Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces 9780773593022

Citation preview

Provincial Governments as Employers

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERIES COLLECTION ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE CANADIENNE J. E. Hodgetts, General Editor/Redacteur en chef The Institute of Public Administration of Canada L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada This series is sponsored by the Institute of Public Administration of Canada as part of its constitutional commitment to encourage research on contemporary issues in Canadian public administration and public policy, and to foster wider knowledge and understanding amongst practitioners and the concerned citizen. There is no fixed number of volumes planned for the series, but under the supervision of the Research Committee of the Institute and the General Editor, efforts will be made to ensure that significant areas will receive appropriate attention. L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada commandite cette collection dans le cadre de ses engagements statutaires. Il se doit de promouvoir la recherche sur des problemes d'actualite portant sur l'administration publique et la determination des politiques publiques ainsi que d'encourager les praticiens et les citoyens interesses a les mieux connaitre et a les mieux comprendre. Il n'a pas ete prevu de nombre de volumes donne pour la collection mais, sous la direction du Redacteur en chef et du Comite de recherche de l'Institut, l'on s'efforce d'accorder l'attention voulue aux questions importantes. Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public Concern Freda Hawkins The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 J. E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker, V. Seymour Wilson

Old Age Pensions and Policy-Making in Canada Kenneth Bryden Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces J. E. Hodgetts and 0. P. Dwivedi

Provincial Governments as Employers A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces

J. E. HODGETTS and 0. P. DWIVEDI

The Institute of Public Administration of Canada L'Institut d'Administration publique du Canada McGill—Queen's University Press Montreal and London

© McGill—Queen's University Press 1974 Paperbound edition reprinted 1976 International Standard Book Number 0-7735-0224-6 (Cloth) International Standard Book Number 0-7735-0234-3 (Paper) Legal Deposit fourth quarter 1974 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec

Design by Anthony Crouch Printed in Canada by The Hunter Rose Company

Contents PREFACE

1. Dimensions of Government Employment 2. Public Personnel Administration at the Centre

Xi

1 15

3. Emergent Role of Treasury Boards in Personnel Administration 35 4. Personnel Administration in Departments

47

5. The Staff Associations

61

6. Staffing the Public Service

85

7. Training and Development

103

8. Position Classification and Pay Plan

121

9. Employee Representations and Appeals

149

10. Joint Consultation, Negotiation, and Collective Bargaining

161

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

179

NOTES

193

INDEX

207

Tables 1. Per Capita Distribution of Net General Expenditure of Provincial Governments, Classified by Function, 1952, 1961-62, and 1971-72

5

2. Cost of Government Employment, Provincial and Federal Governments, 1951-52,1961-62, and 1971-72

6

3. Total Government Manpower, Classified by Type of Engagement, Provincial and Federal Governments, December 31,1971

8

4. Civil Service Employment, Provincial and Federal Governments, 1946-1971

10

5. Civil Service Employment, Classified by Department, All Provinces Combined, 1957 and 1967

12

6. Proportion of Civil Service Employees, Provincial and Federal Governments, to Population and Labour Force, 1946 and 1971

13

7. Membership of Provincial Staff Associations, 1911-1971

64

8. Headquarters Staff, Membership, Annual Budget, and Annual Dues of Provincial Staff Associations, 1971

74

Chart Civil Service Employment and Total Government Manpower, All Provinces Combined, 1959-1971

9

Preface THE DIMENSIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR in Canada have expanded rapidly since World War II, most notably at the provincial and municipal level. The task of calculating the size of the provincial bureaucracies and providing some rationale for their growth is the starting point for this study. Beyond this initial statistical endeavour, we have attempted to assemble the most up-to-date descriptive data on the important managerial reforms that have been necessitated by the sheer growth in size and complexity of provincial government services. These reforms demonstrate a contemporary concern to achieve an appropriate balance between centralized managerial authorities responsible for maintaining an equitable and uniform system for the entire public service and departmental managers who are held accountable for the efficient deployment of the human resources allocated to them. Not the least significant of the new conditions facing governments as employers have been the postwar emergence of strong associations of employees and the need to establish collaborative working relations that will enable organized employees to make an input into the system without impairing governments' sovereign claim to govern responsibly. Working with data that were changing almost from day to day, we have omitted much detail that would, in any case, have been doomed to rapid obsolescence. We hope, however, that sufficient detail remains to enable students and practitioners to make sense of the patterns of development which we have attempted to highlight and to gauge the directions in which provincial government employers are moving. Our obligations are numerous. Our greatest debt in assembling data for this study is to the officers of the provincial central personnel agencies, treasury boards, and employees' organizations who consented to lengthy interviews, commented on an earlier draft of the manuscript, and always

PREFACE

responded generously by providing further information from time to time. In the best tradition of civil service anonymity, they remain nameless; consequently, they are also absolved from any deficiences which remain. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to Dr. 0. Glenn Stahl and Dr. S. J. Frankel for their perceptive and stimulating comments. Research for this study was facilitated by a grant from the Canada Council and publication has been assisted by a subvention from the Institute of Public Administration of Canada: to both bodies the authors express their thanks, coupled with the usual absolutions for sins of omission and commission.

xii

Chapter One Dimensions of Government Employment

IT IS COMMONPLACE TO REMARK that we live in an era of Big Government. Today governments at all levels in Canada own the largest aggregations of capital goods, represented by land, buildings, roads, and movable equipment. They are the largest purchasers and consumers of goods and services and they are the major reallocators of wealth. Above all, in the context of this study, governments are the largest employers of the community's labour force. The complex interplay of socioeconomic forces that has brought about this situation requires no elaboration. The passive "policeman state" of the nineteenth century, concerned with the protection of persons and property and the collection of modest taxes, has been transformed into the "positive state" of the twentieth century, which, in addition to its traditional roles, now finds itself refereeing at the heart and centre of all major social conflicts, dispensing welfare benefits, regulating major sectors of the market economy, and often operating in its own right some of the largest financial, commercial, and industrial enterprises. Obviously, the successful fulfilment of the multifarious and complex roles thrust on contemporary governments requires a labour force of impressive size and infinite variety. How provincial governments in Canada have geared themselves to cope with the important and many-faceted tasks of recruiting and managing their substantial component of this labour force is the central theme of this book. At the beginning of the Canadian Confederation, the affairs of the federal government, especially its programs within executive departments and agencies, were attended to by fewer than 3,000 civil servants. Now, more than a century later, about 216,000 persons arc required to assist

CHAPTER ONE

the same government. A comparable, although not so phenomenal, growth has occurred at the provincial level. If we add to the list of civil servants (including not only those at the federal but also at provincial and municipal levels) those employed in a vast array of nondepartmcntal agencies, boards, commissions, enterprises, and teachers and hospital employees, we would find that at least one in every five in the labour force in the country is on a public payroll. But this striking reliance on governments as employers represents a relatively recent development: for example, in 1901 the Province of Ontario employed just over 600 persons; at the beginning of the post-World War IT period there were 9,000; but by 1971 the corresponding figure was nearly 65,000—a thousandfold growth seventy-one years later. Although the primary focus is on provincial government employment, all-inclusive figures (especially the comparison with the federal dimension) for the whole of Canada arc interjected wherever appropriate. In view of the many difficulties encountered in attempting to compile consistent time series and comparable data drawn from provinces that have established differing definitions of "civil servant" or "public servant," we have added an explanation in the Statistical Appendix. The text of the Appendix will help to explain the various data used in our tables and may prove useful to others who have the temerity to follow the authors into this statistical underbrush. FACTORS AFFECTING THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

Over the twenty-five-year period since World War II, Canada's population increased by 71 percent, an increase which was unevenly spread over the provinces (as shown in table A of the Statistical Appendix). It does not come close to the 447 percent increase in provincial government employment that occurred during the same quarter of a century of development. Nevertheless, a population growth of such an order would necessitate an expansion of the bureaucracy, even with no additional government services; and if one takes into account the specific impact of population pressure on welfare, education services, transportation facilities, or the provision of the normal "law and order" services of government, one can obtain a partial explanation of the proportionately larger growth that occurred in the public service. If, in addition, one realizes that roughly one-third of the population growth was attributable to immigration, it is possible to visualize the need to expand existing programs to meet the special requirements of new Canadians. Or, again, to take a specific area, health (including hospitals) and public welfare, we can see from table 5 that in 1957 there was only one public servant required to 2

Dimensions of Government Employment

serve the health and welfare needs of 575 persons, while ten years later there was one public servant for every 309 persons. In short, even a casual inspection of the consequences of population growth reveals the "multiplier effect" it has on the growth of the public service. But equally important are the changing demographic characteristics of the population. Even as Canada's population was growing, it was undergoing a radical transformation in a shift from rural to urban centres. In the twenty-year period from 1951 to 1971, the rural component of the population declined by 14.3 percentage points (from 38.2 to 23.9 percent). This decline varied widely from province to province: Ontario represented the most urbanized of all provinces with about 82 percent urban dwellers; Prince Edward Island recorded only 38.3 percent. In a general sense, however, urbanization has resulted in an increase in government services—a point that was emphasized in 1959 by the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario: Increased specialization in agriculture and industry and the beginning of massive rural to urban population shift—both products of the process of industrialization—made men less self-sufficient, less able to control by their own efforts the things which affected their daily lives and well-being. The individuals in the community became more dependent one upon the other. Added to this was the steady growth of the various enterprises within the community, increasing the degree of dependence and also making it impersonal and still less amenable to individual control.' The pronounced trend toward urbanization also changed the composition of the labour force: a movement from primary industries such as farming, mining, and fishing to secondary industries. This affected the schooling habits of children and adults alike with the result that the number of white-collar workers increased. For example, during the period from 1901 to 1971, the occupational distribution of the Canadian labour force underwent a radical change from about one-seventh white-collar employment in 1901 to just about one-half of the labou1 force in 1971. (See table C of the Statistical Appendix.) Another occupational group which has also increased its size over the years is the service group. These two groups in effect constitute nearly all occupational categories of government employment. The increase in white-collar workers has certainly influenced the kind and quality of services demanded of provincial governments, thus requiring more employees. Another significant alteration in the composition of population was brought about by the high rates of family formation—the familiar post3

CHAPTER ONE

war "baby boom." The enrolment figure of students in our schools, colleges, and universities by 1971 had reached 6,361,346, constituting about 29.6 percent of the population.2 These students put an enormous financial burden on provincial governments and created a demand for teachers and other facilities. Between 1951 and 1971, for example, the number of teachers increased threefold, from 93,000 to 302,000. Meanwhile, the number of recipients of social assistance, as of August, 1972, accounted for 5.9 percent of the total population.a Increasing demands on special staff and facilities resulted, once again reflected in growing public expenditures and burgeoning bureaucracies in areas once regarded as the primary domain of private or religious charities. Growing industrialization and urbanization have brought governments into other economic arenas which in earlier laissez faire days were also regarded as primarily private. Regulatory and entrepreneurial functions have been expanding that segment of public service employment which is not found in the conventional departmental civil service to the point where this component is numerically almost as large as the civil service proper. GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES

Government expenditures, as one would expect, provide an accurate barometer for registering the pressures of the enlarging and changing demands of an increasing population. In 1945 provincial government expenditure, as a percentage of the gross national product, was 4.2; by 1971 it accounted for 14.6 percent of GNP.4 The wage bill for provincial government employees was $130 million in 1946 (about 1.1 percent of GNP); by 1971 it had risen to $2,341 million (about 2.5 percent of GNP). Thus, the provincial governments' wage bill has increased eighteenfold over a twenty-five-year period and has also doubled as a proportion of the GNP. These figures may be further refined to incorporate the growth of population by recording provincial government expenditures on a per capita basis (see table 1). It will be observed from this table that per capita expenditures on all services have increased by more than seven times over the two decades. While this growth is not as dramatic as the absolute increase in provincial government net expenditures (from $1,207 to $13,827 million—more than an elevenfold rise), it is the most realistic figure to keep in mind. Further refinement of the totals by breaking them down into various functional headings shows where the real growth points have been concentrated. Education heads the list, to be followed closely by debt charges and other miscellaneous expenses. It is interesting to note as well the 4

Dimensions of Government Employment TABLE 1 PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION OF NET GENERAL EXPENDITURE OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS, CLASSIFIED BY FUNCTION,

1952, 1961-62, AND 1971-72

Functions Education Health Social welfare Transportation and communications Natural resources General govt. Protection of persons and property Debt charges Other expenses Total SOURCE:

1952 (S)

1961-62 ($)

1971-72 ($)

Percent Growth, 1952-1972

15.3 13.4 6.6

45.8 32.8 15.0

193.8 136.4 69.9

1,166.7 917.9 959.1

25.5 6.5 3.3

36.0 11.0 7.4

51.3 26.1 26.7

101.2 301.5 709.1

4.7 3.9 4.6

7.7 4.4 9.3

26.3 47.5 54.9

459.6 1,117.9 1,093.5

83.8

169.4

632.9

655.3

Summary of the data provided in table D of the Statistical Appendix.

shift in budgetary priorities over the twenty-year period. In 1952 transportation and communications topped the list, nearly as much per capita being spent on these functions as on education and health combined. In 1971 both education and debt charges had passed transportation and communications, while social welfare had maintained the same fourth rank in terms of per capita expenditures. It should not be inferred from this brief examination of government expenditures that a rise in government spending would necessarily cause a similar growth of government employment. Such a co-relation between these two factors does not seem to apply in the case of provincial spending trends. For example, as shown in table 2, in 1951 the provincial governments' wages and salaries bill constituted 17.6 percent of the total net general expenditure, a proportion that increased to 21.9 percent in 1961 but declined to 17.2 percent in 1971; whereas the growth in total employment at the provincial level does not appear to have slackened during the same period (see table 4). On the other hand, the federal government's wage bill has kept pace with the expenditure growth trend. A possible explanation of the differences in the rate of growth of provincial expenditures and of provincial public service employment may be the 5

CHAPTER ONE

TABLE 2 COST OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS,

1951-52, 1961-62, AND 1971-72

Wages and Salaries (S million) Jurisdiction

Net General Expenditure (S million)

1951 1961 1971

1951

1961

1971

Proportion of Wage Bill to Net General Expenditure (%) 1951

1961

1971

Provincial

213

654 2,341

1,207

3,100 13,827

17.6

21.9

17.2

Federal°

334 1,024 2,212

4,533

7,023 16,137

7.4

14.6

13.7

Total

547 1,678 4,553

5,740 10,123 29,964

9.5

16.6

15.2

Statistics Canada. Federal and Provincial Government Finance series, and and 1972. Wages and salaries data for 1971 were provided by the Gross National Product Division of Statistics Canada. °Figures relate to nonmilitary spending only.

SOURCES:

National Accounts, Income and Expenditures. 1926-56.1965,

fact that more of the provinces' expenditures went on capital projects and outlays for services, welfare payments. and the like, which did not entail the same proportional additions to staff. No discussion of the patterns of government expenditure can be complete without taking into consideration such factors as price level changes, growth of income and population, and certain internal or external emergencies such as wars and depression. However, the aim of this section is only to highlight the point that the growth of government spending is but one indication of the growing business of government in our contemporary society. UNIVERSE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

The universe of government employment includes not only those persons who are usually called civil servants (although the prevailing practice among Canadian provinces seems to be to use the term public servants) and who generally work in executive departments, but also those who work in departmental corporations, government enterprises, workmen's compensation boards, and other commissions and agencies. In 1959, the first year for which reliable data could be secured, there were 204,493 provincial government employees, but by 1971 this group grew to 370,075, an 81 percent increase. Compared to the growth of the federal 6

Dimensions of Government Employment manpower domain, which was about 19 percent, the provincial growth seems to be substantial, as shown below. Levels of Government

1959

1971

% Increase

Federal Provincial Municipal

337,981 204,493 126,680

401,471 370,075 306,131

18.9 80.9 141.7

Even so, the biggest increase is to be found in the local government domain. However, even this information does not give an adequate picture of the global figure for all persons on public payrolls of one kind or another at all levels of government. The following figures for 1971 show that a more comprehensive total of 1% million persons could be claimed to be dependent on the public taxpayers' money. Federal employees (civilian) Armed forces Provincial government employees Teachers Hospital employees Municipal employees Total

401,471 82,149 370,075 302,086 318,526 306,131 1,780,438

Turning from this dramatic picture of the global dimensions of government manpower, in table 3 we present a more conventional set of figures, broken down into two components. First there are the departmental services employees which include not only those persons commonly called civil servants (column 1) who arc subject to general civil service legislation that governs their employment but also other departmental employees (column 2) who are not subject to the same terms of employment as those in the first column. The second major category comprises those persons who are employed by boards, commissions, corporations, and the like whose terms of employment arc generally regulated on an entirely separate basis. In this study, our attention will focus primarily on those employees who fall within column 1 of table 3. However, it can be seen that the impressive number recorded in the other departmental employees column and in the column headed government enterprises and workmen's compensation boards reflects the contemporary and still-growing reliance on nondepartmental boards, corporations, and commissions required for regulatory, deciding, and entrepreneurial functions of provincial governments. A less charitable conclusion is that wide areas of civil service employment are beyond the 7

CHAPTER ONE

TABLE 3 TOTAL GOVERNMENT MANPOWER, CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF ENGAGEMENT, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, DECEMBER 31, 1971

Type of Engagement Departmental Services Employees

Jurisdictions

Civil Other Dept. Service Employees Subtotal

Newfoundland 11,319a Prince Edward Island 1,948 Nova Scotia 7,584 New Brunswick 6,955 52,4004 Quebec Ontario 64,996 Manitoba 9,165 7,604 Saskatchewan Alberta 18,648 British Columbia 29,141

Govt. Enterprises and Workmen's Total Comp. Manpower Boards

417

11,736

1,181

12,917

1,183 8,909 14,570 5,953 16,203 2,846 3,991 6,037 -

3,131 16,493 21,525 58,353 81,199 12,011 11,595 24,685 29,141

99 5,008 2,517 20,335 33,984 8,572 7,189 10,282 11,039

3,230 21,501 24,042 78,688 115,183 20,583 18,784 34,967 40,180

Total, all provinces

209,760

60,109

269,869

100,206

370,075

Federal government

216,488

50,317

266,805

134,666

401,471

Statistics Canada, Provincial Government Employment, October-December, 1971, and Federal Government Employment, December, 1971. Data on British Columbia were provided by the Civil Service Commission. NOTE: This table excludes employees of institutions of higher education. °Estimated figure.

SOURCES:

salutary reach of the merit system of public personnel administration and that patronage is still far from dead. This conclusion could not be properly drawn without a detailed analysis of the employment practices of this great miscellany of agencies lying outside public service acts. In any event, over the last decade, the rate of increase in these sectors of government employment has not been as great as in the civil service proper. Or, to put the matter another way, in 1959 there were 26,750 more employees in the categories lying outside the jurisdiction of provincial public service enactments than were in the civil service proper; by 1971 there were 49,446 more employees in the civil service category than were 8

CHART 1 CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL GOVERNMENT MANPOWER, ALL PROVINCES COMBINED, 1959-1971

350,000

300,000

Number of Employees

250,000

200,000

150,0LY3

100,000

1959

7

1961

1963

Civil Service Employment Total Government Manpower

1965

1967

1969

1971

CHAPTER ONE

to be found outside the reach of the merit principle. Chart 1 elaborates further the variations in growth patterns between these two sets of employees. For present purposes, the significance of the non–civil service categories making up the total component of provincial government employment is that most of the ensuing description and analysis of employment practices and procedures refer primarily to those employees who do come under the conventional jurisdiction of provincial civil or public service legislation. This means that more than two-fifths of the total of government employees will be omitted from this study. GROWTH OF CIVIL SERVICE

EMPLOYMENT

As the major thrust of this book is to bring together in one place the information collected from different provincial jurisdictions which relate to that group of government employees who generally staff the executive departments and related agencies, a detailed examination of the growth pattern of these persons is in order. The data assembled here represent the first attempt to provide a nationwide statistical picture of the growth in the size of provincial and federal civil services although, as explained in the Statistical Appendix, we have been constrained in our efforts to provide a complete and comparable series. As can be seen from table 4, the total civil service employment of all provinces stood at 38,370 in 1946 but grew to 209,760 by 1971. Against this provincial fivefold increase, the federal civil service grew from 120,557 to 216,488 (just about a twofold increase)—even though the scope of the federal central personnel agency jurisdiction is now much wider than its counterpart in several provinces. Of all the provinces, Saskatchewan appears to have experienced the lowest growth rate, having not quite doubled over the twenty-five-year period, while Newfoundland over a somewhat shorter period has experiTABLE 4 CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS,

1946-1971

(SELECTED YEARS)

Increase, 1946-1971 Jurisdiction Provincial Federal

1946

1951

1961

1971

38,370 49,652 100,734 209,760 120,557 124,580 135,922 216,488

SotiacE: Based on table F of the Statistical Appendix.

10

Numerical Percent 171,390 95,931

446.6 79.6

Dimensions of Government Employment

enced well over a fivefold increase. Nova Scotia and Ontario have more than a sixfold expansion; British Columbia has more than a fivefold increase of its employees; the others have either more than doubled or trebled their figures. in some instances, most notably in British Columbia, there are startling increases: between 1965 and 1966 British Columbia would appear to have added nearly 11,000 employees, a jump that can be explained by the fact that a large number of previously excluded employees was brought under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Act on April 1, 1965. Similar changes have occurred in other provinces. The notable example is Quebec where the data on civil service enrolment since 1969—as reported in the annual reports of the Department of the Civil Service—do not correspond to the figures of earlier years. This particular situation is a reminder that the figures being used here by no means provide an exact comparable picture of the universe of provincial civil service employment. Even if we disregard the anomalies that may creep into such elusive calculations, the general picture shows an unremitting overall increase in provincial civil service employment by five-year periods: the first five years, an average of 2,000 employees per year being added; the next five years, an average of 4,000 per year; 5,600 per year between 1956 and 1961; over 10,000 per year over the next ten-year period, with no signs of slackening as our table ends in 1971. Accounting for two-thirds of the total increase are the three provinces of British Columbia, Ontario, and Quebec—over 121,043 of the total of 171,390. While the foregoing figures demonstrate that provincial public services after World War II have been increasing at a much more rapid rate than the federal public service, one should not overlook what has been occurring at the municipal level. Here, the comparable figures from 1946 to 1971 show an increase from 56,760 to 306,131—a little more rapid rate of increase than the provinces have experienced. It is interesting to locate the functional areas which account for the increases within provincial public services. Table 5 reveals a somewhat surprising situation: namely, that the bulk of the increase has occurred in long-established departments, eight of which have been selected for the tabulation. Even without the inclusion of Prince Edward Island and Quebec, the table shows that between 1957 and 1967 these eight departmental areas increased their employees by 59,747, which is about 88 percent of the total increase for all departments. One must conclude, therefore, that the growth in provincial public service employment is not so much related to the assumption of new functions but to the provision of a higher level of service for health and hospitals, police and protection, education, highways, public works, and public welfare. 11

CHAPTER ONE

TABLE 5 CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, CLASSIFIED BY DEPARTMENT, ALL PROVINCES COMBINED, 1957 AND 1967

Employment Departments

Increase, 1957-1967

1957

1967

2,931

3,811

880

1.3

5,381 3,239 18,484 7,769 4,587 2,843 1,925

11,844 8,371 40,580 20,786 7,735 7,640 6,139

6,463 5,132 22,096 13,017 3,148 4,797 4,214

9,5 7.6 32.5 19.1 4.6 7.1 6.2

47,159

106,906

59,747

87.9

Other departments

15,766

23,976

8,210

12.1

Grand Total

62.925

130,882

67,957

100.00

Agriculture Attorney General and Police Education Health and Hospitals Highways Lands and Forests Public Works Public Welfare Subtotal

Numerical

Percent

SOURCE: Based on annual reports of the respective agencies. No-rus: Quebec and Prince Edward Island are not included in this table. Population of the eight provinces included: 1957, 11,732,000; 1967, 14,428,000.

At the same time, these are services-however long established-that are affected by population growth and, as noted earlier, this growth has a multiplier effect on civil service employment. Thus, as table 6 shows, while in 1946 there were three provincial civil service employees for every 1,000 persons, by 1971 there were about ten per 1,000. Taken as a proportion of the labour force, roughly the same threefold increase is found: in 1946 there were eight but in 1971 there were twenty-four civil service employees for every 1,000 in the labour force. A striking regional variation is found: the proportion of civil servants to labour force is highest among the Atlantic provinces, to be followed by British Columbia, Prairie provinces, and lastly by Ontario (see Statistical Appendix, table G). Another interesting feature is that the number of federal civil servants as a proportion of the labour force does not seem to have changed very much during the past quarter of a century. 12

Dimensions of Government Employment TABLE 6 PROPORTION OF CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, TO POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE,

Civil Service Employees Juris. 1946

1971

Population

Labour Force

1946

AND

1971

Ratio of Employees/ 1000 of:

Pop. Lab. Force 1946 1971 1946 1971 (000) (000) (000) (000) 1946 1971 1946 1971

Prov. 38,370 209,760 12,590 21,516 4,830 8,630 3.0 9.7 7.9 24.3 Fed. 120,557 216,488 12,590 21,516 4,830 8,630 9.6 10.1 24.9 25.1 SOURCE:

Based on information contained in table G of the Statistical Appendix.

QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF PROVINCIAL CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT

Accompanying the sheer numerical growth in provincial civil service employment has come an alteration in occupational structures. In this respect, public services have tended to mirror those changes in the general labour force from blue-collar workers and people in primary occupations to white-collar and service occupations to which earlier reference was made. Although the popular stereotype of public servants as paper-pushing clerks performing menial, repetitive jobs may still find some support in the occupational groupings into which a contemporary bureaucracy can be divided, the proportion is dwindling. In part, this is so because mechanization and electronic data-processing call for a new level of skill in the manual group; in part, the shift to white-collar work, requiring managerial, administrative, professional, scientific, and technical knowledge and aptitudes of a high order, is a prominent feature of modern government bureaucracies. Historical data on occupational groupings arc not readily available, and each jurisdiction tends to use somewhat different criteria for categorizing its civil servants. According to the spotty information made available to us by various jurisdictions, we find that although clerical and manual/ operational groups still dominate the scene, nevertheless, administrative, professional, and technical (APT) personnel in some provinces represent about half of the total. At the federal level where comparable data are available, the proportion of APT increased from 26.3 to 31.5 percent of the total between the years 1966 and 1971. While no data were assembled from published salary figures for civil servants, confirmation of this trend can be readily secured by a casual inspection of the increasing numbers 13

CHAPTER ONE

to be found in the salary brackets of $10,000 and over. Thus, an earlier conclusion of the authors still stands: "The more highly trained, highly educated personnel in the administrative, professional and technical groupings of the public service are now numerically strong contenders for first place in an occupation traditionally viewed as the great repository of clerical and operational personnel."5 The expansion of government employment is a function of increasing population and the changing characteristics of that population; it is equally attributable to changing philosophies of state intervention, which in turn provide support for new roles and functions for the state, as well as for enlarged expectations of the populace for more and better services. The demands on the positive state have resulted in a proportionately faster growth of the provincial governments' civil services. If there is any government service growing at a more rapid rate, it is not the federal but the municipal level that is in any way a close contender with the provinces. To this point, the annual growth rate of provincial civil services gives no signs of slowing down. Moreover, if we can anticipate a continuation of the trend toward employment of more highly educated, more professionally and technically trained personnel, we may confront a demand on the labour market which provincial civil services may not be able to meet. Be that as it may, a global governmental work force (including provincial, federal, municipal employees of all kinds, as well as teachers and hospital workers) of about 1% million in 1971 represents a factor of about one in every five of the Canadian labour force. Even if we reduce our sights to include only the employees in the regular civil services of the provinces, we are speaking of 2.4 percent of the labour force. By any standard of measurement, provincial governments are obviously giants among employers. For this reason, an examination of their employment practices and procedures—their personnel administration functions— warrants the attention which is provided in the chapters that follow.

14

Chapter Two Public Personnel Administration at the Centre

IN THEIR ROLE AS EMPLOYERS, governments have always been vulnerable to the charge that the public positions at their disposal can be allocated in such a way as to win political friends and influence. In particular, this power to dispose of public offices has been seen as a means of facilitating the party struggle to mobilize majorities across a continental domain or to apply leverage in strategic local situations. Early civil service reformers concentrated almost exclusively on the evils of this so-called patronage system and on ways and means of eliminating it. In Canada many of the prominent advocates of reform in government staffing practices were identified with other social issues, such as prohibition. The evil of patronage in the public service was viewed as a moral issue that could be resolved only by a strong act of self-denial on the part of politicians and the removal of all temptation by placing recruitment in the hands of a politically neutralized agency—normally a civil service commission. "Merit" was to replace political or personal influence as the basis for selection. Merit was best determined by objective and preferably competitive examinations in which there would be no room for personal or partisan considerations. A career "open to the talents" on a competitive basis became the rallying slogan for the merit principle, achieving success at varying paces and with local variations to meet the conditions in different countries. In the United Kingdom, for example, the merit principle was formally acknowledged in 1855 with the creation of the Civil Service Commission and in 1870, with the adoption of open competitive examinations, gradu-

CHAPTER TWO

ally extended to cover in more and more of the public service. The impelling forces at work in Britain were the middle-class attack on the patronage monopoly of the upper class; the obvious bankruptcy of the latter group so amply demonstrated in the fiasco of the War Office in the Crimea; the need to develop an efficient service for India (where reforms were first introduced); a strong "economical reform" movement mounted by the business interests; and a gradual democratization of the educational system, which lent weight to the case for a career open to the talents. In the United States, a slightly slower development occurred prompted in part by reports on the British reforms and zealously exploited by a strong pressure group, the National Civil Service Reform League (still in existence under the title of the National Civil Service League). The well-publicized assassination in 1881 of President Garfield by a disappointed office seeker provided the final incentive for Congressional approval of the Civil Service Act of 1883. The "covering in" of the progressively larger number of civil servants under this act has moved in slow stages from that point on, impelled by the "efficiency and economy" movement and the scientific management movements of the first two decades of this century. In Canada, the first movements of reform focused on the federal level, sponsored by indigenous moral and social reform movements of a scattered and not highly organized nature but nourished by the British example and later much influenced by the importation of the American scientific management precepts. The Royal Commission on the Civil Service, reporting in 1908, stressed the need to establish a central personnel agency so that patronage appointments could be controlled and civil servants could be forced to abandon their political involvement with the party in power. The royal commission also reported how protégés of influential politicians secured a greater share of federal government vacancies, while other suitable candidates, often more competent than those appointed, were rejected; how civil service salaries were not only inadequate, despite the constant increase of the cost of living, but had not been increased over the past several decades; how the rudimentary classification system produced an inequitable compensation system; and how the promotion procedure favoured mostly those who were expert in office politics. In fact, civil service reformers thought that the efficiency and morale of the civil service had generally deteriorated.' These findings, though limited to the federal level, shocked the nation as a whole and triggered efforts to examine the provincial situation. Although the federal government established an independent central personnel agency in 1908, provincial governments took their own time in 16

Personnel Administration at the Centre following suit. No doubt the federal Liberal administration was pressed to take action in 1908 largely because the opposition was raising the matter on the election hustings.'- Having been reelected, the Liberals were duty bound to administer the first moderate dose of civil service reform by creating the new commission, but they limited the commission's jurisdiction to the Inside (headquarters) Civil Service. Before the wind of reform in personnel administration could affect provincial jurisdictions, the country was at war. Many civil servants from the federal as well as provincial services opted for military service, thus creating a vacuum which the politicians were quick to fill by a return to patronage. Whatever support had been generated for the merit system by provincial authorities evaporated in wartime. Low morale in the services gave ammunition to critics as well as to returned soldiers who demanded sweeping reforms in the management of personnel affairs. While the federal government was busy with its election and conscription issue, British Columbia became the first province to pass a Civil Service Act in 1917, thereby creating the first provincial central personnel agency. Within a year other jurisdictions such as the federal government and provinces such as Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba passed similar legislation designed to remove patronage from the operating departments by charging a central personnel agency with the responsibility of administering an objective merit system. However, the federal and provincial statutes differed markedly: while the federal legislation not only firmly established the supremacy of the merit principle in personnel matters, it also made the central personnel agency completely independent of governmental control. Provincial statutes, though subscribing to the principle of merit appointments and merit considerations in other personnel affairs, did not provide as strong, independent central personnel agencies divorced from executive interference in staffing matters. It was another decade before two other provinces adopted civil service legislation corresponding to these earlier pioneers—Saskatchewan in 1930 and Nova Scotia in 1935. Quebec and New Brunswick followed in 1943; Newfoundland in 1953; and Prince Edward Island as late as 1962. A noteworthy feature of these early provincial central personnel agencies was that, unlike the federal central personnel agency, which was given a commission form of organization with fixed terms of office for its commissioners and statutory control over appointments and classification, the provincial governments of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario created only a one-man agency with no reference to tenure of the commissioner. The absence of a commission form and the lack of firm tenure seemed to negate the spirit of civil service reform which promoted a politically independent central personnel agency. 17

CHAPTER TWO

Among the provinces west of Quebec, the one-member commissioner became a personnel director for the government of his province. His actual work was comparable to that of a deputy minister of a line department, and he sought recognition of his status as one of them rather than acting as an independent watchdog over civil service appointments. In provinces like Ontario, he was supposed to certify all appointments made by deputy ministers, thus having little control over the application of the merit principle. in many instances only persons amenable to the wishes of the government of the day were ever appointed to the position of provincial civil service commissioner. And, if some civil service commissioner proved overly zealous in adhering to the merit principle, he was promptly removed or his agency was financially starved. The singular example of Dr. J. M. McCutchcon, the first civil service commissioner of Ontario, who became an outspoken advocate of civil service reform and who was later dismissed from his post, testifies to this situation. In essence, all provincial central agencies in their formative years were weak bodies, and in retrospect it seems strange that their restricted role did not become an issue for opposition parties and other critics. Presumably the application of the merit principle in personnel affairs was considered to be a matter of greater concern at the federal level and paying lip service to the principle was thought to be adequate for provincial jurisdictions. On the other hand, the seemingly weak position of the provincial central personnel agency helped the development of public personnel administration in the 1960s in such provinces as Ontario and Quebec. The Civil Service Commission of British Columbia, established in 1917, continued to be a one-man commission until 1945 when it was enlarged to a three-member commission. The chairman became the full-time officer of the commission, and the other two commissioners held part-time appointments while continuing as senior members of other departments. The amended Civil Service Act of 1945 also gave tenure to the chairman of the commission. Notwithstanding the absence of formal tenure provisions, its first chairman, Dr. H. M. Morrison, retired in 1970 as the only chairman in any Canadian jurisdiction who had held office for a period of a quarter century. Alberta changed a one-man Civil Service Commission to a three-man body in 1947, although a unique arrangement was made whereby the Civil Service Association (the only provincial staff association) was given the authority to nominate one commissioner. The chairman of the Civil Service Commission was also given the title of director of personnel. In 1954 Alberta became the first jurisdiction to abandon the independent commission form of central personnel agency by transferring the office 18

Personnel Administration at the Centre of the director of personnel from the central personnel agency (renamed the Public Service Commission) to the office of the premier; then in 1957 the Manning government removed all traces of the fiction of an "independent" central personnel agency by accepting the recommendations of an American consultant, Public Administration Service of Chicago, which suggested that "the Commission as a body should be abolished, and its administrative, technical and advisory duties should be assumed by a suitably organized central personnel office headed by a Public Service Commissioner."a Consequently, in 1959 the entity established as an independent agency to act as a watchdog on executive interference in personnel matters came to an end. There was established, under the Public Service Act, 1959, a Personnel Administration Office headed by a public service commissioner to advise the provincial government respecting personnel policies and other related matters. In essence, then, the Personnel Administration Office became a department in the provincial administrative hierarchy. Later developments in Ontario and Quebec, where separate civil service departments were established, point toward a trend of consolidating the administration of personnel functions in a department under the direct control of the Executive Council of provincial governments. Saskatchewan amended its public service legislation in 1947 to create a three-man agency, with the chairman serving full-time while two other part-time commissioners were appointed from outside the public service. In 1965 the Saskatchewan Royal Commission on Government Administration recommended that "the Public Service Commission should be reorganized to be staffed by part-time commissioners and a very small permanent secretariat."4 This recommendation remained unimplemented mainly because the recently elected Liberal government was not in favour of any sweeping changes in the provincial public service. The 1971 election which brought back the New Democratic Party government has not as yet led to a revival of the earlier royal commission's recommendation. Manitoba, like Saskatchewan, passed legislation in 1947 transforming the one-man Civil Service Commission into a three-member body. However, unlike British Columbia and Saskatchewan, the chairman of the central personnel agency in Manitoba had to be an outside professional person on a part-time basis. Not until 1968 were further changes made; in that year the provincial government decided to transfer some of the commission's powers to a body to be known as the Management Committee of the Cabinet. The Civil Service Act was amended in 1969, and the Civil Service Commission became largely responsible for staffing functions. Ontario followed the example of its Western neighbours when it passed 19

CHAPTER TWO

legislation in 1947 for the enlargement of a one-man commission to a three-member commission. The original civil service commissioner persistently crusaded against patronage and other ills in the public service. Even the 1947 legislation which enlarged the membership of the Civil Service Commission was not implemented until ten years later in 1957. While other provinces were trying to consolidate personnel administrative functions by giving more authority to their central personnel bodies, in Ontario the first fifteen years after World War II showed little progress toward civil service reform. Criticisms from scholars, such as Howard A. Scarrow,5 the Civil Service Association of Ontario, and other concerned citizens induced the Robarts government to broaden the scope of the Civil Service Commission. Thus, in 1962 the Ontario Civil Service Commission was given, for the first time since 1918, a decisive authority over all personnel administration functions. The Public Service Act of 1961-62 also made provision for a new Department of the Civil Service to act as an executive arm of the commission. From 1962 to 1969 the responsibilities of chairman of the Civil Service Commission and deputy minister of the Civil Service Department were vested in the same person but in 1969 were assigned to two officials. Following a report and recommendations of the Committee on Government Productivity, new legislation was passed that abolished the department and returned its functions to the Civil Service Commission in 1972. The chairman of the commission, with the status of deputy minister, was required to report to the chairman of a newly erected Management Board of Cabinet on his strictly managerial operations. Those functions of a quasi-judicial nature remained with the Civil Service Commission in its corporate capacity, presumably to be exercised independently. Of all Canadian provinces, Quebec was the first jurisdiction to enact a Civil Service Act in 1867, with a provision for appointing a Board of Examiners consisting of deputy ministers of several departments to certify competency of candidates.° It was modelled after the federal Civil Service Act of 1867, which in itself was a carry-over from an earlier statute of the Province of Canada. The Board of Examiners was a rubber-stamping body, for real power rested within operating departments with respect to all personnel matters. The board continued to exist, off and on, for many decades, being used by various governments whenever the system suited them. During the first few decades of the twentieth century, while other provincial jurisdictions and the federal government were flooded with demands for civil service reforms, the Quebec legislature remained unconcerned with curbing patronage. Matters relating to public personnel administration continued to be handled on a departmental basis where there was ample opportunity to perpetuate patronage. It is interesting to note 20

Personnel Administration at the Centre that the Atlantic provinces shared the Quebec position and did nothing to legislate the merit system for their public services. In Quebec, the only significant change during the interwar period was the appointment of a committee to report on the problem of classification and remuneration. World War II did bring change in the civil service when during the Liberal regime (1943-44) legislation was passed to establish a Civil Service Commission with three members. It was responsible for verifying the qualifications of applicants for admission to the civil service, arranging transfers and assisting departments in promotions, classifying positions, and recommending organizational changes. However, before the newly appointed Civil Service Commission could breathe properly, the government changed and the Union Nationale party of Premier Duplessis came into power. Its contempt for the untried commission was exceeded only by its support of the departmental prerogative of ascriptive appointment. All three civil service commissioners resigned in 1944 and were replaced by a single commissioner who rubber-stamped the actions taken by departmental managers. Thus personnel administration returned to its historic ways. Howard A. Scarrow explains the situation that existed in 1956, as follows: The Civil Service Commission in Quebec can be understood only in relation to the cultural milieu and political climate in which it functions. Here administrative relationships and standards of behavior, rather than being formally based on legal norms, resemble more those of a large family, with the Premier commanding paternalistic obedience and respect. The independence of any sector of the administration is inconceivable, a binding code of regulations seems unlikely, and a merit system appears to be alien to the frankly accepted tradition of political favoritism. In a setting such as this, the Civil Service Commission can perform but a limited, though useful, role.7 Paternalistic and ascriptive-oriented personnel administration continued until the death of Premier Duplessis in 1959. In 1960 the Liberal party came into power and began to implement one of its election promises to revitalize the public service. The one-man Civil Service Commission was promptly enlarged into a three-man commission, and by 1961 the central personnel agency for the first time started advertising positions in the press and in educational institutions with a view to holding competitive examinations. In 1964 Premier Jean Lcsage attracted from the federal government a career senior foreign service officer to become the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. The new chairman, with the help of his dedicated and energetic deputies, was able to convince de21

CHAPTER TWO

partmental managers to accept the central personnel agency as a proper vehicle to implement the merit principle. And so, ninety-eight years after the passage of the first Civil Service Act of 1867, the merit system finally came to be a part of public personnel administration in the Province of Quebec. On August 6, 1965, an amended Civil Service Act was approved, which overhauled the 1943 legislation. The agency now had all legal authority to implement the merit principle. This reform was in the new mood of the Quiet Revolution, a desire for efficiency that vitalized personnel administration in Quebec in a relatively short time. Under the new dispensation the work load of the central personnel agency increased to the point where it was thought necessary to move some functions of the Civil Service Commission (for example, training and development, department organizational review, personnel research, and measures to increase efficiency) to a new agency, a Department of the Civil Service. On November 28, 1969, a Civil Service Department was established, one of its most important responsibilities being to carry on and supervise a new regime of collective bargaining. The rapidity of changes experienced by the Quebec central personnel agency and the heavy work load thrust on it have no parallel among other provincial jurisdictions in Canada. The New Brunswick Civil Service Commission came into being in 1943, with the provision for one full-time commissioner as chairman and two part-time commissioners. However, it was not until 1948 that the chairman of the commission could be appointed on a full-time basis. Functions of the commission—to test and pass upon the qualifications of candidates for appointment, classification of jobs. transfer, and promotion—remained unchanged until 1968 when two bills respecting collective bargaining and an expanded role for the Treasury Board were passed by the legislature. These measures were based on two separate studies, the first of which was conducted by the ubiquitous Public Administration Service of Chicago, which submitted a report on the organization and administration of the public service of New Brunswick in 1962. Among other things, the report proposed that certain functions conferred on the Civil Service Commission by the 1943 act—such as supervising organizational planning in departments and exercising indirect, though real, budgetary control with respect to personnel services—belonged rather to the Treasury Board. The report recommended that the Civil Service Commission should have limited functions such as formulating personnel policies, acting as an appeal board, and representing the public interest; a post of personnel director be established to serve as chief executive officer with the status of a deputy minister, who would be responsible, under a minister, for administering all personnel policies set by the commission; the Civil Service 22

Personnel Administration at the Centre Act should be extended to cover all positions, excluding the judiciary, members of boards and commissions, and others; a better system of classification and pay administration should be devised.8 Except for certain changes in classification work, most of the recommendations were not implemented at that time by the New Brunswick government. On June 29, 1966, the second study that was to influence subsequent legislation was undertaken by the Royal Commission on EmployerEmployee Relations, with a single commissioner, Professor S. J. Frankel. The Frankel Commission, reporting its findings on May 30, 1967, strongly recommended that collective bargaining rights be given to provincial employees. Mainly because of this report and partly because of the influence of the developments occurring at the federal level, the government passed a Public Service Labour Relations Act in December 6, 1968,9 which came into operation a year later. The impact of this legislation on personnel administration has been profound; one significant change was the evolution of the Treasury Board as a central body responsible for management of several important aspects of personnel administration. The Financial Administration Act of 1966 was amended on April 18, 1969, and chapter 31, sections 5 and 5a, empowered the Treasury Board not only to act as the employer when bargaining with employees' associations but also to be responsible for personnel management functions such as manpower requirements, training and development, organization, classification, pay determination, standards of discipline, working conditions, and other terms of employment. This legislation carried the imprint of the proposals made earlier by the Chicago Public Administration Service but went even further in altering the role of the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Act of 1943, which had remained virtually intact, was drastically amended on April 8, 1969. The new act, chapter 3, section 6, subsection 1, reduced the functions of the Civil Service Commission mainly to appointment and transfer, thereby converting the commission into a staffing agency for the civil service of New Brunswick. Thus over its twenty-five-year existence, the commission has moved from a weak agency, to a strong central personnel agency, and finally to a servicerendering agency of the province. The Nova Scotia Civil Service Commission came into existence in 1935 when the Legislative Assembly passed a Civil Service Act which made provision for a part-time commissioner. This action was prompted by a critical assessment of prevailing conditions by the Royal Commission, Provincial Economic Inquiry (the Jones Commission). However, a subsequent study by yet another royal commission, the Royal Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation, prepared by Professor R. MacGregor Dawson in 1944, pointed up the lack of status and consequent 23

CHAPTER TWO

ineffectualness of a part-time commissioner in preserving the merit principle, particularly if there should be a change in government." Professor Dawson's powerful and persuasive critique led to the appointment of a full-time commissioner in 1950. Amendments to the Civil Service Act in 1952 simply delineated more clearly the scope of the commissioner's authority, but as in other jurisdictions Nova Scotia was plagued by the erosion of its commission's jurisdiction by excessive use of cabinetapproved exemptions. In February 15, 1960, Jerome Barnum Associates Inc., a management consultant firm of New York hired to review the salary administration program, submitted, on its own, a brief report on personnel administration in the province." It strongly recommended that the duties of the commission be enlarged to include appointment to all positions in the government service unless exempted by the commission; operation of training and development programs; a personnel administration communication program (meetings with deputy ministers, departmental directors, and others) ; and procedure related to discipline. Several of these recommendations—most of which can be found in the 1944 Dawson Report—have been adopted in further amendments to the Civil Service Act. But, in essence, the basic philosophy of personnel administration has not undergone any substantial change over the last two decades. "An Act Respecting the Civil Service" was passed by the Legislative Assembly of Prince Edward Island early in 1962 and, when assented to by the Lieutenant-Governor on April 6, 1962, marked the first occasion in this province of the legislative creation of a central personnel agency. More than a year later, May 15, 1963, the act was proclaimed. As was earlier the case in Alberta, the Prince Edward Island Public Service Association nominates one member of the three-man commission.12 Beginning with a skeleton staff of one personnel officer and two clerical assistants, the chairman of the commission leaned heavily on the experience of his neighbour, New Brunswick. This early relationship has been maintained, a situation yet to develop in any other jurisdiction. The commission seems to have suffered somewhat from a fairly rapid turnover of its members (two chairmen and two other commissioners within a period of less than five years), and as the commissioners' report admitted in 1968, it is still in the stage of being accepted by both the government, as the employer, and the Prince Edward Island Public Service Association, as the employees' representative, an acceptance that now seems to be assured by legislation passed in 1972.'3 The central personnel agency of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador was established in 1953, five years after the Crown colony was brought into Confederation by Premier Joseph Smallwood. Until that time, personnel affairs of the province were managed by individual de24

Personnel Administration at the Centre

partments, with senior appointments being made by the senior deputy minister and the premier. Although Newfoundland became the first Canadian province to have three full-time members on its Civil Service Commission, the agency was not invited to fill senior positions but acted primarily as a recruitment office for clerical and operational staff. It would appear that the agency remained weak not because its commissioners were not aggressive and unqualified to handle other personnel matters, but mainly because the Liberal government did not want to see its patronage power slipping into the hands of a somewhat independent agency. To that end the Civil Service Act, 1952, chapter 22, section 7, exempted several categories of employees from the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. In 1968 a review of the situation revealed how powerless the commission was in relation to performing such conventional functions as examining the qualifications of most candidates for transfer and promotion, regulating the classification system, or making recommendations on personnel matters." Prompted by the findings of the 1968 study and probably influenced by the active consideration of personnel administration at this time in the Province of New Brunswick and the constant criticism of paternalism in personnel affairs, the Newfoundland government asked the Public Administration Service of Chicago to examine the entire organizational structure of the provincial administration. Its work was followed up by the appointment on April 5, 1972, of the Committee on Government Administration and Productivity, whose detailed proposals were summarized in a White Paper in November, 1972. As one component of the overall plan for equipping government to meet the enlarged policy-making and managerial tasks of the future, the committee proposed a new Public Service Commission Act and a new Public Service Commission to "be assigned responsibilities to provide a wide range of personnel services . . . none of which are presently available."15 The new organization commenced operations in 1973. The evolution of central personnel agencies in various provinces and also in the federal government reveals the primary intention of stamping out patronage by establishing the merit system and assigning its protection to a politically neutralized agency. Unlike the federal commission, provincial agencies were never given the statutory protection nor the resources needed to perform the task. Until World War II, provincial agencies remained ineffective and weak and their contributions toward entrenching the merit system in personnel administration just about negligible. It was the post—World War II period that forced many provinces to fulfil some of the promises implicit in their first ventures by enlarging the 25

CHAPTER TWO

one-man commission to a three-member body, as well as giving it responsibility to apply more effectively the measuring rod of merit for staffing purposes. At the same time, in provinces such as Quebec and the Atlantic provinces, governments did not wish to relinquish their hold on patronage. By circumventing civil service legislation, the provincial governments of Quebec and Newfoundland made their agencies ineffective, although the situation in Quebec later changed radically and most recent developments in Newfoundland reveal a similar trend. But it was the decade of the 1960s that saw the most important changes in the evolution of public personnel administration in the Canadian provinces. In some jurisdictions, such as Quebec, serious efforts were made to establish first the merit system; in other provinces, such as Ontario. the functions of these agencies were enlarged to conform to the broadened conception of new and more positive personnel functions. Most noteworthy, however, was the trend to transfer operational responsibilities of civil service commissions to departments of the civil service (Ontario and Quebec) or to a central personnel administration office (Alberta), or to shift some of the key personnel programs to treasury boards (New Brunswick and now Newfoundland). It is clear that the use of consultant firms from the United States has had a pronounced impact on several provinces in respect to this contemporary trend. CURRENT FUNCTIONS OF PROVINCIAL CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCIES STAFFING

Manpower Planning. With the exception of the federal Public Service Commission, provincial central personnel agencies have been slow to assume the function of manpower planning. At present the central personnel agencies in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec are making some efforts to appraise manpower needs. Assuming the continuing growth of provincial public services, it is imperative that all provincial agencies should extend their efforts in this direction. Determining future manpower needs in operating departments forewarns the recruiting agency of the type of candidates it will need to recruit and will enable it to prepare suitable classification structures. Attraction and Recruitment of Candidates. Central personnel agencies were established primarily with a view to recruiting candidates from a labour market that was assumed would be clamouring for government jobs. Hence central agencies tended to be relatively passive when confronted by the need to "beat the bushes" for qualified persons. The post— World War II economic surge created such a shortage of trained man26

Personnel Administration at the Centre power that central agencies were forced to adopt more positive tactics for attracting and recruiting candidates for the public service. All provincial central personnel agencies now maintain close contact with universities. colleges, high schools, and other technical institutions. They also advertise in local, national, and sometimes even in foreign papers to invite applications. In certain jurisdictions such as Manitoba, Quebec, and New Brunswick, civil service commissions. stripped of their other functions, have intensified their staffing efforts. These efforts are further described in chapter 6. Selection. Central personnel agencies of Canadian provinces have generally sought the cooperation of departmental authorities in making final selection of applicants, although they may differ in their approach. Ontario has delegated much of the selection authority to departmental officials, and its central agency now performs a postaudit function. In provinces such as Alberta. Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and British Columbia, there is also a trend toward delegating the selection function to departmental management. For the future, this trend is likely to be confirmed: the selection function will be handled by departments, while the central personnel agencies will continue to recruit candidates and therefore audit the departmental selection process to ensure that it is in accord with centrally established guidelines. Appointment and Probation. It is the statutory duty of central personnel agencies in Canada to appoint or audit the appointment of a candidate to the government service, and to see to it that, after the expiry of the probationary period, either the candidate gets permanent appointment or his service with the government is terminated if the departmental recommendation is adverse. The exceptions to this arrangement are found in Newfoundland where both appointment and discharge (at least until the new proposals are implemented) have been performed by departmental management; and in Quebec (articles 33 and 34 of the Civil Service Act) and Alberta (section 18.1 of the Public Service Act, 1968) which vest this responsibility in department heads. Transfer and Promotion. All central agencies assist departments and individuals in transfer cases. However, with respect to promotion in Quebec, it is the Civil Service Commission which conducts regular promotional competitions in which employees can compete at any time and if successful they can get promotions when vacancies occur. In other jurisdictions, central agencies generally wait until they are informed by departments of a vacancy and then proceed with internal promotional competitions. The fear of job obsolescence created by such contemporary developments as 27

CHAPTER TWO

electronic data-processing and other technical innovations puts a new pressure on central personnel agencies to pay more attention to manpower planning and to the behavioural problems of employees faced with insecurity stemming from technological change. The transfer of employees, particularly those declared redundant as a result of such technological change, is a problem that must be handled humanely and equitably. Here, a central personnel agency can ensure that such considerations are not overlooked by departmental management.'° POSITION CLASSIFICATION AND PAY DETERMINATION

Until recently the federal and provincial central agencies were required to classify positions and recommend pay scales for employees to treasury boards or similar agencies. With the advent of collective bargaining in the government service, several provinces and the federal government have transferred classification and pay-determination functions to other central agencies. For example, in Manitoba the Management Committee of Cabinet is now responsible for classification and pay determination; in New Brunswick the Treasury Board, through its Personnel Policy Division, handles these functions; the proposed plan for Newfoundland also follows this pattern. At the federal level the Public (formerly Civil) Service Commission no longer controls classification and pay-plan functions, as these have been transferred to the Treasury Board. These examples point toward the realization that collective bargaining and its impact on pay plans and classification of positions should be handled by an agency of government which is also responsible for general management of expenditure. However, a number of provinces, such as British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia, have allowed these functions to remain with the central personnel agencies. In Newfoundland its Civil Service Commission was never given these functions and they will be undertaken by a reinforced Treasury Board. In Ontario, after a ten-year period when such functions were assigned to a Department of the Civil Service, the decision taken in 1972 once again restores these functions to the Civil Service Commission. Quebec, on the other hand, has retained classification responsibilities in its commission but assigned responsibility for pay-plan negotiations to its Department of the Civil Service. GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT

Grievances can arise from such departmental disciplinary actions as suspension, demotion, withholding salary increments, and dismissal; from disputes arising out of working conditions of employees; or from classi28

Personnel Administration at the Centre fication of positions. These three types of grievances, discussed in detail in chapter 9, can be settled either through machinery in which a central personnel agency may be involved or through other channels established beyond the jurisdiction of the central personnel agency. Variations are found among Canadian provinces. For the grievances arising out of disciplinary actions taken by departments against employees, the central personnel agencies of British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia act as appellate bodies. In the remaining provinces other channels are open to grievers. A similar arrangement exists with respect to grievances arising out of working conditions; but if collective agreements have been signed, central personnel agencies handle appeals only from nonunionized employees. For grievances arising out of classification of positions, the central personnel agencies of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, Prince Edward Island, and Nova Scotia are either the final body of appeal or arc involved in intermediate stages of the appeal procedure. The prevalence of arrangements which find the agency that is responsible for position classification also acting as a final or intermediate appeal body appears to be inconsistent, that is, to be a judge in one's own cause. So far only New Brunswick, with its independent Grievance Review Board, and Alberta, with its Classification Appeal Board, appear to have recognized and done something to correct this anomaly. TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT

Rapid technological changes coupled with expanding functions of governments have made the earlier concept of job classification difficult to adhere to in government service. Previously it was thought that a trained and qualified person, either from within or without the public service, would be available for any specific function. As government programs came to challenge the capacity of the labour market to provide the right skills in sufficient quantity, central personnel agencies were faced with the prospect of improving the skills of employees by in-service training. In some cases such training even became imperative if employees were not to be left in obsolescent job categories. Canadian central personnel agencies were late to appreciate the benefits of having training and development programs. At present, besides the federal Public Service Commission, which took the initiative in this respect, agencies in provinces such as British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick are providing several training and development facilities. Most recently the central personnel agencies of Saskatchewan and Prince Edward Island have initiated training programs, while in Quebec, as of 29

CHAPTER TWO

1969, the Civil Service Department was assigned this responsibility. The White Paper proposals for Newfoundland indicate these functions will now be shared by commission and Treasury Board. EMPLOYEES' MEDICAL AND OTHER BENEFITS

Some central personnel agencies administer hospital and medical insurance plans, some operate the superannuation scheme, and others provide postretirement services. But as many provinces have their own government-operated hospital and medical insurance plans for all citizens, central personnel agencies are relieved of this work. In all jurisdictions, though, a separate civil service superannuation board handles pension plans. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS

Collective negotiation for wages and working conditions came late in the government service. Saskatchewan was the first Canadian jurisdiction to start collective bargaining with its employees, and as its Public Service Commission appeared to be the only suitable agency to handle the function, the provincial government decided to ask it to negotiate with employees. Later, in 1962, when Ontario recognized the right of its employees to negotiate collectively, the Civil Service Commission was also asked to handle this function. Subsequently, this function was transferred to Treasury Board, the agency responsible for budget control and capable of speaking on behalf of government on fiscal matters. In 1965 this responsibility reverted to the Department of the Civil Service from where it was transferred to the Civil Service Commission when the department was abolished in 1972. In Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and British Columbia, it would also appear that the Civil Service Commission is or will be used for this purpose. In all other provinces, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Quebec, and Newfoundland, either Treasury Board or the Management Committee of Cabinet or the Department of the Civil Service has been assigned this function. On the whole, though the pervasive preference still seems to award this function to the public service commission, the logic of divorcing collective negotiations from the agency concerned primarily with staffing the public service and placing them with the agency primarily responsible for dealing with budgetary problems would call into question the current preference. PERSONNEL RESEARCH

Personnel research is probably the most neglected function, for very few jurisdictions have any adequate research units. At the federal level 30

Personnel Administration at the Centre some attention has been directed to appraising tests and examinations or analysing such problems as the procedural defects in promotional competitions. In the provinces there is even less evidence of concern for such matters, to say nothing of such vital areas as the philosophy underlying staff training and development programs, or research into employee motivation as it affects performance on the job. At the federal level responsibility for personnel research after the 1967 reorganization, further described in chapter 3, was largely assigned to the Treasury Board. Among provincial central personnel agencies, only Alberta and Ontario devote some energy to this vital role. In Alberta, there was, until a reorganization in 1971, a Research and Systems Development Division, which undertook research on program budgeting and organizational problems. These functions have now been taken on by the secretariat of the Personnel Office. In Ontario, personnel research remains attached to training and development (designated as General Service Branch in 1972) in the Civil Service Commission. In Quebec, personnel research is undertaken both by the Civil Service Department and by the Civil Service Commission on personnel functions coming under their respective jurisdictions. In the main, however, this function still languishes in a relatively underdeveloped state in all provincial jurisdictions. EMPLOYEES' SAFETY AND ASSISTANCE IN THEIR ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS

The modern public service does not operate in an environment where the only physical injury could come from cutting oneself on a letter opener or slipping near the water fountain. Many governmental functions involve machine operation or laboratories where lethal gas or acids may harm employees. In this area the British Columbia Civil Service Commission has done a singular and most praiseworthy job through its Accident Prevention Branch. The main thrust of the branch is to coordinate accident prevention exercises in departments such as Public Works, Highways, Ferries Division, and Forest Service. In Saskatchewan the Department of Highways, rather than the central personnel agency, pioneered a similar accident prevention program. In the provision of arrangements to cope with employees' personal adjustment problems arising from such contemporary phenomena as alcoholism and drug addiction, Alberta, Ontario, and Saskatchewan provide the best examples. Public service employees are no more immune to these societal pressures than other groups, and an ostrichlike posture by governments as employers will not make the problems disappear. As a central personnel agency is separated from the operating departments, it is in the best position to help employees faced with such personal problems, though not necessarily by operating 31

CHAPTER TWO

the program itself. Other provincial jurisdictions might well look to Ontario's and Saskatchewan's example in seeking to deal with this far from inconsequential problem. REPORTING

Finally, all central personnel agencies have been given the statutory responsibility to report to their governments on the effective performance of their role under the legislation. This function can be used as a means for recommending changes needed for effective public service management; it can also be used as a power to expose flagrant violations of the merit principle—a kind of personnel ombudsman function; or it can be used to highlight the scarcity of staff and funds needed for efficient performance of their statutory responsibilities. Historically, apart from the early (but unsuccessful) missionary efforts of Dr. J. M. McCutcheon in Ontario, provincial civil service commissions have not shown much enthusiasm for pushing their reporting or recommending powers too far: their initially weak and insecure positions have probably produced a legacy of caution and a preference for a low profile in the bureaucracy. The role of central personnel agencies in all provinces in varying degrees has clearly moved beyond the older negative functions aimed at guaranteeing impartiality in selection and equitable treatment of employees to a broader range of service and leadership in public personnel affairs. It is also apparent that as the accent on positive staffing increases and many of the operating and managerial functions arc being assigned to separate executive arms—a department of the civil service, treasury board, or management committee—provincial governments are now seeking to establish a clearer functional demarcation for central personnel agencies acting as service arms to senior management and performing independent auditing or appellate functions. In determining which components of the total package of manpower management functions should be assigned to the central personnel agency, a reconciliation must be found between the historic objective of maintaining a judicious eye on the merit principle and at the same time the emerging role of partner in managing a complete manpower program. Proper performance of the first task—a watchdog role—necessitates an arm'slength relationship between the central personnel agency and top management. And yet, top executives are accountable for the efficient use of human resources and are loath to leave this function in the hands of an agency outside their control. For the provinces, the achievement of the necessary compromises to meet this inherent contradiction has not been as difficult as it proved to be for the federal government. In the latter 32

Personnel Administration at the Centre case the central agency acquired an institutional independence that provincial civil service commissions never achieved. In the decade of the sixties, both federal and provincial governments have been seeking to resolve the dilemma by reallocating many significant components of manpower management to central financial control agencies or to departmental managers. This approach was adopted by the federal Royal Commission on Government Organization, and most provincial governments have been cautiously moving in the same direction to bring the performance of major personnel functions closer to executive supervision and guidance. It is worth noting that responsibility for fostering this trend to increasing absorption of personnel management into the top chain of executive command stems in part from the numerous studies conducted in nearly all provinces by such outside consultant bodies as Public Administration Service of Chicago. The logic of the approach followed by such consultants, it must be surmised, is that the need for an independent guardian civil service commission is no longer a matter of great concern. This proposition can be sustained by noting that technological advances have removed the expectation that any person could handle any government job. Now, for many positions an intensified, specialized education is required before a person can be considered for most appointments. Moreover, the capacity of the mass media to publicize abuse of the appointing power acts as some sort of generalized check on the patronage proclivities of politicians. Finally, the recent advent of collective bargaining has provided an internal watchdog procedure with which to contest inequitable personnel decisions that may be based on old-fashioned grounds of personal or partisan favouritism. When these safeguards for preserving the merit principle in government employment are placed beside the traditional role of civil service commissions, which has been seen as sacrificing positive manpower management for the sake of maintaining negative controls on management, the question is raised whether such central bodies have become redundant. It is clear that all provincial jurisdictions have not been fully convinced that the case for abolishing their central civil service commissions is valid. While recognizing that many of the personnel functions previously assigned to independent commissions should now be brought more directly under line management, there is still a strong preference shown for leaving with the central civil service commissions at least three roles: an advisory role on overall governmental manpower policies; an auditing role to ensure managerial compliance with these policies; and a judicial or ombudsman role to ensure that civil servants have access to an appellate court with respect to individual complaints against management decisions. 33

CHAPTER TWO

The proper performance of these functions requires independence and preferably collegial decision-making—all of which are provided in the existing civil service commissions, When, as is most frequently the case, commissions still participate in the programmatic aspects of personnel administration, for example, in managing staffing or classification programs, their judicial role in hearing appeals arising out of the implementation of the programs is called into question. In these circumstances, a separate, autonomous grievance appeal board would appear to be an appropriate addition in order to cope with those matters that are not subject to collective bargaining and thus capable of being brought before the adjudicative agencies provided in the contracts. In short, by preserving a distinction between legislative-policy functions, operating functions, and adjudicative functions, it may prove possible to establish a more appropriate allocation of the manpower management tasks to civil service commissions, to top and departmental management, and to relevant adjudicative agencies. That this allocation has not resulted in a single common pattern for all provincial governments in their disposition of their manpower management tasks is apparent from what has been reported in this chapter and will become even more apparent in the following chapter in which the growing prominence of the governments' central financial control agency is described.

34

Chapter Three Emergent Role of Treasury Boards in Personnel Administration

ALTHOUGH THE LOCUS OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION in Canada, at both federal and provincial government levels, has traditionally been a central personnel agency, in the period after World War II another central agency, commonly termed "treasury board" and with a lineage more ancient than civil service commissions, began to enter the arena of manpower management. The decade of the 1960s has witnessed a continuing effort on the part of both federal and provincial governments to sort and reallocate between these two agencies the numerous functions now seen to be appropriate for the management and development of each government's labour force. This process of realignment of functions began at the federal level in the depression years of the early thirties when an economy-minded government turned to its Treasury Board, relying on its statutory power to advise the Cabinet on "all matter relating to finance, revenue, expenditure."' Its new-found capacity to restrict or abolish positions, limit promotions, and reduce salaries placed the board in direct competition with the Civil Service Commission. This competition and overlapping of responsibilities were not reduced when the Financial Administration Act of 1951, chapter 12, section 5, conferred on the board (among other financial control powers) authority to regulate "the terms and conditions of the employment of persons in the public service" and the power to make regulations for "the efficient administration of the public service." A series of inquiries, the Royal Commission on Administrative Classifications in 1945 (Gordon Commission), the report on personnel administration in

CHAPTER THREE

the public service, 1958 (Hecney Report), and the 1962 Royal Commission on Government Organization (Glassco Commission), continued to wrestle with the seemingly intractable problems of achieving a sortation of public personnel managerial responsibilities that would reduce the debilitating conflict between Treasury Board and Civil Service Commission. The acceptance of collective bargaining in the mid-sixties further confused the situation and made all the more imperative a satisfactory resolution of the contradictions in the top-level system of personnel management. As a result of important enactments in 1967, substantial reconciliation of these controversial issues was achieved. A separate ministerial port: folio, designated President of Treasury Board, was established and the secretariat of the Treasury Board, which had previously been a division of the Department of Finance, was transferred to the new portfolio. The amended Financial Administration Act, chapter 74, section 1, reaffirmed Treasury Board's authority over personnel management in the public service. which was further buttressed in the Public Service Staff Relations Act by designating Treasury Board as the employer for purposes of negotiating collective agreements with staff associations. The new Public Service Employment Act of 1967 provided a corresponding definition of the Civil Service Commission's functions and the commission was renamed the Public Service Commission. The reaffirmation and extension of the authority of Treasury Board in the area of personnel administration necessitated an internal remodelling of the staff working under the President of Treasury Board, which followed rather closely the proposals made by the Glassco Commission in 1962.2 Separate divisions under one of the major branches of the Treasury Board—the Personnel Policy Branch—now are responsible for the determination of manpower requirements; classification of positions; pay determination, working hours, leave, and standards governing other physical working conditions; staff relations, including the coordination of bargaining policy, negotiation of collective agreements, handling of grievances, direction and guidance to departments on the administration of collective agreements.3 The Public Service Commission has emerged, as a result of all these transactions, shorn of many of its traditional functions, but it retains its major operating function of staffing the public service and/or auditing the departments' staffing performance, as well as serving as a final court of appeal on certain types of grievances and appeals lying outside the terms of collective agreements.4 These functions which are far from residual do, however, represent a bare minimum of those powers which relate to the commission's historic task of preserving the merit principle. In addition, the Public Service Commission has been vested with special responsibility for 36

Emergent Role of Treasury Boards facilitating the use of two official languages in the public service and retains responsibility for promoting staff development and training. Among the provinces a similar evolution has occurred, perhaps with less difficulty because in most instances the early civil service commissions had not acquired the same key powers over personnel administration that had been accorded to their federal counterpart; consequently, there was not the same institutional entrenchment to produce competition. Moreover, treasury boards were not as potent or as well staffed as the federal Treasury Board came to be, and, again, the sortation of new personnel functions that had to be developed rapidly after World War II was accomplished with less rancour and friction. A brief survey of the emergent role of treasury boards in the provinces will reveal three patterns: one that still preserves the traditional central role of personnel manager for a public or civil service commission; a second that is closely modelled on the federal pattern summarized above; and a third that is a modification of the federal model but with the same trend toward removal of certain key personnel functions from the civil service commission. British Columbia provides one of the best illustrations of the first pattern just mentioned in that the Civil Service Commission continues to preside over nearly all aspects of personnel administration and has been designated as the employer's representative in the 1973 legislation that authorizes collective bargaining. The key to this pattern is to be found in the fact that Treasury Board, though long an informal subcommittee of Cabinet (chaired by the minister of finance, who for years has also been the premier), has never had a supporting staff of its own. The committee of four has concentrated on budgetary control by reviewing all departmental estimates and setting priorities. In this process, the board controls additions to staff by approving classifications and all new positions recommended by the Civil Service Commission. The Systems Analysis Branch of the Directorate of Data Processing and Research in the Department of Industrial Development, Trade, and Commerce makes recommendations to the board on organization and methods. Beyond these functions the Treasury Board sets per diem meal allowances, mileage rates, and the salaries of deputy ministers. The last operation provides a ceiling for the general salary revisions recommended for the board's approval by the commission. Obviously, the long-anticipated collective bargaining regime inaugurated in 1973 will have profound consequences for both the Treasury Board and the Civil (now Public) Service Commission. Alberta has developed in much the same fashion as its Western neighbour. Beginning with a Treasury Board that was an informal committee of Cabinet until it was given a statutory base in 1966,5 Alberta reposed 37

CHAPTER THREE

most personnel administration functions in the Office of Public Service Commissioner. The apparent motivation for giving statutory recognition to Treasury Board was the decision taken in 1965 to negotiate a pay plan with the staff association and the conferral by Order in Council in 1966 of authority to represent the government in negotiations with the Civil Service Association with respect to revisions to the official pay plan and terms and conditions of employment throughout the public service.° Such other personnel administration functions as the board possesses, for example, the approval of new positions at the time of estimates review, are akin to those exercised by its counterpart in British Columbia. Its staff of eight employees (in 1969) are covered in the budget of the Treasury Department, whose minister is chairman of the board. It would appear, in fact, that most recent changes which will institute a full system of collective bargaining have resulted in the creation of a Finance, Priorities, and Co-ordination Committee of Cabinet which seems to have embraced Treasury Board. Moreover, the Office of Public Service Commissioner has been assigned the responsibility for acting as the employer's representative for collective bargaining purposes; the function of the new cabinet committee presumably will be to set the financial parameters within which such collective agreements can be negotiated. In Saskatchewan, despite the emergence of a much more formal Treasury Board and the early adoption of collective bargaining, central personnel management functions have also remained with the Public Service Commission. It was in 1948 that Treasury Board, hitherto an accounting and audit committee of the Cabinet, was transformed into a committee for financial management generally and budgetary review in particular. To this end, a Bureau of the Budget was created to provide staff backing. Initially, the bureau was located as a division in the Economic Advisory and Planning Board but was subsequently transferred to the Treasury Department. The Administrative Management Division in the Budget Bureau functions as an internal management consultant, otherwise the Bureau's role in assisting the Treasury Board with public service problems is confined to recommending the permanent personnel establishment for each department as part of the annual estimates review. In effect, although the Public Service Commission negotiates collective agreements, Treasury Board controls the salary bill by providing the commission with the financial terms of reference. The fact that classification work is handled by the commission's Classification Branch would appear to run counter to Treasury Board's interest in maintaining control over the salary bill, for classification and pay plans are closely related. However, the commission does refer to the Budget Bureau classification situations in which it appears organizational or procedural deficiencies may require the attention 38

Emergent Role of Treasury Boards of the Administrative Improvement Division. Although the Royal Commission on Government Administration (possibly borrowing a leaf from the pages of the federal Glassco Commission) suggested in 1965 that Treasury Board be given enlarged personnel management functions, the proposals were not acted on. As a result, the Public Service Commission continues to carry responsibility for such matters as classification and pay negotiations which have in other provinces and at the federal level been moving over to treasury boards. Two of the Atlantic provinces, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, can also be grouped with the three most westerly provinces, inasmuch as their Civil Service Commissions continue to retain the bulk of the personnel administration functions. When Nova Scotia converted an informal committee of the Cabinet into a formal Treasury Board in November, 1968, and established a Budget Division to staff the board in August, 1969, no provisions were made for involving the board in personnel administration. Rather, the Budget Division's function was to concentrate on the preparation of annual estimates for submission to the legislature and to assess the performance of the current year's functions on a continuing basis. Inevitably, this financial concern embraces salaries and wages of the public service, but this is expressed in terms of totals and how they fit into overall departmental budgets. The budgeting and financial problems of Prince Edward Island were of such modest dimensions that the entire Cabinet in effect performed a treasury board role. In 1969 a budget committee of Cabinet was created and shortly after, subsequent to a study of the financial management of the province by P. S. Ross and Co. of Toronto in 1969, a Treasury Board was created. This move coincided with intense activity on the whole personnel administration front, not the least important aspect of which was the decision to inaugurate a collective bargaining regime. The almost simultaneous strengthening of the central financial and personnel management arms of government over a period of less than a decade has created a situation in which Treasury Board as the designated "government authority" undertakes negotiations with the assistance of a committee made up of representatives of the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury Board, and line departments, with the commission retaining responsibilities for most other aspects of managing manpower.? In the other two provinces, New Brunswick has developed and Newfoundland is in the process of developing an allocation of central personnel functions between Treasury Boards and Public Service Commissions that clearly parallels the federal pattern. Until 1968 the Treasury Board of New Brunswick acted as a committee of the Executive Council on all matters relating to finance, personnel establishments, and adminis39

CHAPTER THREE

trative policy referred to it by the Cabinets The minister of finance along with four members of the Executive Council constituted the Treasury Board, while secretarial and other administrative assistance was provided by the Department of Finance, whose deputy minister also acted as the secretary of the board. When in 1967 the Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public Service of New Brunswick recommended that the Treasury Board should act as an employer for the purpose of collective bargaining and that a special Personnel Policy Division be established under the Treasury Board,9 suddenly the responsibilities and scope of the board changed immensely from limited overall budgetary responsibilities in the related areas of personnel administration to its direct participation in implementing collective bargaining agreements and supervising other personnel functions. These included determining the manpower requirements of the public service and allocating and effectively utilizing manpower resources within the public service; determining requirements for the training and development of personnel in the public service and fixing the terms on which such training and development may be carried out; determining and regulating the pay, the hours of work, and leave of such persons, and any matters related thereto; providing for the awards that may be made to persons employed in the public service for outstanding performance of their duties; establishing standards of competence and discipline in the public service and prescribing the financial and other penalties, including suspension and discharge; establishing and providing for the application of standards governing physical working conditions of, and for the health and safety of, persons employed in the public service; determining and regulating the payments that may be made to persons employed in the public service by way of reimbursement of travelling." To achieve these aims, a Personnel Policy Division was established on April 1, 1968, and began to analyse the existing classification system in order to make suitable changes in the structure for the purposes of collective negotiations. Exempted positions were merged with those covered by the old Civil Service Act, and all have been rearranged into twenty-six occupational groups. Previously, there were no departmental personnel branches; but beginning in 1970 these began to emerge, just as in January, 1970, collective bargaining got under way. In short, the Treasury Board of New Brunswick has rapidly emerged with powers and responsibilities comparable to those of its federal counterpart. Newfoundland, like most of the other provinces, had a Treasury Board which had been created by statute in 1952 but had secured a secretariat only in 1967. A report prepared by R. Stuart-Kotze in 1968 on personnel administration recommended the creation of a Personnel Administration 40

Emergent Role of Treasury Boards Division in the board "to perform the functions of personnel administration, including job classification, pay research, employee relations and organization and co-ordination of training programmes for the Civil Service."" A cabinet committee on personnel administration was created to supervise the work of this division, as well as the wage and classification survey conducted by a consultant group, Public Administration Service of Chicago. In April, 1972, the Committee on Government Administration and Productivity was appointed to conduct a much broader survey of the organization of the Newfoundland government. In a subsequent White Paper in which the committee's recommendations were generally accepted, Treasury Board was cast not only in its traditional role as budget-developer and monitor of fiscal performance but also as "the principal management agency of government." In this latter role it would direct collective bargaining, administer the personnel classification program, and administer "the various policies and regulations considered desirable in guiding or governing departments as regards the use of public funds" for such purposes as personnel, accommodation, equipment, contracts, travel, and employee expenses. Since, as the White Paper concluded, "the Civil Service Commission provides virtually no personnel services to line departments and other agencies," it was not a question of shifting previously existing personnel administration functions from commission to Treasury Board but rather of assigning new roles to both agencies. The White Paper, in proposing new public service legislation, envisaged a strengthened Public Service Commission whose central task would be staffing the public service and, in conjunction with Treasury Board, developing "an extended staff training and evaluation programme."'" It would appear that the allocation of central responsibilities for manpower management in Newfoundland closely parallels the developments previously noted at the federal level and in New Brunswick. Manitoba, with but a variation in the title of treasury board, has been developing almost precisely the same pattern as has been described for New Brunswick and Newfoundland. From its existence as a separate province, it has always had a Treasury Board—a committee of Cabinet for controlling financial affairs. In September, 1968, the Management Committee of Cabinet, equipped with its own secretariat, virtually displaced Treasury Board and assumed a much wider range of management functions than had hitherto been possessed by Treasury Board. In addition to the conventional functions of reviewing budget submissions, undertaking budget analysis and audit of programs, the Management Committee assumed responsibility for central data-processing services and received, largely by way of progressive transfer from the Civil Service Commission, such personnel management functions as control over establishments, 41

CHAPTER THREE

classification plan, training and development programs, and pay administration (including collective negotiations with the Manitoba Government Employees' Association). The Management Committee has indicated its intention of devolving to departmental managers the authority to classify and conduct training and development within guidelines established and presumably monitored by the committee's secretariat. Thus, in all but name, the sortation of central responsibilities in the area of personnel administration has produced a pattern not too dissimilar from the federal government's arrangements and those now to be found in New Brunswick and Newfoundland. The rapidity with which structural changes in the top-level management and decision-making apparatus have been made in Ontario over the past few years makes it somewhat difficult to categorize the present situation. Ontario had a Treasury Board as early as 1860,'3 but until 1954 it performed the nominal role of a committee of Cabinet in issuing orders and special warrants. It met only sporadically and had no permanent staff. As a result of a review undertaken by Woods, Gordon & Company, a proposal to provide staff for Treasury Board separate from the Treasury Department was adopted in the Financial Administration Act of 1954." Treasury Board thereafter began to hold more regular meetings, and following again a recommendation of the Committee on the Organization of Government and subsequent review of the appropriate staff structure for the board, a full-time secretary was appointed in 1963 to head up a new Program Analysis Branch and the existing Organization and Methods Services Branch. By 1965 an Automatic Data Processing Standards Branch and a Staff Relations Branch had been added, while in the following year legislative provision for the separate staffing of this enlarged secretariat, rather than staffing through designated personnel drawn from the Treasury Department, was made.15 While these measures were being developed and implemented in order to strengthen the financial management capabilities of the government at the centre, it will be recalled that the Civil Service Commission had been given a new and expanded mandate in the realm of personnel administration, beginning in 1962. At the same time, Ontario launched an innovative structure, the Department of the Civil Service, which at the time had no parallel in other Canadian jurisdictions. Since all these developments were occurring more or less simultaneously, the question of sorting out and allocating to three central agencies the various components of a personnel program had to be faced. To this end, in 1962 the Organization and Methods Services Branch of Treasury Board was requested by the Civil Service Commission to survey its organizational requirements. In the course of reporting on this issue, there was a flat rejection of the 42

Emergent Role of Treasury Boards model proposed for the federal government by the Royal Commission on Government Organization. "In Ontario," the Organization and Methods Services Branch concluded, "we feel there is no sound reason to transfer personnel functions to the Treasury Board. Of course the Ontario Treasury Board would retain its authority, subject to Cabinet, 'for any purpose necessary for the efficient administration of the Public Service' (Financial Administration Act). But this ultimate review and control would not mean Treasury Board staff should be organized to 'do' personnel work. In Ontario, we believe this should be a function of the [Civil Service] Commission."la This conclusion was accepted and promptly reflected in the legislation of 1962 which in broadening and strengthening the authority of the Civil Service Commission at the same time strengthened its capacity to "do" personnel work by creating an operating instrumentality designated as the Department of the Civil Service. During the better part of its ten-year existence, the fact that the chairman of the Civil Service Commission was also named deputy minister of the Department of the Civil Service reinforced the close working relationship between commission and department. And, as a further testimonial to the Treasury Board's acceptance of the central position of the Civil Service Commission and Civil Service Department in the area of personnel administration, the Staff Relations Branch, which had been placed in the Treasury Board secretariat, was transferred to the Department of the Civil Service. By the late 1960s what appeared to have been a definitive resolution of this complex sortation of top management functions was shattered once again by a fresh and far-reaching inquiry conducted by the Ontario Committee on Government Productivity. As a result of its recommendations, both the Treasury Board and the Department of the Civil Service were abolished, though when the debris had settled, it was difficult to ascertain whether the consequent new pattern constituted a radical departure from the previous one. In short, Treasury Board has resurfaced under a new title, the Management Board of Cabinet, whose chairman, holding a ministerial portfolio, presides over a secretary equipped with much the same branches that existed within the old Treasury Board secretariat. The staff of the Department of the Civil Service has been transferred to the Civil Service Commission, and while the chairman of the commission is no longer deputy minister of the Department of the Civil Service, he has been accorded the status of a deputy minister; and it is presumably in this capacity that he reports "up the line" to the chairman of the Management Board.17 What remains clear in all this manipulation is that the original sortation of personnel administration functions that confirmed the central position of the Civil Service Commission remains unchanged, 43

CHAPTER THREE

other than the arrangement which makes the chairman the sole reporting link to the chairman of the Management Board. That the Committee on Government Productivity was not altogether certain of this arrangement is revealed in its further recommendation that "the decision to leave the central supply of personnel services within the Government with the Civil Service Commission be reviewed by the Management Board within five years, with the object of transferring some of these services to the Ministry of Revenue and Government Services."18 The pattern proposed by the Committee on Government Productivity and accepted by the government of Ontario hearkens back to a similar solution recommended in the United States by the President's Committee on Administrative Management as early as 1937 for a number of so-called independent commissions. At that time the proposal was to make the chairman of a commission the chief executive officer reporting on the strictly operating and managerial aspects of a commission's work to a line department, while preserving a degree of autonomy for those semi-judicial functions that were exercised by the commission acting collectively. This rationale appears to have been applied to Ontario's Civil Service Commission, with its judicial functions —notably the handling of appeals—remaining autonomous within the collective jurisdiction of the commission. The Province of Quebec, in the late sixties, undertook a revision in its top-level management structures that in the realm of personnel administration followed closely the innovative model that was introduced by Ontario in the early sixties but which was altered by the adoption of proposals made by the Committee on Government Productivity. As in nearly all the other provinces, Quebec early had a Treasury Board which, in 1961, was made a statutory committee of Cabinet. Until 1965 Treasury Board's concern for personnel management embraced the conventional task of controlling totals by approving the complement for each department as part of its budgetary review function. However, the rapid increase in the number of public servants in the early sixties, accompanied by the adoption of collective bargaining in 1965, necessitated both a strengthening of the Civil Service Commission and the creation of two new personnel directorates. One of these, the General Division of Labour Relations (DGRT), was initially attached to the Executive Council; the other, the General Division of Manpower Analysis and Working Conditions (DGAECT), was located in the Treasury Board. In 1968 a General Division of Organization and Development (DGOT) was created and placed in the Treasury Board. Late in 1969 a Department of the Civil Service was created by the transfer from Treasury Board and Executive Council of the three general divisions just mentioned. With relatively minor amendments, the most important of which 44

Emergent Role of Treasury Boards brought pay research and negotiation of collective agreements under an umbrella Directorate of Labour Relations in the Public Service, the Department of the Civil Service continues to fulfil its threefold mandate: proposing policy to the government for increasing the effectiveness of public servants; advising the government on working conditions in the public sector; negotiating and administering collective agreements." With this allocation of broad personnel management functions to the department, the Civil Service Commission has retained two broad categories of responsibilities, namely, staffing the public service—including recruitment, selection, promotion—and classification and inspection, all of which have been the commission's basic assignments since 1943.2" As for Treasury Board, the Financial Administration Act which came into effect on April 1, 1971, provides for a significant delegation of Cabinet's decisionmaking powers to the board "in all matters respecting the approval of organization plans for government departments and bodies, the civil servants required for management of such departments and bodies, the conditions of employment of their staff and the preparation and application of the general administrative policy followed in the civil service." In effect, this means that Treasury Board has the final approval of recommendations emanating from the Department of the Civil Service on such matters as reorganization or conditions of employment or recommendations from the Civil Service Commission on such matters as classification and salary rates. However, the act specifically reserves to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council "the approval or authorization of arrangements or agreements, the retirement of the deputy minister or other officers of equivalent rank, the conferring of powers and duties, and appointment or dismissal."2' The major events of the decade of the sixties—the tremendous increase in the size of provincial bureaucracies and the advent, in one form or another, of collective bargaining—have placed heavy pressures on governments as employers to develop much more sophisticated and positive manpower management programs than were required in previous years when a negative and authoritarian doctrine of control or policing appeared as the prime imperative. The results for the central apparatus of management have been to broaden the jurisdiction and functions of the commissions and to bring treasury boards into a supportive participatory position, which in some instances led to competition and conflict with commissions and led inevitably to the assertion of the preeminence of treasury boards in making key personnel decisions that had significant financial and budgetary implications. The somewhat confusing and by no means common pattern of top management concern for personnel functions which has been outlined evidences the difficulty of deciding which 45

CHAPTER THREE

elements of the complex package of personnel administration responsibilities should be appropriately placed with commission, treasury board, or management committee/board of Cabinet, or, as in the unique case of Quebec, with a department of the civil service. This conundrum, for which there seems as yet no fully agreed common solution, is further complicated, especially in the large provinces, by the introduction of yet another dimension forcibly presented by the Royal Commission on Government Organization in the early sixties, namely, "let departmental managers manage."

46

Chapter Four Personnel Administration in Departments

EFFECTIVE DEPLOYMENT AND SUPERVISION of human resources is probably the most important responsibility assigned to management, and, in line with the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, the personnel functions in provincial departments rest with the deputy minister and other line administrators who constitute the top management group. However, as previously noted, to the extent that concern for the merit principle led to the introduction of central personnel control or policing agencies, departmental managers found their responsibilities either shared or seriously curtailed. Moreover, even where relatively weak control agencies existed —as was true in most provinces—the early conception of personnel administration as a simple set of routine tasks tended to persist in defiance of developments that clearly indicated the inability of senior management to cope without the help of functionally specialized personnel support units. Today the handling of personnel functions requires not only fulltime attention but also specialized training. This development in the field of public administration has shifted the onus for personnel administration from line administrators to a specialized category of full-time personnel administrators to advise and assist the top management group in many departments. The organizational response of provincial government departments to meet the array of functions now deemed requisite for a well-rounded system of personnel administration reveals a rather mixed pattern. Where departments are relatively small, day-to-day personnel matters are handled by supervisory officers, leaving deputy ministers to cope with more important policy issues and to liaise with central control agencies. Even in larger departments it has been a standard practice to allocate personnel

CHAPTER FOUR

administration work to an officer who also performs accounting, audit, and other housekeeping activities such as maintaining supplies and equipment and preparing the financial statement. Such a unit is generally known as an administrative services branch. A typical administrative services branch in a department in Saskatchewan, for example, is responsible for budget formulation and control; accounting; personnel administration; mailing, printing, and provision of office supplies and stationery; property and equipment control; and sometimes legal and staff training facilities for other branches.' Its role is generally of a support nature, and it is established with the primary purpose of assisting the deputy head and branch heads of a department in accomplishing their objectives. Most departments in most provinces adhere to this arrangement whereby personnel administration functions are handled as part of a number of other supportive functions in an administrative services branch. Separation of personnel functions from other support or auxiliary services is a relatively new phenomenon and has by no means been universally accepted. Accordingly, the number of those engaged full-time in departmental personnel work constitutes a very small proportion of the total supervisory staff. As an instance, our survey of the civil service of Ontario showed that for 1966 there were only 118 full-time departmental personnel officers in a civil service which totalled nearly 46.000. In British Columbia, the first experiment with a separate personnel administration unit in a department occurred in 1950 in the Department of Highways. Since then, six other departments have established personnel branches: B.C. Forest Service (1951), Department of Social Welfare (1958), Liquor Control Board (1958), Department of Public Works (1961), Attorney General's Department (1964), and B.C. Ferry Service (1964). These branches generally have one personnel officer and some clerical employees. The main function of departmental personnel branches in British Columbia is to provide liaison service between the department and the Civil Service Commission. As there is a centralization of power and responsibility for personnel administration functions at the Civil Service Commission, departmental personnel branches perform very limited personnel functions. In Alberta, although there were administrative services divisions or branches in several departments, separation of personnel functions from other administrative work came in the early 1960s. From a tendency toward strong centralization, which started in about 1957-58 when an amendment to the Public Service Act of 1954 gave extensive powers to the Office of Public Service Commissioner, a reversal came during 1965 when collective bargaining began to be introduced in the province. In August, 1966, a decision was reached by the public service commissioner 48

Personnel Administration in Departments to accelerate the decentralization of personnel administration functions in a planned way. Three reasons were advanced in support of the decision. First, the advent of collective bargaining and the need to administer collective agreements had brought into sharp focus the desirability of involving the local supervisor and the departmental personnel officer. Second, the growth and complexity of the government service had reached the point that the centrally administered personnel programs were too remote from day-to-day problems to deal effectively with them as they arose. Third, good communication with the work force was felt to be necessary and could best be accomplished effectively by departmental officials through their fuller involvement in the personnel program.'- It was also reasoned that the central personnel agency should concentrate on certain issues such as manpower-planning programs to project manpower needs as an aid to staffing, budgeting, and program evaluation; a management advisory services program to assist departments to evaluate and improve administrative procedures and organization, and to provide an advisory role on personnel administration to government boards, corporations, and agencies which were facing similar problems. A policy statement from the public service commissioner set the tone for new development in Alberta: "It is the policy of the Government of Alberta to delegate to departmental management the authority for personnel decisions within the limits of service-wide uniform standards and to secure departmental participation in the setting of these standards."3 In accord with this pronouncement, departmental personnel branches were created in many departments and strengthened in other departments where they had come into being a few years earlier. As of December, 1972, all nineteen departments and agencies under the provisions of the Public Service Act had departmental personnel branches; some of these departments had established their personnel branches as early as 1960. In Saskatchewan, the traditional way of grouping personnel administration functions with other support services has been maintained in all departments, with the exception of the Department of Public Health which for a number of years had its own personnel branch. Although the Royal Commission on Government Administration (1965) had strongly recommended the creation of such departmental personnel units, it was not until the appointment of a new chairman of the Public Service Commission in 1973 that the central agency encouraged the concept of separate departmental personnel branches. In Manitoba, the personnel administration functions at the departmental level are grouped with other housekeeping activities under the director of an administrative services division. The only exception, until 1969, was the Department of Health and Social Services which, being the 49

CHAPTER FOUR

largest department and performing technical services, needed a separate unit to handle personnel matters. With the transfer of some personnel functions such as classification and collective bargaining from the Civil Service Commission to the Management Committee of Cabinet, a new development has occurred which may serve as a prelude to decentralization: certain personnel functions such as staffing, classification, and employee relations have been transferred to departments, which in turn may result in the establishment of departmental personnel branches. The Ontario government's attempt to establish departmental personnel branches is also recent. In 1959 the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario (Gordon Committee) found that only ten departments out of nineteen had a personnel branch. At that time many senior departmental officers, including some deputy ministers, were not in sympathy with a planned approach to personnel administration at a departmental level. The committee also found that the Civil Service Commission was still "sponsoring the use of personnel officers or personnel units within the individual departments so that the departments may be better equipped to deal with matters relating to employee training and development, etc."4 Even before publication of the committee's findings, the Civil Service Commission and the Civil Service Association of Ontario had stressed the need for trained personnel administrators to advise and assist in achieving the departments' primary goals—to find the bestqualified persons; to instruct and direct them efficiently; to recognize, develop, and use their highest skills and abilities; and to treat them fairly and equitably. Finally in 1959 the Civil Service Commission induced the government to pass an Order in Council under the Public Service Act, which authorized the establishment of a Personnel Council.° Among its several responsibilities, the Personnel Council was required to recommend the establishment of departmental personnel branches and to provide guidelines relating to administrative techniques and procedures to be implemented throughout the service. However, it was not until the publication of the Manual of Administration in 1965 that personnel functions were made mandatory for departments and agencies.° By 1966, seven years after the publication of the Gordon Committee Report, eighteen out of twenty departments (excluding the Department of the Civil Service which was then the managing arm of the Civil Service Commission) had their own personnel branches. In Quebec, where, until the late 1950s, personnel administration had traditionally been under the control of departments and the Executive Council (Cabinet), the need to delegate personnel functions from the central personnel agency had never arisen. This tradition was modified somewhat during the 1960s when the Civil Service Commission was made 50

Personnel Administration in Departments centrally responsible for staffing and classification. However, not all departments have separate personnel branches; only large departments have found it necessary to establish such branches, while small departments, like departments in other provinces, combine personnel functions with other financial, audit, and equipment (auxiliary) services. When the General Division of Manpower Analysis and Working Conditions became part of the Department of the Civil Service in 1969, its primary task was the supervision and coordination of the personnel administration operations variously performed by the Civil Service Commission and the operating departments. The government of Quebec has already acknowledged that the administration of personnel functions, like any other phase of public administration, is so much a part of the responsibilities of line managers that it should not be concentrated in a central controlling personnel agency. A personnel branch performs generally the following functions: staffing and classification (with the assistance of the Civil Service Commission), collective bargaining and collective agreement implementation (with the help of the General Division of Labour Relations in the Department of the Civil Service), and maintenance of personnel records and other matters. In New Brunswick, the Department of Public Works was the first operating department to create a separate personnel branch in 1954. Later, when the department split into the Department of Public Works and the Department of Highways, the personnel branch went with the Department of Highways. Subsequently two other large departments, Education and Health and Welfare, established their own personnel branches. Until 1968 no other department had its separate personnel branch, but rather incorporated personnel functions under administrative services branches. In 1968 when the government of New Brunswick decided to grant collective bargaining rights to its employees, and create a Personnel Policy Division in the Treasury Board, a conscious effort was made by the Treasury Board to establish personnel units in all departments and agencies for which the Treasury Board had to act as employer during collective bargaining. By January, 1969, each department had designated an officer to act as a full-time departmental personnel officer. Some of these were directors of administrative services branches, and others were known as administrative assistants. Unlike Alberta and Ontario, where departmental personnel branches are separate entities, the New Brunswick personnel offices are generally sections or units of the administrative services divisions. Personnel administration at a departmental level in New Brunswick is still at a formative stage, and in due course it will probably follow the trend toward separate personnel branches. 51

CHAPTER FOUR

In Nova Scotia, personnel functions have not yet been given separate organizational life in operating departments. The Civil Service Commission still functions, by and large, as a central agency operating personnel services for all departments. Similarly, in Prince Edward Island, departmental personnel branches do not exist, although personnel functions are performed in all departments either by the deputy minister or by an officer designated by the deputy head. As the provincial public service is small in size, the Civil Service Commission performs all necessary personnel functions adequately. In Newfoundland, departmental involvement in personnel administration hearkens back to the days of Commission government when deputy ministers used to be supreme in all personnel matters, subject only to the overriding power of the Governor in Council. As a consequence, the restricted authority of the Civil Service Commission had given departments a large role in personnel administration, although they had not developed separate personnel branches or offices. In accord with the White Paper proposals of 1972 on the organization of the public service, personnel administration functions are destined to be extended and centralized with the creation of revitalized departmental personnel units to liaise with the central agencies. The response of provincial governments to the recognized need for specialized departmental personnel units raises the practical question of what criteria to use in making the decision to establish such functionally specialized units. The number of employees in a department is one obvious criterion. Smaller departments with small staff do not need and perhaps cannot afford the luxury of a full-time personnel unit. In such instances, a senior administrative officer, frequently an assistant deputy minister, is made responsible. But what size of staff warrants consideration of a specialized personnel office? The Royal Commission on Government Administration (Saskatchewan) suggested in 1965 that "as a general rule, there should be approximately one departmental personnel officer for every 300 to 500 employees."7 A somewhat lower range, averaging about 250 employees, has been proposed by one scholar from the United States.8 In those provinces, such as Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, which have perhaps gone the furthest to date in developing specialized departmental personnel organizations, the viable number appears to average about 400 employees for each full-time personnel officer. However, where smaller departments have established personnel units, a proportion of one personnel officer to 250 employees is found. In Ontario, for example, in 1969 the Department of Mines with 322 employees and the Provincial Secretary's Department with 279 employees, each had a personnel branch; Alberta's Department of Mines and Minerals, with 238 employees in 1968, was the smallest department to have a personnel 52

Personnel Administration in Departments branch, while at the opposite extreme the Department of Highways had one personnel officer for every 735 employees. In addition to the numerical size of a department, its geographic spread often necessitates the establishment of a departmental personnel branch. For example, in Ontario, the Department of Highways which has many regional and local units spread across the province also has the biggest departmental personnel branch. Any department with regional and district or local administrative units needs a bigger staff in its personnel branch than a department in which staff is concentrated at headquarters. The diversity of operations and the complexity of programs also compound the need for establishing and enlarging a departmental personnel branch. For example, during 1966 the Ontario Department of Public Works had a personnel branch with nineteen persons to serve its 1,562 employees, yet the Department of Education with 2,439 employees had seventeen personnel staff members. The more diversified and complex departmental operations are the more the demand on human resources to provide leadership and coordination. A fourth and perhaps most potent factor influencing the trend to create specialized departmental personnel units has been the increasing strength of employee associations which has led to a growing recognition of the deleterious effects of impersonal treatment of a work force by a management wedded to old-fashioned authoritarian conventions of the state as a sovereign employer. Recognition of the human—even humane—element in personnel administration has greatly extended the conception of what is required in a well-rounded program and, with the accompanying recognition by government employers of collective negotiation procedures, has created the need for specialist personnel units. In those provinces, such as Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick, where collective bargaining has been established, departmental personnel units have been an inevitable organizational response. However, in other provinces—Saskatchewan is a notable example—where collective bargaining has been established but authority for personnel policies has been maintained by a central personnel agency, the emergence of specialized departmental personnel units has not occurred. This suggests that, in the last analysis, the primary factor dictating the need for departmental personnel specialists is the extent to which personnel management functions are devolved to departments and out of central control agencies. For example, Alberta's stated philosophy of decentralization accounts for the development of specialized departmental personnel units in that jurisdiction—a situation which has been paralleled at the federal level as well. The enlarged view of what should properly be expected of personnel managers within departments was comprehensively outlined in a mem53

CHAPTER FOUR

orandum produced on April 3, 1967, by the Office of Public Service Commissioner of Alberta. It is summarized here as a somewhat idealized model for departmental personnel administration to which all provinces might aspire but which none, given the already noted variable pattern of development, has completely achieved. Recruitment and selection: To assist the central personnel agency in determining sources of qualified candidates for the vacancies existing within the department; to advise the departmental management as to its responsibilities in selection and to provide help during the selection process; and to conduct competitions for departmental positions if asked for. Employee induction: To maintain an induction program whereby all new employees are introduced to the proper setting of their work and the obligations and responsibilities related to their work are communicated to them. Classification: To maintain and update all personnel records such as position description or specification forms; to work closely with the central personnel agency in the development or revision of classification standards; and to assist line managers and employees in describing the classification action taken by the central agency. Pay setting: To represent departmental views to the central agency (civil or public service commission or treasury board) in all matters affecting pay policies; and to conduct internal pay research and make comparisons with other departments and outside agencies if necessary. Salary administration: To make final recommendation to the deputy minister concerning the actual salary of all employees; and to make sure that adequate budgetary provision exists for all salary changes. Training and development: To recommend to departmental management what training programs would best meet the training needs of various categories of employees; to acquaint the deputy minister with the benefits of using outside service training and educational programs and with the names of those employees who want educational leave; to cooperate with the central agency on any inter-service training programs; and to conduct any seminars and training programs for departmental employees if required to do so. Manpower planning: To set up a manpower inventory within the department as a basis for advising the deputy head on future manpower needs, current rotation, promotions, transfers, and separations. Organization counselling: To advise all line supervisors as to the ramifications of organizational changes with respect to human relations, classification, manpower planning, recruitment, and training. Performance rating: To assist all supervisors in making performance ratings based on common standards and to audit such ratings. Administration of collective bargaining agreements: To be primarily responsible for administering all phases of the collective bargaining agreement related to the department and to see that interpretation and application of the agreement as it per54

Personnel Administration in Departments

tains to such items as vacations, sick leave, grievance handling, and salary administration are properly understood by all concerned. Other functions: To provide counselling services to any employee who wishes to know about career planning, needs interpretation of personnel policies, or requires referral to professional help for personal problems; to participate in the development of personnel policy through service-wide meetings of personnel officers; to advise the central agency if personnel policies have proved impracticable or too restrictive; and to maintain personnel records of all employees, as well as to ensure that all forms respecting personnel transactions are duly completed, authorized, and transmitted. In some provinces where little devolution has occurred, central agencies still retain responsibility for many of the functions listed in this model; in a few instances, such as manpower planning, neither central nor departmental units have demonstrated their capacity to measure up to the high standards established by the model. One example, chosen from a large department in Quebec, will serve to illustrate the extent to which fully established departmental personnel branches measure up to the Alberta guidelines for a comprehensive personnel program. In Quebec, the Personnel Branch of the Department of Education is organized into four sections. The Selection and Employment Section is responsible for planning manpower needs, cooperating with the Department of the Civil Service for service-wide manpower planning, assisting the Civil Service Commission in selection and promotion and in conducting competitive examinations where necessary, and approving all departmental personnel movements involving transfer, reclassification, and dismissal. The Labour Relations Section is responsible for implementing collective bargaining agreements affecting the department, providing interpretation of such agreements to employees, and supervising the implementation of such agreements in semi-autonomous institutions of education such as College d'Enseignement General et d'Education Professionnelle (CEGEP), Commission des Ecoles du Quebec (CEQ), and Syndicat Professionnel des Enseignants (SPE). The Personnel Management Section is responsible for placing all employees, cooperating with the Civil Service Department on all other personnel administration matters such as organizational changes within the department, undertaking research on the efficiency of employees and their working conditions, recommending names of individuals for initiative rewards, and administering all training programs. Finally, the Administrative Services Branch is responsible for maintaining all personnel records, salary administration, and grievance handling. It is important to note that the director general of a personnel branch in Quebec enjoys the same status as other senior line administrators and 55

CHAPTER FOUR

reports to his deputy minister directly. In other provinces, unless the department is large and has extensive operations, a departmental personnel director may be reporting to an assistant deputy minister or some other senior administrator, and thus possesses a lower status than his counterpart in Quebec. Personnel administration appears to have been awarded the highest status in Quebec and at the same time, in terms of the scope and sophistication of the functional units in the personnel branches of the larger departments in Quebec, comes closest to fulfilling the idealized requirements outlined in the Alberta memorandum. The wide diversity among Canadian provinces in recognizing the need for a separate personnel branch and awarding it appropriate status in the department is abundantly clear. The reasons for this diversity may, in the last analysis, boil down to the peculiar ambivalence with which all jurisdictions have viewed the role of the departmental personnel administrator. Is he, for example, to be viewed as the representative of the central personnel agency in the department or should he be considered the department's own agent to make representations to and, if need be, contest with the central agency? Some jurisdictions have seen the departmental personnel officer as an extension of the personality of the central agency and, as such, the bearer of the traditional task of policing the merit system. The lingering fear that departmental managers, if unchecked, might bring back the dreaded days of patronage against which the central personnel agency fought for several decades and for which it was established in the first place, helps to account for this view of departmental personnel officers. It was this view that the federal Royal Commission on Government Organization sought to modify in its recommendations for change. In conformity with its philosophy of "let departmental managers manage," it sought to establish a higher status for departmental personnel officers and proposed an extensive delegation of authority from the central agency to the departments. At the same time, wary of the need to protect the merit principle, it left the central agency with the task of establishing guidelines and auditing the performance of departmental personnel officers. Without proposing that departmental personnel officers be "agents" of the central power, it nonetheless recommended that the "presence" of the central control body make itself felt in the selection and planned rotation of personnel officers between departments and the central agency.`•' In provincial jurisdictions, as central personnel agencies began to gain power and status, they tended to screen and implant personnel officers in departments with the thought that they would help to enforce centrally imposed policies and procedures and would report any headstrong deputy or his subordinates to headquarters for such sanctions as were at the dis56

Personnel Administration in Departments posal of the central body. At the extreme, departmental personnel officers could assume the role of visiting "inspectors general" of the central agency. The opposite conception of the departmental personnel officer was that he should be a representative of the operating department who could be expected to serve the needs of his department whose loyalties and attitudes he should reflect. If there was conflict, he should defend his department. This conception took firm hold as concerns about patronage declined and as personnel administrative functions were enlarged and were seen to be a new component of departmental management's responsibilities. Between these two extremes—agent for the central agency versus agent of his department—a departmental personnel officer will have to find a reasonable middle ground. In the first place, in the interests of sound organization and management, the departmental personnel officer should place himself wholly at the service of his department. At the same time, departments have to recognize that they are a part of a whole organization, and because the central personnel agency is responsible under the law for developing service-wide personnel policies, they should cooperate with any enforcement of the rules and regulations and should not expect their personnel officer to behave like a lawyer trying to defend his client at any cost. Departments should provide proper status for their departmental personnel officer by placing him directly under the deputy head. As an employee of the department, a personnel officer should also develop a sense of professional responsibility, so that when he is asked to provide his opinion on a complicated problem by the central personnel agency, he should not appear to be unduly zealous in defending his department. Dedication to his profession, public personnel administration, would lead him to a better and more fair-minded appraisal of any conflicting issue. This position is well summarized in this statement: He is the personnel specialist who must advise his superiors on selecting and developing of the human resources in his agency vital for program accomplishments. He must communicate the personnel needs of his department to central personnel for interaction in developing appropriate agency-wide personnel policies. In turn he must have a thorough understanding of the policies adopted by the central personnel agency and be prepared to explain the policies and their rationale to line officers and then encourage compliance." The second source of ambivalence about the proper role of a departmental personnel officer, again contributing to the variations in practices 57

CHAPTER FOUR

already noted, is to be found in the "line-staff" dichotomy. Is personnel administration a staff or auxiliary function, divorced from the line, or is it part of management? This problem, as we have observed in chapter 2, has plagued central personnel agencies and has not been fully resolved even though the emergence of departments of civil service reflects an obvious intention of separating out the operating managerial functions and leaving the more purely staff and adjudicative functions with a civil service commission. This kind of structural separation cannot be as easily achieved within a department, and it would appear that the departmental personnel officer must learn to live with the ambiguity of a situation in which he is a partner on the departmental management team and cannot be separated from it by concepts, manipulation, or statute," and yet at the same time is something like the conscience of the department, with allegiance to professional standards and service-wide, centrally approved guidelines for which he must be an advocate. The centralization of personnel functions in a remote central agency created cumbersome and complex personnel operations which hindered rather than helped the smooth running of departmental operations. A maze of rules and regulations framed by the central personnel agency, although designed to check any abuse of the merit principle, extended the interval between the commencement and conclusion of important personnel transactions. This also resulted in wastage of manpower and in creating dissatisfaction amongst employees who had to wait for unusually long periods for decisions affecting them. Moreover, the nature of governmental functions has changed over the years. Departments have been asked to operate on a program-budgeting system, and they are being held accountable for their operations. They have found that, without an adequate voice in matters directly affecting their employees, they were not able to create a viable working atmosphere for mission-oriented programs. Coupled with this, the advent of collective bargaining and the need to administer collective agreements at the department level brought into sharp and immediate focus the need for full involvement of departmental managers in the administration of personnel policies and procedures. These factors gave rise to the recognition of a need for more sophisticated departmental personnel offices. Canadian provinces are still showing a varying recognition of the need for more involvement of departmental managers in personnel policies and the creation of departmental personnel offices. In those provinces where collective bargaining has been in operation for some time, such as Ontario, Alberta, Quebec, and New Brunswick, we find a ready acceptance of decentralization of personnel administration. The only exception from 58

Personnel Administration in Departments

the above general rule is Saskatchewan where traditionally the Public Service Commission has retained the authority for many personnel policies, including collective bargaining agreements. Departments there are not involved in implementing collective agreements, and hence the development of departmental personnel offices as recommended by the Royal Commission on Government Administration, 1965, has been delayed. Other provinces arc at different stages of development. Manitoba is evolving rapidly as, with the establishment of the Management Committee of the Cabinet, some personnel functions have been transferred from the Civil Service Commission and efforts arc under way for decentralization of many personnel functions to the departmental level. In the Province of British Columbia, although the first attempt to establish departmental personnel offices was made in 1950 in the Department of Highways, centralization of personnel functions within the Civil Service Commission coupled with the absence of collective bargaining has made departmental personnel offices less influential and more representative of the central personnel agency. In Newfoundland, a good possibility exists that departments may be given authority to manage their human resources within guidelines established by the Civil Service Commission and Treasury Board, both of which are currently being strengthened for their new managerial mandates. The remaining two provinces, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, are yet to develop a policy regarding decentralization of personnel functions. Personnel administration in itself cannot be accepted as a primary objective of any organization. Personnel administration at a departmental level must be kept in perspective and recognized as a service, though a very important one, to the overall organization to assist it in accomplishing its major program objectives. As such, the departmental personnel officer should hold a subordinate position in the departmental hierarchy. The evolving pattern of personnel administration, as it relates to departmental operations, appears to be reaching a compromise settlement of the ambiguities which we have observed to be implicit in the tasks of managing people in government service. The central agency (such as a civil service commission or a treasury board or both) will establish personnel policies and assume a postaudit function with some appeal responsibilities in cases of grievances, while the departmental personnel offices will be executing such policies as part of the management team. Such a compromise is designed to ensure maintenance of the merit principle and at the same time provide line managers with the specialized assistance in managing people that will ensure achievement of their program objectives.

59

Chapter Five The Staff Associations

ORGANIZATIONS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES have been functioning for several decades as trade unions in many European countries; however, in North America, their emergence is a recent phenomenon. Unlike their British or European counterparts, or even their counterparts in private industries, government employees in Canada for many years were organized largely as social clubs. One of the main reasons for the late development of unionism in government service has been the prevalence of the concept of state sovereignty that stood in the way of the industrialunion kind of activity permitted in the private sector. Second, unlike private industries, the identity of the employer, the state, was diffused among several layers of the administrative hierarchy which included many employees, thereby creating difficulties in making the necessary distinction between management and workers. For example, deputy ministers and officers of similar rank were also members of government employees' associations, a practice unparalleled in industrial unions. Third, unionism in government service meant employees' involvement in lobbying, pressure-group tactics, sometimes even affiliation with a political party, and possibly strike action. These actions were seen as undesirable by the public and its elected representatives, who were acting as employers. S. D. Spero has described the existing situation succinctly in the following words:

Government asserts that its relation to those who earn their livelihood in its service is different from the relation of private employers to their employees. To private employees government guarantees the freedom

CHAPTER FIVE

to organize, to bargain collectively with their employers and to strike. It claims, however, that the means used by workers in private employ to bring pressure upon their employers to improve their conditions have no place in the public service and that their use would represent a derogation of sovereignty and an attack on the authority of the state. Government insists that, in order to preserve the integrity of public authority, it must possess the right of final determination in all its employment relations.' Finally, as most government employees are white-collar workers, they have been reluctant to equate themselves with workers in private industries who were successfully employing trade union methods to improve their working conditions. Part of this self-perception among government employees is reflected in the name of their organization, which is generally referred to as a "staff association" or "government employees' association" rather than "government employees' union." In this chapter, we shall be using the term staff association to denote an organization of those government employees who fall in that category defined in chapter 1 as "departmental services employees," although it will be clear that some associations embrace a broader spectrum of government employees. HISTORICAL SKETCH

There has been no legislation in any Canadian province prohibiting government employees from organizing. Nevertheless, even at the federal level, with the exception of the postal workers, public employees began to organize only at the beginning of this century. Whereas the wide geographical spread of federal employees was one of the main reasons for the late development of unionization, the small number of employees in the provinces put off the birth of any organization. When federal civil servants organized, they tended to form several associations, some based on single occupational groups, such as the Canadian Postal Employees' Association and the Railway Mail Clerks' Federation, and some organized across all occupational groupings, such as the Civil Service Association of Canada and the Civil Service Federation. In the provinces, on the other hand, there emerged a general pattern of the single association whose membership was thrown open not only to civil servants but to those government employees who were beyond the jurisdiction of respective provincial civil service legislation. Historically, the emergence of staff associations has been spread over several decades: in provinces west of Quebec the associations date from the 1920s or earlier, whereas staff associations in the Eastern provinces have had a very recent origin, 62

The Stall Associations mostly in the 1950s. The associations established before World War II initially functioned primarily as social clubs or cooperative societies. British Columbia. Although attempts had been made after World War I to establish some social organization of British Columbia civil servants (mostly those employed in Vancouver), the first positive steps were taken in 1941 when the Vancouver Civil Service Association was organized. Simultaneously, the Institutional Employees' Association was organized at Essondale and Woodlands school. Subsequently, five other separate employee organizations were established within a year or two, with assistance from the Vancouver and Institutional Employees' groups. In May, 1943, these seven groups established a federation for the purpose of forming the British Columbia Government Employees' Association, which came into being in February, 1944. The association started with a membership of about 2,200 in 1944; reached 3,700 in 1946; 12,500 in 1968; and by 1971 it had approximately 15,800 members. (For further details, see table 7.) Until 1952 the association maintained good rapport with the government, and its suggestions for bringing improvement in personnel administration were seriously considered by various governments. In the 1952 election the Social Credit party came into power, bringing with it a suspicion that the association was sympathetic to the Liberal party. The attitude of the Social Credit government hardened further in 1959 when the association tried to resort to strike action for salary increases which were kept pending by the government for about two years. Militant action on the part of the association was met by the government discontinuing payroll check-off of dues privileges from October, 1960. The result was a considerable decline in the association's membership and annual revenue; for example, from $176,965 in 1959-60 to $112,188 in 1960-61. By May, 1967, the government restored to the association the privilege of payroll deduction of dues; however, the punitive mood of the Social Credit government during the early years of the 1960s perpetuated strained relationships between them and rendered impossible the achievement of collective bargaining rights. The 1972 election which brought the New Democratic Party to power changed the situation, and legislation was passed in 1973 to grant the long-deferred right of collective bargaining. The association changed its name to the British Columbia Government Employees' Union at the end of the 1960s. Alberta. The Civil Service Association of Alberta was established on March 19, 1919, with a membership of approximately 300 civil servants. Unlike other provincial associations which came into being primarily as 63

1921

1,000 16 4506 324 1,971

1911

600 -

600

N/A 260 12,000 2,600 3,800 4,550 N/A 23,210

15,140

4,889

4,275

1951

N/A 200 5,700 500 2,480 2,560 3,700

1946

N/A N/A 350 1,377 1,950 1,212

1941

2,000 275 1,300 700 -

1931

As of 1927.

Nom: N/A = information not available. °Information relates to SFPQ only.

SOURCE: Membership figures were obtained from associations through a questionnaire.

Total

Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec* Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia

Newfoundland

Province

40,337

N/A 300 1,511 18,000 3,836 4,140 6,550 6,000

1956

MEMBERSHIP OF PROVINCIAL STAFF ASSOCIATIONS, 1911-1971

TABLE 7

65,657

N/A 866 2,487 2,316 N/A 29,500 5,234 6,445 10,110 8,699

1961

143,149

8,500 1,668 6,771 3,300 30,000 38,486 10,000 7,793 20,869 15,762

2,350 1,088 3,291 3,810 17,134 31,500 5,935 7,117 12,786 6,569 91,580

1971 1966

The Staff Associations social groups, the Alberta association was formed to voice protests against poor working conditions and low wages paid to provincial employees. Such an attempt, however, was resented by the government, although salary raises were given. In 1921, when the United Farmers of Alberta party came into power, the association found the government more sympathetic to its cause. In 1922 informal joint consultation machinery was established, and the association was permitted to nominate three members to the Joint Council. The association continued its effort to upgrade working conditions and wages of its members, and in 1965 the province gave the right to negotiate to the association—a right that was extended in stages to provide genuine collective bargaining coupled with arbitration. In 1931 the association increased its membership to 700; 2,560 in 1946; 6,550 in 1956; 15,283 in 1969; and by 1971 it had 20,869 members. Saskatchewan. In 1913 a group of Regina civil servants founded the Saskatchewan Civil Service Association for the purpose of fostering social and recreational activities. Not only was its scope of activity confined but its membership was also restricted to those civil servants who were working at the Parliament Buildings. The government demonstrated its support for such an association by offering it a place in its Parliament Buildings, Regina. Soon after the founding of the association, the first world war broke out and the association virtually ceased to function until 1919. In 1920 a major reorganization of the association took place when it was decided to enlarge the membership by including government employees of the whole province. However, the first branches at Saskatoon and Weyburn were not formed until 1928. In 1927 the association membership totalled 450; in 1946, 2,480; and by 1971 it had 7,793 duespaying members. The association is the largest trade union in the Province of Saskatchewan. The association has had seven name changes since 1913, and the present name, the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association, came into effect on June 4, 1962. From 1920, when the constitution of the association was changed from an organization for fostering social and recreational activities to an association with the aim of improving general welfare and working conditions, it acted as a pressure group tolerated by the employer, submitting briefs, seeking interviews, and waiting for the unilateral decision of the government. As such, perhaps the most important achievement of the association during the period 1920 to 1944 was the enactment of the Civil Service Superannuation Act, 1927. Unquestionably the most important event in the association's history occurred in 1944 when the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF party) came into power, and, upon its direct insistence, the association joined the Trades and Labor Congress 65

CHAPTER FIVE

of Canada so that it might qualify for recognition as a collective bargaining agent for government employees in the forthcoming legislation, the Trade Union Act, which came into force in 1945. Thus, the association, to its pleasurable surprise, became the first civil service group in Canada to be granted collective bargaining privileges with the right to strike. Since then, the association has been regarded as a pioneer in the field of civil service collective bargaining, influencing personnel administration in neighbouring provinces. Manitoba. in 1921 a handful of civil servants, numbering sixteen, founded a social club, which continued to work as an informal organization until the end of World War II. However, during the late 1940s it started attracting increased membership in the province as well as inducing the government to bring some important improvements in the civil service. In 1947 a new classification plan, for which the association was instrumental, was put into operation. In 1958 the Manitoba Government Employees' Association was given statutory recognition so that it could represent civil servants on the recently formed Joint Council. The most important achievement of the association was in March, 1965, when the Civil Service Act was amended to allow it to enter into collective bargaining arrangements. From sixteen founding members in 1921, the association has increased its strength to 500 in 1946; 3,836 in 1956; 6,541 in 1968; and approximately 10,000 in 1971. Ontario. The Civil Service Association of Ontario was created in 1911 primarily to give a group of employees discount rates for their purchases, and for many years it functioned as a social club, arranging trips to Niagara Falls, convening social gatherings and get-together parties during the year. In 1927 the association was incorporated under the provincial Companies Act, with the result that efforts were made to turn the association into an organization interested in furthering the improvement in working conditions of its members. However, because of the depression period, an unsympathetic government, and later the advent of the war, the association did not achieve much for its members. It was in 1944 that machinery for joint consultation, the Joint Advisory Council, was established, giving statutory recognition to the Civil Service Association of Ontario for the first time. The association had a satisfactory working relationship with the government for many years mainly because Ontario civil servants enjoyed better salary scales and working conditions than those of other provinces. "The Ontario government had developed the practice of tying Ontario salary scales to those of the federal civil service. Thus an increase in 66

The Staff Associations federal scales was followed, in due course, by a similar adjustment in the province. This seemed satisfactory as long as the other provinces lagged behind. But when the staff associations in the Western provinces began to gain conditions of work that improved their relative status, the Ontario association felt compelled to re-examine its position."2 The association in 1956 presented a brief to the government, asking for regular meetings of the joint consultation body and insisting that as the federal scales were based on country-wide averages not corresponding to the higher living costs of Ontario, a separate procedure of salary determination be adopted. The association continued its pressure on the government and later, in 1958-59, it started seeking collective bargaining rights, while continuing to participate in the Joint Advisory Council. By 1962 the association formally withdrew from the council. Meanwhile, the government softened its stand against collective negotiation in the public service, and in 1963 Ontario employees were formally given this right, which, as in the case of Alberta, was progressively expanded into a genuine form of collective bargaining coupled with arbitration. Since 1963 the association has focused on the tasks of learning the technique of negotiation and preparing the membership through educational and training programs for all aspects of collective bargaining in the public service. The association has grown from 600 members in 1911 to 5,700 in 1946; 33,240 in 1968; and over 38,000 in 1971. It is not only the largest but also the oldest provincial staff association in Canada. Quebec. Quebec is the only province in Canada where two major organizations of civil servants have been formed. Civil servants employed at the provincial capital, Quebec City, founded l'Association des Employes Civils (AEC) sometime in the late 1920s.3 The second organization, l'Association des Fonctionnaires de la Province (AFP), came into being in 1938 and was located in the city of Montreal. The second association was set up mainly because a large number of provincial employees are concentrated in Montreal where English is predominant as the working language. These associations were established to promote the general welfare of employees, with special emphasis on social and recreational activities. The main aims of the AEC were: "Promouvoir le bien-titre des employes du Service Civil en general tant professionnellement que socialement; encourager leurs activites sociales, recreatives et artistiques et encourager l'entraide mutuelle de ses membres et de leurs dependants." An unsympathetic attitude taken by Premier Duplessis discouraged these two associations from uniting and expanding their activities beyond the recreational and cultural spheres. The premier also prohibited these associations under the Public Service Employees' Dispute Act, 1944, 67

CHAPTER FIVE

from engaging in any kind of activity or seeking affiliation with any trade union. The Duplessis regime was a period when Quebec government employees, unlike their brothers to the west of them, did not have any voice to represent their views and were practically subservient to the wishes of the regime. The situation prevailing during the period has been dramatically summed up in the following manner: Les fonctionnaires crevaient de faim. Leurs representants ne parvenaient a voir le Premier Ministre, leur patron, que quclqucs minutes par armee. Lcurs memoires n'etaient memo pas lus par le Premier Ministre, mais tombaicnt dans Ics mains de certains ministres, avant de trouver le chemin des oubliettes. C'etait l'ere dans laquelle nous vivions. Les fonctionnaires ne pouvaicnt pas parlor, encore moins agir. Deux fonctionnaires ont tentes d'organiser une assemblec de protet au Palais Montcalm, a Quebec, ils ont ete congedies. Les fonctionnaires vivaient sous le regime du baillon.5 The death of Duplessis in 1959 immediately provided a chance for staff associations to expand their activities and to seek a union of the two main groups. In 1959 the AEC, in association with other groups such as the AFP, approached the Sauve government, seeking permission to federate. On January 5, 1962, a General Council of Government Employees of the Province of Quebec was formally constituted. Suddenly, with the Liberal party in power, government employees were faced with the prospect of getting collective bargaining rights. The General Council, presenting a brief before the legislative committee on the civil service, suggested that it should be able to negotiate with the government on matters concerning working conditions and wages of all government employees in the province. It also suggested compulsory arbitration in case there was a deadlock. The General Council believed that once the collective bargaining right was given, it would automatically be recognized as the association. However, the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU) was trying very hard meanwhile to attract government employees and on July 25, 1961, it succeeded in establishing the National Union of Provincial Civil Servants—its name was changed to Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec (SFPQ) on September 26, 1962. Steps were taken immediately to recruit new members in all regions and to compete with the General Council. With the open support of the CNTU, the National Union was able to win a test case against the General Council when, on October 2, 1962, it requested recognition as a collective bargaining agent for employees of the Liquor Control Board. On April 3, 1964, this certificate was given. 68

The Staff Associations The struggle between the two organizations continued: the General Council tried to present itself as an organization representing civil servants from all departments and simultaneously seeking recognition for total provincial jurisdiction, while the National Union tried to seek recognition on an individual departmental basis. The rivalry between the two groups became so deep that the government decided to end it by vote. November 30, 1964, was fixed as the date to find out which organization could get a majority for recognition as sole bargaining agent for all provincial employees in the event that such a privilege would be granted through the legislation which was to come into force in 1965. For six months, until November 30, 1964, both organizations tried to discredit one another: the General Council saying that the National Union, because of its affiliation with the CNTU, was going to finance government employees' subscriptions to help strikes in private sectors and also alleging opportunism on the ground that the CNTU had done nothing during the repressive regimes of Taschereau and Duplessis. The National Union, in turn, countercharged the General Council with being the lapdog of the past regime, a creation of government which had never acted as a union but only as a cultural association. The vote overwhelmingly, by about 78 percent, favoured the National Union, which by this time came to be known as SFPQ, or the Syndicat. And so, after 1965, the Syndicat emerged as the major association of regular departmental employees in Quebec. In 1971 the Syndicat had approximately 30,000 dues-paying members. Eastern Provinces. Except for the Newfoundland Civil Service Association which was established by some senior civil servants as a social and cultural body in 1934, other provincial associations came into being only during the post—World War II period. Partly because of the very small size of the public services, the formation of staff associations in the Atlantic provinces has lagged far behind the rest of Canada. Employees may have been reluctant to form associations in those provinces because security of employment and recruitment depended also on the loyalty rendered by the employee or his supporter. Government employees as well were subject to an unsympathetic government attitude which did not favour an atmosphere in which civil servants could express their views through an association. This attitude was, of course, not confined to the Atlantic provinces before the World War II period, as other provinces faced similar situations. However, in the Atlantic provinces the unfavourable environment continued to linger into the war and postwar period. The postwar period saw measures taken in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to strengthen the central personnel function by appointing fulltime commissioners. Simultaneously, government employees realized that 69

CHAPTER FIVE

they should have some organized group to safeguard their rights. As a result, and with the consent of the provincial governments, the Prince Edward Island Public Servants' Association was formed in 1945, the New Brunswick Civil Service Association in 1954, and the Nova Scotia Civil Service Association in 1956. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the New Brunswick Civil Service Association's main objective was to encourage a steady rise in membership as well as to seek various benefits relating to improved working conditions. Meanwhile, the government of New Brunswick, being the first among the Atlantic provinces to recognize the need for granting trade union rights to its employees, appointed in 1966 a royal commission to report upon the question of employer-employee relations. Thus the advent of collective bargaining revitalized the spirit of the association, and a major constitutional change was made in 1968 to accommodate the newly acquired obligations. Also, it changed its name to New Brunswick Public Employees Association so as to be able to provide much broader scope to its membership. Previously, it had mainly been concerned with the employees working in executive departments. From 1968 on the association has tried to retain its prominence as the largest provincial employees' body, although it has faced severe competition from its rival, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, a union generally representing municipal employees but also gaining membership among provincial government employees. The association's membership has grown from 1,511 in 1956 to a high of 4,811 in 1968, but declined to about 3,300 in 1971. The constitution of the Civil Service Association of Nova Scotia was approved by the provincial government through an Order in Council in 1956, and the association started functioning from December 5, 1957; however, the Nova Scotia association had to wait until 1967 to be recognized as the official negotiating agent for provincial civil servants. Its membership has increased from 2,487 in 1961 to 3,291 in 1966, and to 6,771 in 1971. The second most senior provincial staff association among the Atlantic provinces is the Public Servants' Association of Prince Edward Island which was established in 1945. In the absence of a central personnel agency in the province and also because of a very small enrolment in the provincial civil service, it functioned merely as a social and recreational body until 1960, although attempts were made to bring improvements in the working conditions of its membership. The growing need for a body akin to a trade union or a strong staff association forced it to change its stance from a social club to become a provincial staff association. Consequently, in 1961, a new association was formed with the 70

The Staff Associations name of Prince Edward Island Public Service Association. In 1963, under the Civil Service Act of 1962, the association was given statutory recognition as the organization having exclusive right to represent provincial government public servants on the Joint Council with respect to salaries, pensions, or other working conditions, and grievances and job classification. And, finally in 1972, the association was able to begin collective negotiations with the government. From 200 members in 1946, its membership grew to 1,668 in 1971. The Newfoundland Civil Service Association (now called the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees) was founded in 1934 by senior civil servants, and its first president, Hon. W. J. Browne, then judge of the Central Court, held that office until 1950. Under such circumstances, an association could function only as a cultural society with low-ranking employees being shunned by the association. This trend prevailed for some years, which speaks for the lack of interest shown by government employees in its activities. Although the name was changed in 1952 to the Newfoundland Government Employees' Association, the association still remained unattractive for many employees. Ultimately, in 1968 under the presidency of C. W. Morgan, serious efforts were made to reorganize the association so that a common front could be provided to better the working conditions of Newfoundland government employees. The government of Newfoundland did not even inform the association when legislation providing for a Joint Council was rushed into the legislature. The indifference on the part of government should be viewed in the context of the apathy shown by employees who did not take any serious interest in the association. However, by the late 1960s, the association was able to demonstrate its capability by negotiating with the government certain aspects of working conditions, such as hourly wages, holidays, and hours of work. It was also successful, in the early 1970s, in negotiating the first collective agreement with the Treasury Board which acted as employer. As a result, it increased its membership to 8,500 in 1971 from 3,253 in 1968. As of 1973, it is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for employees of the executive departments. The slow evolution of associations in the Eastern provinces and Quebec reflects the past political atmosphere prevailing in those jurisdictions which was not conducive to growth such as we have seen in the Western provinces and Ontario. Political patronage was in wide use in provinces east of Ontario. Such partisan attitudes on the part of the party in power perpetuated an environment in which paternalism remained dominant in staff relations.6 Developments in Western provinces, the efforts and assistance of the national federation of staff associations, described later in 71

CHAPTER FIVE

this chapter, and the changing political pattern of the 1960s have induced Eastern provincial governments to recognize the evolving role and importance of staff associations in personnel administration. BASIC AIMS

The objectives for which staff associations are established are usually described in their constitutions. Although there are ten major staff associations in provincial public services across Canada, they have certain common aims. The following objectives are most usually found in their constitutions: to promote and maintain efficient government services; to organize and unite all government employees into one organization; to provide a medium for united action on any issue of common concern between employer and employees; to function as a nonpolitical, nonpartisan, and nonsectarian organization; to promote and encourage social, educational, and recreational programs for the welfare, benefit, and entertainment of the members; and to enter into agreements with the government or any board or agency of government. There are variations from one association to another. Thus, the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association proclaims "to be loyal to Queen and country, and to support the introduction of labourmanagement committees."7 The British Columbia Government Employees' Union aims to cooperate with the other labour organizations in bringing about better working conditions,8 whereas the Manitoba Government Employees' Association would like "to co-operate with the Government and the Civil Service Commission in maintaining effective public service free from political patronage or discrimination." The Newfoundland Government Employees' Association purports "to do such other lawful things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of . . . [other] objects, and which may best promote the moral, material and intellectual interests of the members."'° The Nova Scotia Civil Service Association aspires "to maintain good relations with the Government of Nova Scotia."" It is apparent from these examples that provincial staff associations would like to see the public service free from patronage, and at the same time they would like to disassociate themselves from any political party or group. Some associations, such as the one in Manitoba, have incorporated in their constitutions the objective to strive toward the maintenance of only one organization of all government employees in their respective provinces. These aims and objectives, having been formulated in the 1960s, give the impression that no association ever wanted to attempt such radical goals as affiliation with the Canadian Labour Congress (the only exception being the British Columbia association) or with any polit72

The Staff Associations ical party, but preferred to stress the principle of "civil service neutrality." However, in the early 1970s, several associations, such as those in Prince Edward Island, Alberta, and Newfoundland, applied for affiliation with the Canadian Labour Congress. STRUCTURE Table 8 provides data on membership, operational budget, annual dues, and the strength of headquarters staff of all provincial associations. Ontario and Quebec, being the two largest provinces, obviously have large association headquarters staff and budgetary expenditures to correspond. A common feature of provincial associations—the exception being in Quebec—is that dues deductions are based on fixed annual or monthly payments by each member. The SFPQ in Quebec has a system of membership fee deduction which is 1.3 percent of each member's total annual income from government employment, which would appear to provide a more equitable basis for financing the expenses of an association. The headquarters organization of provincial associations, usually based in the capital city, does not differ much across the country. An association may be divided into branches and, depending upon the system of collective negotiation prevailing, the branches may be based on occupational groupings or departmental organizations. In larger jurisdictions, an association may also have regional branches. To carry out the work of an association, several committees are established by the executive body; these committees are responsible for assisting the association in respect to such matters as finance, collective negotiation, insurance and superannuation, membership drive, grievance, education and publicity, and recreation. All associations hold an annual convention, with the exception of the SFPQ which meets every second year. The executive of these associations is derived from the board of directors (although not all associations, for example, Manitoba, have a board of directors) or a similar body which is elected by the membership of individual branches. The term of office of these directors is generally of two years' duration. A typical executive committee consists of a president, one or more vice-presidents, executive secretary (or general manager), secretary, and treasurer. However, in some jurisdictions, more members are added to this committee. The tenure of the president differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In some provinces, such as New Brunswick, the president is not on a full-time basis; in other jurisdictions, for example, Ontario, the president is a salaried full-time officer. Any fulltime officer of an association must sever his service relation with the employing department or agency. 73

TABLE 8

342,296 666,230 503,771

7,793 20,869 15,762

13 24 23

Data obtained from individual staff associations.

267,500

10,000

8

SOURCE:

2,650,000 1,139,568

30,000 38,486

46 46

6,030,634

30 1.3% of annual salary 52

85,009

3,300

4

143,149

36 228,750

6,771

10

184

26 47,492

1,668

4

48

48 30

24

15

100,000

Annual Dues ($)

8,500

Membership (no.)

Annual Exp. Budget, 1971-72 ($)

1971

6

Total

Newfoundland Association of Public Employees Prince Edward Island Public Service Association Nova Scotia Government Employees Association New Brunswick Public Employees Association Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec Civil Service Association of Ontario Manitoba Government Employees' Association Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association Civil Service Association of Alberta British Columbia Government Employees' Union

Name

Headquarters Staff (no.)

HEADQUARTERS STAFF, MEMBERSHIP, ANNUAL BUDGET, AND ANNUAL DUES OF PROVINCIAL STAFF ASSOCIATIONS,

The Staff Associations Branch representatives, members of the board of directors, and parttime members of the executive committee of an association are permitted time-off to attend the business of their branch, unit, or headquarters. Such time-off is treated as leave with full pay. Although routine matters are attended to by elected members of the unit or provincial executives (with the help of full-time staff), it is the annual convention which sets the tone of the future policy action the executive may take. ACTIVITIES All provincial staff associations have come a long way from their subservient role of "collective begging" to collective negotiation. However, their main objective is to promote and safeguard the interests of their members with special emphasis on improving pay structures and working conditions. To this end they engage in these activities: organization and membership drives; reducing hours of work; extending the existing vacation time; better system of pension and related superannuation benefits; group life insurance schemes; publicity through regular association journals and other occasional bulletins; educational programs for informing members about collective bargaining procedures; representing members' interests on negotiation and grievance committees; sending fraternal delegates to the regional organizations, such as the Council of Atlantic Provincial Employees; and, in some cases, affiliating with organized labour unions, such as the Canadian Labour Congress. Some of these activities are further highlighted here. Right to Organization and Recognition. There has been no prohibition in any province of Canada against provincial government employees organizing themselves for the purpose of safeguarding their conditions. However, in the early years, most organized government staff associations had to tread softly for fear of incurring the disapproval of their employers. One illustration of the conservative political atmosphere that hampered efforts to organize a staff association is provided by the experience of the Newfoundland Government Employees' Association which, until 1967, did not muster enough support from the membership to have a proper organizational set-up. The main reason for this situation can be traced back to the 1959 strike of loggers in Newfoundland in which the government suspected international trade unions of spreading their nets in the province. The passage of the Labour Relations Act of 1959, which expressly excluded government employees from having any form of industrial dispute settlement machinery, created an atmosphere in which an organized government staff association became an impossibility. It was 75

CHAPTER FIVE

only in 1967, when the government decided to grant a limited joint consultation privilege, that a serious attempt could be made to organize. By the late 1960s all provincial governments had officially recognized the various staff associations. At present, provincial government staff associations can be classified into two groups from the viewpoint of official recognition for collective bargaining and employee grievances representation. The first category includes those associations which have been given exclusive recognition by a provincial government by legislation or through the collective agreement, thus creating a monopolistic trade union situation. This situation exists in Alberta, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. The association in Prince Edward Island has been granted the same privileged position for the years 1972 to 1975; thereafter it must retain 50 percent support if it is to continue to enjoy its capacity to act as sole representative for the employees. The second category does not provide any exclusive recognition to an association or trade union. Any organization—be it the already existing government staff association or a relative newcomer, such as the Canadian Union of Public Employees—is given equal opportunity to seek certification as a collective bargaining agent by providing evidence of having a majority of employees as its members. In New Brunswick, for example. the Public Employees Association and the Canadian Union of Public Employees are presently engaged in the traditional trade union phenomenon of seeking sufficient membership to be recognized as a collective bargaining agent. The other jurisdictions in the second category are Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec. In Ontario, the Civil Service Association enjoyed exclusive recognition until the end of 1972 when new legislation, Collective Bargaining for Crown Employees, removed such privileges. Exclusive recognition, as opposed to keeping the option open for any trade union to seek certification, is likely to remain a thorny issue. It seems rather odd that those associations which profess the principle of equal opportunity to organize behave in a most unlabourly fashion when they are themselves threatened with the possibility of competition. Monopoly, whether in the private or public sphere, should be viewed as a departure from democratic principles. Education and Communication Activity. An association, like any other organization, needs a program to develop personnel to be well trained and acquainted not only with the process of trade union rights and responsibilities as applicable in a government service but also with an everincreasing "rumble-jumble" of rules and regulations related to personnel 76

The Staff Associations administration. Almost all provincial associations have accepted this responsibility, in many cases rather belatedly. Associations have found that regular publication of a journal serves as the best medium of communication between the provincial executive and the membership at large. Among the provinces, the Civil Service Association of Alberta was the first staff organization to start publishing a news bulletin in 1920. The most recent arrival on this scene was the association in Newfoundland, which started publishing the Bulletin in 1968. Other associations began their monthly or quarterly publications in this sequence: Ontario in 1927, Saskatchewan in 1927, Manitoba in 1942, British Columbia in 1951, New Brunswick in 1960, and Quebec (SFPQ), Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, all in 1961. As long as associations were working mainly as social and recreational groups, the need for extensive communications through publications and releases was perhaps not so urgent. However, the prospect of bargaining collectively or the actual use of such a right has necessitated a different approach to the communications problem in associations. Journals can serve to inform members and interested persons about their rights and responsibilities, particularly with respect to wages and classification. However, the new era of industrial relations in the public service created an environment which left many employees bewildered with the maze of rules and regulations. Associations have a responsibility to explain and prepare their members to face new developments in the personnel administration field. Toward this end, many associations have established certain educational and training programs. For example, the association in British Columbia printed a brochure in 1966 for the purpose of outlining the reasons why unions were organized and why the association should continue to exist. During 1968 the association, failing to convince the provincial government of the need for an adequate salary raise, established wage educational committees at the branch level to acquaint members with the government's refusal to admit that government employees' wages in British Columbia were substandard. Statistical data were provided to show that wage rates in government service were substantially below outside rates, and to underline the plight of low-paid workers unable to maintain a decent living.''- Statistical data were poured in from the headquarters to branch officers, and branch officials were urged to initiate discussions with community leaders, businessmen, and the press. In the event, only twenty-five branches out of fifty-four took the issue seriously. A pessimistic and defeatist attitude on the part of some branches or some members indicated not only that the headquarters organization was expecting much too much from its branches far removed from the 77

CHAPTER FIVE

place of real action, but also the prevalence of general apathy among white-collar workers. Some associations use regular training programs in which selected delegates are invited to participate. For example, during 1967 the Saskatchewan association held a seminar on collective bargaining at three different places in which a total of 192 delegates representing sixteen branches participated.'3 Similar training programs were conducted by the Alberta association on March 18 and April 1, 1967, in which two delegates from each branch attended. Subjects discussed were the organizational structure of the association, negotiations, group life insurance, and the role of the central executive of the association.'} The Manitoba association also conducts, from time to time, seminars and workshops on topics such as grievance procedure, classification, collective bargaining, and fringe benefits. Although the first attempt to provide a training program by the Civil Service Association of Ontario was made in 1961, and related to the rules and regulations of personnel administration, a different type of training program, more attuned to the trade union system of collective negotiation, was introduced in the early 1960s. It became clear to the provincial executive that to comprehend fully the procedure of collective negotiations, branch directors and other officials should be given orientation training. Such a program, in which speakers come from the Canadian Labour Congress or from universities, not only examines the philosophy and history of the trade union movement in Canada but also studies the practical tools for handling collective negotiation and grievances. Other provinces have similar programs, although the depth of such courses may vary from association to association depending upon their experience with the collective bargaining process. However, those associations which do not yet have a well-developed training program of their own usually send their representatives to seminars, symposia, and courses offered by sister organizations. Affiliation and Political Activity. Provincial associations have had different experiences in seeking affiliation with trade unions and other organizations. Except in British Columbia, Quebec, and Newfoundland where there has been some form of prohibitive legislation or a hostile atmosphere, other provincial governments have not restricted explicitly the right of the staff associations to affiliate with trade union organizations such as the Canadian Labour Congress. Affiliation consists of two avenues: fraternal affiliation, which means affiliating with a federation of government staff associations; and professional affiliation, which implies associating with unions of organized lab78

The Staff Associations our, which have been established long before the time when government employees could form even social clubs. Until 1972 the most significant affiliation of the fraternal type among provincial staff associations was the Canadian Federation of Government Employee Organizations (CFGEO). It was a successor to the Canadian Council of Provincial Employees' Associations (CCPEA) which was founded on September 19, 1945, when delegates of five provincial associations from British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario gathered in Toronto to form a national body. In 1951 the Quebec association (later to become a part of the General Council of Government Employees) joined but withdrew in 1953 because of the prohibition against a provincial association affiliating with unions outside the jurisdiction of Quebec. In 1957 the New Brunswick and Newfoundland associations joined, and in 1958 the associations of Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia followed suit. The CCPEA was a loosely linked organization of several autonomous provincial associations whose main purpose was to act as a clearinghouse of information and to provide a forum for exchange of views. Annual meetings were conducted in which member associations exchanged information about latest developments in their respective jurisdictions. However, member associations began to express their lack of interest in supporting a national organization which was simply a discussion forum. Actually, the Saskatchewan association withdrew its membership in 1958, and British Columbia threatened to do so if reforms were not made immediately. Also, at the 1960 annual meeting of the CCPEA held in Fredericton on May 2, the Civil Service Association of Ontario made it known to all present that unless a definite program of expansion and activity was decided at this meeting, it could not see any useful purpose in continuing affiliation.'' Finally, in 1961, it was decided to change the name of the CCPEA to the Canadian Federation of Government Employee Organizations, which officially came into being on August 31. 1961, to foster the following objectives: to establish for all employees of constituent governments the right to secure and protect their mutual welfare; to become a rallying ground for those organizations of government employees which subscribe to the belief in regulated consultation, negotiation, and bargaining procedures which result in bilateral determinations; and to function as a nonpolitical and nonsectarian organization in pursuit of the establishment and improvement of merit systems.!' The rejuvenated federation proved to be an immense help to many member associations when it held a seminar on collective bargaining in Halifax in July, 1962, in which the attending provincial government representatives, many of them provincial premiers, were convinced of the 79

CHAPTER FIVE

advantages that collective bargaining would have in improving employeremployee relationships. Partly as a result of this conference and partly because of provincial associations insisting on some form of collective negotiations, the Ontario, Alberta, and Manitoba governments moved to grant collective negotiating rights to their employees. The political atmosphere in British Columbia was not conducive to the idea of collective bargaining, and the Eastern provinces remained immune from such pressure for the next few years. As years passed by, and as the bigger provinces granted collective bargaining rights to their employees, the original mandate of the federation to secure such rights became less relevant. During the 1964 annual meeting of the New Brunswick association, a resolution was passed to cancel affiliation with the federation when it became known that the per capita dues would be raised from five to six cents with no consideration of the size of an organization. It meant a heavy financial burden to the association—from $500 annually to $2,160. The Newfoundland association, though subscribing to the aims of the CFGEO, slackened in sending representatives to the annual meeting of the federation. Also in 1967, the executive of the British Columbia association decided to suspend its affiliation with the federation with effect from 1968. With increasing internal dissensions, disenchantment with the accomplishments of the federation, and the death of its first national secretary, Harry B. Hunter, on May 11, 1968, who had been in the post since the 1961 reorganization, it became necessary to revitalize the federation if it was not going to fade away. Consequently, the annual meeting of the federation in 1968 agreed to revise its constitution and also to provide more money so that seminars could be held on such topics as dispute settlement, negotiation, public relations, and grievance procedures. It seemed as if this mandate might rejuvenate the federation and a truly national coordinating body for all provincial associations might emerge. However, by 1971, the same problems of the mid-1960s plagued the federation. Finally, in 1972 the executive committee decided to abolish the federation. The death of this body came mainly because provincial government staff associations were not prepared to give up their autonomy to a national body and to accept national leadership. Provincial associations, it seems, were not ready to see the federation changed into a full-fledged national body, especially as a buffer between the CLC and CUPE. Efforts had been afoot since 1967 to bring the federation, CUPE, and the Public Service Alliance of Canada (a federal government employees' association) into a form of loose national federation of all government employees in Canada. The main reason for forging such a confederation was that "the Canadian labour move80

The Staff Associations ment was still largely dominated by international unions and that there was, as yet, no important place in that movement for public employees. As a result, it was important to all public service organizations to have mutual co-operation in support of a public employee programme."" Other reasons for having a national body were to eliminate duplication of service and communications between jurisdictions, to foster a common bond for all public service groups that have more or less common legislative problems, and to provide good research so that favourable public opinion could be generated. The idea of having such a national body working under the umbrella of the Canadian Labour Congress has also been propagated by the PSAC and the CUPE, which are already affiliates of the CLC. The CFGEO suggested instead the formation of a National Council of Public Service Employees as a counterpart to the CLC—a suggestion not favoured by the other two federations. In turn, they suggested the formation of a Canadian Co-ordinating Council of Public Employees' Organizations made up of three representatives from each of the three organizations, with affiliation with the CLC.'8 The demise of the CFGEO has, for the time being, put this question in abeyance, and CUPE in late 1973 was having serious doubts about its affiliation with the CLC. Another fraternal organization is the Council of Atlantic Provincial Employees (CAPE), a regional federation of provincial government staff associations. Its jurisdiction is limited to the four Atlantic provinces. The first founding meeting of the council was held in St. John's on October 27, 1968. The council was formed because of the perceived need for a forum to exchange information and ideas on problems that are unique to the Eastern provinces. As the economy of these provinces is very closely linked, as personnel problems—especially pay determination—are similar, the establishment of such an organization will provide an important medium of exchange of information. The second meeting was held in Halifax on February 1, 1969, to discuss the new staff relations act of New Brunswick. Other associations were interested in the New Brunswick development, for they viewed it as setting a trend for a new era of employer-employee relationships in these four provinces. The establishment of the CAPE certainly weakened the strength of the CFGEO and was probably one of the factors that precipitated its demise. Besides the three fraternal organizations, some provincial associations are also affiliated with organized labour unions. By the beginning of the 1970s only the British Columbia association had affiliated with the Canadian Labour Congress, but the associations in Prince Edward Island, Alberta, and Newfoundland had applied for affiliation; while, by September, 1972, the SFPQ in Quebec dropped its affiliation with the Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux. Other provincial associations, such 81

CHAPTER FIVE

as Saskatchewan and Alberta, have also been affiliated with the CLC, but later withdrew their membership when, in 1958, the CLC passed a resolution establishing clear ties with the CCF party (later to become the New Democratic Party). The Manitoba association was also at one time an affiliate of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada; however, when a merger occurred between the TLC and the Canadian Congress of Labour in 1956, it severed its relationship." Among the provincial associations, the one in British Columbia has the longest history of affiliation with the organized trade union movement. It continued its affiliation with the Canadian Labour Congress even when it became known that the CLC would be favourable toward political support of the New Democratic Party, thereby exposing it to the danger of being suspected of being partisan by association. The association lost its dues check-off privileges as a result of its loyalty to the labour movement by continued affiliation with the B.C. Federation of Labour, a constituent of the CLC. The Social Credit government charged that such affiliation was not an economic, but a partisan, political instrument. This was, perhaps, the main reason why the Social Credit government showed reluctance to give its employees the right to collective bargaining. The 1972 election brought the New Democratic Party to power; it immediately appointed a royal commission to inquire into employer-employee relations. Subsequent to the recommendation of the royal commission in December, 1972, the NDP government gained legislative approval for granting its employees the right to bargain collectively. Thus, the B.C. Government Employees' Union achieved this right without disaffiliating itself from a regular trade union. In the past, affiliation with a trade union which openly professed linkage with a political party was sufficient ground for any provincial association to invite government displeasure. Those days seem to have vanished. At present, the "guilt-by-association" dictum has less force so long as associations do not openly act against provincial, civil, or public service statutes which have clearly laid down the limitations of political activity. It is surprising that although no provincial civil service act prohibits any government staff association from being affiliated with a trade union, many associations have refrained from doing so. Provincial government staff associations show a checkered history of evolution from small social and recreational clubs to well-organized pressure groups. By the end of the 1960s, nearly all provincial associations emerged as mature institutions eager to handle collective negotiation matters. In Canada, provincial government staff associations are self-governing 82

The Staff Associations and do not function as industrial and craft unions. Their responses to a questionnaire in 1970-71 in general confirmed this public image as their self-image. There appeared to be a feeling of exclusiveness among government staff associations when the question of meaningful relationships with industrial organized labour was raised. Provincial associations, like their federal counterpart, seemed to believe that the industrial-union type of activity has no place in government operations, mainly because the work and ethos of government are drastically different from that of industry. That is why it was not surprising to find that most of the provincial associations were in favour of compulsory arbitration rather than the option of the right to strike. When asked to give their views on the use of the strike weapon, only the Alberta association expressed a desire to use the strike as the final means of dispute settlement. Provincial associations were also divided on the question of open- or closed-shop union methods: with the exception of New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Ontario, other provincial associations favoured the Rand formula which would force all employees, unless excluded by mutual agreement between the government and association, to pay dues with the option of keeping active membership.2° Here again, provincial associations depart from the normal industrial-union practice of favouring the closed-shop union system. Political partisanship is still a dragon among provincial associations; this reflects the influence of those bygone days when patronage was directly associated with political activity. When asked whether a staff association would benefit from having some affiliation with a political party, not a single association expressed its desire to be associated even indirectly. All associations unequivocally claimed that affiliation with a political party was not needed in order to better their status. Partisan activity through direct affiliation may be too radical an action to take when the concept of "political neutrality" is so prevalent. However, it is difficult to see how associations will be able to avoid indirect affiliation with a political party if they, for example, join the CLC as others at the federal and municipal levels have done already. Although the example of the British Columbia association has been sufficient to demonstrate that even a trace of political association would not be tolerated by the previous Social Credit government, it is probable that the continued decline of political patronage is creating a more relaxed posture that will admit more indirect affiliation with a political party, namely, through the CLC, and that staff associations will then become pressure groups in reality. All provincial associations have all along been enthusiastic champions of improved public personnel administration in the province. Through their numerous briefs these organizations have tried to impress on their 83

CHAPTER FIVE

respective provincial governments that better working conditions, a universal merit system, and a sound personnel program are essential ingredients in shaping a service-oriented public service. The present personnel administration system as it exists in the provinces owes much to the initiative and efforts of such organizations. So far many provincial associations have enjoyed a privileged position in the provincial public service, being the only staff association recognized by a provincial government for collective bargaining and employee grievances representation. However, it remains to be seen whether such a monopolistic position will continue to go unchallenged in the future. The contrasting example of New Brunswick, and recently of Ontario and Prince Edward Island, may be used by other governments. Staff relations in the public domain, especially since the advent of collective bargaining in most of the provinces, certainly constitute a new dimension of public personnel administration. Although provinces have accorded to their staff associations the right to negotiate collectively, in some provinces such rights and their working procedures are still on a trial and error basis. Associations should not take it for granted that, having secured these rights, they can expect to be granted all they ask for. As the president of the Civil Service Association of Ontario has reminded his members: "There is a very grave danger in going to an Arbitration Board with demands which we cannot ourselves justify and the danger is, of course, that Arbitration Boards in the future would look with suspicion on any Association demands and rule accordingly."21 Unrealistic demands by an association and an unresponsive "hard-nosed" government would, of course, lead nowhere except to disappointment, frustration, and anger. Provincial associations, therefore, in the years ahead, have to be very cautious in their approach to the use of trade union rights which have been secured after long and strenuous efforts. Only when a sound and mature relationship exists between the various agencies responsible for personnel administration can we then say that the peak of staff relations has been reached in the provincial employment domain.

84

Chapter Six Staffing the Public Service

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT COMPONENTS of the public personnel administrative function is the element currently referred to as staffing. Embraced within this term are a number of operations that begin with manpower planning and forecasting; proceed to recruiting, including advertising for and attracting applicants; selection through evaluating applicants and matching them to positions; formal appointment; probation; and end with transfer and promotion. Implicit in the performance of all these procedures is the notion of merit and the application of the merit principle, particularly in the initial stages of recruitment, selection, and appointment, but as well in transfer and promotion. Because the merit principle underlies the procedures involved in staffing the permanent bureaucracy, it is customary to exclude from consideration those officials recruited by more personal or political means, such as ministerial assistants and advisers, as well as certain very senior civil servants, such as deputy ministers. This chapter will follow the conventional practice of excluding the officials in the grey area of political or quasi-political appointments.

PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT

The task of attracting recruits into the provincial public services in a highly competitive market has forced government recruiting agents to adopt a more positive role than the purely negative one of guarding the sacred portals against patronage-seekers. Persons of talent, with a strong career orientation, have not exactly flocked to these portals, and what civil service commissions and departmental recruiting officers are finding

CHAPTER SIX

is that a persuasive campaign must be mounted if old stereotypes are to be overcome. Surprisingly little investigation has been undertaken to ascertain the real state of public attitudes toward employment in the public service. What little evidence there is points to a long and vigorous effort in public relations if people with the required capacities arc going to be attracted into the service of the state. The pervasive and long-standing image of the North American success story has not made room for the person who seeks government employment. The depression of the thirties dried up the normal opportunities for employment and produced a scramble for places in the bureaucracy, futile de mieux. The wartime expansion was largely at the federal level and here, for the first time, a more positive image of public service employment began to emerge and was carried forward into the postwar period. Even so, there was an exodus back into the booming private enterprise sector, and it was at this very period that provincial governments began to flex their administrative muscles and had to enter the competitive labour market in search of talent they had never before required. The universality of this situation on this continent led to a series of studies in the United States concerned with assessing the prestige of the public service, but such studies in Canada have been scattered and by no means national in scope. The federal and the Ontario civil service commissions each conducted a study in 1964 of the attitudes of high school students toward employment in the public service. Both confirmed the view that these students have not only an inadequate and inaccurate perception of the nature of work performed by civil servants but also a low preference for government employment when faced with alternative opportunities in business and industry.' In 1966, a limited survey of 466 graduating university students, undertaken by the Alumni Association of the School of Business at the University of Toronto, showed that only 44 percent expressed any desire to opt for government jobs.= In 1969, a rather large sample of students (3,025) selected at random from three universities and seven high schools in Ontario produced the following interesting responses. Out of 2,921 respondents to the question about future career choices, only 170 (roughly 6 percent) said that they intended to seek employment in the government service. Out of the 170 positive responses, most preferred the federal government. Students were asked to select some important features in four selected occupational groups including the government service. "Security of service," "unable to get job elsewhere," and "meeting variety of people" were the most important reasons for selecting government service. The disadvantages 86

Staffing the Public Service of government employment, as perceived by the respondents, were (in descending order of frequency) "routine and red tape," "low salary," "slow promotion," "lack of incentive," and "nothing would be worse." When asked about factors which may influence promotion in government service, students gave about equal weight to "political patronage," "having influence with high officers," and "seniority of service." However, "merit" was seen to be the most appropriate criterion. When asked whether they had had an offer of employment from a governmental agency, and if they had rejected the offer, the respondents gave three main reasons for rejection: "more money offered elsewhere," "going on to higher education," and "unsatisfactory nature of the interview."3 These responses provide evidence of a persistent public image of a bureaucracy which, from much more ample testing in the United States, seems to be a continental phenomenon. The conclusion of one U.S. authority is a generalized confirmation of the low prestige of public service employment. "What is a legitimate source of worry," Professor Nigro reports, "is that so many people in the community, young and old, have such mistaken ideas about the nature of government employment. Far too many people are discouraged from seeking government employment because of the persistence of these erroneous notions."4 Clearly, most central personnel agencies have come to recognize the need to develop a long-term program aimed at creating a more positive preference for government employment than the purely fortuitous situations in which, the general labour market being tight, government employment is sought out as a last resort. MANPOWER

PLANNING

The recent acknowledgement of the need for positive programs to counteract the public's poor image of public employment is paralleled by an equally late recognition of the need for manpower-planning programs. With the exception of the federal government and the Province of Quebec, Canadian provinces make few special efforts to forecast their personnel requirements beyond the immediate requests put to Treasury Board. This ad hoc, piecemeal approach aggravates departmental rivalries, accentuates imbalances between the have and have-not departments, and perpetuates a system that hampers effective career development and interdepartmental placement of available talents. Manpower planning in the federal government has become the responsibility of the Treasury Board, and only the Quebec government among the provinces appears to have made a serious attempt to pool its manpower requirements. At the beginning of each fiscal year the Quebec Civil Service Commission asks all departments to let it know their needs for 87

CHAPTER SIX

new personnel. The object is to acquire, well in advance, reasonably precise information on numbers, functional and educational requirements, location of positions, and the probable date by which a department must have such vacancy filled. The merits of this program are so obvious that it is surprising that other provinces do not appear to have followed this example. RECRUITMENT

The starting point of the staffing process is the recruitment stage. When a vacancy has been declared, there are three ways of filling it: a departmental competition, a service-wide competition, or an open competition. Generally, all provincial civil service statutes stipulate that priority be given to candidates from within the public service whenever a vacancy occurs. These internal (departmental) competitions are generally considered to be promotional competitions. After consultation with the central personnel agency, the departmental personnel director (or a designated senior officer in those provinces and departments where there is no separate personnel branch) prepares the advertisement, finds out if the vacancy is within the approved budgetary appropriation, invites applications, and conducts interviews. Candidates arc informed by the central personnel agency about their results and the vacancy is thus filled. For service-wide competitions, the central personnel agency prepares the advertisements, circulates and posts them on departmental notice boards, and invites applications. A selection board is constituted before which candidates may be asked to appear for oral and for written examination. An eligible list is prepared and the vacancy is filled. The core of the recruiting process is the open competition which is undertaken after it has been demonstrated that recourse to either of the other two forms of competition is not likely to produce suitably qualified candidates. The decision to move to an open competition necessitates a more widespread advertisement of the vacancy to the public at large. Newspapers, professional journals, educational institutions, and Canada Manpower Centres are used for this purpose. Some provinces, such as Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, leave each department to handle its own advertising of vacancies. In Ontario, New Brunswick, and Manitoba, the central personnel agency deals with lower-grade positions, leaving the departments to handle the publicity for more senior positions. In Nova Scotia, British Columbia, and Alberta, all advertising is undertaken by the central personnel agency. Quebec has the most centralized system which requires all government information, including advertisements of vacancies, to be handled by the Bureau of Information and 88

Staffing the Public Service Advertising. Unlike the other provinces, in that advertisements are placed whenever they are ready, Quebec has a systematic scheduling of such advertisements in the daily press twice a week. There is a substantial variation in the amount of money spent by central personnel agencies on advertising. The incomplete data made available to us do give some indication of this variation but are far from representing the total expenditure for this stage of staffing since there are no figures for departmental allocations for advertising. For many years industries and commercial enterprises have been sending recruiting teams to universities, technical institutions, and vocational high schools. Relations with teachers have also been cultivated. In contrast, provincial governments have not been particularly active in these respects, although the federal Civil Service Commission started a studentrecruiting program late in the 1940s and has had a university liaison group maintaining contact with students and teachers. The Province of Saskatchewan also started campus visits in 1946. Not until the decade of the sixties did other provinces begin to take similar positive steps. Campus recruiting programs were started by Manitoba and Ontario in 1962, Quebec in 1965, British Columbia and Alberta in 1966. The Atlantic provinces have undertaken only sporadic experiments in this special area of recruitment. Two provinces, Saskatchewan and Quebec, have prepared brochures outlining career opportunities, working conditions, and fringe benefits in their respective services. Other provinces, including Ontario, British Columbia, and Alberta, arc planning to prepare similar information bulletins. When a shortage of qualified candidates in specific fields is evident, some provinces have extended their recruitment efforts into other jurisdictions. In Alberta, for example, where a shortage of personnel in biological and physical sciences and in engineering has occurred, the Alberta public service commissioner has broadened his campus recruitment plan to include British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and even two adjoining states in the United States. Prince Edward Island has special difficulties in recruiting betterqualified candidates from universities and high schools mainly because industries, the federal government, and advertisements from neighbouring provinces generally provide more attractive salaries than it can offer. Newfoundland suffers some of the same penalties of comparative isolation, which are compounded by the restrictedievel of recruitment hitherto accorded the Civil Service Commission. Most of its attention has been directed to recruiting typists and clerical grades, while the departments have tended to recruit more senior positions. Without any advertising budget but with an adequate travelling budget, the Newfoundland corn89

CHAPTER SIX

mission personally interviews all candidates for such positions as clerical worker, messenger, or telephone operator. Among all provincial central personnel agencies, Newfoundland's commission is unique in this regard. As an example of using a sledge hammer to crack a nut, the practice is understandably one that no other province would wish to emulate—and, indeed, is a practice that in 1973 was drastically modified. SELECTION PRACTICES

The success or failure of the recruitment effort is measured by the quantity and quality of applicants who respond. It is a responsibility of most central personnel agencies to scrutinize the applicants and withdraw those found to be lacking one or more of the stated requirements, such as education or professional qualifications. Provinces vary in their notification procedures: some use form letters to notify the candidates whether they have or have not been found fit for admission to the selection process; others use a more personalized communication. Even at this point, the image of the government as employer can be sullied if undue delays are permitted to develop or the tone of the letter is too abrupt or impersonal. Once this preliminary screening has been completed, a list of prospective candidates is prepared and candidates are invited to appear for written examinations and aptitude tests, for an oral examination, or they may be required to survive a battery of tests. For typists and stenographers a practical test is the rule; then an eligible list is prepared and the positions are offered. In most cases, however, an interview is regularly the final phase of the selection process. In many provinces, a selection board or panel consisting of three members is established for each category of position or positions. Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island have a system in which the selection board consists of one representative respectively from the Civil Service Commission, the department concerned, and a different department or a local university. In Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario, the selection board consists of one representative from the central personnel agency, the departmental personnel director, the third member being either the senior officer or branch supervisor from the same department. The Province of Nova Scotia has no established procedure but the Civil Service Commission may ask a departmental representative to be present during interviews. In Quebec, once the Civil Service Commission has prepared the eligible list, it is sent to the department concerned for final selection. A three-member panel is appointed and the department selects its employee. The Public Service Commission of Saskatchewan is 90

Staging the Public Service

unique in that its board consists of a member from the Public Service Commission, a representative of the department concerned, and a representative of the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association. The valued feature of accommodating such an observer in the selection board is the fact that in the view of the employees it maintains fairness and impartiality. This procedure was adopted by the CCF government which was employee oriented when it was in power. The interviewing process allows each candidate about thirty minutes or more, during which time the departmental representative or the personnel director outlines the salient features of the job, and the candidate may ask or be asked pertinent questions in regard to the job responsibilities and other related questions. For an applicant, the selection process offers him an opportunity to bring up matters which were not clear from the advertisement. After the applicant has been interviewed, each member of the selection board completes an interview rating form which includes such items as education, experience, ability to get along with others, interest in the vacancy, motivation, judgement, dependability, leadership qualities, speech, mannerisms, general bearing, appearance, confidence, and ability to express ideas. When all applicants have been interviewed, the selection board prepares the final eligible list. In those provinces where departments control the selection process, the final eligible list is sent to the central personnel agency which informs the selected candidate at the top. In those provinces where a representative from the central personnel agency sits on the selection board, the candidate at the top is immediately informed of the offer of employment, the amount of salary, and the date on which the employment is to commence. If the candidate declines, the offer of employment is made to the next qualified applicant. When an applicant accepts the offer, the remaining applicants who were on the eligible list receive "regret" letters. A streamlined process of selection was initiated in 1967 by the Civil Service Commission of Quebec. It is based on specialized psychological and psychometric tests to supplement the written examinations. Traditional examinations, whether written or oral, were viewed as too subjective and difficult to validate. Also, most examinations were general and were not designed to discover the potential of candidates. Through psychological and psychometric tests, the commission believes that it is able to determine the intellectual and general mental level of knowledge of candidates that makes possible an assessment, in advance, of potential for several tasks. After training, such candidates can be routed into diversified tasks when a promotional position is available. Through psychometric tests, the commission considers it easier to discriminate between individual differences. 91

CHAPTER SIX

Ajoutons quc la selection, par les tests psychometriques, a l'avantage de bien discrimincr les differences individuelles. Ainsi d'unc part, l'employeur aura ce qu'il chcrchc pour chacune des Caches a remplir; d'autre part, les candidate peuvent etre orientes vers les carrieres oil ils ont lc plus de chance de reussir. Les interesses y trouvent donc chacun leur profit.5 No selection process is complete unless it has taken into account the veterans' and locality or regional preferences. Except in Quebec where the Civil Service Act does not specify any veterans' preference and generally no preferential treatment is given to war veterans, other provinces either have statutory provisions or apply the preference in practice. In Saskatchewan, New Brunswick. and Prince Edward Island, war veterans who meet the minimum qualifications receive a 10 percent bonus of marks in their selection rating. In Ontario, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia, a veterans' preference is absolute, that is, if the candidate possesses minimum educational qualifications and work experience, he goes to the top of the list. In Alberta and Newfoundland, there is no specific statutory provision, but in practice a veteran is generally given preference. In British Columbia, only if the candidate's qualifications are equal to the top candidate is the veteran given preference. These cases cited above generally apply to initial appointments only. The veterans' preference has been frequently criticized, though no official body has openly recommended its complete abolition. Critics have said that such preferential treatment to war veterans not only lowers the morale of the public service but also brings in some persons with questionable qualifications. However, in the twenty-five years since the last Great War, the veterans' preference has tended to lose its urgency as an issue, and like great soldiers, the veterans' preference may also fade away. Locality and regional preferences vary from province to province. In Nova Scotia, applicants who have resided in the province are placed ahead of those who have not.6 British Columbia gives preference to those who have resided in the province for at least two years prior to appointment."' In Quebec, instead of a provincial residence preference, there is a requirement that a person must possess a working knowledge of the French language.8 Other provinces do not have any preference based on domicile; however, wherever it is necessary to meet the public demand of any particular area in the province, a locality preference is given. APPOINTMENT AND PROBATION

After a person, successful in the competition, has been offered the job, and if he accepts it, the formal letter of appointment is sent to him. Pro92

Staffing the Public Service vincial practices vary here: in a majority of cases, including Ontario, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, British Columbia, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, it is the Civil Service Commission which has the statutory power to make appointments, although final selection may be made by the department concerned. However, in Alberta and Quebec, all appointments (except those of deputy and assistant deputy ministers) arc made by the department concerned. In the Province of Newfoundland, the minister of finance has held this power from colonial times. Irrespective of which body may issue the letter of appointment, an appointed person assumes all obligations and responsibilities applicable to all civil servants. All provinces have a system of probation. During this period the department gets sufficient time to judge the capability and suitability of the person so appointed. Such a period also gives time to the employee to find out whether he is going to be satisfied with prevailing working conditions and to adjust to the environment. In practice, it is the supervisor who sits in judgement on the performance of the employee. The probationary period varies from six to twelve months. Provinces such as Quebec, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia have a six-month trial period; the remaining five provinces have a twelve-month period. At any time during the probationary period, an employee may be dismissed from his job without any recourse to appeal. However, the department must give specific reasons for rejection. The probationary period may be extended beyond the limit of six or twelve months. In some cases, the probationary period may be shortened if the department is satisfied with the work performance of an employee. TRANSFER AND PROMOTION

Once an employee has completed his probationary period successfully, he is appointed on a permanent basis. From this point on, his career development depends upon transfers and promotions. Transfer of a civil servant is generally of three types. When it involves an increase in the maximum salary of the currently held position and added responsibilities and status, then such a transfer becomes a promotion. In this way transfer and promotion are interlinked. The other two types of transfer are lateral and demotional. Lateral transfer does not involve any change in the existing salary scale of the transferred employee, though his duties and responsibilities may change. This is arranged within the department with two employees exchanging their working positions. In some cases, interdepartmental transfers are arranged, generally with the help of the central personnel agency. The third type of transfer, de93

CHAPTER SIX

motional, may occur in rare cases if an employee is judged to be inadequate for the job allocated. He may be assigned to a position which has a lower maximum and minimum salary range. The demotional transfer may be arranged by abolishing the position currently held by an employee who is being considered for demotion. The promotional transfer may occur in two different ways. If a department wants to limit applications to its own department, it conducts its own written and /or oral examinations. The central personnel agency is informed about such a competition and its approval is secured. In the case of an interdepartmental transfer which involves a raise in salary and status, a competition is conducted by the central personnel agency and the same procedure is followed as described earlier for recruitment and selection, with the exception that no outside candidates from the community are allowed to compete in such a service-wide competition. Promotional competitions are not held on a regular basis except in the Province of Quebec, whose procedure will be described later. In a lateral transfer or a transfer initiated by an employee, provinces differ in their interdepartmental transfer procedures. In Ontario, an employee can seek transfer after asking his departmental personnel director to complete the "Recommendation of Transfer" form. If the personnel director is recommending a demotional transfer, reasons for such recommendation are enclosed. The employee hands the form to the Recruitment and Examination Branch which then notifies him of an interdepartmental or open competition which he is eligible to enter. If interdepartmental competitions are not held, the commission then arranges the transfer. In Manitoba, an employee makes a request for interdepartmental transfer to his deputy minister, who informs the Civil Service Commission. If there is a position in another department suitable for the applicant, the Civil Service Commission, with the consent of that department, determines the date upon which such transfer can be made and facilitates the transfer action by acting as liaison between the two departments. In Saskatchewan, an employee in a clerical or a machine-operator class can request in writing an interdepartmental transfer from his permanent head, who transmits such requests to the chairman of the commission. Upon the approval of the chairman, the requested transfers can be made to vacant positions in another department. But employees in all other classes can, following the bulletin of vacancies, make requests for interdepartmental transfer directly to the Public Service Commission which arranges such transfers with the consent of the departments concerned. An employee in the Alberta public service can request an interdepartmental transfer from his department head, who, upon receiving the request, contacts the other department to which the transfer is to be made. When 94

Staffing the Public Service the consent of that department is secured, the employee is informed that his requested transfer is granted. In Alberta, interdepartmental transfers are generally arranged between the departments concerned. The central personnel agency cooperates with the departments in facilitating the transfer action. In British Columbia, upon the approval of the deputy minister of both departments, an employee makes his request for a transfer to the chief personnel officer, with detailed reasons. However, when the request involves a position below the level of those posted, an application can be made directly to the Civil Service Commission, which makes a real effort to transfer. Generally, an employee making such a request is advised to make application for posted vacancies. Final consent for transfer lies with the commission. In the Province of Quebec, transfer of an employee may be within the same department; to another department to a position with the same salary; or it may involve a change in classification, status, and salary. Transfers are thus closely connected with the process of promotion. The employee who wants a transfer informs his departmental personnel director, who informs the Civil Service Commission. The first notice of transfer originates in the department where the employee is working and contains relevant information about the employee. The commission arranges transfer to another department with the approval of that department. Once the change is approved by both departments, the personnel director of the receiving department informs the Treasury Board so that adjustments in the departmental appropriations can be made. In the case of intradepartmental transfers, the Civil Service Commission is simply informed about the move—a mere formality for which the approval of the Treasury Board is not required. Among the Atlantic provinces, New Brunswick and Newfoundland leave transfer arrangements to the departments. If they feel they need the help of the Civil Service Commission, they may contact it. In Nova Scotia, the Civil Service Commission has final authority in making interdepartmental transfers. An employee may get his request forwarded to the Civil Service Commission which, with the consent of the other department, determines and finally approves the date upon which such transfer may be made. In Prince Edward Island, the Civil Service Commission acts as a liaison agency between the two departments. For both transfers and promotions, governments as employers rely very much on the initiative of employees to take advantage of the opportunities for self-advancement that may be communicated to the employees. In a sense then, as the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism noted, career development in the public service tends to become a personal exercise in which the more ambitious and self-confident 95

CHAPTER SIX

will take full advantage of all opportunities to forward their careers.° But not all of the better-qualified civil servants are necessarily aggressive "upward-mobiles," and unless a systematic and regular scheme of promotion is offered, there will be the danger that the best will not move upward as they should or that, frustrated by their incapacity to carve out their own careers by aggressive pursuit of the main chance, they will look elsewhere. Most provinces have made efforts to accommodate this concern but usually have confined their efforts to specific categories. For example, the British Columbia Civil Service Commission holds regular promotional examinations for clerical staff, for employees in the Land Registry Office, Public Trustee's Office, and Court Registry Offices, as well as regular promotional examinations for draughtsmen, engineering and survey assistants, and technicians. However, only in the Province of Quebec does it appear that a more generalized and regular system of promotional competitions has been developed. In this province, in addition to the opportunities to compete for an announced vacant position which are normal in all jurisdictions, there are also opportunities to enter competitions for advancement from one grade to a higher grade in the same corps (a concept to be examined in chapter 8), regardless of the existence of vacancies. Success in the written and oral examinations assures advancement in rank and/or salary. During 1968, for example, 369 employees were advanced in this way without having to wait for a vacancy created by a separation from the service or the approval of a new position.'° However, if the competition is for a promotion from one corps to another, the successful candidate must await creation of a vacancy. This system resembles the promotional competitions conducted by the armed forces and appears to have beneficial effects on morale and the career orientation of civil servants. Three issues related to transfer and promotion should be mentioned. An employee seldom leaves his job and seeks transfer to another untried environment unless he is under great strain. He may feel that perhaps his worth is not being appreciated by his immediate supervisor or by other senior officers. He may also have been instrumental in creating a strained atmosphere in his place of work. Whatever the reason, employee and department usually arc happy to part company. A similar situation may well have developed in another department. Thus two troubled departments may exchange their "unwanted" employees. Such an arrangement may appear to some as a deal among senior officers to mutually dump undesirable employees. This suspicion hovers over the whole transfer process and tends to override the positive aspects implicit

96

Sta f fing the Public Service in a well-regulated system which genuinely seeks to rectify initial blunders in appointment or to fit the right man to the right job. Another issue that creates difficulties during the process of promotion is the weight to be assigned to seniority as against educational or merit qualifications for selection. In provinces such as Saskatchewan, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, if the two successful candidates have been given roughly equal marks, seniority of service weighs heavily. In Saskatchewan, the existence of a strong association accounts for this procedure. In Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, there are historical reasons for emphasizing seniority, such as weak central personnel agencies or powerful departmental managers. In other provinces, for promotions or fresh appointments, seniority is only one of the criteria considered. Staff associations naturally favour a heavy weighting for seniority and have sought to enshrine the practice in legislation. The Civil Service Association of Ontario, for example, having been instrumental in securing legislation in 1962 to enhance the central personnel agency's authority over recruitment and promotion, discovered that the interpretation of the merit principle could be used to discriminate against those with seniority. "Too often," the association complained, "other vacancies have been filled from within the service on the basis of academic qualifications having priority over experience."" The association obviously interpreted the merit system to mean that employees should not be saddled with the frustration of seeing promotional avenues closed to them because they were giving their all on the job—and thereby were unable to improve their academic qualifications. Provincial governments, like other employers, now have to face a qualitative upgrading in their employees in order to meet the demands of more sophisticated technically oriented programs. Seniority is less than adequate as the prime criterion for adjusting salaries or effecting promotions to meet these new requirements. There will always be sufficient pressure to ensure that dedicated and loyal service will not go unrewarded either by accelerated annual salary increments or by internal adjustments to position classification. As one factor to be considered, seniority has the advantage of being objective and superficially equitable. On the other hand, giving it automatic priority may encourage inbreeding, build up resistance to innovations, and frustrate the employers' attempts to bring on the genuine "flyers" in the service. The third problem in the staffing process, the issue of grievances arising out of promotions or reclassification, will be considered in chapter 9. At this stage it may be noted that no province except British Columbia

97

CHAPTER SIX

provides for appeals from candidates in an open competition; but when the competition is internal, a disappointed candidate may appeal to the central personnel agency. In provinces such as New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, where departments have more autonomy, appeal has generally been out of the question because departmental managers were not disposed to have their own judgement overruled. However, the provision for appeal is currently being liberalized. ROLE OF THE CENTRAL PERSONNEL AGENCY IN STAFFING

Staffing the public service is such a delicate area of personnel administration that the central personnel agency has always had some struggle with departments and other agencies over jurisdiction and procedures to be followed. The role of central personnel agencies in staffing the provincial civil services therefore warrants further attention. The experience of Ontario and Quebec in this respect is sketched at this point because they employ the largest number of provincial civil servants and presumably have evolved a more sophisticated system as a result. Two branches of the Civil Service Commission of Ontario are directly related to staffing work: the Recruitment and Examination Branch and the Administrative Services Branch. The Administrative Services Branch, however, does not confine itself exclusively to staffing activities. A section of it deals with various forms sent by departmental personnel directors, which are needed for inter- and intra-departmental promotions and transfers, position specifications, and probationary and regular appointments. It determines action required upon each form, arranges for collection and attachment of appropriate staff record cards and personal files to serve as a guide to processing, consults with and advises departments in cases of apparent omissions and errors and ensures correct follow-up procedures where necessary, and checks recommendations for appointments to probationary staff against authorized complements. These central "post office" functions enable the commission to oversee departmental managers and insist on compliance with overall service standards. The main responsibility for staffing rests with the Recruitment Branch. Since 1961, when the Recruitment Branch was formally organized to handle staffing requirements, its activities have grown at a tremendous rate: its operating expenditures nearly doubled between 1963 and 1968, from $190,000 to $349,000. The director of the Recruitment Branch supervises the activities of a staff of technicians and clerks engaged in finding and evaluating applicants for positions declared vacant by departmental management. The branch decides methods and procedures to be used in attracting desirable 98

Staffing the Public Service

applicants within broad policy and evaluates applicant qualifications; recommends amendments and additions to overall recruitment policy as set by the commission; maintains statutory Civil Service Commission responsibility for recruitment; advises the officials of the Division of Recruitment and Research and other senior officials on recruitment matters as required; reviews continuously the field of staff recruitment through readings, discussions, participation in conferences, seminars, and so on. Qualifications required for the position of director of the branch include a university degree preferably at the master's level in a social science, followed by extensive experience in all phases of personnel administration, supplemented by courses in personnel management techniques. The director is also required to have a thorough appreciation of all government personnel administration policies gained through experience in previous positions at the supervisory level either in the central personnel agency or in an operating department. The Ontario Civil Service Commission has acquired staffing responsibilities only within the last decade. As such its relationship with operating departments is evolving rapidly. The commission does not want to interfere in the internal management of a department. Instead, it feels that "assignment of managerial authority is empty and hollow if the manager has not the power to select the staff who will serve in that agency and so be fully responsible for the operations of the department. A deputy minister must have the authority to manage and be responsible for managing a department, . . . and he must be able to assign responsibilities to loyal subordinates to get the work done." But if departments are left with managing their own staffing needs, another problem arises. Each department head likes to bring along his own people, likes to be able to choose from the persons he knows.. . . He does not want interference [from an agency such as CSC] and, since in most governments promotion of the man next in line is a matter for internal departmental decision, very few of the senior level jobs except in a professional or technical field come open for competition. Each department tends to operate in isolation from the others, even within the same government. Interdepartmental transfers are very infrequent and there

is a jealousy in keeping staff who understand the policies and procedures of the department and who have made the team through good conduct.' 2 To alleviate these isolationist tendencies, while still having substantial autonomy in staffing departments, the Ontario Civil Service Commission has adopted a partnership posture. Much of the actual recruitment and 99

CHAPTER SIX

selection, particularly for professional and technical personnel and for field staff, remains with the departments, but the commission participates in order to ensure that all who are able to meet the necessary standards have free and equal access to government vacancies. This assurance is achieved either by recruiting for the departments or by participating in the process, and by auditing and approving departmental personnel transactions.'3 The Quebec Civil Service Act of 1965 entrusts recruiting responsibilities to the Civil Service Commission. However, it was in September, 1960, that, for the first time since the establishment of the central personnel agency, the commission was authorized to create a Division of Recruitment and Selection. During the first year, the division conducted sixty-eight competitive examinations. In 1961-62, for the first time, the commission advertised vacancies in various newspapers of the province, and a provision was made for conducting promotional competition examinations. The next year, the Recruitment and Selection Division started its campus recruiting program. For upgrading the capabilities of some of its senior officers, it started selecting employees to be sent to the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Paris. Among other innovations at this time were the creation of groups (corps) of civil servants and the introduction of the notion of designating classes of position for which permanent lists of eligible persons are maintained, the adoption of uniform publication of examination notices, and the elaboration of a new employment questionnaire. The commission also established library facilities during 1966-67, and in the same year created a Psychological Testing Service. In 1967-68 the activities of the Division of Recruitment and Selection included the opening of a recruiting branch in Montreal. Progress was made in validating the psychometric tests and a survey of the advertising used for publicizing examinations was undertaken. The campus recruiting program was further intensified, even as promotional competition examinations were conducted on a service-wide basis. The main responsibility for staffing rests with the Recruitment and Selection Division. Financially, its operational expenditures constitute about 50 percent of the budget of the Civil Service Commission, nearly $600,000 in the 1969-70 estimates. The division employed 88 of the total 146 employees of the commission. The enormous growth of the operational cost of the Recruitment and Selection Division is accounted for in no small measure by the $250,000 a year spent on advertising and publications. In brief outline the tasks of this division may be summarized as follows: first, to administer and supervise the various steps of the recruit100

Staffing the Public Service

ment process which includes these functions: to prepare the examination notices which start from the departments' requests for personnel or from the finished list of eligibles; to evaluate employment demands which present special problems; to ensure that the selection committees meet with the approval of the commission and, in collaboration with the departments, participate in the determination of the evaluation guide; to inform the members of the committee of selection about the work to be achieved; to organize the oral examination and all attendant arrangements such as room allocation; to verify the reports of the selection committee to ensure that they conform with the classification description and that reasons for failure to qualify arc given; to advise the candidates of their success or their failure at the examination; to inscribe or register the qualified candidates on a list of eligibles depending on the case and have this list approved by the commission. Second, the division seeks to organize and supervise the various promotional competitions and to verify if the procedure followed by various departments concerning the promotional competition is in conformity with the regulations of the commission and to verify if the members of the selection boards have been approved by the commission. The director of the division has a very important role to play. From the annual manpower list approved by the Treasury Board and from studies on employee turnover from the civil service, the director has to present periodically to the commission a global estimate of the government's needs for human resources, by categories of positions and employees; further, he has to suggest to the commission programs, processes, and methods of action which arc deemed necessary to attract into the civil service the required qualified persons. The ultimate objective is to enable the commission to draw up a permanent list of eligibles to which the various departments may refer quickly in order to secure competent candidates to fill vacant positions. While the Quebec Civil Service Commission has been mainly busy attracting better candidates to meet the phenomenal growth of its provincial service, the Ontario commission has divided its attention between a broader range of matters such as staffing, position classification, grievance handling, and the organizational improvement of various departments and agencies. Whereas the progress of the Civil Service Commission of Ontario in its main role as the central personnel agency, since the end of World War H, has reflected a continuous accretion of functions, the Quebec Civil Service Commission had to face an almost overnight conversion from a very authoritarian and paternalistic civil service to a service seeking the best in new management practices—all in a period of less than a decade. The experience of other provincial central agencies, with the 101

CHAPTER SIX

exception of Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, has tended to follow that of Ontario rather than that of Quebec. In the competition for the higher-quality manpower required by contemporary provincial public services, central and departmental personnel units are developing well-rounded programs in a partner relationship which seeks to ensure a strong departmental input and at the same time leave the central agency to audit, if not participate in, departmental transactions in order to ensure preservation of the merit principle through upholding service-wide standards and procedures. While much more elaborate and sophisticated staffing programs have emerged, provincial governments as employers still face an adverse public stereotype of government service which is deeply entrenched and will require persistent efforts to dislodge if more of the appropriately trained candidates arc to seek a genuine career in government service. Compounding this pervasive negative attitude is the limitation imposed on salaries at the highest management level. The limitation derives from using ministerial salaries as the ceiling on the presumption that the "boss" should not be paid less than his most senior underling. In Britain, it may be noted, a minister of the Crown may receive even as little as half the total salary of his permanent secretary. Particular provincial jurisdictions may face additional problems in ensuring an adequate supply of candidates for their public services. In Quebec, for example, dramatic expansion of the civil service was constrained by the well-deserved reputation it had acquired for being totally personalized and patronage-ridden. This attitude is changing perhaps as rapidly as the educational system of the province which historically had not been geared to producing the professional and technical skills required by a contemporary bureaucracy. The Atlantic provinces, even with relatively small public services, find themselves competing for a limited number of locally available qualified candidates. In their situation, a central registry for receiving applications and channelling them to the most appropriate provincial service would greatly improve the staffing situation. Indeed, as the competition for qualified recruits induces each province to put more and more into its advertising and publicity budgets or even to extend its search into other countries, a broader coordinated effort, through closer liaison among all provinces (and, indeed, not excluding the federal government), would appear to be most desirable. There might also be a national registry to which individual government employees might have access. The computer now makes such registries a practicable solution to what will, otherwise, become a progressively more competitive hunt for the talents required in the civil service of the 1970s. 102

Chapter Seven

Training and Development

STAFF TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT, as one authority put it, is an essential aspect of the direction of human effort, and as such is most effective when it is planned, systematized, and evaluated.' Training courses and development programs, though intimately related to each other, entail different methods. Training is the process of teaching skills to an individual so that he may improve his performance on a particular job. Development is the process whereby an individual acquires new knowledge, habits, attitudes, self-awareness, and values or maturity.= However, the term training is customarily used to encompass the developmental aspects of personnel administration programs—a usage that will be generally employed in this chapter. THE NEED FOR TRAINING Faced with an immediate need for specific kinds of professional staff, governments were prompted to sponsor and administer, on their own, training programs in the specialities that were particularly short of a supply of recruits. Central personnel agencies, as well as individual departments in the provinces, were induced to lay greater stress on inservice training programs, not only to ease their recruiting problems but also to upgrade the skills and qualifications of public servants already in the service. Paradoxically, the practical pressures to embark on staff training programs were countered by the theoretical postulates stemming from the merit system of recruitment—a system which supposedly recruited employees who were already qualified and trained for quite explicitly classified categories of positions. Therefore to superimpose in-service training

CHAPTER SEVEN

programs on the merit system of recruitment could be construed as either a waste of money or evidence of inadequacy in the initial selection of government employees.3 The force of this last line of reasoning was reduced because of the uneven application of the merit system in provincial jurisdictions. Moreover, even where merit recruitment was in use, the nature and number of job categories were undergoing such changes that further training for orientation and for upgrading of skills became increasingly necessary. Training, then, could no longer be regarded as redundant even in the best-run merit system of recruitment. In certain fields of employment in which governments tend to monopolize the employment opportunities, the need to develop training programs was self-evident; it has taken governments longer to recognize the need for programs that go beyond mere training on the job or upgrading of specific skills and move to the more elusive task of staff development. The concern for development is a much more recent phenomenon which has been concentrated particularly on the middle-management group of public servants. In his review of the somewhat rudimentary programs that had emerged in relation to this group in the 1950s, Professor K. B. Callard, while acknowledging that "experience is essential in the development of an administrator." further observed that "if the public service wishes to find within its own ranks men of superior ability and broad background it must ensure that the service itself encourages such development to take place." He then suggested three principal requirements for that purpose: (a) The recruitment of intelligent, flexible-minded young men and women must be on a sufficient scale to provide a reservoir of talent from which senior officials can be drawn. (b) The service must be organized to provide a satisfactory career at the intermediate levels so that the really able will not become discouraged... (c) A man should be encouraged or even required to broaden his experience by assignments to different types of jobs. . . . No barrier should be placed in the way of a specialist who wishes (and is qualified) to transfer to more general duties.4 Callard's conclusions are consistent with those of the U.S. authority Felix A. Nigro, who correctly commented that no public servant can ever be considered perfectly equipped for his job and "the role of in-service or, as it is sometimes called, post-entry training, is to stimulate the worker to put forth his best effort and to help him improve his performance."5 104

Training and Development From this perspective it may be seen that training and development programs are essential if a career service is to be achieved. In a career system, no matter what form of initial selection is used, opportunities for promotion must be coupled with training and development to qualify candidates for advancement and to contribute to each employee's satisfaction from his job. Recognition of the need for staff training and (more belatedly) staff development has largely occurred in the post—World War II era. Whether the needs can best be met by programs generated within the public service on either a centralized or departmental basis, by contracting out for such services, or by some combination of the two is still an unresolved issue. Currently, all possibilities are being pursued. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS Before 1940 there was practically no formal training program in the federal civil service, while the provinces showed no signs of activity in this area. In this respect, it must be added, Canada and its provinces were no further behind than other major governments. In the United Kingdom, for example, where the tradition prevailed of recruiting candidates within very narrow age ranges, related to the various school-leaving levels, in-service training was based on informal apprenticeship and, particularly in the administrative categories, on job rotation. On the North American continent, detailed classification plans identified each job category according to requisite skills and experience. Advancement, as Professor Callard noted, "is expected to take place when a job with higher status becomes vacant and the individual is promoted to it. This . . . system . . . assumes that a group of eager and suitable applicants will normally be available to compete for any vacancy."6 This system overlooked the possibility that a time would come when the group of eager and suitable applicants might become a scarce commodity in the labour market. Under this system, employees were expected to be fully qualified before they were appointed, and the responsibility for ensuring that they were qualified rested on the candidates themselves.? As there was an abundance of qualified persons awaiting appointment, no need was felt to provide any extra training facilities. World War II altered the situation. During the war, qualified candidates were not available in a number of areas, and the departments had to provide training facilities to make up the gap. Experience with the armed forces training programs that were geared to specific job training provided an impetus to civilian authorities to initiate similar plans. Many departments embarked on ambitious training programs to meet the acute short105

CHAPTER SEVEN

age of skilled and technical manpower. The federal government approved and, in many cases, encouraged departmental training programs. However, no concrete step was taken by the government to authorize the central personnel agency to undertake extensive training and development plans. Major inquiries into the federal civil service in the postwar years were highly critical of this deficiency. The report of the Royal Commission on Administrative Classifications in the Public Service in 1946, for example, observed: "Only the most elementary beginning has been made on the development of programmes for the training of civil servants on entering the service and to improve their efficiency after first employment in order to prepare them for more responsible work. Except in one or two departments there is virtually no provision for the systematic training of administrative personnel."8 Ten years later the report on personnel administration in the public service expressed similar views about the inadequacy of training programs. In 1962 the Royal Commission on Government Organization stated that "in proportion to the needs of such a large and complex organization, very little training and development have, in fact, been done." It further observed: Judged by . . . the degree of top management support, and by the adequacy of financing and staffing, training and development have not, in general, received anything like appropriate attention in the public service. In many departments training needs and possibilities have not been recognized. Where they have been recognized, training specialists of the proper quality have often not been used. There has been, in general, no development of a common policy on training or a common approach to it for the public service as a whole. Such training activity as there is, therefore, tends to be fragmented, unco-ordinated, and tied into no very clear conception of objectives and how to achieve them. The report recommended that, among other duties, it should be the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission, as a provider of common services, "to operate common training programmes and training facilities for the benefit of departments and agencies, as required by the Treasury Board."' This recommendation echoed similar proposals made by the Gordon Commission (1946) and the Heeney Committee (1958). However, no statutory authority was given to the commission until 1961 when the new Civil Service Act authorized the commission, for the first time, to "operate and assist departments in operating staff development training programmes."10

106

Training and Development

Nevertheless, without any statutory authority, the federal commission had been providing a number of interdepartmental training programs for many years, the most noteworthy being the junior administrative officers' course. Of late, the major reorganization brought about under the Public Service Employment Act of 1967 has reaffirmed the need for a centralized effort toward staff training and development. J. J. Carson, chairman of the federal Public Service Commission, had this to say: Parliament has charged us "to operate and assist deputy heads in the operation of staff training and development programmes in the Public Service." . .. the Commission has decided that (Glassco notwithstanding) one of the most important contributions we can make . . . is to assist the Treasury Board and the departments with the development of the new Executive Category. Indeed, we consider this programme to be of such urgency that we are prepared to give it the highest priority in terms of our time, energy and resources." Most recently, the Public Service Commission has launched an administrative manpower development program for university graduates and other promising public servants. The aim of the program is to recruit, develop, and retain individuals of high potential to assure a continuing supply of top-calibre career administrators. The program places heavy stress on service-wide and departmental orientation, job assignment, and after-hours postgraduate academic training. It provides training facilities not only to regular administrators but also to supporting staff including social scientists, economists, psychologists, and social workers. Faced with the same acute shortage of trained personnel in the labour market in a period of rapid expansion of provincial public services, provincial authorities did not miss these federal developments. The provincial response, however, tended to be piecemeal, with individual departments taking the initiative rather than a central agency sponsoring service-wide programs. British Columbia was the first to set up a centrally sponsored training and development program in 1956; Ontario followed in 1960, Alberta in 1965, and Quebec in 1968. In New Brunswick, formal responsibility for training was assigned in 1968 to the Treasury Board rather than the commission; while in Saskatchewan, although the Public Service Commission had long been given statutory responsibility for training, it was not given sufficient budget to become involved until 1972. Elsewhere, this area of personnel management has been undertaken for limited and specific categories by departments or by the central personnel agency, treasury board, or similar agency.

107

CHAPTER SEVEN ORGANIZATION FOR STAFF TRAINING

A review of the organization developed in the provinces to foster staff training reveals substantial variations which, in turn, reflect the varying degree of commitment to this aspect of personnel administration. In British Columbia, the first province to move into the area, the initial extremely modest program was handled for nearly fifteen years by one dedicated official in the Civil Service Commission." Not until 1965 was a Staff Training Division established in the commission; while a second training office was not appointed until September, 1972. This division works with an advisory committee drawn from an interdepartmental committee of deputy ministers which annually recommends the program to be developed on a service-wide basis. In-service training to meet specific needs of individual departments is programmed and administered by the departments themselves. In Alberta, a similar arrangement prevails. A Staff Development and Training Division in the Office of the Public Service Commissioner seeks to coordinate departmental programs as well as to advise on training needs and to develop and administer a uniform training policy. In its task it is supported by a training committee, consisting of the public service commissioner, two deputy ministers, a departmental personnel officer, and the training coordinator of the Personnel Administration Office as executive member. The division has collated information on training needs, reviewed existing programs, and undertaken the design of a comprehensive manpower-planning program which it is hoped will pinpoint potential staff shortages and enable the government to identify and meet future needs in the training and development field.' 3 The Saskatchewan Public Service Act of 1965, chapter 9, section 5, subsection 4(a), confers on the chairman of the Public Service Commission the responsibility to "develop, in co-operation with permanent heads, training and education programmes for employees." The Royal Commission on Government Administration, commenting critically on the failure of the Public Service Commission "to ensure that development and training programmes suit the requirements of individual departments, branches, or agencies," recommended that much greater emphasis be placed on the improvement and coordination of training and development programs as well as on the establishment of guidelines for such programs.'4 In 1972 the commission succeeded in securing in its budget financial means to take the initial steps in establishing such a program. Over previous years, each department had been left to mount, with its own resources, such training programs as it deemed necessary. In the event, the Departments of Welfare, Public Health, and Highways and 108

Training and Development the Bureau of the Budget have shown the most resourcefulness and energy in creating their own programs. Without central coordination, guidance, and stimulation, strictly departmental programs suffer from a lack of continuity and access to the necessary funds. The commission's prolonged inability to activate its statutory authority in this area should now be overcome by placing funds at its disposal to give leadership, guidance, and assistance in this contemporary aspect of personnel management. In contrast with Saskatchewan's central personnel agency, the Manitoba Civil Service Commission, which initiated staff development and training, was relieved of this responsibility when, in 1969, it was transferred to the Management Committee of the Cabinet. There is, at the same time, little evidence of departmental initiatives in mounting programs. Ontario's earliest ventures into staff training were all departmentally inspired. The Ontario Police College and the Ontario Forest Ranger School were two outstanding establishments in this category. Elsewhere, training in the departments was sporadic, ad hoc, and uncoordinated, and generally restricted to meeting a specific need. The Department of Highways established a Training Committee in 1957 to regulate and control all training in the department. In 1958 the Department of Health established a Professional Education Committee with power to advise, inspire, and coordinate. By 1959 ten departments were providing in-service training facilities;' seven years later, eighteen departments were operating their own intradepartmental programs. Not until November, 1960, was there any central coordinating mechanism provided in Ontario. At that time a Training and Development Branch was established in the Civil Service Commission. The authority of this branch was reinforced by the passage of a new Public Service Act which came into force in August, 1962, and generally empowered the commission to "provide, assist or co-ordinate staff development programmes." Specifically, the commission was authorized to provide appropriate interdepartmental training and development programs to ensure continuing improvement in the efficiency of individual public servants and the public services; to assist departments in identifying training and development needs and in planning and instituting programs to meet such needs; and to provide schedules of educational grants for civil servants attending training sessions or courses outside the civil service." The interdepartmental development programs were to be available not only to regular departmental employees but to all other employees of departmental corporations, agencies, and public enterprises, if they so requested them. Under these enlarged terms of reference, the Training Branch of the commission began to develop and administer its own programs and also 109

CHAPTER SEVEN

conducted a survey of actual needs of departments in this area. The new Public Service Act of 1961-62, even as it enlarged the functions of the central personnel agency, authorized the deputy minister of each department to "plan and provide for the public servants in the department training and development programmes that ensure the continued efficient operations of the department." At the same time, all such programs now had to be filed with the Civil Service Commission for assessment and approval." Through this coordinating role the commission was able to compile in 1965 a brochure on departmental training plans, which for the first time permitted all departments to sec what was being offered that might be of interest to their respective employees." However, a measure of the low state of the art of training in the mid-sixties was that only four of the nineteen reporting departments were able to articulate a firm policy in respect of their programs. By the late 1960s the commission had firmly ensconced province-wide training and development programs. To be more effective in its efforts, it purchased a summer resort for a Staff Development Centre at Kempenfeldt Bay, which is now used on a year-round basis. This centre is generally used for middle-management and senior officers' development courses. During 1972, 1,411 employees of the Ontario civil service were given twenty-nine different courses operated by the commission. In the Province of Quebec, training and development was first undertaken, sporadically, by departments to meet specific needs. Not until 1965 was there pressure to create a service-wide, centrally administered program. In that year, when the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec was recognized as a collective bargaining agent, a separate clause was incorporated in the terms of its agreement with the government calling upon the government to give adequate recognition to the need for training and development programs. The amended Civil Service Act of 1965, section 11, subsection 4, acknowledged the government's agreement to this provision by making the Civil Service Commission responsible for managing training and development programs. There was an initial period of frustration for the commission because the collective agreement between the SFPQ and the government provided for a joint committee to recommend on training programs." After its creation in late 1965, this committee, in turn, recommended that initial efforts be directed toward the assemblage of a team of competent persons that would be capable of developing and managing such a program. On August 1, 1968, an "agency" was created, quite separate from the Civil Service Commission, to plan a service-wide approach to training and development. The staffing of this agency was achieved by borrowing from other departments and meeting its expenses from the contingency alloca110

Training and Development

tion of the Department of the Executive Council. With the creation of the Department of the Civil Service in 1969, this agency was destined to be absorbed into it as an important branch. The modest size of the public services in the four Atlantic provinces has not been conducive to departmental initiative in developing their own training programs. The central personnel agencies (the Treasury Board in New Brunswick as of 1968) also have not built up elaborate programs and staff of their own. There has been the same late recognition, as in other provinces, of what the New Brunswick commission described as "the most humanizing of all our personnel activities, . . . the training of employees."2" There have also been the same inquiries into in-service training needs of employees."' But, in the main, rather than mount expensive programs of their own, the commissions have tended to send their public servants to programs being offered in other provinces, in the federal government, or in the United States. New Brunswick appears to have taken the most advantage of these training opportunities provided elsewhere, though Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island have also participated to a lesser extent. The Nova Scotia commission has operated one or two successful short-course residential programs, for example, for supervisors and for secretaries. Although the commission in Prince Edward Island has had statutory authority as of 1968 "to develop, in co-operation with the employing authorities, training and educational programmes for employees in the public service,"22 a Training and Development Division was not set up in the commission until 1970. In Newfoundland, the newly established Public Service Commission has been given a mandate to provide training and development programs. PROVINCIAL TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

As was previously noted, governments can either "buy" or "make" their training and development programs and in most instances are likely to do both. The decision to buy training and development for employees hinges on a policy of leave of absence if the program is for any substantial duration. All provinces do, in fact, have such a policy which normally shares the following provisions.23 First, in nearly all jurisdictions, a distinction is made between an employee who goes on leave at the request of his department in order to improve his performance and an employee who requests leave in order to improve his performance. The employee going on leave at departmental request generally is awarded full pay and all attendant expenses. If the employee himself takes the initiative, less than full pay and compensation is awarded; while, if the program for which the employee seeks leave 111

CHAPTER SEVEN

is not clearly essential or relevant to the performance of his duties, leave without pay is the rule. If attendance at a course does not entail absence from work and if the course is relevant to that work, the government customarily pays tuition fees. Second, the decision on who is to be awarded a leave of absence is made by the Civil Service Commission in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario. In Alberta the approval of the deputy minister is required. If leaves of absence extend to more than one year, the Lieutenant-Governor in Council's approval must be secured. In other jurisdictions, the act and regulations are not explicit on this point, while Newfoundland stood alone, at least until 1972, in as yet having no provision whatsoever for educational leave. Third, the payment of leave awards is, in a few jurisdictions, made by the central personnel agency, but in provinces such as British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia (education leave provisions under review in 1973), the sponsoring department is responsible for bearing the attendant cost of educational leave. Fourth, the granting of educational leave regularly imposes a requirement that the recipient return to the government service for a predetermined period or else accept responsibility for reimbursing the government in whole or in part for failure to fulfil this obligation. New Brunswick requires only one year of service after completion of the leave period; Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan require two years; British Columbia calls for three years; and in Alberta a formula is used for return service commitment. The Province of Quebec offers a rather special case for, in the early efforts to adapt to a new and comprehensive classification plan, many employees found that they lacked the educational background either to retain their place in the new classification or to qualify for advancement from one corps to another. Thus well over 1,700 employees took advantage of government bourses for educational purposes during 1967-68; however, the bulk of these were carrying on with their regular day-time duties. In the same year there were 157 on educational leave in Ontario, 48 in Nova Scotia, 100 in Manitoba, 41 in Alberta, 104 in British Columbia, and the surprisingly large number of 273 in New Brunswick. In total, close to $200,000 was spent by Quebec on these scholarships, with concentration in such basic training as bookkeeping, mimeographing, English language; but there were also a substantial number in administration, criminology, law, education, and personnel administration. The most ambitious of these training programs was directed to the development of middle managers, eight of whom were chosen annually by the Civil Service Commission to attend the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris. 112

Training and Development Preference was given to those with a legal background, and an age limit of thirty was also imposed. Reference to Quebec's somewhat unique program suggests that there is a species of halfway house in the make-or-buy approach to training and development. This middle ground depends on collaboration between a provincial government and the universities. As this collaboration has developed in practice in a number of provincial jurisdictions, it has resulted in the issuance of certificates or diplomas in public administration by the university, while the course content itself has been worked out in consultation with the government concerned. Pioneers in this field were the provinces of Saskatchewan and British Columbia. As early as 1954 the Saskatchewan government, by Order in Council, endorsed support of the diploma course in public administration being given by the University of Saskatchewan. Upon successful completion of the course, many provincial public servants had their tuition fees reimbursed by the government. Beginning in 1956, first with the University of British Columbia but now sponsored by the University of Victoria, the British Columbia government evolved the executive development training plan.24 This senior program is directed toward middle-management employees with a classification of senior clerk or higher and a standard requirement of at least three years' service with the provincial government. This training program is offered annually to some thirty candidates who, initially recommended by their department deputy minister, are screened by a selection committee. The successful candidates then enrol for the program over a threeyear period. The program consists of evening lectures, correspondence lessons, and a two-week seminar held at the University of Victoria in May of each year. The three-year curriculum consists of these topics: first year, law, government, English; second year, psychology, accounting, economics; third year, public finance, public personnel and public administration. Faculty are drawn from the University of Victoria and University of British Columbia and in a few cases from government employees. As students of the interior class (those employed outside the Lower Mainland—Vancouver Island areas) are not able to attend evening lectures at the University of British Columbia or the University of Victoria, the lectures are given in two one-week sessions held in the fall and winter months in Victoria, together with the spring two-week seminar. Expenses for the course are covered by the Civil Service Commission, but the departments are responsible for the payment of travelling and living expenses of their employees who participate. Upon the satisfactory completion of the program, the students are awarded a diploma in public administration by the University of Victoria at a special university con113

CHAPTER SEVEN

vocation in the fall. Over its first decade this program "graduated" 221 public servants. The course affords them a thorough foundational study for their work and also exposes many who have had a narrow professional training to a less-restricted and more liberal education. Beginning in 1966 the Staff Development and Training Division of the Alberta Personnel Administration Office initiated a course in public administration somewhat similar in scope to that in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.-' The Department of Extension of the University of Alberta administers the program in cooperation with the Departments of Political Science and Economics. Certificates are awarded after completion of a six-subject course of three years' duration. Each subject is given over a twenty-five-week period, two hours per week, the program being available to government officials from all levels in the Edmonton area. About seventy-five employees register each year, the Alberta government partially sponsoring some twenty of these annually. Since 1963 the Manitoba Civil Service Commission has sponsored, in cooperation with the Extension Department of the University of Manitoba, a certificate program comparable with those already mentioned. In 1967 the course was expanded from two to four years, all lectures being in the evening and a one-week seminar completing each year's program.20 In Ontario a comparable three-year diploma course in public administration developed in conjunction with the University of Toronto's Division of Extension has been available for a number of years. Newfoundland commenced a similar three-year program in 1968, and Nova Scotia has even more recently moved, in conjunction with Dalhousie University, to develop such a program. When one turns to training and development programs developed within the provincial public services, one finds extraordinary variety, stemming from both departmental and central agency initiatives. Many of these programs arc of the specific in-service training character designed to upgrade certain skills." In New Brunswick, for example, beginning in 1954 and running for a number of years thereafter, a training course for automotive mechanics and welders was run under the multiple sponsorship of the Departments of Education, Public Works, Labour, the Civil Service Commission, and the New Brunswick Technical Institute. In Nova Scotia, a two-day seminar for secretaries was mounted by the Civil Service Commission in 1969 and has grown to four seminars annually. In British Columbia, since 1958 the Civil Service Commission, in cooperation with the Department of Education and the Appraisal Institute of Canada, has sponsored a three-year course on real property appraisal. Employees in the Lands Service, Finance Department, Forest Service, and certain private industries are encouraged to proceed to examinations 114

Training and Development set by the institute which enable them to be accredited as appraisers of the institute. The Saskatchewan Department of Highways has for many years mounted an in-service training program for highway technicians in surveying, soils mechanics, and bituminous surfacing. In Ontario, courses for systems and data-processing specialists have been inaugurated, and, in conjunction with the Toronto Board of Education, a three-month, parttime course in English usage for both clerical and managerial staff was started in October, 1966. Alberta, to take another example, has a tenweek training course for technicians and a variety of courses to improve reading, listening, and writing skills. In a few instances, a particular program has been evolved that is unique among the provinces. For example, British Columbia is alone in maintaining an accident prevention program which combines both training and regulation. Alberta has focused on the problems of alcoholism and has developed a treatment and rehabilitation program as well as an alcoholism training program for supervisors.28 Nearly all provinces have introduced short orientation courses for various levels of new entrants to their services. Most provinces have also established courses for supervisors—in Manitoba this was purchased in 1967 as a "packaged course" from the American Management Association. Another common course is that for personnel administration. In the few provinces with well-established central training branches, a good deal of attention has most recently been directed to programs that move beyond the concept of in-service training to the more nebulous concept of development. Here, attention is directed to employees in the middle-management, administrative, generalist categories and, at a more senior level, to those employees who are considered to have the potential for occupying the most important posts at the top of the hierarchy. In provinces that have instituted programs in conjunction with universities, the developmental philosophy is already apparent. But, in addition, much more effort is now being made within the public services to organize and administer shorter but more intensive courses of their own. In British Columbia, for example, since 1964 there has been a sevenmonth correspondence course operated by the Civil Service Commission "to give employees a broader knowledge of the environment in which they work . . . and to assist these employees in developing staff-management skills.-2" This course is open to lower-level employees (clerks grade 3 or higher). In Saskatchewan, under the Bureau of the Budget, rather than the central personnel agency, a comparable training course in public administration has been offered since 1958 to a small selected group of trainees (three or four) for a year to eighteen months. The course is open as well to senior officials in other departments. 115

CHAPTER SEVEN

Perhaps the most ambitious attempt to groom junior administrators for more senior managerial positions was initiated in Ontario in 1964. In announcing the new program in 1963, the provincial treasurer stated: In the coming year an internship program will be institutcd with five individual internship programs offered to graduates of the universities who have the best qualifications for this particular program. If this program is successful it will be broadened in future years. The intent of this approach is to provide a course of development for professional administrators to make them available when vacancies for the demands of government require middle management personnel. It is one method of preparing for the demands of tomorrow and of assisting in finding qualified persons to fill the vacancies caused by present senior officers through retirement." In 1964 only three trainees were selected; by 1966 there were eleven; between 1966 and 1968 twenty-three university graduates had received the one-year training required by the program. Organized into three parts, the program offers a combination of two-month attachments to six departments, an evening university course in public administration, and participation in the orientation program of thirty weekly sessions of one and one-half hours offered to all new officers in the public service. While on the program the trainees are on contract, not members of the civil service, and remain under the supervision of the director of training and development, Civil Service Commission. Thereafter, if they wish an appointment, they are assigned to the position of administrative officer in a department.3' Apart from these programs developed internally for junior administrative categories, few provinces have had the resources or perhaps the inclination to initiate programs aimed at the development of career senior administrators. At the federal level, over the last decade, a short-term senior officers' course has evolved into the more ambitious career assignment program (CAP) under the auspices of the Public Service Commission and Treasury Board. Only three provinces, Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, have launched similar schemes, though as already noted, the smaller jurisdictions in the Atlantic provinces have made a practice of nominating one or more suitable candidates to attend either the federal or the Ontario course. In Ontario, the first major effort of the newly established Training and Development Branch of the Civil Service Commission was the inauguration in December, 1960, of the Senior Officers' Conference. Over a twoweek intensive period of lectures and workshops, senior line-management 116

Training and Development officers were exposed to the principles and structures of democratic government, the relationships and interactions between government and community, and the principles and methods of governmental administration." This course was held off the premises, first at the University of Guelph and more recently in the well-equipped Staff Development Centre just outside Barrie. The conference is now held twice a year with about twenty-five participants at each session. A follow-up for "graduates" of the conference is convened for a week-long seminar. A somewhat different approach with the same objectives is followed in Quebec." Beginning in 1963 with the selection of a small number of promising younger administrators (age limit thirty) the government availed itself of the resources of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in France. In 1970, in connection with the newly established University of Quebec, a graduate school of public administration (ecole Nationale d'Administration Publiquc) was formed. The school employs mostly part-time instructors, both from the civil service and from the Universities of Quebec, Montreal, and Laval. Both research and teaching arc performed at the school which functions entirely as a postentry training and development centre for civil servants. Its philosophy reflects what Professor Callard detected in his report of 1958, namely, that most civil servants are recruited for specialized tasks, and as they rise in the hierarchy, there is a need for broadening perspectives." The course content, though developed over a longer time period, covers much the same area as the federal government's CAP course or Ontario's Senior Officers' Conference: that is to say, administrative techniques relating to money and manpower, communications, elements of organization, decision-making; knowledge of the working environment; analysis of social, economic, political, and judicial problems. Employees of public and semi-public institutions who hold a university degree and have three years' work experience are qualified for admission, but the intake of about twenty-five a year is far exceeded by the number of candidates. During the eighteen-month course, students remain on full salary from their departments. At the end of the course the successful student receives a master's degree. The record of the provinces in inaugurating training and development programs for their employees reveals not only a belated but a relatively uneven commitment to this aspect of public personnel administration. There is probably no other component of this sector of personnel management that is so resistant to the application of cost-benefit analysis: in short, it is obviously difficult to prove that the investment of the budget on training and development produces measurable benefits in the form 117

CHAPTER SEVEN

of increased productivity, improved morale, increased job satisfaction, and the like. This factor, coupled with the belief that the right man for the right job would be automatically produced by a sound merit system of appointment, helps to account for the hesitant and somewhat piecemeal evolution of training and development programs. The Ontario Committee on Government Productivity, reporting on the management of human resources in the public service, aptly summarized the case for training and development when it stated: Given the tradition of internal promotion and the commonly lower rate of separation in the Public Service compared with the private sector, there is a substantial need for adequate training and development. Obsolescence must be avoided and employee skills continually renewed if the Public Service is to adapt to change and maintain its record of responsiveness. The expenses of training and development should be looked upon as an investment, not as an operating cost.35 The foregoing account of provincial initiatives in this area of personnel administration reveals a gradual recognition of the Ontario committee's position. Certain patterns of common approaches to training and development are beginning to emerge. On the issue whether to make one's own programs or buy them from outside resources, prevailing practices suggest increasing reliance on internally developed and administered programs for such matters as orientation, supervisory training, personnel administration. When the development of particular skills or retraining is required, a combination of in-service and contracting out for programs is found. As one moves to the more elusive area of staff development, greater weight has been placed on contracting out and on introducing provisions for leave—paid or unpaid—to return to university or at least to take a jointly constituted course leading to a certificate, diploma, or advanced degree. Only the larger jurisdictions, such as Ontario, have been able to supplement these arrangements with their own internally managed senior officers' development programs. Smaller and less affluent jurisdictions, such as those in the Atlantic provinces, have sensibly elected to contract out for this expensive component by sending a few selected persons to Ontario or to the federal government's more elaborate courses. Since programs aimed at developing and preparing junior and middle managers for senior positions are costly, possibly the most realistic move in the seventies should be toward regional and even national cooperation. To take one contemporary area, language training, it would seem to make eminent sense for a province like Ontario to send its employees to Quebec for French-language training. In 1971, the Ontario Civil Service Corn118

Training and Development mission trained 673 employees in French, even as in Quebec 139 employees were being exposed to English-language training in 1968. Or, to take another example, if a province has pioneered in developing a special course, as British Columbia has done with its accident prevention program, it would probably be sensible for other provinces to avail themselves of this course rather than establish duplicate and possibly less adequate facilities. Another obvious possibility is interprovincial collaboration on a regional basis in the creation of training and development programs. In December. 1968, this possibility was seen by the three civil service commissions of the Maritime provinces as a highly promising field to be developed on a regional base, and the idea was further supported by the Maritime Union Study." If the prospect of regional and interprovincial collaboration in the area of training and development is a useful and realistic objective to be attained, perhaps it is not inappropriate to direct attention to a more ambitious scheme for a nationwide centre that would be responsible for developmental training programs. The Fulton Committee on the Civil Service of the United Kingdom in 1968 strongly endorsed the creation of a Civil Service College. Although the United Kingdom does not face the problems of continental sprawl and constitutionally separated jurisdictions, it is the very presence of these factors in Canada which a centralized training, development, and research academy or institute might help to resolve, with the objective of creating a cadre of middle and senior administrators who could interact and even be interchangeable within the presently fragmented Canadian political system. This proposal might well be considered as related to the conclusion reached in chapter 1: namely, that in view of the projected needs of governments at all levels for personnel possessing these adaptable, generalist attributes, some Canada-wide pooling and recruiting of such personnel would appear to be desirable and, in the long run, necessary if governments are to be in a position to meet future manpower requirements.

119

Chapter Eight Position Classification and Pay Plan

THE PUBLIC SERVICES IN CANADA project a spectrum of the most diversified types of jobs imaginable. A government employee occupies a specific position classified according to the job's duties and responsibilities. Positions are classified under a comprehensive and well-developed classification plan, the importance of which in personnel administration is so well established that it needs only to be highlighted. First, it enables management to comprehend a bewildering array of facts about thousands of positions. It permits an undifferentiated mass of facts to be reduced to a smaller number of differentiated classes in order to facilitate such general management functions as planning and budgeting, organization, program direction, and fiscal control. It may, at times, seem to be an impediment to rapid administrative action but, in the main, it facilitates the decision-making process. Second, for a proper staffing plan in the public service, certainly some classification system becomes essential if the pertinent facts are to be readily available for recruitment, selection, placement, training and development, and salary administration. Third, the position-classification system may also be seen as a satisfying factor to employees. Through his position-specification form, an employee is encouraged to look at the purpose of his position, to identify with it, and to see his relationship to those around him and his role in the total organization. Consequently, he feels that his job is being properly recognized; and, thus motivated, he may increase his productivity. And, fourth, a basic purpose of classification is to provide uniformity of treatment of employees in terms which can be justified to employees, to the elected representatives, and to the public.' Thus, it may be said that there is no important phase of modern personnel management in which a positionclassification system is not a convenient aid.2

CHAPTER EIGHT

The position-classification system just outlined is but one of two general methods of structuring employees in a public service organization. The conventional position-classification system is based on a "joboriented," rather than a "rank-oriented," personnel management system. The concept of rank orientation denotes that an employee has status in a broad rank such as that held by an officer in the armed forces. The job-oriented concept centres attention on the work assignment of the individual position. These two patterns in personnel management have differentiated the European (especially the British) public personnel system from most North American jurisdictions. In the latter, countries with somewhat similar job-oriented personnel systems for both public services and their large private industries arc the United States and Canada.3 The rank-oriented system, also referred to as a "career system," brings capable young persons, just out of universities, into a small corps of ranked officers. These officers form an elite body with a strong sense of loyalty toward the corps. The inherent characteristic of this concept is that status (pay, prestige, rights, tenure, and fringe benefits) resides in the individual regardless of the nature of the responsibilities and duties.' Often, such career officers, known as generalists or administrative officers, enjoy a highly protected system of rights and privileges mentioned in constitutional documents or special government warrants. For example, officers of the All India Services have been given constitutional protection for their privileges. The rank-oriented concept is based on two assumptions: "that any job can be categorised as appropriate to one or other of the classes; and that it will then be most appropriately filled by selection from the members of that class, all of whom are in principle more likely to be good candidates for it than any member of another class."5 The rank-oriented concept, first applied by the East India Company in 1854, had its foundations in the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854. The report, much influenced by Lord Macaulay whose committee reported in the same year on the reform of the India Service, condemned the nepotism, the incompetence, and other defects of nineteenth-century civil service management. The merits of the young men from Oxford and Cambridge, who rarely read subjects related to their future careers, were extolled by the committee. Once a person entered the administrative class, he was in for life. A class distinction emerged among various employees of the Crown, and at the apex of the structure was the young graduate who was successful in the competitive examination for the administrative class. Lateral movement from one class to another, and especially to the administrative class, was relatively restricted. One of the basic principles of the system was that a proper division of labour depended on the clear separation 122

Position Classification and Pay Plan of intellectual from routine work, and on the separate recruitment and placement of staff for each.° There emerged the career system with its members called an "all-rounder" or "amateur" or "generalist." The career or rank-oriented system of classification was perfected in India as well as in the United Kingdom. However, over the decades, certain problems crept into the management of governmental programs as new tasks were assumed which were unimaginable by the founders of this system more than a century ago. These problems have been well treated by the Fulton Committee, which was appointed on February 8, 1966, to examine the structure, recruitment, and management of the British civil service. The Fulton Committee noted the following defects in the career system: 1. It prevents the best deployment and use of individual talent. The formal and relatively rigid procedures involved in moving from one class to another place unnecessary barriers in the way of the movement of individuals, both upwards to posts of higher responsibility and sideways between different kinds of related work. It also impedes the rapid development and promotion of young people with outstanding potential. 2. It is a major obstacle to the ability of the Service to adapt itself to new tasks. Each class tends to regard the posts that its members usually fill as its own preserve, guaranteeing a career structure with a fixed number of posts at various levels. Men and women enter these classes in their youth and form expectations about their prospects, to which they cling with increasing tenacity as the years go by.. .. 3. The career opportunities that are thus defined for the different classes vary greatly in their attractiveness and scope, even for people with similar educational qualifications. For example, direct graduate entrants to both the Administrative and Scientific Officer Classes need a first or second class degree. . . . It is that separate classification at these levels encourages the idea that opportunity is not equal. . . . 4. The word "class", and the structure it represents, produce feelings of inferiority as well as of restricted opportunities. This is most marked in the attitude of other classes towards the Administrative Class.7 The Fulton Committee went on to observe that the rank-oriented system, by separating functions, has a particularly damaging effect in blurring responsibility and authority in command; and also creates an environment in which a man's career is primarily thought of as a career within his class, leading to a natural pressure to maximize the opportunities in the class by making use of as many grades as possible. Thus the system 123

CHAPTER EIGHT

stands in the way of the most efficient method of matching men to jobs.8 Finally, as job evaluation cannot be accomplished because of the practice of assigning duties to individuals by reference to their membership in particular classes, the career system becomes a major obstacle to the proper application of the principle of accountable management. The Fulton Committee recommended the abolition of classes by creating a classless, uniformly graded structure similar to the system used by the United States civil service and by many large business firms.° Thus, for the first time in the history of the British civil service, an end to the career concept was proposed. In contrast with the rank-oriented system, the job-oriented concept evolved in a modern industrial society in which jobs became increasingly specialized and fragmented. The traditional "generalist" approach proved inadequate, and advocates of scientific management worked out a plan of classifying jobs in narrow boxes according to their duties and responsibilities, arranging them in a hierarchy of difficulty, and attaching an ascending scale of pay rates to them. This array of jobs was then filled by going to the open labor market through competitive examinations and finding qualified candidates. Although many higher-grade jobs were filled by promotion, there was considerable recruitment from the outside at the middle and upper level, particularly in highly specialized work.° People were recruited for a particular job and stayed as long as the job existed. There was no rotation to other duties. Little or no on-the-job training was given. Loyalty to the job could not be developed because of its relatively temporary nature. But the great strength of the system was that it brought in people from industries and universities to perform immediate duties, and they stayed in the same jobs for some years as experts. A further advantage was, and still is, that there was always the transfusion of new ideas into the public service which saved it from the criticism of becoming highly inbred. Moreover, the system proved useful to the kind of governmental operations, particularly in the United States, in which a new administration wanted to prove its worth to the electorate by quick results. The administration needed experts generally available in the open labour market who could come and stay long enough to perform a particular task and then go back to their private professional practice. The major differences between these two concepts of classification rest on their impact on tenure and pay." Under the career system, tenure of a person lies in the Whole service rather than on the current position held by him. If his current position is abolished, the career man is im124

Position Classification and Pay Plan mediately assigned to another position. The status and rank of an employee are never tied to the position held by him at any given point. However, under the job-oriented or position concept, the tenure of a person is usually related to the job currently held by him. If there is a reduction in staff, the retrenched employee will have to compete with others afresh for a new position and his appointment will be new in the organization. The other difference between the two concepts is in the manner of providing salaries. Under the career concept, the salary of an individual depends largely on his seniority and performance; however, the other system is based on the "equal pay for equal work" concept. Criticisms of both concepts have been advanced over the years. In the case of the career or rank concept, the Fulton Committee has provided the most elaborate critical examination, while extolling the advantages of the position concept. Critics of the position concept argue that it creates too many fine occupational distinctions and too many levels of pay, requires laboured and detailed job descriptions, demands a special bureaucratic jargon of phrases, and interferes with variations in pay on the basis of individual performance.'2 The two concepts of classification have come a long way from their extremes. In the British civil service, the Fulton Committee has recommended the adoption of the position-classification system, whereas, in the American context, the second Hoover Commission proposed a Senior Civil Service, somewhat akin to the British administrative class. In the Canadian context, a blend of both systems of classification is emerging, although there still is a heavy emphasis on the position-classification concept. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POSITION-CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN CANADA As we have already stated, the position-classification system in Canada was developed from the American experience. The federal government gave a lead to all other jurisdictions when in 1919 it appointed a firm of consultants, Arthur Young and Company, to study and set up such a plan. In its Report of Transmission, the firm pointed out that the classification of the services was a prerequisite to the examination of candidates —a statutory responsibility given to the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of any plan for listing duties of the position to be filled, the commission could not judge the suitability of applicants. Arthur Young and Company noted: Obviously the Commission cannot pass on the qualifications of candidates to fulfill the duties of particular positions unless they know what the duties of those positions are. . . . Only by a system of classification 125

CHAPTER EIGHT

by which positions having substantially the same duties and calling for the same qualifications are grouped together can examinations be held in advance and lists of qualified persons be secured and maintained.13 From this study a position-classification plan and a pay plan were proposed by the commission, which were approved by Parliament in the same year. This was the first such plan in the history of the Canadian civil service. Since then, the position-classification system, by and large, has remained basically the same, although various commissions of inquiry have recommended changes largely designed to forestall the growing complexity of a system which inherently tends to proliferate classes. This tendency has had particularly serious consequences for the scheme of collective bargaining, which not only the federal but nearly all provincial governments have had to introduce. At the federal level, for instance, the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in 1965 recommended an overhaul of the current position-classification system by delegating classification authority to departmental management; avoidance of the existing complicated and highly fragmented classification structure which serves as a barrier to effective career planning and development; development of a classification structure to provide a custom-tailored approach to personnel administration for different groups of employees; establishment of a relatively simpler structure of grouping classes and categories from the collective bargaining point of view; and initiation of efforts to develop a senior officer class.'4 The committee recognized the requirements of the market in a period of rapid economic change and development and said, "If it is to serve its purpose, a system of classification and pay must be able to respond flexibly, but without loss of integrity, to several types of pressure and requirements. The most important are those generated by the outside labour market and by considerations of equity that flow from evaluation of the relative worth of jobs within an organization."'5 The committee found that the federal civil service had 138,000 continuing positions, 700 classes, 1,700 grades, and 320 salary ranges. Instead, it suggested dividing the service into six occupational categories and sixty-seven occupational groups. These recommendations were adopted by the federal government in 1967 when collective bargaining legislation (An Act respecting Employer and Employee Relations in the Public Service of Canada, Bill C-170) was passed by Parliament and proclaimed in April, 1967. Before the Second World War provincial governments did not seek outside help in devising classification plans for their respective jurisdictions. Several provinces examined carefully the classification report of Arthur Young and Company and various classifications plans in the 126

Position Classification and Pay Plan United States; and from these various reports and other information provincial central personnel agencies were asked to devise suitable plans. Classification work in provinces, before the Second World War period, represented an application of the principle of learning by doing. It was under the pressure of complaints from public service employees that active steps were taken during the later war period to provide well-regulated position-classification plans.'" In British Columbia, a revised classification plan was implemented in 1945 based on a report of a group of senior civil servants headed by the civil service commissioner. Unlike all the other provinces, no outside consultants were brought in and, according to one of the most prominent architects of the B.C. classification plan, Dr. H. M. Morrison, British Columbia thus avoided artificial grafting but rather produced a system which gradually, in accordance with the peculiarities and necessities of the service, took shape.17 Since then, the British Columbia Civil Service Commission has been constantly checking and auditing its system to maintain proper classification of positions, using, whenever it suited the commission, the experience of other jurisdictions. In Alberta, the Public Service Efficiency Act, 1918, established a Civil Service Commission with one of its duties to provide a system of job classification and a salary schedule. However, as the primary duties of the civil service commissioner were those of an "efficiency officer," which were interpreted by departmental officers as making regulations for attendance, vacations, and sick leave, the possibilities of making a classification and pay plan work never materialized. In any case, the act of 1918 only went so far as to authorize the civil service commissioner to prepare such a plan and made no provision for its implementation. Departmental heads, who were to decide whether to apply the act, generally ignored the primitive classification and pay plans that had been prepared after the act was passed.'s Under these circumstances, no effort was made by the civil service commissioner to get any classification implemented until 1941 when a three-member Salary Survey Committee was appointed to recommend an effective classification and pay plan. Each position under the purview of the Civil Service Commission was appraised on the basis of duties performed and qualifications required, and a schedule of classification was drawn up. These proposals were accepted by the government and implemented in January, 1943. When the classification and salary schedules were first implemented in 1943, it was assumed that they would be adequate for some time to come; but mostly because of a postwar rise in wages, numerous changes in departmental organization, and a tremendous growth of public service employment, reclassification of many positions as well as creation of several 127

CHAPTER EIGHT

new classes of position became imperative. However, because of the lack of technical staff and insufficient facilities for job audits, the Public Service Commission could not undertake its statutory duties. In 1954 the commission tried to implement a comprehensive classification plan; however, again it produced no great improvement mainly because performance of an employee, rather than the requirements of his position, became the base of his current salary. Concern developed over a situation in which two or more employees with the same position specification could draw different salaries. The Civil Service Association of Alberta took up the matter as a major grievance, and the commission also thought of installing a detailed plan of classification. The result was the engagement in 1957 of the Public Administration Service of Chicago, a consultation firm specializing in personnel administration."' The implementation of its recommendations represented the first major injection of modern practices into personnel administration in the provincial public service.20 This survey differed from all previous work in that it brought all positions in government departments under a single classification plan and pay schedule; classes, based on the kind and level of work, were described in detail as a basis for allocation of positions; and sufficient staff at the commission was trained and allocated to continue the work. The survey was completed in 1959, and by 1960 all positions under the Public Service Act, 1959, were classified under the new plan. Since 1960 the classification plan devised by the Public Administration Service of Chicago has been in operation. In Saskatchewan, no comprehensive and all inclusive classification was in operation before 1945. In 1944, when the CCF party came into power and decided to give government employees the right to bargain collectively, the immediate problem before the Saskatchewan Civil Service Association was how negotiations with the government could be effectively conducted in the absence of a classification plan that could provide a suitable bargaining unit. The association achieved, in its first collective agreement, a provision for appointing a consultant firm to devise a service-wide classification plan and salary schedule.'' The government appointed the Public Administration Service of Chicago in 1945 to propose a classification and pay plan. The new plan was implemented in 1946. A further modification was made by the same consultant agency in 1955. Since then, the same plan has been in operation with the usual yearly audit and establishment of new positions. The Province of Manitoba, like its counterparts in Western Canada, did not have any comprehensive classification plan before the Second World War. In 1944 the civil service commissioner was charged, under Order in Council, with the preparation of a new classification and pay 128

Position Classification and Pay Plan plan for all government employees covered under the Civil Service Act of 1918. The civil service commissioner submitted his report in 1945; however, the Manitoba Civil Service Association was not satisfied with the plan. It wanted to have some independent agency, such as the Public Administration Service of Chicago (which was currently engaged by the Saskatchewan government to devise its classification plan), to formulate a classification plan for Manitoba. The government of Manitoba brought in two men trained in classification procedures, and the study undertaken was primarily influenced by the plans then in operation in the state of Illinois. The final draft of the classification plan was carefully examined by the Civil Service Assembly (now Public Personnel Association) before the government of Manitoba adopted it. The new classification plan was implemented on May 22, 1947, under Order in Council No. 740/47.22 In 1961 a major survey was undertaken by the Civil Service Commission to review all positions in clerical, stenographic, and accounting occupational categories.23 However, this survey was not an overhaul of the 1947 classification plan but only an adjustment because of the different working conditions affecting these categories. In 1968 a special study of the position classification of senior civil servants in managerial and professional categories was conducted with the assistance of a consultant firm, Hickling-Johnston Ltd. of Toronto.24 These 1961 and 1968 revisions have not altered substantially the original plan adopted in 1947. In Ontario, prior to 1918, no attempt was made to provide a classification plan. In 1919 the civil service commissioner sought assistance from a firm of consultants, Griffenhagen Associates, and in February, 1920, a report on the classification of the public service was tabled in the Legislative Assembly.25 But it was not until seven years later that the first classification plan was formally put into effect, despite the fact that from 1920 to 1927 the commissioner made it his solemn duty to impress upon the government the need to adopt a classification plan. However, as he was not given authority to implement a classification plan in the civil service, he could only recommend such action to the government. Partly because of his continuous efforts and partly because of developments in other jurisdictions in Canada, an Order in Council was passed on October 5, 1927, which made provision for a classification plan for the Ontario civil service. Though the classification plan was formally established in 1927, it had certain inherent weaknesses. The commission was not authorized to prescribe a uniform method of classification,26 and there was no appeal procedure against inaccurate classification. To overcome these problems, a committee of senior civil servants was appointed in 1944 to review the 129

CHAPTER EIGHT

existing classification plan, and its report established a restructured classification plan which was turned over to the Civil Service Commission to be implemented. In 1945 the commission appointed a member of its staff to collect organizational and job information on which to base a revised classification plan. The first schedule of new classes was issued in 1947. The Civil Service Commission prepared a position-description form to be filled in by individual employees. The form at no point referred to educational qualifications needed to perform the job, equipment used, or experience required. Moreover, there was no provision for a supervisor to enter his statement of qualifications required, which sometimes led employees to make descriptions of their own duties. Also, it was left to individuals to report to the commission any improvements in their work; thus, the commission seldom received a position-description form that did not show improvement in the individual's capabilities. At the time of promotion or applying for a new vacancy, a civil servant was required to make out a report of what he did, and on the basis of this he was allocated a certain salary which it was the statutory right of the Civil Service Commission to assess. The commission was not authorized to examine and pass upon the qualifications for each class. The result was that "classification was often a matter of the judicious use of the telephone and a salary schedule. If enquiry was made as to why a certain classification had been awarded, then the answer from the Civil Service Commission Classification Officer was 'because I say so chum.'"27 Soon it was found that the classification overhaul of 1946-47 had not achieved its objective of creating a uniform standard for classifying positions according to work complexities and responsibilities. Moreover, internal patronage could not be controlled when there was no accurate information about the job that had to be filled. There was great dissatisfaction among employees because people doing the same job were paid by different pay scales. The staff of the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario also received complaints from departmental officials or employees concerning the validity of the classifications used to identify the work being done by particular employees.28 In these circumstances early in 1960 the government decided to institute a study of the existing state of affairs with respect to classification. A management consultant firm, Stevenson & Kellogg Ltd., was hired to conduct studies of classification, job evaluation, salary rates, and the organizational structure of departments.29 The study was to report on a balanced classification program after a complete survey was made. Phase 1 of the program started in February, 1961. Phase 2, the study of employees in professional, scientific grades, and administrative categories, was to be undertaken afterwards. 130

Position Classification and Pay Plan

The Stevenson & Kellogg firm appointed a task force consisting of experts from outside the civil service. At the same time, it was given help by thirty-five civil servants drawn from various departments and the Civil Service Commission. The Civil Service Association of Ontario was also requested to participate in the study. Employees were constantly assured that the reclassification program was to evaluate positions and not individuals and would involve considering factors such as seniority, performance ratings, efficiency ratings, and so on. Phase 1 of the study was completed in 1962. During the same year, the new Public Service Act, 1961-62, came into effect which authorized the Civil Service Commission to "evaluate and classify each position in the classified service and determine the qualifications thereof."" The commission was also given authority, subject to the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, to make regulations for prescribing methods of evaluating, classifying, and reclassifying positions, and for prescribing classifications for positions, including qualifications, duties, and salaries.' Thus, for the first time in its history of forty-four years, the commission was given an exclusive authority to prescribe uniform standards for position classification in the Ontario civil service. Plans for phase 2 of the reclassification program respecting technical and professional positions never materialized. The government decided not to renew the contract of Stevenson & Kellogg and asked it to submit a final report by the end of October, 1962.12 Ultimately, the Civil Service Commission, with the help of departmental authorities, completed the remaining part of the program. The reclassification program continued during 1963 and was completed the next year. Although no service-wide survey was made for professional, technical, and administrative classes, nevertheless, position specifications were completed for these occupational categories and job evaluation was done simultaneously. But it was largely owing to the study started by the firm of Stevenson & Kellogg that the following standards and criteria became common practice. First, it became accepted standard practice that all departments of government would chart their organizational structures, identifying positions right down to the lowest level, and submit these to the Civil Service Commission. Second, it was accepted as a management responsibility to define the required duties and responsibilities of each position—to secure agreement of the employee to these descriptions and submit these to the Civil Service Commission in the form of job specifications. This was a significant step forward in that the employee was no longer made responsible for defining the duties and responsibilities of his position. Finally, the Civil Service Commission had a responsibility to evaluate and classify positions and to conduct 131

CHAPTER EIGHT

salary surveys among selected groups of employers in Ontario to arrive at fair and equitable rates for the positions." In 1966 a milestone in decentralization of the commission's authority was reached when from April 1 the power to classify certain positions was delegated to departmental officials. Departmental personnel officers were given authority to assign positions to designated classes and to certify as qualified those employees about to be promoted. In retaining its authority to postaudit all delegated classified positions, the Civil Service Commission made it absolutely clear that "it will be delegating the classification responsibility, and not relinquishing it."34 Between 1966 and 1971, no major change occurred in Ontario, except the regrouping of classes into several occupational categories for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, the report of the Committee on Government Productivity discovered that the existing classification system generated much dissatisfaction and misunderstanding, stemming from the amount of time required for classifying positions and the complexity of the classification procedure. Keeping in view the need for flexibility in the use and management of employees as a prerequisite for a modern government, the committee recommended that service-wide classification standards be prepared but that these should be implemented by individual ministers; a system of broadbanding be developed, that is, the grouping of related jobs at comparable levels across the service into fewer classes and pay grades; and a service-wide master classification system be developed which relates jobs throughout all the province to one another.35 The Civil Service Commission has been working toward implementing these recommendations. In Quebec, the first major classification work was done in 1925 when eleven classes were established, some classes having several salary grades. In the absence of specific position-description guidelines, thousands of employees were lumped together, for example, in class G.36 In 1945 a classification committee was appointed under the chairmanship of the civil service commissioner but its classification work was aborted by the indifference of the Duplessis government. A further attempt was made in 1948 when the Public Administration Service of Chicago was appointed to devise a classification plan which was most suitable to the needs of the administrative environment of Quebec. Instead of recommending a classification plan in which civil servants are grouped together on the basis of similarities in the nature of their work and the minimum qualifications required and thus having an elaborate position-specification form for each position, the Public Administration Service suggested having several groups of civil servants, with three classes for each group: administrative class, class I, and class II. A "career" system was also intro132

Position Classification and Pay Plan

duccd in the classification system in that a civil servant could work through class II at the bottom level and rise ultimately to the administrative class in the same occupational group. In 1965, when collective bargaining rights were given to Quebec civil servants, there arose a need to further consolidate the existing classification structure. The Civil Service Commission started changes in the classification work in May, 1965, and by November, 1966, most of the employees in the administrative support, clerical, and technical categories were grouped together in fifty-seven groups, each group having three classes: administrative, class I, and class II. Each class has several salary grades, and promotion from one class to another depends mainly on examinations conducted by the Civil Service Commission. By April, 1967, other categories of employees, such as professionals, workers in manual and operational tasks, were grouped together to form their respective "corps."37 The special characteristics of the Quebec classification plan, which make it unique among provincial and federal jurisdictions, will be examined later in this chapter. In New Brunswick, the movement to provide an overall classification plan did not affect the provincial government until the end of World War II. It became the responsibility of the newly established Civil Service Commission to devise a classification plan for the entire civil service. A very simple classification plan was prepared by the commission in which an employee in one department, occupying a position calling for certain educational or technical requirements, and demanding a certain range of salary, was brought into line with similar positions in all other departments.38 The plan divided civil servants into three classes: executive class, with four grades and consisting of all employees whose duties required administrative ability or training of a special character; clerical class, with four grades and including all clerical, stenographic, accounting, and bookkeeping positions; and a general class of all other employees in manual, operational, and lower categories of employment. The plan was implemented in 1944. In some respects, the New Brunswick classification plan resembled that of Quebec. In fact, both provinces had exchanged information during the formative phase of their classification planning. Some changes in the classification structure were made during 1948 and the classification of individual positions was also undertaken. However, the number of revisions requested by employees from the Civil Service Commission grew each year. It was evident that the 1948 classification plan needed an overhaul; in addition, the Civil Service Association of New Brunswick was constantly requesting the government to undertake a survey of the whole civil service structure. The Civil Service Commission, under the authority of government by Order in Council 133

CHAPTER EIGHT

No. 61-552, engaged the services of the Public Administration Service of Chicago.3" The survey work started in July, 1961, was completed in November, 1961, and implemented by the Civil Service Commission in April, 1962. The new classification plan reduced the former number of classifications from 752 to 532. With the advent of collective bargaining in the public service of New Brunswick, there arose a significant need to revise the existing classification plan in order to reorganize the public service employees into suitable bargaining groups. Under the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1968, there were established five occupational categories of employees: administrative, administrative support, scientific and professional, technical, and operational.'" As the Treasury Board was recognized as employer on behalf of the government, it was also given authority to prepare the new classification structure. By March, 1969, employees were grouped into various occupational categories, and collective bargaining started in December, 1969. The first classification plan in Nova Scotia was implemented in 1934. The plan provided a grouping of several similar positions in various categories, but there was no avenue of appeal for reclassification and no regular reviews were undertaken of all positions. Although the Civil Service Commission was established in the following year, its authority to review the classification system was not specifically mentioned under the act. The Civil Service Commission started taking serious interest in classification work after World War II; however, no formal, systematic procedure was used by the commission. The commission had to rely on personal judgement and opinion, rather than the application of a specific yardstick, in order to rate the relative importance of jobs within the civil service."' On October 4, 1958, the premier announced the engagement of a consultant firm, Jerome Barnum Associates of New York, to report on job evaluation and salary adjustment. The report was completed in December, 1959, and implemented in 1960. Since then, the classification plan has not undergone any significant change. In Prince Edward Island, as there was no central personnel agency such as a civil service commission until 1963, the Cabinet undertook the responsibility of classifying positions. The Cabinet was helped by the P. S. Ross consultant group of Toronto; however, as political patronage was freely used,42 a systematic classification plan with a regulated system of appeal was not available to employees. The Civil Service Commission, first appointed on May 15, 1963, was given authority to deal with, among other things, classification work. During its first few years of existence, the Civil Service Commission did not have sufficient time and expertise to start a review of the classification system on a service-wide basis although it took steps to revise existing classes. In May, 1969, the gov134

Position Classification and Pay Plan ernment appointed the Public Administration Service of Chicago to conduct a study of organization and to make recommendations on classification and pay plans. On the basis of this study, the Prince Edward Island government revised the system of classification and introduced five occupational categories—administrative, administrative support, professional, technical, and operational—and forty-four occupational groups. In effect, Prince Edward Island followed the general classification pattern being used in such jurisdictions as the federal government, New Brunswick, and Alberta. The Province of Newfoundland has had a different classification plan from other provinces in that an informal classification system has existed in which departmental authorities, rather than the Civil Service Commission, are responsible for upgrading the positions of their employees. Proposed changes in grades and classes arc included in the annual budget, which become operative when passed by the legislature and assented to by the Lieutenant-Governor. In January, 1968, the government appointed Robin Stuart-Kotze to study the system of personnel administration in Newfoundland. The report, submitted on August 28, 1968, suggested that a job classification system be based on the federal example with suitable modifications." In January, 1969, the government engaged the Public Administration Service of Chicago, which was doing similar work in the neighbouring province of Prince Edward Island. The government of Newfoundland and Labrador, like Prince Edward Island, accepted the recommendations and introduced changes which closely parallel the federal and New Brunswick models. The development of position-classification plans in provincial jurisdictions followed the early lead taken by the federal government in employing U.S. consultants to develop the original design. Nearly all provinces initially pursued a halfhearted, do-it-yourself approach, but ultimately six provinces turned to the Public Administration Service of Chicago to help them devise their classification plans: Alberta, Saskatchewan, Quebec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland. Three other American firms helped to establish or review the classification plans of Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia. Only British Columbia has continued to rely on internal studies in developing its classification plan, though all jurisdictions have used the same well-tried American yardsticks to formulate their respective plans." IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON CLASSIFICATION

The position-classification plan was adopted mainly to ensure the merit principle in appointment and promotions. Position-specification forms were meticulously prepared so that there would be no chance for an 135

CHAPTER EIGHT

employee or his supervisor to introduce unfair evaluation of the position for future manipulation. Central personnel agencies, such as civil service commissions, were given authority to devise and administer such plans mainly because of the fear that, left to departmental managers, the plan might be sabotaged by patronage. The use of the position-classification plan as an adjunct to the merit system of staffing has encountered increasing criticism, especially at the federal level. For example, the Royal Commission on Government Organization, 1962, found that the classification files of Ottawa's Civil Service Commission are replete with tedious evidence of long-drawn-out wrangles over alleged inequities and inconsistencies which the present classification maze makes largely unavoidable. The groping for unattainable perfection is also evident in the attempt to write standards. . . . Preoccupation with meticulously detailed classification is unrealistic. Minutely descriptive detail, of little significance for determining the market value of the position, . . . serves chiefly to confuse the issue and limit flexibility in personnel management.45 However, of more profound significance were the deficiencies of the detailed classification plan which became evident when governments were faced with the decision to adopt collective bargaining. The main problem was how to regroup employees into meaningful occupational categories for the purpose of salary negotiations. There were some classes horizontally spread, for example, the class of administrative officer that was located in all departments. Some classes were vertical in structure, existing only in one department, for example, a civil service commission officer performing any duties from recruiting to training, classification, or administering other personnel programs. Then there were classes individual in nature, such as director of a branch. Finally, there were classes based on salary scales without any specific written classification standards, such as clerks 1, 2, 3, and 4. The Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the public service concluded very quickly that extensive reforms in the system of classification would be necessary if there was to be an orderly approach to pay determination and collective bargaining." One of the then civil service commissioners, Sylvain Cloutier, explained the government's proposed system before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Public Service of Canada this way: "We wanted to end up with a classification system which made sense by itself, which was logical, which was based on understandable principles, but which would also be flexible, 136

Position Classification and Pay Plan and which would be capable of responding in a rational manner to the circumst ances."47 One of the most important circumstances was collective bargaining. If the government, as an employer, retained a classification system which it could not explain, let alone comprehend, collective bargaining could never develop into a worthwhile relationship.48 Objectives considered in reforming the old classification plans were these: the system should permit different approaches to the administration of classification and pay for different groups of employees; the system should provide attractive career patterns as strong incentives to superior performance; the system should be characterized by clearly understood pay structures which reflect acceptable internal relativities and permit realistic comparison with outside industries; and the system should permit extensive decentralization of administrative authority.49 Based on these objectives, the Public Service Commission of Ottawa formulated a new classification structure consisting of five occupational categories and ultimately seventy-two occupational groups. Employees in the same occupational group have similar skills and basic educational qualifications. Each of these occupational groups has a separate pay plan that provides for six or seven pay gradations designed to preserve intraservice consistency. Finally, each occupational group bears a relationship to an identifiable outside market for proper comparison, and hence serves as a bargaining base for salary negotiations. The reformed classification plan was finally given legal existence when Parliament approved the report of the Select Joint Committee on the Public Service in 1967. These changes at the federal level have been described here because several provincial jurisdictions had been waiting to see their outcome. In New Brunswick, for example, the federal scheme has been largely adopted with certain modifications. The governments of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland have also expressed their intentions of following the federal lead, while other provinces which have collective bargaining have been quietly changing or making modifications in their classification plans. No doubt, next to the merit principle in the early stages, collective bargaining has been the greatest catalyst in effecting the most recent changes in classification systems of various Canadian jurisdictions. CLASSIFICATION PROCESS

In almost all Canadian provinces, it is the task of the central personnel agency, civil or public service commission, to be responsible for classification of positions in their respective jurisdictions. There are three exceptions: in New Brunswick, the classification function was transferred 137

CHAPTER EIGHT

in 1968 from the Civil Service Commission to the Personnel Policy Division of the Treasury Board; Manitoba has transferred classification from commission to Management Committee of Cabinet; in Newfoundland, where the Civil Service Commission had never been assigned the classification authority, Treasury Board has had this responsibility all along, and since January, 1969, a Personnel Administration Division has been responsible for position classification, pay determination, and employee grievances. Except Quebec, which has a career-cum-position classification system, all other provinces follow generally the same North American approach in classifying positions. Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland are in the process of revising their systems and will be omitted from the discussion that follows. In British Columbia classification of positions in the civil service is the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission and is undertaken by a Classification Division which has four personnel officers and one chief classification officer. These officers constantly visit all departments to evaluate positions and to ensure that all positions with the same responsibilities are at the same level of pay. All positions within the service are first divided into six large occupational groups based on the type and degree of training required in order to perform the duties satisfactorily: administrative, executive, clerical, manual, professional, and technical. All groups, except the administrative and executive groups, are further divided into several classes: clerical, four classes; manual, eight classes; professional, fourteen classes; and the technical group has ten classes. Each class contains all positions of a similar nature in work performance and level of responsibility. In 1968, the British Columbia civil service had 1,100 positions spread among 25,438 civil servants. These civil servants were in these occupational groups: 2 percent in the administrative and executive groups, 31 percent in the clerical groups, 14 percent in the manual groups, 18 percent in the professional groups, and 35 percent in the technical group." In classifying a new position or in reviewing the established position, the commission officers study duties, responsibilities, and the relationship of the position to others. A job description questionnaire is completed by an employee or group of employees and the supervisor. This details what duties are performed, their frequency, and their relative difficulty. The Classification Division assigns proper group and class if the position is new. The main aspect of a classification procedure is how to price or evaluate a job. Two methods are used. One method, factor comparison, compares the job to be evaluated with other jobs previously priced on the basis of the following factors: how much educational qualification, train138

Position Classification and Pay Plan ing, and experience are needed to do the job; whether working conditions are more exacting than usual; the level of responsibility needed; how much direction and supervision are given; what contacts there are with other organizations, departments, the public, and other employees; what decisions are made and what their effect is; and whether there is any monetary responsibility.5t The factor-comparison method is employed in evaluating positions in the administrative, executive, professional, and to some extent the technical occupational groups. Another method of job evaluation is the point-rating system which attributes a certain number of points to each factor, described above, in accordance with a predetermined rating scheme. The total number of points indicates the salary level at which the job should be placed. The point-rating system is generally used for clerical, some technical, and manual occupational positions. For example, taking training as a factor, if a job requires not more than one year of specialized formal training, the point value of this factor will be 125, but with four to six years of formal training, the point value will be 375. In October, 1968, the minimum points required for certain clerical positions were clerk 1: 500 points; clerk 2: 800; clerk 3: 1,100; clerk 4: 1,400, and so on. In British Columbia, the Civil Service Commission is responsible not only for classifying and reviewing positions, but it also entcrtains appeals against reclassification cases. It has not delegated its authority to classify positions to departmental authorities. In Alberta, until October, 1969, the Classification and Pay Division of the Personnel Administration Office was responsible for classification work. After that date classification and the allocation of positions to classes became the responsibilities of the newly formed Departmental Services Division of the Personnel Administration Office. The Personnel Administration Office continuously reviews the classification plans and the allocation of positions and may propose that the plan be amended by adding or abolishing classes. If salaries and terms and conditions of employment of those positions which are under a collective negotiation system are being considered, the Civil Service Association of Alberta is advised of such changes. Although departments are authorized to make changes in the organization of positions or responsibilities to any position for which they have been given delegated authority, the Public Administration Office does keep a watchful eye on such changes. In Saskatchewan, a position-specification form is used to collect data for evaluating a position. The Classification Branch of the Saskatchewan Public Service Commission is responsible for classifying and reviewing all positions. In 1968 the Saskatchewan public service had about 950 positions distributed among about 8,000 employees. As in British Co139

CHAPTER EIGHT

lumbia, the classification authority has not been decentralized among departments. In Manitoba, the responsibility for classifying positions has been transferred from the Civil Service Commission to the Classification Branch of the Committee of Management of the Cabinet. In 1968 there were 566 positions in the Manitoba civil service distributed among 8,344 employees. The procedure of classifying jobs among the three Prairie provinces is not much different from that described in more detail for British Columbia, except in Alberta where the authority to classify has been delegated to departmental officers and a unique system has been adopted of informing the staff association of any change in those positions which are subject to bargaining procedures. In Ontario, the Civil Service Commission has statutory authority for classification, evaluation, and reclassification programs. The Pay and Classification Standards Branch of the commission also checks classification decisions made by departmental personnel officers under the decentralized system. Several training courses are conducted by the branch both for line supervisors and for departmental personnel staffs. In 1967 a new occupational grouping structure was established mainly for purposes of facilitating salary negotiations. Civil servants are grouped into six occupational categories, which in turn are subdivided into a varying number of "units" or groupings of classes for collective bargaining purposes. Each unit contains a number of positions. The administrative and administrative support occupational group has 128 units, the general services category has 147, the law enforcement category has 9, scientific and technical services has 258, the operational category contains 305, and the social services category has 69 units. The Committee on Government Productivity found that about 1,600 classes existed in early 1972 even after the introduction of the above change in 1967. The committee proposed that "the major responsibility for applying claisification standards to positions be transferred to the ministries under general guidelines from the Management Board. This would ensure greater responsiveness, both to the needs of the individual employee and to those of programme managers, who must have freedom to direct their employees in accordance with programme goals."52 Accordingly, the Civil Service Commission has made efforts to implement the recommendation. It provides general guidelines and conducts postaudit of the classification decisions made by the ministries. In Quebec, the classification program has undergone drastic change since 1965 when the Civil Service Commission was reconstructed under the Civil Service Act, 1965. The same year, the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec asked the government to bring in a new classification plan suitable for collective bargaining purposes. To this end, 140

Position Classification and Pay Plan the civil servants of Quebec are divided into several categories, or corps, unlike other provincial examples, which relate to level of responsibility and career concept. Thus, there are ouvriers—workers and employees in manual/operational categories; fonctionnaires—administrative support group, mainly clerical, stenographic, and other auxiliary services employees; projessionnels—employees in scientific and professional categories; professeurs--employees having university degrees and working either as teachers in postsecondary institutions or employed in the Education Department; cadres superieurs—senior officers or executive category employees; cadres intermediaires—middle-management group; and several small categories of employees grouped differently. Advancement of a person in such a classification system is generally restricted to the same corps in which that person began his service. Advancement within the corps can be made either by grade or by class. Movement of an employee from one salary grade to another depends upon his work performance but ordinarily one year is sufficient to be elevated to the next grade. A two-step advancement within a year is possible if an employee has completed further studies equivalent to those of one full-time academic year. Thus there is an inducement for employees to upgrade their educational standards. Interclass promotion depends upon the success of employees in the promotional competition held by the Civil Service Commission each year for each corps. However, not everyone can appear in such promotional competitions; there is a requirement in each corps for an employee to reach a particular grade, generally the middle, before he can appear in the promotion examination. However, employees can appear in other corps interclass promotion examinations. Thus an employee can move from one corps to another, or if he wishes he can make a career in his original corps of entry. In New Brunswick, the classification responsibilities have been transferred from the Civil Service Commission to the Personnel Policy Division of the Treasury Board. The division has regrouped all civil servants and other employees into five occupational categories: administrative, scientific and professional, technical, administrative support, and operational. Each occupational category is further divided into several occupational groups, and each occupational group is again subdivided into several positions. Thus in 1969 there were five occupational categories, twenty-six occupational groups, and many positions. A position-classification questionnaire is used to classify a position. The provinces of Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland follow, by and large, the same system. Finally, in Nova Scotia, the Civil Service Commission is responsible 141

CHAPTER EIGHT

for classification work. A position-specification form, as in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and New Brunswick, is used to evaluate and establish a position. The civil service is divided into seven occupational categories: clerical, hospital, maintenance and operational, administrative, professional, services, and technical. Each category has several classes and positions. In 1968 out of a total of 6,852 civil servants there were 6,396 grouped into 1,600 positions. There is no decentralization of classification authority. Differences in the position-classification systems of the provinces arise in that in one province both the point-rating and factor-comparisons are simultaneously used, whereas in other provinces, the point-rating system is less used. The other major difference in classification systems is the division of the service into several occupational categories, groups, classes, and positions. Provinces have adopted, more or less, categories, groups, classes, and positions in their plan according to their collective bargaining requirements. Quebec is the only province where there is significant emphasis on the career concept, although other provinces such as Ontario have also started some kind of career program for young university graduates. PAY PLAN

The classification plan and the pay plan are two sides of the same coin. They complement each other and any change in one has significant impact on the other. In Canada, at the federal and provincial government levels, certain objectives have been used to formulate a pay plan: there should be equal pay for the same work; salaries paid to government employees should be maintained in reasonable balance with salaries paid for comparable work in private and industrial concerns; the rate of pay should be consistent within the service between various classifications; there should be a maximum and intermediate range in one salary structure; there should be constant reevaluation of occupational categories and positions to see if a revision of the salary structure is necessary in order to reflect modification brought by changing economic conditions in similar occupations in business and industry; and any increase in the total annual payroll of all employees should take into account its possible impact on the economy and on the taxpayers as a whole.53 Although the emphasis on specific elements of a pay plan may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the pay-plan philosophy of provincial and federal governments has been guided by these objectives. To implement these objectives, various approaches to pay administration have been adopted by provincial governments. In British Columbia, 142

Position Classification and Pay Plan it is the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission to suggest a change in the existing pay plan to staff associations and to the Treasury Board. A Pay Research Unit operates in the Civil Service Commission to conduct wage surveys comparing jobs in government service and private industries in the Province of British Columbia. Pay research is a continuous activity of the commission, and it keeps an eye on similar work conducted by other provincial and federal agencies. Three sets of comparisons are used by the Pay Research Unit: average civil service salary with average British Columbia wages and salaries as published by the provincial Bureau of Economics and Statistics; average civil service increase with average increase in the gross provincial product; and average civil service salary increase with the average rise in the consumer price index of Statistics Canada. A further change in salary schedule is suggested by the commission in the case of certain occupational groups, such as registered nurses, physiotherapists, dental surgeons, social workers, for which it is difficult to recruit competent staff within the salary range available. In Alberta, a Pay Research Section of the Employee Relations Division in the Office of Public Service Commissioner conducts wage and salary surveys. Help from the federal Pay Research Bureau and other provincial pay research units is sought. In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, similar efforts are made. Regional cooperation among the three Prairie provinces is emerging through the initiative of the Prairie Economic Council which in its 1968 meeting suggested that the governments of these three provinces attempt to arrive at uniform salary increases for their public servants.54 In Ontario, the Pay Research Branch was established in 1959 and now it is a part of the Staff Relations Branch of the Civil Service Commission. There is a cyclical salary review system which means that the salary structure of each occupational category is automatically reviewed after each two years. Salary surveys are also conducted during each year for some classes in which recruitment is more competitive. Comparisons with private employers, the federal government, and sometimes with American jurisdictions arc also made. The Committee on Government Productivity analysed the public service compensation system and came to the conclusion that the existing classification system does not clarify whether one job contributes more than another to the goals of the government. And, it recommended that "pay research be undertaken for key benchmark jobs which is directed to a comparison of outputs, rather than a comparison of common elements, such as duties, qualifications or experience."55 Thus, a new element has been added in determining differences among jobs and how much each job should be compensated. The committee also 143

CHAPTER EIGHT

recommended the introduction of an effective merit pay system for rewarding superior performance beyond normal annual pay increases, as well as adjustments in pay for a higher or lower cost of living in different regions of the province. In Quebec, the Civil Service Commission conducts salary and wage surveys and has cooperation from the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec as well as other syndicates. A survey is done before the expiry of the agreement between the government and the SFPQ, which is generally of three years' duration. Some ad hoc surveys are done and salary surveys conducted by the federal and Ontario governments are also examined. Salary adjustments are made for each of the ninety-seven occupational groups and corps and within each corps for each class, according to the terms of collective agreements. In New Brunswick, salary administration was the responsibility of the Civil Service Commission until 1968. Annual pay reviews were made, resulting in general pay increases. However, since 1969, with the passage of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1968, the Treasury Board has been entrusted with negotiating salary increases with staff associations. The Treasury Board has prepared a new pay plan according to which each of the five occupational categories has several pay series. For example, there are thirty pay series in the professional category, twentyone in the clerical category, twenty-nine in the maintenance and operational category, and thirty-one in the technical category. These pay series are subject to negotiation with staff associations. In Prince Edward Island, the Civil Service Commission does the pay research and presents its recommendations to the Treasury Board for approval. However, there is no compulsion on the Treasury Board to approve any pay review; for example, during 1968, no approval was given to any reviewed salary adjustment. The Civil Service Commission has remarked: "The salaries paid in this jurisdiction are still below the rates paid in the larger provinces and the Federal Government. In fact, there has been no relative change in this situation during the past twenty years."5° With the approval of Bill No. 60 in the spring of 1973, a regime of collective bargaining has been ushered in which will obviously greatly modify the old pattern of pay administration. In Nova Scotia, the Civil Service Commission maintains a Pay Research Unit which is responsible for collecting salary data so that an annual review of all occupational categories can be made. Data are gathered from local employers, the federal government, and other provincial governments. Although the Joint Council Act does not expressly provide for the negotiation of written agreements, in practice these are made between the commission and the association. 144

Position Classification and Pay Plan

In Newfoundland, the minister of finance is responsible for any change in the salary structure of the civil service. Each year, along with the budget, salaries of employees are presented to the Legislative Assembly, and if passed, become operative. Although there is no pay research unit in Newfoundland, the Ministry of Finance does look for comparable figures in the private sector and the federal government pay structures. If the recommendations of the Committee on Government Administration and Productivity are adopted, a proposed Classification and Pay Division (replacing Treasury Board's Personnel Administration Division) will take over this responsibility in the future and will work in close conjunction with a proposed Collective Bargaining Division of the board.57 Pay-plan administration has been plagued by a number of problems, three of which warrant elaboration. Should a salary increase be a percentage of payroll? Government payrolls are one of the biggest expenditure items in annual budgets. For example, during the fiscal year 1971-72 the gross payroll of the federal government was $2,212 million and the total (nondefence) net general expenditure was $16,137 million; in proportion, then, the federal payroll was 13.7 percent of the total. In the same year for all provinces, the annual payroll was $2,341 million and the total net general expenditure was $13,827 million, that is, the annual payroll was 17.2 percent.58 There is no fixed formula by which the government of any jurisdiction can say what should be the optimum proportion of payrolls to the total budget. Should the ratio of payrolls increase in direct proportion to the annual increase in the total budget? While introducing a budget, a finance minister generally plays down or hardly mentions the proportion absorbed by payrolls so that public reaction may not be adverse to any substantial increase in the salaries of public employees. This issue is of special concern to staff associations when they are told to negotiate a pay settlement as a percentage of total payroll. Associations call such a system the "pot system." According to this system, the government side bargains on the basis that it is prepared to agree to pay increases amounting in the aggregate to a fixed percentage of total payroll. Bargaining, then, is limited by this figure, leaving staff associations with the invidious task of determining how much annual increase should be given to one group compared with another. The other advantage for the government side is that it can take a firm stand on some percentage figure which it thinks can be justified before the public. On the contrary, associations would like to have negotiations of salary increases on a classby-class, or group, basis. Through such a negotiation, they can ask for more or less for those groups which are under- or over-paid according to the wage survey conducted among private employers and in other juris145

CHAPTER EIGHT

dictions. Since comparable adjustments cannot be negotiated in the pot system, staff associations of all provinces are understandably united in asking for class-by-class salary increases. The second problem in pay-plan administration involves salary compression. Each pay plan has a minimum and maximum salary level. The number of steps in a salary range determines the degree of compression of the pay plan. As the minimum of a salary range is a negotiable item, it is comparable with outside pay plans. However, the number of increments or steps is not negotiated, with the result that the government side may provide only four to five salary steps in a series, and hence this arrangement does not offer an attractive career prospect for employees. Besides this horizontal compression in the pay plan, there is a vertical compression system. As it is generally assumed in all provinces that the salaries of elected persons holding administrative posts, such as a cabinet minister, should not be below the salary of an appointed official, there is automatically an unofficial ceiling imposed on the salary structure. This system creates problems in providing sufficient remuneration to the most competent administrators to prevent them from looking elsewhere for employment. Where this pay plan practice prevails, it has had its most adverse effects on executive and administrative personnel. As mentioned earlier, if the number of steps in a salary range is increased, an employee can look forward to having a career in his class. Such a system involves an automatic salary increase, the third problem in administering a pay plan. The system of an automatic salary increase, against a negotiated salary increase, offers an advantage to government service by reducing arguments either between the employee and his supervisor or between the association and government representatives; also it simplifies the administration of pay and classification plans. However, as pointed out by the Royal Commission on Government Organization, such a system encourages mediocrity and constitutes a rationalization in favour of peace in departments.59 The position-cum-career classification system adopted by the Quebec government deserves to be watched as it appears to meet both structural and pay-plan needs. The position-classification system generally includes a very compressed salary range which does not provide adequate incentive for a man to work in the same job for a long time. He starts looking for either promotion to a new position or increased responsibility by "empire-building" so that he may claim reclassification, whereas a career concept blended with the position-classification plan provides sufficient safety and incentive features for energetic and hardworking employees. The advent of collective bargaining has greatly influenced the whole 146

Position Classification and Pay Plan structuring process of classification systems originally designed with merit and economy reform motives in mind. Employees are now grouped in several occupational categories, which are further divided into classes or groups. This has been done so that negotiations can be undertaken systematically and equitably. Collective bargaining has, however, created a new category of employees, called "exempt employees," who belong to the managerial and confidential class and who are excluded from the process of negotiation. Thus the public service now has two groups: negotiated rank employees and exempt employees. Should exempt employees be given a chance to opt for a career system? It is an idea worth considering. The administration of classification plans has also undergone significant change recently. In Ontario and Alberta, departmental managers have been delegated some responsibility in position-classification administration. In other provinces where central personnel agencies have classification responsibilities, there has been no apparent desire to share them with the departments. Whether classification administration be left in the hands of a central personnel agency or transferred to Treasury Board would seem to depend upon which agency represents the government in collective negotiations. The federal government, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland have made this transfer, as has Manitoba with its recent removal of classification work from the Civil Service Commission to the Management Committee of the Cabinet which in fact is a Treasury Board. A pay plan is directly associated with any classification plan. Its philosophy of equal pay for similar work, consistency of pay scales among various classes, and comparability of salary structure with private industries has come to be severely tested under collective bargaining. Certain problems have recently emerged in the administration of pay plans such as whether an annual increase should be across-the-board or be based on a negotiated increase for each individual case. Some jurisdictions may favour the pot system in which they may offer x percentage of the total payroll as an increase for next year, a procedure that staff associations are going to fight tooth and nail. Can there be a formula by which the annual increase could be based on a combination of factors: average rise in the consumer price index plus average increase in the gross provincial product, coupled with a survey of wages in private industries and other jurisdictions? However, these three factors should also be considered in the context of the willingness of taxpayers to pay larger or smaller increases as a proportion of total net general expenditure. Payrolls in governments constitute a major portion of their annual budgets. Individual salary surveys and the capability of individual provincial associations to negotiate more pay have created disparities among 147

CHAPTER EIGHT

provincial government employees. No doubt, regional economic disparity also accounts for such salary discrepancies; however, the time has come for a comprehensive, national outlook on this matter. Just as we have suggested the value of a national approach to government manpower needs, we would propose here the creation of a national pay research bureau to collect wage information and to help individual provinces. A regional approach could then be taken to negotiate salary matters with associations. For example, the Prairie Economic Council has already opened up this possibility. The Maritime Union could be the corresponding instrument to deal with such matters for that region, while Ontario and Quebec, in view of their size, could be regions of their own. A national pay research body coupled with a regional approach to negotiating salary matters might be a most welcome feature in Canadian public personnel administration.

148

Chapter Nine

Employee Representations and Appeals

HEALTHY EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS are necessary if morale and efficiency are to be maintained in a public service as large, variegated, and geographically dispersed as arc all provincial bureaucracies. As the federal Royal Commission on Government Organization has observed, maintenance of proper channels of communication between management and employees is a prerequisite for ensuring the preservation of this healthy environment.' Good communications have to be planned and structured in any organization as complex as the public service. Generally speaking, such planned arrangements are designed either to provide the individual employee with established routes for carrying his grievances to management, which are examined in this chapter, or to provide a means for collective discussion or negotiation of those matters that affect the work and working conditions of groups of employees, examined in chapter 10. Management's front-line for disposing of individual complaints relating to day-to-day working conditions is the departmental supervisor. Grievance handling is best accomplished at this level, since a fair adjustment by a supervisor not only saves both the griever and management time and money to go through several stages for a settlement but also prevents the erosion of good employer-employee relations. In this light, a supervisor's role in handling employee grievances is of tremendous importance. As a court of first resort, a good supervisor will realize that the best way to deal with grievances is to prevent them from arising. Accordingly, he should be on the alert to remove, if he can, causes which lead to employees feeling grieved, or otherwise they are likely to consider the supervisor indifferent to their welfare. But even the best-intentioned

CHAPTER NINE

supervisor cannot head off all grievances by his watchful anticipation: many employees have a habit of nursing their grievances in disgruntled silence. It is, therefore, a part of the supervisor's task to be on the alert for employee reactions that may signal the existence of a grievance: reduction of effort; a fixed attitude of resentment or hostility; an argumentative or bullying stance in relation to fellow employees; irritation or unusual quietness; indifference. Apart from attitudinal or personality signals, high turnover in a department, created by employees quitting their jobs or requesting transfers to other departments for no apparent reason, or poor-quality workmanship—increased scrap and spoilage—may provide additional evidence that not all is well.= Any of these reactions, if allowed to develop, tends to destroy good employer-employee relations and throws obstacles in the way of departmental performance. On the basis of his close relationship to and easy access by employees, the supervisor should, in dealing with grievances, encourage the affected employees to make their complaints to him rather than to fellow employees who cannot help make any adjustment. It is well known that case of presentation by the employee eliminates many of the minor gripes that otherwise would be expressed. Readiness and willingness to listen should therefore be explicitly shown at all times to employees who have complaints to make. A supervisor who refuses to recognize or hear grievances creates additional grievances because employees cannot get their complaints across. Thus, the seeds of discord are planted to flower tomorrow. In dealing with grievances, it is important for the supervisor to get all the facts so as to achieve a fair settlement. Complaints from the dissatisfied employee should be heard and consultations should be held with other persons whose knowledge, experience, and observations of the situation contribute to a thorough understanding of the case. Finally, the supervisor has another more important role to play: if the grievance cannot be successfully and informally dealt with, the supervisor should see to it that the grievance is promptly and properly handled according to established formal procedures. While the supervisor is on management's front-line for grievance settlement, an employee's association can be viewed as his staff and support, particularly if formal procedures have to be instituted. Grievance handling is a part of the activities of a staff association and is one way for the association to fulfil and promote the general well-being of its members. Being a member of the association, an aggrieved employee is entitled to ask his association to defend his case. On the whole, associations in the provinces have adopted a responsible attitude in deciding whether or not to defend the case of an aggrieved employee. An association feels that it has a responsibility to investigate thoroughly each grievance, get 150

Employee Representations and Appeals the full facts from all sides by interviewing the aggrieved party, the senior official involved, and other people who can provide related information. Having checked the case carefully from all angles, the association then tries to convince the griever whether or not he should press the case for formal appeal. An association should view grievance procedures as an orderly process in which both the association and management have the responsibility to expose relevant facts and try to arrive at a fair and reasonable settlement. In taking up the grievance of one of its members, an association has a larger responsibility to the public in ensuring that its advocate role does not extend to supporting a case by invoking the dogmatic rationale: our member first, be he right or wrong. FORMAL APPEAL MECHANISMS

A supervisor in Saskatchewan is called upon to reply to any written complaint of an employee within two days; in Manitoba and Quebec, five days is the limit; Ontario, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island provide for seven days; in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, it is ten days; in British Columbia and Alberta, fourteen days. If the employee and his supervisor do not reach a satisfactory adjustment, and the employee still considers that he has a grievance, then he submits his written complaint to an appointee of the deputy minister or a departmental personnel officer, then to the deputy minister (as in Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and New Brunswick). In the Prairie provinces, the appeal goes straight to the deputy minister. At this stage, the deputy minister reviews or investigates the grievance and renders his decision. All provinces make provision for a final level (s) of appeal beyond the decision of the deputy minister. Three general patterns of final appellate authority have been adopted: either the existing central personnel agency is vested with this responsibility, a separate grievance board is established, or provision is made in the collective agreement between the government and the associations for an ad hoc tribunal. British Columbia (until 1973), Manitoba, and Nova Scotia have adopted the first model in which the final appeal is processed by the Civil Service Commission. In Prince Edward Island this procedure is varied in that appeals from ministerial decision are submitted to the Civil Service Commission with a final appeal to the Joint Council. In British Columbia, the appeal is first handled by the chief personnel officer of the Civil Service Commission from whom an appeal lies to the full commission. Its decision, in turn, can be appealed to the Lieutenant-Governor in Council 151

CHAPTER NINE

(Cabinet) which may appoint a mediation commissioner to render an advisory judgement for the Cabinet with whom the final decision rests. Under the 1973 Public Service Act, this procedure has been changed and a Public Service Grievance Board, similar to Alberta's, has been instituted to hear all appeals on grievances that do not fall within the terms of collective agreements (also provided for the first time in 1973 legislation). In Alberta, there arc three levels of grievance handling within a department before an employee can appeal to the chairman of the Grievance Appeal Board. By Order in Council 2325/70, this board consists of a permanent chairman, who holds office at the pleasure of the minister of personnel and the president of the staff association, one member appointed by the minister, and a third member appointed by the president of the employee association. However, no employee can appeal to this body unless it is a grievance involving an alleged violation of a collective agreement or a disciplinary action. Ontario and New Brunswick, like Alberta, have created a special Grievance Board as a final court of appeal on grievances. In Ontario, as a result of representation by the Civil Service Association of Ontario, a Board of Review was created in 1944. This three-member body was made up of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, a nominee of the association, and an appointee of the Lieutenant-Governor. The board's decisions, like those of the Mediation Commission in British Columbia, were advisory to the Cabinet and were limited to appeals on dismissals. In 1959 a Public Service Grievance Board was established, and when the old Board of Review was merged with it in 1961, it had the authority to hear appeals on all matters relating to terms of employment and working conditions.3 Since 1961 the Grievance Board's jurisdiction has been extended to cover not only classified and unclassified civil servants but also employees of boards and commissions; the number of senior officers excluded from the provisions of grievance hearings has also been reduced to those classified positions, such as deputy minister and chairman of a commission, at the very top of the hierarchy.4 The board consists of six members—three from within the civil service, three (including the chairman) from outside the civil service, but any two members may hear and make final disposition of a grievance.' Although the Civil Service Association of Ontario no longer has its own nominee on this board, as was the case in the original Board of Review,a one member customarily endeavours to represent the association's point of view and, in any case, the association is normally representing or advising the employee throughout all stages of the grievance procedure. A compilation

152

Employee Representations and Appeals of activities of the board over a six-year period (1960-66) reveals that decisions run about two to one in favour of management, the best success (from the employee's point of view) being on appeals on promotional decisions.? The New Brunswick Grievance Review Board was established on March 1, 1968, with a composition and terms of reference similar to that of Ontario's, except that dismissal cases are not handled by the New Brunswick board. It is made up of a chairman, together with a panel of five members, of whom three are senior public servants and two, along with the chairman, are selected by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council from outside the public service.8 The third pattern of appeal procedure is found in Saskatchewan and Quebec and is a component of the collective agreements signed in those provinces. In Saskatchewan, there is provision for an ad hoc Arbitration Board of three members, one appointed by the government, a second by the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association, and a third, who acts as chairman, is a joint nominee of the other two members. The Arbitration Board is used not only to make a final determination on individual grievances arising out of terms and conditions of employment but also to resolve disputes arising out of interpretations of the collective agreements between the government and the association. In Quebec, as well, grievance procedures became part of the collective agreement, which was first signed on March 26, 1966. Here, the General Division of Labour Relations in the Department of the Civil Service is given a central role in following a grievance from its preliminary stages at the supervisory level through to the last court of arbitration.° At all these stages provision is made for an association representative, first on the investigating committee that may be appointed by the senior officer in the department of the aggrieved employee, then on the Grievance Committee having representatives of the Syndicat and deputy minister. Final decision rests with the arbitrator-in-chief in the General Division of Labour Relations. Apart from grievances that arise in the course of an employee's daily work, three important areas of managerial decision—disciplinary actions, classification, and promotion—have such a profound effect on each employee that the injection of special appeal procedures has been deemed essential. Without exception, the civil or public service acts and regulations of all Canadian provinces make provisions for disciplinary actions to be taken against an employee when he has been found guilty of a breach of discipline. Commonly applied disciplinary actions against an employee 153

CHAPTER NINE

are suspension, dismissal, demotion, withholding of annual salary increment, and financial penalty. Of all the punishments, dismissal (usually preceded by suspension) is obviously the most severe. Reasons for dismissing an employee from employment are either set out in the civil or public service acts or regulations, or in collective agreements between the government and public service associations. The regulations in Ontario contain the most detailed provisions: dismissal occurs if a public servant habitually fails to comply with regulations or directives, absents himself without permission during his prescribed hours of duty, reports for duty while incapable of performing his duties, misuses government property or uses government property or services for purposes other than government business, and fails to obey the instructions of his supervisor.'° In Manitoba, an employee is dismissed on grounds of misconduct, unsatisfactory performance, and incompetence or neglect." Similarly, the departmental head in Saskatchewan dismisses an employee for misconduct and when he considers it to be in the interest of the public service to do so.'2 In Alberta, the penalty of dismissal is taken against an employee by reasons of incompetence, misconduct, and improper conduct or negligence.'' In British Columbia, an employee is dismissed if he has been found guilty of misconduct or negligence in the performance of his duties." Contrary to other provinces, Quebec does not provide any specific ground for dismissal of its employees, although grounds for suspension are listed as misconduct or negligence in the performance of duties.' The New Brunswick Civil Service Actl° and the P.E.I. Civil Service Act" have similar provisions. In Nova Scotia, an employee may be suspended, which may lead to dismissal, for misconduct or incompetence.'8 The 1952 Civil Service Act of Newfoundland was most explicit about grounds for dismissal or suspension, which may include inefficiency, insobriety, insubordination, misconduct, dishonesty, or other just cause." We notice that misconduct, incompetence, or neglect of duties are the most common grounds for dismissal of an employee. In all provinces an employee against whom dismissal action is proposed is placed on suspension. The suspended employee does not receive his salary, but if he is reinstated after suspension, he gets remuneration for the period of suspension. Provincial civil service acts are silent on what happens to a public servant's salary if he is dismissed after being suspended; the general practice appears to be that the dismissed employee loses his wages. Some provinces, such as British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Ontario, penalize an employee who is rendering inefficient service or performing unsatisfactory work by withholding annual salary increments. Other provincial jurisdictions make no formal provision for this form of disciplinary action but most provide for demotion to a lower position 154

Employee Representations and Appeals

when the employee's services do not meet the required work standards. Under the provisions of the civil or public service acts in the Canadian provinces, an employee who feels that any of the above disciplinary actions taken against him is not justified can seek redress to an appeal body. In Ontario, as previously noted and except in the case of a reclassification arising out of demotion, an affected employee may file his appeal directly with the Public Service Grievance Board. However, such an appeal is available only to employees who have been continuously employed for at least the preceding twelve months. The board's decision is final. In New Brunswick, the Civil Service Commission made recommendations on dismissal to the Joint Council which had the final word until 1969 when it was abolished. Such cases are now handled by an adjudicator or a board under the Public Service Staff Relations Act, 1968 (chapter 88, sections 96 and 101). The Joint Council in Newfoundland is the final appellate body for dismissal cases, while in Nova Scotia the Joint Council's decision can be appealed to an Arbitration Board. Prince Edward Island is unique in providing for an ultimate appeal on dismissal cases to the Supreme Court of the province. In Alberta the Public Service Grievance Board is the court of last resort on dismissals; in British Columbia it is the Cabinet and in Manitoba it is the Civil Service Commission that render the final verdict. Both Saskatchewan and Quebec spell out the procedures, leading to final arbitration, for dismissals of unionized employees; if nonunionized employees are involved, the Civil Service Commission passes final judgement (in Quebec) or recommends that the deputy minister take final action (in Saskatchewan). The other special category of grievances includes those that relate to an employee's classification. An employee's status among his colleagues as well as in his own eyes depends upon the position he holds in the hierarchy. It is, therefore, necessary that he be given an early and adequate opportunity to be heard if he feels that he has been wrongly or inadequately classified. His morale and performance of his duties depend on whether he feels secure and is reasonably satisfied in his present position classification. In all provincial jurisdictions, this problem has been realized, and various procedures have been adopted to see that a griever gets sufficient opportunity to redress his grievances with respect to position classification. Besides individual actions, staff associations may also feel that there is a need to seek a change in a group of positions or classes, and they may also resort to appeal action. However, grievances arising out of classifications are largely individual. Grievance procedures on classification issues vary among provincial jurisdictions. In British Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, an employee who feels that he has been 155

CHAPTER NINE

wrongly classified or that he should have been classified in a better position may appeal in the same manner as he does in the case of grievances arising out of working conditions and terms of employment. However, in the remaining five provinces, Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Quebec, and New Brunswick, separate mechanisms exist. The Classification Rating Committee in Ontario was established in 1961. It is composed of three members who arc designated by the chairman of the Civil Service Commission to hear classification grievances.20 One of the three members comes from outside the public service. The second member is a personnel director in a government department. The appointment of the third member depends upon the particular situation; he is usually the personnel director of a government department other than the one in which the grievance arises. If a public servant feels that his position has been improperly classified or that a reclassification in his branch of work has placed him at a disadvantage, he first presents his grievance to the immediate supervisor who refers it to the deputy minister. If the grievance is about a new position, the deputy minister gives his decision within twenty-one days of receiving the complaint.2' If the grievance is about reclassification, the deputy minister may make his decision within a period of six months.22 If the griever is not satisfied with the decision of the deputy minister, he may present his case in writing to the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, who directs the case to the Classification Rating Committee for a hearing which is held within fourteen days of the receipt of application at the Civil Service Commission office. The committee's decision, in writing, is final and is sent to the griever, his representative, the deputy minister, and the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. The Classification Rating Committee heard twenty-three grievances in 1967. According to the annual agreement between the Saskatchewan government and the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association, there is established a Classification Joint Council to handle employees' complaints about improper classification of positions. The council is completely independent of the Public Service Commission,'' and its ultimate purpose is to determine whether the position is correctly classified.24 The Classification Joint Council is a three-member body: one member is appointed by the government, one by the association, and the chairman is a person mutually agreeable to both parties. The government and the association members of the council hold their appointments at the pleasure of their respective principals and the chairman holds his office for a period of time mutually acceptable to the government and the association.25 The Classification Joint Council has the power to recommend the establishment of a new class of positions and the amendment or revision 156

Employee Representations and Appeals

of an existing class specification to accommodate the appealed position. Also, it has the power to direct the reallocation of the appealed position to an existing designated class of positions. It is agreed that the council meets at least once a month and at such other times as may be jointly decided between the chairman and members of the council, consistent with the volume of appeals. All members are required to be present at each meeting. In contrast with his counterpart in Ontario, an employee with a classification grievance in Saskatchewan follows a simpler procedure. Section 29 of the 1967 agreement between the government and the staff association states that "whenever a permanent employee feels that his position has altered sufficiently to justify a review as to the appropriateness of its allocation, he may request the Classification Branch of the commission to review his position."27 This means that an affected employee can file his grievance directly to the Public Service Commission without it being processed at the supervisory and departmental levels. If the griever is not satisfied with the decision of the Classification Branch of the Public Service Commission, he can appeal for a final review to the Classification Joint Council by filing a request for a reclassification form and sending it to the chairman of the council within ten days of receipt of notice. After receiving the request, the council notifies the appellant and the Classification Branch of the date, time, and place of the hearing. The appellant can appear in person and can be supported by a fellow employee or an employee of the association to address a written brief to the council. The Classification Branch is also entitled to address a written brief to the council. The decision of the council is final.'" The Classification Joint Council heard thirty-seven grievances in 1967.2" In Alberta, the Public Service Act, 1968, makes provision for the establishment of a Classification Appeal Board to handle appeals by an employee against improper allocation of positions."° Likc the Classification Joint Council in Saskatchewan, the Classification Appeal Board in Alberta is a three-member body. The chairman is a professor in industrial relations, Faculty of Business Administration, University of Alberta. One member is a departmental personnel officer, and the other is the executive secretary of the Civil Service Association of Alberta. When an employee feels that his position has been improperly classified, he may ask his branch head to initiate a request to the director of classification for review. If the branch head declines to initiate the request for review, the griever, like his counterpart in Saskatchewan, may present his case in writing to the director of classification for review. Having made a review, the director forwards his decision to the departmental personnel officer, who transmits it to the griever. If the decision is not acceptable, 157

CHAPTER NINE

the griever may appeal in writing to the Classification Appeal Board within twenty-one days of receiving the decision from the director of classification. The board then conducts a hearing and hears the testimony of persons, including the departmental personnel officer and officers of the Personnel Administration Office who have knowledge of the duties and responsibilities of the position. Based on that testimony and other relevant evidence, the board makes its adjudication. The decision of the board is final. The Classification Appeal Board heard eighteen cases in 1967.31 In Quebec, an employee who feels that he has been wrongly classified can appeal to the Civil Service Commission within two months from the date of receiving his new position-classification order. An employee, or group of employees, has the right to appeal against a classification plan during the period when a new collective bargaining agreement is signed between the trade union and government but has not yet been promulgated by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. Two procedures for appeal arc available. For those who are classified as workers and office employees (Unite Fonctionnaires), an appeal can be made to the Classification and Inspection Branch of the Civil Service Commission which appoints an ad hoc committee to hear the appeal. The ad hoc committee is composed of a departmental representative and representatives from the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec. The report of the ad hoc committee should be unanimous in accepting or rejecting the claim by the griever. Such a report is then approved by the Civil Service Commission and it is final. In case the report is not unanimous, the Civil Service Commission automatically appoints an investigator from its Classification and Inspection Branch to report on the matter. The final decision is taken by the commission. Another procedure of appeal is set up for those employees who arc not represented by the SFPQ and who arc generally classified as professionals, personnel officers, and superior cadres. An appeal for unjust classification can be made directly to the Civil Service Commission which appoints a Jury of Appeal consisting of three members: one representing the commission and acting as a chairman, and two representing the professional occupation of the griever. Decision by the Jury of Appeal is final. The Civil Service Commission heard 10,144 cases in 1967.32 In New Brunswick, the Treasury Board has been made responsible for classification of positions in the provincial civil service. However, under the Public Service Labour Relations Act of 1968, there exists a procedure whereby an employee, after appealing to his supervisor and to the deputy head, can request the chairman of the Public Service Labour

158

Employee Representations and Appeals Relations Board to refer his appeal to the Board of Adjudication for final hearing. Separation of administrative and judicial functions has value for grievance cases arising from reclassification of positions. In instances where a body combines both the initial decision and the power to render a final verdict, as in Quebec and Saskatchewan, the impartiality of proceedings is still guaranteed because the employee's representative or his association's delegate sits in the preliminary appeal body. As the separation of the appeal body from its parental organization gives an impression of impartiality, and as the inclusion of the employee's or his association's representative ensures adequate protection of the griever's interests, it is suggested that the following procedure may be considered for adoption. In the case where treasury board has been given the authority to classify positions, the civil or public service commission should have power to hear appeals. Also, the appeal board should include a representative from the employee's association or his personal delegate. The decision would obviously be final. In the case where civil or public service commissions retain the authority to classify positions, a grievance board such as in Ontario or similar independent body should be given the power to entertain appeals. Representation of employees' interests on such an appeal body is a necessity. At present, the Saskatchewan system appears best to approximate the procedures proposed above. A satisfactory working environment in large organizations requires the provision of adequate machinery to settle fairly and reasonably individual public servants' grievances arising from existing working conditions and terms of employment and disciplinary actions taken by departmental authority. The record of provincial governments' performance suggests that all provinces have become increasingly conscious of the need for such formal appeal mechanisms, even as they have recognized the importance of top-grade supervisors in fending off or dispersing of such grievances at the first level of management. In all jurisdictions beyond the supervisory level, an elaborate series of appeals carries through senior departmental management to some form of central final decision-making authority; whether this authority be the central personnel agency, a joint council, a special grievance board, or an ad hoc arbitration tribunal, it is apparent that the systems are deliberately designed to bring the associations into the decision-making process. This poses a problem for the associations in that they are involved initially in the advocacy role and ultimately in a judicial role that may not be altogether compatible. On the other hand, senior management who may make the final decisions 159

CHAPTER NINE

with respect to such matters as classification or dismissal can also be faced with the same ambiguities in having to pass judgement on their own decisions when aggrieved employees appeal up the line. Finally, it should be observed that the provision of multistep appeals for employees often produces lengthy delays in the personnel decision-making process. However, in the final analysis, ambiguity of roles for both management and association representatives in handling grievances can be lived with as long as the procedures admit grievance collaboration in seeking an equitable outcome for the aggrieved employee. And the time consumed in the provision of multistaged appeals is probably a small price to pay in order to ensure that justice is done and is seen to be done by the employees who have to live and work in such large and seemingly anonymous organizations.

160

Chapter Ten Joint Consultation, Negotiation, and Collective Bargaining

of individual grievances and appeals relating to such matters as disciplinary decisions, promotions, and classification constitute one area of concern to civil service staff associations. Governments, as employers, not only have had to respond to this concern but also have had to react to the claims of staff associations for collective participatory rights in the formulation of personnel policies in general and, more specifically, in the determination of terms and conditions of employment for public servants. The staff associations' claims for collective participation in the manpower management field have taken two forms: first, an insistence on the erection of joint consultative bodies on which they would have equality of representation with management (speaking for the government as employer), and, second, extending beyond mere consultation, the adoption of some form of collective negotiation leading to an agreement binding on both parties. The machinery both for joint consultation and outright bilateral negotiation and for collective bargaining has been put in place at the federal and provincial levels since the end of World War IL In nearly every jurisdiction this development has evolved very rapidly from mere consultation, through an intermediate stage of bilateral negotiation which still left intact the government's right to make final decisions, to a third stage of outright collective agreements reached through bargaining and its attendant attributes of third-party intervention through conciliation, mediation and arbitration, and, in some cases, the right to strike. THE PROCEDURES FOR DISPOSING

CHAPTER TEN

The first stage, that is, joint consultation, provided the rationale for creating joint councils at the federal level and in a number of provinces. Staff associations soon became dissatisfied with this halfway house to more genuine bilateral negotiations and began to press for changes in the joint consultative procedures that led first of all to negotiation and ultimately to outright collective bargaining. In most cases, the attainment of collective bargaining necessitated the creation of new mechanisms that either made the joint councils redundant or pushed them into the background because the efforts of staff associations came to focus on the bargaining process where the real bread-and-butter issues are resolved. JOINT COUNCILS

The joint council concept originated in Britain just at the close of World War I, proving briefly popular in the private sector but from 1919 on enjoying its greatest success in the civil service. The so-called Whitley Council plan that was adopted by the government provided for both a national council and departmental councils. In skeleton outline, the joint councils were composed of equal representation from the Official Side (senior management) and from the Staff Side (various recognized staff associations). They were clearly designed as a means to improve employer-employee relations by providing forums for joint discussion of large policy issues (in the case of the national council) affecting the terms of employment and working conditions of groups of employees. When agreements were reached, they had to be unanimous and were considered final, though, in the last analysis, subject always to the overriding right of a sovereign legislature to maintain control of the purse. Departmental councils considered local issues but were not regarded as appeal tribunals for individual cases.' After the adoption in 1925 of the Industrial Court (in 1936 a separate Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal), there was never any question that the joint councils should be the primary bargaining instruments, although some issues raised in the councils have gone to the Arbitration Tribunal.2 In Canada, the Whitley scheme was early endorsed by several federal staff associations, and in 1930 it appeared that the joint council plan would be accepted by the federal government. For reasons that are now not altogether clear, the proposal was aborted and lay dormant until 1943. At this point, the staff associations revived the scheme and the government promptly responded by setting up the National Joint Council of the Public Service in May, 1944.3 The new council was practically a facsimile of the British Whitley Council, but the provision for departmental councils did not catch on as it had in Britain. 162

Collective Bargaining This federal initiative provided a cue for several of the provinces to inaugurate comparable joint councils. In fact, Alberta had long before, during the initial enthusiasm created by the British Whitley scheme, created a Joint Council in 1922 to ensure "the greatest measure of cooperation between the Government as the employer, and the employee."4 Apparently, the Alberta council, which was composed of three cabinet ministers and three representatives from the Civil Service Association, met irregularly and languished in an ineffectual state until it was given a fresh statutory lease on life in 1954. The Province of Ontario, at almost precisely the same time as the federal government, adopted in May, 1944, a Joint Advisory Council.° Unlike the federal government, however, Ontario proceeded to form a number of departmental and local joint councils. Nearly twenty years later, in 1963, the title of the central body was changed to the Ontario Joint Council and its purely consultative-advisory functions were extended. Manitoba's Joint Council emerged in 1951 as a committee composed of three ministers, three representatives of the Manitoba Government Employees' Association, and a member of the Civil Service Commission.° In 1957 the Joint Council received statutory blessing and moved from a purely consultative role to that of a negotiator, in much the same fashion as its Ontario counterpart. New Brunswick was the next province to adopt a Joint Council—a decision that was taken by the Liberal government in September, 1960, but it was set up initially for a twelve-month trial. In June, 1962, the civil service regulations were amended to give formal recognition to the Joint Council.7 However, as a consequence of the report of the Frankel Commission in 1967 in which it was observed that the Joint Council was "primarily a vehicle of consultation, not negotiation,"8 the government adopted a full-scale collective bargaining system which raised questions concerning the necessity of retaining the council. In the event, when the legislation was proclaimed for full collective bargaining, effective December 1, 1969, the Joint Council ceased to exist. When Nova Scotia established its Joint Council in 1963, it was seen by the Nova Scotia Civil Service Association as a body "to provide for negotiations of matters relating to employment in the Civil Service of Nova Scotia."° In fact, until it was given a statutory base in 1967, the council was purely consultative. However, the Civil Service Joint Council Act of 1967 clearly indicated that the council was to be the central agency for collective negotiation, though it was not empowered to go the full route toward outright collective bargaining. It will be observed that in the Maritime provinces joint councils began 163

CHAPTER TEN

to emerge about the time that other provinces were seeking to extend the purely consultative-advisory role of their joint councils to become negotiating instruments. Hence, the progression from consultation to negotiation occurred much more quickly in the case of the late arrivals. Thus, when Prince Edward Island provided for a Joint Council in its Civil Service Act of 1962, chapter 5, the responsibilities of the council were not merely consultative but also appellate with respect to such matters as grievances concerning classification and discipline. Similarly, when Newfoundland in 1967 belatedly joined the ranks of those provinces that had adopted the joint council plan, the Government Employees' Association almost immediately began to argue the "there is a need to have more teeth in this Joint Council" and recommended a move toward a more forthright "collective bargaining system" on the Nova Scotia model.'" Only three provinces, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and British Columbia, did not embark on a joint council scheme. Saskatchewan was the first jurisdiction to adopt collective bargaining in 1944 without a preliminary period of experimentation with consultative procedures. Quebec followed the same course over twenty years later, while British Columbia, having experienced perhaps the most protracted period of unruly employeremployee relations, shifted very abruptly to collective bargaining in 1973. In five of the seven provinces that moved along a more evolutionary path toward collective bargaining, the joint councils consisted initially of six members: the official side was represented by three cabinet ministers, the staff side by three representatives chosen by the single recognized staff association for each province. Provision was also made for additional consultative members, usually a representative of the Civil Service Commission and an executive officer of the association. In Ontario and Nova Scotia, the official side was represented by three senior government officials appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. In Ontario, a seventh member, the chairman of the Civil Service Commission, was appointed a nonvoting chairman of the council. An added complication for Ontario was the decision to organize departmental councils. While the initial Order in Council establishing the Joint Advisory Council had specifically accorded the Civil Service Association of Ontario the right to represent the staff side, no such requirement had been stated for representing the staff side on departmental or branch councils." Not until 1956, when the association managed to increase its membership so as to represent 85 percent of all civil servants, did the government agree to revise the provisions for staff side representation on local councils by recognizing the Civil Service Association of Ontario as the appropriate selecting authority. 164

Collective Bargaining While it is possible to point to a number of positive achievements of provincial joint councils, initial enthusiasm of staff associations became quickly tempered by the realization that mere consultation was a far cry from genuine bilateral negotiation. As a consequence, in the decade of the sixties those provinces that had created joint councils were pressed to move toward negotiation and ultimately collective bargaining, either by expanding the limited role of joint councils or else by introducing altogether new structures and procedures. NEGOTIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Lying behind the initial reluctance to move beyond the grant of purely consultative forums for discussing general terms of employment and working conditions were a number of powerful shibboleths. Not the least potent of these obstacles to treating civil service associations in a fashion comparable with their counterparts in the private sector was the legal concept of the state as sovereign. In its undiluted form, the doctrine of sovereignty could brook no challenge to its omnipotence, especially in the realm of employee relations. The authoritarian approach of government to its employees, therefore, had a respectable legalistic base.'2 Over the years, in practice, great breaches have been made in this notion of the monolithic sovereign who can do no wrong. The progress toward constitutional government and mass democracy has resulted in the containment of the positive legalistic concept of absolutism. Governments can be sued; "sovereigns" have approved legislation that restricts their unilateral authority; absolute power is dispersed by federalism, pluralism, and the sharing of authority by various organs of government. In short, the doctrine of sovereignty as a rationale for denying participatory rights to organized public servants in matters concerning their terms and conditions of employment has been unable to withstand the contemporary pressure to ameliorate the authoritarian claims to absolutism which management was accustomed to claim in its name. Another assumption that has been especially persuasive in denying organized civil servants the right to withhold their labour as an adjunct to collective negotiation is the view that no stoppage in governmental activities can be countenanced because of their "essential" nature. As a rationale for restricting public employees' rights, this assumption has been successfully challenged. There are many services in the so-called private sector that are as essential as many government services; equally, there are many services performed by state employees in which a work stoppage would create less hardship than a stoppage in certain services provided by employees in the private sector. The argument that essential 165

CHAPTER TEN

services cannot be withheld has left its mark, as we shall see, on a number of provinces where the strike is outlawed and compulsory arbitration has been selected as the ultimate device for reconciling differences between the government and its employees. Recognizing that a number of essential services are also provided by employees in the private sector, consistency would seem to require similar solutions for such employees; in practice, the logic of this argument has not been extended to the private sector." As to the claim that a public service strike is tantamount to treason against the sovereign state, Professor Cunningham's critique of what he terms "the conventional wisdom" on this point appears to be convincing: If a legislature has passed a law making such strikes illegal, a strike then becomes open defiance of the law. If no anti-strike legislation exists a strike can be viewed as an unwillingness of employee associations to accept final offers made by government administrators charged with the responsibility of collectively negotiating an agreement. . . . If the government chooses not to use its ultimate power to impose a settlement, the continuance of the strike, logically, should not be looked upon as a challenge to, or defiance of, that power. Rather, it is a defiance of the position of the government acting in an administrative, not a law-making capacity." Yet another technical argument for restricting the collective bargaining rights of public servants has been drawn from the original tenure conferred on employees of the state, namely, appointment and tenure "at pleasure" or "during the pleasure" of the Crown. This distinctive British heritage is still perpetuated in the federal Public Service Employment Act (section 24) but, interestingly, does not appear in corresponding provincial legislation. In any case, the terms surely reflect a carry-over of the outworn authoritarian concept of state sovereignty and could be used only to insist on a technical but not very realistic point that a public servant's office is not held on the basis of a contract but on the basis of "privilege." The foregoing legalistic arguments probably persisted as potent factors constraining the rights of public employees to embark on a regime of collective bargaining largely because civil servants were slow to contest their validity. The large proportion of white-collar workers in the public service acted as a conservative force and even seemed to reinforce management's view that working for government somehow divorced civil servants from blue-collar unionism in the private sector. Moreover, as Frederick Mosher has remarked of civil servants in the United States, 166

Collective Bargaining "Their pay has been relatively high, their hours reasonably low, their vacations relatively generous, their positions secure. The incentives for unionization and collective bargaining in such circumstances would almost certainly be minimal."'5 In light of these long-standing traditional views and the generally conservative character of civil service staff associations, it is perhaps not surprising to find that the pressure for collective bargaining did not make itself felt, for the most part, until the decade of the sixties. For the seven provinces that had resorted to joint councils, the first step toward collective bargaining was to transform joint consultation into joint negotiation, accompanied or followed later by the introduction of procedures for resolving issues on which the two parties could not agree. The provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Scotia have developed roughly comparable systems of collective bargaining as a result of following this staged procedure. New Brunswick, by 1969. had made a complete break with the joint council plan rather than building on it, as the previously mentioned provinces appear to have done. Prince Edward Island, as of 1972, has retained the consultative apparatus of the joint council but has adopted separate mechanisms for collective bargaining that are akin to the New Brunswick system. Newfoundland would also appear to be favouring the same model, for its Joint Council was not in existence long enough to provide a base for the collective bargaining system. It is interesting to observe that the federal government's National Joint Council adopted in 1944 was retained after the 1967 legislation introduced the Public Service Staff Relations Board and a full regime of collective bargaining. A question mark also hovers over the head of the federal National Joint Council, as its key functions have been largely pre-empted by more direct mechanisms for collective negotiation. In Alberta, between 1954 when the Joint Council was given a statutory base and 1968, the Joint Council had a broad remit to consider all requests with respect to salaries, pensions, working conditions, and all other grievances submitted by the Civil Service Association; to examine and report to the president of the Executive Council upon any regulations and rules of procedure on schedules proposed by the public service commissioner; and to act as a board of appeal in any cases of alleged unjust dismissal, suspension, and demotion. In July, 1965, the legislature approved Bill 123 to allow the Civil Service Association of Alberta to negotiate on wages and working conditions. Negotiations were conducted by a separate negotiating committee consisting of the public service commissioner, two senior public servants appointed by the Executive Council, and representatives of the association. By 1968, when the new Public Service Act was approved, chapter 81, section 30, subsection 2, 167

CHAPTER TEN

reduced the Joint Council's functions to the discussion of matters declared to be not negotiable by the negotiating committee or matters not included in an agreement, and to the interpretation of an existing agreement in order to resolve disagreements. At this point, negotiations that failed to produce agreements were brought to a halt by the Executive Council which could settle the issues by a unilateral decision. In 1970 an amendment to the Public Service Act introduced a third party, in the form of a Mediation Board, to help resolve the areas of disagreement between the two parties. Failing agreements on its recommendations, the association could take its case to the Executive Council "with a view to concluding an agreement." Any items of disagreement still outstanding were to be decided by the Executive Council and become binding on all parties. In 1972 further amendments in the legislation substituted an Arbitration Board for the Mediation Board and conferred final decision-making powers on the new board— thereby eliminating that vestige of unilateral determination that had resided in the Executive Council up to that point. Although the right to strike is neither specifically provided for nor deliberately ruled out, the Civil Service Association does not appear to be pressing for the right, especially now that the changes made in 1972 have confirmed its lengthy endeavour to achieve compulsory arbitration. Early developments in Manitoba closely paralleled those in Alberta. In 1957 the Manitoba Joint Council was formally established with negotiating powers similar to those conferred on its counterpart in Alberta and with the same authority granted to the Executive Council to break an impasse by making a unilateral decision. An amendment to the Civil Service Act in 1965 provided for a negotiating team—generally the provincial secretary and the staff of the Cabinet's Management Committee on one side and the representatives of the Manitoba Government Employees' Association on the other. This arrangement left the Joint Council, as in Alberta, to consider non-negotiable items. Provision was made for a Mediation Board in the event of disagreement, but, as in Alberta, items on which agreement could not be reached were to be settled by the Executive Council after it had listened to both parties." In 1969 Manitoba dropped the Mediation Board and substituted an Arbitration Board with power to render a final and binding decision.'7 Again, existing legislation is silent on the right to strike, although under the province's Labour Relations Act employees of Crown agencies—such as Manitoba Hydro, the Manitoba Telephone System, and the Liquor Control Commission—are permitted to strike." In Ontario, employee dissatisfaction with the Joint Advisory Council reached the point that in 1962 the Civil Service Association announced 168

Collective Bargaining that it "would participate no further until firm negotiating procedures

were established."'" The government responded by amending the Public Service Act in 1963 so as to transform the Advisory Council into the Ontario Joint Council and conferring on it a negotiating function on matters which had service-wide application; the departmental or branch joint councils were to negotiate on local matters. At the same time provision was made for a Public Service Arbitration Board to resolve disagreements between the official and staff sides. In 1966 the Public Service Act was again amended to reduce the Joint Council to a six-member negotiating team, composed equally of three members of management, including the chief negotiator of the Staff Relations Branch, and three officials from the Civil Service Association of Ontario. Provision was also made for the appointment of a mediator through application to the minister of labour. In practice negotiations do not take place in the Joint Council, but the council, acting on the recommendations of the negotiators, determines whether mediation is in order or whether compulsory arbitration proceedings should be instituted in the event that negotiations do not produce agreement. Even this modest "post office" function of the Joint Council disappeared when the Act to Provide for Collective Bargaining for Crown Employees was proclaimed on December 29, 1972.2" This major piece of legislation made provision for a new Ontario Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal, specifically outlawed both strikes and lockouts, affirmed a regime of compulsory arbitration, and divested the Civil Service Association of Ontario of its long-held monopoly of the right to represent the staff side in all negotiations. The Public Service Grievance Board, in addition to its power to make final determinations on grievances arising out of the administration of the Public Service Act, was also to arbitrate any differences "arising from the interpretation, application, administration or alleged contravention of the agreement," such decisions to be final and binding (section 18). When Nova Scotia adopted the Civil Service Joint Council Act in 1967, it created a collective negotiation system closely modelled on the scheme developed by Ontario before it was substantially transformed in 1973. Although it is not a requirement of this act that signed agreements should emanate from the Joint Council's deliberations, in practice such agreements have been made. As in Ontario, provision is made for mediation and ultimately compulsory arbitration in the event of disagreement; the right to strike is specifically prohibited.21 The three remaining Atlantic provinces, it will be recalled, also started on the road to full collective bargaining via the initial route of the joint council plan. New Brunswick made a complete break by abandoning this plan when it accepted the recommendations of the Frankel Commission 169

CHAPTER TEN

on Employer-Employee Relations in 1968 (taking effect in 1969). In broad outline and in most of its details, the New Brunswick system of collective bargaining closely corresponds to the federal scheme that was inaugurated in 1967. The purely consultative role of the New Brunswick Joint Council was, as a consequence of the new legislation, abandoned altogether. Moreover, the New Brunswick Public Employees Association was divested of its monopoly of the right to represent the staff side at the negotiating table. A Public Service Labour Relations Board administers the new act, including the arrangements for appointing Conciliation Boards and the members of the Public Service Arbitration Tribunal. Like the federal legislation, the New Brunswick act provides for alternative routes to achieve a settlement: negotiation leading to compulsory arbitration or conciliation coupled with the right to strike. Unlike the federal model, employees in New Brunswick need not determine in advance which route they propose to follow, but may change course as negotiations proceed. Yet another difference between the New Brunswick procedures and those established by the federal government relates to the compulsory requirement of a strike-authorization vote which, as one noted authority has indicated, introduces an element of realism in that province's procedures. It is the membership of the unit of employees, acting after an impasse has been reached as at least one party has rejected arbitration, who really make the strike decision. On balance, the option of voting for a strike or for further negotiations can probably be expected to have a conservative effect since the voter will be concerned with an imminent strike situation, whereas in the federal procedures the decision has been taken when those who take it are protected by a considerable period of time from the strike itself.22 The Joint Council in Prince Edward Island, for a decade following its creation under the Civil Service Act of 1962, not only considered suggestions or requests involving salaries and pensions but also acted as a grievance tribunal and a board of appeal. In November, 1972, regulations promulgated under the Civil Service Act converted the Joint (now Provincial) Council into a purely consultative body, one whose important power was "to evaluate the effectiveness of the negotiation procedures and grievance mechanisms and make recommendations as required." More importantly, the regulations detailed a collective bargaining process that was to involve an "authorizing body," a "government authority," and an "authorized representative."23 The authorizing body was to be a group of three persons composed of the minister responsible for 170

Collective Bargaining the Civil Service Act acting as chairman and two additional members appointed by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. The government authority was defined as a person or group of persons designated by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council to represent management on the negotiation team. The authorized representative was to be the Prince Edward Island Public Service Association for an initial period of three years but thereafter could be any other group who could claim more than 50 percent of the civil servants and thereby warrant recognition by the authorizing body. When negotiations between the government authority and authorized representative are stalled, provision is made for conciliation under the minister of labour. Should conciliation fail, provision is made for compulsory and binding arbitration. Once again the regulations are silent on the use of the strike, the inference being that compulsory arbitration is the only channel of last resort. Despite Newfoundland's late start in adopting a Joint Council and the conventional limited terms of reference of that council, a collective agreement was in fact negotiated and signed in 1969. What had been merely informal procedure in the following year was written into the Public Service (Collective Bargaining) Act of 1970. Broad collective bargaining rights were conferred on unions of the employees' choice and the right to strike was also specifically granted. However, as Shirley Goldenberg has pointed out, what the government had conceded could in practice be retracted through the exercise of broad discretionary powers to make regulations.24 Current measures to amend and reduce the arbitrary discretionary powers conferred on the government indicate that Newfoundland will shortly have a system of collective bargaining closely akin to that of New Brunswick. As previously noted, three provinces developed collective bargaining systems without going through a preliminary stage of establishing joint consultative arrangements. Saskatchewan was a full generation ahead of all other Canadian jurisdictions when in its Trade Union Act of 1944 it made provision for an all-out scheme of collective bargaining for its employees. The first collective agreement was signed a year later. This action was unique in terms of its early appearance but has remained unique because Saskatchewan is the only jurisdiction in Canada that makes no legal distinction, so far as the conduct of its labour relations is concerned, between its own employees and employees in the private sector. Thus, public servants like the rest of the labour force in the province were guaranteed the right to strike—with the exception of an interregnum from 1966 to 1971 when an Essential Services Emergency Act substituted for certain areas compulsory arbitration in lieu of the strike. The emergency measure was repealed by the New Democratic 171

CHAPTER TEN

government in 1971 and conciliation coupled with the strike route was fully reinstated. In practice, the early adoption of forthright collective bargaining arrangements has apparently provided one of the least troubled arenas in Canada for government-employee relations.25 Given the hostile atmosphere in Quebec toward labour relations generally, the transformation that occurred in the mid-sixties in the province and that extended equally to employees in the public sector was dramatically abrupt. The passage of the Labour Code in 1964 was the prelude to major changes in the Civil Service Act the following year by which most of the important provisions of the code were incorporated in the amended legislation of 1965. Although the Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec was designated as the bargaining agent for workers in the manual /operational categories and the administrative support group, as a result of winning a recognition vote, the broad definition of public employees which is unique in Quebec left large groups to organize in unions of their own choice—a provision that has had special importance for a variety of professional categories, such as teachers. Certification of unions for the professional groups is a matter of negotiation through a joint committee. Despite the freedom to gain recognition for a number of associations, collective bargaining has tended to become highly centralized around a common table.23 If negotiations fail to reach agreements, conciliation procedures are invoked, and before a strike can be called, the government is empowered to establish a board of inquiry which has up to sixty days to report on whether a threatened or actual strike endangers public health or safety or interferes with the education of a group of students. Additional delays (up to twenty days) can be secured when the Attorney General petitions a Superior Court judge for an injunction to prevent or terminate a strike. Thereafter a strike can be legal, provided that prior agreement between the parties has been reached that continuance of essential services has been assured. Unlike New Brunswick and federal arrangements, Quebec does not provide the alternative route of third-party intervention through compulsory arbitration. Though the right to strike still remains in the Civil Service Act, the right has been suspended or revoked for many employees in Quebec's para-public service, and stormy labour relations generally may provoke a reversal of a concession that was made so abruptly and with so little time to prepare the parties for their numerous responsibilities. While for Saskatchewan and Quebec the move to a collective bargaining regime came abruptly and with rather different outcomes in each jurisdiction, in British Columbia it emerged only in 1973 after a long period of frustrated effort on the part of civil servants. The Civil Service 172

Collective Bargaining

Act of 1960, chapter 56, section 73, subsection 1, in British Columbia required that "a committee elected by a majority of the members of [the] association . . . shall be recognized by the Lieutenant-Governor-inCouncil as the representatives of the employees for the purpose of discussing any matters affecting their general welfare and conditions of employment." The act further stated in section 71, subsection 1, that "an employee or his duly authorized representative may make application in writing to the [Civil Service] Commission for a review in respect of any decision or matter affecting him." Informally, as early as 1949, representatives of the B.C. Government Employees' Association had met occasionally with three cabinet ministers and more regularly with the Civil Service Commission. Such discussions hardly amounted to the formalized consultative procedures in other provinces' joint councils, but were rather little more than deputations pleading for their sovereign's consideration. After a particularly hectic period of troubled relations," the government in 1968 introduced the Mediation Commission Act which, insofar as it applied to civil servants, outlawed the strike and in section 19, subsection I (a), permitted the new Mediation Commission to have referred to it at the government's discretion "any matter affecting the general welfare and conditions of employment . . . , or any difference relating thereto between the Civil Service Commission and a group of employees . . or their authorized representatives." The commission's award was to be binding. In the event, only one such reference was ever made and this on a matter to which nurses, rather than the B.C. Government Employees' Association, was a party. Thus matters stood when the New Democratic Party overthrew the Social Credit government in 1972. A royal commission was almost immediately established and its report, Making Bargaining Work in British Columbia's Public Service, was issued in December, 1972.28 This report formed the basis for Bill 75, the Public Service Labour Relations Act, which was approved in 1973. The new measure provides that the Labour Relations Board, established under the Labour Code of the province, shall administer the collective bargaining regime outlined in the legislation, including the certification of bargaining agents, the appointment of mediators to assist the parties in reaching a collective agreement, the selection of a chairman of an arbitration board when the two parties fail to agree on a nomination, and the supervision of strike procedures. If mediation is not requested by either party or else fails to produce agreement, a dispute can be submitted to binding arbitration with the joint approval of both parties. If mediation fails or if both mediation and arbitration arc rejected by either of the parties, the employees' bargaining agent may conduct a 173

CHAPTER TEN

strike vote. The government has discretion to employ a lockout. An interesting feature of the British Columbia legislation is its provision for two collective agreements for each bargaining unit: a master agreement, including all the terms and conditions common to all employees in the unit, and a subsidiary agreement, applicable to terms and conditions of employment peculiar to each designated occupational group in the unit. With this measure, late but not least, British Columbia has taken a major forward leap that brings its collective bargaining arrangements well in line with legislation in the most advanced provinces elsewhere in Canada. The evolution of collective bargaining regimes in all Canadian provinces reveals no common pattern of growth. Even in those jurisdictions that inched their way toward bilateral negotiation procedures by first adopting a joint council form of consultation, procedures and administrative arrangements for coping with employer-employee relations have not culminated in a uniform system. Obviously, political, economic, and other factors indigenous to each province help to account for the variations in the stages and pace of evolution. While the process of incorporating collective bargaining into the public sector has clarified certain issues that reflect differences between the private and public sectors, what arc viewed as appropriate responses to such issues have resulted in rather different solutions. In 1972 the Institute of Public Administration of Canada sponsored a national seminar on the theme of collective bargaining in the public service. The published proceedings of this seminar contain an invaluable comparative description of the collective bargaining processes in the public sector and reinforce the conclusion that we arc still at an experimental stage that is marked by a high degree of disagreement over certain key issues that plague public sector bargaining. It will be sufficient here to take note of three of the most important of these issues. First, there is the question, Who can negotiate? This question is relevant to both civil service associations and individual civil servants. In some jurisdictions—notably in the provinces that started with joint consultative bodies—a single all-embracing association has tended to be recognized as the staff side representative. In provinces that made a clean break with the joint council plan or moved directly to collective negotiation, the tendency has been against conferring a monopoly recognition on one big association but rather to permit civil servants to seek certification of an association of their own choice. If one could hazard a guess as to the likely outcome of this current disparity, it would be to suggest that the course most likely to prevail is the one established in New 174

Collective Bargaining Brunswick, where exclusive certification was dropped in the legislation of 1968. One might interpret the decision taken in 1972 by Ontario and Prince Edward Island to abandon their traditional policy of exclusive recognition for the Civil Service Association as a portent of this trend. On the other hand, the conditions imposed for recognizing a different association of the employees' choice appear to be so stringent that they merely entrench the existing association as the bargaining agent. The other aspect of this question involves the existing exclusion of certain categories of government employees from the bargaining process. These exclusions, which are common to all jurisdictions, derive from the need to preserve a distinction between "management" and "employees" in a situation in which all persons, in fact, from the deputy minister on down are "employees." Although there are possibilities for drawing the line between those in a managerial or confidential capacity rather higher than lower in the hierarchy, it would appear that this distinction will continue to be made and that there will be a not insubstantial number whose terms of employment and working conditions will have to be resolved by means other than a collective agreement. A second major issue relates to the question, What is negotiable? The answer provided by most provincial governments has usually been couched in the form of specific exclusions based on two assumptions. The first bears on the historical protection of the merit principle which, as we have seen, was generally deemed to be the function of an independent civil service commission. Thus, the latest provincial legislation, that of British Columbia (Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1973, section 13a) lists as the first exception from the terms of a collective agreement "the principle of merit and its application in the appointment and promotion of employees under the Public Service Act." The second assumption is that there are certain managerial prerogatives which cannot be brought to the bargaining table. The provisions in the Ontario legislation of 1972 are about as forthright on this issue as any to be found in other provinces: "It is the exclusive function of the employer to manage," section 17 begins, and then goes on to specify, "without limiting the generality of the foregoing," such an impressive list of items that one wonders what is left over to be negotiated. But, Ontario legislation is by no means unique in the listing of its exceptions, for one finds the following items commonly regarded as non-negotiable: pensions, organization, work methods and procedures, classification and assignment, training and development. It is probable that the current rather lengthy list of exclusions—already actively contested at the federal level—will be reduced by some relaxation of the employer's managerial prerogatives provided that a better 175

CHAPTER TEN

mutual understanding of the bargaining process emerges. On the other hand, if the elements of the merit principle are to be thrown into the bargaining process, the existing position of semi-independent civil service commissions as custodians of this principle may be sacrificed, in which case the fulfilment of the ombudsman role of such agencies, particularly for those who will have to remain outside the collective bargaining agreement, may be lost to sight. A third and perhaps the most contentious set of issues relates to the development of the most appropriate procedures for settling disputes if collective negotiations reach an impasse. As we have seen, there appear to be three possible alternative solutions to this problem. The solution most favoured, at the moment, is the use of mediation, followed by compulsory arbitration, with a strike either explicitly or implicitly prohibited. The second alternative is the application of conciliation procedures followed by the right to strike. Yet a third procedural solution is a combination of the first two arrangements, with the right of employees to choose which route they wish to pursue. The federal government and the Province of New Brunswick are the two best examples of the third pattern, though the choice of procedure must be made in advance of negotiations in the federal model, whereas in New Brunswick the selection of the preferred procedure can be made during negotiations. For those jurisdictions that have accepted the strike as a legitimate element of the collective bargaining process, the problem of a cessation of essential services, to which earlier reference was made, has to be faced. The most direct way of dealing with this contingency is to provide a clear-cut definition of essential services and to make access to the strike vote conditional on a prior guarantee that such essential services will be maintained. However, the difficulty of establishing in advance a precise definition of essential services suggests that the issue is perhaps best left to a judicial settlement by the presiding labour tribunal during the course of negotiations. Employee representatives should have an opportunity to make their case for a work stoppage that will not jeopardize the health and safety of the community. A judicial decision that runs against the employees' contention in the name of protecting the public interest should be backed by firm penalties for noncompliance. Community attitudes toward according public employees the right to strike are sufficiently ambivalent that noncompliance with such decisions will inevitably lead governments to withdraw the right. Contemporary debate on these central issues reflects the still unsettled state of employer-employee relations in provincial government services. Clearly, we face a period of experimentation, and for most jurisdictions that have only recently come the full way to the collective bargaining 176

Collective Bargaining table there are inexperienced parties on both sides. The fragility of present arrangements, coupled with the relative newness of the process in the public sector, points to the need for much restraint on both sides if these new regimes of collective bargaining are to usher in a period of peaceful collaboration in a sector that has for so long been dominated by the traditional authoritarian prerogatives of management.

177

Statistical Appendix of this appendix is to present in one place a wide range of statistical information which should help readers to understand the significance of the data analysed in the text. This could also be useful for those who plan to do further analytical work in the quantitative aspects of the role of governments as employers. Research for the present study has revealed a number of important gaps and inconsistencies which we were not able to remedy. As explained by individual notes to the tables, various assumptions, sometimes rather arbitrary, had to be made in order to present a relatively consistent time series. However, every effort has been made to provide as comparable data as possible. Most of the data relating to government employment assembled here have not appeared elsewhere. With the exception of a few statistics going back to 1901 or earlier, the aim was to concentrate on the post—World War II period up to 1971. The text, however, includes changes in personnel policies as of November, 1973. Data on total employment in the federal government have been published continuously in one form or another, commencing in 1925. For the period from 1925 to 1952, federal statistics included only those employees who were under the Civil Service Act, and consequently no global totals were available. In April, 1952, an attempt was made to include employees of agency and proprietary corporations and other government bodies. Thus, the complete list of federal government manpower is available only from 1952 onward.' In the provincial government area, although the compilations on employment were started in 1949 for all provinces except Newfoundland, Quebec, and Manitoba, these were not made public. The report Provincial Government Employment was first released in 1959, although THE PRIMARY OBJECT

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

Quebec was not included in the first few years thereafter. Also excluded from this data was information on British Columbia which did not participate in the data-gathering process because of differences of opinion about statistical methods used. British Columbia still does not provide the much-needed information about those employees who belong to categories such as "other departmental services," government enterprises, and workmen's compensation boards. Thus, the information on British Columbia in table E of the Statistical Appendix has been based on data provided by the Civil Service Commission of British Columbia. For the limited statistical references to municipal government employment, we have chosen the information provided by the Department of National Revenue through its publication Taxation Statistics. The reason for such preference is that whereas Statistics Canada started publishing its municipal employment data in 1968 (although the information goes back to 1961), the series does not go back far enough to be of use to us. Moreover, the municipal government employment data as assembled by Statistics Canada do not include employees working in municipal enterprises, agencies, and corporations. Consequently, Taxation Statistics appeared to us a better source. We have made a drastic surgery in our provincial government total employment data insofar as the information on teachers working in provincial institutions of higher education is concerned. The main reason for such exclusion is the fact that we found that not all institutions of higher education were represented in this data and, moreover, Quebec did not participate in this segment of the provincial government employment data-gathering process. Instead, we thought fit to eliminate this discrepancy by not using any information on teachers. Moreover, if one uses teachers of higher institutions as a part of the provincial employees total, then how could one justify the exclusion of secondary and elementary school teachers as well as those in community colleges and CEGEP's? Our total provincial government employment figures do include departmental employees and those who work in public enterprises and workmen's compensation boards. At this place, a word about two terms used in this study should be said. The term civil servant, in a generic sense, includes any person who is appointed to a position on a full-time basis and whose entry into government service has been subject to final certification by a central personnel agency. This central personnel agency may be referred to as a civil service commission or a public service commission. Invariably, if a jurisdiction calls its central personnel agency by the name of public service commission, employees recruited by it are also called public servants. Thus, these two terms, civil servants and public servants, are used 180

STATISTICAL APPENDIX

interchangeably. Provincial statutes differ in their definitions as to who should belong to this category. For example, while the Workmen's Compensation Board and Liquor Control Commission employees of Prince Edward Island arc part of its civil service, Ontario excludes these employees from the jurisdiction of its central personnel agency. Similarly, while Quebec's Loi de la Fonction Publique includes employees of certain schools (governed under the Specialized School Act, 1964) and the Municipal Commission, these employees do not come under the ambit of civil or public service of other provinces. Even the use of such a widely understood term as public service commission may have a different meaning in different jurisdictions. For instance, in Nova Scotia, there exists a Halifax Public Service Commission which performs essentially the function of a municipal utilities authority responsible for transportation, waterworks, and sewage treatment facilities. The other term, government employees or government manpower, refers to that group of persons who are on the payroll of a provincial or federal government, whether salary earners or wage earners, and who work in executive departments, departmental corporations and agencies, workmen's compensation boards (of those jurisdictions where these are not included in the civil service category), and government enterprises. Included in this category are also those employees who work as private secretaries and executive assistants to ministers, staff employed in legislatures, and in the office of the Governor General and the LieutenantGovernors, members of the judiciary, and other people working under contract. Excluded from this group are teachers, hospital employees, and members of the armed forces.

181

TABLE A POPULATION OF THE PROVINCES, 1946-1971 (SELECTED YEARS)

Provinces Newfoundland Prince Edward Island Nova Scotia New Brunswick Quebec Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta British Columbia Total

1946 (000)

1951 (000)

1961 (000)

1971 (000)

Percent Growth, 1946-1971

322

361

458

522

62.1

94 608 478 3,629 4,093 727 833 803 1,003

98 643 516 4,056 4,598 777 832 940 1,165

105 737 598 5,259 6,236 922 925 1,332 1,629

112 789 635 6,028 7,703 988 926 1,628 2,185

19.1 29.8 32.8 66.1 88.2 35.9 11.2 102.7 117.8

12,590

13,985

18,201

21,516

70.9

SouacE: Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book, selected years. NOTES: Total does not include Yukon and Northwest Territories. Since data for Newfoundland for 1946 are not available, we used figures for 1945.

182

TABLE

B

CIVILIAN LABOUR FORCE, FOURTEEN YEARS OF AGE AND OVER, DISTRIBUTED BY REGION OR PROVINCE

Increase, 1946-1971 1946 (000)

1951 (000)

1961 (000)

* Newfoundland Prince Edward Island f Nova Scotia f New Brunswick f 415 Atlantic region 1,337 Quebec 1,702 Ontario I Manitoba Saskatchewan I I Alberta 969 Prairie region British Columbia 407

102

113

Provinces

Total, all provinces 4,830

1971 Numerical (000) (000)

I I 948 431

1 1,154 575

157 39 264 215 675 2,394 3,249 390 368 663 1,401 911

5,223

6,521

8,630

f f 1

1 f f

513 1,462 1,870

571 1,820 2,401

I

f 1

Percent

-

-

62.9 79.1 90.9 -

—

—

— 261 1,057 1,547 —

— 432 504

45.6 123.8

3,801

78.7

SOURCES: Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book, selected years; idem, Canadian Statistical Review, June, 1972. NOTE: Total does not include Yukon and Northwest Territories. *Newfoundland not included in 1946. }Separate data for provinces of Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta not available up to 1961.

TABLE C OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CANADIAN LABOUR FORCE, 1901-1971 (SELECTED YEARS)

Occupational Categories

1901 (% )

1931 (% )

1961 (% )

1971 (% )

White collar Manual Service Primarya Unallocated

15.2 32.2 8.2 44.4 0.0

24.4 33.8 9.3 32.5 —

38.6 34.9 10.8 13.1 2.6

46.1 29.5 12.2 7.9 4.3

Figures from 1901 to 1961 are derived from Canada, Department of Labour, Manpower Trends in Canada, Chart Book, 1965, p. 16. Figures for 1971 are from Statistics Canada, The Labour Force, January, 1972. *Mostly agriculture.

SOURCES:

183

prov.

All

15.3 45.8 193.8

13.4 32.8

33.6 28.0 27.2 30.2 26.6 36.6 33.3 43.8 34.4 35.4 136.4

87.7 79.5 174.7 93.7 168.6 127.7 129.3 102.1 132.1 112.7

16.1 10.8 16.9 15.6 12.6 16.1 11.2 14.1 17.4 23.0

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C. 16.6 9.0 7.4 10.2 7.7 11.6 7.4 31.7 14.9 33.7

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Prov.

213.8 184.8 175.4 212.6 195.1 201.8 157.5 166.8 213.5 172.3

Health

6.6

14.1 3.4 4.8 5.3 7.4 4.5 4.4 7.6 6.5 12.2 15.0

69.9

23.5 101.3 10.8 57.1 9.0 27.2 9.7 82.2 22.7 72.1 8.7 70.9 12.9 48.8 13.9 86.7 16.6 64.0 18.7 72.6

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

51.3

33.7 46.9 63.7 41.1 39.0 45.5 49.3 37.8 26.6 109.6 39.5 22.1 28.7 36.5 31.2 33.6 48.4 31.7 44.7 30.1 25.5 36.0

14.8 27.5 22.5 28.1 26.0 25.3 15.9 20.7 38.8 27.1

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Transportation and Communications

1952,1961-62, AND 1971-72

Social Welfare

OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS,

Education

45.1 34.5 34.4 25.0 49.3 43.5 38.0 46.3 64.8 48.6

TABLE D

PER CAPITA DISTRIBUTION OF NET GENERAL EXPENDITURE

6.5 11.0

3.6 5.9 2.9 9.1 3.7 5.4 6.7 8.9 7.4 12.9 4.1 6.3 5.5 14.7 7.7 16.3 10.9 18.9 12.0 16.9

26.1

38.7 22.3 19.8 20.0 22.9 21.7 35.2 30.1 34.2 38.7

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Natural Resources

7.4

26.7 4.7

7.7 26.3 3.9

82.8 73.2 81.1 54.2 46.2 57.0 28.6 47.7 49.4 0.4

4.4 47.5

-0.1 10.6 6.4 15.4 7.9 14.4 10.5 13.1 2.7 3.8 5.3 8.3 0.2 3.4 3.2 -1.1 -0.9 -12.2 6.2 -0.7

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Debt Charges

4.6

9.3

54.9

2.6 8.6 185.8 2.6 10.0 75.4 3.5 6.5 36.4 5.0 12.4 58.7 3.5 5.0 55.9 3.9 9.2 56.5 1.9 5.9 34.2 1.8 6.5 28.5 8.2 16.3 56.3 14.1 22.6 39.3

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Other Expenses

83.8

77.2 68.6 71.1 85.4 75.0 78.1 52.6 95.1 106.8 140.9

169.4

182.4 184.3 146.0 158.4 161.2 166.2 148.9 171.6 209.6 206.1

632.9

806.9 593.8 594.9 608.9 724.4 614.2 508.6 544.5 646.6 511.2

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

Total Net General Expenditure

cn

SOURCES: Data for 1952 and 1961-62 are in Canada, 1952-62, table 2 in each case;

based on Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Historical Review. Financial Statistics of Governments for 1971-72, Statistics Canada. Provincial Government Finance, 1971, tables 2 and 5. As the British Columbia government does not subdivide its spending according to function, data for that province, all years, come from Statistics Canada, Federal Government Finance, 1971, table 8. oo NcrrE: Figures for 1952 are for fiscal year ending nearest to December 31, 1952.

3.3

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

All prov.

4.6 14.0 33.5 3.6 8.4 41.9 2.0 5.7 21.8 2.6 5.2 36.2 3.1 7.9 25.0 2.0 5.9 25.6 2.6 5.4 18.0 4.9 7.4 29.7 5.3 10.2 37.5 7.6 10.2 26.1

Prov. 16.3 11.6 13.0 13.5 29.0 30.8 20.4 19.2 27.9 18.9

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($)

1952 61-62 71-72 ($) ($) ($) 4.9 7.4 2.4 4.4 2.4 4.4 1.4 4.5 4.8 6.4 5.3 8.4 3.5 6.6 3.4 7.5 5.7 12.2 5.2 9.7

Protection of Persons and Property

General Government

TABLE D (continued)

CC

CA

204,493

337,981

Federal government

5,856 1,725 12,930 10,648 34,993 69,103 16,665 19,463 21,294 11,816

1959

Total, all provinces

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

Jurisdictions

TABLE E

337,042

199,107

6,580 1,685 11,534 10,551 36,766 69,580 13,699 16,175 20,654 11,883

1960

337,456

200,215

6,406 1,814 12,401 10,608 37,213 69,925 13,372 16,273 20,186 12,017

1961

330,306

209,538

7,328 1,969 10,074 8,369 40,239 71,763 14,046 16,001 21,548 18,201

1962

334,028

223,778

8,042 1,810 11,548 9,129 45,814 74,886 14,875 17,387 22,027 18,260

1963

337,943

239,931

8,613 1,658 11,016 9,019 58,446 76,478 15,001 17,122 23,395 19,183

344,715

257,370

9,659 2,079 14,601 10,284 61,401 79,285 15,907 17,064 26,007 21,083

1965

1959-1971

1964

GOVERNMENT MANPOWER, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL. GOVERNMENTS,

363,713

288,774

9,587 2,540 15,116 10,991 70,871 84,056 16,755 17,784 28,379 32,695

1966

368,987 376,761

324,438

10,580 2,821 19,781 11,409 73,331 100,068 19,165 17,668 32,190 37,625

1969

378,986

341,654

11,228 3,057 21,658 11,964 75,751 108,152 19,818 18,066 34,234 37,326

1970

401,471

370,075

12,917 3,230 21,501 24,042 78,688 115,183 20,583 18,784 34,967 40,180

1971

63,490

165,582

7,061 1,505 8,571 13,394 43,965 46,080 3,918 -679 13,673 28,364

Numerical

18.9

80.9

120.6 87.2 66.3 125.8 124.8 66.7 23.5 -3.5 64.2 240.0

Percent

Increase, 1959-1971

. Data for British Columbia were provided by the Civil Service Commission. oo Nom: Total, all provinces, excludes employees of institutions of higher education.

SOURCES: Statistics Canada, Provincial Government Employment and Federal Government Employment, 1959-71, as of December 31 of each year. Data for Quebec for 1959-63 are from Annuaire du Quebec, 1965, p. 114.

369,366

Federal government

318,359

11,945 2,778 20,221 11,219 74,907 96,225 18,506 17,381 29,964 35,213

10,893 2,955 13,674 11,404 75,185 86,871 18,109 19,175 30,268 33,963

302,477

1968

1967

Total, all provinces

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

Jurisdictions

TABLE E (continued)

00 00

38,370

120,557

Federal government

303 1,022 1,700 11,832 8,998 2,531 3,889 3,431 4,664

1946

Total, all provinces

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que.' Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

Jurisdictions

124,580

49,652

1,860 400 1,941 2,080 13,272 14,100 3,346 4,659 N/A 7,994

1951

145,083

72,576

3,463 762 2,830 2,615 18,347 21,100 3,878 5,692 4,619 9,270

1956

133,300

78,370

4,896 981 3,178 2,839 19,192 22,950 4,003 5,767 4,943 9,621

1957

135,627

83,341

3,379 1,045 3,444 2,936 19,782 27,360 4,417 6,067 5,248 9,263

1958

136,856

90,886

5,900 863 3,696 2,908 20,849 30,235 4,758 6,293 5,565 9,819

1959

131,953

96,914

7,065 1,034 3,777 2,867 22,167 32,302 5,201 6,540 5,916 10,035

1960

135,922

100,734

6,313 1,151 3,878 3,347 22,494 34,599 5,346 6,573 6,800 10,233

1961

137,298

106,426

6,786 933 4,062 3,698 23,477 36,468 5,626 6,655 8,418 10,303

1962

7,717 1,154 4,255 4,025 23,931 39,970 6,035 7,296 8,989 10,445

1963

137,818

113,817

CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, 1946-1971 (SELECTED YEARS)

TABLE F

138,666

Federal government

140,206

132,712

6,883 1,398 4,684 5,155 35,105 43,141 6,669 7,049 10,191 12,437

1965

145,783

157,614

7,369 1,435 5,113 6,140 38,877 45,867 7,348 7,478 14,614 23,373

1966

200,329

173,649

8,840 1,413 5,759 6,369 45,423 50,507 7,777 7,659 15,534 24,368

1967

200,321

184,304

10,163 1,421 6,852 6,615 45,206 55,733 8,344 7,742 16,790 25,438

1968

199,720

189,558

9,599 1,507 6,848 6,767 46,800 57,375 8,822 7,299 17,460 27,081

1969

198,701

200,036

10,205 1,671 7,315 6,759 49,600 62,280 9,622 7,299 17,460 27,081

1970

216,488

209,760

11,319 1,948 7,584 6,955 52,400 64,996 9,165 7,604 18,648 29,141

1971

95,931

171,390

9,459° 1,645 6,562 5,255 40,568 55,998 6,634 3,715 15,217 24,477

Numerical

79.6

446.6

508.5° 542.9 642.1 309.1 342.9 622.3 262.1 96.8 443.5 524.8

Percent

Increase, 1946-1971

SOURCES: Data for the federal government for 1946-56 are from Statistics Canada, Canada Year Book; for 1957-66 from Civil Service Commission, Annual Reports; for 1967-71 from Public Service Commission, Annual Reports. Data for the provinces, except Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island (from 1946 to 1962), are from the annual reports of the respective central personnel agencies. Newfoundland, until 1973, did not differentiate between civil servants and other government employees, and, moreover, its Civil Service Commission did not maintain any such statistical records. Therefore, data for Newfoundland, and for Prince Edward Island until 1962 when its central personnel agency was established, are based on Canada, Department of National Revenue, Taxation Statistics, 1946-71. NOTE: In the case of the federal government, a change in the jurisdiction of the Civil (now Public) Service Commission occasioned a big jump from 145,783 in 1966 to 200,329 in 1967. Data on all other jurisdictions are consistent. 'Estimated figures for 1969, 1970, and 1971, since in 1969 Quebec published data only on those employees subject to collective negotiations. °Relates to the period 1951 to 1971.

123,688

6,175 1,297 4,454 4,259 31,956 41,415 6,376 7,146 9,680 10,940

1964

Total, all provinces

Nfld. P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que.° Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

Jurisdictions

TABLE F (continued)

0

:0-

6,313

1,860

11,319

1971

1971

458 522

SOURCES: See tables A, B, and F. °Regional figure.

13,986 18,201 21,516

Federal government 124,580 135,922 216,488

98 105 112 642 737 789 516 598 635 4,056 5,259 6,028 4,598 6,236 7,703 988 777 922 925 926 832 940 1,332 1,628 1,165 1,629 2,185

361

(000) (000) (000)

1961

13,986 18,201 21,516

400 1,151 1,948 1,941 3,878 7,584 2,080 3,347 6,955 13,272 22,494 52,400 14,100 34,599 64,996 3,346 5,346 9,165 4,659 6,573 7,604 N/A 6,800 18,648 7,994 10,233 29,141

1961

1951

1951

49,652 100,734 209,760

Total, all provinces

P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Que. Ont. Man. Sask. Alta. B.C.

Nfld.

Jurisdictions

Civil Service Employees

Population

5,223

5,223

6,521 8,630

6,521 8,630

575 911

431

663

-

-

1971

8.9

3.6

7.5

5.5

10.1

9.7

5.2 13.8 21.7 4.1 11.0 17.4 3.0 5.3 9.6 4.0 5.6 11.0 3.3 4.3 8.7 3.1 5.5 8.4 4.3 5.8 9.3 5.6 7.1 8.2 - 5.1 11.5 6.9 6.3 13.3

1961

1961

23.8

9.5

20.9

15.4

(12.3)° (29.0)" 12.4 9.1 7.5 14.4 (19.7)* (13.4)0 18.5 17.8

1951

25.1

24.3

72.1 49.9 28.7 32.3 21.9 20.0 23.5 21.8 28.1 32.0

1971

Labour Force

Ratio of Employees/ 1000 of: Population

(000) (000) 1951

1961 1971

- 157 (513)* (507)* 39 - 264 - 215 1,462 1,820 2,394 1,870 2,401 3,249 - 390 (948)' (1,154 )0 348

(000)

1951

Labour Force

PROPORTION OF CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS, TO POPULATION AND LABOUR FORCE, 1951, 1961, AND 1971

TABLE G

TABLE H

10.6 100.0

100.0

33.3

56.1

15.5

32.8

51.7

8.3 16.5 31.3

1971

Alberta

100.0

13.9

29.5

56.6

1.8 18.6 36.2

1966

100.0

14.2

30.2

55.6

1.9 20.0 33.7

1971

British Columbia

ministration

12, no. 2 (Summer, 1969): 233. For 1971, percentages are derived from the numerical figures made available by individual jurisdictions. NOTE: These provinces were selected for comparability of data. Provinces excluded either did not provide the requested data or their information could not be easily adapted to our purposes. °Figures for 1971 are not available.

SOURCES: For 1966, see J. E. Hodgetts and 0. P. Dwivedi, "The Growth of Government Employment in Canada," Canadian Public Ad-

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Total

13.4

49.0

40.7

46.9

Operational

25.2

27.8

26.8

Clerical

61.4

4.1 19.3 28.3

1971

1971 1.5 16.0 43.9

Manitoba

Nova Scotia

16.5

34.5

31.5

26.3

Subtotal

12.0 14.1 8.4

13.8 8.4 9.3

8.6 6.7 11.0

Administrative Professional Technical

1972°

P.E.I.

1971

1966

Occupational Groups

Federal Government

ILLUSTRATIVE OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION, IN PERCENTAGES, OF CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYMENT, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SELECTED PROVINCES, 1966 AND 1971

Notes

Notes to Chapter One 1. Ontario, Report of the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1959), p. 7. 2. Statistics Canada, Education in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, June, 1973 ), table 2, p. 90. 3. As of August, 1972, there were 1,275,475 recipients of social assistance in Canada. For further information, see Canada, Department of National Health and Welfare, Working Paper on Social Security in Canada (Ottawa: Information Canada, April 18, 1973), p. 50. 4. Richard M. Bird has prepared a detailed study entitled The Growth of Government Spending in Canada, published by the Canadian Taxation Foundation, Toronto, 1970. For past developments this book should be consulted. 5. J. E. Hodgetts and 0. P. Dwivedi, "The Growth of Government Employment in Canada," Canadian Public Administration 12, no. 2 (Summer, 1969) : 231.

Notes to Chapter Two 1. For historical developments, see Sylvain Cloutier, "Le Statut de la Fonction publique du Canada," Canadian Public Administration 10, no. 4 (December, 1967) : 500-513. A full-scale history of the federal efforts to develop a strong central personnel agency is to be found in J. E. Hodgetts, William McCloskey, Reginald Whitaker, and V. Seymour Wilson, The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).

NOTES TO PAGES 17-36

2. J. M. Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1968), p. 109. 3. Alberta, Personnel Administration Office, "Development of the Personnel Function in the Alberta Government Service," mimeographed (1965), p. 74. Saskatchewan, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Administration (Regina, 1965), p. 422. 5. Howard A. Scarrow, "Civil Service Commissions in the Canadian Provinces," Journal of Politics 19, no. 2 (May, 1957) : 240-61. 6. Quebec, Sessional Papers, No. 12,1869-70. 7. Scarrow, "Civil Service Commissions," p. 249. 8. Public Administration Service, Chicago, Organization and Administration of the Public Service of the Province of New Brunswick (February, 1962), sec. II, p. 53, and sec. II, pp. 51-63. 9. New Brunswick, Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1968, c. 88. 10. Nova Scotia, Royal Commission on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation, Report on the Civil Service (Halifax: King's Printer, 1944), p. xviii. 11. Jerome Barnum Associates Inc., "Comments on Personnel Administration in the Public Service of Nova Scotia," mimeographed (February 15, 1960). 12. Prince Edward Island, Civil Service Act, 1962, c. 5, s. 3, ss. (a) and (b). 13. Prince Edward Island, Civil Service Commission. Annual Report, 1968, p. 9. 14. Newfoundland, Review of Personnel Administration, by R. StuartKotze (September, 1968), part IL p. 2. 15. See Newfoundland, Government White Paper on the Organization of the Public Service of Newfoundland and Labrador (November, 1972), p. 32. 16. See, for example, the Order in Council (February 10, 1971) approved by Quebec's Executive Council in which the minister of the Civil Service has established guidelines for the procedures to be followed in handling transfers and according to which the Civil Service Commission is authorized to set up advisory committees to make recommendations on the eligibility of employees declared supernumerary for which places cannot be found in their own departments.

Notes to Chapter Three 1. Walter L. White and John C. Strick, "The Treasury Board and Parliament," Canadian Public Administration 10, no. 2 (June, 1967): 211. 2. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol. 1, Management of the Public Service (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p. 257. 3. From an internal document, dated March, 1973, containing an organ194

NOTES TO PAGES

36-45

ization chart for Treasury Board and a detailed description of the functions of each branch. 4. Taken from the description in the Estimates, 1973-74, for the Secretary of State, Section K, Public Service Commission. 5. Alberta, Treasury Department Act, 1966, c. 101, s. 38. 6. Alberta, Order in Council No. 1449/66, August 2, 1966. 7. The detailed arrangements for collective bargaining are spelled out in Order in Council No. 958/72, November 22, 1972, and Treasury Board's conventional responsibilities (including supervision of the spending of government departments and agencies and "final approval to request to create, reclassify and abolish civil service positions") are described in Order in Council No. 833/70, July 29, 1970. 8. New Brunswick, Financial Administration Act, 1966, c. 10, s. 5(1). 9. New Brunswick, Report of the Royal Commission on EmployerEmployee Relations (Fredericton, 1967), p. 23. 10. New Brunswick, An Act to Amend the Financial Administration Act, 1969, c. 31, s. 5(2). 11. Newfoundland, Review of Personnel Administration, by R. StuartKotze (September, 1968), part I, p. 1. 12. Newfoundland, Government White Paper on the Organization of the Public Service of Newfoundland and Labrador (November, 1972), pp. 11, 38, 33. 13. For historical developments, see F. F. Schindeler, "The Executive Branch of Government in Ontario," Canadian Public Administration 9, no. 4 (December, 1966) : 423-29. 14. Statutes of Ontario, 1954, c. 30. 15. For this series of developments, consult Ontario, Report of the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1959), p. 37; C. E. Brannon, "The Treasury Board of Ontario," mimeographed (May, 1966), p. 12; Statutes of Ontario, 1961-62, c. 43, s. 2; Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, June 10, 1966, p. 4551; and Ontario, Financial Administration Act, 1966, c. 55, s. 2, ss. (3) and (3a). 16. Ontario, Organization and Methods Services Branch, Treasury Board, "Survey of Organizational Requirements for the Civil Service Commission," unpublished (Toronto, 1962), p. 5. 17. A summary of the committee's recommendations is to be found in Ontario, Committee on Government Productivity, Report Number Ten, A Summary (March, 1973). Also, Ontario, Public Service Amendment Act, 1972. 18. Ontario Committee on Government Productivity, Report Number Ten, p. 89. 19. For a convenient summary of these developments, see Quebec, Ministere de la Fonction Publique, Premier Rapport Annuel, 1969-70, pp. 7-14. 20. For a brief account of the commission's historic assignments, see Quebec, Commission de la Fonction Publique, Rapport Annuel, 1970, pp. 1-4. 21. Quebec, Financial Administration Act, 1970, c. 17, s. 22. 195

NOTES TO PAGES

48-72

Notes to Chapter Four 1. Based on a report prepared by the Saskatchewan Bureau of the Budget, Organization and Functions Manual (January, 1969). 2. Alberta, Annual Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1966, unnumbered. 3. Ibid. 4. Ontario, Report of the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1959), p. 347. 5. Ontario, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1959 (Toronto, 1960), p. 17. 6. Ontario, Treasury Board, Manual of Administration (Toronto, 1965), vol. 1, sec. IV-B-7. 7. Saskatchewan, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Administration (Regina, 1965), p. 424. 8. See Achille R. Alhouse, Criteria for Establishing a Departmental Personnel Office (Chicago: Public Personnel Association, 1962), p. 11. 9. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol. 1, Management of the Public Service (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p. 258. 10. C. C. Jorgensen, "Departmental Personnel Officer's Role: Personnel Opinions," Public Personnel Review 30, no. 2 (April, 1969): 109. 11. For further analysis of this argument, see Gene Huntley, "The Departmental Personnel Function: Where the Action Is," Public Personnel Review 30, no. 4 (October, 1969): 238-41.

Notes to Chapter Five 1. S. D. Spero, Government as Employer (New York: Remsen, 1948), p. 1. 2. Saul J. Frankel, Stall Relations in the Civil Service: The Canadian Experience (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1962), p. 266. 3. Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1949), p. 204. 4. General Council of Government Employees of the Province, Contact (March, 1962), p. 3. 5. Ibid., vol. 2 (November, 1964). 6. See, for example, the situation described in Nova Scotia in R. A. Vaison and Pete Aucoin, "Evolving Staff Relations in the Nova Scotia Civil Service," Canadian Public Administration 12, no. 4 (1969): 572-80. 7. SGEA, Constitution, 1969, art. 3(1). 8. BCGEA, Constitution and By-Laws, 1967, art. II(f). 9. MGEA, Constitution, 1967, s. 5 (ii ). 10. NGEA, Constitution, art. II, 1(h). 11. NSCSA, Constitution, art. II (e). 196

NOTES TO PAGES

77-97

12. BCGEA, Minutes of the Twenty-fifth Annual Convention (Report of the General Secretary), October 4, 1968, p. 39. 13. SGEA, Proceedings and Minutes of the Fifty-fifth Convention, May 29, 1968, p. 59. 14. CSAA, Forty-seventh Annual Convention: Reports and Resolutions, November 22, 1967, p. 18. 15. BCGEA, Minutes of the Seventeenth Annual Convention (Report of Delegates to the CCPEA Annual Meeting), October 7, 1960, p. 33. 16. CFGEO, Constitution (as amended to November, 1969), art. 1.01, 1.03, and 1.07. 17. CSA of New Brunswick, "Report on Joint Council of Public Service Organizations," The Civil Service Digest 8, no. 6 (September, 1967): 5. 18. MGEA, "C.F.G.E.O. News," The Bison 22, no. I (March, 1969): 6. 19. For historical details of affiliation of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba associations with trade unions, see Frankel, Staff Relations, pp. 312-15, 244-48, and 229-31. 20. Views expressed by associations through a questionnaire. 21. CSAO, "Report of the President to the 1966 Annual Meeting," The Trillium 18, no. 4 (Winter, 1966-67): 5.

Notes to Chapter Six 1. J. Fred Dawe, "The Image of the Public Service: Survey of Student Opinion," Public• Personnel Review 25 (October, 1964) : 233-36; and Ontario, Civil Service Commission, "High School Attitude Survey," unpublished (1964). 2. School of Business, University of Toronto, "A Survey of Career Preferences and Attitudes among Graduating Students," unpublished (1967). 3. 0. P. Dwivedi, "A Study of Student Image of Government Service," unpublished (Guelph, 1969). 4. F. A. Nigro, Modern Public Adtninistration, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 266-67. 5. Quebec, Commission de la Fonction Publique, Rapport Annuel, 1967, pp. 21-22. 6. Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, Civil Service Act, 1967, c. 34, s. 34, ss. (c). 7. British Columbia, Civil Service Act, 1960, c. 56, s. 80, ss. 2. 8. Quebec, Loi de la Fonction Publique, 1965, c. 14, s. 35. 9. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book 3, The Work World, Part 2, The Federal Administration (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), pars. 715-20. 10. Quebec, Commission de la Fonction Publique, Rapport Annuel, 1968, p. 27. 11. Civil Service Association of Ontario, "Discounting Experience," The Trillium 15, no. 3 (April—May, 1963): 25.

197

NOTES TO PAGES 99-108

12. D. J. Collins, "Recruitment and Selection for Public Administration," Canadian Public Administration 7, no. 2 (June, 1964): 198-99. (Emphasis

added.) 13. Ibid., p. 200.

Notes to Chapter Seven

1. 0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 5th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 279. 2. See Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol. 1, report 3 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p. 373. 3. See, on this point, Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, p. 277. 4. Keith B. Callard, Advanced Administrative Training in the Public Service (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1958), pp. 9-10. 5. Felix A. Nigro, Public Personnel Administration, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), p. 226. 6. Callard, Administrative Training, p. 7. Recent confirmation of this point is found in Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book 3, The Work World, Part 2, The Federal Administration (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), pars. 715-20. 8. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Administrative Classifications in the Public Service (1946), quoted in J. E. Hodgetts and D. C. Corbett, Canadian Public Administration (Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1960), p. 263. 9. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, p. 299. 10. Statutes of Canada, 9-10 Eliz. II (1961), c. 71, s. 6, ss. (e). 11. J. J. Carson, "Executive Development in the Public Service" (Address to the Annual Meeting of the Ottawa Regional Group of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada, April 26, 1967), mimeographed, pp. 2-3. 12. For details, see Peter J. T. Gibson, "The Administration of the Administrative Classes of the Province of British Columbia," (B.A. thesis, University of Victoria, B.C., 1968), p. 71f. See also, British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, "Canadian Personnel Administration," Lecture 4, 1968. 13. The policy statement is to be found in Alberta, Annual Report of the Public Service Commissioner, 1966 (Edmonton, 1967). "It is the policy of the government of Alberta to afford employees opportunity for advancement through increased knowledge, education, training and experience. Employees are encouraged to attend approved courses which may enhance their ability and hence their value to the Service." 14. Saskatchewan, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Administration (Regina, 1965), pp. 417, 428. 198

NOTES TO PAGES

109-19

15. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, March 3, 1959, p. 747. 16. Ontario, Public Service Act, 1961-62, c. 121, s. 4, ss. (f); and Ontario Regulations, 190/62, s. 16, ss. (1). 17. Ontario, Regulations, 190/62, s. 16, ss. 2(a) and 2(b). 18. Ontario, Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1964 (Toronto, 1965), p. 12. 19. Quebec, Convention Collective de Travail, 1968-71, art. 20. 20. New Brunswick, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1959 (Fredericton, 1959), p. 17. 21. See ibid., 1965, p. 21; a similar survey was made in Nova Scotia in 1969. 22. Prince Edward Island, Civil Service Act, 1968, s. 5, ss. (1). 23. The following summary is drawn from the civil service act and/or regulations to be found in each province. 24. British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, Manual of Personnel Administration (May, 1967). 25. Alberta, Department of Extension, Certificate Programs in Management Development, Personnel Administration and Public Administration, 1967-68 (University of Alberta, 1968), pp. 4-5. 26. Manitoba, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1967 (Winnipeg, 1968), p. 4. 27. These and other detailed examples of specific programs are to be found in the various annual reports of the provincial civil service commissions; see also D. G. Collins, "Personnel Development in Canadian Provinces," Public Personnel Review 24, no. 1 (January, 1963) : 13. 28. Alberta, Civil Service Association, "New Alcoholism Policy Encourages Professional Treatment," Civil Service Bulletin 48, no. 5 (May, 1968): 3. 29. British Columbia, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1964 (Victoria, 1965), p. 14. 30. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, March 7, 1963, pp. 1507-8. 31. For details, see Ontario, Civil Service Commission, "Administrative Training Program," mimeographed (Toronto, 1966). 32. Ontario, Report of the Civil Service Commission, April, 1960, to December, 1961 (Toronto, 1962), p. 46. 33. A detailed study entitled "Civil Service Training in Quebec" by David Kwavnick has been used for the following comments on the Quebec program. This study was part of a larger report, The Objectives of Educating Public Managers in Canada, prepared for the Public Service Commission of Canada by G. Bruce Doern, David Kwavnick, and V. Seymour Wilson, School of Public Administration, Carleton University, April, 1971. 34. See Callard, Administrative Training, pp. 4-10. 35. Ontario, Committee on Government Productivity, Report on the Utilization of Human Resources in the Ontario Public Service (Toronto, April, 1972), p. 17. 36. See Prince Edward Island, Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 199

NOTES TO PAGES

121-26

1968, pp. 11-12. The concept of a Maritime Union of the provinces of Nova

Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island emerged from the report of a special joint study commission undertaken by the governments of these three provinces. One of its proposals called for collaborative efforts to seek a unification of these provinces' public services. Further details may be found in "The Move Towards Maritime Integration and the Role of the Council of Maritime Premiers," Canadian Public Administration 15, no. 4 (Winter, 1972) : 610-30.

Notes to Chapter Eight

1. M. R. Barclay, "Position Classification: The Theory and Principles" (Lecture given on November 21, 1958, issued by the Ontario Civil Service Commission, "Personnel Training Institute," unpublished [Toronto, 1958], p. 33). 2. Ismar Baruch, Position Classification in the Public Service (Chicago: Civil Service Assembly, 1941), p. 72. 3. 0. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 6th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 51. 4. Keith B. Callard, Advanced Administrative Training in the Public Service (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1958), p. 5. United Kingdom, Report of the Fulton Committee: The Civil Service, 1966-68, vol. 1 (London: H.M.S.O., June, 1968), p. 68. 6. Ibid., p. 64. 7. Ibid., pp. 67-68. 8. Ibid., p. 68. 9. Ibid., p. 71. 10. Harold H. Leich, "Opinion on the Question, Would it be desirable to graft some features of the rank-in man concept onto our rank-in job approach to classification and pay? Why or why not?" Public Personnel Review 26, no. 1 (January, 1965): 103. 11. For other differences between the two concepts, see Stahl, Public Personnel Administration, 6th ed., pp. 50-56. 12. Ibid., p. 53. Professor R. MacGregor Dawson's early study of the Canadian civil service rang the critical changes on the position-classification plan prepared for the federal public service after World War I by an outside firm of management consultants. See his The Civil Service of Canada (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1929). He was especially critical of the dead-end consequences of boxing in employees so that a career progression was next to impossible unless new classes or reclassification was constantly developed; in practice, his prognosis was proved correct as with the passing years the number of classes more than doubled. 13. Quoted in Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol. 1, Management of the Public Service (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), p. 413. 200

NOTES TO PAGES 126-33

14. Canada, Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Ottawa, July, 1965), pp. 10-13. 15. Ibid., pp. 10-11. 16. Taylor Cole, The Canadian Bureaucracy (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1949), p. 194. 17. H. M. Morrison, "Changing Nature of Public Personnel Administration in British Columbia," Public Personnel Review 27, no. 1 (January, 1966): 40. 18. J. R. Ife, "Development of the Personnel Function in the Alberta Government Service," unpublished (December, 1963), p. 2. 19. Alberta, Annual Report of the Public Service Commission, 1957 (Edmonton, 1958), p. I I. 20. He, "Personnel Function in Alberta," p. 6. 21. Cole, Canadian Bureaucracy, p. 196. 22. Manitoba, Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1948, unnumbered. The Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada was a professional association of public personnel officers, primarily federal and state or provincial, that provided test consulting services as well as a discussion forum. 23. Manitoba, Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1961, s. 1. 24. Manitoba, Civil Service Commission, Annual Report. 1968, p. 6. 25. J. S. Stephen, "The Merit Principle in Classification," unpublished, p. 33. 26. The authority to make regulations rested with the Executive Council. Section 6 of the Public Service Act provided: "The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make regulations, (a) for the classification of civil servants in any department and prescribing the duties to he performed by them." Ontario, Statutes, R.S.O., 1937, c. 15, s. 6, ss. (1). 27. H. Copland, "Statement of Needs Relevant to the Improvement of Class Specifications and Standards," unpublished (June, 1966), p. 4. 28. Ontario, Report of the Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1959), p. 345. 29. Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Debates, March 31,1960, p. 2136. 30. Ontario, Public Service Act, 1961-62, c. 121, s. 4, ss. (a). 31. Ibid., s. 20, ss. 1(a) and (b). 32. "Letter of Provincial Treasurer to Mr. B. D. McAuley, President, Stevenson & Kellogg Ltd.," The Trillium 14, no. 9 (October, 1962): 2-3. 33. Copland, "Needs Relevant to the Improvement of Class Specifications and Standards," p. 4. 34. Ontario, Annual Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1966 (Toronto, 1967), p. 20. 35. Ontario, Committee on Government Productivity, Interim Report Number Six (Toronto: Queen's Printer, April, 1972), pp. 20-24. 36. Cole, Canadian Bureaucracy, p. 195. 37. Quebec, Commission de la Fonction Publique, Rapport Annuel, 1967, p. 12. 201

NOTES TO PAGES

133-46

38. New Brunswick, Civil Service Commission, First Annual Report, 194344 (Fredericton, 1945), p. 3. 39. New Brunswick, Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1962, p. 19. 40. New Brunswick, Public Service Labour Relations Act, 1968, c. 88, s. 1( r ) . 41. Nova Scotia, Final Report on the Salary Administration Programme, by Jerome Barnum Associates (December 16, 1959), p. 2. 42. Howard A. Scarrow, "Civil Service Commissions in the Canadian Provinces," Journal of Politics 19, no. 2 (May, 1957) : 252. 43. Newfoundland, Review of Personnel Administration, by R. StuartKotze (September, 1968), pp. 1-2. 44. The standard text on classification systems is by Ismar Baruch, Position Classification in the Public Service, Chicago, 1941. 45. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, p. 416. 46. Canada, Report of the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining, p. 12. 47. Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the Public Service of Canada, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, November 1,1966, pp. 695-96. 48. Ibid., p. 696. 49. Ibid., p. 698. 50. British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, Fiftieth Annual Report, 1968, p. 6. 51. British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, "Manual: Classification and Job Evaluation," mimeographed (1965). 52. Ontario, Committee on Government Productivity, Interim Report Number Six, p. 20. 53. See, for example, the Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, p. 418; and a "Brief' submitted by the B.C. Civil Service Commission to the Board of Reference on May 9,1962, pp. 1-3, mimeographed. 54. Alberta, Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report, 1968, p. 6. The Prairie Economic Council is the Western provinces' counterpart to the Maritime Union (see n. 36 to chap. 7). 55. Ontario, Committee on Government Productivity, Interim Report Number Six, p. 23. 56. Prince Edward Island, Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1967, p. 12. 57. See Newfoundland, excerpts from the Report of the Committee on Government Administration and Productivity (December, 1972); also Government White Paper on the Organization of the Public Service of Newfoundland and Labrador (November, 1972). 58. See table 2, chapter 1. 59. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, p. 419. 202

NOTES TO PAGES

149-56

Notes to Chapter Nine 1. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization, vol. 1, Management of the Public Service (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1962), pp. 281-82. 2. Reg Shawcross, "About Grievance Handling," The Dome 41, no. 6 (July, 1967) : 168, provides an extended inventory of personality and other signals warning of employee grievances. 3. For a detailed examination of the workings of the Public Service Grievance Board, see Donald K. Skerrett, "The Ontario Public Service Grievance Board" (M.A. thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1965). 4. Ontario, Regulations, 190/62, schedule 1. 5. Ibid., s. 25, ss. 2. 6. See Professor R. Presgrove, "Grievance Procedures in the Civil Service of Ontario," The Trillium 15, no. 1 (January, 1963) : 18-21. Professor Presgrove, as chairman of the board, opposed direct representation of the CSAO on the board. 7. See "Report of the General Manager (CSAO) to the Annual Meeting," The Trillium 17, no. 4 (Winter, 1965) : 14. 8. See New Brunswick, Civil Service Regulations, 1964, s. 116, ss. 2, and s. 115, ss. 4. 9. The grievance procedure has been described in Convention Collective de Travail, 1968-71, s. 12. 10. Ontario, Regulations, 190;!62, s. 14, ss. 1. 11. Manitoba, "Agreement between the Manitoba Government and the Manitoba Government Employees' Association" (April 1, 1968–March 31, 1969). 12. Saskatchewan, Public Service Act, 1965, c. 9, s. 37, ss. 1 and 3. 13. Alberta, Public Service Act, 1968, c. 81, s. 25, ss. 1. 14. British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, Manual of Personnel Administration (May, 1967), p. 95. 15. Quebec, Loi de la Fonction Publique, 1965, c. 14, s. 57. 16. New Brunswick, Civil Service Act, 1952, s. 38(1). 17. Prince Edward Island, The Civil Service Act Regulations, 1964, s. 7(d). 18. Revised Statutes of Nova Scotia, Civil Service Act, 1967, c. 34, s. 48. 19. Revised Statutes of Newfoundland, Civil Service Act, 1952, c. 22, s. 19(1). 20. Ontario, Regulations, 190/62, s. 42, ss. (3 ). 21. Ibid., s. 42, ss. (1). 22. Ibid., s. 42, ss. ( la). 23. Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association, "The Public Service Classification Plan," The Dome 37, no. 8 (October, 1963) : 195. 24. "Classification Joint Council—Not on Advisory Basis," ibid., p. 193. 25. Saskatchewan, "Agreement between the Government of the Province of Saskatchewan and the Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association" (October, 1967), s. 34. 203

NOTES TO PAGES

157-65

26. Ibid., s, 38. 27. Ibid., s. 34. 28. SGEA, "The Public Service Classification Plan," p. 195. 29. This figure is the total number of appeals heard by the Arbitration Board and the Classification Joint Council. 30. Alberta, Public Service Act. 1968, c. 81, s. 12, ss. (1). 31. Alberta, Public Service Commissioner, Annual Report, 1967, p. 4. 32. Quebec, Civil Service Commission, Annual Report, 1967, p. 36.

Notes to Chapter Ten 1. For a full description of the formation of, and early experience with, joint councils in Britain, see Leonard D. White, Whitley Councils in the British Civil Service (Chicago: Unversity of Chicago Press, 1933), part 1. 2. For a brief account of relatively recent developments in Britain, see W. J. M. MacKenzie and J. W. Grove, Central Administration in Britain (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), pp. 134-48. 3. See J. E. Hodgetts. The Canadian Public Service, 1867-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1973), pp. 326-31. 4. British Columbia, Civil Service Commission, "Canadian Personnel Administration," Lecture 5, unpublished (1968), p. 7. 5. For the terms of the Order in Council establishing the Joint Advisory Council, see "Channels of Communication," The Trillium 7, no. 2 (March, 1957): 13-14. 6. For Manitoba, see Howard A. Scarrow, "Employer-Employee Relationships in the Civil Service of the Canadian Provinces," Public Administration (U.K.) 35, no. 1 (Spring, 1957): 71. 7. New Brunswick, Civil Service Regulations, 1964, s. 105. 8. New Brunswick, Report of the Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations (Fredericton, 1967), p. 45. 9. Nova Scotia Civil Service Association, "NSCSA—Government Negotiate Formal Joint Council," Newsletter 3, no. 8 (August, 1963): 1. 10. Newfoundland Government Employees' Association, "How It Came to Be and Why," Bulletin I, no. 2 (June, 1968) : 3-4; "President's Report," ibid., 1, no. 7; and Newfoundland Government Employees' Association Convention, Proceedings, 1968 (St. John's, May 1-10, 1969), p. 44. 11. Ontario, Public Service Act, 1947, c. 89, s. I, ss. (j), provided that the Lieutenant-Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission might make regulations "providing for the establishing of advisory, joint or departmental councils or committees and prescribing the powers and duties thereof." 12. For an extended critique of the "sovereignty" argument, see W. B. Cunningham, "Public Employment, Collective Bargaining and the Conventional Wisdom," The Provincial (May, 1967): 9; Saul J. Frankel, Stall Rela204

NOTES TO PAGES 166-79

tions in the Civil Service: The Canadian Experience (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1962), p. 12f. 13. For a forthright argument against the strike, both in public and in private employment, where services arc deemed essential, see 0. Glenn Stahl, "Strikes and Society," Good Government 87, no. 4 (Winter, 1970): 15-20. 14. Cunningham, "Public Employment, Collective Bargaining." 15. Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 181-82. 16. Manitoba, Civil Service Amendment Act, 1965, c. 11, s. 45, ss. H(3). 17. Statutes of Manitoba, Civil Service Act, 1969 (2d sess.), c. 3, s. 20. 18. For further details, see Shirley B. Goldenberg, "Collective Bargaining in the Provincial Public Services," in Collective Bargaining in the Public Service (Toronto: institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1973), pp. 22-23. 19. "Unit and Departmental Committees," The Trillium 18, no. 2 (Summer, 1966): 5. 20. Ontario, An Act to Provide for Collective Bargaining for Crown Employees, 1972, c. 67. See also Collective Bargaining in the Ontario Government Service, a report of the special adviser, His Honour Judge T. Little, May, 1969, in which appears a number of recommendations having a bearing on the measure finally passed in 1972. 21. But, as Goldenberg indicates, employees of government boards and agencies are subject to the general Trade Union Act which postpones but nevertheless admits of strike action for such nondepartmental employees. See "Collective Bargaining," p. 21. 22. Goldenberg, quoting Professor H. D. Woods, ibid., pp. 33-34. 23. Order in Council No. 958/72 (November 22, 1972), part 16, Consultation and Negotiation Procedures, s. 10. 24. Goldenberg, "Collective Bargaining," p. 15. 25. For the detailed arrangements provided, consult the Trade Union Act, 1966, and Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association, "The Negotiating Committee, 1967-1968," The Dome 42, no. 2 (March, 1968): 33f. 26. On this point and more generally on further detailed aspects of procedure, see Goldenberg, "Collective Bargaining," pp. 25-30. 27. See Frankel, Stan Relations, p. 306. 28. Report of the Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public Service of British Columbia (Victoria, B.C., December, 1972).

Notes to Statistical Appendix 1. For further details, see Statistics Canada, Federal Government Employment, April—June, 1968, part C, "Explanatory Notes" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March, 1969), pp. 38-40.

205

Index Accident prevention programs, 3132, 119 Administrative, professional, and technical (APT) personnel, 1314 Advertising, public service vacancies, 26-27, 88-89, 100, 102 Advisory functions of central personnel agencies, 33 Alberta, Province of: central personnel agency, evolution of, 1819, 38, 48, 54 (see also Public Service Commissioner, Alberta); civil service employment in, 18889; Classification Appeal Board, 29, 157, 158; classification plan for, 127-28, 139; collective bargaining, 167-68; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth of, 186-87; Grievance Appeal Board, 152; Joint Council, 163, 167; Mediation Board, 168; pay plan administration, 143; personnel administration functions in departments, 48-49, 5455; Public Service Act (1954), 48; (1959), 128; (1968), 167, 203 n, 204n; Public Service Efficiency Act (1918), 127; Public Service Grievance Board, 155; recruitment process, 88-89; selection practice, 90; training pro-

grams, 108, 114; Treasury Board, 37-38; Treasury Department Act (1966), 195n Alcoholism rehabilitation, 115 Alhouse, Achille R., 196n American consultant firms, influence in Canada, 26 American Management Aisociation, 115 Appeals: classification, 155-59; disciplinary action, 154-55; open competitions, 97-98; working conditions, 151-53 Appointments, 27, 92-93 Aptitude tests, 90 Armed forces, numbers, 7 Arthur Young and Company, 125, 126 Aucoin, Peter, 196n Barclay, M. R., 200n Baruch, Ismar, 200n, 202n Beck, J. M., 194n Bird, Richard M., 193 n Brannon, C. E., 195n British civil service: administrative class, 123, 125; career system, 122-23; Civil Service College, 119; in-service training, 105; reforms in, 15-16, 123, 124 British Columbia Federation of Labour, 82

INDEX

British Columbia Government Employees' Union, 63, 64, 72, 74, 82, 173 British Columbia, Province of: Civil Service Act, 11, 17, 173, 197n; civil service employment in, I1, 12, 188-89; classification plan for, 127, 138-39; collective bargaining, 172-74; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth of, 186-87; grievances, appeal mechanism, 151-52; Labour Relations Board, 173; Mediation Commission Act (1968), 173; pay plan administration, 142-43; personnel administration functions in departments, 48; probationary period for civil servants, 93; promotional competition, 96; Public Service Act (1973), 152, 175; Public Service Commission, 37 (see also Civil Service Commission, British Columbia); Public Service Grievance Board, 152; Public Service Labour Relations Act (1973), 173, 175; recruitment process, 88-89; residential preference, 92; selection practice, 90; staff associations in, 63; training programs, 108, 113-14, 115; transfer system, 95; Treasury Board, 37; veterans' preference, 92 Browne, W. J., 71 Bureaucracy, public image of, 8687 Cabinet, and treasury boards, 35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44 Callard, K. B., 104, 105, 117, 198n, 199 n, 200 n Canada, Government of: Civil Service Act (1867), 20; (1961), 106, 179; Civil Service Commission, 35 (see also Public Service Commission, Canada); classification plan, 125-26; and collective bargaining, 126; Financial Administration Act (1951), 35; (1967), 36; government manpower, growth 208

of, 186-87; government manpower, planning for, 87; National Joint Council, 162, 167; public attitudes toward employment with, 86; Public Service Employment Act (1967), 36, 107, 166; public service employment, growth of, 1, 7, 8, 10, 13, 188-89; occupational distribution, 191; related to labour force, 13, 190; related to population, 13, 190; Public Service Staff Relations Act (1967), 36, 126; Treasury Board, 31, 35-37, 106 Canadian Council of Provincial Employees' Associations (CCPEA), 79 Canadian Federation of Government Employee Organizations (CFGEO), 79-81 Canadian Labour Congress, 72, 75, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83 Canadian labour force: growth of, 183; and population, 182 Canadian Postal Employees' Association, 62 Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPS), 70, 76, 80, 81 Career assignment program (CAP), 116, 117 Career concept, 122-25 Carson. J. J., 107, 198n Centralization of personnel functions, 48, 52, 58 Central personnel agencies, 15-34; character of, 18; commission form, 17, 18, 19; evolution of, 16-26; functions of, 26-33; and merit principle application, 15; and patronage, 16; role evaluation, 32-34. See also jurisdictional entries Civil servants: definition, 6, 180-81; distribution by departments, 12; numbers, 10-13, 186-87; public image of, 85-87; ratio to labour force and population, 13, 190; wage bill for, 4 Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada, 129

INDEX

Civil Service Association of Alberta, 38, 72, 76, 157, 167, 168; budget and staff, 74; evolution of, 63, 65; membership growth, 64; publications of, 77; role in classification reform, 128, 139 Civil Service Association of Canada, 62 Civil Service Association of Nova Scotia: aims, 72; affiliation, 79, 81; budget and staff, 74; evolution of, 70; membership growth, 64; recognition, exclusive, 76 Civil Service Association of Ontario, 20, 50, 76, 78, 84, 152, 164, 16869; affiliation, 79, 80; budget and staff, 74; evolution of, 66-67; membership growth, 64; recognition, exclusive, 76; role in classification reform, 131; role in promotions, 97; role in training programs, 78 Civil Service Commissions British Columbia: classification, role in, 127, 139; collective bargaining, 173; and departmental personnel branch, 48; establishment of, 18; grievance handling, 151, 152; pay research, 142-43; staffing role, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96; training programs, 108, 112, 113; and Treasury Board, 37 Manitoba: classification of positions, 128, 129, 140; establishment of, 17, 19; grievance handling, 151, 155; and Management Committee of the Cabinet, 19, 28, 41-42, 50, 59, 109, 138, 140, 147, 168; pay research, 143; staffing role, 8894, training programs, 114 New Brunswick: classification, role in, 133-34; establishment of, 22-23; salary administration, 144; staffing role, 88, 90, 93, 95; training programs, 107, 111, 114; and Treasury Board, 39-40 Newfoundland: establishment of,

24-25; staffing role, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 102 Nova Scotia: classification, role in, 134, 135, 141-42; establishment of, 23-24; grievance handling, 151, 154, 155; pay research, 144; staffing role, 88, 90, 93, 95; training programs, 111, 113 Ontario: classification, role in, 129-32, 140; collective bargaining, 164, 167; and departmental personnel functions, 50; establishment of, 17, 18-19, 20; grievance handling, 29, 155, 156; pay research, 28, 143-44; staffing role, 26, 27, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 97, 98-100; training programs, 109-10, 112, 114, 116-17, 118; and Treasury Board, 42-43 Prince Edward Island: establishment of, 24; grievance handling, 29; pay research, 144; staffing role, 88, 89, 90, 93, 95; training programs, 29, 111 Quebec: classification, role in, 28, 132-33, 140-41; and departmental personnel functions, 50-51; establishment of, 2021, 31; grievance handling, 158; pay research, 144; staffing role, 26, 27, 87, 88, 89, 90, 9192, 94, 95, 100-102; training programs, 29, 110; and Treasury Board, 44-46 Civil Service Federation (Canada), 62 Civil service reforms: in federal service, 16-17; in provincial services, 17-18 Classification, 28, 120-48; American and British systems compared, 122-25; appeals, 155-59; basic principles of, 137; and central personnel agencies, 28; classification process, 137-42; and collective bargaining, 13537, 146-47; and merit system, 136; and pay plan, 142-45; plan

209

INDEX

procedures and development, 125-35. See also jurisdictional entries Cloutier, Sylvain, 136, 193 n Cole, Taylor, 196n, 201n Collective bargaining, 161-77; absolutism in, 165; and central personnel agencies, 30; evolution of concept, 167-74; issues facing, 174-77; and managerial prerogatives, 175-76; process of, 16574; right to, 165-67; staff associations' claims for, 75-76; 16162; and strike, 166, 176 Collective negotiations, 30. See also Collective bargaining Collins, D. J., 198n, 199n Committee on Government Administration and Productivity (Newfoundland), 25, 41, 145, 202n Committee on Government Productivity (Ontario), 20, 43, 44, 50, 118, 132, 140, 143-44, 195n, 199 n, 201 n, 202 n Committee on the Organization of Government in Ontario, 3, 42, 130, 193 n, 195n, 201n Compensation. See Pay plan Compulsory arbitration, 67, 83, 161-70, 172. See also Collective bargaining Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU), 68, 69 Copland, H., 201n Corbett, D. C., 198n Council of Atlantic Provincial Employees (CAPE), 75, 81 Counselling, 54, 55 Cunningham, W. B., 166, 204n Dawe, J. Fred, 197 n Dawson, R. MacGregor, 23, 24, 200 n Decentralization of personnel functions, 49, 50, 58, 132 Departmental services employees, 8, 62 Department of the Civil Service. See Ontario; Quebec Departments, personnel administra210

tion in, 47-59; and central personnel agencies, 56-57; criteria for establishing a personnel branch, 52-53; decentralization of, 58-59; evolution of, 47-52; functions of branches, 53-55; organization of, 55-56; role of, 5758; staff for, 52, 53 Deputy minister, relations with personnel director, 56-57, 59 Disciplinary action: appeals, 155; forms of, 154-55; grounds for, 154 Discrimination, 72 Dismissals, 153-55 Doern, G. Bruce, 199n Dominion Bureau of Statistics. See Statistics Canada Duplessis, M., 21, 67, 68, 69, 132 Dwivedi, O. P., 191, 193n, 197n East India Company, 122 Ecole Nationale d'Administration (Paris), 112, 117 Ecole Nationale d'Administration Publique (Quebec), 117 Educational leave, 111-13 Eligible list, 90-91 Employee grievances and appeals, 149-60; appeal against classification, 155-59; appeal against dismissals, 154-55; appeal mechanisms, 151-53; and channels of communications, 149; collective bargaining, 176 Employee organizations. See Staff associations Employee representation, 75, 97, 152, 153, 158, 159, 164, 170, 176 Employee safety, 31-32 Employment: federal government, growth of, 1, 2, 7, 10, 13, 186-87, 188-89; municipal governments, 7; occupational distribution, 13, 191; provincial governments, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10-13, 186-87, 188-89, 190 Examinations, 91 Expenditures, provincial governments, 4-6; per capita distribution of, 184-85

INDEX

Favouritism, 33 Frankel Commission. See Royal Commission on Employer-Employee Relations (New Brunswick) Frankel, S. J., 23, 196n, 197n, 204 n, 205 n French language training, 118-19 Fringe benefits, 30 Fulton Committee (United Kingdom), 119, 123-25, 200n General Council of Government Employees of Quebec, 68-69 Gibson, Peter J. T., 198 n Goldenberg, Shirley, 205n Government employees' union. See Staff associations Government employment: cost of, 5-6; definition of, 181; dimensions of, 1-14; divided by type of engagement, 8; factors affecting growth of, 2-4; total growth, 186-87; universe of, 6-10; wage bill, 4. See also Employment Government service, image of, 8587 Government work force. See Government employment Grievance settlement, 28-29, 15159 Griffenhagen Associates, 129 Grove, J. W., 204 n Hickling-Johnston Ltd., 129 Hodgetts, J. E., 191, 193 n, 198 n, 204 n Hoover Commission, 125 Hospital employees, 7 Hunter, Harry B., 80 Huntley, Gene, 196n Ife, J. R., 201n India, 17, 122 Inside Civil Service (Canada), 17 Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 174 Interviews, 91 Jerome Barnum Associates, Inc., 24,

134, 194n, 202n Job competitions, 88-89 Job evaluation, 138-39, 140 Job-oriented classification, 124-25 Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Public Service of Canada, 13637 Joint councils, role in collective bargaining, 162-65 Jorgensen, C. C., 196n Judicial functions of central personnel agencies, 33 Kwavnick, David, 199n Labour force, 3-4, 13, 14, 183, 190 Legislative functions of central personnel agencies, 34 Leich, Harold H., 200n Lesage, Jean, 21 Little, Judge T., 205n Macaulay, Lord, 122 McCloskey, William, 193 n McCutcheon, J. M., 18, 32 MacKenzie, W. J. M., 204n Management Board of Cabinet (Ontario), 43-44, 140 Management Committee of the Cabinet (Manitoba), 19, 28, 41-42, 50, 59, 109, 138, 140, 147, 168 Manitoba Government Employees' Association: affiliation, 79, 80; budget and staff, 74; educational activity, 77; evolution of, 66; membership growth, 64; recognition, exclusive, 76; role in classification, 129; role in collective bargaining, 163, 168; role in grievance handling, 152, 155 Manitoba, Province of: Arbitration Board, 168; Civil Service Act (1918), 129; (1969), 205n; civil service employment in, 12, 18889; classification plan for, 12829, 140; collective bargaining, 168; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth of, 18687; Joint Council, 153; Mediation 211

INDEX

Board, 168; pay plan administration, 143; personnel administration functions in departments, 49-50; recruitment process, 8889; selection practice, 90; staff associations in, 66; training programs, 109, 114, 115; transfer system, 94; Treasury Board, 41; veterans' preference, 92. See also Civil Service Commission, Manitoba Manpower planning, 26, 87-88 Manual of Administration (Ontario), 50 Maritime Union, 119, 148, 200n Merit principle, 47, 85; and classification, 135-36; and collective bargaining, 175-76 Merit system: coverage, 8-9; historical development, 15-17; role in classification, 136-37 Ministerial responsibility, 47 Morgan, C. W., 71 Morrison, H. M., 127, 201n Mosher, Frederick, 166, 205n Municipal government employment, 7 National Civil Service Reform League (U.S.A.), 16 Negotiations. See Collective bargaining New Brunswick, Province of: Civil Service Act (1943), 22-23; (1952), 154, 203 n; civil service employment in, 188-89; classification grievances, 158-59; classification plan for, 133-34, 144; collective bargaining, 51, 53, 169-70; dismissals, 154, 155; Financial Administration Act (1966), 23, 195 n; government manpower, growth of, 184-85; Grievance Review Board, 29, 153; Joint Council, 155, 163; pay plan responsibility, 144; personnel administration functions in departments, 51; Personnel Policy Division, 28, 138, 141; probationary period for civil servants, 93; Pub212

lic Service Arbitration Tribunal, 170; Public Service Labour Relations Act, 23, 134, 144, 155, 158, 194n, 202n; Public Service Labour Relations Board, 158-59, 170; recruitment process, 88-89; right to strike of employees, 170; selection practice, 90; staff associations in, 70; training programs, 114; transfer system, 95; Treasury Board, 23, 28, 39-40, 51, 107, 134, 138, 141, 144; veterans' preference, 92. See also Civil Service Commission, New Brunswick New Brunswick Public Employees Association: affiliation, 79, 81; budget and staff, 74; educational activity, 77; evolution of, 70; membership growth, 64; role in classification, 133 Newfoundland Association of Public Employees: affiliation, 76, 81; budget and staff, 74; educational activity, 77; evolution of, 69, 71; membership growth, 64 Newfoundland, Province of: Civil Service Act (1952), 25, 154, 203 n; civil service employment in, 10, 11, 188-89; classification plan for, 135; collective bargaining, 171; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth of, 186-87; Joint Council, 71, 155, 167; Labour Relations Act (1959), 75; pay plan responsibility, 145; personnel administration functions in departments, 52, 59; Public Service Commission, 25, 41, 59, 111 (see also Civil Service Commission, Newfoundland); Public Service (Collective Bargaining) Act (1970), 171; recruitment process, 88-90; staff associations in, 69, 71; transfer system, 95; training programs, 114; Treasury Board, 40-41, 59, 71, 145; White Paper on the Organization of the Public Service, 24, 41

INDEX

Nigro, Felix A., 87, 104, 197n, 198n Northcote-Trevelyan Report, 122 Nova Scotia Government Employees Association. See Civil Service Association of Nova Scotia Nova Scotia, Province of: Civil Service Act (1935), 23; (1952), 24; (1967), 197n, 203n; Civil Service Joint Council Act (1867), 163; classification plan for, 134, 14142; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth of, 18687; Joint Council, 155, 163; pay plan administration, 144; personnel administration functions in departments, 52; recruitment process, 88-89; residential preference, 92; selection practice, 90; training programs, 114; transfer system, 95; Treasury Board, 39; veterans' preference, 92. See also Civil Service Commission, Nova Scotia Occupational categories, 126, 134, 137, 138, 141 Ontario, Province of: civil service employment in, 2, 11, 188-89; classification plan for, 129-32, 140; Classification Rating Committee, 156; collective bargaining, 53, 67, 168-69; Collective Bargaining for Crown Employees Act (1972), 76, 169, 175, 205n; Department of the Civil Service, 20, 26, 28, 42, 43, 50 (see also Civil Service Commission, Ontario); dismissals, 154-55; Financial Administration Act (1954), 42; (1966), 195n; government manpower, growth of, 8, 186-87; Joint Advisory Council, 66, 67, 163, 164, 168; Joint Council, 169; Manual of Administration, 50; pay plan administration, 143-44; personnel administration functions in departments, 50; Personnel Council, 50; public attitudes survey, 86-87; Public Service Act (1961-62), 20, 109,

110, 131, 199 n, 201n; Public Service Arbitration Board, 169; Public Service Grievance Board, 152-53, 169; Public Service Labour Relations Tribunal, 169; recruitment process, 88-89; selection practice, 90; Senior Officers' Conference, 116, 117; training programs, 109-10, 114, 115, 116-17; transfer system, 94-95; Treasury Board, 42-44; veterans' preference, 92 Patronage, 8, 15, 17, 20, 71, 72, 85, 87, 102, 130 Pay plan, 142-48; administration of, 142-45; objectives of, 142; problems with, 145-46; relationship to classification plan, 147. See also jurisdictional entries Pay research bureaus, 142-45 Personnel administration, role of central agencies in, 15-34. See also jurisdictional entries Personnel research, 30-31 Political partisanship, and employees' organizations, 82-84 Population, growth of, 2-4, 182; in relation to civil service employees, 12, 13, 190 Position classification. See Classification Pot system, 145 Prairie Economic Council, 148 Preferential treatment in recruiting: language, 92; locality, 92; veterans, 92 Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining (Canada), 126, 137, 201n, 202n Presgrove, R., 203n Prestige of civil service, 85-89 Prince Edward Island, Province of: Civil Service Act (1962), 24, 72, 154, 164, 170, 171, 194n; (1968), 199 n; civil service employment in, 11, 188-89; classification plan for, 134-35; collective bargaining, 170-71; dismissals, 154, 155; government manpower, growth 213

INDEX

of, 188-89; Joint Council, 71, 164; pay plan administration, 144; personnel administration functions in departments, 52; probationary period for civil servants, 93; recruitment process, 88-89; selection practice, 90; Supreme Court, 155; transfer system, 95; Treasury Board, 39; veterans' preference, 92. See also Civil Service Commission, Prince Edward Island Prince Edward Island Public Service Association: affiliation, 79, 80, 81; budget and staff, 74; evolution of, 70-71; membership growth, 64 Probation, 93 Promotion, 94, 95-98; examination for, 96; and seniority, 97 P. S. Ross and Company, 39, 134 Psychological tests, 91 Public Administration Service (Chicago), 19, 22, 23, 25, 33, 41, 128, 129, 132, 134, 135, 194n Public servants: associations of, 6184; and collective bargaining, 161-81; entry in government, 8890; and grievances, 149-66; numerical growth, 186-89; training of, 103-19. See also Civil servants Public Service Alliance of Canada, 80 Public Service Commission, Canada: attitude survey by, 86, 87; classification responsibility, 125-26; evolution of, 16-17; relations with Treasury Board, 36-37; training programs, 105-7 Public Service Commission, Saskatchewan: classification, role in, 139-40; and collective bargaining, 30; establishment of, 17, 19; grievance handling, 155, 156, 159: staffing functions, 89, 90, 93, 94; training programs, 108-9 Public Service Commissioner, Alberta, 19, 38, 48, 54; and classification, 139; establishment of, 214

17, 18-19; relationship with departments, 48-49; relationship with Treasury Board, 37-38; staffing functions, 88, 89, 90, 92, 94; training programs, 108, 114 Public service unions. See Staff associations Quebec, Province of: Civil Service Act (1867), 20, 22; (1965), 22, 100, 110, 172, 181, 197n, 203n; civil service employment in, 11, 188-89; classification grievances, 156, 158; classification plan for, 132-33, 140-41, 146; collective bargaining, 53, 172; Department of the Civil Service, 11, 22, 26, 28, 30, 31, 44-45, 51, 55, 111, 153; dismissals, 154, 155; Financial Administration Act (1970), 45, 195 n; government manpower, growth of, 186-87; Labour Code (1964), 172; langauge and locality preference, 92; manpower planning, 87; pay plan administration, 144; probationary period for civil servants, 93; promotional competitions, 96; Public Service Employees' Dispute Act (1944), 67; recruitment process, 88-89; selection practice, 90, 91-92; staff associations in, 67-69; training programs, 114, 117; transfer system, 95; Treasury Board, 44, 95. See also Civil Service Commission, Quebec Railway Mail Clerks' Federation, 62 Rand formula, 83 Rank-oriented classification, 12224 Recruitment. See Staffing Report on Personnel Administration (Heeney Report), 35-36, 106 Rights of civil servants: to bargain collectively, 165-74; to organize, 75-76 Royal Commissions: on Administrative Classifications in the Civil Service (Gordon Commission),

INDEX

35, 106, 198n; on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 95, 96, 197n, 198n; on Employer-Employee Relations (New Brunswick), 23, 40, 70, 163, 169, 170, 195n, 204 n; on Employer-Employee Relations in the Public Service (British Columbia), 173, 205n; on Government Administration (Saskatchewan), 19, 39, 49, 52, 59, 108, 194n, 196n, 198n; on Government Organization (Glassco Commission), 36, 43, 46, 56, 106, 107, 136, 146, 149, 194n, 196n, 198n, 200n, 202n, 203n; on Provincial Development and Rehabilitation (Nova Scotia), 23-24, 194 n

Saskatchewan Government Employees' Association: affiliation, 79, 82; budget and staff, 74; and CCF party, 65-66; evolution of, 65-66; membership growth, 64; role in classification grievances, 156 Saskatchewan, Province of: Arbitration Board, 153; Bureau of the Budget, 38; Classification Joint Council, 156-57; classification plan for, 128, 139-40; collective bargaining, 53, 66, 171-72; dismissals, 154, 155; Essential Services Emergency Act (1971), 171; government manpower, growth of, 186-87; grievance handling, 156-57; pay plan administration, 143; personnel administration functions in departments, 49; probationary period for civil servants, 93; Public Service Act (1965), 108, 203 n; public service employment in, 10, 188-89; recruitment process, 88-89; selection practice, 90-91; staff associations in, 65, 128; Trade Union Act (1944), 171; training programs, 108-9; Treasury Board, 38-39. See also Public Service

Commission, Saskatchewan Scarrow, Howard A., 20, 21, 194n, 202n, 204n Schindeler, F. F., 195n Selection practices, 90-92 Seniority in promotion, 97 Shawcross, R., 203 n Skerrett, Donald K., 203n Smallwood, Joseph, 24 Spero, S. D., 61, 196n Staff associations, 61-84; aims, 72-73; budgets, 74; educational activity, 76-78; historical development, 62-72; organizational activity, 75-76; political activity, 78-82; structures of, 73-75. See also names of individual associations

Staffing; appointment, 27, 92-93; central registry for, 102; definition, 85; manpower planning, 26, 87-88; preferential treatment, 92; probation, 27, 93; promotion, 27, 95-97; public attitudes to government employment, 85-87; recruitment system, 26-27, 88-90; role of central agencies in, 98102; selection practices, 27, 9092; transfer, 27, 93-95 Stahl, 0. Glenn, 198n, 200n, 205n Statistics Canada, 6, 8, 182, 183, 185, 187, 189, 193n, 205n Stephen, J. S., 201 n Stevenson & Kellogg Ltd., 130, 131, 201 n Strike, by civil servants. See Collective bargaining Stuart-Kotze, R. (Report), 40-41, 135, 194n, 195 n, 202n Supervisors, role in employee grievances, 149-51 Syndicat des Fonctionnaires Provinciaux du Quebec (SFPQ): affiliation, 81; budget and staff, 74; evolution of, 67-69; membership growth, 64; role in collective bargaining, 172; role in grievance handling, 153, 158; role in salary administration, 144; role in training programs, 110 215

INDEX

Taxation Statistics, 180 Teachers, number of, 4, 7 Training and development, 103-19; assessment of, 117-19; for career service, 116-17; and central personnel agencies, 29-30; correspondence courses, 115; definition of, 103; intergovernmental collaboration on, 119; organization for, 108-11; programs in provinces, 111-18; progress in provinces, 105-7; purposes of, 103-5 Transfer, 27, 93-95 Treasury Boards, 35-46; evolution of federal, 35-37; of provincial, 37-45; role in personnel management, 45-46. See also jurisdictional entries Unionism in the public service. See Staff associations

216

United Farmers of Alberta, 65 United States: civil service reform, 16; classification system, 122; President's Committee on Administrative Management, 44; prestige of government employment, 86, 111 Vaison, R. A., 196n Veterans' preference, 92 Wages and salaries (of government employees), 4, 6, 145, 147-48 Whitaker, Reginald, 193n White, Leonard D., 204n White, Walter L., 194n Whitley Council (U.K.), 162, 163 Wilson, V. Seymour, 193n, 199 n Woods, Gordon & Company, 42 Woods, H. D., 205n