler, Rolf 1985 "Bildungsexpansion und Partnerwahl." In Stefan Hradil, ed., Sozialstruktur im Umbruch, 85-106. Opladen: Leske Verlag und Budrich GmbH. .

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4 Employment and Labour-Market Change. Toward Two Models of Growth Heinz-Herbert NOLL Simon LANGLOIS

Many changes have occurred in the composition of the labour force in the developed industrial societies over the last 30 years. These changes are primarily the result of structural transformation in the labour market and developments in the demand and supply of labour. The modernization and computerization of businesses have resulted in job losses and forced some older workers to retire. The tertiarization of the economy, particularly job growth in the service sector, has created more opportunities for paid work outside the home for women and young people. Increasingly, these changes have also been brought on by social changes outside the labour market. The supply of labour underwent major transformations as a result of demographic developments, such as population ageing and increased immigration, and social or cultural changes, the most important of which is probably the new roles taken on by women, whose presence in the labour market has increased everywhere. Decreasing fertility, higher individual levels of education, increases in life expectancy, and rising numbers of divorces, to name just a few examples, have had major effects on the structure and composition of the labour force. Because they are numerous and diversified, these factors may be combined in a number of ways. Even highly modernized societies on a similar level of social and economic development, like the ones under consideration here, show remarkable structural differences. Why is the average retirement age in France lower than elsewhere? Why 89

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 1 Changes in Total Population Aged 15 to 64, in Index (1966=100), France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1966-90

Sources: OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 91-512,91-210,and 71-001.

Figure 2 Labour-Force Participation Rates, Population Aged 15 to 64, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1969-90

Sources: OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 91-512,91-210,71-001, and 71-529.

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is the rate of women's participation in the labour market higher in the United States? Why has this rate grown more rapidly in Quebec than everywhere else? Why is the proportion of service-sector employment lower in Germany? The answers to these questions must be sought through a systematic examination of social and economic transformations, and especially of their interrelationships, which take on different forms from one society to another. This is the approach we are following here. We will begin by looking at changes in total population, trends that characterize participation in the labour market, and changes in total employment - that is, the supply and demand of jobs. We will then identify trends in labour-market participation by age and by sex, since there are significant variations at both ends of the working-life cycle and in the female population, and these differ from society to society. An analysis of structural changes in the labour market will follow. The presumed decline in employment in smokestack industries will be examined, as will the increase in services, although these are less and less distinguishable from goods. Do men and women work in the same sectors? Is the quality of their respective jobs different? Types of employment and precariousness will be considered as indications of different outcomes of labour-market operations. Finally, we shall look at the scope and structure of unemployment in the four societies as a major labour-market problem during the last two decades. It is obvious that some trends differ in various ways in the four societies, and that others have at least different rates of change. Is there, then, a convergence or a divergence between the four industrialized societies? The answer to this question will conclude the analysis. TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT AND OCCUPATIONAL ACTIVITY

Two factors affect the evolution of the demand for jobs in any society: changes in the population of working age1 and in participation in the labour market. Between 1966 and 1990, growth in the population of working age was stronger in North America than in Europe: 39% in the United States and 34% in Quebec, compared to 21% in France and 15% in West Germany (figure 1). Demand for jobs also grew more strongly in North America, particularly among women and young people. Over all, the rate of labour-force participation was very similar across the four societies in the late 1960s, at about 65%. This rate decreased slightly in France and Germany and increased in the U.S. and Quebec in the late 1980s. Over a 20-year period, a gap of about 10% developed between the two pairs of societies (figure 2). These data show a major difference: a much higher proportion of

1

Corresponding to the categories used by the OECD, the population of working age is defined here as the 15to-64-year-old population.

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Figure 3 Evolution of Total Employment, France, Germany, Quebec and U.S., 1966-90

Sources: OECD, 1992; Statistics Canada, cat. nos 91-512, 91-210, 71-001, and 71-529.

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individuals of working age are in the labour marked in North America than in Europe. In other words, North Americans work more than Europeans. This divergent development is revealed even more clearly when the supply of jobs is examined. Between 1966 and 1990, the number of jobs held increased very slightly in West Germany, growing by a total of 6%, and even underwent negative growth from 1974 to 1976 and from 1980 to 1983 (figure 3). The number of jobs began to increase again gradually in 1984, and growth accelerated considerably during the second half of the 1980s. By 1990, Germany had an unprecedented level of employment. Growth in the total number of jobs held was also quite low in France: 10% during the period considered. However, this growth took place only until the mid1970s, and the number of jobs has actually been nearly stable since then. In both European countries, growth in employment has thus been considerably lower than growth in the population of working age. The situation is different in North America, where the number of jobs held grew more rapidly than the population of working age, and job growth was considerably higher. By 1990, the index, calculated on the basis of 1966=100, reached a much higher level in the U.S. (160) and Quebec (151) than in France (110) and Germany (106), where it barely exceeded the level at the beginning of the period. In summary, there was strong growth of employment in North America but not in Europe, first because the population of working age increased more rapidly, but also because of higher participation rates and a larger supply of jobs. PARTICIPATION IN THE LABOUR MARKET

Men and women have had opposite behaviour patterns in the labour market over the past two decades: there has been a decrease in the labour-force participation rate among men and an increase among women (figure 4). The gap between the rates has shrunk considerably; the difference is smallest in Quebec and remains most pronounced in Germany. In Europe, the low increases in the female participation rate in fact partially offset the withdrawal of older men and young people from the labour market, so that the over-all labour-force participation rate has decreased only slightly; the two developments in a sense have cancelled each other out. The situation is different in North America. In the United States, the decrease in the male labour-force participation rate was quite slight and less pronounced than elsewhere; on the other hand, the female labour-market participation rate rose to a level higher than that in the other societies. These two movements explain the strong increase of labour-force participation in the United States. In Quebec, changes in labour-force participation rates occurred more rapidly and more markedly than elsewhere. The rate for men, 93

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Figure 4 Labour-Force Participation Rates by Sex,Population Aged 15 to 64, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1969-90

Sources: OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 91-512,91-210, and 71-001.

particularly those 55 years and older, dropped faster and to a lower level, whereas the rate for women increased more rapidly. As a result, the differences between male and female involvement in the labour market were progressively reduced. Significant changes also occurred in the four societies in participation rates of specific age groups, particularly those at the beginning and the end of the working-life cycle. For practical reasons, we shall limit our analysis to three groups: men and women aged 15-24, 25-54, and 55-64 years (figure 5). It is more difficult to measure the labour-force participation rate of young people than of any other age group, because institutional differences among the societies - particularly in the educational system - make international comparisons more complicated (Freeman and Medoff, 1982; OECD, 1988). In spite of these limitations, it can be stated that the over-all rate of labour-force participation by young people is distinctly higher in North America than in Europe. This difference can be explained to a large extent by a much higher propensity to hold jobs among students aged 15 to 19 in North America than in France and Germany: more than 40% of 15-to-19-year-old students in the U.S. and Quebec held jobs in the late 1980s, while only about 1% in France and 5% in Germany did so. Among 20-to-24year-old students, the labour-force participation rate is about 60% in the U.S. and 50% in Quebec, compared to only 15% in France and 12% in Germany.

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The labour-force participation rate of young people rose very rapidly in Quebec during the 1970s and 1980s, and has almost reached the level in the U.S.. However, most of them work at part-time jobs, since they attend an educational institution and therefore cannot work on a full-time basis. According to an OECD study, "the availability of part-time jobs is a factor that contributes substantially to propagating the work-and-study formula among young people" (OECD, 1988: 64). The more restricted availability of part-time jobs in France and Germany and institutional characteristics of the educational system, particularly greater pressure on students in North America to earn their own living, explain the differences observed. France is distinct from the other societies, since the labour-force participation rate among both men and women aged 15 to 24 there has been decreasing substantially since 1970. This 15% drop can be attributed, at least in part, to the increase in unemployment, which has closed the doors of the labour market particularly to young people. Other factors accounting for the decline are the expansion of the educational system, including implementation of post-school training schemes set up to counteract the high rate of youth unemployment. The data for Germany indicate a trend parallel to that of France at the beginning of the period examined: a decrease in the rate of participation until 1982, followed by an increase. The much higher labour-force participation rate of young Germans compared to the French may at least in part be due to the German system of vocational training, which is different from that in France and in North America. The most important type of vocational training in Germany is apprenticeship, which is a three-year course combining practical training in a business and part-time theoretical training in school. As opposed to forms of vocational training inside the school system, this type of training is considered employment in labour-market statistics. Therefore, the labour-force participation of young people is comparatively high in Germany, particularly for those who are not studying at the same time. The increase observed since 1980 can be explained in part by an increase in the number of apprenticeships due to the baby-boom generation, but also by a general improvement in the labour-market situation. The decrease in participation before 1980 can be explained in all societies by the increasing amount of time spent in school or in other types of general education and vocational training. Almost all men aged 25-55 years are in the labour force in the four societies analyzed. The pronounced increase of female labour-force participation is certainly one of the most important changes to have occurred in our contemporary societies, and this can be traced to a shorter childbearing period and increasingly high levels of education among women. Another major change is the increasingly continuous labour-market-participation profile of married women with dependent children. Fewer and fewer women abandon their occupational activities after the arrival of children. Withdrawal from the market after marriage or after having a child is declining, 95

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Figure 5 Labour-Force Participation Rate, by Sex and Age, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1970-90 Men Women

Sources: OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 91-512,91-210, and 71-001.

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except the case of women having three or more children. Another significant change is that career interruption is shorter than before, when it does occur at all. As a consequence, the patterns of male and female labour-market participation are becoming increasingly similar. Since 1970, the female participation rate in the middle-age group has increased continuously in France and the United States, climbing from 50% to about 74% in the late eighties. It reached almost a similar level in Quebec, but at the end of a more rapid increase over a 15-year period. Female employment is significantly lower in Germany than in the other three societies; at the end of the eighties the participation rate of 25-54-year-old women was only somewhat above 60%. Starting from a similar level in the early seventies, female labour-force participation increased as constantly as in other countries, but at a slower rate. There is good reason to assume that this is related to the lesser degree of tertiarization of the German economy and to the fact that the participation of German women in the labour market is lower during the maximum childbearing period and among women with dependent children. These differences correspond to differences in attitudes toward women's roles. There is empirical evidence that the proportion of men and women approving of women working while taking care of young children at home is much smaller in Germany than in the United States (Alvin, Braun, and Scott, 1992), France, and Quebec. Besides the massive influx of women into the labour market, the premature withdrawal of an increasing proportion of men aged 55 to 64 no doubt constitutes one of the major transformations in the labour market (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein, 199la). The decrease in labour-force participation of the male population in this age group was quite sharp in France, dropping from 75% in 1970 to 46% in 1990. The decline was accelerated by the adoption of governmental measures to encourage early retirement in order to create jobs for young unemployed persons (Guillemard, 1991). It was also pronounced in Germany until 1982, after which time it slowed down (Jacobs, Kohli, and Rein, 1991b). The participation rate of men in this age group was higher in Quebec than in the U.S. in 1975, but it dropped more rapidly in Quebec, at nearly the same rate as in France. Programmes aiming to promote early retirement encouraged this decline in all of the societies, as did accelerated retirement for health reasons, not to mention the difficult economic situation, which compelled many workers, employed mainly in traditional industrial sectors, to take forced retirement. In summary, the labour force has undergone significant transformations, the amplitude of which has differed from society to society. In North America, more women and young people have taken on jobs, thereby increasing the proportion of the population employed as a whole, whereas fewer older men have withdrawn from the labour market, in contrast to what has occurred in Europe.

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In summarizing the evolution of labour-force participation in the societies considered, it can be concluded that the two most outstanding common trends are an increase in concentration of employment within the intermediate age group and a gradual decrease in the gap between male and female labour-force participation rates and patterns. In this respect, it is not so much the direction of the trends that accounts for the differences between these societies, but rather the continuity and the rates of change. SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF THE LABOUR MARKET

The labour market underwent profound changes between 1960 and 1990, ranging from the relative decline of the secondary sector and a rise in precariousness to the spreading of unemployment, not to mention a redefinition of the boundaries between the production sector and the service sector, which are now no longer as clearcut as they used to be. There is a regular and ongoing shrinkage in the manufacturing sector as a whole in all four societies. Employment in this sector was at a higher level in West Germany, and the gap between this society and the other three remained constant throughout the period. In Germany, 32% of the labour force was employed in manufacturing in 1990, versus 21% in France, 19% in Quebec, and 18% in the United States (figure 6). A relative decline in employment in the manufacturing sector does not mean that the industrial sector was decreasing in absolute numbers. In both the U.S. and Quebec, the absolute number of jobs in the secondary sector remained at about the same level between 1969 and 1990, with slight upward or downward variations according to economic cycles. In order to neutralize these variations in the short term and to better identify the long-term trend, we have calculated five-year moving averages to describe the evolution of the real number of manufacturing jobs (figure 7). An examination of the trend indicates a drop in the real number of jobs in this sector in West Germany and in France, and the gap between these two countries had narrowed by 1990. The decline in the relative employment share of the secondary sector cannot in general be interpreted as a sign of deindustrialization (Caplow, 1990; Lawrence, 1984; Loveman and Tilly, 1988). In North America, employment in this sector remained at about the same level during this period. It is only the large increase in service-sector employment that caused the decrease in the relative over-all importance of the secondary sector, creating a statistical illusion. The situation in France and Germany is different from that in North America, where industrial employment is decreasing in both relative and absolute terms, while its level is still higher in the European countries, particularly Germany. 98

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Figure 6

Civilian Employment Rate in Manufacturing and Service Industries, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1966-90

Sources:

OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 71-529 and 71-001. Bureau de la statistiquedu Quebec, Annuaire du Quebec.

Figure 7 Civilian Employment in Manufacturing Industries, in Index (1971=100), Five Years Moving Average, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1971-88

Sources:

OECD, 1992; StatisticsCanada, cat. nos 71-529 and 71-001. Bureau de la statistiquedu Quebec, Annuaire du Quebec.

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Service-sector employment has undergone rapid growth since 1966. This trend reveals a major structural change, already anticipated early on by Clark (1940) and Fourastier (1954). The level of employment in this sector exceeded 70% in the U.S. and Quebec in 1990 (figure 6). In these economies, the ceiling of 80%, which Fourastier had identified as attainable in this sector, is about to be reached. In regard to level of tertiarization, Germany is thus among the latecomers in Europe, whereas France holds an intermediary position. If we compare the points in time at which the share of employment in the service sector began to exceed 50%, it becomes obvious that the changes in the sectoral structure of the labour force have not taken place simultaneously. In France and Germany, this level was not reached until the mid-1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, respectively, as compared to Quebec, where more than 50% of the labour force were employed in the service sector as early as 1960, or the United States, where this phenomenon could be observed in the 1950s. In the societies that registered an increase in employment in the 1980s, this increase is almost entirely concentrated in the service sector. The dynamics of the tertiarization process are still strong even in those economies in which tertiarization is most advanced. It particularly favours women and young and well-trained employees. The American experience, however, proves that the expansion of the service sector is not automatically linked to an increase in high-skill jobs, but that it does affect the number of jobs for which higher levels of qualification are not required. Germany has not yet managed to make up for its above-average time lag in tertiarization. In respect to service-sector employment, the United States was ahead of Germany by 18% in 1970 and by 14% in 1990. France, on the other hand, has gained ground on its way toward a service economy and has reduced its gap in comparison with the United States by half (14% in 1970, 7% in 1990). There may be various reasons for the considerable differences in the size of the service economy, even between societies that by other standards have reached similar levels of development. There is certainly no simple and universal explanation for this phenomenon. The variations observed in the sectoral distribution of the labour-force are at least in part due to the fact that the statistical procedure of assigning employees to economic sectors is handled by different classification principles from society to society. Individual businesses, or even entire industries, classified in the service sector in one society may be assigned to the manufacturing sector in another, and vice versa. There is ample evidence, for example, that the degree of tertiarization in terms of sectoral distribution of the labour force is underestimated for Germany. As to Germany and its tertiarization time lag, discussion has focused on three factors. One might argue that the potential for expansion of employment in social 100

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services is more limited in societies in which these services are not primarily supplied by the market, as they are in the U.S., but are provided by welfare-state institutions and financed by the public, and are thus subjected to specific restrictions. The rather strong external orientation of the German economy seems to be a second explanation for the observed differences, given the correlation between a larger service sector and the strength of the internal orientation of an economy. In addition, the international competitiveness of the manufacturing industries may contribute to the fact that secondary-sector employment in Germany is larger than in comparable economies. While these factors - with some qualifications - may also account for the smaller gap between France and North America, there is also evidence that the process of "contracting out," in which service functions within secondary-sector businesses are taken over by specialized tertiary-sector businesses, is less advanced in Germany than in France, the U.S., or Quebec. Obviously, this process has contributed substantially to the expansion of the service sector in recent years. Internalization of the market is much more marked in Germany, where, for example, large industrial enterprises carry out many activities which would be otherwise classified as services. While employment shares in the service sector differ, developmental trends within the tertiary sector are strikingly similar across the societies. Business-oriented services have expanded the most in all four societies, and there is an above-average increase in social services, particularly in the fields of health and education. These service functions are the ones in which Germany may still have a lot of catching up to do, compared to other countries with a higher degree of tertiarization. Thus some authors claim that there is a good chance of a further increase in employment in the service sector (Krupp, 1986). Finally, it should be pointed out that growth in services was more rapid in societies that had reached the highest levels of labour-market participation among married women. Indeed, the arrival of married women in the labour market implied a shift in a number of activities relating to production in day-to-day life - such as child care and housework - toward the open market; these activities are then taken into consideration in the national accounts and recognized in the official statistics, which is not the case for housework done by women not active in the labour market. As a general trend in the change of the sectoral structure of work, it must be stated that the classic distinction between goods and services, as described by Hill (1977), is less and less valid, and the dividing line between the two is increasingly vague. The manufacture of products requires more and more services, and certain goods are highly personalized. Moreover, the production of certain services is increasingly linked to the production of goods (Gershuny, 1978). But it is particularly the arrival of new technologies that has contributed to making the boundary between 101

Convergence or Divergence

goods and services more vague, as was clearly demonstrated in a study by the Economic Council of Canada (1991). A service produced by a business can be stored, as in the case of a computer programme or an audiovisual presentation, or it can be produced on an assembly line (fast food or frozen food). There are delays in the delivery of certain services, and the personalized relationship can be entirely absent. Certain classic characteristics of goods may also apply to a broad range of services, and characteristics of services may apply to an increasing number of goods, such as personalization or just-in-time delivery. For example, cars or bicycles that are personalized to a certain extent can be mass-produced. As well, there are increasing numbers of machines and new technologies involved in the distribution of services such as health care, personal financial management, scientific research, and education. This effacement of the boundaries between the industrial and service sectors thus creates the need for certain clarifications in any analysis of the evolution of employment by sector in the future. TYPES OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS: GOOD JOBS AND BAD JOBS?

Without doubt, a rise in precariousness and a deterioration in quality of some jobs are significant characteristics of labour-market changes during the 1980s. Obviously, precariousness is more pronounced in North America than in the two European countries. In the two North American societies, the number of jobs held increased considerably, but a large number of the new jobs were of low quality compared to those that had been created during the years of strong economic growth. The increase in precarious jobs has been considered to be one of the forces behind the claimed trend of a declining middle class (Bradbury 1986; Harrison and Bluestone 1988; Lawrence, 1984; Phillips 1990; Picot, Myles, and Wannell 1990). This decline can also be attributed to changes in demography in household composition, as various authors have demonstrated. One factor that must be considered in an explanation of growing precariousness is the change in distribution of age groups. There are more young people in the North American labour market, hence the downward pressure on incomes. This phenomenon is important, even if it does not totally explain the decrease in wages and salaries or the deterioration in quality of jobs. The study by Picot, Myles, and Wannell (1990) on Canada and Quebec and that by Lawrence (1984) on the United States showed that when the effect of changes in the distribution of age groups is neutralized, the decline in the quality of jobs still exists. These studies also showed that the decline in average total quality of jobs could not be attributed to a more rapid increase in sectors offering jobs of lower quality (in personal services, the retail trade, and, more generally, McJobs), an explanation 102

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rooted in popular wisdom often mentioned in the mass media or in the most superficial analyses. On the contrary, the phenomenon seems to be present in all sectors of activity, including ones that have traditionally offered the best working conditions. The goods-production sector was more severely affected by the increase in precariousness and the decrease in quality of jobs. There are fewer jobs in the traditional big industries, many of which offer fewer benefits than previously, and more in smaller businesses, which offer less advantageous working conditions. According to Lawrence (1984), men aged 50 and over bore the bount of this transformation. In North America, a larger proportion of older employees remained in the labour-force, but were forced to accept a reduction in their working conditions, whereas Europeans more often left the labour market through early retirement. Several studies have shown that the quality of jobs available to young people has also deteriorated in North America. Young employees are more exposed to precariousness than are the other age groups, particularly in comparison to the young people of preceding generations. In fact, for the first time in North America, young people face the prospect of downward intergenerational social mobility; there seems to be the real possibility of being unable to surpass, or even maintain, the standard of living their parents have reached. Precariousness of employment is still a marginal phenomenon in France. Malinvaud (1987) assessed the proportion of precarious jobs (fixed-term contracts) at 3% of the total and at 10% among young people. He also observed that employees who had been unemployed were more dependent on the vicious circle of precarious jobs than were other members of the labour-force, and that this dependence had increased since the 1970s. Germany also faced some increase in precarious types of employment during the last decade: besides fixed-term employment (Rudolph, 1987) and marginal part-time work, there were rising numbers of agency workers and people temporarily employed in the context of public job-creation schemes (Biichtemann and Quack, 1989). To some extent, the increase in precarious work seems to be a consequence of the high level of unemployment at the beginning of the 1980s, which forced some people to accept jobs of inferior quality. On the other hand, the policy of deregulation of the labour market, which took place in Germany and in many other countries during the 1980s, also gave rise to nonstandard types of work, particularly the growth of fixed-term jobs. Over all, however, the increase in precarious types of work in Germany was rather marginal and their total share is still of minor importance (Noll, 1991).

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UNEMPLOYMENT

Although unemployment, by its nature, is a cyclical phenomenon and is not likely to follow a long-term trend, it nevertheless has multifarious effects on behavioural and structural changes in various societal domains. The so-called oil-price shocks of 1973 and 1979, which induced recessionary trends in the world economy, have been important markers for the development of unemployment in the last two decades. As in many other countries, there was a significant increase in unemployment following the two oil-price shocks in all societies under study here. It would be too simple, however, to consider the rise in oil prices to be the only or the essential cause of the increase in unemployment within this period of time. Rather, it seems that the oilprice shocks, besides their recessive consequences, triggered and accelerated an economic and technical structural change that resulted in a quantitative and qualitative change in the demand for labour. Apart from this structural change on the demand side, an unusually large increase in the supply of labour contributed to labour-market imbalances, partly due to a change in female labour-force participation and to demographic changes, as mentioned above. (Franz and Konig, 1987). Cross-national comparative analysis of the evolution and structure of unemployment is handicapped by the fact that the comparability of the data bases is not fully ensured. In the United States, France, and Quebec, information about employment status and about the characteristics of unemployment and the unemployed is collected by labour-force surveys, while information for Germany is based on the statistics of the federal labour administration. In this context, a person is classified unemployed if he or she is registered as unemployed with the employment office. This methodological difference in data collecting, as well as other differences in statistical classification, have to be taken into account when interpreting the national differences we find in the data. Due to differences in initial economic situation, institutional settings, and political approaches to coping with the labour-market crisis, the four societies were not hit equally by unemployment, although the structural problems they encountered were quite similar. During the 1960s and early 1970s, unemployment was low in Germany and France (figure 8). It was not until the late 1970s that the scope of the problem reached a level comparable to that which had obtained in North America for some time. Quebec faced the highest rates of unemployment almost throughout the period, with a maximum of 14% in 1983. The United States, on the other hand, fared remarkably well during the 1980s, coming off better than Germany or France. The relatively moderate level of unemployment, and especially the enormous growth in jobs, gave rise to the reputation of the United States as an "employment miracle," except for the fact that some of these new jobs were considered "bad" jobs.

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Figure 8 Evolution of Unemployment Rates, France, Germany, Quebec and U.S., 1966-90

Sources: OECD, 1992; Langlois et al., 1991.

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Convergence or Divergence

In the 1980s, unemployment passed its peak in all four societies. Whereas unemployment had begun to decrease in the United States and Quebec in the early 1980s, this occurred somewhat later in the two European societies: in Germany by the mid-1980s and in France not before the end of the decade. As yet, however, unemployment has not come down to the level of the early 1970s, and there are signs that it is rising again in all four societies. In addition to differences in the overall level of unemployment, there are significant distinctions between the four societies with respect to the structure and duration of unemployment. Women have a higher risk of becoming unemployed than men in all four societies and at almost all points in time. Strikingly, this difference is much larger in the European societies under consideration than in the North American ones. This finding can be interpreted as an indication of a gender-specific segmentation of the labour market. When we compare the unemployment rates of three age groups (15 to 24 years, 25 to 54 years, 55 to 64 years), we find that in Quebec and the United States the risk of becoming unemployed decreases with age, while in Germany and France - at least for men - the intermediary age group carries the smallest risk of becoming unemployed. One possible explanation for the differences is that the "last-in, first-out" principle that favours older employees is applied more rigidly in North America than in Germany or France. Germany differs from the other three societies by its comparatively low level of youth unemployment, and by the fact that the oldest age group - men and women alike - is most affected by unemployment. In France, on the other hand, due to some characteristics of its educational system, young people, especially young women, carry an extraordinarily high risk of unemployment compared to the other societies (Malinvaud, 1987). Most significant perhaps are the inter-society differences in the duration of unemployment. While there was an increase in all four societies, at least at the beginning of the 1980s, the incidence of long-term unemployment remained much lower in North America than in Europe (figure 9). In 1989, the proportion of longterm unemployment - that is, unemployment for 12 months and over - was 11% in Quebec and 6% in the United States, compared to 44% in France and 49% in Germany (OECD, 1991). In the North American societies, unemployment seems to be absorbed relatively quickly in comparison to the two European societies. Although there is in general a positive correlation between the aggregate level of unemployment and the proportion of the long-term unemployed, the various levels of unemployment obviously cannot explain the differences in unemployment duration. Although these differences may in part be due to data-collection methods, there is good reason to look at them as indications of different modes of labourmarket operations. The OECD states that "in North America the rate of flows into and out of unemployment is relatively high and ... job search and hiring are relatively 106

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Figure 9 Incidence of Long-term Unemployment % Unemployed 12 Months and Over France, Germany, Canada, and U.S., 1983-89

Source: OECD, 1992.

familiar activities for workers and employers respectively" (OECD, 1991: 41). On the other hand, labour markets in France and Germany, as well as in some other European societies, are characterized by comparatively low labour turnover, and the experience of unemployment is more restricted to specific groups within the labourforce than is the case in North America. The differences in duration of unemployment can be seen over all as indications that labour market operations in the two European societies favour those with a job by giving them a considerable amount of protection against job loss, whereas labour-market operations in the two North American societies favour the unemployed by giving them better opportunities to reintegrate into the ranks of the working population. TWO MODELS OF GROWTH: CONVERGENCE OR DIVERGENCE?

In summary, the economic growth observed in the past 30 years in the four societies examined was apparently sustained by two mechanisms: the creation of a larger number of jobs in North America and higher labour productivity in Europe (figure 10). Freeman, for example, claims "that the United States paid for job creation with slow growth in real wages and productivity ... Americans work harder for the same gain in living standards as Europeans" (Freeman, 1988: 298-299).

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Convergence or Divergence

Since the mid-1970s, the standard of living has increased in the United States and Quebec almost exclusively because more people were involved in the labourforce. Although people worked more - in terms of labour-force participation as well as in terms of hours worked - in North America, there were also greater numbers of precarious or poorly paid jobs. The European societies created fewer jobs and tolerated increasing levels of unemployment, but at the same time they were less affected by precariousness and more successful in terms of growth in incomes and a reduction in working hours. Over all, we can therefore advance the hypothesis that there were two models of growth during the period from 1960s to 1990s: one based mainly on increasing productivity, and the other on the broadening of the labour-force. A French economist came to the conclusion that in France and Germany, "employment is partly sacrificed for competitiveness and to maintain the standard of living of those workers who do have jobs" (Marchand, 1990: 19). Are the two divergent models following a continuous trend, or are we witnessing a convergence? A study by the OECD indicates that the beginning of the 1990s marks the "first sign of an attenuation of the disequilibrium of the past decade during which Europe as a whole saw strong growth in production but a levelling off in employment, whereas North America registered rapid employment growth, but a levelling off in productivity" (OECD, 1989: 19). At present, there are more indications of convergence than of divergence: precariousness is not a phenomenon only of North American labour markets, but is also expanding in France and, to a lesser extent, in Germany; the number of jobs increased again considerably in France and Germany during the late 1980s, while unemployment rose again in the U.S. and Quebec and the gap in productivity growth declined. Taking into account the diminishing differences in the sectoral structure of the work force and in the patterns of labour-market participation, the societies under examination obviously are becoming more similar, even if they are still different in many aspects of employment structure and labour-market operation.

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Figure 10 Growth in Total Employment, Productivity, and Gross Domestic Product, France, Germany, Canada, and U.S., 1973-79 and 1979-89 Growth of Total Employment

Growth in Productivity

Growth in Real GDP

Sources: OECD, 1992; Statistics Canada, cat. nos 71-529 and 71-001. Bureau de la statistique du Quebec, Annuaire du Quebec.

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References Alvin, Duane, Michael Braun, and Jacqueline Scott 1992 "The Separation of Work and the Family: Attitudes Toward Women's Labour Force Participation in Germany, Great Britain, and the United States." European Journal of Sociology, 8: 13-38. Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 1991 Arbeitsstatistik 1990. Niirnberg: Jahreszahlen, 39. Barrere-Maurisson, M.-A., et al. 1989 "Le travail a temps partiel plus developpe au Royaume-Uni qu'en France." Economic et statistique, 220, April: 47-56. Bean, Charles, Richard Layard, and Stephen Nickell, eds. 1987 The Rise of Unemployment. London and New York: Basil Blackwell. Beecley, V. 1987 Unequal Work. London: Verso. Bradburry, Katherine L. 1986 "The Shrinking Middle Class". New England Economic Review. September-October: 41-55. Biichtemann, Christoph F., and Sigrid Quack 1989 "Bridges" or "Traps"? Non Standard Forms of Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany. The Case of Part-time Work and Temporary Work. Discussion paper FSI 89-6. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung. Biichtemann, Christoph F., and Jiirgen Schupp 1988 Socio-economic Aspects of Part-time Employment in the Federal Republic of Germany. Discussion paper FSI 88-6. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum fur Sozialforschung. Caplow, Theodore 1990 American Social Trends. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Clark, Colin 1940 The Conditions of Economic Progress. London: Mcmillan. Cornilleau, Gerard, Jean-Paul Fitousi, and Michel Forse 1990 "Emploi et chomage." In Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, ed., L' economic fran^aise depuis 1967, 162-185. Paris: Editions du Seuil. Dim, Louis, and Denis Stoclet 1985 "Travail des femmes et structures sociales." Observations et diagnostics economiques, 10, January: 83-108. Economic Council of Canada 1991 Employment in the Service Economy. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada. Forse, Michel 1983 "Activite et chomage des femmes en France face a la crise." Observations et diagnostics economiques, 13, February: 91-99.

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Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Fourastie, Jean 1954 Die Grofie Hoffnung des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, Koln: Bund-Verlag. Franz, Wolfgang and Heinz Konig 1987 "The Nature and Causes of Unemployment in the Federal Republic of Germany Since the 1970's: An Empirical Investigation." In Charles Bean, Richard Layard, and Stephen Nickell, eds., The Rise of Unemployment, 219-244. London and New York: Basil Blackwell. Freeman, Richard B. 1988 "Evaluating the European View that the United States Has No Unemployment Problem." American Economic Review, 78: 294-299. Freeman, R. B., and J. Medoff 1982 "Why Does The Rate of Youth Labour Force Activity Differ Across Surveys?" In R. B. Freeman and D. A. Wise, eds., The Labour Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences, 75-114. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Gershuny, Jonathan 1978 After Industrial Society? London: MacMillan. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Guillemard, Anne-Marie 1991 "From: Massive Exit through Unemployment Compensation." In Martin Kohli et al., eds., Time for Retirement. Comparative Studies of Early Exit From the Labour Force, 127-180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harrison, Bennett, and Barry Bluestone 1988 The Great U-Turn. Corporate Restructuring and the of Polarizing of America. New York. Basic Books. Hill, T.P. 1977 "On Goods and Services." Review of Income and Wealth, 23, 4, December: 315-338. Jacobs, Klaus, Martin Kohli, and Martin Rein 1991a "The Evolution of Early Exit: a Comparative Analysis of Labour Force Participation Patterns." In Martin Kohli et al., eds., Time for Retirement. Comparative Studies of Early Exit From the Labour Force, 36-66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1991b "Germany: The Diversity of pathways." In Martin Kohli et al., eds., Time for Retirement. Comparative Studies of Early Exit From the Labour Force, 181-221. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kohli, Martin, Martin Rein, Anne-Marie Guillemard, and Herman van Gunsteren 1991 Time for Retirement. Comparative Studies of Early Exit From the Labour Force. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krahn, Harvey 1991 "Les regimes de travail non standard." L'emploi et le revenu en perspective. Statistique Canada, 75-001F, Winter: 41-52.

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Krupp, Hans-Jiirgen 1986 "Der Strukturwandel zu den Dienstleistungen und Perspektiven der Beschaftigungsstruktur." Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 19: 145-158. Lane, C. 1989 "From 'Welfare Capitalism' to 'Market Capitalism': a Comparative Review of Trends towards Employment Flexibility in the Labour Markets of Three Major European Societies." Sociology, 23, no. 4: 583-610. Langlois, Simon 1990 "Le travail a temps partiel. Vers une polarisation de plus en plus nette." Relations industrielles/lndustrial Relations, 45, no. 3: 548-564. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Lawrence, Robert Z. 1984 "Sectoral Shifts and the Rise of the Middle Class." The Brookings Review, Fall: 3-11. Loveman, Gary W., and Chris Tilly 1988 "Good Jobs or Bad Jobs: What Does the Evidence Say?" New England Economic Review, January-February: 46-65. Malinvaud, Edward 1987 "The Rise of Unemployment in France." In Charles Bean, Richard Layard, and Stephen Nickell, eds., The Rise in Unemployment, 197-217. London: Basil Blackwell. Marchand, Olivier 1990 "L'evolution de 1'emploi dans les pays industrialises." Futuribles, 146, September: 15-35. Mendras, Henri 1989 La seconde revolution francaise. Paris: Gallimard. Mincer, Jacob 1985 "Intercountry Comparisons of Labour Force Trends and of Related Developments: An Overview." Journal of Labour Economics, January Supplement: 51-532. Noll, Heinz-Herbert 1991 "Beschaftigungsstruktur im Wandel: Die Bundesrepublik im internationalen Vergleich." In: W. Zapf, ed., Die Modernisierung moderner Gesellschaften. Verhandlungen des 25, Deutschen Soziologentages in Frankfurt, 279-292. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus. OEDC (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 1987 Employment Outlook. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1988 Employment Outlook. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1989 Employment Outlook. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1991 Employment Outlook. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1992 Labour Force Statistics. Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

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Phillips, Kevin P. 1990 The Politics of Rich and Poor. Wealth and the American Electoral in the Reagan Aftermath. New York, Random House. Picot, Garnett, John Myles, and Ted Wannell 1990 Les bons et les mauvais emplois et le declin de la classe moyenne: 1967-1986. Ottawa: Statistique Canada, Direction des etudes analytiques, no. 28. Rudolph, Helmut 1987 "Befristete Beschaftigung - Bin iiberblick." Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 20: 288-304. Sims, Harvey 1983 "Participation Rate Changes in Canada in the Early 1980's." Canadian Labour Markets in the 1980's, 65-80. Kingston: Queen's University Press.

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5 The Changing Bonds of Kinship. Parents and Adult Children Howard M. BAHR Jean-Hugues DECHAUX Karin STIEHR

Our objective is to portray intergenerational relations in the four societies under study in the context of other contemporary trends that may influence the way kinship behaviour is enacted and the forms it takes.1 We have also reviewed the vast research literature on generational ties in industrial societies, in order to frame our study of change within well-established generalizations from that literature. Theoretically, the number of one's kindred is a function of the fecundity and mortality histories of one's family, but in practice these biological constraints are mediated by cultural definitions of what constitutes a "close" or "distant" tie and by variables such as traditional holiday practices, family social status, and the residential proximity of marginal or "distant" kin. Kinship as a network of relations among relatives is more sociological than genealogical. Genealogy defines potential networks, but interaction determines their reality. In common usage, terms such as "kinship" and "relatives" have ambiguous limits. Much of the research literature

1 Much of this chapter was written while the senior author held a faculty research fellowship at the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University. In addition, the Kennedy Center provided partial support for the January, 1992, semi-annual meeting of the International Research Group in Provo, Utah, where drafts of this and several other chapters in the present volume were presented and critiqued.

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applies concepts such as "kinship network" or "intergenerational relations" to studies that have mainly to do with the "immediate" families of orientation and procreation. For international comparisons, a very narrow definition, a core that virtually all researchers identify, is preferable to a wider one with varying network boundaries. Accordingly, most of the present analysis is limited to one category of intergenerational ties: parent-child relationships. This limitation is not very constraining, because the parent-child connection is the single most important kinship tie in Western industrial societies, and the so-called kinship literature is mainly concerned with the study of relations between older parents and their grown children.2 Studies of intergenerational relations or kinship, whatever else they do, usually highlight the priority of this bond. No other kinship tie approaches the parentchild connection in terms of affect, contact and communication, mutual obligation, and helping behaviour.3 An emphasis on the parent-adult child connection is also appropriate because that dyad has become the typical one. In each of the four late-stage industrial societies considered here, there are now more parent-adult child pairs than there are parent-minor child pairs. In other words, the parent-child bond is now predominantly a relationship between adults. This new modal relation is more complicated than the typical parent-child dyad of former times. It often involves simultaneous occupancy of the role of child and parent, for most adults nowadays have responsibilities to at least two generations (Smyer, 1984: 325-326). Good trend data on kin relations are relatively scarce, and therefore some of our national trend reports on kinship networks were largely qualitative and impressionistic. Each drew upon local or regional studies to some degree. As a result, the present chapter does not rely quite as heavily on the trend reports in the four national volumes as do some other chapters in this book. This is not to say that it is any less an outgrowth of the co-ordinated efforts of our Research Group, but rather

2

3

Although there are relatively few quantitative studies of sibling relationships, the literature on kinship relations in industrial society is so extensive that "relatively few" now amounts to a substantial bibliography. The underrepresentation of studies of sibling relations in the research literature was recently underscored by several contributors to a special issue (1989, no. 1) of American Behavioral Scientist. The research indicates that in old age siblings are relatively unimportant as sources of instrumental support but more important for emotional support; that there is little sibling contact in comparison to parent-child contact; and that sibling pairs involving sisters are closer than those involving brothers only (Gold, 1989: 30). Most studies of connections beyond the immediate family are of ties to grandparents. Stated differently, the research literature on kinship is largely a literature of "familial" relations (i.e., "relationships [that] arise out of reproductive activities involving interaction by persons living in proximity") in the limited usage of that term recommended by Harris (1990: 74). Closely related is Hohn and Liischer's (1988: 317) conceptualization of family as "life-forms (Lebensformen) based primarily upon the organization of parent-child relations, which enjoy a special status of societal recognition."

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that the collection and analysis of much of the data followed the preparation of the individual trend reports rather than building directly on them. We acknowledge the risks inherent in generalizing about even one society (see Gommers, Hankenne, and Rogowski, 1979: 117), let alone across societies and language groups. In the present instance, there is a great temptation to conclude that because rates of residential proximity, kin contact, or household structure are approximately the same from one society to the next, the same things are happening in each place. Yet we know from the literature of several other national trends that apparent parallelism often presents a situation in which a myriad of differing cultural and historical factors have yielded nearly identical rates. A related problem is the too-ready acceptance of notions of "convergence" or "isomorphism".4 The assumption that changes in one society have their counterparts in another, perhaps offset in time but similar in direction, may facilitate the premature and erroneous identification of "master trends." An example bearing directly on kinship relations is an attempt to interpret the "massive trend" toward early labour-force withdrawal among persons aged 55-64 in several industrial countries. Seeking similarities in the institutional arrangements that produced this trend, Guillemard (1989: 169) was careful to examine the data for each nation separately rather than assuming parallelism. "The institutional arrangements to be taken into account cannot be defined a priori," she wrote "they must be discovered and examined country by country." Similarly, van de Kaa (1987: 8-12, 33) argues that despite a "second demographic transition" that manifests remarkably similar characteristics in most European nations, many factors are at play within each nation, and similar outcomes may reflect different combinations of antecedents. We will begin our examination of intergenerational relations in France, Germany, Quebec, and the U.S. by restating certain well-documented characteristics of kinship in modern industrial societies. These include descriptive attributes of kinship relations as well as generalizations about processes of change and the mutual interplay between family and other social institutions. We then review some of the "master trends" supposedly driving changes in kinship relations. Next, we consider demographic changes relevant to parent-child relations, especially trends in life expectancy, the sex ratio, fertility, births outside of marriage, and abortion. Finally, 4

Weatherford (1981) notes the frequent tacit assumption of similarity among industrial nations and cautions that there is no more reason to think that they are all alike than there is to think that all pastoral or horticultural peoples are alike. His analysis of labour and domestic life cycles in an industrial, non-urban German community demonstrates that small differences in the labour or working-life cycle may be accompanied by substantial differences in domestic life cycles and cultural patterns of ageing. The sizeable differences in family life and ageing patterns, he says, are consequences of interactions involving "particular values which are pronounced in German society," along with a distinctive history of supporting legal and governmental policies and the influence of the local environment (Weatherford, 1981: 145-146). 117

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we turn from issues of cultural and demographic context to characteristics of households and families: household size and composition, residential proximity to parents and children, frequency of visits, and mutual aid. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES AND KINSHIP RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL

SOCIETIES

In late-stage industrial societies, the dominant family form is the "modified extended family," generally with the following characteristics: frequent interaction, close affective bonds, exchange of goods and services, mutual aid, voluntary interaction, and at least some family members residing within visiting distance (Bengtson and Cutler, 1976; Cowgill, 1986; Sussman, 1976; Troll, 1971; Troll, Miller, and Atchley, 1979; Young and Willmott, 1957). Kin structure is typically bilateral, with an emphasis on close blood relationships, a matrilateral focus, and a female-centred basis for kinship activities (Johnson and Barer, 1987; Kivett, 1985: 228; Yanigasako, 1977). Relationships are normative but often governed by a "voluntaristic or optional principle," and relatives tend to be divided into two major classes, the nuclear family and an amorphous category of "kindred" with culturally variable boundaries. Most elderly people live near and have frequent contact with at least some of their children (Cowgill, 1986; Shanas et al., 1968: 195; Townsend, 1957; Young and Willmott, 1957: 30). Relations between grandparents and grandchildren are usually rather formal or distant, with the lack of affect due partly to physical distance and partly to their differing activities (Cowgill, 1986: 92).5 Among the factors that influence kin relations are the proximity of kindred in space and time, closeness of genealogical linkage, fertility and mortality rates, common residence, household composition, and cultural differentials reflecting region, ethnicity, class, and gender. The influence of spatial/temporal proximity is mediated by the strength (affective and biological closeness) of the relation and a society's communications and transportation technology. Other things being equal, distance attenuates contact, communication, and mutual aid. In other words, the greater the dispersion of kin, the weaker their reciprocal influence, and "the stronger the nuclear unit becomes at the expense of kin ties" (Blood, 1970: 193). Even with modern transportation and communication, distance is an important determinant of kin contact, with frequency of contact inversely related to the distance between residences (Cowgill, 1986: 85). Both number of visits and amount of help received by older people from their close kin is directly related to residential proximity (Kivett, 1985: 231).

5

Cowgill's generalization refers to Western families, but the research it reflects is more American and British than continental. In contemporary Germany, grandmothers and often grandfathers are highly involved in childraising activities because external child-care facilities are insufficient.

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The parent-adult child tie is the most important kinship relation in terms of mutual support (see, for example, Adams, 1968; Shanas, 1979a; Taylor, 1986), and the most important parent-child bond is that between mother and child. Initially biological, it is augmented by socialization and nurturant interaction. For many reasons, throughout life women continue to be more involved than men in maintaining interpersonal family connections. The net consequence is that the motherchild connection endures longer and matters more than other kinship ties in terms of communication, caring, visiting, mutual responsibility, and mutual aid. The effects of genealogical distance are roughly congruent to those of space/time. Kinship obligations fade with genealogical distance, "not because they subsist between members of different categories, but because the parties have never shared common household membership experiences" (Harris, 1990: 74). Much of the literature on the primacy of parent-child dyads supports the conclusion that their cohabitation - the sharing of experiences and the reciprocation that accompanies family life - creates obligations and generates privileges that are crucial determinants of subsequent relationships between parents and grown children. Family activity creates sentiments, rituals, and enduring social patterns. Role obligations weaken with distance from the parent-child dyad, and in most industrial societies "consanguineous relatives outside of the family of orientation [are] ... of little functional importance to the support systems of older adults" (Kivett, 1985: 229). Changes in longevity and fertility alter kinship structure - or, at least, its potential structure. The greater the life expectancy, the greater the number of generations available for intergenerational activity. The higher the fertility, the more potential kindred within a single generation. Fertility does not determine the nature of kinship networks, but it sets limits. High fertility means that there are potentially many family members, both in the family of orientation and in the extended kinship network. Low fertility means that even though older people live long lives, many will be without grandchildren (Cowgill, 1986: 91). Note that from the perspective of grandchildren, high life expectancy means that virtually all grandchildren will have two or three generations of living antecedents. Perhaps most essentially, culture provides the social definitions of whatever biological links are known to exist. All societies specify rights and obligations that accompany putative biological ties, especially close connections. The significance of "kindred" is socially defined, and the meaning and limits of "family" and "kindred" vary from culture to culture. Kinship definitions and behaviour vary within as well as between nations. Each national society has ethnic populations whose kinship patterns differ from the majority's. In addition to purely ethnic effects, populations may be characterized by 119

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regional or locational differences that also influence kinship relations. Furthermore, ethnic subcultures typically differ from the majority socio-economically, and class status is known to influence kinship patterns. The multiculturality of European countries has been augmented by the "guest worker" movement, whereby labour shortages have been resolved by importing workers from less developed lands. In addition, many refugees have entered Europe. These "foreigners" in France and Germany appear rapidly to adjust their fertility and much of their other behaviour to host norms, but they still reflect distinctive, or even "traditional," kinship and family values.6 There are also historic regional patterns, such as the several French "anthropological traditions." In southwestern France, the proportion of households with parents and adult children living together is higher than elsewhere because of the traditional maison family type, which resembles the notion of "stem family" developed by Frederic Le Play (see Augustins, 1989; Dechaux, 1991). In the U.S., there are two distinct orientations of rural families to "closest" kin: an "extended-kin" familism in the rural South that includes considerable residential concentration of kindred and counts first cousins as "close" kin, and a "western type" familism that defines "close" as coterminous with the nuclear family (Heller and Quesada, 1977). Also, blacks and Hispanics differ from whites in levels of interaction between the elderly and their children, and in financial help and other aid exchanged. There are also Hispanic-black differences (Cantor, 1979; Jackson, 1980; Shanas, 1979a). Studies of networks of support for elderly blacks in the U.S. reveal considerable regional and socio-economic variation (Taylor, 1985). Variations in socio-economic status produce differences in kinship behaviour and in the scale of kin networks. For instance, Blood (1970: 191) found that among high-status people, a lower proportion of all social transactions were kin transactions than among low-status people. However, this did not mean that kinship ties were less important to high-status people, because "the same discretionary margin which enables such families to devote more resources to their kin also enables them to devote more resources to non-kin." As a result, paradoxically, "kin are at the same

6

In 1982, about 10% of French births and almost 15% of German births were due to the fertility of immigrants. In Germany, immigrants amounted to just over 4% of the population in 1970, rising to 8% by 1989. In France in 1982, immigrants comprised 11% of the population, with Algerians, Portuguese, Italians, and Moroccans accounting for over half of the foreign-born. In Germany, "guest workers" are not regarded as immigrants and are supposed to return to their native countries after a limited stay, but this legal definition does not reflect reality. In fact, foreigners' stays are becoming longer.

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time more important absolutely and less important relatively for high status people."7 Rossi and Rossi (1990: 226-228) also found socio-economic status to make a difference. Among their Bostonian respondents, the strength of perceived kinship obligation varied directly with educational attainment. Another way that culture matters is in the value orientation of populations, for such orientations ascribe meanings and establish priorities of family behaviour. That is, they determine what is appropriate or proper behaviour in dealing with one's family and relatives, and what one's rights and duties are. Cultural values that accentuate commitment (or altruism or "traditionalism") are likely to maintain and strengthen kinship systems. On the other hand, those that give priority to individualism (or hedonism or "progressivism") are thought to limit and attenuate kinship systems. Culture also shapes kinship relations through gender roles. In Western societies - and apparently in most other present-day societies - women are more responsible for "kin-keeping" activities than are men. Women traditionally have been assigned the bulk of nurturance activity, and "filial services" are usually provided by daughters or sisters (Harris, 1990: 90; Smyer, 1984: 330-331).8 Contemporary trends that add to women's kinship responsibilities are recent increases in the number of female-headed families and, at the upper ages, greater numbers of women. Note that if most kinship services are provided by adult women, and these women are also increasingly occupied in the labour force, either they must become more burdened or the level of services and activities they provide must decline.9 7 This paradoxical relation is confirmed in German research conducted in 1984-85 in which lower-class people

reported a "contact net" of about 13 people, while upper-middle-class people reported about 35. However, the larger number reported among the higher-class people was due almost entirely to their having more friends and acquaintances; they did not have many more kin. Their larger networks were not inherited but gained in the course of life, and thus tended to be more voluntary and reciprocal than the kinship ties that both they and the lower-class respondents had (Marbach and Mayr-Kleffel, 1988).

8 For example, in England, the proportion of elderly parents having daily contact with sons is half that of those having contact with daughters, and the elderly parents live closer to their daughters than to their sons (Cowgill, 1986: 86; Young and Geertz, 1961: 131-133). The bias to female linkages also extends to cousins. In one study, the cousin of most contact was a maternal blood relative (55%) or maternally related through marriage (6%) (Kivett, 1985: 230). Even researchers are oriented by the prevailing bias: there are fewer studies of grandfathers than of grandmothers, and much that falls under the title "grandparenting" is either derived from or mostly applies to grandmothers. Similarly, there are many more studies of mother-child than of father-child relations, and more studies of relations between sisters than between brothers.

9 Efforts to involve "the family" in various activities of mutual support generally occupy women more than men. In what Baker (1986: 439) calls the "social conscience" approach, appeals to the "morality" of family responsibility "reinforce ... increasing the obligations of normally female family members to the old, sick and handicapped." Blood (1970: 200) notes that while today's kin networks are more equalitarian and less hierarchical than formerly, even this "softening" of kinship obligations continues to foster greater participation

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KINSHIP AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Among the historical processes often cited as disrupting or changing kinship behaviour are modernization, industrialization, and urbanization.10 Accompanying these master processes have been changes in demographic rates, such as increased migration and reduced fertility and mortality, that have had significant impacts on the structure of kinship groups. Changes in political and educational institutions have also influenced kin relations and, conversely, kinship groups and families have influenced political, educational, and other social institutions. We now know that there is no necessary relationship between modernization and the size or viability of kinship systems. Sometimes modernization strengthens kinship systems, although that seems not to have been the usual experience in Western industrial nations. For example, living in a city, with its diversity of occupational specialties, may actually reduce people's need to migrate in search of employment, and thereby increase their opportunity to live near kindred (Sussman, 1970: 95). Under some circumstances, kin networks facilitate rather than obstruct modernization, and among the possible effects of migration are a concentration and intensification of kin ties (Blood, 1970: 191,196; Talmon, 1970).11 In many modern settings, the kin group continues to be an important economic unit, facilitating integration into the economy. If kinship groups enact such

of women than men. 10

Brief definitions of these processes are in order here. (Defining them further, specifying the relations among them, and comparing the intellectual and political orientations (or perspectives or paradigms or theories) associated with them is a multi-volume task beyond present need or capability.) "Industrialization" refers to the progressive utilization of inanimate sources of energy in economic production. "Modernization" denotes an increasing rationality in the planning, management, and conduct of social life, including necessary changes in social institutions and in people's attitudes and values, in the interest of industrial development and technological innovation. "Urbanization" refers to the processes whereby increasing proportions of a society's population live in cities or areas of relatively high population concentration.

11

Two decades ago, Sussman (1970: 497-498) called for more study of family systems as forces independently acting to shape their institutional environment in place of the usual conceptualization of family as a dependent variable. He insisted that the relationship was reciprocal: families acted and also were acted upon. He maintained that cross-cultural studies were especially useful in learning "how the particular form and stage of industrialization and urbanization affected change in the family structure and functions and how the family system itself may have shaped and molded the pattern of economic and industrial development." Reviewing Murdock's study of the interplay of social and family change in 250 societies, Sussman (1970: 490) concluded, "Kinship structures do not break down, dissolve, or even change radically as the result of culture contact with either equal or technologically advanced societies. Rather, such structures evolve and adjust over time, taking on activities and functions which for the most part are supportive of and adaptive to the changed conditions and emerging social systems."

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functions, then kinship ties are a vital part of the contemporary social structure. Kinship ties may establish or sustain economic ties, and by the same token economic relationships may strengthen or weaken kinship ties (Harris, 1990: 92). To summarize, family and kinship relations exist along with other social relations, and cannot be understood a priori as either in opposition to or congruent with them. Sometimes the family institution competes with other "greedy institutions" for loyalty and personal resources (Coser, 1974), and sometimes kinship systems facilitate access and achievement in other institutions. The relation between kinship and modernization must be interpreted in particular historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. "MASTER TRENDS": MODERNIZATION, INDUSTRIALIZATION, URBANIZATION

In highlighting aspects of the "master trends" apparent in these four national contexts, we do not intend a redundant retesting of the already discredited urbanization family defunctionalization hypothesis. Rather, we merely wish to emphasize that there are important, continuing societal differences in many key indicators of modernization/industrialization. Indeed, there turns out to be enough diversity in level and sometimes even direction of trend so as to call into question the oft-assumed direct linkage between modernization and the micro-realities of kinship behaviour. That is, when we actually compare specific modernization indicators, rather than assuming their similarity, it appears that the four societies under study differ more in modernization level or phase than in kinship behaviour. A further problem in trying to interpret changes in intergenerational behaviour in the context of the modernization (or postmodern) perspective is that master trends such as modernization or industrialization are so broadly defined as to be virtually useless as discrete independent variables. Consider this definition from a sociology text: Modernization refers to a set of social changes that have taken place in societies throughout the world in the past three centuries. It encompasses all the changes that societies and individuals experience as a result of industrialization, urbanization, and the development of nation-states ... [It] summarizes most of the major changes, for better or worse, that societies throughout the world are experiencing, albeit at differing rates and with different amounts of social disruption. (Kornblum, 1988: 568-569)

Note that there is virtually no change since 1700 that may not be described as modernization. The metaphor is all-encompassing: modernization causes everything, or is everything. It is presumed to permeate all aspects of family life: 123

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"Industrialization ... moved production to factories. By removing production from the household, modern capitalism created far-reaching effects on all facets of the family. Nothing was left untouched" (Henslin, 1990: 410, 414). To say that modernization or industrialization changed everything does not explain just how the changes took place. More importantly, to say that almost all change is modernization and that everything has been altered by it explains everything, and thereby explains nothing. Especially in advanced industrial societies, each already the object of decades if not centuries of pervasive change, such overstatement tends to discourage rather than stimulate inquiry. For present purposes, we are interested only in establishing whether these four post-industrial settings represent fairly congruent contexts for kinship behaviour. We may begin with the process of urbanization, a necessary but not sufficient condition of modernization. The four societies are all urban, the degree of urbanization ranging from well over 80%, for Germany, to the 60-70% range, for France. Since about 1970, the proportion has been stable everywhere except Germany. However, the definition of "urban" is too inclusive to be very meaningful, for it includes people living in small communities with populations of 2,000 or more (for Quebec, 1,000), along with everyone in larger centres. The four societies are more differentiated with respect to "metropolitan living," defined as the percent of population residing in centres of 100,000 or more. Germany, the most urban, turns out to be the least metropolitan, with only one third of its people in large metropolitan centres. France, in line with the "European pole" or Franco-German model, proposed by Lemel and Modell (chapter 2 of this book), is similar to Germany, with relatively low metropolitanization, just over 40%, and a pattern of stability rather than of increase since 1970 or so. Quebec is substantially more metropolitan, as over half of its population lived in metropolitan areas during the entire three decades, and there was a noticeable upward trend, to about 60%, by 1990. The U.S. trend is congruent with Quebec's, but higher still, with 63% of its people in metropolitan areas of 100,000+ in 1960, and almost 80% by 1990. In other words, the four societies can be seen as representing three distinct "levels" of metropolitanization (figure 1). By 1980, over three fourths of U.S. citizens lived in metropolitan areas, compared to only about one third of Germans, and the difference was increasing.12

12

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This example illustrates how choice of indicator, among seemingly comparable alternatives, can totally alter one's conclusions. If urbanization is the indicator of choice, then Germany is the most "modern" of the four countries, and the U.S. is tied with France (1990) for least modern. If "metropolitanization" is the indicator, the results are reversed, and the ratio of difference is greatly expanded. The rates of urbanization discussed above are from Caplow et al. (1991), trend report 0.1; Langlois et al. (1992), trend report 2.3; and Keyfitz and Flieger (1990: 201, 262, 264).

Intergenerational Relations

Figure 1 Percent of Population in Urban Agglomeration of 100,000 and Over, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S. 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzeret al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992.

Figure 2 Persons Under Age 15 Per 1,000 Population, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzeret al., 1992; Keyfitz and Flieger, 1990; Langlois et al., 1992.

125

Convergence or Divergence

Consider the 15- to 20-year trends in the five indicators of modernization summarized in table 1. For only one - telephones per capita - has convergence occurred. In another, enrolment rates in higher education, there is a modest trend toward convergence: by 1990, people in Quebec and the U.S. were about twice as likely as those in France and West Germany to be enrolled in "third level" or higher education. Fifteen years earlier, the gap had been larger: the U.S. rate had been three times the European, and Quebec had occupied an intermediate position. In two other indicators, physicians per capita and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, sizeable differences among the four nations were maintained but trends were uniformly upward. If the number of physicians per capita is the indicator of modernization, Germany is the most modern of these countries, by a slightly larger margin in 1987 than in 1970. If GDP per capita is the indicator, the U.S. has the lead, by a continuing margin in constant dollars of about 50% over France and Germany, while Quebec's GDP has risen to approximate the U.S. figure. In terms of energy consumption per capita, the four societies manifest parallelism and no particular trend: rates of consumption in the late 1980s are about what they were in 1970. However, if we define "modern" in terms of efficiency of energy consumption, computing ratios of per-capita GDP per unit of energy consumption, France is the most modern nation, with dollar/energy unit ratios consistently twice as high as those of the least modern of the four (the U.S.). Although economic power (GDP) and energy consumption are classic indicators of modernization, there are serious problems of interpretation associated with both of them,13 and many current critics of modernization theory ("limits to growth," "appropriate technology," "alternative futures," and "green" movements) would reject them as indicators of the kind of "modern" society they prefer. Even so, they both represent a continuing economic reality that impacts intergenerational relations in many ways. Other things being equal, a more affluent society has more resources to devote to the maintenance of kinship relations, and high energy consumption may facilitate as well as frustrate family interaction and activity. It can also be argued that the personal stresses associated with low productivity and scarce energy complicate family life and are destabilizing factors. The point is that high percapita productivity and resource use (modernization) may impact family relations in either direction - or in neither, depending on other aspects of the national and cultural context. 13

126

Among these problems are that climate, population density, availability of local energy sources, and nature of transportation systems must be somehow factored in before international comparisons are truly meaningful (cf. Dunkerley, 1980). To the critics of classical modernization theory, the correlation of energy consumption with modernization or development illustrates the exploitative, wasteful, and ultimately destructive nature of the processes conceptualized as modernization by ethnocentric Americans and Europeans in the 1950s and 1960s (Kassiola, 1990; Kothari, 1989).

Intergenerational Relations

Table 1 Selected Indicators of Modernization France, Germany, Quebec, and the United States, 1963-1989 Year

F

G

Q

US

F

G

Q

US

Physicians/ 100,000 pop.

Telephones/ 1,000 pop.

1963

112

137

329

446

-

--

--

1970

172

225

434

587

128

163

137

1975

264

317

550

686

153

193

158

143

1980

452

464

653

788

201

226

182

172

1985

608

621

--

760

232

204

201

1987

--

650

--

-

250

214

205

280

Energy consumption/cap kg coal equity. COOOs)

GDP/Cap., 1988$ ('100s)

1970

10,0

10,3

9,8

15,0

4,0

5,4

6,9

11,0

1975

11,5

11,3

12,8

16,0

3,9

5,4

7,4

10,9

1980

12,5

12,7

14,9

17,0

4,4

5,7

7,5

10,6

1985

12,9

13,3

15,8

18,2

4,0

5,7

6,4

9,5

1987

13,3

13,8

17,6

19,0

3,7

5,6

6,5

10,0

1988

13,6

14,2

--

19,6

3,7

5,6

6,9

Higher educ. ("3rd level" enrolment/100,000 pop.)

Ratio, GDP/cap., 1988 $ per kg coal equity.

1970

1333

--

2988

4144

2,5

1,9

1,4

1,4

1975

1971

1684

3801

5179

2,9

2,1

1,7

1,5

1980

1998

1987

4829

5311

2,8

2,2

2,0

1,6

1985

2318

2540

5883

5118

3,2

2,3

2,5

1,9

1988

2656

2760

5954

5438

3,7

2,5

2,0

1989

2842

2843

5991

5596

--

--

--

Sources:

Caplow et al., 1991; Eurostat, 1984; Force et ah, 1990; Glatzer et ah, 1992; Langlois et ah, 1992; GDP in constant dollars was computed using international purchasins-power parities and converted to 1988 U.S. dollars by the appropriate consumer-price-index multipliers. Additional sources are available from the senior authour.

127

Convergence or Divergence

If the patterns described thus far are summarized in terms of relative national position (high, moderate, low), it might be argued that we are dealing with three types of advanced industrial society, with an apparent distinction between the European societies and the North American ones, as well as many differences between Quebec and the U.S. There is little reason to expect uniform or samedirection effects upon kinship behaviour from ambiguously conceived modernization processes as reflected in indicators that confirm substantial and continuing national diversity. DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Changes in the rates of fertility, nuptiality, and mortality affect the number of potential kindred. If women are the primary kin-keepers, and the bond between mother and child is the strongest bond, then the number of women in a population, their fertility, and their longevity all help to define the potential limits of kinship structure and even, relatively speaking, the intensity of kinship relations. The potential scope of intergenerational relations is limited in the horizontal sense by fertility and in the vertical sense by longevity. Demographic processes interact with cultural rules of kin formation and household formation to determine socially defined kinship networks and co-residency groups (de Vos and Palloni, 1989: 176-178). In these groups, the ongoing processes of stable co-residency are associated with the formation and strength of kinship obligations. For example, recent research in the U.S. indicates that "the more cohesive the respondent's childhood family was, the stronger are felt obligations to parents and children" (Rossi and Rossi, 1990: 234). The demographic processes are not determinant, but they set limits and establish potentials. Mortality patterns limit the duration of kinship relations. If adult mortality is high, the kinship group will contain few ascending relatives. The longer the typical lifespan, the longer the members of earlier generations live to enact their kinship roles.14 The trends in life expectancy at birth in these four societies are remarkably congruent. For this variable, there are not three types of society, but one, in which over the past three decades expected lifespan increased from 67 to 72 years for men and from 73 to about 80 years for women.

14

128

See Matilda White Riley's (1985) discussion of the implications of increased longevity for family and social life, and especially its impacts on the opportunities and challenges facing women. She concludes (p. 344) that while longevity creates problems for the elderly and for society in general, it also means "continuing transformation of kinship relations, continuing proliferation of role options, continuing increments of accumulated experience, continuing alteration in the social, psychological, and biological patterns of growing up and growing old." Many of the impacts of increased longevity on family and kinship relations have been identified by Sullivan (1979) and le Bras (1973).

Intergenerational Relations

The congruity apparent in life-expectancy trends does not extend to age structures. Although all four societies experienced a dramatic decline in fertility (see chapter 3 of this book), there continue to be sizeable differences in the representation of children in the population (figure 2). In the early 1960s, a European-American distinction already noted for certain other indicators seemed to apply: in Quebec and the U.S., about one third of the population were children under age 15, while in France and Germany the proportion of children was lower, between one fourth and one fifth. Over the next 30 years, fertility dropped in all four societies, and by 1990 the proportion of children in the most "childful" nation (the U.S.) was as low as it had been in the country with the fewest children in 1960 (Germany). By this time, the European-American distinction had given way to one between Germany and the other countries. Children accounted for about one fifth of the population of France, Quebec, and the U.S., but only one seventh of the population of Germany. By 1990, Germany was the only one to have more older people (age 65+) than children, while Quebec had two children per older adult, and France and the U.S. occupied intermediate positions. Another relevant aspect of the demographic context is the ratio of men to women in the population. If women live longer than men, they come to be overrepresented in the "vertical" kindred. If they are also socially defined as more responsible than men for kin care, then the dominant form of adult intergenerational behaviour will be women relating to women and, as mothers grow older, women caring for women. Thus it is no surprise to learn that "in Western societies, the modal pattern of help to older people is that of daughters helping their mothers" (Brody and Lang, 1982: 18). If declining fertility rates accompany women's increased longevity, the probability that a given woman will at some time have to care for her mother increases, for there are fewer siblings to share the responsibility. Females predominate numerically in all four societies, with the greatest imbalance in Germany (927 males per 1,000 females in 1988, up from 893 in 1960) and the smallest in Quebec (974 males per 1,000 females in 1987, down from parity in 1961). There is a clear convergence over the three decades which combines increases in the proportion of men in the population in Germany and, until 1975, in France, with declines in the U.S. and Quebec. The national differences are much sharper among people aged 65 and over. In terms of relative numbers of men and women, the profiles in figure 3 show the now-familiar European-American split, with consistently higher proportions of women in France and Germany than in Quebec and the U.S. The trend for France is distinctive in not showing an increase in the proportion of women in the elderly population over the three decades, in contrast to Germany, Quebec, and the U.S.

129

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 3 Sex Ratios (Males/1,000 Females) Among Persons Age 65+, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S. 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Euromonitor, 1974; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzeret al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992.

Figure 4 Total First-Marriage Rates per 1,000 Women, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzeret al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992; Monnier, 1988.

130

Intergenerational Relations

MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, NON-MARITAL FERTILITY, AND ABORTION

The primary intergenerational tie, the mother-child relationship, can exist outside of marriage, and it persists regardless of subsequent changes in the situation of mother and child, family, or household. It is the basic kinship tie, the essential core, elaborated in innumerable cultural forms.15 Although marriage is not essential to the intergenerational tie, it is the traditional institution wherein that tie is created. Ideally, it creates a socially recognized household context with the expectation of long-term commitment in which the day-to-day dynamics essential to the formation of kinship bonds and responsibilities occur in more or less predictable arrangements. Behaviours that prevent or disrupt marriage, or that lead to fertility outside of marriage, do not eliminate the primary intergenerational tie, but they change its setting and often increase the challenges and stresses that accompany the formation of kinship networks. Just as, in classic sociological tradition, national and regional differentials in suicide rates were interpreted as reflecting differences in social cohesion, so differentials in marriage, divorce, and abortion rates may logically be viewed as reflections of intergenerational cohesion or commitment. At least, they may be interpreted as possible indicators of social commitment to traditional generational and kinship ties, and thereby reflections of general propensities toward change, if not displacement, of kinship rules and responsibilities. As with altruistic suicide, the argument can be made that some instances of divorce, and some abortions, are responses to the power, rather than the attenuation, of intergenerational bonds. Even so, rapid increases in divorce and abortion rates (and also in singleness and childlessness) clearly suggest the emergence of an alternative social climate less favourable to traditional family roles and responsibilities. Trends in first-marriage rates, summarized in figure 4, show a sharp decline in all four nations, although U.S. rates have stabilized since 1975.16 Over all, the socalled "second demographic transition is well advanced," and "the tremendously changed social significance of the 'married' status ... demonstrates the transition toward greater individualism." The change amounts to a decline in the status of being married: "Marriage has fewer implications for one's early adult life," and "not

15

It and other "close" ties are celebrated by Talmon (1970: 511): "The bond is given', it is based on objective facts which cannot be obliterated and wished out of existence. Commonality of 'flesh and blood' links relatives ineradicably; it is fundamentally unalterable."

16

The trends for marriage rates that include second and subsequent marriages (and thereby mix issues of marriage/non-marriage with national differences in divorce and the availability of partners at later ages) show a different pattern (see chapter 3, figure 6, of this book).

131

Convergence or Divergence

marrying or remarrying has become a reasonable option and divorce is far easier to consider than a few generations ago" (van de Kaa, 1987: 11-12, 16). Perhaps no social characteristics so sharply distinguish the U.S. from the other three societies as do divorce and abortion. For both, the absolute level over the entire period under study is between two and three times higher in the U.S. than elsewhere, and there is no evidence of convergence between U.S. patterns and the French and German patterns, but rather a parallelism, with the U.S. profile greatly offset from the others. Trends in divorce are summarized in figure 5. Note that the position of Quebec might represent a third type by virtue of its rapid change. Beginning in the 1960s with a divorce rate lower than that of France or Germany, in less than a decade Quebec surpassed them and thereafter occupied an intermediate position between the European countries and the U.S. In the late 1980s, with about 11 divorces annually per 1,000 married women, Quebec divorce rates were somewhat higher than the nine per 1,000 in France and Germany, but several strata removed from the 21-22 per 1,000 in the U.S., a rate unmatched by any other modern nation. Abortion rates in France, Germany, and the U.S. increased in the early 1970s, stabilized late in the decade, and exhibited modest declines after about 1982 (figure 6). Quebec had the lowest rates in the early 1970s, but by the end of the decade abortion rates there were comparable to those in Europe. As with divorce, the four trend lines are roughly parallel, but the U.S. rates are much higher. By the late 1980s, German abortions were in modest decline, at 110 per 1,000 live births, and the French and Quebec rates were stabilized at about 200 per 1,000, compared to over 400 per 1,000 in the U.S. In terms of total fertility rates (chapter 3, figure 1), the European-American differences apparent in the higher total fertility rates of Quebec and the U.S. in the 1960s give way by the 1980s to transatlantic pairings of societies with fertility slightly below replacement (France and the U.S.) and those with rates far below replacement (Quebec and Germany). The four societies manifest two distinct patterns of fertility outside of marriage (chapter 3, figure 5). One, represented only by Germany, is a continuing low level of out-of-wedlock births, such that, despite three decades of modest increase, 90% of births are to married women. As late as 1988, analysts of family change in Germany noted that "the old rule 'If children, then in marriage,' still holds true" (Hohn and Liischer, 1988: 324). The other pattern is rapidly rising fertility among unmarried women such that between one fourth and one third of all births are to single mothers. As of 1988, there was no evidence that this trend was levelling off in France, Quebec, or the U.S. We must add that out-ofwedlock births do not necessarily mean that children will live in single-head families; many of them will spend their lives in de facto families (parents not married).

132

Intergenerational Relations

Figure 5 Divorces per 1,000 Married Women, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Dumas, 1990; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzer et al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992.

Figure 6 Abortions per 1,000 Live Births, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1970-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzer et al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992.

133

Convergence or Divergence

The implications of the rising rates of out-of-wedlock births for future intergenerational relations are profound. Research in U.S. settings shows that children born to single mothers tend to spend most of their childhood in a one-parent setting: "If the biological father is not present in the household at birth, he rarely shows up later" (Wojtkiewicz, 1992: 61). As well, children raised in single-parent households, especially female-headed households, suffer marked economic and other disadvantages compared to children in two-parent homes (Whitehead, 1993). Among the ways they differ, recent research suggests, is in the strength of their affectional ties to parent(s), with ties to fathers particularly at risk, and in their perceived responsibility to parents and kindred generally. High levels of kinship responsibility are associated with stable, intact families of orientation (Rossi and Rossi, 1990). In some other cultural settings, the negative consequences of out-of-wedlock births may be much less dramatic. Although there has not been sufficient research to provide a definitive result, expert opinion has it that in France and Quebec, the children of single-parent families are often indistinguishable from the children of traditional two-parent families. Furthermore, there are said to be sizeable national differences in the probabilities that a child born to a single mother will end up being reared in a single-parent home. With respect to trends in modernization and associated demographic changes as antecedents of or context for change in intergenerational behaviour, our brief overview suggests that the linkage between modernization (or urbanization, or industrialization) and kinship behaviour is very complex and culture-specific. Facile generalizations about consequences of modernization for the family are suspect, partly because modernization itself shows a diversity of characteristics along with some apparent uniformities. There are increasing urbanization and metropolitanization in some countries, increasing urbanization but a stable or declining proportion of metropolitan population in others. There is convergence in access to telephones and, to a lesser degree, to physicians and higher education, but continued differences in per-capita energy consumption, national productivity, and efficiency of energy use. There is convergence in life expectancy - longer lives for everyone - but continued differences in fertility and in the presence of children in society. Despite a general and growing tolerance for a diversity of family forms, there remain vast differences in the range of abortion, unmarried-fertility, and divorce rates, and sizeable national differences in propensity to marry, despite some convergence in the late 1970s. Even where there is apparent convergence, there are important exceptions. There are declining sex ratios for elderly people, except in France, where there is stability. Marriage is increasingly out of favour, except in the U.S., where firstmarriage rates have been stable since 1975. By 1980, abortion rates were stable or declining everywhere except Quebec. Births to unmarried women are rising everywhere, with no end to the trend in sight, but the rates are greatly divergent, and 134

Intergenerational Relations

over three times higher in Quebec than in Germany. Where parallel trends or convergences exist, often there are sizeable differences in the rate of change, thereby adding another variable to the situation. The recent experience of Quebec, in particular, raises the issue of the differential social impacts of varying rates of change. Specifically, the social consequences of rapid modernization, as opposed to moderately paced change, need to be explored. CONTRASTS IN KINSHIP INTERACTION AND SUPPORT Households

Household characteristics are important indicators of kinship behaviour, because the strongest predictors of active involvement with kin are co-residence and proximate residence (Harris, 1990: 74; Lee, 1980: 924-925). Kinship interaction depends on the availability of kin, and availability is maximized by co-residence. Moreover, the mutual life-support activities that occur in households are the usual context for the transmission of kinship norms, the enactment of kinship responsibilities, and the creation of emotional bonds between generations. Household structure may reflect a variety of family-related behaviours, among them "the propensity to marry, divorce, separate, remarry, or cohabit and changes in fertility behaviour and in the ages at which children leave home, along with mortality trends and differentials" (van de Kaa, 1987: 32). In other words, patterns of household formation and structure mediate between certain socio-economic and demographic variables and intergenerational behaviour. Just as mutual activity among parents, children, and others creates kinship bonds, so the absence of shared activity inherent in living alone, labelled "the ultimate expression of individualism" by van de Kaa (1987: 32), may tend not to foster feelings of family solidarity and responsibility. Accordingly, a possible inverse indicator of people's commitment to intergenerational relations is whether they live with others or alone.17 In 1960, one out of five French and German households were one-person households, compared to about one in eight for the U.S. and only one out of 20 for Quebec (figure 7). Over the next three decades, rates of living alone increased consistently and, in Quebec and Germany, quite rapidly. By 1990, one third of all German households were one-person units, as were one fourth of all households in the other three societies, a striking convergence. The change was most notable in Quebec, which posted a 20-point increase in one-person households.

17

Of course, not all who live alone are necessarily "separated" from parents or other family members. Solitary living is not incompatible with regular and cohesive kinship relations. But the research quite clearly shows that distance impedes interaction, and, by definition, persons who live alone are more distant from family members than those who share a household with them.

135

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 7 One-Person Households as a Percent of All Households, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Eurostat, 1984; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzer et al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992; Marchand and Balland, 1976; Noelle-Neumann, 1981; Schwarz, 1983; Villac and Morin, 1983.

Figure 8 Persons by Private Household, France, Germany, Quebec, and U.S., 1960-90

Sources: Caplow et al., 1991; Euromonitor, 1986; Forse et al., 1990; Glatzer et al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1992; Marchand and Balland, 1976; Noelle-Neumann, 1981; Schwarz, 1983; Villac and Morin, 1983.

136

Intergenerational Relations

Although this rise is notable, the over-all effect is smaller than is suggested by the scale of the percentage increase in one-person households, because each such household contributes only one person to the total population. In Quebec, for example, the dramatic increase in one-person households is much less impressive in terms of proportion of the total population affected, and the apparent numerical impact on family living seems to be relatively minor. As table 2 shows, between 1961 and 1986 the proportion of the Quebec population living in family households declined by only 2%. Although the proportion living alone increased fivefold, the people seemingly most affected by this increase were residents of households of unrelated persons, or of related persons and others living in non-family households. That is, while the proportion of the Quebec population living alone increased by over six points, the proportion living with others in non-family households showed a corresponding drop of over five points. There is little retreat from family living apparent in these figures. Trends in the percent of population living alone manifest, at lower levels, the same consistent rise and convergence pattern shown in figure 7 for household size. By the late 1980s, one out of six Germans lived alone, compared to one eleventh of the populations of France, Quebec, and the U.S. Not only did more people choose to live alone, but those who did not lived with fewer others. While living in families remained almost as popular as ever, the family group became smaller (figure 8). This reduction, consistent and sizeable in all four societies, was largest in Quebec, which formerly had households half again as large as those of the other countries. Household size converged for France, Quebec, and the U.S., averaging 2.6 persons by 1990. As with the trends in one-person households, Germany's profile is parallel but not convergent. German households, already the smallest in 1960, had shrunk to an average of only 2.2 persons by 1989. Societies of small households may maintain strong intergenerational ties, and a decline in co-residence may not always indicate a reduction in solidarity with kin. Many one-person households are very well connected to a network of kindred and friends. In accordance with the notion of "intimacy at a distance" (Rosenmayr, 1977; Rosenmayr and Kockeis, 1965), parents and other relatives may live nearby, thereby facilitating or even enhancing kinship relations despite residence in separate households. Even so, the growing popularity of solitary living, combined with reduced household size and the growing atypicality of households with young children, has changed the shape and complexity of kin relations. Related to the trend toward smaller households is a decline in the number of three- and four-generational households. In Germany between 1961 and 1981, the number of such "traditional" households dropped from 6% to 2% (Schwarz, 1983: 566). There was a parallel trend in Quebec, where the proportion of the population in households who were either grandchildren of the household head or parents of the

137

Convergence or Divergence

Table 2 Persons in Private Households by Household and Family Status, Percentage, Quebec, 1961-1986 Household Type Kinship Status

1961

1966

1971

1976

1981

1986

90,6 39,1

90,4 40,2

88,7 42,1

9,3 47,4

89,9 49,8

88,1 50,9

48,6 2,4 0,5

48,2 1,8 0,2

45,0 1,3 0,3

41,0 0,9 0,1

37,4 1,7 0,9

34,8 1,6 0,8

In non-family households With relatives With non-relatives Living alone

9,4 3,1 4,7 1,6

9,6 3,0 4,4 2,3

11,3 3,5 4,6 3,2

10,7 1,6 1,8 6,8

10,1 1,6 2,2 8,0

11,9 1,7 2,2 8,0

Total population

100

100

100

In family households Husbands, wives, single parents Unmarried children Relatives Non-relatives

100

100

100

Source: Census of Canada.

head decreased by almost half between 1961 and 1976, from 2.0% to 1.2%.18 In the U.S., a similar downward trend in grandchildren cohabiting with grandparents was reversed in the late 1970s, when increasing numbers of grandchildren accompanied a divorced parent back into a grandparental household. Residential Proximity and Intergenerational Contact

One of the best-documented findings about contact between parents and their adult children is that distance makes a difference. The closest residential proximity - coresidence - is associated with the highest levels of mutual aid and interaction. As the distance (or time) separating the households of parents and their children increases, contacts and shared activities decline. Lacking comparable national data on residential proximity for all four societies, we finally assembled a very rudimentary series for France, Germany, and the U.S., mostly reflecting the distances between the homes of elderly parents and

18

138

Statistics Canada changed reporting categories in the 1981 census, preventing us from tracing this trend through the 1980s.

Intergenerational Relations

their grown children (figure 9). The most notable thing about these data is the lack of change they show. Over two to three decades of marked economic and social change, including sizeable shifts in some key modernization variables, the distances between the households of parents and their grown children changed very little. In the U.S., there was a slight decrease, from 77% to 72%, in the proportion of older parents living within 30 minutes of their nearest child. In France and Germany, the effective distance between elderly parents and their grown children was not much different in the 1980s than in the two previous decades. There were declines in coresidence - the two generations were increasingly apt to live in separate dwellings - but usually these dwellings were not far separated, mostly within the easy access of a half-hour's trip or less. Thus the probability of having a parent or grown child nearby remained about the same, while the probability of having them underfoot declined. Relatively small increments of distance seem to make a great difference in frequency of contact. In the mid-1970s, weekly visits by French parents to their children decreased from 65% to 27% when the distance between their homes increased from within the same municipality to within 20 kilometres (Roussel and Bourguignon, 1976). A decade later, contacts between elderly Parisian parents and their children ranged from 85%, for children living nearby in the same commune, to 8%, for those living outside the Ile-de-France region (Paris and its environs) (Cribier, 1989a: 45). Contact between parents and children is also influenced by other variables, among them the number of children, the marital situation and health of both parent and child, each person's employment status, the presence of grandchildren, and the "affective closeness" between parent and child (Cribier, 1989a: 45-47; Rossi and Rossi, 1990: 372-386). Keeping in mind the sizeable intrasample variations that reflect such factors, we can compare national trends in intergenerational contact for the handful of studies similar enough to justify such comparisons. Judging from the profiles in figure 10, rates of parent-child contact have declined slightly in France and the U.S. In contrast, Germany shows no decline, and even some signs of increase. In the U.S., the proportion of parents having weekly contact with a non-cohabiting child dropped 13% between 1962 and 1984. The decline is even more substantial than these weekly contact figures indicate, because the largest declines were in the categories of most intense contact. If we add into the percentage base older persons living with a child (who are not represented in the profiles in figure 10), then in 1962, of all parents aged 65+ with surviving children, 28% lived with a child and 37% saw a child several times a week, for a total of 65% with daily or almost daily contact. The corresponding percentages for 1975 and 1984 are 53% (18% cohabitating) and 46% (again, 18% cohabiting). In other words, the

139

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 9 Residential Proximity,3 France, Germany, and U.S., 1955-90

a Percent of adults living near their parents and parents living near an adult child; in same household, same neighbourhood/town/city, within 20 km. or a half-hour trip. Sources: Baumert, 1960; Collot et al., 1982; Crimmins et ah, 1990; Davis et ah, 1987; Dieck, 1989; Diewald, 1990; Fortin, 1987; Gokalp, 1978; Hollinger et al., 1990; Hugick, 1989; Klatsky, 1971; Moss et al., 1985; Rossi et ah, 1990; Roussel, 1976; Shanas, 1979; Stehouwer, 1968.

proportion of older parents in the U.S. who had contact with a child daily or almost daily dropped by more than one third between 1962 and 1984. There is also evidence of a slight decline in intergenerational contact among the French, although in this case the data are shakier because the span is shorter and the trend line represents two studies of the same cohort of retired Parisians. As shown in figure 10, among retirees aged 63-69, 74% saw a child at least weekly in 1975; a decade later, the rate of weekly contact had fallen to 67%. The trend in Germany is different, with parents' rates of weekly contact with one or more children at least as high as in the other societies, and showing no sign of decline; if anything, there was more contact in the 1980s than previously. Everywhere, average rates of adult children's contact with parents run somewhat lower than rates of parental contact with at least one child. This finding follows logically from the greater geographic dispersion of several children as opposed to a "nearest" child. The data on frequency of contact with parents suggest 140

Intergenerational Relations

Figure 10 Intergenerational Contact at Least Weekly," France, Germany, and U.S., 1955-90

a Percent of parents who see a non-co-resident adult child, and adult children who see a non-co-resident parent. Sources: Baumert, 1960; Beland, 1984; Cribier, 1989; Diewald, 1990; Gokalp, 1978; Hugick, 1989; Moss et al., 1985; Pitrou, 1977; Rossi et al., 1990; Roussel, 1976; Shanas, 1973; Statistisches Bundesamt, 1985.

the following conclusions: German adults see their parents more often than Americans do (about 40% of U.S. adults see their parents weekly, compared to about 60% of German adults); French adults also see their parents more often, although they probably have less contact than do Germans; and rates of contact with parents, as computed from adult children's reports, have changed very little over the recent periods for which there are data. Mutual Aid

The same finding of continuity holds for helping behaviour between parents and their children, for which we found comparable data over a decade or more only for France and the U.S. As figure 11 shows, for both nations the profiles of selected indicators of intergenerational exchange reveal more continuity than change. In the U.S., about 70% of parents receive some kind of help from their grown children, and about the same proportion of parents report providing some kind of aid to their children. In France, grandmothers continue to babysit their grandchildren, with between one fourth and one third of their grandchildren receiving such assistance. 141

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Figure 11 Intergenerational Exchange," France and U.S., 1960-90

a Percent of parents receiving some kind of assistance from adult children in the past year or so, and children from their parents. Sources: Bengtson et al., 1985; Commaille, 1983; Dechaux, 1990; Delbes, 1983; Dieck, 1989; Gokalp et al., 1982; Hugick, 1989; Michel, 1970; Neidhardt, 1978; Pitrou, 1977; Rossi et al., 1990; Roussel, 1976.

Less appropriate for charting but nevertheless persuasive are several local studies of intergenerational resource flows. Taken together, the available data convey a picture of kinship ties continuing to serve important economic, educational, and social support functions despite bureaucratic and industrial change in the wider society. Lacking additional family- or individual-level data on intergenerational exchange appropriate for national comparisons, we now consider patterns of intergenerational support separately for each society. We explicitly exclude what was once the most important transfer of all, formal inheritance. INTERGENERATIONAL

TRANSFERS AND ELDER CARE

The historic role of kinship systems as mediating institutions between economic or political systems and individuals continues in modern society, although its scope may be reduced (see Anderson, 1977; Shanas and Sussman, 1977). Among the relevant changes since the 1960s is a heightened visibility of kinship in urban settings, thanks to the "discovery" in contemporary society of vital intergenerational linkages

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associated with patterns of mutual aid and nurturant assistance to the elderly. Such patterns of familial assistance occur in all advanced industrial societies (Cowgill, 1986). Much recent study of family networks reflects concern about the present and future status of intergenerational resource transfers. A sizeable and growing body of literature on family care as a supplement to national social-support systems explores these connections (see, for example, Cicirelli, 1981; Conseil de la famille, 1989), as does another body of literature examining the implications of family variables such as maternal employment and fertility for the future of pension and social-security systems. Social and economic trends influence families directly, but they also affect the political structure and extra-familial support programmes. How much mutual assistance is needed, the net balance of the flow of resources between generations, and the way resource transfers are carried out vary according to national, historical, economic, and political context. In the societies under consideration, the past three decades have seen major changes in the prescribed role of the family, as opposed to the state, in caring for persons formerly considered family dependents, whether under-age children or elderly and impaired adults. Political changes have strengthened the role of the state as an alternative parent or a parent of last resort, and as a caretaker of last resort for the elderly. In addition, the following generalities apply to all four societies: in practice, if not law, the family continues to be defined as primary caretaker for the elderly, although not necessarily the source of financial support; economic instability and growing dependency needs, especially projected increases in medical and maintenance costs for the elderly, have forced policy makers to anticipate that families must continue to provide much economic and social support; demographic changes and shifts in social and moral values - for instance, the partial delegitimation of marriage and parenthood - have changed the shape and content of some intergenerational structures, weakening certain links, strengthening others, producing altered, more varied, but still vital generational ties; women continue to be the primary caretakers, and there is little sign of increased male involvement in the maintenance of intergenerational ties or the direct care of aged parents; and the heightened instability of marriage has tended to strengthen the mother-child tie as the permanent and most reliable intergenerational bond, and to reduce paternal involvement in child-rearing, thereby assuring the continued matricentricity of kinship relations. These generalizations, along with some less universal ones, are elaborated below as we consider intergenerational exchange in each societal context. The four societies differ in their legislation regarding family responsibility for other family

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members.19 There are also diverse customs bearing on family relations over the life cycle - patterns of family ritual, retirement, elder care, inheritance, and grandparenting - that vary by locality, class, religion, and nationality and affect national trends in intergenerational behaviour. We will pay special attention to changes in patterns of intergenerational support and national responses to the needs of an expanding population of older citizens. France

France was the first of the four societies - the first in Europe, with the possible exception of Sweden - to encounter the problems of an ageing population. This is due to an early decline in the birth rate such that by 1900 more than 8% of the population was over age 65, compared to fewer than half that many in other modernizing nations, such as Germany and the U.S. France's early experience with low birth rates and a large elderly population did not translate into effective support programmes for elderly citizens. Until recently, according to Stearns (1976: 16), France was "merely preceding other countries in gerontological neglect." However, early national concern with population stagnation did generate policies promoting a higher birthrate that, in altered form, still have popular support (van de Kaa, 1987: 49). These policies seem to have had some effect, for French fertility is relatively high by European standards, though below replacement level. In France, as elsewhere, the combination of declining fertility and extended life expectancy has changed the structure of kinship relations. In a comparison of estimates of generational coexistence for French society in the eighteenth century and in the 1960s, le Bras (1973) demonstrated how rough numerical equivalence in the size of kinship networks can mask great dissimilarity of content. The number of parents in the two networks were equivalent, but the number of collateral kin was greatly reduced in the 1960s because fertility was so much lower than it had been in the eighteenth century. On the other hand, coexistence between generations was much more common in the 1960s because of increased longevity. In the past, brothers, sisters, uncles, and aunts were more numerous but not as long-lived, while now the structure of the kinship network is more narrow but with greater vertical scope. The simultaneous presence of four generations exists today in the lineages of one fourth of French persons aged 45-64.

19

144

For example, German law requires parents to be responsible for their children until they have a "viable occupation," rather than up to a certain age, as in U.S. law. "Viable occupation" is interpreted to mean having a trade (completing an apprenticeship), technical skills (holding a certificate of advanced training), or a university degree. The law applies equally to men and women (Weatherford, 1981: 147).

Intergenerational Relations

A long-term emphasis on close rather than extended kindred (Davis, 1977: 100) has been increasingly evident in recent decades. Ardagh (1982: 368) states that "the main change since the war is that the focus of loyalty has been steadily narrowing ... from the big multi-generation ... [family] to the immediate home cell of parents and children." The rate of narrowing has not been uniform. The attenuation of ties to extended family is more advanced among propertyless city dwellers than among rural landowning families. Accompanying the apparent attenuation is a revitalization of intergenerational ties to parents and grandparents (Ardagh, 1982). Attachment to family lines is expressed in an extensive exchange of goods and services. Parental aid to children continues over most of the lifespan. As children grow up and are followed by grandchildren, numerous reciprocal favours and services bind the generations. Bonds to mothers are especially strong, and, because women enact kinship roles more than men, intergenerational bonds especially favour the maternal line. The flow of resources from parent to child or grandchild continues even in the parents' old age. Even "the co-residence of 75-80-year-olds and their children often functions as a form of aid to the children, contrary to what is usually assumed!" (Cribier, 1989b: 189). Ethnographic fieldwork in the early 1980s revealed an expanding role of kinship interaction and exchange, in both rural and urban areas. The contemporary French family is important politically and economically, and not just a setting for psychological and emotional relationships. In the rural areas, Family help inaugurates a cycle of exchanges as other kin expect that, when necessary, they will be helped on a similar occasion. Finding jobs, especially first jobs, is always facilitated by kinship networks, inside which information circulates ... Once settled, a young couple receives much help from older parents, regarding children's care. Grandmothers are all the more necessary when mothers have to work in order to help repay the loan required to buy the plot and house. On the other hand, older parents who are still in agriculture also find a lot of help from their children during heavy farm work. The wider family team of former times has been replaced by a much smaller one. (Segalen, 1985: 24-25)

In cities, too, kinship networks seem to be experiencing a revitalization. They serve as recruiting agencies, and child-care centres, and have additional economic and political functions. Commaille (1983: 104) contrasts the conventional wisdom of the "narrowing of the family network" with the findings of recent research that grandparents, parents, and children form "an important network of exchange" that contributes to family self-sufficiency for children of divorced parents, for whom, it turns out, the efforts of grandparents "offer continuity and support in an otherwise unstable situation." 145

Convergence or Divergence

Intergenerational transfers serve a double function. They operate as buffers, helping to insulate family members from the full consequences of economic or personal hardships. They also serve a conduit or intermediary function, facilitating entry into institutions (employment, home purchasing) or other social networks (Dechaux, 1990: 94). This double function is very important in French society. In the late 1980s, two thirds of exchanges between households were between kin (with intergenerational exchanges the most common), including 70% of child-tending exchanges, 58% of helping with errands, and 82% of sewing help (Degenne and Lebeaux, 1991). Since 1960, the French government's family policy has changed from one favouring large families and the traditional family division of roles to one that favours poor people generally and is officially neutral about family characteristics. Roussel and Thery (1988) describe two related trends: a shift from a "golden age of pro-family policies" to a condition where "the Family" was replaced by a multiplicity of family types, and one in which aid formerly earmarked to reduce the costs of large families (subsidizing fertility) was redirected to "disadvantaged" families, whatever their age or family status (subsidizing the underprivileged). This evolution toward discontinuity and rupture has many implications for intergenerational relations. If "henceforth the state-family relationship will be permanently negotiated" (Roussel and Thery, 1988: 348), then intrafamily and intergenerational rights and obligations are also open to negotiation. In such a fluid situation, elderly citizens are as likely to lose entitlements and security as to gain them. There is already a latent conflict over generational rights to state-regulated resources between the employed population born after the Second World War and their elders, who are seen as "a privileged population in ... the 'Golden Age of pensions.'" Cribier (1989b: 198) remarks that the French generally refuse to recognize this potential conflict. Even so, the relatively well-off newly retired are themselves concerned about the implications of an apparent imbalance between the economic condition of young people, employed and unemployed, and their own more favourable situations, "this imbalance no longer being acceptable to society." Despite the changes in family mores and a potential generational conflict, there is continuity in the French government's policy regarding the family's responsibility to care for its own elderly members. Since the 1962 "rapport Laroque" proposed social integration of the aged and their maintenance in private homes, it has been official policy to try to avoid placing them in rest homes, hospices, or asylums. Early on, some new public services, such as nursing aid and housework assistance, were created to facilitate the policy. Faced with rising costs and an economic crisis, in 1983 the government reaffirmed the principle of integration and maintenance but restricted public support. Kinship networks, which had been providing most of the 146

Intergenerational Relations

support for their aged members anyway, were reaffirmed as the "irreplaceable" group with ultimate responsibility for the elderly. This policy remains in effect. Officially, the government encourages the maintenance of kinship ties, as in urban policies designed to prevent too great a distance between the residences of parents and those of their grown children. In the 1990s, there are some financial incentives that encourage people to live with their parents. Some public services exist for the impaired elderly, but they are inadequate, and the responsibility falls mainly on close relatives, especially grown daughters. The proportion of older adults who are institutionalized is very low, though increasing: in 1962, fewer than 3% of those aged 65 and over lived in institutions; by 1988 the figure had more than doubled, to 6%. In other words, fully 94% of those aged 65 and over were living in private homes. Even persons aged 80 and over were largely domiciled in private homes (and therefore largely self-supporting or supported by kin): in 1987, 16% lived in instutitions, up from 12% a decade earlier (Joel and Bungener, 1990). The government's policy of relying on families to maintain most of the elderly population is nothing new; it merely formalizes a continuing reality. It also continues a disproportionate burden on French women, who are the main providers of personal support to the elderly. Germany

In Germany, as in France, family policy over the past three decades has evolved from a system officially supporting certain "traditional" social forms designated as "family" to a more comprehensive, diverse system that acknowledges "a progressive plurality of family forms." A public manifestation of this trend was the 1986 renaming of the Ministry of Family Affairs as the Ministry of Youth, Family, Women, and Health, and its involvement in programmes facilitating both family and occupational careers for women (Hohn and Liischer, 1988: 330-333).20 The differentiation of household and family forms since the end of the Second World War exhibits several characteristic tendencies sometimes cited as evidence for increasing personal isolation and an erosion of family relationships in German society. These tendencies include less willingness to marry, lower fertility, persistent shrinkage in the size of private households (the reduction of multigeneration households and those with many children being particularly notable), decreasing stability of marriage and family, and a diminution of horizontal kinship networks due to scarcity of same-generation relatives and family members.

20

In 1991, this ministry was divided into a Ministry of Youth and Women and a Ministry of Family and Elders.

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On the other hand, there are many indications of continuity and even increased commitment to family and kindred. In 1953, asked "If you had more time or money, what would you like do?," 45% of adults responded, "Spend more time with my family." Twenty-six years later, the response was about the same (46%). In the same survey was the question, "What would you probably miss most if you had to move?" In 1979, 45% said "Relatives who live here," compared to 38% with this response in 1953 (Noelle-Neumann, 1981: 11, 86). Additional evidence of heightened kin solidarity despite smaller households and a societal trend toward individuation is an enlargement of the circle of relatives defined as "family." Persons outside the immediate nuclear family, such as parents, parents-in-law, siblings, and grandchildren, were twice as likely to be defined as "family" in 1979 as in 1953 (e.g., for parents, from 19% to 34%; for siblings, from 10% to 23%) (Glatzer et al., 1992; see trend 2.2). One review of trends affecting the German family cautions that the continuing increase in single-person households does not necessarily mean increasing social isolation (Hohn and Luscher, 1988). Other recent surveys21 demonstrate that changes in household composition, specifically increases in one-person households, are not good indicators of whether people are tied into networks of contact and support. As many as one third of adults under age 35 living alone said that they had a life companion living outside of their household, as did about 10% of older respondents. Lower-than-average integration in contact and support networks tends to characterize older single persons living alone, childless older couples, and the widowed, and seems to be largely a consequence of the increasing verticalization of kinship relations. Turning to intergenerational assistance, in the early 1970s grandparents accounted for 46% of the care of children under age three whose mothers were employed (Neidhardt, 1978: 235), and intergenerational ties were said to have "growing relevance for young families with a job-holding mother" (Pfeil and Ganzert, 1973). Fifteen years later, employed mothers still had to fall back on private resources to take care of their very young children, and for married women, help from close relatives was still the typical solution (Brand, 1989: 191-193).22 Studies

21

Based on findings from five data sets, the Wohlfahrtssurveys of 1978, 1980, 1984, and 1988, and Allbus 1986; see also Diewald, 1990.

22

The continuity of aid provided by grandmothers as babysitters can be explained by a national inadequacy of public child-care services. In Germany, the functions of pre-schools and kindergartens are understood much more as pedagogic than as service institutions for working parents. In 1989, only 60% of preschool children attended a kindergarten, compared to 88% in Italy and 95% in France and Belgium. Furthermore, 88% of the children who did attend kindergarten were registered for only half-day attendance (Zweiwochendienst, 1989: 13).

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of mothers' social networks in four nations (Sweden, Germany, Wales, and the U.S.) in the 1980s reveal German (and Welsh) mothers' main support networks to be particularly dominated by kinfolk, especially primary kin (Cochran and Gunnarsson, 1990: 92-96). In traditional Germany, individual welfare was first the responsibility of the family, then the church, and then the government. The government's role, in the sense of "charity" for low-income persons, including the elderly poor, was always substantial. Nowadays, the government shares responsibility with the so-called welfare organizations, prominent among them the Catholic and Protestant churches. Although government now assumes greater responsibility, and the church a somewhat diminished role, the main agency providing personal services to elderly Germans is still the family (Smyer, 1984: 243). Adult children continue to represent by far the most important source of help for their parents, even after they leave the parental home. Up to a travelling distance of a half-hour, parents living alone enjoy almost the same degree of attention and support as parents living with their children in the same house or household. In fact, the balance of positive over negative interaction may be improved because of the separate quarters, for "multi-generation households are as a rule fraught with conflict and demand adaptation processes which do not affect all members equally" (German Centre of Gerontology, 1982: 49). Short distances and frequent contact between parents and their adult children are the rule. Young singles living alone have somewhat less contact with relatives and live farther away than do young married couples and families, but these differences are less distinct than commonly assumed. Their lack of involvement in the kinship network is far less dramatic than that of childless older persons, whose situation is, in addition, irreversible due to lack of relatives. In fact, singles prove to be the most active of all when it comes to assisting relatives and friends. Reviewing the available empirical data, Diewald (1990) concluded that no single interpretive metaphor such as "desolidarity" or "pluralization" was adequate to convey the complexities of recent change and what they mean to German families at different stages of life. While no general claim of progressive erosion of intergenerational relationships can be made, it does appear that the support of a growing number of dependent older persons is increasingly problematic. The heavy involvement of family members in the care of the elderly is shown by recent statistics and refutes the political stereotype of helpless older invalids being carted off to institutions. In the late 1980s, Germany had about 2.1 million invalids and chronically (or multiply) ill persons, most of them elderly. Of these, about 420,000

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Convergence or Divergence

partial invalids23 and 210,000 complete invalids were living at home. Another 370,000 persons were in nursing homes or hospitals. The remaining 1.1 million were considered relatively mild cases, treatable through a combination of assistance with household chores, minor basic care and treatment programmes, and their own selfhelp potential (Gitschmann and Veil, 1990). In other words, over 80% of invalids in need of care were being tended to in the home. To some degree, such intense family involvement is necessitated by the sheer scale of the problem. Government policy is to encourage "domiciliary nursing care by family members, close friends, or neighbours," for there are simply not enough public homes for the infirm aged to meet the demand (Lowy, 1979: 219). As a result, state assistance programmes for nursing and household chore services have been designed to help families care for their elders at home. Approximately every 20th private household is a Pflegehaushalt, in which at least one permanently handicapped or chronically ill family member, or one needing care, is nursed. These are mostly older persons; over 25% of persons in care are over 80 years old. At the same time, 75% of the other members of such households are over 50 years old. In the cases of at-home care for serious or complete invalids, the person responsible for providing care, generally a wife, daughter, or daughter-in-law, devotes from four to six hours daily to nursing work. In 94% of the cases, these tasks must be performed daily, and in 60%, the nursing effort takes more than four hours a day. These findings dramatize the fact that in Germany it is not so much "family" that cares for older family members, but, rather, women. Of daughters aged 55-70 with at least one surviving parent, 46% were caring for parents or parents-inlaw in their own households, and an additional 27% had previously cared for parents who now were in homes for the aged (Lehr, 1985). Some observers, noting the conflict between such self-sacrifice and modern norms of self-actualization for women, anticipate serious future declines in the quality of elder care: Care for the old is the main task that falls on women, who are able to perform this duty only if they give up a work life of their own free will or as a consequence of insufficient professional qualifications. As the participation of women in the work force becomes greater, the willingness to give up their jobs in favour of family duties declines. (Schumann, 1988: 68-69)

23

150

Defined in the Health Care Reform Act as persons "ascertained by physician to be so helpless in consequence of illness or handicap ... that they are permanently and to a very high degree in need of help in the common and frequent tasks of day-to-day life."

Intergenerational Relations

As yet, there is little evidence of any trend toward significant male involvement in such nurturant care, in the service either of invalid parents or of children. Neidhardt's (1978: 233) observation of more than a decade ago that "in the F.R.G. ... the father is not seriously expected to take the mother's role, nor is any outside institution" still seems apt. More likely than increased male involvement or a continuation of "family" self-help in its traditional form would be additional public services in response to heightened advocacy by both professional organizations and self-help groups among the German elderly (Gelfand, 1988: 65-67). Such an extension of services would probably reflect political acceptance of the emerging notion of individually attained rights in public support systems. Much of the current debate about revision of the social, health-care, and nursing policies is aimed at creating a new balance between public and private responsibilities. Two concepts of solidarity, one old and one new, each based on different fundamentals, collide in the search for possible solutions to the present, and worsening, Pflegenotstand (crisis in the nursing situation) (Baldock and Evers, 1991: 32). According to the older concept, based in the subsidiary principle of Catholic social theory, the family is the smallest social unit and should receive help from larger units such as associations or government only when it has exhausted its own resources. Care of older persons in the home is financed in accordance with the tradition of relief-funding legislation (forma pauperis), and not until private and family resources have been exhausted and self-help is no longer possible because the invalid has become pauperized, is government support to be granted.24 This support is seen as relief or "charity," a designation many older people define as stigmatizing. In line with administration of other forms of welfare, family members may be subjected to official financial scrutiny or other government demands associated with eligibility for public assistance. In the competing conceptualization, services granted to a state-assistance recipient fall under the definition of social insurance, not welfare. They are to be viewed not as government charity, but as the "properly attained rights" of the individual. Traditionally, social-insurance systems are closely tied to a recipient's gainful employment, and they discriminate against persons whose work does not qualify. Just as the 1883 introduction of the German social insurance system was an immediate consequence of lobbying by the labour movement,25 the emergence of the individual-rights notion is an outgrowth of lobbying by feminists on the value of 24

The same principle can also develop an effect completely contrary to care "from above," as in the purposeful public promotion of a "new subsidiarity" of self-help associations and voluntary civil engagement.

25

Because it represented a political instrument "from above," and by no means satisfied the labour movement's desire for self-administration, the movement rejected this system.

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Convergence or Divergence

women's labour at home. Since 1986, time spent rearing children counts toward social-security retirement pensions. The decade-old controversy26 about how to manage nursing care in the future seems to be taking a similar turn, and heading toward radical change, "away from the nonobligatory responsibility of the government after all private resources have been exhausted, and towards a socialization of nursing care, guaranteed by its integration in general health insurance, so that the right to care in old age is no longer bound to any particular duties" (Baldock and Evers, 1991: 33). Quebec

Studies of Montreal families in the 1950s revealed patterns of urban living organized around kinship networks of exceptional density (Garigue, 1956; Rioux, 1959). Kinship relations in French-Canadian cities were seen as paradoxical, because they were much like rural family patterns elsewhere. Urban Quebec was thus identified early as an exception to the hypothetical processes whereby urban living led to the isolation of the nuclear family.27 Similarly, a postwar study of Quebec City (Lamontagne and Falardeau, 1947: 246-247) reported the persistence of a traditional family complex that exhibited "symbols of social stability while immersed in often unnoticed violent industrial and social changes." Despite industrialization and metropolitanization, families in Quebec City continued to "show social and economic characteristics which, according to usual American standards and criteria, were more 'rural' than 'urban.'"

26

Various reforms have been proposed since 1980. The mid-1980's saw several draft laws, though the only oneto pass (in 1989) concerned the possibility of the caregiver applying for a substitute for private nurses while on vacation. In 1991, supplementary care was granted, though health-insurance agencies view this as mandatory only for persons seriously in need of care living at home. The question of whether private sources should be expected to bear more of the costs of elder care re-emerged recently as a contested political issue. The liberal-economist wing of the Christian Union coalition parties, among others, demanded the upgrading of self-help contributions by non-government bodies - that is, by families and private households - who were accused of shirking their responsibilities. Although there is declining support for the formerly fundamental liberal-conservative position that too much guaranteed social security undermines individual helpfulness and feelings of duty, the concept of the "enabling state" in its entire spectrum is still part of the debate. Its forms include proposals of tax relief to encourage enrolment in private nursing insurance, a moderate position in which the state makes nursing insurance mandatory, and the position favoured by the present (1992) government, socializing nursing insurance in the same manner as health insurance.

27

Garigue (1956: 1098-1100) was among the earliest to refute the theoretical link between urbanization and the isolated nuclear family. Rather than seeing urban processes in Quebec as atypical, he argued that kinship networks were adaptive mechanisms that might function as efficiently in urban settings as in rural. Whether kinship organizations turned out to be useful in the city was more a function of culture than of urbanization itself.

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In this traditional complex, kinship relations were largely directed by the women, who were expected to take the lead organizing "family affairs" and who "acted as links between the various households of the kin group" (Garigue, 1956: 1093). Ties to immediate family - parents and siblings - were the ones most strongly supported by community expectations and affirmed in contact and exchange. Though we lack the benchmark data necessary to chart trends in intergenerational helping behaviour, descriptive accounts and case studies highlight the continuing vitality of kinship ties in Quebec social life. While it appears that kinship formerly played a more important part in Quebec's economic and political life than it does at present, it remains an important force. Declining fertility and heightened geographic mobility have thinned some of the remarkably dense kinship networks studied in urban Quebec in the 1950s, but a substantial proportion of all exchanges of goods and services continue to be carried out within the framework of kinship. Levels of intergenerational exchange seem to be at least as high in Quebec as in other industrial societies. It can also be argued that they are at least as high in Quebec as in the rest of Canada. For example, in a comparison of rates of coresidence with adult children reported in several local Canadian studies, Beland's (1984) studies of Quebec showed higher rates of co-residence than any of the other samples (Rosenthal, 1987: 316). A 1985 study of family support and friendship ties among Canada's older population found that about 50% of women aged 65-69, and well over 70% of women older than that, received help from others in yard work; almost 59% of men over age 65 received help from others in housework, and almost 60% received help in meal preparation. In these and other, less frequent, kinds of support, family members were more important than friends and acquaintances. In cases in which involved family members are identified, daughters were more likely than sons to be providers of help, partly because for the very elderly, surviving children tend to be daughters (Stone, 1989). There is no reason to believe that comparable figures for Quebec would be lower than those for Canada as a whole. Roberge (1985: 7), studying the informal exchange of consumer goods and services between households in a semi-rural community near Quebec City, observed that exchange of goods and services formed the very core of kinship. He found that 71% of married women were involved in informal exchange with relatives, and that such exchanges made up as much as 85% of the value of all informal exchanges (Roberge, 1987: 63-64). Delage (1987) documents the persistence of traditional kinship values and practices among contemporary families in a Quebec City neighbourhood. However, alongside traditional families are the more modern instances of divorce, single parenthood, poverty, and low fertility. Delage predicts that the traditional family, sustained by social relations largely enacted by women members, centred on the care 153

Convergence or Divergence

and raising of children, and with economic relations structured more by blood relationships than by impersonal market forces, is doomed. It has persisted into the present, he says, only by virtue of the high fertility of the grandmothers. In a similar vein, Beland (1986: 178) maintained that the Quebec family was no longer able to provide the necessary support for elderly people, although, he said, it should continue to be the first source of support. His research among elderly pensioners in three urban areas in 1978 revealed high rates of elderly residence in multigenerational households and prompted a recommendation that policy makers should attempt to further encourage aged parents to live with their children. At the same time, he found that rates of helping behaviour by adult children not co-resident with elderly parents were surprisingly low, ranging from 9% to 18% over a sixmonth period. He concluded that help given by children who do not have their elderly parent in their household is almost nil. When a child, relative, or friend takes the parent into his or her home, other children give up all responsibility for rendering help in daily activities (Beland, 1984: 305, 312). Evidence of continued high concern about family values and the need to care for older family members was revealed in surveys in which respondents rated the importance of "personal values" such as prosperity, pleasure, friendship, success, love, self-fulfillment, and family security. In surveys conducted in 1977 and 1981, 58% of Quebecers selected family security as the most important personal value. Quebec's recently enacted (1987) family policy is both more modern and more traditional than the policies of France and Germany. It is "modern" in the sense that, when forced to define what constitutes a family, it has settled on a nontraditional definition - an adult and a child living together, whatever their biological relationship. In contrast, the policy principles state as government objectives the reinforcement of the family as a fundamental collective unit, the strengthening of its cohesion and stability, and the affirmation that "parents have the primary responsibility for raising children," although government has an interest in protecting the children's interests (Ouellet, 1989). Obviously, this official emphasis on parental obligation for children has implications for intergenerational relations later in life, for here, as elsewhere, obligations to parents are learned in the context of family nurturance of children. An official weakening of the latter, in the sense of the government substituting itself for family, is likely to be accompanied by substitution of government for family at the other end of the life cycle as well. The official family policy also promotes a high birthrate. That the rapid collapse of fertility to levels far below replacement is defined as a social problem is apparent in the title of a 1989 government publication, Denatalite: des Solutions. Part of the concern about low fertility stems from fears that if present trends continue, the continually declining population of working-age people will be unable to bear the tax burden necessary to support the high medical and pension costs of a relatively large 154

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elderly population. The Quebec government's family policy, which emphasizes each family's responsibility for its own as a first line of effort, is an attempt to try to limit expenditures for elder care by encouraging family care. There are proposals that the burden on the state be reduced by encouraging more retired people to live with their children, and that older people be constrained to remain in the workforce longer (Patterson, 1980; Ridler, 1979, 1980), along with warnings that Canadian citizens must be prepared to bear much greater tax burdens (Barker, 1980). There is growing concern that continuing low fertility may lead to a declining population, along with some hope that increased immigration will ameliorate the problem (Gauthier, 1989). Analysts in Quebec have noted the potential for intergenerational conflict fueled by a demographic structure that places increasingly heavy burdens on a shrinking working population. Writing that the impact of the "demographic crisis" is more than a family matter, Mathews (1987) states that, in addition to the issue of support, there is the question of the general orientations and preoccupations of the society as a whole, which will be different if a majority of adults are over 50 than if the most of the population is younger.^ There is already an implicit conflict between the politics of old age and the politics of family responsibility. Resolving the issue of who shall care for the elderly promises to create major family stresses. It means that the households of 40-50-year-olds must agree to look after their aged parents, not only financially but also in terms of providing personal care (Mathews, 1987: 15). United States

The image of isolated nuclear families in urban America has been replaced by the image of the "modified extended family," in which family members live relatively close to each other, communicate frequently, and exchange resources and other assistance. The new image includes some suggestion that urban living may actually encourage kinship ties - for example, that urban dwellers have an enhanced ability to live near each other because of the diversity of occupational opportunities the city offers (Haller, 1961) or because urban-transit systems facilitate easy contact between family members.28

28

The strength and continuity of kinship relations in American cities are illustrated in this description of a typical middle-American city: "Kinship ties permeate Middletown. No other affiliative bond directly links as many of the city's people in or near Middletown; and no other affiliative bond, apart from that between a husband and a wife, has the combined power of normative obligation and personal affection to the same extent ... Most Middletown adults recognize an obligation not only to keep in contact with their close relatives but to help them when necessary. Both the amounts of obligation and contact decline rather sharply between primary, secondary, and tertiary relatives. Women in Middletown seem to enjoy the maintenance of kinship ties more than men do; men are more apt to stress the obligations involved. The greater

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Government support programmes for the aged date from the social-security programmes of the 1930s, and were augmented in the 1960s by anti-poverty and medical-cost-support programmes. By the 1980s, these had become so expensive that there were serious efforts at retrenchment. Most Americans believe that family members have some responsibility to help care for their aged kin, but primary economic support of older adults unable to support themselves is assigned to the state. In the mid-1970s, 96% of the public said that the government was responsible for supporting retired old people, and in 1981, 91% of adult children said they did not expect that they would have to provide "income services" for their own elderly parents (Treas and Spence, 1989: 184). A 1986 national survey stated, In general, Americans see state income maintenance efforts as an entitlement for the needy, whether young or old ... Public assistance has come to be seen as something to which the needy are entitled regardless of kin's ability and willingness to help ... Expectations about intergenerational obligations are not linked with judgments about social welfare benefits. Whether the middle generation helps out does not factor into decisions about the level of financial assistance the state should provide to needy members of the younger or older generation. (Treas and Spence, 1989:191)

On the other hand, there are strong norms making families responsible for providing various kinds of nonfinancial support for family members, such as help in shopping or advice in financial management (Treas and Spence, 1989: 192). In the mid-1970s, over half of persons aged 80 and older continued to provide some material assistance to their adult offspring (Harris, 1975), and 80-90% of older urbanites had visited an adult child in the week previous to being surveyed (Shanas, 1973, 1979b). Between half and two thirds of older people in the U.S. say that they receive help from their children (Cowgill, 1986: 89; Shanas et al., 1968: 214). Much of this aid is services, rarely coerced; children often provide more than parents expect (Cowgill, 1986: 89; Streib and Thompson, 1960: 483). If aged parents need financial support, it is more likely to come from sons than daughters, but there is little call for this kind of support. The numerous other types of assistance are the province of daughters (Cowgill, 1986: 90). Even though impaired elderly family members may receive government payments, when the sum total of supports and services they involvement of women in kinship activities appears at every turn ... Having examined kinship activity in Middletown in 1976-1977, we can say with assurance that it is the principal focus of social life in Middletown. People's social activities with their relatives who live in or near Middletown are frequent and highly valued. There is no evidence for any weakening of kinship ties during the past 50 years" (Caplow et al., 1982: 222-224).

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receive are evaluated, it turns out that family members and friends provide most of the services, and the more impaired, the larger the portion of care provided by family members and friends, "up to as much as 80% of all help received by the most impaired" (Smyer, 1984: 326, citing GAO 1977 and 1979 studies of care received by 1,600 elderly persons in Cleveland). Analyses of patterns of exchange in several U.S. studies suggest that there is substantial reciprocity between generations. Where there is an imbalance, it occurs "with the older generation receiving more than they give and the middle-aged parent generation being squeezed with demands from above and below in the generational hierarchy" (Bengtson et al., 1985: 323). It also appears that older couples give more assistance to their children than they receive, while the widowed are more balanced in their exchanges. In the popular media, the "problem" of adult dependency is generally defined in terms of employed workers versus the retired, or the "productive" middleaged versus the elderly. However, not all dependency is measurable in terms of GNP and pay cheques. Older people not on payrolls - even in their children's homes - may take care of many of their own dependency needs, and often contribute greatly to the well-being of other members of the household. They "remain active contributors throughout the life span, until impairment or advanced age requires that they become recipients" (Smyer, 1984: 326). Although much of the legal basis of obligation for familial aid has been removed, many patterns of assistance continue. For while there may be extra-familial sources of support for aged parents, bonds of affection and compelling norms of family obligation persist (Treas and Spence, 1989). Also, the aid continues to be mutual until very late in a parent's life. Much of the "problem" of older Americans is not isolation from kin, but rather the continuing stress of being expected to help meet the dependency needs of grown children (Cohler, 1983). CONCLUSIONS

The connection between change in kinship relations and change in other sectors of society is neither straightforward nor unidirectional. Moreover, the aspects of kinship structure that are typically quantified may be its least interesting elements in the sense that they miss much of the richness and variety of the interplay between kinship and other elements of social life. A second methodological conclusion is that we do not know enough about even the typically quantified kinship variables to chart with confidence trends in intergenerational behaviour over the past three decades. When we turn from the many particular studies to those that are similar enough to generate points on a trend line, it turns out that much of our "knowledge" is

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superficial and idiosyncratic. The near past turns out to be much less well illuminated than we anticipated. Presumably, some of the variables generally associated with modernization or urbanization, especially the demographic trends, do indeed relate to changes in family and kinship behaviours. However, often the linkage is neither obvious nor carefully demonstrated. Here, we have argued that national variations in the "independent" variables are sometimes much greater than those apparent in the "dependent" kinship behaviours, and often apparently irrelevant. The metaphoric generalizations in the literature about the impact of modernization on kinship relations typically distort or mislead rather than explain. It is apparent that since 1960 there has been a transformation of the family, but not necessarily an attenuation of intergenerational relationships. The extent of the transformation varies by region, culture, and ethnicity, but its general shape is quite consistent. It seems to involve weakening of conjugal bonds, continuity of intergenerational bonds, and a partial transfer of economic responsibility for family members from families to governments. There have been major shifts, in the definitions, emphases, and usages of kinship networks, but not in the apparent vitality and efficacy of relations between adult children and their parents, as least as indicated in the few standard measures of contact and exchange we have examined. In France, the narrowing focus of loyalties from a horizontally and vertically extended kinship structure to the familial bonds connecting parents and children has maintained, and even revitalized, intergenerational relations. In Germany, the widespread retreat in the 1950s to the "private sphere," a reaction to the confrontation with the results of National Socialism, has been replaced by increased openness and trust toward people outside the family, but ties to family have not diminished in importance. In Quebec, family size has declined dramatically, and norms governing family behaviour have been altered and even reversed, but commitment to a narrowed set of responsibilities for a smaller circle of kin remains strong. And in the U.S., apart from changes associated with declining fertility and a growing percentage of older family members, intergenerational relations exhibit remarkable stability. There is as much evidence for increased intergenerational linkages - for instance, in response to family needs associated with high divorce and single parenthood rates - as for decline. In all four societies, intergenerational relations, especially between parents and their adult children, continue to be among the most important, if not the most important, social relationships outside the nuclear family, and tend to be maintained throughout the lives of the parents. When children move out, it does not signify isolation and rupture between generations. Parents and their adult children may not live in the same household, and may not want to, but they see each other frequently and engage in mutual support, a kinship relation that has been labelled "intimacy at 158

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a distance." This model which represents a reconciliation between the individualistic desire for autonomy and the necessity for mutual support that makes family life possible, will probably continue to characterize kinship relations in advanced industrial societies. In each of these societies, an acknowledgement of the increasing plurality of family forms took place. Its most radical form was observed in Quebec, where the definition of family is no longer based on consanguinity, but solely on the social category of an adult and child living together. In each society, there has been a sequence of government assumption of partial responsibility for care of the aged, followed by spiraling costs, a movement to resist additional claims for financial support, and state efforts to stabilize expenditures by reaffirming the responsibilities of families to care for their own, at least in part. In France, a policy former favouring large families has been modified to favour the poor, redefining family problems as problems of "the disadvantaged." In the United States, there has been steady growth of state support for the elderly since the 1930s, but, with the notable exception of the 1960s, much less federal effort to help the economically disadvantaged. Perhaps as a result of a relatively long history of social-security systems, Germans in need of help tend to feel entitled to state support. The debate about "care insurance" for the elderly has changed the prevailing definition from one that stigmatized impaired and impoverished old people as objects of public charity to one in which the recipient has a "properly attained right" to support. An examination of the trends in living alone, out-of-wedlock births, abortion, marriage, and divorce clearly conveys the sense that in all of these societies the traditional family is "in trouble," with its structure altered and its normative authority diminished. On the other hand, examination of the trends in intergenerational contact and support suggest that these kinds of family ties maintain their vitality. This apparent incongruity is partially resolved by the observation that some of the behaviours apparently destructive to the "traditional family," such as divorce and out-of-wedlock childbearing (and, under some circumstances, abortion and solitary living), actually increase the need for intergenerational contact and support. The divorced adult child may return to the parental home for a time, or at least spend more time visiting. Parents of a divorced son or daughter may feel more responsibility to look after the emotional and physical needs of that person than if he or she were married. Similarly, compared to marital births, out-of-wedlock births are apt to generate more, rather than fewer, grandparental responsibilities and essential intergenerational contacts, both in support of an unmarried adult child, who now must also be a single parent, and in support of the grandchild, who usually lacks a father. However, there is the suggestion, as yet unsupported in research, that in some of 159

Convergence or Divergence

these societies nonmarried but stable cohabiting couples exhibit the same "family" characteristics as married couples. We have noted theoretical and research support for the finding that the most basic kinship bond is the mother-child bond. While that bond may be threatened by some of the current trends, most notably declining fertility and increased abortion, the other trends pointing to a weakening of "the family" have to do with conjugal, rather than generational ties. Specifically, the traditional role of the husband-father seems most threatened. Some of the literature explicitly talks of the substitution of the state for the male provider (Christensen, 1990: ix-x; Elshtain, 1982: 46), and some of the trends in divorce and out-of-wedlock childbearing point to a weakening father-child link. Even among more or less traditional families whose parents are now elderly, mother-daughter bonds are the strongest, followed by mother-son bonds, with fathers' links to offspring of either sex usually weaker than those of the mother. The mutual exchange over increasingly long periods between adult children and their elderly mothers will further enhance these mother-child ties.29 It thus seems that the apparent vitality of intergenerational relations reflects a continuity of mother-daughter or mother-adult-child ties. There is little evidence in the literature reviewed to suggest that the ongoing changes in the nature of the family will alter these ties appreciably. On the other hand, the continuity of father-adultchild ties seems much at risk; they are already weaker than mother-adult-child ties, and trends associated with the "second demographic transition" that threaten the legitimacy and priority of conjugal bonds seem likely to further erode them.30 At any rate, there is need for intergenerational research that explores trends in relationships to fathers, and fathers' involvement with children over the life cycle.

29

Segalen (1985: 27) interprets recent changes in the Western family as an evolution in the direction of a matricentric model rather than decline: "All these indexes seem to define a new type of family model, in which the couple seems to be more and more often questioned; besides, contrary to the time period where the norm left place for only one type of family, regularly married couples, it now admits juvenile cohabitation, and rather transitory matri-centered family structures ... We believe it is wiser to look beyond the couple and its fortunes to the whole kinship network ... Family and kinship are universal structures, taking on various forms ... The matri-centered family is not a European invention but is quite common throughout various human groups generally studied by anthropologists." Implicit in her comments, and evident from many of the trends we have reviewed, is that along with matricentricity comes reduced involvement of men in most aspects of family and kinship relations.

30

In support of this position, see Hawkins (1992). Some writers take an opposing position, arguing for the emergence of a "new father" role with paternal characteristics better fitted to the postmodern era (cf. Yablonsky, 1990). However, systematic efforts to identify such fathers in representative surveys have been notably unsuccessful. Contemporary fathers, although often present at the birth of their children, tend not to take advantage of the "parental leave" to which they are entitled and are more likely than are men without children to hold traditional values (Leube, 1988).

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Finally, there is the question of whether the apparent stability of intergenerational relations is a historic artifact or a structural consequence of motherchild bonding. The middle generation who now, with their parents and grandparents, demonstrate continued intergenerational solidarity, as demonstrated by helping, visiting, and caring, are the children of 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - of the Great Depression, the war years, and the baby boom. They antedate much of the second demographic revolution and its attendant shift in emphasis from commitment/traditionalism to individualism/progressivism. The "dependency crisis" foreseen by some analysts - an approaching strain on pension and health-care systems due to high proportions of older people in the advanced Western nations - is predicted to arrive at a time when the middle generation consists of the children of the 1960s to the 1980s, many of whom represent a generation whose lifestyles and political decisions have affirmed individualism as opposed to commitment, and state support systems as a substitute for traditional family responsibilities (van de Kaa, 1987: 11, 24-26). It remains to be seen whether children reared in cultures emphasizing individualistic priorities, yet faced with heavy dependency responsibilities, will continue the present levels of contact with and support for their elders. References Adams, Bert N. 1968 Kinship in an Urban Setting. Chicago: Markham. Anderson, Michael 1977 "The Impact upon Family Relationships of the Elderly of Changes Since Victorian Times in Governmental Income-Maintenance Provision." In Ethel Shanas and Marvin Sussman, eds., Family Bureaucracy and the Elderly, 36-59. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Apter, David E. 1987 Rethinking Development: Modernization, Dependency, and Postmodern Politics. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. Ardagh, John 1982 France in the 1980s. London: Seeker & Warburg. Augustins, Georges 1989 Comment se perpetuer? Devenir des lignees et destins des patrimoines dans les paysanneries europeennes. Nanterre: Societe d'ethnologie. Baker, John 1986 "Comparing National Priorities: Family and Population Policy in Britain and France." Journal of Social Policy, 15: 421-^42.

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Baldock, John, and Adalbert Evers 1991 "Biirgerrechte und pflegebediirftige alte Menschen - Gefahren und Chancen sozialpolitischer Neuorientierungen im internationalen Vergleich." Journal fur Sozialforschung, 31, no. 1: 25^49. Barker, Paul 1980 "Views and Comments." Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politiques, 63: 544-545. Baumert, Gerhard 1960 "Changes in the Family and the Position of Older Persons in Germany." International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 1: 202-210. Beland, Francois 1984 "The Family and Adults 65 Years of Age and Over: Co-Residency and Availability of Help." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 21: 302-317. 1986 "Living Arrangement Preferences Among the Quebec Elderly: Findings and Policy Implications." Canadian Public Policy/Analyse de politiques, 12: 175-188. Bengtson, Vern L., and Neal E. Cutler 1976 "Generations and Intergenerational Relations: Perspectives on Age Groups and Social Change." In Robert H. Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 130-159. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Bengtson, Vern L., Neal E. Cutler, David J. Mangen, and Victor W. Marshall 1985 "Generations, Cohorts, and Relations between Age Groups." In Robert H. Binstock and Ethel Shanas, eds., Handbook of Aging and the Social Sciences, 2nd ed., 304-338. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Blood, Robert O., Jr. 1970 "Social Change and Kinship Patterns." In Reuben Hill and Rene Konig, eds., Families in East and West: Socialization Process and Kinship Ties, 189-201. Paris: Mouton. Brand, Ruth 1989 "Single Parents and Family Preservation in the Federal Republic of Germany." Child Welfare, 68, no. 2: 189-95. Brody, Elaine M., and Abigail Lang 1982 "They Can't Do It All: Aging Daughters with Aged Mothers." Generations, 6: 18-20, 37. Cantor, Marjorie H. 1979 "The Informal Support System of New York's Inner City Elderly: Is Ethnicity a Factor?" In Donald E. Gelfand and A. J. Kutzik, eds., Ethnicity and Aging: Theory, Research and Policy, 153-174. New York: Springer. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, Bruce A. Chadwick, Reuben Hill, and Margaret Holmes Williamson 1982 Middletown Families: Fifty Years of Change and Continuity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Christensen, Bryce J. 1990 The Retreat from Marriage: Causes and Consequences. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. Cicirelli, Victor G. 1981 Helping Elderly Parents: The Role of Adult Children. Boston: Auburn House.

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Cochran, Moncrieff, and Lars Gunnarsson, with Sylvia Grabe and Jill Lewis 1990 "The Social Networks of Coupled Mothers in Four Cultures." In Cochran Moncrieff, Mary Larner, David Riley, Lars Gunnarsson, and Charles R. Henderson, Jr., eds., Extending Families: The Social Networks of Parents and Their Children, 86-104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cohler, Bertram J. 1983 "Autonomy and Interdependence in the Family of Adulthood: A Psychological Perspective." Gerontologist, 23: 33-39. Collot, Claudette, and Hannelore Jani Le Bris 1981 "La femme agee isolee dans trois pays europeens: France, Italic, R.F.A." Revue francaise des affaires sociales, 35, no. 3: 101—114. Commaille, Jacques 1983 "Divorce and the Child's Status: The Evolution in France." Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 14, no. 1: 97-116. Conseil de la famille 1989 Penser et agir famille: guide a I'intention des intervenants publics et prives. Quebec City: Conseil de la famille. Coser, Lewis A. 1974 Greedy Institutions: Patterns of Undivided Commitment. New York: Free Press. Cowgill, Donald O. 1986 Aging Around the World. Belmont, CA: Wads worth. Cribier, Francoise 1989a "Les vieux parents et leurs enfants: une generation de parents parisiens, quinze ans apres la retraite." Gerontologie et societe, 48: 35-48. 1989b "Changes in Life Course and Retirement in Recent Years: The Example of Two Cohorts of Parisians." In Paul Johnson, Christoph Conrad, and David Thomson, eds., Workers Versus Pensioners: Intergenerational Justice in an Ageing World, 181-201. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Crimmins, Eileen M., and Dominique G. Ingegneri 1990 "Interaction and Living Arrangements of Older Parents and Their Children." Research on Aging, 12, no. 1: 3-35. Damkowski, Wulf, and Karin Luckey 1990 Neue Formen lokaler Sozial-und Gesundheitsdienste. Cologne: Bund-Verlag GmbH. Davis, James A., and Tom W. Smith 1987 General Social Surveys, 1972-1987: Cumulative Codebook. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center. Davis, Natalie Z. 1977 "Ghosts, Kin, and Progeny: Some Features of Family Life in Early Modern France. Daedalus, 106, no. 2: 87-114. D'Costa, Ronald 1985 "Family and Generations in Sociology: A Review of Recent Research in France." Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 16: 319-327.

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Dechaux, Jean-Hugues 1985-86 "Le Renouveau des etudes sur la parente en France." The Tocqueville Review, 7: 285-98. 1990 "Les echanges economiques au sein de la parentele." Sociologie du travail, 32: 73-94. 1991 "Structures de parente et societes paysannes: deux points de vue et des suggestions pour une sociologie de la parente dans les societes urbaines." Archives europeennes de sociologie, 32: 153-171. Degenne, Alain, and Marie-Odile Lebeaux 1991 "L'entraide entre les menages: un facteur d'inegalite sociale?" Societes contemporaines, 8 (December): 21-42. Delage, Denys 1987 "La sociabilite familiale en Basse-Ville de Quebec." Recherches sociographiques, 28: 295-316. Delbes, Christiane 1983 "Les families des salaries du secteur prive a la veille de la retraite. II. Les relations familiales." Population, 38, no. 6: 959-974 De Vos, Susan, and Alberto Palloni 1989 "Formal Models and Methods for the Analysis of Kinship and Household Organization." Population Index, 55, no. 2: 174-98. Dieck, Margret 1989 "Long-Term Care for the Elderly in Germany." In Teresa Schwab, ed., Caring for an Aging World: International Models for Long-Term Care, Financing, and Delivery, 96-161. New York: McGraw-Hill. Diewald, Martin 1990 "Informelle Netzwerke zwischen "verlorener Gemeinschaft", Pluralisierung und Polarisierung - Anforderungen an die Gesellschaftspolitik." Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Sektion Sozialpolitik, der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Soziologie, 4 May. Dix-Neuvieme Rapport 1990 "Dix-neuvieme rapport sur la situation demographique de la France." Population, 45, no. 4-5: 873-922. Dix-Septieme Rapport 1988 "Dix-septieme rapport sur la situation demographique de la France." Population, 43, no. 4-5: 727-798. Dumas, Jean 1991 Current Demographic Analysis: Report on the Demographic Situation in Canada 1989. Ottawa: Statistics Canada. Annual. Other years as cited. Dunkerley, Joy 1980 Trends in Energy Use in Industrial Societies: An Overview. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. Elshtain, Jean Bethke 1982 "Antigone's Daughters." Democracy, 2, no. 2: 46-59. Euromonitor 1990 European Marketing Data and Statistics 1990. London: Euromonitor Publications. Annual. Other years as cited.

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Eurostat 1984

Social Indicators for the European Community 1984. Luxembourg: Statistical Office of the European Communities. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Fortin, Andree 1987 Histoire de families et de reseaux: la sociabilite au Quebec d'hier a demain. Montreal: Editions Saint-Martin. Fulgraff, Barbara 1978 "Social Gerontology in West Germany: A Review of Recent and Current Research." Gerontologist, 18: 42-58. Garigue, Philip 1956 "French Canadian Kinship and Urban Life." American Anthropologist, 58: 1090-1101. Gauthier, Herve 1989 "Des conditions demographiques nouvelles." Revue d'etudes canadiennes, 23, no. 4: 16-36. Gelfand, Donald E. 1988 "Directions and Trends in Aging Services: A German-American Comparison." International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 27: 57-68. German Centre of Gerontology 1982 Report on the Situation of the Elderly in the Federal Republic of Germany. Berlin: The Centre. Gitschmann, Peter, and Mechthild Veil 1990 "Armutsrisiken und Unterversorgung bei Krankheit und Pflegebedurftigkeit im Alter." In Theorie und Praxis der sozialen Arbeit (December): 442-452. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Gokalp, Catherine 1978 "Le reseau familial." Population, 33, no. 6: 1077-1094. Gokalp, Catherine, and M.-G. David 1982 "La garde des jeunes enfants." Population et societes, 161 (September): 1-4. Gold, Deborah T. 1989 "Generational Solidarity: Conceptual Antecedents and Consequences." American Behavioral Scientist, 33: 19-32. Gommers, Adriene, Bernadette Hankenne, and Beatrice Rogowski 1979 "Help Structures for the Aged Sick: Experiences in Seven Countries." In Morton I. Teicher, Daniel Thursz and Joseph L. Vigilante, eds., Reaching the Aged: Social Services in Forty-Four Countries, 117-140. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Guillemard, Anne-Marie 1989 "The Trend Towards Early Labour Force Withdrawal and the Reorganisation of the Life Course: A Cross-National Analysis." In Paul Johnson, Christoph Conrad and David Thomson, eds., Workers Versus Pensioners: Intergenerational Justice in an Ageing World, 164-180. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

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6 Trends in Religion and Secularization Bruce A. CHADWICK Madeleine GAUTHIER Louis HOURMANT Barbara WORNDL

Discussions about religion in modern society usually assume that secularization has been an inevitable consequence of industrialization, urbanization, and modernization. The rise of rational thought, the advancement of science, and the emergence of occupational specialization are felt to have reduced both societal and individual dependence on religion. The common-sense wisdom of this industrializationurbanization-secularization link is so persuasive that most social scientists, as well as the general public, uncritically assume that secularization has occurred in industrial societies. Recently, however, a few social scientists have challenged this assumption and have pointed out religion's contemporary influence in American and European society (Bacot, 1991; Caplow, Bahr, and Chadwick, 1983; Greeley, 1972; HervieuLeger, 1986; Robbins and Robertson, 1987). Although theologians and social scientists have produced a variety of definitions, secularization is generally thought to involve a lessening in the importance of religious institutions in society and a decline in individual acceptance of religious beliefs and participation in religious activities (Roberts, 1984). Recent multi-dimensional theories direct attention to the influence of religion on both individuals and social institutions (Wilson, 1985). Dobbelaere (1981, 1985, 1987) has developed a conceptualization of secularization with three distinct dimensions. The first is the autonomy that social institutions such as politics, education, and family have from the religious institution. Forbidding prayer in public schools (educational 173

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institution) and increased premarital sex, cohabitation, divorce, and abortions (family institution) are examples of this dimension in the United States and Western Europe. The second dimension involves the degree to which religious institutions focus on "worldly" issues, as compared to "other world" concerns. Examples of this dimension are the energies religious groups and denominations devote to reducing poverty, racism, and sexism and to protecting the environment in contemporary society. Such a focus was clearly evident in Europe following the Second World War, in the United States during the civil-rights movement and the war on poverty in the 1960s, and in Quebec's "quiet revolution", which precipitated the decline of the influence of religion on other social institutions. The final dimension is individual acceptance of traditional religious beliefs and participation in religious activities. The influence of religion is diminished as members of society satisfy their emotional and social needs through other social institutions. Although the three dimensions are strongly related, they may vary somewhat independently. Thus, scholars and researchers focusing on only one of these dimensions have garnered inconsistent results regarding the contemporary influence of religion in industrial societies. This chapter examines all three dimensions of secularization. We attempt to shed additional light on the contention that the influence of religion has been reduced through industrialization, urbanization, and modernization by comparing religious trends over the past 30 years in four industrial or post-industrial societies. If secularization is part and parcel of industrialization and modernization, it should be readily apparent in Quebec, West Germany, France, and the United States. DATA

This chapter utilizes data collected by the International Research Group on the Comparative Charting of Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies (Caplow et al., 1991; Forse et al., 1992; Glatzer et al., 1992; Langlois et al., 1990). In addition, we scrutinized public-opinion polls, government statistics, and social research about religion in the four societies for the 30-year period 1960 to 1990. International comparisons are difficult because beliefs, behaviours, issues, and events vary in their importance in different societies. Thus while one society may carefully chart particular religious beliefs or behaviours, another society may pay little attention to them. For example, Caplow (1982) has noted the paucity of information about individual religious beliefs and behaviours in Europe, while such data abound in the United States. Even when several societies record information about a particular belief or behaviour, each may employ different indicators, so that literal comparisons are not always possible. We have included four figures that 174

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compare at least three of the four societies on significant religious characteristics. We have tried to minimize the problems of cross-cultural comparison by examining religious beliefs, practices, and organizations in their national, institutional, and historical context, in the hope that this study will reveal socio-structural regularities concerning religion and industrialization that transcend historical differences and national cultures. RELIGION IN QUEBEC

Religion in Quebec cannot be understood without reference to its general history beginning in the sixteenth century. The Catholic church, its clergy, and its religious communities provided most of the social cohesion and stability during the colonization period. Indeed, the strength of parochial structures prevented parishioners from being greatly affected by the change in regime following the British defeat of the French. The century following the British conquest found the Catholic hierarchy exercising finesse in dealing with governors, who were not of the same faith and who had received orders from London to undermine Catholicism. These difficult negotiations forced the Catholic church to Canadianize itself, through adoption of a local clergy and through interventions of the clergy vis-a-vis the government. Gains made in preserving Catholic influence foretold the emergence of a "national church" (Voisine, 1971: 37). The Catholic church broadened its influence in all levels of education, in charitable works, and in numerous other ways. A "religious awakening" fulfilled the ideal of "restoration" of the Roman Catholic papacy in Quebec during the second half of the nineteenth century (Sylvain and Voisine, 1991; Voisine, 1971: 46). The prevalence of Christianity gave a broad scope to canon law-ultramontane ideas gained the upper hand over modernism- and to ritual through various types of devotions. At the beginning of the twentieth century, when most states in the Western world were setting themselves apart from the church and moving toward secularism and atheistic humanism, the church of Quebec had established itself as a national church and as a powerful political force (Hamelin and Gagnon, 1984; Hamelin, 1984). It was "the most Roman of the national churches," according to Voisine (1971: 59). It was wealthier than the provincial government and held powers beyond those of other social groups or institutions. The legal separation of church and state in no way prevented the former from exercising major influence on political decisions or from resisting any overly democratic tendencies that might spread the European revolutionary movement to the new continent. The triumph of the church was not to last. The homogeneity of parish life could not continue in a society that was becoming increasingly urban, industrial, and 175

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open to new, and sometimes radical, thought. In addition, the church was threatened as Canadian society questioned its own future as a nation. The economic depression of the 1930s made the financial situation of the church more precarious and its humanitarian endeavours more difficult to support. Catholics in all social classes began to attend mass less often and to distance themselves somewhat from the church. The years following the Second World War saw the rise of ideological pluralism. Tensions within the bishopric itself and then with its laymen, and the church's inability to continue to support all its temporal works further reduced its influence (Belanger, 1977: 97; Clement, 1972). The "quiet revolution" of the 1960s contributed greatly to the decline in church power and influence. The separation of church and state was fully realized through the emergence of a modern and secular state. Former church social responsibilities for welfare and education were largely assumed by the government. This situation led certain observers to comment that the government employees in these fields had become "the new clergy." Autonomy of Other Social Institutions

During the 1960s, the process of secularization of Quebec's social institutions was virtually completed (Hamelin, 1984). Institutions involved in providing public assistance, including hospitals, were brought under state control. The Catholic hierarchy is occasionally consulted by government officials and thus is able to exercise some modest influence. More often, the church takes the initiative in voicing its opinion about specific legislation, particularly proposals concerning social justice and human dignity. It continues to exercise discreet moral leadership, but little real power. The discretion of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is parallelled by the silence of Catholics, who no longer dare to voice their convictions openly (Dumont, 1982). Secularization of social institutions evolved without much resistance. The only serious threat to autonomy from religion surrounded the creation of a Ministere de 1'education (Department of Education). The bishops had previously exercised considerable control over education, since nearly all of them sat on the Conseil de 1'instruction publique, a government body that had some independence from the political domain. The bishops lost the battle over the creation of the Ministere de 1'education in 1964, but they did not entirely lose the war, for they continue to exercise significant influence through the committee structure of the department: the Catholic and Protestant committees are responsible for religious instruction and for the denominational orientation of the schools. Although it has been a matter of debate for many years, the denominational status of the school boards of Quebec City and Montreal has been guaranteed by the Canadian constitution since Confederation in 1867 (Section 93 of the British North America Act). This can be removed only 176

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through an amendment to the constitution, which has been the major stumbling block for groups that have attempted to complete secularization of the schools. Education remains the last bastion in which the church is entrenched in the institutional structure of Quebec society. The bishops' position in education is supported to a degree by parents who enroll their children in religious instruction. Since 1983, parents have had the option of enrolling their children in either religious instruction or irreligious moral instruction. The majority of parents continue to request traditional religious instruction linked to their cultural tradition (see figure 1; Milot, 1991). The presence of the church in social welfare has changed drastically. Almost all public assistance is now provided by the state. The church does contribute to social-welfare efforts by meeting some needs that are neglected by government policy and/or programmes. Chaplains serve in hospitals and in homes for the elderly, and sometimes there are nuns among the employees, but many people simply ignore them. The church frequently reminds the government of its responsibilities to the disadvantaged. For example, religious communities recently called the government's attention to persistent poverty in Quebec (Conference religieuse canadienne, region de Quebec, 1988). While the institutional church had a strong presence during the organization of the labour-union movement, it withdrew from this sphere of activity in 1960, when the Catholic unions were deconfessionalized (Rouillard, 1989). The messages delivered by the bishops on May Day each year recall the principles of social justice that should guide society's management of its labour force and economy. However, the church's influence is marginal and sometimes provokes opposition, as was the case when the Commission episcopate des affaires sociales denounced certain economic policies that were opposed to the interest of workers (Commission des affaires sociales de la Conference des eveques catholiques du Canada, 1983). Economists and politicians accused the bishops of knowing little about the issue and urged them to return to their sacristy. The Catholic church's involvement with the family has changed dramatically over the past 30 years. Prior to 1968, all marriages were performed by religious representatives. Since then, civil marriages have been allowed. As well, there has been an increase in living together and common-law marriages. Importantly, Pope Paul VFs 1968 encyclical Humanae Vitae, particularly the continued prohibition of birth control, was not well received by Catholics in Quebec. This encyclical no doubt accelerated the loss of church influence over moral issues affecting the family. The contraceptive behaviour of couples in Quebec clearly rejects the traditional teachings of the Catholic church. Nor has church doctrine prevented the decriminalization of abortion or the operation of government-sponsored abortion clinics. Within the church itself, there has been opposition to various official doctrinal positions. Feminist 177

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Catholic groups have tried to demonstrate how Christian moral values can be interpreted to justify abortion (Roy, 1990: 102). A survey conducted following Pope John Paul IPs 1984 visit found that the majority of Catholics in Quebec disagreed with him on nearly all of the family issues of contraception, abortion, divorce, remarriage of divorcees, and marriage of priests. In summary, there has been a significant increase in the autonomy of social institutions from religion in Quebec. The so-called quiet revolution has shifted much of the power and many of the functions formerly the domain of the Catholic church to various government agencies. Shift to Worldly Focus

It appears that the Catholic church has shifted its efforts to a degree from encouraging members to prepare for the world beyond the grave to seeking immediate happiness and peace. Sermons about heaven and hell, which were common during most of the history of Quebec Catholicism, now seem to have negligible impact. A survey conducted during the pope's 1984 visit found that only 15% of Quebecers still believed in heaven and hell as places where one goes after death (Le Devoir, September 9, 1984). The "other world" perspective has been joined by a pursuit of happiness in this world in the official discourse of the Catholic church. The social, economic, and political messages of the bishops of Quebec (Centre Justice et Foi, 1984) also illustrate church involvement in contemporary social issues. Church leaders have taken a strong stance supporting anti-poverty programmes and have called attention to current economic problems. Cardinal Maurice Roy, who presided over the pontifical Justice and Peace commission created by Paul VI, made a notable contribution to the development and peace issues. Financial contributions to Development and Peace have increased slightly from 1968 to 1990. In addition, the church officially supported mass demonstrations such as the Grande Marche pour Femploi in 1983 and other marches for peace through disarmament. Environmental issues also appear in the discourse of the bishops. The economy of Quebec is highly dependent on forestry resources, which are located in remote regions. The distant forests are usually discussed in the context of regional development, and some bishops consider it their responsibility to protect the environment in these isolated rural areas. Although the bishops are reserved in their discussion of political issues, they do not abstain from evoking them in provincial and federal elections. Some bishops have become involved in the spirited discussions regarding the constitutional future of Quebec and the Charter of the French Language. Generally, the bishops have reiterated the rights of minorities, self-determination of peoples, and greater tolerance of diversity. 178

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Women's issues have received considerable attention from both the Catholic and the Protestant church in Quebec, as women have questioned family violence, contraception, and issues surrounding women's labour-force participation, including child care. The Catholic hierarchy has taken a position against injustices perpetrated against women in a document called La place desfemmes dans I'Eglise, prepared by an ad hoc committee presided over by a woman theologian at the request of the Catholic Conference of the Bishops of Canada (Roy, 1990: 106-110). In summary, the church in Quebec is less involved in contemporary social issues than in the past, because of its withdrawal from control of social welfare. In spite of this forced separation, the church and its members have become involved in advocacy for the disadvantaged. Over all, this has led to a smaller financial and institutional commitment to social issues, but at the same time a greater awareness of social problems. Finally, an "other worldly" orientation is not preached as often, and church members are encouraged to help create a more responsive society. Individual Beliefs and Practices

Religious affiliation remained steady over the past 30 years, even during the period of institutional secularization described above. In 1970, 99% of the population were church members, and 98% were in 1980 (figure 1). Approximately 88% of the population identifies itself as Catholic; this figure has remained steady. Protestantism has decreased from 8.1% in 1961 to 5.9% in 1991 (Census of Canada). This decrease may be explained in part by the exodus of Anglophones to other Canadian provinces. The religious landscape has become slightly more diversified with the arrival of immigrants from Southeast Asia, although a modest proportion of these are also Catholics. The proportion of individuals who indicate that they do not belong to any religious institution was zero in 1961 and rose to 3.9% in 1991 (Census of Canada). Although the vast majority of Quebecers continue to define themselves as Catholics, their religious practice has declined. On any given Sunday in 1980, 40% of Catholics were in church, but only 33% were in 1985 (figure 2). In only five years, from 1981 to 1986, weekly church attendance decreased from 51% to 36% for the population as a whole. Among Catholics, 88% attended mass at least twice per month in 1965, but this figure had plummeted to only 38% 20 years later. Similar data were not available for Protestants in Quebec, but for Canada as a whole, a Gallup poll conducted periodically since 1957 reveals that weekly church attendance among Protestants decreased slightly, from 32%, in 1965, to 26%, in 1988 (La Presse, 30 May 1988). Religious practice among youth is even lower. According to a study conducted in 1987, 93% of Quebecers aged 15 to 25 years considered themselves Catholic, but

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Figure 1 Membership in Religious Organizations in West Germany, Quebec, and the United States, 1960-90

Note: Occasionally, data for a given year were not available and information from a previous or later year was substituted. Figure 2

Weekly Attendance by Roman Catholics in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the United States, 1960-90

Note: Occasionally, data for a given year were not available and information from a previous or later year was substituted. In 1965, for Quebec, 88% represents attendance at least twice per month.

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only 17% attend mass every week. Only 7% of young people consider themselves active members of their parish (Bibby, 1990). The "electronic church" allows individuals to participate in religious services in the comfort of their own homes. Although fewer minutes each week are now devoted to religious radio broadcasts than in the early 1960s, television time has increased. Religious programming on TV rose from 115 minutes per week, in 1957, to 195 minutes, in 1990, in the Montreal region. Mass is broadcast on television every Sunday morning, and additional religious programming is available on cable (Office des communications sociales, compiled by Mario Doyle). The government television channel also provides public-affairs broadcasts exploring religious issues. For example, a recent programme was devoted to new forms of spirituality. Interestingly, television evangelists seem to appeal less to Francophone than to Anglophone audiences. Religious newspapers and magazines have had a fairly stable circulation, and some have even experienced an increase (Association canadienne des periodiques catholiques). For example, the Revue Notre-Dame, which is distributed in savingsand-loan institutions, is quite popular: its circulation increased sixfold from 1971 to 1991 (Association canadienne des periodiques catholiques). Unfortunately, we could not find any trend data concerning religious belief in Quebec, and we thus have only a few cross-sectional surveys. A belief in God was reported by 92% of the Quebec population in a survey conducted during the papal visit in 1984 (Le Devoir, 8 September 1984). The belief that Jesus Christ is God was held by 73% of the population, including 79% of Catholics and 57% of Protestants. The belief that "religion is above all a moral force to guide us in our life" was accepted by 44% of the respondents, while 36% believed that it is "a source of support or consolation during difficult times." The fate of an individual after death is far from a matter of unanimity. Thirty-nine percent believe that the soul continues to live, 18% believe in reincarnation, and 20% think that existence ends with death. Belief in heaven and hell has become marginal: only 15% are convinced that they exist. Eight percent didn't answer the question. The proportion of Catholic infants baptized was 81% in 1968; this figure rose to 87% in 1985, and then dropped back to 81% in 1988 (figure 3). Even though the number of births among French-speaking women has declined, families have maintained the tradition of having their children baptized. Prior to 1968, religious marriage was the only way to get married in Quebec. Since then, however, couples have the choice between a civil marriage at the courthouse or a religious marriage in the church. The number of religious marriages has declined considerably over the past 20 years, from 98% of all marriages, in 1970, to 72% in 1990 (figure 4). Interestingly, people under age 25 are the most likely to opt for a religious marriage: 87% of husbands and 85% of wives in 1985 181

Convergence or Divergence

(Baillargeon, 1987: 348). Much of the increase in civil marriage is accounted for by remarriage following divorce, which is not allowed in the Catholic church. As well, common-law marriages have increased, also reducing the proportion of religious marriages. The number of funeral services conducted under religious auspices has been relatively stable over the past 30 years. However, the Catholic church has liberalized its funeral policy. Previously, cremation was frowned on, but now it is acceptable: since 1985, priests have adapted the ceremony accordingly. Parish revenues show a modest decline. When contributions are converted to constant 1981 dollars, low of 122 million dollars was reached in 1988, but the total has since increased to 135 million dollars in 1990 (according to the Assemblee des Eveques du Quebec). Financial support of the church, however, is not consistent with a lack of regular attendance; members continue to tithe and contribute to the church even though they do not attend as frequently as in former times. Religious attachment is manifested at times of important life events, including births, marriages, and deaths. The number of ordinations of priests has fallen sharply over the past 30 years. Ordinations dropped from 117, in 1961, to fewer than 20, in 1987 (Commission episcopale des ministeres et de 1'apostolat, 1988). The replacement of priests is a problem that is not unique to Quebec, but is a serious predicament faced by the Catholic church throughout the world. Although ordinations have declined, the number of theology students has remained steady; the number of part-time students actually rose rather significantly during the 1980s (Citta Del Vaticano), and a majority of them are women. The church has continued its essential activities by shifting responsibility from priests to other members of various religious communities and by appointing laypeople to duties previously assigned to members of religious orders or to clerics (Commission episcopale des ministeres et de 1'apostolat, 1988: 9, 22, 23). There are currently a substantial number of laymen attending theology faculties who are preparing themselves not only for religious-instruction duties in the schools, but for roles in the pastorate and in administration of ecclesiastical organizations. Even though they are not allowed to be priests, women in particular have been recruited into positions previously reserved for clerics, including proclaiming the Word, administering parishes, and distributing communion. The emergence of new religions is difficult to track, since they are not clearly documented in the Canadian census. Nevertheless, it appears that membership in new religions has increased from 1.8% of the population, in 1961, to 3.3%, in 1981. Research has revealed that even though individuals may attend a new religious group, they will likely indicate on the census their religion at the time of their baptism, and

182

Religion

Figure 3 Baptism of Infants into a Roman Catholic or Protestant Church, in France, West Germany, and Quebec, 1968-90

Note: Occasionally, data for a given year were not available and information from a previous or later year was substituted. In France and Quebec, Catholic baptism; in West Germany, both Catholic and Protestant baptisms.

Figure 4 Religious Marriages in France, West Germany, and Quebec, 1960-90

Note: Occasionally, data for a given year were not available and information from a previous or later year was substituted.

183

Convergence or Divergence

they do not see any contradiction in identifying themselves as Catholic (Gauthier, 1991: 50). Changes in church membership noted by the census identify a proliferation of new religious and parareligious groups. Bergeron (1982: 9) identified 300 such religious groups in Quebec in 1982; the Centre d'information sur les nouvelles religions distinguished more than 650 of them in 1988. Within the Catholic church itself, a renewal of faith has been expressed with varying degrees of intensity over the past three decades. The Charismatic movement had nearly 30,000 members in Quebec in 1980 (Zylberberg and Montminy, 1981: 62). Fundamentalist tendencies are expressed through Neo-Catechumension, Opus Dei, and the Cursillists. Churches that are half empty on Sunday are filled for Lenten conferences focusing on social injustice (according to les Caremes de NotreDame de Quebec). In summary, affiliation with the Catholic church has remained quite high, over 80%, but acceptance of traditional religious beliefs has diminished. In addition, church activity, especially attendance at services, has declined considerably. Conclusions

Prior to the Second World War, religion played an enormously important role in French-Canadian society. Since the end of the war, the following changes have occurred. 1. A rapid decline of the influence of institutional religion. Social institutions have vastly increased their autonomy from religion. What is interesting is that this secularization of institutions in Quebec occurred later than in the other three societies we examined. However, once the process started, it proceeded rapidly. The Quiet Revolution, as it is called, took place over just a few years (Rocher, 1973). Vestiges of church influence remain in religious instruction in the public schools and in the denominationality of certain school boards, but over all the church has been removed from formal participation in other major social institutions. 2. Continued involvement with contemporary social problems. The Catholic church and its clergy are heavily involved in reducing poverty and promoting peace. 3. A rejection of some Catholic beliefs and a decline in participation, especially attendance. Although attendance has declined, other religious practices, such as baptism of children, religious marriages, and religious funerals, continue at a high rate. The Christian press has maintained a large readership, and the electronic church is growing on television. Belief in God and weekly attendance at religious services has declined considerably. Even though few continue traditional religious practices, Quebecers have not let go of all association with religion; many maintain

184

Religion

its cultural heritage. For example, the majority of parents still opt for religious training of their children, which leads to first communion and first confession. 4. An increase in unusual forms of religious beliefs and practices. An important change is occurring in the diversity of religious beliefs, such as the explanation of what happens after death. The multiplication of esoteric and new religious movements constitutes an indicator of the shifting of beliefs, rather than their disappearance. RELIGION IN FRANCE

The French Revolution, marked by a strongly anti-clerical character, seriously strained relations between the Catholic church and the republic. The church's close association with the monarchy of the ancien regime made it an obvious target for French revolutionaries, who duly decreed the disestablishment of the Catholic church in 1795 and confiscated its lands. At the centre of the ideological conflict between the church and the anti-clerical movement was the question of who would dominate the peasantry. The church was the most important institution within the antirepublican camp, and it united those who wanted to re-establish the ancien regime. Church and state reached a compromise under Napoleon's concordat of 1801, and Catholicism was recognized as the religion of the "great majority" of French people. The church provided enthusiastic support for the restored monarchies of 1815-30, for the July monarchy of 1830-48, and for Napoleon Ill's Second Empire of 1852-70. In regions of strong religious observance, as well as in social classes in which religious practice flourished (the nobility), to be a Catholic was to participate in a counter-culture. For these Catholics, everything could be explained in terms of religion, and behaviour patterns, opinions, and values conformed to a Catholic viewpoint. The church itself acted as a counter-society. It provided a whole range of social institutions that enabled Catholics to escape from those of the republic. Children were sent to schools run by Catholic nuns or monks, and were encouraged to train as priests. Access to a seminary provided upward social mobility for Catholics from poor backgrounds similar to receiving a grant from the republic. Wealthier Catholics devoted considerable time and money to sponsoring charitable activities and associations benefitting the poor, such as sewing circles, youth clubs, and sporting associations. The organizational strength of the church most strongly emerged in the agricultural sector of society, where an impressive network of para-Catholic associations was established, including farmers' co-operatives, friendly societies, trade unions, and banks. They were so successful that the republicans attempted to imitate them in order to win peasant support away from the church. 185

Convergence or Divergence

A democratic political system gradually came into existence in France toward the end of the nineteenth century, with the creation of the Third Republic. Relations between church and state degenerated rapidly once the Third Republic was established. The confrontation came to an end in 1905, when the Radical government of Combes decreed the separation of church and state and the Catholic church ceased to be the official religion. Despite sporadic conflicts between the church and the republic since 1905, harmony has generally prevailed in their relations. Autonomy of Other Social Institutions

Control over the nation's educational systems continues to be a source of conflict between church and state. The church believes that it has a duty to teach Christian values. The state rejects this claim and is determined to inculcate French citizens with republican values. Between 1960 and 1990, the jurisdiction of the church in the education system has stabilized. The church's successful defence of its schools against the Socialist government's attempts to incorporate them within the state education system in 1984 illustrates its continuing institutional strength. In response to the government's reform plans, the church did not hesitate to intervene in the "defence of liberty." The opinion polls suggested that three quarters of the French people backed the church's right to retain independent schools, despite the fact that practising Catholics represented at most 15% of the population, and only 10% of French families enrol their children in private schools. The overwhelming majority felt that the right to choose their children's education was one of the fundamental principles of democracy. By opposing the proposed reform, the church showed itself to be still a powerful institution, speaking for a wide range of pressure groups. The combination of the church, a burgeoning pressure-group movement, and overwhelming opposition from public opinion was sufficient to force the left-wing government to abandon its planned reform. This conflict reversed the values traditionally associated with left and right: the church defended the "principle of liberty," whereas the left-wing parties and the lay teachers' union called upon "respect for authority." The majority of French people felt that in order to defend its position of power, the left had abandoned its traditional principles of liberty and equality for all citizens. After the First World War, the church established a series of para-Catholic organizations in an attempt to increase its institutional influence in economic sectors of society. Three groups were established initially to extend the church's appeal among workers, peasants, and students, united under the control of a mother organization, Catholic Action. These organizations were remarkably successful: the Young Christian Farmers (JAC) brought all those who lived in the countryside back into the fold of the church, and it was followed by the Young Christian Workers 186

Religion

(JOC) and the Young Christian Students (JEC). In the interwar period, the JAC was, indeed, too successful, for it eventually demanded its independence from the church. The more it distanced itself from the church, the more it adopted an overtly political stance and transformed its task from that of winning converts to Catholicism to that of training Catholic activists to exercise influence in other professional and political organizations. The student organization, JEC, also, quarrelled with the church hierarchy and eventually declared itself independent of any ecclesiastical influence. Its success can be measured by the fact that many of its student leaders of the 1950s held prominent positions in government in the 1980s, including Michel Rocard (prime minister), Henri Nallet (minister of agriculture), and Robert Chapuis (minister for technology). The workers' organization, JOC, attempted to increase church influence among industrial workers. However, it increased the feeling of class consciousness, rather than attracting workers to the bosom of the church. Thus formal links between the JOC and the church did not last long. In the 1950s, "worker priests" invested themselves in the workers' milieu in spite of the hesitations of the church hierarchy. The increased involvement of Catholic ^activists among industrial workers led to the creation of a Christian trade union, the CFTC, in 1919. The CFTC became independent of the church in 1964, when a majority of its members declared themselves in favour of secularizing the union. A minority of members formed a new Christian trade union, which kept the old initials, CFTC. Fewer than 3% of all unions members belong to this union. Thus, the various attempts by the church to extend its influence within economic institutions have, more often than not, backfired. Catholics disagree with their church hierarchy about traditional sexual norms and family life. Discussions about the encyclical Humanae vitae revealed the church's loss of influence in family life. Recent (1974) legislation liberalizing access to contraception, divorce, and abortion received little opposition. A pro-life movement emerged, but it was unsuccessful in preventing the legalization of abortion. Religious institutions, both Christian and Jewish, have focused on the ethics of genetic engineering as a means to inject morals back into the discussion of sex and birth. They are joining with other groups, physicians, biologists, and "free thinkers" to promote legislation restricting such experimentation. Shift to Worldly Focus

Since the Second Vatican Council (1965), catholic church doctrine has changed so rapidly as to be barely recognizeable to older generations, who grew up in a church that held out the prospect of hell and damnation for sinners. Such threats are now regarded by younger people as superstitious nonsense. As God has been transformed into a symbol of love rather than fear, the gravity of sin has been greatly diminished. 187

Convergence or Divergence

Rather than being a prelude to eternal damnation, sin has become an obstacle to leading a happy life. Because it is no longer punished by the threat of damnation, it does not provoke the same feelings of remorse and guilt. The ritual of confession has relentlessly declined as a consequence. Instead of postponing the pursuit of happiness until they are in heaven, as believers were encouraged to do under the old theology, the Catholic church now accepts that people have a right to happiness on earth. Far more than merely a relaxation of stricter religious beliefs and practices, the change in church doctrine constitutes a fundamental transformation of its vision of the world. Not surprisingly, many devout Catholics feel cheated by the dilution of the traditional doctrine. In contrast, many activists in para-Catholic associations, as well as in the church itself, have been encouraged by what they see as its adaptation to the modern world. All things considered, there has been a significant shift of focus in the Catholic church in France. This has been accompanied by involvement of the Catholic church in ameliorating social problems such as poverty and in supporting social movements such as world peace and protection of the environment. In summary, the church in France has greatly increased its attention to moral existence at the expense of the hereafter. Individual Beliefs and Practices

Since the law does not permit the census to ask about church membership, such information is not available. Surveys have found that 80% of the population identify themselves as Catholic with remarkable stability. Nevertheless, response varies when the question is phrased differently. For example, when asked "Now, do you consider that you belong to a religion?," only 75% in 1970 and 58% in 1990 claimed to be Catholic. Conversely, the rate of those belonging to no church varies from 18% to 38%, depending on the wording of the question. Fewer than half of all young people have reported church membership for some years, which suggests that the proportion of the population belonging to the Catholic church is declining. Doubts about the extent of religious affiliation in France, which the church contended to be almost universal, first surfaced in a 1943 study by Godin and Daniel. They claimed that while the majority of French people were baptized, fewer than one quarter were attending mass every Sunday. In certain regions, the proportion of regularly practising Catholics even fell below 10%. Only in a few, deeply pious regions was there a high, quasi-unanimous level of religious observance. Elsewhere, regular church attendance averaged between 10% and 15% of the population. Indeed, contemporary historians are providing evidence that certain areas in France (for example, the Paris Basin and the northwest Massif Central) never really succumbed to the influence of the Catholic church. 188

Religion

As can be seen in figure 2, attendance at mass dipped from 32% of church membership, in 1960, to only 11%, in 1990. The decline in religious observance can be traced, in part, to the changing nature of Catholicism itself. Since attending mass on Sunday is no longer portrayed as a strict moral obligation, it is hardly surprising that regular attendance has fallen. Other factors, such as a drop in the number of priests, the closing of churches, and the holding of fewer masses have all contributed to the decline in religious observance. According to various studies of religious practices in France from the 1940s onward, the church had previously greatly exaggerated the extent to which people regularly attended church. In reality, for most people church attendance was irregular. The mode of religious observance was celebration of the "four seasons" of the life cycle: baptism at birth, first communion as an adolescent, marriage at the start of adult life, and funeral at death. This minimal conformity was extended in certain regions to include celebration of a number of annual religious festivals, such as Christmas, Easter, the Feast of the Assumption, All Saints' Day, Ascension Day, and Whit Sunday. The proportion of children who are baptized at birth has declined. In 1968, 82% of the births in France were followed by a baptism (figure 3). After a slow decline, only 64% of all infants were baptized in 1987, and fewer than 50% of children went to catechism. A similar decrease occurred for religious weddings (figure 4). In 1965, 78% of the weddings in France were conducted by clergy, while only 55% were in 1985. It is notable, however, that although baptisms and church weddings have declined, nearly two thirds of infants in France were still baptised and over half of all weddings took place in the church. Individual religiosity in France can also be measured by the strength of the priesthood. The number of men training to be priests began to decline at the beginning of the twentieth century, from around 1,500 per annum, in 1900, to around 1,000 per annum, in 1950. That figure fell to 500 in 1960, to 200 during the 1970s, and to a mere 100 in the 1980s. Moreover, increasingly large numbers of priests have expressed their dissatisfaction with the role of the priesthood. Growing disillusionment motivated a large number of priests to leave the church, which was followed by a decline in church attendance by their former parishioners. A diminished band of ageing priests is left to staff the Catholic church. In 1965 there were 45,003 secular priests in France, in 1975 there were 41,461, and in 1985 there were 36,617 (table 1). By 1995, this figure will decline to only 20,000 unless married men and women are allowed into the priesthood. There is a striking contradiction between the decline in church attendance, baptisms, and religious weddings and the flourishing state of other religious activities, such as the religious press and church schools. The press that falls within the Catholic orbit has a large circulation: Le Pelerin has more than one and a half 189

Convergence or Divergence

Table 1 Clergy in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the United States, 1965-90 Year

France Cath.

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

45,003 45,507 41,461 38,876 36,617 27,000

— 14,762 15,544 15,614 16,696 18,040

Variation 1990/1970

-41%

+22%

Note:

Quebec Cath.

United States Cath & Prot.

26,667 26,286 24,909 23,842 23,842 23,862

8,758 8,589 8,149 7,316 6,603 6,428

— 218,000 262,000 265,000 289,000 331,000

-9%

-25%

+52%

West Germany Prot. Cath.

Occasionally, data for a given year were not avalaible and information from a previous or later year was substituted.

million readers weekly, and La Vie (catholique) almost one million. Catholic publishing companies are also enjoying a boom. Religious programmes on national TV are broadcast only on public channels. However, the liberalization of radio frequencies in 1981 allowed local religious stations to begin broadcasting. Currently, there are 19 Christian stations on the air. Acceptance of Christian beliefs appears, on the basis of limited data, to have remained fairly stable in France. In 1967, 57% of the population reported that they believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and the proportion rose to 64% in 1986. On the other hand, belief in God dipped from 62%, in 1962, to 57%, in 1990. Table 2 shows that the proportion of French citizens who believe in life after death increased from 35%, in 1965, to 46%, in 1980. Orthodox Christian beliefs are being challenged to a degree by non-Christian beliefs such as reincarnation. Thirty percent of French men and women reported in 1990 that they believe in "heaven," and 16% affirm the existence of "hell." Thus it appears that about half of the population in France believe in God, Christ, and some kind of life after death. When Pope John Paul II reiterates the traditional doctrines of the church, in particular denouncing the excesses of modern society, his message is widely

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Religion

Table 2 Belief in Life After Death, in Percentage, in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the United States, 1960-90

Note:

Year

France

West Germany

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990

35 37 50 46 — --

38 __ 36 40 39

44

Quebec

57

United States

78 78 — 70 66 78 76

Occasionally, data for a given year were not avalaible and information from a previous or later year was substituted.

accepted. Most citizens agree that societies are in the throes of a moral crisis. When the pope condemns modern society in general terms, opinion polls suggest that the vast majority of people (83%) agree with him. However, when he speaks of people's personal behaviour and intrudes into their private lives - for example, by dictating codes of sexual morality - his message is far less popular. In one opinion poll, 52% of all practising Catholics refused to recognize his right to interfere in their personal lives. In fact, John Paul II has called into question the individual's moral autonomy, which the Second Vatican Council conceded. According to the Council, all individuals are free to make their own moral choices, as long as they are prepared to assume the consequences. In France, religion is a matter of the private relationship between individuals and God. By admitting that religion falls into the private rather than the public sphere, the church no longer can claim a right to participate in politics. Paradoxically, having denied itself any right to intervene in the public sphere (for example, in politics or in economic, social, or cultural policy), the Catholic church has had to intensify ifs action within the private sphere to recover its influence. However, it is precisely in the private domain that many believers today reject the church's right to exercise influence. The pope is given a far more favourable reception when he focuses on public affairs (as long as he defends human rights and individual autonomy against the state) than when he speaks out on private affairs. Thus, he evoked virtually unanimous support when he praised the spirit of Polish resistance against bureaucratic 191

Convergence or Divergence

Communist rule, but met a lukewarm response when he condemned abortion and divorce. The Charismatic movement, the Catholic version of Pentecostism, has about 250,000 adherents. This movement was initially regarded with suspicion by the Catholic hierarchy, but is now embraced by the church. These small, emotional communities emphasize personal experience over tradition (Hervieu-Leger, 1986). Although a majority of French people remain nominally Catholic, other religions have sprung up in France. The second most important religion in France today is Islam. The third is Judaism, which has grown considerably in importance, in part because of the Jewish faith of many of the pied-noirs who returned from North Africa in the 1950s and 1960s. Protestantism has been relegated to fourth position. Finally, those who are confirmed non-believers comprise around 18% of the population. New religious communities have emerged that are composed of individuals searching for a superior spiritual logic to which to subordinate themselves, or for fulfilment of their personal needs for self-development and realization. It is not necessary to be converted, in the formal sense, in order to enter one of these "emotional communities." A commitment is, however, demanded in terms of seeking personal spiritual satisfaction. The rituals within these communities are strongly antiintellectual and stimulate "emotional convergence" between members by means of, for example, expressive body movements during prayers. Because they are antiintellectual, such religious communities distrust abstract theologians, as well as established clerics. Their advent is a sign of a religious revival taking place outside of existing churches. Data on new religious movements are controversial, and membership in them is often overestimated. Even the most popular groups attract just a few thousand members. It is estimated that only between 150,000 and 500,000 individuals are involved with religious cults in France. Conclusions

1. The institutional influence of the Catholic church has greatly declined in France over the past 30 years. This is part of a long-term trend of weakening influence of traditionally powerful social institutions over individuals. In addition, the church is more clearly separated from formal association with other social institutions than in the past. The only exception is the preservation of Catholic schools. The Catholic church is no longer the majestic institution that once spoke, by general consent, in the name of God. However, it is important to recognize that although the church can no longer claim to reign undivided over spiritual life in France, it remains

192

Religion

a powerful organization and maintains considerable informal influence with other social institutions. 2. There has been a major shift to a worldly focus in the doctrines and practices of the Catholic church in France. The eternal consequences of sin have diminished and are viewed instead as a deterrent to a happy life. In addition, the church is involved in combating social problems and supporting popular social movements. 3. Personal acceptance of traditional religious beliefs has declined only modestly, while most practices, such as attendance, baptism, and church marriages, have decreased significantly. On the other hand, the Catholic press seems to be growing in France, and new charismatic movements signal a renewal of religious fervour among some segments of the population. The charismatic movement is strongest among Protestants, but has also attracted a sizeable number of Catholics. All things considered, there has been a decline in activity in the public religious sphere in France, while activity in the private religious sphere has diversified. RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES

Since most of the early immigrants to North America were fleeing religious persecution in other lands, religion played an important role in the settlement of North America and in the founding of the United States. As a consequence, religious freedom was guaranteed in the American constitution and its first amendment. Although a sizable Catholic contingent arrived from Europe in the 1800s, Protestantism has dominated the religious scene throughout the country's history. The constitution establishes a clear separation between church and state, but the founding fathers never intended that this would stifle the role of religion. To a large degree, it has not, as church and state have historically been deeply entangled, churches freed from the state have been a greater moral force than in other societies, where they are a part of the establishment. As Wills (1990: 25) notes, "The first nation to disestablish religion has been a marvel of religiosity, for good or ill." Prior to the Civil War, state courts generally held that Christianity was a part of the common law inherited from England. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in 1824 that "Christianity, general Christianity, is and always has been, a part of the common law of Pennsylvania" (Reichley, 1985: 155). Following the Civil War, states' rights were curtailed by the expansion of the federal government's influence, and a more strict separation of church and state followed. Such comments by courts are infrequent in this day; Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor was criticized by some and applauded by others for her 1989 reference to the United States as a "Christian nation" (Dershowitz, 1989).

193

Convergence or Divergence

Churches, their leaders, and their members have been seriously involved in political activities in the United States, especially in struggles against social injustices. Organized religion rallied its members and resources in the battle against slavery. Many of the leading abolitionists were affiliated with liberal Protestant denominations (Unger, 1989). The Civil War, in many respects, was a holy war. Religious values against drunkenness and churches' lobbying efforts were influential in the temperance movement and the passage of prohibition legislation. As the industrial revolution swept across America, some clergy and church members were distressed by the blatant economic exploitation they observed, and they joined the struggle against the poverty. The "social gospel" of the early twentieth century sought to reform social and economic evils such as sweatshops, rotting tenements, and oppressive child labour. The New Deal and its economic reforms were supported by a coalition of Catholics and liberal Protestants. Some of the larger denominations have formalized their efforts to influence the federal government's social policies by opening lobbying offices in Washington, D.C. More recently, the civil-rights movement, including the landmark Civil Rights Bill of 1964, was greatly assisted by organized religion and its clergy. Most of the black leaders in the civil-rights movement were ministers, and much of their support flowed from white churches. The protest against the Vietnam war had its share of religious leaders, perhaps the most visible being Father Daniel Berrigan. The war on poverty, the women's-rights movement, more humane treatment of prisoners, and the patient's-rights movements have all been assisted by churches and religious leaders (Unger, 1989). The last three decades, however, have witnessed a resurgence of tension in the relationship between church and state. Federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, have re-emphasized the separation of church and state, as evidenced in a ban on prayer and religious displays in public arenas and a challenge of the tax-exempt status currently enjoyed by most religious groups. At the same time, the courts have exercised greater constraints on expressions of religious freedom, including bans on religious rituals and practices such as snake handling, drug consumption, and harsh punishment of and withholding of medical care from children. The rationale applied by the courts is that an individual's welfare as a member of society is considered first and as a member of a religious organization second. Some analysts are convinced that the resurgence of the separation doctrine and the limits on free expression were precipitated by the entrance of larger numbers of Catholics into the American mainstream (Demerath and Williams, 1987). Increased separation is seen as a reasonable price to pay for ensuring that no religious denomination, including the Catholic church, gains pre-eminence in American society.

194

Religion

Autonomy of Other Social Institutions

The degree of autonomy of social institutions - the state, family, education, welfare, labour, and politics - from religion is difficult to determine with exactness, but general trends are apparent. The level of interdependence between church and politics is considerable. Much has been made of the recent foray of religious leaders into the political arena. In the 1980s, two religious leaders, Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson, sought the presidency of the United States. They were unsuccessful, but they did attract considerable support. The last four presidents - Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush - all declared themselves "born-again" Christians. The 1980s witnessed the organization and emergence of the "moral majority." Moral Majority, Inc., organized by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, has received the most media attention, but several other New Right Christian organizations have also entered the political arena. These organizations, their members, and their followers are absolutely convinced that America's survival is contingent on returning to its Christian values. They contend that although the founding fathers separated church and state, the intent was never to have a government devoid of God. According to Falwell, the United States was founded upon Christian principles and thus has "enjoyed a unique relationship with God because of that foundation" (Falwell, 1980: 266). The battle for reshaping America around such values includes electing "moral" political leaders, the creation of alternative institutions such as schools, media campaigns, and economic boycotts, and legal action. A study conducted in 1980 found that born-again Christians constituted a distinct political subgroup with rather conservative political values (Patel, Pilant, and Rose, 1982). The Moral Majority has had, and in all likelihood will continue to have, a significant impact on American political life. Ascertaining the autonomy of other institutions, especially state and political, from the religious institution is complicated by the indirect influence of religion. Herberg (1955), in his insightful book Protestant, Catholic, Jew, argued that America is dominated by a "civil" religion, the American Way of Life, which is based on a belief in God, the rewarding of virtue, and the punishment of evil. The separation of church and state has not deprived politics of a religious dimension, which is institutionalized throughout society. According to Bellah (1973), Americans worship society itself through its civil religion, which unites churches, denominations, sects, and cults in their support for things American. Manifestation of civil religion are numerous: the Pledge of Allegiance refers to "One nation under God," both coins and currency proclaim the message "In God We Trust," sessions of Congress and the Supreme Court are opened with prayer, and the bald eagle and the flag are sacred symbols of national unity. The founding fathers would not find it paradoxical that the courts continue to insist on a strict separation of state and church, and yet a belief 195

Convergence or Divergence

in God and other basic Christian values are tightly woven into the political and social fabric of America. Political leaders, as well as churches and religious leaders, appeal to religious values in encouraging public policies supportive of traditional family life. The focus of organized religion on out-of-wedlock births, teenage pregnancy, divorce, family violence, and abortion indicates the continued interdependence of religion and family. For example, religious leaders are at the forefront of the pro-life movement and have organized massive demonstrations to influence state legislators to support restrictive abortion laws. Among the 2,000 people arrested in 1991 for blocking access to an abortion clinic in Wichita, Kansas, nearly 100 were men and women of the cloth. The separation of church and state doctrine has been used to limit the overt presence of religion in education, especially in public schools. Recent court decisions have forbidden opening school with prayer and praying at school-sponsored events such as athletic contests or graduation ceremonies. Nevertheless, religion has a long history of influencing curriculum content. Religious leaders and laity alike have in recent years become exercised that the public schools are teaching their children to be "Godless" under the guise of "secular humanism." Fundamentalists are pressuring schools to teach creationism as an alternative to secular humanism, limit sex education, and eliminate "offensive" literature from English classes and libraries. Basic Christian values are still in evidence in the curriculum, especially in civics, citizenship, and family-life courses. Approximately 16% of students enrolled in elementary and secondary schools attend private schools. Of this number, 60% attend Catholic schools, 26% are in schools sponsored by various Protestant denominations, and 14% attend private schools not affiliated with any religion. In other words, nearly 15% of the students in elementary and secondary schools are being educated within a religious environment. In addition, some parents are opting to keep their children out of the "Godless" public schools and are educating them in home schools. Private religious schools and home schools help to maintain a modest link between religion and education. The involvement of religion in the American labour movement has been considerable, especially for the Catholic church. Church and labour are still, to a degree, intertwined; various denominations and churches contribute sizeable sums of money and goods to help the poor and socially disadvantaged (social services). But their overall contribution to the welfare effort is rather modest in comparison to that of state and federal governments. Shift to Worldly Focus As discussed above, religion has a long history in American society of being concerned with societal issues such as slavery, poverty, child labour, temperance,

196

Religion

civil rights, family disruption, and abortion. Generally, mainline Protestant denominations - Episcopalian, Presbyterian, Methodist, and Lutheran - have rather liberal political views, and they have thrown themselves into struggles on behalf of racial minorities, women, the poor, homosexuals, the mentally ill, and the homeless. At the same time as they were heavily involved in various civil-rights movements, their memberships were declining significantly. It is tempting to assume that members were rejecting involvement in social issues in favour of the search for salvation. An alternative explanation is that members were supportive of addressing social issues, but repudiated the liberal solutions offered by their churches. While the mainline churches were losing members, fundamentalist churches, especially evangelical denominations, experienced rapid growth. During this period, there was a political and social reawakening among evangelical denominations, and they entered the fight against contemporary social ills. According to Liebman and Wuthnow (1983), the "assumption that fundamentalist convictions are too otherworldly to countenance political involvement" must now be re-examined. The acceptance of political and social problems as church business is illustrated by a survey of members of the "700 Club": more than one third reported that "learning about politics and what is right and wrong in America today" is a very important reason for participation. Such groups make up the "moral majority," aligned on the conservative side of the issues, opposite the mainline churches. Attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to remove the tax exemptions of racially imbalanced Christian schools and colleges triggered a grassroots storm of protest from the fundamentalists. This seemed to be a wake-up call, and they jumped into the fray against what they see as threats to traditional morality and family life, such as gay rights, abortion, and pornography. The political awakening of evangelicals after several decades of inactivity is testimony to the capacity of religion to adapt to changing social conditions. Religion in America has kept one eye on heavenly pursuits and the other on social problems. The pattern is one of various denominations joining different causes, and the groups frequently oppose each other. The worldly pursuits of their churches at times seem to have offended some members, who have opted to disaffiliate or withhold financial support. This appears to have occurred with mainline Protestant churches during the civil-rights movements in the 1960s and 1970s. At other times, political and social involvement appears to have spurred believers to even greater faith. The American experience is one of recurring "great awakenings," in which religious groups exert a burst of energy in worldly activities interspersed with periods of inactivity. There has not been a direct and continuous shift from an other-worldly perspective to a worldly focus among religious groups in the United States over the past 30 years, as predicted by the secularization hypothesis.

197

Convergence or Divergence

Individual Beliefs and Practices

A large majority of Americans report a religious preference, as figure 1 shows. A vast majority of Americans, 92%, listed a religious preference in 1960, and this proportion has remained over 90%. In 1965, 73% of the population claimed membership in a church, and this number has hovered around 70% in the past three decades. Denominational preference and church membership declined only slightly from 1960 to 1990. There are contradictory findings about church attendance. First, Catholic attendance dropped from a high of 74%, in 1960, to 46%, in 1990 (figure 2). On the other hand, the proportion of Protestants who attend at least one service a week has been constant at 40% for the 30-year period (table 3). In perspective, even with this modest decline in attendance, more people go to church each week than attend all sporting events combined (Wills, 1990: 16). Financial contributions contradict the notion of declining commitment to religion, as per-capita contributions to Protestant churches rose steadily from 1945 to 1987. Standardizing for inflation by using 1967 dollars, per-capita contributions from members of Protestant churches rose from $36 to $108 per year. Comparable figures are not available for Catholics. The proportion who report that they believe in God and that Jesus Christ is God or the son of God has changed little over the past 40 years. Over 95% of the public acknowledged a belief in God between 1960 and 1990, while approximately 80% professed a belief in the divinity of Jesus Christ. Table 2 shows the consistently high level of belief in life after death, at around 75% of Americans, over the past 30 years. Modest support of secularization appears in perceptions of the importance of religion in individuals' lives and in society in general. In 1952, 75% reported that religion was an important influence in their life; by 1986, the proportion had dropped to 58%. The perceived importance of religion in society was 70% in 1957, dropped to a low of 13% in 1970 and since then has steadily risen back to 50% in 1986. Whether the recent rise will continue remains to be seen. Both of these items suggest that the influence of religion in American society has declined over the past three decades. Over all, the production of religious books shows a modest decrease. The number of books published rose slightly during the 1950s, dipped during the mid1970s and then increased again in the 1980s. The ratios of clergy to employed persons and of clergy to the general population rose during the 30 years from 1960 to 1990. The number of Protestant ministers has increased considerably, while the Catholic ministry has held constant. Catholics will have trouble maintaining the current level of clergy if seminary enrolment continues to drop. In 1965, there were 800 students in theology school for 198

Religion

Table 3 Weekly Attendance of Protestants, Percent of Members, in West Germany and the United States, 1960-90

Note:

Year

West Germany

United States

1960 1970 1980 1990

6 5 4 4

39 38 43 42

Occasionally, data for a given year were not avalaible and information from a previous or later year was substituted.

every 1,000 practicing clergy. This decreased dramatically, to under 200, in 1987. At the same time, the number of Protestant theological students has slightly increased. In summary, citizens in the United States have high religious affiliation and activity. About 90% of adults currently have a religious preference, a slightly lower rate than in the 1950s and 1960s. Rates of church membership have declined slightly, and among Catholics rates of weekly attendance at services are lower than formerly. Donations and the popularity of the clergy as a vocation have increased among Protestants; the latter has decreased among Catholics. There are more religious books being published, but the proportion of all publishing devoted to religious matters is down. The Princeton Religion Research Center (1990) has been collecting information about religion in America for a number of years, and has combined several beliefs and behaviours into a religious index. A perfect index score of 100 would be achieved only when all people interviewed believed in God, had a stated religious preference, were members of a church, attended religious services once a week, considered religion very important in their lives, believed that religion provides answers to today's problems, and had high confidence in organized religion and the clergy. The religious index was 73 in 1940, and declined slowly, to 65, in 1990. The eight-point decline over the past 50 years indicates a very modest secularization in individual belief and practice. In other words, there seems to be "a continuous 'bloom' in American adherence and belief (Lipset, 1973: 44).

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Convergence or Divergence

Conclusions

Religion has had consderable influence in the United States throughout its history. While secularization has occurred in some religious domains, others continue unabated. 1. In spite of rigorously enforced separation of church and state, institutional religion continues to influence major social institutions. Civil religious underpinnings are so deeply entrenched in other institutions that religious values have a significant effect on them. 2. Churches have increased their worldly power by greater involvement in ameliorating some social problems. However, most churches have not neglected their spiritual, salvation, or heavenly orientation. It appears that many churches have taken on worldly problems as a part of their salvation seeking. 3. Specific beliefs and practices have ebbed and flowed over the past 30 years. Although beliefs have changed somewhat over time, the proportion of the population who believe in God, Jesus Christ, and a life after death remained quite high in American society. Activity in organized religion has declined somewhat and there appears to be a shift to more personal religious observance. RELIGION IN WEST GERMANY

Religion was extensively woven into the fabric of the German state organized in the mid-sixteenth century (Hegel, 1935). This intricate fusion began to dissolve in the seventeenth century, as feudalism gradually gave way to more democratic forms of government. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the old feudal guarantees benefiting the church were slowly superseded by constitutional provisions (Maier, 1989). The constitution of the Federal Republic, signed in 1949, decrees a separation between church and state. However, it also guarantees freedom of religion and establishes the dominant churches as public corporations. Such status obliges the government to subsidize the churches, even paying the salaries of the clergy. The federal government collects taxes from members for the individual churches, Sundays and Christian holidays are officially recognized, and religious instruction is a mandatory subject in the public schools. The institutional influence granted to religion by the Federal Republic emerged from the critical role churches played in the German restoration following the Second World War. When the Third Reich collapsed, the Lutheran and Catholic churches were the only functioning social organizations left in Germany. They performed a profusion of tasks normally performed by government, and in many ways acted as advocates for the conquered nation. These two churches have since been able to 200

Religion

maintain a strong voice in education, social services, labour relations, and the mass media (Greschat, 1983; Hollenstein, 1983). Autonomy of Other Social Institutions

Religion continues to play a major role in distribution of social welfare services; Protestant and Catholic organizations are influential social-service agencies. These organizations deliver health care and assistance, and ambulant services for various disadvantaged groups. Religion continues to have a modest influence on family life. Over half of all marriages in Germany are performed in a church by a member of the clergy, and nearly 80% of all children are christened. Traditional family values are encouraged by the churches, but public acceptance of alternative family life styles has increased over the past 30 years. Aside from a high incidence of war-caused divorces in the early 1950s, divorce occurred relatively infrequently until well into the 1960s. In 1960, 36 of every 10,000 marriages ended in divorce; this figure rose to 86 per 10,000 in 1985 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1988: 78), in spite of religious teachings discouraging it. Extramarital cohabitation is widely accepted by the general public. In 1976, 63% of West Germans saw "nothing wrong" with a man and woman living together, and this proportion rose to 78% in 1988. Cohabitation tripled between 1972 and 1982, and currently over two million men and women live together without benefit of marriage (Schenk, 1987). Although the number of West Germans who disapprove of abortion increased from 8%, in 1978, to 15%, in 1986, the number still remains rather small. The majority of both Catholics (four in five) and Protestants (nine in ten) favour legalized abortion. The number of legal abortions jumped from 54,000, in 1977, to 91,000, in 1982, and then dropped slightly, to 88,500, in 1987 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1987c: 163, 1988: 387). There is a modest link between religion and education. In the 1960s, the confessional schools that had been so jealously protected by the churches largely disappeared. The influence of religion on education is now limited to the requirement that students in the public schools enroll in religious instruction. If parents do not want their child to take religious classes, an ethics class can be substituted. This happens rarely; over 90% of the students in German public schools attend religious classes each year (Glotzner, 1981). Finally, the two dominant churches also have a strong voice in the nomination of theology professors appointed to the country's universities. Religion as a social institution has only minimal influence on organized labour. A very small proportion of the men and women in the labour force belong to a trade 201

Convergence or Divergence

union characterized by a Christian orientation (Armingeon, 1988: 461). The Christian Federation of Trade Unions (CGB) comprises a mere 1% of the work force, though it has increased its membership slightly over the past few years. The direct influence of the churches on politics is rather weak. Political parties such as the Christian Democrats (CDU) and its sister party, the Christian Social Party (CSU), have an attachment to Christian ideals, as indicated by their names; however, the churches have no direct control over party platforms or candidates. Churches attempt to exert some impact on politics by issuing public statements about political responsibility. The Protestant church, for example, publishes its Denkschriften, which are guidelines for government policies and activities. The Denkschrift on real estate was published in 1962; the one on agriculture in 1965; the one on Eastern Europe in 1965; the one on peace in 1968; the one on Christian values in 1979; another on peace in 1981; and the one on liberal democracy in 1985. These "orientations" receive little attention from public officials and do not give religion any additional influence in the political arena. Overall, the major institutional influence of religion in West Germany is its provision of social services. Religious instruction in the public schools gives churches some modest influence in education, and traditional family values are officially espoused. In addition, the government's collection of the church tax institutionally links church and state. Although its institutional influence is mainly confined to social welfare and education, these are important functions; as a consequence, the church exercises considerable influence in society. Shift to Worldly Focus

One evidence of a shift to a worldly focus by churches in West Germany is their extensive involvement in providing social services. They are largely responsible for looking after the poor, the homeless, the aged, immigrants, asylum-seekers, and other groups. In addition, organized religion is strongly involved in fighting hunger in Third World countries. The Lutheran church founded an extensive foreign-aid programme in 1962, which was funded by the federal government. The focus of this programme has shifted from "mercy" to "more active social reorganization" in underdeveloped countries. Foreign aid presently consumes 2% of the Lutheran church's budget. Another sign of "worldliness" is that churches themselves are being influenced by new social movements. In the 1960s, "grassroots parishes" sprang up within Protestant and Catholic churches to press for democratization of church structures and a larger say in church practices. In addition, new forms of church services have been experimented with occasionally. The churches are also involved in social movements aimed at improving the quality of life. The German peace movement of the 1980s 202

Religion

received powerful support from both major churches. The environmental movement replaced the peace movement to a considerable degree during the past decade, and currently receives substantial support from churches and associated groups. Although there has been an increase in involvement in issues pertaining to this world, the major focuses of most churches remains on heaven, hell, and other-worldly concerns. Not only have churches supported important social movements, but also, generally within the context of Christian values, social responsibility. Religious Beliefs and Practices

Reliable data on religious behaviour and practice are abundant in West Germany. Germans have long been members of either the Lutheran or Catholic church; since 1945, approximately 90% of the population has affiliated with one of these denominations (figure 1). Protestant membership has dropped slightly, from 52% of the population, in 1960, to 41%, in 1985. Catholic membership has remained fairly constant at around the 44^4-5% range, so that in recent years believers have been fairly evenly divided between the two major churches. The high percentage of church members in Germany is somewhat puzzling, given the marked increase in members "leaving" a church. A rather sizeable exodus has occurred since the early 1980s (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1986, 1989b; Zapf, 1977). This loss was compensated for by the immigration of Catholic foreign workers and their families. Although most of the population are affiliated with a church, only a few are actively involved. This is certainly true for Protestants, as can be seen from their attendance at services (table 1). In 1960, only 6% attended services on any given Sunday, and this declined to only 4% by 1990. Catholics have maintained a higher level of attendance than Protestants, but their involvement has also dropped: nearly 50% attended mass each week in 1960, and this decreased by half, to 24%, by 1990 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1987a, 1989a). Modest support for secularization is evident in the decline in the number of church weddings and christening of children. We cannot separate Catholics from Protestants, but between 1960 and 1987 the proportion of weddings in the Federal Republic performed in church by a member of the clergy declined from 80% to 55%. During the same period, christenings dropped from 97% of children born to 79%. Although the percentage of church weddings and christenings have declined, a solid majority of all marriages and births still involve the church (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1987a, 1989a). Generally, financial contributions are insightful indicators of religiosity. The case is somewhat less clear in Germany, since the federal government collects a church tax from members. There has been a significant increase in the per-capita 203

Convergence or Divergence

church tax in recent years, but it is more likely a function of inflation than of rising religiosity. Church taxes can be avoided by leaving the church, and the fact that nearly 90% continue to affiliate and pay is evidence of religious commitment. Voluntary donations by both Catholics and Protestants are rather modest, but they have risen during the past 25 years. For example, per-capita donations to the Protestant Bread for the World organization rose from 0.6 marks in 1963 to 3.5 marks in 1987 (Diakonisches Werk, 1988). A similar trend appears for contributions to Misereor, the major Catholic charity: Catholics donated 3.3 marks per capita to Misereor in 1978, and increased their support to 4.8 marks per capita in 1988 (Bischofliches Hilfswerk, 1988). The size of the clergy has declined a little. In 1964, the Catholic church had one priest per 1,000 members; this dipped to .96 per 1,000 by 1987. The Catholic church's world-wide difficulties in recruiting priests is evident in the number ordained in Germany in recent years, which dropped from 473, in 1965, to only 163, in 1978, but then rose to 240, in 1986 (Informationszentrum Berufe und Kirche, 1987). Protestant ministers have historically served more members than Catholic priests, and this is true in Germany. In 1970, there were .5 ministers for each 1,000 members, and this increased to .7 in 1987. The number of men and women entering the ministry reveals little change in West Germany. Catholic students studying for the ministry declined from 5,200, in 1960, to 2,000, in 1973; since then, the number has steadied at around 3,000 (Hauschild and Wilkens, 1978; Informationszentrum Berufe und Kirche, 1987). Subscriptions to religious magazines are quite high. The number of magazines steadily increased from 1975 to 1987, while overall circulation remained fairly constant. It seems that more specialized religious journals and newsletters were launched during this period, but each appealed to a narrower audience, so that total subscriptions to religious periodicals remained the same. A national survey explored how often German families offer a prayer, grace, or blessing at mealtime (Noelle-Neumann and Piel, 1983). The question asked was, "There are things commonly done in some families but not in others. For example: Thinking back to your childhood, did you pray before or after meals?" In 1965, 62% replied "yes," but the proportion dropped to 47% in 1982. The survey then asked whether the family currently offers a prayer at mealtime. In 1965, 29% did so all the time, 17% did so sometimes, and 54% never did. The proportion of families praying at mealtime declined during the next 17 years: in 1982, only 11% prayed regularly, 14% did so sometimes, and 75% never did. It is obvious from this survey that family prayer at mealtime has greatly decreased, to the point that in 1982 only one out of four families prayed some of the time. The Bible is read by a minority of Germans, as from 1966 to 1978 approximately 60% of those surveyed claimed "never" to read it. The proportion who 204

Religion

"seldom" read the Bible increased from 17% to 22%. "Occasional" readers dropped from 15% to 11%, while only 5% reported that they "often" read the Bible. Belief in life after death is held by about 40% of the population, and this has remained fairly constant since 1960 (table 2). Approximately 30% reject the notion of life after death, and the remaining 30% are undecided (Institut fur Demoskopie, 1992). Longitudinal surveys have documented changes in acceptance of church beliefs and doctrines. Catholics who affirmatively answered this query declined in proportion from 49%, in 1970/71, to 38%, in 1982. The loss of faith and works was significantly greater for Protestants, among whom the proportion fell from 37% to 14% (Noelle-Neumann, 1974; 1983; 1984). A survey conducted in 1978, 1984, and 1988 found that members' satisfaction with their church declined a little. For Catholics, the number of "very satisfied" members dipped from 9% to 8%, while those "very dissatisfied" rose from 23% to 31%. Similar results were garnerred for Protestants: those "very satisfied" decreased slightly, from 8% to 7%, while those "very dissatisfied" increased from 26% to 30% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1989b). The general trend in these surveys seems to be a slow withdrawal from the institutional church and a modest increase in personal religiosity. Conclusions

Organized religion played a major role in the reconstruction of German society following the Second World War. Institutional ties have preserved the influence of Catholic and Lutheran churches in German society. 1. The autonomy of other social institutions in West Germany is somewhat greater today than 30 years ago. However, the church's institutional position of distributing social services and public assistance, along with a state-collected church tax, continues to ensure organized religion of a significant position in the German government. 2. There has been a significant increase in church involvement in worldly affairs involving human rights, world poverty, and environmental protection. At the same time, traditional concerns about sin, heaven, and hell persist. It seems that the churches have expanded their domain to include current concerns, while maintaining their attention to "life after death." 3. Many traditional beliefs are not held as inviolate as previously, and church activity has decreased dramatically. It seems that Germans are maintaining their institutional ties, but have greatly reduced their personal religious involvement.

205

Convergence or Divergence

RELIGION IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

Our review of religion in the four societies for the past 30 years corroborates Hunter's assertion that the relationship between modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and religion is much more complex than simply the "institutional demise of the latter" (Hunter, 1983: 11). He argues that modernity and religion engage in considerable bargaining, or negotiation, which generally produces "mutual accommodation, mutual permutation or even symbiotic growth." The same conclusion was reached in a comparison of religions in Holland, Japan, and the United States (Sasaki and Suzuki, 1987), which concluded that "secularization cannot be viewed as a global phenomenon of modern societies" (p. 1055). Greater institutional autonomy has occurred in all four societies as rational structural pluralism has emerged as a part of modernization. Institutional autonomy is most pronounced in Quebec, but is also visible in the other three societies. Accommodations between religion and other social institutions are also clearly evident, and different patterns of change in interdependence of social institutions have emerged. The shift in autonomy in Quebec has been dramatic: from a religious welfare institution and a government largely controlled by the Catholic church to a civil state. In Quebec, and to a lesser degree, France, societies in which a single religion held a dominant institutional role, social institutions have obtained the greatest autonomy from religion. As these two societies industrialized and modernized, and as greater cultural diversity appeared, the Catholic church was unable to maintain its position. Both societies have been reorganized in ways to diminish greatly the position of the church. Deprived of its institutional presence in Quebec and France, the Catholic church seems to be negotiating other ways of influencing society. In Quebec, religion has bargained for influence with other social institutions, especially education. The presence of church leaders as counsellors to Jacques Delors, president of the Association of the European Economic Community, is an example of the attempt by organized religion in France to forge new relationships with other social institutions. The experiences in the United States and Germany have been quite different. The United States constitution prescribes the separation of church from state, yet much of the social fabric of American society is based on Christian values. Institutionally, church and government are separate, but Protestantism has considerable indirect influence on other social institutions through a civil religion based on traditional Christian values. As well, a religious diversity has allowed individual churches or denominations to occupy insititutional positions at various times without raising as much fear about oppression at the hands of a dominant religion. Finally, the constitutional separation of church and state and religious

206

Religion

divinity has permitted denominations to proclaim their values openly and to lobby for legislation supportive of them. Germany, with its two major religions, has followed a pattern closer to that of the United States than to that of France and Quebec. The Catholic and Lutheran churches served in the place of destroyed political and social institutions following the Second World War, and have maintained significant institutional positions within the state since that time. In Germany, religion still maintains a strong institutional presence in society through its role of dispensing social welfare. Recently, the Protestant church played a decisive part in the reunification of Germany, nurturing the "unification" that precipitated the fall of the Berlin Wall. The German experience illustrates the negotiation between religion and other social institutions during times of change to either assume or maintain a significant role in society. In summary, several social institutions in the four societies have increased their autonomy from religion, but religion has negotiated unique ways to maintain a significant institutional influence. Modernization does not seem to isolate religion as an institution much more than it isolates other social institutions from one another. Organized religions are active ia worldly affairs in all four societies. This is not a new activity for religious groups in these societies. For example, churches in the United States have a long history of involvement in the amelioration of social problems. Religion's concern with a particular problem or set of problems has at times been followed by periods of political or social inactivity. However, these times of quiet have not signified a permanent abandonment of a worldly focus. New issues have arisen, or old ones have been rediscovered, and religious awakenings have ensued. In Quebec and France, with their single dominant religion, the link between this world focus and salvation is not explicitly discussed as frequently as it is in the United States and Germany. The relationship between involvement in worldly affairs and salvation is implied in Catholic values and therefore is not explicated as often. In Germany and the United States, where denominations compete for members and positions in society, the importance of relieving the misery of the poor and the oppressed as a prerequisite to salvation is regularly expounded. The anticipated pattern of a steady and large-scale shift from sacred to secular activities by churches has not materialized in the four societies. In fact, in Quebec and France, the Catholic church has lost many of its institutional positions in the struggle against social problems. Over all, there has been an increase in involvement in secular issues during the past 30 years, but no wholesale abandonment of spiritual concerns has occurred. It is entirely feasible, if not likely, that the future will bring about a decline in religious concern about social issues, followed by religious awakenings, while concern with spiritual matters will continue at a more even pace. Different patterns of adjustment or adaptation of individual beliefs and practices emerged in the analysis of the four societies. Quebec and France, the 207

Convergence or Divergence

societies with a single dominant religion, have witnessed the greater decline in acceptance of religious doctrine, practices and beliefs. This suggests that in societies like the United States and Germany, which have religious pluralism, when individuals are dissatisfied with their church, rather than drop out of the religious realm they seek another church whose doctrine they approve of. Germany has experienced a more modest decrease in religious beliefs, and a major decline in some practices, especially attendance. But other religious practices in Germany, such as membership and financial support, have remained at rather high levels. The United States has maintained strong acceptance of God and basic Christian values. At the same time, there has been moderate decline in some religious activities and an increase in others. Significant life events continue to be celebrated with religious rituals. Baptism of newborn infants, confirmation of children, marriage in the church, and a religious funeral are experienced by a majority of the citizens in the four societies. For some, these occations comprise their only visits to the church; nevertheless, religion seems to provide a unique sense of meaning to these significant passages. The decrease in some traditional religious practices does not signal the disappearance of religion. New forms of worship have appeared, which may not show up in the body counts taken in the churches on Sunday. Religious programmes on television and radio provide an electronic pathway to God for many in all four societies. The elderly especially enjoy worshipping God in the comfort of their own home. It is clear from observations in all four societies that the cultural pluralism associated with modernity has led to greater tolerance of religious differences. Catholics can now be found attending Protestant services with their friends, and Protestants feel comfortable at mass. A trend from the institutional church to a privatization of the religious experience is also clearly observable in the four societies. A personal relationship with God and the living of a 'moral life' are more important than attendance at Sunday services for increasing numbers. In spite of its heuristic value, the secularization hypothesis was not confirmed by the analysis of religious change in these four industrial societies: secularization has not been associated with industrialization, urbanization, and modernization in France, Germany, Quebec, and the United States. Rather, a broad range of change and adaptation has evolved as religion, like other social institutions, has adjusted to the social change inherent in industrialization. Religion today is not what it was 30 years ago, but we were amazed at its ability to maintain a meaningful presence in modern society. In unique ways in each of the societies, religion has an influence at the institutional level as well as in individual beliefs and activities.

208

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214

7 The Reduction of Personal Authority Theodore CAPLOW

This chapter reports partial findings from a search for major commonalities in the profiles of social trends in four societies developed by the members of the International Research Group for the Comparative Charting of Social Change. Among the trends that appeared in all four of these societies during this period were the following: . The movement of married women, particularly those with small children, into the labour force; the movement was weakest, but still important, in Germany. . The legitimation of unmarried, consensual unions. . A sharp decline in fertility. . The reduction of paternal responsibilities. . The relaxation of ancient taboos against promiscuity, bastardy, and homosexuality. . A massive shift from blue-collar to white-collar employment. . A vast expansion of secondary and higher education. . A vast increase in leisure activities and facilities. . A spectacular improvement in the machinery and equipment in private households. . The decline of political extremism. . The institutionalization of social movements. . The proliferation of specialized publics. . The fading of collective hatreds that seemed immutable - between bourgeois and proletarian, Christian and Jew, rightist and leftist. . A great increase in the per-capita consumption of consumer goods. . A great expansion in bureaucratic regulation, both public and private. The institutions that had to adapt to the above trends - family, church, school, workplace, voluntary associations, government - proved remarkably resilient, 215

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preserving their structures and functioning without serious interruption despite drastic changes in the laws, rules, and norms by which they are governed. Thus, for example, the family continues to be the fundamental unit of affiliation for most people in these societies, despite easy divorce, the employment of married women during the infancy of their children, the toleration of illegitimacy, and the removal of legal sanctions against unmarried unions. The factory of 1990 looks very much like the factory of 1960, although its workforce is differently composed, differently selected, and differently managed. The same may be said of universities, political parties, suburban neighbourhoods, and social movements. Changes of form have lagged far behind changes of function. The acceleration around 1960 of «the gradual progress of equality» that Tocqueville had noted more than a century earlier is confirmed by all of the foregoing trends and is related, as both cause and effect, to a number of technological and social innovations. Pregnancy was made elective for women by oral contraception, legal abortion, and easy sterilization. They elected to bear fewer children, and - with the risk of unwanted pregnancies removed - they claimed the same sexual freedom as men. The parental obligations of men were reduced accordingly. Meanwhile, developments in industrial technology were making labour less strenuous and women more employable, while domestic technology changed the work requirements of housekeeping and greatly increased the number and variety of mass-marketed consumer products. Patterns of household and personal consumption in the four societies were profoundly affected, on the one hand, by the virtual disappearance of servants from the homes of the affluent and, on the other hand, by the nearly universal acquisition of domestic machinery - indoor plumbing, central heating, telephones, refrigerators, laundry machines, television, automobiles - by the moderately poor. There were parallel trends in services. Educational facilities formerly reserved for the exclusive use of privileged strata were opened to the entire population. Moreover, since formal education prepared students for sophisticated forms of leisure, the educated poor began to attend symphony concerts and play golf. Health care was democratized in a similar way. House calls and personalized medical service ceased to be available at any price, while advanced medical technology was brought within the reach of most people. In three brief decades, the conditions of work, leisure, and family life were fundamentally transformed and the apparatus of social control was reconstructed on new principles (Caplow, 1991; Mendras, 1989). The revolution that reflected and ratified these changes was an uprising against society rather than against the state, as was illustrated so clearly in the spring of 1968. The uprising at that time did not challenge the essential authority of the state; it did challenge the personal authority of officials and, more broadly, the personal authority of superiors over inferiors 216

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throughout the social structure. Authority, as used here, means legitimate power that is, collectively sponsored coercion. The authoritative superior controls the actions of subordinates by virtue of a social franchise that puts appropriate punishments and rewards at his or her disposal. Personal authority differs from other forms of authority in that it is exercised by a person rather than by a collectivity and expresses the independent volition of that person. Nearly every form of personal authority is embedded in an institutional matrix that sets limits within which it can be exercised legitimately and provides external sanctions, including the ultimate recourse to violence that constitute legitimacy. The conventional forms of personal authority in these societies include that of parents, teachers, employers, managers, officers, priests, and chiefs of various kinds over their designated subordinates, and also the more diffuse authority of persons belonging to a superior social category over persons belonging to an inferior one. Governments, at first apprehensive about the uprising against society, soon recognized that the lessening of personal authority would strengthen their own and made common cause with the insurgents. The revolutionary ideologies - feminism, nondiscrimination, participation, self-realization - were enacted into law. Every form of personal authority by which social control had been exercised in these societies was weakened and replaced, at least in part, by collective authority, which commonly took the form of bureaucratic regulation. Among the forms of personal authority most affected were those of managers over workers, men over women, parents over children, masters over servants, teachers over students, priests over parishioners, officers over soldiers, and party leaders over followers. The consequences extend throughout the social structure. Between 1960 and 1990, the rapidly declining ratio of blue-collar to whitecollar jobs and the elimination of many of the dirty and dangerous jobs in the industrial sector removed much of the visible difference between managers and workers. The mechanization of agriculture had similar effects. Mendras (1989: 28-35) has documented the conversion of the French peasantry, once tied to the land, to rural-dwelling employees obsessed with the acquisition of consumer goods. As well, the sharp contrasts in daily and annual work schedules between blue-collar and whitecollar workers that were still observable in 1960 have nearly disappeared. The shrinking gap in working conditions would in itself have reduced the authority of supervisors, foremen, and managers, but this tendency was strongly reinforced by intervention by the state in the manager-worker relationship on behalf of the workers. In 1960, it was not uncommon in the United States for an industrial foreman to enforce an order with his fists. A foreman who tried to do that today would probably be arrested for assault, and the enterprise sued for damages. In all four societies, most workers are now employed in large, closely regulated bureaucratic systems that allow supervisors to exercise only minimum authority - and that under close surveillance. 217

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The authority of men over women was formerly evident in a variety of settings: in the modal family, where the husband-father was the sole breadwinner and the ultimate disciplinarian; in the workplace, where women were normally supervised by men but were rarely allowed to supervise men; in the educational system, where women were expected to stop short of the higher professional degrees; in the churches, where women were not permitted to become bishops, priests, or ministers; in sports, where women were frequently coached by men but men were never coached by women; and in politics, where women voted but were seldom elected to office. Women were not allowed to join police forces, to become soldiers, or to operate common carriers. Women patients were usually treated by male physicians; men were seldom treated by female physicians. In most of these relationships, a male advantage remains but its moral underpinnings are gone. The personal authority of parents over children has likewise been conspicuously reduced since 1960. The extension of the median educational career, subsidized by public funds, has had the unanticipated effect of establishing adolescents as independent consumers, even while they continue to live at home. And the state now stands ready to intervene in the parent-child relationship at a moment's notice. In the United States, this tendency has gone so far that the relationship between a father and his female children is always open to accusations of sexual abuse, and such accusations, whatever their source, are taken very seriously. At the other end of the life cycle, the prolongation of life expectancy (least marked in Germany) and the consequent deferment of inheritance, together with ideological shifts, seem to have reduced the authority of parents over adult children. That decline is reflected by conspicuous increases in inter-class, inter-confessional, and inter-ethnic exogamy; the parents of adult children are no longer able to enforce their preference for endogamous unions. The personal authority of teachers over students has been sharply curtailed by state regulation and by new ideologies. Teachers at the lower educational levels have lost most of their power to discipline pupils; at the higher educational levels, the authority that teachers formerly exercised in loco parentis over the comportment and attitudes of students has virtually disappeared. As recently as 1960, priests and ministers in the major denominations of these four societies had sufficient authority over their parishioners to command their observance of religious duties and to enforce, at least partially, ecclesiastical prohibitions against fornication, adultery, divorce, exogamy, illegitimacy, abortion, homosexuality, suicide, blasphemy, domestic violence, and intoxication. By 1990, most of that authority had been nullified, either by the resistance of the laity or by the abdication of the clergy. The mainline Christian churches now tolerate most of the behaviour that they formerly stigmatized and punished.

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There has been a similar decline in the authority of party leaders over their followers. In all four societies, political parties became less authoritarian and solidary in this period; leaders in organized labour, social movements, and parliamentary blocs have lost most of their ability to impose decisions on their followers. The diffuse but real authority that members of privileged strata used to exercise in their contacts with the less privileged has eroded as well. The caste etiquette that subordinated blacks to whites whenever they interacted was largely intact in the U.S. in 1960. It is totally gone today. The class etiquette that required a measure of deference toward persons of higher socio-economic status is rapidly disappearing from all four societies. This is not only a matter of outward form: deference implies an appreciable degree of social control. The trends described above are variable in detail but highly consistent in direction. Even the most authoritarian relationships that can now be found in these societies - physicians to patients, judges to litigants, keepers to prisoners - are increasingly regulated by bureaucratic third parties and constrained by laws and regulations that limit the discretion of the superior and enlarge the rights of the subordinate. The reduction of personal authority is inextricably connected with a partial and irregular reduction of other forms of status differentiation in these societies that occurred after 1960. At that time, each of them had a coherent system of stratification, and despite innumerable differences of detail, the four systems resembled each other enough to be considered together. They were not easy to describe, because they involved intricate combinations of ascribed and achieved status and because some status groups were sharply bounded and others were not. But the main outlines were clear. The core was an informal but universally recognized occupational scale that assigned a differential value (occupational prestige) to every male worker. Under normal conditions, that value was transferred to the worker's nuclear family, and, within rough limits, it determined both the household's disposable income and the class status of its members. Women, whether or not they were employed, took their class status from the occupations of their husbands or fathers. In these four societies today, the distribution of household income is less closely connected with the occupational level of a male breadwinner, and the concept of class status has become more nebulous. With regard to the first point, the entry of women into the labour force, the delay of marriage, and the rise of femaleheaded families have all reduced the association between male occupational prestige and household income. The income of a military family in which both husband and wife are enlisted people usually exceeds the income of a family in which the husband is an officer and the wife keeps house. At the same time, all of these societies have witnessed an expansion of speculative opportunities: state lotteries, high-risk bonds, 219

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superinflation of real-estate prices, the escalation of earnings in sports and entertainment and - especially in the United States - a great flood of income from drug trafficking and other illicit activities. Many of today's high-income families have none of the conventional marks of high status. Although income inequality is conspicuous in all of these societies, and indeed has increased somewhat in the United States in the past decade, the variation in life style by income level declined sharply after 1960, and it is still declining. There are many more millionaires in all four of these societies today than there were in 1960, but only a tiny fraction of them can afford what used to be the fundamental privilege of wealth - authority over servants. The working poor have not disappeared from any of these societies, but most of them have telephones and automobiles and some of them travel abroad for pleasure; they are not subject to the personal control of social superiors and not required to show deference toward them. Instead of being converted into personal authority, as in the past, much of the surplus income of the rich is absorbed by large surcharges for the goods and services they purchase. Since 1960, there has been an enormous widening in the price ranges of functionally equivalent items (Caplow, 1991: 137). In the U.S. in 1960, the most costly production automobile cost about seven times as much as the cheapest. Today, the ratio is 95:1. For men's ready-made suits, the ratio was about 4:1 in 1960; it is about 18:1 today. For airfares, the ratio was 1.4:1 in 1960; it is more than 20:1 today - the cost of a roundtrip from New York to Paris on the Concorde compared to the charter rate. Thus, surplus income is absorbed without providing much utility for its recipients. The increasingly nebulous character of class status is clearly shown in all four societies by conformity to a new norm that prohibits nonmonetary restrictions on the sale of goods and services. Hotels in these countries are not free to exclude guests who lack the visible marks of high status, as they routinely did 30 years ago; shops hesitate to turn away disreputable customers for fear of legal consequences; physicians cannot legitimately refuse prenatal services to unmarried women. Differences in class status used to be, and still are, perpetuated from generation to generation by differential access to formal education, but with the great expansion of educational opportunities that occurred between 1960 and 1990, the intergenerational transfer of social advantages and disadvantages has become markedly less regular and predictable (except perhaps in France). Needless to say, the ancient practice of asserting status by exclusion has not disappeared, but it has retreated on all fronts. Upper-class groups that were formerly able to enforce endogamy - French nobles, German Junkers, Boston «brahmins» are by now quite resigned to the exogamous marriages of their children. And since upper-class lineage no longer guarantees favourable placement in the occupational

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distribution or the maintenance of a distinctive lifestyle, the change has not been strongly resisted. The influence of ethnicity on personal authority declined significantly in all four societies between 1960 and 1990, although their ethnic situations are highly diverse. In the U.S., which has a more troubled history of ethnic conflict than France or Germany, and a markedly different ethnic situation from that in Quebec, the body of law and custom that made blacks subordinate in every face-to-face interaction with whites was systematically demolished by the federal government between 1954 and 1972. For a variety of reasons, including the defective design of the U.S. welfare, drug-control, criminal-justice, and health-care systems, the same period saw the emergence of an urban underclass of blacks and Hispanics, of whom many are fatherless, poor, prone to violence, and resistant to authority. In France, the growing Muslim population can also be characterized as an urban underclass; their absorption into French society has been slow and difficult. The situation of the Turkish, Greek, Italian, and Yugoslav guest workers who comprise most of Germany's foreign population is slightly more favourable, but German law does not confer citizenship on the native-born children of foreign parents, and the prospects for their eventual assimilation are unclear. Within each of these disadvantaged groups, personal authority appears even weaker than in the majority population. The individually oriented values that emerge when personal authority is relaxed favour freedom of choice, not only with respect to consumption preferences, but also with respect to marriage and parenthood, residential arrangements, career patterns, leisure activities, attitudes and opinions, manners and morals, and the presentation of self. New religious cults and secular ideologies flourish today in these societies, while the diversity of voluntary activities defies description - truck drivers give poetry recitals, nuns run political campaigns, lawyers practice ballet. This diversity goes beyond superficial; it extends to the meanings that people find in their lives and the ways in which they relate to each other. The decline in personal authority carries both costs and benefits. In principle, the expected benefit is enhancement of individual freedom and the expected cost is weakening of social control, but the specific effects vary enormously from one situation to another. Highly authoritarian organizations are likely to become more productive and better integrated when personal authority is reduced, as happened, for example, in U.S. military units between 1960 and 1990. But organizations with initially weak authority structures, like the Catholic church in France, may become less effective. In all four societies, the decline in personal authority has been more costly for poor families than for rich ones. In the former, where the personal authority of husbands over wives and parents over children was barely sufficient to hold the family together, the loss of that authority and of the responsibilities that went with it have greatly increased the number of single-parent households, 221

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unsupported children, and uncontrollable adolescents. In more prosperous families, where personal authority, buttressed by ample resources, might otherwise be excessive, its reduction probably contributes to the happiness of all concerned. Similarly, it appears that the reduction of managerial authority in German industry, which was traditionally over-controlled, improved productivity, while a parallel reduction in American industry, where supervision was much weaker, had an adverse effect on productivity. A society without much personal authority must be managed more continuously and more skilfully than a society whose institutions have strong internal controls. Under the emerging new order, bureaucratic failures in the regulation of social relationships produce extraordinary hardships, as for the homeless, or profound maladjustments, as in the escalation of health-care costs, or striking injustice, as in the massive transfer of wealth from the young to the old that has been unintentionally achieved by the American welfare state (Caplow, 1991: 140). But the trend described by our data is not likely to be halted or reversed in the short term. A revival of personal authority in family, school, and workplace is unlikely as long as public and private bureaucracies continue to expand their regulatory functions in these areas. That expansion is facilitated by the continued expansion of information technology and by the redefinition of social roles that the new technology seems to encourage.

Both of the major, long-term trends in Western society that Alexis de Tocqueville discerned so presciently 160 years ago have come into full flower in these four societies in the past three decades: on the one hand, the gradual progress of equality; on the other hand, administrative centralization. Most of the personal authority that formerly ruled the innumerable, small compartments of society has been revoked, leaving individuals face to face with larger collectivities. They are emancipated from submission to nearby persons and thereby given a wider range of options in many spheres of life, but this apparent freedom masks their increasing submission to bureaucratic agencies that are less responsive than the old patrons were in their time.

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References Caplow, Theodore 1991 American Social Trends. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Mendras, Henri 1989 La seconde revolution francaise. Paris: Gallimard.

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8 Conflicts and Conflict Regulation Karl-Otto HONDRICH Theodore CAPLOW

This chapter started from the assumption that as national societies become more complex, oppositions of interest and values become more numerous and may or may not develop into overt conflicts. The problem is to understand why some of them do and some do not. The comparative analysis of conflict data from three large industrial societies - France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United States of America - does indeed disclose a tendency toward the replacement of violent by nonviolent forms of conflict. We take for granted that the three societies have had different traditions of conflict resolution, but we expect to find some convergence in the recent past. In each there seems to be increasing recognition that social conflict has benefits as well as costs for a democratic polity. The integrative benefits of conflict are likely to exceed the costs when the divisions between major factions are cross-cutting and the coalitions formed around any given issue dissolve when another issue is raised. The costs are likely to exceed the benefits when class, political, ethnic, religious, and ideological boundaries coincide, dividing a society into irreconcilable factions (Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1922). Most observers of our three societies agree that this sort of polarization has been diminishing during the past half century as the lines between blue-collar and white-collar occupations and between urban and rural culture have softened and class, religious and ethnic identities have blurred. Social conflicts contribute not only to integrative processes in social systems but also to learning processes. They inform societies about their choices. The number of possible choices being overwhelming, societies must establish "a hierarchy of relevance," giving more attention to some choices than to others, thereby sharpening 225

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the resulting conflicts. The relevance assigned to particular issues can be measured empirically, for instance by content analysis of the mass media. Changes in the hierarchy of relevance seldom occur because conflicts are resolved; typically, old conflicts are displaced by new ones that have attracted the attention of the public. Although empirical data are scanty, we think that we are seeing that traditional religious and industrial conflicts, and conflicts about the legitimacy of political institutions, are fading away, while new conflicts are assuming importance. Among these are conflicts between work and welfare systems, between educational and industrial values, between ecological and economic goals, gender-role conflicts, and a conflict between industrialized and developing societies. Some other general remarks about social conflict may be in order. Without social interaction, there can be no social conflict. With an increasing volume of interaction, the potential for social conflict must increase too. In today's world, which has developed a global division of labour, a global balance of power, and the rudiments of a global culture, there are innumerable differences of interest that might generate conflict, but relatively few that actually do so. The reasons are evident. Social .conflict carries both direct costs - in human energy and material resources - and the indirect costs of disrupted routines and foregone opportunities. As a society increases in size and complexity, both kinds of costs grow disproportionately, so that it may not be able to support as much internal strife now as in former times, when it was less developed. On the other hand, the integrative and learning functions of conflict are so essential to modernization that despotic regimes that attempt to suppress internal conflict generally fail to achieve their modernization goals. THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Successfully modernizing societies require a large, aggregate volume of conflict, but since violent conflict is very costly for them, they are driven perforce toward nonviolent modes, such as lobbying and litigation. Their technology of violence has developed to a degree of destructiveness that strictly forbids its application. In this sense, it can be said that only underdeveloped or developing countries can afford civil wars or guerrilla movements under current conditions. These observations are consistent with Norbert Elias's (1978) proposition that the progress of civilization constrains individuals and organizations to refrain from violent action and reinforces the state's monopoly on legitimate violence. There are several important exceptions to the general trend of diminishing violence in advanced industrial societies. In the first place, the trend does not seem to affect the criminal underworlds that flourish in metropolitan cities, particularly in the United States. Rates of violent crime oscillate with the size of successive cohorts 226

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of underprivileged male adolescents, but the incidence of murder, robbery, and rape, which rose sharply after 1960 in the United States, showed no definite trend in France or Germany. It can be argued that most of this violence is confined to segregated urban sectors that resemble underdeveloped societies in having low incomes, poor living conditions, and limited opportunities, but that is not entirely persuasive. An alternative interpretation is that criminal underworlds are created, for the most part, by inept public policies, such as the welfare measures that promote single-parent families and the law-enforcement practices that make drug-related crimes uniquely profitable in the U.S. By establishing specifically criminogenic conditions within circumscribed areas, the state inadvertently counteracts the society-wide tendency to reduced violence. The other major exception to the trend of diminishing violence in recent decades is a dramatic increase in the scale and lethality of the means of violence monopolized by the state. Governments that regard flogging as excessively inhumane plan for the nuclear massacre of entire populations with perfect equanimity. The inhibitions that restrain the internal use of violence by the state do not apply to external use, and while systems of mutual deterrence have protected the major industrial powers from each other for almost half a century, they have not prevented those powers from conducting or sponsoring military operations in dozens of Third World countries, from Korea to Iraq. Another apparent exception to the downward trend of violence is the rioting that breaks out in the advanced industrial nations from time to time: the quasirevolutionary riots of the 1960s, the anti-nuclear demonstrations of the 1970s, the ecological protests of the 1980s, neo-Nazi activity in Germany in the 1990s. But although these episodes of political theatre are cloaked in the rhetoric of violence, they seldom involve any large-scale damage. The displacement of violence by other modes of conflict resolution in the advanced industrial societies in the second half of the twentieth century seems to be self-evident. The bloody and protracted strikes of the previous era have virtually disappeared, and there is strong normative pressure to reduce violence in family life, in schools, in the workplace, and in politics. In the private sphere, the falling incidence of violence is accompanied by increasing recognition of it, creating the illusion, for example, that wife beating has increased, whereas the practice has almost certainly declined. As far as public violence is concerned, Germany illustrates the recent tendency most dramatically. Between 1918 and 1945, its history was marked by attempted revolutions, street fighting between right- and left-wing gangs during the Weimar era, state-sponsored terrorism during the Nazi era, and the general collapse of internal order in the last days of the Second World War. The current episodes of public violence have been incomparably less intense. 227

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To be more specific, data on German conflict events from the Yale World Data Programme show that rioting occurred frequently between 1948 and 1952, when institutionalized conflict regulation was still weak, declined sharply afterwards, then rose to new peaks with the student and anti-authoritarian demonstrations of 1968-72 and the anti-nuclear and Green demonstrations of 1978-82. During these three periods, the incidence of conflict events in Germany somewhat exceeded the average incidence in 15 democratic countries. Otherwise, the Federal Republic lies around the middle of the range; in general, smaller countries show lower conflict frequencies. Only about 4% of recent political demonstrations included any violent activity at all. The French and American trends have been roughly parallel, except that the frequent and protracted strikes that interrupted public services in France during the 1950s and 1960s have become brief and rare and the incidence of labour-related violence in the U.S. has declined almost to the vanishing point. Some important mass protests occurred in France over educational and regional issues in the 1980s, but they were essentially nonviolent. In the U.S., there were dozens of large-scale race riots, involving considerable violence, during the summers of the late 1960s. Since then, the occasional outbreaks of racial violence have been small-scale, except for the great Los Angeles riot of 1991, which so far has not elicited any imitation. COMPARING CULTURES OF CONFLICT

Conflict and conflict resolution are inseparable. Every conflict involves explicit or implicit expectations about how it will be resolved, and the scenario of a conflict is often dictated by an available mode of conflict resolution. Viewed abstractly, violence is a basic mode of conflict resolution. Two other modes, in Albert Hirschmann's (1970) useful terms, are "exit" and "voice". Exit resolves the conflict by disrupting or suspending the relationship between contending parties. Voice attempts to resolve the conflict by verbal persuasion directed at antagonists, third parties, or both. Different cultures exhibit different patterns of conflict resolution. Strangely enough, American culture seems to emphasize all three modes. There is a strong tradition in the U.S. of violent conflict, including armed clashes between strikers and strike-breakers, lynchings, race riots, and violent social movements, but there is an equally strong tradition of exit in the same pattern - pulling up stakes and leaving town. There is no European society in which social relationships can be so easily dissolved by either party. But voice, too, seems to be specially cultivated in the United States as a mode of conflict resolution, whether as oratory, advertising, debate, or negotiation. In no other country would a small group of friends coming together to pursue a hobby be likely to adopt the full panoply of parliamentary procedure enshrined in Robert's 228

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Rules of Order. In the U.S., they do so as a matter of course. A perceptive foreign observer, Michel Crozier, comments on the importance given to negotiation by American labour leaders: In the American working world of 1947, by contrast, speaking up and negotiating came to the same thing. There was no speech in the abstract; you always spoke to someone, in this case to the boss. Americans had a perhaps naive but marvelously human confidence in the power of speech: as long as you keep talking, you're bound to find a solution. The bosses, naturally, do not want to listen. That's what makes them such bastards. But make them listen and things will work out. After all, they're not monsters. (Crozier, 1984: 4)

Is there, in the American tradition, really more violence, more exit, and more voice - in short, more conflict to be resolved - than in Europe? If so, why? One possible explanation is that conflict in Europe was traditionally resolved by the intervention of a higher authority, a feudal ruler or the national state. But there were no feudal rulers in the United States, and the authority of the national government was until recently much more limited than that of any European state. In America, both conflict and conflict resolution were distributed more "equally"; when authority was needed, a voluntary association was formed to exercise it. As Tocqueville noted, "Wherever, at the head of some new undertaking, you see the government in France, or a man of rank in England, in the United States you will be sure to find an association" (Tocqueville, 1838). It fits this picture that in our own times, Americans resort to litigation to settle many conflicts which, in France or Germany, would be resolved administratively. In contrast, the European tradition regards the resolution of conflict as an administrative function of the state. Until very recently, European governments exercised much broader powers than the American federal government, and consequently provoked much more resentment and resistance. Moreover, European states were, to varying degrees, authoritarian; they attempted not only to regulate but to suppress conflict, thereby creating additional conflicts. Within the European pattern, there are remarkable variations. In the tradition of the grand revolution, France developed the paradoxical institution of "legitimized insurrection" (Mendras, 1988: 134). This scenario of direct democracy is recognized and well understood by the political class in France: de Gaulle took the 1968 student riots as a signal to abdicate, and the student riots of 1984 and 1986 vetoed the educational plans of the government. Germans have no recollection of a really successful - and therefore historically legitimized - mass insurrection, except for the very recent "November Revolution" in East Germany (1989). On the contrary, the abortive uprisings that occurred under the Weimar Republic are remembered as preparing the way for the Third Reich, and 229

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there was nothing glorious about the episodes of violence that accompanied Hitler's rise to power. Thus, the founding fathers of the Federal Republic of Germany, in devising mechanisms for the regulation of conflict, faced a dilemma: the new state should be strong enough to suppress violent struggles of the kind that had undermined the Weimar Republic, but it should avoid the populist and authoritarian elements of the Nazi Reich. Streitbare Demokratie became the watchword of the new state. In German history, it is not only political violence that has an unfavourable image, but political conflict in general. Parliamentary democracy and its mechanisms for regulating conflict are not associated, in Germany's collective memory, with nation-building and industrialization, achievements of Bismarck's authoritarian regime, which nationalized essential industries like railroads and public utilities while protecting capitalist entrepreneurs and the working class from each other. Social security and unemployment insurance were unique inventions of German authoritarianism. The classes and groups involved in German industrialization did not see themselves as oppressed by the state - as in France - or as largely independent of the state - as in the United States - but as supported by it. The idea that the state should take care of all groups and suppress intergroup conflict was reinforced by the negative experience of the Weimar Republic, which was not really accepted by traditional elites and was too weak to keep peace among important right-wing and left-wing groups. National Socialism, by trying to re-establish national consensus, finally liberated Germany from the dream of a conflict-free society under the protection of a strong and benevolent ruler. To sum up: after the Second World War, our three societies started from quite different traditions of conflict regulation. In the United States, the ubiquity of social conflict was taken for granted: all three modes of conflict resolution were widely practised. When the federal government intervened in major conflicts, as it did with increasing frequency after 1945, its purpose was to regulate rather than suppress the conflict, and in many instances it threw its weight to the weaker side. In Europe, on the other hand, the suppression of social conflict was one of the major responsibilities of the national state. While French attitudes toward social conflict were profoundly ambivalent, torn between admiration for effective authority and the glorification of revolution, Germany had a tradition of close collaboration between social classes and the state and a strong distaste for class conflict. These cultural differences have been eroded by recent developments. In the United States, the role of the federal government in the regulation of conflict now resembles that of its European counterparts. The deregulation movement of the 1980s did not interrupt the steady expansion of federal functions, and the economic consequences of deregulation were so disastrous that the movement is unlikely to 230

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recover in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, European states have been evolving in the opposite direction by transferring functions from the state to voluntary associations and local authorities. The regulation of conflict is increasingly a matter for organized interest groups. In this respect, Germany seems to be more Americanized than France. One comparative study of parallel legislative initiatives to humanize working conditions in the two countries attributes the failure of the initiative in France to the inability of French trade unions and entrepreneurs to come to agreement on their own (Gottelmann, 1983). The relatively slower acceptance of decentralized conflict regulation in France is explained in part by the great social distances between government agencies, trade associations, labour unions, and interest groups. Some political scientists speak of the "fragmented pluralism" of France, in contrast to the "integrated pluralism" of the United States and the Federal Republic (Lehmbruch, 1984). However, the German version of integrated pluralism is clearly more integrated than the American. Co-operation between opposing interest groups is more firmly institutionalized in Germany, although whether that co-operation can withstand the strains introduced by reunification remains an open question. The convergence of conflict-regulating processes in these three societies should not be misinterpreted as the disappearance of their special traditions - administrative centralization in France, the collaboration of interest groups with the state in Germany, self-regulation by voluntary associations in the United States. These are still in evidence, though modified by the trends described above. A common recent development in the three societies is a greater acceptance of the legitimacy of intergroup conflict, and a recognition of its positive functions. The attitude that social conflict is a normal and necessary feature of complex societies presupposes a trend toward the moderation of conflict and the substitution of voice for exit and violence. It is instructive to see how this has occurred in a number of different conflict arenas. CLASS STRUGGLE AND LEGITIMACY CONFLICTS

When the factory system appeared on the European stage, the opposition between capitalists and industrial workers became entangled with the pre-existing opposition of the old feudal class and the bourgeoisie. In France, the revolution of 1789 united the new proletarians, the urban artisans, and part of the peasantry with the rising bourgeoisie against the landowning aristocrats and the remainder of the peasantry. This configuration persisted through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth at every level of social organization: republicans against monarchists, rationalism against religion, collectivism against individualism, workers against patrons. The congruence of several lines of conflict divided the country into two almost separate parts with incompatible standards of political legitimacy, les deux Frances, 231

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dramatized in the Dreyfus Affair. It took a long time for the French working class to acquire an identity strong enough to introduce industrial class conflict in the proper sense into the picture, and the effort was never completely successful. The earlier conflict about the political, religious, and philosophical character of the state continued to reassert itself periodically, as during the prolonged crisis over Algerian independence. It is not totally extinguished yet. But the very fact of that deep rift in the society favoured the concentration of state power. The state, whether controlled by the right or the left, had to be strong in order to prevail over its internal enemies and to unite the two halves of the society against external threats. Germany, although a late-comer to national unity and industrialization, could rely on the integrating force of nationalism as well. Its working class developed later but grew faster than that of France. From the beginning, the effort to mobilize German workers for the class struggle was weakened by their respect for authority in general and for state authority in particular. Eventually, the working class formed an unacknowledged coalition with the old feudal class, which controlled the apparatus of the state and could protect them from unrestricted capitalist exploitation. This alliance was not incompatible with the German variant of the socialist vision: property rights would be taken away from the bourgeoisie and handed over to the state, which would not shed any of its authority in becoming socialist and democratic. The class struggle in Germany was not about the distribution of economic resources but about the legitimacy of the social order. In that respect, it resembled the French situation, but with far more emphasis on the industrial class struggle. Having no feudal order to overthrow, the United States did not experience the legitimacy conflicts so familiar to Europeans. The deepest American divisions were ethnic, and they were inextricably entwined with the contending sovereignty claims of the federal government and the states. These questions divided the Constitutional Convention of 1787, defined the politics of the Jacksonian era, and led directly to the Civil War, in which slavery and federal sovereignty were equal and inseparable issues. Similar issues continue to dominate American politics to this day. The ethnic issues include not only the relative status of whites and blacks, but of early-comers and late-comers, natives and immigrants, angles and Hispanics, even Protestants and Catholics. The supremacy of the federal government was firmly established in 1865, but the scope of federal authority is still an unsettled question. In general, Republicans win elections by promising to reduce it; Democrats win elections by offering to enlarge it. When industrial class conflict first appeared on the American scene, in the late nineteenth century, it had a distinctly ethnic character: virtually all of the capitalists were descendants of early British immigrants, virtually all of the workers were recent immigrants from other parts of Europe. The early labour movement was stigmatized as radical and un-American. It gained some footholds in heavy industry but never 232

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attracted widespread public support, and it was eventually suppressed when both federal and state governments sided with the business interests. The agrarian and populist movement of the same period was more successful, but it too was eventually suppressed by the same coalition. When large-scale labour organization finally came to the United States in the New Deal of the 1930s, it was made possible by a vast and controversial expansion of federal authority. Most of the recent social movements that have transformed American society since 1960 have remained focused on the same pair of issues: the relative status of ethnic groups and the proper limits of federal authority (Caplow, 1991: 201-213). What happened to the French and German conflicts about the legitimacy of the political and economic order? In West Germany, just after the Second World War, the authoritarian legacy, although deeply discredited, was still supported by about 15% of the electorate who voted for right-wing parties, and by about 6% who voted communist, By the end of the 1950s, the extremist parties had disappeared from the federal parliament. The Social Democrats, in the Godesberger programme of 1959, abandoned the goal of a socialist economy, substituting a "social market economy" and the integration of the Federal Republic into the Western bloc system. The trade unions also gradually ceased to advocate a collectivist reorganization of the economy. Opinion polls show a long-term, continuously increasing acceptance of the market economy and of parliamentary institutions; this consensus has been marred symbolically - though not statistically - by the recent resurgence of the extreme right. The development of a political consensus in France has been more uneven. The politics of the Fifth Republic have been dominated by recollection of the dangerous instability that characterized the Fourth Republic. Given the impossibility of doing away with the multi-party system in the Chamber of Deputies, that body has been bypassed by the installation of a very strong president, elected under a system that reduces party influence in the final run-off. By this means, the extremist parties of both left and right, which still have substantial followings, are virtually excluded from the determination of national policy. In France as in Germany, the legitimacy of the political and economic order is no longer seriously challenged, either in politics or in labour relations. The class struggle has become obsolete in the face of the nearly unanimous commitment to democratic and market institutions. By contrast, some observers see an erosion of the American commitment to the same institutions. Sidney Verba wrote, in The Civic Culture Revisited, In the United States and Britain, the nations in which we found such [civic] attitudes, [supportive of a democratic political system] to be widespread (around 1960), there has been a steady erosion of confidence in the government. We had assumed that other nations might move in the "civic" direction of the United States

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and Britain; in fact, the latter two nations moved away from that position. (Verba and Almond, 1980: 399)

A decline of confidence in the Congress, the executive branch, and the courts, recorded by annual General Social Survey since 1972, and a decline in voter participation that began around 1960 are unmistakeable, but it is not at all certain that these trends reflect a real decline in the American public's commitment to democratic and market institutions. On both the left and the right, fewer voices now clamour for basic change in American institutions than at any time during the past 200 years. The people are dissatisfied but not at all rebellious. There seems to be neither tradition nor future for legitimacy conflicts in the U.S., and West European countries today resemble the U.S. in this regard. In Germany and France - and in Japan, Spain, Italy, and Scandinavia - the old issues of legitimacy are in abeyance. What about the other perennial types of conflict: religious, industrial, ethnic, and international? TRADITIONAL CONFLICTS IN TRANSITION

The old religious conflicts - clericalism versus laicism in France, Protestantism versus Catholicism in Germany, denominational competition in the United States, and the several versions of anti-Semitism that flourished in these countries - have almost disappeared. However, there are new religious conflicts here and there - the essentially religious abortion controversy in the United States, the anti-Muslim movement in France, and, of course, the growing menace of Islamic fundamentalism, directed not so much against Christianity as against the Western democracies. Industrial conflict too has changed but not disappeared. For more than a hundred years, the conflict between industrial workers and industrial owners, envisaged as the last and most important of class struggles, occupied the centre of European politics and the periphery of American politics. The frame of reference proposed by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto had a powerful grip on both their followers and their adversaries; it survived the rise and fall of fascism and the manifest failures of state socialism. After the Second World War, however, a growing gap developed between the theory of the class struggle and the actual course of labour-management relations in Germany, France, and the United States. The theory was undermined by a spectacular rise in the wages and living standards of industrial workers; by increasing differentiation within the working class with respect to qualifications and earnings; by an influx of women, guest, and minority workers; by a massive shift from blue-collar to white-collar employment; by the automation of dirty and dangerous jobs; by state regulation of working conditions; by the bureaucratization of trade unions; and by various forms of worker participation in the ownership and management of industrial enterprises. With these developments, the key concepts of the class struggle, exploitation and class solidarity, lost much of their relevance, and 234

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political parties dedicated to the class struggle lost most of their members, although they remain much more important in France than in Germany or the United States. Industrial conflict in these three societies became routinized and less dramatic. The number and importance of strikes declined. Changes in wages and working conditions are now negotiated at set intervals by skilled representatives of labour and management who share the same professional habits (and work under government oversight). Most industrial issues are local rather than national: displacement of workers by plant closings, discrimination in hiring and promotion, wage differentials among job categories, health insurance, and pension plans. In West Germany, due to the traditionally favourable attitudes of workers toward authority and the establishment of co-determination in the 1950s, there is a workingclass elite that shares in the mangement of enterprises and is particularly well placed for negotiation. As in other countries, the number of negotiable issues - job security, retirement planning, automation, training and retraining, implementation of general agreements on the plant level — has been increasing, and the existence of facilities for negotiation has the effect of raising new issues and creating new conflicts, which are then resolved in more negotiation. As Simmel (1922) observed, conflict and consensus develop together. German co-determination provides perhaps the clearest example of how the class struggle has been converted into numerous small conflicts that integrate more than they divide. The same effect has been achieved in France and in the United States by routinization of labour-management negotiations, professionalization of the negotiators, and increasing participation of the state, either as an interested-party or as a neutral arbiter. The interested-party role is more salient in France, where the state manages major enterprises and assumes responsibility for the economy as a whole. The neutral-arbiter role is more important in the United States, where all collective bargaining is supervised by federal agencies and a great many labourmanagement disputes give rise to litigation. The conventional view of the state as an instrument of the ruling class does not square with either of these roles as presently enacted. Complex systems of influence involving money and votes make government representatives responsive to the interests of both labour and management. They may tilt a little toward labour under a Socialist president in France, or toward management under a Republican president in the U.S., but tilting too far invites reprisal at the next election, and the agents of government share with the agents of labour and management a set of understandings about the need for compromise and the importance of the long view. These common understandings sometimes break down, but the development of an irreconcilable conflict anywhere in the system is not heard as a call to battle but as a signal to reorganize so that negotiations can resume. The class struggle, conceived as a zero-sum game played by capitalists and workers for the control of the state, has been transformed into a set of non-zero-sum 235

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games with more modest payoffs, conducted under the supervision of a more or less impartial state. By contrast, ethnic conflict has been sharpening in France and, to a lesser degree, in Germany, as the native-born children of Muslim guest workers form minority groups that are visibly separate from the rest of the population. In the United States, the ethnic conflicts that have loomed large on the political scene for the past 40 years show no sign of winding down, despite the massive efforts of federal, state, and local governments to remove the disadvantages of minority groups by vigorous enforcement of civil rights; by mandating the desegregation of schools, workplaces, public facilities, and voluntary associations; and by the preferential treatment of minority persons in competitive situations (Caplow, 1991: 185-200). These measures have been partly frustrated by two demographic trends - the enormous expansion of the Hispanic minority by legal and illegal immigration and by high fertility; and the sharply rising illegitimacy rate of the black population, which means that most black children are now born to unmarried mothers and raised in poverty without a father or stepfather. Despite the emergence of a large, prosperous, well-educated black middle class, the failure of expectations for the remainder of the black population has sown deep resentment among them, while the high concentration of crime and social disorder in the black underclass has revived some of the white racist attitudes that had apparently been overcome. International conflict has been, of course, the principal scourge of the industrial societies in this century, and not class antagonism. It was nationalism and national antagonism that changed the world. The great hope of European socialists, at the beginning of the century, that class solidarity based on class struggle would prevent national wars proved terribly wrong (Caplow, 1989: 65-66). The First World War not only inflicted grave damage on the participants but destroyed the international system that had maintained a degree of stability in the world since the Congress of Vienna. It led to the continual troubles of the interwar period and then to the vast destruction of the Second World War and the division of the industrial world into two hostile camps with competing economic and political systems. Over 40 years, national struggles were replaced by ideological confrontation. No shots were exchanged between the major antagonists, but their relations were so far from peaceful that each felt constrained to develop weapons capable of obliterating entire nations. And although they were deterred from direct action against each other, they were free to engage in military adventures in places such as Vietnam and Afghanistan, to sponsor more than a hundred regional and civil wars, and to arm unreliable client states all over the world. There may be some subterranean connection between the declining tolerance of violence within these national societies and their hyperdevelopment of violent means for external use, but that mystery lies outside the scope of this essay. What is 236

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important for our present discussion is that there has been so little dissent about military policies that seem irrational on their face: the investment of enormous resources in weapons that put humanity itself at risk in order to repel an invasion of Germany by Russia that had became strategically implausible by the end of the 1950s, after the People's Republic of China broke with the Soviet Union and the United States targeted Soviet territory with thousands of nuclear missiles. Although the Federal Republic was not directly involved in nuclear-weapons development, it was a major participant in NATO, maintained a mass army, and shared with the United States control of a nuclear arsenal. Although there was a minority opposition in the Federal Republic to the nuclear aspects of the NATO scenario, in which Germany was the chosen battleground, the general policy of remilitarization went virtually unopposed. It was not until the late 1970s that the new Green Party, some Social Democrats, and a strong peace movement turned against the escalating arms race. In France, after the rejection of the EOF project in 1954, popular support for the development of the nuclear force de frappe was virtually unanimous; there was no anti-nuclear movement to speak of. Similarly, American defence policy was supported by both major parties and by the overwhelming majority of the public. There was a moderately strong anti-nuclear movement, whose influence peaked in the 1970s, but it advocated a nuclear freeze rather than nuclear disarmament and had no appreciable effect on defence policy (although it was able to obstruct and finally halt the development of the nuclear-power industry). In all three societies, the absence of serious debate about defence policy may be taken as another indication of the nearly unanimous consensus that now supports the legitimacy of the state, or, to put it differently, another indication of the disappearance of class conflict. AFTER CLASS CONFLICT: THE EMERGENCE OF NEW CONFLICTS

As we see it, class conflict has broken down both nationally and internationally. Historically, it was no more than an intermezzo. What will come after it? Two events in the former Soviet imperium leave no doubt. As a principle for organizing society, it is again the concept of nation, with its connotations of freedom and democracy, that has triumphed over that of class. Thus, conflicts between nations and/or between nations and supranational political entities, market interests, and value systems will be on the agenda for the coming decades. These conflicts will remind us, to some degree, of traditional national antagonisms, but they will be basically different for at least two reasons. There is a deep-rooted experience of nationalistic exaggeration and failure in central Europe, particularly in Germany, and there is the challenge of global problems that invite supranational solutions. These problems result from the success, not the failure, of industrial societies, compared to all previous societies, in increasing material and cultural well-being. 237

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They bring about new conflicts, which are exclusively the products of mature industrial societies. Today's salient political conflicts are defined not by antagonistic classes but by competing necessities. Cross-cutting older social cleavages, they make class and traditional conflicts obsolete. The Conflict Between Work System and Welfare System

As broader segments of the population came to share the achievement orientation that was once the exclusive prerogative of the bourgeoisie, the work system has become increasingly rewarding to qualified and motivated people. But it rejects a growing number of people who, for one reason or another, can not meet its performance standards. Modern industrial economies have a perennial shortage of the former and a perpetual surplus of the latter. There is chronic unemployment and unemployability at the bottom of the occupational scale even under the most favourable economic conditions. A large segment of the adult population is economically worthless; the cost of employing them, even at subsistence wages, is more than their labour is worth. They are supported in a welfare system by the contributions of those who have found a place in the work system. In our three societies today, the major political parties are structured by the opposed interests of the work system and the welfare system. Liberal-conservative parties, supporting achievement values, try to establish optimal conditions for the work system and protect the income and property rights derived from it. Socialists and Social Democrats in France and Germany, and Democrats and some liberal Republicans in the United States, promote the welfare system in the name of social justice. The alternation between left-centre and rightcentre governments that is characteristic of modern democracies reflects trial and error in balancing the interests of the work and welfare systems. The Conflict Between Educational and Industrial Values

Another aspect of the rising level of occupational qualification in advanced industrial societies that are increasingly dependent on high technology is the expansion of higher education and the opposition that tends to develop between the values it fosters and the values built into the work system. All three societies greatly expanded their universities between 1960 and 1975. An unanticipated result was the rise of a cohort of highly educated young people who, unlike preceding cohorts of university students, represented a cross-section of the entire population and did not identify with established elites. They created their own youth culture, focused on the values of freedom, equality, spontaneity, and self-direction. On behalf of those values, derived directly or indirectly from exposure to the university curriculum, they attacked the political and industrial values of authority, efficiency, and order, and challenged the 238

Conflicts

structure of authority in universities, churches, parliaments, and factories. Although the young intellectuals of 1968 sought solidarity with the working class, they did not achieve it. Trade-union leaders, fearing anarchy, supported authority against the young rebels. And as the first cohorts of degree-holders produced by mass higher education matured in the labour force, they took their places on the upper reaches of the occupational ladder and moved toward the political centre, while retaining some trace of their youthful beliefs. The nuances were a little different in each country. The American student revolt that began with the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1965 was grounded on opposition to the Vietnam war but included a general rejection of established authority and conventional behaviour. In Germany, the student revolt was more pointedly directed against officials attempting to enact their traditional roles. In France, in May of 1968 and for some time thereafter, the student movement aimed for a grand revolution in the style of 1789, and attracted enough support from other sectors of the population to make that goal momentarily plausible. The Conflict Between Ecological and Economic Values

The replacement of the industrial class struggle by newer forms of contention shows even more clearly in the opposition between ecology and technology that came to public awareness in the 1970s and gathered strength in the 1980s as the legitimate offshoot of the opposition between the educational system and the work system. It originally had the same configuration: young and highly educated protesters challenging an entrenched establishment. But in this case, the protesters attracted such broad support that ecological values were eventually accepted by nearly everyone in Germany, by a large part of the American population, and by a growing minority in France. Nevertheless, when specific ecological issues affect the economic interests of managers and workers, in the chemical industry for example, they generally prefer their own interests over ecological concerns, such as protection of endangered species, that they regard as exaggerated. The opposition between ecological and economic values came to prominence first in the United States, where voluntary associations such as the Sierra Club and the Audobon Society had been defending wilderness areas against encroachment since the turn of the century But most of the current ecological issues emerged in the 1960s and 1970: domestic ones, such as air quality, polluted rivers, toxic waste, ocean dumping, endangered species, acid rain, radon, toxic fertilizers, overfishing, and the preservation of wetlands, and global ones, such as ozone depletion, greenhouse gases, species extinction, and tropical deforestation. The numerous voluntary associations formed in the U.S. to combat these dangers have grown rapidly in size and influence, but they have not combined into a unified movement 239

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(Caplow, 1991: 208-211). No environmental bloc has formed in national politics, although about 30 major environmental statutes have been passed by Congress since 1970. Each issue is debated ad hoc and resolved separately. The environmental platforms of the two major parties are bland and indistinguishable. In West Germany, on the other hand, ecological issues were politicized as soon as they entered the public domain. At the beginning, the groups that placed themselves on the left of the political spectrum - in terms of the industrial class struggle - seized on these issues with the hope of revitalizing themselves. But it soon became clear that ecological concerns cut across the old lines and tended to undermine the old left. The Greens, founded in 1979, established themselves almost overnight as a legitimate political party with substantial voting strength. At first, they tried to reinforce their ecological position with a legitimacy issue, calling for "basic democracy" as an alternative to parliamentary democracy. But this approach was soon abandoned - another indicator of the difficulty of reanimating legitimacy conflicts. In France, the ecological movement was weak until very recently, when it suddenly became a force to be reckoned with. The distance between the old political left and the new ecological movement is even more evident than in Germany. French Greens are more pragmatic, even technocratically minded. Gender-Role Conflict

In all three of our societies, the women's movement introduced another set of issues that tended to supersede class conflict. Thanks to new birth-control technologies that became available after 1960, childbearing became largely elective. Concurrently, married women entered the labour force in larger numbers than ever before; by 1990, the majority of women with young children in these societies were employed outside the home and fertility had declined to unprecedented lows: far below zero population growth in Germany, slightly below in the United States, slightly above in France. The women's movement, and the several versions of feminism it proposed, offered new social values that responded to the changed situation of women and the changed relationship between the sexes. The stigma was removed from unmarried cohabitation and unmarried motherhood. The number of illegitimate births and single-parent families rose more in the U.S. than in Germany, and more in Germany than in France. Among black Americans, about two thirds of all babies have no recognized fathers. In all three societies, the obligation of men to support women and children has been attenuated without a corresponding reduction of women's responsibilities for child care, although some role-sharing does occur in two-parent families and daycare facilities for the children of working mothers have been vastly expanded. Women have gained access to many occupations formerly monopolized by men, 240

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including supervisory and managerial positions, although their average earnings remain much lower. Finally, women now claim as much sexual freedom as men and exercise it liberally. The conflict here should not be misconstrued as a war between the sexes. Whether the changes wrought by the women's movement are more advantageous for men or for women is a debatable, and perhaps unanswerable, question. It is true that men have lost domestic authority and their virtual monopoly of the public sphere. But they have also shed many of their former obligations and improved their sexual opportunities. Opinion surveys generally show about as much support for feminist values among men especially younger men, as among women. The significant opposition is not between men and women, but between old and new gender roles. Love and parenthood now fall within a political spectrum whose right wing preaches a modified version of traditional values - marital fidelity, dual parenthood, male dominance in the public sphere, and female dominance in the private sphere - and whose left wing demands the absolute equality of the sexes and regards the Rights of Man and Our Father in Heaven as sexist concepts. The centre is thoroughly confused. For activists at both extremes, this conflict takes precedence over any other and makes the traditional class struggle irrelevant. The differences among our three societies with respect to this issue are differences of degree, not of kind. The equalization of the sexes is somewhat further advanced in Germany than in the United States, and much further advanced in the United States than in France, but the direction is the same. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST SOCIETIES

The aftermath of the Second World War had the unexpected effect of undermining the class struggle in the capitalist societies. It was partly a matter of hostility toward an out-group promoting internal solidarity, but the effect was more complex. Only by comparing themselves with socialist societies did the Western capitalist societies discover how successful they had been in producing economic well-being. Thus, the East-West conflict gave the classes of our three societies a common interest in defending their high standard of living against potential attacks from the East. And only by contrast to the authoritarian "people's democracies" did the political arrangements of the Western democracies acquire the unquestioned legitimacy they now enjoy - a legitimacy quite incompatible with older notions of class conflict. From the perspective of the person in the street, the proletarian triumph achieved in the socialist world had brought less economic welfare and less freedom than the preservation of classes. The political lesson was clear. Indeed, it was so clear that it may have been learned too well. Astonishingly, the poor almost ceased to grumble about the rich. The malefactors of great wealth, 241

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as Theodore Roosevelt called them, enjoyed virtual immunity from criticism in these societies after 1975, if they stayed within the nominal bounds of the law. This was most striking in the United States, where the Reagan administration, frankly solicitous of millionaires, was able to slash the taxes of rich families and corporations without arousing any significant resistance, and capped the achievement with an income-tax schedule that set a lower tax rate for high-income than middle-income families. In Germany, where a third of all households are reported to have a net worth of more than a million marks and poverty has been virtually abolished, the rich so greatly outnumber the poor that any attack on wealth has an undemocratic ring. The French are less complacent in this regard, but under a Socialist president, they too have provided inherited and accumulated wealth with a more favourable climate than at any time since 1848. In the United States, this complacency has already proved costly. The unbridled speculation of the 1980s ruined the savings banks and cost taxpayers many billions of dollars. In Germany and France, the party is still in full swing. The disappearance of the class struggle having coincided with victory in the Cold War, the institutions of the Western democracies are accepted as wise and benevolent, even when they plainly are not. In Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific Rim, Utopia is here and now, and the goal of many societies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia is to follow the same path and arrive at the same place. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES AND THE REST

Not only the class struggle but the competition between capitalism and socialism has become obsolete. In their place is a new and overwhelming difference of interest between the advanced industrial societies and the rest of the world. Like the opposition between the work and welfare systems, this is an opposition between insiders and outsiders. The insiders include the entire population of the industrial societies, those in the welfare system as well as those in the work system, and the outsiders are the entire populations, barring a privileged few, of the countries that have remained agrarian or failed to industrialize successfully. On the international scene, the principal opposition is no longer betweem competing ideologies but between high and low levels of living. The nations with relatively low levels of living fall into several categories, with dissimilar situations: . State socialist nations, with failed or partly failed industrial economies. They account for about a third of the world's population and more than half of its armed forces. Some of them - the ex-Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria - have begun to forsake state socialism in search of a new model. Others - Cuba, Albania, Vietnam - have so far refused that 242

Conflicts

option. The situation of China is too uncertain to characterize. East Germany was removed from this category by its merger with the Federal Republic. . Black African nations, with predominantly agrarian economies and authoritarian regimes. In the 1980s, some of these moved backwards with respect to indicators of modernization. . India, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Indonesia. These five large, heavily populated nations are partly industrialized, contain some of the world's largest cities, and have recently made striking economic progress. But they have high rates of population growth, very unequal income distributions, and extensive poverty. Many of the island nations of the Caribbean and the Pacific show similar patterns on a smaller scale. . Scattered around the world are desperately poor countries, such as Bangladesh. Haiti, Bolivia, Mozambique, Nepal, and New Guinea, and others torn by internal dissension, such as South Africa, Ceylon, El Salvador, Chad, the Philippines, Afghanistan, and Lebanon, in which modernization has been decisively interrupted. . The nations of the Mideast display striking contrasts of wealth and poverty among themselves and internally as well._ Taken as a whole, the region claims a disproportionate share of the world's wealth in return for its oil, but still makes millions of its people live under pre-industrial conditions. As this brief listing suggests, the simple picture of a global conflict between North and South, between the industrialized haves and the agrarian havenots, does not fit the current situation. There are major concentrations of high technology and industrial wealth outside of the European orbit, major failures of of modernization within that orbit, and all sorts of mixed outcomes among the world's 200 independent nations. But there is clearly a potential conflict between the areas of rapid population growth - Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia - and the areas of zero or negative population growth - Europe and North America. Under today's conditions, the least modernized populations generally have very high rates of population growth, while the fertility of the most modernized populations has fallen below the replacement level. The general effect is to lower the living standards of very poor countries faster than modernization can raise them and to attract as many immigrants to rich countries as they are willing to admit. The immigrants are exploited initially but eventually prosper, while the native-born, especially those of lower status, feel threatened by the influx. In the Federal Republic, it was low-income people who expressed hostility toward Turkish guest workers, and who now resent the arriving East Germans and German-speaking immigrants from Poland and the Soviet Union. There has been a similar reaction in France, where Le Pen's right-wing movement, motivated largely by hostility toward Muslim immigrants from North Africa, draws most of its support from low-income workers. In the United States, the opposition of organized labour to immigration has 243

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been a fact of political life for more than a century, and the attitude of urban blacks to Hispanic and Asian immigrants is fairly hostile. But it is perhaps more significant that resistance of this type is usually futile. The immigrants eventually find places in the host society, and their children are likely to join what Ralf Dahrendorf calls the majority class. There are many differences between [the members of industrialized societies] including inequalities of wealth and income, but there is also a fundamental equality of access. The new class is the citizen's class, or at any rate the majority class. A chapter of social and political history which began with a profound and potentially revolutionary class struggle led after many travails to the calmer conflicts of institutionalized or democratic antagonisms of class, and eventually resulted in the creation of a majority class of those who belong and can therefore hope to realize many of their aspirations without fundamental change. (Dahrendorf, 1988: 112)

For reasons that are not very well understood, this beneficent mechanism does not always work for internal migrants, such as the blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans who migrate to metropolitan cities in the United States but remain disadvantaged afterwards. Their grievances against the majority are more commonly expressed by street crime, gang warfare, and dependency than by organized resistance. The radical student movement of the 1960s attempted to politicize underclass grievances and to create a revolutionary front that identified capitalism, racism, and colonialism as aspects of the same repressive system. The effort had some temporary success but faded with the Vietnam war.

Were they alone in the world, the industrial democracies might reasonably hope for a peaceful future. Their methods of conflict resolution - parliamentary democracy, bargaining between interest groups, demonstration and protest, the representation of opposing interests by voluntary associations, lobbying and litigation, uncensored news media, competitive markets in ideas and commodities - have developed so far that the appearance of a serious division in any of these societies sets in motion a process of peaceful problem-solving. It would be premature to say that societies of this type can no longer develop fundamental cleavages, but it is important to observe that they have not recently done so. Since they are not alone in the world, the prognosis must be somewhat less hopeful. We noted above that the mitigation of internal conflict by advanced industrial societies has not been matched by any serious effort to restrain external conflict. In a co-operative competition with their Cold War adversaries, they have continuously improved their military technology and exported it on a vast scale to 244

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less developed nations, either for short-term strategic purposes or for profit or both. Dozens of undemocratic and irresponsible regimes have been given the means to threaten their neighbours and oppress their own people. Dozens of civil wars have been ignited in poor countries. No serious effort has yet been made to interrupt the continued development of the technology of mass destruction. The collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe unleashed ethnic conflicts that had been held in abeyance for many years. The serial wars that have ravaged Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East since 1945 show no sign of winding down. As well, thousands of live nuclear warheads are still targeted on the cities of Europe and North America. The peaceful resolution of internal conflicts in the Western democracies is a historic achievement, but it can not be a durable one until comparable progress is made toward peaceful resolution of international conflicts. References Caplow, Theodore 1989 Peace Games. Middleton CT: Wesleyan University Press. 1991 American Social Trends. New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends In The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Coser, Lewis 1956 The Functions of Social Conflict. Glencoe: The Free Press. Crozier, Michel 1984 The Trouble with America: Why the System is Breaking Down. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dahrendorf, Ralf 1988 Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Dim, Louis 1990 La societe francaise en tendances. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Elias, Norbert 1978 Uber den Prozess der Civilization. 2 vols. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, [1939]. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag.

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Gottelmann, Gabrielle 1983 Staatliche Regulierung socialer innovation in der Bundesrepublik und in Frankreich. Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang. Hirschmann, Albert 1970 Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Lehmbruch, Gerhard 1984 "Concertation and the Structure of Corporate Networks." In John Goldthorpe, ed., Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, 60-80. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lehmbruch, Gerhard, ed. 1982 Patterns of Corporatist Rule-Making. Beverley Hills: Sage Publications. Mendras, Henri 1988 La seconde revolution franfaise. Paris: Gallimard. Simmel, Georg 1922 Soziologie. Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot. Taylor, Charles Lewis, and David A. Jodice 1983 World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Vol 2. New Haven: Yale University Press. Tocqueville, Alexis de 1838 Democracy in America. New York: G. Dearborn. Verba, Sidney, and Gabriel A. Almond, eds. 1980 The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston: Little, Brown.

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9 Institutionalization Tendencies in Ecological Movements Barbara WORNDL Guy FRECHET

In contemporary industrialized societies, there was a sharp increase in initiatives and associations in the environmental field, particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The postwar drive for industrialization formed the background for this ecological protest, as the problems of unlimited growth became obvious. The symptoms (growth crisis, oil crisis, etc.) did their part to expose the "limits to growth"; ecologists' warnings were confirmed by environmental destruction of major proportions, chemical-waste scandals, and nuclear accidents. After 30 years of environmental protest, these problems are now recognized as a political concern. It is commonly agreed that this social consciousness-raising is an achievement of the ecological movements. The movements themselves have undergone change in the course of their work, which can be attributed to the type and degree of their acceptance into the system. In this chapter, we will compare the ecological movements in France, West Germany, Quebec, and the U.S. The centre of attention is how the movements in these societies have developed, and how they have been integrated into the political and social systems. Within this framework of empirically oriented comparison, we will not refer to the controversial discussion on the terminology of social

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movements,1 but will instead briefly define the basis for our comparison. (For a theoretical discussion on those topics see Frechet and Worndl, 1993). New social movements2 of the postwar period are not directly concerned with problems of production and distribution of material wealth, but rather primarily with problems of social reproduction (Brand, 1985). Progressing industrial destruction of natural and social habitats, growing threat of war, concentration of political control, and so on are all departure points for social movements. They confront society with demands for collective welfare, individual self-realization, and the desire for a voice in the political decision-making process. They actively intervene in socialtransformation tendencies and are, in this sense, producers of change (Touraine, 1973). The changes aimed for are by no means necessarily "revolutionary" in the sense of an overthrow - action is directed toward modifying existing social structures (Roth and Rucht, 1987). Social movements are subject to more or less distinct institutionalization tendencies, in two ways. First, no movement remains an exclusively spontaneous and nonorganized grass-roots movement. In accordance with the resource-mobilization approach (McCarthy and Zald, 1987; Tarrow, 1989), we assume that social movements must necessarily take on formalized structures in order to focus their action potential. In order to optimize their influence possibilities, they make use of existing forms of conflict settlement and interest representation. Many theoreticians have - seeing that institutionalization of the labour movement was accompanied by a certain ossification - dubbed institutionalization of movements a perversion of goals; some have even called it the end of the respective movement (Rammstedt, 1978). The spontaneity and informality of movements were presented as their essential features, organization and institutionalization as their enemy (see the criticism of this opposition by Oommen, 1990). The question of whether the crystallization of organizations is equivalent to perversion of movement goals cannot be definitively answered. This is determined by the type and orientation of the organization,3 and whether interaction with existing social institutions weakens

1

Many studies have dealt with the definition problem - to mention just a few, Touraine in France; Brand and Offe in Germany; Klandermans in Holland; B6Ianger and Vaillancourt in Quebec and Canada; McCarthy and Zald and Tarrow in the U.S., and Melucci and Alberoni in Italy.

2

In European terms, "new social movements" means a variety of protest groups such as the student movement, new women's liberation, citizens' initiatives, environmental protest, peace movement, etc., and serves to distinguish them from the "old" movements such as the labour movement.

3

Melucci writes that "the new organizational form of contemporary movements is not just 'instrumental' to their goals. It is a goal in itself (Melucci, 1984). He points out that the formation of democratic organizational methods belongs to the goals of new social movements. This means that the question is what kind of organization is needed, and not whether the organization is or not needed at all.

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movement goals is decided by the institutions' readiness to recognize these goals as social problems. Below is an overview of the main trends in the ecological movements of the societies under study. Attention is focused on the movements' main themes, the various movement orientations, and characteristic forms of action. We will then discuss institutionalization of the respective movements according to the following aspects: how do they interact with existing channels of conflict settlement and use them (or attempt to use them) to their own advantage? How do they, with new organizational forms, try to intervene in the social system? How successful have they been in drawing public attention? For purposes of terminological differentiation between single groups and movement orientations, we make use of terminology introduced by Vaillancourt (1982b) and Rucht (1989), who divided the ecological movements into conservationist, environmentalist, and ecologist groups. Vaillancourt (1981, 1982a, 1982b, 1985) also identified sub-branches within some of these groups; for example, the conservationist groups can be split into pseudo-conservationists and conservationists, the environmentalist groups into more or less politically involved groups from moderate reformists to consciousness-raising militants, and ecologist groups into political ecologists and ecosocialists, aiming toward a more global change. These terms stand for various, even competing ideologies within the movement, though the dividing lines are flexible. According to Rucht (1989), the environmental-protection idea of conservationism is aesthetically, ethically, and religiously motivated: the beauty of nature is to be respected and protected for its own sake. Conservationist means to this end are, above all, moral and aesthetic education, public consciousnessraising, and demanding nature-preservation areas. Environmentalism has a more pragmatic reason for its advocacy of environmental protection: nature is considered a resource worthy of preservation in order to assure its continued function as a means of production and reproduction. The political arena serves as the environmentalists' main battlefield. Ecologism covers much more than just protection of nature: it allies it with global social criticism, and aims at an egalitarian, decentralized, and democratic society in harmony with nature. Readiness to practice unconventional, even illegal forms of influence such as militant action, civil disobedience, and so on, separates the methods of ecologists from those of other nature protectionists. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE, WEST GERMANY, QUEBEC, AND THE U.S.

In all the societies observed herein, a protest cycle started in the 1960s and 1970s, attracting public attention in varying, overlapping phases until the late 1970s. After the wave of decolonization in the 1960s and the large demonstrations of the time (student revolts in Europe and the U.S., the civil-rights movements and the anti249

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Vietnam-war demonstrations in the U.S.) weakened, their resources were mobilized for more specific and precise sectors of protest activity. Tarrow (1989) suggests, for instance, that the most important movements of the past two decades (the women's, environmental, and peace movements) originated in the students' movement of the 1960s, where many of the leaders gathered their experience. Even before the American environmental movement took off, in the mid1960s, there were efforts at environmental protection. Settlement of the west and exploitation of natural resources turned environmental protection into a government concern at an early stage. The New Deal was prototypical for this. Instead of natureromantic ideology, pragmatic considerations caused political and economic criteria to be applied in the exploitation and preservation of nature. When the environment theme became a subject of protest in the 1960s, environmentalism got "ecologized." Rapid industrial expansion had by that time exhibited its destructive consequences, visible in such spectactular catastrophes as the polluted beaches of Santa Barbara, which made it drastically obvious that the immense natural wealth of America was not inexhaustible. The ecologism of the 1960s differed from New Deal environmentalism in its socially critical viewpoint, and also in its countercultural nature. Alternative protest forms such as demonstrations and blockades have remained, however, a typical aside from a few exceptions - for example, the wave of demonstrations immediately following the accident at the Three Mile Island plant. Environmentalist groups preferred to agitate through lawsuits and supervisory legal processes. As early as the 1970s, protest activities started fading into the background while the movement concentrated on lobbying and litigation (Caplow, 199Ib). The ecologism of the 1960s, with its criticism of civilization - like Baer and Lovins's vision of libertarian and cooperative capitalism and Bookchin's anarcho-syndicalism - could not gain any foothold in the U.S. (Kitschelt, 1985). The American ecological movements went through four phases: between 1967 and 1972, themes such as air and water pollution and protection of animal species were in the foreground of discussion. The thematic complex of energy and growth crises (this was the time of the fight against the Alaska pipeline) was next. In the late 1970s, the nuclear-power conflict took over from the previous themes. During Reagan's term in office, the fight against his administration's attempt to undo whatever progress had been made in the environmental field dominated. Today, the American movement comprises a wide spectrum of groups limited to a particular region or theme. The list is quite long: protection of endangered species, air and water pollution, smog, acid rain, energy saving, chemical- and nuclear-waste disposal, destruction of the rain forest, depletion of the ozone layer, nuclear disarmament (Caplow, 1991b). The groups have only loose connections with each other or with other movements.

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"Older" associations are easily distinguishable from "younger" ones within the American ecological movement. The older ones are the established organizations such as the Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Society. Previously fairly nonpolitical, they adapted their programme in the course of the ecologization of the 1960s, gradually responded with more flexibility to these new challenges, and have been enjoying an unprecedented rise in membership since 1977 (Caplow, 1991b: 208; Kitschelt, 1985: 276). They have a conventional and very topheavy organizational structure, which predestines them for activity on the federal level. Among the younger groups that can also boast of membership growth are the Friends of the Earth, Environmental Action, the Nader organizations, and the "Greens," as well as a multitude of local groups intervening in specific conflicts (Caplow, 1991a, 1992b; Kitschelt, 1985; McCarthy and Zald, 1987). The American Greens have not yet formed a political party. Their self-image is tied to the principle of grass-roots democracy, involving direct actions and civil disobedience. In the late 1960s, there was an upswing of environmental protest in France. Until then, nature protection was the concern of nature leagues dating from the turn of the century. As single-purpose associations mainly interested in preserving the environment directly involved with special preferences and hobbies (fishing, sailing, etc.), these associations attempted to prevent environmental damage by legal and political means. Influenced by this conservative tradition, the environment protectionists of the 1950s and 1960s found themselves in selective resistance to large-scale technological projects, environmental and urban destruction, and spoilage of regions with intact cultural identities (such as Alsace). Prototypical for this was the protest against the transformation of the La Vanoise nature park into a ski resort, which inspired the first big demonstration in 1969. Against a background of the de Gaulle government's ambitious industrialization programme, which brought about a hiatus in environmental and life quality, this protest experienced an ecologization and fanned out to include global socially critical components (Rucht, 1989: 69). The short but violent revolt in May of 1968 was decisive. In this protest phase, a network of ecological groups emerged, some linked with regional movements. The alternative movement expressed itself in young people moving to the country, experimenting with co-operative economy (handicrafts, animal husbandry) - a "return to nature." This was carried out as a practical-radical rejection of the "consumption and growth model" of French society. Several large cities witnessed the emergence of communes and flat-sharing, alternative culture and communication centres, and protest actions against urban destruction. Starting in 1974, the anti-nuclear protest gathered support. The massive expansion of civil atomic power (the politics of "tout nucleaire": nothing but nuclear energy) became the central point of criticism of large-scale technology and environmental endangerment. This protest emerged at the first nuclear-powerplant locations at Bugy and Fessenheim, consolidating in the mid-1970s into the biggest mobilization campaigns and mass demonstrations since the May, 1968, revolt. 251

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Local committees have since formed, at these nuclear-plant locations and construction sites, adhering to decentralized and grassroots-democratic structures. Their actions are dedicated to the principle of nonviolence (Dechaux, 1990; Galtung, 1990; Leggewie, 1985; Rucht, 1989, Touraine, 1978, 1981, 1984). The small but innovative left-wing party, PSU (Parti Socialiste Unitaire), eagerly seized upon these initiatives. Somewhat later - in reaction to the "tout nucleaire" programme - the anti-nuclear-power movement received support from the socialist labour union (CFDT) and the Socialist Party. An important point in the development of the French environmental movement was its early attempt to participate in elections (1973-74). Several ideas were brought together in a voters' initiative, bringing the movement's most spectacular success to date. The alliance of the ecologists with the CFDT-trade unions dates from that time. A green party was not founded until 1984 (Les Verts). After a strong mobilization of ecological protest potential in the early 1970s, the boom died out in the second half of the decade. It is obvious that the Utopians of a "soft" ecological society have faded away, to be replaced by the proponents of pragmatic intervention and solid political methods. Similar to the U.S., a spectrum of diverse movements, often contrary in their goals and strategies, are subsumed under the heading of "environmental protection." For example, the conservative section could never be mistaken for the socially critical/libertarian wing. One of the most important associations in the environmental movement is the FFSPN (Federation franchise des societes de protection de la nature), founded in 1968 but with origins going back to the beginning of the century, which has grouped together conservationist and environmentalist organizations in France. By the beginning of the 1980s, membership in these groups had expanded considerably. At present, the FFSNP consists of 1,100 national, regional, and local associations and groups. Its affinities with its antecedents are witnessed by its thematic points of effort, by its membership (rural and urban middle classes), and its political orientation (neutral, its leaning toward the left not having appeared until the 1970s). The original representative of the moderate political ecologists is Les Amis de la Terre (AT), which has taken up and popularized the economic-growth criticism of the Club of Rome and the nuclear-power opponents. AT, having agitated against civil nuclear power since 1974, is a major factor in the French anti-nuclear-power movement. Its structure consists of a fairly informal and loose-knit network of local groups. Since 1977, the number of groups belonging to AT has grown to approximately 100. Not until 1977 did they organize on a national level (Reseau des Amis de la terre - RAT). A distinguishing characteristic of RAT is its orientation toward elections and participation in official, institutional politics.

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Ecological protest in West Germany set in later than in France and the U.S. Not until the early 1970s did the movement start livening up the antiquated and rusty environmental-protection effort - previously left up to conservationist associations such as nature-protection leagues, mountain-climber associations, and hiking and homeland associations - in the form of citizens' initiatives with specific themes, such as urban traffic, housing, and social services. This environmentalism found its first advocates in the parliamentary arena, with the enactment of various environmental protection laws in the 1970s. It was not until the crises of the mid-1970s that this theme was deprived of its reputation-making character for politicians and trade unions, as it came to be seen as a Konjunkturbremse (hindrance to economic growth). This worked to the advantage of an autonomous ecological protest, which took shape within the alternative scene and subsequently went through the following phases: in the early 1970s, protests were organized against the nuclear-power plants; in the second half of the seventies, small towns like Brokdorf, Grohnde, Kalkar, and Gorleben (with their nuclear-power-plant sites) became targets and epicentres of a public protest that mobilized greater numbers than any other campaign since the Adenauer era. The sources of protest extended from critical experts to local opposition, leftist groups, and subcultural protest. Nuclear power became the source of hard, and sometimes violent, confrontation between the state and nuclear-power opponents. Not only the conservative parties, but also the Social Democrats and the labour unions declared nuclear energy to be an indispensable energy source for the modern, growth-oriented society. Nuclear protest was the pioneer of the ecological movements in West Germany. Numerous citizens' initiatives against destruction of nature merged into the Bundesverband Burgerinitiativen (BBU) in the mid-1970s. The BBU became the most important voice of the environmental-protection movement. There was a membership influx from the crumbling leftist movements of the 1970s, which in turn imparted a social-critical potential to the new movement. In 1979-80, the "Greens" ecological party was founded and quickly elected to over half of the state parliaments in West Germany, as well as to the European and federal parliaments. Ecological protest entered a quiet phase in the early 1980s; the formerly major targets of conflict - such as nuclear power - were keeping a low profile (Roth, 1985; Roth and Rucht, 1987; Worndl, 1992). What has remained, however, is a many-faceted, disorganized network of nature-protection organizations, complemented by an infrastructure of natural-food stores, alternative bookstores, bars, and so on. Under the umbrella of the more conservative Deutscher Naturschutzring (DNR) are 94 associations, with a total of 3.3 million individual members (in 1985). Its spectrum covers protection of animal and plant species, nature-environmental education, and hikes. These areas are also covered by the pragmatic-environmentalist organizations forming under the auspices of the organization Bund fiir Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (BUND). BUND 253

Convergence or Divergence

declares itself against nuclear power and engages in "detail" conflicts (garbage problems, etc.). In 1986, BUND had 145,000 members. Political ecology, as represented by the BBU, attempts to combine the autonomous grassroots principle with an organization possessing political clout. An estimated 300 groups belong to the BBU, which puts it somewhat behind the more pragmatic oriented associations. The traditional groups have more influence on public opinion (Rucht, 1989). As in other societies, ecological movements in Quebec and Canada gathered much of their momentum from the student movement and youth protest. Environmental protest really started in the late 1960s, but there were specific actions long time, before, such as the first air-pollution regulation in 1872, the founding of conservationist societies at the beginning of the twentieth century, and so on. The ecological movement got more vigorous and active in the wake of the student movement, where organizations sprang up and gained focus. The actions have been most visible when targeted around very specific issues, such as the anti-nuclear protest in the 1970s and the ecological disasters of the late 1980s (Saint-Basile, SaintAmable, and the persistent and growing pollution problems with toxic wastes and the St. Lawrence River). The anti-nuclear protest accelerated in the mid-1970s, especially with the testing in India of a bomb made with plutonium from a Canadian CANDU reactor (designed for civilian use and intended to be sold for such purposes only). There was also protest against the installation of nuclear-power stations - Pointe Lepreau in New Brunswick, Gentilly in Quebec, and a few stations in Ontario. In 1978, a group of anti-nuclear activists created Alliance Tournesol, representing "the core of antinuclear activity among Francophones in Quebec" at the time (Vaillancourt, 1981). In Quebec, the anti-nuclear movement is not as active as it is elsewhere, particularly because greater use is made of hydro-electric power and there is only one nuclearpower station in the province. More than 820 ecological groups have been enumerated in Quebec (Vaillancourt, 1985). The pseudo-conservationists include large industrial enterprises, which take symbolic action and often proclaim themselves greener than the Greens; moderate reformist and conservationist associations work for the protection of lake environments, recruiting from wealthier classes of people owning cottages and promoting a better quality of life. Quite different groups characterize the environmentalist associations, whose policy goes further in denouncing the current environmental status quo and in practising a more political ecology (some are very nearly formal Green parties); finally, there are the most intransigent groups, including the ecosocialist militants, whose influence remains insignificant. The ecologists' plea for replacement of a "wasteful" society by a conserving society does not meet with the desired acceptance in conservationist circles (Frechet, 1992). Recently, Green candidates have been trying to gain an electoral foothold in Canada and Quebec. 254

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Their success has been very slight in Quebec; in the provincial elections of 1989, they got only 2.5% of the vote. INSTITUTIONALIZATION TRENDS IN THE ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENTS

The evolution of the movements in all four societies shows that the nature-protection idea, which in simultaneously with industrialization, has experienced a certain radicalization since the Second World War. Subsequent to the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s, ecology was a buzzword for criticism of the growth-and-profit economy. The oppositional and conflict-oriented direction of the environmental movement waned during the 1980s in all four societies. What is left of the movement has turned to traditional interest politics. It should be kept in mind that the American movement, even in its "radical" phase, was more moderate than the movements in Europe, which had to work through a series of intermediate steps to reach their pragmatic turning-point. The following comparison of these movements describes their typical characteristics and concentrates on how they have been integrated through the use of established, official means of conflict regulation and interest representation, the formation of movement parties, and the acceptance of environmental themes in public awareness. Use of Established Means of Interest Representation and Conflict Settlement

Social movements, in the course of resource mobilization, eventually try to go through established channels of conflict settlement, including court action and/or strong interest groups such as labour unions" and established political parties. An overview of the American movements shows that their politics are largely determined by use of established channels and interest politics. Intervention in electoral campaigns, clever use of mass media, court battles, and confrontation with government authorities are the preferred modi operandi. Environmental groups allow themselves to be involved in government-level negotiations, a method that is increasingly applied to locally undesirable projects. This procedure requires the parties in conflict to bargain for compensation for disadvantages, thereby serving to increase acceptance of risk and environmental damage (Holznagel, 1989: 4). These processes are only very reluctantly practised in other societies, where they are encumbered with the unsavoury reputation of paying off the protesters and, thereby, betraying the environmentalist cause. For example, the German leftist daily newspaper Die Tageszeitung (TAZ) printed - with obvious distaste - an article about American environmentalist groups for protection of the rain forest meeting with representatives of the lumber industry for negotiations similar to wage bargaining between labour and employers (TAZ, August 24, 1989). The obvious preference for 255

Convergence or Divergence

litigation and lobbying, which has gained these groups a reputation for "thinking small" (Kitschelt, 1985), is based on a specifically American political structure. Legislation processes are distinguished by their openness to social interest groups. American legislation pledges its supervisory authorities to receptiveness for environmental issues. They are more heavily obliged than are their European counterparts to consider possible objections. The public can participate in environmental supervisory processes. The environmentalist strategy of bringing about regulatory or remedial action by the federal government in the U.S.. has been successful; more than 30 major statutes have been enacted to improve air and water quality. The anti-nuclear movement was responsible for a number of strict laws, and also for the reorganization of environmental control via creation of the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) and, later, the NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) (Caplow, 1991b). The relative successes also mean, however, that the efficacy of environmental politics is hindered by the foot-dragging slowness of established politics, and that achievements can be revoked according to shifts in the political mood. This is illustrated by the attempts of the U.S. administration, since 1981, to undo whatever progress had been made in the environmental field, due largely to pressure from stronger counteracting interest groups. The environmental movement in France differs from the American movement in that it has expressed itself more vehemently as an oppositional and socially critical force, as illustrated by the linking of ecological protest with regional movements, attempts to build up an alternative co-operative economy, and grassroots activities such as mass demonstrations. These more radical protest elements can be attributed to the lack of institutionalized possibilities to exert influence within the French political system (Leggewie, 1985). There are very few intermediate channels between the executive and the people in France, and there are further restrictions as a result of closed systems for recruiting political and administrative elites, centralized state structures, an absence of administrative courts, and repressive use of police force against disruptive actions. This has worked to the advantage of the alternative cultural protest movement. The fact that this protest quieted down quickly and did not manage to survive as an autonomous/independent emancipatory reservoire can be explained by the dominant presence of a strong traditional left. In contrast to America, where labour has very little mobilization, France has a tradition of a strong and pugnacious labour movement. Equipped with a pronounced class consciousness, the French left ensured that the hard-won social victories in the industrial and agricultural sectors could not defanged by government. This made the left a base for any rumblings of dissatisfaction. Since it was open to the environmental theme, the ecological movements took the opportunity to champion their cause via a powerful organization: in the 1970s, there were an "action alliance" with the socialist labour union and ideological and personnel connections with the non-communist left. The 256

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Socialist Party (PSF) was supported in the 1981 campaign by many ecologists hoping for an ecological turning-point. The price for this "dovetailing" with the left was a right-left polarization within the environmental movement and an overshadowing of the ecological paradigm by an economic one. Whereas the ecological movements had tried to mobilize the left for their cause, they now were instrumentalized by the left. Leggewie (1985: 124) writes, "The ecologists therefore have, at the most, earned the honour of playing the role of catalyst in the transformation process of the French left; they strengthened the 'second left' against the traditional leftist paradigm of party communism and the CGT, but were not capable of developing and maintaining a stance independent of the left." The environmental movement did gain some influence on federal politics via the socialist government. While environmental groups now have a say in defining public policy in some municipalities and departments, as well as on a national level (in 1971, a ministry of environment was created), alternative groups have come to the sobering realization that they probably cannot survive on their own and that their original idea has been banalized. Relatively persistent protest in West Germany was - at least in the 1970s more radical than that in other societies. This can be attributed to a lack of openness in the political structure, as is the case in France. The German movements were repeatedly disappointed in their attempts to take part in political-administrative processes (for example, public hearings on construction of nuclear-power plants). The available channels are better suited to blocking citizens' interests than to accepting them. Especially in the 1970s, this led to activities such as demonstrations and blockades during pertinent hearings and court cases. In contrast to the French movement, the German movement did not have the alternative of another representational organ, such as a well-anchored left. This lesson was unavoidable in the phase of protest against nuclear-power plants, when the nuclear-power critics found themselves facing opposition by both the Social Democrats and the labour unions. This drove protest into social isolation, and the movement developed into a counter-movement against the "corporatist bloc" consisting of the state, capital, and labour unions (Esser et al., 1983). In general, the movement in the West Germany has retained more of its counter-cultural character, even after its pragmatic turningpoint, than did the French or American movements. This is reflected in its continued involvement with other socially critical movements (women's movement, peace movement). Visible expression of this is an alternative infrastructure - including an extensive system of alternative bookstores, bars, institutes, businesses, and so on that condones rejection of existing economic and political rationales. The alternative projects are, however, increasingly adapting to the laws that govern a profit-oriented economy. For example, the alternative Eco-Bank grants loans to alternative projects and yet is profit-oriented. Within the remaining oppositional section of the movement, a discussion is currently taking place concerning the disadvantages of spectacular actions in Greenpeace style in comparison with the effectiveness of a pragmatic 257

Convergence or Divergence

policy of negotiating conflicts (the Frankfurter Rundschau of 10 May, 1992). They are encouraged to have the opportunity to be taken seriously as participants in the political-administrative process, now that environmental concerns have been accepted by official institutions. In 1986, a federal ministry was created for environmental protection. A myriad of environmental committees and forums have emerged on the established political level, and administrations and institutions (such as the church) often have their own environmental agent or agency. But even here, the movement has made the disappointing discovery that environmental concerns can also serve as a mere front for business as usual instead of having real effects. The ecological movements in Quebec seem to be much more involved in politics than those in the U.S., occupying an intermediate position between the American and European experiences. While less open to impulses from "below" than that in the U.S., Quebec's political system does exhibit relative flexibility in negotiations on the official-institutional level. Its structures have been conceived as a way to establish a formal link between citizens and decision makers. The environmental movement in Quebec seems to have made some achievements on the official level: the governments, both federal and provincial, have, with the establishment of competing ministries of the environment in the 1970s, acknowledged certain demands, such as the fight against acid rain and water pollution, the antismoking and recycling campaigns, and so on. Commissions of inquiry have been established, and the consciousness-raising process among politicians is under way. The success of the Bureau des audiences publiques sur 1'environnement, when not short-circuited by the political process, has the power to stop environmentally undesirable projects. The institutional response of the establishment of "green police," though its means are not equal to its needs, is also a step in this direction. Influence through Founding of Movement Parties

Social movements develop a so-called mixed strategy to fight a take-over by the system on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness of reliance on purely grass-roots political action, such as demonstrations, blockades, and so on, on the other. This strategy consists largely of founding movement parties that offer the organizational minimum necessary for participation in the political arena, without abandoning grassroots mobilization. The party-founding process is different in each of the four societies studied. In West Germany, the movement endeavoured to anchor environmental concerns in the parliamentary arena early on. This can be seen as a response to the creaking slowness of the established political organs in taking up these matters. Even in the mid-1970s, ecological parties and voters' initiatives achieved respectable percentages in municipal and state parliamentary elections. Toward the end of the 258

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1970s, the Green, Bunte (Colours) and Alternative Lists parties provided enlivening opposition to the traditional parties. The Greens emerged from this constellation in 1980. They failed to pass the 5% hurdle in their first attempts to gain seats in the European and federal governments, but it speaks for the new party's strength that it is now represented in over half of the state parliaments, the European Parliament, and the federal parliament, (the 5% threshold is difficult for new parties to surpass), with between 6% and 12% of the vote. These respectable successes have, however, had their price: whereas the first environmental parties were single-issue movements, the Greens represent the transformation to a party, complete with political programme. They have sacrificed environmental protection to political "seriousness," demoting it to just another plank in their platform. In their fight against pollution and largescale technology, they form coalitions and make compromises with established parties. All this makes for discord within the party. Green "fundamentalists," adhering to the grassroots principle, wrestle with the pragmatically oriented "Realos" about the delicate balance between opposition and adaptation. These conflicts absorb much of the Greens' energy and detract from their plausibility. France had a Green Party much later than Germany. While there were electoral initiatives in the late 1970s (in district and municipal elections of 1976-77, they enjoyed spectacular electoral successes, with help from the left), it was not until 1984 that an independent Green party (les Verts) was founded. This can be seen as an attempt to mobilize resources in the face of defeats suffered by electoral initiatives in the 1980s, and also as a preventive measure against the above-mentioned channeling-off into the left. But the founding of the party failed to provide the movement with new impetus; the Greens drew only a negligible share of the vote in the elections of the 1980s, with the exception of the European Parliament elections in 1989, in which they got 11% of the vote. The political aspect of the Green movement - with the addition of a second, competing party, the Generation Ecologie (GE) - has been consolidated, as evidenced by the results of the local elections of March, 1992: the Green parties totalled 14 percent of the vote (7.1% for GE, 6.8% for les Verts), giving them 104 seats in the regional councils (de Brie, 1992). The Greens have converted to pragmatic and technocratic tactics. How far removed they are from their previous socially critical impetus is exhibited in their difficulties in setting down a definite demarcation line between themselves and the rightist parties (Piermont, 1992). The Canadian political Green movement is weaker. In Quebec, there are Green candidates in almost every campaign and in a majority of electoral districts. The Quebec provincial election of 1989 provided them with a bit of moral success, as they garnered 2.5% of the total vote. In one particular district, their share of the vote climbed to 15%, but the situation was influenced by a specific issue - the location of PCB-contaminated oil barrels from the ecological-disaster site of SaintBasile (where many of the barrels caught fire in an unsafe warehouse). When 259

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combined with an electoral system (British-type uninominal) that is by nature unfavourable to third parties (without any proportional-representation principle), the election of such candidates is highly improbable, if not virtually impossible. In addition, political coalitions have never been present in the historical context, as has been the case in Europe. The Green Party in Quebec states that it does not want to take power, it simply wants to share it. It intends to remain marginal almost by vocation and principle, just to send a message. There is thus less of a tendency to act on strategy, whether technocratic or pragmatic, as the institutional level already makes room for those types of actions. Developments in the U.S. can be seen as the opposite extreme to those in Europe and Canada. The American environmentalists, impressed by the Greens' electoral success in Europe, are currently debating about founding a party, though the consensus still favours renunciation of state-level elections and party politics. One factor in the "backwardness" of American environmentalists may lie in their successful lobbying, which reduces the urgency for a regular party. But it is probably more decisive that the American political system leaves new parties with next to no chance for election; the American two-party system is a ritualized tug-of-war for power, influence, and money, and it is hard for third parties to establish themselves. So for the time being, the American Greens remain upholders of grassroots democracy, and are more radical than their European counterparts. Acceptance in the Public Consciousness

The movement's integration can also be observed on a third level - how present it is in the general public consciousness. This process finds its expression in the fact that, for one, the movement can count on a mobilization potential that is not identical with that of its activists. Moreover, it can count on the fact that the environment issue is a commonly acknowledged subject of public awareness and discussion. Surveys in West Germany have shown that such values as the environment are increasingly highly placed. Survey results from the 1980s show the majority of the population giving environmental protection priority over material or economic goals (Glatzer et al., 1992). Conservation of the natural environment counts among the most important factors of personal comfort for all age groups. The only things more highly valued are health and interpersonal matters, including family, love, and affection.4 Reflecting this, satisfaction with environmental protection is, in comparison to other spheres of life, extremely low in Germany. It was the lowest of

4

The life spheres surveyed were love/affection, health, family, environmental protection, leisure time, work, income, success, political influence, and religion (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1989).

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all life spheres in 1978, sank even lower in 1984, and increased slightly in 1988, without reaching the 1978 level.5 In France too, an overwhelming majority of respondents agree with statements showing concern with environmental matters. From 1977 to 1990, between 75% and 88% of respondents expressed agreement with the fact that pollution is a real concern, and between 47% and 64% of respondents said that they support ecological movements (which is not equivalent to voting for an ecological party) (Agorametrie, 1992). Over-all support of these matters dropped from 1977 to 1984, then bounced back significantly, returning to its late-1970s level by 1990. Although 41% of respondents believe that fighting pollution is a top priority, fighting unemployment and fighting AIDS gained even more support as top priorities (48% and 49%), so it is difficult to establish which would be considered the most important. In view of these results, the environmental issue appears to be less well accepted in France than in Germany. The data on mobilization potential run parallel to these trends; the term "mobilization potential" defines the portion of the total population principally sensitive to and approving of mobilization efforts of a social movement. The mobilization potential of groups in the field of environmental protection, ecology, and the anti-nuclear-power movement grew markedly in all European countries between 1986 and 1989 (Fuchs and Rucht, 1990). Combining strong and moderate supporters of the movements, the proportion of supporters was over half of those questioned in all cases, with occasional peaks of over 90%. This potential is higher in France than in West Germany. Other studies, however, have shown that de facto mobilization for protest action - unconventional forms of political pressure such as civil disobedience - is higher in West Germany than in France. Even though there is some acceptance of this kind of action in environmental organizations in France, it does not seem to occur as often as in West Germany, and when it does, it often pertains to regional protests. This is due to the low level of acceptance of alternative forms of political activity, but is also a result of low ecological consciousness (the French government's "tout nucleaire" programme does not meet with resistance comparable to that in West Germany). The environmental theme plays a lesser role in the French media than it does in West Germany's. The American public is less concerned with the environment than is the case in Europe. In the U.S., Roper's annual surveys from 1974 to 1986 show themes such as air and water pollution coming in near the bottom of the list, with the item "energy resources" sinking from top spot, in 1974 (world oil crisis), to last place, in 1986 (Caplow, 1991b). According to other surveys, the "ecology and pollution" 5

The sectors were: marriage/partnership, family life, neighbourhood, life as housewife, work division, place of work, living standard, housing, leisure time, household income, health, social security, occupation/professional training, democracy, church, political participation, national/public security, and environmental protection (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1989).

261

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theme stood at 4% in 1970, dropped to insignificant levels afterward, and bounced back to 4% in 1989, while the "energy" theme dropped from 34%, in 1974, to marginal values in subsequent years, reaching 1% in 1984 - no more, in fact, than a flash in the pan (Caplow et al., 1991: 542-543). The environmental theme seems to enjoy be as popular with the public as classical music, although membership in environmentalist groups grew enormously in the 1980s. In Quebec, the environmental problem was cited as the most important problem by 4.1% of the population in a 1977 survey, and this proportion grew to 20% in a 1989 survey (Langlois et al., 1992: 577). Economic and constitutional problems are still at the top of the list, but growth in concern for environmental matters is significant, especially following the succession of ecological disasters in the late 1980s. Survey data show that the U.S. and Germany occupy the two extreme positions with regard to environmental consciousness - lowest and highest, respectively - with France and Quebec in between. A strong anchoring of environmental consciousness, as observed in Germany, does not necessarily mean success for the environmental idea. The darker side of the legitimation process is that the ecological idea can be diluted to a buzz-word with which disparate interests are propagated and legitimized. This is illustrated by the following examples: in West Germany, the nuclear industry has been campaigning for the protection of nature, stating that nuclear energy is cleaner than coal and pointing out the ongoing problems just over the former East German border. The chemical industry has also been advertising its contribution toward cleaner water. Not only does industry thereby pervert the environmental idea, but there are contradictory actions and conflicts within the social movements themselves. This has been the case with a campaign by Greenpeace against hydro-electrical development in Quebec; its accusation in the media of "genocide" of aboriginal people could not be documented, and served only to raise suspicions about those whose interests could be served by such a disinformation campaign, in the context of the ongoing constitutional debate in Canada. In Quebec, Greenpeace was successful in completely eliminating the hunting of baby seals on the east coast, although seal overpopulation is known to be harmful for the coastal ecosystem in general and for fishing in particular, due to devastation of fish stocks. A few years later, Greenpeace USA was a dominant actor against hydro-electrical development in northern Quebec (Great Whale River at Hudson's Bay), thus championing and upholding aboriginal peoples' traditions, which, paradoxically, include free hunting of endangered species. The problem here is one of the legitimacy of the means proposed, and on that specific ground, large industrial enterprises, for instance, can easily show themselves to be greener than the Greens. For example, enterprises promote recycling on the basis of the traditional economic approach (cost-benefits), as they have the means to 262

Ecological Movements

profit from it (Allan Michaud, 1989); this, however, may not mean much in terms of an alternative economy. In other cases, one of the main environmental demands, that the polluters pay for cleaning up their pollution, will certainly be more and more applied, leaving to the state its traditional regulation-making role. This leads directly to the political sphere, where, theoretically, conflicting ends are put to the ballot. As soon as there is a cost to be shared, the problem becomes a political one that is likely to be solved in the political sphere, whether by convincing or by constraining.

As part of the student and youth movements, a protest movement dedicated to environmental protection formed in all four societies surveyed, which linked environmental conservation with a socially critical impetus. In the 1980s, the protest quieted down, and environmentalist groups concentrated their activities within established forms of interest representation. The subsiding of protest is due to institutionalization trends among the movements in the respective societies. The specific ways of channeling protest indicate varying degrees of opportunity for success of popular concerns. The relative openness of the political system in North America was responsible for the early taming of the movements, which were mainly involved in the use of established channels and interest politics. The relatively closed political systems in Europe caused radicalization of the movements, which expressed itself more vehemently as an oppositional and socially critical force. In France, the environmental protest was subsequently carried into the traditional channels of interest politics via a powerful left. In spite of channeling tendencies, the German movement was able to remain an intervening force. Pressure exerted on official parliamentary politics to recognize environmental protection as a problem to be dealt with was stronger in Europe than in the U.S. and Canada; it was much stronger in West Germany than in France, and stronger in Canada than in the U.S. The minor and frequently diminishing electoral success of Green parties shows greater voter trust in the problem-solving abilities of the established parties than in that of these "upstarts." Wherever Green parties are successful, as in West Germany and France, parties have to deal with the quandaries of their movements' character and of special environmental concerns being absorbed by the necessities of conventional politics. We ascertain high public consciousness of environmental protection in Germany and low awareness in the U.S., with France and Quebec in the middle. The more aggressive the movements were, the more permanently they were etched into the public consciousness. Where environmental protection has become a publicly recognized problem, the idea runs the risk of turning into a lip-service justification for diverse and contrary interests. While all parties have started "wearing green," environmental problems are still on the rise. 263

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Our initial postulate was that social movements initiate social change. It was shown that movements tend to be absorbed by the system. What does this mean for the possibility of real change? It cannot be denied that the institutionalization process waters down the movement's original ideas, and that practical application of environmental protection always lags behind its propoganda. But this very disparity between ideal and reality is the thorn in the side that keeps consciousness high, and keeps leading to new conflicts which, in time-lag modus, bring about macrosocial, structural, and cultural change. Though things have quieted down regarding environmental protection, the matter has not yet vanished from the political agenda. It seems to have moved to a new arena, the international level (for example, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in June, 1992). International conflict management offers opportunities, because consolidated actions mean higher problem-solving capacity. It is not, however, certain that this chance will be taken advantage of. The societies are still bickering about who will shoulder the main burden for environmental protection. References Agorametrie, ed. 1992 Agorametrie 1992. Paris. Alberoni, Francesco 1984 Movement and Institution. New York: Columbia University Press. Allan Michaud, Dominique 1989 "L'environnement et 1'ecologisme au coeur de la societe alternative, en France et en Allemagne." In L'avenir de la societe alternative, 57-87. Paris: Editions 1'Harmattan. Belanger, Paul-R. 1988 "Les nouveaux mouvements sociaux a 1'aube des annees 90." Nouvelles pratiques sociales 1, no. 1: 101-114. Brand, Karl-Werner, ed. 1985 Neue soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA. "Ein internationaler Vergleich." Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Caplow, Theodore 1991a "Social Movements." In Theodore Caplow et al., Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990, 326-327. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. 1991b American Social Trends. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Caplow, Theodore, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce A. Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in The United States, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. De Brie, Christian 1992 "La longue marche des ecologistes." Le Monde Diplomatique, April: 23.

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Dechaux, Jean-Hugues 1990 "Mouvements sociaux." In Louis Dirn, ed., La societe fran^aise en tendances'. 245—249. Paris: PUF. Descent, David, et al. 1989 "Theorie des classes et des mouvements sociaux dans les sociologies quebecoise et canadienne: de la fragmentation des classes aux nouveaux mouvements sociaux." In Classes sociales et mouvements sociaux au Quebec et au Canada, 19-64. Montreal: Editions Saint-Martin. Esser, Josef, et al. 1983 Krisenregulierung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Faivret, Jean-Philippe, Jean-Louis Missika, and Dominique Wolton 1980 L'illusion ecologique. Paris: Seuil. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1992 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Predict, Guy 1992 "Social Movements." In Simon Langlois et al., Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990, 351-361. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Frechet, Guy, and Barbara Worndl 1993 "The Ecological Movements in the Light of Social Movement's Development. The Cases of Four Contemporary Industrialized Societies." International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 34, no. 1-2: 56-74. Fuchs, Dieter, and Dieter Rucht 1990 Neue Soziale Bewegungen. Mobilisierungspotentiale im 5 Ldnder-Vergleich. WBZ Mitteilungen, 48. Gagnon, Gabriel 1989 "La metamorphose des mouvements sociaux." Journal of Canadian Studies, 23, no. 4: 5-15. Galtung, Johan 1990 "The Green Movement: A Socio-Historical Explanation." In Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King, eds., Globalization, Knowledge and Society, 235-250. London, Newbury Park, and New Delhi: Sage Publications and ISA. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGillQueen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Hegediis, Zsuzsa 1990 "Social Movements and Social Change in Self-Creative Society: New Civil Initiatives in the International Arena." In Martin Albrow and Elizabeth King, eds., Globalization, Knowledge and Society, 263-280. London, New York, and New Delhi: Sage Publications and ISA. Holznagel, Bernd 1989 "Der Einsatz von Konfliktmittlern, Schiedsrichtern und Verfahrensverwaltern im amerikanischen Umweltrecht." Die Verwaltung, 3.

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Kiersch G. and Sabine von Oppeln 1982 "Kernkraftwerksprogramme. Einstellungen zur Kernenergie in Frankreich und in der BR Deutschland." In Atomwirtschaft. Atomtechnik: 275-280. Kitschelt, Herbert 1980 Kernernergiepolitik, Arena eines gesellschaftlichen Konflikts. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. 1985 "Zur Dynamik Neuer Sozialer Bewegungen in den USA, Strategien Gesellschaftlichen Wandels und 'American Exceptionalism.'" In Karl-Werner Brand, ed., Neue Soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA, 248-305. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt. McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Leggewie, Claus 1985 "Propheten Ohne Macht, Die Neuen Sozialen Bewegungen in Frankreich Zwischen Resignation und Fremdbestimmung." In Karl-Werner Brand, ed., Neue Soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA, 83-139. Frankfurt and New York: Campus Klipstein, Michael von, and Burkhard Striimpel 1984 Der Uberdru/3 am Uberfluf). Miinchen and Wien: Olzog. Maheu, Louis 1991 "Nouveaux mouvements sociaux, mouvement syndical et democratic." Nouvelles pratiques sociales, 4, no. 1: 121-132. Maheu, Louis, and David Descent 1990 "Les mouvements sociaux, un terrain mouvant." Nouvelles pratiques sociales, 3, no. 1: 41-51. McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald 1987 "The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization." In Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy, eds., Social Movements in an Organizational Society, 337-391. New Brunswick, NJ, and Oxford: Transaction Books. Melucci, Alberto 1984 "An End to Social Movements?" Social Science Information, 24: 813-835. 1989 Nomads of the Present, Social Movements and the Individual Needs in Contemporary Society. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Mez, Lutz 1987 "Von den Biirgerinitiativen zu den Griinen." In Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht, eds., Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 263-277. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Offe, Claus 1985 "New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics." Social Research, 52, no. 4: 817-868. Oommen, T.K. 1990 "Movements and Institutions: Structural Opposition or Processual Linkage." International Sociology, 5, no. 2: 145-156. Piermont, Dorothee 1992 "Siamesische Zwillige." In Konkret, May. Rammstedt, O. 1978 Social Movements. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

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Roth, Roland 1985 "Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Eine Vorl^ufige Skizze." In Karl-Werner Brand, ed., Neue Soziale Bewegungen in Westeuropa und den USA, 20-82. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Roth, Roland, and Dieter Rucht, eds. 1987 Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt and New York: Campus. Rucht, Dieter 1987 "Von der Bewegung zur Institution?" In Roland Roth and Dieter Rucht, eds., Neue Soziale Bewegungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 238-263. Frankfurt and New York: Campus. 1989 "Environmental Movement Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure and Interorganizational Relations." In Bert Klandermans, ed., International Social Movement Research, vol. 2, 61-94. Greenwich, CN, and London: JAI Press. Statistisches Bundesamt, ed. 1989 Datenreport 1989. Stuttgart: Bonn Aktuell. Tarrow, Sidney 1989 Struggle, Politics and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest. Cornell Studies in International Affairs, Western Societies Papers. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Touraine, Alain 1973 Production de la societe. Paris: Les editions du Seuil. 1978 La voix et le regard. Paris: Les editions du Seuil. 1984 "Le reflux des mouvements sociaux." In Le retour de I'acteur. 271-298. Paris: Fayard. 1991 "Au-dela d'une societe du travail et des mouvements sociaux?" Sociologie et Societes, 23, no. 2: 27-41. Touraine, Alain, ed. 1981 Mouvements sociaux d'aujourd'hui, acteurs et analystes. Paris: Economic et humanisme, Les editions ouvrieres. Vaillancourt, Jean-Guy 1981 "Evolution, diversite et specificite des associations ecologiques quebecoises: de la centreculture et du conservationisme a Fenvironnementalisme et a I'ecosocialisme." Sociologie et societes 13, no. 1: 81-98. 1982a "Le mouvement ecologiste quebecois des annees 80." In Serge Proulx and Pierre Vallieres, eds., Changer de societe. Declin du nationalisme, crise culturelle et alternatives sociales au Quebec, 143-164. Montreal: Quebec/Amerique. 1982b Mouvement ecologiste, energie et environnement: essais d'ecosociologie. Montreal: Editions cooperatives Albert Saint-Martin. 1985 "Le mouvement vert quebecois: entre 1'ecologie et 1'ecologisme." Possibles 9, no. 3: 35-46. Worndl, Barbara 1992 "Social Movements." In Wolfgang Glatzer et al., Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990, 327-332. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag.

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Zald, Mayer N. 1987 "The Future of Social Movements." In John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Social Movements in an Organizational Society, 319—336. New Brunswick, NJ, and Oxford: Transaction Books.

268

10 Comparative Structural Analysis of Social Change in France and in Quebec Michel FORSE Simon LANGLOIS

To perform macro-sociological analyses of change for the purposes of comparison is a complex project, and we must find a way to reduce this complexity, for explanation requires simplification. Although the ambition of finding a general theory still haunts the field, the idea has been abandoned. In La place du desordre, R. Boudon (1984) gave many reasons for this. Social systems do not obey laws of history that can be extended to any group of societies, large or samll, since they do not necessarily produce the same effects. Starting from an a priori reading key, an aspect that we are sure is dominant (modernization or the rise of individualism, for example) and that imparts a meaning to all changes has the merit of clarity but not of systematicity. By its nature, this approach precludes integration of diversity except through force. Rather than giving up, we can turn to trends and the charting of their causal links - what we call a structural analysis - to propose a different perspective. This approach rejects all a priori hierarchies and all leading ideas that serve as guidelines, and claims that it is possible to discover the logic of changes through an a posteriori analysis of causative relations between trends. It is based not on a specific sociological theory but on a variety of theories, for if there is to be a theory of change, it must be a formal model that can be adapted to particular situations. 269

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As the trend approach has already been presented in detail elsewhere (Forse, 1991), here we will review only its major characteristics. Its point of departure resides in the identification of a group of medium-term (20-30 years) transformation trends for a given society. Trend analysis has overflowed the closed circle of specialists interested in prediction to become a means of describing social and cultural change. However, a trend is an ambiguous notion, often restricted to a statistical definition, such as "the direction that a statistical series takes once the short-term variations have been neutralized.» In fact, a trend may have a wider meaning, beyond the domain of statistical analysis; it can be defined as a statement on the evolution of a social segment. It is possible to distinguish such trends through qualitative observations, through timely observations made at irregular intervals, or through a number of statistical series. This perspective was explained and formalized by the French group Louis Dim (1985), in the following definition: "A trend is a theoretical diagnosis through which meaning is given to a group of empirical evolutions, described by indicators arising from a particular societal domain" (Forse et al., 1993: 4). In a way, a trend is the smallest unit of social change, in contrast to sweeping interpretations that seek to give meaning or unity to society as a whole. In itself, the trend has a circumscript, limited range. To identify trends, as Louis Dirn has defined them, consists, in a sense, of operationalizing social change by outlining a series of diagnoses of limited range. If research were to stop at this level, our international comparison would consist, as many do, of a discussion of similarities and differences between various countries. This would deprive us of the richest and most promising aspect of this approach: a systemic analysis of relations between trends that enables us to identify the structures of change in a given society and then to compare them across societies-supposing, of course, that a similar trend analysis has already been performed in several countries with comparable development levels, for identical periods, and following the same methodological rules. This is exactly the task we have undertaken for France and Quebec: a first structural comparison between the evolutions of these two societies since the 1960s. But what does this systemic analysis consist of? After listing the trends, the first step is to discuss systematically all of their possible causal relationships. We do this by placing the trends in rows and columns, then exploring the existence and the meaning of the relationships that may exist between each of them, noting with a plus sign (+) a reinforcing relationship between one trend and another, with a minus sign (-) a trend that constrains or affects negatively the evolution of another, and with a zero (0) the lack of a relationship. Once constructed, this square binary matrix can be submitted to a variety of analyses. Based on graph theory and using network-analysis algorithms (the matrix 270

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describes a network of causalities formally identical to a matrix of sociometric choices), processing is either explanatory or descriptive. In the first case, the direct and indirect antecedents and consequences of a trend are hierarchized a posteriori. Such a comparison of direct and indirect causalities, for which a number of methods have been developed, would obviously have great heuristic value, but we will instead be focusing on the second orientation, which involves investigating whether the complexity of the causal structure described by the matrix can be reduced by bringing to light groups of trends and studying the links between them. These substructures, called macrotrends, which are revealed from a posteriori processing of the matrix, give a general idea of the dimensions of change and their interrelationships. Interpretation of the whole and then a structural comparison are the next steps. The criterion for deciding that trends belong to a particular group can be either the degree to which they resemble each other (that is, those that have almost identical causes and effects) or the density of links with each other; there is no reason, of course, for groupings made on the basis of similitude to resemble those made on the basis of cohesion. An examination of the trends for France and for Quebec shows differences in each case. However, no matter how instructive the study of these differences, and so as not to complicate the problem from the start, we will confine ourselves to a comparison of macrotrends, and of the connections between them, obtained according to the criterion of cohesion. SOME

LIMITATIONS

Before we even begin to compare the results for France and Quebec, we must acknowledge that the structural analysis raises some overall difficulties and poses some problems. We shall respond to some of these before getting under way with our analysis of the matrix. First, there is the problem of closing the field. Is the list of trends exhaustive? Have important trends been forgotten? These questions raise the issue not of the problem itself, but rather of the state of knowledge regarding the society studied. If we can prove that an important trend has been neglected, researchers can take it into account by modifying the matrix, which will oblige them to recalculate and reanalyze. Thus, the matrix is not a closed system; rather, it evolves along with the society and our knowledge of it. The most important objection deals with the validity of the diagnosis of relations between trends. Most of the relationships posited here have not been systematically analyzed by researchers in a longitudinal perspective. Are these connections really empirically based, beyond all doubt? Once again, this lacuna characterizes the state of knowledge - the quality of sociography on the society studied - rather than the method itself. As we accumulate knowledge and research results, however, we will be able to refine our proposed diagnoses. The interesting 271

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aspect of this approach may very well be the ability to examine systematically certain relationships, which would then be taken into consideration in the matrix. The most important point is to ensure that a relationship between two trends persists when a third (or fourth) trend is taken into consideration. For instance, we observe that the rise in salaried work among women has resulted in fewer children being born. We must make sure that this relationship is not in fact caused by a third trend, such as a rise in education levels, which could be the source of the first two trends. To this problem of validity is added that of reliability: will two different teams of researchers make the same diagnosis of relationships between trends? This is a real difficulty. Many relationships are based on abundant documentation and it is possible to discern them precisely. In these cases, the problem of reliability is less acute. However, a good number of relationships have been the subject of little research. We can circumvent this difficulty by asking experts to make a diagnosis on the existence of a link. Relying on a consensus among a panel of experts is probably the best way to create reliability. In the case of doubt or profound disagreement, we will abstain from making a link between trends. Recourse to experts is an imperfect solution, of course, but it does have advantages: any diagnosis is better than none, and such a panel is probably in the best position to have a well-founded opinion on the phenomenon being studied. The fourth difficulty is the period studied and the differences over time. Some trends have immediate effects, while others are felt only over the long term. This is a major problem for econometric analyses that seek to quantify trend effects precisely (for example, the effect of the rise in interest rates on unemployment rates). We are not concerned with this aspect in our more qualitative approach; what is important to us is the existence of a relationship between two trends, and whether or not the effect of one on the other differs over time. The last problem is closely linked to our method. We posit that all relationships between trends have equal weight. For instance, we have identified that the increase in household wealth has eight consequences; of course, they are not all of equal importance. This trend contributes to accentuating inequalities, changing the value system, increasing the importance of the elderly, and so on. But how can we judge that one effect is more important than another? Empirical data do not enable us to answer this question precisely and definitively. It would be possible to quantify roughly the relative importance of relationships by using a weighting system - giving a score of 1 to a weak relationship and a score of 4 to a very strong one, for example. Aside from the arbitrariness of this procedure, it would create major problems in the analysis, given the state of development of instruments at our disposal. We must keep in mind that analysis of the matrix is not an end in itself, but a tool to help researchers formulate an interpretation of the whole that appeals to the sociological imagination, to borrow from C.W. Mills. 272

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THE MATRICES OF TRENDS IN FRANCE AND QUEBEC

The trends in the French and Quebec societies, respectively, were subjected to profound analysis in Forse et al. (1992) and Langlois et al. (1992). We ask the reader to refer to these volumes for identification of the trends. For reasons that are contingent and relate to the history of this research, the French and Quebec matrices are not the same size; the French matrix contains 60 trends and the Quebec one 75.' This difference did not create problems in terms of international comparison, since the Quebec team took as its point of departure the list of 60 trends created for France and specified some of them in greater detail. The only major difference is the addition of a group of five trends that characterize social representations, which are absent from the French matrix. This difference will have to be kept in mind during the comparative analysis of the two matrices. The matrix consisting of 75 trends theoretically renders possible 5,550 relationships, excluding the diagonal. A total of 606 empirical relationships have been identified for Quebec, for a density of 11%. With 60 trends across and down, the French matrix has a possibility of 3,540 significant cases, from which 509 links were formulated, for an overall density of 14%. In both matrices, each trend is linked to at least eight others, as antecedents or consequences. In the Quebec matrix, the antecedents are less scattered than the consequences; in rank one, the former have a standard deviation of 4.3, compared to 5.9 for the latter. The results are fairly similar for France. There are 70 symmetrical links, or 11.6% of the total, in Quebec, and 92 in France. Although they worked completely independently, the French and Quebec groups arrived at global results that are stunningly similar - a fact that tends to validate the methodology. To those who might criticize the subjectivity of the approach to constructing the matrix, we can respond that if the methodology had this fault, it would not, in all probability, lead to such consistency, especially since it is reinforced when we break down the trends according to number of antecedents and direct consequences. In both cases, the distributions are asymmetrical toward the right (see figure 1); if we had a strong package of basic trends and a few auxiliary trends, we would have found a Gaussian distribution. Thus, for both France and Quebec, the study of change cannot be reduced to the examination of a few major trends. We must take all developments into account in our diagnosis, and the entire matrix must be analyzed systematically. The matrix is too large, however, for a direct reading to be possible. We must reduce and simplify, while attempting to lose the least amount of information. 1 The Quebec matrix was constructed from the list of trends chosen by the International Research Group

for the Comparative Charting of Social Change, (Caplow et al., 1991). The English-language version of the work on France, (Forse et al., 1992), also contains the 75 trends used by the group for comparison purposes.

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As we mentioned above, one way of doing this is to group trends together that form a network the internal density of which is superior to the density of their relations with the exterior. Such a group of trends comprises a block that we call a macrotrend. Forse (1991) has given a detailed explanation of the logic of this approach; here, we will give a summary description of the broad outlines. We effect a hierarchical descending classification by partitioning the entire matrix into the most dense submatrices. By permuting rows and columns, we gather in one submatrix the trends that have the most interrelationships and the fewest relationships with trends belonging to the other submatrix. In other words, we change the order between the trends so that we bring together the ones that are most closely linked, resulting in two groups containing components with a maximum number of relationships among them and a minimum number of relationships with the components of the other group. Each submatrix can then be divided into new subgroups, which are increasingly dense and homogeneous as the number of their components diminishes. This sorting operation is used for block-model analysis - that is, a partition into blocks after permuting lines and columns. This sorting changes none of the data in the matrix; it simply groups them differently to reveal the underlying structure. The CONCOR programme is used to perform this analysis. Second, we investigate the causal relationships between these blocks. We count the number of elementary links in each block and between blocks, which enables us to compare and evaluate the meaning of these relationships. If we retain only the numbers above a certain threshold, we arrive at a simplified representation of the causative relationships between groups of trends. This simplification, however, calls on important methodological reserves. The final model, which has an important heuristic value, will serve in the formulation of new research hypotheses for which verification will be undertaken through sociology. By exposing and simplifying the relationships, we create a graph that should reveal a partial hierarchy of causalities. Certain groups will be more causal, while others will be more caused. The groups themselves, then their relationships, culminate in a representation of the underlying causative structure of the matrix that will be the object of comparison. In total, 12 macrotrends in France and 14 in Quebec were discerned. We will describe them briefly before comparing them. MACROTRENDS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS France

The first segmentation results in two blocks (1 and 2) with densities of 22% and 20%, respectively. (The numbers in parentheses refer to figure 2, which shows the descending segmentation of the matrix.) The first one groups together trends

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Figure 1 Number of Antecedents and Consequences of Trends, France and Quebec

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describing the evolution of social structures and institutions, while the second is more concerned with behaviours and their models, and with ways of living. Each block can in turn be separated into two others, with densities of 31%, 32%, 37%, and 25%, respectively. On one side are structures, social forces, changes in the work market, and politics (11) and large institutions (12). On the other side are cultural models (21) and ways of living (22). The advantage of this model, which presents just four large macrotrends, is its high degree of simplification; on the other hand, at this level each block still covers fairly heterogeneous phenomena. The only way to obtain more precision is to increase the number of groupings. This is done by performing the operation described above for each macrotrend that is considered in isolation. This process is illustrated by descending the tree in figure 2. Structures, social forces, and their institutionalization (111) are then differentiated from changes regarding work (112). Institutions are divided into those concerning qualifications and work (121) and those that represent local or societal interests (122). Among the models, on one side are those in which transformation is linked to change in the status and role of women (212); on the other are those that tend to reduce authority and diminish the power of the church (211). Ways of life are divided into diversification and relocation of use of free time and consumption (221) versus certain characteristics of households (222) (sociability, household wealth or purchasing power). Thus, for the moment we are dealing with eight groups in which overall relationship densities grow as classification level rises. However, the groups do not all have the same propensity for being further subdivided. Block 111 is divided into 1111, grouping together political trends, and 1112, representing social forces and their institutionalization. Block 112 (work) is divided into 1121, comprising trends that reflect tensions on the labour market, and 1122, in which organization and management of work are described. By segmenting block 121, we isolate the health and "computerization" trends, but we lose density. Likewise, for block 122, we can isolate association and decentralization with a loss of density. Block 212 comprises only four trends, and its division enables us only to distinguish the trend "army" from trends describing the place of women in society. Therefore, we have left these blocks undivided. Dividing block 211 permits us to distinguish between an "anomic" group and in "immigrant" group. There is no loss of density here, and we can consider that this division reveals additional information. However, we will remain at the previous level because it is obvious that diversification of codes of conduct, the decline in authority, religious practice, and influence of the church and of marriage, and the ethical problems posed by biotechnologies are all evolutionary factors that translate into the disorganization of models that were once dominant. The development of certain signs

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of anomie can thus be interpreted as the manifestation of malaise engendered by this disorganization. Difficulties with integration of immigrants are becoming so great that society has lost some of its major traditional points of reference. All of this seems able to fit perfectly and, even without partition, sheds a new light on the prenomena of anomie and integration of immigrants. Block 221 is also composed of eight trends, which are divided into 2211, describing consumption, and 2212, concerning the social conditions or the consumption framework. The final block, 222, is divided into 2221, which groups together trends describing household sociability, exhanges, and economic choices, and 2222, in which the link between the trends "youth" and "purchasing power" is explored, accompanied by the trends "poverty" and "delinquency"; in particular, the position occupied by the trend "youth" is quite surprising here. The proximity with "purchasing power" seems to indicate that the increasing independence of young people over the last 30 years should be intepreted, over all, as an economic phenomenon. In this case, all trends for this group reflect the processes of rising wealth and increases in inequalities that have occurred since the 1960s. Finally, from all of this we can distinguish twelve groups of trends, each of which is sufficiently coherent that we can relatively easily name the macrotrend at work: 1 Transformations of political and ideological behaviours (1111) 2 Growing middle class (1112) 3 Tensions on the labour market (1121) 4 Reorganization of businesses (1122) 5 Occupational and educational structure (121) 6 Intermediate regulation (122) 7 Disintegration of old models (211) 8 New women's roles and status (212) 9 Consumption framework (2211) 10 Household consumption (2212) 11 Household exchanges and sociability (2221) 12 Increase in wealth and inequalities (2222) This classification in its entirety is shown in figure 2. (The circled numbers are those where we have decided to stop.) The two following tables (1 and 2) summarize this analysis by presenting the trends and how they are grouped, along with the titles they have been given. Each block is an important loop in the maze of causative links described by the model. It is thus of interest to construct a simplified graph of causalities between macrotrends based on an examination of the interrelationships between the trends that comprise them. The fact that the classification is descending enables us to start from 277

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Figure 2 Segmentation of the Trends in France

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Table 1 Trends in France and Their Clustering

Political differ. 11.1 Consensus 11.2 Political parties 9.4

Self-identity 2.1 Occupat. status 6.1 Mobility 6.2 Social movements 10.3

Types of employment 4.3 Unemployment 4.1 Negotiation 7.2 Dispute settlem. 10.1 Conflicts 7.1 Labour unions 9.1

Work organization 5.1 Personnel administration 5.2 Enterprises 5.3 Interest groups 10.4

Matrimonial models 3.3 Religious beliefs 11.4 Norms of conduct 7.3 Religious institutions 9.2 Reproductive tecbnol. 3.5 Authority 7.4 Immigration 16.1 Disorders 16.3

Women employ 3.4 General education 15.1 Females roles 3.1 Childbearing 3.2 The military 9.3

Vocational education 15.2 Labour sectors 4.4 Educational system 8.1 Skills 4.2 Health system 8.2 Computerization 4.5

Associations 2.5 Local autonomy 2.4 Public opinion 7.5 Welfare system 8.3 Institutionalization of labour unions 10.2

Economic orientations 11.3 Information 13.2 Community 2.3 Sports 14.3

Market goods 13.1 Beauty 13.3 Free time 14.1 Culture 14.4

Elders 1.2 Family wealth 12.3 Vacation 14.2 Sociability 2.6 Kinship 2.2 Household production!3.4 Informal econ. 12.2

Youth 1.1 Crime 16.2 Family income 12.1 Poverty 16.4

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Table 2 Macrotrends that Characterize French Society

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Figure 3 Causal Structure between Macrotrends - France

Exogenous 4 Businesses 5 Occupational & educational structures 12 Wealth & inequalities

Relay 2 Middle class 7 Old models 8 Women's roles 9 Consumption framework 11 Sociability

Endogenous 1 Political behaviour 3 Labour market 6 Intermediate regulations 10 Household consumption

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Convergence or Divergence

a very abbreviated graph, describing the relationships between the four major groups, to make it more complex, and to extend it thereafter to a representation of the main links between the twelve macrotrends we have retained (figure 3). The causal structure is not, properly speaking, the result of a classic quantitative analysis. It must be seen, rather, as an attempt at a global diagnosis made from a qualitative examination of the relationships between trends, and be used to develop hypotheses and paths of interpretation rather than to make firm conclusions. We must keep in mind that these are macrolinks obtained thanks to a drastic simplification of the initial complete graph. In reality, links exist in all directions and between all of the vertices, and only the most important flows are presented above. This graph shows the globally causative role of institutional transformations. Behavioural models change under the influence of institutions, but keep a relatively causative position and a relatively high ranking in the hierarchy. Institutionalized structures and social forces, politics, and changes in work and employment are in an intermediate position, contradicting a number of theories that have accorded them the position that institutions occupy here. Household life styles are at the end of the chart, signifying that household behaviour is explained by cultural and structural transformations, rather than the reverse. The interest of this model lies in its relatively atypical shape, which corresponds to no major theory. Neither production nor structural or infrastructural relations are primary. Cultural transformations are decisive with regard to behaviours, which implies a certain culturalism, but they do not occupy a primary position either. One could talk of a tempered culturalism, since the large institutions seem to enjoy sufficient autonomy to cause cultural changes. This is even more interesting because it is not the institutions that have or had a powerful symbolic role (such as the army or the church) that comprise this group, but those from the national or territorial "social sector" (the welfare state, health, training). All of these institutions are the first affected by decentralization. In this motivating group are also all of the elements that contribute to structuring the labour market. Examination of the macrolinks between the 12 groups shows the primary causative role played by the macrotrend "occupational and educational structure" (5). The institutions exercising intermediate regulation (6) are in reality more caused than causative. This diagnosis is confirmed by an examination of the macrolinks between the 12 groups (figure 3, model 2), in which the "occupational and educational structure" macrotrend (5) plays a very important causal role. Two other macrotrends are also more decisive: the destabilizing effect of growing wealth (12) and the reorganization of businesses (4). The change in purchasing power is behind a transformation in life styles and has had the effect of levelling the social structure. Although it is influenced essentially by tensions on the labour market (unemployment, precariousness, etc.), its global role leads us to suggest 282

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that the causative model attributes a rising position to economic factors. This hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that the two other groups that are in an analogous position (4 and 5) are themselves tightly linked to productivity, and the job structure is one way to describe the structure of economic production. However, these latter two macrotrends are not limited to these aspects alone. The group concerning employment includes the trend "computerization" and contains the link between technical and economic factors and the traditionally motivating role assigned to them. This group also includes everything that deals with training and qualifications. That this is a key problem is well accepted today. The model only confirms the eminent role of education (linked to the job structure) in the explanation of change. Certain macrotrends are in an intermediate causative position: they are as much influencing as influenced. This is the case for group 2, which describes changes in the social structure; group 7, which comprises institutions and behaviour models in the midst of change; group 8, which describes the transformation of women's status; group 9, which deals with transformation, and notably a certain relocation, of household consumption conditions; and group 11, which deals with major changes in exchanges and sociability among domestic groups. Structures, models, roles, and status have thus been the agents of change. Themselves in mutation, they both explain trends and are explained by them. Finally, four macrotrends are "downstream" in the chart and represent a sort of endogenous form of the model, which is worth taking a close look at. Group 1 describes a situation of ideological and political sluggishness; group 3 reflects tensions on the labour market; group 6 deals with intermediate regulation; and group 10 describes new consumption and life-style orientations. It is not surprising to find this last group in a position of being globally caused. Consumption itself is more a result. The most endogenous macrotrends (groups 1, 3, and 6) describe, each in its own way, a state of crisis or tension: ideological and political sluggishness due to growing indifference toward ideologies of the past; tension on the labour market that results in unemployment and precariousness; and crises in the welfare state accompanied by the problem, recurrent in France, of intermediate regulation (associations, unions, etc.) the institutional aspect of which is poorly defined or recognized; this state of affairs is aggravated by excessive decentralization. The position of these three crises poses a problem. If they had occupied the intermediate position of structures and behaviour models, we might have had an idea of the changes that they could not help but involve. In the endogenous position, they are explained by other transformations, but it is hard to see where they will lead.

283

Convergence or Divergence

Quebec

A preliminary division of the 75 trends observed in Quebec separates them into two large blocks with a fairly weak density (16% in both cases). These blocks comprise trends that deal with individual behaviours and ways of life in the broad sense, on the one hand, and institutions, collective traits, and social norms, on the other. These two subgroups are themselves too heterogeneous for our purposes, and so they have been divided into four groups with a higher density (23%, 25%, 22%, and 25%, respectively). These blocks are more homogeneous and comprise four overarching dimensions. On one side are elements that specify living conditions - revenue, inequality, and precariousness - and elements that specify ways and means of life-women's roles, standards of conduct, and microsociety. On the other side are institutions, including trends that characterize the emergence of a social consensus and of public opinion as a controlling element in society, and trends describing work and social position. If we continue to divide the matrix into blocks, we ultimately obtain 14 highdensity groups of trends, instead of the 75 individual trends in the original matrix. Figure 4 presents the results of the hierarchical descending classification we obtained. Each of the blocks is characterized by or named for the identity of trends it contains. Thus, block 4 can be designated "social disorganization and anomie," because it groups together a number of elementary trends describing the emergence of social problems: increases in suicide, consumption of mood-altering drugs, delinquency, and emotional disorders. In some cases, it is more difficult to name a macrotrend that groups together heterogeneous trends, so we must search for coherence or attempt to reveal a hidden meaning. For instance, we can take as a point of departure the trend that has the greatest number of links to others within the group. Below is a brief description of the content of the 14 macrotrends retained for analysis. 1.

Growing precariousness This block groups together six trends characterizing growing precariousness in employment, rising unemployment, an increase of jobs in the tertiary sector, the development of the informal economy, and the rising level of education. All of these trends show that integration into employment and, more broadly, into society are tending to become more difficult, and a growing number of people must be content with a precarious status in society, in spite of more education and a greater amount of training acquired by young graduates.

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Figure 4 Hierarchical Descending Classification of Trends - Quebec

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Convergence or Divergence

2.

Increasing wealth This block contains three trends: an increase in real income, a rise in salaried work among women, and accumulation of household wealth. Since 1960, Quebec society has grown wealthier; the real revenue of individuals rose quickly until 1975, then underwent a serious slowdown between 1975 and 1990. Salaried work by women in families has either compensated for this slowdown or contributed to taking the family to a clearly higher income level. 3.

Rise in inequalities Social, cultural, and economic inequalities tended to diminish at the beginning of the period analyzed, but they were accentuated in the second half - that is, since 1975. Although society was wealthier in 1990, it also appeared to be more unequal. The 1980s thus marked a turning-point in the evolution of inequalities. Individuals and families in the top revenue quintile are capturing a growing share of disposable income, while individuals and families in the lowest quintile have seen their relative position deteriorate in this regard. The numerous changes in life styles also generate new types of inequality and emphasize, others, such as those between women and between the generations. Aside from trends characterizing economic and social inequalities and poverty, we find in this block the trend specifying a rise in standard of living for the elderly. In Quebec, we have observed the appearance of an important generational effect in the second half of the period studied, marked by a deterioration in the relative position of young people and a relative improvement in that of the aged. Finally, two trends characterizing social representations - a rise in satisfaction and confidence in the future - are in this second group. A seventh trend, the lengthening of annual vacations, is not linked a priori to the others. 4.

Social disorganization and anomie Trends in this block describe dysfunctions in the social system and emphasize certain social problems: increases in delinquency, consumption of mood-altering drugs, emotional disorders, and suicide rates. In this group are also found the trend of bipolarization of professional training, indicating a devaluation of this type of training, which is more marked in the secondary-school system. These deficiencies in professional training have been criticized often in Quebec. Finally, this block contains the trend of increased interest in business. This is not linked very closely to the others, and undoubtedly it constitutes a second misplaced trend. 5.

Change in women's roles Women's roles have changed considerably. Women have acquired increased economic independence and are more active in spheres outside the home. The decrease in birthrate is probably one of the most marked trends in this block, which 286

Comparative Structural Analysis

is also characterized by recourse to contraception, an increasing diversity in matrimonial models, the advent of retail consumption, and changes in values. This mutation is toward individualization in the feminine condition. The changes observed in religious beliefs, notably the individualization of beliefs, are closely associated with changes in the feminine condition. 6.

New standards of conduct and transformation of models This block characterizes the advent of new forms of conduct: the questioning of traditional authority figures, liberalization of standards of conduct, more attention to eroticism, and greater sociability between peers. Two other trends are attached to these: the declining influence of the church and the increased concern with physical care and health. 7.

Transformation of daily life, based on mobility Daily life has been the theatre for a number of transformations. Domestic work tends to be increasingly shared between men and women, and mobility has increased in all spheres of activity. Personal space and individual horizons have widened, as evidenced in the increase in daily mobility and the marketing of leisure outside the home. Use of time has changed, and free time seems to be more constrained. The media have acquired more importance in people's daily lives. They are more numerous, more diversified, and more present. 8.

Microsociety is changing its form Five trends characterizing the immediate surroundings of individuals are aggregated to form a macrotrend: identification of the microsociety, dispersion and diminished density of the family, marked development of associational life, greater population concentration in urban centres, and increased sports activity. We can conclude that it is the entire microsociety that is being transformed. The traditional forms of organization of daily life, based on family and taking place within a small circle, are being modified: local and sociability networks are becoming more important. 9.

The emergence of the Quebecois identity The Quebecois identity is in ascendance, to the detriment of the FrenchCanadian identity, which now seems split into regional identities. Increased social mobility is linked, in fact, to the greater presence of government, at both the provincial and federal levels. Modernization of society and the creation of a number of state apparatuses have contributed to the establishment of a middle class, mainly among Francophones. The immigration trend is found in this block, indicating the willingness of Quebec society to welcome and integrate new arrivals. The linguistic laws adopted over the years support the desire to integrate immigrants into the 287

Convergence or Divergence

Francophone majority, with the consequence of an eventual transformation of identity. Finally, there is a long anti-militarist tradition in Quebec, which was expressed during the conscription crisis of the Second World War. The army, under federal jurisdiction, has long been seen as an institution that is not very open to Francophones. 10. Increased presence of the state A number of trends describe the increased intervention of the state, which has taken charge of a great number of functions, including education, health care, social security, and promotion of economic development. In Quebec, the existence and orientations of social movements have been closely connected to government intervention. Social movements and interest groups have always declared themselves in favour of broader state intervention, or else they pressure the government to modify its orientations. The trend of development of small and medium-sized business also appears in this block, showing the tight link between business and government. 11. Broader social consensus Quebec society seems to have become much less conflictual as it approached the 1990s. Radicalism is in decline, social conflicts are less sharp, mechanisms for arbitration and negotiation have been institutionalized, and confidence in existing institutions has risen. The institutionalization of unions is part of the shift to this broader social consensus. There is also a certain convergence in political behaviours. 12. Increased referral to public opinion The mass media are playing a more important role as a mechanism of social control. We also see more marked and more frequent referral to public opinion, as evidenced by the multiplication of polls, both by government bodies and by businesses and associations. This serves as a sort of intermediate social control. There is greater democratization of political parties, indicated by numerous electoral laws, notably those regulating financing of parties, at least on the municipal and provincial levels. Finally, we are witnessing a shift toward concern for social problems, particularly under the influence of the mass media. 13. New forms of work organization Union membership increased greatly in the 1960s, but the rate of unionization hit a ceiling as of the mid-1970s, when there was also a great feminization of union membership. The role of unions in businesses has changed considerably. Work organization is tending to become less bureaucratic and more emphasis is placed on promotion of participation of workers and employees. This movement is still 288

Comparative Structural Analysis

embryonic, but changes in the form of work management are so clear that we can speak of a macrotrend in this sense. In fact, authority relationships are changing, and the hierarchical path is no longer as strong as it once was. 14. Growth then relative stability of the middle class The social structure changed profoundly in the 30-year period from 1960 to 1990. Francophones have considerably increased their status in the social hierarchy, and the Quiet Revolution has given rise to a middle class that depends on government apparatuses being more present in the private sphere. The brake on growth at the end of the 1980s, along with a group of other factors, resulted in a slowdown in the growth of the middle class, which has an uncertain status as we enter the 1990s. Bipolarization of professional qualifications seems to accentuate this crisis. The trend of development of permanent training also appears in this block. Having established the macrotrends, we constructed, for Quebec, a causal structure using the same procedure as that for France (figure 5). To begin with, we shall briefly examine the links between the four major dimensions (figure 3, model 1). Institutions are an upstream position, transformations in the socio-economic structure play a relay role, and life styles, like matters regarding work and social position, are exogenous. It thus seems that institutional changes have played a very important motivating role in Quebec. But this schema is still very general, and we should examine the detailed model of relations between the 14 macrotrends before making a comparison with the French model (figure 4, model 2). Four macrotrends appear as exogenous to the model, requiring further changes. The motivating role of the government (10) in the modernization of Quebec is confirmed; this diagnosis will surprise no one, as many researchers have come to the same conclusion. The government's role is twofold: it has established a group of institutions and social measures comprising what is commonly called the welfare state, and it has been an important actor in the collective promotion of the socioeconomic status of Francophones, who had been in a position of inferiority. The motivating role of the microsociety, alongside that of the state, is rather more surprising. This observation led us to hypothesize that the great social changes that Quebec has known have not come only from above. Changes in the family system, accelerated urban development, and the increased population concentration in urban centres, as well as observable changes at the microsociety and local levels, have all played a part in the changes that have characterized Quebec, in parallel with the influence exerted by the government. We have often described Quebec as a closeknit society. Thus, changes observed, notably at the microsociety level, in the family system, and in traditional work places, appear to be at the source of other social transformations. Two other macrotrends, increased wealth on one side and increasing precariousness on the other, have also played a major, probably diametrically 289

Convergence or Divergence

Figure 5 Causal Structure Between Macrotrends - Quebec Model 1

Model 2

Exogenous 10 State 8 Microsocial 2 Enrichment 1 Precariousness

290

Relay 14 Middle class 5 Women's roles 12 Public opinion

Endogenous 9 New identity 11 Consensus 3 Inequality 4 Social disorganization 6 New norms 7 Daily life

Comparative Structural Analysis

opposed, role in the process of change, and their effects are no doubt felt at different times. Increasing wealth was most evident in the 1960s and 1970s, while precariousness arose strongly during the 1980s. Three macrotrends emerge as agents of change, playing an intermediary role: they both are affected by other changes and themselves cause social transformations. This is the case, above all, with women's roles. The feminine condition has profoundly changed under the effect of a great number and variety of influences, and it has, in turn, been the source of other changes. The development of professional qualifications and the changes observed in the social structure, particularly the establishment of a more extended middle class, have also been at the centre of the process of transformation of Quebec society, serving as a relay between changes undergone above and below. The constitution of a true body of public opinion and the extension of the mass media have also served as agents in the process of social change. Five macrotrends represent changes induced by other macrotrends; they appear as consequences of the macrotrends analyzed above. The first is the confirmation of a strong Quebecois identity, to which must be added the appearance of a strong social consensus. Deep ideological transformations are under way. In parallel to the split of the French-Canadian identity into regional identities, the Quebecois identity is strongly affirmed as a national identity. Quebec society has also become less conflictual; a greater social consensus has emerged as radicalism has waned. Inequalities diminished after the beginning of the 1960s, in the wake of increased government intervention. But this narrowing of the gap came to a stop during the 1980s, and a number of indices lead us to believe that it is widening again. New forms of social inequalities have also appeared, notably between women and between generations. The transformation that Quebec has undergone has also been accompanied by the appearance of a number of forms of social disorganization: more visible and frequent violence and a rise in suicide rates, drug addition, and homelessness. New social forms have been established, with the questioning of traditional authority figures. Finally, daily life has been transformed profoundly; it is based more on mobility and more open to the outside world because of increased access to the mass media.

291

Convergence or Divergence

COMPARISON OF FRANCE AND QUEBEC Convergent macrotrends on a background of singularities

By dividing the matrix into four large subgroups, we highlight convergences and singularities. In France, work and social position are associated, though in a broader sense, with "structuring of social forces," which includes, notably, transformation of political and ideological behaviours and reorganization of business. The trends observed in the life-style groups in France and in Quebec are not similar in all respects, but both models do identify fairly similar groups. Although this is true for institutions, the "models" dimension in France has no equivalent in Quebec, and "transformation of socio-economic structures" in Quebec has no strict equivalent in the French model. However, these groups are still too heterogeneous to lend themselves to a detailed comparison, which would be conducted, rather, between the 12 and 14 macrotrends of each society, respectively. The content of the 12 macrotrends isolated for France and the 14 isolated for Quebec is fairly convergent, although, of course, the trends listed in each block are not absolutely identical. This is quite normal, since the two societies are very different with regard to history, geographical situation, and size, to mention just a few factors; as well, the Quebec matrix includes 15 more trends than the French matrix. What stands out is that the trends describing a macrotrend in one society are not scattered randomly in macrotrends that characterize the other society. Many macrotrends, such as increased social consensus and changes in women's roles, are almost identical in their general configuration. The trends in the majority of the other macrotrends are found in at most two different macrotrends in the other society. Finally, one macrotrend in each society has no clear correspondence in the other, a remarkable result that deserves special mention. The macrotrends are not organized by chance, nor only as a function of the respective historical, geographical, or other constraints within each society. Although it is predictable that the groupings are not identical, there are consistencies that provide validity for this coherent exploratory approach, as we can observe in the principal convergences and divergences illustrated in figure 6. This figure can be read either from the left, to see which Quebec macrotrends correspond to which French ones, or from the right, to see which French macrotrends correspond to which Quebec ones. Changes in women's roles appear clearly in both societies in the form of macrotrends with fairly similar content. In the French case, the macrotrend is formed of trends characterizing changes in the feminine condition in the strict sense "women's work," "childbearing," "role models," "education level" - while the Quebec macrotrend includes, in addition, the trends describing evolution of consumption and of religious practice . From this, we can speculate that in Quebec, 292

Comparative Structural Analysis

Figure 6 Correspondence Between Macrotrends, France and Quebec

FRANCE 1 Consensus 3 Tensions on the labour market 5 Occupational and educational structures 2 Growing middle class 4 Enterprises 6 Intermediate regulation 11 Sociability 10 Consumption 8 Women's roles 7 Disintegration of old model

QUEBEC Consensus 11 Precariousness 1

Middle class 14 State 10 Work organization 13 Public opinion 12 Microsocial 8 Daily life 7 Women's roles 5 New norms 6 Social disorganization 4

12 Enrichment

Enrichment 2 Inequality 3

9 Consumption framework

New identity 9

293

Convergence or Divergence

the change have marked the feminine condition are not isolated from changes observed in other areas. In recent years, intermediate forms of social control have been developing in France. Various forces tend to counter or circumvent the centralization so often observed by analysts. On the one hand, consultation of public opinion via polling is tending to become more extensive; on the other hand, associative life has developed and a degree of decentralization has occurred. These two aspects are also found in Quebec, but they form two separate and stronger macrotrends: "recourse to public opinion" and "microsociety." This is one example of a French macrotrend corresponding to two Quebec macrotrends, a configuration that occurs a number of times. Since the 1960s, both societies have seen a major increase in overall wealth. The Quebec matrix is more finely divided than the French matrix in various forms of inequalities: in France, increasing wealth and a rise in inequalities are grouped in one macrotrend, while in Quebec, they form two macrotrends. Both societies have also evolved in parallel with regard to social conflicts. Three trends, forming a sort of nucleus, characterize the emergence of a social consensus or, at least, a diminution of discord: "creation of arbitration mechanisms," "development of negotiation procedures," and "diminution of social conflicts." These central trends link up with others that are not the same in the two societies. In France, they are associated with the trends "rise in unemployment," "more varied forms of employment," and "reduction in unionization rate"; in Quebec, they are associated with the trends "reduction in radicalism" and "increased confidence in institutions." These differences are explained by the social organization and history of the respective societies. In France, social and political struggle were led by the Communist Party, which has been in a state of constant decline; however, this loss of influence has not prevented a number of conflicts from springing up. Conflicts are not as generalized as they were in the 1960s; rather, they seem more localized or miniaturized - restricted to certain places or sectors of activity. In Quebec, the large unions, which are not affiliated with any one political party, were involved in a number of major social conflicts during the 1960s and 1970s, and were the main outlet for the expression of radicalism. Thereafter, they became less radical and were no longer the motivating force behind conflicts and social tensions, which were reabsorbed at the end of the eighties as radicalism declined. In spite of a deterioration in the socio-economic position of many groups, in particular that of young households, and a very high unemployment rate, social conflicts and tensions are less acute in a context marked by a clear slowdown in growth than they were in a more favourable context.

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The disintegration of old models in France is characterized by the decreasing influence of the church, a growing diversity of matrimonial models, and changes in authority roles. This macrotrend also contains signs of anomie: consumption of alcohol and drugs, suicides, and mental illness. Again, the elements that form a single macrotrend in France appear in two discrete macrotrends in Quebec: "new standards" on the one hand, and "social disintegration and anomie" on the other. As well, the elements that form the French macrotrend "employment and training structure" are found, yet again, in two macrotrends in Quebec, "growing precariousness" and "growth of the middle class," which themselves contain other trends that are listed in the French macrotrends "tension on the labour market" and "growing middle class." The trends describing training, work, jobs, and business give rise to the most divergent groupings among the ensemble of macrotrends observed in the two societies. This is probably due to very different respective institutional contexts. It is to be noted, however, that each macrotrend in one society corresponds to only two others in the other society. Finally, two blocks of trends do not have any exact correspondence in the other society: in Quebec "the Quebecois identity," and in France "the consumption framework." The Quebec matrix contained a trend bearing on the emergence of a new collective identity; this trend was absent in the French matrix, which probably explains the divergence observed. The case of the French macrotrend "consumption framework" is more complex; it is more difficult to describe and especially to interpret, because it is composed of not very homogeneous basic elements. The differences described above were predictable, since the two societies are not identical. The surprise is that there are so few divergences. Does it follow that, with just two exceptions, there is perfect similarity between the two models? The answer is, of course, no, since the similarities between the macrotrends all lead to a diagnosis of partial or relative convergence. In other words, similarities are always accompanied by singularities. Thus, although France and Quebec have had, in the very large majority of cases, comparable change processes, they are nevertheless not identical. Most often, the classic comparative analyses of change conclude, in a more or less embarrassed way, that there is a certain mixture of convergences and divergences in the processes studied. The reason for the confusion is that strong divergences between industrial societies are exceptional, and absolute convergence is even rarer. Most often, differences mask resemblances or, what comes to the same thing, similarities mask divergences. This is what we call a singularity. It is possible to understand this phenomenon only if one systematically resituates each analyzed element in a substructure - that is, if one takes the measure of that which, beyond divergences, differs within the similar. One advantage of comparative structural analysis is precisely that it highlights these singularities. 295

Convergence or Divergence

In most of these cases, we have noted that a similar over-all evolution linked one or two macrotrends (depending on the society), in which the contents were similar without being exactly the same. In other words, when two macrotrends are similar, the trends that they contain have, of course, something in common, but also aspects that are different. Let us take, for example, the "consensus" macrotrend (numbers 1 in France and 11 in Quebec). In both societies, there has been a decrease in major ideological discord, and in both models this was embodied in a macrotrend. From this point of view, there is convergence; however, upon closer examination, the trends comprising the respective macrotrends are not identical. The French trends concern only developments in ideology and politics; in Quebec there are also trends describing the labour market in a broad sense ("conflicts," "negotiations," "unions," etc.). There has been an increase in consensus in both societies, but it does not have the same significance: in France, it is limited to the ideological-political aspect, while it involves first the business world in Quebec, and then society as a whole. A quick look at the phenomenon would lead us to believe that both societies had evolved in the same way; without negating this, the structural analysis shows emphatically that differences nevertheless persist. The same reasoning applies on the trend level. In construction, the trends are quite similar from one country to the other, but we better illuminate their resemblance by comparing their structural position in each model. When identical trends are listed in similar macrotrends, the roles played by each with regard to change are very similar. There is convergence. When, on the contrary, they are listed in different macrotrends, we must conclude that the same basic evolution does not have the same structural significance from one society to the other. This situation reinforces local singularity, without necessarily leading to a global divergence of the models, since the two macrotrends in question usually have an equivalent in-, the model of the other country. For example, in both France and Quebec there has been, according to trend 10.2, institutionalization of unions. In France, this must be interpreted as a issue of transformation of intermediate control, since this trend is listed in macrotrend 6, which groups developments relating to this issue. In Quebec, the same phenomenon has a more ideological dimension, since it is found in macrotrend 11, describing the increase in consensus. To take another example, the increase in salaried work among women is linked in France to changes in the status of women (macrotrend 8), while in Quebec it is first an economic phenomenon (macrotrend 2, increasing wealth). On the other hand, evolution of the forms of authority (trend 7.4) in ritualized situations has a structural significance that is almost identical in France and in Quebec. In both cases, it is listed in a macrotrend (numbers 6 in Quebec and 7 in France) describing transformations of old behaviour models. As well, the reduction 296

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in political radicalism in Quebec (trend 11.4) plays a role comparable to that of the fall of the Communist Party in France (trend 9.4), even though the formulations are, given the local political contexts, different. Both contribute to the diminution of discord (macrotrends 1 in France and 11 in Quebec). Here again, structural analysis helps us to understand the divergences and singularities that are hidden behind the convergences. It shows that the same trends do not necessarily have the same structural roles, and, on the contrary, that different trends can play similar roles (the role being only the result of a change of position in the model). It is not possible here to analyze in detail each trend in both models. Such an examination would lead to the same conclusion that we can draw from studying the macrotrends: absolute convergence does not exist, and since cases of extreme divergence are rare, most often the change is in an identical global direction that takes nothing from the singularities of the processes at work in each society. Similarities and differences

in causal models

If, in spite of everything, we can say that convergence dominates divergence, the over-all diagnosis of the comparison of causal structures presented above (figures 3 and 5) will be more complex. We shall start by examining the two aggregate models in four dimensions. The French model has brought to light an atypical explanatory schema with regard to theories of change. The same atypical schema is revealed in the Quebec model, where institutions also play an exogenous role. This seems to confirm that they have enough autonomy to entail other changes in industrial societies. Over the last 20 or 30 years, production relations and the economic infrastructure may not have played the motivating role that many classic theories have attributed to them (see Mendras and Forse, 1983). In both models, life style - in a very broad sense - occupies an endogenous position, which demonstrates its dependence on other transformations. This position reinforces the overall convergence of the two explanatory schemas, which start from institutions and culminate in life styles. "Transformations of socio-economic structures" in Quebec play a role that has something in common with that of "social structures and forces" in France, but the comparison here is attenuated by the fact that these two dimensions overlap only partially. The other macrotrends differ even more in their composition, and it is thus difficult to compare their positions. The moderate "culturalism" of the French model is not found clearly in Quebec; conversely, the exogenous role in Quebec of work relations and matters regarding social position cannot be compared in the French case, in which trends are grouped differently with regard to this point. To provide more precision and to work more systematically, it is thus preferable to focus on the models constructed from the 12 and 14 macrotrends, respectively. 297

Convergence or Divergence

The French model attributes a motivating role in social change to the economic macrotrends "increase in wealth", "reorganization of businesses," and "occupational and educational structure." While increasing wealth seems to be an important engine of social transformations and changes in the Quebec model, increased precariousness, which includes training, is also found in a causative position. As well, the macrotrend "increased presence of the state," which includes a trend on business, is situated upstream in the Quebec model, no doubt because the state is a driving force in economic and social development. The motivating role traditionally attributed to economic factors is thus confirmed in both societies. However, in the Quebec case, the central role played by the microsociety is added, since urbanization, centralization, and changes in parenting seem also to have resulted in other social transformations. The French equivalent plays only a relay role. It is in the relay position that the greatest divergences between the two societies are revealed. Three macrotrends appear in completely different positions, and only one is in an identical position. We will start with this one. The changes characterizing women's roles are, in both cases, at once caused and causative, thus in a central position. These changes .are, first, themselves the product of other changes, notably economic development and extension of training. The changes in the feminine condition, without doubt one of the most radical transformations observed in contemporary societies, thus play an intermediate role in society as a whole: they are caused, in the wide sense, by economic forces, and they have other consequences in their turn. A large middle class has formed in both societies. However, this has had different consequences: it has probably contributed to a decrease in ideological opposition and polarization in France, notably accentuating the decline of the Communist Party, while in Quebec it has been the principal source of the creation of a stronger national identity and social consensus. Two other macrotrends are found in a relay position in the French model: those describing sociability and changes in behavioural models. The basic trends that comprise these two blocks are found in macrotrends that occupy different positions in the Quebec model. "Disintegration of old behavioural models," in a central position in the French model, is found in an endogenous, thus caused, position in the Quebec model. The elements that define the French macrotrend "tensions on the labour market" are found in two Quebec macrotrends, "growing precariousness" and "broader social consensus," downstream in the model. Analysis of the macrotrends in an endogenous position in both models reveals, once again, convergences and divergences. The first element of convergence is that in both societies, transformations observed in consumption, daily life, and life styles are caused by other social changes. The second is that the changes in each society have led to a widening of social consensus and a decrease in radicalism. 298

Comparative Structural Analysis

There is, however, an important divergence between the two societies. In France's case, we can hypothesize the existence of three major crises: one in employment, one in ideologies, and one in institutions, particularly in the welfare state. This diagnosis is formulated from identification of endogenous macrotrends in the model, which tend to put them in the caused position. The situation is quite different in Quebec, where the state played a motivating role in social transformations, especially after 1960. The welfare state was established later in Quebec than in France, and it was much less present and less strong at the beginning of the period studied. Quebec evolved toward greater centralization during this period, while in France the existence of a very centralized state was questioned. Quebec, for its part, had a major social crisis, marked by the emergence of more acute social problems and a rise in inequalities. CONCLUSION Structural consistencies alongside singularities

The comparative analysis we have just sketched out-too briefly, it is true, in the tight framework imposed here - provides an exemplary illustration of the distinction between the formal and the empirical formulated by Boudon (1984) to characterize social change. In our comparative analysis of two causal models, we have found social processes that reveal consistencies requiring explanation in terms of ideal models, which might give rise to a general statement, and also singular social processes, belonging to a given society in a given context. Here we will content ourselves with describing the advantage of this distinction between the formal and the empirical, with the understanding that comparison between only two societies constitutes a fragile and insufficient basis. First, it seems possible to distinguish structural consistencies at work in developed societies, at least with regard to these two cases. We must stress the influence of economic factors, which seem to play a decisive role in social change. Second, the social processes at work in developed societies seem to lead to a decrease in discord, and perhaps even to a wider social consensus. Although global and generalized social tensions and conflicts are fading, this does not imply the disappearance of all conflict - far from it. Rather, conflicts are becoming more localized, more limited, more circumscribed, and shorter. What has changed is the fact that social conflicts no longer involve a questioning of the overall society, in contrast to the globalizing aims of radical ideologies in the 1960s and 1970s. A third statement describing another structural consistency will, for the moment, be formed as a hypothesis. This is the relay role played by the transformation in women's roles in the process of social change. Contrary to certain feminist theories, changes in women's roles and, in a wider sense, in the feminine condition were a motivating force in the social change that has taken place in 299

Convergence or Divergence

developed societies. First, the condition of women changed under the impetus of a good number of other changes, then the new feminine condition itself caused social, cultural, and economic changes. The same can be said for transformation of social stratification, which can be seen as a modification of class relations, considered by many to be a primary cause of social change. Both societies have seen a large increase in the middle class, but in both cases this evolution has played only a relay role, and was caused principally by economic changes and transformation of employment. The final structural consistency is that changes observed in life styles appear as endogenous, resulting from a complex group of other changes. Community enrichment and new women's roles are probably among the forces that have resulted in a profound redefinition of life styles, which are now characterized by diversity and mobility of form. However, our analysis emphasizes, quite strongly, that social change is also singular. Different history, geography, and, perhaps most importantly, institutions from one country to another provoke deep divergences in the disposition or configuration of processes at work. The case of centralization/decentralization illustrates very well the existence of such singularities. In France, there is a trend toward a certain degree of decentralization. Although Paris remains undeniably the centre and the capital city, many other large French cities have become very important regional centres, themselves turned toward the rest of Europe. Quebec, for its part, has evolved toward a more marked centralization over the years. Singularities also emerge from an examination of the macrotrends themselves. We have seen that absolute similarities do not exist and that extreme divergences are exceptional. In the great majority of cases, similar macrotrends could have been formulated, the content of which, in terms of trends, would be only partly identical. Over all, social changes take common directions that do not prevent local singularities from persisting. Only a structural comparison of the type we have undertaken here can show them systematically, since we must resituate each element in a substructure before comparing them. From this first attempt, we draw the following conclusions: . two societies in a comparable stage of development are necessarily characterized by an ensemble of local singularities; . a small number of these singularities give rise to divergences in evolution; . but in the majority of cases they do not prevent convergences, even though these remain partial since a certain amount of singularity always persists. This is why social changes can move in the same direction without altering the identity of each society. It would not have been possible to establish the above structural consistencies and singularities if we had started from one or a small number of overarching ideas on social change within industrial or post-industrial 300

Comparative Structural Analysis

societies. Only a hindsight reading of the relationships between trends enables us to make a systematic comparison of the causative structures characterizing change in each society, and only such a comparison enables us to systematically reveal consistencies and singularities. Thus, it would be worthwhile to pursue this approach and extend it to include other societies. References Boudon, Raymond 1984 La place du desordre. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, collection Sociologies. Caplow, Theodore 1988 "The Comparative Charting of Social Change in Advanced Industrial Societies." European Studies Newsletter, 17, no. 5, April: 1-6. Caplow, Theodore, Howard Bahr, John Modell, and Bruce Chadwick 1991 Recent Social Trends in the United States 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGillQueen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Dim, Louis 1985 "Pour un tableau tendanciel de la societe franchise: un parti de recherche." Revue francaise de sociologie, 3, July-Sept.: 389^108. Forse, Michel 1991 L'analyse structurelle du changement social. Le modele de Louis Dim. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, Coll. Le sociologue. 1992 "Les theories du changement social." Sciences humaines, Ma.: 27-31. Forse, Michel, and Yannick Lemel 1990 "Peut-on parler de macrotendances de transformation de la societe francaise? Quelques elements de reponse apportes par la methode 'Louis Dim'." In M. Brissaud, M. Forse, and A. Zighed, eds., La modelisation confluent des sciences, 167-187. Paris: Editions du CNRS. Forse, Michel, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, and Jean-Hugues Dechaux 1993 Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Glatzer, Wolfgang, Karl-Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, and Barbara Worndl 1992 Recent Social Trends in West Germany 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGillQueen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Langlois, Simon, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, and Jean-Pierre Simard 1992 Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990. Montreal and Frankfurt: McGill-Queen's University Press/Campus Verlag. Mendras, Henri 1989 La seconde revolution francaise. Paris: Gallimard. Mendras, Henri, and Michel Forse 1983 Le changement social. Tendances et paradigmes. Paris: Armand Colin.

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Lexicon Renata HORNUNG-DRAUSS

1. REMARKS ON A COMMON LANGUAGE

The general introduction to this volume pointed out that one of the main goals of the Comparative Charting of Social Change project is to arrive at comparative analyses of social change in the societies studied. The trends in each individual society, however, have been analyzed on the basis of national data and sociological literature, and the bibliographical references accompanying each trend report are national sociological publications. Therefore, although the national profile volumes are all published in English, they invoke the language and sociological concepts peculiar to each society. In the course of its work, the research group came to the conclusion that it was necessary, as part of this project, to tackle the problem of the compatibility of the different languages involved. The problem of a common language arises on two levels. First of all, it seems advisable to provide scholars studying this publication with direct mother-tongue access to the topics taken up in the study. At the same time, scholars studying the foreign literature referred to in the bibliographical references may wish to have a translation into their own language of the sociological terms used. It seemed to us that these problems could best be tackled by a multilingual lexicon combined with an index (part 3 of this chapter). Starting from the English terms used in the publication, the lexicon-index-lexicon contains the equivalent terms in French, German, and Spanish. Each entry makes reference to the trend numbers in which the term is used, thereby allowing direct access to the different volumes of the individual society profiles. Of course, each volume contains an alphabetical index, the entries in which have been taken into account in the multilingual lexicon-index. The second language problem that arises is that of different sociologi- cal concepts or definitions underlying seemingly equivalent terms in the various languages. Typical examples of this would be the terms "social class" or "occupational category." The mere translation of those terms into other languages, might lead to misunderstandings. We therefore decided to create an annotated glossary of terms in the lexicon that needed additional explanations as to their precise meaning in the different contexts of the present work. The glossary is part 2 of this chapter. 303

Convergence or Divergence

Finally, we would like to point out that this lexicon and glossary are by no means intended to be a comprehensive sociological dictionary or glossary. Their scope is limited to the pragmatic and modest end of providing some help for scholars using the research group's publications. 2. COMMENTS ON CERTAIN ENTRIES IN THE LEXICON

authority - autorite - Autoritat - autoridad (7.4) Authority can be studied from the perspective of the persons or institutions exerting authority - Max Weber's study of the types of legitimate rule would be a typical example - or from the perspective of those expected to respect or obey authority. In the present work, the latter perspective is adopted. On the basis of several empirical indicators, conclusions are drawn as to how attitudes toward and respect of authority in its different expressions (family, conventions, state) have evolved over the last three decades. church membership - affiliation religieuse - Kirchenmitgliedschaft - afiliacion religiosa (9.2) In all societies represented in this study except Germany, church membership is defined on the basis of subjective claims of individuals. In Germany, the main churches (Protestant and Catholic) levy church taxes, which are collected by the state with the income tax. The fiscal data resulting from the levying of the church taxes is used for determination of church membership: church members are only those persons who officially pay the church tax. Those who refuse to pay the tax are considered to be nonbelievers. In America, surveys of subjective claims of individual attendance tend to miss the growth of televangelism in recent years. In Quebec, official data on membership come from the census, but are by no means a precise indicator. citizens' initiatives - initiatives des citoyens - Biirgerinitiativen - iniciativas ciudadanas (10.4) This term is mainly used in German sociological literature. It refers to a new form of interest group emerging in the late 1970s, largely associated with social movements (especially the ecological movement). Such groups are based on spontaneous actions of citizens, their scope is limited to the solution of specific local problems (such as the construction of highways or nuclear plants), and they generally cease to exist once the problems have been solved. 304

Lexicon

co-determination - co-gestion - Mitbestimmung - codeterminacion (5.1; 10.2) The term belongs to the realm of industrial relations and refers to the involvement of employees in the decision-making process of an enterprise. In some countries, codetermination rights of employees are based on tradition and/or collective agreements. In Germany, the country with the most sophisticated system of co-determination, the term refers to the legally institutionalized participation of trade unions or elected workers' representatives in firms' decision-making process. Co-determination can take place at two levels: at the plant level in the workers' council, and at the company level within the (supervisory) board of the company. Some form of codetermination may be appearing in the U.S. as a result of Japanese corporations building and operating large assembly plants there. In Quebec (where the term is cogestion), the practice is very limited in scope. collective bargaining - negociations collectives - Tarifverhandlungen - negociacion colectiva (7.2) The term refers to negotiations regarding working conditions and wages between trade unions and employers' representatives. Depending on the national traditions, collective bargaining can take place at the company level, the branch and regional level, and the national level. corporatism - corporatisme - Korporatismus - corporatismo (10.4) Historically, the term corporatism has had several meanings. It has referred to a typical feature of fascism, or to corporations of practitioners of a single occupation. The term, sometimes labelled "neo-corporatism," also refers to the institutionalized role interest groups have in shaping politics. A typical example of this would be the tripartite administration (state, labour unions, employers' associations) of the socialsecurity system in Germany. In North America, the role of corporate PACs in U.S. politics should be noted. They are certainly interest-group players in politics, though they do not get involved in anything resembling tripartite administration. educational system - systeme d'education - Bildungssystem - sistema educativo (8.1) In all societies studied, the educational system comprises at least three major stages: . primary education, from about age 6 to about age 10 (Germany) or 12 (other societies) . secondary education, from about age 12 (10 in Germany) to about age 18 (16, 17, 18, or 19 in Germany, depending on the type of school chosen) 305

Convergence or Divergence

. post-secondary education, which includes undergraduate and graduate studies at universities, colleges, technical colleges, grandes ecoles, etc. In some countries, pre-primary education is highly developed and covers a large proportion of children, and is consequently also considered to be a part of the educational system. Compulsory schooling starts with primary school at age 6 and ends generally at age 16. In the U.S., companies spend almost as much on employee training as is spent on all of higher education. industrial relations - relations industrielles - industrielle Beziehungen - relaciones industrials (7.2) The term refers to the relations between employers or their representatives and employees or their representatives, the trade unions. Typically, it includes topics such as labour law, labour disputes, collective bargaining and agreements, codetermination, and so on. informal economy - economic informelle - informelle Qkonomie - economia informal (12.2) The informal economy comprises a number of very different activities - some illegal, others legal - all characterized by the fact that they are not included in the official economic figures (national product). The major components of the informal economy are: . illegal employment - employees who are not declared to the fiscal and social authorities . artisans doing parts of their work off the books . profitable criminal enterprise (e.g., drug dealing) . barter of goods and services . assistance to neighbours, friends, and relatives . household production - do-it-yourself activities, etc. labour unions - syndicats ouvriers - Gewerkschaften - sindicatos obreros (9.1) Labour and trade unions are the wage and salary workers' organizations. Their main object is to negotiate the working conditions and wages of their members with the employers, but they also act as interest groups in the political arena.

306

Lexicon

occupational categories - categories socio-professionnelles - Berufsgruppen categorias occupacionales (4.2) The term refers to the classification of the labour force according to professional and sociological criteria. As classifications vary considerably from country to country, only a rough comparison is possible. In the overview table below, the main occupational categories of each country are printed in bold; the terms in parentheses are translations of occupations that do not constitute a category of their own in the respective society. Terms preceded by an arrow show which category an occupation belongs to if it does not constitute a category of its own. part-time employment - travail a temps partiel - Teilzeitbeschaftigung -empleo a tiempo parcial (4.3) It is very difficult to compare different national data on part-time work because of how it is defined - that is, its delimitation from full-time work differs from one country to another. For example, in theJLJ.S., part-time workers are persons working less than the normal full weekly shift in their enterprise; in Germany, jobs with a regular weekly working time of 36 hours or less are considered part-time jobs; in France, jobs with a regular working time of less than 30 hours per week are considered part-time jobs. worker participation - participation des salaries - Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung participacion de los trabajadores (5.1)

-

This term is sometimes used to refer to the information, consultation, and codetermination rights of employees in the decision-making process of their enterprise. More specifically, however, it refers to the financial participation of employees in the company's profits (profit sharing or profit-related pay) or the company's capital (equity sharing, employee share ownership). The financial participation of U.S. workers also includes enormous employer-funded pension schemes, some including workers' contributions. These are, arguably, the largest form of U.S. workers' financial participation in firms.

307

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USA

FRANCE

GERMANY

SPAIN

Owner/Boss

Patron(F)/ Proprietaire(Q)

Selbstandige

Patronos

Craftsman/tradesman

Artisan/commergant

Professional

Professions liberales(F)/ Professionnel(Q)

Freie Berufe ->Selbstandige

Profesiones liberates

Manager/top executive

Cadre superieur

Angestellte leitende A.

Gerantes directives

Middle manager/ lower manager

Cadre moyen

Hohere A. mittlere A.

Mandos medias

Clerical

Employe de bureau

Biiropersonal

Empleados

Technician

Technicien

Civil servant

Fonctionnaire

Beamte

Funcionarios

Artist clergy army, police officer

Artiste clerge armee, police

Domestic servant

Personnel de service

Hauspersonal ->Angestellte

Servicio domestico

Unpaid family worker

Travailleur familial

Mithelfende Familienangehorige

Trabaj adores familiares

Foreman

ContremaTtre

Blue-collar worker

Ouvrier

Arbeiter

Obreros

Skilled worker

Ouvrier qualifie

Facharbeiter

Obiero cualificado

Operator

Ouvrier specialise

Angelernte Arbeiter

Obreros especialisados

Labourer

Manoeuvre

Hilfsarbeiter

Peones

Farmer

Agriculteur exploitant(F)/ cultivateur(Q)

Landwirte ->Selbstandige

Agricultores

Farm labourer

Salarie agricole

Landwirtschaftliche Arbeitskrafte ->Arbeiter

Obreros agricoles

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Lexicon

social class - classe sociale - soziale Schicht - clase social (2.1; 6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 6.4) There are two main sociological traditions with respect to the concept of social class. On one hand is the Marxist tradition, which defines the social classes with reference to the place of the social agents in the production system. The German term Klasse is generally used in the context of this Marxist concept of social class. The other notion of social class refers to the more recent theory of social stratification, which can be traced to Max Weber's sociology and which defines social classes with reference to several indicators such as status, income, and power. The German term Schicht is generally used when reference is made to this concept. social elections - elections professionnelles - Betriebsratsversicherungswahlen - elecciones sociales (7.5)

und

Sozial-

This term is peculiar to France and Germany. It refers to the election of workers' representatives to workers' councils in enterprises, of the workers' and employers' representatives to the managing boards of the social-security institutions, and - in France only - to the election of representatives to the courts of arbitration (prud'hommes). strike - greve - Streik - huelga (7.1) Strike is one of the employees' "weapons" in a labour dispute. It consists of the refusal to work until an agreement on the disputed issue has been reached. The employers' counter-measure is the lockout (which is, however, prohibited in some countries). Statistics on labour disputes generally refer to working days lost per 1,000 employees due to both strikes and lockouts. In France, the data refer to working days lost per striker. There are important institutional and traditional differences between the societies: in France, striking is an individual right granted by the constitution. It can be exercised by any individual worker at any given moment, provided that he or she gives 48 hours' notice. In Germany, the strike is part of the "ritual" of collective bargaining and is considered legally as an ultima ratio instrument, to be used by the trade unions only when negotiation and mediation efforts have failed, whereas strikes during terms of valid collective agreements and during negotiations are illegal. In the U.S. and Quebec, legal strikes are organized by officially recognized unions and decided upon by strike ballots, whereas other strikes ("wildcat strikes") are considered illegal. Note should be taken of the large differences among the states of the U.S. in their right-to-work laws, both on paper and in practice. Also, workers who lack the legal right to strike (a large and growing proportion of union members) engage in "blue flu" (police), "sick outs" (pilots), and "by-the-book slowdowns" (aircraft and other high-tech assembly workers). 309

Convergence or Divergence

transfer payments - transferts sociaux - staatliche Transferzahlungen - pagos por transferencias del Estado (6.3) The term refers to state payments to households - transfers for children, low-income benefit schemes, and so on. These transfer payments are used most often as an instrument to influence income distribution toward a higher degree of equality. The term does not include subsidies to enterprises. A large and increasing proportion of these payments in the U.S. take the form of tax credits, deductions, and exemptions. There is even a negative income tax (the EIC) for people with low income and dependent children. Also, some tax items, such as the mortgage-interest deduction, are indexed to inflation, but others, such as the exemption for dependent children, are not. unemployment - chomage - Arbeitslosigkeit - paro (4.1) The different national figures on unemployment cannot be compared easily due to differences in the definition of this term. In the U.S., for instance, the unemployed are persons out of work and actively seeking work, and people are dropped from the unemployment count after a set amount of time, even if they are still unemployed and actively seeking work. Thus, the unemployment rate for the U.S. is actually only those unemployed who have failed to find work in the first X weeks after job loss. The value of X changes according to political decisions. Most of the homeless are almost entirely absent from the unemployment rolls, even if they look for work. Other complications are the treatment of the 2.1 million uniformed military personnel, who are sometimes counted as employed and sometimes not, and variable treatment and methods for counting the part-time employed and the self-employed. The unemployed in Germany are those persons below age 65 who are registered at the federal employment office (Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit) as seeking employment of at least 18 hours per week and for at least 3 months, and who are immediately available to the labour market. In France, the official unemployment figure includes all persons registered at the national labour office (Agence Nationale pour 1'Emploi) as seeking employment. A second source, the main one, is the annual INSEE Employment Survey, in which 60,000 persons are investigated on their position in the labour market and on their life style. In Quebec, persons out of work must also be actively seeking work to be considered unemployed. Some who have worked for a period varying with the different region's unemployment rate (between 10 and 20 weeks) and who have contributed to the unemployment-insurance programme will get payments and be registered as such. There are yet other definitions, so that it is necessary to specify the definition of unemployment underlying the data used.

310

Lexicon

welfare system - protection sociale - Wohlfahrtssystem (Sozialhilfe und freie Wohlfahrtspflege) - sistema de bienestar (8.3) The welfare system includes both the welfare state and private social agencies such as churches, along with para-religious and other institutions. The concept of the welfare state, as used in the present studies, refers to the efforts of the state to influence and control the distribution of welfare in the population by deliberate political action. Quantitative indicators for development of the welfare state are the number of civil servants and the state's welfare expenditures. In the U.S., variability among the states in such funding as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, and so on, is very large. Thus, the average for the U.S. as a whole can conceal more localized deprivation than there is in other countries with more uniform standards of support. 3. LEXICON - INDEX (ALPHABETICAL ORDER) (English, French, German, Spanish) (The entries printed in bold are commented on part 2.) abortion - avortement - Abtreibung - aborto 3.5 addiction - to\icomanie - Sucht - toxicomanfa 16.3 adult education - formation des adultes - Erwachsenenbildung - educacion de adultos 15.3 age at first childbirth - Sge a la premiere naissance - Alter bei Geburt des ersten Kindes edad en el primer nacimiento 1.1 age at marriage - age au mariage - Heiratsalter - edad al casarse 3.3 age distribution - repartition selon 1'age - Altersaufbau - distribution de edades 0.1 age-adjusted suicide rate - taux de suicide standardise - altersstandardisierte Selbstmordrate - tasa estandarizada de suicidio age-specific first marriage rate - indice de primo-nuptialitdr- altersspezifische Erst-Heiratsquote - tasa por edad en el primer casamiento 3.3 anti-poverty programmes - programmes de lutte contre la pauvrete - Programme zur Bekampfung der Armut - programas de lucha contra la pobreza 16.4 arbitration - arbitrage - Schlichtung - arbitraje 10.1 aspirations - aspirations - Aspirationen - aspiraciones 17.2 associations - associations - Vereinigungen - asociaciones 2.5 athletics - athletisme - Leichtathletik - atletismo 14.3 attendance at performances - assistance & des spectacles - Besuch von kulturellen Veranstaltungen - asistencia a espectaculos 14.4 attitudes - attitudes - Einstellungen - actitudes 17.1; 17.2; 17.3; 17.4; 17.5 authority - autorite - Autoritat - autoridad 7.4 birth rate - taux de natalite - Geburtenrate - tasa de natalidad births - naissances - Geburten - nacimientos "black economy" - economic souterraine - Schattenwirtschaft - economfa sumergida books bought - livres achetes - Biicherkauf - libros comprados business failures - faillites - Insolvenzen - quiebras

3.2 3.2 12.2 14.4 0.2; 5.3

311

Convergence or Divergence

capital formation - formation du capital - Kapitalbildung - formacion de capital career development - promotion de carrieres - Karriereforderung desarro-llo de las carreras ocupacionales career mobility - mobilite professionnelle - berufliche Mobilitat - movilidad profesional celibacy - celibat - Ehelosigkeit - celibato child care - soins aux enfants - Kinderbetreuung - cuidado de los nifios church membership - affiliation religieuse - Kirchenmitgliedschaft affiliation religiosa church tax - denier du culte - Kirchensteuer - impuesto religioso citizens' initiatives - initiatives des citoyens - Biirgerinitiativen - iniciativas ciudadanas civil servants - fonctionnaires - Beamte - funcionarios class —> social class - classe sociale - Klasse clerical worker - employe de bureau - Biiroangestellte(r) - empleado administrative co-determination - co-gestion - Mitbestimmung - codeterminacion cohabitation, types of (other than marriage) - cohabitation, types de (autres que le mariage) - nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaften - cohabitaci6n (no marital) collective agreement - convention collective - Tarifvertrag - convenio colectivo collective bargaining - negotiations collectives - Tarifverhandlungen - negotiation colectiva college - premier cycle de 1'universite' - Grundstudium - primer ciclo universitario common-law marriage - concubinage - nichteheliche Lebensgemeinschaft uni6n de hecho community leaders - notables - Honoratioren - Ifderes comunitarios community types - types de communautes - Gemeindeformen - tipos de comunidad commuting - migration pendulaire(F)/faire la navette(Q) - Pendeln - viaje pendular computer applications - applications informatiques - Computeranwendung aplicaciones del ordenador computerization of work - informatisation du travail - Computer!sierung der Arbeit informatizacion del trabajo confidence in institutions - confiance dans les institutions - Vertrauen in die Institutionen - confianza en las instituciones conscription - service militaire obligatoire - Wehrpflicht - servicio militar obligatorio consensual union —> cohabitation, concubinage(F)/union libre(Q) constraint - contrainte - Zwang - sujecion consumer patterns - modeles de consommation - Konsumverhaltensmuster - modelos de consume consumerism - consumerisme - Verbraucherschutzbewegungen - consumismo continuing education - formation permanente - Weiterbildung - educaci6n permanente contraception - contraception - Empfangnisverhutung - anticoncepcion corporation - societ6 anonyme - Aktiengesellschaft - sociedad andnima corporatism - corporatisme - Korporatismus - corporatismo craftsman (sometimes "skilled worker") - ouvrier qualifie et artisan - Facharbeiter und Handworker - artesano y obrero cualificado crime - crime - Kriminalitat - delito criminal-justice administration - administration de la justice - Strafjustiz, Verwaltung der - administracidn de la justicia penal

312

0.2 5.2 6.2 3.3 3.1 9.2 9.2 10.4 4.2 4.2 5.1; 10.2 3.3 9.1; 10.2 7.2 8.1 3.3 2.5 2.3 13.5 4.5 4.5 11.2 9.3 7.3 13.1 10.3 15.3 3.5 5.3 10.4 4.2 16.2 16.2

Lexicon

daily mobility - defacements quotidiens - Alltagsmobilitat - movilidad cotidiana data dissemination - diffusion de 1'information - Dateniibermittlung - difusi6n de la informacion data storage - archivage de 1'information - Datenweitergabe - almacenamiento de la informacion death rate - taux de mortalite - Sterberate - tasa de mortalidad de-nesting (leaving home) - decohabitation - Auszug aus dem Elternhaus - marcha del hogar paterno dieting - regimes - Ernahrungsweisen - dieta disposable income - revenu disponible - verfiigbares Einkommen - renta disponible dispute settlement - arbitrage - Konfliktlosung - arbitraje divorce - divorce - Scheidung - divorcio durable goods - biens durables - langlebige Gebrauchsgiiter - bienes duraderos dwellings - logements - Wohnungen - viviendas ecological movements - mouvements ecologiques - Okologiebewegungen - movimientos ecologicos economic inequality - inegalit6s economiques - okonomische Ungleichheit desigualdades econ6micas economic orientations - orientations economiques - okonomische Orientierungen orientaciones economicas educational attainment - niveau scolaire - Bildungsniveau - nivel educative educational system - systeme ({'education - Bildungssystem - sistema educative elderly, the - personnes agees (troisieme age) - Altere (3. Lebensalter) - ancianos (tercera edad) elected local officials - elus locaux - gewahlte Gemeindevertreter - cargos locales elegidos elections - elections - Wahlen - elecciones emotional disorders - desordres emotifs - emotionale Storungen - desordenes emocionales employee stock-ownership programme - plan d'interessement des salaries - Mitarbeiter - plan de participacion accionarial de los asalariados Kapitalbeteiligungsmodell fur asalariados employment of women - travail des femmes - Frauenerwerbstatigkeit - empleo de las mujeres employment, types of - emplois, formes d' - Beschaftigung, Formen der - tipos de empleo energy consumption - consommation energetique - Energieverbrauch - consume energetico enrolment (educational system) - inscription (systeme d'education) - Einschreibung (Bildungseinrichtungen) - matricula (sistema educative) entrepreneurship - entrepreneurial - Unternehmertum - empresariado environment - environnement - Umwelt - medio ambiente erotic expression - expression erotique - erotische Ausdrucksformen - expresion erotica ethnic minorities - minorites ethniques - ethnische Minderheiten - minorfas etnicas family income - revenu familial - Haushaltseinkommen - renta familiar family wealth - patrimoine familial - Vermogen einer Familie - patrimonio familiar farm labourer - salari6 agricole - Landarbeiter - trabajador agricola farmer - agriculteur exploitant - Landwirt - agricultor female labour-force participation - taux d'activite des femmes - Frauenerwerbsbeteiligung tasa de actividad femenina female roles - roles feminins - weibliche Rollen - roles femeninos fertility - fecondite - Fruchtbarkeit - fecundidad

13.5 4.5 4.5 0.1 1.1 13.3 12.1 10.1 3.3 13.1 2.3 10.3 6.3 11.3 15.1; 15.2; 15.3 8.1 1.2 2.4 7.5 16.3 5.3 3.4 4.3 0.2, 0.3 8.1 11.3 10.3 13.7 16.1 T

12.1 12,3 4.2 4.2 3.4 3.1 0.1; 3.2

313

Convergence or Divergence

fixed-term contracts - contrats a duree determine'e - befristete Arbeitsverhaltnisse contratos a plazo fijo flexible schedules - horaires flexibles - flexible Arbeitszeit- horarios flexibles flextime --> flexible schedules foreign trade - commerce exterieur - AuBenhandel - comercio exterior free time - temps libre - Freizeit - tiempo libre fringe benefits - benefices marginaux - Sozialleistungen, betriebliche - beneficios marginales full-time employment - emploi a plein temps - Vollzeitbeschaftigung - empleo a tiempo completo gainfully employed persons - personnes actives occupees - Erwerbstatige - personas activas ocupadas gardening - jardinage - Gartenarbeit - jardineria GDP —> gross domestic product - PIB, produit interieur brut general education - formation generate - Allgemeinbildung - educaci6n general GNP —> gross national product - PNB, produit national brut goods-producing sector - secteur de la production des biens - giiterproduzierender Sektor sector de la produccion de bienes graduates - diplomes - Graduierte - graduados grievance procedures - procedures de griefs - Beschwerdeverfahren, innerbetriebliche procedimientos de queja gross domestic product - produit interieur brut - Bruttoinlandsprodukt - producto interior bruto gross national product - produit national brut - Bruttosozialprodukt - producto nacional bruto gross reproduction rate - taux brut de reproduction - Bruttoreproduktionsrate tasa bruta de reproduction health and beauty practices - soins corporels et de sante - Gesundheits-und Schonheitspflege - cuidados corporales y de la salud health system - systeme de sante - Gesundheitswesen - sistema sanitario hidden poverty - pauvrete cachee - versteckte Armut - pobreza oculta high-school graduates - bacheliers - Abiturienten - bachilleres homelessness - sans domicile fixe - Obdachlosigkeit - vagabundaje household expenditure - depenses des manages - Ausgaben der privaten Haushalte gastos de los hogares household production - production domestique - Haushaltsproduktion - produccion domestica housework - taches domestiques - Hausarbeit - tareas domesticas illegal employment - travail au noir - Schwarzarbeit - empleo ilegal illegitimacy —> out-of-wedlock births illicit drugs - drogues illicites - verbotene Drogen - drogas ilfcitas immigrants - immigrants - Einwanderer - inmigrantes income - revenu - Einkommen - renta income distribution - repartition des revenus - Einkommensverteilung - distribution de la renta independent trade union - syndivat autonome(F)/syndicat non-affilie(Q) - unabhangige Gewerkschaft - sindicato independiente individual income —> personal income

314

1.1; 4.3 4.3 5.1 0.2 14.1 5.2 4.3 4.1 13.6 15.1 4.4 8.1 5.2 0.2 0.2 3.2 13.3 8.2 16.4 8.1; 15.1 16.4 13.1 13.6 3.1 4.1 16.3 16.1 6.3; 12.1 6.3; 12.1 9.1

Lexicon

industrial relations - relations industrielles - industrielle Beziehungen - relaciones industriales 7.2 inequality, economic —> economic inequality infant mortality - mortalite infantile - Sauglingssterblichkeit - mortalidad infantil 0.1 informal economy - economic informelle - informelle Okonomie - econonua informal 12.2 institutional authority - autorite institutionnelle - institutionelle Autoritat autoridad institucional 7.4 institutionalization of labour unions - institutionnalisation des syndicats Institutionalisierung der Gewerkschaften * - institucionalizacidn de los sindicatos 10.2 institutionalization of social forces - institutionnalisation des forces sociales Institutionalisierung der gesellschaftlichen Krafte - institucionalizacion de la's fuerzas sociales 10.1; 10.2; 10.3; 10.4 intangible commodities - biens (services) immateriels - intangible Outer - bienes intangibles 4.4 inter-generational mobility - mobilite inter-generationnelle - intergenerationale Mobilitat movilidad intergeneracional 6.2 interest groups - groupes d'interet - Interessengruppen - grupos de intereses 10.4 inventions - inventions - Erfindungen - inventos 0.3 irregular employment —> precarious employment - emplois precaires job enlargement - enrichissement des laches - Erweiterung der Arbeitsinhalte enriquecimiento de las tareas job sharing - partage du travail - job sharing - reparto del trabajo

5.1 5.1

kinship networks - reseaux de parente - Verwandtschaftsnetzwerke - red de parentesco

2.2

labour agreements - conventions de travail - Tarifvereinbarungen - acuerdos labourales 7.2 labour contracts - contrats de travail - Artbeitsvertrage - contratos de trabajo 7.2 labour force - population active - Erwerbspersonen - poblacion activa 4.1 labour-force participation of women —> female labour-force participation labour-force participation rate - taux d'activite - Erwerbsquote - tasa de actividad 4.1 labour market - marche du travail - Arbeitsmarkt - mercado de trabajo 4.1 - 4.5 labour-union membership rate - taux de syndicalisation - gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad - tasa de sindicalizacion 9.1 labour unions - syndicats ouvriers - Gewerkschaften - sindicatos obreros 9.1 labour unions, institutionalization of —> Institutionalization of labour unions labourer - manoeuvre - Arbeiter (ungelernter) - trabajador 4.2 leisure - loisir - Freizeit - ocio 14.1; 14.2; 14.3; 14.4 level of general qualification - degre de qualification generale - allgemeines Qualifikationsniveau - nivel de cualificacidn general 15.1 level of professional qualification - degre de qualification professionnelle berufliches Qualifikationsniveau - nivel de cualificacion profesional 15.2 life expectancy - esperance de vie - Lebenserwartung - esperanza de vida 0.1; 1.2; 13.3 life styles - modes de vie - Lebensstile - estilo de vida 13.1; 13.2; 13.4; 13.5; 13.6; 13.7; 13.8 limited partnership - societe en commandite simple - Kommanditgesellschaft - sociedad en comandita 5.3 litigation - judiciarisation - Rechtsstreit - judicializacion 10.1 local autonomy - autonomie locale kommunale Selbstverwaltung - autonomia local 2.4 locality, identification by - localite, identification par - lokale Identifikation identification por localidad 2.1 lockout - lockout - Aussperrung - lockout 7.1

315

Convergence or Divergence

macro-economic trends - tendances macro-economiques - gesamtwirtschaftliche (makrookonomische) Trends - tendencias macroeconomicas 0.2 magazine, readership - lecture de periodiques - Zeitschriftenleser - lectura de periodicos 13.2 majority rule - systeme majoritaire - Mehrheitswahlrecht - sistema mayoritario 11.1 managers - cadres - hohere und leitende Angestellte - directives 4.2 mandatory retirement - retraite obligatoire - Zwangspensionierung - jubilacion obligatoria 4.1 market goods and services - biens et services marchands - Marktgiiter und Dienstleistungen - bienes y servicios mercantiles 13.1 marriage - mariage - Ehe - matrimonio 3.3 mass media - mass media - Massenmedien - medios de comunicacion de masas 9.5 matrimonial models - modeles matrimoniaux - Familienformen - modelos matrimoniales 3.3 mediation - mediation - Vermittlung - mediation 10.1 mental illnesses - maladies mentales - psychische Erkrankungen - enfermedades mentales 16.3 metropolitan areas - regions metropolitaines - Ballungsgebiete - areas metropolitanas 2.3 microsocial evolution - evolution microsociale - mikrosoziale Entwicklung evolution microsocial 2.1; 2.3; 2.4; 2.5; 2.6 middle classes - classes moyennes - Mittelschicht - clases medias 6.1;6.2;6.3;6.4 migration - migration - Migration - migration 0.1 military forces - forces militaires - Streitkrafte - fuerzas armadas 9.3 mobility, daily —> daily mobility mobility, inter-generational —> inter-generational mobility mobility, social —> social mobility mood-altering substances - psychotropes - Rauschmittel - sustancias toxicas 13.8 mortality - mortalite - Sterblichkeit - mortalidad 0.1 mother tongue - langue maternelle - Muttersprache - lengua materna 0.1 multi-cultural society - multiculturalisme - multikulturelle Gesellschaft sociedad multicultural 16.1; 17.5 multiple employment - cumul d'emplois - Mehrfachbeschaftigung - pluriempleo 4.3 narcotics - narcotiques - Narkotikum - narcoticos natality - natalite - Geburtenrate - natalidad national identity - identite nationale - nationale Identitat - identidad nacional negotiation - negotiation - Verhandlung - negotiation neighbourhood - voisinage - Nachbarschaft - vecindad net reproduction rate - taux net de reproduction - Nettoreproduktionsrate - tasa neta de reproduction newspapers, readership - lecture de journaux - Zeitungsleser - lectura de periodicos nonpecuniary benefits - avantages non-monetaires - Sachbeziige - beneficios no monetarios norms of conduct - normes de conduite - Verhaltensnormen - normas de conducta obedience - obeissance - Gehorsam - obediencia occupational categories - categories socio-professionnelles - Berufsgruppen categorias ocupacionales occupational status - statut socio-professionnel - berufliche Stellung (Berufsstatus) - status ocupacional operatives - ouvriers specialises - Arbeiter - obreros especializados opinion polls - sondages d'opinion - Meinungsumfragen - encuestas de opinion orientations to the future - perceptions de 1'avenir - Zukunftsorientierungen orientaciones hacia el futuro out-of-wedlock births - naissances hors mariage - nichteheliche Geburten nacimientos fuera del matrimonio

316

13.8 0.1 17.5 7.2 , 2.3 3.2 13.2 12.1 7.3 7.4 4.2 T

6.1 4.2 7.5 17.3 3.2

Lexicon

parades - defile's - festliche Umziige - desfiles participation of workers - participation des salaries - Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung participation de los trabajadores participatory management - gestion participative - partizipativer Fiihrungsstil gesti6n participateva participatory sports - sports collectifs - Breitensport - ten-deportes de participacion partnership - societe en partenariat - offene Handelsgesellschaft - sociedad por acciones part-time employment - travail a temps partiel - Teilzeitbeschaftigung - empleo a tiempo parcial patents - brevets - Patente - patentes peace movement - pacifisme - Friedensbewegung - pacifismo perception of social problems - perception des problemes sociaux - Wahrnehmung sozialer Probleme - percepci6n de los problemas sociales permissiveness - permissivite - Permissivitat - permisividad personnel administration - gestion du travail - Personalverwaltung, betriebliche administration de personal personnel representative - delegue du personnel - Personalbeauftragter - representante del personal petty crime - petite delinquance - Bagatellekriminalitat - pequefia delincuencia phonograph production - production de disques - Schallplattenproduktion - production discogrdfica physical exercise - exercices physiques - Fitnesstraining - ejercicios fisicos political differentiation - differentiation politique - politische Differenzierung differentiation polftica population - population - Bevolkerung - poblacidn post-educational unemployment - chomage d'insertion - Arbeitslosigkeit beim Ubergang von der Ausbildung in den Beruf - paro de insertion post-secondary education - enseignement superieur - Hochschulbildung - ensenanza superior poverty - pauvrete - Armut - pobreza poverty line - seuil de pauvrete - Armutsgrenze - dintel de la pobreza precarious employment - prdcarite - prekare BeschaTtigungsverhaltnisse - empleo precario pre-school education - 6cole maternelle - Vorschulerziehung - educacion preescolar pressure groups - groupes de pression - Interessengruppe - grupos de presion prestige, occupational —> occupational prestige primary education - education primaire - Grundschulbildung - educacion primaria primary sector - secteur primaire - primarer Sektor - sector primario private limited company (closed corporation) - societe a responsabilit6 limite'e Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung - sociedad limitada private social agencies - assistance sociale - private Institutionen der Wohlfahrtspflege instituciones privadas de beneficencia professionals - professions liberales(F)/professionnels(Q) - Freiberufler - profesionales profit sharing - participation aux benefices - Gewinnbeteiligung - participacion en beneficios property crime - crimes contre la propriete - Eigentumskriminalitat - delitos contra la propiedad proportional representation - systeme proportionnel - Verhaltniswahlrecht representation proporcional public debt - dette publique - offentliche Schulden - deuda publica public deficit - deficit budgetaire - Staatsverschuldung - deficit piiblico public opinion - opinion publique - offentliche Meinung - opinion publica publications - publications - Veroffentlichungen - publicaciones purchasing power - pouvoir d'achat - Kaufkraft - poder de compra

14.4 5.1 5.2 14.3 5.3 4.3 0.3 10.3 17.2 7.3 5.2 10.2 16.2 14.4 13.3 11.1 0.1 4.1; 15.1 8.1 16.4 16.4 1.1; 4.1; 4.3 8.1 2.5; 10.2 8.1 4.4 5.3 8.3 4.2 5.2 16.2 11.1 0.2 0.2 7.5 0.3 12.1

317

Convergence or Divergence

qualifications (labour market) - qualifications (marche du travail) - (berufliche) Qualification - cualificaciones labourales R&D —> research and development - recherche et developpement radicalism - extremisme - Radikalismus - radicalismo radio listenership - ecoute de la radio - Radiohorerschaft - audiencia radiofonica real property - propriete immobiliere - Immobilienvermogen - propiedad inmobiliaria recurrent unemployment - chomage recurrent - periodisch wiederkehrende Arbeitslosigkeit paro recurrente regional movements - mouvements regionaux - regionale Bewegungen - movimientos regionales religious beliefs - croyances religieuses - religiose Uberzeugungen - creencias religiosas religious institutions - institutions religieuses - religiose Institutionen en-instituciones religiosas religious sects - sectes religieuses - religiose Sekten - sectas religiosas reproductive technologies - technologies de la reproduction Technologien zur kiinstlichen Befruchtung und Empfa'ngnisverhutung tecnologfas de la reproduction research and development - recherche et developpement - Forschung und Entwicklung investigation y desarrollo retail prices - prix de detail - Einzelhandelspreise - precios al por menor re-urbanization - reurbanisation - Reurbanisierung - reurbanizacion rurbanization - rurbanisation - Stadtflucht - rurbanizacion satisfaction - satisfaction - Zufriedenheit - satisfaction savings - epargne - Ersparnisse - ahorro seasonal employment - travail saisonnier - Saisonarbeit - empleo estacional second homes - residences secondaires - Zweitwohnungen bzw. hauser viviendas secundarias secondary education - education secondaire - hohere Bildung - education secundaria secondary sector - secteur secondaire - sekundarer Sektor - sector secundario sectors of the labour force - secteurs d'emplois - Beschaftigungsbereiche - sectores labourales sects --> religious sects securities - litres - Wertpapiere - valores self-identification - auto-identification - Identifikation - autoidentificacion self-management - auto gestion - Selbstverwaltung - autogestion service-producing sector - secteur des services - Dienstleistungssektor - sector de servicios sex ratio - ratio entre les sexes - Geschlechterrelation - razon entre los sexos sexual practices - pratiques sexuelles - Sexualpraktiken - practicas sexuales single-parent families - families monoparentales - Ein-Eltern-Familie - familias monoparentales skilled worker —> craftsman skills of workers - qualifications des travailleurs - berufliche Qualifikation cualiificaciones de los trabajadores small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) - petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) kleine und mittlere Unternehmen (KMU) - empresas medianas y pequenas (PYME) sociability - sociabilite - Soziabilitat - sociabilidad

318

4.2 11.4 13.2 12.3 4.1; 15.1 10.3 11.5 9.2 11.5 3.5 0.3 0.2 2.3 2.3 17.1 0.2, 12.3 4.3 2.3 8.1 4.4 4.4 12.3 2.1 5.1 4.4 0.1 13.7 3.3 4.2 5.3 2.6

Lexicon

social class - classe sociale - soziale Schicht - clase social 2.1; 6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 6.4 social elections - elections professionnelles - Betriebsrats - und Sozialversicherungswahlen - elecciones sociales 7.5 social inequality - inegalites sociales - soziale Ungleichheit - desigualdad social 6.4 social mobility - mobilite sociale - soziale Mobilitat - movilidad social 6.2 social movements - mouvements sociaux - soziale Bewegungen - movimientos sociales 10.3 social relations - relations sociales - soziale Beziehungen - relaciones sociales 7.1; 7.2; 7.3;.7.4; 7.5 social stratification - stratification sociale - soziale Schichtung estratificacion social 6.1; 6.2; 6.3; 6.4 source of income —> income, source of specialized press - presse specialised - Fachpresse - prensa especializada 13.2 spectator sports - sports de spectacle - Zuschauersport - deportes espectaculo 14.3 state, presence of in society - presence de 1'Etat dans la societe - Prasenz des Staates in der Gesellschaft - presencia del Estado en la sociedad 8.4 status groups - groupes sociaux - Statusgruppen - grupos de status 6.4 status, occupational —> occupational status steady employment - emplois stables - stabile Beschaftigungsverhaltnisse - empleos estables 4.3 sterilization - sterilisation - Sterilisierung - esterilizacion 3.5 stratification.social —> social stratification strike - greve - Streik - huelga 7.1 structural mobility - mobilite structurelle - strukturelle Mobilitat - movilidad estructural 6.2 subcontracting - soustraitance - Einsatz von Subunternehmern - subcontratacion 5.3 subsidized employment experience - stages d'insertion - ArbeitsbeschaffungsmaKnahmen etapas de insercion 4.3 suicide - suicide - Selbsmord (Suizid) - suicidio 16.3 sun bathing - bronzage - Sonnenbaden - bafio de sol 13.3 support network - reseaux d'entraide - Unterstiitzungsnetzwerke (private) - red de apoyo 2.6 teachers - enseignants - Lehrer - maestro television viewing - ecoute de la television - Fernsehkonsum - audiencia de la television temporary work - travail interimaire - Zeitarbeit - trabajo temporal tertiary sector - secteur tertiaire - tertiarer Sektor - sector terciario time-and-motion studies - etudes de temps et mouvements - arbeitswissenschaftliche (Zeit-) Studien - estudios de tiempos y movimientos time budget - budget-temps - Zeitbudget - presupuestos de tiempo time use - emploi du temps - Zeitverwendung - uso del tiempo total fertility rate - indice synthetique de fecondite - Fruchtbarkeitsrate - tasa total de fecundidad tourist travel - voyages touristiques - touristische Reisen - viajes turisticos trade balance - balance commerciale - Handelsbilanz - balanza comercial trade unions --> labour unions tranquillizers - tranquillisants - Beruhigungsmittel - tranquilizantes transfer income - revenus de transfer! - Transfereinkommen - transferencias de renta transfer payments - transferts sociaux - staatliche Transferzahlungen pagos por transferencias del Estado types of enterprises - types d'entreprises - Unternehmenstypen - tipos de empresas unearned income - revenu du patrimoine - Kapitaleinkiinfte - rentas de patrimonio unemployment - chomage - Arbeitslosigkeit - paro unemployment severity index - indice de gravite de chomage - Index der Belastung durch Arbeitslosigkeit - fndice de gravedad del paro

8.1 13.2 4.3 4.4 5.1 13.4 13.4 3.2 14.2 0.2 13.8 12.1 6.3 5.3 12.3 4.1 4.1

319

Convergence or Divergence

vacation patterns - vacances - Urlaubsformen - vacaciones values - valeurs - Werte - valores violence - violence - Gewalt - violencia violent crime - crimes avec violence - Gewaltkriminalitat - delitos violentos vocational education - formation professionnelle - berufliche Bildung - formaci6n profesional volatile electorate - Electoral volatile - Wechselwahler - electorado volatil volunteer work - beneVolat - ehrenamtliche Tatigkeit - trabajo voluntario

14.2 17.4 7.1 16.2 15.2 11.1 2.5; 8.3

wages - salaires - Lohne - salaries wealth - patrimoine - Vermogen - patrimonio wealth - richesse - Vermogen riqueza welfare state - Etat providence - Wohlfahrtsstaat - Estado de bienestar welfare system - protection sociale - Wohlfahrtssystem (Sozialhilfe und 'freie Wohlfahrtspflege) -sistema de bienestar white-collar crime - crimes de cols blancs - weiBe-Kragen-Kriminalitat (white collar crime) delitos de cuello bianco wholesale prices - prix de gros - GroBhandelspreise - precios al por mayor word processing - traitement de textes - Textverarbeitung - tratamiento de textos work at home - travail & la maison - Heimarbeit - trabajo en casa work organization - organisation du travail - Arbeitsorganisation - organizacion del trabajo worfc teams - equipes de travail - Arbeitsgruppen - equipos de trabajo

12.1 12.3 6.3 8.3

years of schooling - dur6e des etudes - Studiendauer - duracion de los estudios youth - jeunesse - Jugend - juventud

320

8.3 16.2 0.2 4.5 3.4 5.1 5.1 1.1 1.1

Author index

Adams, Bert N. 119 Allan Michaud, Dominique 263 Almond, Gabriel A. 234 Alvin, Duane 97 Ardagh, John 145 Armingeon, Klaus 202 Atchley, Robert C. 118 Augustins, Georges 120 Bacot, Jean-Pierre 173 Bahr, Howard M. 173 Baillargeon, Jean-Paul 182 Baldock, John 151, 152 Barer, Barbara M. 118 Barker, Paul 155 Beland. Fran9ois 154 Belanger, Andre J. 176 Bellah, Robert N. 195 Bengtson, Vern L. 118,157 Bergeron, Richard 184 Bibby, Reginald W. 181 Blood, Robert O. Jr. 118, 120, 122 Bluestone, Barry 102 Boudon, Raymond 269, 299 Bourguignon, Odile 139 Bradbury, Katherine L. 102 Brand, Karl-Werner 248 Brand, Ruth 148 Braun, Michael 97 Brody, Elaine M. 129 Buchtemann, Christoph F. 103 Bumpass, Larry 83 Bungener, M. 147 Calame, Andre 74 Caldwell, Gary 82 Caldwell, John C. 51, 56, 61, 83 Calot, Grand J. 49, 74 Cantor, Marjorie H. 120 Caplow, Theodore 61, 98, 173, 174, 216, 220, 222, 233, 236, 240, 250, 256, 261

Castelain-Meunier, Christine 63 Chadwick, Bruce A. 173 Chesnais, Jean-Claude 79 Christensen, Bryce J. 160 Cicirelli, Victor G. 143 Clark, Colin 100 Clement, Gabriel 176 Cochran, Moncrieff 149 Cohler, Bertram J. 157 Commaille, Jacques 145 Coser, Lewis 225 Coser, Lewis A. 123 Cowgill, Donald O. 118, 119, 143, 156 Cribier, Francoise 139, 145, 146 Crozier, Michel 229 Cutler, Neal E. 118 Czarnocki, Bogdan 82 Dahrendorf, Ralf 244 Davis, Kingsley 56, 83 Davis, Nathalie Z. 145 De Brie, Christian 259 De Vos, Susan 128 Dechaux, Jean-Hugues 120, 146, 252 ; Degenne, Alain 146 Del Campo, Salustiano 71 Delage, Denys 153 Demerath, N.J. Ill 194 Dershowitz, Alan M. 193 Diewald, Martin 149 Dim, Louis 270 Dobbelaere, Karel 173 Dumont, Fernand 176 Elias, Norbert 226 Elshtain, Jean Bethke 160 Esser, Josef 257 Evers, Adalbert 151, 152 Fagnani, Jeanne 63 Falardeau, J.-C. 152 Falwell, Jerry 195 Fiedler, Maria 74

321

Convergence or Divergence

Forse, Michel 174, 270, 273, 274, 297 Fourastier, Jean 100 Franz, Wolfgang 104 Frechet, Guy 82, 248, 254 Freeman, Richard B. 94, 107 Fuchs, Dieter 261 Gagnon, Nicole 175 Galbraith, V.L. 82 Galtung, Johan 252 Ganzert, Jeanette 148 Garigue, Philip 153 Gauthier, Herve 155 Gauthier, Madeleine 184 Gelfand, Donald E. 151 Gershuny, Jonathan 71, 101 Gitschmann, Peter 150 Glatzer, Wolfgang 148, 174, 260 Glotzner, Johannes 201 Gommers, Adriene 117 Gottelmann, Gabrielle 231 Greeley, Andrew M. 173 Greschat, Martin 201 Grignon, Michel 71 Guillemard, Anne-Marie 97,117 Gunnarsson, Lars 149 Haller, Archibald O. 155 Hamelin, Jean 175,176 Hankenne, Bernadette 117 Harris, C.C. 121, 123, 135 Harris, Louis 119, 156 Harrison, Bennett 102 Hauschild, W.D. 204 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 200 Heller, P.L. 120 Henripin, Jacques 68 Henslin, James M. 124 Herberg 195 Hervieu-Leger, Daniele 173, 192 Hill, T.P. 101 Hirschman, Albert 228 Hoem, Jan M. 83 Hohn, Charlotte 132, 147, 148 Hollenstein, Giinther 201 Holznagel, Bernd 255 Hopfinger, Francois 68 Hunter, James Davison 206 Jackson, J.J. 120 Jacobs, Klaus 97 Joel, M.-E. 147 Joffe, Carole 75 Johnson, Colleen Leahy 118

322

Kirk, Dudley 82 Kitschelt, Herbert 250, 251, 256 Kivett, ViraR. 118, 119 Klages, Helmut 65 Kockeis, E. 137 Kohli, Martin 97 Konig, Heinz 104 Kornblum, William 123 Krupp, Hans-Jiirgen 101 Lamontagne, Maurice 152 Landis, Jean M. 68 Lang, Abigail 129 Langlois, Simon 61, 174, 262, 273 Lawrence, Robert Z. 98, 102 Le Bras, Herve 144 Lebeaux, Marie-Odile 146 Lebert, Ursula 71 Lee, Gary R. 135 Leggewie, Claus 252, 256, 257 Lehmbruch, Gerhard 231 Lehr, Ursula 150 Leibowitz, Arleen 76 Leroy, D. 49, 74 Lesthaeghe, Ron 44, 54, 61, 65, 73, 80, 83 Liebman, Robert C. 197 Lipset, Seymour M. 199 Lodh, Francoise 82 Loveman, Gary W. 98 Lowy, Louis 150 Luscher, Kurt 132, 147, 148 Maier, Hans 200 Malinvaud, Edward 103, 106 Marchand, Olivier 108 Mathews, G. 155 McCarthy, John D. 248, 251 Medoff, J. 94 Mendras, Henri 216, 217, 229, 297 Miller, S.J. 118 Milot, Micheline 177 Modell, John 56, 65 Montminy, Jean-Paul 184 Myles, John 102 Nave-Herz, Rosemarie 67 Neidhardt, Friedhelm 148, 151 Noelle-Neuman, Elisabeth 204 Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth 148, 205 Noll, Heinz-Herbert 103 Oommen, T.K. 248 Ouellet, Aubert 154 Palloni, Alberto 128 Patel, Kent 195

Author index

Patterson, Keith 155 Pfeil, Elisabeth 148 Phillips, 102 Picot, Garnett 102 Piel, Edgar 66, 204 Piermont, Dorothee 259 Pilant, Denny 195 Popenoe, David 56, 61 Quack, Sigrid 103 Quesada, G.M. 120 Rammstedt, O. 248 Reichley, A. James 193 Rein, Martin 97 Ridler.'Neil B. 155 Rioux, Marcel 152 Robbins, Thomas 173 Roberge, Andree 153 Roberts, Keith A. 173 Robertson, Roland 173 Robinson, John P. 71 Rocher, Guy 184 Rochon, Madeleine 49 Rogowski, Beatrice 117 Rose, Gary 195 Rosenmayr, Leopold 137 Rosenthal, Carolyn J. 153 Rossi, Alice S. 121, 128, 134, 139 Rossi, Peter H. 121, 128, 134, 139 Roth, Roland 248, 253 Rouillard, Jacques 177 Roussel, Louis 139, 146 Roy, Marie-Andree 178, 179 Rucht, Dieter 248, 249, 251-254, 261 Rudolph, Helmut 103 Sasaki, Masamichi 206 Schenk, Harald 201 Schumacher, Jiirgen 70 Schumann, Jutta 150 Schwarz, Karl 137 Scott, Jacqueline 97 Segalen, Marline 145 Shanas, Ethel 118-120,142,156 Simmel, Georg 225, 235 Simon, Rita J. 68 Smyer, Michael A. 116, 121, 149, 157 Spence, Michele 156 Stearns, Peter N. 144 Stoetzel, Jean 67

Stone, Leroy O. 153 Streib, Gordon F. 156 Surkyn, Johan 54, 61, 65, 73, 80, 83 Sussman, Marvin B. 118, 122, 142 Suzuki, Tatsuzo 206 Sylvain, Philippe 175 Talmon, Yonina 122 Tarrow, Sidney 248, 250 Taylor, Charles Lewis 228 Taylor, Robert Joseph 119, 120 Thery, Irene 146 Thibeault, Normand 82 Thomas, D.S. 82 Thompson, Wayne E. 156 Thornton, Arland 69, 72 Tilly, Chris 98 Tocqueville, Alexis de 229 Tohariz, Jose Juan 67 Touraine, Alain 248, 252 Townsend, Peter 118 Treas, Judith 156 Troll, Lillian E. 118 Unger, Irwin 194 Vaillancourt, Jean-Guy 249, 254 Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 117, 132, 135, 144, 161 Veil, Mechthild 150 Verba, Sidney 234 Veroff, Joseph 65, 67, 69 Voisine, Nive 175 Waite, Linda J. 76 Wannell, Ted 102 Whitehead, Barbara Dafoe 134 Wilkens, E. 204 Williams, Rhys H. 194 Willmott, Peter 118 Wills, Gary 193, 198 Wilson, Bryan 173 Witsberger, Christina 76 Wojtkiewicz, Roger A. 134 Worndl, Barbara 248, 253 Wuthnow, Robert 197 Yanigasako, Sylvia Junko 118 Young, Michael 118 Yule, G.U. 82 Zald, Mayer N. 248, 251 Zapf, Wolfgang 203 Zylberberg, Jacques 184

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Subject index

Abortion 51, 59, 132, 177, 201 Anomie 277, 284, 286, 295 Associations 9, 185, 188, 229, 239, 251, 253 Authority 10, 64, 215, 218, 229, 296 Baby boom 6, 44, 79 Beliefs 181, 188, 198, 203 Births 14, 56, 132, 240 Capitalism 124, 241 Centralization 37, 256, 294, 299, 300 Child care 16, 72, 76, 240 Church 13, 175, 185, 194, 200 Clergy 182, 189, 198, 204, 218 Co-residence 119, 135, 153 Communism 233, 257, 294 Computerization 29, 89, 276 Conduct (norms of) 64, 150, 276, 287 Confidence 37, 199, 233, 286, 288 Conflict 8, 185, 225, 294 ethnic 236 gender role 241 generational 146 labour 9, 234 religion 234 resolution 228 Consumption 126, 216, 283, 286, 295 Contraception 51, 59, 177 Criminality 177, 226, 236 Culture 13, 63, 80, 119, 177, 185, 206, 228, 238, 251, 282 Decentralization 276, 283, 294, 300 Deindustrialization 7, 17, 98 Democracy 186, 200, 216, 225, 233, 245, 288 Differentiation 124, 147, 219, 234, 249 Discrimination 151, 235 Divorce 57, 78, 132, 201 Ecological movement 239, 247 Economy business 239, 263

dependency 143 depression 176 development 6, 298 domestic 75, 122 market economy 233 production 283 recession 104 tertiarization 89, 97, 100 Education 51, 61, 216 church influence 186 religion 12, 177, 196, 201 Elders 16, 118, 129, 138, 142, 208, 286 Environment 178, 203, 240, 247 Ethnicity 20, 38, 119, 221, 232, 236 Family 67, 216 model 63, 69, 120 network 15, 25, 115, 118, 139, 143, 152 policy 15, 74, 146, 147, 154 structure 13, 68, 134 Fertility 5, 7, 13, 19, 43, 119, 129, 132 French revolution 185 Generation 15, 68, 80, 95, 103, 115, 187, 220, 286 Gross domestic product 126 Household work 15, 69, 71, 101, 150, 216 Identity 13, 18, 232, 287, 291 Income family 74, 156, 219, 242, 286 personal 7, 286 Industrialization 36, 62, 123, 173, 194, 216, 232, 250 Inequalities 286, 291 between age groups 106 between sexes 70, 93, 106, 129, 218 income 77, 220 Institutionalization 5, 147, 255, 296 Institutions 176, 184, 195, 201, 206, 215, 282 Intellectual 192, 239 325

Convergence or Divergence

Kindergarten 75 Kinship 25, 37, 115 Labour labour force 11, 70, 91, 93 labour market 16,89,217,295 labour-union 177, 187 Levels of living 242 Life styles 287, 300 Life-expectancy 129 Marriage 54, 62, 68, 78, 131, 177 * fertility 14, 49 religion 181, 189, 203 Mass media 181, 190, 204, 255, 262, 287, 288 Microsbcial 287, 289 Mobilization 31,248,251,256,261 Modernization 4, 29, 63, 83, 123, 134, 174, 206, 226, 287 Mortality 122, 128 Mutual aid 118, 141, 145, 148, 153, 156 Networks 15, 25, 67, 76, 115, 144, 185, 251, 287 Nuclear 227 arsenal 237 energy 251 protest 253 Oil-price shock 104 Parenthood 69 Political change 36 Political parties 202, 233, 238 ecological party 253, 258 Poverty 77, 153, 174, 178, 184, 194, 205, 236, 242 Power 9, 12, 131, 175, 192, 203, 217, 226, 237, 251, 277, 282 Precariousness 102, 108, 284, 291 Private life 191 Public opinion 288 Quiet revolution in Quebec 174, 176, 184, 289 Religion 6, 11, 173 Rights 119, 146, 151, 186, 232, 241 minorities 178, 236 movements 197 Secularization 11, 13, 64, 173, 221 Social change analysis 1, 24, 269 Social class 8, 36, 120, 219, 220, 231, 289, 300

326

Social consensus 19, 233, 288, 296, 299 Social control 294 Social disorganization 286 Social evolution 23 Social indicators 27 Social movement 197, 202 Socialism 158, 230, 234, 241 State 200, 288, 289 conflict resolution 229 education 176 governmental aid 149 social-insurance 151, 156 Stratification 8,31,38,219,299 Technology 4, 80, 101, 216, 226, 240, 244, 251 Trend definition 270 list of 41 Unemployment 17, 95, 104, 238, 294 Urbanization 123, 134, 298 Values 10, 14, 64, 120, 154, 186, 221, 238, 260 Violence 9, 221, 226, 251, 253, 291 Wealth 54, 75, 220, 222, 242, 243, 272, 277, 286 Welfare 149, 177, 196, 201, 238, 283 Women feminism 80, 241 kinship 121 roles 68, 150, 160, 179, 240, 286, 292, 298, 299 Women's employment 57, 70 fertility 14, 51 participation rate 93, 95 Work organization 288 Youth 277 education 70 fertility 47 labour 17, 59, 70, 94, 102 marriage 54 movements 7, 254 precariousness 103 religion 179, 186 values 238

The Authors

Howard M. Bahr is a professor of sociology at Brigham Young University, Utah. His recent interests include social change, Native American studies, and urban sociology. He is the co-author of Social Science Research Methods (1984) and the forthcoming Contemporary Navajo Bibliography. Gary Caldwell, an independent researcher, is interested in questions of fertility, migration and political culture in Quebec and Canada. His upcoming publications are Immigration Incorporation in Montreal in the Seventies and "Social Change in Contemporary Quebec". Theodore Caplow is the Commonwealth Professor of Sociology at the University of Virginia. He is the author of Peace Games (1989) and American Social Trends (1991), and the senior author of Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990 (1991).

Bruce Chadwick is a professor of sociology and director of the Center for Studies of the Family at Brigham Young University, Utah. He has conducted research on a variety of topics, including education, family, juvenile delinquency, race relations, religion, and social change. He is the author of Statistical Handbook on the American Family (1992). Jean-Hugues Dechaux is an associate professor of sociology at 1'Universite Rene-Descartes, in Paris. He is interested in family studies, and he has authored many articles. Salustiano Del Campo is the chairman of the Department of Social Structure at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and secretary general of the Spanish Royal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. His most recent book is La nuevafamilia espahola (1992).

Michel Forse is a professor of sociology at the University of Lille. He recently published L'ordre improbable (1989) and L'analyse structurelle du changement social (1991). Currently, he is working on social network and social change.

327

Convergence or Divergence

Guy Frechet is project manager on social research (Quebec Ministry of Health and Social Services) and an associate professor in the Department of Sociology, at Laval University, Quebec. His topics of interest are social and technological change, sociology of work, and quantitative methods. Madeleine Gauthier is a researcher and a member of the executive board of the Institut quebecois de recherche sur la culture. She is the author of books and papers on religion, poverty, and youth, and recently published Les jeunes chomeurs. She is currently working on a book on youth. Wolfgang Glatzer is professor of Sociology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat at Frankfurt/Main. In the last years he published books on Household Technization and Division of Labour, Modernization of Modern Societies, Developmental Tendencies of Social Structure, Living Conditions in Germany, Attitudes and Living Conditions in Europe. Karl-Otto Hondrich is a professor of sociology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat at Frankfurt/Main, Germany. He is the author of Lehrmeister Krieg (1992) and Solidartat in de Modern Gesellsheft (Solidarity in Modern Sociology) (1992), as well as several books on social change, differentiation, conflicts, and authority. Renata Hornung-Drauss is a sociologist currently working in Brussels for the European Community Commission. Louis Hourmant is a research assistant in the Observatoire fran^ais de conjoncture economique in Paris. He is currently working on European values in a comparative perspective. Simon Langlois is a professor of sociology at Laval University, Quebec, and a research director at FInstitut quebecois de recherche sur la culture. He is co-editor of a handbook on social problems, Traite des problemes sociaux (1994). He is presently the secretary of the International Group for Comparative Charting of Social Change. Yannick Lemel is the head of the Observatoire Economique de Paris, INSEE, in Paris, and the director of a research group on households and ways of living at IRESCO, Paris. He has published Stratification et mobilite sociale (1991). Henri Mendras is the research director at the Centre national de la recherche scientifique and at the OFCE (Paris). He also teaches at the Institut de science politique in Paris. He has published numerous books and papers, including La fin des pay sans (new edition 1992) and La seconde revolution franfaise (1988).

328

The Authors

John Modell is a professor of history at Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh. He has worked on the history of youth, and he is the author of Into One's Own (1989). He is currently working on a comparative historical analysis of education.

Heinz-Herbert Noll is the director of the Social Indicators Department of the Zentrum fur Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) at Mannheim, Germany. He is presently engaged in research on social inequality and indicators of well-being. He is the author of numerous articles and the editor of books on social indicators and the quality of life.

Karin Stiehr was working as a social researcher at the University of Frankfurt/Main, Germany, when she joined the CCSC Group. As well, she is a co-owner of the Institut fur Soziale Infrastruktur, Frankfurt/Main, and specializes on conceptualizing social and labour-market policies. She published books and articles about modern societal risks as well as the effects of social change on women's living and working conditions.

Barbara Worndl works as a senior researcher in the Department of Sociology at the University of Frankfurt/Main, Germany. She is currently working on social conflicts about modern environmental risks and the dynamics of social change. She is the author of articles on these topics.

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Series COMPARATIVE CHARTING OF SOCIAL CHANGE Editor: Simon Langlois Laval University and IQRC, Canada

Recent Social Trends in the United States 1960-1990. Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, Bruce A. Chadwick Recent Social Trends in Quebec 1960-1990. Simon Langlois, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, Jean-Pierre Simard Recent Social Trends in France 1960-1990. Michel Forse, Jean-Pierre Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Jean-Hugues Dechaux Recent Social Trends in The Federal Republic of Germany 1960-1990. Wolfgang Glatzer, Karl-Otto Hondrich, Heinz-Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, Barbara Worndl

(In preparation) Recent Social Trends in Spain 1960-1990. Salustiano Del Campo et alii. Recent Social Trends in Italy 1960-1990. Alberto Martinelli, Antonio Chiesi, Sonia Stefanizzi (Work in Progress) Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960-1990. Recent Social Trends in Russia 1960-1990.