Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960-2000 9780773569324

Citation preview

Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960 - 2000

Series: Comparative Charting of Social Change Series Editor: Simon Langlois

Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990 Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell, Bruce A. Chadwick Recent Social Trends in Quebec, 1960-1990 Simon Langlois, Jean-Paul Baillargeon, Gary Caldwell, Guy Frechet, Madeleine Gauthier, Jean-Paul Simard Recent Social Trends in West Germany, 1960-1990 Wolfgang Glatzer, Karl-Otto Hondrich, Heinz Herbert Noll, Karin Stiehr, Barbara Worndl Recent Social Trends in France, 1960-1990 Michel Forse, Jean-Paul Jaslin, Yannick Lemel, Henri Mendras, Denis Stoclet, Jean-Hugues Dechaux Recent Social Trends in Russia, 1960-1995 Irene A. Boutenko, Kirill E. Razlogov Recent Social Trends in Italy, 1960-1995 Alberto MartineHi, Antonio Chiesi, Sonia Stefanizzi Convergence or Divergence ? Comparing Recent Social Trends in Industrial Societies Simon Langlois, Theodore Caplow, Henri Mendras, Wolfgang Glatzer (eds) Recent Social Trends in Bulgaria, 1960-1995 Nikolai Genov, Anna Krasteva Leviathan Transformed: Seven National States in the New Century Theodore Caplow (ed.) Changing Structures of Inequality: A Comparative Perspective Yannick Lemel, Heinz Herbert Noll (eds) Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960-2000 Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti, Andromachi Hadjiyanni (eds) In preparation Recent Social Trends in Canada, 1960-2000 Lance Roberts, Rod Clifton, Barry Ferguson, Simon Langlois

Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960-2000 EDITED BY DIMITRIS CHARALAMBIS, LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI, AND ANDROMACHI HADJIYANNI

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

© McGill-Queen's University Press 2004 ISBN 0-7735-2202-6 Legal deposit first quarter 2004 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper McGill-Queen's University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. It also acknowledges the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Book Publishing Industry Development Program (BPIDP) for its publishing activities. National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Recent social trends in Greece, 1960-2000 / edited by Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti, Andromachi Hadjiyanni. (Comparative charting of social change; 11) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-2202-6 1. Social change - Greece - History - 20th century. 2. Greece Social conditions - 20th century. 3. Social indicators - Greece. I. Charalambis, Dimitris II. Maratou-Alipranti, Laura III. Hadjiyanni, Andromachi IV. Series. HN650.5.A8R42 2004

303.4'09495

C2003-903360-0

Contents

Author's C o n t r i b u t i o n s Acknowledgments

xii

Preface

xiii

Introduction 0

x

1

Context 0.1 Demographic Trends

25

0.2 Macro-economic Trends

35

0.3 Macro-technological Trends

44

1 Age Groups 1.1 Youth

54

1.2 The Elderly

61

2 Microsocial 2.1 Self-Identification

67

2.2 Kinship Networks

74

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

83

2.4 Local Autonomy

90

2.5 Voluntary Associations

96

2.6 Sociability Networks

100

vi

Contents

3 Women 3.1 Female Roles

109

3.2 Childbearing

120

3.3 Matrimonial Models

128

3.4 Women's Employment

140

3.5 Reproductive Techniques

154

4 Labour Market 4.1 Unemployment

165

4.2 Skills and Occupational Levels

180

4.3 Types of Employment

185

4.4 Sectors of Economic Activity

201

4.5 Computerization of Work

207

5 Labour and Management 5.1 Work Organization

215

5.2 Personnel Administration

221

5.3 Size and Type of Enterprises

225

6 Social S t r a t i f i c a t i o n 6.1 Occupational Status

231

6.2 Social Mobility

240

6.3 Economic Inequality

249

6.4 Social Inequality

261

7 Social Relations 7.1 Conflict

266

7.2 Negotiation

276

7.3 Norms of Conduct

286

Contents

7.4 Authority

294

7.5 Public Opinion

299

8 State and Service Institutions 8.1 Educational System

305

8.2 Health System

318

8.3 Welfare System

331

8.4 The State

344

9 M o b i l i z i n g Institutions 9.1 Labour Unions

353

9.2 Religious Institutions

358

9.3 Military Forces

363

9.4 Political Parties

370

9.5 Mass Media

376

10 I n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n of Social Forces 10.1 Dispute Settlement

391

10.2 Institutionalisation of Labour Unions

398

10.3 Social Movements

408

10.4 Interest Groups

415

11 Ideology 11.1 Political Differentiation

425

11.2 Confidence in Institutions

434

11.3 Economic Orientations

445

11.4 Radicalism

452

11.5 Religious Beliefs

460

vii

viii

Contents

12 Household Resources 12.1 Personal and Family Income

466

12.2 Informal Economy

472

12.3 Personal and Family Wealth

477

13 Life Style 13.1 Market Goods and Services

482

13.2 Mass Information

493

13.3 Personal Health and Beauty Practices

503

13.4 Time Use

512

13.5 Daily Mobility

515

13.6 Household Production

525

13.7 Forms of Erotic Expression

532

13.8 Mood-altering Substances

536

14 Leisure 14.1 Amount and Use of Free Time

544

14.2 Vacation Patterns

550

14.3 Athletics and Sports

557

14.4 Cultural Activities

562

15 E d u c a t i o n a l A t t a i n m e n t 15.1 General Education

574

15.2 Vocational and Technical Education

589

15.3 Continuing Education

603

16 Integration and M a r g i n a l i z a t i o n 16.1 Immigrants and ethnic minorities

616

16.2 Crime and Punishment

631

Contents 16.3 Emotional Disorders and Self-destructive Behaviour 16.4 Poverty

650 660

17 Attitudes and Values 17.1 Satisfaction

669

17.2 Perception of Social Problems

676

17.3 Orientations toward the Future

682

17.4 Values

687

17.5 National Identity

693

Editors

699

ix

Authors' Contributions

DIMITRIS CHARALAMBIS, LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI and ANDROMACHI HADJI-

YANNI are the editors of this volume ALBERTO MARTINELLI is the author of Preface DIMITRIS CHARALAMBIS is the author of Introduction ELISABETH ALLISON is the author of chapter 13.1 ELISABETH ALLISON, EVDOKIA MANOLOGLOU and PARIS TSARTAS are the joint authors of chapters 14.1, 14.2 IOANNIS ANTONOPOULOS is the author of chapter 9.4 DIONISIS BALOURDOS is the author of chapter 16.4 NIKOS BOUZAS is the author of chapters 12.2, 12.3 DIMITRI ECONOMOU is the author of chapter 0.2

DIMITRIS ECONOMOU and THOMAS MALOUTAS are the joint authors of chapter 8.4 (updated by APOSTOLIS RAFAILIDIS) KALIROI DASKALAKI, EMMY FRONIMOU and PANAGIOTA PAPADOPOULOU are the

joint authors of chapter 16.2 EVI FAGADAKI is the author of chapter 13.4 AMALIA FRANGISKOU is the author of chapters 9.5; 13.2 AMALIA FRANGISKOU and CHRISTINA VAROUXI are the joint authors of chapters 17.1, 17.2, 17.3, 17.4 ANDROMACHI HADJIYANNI is the author of chapters 1.1, 1.2; 2.3, 2.4, 2.5; 9.2; 11.5 ANDROMACHI HADJIYANNI and MARINA PETRONOTI are the joint authors of chapter 2.6 PANAYIOTIS KAFETZIS is the author of chapter 11.1

ROXANNE KAFTANTZOGLOU and KOSTAS YANNAKOPOULOS are the joint authors of chapter 13.7 JOHN KALLAS and THEODORE PAPADOGONAS are the joint authors of chapters 0.3; 4.5

Authors' Contributions

xi

CHRYSA KAPPI is the author of chapters 15.2, 15.3 CHRYSA KAPPI and HARA STRATOUDAKI are the joint authors of chapters 8.1 (updated by LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI), 8.2

HELENE KOVANI is the author of chapter 10.3 THOMAS MALOUTAS and CHRISTOS PAPATHEODOROU are the joint authors of chapter 8.3 LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI is the author of chapters 0.1; 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3; 16.1 LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI and ERSI ZACOPOULOU are the joint authors of chapter 9.1 IOANNIS MICHELOYIANNAKIS is the author of chapter 9.3 ALIKIMOURIKI is the author of chapter 5.1 IOANNIS MYRIZAKIS is the author of chapter 14.3 ROY PANAGIOTOPOULOU is the author of chapters 4.3 (updated by ANDROMACHI HADJIYANNI), 4.4 (updated by ANDROMACHI HADJIYANNI); 5.2, 5.3; 6.2, 6.4 APOSTOLOS G. PAPADOPOULOS is the author of chapters 10.1, 10.2; 13.6 IOANNA PAPATHANASSIOU is the author of chapter 11.4 MARIA KETSETZOPOULOU is the author of chapter 12.1 APOSTOLIS RAFAILIDIS is the author of chapters 4.1, 4.2; 6.1, 6.3; 11.3 NIKOS SARRIS is the author of chapter 7.5 NIKOS SARRIS and OLGA TSAKIRIDES are the joint authors of chapters 10.4; 17.5 THEONI STATHOPOULOU is the author of chapters 13.8; 16.3 HARA STRATOUDAKI is the author of chapter 15.1 HARIS SYMEONIDOU is the author of chapters 3.4, 3.5 OLGA TSAKIRIDES is the author of chapters 2.1; 13.3, 13.5 JOANNA TSIGANOU is the author of chapters 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 JOANNA TSIGANOU and ERSI ZACOPOULOU are the joint authors of chapter 7.1 CHRISTINA VAROUXI is the author of chapter 11.2 EFI VENIZELOU and MARIA THANOPOULOU are the joint authors of chapter 14.4 (updated by LAURA MARATOU-ALIPRANTI)

Acknowledgments

The Greek group and the editors of this volume are grateful to the members of the International Group for Comparative Charting of Social Change (ccsc) for all their support throughout this project. Our warmest thanks are due to our colleagues of the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) for their collaboration and contribution in this volume. We would like to thank in particular EKKE'S successive presidents Prof. Konstantinos Tsoukalas, Prof. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Prof. Elizabeth Panayiotatou, for their generous help and financial support. Paraskevi Galinou and Androniki Kalogiratou translated several chapters, and Kathe Roth copy-edited this book. Our warm thanks to them all. Finally, we are particularly indebted to Marina Rigou, who did a perspective job of additional proofreading and managed the task of integrating varied typescripts into an editable form working with patience and remarkable accuracy on the final layout. Dimitris Charalambis Laura Maratou-Alipranti Andromachi Hadjiyanni

Preface

This volume, edited by Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti and Andromachi Hadjiyanni, adds an important component to the mosaic of country monographs written in the framework of the international Comparative Charting of Social Change programme. This research programme, started by Ted Caplow and Henry Mendras in 1987, is developed by a series of national teams from both European and North American countries. The purpose is the systematic comparison of major changes that have occurred in developed societies on the basis of a list of 78 social trends, arranged in 17 groups, covering all significant aspects of social life, from demographic to microsocial trends, from labour market to social stratification, from state and service institutions to ideologies, from life styles to patterns of integration and marginalisation. Trends can be defined as "theoretical diagnostics through which a direction is given to a group of empirical developments, described by indicators arising from a single societal sector". Each different trend is synthetically interpreted and analysed, in order to compose an overall picture of the entity, direction and quality of social changes in a given country. Starting with the country monograph on Italy, an introductory chapter was added, with the aim of providing also a general interpretation of societal change in a given country. The volume on Greece follows this model, providing an introduction to the series of trends which draws a picture of the transformation of Greek society and political system from the immediate post-war period to the times of globalisation. National societies have been traditionally a basic object of sociological research. These studies have been, and still are, a major way to rearrange into a more general picture the different pieces of knowledge which can be drawn from a variety of specialized and separated sectors of sociological research focusing on different processes, actors and institutions. The aim of country monographs is that of acquiring an understanding of a society's internal dynamics and structures, its distinctive cultural code, its specific mechanisms of integration, conflict and change. The old sociological question asked by Sirnmel, "how is society possible?" (that is, how cooperation can be fostered so that basic needs are met, social reproduction guaranteed and conflict regulated) is still asked -and still finds reasonable answers- at the country level.

xiv

Preface

The main reason for this country focus is that the sovereign national state has been the key institution and the basic element of structuration of modern society; it is within this framework that the basic normative questions of non-violent regulation of conflict, social justice, and individual freedom have been managed. And even if national sovereignty is eroded by global trends, the nation-state remains a key institution and a basic source of collective identity, as well as a central theme of sociological research. And yet, country studies must be qualified and integrated in three major ways. First, as the Comparative Charting of Social Change Programme upholds, they must be conceived in a genuine comparative way, since they have seldom been conducted with an explicit comparative approach. Second, whereas most sociologists have usually studied their own societies as if they were separate entities- each with its own clearcut national boundaries, we must rather analyse them as parts of a globally interconnected world. In fact, today globalisation implies not only the emergence of a new object of study, the world as such, but requires that any specific study (a study of work organization and labour relations in a specific firm, or a research on migration patterns in a given country) be framed in a global context, since each part of the world is increasingly interdependent with many others and the world as such is increasingly present in all of its parts. The contemporary world looks more and more like a laser beam hologram, where every point contains the information of the whole, since each human being increasingly tends to consume information and resources coming from everywhere. Therefore, each study of national and local social realities should take into account their relations with the world as an interconnected whole. Third, flows should be put at the centre of the analysis alongside structures, because, with the erosion of national sovereignty as a consequence of global interdependence, social structure has become less coherent than before, and flows of people, technologies, ideas, symbols, capital, within and across national boundaries are becoming more and more important. This study of social change in contemporary Greece is aware of this kind of problems; the description and the reading of trends is conducted on the basis of a common framework which makes comparison possible with similar country studies; it takes into account the impact of international trends on domestic developments; and it gives importance to processes like migrations, stressing the growth of a multicultural society in Greece with its various consequences, first of all the threat to the belief of national homogeneity. The underlying assumption of the Comparative Charting of Social Change series of country monographs Greek society toward is that of multiple modernities, i.e. the idea that the best way to understand the contemporary world of modern societies is to see it as a story of continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs. In a highly interdependent world, each modernising country has to meet

Preface

xv

common challenges. Yet, given its history and autonomous culture, each country is unique and often seems to its own citizens "more unique" than others. This was my interpretation of the transformation of Italian society as "unequal modernisation", a model which stresses the imbalance between a fast and thorough socio-economic change and a much slower evolution in the law and state institutions, the bureaucracy and political culture. Greece's specific version of modernity clearly appears in Charalambis' introduction to the volume and in the analysis of various trends as well. Charalambis maintains that Greece has followed a distinctly European trajectory, with meanings, behaviours, and structures that are clearly different from those usually associated with processes of rationalization. A perspective shared by other Greek scholars, like Mouzelis, according to whom Greece displays all the characteristics of a society in which "progress" often means regression and return to previous developmental stages. Actually, at first glance, the changes of Greek society from the post-second World War to the times of globalisation show some typical patterns of the process toward modernity and through modernity, such as the shift from a predominantly rural and locally fragmented society to a centrally-organized urban society (the rural population decreased from 48% in 1961 to 30% in 1991, with one-third of the total population concentrated in Athens' metropolitan area), the shift from an agricultural economy with a few industrial enclaves to a tertiary economy, the shift from a relatively static social structure with limited expectations to a more dynamic one with rising expectations and the most intense social mobility that Greek society experienced its modern history, the shift from a labour exporting country to a labour importing country (especially in the period 1955-70, about a million people emigrated to Western European countries, mostly Germany, and overseas, in the US, Canada, Australia, but, by 1986, about six hundred thousand of them had returned home, and now it is estimated that more than 800,000 illegal immigrants live in Greece, corresponding to 8% of the population and 13% of the labour force). However, even the most typical "modern" trends, such as urbanisation and industrialisation, social mobility and immigration, show specific social features and consequences, different from those of other countries. To give a few examples, first, the massive population outflows to urban centres and especially to Athens did not sever familial ties between rural and urban inhabitants. Second, urbanization was not accompanied by thorough industrial development. The industrialization process started in the 1950s (mainly in the branches of food products, beverages, textiles, chemicals), and the majority of manufacturing enterprises were located near the two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki. But, on the whole, the new urban immigrants found jobs in services and other areas of the tertiary sector. The number of those employed in public administration soared, resulting in an increase in the role and power of the state.

xvi

Preface

The public sector became the breeding ground for the new bourgeois class affiliated with the state, and public employment has been intricately linked to objective and subjective class/strata identifications. Thus, as Tsoukalas points out, the patron-client networks representing atomised interests as well as the organized interest groups have contributed to the formation of modern Greek society and to the maintenance of the traditional ideology of political clientelism. Third, a relatively high participation of the primary sector in the formation of GDP (14% in 1993) is coupled with a weak industrial base, mostly producing for the domestic market and with rather limited foreign investments. Fourth, in Greece the welfare state remains less developed than in other European countries. Historical, political, and social factors have hindered its development. The Greek social policy system is characterised by fragmentary and often contradictory regulations obstructing the function of welfare institutions and creating gaps and overlaps, whereas in the field of family policy the majority of the programmes aim mostly at supporting families in financial need. The longsought social security reform has always been postponed, and the state, which has preferred to offer short-term remedies, has not put any cost-containment measures in place. The supportive role of the family somewhat counterbalances the state's inability to satisfy social needs. The role of women is critical to the care of younger, older, and disabled family members. Thus, the modern Greek family constitutes the most important institution of social regulation and the framework of social organization, as the nuclear family often works as a substitute for the welfare state. The fifth example of specificity is precisely provided by the central role of the family, which is much greater than on average in developed countries. The dominant family type is the nuclear family: the married couple and their children, living in their own residence and often in the same area or neighbourhood with parents and/or relatives. Though the nuclear family predominates, it is embedded into a wider network of relatives which supports its members in daily life. As many studies point out, from Moussourou to Maratou-Alipranti, solidarity and mutual support between close kin continue to have a very important place in family organisation and are expressed in the exchange of goods and services, in daily contacts and communication, financial assistance, help in finding a job or during an illness, and so on. But the most dramatic distinctive feature of Greek path to modernity is to be found in the relation between modernisation and democratisation. The political regimes of modern Greece have alternated between parliamentarianism and dictatorship military or civilian - in varying combinations with a monarchical or republican form of government. The traumatic experience of the military dictatorship in 1967-74 is interpreted in the introduction as the result of the failure to modernise and democratise the political system in a period of fast economic growth, and to the special role of the army within the state as a consequence of the post-second World War civil war. Yet, the military coup d' etat only slowed down a process toward the complete

Preface

xvii

acceptance of the market economy and of representative democracy which seems irreversible. Papandreou's party (PASOK) followed a specific blend of anti-Western rethorics and pro-Western practice; the policies of joining the European Community and consolidating Western democracy were pursued while expressing an essentially nationalist, populist and anti-Western ideology. The joining of the European Community in 1981 has been perceived in different ways by Greek scholars, political leaders and public opinion: on the negative side, it has been argued that the balance of trade has been deteriorating in the long run, and that the trade deficit accordingly represents an increasing proportion of GDP (from 10.1% in 1980 to 22.1% in 1993); on the positive side, it has been argued that in the last decade the Greek economy has been marked by a more rapid industrialization, a continuous rise in consumer spending, higher yearly rates of GDP increase (3.5%) than those of the European Union average (2.7%), and slightly lower unemployment rates (below 10%) than the EU average. Moreover, Greece contributes 1.5% to and collects about 7% from the EU budget. This net gain is, of course, true for most other member countries with a per-capita GDP lower than the EU average. The EU contrib tion to Greek GDP started at 0.5% back in 1981, rose to 5.5% in 1991, and reached a peak of 7.1% in 1996. From 1996 onwards, there has been a decreasing trend due to the stabilization of the exchange rates between Greek currency and the ECU, on the one hand, and the consolidation of payments by the Common Agricultural Policy. Finally, EU monetary resources currently fund 50-55% of public fixed capital investments. On the whole, Greece's integration in the European Union seems having more benefits than costs. Greece's accession to the Community in 1981 was the beginning of a period of gradual incorporation in a complex process of economic and political reform and rationalization, implying major restructuring practices in economic and political institutions. It certainly fostered greater similarity with the other European Union member countries-as it is shown by several societal trends described in this volume. First and foremost, the major task of democratic consolidation, i.e the establishing of the institutions, values and practices of a viable, feasible democracy, seems to a large extent accomplished, although traditional peculiarities, first of all political clientelism - which according to scholars like Pollis, have characterized the modern Greek political system, or the ethical deficit in political life which is stressed by Charalambis - are farfromovercome. The future of Greece looks more and more tied to that of the European Union (where the enlargement to the East provides a more important role for Greece), and must be framed into the larger context of an increasingly globalised world. Key issues like the relations between citizens and governing institutions, between the economy and the state, the conceptions of individual rights and obligations, the role of the church, the increasing relevance of multiculturalism, are all to be analysed in

xviii

Preface

this double framework. The concept of multiple modernities allows us to take into full consideration the blend of homogenisation and continuing differentiation among European Union countries. And the concept of global interconnectedness allows to properly analyse the complex web of relations among the local, the national, and the supranational and global levels. Alberto Martinelli President of International Sociological Association Professor at Universita Degli Studi di Milano

Introduction

1. From 1960 to the year 2000. The transcendence of the immediate post-war period to the times of globalisation The introduction to this volume has a very simple but simultaneously especially complex purpose. It aims to aid the comprehension of historical prerequisites, the particularities of Greek society and the Greek political system, so that the reader can have a view of the context in which the indicators-social trends which are being analysed here can acquire their real meaning. The authors of this volume know that without Greece being somehow different from the other societies which are being included in the pursuits of this series, it does not cease to present its own particularities. Particularities, which have to be comprehended as prerequisites in every effort of comparative study of the 78 indicators-trends which form the subject matter of these volumes. The last twenty-eight years of the Third Hellenic Republic have exhibited rather clearly the problems and the contradictions of Greek society and the Greek political system. In this demystifying process, which allowed the appearance of real problems in the formation and functioning of the political system, one has definitely to acknowledge the implications of the country's entrance in the EEC and the collapse of all sorts of alibis - social and political - available to the conservative, as well as to the so-called progressive sectors by the system's juxtaposition, i.e. capitalism vs. socialism. The period has served to allow a diagnosis of much deeper coordinates in the Greek political system, as it comprises the only period during which the quality of the political system and the forms of social cohesion have not been covered by historical conjunctures able to cancel the diachronic experience and the expression of its contradictions. There is a range of problems in the political system, problems of social inclusion and self perception, problems in the relations between state and citizen, in the relations between the state and the economy, the private and the public, in the conceptions of individual rights and the rule of law, etc., all of them such crucial char-

2

Introduction

acteristics of modern Greek society. All these relations and their interplay attained increasingly complex forms in the historical process; yet, a range of historical conjunctures had not revealed their fundamental significance in the process and quality of the political system. In the final analysis, it was the realization of democracy that brought the problem of the content of democracy to the foreground and by implication the fundamental elements of social cohesion. The first historical period of the modern Greek state was actually characterized by the intensity of problems in constructing a nation-state and in building its central authority. Starting with the mid 19th century, the nascent and precocious parliamentary system is already faced with the fundamental problems of its particularities and deficits. Such problems pertained to the institutional and organizational levels, as well as to the citizens' democratic consciousness. However, they were not presented as such at the time. The contradictions between actual conditions in the social formation and the political system were functionally bridged by the system's adjustment under clientelistic terms of extra-institutional legitimisation. Up to 1922, "Megale Idea" (The "Great Idea": the irredentist movement for a bigger Greece and a Renaissance of the Byzantine Empire) constituted the basic referent of cohesion in Greek society. The problem of attaining the final national borders offered a guiding dimension in the process of national integration. It placed political processes, polarized and intense indeed, in citizens' consciousness and, in practice, in the context of the overall goal-setting that actually transcends polarization and pursues the rationality of a concrete goal, especially in the beginning of the 20th century. After 1922 (Lausanne agreement, final setting of the Greek national borders, defeat in Asia Minor, end of the Ottoman empire and consolidation of the national state of Turkey) and up to World War II there was an effort to transcend traditional cleavages, such as those of the "classic" period of clientelism (19th century). This combined with all the shortcomings of the new modernizing goal setting, namely to rationalize the political and economic system. Those shortcomings were presenting themselves as an interplay of contradictions and impasses that combined into the "stillborn character" of the Second Hellenic Republic (1924-35). The problem of content in Greek democracy came to the forefront. However, tensions between the old and the contradictory new could not permit a substantial conception of our democracy's quality. The system's stake was, and continued until 1974 to be, how to establish a viable, feasible democracy. After World War II and especially after the Civil War (1946-49), coercive and exclusionary mechanisms were the tenets of social discipline. Along with ideological rationalizations of the Left and later of the Left of Centre political proponents, they compose a concrete conjuncture in which economic integration does occur and leads

Introduction

3

to the contradiction between the organization of political authority and the material conditions of its legitimation. An extreme point of this contradiction is the political and institutional crisis of the 60s and the imposition of the military dictatorship. This contradiction constitutes the main point in the construction of a political ideology that continues to be active even in the 80s. On the basis of economic continuity (stability), the dictatorship intensified the process of economic integration. The 60s was a decade of fast economic growth and an effort to modernise and democratise the political system which fails and is led in 1967 to the military dictatorship of 1967-74. The fall of the dictatorship and the collapse of post civil war mechanisms constitute the point of disentanglement of the Greek society from all those special historical conjunctures which covered and formed the actual problems of social cohesion as historical experiences. Those conjunctures maintained, reproduced and at the same time defined all the deficits of Democracy, all the vacua and deviant forms one can locate in the content of the system itself throughout that period. With the collapse of coercion and political exclusion, fundamental mechanisms and contradictions emerge and determine the quality of Democracy the Greek society has experienced since 1974 and during the 80s and 90s. They also give meaning to both negative and positive prospects which Greece is now facing. Dysfunction's problems and impasses can be identified in all areas of social communication and material reproduction ever since 1974 at least until the middle of the 90s. They constitute indices, symptoms and ramifications of much deeper problems in the content of Greek Democracy. An indicative list of such indicators after 1974 is: - The fall in productivity and de-industrialization - State over-borrowing and enormous budgetary deficits, conditions in which the satisfaction of particularistic client-group interests, as they determine the reproduction of political authority, are the main source of growing debts. - The inability to formulate an effective long term and acceptable policy in the urban -regional planning fields - The inability to set up an acceptable, fair and efficient tax system - The dominant role of political parties and their substitution of all forms of social groups and social categories in their de facto monopolization of the expression, organization and realization of social demands. - The confusion between public and private interest throughout the social stratification continuum, a condition linked to the distributive role of the state, and the tendency to politicise every private, particular and partial social demand. - The missing efficiency of the public sector

4

Introduction - The emergence of economic oligopolies which engage in economic exchanges with state, government and political parties and control the media sector. - The indignant search for collective identities of a pre-political and para-political nature as parts of an imaginary collectivity that transcends a society broken into individual, family-cantered and corporate rationales. - The formalist and procedural perception of the democratic system with a resultant prevalence of interest-cantered, pragmatic, cynical relativism that denies values and premises of democratic content - An immediate result of the above is the absolutist treatment of the majority principle as a singular process of legitimation in decision-making structures and procedures, and in justifying governmental practices. There is concomitant marginalisation of the liberalist principles and an absolute precedence of a procedural principle that is empty of moral, ethical and in all meanings binding contents. This condition imposes a populist and ad hoc character to Democracy, as it rewards, reproduces and legitimates practices that are beyond regulative and institutional mandates. It reinforces instrumentalist rationales in individual, collective and managerial practices and it serves to marginalize the concept of individual and political responsibility at least until the middle of the 90s. - The inability to rationalize and modernize the educational system, the prevalence of formalism in education and the corporatist rationale of state interventions. - The relativism in the distinction between the judicative, the legislative and the executive function as an outcome of a decisionist case by case formulation of the rules of the game.

The above indicative and, by no means exhaustive, symptoms of malfunction in the political system and in the construction of social cohesion and collectivity, obviously lead to the identification of a much deeper and, in fact, fundamental problem. The precocious introduction of the representative parliamentary system in Greece formed the organizational, procedural and institutional expression of the political activation of the traditional local power holders. This has been seen as a means of control of the central authority at the time the modern Greek state was created (1828). Universal suffrage initiated in 1844 and constitutionally sanctioned for the male adult population in 1864, was to gain even more legitimisation with the principle of governmental majority in 1875. However, it was not the culmination of a continuous broadening of political rights as it happened in the UK, or in the USA, a fact that becomes evident if we consider the delay in extending the vote to women. Neither does it reflect the outcome of revolutions and restorations, as it was the case in France. It was not the result of military defeat of an old regime and the outgrowth of a social

Introduction

5

democratic expression of the labour movement as a singular force of bourgeois freedoms and rights, as in the case of Germany. Universal suffrage was the necessary and, finally, the functional process through which central authority asserted control by transferring patron-client relations to the formal, institutional and organizational context of nationwide representation. This process reproduced an inherently and historically local exchange relationship between patron and client to the national level and this was to become the central content of the Greek political system in the 19th century but also determines the character of the political system in the 20th century. In a schematic mode, the matrix of the systemic constants, which account for problems and impasses will be condensed into eight groups: 1. The precocious introduction of universal suffrage prevents the passage through the phase of Industrial Revolution. The reliance-dependence of political authority on universal suffrage. The endurance of pre-independence property relations and statuses, the delay and hesitancy of legal state regulations in the context of universal suffrage and an agrarian economy have limited the momentum of capitalist relations and restricted, discouraged, if not precluded the acceptance of the productive logic of capitalism. This latter point refers to an inability to internalise the capitalist logic of production, and can be seen as the most important outcome of the political process on economic and social behaviour. 2. The clientelist relationship, as an interpersonal, exchange relation of patron and client, is by now a primarily extra-institutional relationship. It operates beyond the rational adoption and modern institutionalisation of binding social values. As a relationship external to the institutional framework, it conditions and determines the system's inputs, it imposes particularistic, apportioning, interventionist and fragmented outputs of the state apparatus as state power holders aim at particular individual or group recipients of resources and facilities. This factor conditions an overall context of adhocracy that rationalizes processes inherently external to, and deviating from, institutional norms with a facade of rule of law procedures. In effect, it undermines rule of law principles as interventions are arbitrary and do not operate through universally binding norms and rules. 3. State interventionism is a continuous and fundamental component, while the productive process remains marginal and secondary, as it does not constitute a main goal or the main issue at stake. One can read a diachronic priority in the distribution of resources and privileges, be it to the 19th century clients, or to the more organized interests of post civil war and post dictatorship Greece. Organized social groups and small business groups have managed to enter in a framework of "cli-

6

4.

5.

6.

7.

Introduction entelist neo-liberalism", a term that perfectly describes, but is not free of its own internal contradiction. An immediate consequence of the above is the pathological nature of the relationship between the private and the public sphere, as the private side (that of the economy) exists only through state intermediation and intervention. The public space is fused with the private, cancelling the value base of individual and collective autonomy leading to a latent populism, by which the liberal character of Democracy suffers. At the same time, political participation denotes the means of participation in the distributive game and fuses and confuses privileges with rights. The clientelist relationship constitutes the content and the final imperative of this system. This holds for both its classic 19th century form and the contemporary equivalent of corporatist exchange between political power and particular interests. Democracy is merely procedural and formalistic, whereas the formalistic component is not a formal expression of value contents, but a procedural codification of the mode of participating in the distribution of goods. Under these conditions, the area of rights remains a weak one, while formalism is always exposed to conjunctural arbitration. Typical forms of this phenomenon are the games around the electoral systems and their recurrent adjustments, occurrences that have equivalents in elections of organized interests under the guardianship of political parties. As the legislative and the executive function constitute mechanisms for the allocation of privileges and resources - for their acquisition, as well - the separation of legislative and executive authority has been formal, rather than substantive, ever since the 19th century. Starting with 1974, we have seen the substitution of social groups by political parties in the articulations of interests and demands, a phenomenon exacerbated in deed during the 80s. The populist character combines with the distributive mechanisms, which are not based on more or less objective market terms but on state intervention to prohibit the juxtaposition and balancing of social interests as autonomous partners, politicises all demands as pressures on the state apparatus. Efforts to impose particular social interests are presented as "popular" demands, as popular requirements of "fair" distribution. Each attempt to depoliticise demands meets the opposition of political power, parties, etc. It reveals that entanglement constantly reproduces their determining interventionist role. Social collectivity was not produced by the transcendence of individuality, by universally binding norms, such as the respect of the person, tolerance, solidarity, etc. In effect, for a crucial part of Greek society, it remains marginal and exhausts itself in reproducing pre- and para-modern imaginary community identification. Its common referents are those of Christian Orthodoxy and of the nation. There have been collectivist views of equality that have no relation to the actual condi-

Introduction

7

tions and practices of their proponents. Such imaginary identifications leave room for non-rational verbalisms (neo-orthodoxy, cultural supremacy of the Hellenes, etc.). The celebrated interpersonal relationship is widely referred to as an argument to support clientelist and neo-clientelist relations, as relations of persons who thus evade the alienation of objectified market relations and binding rules. This is definitely a rationalization of interest relationships. Relationships which are clearly utilitarian and in which the other is not a person, an individual, a subject, but the means to the realization of individual interests. 8. The inability to comprehend and effectively adopt a normatively binding system of universally applicable values and its resultant moral de-valuation of politics (political cynicism) weaken the ability to rationally interpret and explain the political process. They lead to interpretations on the basis of conspiracy in both internal and external affairs. Under the semblance of pragmatism, they interpret everything as the interlocking of interests. The demystifying element available to such stands is counteracted and in effect cancelled by the urge to mystify conspiratory practices. Combined with anti-modernity theories, such as metaphysical substantiations of the nation-state, these stands reinforce, among other things, an impressive neglect to the problems of older and more recent minority groups. They could explain the absence of rationalized state policies for these groups and international affairs in terms of power politics, at least until the 90s.

2. The military dictatorship of 1967-74. Causes and consequences Almost thirty-five years after the military coup of the 21st April 1967, the questions that one makes do not differ entirely from those made both then and after the collapse of the dictatorship among the debris of its nationalist insanity. A dictatorship that shortly before the end tried to rely on nationalist politics in order to stay afloat and win the legitimisation that it never had obtained. Why a military coup and a seven year dictatorship in Greece at a time when at least the western world was experiencing emancipation and liberalization from the post-war anchyloses? Why such a denouncement to the democratic opening that starts for Greece too with the 60s? Finally an equally painful question, which concerns the institutions and the structures of the system: was the 1967 coup in some ways predetermined? Was it the logical, inescapable outcome of the articulation of social relations and the exercise of power defined by the civil war? Alternatively, was it a result

8

Introduction

of the functioning and the handling of a political class that did not prove able to defend and shape a stable political regularity? It is not a matter of the acceptance or not of a teleological conception of history, it is simply the quest for an answer. Why did the coup arise. The Archimedean spot of post civil war Greece was the special role of the army within the state. A role which starts to be defined in the Middle East with the founding of the paramilitary organization Young Officers' Union (ENA) and a little later with the founding of the Holy Bond of Greek Officers (IDEA), in October 1944, in Athens. In the civil war, IDEA is distinguished as the organizational web of cohesion of the officer corps in the framework of a radical nationalist ideology, where the army identifies with the idea of the nation as carrier of national destinies. The military appears as the victor of the civil war, as the guarantor of the victory against communism organized and drawn up as a regimental anti-parliamentarian anticommunist power by IDEA, whose informal leader was General Papagos. Papagos was elected prime minister in 1952 and until his death in 1955 was the master of the game securing the guaranteeing role of the army without the appearance of any specific army influences and interventions in the government. Simultaneously, that particular period (1952-55) presents strong analogies, but without formal institutional safeguard, with the way in which the army patronizes the course of political action in Turkey. In the 1952 constitution, the fundamental rights are mentioned, but in the practice of its operation this system this does not have any meaning. Administrative acts, the power of Metaxas' (1936^0) dictatorships laws and occupation laws etc. essentially and practically negate the power of fundamental rights. Simultaneously the following constitute multiple forms of non freedom and control: keeping records on citizens by the police, the way in which elections take place, the power of emergency measures in borderline regions, police violence, at least away from the big city centres, aiming, apart from others, to control the election result, the election system itself which deforms the will of the people. The renowned "state of the national-minded" of the post civil war period constitutes a clear method of political exclusion (and as a result also socio-political exclusion through the certificates of "proper" social beliefs etc.). It is distinguished from the shaping of two categories of citizens: the national-minded and the anti-national minded. The boundaries between these two categories remain unclear, as long as the classification into the one or the other category depends, not only on the past of everyone or their family but also on the degree of non freedom that they can accept. Because essentially, one belongs to the first category only as long as they accept the real loss of their rights as a citizen, as long as they accept the terms of non freedom, either due to white terrorism or interest.

Introduction

9

The political notion of the people declines. Its place is taken by the metaphysically imbued notion of the nation and its destinies. But this non-rational metaphysical notion of the nation, known to each form of totalitarianism and radical nationalism, acquires a peculiar and specific nature (specific as long as it has specific results in the function and the terms of political non freedom that distinguishes the system). This nature constitutes the result of the civil war itself and its ideological interpretation. The army, winner of the civil war, is presented through its victory not only as guarantor of the system, but essentially as the guarantor of the nation. The Left, constitutes an anti-national power for IDEA. It constitutes the besieging machine of Soviet politics, Bulgarian imposition and Slav expansionism. For nationalism always exists as a radical, non-rational, aggressive ideology with a racist basis. In the framework of this ideology, the communist threat is perceived only secondarily as a danger to the bourgeois regime, as long as it consists of an ideology directly opposing to bourgeois rights and bourgeois freedoms. These identify - in the framework of the most common anti-enlightened ideology - with the undermining of the cohesion and the entity of a nation. Communism is perceived as a threat because according to this nationalist ideology it aims to the dissolution of the national entity. The position of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) on the "Macedonian" issue (The KKE was supporting the idea of an independent soviet Macedonia) in the midwar assists actually the legalization and establishment of this ideology. Under this light the communist rebellion aims to fasten the country to the Panslav chariot of Soviet sovereignty. It was ultimately aiming to the dissolution of the hypostasis of the Greek nation, the Greek identity. The communists are considered to aim to the national and racial dissolution of Greece. Since the definition of the nation is in final analysis of a racial nature, the effort to dissolve it is nothing but the corruption of the (Greek) race. The Greek communists are considered nothing other than traitors, agents, instruments, Genitsars of the Slavs and the Soviets. The threat is everywhere and not only in the battlefield. The underground infiltration of communism is not easily distinguished, but as an epidemic it threatens all Greeks. The only healthy section of the Greek society that faced and faces with success this danger was the army, IDEA'S officer corps. The identity of army and nation was nothing but the logical conclusion of this ideology. According to it, the army is the carrier of the national idea and its role is identical with the guarantee of the continuity of the nation. The structuring of non-freedom, the institutionalisation of coercion and violence guarantees the sovereignty of national feeling, of which the real expression is the force that rebutted and defeated anti-national scheming: the army. In this way, the army is identified with the nation, or at least, it is the only true carrier of the national idea. So the source of power, in the rationale of this system, cannot be the nationally suspect populace, but the army. Because the source

10

Introduction

of power is the nation, the destiny of which is secured by the officer corps organized by IDEA. The Greek people are divided in those who accept this notion of "nationalmindedness" and in the enemies of this notion. The mechanisms of violence shape the structure, the articulation of the political system. The army consists of the main centre of power, the central hard core of the state. It is the army that permits the preservation, the reproduction, the continuity of victory and its long-term consolidation. The state of the "national-minded" people is the state whose territorial and racial hypostasis the army guarantees. The guarantee is given through the choking framework of political exclusion and violence. With the coming to power of Papagos, the aims of IDEA, this system of military patronizing and semblance of democracy, appears to shape the terms of its stabilization.

2.1 THE 60S DECADE After the death of Papagos, Karamanlis became the leader of the conservative party Greek Rally (ES) and changed the name of the party to National Radical Union (ERE). In the same time the King had tried to incorporate the institution of monarchy as sovereign in the framework of the post civil war structure, securing thus continuity, not anymore with the person of Papagos as its centre but the institution and the person of the King instead. The 60s are distinguished by the unsuccessful and contradictory effort to exit the ring of the national guarantor. The choking margins of political function soon lead to a confrontation between the Prime Minister and the King. At stake in this confrontation was control of the army and - from Karamanlis' side - the effort of rationalization-intellectualisation of political control of the post civil war tangle of power and coercion. The EEC policy, the effort of resolution of the Cyprus issue, the proposals for the constitutional reform were nothing but efforts to rationalize politics. Their correlate and essential aim was to put some limits to the violence mechanisms and mainly to control and regulate them through political power. This first step towards democratisation was unsuccessful mainly due to the confrontation between the Prime Minister and the King, in a game at the top of the power pyramid and with deep suspicion towards the citizens. The confrontation leads to the foundation and activation of the Centre party as an alternative solution. The Union of the Centre (EK) is founded as an adversary of Karamanlis' party National Radical Union (ERE). The developments that follow are rapid. The stabilisation, the legitimisation of the bourgeois regime and economic development was demanding the widening of participation. The widening was necessary but the widening signified the transformation of the state, the marginalisation or smoothing of the role of the army, the end of the political system under guardianship. Under

Introduction

11

these terms the events and the initiatives of the 60s were distinguished by the contradiction between the rationality of social incorporation and the rationale of specific post civil war structures, and also by the inability to cancel this contradiction. The electoral result of February 1964 (EK, under the leadership of G. Papandreou, won 53% of the votes) leads to a formally very powerful government which hesitates to represent the popular demand for democratisation. That is because EK is not in a position to function as a carrier of political transcendence of post civil war structures. Additionally, the weakness in controlling the army does not allow a direct confrontation with the King, who is trying to express the post civil war structures of exercising power. The dilemma is centred again on the issue of controlling the army and Papandreou's resignation from office in July 1965 is nothing but the effort of winning time and to preserve popular support. The defection governments that follow (1965-67) and their failure is also expression of the contrast between the processes of fast social integration and the post civil war political structure and the ensuing weakness of the parliament and the King to find a viable solution which would secure limited democratisation, would stabilize control of the army by the King and would finally control the widening of this necessary opening. The King, terrified with the prospects of reshaping the post civil war articulation of power, hesitates to go forward with a political solution. But he also hesitates to decide the imposition of a dictatorship, because he perceives that this would mean the narrowing of the framework and as a result his final marginalisation as a centre of power. It is obvious that the army by abolishing legality would abolish finally every institution of preservation of this semblance of constitutional legality. The result was the "domino effect". The political, constitutional institutions collapse one after the other, and prove incapable and ineffective thus lifting the curtain for the coup of Papadopoulos' group. Dictatorship was imposed at a historical moment when Greek society was trying to escape from the post civil war structure. The 60s are characterized by a process of social change (in 1960, the relationship between rural and urban population becomes for the first time 1:1 thus opening the way to the fast urbanization of the population). The 60s are also characterized by the acceptance of the end of civil conflict and in connection to these two, by the demand of democratising the political system and widening the participation in political, economic and social processes. Economic development, the widening of the market etc. lead to the contradiction between, on one hand the social acceptance of market economy and social integration and on the other hand the preservation of a political system which is based on the rationale of civil conflict and the consequences of military victory. The Greek society of the 60s has overcome the conditions, which distinguished the 40s and 50s, and demands the smoothing of exercising power. It demands the reform of the legalization and func-

12

Introduction

tioning terms of the system. Maybe the elections of February 1964 are the most obvious, the most complete expression of this popular will. With the imposition of dictatorship, Greek society essentially loses contact with the apparently decisive developments in the western democratic world, the influence of which would certainly have been essential to further demands of democratisation. When in Western Europe, but also in the USA the cultural - political movement of the 60s is taking off, achieving the transcendence of the cultural, moral and political ankyloses of the immediate post-war period, Greece finds itself abruptly excluded from this process. The Greek society didn't take part in the emancipation movement that characterized the societies of Europe and in the political developments, which brought to the foreground a different concept of social cohesion, individuality etc. This situation was marked by the consolidation of the social democratic contract, the transition from the paternalistic conceptions of the relation state-society and the emancipation of citizens in relation to the decisions and the choices taken from above. This suggests initially that the seven years of dictatorial regime in our country constituted negative time because they impeded both democratic developments and the diffusion of the democratising atmosphere that distinguished this period internationally. The 21st of April dictatorship constituted a specific obstacle to democratisation in a climate where the abolition of the democratic representational system was an evident and shocking exception. (The dictatorships of Spain and Portugal cannot be considered as a counter-argument since they formed the negative heritage of mid-war years). Economic continuity, which was secured by the dictatorship, played a particular role (except for the first stretch, when for approximately a year the normal anticipation of investments etc. took place until the stabilization of the dictatorial regime). In terms of economics, we do not have a differentiation, at least superficially. Economic development continues under its initial terms. In addition, the writing-off of agricultural debts, the gradual abolition of hard monetary policy and the supply of loans for opportunist investments created a climate of economic euphoria (mainly in 1970-73). Although the way in which loans were being provided and their uncontrollable use constituted the introduction to the process of de-industrialization which begins with the loannides period. The collapse of the dictatorship, due to the nationalist fury of the last period, the loannides period, led to the collapse of the compulsive interconnections of power that the civil war and its consequences had shaped.

Introduction

13

3. The era of political changeover. From populism to the Maastricht criteria The collapse of the dictatorship in July 1974 has three determining consequences: a) it signals both the end of the mechanisms and the structures of non-freedom and violence that had resulted from the civil war and the organization of the state, the political system and social relations that were shaped under the shadow of civil war and its consequences b) it introduces new era in the Greek political system, clearly the most democratic in the history of the Greek state and - after the difficulties of the first years of the political changeover - consolidates party democracy in Greece; and c) "it stabilizes" a situation of continuous tension with Turkey due to the occupation of the 30% of Cyprus by Turkey. This occupation resulted from the nationalist coup that was organized by the dictatorship in Cyprus and gave the right to the guaranteeing power, Turkey, to intervene. It also gave an alibi for the presence of the Turkish army and the colonization of Cyprus from mainland Turkey as a presupposition and term of consolidation of the dichotomy of the Cypriot Republic. This situation was changed after 1995 by the foreign policy of Simitis' government. The 80s are the decade of the PASOK (Socialist Party) government under the determining leadership of A. Papandreou and had substantial consequences on the Greek society. The most basic parts - results of this decade can be summarized as follows: a) The coming into office of PASOK signified both socially and politically the end of the post civil war era. Certainly this is true already for the period after the collapse of dictatorship (1974), but it is systematized by PASOK. Essentially this means that the forms of political and as such social and economic exclusion that had distinguished the post civil war times vanish for good. Already the political situation has been smoothed completely and the coming into power of a party, which differentiated from the political social block that was abusing political power after the civil war, happens without any tossing about. This is because finally the coming to office by PASOK seals the complete acceptance of the capitalist relations by all the social strata of the country. That was a presupposition of the coming into power of EK in 1963-64 but in a political climate in which political rationale was being shaped by the civil war and its consequences. b) The political theory and political practice of A. Papandreou relied on two cohesive parts which appear to the outside observer contradictory. He followed politics of redistribution and incorporation into the social economic process expressing a nationalist, populist and essentially anti-western viewpoint (against NATO and the EEC)

14

Introduction following simultaneously policies of consolidation and incorporation of the country to the unification of Europe. Of course one should not forget that we are referring still to the period of the Cold War. A. Papandreou created the image of a leader, who is independent of the "blocks". The economic policy of PASOK was not particularly original and was based on classical models of economic growth. Via policies of redistribution he tried to create a domestic market, which was expected to form presuppositions of economic growth due to the investments it would lead to. Simultaneously the state took charge of the bankrupt private companies - which had been led to bankruptcy for structural reasons (non-competitiveness), but also for reasons of business-strategy of the individual businessmen - in order to avoid the rise in unemployment. But the result was not as expected. The domestic market did not lead to investments but to a fast rise in imports. This had ruinous results for the trade balance and the industrialization process. At the same time the public sector was lifting the big weight of preserving in operation problematic and non-competitive firms.

The weight was magnified to an unprecedented degree because these nationalized companies, but also the public sector per se were viewed and utilized as the mechanism of preservation and increase of the clientele basis of the party. As the present Minister of Economy N. Christodoulakis emphasises "the three main characteristics of the Greek economy between 1980-94 are the slowing down of growth rates, the dramatic fall of investments and the threatening swelling of public sector debt. A simple comparison of the figures of this period with the averages of 1975-79 shows the shrinking of the growth process and the burdensome inheritance, which has to be confronted by the present and following generations of Greeks. During the 1980-94 period the economy grew by three times slower rates, investment fell by one-fourth and public debt was four times larger than its initial size at the beginning of the period. After the 1985 elections, Greek macroeconomic indicators reach a very unfavourable point. Public expenditure is 43% of GNP versus 31% in 1980, internal debt reaches 24% of GNP versus 7% in 1980, inflation is beyond 20% and private investment falls to 11% of GNP at the lowest point of the political changeover 20-year period. After the accession to the European Community, the deficient prioritisation of new requirements led to the application of economic recipes which in most cases worsened existing problems. With very few short-lived exceptions, during 1980-94, Greece was in a systematic process of nominal and real deviation from other European economies. The developmental stagnation and the general political perplexity were enforcing and inter-supplying a more generalized immobility in many facets of economic and social activity. The domination of groups, which had developed around the state had

Introduction

15

reduced it bound to multiple sectional interests. They often directed its decisions for the exclusive service of those who had the privilege to find themselves "inside state walls", ignoring thus the rights and undermining the expectations for a brighter future of those who were "outside the walls". We saw that fiscal policy did not put emphasis on the funding of investments, but on the increase in consumption. The momentary prosperity however led finally to a colossal public debt and to the lack of public structures. We saw that social policy instead of assisting the beneficiary to come out of a negative situation of unemployment, insecurity or isolation was transformed slowly to an uncontrollable mechanism of spreading benefits. With armies of mediators, an unknown number of fictitious beneficiaries and an uncertain final benefit for society and development". Private investment, between 1982 and 1985 receded from 96 units of the relevant index (1980=100) to 66.5 units. Total public and private investments at the end of these four years represents a percentage of 2.46% of Gross National Product from 3.35% in 1981. The greater subsidence of the processing sector was suffered by the domain of producing capital goods - the technologically most important - a fall of 28.5%. The domestic product, in spite of the inflow of EEC funds of $ 3 bin. and borrowing of another $ 6 bin. was in 1985 only 1% higher than in 1980. In the mid-80s a policy of austerity is tested which does not apply to state consumption but to the reduction of consumption by wage-earners so that inflation can be reduced. The cost-of-living adjustment is abolished while the Drachma is suddenly devalued by 15% and is left to a course of devaluation in order to reduce demand. The result was the increase of business profits while wage earners and pensioners lost 18.3% of the purchasing value of their salaries in 1986-87. This policy is abandoned before the 1989 elections because it is perceived that it would lead to an electoral defeat. The 90s were to a great extent the decade of awakening from the illusions of the 80s. PASOK loses power in 1989 in the midst of a multiplicity of scandals while the main opposition party does not lead the country to a smooth course of government. The loss of political power by PASOK is followed by governments of bizarre alliances which finally intensify the political and economic crisis because their aim is the increase of the clientele of each party so that the election would be won which would bring forward a one party government instead of a coalition. During this period we have unexpected and bizarre denouements. After the elections of June 1989, no party achieves the necessary majority in order to form a government. In July 2, 1989 a government is formed by the coalition of the conservative party New Democracy (ND) with KKE and the United Left. This government has no other aim than to clarify the scandals of the last phase of the PASOK government in the law courts (Koskotas scandal). Finally the Special Supreme Court pronounces A. Papandreou innocent with a one-vote majority. In October follows an emergency gov-

16

Introduction

ernment which leads the country to elections in November. There is no government majority achieved but an ecumenical government is formed in which all parties participate. The Soviet Union collapses in a formal way too during this period. The ecumenical government does not bring any substantial political outcome of transcendence of the political crisis. So the elections that follow in April 1990 bring to power a small majority by ND, which follows an austerity policy, but without being systematic or having serious prospects, hi the 1993 elections, PASOK, with the support of the electoral system comes to power again. After the death of A. Papandreou, K. Simitis takes over the leadership of the party and in the ensuing elections he leads PASOK again to the government. The period was excessively difficult because the country was due to overcome the great economic problems: inflation, de-industrialization, weakness to compete, overwhelming state deficits and compliance with the monetary criteria of the Maastricht treaty, so as to become a member of the EMU (European Monetary Union). A policy of fiscal austerity, a holding down of prices and wages consist of the contents of a policymaking, which has as its sole significance the success of this aim: the participation of the country to the common European currency. Except from economic problems, the challenges of circumstances are particularly difficult. The tension between Greece and Turkey, the crisis in Yugoslavia, the rebirth of nationalism and anti-westernism lead to a peculiar situation. The government had to face not so much the main party opposition, but internal opposition. The latter desires the return to the terms of government of the A. Papandreou period, knowing however that it had no serious prospects and is always retreating at the critical moments. This was creating a contradictory situation in the party and in Greek society and, something particularly interesting, a situation in which the government followed its modernizing policy in a milieu where public opinion, mainly under the control of the Mass Media, appears anti-westernizing and to a great extent anti-European. Simultaneously, the principal choices of the government are accepted because other than in terms of ideological mottoes, the journey towards the EU and the accession in the EMU (2000) is considered a one-way course for the majority of the population.

Introduction

17

4. Greece today. The Economic and Monetary Unification with the EU and the new foreign policy From 1995 onwards the new government of PASOK under the leadership of K. Simitis starts an effort of rationalization of state politics, of state expenses and of the relation between public and private. The aim is one and precise and in spite of all reactions it is socially acceptable: the acceptance of the criteria which according to the Maastricht treaty consist of a presupposition of our entry to the EMU. The main points of the policy of the new government which had lead to the accession of the country to the EMU are the following: a)

A reduction in state expenses (public consumption but also public investment) and simultaneously constraints to state borrowing in connection with the release of the state from problematic businesses which it had taken over in the 80s period. The result is positive since in connection with the growth of inflow and absorption of EC funds, the fall in state expenses does not present dramatic social results. b) An effort of rationalization of the tax system and effective confrontation of the gigantic problem of tax evasion in connection with the preservation of the tax bracket at the level of previous years with the resulting rapid increase in direct/amesi taxation. Indicative is the fact that direct taxation reached 4% of GNP in 1980 and 10% of GNP in 1998. The result is the rise of state income and the resulting fall of yearly state borrowing, the increase in the debt repayment structure of previous years and the restriction of the total volume of state debt or at least the strong restriction of its augmentation. c) The combination of points (a) and (b) results to the fall of consumption which combined with the stagnation of wages, pensions and wages had a fast impact on the population (some rises which were given were always lower than inflation). If one adds the policy of a hard Drachma that constituted an obstacle to imported inflation, one can comprehend the success of this policy which took inflation from the highs of previous years to 2.5% approximately. d) A very fast adaptation of the legal order of the EU, according to the obligations of the agreement with the community with a series of positive repercussions for the position of the citizen, the realization and function of rights but also the creation of terms, which change stances and behaviours in the framework of Greek society. This happens in spite of all the reactions of the church and the nationalist, state and traditional clientele-references and stances contextual to the Greek society.

18

e)

Introduction

A decisive political solution of "national problems" through the readjustment of relations with Turkey and through the seeking of terms of dialogue for the solution of the Cyprus issue (Annan plan) and the demands of Turkey in the Aegean but also the admission of Cyprus to the EU (2002) must be seen as success of Simitis' foreign policy. A policy incorporated in the strategic smoothing of foreign problems in view of the accession to the EMU in an unprecedented consistency on all counts with the policy, which K. Karamanlis had followed in the end of the 50s, and the beginning of the 60s.

Simultaneously the unprecedented liquidity that was noticed in recent years (fall 90ties) in the stock market, irrespective of the reasons that led to it (return of the capital of the underground economy which had been deposited abroad, due to favourable laws, deficient rules and great profits, money laundering from the Balkans, transfer to the stock market of domestic savings in bonds and deposits etc.) led to a particularly favourable atmosphere which created a more general euphoria, without this meaning anything in terms of real productivity of the country's economy and its international competitiveness. Nevertheless this euphoria stopped by the end of 99 by the crisis in the stock market. But the accumulation of investment in the stock market and the transfer of small and medium range savings to it, lead to the concentration of capital, to a violent and rapid redistribution of income. This development, in connection with the compression of salaries, wages and pensions as well as the cutting down on public and private productivity investments (the index of industrial production reached in 1998 its 1979-level), led to an unprecedented growth in unemployment and the prospects are clearly even more negative. Already in the first trimester of 1999, unemployment had reached 11.3%. In young ages it is much higher while in underdeveloped regions such as Eperos, it is estimated around 43% for young people of 18-25 years. The main result is of course the rapid widening of the gap between social classes in a way that was unknown in Greek society before. One could focus on 5 points the observed new developments and the concentration of social and political power that will influence the next decade: 1.

2.

The new - at least in the framework of the Greek experience - forms of restructuring and concentration of private capital and their role in the economy, in connection with the internationalisation of the financial system, the privatisation of the banking system, the mergers of banks and the role of the stock market. The role of the Mass Media and the relation of economic interests that control them with political power. The ownership of printed or/and electronic media becomes the means of pressurizing for the accumulation of control over state sup-

Introduction

19

plies, the undertaking of public works, the control over the services sector, thus shaping the interlacing of state and private interests on the basis of exchange relations. 3. New forms of decentralization with the reinforcement of peripheral and local institutions which shape neo-clientele relations on a local and peripheral level since they handle great funds mainly coming from the European Community (prefectures, municipal authorities, local economic interests etc.). The reshaping of social, economic and political power on a local level through the new channels of access to European or state funds and the resulting codependence of local economic interests and local political power. Or even the interlacing of these interests as a way of reproducing the pathology of the relationship between public and private that characterizes Greek society and appears clearly in cases (2) and (4). This consists of a new centre of entanglement and interlacing of interests. 4. The creation of control networks for European funds (interlacing of state bureaucracy, political power and economic interests). Resulting in the formation of new centres of management and use of funds, which shape cores of long-term stabilization of social inequalities and multiple speeds of social participation or even exclusion. 5. The development of new forms of underground economy beyond the until today known and abiding ones (business activities moving outside state control). These rely on the corruption of public management, the security forces etc. and become negative for the notion of legal order and the State of Justice. This area of illegality gathers unprecedented funds and infiltrates the formal economy (stock market) creating uncontrollable sources of economic power. Simultaneously we have the reproduction in this way of the conditions for the dissolution of public management and terms of security. At the same time social areas are created outside of any form of protection, in direct connection with the formal economic and political sectors. Usually this sector is not examined by scientific research, but due to the prospects that it represents and due to the experience of other countries (Italy, Japan but mainly also the former socialist countries) it should be seriously considered, maybe as a new form of widening underground economy.

20

Introduction

5. Greece today. New and old problems of Greek Society New conditions are shaped, which do not consist of circumstantial occurrences. On the contrary they seem to form a permanent condition in the country and they take on a structural character. Together, in connection with the tension in Greek-Turkish relations, appears in the forefront the phenomenon of multiculturalism stressing again the problem of minorities, which consist of parts of the Greek population (Gypsies, Muslim minorities etc.). Greek society discovers that Manichean interpretations of national identity cannot anymore either take effect or challenge the new conditions. They are obliged to comprehend that the minority problem cannot be faced by its marginalisation. Social intolerance is however great with the result of the appearance of xenophobic and nationalist trends which form the greatest danger of democratic principles. It should be stressed here that the problems which Greek society faces, in relation to the stream of immigrants and multiculturalism as well as the generalized negative stance towards these phenomena, is not a solitary case. Similar resistance appears in all European societies today with the appearance of new immigration streams mainly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the inflow of economic immigrants from Third World countries. A phenomenon, which is part of the more general problem of the trend towards internationalisation. Nevertheless, if we stop there, we do not have the full picture of real attitudes in Greek culture. The non-existence of an organized party, which expresses xenophobic, nationalist and racist positions, conceals the fact that xenophobia and racism lay dormant in the electoral body. They find their expression in almost all the political parties, under a conservative or socialist banner, coexisting thus with democratic and non-ethnocentric positions. This fact jeopardizes the democratic character of the party spectrum, as it forces the political speech of the parties to avoid direct confrontations with pro-political or para-political stances. The locus of the problem is the weakness of shaping a conscience of the multicultural constitution of the Greek society and some equivalent social and political practices, as well as institutional commitment. In that way we can be led to democratic and viable solutions for the reception and incorporation of economic immigrants. The aspects of this problem in social every day life are: Xenophobia, revival of nationalist and racist trends, insecurity, impression of threat, estrangement between the indigenous population and economic immigrants. But also refusal/estrangement from minorities which consist traditionally the composition of the Greek population, various expressions of hegemony of the culturally sover-

Introduction

21

eign group, generally anti-western, anti-neoteric trends in the shape of expression of national/religious eclecticism. Presuppositions which shape the terms of the appearance of such phenomena and shape the architectural structure of Greek society: 1.

The belief of national homogeneity (parallel refusal of the acceptance of the national descent of the Greek population: Arvanites, Vlachoi, Koutsovlachoi etc.) but also the marginalisation of Pomak, Turkish-born, Roma, Slav-speaking people etc. 2. The creation of social cohesion based on clientele networks of blood-relatives / local descent, as constituting element of the composition of the political system, already since the 19th century. The neo-clientele networks transcend the bloodrelatives / local networking, but are due to internal rationale, structurally opposing to the acceptance of the "other". 3. The particular relationship between Church and state reproduces an ethnocentric cultural identity with a resulting pre-neoteric cultural conception of the notion of the people. This obstructs the distinction of the political notion of the people and as such impedes the maturity of the society of citizens 4. The belated shaping/completion of national territory (1923) and in particular after a military defeat (1922), in connection to the "Macedonian problem" of the mid-war and the land dimension, real or ideological, of the interpretation of the civil war are the causes of: - fear of fragmentation/separation and decomposition of the national territory - constant insecurity in relation to the diachronic dimension of the borders (characteristic is the higher tension of nationalist trends in Northern Greece). This insecurity is reproduced: a) due to the tension with Turkey related to the Aegean b) due to the weakness of solving the Cyprus issue because of creeping insecurity. 5. The geographic detachment from issue. The solution to these foreign policy problems becomes very difficult exactly the natural locus of the political and social system (Western Europe) which leads to the self-perception of isolation since: a) Greece was the only democratic country of the Balkans, at least until recently. b) Until recently it was the only capitalist country of the Balkans. c) During the cold war communist countries chokingly surrounded it. d) Geography prohibits an ideology of splendid isolation but demanded a strong political / military / cultural connection with the West so that the country would not succumb to the political / cultural pressure of its surroundings. This need could be interpreted as dependence - presupposition for the constitution of autonomy.

22

Introduction

The main characteristics of modern Greek society are: 1.

2.

3.

The deficient conscience of social solidarity due to the family-oriented character of society. The cohesion is shaped mainly around the basis of fantasy sameness of nationalist (community) character. These identities (of fantasy subjects) create beliefs of belonging together but allow the indifference/negation towards the particular other and especially the national other. The avoidance of taking personal responsibility due to democratic deficits leads to the transference of responsibility to third parties or groups considered foreign to the national community, with the resulting latent ease in the creation of scapegoats. The lack of experience in the phenomenon of immigration from a receiver's point of view. The country has great experience of immigration to the USA and Western Europe (Belgium, mainly Germany etc) but for the first time, especially after the fall of applied socialism, it faces the phenomenon of receiving economic immigrants. Simultaneously, the flow appears at a moment of economic slowdown and not as a result of lack and demand of working hands (as for example in the 60s Germany). A result of this is the lack of multilevel mechanisms of reception, which connected to the renowned view about national homogeneity, eliminate initially the belief that Greece is a country of reception of immigrants. The particular stress on national homogeneity not only excludes new economic immigrants from the processes of incorporation, but also obstructs the comprehension and acceptance of the traditional and real composition of the country's population (old minorities, national origins of the Greek population etc.). That is because the comprehension of the minority issue and of the historical process of forming a national identity consist of negative elements in the substantiation of homogeneity. Besides, indicative of this stance is the totally negative position in relation to the thesis that a process of gradual incorporation e.g. of Albanian economic immigrants would consist of the decisive solution to the country's demographic problem (Cf. similar reactions e.g. in Germany, which faces the same demographic problem, but is already following some gradual solution through the transcendence of jus sanguinis and the recognition of a Iimitedyw5 solis). In that point we should also pose the problem of the real number of foreigners who are in the country, as well as that of the exaggeration of this number, because there is a tendency of excessive swelling of the number of foreigners, which consists of a common element in xenophobic stances. According to existing approximate data, the number of foreigners in the country rose from 2% of the popula-

Introduction

4.

23

tion almost 10 years ago, to 10% of the population today. This seems to confirm the supposition that the rise in the number of foreigners in Greece during recent years has influenced considerably the perception of the "foreign" and the "other" in Greek society. The reserved tolerance that consisted of a dominant stance in the past is gradually giving its place to disbelief, unrest, xenophobia and lack of tolerance. The presence of foreigners is clearly considered as particularly strong now in Greece. Even though only one fourth of the population declares that it is disturbed by it, in many cases the stance towards foreigners generally or towards special groups in particular is characterized from unrest and reserve to especially strong preconceptions and xenophobia. These feelings are expressed in clearly more emphatic manner particularly by individuals of relatively old age and low or mid level education. The restriction of production investments and the increase of the unemployed leads to: a) fear of loss of work due to the supply of working hands from the economic immigrants, and b) overexploitation of economic immigrants by the numerous small businessmen, small manufacturers, farmers etc in small businesses, building sites, constructions, agricultural work etc. These consist in a (para) economic performance which would be impossible without the economic immigrants, proving essentially the ideological character of (a) and the counterfeit and insecure nature of economic operation which is presented in (b). On the basis of this lawlessness and overexploitation of economic immigrants these strata can preserve their economic condition and their consumption power (a decisive example today is agricultural economy, but not only, where more than 40% of the production relies on the labour of illegal immigrants) mainly in the area of underground economy. For this reason exactly, these social strata oppose the legalization (white, green card) of working economic immigrants. And for this reason mainly these strata and not necessarily the working ones will constitute (and constitute already), the basic social carrier of the position that foreigners take the jobs of the Greeks and that the economy cannot withstand the numerous foreign economic immigrants.

The terms of endurance that these positions underscore presuppose overexploitation so that: 1) individuals and small businessmen can function as employers, when they could never operate as such in the framework of legal economy. 2) Consumption power is secured due to overexploitation and 3) economic operation takes place under conditions, which would never be accepted by the indigenous manpower. Besides, the contribution of foreigners to the economic performance is substantial, as has shown a recent study on the subject.

24

Introduction

In recent years, after the collapse of applied socialism in Eastern Europe, Greece is transformed to country-receiving immigrants. Greek society has only known the phenomenon of immigration of a great part of its population towards other countries. Under the new circumstances it faces an experience unfamiliar to the present day. The inflow of a great number of economic immigrants, mainly from Albania but also from Poland, Bulgaria, former Soviet Union as well as other countries (Pakistan, India, Philippines, African counties etc.) with the aim of finding an occupation, presents Greek society with new challenges. According to the data of the last census conducted by NSSG in 2001, 797,093 foreign immigrants were registered, 43.5% of whom lived in the area of the capital. Two legalisation programs have been applied in Greece, one in 1998 and the other in 2001 - much later than in other Southern EU countries. Finally, from the period of the immigration inflow towards Germany and other older periods, there is a time-distance which now inhibits solidarity towards contemporary economic immigrants (already about 30 years have passed from the 60s). This happens in connection with the rise of the living standards and the resulting impression of superiority / success in relation to the others. The perception of superiority is also stressed by the participation of Greece in the European Union and the knowledge of economic desolation, which devastates the former socialist countries. Dimitris Charalambis

0 Context

0.1 Demographic Trends Abstract. Population growth has been low since 1960. Life expectancy at birth increased mainly as a result of a decline in infant mortality. The ageing process has contributed to an increase in the elderly population and a gradual decrease in the proportion of children. In-migration to urban centres, an intense phenomenon up to 1970, continued at a much slower rate thereafter. The annual rate of population growth fell to less to 1%. The Greek population grew from 8,4 million in 1961 to 10,3 million in 1991 and to 10,9 to 2001. The average annual rate of increase ranged from 0.44% between 1960 and 1970, a period with strong emigration out-flows, to 1.06% in 1981. From 1976 to 1980, it increased to 1.5% due to some repatriation of earlier emigrants. In the next decade (1981-91), it was 0.51% and recently it increases to 0.67% (see tables 1, 2). The increase of 680,000 inhabitants observed in the recent population census of 2001 is due to the settlement of foreign migrants and ethnic Greeks during the last decade in the country (see also trend 16.1). A general examination of all demographic components shows a declining trend in natural increase after 1970, due to a reduction in births from 157,239, in 1960, to 100,894, in 1998, and a concurrent gradual increase in deaths from 60,563, in 1960, to 102,668, in 1998. The ageing of the population explains the increase in CDR (crude death rate) from 7 per 1,000 inhabitants, in 1960, to 9.8 per 1,000 in 1998, even though life expectancy at birth has been improving (see table 3). In other words, the population age structure has affected the CDR and the annual rate of natural increase in a period of an overall downward fertility trend, in spite of improvements in health and living conditions (Siambos, 1994). The negative international migratory balance has been offset by repatriation gains. Strong emigration outflows produced negative net migration between 1960 and 1970 (see also trend 16.1). From then on, Greece experienced migratory gains between 1975

26

Context

and 1980 due to repatriation of earlier emigrants. The latter period (1980-1990) saw the highest net population increase but after that period a continuous decrease in natural increase is observed (see table 3). The infant-mortality rate dropped by a factor of 5 over 30 years. Due to steady improvements in health and living conditions, Greece experienced an impressive reduction in infant mortality. Deaths before the age of one dropped from 40.1 per 1,000 live births, in 1960, to 6.68 per 1,000, in 1998 (see table 3). Compared with low fertility and population ageing, infant mortality is a small factor in overall mortality. Population ageing is here to stay. Trends in natural population movement have affected the age structure of the Greek population. A comparison of changes in the size of population age groups shows a gradual reduction in the proportion of children (014 years), from 26.8% in 1961 to 23.7% in 1991 and to 15.6% in 1998, and a concomitant increase in the proportion of those 65 years and over, from 8.2% in 1961 to 14% in 1991 and to 16.7% in 1998. During the same period, a slight increase in the population active in the job market, from 65% to 67%, was observed. The proportion of old people increased from 30.6 per 100 children, in 1961, to 73.0 per 100 in 1998 (see table 4). These figures depict the drastic changes in the two dependent population groups (Emke-Poulopoulou, 1999). There are more women in the population. The sex ratio has remained quite stable: 100 men per 105 women in 1961, and 100 men per 103 women in 1991 and in 2001. This stability conceals mutually cancelling effects of World War II losses, involving mostly men, and massive emigration, involving mostly women (see table 5). The presence of women is much stronger in the older age groups, as gains in life expectancy have been greater among women (see table 6). There has been a continuous upward trend in life expectancy at birth. Life expectancy at birth improved drastically during the period under examination. At the beginning of the period (1960), life expectancy at birth was 67.3 years for men and 72.4 years for women. Thirty-five years later (1995), men had gained 7.7 years (to 75.0 years) and women over 10 years (to 80.3 years). Even at age 65, life expectancy increased by 3.3 years for men and 4 years for women (see table 6). Greece has a good record in this socio-demographic indicator and is favourably compared with more developed countries. To a large extent, these improvements stem from gains in care of infants and children, which has reduced mortality in those age groups.

0.1 Demographic Trends

27

The number of households has grown and changed in size. Demographic changes and new social conditions led to an increase in the number of households, from 2,142,968 in 1961 to 3,260,000 in 1991. Average household size decreased gradually, from 3.78 people in 1961 to 3.00 in 1991 (see table 7). The proportion of one-person households increased from 10.1% in 1961 to 18.0% in 1991 (see table 7). These changes can be attributed to the effects of urbanization, new family and living standards pertaining to residence, and population ageing, which tends to produce widows and widowers. Geographic population distribution was affected by domestic and international migration trends. Throughout the post-war period, internal migration flows led to intense urbanization, which resulted in a high concentration of the population in urban centres, immense growth of Athens, and, along with international emigration, a gradual depopulation of the rural areas (Frangos, 1974; Maratou-Alipranti, 1993). Internal population movement was at its highest between 1960 and 1970. The urban population grew from 43.3% in 1961 to 58.9% in 1991 (see table 8). Even after significant repatriation flows between 1975 and 1980, international migratory trends, combined with the internal rural exodus, served to intensify population concentration as repatriating migrants normally settled in urban centres. Rates of urban population growth dropped from 11% in 1960-70 to 5% in the following decades. The proportion of the rural population decreased from 43.9% in 1960 to 28.3% in 1991 (see table 8), a figure that does not describe the intense depopulation of many areas, regional imbalances, and the complete restructuring - often dismantling - of urban-rural relations, exchanges, and balances (Katohianou and Thodori-Makroyiannaki, 1989). One of the particularities of Greek urbanization is the extreme growth of the city of Athens (Burgel, 1976). Presently, its population of 3 million amounts to 55% of the urban population (Kotzamanis and Petrakos, 1994). It also dominates the urban structure as it monopolizes access to economic and social resources at the expense of an alternative balance in the urban system and its territorial links. At the same time, it is experiencing serious traffic, pollution, population-congestion, and quality-of-life problems. Laura Maratou-Alipranti

28

Context

REFERENCES Burgel, G. 1976 Athens: Development of a Mediterranean capital. Athens: Exandas. Emke-Poulopoulou, I. 1999 Greeks, aged citizens. Past, present and future. Athens: Hellin. Eurostat 1997 Demographic statistics. European Communities, Luxembourg. Frangos, I. 1974 "Internal migration during the period 1966-1971", Greek Review of Social Research, Part 1: 21-22: 200-21; Part 2: 23: 118-32. 1966-1971 Katohianou, D., and Thodori-Makroyiannaki, E. 1989 The Greek system of urban centres. Athens: KEPE. Kotzamanis, B. 1986 "Greece in the international and European space: Comparative data concerning demographic evolution during the post-war period, 1950-1985", Greek Review of Social Research, 63: 82-132. 63:82-132 Kotzamanis, B., and Maratou-Alipranti, L. (eds.) 1994 Demographic developments in post-war Greece. Athens: Livanis. Kotzamanis, B., and Petrakos, G. 1994 "Metropolitan concentration in Greece: Time-series estimates for the 19611991 period." In B. Kotzamanis and L. Maratou-Alipranti (eds.), Demographic developments in post-war Greece, pp. 221-242. Athens: Livanis. 991». STO Kotzamanis, B., Maratou-Alipranti, L., Teperoglou, A., and Tzortzopoulou, M. (eds.) 1996 Ageing and society. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE).

0.1 Demographic Trends

29

Lambiri-Dimaki, J., and Kyriazi, N. (eds.) 1995 Greek society in the late twentieth century. Athens: Papazisis. 20 Maratou-Alipranti, L. 1993 "The urbanization process in Greece: The case of Athens." In Polarization and Urban Space, pp. 54-64. Cross-National Research Papers, Loughborough University of Technology. Siambos, G. 1994 "Demographic evolution in post-war Greece." In B. Kotzamanis and L. MaratouAlipranti (eds.), Demographic developments in post-war Greece, pp. 71-102. Athens: Livanis.

TABLES

Table 1 Population and average annual growth rates, Greece, 1961-2001 Year

Population

Increase

Average variation (%)

1961

8,388,553

755,752

0.95

1971

8,768,641

379,819

0.44

1981

9,740,417

971,776

1.06

1991

10,259,900

519,483

0.51

2001

10,939,605

679,705

0.67

Source: National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG), Statistical Yearbooks, various years.

30

Context

Table 2 Population, annual increase, and population density, Greece, 1960-98 Year (June 30)

Population

Increase

Annual rate of increase (%)

Inhabitants per sq.km.

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

8,327,405 8,398,050 8,448,233 8,479,625 8,510,429 8,550,333 8,613,651 8,716,441 8,740,765 8,772,764 8,792,806 8,831,036 8,888,628 8,929,086 8,962,023 9,046,542 9,167,190 9,308,479 9,429,959 9,548,262 9,642,505 9,729,350 9,789,513 9,846,627 9,895,801 9,934,294 9,967,264 10,000,644 10,036,037 10,089,550 10,161,551 10,247,341 10,323,883 10,380,453 10,426,289 10,454,019 10,475,878 10,498,836 10,516,366

69,243 70,645 50,183 31,392 30,804 39,904 63,318 102,790 24,324 31,999 20,042 38,230 57,592 40,458 32,937 84,519 120,648 141,289 121,480 118,303 94,243 86,845 60,163 57,114 49,174 38,493 32,970 33,380 36,393 53,513 71,001 86,790 75,542 57,570 46,836 27,730 21,859 22,958 17,530

0.83 0.84 0.59 0.37 0.36 0.47 0.74 1.18 0.28 0.36 0.23 0.43 0.65 0.45 0.37 0.93 1.32 1.52 1.29 1.24 0.98 0.89 0.61 0.58 0.50 0.39 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.53 0.70 0.85 0.72 0.55 0.45 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.17

63.1 63.6 64.0 64.3 64.5 64.8 65.3 66.1 66.2 66.5 66.6 66.9 67.4 67.7 67.9 68.6 69.5 70.5 71.5 72.4 73.1 73.7 74.2 74.6 75.0 75.2 75.5 75.8 76.1 76.5 77.0 77.7 78.2 78.7 79.0 79.2 79.4 79.6 79.7

Source: NSSG, Vital Statistics, 1960-2000.

0.1 Demographic Trends

Table 3 Births, deaths, infant mortality, and migration balance, Greece, 1960-98

Year

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Births (N)

157,239 150,716 152,158 148,249 153,109 151,448 154,613 162,839 160,338 154,077 144,928 141,126 140,891 137,526 144,069 142,273 146,566 143,739 146,588 147,965 148,134 140,953 137,275 132,608 125,724 116,481 112,810 106,392 107,505 101,657 102,229 102,620 104,081 101,799 103,763 101,495 100,718 102,038 100,894

Births per Deaths

Deaths per

inhabitants

inhabitants

1000

18.88 17.95 18.01 17.48 17.99 17.71 17.95 18.68 18.34 17.56 16.48 15.98 15.85 15.40 16.08 15.73 15.99 15.44 15.54 15.50 15.36 14.49 14.02 13.47 12.70 11.73 11.32 10.64 10.71 10.08 10.06 10.01 10.08 9.81 9.95 9.71 9.61 9.72 9.59

(N)

60,563 63,955 66,554 66,813 69,429 67,269 67,912 71,975 73,309 71,825 74,009 73,819 76,859 77,648 76,303 80,077 81,818 83,750 81,615 82,338 87,282 86,261 86,345 90,586 88,397 92,886 91,783 95,656 92,407 92,720 94,152 95,498 98,231 97,419 97,807 100,158 100,740 99,738 102,668

Source: NSSG , Vital Statistics, 1960-2000.

1.000

7.27 7.62 7.88 7.88 8.16 7.87 7.88 8.26 8.39 8.19 8.42 8.36 8.65 8.70 8.51 8.85 8.93 9.00 8.65 8.62 9.05 8.87 8.82 9.20 8.93 9.35 9.21 9.57 9.21 9.19 9.27 9.32 9.52 9.39 9.38 9.58 9.62 9.50 9.76

Infantmortality rate per 1,000 live births 40.07 39.85 40.38 39.29 35.84 34.30 33.98 34.33 34.41 31.80 29.60 26.91 27.33 24.14 23.93 23.96 22.52 20.36 19.33 18.73 17.94 16.27 15.12 14.57 14.34 14.14 12.24 11.72 11.04 9.73 9.71 9.03 8.37 8.49 7.93 8.17 7.25 6.44 6.68

Natural increase (000)

96.7 86.8 85.6 81.4 83.7 84.2 86.7 90.9 87.0 82.3 70.9 67.3 64.0 59.9 67.8 62.2 64.7 60.0 65.0 65.6 60.9 54.7 50.9 42.0 37.3 23.6 21.0 10.7 15.1 8.8 8.1 7.1 5.8 4.4 6.0 1.3 0.0 2.3 -1.8

Migratory balance -30.5 -23.9 -48.2 -56.0 -47.5 -40.0 -4.8 -29.0 -38.5 -66.9 -46.2 -15.5 -0.6 -42.5 -19.3 58.5 55.9 62.1 65.8 41.5 50.1 7.0 10.0 9.0 10.1 6.0 15.2 19.9 27.1 53.9 71.1 87.3 48.9 56.0 27.3 20.9 21.6 22.1 12.5

31

32

Context

Table 4 Population by age group, Greece, 1961-98 1961

1971

1981

1991

1998*

0-14 15-64 65+

2,243,962 5,457,937 686,654

2,223,904 5,587,352 957,116

2,307,297 6,192,751 1,239,541

1,974,867 6,880,681 1,404,352

1,639,774 7,117,116 1,759,476

Total

8,388,553

8,768,372

9,739,589

10,259,900

10,516,366

Age group

Distribution (%) 0-14 15-64 65+

26.75 65.06 8.19

25.36 63.72 10.92

23.68 63.59 12.73

19.25 67.06 13.69

15.59 67.68 16.73

Ageing ratio (65+ 70-14)

30.60

43.10

53.70

71.10

72.99

*Mid-year population estimates Source. NSSG, Statistical Yearbooks, various years.

Table 5 Sex ratio (female/male), Greece, 1961-2001 Year

Population Men

1961 1971 1981 1991 2001

4,091,984 4,286,748 4,779,511 5,055,408 5,424,089

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbooks, various years.

Women 4,296,659 4,481,624 4,960,018 - 5,204,492 5,515,516

Female/male ratio

105 105 104 103 103

0.1 Demographic Trends

33

Table 6 Life expectancy of men and women at birth and at selected ages, Greece, 1960-95 (years)

Age

1960

1970

Men 1980

0

67.3

70.1

72.2

74.6

75.0

72.4

73.8

76.8

79.5

80.3

10

62.4

63.8

64.1

65.7

65.8

64.9

65.7

67.9

70.4

71.0

50

25.0

25.9

26.4

27.8

28.3

27.0

27.6

29.5

31.5

32.0

65

13.4

13.9

14.6

15.7

16.7

14.6

15.2

16.8

18.0

18.4

Women

1990

7995

1960

7970

1980

7990

7995

Source: Eurostat, 1997.

Table 7 Selected statistics on households, Greece, 1961-91 Year

Number of households

Average size (number of members)

Number of oneperson households

One-person households (%)

1961

2,142,968

3.78

217,299

10.1

1971

2,491,916

3.39

282,268

11.3

1981

2,974,450

3.12

434,290

14.6

1991

3,260,000

3.00

580,000

18.0

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook, 1992-1993.

34

Context

Table 8 Urban, Semi-urban, rural population and residents of metropolitan areas, Greece, 1961-91 Areas

1961 (000)

1971 (000)

1981 (000)

1991 (000)

URBAN AREAS

3,628 1,853 381 1,394 1,160 3,675 8,389

4,668 2,548 557 1,563 1,019 3,082 8,769

5,659 3,078 706 1,915 1,125 2,956 9,740

6,037 3,073 749 2,215 1,313 2,910 10,260

43.3 22.1 4.5 15.7 12.9 43.9

53.2 29.0 6.3 17.9 11.6 35.2

58.1 31.1 7.2 19.8 11.6 30.3

58.9 30.0 7.3 21.6 12.8 28.3

Greater Athens Greater Thessaloniki Other urban areas SEMI-URBAN AREASA RURAL AREAS8 TOTAL

Distribution (%) URBAN AREAS

Greater Athens Greater Thessaloniki Rest or urban areas SEMI-URBAN AREASA RURAL AREAS8 a

Semi-urban areas: 2,000-9,999 inhabitants (except areas in urban agglomerations). Rural areas: 100,000 50,000-99,999 30,000-49,999 10,000-29,999 7977 Urban population Athens Thessaloniki >1 00,000 50,000-99,999 30,000-49,999 10,000-29,999 1981 Urban population Athens Thessaloniki > 100,000 50,000-99,999 30,000-49,999 10,000-29,999 7997 Urban population Athens Thessaloniki > 100,000 50,000-99,999 30,000-49,999 10,000-29,999 Change Urban population Athens Thessaloniki >1 00,000 50,000-99,999 30,000-49,999 10,000-29,999

Population

Distribution (%)

1 3 8 41

3,554,042 1,852,709 378,444 102,244 192,798 299,731 728,116

100.0 52.1 10.7 2.9 5.4 8.4 20.5

1 4 11 39

4,571,287 2,540,241 557,360 120,847 298,168 410,048 644,623

100.0 55.6 12.2 2.6 6.5 9.0 14.1

4 2 17 36

5,609,188 3,027,331 706,180 475,009 118,351 664,105 618,212

100.0 54.0 12.6 8.5 2.1 11.8 11.0

4 6 15 38 1961-71(%) +28.6 +37.1 +46.4 +18.2 +54.6 +36.8 -11.5

5,982,406 3,072,922 749,048 526,167 372,166 593,150 668,953 1971~81(%) +22.7 + 19.2 +26.7 +29.3 -60.3 +61.9 -4.1

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995.

100.0 51.4 12.5 8.8 6.2 9.9 11.2 1981-91(%) +6.7 +1.5 +6.1 +10.8 +214.5 -10.7 +8.2

2.3 Community and Neighbourhood Types

89

Table 3 Population distribution in settlements of population of less than 10,000, Greece, 1961-91 Population (000)

Number of settlements Size of settlement

1961

7977

5,000-9,999

1981

1991

56

77

1971

7967

1981

7997

373..7

553.6

2,00(M,999

359

294

297

275

1,040.,2

869.,5

892..6

909.7

1,000-1,999

937

707

669

531

1,265.,0

954.6

917.,4

824.0

500-999

1,882

1,609

1,440

1,207

1,335..4

1,121. 1 1,021..6

1,004.2

200-499

2,065

2,115

2,104

2,013

719..6

719.,3

720.3

830.8

587 1,164

1,335

1,690

79..5

142..2

172..5

287.4

-200

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995.

Table 4 Distribution of households by housing density (persons per room), Greece, 1961-91 (%) Persons per room

1961

7977

1981

7997

4

6.6

1.1

0.4

0.2

Undeclared

2.2

0.1

0.2

-

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1995.

2.4 Local Autonomy Abstract. Greece's political-administrative system remains centralized, despite laws promulgating decentralization in the 1980s. The administrative system was modified in the 1980s, but the repercussions of these changes were not directly apparent. Local government remained to a large extent financially dependent on central government despite a rise in revenues since 1980. Greece's political-administrative system remains centralized, despite laws promulgating decentralization in the 1980s. The first attempts at decentralizing the highly centralized administrative system in the post-war period began in the 1960s, but the dictatorship of 1967 put a stop to these proceedings. Efforts began again after the fall of dictatorship in 1974, due to the country's accession into the European Economic Community, but it was not until the 1980s that these laws, which inaugurated a new era for administrative decentralization, were passed. Until the mid-1980s, the Greek administrative system was organized on four levels: municipalities or communities (the only level of elected representatives); provinces; prefectures; and central administrative services. The prefectures, as decentralized units of the state administration, were created in 1986 and began operating in 1987. Prefectural governments were inaugurated in the mid-1990s: the first prefectural elections took place in 1994, and the first representatives were elected in 1995. Until the early 1980s, the prefecture was an exclusively administrative entity. It had no elected representatives, and it had its seat in the prefecture capital. The prefect, appointed by the government, governed the prefecture and checked the decisions of the municipalities and communities with regard to their legality and necessity. Control ultimately rested with the Ministry of the Interior, to which the prefects were accountable. The laws passed by the PASOK governments in the 1980s did not change the situation radically but broadened participation in local affairs by social groups and other entities, at the same time decreasing to some extent control over decisions made by representatives of municipalities and communities. Based on this rationale, some new institutions were created, the most significant of which were prefectural councils. These councils consist of representatives of OTA (Local Government Organizations) and local production and professional organizations, which are presided over by the prefect. Although these councils have decision-making power, they do not influence the prefectural government and operate more as pressure groups (Christofilopoulou, 1996).

2.4 Local Autonomy

91

The administrative system was modified in the 1980s, but the consequences of these changes were not directly apparent. The division of Greece into 13 prefectures took place in 1987, as a step toward improving regional development. Each prefecture is administered by a district general secretary, who is appointed by the government and the district council, in which the prefectural administrations and local government organizations from all constituencies take part. The general secretaries are supervised by the Ministry of the Interior, and thus the prefectures remain under the control of the central political authority (Christofilopoulou, 1996). One of the main reasons for the creation of prefectures was the handling of European Community funds, which reach the prefectures through prefectural programmes aimed at financing regional development projects. The significance of these programmes is enormous because they constitute in essence the only source of financing regional development, as the state is less and less able to finance this kind of project. With its exertion of control over decisions made by the general secretary, the central authority also checks the allocation of revenues and influences decisions according to its interests, restricting to a great extent any autonomy at the regional level. The prefectural level of government was created in the early 1990s after much political controversy and debate. Laws passed in 1994 initially abolished prefectures, replacing them with prefectural local governments (elected) transfer of prefectural power to the regions, and modifications in the supervision of municipal governments. Because of the reaction to this, the laws were modified: the prefectures were retained as administrative divisions, but apart from the elected prefect there is also the district council consisting of councilors who are elected every four years and prefectural committees elected by the district council for two years. Local governments acquired decision-making power and more revenue, but remain to a great extent financially dependent on the central services of the state. What helped local governments to broaden their activities, more than the new institutions, was the transfer of decision-making power related to financial activities for regional development, under pressure exerted by the EU for decentralization. Given that decentralized public investment rose after 1980 and because the EU sums that come through Regional Enterprise Programmes must be absorbed on the regional and local levels (and not on the central level), the role of local authority in the handling of sums is reinforced significantly. The rise in revenues of OTA since the early 1980s is indisputable (see table 1), although this has not increased their autonomy. The main source of funding of OTA, both for operations and for financing of their various activities, remains the state. Even in cases where this rise was significant, regular subsidies were becoming a smaller proportion of total subsidies, whereas extraordinary expenditures were rising. In spite of the fact that the OTA broadened their sectors of intervention, the fact that they

92

Microsocial

handled much bigger revenues and are financed with bigger sums did not increase to a corresponding rate their autonomy in relation to the central services of the state. With regard to municipalities and communes, there was a significant decrease in the amount of general expenditures and a corresponding increase in investments between 1974 and 1996 (see table 2). Andromachi Hadjiyanni REFERENCES

Christofilopoulou, P. 1996 "Prefectural administration and local government", Greek Review of Political Science, 7: 124-53. , 7:124-53 Getimis, P. 1987 "Territorial problems and territorial regulations in Greece after 1981", City and Region, 13: 85-98. 1981», 13: 85-98). 1988 "The formulation of the 'Regional State' in Greece." In T. Maloutas and D. Economou (eds.), Development problems of the -welfare state in Greece, pp. 149-82. Athens: Exandas.

Getimis, P., and Kafkalas, G. 1988 "Regional development and forms of state regulation in Greece", Topos, Review of Urban and Regional Studies, 1: 3-20. (

1:3-20). Psychopedis, K. 1982 "The local government as institution", Local Government, 6: 61-85. (

6:61-85). Psychopedis, K., and Getimis, P. 1989 Regulation of regional problems. Athens: Foundation for Mediterranean Studies. Sagias, I., and Spourdalakis, M. 1990 Prefectural councils: History, operation, prospects. Athens: Greek Association of Local Development and Government (EETAA).

2.4 Local Autonomy

93

Tatsos, N.

1988 State funding of local government. Athens: Greek Association of Local Development and Government (EETAA). Theodorou, T. 1995 "Second level of local government." In Greek local government. Vol. 3. Athens: Tolidi. Velonias, E. 1987 "Prefectural government", Administrative Reform, 31-32: 62-106 ( 31-32: 62-106).

94

Microsocial

TABLES

Table 1 Revenues of municipalities and communities by category, Greece 1974-96 Year

Ordinary receipts

Extraordinary receipts % 000 drachmae

Other receipts

%

Total

%

000 drachmae

%

1974

4,571

56.9

1,564

19.5

1,887

23.6

8,023

100.0

1975

5,327

54.1

2,430

24.7

2,086

21.2

9,844

100.0

1976

7,791

3,125

23.2

2,580

19.1

13,498

100.0

1977

9,627

57.7 54.4

4,376

24.7

3,697

20.9

17,700

100.0

1978

11,460

53.4

5,188

24.2

4,818

22.4

21,468

100.0

1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986

15,107

54.5

7,760

4,875

8,745

27,715

20,109

144,101

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

75,861

55.6 48.7 57.1 52.9 48.9 46.6 49.0

17.5 19.1 16.5 15.9 14.7 14.3 14.0

27,743

19,264

56,410

28.0 25.3 34.8 26.9 32.3 36.8 39.4 36.4

22,667

14.6

154,939

100.0

1987

88,170

52.7

54,371

32.5

24,618

14.7

167,160

100.0

1988

113,608

51.3

74,519

33.7

33,125

15.0

221,254

100.0

1989

151,844

51.5

104,741

35.5

38,406

13.0

294,992

100.0

1990

170,916

53.2

99,205

30.9

51,043

15.9

321,165

100.0

1991

211,125

53.6

132,728

33.7

50,151

12.7

394,006

100.0

1992

264,280

55.3

154,043

32.2

59,774

12.5

478,099

100.0

1993

327,287

57.1

177,073

30.9

68,784

12.0

573,146

100.0

1994

350,362

56.8

185,907

30.1

81,096

13.1

617,366

100.0

1995

421,872

60.9

198,560

28.6

72,722

10.5

693,155

100.0

1996

527,556

60.9

239,996

27.7

98,677

11.4

866,231

100.0

23,816 37,225 45,405 57,762 67,202

17,037 17,533 43,544 56,789

Source: NSSG, Statistical Yearbooks, various years.

000 drachmae

6,625 8,058 10,396 12,647 16,881

000 drachmae

34,635 48,913 65,156 85,768 118,188

95

2.4 Local Autonomy Table 2 Expenditures of municipalities and communities by category, Greece 1974-96 (%)

Year

Paymentsfor Payments Special transfer of related to General expenditures Investments revenue to public credit expenditures for individual thirdparties regulations services

Other

Total

1974

17

48

19

4

4

8

100

1975

16

48

20

4

3

9

100

1976

16

48

24

3

1

8

100

1977

16

48

24

3

1

8

100

1978

12

51

25

3

1

8

100

1979

12

51

24

3

1

9

100

1980

12

53

25

3

2

5

100

1981

11

51

29

2

2

5

100

1982

11

49

30

2

2

6

100

1983

10

47

33

2

2

6

100

1984

9

45

37

2

2

5

100

1985

8

45

37

3

2

5

100

1986

7

46

34

4

3

6

100

1987

8

49

26

6

3

8

100

1988

8

50

26

6

3

7

100

1989

8

48

28

7

3

6

100

1990

7

48

28

7

4

6

100

1991

8

49

26

8

3

7

100

1992

7

46

29

8

4

6

100

1993

7

44

30

8

4

7

100

1994

7

43

30

8

4

8

100

1995

8

44

26

9

5

8

100

1996

8

44

25

10

5

8

100

Source. NSSG, Statistical Yearbooks, various years.

2.5 Voluntary Associations Abstract. Although the number of societies, associations, and non-profit companies or organizations fluctuates annually, there seems to be an overall decline in numbers. Among entities founded after 1970 were a number of compatriots' societies; after 1985, new societies were increasingly related to protection of the environment and quality of life. Because there are no formal or informal records of societies, associations, and nonprofit companies or organizations, it is particularly difficult to estimate their number, growth rate, and activities and, by extension, the trends in membership in recent decades. After 1970 a significant number of societies were founded, mainly in large urban centres. This growth was related in part to the mass agricultural exodus in the 1960s, 1970s, and, to a lesser degree, 1980s and to the consequent foundation of a large number of compatriots' societies by domestic migrants. In addition, there was the potential for funding (mainly from the European Union, but also various other public sources of funding) after 1980, when Greece joined the EU. It is also difficult to identify societies by area of activities, because there is a tendency to list multiple objectives in the mandates that appear both in their articles of association and in their formal applications to the lower civil courts. For example, compatriots' societies that were founded in great numbers in the 1970s and 1980s in the urban centres, where most domestic migrants settled, listed as mandates the preservation of ties between compatriots, preservation of the cultural heritage (habits and mores, traditional dances, etc.) of their region of origin, the preservation and rehabilitation of the natural and cultural environment of their region of origin, improvements to the region's infrastructure, and other goals. In a list of societies founded between 1971 and 1991 compiled from the archives of the Court of the First Instance of Athens (see table 1), two main thematic groups of societies stand out: cultural societies and compatriots' societies. As mentioned above, compatriots' societies are related to the intention of domestic migrants to preserve their "identity" and help their region of origin preserve its particular cultural and natural characteristics - in other words, they are also basically cultural societies. Approximately half of the societies that were founded during the period under study are included in the "other" category (environmental protection, quality of life,

2.5 Voluntary Associations

97

management of natural resources, urban environment, natural and health foods, societies of parents and guardians, and societies with an expressed political dimension in their objectives). Most societies concerned with the environment and quality of life were founded after the mid-1980s. Most societies concerned with the environment and quality of life were founded after the mid-1980s (some of them had previously existed as informal groups) when the debate on protecting the environment and improving quality of life became more intense (see table 2). Andromachi Hadjiyanni

REFERENCES

1971-91 Lower Civil Court of Athens Archives, raw data. Compilation by the author (Ilp(OTo8iKeio A0r|vti)v - Ap^eio, TipcoToyevf| 8e5ou£va 1971-1991, KaTau£rpr|ar| TOD avyypacpea). IAAK/EKKE Environmental Team 1998 Bodies related to the environment. Athens: Ergomedia (

59.5 19.3 21.2

19.5 5.9 74.6

5.8 0.8 93.4

0.2

99.8

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

61.2 19.2 19.6

21.2 6.4 72.3

51.2 0.7 94.1

0.1

99.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

58.1 14.1 27.8

21.4 7.2 71.4

5.4 1.2 93.5

0.1

99.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

60.8 20.0 19.2

21.0 8.2 70.8

4.7 0.9 94.4

0.1

99.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employers / Unpaid family workers Employees

-

-

5.2 94.8

0.1 99.9

Total

-

-

100.0

100.0

1969 Employers Unpaid family workers Employees Total

1978 Employers Unpaid family workers Employees Total

1984 Employers Unpaid family workers Employees Total

1988 Employers Unpaid family workers Employees Total 7996*

* Establishments in large-scale manufacturing industry. Source: NSSG, Results of the censuses of industrial, manufacturing and commercial enterprises, 1969, 1978, 1984, 1988, 1996.

230

Labour and Management

Table 5 Legal forms of enterprises by number of firms and number of average employees per year, Greece, 1969, 1984, 1988 (number and %)

1984

1969

Type of enterprise

1988

Enterprises Employees Enterprises Employees Enterprises Employees

Number Personal firm Joint-stock company Limited corporation General partnership Limited partnership Other Co-operative State corporation Private legal entity Public legal entity

312,233 6,551 2,524 46,129 2,036 6,118 2,864 942 1,685 2,381

551,139 231,589 28,630 221,429 13,646 19,108 12,542 9,731 49,553 33,716

277,414 9,470 6,061 54,515 5,592 693 2,420 129 1,453 4,430

447,658 326,163 48,783 210,644 24,756 2,720 12,854 1,845 34,791 11,768

376,065 76,809 11,897 19,455 10,963 1,687 4,698 594 5,763 1,791

629,402 288,866 48,965 530,064 85,003 13,318 23,307 6,764 28,681 58,046

Total

383,463 1,171,083

362,132

1,121,983

509,722

1,712,417

(%)

Personal firm Joint-stock company Limited corporation General partnership Limited partnership Other Co-operative State corporation Private legal entity Public legal entity Total

81.4 1.7 0.7 12.1 0.5 1.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.7

47.1 19.8 2.4 18.9 1.2 1.6 1.1 0.8 4.2 2.9

76.6 2.6 1.7 15.1 1.5 0.2 0.7 0.0 0.4 1.2

39.9 29.1 4.3 18.8 2.2 0.2 1.1 0.2 3.1 1.1

73.8 15.2 2.3 3.8 2.2 0.3 0.9 0.1 1.1 0.3

36.7 16.9 2.8 30.9 4.9 0.8 1.4 0.4 1.8 3.4

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: NSSG, Results of the censuses of industrial, manufacturing and commercial enterprises, 1969, 1984, 1988.

6 Social Stratification

6.1 Occupational Status Abstract. Activity rates are generally low but increasing. Women are participating more in the labour force, while young people are participating less. A persistently high proportion of self-employment and informal economic activities help to account for the low activity rates. The proportion of higher-status jobs in thejob hierarchy in industry is increasing. Activity rates were low from 1951 to 1997. Women's participation in the labour force increased, while that of young people decreased. The population of the country increased by approximately 25% between 19511 and 1995. At the same time, the labour force increased by approximately 35%. Activity rates, however, only increased, from 35.8% in 1951 to about 40.9% in 1997 (see table 1). Activity rates are, however, severely compromised when the age structure of the population (which has changed considerably over the period under study) is not taken into account. An adjusted index using the proportion of economically active people aged between 15 and 64 raises the above figures by about 20% in all cases. Thus, in 1951 the index was at 52.8%; it underwent a slow and steady increase until approximately 1983, when it stabilized at around 60%. The increase in activity rates between 1951 and 1983 can be attributed mainly to two facts. From 1951 to about 1974, emigration and internal migrations meant lower unemployment rates (i.e., inherently higher activity rates) and improving job prospects and expectations (see trend 4.1). Between 1974 and 1983, it was mainly the delayed impact of the international crisis in 1974 that caused employers in industry in Greece 1 Please note that the starting year for this section is 1951. This is because of serious inconsistencies in the required data available for 1961, which do not allow the use of that year as a starting point.

232

Social Stratification

to substitute people for machinery whenever possible. Thus, there was an increased demand for labour, which automatically improved work prospects. The remarkable stability observed from 1983 on implies that further radical fluctuations seem improbable. The activity rates, even for 1997 (60%), are considered unusually low on the whole. Overall participation rates conceal subtle changes taking place "within" the index. Participation rates for men were persistently on the decrease (about 90% in 1951 and 79% in 1981), while the rate for women presented the opposite picture (18% in 1951, 29% in 1981). Furthermore, activity rates for the younger age cohorts (aged 15-19 and 20-24) were on the decrease. Similar trends have been observed internationally. Women's participation in the labour force has generally been rising worldwide, explaining the relevant index. Decreasing activity rates for younger people are attributed mainly to increasing requirements and the need for better education and training. People who are currently in school will become active members of the labour force only at age 22 to 24. The declining activity rates of men (especially young men) are partially explained by this extension of education. Men's participation rate is also affected by compulsory military service, which lasts 18 to 24 months. Studies and military service combined mean that a young man who has gone to university and fulfilled his military obligations cannot be younger than 25-26 years old when he joins the labour force. Labour-force participation in the primary sector is shrinking; participation in the secondary sector remains stable; participation in the tertiary sector is rising. There is a high proportion of self-employment. Distribution of the labour force by occupational category has changed considerably over the past 45 years (see table 2). The most obvious change concerns people employed in agriculture. In 1951,48% of the total population was employed in the primary sector, while in 1997 only 19.3% were thus employed. This proportion is still very high compared to that in other European Union countries, reflecting the traditional social structure prevailing in the primary sector despite extensive technological modernization. The proportion of unpaid family workers is slowly shrinking, reflecting mainly the exodus of women into formal employment, and also an improvement in general education levels, which makes formal employment more feasible and desirable. The percentage of blue-collar workers seems to be remarkably stable. This is probably due largely to the inflow (to the secondary sector) of considerable numbers of people formerly employed in the primary sector, who are more likely to have little or no formal education, and are thus more likely to become blue-collar workers. The proportion of people employed in services, clerical jobs, trade, and sales (tertiary sector) rose steadily, from a combined percentage of 22% in 1971 to almost 34% in

6.1 Occupational Status

233

1991 (see table 2). Salaried employees also present a steadily rising percentage, from about 34% in 1961 to about 55% in 1997. In comparison with other countries, it seems that the balance between salaried employees and blue-collar workers is slightly different in Greece. In Germany, for example, bluecollar workers and salaried employees represented 38.1% and 42.1%, respectively, of all employed people in 1988. In Greece, the respective figures stood at 28.5% and 50.5%. This would suggest an advanced post-industrial economy, but it actually reflects the fact that Greece has never really had an industrial economy, but a service-oriented one. The numbers of civil servants (see table 3) are not representative, since they exclude many categories of civil servants. The extended public sector (including all civil servants) employed some 700,000 people in 1990, while the respective figure in the table has to be multiplied by 7 to reach this number. Accurate estimates of the total employed in the extended public sector are not available; thus, table 3 can show only trends. The number of civil servants more than doubled between 1972 and 1986, while there was a slight downward trend in more recent years. The overall increase in the numbers of civil servants reflects basically two socio-economic phenomena, the second of which is idiosyncratic and an integral feature of Greece's socio-economic system. First, there is the development of the welfare state, which created jobs in the public sector. Second, permanent employment, to be found only in the public sector, attracts many potential civil servants. This situation activates clientelistic relationships from the nineteenth century in which political agents play an active role (Tsoukalas 1978,1981,1986). Employers currently represent an increasing proportion of the active employed population, although there were considerable fluctuations in the 1980s. Self-employed people present an amazingly high (and almost stable from 1961 onward) proportion of about 30% of the labour force (see tables 2, 4). In the primary sector, around 90% of the country's farmers are self-employed and most run small family businesses. The situation is not much different in the secondary sector: almost 50% of crafts and industry enterprises employed fewer than 10 people in 1988. During the same period, only 74 firms (out of a total of more than 600,000) employed more than 500 people. Things are even more extreme in the tertiary sector, where firms employ fewer than 3 people on average. Thus, there are a huge number of tiny firms, each addressing small fragments of a small national market (the potential for exports for such firms is practically nonexistent). Although this production structure is flexible, it generally presents severe economic disadvantages that ensure not only operational inefficiency, but frequently counter productivity. Despite these characteristics, and the fact that many such firms do not make a profit but only a marginal wage (or income) for the owner, the proportion of self-employed people persists and that of employers is increasing! Despite the apparent

234

Social Stratification

economic paradox, there is obviously an underlying social structure supporting the operation of such enterprises. The model includes informal economic activities, unregistered employment, and multiple jobs, all of which are variables accounting for an indeterminate part of the survival formula (a better insight might be gained in conjunction with trend 4.1 and other trends). Such socio-economic phenomena help to explain why activity rates are (probably misleadingly) low. There is a shift in distribution of employees in the job hierarchy. Data on distribution of the economically active population by position in the job hierarchy at plant level are very scarce, cover a limited time-span (see table 5), and can be used only to identify trends. There seems to be a trend toward higher proportions of managers, executives, and white-collar (clerical) workers, and a reverse trend toward fewer blue-collar workers. The figures thus indicate a slight tendency toward a general shift from lowerlevel positions to intermediate and higher-level ones, although definite conclusions cannot be reached. Apostolis Rafailidis REFERENCES Coutsoumaris, G. 1963 The morphology of Greek industry. Athens: Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE). Kasimati, K. 2001 Structures and flows. The phenomenon of social occupational mobility. Athens: Gutenberg. Gutenberg). Lenski, G.E. 1958 "Social stratification." In J.S. Roucek (ed.), Contemporary Sociology, pp. 521-38. New York: Philosophical Library. Moschonas, A. 1986 Traditional petit bourgeoisie: The case of Greece. Athens: Institute of Mediterranean Studies. Mouzelis, N. 1978 Modern Greek society: Aspects of under development. Athens: Exandas.

6.1 Occupational Status

235

National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) 1951—91 Population census. 1974-97 Employment and labour force census. Nikolinakos, M. 1974 Economic development and immigration in Greece. Athens: Kalvos. OECD 1968 Measures of adjustment of rural manpower to industrial work and urban areas. Paris. Sotiropoulos, D. 2001 The clientelistic state's peak. Athens: Potamos. Tsoukalas, K. 1978 "On the problem of political clientelism in Greece in the nineteenth century", Journal of Hellenic Diaspora, 5: 5-17. 1981 Social development and the state. Athens: Themelio. 1986 State, society and employment in post-war Greece. Athens: Themelio. Vernardakis, N. 1988 The development train and Greece of the fifth Condratiev. Athens: Papazisis.

236

Social Stratification

TABLES

Table 1 Population by labour force participation, Greece, 1951-97 Year

Population (000)

Labourforce aged 15+ (000)

Gainfully employed (000)

Labour-force participation (%)

Adjusted participation rate(%)*

1951

7,633

2,732

2,565

35.79

52.80

1961

8,389

3,505

3,313

41.70

62.78

1971

8,768

3,170

3,081

36.15

55.37

1981

9,729

3,665

3,517

37.66

57.70

1982

9,789

3,697

3,483

37.76

57.49

1983

9,846

3,790

3,494

38.49

59.77

1984

9,896

3,799

3,491

38.38

59.84

1985

9,934

3,881

3,578

39.00

60.00

1986

9,967

3,887

3,592

38.99

59.46

1987

10,001

3,875

3,590

38.74

59.15

1988

10,037

3,953

3,651

39.39

59.80

1989

10,089

3,958

3,663

39.23

59.78

1990

10,160

3,993

3,713

39.05

59.00

1991

10,247

3,928

3,628

38.33

57.56

1992

10,322

4,219

3,870

40.87

-

1993

10,379

4,303

3,905

41.46

-

1994

10,206

4,154

3,790

40.74

60.29

1995

10,238

4,201

3,821

41.00

60.10

1997

10,498

4,290

-

40.90

60.11

* Proportion of the population of working age (15-64 years) in the labour force. Sources: NSSG, Labour Force Survey (employment), author's calculations; Eurostat, Employment statistics, 1994, 1995, 1997.

6.1 Occupational Status

237

Table 2 Occupational category of total employed population, Greece 1961-97 (%)* Year

Employer

1961 1971 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1997

3.20 4.00 6.60 6.30 5.66 5.10 5.00 5.60 5.50 5.60 5.56 5.60 6.30 7.10

Salaried Self/ , employed employee

31.80 34.50 31.28 32.72 30.89 30.66 30.92 29.72 29.94 29.60 28.73 29.13 28.88 26.15

33.50 42.30 48.14 49.00 48.38 49.00 49.30 49.27 49.86 50.43 51.43 52.33 53.15 54.78

Unpaid Blue-collar Farmer family worker worker

28.60 18.35 13.96 11.85 15.07 15.15 14.73 15.39 14.70 14.36 14.26 12.89 11.66 11.93

31.99 29.87 30.48 30.84 30.36 29.98 29.11 29.45 29.27 28.57 29.13 29.30 29.54

-

Services Clerical Trades employee worker and sales

4.73 7.38 7.77 8.07 8.36 8.99 8.98 9.03 9.29 9.35 9.34 9.31 9.22

35.11 40.59 30.70 29.00 29.97 29.43 28.93 28.54 27.02 26.60 25.37 23.99 22.30 19.30

-

0.00 7.54 8.89 9.33 9.09 9.23 9.49 9.29 9.62 10.08 10.43 10.99 11.71 10.95

* Sums not equal to 100 as some categories are interlinked. Source : NSSG, Labour Force Survey, various volumes, author's calculations.

Table 3 Civil servants, Greece 1972-97 Year

1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1991 1996 1997

Civil servants 53,900 57,871 69,711 77,939 69,428 76,050 80,501 107,492 106,953 103,071 102,046 118,135 119,085

Source'. NSSG, Labour Force Survey, various volumes; 1996-1997, Sotiropoulos, 2001.

-

7.18 9.74 9.86 9.81 9.81 10.10 10.16 10.53 10.42 10.98 11.51 11.97 11.57

238

Social Stratification

Table 4 Occupational status by sector, Greece 1951-97 (%) Employer

Self-employed

Salaried employee

Unpaidfamily member

Agriculture

1951 1971 1991 1997

1.30 1.20 3.20 4.27

56.00 51.80 57.10 64.19

9.00 4.80 3.80 3.62

31.10 41.60 35.90 37.80

Mining

1951 1971 1991 1997

1.80 3.00 2.00 4.00

5.40 6.10 1.00 0.57

91.00 89.60 96.40 95.37

0.80 1.00

Crafts and industry

1951 1971 1991 1997

5.80 7.70 10.00 9.61

21.50 21.18 17.00 14.48

66.30 67.60 67.60 69.14

3.30 3.00 5.30 6.76

Construction and public works

1951 1971 1991

3.50 5.00 10.00

21.30 14.80 21.80

70.95 78.80 66.10

1.35 1.00 2.00

Electricity and water supply 1951 1971 1991 1997

0.70

1.00 1.20

97.80 98.10 99.20 100.00

Trade

1951 1971 1991 1997

7.20 10.85 10.56 11.34

50.95 44.15 36.84 35.15

33.90 38.85 40.40 41.73

5.70 5.85 12.20 11.75

Transportation, storage and communications

1951 1971 1991 1997

2.75 3.40 2.70 3.65

17.60 24.80 23.00 22.3

74.85 70.60 72.90 72.52

1.40 1.00 1.30 1.6

Services

1951 1971 1991 1997

2.75 2.00 2.00

15.10 11.70 8.10

79.60 84.40 89.10

1.40 1.00

Banking and insurance

1951 1971 1991 1997

6.50 8.50 9.10

26.00 28.75 24.35

66.40 60.90 64.28

1.00 1.80 2.20

Source: NSSG, Labour Force Survey, (employment).

6.1 Occupational Status

239

Table 5 Employees by position in the job hierarchy in industry, Greece 1985-91 (%) Executive or manager

Clerical worker

Blue-collar worker

Not accounted for

Year

1985

3.28

6.38

7.39

7.39

1987

3.46

6.44

7.66

7.66

1989

3.86

6.56

8.23

8.23

1991

3.56

7.27

7.98

7.98

Source: NSSG, Labour Force Survey, (employment), various years.

6.2 Social Mobility Abstract. Structural social mobility has been extremely pronounced since 1960, especially among poor rural dwellers, whose offspring are increasingly represented in the higher job echelons. New occupational activities in urban centres, in combination with a higher educational level, offered the most common way to achieve upward social mobility. Changes to the structure of socio-economic activities reflect, by definition, the dominant forms of social mobility. Indeed, within less than 50 years, the active population in the agricultural sector dropped from over 60% (in the 1950s) to less than 20% (in the 1990s). Within this rapidly changing structure and in view of the scarcity of detailed data, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between structural mobility and "real" mobility. It is also impossible to estimate the real and persistent differences in opportunities for social upward mobility between offspring of different social backgrounds and classes or, what amounts to almost the same thing, to establish the power and factors of social "representation" within each social category. All the more so given that we have only vague statistical categories embracing occupational activities of varying income and prestige. Furthermore, we have no time series using comparable criteria of social backgrounds. The most reliable sources indicating social mobility trends are provided by two surveys, stating occupation of the offspring and father's occupation and clearly distinguishing between successive age cohorts. The development of Greece after the Second World War favoured social mobility because a large part of the population abandoned the agricultural sector and migrated either within the country or abroad, causing major changes in the composition of social strata. Although a great variety of means are used to achieve upward social mobility, two widespread "strategies" can be observed: an effort to obtain a better job with higher income, and improvement of the educational level of family members. After the fall of the dictatorship, new opportunities arose for all social categories, generations, and members of political parties. Over the period under examination, the family remained the core mechanism of guaranteeing upward mobility to its members. Family "strategies" concerning each member's job and desired educational specialisation started to be carefully planned and realized. Whether a family member will work in the private or public sector or get a second job is a decision made by the family with the aim of improving the overall social position and prestige of all family members (Tsoukalas and Panagiotopoulou, 1992).

6.2 Social Mobility

241

Intergenerational social mobility as concerns the occupational activity of the various age cohorts has undergone serious modifications, especially in the countryside. Significantly, the proportion of professionals and administrative executives increased from 5.5% in 1974 to 14.6% in 1988 (see table 1), a trend that continued to grow until recently. In 1974, only 11.8% of those in this category had a father in the same occupational activity. On the other hand, more than one third (35.4%) of professionals and managers were offspring of farmers and more than one fourth (27.4%) were offspring of craftsmen or labourers (see table 1). Fourteen years later, in 1988, the observed tendency remained almost the same, showing a slight increase in the number of professionals and administrative executives (16%), while the other occupational categories remained nearly constant, except for the offspring of craftsmen and labourer, which showed a declining trend due to deindustrialisation. The categories of clerical workers, tradesmen, and salesmen also indicated strong upward social mobility. In 1974, more than half (56.8%) were the children of farmers and craftsmen or labourers; in 1988, this proportion increased to 63.2%. Finally, craftsmen and labourers remaining in the same category as their fathers form a more or less constant group (between 39% and 36%), while those whose father worked in agriculture also remained relative stable, fluctuating between 43.5% and 45.6%. It is worth noting, however, that some upward mobility to more distant social positions occurs in all occupational categories. Comparing the various categories of occupational status of intergenerational mobility, we note that more than half (55%) of farmers' offspring abandoned the primary sector by 1988 (see table 2). Despite an apparent overall stabilization of the rural population since the beginning of the 1980s, which can be partly accounted for by the rapid increase of elderly actives (see also trend 6.1), it is important to underline the generalization of occupational shifts among the youngest offspring of rural dwellers - all the more so because the internal reproduction rate among this group seems to be much lower than that among craftsmen and labourers. Major changes can be observed between generations in the category of independent occupations (employers and self-employed persons). More than half (53.4%) of independent workers had fathers who worked for someone else (employee, unpaid family assistant, etc.) (see table 3). This development correlates with the strong tendency for self-employment observed after the mid-1970s. Occupational mobility according to gender was examined only in one study conducted in 1979 (Madianos et al., 1988). The main results can be summarized as follows: among men, approximately 51% included in the sample (n = 1,820) moved upward, 38% were "non-mobile," and 11% moved downward; among women, 55% (n = 2,263) moved upward, 26% remained at the same position, and 18% moved

242

Social Stratification

downward. The rapid change in composition of the labour force after the mid-1970s and the increased participation of women in the labour market may offer a broad explanation for these trends. The more accentuated upward mobility among women reflects the accelerated migration of young women from the villages, where they worked as unpaid family assistants, to urban centres, where they found paid jobs mostly in the service sector. A considerable portion of the population improved its educational level over the previous generation (see table 4). This is due to the increased opportunities offered primarily by changes in the tertiary educational system in 1963 and 1982 (extension of tuition-free university attendance, increase in total number of students, etc.). It should be remembered that the secondary level of the educational system does not provide adequate occupational skills or necessary specialization and expertise, which can be gained only at the university level. It can be concluded that among the lower social strata it has been mainly rural dwellers who have profited from structural changes. This fact can be correlated with the traditional relative equality of educational opportunity, leading to a virtual fetishisation of educational achievement, especially in the countryside, and to the equally traditional family planning of educational promotion. The persistence of this attitude and the desire for upward social mobility among rural dwellers should also be linked with a long history of selective emigration, which did not destroy but, on the contrary, may have invigorated threatened small holders in the agricultural sector. Finally, it should be kept in mind that the booming public recruitment has been largely organized on the basis of clientelistic networks surviving mainly on the countryside. In conclusion, while it is extremely difficult, for both methodological and empirical reasons, to make definitive statements on the relative "openness" of Greek society, there can be no doubt that mobility, both imaginary and real, is one of the country's most persistent features. Roy Panagiotopoulou

6.2 Social Mobility

243

REFERENCES

Kasimati, K. 1980 Occupational mobility: Trends in Greek industry. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). Lambiri-Dimaki, I. 1983 Greek society as seen by students. Athens: Odysseas. Lyrintzis, C. 1993 "PASOK in power: From 'change' to disenchantment." In R. Clogg (ed.), Greece 1981-1989. The populist decade, pp. 26^16. New York: St. Martin's Press. Madianos, M, et al. 1988 Health and Greek society: A case study. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). Moschonas, A. 1986 Traditional petty bourgeoisie. The case of Greece. Athens: Institute for Mediterranean Studies. Mouzelis, N. 1978 Modern Greek society: Aspects of under development. Athens: Exandas. Panagiotopoulou, R. 1996 "'Rational' individual-oriented practices in an 'irrational' political system." In C. Lyrintzis, I. Nicolakopoulos, and D. Sotiropoulos (eds.), Society and politics. Aspects of the Third Democracy in Greece 1974-94, pp. 139-60. Athens: Themelio.

1974 - 1994 Petmezidou-Tsoulouvi, M. 1987 Social classes and social reproduction processes. Athens: Exandas.

244

Social Stratification

Tsoukalas, K. 1986 State, society and employment in post-war Greece. Athens: Themelio. 1995 "Free riders in Wonderland; or, of Greeks in Greece." In D. Constas and T.C. Stavrou (eds.), Greece prepares for the twenty-first century, pp. 191-222. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Tsoukalas, K., and Panagiotopoulou, R. 1992 "Education in socialist Greece: Between modernization and demoralisation." In T. Kariotis (ed.), The Greek socialist experiment. Papandreou 's Greece 1981-1989, pp. 305-33. New York: Pella.

6.2 Social Mobility

245

TABLES

Table 1 Intergenerational occupational mobility, Greece, 1974, 1988 (%).

A. Percentage in row 1974

Occupation of father

Occupation of respondent Professional,

Professional, administrative, executive Clerical, trades, sales Service worker Farmer Craftsman, labourer Average Professional, administrative, executive Clerical, trades, sales Service worker Farmer Craftsman, labourer Average

Clerical,

Service Farmer Craftsman Total , labourer

administrative, executive trades, sales -worker

11.8 10.2 4.3

19.6 29.4 13.1

5.9 4.3

35.4 26.2 60.9

27.4 29.9 21.7

1.9 4.2

10.2 14.6

5.4 5.1

43.7 40.1

38.8 36.0

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

20.0 23.7 8.3 1.7 10.5 11.5

6.3 5.6 7.0 1.7 3.9 4.2

36.0 38.3 57.3 91.3 45.6 56.7

21.7 24.8 24.2 4.4 36.5 22.3

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1988

16.2 7.6 3.2 0.9 3.5 5.3

B. Percentage in column 7974

Occupation of father Occupation of respondent Professional, Clerical, Service Farmer Craftsman Total , labourer administrative, executive trades, sales worker

Professional, administrative, executive Clerical, trades, sales Service worker Farmer Craftsman, labourer Average

15.4 48.7 2.6

7.4 40.4 2.2

33.3 100.0

Professional, administrative, executive Clerical, trades, sales Service worker Farmer Craftsman, labourer Average

44.5 25.0 4.6 4.6 21.3 100.0

1988

6.4 17.0

4.8 13.1 3.8

4.2 16.8 1.5

5.5 20.1 2.5

50.0 100.0

76.6 78.3 100.0 100.0

77.5 100.0

71.9 100.0

25.3 35.4 5.5 4.3 29.5 100.0

22.1 23.3 12.8 11.6 30.2 100.0

14.2 19.2 8.3 5.5 52.8 100.0

14.6 17.3 7.7 28.1 32.3 100.0

9.3 11.7 7.8 45.2 26.0 100.0

Sources: 1974: Kasimati (1980): 77-79; 1988: unpublished data compiled by R. Panagiotopoulou on the basis of the research program by J. Yfantopoulos et al., The limits of poverty, conducted in the National Centre for Social Research.

246

Social Stratification

Table 2 Intergenerational mobility of occupational status of the offspring by economic sector of father's occupation, Greece, 1988 (%) A. Percentage in row Branch of economic activity of father Occupational status of respondent

Primary sector

Secondary sector

Tertiary sector

Total

Employer Self-employed* Employee Unpaid family member Farmer

39.5 40.0 46.7 28.6 92.6

27.2 21.5 22.8 42.9 3.1

33.3 38.5 30.5 28.6 4.3

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Average

57.4

17.4

25.1

100.0

B. Percentage in column Branch of economic activity of father Occupational status of respondent

Primary sector

Secondary sector

Tertiary sector

Average

Employer Self-employed* Employee Unpaid family member Farmer

2.1 13.8 39.6 0.2 43.6

6.2 24.4 63.8 0.8 4.8

5.3 30.4 59.3 0.4 4.7

4.0 19.8 48.8 0.3 27.1

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

* Except fanners. Source: unpublished data compiled by R. Panagiotopoulou on the basis of the research program by J. Yfantopoulos et al., The limits of poverty, conducted in the National Centre for Social Research.

6.2 Social Mobility

247

Table 3 Intergenerational mobility of occupational status, Greece, 1988 (%) A. Percentage in row Occupational status of father Occupational status of respondent

Employer Self-employed* Employee

36.6 38.3 45.1 28.6 93.0

100.0 100.0

2.2

1.2 0.2 0.1 -

16.9

24.9

0.1

56.3

100.0

5.8

Self-employed*

1.2

Employee

1.5

31.2 18.7 14.3

Unpaid family member Farmer Average

28.6 0.2 1.7

Total

23.2 29.0 34.6 28.6 4.7

14.6

Employer

Unpaidfamily Farmer member

100.0 100.0 100.0

B. Percentage in column Occupational status of father Occupational status of respondent

Employer Self-employed* Employee

Employer

34.3

5.8

3.7

Self-employed*

Farmer

14.3 42.9 5.7 2.9

36.7 53.8 0.3 3.5

23.1 67.6 0.4 5.1

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

Employee Unpaid family member

Unpaidfamily member

Farmer Average

33.3 33.3

2.6

4.0

13.5

19.9

33.3 -

39.0 0.2 44.7

48.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

0.3 27.1

* Except farmers. Source: unpublished data compiled by R. Panagiotopoulou on the basis of the research program by J. Yfantopoulos et al., The limits of poverty, conducted in the National Centre for Social Research.

248

Social Stratification

Table 4 Intergenerational educational mobility, Greece, 1974, 1988 (%) A. Percentage in row 1974 Educational level of father Primary Secondary Illiterate

University

Total

30.2 20.6 8.5 1.4

58.1 66.4 60.5 53.2

4.7 8.6 22.5 36.7

4.4 4.4 8.5 8.7

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

4.2

42.6

39.5

13.7

100.0

Illiterate Primary Secondary University

55.7 20.7 6.4 4.5

3.4 6.3 20.7 28.9

1.2 3.9 15.2

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Average

15.3

40.9 71.8 69.0 51.3 67.0

13.7

4.1

100.0

University

Average

Educational level of respondent Illiterate Primary Secondary University Average

1988

B. Percentage in column

Educational level of respondent Illiterate Primary Secondary University

1974 Educational level of father Primary Secondary Illiterate

9.4 64.5 24.6 1.5

4.0 45.7 38.5 11.8

1.1 20.6 50.0 28.3

4.2 27.9 50.0 17.7

4.2 42.6 39.5 13.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Illiterate Primary Secondary University

10.9 73.1 11.6 4.4

1.8 57.9 28.6 11.6

0.7 24.9 42.1 32.2

16.2 26.9 57.1

3.0 54.0 27.8 15.2

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

1988

Sources: 1974: Kassimati (1980): 77-79; 1988: unpublished data compiled by R. Panagiotopoulou on the basis of the research program by J. Yfantopoulos et al., The limits of poverty, conducted in the National Centre for Social Research.

6.3 Economic Inequality Abstract. Although the general standard of living has greatly improved, the economic distance between different income groups seems to be widening. A new low-medium-income class is being created; economic inequality also has a regional dimension. Salaried employees and pensioners carry most of the tax burden, while elements of wealth are relatively -widely distributed among the population. There is a widening gap in income distribution. Before starting this discussion, some difficulties and inaccuracies in the data used must be presented. The only official data available on distribution of income and wealth are those used by the tax department. The picture they present may be different from the real one, for several reasons. First, only taxable income is measured, and as there are many tax-free or reduced-tax economic activities, the data are inherently inaccurate. Income from agricultural activities, for example, is almost tax-free. In addition, only a portion of the population is subject to taxation; in 1965, for example, only 2% of all households submitted a statement. Second, the excessively complex legal system concerning taxation has repeatedly proved to be an excellent ground for tax evasion. Third, all professional groups and income categories do not have the same potential or opportunities for tax evasion. For example, salaried employees are thought to have the least chance to evade tax. Professionals (doctors and lawyers, for example), on the other hand, are generally thought to have many opportunities for tax evasion. Finally, the informal sector of the economy (see trend 12.2) creates "invisible" income that cannot be taxed. Moreover, not all occupational groups provide the same opportunities for tax-free activities. For all of these reasons, the data used in this presentation should be considered trend indicators and not hard evidence. Only the income and wealth aspects of economic inequality will be discussed, since these are the most important variables as far as socio-economic stratification is concerned. As in most countries, annual per capita disposable income in Greece has dramatically improved over the years. Between 1980 and 1992, it increased by a factor of almost eight (from Drs 24,000 to Drs 195,600 in 1992 prices; these figures are provisional, since they do not include the unknown savings of corporations, which would have to be deducted from the index). For those working in the primary sector, the annual gross per capita income (in 1982 prices) more than quadrupled between 1961 and 1991 (Drs 98,792 in 1961, Drs 436,734 in 1991), while for salaried employees it more than doubled over the same period (Drs 256,750 in 1961, Drs 530,259 in 1991).

250

Social Stratification

The per capita index is, however, not useful in examining the distribution of income. Unfortunately, the Gini coefficient cannot be used because the available data present cumulative inaccuracies (relevant specialized studies, however, suggest a Gini value varying between 0.326 and 0.376). Another useful index is thus constructed to present not only the "amount" of inequality in general, but also the distribution of inequality among separate income groups. In table 1, the income of the lowest-income taxpayer class for all years was adjusted to represent fixed 1982 prices. The basic 0-1 income category includes people with roughly equal income during the years examined (adjusted for inflation and for the general improvement of income through time). The 2-3 income class includes those who had two to three times the income of the basic class, and so on. A clear income-inequality scale is thus constructed. We shall refer to those in the 0-2 income category as the low-income class, to those in the 3-5 income category as the middle-income class, and to those in categories higher than 5 income as the upper-income class. What can be deduced is that the lowincome class improved its taxable income per taxpayer ratio (see table 2) (which will be called simply the income ratio in the rest of the section) from 0.335 in 1965 to 0.369 in 1995. This means that 1% of those in the low-income class possess 0.369% of the total declared income. In fact, all classes are improving their absolute participation rates in total declared income. However, the distance between the low-income and middle-income classes is widening. In 1965, the middle class had a 50.8% higher income ratio, while by 1995 the ratio had become 70.35% in favour of the middle-income class. That is, the latter class possessed on average 70.35% more taxable income per taxpayer than did the low-income class. Thus, there is an increasing proportion of taxpayers dropping to the low-income class (18.2% in 1965, 50.7% in 1995) and their economic distance from the middle class is increasing. On the other hand, the middle-income class is slowly approaching the higher-income class income, hi 1965 the latter class possessed a 66.7% higher income ratio, while by 1995 the ratio was higher by only 56.9%. However, the proportion of taxpayers in the middle-income class is diminishing (from 54.2% in 1965 to 37.3% by 1995). Moreover, there are fewer taxpayers possessing five or more times the basic income, 12.1% in 1995, compared to 27.9% in 1965. This indicates that there is a polarizing trend toward both ends of the income distribution spectrum. There are increasing proportions of low-income taxpayers, while the middle-income class is approaching the upper-income class but losing a disproportionately large number of members. Finally, the higher-income class is also represented by increasingly few taxpayers (only 12.1% in 1995). It seems, then, that the great mass of taxpayers is shifting to lower income classes (although their income is actually increasing, only not so fast as that of the wealthier), while a small number of taxpayers increasingly possess a bigger proportion of the total available income.

6.3 Economic Inequality

251

This evolving situation may not have the alarming consequences it would have in the 1960s, however. Overall income has greatly increased, and the standard of living has been very much improved for all. It seems that the "low-income" class is increasingly incorporating (socially and economically) excluded people and is shrinking in size, being replaced by a new low-middle income class, supplemented by a smaller but increasingly powerful upper-income class. There is converging income distribution among urban, semi-urban and rural areas, and unequal distribution among occupational groups. There are regional dimensions to income inequality as well (see tables 3 and 4). Taxpayers living in or around Athens represented about 58% of all taxpayers in 1965. They possessed about 67% of the total taxable income and paid around 73% of total tax. By 1995, the inhabitants of Athens and surrounding areas represented 39% of the total number of taxpayers. This is mainly because more and more formerly tax-free activities (practised mainly in semi-urban and rural areas) are being taxed. Inhabitants of Athens and surrounding areas now possess 45% of total taxable income and pay 55% of total tax. Average income in semi-urban and rural areas has improved, compared to that available to inhabitants of Athens and its surrounding areas, hi 1965 the average income in semi-urban and rural areas was equal to about 76.5% of that in Athens and surrounding areas; the ratio had improved to 83% in 1991. A relative deterioration is presented for 1995, which may be attributed to the preliminary data available at the time of writing. Table 5 presents the distribution of declared income and total tax paid among various occupational groups. The most remarkable characteristics are the following. First, income holders (income coming mainly from rent or lease of property or buildings, etc.) represent an increasing proportion of taxpayers, reaching 10.7% in 1995. However, they declare only 4.5% of total income and pay 5.4% of total tax. Second, tradesmen-craftsmen and industrialists are diminishing in relative numbers among taxpayers, representing only 18.3% in 1995 (actually quite high by international standards), compared to almost 43% in 1965. They declared only 21.6% of total income in 1995. This figure, combined with the high number of tradesmen-craftsmen and industrialists, shows the very small scale of industrial production and the important role of commerce in the Greek economy. This group's contribution to taxes was only 26.3% in 1995. Third, professionals also represent a diminishing proportion of taxpayers (3.3% in 1995). They declare 6.5% of total income and are paying 13.9% of total tax, which might be considered satisfactory when compared to what is being paid by salaried employees, who normally have a much lower income (see below). Fourth, those employed in the primary sector are only now starting to become taxpayers, making initially small contributions (7.8% of taxpayers, paying only 0.9% of total tax in 1995). In 1991, 22.3% of the labour force

252

Social Stratification

consisted of people employed in the primary sector, yet they comprised only 2.1% of all taxpayers (that is, fewer than one in ten farmers was paying taxes). Fifth, pensioners represent a remarkable 21.7% of taxpayers in 1995, declare 15.5% of total income, and carry an almost analogous portion of the total tax burden (14.4%). Finally, salaried employees represent an increasing proportion (29.6% in 1965 and 38.2% in 1995) of taxpayers and carry the heaviest tax burden (39.1%). The last two points clearly show that pensioners and salaried employees are among those who have the least opportunity for tax evasion. Thus, an income-distribution table concerning income received by salaried employees (see table 6) might be more accurate than table 5. It is not representative, however, since the occupational groups inducing most income inequalities (tradesmen-craftsmen and industrialists and professionals) are not included. Still, table 6 is useful and presents more or less the same picture described in table 5. Sources of income are widely dispersed. All occupational groups receive income from a variety of sources. This means that wealth, in the form of land, buildings, securities, and so on, is relatively widely (but not evenly) distributed. For example, the occupational group with the widest dispersion of income sources in 1995 is professionals. Of their income, 10.3% comes from buildings (refits, etc.), 9.9% from participation in or ownership of trade-craft or industrial firms, 38.7% from salaried services, and only 40.8% from their main occupation. Salaried employees, on the other hand, seem to have the fewest opportunities for dispersion of income sources: in 1995, 90.1% of their income came from their main occupation, 3.5% from rents from buildings, etc., 4.3% from tradecraft and industrial firms, and 0.5% from sources such as agriculture (see table 6). No particular trends in the differentiation of income sources for the various occupational groups over time can be detected, as it appears that the shifts observed are attributed mainly to the choice of most profitable or advantageous investment for each time period, and to changes in the taxation system, which taxes each income source differently each year. The latter problem is very well illustrated by the fact that 45.6% of farmers' income was attributed to rents from buildings, etc., in 1965, and this proportion dropped to a more normal 12.4% by 1995. Income from agricultural activities represented only 28.1% of farmers' income in 1965, while it represented 56.9% in 1995. The only persistent features observable are the prominent dependence of salaried employees upon their salaries, and that of pensioners upon their pensions. In all, there are no clear indications on how wealth is distributed in the data available. It is clear, however, that there is only a limited relationship between the taxpayers' main occupation and actual income sources. This is an indication of the extent of holding of multiple jobs and of the breadth of distribution of wealth.

6.3 Economic Inequality

253

The general consensus about wealth distribution is that a very large portion of the population owns or controls a wide variety (generally of moderate value) of income and wealth sources. Wealth seems, then, to be more evenly distributed in comparison with other Western countries. Still, there is as yet no national registry recording the official ownership status of elements of wealth, and especially of land. Apostolis Rafailidis

REFERENCES

Coutsoumaris, G. 1963 The morphology of Greek industry. Athens: Centre of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE). Giannitsis, T. 1979 "Issues regarding growth in Greece", Economy and Society, 1: 26-45. 1:26-45). Karagiorgas, S., Kasimati, K., and Pandazidis, N. 1988 Research on the synthesis and distribution of income in Greece. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE). Karagiorgas, S., et al. 1990 The dimensions of poverty in Greece. Athens: National Centre for Social Research (EKKE).

Katsos, G., and Spanakis, N. 1984 Industrial protection and EEC membership: Analysis and measurement of the degree of protection of the Greek manufacturing industry during the pre- and post-membership periods. Athens. Lazaridis, P., Papailias, T., and Sakkelis, G. 1989 Income distribution in Greece. Athens: Agricultural Bank of Greece, Study 35. Lenski, G. E. 1958 "Social stratification." In J.S. Roucek (ed.), Contemporary Sociology, pp. 52138. New York: Philosophical library.

254

Social Stratification

Moschonas, A. 1986 Traditional petit bourgeoisie: The case of Greece. Athens: Institute of Mediterranean Studies. Mouzelis, N. 1978 Modern Greek society: Aspects of under development. Athens: Exandas. National Statistical Service of Greece 1951-91 Population census. 1965-95 Statistics on declared income of the population and on tax. 1970—92 National accounts of Greece. Nikolinakos, M. 1974 Economic development and immigration in Greece. Athens: Kalvos. Papailias, T. 1996 Greek economy 1948-95: Myths and realities. Athens: Agricultural Bank of Greece. 1948-1995:

EKSoaeit; AypoTiKf|