Rationalizing Religion : Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in Singapore Society [1 ed.] 9789047419693, 9789004156944

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Rationalizing Religion

Social Science in Asia Edited by

Vineeta Sinha Syed Farid Alatas Chan Kwok-bun

VOLUME 13

Rationalizing Religion Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in Singapore Society

by

Chee Kiong Tong

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2007

photos front cover: reproduced with the permission of the National Archives of Singapore This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tong, Chee Kiong. Rationalizing religion : religious conversion, revivalism, and competition in Singapore society / Tong Chee Kiong. p. cm. — (Social science in Asia, ISSN 1567-2794 ; v. 13) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15694-4 (alk. paper) ISBN-10: 90-04-15694-1 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Singapore—Religion. 2. Singapore—Religious life and customs. I. Title. BL2085.T66 2007 200.95957—dc22 2006051895

ISSN 1567-2794 ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15694-4 ISBN-10: 90-04-15694-1 © Copyright 2007 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

For My Teachers and Friends Edwin Thumboo Ong Jin Hui

CONTENTS Chapter One

Rationalizing Religion ......................................

1

Chapter Two Religions in Singapore: An Analysis ..............

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Chapter Three

77

Religious Conversion ....................................

Chapter Four Religious Participation and Religiosity .......... 157 Chapter Five Traditional Chinese Customs and Rites ........ 195 Chapter Six

Religion and the State ...................................... 231

Chapter Seven

Conclusion ...................................................... 265

Bibliography ................................................................................ 299 Index ............................................................................................ 317

CHAPTER ONE

RATIONALIZING RELIGION 1. Introduction Singapore, a small nation state with one of the highest population densities in the world, is home to most of the world’s major religions. It has a complex ethnic and religious composition; the 2000 Census states 50% of the population as being Chinese religionists, 14.8% Christians, 12% Muslims and 5% Hindus. Other than the major world religions, there are a multitude of other religions, including Sikhism, Soka Gakkai, Sathya Sai Baba, Bahai, etc, sharing the same social space. What happens when there are so many religions co-existing in such close proximity? What is the nature of the interaction among the different religious groups? Are there incidences of conflict? Does a degree of hybridization occur? In order to answer these questions, it is important to understand the religious situation in Singapore. I begin by detailing the religious situation in Singapore from the 1920s when data was first collected about religion to present day Singapore society. By doing so, it will demonstrate how the religious profile in Singapore has changed dramatically over the years. For example, in 1920, 72.8% of the population in Singapore claimed to practice Chinese religions. By 1980, this had dropped to 56%. It further fell to only 51% by 2000. Concomitantly, Christianity has grown from 5% in 1920, to 10.3% in 1980, and 14.6% in 2000. How do we account for the significant religious shifts in Singapore society? Why do so many young Singaporeans choose to give up their family religion and switch to another religion? Singapore society has undergone rapid industrialization and modernization over the last thirty years. It has transformed from what is known as “a third world” country, to a developed status. The rapid economic development has had significant effects on the social and cultural life in the city-state. Classical secularization theories suggest that there would be a decline in the social significance of religion. Has this happened? The immense transformations in the

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socio-cultural, political, and economic milieu in Singapore society must have necessitated adaptations and modifications in religion. How have religious practices and beliefs changed since the early days? How do we account for these changes? Finally, any analysis of religion in Singapore must deal with the role of the state in Singapore society. Singapore is physically, and mentally, a small society. The state is present in most areas of everyday life. It attempts to manage, through social policies, every aspect of social life, whether it is encouraging population growth, getting graduates to marry, or keeping Singapore clean. In the area of religion, it institutionalized compulsory religious education in schools in the 1980s, and passed a Bill in Parliament to preserve religious harmony in Singapore society. What have the intended and unintended consequences of state intervention in religious matters been? Despite remaining an avowedly secular country, the Singapore government has wielded significant influence on religious life in Singapore. While the need to separate religion from politics has been stressed repeatedly, politics remains deeply intertwined with religion. How has the state affected the religious situation in Singapore? 1.1. Religion and Religious Change The central issue addressed in the book is religious change. Given its small size, extensive socioeconomic changes, and the religiously diverse structure, Singapore provides an excellent case study for analyzing religion and religious change, as well as to test out key sociological concepts such as the secularization hypothesis and the rational choice theory of religion. Based on quantitative and qualitative data collected over a period of 20 years, from 1980 to the most recent data set collected in 2000, I will trace the major changes that have occurred in the religious scene in Singapore. Several major trends are discernible. Firstly, there has been a growing number of converts to Christianity, especially among the Chinese population. As noted, in 1920, only 2% of the Chinese population identified themselves as Christians. By 1980, this has risen to 10.9%. This has steadily grown to 16.5% in 2000. The growth in the number of Chinese Christians has largely been at the expense of Taoism. For example, in 1920, 98% of the Chinese population considered themselves Chinese religionists. By 1980, the number of Taoists in Singapore had declined to 38.2%. Between 1980 and 2000, the percentage of

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Taoists in Singapore showed a dramatic decline to merely 10.8% of the Chinese population. It is not only Christianity that has benefited from the decline in the number of Taoists in Singapore. The data shows that in Singapore, of the Chinese religions, in contrast with Taoism, Buddhism seems to be able to retain its followers, and in fact has been able to attract new converts. For example, in 1980, 34.3% of the Chinese population claimed adherence to Buddhism. This rose to 39.4% in 1990 and to 53.6% in 2000. In fact, between 1990 and 2000, Buddhism was the fastest growing religion in Singapore.1 How do we account for these religious shifts in Singapore society? Sng and You (1982) suggest that educational changes in Singapore, particularly the role of the church or mission schools, can in part account for religious shifts. As I will show in Chapter 3, my data supports the correlation between education and conversion. However, as the number of Singaporeans who attend mission schools is quite small, it is not sufficient to account for the massive growth in the number of Christians in Singapore. Taking another tack, Hinton (1985) argues that the growth in Christianity is due to the anomic condition of Singaporeans. He suggests that in Singapore, anomie is on the increase, as people withdraw into their private worlds. My data, however, does not show an increase in anomie in Singapore. Most previous sociological studies have also found that anomie is not an effective indicator of religiosity or religious participation (Carr and Hauser 1976; Photiadis and Johnson, 1963). Tamney and Hassan (1987) argue that religious change is due to intermarriage and cultural crisis in Singapore society. However, the rate of intermarriage in Singapore is low, and like Hinton’s claim on anomie in Singapore, there is little data to support the cultural crisis hypothesis. Finally, Goh (1999) argues that religious change in Singapore is due to the ability of Christianity to provide transcendent solutions for individuals. Goh’s study, however, focused primarily on charismatic churches in Singapore. Moreover, the growth in charismatic churches in Singapore only occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, it cannot explain the dramatic growth of Christianity from the 1950s to the 1 Here, I am sketching out the main trends in religious change. The details of these religious shifts, such as who are the people who are changing religions, why they are converting, as well as correlating religious change with key demographic and social-cultural variables, will be dealt with in Chapter 2.

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1980s, before the arrival of Charismatic movements in Singapore. The problem with the transcendent argument is that while it may conceivably explain the growth of Christianity for a small sector of the population at a certain period in time, it cannot account for the growth of the Christian population as a whole. Furthermore, Goh does not really explain why Singaporeans would suddenly experience a need for transcendence, and why only among Chinese Singaporeans. In Chapters 2 and 3, I will examine the various factors that can account for these religious shifts. I argue that in Singapore, there is a process of the “intellectualization” of religion. Conceptually, intellectualization refers to a process where individuals shift from an unthinking and passive acceptance of religion to one where there is a tendency to search for a religion that they regard as systematic, logical and relevant. Such religious switching is mainly due to the perception of traditional religious systems vis a vis Christianity and Buddhism. These people have experienced, and are continuing to experience, a movement away from traditional Chinese ritual practices that they consider to be “illogical” and “irrational” to a belief system which they perceive to be more “rational”. Partly due to the nature of the educational system, which emphasized systematic and rational thinking process as well as the rise in the educational levels of Singaporeans, there is a search for a religion of the “book”. It is this process of rationalization, the perception of Christianity as a rational, modern religion that partly explains for its attractiveness to younger Singaporeans who are themselves socialized into an English stream, scientifically oriented educational system. There is a search for a textual religion rather than merely a respect for traditional practices.2 This idea of rationalization draws, in part, from

2 I am not suggesting that Taoism is an irrational religion. In a sense, all religions are rational, or at least internally consistent. Rather, it is that, among those who convert to another religion, whether Christianity or Buddhism, the responses given by the informants were that they saw Taoism as an irrational religion based on superstitions and impractical ritual practices. Later, I will show that this, in fact, may have something to do with the nature of Taoism, where there is little socialization or explanations for ritual practices. As Granet (1975) has argued, the motivation for the performance of rituals, for the Chinese, is a profound conviction regarding the value of moral traditions. Rituals are seen as obligatory behavior; belief in them is of little interest, and even their efficaciousness is not significant. What is important is that Chinese life is governed by a sense of sentiment regarding the idea of an active solidarity between man and the world.

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Weber, who suggests that one of the main features of a modern society is the process of rationalization: “One of the most important aspects of the process of rationalization of action is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom for deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self interests.” The conversion process is made easier by the modern social environment, which emphasizes voluntarism in the decision-making processes regarding religious affiliation, exposure to a plurality of religious options, and an educational system that emphasizes scientific and critical thinking. The crux of the Weberian thesis is that the world we live in is undergoing a continuous process of rationalization. For Weber, traditional and affective action is largely determined by habit and emotion, but as conscious ideas emerge in the orientation of action, society tends towards rational action. For Weber, the concept of rationality is integrally tied to religion. Rationalization involves the clarification, specification, and systematization of the ideas which men have concerning their reason for being. Such ideas imply metaphysical and theological conceptions of the cosmic and world orders as well as man’s position in relation to such wider orders.3 It is important to note that rationalization does not mean the decline of the significance of religion, rather that there are changes in the nature of religion and the role of religion in human lives. In Singapore, a key part of the intellectualization process relates to the demystification of religious beliefs and practices. I will show that one of the key processes taking place is the discarding of what religious practitioners perceive to be the irrationalities of the religions, and attempt to locate what they consider to be orthodox beliefs. To a degree, it involves the filtering out of folk beliefs and practices and the domestication or tidying up of less manageable elements in the religious traditions.4 In a sense, for those who switch religions, they take a more philosophical, and critical view of religion. 3 Ritzer’s (2000) application of the rationalization model show how it can be used in a variety of institutional contexts, including religion. He suggests that in the modern world, using McDonald’s as a case study, that there is a process by which the principles of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world. This process of ‘McDonaldization’ affects every aspect of society, including education, work, health care, leisure, politics and family life. It is, in a sense, a process of rationalization of the modern world, where there is increasing efficiency, calculability, predictability, and the control of nonhuman technology. 4 See Michael Hill, (2004), Regulating Religion, pg. 347.

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There is a process of questioning or at least, an attempt to locate justifications for the beliefs and rituals of the religion, a search for verifiable truths. A religion that is perceived to be based on sentiments such as Taoism, where a request for an explanation for religious practices is replied with statements of: “it has always been done this way” or “just do it as I do it”; without regard to justifications seems less likely to fit the needs and world views of the younger English educated Chinese Singaporeans. I examine the process of the intellectualization of religion at two levels. Firstly, at the level of the individual, it relates to the reasons for and the process of conversion. This is examined in detail in Chapter 3. Intellectualization also takes place at the institutional or structural level of the religions themselves. In an environment where there are so many religions existing in close proximity, and where there are significant shifts in religious affiliations, with some religions gaining members at the expense of other religions, it is expected to witness some reactions from the different religious groups. I will show that there are changes in the structures, religious beliefs, and practices of the various religions as they compete for adherents. Several significant trends will be enunciated. For example, there is a process of intellectualization of Taoism in Singapore society. As a group, Taoists have tried to systematize the religion, and to explain the philosophy of the religion to Singaporeans. As mentioned earlier, there is a perception among young Singaporeans that Taoism is an illogical and superstitious religion. The Taoist Federation, itself a new institutional structure set up to represent the interests of Taoists in Singapore, has been publishing tracts and giving talks to educate Singaporeans regarding the rationality and logic of Taoist beliefs. Thus, religions that are primarily oral in tradition, such as folk Taoism, attempt to create a canonical context in order to raise its social status. In addition, a national level committee was set up to explain, update, and make the rituals more relevant for modern Singapore society.5 Similarly, Buddhist organizations in Singapore have begun to hold dharma classes, dharma rallies, and dharma camps, similar to the Christian bible classes, camps, and gospel rallies, in order to enlarge their membership. This can be termed the process 5 The publication of this book received wide coverage in the media, and over 70,000 copies were sold. The rationale for setting up the committee, its deliberations, and details of the publication will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.

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of the Christianization of Buddhism. I will show that the various religious groups are modifying and adapting their religious ideas and rituals to meet the challenges posed by other religions in Singapore. It will be suggested, following Stark and Iannaccone (1994), Finke (1990), and Iannaccone (1998), that the existence of so many religious groups in close proximity, as well as the success of some religions in attracting converts from other religions, have resulted in an environment of religious competition. As part of the rationalization of religion, I argue that in a society where different faiths compete for appeal to a relatively modernized society, competing religions are forced to modify and demystify their beliefs and practices, to present themselves in a more rationalized manner. It will be shown that this element of religious competition in Singapore society may be partly responsible for the revivalism in religion that we observe occurring in Singapore. With the threat of losing adherents to other religions, various religious groups have stepped up their proselytization efforts in order to gain members, and modifying their religious beliefs in order to retain members. In fact, some religions that were primarily non-proselytizing religions, such as Taoism, and Buddhism, have become proselytizing religions to meet the challenge posed by Christianity. An additional dimension in the intellectualization of religion is the increasing differentiation among the various Chinese religions. In the past, Chinese religion has often been viewed as a syncretic mix of various religious traditions, including Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, ancestor worship, and folk religions of the Chinese. It has led to difficulty in trying to describe what Chinese religion is. For example, terms such as “shenism” (Elliot, 1964), “bai bai” (Clammer, 1985), and “Chinese religions” (Wee 1977), have been used to try to categorize the syncretic beliefs and ritual systems of the Chinese. Thus, in the past, the distinction between Buddhism and Taoism/ Chinese traditional beliefs were not always clear for the Chinese in Singapore. Even today, among older Chinese Singaporeans, especially the less educated, the two are not seen to be mutually exclusive, and many Chinese do not distinguish between the variety of deities, whether Buddhist or Taoist in origin, which they worship. Statues of Buddhist “gods” can be found in most Taoist temples, and many Chinese visit both Taoist and Buddhist temples for religious functions. However, as part of the process of rationalization in Singapore, we are witnessing a greater differentiation of the two

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religions, and greater clarity among informants regarding the beliefs and rituals of these two religions. While there has been a movement towards Christian revivalism, an opposing trend has also emerged. Many young and well-educated Chinese are also proclaiming to have no religious affiliation. Nonreligionists are defined as persons who do not believe in any religion. In 2000, about 18 percent of Chinese claim to have no religion. Who are these people who claim to have no religion? What are their reasons for rejecting religion? Like their Christian counterparts, many non-religionists tend to be young, better educated and come from higher socio-economic backgrounds. Many do not believe in any religion because they consider religion to be unscientific. For this group of people, the emphasis on science makes religion implausible because of its apparent success in explaining phenomena previously in the domain of religion. In Singapore, a large number of individuals who claim to be non-religionist actually practice some form of religious rituals, usually traditional Chinese religious rituals. However they usually deny religious affiliations because these may not be totally in congruence with their religious system or they do not like to call themselves Taoist. Many do not participate in rituals because they are too complex and troublesome. Some Chinese who do participate in Buddhist rituals do not consider Buddhism to be a religion and therefore would claim to be free-thinkers. Switching to Christianity is not feasible as many view it as a Western religion and is biased towards the English-educated population. In a sense, the data on the number of non-religionists may not be a true reflection of religious affiliation and religiosity in Singapore. What is the significance of religion in Singapore? Because of a largely migrant population in the nineteenth century, most of the religious traditions in Singapore are imported, apart from the indigenous pre-colonial Malay belief system. Thus Clammer (1991:33) argues that religion in Singapore was subjected to two important sociological processes. Firstly, they were selective of the original religious tradition because of the social status, conditions of emigration and cultural background of the immigrants. For example, traditional Chinese folk religion was imported mostly by the illiterate or semiliterate population of diverse regional and dialect backgrounds who arrived in Singapore as cheap labour. As such, a degree of syncretism and “do it yourself ” attitude characterized the traditional

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Chinese religionist, since it was based essentially in practice rather than in any written canonical scriptures. Each of the imported religions did not enter a theologically empty environment in which it could establish a dominant presence. This promoted a religious pluralism and also brought religions into close proximity with one another, sometimes even rival ones. Given the great variety of religions in Singapore—Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, Taoism, Buddhism—the potential for religious conflict is very real. Currently, some religions show a distinct pattern of decline while others have grown in membership. These changes have serious consequences for inter-religious relations in Singapore, and have resulted, in the past, in religious conflicts among various religious groups. For example, in the mid-19th century, the growth of the Chinese Catholic population was viewed with some displeasure from the non-Catholic population which continued to subscribe to clan associations and secret societies. They viewed conversion to Christianity as a threat to their membership and survival. In 1851, Chinese Christians were attacked in the northern part of the country by secret societies which resulted in massive riots lasting a week. At the same time, the co-existence of so many religions in close proximity has also resulted in a degree of hybridization of religion, with some religions, particularly Chinese religions, acculturating the beliefs of other religions. Similarly, many of the rituals of the religions in Singapore have been transformed over time—modified and adapted to suit the local contexts. 1.2. Religious Conversion One of the more interesting aspects of religion in Singapore is the changing membership in religious groups due to conversion processes. A significant number of Singaporeans were not born into the religion they have, but had converted from another religion. The book examines the data on religious conversion. Who are those that convert? At what age do they convert? What do they convert from and to? Where do conversion experiences take place? Is there a gender difference? Are there ethnic differences? It will be shown that many of these converts are young, English-educated Singaporeans who are from more affluent socio-economic backgrounds. There is also a correlation between the stream of education and religious conversions.

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For example, English-educated Singaporeans tend to convert to Christianity, while Chinese-educated Singaporeans have a propensity to become Buddhists. A window to understanding religious conversion in Singapore comes from this fact that certain socio-demographic factors are correlated with conversion. I will explicate why certain groups of people are predisposed to certain religions. Another interesting feature of religious conversion in Singapore is that it tends to occur only among the Chinese. While there is some conversion among the Malays and Indians, the numbers are insignificant. I will examine the ethnic angle involved in religious conversion as well as why the Chinese have greater propensity for religious conversion in Singapore. I suggest that part of the reason is that religion is not a key marker for ethnic identification for the Chinese in Singapore.6 Moreover, there is a movement away from obligatoriness and towards voluntarism in the observance of traditional Chinese customs and festivals. The ethnic angle in religious conversion plays out at another level. As noted earlier, almost all Malays are Muslims. Similarly, almost all adherents of Hinduism are Indians. Thus, in Singapore, religious affiliations are closely tied to ethnicity: Islam is seen as a Malay religion, and Hinduism, an Indian religion. These perceptions have an impact on the nature of religious conversion in Singapore. In the sociological literature, conversion refers to a change of belief and personal identity (Balch, 1980). Conversion to another religion implies a transformation of identity or orientation in behavioral and cognitive referents. This could include a conscious shift in one’s sense of grounding, the displacement of one’s universe of discourse by another or the ascendancy of a formerly peripheral universe of discourse to the status of primary authority (Snow and Machalek, 1984). However, most of these studies were conducted in the West. Would the conversion experiences in Singapore be similar? The book argues that a switch in religion does not always necessitate a denial of the previous religious outlook. There is a cultural element involved here. Conversion to another religion does not mean the denial of one’s own culture. For example, in Singapore, for many Christian churches, while the ritual of baptism remains important, it is not a central 6 Such a view of Chinese religion has always been held by intellectuals who feel that the Chinese do not have religions, only ideological systems. See Yang, 1970.

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tenet in the belief system. This is partly due to the fact that among many Chinese parents, while they may not mind their children becoming Christians, there is great resistance to the act of baptism as it is viewed as giving up one’s own culture. Thus, there is a modification in the theology of the religion to fit the local historical and environmental factors. The book will delineate the different conversion experiences of Singaporeans, suggesting that there are at least two kinds of religious experiences, an emotionalist conversion and an intellectualist conversion. Another feature of religion in Singapore is the increasing popularity of new religious movements, including Japanese religions such as Soka Gakkai and Mahikari, as well as new-Hindu religions such as Sathya Sai Baba. I will examine the factors accounting for the popularity of these new religions, suggesting that they are popular because of an isomorphic fit between these new religious traditions and the prior religions of the adherents. Thus, it will be argued that these are not religious conversion per se, but rather religious relabelling, or in the Peter Berger sense, religious alternation. 1.3. Secularization, Modernity, and Religious Revivalism As noted earlier, one of the key features of Singapore society is the rapid pace of industrialization, modernization and westernization. Singapore has developed from a third world country with a high level of poverty, unemployment and slums, to a developed status with one of the highest Gross Domestic Product per capita in Asia, within a short period of forty years. Much of the economic growth has been driven by import substitution and attracting foreign multinational companies to invest in Singapore. The economic growth has been accompanied by a rapid modernization of Singapore society, with its attendant mass consumption culture. Singapore television is replete with American shows, and shops are filled with western products, including the ubiquitous McDonald’s and Burger Kings. In that time, Singapore has largely become a “middle-class” society, where homes are equipped with television sets, with 50 channels of cable television, and all the other amenities of modern society. Economic growth has also resulted in changes in other sectors of society. For example, the educational system has transformed from one that is based on traditional language-specific teaching of traditions and culture to one that is an English-based western rationalistic

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educational system. In the past, the main language of communications within Chinese homes was Mandarin and the various Chinese dialects. Increasingly, because of the educational system in Singapore, English is becoming the main language of communication at home. Classical secularization hypothesis suggests that this will entail the declining significance of religion in Singapore society. The data suggest otherwise. Instead of the decline of religion, we are, in fact, witnessing a process of religious revivalism in Singapore society. Why is this so? Theoretically, secularization denotes the process of decline in the social significance of religion and is thought to be one of the consequences of modernization. The process implies that sectors of society are increasingly removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. In the main, it is argued that the process of secularization has been dependent on the rise of empiricist thinking and the differentiation of roles and functions within society. Berger (1967), Luckmann (1967), Wilson (1969), and Martin (1978) have variously argued that the process of secularization is an inevitable outcome of modernization.7 It should be noted, however, that secularization is a concept developed to characterize “western” society. How useful is the concept when applied to religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, where the religion is diffused in society and in which the ideas of faith and beliefs differ from those of Christianity? How applicable is the secularization hypothesis to an Asian society such as Singapore?

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The classical secularization hypothesis has come under increasing debates and criticism. (See, for example, Stark, Rodney, (1999), Secularization, R.I.P.) With mounting evidence contradicting the hypothesis, various scholars have tried to refine the original hypothesis. Dobbelaere, (1987) for example, argues that we must distinguish between macro and micro level analysis when examining secularization. Others have tried to distinguish the various aspects of life, such as at the level of the structure, culture, organization, and the individual (Fenn, 1970; Chaves, 1994). Terms such as laicization, individualization, compartmentalization, differentiation, pluralisation, privatization, and transformation, have been promoted to try to resuscitate the hypothesis (See Section 2 of this chapter for a review and critique of the literature on the secularization hypothesis). I suggest that while some elements of the secularization hypothesis, such as greater individualism in religious choices, and voluntarism in religious affiliation, have occurred in Singapore, in general, modernization has not resulted in the decline of religion. Rather, there seems to be increasing religious revivalism in modern Singapore. The more pertinent question, in my view, is not the decline of religion in modern society, but how to account for its persistence.

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The literature on this issue offers different conclusions. Chen (1977:23, 24), for instance, suggested that the rapid modernization and economic advancement of Singapore has led to the introduction of new values, some compatible, others in conflict, with traditional values. Tham (1985:17) argued that changes in the economic and institutional systems, such as the dominance of the English language in society as well as the development of an open, capitalist economy have resulted in the adoption of western “traditions” and values at the expense of local language, cultures, and moral/ethical values. This had resulted in greater privatization of ritual practices of the various religions and the selective retention of rituals centered on the individual rather than the group. More recent studies, however, have suggested otherwise. Clammer, for example, suggests religious sentiments in Singapore are experiencing a revival rather than decline (1985:52–54). Indeed, there has been a shift, in the Sociology of religion from its extended, and some would argue, debilitating, focus on the secularization hypothesis. The research agenda has largely shifted from the decline of religion to attempts at explaining the persistence of religion. Chapter 4 examines the reasons for the persistence of religion in Singapore. However, it should also be noted that many rituals have undergone a process of simplification and adaptation to make them more applicable to life in modern society. Generally, there is a reduction in the length of time required for the performance of traditional rituals (Tong, 2004). The book explores the various approaches to understanding religious revivalism in Singapore. It suggests that the with so many religions existing in close proximity, and the changes in religious affiliations, with some religions gaining adherents at the expense of other religions, have resulted in an environment of competition between religions. Some religions, such as Taoism and Buddhism, which in the past were non-proselytizing religions, have developed outreach programs to compete with other religions, such as Christianity, to attract new adherents. This has resulted in greater vitality in these religions. Moreover, there have been a process of modifications and adaptations of beliefs and rituals of traditional religions. For example, as noted earlier, Taoism has embarked on a systematic program, including the publication of books and pamphlets, to explain the meaning, and relevance, of the religion in modern Singapore. Within Christianity, particularly in the 1980s and early 1990s, we see the

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advent of a strong charismatic movement, in response to what they view as the ossified nature of mainstream Christianity. This had resulted in the growth of Christianity, particularly among the young. Religious competition between religions has also resulted in religious groups developing strategies, to put it in the language of business, marketing strategies to attract adherents. For example, in the 1960s to the 1980s, the strategy of the church, and para-church groups, focused on attracting young converts. Outreach programs thus centered in the schools and large gospel rallies. In the 1990s, however, realizing that it was reaching saturation point, and that there was a large untapped market of older Chinese, particularly homemakers, there was a shift in the strategy, to attract these members. It is significant to note that this strategy has worked, and between 1990 and 2000, there was a significant growth of Christian adherents among those age 40 to 60 years old. The book critically evaluates the religious economy and rational choice theories regarding the persistence of and revivalism in religion. While acknowledging that there is religious competition among the various religions in Singapore, which has resulted in different religions strategizing, modifying, borrowing and demystifying their beliefs, I argue that the religious economy and rational choice theories fail to appreciate the social and cultural constraints to rational choice, even in a situation of a relatively open religious market. 1.4. Religiosity and Religious Participation In order to further understand the religious situation in Singapore, it is insufficient to merely analyse the changes in religious affiliation. It is equally important to examine the phenomenon of religiosity and religious participation. Due to the multi-religious nature of Singapore society, different religions respond differently to participation in religious rites/customs either at home or in public places of worship. Chinese religionists tend to go to the temple only on special occasions. This does not mean that Buddhists and Taoists are necessarily less religious or fervent than followers of other religions. Rather, their belief systems do not require regular ritual participation at the temple or shrine. Thus religious participation at home is a better indicator of their level of religiosity. Many Chinese still continue to practise their traditional customs and rituals, even if these have been adapted to suit modern conditions. This is an important point of

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the book. Most studies on religious participation were carried out in the West, and generally centred on Christianity. However, given the multitude of religions in Singapore, it is in fact difficult to comparatively analyse religious participation, and religiosity. In this study, several surveys were carried out to measure religiosity and religious participation. The results of these surveys will be analysed in detail in Chapter Four. It will be shown that the level of religious participation remains essentially high, suggesting that modernization and technological development in Singapore society has not resulted in the decline of religion. Rather, we see evidence of religious revivalism among the various religions in Singapore. I will argue that part of the reason for the religious revivalism is a result of the competition among religions in Singapore. In addition, as many of the adherents are recent converts, there is a higher degree of religious fervour and participation in the religion. Even so, there are some significant trends, such as the lower levels of participation among the young concerning traditional Taoists rituals, which will be discussed in some detail. 1.5. Chinese Customs and Ritual Practices While traditional Chinese religions including Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese ancestor worship, have the largest number of adherents in Singapore, a systematic study of these religions is yet to be conducted. Most studies by anthropologists were primarily ethnographic, and focused on the study of particular rituals or religious festivals. While these are important in studying the meanings and significance of the rituals, they do not offer quantitative analysis of the trends and extent of practice of these religions. As part of this book, a quantitative survey was conducted to examine the practice of Chinese religions. The findings are reported in Chapter Five. It will include an analysis of the full range of rituals carried out by the Chinese; including home based rituals, rituals performed at temples and other places of religious worship; participation in Chinese religious festivals, such as Chinese New Year and Qing Ming; as well as rituals associated with the rites of passage, including birth, marriage, and funeral rituals. It will be shown that among those who claim adherence to Chinese religions, the level of religious participation remains essentially high. For example, over 98.9% claim they carry out the rituals associated

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with Chinese New Year, including the giving of hong pao (red packets), eating the reunion dinner, and visits to the home of the parents. I will analyse and account for the high degree of adherence to Chinese traditional practices in modern Singapore. At the same time, it will look into the trends observed. For example, why are some types of rituals gaining popularity while certain other rituals appear to be in decline? How have the performance of rituals been modified to fit into living in a modern society? While the performance of rituals remains high, certain sectors of the population seems to be less committed to ritual performance, particularly among the younger Chinese. Why is this so? What will be the long-term implications if these trends continue? 1.6. Religion and the State A central problem in any multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is to deal with the tension and possible conflicts that may arise due to the coexistence of different religious groups living in close proximity. I will examine the role of the Singapore state in the management of religion. The competing demands of the various religious groups and the changing face of religion in Singapore, with some religions gaining members at the expense of others, meant that there is a constant threat of inter-religious conflicts. Riots which erupted in Singapore in the 1950s and 1960s were often started through the exploitation and incitement of sentiments associated with religion. The state in Singapore, although avowedly secular, takes an active role in the management of religion in Singapore. I will examine the social policies relating to religion in Singapore focusing on the intended and unintended consequences of these policies. It will examine, specifically, the Religious Harmony Act as well as the Religious Knowledge Program, in which all students in Singapore were required to study a religion in school for a period of two years. The stated intentions of these policies were to ensure religious harmony in society, a moral anchor, as well as to provide cultural ballast for its citizens. However, it will be shown that the implementation of these policies were often viewed as means of ‘social control’ of the population, emphasizing secular and utilitarian values aimed at producing a productive workforce and morally upright citizens. In addition, the state, in using religious ideas and values to counter the supposedly amoral condition of its citizens, has resulted

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in unintended consequences for the society, including the revitalization of religion, and placing religion at the center of political debates. This has led to an increase in religious awareness, altering the pattern of religious affiliation, as well as highlighting the differences among religious groups. 2. Review of the Theoretical Literature on Religious Change In the Sociology of religion, much debate has centred on religious change, particularly the issue of secularization. Many have argued that the importance of religion and religious beliefs has declined in one form or another as a result of modernization. However, secularisation should not be seen as a straightforward, linear decline of religious beliefs. Chaves (1994:753) notes that it is not possible to assert that modernity is incompatible with religious belief. The notion that differentiation of religion and its accompanying rationalization will disenchant the world and undermine religious belief has proven to be presumptuous, judging from the resilience of religion. He advocates abandoning religion as the object of secularization and replacing it with religious authority. Secularization can refer to declining religious authority at three levels of analysis. According to Dobbelaere (1987), these three dimensions include laicization, internal secularization and religious disinvolvement. Laicization is the process of differentiation whereby various societal institutions (e.g. education, political, scientific) gain autonomy from the religious sphere. Secularization at this level can be understood as the declining ability for religious elites to exercise authority over other institutional spheres (Chaves, 1994:757). Internal secularization refers to the process by which religious institutions become more aligned towards the secular world. Secularization at this institutional level can be seen as the declining control of the religious authority over organizational resources within the religious sphere. Finally religious dis-involvement is the decline of religious beliefs and practices among individual persons. This is a decrease in the extent to which religious authorities can exert control over individual actions in the religious sphere. Yamane (1997) also suggests that secularization does not necessarily mean the decline of religion. Rather it is the transformation of religion in the face of modernization. He argues that while the

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concept of secularization remains useful, the core insights of the theory have to be remodelled into a ‘neo-secularization’ paradigm which can transcend the apparent antimonies of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ paradigms of secularization. The old paradigm holds that the social significance of religion will decline over time, while the new paradigm challenges this reality of the trend towards secularization (Yamane, 1997:110). For example, sociologists have highlighted the persistence of religion, the proliferation of New Age religions and Charismatic movements. Yamane points out that secularization should be understood as the declining scope of traditional religious authority structures. Secularization occurs when religious authority structures decline in their ability to exert control over societal-level institutions, meso-level organizations and individual beliefs and behaviour (Yamane, 1997:115). Yip’s (2002) study, focusing on the individual rather than structures, supports the neo-secularization thesis expounded by Yamane. She found that there was a lack of influence of religious authority structures on her respondents’ views of spirituality. Instead religious practice and faith were primarily “predicated on the self, rather than traditions and structures” (Yip, 2002:199). Ironically, for the respondents of Yip’s study, this form of ‘neo-secularization’ made it possible for their continued religious participation since their guiding principle was the Self rather than religious authority structures which tended to discriminate against their sexual orientation. This trend towards a privatization of religion has also been highlighted by other researchers (Cox, 1965, Luckmann, 1999 and Lyon, 2000). This process of moral individualism, as pointed out by Houtman and Mascini (2002), has resulted in the decline of Christian churches since the 1960s and the rise of New Age and non-religiosity during the same period in the Netherlands. For example, the number of Dutch people not affiliated with the Christian church has increased from 24% in 1958 to about 60% today (Houtman and Mascini, 2002:455). This however does not accurately reflect a tendency towards secularization in Dutch society as there has been a significant increase in ‘alternative religions’ such as New Age. The authors argue that the thesis of individualization is instrumental in understanding religious change, specifically the movement towards New Age religions and away from the traditional religions such as Christianity. This thesis of individualization held that traditional Christianity has been eroded by a more or less “privatized” version of religion

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which is characterized by an “emphasis on self-expression, self-actualization, and individual freedom” (Houtman & Mascini, 2002:458). In the case of the New Agers, for example, the Self is the principal moral authority, with individual spiritual development being the main theme while religious organizations, canonized dogmas are absent. From their study on 1848 Dutch, Houtman and Mascini (2002:468) found that an increase in moral individualism undermines the church but can also stimulate the growth of “post-traditional types of religions”, among which New Age is prominent. The study also found that besides religious change, moral individualization also resulted in a greater degree of non-religiosity. For this study, the key question is that these studies were primarily focused on Christianity, which in a sense, has the theological underpinnings for it to become an individualized religion. Does this apply to other religious traditions, such as Taoism and Hinduism, which are fundamentally family religions, with little focus on the individual level? How do these religions in Singapore react to the forces of modernity? Voyé (1999), working on Catholicism in Europe, suggests that, on the one hand, it can be seen as heading towards secularization as the number of church-goers has decreased. However, there seems to be a contradictory tendency, as many individuals seem to set up some kind of “religious patchwork”, using existing resources which they utilize according to their personal needs, views and experiences (Voyé, 1999:275). Moreover, as Stark points out, there is a phenomenon of ‘subjective religiousness’ whereby individuals demonstrate high levels of belief in God and general tenets of faith but have relatively low levels of church attendance (Stark, 1999:264). This attests to the fact that religion has not become obsolete. However, the tendency towards a privatization of religion has meant that institutional religion is losing its capacity to exercise authority on public affairs. Voyé argues that institutional religions such as Catholicism can no longer impose its views, doctrines or morals in public affairs or on individuals who increasingly value religious autonomy. Thus, in order to remain relevant to society, churches or religious actors have to offer themselves as a resource for other systems, (notably in the political and juridical fields). For example, the opinions of religious actors are often sought for bio-ethical debates such as abortion, euthanasia and genetic manipulation. However, Voyé claims that

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religious actors have had to modify its discourse and universalize its doctrines as general human values in order to gain widespread acceptance and credibility. Consequently, the Church has lost its unique identity and is becoming “undifferentiated from both other religious and agnostic or atheistic perspectives” (Voyé, 1999:287). To Dekker (1995:80), the changing nature of religious institutions may be factors in the process of secularization, but only if they result in further secularization on the individual and societal level. Changes at the institutional level do not constitute secularization in itself although many sociologists view religious change, transformation or accommodation of religious institutions as a dimension or form of secularization. Dekker’s proposition stems from his study of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (RCN), the second largest Protestant Church in the Netherlands. In the 1950s, the RCN was an orthodox church where members formed a close community and participated in Christian organizations. However, over the last few decades, the RCN has undergone drastic change, in tandem with Dutch society. According to Dekker (1995:82), since the 1960s, Dutch society has experienced significant cultural change characterized by greater democratization, growing individualization, an emphasis on self-determination and self-development, a strong pursuit of greater equality between social groups and between sexes, increasing acceptance of alternative sexual relationships and partnerships, and greater acceptance of abortion and euthanasia. As a result of these changes, the RCN slowly became more open and adapted to the alterations in society. Influenced by a more open Dutch society, the Church underwent several important changes. These included a less hierarchical organization with greater emphasis on laymen co-operation, less fundamental interpretation of the Bible, declining emphasis on human dependence on God and increasing stress on human activity in Church doctrine. The Church also toned down its authoritarian stance and allowed members the freedom to act according to their own conscience. As a result, the religious life of the RCN members has changed to one which is less orthodox and more open. This has affected many members to abandon the church, weakening their involvement, and leaving the Church’s distinct identity diluted. Thus, the changes by the Church can stimulate the process of secularization. It has led to a decreasing religious involvement among members which can be seen as secularization on the individual level.

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By adjusting to the process of differentiation experienced in society, the Church has supported the privatization of religion. This, according to Dekker would lead to secularization on a societal level as it diminished the influence of religion (Dekker, 1995:86). However, Dekker states that the adaptation undergone by the Church need not necessarily amount to secularization since the RCN is still a lively church where religion is important. He argues that the Church’s ability to adapt has enabled many members to remain faithful to a Church which has a better fit with modern society. In fact, the changes have accelerated and intensified their religious commitment (Dekker, 1995:85) Therefore, the adaptation does not necessarily signal secularization but may actually stimulate religious participation as it can bring about a “revitalization of the faith of people” (Dekker, 1995:86). Thus, although the adaptation by the Church may seem to be a secularizing force, Dekker argues that it is more appropriate to view this accommodation as a response to the secularization experienced on the individual and societal levels. Such a response could reinforce the secularization process but it may also act as a counter-balance to secularization (Dekker, 1995:86). It has been argued that the interest in the secularization thesis, which has dominated the Sociology of religion, has had a debilitating effect on the field. Classical secularization hypothesis, which postulates the decline of religion in the face of modernity has been regarded as simplistic and come under scathing attack. For example, Haddon and Shupe (1985) are sceptical about the efficaciousness of the secularization theory, pointing to the continual role of religion in the modern world. This had led the defenders of the secularization hypothesis, including Wilson (1985) and Dobbelaere (1987), to refine and tweak the thesis, such as emphasizing individualism, compartmentalization, religious authority, etc., to try to keep the idea of religious secularization alive. However, in recent years, there has been a shift away from secularization to attempts to explain the persistence of religion. For example, drawing on rational choice theory, a new paradigm in the sociological study of religion has emerged. This paradigm views religious institutions as a competing market place. Like Berger (1967), Finke and Stark apply an explicit market model to religious organizations. Their approach is to view religious institutions as ‘religious economies’. These function like commercial economies which consist of a market and a set of firms seeking to serve that market (Finke &

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Stark, 1988:42). They argue that under circumstances of non-regulation and non-intervention by the state, pluralism will flourish in these religious economies. It follows that a larger variety of religious bodies will, together, be able to meet the demands of a much larger proportion of the population than may be the case where only one or few faiths are available. In a situation of pluralism, the different religious faiths may maximize their efforts to attract adherents. Thus, the greater the pluralism, the higher the chances of religious participation by individuals. For researchers such as Finke and Stark who embrace a religious economy model, increased urbanization and modernization in America has lead to religious plurality. They argue that this, in turn has led to increased religious participation. From the data they examined, Finke and Stark found that cities had a greater church adherence rate than the surrounding small villages and hinterlands. This, they explained could be attributed to practical reasons. For example, churches in the city tended to be more accessible. The lower population density in rural areas made it difficult to sustain many churches and people usually needed to travel relatively long distances to reach them. This inconvenience could reduce churchgoers’ attendance rates. Cities also offered a greater variety of churches with urbanites more exposed to intensive recruitment efforts. Religious diversity not only increased religious participation by appealing to a broad section of the population, it also resulted in increased competition, an aggressive recruitment and retentive techniques. One example given was the Sunday school initiated by Protestants as an educational programme for children as well as a movement designed to recruit adult members and renew the commitment of current membership. Thus they argue that greater levels of urbanism and hence pluralism do not lead to increased secularization and a decline in religion. Instead the religious pluralism found in many cities translates into a greater religious adherence. Their study was based on a 1906 census report on religious life in the US. This period was chosen because of the explosive growth of American cities at the turn of the century. However, Finke & Stark’s “supply side” theory of religious organizations has had its fair share of criticisms. Breault highlights a 1982 report on church membership statistics for religious bodies in the US which showed a negative relationship between religious pluralism and religious participation even though the variables used in both studies were equivalent. He argues that the method-

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ological considerations in Finke and Stark’s paper resulted in inaccuracies. Breault proposed that religious pluralism would lead to religious participation. He further argued that religious pluralism is differentially effective in undermining religion. In places where there were predominantly conservative religious groups, religious pluralism would be less destructive since these denominations would probably reject other religious groups. However, where liberal denominations predominate, pluralism will have a greater effect and religious participation will be lower (Breault, 1989:1051). Unfortunately Breault stops short at the hypothesis. Based on their assessment of various large-scale studies as well as historical data mainly from Western Europe and North America, Chaves & Gorski (2001) refute Finke & Stark’s theory. Chaves and Gorksi argue that religious pluralism can only be positively correlated to religious participation in a limited number of contexts. Therefore they suggest exploring the social, cultural and institutional arrangements that are partly responsible for religious pluralism’s consequences for religious vitality (Chaves & Gorski, 2001:279). In their research Sherkat and Wilson have attempted to understand the social and cultural factors involved in religious change and apostasy. They argue that the new paradigm which views religious institutions as operating within an open religious market is inherently flawed because it has neglected the way in which religious choices are socially structured. Sherkat and Wilson suggest that religious choices are socially structured “(1) when the utility an individual derives from consuming a good is tied to the perceived effects of that consumption on others; and (2) when others reward or punish consumption or non-consumption of particular religious goods” (Sherkat and Wilson, 1995:999). Thus, although religious markets are portrayed as operating in an open market, one cannot discount the effects of social and cultural constraints imposed on individuals. By taking into account religious preferences and social constraints on choice, they claim their efforts reflect the growing efforts of structural sociology to link individual agency to social structures (Sherkat & Wilson, 1995:1013). As can be observed, most of the research done on religious change has been drawn from Western experiences. Can these ideas be transplanted to an Asian context? According to Bremen (1995), the reproduction of secularization and religious change in Asia does not necessarily mean the demise of its traditional religious establishments.

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It does however imply the importation of new values and ideas that compete with the established religions, thus possibly prompting religious revivalisms as nationalist expressions against Western secularization. Bremen (1995:8) argues that Asian modernization has produced new middle classes that look to the West for secular and rational inspiration but have not forsaken their traditions. Giving the example of Japan, Bremen points out that there has been an erosion of pre-industrial religious practices. However, Japanese society remains steeped in religious belief, with new forms of religious practices abounding in every city in Japan (Bremen, 1995:4). In Singapore as well, religious participation, rituals and customs continue to be important for most people. However, this does not mean that Singapore has not experienced religious change. On the contrary, as highlighted in the above section, Singapore has seen a considerable increase in religious switching. 3. Review of the Literature on Sociology of Religion in Singapore Despite the importance of religion in Singapore, only a relatively small number of studies have been done. Even these suffer from several shortcomings. Firstly, most of the studies were based on ethnographic fieldwork. These include works by Babb (1955, 1976), Ananda Rajah (1976), and Manokara (1979) on Hinduism, Elliot (1955), Wee (1976), and Tong (1986) on Buddhism and Chinese Religions, Abdul Rahman (1976) and Jalil Miswadi (1979) on Islam, and Doraisamy (1985), Chua (1982), and Hinton (1985) on Christianity. Secondly, many studies have focussed on the historical aspects, as exemplified by works of Nathan (1986) on the Jews, Lee (1963) on the Catholic Church and Greer (1959) on the Presbyterians. While these analyses based on qualitative methods are important, contributing to an understanding of the processes and inner dynamics of the various religions, they do not provide statistical data which can be generalised for the whole population. Furthermore, as most of these studies concentrated on specific religions, this has led to a limited understanding of religion in Singapore from a comparative perspective. Due to the rapid changes that have occurred in Singapore society, and commensurably in religious affiliations, a comparative analysis, especially of inter-religious relations, is needed for a fuller under-

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standing of the religious picture in Singapore. Given the distinct nature of each of the major religions, this review will offer a comprehensive analysis of each of the major religions—namely traditional Chinese religion, Islam, Hinduism and finally Christianity. 3.1. Chinese Religion Until recently, Chinese religion was the dominant religion, at least in terms of the number of adherents, in Singapore society. Thus, it is not surprising that studies on Chinese religion constitute the main bulk of research on religion in Singapore. There are, however, several major gaps in the literature. A systematic and comprehensive study on Chinese religion in Singapore is still unavailable. Early studies on the subject, written mainly in Chinese, dealt primarily with Chinese customary practices and festivals. For example, Han Wai Toon (1940) wrote on the Tuapekong cult in Singapore and Chu Chih Chin (1950) described rituals surrounding Tien Fei, the Chinese sea goddess. The Journal of South Seas Society also published articles on Chinese religions regularly. The method used tended to be casestudies of rituals. One of the problems of these early studies was the fact that they were written by non-anthropologists and tended to be descriptive, unsystematic, and contained many personal opinions and anecdotes. Marjorie Topley was one of the first professional anthropologists to conduct systematic fieldwork in Singapore. She published a series of articles on a wide variety of topics, ranging from the curing of illness, birth rituals to vegetarian houses. For example, in Chinese Women Vegetarian Houses in Singapore (1954b), Topley provided detailed ethnographic descriptions of a small, but significant group of women who intentionally chose not to marry but organized themselves on a ‘tribal’ basis, as “vegetarian houses”. Using a functional perspective, she saw vegetarian houses as satisfying the need for security in old age, that is, they are basically “death benefit” societies for arranging funerals, maintaining burial grounds and looking after the “soul tablets”. One of her more interesting observations is the belief among these women that by repeating the name of ‘Amida’ on their deathbeds, they are guaranteed rebirth, in the assurance of becoming men, (as there are no women in the ‘Perfect Land’). The gender symbolism is significant but, unfortunately, Topley did not take the analysis any further. In fact, one of the features of Topley’s work was the fine,

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detailed descriptions, to the extent of an itemized description and count of food and other offerings made to the spirits. However, her work lacked systematic analysis, other than the occasional functionalist statements. Even so, they are useful and important documentation of the religious practices of the Chinese in early Singapore and provide a comparative basis for more recent work. For example, in Chinese Religion and Religious Institutions in Singapore (1956), Topley described and categorized existing Chinese religious institutions, including temples, monasteries, nunneries, vegetarian houses, clan temples, etc. In addition, she provides a broad-based, if brief, description of the historical development of Chinese religion and the origins of sectarian movements such as the Pure-Land and Chan Buddhism. In the same vein, Topley wrote on rituals, mythology (1951) and charms. Further contributions to the early study of Chinese religion in Singapore can be found in the work of Leon Comber. Although not an academic by training, but an officer in the Government of the Federation of Malaya, he was a keen observer of Chinese religious rituals and practices and published several books on Chinese religion in Singapore in the 1950’s and 60’s. For example, Chinese Ancestor Worship in Malaya (1954) provided a description of Chinese funerary rituals, from the preparation for the journey to the final mourning rites. It includes a simple overview of the religious aspects of Chinese society. The list of 20 plates is particularly useful archival material. However, Comber’s description of a single funeral did not take into account regional and dialect variations or gender differentiation; features which are important to Chinese funerals. The book appeals to a popular audience and has gone into several reprints. However it is weak on scholarship and can best be described as more for laymen reading rather than scholars. This is true for his other book, Chinese Temples in Singapore (1958), which is a short description of various temples in Singapore, including famous temples like the Thiam Hock Keng in Telok Ayer, the Shuang Lin Temple in Kim Keat Road; and lesser known temples like the Tou Mu Kung in Serangoon and Lin Shan Min in Bukit Timah Road. In addition, Comber devoted space to a discussion of the popular origins of various gods, such as Kuanyin, Kuankung, Santaizi and Toa Pek Kong, which he draws from secondary sources. Comber estimated that in 1957, there were an estimated 500 temples in Singapore; a figure that is difficult to ascertain in terms of accuracy, as he does not define what he considered

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to be a temple. Moreover, the nature of Chinese religion suggests that many temples may be “home-based”, and not registered. In contrast to Comber’s largely “anecdotal methods”, Elliot (1955) provided the most systematic account to date of spirit-medium cults in Singapore. He gave a vivid description of the theology and rituals (with accompanying illustrations) of the various types of spiritmedium cults, and delved into divination, myths and theatre. It also included a section on Sino-Malay cults as well as his assessment of the future of spirit mediumship in Singapore. A reader will benefit from Elliot’s systematic and detailed discussion of the rituals, religious specialists, ritual paraphernalia and the organizational structure of Chinese spirit mediumship. He suggests that spirit mediumship is essentially temple-based, as a medium cannot operate easily without the help of other individuals or premises approximating a temple. Elliot’s study has been criticized to gloss over the role of systematized religion, in that what is meant by systematized religion in the context of Chinese religion is not clearly spelled out. It is true that Elliot only examined spirit-cults, a form of sectarian movements in Chinese religion and does not deal with the relationship between spirit-cults, an ad-hoc ‘magical’ practice of Chinese religion with the larger religious orientation of the Chinese. In a separate paper, the Significance of Religion among the Overseas Chinese (1951), Elliot wrote a short, impressionistic paper on changes in the religious practices of the Chinese in Singapore. He argued that the urban nature of Singapore society had led to changes in kinship and social organizational patterns, which had resulted in changes to religious practices. In addition, the immigrant nature of the Chinese has led to an attenuation of the cult of ancestor worship. He noted the impact of a modernizing Singapore on Chinese religion, such as the “ignorance of the young regarding Chinese religious practices and the trend”, which became obvious in the 1970’s, towards the increasing conversion to Christianity. Elliot’s work on spirit-cults has become the standard reference for scholars working on sectarianism, and has led a wide range of papers on the topic. One of the most important scholars of this period is Maurice Freedman who has made an immense contribution to Sinology and to Chinese religion in particular. He is the author of three books on the Chinese: a study of family and kinship in Singapore (1955) and two studies of lineage organizations in Southeastern China (1965,

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1966). His more important articles were later compiled into a single volume edited by G. William Skinner.8 Freedman was primarily interested in the relationship between kinship and religion: “It is clear that both the domestic and hall cults throw certain organizational principles of lineage into relief and expressed ideas central to the competition within, and the unity of the lineage communities” (1966:118). He stressed the role of filial piety in the understanding of Chinese ancestor worship: “Filial piety is a duty for the children, who owe their parents obedience for the gift of life. A man’s loyalty to the interests and wishes of his father is supposed to outweigh all other loyalties and attachments. The supreme act of filial piety owed by the sons is the performance of the mortuary and funeral ceremonies for the parents. These ceremonies are the first step in the transformation of parents into ancestor spirits, and the worship of the ancestors is in essence, the ritualization of filial piety” (1965:148). Freedman’s interest is primarily sociological, to the degree that he tries to use ethnographic facts to specify relevant structural principles and examines how those rules and principles shape social interaction. His approach is basically functionalist, influenced by the works of Evans-Pritchard and Meyer Fortes. Freedman has had a profound influence on the direction of research in sinological anthropology, through his reformulation of intellectual issues surrounding the study of the Chinese. One major criticism of Freedman is that his conclusions, because they are reconstructions based on secondary published literature, are often too rigid and do not reflect social reality or the various re-combinations that are actually found. Except for his work in Singapore and a short stay in Hong Kong, he himself did very little fieldwork. His study Lineage Organizations in Southeastern China, has been praised by Skinner as recreating social institutions from myriad facts and clues. It also reveals “arm-chair anthropology” has its inherent problems and perhaps Freedman’s most important contribution may be that he raises serious intellectual issues that are confirmed or revised by later scholars based on more accurate ethnographic information. 8 Given the scope and eclecticity of Freedman’s idea, I will be laying out the general themes of his work, rather than a book-by-book review. He was interested, in varying degrees, in economics, law, politics and ethnicity. I will, however, concentrate on his work on religion, being aware that given the interrelatedness of his ideas, I may be doing him injustice.

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It is clear that these early studies, with a few exceptions, are largely descriptive. In addition, they were primarily undertaken by anthropologists rather than sociologists. Sociologists did not really become interested in religion in Singapore until the 1970’s and 1980’s. Thus, much of the material was based on fieldwork; case studies of particular rituals. They are important in providing a comparative baseline for future research. Unfortunately, there are no broad strokes of the painter’s brush in documenting the practices of the early Chinese, in the tradition of DeGroot (1892–1910) and his massive six volume work on the religion of the Chinese in Xiamen, or Justus Doolittle’s (1865) three volumes on the life of the Chinese. As such, we have only snapshots of ritual life in Singapore. This has had an adverse effect on present-day study of Chinese religion. For example, it is generally believed that there has been a decline in the practice of traditional Chinese rituals in modern Singapore. But, without a reference point, it is difficult to assess the extent of the decline or whether it is only a myth. In fact, it is only in recent years that quantitative surveys have been conducted to assess religious trends in Singapore society. The study of particular rituals or religious organizations by anthropologists has continued. For example, the interest generated by Elliot’s examination of spirit mediumship has resulted in several studies on sectarian spirit-cult activities. Heinz (1983) studied the practice of ‘planchette-writing’ in Singapore. Her fieldwork, based primarily on the study of the World Red Swastika Society, looked at the history and development of this organization. She concluded that while the “structural-symbolic” dimensions, by which I think she meant the rituals and beliefs of this group, have not changed, the socio-cultural dimensions have. Tong (1989) also examined the idea of spirit mediumship focusing on how the sectarian practice of Chinese mediumship revealed the nature of the relationship between power and knowledge in Chinese society, rather than on the belief and rituals of spirit mediumship. Drawing on several sources, including Elliot, Freedman and Ju, as well as participant fieldwork, he argued that the Chinese idea of power is linked to the control of rituals as well as a body of sacred knowledge that is only available to the religious specialists. It is often argued that Confucianism is not a religion, but a philosophical system. Leo and Clammer (1983), however, suggested that Confucius has and can become a component of syncretic folk religion through his incorporation as a specific deity or shen in the

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Chinese religious pantheon. They argued that the origins of religious Confucianism resulted when a spirit medium was possessed by a spirit who claimed to be Confucius, passing through Singapore on a world tour to visit his students. Consequent to this possession, there was the development of “Confucian” priests. These temples are believed to be especially efficacious for getting good examination results if offerings of food and money were made to them. Thus, Leo and Clammer argued that Confucianism should not be regarded as a simple homogenous set of beliefs, and that, as in this case, the division between philosophy and religion is rarely clear in Chinese thought. However they did not provide sufficient evidence whether it is part of the institutional religion or merely the result of an enterprising spirit-medium. It should be noted that spirit-mediums invoke a large variety of deities/gods for their purposes, with Chinese temples having images of the Virgin Mary, even spirit possessions by Jesus Christ. These, however, are ad-hoc in nature and do not necessarily mean that these deities/gods having entered the Chinese pantheon or religious ideology. More recent works on Chinese religion have continued on this trajectory of ethnographic, anthropological approach. One of these is Vivienne Wee’s research on the rituals and beliefs of the Chinese. Wee (1976) was centrally concerned with the disparity between “canonical” and “practiced” religion. Noting that the label “Buddhism” used in Singapore did not correspond with those prescribed in Buddhist literature, but related to a range of beliefs tied to the syncretic Chinese religions (which included Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, ancestor worship and folk beliefs), Wee set up a classification of the various religious categories. She used factors such as religious personnel, temple architecture, social organization, theology and belief systems. Buddhism in Singapore was a fluid and dynamic term which encompasses canonical Theravada and Mahayana forms as well as Chinese folk religions. While this syncretism was not unique to Singapore and probably true of all societies with a history of Chinese emigration, Singapore Buddhism is interestingly linked to changes in Singapore society. This published paper is part of a larger thesis submitted to the University of Singapore for an M.A. and remains unpublished. In it, Wee (1976) attempts to set out the organizing principles of the ritual and belief systems of Chinese religion.

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While Wee’s treatment was more general, Tong (1986; 2004) examined a specific aspect of Chinese religion, the idea of Chinese death rituals. He was fascinated by the readiness of a purportedly pragmatic people to incur huge expenses in the enactment of death rituals. Based on fieldwork, Tong used a cultural analysis of the symbols of death—flesh, blood, bones, souls, time, numbers, food and money— allowing for the Chinese perception of death and their coping with its eventuality. An examination of the interrelationship between death rituals and the socio-economic value system of Chinese society, particularly kinship and economic network, revealed a whole range of organizing principles that operate within the larger social context. Tong argued that no single factor can exclusively account for the desire to enact elaborate death rituals. Instead, a range of factors; including the observance of rules of descent, subscription to ethical imperatives, sense of duty and obligations, desire for social conformity, fulfilment of calculated self-interest, elevation of social status, and the management of death pollution; combine in varying degrees, to act upon the Chinese to ensure ritual performance. The explanation lies in a combination of both ideal and material interests, a fine balance between the desire for personal benefits and a desire for the “good” society. Most studies on Chinese religion have used anthropological methods, which emphasize participant observation and is most comfortable when dealing with closed homogenous groups or bounded religious rituals. Except for Wee (1977) and Tong (2004), there were few attempts to relate the specific focus of the particular set of rituals to the wider arena of Chinese religion or the larger issue of Chinese culture and society. In this sense, we have not made much progress from the seminal works of Maurice Freedman. While Freedman himself did little fieldwork, he attempted broad theoretical generalizations about Chinese religion and culture which are still waiting to be tested with empirical evidence. Questions regarding the nature and boundaries of Chinese religion and the relationship between folk and canonical religions remain unanswered. The present book seeks to ameliorate some of these shortcomings by providing a comprehensive study of religion on Singapore, from both a historical perspective as well as comparative quantitative data to track the trends and changes in religion that have occurred in Singapore.

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Most studies have tended to concentrate on religion in Singapore. How these religions were adapted and transformed, and how they differ from practices in China, again remains unanswered. This is especially critical, given the transplanting of religion from China, and its transformation in Singapore. In this book, I will seek to provide a comparative analysis of religion and religious change of Chinese religion in Asia, including data on China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Malaysia; countries with significant Chinese populations, to examine the nature of religion and religious change compared to Singapore. In addition, I will analyze the religious situation in Korea, the only other Asian country with a significant growth in the number of Christians, over 20% of the population, to examine whether the same patterns and trends observed in Singapore are similar to that happening in Korea. Chinese religion is of course marked by pluralism. It is not simply the three great traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism, but also the folk beliefs, customs and ancestor worship of the populace. Moreover, within Buddhism for example, we find many sects, including Mahayana, Theravada, Pure Land and Chan coexisting and intermingling in Singapore society. Yet, a study of the interrelationship and interaction of these various traditions to come up with an overview of Chinese religion in Singapore is still being awaited. In this book, I will also look at the religious pluralism within each religious tradition, including the rise of sectarianism in Chinese religions as well as the growing popularity of new religions, such as Soka Gakkai Buddhism in Singapore. 3.2. Islam There are significant gaps in the study of Islam in Singapore. With its long history in Singapore and almost 400 thousand believers today, there are, in fact, very few studies of Islam. The majority of studies on Malay society have concentrated on kinship, marriage or economic aspects of Malay society. Of course, given the relationship between religion, culture, and politics for the Muslims, most studies, invariably, if often indirectly, make reference to Islam in Singapore [see, for example, Djamour (1959), Li (1986).] While Djamour was primarily interested in Malay kinship and marriage, she devoted a section to Islam. One of her more interesting findings was that while a great many Malays prefer Islam, only a small proportion of Malays

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pray five times a day or fasted for the whole month of Ramadan (Djamour, 1959:15). Unfortunately, she did not analytically pursue this discrepancy between stated belief and actual behaviour. Similarly, she noted that for the Malays in Singapore, while there was strict adherence to taboos regarding eating pork and alcohol; in actual practice, religious adherence is comparatively mild, compared to the Malay States (present Malaysia), Arabia and Middle-Eastern countries. For example, she claimed that only a handful of believers understood the meaning of prayer and the precepts of Islam. Furthermore, the knowledge of the Quranic tradition was rudimentary and attendance at mosques was generally low (Djamour, 1959:16). However, it should be pointed out that Djamour did not provide any figures or other empirical evidences to support these observations. One of the early works that treats Malay religion directly was Blagden’s Notes on Folk-lore and Popular Religion of the Malays (1900). Blagden was a colonial civil servant, not an anthropologist who provided an impressionistic idea of folk practices in the 1900’s. He made a distinction between folk beliefs (adat) and Islam (at that time, termed by colonial administrators as Muhammaden) and proceeded to document the various types of folk beliefs, including the beliefs in jin, the role of the kramat and religious functionaries like the pawang and the taboos associated with agriculture. Making a clear demarcation between traditional beliefs (adat) and canonical Islam, he declared that he found it strange that the Malays do not comprehend the obvious inconsistencies between their professed religion and traditional ritual behaviour. It should be noted that most studies on the relationship between traditional beliefs and canonical religion have tended to see them as two separate systems. This is true even for more recent studies. Theoretical developments in the study of religion (see Kirsch 1976), however, no longer see the two as separate, rather focusing on continuities and interrelationships. Another area of interest has been on Islamic law, particularly the analysis of differences between Islamic and British laws, as well as the administration of Muslim Laws in Singapore. For example, Djamour described the various types of Muslim divorces, including cherai biasa (ordinary divorce), talak (divorce in which a spouse breaks the condition of marriage), khula (divorce by redemption), fasah ( judicial dissolution of marriage) as well as rojo (revocation of divorce). She also discussed the background of the Shariah Court and the appointments of kathis. Djamour pointed to the problem of high

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divorce rates (59.9% in 1950) and suggested that part of the explanation was related to the nature of Muslim religion/culture; especially the practice of a man’s right to repudiate wives and the weakness of the institutions of marriage and the family (Djamour, 1959:179). Moreover, she suggested that reforms were difficult because of resistance from traditional religious leaders who used Islam to legitimize their position regarding polygyny and divorce, as well as the difficulties in applying the Women’s Charter. Interestingly, divorce rates started to decline rapidly after the 1960’s, (25.7% in 1961) partly through the government’s intervention through the enactment of the 1957 Ordinance regulating the Shariah Court. While Djamour adopted a sociological approach, Hooker (1984) approached the issue of religion and law from a more legalistic perspective. In Islamic Law in Southeast Asia, Hooker devoted a chapter to the Straits Settlements and Singapore. As can be deduced from the title, the work is primarily historical. But the study is sociologically interesting as it shows the relationship between law and society. Hooker began with the premise that one cannot understand Islamic laws in Singapore without seeing its historical and social linkages to the British (colonial) legal system. He then proceeded to cite a series of case laws to demonstrate the inconsistencies between British and Islamic laws and the inconsistent interpretations given by the British courts. To him, the problem arose because both sets of laws were exclusivist: Islam is an exclusive religion and its laws are equally exclusive; indeed, the Sharia is at the heart of Islam and it can be nothing other than exclusive (Hooker, 1984:118).

Given this exclusivity, he asked, “How does one ascertain the proper law to decide a conflict of principles between the tenets of Islam and the laws of the State?” The simple answer was that there is none. He then examines the celebrated Hertogh case where a conflict in the ideological bases of two sets of laws had resulted in riots and the loss of lives. This study, while primarily historical in nature and often couched in legalistic terminologies, provides interesting insights on Islam and society in Singapore. This trajectory is continued by Siddique (1986) who discussed the institutionalization of Islam in Singapore through laws such as the Administration of Muslim Law Act (1966) and the setting up of the Maglis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) in 1968. Taking a broader

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historical-sociological perspective, she saw these developments as stages in the evolution of Muslim legal and bureaucratic history in Singapore. Like Djamour and Hooker, Siddique pointed to the demarcation and conflict between Muslim substantive laws ( fiqh) and British Law. She saw several important markers in the development of Muslim laws in Singapore: • the Ordinance of 1957, • the setting up of the Administration of Muslim Law Act (ALMA) and MUIS in the late1960’s, • the appointment of a Mufti who heads the Fatwa Committee, • the establishment of Mendaki, • the centralization of pilgrimage (1975) and finally, • the setting up the Mosque Building Fund to erect new mosques in HDB New Towns. Another area of research is on Islamic reformism. Peacock (1978) analyzed Muslim reformism as part of a larger study on reformism in Southeast Asia. Using a survey questionnaire,9 he sought to understand the nature and extent of the Kaum Muda movement, particularly groups like the Muhammadijahs and Ahmadiyya. He arrived at several interesting findings including the fact that while Singapore Muslims generally adhered to the main pillars of the faith, Islamic reformism was not a prominent organized movement; and that Singapore Muslims tended to retain customs, such as the ideas relating to semangat (spiritual energy), kramats (holy shrines) and hantus (ghosts and spirits) in their Islamic beliefs. In addition, Peacock discussed the tension between Islamic reformers and the bureaucrats and traditional religious leaders. Peacock’s study is significant because he attempted a quantitative analysis of Islam in Singapore. The study, however, suffers from poor research methodology as well as his emphasis on psychological explanations. Peacock does not properly distinguish between “reformism” and “progressivism”. Hence failing to explain why Singapore Malays do not display progressivism as might be expected from their education and urbanity whereas in Kedah, Malaysia, the reverse is true.

9 Peacock’s sample is a non-probability quota sample of about 400 Muslim households and 481 students.

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Another area of research that has dominated the study of Islam in Singapore is the relationship between culture and economic development, in particular the various theories and explanations to account for the supposed economic backwardness of the Malays (See, for example, Alatas, 1977; Bedlington, 1974; Betts, 1975; Clammer, 1978b). The most recent study in this debate is Li (1986). She explored the relationship between forms of cultural practices in the Malay household and community and the economic structure of Singapore. It is a detailed historical ethnography that tries to integrate both cultural and materialist explanations. The majority of studies in Singapore have tended to fuse religion, culture, and community into a single category. While it is true that Islam cannot be bounded as a “religion” in the narrow sense of the term, as a set of doctrines binding the individual (Milner 1983), it is also necessary to examine religion as an independent system first, and then look at its relationship with identity, culture and community. This is particularly relevant, given the rapid social changes and modernization that has occurred in Singapore society. Most studies of Islam in Singapore have normally been part of a larger study of Islam in Southeast Asia (for example Hooker 1983, Peacock 1978). As such, the treatment is, by necessity, brief, given the more dynamic interest in the larger Muslim societies of Malaysia and Indonesia; as well as problems of Islamic resurgence in Southern Thailand and the Philippines. There is a considerable body of literature on Islam in these countries.10 Islam, its history, development and ideology, to quote Siddique, is unique, with its own set of historical circumstances. Muslims in Singapore are a minority, compared to Malaysia and Indonesia. This fact alone suggests that Islam and its relationship to society in Singapore must be different. A comprehensive study of Islam in Singapore, looking at its historical development, theology, rituals, and its relations to the state and society, is sorely needed. Given the rapid social changes in Singapore society, the changes in Islamic beliefs, its rituals and the linkages with the Malay community, warrant further investigation. What is the impact of mod10 For example, it is not coincidental that the large and excellent collection of papers, Reading in Islam in Southeast Asia, edited and published in Singapore, does not have a single paper on Islam in Singapore. Even Kampuchea and Vietnam warrant chapters (See Hooker, 1983).

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ernization on the traditional religious beliefs? How has urban renewal and the disappearance of the kampong affected Muslim identity and religion? If, as Peacock argued, Malays idealized communal solidarity, personified in the village; then how has the disappearance of these villages in Singapore affected communal solidarity? It is clear that there are tensions within the Malay community; traditionalists versus reformists, fundamentalists versus moderates, and English-educated versus the Malay educated. Tong (1989) for example, suggested that in Singapore, a distinction should be made between fundamentalism and radicalism. However, very little is known about the degree and extent of religious fundamentalism and sectarianism in Singapore. Islam can become the arena where the social tensions are contested and revealed. Again, these warrant further study and analysis. 3.3. Hinduism The literature on Hinduism in Singapore is sparse and sporadic. Of the four religions surveyed, it has received the least treatment. In fact, there is probably more unpublished (but available) material, in the form of academic exercises and master’s theses than published works. (See for example, Ananda Rajah, 1976 and Sinha, 1987/88). One of the earliest publications available was in the National Geographic Magazine, on the Fire-Walking (Timithi ) ceremony (Lewis, 1931). Another early work is Mialaret (1969) on Hindu temples in Singapore. These are primarily descriptive pieces with little sociological analysis. The first available sociological work is by Babb (1974, 1975a, 1975b, 1976) who wrote on Hindu rituals in Singapore. An anthropologist by training, he authored four important papers, including Walking on Flowers (1975a), Mediumship (1974), Thaipusam (1975b), and a broader paper on Patterns of Hinduism in Singapore (1976), where he examined the evolving features of Hinduism in Singapore and how a basically agrarian religion adapted to a highly urbanized, rapidly changing social environment. He suggested that the diversity of Hindu traditions in Singapore is linked to the different ethnic and regional backgrounds of the migrant Indians. As expected, Babb found that Hinduism in Singapore is very different from the one in India. While there is still segregation between the northern and southern Indians in their patterns of religious practices (mostly due to linguistic and philosophical differences)

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he noted that Singapore society itself has been a constraining influence on Hinduism. Moreover, caste or caste hierarchy was de-emphasized, especially during the performance of religious rituals. Despite these changes, Hindu rituals still served important functions for the Indians in Singapore. Interestingly, he found that the practice of taking vows and the reliance on spirit mediums were still deeply entrenched in Singapore, among both the young and the old. In a separate paper, he looked specifically at Hindu mediumship through a comparison of four spirit-medium temples. In a sense, it is not an ethnographic study; there is little description of the temples or rituals, but rather a study of the variations in ritual ideology. There are two main themes in the paper. Firstly, Babb suggested that the most salient feature of Hindu mediumship fitted the broader patterns of Hindu beliefs and practices, that is, the highly particularized religious interests of individuals and the abstract conceptions of divine power found in spirit mediumship were found in the religious system of Hinduism as a whole. While it is true that the ideology of mediumship must invariably be related to Hinduism, I am not convinced that the two fit exactly. Clearly, mediumship falls into the realm of magic and while the recent literature on the relationship between magic and religion suggests new ways of looking at the problem, the fit is not simple; as they have different starting points (see Tambiah 1992). This problem becomes obvious when Babb argued that, like Hinduism, mediums have temples. Medium temples are mostly, periphery to the mainstream temples of Hinduism in Singapore, and perform quite different functions. I think these problems arise because Babb subscribes to psychological explanations for religious behaviour. For example, he ascribed the popularity of public ceremonies to their therapeutic and palliative effects on individuals. In the same way, he argued that Hindu practices are concerned with the fears, hopes, and desires of individuals to help them cope with life: “. . . (the) contexts in which religious symbols are brought directly to bear on the problems which arises out of the unique circumstances of each person’s life” (1976:203). In contrast, Cooper and Kumar (1979) attempted a more sociological analysis of Hindu religion, with the ambitious aim of putting analytical order to the confusing variety of Indian-Hindu ceremonies by developing a typological model based on location of ritual action, participation, and the degree of social differentiation involved. At the same time, they hoped to link changes in the form of religious

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ceremonies with ethnic identity changes among Singaporean IndianHindus. Looking primarily at calendrical rituals of the South Indian, and drawing on the theories of van Gennep on rites of passage and Turner on liminality and communities, Cooper and Kumar saw Thaipusam as anti-structure, where caste, age and gender categories are temporarily suspended. In Thaipusam and Timithi (fire-walking ritual), caste and regional groupings are basically set-aside and the greater Indian-Hindu identity takes precedence. This is an interesting idea but begs for more examples and clearer analysis. Also, Cooper and Kumar do not explain why there is a need to establish this greater Indian-Hindu identity. The paper also attempted to distinguish ceremonies that take place in the streets/temples and homebased worship. They suggested that temple worship involves dropping the normal patterns of structural differentiations (anti-structure) while rituals at home tend to reaffirm structural differentiations. Again, an interesting idea but the paper does not provide sufficient evidence to support this assertion. Similar to Chinese religion, the bulk of studies of Hinduism in Singapore tended to be ethnographic. For example, Ananda (1976) focused on the ecology of shrines; Manokara (1979) on growth and decay in two Hindu temples in Singapore, and PuruShotam (1985) on the celebration of Navarthiri. Sinha (1997) examined the broader aspects of Hinduism, including its rituals and theology, changing features, and its relations with the socio-cultural landscape of Singapore society. In Unpacking the Labels “Hindu” and “Hinduism” in Singapore (1997), Sinha problematises taken-for-granted terms such as “Hindus” and “Hinduism” in Singapore. She argues that for many Singaporean Hindus, there was a great deal of uncertainty when it came to articulating the exact parameters of a “Hindu identity”. This was particularly true of younger Hindus, suggesting the existence of inter-generational differences in attitudes. In her unpublished Master’s dissertation, Hinduism in Singapore: A Sociological and Ethnographic Perspective (1987/88), Sinha also examined the place of Hinduism in Singapore society. She traces the historical development of Hinduism in Singapore and explicates its socio-cultural features, looking especially at class and caste backgrounds. The thesis also examined the attempts by various groups, such as the Hindu Centre, to reform Hinduism in Singapore. In a later paper, she focused on religious specialists. Sinha observed the growing popularity among Singapore Hindus of the notion that Brahmin priests are necessary to direct ritual behaviour

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and the increasing popularity of temples and temple-worship in the lives of Hindus in Singapore. 3.4. Christianity Christianity is a minority, albeit important religion in Singapore. In 1980, Christians accounted for about 13% of the population. Yet, next to the Chinese religions, much of the literature on religion in Singapore has focused on Christianity. There may be several reasons for this. Firstly, Christianity has a long history in Singapore. Being a former British Colony, Christianity was brought in together with colonial rule. In fact, the first Roman Catholic Church was built as early as 1833 and the Saint Andrew’s Cathedral in 1836. The early Protestant missionaries actually had their sights on China and the headquarters in Singapore were supposed to be only temporary (Turnbull 1989). Missionary schools were set up in Singapore in 1822 and by 1829, there were four such schools. In Singapore, missionary work had always been linked to education and the educated class. Initially, churches catered primarily to Europeans and some Babas who, together with adopting western customs and sports, also became Christians. As such, in 1931, only 2% of Chinese considered themselves Christians. The period of rapid growth began in the 1950’s, and by 1980, over 10% of the population were Christians. Early studies on Christianity in Singapore, however, did not address these trends. Rather, they concentrated on the history of churches in Singapore. Greer (1959), for example, documented the history of the Presbyterian Church in Singapore. Teixeira (1963) traced the development of the Portuguese Mission in Malacca and Singapore, while Doraisamy (1985) looked at the history of the Methodist Church in Singapore. Another interesting trend is the number of studies conducted by theologians and church leaders. While many of these adopt sociological techniques (see, for example, Lim 1982, Sng and You, 1982, Hinton 1985), they can more accurately be classified as religious sociology rather than the sociology of religion. The distinction is a fine but important one. Religious sociologists, while using the same techniques as sociologists, carry out their study as a means to a religious end, while a sociologist’s major professional interest is in the study of religion as a social and cultural phenomenon (Robertson 1970:11). Even so, their studies warrant review as they contribute to our under-

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standing of religion and the religious situation in Singapore. For example, Sng and You’s Religious Trends in Singapore; with special reference to Christianity used a survey questionnaire, administered among church members, to examine the socio-economic background of Christians in Singapore. In addition, it tried to provide a more indepth analysis of secondary data derived from the 1980 Census data. As the title suggests, it is primarily interested in explaining how the data relates to the church and Christianity. Thus, the last two chapters are actually titled “Areas of Concern and Challenge” and “Prospects”. Similar types of research include Finnell’s (1986) survey of 218 Baptists and Lim’s (1982) study of the Methodist Church in Singapore. In Growing Churches, Singapore Style, Hinton (1985) sought to explain the growth of Christianity in Singapore. He argued that, in Singapore, anomie is on the increase as people withdraw into their private world where they do not meet each other. They become inward looking, impersonal, individualistic, apathetic and increasingly insecure. But Hinton does not provide any real evidence, whether quantitative or qualitative, that anomie is on the rise or why, even if people are anomic, they would turn to Christianity. While Hinton suggested in his published work, Growing Churches, that there is an increase in anomie in Singapore, his own field-data in his unpublished thesis, Twelve Churches Study, indicate that only 18% of his sample cited crisis as the reason for conversion to Christianity. He establishes the most important factor, is the search for a true religion (41%). This lack of empirical evidence and sweeping generalizations is exemplified in his analysis of why there are more women than men in churches. He suggested that it was because women are, traditionally, more active religiously, and when they lose confidence in traditional religion, they actively seek an alternative; whereas males, who allow females to carry out the family religion on their behalf, more easily slip from passive belief to passive agnosticism. This again is an example of piecemeal explanations that are not supported by other evidences. Hinton has clearly misunderstood the nature of Chinese religion in the Chinese household and fails to consider the difference between public and private rituals in Chinese society.

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Besides the qualitative studies, several other researchers have attempted to gather and analyse quantitative data. These included Lim’s (1982) study of the Methodist Church, Sng & You’s (1982) study of the growth in Protestant churches, Finnell’s (1986) work on the Baptists, Tamney and Hassan’s (1987) analysis of religious switching in Singapore, and Tham’s (1985) research on rites of passage and calendrical rituals among the Malays, Chinese and Indians. While important, these studies suffer from the fact that in most cases, the samples were too small or flawed and did not allow for statistical generalizations. For example, Tamney (1987) carried out several surveys administered to undergraduates of the then University of Singapore. However, the sample was criticized as being unrepresentative of the general population and was limited in scope. Similarly, Finnell used only 218 returned questionnaires, and Tamney and Hassan had only 15 family case-studies. Similarly, Tham (1985) had only 300 respondents (180 Chinese, 80 Malays, and 40 Indians). Tham mentioned that his respondents were chosen at random, but from his description of the sampling procedure, it is more likely a non-probability quota sampling based on considerations like occupation, marital and family status, as well as age. Moreover, because he focused on the ritual practices of three separate communities, the attention given to any one community is, by necessity, limited, and further exacerbates the problem of the small sampling size. For example, his analysis on the Indians was based on a sample of only 40 respondents. It is clear that for a proper understanding of religious trends in Singapore; more rigorous sampling techniques are needed. Even so, Tham’s work is important because it is one of the few that attempted a comparative analysis of the main religions of Singapore, rather than the study of a single community or religion. The first extensive set of data available for the whole population was the 1980 Census of Population. Prior to 1980, the only other censuses which reported data on religion were those collected in 1921 and 1931. These censuses provided statistics on the religion of the Chinese and Indians only, since all Malays are assumed to be Muslim. Also, those who did not claim adherence to any religion were excluded. Although the 1980 census gathered data on religion on a national basis, there were also limitations in its use. The Census only recorded religious affiliation claimed by the individual, with no way to verify the accu-

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racy of this claim. Hence, the data does not avail itself to an indepth look into religiosity or religious practices. Moreover, the 1980 Census collected data on only one variable, religious affiliation. Even so, the Census provided the first comprehensive look at the religious affiliation of the whole population and a wealth of information when crosstabulated with other socio-demographic variables (see Kuo 1988). It will also serve as a benchmark for future studies on religion in Singapore. By the mid 1980s, it was clear that the data from the 1980 Census required updating, given the significant religious changes and the rise of fundamentalism and revivalism among some religions in Singapore. Information was also needed on the extent of religious practices and religiosity. Two surveys were commissioned: a national survey on religion and moral values in Singapore by the Ministry of Community Development, and a study of Chinese religions by the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations (SFCCA). I was the consultant for both these studies and the data collected partly form the basis for this monograph. 4. Research Methodology The book is a culmination of years of research on religion in Singapore, thus providing a longitudinal analysis on religion and religious change. Both qualitative and quantitative methods were utilized to collect the data for this study. In 1987–88, I conducted a national survey on religion and religious change, focusing on Chinese religion, commissioned by the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations in Singapore (henceforth SFAS88). The questionnaire was constructed with the intention of gathering data on religion and religious change, the practices of Chinese customs and rites, homebased, calendrical, and various rites of passage, including birth, marriage and death.11

11 Some of the data and findings of these studies were released, in limited circulation, as reports by the Ministry and Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations. I would like to particularly thank the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations for funding the survey. In addition, I am grateful to Ms. Elaine Wong, my research assistant, who helped in collecting and collating data, as well as library research, in making this book possible.

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SFAS88 had a total of 1025 respondents with the data collected through personal interviews. A three-stage stratified sampling design was adopted. At the first stage, a list of all public housing estates were compiled and grouped into three strata according to the year the estates themselves were completed. The rationale was that the age of an estate can be an indicator of the strength of community relations, which may have an impact on religious practices. Two estates, drawn from a national random sample, were selected with probability proportional to the size of the housing estate, using a systematic sampling design. Once the estates were selected, a sampling frame of all housing blocks in the estate was generated and selection of the housing block was based on random sampling. Once this was completed, a third sampling frame of all Chinese residents in the selected housing block was generated and the respondents were selected again by simple random sampling. The number of households was over-sampled by 25% to include replacements. With 85% of the Singapore population living in public housing estates, the data actually represent the majority of the Chinese population in Singapore. Another national survey was commissioned by the Ministry of Community Development to study religion and moral values in Singapore (henceforth MCD88). Drawn from a random sample of the Singapore population, it had a total of 1015 respondents aged 15 and over. The survey covers religious affiliation, participation, and included scales to measure faith, anomie and alienation. The quantitative data collected for SFA88 and MCD88 was complemented by qualitative data based on focused interviews. A total of 60 persons were interviewed. These last from half an hour to several hours. Quota sampling was used to ensure that a cross section of the population was interviewed, with distribution of various age groups, sex, and educational qualifications. Interviews were classified into three age groups, those below the age of 19, 19 to 24, and those above the age of 24. The study also differentiated the sample into those who are still in school, university students, and working adults. In 1998, as Principal Investigator of a project on Social Indicators in Singapore, a survey was conducted. As part of the survey, a battery of questions on religious affiliation, participation, conversion and religiosity was included (henceforth SIP98). The sampling frame for SIP98 was drawn from the national database on dwellings in Singapore

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maintained by the Department of Statistics. The sampling units were selected using a two stage stratified design. At the first stage, 25 of the polling districts demarcated for the Parliamentary General Elections of 1991 and stratified according to three predominant house types, namely public housing flats, private houses and flats, and others were systematically picked. The probability of selecting a particular polling district was proportionate to the number of housing units in that respective polling district. At the second stage, the housing units in the polling districts were stratified according to house types. Within each of the selected polling districts, 100 units were systematically sampled with a random start. The target population were Singaporeans aged 18 and above for the head of household and aged 18 to 65 for the second respondent in the same household. Up to two individuals were selected from each address; the head of household and a second respondent randomly picked using the Kish Grid method. A total of 1054 households were interviewed for this survey. As part of the research on SIP98, an extensive qualitative data set was collected on religion in Singapore. Based on a semi-structured interview schedule, data was collected on religious affiliation, religious conversion and religious practices. 120 informants were interviewed. Each interview lasted from about an hour to several hours. Quota sampling was used to ensure a good cross section of the population, with a good distribution of various age groups, educational qualifications, ethnic groups and religions. In addition, twenty focused group interviews were conducted. Drawn from the various religions, each group consisted of about 8 to 10 people and the discussion generally last between 2 to 3 hours. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative data collection is very important. As mentioned earlier in the review section, most studies on religion in Singapore were based on ethnographic field methods. While important, they do not provide data that can be generalized for the whole population. Moreover, most of the studies focused on specific religions. This has led to a limited understanding of religion in Singapore from a comparative perspective. This study is in fact the first to systematically collect quantitative data that is representative of the population in Singapore, and thus provides data which can be used comparatively. At the same time, religion and religious conversion are complex processes. The use of extended case interviews and focus groups are important as they

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contribute to an understanding of the processes and inner dynamics of religious beliefs, practices and conversion. The use of both quantitative and qualitative data provides a more complete and comprehensive picture of religion in Singapore society. Finally, a national survey conducted as part of the World Values Survey was conducted in 2002 (henceforth WVS02). In the data set, there are a series of questions measuring religiosity in Singapore.12 The sampling for WVS02 is based on a stratified random sample of Singaporean citizens aged 15 and over with a final sample size of 1512 respondents. Data was collected using face-to-face interviews with the respondents. In addition to the four national surveys conducted over a span of twelve years, this study utilized the National Census of Singapore that is carried out every ten years. National Censuses that included measurements on religion were conducted in 1911, 1921, 1931, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The 1980 Census (henceforth Census80) is of particular importance for this study as it was the first national census in many years to gather data on religion on a national basis. It provided the first comprehensive look at the religious affiliations of the whole population and provided a wealth of data when cross-tabulated with other socio-demographic variables. It serves as a benchmark for comparing the data from the other surveys conducted for this study and is particularly useful for comparative purposes. In the 1990 Census, I was appointed consultant to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore for the section of the Census regarding religion (henceforth Census90). Unlike the 1980 Census, data was collected not simply on religious affiliation, but for religious conversion and religious participation as well. It is probably the first time where such data was collected for the national population, thus providing valuable data on the religious life of Singaporeans. The final quantitative data set is the Census 2000. The three censuses provide important comparative data for the study in terms of religious trends and religious change in Singapore society. As various different data sets are used in the analysis, for ease of reference throughout the book, data used in the survey will be noted by a code to show where it comes from. Thus, SFA88 will refer to 12 I am grateful to Dr. Tan Ern Ser and Dr. Alexius Pereira for allowing me access to the WVS data set on religion.

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the Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations sponsored survey carried out in 1988, SIP98 denotes the Singapore Indicators Survey conducted in 1998, MCD88 refers to the national survey commissioned by the Ministry of Community Development in 1988, and WVS02 refers to the World Values Survey conducted in 2002. Similarly, the Censuses will be denoted by Census80, Census90 and Census00. 5. Chapter Outline Why should we study religion and religious change in Singapore? As an introduction, this chapter hopes to point out some of the salient points which will be explored throughout the book. These include how can we understand the changing religious situation? Why is religious conversion happening in Singapore? What implication does religious change have on our society? This introduction will also attempt to briefly investigate some of the current debate surrounding religious change as well as offer a literature review on earlier research done on religion in Singapore. The second chapter will present an overview and analysis of the religious situation in Singapore, beginning from the early days of its founding. It seeks to show the correlation between religious affiliation and several socio-demographic variables, namely, ethnicity, gender, age, education and occupation as well as socio-economic status. The third chapter will be an in-depth exploration of religious conversion in Singapore. It will briefly highlight the conversion patterns in Singapore before looking at the conversion process. The chapter will attempt to answer the following questions: Who are the converts? What are the religions that attract more converts? How and why do individuals change their religious affiliations? The fourth chapter will investigate the significance of religious participation among the different religious groups in Singapore. In a multi-religious country such as Singapore, there are different religious traditions. Thus the meaning and implications of religious practice and participation vary from one religion to another. This chapter will examine the different forms of religious participation: rituals performed at home as well as in public. It will illustrate the patterns of religious participation and highlight the significance of ritual performance.

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The fifth chapter is dedicated to traditional Chinese customs and rites in Singapore. This is an important but largely neglected area. Until the present study, most studies on Chinese religion were based on ethnographic analysis. As such, it is difficult to understand the trends and changes occurring in Chinese religions. This chapter describes the various customs and rituals associated with the traditional Chinese religion, in particular, festivals, birth, marriage and death rituals. The Chinese community has been put under the spotlight since religiously they are the most heterogeneous of the main ethnic groups in Singapore. Many have converted to Christianity or have professed to have no religion. However, data from the survey will show the relative tenacity of the traditional religion in the Chinese community. This is the first available quantitative study of Chinese religions in Singapore. In Singapore, the state is present in most areas of everyday life. It attempts to manage, through social engineering, every aspect of social life, whether it is encouraging population growth, getting graduate women to marry or keeping Singapore clean. This presence extends to religion, including the institutionalization of religious education in schools, the enactment of the Religious Harmony Bill and the setting up of the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony. Despite the pervasive influence of the state in the religious scene in Singapore, there have been few studies in this area (see Tamney 1988, Ling 1987, Kuah 1990, Wee, 1989). However, the relationship between the state and religion is significant and warrants the sixth chapter in this book. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I will summarize the key ideas proposed in the book. I extend the analysis by comparing religion and religious change in Singapore with various East and Southeast Asian countries to compare and contrast the trends found in Singapore. Countries selected were particularly those with large Chinese populations, including Malaysia, China and Taiwan. In addition, I will examine the religious situation in Korea, the only other Asian country that has experienced a dramatic increase in the number of people professing Christianity.

CHAPTER TWO

RELIGIONS IN SINGAPORE: AN ANALYSIS This chapter presents an analysis of religions in Singapore from its early days to the present. Here, society is marked by a high degree of multireligiosity as well as significant changes in the religious landscape. In different periods, religions wax and wane. Some, such as Christianity, have been very successful in recruiting members. Others saw their numbers decline. The data will also show that in Singapore, there is a correlation between religious affiliation and several sociodemographic variables, including age, education, occupation and socio-economic status. For example, Christians in Singapore tend to be younger, more educated and have a higher socioeconomic status. Obversely, Taoists tend to be older, less educated and come from lower socio-economic groups. This structural differentiation will be analysed and discussed. Another key variable is ethnicity. Despite being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, religious affiliation is culturally or ethnically structured. Most Malays are Muslim, most Indians Hindu, and Chinese, though to a lesser degree, tend to adopt Chinese religions. 1. Early Religious Situation in Singapore When Sir Stamford Raffles landed in Singapore, it was believed that there existed an Orang Laut1 population of about 150 (Song, 1984). This community was believed to have “long been converted to Islam” (Evans, 1927). However, other accounts exist. Bartley (1933) suggests that the population was larger, and certainly included Chinese, as there were already gambier plantations owned and cultivated by the Chinese prior to 1819. Bloom (1986) cites some estimated figures: a total population of about 200, consisting of a few Orang Laut families, about a hundred Muslim Malay fisherfolk (thought to have settled on the island in 1811), and a community of about 40 Chinese

1

Meaning “sea people”.

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pepper and gambier cultivators. The Chinese were likely to have adhered to a form of Chinese religion. As with Islam, archaeological and historical evidence suggest that Buddhism and Chinese religion of some form existed in Singapore prior to Raffles’ arrival. Ke (1984) cites eye-witness accounts of the remains of Buddhist sacred architecture on Fort Canning in 1822, suggesting the existence of a pre-Islamic population in Indianized Southeast Asia, including Singapore. A Chinese temple, Shuntian Gong (Temple of Submission to Heaven), dedicated to the earth deity Dabogong (originally in Malabar Street, but currently settled after several moves in Geylang Lorong 29), was first built in 1796, according to an inscription inside the temple. It is believed to be the first Chinese temple in Singapore (Lee et al., 1994). After Raffles’ arrival, Chinese religion took root with the arrival of Chinese migrants, mainly from South China. Each dialect group began to establish its own presence and established its own temples as the Chinese community grew in numbers. The Fujians established their own temples (e.g. Hengshan Ting at Silat Road, established in 1828); the Teochews established Yuehaiqing Miao in Phillip Street in 1826; the Cantonese erected Haichun Fude Si in 1824; the Hakkas established the Yinghe Guan in 1823; and the Hainanese had a Tianhou temple on Beach Road in 1857. Given the European appearance at the time of Singapore’s founding, it is to be expected that a Christian presence would soon become evident. In 1821, Reverend M. Laurent Marie Joseph Imbert of the Societe des Mission Etrangeres (the French Mission Society) visited Singapore, en route to China. His one-week stay in Singapore resulted in a letter to the Bishop, stating that “there were only twelve or thirteen Catholics in Singapore, who led a wretched life” (in Buckley, 1902; Teixeira, 1963). The growth of the Catholic population was not confined to Europeans alone. There were many Chinese Catholics although the majority of the Chinese population remained nonChristian. These Chinese Catholics were either converted or arrived in Singapore as Catholics. Those Chinese Catholics who arrived were usually the wealthier merchants rather than the lower-class Chinese labourers. Aside from the Catholic Church, there were also a great variety of other Christian denominations in Singapore. The earliest nonCatholic Christian presence was the London Missionary Society (LMS), formed by laypersons and missionaries from various denom-

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inations in England (Sng, 1993). Missionary work started as early as the founding of Singapore in 1819, with the arrival of Samuel Milton that year. He started a school for Malay and Chinese boys. The next missionary to arrive was Claudius H. Thomsen in 1822. He started classes for both Malay boys and girls by 1828. Apart from LMS, the main Protestant denominations established in the 19th century include four main groups—Anglican (1826), Brethren (1864), Presbyterian (1881), and Methodist (1885). Since the turn of the century, various other groups have taken root as well, such as the Seventh Day Adventists (1905), Assembly of God (1926), Lutherans (1927), Salvation Army (1935), Baptists (1937), Bible-Presbyterians (1952), Christian Nationals’ Evangelism Commission (1952), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (1968) (Tan, 1979/80) (Hinton, 1985); (Sng, 1993).2 Hinduism was brought into Singapore by the Indian immigrants who came as early as 1819 as part of Sir Stamford Raffles’ entourage. Later immigrants brought their religion with them and established temples very rapidly. Most of the early immigrants were convicts brought here for construction work (Sandhu, 1969), or labourers for the coffee and sugar plantations (Mahajani, 1960). In turn, 98% of the labour immigrants were from South India (Sandhu, 1969). Given that about 80% of the early Indian migrants into Malaya were Hindus, it follows that Hinduism in Singapore is essentially of a South Indian majority. The remaining 20% of the migrants were Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. The first Hindu temple, located in Bras Basah Road was believed to be founded by one Naraina Pillay from Penang in 1819. However, it was soon demolished (Tan, 1961/ 62). Another temple was later constructed in 1827, dedicated to the goddess Mariamman in South Bridge Road. It stands today as the oldest extant Hindu temple in Singapore. 2. Religious Groups in Singapore Singapore Muslims are primarily of the Shafii School of Law of the Sunni Islamic sect. Adherents to this doctrine are commonly known

2 The precise dates of establishment cited for each denomination has varied from source to source, so the dates represented here are drawn from one of the two sources accredited.

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as orthodox or Sunni Muslims and constitute over 90% of the entire Muslim community today (Farah, 1994). As with other Sunnis, Singapore Muslims follow a comprehensive system of community law: the Shariah. Christians are divided among the Catholic Church and a great variety of other Christian denominations, including, for example, mainline Protestant churches (Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Lutherans), neo-Calvinists (Baptists, Brethrens, and Bible Presbyterians) as well as other independent churches. Reflecting the South Indian bias in Singapore’s Indian population, patterns of Hindu religious practice veer towards South Indian styles in the Republic. These are clearly evident in the way South Indian domestic religious practices, festivals and ceremonial styles prevail over North Indian equivalents. Similarly, there is a predominance of South Indian temples which differ from North Indian ones in design and iconographic style, as well as in separate priesthoods and segregated patronage. Adherents to Islam, Christianity and Hinduism in Singapore sometimes also display evidence of infusion of beliefs and practices with local traditions, for example, animistic beliefs, or by the religious practices of other world religions. “Chinese religion” which is used here as a collective term to describe the myriad beliefs adhered to by the majority of the Chinese population, is by far, the most difficult to characterize. The difficulty in characterization is due primarily to the eclecticism of the religion reflected in the varied nomenclature adopted to describe it. For example, Elliott (1955) termed it “shenism”. Topley (1954a, 1956, 1961), who has researched the various Chinese religious practices, institutions and associations in Singapore, termed it the “anonymous religion”. Comber (1954, 1955, 1958), in turn, referred to it as the “religion of the masses”. Nyce (1971) characterized it as “Chinese folk religion”. Wee (1976) has attempted to clarify the status of these various strands of Chinese religions by using Buddhism as an organizing base line. She distinguished between Buddhist systems which refer directly to specific Buddhist canonical traditions (Theravada and Mahayana schools) on the one hand; and those which have no direct Buddhist canonical reference, on the other. Of the latter, there are two groups: “shenism” (no canonical tradition of any kind); and “sectarianism” (with each sect having its own canonical tradition). Ancestor worship is an important element of Chinese religious practices. It has sometimes been described as an extension of filial

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piety, an important value in Chinese society and strongly rooted in Confucianist thought. Such is the manifestation of mutual care between generations, as much a part of the relationship between the living and the dead, as it should be among the living. In a very important sense, ancestor worship, also acts as a “stimulus to morality” (Addison, 1925), for the consciousness that the ancestors are watching and will judge, reward or punish according to one’s conduct, heightens the moral sense of the community. Indeed, Addison (1925) and Hinton (1985) argue that ancestor worship is the most important religious phenomenon in the life of the Chinese. However, it is seldom seen as composing a distinct religion (Tamney & Hassan, 1987) and is regarded more as a part of Chinese religious life in general. Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism are represented in Singapore, the latter far more so than the former. In addition, a Japanese branch of Buddhism, the Soka Association (formerly Nichiren Shoshu Association up until 1992) is also growing in significance (Clammer, 1988). There is also Confucianism. Although it is sometimes argued that Confucianism is not a “religion” but a moral code or philosophical system, Leo and Clammer (1983) noted that in Singapore, Confucius is regarded by some as a specific deity in his own right, worshipped apart from other deities and constituting the centre of a specific religious complex. 3. Religious Trends in Singapore 3.1. 1849 to 1949 In Singapore, records of religious adherence have been preserved only intermittently. Pre-independence records are mostly silent on religion, even though details exist about other aspects of life, such as sanitary conditions in Singapore (ABSM 1893). This is perhaps indicative of a lack of concern on the part of the colonial rulers about the religious inclinations of the population, who were free to subscribe to whichever religion they choose, as long as they did not create problems. The first systematic data available on religion in Singapore was found in the 1849 Census. As the table below indicates, even in this early stage of Singapore history, the dominant religion in Singapore

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was already Chinese religion,3 constituting 52% of the population. The next largest group were the Muslims (classified in the Census as Muhameddans), with 41.6%. At this time, Christianity constituted a very small proportion of the population, with only 3.5%, and Hinduism, with 2.8%. One key feature of religion at this point in Singapore history is that religious affiliation was practically tied to ethnicity, that is, almost all adherents to Chinese religions were Chinese, all Mohammedans were Malays and all Hindus were Indians. It was only in Christianity that we see some degree of “universalness”. The vast majority of Christians were the Europeans, although there were a few Chinese (particularly among the Eurasians) who converted, as well as a small number of Indians, particularly from Kerala, who were Catholics.4 The religious picture in 1921, the next available set of data on religion in Singapore, was not dissimilar to the Census of 1849. In 1921, the number of Chinese religionists had grown to 69.4% of the population. Islam, as a percentage of the total population had declined to 17.3%. Hinduism grew by 2.2% to 5% of the population. Similarly, Christianity grew to 5.2%. While these changes seem significant, it should be noted that in some ways, the growth trajectories of the different religions are a function of the population growth of the different ethnic groups. Between 1849 to 1921, the policy of recruiting indentured laborers to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations in Singapore and Malaya, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese, and to a smaller extent, Indian migrants to Singapore. For example, in 1830, there were only 6555 Chinese living in Singapore. By 1849, this had grown to 27,988.5 The period 3 At this time, Chinese religion as a category did not exist. In the Census, it was categorized a Buddhism/Taoism/Confucianism. However, the Colonial authorities had issues in classifying what Chinese religion was. In fact, in the report, they noted that many Chinese classified themselves as Confucians but problems arose since Confucianism is a philosophy and not a religion. By the 1921 Census, Chinese religions were in fact classified as Other Religions. 4 This was true to such an extent that the report of 1921 actually noted,” The number of non-Christians among the Europeans and Eurasians and the number of non-Muhammadans among the Malays are so small that the Committee recommended that the only tables to be published in this report should be those dealing with Chinese and Indians. 5 Chinese migration to Singapore in the early 19th century was the result of various push-pull factors. The Chinese that came to Singapore were mostly from the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, two provinces which were more receptive to migrating because of their early contact with the British tea traders

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1849 to 1921 saw particularly dramatic growth, with over 164,000 Chinese in Singapore in 1901 (72% of the total population) and by 1921, 315,151 Chinese, constituting 75% of the total population in Singapore (Saw, 1970:56–57). Thus, the early shift in religious orientation was due more to migration rather than any changes in Singapore society. For example, if we look at the data on the Chinese, in 1921, of all the Chinese in Singapore, 97.5% claim adherence to Chinese religion. Only 2.4% of the Chinese claim adherence to Christianity. Like the Chinese, the changes in religious affiliation among the Indian population were due more to migration rather than religious switching. However, the religious make up of the Indians in Singapore reflects that the Indians migrated from more diverse religious backgrounds compared to the Chinese. In 1921, 61% of the Indians claim adherence to Hinduism, 29.3% were ‘Muhammedans’ and 5.9% were Christians. Notably, this religious fragmentation among Indians is still evident in present day Singapore. However, as in present day Singapore, the religious diversity does not reflect a conversion pattern, rather the communities that migrated. Religious conversion among Hindus remains relatively low. In early Singapore, from 1819 to the 1920s, most of the religious groups were primarily interested in looking after their own flocks within their respective ethnic communities. For Islam, Hinduism, Taoism and Buddhism, there was little interest in proselytizing the religions. Christianity, however, while primarily the religion of the English colonizers, witnessed various missionary groups trying to convert the indigenes. Thus, Texiera reports that in 1829, there were over 200 Catholics in Singapore and by 1832, it was 300 (Texiera 1963:20). Similarly, Buckley noted that between 1832 and 1838, the who came for the tea grown in these provinces. As a result of the contact, it is possible that information about a place which offered the opportunity to make a fortune may have been easily transmitted. More importantly, the floods, famines and droughts frequently experienced in China, made life difficult. For example, in 1911, a severe famine, coupled with a flood, killed thousands of Chinese. The natural calamities, coupled with the lack of good credit facilities in rural communities meant that many peasants were tenant farmers. With a concentration of farm land in the hands of powerful landlords, the peasants were often exploited with high rents (Yen, 1986:2) China was also characterized by civil unrest; the Taiping Rebellion in 1857–1864, the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the power struggle between Sun Yat Sen and Yuan Shih Kai; which prevented any form of stable family life. Adding to this misery, the large population and the inability to find employment induced many Chinese to migrate.

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congregation witnessed 130 baptisms, 64 deaths and 20 marriages (Buckley 1902:247). The growth of the Catholic population could not be sustained if confined to the European population. The Chinese became a majority in the Catholic profile although the majority of the Chinese population remained non-Christians. These Chinese Catholics were converted either before or after they arrived in Singapore. Chinese Catholic arrivals were usually the wealthier merchants rather than the lower class Chinese labourers. (Tan 1988:58) Another group that converted to Catholicism in the 19th century was the Indian migrants. Their presence in Ophir Road led to the establishment of the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in 1888 and a Catholic School of the same name next door. While Christianity had some success in converting the immigrant Chinese and Indians, it made no impact among the Malay population in Singapore. For the Chinese and Indians, accepting Catholicism did not necessarily mean giving up their Chinese or Hindu practices and there was a high degree of syncretism in the practices of these early Catholics. A group that was particularly open to conversion, particularly to Protestant Christianity was the Eurasian population.6 Tamney and Hassan argue that colonialism and the concomitant domination of the British (politically and economically) created a situation in which the British/European cultural practices ascended to a position of dominance and superiority over the other main cultures (Tamney and Hassan 1987:39). Many cultural symbols spatially manifested this cultural dominance: the centrality of churches, cemeteries, sport grounds, architecture and so forth. The cultural hierarchy also became institutionalized and embedded in the social consciousness of the people so much so that people would use the symbol of western culture, such as language and religion for personal or social gratification and advancement. As it involved less of a redefinition of self, language was more readily adopted than religion whereas some Chinese and Indians, for whom the co-identification of ethnicity and religion was not strong, adopted religion. The Census of 1931 paints a similar picture as the Census of 1921. Chinese religion remained the dominant religion of Singapore,

6 Eurasians refer to an ethnic community in Singapore that was the result of intermarriage between the British and European men and Chinese and Indian women.

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with about 72.5% of the population. The number of adherents to the other religions remained relatively stable, with 15.3% Muslims (from 16.3% in 1921), 5.5% Hindus (4.6% in 1921), 5.5% Christians compared to 4.6% in 1921.

Religion

1849

1911

1921

1931

Buddhism/ Taoism/ Confucianism

27,526 (52.0%)

216,501 (69.4%)

310,163 (72.8%)

411,665 (72.5%)

Islam

22,007 (41.6%)

53,595 (17.3%)

69,604 (16.3%)

86,827 (15.3%)

Christianity

1,861 (3.5%)

16,349 (5.2%)

21,386 (5.0%)

30,068 (5.3%)

Hinduism

1,452 (2.8%)

15,580 (5.0%)

19,772 (4.6%)

31,128 (5.5%)

Sikhism

–

146 (0.05%)

1,022 (0.2%)

2,988 (0.5%)

Judaism

22 (0.04%)

707 (0.2%)

623 (0.2%)

777 (0.14%)

Others

23 (0.04%)

14 (0.004%)

38 (0.009%)

306 (0.05%)

No religion

Not listed as a category

Not listed as a category

Not listed as a category

Not listed as a category

Not stated

Not listed as a category

62 (0.02%)

3,269 (0.8%)

3,694 (0.7%)

52,891 (100%)

311,9871 (100%)

425,8772 (100%)

567,453 (100%)

TOTAL

Source: Census of Population, 1849, Marriot 1911: Nathan 1921: Vlieland 1932. 1. This total was calculated by adding the total population of each racial group. It left the religion of 8,669 unaccounted for. Some of these might have had no religion which was not a category captured in the data collection. Some of the discrepancy might also be due to inaccuracies in the data collection. 2. This total is higher than the total calculated by adding up the total population in each racial group. This is presumably another case of inaccurate data.

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The 1931 Census was the last data collection Census for religion; thereafter, data on religious affiliation was not collected in Censuses until 1980. For example, the report for the 1947 Census noted that “no enquires as to religion was made (as) past experience have shown it to be of little value in Malaya where the entire Malay population is Muhammedan, practically every European and Eurasian is Christian and the great majority of Chinese hold to the national religion of China which some describe as Confucian and others prefer to regard as ancestor worship.” (Report of the 1947 Census: 123) Similarly, in the 1957 Census, although there was data regarding the number of religious organizations in Singapore and the religious specialists as an occupational group,7 there was no data gathered on religious affiliations. This is indeed regrettable as clearly, the period from 1950 to 1979 witnessed significant changes in the religious make up of Singapore, especially the growth in Christianity and the decline of Taoism. Hinton correctly delineated the history of Christianity in Singapore in three stages (Hinton 1985:14–28). The first, 1819 to 1930, was characterized as one in which Christianity grew slowly. He suggested that the multiplicity of languages in Singapore made missionary endeavours difficult. Moreover, immigrants expected to return to their homeland after a period in Singapore and were thus not prepared to make permanent and major religious changes. Moreover, the target of Christian missionaries during this period was really China, not Singapore. The second period, from 1900 to 1950 was characterised as a period where the “seeds of hope” were sown, as immigrants began to settle down and the ‘temporary immigrant’ mentality shifted. This meant that some became more open to change and enjoyed greater freedom from traditional ties. Moreover, this was the period where the first generation of Singaporeans contributed to the population, rather than through migration, which according to Hinton, provided greater opportunities for conversion. The 1950s to 1980s were characterized as a period of “harvest time”. In this period, many new Christian denominations were established in Singapore. New congregations also grew among the older denominations. Moreover, the changes in the educational system, 7 The Census noted, for example, that there were 1536 persons from religious organizations involved in community work and 1009 persons in the occupational group of kathis, clergy, and related religious orders.

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particularly after self-government in 1959, and independence in 1963, meant that, increasingly, the English language was more commonly used. Christianity, with its English literature, agencies, and missionaries from the West, became more accessible. There was also a tide of missionaries from the United States.8 This period also saw the introduction of para-church organizations, such as the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (1952), the Varsity Christian Fellowship (1952) and the Youth for Christ (1956). These para-church groups were particularly significant in changing the religious profile of Singapore, as their primary mission was the proselytization and conversion of Singaporeans. Moreover, particularly Youth for Christ and the InterSchool Christian Fellowship targeted the young, especially those in schools, for conversion. These efforts proved particularly successful, as it became evident after a period of 50 years, when data on religion was once again gathered in the Census. 3.3. 1980 to 1990 The active proselytization by the Christians, as well as changes in the educational system and the language of education in Singapore, reflected in the changes to the religious profile of Singaporeans in 1980. Chinese religion remained the dominant religion in Singapore, with 29.3% Taoists and 26.7% Buddhists. Practically all of them were Chinese. Compared to the 1931 Census, although still claiming the largest number of followers, as a religious category, it also registered the highest rate of decline. Both Islam and Hinduism had remained relatively stable, with 10.3% and 3.7% respectively. Like in the case of the Chinese religions, religious affiliation in Islam and Hinduism was ethnically based with practically all Malays professing to be Muslims and all Indians making up Hindus. Data on “no religion” as a category was collected for the first time in the 1980 Census. Previous Censuses did not list “no religion” as a category. It is thus interesting to note that a significant 13.6% of the population in 1980 claim to have no religion. In addition, for those who claim to have no religion, they come primarily from the Chinese population, and in particular among the younger Chinese. 8 The consequence of this was a rise in the levels of proselytizing and a growth of the main denominations, such as the Anglicans, Methodists. Brethrens and Presbyterians. In addition, many new Christian denominations were introduced into Singapore, including the Southern Baptists, Lutheran Church of America, Christian Nationals Evangelism Commission and the Bible Presbyterians.

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For example, 15 to 16 percent of those below the age of 40 claim to have no religion, compared to only 8% for those 50 and over. There was a significant increase in the proportion of Christians in Singapore, drawing new members from the Chinese community and to a smaller extent, from the Indians. Among the Chinese, the percentage of Christians increased from 2.4% in 1921, 2.8% in 1931 to 10.6% in 1980. Among the Indians, it grew from about 6% to 12.4%. As the demographic profile of the Singaporean population in 1921/1931 is qualitatively different from that in 1980, the comparison made should not, however, be interpreted to represent a simple lineal conversion trend. Even so, it is clear that in the intervening 50 years from 1931 to 1980, both Christianity and No Religion emerged to become significant categories. The reasons for these changes are discussed in detail in Chapter Three. 3.4. 1990 to 2000 As can be seen from Table 2.1, Singapore today still remains a multi-religious society. Buddhism has the largest group of adherents, accounting for 42.5% of the population in Singapore in 2000. The next largest religious group is Islam which constitutes 14.9% of the population and whose adherents are primarily ethnic Malays. Following closely behind are Christians who form 14.6% of the population. Taoism, which used to be the religion with the most followers in 1980, has seen a falling number of adherents. It now constitutes only 8.5% of the population. Followers of Hinduism are a minority with adherents comprising around 4% of the population from 1980 to 2000. Interestingly, a significant 14.8% of Singaporeans claim to have no religion. Table 2.1 Resident Population Aged 15 years and Over by Religion Year Religion/Percentage Christianity Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion Source: Census of Population, 2000

1980

1990

2000

100 10.1 27.0 30.0 15.7 3.6 0.5 13.0

100 12.7 31.2 22.4 15.3 3.7 0.6 14.1

100 14.6 42.5 8.5 14.9 4.0 0.6 14.8

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While the Census of 1980, 1990, and 2000 generally demonstrate the same trends in changes in religious affiliations, there are some significant differences that are worth analyzing. These are discussed in the next chapter. For now, I will briefly sketch some key differences. While Christianity, as a religion, continues to attract new members, the rate of growth has declined. From 1931 to 1980, Christianity grew from 5.3% to 10.6%. From 1980 to 2000, it grew to 14.8%. However, the fastest growing religion in those intervening twenty years was Buddhism, not Christianity, especially between 1990 and 2000.9 In Christianity, there has also been a change in the profile of the converts. From 1950 to 1990, Christianity has been most successful in attracting the younger, educated Singaporeans. As I will argue later, this has partly to do with the strategy of the church, in targeting the young as the most fertile ground for growth. From 1990 though, the church; realizing that the outreach among the young may be reaching a saturation point and with a large group of older Singaporeans who were open to religious proselytization; added a focus on older Singaporeans to its outreach program. Thus, from 1990 to 2000, there is a significant growth in the number of older Chinese Singaporeans converting to Christianity. These trends and the process of rationalizing and intellectualizing religion are explained in Chapters 3 and 4. The rest of the section will examine the correlation between religion and socio-demographic variables of religion and religious affiliation in Singapore. 4. Religion and Ethnicity In Singapore, one of the more interesting features regarding religious affiliations is that religion is closely associated with ethnicity. For example, Malays were religiously homogenous with 99.6% consistently practicing Islam from 1980 until 2000 (Table 2.2). Islam is in a relatively stable position in terms of number and proportion of its followers, being supported by a cohesive and homogenous Malay community with no sign of significant conversions to other religions. However, the Muslim community is not as ethnically homogenous as is commonly assumed to be. In 1990, 12.2% of all Muslims in Singapore were Indian by ethnic origin (Table 2.3) and hence were

9 A detailed description, discussion and explanation for this can be found in Chapter 3.

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different in linguistic and cultural practices from the majority of the Muslims who were Malay. Thus, Malays, as an ethnic group, is religiously homogenous, but Muslims, as a religious group, is more heterogeneous. A possible reason for the religious homogeneity among Malays may be the close interrelationship between Malay identity, culture, and religion, to the extent that they are seen as identical. Thus, a Malay who converts to another religion is seen as having given up his culture and is often ostracized from the community. Religiously, the Indian community was relatively stable from 1980 to 2000. Hinduism remained the most popular religion and had the largest following of 55.4% in 2000 (Table 2.2). Although Hinduism was the religion for slightly more than half of the Indian population, the 1990 Census statistics reveal that about 99.5% of the followers of Hinduism were Indians (Table 2.3). This was a clear indication that Hinduism is primarily the religion of Indians than of any other ethnic group. The proportion of Christians hovered at around 12% over the past two decades (Table 2.2). Yet compared to the case of the Chinese whereby the conversion (to Christianity) trend appears to be strong, the Hindus seem to be able to resist the Christian encroachment. There are a significant number of Indians who are Christians. However, this is not due to conversion in Singapore; but rather, they had already converted to Christianity in India, and migrated to Singapore as a group, and in Singapore, maintained their religious identity. In a sense, the case of the Hindus is the reverse of the Malays. As a religious group, it is rather homogenous, as the table below demonstrates. However, as an ethnic group, the Indians are relatively more heterogeneous, with a significant number of Muslims and Christians. Hinduism is thus viewed by the other ethnic groups as an “Indian” religion, although a significant number of Indians are not Hindus. In terms of religion, the Chinese displayed the greatest heterogeneity of all the major ethnic groups. Traditional Chinese religion (Buddhism and Taoism) was still the most significant religions for the Chinese, with figures in 2000 totaling 64.4% of the Chinese population (Table 2.2). In 1990, practically all the followers of Taoism and 99.6% of Buddhists were Chinese (Table 2.3). Thus these two religions were strongly acknowledged as “Chinese” in nature. Since

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Table 2.2 Resident Population Aged 15 years and Over by Ethnic Group and Religion Ethnic Group/Religion

1980

1990

2000

Chinese Christianity Buddhism Taoism Other Religions No Religion

100 10.9 34.3 38.2 0.2 16.4

100 14.3 39.4 28.4 0.3 17.7

100 16.5 53.6 10.8 0.5 18.6

Malays Islam Other Religions No Religion

100 99.6 0.3 0.1

100 99.6 0.3 0.2

100 99.6 0.4 0.1

Indians Christianity Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100 12.5 22.1 56.3 8.0 1.2

100 12.2 26.5 53.1 7.1 1.2

100 12.1 25.6 55.4 6.3 0.6

Source: Census of Population, 2000

Table 2.3 Resident Population Aged 10 years and Over by Religion and Ethnic Group Religion Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

99.6 100 88.3 78.1 94.4 1.0 0.2 17.2 98.9

– – 0.2 0.2 0.2 85.5 0.1 0.1 0.2

0.2 – 6.7 11.2 4.0 12.2 99.5 79.4 0.6

0.2 – 4.8 10.5 10.5 1.6 0.2 3.3 0.3

Source: Census of Population, 1990

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1980, Buddhism has achieved a steady growth in 1990 it surpassed Taoism as the main religion of the Chinese. In 2000, there was a significant increase in Buddhism with 54% of Chinese claiming to be Buddhists (Table 2.3).10 In 2000, Christianity overtook Taoism as the second most important religion among the Chinese. In 1980, Christians made up just 10.9% of the Chinese. This figure increased to 16.5% in 2000 while followers of Taoism declined substantially from 38.2% in 1980 to 10.8% in 2000 (Table 2.2). A sizeable number of the Chinese community also claimed to have No Religion. This group of non-religionists comprised about 18% of the Chinese population in 1990 and 2000. Of those who claimed to have No Religion in 1990, as many as 98.9% were Chinese (Table 2.3). The category of non-religionists, however, must be considered with caution. Many Chinese who claim to have no religion do, in practice, carry out many of the rituals associated with Chinese religion, such as the worshipping of ancestors at home, praying to the gods, or occasional visits to the temple. Some still pray to the gods when faced with personal problems. More importantly, if they were to return to religion, it will probably be back to Chinese religion. It is also true, however, that even if they do continue to practice some of the rituals, the degree of commitment to Chinese religion is generally lower than that of their parents. The linkage between religious affiliations and ethnicity, as I will elaborate in Chapter Three, is critical to our understanding of reli-

10

Given the nature of Chinese religions, which are highly and religiously complex in nature, religious affiliations, based particularly on the Census data, are more difficult to interpret. Chinese religion, especially popular religion, is a syncretic mix of Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism and ancestor worship. For example, based on the qualitative interviews with informants, many Chinese who claim to be Buddhists in fact practice rituals, such as the worshiping of Guan Yin, and Guan Kong, which would generally be considered as Taoist religious practices. In Singapore, however, Buddhism, as a religious label, is seen as of being higher status, and thus many ascribe to this religious label, even if they are not, religiously speaking, Buddhists. Thus, in analyzing the data, there are probably far more Taoists and fewer Buddhists than the Census data implies. However, and this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Three, on the process of the intellectualization of religion in Singapore, the Chinese are making a clearer distinction between Taoism and Buddhism as religious belief systems. Buddhists in Singapore, particularly the younger Chinese, are more knowledgeable about the beliefs and rituals of Buddhism.

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gious change in Singapore. For example, because of the linkage between religion and culture, for both the Malays and to a degree the Indians, there is greater resistance to conversion to another religion. For the Chinese, religion is less central to ethnic identity and community resistance to conversion is lower. For a person who is dissatisfied with the religion of his/her parents, while easier to convert, the religious options however, are limited. While there are some converting to Islam, mainly for reasons of intermarriage,11 Islam is viewed by most Chinese as a “Malay religion,”12 just as Hinduism is viewed as an “Indian religion.” Thus, a Chinese who chooses to convert will more likely turn to Christianity or claim to have no religion. 5. Religion and Gender The 1990 Census indicated that there were more females (14%) than males (11.1%) professing Christianity but more males (15.3%) than females (13.3%) who claimed to have No Religion. This pattern is especially pronounced among the Chinese, where 15.7% of the females, as compared to 12.3% of the males professed Christianity. In contrast, 19.4% of Chinese resident males claimed to have No Religion, as opposed to 16.6% of Chinese resident females. On the whole, however, there is no significant statistical difference in the correlation between religion and gender. This is interesting if we consider the role of women in Chinese religion. Traditionally, in Taoism, religious practices, particularly within the confines of the home, are carried out by the women on behalf of the whole family. Religion, in fact, is “women’s work”, and men are really only responsible for public rituals, when the family presents a formal face to the public.

11 In Islam, a person who marries a Muslim, like in the case of Catholicism, the spouse must “convert” to Islam for the marriage to be recognized. 12 In fact, to convert to Islam, for the Chinese, is to “jip huan” literally, to enter in Malayness, and is used in a derogatory manner.

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Table 2.4 Resident Population Aged 10 years and Over by Religion, Ethnic Group and Sex Males Religion Total (%) Total (Numbers) Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

Total

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

100 (1,147,993) 30.9 22.4 11.1 4.3 6.8 15.9 3.9 0.5 15.3

100 (897,942) 39.4 28.6 12.3 4.1 8.2 0.2 – 0.1 19.4

100 (152,730) – – 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.6 – – 0.2

100 (86,579) 0.6 – 11.2 7.1 4.1 29.2 51.7 5.8 1.5

100 (10,742) 4.3 0.3 62.2 51.7 10.5 26.3 0.7 1.5 4.7

Total

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

100 (1,128,741) 31.3 22.5 14.0 5.2 8.8 14.9 3.4 0.6 13.3

100 (897,883) 39.1 28.2 15.7 5.2 10.5 0.2 – 0.2 16.6

100 (147,235) 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.5 – – 0.2

100 (71,806) 0.8 – 13.4 8.3 5.1 24.4 53.7 6.8 0.9

100 (11,817) 9.2 0.6 59.2 48.3 10.9 23.2 0.7 2.1 5.0

Females Religion Total (%) Total (Numbers) Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

Source: Census of Population, 1990

6. Religion and Age There is significant correlation between religion and age in Singapore. For the Chinese, there is a generational divide, between the religion of the parents and that of their children. In 2000, there was an overall decline in Taoist numbers across all age groups, especially among the younger generation. Buddhism was popular across all age groups with more adherents among those 55 years and older.

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Generally, the bulk of Christians tend to be from the younger generation. In 1990, among those aged 55 and above, 11% professed Christianity while the 15–24 age group averaged 13.2% and the 25–34 age group had 14%. In 2000, while the 25–34 age group still had the highest proportion of Christians (Table 2.5), the 15–24 age group (12.8%) was slightly lower than that of the 55 and over age group (13.7%). Possibly, this is attributed by the high conversion rates during the 1970s and early 1980s where the bulk of the younger generation was converted. Much of that generation of Christians would presently be in the 55 years and over cohort, resulting in a relatively large percentage of older Christians. Moreover, among the Christians, there has been a change in conversion strategy. While the fastest growing churches were previously charismatic churches which attracted younger people, proselytizing has now focused on the older generation. This is especially with dialect churches which draw the older Chinese dialect-speaking community. A closer look at the three major ethnic groups reveal that there was no significant relationship between age and religion for the Malay communities which continued to show high levels of homogeneity among the age groups (Table 2.6). There was also little variation among the Indian community across age groups. However, it can be observed that the percentage of Christians was slightly higher among the younger Indians than the older ones, especially those aged 60 years and above (Table 2.7).

Table 2.5 Religion

Total (%) Christianity Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Other Rel No Relig

Resident Population Aged 15 years and Over by Religion and Age Group 15–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

1990

2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990

100 13.2 29.1 18.9 17.7 3.6 0.5 16.9

100 12.8 38.9 8.4 18.6 3.5 0.6 17.3

Source: Census of Population, 2000

100 14 29.8 18.6 17.2 3.9 0.6 16

100 15.8 40.2 5.6 15.1 4.6 0.6 18.1

100 12.7 32.6 22.8 13.2 3.4 0.5 14.8

100 15.7 41.5 6.9 15.7 4.5 0.7 15.0

100 11.4 34.2 26.6 12.4 3.6 0.6 11.2

55 & over

2000 1990 2000 100 14.4 44.9 9.9 13 3.6 0.6 13.7

100 11.1 32 29.7 13.8 4.2 0.6 8.6

100 13.7 47.4 12.7 12.3 3.5 0.7 9.8

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Table 2.6 Malay Resident Population Aged 10 years and Over by Religion and Age Group Religion

Total

10–19

20–29

30–39

40–49

50–59 60 years & above

Total

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 (299,965) (59,387) (84,619) (69,917) (33,135) (25,520) (27,387) Buddhism – – – 0.1 0.1 – – Taoism – – – – – – – Christianity 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 Catholic 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 Protestant 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 Islam 99.6 99.7 99.6 99.5 99.5 99.7 99.5 Hinduism – – – – – – – Other Religions – – – – – – – No Religion 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 Source: Census of Population, 1990

Table 2.7 Indian Resident Population Aged 10 years and Over by Religion and Age Group Religion Total Buddhism Taoism Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

Total 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60 years above 100 0.7 – 12.2 7.6 4.6 27.0 52.6 6.3 1.2

100 0.7 – 11.8 7.5 4.3 31.9 48.8 5.9 0.9

100 0.6 0.1 12.6 7.7 4.9 25.2 53.8 6.8 0.9

100 0.7 – 12.9 7.8 5.1 25.8 52.9 6.5 1.2

100 0.9 0.1 12.1 7.9 4.2 28.8 51.3 5.5 1.3

100 0.7 – 12.4 8.2 4.2 24.5 54.4 6.6 1.4

100 0.7 – 10.5 6.7 3.8 26.2 54.8 5.9 1.9

Source: Census of Population, 1990

This reflects the general trend found among the Chinese, although to a lesser extent. The Chinese community showed a change across the age groups in the three religious categories of Taoism, Christianity and No Religion. Buddhism increased its following and garnered a significant number of adherents among the various age groups. In 1990, 38% of those aged 60 and above claimed to be followers of Taoism.

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Table 2.8 Chinese Resident Population Aged 10 years and Over by Religion and Age Group Religion

Total 10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60 years & above

Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100 39.3 28.4 14 4.7 9.3 0.2 – 0.1 18.0

100 38.1 26.9 13.5 4.4 9.1 0.2 – 0.1 21.2

100 38 23.8 16.2 4.1 12.1 0.2 – 0.1 21.7

100 39.3 25.9 15.1 4.6 10.5 0.3 – 0.1 19.3

100 40.4 30.2 12.9 5.6 7.3 0.2 – 0.2 16.1

100 42.1 34.1 11.9 5.4 6.5 0.2 – 0.1 11.6

100 39.5 38 11.8 4.6 7.2 0.1 – 0.1 10.5

Source: Census of Population, 1990

Table 2.9 Proportion Reporting No Religion by Age and Ethnic group Ethnic Group

15–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

55 & over

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 Chinese Malays Indians

21.8 0.1 0.8

22.5 20.6 0 0.2 0.7 1.1

23.0 0.1 0.6

17.9 19.1 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.6

13.5 16.7 10.6 11.9 0.1 0 0.2 0 1.6 0.5 1.7 0.4

Source: Census of Population, 2000

However, the percentage fell to 26.9 among those in the 15–24 age cohort and 23.8% among those in the 20–29 age group (Table 2.6). In 2000, there continued to be a higher concentration of Taoists, all believed to be Chinese, among the older age groups (Table 2.5). In contrast, Christianity was more popular among the younger Chinese. In 1990, Christianity was professed by 11.8% of the Chinese aged 60 and above, but among those in the 20–29 age group, 16.2% were Christians (Table 2.8). The survey data shows that the Chinese, especially the younger generation, are abandoning traditional religious practices for Christianity or have become non-religionists. The proportion of Chinese claiming to have no religious affiliation rose across the age groups. However, as in the previous decade, there was a higher prevalence of non-religionists among the younger age groups (Table 2.9).

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6. Religion and Education Education appears to be an important factor that differentiates people religiously. In 1990 and 2000, Christianity and No Religion were positively associated with the level of education. Among the nonstudent population, those with University qualifications and above registered the highest percentages in the categories of Christianity and No Religion. In 2000, Christians formed the largest religious group among University graduates (33.5%), although their proportion declined slightly since 1990 (Table 2.10). 28.9% of University graduates claimed to have No Religion. In contrast, amongst those who had below secondary education, only 6.4% were Christians while 7.7% professed No Religion (Table 2.10). While Christianity seems to appeal to those with a higher educational attainment, the reverse is true for those who adhere to Taoism. In 2000, the largest group of Taoists (13.2%) came from those with below secondary education. Among those who had university qualifications, the proportion of Taoists fell to 2.7% (Table 2.10). Thus the data suggests that higher educated Singaporeans, especially the Chinese, tend to abandon their traditional faiths to become Christians or non-religionists. While Taoism has seen a decline among the better educated, Buddhism, on the other hand, appeared to have attracted a significant number of followers among graduates. The proportion of graduates professing Buddhism increased from 15.1% in 1990 to 23.6% in 2000 (Table 2.10). However, the largest group of Buddhists Table 2.10 Resident Population Aged 15 years and Over by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained Religion

Total

Full time Students

Below Secondary

Secondary

Post University Secondary

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 Christianity Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

12.7 14.6 17.1 14.3 6.3 6.4 16.1 14.6 24.7 20.8 39.3 31.2 42.5 29.0 37.3 34.1 51.5 30.3 41.6 25.7 38.3 15.1 22.4 8.5 18.2 8.5 29.4 13.2 14.8 5.8 13.0 5.5 7.4 15.3 14.9 12.0 16.2 17.1 17.2 17.3 18.9 8.5 11.2 2.6 3.7 4.0 2.9 3.6 3.9 3.5 3.9 4.1 3.1 3.5 3.5

33.5 23.6 2.7 3.5 6.9

0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 14.1 14.8 20.3 19.3

0.9 28.9

Source: Census of Population, 2000

0.5 8.7

0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 7.7 16.9 14.3 24.4 20.0 31.1

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Table 2.11 Educational Stream by Christianity Educational Stream Chinese English No Education Total

Non Christians

Christians

93.0 74.6 96.4 88.8

7.1 25.4 3.7 3.7

Source: SFAS88

(51.5%) were still those with a lower level of education—that is, below secondary qualifications. The language stream of an individual appears to have a strong influence on the religious affiliation of the resident population. Those who had an English stream education seemed more inclined to be Christians while a high proportion of Taoists and Buddhists came from Mandarin-stream educational backgrounds. An in-depth survey on 1025 HDB households done in 1988 also showed a correlation between educational streams and religious affiliation. 25.4% of those with an English stream education were found to profess Christianity while only 7.1% of those from the Chinese stream schools were Christians (Table 2.11). On the other hand, 67% of those with a Chinese stream education and 73.5% of those with no formal education consider themselves as Taoists. Only 39.6% of respondents with an English stream education claim to be Taoists (Table 2.12). Thus, just as Christianity is seen as a religion of the English educated, Taoism seems to be correlated with those who had a Chinese stream education. In Chapter Three, I will elaborate on the relationship between religion and education, both in terms of the level of educational attainment and language of education. I will illustrate that those who are exposed to a higher level of education tend to gravitate towards a religion that fits more closely with their world view, that is a person who is steep in a rationalistic, western based educational system tends to look for a religion that they view as more rational and systematic, rather than follow the religion of their parents which is based on ritual practices and sentiments.

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Table 2.12 Religious Affiliation by Stream of Education (%)

Shenism Buddhism Christianity No Religion Other Religions Total

Chinese

English

No education

67 17.2 7.1 7.8 0.9 45.7

39.6 17.5 25 16.4 1.4 27.6

73.5 18.4 3.7 4 0.4 26.8

Source: SFAS88

7. Religion and Socio-Economic Status Similar to findings relating to education and religion, the majority of Christians and those who profess to have No Religion come from a higher socio-economic background. In 1990, 28.3% of Christians and 24.6% of non-religionists were found among those in the professional and technical occupations (Table 2.13). These occupations tend to be more prestigious and better paid. In contrast, only 11.2% of Taoists were found in the same job sector (Table 2.13). The bulk of Taoists were employed in the production and sales/service sectors which are viewed as less prestigious. These occupations had low proportions of Christians and non-religionists. Table 2.13 Resident Working Population Aged 15 years and Over by Religion and Occupation (%) Religion

Total Professional/ Admin Clerical Sales/ Production Others Technical and Service and Managerial Related

Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholicism Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

30.9 20.9 13.3 4.8 8.5 15 3.9

23.0 11.2 28.3 8.5 19.8 9 3.3

33.9 18.9 18.7 6.7 12.0 3.4 2.5

29.9 13.7 18 7.1 10.9 16.2 3.8

34.6 25.5 7.8 3.5 4.3 16.1 3.8

32.7 27.4 4.7 2.1 2.6 20.6 4.5

30.8 18.4 17.8 6.1 11.7 8.8 5.6

0.6 15.4

0.6 24.6

0.7 21.9

0.6 17.8

0.6 11.6

0.4 9.7

0.9 17.7

Source: Census of Population, 1990

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Table 2.14 Resident Population Aged 15 years and Over by Religion and Type of Dwelling Religion

Christian Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

HDB 1 & 2 rms

HDB 3 rms

HDB 4 rms

HDB 5 rm and Exec

Private Apts & Houses

1990 2000 1990

2000 1990 2000

1990 2000

1990 2000

5.5 27.8 32.7 16.1 4.7

6.8 41.8 11.8 23.7 5.2

8.0 32.2 25.1 19.9 3.3

9.7 46.3 10.5 16.7 3.9

10.0 34.1 23.2 16.2 3.7

10.2 46.3 9.8 17.4 3.9

20.3 17.4 29.4 39.5 15.3 6.4 11.9 14.3 4.0 4.2

30.0 34.3 26.1 30.1 13.2 4.2 3.3 2.8 3.7 3.6

0.3 12.8

0.4 10.5

0.4 11.1

0.5 12.5

0.6 12.2

0.5 11.9

0.7 0.8 18.4 17.4

0.9 0.9 22.9 24.2

Source: Census of Population, 2000

Using housing type as another indicator of social economic status, the statistics in the 2000 Census reveal a similar trend with occupation. Christians and non-religionists tend to concentrate in private dwellings and better HDB housing categories, while those living in smaller HDB flats tend to profess Taoism. In 2000, 34.3% of Christians and 24.2% of non-religionists lived in private apartments and houses while only 4.2% of Taoists lived in the private residences. The highest proportion of Taoists (11.8%) lived in one- and two-room HDB flats (Table 2.14). Conclusion From the preceding overview of the situation of religions in Singapore, several trends can clearly be discerned. There has been a substantial growth in the number of Christians, a rapid decline in adherence to traditional Chinese religion, an increase in the number of persons who claim to have no religious affiliations, and some indications suggesting a revivalism in Buddhism. In addition, the findings suggested that the shifts in religious affiliations tended to follow certain demographic patterns. For instance, Christians tended to be younger in age, spoke English as a dominant home language, and were of higher socio-economic status in terms of occupation, income and housing type. Taking survey data objectively, then non-religionists

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shared almost the same characteristics as the Christians, except that while Christianity seemed to appeal more to the English-educated, No-Religion as a category attracted both English-educated and Chinese-educated Singaporeans. However, as noted earlier, the category of non-religionists needs to be treated with caution as some individuals who claim to be non-religionists still perform certain religious rites. Often, these people are unsure which religion they should identify themselves with and hence regard themselves as belonging to no particular religious group. This suggests that the quantitative surveys on religion may be skewed on the high end for those who claim to have No Religion. Taoists, on the other hand, exhibited very different demographic characteristics. They tended to be older in age, spoke dialects at home and had relatively lower socio-economic statuses. In this sense, those who were followers of Taoism were, in demographic terms at least, the opposite of those who were Christians. One of the main features of the current religious scene in Singapore is that the traditionally accepted “boundaries” of the respective religions have become amorphous and ambiguous. The religious ground is shifting. For example, there has been a distinct growth in Christianity and decline in Taoism in Singapore. While their numbers may be comparatively small, the fact that Christianity is most successful among the emergent and younger population, the higher educated and more-affluent Singaporeans, means that their dominance may be greater than their numbers suggest. In a sense, if this trend continues, we may find a demographic structure in which religious differences will coincide with language and social class differences. As such, a two-pronged problem emerges. On one level, we see an intertwining of race and religion, where the population is differentiated along ethnic lines, with Indians being Hindus, Malays as Muslims and Chinese as Buddhists and Taoists. On another level, an intertwining of social class and religion, with Chinese with lower socioeconomic status being primarily Taoists and those from the higher socio-economic class being Christians. Taking into account the strong emotional sentiments that can be attached to religion, the issues surrounding religious change and conversion is a fascinating topic for investigation. In the following chapter, detailed analyses for the three main religious categories, namely Christianity, the traditional Chinese

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religion (Taoism and Buddhism) and No Religion, which have undergone rapid changes in recent decades, are presented. Taking into these trends into account, the next chapter will examine the processes and factors accounting for the religious change and conversions in modern Singapore.

CHAPTER THREE

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION In sociological literature, conversion refers to a change in belief and personal identity.1 Conversion to another religion implies a transformation of identity or orientation in behavioural and cognitive referents. This could include a conscious shift in one’s sense of grounding, the displacement of one universe of discourse by another, or the ascendancy of a formerly peripheral universe of discourse to the status of a primary authority.2 In Singapore’s census survey, conversion to another religion is defined by self-identification, on self-report made by the individual involved. Qualitative processes, such as biographical reconstructions, causal connections, and the adoption of the “convert’s role”, cannot be studied. To help resolve this, the quantitative data is supplemented by one hundred extended case interviews with informants to study the actual conversion experiences and processes to provide a more in-depth analysis of the reasons for religious conversion. At this point, it is important to point out that in the censuses, questions on conversion were asked only among those who professed to belong to a certain religion, excluding all those who claimed to have no religious affiliation (the No Religion group). Thus, in the present analysis, conversion is defined as a transition from a previous religious (even non-religious) position to a certain new religion. By this definition, a switch from a certain religion to non-religion is not considered, and thus not analysed, as religious conversion, although a “switch” in religious preference has apparently taken place. In this chapter, I will examine the religious conversion process in Singapore over the last 50 years. Based on Census data as well as surveys conducted over that period, the chapter will examine the reasons for religious conversion: Who are the converts? What are

1 See, for example, Robert Balch, (1980), “Looking Behind the Scenes in a Religious Cult: Implications for the Study of Conversion”, Sociological Analysis 41:137–143. 2 See, for example, David Snow & Richard Machalek (1984), “The Sociology of Conversion”, Annual Review of Sociology 10:167–90.

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the religions that attract more converts? How and why are they changing their religious affiliations? An understanding of the pattern of their conversion will not only help to explain the changing profile in the past, but also to project the future trend of religious changes in multi-religious Singapore. The chapter will also show that in the context of Singapore, conversion to another religion does not necessitate a total shift in religious orientation and identity, the negation of an old self and its transplantation by a new self. Rather, given the linkage between religious behaviour and the cultural attributes of the population in Singapore, religious conversion often results in a hybridization of beliefs and ritual behaviour, not a total repudiation of the previous belief system. 1. Conversion Patterns in Singapore As the last chapter has demonstrated, the religious profile of Singapore society has shifted dramatically over the last 50 years. Given the rapidly changing religious profile in Singapore, it is important to find out the religious conversion pattern in Singapore. To an extent, in a multi-religious society experiencing rapid social change in the religious scene, a zero-sum game is being played between religions, and conversion becomes an integral part of the game. Obviously, with a trend of religious switching, some religions gain, in terms of the number of followers, at the cost of other religions. In Singapore, in recent decades, the shift has occurred primarily in favour of Christianity, and in the 1990s, Buddhism. Correspondingly, in the past few decades, there has been a decline in the proportion of Chinese who practice traditional Chinese religions, especially Taoism (Table 3.1). The 1990 Census shows that the majority of Singaporeans had been born into the religion they presently belonged to.3 As is shown in Table 3.1, among those who professed to belong to a certain religion, 88.5% claimed to have followed the religion of their parents. 3 The 1990 Census was the only Census that collected data on religious conversion, as well as religious participation. The other Censuses had only one question on religion, which measures religious affiliation. I was the consultant for the 1990 Census on the section on religion. Additional data on religious conversion were based on surveys that I conducted, including the 1989 Survey and the 1997 survey.

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This may seem, at one level, to contradict the earlier statement regarding the significant shift in the number of people becoming Christians. However, it should be noted that a census takes only cross-sectional cut in time, a synchronic slice. Christianity started its rapid growth in the early 1950s and has continued until now. Thus, some of the early Christians are themselves now parents, and their children would be “born into the religion”. Unfortunately, since the 1990 Census is the first to collect data on religious conversion, there is no benchmark data available for comparative analysis. What is clear though is that the changing religious profile in Singapore can only be accounted for through religious conversion. The rest, 14.5% of the population were not “born into their religion” having undergone religious conversion since birth. While they constituted only a moderate proportion of the population, the converts were the ones who, to a large extent, have accounted for the changing religious fabric of Singapore society (the other factor being migration).4 Table 3.1 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Religion and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion, 1990 Religion

Total

Born into Religion

Not Born

Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Religions

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

88.5 93.7 98.0 46.3 65.5 34.1 97.9 98.7 83.7

11.5 6.3 2.0 53.7 34.5 65.9 2.1 1.3 16.3

Source: Census of Population, 1990 4 While 14.5% may seem to be low, this figure must be understood in context. As noted earlier, the bulk of conversion to Christianity occurred between the 1950s and the 1980s. Moreover, the Census data on religious affiliations of the entire family is generally filled in by the head of household on behalf of all family members. Thus, even if the children had converted to Christianity, it is not unusual for the parent to list the child’s religious affiliation as being similar to the parents. This has resulted in discrepancies from various data sets regarding the number of Christians in Singapore. While the Census 1990 listed that there were 12.7% of Christians in Singapore, Kuo and Quahs’ survey in 1988, based on face to face interviews of 1000 respondents reported that there were 18.7% Christians in Singapore.

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Indeed, among the Christians, only 46.3% were born into the religion, while the majority (53.7%) were converts who used to profess another religion or who were not previously affiliated with any religion. Among the Christians, there was a clear distinction between Roman Catholics and Protestants in the conversion trend. 65.5% of Catholics were born into the religion, compared to only 34.1% among the Protestants. Notably, as many as 65.9% of all Protestant Christians were converts from another religion.5 The other religion comprising a noticeable, albeit smaller, number of converts is Buddhism, with 6.3% being converts from other religions, mostly Taoism. Buddhism gained in moderate number as a result of the conversion process. Although the 1990 figures for conversion to Buddhism were relatively lower than for Christianity, it is noted that there was a dramatic increase in the number of converts to Buddhism from 1990 to 2000. In 1990, the percentage of Buddhists was 31.2% rising to 42.5% in 2000. If we look specifically at the Chinese population, the increase is even more dramatic, from 34.3% in 1980, to 39.4% in 1990, and 53.6% in 2000, making it the dominant religion of the Chinese in Singapore. The success of Buddhism has been at the expense of Taoism, which saw dramatic decline in its membership, as well as direct competition with Christianity. In fact, between 1990 and 2000, the growth of Buddhism far surpassed Christianity, which gained 1.9%, compared to Buddhism’s 11.3%. The movement towards the intellectualization of the traditional Chinese religion has led to a renewed interest in Buddhism. This trend was encouraged by the inclusion of Buddhism as one of the six options of the Religious Knowledge course required of all secondary school students in the 1980s.6 The Buddhist movement has also found increasing support from the growing followers of the Singapore Soka Buddhist movement, the largest of the Japanese New Religions.7 This Buddhist sect has attracted a 5 This may be partly because Catholicism has a much longer history in Singapore compared to Protestant Christianity, as well as the fact that Catholicism was more successful in the early years of Singapore in attracting members. As such, the number of Catholics listed, as being born into the religion, is much higher. As noted earlier, the majority of converts to Protestant Christianity occurred in the 1950s to the 1980s. 6 The details of the Religious Knowledge Program and its impact on religions and religious conversion is discussed in Chapter 6. 7 I conducted an extensive study of Soka Gakkai in Singapore. This will be elaborated in detail in section 2 of this chapter.

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large number of young Chinese with its active outreach program and effective grassroots network. As I will argue later, part of the reason for the success of Buddhism is that it began to adopt a proselytizing approach to religion. The other religious groups have not seen any significant increase in membership due to conversion. More than 97% of Muslims and Hindus were born into their religion. As I have argued in Chapter 2, there is a close interrelationship between religion, ethnicity and the sense of community in these two religions, and conversion is often seen as giving up on their cultures. In addition, it should be noted that in Singapore, both Islam and Hinduism are not regarded as proselytizing religions, content to look after their members, who are mostly from the same ethnic group, rather than a mission to expand their membership through evangelism. They also do not see a threat to their membership as both Buddhism and Christianity have been largely unsuccessful in attracting Muslims and Indians in Singapore. 2. Conversion to Christianity If Christianity was one of the major religions experiencing growth, where did it get its converts from? Table 3.2 shows the previous religion of the Christian converts and reveals that 45.7% had converted from Taoism and another 44% from Buddhism. These were mostly Chinese. Relatively few came from a background of Hinduism (3.1%) or Islam (0.5%). Table 3.2 Christian Converts by Previous Religion Previous Religion Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Religions

Total (%)

Catholics

Protestants

100.0 44 45.7 6.7 2.8 3.9 0.5 3.1 –

100.0 44.5 37.4 11.6 – 11.6 1.1 5.3 0.1

100.0 43.8 48.6 5.0 3.7 1.3 0.3 2.3 –

Source: Census of Population, 1990

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It is important to remember that the growth of Christianity in Singapore happens within a specific socio-demographic sector of the population. These people have experienced, and are continuing to experience, an attitudinal shift, moving away from traditional Chinese ritual practices which they consider to be “illogical” and “irrational” to a belief system which they perceive to be more “rational”. In this context, conversion to Christianity has to do with some push factors, such as the nature of traditional Chinese religions, and certain pull factors, such as the nature of Christianity, the linkage between religion and the educational system, and the nature of a modern society. It is this perception of Christianity as a rational modern religion that partly explains its attractiveness to younger Singaporeans, who are themselves socialized into an English-stream western oriented educational system. This relationship between education and religion is clearly exemplified by the fact that for the better-educated Chinese, Christianity tends to appeal to those with an English-stream education, while those educated in the Chinese stream tend to decline any religious affiliation and become non-religionists. It has sometimes been argued that the religious trend in Singapore society is related to a process of secularization, that is, a process by which, increasingly, religion loses its predominance in defining the world-view of a group of people in a modern society. However, the census data clearly suggests that except for a small group of people who claim to have no religious convictions, the majority of Singaporeans still adhere to some form of religion, even though there may have been a switch from one to another. For both of those who have converted to another religion and those who have chosen to become non-religionists, a process of religious switching has taken place. How do we account for this switch? In Singapore, religious switching is related to individual social mobility, particularly to educational and occupational mobility. That is, it is a certain socio-demographic group of people who are switching from traditional religious beliefs to either Christianity or No Religion. The data show that “religious switchers” (including those who switch to non-religion) clearly differ in income, education, and socio-economic status from those who retain their traditional faith. A social class cleavage is particularly evident, with the higher-income, better-educated Singaporeans becoming Christians or non-religionists and the lower-income, less-educated Singaporeans staying in their

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traditional faith. Notably, this happens mostly to the Chinese population, and not the Malays for whom religion (Islam) serves as an ethnic/social marker. 3. Ethnicity and Religious Conversion In Singapore, religious conversion occurs primarily among the Chinese. While 14.8% of the Chinese were converts, only 2.9% of the Indians and 0.2% of the Malays had experienced shifts in religious affiliation (Table 3.3). This is consistent with the observation from the previous chapter, that in terms of religion, the Chinese were the most fragmented. If this trend continues, and indications suggest that it will; this pattern of religious pluralism among the Chinese in Singapore may lead to greater fragmentation. As a formerly shared moral universe is broken up into distinct social/class constituencies, the plausibility of that universe is undermined (cf. MacIntyre, 1967). What is even more significant in this transformation among the Chinese is that the “moral universe” of Buddhism/Taoism is not simply a religious one, but a cultural one as well. As such, we may find the parallel but diverging development of the rise of a group of Chinese who cease to adhere to their traditional cultural practices, side by side with another group that is more steeped in the Chinese cultural traditions that are embedded in the traditional religious systems and practices. For those Chinese who became dissatisfied with their traditional religion, the religious alternatives available are limited. Both Islam and Hinduism are viewed as ethnically based religion. Christianity

Table 3.3 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Ethnic Group and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion, 1990 Ethnic Group

Total

Born into Religion

Not Born

Total Chinese Malays Indians Others

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

88.5 85.2 99.8 97.1 89.2

11.5 14.8 0.2 2.9 10.8

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is an attractive option not only because it is perceived as being “rational,” its active proselytizing program, and fit-the-world view of the young English educated; it is also regarded as an ethnically neutral religion. For the Chinese educated Chinese who are dissatisfied with Taoism, however, Christianity is often viewed as an “English” religion. For them, they tend to switch to Buddhism or claim to have no religion. In terms of religious diversity, the Indian community was just as fragmented as the Chinese. While the majority of the Indians were Hindu, there were significant numbers of Muslims and Christians. The difference between the Chinese and Indians, however, is that while Chinese religious fragmentation in Singapore is mainly caused by religious conversion which took place in recent decades, the religious variety among the Indians reflects the historically heterogeneous nature of the Indians who migrated to Singapore, rather than with socio-cultural changes in Singapore society. This is substantiated by the fact that over 97.1% of Indians were “born into their religion,” and there was a conversion rate of only 2.9% (Table 3.3). 4. Age and Religious Conversion That religious conversion occurs mostly among the younger people is confirmed by the statistics from Table 3.4 which show the distribution of the age of the convert when conversion took place. Thus, 45.3% of the converts mentioned that the conversion took place when they were below 20 of age, and another 32.2% replied that they were 20–29 years old. This finding that religious conversion occurs relatively early in a person’s life is consistent with observations made by Elkind (1967) and Hunsberger (1978).8 The qualitative interviews conducted with informants confirm that religious conversion to Christianity occurs at a relatively young age. Among the 100 interviewees, the youngest convert became a Chris-

8 Extensive discussion on this point can be found in D. Elkind, “Age Changes in the Meaning of Religious Identity”, in R.D. Knudten, The Sociology of Religion, (New York: Appleton, 1967), pp. 182–187, and B. Hunsberger, “The Religiosity of College Students: Stability and Change Over Year at University,” in Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, No. 17, 1978, pp. 159–164.

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Table 3.4 Conversion by Age Group Age Group Total 0–9 Years 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50–59 Years 60 Years & Over

Per Cent 100.0 5.3 40.0 32.2 12.3 4.7 3.3 2.2

tian at the age of 12, and the oldest at 27.9 The majority of Christians (66%) converted between the ages of 14–19 years old. Of the rest, some (14%) converted between the ages of 9–13, while a minority (8%) converted above 20 years old. A small portion of the interviewees (12%) claimed that they did not undergo a conversion process. Of these, some were attending church since young while others had parents or close relatives who were Christians. These interviewees, however, did refer to a process of reaffirmation, or rededication of their lives to God. Reaffirmation, like conversion, generally took place between the ages of 14–19. Studies show that below the age of twelve, children are unable to form concrete conceptions of religious identity and possess a rather undifferentiated, immature impression of religion. Hence they tend to follow the religion of the family, if there is one. Beyond the age of twelve, however, the child begins to comprehend his own religious identity. During the teenage years, in a conducive social environment, a new religion may become something emanating for the self. This explains why even among interviewees who have attended church since young report that they undergo a process of reaffirmation during adolescence. One interviewee said, “I came from a convent school and since primary school, I attended chapel and took catechism classes. But I didn’t know God as a person. It was only in Secondary Four, when I went to a crusade that I first experienced

9 This interviewee actually became a Christian at a much earlier age and in fact was baptised when he was 24 years old. However, he felt that the “real” conversion took place at age 27.

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Table 3.5 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Age Group and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion Age Group Total 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50–59 Years 60 Years & Over

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

88.5 91.9 85.8 86.3 88.7 90.1 90.4

11.5 8.1 14.2 13.7 11.3 9.0 9.6

God touching my heart, and felt the in-dwelling of the Holy Spirit. It was only then that I felt I was a real Christian.” Once a person has passed the age of twenty, the “window of conversion” begins to close and the chances of that person converting to Christianity become more remote. This could be because once past adolescence, a person may have “made up his mind” about his religious affiliation. While conversion generally takes place when a person is young, the converts spread across all age groups in the total population. This is shown in Table 3.5 which compares the percentage of converts between all age groups. Here we find the difference in the proportion of converts between age groups was only moderate, except for the very old group. The percentages range between 14.2% for the 20–29 age group and 9% for the 50–59 age group. It is interesting to note that the percentage of the converts among the over 60 age group was as high as 9.6%. Assuming that most conversion takes place when one is young, this implies that most of the older converts made the switch some 20–30 years ago; suggesting that conversion (which generally means conversion to Christianity in the Singapore context) was not a recent phenomenon. This is consistent with the findings mentioned in the earlier chapter. Of course, this is not to deny that many conversions also took place among other age groups, in fact in all age groups. Meanwhile, it is also true that more active evangelist activities in recent decades have led to larger number of converts among the younger age groups.

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Table 3.6 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Sex and whether Born or Not Born into Religion, 1990 (%) Sex Persons Males Females

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

88.5 89.8 87.2

11.5 10.2 12.8

5. Gender and Religious Conversion As with the variables of age and ethnicity, but to a less distinctive extent, gender also shows a correlation with religious conversion. From Table 3.6, it is clear that more females had converted to another religion since birth (12.8%) as compared to the males (10.2%). This observation on gender and religious conversion must be understood within the context in which the data on conversion was gathered. In the first place, the statistics on conversion were based on those who professed to belong to a certain religion, excluding those who claimed to have no religious affiliation at all. It is known, as discussed earlier, that there were more males than females with no religious affiliation and hence being classified as non-religionists. Furthermore, religious conversion in Singapore refers mainly to conversion to Christianity, and only to a lesser degree to other religions. Taking note of the above, statistics from Table 3.6 are interpreted to imply two “hidden” findings: Firstly, Christianity has a particular appeal to females, relative to its appeal to males, as confirmed by the statistics on distribution of Christians by gender, discussed in the earlier chapter. This however must not be interpreted to mean that males are more loyal to their original religion, as compared with females. When males forsake their traditional religious beliefs, they may either convert to Christianity or revert to become a non-religionist. Also, it is important to understand the context of the role of women in religious rituals within the Chinese family. While it is men, given the patriarchal nature of Chinese society that represents the family in public in religious matters, the actual practice of Chinese religious behaviour, particularly in the context of family religion, is carried out by women. They are the ones responsible for the performance of daily ritual offerings and prayers to the deities and ancestors on behalf of the whole family. Thus, religious life for the Chinese centers on the women, rather than men.

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6. Education and Religious Conversion Conversion seems to be more common among those who have attained higher education. As is shown in Table 3.7, 40.6% of those with a university degree, and 28.9% of those with upper secondary education had converted into a new religion after birth. As a contrast, only 17% of those with a secondary education, and 7% with primary education were converts. Conversion rate was lowest among those with less than primary education (5.8%). This same pattern was also found among the student population. As can be seen from Table 3.8, the largest group of converts came from those attending higher levels of education, particularly those who were currently in the University (34.1%) and beyond (35.6%). Only 20.1% of those who were currently in upper secondary were converts. The percentage dropped to a low of 8% for those in secondary schools. Table 3.7 Resident Non-Student Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Highest Qualification Attained and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion, 1990 Highest Qualification

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

Total Below Primary Primary Secondary Upper Secondary and Polytechnic University

88.1 94.2 93.0 83.0 71.1

11.9 5.8 7.0 17.0 28.9

59.4

40.6

Table 3.8 Resident Students Aged 10 Years & Over by Level of Education Attending and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion Level of Education Total Primary Secondary Upper Secondary an Polytechnic University (1st degree) Postgraduate

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

90.4 97.3 92.0 79.9

9.6 2.7 8.0 20.1

65.9 64.4

34.1 35.6

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Generally speaking, for both the general public and the student population, there is a positive correlation between the propensity for religious conversion and the level of educational attainment. There are two factors that may account for this relationship: language, and the nature of modern education. In Singapore, as in other countries, rationalism is the underlying foundation of modern education. It emphasizes logical reasoning (inductive or deductive) and empirical observation. With an increasing level of education, more and more Singaporeans find it difficult to continue to accept the traditional religions of their parents that are perceived to be “irrational” and “mere superstitions”. Disillusioned, many choose to convert to Christianity or Buddhism, which, in contrast, are perceived to be orderly and systematic religions.10 This perception in part explains the appeal of Christianity and Buddhism to younger Singaporeans, who have been socialized in a rational educational system. Both Christianity and Buddhism are religions of the book, with established religious institutions such as the church or sangha, and both were once taught in Singapore’s formal educational system as a part of the Religious Knowledge programme. In this connection, it must also be pointed out that, in response to the perception that the traditional beliefs (such as Taoism among the Chinese) are irrational and superstitious, another “rational” choice is to decline religion totally, hence becomes an atheist or agnostic (i.e. non-religionist.) Indeed, this other viable option accounts for the equally significant pattern of growth involving the number of nonreligionists in the past decades. The appeal of Christianity in Singapore may also have something to do with the dominant language of education, English. Christianity, as a religion introduced into Singapore from the West, seems to have an affinity with the English language. As it is now, Christianity, especially among the young converts, is predominantly the religion of the English-educated population. It has been suggested that 10

It should be noted that these perceptions of Taoism as an “irrational” religion and Buddhism and Christianity as more “rational” religions are drawn from the statements made by the informants themselves. These comments about the rationality and irrationality of various religions, in fact, occurred very frequently in the interviews. Of course, from a sociological perspective, the rationality or irrationality of a religion is not an issue. In a sense, all religions are rational; at least in the sense of internal consistency, and from my perspective, it is treated as such. However, the fact that the informants constantly refer to the rationality or irrationality of religions in Singapore is sociologically interesting.

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a person’s language affects his entire world-view. According to SapirWhorf, language functions not simply as a device for reporting experience, but also as a way of defining experience for its speakers. It directs the perceptions of the speaker and provides the habitual modes for analyzing experience into significant categories.11 It is not simply the acquisition of the English language, however, that leads to conversion, but a combination of language stream, an educational system that stresses rational inquiry, and a society whose institutions and value systems are becoming affected by western ideas and lifestyles. The entire social fabric of Singapore society is being transformed. As more young Singaporeans are going through an educational system using English as the major school language, their attachment to the traditional beliefs and practices may further become weakened. Concomitantly, the environment becomes more conducive to the spread of the Christian faith. It should be noted, however, it is probably for these same reasons, that is, the perception of Christianity as an English-based western religion that might have prevented many Chinese-educated Chinese from converting to Christianity, as they see it as counter to Chinese culture. They may turn to Buddhism or simply claim to have no religion. The relevance of language to religious conversion is confirmed by statistics from Table 3.9 which shows the association between conversion and the major language spoken by the person. Of those whose language most frequently spoken was English, 30% had conTable 3.9 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Language Most Frequently Spoken and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion Language Most Frequently Spoken

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

Total English Mandarin Chinese Dialects Malay Indian Languages Others

88.6 70.0 88.5 90.9 98.6 98.2 85.9

11.4 30.0 11.5 9.1 1.4 1.8 14.1

11 See Harry Hoijer, Language in Culture, American Anthropological Association, No. 79, 1954.

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Table 3.10 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Private Households by Predominant Household Language and whether Born or Not Born into Religion Predominant Household Language Total English Mandarin Chinese Dialects Malay Indian Languages Others

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

88.6 70.9 88.7 90.3 98.6 98.1 87.3

11.4 29.1 11.3 9.7 1.4 1.9 12.7

verted to another religion, mostly Christianity. In contrast, only 11.5% and 9.1% of Mandarin and dialect speakers, respectively, had converted to another religion since birth. An analysis of the association between religious conversion and the major household language confirms the same pattern (Table 3.10). Among those from families with English as the dominant household language, 29.1% had converted to a different religion (mostly Christianity). As a contrast, those from Mandarin and dialect-speaking households had much lower rates of conversion, being 11.3% and 9.7% respectively. Christianity, probably due to the colonial influence in Singapore, is often associated with modernization and the English language. In fact, there is probably a subconscious notion among Singaporeans that the Christian God speaks English as a first language, exemplified in the statement of one interviewee, “English is my first language. It offers me direct access to God”. It is also significant that English is the primary language medium used in churches. Dialectbased churches, until recently, were witnessing a decline in membership. Christianity on the other hand is seen as not restricted to one ethnic group/social class. It is deemed to be linguistically neutral and not tied to any of the major ethnic groups in Singapore. This universalistic feature of Christianity, in which it is open to all races, is important. It is this perception of Christianity as a modern, English-based, ethnically neutral religion that partly explains for its attractiveness to the younger generation in Singapore, who are themselves socialized into an English-stream western-oriented educational system. One

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interviewee noted, “Christianity fits me and is relevant for my life”. This same reason probably accounts for why older Chinese are more resistant to religious conversion, as they view Christianity as western, and counter to Chinese culture. 7. Socio-Economic Status and Religious Conversion In addition to the level of education, other major indicators of socio-economic status (SES) are occupation and income. The association between educational level and the pattern of religious conversion, as discussed above, generally applies to occupation and income. There is a strong correlation between conversion and the occupational status. Among the working population, conversion was most prevalent among those with a higher occupational status, with the largest group being “professional and technical” (28.7%) followed by “clerical” (19.6%) and “administrative and managerial” (19.0%). At the other end of the spectrum, conversion to another religion was very rare among those from the lower occupational groups, with the lowest being “production and related” (5.1%). (Table 3.11) The rate of conversion was also related to the level of household income. (Table 3.12) Persons from households earning more than $6,000 a month were more likely to have converted to a different religion since birth (21.3%), compared with those from households earning $5,000–5,999 (17.4%). As a contrast, only 7.8% of those from families earning below $1,000 had switched to another religion. Table 3.11 Resident Working Population Aged 15 Years & Over by Occupation and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion Occupation Total Professional/Technical Administrative/Managerial Clerical Sales and Services Production and Related Others

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

87.0 71.3 81.0 80.4 92.2 94.9 84.6

13.0 28.7 19.0 19.6 7.8 5.1 15.4

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Table 3.12 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Monthly Household Income from Work and Whether Born or Not Born into Religion Monthly Household Income from Work

Born into Religion

Not Born into Religion

Total Below $1,000 $1,000–$1,999 $2,000–$2,999 $3,000–$3,999 $4,000–$4,999 $5,000–$5,999 $6,000 and Above

88.5 92.2 92.3 90.6 87.9 84.8 82.6 78.7

11.5 7.8 7.7 9.4 12.1 15.2 17.4 21.3

In this connection, it should be noted that these socio-economic variables, i.e. education, occupation, and household income, are interrelated, and cannot be viewed in isolation. In other words, conversion to another religion in Singapore (which means mostly Christianity) tends to occur within a particular demographic sector of the population: the younger, better educated, and those from the more prestigious and higher income occupational groups. I am not suggesting that it is these structural features, whether education, language, or socio-economic status, that are the causes of religious conversion in Singapore. After all, conversion, in a sense, is a personal process, and to a degree, an emotional and transcendental experience. However, it is clear that conversion in Singapore tend to related to a certain “class” or niche group. But it does not mean that this implies a class-consciousness or class objectivity. Rather, I argue that these structural features predispose the individual with a particular worldview, and thus a search for a religion which is congruent with that particular way of looking at the world, once they are dissatisfied with their previous religion. As Geertz (1973:90) correctly noted, in religious belief and practice, a group’s ethos is rendered intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life ideally adapted to the actual state of affairs the worldview describes; while the worldview is rendered emotionally convincing by being presented as an actual state of affairs, peculiarly well arranged to accommodate such a way of life. Religious symbols formulate a basic congruence between a particular style of life and a specific, if

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often implicit, metaphysics, and in so doing, sustain each other with the borrowed authority of the other. 8. Individual Religion and Household Religion One of the many consequences of the shifts in religious affiliations is the fragmentation of religious beliefs within the family household in Singapore. While it can be suggested that in the past, the household religion is closely associated with the religion of the head of household, in Singapore, with many young Singaporeans changing their religious affiliations, we begin to witness a fragmentation in the religious makeup within the family, both between the older and younger generations and between the religions of spouses. As the table above indicates, given the different religious conversion experiences for the different religions in Singapore, there are variations in the individual’s religion in relation to the dominant religion of the household.12 There is a higher degree of homogeneity Table 3.13 Resident Population Aged 10 years and over by Religion and Predominant Household Religion Religion/ Budd/ Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hindu No Household Taoism Total Religion Religion Total Budd/ Taoism Budd Taoism Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hindu No Relig

55.4

11.1

4.8

6.3

15.3

3.7

14.0

94.5 94.6 94.4 13.1 5.4 17.7 0.1 0.4 22.7

1.1 1.1 1.1 76.2 88.9 68.7 0.1 1.2 4.7

0.3 0.4 0.3 33.7 87.2 1.7 0.1 0.7 1.6

0.8 0.7 0.8 42.5 1.7 67.0 – 0.5 3.1

– – – 0.1 0.2 0.1 99.5 96.5 0.3

– 0.1 – 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2

4.4 4.2 4.5 10.0 4.9 13.0 0.1 0.3 72.0

12 In the Census, the dominant religion of the household is defined as the religion or religious category followed by a majority of its household members. For instance, if three members of a 5-member household are Christians, the household is considered a Christian household. If two or a 3 member household claim to have no religion, this household is classified as a No Religion household.

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between the religion of the individual and dominant household religion for some religions in Singapore, including Buddhism, Taoism, and Islam. Given the correlation between religion and ethnicity for the Malays, and the extremely low rate of conversion, Islam has the highest homogeneity, with 99.5% of respondents sharing the religion of the household. Given that the bulk of religious conversion occurred among the Christians, it is not surprising that this religion has the most significant diversity between personal and household religion. Only 76.2% of those whose personal religion was Christianity came from Christian households. Protestant Christians have a higher degree of variance compared to Catholicism. A sizable 13.1% (17.7% for Protestants) of Christians live in households where the parents are Taoists or Buddhists. Qualitative data collected from face to face interviews with informants suggest that this has often led to tensions and conflicts within the households, especially disagreements when it comes to performing rituals, particularly death and ancestral rituals for the parents. Similar patterns are found when comparing the religion of the husband with that of the religion of the wife. Of all the religions, Islam and Hinduism have the highest level of correlation between husbands and wives. Given the close interrelationship between religion and ethnicity, where even in inter-ethnic marriages, the spouse has to convert to Islam, the homogeneity between the religion of the spouses in Islam is understandable. Similarly, in Hinduism, the requirements of religious proscriptions, especially since many of the rituals associated with Hinduism in Singapore are household based rituals, the high degree of homogamy in Hinduism in understandable. Table 3.14 Religion of Husband by Religion of Wife Relig of Total Budd Taoism Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism No Husband/ Total Relig Relig of Wife Total 100.0 100.0 Buddhism 32.6 90.9 Taoism 23.5 2.4 Christian 11.3 1.3 Catholic 4.6 0.5 Protestant 6.7 0.8 Islam 16.0 – Hinduism 3.6 0.1 No Relig 12.4 5.2

100.0 3.4 91.7 0.9 0.3 0.6 – – 4.0

100.0 5.1 2.6 76.1 31.8 44.3 0.1 0.9 15.0

100.0 5.1 2.3 78.6 74.7 3.9 0.2 1.3 12.2

100.0 5.1 2.7 74.3 2.3 72.0 0.1 0.6 17.0

100.0 0.1 – 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.4 0.2 0.1

100.0 0.3 0.1 1.7 1.1 0.6 0.5 96.4 0.4

100.0 9.3 4.8 8.8 2.8 6.0 0.1 0.2 76.7

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The largest variation between the religion of the husband and religion of the wife is found in Christianity, with 76.1% of Christian wives sharing the same religion as their husbands. The others either marry non-religionists (15%), of those who follow traditional Chinese religions (7.7%). Similarly, 76.6% of married women with no religion marry husbands with also no religion. 9. Religious Conversion 1980 to 2000 In examining the data on religious conversion from 1980 to 1990, and from 1990 to 2000, it can be observed that there are significant differences between the two time periods. It was earlier noted that the conversion process tended to take place among the younger Chinese Singaporeans. This is clearly borne out when we examine the age cohort comparison from 1980 to 1990. As can be seen in Table 3.15, the growth in Christianity is particularly prevalent among the young. The cohort change for those 20–29, from 1980 to 1990, is 4.5%, and 3.1% for those aged 30–39. This drops dramatically for those aged 40 to 49 (1.1%), and 50 to 59 (0.7%). Also, the table shows that the growth in Christianity is primarily occurring among the Protestant Christians, and not among the Catholics. Across all age groups, the age cohort growth for Catholics is less than 0.4%. Table 3.15 Age Cohort Comparison Christians in 1980 and 1990 Religion/Age Cohort Christianity 1980 1990 (Change)

10–19 20–29 30–39 40–49

50–59

60 & above

Total

9.7 11.7

10.6 14.2 (4.5)

11.2 13.7 (3.1)

10.6 12.3 (1.1)

10.1 11.3 (0.7)

8.6 11.2 (1.1)

10.3 12.8

Catholics 1980 1990 (Change)

4.0 4.3

4.3 4.3 (0.3)

5.4 4.7 (0.4)

5.5 5.7 (0.3)

5.1 5.5 (0.0)

4.0 4.9 (–0.2)

4.6 4.8

Protestants 1980 1990 (Change)

5.7 7.6

6.4 9.9 (4.2)

5.8 9.0 (2.8)

5.1 6.6 (0.8)

5.1 5.8 (0.7)

4.5 6.3 (1.2)

5.7 8.0

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Table 3.16 Age Cohort Comparison Religion 1990 and 2000 (Resident population Aged 15 and Over) Religion/Age

15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55 & above 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000

Christianity

13.2 12.8 (–0.4)

14.0 15.8 (1.8)

12.7 15.7 (3.0)

11.4 14.4 (3.4)

11.1 13.7 (2.6)

Buddhism

29.1 38.9 (9.8)

29.8 40.2 (10.4)

32.6 41.5 (9.9)

34.2 44.9 (10.7)

32.0 47.4 (15.4)

Taoism

18.9 8.4 (–10.5)

17.2 15.1 (–2.1)

13.2 15.7 (2.5)

12.4 13.0 (0.6)

13.8 12.3 (–1.5)

Islam

17.7 18.6 (0.9)

17.2 15.1 (–2.1)

13.2 15.7 (2.5)

12.0 13.0 (1.0)

13.8 12.3 (–1.5)

3.6 3.5 (–0.1)

3.9 4.6 (0.7)

3.4 4.5 (1.1)

3.6 3.6 (0.0)

4.2 3.5 (–0.7)

0.5 0.6 (0.1)

0.6 0.6 (0.0)

0.5 0.7 (0.2)

0.6 0.6 (0.0)

0.6 0.7 (0.1)

No religion

16.9 17.3 (0.4)

16.0 18.1 (2.1)

14.8 15.0 (0.2)

11.2 13.7 (2.5)

8.6 9.8 (1.2)

Total

100

100

100

100

100

Hinduism Other Religions

100

100

100

100

100

If we examine the age cohort change between 1990 and 2000, there are some major differences in the pattern of religious conversion. As can be observed from the table above, both Christianity and Buddhism have witnessed growth from 1990 to 2000, with Buddhism registering a more dramatic shift. However, what is interesting is that the growth in Christianity was not primarily from the younger Chinese, but rather from the older Chinese Singaporeans. See Table 3.16. For example, the percentage of Christians in the 15–24 age group has in fact witnessed a decline, from 13.2% in 1990, to 12.8% in 2000, and a slight growth of 1.8% (14.0 to 15.8%) for those aged 25 to 34. The highest growth is in fact among the older Singaporeans, 3% growth for those aged 35–44, and 3.4% for those 45 to 54. If we do an age cohort comparison, then the growth in Christianity from 1990 to 2000 was seen across all age groups, instead of merely among younger Singaporeans as seen in the data from 1980 to 1990. For example, 2.8% growth for those aged 15 to 24, 2.7% for those aged 25 to 34, 1.7% for those ages 35 to 44, and

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2.3% for those aged 45 to 54. I suggest that the increasing success of Christianity may be due to the change in the strategy of the church and para-church group in their outreach program. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the strategy of the church was to reach out to the young, and energy and resources were directed towards this group. For example, groups such as the Inter-School Christian Fellowship, Eagles, and Navigators, focused much of their missionary work among school going children and teens. In the 1990s, there was a shift in the strategy and the focus was on a largely untapped market of older, dialect speaking Chinese Singaporeans. The strategy seems to have worked, as the following table demonstrates. When cross-tabulating religion by language most frequently spoken at home, and comparing the 1990 and 2000 Census data, it shows that the growth in Christianity is most visible for the dialect speaking homes. For example, the growth in Christianity in English speaking home was only 0.6%, while that in Chinese dialect speaking homes was 1.7%. In contrast, the period from 1990 to 2000 witnessed significant growth in the number of Buddhists in Singapore. Unlike Christianity, Buddhism seems to be attractive to Singaporeans from all age groups, with over 10% points change across the age range. For example, among those aged 25 to 34, age cohort growth registered 11.2% (from 29.1% to 40.2%). Similarly, age cohort growth for those aged 35 to 44 was 11.7% (29.8% to 41.5%) and 12.3% for those aged 45 to 54, from 32.6% to 44.9%. The highest growth is among those aged 55 and above, registering over 15-percentage points change. Table 3.17 Resident population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion by Language Most Frequently Spoken at Home Religion

English

Mandarin

Chinese Dialects

Malay

Tamil

Others

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 Christianity 39.2 39.8 (0.6) Buddhism Taoism

8.2 8.3 (0.1)

8.2 9.9 (1.7)

0.7 0.7 (0.0)

8.2 6.7 (–1.5)

11.1 11.1 (0.0)

21.2 24.8 (3.6)

43.1 60.0 (16.7)

43.2 61.0 (17.8)

0.4 0.2 (–0.2)

0.1 0.1 (0.0)

3.7 10.3 (6.6)

7.2 2.2 (–5.0)

26.7 11.2 (–15.5)

36.0 15.5 (–20.5)

0.2 0.0 (–0.2)

0.0 0.0 (0.0)

0.1 0.5 (0.4)

Source: Census of Population, 2000

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In examining the age cohort changes among the other religious groups, different patterns were observed. There is a general decline in Taoism, which registers across all age groups, although it was still steepest among the younger Singaporeans. Thus, while the decline in Taoism in the 1970s and 1980s was due primarily to the younger Singaporeans switching their religious affiliations from Taoism to Christianity, the dramatic decline in Taoism in the 1990s was due to both the young and the older Singaporeans switching their religious affiliations, mostly to Buddhism, with a lower number to Christianity. It is a contentious point, however, whether this move to Buddhism, particularly among the older Singaporeans represents a conversion in the more classical sense of the word, that is, a change in beliefs and personal identity, and a transformation of orientation and cognitive referent, or more of a switching of religious labels. This will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter when dealing with conversion to Buddhism. For those who claim to have no religion, the pattern of change from 1990 to 2000 is slightly different. The data suggests that those who adopt this label tend to be younger Singaporeans, and there is little change among older Singaporeans. For example, there is a 1.2% increase for those aged 25 to 34 in those who claim to have no religion. However, there is a decline among the older Singaporeans who claim to have no religion. Thus, only 15% of the age cohort 35 to 44 claims to have no religion, a drop of 1% from the 1990 Census. Similarly, the 45 to 54-age cohort registered a decline of 1.1%. Even among the very old, 55 years old and above, there is a decline of 1.4% claiming to have no religion. 9. Process of Religious Conversion to Christianity The preceding section showed that converts to Christianity fit a certain socio-demographic profile. Generally, higher-income, better educated Singaporean Chinese are less-educated Singaporeans staying in their traditional faith. The following section examines the processes and factors accounting for religious conversion to Christianity. Based on in-depth interviews carried out with over 100 informants, it offers insights into the processes involved in religious conversion. Why do the Chinese in Singapore find Christianity attractive? Who influences them to become Christians? How are they converted? Finally, why

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do they become Christians? The central question, then, is to account for the religious shifts that are occurring in Singapore society. One of the main trends is the rapid growth in Christianity and the decline of traditional Chinese religion. In fact, the majority of converts to Christianity come from families where the parents are Buddhists, Taoists, or practise ancestor worship. 9.1. Influences underlying Religious Conversion The majority of interviewees (68%) said that they were exposed to Christianity and converted through the influence of friends. This either takes the form of direct evangelism that is, preaching the gospel and having discussions about religion, or more passive methods of bringing the person to a gospel rally or to church. About one fifth of the interviewees said that they were brought to Christ by relatives (aunts, uncles, brothers, and sisters) or because they come from Christian families. Of the rest, some became Christians through direct evangelism by strangers or through participation in Biblecorrespondence courses. A few felt that it was school teachers who influenced them to convert to Christianity. The importance of friends as a factor in religious conversion must be seen in conjunction with the fact that conversion takes place at a relatively young age. At this age, social relationships are extremely important. There is a desire to be accepted and a willingness to conform to peer pressure. Interviewees often mention the closeness and common bond of Christians as a positive attribute of Christianity. Thus, the readiness to convert to Christianity may be linked to a desire to become an “insider” in the group. Christianity has the ability to draw people together because of shared values. The creation of this community, reinforced through regular interaction, confers a sense of belonging and identity for the individual. Thus, social networks are very important in accounting for conversion in Singapore. It is especially so among the young where peer pressure and acceptance are vital for personal identity and affective ties. However, the pattern of conversion to Christianity in Singapore is not simply due to the greater propensity of the young to seek a new religion or simply the need for peer acceptance and companionship. As I will further elaborate in Chapter 4, part of the reason for the growth in Christianity among the young is because the churches, in line with

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the argument that there is religious competition among the various religions, over the years, have targeted this group as “fertile ground” for conversion. Christian churches and para-church groups use friendship networks as a basis for recruitment. Members in the churches are constantly exhorted that it is part of their religious duty to bring friends and classmates to church meetings, particularly evangelistic services. The important role of friendship in religious conversion lends support to Lofland and Stark’s (1965) hypothesis that people become converts gradually through the influence of social relationships, especially during times of personal strain.13 However, this emphasis on the role of social relationships in conversion also suggests that religious commitment is subject to change in response to shifting patterns of association. For example, when a person moves into an environment where there are fewer Christians, such as from the school to the work place, there may be a reduction in commitment to Christianity. Parents and relatives are also important sources of religious socialization. Many interviewees felt that it was the early exposure to Christianity that partly account for their conversion. Others, however, indicated that it was the exposure to church activities rather than the fact of having Christian parents that was responsible for their conversion to Christianity. 9.2. Where Are They Converted? Over half the interviewees said that they accepted Christ in school. The school environment, with constant, intimate contact among students, is a fertile ground for religious proselytization. Churches and para-church groups are acutely aware of this and the school is a target population for most of their activities. For example, in many schools there are weekly meetings which are held after school hours, either within the school premises or in a nearby church. Sng and You (1982), and Hinton (1985), have suggested that students in

13 See John Lofland and Rodney Stark, “Becoming a World Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 20, No. 6, 1965, pp. 862–74.

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mission and convent schools are more likely to convert to Christianity.14 This observation is supported by the data collected for this study. Inaugurated in 1852, mission school education has continued until today. Beginning with St Joseph’s Institution, a Catholic school for boys, there are now 19 Catholic schools for boys and 31 Catholic schools for girls. In addition, there is also a Catholic Junior College, set up in 1974 for pre-university education. Traditionally, the older established Christian denominations have also been involved in education. The Methodists, Anglicans and Presbyterians have 17 schools of various levels among them. Christians who attended such schools mention the early exposure to chapel, mass, and catechism classes, as contributory factors for religious conversion. It is interesting to note, however, that many girls who attend convent schools actually converted to Protestant Christianity rather than Roman Catholicism. Part of the reason for this may be because the Protestant paraChurch groups were very active in proselytizing in schools, compared to Catholic churches. Other than schools, most interviewees accepted Christ in church (28%) or at gospel rallies (12%). Gospel rallies are special evangelistic meetings directed specifically at converting non-believers. Some of these mass-rallies are huge, such as the Billy Graham Crusade in 1978, when the National Stadium, with over 50,000 seats, was filled to capacity for six consecutive nights. Other big rallies that were held in Singapore in the 1980s were the “Here’s Life Crusade”, and the “Luis Palau” crusade. Many churches also hold gospel rallies in the church premises. At these gospel rallies, central themes in the Christian message, such as the sinful nature of man, Christ’s sacrificial death on the Cross, God’s redemption of man, and salvation through Christ, are constantly repeated. Charismatic speakers implore the audience to turn away from their sins and to “return” to God. At the end of the message, the mood at a gospel rally is always solemn and quiet. At this juncture, the audience will be invited to make a commit-

14 See Bobby E.K. Sng and You Poh Seng, Religious Trends in Singapore: With Special Reference to Christianity, Graduates Christian Fellowship and Fellowship of Evangelical Students, 1982), p. 47, and Keith Hinton, Growing Churches Singapore Styles: Ministry in an Urban Context, (Singapore: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1985).

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ment to God by raising their hands or coming forward to the pulpit. Churches have adopted many innovative types of gospel rallies, such as musicals and Christmas cantatas. Many rallies also emphasize the healing of sicknesses and performing miracles. Other interviewees (12%) accepted Christ at home, or in public places. Some became Christians while serving their national service. 9.3. The Conversion Process Religious conversion is a highly complex process. Many variables, both psychological and social, play a part in a person’s decision to accept an alternative religion. In the study, interviewees were asked to describe, in detail, how they became Christians. From these openended answers, two main types of responses were identified. One is an emotional conversion; the other is an intellectual conversion. 9.3.1. Emotional Conversion The emotionalist often gets converted at a gospel rally, or when faced with a personal problem. The process of conversion is often characterized as a personal experience with a supernatural God. Common responses of how they felt at the moment of conversion are exemplified by statements like, “I felt a total breakdown of myself ”, “I cried to God and He spoke to me”, or “I was touched by the Holy Spirit”. Even so, as noted earlier, conversion is often not a one-off, sudden event, but often through exposure to the religion over time, as the case below exemplifies. Thus, even for an emotionalist conversion, there has been a period of thinking over and evaluating religious options before final conversion. While the act of commitment may be sudden and dramatic, the actual conversion is a result of a continual exposure and reinforcements regarding the new religion. Case 1: Interviewee is a 19-year old junior college student. Both parents are Chinese religionists: “I have attended church services with my aunt before, but Christianity was always rather faint for me. One day, two years ago, I felt the urge to visit a church. I called a friend who brought me to a gospel rally. I can still remember that day clearly. The speaker was giving a message on how Christ died for our sins on the cross. At that time, I could feel the presence of God and felt that He was talking to me. Deep in my heart I could hear

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God calling me to confess my sins and come to him. At the end of the message, the choir began singing a hymn, “Just as I am”, and the speaker asked those who wanted to accept the Lord to raise their hands. I accepted Jesus Christ as my Saviour. After I came to know the Lord, I felt free inside, as if all my sins were washed away. I was joy-filled and enjoyed lots of inner peace. I really thank God for his timing. Praise the Lord for everything, his love and patience.” 9.3.2. An Intellectual Conversion The intellectual approach to Christianity is more prevalent. Conversion is often described as a gradual process of coming to terms with Christianity. Common reasons given for conversion are “Christianity is a rational religion”, “Christianity provides the truth”, or “I cannot prove Christianity wrong”. Many interviewees, particularly university students, indicate that they accepted Christianity because it is a rational religion. One interviewee said, “Christianity provides the truth. It is the most rational religion. I cannot prove it wrong. Until I can prove that Christ does not exist, I will continue to believe in Him.” Christianity is a religion of the book with an established church. It is seen as an orderly and systematic religion. Case 2: Interviewee is a 21-year old university undergraduate: “Since young, I followed my mum to the temple to pray. I did not understand any of the rituals, and just did what my mum said. In junior college, I came into contact with a group of Christian friends. They began to talk to me about Christianity and gave me books to read. I actually became more confused and perturbed. Why are there so many religions? I began to ask many questions. I had discussions, sometimes arguments, with my Christian friends. As I searched more and more, Christianity became more real to me. I began going to church with my friends to attend Sunday school. I could sense that I have the right religion, as I could not find anything that is contradictory about Christianity. There is a reality in Christianity. It is a personal relationship with God.” Conversion to Christianity tends to be a gradual process of continued exposure to the religion; in schools, in churches, through friends and relatives. Thus, increased exposure can lead to an increase in number of Christians. It is possible that the introduction of Bibleknowledge, as part of the school curriculum, may have the indirect

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function of promoting Christian conversion.15 Another non-religious activity of the church which may affect the rate of Christian conversion is the church kindergarten. Although explicitly educational, church kindergarten provides, for children of non-Christian families, the first exposure to Christianity. Open to children of all ethnic and religious groups, the kindergarten program includes the singing of Christian songs, telling of Bible-stories and prayers. Although insufficient in itself for conversion, the early exposure will have effects on future conversion. These case studies of conversion experiences suggests that in studying religious conversions in Singapore, greater emphasis must be placed on the idea of an “active” convert evaluating the validity of his or her beliefs (Richardson 1985, Dawson 1990, cited in Tan 1997). The point is not that of a passive convert, but rather of an active agent seeking meaning. In choosing to convert, the individual evaluates religion not only as a problem solving mechanism, but also how it is congruence with their conception of personal identity and worldview. Thus, conversion, both the emotional and intellectual kinds, is processual rather than instantaneous. I argue that accounting for conversion in Singapore, whether to Christianity, and as I will show later, to Buddhism, have to do with seeing Christianity as a rational religion compared to Taoism. Conversion has to do with a gradual process of cognitive and affective evaluation of the new religion, what Richardson (1980) describes a “sequential trying out of new beliefs and identities in an effort to resolve felt difficulties.” However, in the Singapore context, the possibilities of conversion are constrained by the social environment. It is not an open market. Given the cultural context of being a Chinese in Singapore, and the close inter-linkage between religion and ethnicity, the religious options available are limited for those who are dissatisfied with their previous religion. The traditional way of accounting for conversion have focused on psychological and deterministic factors, often assuming the negation of the old self and the implantation of a new self. The data on religious conversion suggests that 15 In Singapore, from 1984 to 1990, all students are required to take a course in religion as part of the school curriculum. Details of the program and its impact on religious affiliations and religious change in Singapore will be discussed in Chapter 5.

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while it is true that it is the individual who converts, and is seen be him or her as a personal decision, conversion in Singapore must be viewed in the context of social structural and cultural constraints. Religious affiliation is socially structured. 9.4. Anomie and Religious Conversion to Christianity There is a contention (see Hinton 1985) that the social-psychological condition of anomie is the primary factor responsible for religious conversion or religiosity in Singapore. Merton defines anomie as “a breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them”.16 Anomie, according to Durkheim, is a state of moral anarchy in the economic sphere, where men’s thoughts and desires are insufficiently controlled and where the individual is not in harmony with his condition. Such a state is accompanied by feelings of weariness, disillusionment, disturbance, anger, and an irritated disgust with life.17 An anomic person will feel a sense of powerlessness, an inability to affect the conditions of his life, a state of normlessness, social isolation, and lacks a sense of community. He finds work to be meaningless, playing a role in an impersonal system that he does not control. However for the majority of the population in Singapore, the conversion to Christianity cannot be explained by the existence of an anomic state in the converts prior to conversion. When asked to recall if they encountered any specific problems prior to conversion, the majority of the interviewees (60%) said no. In fact, most people were more inclined to give spiritual explanations, such as “it was God’s will”, “God’s timing”, or “God answered my prayers”, as being responsible for their decision to accept Christianity.”18

16

Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 185–214. 17 See Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1973), pp. 210–218. 18 This does not suggest that Christianity is the only religion capable of meeting human needs. Clearly, Buddhism, Taoism, or any other religion, has spiritual benefits for their adherents. In the interviews with Christians who have converted from other religions, however, a main theme that emerged was the constant comparison between their perception of Chinese religion as being unreal and illogical and the

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About 20% of the interviewees indicated that they faced problems prior to conversion. Of these, some converted after there were deaths in the family or because of relationship problems (break-up with girlfriends or boyfriends), family problems, or due to the anxiety of impending examinations. Case 3: Interviewee is an 18-year old student. Both parents are Chinese religionists: “I was brought up in a Catholic school and my teachers would often read Bible stories to us. However, I was not really influenced as I felt that I didn’t need God. However, two years ago, my grandmother passed away. She had breast cancer. I was very close to her and her death really left me shattered. I remembered I couldn’t eat and cried everyday. I kept on asking, “Why did my grandmother have to die?” It was during this time of anguish and hurt that my Christian friends turned up to support and be with me. The care and concern of my Christian friends really encouraged me. It was then that I realized God’s love, someone who is always there to listen to me and hold on to me. I was in my bedroom with my friend when I decided to accept Christ. We knelt beside the bed and I prayed to God to forgive me and to come into my life.” It is important to note that these are personal problems and not structural breakdowns or normative confusion at a societal level. At a time of personal crisis, religion functions to provide comfort and security for the individual. Many interviewees, for example, mention that when they have problems, they will turn to God for help. A small minority of the sample can be classified as anomic prior to religious conversion. Some interviewees mentioned that they became Christians because life was meaningless or that they felt lost and empty. Others said that they became Christians because of loneliness. One interviewee noted, “I felt lonely. In my secondary school I had more friends. Now, I don’t have many friends. I became a Christian because God can be a friend forever, and I don’t have to be lonely anymore.”

belief that Christianity is able to satisfy their religious needs. In this sense, Christianity is able to provide something that young English-educated Chinese Singaporeans find wanting in Chinese religion.

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These interviewees claim that they lack direction in life. They complain about the uncertainty of the future, and unanswered questions of “Who am I?”, “Why am I here?”, and “Where am I going when I die?” It is this inability to find meaning in life that accounts for their conversion to a religion that promises answers to these questions. Case 4: Interviewee is a 21-year old university student. Parents are Chinese religionists: “Before I became a Christian, I found life to be very meaningless. It was so routine and empty and people reduced to merely economic digits. I also faced family problems. Being the youngest child, I was quite isolated from the rest of the family. Since I am a shy person, I do not have many friends to turn to when I am confused or when I have problems. Last year, I was invited to a church meeting. There, I heard the voice of God talking to me, telling me that the cause of my problem is sin and that the Lord will meet all my needs. That night, I cried out to God and requested that He come into my life.” In reviewing and analyzing these case studies and accounts of religious conversion, I am aware that there are methodological issues relating to the reliability and validity of informants’ account of their religious conversion. As Beckford has noted, conversion accounts are forms of social construction and therefore not necessarily neutral or objective: ‘actors’ accounts of their religious conversion as situated in social contexts which lend them meaning” (Beckford 1978:250). They are expressions of practical reasoning about the problem for them of discovering appropriate ways to describe what supposedly happened in the course of their conversion. Similar concerns have been raised by Preston (1981) and Snow (1976). While these concerns are important, it should be noted that many of these studies relate to new religious movements. For example, Beckford’s analysis was based on a study of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Snow on the Soka Gakkai, where it can be argued that there is a higher degree of social control by the leaders of the religion and greater rigidity in adherence to the group’s ideology and belief systems. This can partly account for the greater commonality in constructing an appropriate account of the conversion experience. I would suggest that in Singapore, the conversion to Christianity, both mainline as well as Charismatic movements, does not exert the same degree of control in the “official script” as one would find in

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groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and Soka Gakkai. While not claiming that the conversion accounts reported by the informants are “objective,” what the fieldwork does show is that there are recurring themes though not using the same terminologies and “conversion careers”, even if it is true that they are social reconstructions, which occur in the converts’ account of their conversion experience.19 For example, a recurring theme that surfaces in the interviews is the often-quoted statement that “Christianity is a rational religion compared to Taoism.” I regard this as significant. It should be noted that during my fieldwork, attending numerous church services, cellgroup and bible study meetings, this comment that Christianity is a rational religion was never mentioned by the church leaders or in their sermon to the congregation. Snow and Machalek (1984) suggest that conversion narratives are processes of biographical reconstructions, and such personal biographies are constantly reinterpreted in the face of new information and experiences. Moreover, as part of “master attribution,” there are cognitive processes which the converts employ in forming causal explanations (Tan 1997). While I do agree that the accounting of conversion must be viewed as narratives, whether they are actual occurrences, I argue, is a moot point. What is more important is what the discourses of these narratives tell us. In the interviews with the converts, several patterns were observed. For example, many informants noted that they had to deal with the ambiguities of their parents’ religion, especially the Taoists, in making sense of their own lives. They often mention the search for a true and rational religion that is relevant to their present social circumstances. Another common response is that these converts had to work through their religion and conversion, with a high degree of selfexamination and debates among friends. Thus, religious conversion in Singapore is not an instantaneous reaction, even for those who claim to have an emotionalist conversion, but rather an extended period of thinking through and experimentation before the actual conversion process. A common element found in the conversion narrative is the encapsulation of the convert by the Christian groups. 19 To partly resolve this problem, I interviewed many informants who had converted recently, within six months of conversion. While this does not fully resolve the problem of converts’ account, it can be suggested that the “official script” has not been fully incorporated into the converts’ discourse.

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Prospective converts are “cocooned” by Christian friends, who provide religious reinforcement, emotional support, friendship, and social activities which, over time, finally lead to religious conversion. 9.5. Reasons for becoming Christian The most common reasons cited for conversion to Christianity are spiritual. For example, many said that they became Christians because “Christianity is about the love of a Great God”, or “Jesus Christ died for my sins”. Some indicated that they accepted Christ because they felt the Holy Spirit moving inside them. Others felt that Christianity offers answers to prayers. Christianity is seen as a relationship with a personal God, not merely a religion. Thus, one reason for the success of Christianity in Singapore may be the appealing nature of the Christian message. It is a message of love, joy, peace, and the forgiveness of sins. Of course, informants who convert to an alternative religion would mention spiritual or religious experiences to account for conversion. However, the fact that religious conversion primarily occur within a specific ethnic group and within specific socio-economic and demographic sectors of the population suggests that there are structural reasons that influences the decision to switch religions. Another commonly cited reason for conversion is peer influence. Many interviewees mentioned that they converted to Christianity because Christians seem to care for and love one another: “Christianity has families that care and talk about love”, or “My friends are all Christians”. A common response for converting to Christianity is the dissatisfaction with parent’s religion. Most interviewees indicated that they found little reality in the Chinese religion. Thus for the majority of the population, the reasons for conversion to Christianity cannot be explained by the existence of an anomic state in the converts prior to conversion. Rather, the answer seems to lie in what Christianity has to offer to a group of people who are largely dissatisfied with traditional Chinese religion. There were some interviewees who indicated some personal crises. Religion, for these people, provides some form of security and protection against the problems of daily life. However, a small number of interviewees did exhibit symptoms of an anomic state, with signs that they felt that life was meaningless and that they felt lost and lonely.

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The data suggests that it is exposure over time that partly explains for the propensity for conversion. This finding that religious conversion to Christianity is an extended process, with continual reinforcement over a period of time, rather than a sudden or dramatic occurrence, as noted earlier, suggest that religious conversion should be viewed as an “active” process of a convert discerning the validity of his or her beliefs. In addition to the continued reinforcement of the religion over time, Christianity, in its outreach program, seeks to provide a comprehensive lifestyle, intending to meet both the religious and nonreligious needs of its members and potential converts. Here, the models of a social cocoon (Palmer, 1993) and social encapsulation (Greil and Rudy, 1984) may be useful in helping to explain the success of Christian conversion. Palmer, studying female participation in new religious movements, argues that NRM provides a protective and supportive micro-society for women, a social environment that allow women to experiment with a broad array of social roles beyond those of their institutionalized and stereotypical roles demanded by society. Greil and Rudy analyzing Identity Transformation Organizations, suggest that the group provides physical, social and ideological encapsulation of its members which plays an important role in the creation and reconstruction of individual identities (See Tan 1997). It can be argued that part of the reason accounting for the success of Christianity in Singapore is that it provides a supportive communal setting in which the individual can experiment with a variety of roles. This happens from the moment a potential convert is introduced to the church or para-church group. Trying to convert the individual is not a yes or no exercise. Rather, the potential convert is “cocooned” or “socially encapsulated” over a period of time. This could include drawing the potential convert into a friendship network and interpersonal relationships, engaging him or her in a series of social and recreational activities, interspersed with religious messages, which could eventually lead to conversion. Furthermore, after conversion, the social environment provided by Christianity in Singapore serves as a protective and safe environment to fulfil the needs, both social and religious, of the converts. Most studies on religious conversion have emphasized the notion of radical personal change (Gillespie, 1979), a change in one’s sense of ultimate grounding or root identity, a displacement of one universe

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of discourse by another or the ascendance of a formerly peripheral universe of discourse to the status of primary authority (Snow and Machalek 1984:170). What I have tried to demonstrate is that there are many modes of conversion and conversion experiences. Moreover, conversion to another religion, in this case, from Taoism and Chinese religions to Christianity does not mean the total repudiation of former belief systems. More often, there is a process of adaptations, modifications, and negotiations, to retain elements of the cultural system of the converts while at the same time, a change in religious beliefs. A change in religion does not necessarily mean a change in values or personal and group identity. There is also a certain degree of hybridization. For example, it is not uncommon to find churches in Singapore presenting gifts of oranges to the congregation as a wish for prosperity and wealth. In Chinese, the word for oranges is a homonym for “gold.” In Singapore, the data suggests that conversion to Christianity is related to potential converts who are largely dissatisfied with their previous religion, and actively looking for an alternative religion to meet their social and religious needs. This will be discussed in detail in the next section regarding the renouncing of traditional religions. 9.6. Renouncing Traditional Chinese Religion The majority of Christians in the study come from families where the parents are Buddhists, Taoists, or practise ancestor worship. Only a small number have at least one parent who is Christian. The finding that Christians come primarily from families which practise traditional Chinese religion is consistent with earlier studies by Clammer and Sng and You.20 In Singapore, a large number of Chinese are renouncing their traditional religion and adopting a more “attractive” religious alternative. What is it about Chinese religion that is responsible for its low retention rate of adherents? Chinese traditional religions, particularly Taoism and ancestor worship, are “folk” traditions that are orally transmitted from generation to generation. What we understand as Chinese religion today is a syncretic mix of many religious traditions, including Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and traditional practices, which have evolved 20 See John Clammer, Singapore: Ideology, Society and Culture (Singapore: Chopmen, 1985), pp. 64–87, and Sng and You, Religious Trends in Singapore.

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over China’s long history. Because of this religious complexity, the belief system is amorphous and syncretic. This syncretism allows believers of Chinese religion to be more tolerant of alternative religious creeds. Chinese religion is not a rigid doctrinal religion with a codified system of beliefs. It does not possess an authoritative canon, such as the Bible, nor a powerful priesthood. In fact, Granet (1958) suggests that, for the Chinese, the performance of religious rituals does not necessarily presuppose either intellectual understanding of their meaning or religious belief in their efficacy. Instead, the key feature is a respect for traditional practices. The Chinese follow custom and conformity to tradition is often the reason given for ritual performance. When asked why they carry out rituals, the common responses are, “It has always been done this way,” or “This was how my mother did it”. In a sense, the Chinese perform rituals without too much concern for doctrinal propriety or allegiances. The belief system is un-questioned as such queries will be answered with, “It must be done,” or “Custom requires that this is the way to do it”. Chinese religion emphasizes the ritual performance itself, rather than an internalization of the ideas and meanings of the religious practices. Such a religious system is acceptable to older and more traditional Chinese. Most young people, however, exposed to the critical, scientific mode of analysis, find it difficult to accept this line of argument. Furthermore, an educated person is more likely to accept a religion of the book, or at least relatively more codified systems of beliefs compared to Taoism and ancestor worship. In the interviews with these Chinese who have converted, the respondents expressed a general dissatisfaction with the rituals and belief systems of traditional Chinese religion; In fact, Chinese religion is characterized as “illogical”, “unrealistic”, “unconvincing”, and “superstitious beliefs in a myriad of gods and spirits”. They point to rituals which they consider to be irrational, such as purchasing passports and money for the dead, burning of cars, houses, television sets, and even credit cards, during the funeral rites.21, 22

21 Cf. Lee Meng Chee, “Religious Examination of the Over Tolerance 22 These statements are based on verbatim, it is obvious that they do system of Chinese religion.

Conversion among Chinese Singaporeans: An Concept,” forthcoming. the perception of the interviewees. From the not have a clear understanding of the belief

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Coupled with the dissatisfaction is an ignorance of the tenets of Chinese religion among the respondents. As one informant said, “When I was young, my mother would bring me with her when she visits the temple and when we go to the graveyard during Qing Ming. I would do what they ask me to, like burning joss-sticks and joss-papers. But I did not understand what they were doing. I merely followed.” This lack of knowledge and understanding of traditional Chinese religious practices may be because religious instruction is not commonly practised in Chinese homes. According to Weber, one of the main features of a “modern” society is the process of rationalization: “One of the most important aspects of the process of the rationalization of action is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom for deliberate adaptation to situations in term of self-interests.23 There is a shift from traditional and affectual actions that are characterized by being relatively unthinking and determined by habit and emotion, to one where conscious ideas emerge in the orientation of action and becomes more rational. In a sense, it is this perception of Christianity as a rational, modern religion that partly explains for its attractiveness to the younger generation in Singapore, who are themselves socialized into an English-stream, western-oriented educational system. Unlike Chinese religion, Christianity also has an established organizational structure, with ordained religious specialists and established churches. These create a boundary for the group vis-à-vis outsiders: a community drawing people together based on shared values. Weber suggests that the fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and the disenchantment of the world: “there are no mysterious incalculable forces that come into play, but rather that one can, in principle, master all things by calculation. One need no longer have recourse to magical means in order to master or implore the spirits, as did the savage for whom such mysterious powers exist.” The data suggest that in Singapore there is a process of rationalization of religion, in which converts to Christianity question the unquestionable acceptance of traditional beliefs and rituals found in traditional Chinese religion, to one which they regard as more rational and systematic. My point is that rationalization does not necessary lead to a decline in religion, but rather, a shift in orientation 23 Stephen Molloy, “Max Weber and the Religion of China”, British Journal of Sociology, 1980, vol. 31, No. 3.

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and a “search for a meaning system” where the informants find offering a greater isomorphic fit to their worldview. They move from religious systems that emphasize the idea of magic to one which they regard as a systematization of ideas and ethical images of the world, a search for meaning rather than unconditional acceptance of traditional beliefs. Moreover, there is a shift from the ritualistic to the more theological and philosophical, that is, a process of the intellectualization of religion. Wuthnow (1978) suggests that four conditions are necessary for experimenting with a new religion: exposure to the new phenomenon, opportunity to experiment with it, experience of a problem for which the innovation is relevant, and the accordance of legitimacy to the innovation. The religious shift to Christianity among young Chinese Singaporeans may be because they perceive traditional Chinese religion to be unfulfilling and impersonal. Christianity is considered by these converts as a more rational, systematic, and intellectual religion, as opposed to the perceived disorderliness of Taoism. 9.7. Voluntarism and Obligatory-ness in Modern Society Traditionally, Chinese religion is based on the principles of obligatoryness and duty. The performance of rituals, particularly ancestor worship, is embedded in the values of xiao (piety), li (propriety) and zhong (loyalty). Because of this, there is a strong social pressure to ensure that the necessary rituals are conducted properly and a failure to do so would subject the individual, and family, to strong social sanctions. An important feature of a modern society is an enlargement of the voluntaristic sphere, in which increasingly, people have opportunities to espouse their own values and to exercise their own opinions. In such a situation, modern man is less constrained by customs and traditions. Thus a person has greater choice as to which religion he or she may choose to follow. This greater individualism and increased religious toleration is further affected by the exposure to, and availability of, alternative religious options.24 Modernity has opened up religious options that were previously unavailable. It allows for the contestation of ideas, and the contestation of religions, opening 24 Cf. Bryan Wilson, “Secularization and the Survival of the Sociology of Religion” in Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1987.

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up the possibility of multiple constructions of what constitutes the social order or the basis for the collective identity of the group. In Singapore we see the breakdown of traditional religious forms and the individualization of the religious process. This individualism in religion is seen in the fact that a large number of young Chinese do not share the religion of their parents. Religious status, which was once ascribed, has moved to one where there is greater emphasis on an achieved status and a higher degree of voluntarism, or what Luhlmann would term as privatization in decision making. This movement from obligatoriness to voluntarism in religion is exemplified by the reaction of Chinese parents to their children’s conversion to Christianity. There is less social pressure to conform to traditional practices and this ease can be observed during Chinese funerals. Yet, while there is a degree of privatization of religion, as modernity offers greater institutional differentiation and pluralistic individual identities (Bellah 1970, Berger 1990) there are limitations to the individual choices, as they are constrained by cultural and ethnic factors. It is thus not a free for all, but rather, a constant process of negotiation, mediation, and adaptation takes place. Nowadays, many children who are Christians are given the choice not to carry joss-sticks at funerals or can even opt out of the rituals altogether. Such practices, which would not have been condoned in the past, are now more readily accepted. In fact, only a small percentage of interviewees reported resistance from parents, such as threats to disown the children or to chase them out of the home. The main concern for Chinese parents is the fear that if their children become Christians, there would be no one to perform funeral rituals for them when they die. For the Chinese religionist, funeral rituals must be properly carried out, if necessary at great expense and elaborateness to ensure the successful after life of the deceased and spiritual protection of the living. While Christianity recognizes and respects ancestors, it does not worship them nor accord them any particular spiritual or cultural status (unless they are recognized as saints among the Catholics and Orthodox). This is a key point of social conflict between Christianity and the traditional Chinese religion.25

25 John Clammer, The Sociology of Singapore Religion: Studies in Christianity and Chinese Culture, Singapore: Chopmen, 1991, pp. 84–85.

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One interviewee said, “My mother was upset when I became a Christian. She had gone to a spirit-medium who told her that my aunt, who passed away the previous year, was now a ‘hungry ghost’ because her children, who are Christians, do not perform ancestral rituals. My mother fears that she will suffer the same fate when she dies”. The fear of not having children to perform ancestral rituals can be seen in the continued resistance to the Christian ritual of baptism. Baptism is likened by many traditional Chinese as becoming the foster-son of the Christian God. It is equivalent to losing the children forever. The fact that a high percentage of Christians in Singapore are not baptized is an indication that most Chinese Christians still respect the wishes of their parents. It may also mean that Christians in Singapore do not consider baptism to be a central feature of religious conversion, or that there is a process of the adaptation of religious ideology to suit the cultural proscriptions of the religious converts. Thus, in Singapore, conversion does not mean the total denial of a past identity and the acquisition of a completely new one. Rather, there is an accommodation between the new religious identity and the cultural forms from which the individual is socialized from young. In many instances, there are conflicts between the two forces, particularly witnessed during funerary rituals for parents when rituals such as carrying joss sticks and kneeling before the altar for the deceased parents are anathema to Christian beliefs. More often than not though, we see an attempt to bridge the gap between religious and cultural identity. These include the invention of new rituals to accommodate the two. For example, during funeral rituals, many Christians would now use flowers, instead of joss sticks as an offering to the deceased parent to fulfil the requirements of filial piety and paying respect to the dead, yet still satisfy the Christian theology of not praying to “pagan gods.” There are many other instances of adaptation and modifications of rituals to fit the two identities. In a sense, there is a hybrization of religious beliefs. For example, it is not uncommon to find Chinese Catholics using the ritual of sprinkling of holy water in the homes for the purpose of warding off evil spirits. Similarly, many Catholics will wear amulets with the engraving of Jesus of the Virgin Mary as a form of protection against evil spirits and accidents (Low 1974). Churches also often celebrate mass on the first day of Chinese New Year, and make traditional Chinese offerings, including nian gao, offerings that are often made to

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the Chinese deities and ancestors, as a form of Catholic ritual. From another perspective, this hybridity relates to the multi-rootedness of the Chinese in Singapore, between culture and religion. The point here is that there is a possibility of plural consciousness, or what Berger (1986:77) calls alternation, “the possibility to choose between varying and sometimes contradictory systems of meanings.” Conversion to Christianity does not always necessitate a complete break with the past, a radical reorganization of identity and meaning, but rather a change in the universe of discourse. For example, for many Chinese Christians who practice aspects of Chinese religion, they rationalize that these practices are not religious, but cultural behaviours. However, the central question is not whether there is greater individualism or religious options. More importantly, why do people make the religious choices that they do? I argue that an understanding of the social, cultural and environmental conditions of Singapore society play an important part in their decision making regarding religion. 9.8. Attractiveness of Christianity Religious switching involves a “push” factor, with many Chinese expressing dissatisfaction with their parent’s traditional religious system. This is reinforced by the modern social environment, with increasing voluntarism in decision-making processes regarding religious affiliation, exposure to a plurality of religious options, and an educational system that emphasizes scientific and critical thinking. But the “push” factor cannot, in itself, explain why these people choose Christianity over other religious options. Part of the explanation must lie in the “pull” factor, the attractiveness of Christianity to young, English-educated Chinese Singaporeans. 9.8.1. Meeting of Religious Needs As pointed out earlier, the promise of spiritual benefits was the main reason given by interviewees for conversion to Christianity. Christianity is portrayed as an internal experience, a relationship with a personal god, with the presence of the Holy Spirit providing guidance in daily life, as opposed to the more impersonal and ritualistic nature of Chinese religions. There is a promise of an abundant and eternal life. Peace and joy are commonly cited as positive attributes of Christianity. Thus, Christianity, as a religion, is seen from

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an experiential level, a social relationship with a caring supernatural being. It is basically a private and individualistic relationship with a personal God. Interviewees often compare this to the unfulfilling nature of Chinese religion. In this sense, Christianity is attractive because it emphasizes an intrinsic experience, rather than merely extrinsic conventions found in Chinese religion.26 Interviewees point to the realistic nature of Christianity, recalling instances of answered prayers and miracles. They indicate that when they have problems, they will turn to God for help. One interviewee said, “When I am in trouble, I turn to him, knowing that there is someone there who cares and listens. It is this part of Christianity that is most important to me”. This belief in a personal god gives Christians a sense of security. Christians claim that they have a better idea of the meaning and direction of life, and, as one person puts it, “I know where I’ll go when I die.” By emphasizing the spiritual aspect of Christianity, it can be argued that for the interviewees, Christianity fulfils the classical function of religion, that is, it allows man to make sense of the world around him. Religion, because of its reference to the supramundane order, provides meaning for mundane realities by allowing man to interpret his experiences and organize his conduct. There is a belief that the ordinary world of our senses and experience is not the whole of reality, but that there exists another world, more powerful, but nonetheless related to our world. The fundamental characteristic of religion is then to address the problem of meaning: “There are at least three points where chaos—a tumult of events which lack both interpretation and interpretability—threatens to break in upon man; at the limits of his analytical abilities, at the limits of his powers of endurance, and at the limits of his moral insight. Bafflement, suffering, and a sense of intractable ethical paradox are all radical challenges with which every religion must somehow cope.”27 Religion provides man with the cognitive, affective, and moral capacity to deal with the world he lives in. This does not mean that a person must be anomic in order to convert, but rather, religion deals with certain fundamental pan-human problems that are endemic in human

26 Again, these are the views expressed by the interviewees. The verbatim shows that they do not have a deep understanding of the belief systems of Chinese religion. 27 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Culture, New York: Free Press, 1975, p. 119.

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life, problems which science and modern technology do not, and cannot, address. 9.8.2. Social Benefits of the Church Confirming previous studies, one of the benefits most commonly cited for going to church or joining para-church groups is the fellowship available in these organizations. To many, the church is a place where they have a “sense of belonging”. It is a place to meet for fellowship, and to encourage each other. The church is likened to a family. Christians call each other “brothers and sisters”, and Christ is seen as the head of the family. This notion of a church as family does not mean that Christians have a problematic family life. Most interviewees claim to come from homes that are warm and caring. Christians report that most of their friends are also Christians. A small number say they have a balance of Christian and non-Christian friends. More importantly, they perceive that there is a qualitative difference between Christian and non-Christian friends. As one interviewee noted, “I prefer to spend my time with Christians. We understand and care for one another”. Many feel that a Christian, by biblical command, should marry another Christian, and thus the Church becomes a place to locate a future life partner. Membership in any group has both cultural and social organizational features which create boundaries for the group vis-à-vis outsiders. Within the group, there are integrative principles which keep the group together and exclusivist principles which define who are the outsiders. Christians tend to have a circle of Christian friends. They also spend more time, both within the church and in other social activities, with other Christians. Christianity provides a sense of community, drawing people together on the basis of shared values. The church becomes the focus of a person’s activity. Sunday school, youth fellowships, camps, and picnics provide the impetus for Christians to gather together and, in the process, reinforce their common beliefs. For many Christians, fellowship with other Christians is a magnet to attend church. 9.8.3. Non-Religious Activities of the Church It is not simply the religious aspects of Christianity that makes it attractive. As the previous section has noted, the social aspects of Christianity, in providing friendship circles and community also serves

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the needs of its members. In studying conversion in Singapore, it is also important to analyze the role of non-religious activities. Churches in Singapore provide a variety of programs that cater to the needs of all age groups. Some of the more common ones include: 9.8.3.1. Ministries (i) Youth ministry—caters primarily for youths aged from 13 to 18. They meet regularly for fellowship, camps, outings and Biblestudy. (ii) Campus, combat, and career ministry—cater to students of tertiary institutions, national servicemen and workers aged 19–25. Activities include seminars, talks, group outings, evangelism, and leadership training classes. (iii) Adult ministry—primarily for those above 25 years old. Games, such as tennis and squash, are organized on a regular basis. There are talks and seminars on a wide range of topics, such as Coping with Executive Stress, and Financial Management. There are frequent gatherings for picnics, barbeques, as well as vacation trips. (iv) Ladies’ ministry—organizes talks on topics relevant to women. Social activities include cooking classes, hobbies, and regular discussions on family problems. (v) Music ministry—choir singing groups, playing of musical instruments, music training for church members and drama presentations. (vi) Kindergarten and children’s club—Many churches run kindergarten classes which are open to both Christians and non-believers. Games and church camps provide recreational activities for primary school children. These comprehensive activities provided by churches perform important integrative functions for church members. Activities, organized around age-sets, create group norms for the individual. Furthermore, because these activities are open to non-believers, they provide opportunities for evangelism. 9.8.3.2. Counseling Services Most churches provide counseling services and offer help to solve personal and social problems of church members. The pastors and elders of the church usually carry these out. There are also youth

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centers which provide tuition programs, job and personal counseling, and organizes sports and other social activities. Counseling programs also extend to the family group. These include pre-marital and parenting classes, as well as prenatal courses. Many churches also organize visits to orphanages, old folks’ homes and prisons. 9.8.3.3. Social Services Traditionally the more established Christian denominations have been involved in the provision of health services for example through the St Andrew’s Mission and Orthopedic Hospitals, Mount Alvernia Hospital, and Youngberg Memorial Adventist Hospital. Churches in Singapore are also active in providing social services to the destitute and underprivileged. Many run homes for the aged or aged sick. The aim is not only to provide shelter, but also to give spiritual and religious comfort. Volunteer nurses and occupational therapists render their services to residents of these Homes. Funds are also made available to help the needy or families with financial problems. These non-religious activities provide, for those who are believers, a comprehensive way of life, looking after all aspects of daily living, as well as a sense of community and continued socialization and reinforcement of beliefs. It is, at the same time, an effective tool of evangelization. Like the setting up of mission schools in early Singapore, where education is used as a means of attracting members, these non-religious activities often provide an alternative means of reaching out to non-believers. 9.9. Social Structural and Organizational Aspects of Christianity It has been shown that young, English-educated Chinese Singaporeans are turning away from traditional Chinese religion and converting to Christianity. Part of the answer must lie with the social structural aspects of Christianity. In Singapore, in comparison to the other religions, particularly Taoism and traditional Chinese religions, Christianity is a very well organized religion. Other than the fact that many of these churches have been in Singapore for a long time, the social structural organization of Chinese churches in Singapore is very structured and hierarchically arranged. In contrast, Taoist groups are very amorphous, with temples being run independently, each with its own board of management. The structural organization of Christianity allows the Church to systematically work out

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strategies of proselytization and co-ordination of evangelical efforts. In addition, Christian organizations and churches were able to raise a substantial amount of money from its members to fund the programs and evangelical activities of the religion. In Singapore, the following factors combine to promote the growth of Christianity: • the finding that the young Chinese are generally dissatisfied with the values and beliefs associated with their parents’ religion, • the exposure to a plurality of religious options in schools, the active proselytization of church and para-church groups at an age when the individual is impressionable and open to new ideas, • the perceived relevance of Christianity to a generation of young, English-educated Chinese. Continued socialization and reinforcement of the tenets of faith are vital in the religion. Christianity emphasizes the importance of evangelization; to spread the word of God to the world. The rationale is that God has commanded Christians to evangelize, and it is the duty of every Christian to save lives. One interviewee said, “We meet on Wednesday for our weekly meetings, with sharing and singing, after which we break up into small groups for discussion. These meetings help to build me spiritually. . . . Evangelism is important. I have a faith target of speaking to 2 persons per week. Every Friday, I join a “witnessing blitz”, where the group leaders bring us out to evangelize. I have also gone on “mission trips” to Malaysia and Philippines.” Schools have often been targeted by Christian groups as the most fertile ground for religious conversion. Active evangelism, through the extensive network of student Christian groups in the schools and in the university, and existence of “mission” schools where students are exposed to scripture and worship from an early age, are important factors responsible for the increase in the number of Christians in Singapore. 9.10. Charismatic Churches Churches that have witnessed phenomenal growth are the charismatic renewal movements. Some of these churches have church membership in the range of three to five thousand people. Part of the reason for their success in attracting converts lies in the nature

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of these churches. Charismatic churches tend to emphasize a more emotional approach to religious worship. The order of worship is lively, with contemporary musical accompaniment and singing of upbeat songs, not solemn hymns. Songbooks are seldom used and the words are electronically flashed unto screens. The services also emphasize a freer form of worship, with the raising of hands, loud exhortations, crying to God in the open, clapping of hands, and hugging each other in the congregation. The worship atmosphere is intense, emphasizing a personal relationship with a living God. Church members “speak in tongues” during the service to demonstrate the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. A general feature of any religious group is that after a period of time it becomes increasingly institutionalized and conservative. As these established churches become more conventional, there is a growing population in search of new religious alternatives. Conventional churches are unable to serve and interpret the beliefs of these people. Charismatic churches are renewal movements, trying to revive the potency of the church. One of the ways that charismatic churches have been able to do this is to place greater emphasis in the area of “mission”. For example, many of these churches seek to evangelize not only in Singapore, but also to all of Southeast Asia, with many mission workers situated in Southeast Asian countries. This strong evangelistic zeal serves to bring members together through a sense of common purpose. Tied in with the evangelistic zeal is a more fundamentalist interpretation of the Bible. There is also a demand for loyalty and commitment to the church. This is achieved by stressing the social solidarity of members. The emphasis on a more expressive religion, discipline over the beliefs and lifestyles of its members, and the strong missionary zeal, account for why young people find charismatic churches to be attractive. Charismatic churches in Singapore are experiencing a process of renewal and revivalism. These churches have experienced phenomenal growth in membership. Furthermore, their religion is potent, with firm fundamentalist beliefs and strong evangelistic zeal. Charismatic movements have also caught on among Catholic groups. Mainline churches, however, have not seen the same degree of growth. The popularity of charismatic movements is probably the result of a reaction among younger Christians to what they see as a general weakness of the mainline churches. Many Christians are leaving mainstream churches to join charismatic movements. Many Chinese,

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dissatisfied with the traditional religion they found to be unrealistic and impersonal, find the charismatic movement, with its emphasis on an experiential religion that stresses a personal relationship with God to be a very attractive alternative. According to Clammer (1991:84–85), Charismatic churches exhibit features which are in common with the traditional Chinese religion. Both have no fixed ritual and worship is in free form. Like the Charismatics, Chinese folk religions give emphasis to healing. Many people who visit the Chinese spirit mediums seek healing for bodily sickness which is often attributed to spiritual influences. Similarly, many charismatic churches likewise have healing sessions as part of their services or have special services for this purpose. In fact, many converts to the Charismatic churches remain in the movement because of healings which have taken place. The main difference between the two is that Charismatic churches use the Bible as their point of reference while Chinese folk religion has no fixed scripture. However, the formal similarities are significant as it makes it easy for the Charismatics to recruit believers who have already been exposed to the spiritual realm of Chinese folk religion. On the other hand, it also creates another paradox—as it persuades the Chinese religionists to stay in their own religious tradition or adopt a syncretic attitude. This syncretic attitude can also be observed at the Roman Catholic Church of the Novena is frequented by many Chinese religionists. A Chinese style of worship is encouraged and many Chinese religionists regard the Virgin Mary as a manifestation of Guan Yin the Goddess of Mercy. In such cases the syncretism creates a bridge for the Chinese believers to cross into Catholicism. For the Catholic Church, the possibility of a degree of syncretism, ritualistic worship services are strong attractions to the Chinese religionists.28 10. Non Religionists Not all young Chinese Singaporeans who renounce their parents’ religion are flocking to Christianity. Some claim to have no religion. Who are these people? Why have they not turned to Christianity? What are their reasons for rejecting religion?

28

See Clammer (1991), p. 86.

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Non-religionists, like their Christian counterparts, are generally young. They also tend to have a higher educational attainment and socio-economic backgrounds. The main difference between the two groups is that there are more Chinese educated Chinese who claim to have no religion than the English educated Chinese. The label of non-religionists must be analyzed carefully though. In the interviews with those who claim to have no religion, a large number actually continue to practise some form of religious ritual. These are primarily traditional Chinese religious rituals. Even though they perform these rituals, they do not claim affiliation to the religious because they are not totally in congruence with the religious system or would not like to call themselves Taoist. They do not practise Chinese religion because the rituals are too complex and troublesome. Others who practise Buddhist rituals do not consider Buddhism to be a religion and therefore would claim to be free-thinkers. This is important as it suggests that the Census data is skewed on the high end for no-religion and there are probably a higher proportion of people who practise Chinese religion than the figures suggest. However, their commitment to Chinese religion is probably lower than that of their parents. Many said that when they have problems, they will pray to “god” as a last resort. This category of people can be termed “crisis religionists.” One person said that he prays (talks) to his deceased mother when he has problems. Others said that they will visit the temples occasionally. Finally there are those who just appeal to an amorphous “god” or all the gods at the same time. The other category of non-religionists is more aligned to the definition of a person who does not believe in any religion. They do not believe in any religion because they consider religion to be unscientific: “All religions are false because they are man-made. There is no such thing as gods and spirits. It is all superstition. I am very scientific and I want to question whatever seems unreal. When I consider god, I don’t believe in his existence. I find evolution theory to be a more reasonable explanation.” For this group of people, there is an erosion of belief in the supernatural and a loss of faith in the existence of “other-worldly” forces. The constant ascription to science suggests that, for these non-religionists, science is supposed to make religion implausible because of its success in explaining many phenomena previously in the domain of religion. It should be noted, however, that Singaporeans with such views form a very small proportion of the population. Moreover, as the next chapter will

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demonstrate, the degree of religiosity and religious participation in Singapore remains essentially high. It is thus difficult to argue that modernity and modernization of Singapore society has resulted in a decline of religion. Rather, it will be demonstrated that there is in fact a process of religious revivalism in Singapore. Almost every one who claims to have no religion have had some exposure to Christianity, including attending Sunday school when they were young and visiting churches. Except for one interviewee who thinks that he may become a Christian in future, the rest reject Christianity. Several reasons were given for rejecting Christianity. The most common is that they cannot accept the Christian belief system. Others point to the rigidity of Christians against other religions as an obstacle to their conversion. Some are unhappy with the persistent evangelism of Christians and others feel that they did not become Christians because it is a “western” religion and not suited for the Chinese. “It is a religion for the English-educated. With my background, I will rather be a Buddhist”. 11. Buddhist Revivalism Like Christianity which has been growing at the expense of Taoism, Buddhism has also seen a revival in Singapore. While there has been little statistical data on the conversion to Buddhism, it is clear that the proportion of Buddhists has been on the increase in Singapore. From the 2000 Census, Buddhism is in fact the fastest growing religion in Singapore. Why is Buddhism proving attractive to these Singaporeans? From the interviews, several factors were identified. First, Buddhism is seen as a logical, systematic, and relevant religion. It is able to provide answers to questions on the meaning of life. As one interviewee said, “In school, I asked many questions. Why was I born? What is the meaning of life? When I came into contact with Buddhism, I find it very appealing. I believe in the Buddhist concept of yinguo, that is, every outcome results from some causal factor.” Many Buddhists contrast this idea of Buddhism to what they perceive as the irrationalities of traditional Chinese religion. This trend can be termed as an “intellectualization” of Chinese religion. As I had outlined earlier, intellectualization of religion refers to a process where individuals shift from an unthinking and passive acceptance of religion to one where there is a tendency to search for a religion

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that they regard as systematic, logical, and relevant. There is a propensity to switch to a religion that they regard as more “rational,” which fits their worldview. It is found that, particularly among the better-educated Chinese, there is a tendency to call themselves Buddhists rather than Taoists. Like the Christians, they perceive Taoism to propagate mere superstitions or at most, folk beliefs. As one informant said, “I did follow my mother’s religion when I was young, but gradually when I grew older and received an education, I started to question the religion.” There is a trend towards a clearer distinction between Taoism and Buddhism, what I term as the desyncretisation of Chinese Religion. In a sense, this is an attempt by younger Chinese to understand the tenets of their religion. Among the more educated Chinese, some have begun to take a more philosophical approach towards religion. They take a more critical view of traditional Chinese religion, and rationalize those aspects which they perceive to be “superstition” and seek to locate what they consider to be orthodox Buddhism. One informant said, I am more interested in Buddhism. I attend talks as well as meditation classes, and practise yoga. The philosophy of life in Buddhism influences me a great deal. It provides logical answers to my problems.

Another informant, I do not believe in reincarnation or the ten courts of Hell. They are superstitions added to Buddhism.

The statements above suggest that there is a process of demystifying religion, where the religious practitioner discards what they perceive to be irrationalities in the religion. They take a more philosophical and critical view of religion. There is a process of questioning or at least, attempts to locate justifications for the beliefs and rituals of the religion. It is not uncommon, nowadays, to hear a Buddhist say that particular rituals are “canonical” or “pure” Buddhism, while other rituals commonly practiced by the Chinese are Taoist creations, and not part of Buddhism, or that “in Buddhism, there are no gods”. Part of the explanation for this process of rationalization and taking a more philosophical approach to religion may be due to the impact of religious education in schools. In Singapore, from 1984 to 1991, religion was taught as part of the school curriculum. For two years, in secondary schools, fifteen-year-old students were required

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to study a religion of their choice. The religions that were offered in the school curriculum included Buddhist Studies, Bible knowledge, Confucian ethics, Islamic knowledge and Hindu Studies.29 It is noted that one of the most popular options taken by students was Buddhism. The teaching of Buddhism in school, as to be expected, emphasized the theological rather than the ritual aspects of the religion. The trickle-down effect of this emphasis on the “philosophy” of religion can be seen in the conceptual terms used including shengan or yinguo. Buddhists in Singapore today also tend to take a more systematic approach towards religion. They attend talks and seminars conducted by Buddhist monks. Like the Christians, many Buddhist groups now have “Sunday-school” classes in Buddhist liturgy, as well as Buddhist camps during the school holidays. Structurally, Buddhism is a more organized religion. It has a body of canonical text and an ordained monk-hood which provides guidance for Buddhists. This is unlike Taoism which is organizationally very weak. Taoists do not have a centralized institution. Instead, individual temples each have their own management committees running their own affairs. There is also a lack of systematic theology, and is often viewed as simply a congeries of rituals and practices without a structure. The Buddhist organizations play a leading role in uniting Buddhists in Singapore and spreading Buddhist teachings and practices. They invite foreign Buddhist scholars and monks to give Dharma talks, organize regular meetings, and meditation groups. These talks have reached many young people in Singapore. Like Christian churches, the Buddhist organizations engage in voluntary welfare and charitable work. For example, they set up medical clinics that provide free consultations and medicine, and are actively involved in anti-drug abuse counseling programs. Buddhists in Singapore are, like Christians, beginning to propagate their religion. Buddhist societies have been set up in the institutions of higher learning with the aim of promoting Buddhist teachings, and encouraging friendship and understanding among Buddhists. These societies organize regular talks and seminars, Buddhist camps, and produce publications. More significantly, they seek to provide opportunities for Buddhists 29 This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, when I examine the relationship between religion and the state.

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to interact with each other, through camps, regular outings, and visits to places of interest, such as trips to Mount Ophir; thus providing the type of fellowship that churches and para-church groups serve for Christians. Though not as active as the Christian groups on campus, they have started their own outreach programs to propagate Buddhism. According to interviewees, membership in these Buddhist societies is growing. It should be noted that prior to the 1980s, Buddhism in Singapore was not a proselytizing religion. In the past, it was more concerned with looking after its own flock. However, with the success of Christianity in Singapore, in its ability to draw away members from the Buddhist congregation, there is a shift in the strategy of Buddhism, emphasizing the systematization of the religion as well as actively advocating the evangelization of the religion. In fact, the activities of the Buddhists mirror that of the Christian churches, and has been termed as the Christianization of Buddhism. 12. Reaction of Taoism Taoist organizations have reacted to the loss of members to other religions. In recent years, for instance, we have seen the formation of the Singapore Taoist Federation, whose explicit aim is to educate and unite Taoists in Singapore. It is, in a sense, an attempt to develop an organizational structure that will be able to meet the challenges from other religious traditions; a response to the declining membership of Taoism in Singapore, and correct misconceptions about the religion. As noted in the articles of incorporation, the aims of the Taoist Federation is to promote an understanding of Taoism, ensure co-ordination and co-operation among the various temples, raise public awareness of Taoist culture and traditions through various activities and educational programs, and to rid Taoism of outdated perceptions that it is a superstitious religion. There have also been attempts to raise the legitimacy of Taoist priests. There is increasing use of professional training for new priests, and the opening of formal Taoist schools. Well-known Taoist religious specialists from China and Taiwan have been invited to hold training classes in Singapore. In addition, many Taoists priests have gone back to China, where there are formalized schools for training Taoist priests, to learn the “correct” way of performing the rit-

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uals. Religious knowledge is rationally systematized to a fixed set of rituals and canon which are closely followed in the performance of rituals. In fact, another feature of the process of rationalization has been the institutionalization of religion, with increasing dependence on religious specialists. As religion becomes increasingly based on knowledge rather than sentiments, religious experts, with their specialized knowledge, take on greater significance. Like the Buddhist and Christians, Taoist groups are beginning to hold classes for its members to explain the tenets and beliefs of the religion. In fact, every Sunday, religious classes are held in temples to “teach the real truth about Taoism, and to educate the people regarding the difference between Taoism and Buddhism.” These classes are held both in Mandarin and English, unlike temples in the past where sessions tended to be based on Chinese dialects. The focus of these classes is not only limited to teaching “orthodox” and “correct” Taoism, but also to demonstrate that Taoism can be very relevant to modern living. Seminars on topics such as “Taoism and Chinese Culture” are regularly organized. There is even an Annual Taoism Festival to raise the peoples’ understanding and interest in Taoism. In all these, Taoism is promoted not a “superstitious” religion, but rather one that is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. It is a rational religion that incorporates ancient Chinese astronomy, medicine, mathematics, and alchemy. For example, Taoists argue that the concept of yin and yang, central to Chinese religion, is said to account for all things and that it has its roots in what western science call physics. Taoism is also upheld as a scriptural religion, with a codified system of beliefs embodied in the Dao-te-qing. Key Chinese concepts, such as filial piety, loyalty, and kindness are drawn from Taoist ideas. There are also attempts by the Taoists to root out what they consider to be superstitions added onto Taoism. For example, the common ritualistic practices among Chinese of asking for “lucky numbers” which are used for lottery gambling, is not part of orthodox Taoism. Many of the practices which are associated with Taoism are in fact, they argue, corrupted by lay people, as they do not really understand the beliefs and rituals of Taoism. For example, when Taoists pray to the gods, such as Yuefei and Guandi, they not only pray to the gods, but also “respect” the virtues embodied in these spirits. These gods embody the nine virtues (loyalty to country, filial piety, humanity, loyalty to friends, honesty, simplicity, respect, kindness,

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and trustworthiness), that Taoism preaches and are models that people should look up to and emulate. Informants mention that the root of Taoism lies not in the rituals or gods, but rather, the four supporting pillars of Taoism are to respect heaven, honour ones’ ancestors, be thankful to mother earth, and be a virtuous man. Similarly, instead of a never-ending pantheon of gods in Taoism, it is taught that there are in fact, only three categories of spirits: gods, immortals, and saints. These can be viewed as an effort at the disenchantment of Taoism, abandoning the myths and unsubstantiated features in Taoism and provide logical explanations and relevant understanding of the world that one lives in as well as to raise the status of Taoism in Singapore. There have been increased activities, including the publication of manuals and books to explain the significance of the rituals, and the rationale behind the beliefs. There are attempts to put together a body of written text and literature, to have a codified and standardized system of beliefs which will inculcate an understanding of the meanings behind the myriad beliefs and ritual practices of Taoism. Significantly, these have included the increased publication of English language materials to reach to the large English educated population in Singapore. There is even the introduction of English translated divination slips. Like the Christians, Taoist groups have also expanded on non-religious activities to promote the religion, such as educational programs, tuition classes, charitable activities, such as counselling and social work programs, to meet all aspects of the needs of its members. In the interviews conducted with the young and better educated Taoists, one interesting observation is that they are very well informed and conscious of the pattern of worship. In fact, they seem to suggest that the orderliness of worship takes precedence over rituals. Also, in narrating their religious experiences, they tend to organize the discussion in a more intellectual and technical manner, emphasizing the importance of knowledge, rather than sentiments. To them, Taoism is a 4000-year old religion which teaches the principles of simple living, harmony and nature. It is a scriptural religion which is logical and relevant. Moreover, the Taoist cosmology is closely related to biological and scientific explanations of the universe. The emphasis of the Taoist groups, in reaction to the success of Buddhism and Christianity in drawing away its members, have been at attempt to demonstrate that Taoism is quintessentially the only

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indigenous Chinese religion, and as opposed to other religions, such as Christianity, that embodies the synthesis of Chinese culture. As such, Taoism in Singapore, in trying to reach out to young Singaporeans, focuses on moral education and self-cultivation, emphasizing the performance of good deeds and the accumulation of merits. All these efforts at developing an organizational structure with centralized authority, the standardization of rituals and beliefs, institutionalizing religious specialists through an organized priesthood and the proselytization of the religion, can be viewed as an endeavour reform Taoism and raise the status of the Taoism to meet the challenges and competition posed by Buddhism and Christianity in Singapore. This attempt at a systematization and rationalization of traditional Chinese religion can be further exemplified in the production of a handbook on Chinese Customs and Festivals in Singapore. To quote from the foreword of the book: This handbook on Chinese Customs and Festivals will help younger Singaporeans have a better understanding of Chinese festivals and rituals to explain the origins and, more important, the meaning of Chinese festivals and customs. Blind observation has no place in a highly educated nation like Singapore. To get the modern Singaporeans to observe Chinese festivals and rituals, we have to explain their significance and importance. . . . (This book) has also been designed to make Chinese Customs and festivals more relevant to Singapore society.

It is noteworthy that this handbook sold over 50,000 copies in its first imprint. In examining the religious conversion process in Singapore, trying to account for the rise of Christianity and Buddhism, the decline and subsequent reaction of Taoism, I suggest that there has been a process of religious rationalization and intellectualization. Religions in Singapore now place greater emphasis on the theological and philosophical aspects of their religion, rather than focussing on ritualistic practices. Various religions, especially Buddhism and Taoism, are systematizing and re-codifying their beliefs and rituals to meet the challenges posed by Christianity. Various strategies, including the publication of materials, holding religious classes when previously there were none, and starting social and educational programs to meet the non-religious needs of its members, are adopted to reach out to the marketplace of potential converts, particularly the young, increasingly English educated Chinese population in Singapore.

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chapter three 13. Islam and Hinduism

The preceding discussion has focused on Christianity, Buddhism and Taoism. The reasons are simple. In Singapore, religious conversion and religious change have primarily occurred among the Chinese in Singapore. However, even though there have not been a process of religious conversion to other religions, there are clearly changes within the religions, in the face of modernization and rapid social change within Singapore society. At the same time, in an increasingly globalised world, events outside of Singapore, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the growing religious revivalism of Islam in various parts of the world, particularly in Malaysia, have an effect on these religions in Singapore.30 14. Rise of New Religions In the study of religious conversion in Singapore, another important facet has been the emergence and growing popularity of new religious movements. Groups such as the Soka Gakkai, Surkyo Mahikari, Satya Sai Baba, and the Bahai’s, have seen their numbers increased dramatically. For example, Soka Gakkai, which started in the 1970s with about 5 to 7 members, has expanded to over 40 thousand households. How do we account for the growing popularity of these new religions? Many other new religions have surfaced in Singapore, including other Japanese new religions such as Tenrikyo, RisshoKosei-Kai, and GLA. These, however, have not made such an impact in terms of attracting new believers. Why are some new religions more successful than others in Singapore? What is it about their theology or ritual practices that cause Singaporeans to abandon their traditional religious system, Taoism, and convert to these new religions? One large segment of the population that converted to Soka Gakkai and Sukyo Mahikari are middle-aged Chinese housewives. Given the experience of the Second World War in Southeast Asia, why would these Chinese convert to a “re pen jiao” or Japanese religion?

30 The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its effects on religion in Singapore will be discussed in Chapter 6.

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In this section, I provide a detailed case study and analysis of the Soka Gakkai movement in Singapore. There are several reasons for this. First, it is one of the fastest growing religion in Singapore, and therefore important to try to account for its success. I suggest that the Soka Gakkai must be viewed as a rationalized form of Neo-Buddhism or Reformist Buddhism, and its success must be seen in tandem with the general ability of Buddhism to attract new converts in Singapore. However, being a Japanese new religion, there are several features of Soka Gakkai that differentiates it from other forms of Buddhism in Singapore, thus making it important to highlight these differences. Second, Soka Gakkai is used as a case study to illustrate the growing popularity of new religious movements in Singapore. Other forms of new religious movements, such as Mahikari and Sathya Sai Baba have been making inroads into Singapore, attracting large following. It is also interesting to note that the conversion experiences for many of these new religions are similar to that observed for Soka Gakkai. For example, Sathya Sai Baba, as a form of Neo-Hinduism, is gaining popularity among the young in Singapore. The difference is that while Soka Gakkai has been successful among Chinese Singaporeans, Sathya Sai Baba has enjoyed considerable success among the young Indian population. Third, I will show that one of the reasons of the popularity of these imported religions has been the process of indigenization of the religion as well as the isomorphic fit between the new religions and the former religions of the adherents. Various theories have been promulgated to explain the expansion and global reach of new religious movements. Within Japan, the most prevalent were the anomie or crisis theories, which basically suggested a significant relationship between social conditions and the rise of new religions. McFarland (1967), for example, postulates that new religions were “variously dated products of or responses to endemic recurrently intensified social crises. Similarly, Yinger (1970) suggests that ‘normlessness’ caused by urban migration, war, defeat, and occupation predisposed many Japanese to new religious movements, an antidote to anomie. Others, in trying to analyze the global reach of new religions, focused on the theologies. Scholars working on Soka Gakkai have tried to account for its popularity by pointing to its universal message and peace. The problem is that while it is true that these messages are found in Soka Gakkai, it is difficult to argue that converts in various countries, from USA, UK, and Australia,

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and those in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, were attracted to the religion for the same reason. For example, the growth in Soka Gakkai in Great Britain draws primarily from those aged 25 to 45, and concentrated in certain professions, such as arts and graphics, media industry, and teachers. In Singapore however, the majority of members are the young, especially students as well as middle-aged housewives. It is difficult to argue that these people are attracted to Soka Gakkai for the same reasons. Furthermore, the attraction of Soka Gakkai in Singapore is ethnically based. Except for a few Indians and expatriates, almost all the members are Chinese. In the case of Soka Gakkai, the fact that it is attractive to two particular niches of the Singaporean population; the young, generally Chinese-educated Chinese, and the older, middle-aged Chinese housewives, is instructive. I suggest that, even in Singapore, much less for different countries, the same reason need not be responsible for religious conversion. I will show that, as in the case of the attraction of Buddhism and Christianity in Singapore, there is a process of intellectualization and rationalization of religion, and the young are turning to religions like Soka Gakkai because it is perceived as a rational religion which meets their needs. These, however, are not the same reasons for the older Chinese. While they too may be dissatisfied with their traditional belief system, one main rationale for choosing Soka Gakkai is that it is viewed as Buddhistic, rather than a Japanese religion. I will demonstrate that there is an isomorphism between the previous religion of these adherents, Taoism, and the theology and rituals associated with Soka Gakkai. Concepts such as accruing benefits from ritual performance, rebirth, and the Buddha, are not alien ideas, but already a part of the stream of syncretic beliefs found in Chinese religion. It is thus not religious conversion, but religious switching or even, re-labelling. Soka Gakkai is not viewed as much as a new Japanese religion, but a form of Buddhism. Religion is complex and dynamic. The very reason for its global appeal is precisely its flexibility available in interpretations. The theology and rituals of Soka Gakai are fascinating in that it can provide a religious framework that is amenable to the practitioner who is more comfortable with religious rituals and performance, while at the same time providing a philosophical route for those who are uncomfortable with anything that seems irrational or are blind and meaningless practices.

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An understanding of the appeal of Soka Gakkai must be seen within the framework of the socio-cultural and religious changes occurring in Singapore society as a whole. Religion and religious change is embedded in the social and cultural life of the society. Thus, it is not simply Soka Gakkai, but rather, the religious scene in Singapore that has altered tremendously in the last 30 years and the growth of Soka Gakkai must be seen in this context. The growth of Soka Gakkai must be viewed within the context of the general growth of Buddhism in Singapore. Soka Gakkai is not the only Japanese new religion in Singapore. In fact, groups such as Tenrikyo, GLA, predate it. Other groups, such as Rissho-Kosei-Kai, Sukyo Mahikari, have also started branches in Singapore. However, while these groups have enjoyed moderate success, they cannot compare in scale to the popularity of Soka Gakkai. Why is that so? I will demonstrate that part of the reason is not only in the theology and rituals of Soka Gakkai, but rather, of all the Japanese new religions, it has been the most active and successful in “indigenization” of the religion. In terms of leadership structure, activities, and even nuanced interpretations of the theology and rituals, there is a process of localization of the religion. Thus, while the other Japanese new religions remain essentially Japanese, with most of their members made up of Japanese expatriates, Soka Gakkai has been successful in promoting itself as a form of Buddhism rather than a Japanese religion. Before I proceed to the analysis, it may be useful to trace the development of Soka Gakkai in Japan. This will help to show up the changes and adaptation of Soka Gakkai in Singapore. 14.1. Nichiren Shoshu, Soka Gakkai and Soka Gakkai International Much has been written about Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism and Soka Gakkai (see, for example, Snow, 1980; Machacek and Wilson, 2000; Metraux, 1986; and Tamura, 2000). I will thus focus on the key ideas and those aspects relevant to the understanding of Soka Gakkai in Singapore. Nichiren Buddhism was founded by a monk, Nichiren Daishonin (1222–1282) in the thirteenth century. Born in a time of political upheavals and disasters, Nichiren came to the conclusion that a stable and peaceful nation could only be achieved after the “correct”

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Buddhist teachings have been accepted by the whole country. The main teachings of Nichiren Buddhism are based on the Lotus Sutra. In fact, Nichiren believed that the Lotus Sutra contains the quintessence of the Buddha’s message. Nichiren argues that the Lotus Sutra supersedes all other Buddhist texts. Moreover, the Nichiren school branch of Buddhism holds that the power and efficacy of the Sutra itself is such that it is sufficient to chant Buddha’s given title of the sutra to accrue the benefits. Thus, the chant of Nam-myoho-renge kyo, (I devote myself to the inexpressively profound and wonderful truth—the law of life— expounded in the Lotus Sutra, which embodies the loftiest teachings of Buddhism), is seen as capturing the essence of the Lotus Sutra itself, the fundamental mystic and ultimate law of the universe. It therefore has the power to uplift and mitigate, in and of itself, as the sum total of Buddhist law. Under Nichiren teaching, it therefore becomes promoted as a practice of chanting, through which people can attain Buddha-hood in this life. By chanting and invoking the mystic law embodied in the sutra, the practitioner is thought to be able to fuse his or her life of the universe, with this eternal and unchanging ultimate truth. To quote Nichiren: If you wish to free yourself from the sufferings of birth and death you endured through eternity and attain supreme enlightenment in your life time, you must awaken to the mystical truths which have always been within your life. The truth is myoho-renge-kyo. Chanting myohorenge-kyo will therefore enable you to grasp the mystical truth within you. Myoho-renge-kyo is the king of sutras, flawless in both letter and principle. It words are the reality of life and the reality of life is the mystic law (myoho). It is called the mystic law because it explains the mutually inclusive relationship of life and all phenomena. This is why this sutra is the wisdom of all Buddhas.

There are several features of this theology that is relevant to the understanding of Soka Gakkai in Singapore. Nichiren beliefs are fundamentally Mahayana in outlook. The distant roots of Nichiren are in the Chinese Tien Tai school of Buddhism and the Lotus Sutra on which its doctrines are based. It is Mahayana primarily in the sense that it begins with the assumption that the ability to attain enlightenment is a potential available to all people. This tradition of Mahayana Buddhism is very familiar for the majority of Chinese in Singapore practicing Chinese religion. Second, like Chinese religions, it has a ‘this-world’ orientation, rather

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than an ‘other-world’ orientation, as found in Christianity and Islam. The theology has a pragmatic focus, promising immediate benefits and salvation for its adherents. Nichiren Buddhism argues that it is possible to achieve Buddha-hood in this life. Nichiren interpreted that the state of Buddha-hood brought the ultimate goal of salvation closer to worldly existence of humankind, not some mystical place in the heavens which mortals cannot fathom and far less hope to aspire. In this sense, with the individual’s faith and conscientious practice of chanting, it has been promised that he can attain this ultimate goal of Buddha-hood with his personal effort. This pragmatism, and simplicity in the rituals, however, belies the fact that Nichiren Buddhism has very deep and profound philosophical roots.31 Nichiren left behind volumes of writings, doctrinal expositions and treatises on Buddhist philosophy and ideology. Nichiren, for example, taught that all men are capable of determining good from evil, and that all human beings have the potential for Buddhahood, since an innate Buddha nature is found in everyone. Nichiren believed that the history of Buddhism can be divided into three millenniums: the Hinayana period (beginning with the death of Buddha); followed by the Mahayana period (beginning at the time roughly equivalent to the Christian era); and the third period, Mappo or the Destruction of the Law, which, according to Nichiren, began at about A.D. 1050, which is the time we currently reside in. Nichiren was deeply convinced that the doctrine he was teaching was a return to the original Tendai teachings. He stressed that all sutras, other than the Lotus Sutra, were accommodations and preliminary teachings. In the Lotus Sutra, the Buddha Sakyamuni promised that the Lotus Sutra would be taught to all during the last centuries of the age of Mappo (Rodd 1980:7). Nichiren’s ideas were also deeply political. He thought that he could account for the turmoil and the calamities affecting Japanese society at that time could be explained in religious terms. He believed that there was hope for an ideal ruler, a wise Confucian Buddhist

31 For a detailed discussion of the life, history, and development of Nichiren Buddhism, including his childhood, his period of study at Kyozumi-dera, the Kamakura years, exile in Izu and later Sado, retreat to Minibu, his death and subsequent fragmentation of Nichiren Buddhism, sees Rodd, L.R., Nichiren: Selected Writings. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1980, and Eliot, C., Japanese Buddhism. London: Arnold and Company, 1935.

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king who would believe in the dharma and lead the country to faith. To him, the national morality was dependent on the ruler’s morality, and in a world governed by a foolish king immorality would triumph. (Rodd 1980:9) Through acceptance of the Lotus Sutra, and unity through Buddhism, the nation can achieve peace and prosperity. For most of his life, Nichiren tried to influence political developments, unsuccessfully. This intertwining of religion and politics and help explain the later interest of the Soka Gakkai in politics. 14.2. Soka Gakkai Soka Gakkai, initially known as Soka Kyoiku Kai (the Value Creating Educational Society) was founded in the 1930s. An association of lay adherents, its origins lies in the amalgamation by Makiguchi, a school teacher and principal, of Nichiren Buddhism with his own secular theory of value creation and education (Chan 1988:7). Makiguchi arrived at the personal conviction that the ultimate goal for the individual was happiness and that religion was the fundamental teaching which regulates individual life (Metraux 1986). He found that the solution to attaining happiness lies in the teaching of Nichiren Daishonin. Of particular importance was the idea that individual transformation is a means of transforming the whole. After its founding in 1930, Soka Kyoiku Kai (SKG) gradually developed into a successful propagating Buddhist organization, claiming a membership of over 3000 by 1943. In the same year, however, both Makaguchi and Toda were incarcerated by the militaristic government for opposing the 1941 order to consolidate SKG with other Nichiren lay groups. He died in prison in 1944, aged 73. His successor, Toda, on being released from prison, began to reconstruct the collapsed SKG, renamed it Soka Gakkai (SG). Under his leadership, Soka Gakkai grew from an association of mainly school teachers to a nation wide religious movement with over 750,000 members. This was achieved through active, and somewhat forceful proselytization, or shakubuku. Toda was said to have once remarked, “In my lifetime, I will see 750,000 families converted through shakubuku. If this goal is not attained before I die, then don’t hold a funeral for me. Just throw my ashes into the sea off Shinagawa.” (EA, 1990. No. 155). However, the aggressive methods of proselytization created problems with the public and other religions, especially since it called for the conversion of all Japanese denouncing other religions,

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including Shintoism, as “militaristic” and “violent”. Despite persecution, Soka Gakkai continues to grow in size, and by his demise in 1958, Toda had built an organization of over 1 million members. Toda is also credited with fostering a closer linkage with the priesthood in Taiseki-ji, thus providing much-needed religious legitimation for the lay Buddhist movement. Toda was succeeded by Daisaku Ikeda. Under his leadership, there were several major changes. He turned down the idea of shakubuku, or aggressive proselytization for shoju, a more gentle and persuasive conversion. He also started plans to build the Grand Temple at Taiseki. In 1964, Komeito (Clean Government Party) was founded as the political arm of Soka Gakkai. However, his most significant step was setting up the Soka Gakkai International (SGI), the initiation of a worldwide kosen-rufu. He travelled widely, and under his leadership, branches of Soka Gakkai were set up all over the world. At present, SGI estimates as having more than 12 million members in 188 countries and territories worldwide as to whom the practice of Buddhism is significant as “a practical philosophy of individual empowerment and inner transformation that enables people to develop themselves and take responsibility for their lives.” In 2000, the official estimates by Soka Gakkai are 8.2 million households in Japan alone, with a sizable youth membership of 4.4 million. Of this global spread, the lion’s share at that time came from Asia, with over 1 million members. It is important to distinguish between Nichiren Shoshu Buddhism and Soka Gakkai. Soka Gakkai is a lay Buddhist association which views the Lotus Sutra as the penultimate Buddhist text. Soka Gakkai, as an organization, follows the interpretation of Nichiren Daishonin, who they regard as correctly interpreting Buddhist scriptures for the present day. Thus, Nichiren Shoshu, as a religious sect, is organizationally different from Soka Gakkai, as a lay association. In earlier years, there was an interdependent relationship between the two groups. Soka Gakkai drew on Nichiren Shoshu priests to perform rituals, including marriages, funerals and especially the production of copies of the authenticated gohonzon by the High Priest of Nichiren Shoshu, as well as Soka Gakkai adherents making pilgrimages to the head temple of the Nichiren Shoshu sect, Taiseki-ji. The relationship is complementary, with the Nichiren priesthood providing religious legitimacy and Soka Gakkai providing funds, donating buildings, and helping to rebuild the Head temple of Nichiren. However, in 1992, following

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disagreements with the Nichiren priesthood, Soka Gakkai formally separated from Nichiren Shoshu, renouncing all relations with the priesthood.32 In fact, the original registered name of Soka Gakkai in Singapore was The Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist Association. After the split with Nichiren Shoshu sect, the Singapore group changed its name to the Singapore Soka Association. Despite the break with the Nichiren priesthood, Soka Gakkai continues to expand successfully. 14.3. Soka Gakkai Singapore Having outlined broadly the history and development of Nichiren Shoshu and Soka Gakkai, which will be useful in helping to understand the popularity of Soka Gakai in Singapore, the rest of the discussion will focus on Soka Gakkai in Singapore. Soka Gakkai was introduced to Singapore in the mid 1960s by Ushiro, a Japanese expatriate working in Singapore. Initially, it had a membership of only ten to twenty people, mainly Japanese expatriates meeting in the home of members for discussions and prayers. It grew gradually in membership, and by 1972, had a membership of about 100 members. In 1972, the group officially registered with the Registrar of Societies in Singapore and became formally known as the Singapore Nichiren Shoshu Association (NSA), an association of lay-believers of Nichiren Daishonin Buddhism. Its explicit goal was to practice and propagate Nichiren Buddhism: . . . as a part of the vital religious movement that cause(s) to flower of (the) Buddhist faith to bloom in every individual, and ultimately, to create (a) great wave of peace and happiness that encompasses the family, country, and the world. (see Chan 1988:1)

After its registration, NSA began a concerted effort at prosyletization, to propagate kosen-rufu in Singapore. It met with some success and by 1980; the membership was estimated to be over 12,000 members. It is difficult to know precisely how many members they presently have as they are a tightly knitted group and weary of outsiders. Estimates range from a low of 40,000 members to a high of 150,000 members. Officially, the SSA listed 25,000 believers participating in SSA activities. (It is however, not clear whether these are 25,000

32 See Wilson and Dobbelaere (1994) for a detailed discussion of the schism between Nichiren Shoshu and Soka Gakkai.

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households, which will make it about 100,000 members or individual believers. In addition, there is a category of believers, who follow Soka Gakkai, but who have yet to receive the gohonzon, as opposed to being members.) Whatever the true figure may be, given the small population size of Singapore of only 4 million people, and among all the new religions in Singapore, Soka Gakkai, has been extremely successful in recruiting new members. It should be noted that at the initial stages, the SSA, at that time known as the Nichiren Shoshu Association, was largely an organization of Japanese expatriates and growth was slow. The ascension of a Singapore leadership in the association coincided with the period of rapid growth, with a large number of Singaporeans joining the Association. At present, to cater to the large membership, Singapore Soka Gakkai has six centers located in various parts of the island. The first SSA centre was opened in Geylang, Lorong 18 in the early 1970s, with the help of some personal donations from SGI president Ikeda. The Telok Blangah Soka Centre was opened in 1984. This centre hosted the visit of Daisaku Ikeda’s visit to Singapore in 1988. The Pasir Panjang Center was started in 1987. It was later converted to the Soka Youth Center in 2001. The SSA HQ Building in the eastern part of the island was opened in 1993. In addition, the Tampines Soka Center in the East and Soka Culture Center in the West were opened in 1998, and the Senja Soka Center in 2002. In addition, the SSA Anle temple opened in 1997 included the provision of a prayer hall with a capacity of 700 people, as well as a columbarium to house the remains of members. 14.3.1. Organizational Structures Like its counterpart in Japan, the Singapore Soka Association is characterized by a very strong institutional structure with a plethora of tightly knitted social groups organized in a clearly demarcated hierarchical structure. At the lowest level of the pyramid is the han, or group. Generally consisting of thirty to forty individuals who live in the vicinity, the han meeting is usually held in the home of the leader. Meetings at the han level are usually conducted about once a month. Members share testimonies about their religious practices and daily experiences. Meetings often open with the chanting of the daimoku. Three or four hans form a chiku or district. With a larger group, monthly meetings are often held at one of the Centers. The next

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level, an agglomeration of four or five district groups, is the shosho, or chapter. Under the leadership of a more senior member, the chapters are organized geographically, such as the Eastern Chapter, Western Chapter, etc. Finally, above the chapters are the zones, again made up of 4 to 5 chapters, and similarly organized around a geographical area. At the apex of the organization is the Singapore Headquarters, led by the General Director. Besides this vertical network, the Singapore Soka Association is structured along horizontal lines based on age, gender, and recreational interests. Fundamentally, there are four divisions; Men Division, Women Division, Young Men Division, and Young Women Division. The Young Men and Young Women Division collectively form the Youth Division. Within the Youth Division, they are categorized into Student Division and Future Division. In addition, there are a variety of special interests groups, including Young Lions, the Byakuren, the Gojokai, Handicraft Group, Youth Choir, Youth Band Female Fife and Drums, Gymnastic Group, and professional groups, such as the Teacher Group, and the Medical Group. It is also interesting that Singapore Soka Gakkai encourages cultural activities that are localized, such as the Lion Dance Group, and the Chinese Orchestra. The picture one gets of this organizational structure is that not only is it tightly knitted; a member will belong to several groups within the organization. Thus, a member may attend a han discussion, a District meeting as well as a Zone meeting, and professional group meetings. He may spend time at his/her Youth Division, participate in group recreational activities, help out at activities of other groups, take part in cultural activities, or attend social gatherings organized by members. The hive of activities is confirmed in interviews with informants. As one noted, “There is always something going on at SSA. I never ever feel alone. Sometimes, when I am too busy, I cannot go. But it is not good not to attend. They do not force me to attend, but I do not feel good if I do not go. So I try my best to take part in as many activities as I can.” The multiple ties and high degree of participation, across age and gender lines, creates a strong loyalty to the organization. In addition, this reticulate hierarchical structure is maintained by a welldefined leadership structure. At every level, a member is assigned to a group leader, who acts as a conduit to the central leadership. Leaders hold regular meetings to discuss strategies for proselytization and

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keep the headquarters informed about the various groups, thus ensuring a high degree of social control within the organization. Such a network also helps to ensure an environment for the correct practice and understanding of Nichiren Buddhism. Moreover, the organization caters not only to the religious needs of the members, but has social and recreational functions as well. There is a constant stream of programs linking the individual to the group, which help build group identity. Many informants mentioned this to be a particularly appealing aspect of SSA. 14.3.2. The Growth of Soka Gakkai Having briefly detailed the development and structure of Soka Gakkai in Singapore, I will now focus on the reasons for its success. Most studies on the success of new religions have focused on their universalistic appeal. For example, Metraux, trying to explain for the success of Soka Gakkai International, argues that, “Soka Gakkai has a message that appears universally relevant in many countries on a foundation of Buddhist ideals (Metraux 1986:365). Others, also look into its theology, particularly its claim to be a religion of self-empowerment (Teng, 1997; Machalek & Wilson, 2000). While there may be truths to these claims, it really cannot explain groups in various countries see the religion in the same way. As I suggested earlier, the people who turn to Soka Gakkai in the United States of America and in Great Britain, are very different, both in background, socio-cultural values, and previous religious orientations compared to those in Singapore or Malaysia. Thus, I suggest that an understanding of religious change must take into account the institutional and environment that the converts are embedded. While there may be some commonalities, the success of a particular religion in different parts of the world need not be explained by the same reasons. For example, one of the popular theses for accounting Americans turning to a new religion is the “integrative thesis”. However, many Asian youths do not experience the same angst felt by American youths. Yet, they are also turning to new religions. Moreover, I would further argue that even within the same institutional environment, different groups of people who convert to the same religion may not be doing it for exactly the same reason. After all, one of the features of a successful religion is precisely the fact that its theology is flexible and able to adapt to the different conditions and interpretations of its theology by the new converts. One of the

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problems in understanding conversion is that most studies have been done on conversion to Christianity, or at least in the western context of religion. Thus, religious conversion has often been seen not as a change in beliefs, but also a change in personal identity. As discussed earlier in the conversion section, in studying religious change in Asian religions, such a model of conversion, in which conversion requires a transformation of identity, reorientation in behavioural and cognitive referents, and a displacement of the universe of discourse, may not be very useful. In the interviews with the informants, it was clear that the conversion to Soka Gakkai, particularly for the older Chinese, did not mean for them a change of identity or discourse. Rather, they retained many elements of their previous religion, melded and amalgamated with the new religious system. In a sense, the term religious conversion may not be the most appropriate term. Rather, it is a process of “religious re-labelling”, or “religious switching.” This is clearly exemplified when we look at the informants who switch to Soka Gakkai. As noted earlier, Soka Gakkai has been most successful in attracting middle-aged Chinese housewives. While there is a significant number of younger Chinese, this group forms the largest single constituency of Soka Gakkai in Singapore. The majority of these were formerly adherents to traditional Chinese religion such as Taoism, and ancestor worship. When asked why they switched to Soka Gakkai, one is immediately struck by the fact that the informants interviewed were not so concerned about the history of Nichiren, or Soka Gakkai, but rather the benefits that they would gain from faithful chanting. For example, one informant said, “I have accepted Nichiren Shoshu Singapore (NSS) for over seven years already. I used to have a cold everyday. Do you know, I was capable of finishing at least one box of tissue paper just blowing my nose? But when I started to believe in NSS, my cold stopped automatically. I did not even have to visit a doctor. It is because I chant everyday. My husband was against me believing in NSS. He said he would give me anything else if I stopped believing in NSS. But I did not want anything else. I have seen what chanting can do for me. So I started chanting secretly for my husband. So each morning, after my husband has left for work, I would start chanting. One day, my husband told me that nowadays, I do not have a cold anymore and I do not use tissue

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paper. I told him that is because the chanting has cured me. After that, my husband also became a follower of NSS.” Another informant said, “After my wife gave birth, she suddenly became mentally unstable. We just could not explain it. It was so bad that I had to admit her to the hospital. I was desperate so I chanted for her recovery. I asked my wife to chant along with me. Initially, she was afraid. However, at the altar, I asked her to follow my example and chant with me. As we chanted, the Gohonzon helped us. Everyday I would face east and chant in front of the altar. The power of the Gohonzon is very, very strong. My wife did not have to take much medication, but she was cured after the chanting.” When asked how often a person is supposed to chant, he replied, “The more you chant, the better it is for you. It is like a bank. You can chant a lot and save it. Therefore, the more you chant, the better it is.” I took life histories of many of the informants interviewed. It is clear that for many of them, the reason given for conversion relates to “miracles” that they have experienced because of the religion or chanting. Most of these relate particularly to health or personal problems. A case history of one informant exemplifies this, “I used to be a follower of Taoism. I would pray to Guan Yin, Da Be Gong, and the ancestors at home. My husband is always sick, with all sorts of illness that you can think of. I prayed to the gods; I brought him to see many doctors, but none of them was able to help. A few years ago, he fell really ill, and the doctors’ diagnosed that he had a growth in his stomach. He was bleeding a lot when he went to the toilet. He was really suffering. Everyone I asked told me that there is no cure for this illness. One day, a friend introduced me to NSS and brought me to a meeting. They said that if I chant for my husband, he will be healed. When I told my husband about it, he said it was all nonsense. However, my friends encouraged me to believe in NSS and to chant for him. So I started to chant. I chanted and chanted for him. Now my husband is healed. He is feeling so much better. No need to even go see the doctor. So now, even my husband believes. When I first started to believe in NSS, my husband refused to let me install the gohonzon at home. Now, he has seen the powers of the gohonzon, and he allowed me to put one at home. Sometimes, he even chants with me. My children were against my beliefs. They are Christians and are always quarrelling with me,

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telling me to give up being NSS and believe in their god. But how can I when I have seen how my husband was cured. NSS is very real. I have recently gone on a pilgrimage to Japan where I met many fellow believers.” One interesting feature of these Chinese women, who “convert” to Soka Gakkai, is that they continue to practice many of the rituals associated with Chinese religious beliefs, such as praying to ancestors. In fact, some Soka Gakkai members actually place the ancestral tablets besides the gohonzon. In this sense, the Gohonzon is no different from the ancestral altars found in the home of traditional Chinese religionists. Many informants continue to practice some of their traditional rituals associated with Taoism and ancestor worship. The point to note here is that for these middle-aged Chinese women, the theology and rituals associated with Soka Gakkai are not entirely new to them. Ideas such as karma, rebirth, shengan, that is, that we all possess the nature the Buddha, and yinguo, that all actions have moral consequences, are already found in the broad syncretic stream of Chinese traditional religions, which over the centuries, Buddhism in China has been absorbed into traditional Chinese beliefs. In a sense, Taoism and Soka Gakkai Buddhism both emphasize the pragmatic and practical aspects of religion. I have suggested elsewhere that the fundamental consideration of Chinese religion has to do with the conception of power and efficacy. The closest word to power in Chinese is li or neng li which is more correctly translated as strength or the ability to effect change. Another term that is associated with the concept of power is ling or efficaciousness. This power transcends the boundaries of man and spirits. Moreover, power is conceived as an invisible force that can be imbued in objects. The physical images of deities and ancestral tablets are regarded as sources of power. Sacrifices and ritual supplications are made before these images as they are said to be the centers of power. Similarly, spirit mediums are consulted because it is thought that when they are possessed, the power of the shen is actually in the person. There is a sense that the powers of spirits can be tapped to further the interests of men. The perception is that the protection and blessings of the spirits will greatly enhance the chances of success. Ritual performance can be seen as attempts to obtain power to improve a person’s luck. By presenting elaborate sacrifices, men hope to inspire the spirits to improve their lot in life. Thus, both gods and ancestors are appealed to in order to ensure that every con-

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ceivable avenue of power to effect the changes desired are covered. It is not unusual, for instance, for informants to visit different temples to pray to different deities. In fact, this power is not limited to Chinese gods. Many see no contradiction in praying to Guan Yin, or the Goddess of Mercy one day, visiting a Malay kramat the next, and on another, praying to Virgin Mary at the Novena Roman Catholic Church. In short, a sundry of spiritual beings, Jesus Christ, Mohammed, Buddha, and Virgin Mary, can be appropriated to serve the needs of the worshipers, since they are all conceived to be sources of power. (See Tong 2004). The point here is that for many of the older Chinese housewives, Soka Gakkai Buddhism operates within this conception of power and efficacy. Thus, the gohonzon, in a sense, is an object infused with power, and the chanting is part of the ritualized process of tapping this power source. Through these ritualistic behaviours, the participants hope to effect changes in their lives, whether in the curing of illnesses or ensuring that their children do well in the examinations. Thus, while they have, in a sense, turn away from Taoism as a religion, or at least as a form of formal affiliation, the values that they hold as important, such as the worship of ancestors remains strong. Ideas of filial piety, respect for elders, the centrality of the family, and having sons for the purpose of posterity of the family name are still highly regarded. Soka Gakkai, in a sense, is acceptable, as the theology does not contradict these cultural values. For these “converts”, they have changed to a new religion, but the new religion retains elements of their traditional belief system. But, it is not simply an affirmation of traditional values, or a return to tradition. If that is so, there is no need to change religions in the first place. Rather, it involves a more complex relationship of the preservation, or at least the theological emphasis on certain religious ideas, together with a reformulation of the adherents’ value system. One of the reasons for Soka Gakkai’s success is precisely to present to potential converts a new worldview that is in consonant, or at least does not directly contradict their previous cultural or traditional value system. As I show later, Soka Gakkai is not presented as a “Japanese” religion, but rather as a form of revitalized Buddhism. Moreover, Soka Gakkai Buddhism is sold in Singapore as very much a ‘this-world’ religion, as opposed to ‘the other-world’ religions such as Christianity and Islam. In sociological literature on religion, there is a conception of this world versus other-world religions.

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Benjamin, for example, makes a distinction between transcendental (other-world), including Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, and immanent (this-world) religions, such as Taoism and Chinese religions. Transcendental religions portray a dualistic universe, emphasizing the contrast between life in this world and life in the supernatural realm. This supernatural realm is viewed as the only true dwelling and the goal of salvation is to enter this realm, which becomes the central religious quest. The have also been called “world-rejecting” religions. This-worldly religions, however, while still portraying a dualistic universe, emphasize the importance of life in this world. As in Chinese religions, the deities are accorded ordinary knowable characteristics, and are, in many ways, like human beings (Benjamin 1987:21–22). Thus, for Chinese religions, the goal is to accumulate resources, whether wealth, health, or prosperity. Ritual performance is anthropocentric and ego-centric, and religious behaviour is humancentred rather than spirit-centred, and it is from the human point of view that the entire cosmos is viewed. Religion is primarily concerned with solving the problems of human existence (Wee, 1977). The relationship between human beings and his/her gods is an instrumental one. It is suggested that part of the attraction of Soka Gakkai Buddhism for the middle-aged Chinese housewives is that, like Taoism and traditional Chinese religion, Soka Gakkai is fundamentally an instrumental religion. The daily rituals such as the chanting the phrase, nam-myo-renge-kyo, together with the reading of the gongyo every morning and evening in front of the gohonzon, will bring immediate benefits to the practitioners. The other large group of Singaporeans attracted to Soka Gakkai is the young Chinese-educated Chinese. I suggest that the motifs for conversion to Soka Gakkai for this group of people are different from those of the older Chinese housewives. In the interviews with them, the common reasons given for turning to Soka Gakkai is not the religion of miracles and instant benefits, but rather that it is a rational, systematic religion. For example, one informant noted, “I find Soka Gakkai to be a systematic religion. In Soka Gakkai, I am especially drawn to the idea that all people bear the potential for Buddha-hood. Nichiren has diagnosed the cause of man’s afflictions; a world of hatred, greed and warfare. Through believing in the Lotus Sutra, and chanting, it provides a vehicle to bring peace and salvation to mankind.”

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Many are attracted to the fact that Soka Gakkai is a textual based religion, and point to the deep philosophical underpinnings of the Lotus Sutra. This is often compared to what they see as the “superstitious” and “irrational” nature of their previous religion, Taoism. An informant said, “Soka Gakkai is based on the Lotus Sutra, the greatest of all the Buddhist sutras, and the final and most important set of scripture. The Lotus Sutra is the true teaching of Buddhism. I often ask myself, What is the meaning of life?, How can I ensure my well-being? I find the answers in the Lotus Sutra. Soka Gakkai is the highest form of Buddhism. It is very practical and helps me live my daily life.” It is suggested that part of the reason for the desire for a textbased religion may be due to the introduction of Religious Knowledge program in schools as well as the nature of the educational system in Singapore. The popularity of Soka Gakkai in Singapore cannot be viewed in isolation, but seen within the context of religious and social change in Singapore, especially the institutional and environmental background of the society. Thus, the growing popularity of Soka Gakkai among the younger Chinese in Singapore must be seen within the context of the shift in affiliation to Buddhism, rather than simply the attraction of the theology and rituals of Soka Gakkai alone. In a sense, for these young Chinese, Soka Gakkai is viewed as a form of rational Buddhism, rather than a new Japanese religion. Similarly, to understand why the Chinese will turn to Soka Gakkai Buddhism, rather than other religions available in multi-religious Singapore society, it is important to note the close interrelationship between religious affiliation and ethnicity. As noted earlier, Hinduism is perceived to be a religion of the Indians and Islam, the religion of the Malays. Thus, a Chinese who is dissatisfied with his previous religion, has few options as to the religion he wants to convert to. Because of ethnic reasons, Islam and Hinduism are non-options. This is clearly exemplified in the data where there are insignificant numbers of Chinese who embrace these two religions. Those who do often were forced to do so because of inter-ethnic marriages. Thus, if one is dissatisfied with the religion of their parents, then the only really available options are to switch to Buddhism, convert to Christianity, or claim to have no religion. Given the interrelationship between the language of education and religious affiliations, many Chinese-educated Chinese will switch to

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Buddhism or claim to have no religion, as they view Christianity as a western religion, and that of the English educated in Singapore. It is this interaction of the variables of dissatisfaction with their parents’ religion, religious rationalization, and the influence of socio-cultural and ethnic factors that can account for the religious switching to Soka Gakkai Buddhism. 14.3.3. Religious Proselytization and Indigenization It is not simply, external factors that account for the popularity of Soka Gakkai, but a combination of both external and internal factors. One of the reasons for the success of Soka Gakkai in Singapore is that it is a proselytizing religion in an environment of mainly non-proselytizing religions. As noted earlier, one of the key theological aspects of Soka Gakkai is a call of conversion for non-believers. From the time of Toda, part of the mission of any Soka Gakkai member is shakubuku, or “break and subdue”. From a more fundamentalist perspective, all other religions are regarded as false, and the only way to salvation requires an adherence to the Lotus Sutra. In Singapore, given the state’s role in setting the general parameters for religious groups to operate, such as the Religious Harmony Bill, Soka Gakkai does not adopt the more extreme methods of shakubuku, but rather the less confrontational and persuasive method of shoju. Even so, in the interviews with the informants, this idea that it is the duty of every Soka Gakkai member to bring in new converts in clearly a key belief in Soka Gakkai in Singapore. This proselytization process is very well organized and systematically structured. Soka Gakkai members in Singapore are given guidelines for proselytization and members are given cards to keep track of their proselytization efforts. During the discussion group meetings at the han, district or zone level, leaders will often ask members about number of new members that they have introduced and to share their successful proselytizing efforts with other members. Some informants suggest that they in fact have a quota for proselytization, though this cannot be confirmed. This systematic program of proselytization is significant, as the majority of religions in Singapore are not proselytizing religions. In fact, the only other proselytizing religion in Singapore is Christianity. Islam and Hinduism, in Singapore, are basically only interested in tending to their own, and as indicated earlier, basically confined to their own ethnic groups, the Malays and Indians, respectively.

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Until recently, both mainstream Buddhism, and Taoism were also not religions that had a mission to convert non-believers. Thus, using the language of the religious economy model, there is “unfair competition”. Part of the reason for the success of Christianity in Singapore, especially between the 1950s to the 1980s, is that it was a religion with a theological basis and systematic program of religious outreach. Churches as well as para-church groups such as the Youth for Christ, Scripture Union, Eagles, and Navigators, targeted the young school-going children for conversion. It was looking outwards while the other main religions were looking inward. The success of Soka Gakkai proselytization is augmented by a very strong institutional structure as well as financial and other resources. The close-knitted nature of the group, and the peer pressure to invite and convert new members aided its outreach program. This is significantly different from traditional Chinese religion, which is organized as individual temples with no centralized authority. Moreover, there is no established clergy or a canon to hold the group together. Another reason for the success of Soka Gakkai is that, unlike other Japanese new religions such as Tenrikyo and Rissho-Kosei-Kai, it had, over time, become an increasingly indigenized religion. As I have mentioned earlier, part of the success of Soka Gakkai is that it is not viewed as a Japanese religion, but as a form of Buddhism. The indigenization of the religion occurs at many levels. This is mostly clearly illustrated at the leadership level. While Soka Gakkai was started in Singapore by a Japanese expatriate, it was quite quickly transferred to a Singaporean, Mr. Koh, and later, a Mr. Ong. This period also saw the growth of Soka Gakkai membership in Singapore. It is also not in the top leadership that is localized. At all level, from the chapter to the han levels, the leadership of Soka Gakkai is primarily Singaporean. The only main Japanese leader is Mr. Watanabe, a Buddhist monk who is responsible for some of the rituals conducted by Soka Gakkai Singapore. These Singaporean leaders have an understanding of the needs of Singaporeans as well as local knowledge in its strategy for growth and development. Just as importantly, there are certain changes in the theology and practices of Soka Gakkai Singapore to fit the local conditions. While the core message is still the same, that it, the centrality of the Lotus Sutra and the chanting of the namo-renge-kyo as well as the installation and importance of the gohonzon, other aspects of the religion

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have undergone modification. For example, there is no strict observance of the hobobarai, with its very militaristic and anti- other religions stance on conversion. Similarly, the practice of shakubuku, which was prevalent in Soka Gakkai Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, given the local conditions, especially the integral role of the state in religion, was never part of the theology of Soka Gakkai Singapore. While there are still ties to Japan, including pilgrimages to Japan, and a great deal of respect for the Soka Gakkai president, Ikeda, Soka Gakkai Singapore, in its outreach program, does not focus on the Japanese elements of the religion, but rather on the Lotus Sutra and it being a form of Buddhism. In the various sessions that I attended while conducting field research, the dominant language used by the members is Chinese, both Mandarin and local dialects such as Cantonese and Hokkien, rather than Japanese. In fact, a casual observer will not know that it is a Japanese religion except for the use of Japanese words such as the gohonzon, and chants. In the group activities, we see the incorporation of many “Chinese” cultural activities, such as the “lion dance” group and a Chinese orchestra. Soka Gakkai Singapore is also financially independent, drawing its resources from the membership in Singapore rather than obtaining funds from Japan. One of the most obvious key differences between Soka Gakkai Japan and Soka Gakkai Singapore relates to its role in politics. As I have outlined earlier, the very theology of Soka Gakkai, beginning with Nichiren, is the integral relationship between religion and governance. In Japan, there is a clearly political agenda, seen in the linkage between Soka Gakkai and the Komeito political party. In Singapore, the reverse is true. Soka Gakkai Singapore assiduously avoids any political involvement and attempts to keep a very low profile in politics. Although it has participated in the National Day Celebrations for many years, often putting up the best displays, the interest is seen as a form of cultural activity rather than political involvement. The headquarters of Soka Gakkai in Singapore is in fact called the Cultural Centre. It is not simply the changes in the theology or rituals that are important, but also how, in a nuanced way, the religion is presented to the population. Soka Gakkai Japan is often viewed as an exclusivist religion. In Singapore however, the group emphasizes peaceful co-existence with other major religions in Singapore. In ritual behaviour, while it does not officially support the practice, Soka

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Gakkai tolerates the continued practice of ancestor worship among its members. It is, I argue, this ability of Soka Gakkai to indigenize, presenting itself not as a Japanese religion, but rather as Buddhism, and in the process not be seen as an “alien” religion that can partly account for its success in attracting Singaporeans. This chapter has focused on various aspects of religious conversion. While the notion of religious conversion is important, it is equally vital to examine the practices related to religious change. The next chapter will deal with religious participation and religiosity in Singapore society.

CHAPTER FOUR

RELIGIOUS PARTICIPATION AND RELIGIOSITY An analysis of the pattern and level of religious participation is important because religious participation is an important indicator of religious commitment (cf. Pateman, 1970; Pennings, 1976). It is a measurement of religious fervour and religiosity for the individual follower, as well as an indicator of the strength of the religious institution (Savage, 1976; Katz and Kahn, 1978). An analysis of the level of religious participation by various religions will provide a more complete picture of the religious dynamics of Singapore society. In a multi-religious society, the level of religious devoutness and fervour, more than the size of various religious groups, accounts much for religious harmony and inter-religious relations. In the sociological literature, there are several dimensions in measuring religious participation. These include attendance at religious rituals and services, financial contribution to religious organizations or causes, and behavioural conformity to the tenets of the religion. For the present analysis, the bulk of the data on religious participation was derived from the survey done in 1988 and from answers to two questions in the 1990 census survey: one on the frequency of religious practices at home, and the other on the frequency at the place of worship. In addition, data from the WVS survey, conducted in 2003, where there were several questions on religiosity, will be used in the analysis. Given the multi-religious nature of Singapore society, with quite different religious traditions, the meaning and implications of religious practice and participation vary from one religion to another. It is thus difficult and indeed meaningless to use the data for cross-religion comparisons. This is because different religions have dissimilar theological doctrines on what constitutes expected religious participation. The data is thus more relevant for intra-religion comparisons. This chapter will examine several issues: Do different religions differ in the type and rate of religious participation? Were there differences in the frequency of participation between private religious practices performed at home, and the activities and rituals performed

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in the public places of worship? In the second section on religiosity, the focus is on the degree of religiosity in Singapore and the correlation between religiosity and socio-demographic variables such as age, gender and socioeconomic status. The chapter will also try to account for the high degree of religiosity among Singaporeans. Many Singaporeans, particularly the Christians and Buddhists were converts from another religion. Does this affect the degree of religiosity among Singaporeans? 1. Religious Participation at Home Of all the followers of various religions, Muslims were the most active in the frequency of religious participation at home (Table 4.1). Over 84% of Muslims reported that they performed home-based religious rituals on a daily basis. This is not surprising since the tenets of Islam require its members to observe congregational and private prayers. Practising Muslims pray just before sunrise, after high noon, around four o’clock in the afternoon, at sunset and just before bedtime. These prayers can take place anywhere: at work, in school, at home or in a surau or masjid (Arabic word for mosque which literally means “place of prostration”). Besides prayer, Muslims are also required to abide by four other “pillars” of their faith. These include the payment of zakat (a religious tax), the puasa (fasting) during the month of Ramadan, the profession of faith or shahadat (“There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet”), and the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Only a small number of Muslims, presumably the less ardent followers, carried out the rituals occasionally (5.9%) or not at all (4.1%). Followers of the other religions tended to be less active than Muslims as far as home-based religious activities were concerned. Among Buddhists, only 45.9% reported that they performed Buddhist rituals on a daily basis at home, with 11.6% doing so weekly/monthly. 28% of Buddhists practiced relevant rituals only occasionally or not at all (14.5%). Rituals performed by Buddhists at home included prayers and the chanting of sutras. Like Buddhists, Taoists in Singapore tended to either practice the rituals very regularly or only occasionally. Almost half of all Taoists (47.7%) claimed that they carried out relevant religious rituals daily. These included offering of food and incense to the various gods of the household to the spirits of the ancestors. Only 8.6% (70) of the

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Table 4.1 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Religion and Frequency of Religious Practices at Home, 1990 Religion

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Occasionally

Not At All

Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Relig

54.7 45.9 47.7 48.8 49.8 48.2 84.3 64.0 58.6

5.8 4.4 3.8 10.0 11.3 9.1 5.0 17.1 9.0

5.4 7.2 9.7 1.2 1.2 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.0

21.3 28.0 27.7 16.7 18.1 115.7 5.9 10.1 14.2

12.8 14.5 11.1 23.3 19.6 25.7 4.1 7.4 17.2

Table 4.2 Home Worship Activities of Traditional Chinese Religionists Home Worship Activity Use joss-sticks Offer fruit Offer flowers Burn joss-papers at home Offer cooked food Burn joss-papers at public places

Number Mentioned

Percentage*

764 739 619 600 520 518

93.5% 90.5% 77.0% 74.2% 63.6% 63.4%

*Note: The percentage is calculated from a denominator of 817 respondents professing affiliation to Chinese Religion.

Chinese religionists claimed that they did not have a home altar. The majority of respondents carried out worship activities, such as using joss-sticks, offering fruit and flowers, and burning joss-papers at home (Table 4.2). The rituals of praying with joss sticks and fruit offerings were performed by more than 90% of the respondents, attesting to the extensiveness of some home worship practices among the Chinese religionists in Singapore. The two relatively more “elaborate” activities such as the “offering of cooked food”, and “burning of joss-paper at public places”, were still comparatively high (60%). The complexities of the traditional Chinese religious practice can be seen in the way the Chinese worship their gods. For example, Guanyin is a sinicized version of the male Indian deity, Avalokitsvera; Dabogong is an indigenous deity canonized in Southeast Asia, while Guangong is a Taoist deity. In this sense, traditional Chinese religion incorporates Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, and other folk traditions into one syncretic religious system. To a certain degree, this syncretism

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can also extend to Christianity, for example in the mixing of practices of Chinese religious traditions and Catholicism. This is evident in some practices of Chinese Catholics, for example when holy water is sprinkled in homes to ward off evil and when amulets with the engraving of Jesus, Mary or the saints are worn to protect the wearer from evil or accident (Low, 1974). Churches also celebrate mass on the first day of the Chinese New Year and make traditional Chinese offerings such as nian gao, melon seeds and Mandarin oranges. Traditionally, Taoists are required to offer food and burn incense for the deities at home on a daily basis. These include the deities found on the shen zuo (altar). The most common deities found in Singapore homes are Guanyin and Dabegong, Buddha and Guangong. The 1988 survey shows that almost half of the Chinese households (47.4%) who practise Chinese religion; worship one deity (see Table 4.3). However, the majority (81.5%) worship between 1 and 3 deities at home. In the Chinese tradition of ancestor worship, ancestors must be appeased with food and incense. While the offering of food and burning of incense for the deities and ancestors should be carried out daily, in actual practice, many Taoist households only conducted these rituals on the First and 15th day of the Lunar month and not daily. As shown in Table 4.1, 27.7% of Taoists occasionally performed rituals at home. These were likely to be rituals associated with the birthdays of the gods or death anniversaries of the ancestors. It could also mean that the gods were only prayed to when there were familial problems or personal crises. It is interesting to note that Christians shared a pattern of religious participation similar to that of Buddhists and Taoists. About Table 4.3 Number of Gods Worshipped by Traditional Chinese Religionists Gods 0 1 2 3 4 5 and above Total

Frequency*

Percentage

70 387 175 104 40 41 817

8.6% 47.4% 21.4% 12.7% 4.9% 5.0% 100%

*Note: Figures based on the 817 respondents who mentioned practising Chinese religion.

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half (48.8%) of Christians (49.8% among Catholics and 48.2% among Protestants) performed rituals at home daily. An additional 10.0% performed religious practices on a weekly basis. Home-based rituals of Christianity included (mealtime or bedtime) prayers and biblereading. The rituals were relatively simple to perform, with no fixed hours or specified rituals. In this sense, it is worth noting that a high percentage of Christians did not perform any home-based practices regularly—16.7% performed such home-based rituals occasionally and 23.3% did not carry out home-based rituals at all. This suggests that a number of Christians could actually be considered “nominal Christians”, that is, although they claimed religious affiliation to Christianity, they did not follow closely the doctrinal requirements associated with the religion. Hindus had a higher rate of ritual adherence at home compared to Buddhists and Taoists, but a much lower rate compared to Muslims. Statistics show that 64% of Hindus reported that they carried out rituals associated with their religion on a daily basis; with another 17.1% on a weekly basis (Table 4.1). Religious practices of Hinduism at home included the offering of prayers and incense to the gods as well as special rituals conducted on special religious festivals such as Navarathri, as well as on the birthdays of favourite deities. A small number of Hindus carried out rituals occasionally (10.1%) or not at all (7.4%). 2. Religious Participation at Temple/Mosque/Church Given the different tenets and ideologies of various religions, the pattern for religious participation is quite diverse for one to the other. Some may be more home-based, while others stress activities at the place of worship (temples, churches, or mosques). Buddhism and Taoism, unlike Islam and Christianity, do not require their adherents to pay regular visits to the place of worship and they are not obliged to participate in weekly congregational worship. They may visit temples at any time, as often as they please and as many as they desire. One of the beliefs of Chinese religionists is that different gods have different powers. Thus, in order to get a multiplicity of blessings, one would have to pray to many different gods. These may be syncretic, Buddhist or Taoist ones which can be worshipped at home or in temples.

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Chinese religionists tend to go to the temple only on special occasions, such as on the birthdays of the gods, or when there are personal or familial problems in the family, when special requests need to be made to the deities. If the problem is solved, adherents will generally return to the temple to give thanks and make offerings of incense, food and the like. Adherents also visit temples on special festivals. As such, only a small percentage of Buddhist and Taoists visited the temple/shrine on a weekly basis (5.4% for Buddhists, 2.9% for Taoists). The majority of Buddhists (62.2%) visited the temple only occasionally. Similarly 66.5% of Taoists went to the temple occasionally. It should be noted that this itself does not mean that Buddhists and Taoists are necessarily lower in religiosity or religious fervour compared with followers of other religions, but rather that their belief systems do not require regular ritual participation at the temple or shrine. In the case of Taoism, religious participation at home is a better indicator of their level of religiosity. This is not the case for Christianity. Christian theology encourages, and in fact prescribes, that the individual Christian participates in communion with the body of other Christians which, for most denominations, is represented by the church. Catholics are obliged to participate in congregational prayers once a week. This involves the worship of God through participation in Mass every Sunday. Additionally there are specific holy days of obligation in the church calendar, during which Catholics must attend Mass. In Singapore these include Ascension Day, Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, All Saints’ Day and Christmas Day. Catholics have a duty to receive Holy Communion frequently (at least once a year) as well as to receive the Sacrament of Penance (through Confession) at least once a year if serious sin is involved. These two, together with baptism, confirmation, ordination, marriage and the anointing of the sick, are the seven sacraments through which it is believed Jesus Christ gives his spirit to the people. Rituals are an integral part of Catholic worship. Many of the rituals are tied to the weekly mass, while others are tied to cyclical calendrical events such as the observance of Ash Wednesday (the day when ashes are put on the forehead of believers to remind them that this is the state from which they came and to which they will return). It is therefore no surprise that 71.7% of all Christians reported that they went to church at least once a week, with an additional 2.8% who said they did so on a monthly basis.

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Table 4.4 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over by Religion and Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church, 1990 Religion

Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church

Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Other Religions

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Occasionally

Not At All

2.2 0.7 0.4 2.6 4.3 1.6 7.0 1.8 2.5

24.0 5.4 2.9 71.7 73.9 70.3 45.6 38.0 47.1

10.2 14.8 12.2 2.8 3.0 2.7 3.6 14.1 13.9

47.6 62.2 66.5 13.9 13.3 14.2 24.7 36.7 27.5

16.0 16.9 18.0 9.0 5.5 11.2 19.1 9.4 9.0

Census of Population, 1990

As for Muslims, while participation in home-based religious function was quite high, the statistics from Table 4.4 reveal a relatively low frequency of public participation. Only 7% of Muslims performed religious practices at the mosque daily, and another 45.6% did so weekly. However these figures are misleading as such rates do not reflect gender differences in participation in mosque-based religious functions. Islamic tenets prescribe that male Muslims join the community of believers and attend weekly prayers at the mosque. Thus, every Friday, all male Muslims above the age of puberty must congregate at the mosque for their noon prayers which are led by an imam (Arabic word for prayer leader). As such mosque-based religious activities are male-centred, Muslim males generally participate more actively in mosque affairs than do females, as will be shown in the next section. Whereas weekly obligatory worship is a distinctive feature of Islam and Christianity, in Hinduism, temple attendance is not obligatory. Thus, 36.7% of Hindus visit their temples only occasionally (Table 4.4). While the temple is an integral part of the Hindu life in India, I argue that the influence of Hindu temples has declined after World War II for several reasons. One is the urban renewal and with it, the fact that people found permanent settlement and increasingly could perform most of the rituals and worship at home. A second reason for the declining influence of the temple is a higher level of education and concomitantly the greater access to an increased

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number of secular and broad-based social institutions. This has meant that people can seek help and advice through other channels such as community or welfare associations, rather than from the temple. However, the temple still serves as a focal point of Hindu worship, festivals and ceremonies. The festival of Thaipusam, for example, involves the procession of devotees carrying kavadi, in penitence or thanksgiving. The traditional kavadi is a wooden arch on a wooden base, decorated with peacock feathers and supporting various offerings such as flowers and fruits, pots of milk (or sometimes sugar). In recent years, heavy metal kavadi have been used by some devotees. The kavadi is carried from the Sri Srinivasa Perumal Temple in Serangoon Road to the Thendayuthapani Temple in Tank Road. During Deepavali, another major Hindu festival, the main activity held in the temple is the fire-walking ceremony (thimithi) where devotees walk barefoot across a pit of heated granite chips. Although the heat is enough to burn, it is believed that a devotee who is strong in faith will be able to overcome this and emerge unhurt. For Hindus, the relatively fixed routines of work patterns and urban life have resulted in a reduction of time available for ceremonial activity. As a result, many festivals are celebrated on a reduced scale in the evenings or on weekends (Babb, 1976:166). 3. Gender and Religious Participation On the whole, women tend to be more active in performing religious rituals and participating in religious activities compared to men. This is found across all religions. From Table 4.5, we find that in all religions, there were more female believers conducting religious practices at home daily/weekly, than their male counterparts. For instance, 52.9% of Buddhist women carried out home-based rituals on a daily/weekly basis, compared to 47.7% for Buddhist men. Similarly, 90.7% of Muslim women performed home-based rituals daily/weekly, higher than 87.8% for men. The largest variation in the rate of participation between men and women was found in Hinduism (86.1% compared with 76.1%) and Taoism (55.3% compared with 47.9%), with the lowest being in Christianity (61.4% compared with 55.1%). This suggests that both Taoism and Hinduism are relatively home-based, and the responsibility for ensuring the performance of the correct rites often rests

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Table 4.5 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Daily/Weekly Religious Practices at Home by Religion and Sex Religion Buddhism Taoism Christianity Islam Hinduism Other Religions

Males

Females

47.7 47.9 55.1 87.8 76.1 61.4

52.9 55.3 61.4 90.7 86.1 72.8

Census of Population, 1990

Table 4.6 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Weekly/Monthly Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church by Religion and Sex Religion Buddhism Taoism Christianity Islam Hinduism Other Religions

Males

Females

18.6 13.5 72.1 64.0 49.5 55.3

21.8 16.7 76.2 34.1 54.6 65.7

Census of Population, 1990

with women. Islam, on the other hand, has specific ritual requirements for both men and women. Similarly, Christianity is a more individualistic religion in which all believers, both men and women participate as equals. When examining religious practices at public places of worship by gender, the pattern is quite similar to the one found for home-based rituals, with the exception of Islam (Table 4.6) 21.8% of Buddhist women carried out public-based religious activities on a weekly/monthly basis, compared to 18.6% for men. Similarly 76.2% of Christian women went to church regularly, compared to 72.1% among male Christians. The same pattern was also found among Taoists and Hindus. In the case of Islam, Muslim men were found to be much more active at public places of worship compared to women. From Table 4.6,

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we find 64% of Muslim men participated in mosque activities on a weekly/monthly basis, compared to only 34.1% for women. This clearly reflects the Islamic tenet which places a greater emphasis on the role of men in mosque affairs than of women. 4. Age and Religious Participation Generally, older people are more active in home-based religious activities. This is revealed in Table 4.7 which shows that believers over 30 years of age were far more active in performing daily or weekly religious practices, compared with those below 30. More of the younger believers were involved with home-based religious rituals only occasionally or not all, compared with the older folks. However, the trend found for home-based rituals, does not apply to public-based rituals. As far as religious practices at the place of worship are concerned, physical mobility becomes an important factor. From Table 4.8, we find that the very young (below 20) and the very old (60 and above) were less active than the young and middle-aged adult group between 20 and 60 who were more actively involved in religious activities at the place of worship—temples, shrines, churches, or mosques. Several different patterns emerge when we examine the rate of religious participation by religion. For Buddhism and Taoism, younger adherents were found to have significantly lower rates of participation compared to the older believers, both at home and at the temple or shrine. From Table 4.9, we find only 36.3% of Buddhists and 34.2% of Taoists in the 10–19 age group were involved in home-based rites on a daily/weekly basis, compared to 61.7% (Buddhists) and Table 4.7 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Age Group and Frequency of Religious Practices at Home Religious Practice at Home Age Group 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50–59 Years 60 Years and Over

Daily/Weekly

Occasionally/Not at All

51.1 54.4 65.0 66.1 65.6 66.7

44.7 40.6 29.7 27.8 27.1 27.2

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Table 4.8 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Age Group and Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church Age Group 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50–59 Years 60 Years and Over

Daily/Weekly

Occasionally/Not at All

24.3 29.7 27.5 23.8 25.1 23.5

68.6 62.5 61.5 62.1 61.7 66.0

Table 4.9 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Daily/Weekly Religious Practices at Home by Age Group and Religion Age Group 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50 Years & Over

Buddhism Taoism 36.3 37.9 56.4 61.7 59.1

34.2 38.1 58.9 60.1 61.0

Christianity

Islam

Hinduism

56.5 58.6 60.2 57.2 60.5

87.5 86.4 90.4 92.1 92.2

81.3 76.2 80.7 84.6 85.1

Table 4.10 Percentage of Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Weekly/Monthly Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church by Age Group and Religion Age Group 10–19 Years 20–29 Years 30–39 Years 40–49 Years 50 Years and Over

Buddhism Taoism 14.1 16.6 22.8 26.3 21.7

8.7 12.3 17.9 20.0 15.8

Christianity

Islam

Hinduism

74.2 75.4 76.1 71.8 73.6

49.2 48.0 49.9 51.5 48.7

48.2 52.5 52.7 54.5 52.3

60.1% (Taoists) for respondents between the ages of 40 to 49. From Table 4.10, which compares the rate of participation at the place of worship, only 14.1% of Buddhists and 8.7% of Taoists in the 10–19 age group participated in temple-based rituals on weekly/ monthly basis, compared to 26.3% of Buddhists and 20% of Taoists in the active 40–49 age category.

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Table 4.11 Use of Joss by Age

Less than 30 30 to 39 40–49 50–59 60 and above Total

No

Yes

30.8 28.7 20.9 16.6 25.2 23.8

69.2 71.3 79.1 83.4 74.8 76.2

This pattern of religious participation was similar to the 1988 survey findings on 1025 head of households in six HDB estates. Younger Chinese Singaporeans were less likely to participate in the traditional customs and rituals than their older counterparts. On the other hand, older respondents were quite firmly entrenched in Chinese ritual performance. For example, 83.4% of those aged 50–59 claimed that they used incense when praying at home. This falls to only 69.2% for those less than 30 years old. The significant relationship between age and ritual practice is indicative of the “cohort effect”. In Chinese families, heads of households and their spouses who were between 40 and 60 years old grew up at a time when Singapore society was more “tradition bound”. Thus, they are more likely to observe traditional Chinese rituals and festivals. The younger cohorts, however, experience a different socialcultural milieu, a more pluralistic society where there is greater freedom in the choice of alternative modes of religious beliefs. Moreover, they live in a society that emphasizes a scientific, rational education system and where economic development through modernization, industrialization, and urbanization are given greater emphasis. For Muslims and Hindus, a similar association between age and religious activities at home was also found, although the contrast between age groups was much less pronounced. The difference here may well reflect a normal variation in religious participation in association with the changing life cycle of a person. For Christianity, about 60% of its believers participated in home-based religious activities, across all age groups. There was little variation, ranging between 56 and 61%. As discussed earlier, younger Buddhists and Taoists were less likely to take part in public-based religious activities (Table 4.10). For Islam

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and Hinduism, there was little variation between the rates of religious participation between Muslims of various ages. For Christians, slightly more of the younger believers (those below the age of 40) were involved in church activities than those 50 and over. From the 1988 survey, it was clear that the younger and newer Christians were the most active in terms of regularity of church attendance, degree of personal devotion, amount of financial contributions and attitude towards evangelism. For example, the majority of those from the 14–19 age group considered themselves to be very active in church. They attended church services, Sunday schools and youth ministries very regularly. Most said that they enjoyed going to church as it allowed them to meet their close friends and fellowship with other Christians. Additionally, more of the younger Christians participated in other church activities, such as “Bible Clubs”, church camps, and outings. When interviewed, only a small minority in this age group felt that they were inactive in church. Similarly, most people in this age group felt that the giving of tithes to the church was necessary. Evangelism was also very important to them, as they believe that God has commanded Christians to evangelize, and it is the duty of every Christian to save lives. However, the religious commitment among Christians in the 20–24 age group was generally lower than that in the 14–19 age group. Almost half the Christians in this group did not consider themselves to be active Christians. Although they attended church, they do not actively take part in the activities or assume leadership positions. Some said that they did not go to church at all. Like those in the 14–19 group, they feel that evangelism is an important part of Christian living. Most, however, did not evangelize on a regular basis, and some, not at all. The main reason given for their lack of involvement in evangelism was the lack of time, being too busy with schoolwork and examinations, or having other priorities. The group that showed the lowest religious commitment was that above the age of 25. In this group, only a small percentage considered themselves to be active Christians. For those who did go to church, it was only to attend the services. They did not get involved in other church activities. Others said that they used to attend church, but did not do so anymore. Only 10% said they evangelized regularly. One interviewee said, “I used to evangelize when I was younger, but not anymore. I find it awkward to talk to people”.

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For Christians, there is a distinct trend with regard to religious participation and age. The younger and newly converted Christians are more likely to be active in church. There is a high degree of idealism and excitement about the newfound religion, and evangelistic zeal is strong. These Christians are very active in the field of ‘missionary work’. They are the ones that grab the attention of the public, giving many the impression, that all Christians are young and active although the 1990 census and the national survey data show that Christians were spread across all age groups. Among those who have been Christians for a longer period, the 1988 survey found that the majority become less active. For these older Christians, although participation in church activities and evangelism is low, many still carry out the rituals and attend services at church. This may, in part, account for the relatively high rates of public participation (above 70%) among Christians of the various age groups (Table 4.10). Some Christians do not consider themselves to be active members of the church and stop participating in the rituals of the religion altogether. This, however, does not stop them from professing to be Christians. Even though they may have “backslid” or are dormant, they still call themselves Christians in the belief that one day they will “return” to God. Also, in Christian theology, for a Christian to deny his faith amounts to apostasy, a condition beyond redemption. This fact suggests that the figures for religious affiliation to Christianity for the total population may be skewed on the high side. 5. Religious Participation and Socio-Economic Status There was a negative association between socio-economic status (SES) and the frequency of religious practices at home; but a positive association between SES and the frequency of religious practices at the place of worship. This pattern is clear when three indicators of socio-economic status are applied to the analysis. These three indicators are: occupation, income, and education. Singaporeans employed in the more prestigious and better-paid occupations were less likely to participate in home-based religious activities. As is shown in Table 4.12, about 48–52% of those in white-collar (professions and technical, administrative and managerial, and clerical) occupations carried out daily religious activities at home.

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Table 4.12 Resident Working Persons Aged 15 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Occupation and Frequency of Religious Practices at Home, 1990 Frequency of Religious Practices at Home Occupation

Daily Weekly

Monthly Occasionally Not At All

Total Professional and Technical Administrator and Managerial Clerical Sales and Services Production and Related Services Others

53.8

6.1

5.4

21.9

12.8

49.9

6.9

3.7

23.7

15.8

48.3 51.5 55.0

4.7 6.1 6.3

6.4 4.1 6.1

24.3 24.0 21.8

16.3 14.3 10.8

58.6 39.3

5.5 9.7

6.2 3.9

19.1 30.2

10.6 16.9

Table 4.13 Resident Working Persons Aged 15 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Occupation and Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church, 1990 Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church Occupation Total Professional Technical Administrator/ Managerial Clerical Sales and Services Production and Related Others

Daily

Weekly

Monthly

Occasionally

Not At All

2.2

25.6

10.3

47.6

14.3

2.4

40.3

6.9

38.3

12.1

1.6 2.5

22.4 33.0

12.5 8.9

49.4 43.1

14.1 12.5

2.5

20.4

11.1

52.2

13.8

2.2 1.1

19.7 27.1

11.8 7.4

50.8 45.7

15.5 18.7

Among those holding blue-collar (production and related) jobs, this figure rose to 58.6%. The pattern is, interestingly, reversed when it comes to religious activities at the place of worship. Here, it is those in higher occupational groups who tended to be more active. From Table 4.13, we find that 42.7% of those in the professional and technical occupation

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Table 4.14 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Monthly Household Income from Work and Frequency of Religious Practices at Home, 1990 Monthly Household

Frequency of Religious Practices at Home

Income from Work Daily Weekly Monthly Total Below $1,000 $1,000–$1,999 $2,000–$2,999 $3,000–$3,999 $4,000–$4,999 $5,000–$5,999 $6,000 and Above

54.7 58.7 60.0 55.2 51.4 51.6 48.9 47.9

5.8 6.2 5.5 5.2 6.4 6.2 7.0 5.5

5.4 5.8 5.5 5.3 5.5 4.8 4.1 6.3

Occasionally Not At All 21.3 17.1 18.4 22.1 22.4 23.8 23.3 25.5

12.8 12.2 10.6 12.2 14.3 13.6 16.7 14.8

took part in religious practices at the place of worship daily or weekly, only 22.9% of those in sales and services jobs, and 21.9% of those in production and related jobs did so. In Singapore, income level is closely associated with occupation. Thus, as illustrated in Tables 4.14 and 4.15, it is not surprising that the same pattern found for occupational groupings is also found for income groupings. In terms of religious practices carried out at home, those from lower income categories had a higher level of participation. Hence we found 58.7% of those earning below $1,000 a month and 60% of those earning between $1,000 and $1,999 per month performed religious practices daily at home (Table 4.14). This drops to only 48.9% and 47.9% for those earning $5,000–5,999 and $6,000 and above respectively. Again, as in the case of religious participation at the place of worship by occupation, those in the lower income groups tended to have lower rates of participation. Only 22% of those earning less than $1,000 and 22.9% of those earning $1,000–$1,999 a month carried out public rituals on a daily or weekly basis. It rose to 29.8% and 30.1% for those from the $4,000–4,999 and $5,000–5,999 income categories respectively, and 34.1% for those earning more than $6,000 a month (Table 4.15). From the 1988 national survey, an interesting relationship was observed between income levels and traditional Chinese practices. At the lower income levels, there were financial constraints on the number of home-based activities and festivals that respondents could

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Table 4.15 Resident Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Monthly Household Income from Work and Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church, 1990 Monthly Household

Frequency of Religious Practices at Home

Income from Work Daily Weekly Monthly Total Below $1,000 $1,000–$1,999 $2,000–$2,999 $3,000–$3,999 $4,000–$4,999 $5,000–$5,999 $6,000 and Above

2.1 2.6 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.9 2.0

24.0 19.4 20.8 22.5 25.0 27.9 28.2 32.1

10.2 12.3 10.9 9.8 10.0 9.5 9.9 8.5

Occasionally Not At All 47.7 48.0 50.3 48.6 46.9 45.7 44.1 44.0

16.0 17.7 15.9 16.9 16.0 15.0 15.9 13.4

observe. At the same time, poorer households tended to place greater importance on customary rituals. The result was that households in the lower income groups usually conducted as many activities and festivals as their income allowed. However, families from the highest income group either did not practise rituals at all, or, if they did, they usually observed most of the rituals and festivals. A possible intervening variable is the educational stream. Chinese educated respondents with high income (e.g., Chinese businessmen) were more likely to perform Chinese traditional rituals. English educated respondents with a high income, such as professionals and managers, would be less likely to adhere to such rituals. The pattern found for occupation and household income is repeated when we examine the educational factor. As is shown in Tables 4.16 and 4.17 the higher the level of educational attainment, the lower the frequency of religious practices at home, and the higher the frequency of religious participation at the place of worship. The relationship between religious participation and the various socio-economic indicators must be understood from findings discussed earlier. Firstly, there is a positive relationship between socio-economic status (education, occupation and income) and the percentage of Christians in the population, and a negative relationship between socioeconomic status and the number of followers of Taoism/Buddhism. Secondly, Taoism and Buddhism are more home-based with more frequent religious practices performed at home by their believers, while Christianity has the most active participation among its followers

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Table 4.16 Resident Non-Student Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Highest Qualification Attained and Frequency of Religious Practices at Home, 1990 Highest Qualification Attained

Frequency of Religious Practices at Home Daily Weekly Monthly

Total Below Primary Primary Secondary Upper Secondary & Polytechnic University

Occasionally Not At All

56.7 61.4 58.6 52.7 46.5

5.6 4.6 6.1 6.1 6.0

5.7 7.6 5.3 4.6 3.5

19.9 17.3 18.6 22.0 26.8

12.1 9.1 11.4 14.6 17.2

46.1

7.5

2.0

25.1

19.3

Table 4.17 Resident Non-Student Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households by Highest Qualification Attained and Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church, 1990 Highest Qualification Attained

Frequency of Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church Daily Weekly Monthly

Total Below Primary Primary Secondary Upper Secondary and Polytechnic University

Occasionally Not At All

2.3 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.2

24.0 14.7 22.3 31.4 35.1

10.8 13.0 11.8 8.3 7.7

47.5 52.1 48.8 44.2 40.2

15.4 18.1 14.8 13.5 14.8

1.4

51.0

6.1

30.3

11.2

at its place of worship (Tables 4.1 and 4.4). Hence, as there are more Christians and less Taoists and Buddhists among the higher SES Singaporeans, we find more of those in this SES group more active in the religious activities in the place of worship, but less so in the home-based religious practices. That the relationship between SES and religious participation varies from one religion to another religion is confirmed by statistics in Tables 4.18 and 4.19, which compare the extent of religious participation between different religions by the level of educational attainment. For home-based religious practices, we find there was a strong

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negative association between religious participation and education among the Buddhist and Taoist populations. But for Christians, it was the better educated who were more active in home-based religious practices. As for Islam and Hinduism, the difference between various educational categories was minimal. As far as religious participation at the place of worship is concerned (Table 4.19), we find that, for Christians, it was again the better educated who were more active in church activities. For Buddhists and Taoists, it was the least educated and the best educated that were more active. Yet, for Muslims, it was reversed, with the least educated (many of them females) and the best educated who were the least active in mosque activities. As for Hinduism, the pattern remained the same for all levels of education, as in the case of home-based religious rituals. Overall, there does not seem to be any clear-cut pattern which can be identified in the relation between education and the level of participation, for all religions. Table 4.18 Percentage of Resident Non-Student Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Daily Religious Practices at Home by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained, 1990 Religion Buddhism/Taoism Christianity Islam Hinduism

Below Upper Primary Primary Secondary Secondary University 57.3 46.2 83.5 66.0

51.4 46.4 82.9 61.0

40.4 47.9 87.3 65.8

29.6 54.9 89.8 64.1

27.1 50.9 87.5 67.1

Table 4.19 Percentage of Resident Non-Student Population Aged 10 Years & Over in Resident Private Households Engaged in Religious Practices at Temple/Mosque/Church by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained, 1990 Religion Buddhism/Taoism Christianity Islam Hinduism

Below Upper Primary Primary Secondary Secondary University 82.6 87.4 75.4 90.0

85.2 89.9 82.1 90.1

84.3 91.7 84.5 92.1

79.4 92.3 84.9 91.9

83.6 92.8 78.0 85.9

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From the analysis above, it has been shown that the differences in religious doctrines and traditions, followers of different religions vary in the type and frequency of religious activities they perform. Both Christianity and Islam subscribe to regular prayer and attendance at places of worship. These two religions are also highly organised and institutionalised. To a large extent, this accounts for their strength in Singapore. Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism on the other hand are more home based. The majority of their followers frequently perform religious practices such as incense-burning and offerings at home. Followers of Hinduism are relatively less frequent in visiting their temples while Chinese religionists (Buddhists and Taoists) were the least active of all with regard to praying and visiting places of worship. This did not mean that Buddhists and Taoists were necessarily lower in religiosity compared with followers of other religion nor does it necessarily reflect a decline in religious beliefs among the Chinese. 6. Religiosity in Singapore The preceding analysis on religious conversion and participation depended primarily on the SFAS88 survey as well as the Census of Singapore 1990 and 2000. Census data has inherent limitations and especially because of the limited number of questions on religion, cannot elucidate other aspects of religious conversion, such as religiosity. Moreover, since the Census data is based on self-reporting, there is really no way to ascertain whether the conversion is “real” or resulted in radical personal change. In a separate survey (WVS 2000), data was collected on the religiosity of Singaporeans. This section elaborates on this idea. The data on religiosity assessed three key indicators of religiosity: the importance of religion in peoples’ lives; the level of belief in (metaphysical) religious aspects; and the degree of participation in religious activities. The data suggests that the level of religiosity is high among Singaporeans. For example, over 70% of respondents felt that religion was “very important” or “rather important” in their lives. Only 6.7% claim that religion was not “important at all”. Similarly, 84% of the respondents believe that there is a god(s), with only 12.3% saying that they do not believe that there is a god. Furthermore, over 72% of Singaporeans said that god(s) is/are very important in their lives, compared to 14% who say that god(s) is/are not important.

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The other questions used in the survey elicited similar responses and suggest a rather high degree of religiosity in Singapore. For example, 67.8% of respondents claim that they believe that there is life after death; 86.6% claim that people have a soul, and 73.6% claim that they believe in the existence of hell(s). Despite the rapid modernization of Singapore society, the level of religiosity, both in terms of the importance of religion in the lives of people, as well as beliefs in the metaphysical aspects of life, such as the notion of heaven and hell and the existence of soul(s) remains essentially high. As detailed in the last section, it is interesting that while, from the theological and philosophical angle, the level of religiosity is rather high, at the level of practice, that is ritual behaviour, and respondents register a lower level of adherence on ritual practice. Thus, while the response on the importance of religion is over 80%, the number of people who actually spend time in church/mosque/synagogue/temple or other place of worship is relatively lower. For example, only 18.6% of respondents say they spend time at the religious place of worship weekly, and 17.6% once or twice a month. A significant 41.6% claim that they do not visit places of worship at all. Similarly, only 19.7% of respondents claim membership in religious organizations. While significant, this data should be analysed with care. As noted earlier, the different religions in Singapore have different prescriptions regarding ritual practices at places of worship. Unlike Christianity and Islam, where there are clear rules on church/mosque attendance, religions such as Buddhism, Taoism, and Hinduism, do not require regular attendance at places of worship. Most people only visit temples when there is a need for ritual propitiation or on special religious days. Later, this section will examine each religion in relation to visits to places of worship to illustrate this. Even so, the fact that, relative to belief systems, the lower adherence to visits to places of worship is interesting. As I have argued earlier, it suggests that there is a shift in religious behaviour to a more philosophical approach to religion, emphasizing the belief systems, rather than adherence to ritual practices occurring in Singapore. 6.1. Religion by Religiosity To get a more complete picture of religiosity in Singapore, given the variations in what constitutes ritual performance for the various religions, it is important to analyze religious behaviour within each

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religion. As the following table demonstrates, there are wide variations in what constitutes religious practice. When we examine religion by whether religion is important in their lives, the various religions display some degree of variations. For example, for the Taoists, only 6% said that religion was very important and 28.8% said that it was rather important. A large 65.2% said that religion was not very important or not important at all. This contrasts significantly with Protestant Christians, where 92.7% said that religion was very important/rather important in their lives, and Islam, where a high 99.2% said that religion was very important. The Buddhists are in the middle, with 67.6% saying that religion is very/rather important, and 32.4% noting that it is not very important or not important at all. It could be argued that this is not a measure of religiosity for those who ascribe to Chinese religion, especially Taoism, as religion is not seen as being separate from social life in general or with the customs and cultural practices of the Table 4.20 Religions by How Important Religion is in your Life Religion

Very Important

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Total

Taoist

18 6.0

86 28.8

142 47.5

53 17.7

299 100%

Buddhists

82 17.2

240 50.4

128 26.9

26 5.5

476 100%

Protestant

130 72.6

36 20.1

11 6.1

2 1.1

179 100%

30 40

7 9.3

4 5.3

74 100%

226 95.0

10 4.2

2 8

0 0

238 100%

Hinduism

31 66

10 21.3

1 2.1%

42 100%

N.R.

18 6.0

86 28.8

Others

5 31.3

4 25

Roman Catholic Islam

33 44

5 10.6% 142 47.5

53 17.7

299 100%

5 31.3

2 12.5

16 100%

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Table 4.21 Religions by How Often Do You Attend Religious Services Once a Once a Special week month Holy Days Islam

Once a Less than Never year once a year

135 57.0

42 17.7

24 10.1

4 1.7

27 11.4

5 2.1

Hinduism

21 45.7

12 26.1

9 19.6

1 2.2

2 4.3

1 2.2

Taoism

20 11.1

32 17.8

63 19.6

6 3.3

39 21.7

20 11.1

Buddhism

84 17.6

82 17.2

166 34.8

11 2.3

89 18.7

45 9.4

Protestant

133 74.7

26 14.6

4 2.2

4 2.2

9 5.1

2 1.1

Catholics

57 73.1

3 3.8

7 9.0

2 2.6

7 9.0

2 2.6

Chinese as religion is diffused into all aspects of social behaviour. In Chinese religion, there is, unlike Christianity and Islam, no clear distinction between the secular and the sacred (See Yang, 1961). It is thus not that they are less religious but that the religion does not necessary require regular visits to places of worship. For Taoism in particular, it is probably more important to examine home based rituals, rather than visits to public places of worship. In the next section, the performance of home based rituals is analyzed in some detail showing that the performance of these rituals remains essentially very high among the Taoists in Singapore. These differences in ritual prescriptions are again obvious when we examine the level of attendance of religious services. Among the Christians and Muslims in Singapore, with defined guidelines on attendances at places of religious worship, the attendance level is relatively higher compared to Taoism and Buddhism. For example, over 74% of Protestant Christians claim they attend church once a week and 14.6% at least once a month. Similarly, 57% of Muslims go to the mosque once a week, and 17.7% at least once a month. Among Muslims who do not follow the tenets of the religion, 11.4% attend mosque less than once a year and 2.6% never attend mosque. For Taoists and Buddhists, where attending religious services at places of worship is not a requirement of the religion, only 11.7% go to

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the temple once a week and 17.8% once a month. 32.8% visit less than once a year or never. The same trend is observed for the Buddhists. As I have indicated earlier, this does not mean that the Taoists and Buddhists are less religious, but rather, the tenets of the religion need to be understood in order to measure religiosity. 6.2. Ethnicity and Religiosity Given the close interrelationship between ethnicity and religious affiliations, when analyzing ethnicity and religiosity, one would find the same pattern as the correlation between religion and religiosity. As can be seen in Table 4.22 the Malays register the highest score concerning the importance of religion in their lives, with 95.5% saying that it is very important and 3.8% saying that it is rather important. Similarly, for the Indians in Singapore, over 89.6% noted that religion is very/rather important in their lives. The Chinese present an interesting case study as only 22.5% claim that religion is very important and a further 42.0% say that it is rather important. Does the data suggest that Chinese in Singapore are less religious? Yang has alluded to this problem of understanding religion when he noted that the place of religion in Chinese society is a controversial subject as there are a number of seemingly contradictory factors in the situation. At one level, one is struck by the vast number of magical practices and beliefs that the whole pattern of Chinese life “was heavily colored by a shadowy world of gods, spirits and ancestors” (1961:3). At another level, however, most Chinese scholars point to the unimportance of religion in Chinese society and that Table 4.22 Ethnicity by How Important Religion is in your Life Ethnicity

Very Important

Rather Important

Indian

69 74.7

14 14.9

Chinese

272 22.5

Malay Others

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Total

7 7.3

2 2.3

92 100

506 42.0

329 27.3

99 8.2

1205 100

193 95.5

8 3.8

1 0.5

0 0.2

202 100

10 77.9

2 15.6

1 3.9

0 2.6

13 100

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belief systems, such as Confucianism, Buddhism and even Taoism must be viewed as philosophies, rather than religion. Thus, scholars such as Bodde (1979) suggest, “[The Chinese] are not a people for whom religious ideas and activities constitute an all important and absorbing part of life . . .” and the philosopher Hu Shih who noted, “China is a country without religion and the Chinese are a people who are not bound by religious superstitions.” Yang ascribed this seeming contradiction to a difference between the view of religion from the folk level and that of the cultured elites. It is clearly more than that. As I have argued earlier, most informants interviewed do not really make the distinction as found in religions such as Christianity, where there is a separation of the sacred from the secular. Rather, for Chinese religion, religion permeates all aspects of social life, and the core cultural values, such a filial piety, loyalty, and the importance of the provisions of descendants to propagate the family name are encapsulated in religious ideas, particularly those related to death and funerary rituals. Thus, it is difficult to separate religious ideas from cultural practices. As Table 4.23 below clearly indicates, religiosity for the Chinese is mediated by the religion that they claim adherence to. For example, among the Chinese who are Christians, 72.3% claim that religion is very important in their lives, with 20.2% saying that it is rather important. Similarly, for Chinese Muslims, and as a population, it constitutes a very small percentage of the total Chinese population, 100% claim that religion is very important. However, for the Chinese Taoists, only 10.6% claim that religion is very important, with 26.7% claiming that it is not very important or not important at all. This is also true for the Buddhist, with 17.2% saying that religion is very important and 32.4% noting that religion is not important in their lives. As I have already argued, this does not mean that the Chinese Taoists and Buddhists are less religious compared to the Christians. Rather, it rests with the nature of the religion. This is clearly exemplified when we examine the data on attendance of religious services. In Table 4.24 below, for the Chinese Christians, as expected, religious attendance is very high, with 74% claiming to attend church more than once a week and 15% once a month. However, when we look at the Chinese Taoists and Buddhists, attendance is low, with most of the Taoists (35%) and Buddhists (34.8%) going to the temples on special ritual days, as required by Chinese religious proscriptions. However, when we look at the data

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Table 4.23 Religion by Ethnic Group by How Important Religion is in your Life (Chinese) Very Important

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Taoist

19 10.6%

113 62.8%

37 20.6%

11 6.1%

180 100

Buddhists

82 12.2%

240 50.4%

128 26.9%

26 5.5%

476 100%

Protestant

125 72.3%

35 20.2%

11 6.4%

2 1.2%

173 100

24 38.1

28 44.4

7 11.1

4 6.3

63 100

4 100%

0

0

0

4 100

0

0

0

0

0

N.R.

17 5.7

86 29.1

141 47.6

52 17.6

296 100

Others

2 16.7%

4 33.3%

2 10.7

12 100

Roman Catholic Islam Hinduism

4 33.3%

Total

on home based ritual performance among the Taoists and Buddhists in Singapore, as detailed in the earlier section on ritual performance at home, as I argue that these are more home based religions, the level of ritual performance is rather high. 6.3. Gender by Religiosity The two tables below details the relationship between gender and religiosity. It is interesting to note that while women tend to be more religious, both in terms of the importance of religion to life and going to places of worship, the difference is lower than expected. The literature suggests that women are generally more religious or at least more active in religion compared to men. This is especially true when we consider that a large percentage of the Singaporean population is Buddhist and Taoist. In Taoism, while men tend to be involved in public rituals associated with the religion, most of the ritual practices, as well as intercession to the gods on behalf of the family, are carried out be women, not the men. However, the data

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Table 4.24 Religion by Ethnic Group by How Often do you Attend Religious Services (Chinese) Religion

More Once a Only on Once than month special a year once days a week

Less Never/ Total than Practically once never a year

Taoism

20 11.1

32 17.8

63 35.0

6 3.3

39 21.7

20 11.1

180 100%

Buddhism

84 17.6

82 17.2

166 34.8

11 2.3

89 18.7

45 9.4

477 100%

Protestant 128 74.0

26 15.0

4 2.3

4 2.3

9 5.2

2 1.2

173 100%

Catholic

47 72.3

2 3.1

6 9.2

2 3.1

6 9.2

2 3.1

65 100%

Islam

2 50

–

–

–

2 5.0

–

4 100%

Hinduism

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

N.R.

2 2.0

4 1.3

50 16.8

17 5.7

110 37.0

110 37.0

287 100%

collected for the WVS, unfortunately, does not measure performance of home based rituals, only visits to places of worship. Thus, it can be argued that this has somewhat skewed the data. As the next chapter on Chinese religious practices will show, the performance of home based rituals among the Chinese in Singapore is very high, and thus, if performance of rituals is an indicator of religiosity, women will have a higher score compared to men. 6.4. Age by Religiosity It is interesting to note that unlike the data on religious conversion (Chapter 3) where there is a significant correlation between age and religious conversion, with younger Chinese Singaporeans more likely to convert to a new religion, the data on religiosity suggests that age does not correlate significantly with religiosity. Those who are older tend to be slightly more religious but not dramatically so. As Table 6 indicates, across the various age groups, the importance of religion in the lives of respondents is high, between 64% to 83%. For those between 15 to 29 years old, it averages about 64%, and for those

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Table 4.25 Gender by How Important Religion is in your Life Gender Very Rather Not Very Important Important Important

Not at all Important

DK (Don’t Know)?

Total

Male

250 33.5

272 36.4

170 22.7

54 7.3

0 0.1

746 100

Female

293 38.3

258 33.7

168 21.9

47 6.1

0 0

766 100

Table 4.26 Gender by How Often do you Attend Religious Services Gender More than once a week

Once a month

Only on Special holy days

Once a year

Less Often

Never/ Practically Never

Total

Male

229 30.8

97 13.0

151 20.2

29 3.9

142 19.0

97 13.1

746 100

Female

233 30.3

107 14.0

175 22.8

17 2.2

143 18.6

92 12.0

766 100

30 to 49 years old, it is 76%. This same pattern is observed when cross-tabulated with variables such as belief in god(s), importance of religious faith; believe in life after death, belief in existence of soul(s), and beliefs in the existence of heaven and hell. In terms of participation and attendance in religious services and visits to places of worship, there is not a strong correlation between age and attendance at places of worship. In general, the attendance rate is relatively high, suggesting that Singaporeans tend to follow the prescription regarding attendance. However, it is somewhat surprising that there is low correlation between age and religiosity and religious practice. Given the data on religious conversion, one would expect that since the respondents tend to convert to another religion when they are younger, and new converts tend to have a higher degree of religiosity and adherence to the tenets of the new religion that they have chosen, it is expected that they would show a higher level of religiosity. However, those between the ages of 50 to 59, and 60 to 69, register over 84% in terms of the importance of religion in their lives, compared to only over 64% for the younger age group. In order to make sense of this, the data was subjected to a deeper level of analysis, by controlling the religion variable. This will provide more depth and sense to the data. As seen in the tables below, the relationship between

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Table 4.27 Age by How Important Religion is in your Life Age

Very Important

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Total

15–19

119 32.9

113 31.0

108 29.6

24 6.6

364 100

20–29

122 34.1

105 29.2

96 26.7

36 9.9

258 100

30–39

123 37.6

118 36.1

65 19.7

21 6.5

328 100

40–49

100 39.2

102 39.9

42 16.5

11 4.5

256 100

50–59

45 35.5

61 48.0

17 13.4

4 2.9

127 100

60–69

23 39.5

26 44.4

7 12.6

2 3.4

59 100

70 & above

10 51.1

4 21.7

2 9.1

4 18.2

20 100

Table 4.28 Age by How Often do you Attend Religious Services Age

More than once a week

Once a month

Only on Special holy days

Once a year

Less Often

Never/ Practically Never

Total

15–19

90 24.8

55 15.2

84 23.1

13 3.5

74 20.2

48 13.2

364 100

20–29

111 30.8

44 12.2

70 19.4

11 3.0

66 18.3

58 16.1

358 100

30–39

101 30.8

35 10.7

61 18.6

9 2.8

77 23.4

45 13.6

328 100

40–49

94 36.8

38 14.9

52 20.3

9 3.4

43 16.8

20 7.6

256 100

50–59

46 36.1

22 17.3

34 26.9

2 1.6

16 12.2

7 5.9

127 100

60–69

12 21.0

9 14.7

21 35.7

2 3.9

5 8.9

9 15.8

58 100

70 & above

8 37.2

1 6.2

4 18.2

–

5 24.9

3 13.5

21 100

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age and religion correlates with the religion of the respondents. This interaction effect skewed the table when measured only in terms of age and religiosity. For example, when we look at the figures for Christianity, across the various age ranges, religion is regarded as very important/rather important for most of the Chinese Christians in Singapore, in the 85% to 95% range. However, the picture is somewhat different for the Taoists, whereas for the younger Taoists, the importance of religion in their lives is far lower. In fact, for those 15 to 19 years old, only 65% claim that religion is important/rather important in their life. In the 40 to 49 age range, this rises to 88.2% and 84% for those in the 50 to 59 age range. This could mean that religion is less important for the young Chinese Taoists. However, another way to interpret this trend is that Taoism is fundamentally a family religion. The rituals associated with Taoism are generally performed by the parents especially the mother. As such, we observe a lower score for young Taoists. The Chinese Buddhists in Singapore display a somewhat similar trend with Taoism (See Table 4.29, 4.30, 4.31, and 4.32 below). Table 4.29 Age by Religion by How Important Religion is in your Life (Chinese Taoists) Age

Very Important

Rather Important

Not very Important

Not at all Important

Total

15–19

–

13 65.0

7 35.0

0 0

20 100%

20–29

2 7.7

9 34.6

13 50.0

2 7.7

26 100%

30–39

4 23.5

13 76.5

–

–

17 100%

40–49

4 23.5

11 64.7

2 11.8

–

17 100%

50–59

4 16.0

17 68.0

2 8.0

2 8.0

25 100%

60–69

2 25.0

4 50.0

–

2 25.0

4 100%

70 and above

–

6 42.9

6 42.9

2 14.3

14 100%

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Table 4.30 Age by Religion by How Important Religion is in your Life (Chinese Buddhists) Age

Very Important

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Total

15–19

20 15.9

54 42.9

39 31.0

13 10.3

126 100%

20–29

11 11.0

48 48.0

39 39.0

2 2.0

100 100%

30–39

20 21.7

48 52.2

17 18.5

7 7.6

92 100%

40–49

19 21.1

50 55.6

19 21.1

2 2.2

90 100%

50–59

6 14.0

28 65.1

9 20.9

–

43 100%

60–69

4 23.5

9 52.9

4 23.5

–

17 100%

70 and above

2 25.0

2 25.0

2 25.0

2 25.0

8 100%

Table 4.31 Age by Religion by How Important Religion is in your Life (Chinese Protestants) Age 15–19 20–29 30–39 40–49 50–59 60–69

Very Important 24 64.9 41 73.2 33 78.6 19 63.3 6 100 2 100%

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

6 16.2 15 26.8 7 16.7 7 23.3 –

7 18.9 –

–

2 4.8 2 6.7 –

– 2 6.7 –

–

–

–

–

Total 37 100% 56 100% 42 100% 30 100% 6 100% 2 100%

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Table 4.32 Age by Religion by How Important Religion is in your Life (Chinese Non-Religionists) Age

Very Important

Rather Important

Not very Important

Not at all Important

Total

15–19

11 13.3

22 26.5

43 51.8

7 8.4

83 100

20–29

4 5.3

11 14.5

35 46.1

26 34.2

76 100

30–39

2 2.3

33 37.9

41 47.1

11 12.6

87 100

40–49

0 .0

11 35.5

13 41.9

7 22.6

31 100

50–59

0 .0

4 40.0

6 60.0

0 .0

10 100

60–69

0 .0

4 50.0

4 50.0

0 .0

8 100

17 5.8

85 28.8

142 48.1

51 17.3

295 100

Total

6.5. Educational Level and Religiosity In terms of educational levels attained and religiosity, at first glance, the same pattern of the relationship is observed between age and religiosity. That is, given the data on religious conversion, one would expect to see a more significant relationship between the level of educational attainment and religiosity. The tables below suggest that across all educational levels, both in terms of the importance of religion and attendance at places of worship, the level is high. As noted earlier, there is a close relationship between educational attainment, age and religious affiliation. Younger Chinese Singaporeans, with higher levels of educational attainment tend to be affiliated with Christianity, while those who follow Taoism tend to be older Chinese, with lower levels of educational attainment. Thus, like the analysis on age, it is important to analyze the relationship between educational attainment and religiosity, given the interaction effects, by controlling for the religion variable. The data suggests that the same trends are observed as those found for age and religiosity.

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Table 4.33 Educational Level by How Important Religion is in your Life Education

Very Important

Rather Important

Not Very Important

Not at all Important

Total

Primary

198 38.1

204 39.1

92 17.6

27 5.2

522 100

Secondary

194 36.9

174 33.1

122 23.1

38 8.2

463 100

Postsecondary & tertiary

150 32.4

151 32.6

124 26.8

38 8.2

463 100

Table 4.34 Educational Level by How Often do you Attend Religious Services Education

More than once a week

Once a Only on Once Less Never/ Total month Special a year Often Practically holy Never days

Primary

158 30.3

75 14.4

136 26.1

15 2.9

101 19.4

36 6.9

521 100%

Secondary

156 29.7

69 13.1

119 22.6

14 2.7

91 17.3

77 14.6

526 100%

Postsecondary

83 30.2

35 12.7

48 17.5

10 3.6

61 22.2

38 13.8

275 100%

Tertiary

65 34.6

25 13.3

22 11.7

6 3.2

32 17.0

38 20.2

188 100%

It is clear that despite rapid modernization, industrialization of the economy, the introduction of western, rationalistic education in Singapore, the degree of religiosity, measured in terms of the importance of religion, the metaphysical aspects, such as beliefs in heaven and hell, the existence of soul(s), and in religious action, such as participation in religious rituals and visits to place of worship, remains essentially high in Singapore. Modernity has not led to a decline in the importance of religion for the population in Singapore. While there are differences in the level of religiosity, when crosstabulated with variables such as ethnicity and religion, these can be explained by the nature of the religions, especially their belief tenets

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and ritual proscription, rather than in terms of a decline in religiosity. The section also noted that it is important to reconceptualize the methodology for studying the different religions in Singapore. Most scales, questions, and indexes developed for the study of religiosity have focused on studying Christianity. Chinese religion, including Buddhism, and Taoism requires very different types of surveys as these tend to be more focused on ritual practices and the idea of what constitutes religiosity is not prayers, or belief in gods, or attendance at churches, but more in relation to ideas of efficacy, sentiments and the linkage between religious ideas and cultural values. 6.6. Religious Revivalism and Religious Competition One of the key problems in the sociology of religion has been the overemphasis on the concept of secularization. In recent years, however, the interest has shifted from a study of secularization to an attempt to explain the persistence of religion in modern society. In Singapore, like elsewhere, the rise of modernity, industrialization and rapid social change have not eroded the forces of religion. In Singapore, we are not witnessing the decline of religion. Rather, the data on religious conversion, religious participation and religiosity suggest that there is a process of religious revivalism in Singapore. Other studies confirm these findings. For example, Clammer claimed that religious sentiment in Singapore is experiencing a revival rather than decline (1985:52–54). Similarly, for Hinduism, Babb (1976), Cooper and Kumar (1979), and Sinha (1997), also confirmed that the extent of practice of traditional rituals remains essentially high and did not show signs of decline. In present-day Singapore, the practice of traditional Chinese rituals remains essentially high and home worship activities represent a vital component in Chinese ritual life.1 How do we account for religious persistence and revivalism in Singapore? In his study on growing churches, Hinton stated that in Singapore, anomie is on the increase, as people withdraw into their private world where they do not meet each other. They become inward looming, impersonal, individualistic, apathetic and increasingly insecure.2 The findings in this particular study do not support Hinton’s 1 The next chapter will detail the degree of participation and practices of Chinese rituals and customs. 2 Hinton, Growing Churches, pp. 105–107.

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contention on the relationship between anomie and religious conversion. It is also important to note that although in Growing Churches, Hinton suggested that there is an increase in anomie in Singapore, his own field data in his unpublished thesis, “Twelve Churches Study”, indicate that only 18% of his sample cited crisis as the reason for conversion to Christianity. The most important factors, in his own study, were the search for a true religion (41%) and the attractiveness of corporate life of Christianity (35%).3 Most previous sociological studies have found that anomie is not an effective indicator of religiosity or religious participation. Carr and Hauser (1976), for example, found that anomie did not correlate with religious participation.4 Bell showed that there was no significant difference in anomic score between religious and non-religious individuals.5 Dwight Dean (1974), using the Dean Alienation scale, also confirmed that there was no relationship between anomie and religious participation.6 Photiadis and Johnson (1963) found no differences in normlessness due to differential religiosity.7 There is little evidence to support the contention that anomie is the main reason for religious conversion or religiosity in Singapore. The complex nature of religious conversion cannot be sociologically explained by a single causal factor. The growth of Christianity in Singapore is due to multiple causes, including the trend towards renouncing traditional Chinese religion, the nature of a modern society and the nature of Christianity itself. In a similar vein, Clammer suggests that the highly bureaucratic, paternalistic and centralized control of Singapore society means that few people have influence over the way they live their lives in Singapore society. Even the recreational and leisure environment is created and defined by the government. Moreover, there are few political opportunities and a controlled urban environment. There are also no great social causes which Singaporeans can identify with. Thus, most people experience powerlessness in Singapore society. In

3

Ibid., p. 119. Leslie Carr and William Hauser, “Anomie and Religiosity: An Empirical Reexamination,” in JSSR Vol. 15, No. 1, 1976, pp. 69–74. 5 Wendell Bell, “Anomie, Social Isolation and the Class Structure” in Sociometry Vol. 20, 1957, pp. 105–116. 6 Dwight G. Dean, “Anomie, Powerlessness, and Religious Participation,” in JSSR Vol. 13, No. 4, 1974, pp. 497–502. 7 John Photiadis and Arthur Johnson, “Orthodoxy, Church Participation, and Authoritarianism,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 69, 1963, pp. 224–248. 4

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such a situation, religion provides an alternative, offering a sense of community in an individualistic society, spiritual power in place of a lack of social and political powers and spiritual experience in a materialistic environment. Such an analysis suffers from the same problems as Hinton’s assertions. First, like anomie, there is little data to suggest that Singaporeans have a sense of powerlessness. Moreover, the problem with such an approach is that there is a variety of alternative courses of action if one feels anomic or powerless, such a committing suicide, joining opposition parties, etc. The linkage between powerlessness and because of that, turning to religion, has to be sociologically demonstrated, rather than assumed. A possible window to understanding religious revivalism in Singapore is the evidence of religious competition in Singapore society. Finke and Stark (1988) argue that religious pluralism found in many cities translates into greater religious adherence. Similarly, Breault (1989) suggests that pluralism will lead to greater religious participation.8 Singapore is a multireligious society, with the co-existence of many religions. My data shows that, especially in the 1980s and 1990s, there have been a great deal of religious competition among the various religions in Singapore, in particular, Christianity, Buddhism and Taoism. In the 1960s and 1970s, Christianity embarked on a concerted proselytization drive, which saw a dramatic increase in the number of Christians in Singapore. As no religion stands by idly as it members convert to another religion, the religions that were most effected by the religious shifts, Buddhism and Taoism, had to react and change, in order to meet the challenges posed by Christianity. As detailed in Chapter 4, these included processes of rationalizing their religions, as well as programs to proselytize what were, in the Singapore context, previously non-proselytizing religions. Just as Christianity had gospel rallies, we began to see Dharmma rallies being organized by the Buddhists. Similarly, with “Sunday school” classes, we see in Singapore the advent of Dharmma classes. There have been changes in the different religions, both in terms of religious ideology and ritual practices to meet the challenges posed by Christianity. In addition, programs were also developed to look after both the religious and non-religious social needs of its mem-

8 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of the religious economy perspective and the criticisms of the shortcomings of the perspective.

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bers. The point is that religious competition has resulted in various strategies organized by the institutional elements of the religions to compete in the new religious economy. These have led to greater vitality among the various religious groups as well as greater awareness among the population regarding religion. Increased activities within the various religious groups and especially active proselytization programs have led to a higher degree of religious revivalism in Singapore society. I would suggest that, contrary to the assertions of Finke and Stark, pluralism itself does not lead to higher religiosity or religious participation. Singapore, since it founding in 1819, has always been a multireligious society. However, in the earlier periods, the religions were primarily interested in looking after their own flocks, Islam for the Malays, Hinduism for the Indians, Chinese religions for the Chinese, and Christianity for the Europeans. There was little contact between the religions, and except for a small group of Christian missionaries, converting members from other ethnic groups was not a priority. It was only when one group is perceived to be a threat that religious competition and consequently, the rise in religious activism, started. Thus, the question, from a conceptual angle, is not whether pluralism leads to the persistence of religion, but rather, under what conditions does pluralism lead to revivalism. The impact of pluralism on religion must also take into consideration the cultural and environmental conditions that affect the nature of the choices people make regarding religious affiliations. It is not a situation of perfect competition. For example, as shown earlier, religious affiliation in Singapore is closely tied to ethnicity. Certain religions, such as Islam and Hinduism, are perceived as ethnic religions. For both the Malays and to a certain extent, Indians, religion is an important element in ethnic identity and self-conception, and religious change among these two groups is relatively low.9 Thus, in Singapore, the nature of religious change occurs primarily among the Chinese. As such, religious competition centers on Christianity, Taoism, and Buddhism. The changes, such as greater rationalization of the religions and in the strategies they adopt regarding beliefs

9 In fact, in the Constitution of Malaysia, Malay is defined as a person who is of Malay origins and believes in Islam. It is thus impossible, by definition, to be a non-Muslim Malay.

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and practices, as well as the greater degree of religious activism and proselytization can be found in these three religions. In Singapore, there is little competition between Buddhism and Islam, or Christianity and Hinduism. There are in fact, very few Chinese who convert to Islam, and similarly, very few Malays who are Christians. In addition to religious competition, another possible reason for religious revivalism, and the high degree of religious participation and religiosity in Singapore may stem from the fact that many of those who are Christians and Buddhists were recent converts to the religions. It can be suggested that conversion to another religion means that there is greater adherence to the religious ideology of the religion and at least for the initial period, a higher degree of religious participation. As shown earlier, in Singapore, there is movement from obligatoriness to individualism in relation to choice of religion, particularly among the Chinese. While the existence of pluralism is important is accounting for revivalism, it is the loosening of ascriptive religion that partly accounts for religious change. An achieved religion has a higher degree of religiosity and participation compared to an ascribed religion. Neitz (1987), for example, argues that people who are aware that conversion is a choice are more attached to those choices than are those who perceive religious affiliation is inevitable. Another environmental condition that is important in understanding the relationship between pluralism and religious persistence is the role of the state. As will be shown later, the state in Singapore takes a neutral stance regarding religion, allowing the various religious groups to practice their religions as well as to propagate their religious beliefs, as long as it does not cross over to political activism. This neutral stance allowed religions to compete with each other. In recent years, observing that religious competition could lead to instability, tensions and conflicts, the state has begun to institute restrictions, such as the Religious Harmony Bill and the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony, to ensure that competition does not lead to strife among the various religious groups.10

10

These will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER FIVE

TRADITIONAL CHINESE CUSTOMS AND RITES As noted in the introduction, the majority of studies on religion in Singapore tend to be ethnographic or historical studies, and there have been very few quantitative studies. This is even more so for the study of Chinese religion. Almost all work done on Chinese religion was based on participant observation or case studies of temples or festivals. In order to have a clearer understanding of the changes in the practice of Chinese religion, a national survey was carried out to map out the practice of Chinese rituals and religious practices in Singapore. This is probably the first quantitative study of Chinese ritual practices.1 This study sets a benchmark for the analysis of religious changes in Chinese religion. The survey collected data on worship activities at home and in public places, the calendrical ritual practices of the Chinese, the key rites of passage rituals, including birth, marriage and death rituals, as well the calendrical festivals carried out by the Chinese in Singapore. One of the key focuses of the study was to examine the effects of a rapidly modernizing society on traditional Chinese religion. The chapter will provide a profile of the religious practices of the Chinese. 1. Worship Activities at Home Home worship activities form a vital component in Chinese ritual practices. Since these activities are home based, it can be argued that these may be performed more frequently, and can be taken as an indication of the religiosity of the respondents and the extensiveness of ritual behaviour. Variables measured included the number and types of gods worshipped at home, and the types and extensiveness of ritual practices. 1 See Chapter 1 on methodology for a discussion of the sampling and method of data collection. I would like to thank my co-investigators for their assistance in the study. Dr. Ho Kong Chong helped in the management of the survey, the analysis of the data, and writing part of the report. Dr. Lin Ting Kwong was responsible for the sampling procedure.

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Table 5.1 Gods Worshipped at Home Guan Yin DaboGong Buddha Guangong YuHuang Santaizi Mazu Laozi Others

50.2 47.8 22.3 18.1 5.9 5.4 4.9 2.2 21.9

Respondents were asked what gods were worshipped at home. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the most common gods placed on the home altar are Guan Yin (50.2%) and DaboGong (47.8%). Buddha and Guangong are the next most popular deities (22.3% and 18.1% respectively), followed by a host of less popular deities, such as Santaizi, and Mazu. One significant point here is that in Singapore, there is a high degree of religious syncretism in the way that Chinese Singaporeans worship deities. For example, Guan Yin is a sinicized version of the Indian deity, Avalokitsvera, and the deity was brought with the migrants when they came to Singapore. Dabogong, on the other hand, is a localized deity canonized in Southeast Asia, while Guangong is a Taoist deity. The nature of Chinese ritual worship is a syncretic movement incorporating Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, and other folk traditions into one religious system. The nature of this syncretism can be observed in the number of deities worshipped. Among those who practice Chinese religion, about half the households worship only one god (47.4%) at home and 41% of the respondents worship between 2 to 4 deities at home. This observation and the fact that only 8.6% of the respondents state that they do not worship any deities at home, indicate the widespread practice of Chinese ritual behaviour. Data was also elicited on how the respondents carry out rituals at home. As Table 5.3 shows, most respondents exhibit a high degree of participation. For example, over 90% of respondents mention that that use joss sticks and offer fruits to the deities. A lower, but still very significant number offer flowers and burn joss paper at home for the deities. The two more elaborate activities, the offering of cooked food and the burning of joss paper in public was practiced by com-

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Table 5.2 Number of Gods Worshipped Gods

Frequency

0 1 2 3 4 5 & above

70 387 175 104 40 41

Percentage 8.6 47.4 21.4 12.7 4.9 5.0

Table 5.3 Worship Activities at Home Home Worship Activities

Numbers Mentioned

Percentage

Use Joss Sticks Offer Fruits Offer Flowers Burn Joss Paper (Home) Offer Cooked Food Burn Joss Paper (Public)

764 739 629 606 520 518

93.5 90.5 77.0 74.2 63.6 63.4

paratively fewer respondents. However, it should be noted that the two practices were still observed by over 60% of the respondents. In order to find out the variations in home worship practices, the six types of practices mentioned in Table 5.3 were grouped to form a scale. Three subgroups were identified: those who do not observe any of these activities and those who observe up to two (low); those who observe up to four of the activities (average); and those who observe 5 to 6 activities (high). This variation in home worship practices is correlated with several variables, whose relationships are presented below in Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6. They indicate that the age of respondents, the educational level attained, and the income of the household, are all important in accounting for the variations in home religious practices. Table 5.4 indicates that while most respondents from the various age groups, practice many of the home worship activities, the older the respondents, the higher the intensity of practice. For example, 59% of those from age 30 to 39 score high on the home worship scale, compared to 74% for those aged 50 to 59. Obversely, 12.7% of those aged 30 to 39 had a low score, compared to only 5.9% for those ages 60 and above.

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Table 5.4 Variations in Home Worship Practices by Age Age

Low

Average

High

Less than 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 and above

12.4 12.7 9.5 9.5 5.9

19.8 28.3 20.3 15.8 27.7

67.9 59.0 70.3 74.7 66.4

The effect of the level of educational attainment on home worship activities is also significant. As the educational level of the respondents increases, the degree of adherence to home worship activities declines. For example, 70% of those with no formal education or primary education observed 5 to 6 (high) home worship activities. This drops to 60% for those with secondary or post secondary education. The difference is even greater when we examine those who practice few home worship activities (low). While only 4.3% of respondents without formal education are in this category, the figure increases to 9.3% for respondents with primary education, 13.9% for those with secondary education and over 255 for respondents with post secondary education. In a sense, educational attainment is a major predictor of home worship activities among the Chinese. Part of the reason for this may rest with the nature of the educational system in Singapore, which stresses a western oriented educational system that emphasizes rational, critical thinking. The degree of home worship practices is also positively correlated with income levels of the respondents. For example, the percentage of respondents observing 5 to 6 home worship activities (high) increases steadily as the income decreases, from 57.9% for those families earning less than $600 a month, to 66.8% for families earning between $601 to $1000, all the way to 73.7% for families earning more than $3000 a month. It is interesting to note that while the higher income groups tend to practice most of the home worship activities mentioned in the survey, these groups also have higher percentages in the (low) category compared to the lower income groups. Thus, while about 4% of the lowest income group practice none or few of the home worship rituals, the percentage increases to 11% for the middleincome groups and climbs to 14% for the higher income groups. This indicates that while poorer families tend not to practice many home based rituals, they do practice at least some of them. Poorer households tend to be middle level practitioners. A possible reason

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Table 5.5 Variation in Home Worship by Education Education

Low

Average

High

No Formal Ed. Primary Secondary Post-Secondary

4.3 9.3 13.9 25.5

26.1 19.7 24.1 12.8

69.7 71.0 62.0 61.7

Table 5.6 Variations in Home Worship by Income Income

Low

Average

High

$600 or less $601 to 1000 $1001 to 1500 $1501 to 3000 More than $3000

4.0 10.8 11.2 11.0 14.0

38.2 21.9 17.9 19.5 12.3

57.9 67.3 70.9 69.5 73.7

may be that they are restrained by financial resources. More wellto-do families either do not practice the rituals at all, or if they do, they tend to observe many of the home based ritual activities. 2. Birth, Marriage and Death Rituals Other than home based religious practices, the survey also measured the degree of adherence to important ‘rites of passage’ rituals, especially those relating to births, marriages and death. These are important as many traditional Chinese rituals are tied to cultural values which are important to the Chinese. For example, birth and marriage rituals are related to the idea of producing sons to continue the family name. Similarly, death rituals are related to ideas of filial piety and respect for elders, values which are highly regarded by the Chinese. 2.1. Birth Rituals The birth process, for the Chinese, involves a series of rituals which are carried out to ensure a safe childbirth and a healthy baby. Although there are dialect variations, birth rituals can be classified into prenatal and post-natal taboos.2 Of the prenatal taboos, the

2

For a discussion of traditional Chinese birth practices, see J.J.M. DeGroot, The

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avoidance of certain food items is the most widely observed ritual with 65.3% claiming adherence to this practice. Over 60% follow various pregnancy taboos, such as the restriction on shifting of furniture and moving home. The taboos are based on the belief that these physical activities can harm the foetus in the womb. Adherence to post-natal taboos is also quite high. Above 87% of the respondents claim that they practice the one-month period of confinement while 75.1% and 77.8% respectively subscribe to the idea that the mother and child should not attend weddings or funerals during this confinement period. The sense that the mother should not wash her hair or take a bath during the period of confinement is observed by fewer respondents (54%–58%). It is interesting to note that while many of these Chinese continue to observe the rituals, regarding them as important in their lives, we observe that the need to live in a modern urban environment has necessitated changes in the ways the rituals are performed. Table 5.7 Observation of Birth Rituals A. Before Delivery Rituals

Percent

Avoid certain foods Following pregnancy taboos No shifting of furniture No shifting of home Other restrictions

65.3 60.2 57.4 55.0 12.3 B. After Delivery

One month period of isolation No funerals No weddings No visitations Shaving baby’s hair No washing of hair during isolation No bathing during isolation

87.5 77.8 75.1 74.1 64.8 58.2 53.8

Religious System of China, London: E.J. Brill. 1910, Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948, and Margery Wolf, Women in Chinese Society, Stanford University Press, 1975.

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Of the post-natal taboos, those which involve social interaction with outsiders, such as visitations, attending weddings and funerals, are widely observed. The Chinese claim that a woman who has given birth is physically and ritually polluted. A polluted person is not allowed to interact with others as she may affect them with her pollution. Persons who come into contact with her must be given a ritual cleansing. Thus, newborn babies are given a ritual bath and have their hair shaved. A large majority (86.5%) of the respondents mention that they celebrate the manyue ritual. This celebration is usually held at the end of the baby’s first month. Buddhist and Taoists families burn incense and make food offerings to the ancestors as well as the deities worshipped at home. This serves to inform the ancestors of a new addition to the family and to appeal to the spirits to protect the child. The family of the newborn baby will also deliver special gifts to relatives and friends who have given presents to the baby during the confinement month. The manyue gifts prepared by the parents vary according to the dialect group. They include items such as red eggs (hard-boiled eggs dyed in red), cakes, chicken, savoury glutinous rice and pig’s trotters. In Singapore, the practice of giving red eggs (95.7%) and cakes (84%) is still widespread. However, the more cumbersome rituals, such as the giving of chicken, glutinous rice and pork legs, have seen a reduction in practice, reflecting a trend towards a simplification of the rituals. (Table 5.8) 2.2. Wedding Rituals For the Chinese, weddings are seen as important events. As such, many complex customs are observed in a traditional Chinese wedding celebration to ensure that the couple starts their new life together Table 5.8 Man Yue Rituals Activity Giving red eggs Giving cakes Giving chicken Giving glutinous rice Giving a celebration dinner Giving pork legs Other activities

Percent observing 95.7 84.0 63.4 45.6 42.4 25.0 9.9

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on an auspicious note. The rituals begin even before the wedding takes place. A large number of the Chinese in Singapore (67.7%) choose an auspicious date for weddings and practice the Nacai or Guodali ritual (88%). Nacai is equivalent to an engagement ceremony where the family of the groom presents gifts to the family of the bride. Although there are some dialect variations, the gifts generally include cakes, jewelleries, four kinds of gold, chicken, sweetmeat, oranges, wine, a pig (or part of a pig) and, most importantly, the giving of the pinqin or brideswealth.3 Of these gifts, the most popular are the giving of the brideswealth (87.8%), cakes (87.3%), jewelleries (85.5%), tables for the wedding dinner (81.5%), and oranges (83.4%). The other gift items seem to be less important. (Table 5.9) The high degree of Nacai observance is not surprising. Chinese marriage rituals can be seen as a process of exchange. The family of the groom must compensate the family of the bride for the loss of labour and the pro-creational ability of the woman. The bride’s family will be given the pinli (gifts for the bride to confirm the union) and this reflects the importance of the bride. In traditional Chinese society, only servants and slaves are married off without the pinli. Table 5.9 Gifts/Pin Li During Nacai Ceremony Activity Brideswealth Cakes Jewelries Oranges Wedding tables Wine Pork leg Chicken Other gifts

Percent observing 87.7 87.3 85.5 83.4 81.5 76.7 72.0 68.8 11.7

3 Numerous studies have been carried out on Chinese marriage rituals. For an ethnographic description, see Tina Su, A Thematic Study of Chinese Marriage Rituals and Symbolism, Ithaca, New York, 1966, Maurice Freedman, Chinese Family and Marriage in Singapore, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1957, and Paul Chao, Chinese Kinship, London: Kegan Paul, 1983.

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For rituals conducted on the wedding day itself, the most important is the tea ceremony, with 92.2% of the respondents claiming to practice this ritual. The tea ceremony is a ritual which requires the couple to offer cups of tea to the senior members of the family as a sign of respect. In turn, the younger members of the family will serve tea to the wedding couple to signify the acceptance of the bride as a family member. For the Chinese, the tea ceremony is the centre-piece of the marriage ceremony and was evidence of a common law marriage before the enactment of the Women’s Charter requiring all marriages to be registered with the Government (Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, 1989:109). Of the rituals conducted during the tea ceremony, the giving of gifts and hongbao (92.8%) is the most important. Others, such as kneeling (61.4%) and wearing special clothes (52.9%), are given less emphasis. Other popular rituals include the bride returning to the mother’s home (91.5%), the wedding dinner (87.1%), the worship of ancestors on the family altar (78.1%), and the eating of special food (75.8%). (Table 5.10) Table 5.10 Wedding Day Rituals Activity Tea ceremony : Given gifts/red packets : Kneeling when offering tea : Special clothes for bride Bride returns to mother’s home Holding wedding dinner Opening car door Worship ancestors at home Eating special food Shang-tou/hair combing4 Other rituals

Percent observing 92.2 (92.8) (61.4) (52.9) 91.5 87.1 83.3 78.1 75.8 70.3 3.8

4 This refers to the “styling the hair” ceremony. On the eve of the wedding, the hair of the bride and groom is symbolically combed at their respective homes. The combing is done by a person who is considered to have “good fate”, in other words, one who has a living spouse, many children and grandchildren. This ritual is believed to ensure matrimonial togetherness and a large family for the wedding couple (Singapore Federation of Clan Association, 1989:105).

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Over 78% of respondents also practice the worship of ancestor ritual. By worshipping the ancestors at the home of the groom’s family, the bride acknowledges that the groom’s ancestors are now her ancestors and reinforces her role as a procreator of sons to continue the family line. 2.3. Death Rituals The Chinese in Singapore spent a great deal of money to ensure the performance of funeral rituals for deceased parents. The survey found that only 11.2% reported that they spent less than $2000 for the funeral. More than 22% of the respondents spent between $2000–$4000, 21.9% between $4000 and $6000, and 21.5% between $6000 and $10,000. 19.2% spent between $10,000 and $20,000 for the funeral rituals. Even poorer Chinese families spend a great deal of money in the attempt to make the death rituals as elaborate as possible. The fact that many Chinese in Singapore continue to spend so much money in the enactment of funeral rituals attest to the continuing importance of the rituals even in a modern, industrialized society. It is not simply in the spending of money. The adherence to the multitude of rituals associated with death is still very high. Rituals such as the giving of baijin, watching over the dead, wearing of mourning garments, washing and dressing the dead, register between 84.5% to 94% adherence.5 A second set of rituals, including the buying of water to wash the dead, feeding the dead, offerings to the gods, return of the soul and hiring of a band to perform at the funeral, have between 66% to 78.8% adherence rate. A third set of rituals, including the Western Heaven ritual, the Bridge of

5 The giving of baijin in Chinese funerals is related to the idea of giving a gift to help defray the cost of the funeral. It is a form of exchange between kinsmen and friends cementing social relationships between people. Watching over the dead is a ritual where family members must accompany the dead during the wake. The Chinese view is that death is polluting, and one of the key rituals of the funeral is when sons leave the house as a group to “purchase” water from the gods, which is subsequently used to wash and cleanse the dead. The wearing of mourning garment is a ritual where family members don on funerary clothes during the rituals. For a comprehensive description of the rituals associated with death and an analysis of the significance and meaning of the various rituals, see Tong Chee Kiong, Chinese Death Rituals in Singapore, London: Routledge/Curzon, 2004.

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Sighs ritual, the boiling of herbs, and gong de, have a lower degree adherence, ranging from 28% to 64%. 2.3.1. Place of Funeral In Singapore, a total of 49.4% of all respondents conduct funeral rituals in the HDB void-decks,6 28.9% perform the rituals in the compound of the house, and 15.2% in funeral parlours. As expected, with the large number of Singaporeans now residing in HDB estates, the percentage of funerals being conducted on void-decks has increased tremendously. For those who died before 1965, for example, only 16.1% of the funeral rituals were conducted on void-decks. By 1980, this has increased to 42.4%. 69.9% of all death rituals in 1988 were carried out on the HDB void decks. (Table 5.11) This is in contrast to traditional practices in which funerals were conducted either in the home or in the ancestral temple, a change which has resulted because in modern Singapore, the homes of most people are too small for funeral rituals and because there are not that many lineage temples in Singapore. Thus, what used to be a private ritual involving family and kin has now become a public ritual. 2.3.2. Number of days of wake Funerals in Singapore normally last from three to seven days, the number of days being always in odd numbers, such as three, five or seven. In comparing the number of nights for wakes actually practiced Table 5.11 Year of Death by Place where the Funeral was Conducted

1965 & before 1966–75 1976–80 1981–85 1986–88 Total

Casket Home

Clan hall

HDB void deck

House compound

Others

25.8 20.5 15.2 13.2 7.4 15.2

2.2 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.4

16.1 36.2 42.4 61.9 69.9 49.4

44.1 37.8 36.4 19.6 18.4 28.9

11.8 3.9 4.6 4.8 3.7 5.3

6 Void decks are the ground floors of HDB flats that have deliberately been left as open space, with a view that such space may be used by residents for social or familial functions. One of the main impetuses for creating such space was to facilitate social interaction within the estate.

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and the number of nights preferred, the survey data showed that respondents are both pragmatic and culture-bound to respect the dead. Their pragmatism can be seen in their desire to have fewer wake nights, since fewer respondents want 5 and 7 wake nights, compared to what is actually practiced. At the same time, their respect for their dead is indicated in their preference to have more than one wake night. Over 56.8% prefer to have three wake nights for the funeral. (Table 5.11) Owing to the land scarcity in Singapore, the government has increasingly advocated cremation as a means of disposal of the dead in preference to graveyard burials. Priority is given to the use of land for urban development and housing leading to a sharp decrease in the land available for graveyards. Thus burial plots are very expensive, and their acquisition involves a tedious process to obtain special dispensation from the government. As a result, cremation is often chosen as an alternative to burial. This is clearly observed from the survey data. For example, for those who died before 1965, 89.8% were buried and only 10.2% cremated but by 1988, the majority of the dead (68.1%) were cremated and only 31.9% were buried. (Table 5.12) Table 5.11 Nights for Wakes Nights

Actual

1 3 5 7 Total

4.9 34.0 48.3 12.8 100%

Preferred 3.9 56.8 30.9 4.4 100%

Table 5.12 Year of Death by Burial or Cremation

1965 & before 1966–1975 1976–1980 1981–1985 1986–1988 Total

Buried

Cremated

89.8 61.7 46.2 40.2 31.9 49.6

10.2 38.3 53.8 59.8 68.1 50.4

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Except for the process of burning instead of burying, the rituals are similar. On arrival at the crematorium, the coffin is set on a tripod before an altar. Most crematoria in Singapore are run by Buddhist temples. Buddhist monks chant prayers for the dead and then lead the family round the coffin three times, after which the coffin is pushed into an enclosed propane burner. On the following day, the family members return to the crematorium to collect the bones of the deceased. The bones and ashes are spread on a tray, and using chopsticks, family members carefully pick up the small pieces of bones and place them in a joss-urn. The modernisation and industrialisation that Singapore society has been undergoing has vastly changed the physical and socio-cultural milieu of the Chinese. Yet, there is clear evidence that despite modernization, elaborate death rituals are still seen as necessities. For most of the respondents, the degree of adherence to Chinese funeral rituals is quite high. Rituals such as the giving of baijin, watching over the dead, wearing of mourning garments, and the washing and dressing of the dead, register between 84% to 94% adherence. These can be considered as the primary death rituals of the Chinese in Singapore. A second set of rituals, including the buying of water, feeding the dead, offerings to the gods, return of soul and hiring a band, have between 66% to 78.8% adherence rate. These are the secondary death rituals. A third set of rituals, including the Western Heaven ritual, Bridge of Sighs ritual, boiling herbs, gongde and ten Courts of Hell, can be considered as peripheral, with adherence ranging only from 28% to 64%. (Table 5.13) Table 5.13 Death Ritual Practices A. Primary Rituals Rituals 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Baijin Watching Dead Mourning Garments Burning Joss Wreaths Coffining Wash and Dress Chanting scriptures

Practiced

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

94.0 91.9 91.5 89.8 89.4 89.3 86.0 84.1

84.6 80.8 77.9 74.8 81.7

6.4 8.3 10.9 8.5 8.2

9.0 10.9 11.2 16.8 10.1

75.7 73.5

10.7 10.3

13.6 16.3

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B. Secondary Rituals Rituals 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

Hiring Band Ancestral Tablets 7 days Offerings to Gods 49 days 1 year Feeding Dead Buying Water Return of Souls

Practiced

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

78.8 77.1 74.6 73.6 72.4 72.6 69.1 67.4 66.5

63.2 69.4 67.9 68.4 65.9

9.5 9.0 10.4 9.8 11.0

27.3 21.6 21.7 21.8 23.1

61.2 61.7

10.5 11.4

28.4 26.9

C. Peripheral Rituals Rituals 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

Western Heaven Gongde Bridge of Sighs 21 days Courts of Hell Reincarnation Boiling Herbs

Practiced

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

64.4 63.7 62.4 58.1 54.6 53.1 27.6

59.9

14.0

26.1

57.9

13.9

28.2

56.9

14.6

28.5

The importance of the death rituals are tied to several beliefs. These include the observance of rules of descent, subscription to ethical imperatives, sense of duty and obligations and the desire for the management of death pollution combine in various degrees to act upon the Chinese to ensure ritual performance. To the Chinese, deaths are considered to be pollutive and rituals are important as these help to remove pollution. Rituals conducted over time (such as mourning) are also designed to rid the practitioner of pollution. Traditionally, the more “polluted” one is (because of the degree of ‘closeness’ to the deceased), the longer one has to remain in mourning and persist in mourning rituals in order to be rid of “pollution”. 4. Chinese Festivals Chinese festivals are occasions of celebration by the family, and community, a time of joy and remembrance, marking the passing of the seasons, and reminding one of the ebbs and flows of life. Of all the

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festivals on the Chinese calendar, the most popularly celebrated is, as anticipated, Chunjie or the Chinese New Year (Table 5.13). Besides commemorating a fresh start to the New Year, Chunjie is also important because it is a period for strengthening family ties. During the festival, which is celebrated over 15 days, there are reunion dinners, visitations among friends and family, and the exchange of gifts. The eve of the New Year is a major part of the celebration because it is the day set aside for the traditional annual family reunion dinner, when members of the family gather for a meal. This reunion dinner is significant because it serves as an annual demonstration of the love and respect that binds family members together (Singapore Federation of Chinese Clans Association, 1989:37). During the New Year, many Chinese adults practice the custom of distributing hongbao or red packets which contain money. These red packets signify the transmission of good wishes and fortune to the recipient. Of the total sample, 98.9% claim that they celebrate Chinese New Year. The various activities associated with the New Year are also widely practiced. 98.4% of the respondents say they give red packets during the New Year, 97.8% claim that they attend the reunion dinner and 96.7% visit relatives (Table 5.13). The importance of the family and ancestors to the Chinese is reflected in the higher observance rate (81.3%) for the Qing Ming Jie. This festival is a time to remember the dead and is an opportunity for descendents to pay respects to their deceased ancestors. Ancestor worship is an important aspect of the traditional Chinese religion. Daily sacrifices at the family altar remind the descendants of the omnipresence of their ancestors. At all important familial events, such as birth, embarking on a long journey, starting a new business, or choosing a marriage partner, the ancestors are consulted and their blessings requested. But the influence of ancestors is not limited to major life events. In fact, they are consulted even in the mundane affairs of life, from buying lottery tickets to determining the right time for spring-cleaning the home. Chinese ancestors are anthropomorphic. They are perceived to have the same needs and desires as their living descendants (Wee, 1977:18). This is illustrated by the variety of items sacrificed to the dead, including combs, cigarettes, and cars, in the belief that the ancestors will continue to use them in the otherworld. The Chinese conceive of a close interdependence between the dead and the living. Ancestors depend on their descendants for the satisfaction of

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their daily needs, while the living, in turn, look to the dead for assistance in solving daily problems. Besides the manifestation of mutual care between generations, ancestor worship also acts as a “stimulus to morality” (Addison, 1925:26). The consciousness of the omnipresence of the ancestors who will punish or reward according to one’s conduct heightens the moral sense of the community. During the Qing Ming festival, the family members usually honour their deceased ancestors by visiting their graves, ashes or ancestral tablets. Of the Qing Ming activities, the annual visit to the graveyard (82.3%) and praying to the ancestors at home (63.1%) are widely practiced. Fewer Chinese visit the clan ancestral temple (36.8%) (Table 5.13). The observance rate for most of the other Chinese festivals is quite high, ranging from 67.2% for the Dongjie celebrations to 77.1% for the Zhongqiujie (Table 5.13). Dongjie is the mid winter solstice festival and is a period for thanksgiving among the Chinese. It is an occasion for family members to gather and celebrate the good year which they have had. A sweet soup of glutinous rice balls, called tang yuan is eaten. As the tang yuan are round, it is associated with completeness and hence eaten to symbolize the unity of the family. Zhongqiujie refers to the mid-autumn festival. During the celebration of this festival, mooncakes are eaten as well as offered to the ancestors and given to senior family members. For children, a popular activity during Zhongqiujie is the carrying of lanterns. Festivals with lower rates of observance are the Chongyang and the Qiqiao festivals (22.4% and 16.5% respectively). Chongyang is the festival which is celebrated on the ninth day of the ninth lunar month and it is an occasion to remember the dead and visit the graves of the departed. Qiqiao commemorates the annual reunion of the cowherd (Niu Lang) and the weaving maiden (Zhi Nü). The legendary meeting of the two lovelorn characters was an occasion for the unmarried to pray for good spouses and happy marriages. In Singapore, one of the most celebrated religious festivals among Chinese religionists and Buddhists is the birthday of Guan Yin. This actually falls on three days, the 19th day of the 2nd, 6th and 9th month of the Chinese lunar calendar. Certain temples housing Guan Yin such as the one at Waterloo Street become very crowded with worshippers. Chinese religionists also celebrate the birthday of Guan Gong, which falls on the 13th day of the 5th lunar month. Vesak Day is an important day for Buddhists as it celebrates the birth of

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Table 5.13 Celebration of Chinese Festivals Festivals

Percentage

Chunjie (New Year) New Year activities

98.9 Percent observing

Reunion dinner Visit relatives Give red packets

97.8 96.7 98.4

QingMingjie (All Soul’s Day) QingMing activities

81.3 Percent observing

Visit graveyards/columbarium Pray to ancestors at home Visit clan temple Zhongquijie (mid autumn/lantern festival) DuanWujie (rice dumpling festival) Zhongyuanjie (hungry ghost festival) Dongjie (mid winter solstice festival) Chongyangjie (double nine festival) Qiqiaojie (Reunion of the seventh fairy and cowherd festival)

82.3 63.1 36.8 77.1 74.2 72.8 67.2 22.4 16.5

Buddha. This falls on the 15th day of the 4th lunar month. An important procession is usually held at the Bright Hill Temple at Sin Ming Drive. Another well-celebrated event would be the birthday of the Heavenly King, also known as the Jade Emperor. This is known as Tian Gong Dan. This celebration is particularly popular among the Hokkiens who claim that he is the most powerful of all the gods. Apart from birthdays of the deities, many other calendrical celebrations are observed ritually. The 24th day of the 12th lunar month is the day when adherents send the deities back to Heaven. It is thought that the deities will report every person’s deeds. Thus, sweet food will be offered to ensure that the deities do not report any misdeeds. When the deities return on the 4th day of the Chinese New Year, a great deal of preparation goes into welcoming them. Like many festivals, the Chinese usually have standard rituals. These include the offering of joss sticks, candles, food and paper money ( joss paper). Some grander celebrations may also include a performance

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by a Chinese opera troupe and feasting. Such festivities are common during the Hungry Ghost Festival (Zhong Yuan Jie) which falls in the 7th lunar month. During this period, offerings are also made to appease wandering ghosts or spirits. 5. Trends in Ritual Performance 5.1. Crossing Dialect Lines An interesting observation in Singapore is the crossing-over of dialect lines in the enactment of rituals. Rituals which were previously thought to be exclusive to certain dialect groups are now practised by other dialect groups. For example, it is generally thought that the naiheqiao or the “crossing of the bridge of sighs” ritual, carried out during the funeral, was exclusive to the Teochews. In the survey, it was found that other than the Teochews, a large percentage of Hokkiens and Cantonese follow this ritual. Similarly, the gongde ritual performed one hundred days after death is generally thought to be carried out only by the Hokkiens. It was found that 69.5% of the Teochews and 71.2% of the Cantonese claim to practise this ritual. (Table 5.14) A possible explanation for this acculturation process may be that in Singapore, the high degree of intermarriage across dialect lines and the interaction of various dialect groups living in close proximity to each other may have resulted in the intermixing of rituals. Finally, these rituals may be adopted by other dialect groups because they are seen as attractive. The intermixing of rituals across dialect lines is significant because it means that there is probably a reduction in sensitivity towards ritual differentiation along dialect lines. Because of the reduced dialect sensitivity, the Chinese in Singapore Table 5.14 Dialect Groups by Gongde Ritual

Hokkien Teochew Cantonese Hainanese Hakka Others

No

Yes

29.0 30.5 28.8 22.2 32.1 28.6

71.0 69.5 71.2 77.8 67.9 71.4

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are capable of modifying or adjusting the performance of rituals if they can agree on their functions, or if these functions are clearly explained to them. 5.2. Retain, Simplify or Leave Out? In the face of increasing modernisation, would Singaporeans want traditional Chinese rituals to be retained, simplified, or eradicated? Based on the survey, it was clear that the Chinese still desire to retain several rituals. Birth rituals can be classified into two categories. The manyue, one-month period of confinement, and the eating of special food, have the highest percentages of respondents wanting to retain the rituals, between 76.9% and 79.1% (Table 5.15). These can be classified as crucial birth rituals for the Chinese. The belief in pregnancy taboos, such as the restriction on washing of hair and taking baths, and the shaving of the baby’s hair register relatively higher percentages of respondents (between 30–34%) who want to leave these rituals out. For marriage rituals, the respondents’ opinion can be classified into two groups. The first group of rites is the most popular of the rituals. These include the giving of the pinli (87.7%), the bride returning to mother’s home (87.2%), giving of hongbao (83.8%), and the tea ceremony (82.2%). The second group of rites contains the relatively less popular rituals, with a significant number of respondents (from 17% to 33%) wanting the rituals simplified or eradicated. These Table 5.15 Opinion towards Retention of Birth Rituals A. Tendency towards Retention Activity

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

One-month isolation Man yue rituals Eating special foods

79.1% 77.1% 76.9%

7.2% 10.9% 7.4%

13.7% 12.1% 15.7%

B. Tendency towards Removal

Celebration dinner No washing of hair Shaving of hair Belief in pregnancy taboos

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

49.3% 56.9% 60.6% 64.0%

17.1% 8.9% 8.3% 5.8%

33.6% 34.2% 31.1% 30.2%

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Table 5.16 Opinion towards Retention of Marriage Rituals A. Tendency towards Retention Activity Bride returns to mother’s home Giving ang pows Tea ceremony

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

87.2 83.8 82.2

5.6 7.9 9.4

7.2 8.4 8.5

B. Tendency towards Removal

Giving/returning of gifts Giving pig Giving sugar cane Fruits and oranges Shang tou ceremony Eating special foods Worship ancestors at home Opening car door

Retain

Simplify

65.5 55.4 52.4 72.2 61.7 67.7 73.2 73.8

20.7 17.0 14.2 12.2 10.1 10.8 9.1 9.2

Leave out 13.8 27.5 33.3 15.6 28.1 21.3 17.6 17.0

include the giving of sugar cane (33.3%), shangtou ceremony (28.1%), eating special food (21.3%), giving of a pig (27.5%) and opening of the car door (17%). (Table 5.16) Important marriage rituals which show a tendency towards retention have to do with activities relating to the transfer of rights over women. In present day Singapore, there is a trend towards retaining “core” rituals and a willingness to dispense with those considered peripheral or superstitious. Activities which are considered to be more ritualistic, such as the shangtou ceremony, eating special foods, and opening car doors, are less commonly practiced in modern Singapore. The desire to retain or remove death practices shows some distinct patterns. Rituals considered crucial have to do with the treatment of the dead (washing and dressing the dead, coffining) and those which have an element of public demonstration (mourning garments, wreaths and baijin). Other important rituals related to treatment of the dead (feeding the dead, buying water) are given secondary importance. None of the rituals for treating the corpse was accorded as peripheral. In terms of age groups, it was clearly observed that the older Chinese preferred to retain traditional rituals. Of those aged 50–59

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years old, 44.9% want the rituals to be retained, 44.4% want them simplified and only 10.7% want to leave out the rituals. For those aged 40–49 years old, 40% want the rituals to be retained, 46.8% want them simplified, and 13.2% want them to be left out. For those less than 30 years old, a very different trend is observed. Only 33% want the rituals retained, 45.2% want them simplified, and over 21.7% want to eradicate the rituals altogether (Table 5.17). The majority of the young respondents did not perform the rituals on their own accord with their parents or relatives telling them to do so. When it is their turn to make decisions regarding ritual performances, the likelihood is that they will not carry out the rituals, or at least not to the same degree of elaborateness. Traditional Chinese ritual practices are promulgated through observation and imitation. If a sufficient number ceases to practice these rituals, then a multiplier effect will occur and within one or two generations, there may be a drastic reduction in the number of Chinese carrying out traditional ritual practices. Furthermore, it was found that young Singaporeans complain that they do not understand the meanings and functions of these traditional rites, nor can their parents explain why these rituals are necessary. If this persists, a time will come when only the forms of the rituals may remain, but people will not know their significance, leading to a further deterioration in the number of adherents. Chinese educated respondents exhibited a greater desire to retain the rituals compared to the English educated. For those who had a Chinese stream education, 36.6% want to retain the rituals, 49% want them simplified and 12.4% want to leave out the rituals. However, for the English educated, only 29.6% want to retain the rituals, 43.6% want them simplified, and over 26.8% want to leave Table 5.17 Table of Age by Retain Rites

Less than 30 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 and above Total

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

33.0 35.6 40.0 44.9 45.5 39.9

45.2 48.7 46.8 44.4 36.6 45.1

21.7 15.7 13.2 10.7 17.9 15.0

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Table 5.18 Table of Educational Stream by Retain Rites

Chinese English No education Total

Retain

Simplify

Leave out

36.6 29.6 52.8 38.7

49.0 43.6 40.2 46.1

12.4 26.8 7.1 15.2

out the rituals (See Table 5.18). This trend applies to birth, marriage and death rituals. Those educated in the Chinese stream, where there is greater emphasis on learning the Chinese classics, are more likely to be infused with Chinese culture. They are therefore in a better position to appreciate the significance of various Chinese traditions, and are more likely to practise the various rituals. With the changes in Singapore’s educational system in the past 25 years, the stream of education and the level of education are highly correlated. Those receiving their education in Chinese tend to be disproportionately represented at the lower educational strata. Conversely, as most secondary and tertiary institutions teach in English, more respondents who received higher education are in the English stream. The most common reason cited for not wanting to retain traditional Chinese rituals is that they are too complex and troublesome. A large majority of Chinese Singaporeans want traditional Chinese rituals to be simplified. Some respondents felt that many of the Chinese rituals are unnecessary and impractical for a modern society like Singapore. For example, they felt that post-natal rituals associated with the month long period of confinement, such as the prohibition on the cutting and washing of hair and taking baths are unhygienic and “old-fashioned” superstitions. Financial consideration was another common reason for not wanting to retain some rituals. Many felt that Chinese death rituals were too elaborate and expensive. They want the rituals simplified in order to reduce cost. Finally, there are some respondents who say that they do not believe in the rituals and want them eradicated. This reason is most often cited by Christians. Even so, in present-day Singapore, the practice of traditional Chinese rituals remains essentially high. For example, over 98.9% of Chinese Singaporeans reported that they participate in some form of Chinese New Year celebrations. Over 70% of the respondents

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surveyed profess to follow Chinese religion. Over 90% claim that they burn joss-sticks and offer food when performing rituals at home. It would be difficult to argue that there has been a serious erosion of traditional religious practices among the Chinese in Singapore. While it is true that there is some reduction in the practice of traditional rituals among younger Singaporeans, this drop in adherence is not as drastic as one would expect, given the rapid social and economic changes in Singapore. For example, even among those who are less than 30 years old, 68.4% continue to be followers of traditional Chinese religion. This figure is still large, suggesting that Chinese religion will remain the predominant religion of the Chinese in Singapore for some time to come. It is thus untimely to sound the death-knell of traditional Chinese religion in Singapore. This is not to say that there have been no changes in the nature of Chinese religion in Singapore. Many of the rituals that were practised in China have undergone transformations in a modern society. It must be noted that the migrants who came to Singapore, particularly in the eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, arrived as individuals, detached from their family and lineage networks. They are sojourners in the true sense of the word, only intending to stay long enough to make their fortunes before returning to China. Women did not venture to Southeast Asia until 1910. Hence, an extended kinship network did not develop in early Singapore. This has several important consequences for ritual performance. One of the features is the lack of extended lineage temples in Singapore. Freedman (1957) argues that what is practised in Singapore among the Chinese cannot be regarded as ancestor worship since it is really a form of ‘memorialism’. While this fact may be disputed, there is no doubt that the ancestral line is shorter. Most families pray only to two or three generations of ancestors in Singapore, rather than the long lineage worship supposedly practised in traditional China. Another development is the practice of putting up a “li dai zhu xian” tablet that is an altar to worship all the ancestors of the family. Many of the rituals performed by the Chinese in Singapore have undergone a process of simplification and adaptation to make them more applicable to life in a modern society. There is a general reduction in the length of time required for the performance of traditional rituals. For example, in traditional Chinese society, the mourning period for the death of a father can extend up to three years. In Singapore, it is more common for the mourning period to be for

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49 to 100 days. A few families may mourn for up to one year. Similarly, there is a general simplification in the different grades of mourning. Traditionally, there are five grades of mourning, dependent on the relationship of the mourners to the deceased. For example, sons and daughters are the first grade mourners, wearing burlap and dressed in white. Nowadays, in modern Singapore, we see a reduction in the grade of mourning to two grades, the wearing of black or white mourning garments. These simplifications seem to tie in with Cox’s (1965) argument that one of the features of the modernization of religion is the tendency of stripping away the mythical, peripheral elements in the rituals while retaining the core elements. The malleability of ritual practice among Chinese religionists is possible because the religion is not text-based, nor anchored in canonical rules and teachings. As it relies on oral tradition, changes are more easily introduced, accommodated and explained. The traditional Chinese religion is one that is highly pragmatic, problemoriented, result-oriented and this-worldly rather than philosophical. As a result, when conditions of modernity suggest that it is impractical to persist with certain rituals, these rituals become modified. Chinese religion, in other words, avails itself to manipulation with no major dissonance. Despite the modifications to rituals, Chinese religionists in Singapore hold fast to some fundamental beliefs. In other words, the form of rituals may change but the essence and meanings remain. From the Chinese perspective, there exists an integral relationship between the world of humans (microcosm) and the ‘other’ world (macrocosm). Events in one world affect events in the other. All parts of the entire cosmos belong to one organic whole and they all interact as participants in one spontaneously self-generating process (Mote, 1971:20; Lidin, 1974). The Chinese see themselves as cooperating with a heaven above and an earth below; humans are a third component in this all-encompassing order. Harmony and order must be maintained at all times, in an individual’s psyche, in every aspect of social life and in the entire cosmos. Everything that exists has a correct place in the order of things. When there is an imbalance or disharmony, order and equilibrium must be re-established. Humans are responsible to ensure this harmony, or they run the risk of disaster in the physical and human world. Calamities are thought to be punishment for humans’ interference with the natural order and exploitation of the environment (Wong, 1974).

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The importance of balance and harmony is also reflected in the Chinese conception of bipolarity within the cosmos, concretized in the conception of yin and yang. Yang is equated with warmth, male, productivity, sunlight and life; yin to cold, female, moon, darkness and death. Although conceived as opposite forces, yin and yang are in fact complementary and in a process of dynamic interaction. The ideal situation is one where the two forces are in balance, thus achieving harmony. This is reflected in the ways in which the forces are believed to work in everyday life (Boyden and Sheelagh, 1981). For example, many Chinese are of the view that a person should not eat hot ( yang) and cold ( yin) food at the same time. They also claim that illnesses arising from the consumption of too much ‘heat-y’ ( yang) food must be counteracted by the ingestion of cooling ( yin) food. The principles of maintenance of harmony are also apparent in the Chinese practice of feng shui or geomancy with its emphasis on equilibrium with nature. The underlying belief is that humans must harmonize with rather than disrupt nature. Geomantic harmony must be maintained by ensuring that there is symmetry and balance in the environment so that there will be beneficial effects for humans. If humans disrupt nature and alter the environment in a disharmonious way, there will be negative effects on human life. Thus, for the traditional Chinese, the observance of festivals and rituals is closely tied to the desire for balance and harmony, not only in the natural world, but also in the world of the spirits. Social stability, peace and prosperity depend on this equilibrium (Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, 1989:17). 6. Multivariate Analysis of Chinese Ritual Performance The previous section has presented data on the practice of traditional Chinese religious practices in Singapore. These had been presented as cross-tabulations of religious practices with key socio-demographic variables, such as age, sex, education, socio-economic status, etc. While these are important in showing the trends in religious behaviour and practices, cross-tabulations may indicate the significance of a particular variable but do not show which variables tend to be relatively more important. Moreover, “background variables which have an associational relationship with religion, such as age, educational stream, educational attainment and income, tend to be highly correlated with one another. This interdependence between explanatory variables

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makes it difficult to evaluate their relative importance in the analysis. At the same time, this interdependence of the explanatory variables makes it imperative to study the relationship between independent variables and how, in combination, they affect the behaviour of the religious practitioners. Using cross-tabulations also tend to portray respondents as homogeneous groups because of the focus on sub-divisions based on a single variable at a time. For example, if language stream is a significant variable in accounting for change in religious practices, then English educated versus Chinese educated respondents constitutes the first level of analysis. It is important to further analyze the sub-divisions to see whether, within the language streams, there are other variables that may account for variations in religious behaviour. Setting up the problem in this way allows for a multi-faceted picture to emerge and provide a deeper understanding of the reasons for the trends and changes in religious behaviour. To do this, I subjected the data on religious performance of traditional Chinese rituals through a multi-variate statistical technique, CHAID, to study the problem of ritual performance among the respondents in Singapore.7

7

CHAID is an offshoot of the popular technique, Automatic Interaction Detection, AID, first introduced by Morgan and Sonquist (1963). As a multivariate statistical technique, the objective is to explain the effects of a set of explanatory variables in a sequential fashion in terms of a number of stages. At each stage, the most significant variable is split up into various subgroups, and the set of predictor variables is examined for their effect on the dependent variable within each subgroup. The result of this sequential analysis is represented in a dendrogram, which provides a summary of the effects, at various stages, of various predictor variables on the dependent variable in question. It should be noted that this technique requires extremely detailed and finely calibrated data, and not all the data collected in this book could be subjected to this level of analysis. For example, the data set must be able to treat the dependent variable as interval scaled and the predictors as categorical. It also involves the assumption of normality for the distribution of the dependent variables. The bisection of the data also requires that the data allows for maximizing the between-group sum of squares (using F statistics) and where appropriate, the ordered nature of categories within each predictor is preserved. Using CHAID, the data on Chinese ritual performance in Singapore was subjected to an analysis of the predictor variables in stages. At each stage, the contingency tables for all possible partitions for each predictor with the dependent variable are examined and the partition with the most significant chi-square is chosen. All the predictors are then compared to yield the best predictor. This allows for a more detailed analysis of the best predictor, at each stage, for the trends and variations in ritual behaviour of the Chinese in Singapore. I am particularly grateful to one of my co-investigators in this study, Dr. Lin Ting Kwong, who conducted the statistical runs to yield the CHAID dendrograms.

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Based on a careful study of the data and analysis of the crosstabulation data, ten variables were selected as predictors as they are considered most likely to have some influence on the observance of traditional Chinese rituals. These include, the age of the respondents, the dialect of the respondents, the level of educational attainment, housing type, income level, length of stay in the same neighbourhood, religion, gender, the location of the respondents’ home and the stream of education of the respondents. The partitioning and branching procedures, using CHAID, were then performed on the survey data, and a dendrogram constructed. Table 5.17 shows, at the first stage, the most significant partitions for each predictor and their significance levels. From Table 5.17, after adjusting for the significance levels using the Bonferroni multiplier, the most significant predictor of ritual performance, that is, whether the respondents do or do not practice Chinese traditional rituals, is the variable, religion of the respondents. This partition is significant at 1.6 × 10 (–72)%. 6.1. Interpretation of the Dendrogram 6.1.1. First Level In the dendrogram (See Figure 1), percentages within the squares indicate the percentages of the respondents who observed more than four festivals in the respective subgroups. This results from partitioning the best predictor at each corresponding stage. For example, Table 5.17 Most Significant Partitions in Stage 1 Predictor Age Dialect Education Flat Income Length Religion Gender Strata Stream Work

Most Significant Partitions 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4,5 1,2,34 1,2,3,4 1,2,3,4,5 1,2 1,26,35,4 1,2,3 1,2,3 1,2 1,2,3,4,5

Significance Level

Bonferroni Sign. Level

0.82% 1.8% 2.1 × 10 8.3 × 10 2.7% 1.3% 1.6 × 10 7.6% 84.5 3.0 × 10 0.54%

0.82% 1.8% 1.3 × 10–12% 8.3 × 10–4% 2.7% 1.3% 1.6 × 10–72% 7.6% 84.5% 3.0 × 10–10% 0.54%

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Figure 1: The Dendrogram on Observance of Chinese Festivals All 69.8% 1025

Baishen

Buddhism,

85.3%

–72

RELIGION (1.6 × 10 %)

Missing

None, Others

Christianity

28.1%

9.5%

74.2%

631

190

89

EDUC (0.4%)

115

STRATUM (2.5%)

FLAT (1.8%)

None Primary Secondary Post-sec

Stratum Stratum Stratum 2 & 3 4 1 2 3 rooms rooms

5 rooms

90.5% 85.0%

91.2%

78.1% 57.5%

79.2%

21.4%

48.2%

15.0%

34

73

77

42

27

20

210

227

77.5% 160

DIALECT (2.1%) Hokkien Teochew Others Cantonese 75.0%

92.9% 182

28

STREAM (0.1%)

87.0% 211

96.7% 138

84.0% 44

LENGTH (4.1%) 5 years or more

Chinese English No Education

56.3%

68.4%

82.5%

89.7%

60.0%

79.2%

16

57

29

27

24

103

INCOME (5%) $1000 or less

$1001– $1500

82.1%

95.0% 60

106

STREAM (4.7%)

less than 5 years

Chinese Engilsh

GENDER (3%) female male, both

40

INCOME (2.8%) $1000 or less

more than $1000

88.9%

90.8%

68.4%

45

65

38

more than $1500

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examining the dendrogram from the root (top of the diagram). Religion is found to be the most significant predictor. The percentages differ greatly among its four subgroups, viz, respondents with religion Baishen (85.3%), respondents with religion as ‘Buddhism’ or ‘missing’ (74.2%), respondents with ‘no religion’ or ‘other religions’ (28.1%) and respondents who profess to be Christians (9.5%). The partition is significant at 1.6 × 10–70% level. Thus, a quick glance at this first level of the dendrogram shows that respondents for baishen are most likely to observe most of the major Chinese festivals while Christian respondents are least likely to observe the major Chinese festivals. The strong association between those under Baishen and the degree of adherence to Chinese festivals can be attributed to the close association between religion and custom. Many traditional festivals have their origins as “religious” festivals. For example, Chunjie (Chinese New Year) can be traced back to the La festival, an agrarian ritual to ensure a bountiful harvest originating in the Han Dynasty (Bodde, 1979). Similarly, the QingMingJie (All Souls Day) can be traced to the Buddhist ritual for the repose of the soul, already popular in 8th century China. The nature of Chinese religion is such that it is pervasive in all aspects of social life, and it is therefore difficult to make a distinction between customs and religion (Yang 1961, Granet, 1975). To a lesser degree, Buddhists in Singapore observe Chinese festivals for the same reasons. The higher values for those under ‘Baishen and Buddhists’ are in marked contrast to the much lower values for Christians and for respondents with no religion or other religions. This relationship between Christianity and the observance of Chinese festivals will be explored in the next section. 6.1.2. Second Level As we move downwards through the dendrogram, we see the effects of other predictors within each of the four religious sub-groups. The asymmetry of the tree indicates the presence of interaction among the predictors (Fielding 1979, Hawkins and Kass 1982). Thus at the next level of the tree, the most significant predictor differs in each of the four sub-groups and affects each sub-group in a different way. In the group with religion Baishen, education is the best predictor. Of those with no formal education, 90.5% observed more than 4 festivals. The percentage dropped to 85% for those with primary education, and to 77.5% for those with secondary education.

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Those with post secondary education had the higher percentages of 91.2% but the sample size was too small to arrive at any meaningful conclusion. It is particularly important to note that this multivariate analysis reveals that educational level, as a predictor variable, shows its effect only on the Baishen sub-group and not the Buddhist and Christian sub-groups. We believe that this is because the educational system in Singapore emphasizes a critical, scientific mode of analysis which is particularly incongruent with the basic principle in Baishen, which stresses conformity to traditions, without too much concern for ritual propriety or intellectual understanding. Secondly, in line with government policies, Singapore schools have, largely, stressed the use of English as the working language. This has resulted in a generation of graduates who are increasingly alienated from various Chinese dialects. This alienation of the educated from Chinese dialects has again affected Baishen in greater degree rather than Buddhism, since Baishen, as a non-institutional religion, has relied greatly on the dialects in the oral transmission of various Chinese rituals. Related to this is the fact that while the schools have continued to emphasize general aspects of Chinese cultural values, schools are not a significant source of socialization of the values related to the performance of rituals. The reason why education does not play a significant role in Buddhist and Christian sub-groups can be traced to the way these religions are organized and transmitted. Both religions appeal to believers of different education levels because both oral (for lower education levels) and written (for higher educational levels) means are used to convey religious knowledge about particular religious beliefs and various practices, in contrast to Baishen. Moving laterally to the group with religion Buddhism or missing, the best predictor was Stratum. Those living in stratum 2 have a lower rate of 57.5% while those living in stratum 1 and 3 have rates of 78.1% and 79.2% respectively. In the survey, the population was divided into 3 strata, based on the age of the housing estate; with stratum 1 being estates which are over 20 years old, stratum 2 between 10 to 15 years and stratum 3 less than 10 years. The idea was to ascertain whether the older estates, where logically there should be greater degree of interaction among residents and a greater sense of community, would then lead to a higher level of ritual adherence. This spilling over of neighbourly interaction to the involvement of neighbours in customs and ritual practices was indeed pre-

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sent in the stratum 1 neighbourhoods. We also found that Buddhist respondents in these neighbourhoods were more likely to mention involving their neighbours in birth, marriage and death rituals than in neighbourhoods in stratum 2 and 3. It should be noted that stratum 3 also shows a high number of respondents observing 4 or more Chinese festivals, probably for reasons different from those in Stratum 1. Our analysis was however unable to uncover any predictor variable that could explain why households in stratum 3 tend to have high rates of festival observance. In the group with no religion or other religions, the best predictor is flat.8 Among those living in 2- or 3-room flat, only 21.4% observe more than 4 festivals. This rises to 48.2% for those living in 4-room flats but drops to 15.0% for those living in 5-room flats. Since flat-type is closely associated with household income and educational level, what is revealed is how both these affect ritual adherence among those with no religion and other religions. This is as ritual adherence is likely to increase with flat size initially, but fall with higher income and educational level which is represented in the form of larger flats. Thus, flat size (along with income and educational effects) has opposing effects. Among those living in 2- or 3-room flats, the comparatively lower incomes implied by the smaller flat size acts to constrain a higher degree of ritual adherence, although their lower educational level may indicate that they would probably wish to participate in more festivals. On the other hand, the bettereducated and higher-income respondents living in 5-room flats are more likely to profess a lower level of festival observance. In this latter case, the lower adherence is more likely to be accounted for the rationalizing effects of higher education. In the group that professed to be Christians, none of the predictors was significant. This indicates that there is an association between the relative lack of observance of some of the festivals with Christian beliefs. There are probably two reasons why religion is the most important associative variable for the Christians in relation to the performance of traditional Chinese festivals. Firstly, as noted earlier,

8 In Singapore, Flat refers to the size of the apartment in which the respondents live in. Most Singaporeans live in government-built Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats, and they come in a variety of sizes, from 2-room apartments to 5-room apartments. The size of the apartment is generally correlated with the socio-economic status and income of the family.

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the vast majority of Christians in Singapore were converts from traditional Chinese religion. This conscious choice in religious switching implies dissatisfaction with, denial of, and alienation from the traditional religious system. Second, the nature of Christianity in Singapore is one that emphasizes doctrinal purity. Chinese religion tends to be seen as “superstitious” and “un-Christian”. Thus, there is a desire to refrain from practicing what is seen as contradictory to Christian theology. Moreover, given the nature of Chinese religion, where the distinction between what is “religious” and “custom” is vague, most Christians lump the two together resulting in a blanket abhorrence of Chinese traditions. Since the extension of the dendrogram stops at the second level for respondents with no religion, other religions or Christianity, some conclusions can be made about these those sub-groups with regard to their ritual adherence. The dendrogram indicates that for Christians, their beliefs is a sufficient explanation for the relative lack of ritual adherence, while for those with no religion or other religions, the level or ritual adherence can be further decomposed into various socio-economic factors. 6.1.3. Third Level 6.1.3.1. Baishen Further down the dendrogram, in the group with religion Baishen and having no formal education, dialect was the best predictor. Among those belonging to the three major dialect groups, Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese, the percentage observing more than 4 festivals was 92.9%. The percentage dropped to 75% among those belonging to the minority dialect groups. The analysis suggests that for respondents with no formal education, the observance of Chinese festivities and customary practices seem to be organized along major dialect lines, integrating non-educated respondents who are Hokkien, Teochew and Cantonese, and alienating those from minority dialectgroups. In the group with religion Baishen and with primary education, those belonging to the Chinese stream had a higher percentage having observed more than 4 festivals as compared to the English stream (87% as compared to 56.3%). Language stream has a strong associative relationship with religious affiliation. A person’s language affects his perceptions, mode of analysis and his entire worldview.

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This effect is particularly significant for persons with primary education, since those educated in the Chinese medium of instruction are likely to speak Mandarin and dialects. This accounts for the thirty-percentage point difference between the Chinese and English educated respondents. In the group with religion Baishen and with secondary education, 82.5% of those who had lived 5 years or more in the same neighbourhood observed more than 4 festivals. Among those who had stayed less than 5 years in the same neighbourhood, it was only 68.4%. We found a similar pattern of higher involvement of neighbours in birth, marriage and death rituals among Baishen respondents who have stayed in the neighbourhood for longer periods of time. Among the various religious affiliations, Baishen respondents also recorded the highest percentage for home-based rituals. Thus, these three sets of data suggest that Baishen respondents who are longer-term residents develop neighbourly networks which are supportive of home-based, calendrical as well as rituals of rites of passage. This again indicates the mediating influence of the community increasing ritual adherence. 6.1.3.2. Buddhists, Missing In the group with religion ‘Buddhism’ or ‘Missing’, and living in stratum 1, the best predictor was Stream. 89.7% of Chinese-educated respondents observed more than 4 festivals. For English-educated respondents, it was 60% and for those with no formal education, it was 79.2%. Since stratum 1 consists of the oldest neighbourhoods in the sample, there would be a higher proportion of long-time residents. These tend to be those with no formal education and those educated in Chinese. These are the ones who are most tradition bound. 6.1.4. Fourth Level At the final level of the dendrogram, in the group with religion Baishen and having no formal education and belonging to the three major dialect groups, the significant predictor was Gender. Among the females, 95.7% observed more than 4 festivals. It was only 84.1% among the males or couples. In a traditional Chinese family, women are responsible for ritual performance. Although men are seen as the head of the household, when it comes to rituals, their role is limited to a public one, such

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as leading the ritual performance at the graveyard during QingMing, or at the celebrations at the clan temple. In the private sphere and daily life, the routine rituals are in the hands of women (Berkowitz, 1975). Income plays a different role within each of the Baishen sub-group branches. In the group with religion Baishen, primary education and Chinese stream, income was marginally significant at 5%. For these respondents, higher household income leads to higher ritual observance, since higher income presumably allows for opportunities to participate in more festivals. We see this clearly in Figure 1, where the adherence rate for this sub-group increases from 82.1% for those with $1000 or less, to a high of 95% for the middle income category, before falling to 88.9% for those with incomes of more than $1500. For Baishen respondents with more education (secondary) and who have lived in the neighbourhood for longer periods of time (5 years or more), higher income actually leads to less ritual adherence. The adherence rate drops dramatically from a high of 90.8% for those with incomes less than $1000, to 68.4% for the higher income group. In this case, a combination of education and income, acts to lower ritual adherence. Thus from the dendrogram, nine of the predictors, viz, Religion, Education, Flat, Income, Dialect, Length, Stratum, Stream and Gender play significant roles in identifying the various sub-groups. Religion stands out as the most significant predictor. It should also be noted that Age did not turn up to be the best predictor in any of the subgroups. This is due to the particular relationship between Age, Religion and the dependent variable. Age has a strong association with both Religion (X2 = 19.35, P = 0.02%) and the number of festivals observed (X2 = 11.65, P = 0.06%). So when the effect of Religion is controlled for after the first level, the effect of Age disappears in the subsequent levels of analyses. This section demonstrates the usefulness of CHAID as a statistical tool for uncovering relationships between frequency of observance of festivals and its predictors. The complexities of the large data set are reduced to a much simpler set of relationships between a few important predictors. The dendrogram or the tree is a very useful way of displaying the structure of these relationships. One can easily classify the various sub-groups by tracing each of the terminal groups to the root of the tree.

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The results of this multivariate approach uncovered several interesting relationships that would otherwise have remained “hidden”. Of the ten predictor variables, religion was found to be strongest primary predictor of the observance of major Chinese festivals. Within the major religious categories, Christians tend not to observe many major festivals because of their beliefs, while those with no religion and other religions tend not to adhere because of socio-economic factors. Buddhists and Baishen respondents tend to practise many Chinese festivals. Part of the reason for this is related to the finding that Buddhists who observe most Chinese festivals tend to be educated in the Chinese stream or tend to be without formal education and living in established public housing estates (stratum 1) where the strong sense of community reinforces the practice of Chinese traditional rituals. Among the four religious categories the Baishen group is the most complex. It is within this category that CHAID, as a multivariate method, has enabled us to uncover the most interesting patterns of ritual observance. The ways in which the predictor variables affect the dependent variables allow us an insight into how secularization is occurring within the Baishen group. With the exception of a very small group of respondents with postsecondary education, we can conclude that the lower the educational level, the more likely a person is to participate in Chinese festivals. The fact that educational attainment is significant within the Baishen group indicates the very nature of Baishen, a non-institutionalized religion which is transmitted orally. Within each educational category, a clear profile of festival observers emerges. Of those with no formal education, female respondents from the major dialect groupings are most likely to be high ritual adherents. Thus, women from the three major dialect groups, who have no formal education, emerge as the “bastions” of Chinese customs and rites. Of those with a primary education, the Chinese-educated respondents from the higher-income households are more likely to observe more Chinese festivals. Of those with a secondary education, “long time” residents from lower income households are more likely to observe more Chinese festivals. Income thus works in quite different ways within the Baishen group. Respondents who received a Chinese primary education are in a sense, more “traditional”. Those with

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higher incomes have more opportunities to participate in more festivals. Those with secondary education have already lower participation rates, because of their higher educational levels. Within this group, having closer neighbourly relations has strengthened festival observance, but only for lower income groups. The combination of higher incomes and education works against ritual observance. If ritual/festival observance is tied to religious and socio-economic differences as this chapter has shown, then Chinese ritual and customary practices will show a gradual decline in the degree of ritual participation. The socio-economic trend in the population is towards higher educational attainment and household incomes. The use of English at work and as the language of informal communication is likely to increase. Neighbourly relationships are likely to have a lower social significance for the population given the urbanization process and increased residential mobility. Buddhism and Christianity, as institutional religions are likely to grow at the expense of Baishen activities. The combination of such changes will work against the observance of Chinese customs and rites in two ways. First, the Baishen group, who have, at present, the highest percentage for festival participation will fall as a result of losing members to Buddhism, Christianity and to the No religion and other religion category. The latter three categories tend to have lower degrees of ritual participation for religious and socio-economic reasons. Second, socio-economic factors, such as higher education, higher incomes, increasing use of the English language and the declining significance of the neighbourhood network, will work against ritual/festival observance within the Baishen group.

CHAPTER SIX

RELIGION AND THE STATE A central problem in any multi-ethnic and multi-religious society is to deal with conflicts caused by the co-existence of many different groups living in close proximity. If these conflicts are not resolved, the very existence of the state can be tenuous. Clifford Geertz (1963: 153) correctly argued that primordial sentiments or ethnic loyalties tend to generate inter-ethnic hostilities which can threaten the very survival of these plural societies. Similarly, Chiew (1978:130), writing on Singapore, noted; “the political elites often have to take action in order to overcome the divisiveness of the primordial sentiments of race, culture, language or religion between ethnic groups”. In many parts of Asia, religion and ethnicity have, and continue to provide, the focus of communal hostility. This can be seen in the IndiaPakistan conflict, the Muslim separatist groups in Southern Thailand and the Philippines, the Hindu Tamils and the Sinhala Buddhists in Sri Lanka. Given the capacity for religion to arouse strong emotional sentiments and communal feelings, a situation where there is an integral linkage between religion and ethnicity poses a serious threat for the state. They can reinforce each other and become rallying points whenever a group perceives itself to be in a disadvantaged or threatened position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups in the society. Racial riots which erupted in Singapore in 1950s and 1960s were often started through the exploitation and incitement of sentiments related to ethnicity and religion. This chapter will briefly look at the turbulent racial and religious conflicts. It will then focus on the various efforts by the political leaders to transform Singapore into a peaceful and harmonious society and some of the issues which have arisen from the state’s religious management strategies. Finally the chapter will highlight new challenges which seem to indicate that despite the enormous efforts at promoting religious tolerance, issues of religion and ethnicity can continue to be potent rallying points for an ethnic community, which feels that it is being discriminated against or threatened.

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In the two decades after the Second World War, Singapore experienced a series of social upheavals. Internal political strains, communist activity and race riots were prevalent. One of the more serious racial clashes was the Maria Hertogh riots which occurred in December 1950 (See Clutterbuck, 1984). Maria Hertogh was a young girl of Dutch-Eurasian heritage. She was born in 1937 and was baptized as a Catholic. During the Second World War, her parents were arrested in Java by the Japanese and were subsequently interned. Their daughter was then cared for by a Muslim family who later moved to northeastern Malaya and brought Maria up as a Muslim. After the war, Maria’s parents found out her whereabouts and wanted to reclaim her. In May 1950, the Dutch consul in Singapore obtained a court order for Maria’s custody. However due to legal technicalities, the order was reversed in July and Maria returned to her foster parents. She then went through a marriage ceremony with a Muslim. Although the marriage was legalized under Muslim law, it was contrary to Dutch and British law. The case aroused protests in Holland and among the Christians in Singapore. The Court made a decision to annul the marriage and sent Maria to a Catholic convent. Maria’s husband appealed to the Supreme Court and it was during this hearing that fighting broke out. Already, relations between Muslims and Christians, especially Europeans and Eurasians, had become strained over the court case. Muslims who were campaigning for Maria’s custody started a demonstration outside the courtroom. This gathered momentum and by afternoon, unruly mobs began a rampage all over Singapore, dragging Europeans and Eurasians from cars and buses. Nine people were killed and twenty-six others seriously injured. To restore order, the army was mobilized. Nine other people were killed by the army and police. By 13 December 1950, 18 people were killed in all, 173 were injured, 72 vehicles were burnt and another 119 damaged (Clutterbuck, 1984). When Singapore achieved internal self-government from the British, the new government of Singapore was faced with a two-pronged threat. There was a fear of the communist take-over through the exploitation of Chinese sentiments. The Communists were perceived as a political threat by both the colonial administration and later, the People’s Action Party (PAP) government of then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew. The Malayan Communist Party (CPM) was able to

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incite the Chinese populace in Singapore because many Chinese were unemployed and living in poverty during the post-war years. The Chinese-educated felt that they were unfairly treated and received less rights and privileges compared with the European and Malay communities. The PAP government was in a difficult position to alleviate the situation of the Chinese. Any action taken by the political leaders, who were mainly ethnic Chinese which would favour the Chinese majority, would be perceived by the Malay community as being pro-Chinese and may have sparked off inter-communal conflicts. In this period of relative instability, it was not difficult for extremists to exploit the sensitive issues of religion and ethnicity. In 1961, a small group of Malay extremists who went by the name of Angkatan Revolusi Tentara Islam Singapura planned to overthrow the government by attempting to incite the Malays against the Chinese. The real crisis though was in 1964 after Singapore merged with the Federation of Malaysia in 1963. The minority Malay community in Singapore expected to enjoy special rights reserved for Malays provided by the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya in 1957. However, the Singapore government adopted a policy of meritocracy, and refused to confer special privileges on the Malays. Lee Kuan Yew made it clear to the Malay community that All Singaporean citizens had equal rights, regardless of race; and that there were to be no special rights for Malays, no job quotas, no special licenses and no land reservation (The Straits Times, 20 July 1964)

The political rhetoric of meritocracy made the government appear neutral. It served as a clear indication that ethnic favouritism would not be tolerated and also as a reassurance to the other ethnic groups who were apprehensive about Malay domination after the merger. However, this did not sit well with some Malays who were adamant that since Singapore was part of the Federation, they should be allowed similar constitutional privileges. In July 1964, a group of Malays held a demonstration. They were taunted by Chinese bystanders and the exchanges between Malays and Chinese escalated into riots. On the 21st of July, more than 25,000 Muslims gathered for a procession to celebrate the birthday of Prophet Mohammed. In the crowd, there were extremists who aroused the religious zeal of the more fanatical Muslims. During the procession, fighting broke out between the Malays and the Chinese. This rapidly led to widespread rioting and violence all over Singapore. A curfew was imposed but this failed to stop the rioting which lasted for five days. The

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conflict took the lives of twenty-two people and injured some 454 people. 256 people were arrested for unlawful assembly and rioting while 1,579 were arrested for breaking the curfew (Clutterbuck, 1984: 321). As tensions eased, the curfew was gradually relaxed from 2 Aug 1964. Unfortunately the peace was broken a month later when a Malay trishaw rider was stabbed to death in Geylang. Rioting began again lasting another 5 days and nights killing 12 people, injuring 109, causing 240 to be arrested for rioting and over 1000 for curfewbreaking (Clutterbuck, 1984:321). 2. Strategies of the State The riots made it clear to the political leaders that the sensitive issues of ethnicity and religion required careful management. Otherwise they could easily be exploited to cause inter-communal conflicts mobilized in a multi-cultural, multi-lingual and multi-religious society. According to then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew: Communalism is a latent problem in the make-up of our population. Communalists and religious fanatics can, from time to time, work up racial and religious passions and ordinary people can be carried along. We cannot have our minority people worked up and pitted in hatred or fear against the majority, or have one religion so zealous for converts, or so intolerant, that they have open friction with other religions. Any communal or religious collision will be nasty and costly. Our history is be-splattered with such outbursts. The racial harmony we have enjoyed since the last outburst in 1969 cannot be taken for granted (The Straits Times, 3 July 1987)

Several options were open to the Singapore government. One approach was assimilation, where the cultural traits and values of the dominant population are accepted as the national norm and the minority groups such as the Malays and Indians assimilate into the dominant population. However, such an approach was unacceptable due to the geopolitical position of Singapore. Although Singapore had a Chinese majority, its political leaders have always been conscious of being a minority within a Malay (and hence Muslim)-dominated region which may not tolerate a virulent and explicitly Chinese state (Hill & Lian, 1995:97). Another approach was integration, that is, regardless of the size of the dominant ethnic group, all the ethnic communities retain their individual language, religion and culture. Such a model, however, only succeeds in delaying the inevitable conflict if inherent problems

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such as economic and social inequalities between the various ethnic groups are not resolved. In Singapore, a two-pronged approach was adopted. On one level, the government espoused the idea of multi-racialism, in which all the different ethnic and religious groups in Singapore were accorded equal status. All government gazettes are printed in the four languages. Parliamentary proceedings still use all the four official languages. Similarly, education was made available in all four official languages and parents were given the option to choose the language stream they wanted their children to be instructed in. Later, multilingualism was operationalized in the education system by adopting the policy of bilingualism, where students were required to be competent in English and their mother tongue. Equal rights, equal opportunities and the use of the English language as a neutral working language for the nation were given careful attention in the making of a national culture. It implemented what can be termed as the “ideology of pragmatism,” where pragmatic values such as economic growth and progress were emphasized. Singapore is consciously portrayed as a meritocratic state, where theoretically, all groups enjoy equal opportunities for advancement. Merit and performance, rather than ethnic identification or religious affiliation, are supposed to be the criteria for social mobility. On another level, the emotionally laden aspects of ethnic tension, especially religion and culture had to be done away with. In its place, a new national identity—a Singapore identity—was to be created. Ethnic loyalties had to be replaced by a national identity. Taking into account the strong sentiments that religion can muster, any policy undertaken by the state had to be treated with great caution. The state’s religion management strategy has been threefold. First, it seeks to ensure religious tolerance among the various religious groups, and ensure equality of treatment for all religions. Secondly, religions and religious groups must not threaten the sovereignty and national security. Thirdly, religion should not enter the political realm. All three issues were fraught with challenges and dilemma for the state. More so in Singapore where as earlier mentioned, religious affiliations were closely tied to ethnicity. The government could not be seen as promoting any single religion without jeopardizing ethnic and religious relations. In order to ensure religious harmony, the political leaders projected Singapore as a secular state in which all religions had equal status. It also put in place

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specific legislation to ensure that religious groups did not delve into politics and did not impinge on the sensitivities of other groups. The government also utilized the positive social values of each religion to promote harmony and national unity. 3. A Secular State Singapore has explicitly declared itself to be a secular state. A state assumes a secular character if its ideology, individual laws and policies are formulated without regard to any religious creed ( Jones, 1991:1). In a multi-racial and multi-religious state, professing secularity is an astute political move, as the government adopts a neutral stand. The main aim of a secular state, such as Singapore, would be to avoid, religiously based social conflict by removing what might be seen as a privileged position by one community in the affairs of the state (Ling, 1987:1). Ling goes on to argue that the model of a secular state is associated with a society in which religious practices and institutions are important to the community. If a society is secularized and places little importance on religious beliefs, then there is a lower probability for conflict. However, in a religiously plural and religiously free society such as Singapore, Ling (1987:7) argues, the secular state appears to be a political necessity to prevent conflict. Secularism thus allows the government to present itself as a neutral arbiter between the various religious groups. This is derived from the basic premise that the government can only act as a neutral entity because it is equally distant from all religions (Wee, 1989:16). Besides the appearance of neutrality, secularism was perceived as an added advantage for the economy, According to then Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, maintaining a secular society was a positive step because it placed, no impediments as it does in some societies where development is sometimes dictated by religious beliefs which if carried to the extreme can lead to stagnation. It is therefore important for us to realize that while a secular state allows the individual religious enlightenment it also allows for national development without religious hindrances (The Straits Times, 28 June 1970)

In Singapore, pragmatic values such as economic performance are highly prized. In fact, such values are constantly emphasized as a common goal for Singaporeans to work towards. In a sense, the gov-

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ernment has attempted to focus on economic growth and progress because these transcend sensitive communal and religious identities. Appearing secular, however, does not mean that the government does not interfere in religion. As I will show, in passing the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and the promotion of the Religious Knowledge Program in schools, the government in Singapore intervenes in the religious sphere, at one level to ensure stability and harmony, and at another level, to appropriate religion for governance. By using religion for purposes of governance, they create both intended and unintended consequences. For example, while the explicit purpose was to provide cultural ballast for students, one consequence of teaching religion in schools was the inculcation of greater religious awareness as well as religious differences among students. 4. The Separation of Religion and Politics The state has tried to ensure that all religions are treated equally and each group is allowed to promulgate its religion freely as long as it does not affect the sensitivities of other religious groups. In fact, religious freedom is guaranteed by the Singapore Constitution: Article 15(1) Every person has a right to profess and practice his religion and to propagate it. Article 15(3) Every religious group in Singapore has the right to perform the following functions. (1) to manage its own religious affairs; (2) to establish and maintain institutions for religious or charitable purposes; and (3) to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law. Article 16(2). Every religious group in Singapore also “has the right to establish and maintain institutions for the education of children and therein provide instruction in its own religion, and there shall be no discrimination on the ground only of religion in any law relating to such instructions or in the administration of any such law. (Reprint of the Constitution, quoted in Wee, 1989:1)

The religious celebrations of major religions such as Christmas, Hari Raya, Vesak Day, Good Friday and Deepavali are declared as public holidays. Moreover, at such celebrations and various religious ceremonies, political leaders often make an appearance, which is given wide coverage in the media. Similarly at public dedication ceremonies, such as the “passing out” parade of the military, religious

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specialists from all the major religions are invited to give their blessing. This creates the impression that the government sanctions religious pluralism. Religious freedom, however, only extends to the point that it does not undermine the authority of the state. The state does not hesitate to take decisive action against religious groups which it perceives as a threat to social stability or the state’s authority. The government’s stand on religion was clearly articulated by then Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew: . . . the Government guaranteed freedom of worship, but it would not allow anyone to use religion as a cover for subversive purpose (The Straits Time, 3 June 1987)

With this as a justification, the state uses a series of prevailing laws and legislations; such as the Internal Securities Act (originally enacted by the British Colonial rulers to combat communism and communalism); the Societies Act (first enacted by the British in 1889 to outlaw secret societies and triad organizations); and the Unlawful Assemblies Act; to control the activities of religious groups it deems prejudicial to social order in Singapore. Several religious groups are in fact banned. For example, the Singapore Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, an American-based religious group was banned because its existence was deemed to be “prejudicial to public welfare and good order in Singapore” (Straits Times, 15 January 1972). The group claims that Satan was responsible for organized government and religion. Jehovah’s Witnesses claim a neutral position for its members during war and hence refuse to do military service, salute to the state flag or swear allegiance to the state. The rising number of young men refusing to perform national service as a result of their affiliation with the Jehovah’s Witnesses posed a fundamental challenge to the state’s compulsory national service policy. In time, it was feared that this would “seriously undermine vital national interests” (The Straits Times, 26 February 1995). A Straits Times editorial attributed the downfall of the Jehovah’s Witnesses to the turning of a secular obligation (i.e. military service) into a religious choice. Their refusal to do national service or show allegiance to the state conflicted with Singapore’s efforts to uphold unity, integrity and sovereignty because national service is a cornerstone of the Republic’s survival strategy. (The Straits Times, 4 March 1995.)

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In 1982, the Unification Church in Singapore was also dissolved by the Minister for Home Affairs on the same grounds; that it was prejudicial to public welfare and good order (The Straits Times, 3 April 1982). The followers of the Unification Church were commonly known as Moonies after the name of their founder, Rev Sun Myung Moon. The Moonie method of conversion was controversial as it allegedly subjected its new recruits to long hours of theological lectures daily without enough time for sleeping or thinking. New converts were also required to give up their possessions to the Unification Church. Although the number of followers in Singapore was relatively small, the pre-emptive ban by the government was based on fears that the movement might develop into a cult with a large following and pose a threat to social stability. In the case of the Moonies, the government took action because the targets for conversion were mainly the young and impressionable. Other religious groups that were banned include the Divine Light Missionary Society, the Baitiangong, and the Taiwan-based New Testament Church. In this way, the state while professing religious freedom “remains the key decision maker on religious matters in Singapore, with the power to allow or disallow the existence of any religious organization in the country.” (Wee 1989:13) In 1986, the Catholic Church came under the scrutiny of the government. The Catholic Archbishop was warned by the Minister for Home Affairs that certain Catholic organizations were being used for subversive political ends and that the Government could not allow such political activism. One of the key figures in the “conspiracy” was Vincent Cheng, who wrote articles on the inequalities and injustices of the social and political system which “incite disaffection with society and urge for revolutionary change” (The Straits Times, 27 May 1987). Invoking the Internal Security Act, sixteen members of the Catholic Church were subsequently detained without trial in 1987 by the Government for their involvement in the “Marxist conspiracy”. The Archbishop of Singapore acknowledged the government’s grounds for arresting Vincent Cheng and also the resignations of four priests who were involved in the Justice and Peace Commission, the Young Christian Workers’ Movement, The Catholic News and the Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers. The Justice and Peace Commission, the Young Christian Workers’ Movement and the Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers were allegedly infiltrated by

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the Marxists in their plot to overthrow the state, while The Catholic News published an article written by Vincent Cheng which was critical of the capitalist system. After the incident, the Archbishop also announced that the Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers would be closed. He stressed that he wanted to ensure there was no conflict between the Church and the State (The Straits Times, 5 June 1987). After the incident, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew emphasized the importance of keeping religion separate from politics and warned that the government would take quick action against those who “venture into its turf ” (Straits Times, 17 August 1987). The government viewed politics as an area of specialized expertise. With the bureaucratization of many aspects of society, the principle of specialization of function is applied in exactly the same way to religious institutions which are seen as having no legitimate role in the political arena. The values conveyed by religious institutions are viewed as appropriate only to the private sphere (Hill & Lian, 1995:193). Thus any perceived interference from such religious organizations is curtailed. Besides the argument that politics should be left to the ‘specialist’ politicians, there is also the constant reminder of religious strife should religious leaders encroach into politics. The state’s official premise is that if any religious group does enter the political arena, others may follow suit to protect their interests. They claim that if political parties, become involved, it may lead to inter-religious conflict and political instability. Thus, in a multi-racial and multi-religious society such as Singapore, “mutual abstention from competitive political influence is an important aspect of religious tolerance and harmony” (Maintenance of Religious Harmony, 1989:7). Hill, however, suggests that the “Marxist Conspiracy” demonstrates the state’s policy of social control of religion by a process of “crisis constructions”, by highlighting the potential for serious social disorder and hence the use of legislations specifically targeted at preempting this possibility. The strategy of “nipping in the bud” any perceived threat to stability is a central feature of public policy in Singapore (Hill 2004:343). 5. Role of Religion The political leaders in Singapore are keen to demonstrate neutrality and play down differences among the various religions. At the

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same time, the government is aware of the social importance of religion and its possible advantages as a stabilizing moral force: The Government views religion as a positive factor in Singapore society. Religious groups have made, and continue to make, major contributions to the nation. The various faiths practiced by Singaporeans are a source of spiritual strength and moral guidance to them (Maintenance of Religious Harmony, 1989:2) .

To a large extent, the role of religion and religious leaders has been carefully delineated by the state. Religious leaders and religious organizations are warned not to over-step the line between politics and religion. Instead, their responsibility is to promote positive social values and tolerance: Religion and culture, transmitted through society and the family, complements the legal system. Moral and social values . . . inspire us to look beyond ourselves and our immediate needs. They set us standards of conduct and charity to aspire to, and help to build social cohesion and community-bonding. (President S.R. Nathan quoted in The Straits Times, 19 May 2000)

In a National Day Rally speech, Lee Kuan Yew recognized the potential value of religion. Besides attending to the moral needs of believers, he exhorted religious groups: to give relief to the destitute, the disadvantaged, the disabled, to take part in activities which will foster communal fellowship. Emphasis on charity, alms-giving and social and community work. (The Straits Times, 17 Aug 1987)

In Singapore, religion is viewed by the state as a moral anchor for the individual and society. It is also seen as a good source of social support. Indeed, many educational institutions, free clinics and homes for the aged and destitute are run by religious establishments. Thus religious groups provide important social support in a country whose leaders do not support ‘state welfarism’. In order to harness the supposed positive influence of religion, the government even made religious education a compulsory subject in the 1980s. During the early years of independence, Singapore embarked on an education policy which focused on science and technology, subjects which were central to modernization and economic development. Various secular moral education programs were also conducted in schools in the hope of instilling social and civic responsibilities. However, these were, at least according to the state, not deemed to be very effective in combating the negative influences of the West. According to then Minister of State of Education, Tay Eng Soon, young people lived

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in an “age of religious scepticism, moral confusion and almost universal uncertainty because of the questioning of traditional values and beliefs” (The Straits Times, 10 July 1977). From the state’s perspective, there was the fear that “a society unguided by moral values can hardly be expected to remain cohesive under stress” (Goh, 1979:1). A 1979 report concluded that a program called “Moral Education” should be introduced: The principal objective should be to produce good, useful and loyal citizens through inculcation of the desired moral values and social attitudes. (Ong, 1979:8)

In order to balance the positive aspects of religion without compromising its secular outlook, the state turned to Confucianism which promoted codes of conducts and desirable attitudes deemed compatible with an Asian society like Singapore. Moreover, Confucianism, at least from the perspective of the state, did not pose a religious problem, since in theory; it was not a religion but a way of life. Another motive behind the promotion of Confucianism may be the perceived economic relevance of Confucianism in the industrializing economies of Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. While the Protestant work ethic was credited for the rise of capitalism in the West, “Confucian ethics as manifested in an emphasis on thrift and hard work, harmony and cooperation, respect for education and reverence for authority” (Wong & Wong, 1995:299) were believed to be an important social force behind the economic success of the Asian Tigers. Thus, the rationale is that Singapore could maintain its economic dynamism if it too adopted Confucianist values. Although Confucian ideology was viewed by the state as important in promoting social discipline and a positive work ethic, the political leaders realized that their propagation had to be sensitive or it may be perceived as elevating the cultural position of the Chinese (Hill & Lian, 1995:209). In order to build value consensus without overtly religious or ethnic leanings, a ‘Shared Values’ project was subsequently promulgated by the government. The core values were first presented in Parliament in 1989. In 1993, after debating the issue, five statements were adopted as Singapore’s ‘Shared Values’: 1. Nation before Community and Society above Self 2. Family as the basic unit of society 3. Community support and respect for the individual

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4. Consensus, not Conflict 5. Racial and religious harmony The Shared Values reflected the government’s attempt at developing a national ideology which could be applicable and acceptable to all ethnic groups, regardless of religion. In doing so, it hoped to encourage the adoption of values which could maintain harmony between the various ethnic and religious groups. 6. State Legislation and its Impact Despite the numerous efforts at ensuring religious harmony, several episodes in the 1980s drew attention to the fragile state of religious cohesion in Singapore. These included the issue of Malay ethnicity and religion. 6.1. The Herzog Visit In November 1986, Chiam Herzog, the Israeli President, made an official visit to Singapore at the invitation of the President. This led to widespread protests in Malaysia and neighbouring countries. Some Malay leaders in Malaysia saw this invitation as a provocative move and wanted to sever diplomatic ties with Singapore. The Palestine Liberation Front Office in Malaysia said that the visit would “hurt the feelings of Muslims all over the world” (The Straits Times, 31 Oct 1986). Large numbers of Malays, led by the Partai Socialis Rakyat Malaysia held demonstrations against the visit in Malaysia and in front of the Singapore High Commission in Kuala Lumpur. Effigies of the Prime Minister of Singapore were also burnt in protests. As passions rose, the extreme Muslims portrayed the Herzog visit as an attempt to import Zionism to Southeast Asia and the creation of a “second Israel” in Singapore. On the day of the visit, the Prime Minister of Malaysia recalled his envoy in Singapore. Both Brunei and Indonesia also expressed official displeasure with the visit. In Singapore, the initial reaction among the Malay community was to view the protests in Malaysia as external interference in Singapore’s domestic affairs. The Malay members of Parliament reaffirmed the position of the Singapore government. They felt that as a sovereign nation, Singapore had the right to invite leaders of foreign countries with diplomatic relations with Singapore. They also

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expressed regret that foreigners were distorting facts for their own political benefits. However other Malay community leaders and members of the public were not as supportive of the government action. The Majlis Pusat, the Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations in Singapore, described the visit of the Israeli President as an example of the government’s insensitivity towards the Muslims in Singapore, and called for Malays in Singapore to examine the issue and take a stand. The Singapore Malays National Organization, an opposition political party, presented a letter of protest to the government and had plans for a demonstration in Singapore. Other Malay/Muslim groups such as Jamiyah, the Muslim Missionary Society, were also publicly critical of the visit. Finally the Malay Journalists Association in Singapore, reacting to a remark made by Mr. S. Rajaratnam, the Senior Minister (Prime Minister’s Office) that “we are not Muslims”, said these words would seem to suggest that there were no Muslims in Singapore. This hurt and offended the feelings of Malays and Muslims in Singapore and such a statement did not help in building a multi-racial, cultural and religious community (The Straits Times, 12 December 1986). In a poll conducted prior to the visit, it was found that 51% of Muslims and 76% of non-Muslims in Singapore were not against the Herzog visit. However, with mounting protests abroad as well as from the local population, the number of Muslims who were not against the visit dropped to only 29%, while the figure for non-Muslims remained essentially the same at 77%, suggesting that the ethnic/religious divide in Singapore, despite all the efforts at ensuring racial harmony, remains a central feature of Singapore society. Despite the widespread protests and dissatisfaction, there was little threat that the Herzog visit would lead to the communal violence of the past. However, it did demonstrate the power of religious issues in polarizing relations between various segments of the population. Those critical of the visit portrayed it not merely as a political issue but as a religious one. This was because they viewed the visit as insensitivity on the part of the government to the Islamic beliefs of Muslims in Singapore. 6.2. Malays in the Army The sensitive issue of Malay ethnicity and religion was brought to the forefront again in February 1987, when BG Lee Hsien Loong,

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then Second Defence Minister commented on Malays not being given sensitive posts in the armed forces: We live in Southeast Asia. If there is a conflict, if the Singapore Armed Forces is called upon to defend the homeland, we do not want to put any of our soldiers in a difficult position where his emotions for his nation may come into conflict with his emotions for his religion, because these are two very strong fundamentals, and if they are not compatible, then there will be two very strong destructive forces in opposite directions . . . Soldiers in combat must have no qualms about what they are fighting for. (The Straits Times, 23 February, 1987)

The statement quickly brought strong comments from abroad. Some Malaysian leaders, although acknowledging that the matter was an internal matter, expressed regret, because the policy questioned the integrity of Malays everywhere. Some critics even accused the Singapore government of chauvinism and racism, warning that such a view could lead to war in Southeast Asia. The response by Malay political leaders in Singapore to criticisms from abroad was that the issue was an internal affair and foreigners should not exploit Malay sentiments. The Malay MPs noted that they were aware of the Armed Forces policy but accepted it because it was seen as a practical reality in the 1970s. At the same time, they were quick to point out that Malays were making slow but sure progress in the army. For example, Sidek Saniff, a Malay MP, cited the inclusion of Malays in the commando battalion and the promotion of several Malay officers as indicative of the progress made (The Straits Times, 3 March 1987). The responses from the Malay community were mixed. Some like the Majlis Pusat supported the government’s position, noting that Singaporean Malays were free to speak their minds and practice their religion, rights which are respected by the government. Others such as the Singapore Malays National Organization expressed concern since the statement offended the feelings of the Malay/Muslims in Singapore. There were also Malays who felt that their loyalties should not have been questioned. 6.3. Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill Besides the conflicts between the state and the Malay/Muslim community, another concern of the political leaders was the high rates of conversion to Christianity and the increasing number of fundamentalist Christians in the 1970s and 1980s. In a study commissioned

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by the Ministry of Community Development, it was observed that one fifth of all interviewees could be considered as very staunch Christians. These Christians are heavily involved in church activities and were usually very active in the field of mission. For this group of people, Christianity was often perceived as non-integrative and the tenets of the Bible were given a fundamentalist interpretation. Their stance towards other religions was more confrontational. There was a “sense of mission”, a divine call to preach and convert people of other religions to the “true way”, whether they be Muslims or Hindus. The state’s position was that aggressive proselytization by such groups of Christians could cause inter-religious conflict if it is done insensitively. In 1986, the ISD rounded up leaders of eleven Christian organizations which had been evangelizing among Muslims. They were advised to avoid activities which could cause conflict between Christians and Muslims since Muslims were very sensitive towards attempts to convert them to other faiths. (Maintenance of Religious Harmony, 1989:14) In response to these “perceived” threats, the state instituted even firmer measures in the name of preserving religious harmony. While it continued to stress the need for religious tolerance and respect, the state in fact passed additional legislations which, in its view, will prevent possible conflicts among religious groups. In an address at an Inter-Religious Organization meeting, then Minister for Home Affairs, Professor S. Jayakumar tried to justify the necessity of the government’s involvement in religious affairs in Singapore: Religious tolerance and harmony in a multi-racial society cannot be left to chance. Religious groups, leaders, organizations and individuals all have a duty to consciously and constantly work towards this objective . . . Of course, Government and the Law have a role to play. For example the Government will not tolerate anyone who exploits religion to cause incitement or hatred amongst different communities. Nor will we allow anyone to exploit religions or religious bodies for political ends or subversive activities (IRO, 1987:6)

This led to the passing of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act in 1990, with the explicit aim of ensuring that religion is not exploited for political or subversive purposes. To quote from the draft legislation: Religious harmony is as important to us as racial harmony. Singapore is a secular state. . . . The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion. However, in Singapore, racial distinctions accentuate religious ones.

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Religious polarization will cause sectarian strife. We can only enjoy harmonious and easy racial relationships if we practice religious tolerance and moderation.

In addition, a Presidential Council on Religious Harmony was established, made up of representatives of the various major religious groups in Singapore. The enactment of legislation to separate religion and politics reflected the state’s attempt to establish clear parameters for religious organizations and to control the rise of ethnic and religious consciousness in Singapore (Mutalib, 1992:80). With this legislation, any leader, official or member of a religious group who instigates ill-feelings between different religious groups or who promotes a political cause or carries out subversive activities or who excites disaffection against the President or the Government under the guise of propagating or practicing any religious belief may be issued with a restraining order by the Minister for Home Affairs to stop such activities. The Minister may restrain him from addressing any congregation or publishing any publication or holding office in an editorial board for up to 2 years. A restraining order may also be issued against any person who incites any religious group or institution or any leader, official or member of a religious group or institution to commit the afore-mentioned harmful acts. A restraining order may also be issued against any person, other than a leader, official or member of any religious group or institution, who causes feelings of hatred and hostility between different religious groups. If the person violates the restraining order, he may be fined up to $10,000 or face a prison sentence of up to two years or both (MITA, 1992:1).

Such legislation was also put in place due to increasing religious conversion (especially to Christianity), heightened religious fervour and religious zeal especially among Christian groups. The government’s position is that such conversion activities would create social conflict among the various religious groups, especially if it was done insensitively. Thus the government was quick to pass legislation which was seen as a conscious effort to preserve religious stability and by association, political stability. With the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, the space given to religion was also formally demarcated. The new legislation clearly distinguished the secular from the political, a space all religious organizations should keep away from. In evaluating the state’s legislations regarding religion, Hill suggests that it is important to take into account powerful “myths”, in the sociological sense of the word, which the state promulgates. First,

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that there are persistent underlying communal tensions in Singapore. These communal tensions are a source of ethnic conflicts. Second, there is an ever-present conspiracy by communist elements to subvert the state. These two threats, from the state’s perspective, have the potential to undermine social cohesion in Singapore. In this way, religion is viewed as having the potential to be used for left wing subversion. Singapore is projected as a vulnerable society and the state emphasizes the “crisis” and “survival” motifs in justifying its social policies. The state constantly reminds its citizens that the alternative to its firm control of their lives is a reversion to what is portrayed as the anarchy and violence of its early days (Hill 2000). 6.4. The Religious Knowledge Program By the 1970s, with the rapid expansion of the economy and Westernization, including the media, etc, the government was of the view that the population of Singapore was in “moral decline.” According to a Cabinet minister in the government at that time, young people in Singapore live in an age of religious scepticism, moral confusion and almost universal uncertainty because of the questioning of traditional values and beliefs. There was a fear that a society unguided by moral values can hardly be expected to remain cohesive under stress. Religion was thought to be able to combat the mounting social and moral problems plaguing the nation: “A country of agnostics who are morally confused would lead the country into decline and even destruction.” (Straits Times, 17 January, 1982) The recurring theme promulgated by the state is that of religion as “inoculation”, arguing the importance of “Oriental” values which might protect the younger generation against western decadence and the importation of unhealthy fads and fetishes (Hill, unpublished: 5). Thus, in January 1982, the state instituted compulsory religious knowledge programs, for all students aged 14–16 years old, in all schools. Five religious subjects were offered, including Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious knowledge, World Religions. In early February, the following year, Confucian Ethics was added to the list. The explicit aim of the program was to teach social discipline and to imbue values in pupils to provide the cultural ballast against negative corruptive influences. Religion, supposedly, or at least according

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to the state, will produce morally upright citizens who can tell right from wrong and inculcate desirable traits such as trust, filial piety, loyalty, and peace. Exposure to “Western” ideas of materialism, according to then Minister of Education, Dr. Goh, led to moral confusion, as experienced in the West. Interestingly, Taoism and traditional Chinese religion were not included in the syllabus, despite the fact that Taoism registered the largest number of adherents (29.3%) in the 1980 Census. Wee (1989:19) argues this implied that despite its professed neutral stand on religious matters, the state does show preference for one religion in different situations. In a sense, the state, through the Religious Knowledge Program, defines what acceptable religion is. All religions are pressured to adjust to state ideology. This involves, among other things, accepting the capitalist basis of the economy, adopting a tolerant stance towards other religions, and subscribing to democratic values (Hill 2000). In addition, as Tamney notes, the state homogenizes religion, permitting interreligious differences to emerge only if they complement each other (Tamney 1988:127). Despite its professed noble intentions, the religious knowledge program has been criticized by some observers as being a means of social control as it promoted “secular and social utilitarian values aimed at producing a productive workforce and morally upright citizenry” (Kuah, 1991:24). Moreover, the concept of an upright individual was in keeping with the government’s strategy to nurture its citizens to a standard of morality which it defines (Hill & Lian, 1995:161). Commenting on the Buddhist Studies syllabus, Kuah argues that such a program was openly an exercise in social engineering. The Buddhist Studies textbook, which was initially written by a prominent Sinhalese scholar-monk was deemed inappropriate because it lacked practical orientation and did not reflect ‘desirable national values’. Thus the task of writing the syllabus was given to the Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore, under the Ministry of Education. The Buddhist teachings in the syllabus were given a practical redefinition to suit the secular context. Religious references were minimal and used mainly to reinforce the secular values of the program (Kuah, 1991:34). Another unintended effect of the Religious Knowledge program was its unhealthy tendency to emphasize religious differences in its curriculum. The state was criticized for retarding the national integration process, instead of broadening ethnic and religious horizons.

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Religion, historically viewed by the state as a source of potential disruption and ethnic communal conflict, was rehabilitated as a tool to instil civic virtue into young Singaporeans. It was not so much religious education but to instil discipline so religion becomes a means of social control by the state (Hill 2004:346). In 1990, the Religious Knowledge program was scrapped, possibly due to rising concern that it could lead to ethnic and religious chauvinism as it encouraged the segregation of students along religious lines. Furthermore, as long as the state, represented by the Ministry of Education decides on the specific religions to be taught as an option in the RK program, the decision itself implies official endorsement of such chosen options. This is especially so since the curriculum for the Religious Knowledge Program is designed and decided upon by the Education Ministry. Since most religions are not internally homogenous, the education authority, through such program planning, may have to endorse a particular ideological stance out of the several theological traditions of a given religion. In such a case, the state has entered into a domain which is strictly speaking, that of religion. In addition, the secular state’s involvement in religious matters created some unintended consequences. First, by promoting the teaching of religion in schools, it elevated religious consciousness among students, particularly differences between religions. Thus, the schools may become the site where inter-religious tensions result. Another unforeseen consequence of the RK program was that a large majority of the students (over 50%) chose the Buddhist Studies option. This may partly explain for the dramatic increase in the number of Singaporeans who claim to be Buddhists in the 1990s. It has also, in part, led to a revivalism of Buddhism in Singapore. Moreover, because of the way Religious knowledge was taught in schools, emphasizing theological systems over the ritualistic aspects, we see a transformation in the nature of religion. Earlier, I have argued that this has led to an intellectualization of religion in Singapore, where Buddhists take a more philosophical attitude towards religion, and perceiving other Chinese religions, such as Taoism to be “mere superstitions”, seen in ritual behaviours such as burning of goods for the dead. The central point is that when the state draws on religious values and ideas, seen in programs such as the compulsory Religious Knowledge curriculum, to counter the amoral and homeless condi-

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tion of globalization, it results in unintended consequences such as the revitalization of religion, and places religion at the centre of political debates. This has led to an increase in religious awareness, as well as highlighting the differences between religious groups, posing problems for the state, as it may lead to increased ethnic differentiation and religious intolerance. It is not only in social policies, such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill and the Religious Knowledge Program that the impact of the state on religion is felt. In other social policies, such as in land usage, an avowedly secular state can be highly influential in religious activities. 6.5. Competition for Space The large scale government initiative of urban development has resulted in the demolition of many places of worship. According to a newspaper report in 1987, 23 mosques, 76 prayer houses, 700 Chinese temples, 27 Hindu temples and 19 churches had to make way for public developments since 1974 (The Straits Times, 4 Oct 1987). Officially, the government policy has been to reserve ‘adequate land’ for religious buildings in each new town. This is to replace old temples, mosques or churches which have to make way for redevelopment unless they are of historical or architectural value. However, the historical or architectural worth of these places of worship are defined by the government-appointed Preservation of Monuments Board. Thus the demolition of an existing place of worship can occur without the consent of worshippers. This was the case in 1977 when the Central Sikh Temple on Queen Street was acquired by the Housing and Development Board for public housing and commercial development. The temple’s board of trustees appealed, unsuccessfully (Wee, 1989:23). Although most places of worship are given an alternative location elsewhere, this is not guaranteed since it is not possible to have a temple for a temple, a mosque for a mosque, a church for a church substitution (The Straits Times, 26 November 1973, quoted in Wee, 1989:23). While spaces in new towns are allocated for religious purposes, these are tendered out to the highest bidder. As a result, wealthier religious organizations with the available means will be in a better position to obtain a new site while those without the financial means will tend to be pushed out of the religious scene. In fact, the

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number of temples, shrines and other places of worship have dramatically declined mainly due to urban renewal. The main casualty of such urban developments is the wayside shrines which were used to worship the local spirits. Once a common sight in Singapore, these shrines have been replaced by official mosques in housing estate or official temples in which the images of the deities from neighbourhood temples have been relocated. In many of the new towns, it is not uncommon to find one large Chinese temple accommodating several smaller temples which have been demolished. The decline in the number of places of worship has resulted in a situation whereby religious institutions and groups operate out of homes, without any official registration. As Wee (1989:26) pointed out, such religious activities carried out in private can pose a danger because they are not easily subject to public scrutiny. The conflict over the use of space can also extend to the public housing void deck. Due to the small size of most public housing apartments, many Chinese families tend to hold their funeral wakes at the void deck of the apartment block. However, conducting a funeral at the void deck may not always be unproblematic. Sometimes, it is possible that the family applying for permission to use the void deck to hold a funeral may be refused permission and be instead given a site several blocks away from the home. This may cause dismay to the family concerned since it is believed that the soul of the deceased will not be able to find its way to a place he/she had not visited while alive. The refusal of permission may be because the void deck of one’s immediate block of apartments may have been previously booked by other groups for other activities. In particular, in multi-ethnic, multi-religious Singapore, void decks are also used for Malay weddings. Lai (1995) recounts the conflicts that arise when an unexpected Chinese funeral wake is held in a void deck which had earlier been booked for a Malay wedding. This conflict over use of space is compounded because the Chinese believe that once a coffin has been put down in a particular location, it should not be moved. When such a conflict occurs, the HDB has chosen to abide by its system of booking (based on a first-come-first-serve principle) in order not to appear discriminatory. 6.6. Changing Rituals With public housing developments, modern high-rise living has become commonplace in Singapore. Such a situation has inflicted its own

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bureaucratic and political demands, and cultural beliefs and rituals have to be adapted to suit these demands. An example of this can be seen in the public rituals conducted during the seventh lunar month (the Hungry Ghost Festival during which prayers and offerings are made to appease spirits of the nether world which are believed to wander through the gates of hell). The traditional practice of burning large joss sticks and candles has come under restriction with increased density and proximity of living, as well as concerns about pollution. New regulations since March 1998 stipulate that joss sticks and candles should not be more than a certain size and that they should not be burnt within 30 meters of any building (The Straits Times, 4 September 1998). However such legislation is in contradiction to religious beliefs. In Taoist practice, joss stick burning is an integral ritual as devotees believe that the incense helps to lift their petitions to the deities. Thus they believe that the bigger the joss sticks, the greater the lift. On the other hand, the values that underpin modern living privilege clean and unpolluted environments and these should prevail over religious concerns. The state’s regulations on these giant joss sticks are based on secular and non-religious considerations thereby minimizing potential religious friction with Taoist devotees. Conflict was also minimized because the government managed to obtain the co-operation of the Taoist Federation which had earlier asked its devotees to cut back on the size of their joss sticks since these were unnecessary and contributed to pollution. The Federation had also announced that purchasing bigger and longer joss sticks for religious festivals was against the spirit of Taoism. It would be better for devotees to spend less on joss sticks and donate more money to charity (The Straits Times, 30 Oct 1997). Another example is the burning of joss papers and paper money as offerings to the gods and ancestors. In the past, joss papers were burnt in front of the home altar, so that the gods and ancestors would know that the offerings were meant for them. Nowadays, this practice is curbed because the law states that burning such offerings in the house is too dangerous. It is therefore quite common to find that offerings are burnt outdoors or pavements at the ground floor of HDB apartments. Yet, this is believed to be less than desirable, as worshippers fear that their ancestors would not know which offerings are for them. To make things worse, the government has stipulated that offering must be burnt in communal bins where all offerings

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are mixed up. Such bins are provided by the town council because open burning of joss papers contributes to pollution, with burnt joss paper and resultant dust and ashes flying all over the estate. It also leaves behind unsightly, burnt spots on the fields and poses a fire hazard. The public is also discouraged from continuing with their open burning with some punitive measures (fines). While the use of bins has gained some acceptance, largely, people are still unhappy with the joss bins and seek other ways of performing their ritual, such as drawing a chalk circle or pouring a circle of tea around offerings in an attempt to establish a degree of exclusivity. However, many still place a bin outside their apartment to burn joss paper though they know this is forbidden by law (because of obstruction and fire hazard). This is still widely practiced, even at the risk of being fined, evidence of the persistence of the territorial imperative in Chinese religious thought. In Singapore, there is constant tension between the state, which uses secular non-religious considerations as well as the necessity of ensuring harmonious existence of different ethnic groups, and the religious practices of the different ethnic and religious groups. In some instances, this has led to resistance by the group against state policy. In other instances, it has led to a degree of accommodation and the alteration of religious practices to accommodate state policy. For example, in land scarce Singapore, the state has encouraged cremation instead of burial. As such, columbaria have become more common. However, with modern columbarium, the Chinese worship practices have also had to change. The Chinese generally hold the view that any offerings to the dead should be presented in front of the deceased, whether at the ancestral tablet or the tombstone. This is linked to the notion of the boundedness of the ancestral spirit, that is, the Chinese conceive of the soul of the deceased actually being present at the graveyard. However, in a columbarium, the deceased is kept in an urn and interred together with thousands of other urns. The performance of offering to the deceased is carried out at a community altar. Joss paper cannot be burnt in front of each cubicle but in special pagodas which are used by all worshippers communally. On important ritual days, such as the Qing Ming festival, there could be hundreds of worshippers performing rituals simultaneously. What used to be the individual worship of ancestors has been turned into a corporate ritual because of the movement from graveyards to a columbarium. Some worshippers lament the

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fact that they cannot be really certain that the offerings are being accepted by their deceased. As a consequence, new rituals have been invented to circumvent the problem, for example by calling out to one’s ancestor to come to partake of the food and gifts. This is done in the belief that the deceased will then be able to find his/her way to the appropriate offerings. As stated earlier, due to the massive urban redevelopment and renewal, over 85% of Singaporeans live in government-built HDB apartments. Most of these families were relocated from ethnically specific house forms to standardized high-rise apartments. Traditionally, the house forms of the various ethnic groups were constructed with considerations for the religious beliefs and ritual practices of the group. For example, the concerns with fengshui, or geomancy as well as the hierarchical organization of the Chinese family structure have produced a housing type that emphasizes formal symmetry in the building’s façade and layout. Similarly, the Hindu Indians’ cosmological concerns with the notion of “purity” and “pollution” are expressed in the spatial arrangement of the house that maintains both functional and gender segregation. However, as Chua (1988:3), has pointed out, the standardized HDB apartments built by the state eliminates all these particularistic layouts. This has not resulted in the demise of the religious beliefs, but rather, each group seeks to invent new ways, both spatial and symbolic, to preserve their beliefs systems within the standardized space allocated. For example, ideally, a Chinese building should have asymmetrical plan oriented in a “north-south” axis, facing south to capture the positive yang elements of Chinese belief systems, and north to deflect the negative yin elements. Moreover, the central wall in the house should face the main door, so that the gods and ancestral altar also face the main door. This is done in order to ensure that the spirits can protect and ward off evil spirits that may try to enter the home. As Chua noted, in the layout of the standardized HDB apartments, the importance of north south orientation and internal symmetry in the home are often not possible. Here, for practical considerations, the main door of the apartment is situated on the side, or when the wall facing the main door has a opening in the centre to allow easy access to the kitchen. This will result in problems placing the altar (Chua, 1988:18–20). It is not uncommon in Singapore for Chinese families to renovate the apartment, such as shifting the entrance of the kitchen to the side of the wall in order

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for the correct placement of the altar. In other cases, there are changes to the rituals themselves. For example, traditionally, the god altar is placed on the left side of the altar, with the ancestors on the right, as gods are considered to be superior to ancestors. However, in many households, the gods may be placed on the right and ancestors on the left to ensure that the gods face the main door, as they have the power to ward off evil spirits. These changes reflect attempts by Singaporeans to maintain, yet adjust, their religious practices in the face of living in a modern environment. 6.7. Conflicting Ideology For the Malays, the state’s desire to integrate the Muslim student more fully into the secular educational system resulted in controversy. As a matter of policy, the state did not allow four Primary One Muslim girls to wear the tudung (Islamic headscarves) to their schools. The Ministry of Education threatened to suspend the girls involved from school if they insisted on wearing the tudung. The Education Ministry emphasized that its ‘no-tudung’ rule was necessary to ensure that the proper school uniform was adhered to. The common school uniform served as a tool of religious harmony as it reminded every student of the “common ties that bind us in a common destiny”. It said that if school uniforms were allowed to be modified according to religious or customary practices, “over time, our schools will lose their value as key places where our young learn about unity and togetherness’ (The Straits Times, 5 February 2002). Malay MPs quickly attempted to pacify the Malay/Muslim community. Minister of State (Community Development and Sports) Yaacob Ibrahim said that some changes had already been made. For example, Muslim girls may wear slacks instead of shorts during physical education lessons. Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs Abdullah Tarmugi said that no one was stopping Muslim girls from wearing the tudung outside school hours. Therefore it was only during school hours when the girls could not wear the tudung. The Malay MPs stressed that the schools which the girls attended was a secular school, implying that the girls should not stress their religious differences in such a situation. Mr. Yaacob Ibrahim, then Minister of State, reiterated the government’s position that Religious freedom has to be guided by a greater need for integration, and racial and religious understanding and tolerance (The Straits Times, 27 January 2002).

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Besides the stand made by the Ministry of Education on its uniform policy, the ‘no tudung’ rule reflected the Government’s view that if the government conceded to reverse its policy on the tudung, this could lead to demands by other religious groups. Moreover, bending the rules on the tudung issue could lead to further Muslim demands for more concessions. This concern was reflected by PM Goh Chok Tong So there are moments when our own religion, our own beliefs, conflict with what others can do. We cannot expect the organisation to conform in every way to individual religious needs. (The Straits Times, 6 November 2000)

According to Islamic belief, the tudung is important in maintaining modesty in women. However, the tudung issue in Singapore was not just about religion. For some in the Muslim community, it was an assertion of political, religious and political rights, with threats to take the Ministry’s stand to court (The Straits Times, 30 January 2002). The tudung issue also drew strong criticism from several Malaysian politicians and Islamic groups, claiming that it discriminated against the Muslim community. In addition, the opposition party in Malaysia, PAS, went a step further and submitted a protest to the Singapore High Commission demanding that the no-tudung ruling be retracted. PAS claimed that the ruling could create disenchantment among the minority Muslim community and cause racial tension. A Muslim non-governmental organization, Iman International described the ruling as a “clear violation of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (The Straits Times, 31 January 2002). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Singapore responded by warning the Malaysian politicians and Islamic groups to keep out of what it deemed to be Singapore’s internal affairs. The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) also encouraged the parents of the four girls to send their daughter back to school without the tudung. MUIS President gave the advice after consulting with Mufti Syed Isa Semait, the highest Islamic authority in Singapore. The Mufti’s position was that if they had to make a choice, Muslims should give higher priority to education than wearing the tudung (The Straits Times, 6 February 2002). Eventually, the mother of one of the Muslim girls relented and allowed her daughter to return to school without the tudung. The parents of the other three girls involved in the controversy engaged Malaysian lawyer Karpal Singh to fight their case in the Singapore courts.

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Through legislation and a policy of multiculturalism and religious tolerance, Singapore has been relatively successful in maintaining social stability. However, given the strong response that religion can engender in adherents, and the close inter-linkage between religious affiliation and ethnicity in Singapore, the possibility of religious strife remains significant. The lack of religious conflicts in recent Singapore history may in fact be a surface phenomenon. Beneath the surface, there may be underlying ethnic and religious tensions among the various ethnic and religious groups in Singapore which can erupt if a group feels that it is being discriminated against. In January 2002, fifteen people were arrested in December 2001 under Section 74 of the Internal Security Act (ISA) for their involvement in terrorismrelated acts, such as making preparations to bomb targets in Singapore. According to the Home Affairs Ministry, some of the suspects had been trained in Muslim extremist Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Thirteen of the fifteen arrested were cell members of a clandestine organization which called itself Jemaah Islamiah ( JI). The JI is part of a larger terrorist network with cells in Malaysia and Indonesia and links to Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda network. Searches of the suspects’ homes and offices turned up detailed information on bombmaking, as well as photographs and video footage of surveillance carried out on potential targets here. Material linked to Al-Qaeda, tampered passports and forged immigration stamps were also found. They were also attempting to procure materials to make bombs, including large amounts of a chemical, ammonium nitrate—a powder that appears colourless or white, which can be used as an explosive (The Straits Times, 6 January 2002). The focus on Muslim extremists grew even more intense when the government arrested 21 more Singaporeans in August 2002 for terrorism-related activities. According to the Home Affairs Ministry, nineteen of the arrested men were members of the JI network, while the others were linked to the Philippines-based Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Several had trained in terrorist camps in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and some had conducted reconnaissance of targets in Singapore (The Straits Times, 17 September 2002). According to the Government statement, the 21 JI members had surveyed potential targets such as Changi Airport, Jurong Island and the Bukit Timah Waterworks opposite KK Women’s and Children’s Hospital (The Straits Times, 20 September 2002).

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The issue of Islam and terrorism was debated in many parts of the world following the September 11 incident in New York and the arrests of the 21 men are used to emphasize the need for vigilance against such terrorism. In his 2002 National Day Rally speech, the Prime Minister pointed out that the majority of the Muslims in Southeast Asia were tolerant and open-minded, many were influenced by developments in the Arab world, and wanted to adopt an extreme version of Islam. Hence the concern was that Muslims may choose to interpret and practice their religion narrowly and rigidly. This would allow radicals to exploit Islam for their own subversive purposes. The resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism was not a new phenomenon in Singapore. The successes of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the 1970s led to the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in many parts of the world, including many Southeast Asian countries. In 1981, with the aim of establishing an Islamic state, a group of Malays calling themselves the Singapore People’s Liberation Organization sought to topple the government of Singapore by armed revolution. The group was arrested when it tried to distribute pamphlets to Muslims attending the celebration of Prophet Mohammed’s birthday. Although the state has managed to effectively contain the fundamentalist Muslim threat, the existence of such religious and communalistic elements suggests that a portion of the Malay/Muslims is discontented with their position as minorities in Singapore. It also suggests that with increasing globalization, the state cannot insulate itself from events in other parts of the world. Since the early days of Singapore’s independence, Malay/Muslim issues have been treated with care. To circumvent possible conflicts between the Government and the Muslim community, a Parliamentary Bill was passed in 1966 to set up the Muslim Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), a supreme body to regulate Muslim religious affairs. MUIS was set up in 1968 providing a means to satisfy the demands of Muslim organizations and also serving as an umbrella structure for 15 religious organizations (Hill & Lian, 1995:168). The President, Mufti (religious head of the Muslims in Singapore) and the Secretary were to be appointed by the Government. MUIS served an intermediary function between the state and the Muslim community. More importantly, it was believed that through MUIS, the government could effectively contain Muslim extremism and fanaticism (Kassim, quoted in Hill & Lian: 168). After the arrest of the JI members, the important role of MUIS in ensuring moderation among the Muslim community was highlighted. MUIS responded

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by dis-associating itself with the JI members, and stating that it maintained close ties with Muslim leaders whose teaching did not stray from Islam (The Straits Times, 10 January 2002). Thus, despite legislations and years of attempting to cultivate religious tolerance, the issues and problems related to religion and religious sentiments are not easily resolved by policies of the state, especially in a multi-religious society. Policies that are too rigid could lead to accusations of religious persecution and discrimination, as the tudung incident clearly demonstrates. Too lax, it could result in inter-religious strife. Conclusion The challenges facing Singapore in its early years of independence forced political leaders to take issues of ethnicity and religion very seriously. Through the years, the government has continually emphasized the need for religious moderation, citing examples of political instability caused by religious conflict. It has also attempted to synthesize values to promote ethnic and religious harmony. One of its latest attempts has been to create a Code on Religious Harmony. The draft code reads like a pledge for all citizens to uphold religious peace in Singapore: We, the citizens of Singapore, acknowledging that we are a secular society; enjoying the freedom to practice our own religions; and recognising that religious harmony is a cornerstone of our peace, progress and prosperity; hereby resolve to practise our religions in a manner that: promotes the cohesion and integration of our society; expands the common space of Singaporeans; encourages mutual tolerance, understanding, respect, confidence and trust; fosters stronger bonds across religious communities; and prevents religion from ever being a source of conflict. (The Straits Times, 16 Oct 2002)

The draft code was drawn up by Minister of State (Community Development and Sports and Prime Minister’s Office), Chan Soo Sen with a team of seven people, each representing a major religion (The Straits Times, 2 November 2002). Even the team members picked to draft the Code is a reflection of the state’s commitment to secularism and religious pluralism. The newspaper report on the team drafting the code has explicitly mentioned that Chan’s lack of religious affiliation makes him impartial and hence an ideal candidate for the job. The government has also put in place legislation to ensure religious harmony. However, in a plural society such as Singapore’s,

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the right of every religious group, particularly the minorities are continually reinforced in order to prevent the use of religion as a political instrument. While the government’s stand on the Islamic headscarves issue seems heavy-handed, it reflects the concern that giving in would be a reflection of weakness on the part of the political leaders. This might lead to greater demands for concessions by the Muslim population. Surrounded by large, predominantly Malay/ Muslim populations in Malaysia and Indonesia, the state, in its policies, has to consider the geopolitical reality of a essentially Chinese population in a predominantly Muslim region. Supported by a regional network, the JI organization in Singapore had alliances with Islamic groups in the Philippines and southern Thailand. Members of the alliance cooperated and shared resources in training, funding and procurement of arms. At least 14 of those arrested had undergone military training in camps in Malaysia, the Philippines and Afghanistan, learning to handle explosives and firearms. The growing influence of the Internet has also made it more difficult for the government to manage religious issues in cyberspace, which has the potential to incite racial and religious conflict. In 2001, the Secretary of the South Indian Jamiathul Ulama religious group through the email accused Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs, Mr. Abdullah Tarmugi of instigating Malay MPs to act against the interests of the Indian-Muslim community (The Straits Times, 2 January 2001). The recent controversy surrounding the website called Fateha.com reflected the ease with which cyberspace could be used to manipulate ethnic and religious sensitivities. The Fateha.com webpage was set up to discuss Malay/Muslim issues and promote better understanding among Singaporeans of different races and religions (The Straits Times, 26 Jan 2002). However, the articles posted on the website posted by Fateha’s CEO aroused criticism as the website contained articles which were written in a confrontational manner. It also challenged the authority of the Minister of Muslim Affairs and was critical of the government’s stand on the ‘no tudung’ ruling. (The Straits Times, 25 July 2002). The vastness of cyberspace makes it difficult to monitor and screen web pages for potentially subversive articles which could inflame religious rivalry and create discord. With the increasing influence and accessibility of information technology, such articles can reach out to many more people, especially to the younger generation who tend to use the internet more frequently. These young people are perhaps

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also more susceptible to negative influences. Realizing the dangers posed by the Internet, PM Goh warned that intolerant views could be spread swiftly. As such, the Government would not hesitate to take “firm action” against those espousing extremist views on the Internet. (The Straits Times, 2 January 2001). To understand the state’s management of religion in present day Singapore, it is important to consider the turbulent circumstances of inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations at the early stages of nation building. The 1950s and 1960s were marked by inter-ethnic strife and religious riots. Social policies during that period, such as the emphasis on multi-racialism, meritocracy and the secularism of the state, were enacted to try to diffuse ethnic tensions and the potential for inter-religious conflicts. Emphasis, at this stage of nation building focused on ensuring social stability and social order, using legislation to exert control of religion. By the 1970s and 1980s, with greater economic affluence, social stability and relative inter-religious harmony, social policies were altered to reflect the changing political and economic environment. Faced with the prospect of increasing westernization and the perceived lack of cultural ballast, particularly among younger Singaporeans, the state sought to resuscitate religion, appropriating religious values and ideas to counter the amoral and homeless condition of globalization. Yet, while drawing on religion, the state explicitly sought to articulate certain ideas and values found in the religions which it deems desirable for its citizens, conforming to a morality that it defines. Singapore society, as Hill argues, is dominated by instrumental rationality and the government pursues overwhelmingly pragmatic policies. This pragmatic approach is most clearly exemplified in the Religious Knowledge Program and the Religious Harmony Act, which were enacted to manage and control religion to ensure social stability in Singapore (Hill, 2004). Even while using religion as a means for social engineering, the ambivalence of the state towards religion is evident, cognizant of the ability of religious sentiments to causing inter-ethnic strife. Moreover, any attempts to manage religion are fraught with problems. It became obvious in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the use of religion as a means to counter westernization resulted in unintended consequences, such as the revitalization of religion, increasing religious awareness among Singaporeans and highlighting the differences among religious groups. Events such as the “Marxist Conspiracy”, the grow-

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ing influence of evangelical Christianity and increasing religious competition among religious groups required changes in state policies. The Religious Knowledge Program experiment was scrapped after just a few years. Legislations, such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill, the separation of politics and religion as different “spheres of competence” and the setting up of the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony reflected a re-recognition of the potential divisiveness of religious sentiments and a reversion to an attempt of the social control of religion on the premise of ensuring social stability. In the 1990s and 2000s, the difficulties of managing religion are further compounded by increasing globalization and the growth of cyberspace. In this new environment, it became increasingly difficult to insulate Singaporeans from the social and political impact of events such as 9/11 and the spread of militant Islamic networks, particularly in Southeast Asia. Signs of this fundamentalism are present and growing in the region. There are many Malays who insist on following orthodox Islamic precepts and more and more Muslim women are observed to be wearing the hijab and purdah. The inter-connectedness of the world has reduced the utility of social policies to manage activities within the state. One of the consequences of this has been attempts at increasing control, and greater surveillance of the population.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION Overall, I have focused in this book on detailing and explaining religious conversion, change, and revivalism in Singapore. Singapore, a small state where a large number of religions exist in close proximity, provides an interesting case study of what happens to religions in such an environment. One of the key finding is that there are religious breaches as well as hybridity. The historical analysis of religion in Singapore demonstrates that very often, the close proximity of religion can often result in conflicts, as witnessed by the number of riots in the 1950s and 1960s. Part of the reason for this situation is the strong correlation between ethnicity and religion, such as Malays and Islam, Indians and Hinduism, and Chinese and Taoism, to the extent that some religions are viewed as ethnic religions. During various points in its history, these conflations of religion and ethnicity have resulted in religious conflicts. Yet, at the same time, the close interactions among the various religions have also resulted in a degree of religious hybridity, including the inventions of new rituals to meet the needs of living in a modern, urban, and highly industrialized society. 1. Rationalizing Religion One of the key problematic explored in this study is the relationship between modernity and religion. Disputing the classical secularization hypothesis, rapid social change and modernity in Singapore has not led to the decline of religion. Instead, Singapore society has in fact witnessed a degree of revivalism. The data, for example, show that the degree of religious participation in both home based and public based rituals remains essentially high. This is true even for the practice of traditional Chinese rituals, such as the worship of gods and ancestors, as well as proscriptions on birth, marriage and death rituals. In addition, the degree of religiosity among Singaporeans, despite all the social changes occurring in Singapore society, is very high, attesting to the importance of religion in their lives.

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These observations suggest that it is necessary to rethink the relationship between modernity and religion. In any case, the supposed correlation between secularization and modernity has come under increasing criticism. For example, Haddon and Shupe (1985) are particularly skeptical of the efficaciousness of secularization theory, with the evidence of the continual role of religion in the modern world, pointing to the role of religion in the civil rights movement in America, the rise of Soka Gakkai Buddhism to political power in Japan, the rise of the Moral Majority in the US, and the Shiite Muslim uprising of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Haddon notes that secularization, in sociology, constitutes doctrine rather than theory, to the extent that the idea of secularization becomes sacredize. The study suggests that the key question to address is not the decline of religion, but the reasons for its persistence.1 Following Weber and Geertz, I suggest that religion continues to perform important functions of providing meaning systems for individuals and groups to make sense of the world they live in. Humans are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and lend it significance. This significance will lead them to judge certain phenomena of human existence in this light and respond to these in a meaningful way. In this respect, an individual acquires, creates, and subscribes to meaning central to his ethical world. Indeed, man is constantly striving to articulate his life and search for the meaning of the human condition. Science, technology, and modernity may affect the ways such meanings are conceived but does not replace religion in providing a basis of making sense of the world he/she lives in. The structural and social transformations in Singapore society has resulted in modifications and adaptations of beliefs and ritual performance, but not in the decline of the importance of religion. However, it is not only necessary to explain the need for religion in modern society, but to account for its vitality. I suggest that one of the reasons for religious revivalism in Singapore is due to a degree of religious competition among religions in Singapore. Starting from the 1950s, the religious situation in Singapore has changed dramat1 This is of course, not only true for Singapore. In this chapter, I compare the religious situation in various Asian countries, like Korea, China, Taiwan and Malaysia. It is shown that all these countries have also experienced a degree of religious revivalism.

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ically. Prior to that, most of the religions were content to look after their own adherents, and religion was closely tied to ethnicity. However, from the 1950s to the 1980s, due to active proselytization by Christianity, and the changing social environment of Singapore society, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Christians in Singapore. As no religion will idly stand by while its members are drawn away, there have been various responses from the other religious groups, particularly Buddhism and Taoism, to try to stem the tide and even attract new members. Both of these religions have undergone a process of rationalization and intellectualization of religion in an attempt to stay relevant for the new types of Singaporeans schooled in western educational systems and who are increasingly affluent and globalised. Such a process of rationalization includes the intellectualization of religion, where individuals shift from an unthinking and passive acceptance of religion to one where there is a tendency to search for a religion that they regard as systematic, logical and relevant. There is gravitation towards religions of the book. There are also the processes of demystification and disenchantment, particularly among the Buddhists and Taoists, where the practitioners seek to eradicate what they perceive to be irrationalities and “superstitions” in the religion and to locate what they consider to be orthodox beliefs. These include searching for justifications for the beliefs and rituals. There is, at the same time, a process of dysyncretization of Chinese religion, into what the practitioners consider to be “real” Buddhism, and “real” Taoism, and not the stream of religious beliefs and practices collectively known as Chinese religion, which is a mix of Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, ancestor worship, and folk Chinese beliefs. Religious competition causes the various groups to step up their activities and place greater emphasis on proselytization. It is interesting to note that religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, which in the past were non-proselytizing religions, have both embarked on active programs to recruit new members. Of the two, Buddhism, because of its organizational structures, has been relatively more successful. Even so, we are witnessing, in recent years, a degree of revitalization in Taoism, after the formation of the Taoist Federation and Taoist Mission, umbrella organizations to represent the interests of Taoists in Singapore. Together with the proselytization programs, have been efforts to retain the affiliation and loyalty of existing

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members. This has resulted in increased levels of activities to look after the interests and needs of the adherents, including religious classes, talks and seminars. Taking a page from Christianity, Buddhist and Taoist groups have expanded to non-religious activities, including educational programs, tuition classes, field trips and social programs, such as counseling and social work programs to meet all aspects of the needs of its members. In this sense, it ensures multistranded linkages to the religion, rather than a single strand relationship related to religion. All these have led to greater visibility of religion in Singapore and greater public awareness. However, even as religiosity remains high, living in a modern society has necessitated modifications in religious behaviour to suit the new lifestyle. For example, as elaborated in Chapter 5, there have been alterations to ritual performances, such as in the number of days needed for funerals, the wearing of mourning clothes, and in birth ritual taboos. In general, we see a trend toward the simplification of ritual performance, emphasizing rituals that the adherents consider more central and more essential and removing those that they regard as peripheral or superstitious additions promoted by ignorant people. In addition, there are modified rituals to suit living in a modern environment. For example, funeral rituals which were previously private affairs conducted in the confines of the home have moved into the public arena because of the smaller apartments that people live in nowadays. This has required the creation of new rituals to protect innocent public bystanders from coming into contact with death. While there have been a process of simplification and getting rid of certain rituals; in general, the performance of Chinese traditional rituals, remains essential high, indicating the continued importance and relevance of religion for the Chinese in Singapore. While it is true that the percentage of adherence to ritual performance is lower for the younger Chinese educated, together with the fact that these rituals are oral traditions passed down from generation to generation, it is noted that even for these people, performance of rituals remains relatively high. The data also suggests that there is an increasing dependence on ritual specialists to assist with the performance of rituals, to ensure that the “correct rituals” are enacted. In addition, modernity has opened up religious options that were previously unavailable. It has allowed for the contestation of ideas, and the contestation of religions, opening up the possibility of multiple constructions of what constitutes the social order or the basis

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for the collective identity of the social group. Religious affiliation moves from the realm of the obligatory to a higher degree of voluntarism and individualism. Religious status, which was once ascribed has moved to one where there is greater emphasis on achieved status and a higher degree of voluntarism and what Luhlmann would term as privatization in decision making. Yet, while there is a degree of privatization of religion, as modernity offers greater institutional differentiation and pluralistic individual identities (Bellah 1970, Berger 1967), it is not a free for all, open market place, given cultural, ethnic and state intervention. Religious choices are constrained by social and cultural forces. Religious competition and modernity have also resulted in changes within the religions. As the book shows, these occur at three different levels. At the level of the individual believers, changes in the society, including the educational system and language of education, have resulted in Singaporeans looking for a more intellectual or rational religious system which coincides with their new world view, moving away from religions that informants claim to be “mere superstitions,” to those that they consider more rational and knowledge based. In addition, even in the new religious affiliations, they attempt to focus more on the philosophical and theological aspects of the religion rather than an emphasis on ritualistic behavior. For example, in Buddhism, informants mention that they like the philosophy and rationality of the religion, including notions of shengen and yinguo, but do not believe in the concepts of the nine hells, which many view as popularistic additions to the main tenets of the religion. This had meant a shift to Christianity or claiming to have no religion. More recently, the interest has shifted to claiming adherence to Buddhism. At another level, the nature of religious practices has changed. Adherents are emphasizing the more philosophical and theological aspects of religions rather than their ritualistic practices. To meet these challenges, many religious groups, particularly Buddhism and Taoism, have reformed their religions. From the perspective of religious economy, they repackaged and focus their messages to attract a new class of possible clients. Both in their activities and how they project their message, the strategy, as the analysis in Chapter 3 of this book clearly demonstrates, of the religion, whether Taoism or Buddhism, are rational and relevant to modern society. These strategies include systematizing and codifying the religious beliefs and rituals of the group; publications, especially in the English

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language, to explain the rationale for the belief systems; the holding of religious classes to educate members and possible new adherents, and a program of proselytization. Even in Christianity, we see changes in religious strategizing. In the 1990s, for example, realizing that there is a huge religious marketplace of older Chinese Singaporeans, the proselytizing strategy shifted from merely reaching out to younger Singaporeans to this new market. It is interesting to note that from 1990 to 2000, there has been significant growth in older Chinese turning to Christianity. The central question is not that there is greater individualism and religious option, but more importantly, why do people make the religious choices they make. I suggest that an understanding of the social, cultural and environmental factors play an important part in their decision-making processes regarding religion. The traditional way of accounting for religious conversion has focused on psychological and deterministic factors. Seen as the main agent of change, the individual often assumes a negation of the old self and the implantation of a new self. The emphasis has been on the cognitive processes and assumes beliefs and behavioural changes. The data on religious conversion in Singapore suggests that while it is the individual who converts, which is seen as a personal decision, conversion in Singapore must be viewed as having structural and cultural causes, rather than merely an individual’s decision. Religious affiliation is socially structured. Structurally, in Singapore, the English educated Chinese are more likely to convert to Christianity compared to those who received a Chinese education. The younger Chinese are more likely to convert to Christianity compared to older Chinese Singaporeans. Similarly, more educated Chinese, and those who from higher socio-economic statuses are more likely to convert to Christianity rather than the lower educated Chinese. It is, of course, not simply that they belong to these groups that lead to conversion. Rather, as a group, they have a very different worldview. Exposed to western-based education, and modernity, they tend to take, I argue, a more intellectual approach to religion, and see Christianity as more relevant to their worldview. I suggest that in Singapore, there are different types of conversion. For those moving from Taoism and Buddhism, it fits into the more classical definition of religious conversion, as shifts in religious orientations or worldviews. Even here though, converts have to medi-

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ate their new religious beliefs with the social and cultural roles which form part of their ethnic identity. For some those who shift from Taoism to Buddhism, it is not so much conversion as religious relabelling, and for others, religious alternation in the Bergerian sense of the word, providing for the possibility of choosing between varying and sometimes contradictory systems of meaning. In a sense, this prospect of religious conversion is possible because of the modern nature of Singapore society. There is an increase of personal choice regarding religion. In the past, Chinese parents were often very strict regarding the religion of their children, and becoming a Christian was often viewed as denying one’s own culture and traditions. A Chinese who became a Christian was seen as committing a grave offence and would be severely punished. Chinese parents, nowadays, take a more relaxed and tolerant attitude towards their children’s religious affiliation and the performance of traditional rituals. For example, in the past, the performance of funerary and ancestral rituals was obligatory practices and their performance seen as a duty. There are strong social pressures to ensure that the rituals are conducted properly. Nowadays, there are little sanctions for nonadherence. With the progressive loss of monopolistic control, religion becomes increasingly a matter of free choice, and loses its inter-subjective obligatory character. (Berger 1967:168) Thus, in modern Singapore, there is the availability of different worldviews, and individuals in society have and are permitted, to make religious choices. The religious make-up of the family illustrates this. In the past, there is consistency in the religious affiliation of the family, and all members of a family share the religion of the head of household. The Census data (1990) show that even within the family, there is a degree of religious fragmentation, with many children not sharing the religion of their parents. Similarly, there is increasing differentiation in the religious affiliations of spouses. The structural effects on conversion do not simply rest with sociodemographic factors. In a multiethnic society, interestingly, Singapore demonstrates how ethnicity is closely correlated with religion. For example, Islam is viewed as a “Malay” religion, and Hinduism as an “Indian” religion. For a young Chinese Singaporean who is dissatisfied with his/her present religion, conversion to Islam or Hinduism is considered untenable, as it signifies not only religious conversion, but also entering another ethnic group. Thus, the options available to

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him are limited. This partly accounts for the choice of becoming a Buddhist, viewed as another Chinese religion, or Christianity, seen as an ethnically neutral religion, or they choose to have no religious affiliation by calling themselves free thinkers. In this sense, religious conversion is not simply a personal decision, but influenced by culture. This emphasis on the cultural factors is important. As noted earlier, most literature on religious conversion tends to assume the negation of the old self and the implantation of a new self. Given the importance of cultural factors, religious conversion in Singapore does not mean that the total repudiation of traditional belief systems, even when converting to an exclusivistic religion such as Christianity. For example, funerary and ancestral rituals occupy a central place in Chinese society. Values which are highly regarded by the Chinese, such as filial piety, loyalty, and the provision of descendants to carry on the family name, are embedded in the rituals. It is the duty of sons to ensure that the needs of the dead parents are adequately met. Theoretically, filial piety demands total obedience from the sons. In traditional Chinese law, unfilial conduct is regarded as a serious crime. The beliefs and religious practices of Chinese ancestor worship are at odds with those of Christianity, and for a Christian to practice ancestor worship could be construed as worshipping another god or pagan idols. However, in Singapore, it is observed that many Christians continue to carry out ancestral rituals for their deceased parents. Due to social pressures, some would perform the ancestral rituals according to Chinese traditions. Other Christians do take part in the rituals, but with modifications and adaptations to try to stay true to their Christian principles. For example, many Christians participate in the rituals but do not carry the joss sticks. Instead, they will offer flowers to the deceased parents. Many though, will wear the mourning garments associated with Chinese funerals. It is not simply adjustments on the side of Chinese religion. For example, one of the more interesting findings on Christianity is that while the number of Christians has increased in Singapore, there is a large number of Christians who are not baptized. One reason for this may be the attitude of Chinese parents towards the rites of baptism. While many parents do not object to their children being Christians, they have objections regarding the ritual of baptism. Many parents view it as the repudiation of one’s culture. The church in Singapore is

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aware of this, and the ritual of baptism is not greatly emphasized in Singapore. Religious conversion is Singapore is therefore textured, rather than simply the giving up of one religion for another. The study has shown that in an environment of many religions coexisting in close proximity, the state has had to intervene in religion to ensure religious harmony and the stability of society. Despite its avowed secularity, the government in Singapore has tried to diffuse the emotionally charged and potentially disruptive forces of interreligious conflicts while trying to use religion for political purposes, to assist in nation building. For example, the government has attempted the use of the Religious Knowledge program, teaching religion in schools, to try to provide cultural ballast and a moral compass in the face of what they view as the amoral condition of modernity. These interventions, however, have resulted in various unintended consequences, including the raising of religious awareness and religious differences among students, changing religious profiles, particularly for Buddhism in Singapore, unintended endorsement of certain religions over others, and the changing nature of religion in Singapore, particularly moving towards a more philosophical interpretation of religion due to the way religion was taught in schools. Similarly, with the historical experience of various riots and disturbances caused by religious conflicts in its early history, and the greater degree of religious fundamentalism, particularly the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism, the government has enacted various policies, including the Religious Harmony Bill, the setting up of the Presidential Council on Religious Harmony, and recently, the drawing up of a Religion Pledge, to try to control religion in Singapore. While these measures have had some positive effects, increasing globalization, including in the arena of religion, has meant that the government has less and less control over religion, and its policies have less influence. 2. Comparative Study of Asian Societies The book has focused on religion and religious change in Singapore as a case study to develop theoretical ideas on religious conversion, religious change and religious revivalism. However, the empirical evidence must be seen within the context of the historical development and social environmental conditions of Singapore society. And

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in that sense, there is a particular uniqueness in Singapore, including the smallness of the country, the strong hand of the state, the nature of its educational system, and the nature of the interaction between religion, ethnicity and culture in the society. Do these trends observed in Singapore apply to other countries in Asia? Is there a relationship between language, educational level and religious affiliations? Do religions go through the same process of intellectualization and rationalization? Is there a high degree of religious conversion in other Asian countries? Are they also experiencing revivalism? In the final part of the conclusion, the book will try to locate the religious change in Singapore within the context of Asian societies. To achieve this, I will compare the religious situation and religious change in various Asian countries with large Chinese populations, including China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. As these are largely homogenous societies, with primarily Chinese populations, I will also look into the religious situation in Malaysia, which like Singapore, is multiethnic and multireligious. I will begin by examining the religious situation in Korea, which, like Singapore, has seen a dramatic increase in the number of people professing Christianity. This is the only other Asian country to experience this. 2.1. Korea Like Singapore, Korea is a multi-religious society. About half of the Korean population professes a religion. However, Korea has no “official” religion nor is there one overwhelmingly dominant religion. In recent years, Buddhism and Christianity are two of the most popular religions (see Table 7.1). Again, like Singapore, Korean society has witnessed a dramatic growth in the number of Christians. Buddhism entered Korea from China in 372 AD and was a strong religious and political force in the country. Buddhism dominated the religious scene with its concerns about afterlife and metaphysical questions about the ultimate nature of the world whilst Confucianism dominated the political and moral scene (Grayson, 1995:78). This complementary relationship between Buddhism and Confucianism changed dramatically in the Chosön Dynasty (1392–1910). NeoConfucianism came to dominate Korean society and as the national religion, it was in direct conflict with Buddhism. Rigid regulations were set in place, severely limiting the Buddhist temples and monastic life. The ruling literati also limited any political, moral and religious discourse. While Confucianism appealed to

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Table 1 Religious Distribution in Korea Religion Buddhists Protestants Catholics Confucians Won Buddhists Daesoonjinlihoe Chondogyo Daejonggyo Others Subtotal No religion Total Population

Population (thousands)

%

10388 8819 2988 193 85 68 30 11 197 22779 22772 45551

23.2 19.7 6.6 0.5 0.2 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.43 50.85 49.15 100

Source: National Statistical Office (1995), taken from Kim, (2003:153)

the intellectual elite in Korea, it alienated the vast majority of the Korean people. As a result, a spiritual vacuum existed among the people. The philosophical and metaphysical nature of Confucianism put off the common masses, thereby making Shamanism more popular. Through its mediums, shamanism provided a direct communication link between the common people and the spirit world and took on the supernatural characteristics of Buddhism and Confucianism (Bong, 1998:58). According to Bong (1998:59), the spiritual void among the Korean people continues till today. Many Koreans have grown skeptical of their traditional religions. This is explicitly expressed by the large number of Koreans who profess to have no religion at all. These figures however, may not reflect the true situation. Confucianism in modern day Korea still survives largely as a set of social ethics, focusing on family, education, loyalty, hierarchy and propriety. The “religious” element in contemporary Confucianism is ancestor worship. Thus, while Koreans may profess to not having a religion, they still remain Confucianists at heart, for a large majority of Koreans, including a substantial proportion of Christians perform Confucian-style ceremonies for their dead ancestors on death anniversaries and on culturally significant public holidays such as chusok (Korean Thanksgiving) and the Lunar New Year’s Day (Kim, 2003:166). Although Korea has been a traditionally Buddhist and shamanistic country, Christianity has made considerable inroads. Since its introduction in the 1880s, Christianity has proceeded to become one

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of the largest religions in the country. About one quarter of South Korea’s 40 million people are Christians (Kim, 2000). Besides their large numbers, Christianity in Korea is highly visible because it is aggressive and dynamic. For example, the Full Gospel (Pentecostal) Church on Yöido Island has a membership of over 325,000, a pastoral staff of over a hundred, multiple services each Sunday, a domestic radio and television ministry and a regular religious telecast for the Korean community of Los Angeles. It is already the world’s largest church and growing fast. (Clark, 1986:1) Grayson (1995:82) asserts that the religious vacuum which was created by the “aridity of Neo-Confucian thought” and by the suppression of Buddhism and superstitious shamanistic practice allowed other religions to penetrate the Korean religious scene (Grayson, 1995:82). Christianity, especially the Protestant missionaries were particularly successful because of several reasons. Kim (2000) argues that the dramatic progress of Protestantism in South Korea during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s was due in part to the way the imported faith converged with certain concepts and practices of Korean shamanistic tradition. Early Protestants adopted Hananim as the supreme God of their Christian faith. Korean shamanism worships large numbers of spirits, but the supreme God in its pantheon is Hananim. The identification of the Christian God with the highest deity of the shamanistic tradition prepared the Koreans to accept the Christian faith more easily (Kim, 2000:123). Kim thus argues that the growth of Christianity in South Korea can be partly explained by the fact that the Koreans from the popular shamanistic tradition found a mirror image of their supreme God in the imported faith. Also, the supernatural elements of the Christian scriptures (i.e. faith healing and casting out demonic spirits) suited the inclinations of many Koreans who were accustomed to a culture that exult the exorcising and healing powers of shamans. The emphasis on healings and exorcism also led to the popularity of Christian pastors who supposedly had healing powers. Again, like in the case of Singapore, Christianity also had to compromise on the issue of ancestral worship which was central to the culture of the Korean people. While traditional ancestral worship was rejected, a Christian memorial service, similar in intention and meaning was put in its place. By allowing such memorial rites, albeit syncretised and toned down, to be performed by Christians, Korean Protestantism evaded a potential clash of traditions, thereby helping

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the imported faith achieve its dramatic growth in South Korea (Kim, 2000:128–129). There is a degree of hybridization of the beliefs and rituals of Christianity and traditional religious system for it to be able to attract the large number of Koreans choosing to follow Christianity. When Japan colonized Korea in 1910, it became a victim of imperialism. Many of the people suffered tremendous hardships as a result of political instability. However, unlike other victims of imperialism, its master was a non-Western power. While Christian missions and churches in other colonies were perceived as part of the imperialist presence, in Korea, the church was associated with a new nationalism. Christian leaders were in the forefront of the Korean resistance to colonization. The church itself was seen by many as a refuge from Japanese rule (Clark, 1986:8). Moreover, the missionaries’ were seen as champions of modern ideas and knowledge (Park, 2000:513). They built up the medical and educational infrastructure in Korea. The provision of such services for all classes of people was seen as an expression of compassion for the lower classes, which were largely ignored in the rigid social structure of Confucian society. These common people enjoyed new social mobility when they entered the Christian faith which professed to be egalitarian. (Clark, 1986:36). The early missionaries also helped to bring the written word to the common man. They were faced with the daunting work of conveying the Christian message to the Korean people since most of the books published were in classical Chinese. Most Koreans could not afford training in classical Chinese and were therefore, in effect, illiterate. There was an easyto-learn alphabet for Korean called önmun (“vulgar writing”—called Han’g5l after 1945) but it was treated with contempt by the literati and educated aristocracy. The Christian missionaries however, used the simplified Korean alphabet to translate the Bible. In order to propagate the Christian faith more effectively, the churches carried on a literacy campaign to encourage the use of önmun among churchgoers. Gospels, tracts, Sunday school material were widely disseminated and many Koreans responded to the Christian message and joined the church (Clark, 1986:32). Like the case in Singapore, Christianity was able to make inroads into Korea by emphasizing both the religious and social aspects of its missionary work, including the provision of social services, educational institutions and charity work. The institutional philanthropy

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first introduced by the early Protestant missionaries continues till today. It continues to establish schools, run universities and hospitals. The Protestant missionaries also provided the model which emphasized scriptural doctrine, personal belief and membership in formally organized congregations. As these were successful in attracting adherents, many Buddhist groups, especially the Chogye order adopted the organizational model of the Christian Protestants in the latter part of the 20th century (Konig, 2000:555). For some time, Buddhist sects were hesitant to engage in welfare activities but have become more active in establishing nursing homes, sanatoriums, orphanages, welfare facilities for the physically challenged (Kim, 2003:162). They have also encouraged the formation of local congregations (Konig, 2000:556). As in Singapore, in recent years, there have been some signs of resurgence in Buddhism. Conservative elements are trying hard to preserve the tradition of patriotic Korean Buddhism. Radicals and intellectuals are also trying to revive the Buddhist consciousness which aims to eradicate human suffering. Buddhism gained greater momentum in the 1980s when it evolved under the general label of minjung pulgyo (Buddhism of the masses). This was characterized by the vigorous modernizing efforts of a few Buddhist leaders. Most are fully conscious of their responsibilities in engaging Buddhism with global and societal issues (Shim, 2000:543–544). This Buddhist revivalism must be seen in the context of a reaction and resistance to the popularity of Christianity in Korea over the last thirty years. Unlike Singapore though, the rise of Christianity was not due to the introduction of the English language. Both Singapore and Korea were, for a significant part of their history, under colonial rule. While Singapore was under English domination, Korea was under Japanese rule. So the issue of language and religion was not an important factor in the case of Korea. Even so, the “class” divide in religious affiliation is still relevant, as the elites were drawn to “state” religions, such as Confucianism and Buddhism, while Christians tended to come from the lower classes, often as a form of resistance to the elite religion. Today, Buddhist, Catholic and Protestant Churches collectively engage in extensive socio-political activities and operate a wide range of services. They publish more than 200 newspapers, magazines and periodicals, and operate research centers. Each of these major religious bodies has its own cable television and radio network, which

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broadcasts nationally. They run hundreds of kindergartens, primary and secondary schools and nearly a quarter of the colleges and universities. In fact, the three most prestigious universities in Korea— Sogang University, Yonsei University and Ewha Woman’s University— are Christian (Kim, 2003:161). The rapid growth of the early Church has been largely attributed to the methods used by the missionaries. The work by the first generation of Protestant missionary involved medical and educational work rather than just evangelism. This appealed to Koreans not only because of its practical value but also because it resonated with certain aspects of the Confucian tradition which placed great importance on learning and education (Grayson, 1995:82–83). The rapid industrialization during the 1960s through to the end of the 1980s in some sense also supported the growth of Christianity. During that period, South Korea changed radically from largely rural agrarian society to an urbanized industrial state. The movement of the bulk of the populace from the rural areas to the cities and the change from agricultural to industrial work meant social and psychological dislocation and disorientation. Grayson (1995:85) argues that the Christian churches grew at an extraordinary rate during that era because of the lack of serious spiritual competitors among the urban masses and because massive social changes had created yet another significant area of spiritual need. The church’s stress in personal evangelism was especially effective in recruiting new converts in the urban areas. Many migrants from the countryside felt out of place and Christianity provided them with a new sense of community (Clark, 1986:36). Koreans now control the Protestant denominations that developed for the most part under Western missionary guidance prior to World War II (Clark, 1986:21). This gives the Korean Christians a strong sense of pride. Today Christianity in Korea is not seen as a ‘foreign Western religion’. Perhaps this is another reason why Koreans remain receptive to becoming Christians. The Korean Church has also become a “sending church” with a missionary program of its own. This is considered the development of a healthy and mature religious faith (Clark, 1986:33). As Buddhism and Christianity continue to maintain a strong presence in Korea, the Korean government has begun to re-evaluate ‘traditional religion’ as an integral part of Korean history. This trend is reflected in the state’s educational policy which has introduced

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“religious studies” as an alternative subject in public education. They have also begun the promotion of folk religious festivals, the maintenance of a National Folk Museum and the restoration of Buddhist temples and Confucian shrines (Konig, 2000:560). What is clear in the Korean case, although the historical and environmental conditions are different, is that there has been a process of religious shifts and conversion in the population, including the growth of Christianity and the revivalism of Buddhism. Bong and Grayson have argued that the reason for the religious shift is the existence of a spiritual vacuum among Koreans. Like the explanation of anomie posited by Hinton and Clammer in Singapore, it is difficult to substantiate the nature of the spiritual vacuum as well as prove the linkage between having a spiritual vacuum and religious revivalism. Rather, like Singapore, there is religious pluralism and the existence of multiple religious options and evidences of a process of religious competition among Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism in Korean society. Modifications occur in the religions, such as the concept of “Buddhism for the masses”, to counter the success of Christianity in Korea. Social and political changes in Korean society, such a rural urban migration have also affected the religious profile of Korean society. 2.2. China Despite the suppression and strict restrictions placed on religions during the communist era, religion in China remains an important part of life to the people. According to official statistics, there are over 100 million followers of various religious faiths (China Internet Information Center, 2000) and religious traditions with non-Marxist ideologies are flourishing (Overmyer, 2003:307). According to Daiber (2003:426), the information given by the US Dept. of State, published in the International Freedom Report 2002 on China is fairly realistic. The information is said to be based on a “government White Paper” published in April 2002, hence to an official Chinese source. According to this White Paper, 200 million of the 1.3 billion Chinese are religious adherents: about 8% are Buddhist, 1.4% Muslim, 0.4% members of the official Catholic Church and 0.4–0.8% belong to the unofficial Vatican-affiliated Catholic Church. For registered Protestants, it is between 0.8–1.2% while the number of those worshipping in Protestant house churches is estimated to be between

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2.4% and 6.5%. Estimates of Taoism numbers were not available. Listed however are the numbers of Taoist monks and nuns (more than 10,000) and the number of Taoist temples (more than 1000). Although there are no figures for the number of practicing Taoists in China, anecdotal research has shown that it is thriving in China. After the cultural revolution, the National Daoist Association took up the responsibility of restoring the Taoist temples which had been destroyed by the Red Guards or occupied by non-religious organizations during the Revolution (Lai, 2003a:415). The initial phase of recovery was characterized by a revival of destroyed temples and the return of old Taoist priests nation-wide. Since then the speed of restoration and reconstruction of temples has accelerated. In the 1990s, temple restoration expanded from the metropolitan areas to the more rural, county areas (Lai, 2003a:416). When the temples were rebuilt and required consecrating, many of the local Taoists and Buddhists religious specialists were enticed back to work. Moreover, newly carved god statues required the services of Taoists for kaiguang dianyan (rituals of consecration of the gods involving dotting the eyes with blood or red ink to open them to the light) (Dean, 1993:4). Many Chinese communities also began to celebrate elaborate Taoist jiao communal sacrifices, have been extensively revived in China, especially in the south-western villages (Dean, 1993:5). Such of the resurgence in religious activities is also closely linked to the donations from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. They return in large numbers to attend religious rituals and to bury their dead, or at least hold services in their places of origin for those who have died overseas (Dean, 1993:4–5). Since the 1990s, the Taoist associations have been able to shift their concerns from the survival of their religion and the restoration of temples to the organization and legitimization of their religious order. Taoist associations are now more focused on ensuring the effective means of managing and administrating so called ‘corrected’ temple activities, the religious life of resident members and the Taoists living at home who perform ritual services and ceremonies outside the temples (Lai, 2003a:417). Although the current regime has put in place less restrictive religious policies, party policy continues to recognize only five institutional religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism and Protestantism (Fan, 2003:449). Popular religion, which includes the worship of ancestors and deities, funeral rituals, temple festivals of community

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renewal in honour of patron gods, various forms of divination, geomancy, spirit possession and exorcism are not officially recognized as a religion. In spite of this, popular religion remains entrenched in the Chinese culture and it is a significant religious force in China. As Fan (2003:450) notes, there has been a renaissance of popular religion with the on-going popularity of temple cults, local deities and temple festivals. With the boom in economic activity, many Chinese could also afford to rebuild temples to their local cult god. Many of these had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution as popular religion was considered unworthy of recognition as a religion and hence subject to repression and destruction (Overmyer, 2003:308). In the southern villages of China, ritual events are large scale and communal. These rites and rituals are centered on temples dedicated to various gods. Individuals participate in communal rites on important festivals such as Chinese New Year or on the birthdays of gods, but they also worship their local gods at village temples by bowing, praying, making offerings, burning incense and spirit money. Ritual specialists are sometimes hired to perform rites of passage and prophylactic rituals. Spirit mediums are particularly important in popular religion as they provide a channel of communication to ancestors and gods. Ancestor worship halls, where communal ancestor worship can take place, have sprung up in almost every town in southeast China (Fan, 2003:453). In 1979, for the first time in decades, parts of Fujian witnessed the performance of large-scale religious rituals. According to Dean (2003:356), ritual events in some particularly active and complex areas of South-east China can take place 250 days out of the year. Almost the entire village takes part in these events, with the exception of some Christian families. Popular religion practices have not diminished in importance as China begins its modernization process. Instead, Fan (2003:454) argues that there has been an increase in spirituality among the population as many urban workers who have moved beyond basic struggle for survival are now faced with deeper questions of personal meaning. In his study on religion in the modern city of Shenzhen, Fan (2003) shows the trend towards a privatization of popular religion among urban Chinese. To them, religious beliefs are private concerns and the search for spiritual meaning is a personal one. Although many of these urban Chinese do not organize large communal wor-

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ship events, they still uphold the traditional Chinese popular religion worldview of ming yun, yuan fen and feng shui (Fan, 2003:455). Christianity has become a prominent part of the general resurgence in China in the past twenty years. Like the other religions, Protestant Christians have gone through the same cycle of repression and recovery. However, in this case, the result has been rapid growth. Although analysts have attempted to put figures on the number of Protestant Christians and Catholics in China, there is still great uncertainty over the actual numbers. One of the main reasons for this is that since the 1980s, much of the Protestant Christian church growth has been in the countryside where it is difficult to get accurate numbers. Moreover, many Christians, perhaps more than half, are in autonomous Christian communities (house churches). These house churches are separate from the congregations registered with the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement (TSPM), which is the organization created as a link between the Protestant community and the State (Bays, 2003:491). As for the Catholics, the existence of an “underground church” and an “official church” has made matters even more complicated. In their 1993 study of Christians in China, Hunter and Chan (1993:66) acknowledged that the actual size of the Protestant community could not be accurately determined. Even with estimate figures, large discrepancies were apparent. The official figures claim that there are 10 million Protestant church members (China Internet Information Center, 2000). However, unofficial data suggests that the figure is much higher. According to Bays, the number of Christians is estimated to be between 25 and 35 million. This represents a significant increase from 50 years ago when there were about 700,000 to 1 million Protestants (Bays, 2003:491). Overmyer (2003:313) estimates that the total Protestant membership is between 25 to 30 million, at least 20 times more than in 1949. Protestantism appeals to its followers for different reasons. According to Bays (2003:502), its beliefs provide an explanation of suffering, an ethical code and a promise of salvation. All this comes at a much cheaper cost than traditional rituals in local communities because of less expense for ritual offerings, operas and feasts. Also, it provides fellowship, from small groups to large congregations. Christianity offers personal affirmation and an outlet for development of musical, organizational and preaching skills. This is especially important

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to the younger Chinese people. Hunter & Rimmington (1992:3) note that Christianity was more easily transmitted because of key parallel cultural patterns and structures in popular Chinese religion. For example, the True Jesus Church teaches that the Holy Spirit enters into Christian believers at prayer. Those who already believe the spirit possession of the local shamans easily accept this. Thus, for many Chinese, especially those living in the countryside, Christianity is an attractive religious option because in practical terms many Christian activities are closely related to traditional cultural patterns. Many of those linkages to popular culture include the function of prayer, requests for healing, charismatic phenomena like shamanism, moral norms, ideas about sin and salvation, and the pragmatic aspects of conversion (Bays, 2003:495). Often the requests for healing, charismatic phenomena, the ideas of sin and salvation and the pragmatic aspects of conversion appeal to these Christians. While Christianity was once a striking example of foreign influence, it has become increasingly sinicized through the inclusion of features of folk religion and traditional cultural forms (Potter, 2003:334). It is this syncretic and sinicized Protestant Christianity that is doing well in China. This in part can be attributed to the fact that, for a long time, much of the local popular religion was destroyed or discredited (Overmyer, 2003:313). Protestant sectarian groups are also flourishing in the countryside. Two of the apparently better organized of the more or less orthodox Protestant groups are the Chongsheng pai (Born again sect) and the Quanfanwei jiaohui (Full scope church) which stresses a dramatic conversion experience including copious weeping (Bays, 2003:496). Groups such as the Beili wang (Established king), Mentuhui (Disciples sect) and many other often have a charismatic leader who proclaims himself to be Christ or otherwise divine and who creates new sacred instructions or scriptures. They typically denounce orthodox Christian congregations, perform alleged spectacular miracles, and promise deliverance from an imminent apocalypse demanding obedience and resources from their followers. For the past two decades, such groups have siphoned off many rural Christians from the mainstream of the faith (Bays, 2003:497). Compared to the growth of Protestantism and the Chinese religions, the rate of increase among the Catholics has been relatively slow. Officially, the Catholic population is estimated to be about 4 million

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(China Internet Information Center, 2000). However, Madsen (2003: 469) estimates that the Catholic population in China is between 10–12 million, an increase from 3 million in 1949. There are clearly more Protestants than Catholics in China today. Estimates of the Catholic community centre on a figure of about ten million. This is a reversal from half a century ago, at the end of the missionary era, when there were about three million Catholics and somewhere between 700,000 and one million Protestants (Bays, 2003:491). One of the possible reasons for the slower rate of growth has been the factionalism within the Chinese Catholic Church. These are popularly called the “underground” Church (those who remained loyal to the Holy See) and the “open” or officially sanctioned church. Many “underground” Catholic communities operate as unregistered “house churches” and are vulnerable to government repression. Although such factionalism has been diminishing in recent years the effects of such a schism has had a significant impact on the Catholic population. While actual figures are difficult to ascertain, it is clear that with the opening up of China, religions which were suppressed during the communist regime have witnessed remarkable revivalism. There have been increased religious activities, both in the rural and urban areas and in all the major religions, including Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and traditional folk Chinese religions. Part of the explanation for this revivalism rests with the fact that after years of suppression, where many of the religions have to go underground, the opening up of the country has allowed the innate religiosity to resurface. On several of my recent field research trips to China, including Shanghai, Hangchou, Shenzen, Guangchou and Suchou, I witnessed a significant increase in the performance of rituals associated with traditional Chinese religions, such as the enactment of elaborate funeral rituals for the dead. Part of the explanation could also rest with the fact that many Overseas Chinese are re-establishing linkages with their home villages, and bringing in resources and monetary contributions to rebuild temples and clan ancestral halls. As missionary activities are largely curtailed by the state, we are not witnessing, as yet, a high degree of religious conversion, but this may change as China continues to open up to external influences.

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Since the end of martial law in Taiwan, religion is thriving. According to the Taiwan Yearbook in 2003, Buddhism (5.4 million) and Taoism (4.5 million) have the largest numbers of religious adherents. Members of any religious community are free to congregate and introduce their belief systems to others without fear of state suppression (Katz, 2003:395). The government statistics on temple numbers give an indication to the resurgence in religious activity. The number of “Buddhist” and “Daoist” temples in Taiwan nearly doubled in the 50 years from 3661 in 1930 to 5531 in 1981. According to the statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior, by 2003 Taiwan was home to 4037 “Buddhist” and 8604 “Daoist” temples that had registered with the state. These government statistics on temples tend to be unreliable in their categorizing of all temples as either Buddhist or Daoist, as well as their failure to count unregistered temples and household shrines. However, they do show the ongoing growth of Chinese religious organization (Katz, 2003:396). Buddhism, utilizing what is termed an “of the world” strategy is now experiencing a general religious revival in Taiwan. Much of this strategy was modeled after the organizational structure of Christianity. The Buddhists have developed programs which establish fellowship groups on college campuses and Buddhist summer camps for college students. In addition, there is a new emphasis on family life which has encouraged Buddhist marriage ceremonies which are similar to Christian ones. The use of Buddhist hymns has also become more popular. Some of these tunes are similar to the Christian hymns though most of them are Chinese folk song tunes. Like the Christian organizations, Buddhists have also started propagation services and Children’s School which is similar to the Christian Sunday School (Sha & She, 1998:133). Although Buddhism and Taoism have the most number of adherents, in reality, a polytheistic and syncretic religious outlook hugely marks Taiwanese society. Popular religion or folk religion is very widespread. In fact, Sha & Shen (1998:133) note that the surge in folk religions is far exceeded by the increase in the number of temples and shrines in Taiwan because in reality, family altars, roadside shrines, foothill temples and other worship places cannot be accurately tabulated. Temple cults in particular have retained their importance as sites for daily worship and community festivals, with

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popular deities worshipped for their ability to provide health and prosperity (Katz, 2003:395–396). Some of the popular deities include Mazu and the Royal Lords. Mazu was originally worshipped as the patron goddess of the sea by fishermen but her popularity has elevated her as an all-powerful protective deity while the Royal Lords are worshipped for their ability to provide health and prosperity (Katz, 2003:395–396). Not only are these temple cults and festivals flourishing, they are also moving beyond their local boundaries to play a significant role on the national stage as well. In the past, temple cults and the traditional popular religion of the people were branded as superstition and government policy sought to reform local temple cults thereby reducing the size of the festivals. In the 1960s and 1970s, Taiwan’s Nationalist government ran campaigns to inculcate values which focused on patriotism and ‘proper behaviours’ which tried to shape religious practice by stressing the importance of good manners and simple rituals (Katz, 2003:402–403). However, by the late 1970s, the government became increasingly aware of the significant roles which temples play in Taiwanese society. With the democratization of Taiwan in the 1980s, local temple cults have become less passive of government policies and have taken on a role in furthering local interests and asserting local identity (Katz, 2003:405). These temples have also extended their reach into social services currently operating a total of 20 hospital and clinics as well as 180 schools ranging from kindergarten to University (Katz, 2003:396). Popular religion also permeates many aspects of everyday life. Rituals and practices related to fortune-telling and geomancy play a part in the naming of babies, before beginning construction of building projects, the positioning of furniture in homes and in many other common activities of life (Sha & Shen, 1998:133). In Taiwan, another modern, syncretic form of religion similar to those found in the folk or temple cults is currently growing in significance. The Yi Guan Dao (roughly translated as “Religion of the One Unity”) draws upon both traditional teachings and each of the world’s major religions. Yi Guan Dao adherents try to identify common principles underlying Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Hinduism. They believe in a God above all other gods called Ming Ming Shang Di (the God of Clarity). The Yi Guan Dao adherents follow many of the Confucian rituals and engage in ancestor worship. They strive to uphold the precepts of not killing, stealing, committing adultery, lying, and drinking alcohol while putting into

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practice the ideals of benevolence, righteousness and universal love envisioned by Confucian teaching. As of June 2001, the Yi Guan Di has 887,000 believers, making the third most popular religion in terms of the number of adherents (Taiwan Yearbook, 2003). Christianity also has a sizeable following in Taiwan. The religion was introduced in Taiwan in the 17th century when the Dutch Protestants and the Spanish and Portuguese Catholics began their missionary work. Prior to the Japanese Occupation of the island, there were about 97 Protestant churches and 4854 believers (Taiwan Yearbook, 2003). When the Japanese began their occupation of Taiwan in 1895, the growth of Christianity, continued unabated. However, for the first thirty years of their rule the Japanese only allowed the Presbyterians to work at their evangelization. The Presbyterian church prospered without much interference from the Japanese. By 1910, the Presbyterians had set up synods in northern and southern Taiwan (Rubinstein, 1991:21). In 1925, other Christian missions were allowed into Taiwan and the number of Taiwanese Christians grew. Not only did Christianity appeal to the farming community in the countryside, it also found adherents among the better-educated middle classes (Rubinstein, 1991:25). However, Christian activity reached a peak when the Nationalist regime collapsed in mainland China in 1949. As a result of the political situation, about a million and a half people migrated to Taiwan. In Taiwan, the government re-organized itself and worked closely with American advisors to develop the island’s economic and political sectors. This period of reform helped to foster a climate which was open to Western missionaries, especially since these missions had the means to develop the social infrastructure. The missionaries established relief agencies, built schools, developed the medical facilities (Rubinstein, 1991:33). The increase in Christian missionary activity was dramatic. By 1954, the missionary community swelled to over 300. Twenty five different Christian denominations which had not been engaged in missionary activity before 1945, were present in Taiwan (Rubinstein, 1991:35). The Taiwanese people were very responsive to the efforts of the missionaries and many of them converted. The Southern Baptist Church which had a handful of Taiwanese members in the early 1950s saw their congregation increase to over 7000 Chinese by 1959. Seventh Day Adventists membership swelled to twenty thousand during the same period. Perhaps the most impressive number

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of converts came from the Presbyterians. From 1955 to 1965 the number of Presbyterians grew from 86,064 to 176,255 (Rubinstein, 1991:35–36). The Catholic Church did not make significant inroads into Taiwanese society until the Nationalist government took power on the island. In 1948, the number of Catholic believers stood at 13,000. When the nationalist government moved to Taiwan in 1949, many of the Catholic clergy and religious believers followed. This created a renewed vigour in Catholicism in Taiwan. The number of converts grew significantly from 27,000 in 1953 to 300,000 in 1963 (Taiwan Yearbook, 2003). This number peaked in the 1960s, with the total number of adherents being around 306,000. Since the 1960s as Taiwan continued its industrialization progress, Christianity has experienced a slower growth. Several reasons have been suggested for this. Firstly, Taiwan experienced a religious renaissance in folk religions. Many Taiwanese returned to the Orthodox religious centers, folk temples and shrines. Festivals became important and a vibrant traditional religious scene came about. According to Rubinstein (1991:45), the people felt blessed by their new prosperity. As they had done so often in the past, the Taiwanese wanted to thank the gods who were responsible for obtaining the new wealth. Also, with industrialization, many Taiwanese, including Christians moved from rural areas to the cities. The Church leaders however, were unprepared for this widespread rural to urban migration. Thus, while many rural churches were losing members, many of these Christians were not being fully integrated in the urban churches (Wang, 2001:326). Economic wealth also brought about greater independence for the poor. One significant reason for the growth of Christianity in the 1950s was that missionaries often provided essential relief services. Many of the Taiwanese responded to Christianity largely for the basic necessities of food and clothing which the missionaries distributed. These “rice Christians” as they were called, viewed Christian establishments as a source of practical help and realized the advantages of belonging to such churches. With the greater levels of prosperity, the Taiwanese put less reliance on the Christian social support and returned to their traditional religion (Rubinstein, 1991:50). Currently, Protestantism is the fourth most popular religion with about 605,000 adherents while the Catholic Church has about 298,000 believers (Taiwan Yearbook, 2003).

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The situation in Taiwan mirrors that of Singapore. It is a multireligious society with the major religions co-existing in a small area. There has been, over recent years, a significant increase in the number of Christians, particularly in the urban areas. The growth of Christianity is due to the active proselytization efforts of missionaries. In addition to religious activities, the success of the Christian church also rest on providing non-religious social services. The growth of Protestant Christianity, particularly in recent years, has been sectoral, especially among the better-educated middle class in the urban areas. Like in Singapore, the Buddhists and Taoists have reacted to the growth of Christianity by changing their strategies. There is a similar process of the “Christianization” of Buddhism, modeled after the organizational structure and proselytizing methods of the Christians in Taiwan. Similarly, the Taoists have become very active, given the competition from Buddhism and Christianity to promulgate their religion. This has also led to a revivalism in Taoism, as well as the rise of many new sectarian Taoist movements. Some of these, such as Chu Tzi, have also extended their outreach overseas, including Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and the United States of America. 2.4. Hong Kong Religious freedom is protected by the Basic Law and the relevant legislation in Hong Kong. There are several religious groups in Hong Kong. These include Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism and Judaism. Buddhism and Taoism, traditional Chinese religions, have a large local following with more than 600 Chinese temples in Hong Kong (Hong Kong SAR, government information centre, 2004). Religious practices are still very much observed today. Tablets for ancestors, Master of the Site (dizhu), Heaven God (dangtian), Kitchen God (zaojun) and Door God (menguan) are commonly found in homes which practice local religion (Liu, 2003:380). People regularly organize temple festivals to celebrate the birthdays of the local deities and to seek blessings. Leading deities include Buddha, Guan Yin, Guandi and Luzu. These deities are believed to be efficacious for inviting wealth. Tian Hou, the Queen of Heaven and Protector of Seafarers, is reputed to be worshipped by 250,000 people. During the Tian Hou Festival, which falls on the 23rd day of the third moon, many worshippers visit the famous Tian Hou temple, at Joss House Bay on the Clear Water Bay Peninsula

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(Hong Kong SAR, government information centre, 2004). The jiao festival is another popular event for the community. During the major jiao event, a large stage is constructed for the Taoist rituals and Cantonese opera Professional Taoist priests are hired to perform rituals which last several days. After the Taoist ritual, a Cantonese opera is performed for several days to signify the beginning of a new cosmic cycle (Liu, 2003:382). Besides communal worship and domestic altars, some Chinese religionists also practice a form of ‘spirit’ worship at ritual sites. Adherents of local religion believe that all animals and natural landscapes have individual spirits which can choose to help people with their supernatural abilities. These earth spirits are at the bottom of the hierarchy among the gods, but they can still wreck havoc for humans if they are not shown respect. Thus, in Hong Kong, people may worship old trees, rocks with special shapes and Earth Gods represented by rocks (Liu, 2003:373). In spite of the bustling local religious scene, most of the people have no agreed-upon name for their religious beliefs. In fact, some even argue that they have no religious beliefs (Liu, 2003:373). Many people refer to their practices as baishen (worshipping of deities), while others describe them as Buddhism or Taoism although strictly speaking, they are neither. The local religion is highly flexible and adaptable and often the forms of religious expression are determined by the local traditions, leadership and financial resources of the community. In fact, it is quite common to witness different variations of the same festival since these local activities are organized by leaders from different social backgrounds (Liu, 2003:374). Officially, the government defines Buddhism and Taoism as “traditional Chinese religions” and the deities in the Chinese temples are either Buddhist or Taoist even though Buddhist and Taoist deities are often honoured together in the same temple. Although local popular religion is not officially recognized, it is very important to the Hong Kong people and its influence permeates everyday life. Ancestor worship is carried out at home, in ancestral halls or at the graves of ancestors. People enthusiastically participate in deity festivals, birthdays, Hungry Ghost festivals and communal jiao festivals. Taoist masters of the Zhengyi tradition (known as Nahm-mouh Taoist masters in Hong Kong) are estimated to be around 500 and they are in high demand, religiously conducting funeral rites in the Daoist liturgical manner (Lai, 2003b:464).

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In recent years, the Taoist organizations in Hong Kong have also evolved into socially conscious, charitable organizations. With greater economic prosperity in Hong Kong, the Taoist organizations have raised millions of dollars to reconstruct temples in China. They have also funded universities, schools and hospitals mainly in Guangdong. In Hong Kong, they have contributed to the opening of schools, established social services for old people, orphanages, clinics and study rooms for students (Lai, 2003b:466). This is similar to the social involvement shown by many of the Christian denominations in Hong Kong. The Christian community in Hong Kong is relatively small when compared to the Chinese religionist. Kwok (1998:147) estimates that Christians make up approximately 9% of the total population in Hong Kong. About half of these are Catholics, while the other half Protestants. According to the Hong Kong Information Services Department, there are about 239,400 Roman Catholics in 52 parishes. The Protestant Church which has about 300,000 members is made up of over 1300 congregations in more than 50 denominations. The Baptists form the largest denomination followed by the Lutherans. Other major denominations are Adventists, Anglicans, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Church of Christ in China, Methodist, Pentecostal and Salvation Army (Information Services Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2004). With their emphasis on youth work, many congregations have a high proportion of young people. Despite its relatively small membership, the Christian community wields some influence in Hong Kong society. This is largely because the Christians are deeply involved in the provision of social services. Since the early days of the Christian missionaries, the provision of health care, education and social services has been a major thrust of the church in Hong Kong. In the 1950s, due to the political instability in China, many refugees from Mainland China arrived in Hong Kong. In order to aid these refugees, the Christian missionaries channelled a great deal of resources and materials to Hong Kong. These were greatly appreciated by the tens of thousands of needy refugees who in turn were receptive towards the Christian faith. Thus, the 1950s was marked by a rapid expansion of Christianity in Hong Kong. Currently, Christian-run schools make up over 40 percent of all primary and secondary schools in Hong Kong. Moreover, these are

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popular schools because they are reputed to be the best in the system and have produced many of Hong Kong’s top government and public figures (Straits Times, July 2004). Besides educational institutions, the Christian bodies also run hospitals, clinics, homes for the aged, children’s homes, rehabilitation service centers and many selfhelp clubs and associations. These services are open to people of all religions and about 95% of those who have benefited from the wide range of services provided by the diocese are not Christians (Information Services Department, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, 2004). However, even with its extensive social network system, Christianity has yet to pose a serious challenge the dominant Chinese religious tradition. Despite both being former colonies, the number of Christians in Hong Kong is far smaller than in Singapore, although at 9%, the number is not insignificant. It can be hypothesized that part of the reason may be that the English language did not permeate Hong Kong society as much as it did in Singapore. Most schools in Hong Kong are still conducted in Cantonese, rather than English being first language of education. Like Singapore though, there has been a process of revivalism in religion, particularly among the Buddhists and the Taoists. 2.5. Malaysia The Malaysian constitution and Rukunegara (National Ideology) was written to ensure that the country remains a multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious society governed by democratic rule. In the Federal Constitution, the right to religious beliefs and freedom of faith is enshrined in Article 11 (1) which states, “Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion”. This is further emphasized in the Rukunegara which affirms the state’s desire to “ensure the existence and growth of liberal society in which its members are free to practice and profess their own religions, customs and cultures consistent with the requirements of national unity” (Woon, 1988:115). Islam, Buddhism and Christianity are three of the world scriptural religions which have put down deep roots in Malaysia. Islam was the most widely professed religion in Malaysia with 60.4% of the population in 2000. Although it is the dominant religion, Malaysia is not an Islamic state. Islam is the official religion and its religious laws are binding on all its Muslim citizens (Nagata, 1995:309). The

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other religions include Buddhism (19.2%), Christianity (9.1%), Hinduism (6.3%) and Confucianism/Taoism/other traditional Chinese religion (2.6%). (Department of Statistics, Malaysia) In Malaysia, religion is politicized along ethnic lines. Malays are by birth considered to be Muslims and few convert to other religions. The Muslim law (sharia) also provides a boundary against nonMuslims who are bound by legal injunction against proselytization of Muslims (Lee & Ackerman, 1997:21). The Chinese on the other hand have a different outlook on religion. The Chinese religious worldview is non-exclusive and it is not difficult for a Chinese to accept another religion which is not ethically defined. For example, most Chinese Malaysian parents object to their children becoming Muslims due to the fear of assimilation by the Malays (the majority of whom are Muslims), there is generally little opposition to them joining other religions which do not erode the Chinese ethnic identity (Tan, 2000:282). Thus, while many Chinese Malaysians observe the traditional Chinese religion, they are also found in the other major world religions. In 1991, about 88 percent of the Chinese population belonged to a traditional Chinese religion (68 percent Buddhist, 20.2 percent were Confucianist/Taoist). The next most popular religion was Christianity (7.8 percent) (Tan, 2000:282). From the figures above, Buddhism appears to be the main religious tradition among the Chinese. However, one must note that these categories were employed for the census and may be misleading because Chinese Malaysians do not have a specific name for their ‘traditional’ religion (known as baishen) which involves the worship of deities and Buddhas and may refer to themselves as Buddhists. Overall, Buddhism seems to be maintaining its stronghold on the Chinese population. Buddhism has evolved to becoming more organized, especially in schools and universities. There are more Buddhist activities such as talks, chanting of Buddhist scriptures, and greater concern with understanding Buddhist teachings. Tan (2000:299) cautions against attributing this Buddhist reformism as a reaction to the Malay Muslim revival. Instead, he argues that the revitalization and renewed interest in Buddhism stems from the improved organization and changing emphasis on teachings Buddhism scriptures rather than on rituals. Besides Buddhism, the Chinese in Malaysia also subscribe to local popular religion which has always been eclectic and polytheistic. When they immigrated to Malaya, many of the early Chinese immigrants reproduced the social structures and practices of the popular

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religious culture of their native country, which included a mix of ancestor worship with cosmological and ethical frameworks derived from Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism (DeBernardi, 2002:301). They also added local innovations and incorporated local religious practices and beliefs into their religious system (Tan, 2000:283). Many Chinese belong to the popular religion tradition and it has become part of life among the Chinese in Malaysia. In recent years, some Chinese in Malaysia have used the label of ‘Taoist religion’ but in the strict sense, Tan (2000:283) argues that Taoism, from the perspective of its followers does not exist as a separate Chinese religion in Malaysia and one must consider the Taoist tradition in Malaysia as part of the larger complex of Chinese religion. Like most Chinese religionist, many Chinese in Malaysia worship popular ‘universal’ deities. These include Guanyin, Guandi, Mazu and Dabogong. Many importance of these deities spread to Southeast Asia through the Chinese migration in the 19th century. There are also deities which are local Malaysian or of Southeast Asian origin. The famous Admiral Cheng Ho, who conducted voyages from China to Southeast Asia is deified as Sanbaogong (Tan, 2000:289). Another interesting example of localizing Chinese religion is the worship of nadugong or Da tok kong in Hokkien. These are regarded as local spirit guardians, local territorial deities or earth gods. These stem from the Chinese belief in earth spirits as well as the incorporation of Malay Muslim keramat beliefs. Keramats refer to sacred spots which are perceived to be the dwelling place of guardian spirits. Similarly, the Chinese Malaysian worshippers have shrines at different sites, much like the many earth god shrines in Taiwan and China. Even the terms used for the earth spirits reflect the localized Malay identity of these Chinese spirits. The term da tok is derived from the Malay word datuk which means grandfather. To the Chinese, kong (gong) also means grandfather and it is used as an honorific for deities (Tan, 2000:290). Besides domestic worship and worship in communal temples, festivals are major occasions to celebrate the ‘Chinese religion’ culture. Since the 1970s, the celebration of Chinese festivals has seen a revival and this has been especially evident in Penang where there is a sizeable Chinese community. Debernardi (2004:156) attributes this revitalization to the Chinese Malaysians’ fear of cultural loss and assimilation. The enactment of the policies which favoured the bumiputera and strengthened the hegemony of the Malay majority led the Penang Chinese politicians to launch a social movement to unite the

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Chinese. They attempted to centralize the celebration of the Hungry Ghost Festival—an important event in the Chinese calendar. Diverse local street committees were combined into a united organization in order to create a larger sense of the community. The Hungry Ghost festival was an appropriate common focus since most of the traditional Chinese religionists celebrate the event, with the Taoist priests leading most of the ritual performances. Buddhists also celebrate the event. Currently, such large-scale festival events of the 1970s and 1980s have abated. In Penang, a new trend, since 1999, has been to organize secular, multi-cultural street parties to celebrate Chinese festivals. However, popular religious culture which is rooted in cosmology and theodicy is not so easily secularized (DeBernardi, 2004:223). In conjunction with the increasing modernization of Malaysia, the popular religious culture has also undergone change. Previously Chinese religion was experienced by often-illiterate Chinese through oral narrative and ritual experience. With better education, Chinese Malaysians are not forsaking such religious tradition but are now seeking a deeper understanding of Taoism and Buddhism (DeBernardi, 2004:224). The third most important religious influence among the Chinese is Christianity which accounts for about 7.8% of the Chinese population. While many Christians were converted by missionary activity in the 1800s, many of the Chinese-speaking congregation actually grew out of the arrival of Chinese immigrants who were already Christians in China. The varied Christian activity in Malaysia gives one the impression that there are many Chinese Christians in Malaysia. However, as the statistics show, Christianity has yet to take a firm footing among the Chinese. Still, the Christian community is growing due to the increase of young converts, especially from schools and colleges (Tan, 2000:301). Those who convert are usually from Chinese religionist backgrounds and are dissatisfied with the less organized and ritualistic nature of their religion. Compared to Islam, the Chinese find it more acceptable to convert to Christianity since it is not in conflict with their cultural and ethnic identity. The Chinese convert may only give up some aspects of Chinese culture, such as ancestor worship, which are perceived as being in conflict with Christianity (Tan, 2000:306). One interesting feature regarding Malaysia is that, like Singapore, religion and ethnicity are closely interlinked; almost all Malays are Muslims, Indian Hindus, and the Chinese following traditional Chinese

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religions. This intertwining of religion and ethnicity has, in the past, like Singapore, led to inter-religious conflicts among the various ethnic groups in Malaysia. In addition, religion in Malaysia is highly politicized, and the state has had to deal with the issue of religion internally in the contestation for Islam, as well as inter-religious relations among the Malays, Chinese and Indians. For example, in order to remain in government, the ruling party had to meet the challenges posed by an increasingly vocal Malay populace; especially those in the rural areas who wanted the adoption of Islam as a total way of life and were opposed to capitalism. As Ackerman noted, these Islamists called for an intensification of faith, performance of religious duties and personal morality. In addition, there was a rising Islamic consciousness that emphasizes Islamic culture. As Lee noted, the Dakwah movement can be interpreted as a protest against the secular state and the elites that control the bureaucratic machinery. Religion can be seen as a way of reacting against economic imperatives and globalization. The push by the state to use Islam, even in its modernist form, has consequences for a multi-ethnic society. Lee suggests that the evocation of religious symbols in the redefinition of Malay nationalism inevitably impinged upon those in the non-Muslim religious fields. By raising religious issues to national level politics, it has the consequences of raising religious consciousness and the possibility of religious tensions and conflicts between the various ethnic groups in a society. For example, fears were expressed by the ethnic minority that the government’s Islamization program was meant to establish some form of an Islamic state in Malaysia. This has resulted in competition in religion. For example, Suqi, a Chinese non-governmental group listed a series of demands, including the promotion of the Chinese language and freedom of religious worship, which was sent to the prime minister of Malaysia. It should be noted that, in tandem with the rise of Islamic revivalism, Malaysia is also witnessing religious revivalism among the Chinese and Indians. This is the inherent danger of playing the religion card in a heterogeneous, multiethnic society. The preceding discussion on religions in various Asian countries has raised several interesting trends. Like Singapore, many of the countries in Asia, especially China, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan, had witnessed a process of religious revivalism, despite the fact that these are rapidly modernizing societies. The persistence of

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religions in these countries warrants further investigation. Similarly, most of the countries discussed are multi-religious societies, and like Singapore, have witnessed a process of religious competition among the various religions, with its consequent changes in religious practices and beliefs. However, it is important to note that these countries went through very different historical experiences, institutional and environmental conditions, and thus a straightforward comparison must be treated with caution. What is necessary is to conduct a detailed study of religion and religious change, in order to develop a model that can explain religious change, one which may be different from those proposed for understanding conversion, revivalism and competition as outlined in the dominant literature, most of which relates to the study of Christianity in the West. Asia, with its different historical experience, may require a new conceptual model to explain changes in Asia.

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INDEX Abdullah Tarmugi 256, 261 Abdul Rahman bin M.S. 24 Addison, J.T. 53, 210 Administration of Muslim Law Act (1966) 34, 35 Administrative Report of the Singapore Municipality (ABSRM) 53 Ahmadiyya 35 Alatas, S.H. 36 Al-Qaeda 258 Angkatan Revolusi Tentera Islam Singapura 233 Attractiveness of Christianity 118–122 and counseling services 121–122 and meeting of religious needs 118–120 and ministries 121 and non-religious activities of the church 120–121 and social benefits of the church 120, 277, 278, 289 and social services 122, 277, 278, 292 Babb, L.A. 24, 37, 38, 164, 190 Bahai 1, 134 Baijin 204, 207, 213 Baishen 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 291, 294 Balch, R. 10 Bartley, W. 49 Bays, D.H. 283, 284, 285 Beckford, J.A. 108 Bedlington, S.S. 36 Bellah, R. 116, 269 Benjamin, G. 150 Berger, P. 12, 21, 116, 118, 269, 271 Betts, R.F. 36 Birthday of Prophet Mohammed riot 233, 234 Blagden, C.O. 33 Bloom, D. 49 Bodde, D. 181, 223 Bong, R.R. 275, 280 Boyden and Sheelagh 219 Breault, K.D. 22, 23, 192 Bremen, J.V. 23, 24

Buckley, C.B. 56 Buddha 160, 211, 290 Buddhism as religion or philosophical code 53, 128, 269 Christianization of 6, 7, 13, 81, 129, 130, 151, 152, 192, 193, 267, 268, 269, 286, 290 disparity between canonical and practiced 30, 52, 128 intellectualization of 6, 7, 80, 81, 129, 130, 136, 193, 194, 267, 294 perception of 5, 6, 8, 62, 89, 126, 127, 129, 151 Shenism and sectarianism within 52 statistical growth of 3, 64, 68, 78, 80, 97, 98, 127, 286 statistical stability of 3, 60 theology of Nichiren see Nichiren Shoshu, Soka Gakkai and Sokka Gakkai International; Lotus Sutra; Nichiren Daihonsin Buddhist missing 227 revivalism 73, 80, 81, 127–130, 149, 151, 278, 280, 286, 293, 294 Socio-economic profile of 70, 71, 80 Bumiputera 295 Carr and Hauser 3, 191 CHAID 220, 221, 228, 229 Chan Soo Sen 260 Chan, S.Y. 140, 142 Charismatic Churches 123–125 Charismatic Movement 3, 4, 14, 18, 108, 284 see also Charismatic Churches Chaves and Gorski 23 Chaves, M. 17 Chen, P.S.J. 13 Chiew, S.K. 231 China Internet Information Center 280, 283, 285 Chinese Customs and Ritual Practices 15–16, 116, 117, 131, 132, 195 see also Chinese Festivals

318

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Adaptation of 13, 27, 32, 200, 201, 205, 206, 207, 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 226, 253, 254, 255, 256, 268 and ancestor worship 27, 52, 53, 115, 160, 209, 210, 272 and birthday of deities 160, 210, 211, 212 and birth rituals 15, 25, 43, 199–201, 213 and Chinese New Year 15, 209, 216, 223 and death rituals 15, 25, 43, 26, 31, 116, 117, 204–208, 212, 214, 216, 217, 254, 272, 291 and dongjie 210 and marriage rituals 15, 43, 201–204, 213, 214, 272 and Qing Ming Jie 15, 209, 210, 223, 228, 254 and spirit medium-ship 26, 27, 29, 30, 125, 291, 295 and zhongqiujie 210 Ethnography of 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 48, 195 Perception of 4, 82, 89, 104, 113, 114, 215, 216 Trends and extent of practice 15, 16, 196, 265, 271, 272, 282, 283, 290, 291 see also Trends in Ritual Performance worship Activities At Home 14, 195–199 Chinese Festivals 208–211 Chinese Religion 25–32 and gender symbolism 25, 65 and kinship links 26, 27, 28, 52, 53, 115, 116, 217, 272 and pragmatism 161, 162, 190, 206, 218, 219, 286, 287, 289 and religious institutions 26, 27, 29, 50, and rise of sectarianism 27, 30, 32, 50, 62, 52 Concept of 52, 53, 54, 58, 62 conflation with ethnicity 54, 55, 62, 83, 105, 226, 271, 272 Dominance of 25, 54, 56, 57, 59, 62, 217 Perception of 113, 118, 119, 123, 127, 218, 219, 225, 226 Renouncing 112–115 Syncretic nature of 7, 8, 9, 29, 30, 32, 52, 112, 113, 125, 136, 159,

160, 161, 196, 267, 287, 288, 294, 295 Chogye 278 Christianity 40–42 adaptation by 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 52, 104, 109, 112, 114, 117, 118, 125, 127, 272, 276, 277 and religious institutions 50, 51, 102, 122, 129, 169 as a colonial inheritance 40, 50, 55, 56, 58, 59, 91, 102, 277 as a communal religion 100, 101, 109, 110, 111, 118, 119, 120, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 169, 170, 279 as ethnically neutral 54, 91, 92, 105, 272 Causes for growth of 3, 4, 13, 14, 27, 41, 48, 58, 59, 61, 70, 71, 74, 89, 90, 91, 98, 108, 109, 110, 122, 123, 152, 191, 288, 289, 290, 292 see also Attractiveness of Christianity; Conversion to 81–83 see also Process of Religious Conversion to Christianity English language as a facilitator of conversion to 58, 59, 61, 74, 89, 90, 91 growth of 1, 2, 3, 8, 14, 32, 40, 49, 50, 51, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 67, 69, 73, 74, 78, 79, 81, 96, 97, 98, 127, 193, 245, 267, 280, 288 Growth of Chinese Catholics within 50, 51, 55, 56 Perception of 4, 8, 56, 82, 83, 84, 90, 91, 104, 109, 114, 119, 122, 127, 128, 151, 226, 246, 277, 279 Social Structural and Organizational Aspects of 122–123 Christians converts’ socio-economic profile 9, 10, 14, 41, 49, 50, 56, 61, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 74, 82, 83, 93, 96, 99, 270 Distinction between Protestant and Catholic converts 80, 95, 96, 102, 278, 280, 283, 284, 285, 289 Heterogeneous denominations of 52, 58, 284, 292 Reasons for becoming 110–112 see also Causes of growth of Christianity

index Chua, B.H. 255 Chua, C.S. 24 Chu, C.C. 25 Chusok 275 Clammer, J. 7, 8, 13, 36, 53, 112, 125, 190, 191, 280 Clark, D.N. 276, 277, 279 Classical secularization theory 2 and religious decline 1, 12, 21, 265 Theoretical limitation of 12, 13, 21, 266 see also Conceptual limitation of secularization Clutterbuck, R. 232, 234 Comber, L. 26, 52 Comparative Study of Asian Societies 273–274 China 280–285 Hong Kong 290–293 Korea 274–280 Malaysia 293–298 Taiwan 286–290 Confucianism as religion or philosophical code 29, 30, 242, 274 Chinese religions’s syncretic incorporation of 29, 30, 267 Constitution of the Federation of Malaya 233 Cooper and Kumar 38, 39, 190 Cox, H. 18, 218 Cultural Revolution 281, 282 Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore 249 Dabogong 160, 196, 295 Daiber, K.F. 280 Dawson, L. 105 Dean, D.G. 191 Dean, K. 281, 283 DeBernardi, J. 295, 296 DeGroot, J.J.M. 29 Dekker, G. 20, 21 Department of Statistics Malaysia 294 Department of Statistics Singapore 45 Djamour, J. 32, 33, 34, 35 Dobbelaere, K. 17, 21 Doolittle, J. 29 Doraisamy, T.R. 24, 40 Elkind, D. 84 Elliot, A.J. 7, 24, 27, 52 Evans, H.N. 49

319

Fan, L. 281, 282, 283 Farah, C.E. 52 Fateha 261 Fielding, A. 223 Finke and Stark 21, 22, 192, 193 Finke, R. 7 Finnell, D. 41, 42 Fiqh (Muslim substantive laws) 35 Freedman, M. 27, 28, 31, 217 Geertz, C. 93, 231, 266 Gillespie, V.B. 111 Goh Chok Tong 257, 262 Goh, D.P.S. 3 Goh, Keng Swee 242, 249 Granet, M. 113, 223 Grayson, J.H. 274, 276, 279, 280 Greer, R.M. 24, 40 Greil and Rudy 111 Guanyin 160, 196, 210, 290, 295 Guangong 160, 196, 210 Haddon and Shupe 21, 266 Hananim 276 Han, W.T. 25 Hawkins and Kass 223 Heinz, R.I. 29 Hill and Lian 234, 240, 242, 249, 259 Hill, M. 240, 247, 248, 249, 250, 262 Hinduism 37–40, 51 And adaptation to Singapore context 37, 38, 52 And mediumship 38 And religious participation of Hindus 51, 161, 163, 164, 168, 169, 175, 176 Conceptual problematic of Hindus and 39 Conflation with ethnic Indian identity 38, 39, 49, 54, 55, 59, 62, 65, 74, 81, 83, 95, 151, 193, 194, 271 History of 51 Sociological analysis of 38, 39, 40 South Indian bias 51, 52 Hinton, K. 3, 24, 40, 41, 51, 53, 58, 101, 105, 190, 191, 192, 280 Hong Kong Information Services Department 292, 293 Hong Kong SAR, government information centre 290, 291, 293 Hooker, M.B. 34, 35, 36

320

index

Housing and Development Board 205, 251, 252, 253, 255 Houtman and Mascini 18, 19 Hunsberger, B. 84 Hunter and Chan 283 Hunter and Rimmington 284 Hybridization 8, 9, 11, 13, 116, 265 as a consequence of religious competition see Religious competition and hybridization concept of 9 induced by religious importation 8, 9, 12, 137 Iannaccone, L.R. 7 Individual Religion and Household Religion 94–96, 271 Conflict between 116, 117, 147, 272 Increasing incongruence among Christians’ 94, 95, 96, 112, 116, 117 Intellectualization of religion and demystification 5, 6, 7, 128, 177, 267, 269 see also Intellectualization of Buddhism; Christianization of Buddhism; Intellectualization of Taoism and religious differentiation 7, 115, 269 Concept of 4, 127, 128, 177 Internal secularization 17 Internal Security Act (ISA) 238, 239, 258 Interpretation of the Dendrogram First level 221–223 Second level 223–226 Third level 226–227 Fourth level 227–230 Inter Religious Organization 246 ISD 246 Islam 32–37 and adat 33, 35 and conflict with the state’s laws 33, 34, 35, 232 and fundamentalism 36, 37, 258, 259, 260 and predominance of Sunni Muslims 51, 52 and sociology of Islamic laws 33, 34, 35 and terrorism 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 273 and the economic backwardness of the Malays 36

as a Malay religion 10, 36, 49, 54, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 74, 81, 83, 95, 151, 193, 194, 271, 294 Disparity between canonical and practiced 32, 33 Jalil Miswadi 24 Jamiyah 244 Japanese New Religions 11, 80, 134, 137, 153 Jayakumar, S. 246 Jehovah’s Witnesses 108, 109, 238 Jemaah Islamiah ( JI) 258, 260, 261 Jones, D.S. 236 Katz, P.R. 286, 287 Katz and Kahn 157 Kaum Muda movement 35 Ke, Z. 50 Keramat 33, 35, 295 Kim, A.E. 275, 276, 277, 278, 279 Kirsch, A.T. 33 Konig, M. 278, 280 Kuah, K.E. 48, 249 Kuo, E.C.Y. 43 Kwok, N.W. 292 Lai, A.E. 251 Lai, C.T. 281, 291, 292 Laicization 17, 19, 20, 21 Lee and Ackerman 294 Lee et al. 50 Lee, F.G. 24 Lee Hsien Loong 244 Lee Kuan Yew 232, 233, 234, 238, 240, 241 Leo and Clammer 29, 30, 53 Lewis, I. 37 Li, T. 32, 36 Lidin, O.G. 218 Lim, C.K.S. 40, 41, 42 Ling, T.O. 48, 236 Liu, T.S. 290, 291 Lofland and Stark 101 London Missionary Society (LMS) 50, 51 Lotus Sutra 138, 139, 140, 141, 150, 151, 152 Low, K.L.S. 117, 160 Luckmann, T. 12, 18 Lyon, D. 18 Machacek and Wilson 137 MacIntyre, A.C. 83 Mahajani, U. 51

index Majlis Pusat 244, 245 Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) 34, 35, 257, 259 Malayan Communist Party 232 Manokara, S. 24, 39 Manyue 201, 213 Maria Hertogh Riot 232 Martin, D. 12 Marxist Conspiracy 239, 240, 262, 263 McFarland, H.N. 135 Mendaki 35 Metraux, D.A. 137, 140, 145 Mialaret, J.P. 37 Milner, A.C. 36 Minister of Home Affairs 246 Minister of Muslim Affairs 256, 261 Minister of State of Education 241, 249 Ministry of Community Development 43, 44, 47, 246, 256, 260 MCD88 44, 47 Ministry of Education 249, 250, 256, 257 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 257 Ministry of Home Affairs 258 Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA) 247 Modernization and modification of religion 2, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 27, 36, 114, 189, 190, 205, 206, 216, 217, 218, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 268, 296 and persistence of religion 11, 13, 15, 22, 24, 119, 120, 127, 189, 190, 193, 194, 216, 217, 265, 266, 268 and religious decline 4, 5, 12, 13, 17, 27, 29, 168, 248, 265 and religious plurality 5, 7, 21, 22, 193, 268, 269 and Voluntarism and Obligatory-ness in Modern Society 115–118, 123, 129, 269, 271 of Singapore society 1, 2, 11, 13, 15, 115, 134 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 258 Mosque Building Fund 35 Mote, F.W. 218 Muhammadijahs 35 Multivariate Analysis of Chinese Ritual Performance 219–220 see also Interpretation of the Dendrogram

321

Muslim Religious Council of Singapore see Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) Mutalib, Hussin 247 Nacai 202 Nagata, J. 293 Nathan, E. 24 National Daoist Association 281 Neitz, M.J. 194 Neo-secularization paradigm 18 And bias towards Christianity 19 and decline of Christianity 18, 19 And moral individualism 18, 19 New Age religions 18, 19, 108 New Religious Movements (NRM) 111, 135 Nichiren Daihonsin 137, 138, 139, 140, 153 Nichiren Shoshu Association (NSA) 53, 142 Nichiren Shoshu Singapore (NSS) 146, 147, 148, Nichiren Shoshu, Soka Gakkai and Soka Gakkai International 137–140, 146 Non-religionists and moral individualism 19 as a rational choice 89, 126 conceptual limitation of 8, 64, 127, 275 definition of 8, 59, 125 Growth of 59, 60, 64, 69, 70, 73, 125 Socio-demographic profile of 59, 60, 69, 72, 73, 74, 126 Statistical representation of 8, 60, 99 Nyce, R. 52 Ong Teng Cheong 242 Onmun 277 Orang Laut 49 Overmyer, D. 280, 282, 283, 284 Palmer, S.J. 111 Park, Y.S. 277 Partai Socialis Rakyat Malaysia 243 PAS 257 Pateman, C. 157 Peacock, J.L. 35, 36 Pennings, J.M. 157 People’s Action Party (PAP) 232, 233 Photiadis and Johnson 3, 191 Pinli 202, 213

322

index

Pinqin 202 Potter, P.B. 284 Preston, D.L. 108 Process of Religious Conversion to Christianity 99–100 and Anomie 106–110 influences underlying 100–101, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116 The Conversion Process 103–106, 112 see also Emotional basis for religious conversion; Intellectual basis for religious conversion Where are they converted? 101–103, 104, 105 PuruShotam, N. 39 Rajah, A. 24, 37, 39 Rajaratnam, S. 244 Rational Choice theory of religion 2, 14, as explanatory to persistence of religion 21, 22 Rationalization and educational correlation 4, 225 and religious differentiation 7, 17 and Weberian thesis 5, 114, see also Weberian thesis and typologies of action process of 4, 5, 17, 61, 114, 128, 133, 136, 267 Red Guards 281 Reformed Churches in the Netherlands (RCN) 20, 21 Religion Adaptation of 2, 8, 9, 13, 6, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 32, 52, 116, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 145, 146, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 160, 192, 205, 206, 272, 276, 277, 280, 283, 284, 294, 295 Alternative see New Age religions and ethnic exclusivity 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 74, 81, 135, 136, 151, 152, 193, 231, 234, 267 and Religious Change 2–9 as a socially structured choice 23, 105, 106, 151, 270, 278 as an ethnic marker 10, 32, 42, 49, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 74, 81, 105, 135, 136, 151, 193, 194, 231, 235, 258, 265, 266, 267, 271, 294, 297 by Religiosity 177–180

Consequences of importing see Adaptation of Religion Cross-cultural perspective on 32, 48, 231, 242, 261 see also Comparative Study of Asian Societies discrepancy between individual and household see Individual Religion and Household Religion Ideological function of 16, 17, 241, 242, 243, 248, 249, 250, 251, 262 see also Religious Knowledge Program; in conflict with national interests 231, 238, 239, 240, 254 Persistence of 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 82, 176, 177, 190, 266, 268 see also Modernization and persistence of religion Privatization of 18, 19, 20, 21, 115, 116, 269, 270, 282 Quantitative studies of 42–43 Role of 240–243 Secular State’s management of 2, 16, 154, 155, 194, 231, 235, 236, 237, 238, 246, 260, 261, 262 see also Religious Harmony Act; Religious Knowledge Program Religion and Age 66–69 Religion and Education 9, 10, 58, 59, 61, 70–72, 82, 84, 113, 128, 173, 216, 224, 268, 269 Religion and Ethnicity 61–65, 231, 243, 244, 260, 265 a basis for communal hostility 231, 235, 251, 294, 297 see also Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Singapore Society State’s management of 231, 234–236, 254, 297 Religion and Gender 25, 65–66 Religion and Socio-Economic Status 72–73, 82, 170–176 Religion and the State 16–17, 139, 140, 152, 154, 191, 194, 205, 205, 231, 246, 254, 260, 274, 279, 280, 281, 284 285, 287 see also Secular State’s management of religion; Ideological function of religion; State’s management of Religion and Ethnicity; Religion and communal hostility; State Legislation and Its Impact

index Strategies of the State 234–237 see also The Separation of Religion and Politics; Religious Harmony Act; Religious Knowledge Program; Singapore Constitution Religious affiliation and ethnicity see Religion as an ethnic marker and language stream of education 9, 10, 71 and socio-economic correlation 9, 10, 41, 49, 56, 61, 73, 193, 278 Religious competition 7 and hybridization 7, 9, 11, 13 and impact on inter-religious relations 9, 16, 192, 247, 248 and religious marketing 14, 22, 101, 102, 103, 193, 267, 268 and religious revivalism 7, 13, 15, 190, 192, 193, 266, 267 Religious Conversion 9–11 a consequence of cultural change 10, 11, 56, 62, 65, 77, 78, 81, 105, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 146, 149, 270, 272 and Age 84–87, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100 and Education 9, 10, 58, 59, 61, 74, 88–92, 113, 114, 224 and Ethnicity see Religious Conversion as an ethnic phenomenon and Gender 87 And hybridization of beliefs and ritual behaviour 78, 112, 117, 125, 146, 147, 148, 149, 160, 272, 273, 296, 297 And income correlation 82, 92, 93 and Socio-Economic Status 9, 10, 82, 83, 92–94, 151, 152, 226 as an ethnic phenomenon 10, 83, 84 Definition of 77 emotional basis for 93, 94, 103, 104, 105 Pattern of see Conversion Patterns in Singapore Society transcendental basis for 93, 94, 104, 105, 106 1980 To 2000 96–99 Religious dis-involvement 17, 20, 21 Religious economy model 21, 22 Religious education

323

Institutionalization of 2, 128, 129, 237 see also Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore Religious Harmony Act 16, 48, 152, 194, 237, 246, 247, 251, 260, 263, 273 Functions of 16, 194, 237, 241, 247 Religiosity And ethnicity 180–182 And Educational Level 188–190 by Age 183–188 Gender by 182–183 Indicators of 176 Religiosity and Religious Participation 14–15, 18, 19, 47, 64, 126, 127, 157, 158 see also Religious Participation Ethnocentric bias study of 15 Increased in the context of urbanization 22, 23 In the context of pluralism 21, 22, 23 Of Buddhists 14, 161, 162, 166, 167 Of Muslims 158, 161, 163, 168, 169, 175, 176 Of Taoists 14, 15, 158, 159, 160, 162, 166, 167, 179, 180, 181, 182 Psychological explanations for 35, 38 Religious Knowledge Program 16, 80, 89, 151, 237, 248–251, 262, 263 Functions of 16, 248, 249 Unintended effect of 249, 250, 251 Religious Participation and Age 166–170, 214, 215, 227, 228, 229 and Gender 41, 164–166, 227, 228 and Socio-Economic Status 170–176, 197, 198, 199, 215, 216, 219, 220, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230 at home 158–161, 175, 176, 179, 195–199, 265 at Temple/Mosque/Church 161–164, 179, 265 Religious profile 1849 Census 53, 54 1980 Census 2, 3, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 96 1988 Census 168, 169, 172 1921 Census 54, 55, 56

324

index

1931 Census 56, 57, 58, 59 1947 Census 58 1990 Census 3, 14, 47, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 72, 78, 79, 81, 87, 88, 96, 97, 98, 157, 159, 163, 165, 170,171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 271 2000 Census 1, 2, 3, 46, 47, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 70, 73, 97, 98, 127, 176 Changes in 1, 2, 3, 14, 54, 59, 67, 78, 79 Religious relabelling Concept of 11, 146 Religious shift see religious switching Religious switching 23, 24, 42, 78, 146 and anomic condition 3, 41, 135, 190, 191 see also Process of Religious Conversion to Christianity and anomie and cultural crisis hypothesis 3 and demystification 5, 6, 7 and educational correlation 4, 8, 9, 10, 59, 70, 73, 74, 82, 113, 267 and impact on inter-religious relations 9, 16, 47 and intellectualization of religion 4, 5, 6, 61 and modern social environment 5, 115, 116, 191 and need for transcendence 3, 4 and occupational status correlation 82, 92, 93 as a socially structured choice 23, 105, 106, 151 Ethnocentric bias in the study of 23, 24 Religious trends in Singapore 2, 3, 53–61, 134, 135, 136, 137 From 1849 to 1949 53–57 From 1950 to 1979 58–59, 79, 99, 266 From 1980 to 1990 40, 42, 43, 59–60, 96, 99 From 1990 to 2000 60–61, 78, 80, 96, 97, 98, 99, 270 Research methodology 43–47, 108 Richardson, J.T. 105 Rise of New Religions 134–137, 282 Robertson, R. 40 Rodd, L.R. 139, 140 Rubinstein, M.A. 288, 289 Rukunegara 293

Sandhu, K.S. 51 Sathya Sai Baba 1, 11, 134, 135 Savage, J.S. 157 Saw, S.H. 55 Secularization and declining religious authority 17, 18, 19, 20, 82, 190, 266 see also Laicization; Internal secularization; Religious dis-involvement Conceptual limitation of 2, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 265 Religious adaptation as counter to 17, 18, 19, 20, 21 see also Modernization and the transformation of religion; RCN Sha and She 286, 287 Shariah 52, 294 Shared Values 242, 243 Shenism 52, 129 Sherkat and Wilson 23 Shim, J.R. 278 Siddique, S. 34, 35 Sidek Saniff 245 Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Association (SFCCA) 43, 44, 46, 47, 72, 176, 203, 209, 219 SFAS88 43, 44, 46, 47, 72, 176 Singapore a Secular State 236–240 and Assimilation of society 234 Constitution 237 Conversion Patterns in 78–81 Dominance of Chinese Religion in see Dominance of Chinese Religion Early religious situation in 49–51, 266 Ethnic and Religious Conflicts 231 Ideology of secularism in 236 Integration of 234 Inter-religious relations within 16, Multi-religious nature of 14, 47, 16, 60, 78, 192, 193, 234, 265 Operationalization of Multi-racialism in 235 Persistence of religion in 11, 13, 15, 24 Religious Groups in 51–53 Religiosity in 176–177 Singapore People’s Liberation Organization 259 Singapore Soka Association (SSA) 53, 80, 142, 143, 144, 145 Sinha, V. 37, 39, 190 Sng and You 3, 40, 41, 42, 101, 112

index Sng, B.E.K. 51 Snow and Machalek 10, 109, 112 Snow D.A. 108, 137 Social Indicators in Singapore (SIP98) 44, 45, 47 Societies Act 238 Soka Gakkai 1, 11, 108, 109, 134, 135, 136, 138, 140–142, 266 see also Soka Gakkai Singapore History of 140, 141, 142 International (SGI) 141, 145 Perception of 136, 137, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155 Political arm of 141 Reasons for growth of 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 145–152 Soka Gakkai Singapore 142–155 History of 142–143 Organizational Structures 143–145, 152, 153 Reasons for the growth of 32, 145–152, 153 Religious Proselytization and Indigenization 152–155 Soka Kyoiku Kai (SKG) 140 Song, O.S. 49 S.R. Nathan 241 Stark, R. 19 Stark and Iannaccone 7 State Legislation and Its Impact 243–263 Changing Rituals 252–256 Competition for Space 251–252 Conflicting Ideology 256–257 Maintenance of Religious Harmony Bill 245–248, 273 Malays in the Army 244–245 New Challenges 258–260, 261, 262, 263, 273 The Herzog Visit 243–244 The Religious Knowledge Program 248–251 Taiwan’s Nationalist government 287, 288 Taiwan Yearbook 288, 289 Tambiah, S.J. 38 Tamney and Hassan 3, 42, 53, 56 Tamney, J.B. 42, 48, 249 Tamura, Y. 137 Tan, C.B. 294, 295, 296 Tan, K. 56, 105, 109, 111 Tan, K.C. 51 Tan, R. 51

325

Taoism Adaptation of see Intellectualization of Taoism And adaptation of religious practices 160, 192 As Chinese in nature 62, 63, 64, 131, 132, 133, 178, 179, 181 Christianization of 130, 131, 132, 133, 267, 268, 269, 290 Intellectualization of 6, 13, 130, 131, 132, 133, 193, 194, 267, 269, 290 Perception of 5, 6, 89, 109, 113, 122, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 153, 267 Reaction of 130–133, 192, 267, 290, 292, 293 Statistical decline of 2, 3, 60, 64, 66, 68, 69, 74, 78, 80, 99, 134 see also religious profile Taoist Religious participation of 14, 179, 180, 181, 182 see Religiosity and Religious participation of Taoists Socio-demographic profile of 62, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74 Taoist Federation 6, 130, 253, 267 Tay Eng Soon 241 Teng, Y.L. 145 Teixeira, M. 40, 55 Thaipusam 39, 164 Tham, S.C. 13, 42 The Separation of Religion and Politics 237–240, 247 The Straits Times 233, 234, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 248, 251, 253, 256, 257, 258, 260, 293 Three-Self Patriotic Movement 283 Timithi 39, 164 Tong, C.K. 13, 24, 29, 31, 37, 149 Topley, M. 25, 26, 52 Trends in Ritual Performance 212–219, 265 Crossing Dialect Lines 212–213, 226 Retain, Simply or Leave Out? 213–219 Tuapekong cult 25, 26 Tudung 256, 257, 261, 297 Turnbull, C.M. 40 Unlawful Assemblies Act 238

326 Voye, L. 19, 20 Wang, P.C.M. 289 Weberian thesis 5, 114, 266 And typologies of action 5, 114 Wee, V. 7, 24, 30, 31, 48, 52, 150, 209, 236, 237, 239, 249, 251, 252 Wilson, B. 12, 21, 145 Women’s Charter 34, 203, 204 Wong and Wong 242 Wong, M. 218

index Woon, C.S. 293 World Values Survey (WVS02) 46, 47, 176, 183 2003 157 Wuthnow, R. 115 Yaacob Ibrahim 256 Yamane, D. 17, 18, Yang, C.K. 179, 180, 223 Yin and yang 219 Yinger, J.M. 135 Yip, A. 18