Open Government and Freedom of Information: Policy and Practice in Asia and the Middle East (Information Technology and Global Governance) 3031358627, 9783031358623

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Open Government and Freedom of Information Policy and Practice in Asia and the Middle East Edited by Habib Zafarullah Noore Alam Siddiquee

Information Technology and Global Governance Series Editor

Derrick L. Cogburn American University Bethesda, MD, USA

Information Technology and Global Governance focuses on the complex interrelationships between the social, political, and economic processes of global governance that occur at national, regional, and international levels. These processes are influenced by the rapid and ongoing developments in information and communication technologies. At the same time, they affect numerous areas, create new opportunities and mechanisms for participation in global governance processes, and influence how governance is studied. Books in this series examine these relationships and influences.

Habib Zafarullah  •  Noore Alam Siddiquee Editors

Open Government and Freedom of Information Policy and Practice in Asia and the Middle East

Editors Habib Zafarullah Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences University of New England Armidale, NSW, Australia

Noore Alam Siddiquee Nazarbayev University Astana, Kazakhstan

Information Technology and Global Governance ISBN 978-3-031-35862-3    ISBN 978-3-031-35863-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Futuristic VR businessmen - stock photo This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

To those who seek transparency and truth, champion freedom and justice, and envision a society where the power of information belongs to the people!

Preface

In an episode of the fictional television series, ‘Yes, Minister,’ in response to the young civil servant Bernard Woolley’s politically appropriate remark that “surely the citizens of a democracy have a right to know,” the ‘permanent secretary,’ Sir Humphrey Appleby, a staunch bureaucrat in the British Civil Service, wisecracked: “No. They have a right to be ignorant. Knowledge only means complicity in guilt; ignorance has a certain dignity” (BBC, 1980). Autocratic or authoritarian rulers would probably applaud Sir Humphrey for they either deprive the people of their right to know the decisions and actions of the government or prefer to keep them in the dark by performing their political and administrative routines behind closed doors. Gaining or disseminating knowledge can never be an indiscretion, neither partnership nor collaboration in doing so is incorrect. Being ignorant is not a right for the people and depriving them of their right to know should not be a prerogative for the rulers. One of the founding fathers of the USA, Patrick Henry, asserted in 1788 that “The liberties of a people never were, nor ever will be, secure, when the transactions of their rulers may be concealed from them” (quoted in Elliot, 1836: 170). In a similar vein, Jeremy Bentham contended that “In the darkness of secrecy, sinister interest and evil in every shape shall have full swing” (Bentham, 1962: 493). He insisted that “secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of regular government” (quoted in Hood, 2006: 9). This lends credence to the ethical and democratic demand in the contemporary world that the tasks of the state should be performed in full view of the public, except vii

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those that have implications for national security and individual privacy. Social justice has its heart in the public eye, and openness shields from wrongdoing and depravity. A defining feature of democratic governance is the explicit use of the right to information by the citizens to enforce transparency and accountability in public affairs and, along with other elements, work in tandem to reify the concept of open government (OG). With the worldwide waves of democratization and the swift spread of electronic communication, the imperative of ensuring unrestricted access to information has become increasingly salient. This experience has also influenced Asia, and there has been a growing acceptance of OG and freedom of information (FOI) as instruments of democratic governance. Asia presents a complex situation characterized by both impressive economic growth and social progress, as well as problematic issues such as democratic deficits, political instability, and societal disorder in some countries. While these are more significant issues demanding in-depth analysis from broader perspectives, this volume’s simple goal is to comprehend the usefulness of participatory platforms in selected Asian countries that enable citizens’ ‘right to information’ and assist them in monitoring and scrutinizing governmental activities to ensure accountability and integrity and to improve the quality of democracy. Thus, the focus is on the various pivotal elements of open government—transparency, accountability, participation, collaboration, inclusive policymaking, technology, and open data. The book also evaluates the policies and practices concerning FOI and their impact on the citizen-state nexus and its relevance to the principles of democratic governance. Contributors to the volume assess OG arrangements and/or FOI policies and practices in 13 countries and one regional group spread across East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and a part of the Middle East and adjudge their performance from both global and regional perspectives. Some chapters provide critical overviews of national situations, while others present findings from empirical research at the local level. This would allow for an evaluation of the similarities and differences in the approaches to promoting open government, citizens’ rights, and inclusive governance in the region. We want to express our deepest gratitude to Stewart Beal (Editor) and Ruby Panigrahi (Project Coordinator) at Palgrave Macmillan for their unwavering support, encouragement, and guidance throughout the process of publishing this book. We also thank the other members of the

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production team for giving shape to the final product. We also extend our sincerest appreciation to all the contributing authors who made this edited volume possible. Their contributions have added immense value to the book. We hope it will serve as a valuable resource for scholars, researchers, and students and add to the literature on open government and freedom of information in Asia. Armidale, NSW, Australia Astana, Kazakhstan

Habib Zafarullah Noore Alam Siddiquee

References BBC. (1980). Open Government. Yes, Minister. Episode 1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8qSbB0ofJ4g Bentham, J. (1962). Constitutional code. In J. Bowring (Ed.), The works of Jeremy Bentham (vol. 9). Russell & Russell. Elliot, J. (1836). The Debates in the several State conventions on the adoption of the federal constitution (vol. 3). United States Congress. Hood, C. (2006). Transparency in historical perspective. In C. Hood, & D. Heald (Eds.), Transparency: The key to better governance? (pp. 2–23). British Academy.

Contents

Part I Prologue   1 1 Open  Government and Freedom of Information: Parameters and Determinants—An Introduction  3 Habib Zafarullah and Noore Alam Siddiquee 2 Open  Government and Freedom of Information in Asia: Exploring Developments and Outcomes 27 Habib Zafarullah and Noore Alam Siddiquee Part II Country Studies East & Southeast Asia  53 3 Leaning  Towards the Light? The Path to Open Government in Taiwan 55 Tsai-Tsu Su, Nai-Ling Kuo, and Hsini Huang 4 Open  Government and Freedom of Information: The Philippine Experience 75 Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan, and Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz 5 Open  Government in a Non-democratic Context? Access to Information in Hong Kong107 Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Wai Kit Cheng xi

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6 State  of Access to Information in the Context of Open Government in Malaysia127 Kevin Fernandez and Kuppusamy Singaravelloo 7 Twenty-Five  Years of Freedom of Information in Thailand: An Empty Gesture?145 Patamawadee Jongruck 8 Open  Government Data and Smart Nation in Singapore163 Chengwei Xu and Chung-An Chen 9 Right  to Information Law and Open Government: The Indonesian Experience185 Noore Alam Siddiquee 10 Open  Government Information in China: Review and Assessment205 Zhibin Zhang Part III South Asia 231 11 Integrating  Social Equity into Right to Information and Access to Information Laws and Policies: Drawing on the Indian Case233 Jeannine E. Relly, Md. Fazle Rabbi, Himanshu Jha, Rajdeep Pakanati, and Meghna Sabharwal 12 Lifting  the Shroud of Secrecy: State of Open Government and Information Access in Bangladesh259 Habib Zafarullah 13 Quest  for Democratic Governance in Nepal: The Relevance of Governance Legitimacy and Capacity283 Ishtiaq Jamil and Narendra Raj Paudel

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14 Open  Government and Freedom of Information: The Sri Lankan Experience305 Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Ashwini Natesan, and Inshira Faliq Part IV Middle East 329 15 An  Analysis of Digital Transformation in Public Organizations: The Case of the United Arab Emirates331 Abu Elias Sarker, Mohammad Habibur Rahman, and M. Rezaul Islam 16 Assessing  the Quality and Usability of Open Government Data Portals in the GCC Constituents353 Stuti Saxena and Charalampos Alexopoulos Part V Epilogue 377 17 Conclusion:  Recap and Recommendations379 Noore Alam Siddiquee and Habib Zafarullah  Correction to: Open Government and Freedom of Information: The Philippine Experience C1 Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan, and Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz Index389

Notes on Contributors

Charalampos Alexopoulos  is a senior researcher and adjunct professor in the Department of Information and Communications Systems Engineering at the University of the Aegean, teaching Smart Cities Technologies; Big, Open, and Linked Data Management; Interoperability; and Digital Governance. He is also a founding member of the Digital Government Research Center of the University of the Aegean, working on HORIZON, CEF, ERASMUS, and National funded research and pilot application projects for governments and enterprises. He is the course manager of the University of the Aegean Summer Schools on ‘Open & Collaborative Governance’ and ‘Big Data Analysis on Earth Sciences.’ Alex Bello Brillantes Jr.  is Professor Emeritus of Public Administration, former Dean of the National College of Public Administration and Governance of the University of the Philippines, and Secretary-General of the Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration. He is a member of the board of management of the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA). He has served as President of the Philippine Society for Public Administration and the Asian Association for Public Administration (AAPA). He was Executive Director of the Local Government Academy of Department of Interior and Local Government and Commissioner (Deputy Minister) of the Commission on Higher Education. He has a PhD and MA from the University of Hawaii.

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Chung-An  Chen  is an associate professor of public administration at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He serves on the editorial board of several journals such as Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, International Journal of Public Administration, Public Administration, and Public Personnel Management. His recent research interests focus on public personnel administration in East Asia. Wai  Kit  Cheng  is an engineering expert. He obtained a Bachelor of Engineering degree with Honors from the City University of Hong Kong, and Master of Engineering and Public Policy from McMaster University. Wai Kit Cheng’s research interests include public policy, governance, and management, ESG (Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance), and sustainability policy. He has partnered with the City of Burlington in refining local policy framework to stimulate renewable energy transition. Inshira Faliq  is an Attorney-at-Law and legal researcher. She is currently the Sri Lanka Program Manager for Legal Action Worldwide. Previously, she worked at the Centre for Policy Alternative as a legal researcher and a junior counsel on several fundamental rights cases. She has also worked as a legal researcher for the Ministry of Justice’s Special Committee on amending the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure Act and the Right to Information Commission of Sri Lanka (RTIC). She was also the deputy-editor for three books published featuring the work of the RTIC during 2017–2021. She completed her legal apprenticeship at the Attorney-General’s Department and holds an LLB from the University of Colombo. Kevin Fernandez  is a lecturer in the Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Political Science, Public Administration and Development Studies, University of Malaya. He is also a Fellow at the Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya. Kevin is interested in areas of research involving new media and mass mobilizations, as well as state responses to such collective actions. He is also interested in understanding non-traditional security threats that disrupt state-society relations. Hsini  Huang is an assistant professor at the Institute of Public Administration at Leiden University and an associate professor affiliated with the Department of Political Science and Graduate Institute of Public Affairs at National Taiwan University. Dr. Huang’s research interests intersect with science and technology, digital governance, innovation policy, and organization theory. In particular, she studies the initiation and

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applications of intelligent digital innovations in public organizations. She has published scholarly articles in the Research Policy, Journal of Management Studies, Government Information Quarterly, Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society, Science and Public Policy, etc. Ahmed  Shafiqul  Huque is a professor and former Chair of the Department of Political Science at McMaster University. His research and teaching interests are in public administration and management, public policy, governance and development, South Asian government and politics, and climate change. He has served as Vice President of Hong Kong Public Administration Association and Editor-in-­ Chief of the journal Public Administration and Policy. He has provided consulting services to various organizations including the Companies Registry of Hong Kong Government, United States Agency for International Development, Swedish International Development Agency, Danish International Development Agency, and Canadian Food Inspection Agency. M.  Rezaul  Islam  holds a PhD in Social Sciences from the University of Nottingham, England. He is currently a post-doctoral fellow at the Centre for Family and Child Studies, Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE.  He is a professor of Social Work, Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh. His fields of interest are climate justice, human rights, child and family studies, international migration, and community development. Ishtiaq Jamil  is a professor at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, Norway. His research interests include administrative culture, gender in development, public policy, institutional trust, representative bureaucracy, crisis management, and governance. He has co-edited and written several books, journal articles, chapters, and research reports. He has organized and coordinated several international conferences on governance, civil service, gender mainstreaming, service delivery, and public policy in South Asia. Currently, he is co-editing the Palgrave Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Public Administration in the Global South. Himanshu Jha  is an associate professor at the School of Liberal Studies, UPES, India. He previously taught in the Department of Political Science at the South Asia Institute (SAI), Heidelberg University, Germany. Jha is the author of Capturing Institutional Change: The Case of the Right to Information Act in India published by the Oxford University Press in 2020.

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Patamawadee  Jongruck (Jan)is an assistant professor in Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. She holds a PhD in Development Policy and Management (Governance) from the Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM), University of Manchester, UK.  Her research interests cover the following issues: governance, network governance, good governance, e-governance, and sustainable development. The focus of her research is particularly on Thailand and other Asian countries. Nai-Ling  Kuo  obtained her PhD in public administration and policy from the State University of New York at Albany and holds an associate professor position at the Graduate Institute of Public Affairs at National Taiwan University. Her research encompasses public budgeting, local finance, public management, and accountability. She has contributed articles to renowned journals, delving into local fiscal independence, the efficacy of participatory budgeting, and governmental financial reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. Committed to advancing knowledge in her domain, Dr Kuo is also eager to explore the application of AI within the realm of public management. Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan  is Chairperson of the Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Holy Angel University, Province of Pampanga in the Philippines. He participated in several resource-speaking engagements and availed travel opportunities in research and cultural studies. He has completed his academic requirements for his Doctor of Public Administration at the University of the Philippines, Diliman. Ashwini Natesan  is a qualified legal consultant and researcher specializing in technology, media, and communications law. She consults on technology, telecommunications, and social media law issues in Sri Lanka. Additionally, as a Research Fellow at LIRNEasia, a think tank, her focus areas have been data protection, AI Ethics, etc. She frequently works on research projects concerning right to information in Sri Lanka and is the current project lead for RTI at Sri Lanka Press Institute. She holds Master of Laws/LLM (International Business Law) from the National University of Singapore. Rajdeep  Pakanati  is a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O. P. Jindal Global University, India. His research interests lie in Comparative Politics, International Relations, and International Law. He

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teaches courses on transparency and accountability; India and China in International History; Films and International Relations, among others. Narendra Raj Paudel  is an associate professor at the Central Department of Public Administration, Public Administration Campus, Tribhuvan University of Nepal. He has research interest in policy implementation, civil service reform, inclusion, administrative culture, trust, and other cross-cutting public administration issues. He has contributed articles and book chapters in peer-reviewed journals and edited volumes. Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena  is Commissioner at the Right to Information Commission in Sri Lanka (2017–2023) and legal columnist for The Sunday Times (Colombo). A constitutional/public law practitioner, she has been at the forefront of drafting Sri Lanka’s right to information and contempt of court laws. A 2013 Distinguished Visitor, Australian National University (ANU, Canberra), Visiting Delegate, Rockefeller Foundation (Italy), Scholar of Peace, WISCOMP (New Delhi), and Salzburg Fellow (Austria), she has consulted/advised the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), the Institute for Commonwealth Studies (ICwS), the World Bank, the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, and the Dignity Institute, Denmark. Her several books include Rule of Law in Decline (Copenhagen, 2009), Still Seeking Justice (Geneva-Bangkok, 2010), and Embattled Media (India-­London, 2015). Md. Fazle Rabbi  is a civil servant in Bangladesh. Currently, he is serving as a director of the Institute of Public Finance, Bangladesh. His research interests include civil service reforms, public policy, governance, leadership, and ethics. Mohammad Habibur Rahman  is currently a non-resident research fellow at the Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government in Dubai, UAE, and a part-time professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. Dr Rahman is also a research affiliate with the Centre on Governance at the University of Ottawa. He received his PhD from Swansea University, UK, and later held two visiting positions, as Senior Fulbright Scholar at Maxwell School of Syracuse University in USA and Visiting Fellow at York Centre for Asian Research of York University in Canada. He has published papers on governance, administrative reforms, local government, human resource management, e-government, and knowledge sharing.

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Jeannine  E.  Relly  is a professor at the University of Arizona whose research focuses on government information policy and democratic institutions, including freedom of expression and access to public information in countries that often are in conflict, post-conflict, or in political or economic transition. Three of her most recent projects have focused on collective action and the influence of global networks or social movements on access to public information. She also has a line of research focused on formal and informal institutions related to democratic governance, including issues related to public corruption, whistleblower protection, and disinformation. Karl  Emmanuel  V.  Ruiz  graduated with a Bachelor of Library and Information Science degree from the University of Santo Tomas in 2015 (Benavides Outstanding Achievement awardee). He ranked 1st in the Librarians’ Licensure Examination, 2016 and is doing a Master of Library and Information Science in the School of Library and Information Studies, UP Diliman. He is a librarian at the UP National College of Public Administration and Governance. He has co-authored articles like ‘Public administration in the Philippines’ (Edward Elgar), ‘Good practices in collaborative governance’ (Korea), and ‘Public policy should shape what endemic means.’ Meghna Sabharwal  is a professor in the public and nonprofit management program at the University of Texas at Dallas. Her research is focused on public human resources management, specifically diversity, equity, and inclusion. She has published three books and over 70 peer-reviewed journal articles and chapters and is the winner of five best paper awards. She serves on editorial boards of leading journals and is the Associate Editor of the Review of Public Personnel Administration and Public Integrity. Abu  Elias  Sarker is an associate professor in the Department of Management, University of Sharjah, UAE. He received his PhD in Public Administration from the University of Liverpool in 1991. He has researched and published articles on public management reforms, governance, accountability, decentralization, and local government in reputed and refereed international journals. Stuti  Saxena  follows Open Government Data (OGD) as her research theme. She delves into the domain of political science, and works on the intersections of government and information technology. She has been associated with the Graphic Era University, Dehradun, in the Department

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of Humanities and Social Sciences (HSS) where she engages in dyadic conversations with students. Noore Alam Siddiquee  is a professor at the Graduate School of Public Policy (GSPP), Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan. He has extensive experience in teaching, research, and academic administration having served for over 30  years in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Brunei, and Australia before joining the GSPP in 2023. His research broadly focuses on public management and institutional changes in developing countries, assessing impacts of contemporary reforms on governance and service delivery. He has published widely, including two books, 21 chapters in edited volumes, and 63 articles in international journals. Kuppusamy  Singaravelloo joined the Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, in 1992. He also served as Acting Director and Deputy Director (Academic) at UM Centre for Continuing Education (UMCCed) and twice as Head of Department at the faculty. His research interests are on privatization, public enterprises, local government, housing, and education. He has consultancy experience in management, finance, and implementation as well as economic base in numerous Local Plans and Structure Plans in Malaysia since 1993. His retirement as associate professor in 2022 led him to focus on social impact assessment in various infrastructure projects both as consultant and panel member. Tsai-Tsu Su  is a joint professor at National Taiwan University’s Graduate Institute of Public Affairs (GIPA) and the Department of Political Science (DPS). She has served in various leadership roles, including Chair of GIPA, DPS, and President of the Taiwan Association for Schools of Public Administration and Affairs. Dr. Su’s research interests include public budgeting, governance, and policy analysis. She has published in prestigious journals such as JPAM, AJPS, and APSR.  She has also advised several Taiwanese government agencies. Dr Su earned her PhD from Carnegie Mellon University and has taught at National Taiwan University since 1991. Chengwei  Xu  is an assistant professor in the Public Management and Policy Analysis Program, International University of Japan (IUJ), Japan. Before joining IUJ, he was a research fellow at the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Dr Xu’s research primarily focuses on behavioral public administration, public governance, and regional economic cooperation. He published in several international journals such as Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration,

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International Review of Administrative Science, Public Performance and Management Review, and Public Personnel Management. Habib Zafarullah  is an adjunct faculty at the University of New England, Australia, where he served as Chair of the Public Policy Program. He was previously a professor of Public Administration at Dhaka University, Bangladesh. His research interests include democratic governance, public policy, public administration, and international development. He has published extensively in these areas. His recent books include: Handbook of Development Policy (2021), Colonial Bureaucracies (2014), and Managing Development in a Globalized World (2012). He is the Founding President of the South Asian Network for Public Administration (SANPA) and Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Governance, Security & Development. Zhibin Zhang  is a senior lecturer in Public Administration at the College of Business, Government and Law, Flinders University. His research interests focus on comparative government-nonprofit relations, comparative public administration/policy, and Chinese governance. Before joining Flinders University, he taught at Nanyang Technological University. He obtained his PhD from George Washington University.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

The Philippine FOI website. (Source: Philippines FOI website. https://www.foi.gov.ph/)81 Fig. 4.2 The Philippine Statistics Authority’s Open Stat. (Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Open Stat. https://openstat. psa.gov.ph/)89 Fig. 4.3 The full disclosure portal of the Department of Interior and Local Government. (Source: Full Disclosure Portal. https:// fdpp.dilg.gov.ph/)90 Fig. 4.4 Public Sector Reform Framework. (Source: Brillantes, 2021 (The Framework was from a contributed chapter of Brillantes (2021) in a UN report entitled Changing Mindsets to Realise the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: How to promote new mindsets and behaviours in public institutions to implement the Sustainable Development Goals, which was adapted from Brillantes and Fernandez (2010) and Brillantes and PeranteCalina (2018))) 93 Fig. 7.1 Number of complaints and appeals, 2000–2020. (Source: Author’s compilation (Thailand Official Information Commission (OIC): http://www.oic.go.th/web2017/en/ stat.htm))153 Fig. 7.2 Thailand’s Corruption Perception Index—Score and Ranking, 2012–2021. (Source: Author’s compilation (Transparency International: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021)) 159 Fig. 10.1 The assessment framework of open government 212

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List of Figures

Fig. 10.2

Government information disclosures in response to requests per State Council agency, 2008–18. (Source: Duan et al., 2020) Fig. 11.1 RTI continuum Fig. 11.2 Use of the RTIA by above poverty level (APL) and below poverty level (BPL)

221 240 250

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 4.1 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 8.5 Table 8.6 Table 8.7 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 10.3 Table 10.4 Table 10.5 Table 11.1 Table 13.1 Table 13.2 Table 13.3

World governance indicators 30 Open government global rankings and scores 32 Global open data index 33 Global right to information 37 List of Philippine transparency laws 84 Thailand’s ranking in open government indexes 157 Descriptive analysis of perceived government openness (GO) 171 Descriptive analysis of trust in government 172 Descriptive analysis of smart nation initiatives in Singapore 173 Correlation analysis 174 Regression analysis 175 Variables and scale items 179 A descriptive analysis of trust in authorities (N = 2012)180 Right to information in selected Asian countries 198 Open Government Index in Southeast Asia 199 The chronology of open government in China 211 The development of government transparency, 2010–18 217 Public participation in OGI 220 OGI administrative reviews and outcomes, 2019–21 223 OGI administrative litigations and outcomes, 2019–21 225 Summary of the responses of interviewees 243 Descriptive statistics of socio-demographic variables 292 Development of democratic governance in Nepal as perceived by citizens 293 Determinants (independent variables) of democratic governance as perceived by citizens (Survey items, coding, and variable name) 294 xxv

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List of Tables

Table 13.4 Table 15.1 Table 15.2 Table 15.3 Table 15.4 Table 16.1 Table 16.2 Table 16.3 Table 16.4 Table 16.5 Table 16.6 Table 16.7 Table 16.8

Regression models of development of democratic governance in Nepal (standardized beta coefficients) 299 The UAE strategy for government digital transformation 2021–2025339 Current digital and open government initiatives in the UAE 343 The UAE’s rank in the UN E-Government Survey (EGDI) 344 GovTech maturity index and component scores for the United Arab Emirates, 2020 345 Extant literature on OGD initiatives of the GCC 357 Saudi Arabia’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)360 Kuwait’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)361 UAE’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)363 Oman’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)364 Bahrain’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)365 Qatar’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks)367 Accumulative findings from national OGD portals of the GCC constituents 368

PART I

Prologue

CHAPTER 1

Open Government and Freedom of Information: Parameters and Determinants—An Introduction Habib Zafarullah and Noore Alam Siddiquee

A popular government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both. James Madison (1832)

Introduction The origins of democracy and citizen participation can be traced to antiquity, such as in Greece in the fifth century B.C. Ancient Athens exemplified a model of democracy in which citizens participated directly in H. Zafarullah (*) University of New England, Armidale, Australia e-mail: [email protected] N. A. Siddiquee Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_1

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decision-making. Politically, it underscored the primacy of the ‘consent of the governed’—shorthand for a government’s legitimacy and exercise of authority derived from the people it serves. Over time, notable thinkers— Plato (1997), Rousseau (1895), de Tocqueville (2002), Marx and Engels (1848)—advanced ideas that rulers who are open and transparent in their acts serve society’s best interests, with individuals playing an active role in the political process. John Stuart Mill (1859: 15) emphasized citizens’ ‘free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and participation’, while Karl Popper (1945) asserted that open societies are indispensable for advancing human civilization. Indubitably, transparency and accountability are central to maintaining democratic governance, and the state in such societies is expected to reflect this commitment. People’s input in public affairs is crucial, and a healthy policymaking process can benefit from open, informed dialogue based on their critical thinking (Olson, 1971). James Madison, the fourth president of the United States, was steadfast in his belief that it was wrong for a government to shield its citizens from its actions. The ‘advancement and diffusion of knowledge’ is the only Guardian of true liberty,1 be asserted. In 1830, the British philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1830, in Rosen, 1983) advocated for full disclosure of all government operations and removing all secrecy. In his seminal work, On Liberty, Mill argued that free speech and open information were necessary for a functional democracy. He said that if people are stifled in their ability to speak their minds, they would be unable to make informed judgments or hold their government to account. US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1913) argued that public accountability and corruption prevention required a high degree of transparency. He wrote: ‘Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants…’ Thus, from Plato to latter-day thinkers, openness, responsibility, and fairness in executive, legislative, and judicial operations were regarded as critical for establishing a just and equitable society, and democratic governance was the best route toward that goal. Indeed, its relationship with open government (OG) has been a subject of academic discourse over the years. Both ideas are intrinsically linked, with democratic governance promoting OG that supports the other. While the former emphasizes 1  Letter from James Madison to George Thomson (June 30, 1825) (on file with The James Madison Papers, 1723–1859 at The Library of Congress). http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/ mjm.21_0205_0206

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transparency, accountability, and participation in decision-making processes, OG combines these values with technology and information to improve government openness, collaboration, and citizen engagement. Although democracy has been practiced for a long time worldwide, democratic governance is a newer concept gaining ground in the 1970s. It marked a departure from the old ways of running a state in favour of one in which the government is more in tune with citizens’ needs and preferences: the shift from government—centralized structures making decisions and enforcing policies, to governance—an approach that is more open to input from a variety of stakeholders and institutions. It can also be seen as a transition from governmentalism or statism—government playing the dominant role in society, regulating and controlling various aspects of social and economic life, to governability—the capacity of a government to effectively govern and manage society, making and enforcing policies and addressing the needs and concerns of citizens. While governmentalism rests on an ideological pedestal, governability is a practical concept that evaluates how well a government runs a country (Mayntz, 1993; Cudworth, 2007). In both contexts, governments have been criticized for being too secretive and not accountable enough. The OG concept thus emerged as a response to this criticism, with many countries making efforts to become more transparent and inclusive. One crucial aspect of OG is freedom of information (FOI), which enables citizens to access government-held information and hold their representatives accountable. In recent times, its significance has been heightened by global issues, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change, and a government’s response and accountability for its actions. This chapter aims to introduce the book’s two main themes—OG and FOI and what they connote. It explores the dimensions and determinants of OG and how these are interlinked with FOI, which is a fundamental human right and a necessary component of a functioning democracy. Indeed, FOI is the lynchpin of OG.

Explaining Open Government As noted above, the OG idea has deep roots but was not widely recognized until the twentieth century, and since then, it has continued to be refined and expanded. To put it plainly, OG is a complex arrangement in which a state’s operations are not shrouded in secrecy. When it comes to public policies, decisions, or governmental actions that impact people’s

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lives, it is imperative that the state maintains open communication with citizens. This gives them a legitimate way to access the information and data they require for personal use or for the communities they represent. The famous statement, ‘Democracies die behind closed doors’ that Judge Damon J.  Keith made in 2002 was an insightful recognition of OG (Chabrava, 2012). It underlined the value of democracy and that it is reliant on the visibility of state actions, with citizens recognizing that those in power are serving the interests of those they represent. The delicate balance between the state and its citizens can be tipped by unchecked political power resulting from the misuse of information. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) emphasized the relevance of the democratic will of the people in guiding government policy (UNGA, 1948). Openness assists in ennobling public trust, adding to the legitimacy of governmental policy, and enhancing democracy itself. Trust in government and public institutions is higher in countries with higher levels of transparency and accountability (Kaufmann et  al., 2005). Openness improves the credibility of public policies and the effectiveness of decision-­ making processes (OECD, 2017; Tydd, 2018). A functioning democracy needs transparency for citizens to hold their government accountable and make informed decisions about the implications of public policies. None can participate meaningfully in public life unless they thoroughly understand the many means by which the government exerts its authority. Access to public information can also assist citizens in monitoring government activities and acquiring the knowledge necessary to hold public officials accountable. An OG regime can help citizens organize themselves more effectively to make their participation in public life more meaningful, connecting them with fellow citizens and groups who share their interests and concerns, empowering them to take a stand against corruption and compelling government action on the issue. Deliberative, collaborative, and participatory approaches to solving complex societal problems could flourish in an OG setting. Besides, OG strategies improve public officials’ efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness and provide citizens a platform to share their views, offer feedback, and interact and collaborate with public officials (OECD, 2017; UN, 2016). Democratic governance and OG reinforce one another. OG initiatives help promote democratic values and ensure citizens voice in state affairs. One theoretical framework that can be used to understand the relationship between democracy and OG is the concept of deliberative democracy,

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which emphasizes the importance of informed and inclusive public deliberation in democratic decision-making processes. This suggests that OG, particularly the provision of accessible and accurate information, is essential for creating a well-informed public and promoting meaningful public deliberation leading to enhanced public trust in government institutions and better policy outcomes (Cohen, 1989; Mansbridge, 1999). Essentially, OG initiatives can promote more collaborative forms of governance to drive improved citizen-centric service delivery outcomes (OGP, 2021). Ansell and Gash (2008, 561) argue that collaborative governance can ‘avoid the high costs of adversarial policy making, expand democratic participation, and even restore rationality to public management.’ A more transparent government can help the economy grow by encouraging risk-taking and groundbreaking thinking. OG data can aid in achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and inspiring innovation and entrepreneurship among people and collectives and, more importantly, fostering employment opportunities (Meuleman et  al., 2022; UNDP, 2022; World Bank, 2018). Human rights can be protected and advanced by an OG framework focusing on inclusivity, equality and nondiscrimination, accountability, justice and, of course, transparency. The practice of deliberative democracy would increase political awareness and participation and build a society more capable of upholding human rights. The right mechanisms are necessary to counter human rights abuses by both state and non-state actors (Nino, 1996). Government actions and decisions must be open, inclusive, and accountable, and provide access to justice if human rights are to be upheld. Public consultations, town hall meetings, and other forms of citizen engagement allow citizens to provide valuable insights and constructive feedback, ensuring policies and decisions comply with human rights standards. Human rights abuses can be reduced when public officials face consequences for their actions. The right to seek redress for human rights violations and the availability of the legal system are both bolstered by an OG arrangement that can provide opportunities for effective legal aid, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and other forms of assistance. Human rights are respected, protected, and enforced when the rule of law exists. It should be noted, however, that applying the rule of law necessitates a rigorous elaboration of a country’s human rights approach; otherwise, it will be ineffectual (Zolo, 2007). OG is governed by an information regime (IG) based on a legal framework that includes laws, regulations, policies, strategies, and relevant

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instruments that promote transparency, accountability, and citizen participation. IG establishes standards for data collection, storage, processing, sharing, and protection; it also guarantees that data used for decision-­ making and accountability is easily accessible and is accurate, complete, and au courant. It specifies the roles, responsibilities and practices for managing information and gives citizens and groups the means to access the data they require to make informed judgments (Smallwood, 2019; OECD, 2019). Effective information governance is a prerequisite to protecting fundamental freedoms and attaining the SDGs (UN, 2016). OG can work towards its goals if the IG is supported by a robust civil society advocating and monitoring government openness and an engaged citizenry. However, citizens cannot participate in public life without a thorough understanding of the many ways in which their government exerts control. OG entails creating a civic space for citizens to become acquainted with regulatory practices by gaining access to public information, participating in decision-making processes, and making informed decisions for themselves. Citizens can stand strongly against bureaucratic excesses and anything contrary to public integrity by effectively organizing themselves in public life. The right to information (RTI) can aid in this endeavour. It is a fundamental democratic right to give individuals access to information held by public bodies or private entities that perform a public function. If people are unaware of what is going on in their society, if the acts of those in power are disguised, they will be unable to participate meaningfully in the affairs of that society. Knowledge is hugely vital to democratic processes, and information is ‘the oxygen of democracy’ (Article 19, 1999: 1). FOI/RTI is the principal bedrock of OG and, thus, a crucial feature of democratic governance because of its specific application in enforcing transparency and accountability. The United Nations heralded it as ‘a fundamental human right and… the touchstone of all freedoms’ and was incorporated in the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which implied people’s ‘right to freedom of opinion and expression … and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers’ (UNGA, 1946: clause 59[1], 1948: Article 19). Other regional and international instruments, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights endorse FOI.

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The Pivotal Elements of Open Government The agency and potential of OG to achieve its goals are predicated on several key elements: transparency, accountability, participation, collaboration, inclusive policymaking, and technology (Fung & Weil, 2010; Birkinshaw, 2006; Pollitt, 2003; UNESCO, 2015; ADB, 2016; Alderete, 2018). Together, these elements strengthen the democratic system, hold government agencies accountable for their actions, ensure public trust in the government, and prevent corruption in the bureaucracy. A more expansive construal of OG posits that its underlying structure and methodology ensure that individuals are equipped to make well-informed choices that result in worthwhile outcomes (Bergström & Ruotsi, 2018). Constitutional protections or specific laws are necessary to enforce citizens’ rights to access government data effectively. Aside from the obvious exceptions (viz., classified information relating to national security and intelligence, defence data, citizen’s privacy matters, and commercial confidentiality), OG demands that the public have access to accurate information on a wide range of government actions. Transparency As indicated, transparency is synonymous with OG for its crucial function in promoting accountability, establishing good governance in various spheres of society, and building trust between the government and the public. Miscommunication, mismanagement, corruption, and a lack of oversight in public administration can be mitigated by making government operations more open and accessible to the public. Transparency will make the legislative and executive decision-making processes more intelligible to the general public (Birkinshaw, 2006). Pollitt (2003) notes that transparency has both normative and mechanistic elements attached to it. Normatively, transparency is about promoting good governance and accountability. Mechanistically, transparency involves providing information to the public about the operations of the government and its decision-making processes. Citizens’ access to information for their own purposes is essential, but so is information about how their government works and how social policies impact them (Roberts, 2006a). Through open public communication and proactive disclosure of information by government agencies about their objectives and operations, the public interest can be served, and public good attained for society.

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Ultimately, it is up to public agencies to defend their decisions (Goetz & Jenkins, 2005). Both OG and FOI rely on freely available and straightforward access to information. However, access and analysis would be facilitated if data were available in open data formats (McInerney & Ghose, 2013). While transparency is crucial to OG functioning and promoting democratic participation, it can also lead to individual privacy and security fears. Some worry that too much openness will cause private information to leak, which could negatively impact both individuals and institutions (Jonas & Harper, 2010). Public officials and the administrative system could buckle under too much scrutiny, resulting in subpar work and lower productivity. Also, as Hood (2006) warned, rather than generating more openness in government, efforts to increase transparency typically might result in consolidating control over the flow of information. Accountability The role of transparency in facilitating accountability in governance, though critical, is a contested issue. Although transparency can help citizens learn more about government operations, it is unclear whether it will help hold public officials accountable or improve governance. It has been argued that public participation, oversight, and transparency are essential for ensuring accountability and good governance (O’Donnell, 2008). Furthermore, although transparency is commonly regarded as a universal principle, its efficacy may differ depending on the political and cultural setting in which it is put into practice. Transparency’s ability to incentivize accountability and good governance may be diminished in countries with poorly developed legal systems and widespread corruption (Kraft & Vigoda-Gadot, 2017). Accountability is a difficult and nuanced task, especially in highly bureaucratic or fragile democracies. It is ‘a pro-active process by which public officials inform about and justify their plans of action, their behavior…’ (Ackerman, 2005: 1). The accountability mechanisms to offset administrative inefficiency and failures mean that bureaucracies, despite their size and influence, are not immune to political and even social pressure (Smith, 2009). The democratic demand of citizens to access and extract information from inherently conservative, cautious, and restrictive bureaucracies is an effective means of keeping state institutions under

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surveillance and accountable for their decisions and actions. Citizens own information; the government merely acts as a custodian (Calland & Bentley, 2013). Participation Apart from increasing transparency and accountability and improving policy outcomes, open government relies on the active participation of all relevant parties. Network and collaborative structures to drive effective citizen and stakeholder engagement is a potent way to effectively address democratic and citizenship deficits that can destabilize a polity (Nabatchi, 2012). For effective stakeholder participation, a shift in the traditional power dynamics between government and citizens needs to be complemented by a systemic and collaborative approach to governance that includes multiple actors in and out of government. Collaboration, along with public participation, promotes openness and restores trust in government (Obama, 2009). These facilitate cooperative decision-making among various parties, including public and non-government organizations (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Collaboration paves the way for citizens to participate in data collection, analysis, and measurement, all of which can improve the efficiency of public programs (Noveck, 2010). This dynamic phenomenon can manifest in a variety of ways, such as co-creation (service providers working together with users to create new values, new services, and improve performance), co-production (as in service delivery in consultation with recipients), and circular subsidiarity (the interaction, provision, and management of services between government agencies and non-­ government organizations) (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004; De Blasio & Sorice, 2016; Becchetti et al., 2019). The non-governmental sector, academia, professional bodies, and the media can all play important roles in enforcing accountability (Forrer et al., 2014). Members of the public engage in ‘a distinctive and consciously adopted role’ while ‘interacting and debating’ in the open (Holmes, 2011: 3). Citizen-generated data or input from the field is invaluable for efficient and open operations of the government, especially the delivery of public services. Informational asymmetries can be mitigated through the government’s on-demand or proactive data dissemination (Stiglitz, 2002). Co-production boosts citizen engagement and enhances better public service outcomes in the OG context as service users and other stakeholders collaborate on planning, implementing, and assessing public service delivery. Citizens and communities can make a difference in outcomes and

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public value by encouraging collaboration between professionals and the public through creative problem-solving and social innovation. Similarly, co-creation is the collaborative ideation of concepts, products, or services amongst many stakeholders, frequently including end users or customers (Bovaird & Loeffler, 2012; Boyle & Harris, 2009; Brandsen & Honingh, 2016). Inclusive Policies An inclusive approach is required in designing laws, policies, and strategies for putting OG and FOI into practice. To ensure that policies are just, equitable, and efficient, inclusive policymaking requires a larger voice from all interested parties, including those historically excluded from state power, such as marginalized and underrepresented groups (UNESCO, 2015). Government institutional practices instilling an inclusive perspective will positively impact social interaction (UNDP, 2002). The policymaking process will move in a more inclusive direction if there is openness, opportunity, and cooperation. The credibility, validity, and acceptance of policies in society and beyond increase as transparency and participation deepen. Only inclusive policymaking (information-based, evidence-driven, and citizen-centred) can be sensitive to the diverse views and demands generated in the policy environment (Zafarullah & Huque, 2012; Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). When underrepresented groups have a voice in policymaking, they increase the likelihood that solutions will be developed to tackle the underlying issues that lead to inequality. In turn, this can aid in fostering growth that is both sustainable and equitable. Such policies can be the product of discursive articulations. As has been argued, ‘inclusive policies are often developed and implemented by people with historical, cultural and psychological biases that influence the terms of inclusion and exclusion’ (Kurian & Singh, 2020: 306). The incorporation of diverse perspectives in policymaking can be a critical factor for stimulating innovative approaches to problem-solving. With a broader range of opinions and experiences represented, more creative solutions to difficult social and economic problems can be developed. OG will lose its character if devoid of inclusive policies influencing its operations. OG can serve as the framework to deliver inclusive policies addressing interlinkages among SDGs. With an emphasis on administrative practices, methods, capacities, financial arrangements, and resources, the integration

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will encourage institutions at all levels to collaborate on interconnected inclusion issues and engage non-state stakeholders (including the marginalized) in policymaking (UNDESA, 2018). Technology The world today represents a global communications network with advancing technology and information systems playing a pivotal role in connecting the state to its citizens, disseminating knowledge and cumulating ideas, feeding inputs to policy development and appraisal, enhancing productivity and competitiveness in the economy, influencing the public sector’s norms, procedures, and outputs, enabling political communication and deliberation and, last but not least, empowering communities (Chadwick, 2006; Shfane, 2004; Andrews et  al., 2015; Garson, 2006). Technology has been a game changer in fostering these values when applied to the OG and FOI principles. The proliferation of digital tools has made it simpler to store, retrieve, manipulate, transmit, and receive analogue and digital data relevant to government operations and society (ADB, 2016). The advent of information and communications technology (ICT) and the spread of Internet service providers have benefited many people, especially those on the margins of society, by making information widely available at low cost. FOI/RTI schemes have been making good use of ICT. It is the cornerstone of e-government, which is revolutionizing traditional administration by providing various public services online using dedicated infrastructure and procedures. It can increase public trust in government, reduce wasteful spending, and boost citizen participation and productivity. It has eliminated the need for people to visit government offices physically, wait in long queues, or pay bribes to obtain the necessary information. Citizens can have a voice in government at all levels through e-­participation because it facilitates two-way communication between them and public officials. ICT-enabled citizen-government engagement—information dissemination, consultation and participation—enhances the credibility of public policies and their acceptance in society (OECD, 2003). From the perspective of a developing country, e-government using both formal and informal networks create opportunities for pro-poor development projects at the local level to empower individuals and communities and increase choice (Holliday, 2006). Community-based delivery methods can be expanded using ICT by local governments operating

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within a decentralized structure (Von Haldenwang, 2004; World Bank, 2004). Performing transactions online via publicly available Internet portals can reduce costs, increase accountability via data logs, and boost productivity. These have the potential to reduce paperasserie, saving time and resources and, thus, bolstering bureaucratic efficiency. Constant access to government information benefits users (World Bank, 2002; West, 2005). On the flip side, the expansion of ICT has resulted in a digital divide, creating discrepancy between those people and places that have easy access to its advanced capabilities and those that do not or use related tools sparingly (Ragnedda & Muschert, 2013). Injudicious application of e-­ government regulations ‘can take away freedom, invade privacy, or endanger cherished social objectives’ (West, 2005: 117). The application of FOI/RTI law will then become meaningless. Thus, digital inclusion and individual privacy protection should be reinforced in OG schemes. Digitalization broadens e-government by shifting the focus of the public sector away from just efficiency and toward open, collaborative, and innovative administration. It allows public organizations to implement digital and data strategies for user-driven, proactive public service delivery (OECD, 2020). E-government cannot be fully operationalized in the absence of Open Government Data (OGD) for online activities that are transparent and citizen-friendly. OGD is based on the idea that certain forms of information should be free from legal constraints like copyright, patents, censorship, and so on. Individuals, corporate sector organizations, and nonprofits can use open data to get insights and build new goods and services (Bertot et al., 2014). It can assist the public in understanding what the government does, and how well it operates, and hold it accountable for wrongdoings or unmet goals (Ubaldi, 2013). OGD can generate real-time innovative solutions to problems in the social, development and business sectors. Given that manual computing of big data is onerous and troublesome, there is need for infrastructure to store and share data, capacity to process large datasets and transmitting and receiving data in machine-readable formats (Bertot et  al., 2014; Ubaldi, 2013). Integration and innovation in public service delivery can result from the use of data analytics and technological tools in evidence-­ based policymaking and service design (OECD, undated). OGD are to be collected at source and must be complete. These should be quickly and freely available and accessible to the broadest range of users for a variety of

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purposes. To facilitate machine processing, these are to be structured and reusable, published using open standards, cannot be discriminatory, and no entity should be in exclusive control. OGD should be timely and comprehensive, comparable and interoperable, usable for inclusive development, license-free and obtainable by anyone without applying or registering (ODC, 2015; Ubaldi, 2013). Citizens depend on government portals and websites helping them make informed decisions and choices, but their engagement with these may suffer from poor information quality (Detlor et al., 2013; Kaisara & Pather, 2011). Open Government Partnership The Open Government Partnership (OGP), founded in 2011, is a global coalition of governments and civil society organizations (CSOs) working together to increase government openness, accountability, citizen engagement, technology and innovation. Each member state is obligated to take the initiative to create and implement new measures to increase transparency in government. This unique collaborative approach has successfully advanced OG reforms in several countries. One of its defining characteristics is the extensive backing it has received from political leaders (OGP, 2023). It is built on the rationale that ‘[i]ncreased openness improves governments’ own legitimacy by building long-term trust among public institutions, government officials, and the citizenry at large’ (Lindroth, 2016: 2). One of the priority areas of OGP is ensuring effective digital governance, which covers, among other things, digital inclusion, the protection of digital rights and privacy, the preservation of online civic space, and the accountability of automated decision-making tools (OGP, 2021).

Exploring Freedom of Information A new relationship between the state and citizens ushered in the Enlightenment era, emphasizing individual rights and governance transparency. Sweden was the first country to enact legislation ensuring public access to government information. However, the idea gained worldwide attention much later, in 1946, with the ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (UNGA, 1948: Article 19). While the UN was upfront on the issue, most states did not initially regard freedom of information as a human right, and it took nearly half a century for the RTI movement to gain momentum (Birkinshaw, 2006). It was fuelled by rising public

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expectations for transparency, accountability and integrity in government in line with the essence of democratic governance. By expanding citizens’ access to public records, FOI/RTI aims to strengthen democratic norms and institutions and make representative government more effective. Also, technological advancements achieved by that time had made it simpler to process and share information. Today, freedom of and the right to information is recognized as a basic right in exercising free speech, applying the rule of law, trust building, and combatting corruption. This right is being codified into and guaranteed by law in both developed and developing democracies, and the veil of secrecy that once surrounded government operations is slowly being lifted. Information access is recognized as a key enabler in attaining the SDGs (UNESCO, 2022). Aside from establishing a right to access information held by public authorities, FOI/RTI laws also provide procedures for requesting information and specify criteria for exempting specific types of information from disclosure. The structure of FOI laws also contains procedures for review and appeal, which allow anyone to dispute decisions to withhold information. Proactive disclosure of information (including information on policies, decisions, and activities) as a matter of course by government agencies in the public interest is critical in the OG arrangement. Making information available to the public without the need for a specific request is the supply side of the FOI/RTI process. On the demand side, citizens are permitted to request information from government agencies, which are obligated by law to provide (Article 19, 2012). Maintaining parity between the FOI/RTI system’s supply and demand sides is a complex task that must be carefully pursued. The availability of resources, the complexity and sensitivity of the information can affect the supply side. Simultaneously, it is imperative to refrain from imposing superfluous bureaucratic procedures or exorbitant charges on the populace for obtaining information that has not been disclosed proactively. Many variables affect RTI’s efficacy and may dampen or prevent its positive impact. The undeniable fundamental right can be undermined by censorship, manipulation, or information distortions, which can impact negatively on deliberative democracy (Adu, 2018; Whitehead, 2008; Blevins, 2014). Taking cues from the British experience, Roberts (2006b) argues that FOI primarily serves as an instrument to regulate the competition for authority over government data. The resolution of this conflict remains elusive, and the significance of grievances regarding governmental secrecy persists.

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There are four key components to consider when appraising a country’s RTI system (UNDP, 2006): (i) information access legal framework (constitutional provision; specific law and regulations, and administrative procedures); (ii) the implementation process and its outcome (implementing agencies and procedures, monitoring and evaluation, and administrative and technical capacity); (iii) the modalities of using RTI by citizens and group (access procedures, fees and charges, request processing, feedback and appeal, use of ICT); and (iv) access to and use of information by marginalized segments of the population (opportunities for women, minorities and the underprivileged to make use of RTI, the role of civil society groups). Effective FOI/RTI regimes, while striving to promote transparency and accountability in government institutions, face several limitations and challenges. Balancing the public’s right to access information with the need to safeguard national security, personal privacy, and other interests is an integral part of managing them, but it can be difficult. Also, the legal framework for accessing and using information may not always be definitive and instructive. Incoherent rules and their application are likely to undermine the very purpose of information freedom and may work against accountability. It is not uncommon for administrative processes to be difficult to navigate due to factors such as red tape, lack of resources, and pointless obfuscation. FOI/RTI requests may take longer than the statutory time frame, making the documents almost irrelevant by the time they are released. Managing the high volume of complaints can be difficult for regulatory bodies due to chronic understaffing. Their inability to conduct scientific monitoring and evaluation may be attributed to a lack of capacity needed to employ state-of-the-art technology. The access procedures need continued streamlining based on feedback from information seekers and the outcome of appeals against improper or incomplete responses to requests. There must be a constructive relationship between information, secrecy and security for governance to have any meaningful impact on society. Overbearing political meddling and impertinent bureaucratic resistance could destroy this relationship (Roberts, 2006a). In many former colonies, the colonial mentality of withholding information from the citizenry to deflect criticism persists (Gopal, 2012).

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Open Government and Bureaucracy In a democracy, different individuals or groups have, in varying degrees, some stake in the public information regime in terms of information gathering, storage, retrieval and dissemination. It is a collaborative endeavour with input from several entities—the bureaucracy, civil society, the business sector, and the public. According to Max Weber, a bureaucracy exemplified the purest form of legal-rational administration and was a nearly indispensable feature of modernity (Weber, 1978) but, as Michel Crozier (1964) noted, because of their innate self-interest, bureaucrats may prioritize their own aims over those of the public good. In developing nations, the bureaucracy, with a monopoly over knowledge and possessed of technical and professional expertise, is a massive repository of information and has the upper hand in managing government and influencing decision-­ making (Smith, 2009). However, OG will suffer if information is totally controlled and unreasonably used by the bureaucracy. As Weber (1946: 233) remarked, ‘The concept of the “official secret” is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this attitude…’. Joseph Stiglitz (2002: 28) warned that information inequality can give officials even more power and push them ‘to pursue policies that are more in their interests than in the interests of the citizens’ and unless the rules governing the flow of and access to information are controlled, bureaucratic excesses will increase, endangering the OG’s rationale. A bureaucracy that is too pervasive and intrusive can subvert the principles on which democratic governance stands. Public officials may put their own or those of their constituents’ ahead of the public interest leading to subversive behavior, such as corruption and abuse of power. Attempts to initiate change in bureaucratic structures and processes sometimes run into resistance from the bureaucracy (Roberts, 2006a). In many developing countries, policy or program implementation can be stymied by bureaucratic noncompliance to political intents (Grindle & Thomas, 1991). It is imperative for a bureaucracy not only to be committed to and competent in carrying out the necessary monitoring and enforcement of laws relating to OG and FOI, but also to be an active stakeholder in upholding democratic practices, professionalism and ethical behavior in government. When government officials are reticent to help the public, it can be challenging for members of the public to navigate the bureaucratic maze. Although bureaucratic formalism or excessive

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adherence to rules and procedures can promote objectivity, consistency, fairness, and accountability rather than subjective biases and preferences, it may also stifle efficiency, creativity, and sound practical judgment. Successful bureaucracies balance rigidity and responsiveness to unique situations and people. An overwhelming bureaucracy can lead to a lack of innovation and responsiveness to changing circumstances, essential to operationalizing OG. Also, if the bureaucracy becomes all-powerful and the public is forced to comply with its rules and regulations without any meaningful input into decision-making processes, accountability, inefficiency and integrity problems may arise (Rosenbloom et  al.,  2022; Hood, 1991). Thus, for OG and FOI to provide positive outcomes, the bureaucracy needs to be less intrusive in individual and public decision-making, enforce rules and regulations judiciously and be empathically citizen-centric.

Conclusion Numerous reform initiatives have been implemented globally with the objective of optimising the efficiency, effectiveness and overall performance of government institutions. The OG movement has gained significant traction and is associated with multiple values and benefits. It is widely regarded as a prop of good governance and a mechanism to combat corruption and improve the performance of public institutions by fostering transparency, accountability, and responsible administration. The phenomenon has attained worldwide scope and has garnered substantial backing from diverse groups, such as academics and the research community, influential political leaders, global organisations, and think tanks. The Asian region is no exception to this trend. Governments and policymakers in the region have shown increasing interest in OG, as reflected in the rising number of initiatives announced and undertaken to enhance the OG framework. However, the nature and extent of the OG techniques utilized in Asia, as well as their execution, implications, and consequences, greatly vary from country to country given the enormous range of historical, institutional, and cultural variables across the region. This collection delves into the varied Asian experience and is structured around central themes and concepts in contemporary OG theory and practice. The investigation of the processes and the ways in which OG is understood and applied in various countries in the region, together with the emerging issues, trends and implications, is expected to advance

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understanding in this field while informing policy and practice in the future. This chapter, along with the next, is intended to provide a general framework of OG and FOI around which discussions of the subsequent chapters revolve. Following the brief survey of the core conceptual determinants of OG in this chapter, Chap. 2 provides an overview of Asia’s governance context—the institutional, political and cultural setting—against which OG and FOI initiatives must be understood and assessed. An overview of the major aspects of OG in Asia will be presented, followed by a synopsis of the several cases in this volume.

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CHAPTER 2

Open Government and Freedom of Information in Asia: Exploring Developments and Outcomes Habib Zafarullah and Noore Alam Siddiquee

Introduction The growing decline in democratic values and institutions in Asia, which is mirrored in some other regions around the globe, has been a disturbing phenomenon. Even in countries with elected democratic regimes, the space for opposition politics, protest movements, and citizen participation has significantly shrunk, contributing to an unsettling backsliding of democracy and a corresponding increase in autocratization. The free flow of information, crucial for informed political deliberation, good

H. Zafarullah (*) University of New England, Armidale, Australia e-mail: [email protected] N. A. Siddiquee Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_2

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governance, and the protection of human rights, has been stifled (V-Dem Institute, 2022; Freedom House, 2022). Disinformation is pervasive in several Asian countries, increasing concerns about civil liberties, human rights, and their persistent violation. The strict control over the flow of information is palpable, and civil society campaigns that advocate for open democratic governance and freedom of information are closely monitored (Civicus, 2023). The Asian continent is massive and incredibly diverse, encompassing many social, cultural, political, and economic systems. With more than half of the world’s population residing in this region, it is home to diverse cultures and traditions, vastly different histories, geographies, religions, languages, and socioeconomic situations. The importance of family, community, and social hierarchy is deeply ingrained in many Asian societies, which is reflected in the variations of cultural norms and customs across the region. The social mores and political systems of many Asian cultures are heavily influenced by their religious and spiritual values making cultural relativism a pertinent concept with cultural norms serving as the primary basis for moral authority to govern (Donnelly, 1984). In Southeast Asia, the notion of ‘Asian democracy’ gained ground and was heralded by authoritarian leaders who extolled the primacy of ‘Asian values’ derived from social and religious norms (Thompson, 2015). This idea paved the way for the growth of authoritarianism in the region. While some countries have experienced remarkable economic growth in recent decades, the majority of them have witnessed a widening rich-poor chasm (Bose & Jalal, 2022; Jalal, 1995; Andersson & Gunnarsson, 2003; Holroyd, 2021; Croissant, 2004; Angrist, 2019). Asia’s political landscape is diverse and complex. Political regimes lie at various points on a continuum, the two extreme points being democracy and autocracy—the two basic types. A fully fledged functional democracy is distinguished by freedom, equality and political and legal control (Bogaards, 2009). These characteristics are absent in a hard autocracy, whereas in a moderate autocracy they are either underdeveloped or indicate a marginal trend toward political liberalization. In contrast to a functioning democracy, political institutions in a deficient democracy are dysfunctional and incapable of fully meeting the standards of a robust democracy. There are significant barriers to citizens’ full engagement in the political process. Broadly, there are four regime types: hard autocracy, moderate autocracy, deficient democracy and working democracy. Sub-­ types may exist depending on different variations of traits. Hybrid regimes

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compromise features of both deficient democracies and autocracies and are notable for their lack of political stability, weak institutional checks and balances on the executive branch, and subpar standards of governance, (Norris, 2017; Bogaards, 2009). They are also infamous for severe restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, including media censorship and human rights abuses. The University of Würzburg’s ‘democracy matrix,’ measuring the quality of democracy based on performance, categorizes Taiwan and South Korea as working democracies, while India, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Kuwait are classified as illiberal or hybrid regimes. Indonesia, Nepal and Sri Lanka are considered deficient democracies. Thailand, Bangladesh and Oman have been labelled moderate autocracies, while the UAE, Qatar, China and Saudi Arabia are hard autocracies. China and several Middle Eastern countries are authoritarian regimes or display their governing attributes. Singapore has had the same ruling party in power since independence and is distinguished by its tight limitations on political freedom and the press. Despite being stable democracies, some Asian countries still face problems with transparency, bureaucratic inertia, social responsiveness, and a lack of initiative that hamper effective decision-making and citizen engagement (Diamond, 1999; Diamond et al., 1989; Croissant, 2004; Régnier, 2011). While India is a multiparty democracy, the ruling party’s discriminatory measures and suppression of political dissent undermine the constitution’s protection of civil liberties, such as freedom of expression (Freedom House, 2022). The most recent World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank indicate a mixed bag for the Asian and Gulf countries. The best performer among them is Singapore, with an overall average score of 89.22, followed by Taiwan (scoring 85) and South Korea (80.30). Bangladesh has the least score (23.45), and Pakistan with a slightly better average (26.10) (see Table 2.1). One of the obstacles of Asian democratization is the ineffective implementation of the rule of law, which requires that everyone be held to the same legal standards, regardless of their social status or the nature of the entity to which they belong.. The rule of law ensures the protection of the fundamental rights of citizens, such as their right to access information, and the courts of law to uphold them impartially and judiciously (Zolo, 2007; Bingham, 2011). However, in most of Asia, there has been a general decline in the application of the rule of law because of executive domination, the politicization of the judiciary, opacity in administration and

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Table 2.1  World governance indicators Country

A

East and Southeast Asia China 5.31 Hong Kong 38.65 Indonesia 52.66 Korea 77.78 Malaysia 39.13 Philippines 39.61 Singapore 40.58 Taiwan 86.47 Thailand 27.05 South Asia Bangladesh 28.02 India 51.69 Nepal 43.00 Pakistan 25.12 Sri Lanka 44.44 Middle East/Gulf Bahrain 8.70 Kuwait 29.95 Oman 16.43 Qatar 17.39 Saudi Arabia 6.28 UAE 16.91

B

C

D

E

F

Overall

29.21 54.72 27.83 67.45 50.94 16.98 97.64 72.17 27.36

76.44 93.75 65.38 90.87 81.25 57.69 100.00 91.83 60.58

41.35 93.75 62.50 83.65 72.60 54.81 100.00 91.35 56.73

53.85 90.38 46.63 84.62 70.19 26.92 98.56 87.98 55.77

58.17 94.23 38.46 77.40 61.06 34.13 98.56 85.10 35.10

44.06 77.58 48.91 80.30 62.53 38.36 89.22 85.82 43.77

16.04 24.53 38.21 6.60 34.91

28.85 62.50 17.79 37.50 50.48

20.67 49.52 30.29 35.96 39.42

28.85 51.92 34.62 27.88 54.33

18.27 46.63 33.17 23.56 44.23

23.45 47.80 32.85 26.10 44.64

28.30 55.66 60.85 83.49 26.42 66.51

74.04 51.44 40.08 82.69 68.75 89.90

76.44 58.17 63.46 77.40 63.94 82.21

67.31 59.13 63.94 81.25 58.17 77.40

60.58 53.37 60.10 78.85 64.42 84.13

52.56 51.29 50.81 70.18 48.00 69.51

Source: Based on World Bank (Online) A  =  Voice & Accountability; B  =  Political Stability; C  =  Government Effectiveness; D  =  Regulatory Quality; E = Rule of Law; and F = Control of Corruption

weak bureaucratic accountability mechanisms (WJP, Online-a, Online-b; Dressel, 2012). With an impartial judiciary and strict application of the law, Singapore ranks very high in the WGI score (98.56) for the rule of law. Hong Kong (90.38), Taiwan (85.10), Korea (84.62) and Malaysia (70.19) follow. Among the Gulf countries, the performance of Qatar (81.25) and UAE (77.40) is commendable, while that of the other Asian countries is less than satisfactory (Table 2.1) (World Bank, Online). Despite Asia’s diverse political systems, social movements, civil society campaigns, human rights advocacy, and media coverage of corruption, injustice, and poor governance highlight the need for OG and FOI/ RTI. These movements have been led by political parties, civil society organizations, community groups, grassroots activists, and concerned

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citizens who seek to create public spaces for people to express their grievances. The drive towards OG/RTI has not only been motivated by domestic concerns but also by the global trend towards democratization, sound governance, and people’s empowerment through strengthened participation and integrity in public life (Webb, 2010; Baniser, 2002; Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Butt, 2013). However, the lack of a truly impartial judiciary is a major obstacle to the rule of law in Asia. Many judiciary systems in the region are either ineffective or corrupt, making them vulnerable to political interference. The lack of transparency and accountability in the justice system further erodes public trust in it. In the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law global rankings, among the countries of Asia, South Korea is at the top (ranked 19/140), closely followed by Hong Kong (22), both countries scoring the same point—0.73. Bangladesh and Pakistan are very low in enforcing the rule of law, 129 and 127 respectively (both score a meagre 0.39 points). These rankings and scores are based on several factors with implications for the performance of OG and the enforcement of FOI principles: constraints on government powers; absence of corruption; open government; fundamental rights; order and security; regulatory enforcement; civil justice; and criminal justice (WJP, Online-a, Online-b).

Dimensions of OG and FOI in Asia Thus, while FOI/RTI laws are good in principle, their application may go amiss. These may have been passed for symbolic reasons or in response to domestic and international pressures but with little or no implementation strategy or machinery in place (Relly & Sabharwal, 2009). In such situations, the government would fail to deliver good governance. Indeed, the rollout of FOI/RTI legislation has been sluggish and uneven in many countries. There are also gaps between official statements and actual procedures. The absence of clear rules, regulations and explanations has exacerbated the problem. Few people understand the law or its implications, which is true not only of the public but also of the vast majority of public officials (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021; Baroi & Alam, 2020). Officials lacking proper training and orientation have failed to fulfil their duties or adequately respond to the people because of a widespread misinterpretation of the law and their corresponding transparency obligations. Evidence suggests that requests for crucial information, such as government decision-­making, expenditures, and contracts, have been routinely denied (Roberts, 2010). A World Bank study found that RTI implementation in

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India has devolved into a ‘check the box’ exercise. Compliance with procedures takes precedence over facilitating a steady flow of useful information (World Bank, 2014). Despite these widespread obstacles, some Asian countries have made remarkable progress in consolidating their OG and FOI systems. On the global plane, South Korea is one of the world leaders in applying open data policies and practices. It ranks at 21 followed by Hong Kong, while other Asian countries lag. Among the countries covered in this book, Malaysia, Bangladesh, China and the UAE are way behind in the rankings, while Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea have done fairly well (Table 2.2) (WJP, Online-a, Online-b). The rankings by the World Justice Project are based on the degree of countries’ willingness to share government information with the citizens: published laws and publicly available data, right to information, civic participation, and complaints instruments (WJP, Online-a, Online-b). The Global Open Data Index (GODI) compares countries based on the availability of public data on government budgets, national statistics, laws, procurement and other key sectors. Taiwan tops the world rankings with a cumulative score of 90%. Singapore at 17 (60%), Hong Kong at 24 Table 2.2 Open government global rankings and scores

Country South Korea Hong Kong Singapore India Indonesia Nepal Sri Lanka Philippines Thailand Malaysia Pakistan Bangladesh China United Arab Emirates

Global ranking

Score

21 25 35 43 56 62 68 71 77 101 102 104 106 127

0.71 0.70 0.62 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.5 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.35

Source: Adapted from WJP (Online-a, Online-b) Ranking/Score not available for Taiwan Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain & Qatar

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(51%). The rest of the countries score well below 50% (See Table  2.3). Interestingly, this Index has not covered South Korea, one of the highest-­ ranking OG countries in Asia, according to the UN’s E-Government Survey, while Malaysia has been ranked pretty low (UN, 2022). Korea’s ongoing, all-encompassing efforts to develop unified digital government changes is exemplified in OECD’s 2019 Digital Government Index encompassing six variables (digital by design, data-driven public sector, government as platform, open by default, user-driven and proactiveness). It is at the top of the rankings ahead of several advanced countries (OECD, 2020). However, no other Asian country has been covered in this Index as the focus is solely on the OECD countries. The UN’s Open Governance Data Index (OGDI) is premised on policy, platform and impact of e-government, categorizes countries into four groups: Very High, High, Middle and Low. From Table 2.3 it is evident that Singapore, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, UAE, India, Thailand, Indonesia, China and Malaysia are all in the ‘Very High’ category, Qatar, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Pakistan, Oman and Kuwait in the ‘High’ category, while Sri Lanka and Nepal in the ‘Middle’ (UN, 2022). The UN has created a composite benchmark—the E-Government Development Index (EGDI) based on the weighted average of three independent component indices: the Online Services Index (OSI), the Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII), and the Human Capital Table 2.3  Global open data index

Country Taiwan Singapore Hong Kong India Thailand Philippines Indonesia Bangladesh Nepal Pakistan Oman Malaysia

Global ranking

Score (percent)

1 17 24 32 51 53 61 61 69 72 81 87

90 60 51 47 34 30 25 25 20 19 14 10

Source: Extracted from OKF (Online) Index does not list South Korea, China, UAE, etc.

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Index (HCI). The OSI component has been refined to allow government portals to be assessed based on five subindices—institutional framework (IF), services provision (SP), content provision (CP), technology (TEC) and e-participation (EPI) (UN, 2022). Asia has done pretty well in average EDGI values, slightly ahead of the American continent but behind Europe. The vulnerable population in Asia has highly benefitted from the high number of online services, better than other regions, except Europe. This particularly helped during the COVID-19 pandemic. A key factor in Asia’s commendable performance in e-governance has been strengthening institutional and legal frameworks. Korea has the highest EGDI value among Asian countries, followed by Singapore and UAE. China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Gulf countries have performed highly in the UN’s e-Government Survey (UN, 2022). The success of OG and FOI regimes relies heavily on digital connectivity, which focuses on digital infrastructure, readiness, and capabilities to expedite a country’s digital transformation. High-speed broadband networks that easily connect to the Internet and sound infrastructure for storing, processing, and delivering information and services are two critical enablers. Many countries are ramping up their initiatives toward digital transformation. For instance, Middle Eastern countries are actively pursuing a complete digital transformation of their infrastructures, focusing on developing digital innovation centres and enabling local demand for ICT. Singapore and Korea have both improved their innovation capabilities (GCI, 2020). The Global Connectivity Index ranks 79 countries into three categories: ‘frontrunners,’ ‘adopters’ and ‘starters.’ Two Asian countries feature in the first category—Singapore (ranked 2 globally) and South Korea (13). Among the adopters are UAE (21), China (22), while Malaysia (34). Indonesia (58), the Philippines (59), India (63), Bangladesh (73) and Pakistan (75) are among the ‘starters’ (ibid). The International Telecommunication Union’s Global Connectivity Report 2022 makes some interesting observations about Asia’s Internet connectivity, a key technical component of OG and FOI.  Many homes that can afford high-speed Internet do so through a mobile-broadband connection. Over 70% of Thai homes use only mobile broadband for Internet access. The vast majority of people in India and China do not have access to the Internet. In the UAE, a large proportion without access at home rely on connections elsewhere. In Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh, Internet penetration is very low. However, in Bangladesh, a

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very high proportion of those who have access are broadband subscribers with high-speed connections. China, Singapore, Thailand and India have adopted data protection regulations, while many other Asian countries are yet to employ these. Strong cross-sectoral policies and progress toward digital development goals have allowed Korea and Singapore to fully benefit from the digital revolution (ITU, 2022). To make e-governance operate, public infrastructure (Internet-web fusion), interconnectivity (connecting public networks), interoperability (ICT ability to process information), intergovernmental access (central-­ local connection), and security (user data protection) are essential (OECD, 2007). This would allow citizens to electronically request and receive a variety of government informational and transactional services (Curtin et al., 2003; Zwass, 2006). According to the UN’s E-Government Survey of 2022, Asia’s average EGDI has grown, making it the second most advanced e-government region. Yet, EGDI ratings and rankings vary widely among countries in the region. Korea (3rd), Singapore (12th), and the United Arab Emirates (13th) lead the world in e-government development with strengthening telecommunications infrastructure (UN, 2022). Some other countries have made remarkable strides given constrained resources and limited communications infrastructure development. Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, all least developed but graduating countries, have the highest EDGI value. With highly developed telecommunications infrastructure, the Gulf countries also rank very high in the EGDI (Ibid). E-Participation or engaging citizens in public decision-making and service delivery using ICT is integral to OG. The e-Participation Index (EPI) is based on the availability, nature, and quality of online services and the level of citizen participation in state affairs. E-information, e-consultation, and e-decision-making form the backbone of this multifaceted EPI framework, which is evidence of co-creation or co-production systems for collaborative services, people’s opinions in deliberations and decision-making, online consultations and the availability of OGD in critical social, economic and environmental sectors are factored into its creation. Among the Asian countries, Singapore has done exceptionally well at third place in the EPI, while others (e.g., Bhutan, Philippines, Qatar, Sri Lanka) are also on the high achievers’ list (Ibid). Among the Asian countries, Thailand was the first to enact the RTI law, followed by Pakistan (2002), India and Taiwan (2005), Nepal and China (2007), Bangladesh and Indonesia (2008), Sri Lanka (2016) and so on. In

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general, these laws provide citizens with the means of investigating and evaluating their government’s performance. This enables public participation by increasing awareness and interest in policy issues and giving citizens a stake in policy development. Although an Executive Order on Freedom of Information has existed since 2016  in the Philippines, the parliament has not acted on a pending FOI Bill. Nonetheless, the Order does make available to every citizen research data, public records, and other papers and resources relating to governmental acts, transactions, or decisions and covers most of the procedural matters contained in the FOI/RTI Acts in other countries (GoP, 2016; AIE/CLD, Online). Using seven indicators—right of access, scope of the law, requesting procedures, exceptions and refusal, appeals, sanctions and procedures, and promotional measures, Access Info Europe (AIE) the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD) has created a ‘Global Right to Information Rating Map’ that provides scores for each country covered. With its robust legal system and the positive interpretation of its regulations by an independent institution, Sri Lanka is ranked fourth in the world.1 India, Nepal and Bangladesh also rank high, while the Philippines is among the bottom 10 (Table 2.4). India, in particular, ‘has one of the world’s best laws…[and] civil society regularly uses the right to information to get their other rights fulfilled’ and, along with Indonesia, has ‘progressive mechanisms for access and enforcement’ (Article 19, 2015). While the Indian law was hailed as ‘great’ and ‘revolutionary’ by its champions, it cannot be used practically by the rural poor and is ‘useful only to businesses or wealthy citizens who have the knowledge and resources to file requests and persist with prolonged enforcement processes’, as Roberts (2010: 932) observed years ago. Several shortcomings persist. Except for UAE, which remarkably has a very high OGDI, all countries covered in this volume provide full constitutional rights and access to information. However, the modalities of accessing information, proactive disclosure, requesting procedures, appeals, exemptions, sanctions, etc. vary. In most of Asian countries where an RTI regime exists, a central body (an information commission or a government agency) is tasked with reporting on the law’s administration to the legislature. Public bodies

1  Interestingly, while Malaysia is classified as an illiberal democracy in the University of Würzburg’s ‘democracy matrix, the EIU gives it a fairly high democracy score. Perhaps, this is due to different methodologies used in the two indices.

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Table 2.4  Global right to information

Country Afghanistan Sri Lanka India Nepal Bangladesh Pakistan Indonesia South Korea Thailand China Saudi Arabia Taiwan Kuwait Philippines

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Global ranking Total points 1 4 8 23 27 32 40 45 86 89 118 124 126 131

139 131 127 112 109 105 100 97 76 75 60 55 54 46

Source: AIE/CLD (Online)

must also provide an annual report detailing their steps to fulfil their disclosure responsibilities (AIE/CLD, Online). Given the region’s general success in implementing FOI/RTI laws, the observation made by Relly et al. (2020) in the context of India holds good for all countries. They argued that strong political will, strategic vision, adequate oversight, coordination, and incentives, increased communication, reinforced monitoring and training systems, and extended records management could all help to strengthen the RTI regime. OGP has made considerable inroads in Asia, with many nations in the region signing on to the initiative and promising to work towards more transparent administration. However, the OGP’s status in Asia differs from country to country, with some making substantial progress while others struggle to execute open government reforms. In many countries, not enough attention has been paid to ensuring that democratic norms and individual rights are upheld in a transparent, inclusive, and accountable government. Several examples have seen the removal of essential watchdog authorities, the censorship of journalists, the introduction of widespread and potentially permanent digital surveillance regimes, and the weakening of legislative mechanisms and other crucial forms of checks and balances (OGP, 2020). While some Asian nations have made great strides toward data transparency, others continue to struggle. South Korea, Indonesia, India, and the

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Philippines have all enacted laws that make it easier for citizens to share and access government data. Their open data portals offer access to a wide range of data, including real-time data on national budgets, education, health, and public transportation, among other things. However, obstacles remain, such as poor data quality control and insufficient citizen participation in open data projects. In terms of data readiness, implementation and impact, Korea leads the pack globally, ranked at 5. The Philippines (22nd), Singapore (23), Indonesia (38), Malaysia and Thailand (53), China (71), UAE (59), and Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (all 74) are included in the ODB rankings, while others are not (ODB, Online). There has been a significant backslide in democracy and declining public trust in political institutions in recent years because of high-level corruption, insufficient transparency, and lack of accountability in government. Democratic performance varies across Asia and the Middle East. According to the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), Taiwan has the highest democracy score (8.99) in Asia, followed by South Korea (8.16), and Malaysia (7.24).1 Other countries score lower than 7. The democratic situation in the Middle East is poor, but definitely better than it was over a decade ago (EIU, 2021).

Asian Case Studies of OG and FOI This collection covers the state of OG and FOI/RTI in several countries in East Asia (Taiwan, Hong Kong and China), Southeast Asia (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore), South Asia (India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) and a part of the Middle East (United Arab Emirates and the Gulf counties). Despite initial efforts to recruit scholars or practitioners to write on additional countries (especially South Korea and Pakistan), their inability to do so limited the scope of the book. However, the case studies present different dimensions of OG and FOI/ RTI at either the national or subnational levels in these countries. Some provide analysis of broad applications, while others focus on specific areas. In the first country study presented in Chap. 3 of this volume, Tsai-Tsu, Kuo and Huang meticulously evaluate Taiwan’s initiatives in OG.  First, the authors explicate the impetus behind Taiwan’s decision to embrace OG by analysing the contributing factors. Subsequently, they introduce and assess the major OG initiatives in Taiwan, gauging their impact on the core OG values of transparency, public participation, accountability, and inclusion.

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The participatory budgeting, Youth Advisory Committees, Open Data Platform, and Online Civil Engagement Platforms are among the pioneering OG initiatives that enable citizens to participate in public policymaking and enhance governmental operations’ openness and transparency. While conceding that these initiatives are not without flaws, the authors contend that they have yielded some advantageous outcomes, particularly in terms of transparency and public participation. The government’s proactive disclosure of official documents and data since the enactment of the Freedom of Information Law in 2006 and the establishment of the Open Data Platform in 2013 has lowered the transaction costs for obtaining government information, while the participatory budgeting and online civic engagement platforms have empowered citizens to participate in public affairs and contribute to debates and discussions on various issues affecting them. However, the authors note that although the Taiwanese government has become more open and participatory due to these initiatives, the same cannot be said for inclusion and accountability. The country’s deep political schism, with the associated animosity and distrust between the ‘Green’ and ‘Blue’ factions, has created obstacles to inclusion and the ability to hold political figures and public servants accountable. The chapter concludes with a set of strategies that can help overcome these challenges and secure the support and cooperation of public servants, without which OG measures may not achieve their intended objectives. In Chap. 4, Brillantes, Lilangan and Ruiz present a comprehensive analysis of the state of freedom of information and open government in the Philippines. They acknowledge the current context of poor governance ratings in the country, underscoring the significance of transparency, accountability, and good governance. The authors highlight various community and civil society initiatives that seek to narrow the gap between the state and citizens, promote social accountability and participation, and foster open government. They examine several OG initiatives in the Philippines that aim to improve public access to governmental data and enhance transparency in governance. Among these, the Open Data Portal, the Full Disclosure Policy of the Department of Interior & Local Government, the Open data Portal of the Philippines Statistics Authority, and the Freedom of Information Website (eFOI) are some of the notable examples. While the Open Data Portal mandates executive agencies to disclose information, the eFOI portal allows citizens to submit requests for and receive

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information from the government online. The Executive Order NO. 2 (2016) and the National Action Plan (2019–2022) serve as guiding documents for various agencies and authorities in OG initiatives, in the absence of FOI law. Despite these initiatives, the authors argue that progress in OG remains limited, and the initiatives have failed to remove barriers to public access to information, particularly those relating to large projects. Additionally, there are concerns with the online availability and accessibility of information, privacy protection, and the rate and completeness of the information provided. In the current context, they note the lack of FOI law and a dedicated agency responsible for monitoring, supervising, and handling appeal cases as two major weaknesses in the current approach to OG. The chapter concludes that a comprehensive FOI law and an implementing office are critical imperatives for institutionalizing a culture of open government, fostering participation, and enhancing people’s trust in the government. The authors argue that while the initiatives demonstrate progress, the long-term success of OG in the Philippines will depend on the government’s commitment to addressing the barriers to accessing and improving the quality and availability of information. In Chap. 5, Huque and Cheng critically assess the state of open government and the right to information law in Hong Kong, drawing attention to the obstacles and restrictions that impede information disclosure and public participation. The authors emphasize the distinctive context of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region of China, and how the territory is governed, where OG is not a leadership priority. In fact, Hong Kong’s current arrangement as a region of a non-democratic country inhibits the democratization process and impedes the development of open government. Therefore, it is unsurprising that Hong Kong has implemented very few policy measures to promote openness and facilitate public access to governmental information. As a result, citizens encounter various difficulties in accessing governmental records and information. The Public Records Access Rules 1996, and the Committee on Access to Legislative Records and Documents are two significant measures that enable citizens to access government information. However, due to exemptions and officials’ discretion, these measures remain restrictive in nature. Furthermore, the complex processes and procedures prescribed in both cases make it difficult for citizens to navigate them. Even if they succeed in applying for information, they may face further obstacles in obtaining them from relevant agencies. Frequently, their requests for information

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are denied by agencies, and appeals are rarely successful. Moreover, the Chief Executive holds the power to deny access to information on the grounds of public interest. Consequently, Hong Kong citizens continue to experience limited access to government information, and the leadership has failed to demonstrate its commitment to introducing open government in the region. In Chap. 6, Fernandez and Singaravelloo provide a depressing analysis of Malaysia’s current state of OG and the RTI. Undesirably, there is no access or right to information legislation at the federal level, and Malaysia ranks very low on the Global Open Government Data Index, indicating a low level of government openness and public access to information. During the uninterrupted 60-year rule of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition (1957–2017), Malaysia was widely regarded as a semi-democracy, with the power elites never prioritizing the freedom of information. Rather, they maintained and enforced restrictive laws and regulations such as the Sedition Act of 1948, the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1972, and the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998. These laws severely limit the free flow of information in society and remain firmly in place, acting as barriers to public access to governmental data. Under the OSA, public servants are mandated to maintain the confidentiality of information that is deemed an official secret, leading them to be hesitant to disclose or share information. Consequently, much of what occurs within the government is concealed from the public eye and is not subject to scrutiny by society at large. In this context, Malaysia has witnessed countless instances of corruption, patronage distribution, and scandals, some of which have involved billions of dollars and garnered international media attention. While two of Malaysia’s states attempted to champion the idea of open government by enacting RTI laws in 2010, no similar initiatives were undertaken at the federal level, even after the non-BN government came to power in 2018. The only glimmer of hope is that Malaysia’s e-­government programs have effectively promoted OG. Spearheaded by MAMPU, the e-government initiative supports online transactions and open data. Following the implementation of various e-initiatives, government agency websites and portals now make limited information available online. At the same time, public procurements are required to be carried out via e-procurement tools, increasing transparency and monitoring of financial data. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s challenges to OG are significant,

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and whether the new government under the reformist leader Anwar Ibrahim is prepared to address them in earnest remains to be seen. Thailand was one of the first in Asia to embrace the OG concept by enacting the Official Information Act (OIA) in 1997, but the Thai experience has been far from satisfactory. In Chap. 7, Jongruck explores the context and operations of OIA in Thailand. While the law has been on the books for over 25 years, she shows that political unrest and multiple military takeovers in Thailand have hampered its implementation. As a result, it has not made any measurable progress toward its stated goals of increasing government openness or expanding citizen participation. Due to barriers in obtaining data from government entities, the general public has not widely utilized the Act. Most official documents and information in Thailand are kept by centralized agencies in Bangkok, making it difficult for people outside the capital to access them. While a Royal decree requires state agencies to respond to citizens requests or complaints within 15 days, rarely this is complied with. Agencies are notoriously secretive, especially when it comes to details about high-ranking politicians and bureaucrats. When they do, doubts about the information’s veracity and reliability persist. Despite the OIA being in force for more than 25 years, Thailand is not doing well in the OG rankings and the corruption perception index/score. The author concludes that the OIA has not helped usher in an era of open government in Thailand, nor has it contributed to improving the country’s overall standard of governance. Xu and Chen analyse the impact of OGD initiatives on citizen satisfaction and trust in Singapore in Chap. 8. Despite the absence of a Freedom of Information Act and non-membership in the Open Government Partnership, Singapore has implemented several smart initiatives to foster transparency, accountability, and citizen participation in governance. Among these initiatives are e-government schemes introduced in 2000, subsequently evolving to include online service delivery, one-stop online data repositories, and the Smart Nation Initiative (SNI). Recent initiatives include online platforms that provide access to a variety of governmental data, including economic and social statistics, government finance data, and real-time data on land use, city development, property, and urban transportation. Although these initiatives were primarily driven by economic rationales rather than democratic values, they helped promote government transparency and accountability. The study seeks to determine the extent to which

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Singaporeans are satisfied with OGD initiatives and whether such openness promotes trust in the government. Findings indicate that citizens are generally satisfied with OGD initiatives and that openness is positively associated with citizens’ trust, suggesting that OGD can be an effective policy tool to promote public trust in government. Despite high levels of public trust in the Singaporean government, the study reveals that a significant proportion of people rated their trust at a low satisfaction rate. This is primarily due to the government’s top-down approach to policymaking, where OGD initiatives are dominated by the government, leaving little space for bottom-up engagement and participation. The chapter concludes that strengthening public trust would require emphasizing transparency and public participation as underlying values of the SNI, responding to popular demands for the Freedom of Information Act, among other things. In Chap. 9, Siddiquee delves into the status of RTI and OG in Indonesia. Following Indonesia’s transition to democracy in the late 1990s, the populace increasingly demanded improved public access to information to create a transparent, accountable, and open government. In response to this demand, the government passed an RTI law in 2008, which became effective in 2010. The law was viewed as a groundbreaking initiative for Indonesia’s democratic consolidation, simultaneously promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance. The law requires public agencies to disclose all public information, granting citizens the right to request and obtain such information. However, more than ten years after its implementation, concerns about the law’s effectiveness and influence have arisen. This chapter examines the obstacles and challenges to achieving an accountable and open government. Although the law has many promising characteristics, its implementation and enforcement have been erratic and uneven. This is due to various constraints and shortcomings, including a lack of knowledge about the law and a reluctance by officials to enforce it. Furthermore, Siddiquee indicates that Indonesia is yet to experience a cultural shift towards greater transparency and openness and asserts that both supply-side and demand-­ side actors must play a significant role in ensuring the success of the RTI regime. Additionally, he identifies key lessons and policy implications that could be useful to other developing nations with comparable socioeconomic and political conditions. The promulgation of the Regulation on Open Government Information (ROGI) in 2007 marked a significant departure towards freedom of

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information and transparency in government operations in authoritarian China. In Chap. 10, Zhang examines the policy significance and impact of the ROGI, which has operated since 2008. He contends that, contrary to the apprehensions of sceptics and critics, the Chinese government has demonstrated a firm commitment to effectively implementing the ROGI. As a result, there have been significant governance outcomes, particularly in terms of transparency, public participation in policymaking, and improved accountability in public governance. Zhang observes that, although there was initial confusion about what constituted government information to qualify for disclosure, most provinces have made steady progress in government transparency by proactively disclosing information. He notes that the ROGI has created a unique channel for citizens and social groups to participate in the policy process and to hold the government accountable. His research reveals that the number of requests for government information per 10,000 residents has increased not only at the subnational level, but also at the national level, with the average number of government information disclosed by a state council agency increasing more than ten times between 2008 and 2018, suggesting a significant increase in people’s participation. Moreover, he demonstrates that the newly created institutions and the number of requests for government information, administrative litigations, and reviews suggest that the ROGI has provided substantial space for political interaction between the government and citizens. Although much work still needs to be done, Zhang maintains that China offers an interesting case for further research on open government initiatives. The Right to Information Act 2005 is an extraordinary achievement for India, and it has been widely recognized as one of the most progressive and exemplary RTI laws worldwide. This landmark legislation aims to empower citizens, particularly the poor and marginalized, to seek and obtain government information, which is enshrined in the law as a fundamental right. In Chap. 11, Relly, Jha, Rabbi and Sabharwal scrutinize the Indian experience to assess the extent to which this law has advanced the information rights of such communities. By analysing national and state-­ level data, the authors found that the RTI law has produced some positive outcomes for the poor and marginalized groups, where they were able to assert their demands, get their grievances addressed, and gain access to services and entitlements. However, the authors also discovered that the rate of utilization of the RTI law among these groups was low due to a lack of awareness, among other factors. Moreover, these groups continue

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to experience problems that severely restrict their ability to demand and obtain information. Some of the challenges include issues of accessibility, availability, and affordability of information, as well as various supply-side challenges, such as the reluctance of the administration to provide information and the limited capacity of agencies to maintain and protect it. Additionally, sociocultural challenges like the prevailing hierarchical social system, gender inequality, and lack of education and training often prevent many of these people from exercising their rights to seek and obtain information under the law. The findings lead the authors to conclude that, while RTI laws are essential, they are not comprehensive enough to guarantee that those who need them the most will reap their benefits. Thus, the Indian government and civil society organizations need to do more to increase awareness of the law and to aid these groups to enable them to overcome the various challenges they face in accessing government information. In Chap. 12, Zafarullah’s work critiques the state of OG and information access in Bangladesh. He examines the political and institutional context within which the RTI regime operates. In contemporary Bangladesh, an authoritarian approach to governance, democratic deficits and backsliding, fraudulent elections, near-absent freedom of expression, a lack of adequate checks and balances and dysfunctional accountability systems are the core features of governance. These issues are further compounded by the introduction of the draconian Digital Security Act (DSA), which curtails the freedom of the media and public scrutiny of government actions and policies. Against this backdrop, the RTI Act introduced in 2009 has had little effect in making the government more open and accountable through enhanced public access to governmental information and operations. Zafarullah illustrates how Bangladesh performs poorly in measures of open governance despite the implementation of the RTI. Governmental operations remain opaque, and proactive disclosure is rare, with institutional secrecy considerations guiding any attempts. In accountability, Bangladesh scores very low in the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability Index. Citizen participation in public affairs is limited, with little opportunity for meaningful contributions to the policy process. Governance in other areas also presents a dismal record. Despite these challenges, Bangladesh has made some inroads in one area. The extensive use of information and communication technology

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(ICT) in the public sector has improved service delivery, reduced citizen-­ state gaps, and bridged the digital divide. Despite these gains, governance in Bangladesh is in dire straits, and the RTI has failed to deliver the intended benefits. Corruption remains widespread and endemic, eroding citizen trust in government institutions. Jamil and Paudel have comprehensively analysed OG practices in Nepal since it transitioned to democracy in 2008. In Chap. 13, they interpret the concept of OG in a broader sense to include democratic governance and evaluate its current status using two crucial determinants: governance legitimacy and governance capacity. Based on empirical data collected from a nationwide survey of 2254 respondents, they have identified some of the shortcomings and challenges of democracy and OG in Nepal. RTI was used as a critical variable to assess governance legitimacy and openness. The authors have found that despite Nepal’s RTI law being in effect for over 15  years, its implementation remains poor, and citizens’ usage of it is inadequate. Even if citizens know their rights under the law, they rarely exercise them. Government institutions operate opaquely and non-transparently, lacking well-trained and competent workforce to implement the RTI law and proactively disclose information. The culture of secrecy in public institutions hinders the sharing of information and public access to vital government records and information. Nepal lacks a nodal agency responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the law, which largely explains the poor implementation of the law and its limited impact. It has failed to promote a transparent and accountable government in Nepal or empower citizens to evaluate government performance and participate in decision-making. In closing, the authors stress the importance of taking immediate measures to resolve these problems and enhance Nepal’s open government practices. This requires raising awareness among citizens about their RTI rights, ensuring transparency and accountability in government institutions, investing in government officials’ training and capacity building, and establishing an effective mechanism for monitoring and enforcing compliance with the law. Only then can Nepal truly achieve its aspirations of democratic governance and open government. In Chap. 14, Jayawardene, Natesan and Faliq delve into Sri Lanka’s experience with FOI and OG.  The country introduced the Right to Information Act in 2016, which became operational the following year. This Act, along with the establishment of the RTI Commission, an autonomous body responsible for monitoring the implementation of the RTI

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Act, and the country’s inclusion in the Open Government Partnership, marked the start of a new era of public governance. In their assessment, the authors focus on the role and importance of the RTI law in promoting open government in Sri Lanka. They highlight key features of the law that make it one of the strongest in the world, such as the power to override public interest, the principle of proactive disclosure, and the RTIC’s authority to investigate information held by authorities and prosecute officials who do not comply with RTIC orders. They argue that over the past 6 years, the implementation of the RTI law has led to a visible and significant improvement in governance. The authors present cases where RTI was successfully used to uncover corruption in the use of public funds and to ensure compliance from relevant authorities in various matters. Moreover, the RTI law has increased the accountability and integrity of elected officials and improved public service delivery, thus laying the foundations for open and accountable government in Sri Lanka. Despite these gains, the authors conclude that there are still challenges to be faced in ensuring participatory decision-making and institutionalizing public accountability. Sri Lanka’s current period of economic crisis and social unrest due to poor governance and economic management makes the need for a truly open, accountable, and transparent government more pressing than ever before. In Chap. 15, Sarker, Rahman, and Islam delve into the impact of digital transformation in OG in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The authors assert that the country is one of the pioneers in ICT adoption, utilizing it to revamp public service delivery and enhance the user experience. E-government was the UAE’s first step towards digital transformation, culminating in adopting ‘smart government’ and, eventually, mobile government. The National Digital Transformation Strategy (2021–2025) has facilitated sustained efforts to improve various aspects of the UAE’s digital infrastructure, including a consolidated digital platform, integrated government systems, and automated processes, among other things. Notably, the UAE’s Open Data portals provide access to a wealth of information on critical areas such as health, education, finance, employment, social welfare, environment, and justice. BAYANET.AE, the UAE’s OGD portal, houses a repository of 2500 data sets spanning a broad range of sectors, including agriculture, economy, education, food security, technology, and transportation. Because of implementing such initiatives, the UAE has emerged as one of the leading nations in managing public affairs using digital platforms. Although it currently lacks an RTI law, the authors

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maintain that the progress made in terms of OG is obvious, as evidenced by assessments conducted by prominent international organizations such as the World Bank, Transparency International, and the World Justice Project. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, OGD is a vital component of OG, enabling government data to be accessible online, free of charge, and in an easily understandable format for use by diverse stakeholders. In Chap. 16, Saxena and Alexopolos provide insight into the state of OGD in six Gulf countries: Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The authors contend that while the GCC nations have recognized the potential benefits of OGD, aiming to solve societal challenges and promote economic growth and development, OGD initiatives in the region still lag behind international benchmarks and best practices. Most GCC countries have established OGD portals; however, these are plagued with significant deficiencies, and the quantity and quality of data available fall short of internationally recognized standards. In terms of overall performance, only two Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman, are laudable in their national OGD portal features and UAE, to some extent. Consequently, the authors argue that significant overhaul and improvement of the OGD portals in the region are necessary to ensure their usefulness to various stakeholders. The following parts of the book elaborate on each country’s study focusing on different dimensions of OG and FOI and analysing outcomes of different initiatives, approaches or experiments.

References AIE/CLD. (Online). Global right to information rating map. Access Info Europe & Centre for Law and Democracy. https://www.rti-­rating.org/ Andersson, M., & Gunnarsson, C. (Eds.). (2003). Development and structural change in Asia-Pacific: Globalizing miracles or end of a model? Routledge Curzon. Angrist, M. P. (Ed.). (2019). Politics and society in the contemporary Middle East. Lynne Rienner. Article 19. (2015). Asia disclosed: A review of the right to information across Asia. Article 19. https://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/38121/ FINAL-­Asia-­Disclosed-­full.pdf Baniser, D. (2002). Freedom of information: International trends and national security. Paper presented at the Workshop on “Democratic and Parliamentary

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Oversight of Intelligence Services,” held in Geneva 3rd–5th October. https:// www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/rti/articles/foia_intl_trends_ and_nat_sec.pdf Baroi, H. S., & Alam, S. (2020). Operationalizing the right to information Act through e-governance in Bangladesh: Challenges and opportunities. International Journal of Public Administration. https://doi.org/10.108 0/01900692.2020.1747489 Bingham, T. (2011). The rule of law. Penguin Books. Bogaards, M. (2009). How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism. Democratization, 16(2), 399–423. Bose, S., & Jalal, A. (2022). Modern South Asia: History, culture, political economy. Routledge. Butt, S. (2013). Freedom of information law and its application in Indonesia: A preliminary assessment. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 8(1), 1–42. Civicus. (2023). State of civil society report. Civicus. Croissant, A. (2004). Transition to defective democracy: Mapping Asian democratization. Democratization, 11(5), 156–178. Curtin, G. G., Sommer, M. H., & Vis-Sommer, V. (Eds.). (2003). The world of e-government. Routledge. Diamond, L. (1999). Developing democracy: Toward consolidation. Johns Hopkins University. Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. M. (Eds.). (1989). Democracy in developing countries: Asia. Westview Press. Donnelly, J. (1984). Cultural relativism and universal human rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 6(4), 400–419. Dressel, B. (2012). The judicialization of politics in Asia: Towards a framework of analysis. In B. Dressel (Ed.), The judicialization of politics in Asia (pp. 1–14). Routledge. EIU. (2021). Democracy Index 2021. Economic Intelligence. Freedom House. (2022). Freedom in the world 2022: The global expansion of authoritarian rule. Freedom House. GCI. (2020). Global Connectivity Index, 2020. Huawei Technologies. GoP. (2016). Executive Order No. 2. Government of the Philippines. https:// www.foi.gov.ph/downloads/EO-­2-­s-­2016-­signed-­copy.pdf Holroyd, C. (2021). Introducing East Asia: History, politics, economy and society. Routledge. ITU. (2022). Global Connectivity Report 2022. International Telecommunication Union. Jalal, A. (1995). Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia: A comparative and historical perspective. Cambridge University Press. Jenkins, R., & Goetz, A. (1999). Accounts and accountability: Implications for right to information movement in India. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 603–622.

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Norris, P. (2017). Is Western democracy backsliding? Diagnosing the risks. SSRN Electronic Journal. Elsevier BV. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2933655 ODB. (Online). Open Data Barometer regional rankings. https://opendatabarometer.org/4thedition/regional-­snapshot/east-­asia-­pacific/; https://opendatabarometer.org/4thedition/regional-­snapshot/middle-­east-­north-­africa/ OECD. (2007). Towards better measurement of government. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/301575636734 OECD. (2020). Digital Government Index: 2019. OECD. OGP. (2020). Statement on the COVID-19 response from civil society members of OGP Steering Committee. Open Government Partnership. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/news/statement-­on-­the-­covid-­19-­r esponse-­from-­civilsociety-­members-­of-­ogp-­steering-­committee/ OKF (online). Global Open Data Index. London: Open Knowledge Foundation. http://index.okfn.org/place.html Régnier, P. (2011). Developmental states and hybrid regimes in South-East Asia: The socioeconomic and political challenges of global crises (1998-2008). ASIEN, 120, 10–27. Relly, J. E., & Sabharwal, M. (2009). Perceptions of transparency of government policy making: A cross-national study. Government Information Quarterly, 26(1), 148–157. Relly, J. E., Rabbi, M. F., Sabharwal, M., Pakanati, R., & Schwalbe, E. H. (2020). More than a decade in the making: A study of the implementation of India’s Right to Information Act. World Development, 136, 105088. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105088 Roberts, A. (2010). A great and revolutionary law? The first four years of India’s Right to Information Act. Public Administration Review, 70(6), 925–933. Thompson, M. R. (2015). Democracy with Asian characteristics. The Journal of Asian Studies, 74(4), 875–887. UN. (2022). E-government Survey 2023. The United Nations. V-Dem Institute. (2022). Democracy report 2022: Autocratization changing nature? Varieties of Democracy. Webb, M. (2010). Success stories: Rhetoric, authenticity, and the right to information movement in North India. Contemporary South Asia, 18(3), 293–304. World Bank (Online). World governance indicators. World Bank. https://info. worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports WJP. (Online-a). Rule of Law Index. World Justice Project. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-­of-­law-­index/ WJP. (Online-b). Open government around the world. World Justice Project. https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-­of-­law-­index/global/2022/Open%20 Government/ World Bank. (2014). Right to information: Case studies on implementation. World Bank.

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Zafarullah, H., & Siddiquee, N. (2021). Open government and the right to information: Implications for transparency and accountability in Asia. Public Administration and Development, 41(4), 157–168. Zolo, D. (2007). The rule of law: A critical reappraisal. In P.  Costa & S.  Zolo (Eds.), The rule of law: History, theory and criticism (pp. 3–72). Springer. Zwass, V. (2006). The web-internet compound as the infrastructure of digital government. Business Process Management Journal, 12(1), 7–12.

PART II

Country Studies East & Southeast Asia

CHAPTER 3

Leaning Towards the Light? The Path to Open Government in Taiwan Tsai-Tsu Su, Nai-Ling Kuo, and Hsini Huang

Introduction Open government (OG) has received considerable attention from practitioners and scholars worldwide in recent years because of its significant role in promoting government efficiency, eliminating corruption, and enhancing democratic governance. The term was formally introduced as early as 1957 by Wallace Parks, a member of the subcommittee on Government Information of the U.S. Congress, who argued that openness and accessibility are essential to government accountability (Wallace, 1957). However, the key to OG’s rapid development in the twenty-first

T.-T. Su (*) • N.-L. Kuo National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] H. Huang National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan University Leiden, The Hague, Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_3

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century was closely related to U.S. President Obama’s Open Government Directive. In his Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies of 2009, Obama says, “We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in government.”1 This statement kickstarted the promotion of the doctrine in countries worldwide. Under the influence of other countries promoting OG, the Taiwanese government has also embraced it. However, the process of making government transparent and open has a unique historical background in Taiwan that is different from other countries. After a long period of authoritarian rule by the Nationalist Party (KMT), Taiwan lifted martial law in 1987. It then gradually drove a series of reforms aimed at freedom, openness, and accountability, including the first direct presidential election in 1996, the beginning of promoting e-government in 1998, the promulgation of the Freedom of Information Act in 2005, and the launch of the Open Government Data Platform (http://data.gov.tw) in 2013. In addition, it is worth mentioning the significant impact of the Sunflower Student Movement of 2014 on the development of OG in Taiwan. In March 2014, a group of people, many of them college students and postgraduates, became dissatisfied with the Legislative Yuan’s rapid passing of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, protesting that the bill review process lacked transparency and amounted to a “black-box” process. They led the student movement and occupied the legislative chamber for 24 days. Known as the Sunflower Student Movement, protesters regard sunflowers as a symbol of sunlight or a movement spirit that pursue openness and transparency in the policy process. The impact of this social movement was controversial, but it did promote civic participation in Taiwan and strengthen the power of civil society (Lee & Tseng, 2017). Another impact is the emphasis on youth participation and seriously viewing young people as crucial political actors. After the Sunflower Student Movement ended, it continued to influence Taiwanese society. For instance, in the highly competitive local elections at the end of 2014, many mayoral candidates made their stance on OG a vital part of their campaign to gain the support of young voters. Political newcomer Wen-Je Ko, for example, used the campaign slogan 1  https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/transparency-and-open-government, 2022/07/31.

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“open government, participation across the nation,” and won a landslide victory to be elected mayor of Taipei City. Moreover, immediately after taking office, he fulfilled his promise to set up a participatory budgeting mechanism for Taipei City and an “i-voting system” allowing residents to vote online on issues of public concern, both considered valuable tools in implementing OG. Presently, most Taiwanese people believe that following the dismantling of the authoritarian regime, the government should continue in the direction of democratic participation and deepen its OG strategy to enhance government effectiveness. At the Open Government Partnership summit in Canada in 2019, the Taiwanese government announced it would launch an OG action plan on its initiative to highlight the government’s determination to promote OG. Then, in January 2021, the government released the “Taiwan Open Government Action Plan 2021–2024” and began officially implementing its first OG action plan. The Action Plan is based on four key concepts of OG, including transparency, participation, accountability, and inclusion.2 While there is no single, universally accepted definition of OG, several of its core principles have emerged gradually. Wirtz and Birkmeyer (2015) first summarize the three pillars of OG as transparency, participation, and collaboration, suggesting the conduct of OG should ensure public access to information, encourage public engagement, and cooperate with the public to create new government solutions. Then, in 2017, OECD defined OG as “a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholders’ participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth” (OECD, 2017). It implicitly argues that transparency, integrity, accountability, and stakeholders’ participation are the four core elements of OG. Furthermore, OECD/UN ESCWA (2021) emphasizes that OG nowadays aims to promote an ethos of transparency, collaboration, and inclusion, regardless of its definition. In summary, OG encompasses core concepts such as transparency, participation, collaboration, accountability, integrity, and inclusion. Among them, the four principles adopted in the “Taiwan Open Government Action Plan 2021–2024” 2  Taiwan Open Government National Action Plan, 2021–2024 https://ws.ndc.gov.tw/ Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9hZG1pbmlzdHJhdG9yLzExL3JlbGZpbGUvMC8xMzY5My 84YzRmMWVmNi01NTk0LTQyMTYtYjFkNS04MjE1YzEzY2JmODIucGRm&n=MTI 4YTJkNDctZWJkYi00OGZhLTkyODAtMzY5YjQ4NmZiOTM2LnBkZg%3d%3d&icon=. pdf 08/08/2021.

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(i.e., transparency, participation, accountability, and inclusion) are described as “a new development consensus” to enhance governance quality (Carothers & Brechenmacher, 2014; Genyi & Mamuda, 2020). The next section will introduce the relevant policies in Taiwan that match the core OG principles. The policy highlights introduced are (1) participatory budgeting, (2) youth advisory committees, (3) open data, and (4) online civic engagement platforms. In section “Assessing the Performance of Open Government”, we then use transparency, participation, inclusion, and accountability—four core principles specified in Taiwan Open Government Action Plan—to comprehensively evaluate the performance of Taiwan’s OG practices. The final section will discuss the challenges and strategies to ensure a successful implementation of OG in the future.

Policy Highlights of Open Government Participatory Budgeting Participatory budgeting emphasizes allocating government budgetary resources in an open, transparent, democratic way that is consistent with the concept of OG (Touchton & Wampler, 2014). Thus, participatory budgeting has become a favored tool for many governments as they promote OG. In Taiwan, participatory budgeting gained prominence in the 2014 local elections. It was one of the leading campaign platforms of Wen-Je Ko in his bid to be elected Taipei mayor. To date, many central government agencies and local governments in Taiwan have adopted or tried the practice. As Alfaro et al. (2010) mention, participatory budgeting comes in different forms and has different implementation approaches in different political environments. In Taiwan, we could observe the following three operational models which include: local councilors’ discretionary funds, outsourcing, and the administrative agency model (Su, 2017). The councilor’s discretionary fund (CDF) is a long-standing system in many local governments in Taiwan. Under this system, a local councilor is entitled to a fixed amount of government budget each year, which he/she is free to spend on public infrastructure or to subsidize his or her constituency activities. In 2016, New Taipei City councilor Yi-Chun Chen asked the City Government for $600,000 NTD (approximately USD 20,000) for use on projects proposed and selected by her constituents through a

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participatory budgeting process. It is the first instance of using participatory budgeting procedures to decide the usage of local councilors’ discretionary funds in Taiwan.3 The outsourcing model is currently mostly adopted as the participatory budgeting practice in Taiwan. In this model, administrative agencies select NGOs or experts via a tender process and commission them to carry out the participatory budgeting work. The work usually includes designing the process, chairing residence meetings to brainstorm project ideas, and mobilizing residents to vote on proposals. Many local and central government agencies in Taiwan prefer this participatory budgeting model. It is because public officials may not be familiar with the participatory budgeting process and its related concepts, especially when it was first introduced in Taiwan (Su, 2017, p. 6). For example, the Ministry of Culture commissioned National Taiwan University’s Department of Sociology to carry out the Promotion of Civic Engagement and Participatory Budgeting Experiment in 2015, which was the pioneer of the outsourcing model in Taiwan. The third model is the administrative agency model. Under this model, the administrative agency is in charge of planning and executing the entire participatory budgeting process. Residents are invited to put forward proposals, and government agencies help evaluate the feasibility of these proposals. This collaborative proposal will then return to the public to be discussed and put to the vote. Proposals that pass will be incorporated into the government budget that year or the next and implemented by the government. Compared with the councilor’s discretionary fund model and the outsourcing model, the administrative agency model comes with the highest administrative costs in terms of staffing and time. Nevertheless, it gives public servants the highest degree of participation and collaboration in the process. Moreover, the cumulative experience of public servants, the degree of substantive public participation, and the degree of government openness are also more significant than in the preceding two models. At the time of writing, Taipei, the nation’s capital and economic and political center, was the only city with the most mature civil society and 3  There are previous examples of using the CEF model in participatory budgeting in other countries. For example, in 2009, Chicago’s 49th District Councilman Joe Moore released US$1.3 million from his councilors’ discretionary fund and let his constituency vote to determine the usage of money. Many local councilors in Chicago and New York have followed suit since.

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governance capability in Taiwan that could support and continue adopting the administrative agency model. Statistics show that from 2016 to 2022, more than 1,211,000 people4 in Taipei engaged in participatory budgeting events such as training courses, proposal meetings, resident meetings, and online votes. As of May 2022, 422 resident proposals were incorporated into government budgets, and 380 of these have been successfully implemented.5 Overall, the accomplishment of participatory budgeting in Taipei lives up to its expectation. Youth Advisory Committees The vigorous development of OG in Taiwan is related to the Sunflower Student Movement mentioned above. The Movement has sparked many young people’s interest in public affairs, and some are keen to get involved in the decision-making in public policies. Thus, in 2016, the Executive Yuan of the central government set up a National Youth Advisory Committee whose main task is to collect opinions and provide advice on public policies that reach the young generation. Local governments quickly follow this trend. Today, six municipalities and ten other county and city governments have set up youth advisory or youth affairs committees for the general population or specific ethnic groups (such as indigenous peoples). The selection criteria for youth advisory committee members differ from ministry to ministry and city to city. In Taichung City,6 for example, an open selection is conducted among young people aged 15–35 who are registered as residing, studying, or working in Taichung City, whether self-registered or on the recommendation of government agencies. The selection is carried out by representatives from youth-related industries or media, scholars and experts, and public sector representatives. In 2021, more than 350 young people aged 15–35 ran for election, and 100 were selected to form the Taichung City Youth Affairs Advisory Committee. The powers, responsibilities, and modes of operation of committees also vary widely. In general, the committees have a reasonably broad scope 4  This figure calculates the total number of participations; that is, if the same person participates in three activities, it will be counted as three people. 5  Data was collected from the official website of Taipei’s participatory budgeting, see https://pb.taipei/Default.aspx. 6  Taichung City is the second largest city in Taiwan in terms of population. As of May 2022, its population is close to 2.8 million.

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over public affairs, ranging from foreign policies (e.g., the New Southbound Policy) to internal affairs (e.g., social housing, review of the election system for university presidents, and the installation of gender-neutral toilets). Open Data In line with the global shift towards FOI and OG, Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan enacted the Freedom of Government Information Law in 2005, which laid the legal groundwork for OG. Then, in 2013, we saw the continued effort regarding the official launch of the Open Data Platform (https://data.gov.tw/), a centralized portal of government agencies’ open data that is available to the public. Open Data involve sharing data over the Internet. Therefore, all government bodies are required to disclose government information on this platform per three criteria: open license, open access, and open format. All citizens, organizations, enterprises, and government bodies can download and use the data released on the platform. The goal is not only to let individuals or private industries create added value to data but also to reduce the information asymmetry between the public and government organizations and to improve public service delivery. As of November 2022, more than 58,400 data sets have been published on the Open Data Platform.7 Meanwhile, to prevent open data becomes merely “…unidirectional sources of information for residents with internet access” (Young, 2020, p.305) and to stimulate more innovations in data application and closer public-private partnership, the central government has held the annual Presidential Hackathon since 2018 to provide government data and another avenue for civic engagement actively. It is encouraging to see that some winning projects from previous hackathons have produced positive results. For the 2019 Smart Nation Hackathon, for instance, the Judicial Yuan developed the Judgement Parser, which helps non-jurists make sense of court judgments by providing ordinary-language annotations of legal terminology.8 However, most winning projects from the Presidential Hackathon are still at the early stage of idea initiation or the stage of idea experimentation. Hence, it is too early to say when those policies and efforts in open data could effectively enable civic engagement and innovation in society, as suggested by Zuiderwijk and Janssen (2014). 7 8

 https://data.gov.tw/dataset/15946. 2022/11/26.  https://presidential-hackathon.taiwan.gov.tw/teams.html. 2022/08/08.

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Online Civic Engagement Platforms There are two influential online platforms on which Taiwanese people can participate in policymaking. One is the JOIN platform, an e-petition website, and the other is vTaiwan, a platform for creating consensus and drawing up recommendations for digital economy regulations and legislations. The central government set up the JOIN platform in 2015 to provide people with a way to create e-petitions or express opinions online. It has become a permanent channel enabling everyone with legal residency status to participate in public affairs. Proposed policies or petitions go through four stages: proposal, review, endorsement, and government response (Huang et  al., 2020). For example, in 2017, someone complained on the JOIN platform that filing income tax online was complex and filed a petition urging the income tax software interface to be improved. The petition passed the review stage and got enough signatures from other participants, and the Ministry of Finance responded immediately. The Ministry of Finance held collaborative meetings with stakeholders to probe the problems of the existing system. Then in 2018, the Ministry launched a new interface for Web-based tax filing, which is more user-friendly and has dramatically improved its compatibility with different OS systems. In addition to responding to petitions passively, government agencies can also address controversial policies on the JOIN platform and invite the public to provide feedback or participate in online discussions. For instance, the Ministry of Health and Welfare used this platform to broach the issue of second-generation health insurance cards and collect public feedback on the idea of virtual health insurance cards.9 vTaiwan is another experimental online platform for public participation focusing on inviting discussions on laws and regulations related to the digital economy. It originated in a civic hackathon held by a nonprofit organization in 2014. vTaiwan has a strong streak of public-private collaboration. Through the joint efforts of civil society and government agencies, many bills relating to online economic activities can be fully discussed on this platform, which increases the possibility of bill passage in the Legislative Yuan. For instance, in 2015, when taxi drivers raised the legal issue of Uber’s operations in Taiwan, a 2-hour live-streamed meeting 9  https://join.gov.tw/policies/detail/dc226809-6651-406e-8841-87fefec51875. 2022/11/20.

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was convened on vTaiwan with 1875 online participants, including stakeholders from academia, industries, and government agencies. Therefore, the bill regarding Uber’s operation had reached a certain degree of consensus among stakeholders before it was sent to the Legislative Yuan for review. As a result, Uber drivers could finally operate legally in Taiwan based on Article 103-1 of the “Regulations for Automobile Transportation Operators” amendment or the so-called Uber clause passed in 2019.

Assessing the Performance of Open Government Since martial law was lifted in Taiwan in the late 1980s, there has been gradual progress towards openness, transparency, and democratic participation in the government. However, it was not until the Sunflower Student Movement that the term “open government” gained traction. Its core concepts (i.e., transparency, public participation, inclusion, and accountability) have also become more actively pursued by the general public and civil society. Thus, the following section further examines whether these core concepts have been fulfilled in implementing OG in recent years. Transparency Though scholars argue that transparency is not a coherent normative ideal (Pozen, 2020, p.326), today, nobody would question “sunlight is the best antiseptic.” Transparency has become a desirable value in the democratization society such as Taiwan. Following the passing of the Freedom of Government Information Law in 2005 and the setting up of the Open Data Platform in 2013, the Taiwanese government proactively disclosed many official documents and data, and the transaction cost of obtaining government information has decreased. In particular, since the Sunflower Student Movement, the social atmosphere has emphasized openness and transparency. The minutes from many government meetings and public hearings have been promptly released to the public. In other words, policy processes and results seem to possess greater openness and transparency. However, a closer look at actual operations and development reveals many problems. Though government agencies publish information online following the Freedom of Government Information Law, the quantity and quality of data released are unsatisfactory. Many government data are incomplete or inconsistent. Studies have also found that open data practices and willingness to open up vary from agency to agency (Chu &

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Tseng, 2016, p. 65). For example, the Ministry of Labor stopped updating advisory group meeting minutes in 2019. The minutes of Ministry of Foreign Affairs advisory group meetings are not made public on the grounds that the information is too sensitive and inappropriate for disclosure. We begin to observe passive attitudes to openness and strategic behaviors of open data practices (e.g., the workaround with current open policy by raising the bar to citizens’ data requests). The Open Culture Foundation also criticized the Open Data Platform for focusing on quantity over quality, the inconsistent quality of data sets uploaded on the portal, and the fact that many data sets cannot be used without further manual processing (Lee & Tseng, 2017). The differences in the public officials’ attitudes and practices may derive from officials’ fear of public accountability brought about by openness and transparency (Huang et al., 2020). In addition, progress in fiscal transparency has been unstable and not fully met expectations. Since 1992, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense budgets have divided their annual budgets into the black budget (i.e., classified) and the open budget. With the move towards democratization and fiscal transparency, the relative size of the two ministries’ black budgets has been reduced yearly. Taking the example of the 2020 government budget proposal, the Ministry of Defense’s open budget accounted for 93% of total funding, while that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached 95% (Tseng, 2019). Both have displayed good progress towards openness and transparency. However, we have also witnessed a reverse trend towards fiscal opaqueness. For example, in 2011, the government amended the law to allow the National Security Bureau (NSB) to compile classified budgets for the first time. Nevertheless, the Legislative Yuan’s Budget Center report released in October 2019 indicates that further review is needed to determine the appropriateness of the Bureau’s black budget items (such as clothing costs for Secret Service personnel), and it is not reasonable for the black portion of the NSB’s 2020 budget to be more than 80% of the total.10 In response to the criticism, less than 2 months later, the government amended the law to allow the NSB to hide its black budget across the budgets of other agencies. The reasoning was that this move would evade enemy intelligence and is helpful to national security. However, it is clear that the practice significantly reduced the Legislative Yuan’s ability to supervise the NSB budget and took a step backward in fiscal transparency (Chen, 2016).  https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=33566&pid=188698. 2022/08/08

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Additionally, since 2018, the Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) has routinely used a classified budget of 5–8% of the annual total. Though the proportion is not large, there is no clear explanation of the legal basis and legitimacy for OCAC to compile a black budget. Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic that began in 2019 gave Taiwan’s central government almost unchecked power in the name of pandemic prevention. Only a few people are allowed to participate in the pandemic prevention decision-making process, and the procurement process for vaccines and medical supplies is no longer open and transparent. The quantity and price of purchases, the distribution of anti-pandemic supplies, and the selection criteria for contractors who procure rapid test kits are rarely disclosed. At the same time, public and media attention has been focused during the pandemic on the numbers of confirmed cases and pandemic news, leaving no time to review other public policies. As a result, the transparency of policy formation and implementation on issues unrelated to the pandemic has also been negatively affected. Public Participation The 2014 Sunflower Student Movement has increased civic engagement significantly, especially among young people. It successfully pushed the adoption of participatory budgeting and the setting up of the Youth Advisory Committees in many government agencies. They went rapidly and smoothly at the outset. However, after being in operation for some time, only with a few exceptions, participatory budgeting and the Youth Advisory Committees have become mere formalities or are being poorly executed. For example, the councilor’s discretionary fund (CDF) in Taiwan has long been criticized for lacking a transparent monitoring mechanism and for the ease with which it can become an election tool benefiting local factions. Thus, when in 2016, local councilors decided to allot part of their CDF to the participatory budgeting process to allow constituents to determine their use, it was expected that the new model would improve the transparency and legitimacy of the CDF. However, since the new model was introduced, only a few local councilors have supported it. By the end of 2021, only 11 proposals for using the councilor’s discretionary funds in New Taipei City were made through the participatory budgeting process. The main reason is that participatory budgeting creates far less political capital than other forms of budget allocation, and it has higher

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time and communication costs, so it fails to rouse the interest of other city councilors (Yeh, 2021). Another approach to participatory budgeting adopted in Taiwan is the outsourcing model. This model can be advantageous because it reduces pressure on public officials with insufficient knowledge and experience of participatory budgeting, thus also reducing resistance to its introduction. However, the outsourcing model also has risks. First, the tedious public procurement procedures and regulations imply that the most suitable contractor might be reluctant to participate in the bidding, so it is not easy to find a competent contractor. Second, if public officials do not have sufficient capabilities or suitable mechanisms to supervise the contractor, outsourcing results may not be held accountable. The last and most critical point is that the public officials, not contractors, have to stand in front of the public when implementing spending plans proposed and selected by residents via participatory budgeting. Thus, if public officials rely too much on outsourcing, it not only increases the communication cost of budget implementation but also deprives public officials of the opportunity to learn from the interaction with the participants in the process. The administrative agency model is the most demanding of the three models of participatory budgeting regarding public servant effort and time. It may also encroach on the city council’s budget review powers, which could easily lead to conflict between the local government and the city council (Su, 2017). It happened in Taipei City Government, the only Taiwanese city insisting on using the administrative model and caused dissatisfaction and raised doubt among councilors about participatory budgeting. No matter which model is adopted, existing literature indicates that participatory budgeting could impose a considerable burden on the public service system and might not last long without institutionalizing participation budgeting (Bartocci et  al., 2022). Additionally, without enough administrative aid, financial resources, and political support, participatory budgeting might be discontinued after showing once or twice. Thus, in most government agencies, enthusiasm for participatory budgeting is shrinking except Taipei City Government. Likewise, there has been much noise but little action about Youth Advisory Committees, with participants complaining that government policymakers do not take the outcomes of committee meetings and discussions seriously. Although Youth Advisory Committees have had

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different levels of effectiveness, and some still play a role in civic engagement, it is widely agreed that their significance is more symbolic than substantive. However, even if participatory budgeting and Youth Advisory Committees have been poorly executed or criticized for being mere box-­ ticking, they have positively impacted the strength of civil society. The process of public participation in decision-making has been educational to participants. Compared with the traditional civic participation mechanisms (e.g., opinion polls, public hearings, petitions, voting), the theory and practice of OG emphasize more on the spirit of deliberation. Evans and Campos (2013) argue that the ultimate goal of OG is to enable citizens to understand complex policy issues, thereby enabling meaningful policy deliberation. In other words, highly decontextualized government information disclosure or pro forma discussion processes are not true to the essence of OG. Instead, the real task is to use full discussion to help the public and other stakeholders understand the ins and outs of various policy options, the pros and cons, and their potential consequences. Only then will we have graduated from “participation” to “collaboration” in the true spirit of OG. Inclusion The idea of inclusion implies that the government should try to listen to and accommodate the opinions of all stakeholders during the process of public policy formation, so as to reduce the possibility of policy mistakes, and that government resources should be used as much as possible for the benefit of disadvantaged groups. Assessing the implementation of OG in Taiwan, we find that, although it has expanded civic engagement, there has been a disappointing lack of significant progress in terms of inclusion. The main reason is the polarization of the nation’s Blue/Green political divide. The policy-formulation process has failed to consider a diverse range of voices, and ordinary people, journalists, and policymakers tend to pick sides on the basis of their own political ideology but not on rational discussions to address mutual understandings and the optimal solutions. As a result, government policies in recent years tend to be insufficiently inclusive. The nuclear energy and Covid-19 pandemic policies are prominent examples in recent years. Nuclear energy policy, for example, has been a political agenda rather than a security or energy one in Taiwan.

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In addition to the ideological polarization of Blue/Green politics, an unfavorable cross-generational antagonism has also been gradually forming. Specifically, Taiwan’s pension schemes and medical care for the elderly constitute a weighty financial burden. It means the younger generation will inevitably blame older people as they face a long-term, low-wage environment and high housing prices. On the other hand, many older people criticize the younger generation for attaching too much importance to personal rights and freedom, being unwilling to take on the burden of raising children and eschewing arduous work environments. However, young people are more able to use new media to speak out and actively seek opportunities for public participation, so they have received more attention from political leaders. Thus, young people have become more vocal in the formation of many policies such as housing, education, childcare allowance, gender diversity policies, and so on. It has led to many policies giving priority to meeting the needs of the young. Consequently, it is impossible to target the government’s limited budgetary resources at truly disadvantaged groups, which undermines efforts for inclusion. Lastly, the rise of social media in recent years has meant that often during elections or major policy debates in Taiwan, public opinion has been manipulated by “online agitators.” In this context, it is difficult for the various stakeholders to hold a rational discussion on a particular policy, and it is also difficult for policymakers to rationally consider all reasonable opinions voiced by different groups. This is another critical reason why Taiwan has failed to realize the spirit of inclusiveness in promoting OG. Public Accountability Public accountability means that public officials are held responsible for the consequences of their decisions and actions, and that they accept sanctions and rewards, as appropriate (Bovens, 2007). In Taiwan, apart from elections, media commentary, and public opinion, the main mechanisms for public accountability include political accountability from the Legislative Yuan, the administrative and political accountability from the Control Yuan, and the legal accountability from the judicial system. Accountability is premised on openness and transparency (Piotrowski et al., 2009). If we do not know what public officials have done, we cannot give them appropriate rewards and punishments. However, even with transparency, whether voters and institutions hand out rewards and punishment fairly and equitably is another question.

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In theory, the mass media, elections, parliamentary inquiries, and investigations by the Control Yuan and the Judicial Yuan evaluate, reward, and sanction politicians and government bodies for their performance. This is the essence of public accountability. However, Taiwan’s Blue/Green divide runs deep, as mentioned above. It not only leads to the failure of inclusiveness but sometimes also affects the operations of the Control Yuan and the judicial system, which should be objective and neutral. The situation often leads to undue political influence and reduces public trust in Control Yuan’s and Judicial Yuan’s judgments. Thus, it is sometimes debatable whether civil servants and political figures can be held accountable for their actions via investigations by the Control Yuan or the judicial system. In conclusion, of the four core values of OG—transparency, public participation, inclusion, and public accountability—we believe that it is in public accountability that progress has been the slowest.

Conclusions and Further Challenges Thirty years after the end of martial law, Taiwan gradually moved towards openness and democracy. In the wake of the Sunflower Student Movement, the OG concepts of transparency, public participation, inclusion, and public accountability have become more apparent. Among the various OG measures that have been put in place in Taiwan, participatory budgeting, youth advisory committees, open data, and online civic engagement platforms have attracted the most attention. Though far from ideal, these OG measures have achieved some benefits, especially transparency and public participation. The public faces lower transaction costs when acquiring government information and comprehending public policies. People are encouraged to actively practice citizenship and are more willing to care about and participate in public affairs. As the Taiwanese government becomes more open and participatory, it does not necessarily become more inclusive and accountable. Due to the deep political divide and the mutual distrust engendered by polarized political ideologies, it has created obstacles to inclusion and a high distrust of the public accountability mechanism (i.e., the mass media, the Control Yuan, and the judicial system). Thus, inclusion and public accountability, the two other core values of OG, have made slower progress in Taiwan than transparency and public participation.

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Overall, efforts to implement OG measures send a clear signal of government’s commitment to strengthen the dialogue with citizens and to invite them to play a greater role in shaping policies. Successful or not, it inevitably increases the administrative burden on the already overworked bureaucratic system and may trigger bureaucrats’ resistance to the reform measures. Hence, future challenges will lie in knowing how to continue to elicit the support and cooperation of public servants. There are several strategies to address the challenges. First, it is important to prioritize quality over quantity in pursuing information transparency and public participation. As the literature suggests, more information does not necessarily increase efficiency or help build trust (Fung et  al., 2007; Lessig, 2009). To acquire the benefit of transparency, one has to incorporate data and information into complex chains of comprehension because responses to information are inseparable from his/her interests, resources, cognitive capacities, and social contexts (Fung, 2007). Similarly, more participants do not necessarily contribute to better policy decisions. If the policy result does not match the interest in public participation, then involving large numbers of participants would create a big rhetoric-practice gap (Cooke & Kothari, 2001). Therefore, instead of dumping data and information hastily on the open data platform, the focus should be on improving the quality of information and reducing the risk of misinterpretation and misuse. Instead of being obsessed with increasing the number of proposals/e-petitions and voting rates on the participatory budgeting and online civic engagement platforms, it is more meaningful to stimulate rich discussions on the participatory budgeting and online platforms and get more disadvantaged groups to participate. Focusing on quality rather than quantity will ease the workload for public servants. More importantly, it also reveals the real impact of OG measures, which helps public servants understand that their efforts are meaningful and not just for political shows. Secondly, to better facilitate and encourage public servants’ cooperation in promoting OG, it is necessary to empower them. After all, implementing participatory budgeting, open data platforms, youth advisory committees, and online civic engagement platforms all involve additional skills and knowledge. Therefore, human resource training organizations in the government must upgrade their training programs and methods. The goal is to equip public servants with better communication and ICT skills and more understanding of OG concepts to ensure feasible approaches to OG are in place.

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Lastly, the Taiwanese government should not focus entirely on the bright side of OG. It should also anticipate and be responsible for the possible costs. Adopting new measures is never free. It consumes substantial staff time and creates various risks such as privacy violation, misinterpretation and misuse of data, and power imbalance. However, the Taiwanese government is currently far from sufficient in assessing and mitigating various risks associated with openness, whether judging from legislation making or resource deployment. Many scholars see transparency and participation jointly as a “precondition for trust” (Meijer et al., 2012, p. 22). However, it is not a sufficient condition. Though Taiwan has made improvements in government transparency and public participation, political polarization and lack of trust remain significant barriers to promoting inclusion and accountability in Taiwan. How can Taiwanese society change such an unhealthy political environment? The solution to it will not come easy. Nevertheless, we believe that if the government continues to advance toward the goals of meaningful policy transparency and public participation, Taiwan’s civil society and deliberative democracy will inevitably grow more mature over time. Only mature citizens can dismiss political prejudice and learn to accept people whose values differ from their own, thus leading to inclusive and equitable policies. It is also expected that only a mature civic society can more effectively monitor government actions using complete information and respect the outcomes of professional organizations that adjudicate public accountability.

References Alfaro, C., Gomez, J., & Rios, J. (2010). From participatory to e-participatory budgets. In I. D. Rios & S. French (Eds.), e-Democracy: A group decision and negotiation approach (pp.  283–299). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/ 978-­90-­481-­9045-­4_16 Bartocci, L., Grossi, G., Mauro, S. G., & Ebdon, C. (2022). The journey of participatory budgeting: A systematic literature review and future research directions. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 1–18. https://doi. org/10.1177/00208523221078938 Bovens, M. (2007). Analysing and assessing accountability: A conceptual framework. European Law Journal, 13(4), 447–468. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1468-­0386.2007.00378.x

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Carothers, T., & Brechenmacher, S. (2014). Accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion. A new development consensus? Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Chen, L-Y. (2016). Classified budget of National Security Bureau hides in executive Yuan’s amendment, ‘DPP is so arrogant due to unified government’ said Yu-fang Lin. The Storm Media, 1 December. https://www.storm.mg/ article/196451 Chu, P.-Y., & Tseng, H.-L. (2016). Open data quality. Public Governance Quarterly, 4(4), 54–66. Cooke, B., & Kothari, U. (2001). Participation: The new tyranny? Zed Books. Evans, A. M., & Campos, A. (2013). Open government initiatives: Challenges of citizen participation. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(1), 172–185. Fung, A., Graham, M., & Weil, D. (2007). Full disclosure: The perils and promise of transparency. Cambridge University Press. Genyi, G. A., & Mamuda, A. (2020). Qualifying governance towards a new development consensus: The imperative of accountability, transparency, participation and inclusion. Fulafia Journals of Social Sciences (FJSS), 3(4), 1–13. file:///C:/ Users/user/Desktop/93-Article%20Text-­280-­1-10-20210719.pdf. Huang, H., Liao, C. Z.-P., Liao, H.-C., & Chen, D.-Y. (2020). Resisting by workarounds: Unraveling the barriers of implementing open government data policy. Government Information Quarterly, 37(4), 101495. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.giq.2020.101495 Lee, M-C., & Tseng, P-Y. (2017). Taiwan open government report. Open Culture Foundation. https://opengovreport.ocf.tw/assets/pdf/report-­en.pdf Lessig, L. (2009, October 9). Against transparency: The perils of openness in government. The New Republic,. https://newrepublic.com/article/70097/ against-­transparency Meijer, A.  J., Curtin, D., & Hillebrandt, M. (2012). Open government: Connecting vision and voice. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(1), 10–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852311429533 OECD. (2017). The OECD Recommendation of the Council on Open Government. https://www.oecd.org/gov/Recommendation-­O pen-­G overnment-­ Approved-­Council-­141217.pdf OECD/UN ESCWA. (2021). The economic and social impact of open government: Policy recommendations for the Arab countries. OECD Public Governance Reviews. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/ 6b3e2469-­en Piotrowski, S. J., Zhang, Y., Lin, W., & Yu, W. (2009). Key issues for implementation of Chinese open government information regulations. Public Administration Review, 69(s1), S129–S135.

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Pozen, D.  E. (2020). Seeing transparency more clearly. Public Administration Review, 80(2), 326–331. Su, T.-T. (2017). Participatory budgeting in the public sector: Experiences and reflections. Journal of Civil Service, 9(2), 1–22. Touchton, M., & Wampler, B. (2014). Improving social well-being through new democratic institutions. Comparative Political Studies, 47(10), 1442–1469. Tseng, W-H. (2019). 2020 budget evaluation report of the National Security Bureau. Budget Center of the Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeid=33566 Wallace, P. (1957). Open government principle: Applying the right to know under the constitution. George Washington Law Review, 26, 1–22. Wirtz, B. W., & Birkmeyer, S. (2015). Open government: Origin, development, and conceptual perspectives. International Journal of Public Administration, 38(5), 381–396. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.942735 Yeh, T-C. (2021). Only 11 councilor’s-discretionary-fund-type participatory budgeting cases completed in 6 years. China Times, 20 November. https://www. chinatimes.com/newspapers/20211120000459-­260107?chdtv Young, M.  M. (2020). Implementation of digital-era governance: The case of open data in U.S. cities. Public Administration Review, 80(2), 305–315. Zuiderwijk, A., & Janssen, M. (2014). Open data policies, their implementation and impact: A framework for comparison. Government Information Quarterly, 31(1), 17–29. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2013.04.003

CHAPTER 4

Open Government and Freedom of Information: The Philippine Experience Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan, and Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz Overview The greatest disinfectant is said to be sunlight (Brandeis, 1914). It is a widely accepted notion, decades after the late US Supreme Court Associate Justice Louis Brandeis emphasized the necessity of transparency in The original version of this chapter has been revised. Author’s name has been corrected. The correction to this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_18 A. B. Brillantes Jr. (*) University of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] C. R. W. B. Lilangan Holy Angel University, Angeles, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] K. E. V. Ruiz University of Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023, corrected publication 2024 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_4

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combating fraudulent activities. Many experts agree that openness in government agencies is a significant weapon in avoiding and fighting corruption (Kaufmann, 2005). Corruption and secrecy are deeply entwined. The more transparent all aspects of record-keeping in public administrations are, the better equipped they will be to avoid vulnerabilities that could mask instances of corruption. Laws must assure that all information generated by government activities is correctly documented to give evidence about the functions performed. This setting is especially important when it comes to high officials’ jobs (Casadesús de Mingo & Cerrillo-i-Martínez, 2018). Indeed, the public’s awareness of government activities facilitates effective oversight of government officials and employees’ actions and avoids corruption, which thrive in cultures of secrecy (Bauhr & Grimes, 2013; Lindstedt & Naurin, 2010; Vian, 2020). Calls for more transparency and accountability in public affairs challenge all national and local authorities (Olsen, 2015; World Bank, 2017). Southeast Asia has low governance scores regarding transparency, accountability, and other characteristics of good governance. There will always be differences from one country to the next and from one level of government to another (Gabriel, 2017). Transparency and accountability must be institutionalized, especially at the local level, to encourage citizen participation in local development and increase public trust (Gabriel & Mangahas, 2016). Hence, governments often need to do much more to be committed and engaged in improving information openness and accountability (Gabriel, 2017). Accountability is based on the openness and movement of data between governments and the public. It entails establishing facts and assigning responsibility, developing and implementing norms for assessing conduct and reasons given, and cultivating and deploying capabilities for sanctioning inappropriate behaviour—all in ways that recognize and act on how obligations and powers are structured and practiced in the public sector (Olsen, 2015). It is widely accepted as a necessary element of a democratic system and governance (Gabriel, 2017). Transparency is about providing accurate, correct information about organizational activities to insiders and outsiders. In governance, it can be passive, active, or compulsory. It is an aspect that can be used to assess an institution’s inner structure or effectiveness that impacts a community’s social, political, and economic growth (Ingrams, 2016). Transparency is essential for opening up government and governance to facilitate inspection and citizen participation (Gabriel, 2017). An institution must be transparent to be accountable, and if an institution is open, it is likely to be

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accountable as it has nothing to conceal. The more open the government, the more responsible the officials are (Mallya, 2009). The pressure for accountable governance originates from citizens’ awareness of the service quality they deserve and should obtain (Perante-Calina, 2015). Accountability and transparency are keys to governance effectiveness, with accountability being effective when people, efficacy refers to a person’s actions in response to fresh information, do not re-elect those who are politically accountable for undesirable policies. At the same time, collective engagement increases the price of inaction for those with authority to hold others accountable. This link between accountability and information-­based openness is something that policymakers and administrators must invest in. It is dynamic, and changing, with publicity playing an important role in the processes that make knowledge available, accessible, and usable (World Bank, 2017). Similarly, in the Philippines, two principal factors drive transparency and accountability. The first is external influence. As the Philippines had co-founded the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT), it will be challenging to gain the international community’s confidence and emulation if a so-called openness champion has a modest performance in transparency (Capistrano, 2017). Second, previous administrations were rocked by successive corruption scandals, which caused plummeting confidence in the government (Thompson, 2014; Villanueva, 2018). Then-President Benigno Simeon Aquino III inherited a government that was internationally regarded to be highly corrupt. Based on the electoral promise of good governance and eliminating corruption, the Aquino III presidency spearheaded transparency initiatives, including ICT, to regain the citizens’ trust and convey that the country is investment-friendly (Capistrano, 2017; Villanueva, 2018). Unlike its Asian neighbours, the Philippines has long been seen as a leader in promoting social accountability and encouraging civil society participation, particularly in infrastructure development (Rodan & Hughes, 2012). Before the OGP, several government projects used digital platforms to close the gap between state and citizens. Bottom-up Budgeting, Budget ng Bayan (The Nation’s Budget) and Pera ng Bayan (The People’s Money) are examples of public forums and participatory programs for transparency. Civil society has also launched various initiatives to encourage active people’s engagement in public affairs. The Citizens Participatory Auditing, a multi-award-winning collaboration between the Philippine Commission on Audit (COA) and the Affiliated Network for Social

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Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP), is one of these efforts. Government Watch, Bantay Kita (Profit Watch), and Pera Natin Ito! (This is our money!) are examples of civil society projects. Civil Service Organizations: People’s Participation Partnership Program, Pork Barrel Watch, Procurement Watch, Automated Election System Watch, Social Watch, and Civil Society Index (Pacis, 2017). After being among the first states in the Asia-Pacific region to institutionalize civil society participation in public purchasing and anti-­corruption mechanisms, the administrations of Duterte, Macapagal-Arroyo, and Benigno S.  Aquino III made progress towards enhancing transparency and openness, both generally and in the construction of infrastructure (Mendoza, & Cruz, 2020). After entering the OGP in 2011, the Philippines pledged to uphold information openness, civic involvement, citizen participation, and technology and innovation for transparency and accountability (Saxena, 2018). The Philippines announced its 5th National Action Plan (2019–2022), a guiding document for its Open Government (OG) Commitments. The themes are improving education quality through information openness supported by new technology and strong public participation, responsible use of natural resources in the extractive sector, simplified and corruption-­ free government purchasing, and labour peace. A wide group of stakeholders, such as those with disabilities, LGBTQIA+ people, the elderly, and indigenous peoples, in policy consultation and advocacy is also included. The Action Plan also emphasized the significance of enacting broad FOI legislation and localizing FOI programs so that even tiny communities may enjoy public transparency and accountability. While there is still much to be done, all of these measures are significant milestones toward institutionalizing an open culture in the public sector to win and preserve people’s trust (Philippine Open Government Partnership, 2020). Despite its efforts, in the Open Government Index (OGI) 2021, the Philippines was ranked 71 out of 139 countries globally and 8th out of 15 countries in the Asia-Pacific Region, compared to its 55th world ranking in 2020. Also, the country’s 2021 global ranks are 65th in the published legislation and government data; 28th for the right to information dimension; 99th across the citizen participation aspect; and 111th across the complaint mechanisms factor (WJP OG, 2021). These developments may reflect the lack of public involvement and collaboration and the government’s lack of a strong OGP initiative. Additionally, the state looks to be falling behind compared to the

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commitments envisioned under the National Action Plan after joining the OGP, as evidenced by the WJP’s Open Government Index statistics. The OGI is based on four aspects of government transparency: publication of legislation and government data, information access, citizen participation, and complaints systems to enhance government transparency. Furthermore, the rankings are based on citizen and expert survey answers (Saxena, 2018). In the 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index,1 the Philippines is 155th out of 180 countries worldwide, while its score is 34. The country’s score shows the estimated degree of government corruption on a range of 0–100, with 0 signifying a state is very corrupt, and 100 indicating a country is corruption-free. A country’s rank reveals how it relates to the other states in the list. Transparency International (TI) collaborates with both the academic and corporate sectors to gather data on bribery, public money diversion, the prevalence of officials using public office for private gain, the government’s power to stop corrupt practices in the public sector, red tape, meritocratic versus political appointments, efficient criminal action against corrupt officials, sufficient financial transparency and conflict of interest rules for public servants, lawful protection for people who fight corruption, and the civil society’s ability to combat corruption (Transparency International, 2020). To augment its capacity to meet its transparency and accountability goals, the Philippines entered the OGP as one of its eight founders, alongside Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, the UK, and the USA in June 2011. The US Agency for International Development (USAID), which was steering such agreements for the OGP at the time, designated the Department of Budget and Management (DBM), through ex-Secretary Florencio Abad, as the frontline institution for constructing and implementing the Philippines’ pledges to the OGP. In response, an Open Government Steering Committee was established. From June to September 2011, the Philippines prepared its first national OG action plan, which contained 19 initiatives under four major outcome areas. The first scheduled meeting between DBM (Department of Budget and Management), PCDSPO (Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office), OPS (Office of the Presidential Spokesperson), and the World Bank for Open Data Philippines took place

1  No 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index available in Dec 2021. Hence the 2020 version was used. (https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/phl)

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in May 2013 (Pasaribu, 2017). From that time, it has implemented several initiatives to institutionalize government transparency. Despite challenges, the Philippine Commission on Audit’s (COA) Citizen Participatory Audit (CPA) initiative won accolades in the Asia Pacific Region’s 2021 Open Government Partnership Impact Awards. The event was established to celebrate efforts that have tangibly benefited people’s lives or the integrity of democracy. The program is a framework for constructive dialogue between citizens and the government in performing audits and capacity-development activities to maintain the people’s fundamental right to a decent government and prudent use of taxpayers’ money. It was anchored on the belief that public accountability can only thrive in the presence of a watchful and informed citizenry (Rosario, 2021). Moreover, the Open Data Portal, which can be found at gov. ph/data, is the Philippine OGP’s flagship project launched 2013. It is a unified portal for collecting and disseminating government data. The gov. ph/ data offers 650 data files arranged using dashboards with significant search features (Pasaribu, 2017; Saxena, 2018). The Department of Budget and Management earned plaudits for implementing openness measures on public spending during the Benigno Aquino administration. Similarly, the Department of Interior and Local Government’s Full Disclosure Policy Portal2 on local governments’ fiscal activities is part of the Benigno Aquino administration’s policy efforts to institutionalize transparency (Chua, 2015). Also, the Commission on Audit and the Finance Department’s Bureau of Local Government Finance disclose documents related to state finances online (COA, n.d.; DOF BLGD, n.d.). In March 2017, the Philippine Statistics Authority (formerly called National Statistics Office) launched an open data portal called OpenStat (see Fig. 4.2) (https://openstat.psa.gov.ph/). It offers datasets compatible with open data standards. They are machine-readable and free of charge. This web platform encourages transparency by actively disclosing public information and governmental statistics (Magno, 2017). Once data is interpreted and utilized purposively, it can help improve the government’s decision-making and services (Cornford et al., 2013), which public value is all about. In a similar vein, Wirtz and Bikmeyer (2015) noted that a high degree of openness in government could enhance public value, especially with the use of new technologies. 2

 Source: https://fdpp.dilg.gov.ph/documents

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Also, President Duterte, among his first acts of office, issued Executive Order No. 2 on July 23, 2016, which mandated the Executive Branch to disclose information subject to the law (Official Gazette, 2016). It was quickly followed by creating the electronic freedom of information (FOI) website, the first in the world where people could submit queries for government documents and information freely (Cabaero, 2016). Receiving officers and FOI decision-makers are employed by government agencies to operationalize FOI (Perez, 2020). As of 2020, 32 local governments have passed an FOI ordinance, with 42,086 FOI online inquiries, 40,386 paper-based queries, and 490 governmental organizations participating in the eFOI website, a 46 percent success rate in responding to requests, and an average preparation time of 7 days (Freedom of Information Philippines, 2020). The web portal is in Fig. 4.1. Alongside the enactment of the executive order, the eFOI portal (Fig. 4.1) was implemented. eFOI is an online system that Filipino citizens can easily submit their FOI requests to government agencies. Like any other FOI, the Philippines’s eFOI is far from perfect. According to the eFOI’s official website, 25.1% of the requests from January 2021 until January 20, 2022, have been denied, 49.9% of requests are still being processed, and only 25.1% are successful (FOI, 2020).

Fig. 4.1  The Philippine FOI website. (Source: Philippines FOI website. https:// www.foi.gov.ph/)

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Literature Review Philippine Policies on Public Transparency and Accountability Resource availability not directly controlled by a single holder in the public realm, such as large-scale procurement and major infrastructure programs, tax system, debt management, customs, and poorly crafted privatization of government-owned companies, can create an enabling environment for corruption. As a result, the significance of anti-­corruption policies has been acknowledged. They are now at the forefront of worldwide discussions (OECD, 2013; Brusca et al., 2017). For instance, infrastructure development is usually entangled in a web of patronage and money politics. Public partnerships between the government and businesses can bring significant governance shortcomings when employing national resources (Aspinall, 2015). Massive Philippine corruption cases have frequently involved public works and procurement contracts, like the Marcos-era Nuclear Power Station and several Special Economic Zones and Freeports (Manasan, 2013; Mendoza et al., 2018). Thus, one of the most common responses in fighting corruption is having a transparency law, exposing questionable transactions, and increasing the likelihood that offenders will be caught. In this way, augmenting transparency can allow public institutions to gain greater legitimacy (Curtin & Meijer, 2006; Gabriel, 2017). In the Philippines, even in the 1973 Constitution during the Marcos era, Article IV, Sec. 6 stipulates that the people’s right to information in matters of public concern shall be acknowledged. Access to official documents, activities, and decisions shall be granted to citizens subject to exceptions and limitations prescribed by the law. However, as the country was under authoritarian rule from 1972 to 1986, people believed this constitutional right was disregarded. After Marcos was overthrown and the present 1987 charter was signed and ratified, it had several provisions for the right to information (Magno, 2017). In this principal state document, there are several enabling policies for OG and FOI. Article 3, Sec. 7 states, ‘The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and documents and papers about official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as government data to

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inform policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to limitations as may be provided by law’. This constitutional right became the basis for the FOI EO and an integral element of the President’s Good Governance Plan for pursuing transparency, accountability, and citizen participation (Perez, 2020). The directive covers all government offices, departments, agencies, and bureaus under the executive, including Government-Owned and Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and state universities and colleges (SUCs). It amends them to make public records, contracts, transactions, and any information requested by an individual, with certain exceptions (VERA Files, 2016). Although the Philippines has yet to establish a comprehensive FOI law (Stagars, 2016), the country already has various enabling laws that promote public information transparency (see Table 4.1). While these provisions may be regarded as accomplishments, they are dispersed. In the lack of comprehensive FOI legislation, open data projects are mainly at the government’s discretion, which may close portals or erase data that generated problematic findings. The legal structure that allows for the neutrality and stability of open data is critical for its credibility. As discussed above, while the country’s efforts on institutionalizing transparency and accountability are remarkable, many gaps remain. According to Mendoza and Cruz (2020), the country’s historic Executive Order on FOI and the creation of a parallel eFOI portal (Fig. 4.1), one of the first in Asia, have not yet fully removed barriers to public access to information, particularly on large-scale infrastructure projects. Their study retrieved only seven copies of feasibility studies for 48 of the Duterte administration’s major infrastructure investments. To reinforce openness and accountability reforms, the FOI EO must be developed into a full-­ fledged FOI law (Gabriel, 2017). Reformists and civil society organizations must focus on independent policy advocacy rather than technical and administrative chores because they risk being co-opted by elite-driven agendas that undermine anti-corruption activities (Rodan, 2018). If reform efforts remain disconnected from a coherent, well-designed agenda of institutional change, such efforts may distract attention from more transformational reforms required to address accountability deficits in countries like the Philippines (Custer et al., 2016).

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Table 4.1  List of Philippine transparency laws Law

Description

RA 6028 (1969)

Provided for the advancement of improved efficiency and fairness norms in the enforcement of laws and effectively protected the public’s freedom to petition the government to remedy grievances by establishing the citizen’s counsellor’s agency. ‘The state implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its activities involving public interest, under reasonable conditions prescribed by law’. ‘The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records and documents and papers on official acts, transactions, or decisions, and government research data used as a basis for policymaking, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law’. All public employees are required by law to file annual disclosures of liabilities and net worth. The law mandates the President, Vice President, Cabinet members, Congress, the Supreme Court, Constitutional agencies, and other institutions, general and flag officials of the military to submit and publicly disclose their SALNs annually (Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth) Law on Ethical Conduct for Public Servants Local Government Code. Sec. 353 requires local governments to fully disclose data on all local public finances within 30 days after the immediate fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous areas. Law on Public Procurement Reform. Under this act, the PhilGEPS will be the main and authoritative source of state procurement data. Anti-Red Tape Act. In Sec. 6, government agencies must post a Citizen’s Charter near their offices’ main entrance and in public places.

Article II, Section 28, 1987 Constitution

Article III, Section 7, 1987 Constitution

Article 11, Section 17, 1987 Constitution Book 1, Chapter 9, Section 34, Administrative Code (EO 292) of 1987

RA 6713 (1989) RA 7160 (1991)

RA 9184 (2002)

RA 9485 (2007)

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Law

Description

EO 2, s. 2016 ‘Operationalizing in the Executive Branch the People’s Constitutional Right to Information and the State Policies of Full Public Disclosure and Transparency in the Public Service and Providing Guidelines’ DILG MC 2019-149

This directive applies to all executive branch offices, including government enterprises and state universities. It allows for greater public information and records exposure to people and promotes government openness (Asia Society, 2022). It operationalizes the government’s Full Disclosure Policy (FDP). It encourages local governments to disclose public expenditures. It also amended the DILG MCs 2013-140 and 2010-083 (DILG, 2019).

Source: Brillantes and Fernandez (2010). Updated by the authors Brillantes, Lilangan, and Ruiz RA Republic Act, PD Presidential Decree, EO Executive Order, MC Memo Circular

FOI and OG in the Philippines and Its Southeast Asian Neighbours 3 In Asia, countries are still on the road to guaranteeing full public disclosure of government information, except for India. India adopted the most substantial freedom-of-information policy in 2005, naming the Right to Information Act. Because of India’s commendable government transparency, other Eastern Asian nations like Mongolia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia have passed the FOI law in 2011, 2009, and 2010, respectively. Draft FOI laws are under discussion in other Asian states. In some countries like the Philippines and Sri Lanka, the rights to information laws are discussed, proposed, and drafted, but they have yet to pass one. In contrast, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand, Vietnam maintain a firm grip on government information, deeming it state property, and largely unwilling to share it with their citizens (ARTICLE 19, 2015; Padman, 2002). For instance, in Laos, Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 44 of Lao PDR’s constitution theoretically grant Laotians freedom of expression. However, the Lao charter has legal 3  Even countries with comprehensive FOI laws, the degree of their effectiveness and manner of application may still vary widely (UNESCO, 2019).

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restrictions that restrict this right when its government perceives information as propaganda against the Lao state. Through the Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) governs the media. Many citizens do not even protest government programs that harm the environment, and the press routinely self-­ censors (United Nations Human Rights, 2021; United States Department of State, 2020). The legal and practical application of information freedom in Southeast Asia needs to be improved. Before 2016, only Indonesia and Thailand had FOI legislation (FNF, 2017; Khan, 2014). The Philippines issued an executive order in August 2016 ensuring access to government data. This directive only applies to executive agencies, prompting calls for the Philippine Congress to pass a comprehensive FOI Act. Other Southeast Asian countries have made minimal steps to safeguard freedom and access to information. The Selangor state of Malaysia passed a FOI Act, although the Official Secrets Act and the Internal Security Act limit its influence. In practice, the government has the authority to designate inquiry-related information as a state secret. This setup renders free expression, although supported on paper, meaningless. Even nations with FOI laws, like Thailand, have shortcomings. The Official Information Commission (OIC) was established to implement the Official Information Act (OIA). Its officials and employees report to the Prime Minister, raising concerns about the OIC’s independence. Furthermore, the OIA does not provide time frames for state agencies to respond to information requests or penalties for government entities that fail to comply. It is hardly surprising that the Official Information Act has not been used much (FNF, 2017). In theory, most Southeast Asian countries consider FOI a critical contributor to freedom of expression and speech since it enables individuals to exercise their democratic rights in an educated manner while also generating stronger incentives for effective bureaucratic governance. The right to information has yet to be completely realized. Southeast Asian countries should promote transparency to reduce corruption and mismanagement. Such experiences would help inform countries experiencing a democratic transition since information gleaned from these transparency and accountability efforts would help ensure sustained growth (FNF, 2017). Regarding FOI and OG, the Philippines shines more in technical criteria (data availability, digital form, Internet access, machine readability, bulk availability, and timeliness). However, there is still more work to be done in the legal aspects (public availability, zero cost, open license).

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There may be a lack of open data licenses since there is still no comprehensive FOI statute (Republic Act) (Stagars, 2016). On the other hand, the Philippines, which possesses a constitutionally guaranteed free press, has been fighting for decades to pass an FOI law to no avail (Khan, 2014; Romero & Reyes, 2014). Even with an eFOI portal and an FOI EO, difficulties such as online availability and information accessibility, agency timeliness in addressing information requests, privacy protection, and the completeness and rate with which they are distributed remain (Mendoza & Cruz, 2020). Nonetheless, the country has a strong civil society involvement in transparency and accountability and its OG initiatives (Stagars, 2016).

The Necessity of a FOI Act in the Philippines The passing of an enabling FOI law can result in allocating funds and methods to satisfy public demand for access to government information. This encourages proactive disclosure of information and enhances public accountability. While there is no enabling law (a Republic Act) on FOI in the Philippines yet, the Supreme Court has already decided, more than once, that the constitutional mandate on the right to information is enforceable. In Legaspi vs. Civil Service (1987), the high tribunal ruled that ‘the Constitution requires public agencies to provide information upon request; if they do not want to disclose information, they carry the burden of proving that the information is not of public concern, that the information has been specifically exempted by law’. In Garcia vs. Board of Investments (1989) and Chavez vs. National Housing Authority (2007), it was similarly declared that government offices must allow information access relevant to state policies and projects. While the high tribunal’s judgment upheld the people’s right to information (Magno, 2017), a comprehensive FOI law and an implementing office or group of agencies are still imperative to operationalize information openness in government and foster citizen participation in public affairs (Magno, 2017; Stein & Camaj, 2018). On the other hand, the Philippines is the only founding member of the OGP with no FOI law (Chua, 2015). There is widespread consensus that a fully designed and functioning right-to-information regime benefits government departments just as much as it helps the people they serve. According to a 2003 World Bank study, more transparent governments perform better in various governance indicators such as government

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effectiveness, regulation, preventing mismanagement, accountability, the rule of law, bureaucratic effectiveness, letting of contracts, expropriation risk, and a cumulative corruption index (ARTICLE 19, 2015). Hence, there is a need for the Philippines to truly institutionalize OG and help show a good example to neighbours about the causes of transparency and accountability that it has always been keen to champion. Although transparency rules are required to promote accountability, they are insufficient. The second criterion for its effectiveness is publicity, which demands that available information be made public and reaches the intended users, especially those for whom the data is important. Transparency’s potential power is thus activated through publicity. However, whether knowledge reaches its intended audiences is determined by who has the motives, means, and capacity to promote it (Gabriel, 2017). In this regard, FOI legislation and Open Data Initiatives (ODI) can facilitate publicity. These often employ technical methods to make public data available to civil society, businesses, and academia to aid in solving societal problems (Stagars, 2016). Technological advances have enabled governments to implement the OG concept (Parycek & Sachs, 2010). In the country, these are the PSA’s Open Stat (see Fig. 4.2) and the Interior and Local Government Department’s Full Disclosure Portal (see Fig. 4.3).

Issues and Concerns The Philippines’ FOI enabling environment is not flawless. Analysts have identified difficulties like Duterte’s drug war, harsh fines, insufficient budget, and an FOI overseeing office (Perez, 2020; Salaverria, 2017). Certainly, it has an FOI Executive Order (EO) and an eFOI portal as part of its OG agenda. However, challenges remain. First, FOI coverage and its exceptions include national security, presidential communications, cabinet discussions, public safety, personal information of crime victims, minors, or those involved in court cases, proprietary information, premature disclosure of potentially confidential data, and banking and finance secrets (Medialdea, 2016). When the FOI EO was announced in 2016, information requests regarding Duterte’s anti-drug tactics intensified. However, the Philippine National Police was slow to answer questions (Rey, 2017). FOI EO only applies to Presidential Office agencies. This directive excludes the legislature, courts, and local administrations (LGUs) (PSA, 2017), although 58 local government units

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Fig. 4.2  The Philippine Statistics Authority’s Open Stat. (Source: Philippine Statistics Authority Open Stat. https://openstat.psa.gov.ph/)

(LGUs) have enacted their FOI ordinances to localize the application of FOI (Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2021). Second, information-sharing procedures with public agencies raise issues about premature raw data dissemination. Getting sub-agency information takes a lot of work, and few agencies have a master inventory of all public data. For instance, the Transportation Department may have problems answering a request for Maritime Industry Authority-only information (Rey, 2017). Third, agencies who are non-compliant on FOI could face severe and impractical sanctions. EO needs a 35-day response. Officers who miss deadlines risk administrative action. Delinquent officers face discipline for the first infraction, a 30-day suspension for the second, and dismissal for the third. The EO is inadequate for some because it lacks criminal

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Fig. 4.3  The full disclosure portal of the Department of Interior and Local Government. (Source: Full Disclosure Portal. https://fdpp.dilg.gov.ph/)

responsibility, unlike a national law (Republic Act) (Rey, 2017; Salaverria, 2017). No clearly defined, centrally issued information-sharing guidelines and disparate record systems can make implementing FOI services hard. When implementing FOI, authorities may face a voluminous torrent of requests and administrative difficulties. eFOI receives 150 requests daily. Twenty-­eight of 144 formal requests (19.4%) were only responded to successfully, 13 were denied (9%), and 103 (71.5%) are still awaiting a response (FOI, 2020). Fourth, governance for FOI needs a regular budget and a central office. The FOI EO paragraph mandating its funding was removed. The lack of a dedicated organization to monitor, supervise, and handle FOI appeals may affect the policy’s success. Each agency must have FOI receiving officers and funding for all government offices (Rey, 2017). A multi-­ stakeholder FOI monitoring program must be developed to ensure public demands are satisfied and appropriate ICTs are used (Pacis, 2017). While the Presidential Communications Operations Office helps implement FOI programs, its governance should be entrusted to an independent organization, such as a Public Transparency or a National Information Commission, to assess and maximize the use and efficacy of the full network of practices (Mendoza & Cruz, 2020; Michener et al., 2018).

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Also, if an FOI request is denied, there are options for appeal; however, their application might be problematic because the authority rests with individual agencies, with no final impartial adjudicator (Perez & Henninger, 2022): There shall be a central [inside an agency] complaints and review panel constituted of three (3) officials with a level not less than that of a Director or its equivalent, chosen by the Chief of the AGENCY to evaluate and assess the approval or refusal of an information request (Presidential Communications Operations Office, 2017).

The Role of Institutions for FOI in the Philippines On its own, a single administration cannot handle meaningful reforms in pursuit of OG.  Changes must begin in the minds of policymakers and public servants, who must comprehend what people, civil society, and the private sector expect of government agencies (Araujo et  al., 2014). Presidents and Prime Ministers guide the government’s thrusts (Sarker, 2019). They can inspire a large group of people around a body of ideas to attain long-term goals (Rotberg, 2017; Bell, 2014). Moreover, social differences and historical experiences are amassed over time, leading to different societies having institutional variations. The distinctions brought by these drifts are significant because it affects how a polity would respond to political and economic developments (Acemgolu & Robinson, 2012). Consequently, people would evaluate data based on their own national and institutional settings. Then, they will share that information if deemed acceptable, contributing to collective learning within organizations. This may help promote the official institutionalization of norms in law or initiative by contributing to a policy’s informal integration into an institutional culture (Wilson, 2019). In this vein, it can be argued that strong leadership, collective actions, and building coalitions can sustain institutional development, which in this case would enable OG.  Unsurprisingly, OG is recommended to encourage better effective decision-making mechanisms, prevent corruption, strengthen accountability systems, and re-establish public faith in government institutions (Gavelin et al., 2009). It is about transparently engaging and collaborating with civil society to address social problems effectively, efficiently, and sustainably (Gavelin et  al., 2009; Lathrop & Ruma, 2010).

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As a democracy, the Philippines emphasizes civic engagement to guarantee that peoples’ voices are heard and involved in crucial policy decisions (Pacis, 2017). Unsurprisingly, citizen-centred multi-sectoral participation is critical to public affairs sustainability because it is difficult to dismantle a program that the public has embraced. Local governments can encourage citizen participation while combating disinterest. Participatory planning, community debates, feedback mechanisms, and volunteer involvement in local initiatives were all part of these efforts (Teng-Calleja et al., 2016). In essence, citizen participation ensures continuous sustained awareness of the public on the importance of FOI. Eventually, this setup can localize programs and lead to more policy advocacy which can deeply institutionalize FOI.

Discussion In our times, where there is a strong distrust of government across many countries, there are clamours to OG information to the people. Elected officials face a daunting task in resolving complex social challenges amid difficult situations when governments face severe fiscal limitations and power is divided among organizations, sectors, and levels. Public mistrust develops when officials fail to offer solutions that satisfy citizens’ growing demands (Torfing et al., 2020). Thus, OG was conceived to help alleviate plummeting confidence in the government by assuring them that public resources are spent wisely. It is within this context that the authors propose the public sector reform framework in Fig. 4.4, which identifies five sectors that must be considered when planning the provision of effective public sector reforms, in this case, OG. The following are the five areas for public sector reform: (1) altering institutions, frameworks, procedures, and processes; (2) reforming values, conduct, and mentalities to signal a new way of understanding things; (3) supporting mechanisms for leadership; and (4) encouraging people’s involvement, who may be referred to as duty bearers. All these components are underpinned by a shared vision towards good governance distilled in the Ambisyon Natin 2040 (Our Ambition) of which OG is vital in institutionalizing transparency and accountability in the public sector. Drawing from the earlier works of Brillantes (2021), Brillantes and Perante-Calina (2018) and Brillantes and Fernandez (2010), the following are some of the significant factors that can strengthen OG as shown in the public sector reform framework (Fig. 4.4).

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Fig. 4.4  Public Sector Reform Framework. (Source: Brillantes, 2021 (The Framework was from a contributed chapter of Brillantes (2021) in a UN report entitled Changing Mindsets to Realise the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: How to promote new mindsets and behaviours in public institutions to implement the Sustainable Development Goals, which was adapted from Brillantes and Fernandez (2010) and Brillantes and Perante-Calina (2018)))

Strong Political Leadership Defining and accomplishing policy objectives while winning essential supporters’ backing is the essence of political leadership (Nye, 2008). It highlights the importance of politicians in establishing an agenda, designing solutions, and mobilizing cooperation (Nye, 2008; Sorensen, 2020). As we can see in the Philippine experience, a President’s commitment can bring the state’s capacity in helping to realize transparency and accountability. Furthermore, building and maintaining coalitions can help sustain OG across administrations. Though there is still much to be done, the Philippines’ co-founding of the OGP and its ongoing active participation by developing action plans and exerting efforts are among a series of cumulative actions that help it continuously craft a well-designed

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institutional change agenda with closely linked reforms for transparency and accountability. Multi-sectoral Collaboration Other key actors, such as local leaders, social and political movement leaders, prominent businesses, or members from diverse NGOs and CSOs, may also play a significant role in agenda formulation, policy design, and implementation, and resource management (Uhl-Bien & Carsten, 2016; Torfing et al., 2020). CSOs assist in bolstering democracy by (1) observing, verifying, and restraining state power, (2) encouraging citizen engagement in policy decisions, (3) educating people about their rights and obligations, and (4) creating new paths of access to the political system (beyond official polls) for the public to voice their concerns (Diamond, 1999; Fraundorfer, 2016). Scholars studying the global implementation of FOI policies have found that a civil society’s response must be vigorous for a long time (Lu, 2020). Without a strong demand for information and close supervision, the hard-won right of access to information can swiftly deteriorate due to lax government enforcement (Neuman & Calland, 2007). In the Philippines, civil society organizations like the Procurement Watch, Social Watch, the Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific, and its history of participatory budgeting underscores that the country has strong inter-sectoral cooperation capacities. While passing a comprehensive FOI law is still far away, society’s robust ongoing efforts, including policy advocacy for public transparency create enough momentum for state authorities to further institutionalize OG. Information Dissemination Through Digital Platforms Using ICT, citizens can participate actively in political processes (Pacis, 2017). As a nation’s Internet usage rises, so does the opportunity for digital interaction with people. Streamlined platforms give access to several integrated public services online. New media sites can boost civic engagement. Providing one-stop platforms allows access to a set of integrated public services online (World Bank, 2016). However, as long as digital access is not universal, low-income individuals in societies with high inequalities risk being left behind (Alderete, 2018). Public investments in digital technology would further strengthen the elites when there are no strong institutions, leading to greater state capture (World Bank, 2016).

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In the Philippines, strong citizen participation in governance and continuous reforms are every President’s priority to develop robust public institutions (Brillantes & Perante-Calina, 2018). These organizations are important as they can facilitate or hinder efforts for OG.  Furthermore, once the people know their rights and ask for greater transparency from their leaders, it would be one step closer to realizing OG, which may lead to more effective, efficient, economic, and equitable governance. Support from International Institutions While foreign aid institutions may not be able to fund all government programs, they do play an important role in their success due to the huge help they may provide—which may or may not be visible in the long run (Brillantes & Ruiz, 2020). Moreover, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), such as the OGP, are governance setups that integrate international policy platforms with national politics through which governments, civil society, and private enterprises discuss, coordinate, and collaborate to solve complicated policy concerns. A country participating in such an initiative may gain incentives like a better public image (Wilson, 2019). The Philippines realizing that transparency and accountability are great weapons against corruption has always exerted greater information openness in its jurisdiction. When the international environment became more favourable for initiatives against public misconduct, it readily participated in the OGP to gain more knowledge for its programs and gain widespread support for its actions. Over time, this is intended to institutionalize a responsible government and an investment-worthy country. Indeed, institutionalizing OG, as discussed earlier, must rely mainly on leadership, people’s support, and multi-sectoral cooperation. It could be argued that these three components are significant in ensuring a program’s success and demonstrate the need for various societal groups’ direction, participation, and cooperation. Combining these three components shows the interconnection of the government, people, and civil society in supporting a common goal—ingraining transparent and accountable governance. From the local to the national level, sustainable programs need to mobilize people’s participation and multi-sectoral collaboration. While political leadership is not always strong, the collective commitment demonstrated that much could be accomplished in OG. On the other side of the spectrum, support from international organizations greatly assists the adaptation of an initiative. These international

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institutions provide funding, knowledge, and widespread support for its realization. The analysis can be further deepened by utilizing the Public Sector Reform Framework (Fig. 4.4) which include innovations that emerged as a result of reforms in the following areas: • Reforms in Institutions, Processes, and Procedures. • Reforms in Mindsets, Paradigms, and Behaviour. • Reforms enabled by Leadership and Political Will. • Reforms enabled by Active Citizen Engagement. • Reforms are consciously communicated to stakeholders to enable ownership and sustainability. The context within which these initiatives are conducted should be recognized. This includes the global—yet local—context in line with the generally accepted value to think global yet act local, hence glocalization. Equally important is to recognize the need for robust collaboration and coalition building in the highest levels of government and with other stakeholders to attain a common purpose yet be driven by a sense of competition with other OGP participants, hence coopetition. The context in which the reforms take place is a world where cooperation and competition are merged into coopetition. ‘Think global, act local’ is the guiding principle of glocalization. For a region marked by cooperation and competition among its members like the ASEAN, this is especially notable. The Public Sector Reform Framework takes a comprehensive approach to institutionalize changes in governance, specifically OG in the Philippines, through strong political leadership, capacity-­ building, values development, the role of enabling mechanisms for organizational change, strengthening institutions, co-opetition, and citizen’s engagement to instil a strong sense of ownership and pride for the public through meaningful participation. Public transparency and accountability can become more mainstream and result in enhanced governance that is more effective, efficient, and equitable while saving money.

Conclusion This study ends with findings and principles that can enable the emergence and development of OG in the Philippines in line with the Public Sector Reform Framework (see Fig. 4.4) above. It shows that institutions

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and processes are needed to create an enabling environment for reforms that emphasize effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and the willingness to equitably serve the public. In turn, changing mindsets would facilitate leadership changes which would help instil phronesis (making the right call and rising to the occasion for the public good) in everyone. Thus, the people and civil servants will become duty bearers, where each person fulfils their social responsibilities well. These elements are underpinned by communication and information dissemination through traditional media and cyberspace. Once these factors are in place, a gradual but positive transformation in the public sector may be possible through thrusts for good governance, of which OG is a vital part. Strong political leadership is essential. This type of leadership is distinguished by a shared vision, curiosity, fearlessness, nonconformity, and the courage to challenge authority and the status quo. It also implies capitalizing on a country’s strengths, such as solid citizen engagement. In the context of OG in the Philippines, strong political leadership would entail the executive and legislature passing a full-fledged FOI law (i.e. Republic Act), as this document would lay out a comprehensive framework that would make transparency and accountability reforms extensive and sustainable across the public sector (i.e. Congress, courts, and local governments), not just the offices under the President’s office. Equally important would be a well-defined institutional OG strategy closely linked to transparency and accountability reform efforts that can help produce favourable governance outcomes. Citizen participation is essential to sustain innovations (particularly OG) in the public sector. A policy framework, such as a statute or the Constitution, should be the context for an initiative. While risk-takers, innovators continually push the edge and develop fresh methods of achieving outcomes. Non-governmental organizations and civil society actors in the Philippines have supported transparency and accountability efforts by participating in  local governance bodies. In addition, the Commission on Audit and the Department of Finance have been actively participating in the country’s OGP commitments. People’s participation in these efforts must be sustained and centred more on autonomous policy advocacy rather than just technical and administrative tasks so that momentum for significant reforms for transparency and accountability stays strong. This is important to avoid becoming largely influenced by rent-seeking, elite-­ driven agendas primarily concerned with business as usual.

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Building capacity is essential for institutionalizing reforms for OG through awareness campaigns, seminars, and formal module studies. Despite the construction of an eFOI portal and other Open Data systems such as the Open Stat and Full Disclosure website, there needs to be more openness and accountability, as described above. For example, under the Office of the President, agencies such as the National Privacy Commission, the OGP Philippines, the Presidential Communications Operations Office, and the FOI Office are championing such programs to inculcate the value of transparency and accountability throughout the public sector. Equally important is the responsibility of higher education institutions (HEIs), particularly schools of Public Administration, Governance, and Civil Service, to ensure transparency of information to provide citizens with a comprehensive picture of how the government makes decisions that affect everyone. Furthermore, the Philippines may also enter capacity-development partnerships with international development agencies from other countries. After all, these agencies are from developed states where their experience in OG initiatives would help improve the country’s FOI human resource capacities. While capacity-building for Filipino government agencies’ human resources is important, increased investment in improving systems and personnel technical capacity (e.g. improved training in formal practices, records keeping and requests handling for FOI receiving officers, revamping information access procedures and communications networks across government offices) would be crucial. In this context, these cooperative endeavours would build administrative and technical capacities for the government sector as it attempts to intensify its drive toward greater OG in practice—more transparent and accountable leadership and a more felt good governance. Strong institutions are important, and continuous capacity-building is critical in deepening OG at the institutional level. Capacity development can be for individuals and reforming organizations and aligning them with changing demands of people. The technical details of how reforms in the Philippines are formulated contain many elements crucial to the strength and integrity of these changes. However, the formation of effective coalitions within and outside government capable of sustaining the political dynamics required to ensure that such changes for transparency and accountability are successfully institutionalized and implemented will also be critical.

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This setup implies that, in addition to focusing on the technical and administrative capacity required to address accountability and anti-­ corruption deficiencies, significant efforts, including coalition building, should be expanded in understanding and anticipating how reforms, both individually and collaboratively, should be adopted and sustained in the Philippines, with its distinct incentives for various stakeholders and actors. Also, as stated in the discussion above, while the Presidential Communications Operations Office is responsible for FOI programs, creating an independent governance and arbiter organization like a Public Transparency or a National Information Commission may be significant in improving the Philippine institutional capacity for implementing OG. Finally, establishing a transparent government is a dynamic and ongoing process, and the core notion of constant improvement is integrated into the process, as it is in all innovations. Furthermore, a built-in monitoring system recognizes that there is always a better way, given the continually changing, tumultuous world. Indeed, given the political discontinuity generated by weak political parties and six (6) year single-term presidents, the fundamental strategy of governments and civil society actors in the Philippines has concentrated on forming and preserving coalitions. This development may indicate that these stakeholders have learned that, in addition to administrative and technical capacity development, they need a clear, well-designed agenda underpinned by robust political backing to make OG sustainable in the long run. Though much remains to be desired, the Philippine experience has demonstrated that a holistic approach, underpinned by administrative and technical capacity development, citizen engagement, institutional reforms, and alliance building, demonstrates that open government efforts are alive and well.

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Medialdea, S. C. (2016, November 24). Inventory of exceptions to executive action No. 2 (s 2016) [Memorandum]. https://www.foi.gov.ph/downloads/inventory­of-­exceptions-­to-­eo-­2.pdf Mendoza, R.  U., & Cruz, J.  P. (2020). Governing the ‘Golden Age of Infrastructure’: Assessing transparency innovations in Philippine infrastructure development. Asian Politics & Policy, 12(2), 175–204. https://doi. org/10.1111/as12527 Mendoza, R. U., Bertulfo, D. J., & Cruz, J. P. D. (2018). From megaproject to white elephant: Lessons from the Philippines’s Bataan nuclear power plant. Philiine Studies: Historical and Ethnographic Viewpoints, 66(3), 335–374. https://doi.org/10.1353/phs.2018.0028 Michener, G., Contreras, E., & Niskier, I. (2018). From opacity to transparency? Evaluating access to information in Brazil five years later. Revista de Administração Pública, 52(4), 610–629. https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-­ 761220170289 Neuman, L., & Calland, R. (2007). Making the law work: The challenges to implementation. In A. Florini (Ed.), The right to know: Transparency for an open world (pp. 179–213). Columbia University Press. Nye, J. (2008). The powers to lead. Oxford University Press. OECD. (2013). The rationale for fighting corruption. https://maritimecyprus. files.wordpress.com/2017/09/oecd.pdf Official Gazette of the Philippines. (2016). Executive Order No. 2, s. 2016. https:// mirror.officialgazette.gov.ph/2016/07/23/executive-­order-­no-­02-­s-­2016/ Olsen, J. P. (2015). Democratic order, autonomy, and accountability. Governance, 28(4), 425–440. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12158 Pacis, J. (2017). Open data in Philippines: An issue of access and awareness (Research Brief). IT for Change. https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/20.500.12413/13008/Research-­Brief-­Philippines.pdf Padman, P. (2002). Freedom of Information: Access to information as a key to democratic governance. Inisiatif Wartawan. https://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/programs/ai/r ti/international/laws_papers/malaysia/foi_ malaysia.pdf Parycek, P., & Sachs, M. (2010). Open government: Information flow in Web 2.0. European Journal of ePractice No. 9. https://researchgate.net/publication/ 279684242_Open_Government_-­_Information_Flow_in_Web_2_0 Pasaribu, N. M. A. (2017). A comparative study of open data policies: Lessons learned from Indonesia’s and the Philippines’ participation in open government partnership. Master’s thesis, Asia-Europe Institute, University of Malaya. https://www. academia.edu/38322376/A_Comparative_Study_of_Open_Data_ Policies_Lessons_Learned_from_Indonesia_s_and_the_Philiines_Participation_ in_Open_Government_Partnership_pdf

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Perante-Calina, L. (2015). Citizen’s Charter: An assessment of contribution to frontline service delivery. Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 59(1), 34–58. Perez, P. J. V. (2020). Why are freedom of information requests in the Philippines being denied?: An analysis using a practice-based approach. Philippine Journal of Librarianship and Information Studies, 40(2), 3–36. http://www.phjlis. org/index.php/phjlis/article/view/41/35 Perez, P. J., & Henninger, M. (2022). The right to information: An investigation into the legal framework and implementation in the Philippines. Proceedings of the Association for Information Science and Technology, 59, 251–261. https:// doi.org/10.1002/pra2.750 Philippine Open Government Partnership. (2020, December). 5th National Action Plan: Revised 2019–2022: Genuine co-creation for transformative outcomes: Towards a more open government, towards a more felt government. www. opengovpartnership.org/wp-­content/uploads/2019/12/Philippines_Action-­ Plan_2019-­2022_Revised.pdf Philippine Statistics Authority. (2017). Freedom of information: People’s manual. Author. https://psa.gov.ph/system/files/kmcd/FOI%20Annex%20B%20 Peoples%20Manual%20final.pdf Presidential Communications Operations Office. (2017, April 25). FOI—MC No. 03: Enrollment to eFOI Portal, memorandum. https://www.foi.gov.ph/downloads/FOI_Memor Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO). (2021). 5 years our shared legacy: Truth, trust, transparency 2020–21 FOI annual report. https:// www.foi.gov.ph/downloads/2021_FOI_ Rey, A. (2017, March 19). How serious is the Duterte administration about FOI?. Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-­depth/163663-­review­duterte-­administration-­foi-­policy/ Rodan, G. (2018). Participation without democracy: Containing conflict in Southeast Asia. Cornell University Press. Rodan, G., & Hughes, C. (2012). Ideological coalitions and the international promotion of social accountability: The Philippines and Cambodia compared. International Studies Quarterly, 56(2), 367–380. https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1468-­2478.2011.00709.x Romero, P., & Reyes, J. (2014). The politics of the freedom of information bill in the Philippines. In R.  Fabella, J.  Faustino, A.  Leftwich, & A.  Parker (Eds.), Room for Maneuver: Social sector policy reform in The Philippines (pp. 93–117). The Asia Foundation. Rosario, B. (2021, December 16). COA’s citizen participatory audit win top honors in 2021 OGP Impact Awards. Manila Bulletin. https://mb.com. ph/2021/12/16/coas-­citizen-­participatory-­audit-­win-­top-­honors-­in-­2021-­

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ogp-­impact-­awards/?fbclid=IwAR1YK352xI3mBGmIU6SgzMKpa6ojsnXGu vTjofeYaIO0n9FiJ-­qRcY7dRHw Rotberg, R. (2017). The corruption cure: How citizens and leaders can combat graft. Princeton University Press. Salaverria, L. B. (2017, June 26). Duterte’s FOI order leads to ‘unintended consequences.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer. https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/908698/ dutertes-­foi-­order-­leads-­to-­unintended-­consequences#ixzz7IgQBiHqZ Sarker, M. (2019). Public administration as an academic discipline and social science. In A. Farazmand (Ed.), Global encyclopedia of public administration, public policy, and governance (pp. 1–7). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­ 3-­319-­31816-­5_3856-­1 Saxena, S. (2018). Drivers and barriers to re-use Open Government Data (OGD): A case study of open data initiative in Philippines. Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance, 20(4), 358–368. https://doi.org/10.1108/dprg-­08-­ 2017-­0045 Sørensen, E. (2020). Interactive political leadership. Oxford University Press. Stagars, M. (2016). Open data in Southeast Asia. Springer. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­32170-­7 Stein, L.  L., & Camaj, L. (2018). Freedom of information. In Oxford research encyclopedia of communication. Oxford University Press. https://doi. org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.97 Teng-Calleja, M., Hechanova, M. R. M., Alampay, R. B. A., Canoy, N. A., Franco, E.  P., & Alampay, E.  A. (2016). Transformation in Philippine local government. Local Government Studies, 43(1), 64–88. https://doi.org/10.108 0/03003930.2016.1235561 Thompson, M. R. (2014). The politics Philippine presidents make. Critical Asian Studies, 46(3), 433–460. https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2014.935135 Torfing, J., Bentzen, T. Ø., & Winsvold, M. S. (2020). How institutional designs condition perceived local political leadership. Local Government Studies, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2020.1821664 Transparency International. (2020). Corruption Perceptions Index. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/phl Uhl-Bien, M., & Carsten, M. (2016). Followership in context. In J. Storey et al. (Eds.), The Routledge companion to leadership (pp. 142–168). Routledge. UNESCO. (2019). Powering sustainable development with access to information: Highlights from the 2019 UNESCO monitoring and reporting of SDG indicator 16.10.2. UNESCO. unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000369160 United Nations of Human Rights. (2021). Disinformation and freedom of opinion and expression in Laos. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/ D o c u m e n t s / I s s u e s / E x p r e s s i o n / d i s i n f o r m a t i o n / 2 -­C i v i l -­s o c i e t y -­ organisations/CIVICUS.pdf

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CHAPTER 5

Open Government in a Non-democratic Context? Access to Information in Hong Kong Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and Wai Kit Cheng

Introduction As the concept of open government (OG) continues to gain popularity globally, its potential and application in Hong Kong present an interesting dilemma. This former British colony, currently a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, has several characteristics that challenge the practice of OG in both colonial and post-colonial Hong Kong. There are debates over the desirability, utility, and effectiveness of allowing full access to citizens for detailed information on decisions and strategies for governing. The idea of OG is firmly rooted in the tradition of democracy based on access to information regarding the objectives and strategies of government in responding to the needs of society. Several studies have advocated OG as a critical element for good governance. A. S. Huque (*) • W. K. Cheng McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_5

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These arrangements make governments more transparent and accountable, facilitate citizen participation, create conditions for social and economic development, and improve the quality of decisions made by public authorities. In addition, OG helps guarantee public oversight and lessens political corruption. Hong Kong is a unique political entity as a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China. Such regions enjoy certain degree of economic and political independence, but they must operate within the broad framework of the Chinese political system. This imposes some constraints on Hong Kong in designing policies and procedures that need to be consistent with the arrangements governing its relationship with China. Understandably, the interpretation and application of the concept of OG are expected to be different in this autonomous region that is governed under the principle of ‘One country, two systems’. This chapter intends to analyse the concept of OG and its practice in Hong Kong. It begins with a review of the OG concept and the strategies of its application. An overview of the laws and rules intended to provide access to citizens to services and scope for participation in the governing process will help understand the challenges and practices adopted. Also, analysing the existing context, laws and arrangements will lead to conclusions about the problems and prospects of OG in Hong Kong. It will be interesting to identify and analyse the arrangements for information access in a society that has previously been governed as a colony and now exists as an administratively unique region of a non-democratic country. The chapter concludes that an OG modelled on the systems in western liberal democratic systems will face tremendous challenges in the unique context of Hong Kong, and it is not realistic to establish OG in non-democratic contexts.

Open Government and Freedom of Information The idea of OG is simply an extension of criticisms and complaints by the public against the government, and it is a common phenomenon across the globe. Open government is not an entirely new concept and has been used to support arguments for freedom of information (FOI), anti-­ corruption, and transparency (Nam, 2012). In recent years, the growth of the Internet emerged as the key factor that propelled the demand for e-government (Evans & Campos, 2013). Citizens are never completely satisfied with their governments’ performance, and their expectations

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continue to rise. The practice of OG can inform citizens and make them aware of the limitations that influence the performance of public agencies and do not allow them to fulfil their responsibilities. A combination of transparency, arrangements for oversight and public scrutiny and effective accountability can go a long way in ensuring the quality of governance. In other words, public affairs must be conducted openly. Therefore, the concept of OG is firmly grounded on FOI, access, and expression. The concept of OG is yet to be clearly defined, and most studies describe the phenomenon by presenting a list of features. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development describes OG as ‘a culture of governance based on innovative and sustainable public policies and practices inspired by the principles of transparency, accountability, and participation that fosters democracy and inclusive growth’ (OECD, 2016). Geiger and von Lucke (2012) explain the role of the state in establishing transparency, participation, and collaboration and argue for equating OG with e-government, mainly due to the extensive use of information and communication technologies in linking citizens with the public agencies that serve them. In other studies, the OG system has been explored in terms of the level of monitoring and influence citizens have over government processes by gaining access to government information (Meijer et al., 2012). On the other hand, OG represents the arrangements for integrating external knowledge into the political and administrative process by using new information and communication technologies (Hilgers, 2012). Evans and Campos (2013) highlight a similar emphasis on the technological aspect, based on the assumption that information technology will facilitate participatory and collaborative exchanges of ideas between citizens and government. Arguably, OG is a recently recognized phenomenon that helps strengthen citizens’ freedom of information and their participation in public affairs and the governing process and contributes to inclusive policymaking. The practice informs citizens about the contexts and rationale guiding decisions and allows them to contribute to the process from their respective positions in society. Democracy, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, equity and citizens’ access to governing-related information are the core values underlying OG. These values facilitate and improve the participation and collaboration in public affairs and inclusive policymaking, particularly with the aid of enhanced technological capability.

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The key requirements for OG are a high degree of transparency and sound mechanisms for scrutiny and accountability of government decisions and actions. It also underlines the need for effective communication with citizens who should be able to receive requested information. Transparency is essential for establishing public trust in government, which ensures the relevance of public policies and contributes to increased citizen participation in public affairs. On the other hand, governments are concerned about the need to maintain confidentiality on sensitive issues, such as information and decision on security and financial matters. This chapter considers the framework of legal access to information in Hong Kong that includes constitutional provisions such as specific laws, regulations and administrative procedures, the process of implementation of strategies and programs by agencies, and the scope for citizens and groups to use the facilities for ensuring FOI. The chapter also sheds light on the processes and strategies adopted by public agencies and the Office of the Ombudsman in Hong Kong to review and respond to requests for access to information.

The Context of Hong Kong The domination of two external forces strongly influences the political system in Hong Kong. Until 1997, Hong Kong as a colony of Great Britain was administered under the leadership of a Governor whom the British Crown appointed. Under British oversight (1841–1997), Hong Kong underwent gradual changes and emerged as an economic and financial powerhouse in Asia. It has been argued that ‘the Chinese cultural traits of hard work and emphasis on savings, combined with the spirit of Confucianism, favourable geographical location and openness to external influence contributed to the success of Hong Kong’ (Huque, 1996: 23). Cheung (2008: 126) believes that the system ‘thrived on the political acquiescence of the governed, which helped to lower public expectations on systemic change, and allowed the government to satisfy material wants through economic and service outputs’. In addition, the role of political institutions was limited in a colonial territory. With the reversal of sovereignty to China in 1997, Hong Kong’s status transited to a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China to be governed under the Basic Law of the Special Hong Kong Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (1990). Under the influence of the new public management model, there was enhanced emphasis on values such

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as openness, participation and social justice that influenced the management of the public sector in Hong Kong for some time (Huque, 2010: 278). However, subsequent reforms neglected to continue this trend. Under the circumstances, OG and FOI were not among the ruling elite’s top priorities before or after reintegration with China. The Chief Executive currently administers the territory with the assistance of an Executive Council, which normally meets once a week. The Chief Executive appoints the members of the Executive Council and its proceedings are confidential, ‘although many of its decisions are made public’ (Government of the HKSAR, 2021: 2). Members of the Legislative Council are elected on a combination of geographical and functional constituencies. Representatives of the geographical constituencies are elected through direct votes of residents, while those of the functional constituencies are by designated professions and groups. The principal functions of the Legislative Council include enactment, amendment, or repeal of laws under the provisions of the Basic Law, and approval of budgets and public expenditure. The Council is also empowered to raise questions on the work of the government, debate issues concerning public interests, and receive and handle complaints from Hong Kong residents (The Government of the HKSAR, 2021, p.2–3). Despite its nature as a top-­ level advisory and decision-making body, the lack of open access to relevant documents and untraceable records have cast doubt on its accountability. Even under the legal protection for freedom and rights by the Basic Law, public access to government information is not entirely guaranteed. For instance, Article 35 of the Basic Law stipulates that citizen of the People’s Republic of China (Hong Kong included) ‘shall enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration’ and Article 37 rejects the provision of unlawful detention or restriction of personal freedom. However, those articles do not permit citizens to fully open up, examine or use any primary document from the administration. It is not surprising that there was little prospect of an OG in the colonial setting of Hong Kong. Hong Kong was governed through an executive-­led government in which high-ranking civil servants made all critical decisions for the government. Lau (1982: 25) described the system as a ‘bureaucratic polity’ where the bureaucracy enjoys immunity from control by political parties, elected legislatures or politicians. Occasionally, the government could seek advice from members of the elite appointed to consultative bodies. The Public Records Access Rules, 1996 represented the

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first attempt to allow citizens to obtain information from the government. The information would be available for access after at least 30 years of the event, and hence did not significantly contribute to the practice of OG. To access information, citizens are required to open an account with the General Records Service (GRS) and submit an application online. The relevant agency is consulted on permitting access, and the request may be denied ‘if the requested records are deemed unsuitable for public access’ (GRS, Hong Kong Government, n.d.). Those procedures have created restrictive conditions for information disclosure and prevented citizens from gaining the right to access. Since 1997, Hong Kong has been governed under the principles of ‘one country, two systems’, ‘Hong Kong people administering Hong Kong’, and a high degree of autonomy according with the Basic Law (Government of the HKSAR, 2008). The principles give rise to concern over the oversight mechanisms of government functions, particularly in terms of openness and access to information. There are also noticeable differences with other countries in structures, practices and process facilitation. This point is elaborated in the following section to explain the uniqueness of the context of Hong Kong and the challenges to government openness and citizen participation.

Access to Information and Refusal to Disclose The government structure in Hong Kong is based on the needs of a small territory (1114 square kilometers) with a population of approximately 7.5 million. The territory is centrally administered, and residents, for most purposes, deal with only one level of government. There is a Committee on Access to the Legislature’s Documents and Records for determining if a document or record of the government ‘should be released for access earlier than the expiry of the closure period specified in the Policy on Access to the Legislature’s Documents and Records’ (Government of the HKSAR, 2021: 5). The mandate of the Committee includes setting guidelines for implementing the relevant policy and considering objections registered for the denial of access to a piece of information. The Clerk to the Legislative Council conducted reviews on closed documents and records in existence for more than 25 years and approved the disclosure of 31 files in 2019–2020 (Ibid, 5). While there are specified time frames for the release of legislature’s documents and records to residents, it is impossible to obtain

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corresponding information on the proceedings and decisions of the Executive Council unless the government does so voluntarily. This approach demonstrates the unwillingness of the Hong Kong government to establish an OG regime. Unfortunately, the provisions for opening up public records for perusal by the residents do not necessarily guarantee their availability. In addition to the formalities involved and the challenges encountered in the consultation and approval process, several restrictions and exemptions result in the unavailability of the requested information, even with the approval obtained after thorough public inspections. This may happen if the circumstances for disclosure of records are determined to be ‘not be in the public interest’ or constituting ‘a breach of good faith on the part of the Government’. Whether those criteria are applicable to any of such data depends on the advice from Chief Secretary, but the grounds for objection are not specified in the rules. The autonomy of agencies under the administrative regime is, therefore, unclear and questionable. It is obvious that these strict measures and controls in determining and disclosing information limit the accessibility of residents to government records. The management of archives is an essential factor in facilitating the availability of information to the public. Poorly managed archives affect not only the overall accountability of a government but also the credibility of official investigations into any decision or incident with significant consequences. Governmental documentation is generally expected to be accurate and include appropriate details. However, according to the Office of the Ombudsman in Hong Kong (2014) ‘binding decisions by adjudicating body and sanctions for non-compliance’ are not included in the records. It is necessary to archive complete documents, and the absence of such vital information affects their reliability. Obviously, the submission of incomplete evidence for the investigation of any case does not help determination of the facts and comprehension of problems. In practice, these strategies are used to conceal the identity of responsible parties and flaws in the decision-making process. In controversial cases with potentially significant harm to public interest, it is a common approach in most countries to establish Commissions of Inquiry for conducting independent investigations. Likewise in HK, the Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance empowers the Chief Executive (CE) ‘to inquire into the conduct or management of any public body, the conduct of any public officer or into any matter whatsoever which is, in his opinion, of public importance’ by appointing a Commission (Commissions

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of Inquiry Ordinance, 2019: 2). According to the ordinance, these commissions may exercise any necessary investigative powers. Because of the exclusive legal rights given to the commissioners, this arrangement can be the most effective tool for accessing information in controversial cases. However, CEs have the authority to refuse to establish a commission based on their own discretion, thereby preventing the investigation of some critical events in Hong Kong. For example, during the pro-­ democracy moment in 2019, there was a strong demand for establishing a commission of inquiry regarding specific human rights violations against protesters. The former Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal, Andrew Li, also openly supported the idea. Unfortunately, the public and civil society sentiments were not taken into account, and the CE completely ignored them. This chapter reviews a few cases to illustrate that OG is yet to be established and practiced in Hong Kong. The first two cases illustrate that public sector agencies and the Ombudsman investigated public complaints and determined that the requested information could not be released. The other cases demonstrate a wide range of intriguing and dubious explanations for government agencies’ refusal to provide information. Managing COVID-19 The lack of access to information primarily creates doubts in the public mind, particularly on issues which controversial decisions were made by authority. This highlights much more importance of great transparency for a decision related to public health or a major pandemic like COVID-19. During the pandemic outbreak, the government implemented some temporary measures such as mask mandate, restrictions on gatherings of people, and vaccination. On the one hand, there was an impending need to stop the spread of COVID by any necessary and immediate actions, and that had provided these measures a reasonable ground. On the other, the government refused to fully disclose corresponding records based on confidentiality, non-availability of time, and human resources shortage. The ineffectiveness of adminstration arrangements and the absent of transparency have also triggered alarms over any possible violation of laws and rights, conflicts of interest, and abuse of power. Unfortunately, such responses were not unusually used to justify the refusal to information disclosure and non-compliance with the Code.

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In June 2021, the Office of The Ombudsman published an investigation report on the refusal of the Department of Health (DH) to disclose information about COVID vaccine procurement. The complainant argued that the department should make available the information about the voting results of internal committees and panel members on the purchase of vaccines and their professional advice that was significant for ensuring the public interest. However, the DH rejected the request by arguing the possible inhibition from ‘the frankness and candor of discussion within the Government and advice given to the Government’ and violation of the agreement for confidentiality concluded with the vaccine suppliers and the advisory bodies. Although the Code allows public disclosure under the circumstances of the interest outweighing the terms of violation risk or harm, the Ombudsman ruled that there was no sufficient evidence suggesting an overriding public interest in this case (Office of the Ombudsman, 2021a. A similar complaint was also filed against the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) regarding Prevention and Control of Disease (Prohibition on Group Gathering) Regulation Cap. 599G and the Prevention and Control of Disease (Wearing of Mask) Regulation Cap. 599I (Office of the Ombudsman, 2021b). The complainant, previously being charged under its subsidiary regulations, had requested missing details on her offence notices to the police force and other departments. She challenged the unacceptable rejection from the police, complained of misalignment between departments in response to releasing requested information, and objected to the retention of her personal data on the files. However, the police justified their decision by citing the reason of limited resources in re-examining the offences, and the Ombudsman concurred with this explanation. The office even commented that the comparison between departments in handling similar cases was ‘inappropriate’. In the current context of Hong Kong, it is not surprising that these complaints were considered as unsubstantiated. Those decisions have exposed loopholes in the current access arrangements and highlighted the agencies’ defensive measures to avoid disclosure. The government may deny public access to corresponding documents if there are exemptions in providing information by third parties or related to commercial confidences. As records of internal discussion and consultation are also exempted from the Code, the agencies tend to designate any archival material related to decision-making into that category and reject all requests for information. Furthermore, due to the nature of internal

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guidelines and rules with ambiguous definitions, each department may have its own rationale and procedure for information disclosure as well as disparate responses to the same request. Some departments may not even have the capability to process all the requests independently. Without an archives law, it is unrealistic to develop standardized procedures for disclosing records and respond satisfactorily to requests for access to information. Welfare Support to Mainland Immigrants Data transparency should aid not only in monitoring the performance of public sector agencies, but also in resolving disputes between Hong Kong residents and new immigrants. After the reintegration in 1997, the border between Hong Kong and Mainland China has remained unaffected, and Chinese citizens need permits to enter Hong Kong for either tourism or residence. The inflow of Chinese immigration through one-way permits to live permanently in the territory has increased, and there has been significant growth in the number of residents from China. These migrations have greatly impacted the welfare system and generated misgivings between the public and the government. The document for mainland residents for immigration to Hong Kong (or Macau) is titled Hong Kong for Settlement on Permits for Proceeding to Hong Kong and Macau. This permit allows Chinese residents to enter Hong Kong for family unions. The corresponding approval is processed by the competent authorities of the Central People’s Government according to Article 22(4) of the Basic Law. After residing in Hong Kong continuously for seven years, those Chinese citizens become eligible to apply for the Right of Abode in the HKSAR (Immigration Department, n.d.). The permit holders annually contribute to a more than 2% increase in the population, although their income was approximately two-thirds of the average in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department, 2018). More than one million new immigrants have settled in Hong Kong over the years, and it was widely assumed that lower-income Chinese families imposed a ‘heavy burden on Hong Kong’s public services such as social welfare, housing, education, and healthcare’ (Hong Kong Government Press Release, 2019). Hong Kong citizens usually have a negative attitude towards those newly immigrated applicants from China regarding the Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) scheme (Lee & Chou, 2018). The

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scheme aims to provide financial grants to citizens whose income level falls below the basic living standard, with a pervious requirement of a seven-­ year residency to prevent abuse. However, in 2013 the Court of Final Appeal ruled the provision unconstitutional; following the court decision, the required residence period was revised to one year. The updated criteria have increased the number of assistance recipients and associated expenditures, and the relevant information and statistics are critical for reviewing and assessing the CSSA program. Unfortunately, the government disclosed only partial data in response to the inquiry of legislative council members (Lam, 2017; Hong Kong Government Press Release, 2014). Most relevant statistics remain missing in official reports published by either the Census and Statistics Department or Social Welfare Department. These examples of thwarted efforts at obtaining disclosure suggest the absence of effective measures and mechanisms for public monitoring of administrative decisions. It also creates doubts about the questionable distribution of resources and eventually intensifies discrimination against new immigrants and the polarization of society. Voluntary disclosure is also subject to the internal decision of those agencies, which is another obstacle to accountability and contributes to a lack of trust among citizens. Request for Details on Offences On 14 October 2020, a resident requested the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF) and other government departments under the Code on Access to Information for details of offences under which fixed penalty notices were served to them in July of the same year. The offences were framed under the Prevention and Control of Disease (Prohibition on Group Gathering) Regulation and the Prevention and Control of Disease (Wearing of Mask) Regulation. Nevertheless, the offence details did not include the date, time and place of occurrence. In response, the HKPF refused to provide the requested information and cited two subsidiary regulations under the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance (Related to Code on Access to Information) Investigation. The request was declined by HKPF on 2 November, arguing that providing the information ‘would entail unreasonable diversion of the department’s resources’. The applicant asked for a review on the same day and sought specifications of the work hours and workforce arrangement required for preparing the information. In addition, the applicant requested the HKPF to discuss and find ways to complete the task. In the

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rejection of the request, the HKPF pointed out that not all notices contained private residential flats’ complete addresses with the reason of possible ‘legal disputes with uncompleted legal proceedings’. This would require ‘considerable manpower (sic)… for deleting relevant details from the records’ and ‘entail unreasonable diversion of a department’s resources’. The applicant requested a review on the grounds that those two relevant legislations were related to regulating behaviour in public places and, therefore by definition, did not involve neither private properties nor the disclosure of private residential addresses. Interestingly, the responses from other departments were inconsistent referring to the need for deleting private residential addresses or ‘legal disputes with uncompleted legal proceedings’. The resident was unsatisfied with the explanation and felt the HKPF breached the Code. The Ombudsman investigated the case and offered several observations. They found that the HKPF provided the complainant with some information but ‘reiterated that it had to deploy considerable extra manpower to scrutinize the contents of over 7,000 such Notices in order to delete information believed to be addresses of residential or private premises’ and upheld the decision to reject the request for the records. The applicant requested information on the ‘offence details’ as recorded on the Notices issued between 15 and 31 July 2020 according to the Prohibition on Group Gathering Regulation. This can be requested under Paragraph 2.15 of the Code that states ‘Information about any person (including a deceased person) other than to the subject of the information, or other appropriate person, are information which may be refused, unless: (a) such disclosure is consistent with the purposes for which the information was collected; or (b) the subject of the information, or other appropriate person, has given consent to its disclosure; or (c) disclosure is authorized by law; or (d) the public interest in disclosure outweighs any harm or prejudice that would result’. HKPF argued that even with a narrower range of time, the agency would have to use ‘considerable extra manpower (sic) to delete addresses of residential or private premises’; therefore, the requested information was denied. Citing legal advice, the HKPF pointed out that ‘private residential flats or private premises may be regarded as public places under certain circumstances’. However, the locations of offence recorded on some notices might be private residential flats or private premises, and their disclosure could reveal the identities of the recipients of the Notices, and the ‘harm

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or prejudice to the persons involved would outweigh the public interest in disclosure’. Although the Notice recipients had declared their intention to contest, the HKPF might keep the review of their cases or the legal proceedings as incomplete or processing. The agency also presented numerous reasons for not disclosing the requested information, including exceedingly high volume of similar requests, privacy issues and limited resources to handle individually. The Office of the Ombudsman still found the explanation from the HKPF acceptable and concluded that the complaint against the agency was unsubstantiated.

Analysis and Observations The above cases shed light on the numerous obstacles in the mindset, procedures and formalities that affect government transparency in Hong Kong. In addition to several restrictions and challenges at every step of the process for requesting access to information, the consultation and approval progress is complicated and opaque that frustrates the efforts for openness. There is a distinct impossibility for an applicant to gain the right to access even with the fulfillment of the requirements for public inspection. The circumstances for the disclosure may be defined as ‘not (to) be in the public interest’ or constituting ‘a breach of good faith on the part of the Government’. Whether those criteria are applicable to any of such data depends on the advice from Chief Secretary, and the rules do not clearly state objective and detailed guidelines. The autonomy of agencies under the administrative regime is in doubt and residents’ access to government records is restricted with disclosure controls. Interestingly, the Public Records Access Rules 1996 has been in effect for almost three decades, but the archives law is yet to be instituted. The latter is necessary for ensuring professional creation, management, retention, and ultimately public accessibility of records in the public sector (Lo, 2013). Without the archive legislation, proper record-keeping becomes neither civil servants’ duty nor priority. Despite establishing internal guidelines in departments, the GRS plays a passive role in receiving and archiving materials. Simon Chu, a former Hong Kong government archivist, commented about the lack of the practice of transferring records related to crucial policy planning and decision-making. In other words, records may be missing, and therefore the rights to access are not guaranteed (Lo, 2013).

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Poorly managed archives affect not only the overall accountability of a government but also the creditability of official investigation into any critical incident. Governmental documentation is generally expected to feature high accuracy and relevant details. The Ombudsman (2014) reported that binding decisions by adjudicating bodies and sanctions for noncompliance in agencies are not included in the records. It is impossible to investigate and analyse documents that lack essential elements as reliable, and submitting incomplete evidence for any case investigation does not aid in the discovery of the truth. The responsible parties and progress in decision-making would remain concealed, and the investigation of the Collision of Vessels near Lamma Island faltered due to such circumstances (Lo et al., 2016). Another example can be cited from the case of the Construction Works at and near the Hung Hom Railway Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project. Since the information access code does not cover the activities of partners who collaborate and contractors in public-private partnership (PPP) projects, most records were found to be inaccurate, with improper references that the commissioners responsible for investigating the case were unable to verify (Hartmann & Hansford, 2020). In this way, the limited coverage of the existing arrangements and practices creates concerns over effective monitoring and governance. A Commission of Inquiry was established to conduct an independent investigation into these two cases. The Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance empowers the Chief Executive (CE) ‘to inquire into the conduct or management of any public body, the conduct of any public officer or into any matter whatsoever which is, in his opinion, of public importance’. In fact, the Commission is empowered to exercise any necessary powers for the inquiry. Because of the exclusive legal rights given to the commissioners, the public expects it to be the most effective tool for accessing information. However, the CE has the authority to reject the conclusion and recommendations of the Commission based on his or her own judgement. During the pro-democracy moment in 2019, there was a strong consensus for setting up a Commission of Inquiry on human rights violations against protesters. The former Chief Justice of the Court of Final Appeal openly supported the idea. However, the CE disregarded the demands and suggestions, and public expectations remained unfulfilled. In response to the passive attitude, the Legislative Council could pressure the government to disclose information upon request. The most common approaches include proposing motions not intended to have any

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legislative effect. Margaret Ng, a former legislative councillor from the Legal functional constituency, had emphasized the urgency of the legislation of an archive law and initiated a motion for ‘enacting an archives law’ (Legislative Council, 2011). It was intended to exert pressure on the government to kickstart the public consultation process and formulate archives laws. Unfortunately, the motion failed to receive approval because many members from the functional constituencies decided to abstain from voting. Even if there were enough votes to pass the motion, the government was not strictly required accept and follow the proposal. For this reason, most legislative initiatives turn out to be more or less personal expressions of law makers on certain issues of public concern. The council members may also interrupt the process in legislation of any governmental proposals by filibusters and raising motions for the adjournment according to the Rules of Procedure, despite the uneasy compromise. The Legislative Council has exhausted its options for convincing the government to change course, so the matter has been put on the back burner. Given the lack of checks and balances between the executive and legislature in Hong Kong, the media can serve as an independent platform for unofficial investigation, record-keeping, and a source of information for the public. Article 27 of the Basic Law ensures freedom of speech, press and publication for local residents, and there should be no control over the media. However, implementing the National Security Law in 2020 has resulted in multiple restrictions on the media. In late 2020, Jimmy Lai, the founder of pro-democracy media Apple Daily, was prosecuted for endangering national security. Since this prosecution, there has been a ‘chilling effect’ that discouraged the media from recording and reporting content which may indicate criticism of the government or its policies. To avoid the risk of transgressing the law, some news providers in Hong Kong, such as Stand News, terminated their operation and immediately deleted all contents from their online database. There have been significant changes in the communication industry in Hong Kong in the twenty-first century that have resulted in additional obstacles to the dissemination of information. In colonial Hong Kong, several laws were seldom used to control the press (Lee, 2018). Under Chinese sovereignty, the strategy for control shifted to co-opting of influential media owners who were sympathetic to China. Fung (2007: 15) pointed out that ‘many media owners are businesspeople having vast interests in the mainland’. Their approach to freedom of access to information is strongly influenced by practices in China that are not conducive to OG.

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Concluding Observations The benefits of OG and access to information on government decisions by the public contribute to good governance in modern states. However, the unique context of Hong Kong needs to be taken into consideration in analysing the issue. Following colonial traditions, there was no effort to open up the governing process in British Hong Kong. However, The Public Records Access Rules 1996 was introduced only a year before the termination of British control. Moreover, the rules allowed a time lag of thirty years before the public could access records and, therefore, was only a symbolic move to demonstrate support for openness by the government. The new status of Hong Kong as an administrative region of communist China did not really make much difference. Both democratic Great Britain and Communist China demonstrated similar reservations and unwillingness to allow access to information by the public in Hong Kong. In view of the worldwide surge of interest in transparency and openness, some arrangements have been made to allow citizens access to information in Hong Kong. This chapter presented several examples and cases to demonstrate that the process and procedures are incredibly complicated, and the public face extreme difficulties in navigating them. These apparent obstacles can be perceived as strategies to discourage seeking access to information. In case the applicants for access to information persist and eventually succeed in applying, there are additional obstacles in obtaining approval from various agencies. As noted in the cases reviewed in this chapter, the agencies find excuses for rejecting the applications for information. Appeals against these decisions turn out to be futile as the Office of the Ombudsman generally finds the arguments of the agencies to be convincing, and the public become frustrated after investing considerable time and effort for accessing information they need. On top, the CE has the authority to deny access to information on the ground of public interest. The colonial experience influenced the uniqueness of Hong Kong and positioned it as an international trading and commerce hub located in China but guided by British traditions. The majority of public servants were trained and steeped in this style and approach to administration. These factors remain the foundation of the current civil service, ensuring a certain level of professionalism. The twin goals of stability and prosperity have served as the foundations on which Hong Kong was governed. Adherence to Confucian values allowed the development of a strong

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economy and an effective social welfare system. The Independent Commission Against Corruption operates with full autonomy, and a competent civil service contributes to achieving results, particularly in the areas emphasized by the governance indicators used by various agencies. Therefore, the performance of Hong Kong is adjudged better compared to the People’s Republic of China and other Asian countries. However, the arrangements to govern Hong Kong as a special administration region restrict the democratization process and inhibit the transition to an OG. There are issues regarding the extent of freedom and democratic principles, but this is to be expected in a non-democratic society with strict controls on access to information. The experience of Hong Kong demonstrates that the effectiveness of OG and full access to information can only be effective in specific contexts. These ideals are consistent with democratic political systems that allow citizens to oversee and scrutinize public agencies’ decisions. The tradition in Hong Kong has been strikingly different, particularly with the substantial amount of power exercised by the bureaucracy, which may be unwilling to disclose details of their decisions. A strongly centralized governing system supports this. Obviously, expecting open governments interested in sharing information with the public in non-democratic systems is unrealistic. The unique context of Hong Kong does not lend itself to the establishment of open government.

References Census and Statistics Department. (2018). Thematic Report: Persons from the Mainland Having Resided in Hong Kong for Less Than 7 Years. 2016 Population by-census. Government of Hong Kong. Cheung, A. B. L. (2008). The story of two administrative states: State capacity in Hong Kong and Singapore. The Pacific Review, 21(2), 121–145. https://doi. org/10.1080/09512740801990188 Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, Cap 86. (2019). https://www.elegislation. gov.hk/hk/cap86!en.pdf Evans, M. A., & Campos, A. (2013). Open government initiatives: Challenges of citizen participation. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(1), 172–185. Fung, A. Y.-H. (2007). Political economy of Hong Kong media: Producing a hegemonic voice. Asian Journal of Communication, 17(2), 159–171. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01292980701306530

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Geiger, C. P., & von Lucke, J. (2012). Open government and (linked) (open) (government) (data). eJournal of eDemocracy and Open Government, 4, 265–278. Government of the HKSAR. (2008). Hong Kong Report 2007. https://www. yearbook.gov.hk/2007/en/pdf/E01.pdf Government of the HKSAR. (2021). Hong Kong Yearbook 2020. https://www. yearbook.gov.hk/2020/en/pdf/E01.pdf GRS, Hong Kong Government. (n.d.). https://www.grs.gov.hk/en/access_our_ holdings.html Hartmann, M., & Hansford, P. (2020). Final Report of Commission of Inquiry into the Construction Works at and near the Hung Hom Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project. Commission of Inquiry into the Construction Works at and near the Hung Hom Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project (formerly Commission of Inquiry into the Diaphragm Wall and Platform Slab Construction Works at the Hung Hom Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project) - Report. https://www. coi-­hh.gov.hk/eng/report.html Hilgers, D. (2012). Open government. Journal of Business Economics, 82(6), 631–660. Hong Kong Government. Press Release. (2019). LCQ1: Operation of one-way permits scheme. The Government of Hong Kong Special Administration Region. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201903/20/P2019032000536.htm Hong Kong Government. Press Releases. (2014). LCQ16: Immigration policy and Comprehensive Social Security Assistance for new immigrants. news.gov.hk. https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201402/26/P201402260288.htm Huque, A. S. (1996). Administering the dragons: Challenge and issues. In A. S. Huque, J. Lam, & J. Lee (Eds.), Public administration in the NICs: Challenges and accomplishments (pp. 1–32). Macmillan. Huque, A. S. (2010). Managing the public sector in Hong Kong: Trends and adjustments. Asian Journal of Political Science, 18(3), 269–288. https://doi-­ org.libaccess.lib.mcmaster.ca/10.1080/02185377.2010.527215 Immigration Department. (n.d.). Apply for right of abode in Hong Kong. Our Services Right of Abode. https://www.immd.gov.hk/eng/services/right-­of-­ abode-­in-­hksar/apply.html Lam, J. (2017). HK$2.5 billion spent on Social Security for New Hong Kong immigrants in past three years. Business in Vancouver. https://biv.com/article/2017/04/hk25-­billion-­spent-­social-­security-­new-­hong-­kong-­i Lau, S. K. (1982). Society and politics in Hong Kong. The Chinese University Press. Lee, F. L. F. (2018). Changing political economy of the Hong Kong media. China Perspectives, 9–18. https://doi.org/10.4000/chinaperspectives.8009

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Lee, S., & Chou, K. (2018). Explaining attitudes toward immigrants from Mainland China in Hong Kong. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 27(3), 273–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/0117196818790572 Legislative Council, Hong Kong. (2011). Amendments to Dr Hon Margaret NG’s motion on ‘Enacting an archives law.’ Council meeting of 16 November 2011. https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr11-­12/english/counmtg/motion/m_papers/ cm1116cb3-­141-­e.pdf Lo, P. (2013). Why Hong Kong needs and Archives Law, − An interview with Simon Chu), Chairman of Hong Kong Archive Society. Journal of East Asian Libraries, 157, Article 10. https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/jeal/vol2013/ iss157/10 Lo, P., Kong, E. W. S., & Chiu, D. K.W. (2016). Long way for Hong Kong to achieve democracy: Urgent call for the Archives Law to Protect Valuable Government Records. Informational Interview with Cyd Ho, JP. Journal of East Asian Libraries, 2016(163), Article 8. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/jeal/vol2016/iss163/8 Meijer, A. J., Curtin, D., & Hillebrandt, M. (2012). Open government: Connecting vision and voice. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(1), 10–29. Nam, T. (2012). Citizens’ attitudes toward open government and government 2.0. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78, 346–368. OECD. (2016). Open government: The global context and the way forward. Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development. https://www. oecd.org/gov/open-­gov-­way-­forward-­highlights.pdf Office of the Ombudsman. (2014). Direct investigation into the access to information regime in Hong Kong. Issue No. 4 of Reporting Year 2013/14. https:// ofomb.ombudsman.hk/abc/files/OmbudsNews_E-­20_3_2014_0.pdf Office of the Ombudsman. (2021a). Department of Health refused to disclose the voting results and advice of its two Scientific Committees and Government’s Expert Advisory Panel on COVID-19 vaccine procurement by Government (Related to Code on Access to Information). Investigation Report. https:// ofomb.ombudsman.hk/abc/files/DH_code_EN202106.pdf Office of the Ombudsman. (2021b). The Hong Kong Police Force refused to provide information about fixed penalty notices issued pursuant to two subsidiary regulations under the Prevention and Control of Disease Ordinance (Related to Code on Access to Information). Investigation Report. https://ofomb.ombudsman.hk/ abc/files/HKPF_code_EN202104.pdf

CHAPTER 6

State of Access to Information in the Context of Open Government in Malaysia Kevin Fernandez and Kuppusamy Singaravelloo

Introduction Since the release of President Barack Obama’s Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies in March 2009, there has been a significant increase in public and intellectual interest in open government (OG). His primary goal was to establish a government that is open to dialogue and works together through increased citizen engagement. He was determined to make his administration more effective and ready for the challenges of the digital era. Two major categories could be used to organize the various pieces of writing and movements related to OG. To begin with, in the 1980s, the world was introduced with the development of a new method of public management. This approach brought more aspects of the private sector into the public arena, such as decentralization, autonomous agencies, or

K. Fernandez (*) • K. Singaravelloo University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_6

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customer orientation, to create a more effective public administration (Larbi, 1999). Second, the introduction of the Internet in the 1980s accelerated the development of e-government over time, particularly in the last decade and the recent industrial revolution, resulting in significant shifts in public administration and governance. The ramifications of these changes can be felt today. Hence, the contemporary push toward OG. The mid-1990s witnessed the rise of e-government, resulting in a more modern OG movement (Evans & Campos, 2013). Because of the rapid development of new technologies, particularly by the end of the 1990s, both public administration and governance have been profoundly reshaped. In Malaysia, which already possessed a developed infrastructure, implementing information technology (IT) in its administration was viewed as a means of attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs). Laws such as the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 [Act 588] were enacted ‘to provide for and to regulate the converging communications and multimedia industries, and for incidental matters’ (MCMC, 2002). Even though the Act was enacted to protect people’s rights to free speech and expression on the Internet, it has occasionally been applied in a way that limits those rights (Steven, 2016). Unfortunately, Malaysia now ranks 87th out of 94 countries on the Global Open Data Index, trailing Zimbabwe and Afghanistan with a score of only 10% (Lim, 2021). Because of this, it is hard to arrive at a meaningful measurement of the country’s performance, known as the Malaysia Governance Index. Second, environmental exploitation is possible because of structural inefficiency brought on by colonialism, culture, and structural incompetence and because commercial and economic elites collaborate with political elites to create further exploitation opportunities. This inefficiency makes it possible for commercial and economic elites to exploit natural resources, disregarding the need for total transparency through an OG made possible through the Internet. Last but not least, a key problem in Malaysia is the lack of openness between the various government departments. According to research conducted in Malaysia on data guardians working within departments, the respondents generally agreed that increased openness provides reassurance for increased performance (Yusup et al., 2018). When it comes to keeping information under wraps, governments worldwide fixate on the philosophy of secrecy. All civil servants in Malaysia are required by the country’s ‘Official Secrets Act’, passed in 1972, to maintain the confidentiality of information deemed official secret.

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Laws written in the Malaysian constitution further restrict the already limited amount of freedom of information (FOI) in the country. In the interest of ‘enhancing the externalization of information for public interest and to provide opportunities for every individual to access information provided by the departments of the state government through an application submitted to the relevant departments’, two oppositional states— Selangor and Penang, enacted their respective right to information (RTI) laws—the Selangor Freedom of Information Enactment and the Penang Freedom of Information Enactment, both in 2010 (MBPJ, 2021 para 1–4). This study adopts a thematic analysis which Boyatzis (1998: 4) states is ‘a way of seeing’ and ‘making sense out of seemingly unrelated material’. We adopted this method to identify and analyse patterns of the meaning of the texts as recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006). The process is viewed as organic and reflexive, involving an ‘engaged, intuitive’ investigator who analyses ‘the ways in which they are part of the analysis... [making] it a personal, and often even emotional, experience’ (Braun et  al.: 107). This was the best method for delivering a storyline. As prescribed by Krippendorff (1980), (1) data was analysed using the basic Google data search; we (2) Googled keywords such as ‘open government’, ‘freedom of information’ coupled with the word ‘Malaysia’ for the Malaysian case; (3) selected the articles published by reliable sources; (4) the context was primarily based on articles that addressed topics on OG and FOI; (5) excluded articles that were not directly addressing these issues; (6) the articles were read in context, and inferences were drawn if some relationship to the context was found. This study elaborates on the three points mentioned above. Finally, it provides some explanations on how the protection of information is exploited in the context of Malaysia by the political elites at the expense of transparency.

Theoretical Framework Why is it necessary to have a transparent government? In the case of Malaysia, the nation has been rocked by a number of global financial scandals totalling several billion dollars. The Asian Wall Street Journal stated in the 1980s that the company that was then known as Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF) lost money owing to bad loans in Hong Kong that totalled millions of ringgit in 1982 (Parkaran, 2021). The recent financial scandal involving 1MDB (Malaysia’s state investment arm) involving one of the country’s former prime ministers has reignited calls for greater

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information transparency in the country. This scandal was also discovered by an international publication, The Wall Street Journal (Al Jazeera, 2020). There is a widespread consensus among academics that open data has the potential to facilitate increased levels of transparency (Bertot et al., 2010), participation (Borzacchiello & Craglia, 2012), and economic growth (and maybe other benefits, as well). When discussing ‘digital politics’, there are four major subfields to investigate: ‘digital government (executives and bureaucracies), digital democracy (community, deliberation, and participation), digital campaigning (parties, candidates, and elections), and digital mobilization (interest groups and social movements)’ (Postill, 2018: 8). According to our present understanding, OG is a subset of digital governance that incorporates certain aspects of digital democracy. To be more precise, we also believe that the primary value of digital media is to lower the financial entry barriers to political participation (Deseriis, 2021). The ability of elected officials to monitor and consult with their voters is made possible by digital affordances, which play a crucial role in the functioning of representative democracies. In turn, digital democratic affordances offer a mobilized public the tools it needs to organize and actively represent its own interests in a way that is accountable to itself (Deseriis, 2021). This lends credence to the idea that increased openness entails a commensurately elevated level of public social control. To have a democratic society that operates effectively, its citizens and other stakeholders need to have the ability to oversee the operations of the government and ensure that they are legitimate. Gerbaudo (2019: 106) distinguishes the early e-democracy experiments that were generally based on blogs, email campaigns and online forums from the current ‘second wave of democracy’. As compared to early e-democracy experiments based on mass email campaigns and online forums (Chadwick, 2008; Shulman, 2007), this ‘second wave’ (Gerbaudo, 2019: 106) presents three distinctive features. First, the software tends to contain previously non-existent decision-making capabilities. Second, the new digital democracy initiatives (DDIs) are typically binding, implying that they have more political weight than prior consultation methods. First, the software tends to include decision-making skills that did not exist in the past but are now present. Second, the new digital democracy initiatives (also known as DDIs) tend to be legally binding, which suggests that they have greater political weight than the traditional means of consultation. Third, the DDIs of the 2010s were able to attract and facilitate

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widespread participation, with peaks of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of participants in each campaign. This suggests that citizens are increasingly put in the position to directly express their own interests rather than entrusting elected officials with the obligation of expressing them in their fullness. This is a positive trend that should be encouraged. On the other side of the spectrum is the use of fake news and disinformation by a diverse group of political, ethnic, and sectarian actors who are messaging their target constituencies in a competitive manner to gain votes. Two major trends have heightened the use of misinformation and false news in Malaysia: greater political competitiveness and polarization, and the fast growth of mobile Internet, which has resulted in increased active involvement in the public sphere. We observe similar patterns here in Malaysia with ‘the use of identity-based narratives that have been crafted to activate the mass anxieties of the majority to de-legitimize their rivals, and to aggregate a coalition by weaving different anxieties together through the strategic use of framing techniques’ (Cheema et  al., 2019: 18). Racist memes (Johns, 2017), for instance, also link and organize the public, but in damaging ways and with violent political consequences. Dean describes how platform algorithms and functions enable states to manage affective communication flows through the deployment of ‘paid commenters and political bots’ that amplify messages beneficial to states and that ‘message force multipliers’, ‘repetition itself has an affective impact’ (Dean, 2010, p. 26). The use of ‘cybertroopers’ or, in the case of Cambridge Analytica, the exploitation of big data to hack publics, distribute misinformation or biased information, and consequently affect voting populations and election outcomes have brought this concept to a tumultuous point in recent times. Why, in light of the facts in Malaysia, are political elites so afraid of having a transparent government? For this study, when we refer to ‘[e]lite theory we envision society as divided between the mass of people and a ruling minority, where the political power – the power to take and impose decisions valid to the whole society – always belongs to the latter’ (Mariotti, 2020: 2). According to the theory advanced by Gaetano Mosca (ibid), the connection is predicated on the existence of common interests and encourages members of an (organized) minority to establish a cohesive and homogenous group in opposition to the largest but most disorganized majority. Additionally, the term ‘connection’ can be used as a synonym for political hierarchy, which is essential to the operation and continuation of the state.

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This study helps to understand the policymaking process by political elites. According to David Easton’s systems model, citizens’ demands, also known as ‘inputs’, are recognized by government decision-makers, who then process them into authoritative decisions and actions, or ‘outputs’. This model was adopted for the purpose of this study to assist in understanding the policymaking process. These outputs influence the social, economic, and political environment that the citizens may or may not enjoy depending on the specifics of the situation. The public once again makes their needs known, which serves as an essential ‘feedback’ connection for the system and has the potential to change the choice that was made previously. According to Robert Michels, ‘The Iron Law of Oligarchy’ asserts that formal organizations are headed by a small number of people, while Wright Mills’ claim of the ‘power elite’ states that a large number of wealthy and powerful people influence the policies and decisions made by the government (Mariotti, 2020). Power elites are political elitists and their business cronies who collude with each other in exploiting the state’s resources by creating a patron-client relationship. As a result of the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition’s previous control over the public sphere in Malaysia, the implementation of Orwellian newspeak was made possible within the state (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). The major component parties that were allied with the BN directly owned the national and vernacular language publications. Back in the day, those in positions of authority had a lot more leeway to manipulate the narratives that were told. In addition, the Sedition Act of 1948, the Official Secrets Act of 1972, and the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 are some of the regulations that make it difficult for journalists to practice their craft freely in Malaysia. Because of these impediments, whichever party wins the Malaysian election will be able to obstruct the free flow of information even across different government institutions. Most significantly, these regulations make it difficult and often impossible for different government ministries, departments, and agencies to communicate with one another and share information. Taken as a whole, it paves the way for redundancy and corruption. It is essential, for the sake of this investigation, that we examine and come up with a complete definition of what it means to have an OG. According to Geiger and von Lucke (2012), OG involves the state’s transparency, engagement, and collaboration with third parties like corporations or individuals. In addition to this, they link it to electronic government. The most comprehensive definition of OG is taken from Wirtz and

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Birkmeyer (2015), which states it ‘consists of three pillars—transparency, participation, and collaboration—all of which enhance public and citizen value. But external drivers like accountability, regulations, technology, and the acceptance or trust in government influence open government’ (ibid, 380). OG is not directly stated as a goal in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) but is a method of designing and implementing policies to fulfil the whole agenda. Particularly, SDG 16 that states ‘Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions’, which seeks to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’ (UN, 2022). The conversation on fostering inclusion involves members of the lesbian, homosexual, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) community, women, the handicapped community, and minority groups. The power elites are more concerned with catering to the desires of urban voters and providing a justification for megaprojects that impact this sector of society than any other sector. More importantly, e-government programs tend to focus on voters in urban areas and their viewpoints while disregarding minority groups and situations. This creates an obvious digital gap.

Financial Corruption and Access to Information in Malaysia Transparency and access to information enable academics, researchers, and observers to scrutinize corruption at all levels. Scholars argue that transparency, according to them, comprises three fundamental components (van Dooren et  al., 2012). The first is the timely and methodical dissemination of budgetary data, and the second component is the effective functioning of the legislature. The third component is an active role for civil society, as represented by the media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Though oppositional states in Malaysia appeared devoted to FOI and openness during the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime, with the introduction of the Selangor Freedom of Information Enactment in 2010, there has been little progress seven years later (Masriwanie, 2017). In another oppositional state, Penang, for instance, the feasibility for the proposed undersea tunnel across the channel that was said to have been completed in

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2016 has yet to be released at the time of writing this chapter (FMT Reporters, 2022). The 1MDB crisis was one of the most significant scandals that raised questions about the government’s level of openness (Hafiz & Adam, 2019). Low Taek Jho, also known as Jho Low, frivolously wasted the money owed for oil royalties to the undeveloped state of Terengganu. This information became public when the tale was uncovered in an investigative journalistic article published in The Wall Street Journal. Websites run by the government may be helpful in achieving transparency, which is one of the most essential objectives of a democracy (Harder & Jordan, 2013). However, neither the current regime in Malaysia nor the opposing states have been completely transparent, affecting people’s faith in the government (Harder & Jordan, 2013). It is possible that the states who opposed the bill did not want to put themselves in the spotlight by allowing the federal government to investigate them more thoroughly. For example, in 2019, Pakatan Harapan (PH) legislators campaigned for a motion that required all MPs to reveal their holdings. The majority of BN MPs did not wish to disclose their holdings until after the special parliamentary vote was approved (Teh & Kalbana, 2019). One of the obstacles that must be overcome to institutionalize asset declaration is the absence of a legal entity that can prosecute MPs who breach the law. The Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (LHDN) are both examples of institutions in Malaysia that have the authority to uphold legal standards. When it comes to making critical appointments, however, the executive branch, particularly the Prime Minister (PM), has a great deal of power, which offers possibilities for misuse of that power. By ‘participation’, we mean the process of engaging citizens in the making of civic decisions via deliberations (Harrison et al., 2012). To evaluate projects and determine how they will affect society and the environment, the traditional approach of compiling information in the form of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), and Transport Impact Assessment (TIA) reports are still the techniques of choice. There have been certain instances in which substantial amounts of money have been given to businesses with a competing financial interest in the project at hand (Muhammad & Ilah, 2018). Most crucially, the general public is unable to have access to these reports except EIA which is made public.

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The community-oriented policing organizations (Rukun Tetangga) that Tun Abdul Razak created in 1975 gradually lost their popularity as the cities expanded and developed at an accelerated rate. Although this has been rebranded as Community Policing in collaboration with the police, the deterioration of social capital between the people and their elected representatives has resulted in a decrease in public involvement in national decision-making, particularly on matters with the greatest influence on them. Even if the Malaysian government cannot and should not revert to the former methods of incorporating citizens and making decisions, the administration has provided no sign that it wishes to embrace e-­government technology in order to involve citizens. People located in various parts of the world can now collaborate with one another, share information, and make choices collectively in policy areas ranging from the municipal to the federal level, thanks to the lower costs of entry to have affordable access to technology and online social networks. Citizens of Malaysia have taken it upon themselves to start online petitions through websites such as Change.org to pressure the government to change its policies on various issues, ranging from the cleanliness of neighbourhoods to those concerning the state of the nation. During the height of the pandemic lockdown in the country, one of the most successful peer-­ to-­peer smartphone applications was developed by a Malaysian named Reza Razali. This application allowed those who were going through difficult times, such as food shortage, to ask for assistance from fellow Malaysians (Yeoh, 2021). The White Flag movement that took place in Malaysia during the pandemic resulted in the invention of the Kita Jaga Malaysia app. This initiative encouraged Malaysians in desperate need of food relief to display a white flag in their homes so that other people might see it. It is important to note that people’s perceptions of the government’s attempts to safeguard those less privileged during the epidemic were unfavourable.

Laws Restricting Access to Information in Malaysia Except for the Official Secrets Act (OSA) of 1972, Malaysia has no other overarching regulation governing government data. The Act defines ‘official secret’ as: any document specified in the Schedule and any information and material relating thereto and includes any other official document, information and

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material as may be classified as “Top Secret”, “Secret”, “Confidential” or “Restricted”, as the case may be, by a Minister, the Menteri Besar or Chief Minister of a State or such public officer appointed under section 2B.1

which also includes: Cabinet documents, records of decisions and deliberations including those of Cabinet committees; State Executive Council documents, records of decisions and deliberations including those of State Executive Council committees; Documents concerning national security, defence and international relations.2

Malaysia lacks a federal level Right to Information statute; therefore, public personnel are understandably wary of providing information because the law plainly prohibits such behaviour. Meanwhile, the Statistics Act of 1965 specifies the functions of DOS. … to collect and interpret statistics for the purpose of furnishing information required in the formation or carrying out of Government policy in any field or otherwise required for Government purposes or for meeting the needs of trade, commerce, industry or agriculture (including forestry, fishing and hunting).3

The Malaysian government announced plans to update the Statistics Act in September 2020 to improve the function of the DOS and create a systematic process for coordination, reach, and collaboration in data sharing (Nur, 2020). Additionally, researchers found that ‘data provided by the Malaysian government falls short in three areas: completeness, granularity, and timeliness’ (Ashraf, 2020). The combined factors of inaccessible data and uncoordinated data between the different departments within the government do not allow for proper analysis and appropriate interpretation of the data by academics and researchers in Malaysia to provide practical recommendations. The Malaysia Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), a major body under the Prime 1  Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1972 (Act 88) (incorporating all amendments up to 1 January 2006). 2  Section 2 of the Official Secrets Act 1972 (Act 88) (incorporating all amendments up to 1 January 2006). 3  Section 2 of the Statistics Act 1965 (Act 415) (Revised 1989).

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Minister Department, is in charge of managing the initiatives in the country and leading the agenda in the global environment. The government data portal is at www.data.gov.my. These initiatives toward creating a comprehensive one-stop centre are not yet fully functional (Ashraf, 2020). Nevertheless, since 2004, Malaysian Super Corridor (MSC) has been working on e-government flagship projects, which have been classified into distinct e-government applications such as the Generic Office Environment (GOE), Electronic Procurement (EP), Human Resource Management Information System (HRMIS), Project Monitoring System (PMS), Electronic Services Delivery (E-Services), Electronic Labour Exchange (ELX), and e-Syariah, e-Zakat, e-Kasih, and BRIM 2.0 (Shahbaz & Funk, 2021). The second conundrum that nation states face in terms of free expression is how to control the negative consequences of such freedoms being abused by people who use the Internet for criminal purposes. This includes recruiting the vulnerable, including young people, for sex or violence, and those who spread hate speech, fake news, and other crimes (Sani et  al., 2016). Laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), the Prevention of Crime Act (POCA), and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, which replaced the more draconian Internal Security Act (ISA), can be used in these situations. This came after the Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope, PH) government successfully repealed the Anti-Fake News Act 2018, which had been approved by former Prime Minister Najib Razak’s administration in a move that critics say was intended to suppress dissent only weeks before he lost the election in May 2018. The dissemination of news and information that might be seen as critical of the government is prohibited under laws similar to these. Most crucially, it restricts the ability of whistle-blowers on financial wrongdoing to exercise their rights under the Whistle-blower Protection Act of 2010, which was passed in 2010 with the intention of protecting Malaysians who reveal financial abuses.

Freedom of Information and Misinformation A study by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies Malaysia (ISIS) found that during the COVID-19 pandemic, the most common fake news that was spread, particularly using Facebook and WhatsApp, was about authority action and community spread (Harris & Farlina, 2020). The laws that the government is currently using to go after people who

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spread false information, like the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998 and the Penal Code, are not enough to deal with the problem of false information, which is often hard to define. Malaysia’s lack of reputable media outlets may be one of the challenges the government faces. As conspiracies and fake news dominate public discourse, people seeking information from less trustworthy sources when there are insufficient reliable media has the potential to undermine trust in government policies. Fake news and misinformation spread during the pandemic confused the public, increasing anxiety and undeniably causing further mistrust toward the government. In neutralizing the mistrust that brewed among Malaysians during the pandemic, the government adopted image-repairing strategies to fix public opinion towards the government (Masngut & Mohamad, 2021). Anxiety can also be interpreted as the source of out-group hate speech directed at vulnerable groups such as Chinese tourists, tablighs (an Arabic word that means to reach out, make known, or inform people on Islamic issues), and, finally, foreign workers and refugees (Tham & Omar, 2020). We contend that restricting freedom of speech stifles innovation. New ICT technologies enable OG and allow for innovative approaches, yet OG may be implemented even with low ICT penetration. E-Government ‘refers to the use by the governments of information and communication technologies (ICTs), and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve better government’, while Digital Government (DG) refers to the use of digital technologies, as an integrated part of government’s modernization strategies, to create public value. It relies on a digital government ecosystem comprised of government actors, nongovernmental organizations, businesses, citizens’ associations and individuals, which supports the production of and access to data, services and content through interactions with the government’ (OECD, 2014, p.6). MAMPU has been instrumental in ensuring that most transactions with the public, including transmission of documents for approval and related payments, including taxes and fees, are made online, thereby supporting efficient financial management and better monitoring of the performance of the department of agencies. Public procurements are mandated to be made via e-procurement tools. Businesses and contractors doing business with the government are required to use this system. In return, payments to the public, businesses and contractors are also made online. This has now reduced the delays in payments that the electronic system can detect and alert the source to execute actions. The

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actions of approving officers are monitored and evaluated at least once by the KPI scorecard system in the organization. Another good development worth mentioning is the one by the Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM). Following the government’s support, the Director General has directed that the majority of data collected by the department be made public and provided free of charge, as it was collected with public funds. It is now incredible to see the number of statistical reports almost daily, if not weekly, which serve the national, state and district levels. The public is now able to access data much more easily than before, consistent with the needs of various sectors that need to monitor their performance against the goals of SDGs.

Conclusions This review on information access in Malaysia enabled us to highlight the possibility for exploring and improving systems for information access, as well as approaches to remove evident hurdles. Though the government has indicated that it wishes to set up a one-stop centre at www.data.gov. my, it still acknowledges that the different government departments under the various ministries have overlapping and redundant exercises. While this redundancy increases expenditure, the power elites are less enthusiastic about adopting transparent, open government habits. This could be because it would not allow the power elites, both political and economic elites, to collude in business ventures to plunder state resources. The opposition in Malaysia likewise appears to be less enthused about setting a moral standard by adopting transparent government values, despite having previously enacted legislation to do so. We also deduced that the government is less enthusiastic about encouraging and creating the space for community-orientated policing groups that promote trust, networking and reciprocity within the community, councillors, their elected state assembly members and MPs. This would encourage better participation between the community and their policymakers. At best, MPs should embark on encouraging such initiatives to inculcate trust. While the laws of the state should be meant to protect the law-abiding citizens, they can also work to benefit and protect the power elites. Laws such as the Anti-Fake News Bill that was rushed through in 2018 was an example, but other laws are at the disposal of the Executive. The government of Malaysia should start relooking at this idea of OG and access to

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information because the lack of trust in the government is glaring. After going through four prime ministers in the last four years, and the size of scandals involving all sides, this could be a positive way forward.

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CHAPTER 7

Twenty-Five Years of Freedom of Information in Thailand: An Empty Gesture? Patamawadee Jongruck

Introduction Open government (OG) and freedom of information (FOI) are key elements in democratic governance that are believed to bring more transparency, participation and accountability. Having laws of OG and FOI provides a good architecture to guarantee the practice of OG and FOI. Many democratic countries have enacted laws on freedom of information for a long time. The two most influential countries are Sweden, where the world’s first freedom of information law was enacted in 1766, and the USA, where the Freedom of the Press Act was enacted in 1947 and which has become a model for more than 35 countries around the world (Ackerman & Sandoval-Ballesteros, 2006). The movement to enact such laws in most developing countries began after the 1990s. Thailand is P. Jongruck (*) Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_7

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one of the developing countries in Asia that joined the bandwagon in the late 1990s by launching the Official Information Act B.E. 2540 (A.D. 1997)(OIA). However, the country has undergone two military coups and domestic unrest during the past two and a half decades. This chapter explores the history of freedom of information in Thailand and the implementation of the OIA during this period of political turbulence and determines the effects this Act has on the country’s governance. Document research and in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders were conducted.

Open Government, Freedom of Information, and Good Governance Open government (OG) lies at the heart of democratic governance in that it aims at enhancing accountability, transparency and openness (Caddy & Vergez, 2003). The concept of open government has been in place for more than two centuries when Sweden became the first country to establish freedom of information legislation in 1766 (Banisar, 2006; Gunawong, 2015; Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). Open government, in its simplest sense, is the lack of opacity in governmental business (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). Open government can also be defined as ‘a multilateral, political and social process, which includes in particular transparent, collaborative and participatory action by government and administration’ (Wirtz & Birkmeyer, 2015; 392). It requires the state to communicate with its people and to provide them with the means to obtain essential information regarding themselves and public policies and decisions which affect their lives (Chapman & Hunt, 2013). The rationale behind it is to make the governance and lawmaking processes as accessible and comprehensible as possible so that they are more easily understood by the public (Birkinshaw, 2006). In the late twentieth century, advancements in Information Communication Technology (ICT) encouraged governments to use ICT in their affairs, thus leading them to become known as ‘e-governments’ or ‘digital governments’. E-government refers to the approach that allows citizens to engage in policy process by using a wide range of technologies in the public entity’s activities (Dawes, 2008; Harrison et  al., 2012). Today, open government is often considered to be a part of the e-­government field (Hansson et al., 2015), wherein information exchange

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occurs between citizens and governments in a transparent, participative, accountable, and collaborative way (Abu-Shanab, 2015). Kassen (2014) noted that OG is a governmental system that provides online interactive services for its citizens through technologies, including open data platforms and two-way communication platforms. Freedom of information (FOI) is an essential component of open government. FOI, also known as the Right to Information (Ubaldi, 2013), is the presumptive legal right to access any form of information, whether paper-based or computer-based; however, the accessibility right must be appropriately restricted in order to protect government’s legitimacy as well as legitimate privacy (Birkinshaw, 2006). Many countries have enshrined FOI into law, ensuring their citizens have a right to access information. After Sweden established the world’s first freedom of information law in 1766, other Nordic countries took it as a model for their own laws (Banisar, 2006). FOI laws began to spread in the 1990s and early 2000s, with 34 legislation enactments being reported between 2000–2005 (Michener, 2011). Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006) have categorized freedom of information laws into two principal models: the United States (US) model and the Swedish model. The Swedish model is mainly adopted in Finland, Norway, and Denmark, while the US model has been used as an example by over 35 countries across the world, including Thailand. In total, by 2014, over 120 countries have enacted ‘freedom of information’ legislation (Banisar, 2020). OG and FOI are key enablers of Good Governance (OECD, 2022). Van Doeveren (2011) suggested five principles of good governance: accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, openness and transparency, participation, and the rule of law. OECD (2016) also pointed out that open government initiatives can generate various desirable outcomes, for instance: enhancing integrity, reducing corruption, increasing transparency, and improving public service provision. It is widely accepted that OG and FOI can bring transparency, which refers to the timely provision of government information and data regarding the annual budget and expenditure, organizational performance reports, procurement data, and so on (Ganapati & Reddick, 2012). It also constricts confusion, irregularities and secrecy in public administration. OG and FOI can also bring participation. Participation in the e-­government field refers to the engagement and involvement of citizens in the decision-making process utilizing ICT tools (Abu-Shanab, 2015).

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Advanced ICT can connect citizens with government activities whether through the expression of opinions, participation in agenda setting, or cooperating with governments on public service development (Karamagioli et al., 2014). Participation can also lead to improved public services. The US Department of Defense, for instance, allows users to submit feedback on governmental plans through virtual roundtables; or the citizens can directly propose ideas on service improvements (Evans & Campos, 2013). OG and FOI can reduce corruption by enabling non-state stakeholders to access information about policy decision-making, implementation, and evaluation processes more efficiently, and to improve non-state stakeholders’ engagement in those processes (Relly, 2012; Shim & Eom, 2009). However, many scholars have pointed out that merely having OG and FOI cannot guarantee the result of Good Governance. Hansson et  al. (2015) pointed out that, in practice, OG tends to be more focused on the transparency aspect, and the participation and collaboration aspects are often neglected; thus, Good Governance cannot be achieved by focusing on one aspect. Ruijer and Martinius (2017) found that limited empirical studies have been conducted regarding the impact of open data on democratic processes. Park and Kim (2020) noted that open government cannot reduce corruption by itself – effective legal systems are required for this to happen. Thus, merely having the FOI law cannot ensure Good Governance. Context of operation is highly important. The following section will present the OG and FOI context in Thailand.

Sociopolitical Context of Open Government and Freedom of Information The late 1990s was a time of important political and socio-economic changes for Thailand. In the political context, Thailand endured a coup followed by political protests calling for democratic rule of the country. This led to the drafting of a new constitution, known as ‘People’s Constitution’ in 1997, which is considered to be the most democratic constitution of the country – the stated aim of which is to promote democracy and stability of government (Pongsudhirak, 2008). In terms of economic changes, in 1997, Thailand experienced a financial crisis that rapidly brought down the country’s economy and seized the attention of international organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF. The concept of Good Governance was introduced at this time to

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improve the governance of the country. The Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance B.E. 2546 (2003) was enacted to ensure the good practices of government. Transparency is listed as one of the aspects of Good Governance in the decree, and thus it encouraged the movement towards open government. The late 1990s also witnessed large-scale technological changes. Thailand launched the first digital policy framework, ‘IT 2000’, in 1996. It aimed to establish a coherent digital infrastructure, including initiatives such as the Government Information Network, to facilitate intra- and inter-agency communication and information sharing (Thuvasethakul & Koanantakool, 2002). The democracy movement, the financial crisis, and the advancement of ICT thus led Thailand to accept the idea of OG. One concrete effort by Thailand to develop OG was the establishment of the Electronic Government Agency (EGA) in 2011, which later became the Digital Government Development Agency (Public Organization) in 2018. According to the EGA (2012), an open government requires the public sector to offer opportunities for the general public and all stakeholders to acknowledge and participate in decision-making for the administration in order to achieve transparency and efficiency (Gunawong, 2015). The idea of e-government was formed around the same time as the FOI concept. The draft bill of the Official Information Act (OIA) was prepared by the interim government after the coup in 1991. The Council of the State had proposed to the incumbent government to set up a committee to prepare the draft bill, where professors from various universities had jointly prepared the draft. As a result, the concept of the official information law was made widely known to the public. However, the draft bill took several years to submit to parliament. It legitimated as a sub-law of the constitution on 9 December 1997 and has been in force ever since. This marked the first time the country had enacted a law concerning FOI.  Thailand was one of the first Asian countries, along with South Korea, to join the bandwagon of countries establishing freedom of information laws in the late 1990s. After the OIA had been implemented for a period of 9 years, there was a military coup in 2006. The 1997 constitution was terminated; however, the OIA remained active. A year after the coup, the new constitution of 2007 was enacted, and the country returned to democracy. However, this was short-lived and political unrest ensued: a total of five governments held power between 2007 and 2014. There was another coup in 2014 and

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the 2007 constitution was terminated. A new constitution was enacted in 2017 and remained in use until the time of writing in 2022. Although Thailand has been through several periods of political unrest during the past two decades, OG and FOI have remained. As shown in the high-level policy document, the 20-Year National Strategy (2018–2037), one of the strategies for reforming and improving public administration, emphasizes the importance of stakeholder participation in all sectors. The strategy highlights that ‘government agencies should be open to intersectoral operations and participation from all relevant parties to ensure quick and transparent responses to public needs. All sectors in the society should value honesty, integrity, and frugality while resisting all kinds of malfeasance’ (OECD, 2022:81). This national plan aims to transform Thailand to a developed country by 2037. To achieve that goal, the government has promoted the economic model ‘Thailand 4.0’, which has an element of ‘Government 4.0’, which consists of three main pillars: citizen-centric government; smart and high-performance government; and open and connected government. These policy documents provide a long-term framework for OG in Thailand. The Thai governments assigned and set up several public agencies to oversee OG and FOI issues. For instance, the Digital Government Development Agency (Public Organization) is in charge of the digital government aspect, while open government is monitored by the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). The Freedom of Information Act is operated under the Official Information Commission (OIC). This demonstrates that Thailand is committed to the OG and FOI vison, although there are some implementation issues (OECD, 2022).

The Official Information Act The Official Information Act B.E. 2540 (1997) (OIA) was intended as the foundation of the people’s right to access state information. The law has changed government officers’ attitude to treating official information in ways other than keeping it secret (Prachatai, 2021). Disclosure is key, concealing is exemption is a key rationale of the Act. The aims of the act are to: allow people to gain wider access to official information so that they can express their opinions and exercise their political rights lawfully; and to allow the people to be fully aware of their rights and duties so they can protect their own interests and to secure democracy.

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The Thai government set up the Official Information Commission (OIC) under the Prime Minister’s Office to oversee the OIA. The OIC is a secretariat to the Official Information Board (OIB) and the Information Disclosure Tribunal (IDT). The OIB consists of 13 members who are high-ranking government officers from line ministries and independent agencies. Its duties include supervising state officials as they implement the OIA, giving recommendations on enacting royal decrees and ministerial regulations under this Act, giving opinions regarding complaints, and submitting reports on its implementation to the Council of Ministers. The IDT consists of five groups that have the authority to consider the disclosure of information relating to specific issues, namely: foreign affairs and national security; national economics and finance; social affairs, public administration and law enforcement; medical and public health; and science, technology, industry and agriculture. The governmental bodies liable under the OIA include: central, provincial and local administrations; state enterprises; the courts (for information unassociated with trials and the adjudication of cases); professional supervisory organizations; independent agencies of the state; and other agencies as prescribed in the law. These agencies are required to publish information relating to their structure, powers, bylaws, regulations, orders, policies and interpretations and other areas as determined by the OIB. They are also required to keep indices of documents. Historical information is sent to the National Archives Division. According to the Act, Thai citizen can demand official information from a state agency did not provide. The OIB determines the decision. However, not every piece of information is free to access. Several exemptions to official information relate to the Royal Institution and national security. The authorities have the power to withhold information that would damage the monarchy (Section 14), compromise national security, international relations, law enforcement or the well-being of a private individual (Section 15). However, information under Section 14 can be archived and made accessible to the public after 75 years, and information under Section 15 can be made available after 20 years (Prachatai, 2021). When information is not proactively disclosed, or there is a case of administrative silence, the requester can submit a complaint to the OIB.  The appeal may be submitted to the OIC.  When an appeal is received, the OIC transfers it to one of the functional IDT. Its decisions are final, except when a further appeal is submitted to the administrative court.

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Six of the 25 years that the OIA has been in force have been under non-­ democratic governments. The 1997 act has remained in use even during the coups of 2006 and 2014. Following the 2014 coup, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) issued NCPO order 103/2557, which deals with publicizing information. The order limited the rights of all types of media to reveal information connected to the Royal Institution, critiques of the NCPO, and the operations of government agencies. Information considered to be ‘malicious’ and ‘false information’ that ‘aims to discredit’ the NCPO was banned. Determining what information falls within these prohibited categories was solely within the discretion of the NCPO. However, the OIA remained active, and bureaucratic information was declared as usual; but it did not include information connected to the NCPO. The security issues had been interpreted in a highly military manner after the 2014 coup. The government has attempted to amend the Act several times. The latest attempt came from the National Reform Council in 2019. The cabinet approved a new draft bill of the OIA in March 2021 and submitted it to Parliament for consideration. The public strongly criticised the draft contents, claiming that it focused more on maintaining official secrecy than fostering openness. The principle of the new draft seemed to be Concealing is key, disclosure is exemption (iLaw, 2021). The new version focused on maintaining the secrecy of official information, particularly concerning the Royal Institution, as well as that which could be seen as harmful to the institution and military security. Information concerning the Royal Institution still needs to be kept for 75 years, while the latter was extended from 20 years to 30 years. Officers who disclose ‘inappropriate’ information can be jailed for up to 10 years. Regarding the structure of the IDT board, the new draft bill allows for a representative from the National Security Council on the board to consider if the appeals concern national security issues. The draft bill was submitted to parliament, but three months later, in June 2021, the cabinet withdrew the draft, citing a conflict with the National Reform Plan, and since then, progress has been halted (as of July 2022) (Prachatai, 2021). All past efforts to amend the Act hitherto have been unsuccessful. Thus, the OIA 1997 remains in effect.

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Implementation of the Official Information Act Although the Act has been in force for more than 20 years, its use by the public has been limited. Research from the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in 2011 showed that the public is unaware of the Act and does not use it very often, especially the media and NGOs. The data in Fig.  7.1, a compilation of statistics of lodged complaints and appeals from the OIC website, shows that the number of complaints and appeals was as low as just under 300 cases a year between 2000 and 2008. The number rose rapidly between 2009 and 2012 and then suddenly dropped in 2014 when the coup happened, and the military government issued an order that limited freedom of information. It is worth noting that the number of complaints and appeals was significantly high in the times of non-democratic government between 2014 and 2019. During this time, the number of cases increased, reaching a high of 748 complaints in 2018 and 508 appeals in 2019. Compared to other countries, however, these numbers are minimal. The increasing numbers can be attributed to the public’s increased attention to official information, but it also indicates that the needed information was not available or adequately

appeals 800

compliants 748

700 600 500

508

400 300 200 100 0

Fig. 7.1  Number of complaints and appeals, 2000–2020. (Source: Author’s compilation (Thailand Official Information Commission (OIC): http://www.oic. go.th/web2017/en/stat.htm))

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provided to the public. It also reflects the complicated processes of requesting information from governmental agencies. Of the organizations that received the most complaints and appeals between 1999 and 2014, local administrative bodies got the most, with a rate of 1635 complaints and 527 appeals over 15 years. During 2015 and 2020, the Ministry of Education had the highest rate, with 762 complaints and 446 appeals. These cases revealed corruption and nepotism scandals at the local level and in the educational system, which resulted in demands for transparency by several advocacy groups (Nicro et al., 2014). Normal implementation of the OIA continued under military rule. An interview with an NGO representative revealed that requests for general bureaucratic information from government agencies could be done as usual during the period of military government. However, it was challenging to make requests for information about the government or its personnel, including cabinet members and their consultants. For example, there was a case where a journalist used the OIA to issue a request to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) only to be met with a series of rejections, delays and the withholding of information. He was pursuing information relating to a scandal involving a minister and a luxury watch and, in the end, received only a document with several blank pages from the NACC.  The appeal to the Administrative Court took two years to process, from 2019 to 2021. It resulted in the court issuing a judgement that the NACC needed to issue more information to the journalist, which was not received until the time of writing in 2022 (Prachatai, 2021). The case above shows the difficulties in using the OIA, especially when these cases relate to government executives. Interviews with the NGO representatives, who used the OIA to request information for five cases, and the government official in charge of one of the government information centres, revealed the following difficulties in terms of OIA use: • First, the type of information accessible to the public is based on government agencies’ preferences. In other words, the authorities choose what information the citizen should know. Government agencies generally publicize through their websites the information mandated by law, such as their organizational structures and their plans. Other information made available to the public varies from organization to organization based on the capacity and preference of each organization. The agencies hardly research what kind of

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i­nformation the citizen wants to know. Consequently, the citizens do not pay attention to the information provided by government agencies, and the authorities feel the burden of providing information that no one looks at. • Secondly, the Act neither provides detailed guidance on the procedures and necessary steps for the requesters nor mentions what form of information they can get, such as a paper copy, electronic reproduction, or inspection of documents. The two main channels used to obtain government information are websites and directly from the office. However, not all information is available on the websites, thus requiring the citizen to request. Some offices provide a request form that can be downloaded from their website, while many require the citizen to write a request letter and submit the hard copy to the office in person. Requesting information in person discourages people from outside the capital city to seek information. As the nature of the Thai bureaucracy is highly centralized, important information is mainly kept at the central government offices in Bangkok. If the office does not provide the online option for requesting information, the requesters need to go to Bangkok to submit the request in person because respective offices cannot transfer the request to others. This significantly restricts the chances of people outside Bangkok obtaining key official information. Moreover, all government agencies are mandated to have an information centre which is in charge of providing information to the public and responding to citizen requests for information. Although this demonstrates a commitment by the government to provide information to citizens, it is not cost-­ effective as each organization needs to hire at least one staff member to oversee this issue, while few citizens use this service. For instance, the number of people who use the information centre in one of the core ministry offices was less than ten people a month. This can be considered an inefficient resource use by the government. Furthermore, the documents provided by the authorities were generally in hard copy format, requiring the authorities to sign each page. One of the informants had to pay around US$350 for a photocopy of a document. Due to its ease of dissemination, electronic media is not preferable. • Thirdly, the law does not set a time frame for the government to respond to the request nor rules on extensions. It stipulates that the body must respond within a ‘reasonable time’ (Banisar, 2006).

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­ owever, the Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good H Governance requires state agencies to respond to the citizens’ complaints or requests within 15  days (Article19, 2015). The longest periods that the informants of this study had to wait for the government agencies to respond to their requests were 122 days for requesting the first draft of the 20-year National Strategic Plan, and a year and a half to receive the document from the NACC on a minister’s luxury watch case. The lengthy process with no specified time frame is one issue that discourages people from requesting official information. • Fourthly, the quality and accuracy of the information provided by the government remain doubtful. The case of the minister’s luxury watch, where the requester got more than half of the document as blank pages, illustrated the low quality of information provided by the authorities. The government agency can claim that it has responded to a request, regardless of the quality and accuracy of the information they provide. The implementation has fallen into the ‘check-the-box’ process (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). There is no mechanism whereby the citizen can ensure the quality or check the accuracy of the information. The OIC seems to provide the hope that the citizen can make complains and appeals; however, it has a small staff and is run by the Prime Minister’s Office, which is not an independent body and can be easily influenced by politicians (Banisar, 2006; Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). The cabinet appoints some board members; thus, they are used to protect the establishment instead of benefiting the people. Other scholars found a variety of problems arising during the use of OIA. For example, there were unclear reasons given for rejecting access requests; vaguely defined exemptions and wide discretionary powers of officials to apply for exemptions; no penalty imposed on the agencies that failed to disclose information; difficulties in enforcing decisions of the IDT due to overlapping laws; lack of whistleblower protection laws (Banisar, 2006; Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021). These issues have existed in the use of OIA for more than two decades, and they were especially problematic during the time of non-democratic regimes. These problems result from causes belonging to both the supply side – the governmental agencies and the demand side – the citizenry. Regarding the supply side, the governments have committed to OG and FOI at a

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rhetorical level, which is presented in high-level policy documents. However, there are several barriers to getting official information when it comes to implementation. The government does not seem willing to be fully open to the citizen, particularly about information relating to politics and even regular bureaucratic information, as mentioned above. Regarding the demand side, Fig.  7.1 above shows that the FOI Act has not been widely acknowledged or used by the public until recently. The public is dissuaded from requesting information due to the difficulties requesters face and the poor quality of the information provided. Considering these supply and demand issues, implementing FOI in Thailand has been lax and ineffective. The following section will determine the outcome of the FOI law implementation in Thailand.

Freedom of Information Act: Pathway to Good Governance? Being one of the first countries in the region to enact the FOI law, Thailand, however, did not derive a satisfactory ranking from international open government indexes. According to the World Justice Project’s Open Government Index 2015, Thailand was ranked 68th among 102 countries, although this rose to 55th in 2016 (Word Justice Project, n.d.). In 2017, Thailand’s ranking was 51st out of 94 countries, with a score of 34% given by the Global Open Data Index (Global Open Data Index, n.d.). In 2020, the country was ranked 117th in the Open Data Inventory (ODIN) global ranking from 187 countries (Open Data Inventory, n.d.). Regarding the quality of the FOI law itself, in the Global RTI rating 2020, Thailand got 76 points and ranked 85th out of 136 countries, which is below the OECD average but slightly above other Southeast Asian countries that included the RTI (Global Right to Information Rating, n.d.). Table 7.1 Table 7.1  Thailand’s ranking in open government indexes Index

Year

World Justice Project’s Open Government Index

2015 2016 2017 2020 2020 2021

Global Open Data Index Open Data Inventory Global RTI rating Open government index in the Asia-Pacific region Source: Author’s compilation

Rank/Number of countries 68/102 55/102 51/94 117/187 85/136 11/20

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summarizes Thailand’s ranking in the open government indexes, where Thailand ranks mid-range in all indexes. It illustrates that although Thailand has implemented the FOI law for more than two decades, it does not lead the country towards more open government. Considering other aspects of Good Governance that the FOI law aims to bring, such as transparency, participation, accountability and reduced corruption, apparently, Thailand has not gained obvious benefits. In terms of transparency, having the FOI law provides a good infrastructure for bringing a certain level of transparency. However, in the case of Thailand, some obstacles prevent the law towards transparency. The information disclosed to the public is chosen by the government, not the citizen; in other words, the government has the authority to decide what information to reveal to the public. Most information is bureaucratic, while information relating to politics or politicians is difficult to get, especially during non-­ democratic governance. Thus, FOI law in Thailand can bring ‘open bureaucracy’ but not ‘open government’. Regarding participation, the FOI law allows more opportunities for citizens to participate. Nevertheless, some problems discourage people from participating, such as the difficulty of obtaining information, especially that which is not available online, and which is compounded by the undefined length of time involved in acquiring information. Also, the extent to which such participation can result in changes and make the government accountable to the people remains doubtful. OG and FOI are believed to bring accountability of government to the citizen. The OIA mandated that government agencies be accountable to the public. Nevertheless, a study by Komutputipong and Keerasuntonpong (2019) revealed that the Thai authorities valued upward accountability to the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) more than outward accountability to the public, even though both parties have legal power support. It shows that the OIA has less influence on the officers’ attitude towards public accountability. Merely obtaining information cannot bring government accountability. Citizens must go through long juristic processes to make the government counterpart accountable, and it is highly unlikely that any citizen would win in a resulting court case (The Matter, 2020). OG and FOI can reduce corruption by enabling non-state stakeholders to access information about policy processes more efficiently and improve engagement in those processes (Relly, 2012; Shim & Eom, 2009). In the

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160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

88

102

85

101

96

99

101

104

110

36

36

36

35

2018

2019

2020

2021

76

37

35

38

38

35

37

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

score

159

rank

Fig. 7.2 Thailand’s Corruption Perception Index—Score and Ranking, 2012–2021. (Source: Author’s compilation (Transparency International: https:// www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021))

case of Thailand, such benefits are not obvious. The country is not doing well in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Figure 7.2 shows the CPI score and ranking over the past decade compiled by Transparency International. The country achieves an average score of 36 out of 100. Interestingly, Thailand did best in 2015, a year after the latest military coup, with a score of 38 and a rank of 76, while its worst performance of the last decade was in 2021, when it dropped to 110 (Transparency International, 2022). In this instance, the FOI Act does not seem to have an effect on reducing corruption. The evidence above shows that the FOI law in Thailand does not bring major benefits in terms of Good Governance.

Conclusion Thailand was one of the countries in Asia that took early steps on OG and FOI by launching the Official Information Act in 1997. However, the implementation of the law has been affected by several episodes of political turbulence. During the two and a half decades since it was implemented, the Act has not been widely used by the public owing to several technical difficulties, such as the unavailability of online information and the difficulties in requesting information from government agencies. The attempts to amend the act, although hitherto unsuccessful, show the tendency to lead towards a more closed government. With these problems remaining, Thailand, thus, does not gain the benefits of OG and FOI as expected. It can be concluded that although Thailand took early steps in implementing

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the FOI law hoping that it would bring positive outcomes to the country, it has encountered several difficulties in its implementation. Thus, the FOI law did not pave the way to better open government, nor did it bring Good Governance to the country.

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Global Open Data Index. (n.d.). Global Open Data Index: Place overview. Retrieved July 2022, from https://index.okfn.org/place/ Global Right to Information Rating. (n.d.). Country Data: By Country. Retrieved July 2022, from https://www.rti-­rating.org/country-­data/ Gunawong, P. (2015). Open government and social media: A focus on transparency. Social Science Computer Review, 33(5), 587–598. Hansson, K., Belkacem, K., & Ekenberg, L. (2015). Open government and democracy: A research review. Social Science Computer Review, 33(5), 540–555. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439314560847 Harrison, T. M., Guerrero, S., Burke, G. B., Cook, M., Cresswell, A., Helbig, N., Hrdinova, J., & Pardo, T. (2012). Open government and e-government: Democratic challenges from a public value perspective. Information Polity, 17(2), 83–97. https://doi.org/10.3233/IP-­2012-­0269 iLaw. (2021, May). ร่าง พ.ร.บ.ข้อมูลข่าวสารฯ ฉบับใหม่: ใบอนุญาตปกปิดข้อมูลข่าวสารสาธารณะ [Rang Por Ror Bor Khor Moon Khao Sarn Cha Bhab Mai: Bai Ah Nhu Yad Pok Pid Khor Moon Khao Sarn Sa Thar Ra Na]. https://ilaw.or.th/node/5874 Karamagioli, E., Staiou, E.  R., & Gouscos, D. (2014). Can open-government models contribute to more collaborative ways of governance? In M.  Gascó-­ Hernández (Ed.), Open Government (pp. 37–50). Springer. Kassen, M. (2014). Globalization of e-government: Open government as a global agenda; benefits, limitations and ways forward. Information Development, 30(1), 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1177/0266666912473620 Komutputipong, N., & Keerasuntonpong, P. (2019). Accountability perception of Thai Government: To whom and what counts. Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, 31(1), 45–65. https://doi. org/10.1108/JPBAFM-­05-­2018-­0044 Michener, G. (2011). FOI laws around the world. Journal of Democracy, 22(2), 145–159. Nicro, S., Vornpien, P., Chancharoen, N., & Trapnell, S. E. (2014). Implementing right to information: A case study of Thailand. In S. E. Trapnell (Ed.), Right to information: Case studies on implementation (pp. 475–538). World Bank. OECD. (2016). Open government: The global context and the way forward. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264268104-­en OECD. (2022). Open and connected government review of Thailand. OECD Public Governance Reviews. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/ e1593a0c-­en Open Data Inventory. (n.d.). Country profile: Thailand. Open Data Watch. Retrieved July 2022, from https://odin.opendatawatch.com/Report/countryProfileUpdated/THA?year=2020 Park, C. H., & Kim, K. (2020). E-government as an anti-corruption tool: Panel data analysis across countries. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 86(4), 691–707. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852318822055

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Pongsudhirak, T. (2008). Thailand since the Coup. Journal of Democracy, 19(4), 140–153. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0030 Prachatai. (2021, April). New Official Information Law allows more government secrecy. Prachatai English. https://prachatai.com/english/node/9193 Relly, J. E. (2012). Examining a model of vertical accountability: A cross-national study of the influence of information access on the control of corruption. Government Information Quarterly, 29(3), 335–345. Ruijer, E. H., & Martinius, E. (2017). Researching the democratic impact of open government data: A systematic literature review. Information Polity, 22(4), 233–250. Shim, D. C., & Eom, T. H. (2009). Anticorruption effects of information communication and technology (ICT) and social capital. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 75(1), 99–116. The Matter. (2020, March 8). The MATTER มีโอกาสชนะ ‘คดีกระดาษเปล่า’ ต่อ ป.ป.ช.ในศาล ปกครอง มากน้อยแค่ไหน และต้องรอคอยนานเท่าใดกว่าจะได้ข้อสรุป [The Matter Mee O Kard Cha Na Ka Dee Kra Dard Plao Tor Por Por Chor Nai Sarn Pok Klong Mark Noi Khae Nai Lae Tong Ror Koi Nan Tao Dai Kwa Ja Dai Khor Sa Rub]. The Matter. Retrieved July 2022, from https://thematter.co/brief/brief-­ 1583632835/103350 Thuvasethakul, C., & Koanantakool, T. (2002, March 25–29). National ICT policy in Thailand. [Paper presentation]. Africa-Asia Workshop: Promoting Co-operation in Information and Communications Technologies Development, Kuala Lumpur and Penang, Malaysia. Transparency International. (2022). Corruption Perception Index 2021. Retrieved July 2022, from https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_ Report_EN-­web.pdf Ubaldi, B. (2013). Open government data towards empirical analysis of open government data initiatives. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4 6bj4f03s7-­en Van Doeveren, V. (2011). Rethinking good governance: Identifying common principles. Public Integrity, 13(4), 301–318. https://doi.org/10.2753/ PIN1099-­9922130401 Wirtz, B. W., & Birkmeyer, S. (2015). Open government: Origin, development, and conceptual perspectives. International Journal of Public Administration, 38(5), 381–396. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.942735 World Justice Project. (n.d.). Open government around the world. WJP. Retrieved July 2022, from https://worldjusticeproject.org/open-­government-­ around-­world Zafarullah, H., & Siddiquee, N. A. (2021). Open government and the right to information: Implications for transparency and accountability in Asia. Public Administration and Development, 41(4), 157–168. https://doi.org/ 10.1002/pad.1944

CHAPTER 8

Open Government Data and Smart Nation in Singapore Chengwei Xu and Chung-An Chen

Introduction Open government data (OGD), as part of modern public governance, has been widely adopted by governments worldwide. The benefits of OGD are obvious: assisting policymaking and public service delivery, controlling corruption, enabling public scrutiny, and enhancing public integrity (Gascó-Hernández, 2014). In the past two years, OGD also significantly contributed to managing the COVID-19 pandemic (Cole et al., 2021). The disclosure of information about infection cases and the side effects of the COVID-19 vaccines promotes trust and vaccine uptake (Dela Cruz et  al., 2021). Scholars have used various indicators to evaluate OGD,

C. Xu (*) International University of Japan, Minamiuonuma, Japan e-mail: [email protected] C.-A. Chen Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_8

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including accountability, access to information, collaboration, integrity, institutional arrangements, legal obligations, openness, participation, and transparency (Attard et al., 2015). Transparency and participation are at the core (Meijer et al., 2012), the former focusing on what information is open to access and its causes or outcomes, while the latter investigates who the stakeholders are and how they interact with one another. To promote transparency and participation, information and communication technology (ICT) plays an essential role (Noveck, 2009). On the one hand, new technologies provide an efficient channel for citizens to dialog with their government representatives and provide immediate feedback to government officials. At the same time, instant information exchange largely facilitates collective movements such as signing up for a petition and organizing online/offline protests. This significantly changes the dynamics between citizens and politicians and forces the government to be more transparent and accountable. On the other hand, the widespread use of internet-based information platforms such as government websites and social media has substantially reduced the costs of information diffusion. The transformation of e-government or smart government has promoted OGD initiatives worldwide (Jiménez et  al., 2014). In the era of Industry 4.0, OGD is not only necessary but also increasingly feasible (Long et al., 2021; Sołtysik-Piorunkiewicz & Zdonek, 2021). OGD plays a vital role in meeting the citizens’ needs and reducing the costs of public service delivery. Additionally, an uptick in adopting new technologies, such as AI and big data, in smart government has generated opportunities for OGD. OGD has never been as deeply embedded in public values as today, and it also becomes essential for public integrity. This is especially so in the past decade when smart cities have been widely adopted as a new urban development and governance model. From the 1990s, many scholars and policymakers started thinking about how smart governance and smart growth could address environmental, economic, and societal sustainability issues. With the new developments of ICT in the early twenty-first century, researchers, information technology (IT) companies, and governments believed that smart city initiatives could mitigate almost all urban illnesses such as aging society, pollution, traffic congestion, economic disparity, and high costs of public service delivery, and eventually improve the quality of people’s life (Yu & Xu, 2018). What does a smart city look like? Scholars agree that smart cities should consist of six dimensions: smart governance, smart economy, smart environment, smart living, smart mobility, and smart people (Giffinger & Gudrun, 2010; Yu & Xu, 2018). Smart

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governance is located at the core of this new model of urban governance. It inherits almost all the values of OGD initiatives such as citizens’ participation in decision-making and transparent government. Some questions of interest would include: (a) How does smart city development facilitate the progress of OGD initiatives? (b) To what extent are citizens satisfied with OGD? and (c) How OGD promoted citizens’ trust in the government? As citizens’ trust in their government has been the essential attribute of government effectiveness (Serohin et al., 2020), it is critical to examine how OGD impacts public trust. According to the discussions above, the authors argue that smart city initiatives could significantly promote the adoption of OGD; OGD and smart city initiatives jointly improve transparency and public trust in governments. This chapter uses Singapore’s case to elaborate on the argument. The rest of this chapter reviews the OGD status quo in Singapore, followed by an introduction of how OGD is embedded in Singapore’s smart nation-building. The third section reviews existing studies and develops the hypotheses. The fourth and fifth sections present methods and results, respectively, while the sixth and final sections conclude with the chapter’s main findings and implications.

Open Government Data and Trust in Government OGD is grounded in democratic values and aims to promote transparency, participatory governance, and data reuse (Attard et al., 2015). From the knowledge-based view, transparent and information access will strengthen citizens’ trust in the government (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Trust in the government is essential in public services as citizens’/businesses’ confidence in the fairness of government actions significantly conditions government performance (Schmidthuber et  al., 2021). According to most empirical studies, transparency and citizen participation in governance processes as a result of OGD initiatives could effectively control corruption and build trust (Cucciniello et  al., 2017). Gonzálvez-Gallego and colleagues used evidence from 18 European countries and found that open information promoted institutional trust, especially for citizens with better education and good internet access, who are older, and satisfied with open government data (Gonzálvez-Gallego et  al., 2020). Another study from Ukraine indicated that increasing openness is essential to public trust (Attard et al., 2015). Despite these findings, several recent studies found no positive association between OGD and trust in the government

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(Grimmelikhuijsen et  al., 2020; Mabillard & Pasquier, 2016). In some cases where data, system, and service quality are poor, OGD may lead to reduced public trust (Almuqrin et al., 2022; Purwanto et al., 2020). Some scholars also argued that OGD does not promote public trust if it fails to initially increase citizens’ perception of political participation in a meaningful way (Schmidthuber et al., 2021). However, in general, most countries’ investments in OGD initiatives produced better citizen trust in their government.

Open Government and Smart Nation-Building in Singapore Singapore is a country that has neither any laws which require open information nor membership in the Open Government Partnership (OGP), which currently has 77 countries and 106 local jurisdictions.1 Nevertheless, the Singapore government has implemented a variety of actions related to transparency and citizen participation. E-government is one of them. In the 1980s, with the backdrop of the digital revolution, Singapore started to computerize government services and apply ICT to facilitate the automation of public services. In 2000, Singapore started its ambitious plan of building a ‘world-class e-government’ (e-Government Action Plan 2000–2006) that empowers citizens to be involved and ‘be a pacesetter’ in public governance (Ha & Coghill, 2006; Srivastava & Teo, 2005). From 2006 to 2015, eGov2010 and eGov2015 were launched, aiming to help users access all government services, processes, and data in one stop from either mobile phone apps or the eCitizen portals. The primary purposes of e-government were to provide equal and efficient opportunities for citizens and foreign investors to use e-services, facilitate immediate feedback through online platforms, and prepare the nation for future economic advancement. By 2004, the government had shifted 1600 citizen services and 217 business services to online services (e.g., information about public service jobs in Careers@Gov; Xu et al., 2021). The paradigm shifts from traditional face-to-face public services to e-services, including payments to governments, forced all government agencies to disclose most of their information freely and publicly. The underlying goals of e-government projects mainly focus on international competitiveness, the digital skills of 1

 https://www.opengovpartnership.org/our-members/#national

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citizens, and service excellence.2 This progress significantly promotes transparency and citizens’ participation (Clift, 2004). In 2011, data.gov.sg was established as a data repository for more than 70 government agencies. This one-stop online platform contains almost all the data generated by the government for citizens, businesses, and researchers. These freely available databases include data relating to the fields of the economy, education, environment, finance, health, infrastructure, society, technology, and transportation. For example, citizens or researchers can access datasets of government budget and fiscal status after 1997, or any city planning and development. Users can also submit data requests if they need information that has not been disclosed publicly. The smart nation initiative (SNI) continued the legacy of the e-­government of Singapore and was launched in 2014 as the Singaporean version of a smart city, consisting of three pillars: e-government, digital economy, and digital society. SNI aims to use technology to assist ‘transformation in business, government services, health, urban living, and transport.’3 Given Singapore’s unique status as city-state, its SNI is distinct from other smart cities. It is not limited to improving municipal services but also aims to empower citizens to use new technologies to live, learn, and work. Under SNI, the government continues to allocate resources to digital infrastructures and build shared open platforms to empower citizens and businesses. In addition to data.gov.sg, more open government information platforms were established afterward, including (a) singstat. gov.sg, which discloses economic and social statistics; (b) secure.mas.gov. sg, which carries financial data collected by the Monetary Authority of Singapore; and (c) onemap.gov.sg and ura.gov.sg/maps, which include all static and real-time data on land use, urban development, property, car parks, and transportation datasets. The above-mentioned OGD programs significantly promoted government transparency and accountability. Online transparency (e.g., data.gov.sg) could force political representatives and public managers to disclose information about the usage of public resources and their stated performance goals (Lourenço, 2015). Although e-government/SNI in Singapore has been deemed successful, the development was primarily driven by economic rationale rather than democratic values. The main policy goals, as stated in any published 2  https://www.smar tnation.gov.sg/files/publications/smar t-nation-strategy-­ nov2018.pdf 3  https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/about-smart-nation/transforming-singapore

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e-government masterplans or reports, exclusively stress the economic benefits of these government initiatives. Other values, such as freedom of information (FOI) and accountability, are less likely to be mentioned. From the earlier stages of computerization of government services and the e-Government Action Plan to the building of Singapore’s smart nation, each masterplan generated opportunities for OGD.  However, since the main objectives were to promote technological advancement and economic growth, the full benefits of OGD have not been reached. Singaporean scholars criticized that the Singapore government should not use smart technologies to suppress citizens’ disagreements  (Xu, 2023). Instead, the government should use these technologies to promote participation and enable citizens to present critiques or recommendations more publicly and freely (Tan, 2018). Some recent empirical evidence showed that the top-down approach still dominates the decision-making process, and the interactions between citizens and the government are still missing (Wi, 2019). The problem might be that the top-down approach of opening government information may not be fully appreciated by citizens, simply because people could be skeptical about any information disclosed by the government (Teo, 2021). Perceived government control of traditional media and the internet would thwart citizens’ trust in the information provided by the government (Skoric et al., 2012). Based on the preceding discussions, it will be interesting to see if OGD, in the context of SNI, can increase citizens’ trust in their government.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and OGD Since early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has been disastrous in many parts of the world. Public governance has faced historic challenges as most public services have been disrupted or terminated. Governments worldwide have tried all sorts of policy responses to fight against the pandemic and its effects. Whether a policy response to the pandemic can be implemented successfully largely depends on the people’s compliance and collaboration. Taking the vaccination campaign as an example, people with skepticism or distrust in the government may reject vaccination efforts and try to persuade their friends or family to reject getting also vaccinated (Motta et  al., 2018). Studies show that effective public communication and transparency could increase people’s compliance in promoting vaccine coverage (Arghittu et al., 2021). Studies conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic also show that the government’s information disclosing and

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openness significantly contribute to vaccine uptake (Perveen et al., 2022). This is partly because government openness could build public trust in government policies so that people could present higher policy compliance (Vergara et al., 2021). Thus, in the context of ending the pandemic as the top priority of public governance, examining the impact of OGD on public trust becomes imperative. Based on the discussions above, we hypothesize that citizens’ perceived government openness (OGD initiative) is positively associated with citizens’ trust in the government.

Methods Data We used data from an online survey conducted in June 2021 to help answer our research questions. The survey recruited participants through a research company that sent out 5000 survey invitations and received 1151 responses. The response rate was 23.02%, which is an acceptable standard for online surveys (Stanley et  al., 2020). Of the respondents, 49.17% were male. About 33.71% of the respondents were below 35 years old, 45.63% were between 34 and 55 years old, and 20.66% were above 54 years old. Regarding education, 28.78% had completed secondary education, and 71.22% had completed tertiary education. Regarding income level, 17.25% of respondents reported a monthly household income below S$5600 in the previous year, 30.36% had an income between S$3701 and S$7500, 28.21% earned between S$9401 and S$11,300, and 24.16% earned S$11,301 and above. We also used data from the World Value Survey (2020) as an additional analysis. Measures Citizens’ Perceived Government Openness To measure government openness, we asked participants to answer two Likert-type scale items: ‘I am satisfied with the government’s performance regarding being transparent in disclosing information related to the coronavirus’ and ‘During the pandemic, I am well informed about the up-to-date governments’ anti-­ COVID-­19 measures and particular benefit and subsidy.’ The participants could rate government openness on a 7-point Likert scale, from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree. 

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Trust in Government  We constructed five Likert-style items to capture citizens’ trust in government (see details of these scale items in Table 8.6 of the Appendix). Two items are about general trust in government and public health authorities. We also included three items about trust in information from three news channels (newspapers, television, and online news outlets). Trust in public media was included because Singapore’s news outlets are controlled by government-backed organizations, and trust in information from these news channels reflects citizens’ trust in government to some extent. Trust scale items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = totally do not trust, 4 = Neither trust nor distrust, and 7 = Totally trust). The Cronbach Alpha of the five items is 0.85, indicating a good internal consistency of the scale (Xu, 2022; Xu & Chen, 2021).  Control Variables To have robust results, we included some variables with possible conditioning effects on the relationship between government openness and trust in the analysis as control variables (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005; Gonzálvez-­Gallego et  al., 2020; Hooghe & Marien, 2013; Schmidthuber et al., 2021). We thus included age, gender, education, income level, and internet access in the analysis. SNI progress was included since it has been an essential infrastructure of OGD initiatives. We used internet access, internet skill, and internet-based working environment as proxy variables to measure the SNI progress in Singapore. Citizens’ internet access and skill would largely determine the extent that they could reach government information and participate in government activities. Four Likert-type scale items were used to capture the SNI progress: (1) I have a stable and fast internet connection at home; (2) I have adequate technical skills to use the internet; (3) During the pandemic, I achieved effective remote work through the internet; and (4) During the pandemic, I obtained better access to medical care services (e.g., eHealth Apps) through the internet. 

Analysis The analysis of this study is twofold. First, we use descriptive analysis to show the current status quo of the Singapore government’s openness, including: (1) Whether people are satisfied with OGD? and (2) To what extent do people trust governments and government-backed media

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channels? Next, we use regression analysis to test whether perceived government openness positively associates with public trust.

Results Descriptive Analysis As shown in Table 8.1, citizens in Singapore are generally satisfied with the government being open and transparent regarding information about the coronavirus and policy responses to the pandemic. Only 10.29% of the participants showed dissatisfaction with the government performance in being transparent in disclosing information. Significantly few participants (5.4%) reported dissatisfaction with the government disclosing information about the government’s COVID-19 prevention measures and particular benefits and subsidy schemes. Table  8.2 displays participants’ responses to government trust questions. Statistics show that the Singapore government (81.29% of the participants reported trust), public health departments (85.05%), and media news channels (ranging from 60.86% to Table 8.1  Descriptive analysis of perceived government openness (GO) GO1: I am satisfied with the government’s performance regarding being transparent in disclosing information related to the coronavirus (Mean = 5.15)

Strongly disagree Disagree Somewhat disagree Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat agree Agree Strongly agree

GO2: I am well informed about the up-to-date governments’ anti-­ COVID-­19 measures and particular benefits and subsidies (Mean = 5.35)

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

Freq.

Percent

Cum.

30

2.55

2.55

19

1.66

1.66

28 63

2.38 5.36

4.93 10.29

14 29

1.22 2.53

2.87 5.4

199

16.92

27.21

206

17.94

23.34

303

25.77

52.98

299

26.05

49.39

403 150

34.27 12.76

87.24 100

377 204

32.84 17.77

82.23 100

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Table 8.2  Descriptive analysis of trust in government Totally do not trust

Do not Somewhat do trust not trust

Trust in government in general Freq. 35 21 42 Percent 2.98 1.79 3.57 Cum. 2.98 4.76 8.33 Trust in public health departments Freq. 15 8 29 Percent 1.27 0.68 2.46 Cum. 1.27 1.95 4.42 Trust in newspapers Freq. 28 21 38 Percent 2.5 1.88 3.4 Cum. 2.5 4.38 7.77 Trust in television Freq. 18 21 29 Percent 1.6 1.87 2.58 Cum. 1.6 3.46 6.04 Trust in online news outlets Freq. 13 20 51 Percent 1.14 1.76 4.49 Cum. 1.14 2.9 7.39

Neither trust Somewhat nor distrust trust

Trust Totally trust

122 10.37 18.71

246 20.92 39.63

456 254 38.78 21.6 78.4 100

124 10.54 14.95

251 21.33 36.28

498 252 42.31 21.41 78.59 100

247 22.07 29.85

226 20.2 50.04

321 238 28.69 21.27 78.73 100

243 21.58 27.62

224 19.89 47.51

351 240 31.17 21.31 78.69 100

361 31.75 39.14

280 24.63 63.76

261 151 22.96 13.28 86.72 100

72.38%) enjoy a relatively good level of trust. Less than 10% of respondents reported distrust of all trust scale items. Table 8.7 of the Appendix presents the results of the descriptive analysis using data from the World Value Survey 2019–2020 also demonstrates a high level of public trust in Singapore authorities (e.g., of the 2012 participants, 82.06% and 80.32% reported higher trust in the government and the public service, respectively). As shown in Table 8.3, most Singaporeans have stable and fast internet access at home (82.21%). Only 5.7% of respondents reported having a limited internet connection at home. The majority of respondents reported adequate internet skills (83.78%), whereas only 3.38% of the respondents had issues with internet skills. This is a remarkable achievement of Singapore’s smart nation-building, given that Singapore has a rapidly aging society where the elders usually have difficulties being internet savvy. Due to the good internet infrastructure and the government’s efforts to promote ICT skills and smart nation initiatives in Singapore, it is common

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Table 8.3  Descriptive analysis of smart nation initiatives in Singapore Strongly disagree

Disagree Somewhat disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Somewhat agree

Agree Strongly agree

SNI1. I have a stable and fast internet connection at home Freq. 14 10 42 140 245 456 251 Percent 1.21 0.86 3.63 12.09 21.16 39.38 21.68 Cum. 1.21 2.07 5.7 17.79 38.95 78.32 100 SNI2. I have adequate technical skills to use the internet Freq. 11 3 25 148 247 458 261 Percent 0.95 0.26 2.17 12.84 21.42 39.72 22.64 Cum. 0.95 1.21 3.38 16.22 37.64 77.36 100 SNI3. During the pandemic, I achieved effective remote work through the internet Freq. 24 23 37 187 241 365 208 Percent 2.21 2.12 3.41 17.24 22.21 33.64 19.17 Cum. 2.21 4.33 7.74 24.98 47.19 80.83 100 SNI4. During the pandemic, I obtained better access to medical care services (e.g., eHealth Apps) through the internet Freq. 37 59 88 336 222 238 107 Percent 3.4 5.43 8.1 30.91 20.42 21.9 9.84 Cum. 3.4 8.83 16.93 47.84 68.26 90.16 100

for businesses to adopt remote work modes (e.g., 82.76% of the respondents worked at home during the pandemic). Another achievement of SNI might be the wide use of remote health services. For example, Singaporeans can see a doctor from the mobile app Doctor Anywhere. Our statistics show that 52.16% of respondents reported obtaining medical services from remote health service platforms. Regression We first used correlation analysis to diagnose the relationship between trust in government and government openness. Table 8.4 shows that both indicators of government openness are significantly and positively correlated with trust in government. Most control variables, except age and education, present significant correlations with the dependent variable. We also used correlation coefficients to assess potential multicollinearity problems, and results show all coefficients are below 0.7. We thus conclude that multicollinearity is not a concern of the present study (Xu & Wu, 2020).

Note. *p  t

[95% Conf.

Interval]

0.35 0.23 −0.21 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.06 0.08 −0.08 0.06 1.06

0.03 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.31

11.37 6.29 −2.89 2.08 1.46 2.06 1.4 1.86 −2.44 1.91 3.39

0.000 0.000 0.004 0.038 0.145 0.040 0.161 0.064 0.015 0.057 0.001

0.29 0.16 −0.36 0.00 −0.04 0.00 −0.02 0.00 −0.15 0.00 0.44

0.41 0.31 −0.07 0.06 0.27 0.07 0.14 0.17 −0.02 0.12 1.67

Note. F(10, 425) = 46.38, p>F = 0.000. R-squared = 0.5218, Adjusted R-squared = 0.5106. Variable labels can be found in Table 8.6 of the Appendix

The results of the regression analysis are displayed in Table  8.5. The regression model’s R-squared (adjusted) value is 0.5106, which reveals that the regression model can explain 51.96% of the variance of the dependent variable. Both indicators of the government’s openness have significant and positive associations with citizens’ trust in government. Thus, our hypothesis is supported by our findings. Being transparent in disclosing information about the ongoing big socioeconomic crisis, government process, and policy response would benefit the people’s trust in the government. Among the control variables, we are especially interested in how SNI progress impacts public trust in government. Internet skills and using the internet for medical services are positively associated with trust in government, while internet access is not significant. Working in a remote work environment (SNI3) seems negatively associated with trust. Several control variables also present significant signs, including (a) being male is negatively associated with trust, and (b) age and income have a positive relationship with trust.

Conclusions This chapter used data collected from Singapore during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate whether OGD promoted citizens’ trust in the government under the context of smart nation-building. Our results demonstrate that government openness is positively associated with trust in

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the government, which supports the argument that OGD initiatives could increase public trust. The level of public trust mirrors to what extent the government is acting with integrity (e.g., incorruptibility, honesty, impartiality, and accountability) (Huberts, 2018). This finding is consistent with most existing studies (Cucciniello et al., 2017; Gonzálvez-­Gallego et al., 2020; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Schmidthuber et al., 2021). Given that the COVID-19 pandemic remains a severe challenge to public governance worldwide, it is essential to ask how governments can promote public collaboration regarding implementing COVID-19-control measures (e.g., vaccine uptake) through nurturing public trust (Borah & Hwang, 2022; Jamison et al., 2019). Our findings provide fresh evidence that OGD, as a core element of modern public governance, can be an effective policy instrument to achieve public trust in governments. We also found that, as part of SNI in Singapore, people’s internet skills and experience of remote medical service positively impacted their trust in the government. This is not surprising as people with better internet skills would probably benefit more from government open data programs. They are more capable of searching and utilizing open government information in their engagement with the public sector and thus tend to trust the government more. Given all these reasons, it is hard to understand why citizens with more experience of remote work modes were more likely to show a negative view of public trust. This merits more investigation in future research. Our analysis also demonstrates that the Singapore government enjoyed a relatively high level of citizen trust. However, the average score of the five-scale items of trust is not ideal, ranging from 4.99 to 5.63. There was still a significant proportion of respondents who rated their trust in government with a low satisfaction rate (e.g., 18.71% of the participants did not find the government trustworthy, and 20.92% showed a minimum level of trust). Why was this the case? As a centralized government system, Singapore’s policymaking adopts a top-down approach. OGD initiatives and the SNI were dominated by the government, resulting in limited bottom-­up engagement. Political elites set up policy goals mainly to achieve the government’s strategic objectives. For the government, OGD is only a tool for it to achieve its economic goals and power hegemony. Citizens may have different expectations such as accountability, transparency, participation, freedom of information, etc., which may be a critical challenge for the ruling party’s hegemony. This is consistent with one observation from Spain, where the authors found that government officials deemed

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OGD as merely a way of promoting responsibility, innovation, and public access to information from the government’s perspective (Ruvalcaba-­ Gomez et al., 2018). Following this, promoting public trust may be hard if data quality and services are not satisfactory to citizens, especially when citizens have consciously known their ‘right to know’ about what their government and government officials are doing (Mabillard & Pasquier, 2016). Meanwhile, it should be acknowledged that our findings based in Singapore may not be aligned with that in other countries given Singapore’s unique context. Singapore is a small city-state with a dominant one-party government that continuously tries to strengthen people’s pragmatism ideology and elitism beliefs (Tan, 2012). The government tries to persuade the public that it is accountable, effective, and trustworthy by telling about the nation’s impressive economic success (Tan, 2012, 2018). Statistics also demonstrate the government’s performance in infrastructure, GDP per capita, and foreign investments (Xu & Wu, 2020). Tan (2018) argues that Singaporean citizens’ trust in the government mainly builds on the government’s efforts to author national narrative and economic performance. As pragmatism dominates public values, people assess their government performance substantially based on economic gains rather than other values such as democracy, freedom, and transparency. As quoted in Lee (2022), politicians often argue that a nation with high public trust would have less demand for transparency, and thus, some information may not necessarily be disclosed. In the case of controlling the COVID-19 pandemic, people showed strong trust in the government as most information, such as the risks, infected cases, and side effects of vaccines, was communicated timely and efficiently. Nevertheless, this high level of trust and openness may not remain in other areas of government operations (e.g., managing national financial accounts). How should the government promote OGD through smart nation-­ building in Singapore in the future? Compared to the practices of most smart cities in other countries, Singapore’s SNI did not significantly emphasize citizens’ participation and transparency, which are generally the core objectives of most smart cities in other countries (Cocchia, 2014; Dameri, 2013; Yu & Xu, 2018). Instead, the ‘Digital Government’ aspect of SNI in Singapore largely focuses on digitalizing public services, training public officers with digital skills, and applying artificial intelligence in

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public services.4 Therefore, the next step of SNI and OGD should target citizen participation and transparency of the government process. From the citizens’ perspective, the government’s accountability is questionable without legislation on Freedom of Information (FOI). According to Lee (2022), the Singapore government rejects FOI legislation as it claims that the FOI ‘serves frivolous and nefarious purposes while affirming the state’s right to amass and control information.’ Another reason for rejection may be from the thinking of political leaders in an Asian authoritarian regime rooted in Confucian values. Political leaders with such thinking would prioritize social harmony and avoid societal disagreements. They believe disclosing government information would lead to more questioning or even social conflicts that may eventually affect their public image and the trust from the citizens. Although the government discloses some state information, especially financial accounts demonstrating some degree of accountability, all information disclosure is dominated by the government, and it does not contain periodic classified information (Lee, 2022). Seeking accountability without transparency may not be sustainable. A much more plausible way for the policymakers of Singapore to facilitate government openness might be to respond to citizens’ call for the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which is believed to ‘strengthen public trust.’5 As an open economy and globalized modern city (Tan, 2018), a smart city model may not be sufficient to fulfill citizens’ needs for an open government. A new model of smart cities should be a ‘good city’ that prioritizes citizens’ well-being and happiness as the core mission (Amin, 2006; Friedmann, 2000). In addition to material foundations, as claimed by Friedmann (2000), the most distinctive feature of a good city aims at promoting residents’ happiness, social justice, and good governance.

4 5

 https://www.smartnation.gov.sg/about-smart-nation/digital-government  https://foisg.wordpress.com/

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Appendix Table 8.6  Variables and scale items Variable Government openness (GO) I am satisfied with the government’s performance regarding being transparent in disclosing information related to the coronavirus (GO1) During the pandemic, I am well informed about the up-to-date governments’ anti-COVID-19 measures and particular benefit and subsidy (GO2) Trust in government Trust in government in general Trust in public health departments Trust in newspapers Trust in television Trust in online news outlets Gender Age group Education level Income level Smart nation initiatives (SNIs) I have a stable and fast internet connection at home (SNI1) I have adequate technical skills to use the internet (SNI2) During the pandemic, I achieved effective remote work through the internet (SNI3) During the pandemic, I obtained better access to medical care services (e.g., eHealth Apps) through the internet (SNI4)

N

Mean

SD

Min Max

1176 5.15 1.36

1

7

1148 5.35 1.25

1

7

1176 1177 1119 1126 1137 1151 1157 556 1113

1.38 1.17 1.41 1.34 1.27 0.5 2.61 0.5 2.25

1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1

7 7 7 7 7 1 11 3 10

1158 5.56 1.22

1

7

1153 5.63 1.14

1

7

1085 5.33 1.36

1

7

1087 4.65 1.47

1

7

5.47 5.63 5.27 5.35 4.99 0.49 5.99 2.69 4.81

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Table 8.7  A descriptive analysis of trust in authorities (N = 2012) A great deal

Quite a lot

1. Trust in the Press Freq. 122 990 Percent 6.06 49.2 Cum. 8.2 57.41 2. Television Freq. 123 1026 Percent 6.11 50.99 Cum. 7.8 58.8 3. Trust in the Government Freq. 427 1201 Percent 21.22 59.69 Cum. 22.37 82.06 4. Trust in the Civil Services Freq. 299 1268 Percent 14.86 63.02 Cum. 17.3 80.32 5. Trust in the Parliament Freq. 273 1138 Percent 13.57 56.56 Cum. 17.89 74.45 6. Trust in the Political Parties Freq. 140 910 Percent 6.96 45.23 Cum. 11.88 57.11 7. Trust in Justice System/Courts Freq. 439 1169 Percent 21.82 58.1 Cum. 24.65 82.75 8. Trust in Armed Forces Freq. 430 1221 Percent 21.37 60.69 Cum. 23.21 83.9

Not very much

None at all

Don’t know

N.A.

762 37.87 95.28

95 4.72 100

5 0.25 0.25

38 1.89 2.14

739 36.73 95.53

90 4.47 100

4 0.2 0.2

30 1.49 1.69

313 15.56 97.61

48 2.39 100

5 0.25 0.25

18 0.89 1.14

363 18.04 98.36

33 1.64 100

4 0.2 0.2

45 2.24 2.44

445 22.12 96.57

69 3.43 100

9 0.45 0.45

78 3.88 4.32

771 38.32 95.43

92 4.57 100

13 0.65 0.65

86 4.27 4.92

312 15.51 98.26

35 1.74 100

5 0.25 0.25

52 2.58 2.83

288 14.31 98.21

36 1.79 100

2 0.1 0.1

35 1.74 1.84

Note. Data were from the World Value Survey (2019–2020)

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CHAPTER 9

Right to Information Law and Open Government: The Indonesian Experience Noore Alam Siddiquee

Introduction The academic and policy communities and various international organizations have paid increasing attention to the concept of open government (OG) in recent years. This has become a global movement, popular in both developed and developing countries, and is widely regarded as a critical element in promoting transparency, accountability, and good governance. In fact, many of the recent reforms around the globe have been inspired and driven by a desire to promote OG. If a government is open, it shares information with the public, holds officials accountable, and encourages civic participation. The proverbial adage ‘sunlight is the best disinfectant’ best illustrates the significance of transparency. Contrarily, secrecy has corrosive effects on government. It hinders citizens’ ability to check the abuse of power and lowers the quality of public decision

N. A. Siddiquee (*) Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_9

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making. For there to be openness, public affairs and government operations must be available for review by the public. However, such scrutiny is difficult to undertake without access to critical information about government processes, such as policy formulation and implementation. In this regard, the right to information (RTI) plays a significant role in OG. Variously known as access to information, freedom of information (FoI) and public information disclosure, RTI has become a hallmark for democracy and good governance. Democracy cannot be meaningful unless citizens have access to public information that empowers and allows them to participate in and form opinions about public affairs. Furthermore, it provides them with the opportunity to voice their concerns, demand responsiveness of state authorities and fight against injustice and maladministration. In other words, people can question, audit, review and examine governmental actions to ensure accountability (Birkinshaw, 2006; Kaur, 2022). Since the citizens are affected by government decisions and actions, they deserve the right to know about policies and the process in which decisions are made. Good governance requires citizens to be cognizant of the way their government works, access the channels to participate in the governing process and hold those in power responsible for their actions and performance. A well-functioning RTI system enables citizens to seek and obtain information they want, make informed decisions and assess governmental actions and policies. It helps expose irregularities, deter abuse of power and support the fight against corruption (TI, 2018). In addition, RTI can serve as a strategy for deepening democracy and for improving governmental responsiveness to citizens by reducing information asymmetries in society (Shepherd, 2015). Aside from such values, recent writings highlight the importance of RTI in promoting public trust and improving service quality through co-production and public-private partnerships (Piotrowsky, 2017; Moon, 2020). RTI and OG have been two key elements of Indonesia’s democratic consolidation process—viewed as critical for fighting corruption and establishing transparent and accountable government. With a total population of 275 million living in sprawling and diverse archipelago of over 18,000 islands, Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation and the tenth largest economy in the world (World Bank, 2022). The former Dutch colony had a long history of authoritarian government from the early years of independence in 1949 up until 1998. The authoritarian

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system and massive corruption it generated especially during the New Order era fed popular discontent and made Indonesia particularly vulnerable to the Asian financial crisis (AFC) of 1997/98. The events that followed, especially the political and economic reforms, supported Indonesia’s gradual recovery from the worst crisis and marked the beginning of a move toward democracy and open government. Today Indonesia is a vibrant and pluralist democracy, one of the role models in Southeast Asia. Economically, Indonesia has shown a remarkable progress over the past decades by maintaining healthy growth rates while reducing poverty and unemployment at the same time. A combination of strong consumer demands, growth in commodity exports and prudent fiscal management allowed Indonesia to remain relatively unscathed during the global financial crisis and sustain a healthy growth of over 5 percent since the AFC (OECD, 2016). Despite such records, rising poverty under the recent pandemic, worsening inequality and addressing environmental sustainability are among the challenges that Indonesia faces. One of Indonesia’s silver linings is that since the process of democratization began, there has been a growing shift toward enhancing governmental openness, transparency and accountability of public institutions, as reflected in various legal codes, strategies and initiatives introduced. While the idea of OG is enshrined in Indonesia’s 1945 constitution which grants the citizens the right to association and expression of opinions among others, the subsequent amendments to the constitution and various strategic documents have explicitly articulated the legal framework for the RTI and OG (codified via laws, regulations and Presidential Orders, etc.). Thus, Indonesia is at the forefront—among the few countries in the region—to have built a solid and comprehensive framework for RTI and OG. This chapter reviews Indonesia’s experience with RTI and OG. The rest of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section introduces Indonesia’s RTI law and describes some of its important features. Section “RTI Law in Indonesia: The Public Information Disclosure Act 2008” focuses on the implementation of RTI law to highlight both supply-side and demand-side issues that hamper effective execution of the law. The final section discusses the current state of RTI and OG in Indonesia and compares it with other nations in the region. The chapter concludes with major implications for policy and practice.

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RTI Law in Indonesia: The Public Information Disclosure Act 2008 The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 marked the beginning of a new era in Southeast Asia, for it had a profound impact on governance and public policies in the region. Amid growing concerns with poor quality of governance in the region, the crisis served as a major trigger for improving governance. It exposed the level of corruption and poor governance and institutional weaknesses and contributed to political and economic crisis, which paved the way for significant reforms subsequently. In Indonesia, the crisis triggered the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian rule in 1998, paving the way for democratization and good governance based on values such as participation, accountability, transparency, and openness. The constitutional amendment of 2000 incorporated the right to information, together with the freedom of expression, making it an inalienable right of Indonesians to seek, obtain and use governmental information available through various channels. A few years later, the Public Information Disclosure Act (PIDA), 2008, was ratified as one of the most important legislations that seek to tackle corruption and foster transparency and accountable government. This was in fact the culmination and victory of a movement spearheaded by a large coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civic groups led by the Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL), demanding the enactment of RTI legislation in Indonesia. This was followed by several other policy instruments and regulations adopted subsequently to support the implementation of RTI law at various levels. The Act (no. 14, 2008) came into force in 2010 requiring all public authorities and state institutions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches as well as state corporations to provide the citizens with information about virtually every aspect of their operations. In addition to governmental institutions at the national, provincial and local levels, PIDA applies to non-governmental organizations that receive funding from the state or regional budget. Officially, PIDA aims at providing increased access to information which will improve the quality of public participation in decision making, and help enhance transparency and accountability, thus supporting the OG goals. Therefore, it represents a pillar of Indonesia’s process of democratization—a drive toward fostering a new era of governance characterized by enhanced accountability, transparency and openness in public affairs. It requires that all public information be open and accessible to citizens and legal entities. Under the Act, the government agencies and NGOs funded publicly or from overseas must provide information in a manner that is

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fast, prompt, affordable and simple. As ‘public information’ is broadly defined as any information produced, processed, stored and managed by any public agency, the Act entitles the citizens to know everything that relates to the state and its operations. The principle of maximum and proactive disclosure of information are two other distinguishing features that set PIDA apart from RTIs in other jurisdictions. The PIDA requires the public agencies to publish a wide variety of information proactively and categorize them into three broad types: those that should be published periodically, immediately or at any time. While periodic information relates to those about an agency’s annual planning, performance and budget, information for immediate publication includes those that might threaten life and public order (e.g., information of crime-related transactions). The information that should be available at any time includes a list of all public information related to policies and decisions, agency plans including annual budget, organizational structure and staffing, and data on access to public information (GOI, 2008). Public agencies are to report the number of information requests they receive, grant and reject each year, and the time taken to respond to these requests. The Act specifies key information that must be disclosed by state-owned enterprises, political parties and NGOs. As elsewhere, information that is exempt from public access relate to law enforcement, intellectual property rights, fair competition practices, defense and security, natural resources, international relations, private contracts, personal secrets and the like. However, all exceptions other than natural resources are subject to harm test/public interest test. This means that any requests for potentially sensitive information must be assessed in terms of its impact the disclosure may cause to the public interest. The PIDA requires public authorities to develop an information and documentation system and appoint information officers to handle public requests timely and efficiently. These information officers are expected to serve as key access points for information. Under the Law the information officers are required to respond to any requests for information within a maximum of 17 days. If the agency fails to do so, the person seeking information can file a complaint and the public agency will be required to comply within a maximum of 30  days. As in other jurisdictions, PIDA provides for independent mechanisms that information seekers can use where public agencies refuse to provide information or provide only part of the information requested. The most significant of these mechanisms is the Central Information Commission (CIC)—an independent agency responsible for resolving disputes through mediation and non-litigation

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adjudication. The CIC, operating alongside the Provincial Information Commissions, is also authorized to draft regulations and technical guidelines for the public sector on standards of information services, among others (GOI, 2008). The citizens can obtain information through specific mechanisms and the public agency is obliged to provide information through easily accessible channels and infrastructure. As indicated, clear timeline has been set for obtaining information together with measures for dispute resolution. A notable feature of Indonesia’s PID legislation is that in cases of dispute, citizens are not charged. However, a modest fee applies in cases where they want information in hard copies. Another important feature of the RTI law is that sanctions apply for non-compliance, that is, public officials face penalties if they deliberately hinder the right to information by not supplying the information requested, not publishing it, or destroying, losing or supplying incorrect and misleading information. Thus, the RTI law in Indonesia offers a new era of information transparency giving the public access to wide range of governmental information and protection. A broad review of the RTI law reveals that the principles and provisions contained are consistent with the ideals of Article 19 and very similar to those regarded as international best practices (Mendel, 2008). Some of these principles that make it unique and reflect government’s commitment to enhanced transparency are maximum disclosure, proactive publication of information pertaining to public interest, limited exemptions, support for an OG agenda and keeping cost affordable. Given that the Act also requires public agencies to proactively publish a wide range of information, it is seen as a move to empowering citizens and reducing corruption and mismanagement in public institutions.

Implementation of PIDA: Challenges and Pitfalls Since the enactment of PIDA, government agencies at various levels have sought to implement the law in their respective jurisdictions. While the new law has received widespread praise, implementation has been found to be slack and ineffective. In the absence of or insufficient support from politicians and bureaucrats, international donors like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) spearheaded governance reforms in Indonesia with the help of civil society organizations (Farhan, 2017). This explains the slow progress with the implementation of many reform measures including the RTI. The international donors were successful in

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forcing the government to provide the legal frameworks by enacting laws and designing institutional mechanisms. However, they could not do much in making these reforms work. Also, institutional capacity, the level of commitment and the nature of leadership varied widely. Consequently, the execution of the law in country’s vastly dispersed regions has been far from uniform. In many areas, implementation has been hampered due to limited administrative capacity, inadequate leadership, local bureaucratic culture and poor record management, among others. The range of problems that served as major impediments can be grouped into two categories: supply-side and demand-side challenges: The Supply-Side Challenges Officials’ understanding of information access as a public right and their obligation to share, publish and disclose information remains limited. A study on three agencies—the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health and the Police—discovered a general lack of awareness of the legislation among officials. Despite legislation, officials’ attitudes toward disclosure and confidentiality remained unchanged, and public officials continued to cite confidentiality as a justification for refusing to provide requested information (Karanicolas and Mendel, 2012 cited in Ang, 2019). This explains the limited willingness on their part to disclose and give information spontaneously and proactively. There are other reasons for refusing to disclose information. Some officials see information as a commodity, to be used for personal gains. For them giving public access to information is tantamount to eliminating an additional source of income (Jannah et al., 2020). Secondly, for decades the culture of secrecy was among the major features of public bureaucracy, where there was little or no pressure to disclose information. It is this culture of secrecy that is at the root of high level of corruption within the public service. The new law seeks to change this culture, mindset and behavior of public officials who still resent disclosure of information. Notwithstanding the new laws, this culture of secrecy has prevailed in many ways. Not only they fail to disclose information proactively as obligated under the Act (at times due to absence of detailed instructions on information formats and specification on access and reuse conditions), but they also refuse to provide the requested information on various grounds. Evidence shows that public agencies have shown a tendency to refuse requests for information by offering a variety of arguments such as the information requested is a state secret, the

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applicant is not entitled to information sought, and that the information requested may be misused (Jannah & Sipahutar, 2017; Indrajit, 2018; Kaur, 2022). A study of five state Commissions including the National Commission of Human Rights, the Ombudsman, the Judicial Commission and the National Police Commission found poor implementation of the PIDA and its offshoot regulations specific to these Commissions. It reveals that many of the requests were not responded to as mandated under the PIDA. There are also those who worry that the public’s increased access to government data could lead to undesirable outcomes. Often, they tend to reject such requests for information merely on technical grounds or by citing other excuses. A review of 232 non-litigation dispute cases dealt with by the Central Information Commission during 2010–2016 revealed that nearly one in every three cases requests were ignored by the agencies citing confidentiality or for being in the exclusion category (Jannah & Sipahutar, 2017). In other cases, because of disagreements on what information should be classified and what should be disclosed to the public, a lack of cooperation between the information officer and the technical unit is noticeable (Farhan, 2017). Thirdly, not only are the exceptions and exemptions allowed under the Indonesian law excessive (Kaur, 2022), but enforcement within the agencies has also been unsatisfactory. For others, since PIDA is not strong enough to force public institutions to make budget information publicly available, many local authorities do not feel obligated to share vital information. This is evident because only half of the line ministries, public enterprises, and local governments have published their budget documents on their websites (Farhan, 2017). Enforcement of PIDA within the agencies, especially at regional and local levels, is particularly slow/weak. Despite clear stipulations in this regard, it took years for many local government agencies to appoint Information and Documentation Officer (PPID), a key staff who is expected to be the focal point for the people when seeking access to information. They are, however, lower-level officers whose careers are dependent on the support of their superiors. They operate with limited budget and are hardly able to pursue their unwilling colleagues to provide certain information. Furthermore, if they reveal sensitive information to the public, they risk provoking widespread outrage and retaliation from their colleagues (Putro & Berenschot, 2014).

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The Demand-Side Issues Despite PIDA’s many strengths, there is evidence to suggest that the Indonesian public is not making full use of its RTI system. People’s awareness and understanding about the new law has remained low, notwithstanding its existence since 2010. This is among the major factors that explain the lackadaisical performance of the RTI regime. Recent research conducted in two provinces found that the general public has a poor grasp of the PID law. Only a small proportion of the public is aware of the law. Given that there was little or no campaign to educate people about the new legislation, it is not surprising that most citizens are unaware of their legal rights or are failing to exercise them effectively. They see no point in gaining access to public information unless they need it for themselves (Jannah et al. 2020). As a result, it is conceivable why the media and other organized groups, such as private businesses, non-governmental organizations, and academics, are the primary users of government information in Indonesia, rather than the common citizens (see, Ang, 2019). Many members of the public are still reluctant to make requests for public records for fear of appearing to undermine the authority of the state (Article 19, 2015). Similarly, there is a belief that bribery is necessary to obtain timely responses from government institutions. Indeed, public awareness of the PID law has been low, owing primarily to a lack of publicity and promotion of the new legislation, not to mention insufficiency of education and awareness campaigns (Article, 19, 2015). The budgetary allocation for educating public and raising their awareness about information issues for 2013 and 2014 was US$ 187,000 and 145,000 (Rahman, 2015). In a country with a population of 275 million people spread over 18,000+ islands, this is grossly insufficient to launch any meaningful education campaign. Consequently, most citizens have remained unaware of their rights and entitlements under the new legislation. Though during the early years of RTI, Indonesia saw a generally modest level of public enthusiasm in seeking access to government information, as reflected in the number of requests submitted, this could not be sustained. The number of requests for detailed information has dwindled in recent times (see, Farhan, 2017). One of the reasons for such decline is believed to be the current length of time (47 days on average including the time for dispute resolution), which encourages many people to use other channels to obtain required information. An additional factor that discourages

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people from seeking information under the RTI law is that the person requesting information must justify and provide enough reasons for seeking information. Likewise poor compliance on the part of public agencies is believed to have negative impact on public demands for such information. To illustrate the nature of challenges we present two cases that show the complex process in accessing information under the RTI law and reluctance on part of public agencies to share information or make them public, even though such information does not fall under exclusion category. Case 1: Harjono’s Battle to Obtain Information on Compensation for Land Acquisition

Harjono, a migrant laborer from Kadangmas village of Kudus district, East Java, found that his neighbors were cheated by local administration by underpaying the compensation against the land acquired in 2012 for the construction of a water reservoir. He sought to obtain information on the official price of land in the area and the amount budgeted for the project. As his request was ignored repeatedly by local administration, he decided to make a personal visit to Kudus district office. As this was in the lead up to local elections and Harjono brought two journalists with him, the district head felt sufficiently pressured to provide official estimates of the land value which turned out to be almost three times higher than the compensation paid to the villagers. Suspecting that the difference might have been pocketed by those in local administration, Harjono asked for information on the amount of money that, according to official records, was paid to the villagers. The district head refused on ground of the private nature of the information and the exemptions applied. This prompted Harjono and some of his neighbors to charter a bus to Semarang and lodge an appeal to East Java Provincial Information Commission. Although the Commission ruled in their favor ordering the district government to release the information, Kudus district government decided to ignore the ruling. This left Harjono and the villagers with one more option, that is, to appeal to the administrative court. Unable to pursue the case any further considering the costs and time implications, he requested that the Anti-­ Corruption Commission and local prosecutor’s office to investigate it and to bring those involved to the book. But both agencies declined citing a lack of evidence (Putro & Berenschot, 2014).

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This specific example points to major weaknesses of Indonesia’s RTI Act, on the one hand, and the nature of challenges ordinary citizens face, on the other, in dealing with the public bureaucracy especially in obtaining important government information. This also shows a drawback in the current system that any ruling of the Information Commission is not final and binding, as this can be ignored or appealed to the administrative court which leads to endless delays and ultimately prevents the enforcement of law. The following example helps illustrate the problem even further. Case 2: Forest Watch Indonesia and Access to Plantation Data

Indonesia’s palm-oil industry—the largest in the world—is plagued by environmental violations and land conflicts due mainly to the opacity under which it operates. For years, environmentalists and civil society groups have demanded that the operations of the industry be made transparent. The government has repeatedly refused to make plantation data and maps (known as HGU) publicly available, citing various reasons from intellectual property rights to national security challenges. In 2015 a well-known NGO, the Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI), took the matter to the Central Information Commission. When the Commission issued its ruling in favor of the FWI the Ministry of Land appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the decision in 2017 declaring that the HGU documents are public information, ordering the Ministry to share the data with FWI. The Ministry filed an appeal to the State Administrative Court, which was rejected in March 2020. While the hearing was pending the Ministry used it as a justification for refusing to share any data with the FWI.  The Office of National Ombudsman also asked the Ministry to make plantation maps and data publicly available, pointing out that the Supreme Court ruling was legally binding and must be obeyed. However, the Ministry did not obey it. Even other agencies of the government like the Ministry of Environment & Forestry and the Geospatial Information Agency (BIG) also had their requests denied by the Ministry of Land (see Jong, 2021). Similar experiences were reported in other regions like Papua and Aceh. In one such case, in 2019 the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi)—the country’s largest green NGO—sought to obtain HGU data

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from the Aceh provincial government. As the request was rejected by the provincial government/agriculture department citing similar grounds, Walhi took up the matter to the CIC. In its judgment passed in 2021, the CIC held that the provincial government must share the plantation data and other documents with Walhi. However, the department has not done so. It has lodged an appeal against the ruling to the Aceh Administrative Court (Jong, 2021). These specific cases show how complex and lengthy the process is and how difficult it could be to obtain information from relevant agencies where the culture of non-disclosure remains deeply entrenched. These cases also show the weak enforcement of the provisions of PIDA.  Even though the information involved in these cases were not regarded as state secrets or confidential and were unlikely to jeopardize the security of the state, yet relevant agencies remained strongly opposed to disclosing information, despite Supreme Court and CIC rulings in this regard. When the government agencies and the pneed;ul environmental lobbies are unable to access the information they need, it is conceivable how difficult it could be for ordinary citizens to overcome these challenges.

Discussion Since Indonesia’s democratic transition in the late 1990s, significant progress has been made in key indicators of governance, though challenges remain. The introduction of the PIDA is a major step in this regard. It represents a move away from pre-existing policies and practices, which historically were characterized by secrecy and confidentiality. It is also regarded as a landmark, a bold step toward empowering citizens and establishing an accountable and transparent system of public administration, consistent with the ideals and objectives of democratic reform that began in 1998. The law has been in place for over a decade. As such it is timely to assess the value and significance of the new initiative, especially in supporting governmental openness in Indonesia. Although it is often argued that mere enactment of RTI law by itself does not imply enhanced transparency and openness in governmental operations, yet the value of such laws can hardly be underestimated. Among other things, it does signal the willingness of the government to promote OG principles. When this is followed by other concrete measures and effective implementation, RTI laws produce beneficial impacts. As noted, Indonesia’s PIDA is of immense significance, when it is considered

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against the pre-existing situation and the country’s political and administrative landscape during the New Order regime. Throughout the period Indonesia witnessed a highly centralized and an increasingly oppressive system of government. Suharto presided over a system of government which maintained tight control over various social and political forces in order to minimize dissent, where public information was considered confidential unless its disclosure was specifically authorized. Most public agencies were not required to disclose information proactively or upon request. Disclosures, if occurred, were either voluntary or obtained under pressures from the media (Butt, 2011). In short, the system of government was defined by an absence of transparency, accountability, democratic institutions and free press, among others. Also, the New Order regime created a loyalist class of politico-bureaucratic elite whose members were able to extract illegal rents from citizens with virtual impunity. Within this system corruption flourished, and many of the misdeeds within the political and administrative circles could not be uncovered, let alone published (Butt, 2011). It is against this general backdrop that the RTI law must be understood and analyzed. Indonesia now recognizes RTI as a basic right of the citizens stipulated in the constitution and re-affirmed and made explicit by subsequent legislations. Despite ongoing challenges associated with RTI, evidence shows that the new law has helped improve Indonesia’s ranking and profile internationally. The Global Right to Information rating assesses the overall strength of legal framework for RTIs around the world. The ranking is limited to measuring and assessing the legal framework only; it does not seek to focus on and measure the quality and state of implementation. Yet it does give an indication of how nations perform compared with other nations in the region and internationally. Indonesia scores reasonably well when compared with similar RTI laws in the region and elsewhere around the world. Table 9.1 shows Indonesia’s RTI rating scores vis-à-vis other countries in the region that introduced RTI laws during the 1990s and early 2000s. As shown, in terms of the quality of RTI law, with a total score of 130 (out of possible 150) India is top performer and among the global leaders. With a total score of 102 Indonesia is not far behind Bangladesh and Nepal—the two other Asian nations that introduced RTI laws during the same period. Indonesia is well ahead of Thailand and South Korea despite they both having RTI laws in place since the mid-1990s. Table 9.1 shows some of the strongest aspects of Indonesia’s RTI law especially in terms of its scope and appeals

2005 2008 2007 2008 1997 1996

India Bangladesh Nepal Indonesia Thailand South Korea

5 2 4 4 4 4

Right of Access (Max 6) 25 25 27 28 22 22

Scope (Max 3) 27 17 19 11 17 11

Request Procedure (Max 30) 26 20 15 16 16 20

Exemptions & Refusals (Max 30)

Source: Based on Global Right to Information Rating, 2021 www.access-­info.org

Year of RTI Law

Country

Table 9.1  Right to information in selected Asian countries

29 24 24 25 12 17

Appeals (Max 30)

5 6 6 3 2 0

Sanctions & Protections (Max 30)

13 15 10 15 10 8

Promotion Measures (Max 30)

130 109 105 102 83 82

Total Score (Max 150)

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procedures; it also shows major areas where Indonesia’s PIDA scores are unsatisfactory especially in terms of request procedure, exemptions, and refusals and sanctions for non-compliance. Indonesia’s relatively favorable position is further acknowledged and confirmed in other international assessments. The World Justice Project (WJP) has developed an Open Government Index (OGI) that measures government openness in four key dimensions: publicized law and government data, right to information, civic participation and complaints mechanisms. Scores range from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating the greatest openness. Table 9.2 shows Indonesia’s OG ranking and overall scores vis-à-vis those of other countries in Southeast Asia. As shown, with an overall score 0.58 Indonesia’s global ranking is 32. When compared with her neighbors and other countries in the region, Indonesia comes second next to Singapore in terms of governmental openness. Table 9.2 also shows that Indonesia is far ahead of other nations, thus reflecting the strengths of the country’s RTI law and other indicators. Similarly, Indonesia has made visible progress in other spheres. The post-Suharto Indonesia has seen, aside from the enactment and implementation of PIDA, a range of other initiatives to enhance transparency and openness in public affairs. These reforms have played an important role in advancing Indonesia’s OG agenda. For example, decentralization reforms implemented since 2001 have provided the citizens with increased opportunities to engage with the government at various levels and to participate in public policy making and service delivery process (Hofman & Kaiser, 2006; Wetterberg et  al., 2017). Decentralization and associated reforms Table 9.2  Open Government Index in Southeast Asia

Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

Global rank

Overall score

Publicized laws Right to and data info

Civic Complaints participation mechanisms

98 32 88 100 50 25 68 86

0.36 0.58 0.43 0.32 0.54 0.63 0.49 0.43

85 (0.37) 39 (0.49) 34 (0.51) 87 (0.36) 42 (0.49) 9 (0.68) 48 (0.47) 31 (0.53)

89 (0.18) 31 (0.68) 90 (0.37) 98(0.28) 49 (0.62) 70 (0.55) 76 (0.52) 91 (0.37)

Source: Compiled from WJP (2015)

75 (0.46) 46 (0.56) 76 (0.46) 96 (0.39) 40 (0.57) 34 (0.58) 83 (0.43) 85 (0.43)

102 (0.18) 45 (0.57) 95 (0.37) 100 (0.26) 75 (0.48) 22 (0.70) 60 (0.52) 91 (0.39)

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have expanded space for public involvement in service monitoring, participatory forums for national and local development planning, and civil society involvement in local budgeting, among others. One major drive that reflects government’s commitment to transparency and openness is Indonesia’s association with the Open Government Partnership (OGP) initiative. OGP, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, is a global initiative aimed at ensuring governmental commitment to improving transparency, empowering communities, combating corruption, and leveraging information and communication technologies to support good governance. As one of the founding members of OGP since its launch in 2011, Indonesia has expressed its commitment to the open government initiative (OGI) agenda; it has also played an important role in promoting and disseminating OG principles and practices in the region and beyond. The initiative is based on core values of OG: transparency in institutions, public participation and innovation that seek to transform the public sector toward a truly democratic, accountable and transparent system of governance. An OGI secretariat has been established, which is responsible for organizing policy making processes to harness a more transparent, accountable and participatory system. Supported by a core team and various experts and professionals, it is also responsible for determining priorities of Indonesia’s OG agenda and developing annual action plans. To date, the OGI has inspired several innovations including One Data Portal and the One Map Policy, which are seen as major steps toward enhancing governmental openness in Indonesia (Farhan, 2017; Indrajit, 2018). It should be noted that while the implementation of PIDA and associated developments have resulted in greater openness in governance, this has not translated into governance outcomes. In particular, improved transparency and openness does not appear to have played a major role in tackling corruption and mismanagement in the public sector. Over the last 10 years corruption level in Indonesia has remained very high as reflected in the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and other rankings. CPI score in Indonesia has hovered around 32–40, where higher the score the lower the corruption levels. Worth stating that during the same period corresponding scores of neighboring Malaysia were between 47 and 50. In this regard Indonesia performs slightly better than Thailand where CPI during the same period has remained almost unchanged (35–38) indicating high levels of corruption. It is worth noting that Thailand effectively under military rule for last few years performs

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poorly on overall government openness index. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s poor record raises questions about the links between government openness and corruption, which can potentially be a topic for future research.

Conclusion Indonesia has traversed a long and winding road in her pursuit of establishing a political and administrative system that facilitates citizens’ access to public information and increases the openness of government. Soon after the democratic transition in 1998, openness and freedom of information were emphasized, but this came with its fair share of difficulties and problems. After years of lengthy debates and deliberations, the Parliament finally enacted the PIDA, 2008, which came into effect in 2010. This Act officially established the framework for an open and transparent government, ushering in a new era of public governance in the country. This chapter has shown that despite many of its promising features, the implementation and enforcement of PIDA has been patchy and uneven. This is due to various constraints and deficits ranging from poor dissemination of the Act to inadequate awareness about the new law and reluctance on part of officials to enforce it. Notwithstanding the progresses made during the past years, it is obvious that the cultural shift toward greater transparency and openness has yet to occur in Indonesia. All this suggests that it has miles to go before the vision of transparent and open government becomes a reality. Constraints and obstacles to the Act’s implementation must be addressed without delay if it is to be fully effective. This will help facilitate Indonesia’s democratic consolidation further, at the same time ensuring that the country benefits from a transparent, accountable OG. Leadership and commitment at various levels is critical for the implementation of the law and for moving the OG agenda further. Since the RTI regime can hardly be effective without active participation of the community, the government must continue to promote greater understanding of its value and importance in the society. Equally important is overcoming bureaucratic obstacles and ensuring that public officials at all levels have the necessary understanding and skills to carry out the transparency reforms. Finally, it is critical that the public authorities and agencies begin to view disclosure not simply as an act of compliance with the law but rather as a shift toward greater openness consistent with democratic governance values and ideals. Both supply-­ side and demand-side actors have important roles to play in making an RTI regime successful.

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References Ang, M. C. (2019). Freedom of information and Governance I Indonesia and The Philippines. In R.U. Mendoza, et al. (Eds.), Building Democracies in ASEAN. Article 19. (2015). Asia disclosed: A review of right to information across Asia. Birkinshaw, P. (2006). Freedom of Information and Openness: Fundamental human rights. Administrative Law Review, 58(1), 177–218. Butt, S. (2011). Freedom of Information Law and its application in Indonesia: A Preliminary Assessment. Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 8(1), 1–42. Farhan, Y. (2017). The road to budget transparency in Indonesia. International Budget Partnership. Government of Indonesia. (2008). Act of the Republic of Indonesia Number 14 of 2008 on Public Information Openness. Hofman, B., & Kaiser, K. (2006). Decentralisation, democratic transition and local governance in Indonesia. In P.  Bardhan & D.  Mookerjee (Eds.), Decentralisation and Local Governance in developing countries- A comparative perspective (pp. 81–124). MIT Press. Indrajit, A. (2018). One Data Indonesia to support the implementation of Open Data in Indonesia. In B. van Leonen et  al. (Eds.), Open Data Exposed, Information Technology & Law Series. T.M.C. ASSER Press. Jannah, L.  M., & Sipahutar, M.  Y. (2017). Arguments on information secrecy made by public agencies in Indonesia: A case study in the disputes over access to information, 2010-2016. Development & Society, 43(3), 451–469. Jannah, L. M., Sipahutar, M. A., & Hariyati, D. (2020). Public information disclosure: Mapping the understanding of multiple actors in corruption-prone Indonesian provinces. Policy & Governance Review, 167–181. Jong, H. N. (2021, June 10). Final court ruling orders Indonesian government to publish plantation data, Mongabay Series. Kaur, H. (2022). Transparency in governance: A comparative study of right to information legislation in India, Indonesia and Nigeria. Asian Journal of Comparative Politics, 7(4), 1282–1296. Mendel, T. (2008). Freedom of information: A comparative legal survey. UNESCO. Moon, M. J. (2020). Shifting from old open government to new open government: Four critical dimensions and case illustrations. Public Performance & Management Review, 43(3), 535–559. OECD. (2016). Open Government in Indonesia, OECD Public Governance Reviews. OECD Publishing. Piotrowsky, S. (2017). Government partnership and US transparency policy. The American Review of Public Administration, 47(2), 155–171. Putro, W., & Berenschot, W. (2014). Freedom of information, Inside Indonesia, 116(April–June), 1–5.

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Rahman, I. (2015). The nexus between public information disclosure and democratisation- The case of Indonesia. Journal of Global Studies, 5, 47–72. Shepherd, E. (2015). Freedom of information, right to access information, open data: Who is at the table? The Round Table, 104(6), 715–726. Transparency International. (2018). Corruption Perception Index. Wetterberg, A., Hertz, J. C., & Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2017). Social accountability in frontline service delivery: Citizen engagement and provider response in four Indonesian districts. Development Policy Review, 36(S1), 0564–0585. World Bank. (2022). The World Bank in Indonesia. Available in https://www. worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/overview#3

CHAPTER 10

Open Government Information in China: Review and Assessment Zhibin Zhang

Introduction On 5 April 2007, the central government of China—the State Council— promulgated the Regulations on Open Government Information (ROGI), with effect from 1 May 2008. With this new statute, the country joined the global trend with 77 other countries by 2007 (Centre for Law and Democracy, 2022) toward increased freedom of information (FOI) and greater government transparency. China’s embrace of open government (OG) has attracted particular attention for two main reasons. First, as a non-democratic country, China is assumed to have a different political logic underlying its transparency policy (Kim et al., 2021). Political scientists, therefore, are particularly interested in understanding how open government information (OGI) works in the authoritarian setting of China. Second, when China enacted ROGI in 2007, there were only 15 Asian

Z. Zhang (*) Flinders University, Adelaide, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_10

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countries that had passed similar laws on the right to government information, perhaps due to different historical and cultural contexts of Asia (Article 19, 2015). Hence, China’s determination to the OGI sparks scholarly curiosity to figure out the Chinese characteristics in its open government practice. Indeed, with a long tradition of state secrecy, China’s commitment to open government (OG) carries unusual significance that deserves a thorough investigation. Many studies argue that China’s adoption of OGI is largely because of external pressures. Horsley (2007b), for instance, identifies technological stimulus and WTO commitments as two key factors that motivated the Chinese government to become more transparent. Zhou (2007) finds seven causes pushing the OGI development in China, including the demand of the market economy and the coming information society, the WTO requirements, the need to eradicate corruption, and the maintenance of social stability. In other words, these scholars hold an instrumental view—OGI is adopted by the Chinese government as a tool for achieving other external policy goals (Stromseth et  al., 2017). Florini et al. (2012) echo a similar viewpoint. For them, information technology, WTO accession, fighting corruption, and state-society mediation are the major drivers of China’s move toward greater government transparency. In sum, in these studies, OGI in China is interpreted as an expedient tool for response to external challenges. Other studies, however, see OG in China as part of a more integral, systematic, and fundamental transformation of the governance mode. Scholars have observed the Chinese government and the ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), making sincere and ongoing efforts to advance government transparency, reinforced by concurrent progress toward greater openness in legislative lawmaking, judicial decision-­making, and even CCP affairs (Horsley, 2016b; Hubbard, 2008). Zhou (2007) also suggests that OG in China is adopted more essentially as a commitment to promote the rule of law and enhance the right of the people as the masters of their own affairs. Horsley (2016a), therefore, argues that China’s acceptance of OG is an element of a much broader goal seeking a ‘more innovative, clean, service-oriented and law-based government.’ Stromseth et al. (2017) also highlight that promoting government transparency in China is a far-reaching governance reform that would significantly impact China’s future political development. Surprisingly, a systematic assessment of such impact of OG in China as part of its governance transformation is scarce in the extant literature. This

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chapter aims to fill the gap by addressing a key research question: what are the governance outcomes brought about by China’s OG policy? Or, more specifically, how does the implementation of ROGI affect the transformation or change of China’s governance? Drawing on multiple sources of research findings and systematic data from subnational governments, this study offers the first comprehensive and synthetic examination of the significance of ROGI to the governance outcomes in China. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the second section provides an overview of the country’s developmental trajectory of OG. It then proceeds to construct an evaluative framework of OG. Subsequent sections examine the implementation of ROGI and assess its impacts on transparency, participation, and accountability, respectively. The last section concludes by suggesting two main future research directions.

The Developmental Path of Open Government in China Open Village Affairs Open government in China can be traced back to the initiatives of ‘open village affairs’ that started in the early 1980s. In February 1980, the residents of Hezhai village, Yishan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, in a spontaneous way, directly elected the first grassroots self-­ governing body in China—the villagers’ committee. This innovation spread rapidly across China. It was even enshrined in the 1982 new Constitution that stipulated the direct election of villagers’ committees in Article 111, to build up a democratic supervision system that stresses transparency and accountability in the political life of the village (Elklit, 1999; O’Brien & Li, 2000). ‘Open village affairs’ is a logical progression of the village elections, mainly emphasizing financial disclosure on the part of elected village chiefs (Horsley, 2007b). Baodi county in Tianjin municipality was a foregoer in this regard with its invention of ‘open village affairs and democratic management’ (The CCP History Research Office of Tianjn Municipality Committee, 2018). In 1997, CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection convened a forum at Baodi participated by seven provinces to publicize and expand Baodi’s experiences. Subsequently, in June 1998, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council (GOSC) jointly

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issued opinions to promote the ‘open village affairs and democratic management’ nationwide (Xi, 2007). These achievements in OG at the village level were legalized in the ‘Organic Law of the Villagers Committees of the People’s Republic of China’ enacted in November 1998. Article 22 of this law specifies that ‘the villagers committee shall apply the system of open administration of village affairs.’ As a result, by the mid-2000s, 95% of all 680,000 villages in China had applied this rule of ‘open village affairs’ (Central Government of the People’s Republic of China, 2005). Open Government Affairs and Legalization Experimentations In addition to the ‘open village affairs,’ the promotion of OG was progressing with parallel efforts in the ‘open government affairs.’ In 1987, the 13th CCP national congress’ political report proposed building a system of consultation and dialogue with society through greater openness and transparency. In March 1988, correspondingly, the 2nd Plenum of the 13th CCP Central Committee highlighted OG affairs as an essential vehicle for transparency, calling for piloting the disclosure of administrative information (Liu, 2005). In November 1988, the pioneering experience of Gaocheng Country, Hebei province, in the ‘two disclosures and one supervision’—the disclosures of administrative rules and procedures and results to be supervised by the general public—was widely reported and promoted at different levels of government (G. Chen & Yang, 1988). The 1989 Government Work Report further urged to ‘proactively promote the disclosures of administrative rules and results and enhance the transparency of government activities.’ Such momentum continued in the new century with OGI legislations. In 2002, Guangzhou city took the lead by developing the Open Government Information Provisions—the first of its kind in China. Its Article 6 states explicitly that ‘disclosure shall be the principle; non-­ disclosure shall be the exception,’ increasing the number of followers of local governments. In 2004, Shanghai municipality promulgated the first OGI provisions at the provincial level. Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Wuhan, etc., also subsequently got on board with similar provisions. At the central government level, in November 2003, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) released the Interim Procedures of MOC on Open Government. In May 2006, the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) published the Interim Provisions of MWR on Open Government Information.

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In April 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration issued the Provision of Open Environmental Information. The Regulations on Open Government Information (ROGI) The journey of the OGI legislation in China outlined above clearly demonstrates a pattern of local experimentation evolving into a nationwide practice. In April 2005, the General Offices of CCP’s Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued The Opinions on Further Promoting Open Government Affairs. For the first time, the Opinions placed the Party’s commitment to building up a law-based OGI system (Horsley, 2007b). Consequently, the development of OGI in China reached its apex on 24 April 2007—the State Council published the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information (ROGI) that became effective on 1 May 2008. ROGI comprises 38 articles in 5 chapters: general principles, the scope of disclosures, methods of and procedures for disclosure, supervision and safeguards, and supplementary regulations. In particular, these put forward the objectives of the Regulations, which are to ensure the access of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations to government information; enhance the transparency of government affairs; promote law-based government administration; and make full use of government information in service of the people’s production, life, and socioeconomic activities. The Vice Minister Zhang Qiong of the State Council’s Office of Legislative Affairs highlighted that ROGI aimed at safeguarding ‘the public’s right to know, the right to participate and the right to supervise’ (Horsley, 2007a, p.  2). The Regulations further stipulate that government at all levels should designate an office to oversee the OGI’s daily work, and GOSC is the designated national OGI oversight agency. ‘Government information’ is defined by the Regulations as information made or obtained by administrative organs to undertake their responsibilities. ROGI specifies two methods to access government information: self-­ initiated disclosure by government agencies or disclosure in response to requests. According to the Regulations, information involving the vital interests of citizens, legal persons, and other organizations, or that needs to be widely known or participated in by the general public, or that shows the structure, function, and working procedures of the administrative organs, should be proactively disclosed through self-initiation by the government.

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Horsley (2007a) points out that given China’s deeply rooted tradition of government secrecy, adopting ROGI was a remarkable development. Indeed, despite some weaknesses and reservations, ROGI institutes a bureaucratic infrastructure to promote OG, such as establishing designated offices, compiling OG catalogues, publishing annual reports, and undertaking other relevant activities. In April 2019, the State Council revised ROGI with significant expansions of the articles from 38 in the original version to 56. The new ROGI establishes the presumption of disclosure with narrowly drawn exemptions by clearly stating that ‘disclosure is the norm, nondisclosure the exception’ in Article 5. Article 13 further requires that ‘all government information shall be disclosed, except for the information specified by Articles 14, 15, and 16.’ Moreover, the 2019 revision expands the scope of information that must be disclosed through self-initiation from 11 to 15 categories (Article 20), especially adding information related to the basis, process, and results of administrative licensing and permission, administrative penalties, and civil service examinations. According to the 2007 version, the request for government information may be subject to a need assessment. The 2019 revision removes such a test. Table 10.1 summarizes the developmental milestones of OG in China.

A Framework of Assessment Based on a comprehensive review of the empirical literature, Wirtz and Birkmeyer (2015) deduce an OG framework. It identifies three pillars within the heart of OG: transparency, participation, and collaboration. All three pillars point to a goal of creating public and citizen value. Nevertheless, as public value is hard to conceptualize, let alone measure, the enhancement of the three pillars can be the proxy for the betterment of public value (Ball, 2009). That is, the governance outcomes brought about by the OG can be defined and measured as the improvement of the three pillars. Meanwhile, the development of OG has four external drivers: accountability, technology, regulation/law, and acceptance/trust in government. This study contends that accountability, as a condition of transparency, should be viewed as an essential component or pillar of the OG construct rather than as an external force (Schillemans et al., 2003). Meanwhile, collaboration in the literature primarily refers to the engagement of citizens and the cooperation of different government agencies in OG, which either

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Table 10.1  The chronology of open government in China February 1980 December 1982

1985

October 1987 November 1988 December 1990 April 1997

September 1997 June 1998

November 1998 November 2002 January 2003 March 2004 April 2005

April 2007 August 2007

Around 200 farmers at Hezhai village, Sancha Commune, Yishan County, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region voted spontaneously to form the first self-governance villagers’ committee in China New Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated. Article 111 stipulates villagers’ committee as the ‘mass organizations of self-management at the grass-roots level’ and must be ‘elected by the residents’ Villages in the provinces of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, etc., started to disclosure information on finance, homestead allotment, and family planning The 13th CCP National Congress called for establishing a system of social consultation and dialogue The ‘two disclosures and one supervision’ pioneered by Gaocheng Country, Hebei province, was promoted nationwide CCP Central Committee published the ‘Minutes of the National Symposium on the Building of Village-level Organizations,’ demanding establishment of the procedures of ‘open village affairs’ The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the CCP promoted the successful experience of Baodi County, Tianjin Municipality, in the practice of ‘open village affairs’ The 15th CCP National Congress called for ‘open government affairs’ The General Offices of both the CCP Central Committee and the State Council jointly issued the ‘Opinions on Perfecting and Improving the System of Openness and Democratic Administration of Village Affairs’ ‘Organic Law of the Villagers Committees’ was enacted Guangzhou city issued ‘Open Government Information Provision,’ the first local OGI in China Shanghai Municipality promulgated China’s first province-level OGI provisions The State Council issued the ‘Notice on the Outline of Comprehensively Promoting Law-based Administration,’ calling for the advancement of OG information The General Offices of CCP Central Committee and State Council jointly published ‘The Opinions on Further Promoting Open Government Affairs,’ pressing to formulate national ROGI ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information’ (ROGI) was promulgated GOSC issued ‘The Notice on Preparing Well for Implementing the ROGI,’ setting timelines of implementation for government agencies (continued)

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Table 10.1  (continued) April 2008 May 2008 April 2012–22 November 2017 April 2019 November 2019

GOSC issued ‘The Opinions on Various Issues of Implementing the ROGI,’ providing detailed guidelines ROGI took effect GOSC issued annual guidelines on the implementation of ROGI by identifying the priorities and arranging the key work areas ‘Chinese Communist Party Regulations on the Disclosure of Party Affairs (Provisional)’ was promulgated The revised ‘Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information’ (ROGI) was promulgated GOSC issued ‘The Notice on Related Issues of Standardizing the Information Disclosure Platform,’ offering unified standards for constructing the OGI website

Source: Open Government Information platform (http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/xxgk/index.htm), Horsley (2022), and the author’s compilation

Fig. 10.1  The assessment framework of open government

overlaps with the pillar of participation or is part of the implementation process. In other words, collaboration should not be treated as an independent pillar of OG.  Therefore, examining the implications of OG to governance outcomes should focus on its impacts on transparency, participation, and accountability in the governance process. This study applies this revised and simplified framework to assess OG and its significance to democratic governance in China. Specifically, as shown in Fig.  10.1, this study focuses on evaluating how ROGI is

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implemented to enhance transparency, participation, and accountability in China’s governance process.

Implementation of the ROGI Many scholars cast doubts on the possibility of an effective implementation of the ROGI (Chen, 2016, 2017; Distelhorst, 2017; Florini et al., 2012; Hubbard, 2008; Lin, 2020; Zhu & Fu, 2017). Highlighting China as an authoritarian system, these studies presume a paradox in implementing OG there because FOI is only possible in or strongly attached to democracy. This presumption, nevertheless, cannot explain why China is firmly committed to pushing forward OG, which is recognized by the same group of scholars who initially questioned it. For instance, one study that suspected ROGI implementation confesses that ‘the paper finds sincere central political support for the [open government] policy’ (Hubbard, 2008: 2). To solve this apparent contradiction, these scholars insist that China adopted OG mainly as a tool for controlling local bureaucracies, and bottom-­up resistance to implementation is thus expected. This argument, however, is inconsistent with the decentralized style of implementing ROGI, which allows and even supports different local initiatives. Hubbard finds that ‘[implementation] is left to local governments and agencies to develop their own institutions and work processes’ (2008: 3). In fact, empirical evidence finds that not only the central political leadership demonstrated a strong determination to OG in China but also the bureaucrats at the local governments held quite a positive attitude toward the implementation of ROGI.  According to these bureaucrats, the real pressing issues that need to be addressed in the implementation are the training of officials, evaluation and accountability mechanisms, and technological development, among others (Piotrowski et al., 2009). These issues are encountered by all countries, regardless of the types of political systems, when implementing OG, especially in the initial stages. Even in typical democracies such as the United States, ‘it took years for people to begin to recognize the usefulness and effectiveness of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in opening government files to the public’ (Horsley, 2007b: 74). Indeed, many critical skepticisms on ROGI’s implementation in China are actually ideologically biased. Though some scholars caution that it is still too early to assess the implementation of ROGI (Kaiser & Liu, 2009). Horsley (2010) has found

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very positive signs since the beginning of its implementation. In the first year, a wide variety of citizens and groups, including civil society organizations, lawyers, and other ordinary people, started to enthusiastically use the Regulations. A significant amount of government information became accessible to citizens through either the response to requests or the self-­ initiated disclosures by the government. More importantly, ROGI implementation resulted in significant policymaking and legislation changes. Similarly, Shaw (2011) also finds that ROGI had already provided a new and important channel for accessing government information in the first two years into implementation. He is optimistic about the prospect of more effective implementation of the Regulations toward even greater information access and government transparency in China, especially when broader judicial application could be further strengthened. Empirical evidence extends strong support for such optimism. Since ROGI took effect in 2008, the Chinese government has actively pursued a wide range of policies and measures for its effective implementation. First, governments at all levels must work out an annual plan to guide ROGI implementation every year. The plan identifies the key points of annual OGI work and highlights the priority information to be disclosed through self-initiation. As a result, the scope of self-initiated disclosure of government information has been continuously expanded. Secondly, various methods, procedures, and standards have been developed to enhance the efficiency and quality of government information disclosure in response to requests. A one-stop interface has been established to lodge requests for timely responses from the government. Most importantly, because many requests for information are based on underlying disputes, conflicts of interest, or claims of right, the Chinese governments have developed mechanisms to respond to them and resolve inherent problems. Thirdly, a solid technological infrastructure has been put in place to implement ROGI.  An integrated government information database system with a corresponding online platform has been created, allowing governments to disclose more classified and indexed data proactively. In 2019, GOSC issued a notice to further standardize the platforms by placing four types of information: OG information guidelines, OGI regulations and provisions, self-disclosed government information, and the annual reports of OGI work by a specific entity. Furthermore, new media platforms are synchronized with web-based platforms.

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Fourthly, a supervision and inspection system has been in operation to review, evaluate, and control the implementation of ROGI. OGI work has been included in the annual performance appraisal of governments at different levels. It incentivizes the government to dedicate significant resources to training OGI officials and raising awareness and knowledge of other public servants on OGI.  Meanwhile, third-party auditing of OGI performance has been firmly established. Indeed, the Chinese governments demonstrate a strong commitment to implementing ROGI.  The effective implementation brings about enhanced government transparency, increased citizen participation in policymaking, and improved accountability in public governance. The next section turns to a detailed assessment of these governance outcomes.

The Impacts of OGI on Governance Outcomes When assessing the impact of OGI on governance outcomes in China, some studies use abstract, idealistic, and Western-context-derived standards as the basis of judgment. For instance, one study argues that ROGI contributes little to government transparency and accountability because it does not strictly adhere to two fundamental principles of FOI, namely the ‘request-blind’ and the ‘public interest test’ principles (Y.  Chen, 2017). By contrast, other studies find significant governance outcomes brought about by ROGI (Distelhorst, 2017; Kim et al., 2021; Lu, 2021; Zhu & Fu, 2017), though in a gradual fashion. A robust, objective, and systematic evaluation of OGI in China is thus needed to adjudicate these colliding views and findings. Based on data collected from OGI work annual reports published by the subnational governments, which consist of provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions (To put it simply, these subnational divisions are all called provinces in this chapter, unless otherwise specified) this chapter provides an evidence-based assessment of OGI’s impacts on governance outcomes of transparency, participation, and accountability. The annual reports contain OG data from the provincial governments and all subordinate governments at the prefecture and county levels within that province. This assessment, therefore, covers most OGI work in China.

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Transparency This study uses the amount of information proactively disclosed to measure government transparency. Though the definition of government information varies across different provinces, it basically remains consistent within a province. Therefore, the historical variations of such government information are a good proxy for the development of government transparency in a province. Nevertheless, the beginning years of implementing ROGI were indeed marked by confusion or even chaos on what should be counted as government information. Meanwhile, with a new reporting format introduced in 2019, the annual reports have stopped including the amount of proactively disclosed government information. Consequently, the historical analysis of government transparency is truncated to the 2010–18 period. Each province’s compound annual growth rate of proactively disclosed government information from 2010 to 2018 is calculated, as reported in Table 10.2. It demonstrates the overall development of government transparency in local China. In 2010–18, most provinces made steady progress in government transparency by proactively disclosing information. Those richest provinces or municipalities, such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang, unsurprisingly, were the leading ones with compound annual growth rates all above 25%. Underdeveloped provinces like Ningxia and Gansu also achieved fast progress with a higher than 20% growth rate toward government transparency. Though Guizhou province was the worst performer in this category, this was primarily because it had redefined what constituted government information since 2016. Fujian does not appear very impressive either; in fact, it had maintained the most stable disclosure of government information throughout the period, resulting in a seemingly low annual growth rate. In short, the implementation of ROGI has dramatically promoted government transparency in China.1 As one of the most important third parties auditing OGI performance, the Institute of Law of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has been publishing the annual Government Transparency Index (GTI) since 2009. GTI is constructed by evaluating multiple aspects of OGI, including the extent of openness in government decision-making, policy implementation and outcomes, the OGI platform, and responses to requests for 1  Due to data unavailability for a few provinces in the initial years of ROGI’s implementation and in 2016–18, the compound annual growth rate at the national level was not calculated.

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Table 10.2  The development of government transparency, 2010–18 Province Beijing Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia Hebei Henan Shandong Shanxi Jiangsu Anhui Zhejiang Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Yunnan Hainan Guizhou Sichuan Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Xinjiang Tibet Qinghai

Compound annual growth rate of self-initiated disclosure of information

2021 transparency index

32.06% 31.13% 28.51% 1.63% 11.41% 7.49% 17.02% 32.77%

87.68 86.81 77.90 79.67 75.15 74.33 73.39 73.71

18.39% 14.68% 13.19% 9.47% 31.53%a 20.10% 25.81% −0.30% 20.11% 4.73% 53.5%b 0.18%c N/A −0.11% 5.23% −17.12% 19.79% 12.96% 27.15% 39.86% 34.27%d 18.90% 15.20%

76.97 65.78 82.55 68.70 78.83 83.35 78.55 72.29 76.60 80.25 75.70 81.81 75.47 75.31 75.46 79.35 80.64 65.53 68.16 71.09 69.00 60.32 65.58

It is the compound annual growth rate from 2013 to 2018 as Jiangsu did not publish the open government information annual report until 2013 b From 2011 to 2016 c From 2015 to 2018 d From 2014 to 2018 a

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government information. The latest GTI published in 2021 has been included in Table  10.2. Nevertheless, statistical analysis finds that the Index and the compound annual growth rate are not significantly correlated. Empirical studies suggest that progress in government transparency is positively associated with some significant governance outcomes. Stromseth et al. (2017), in particular, find that increases in information about the government power structure and policymaking process are strongly related with reductions in corruption measured as the misuse of public funds. Specifically, using panel data from all provinces in China from 2000 to 2011, their study identifies vital contributions of government transparency to reducing corruption. In addition, their study recognizes a consistent and accelerated upward trend in the transparency of government processes since the implementation of the ROGI. The coefficient of the transparency process is statistically significant and equal to 1.0, suggesting that one standard deviation increase in the policymaking process’ transparency is associated with reducing misuse of public funds by one percentage point. In sum, the empirical findings confirm that China has made steady progress in government transparency, which has led to significant governance outcomes. Participation In addition to the information proactively disclosed by the government, the scholarship investigating OGI’s governance impacts concentrates more on information requests lodged by citizens and social groups and the corresponding responses by the governments (Distelhorst, 2017; Horsley, 2007b, 2010; Kim et al., 2021; Lu, 2021). Governance, after all, is inherently interactive (Torfing et  al., 2012). Following this research line, this study uses three indicators to measure OGI public participation: (1) the number of requests per 10,000 residents for government information in three years between 2019 and 2021; (2) the average response rate of the governments to requests from 2019 to 2021, (3) the average success rate of the requests that result in government information disclosure during 2019–21. Although tracing the historical changes in these indicators might better reveal the impact of OGI on public participation, due to the inconsistencies in defining what is a request for government information by many provinces across different periods, doing so would be

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misleading. For instance, Jilin province included all questions and inquiries about government services as requests for government information. Jilin was not alone—many other provinces used the exact definition. After the revised ROGI took effect in 2019, with the increased standardization in OGI reporting, the inquiries were no longer considered requests. Consequently, the total number of requests in Jilin province dropped from 71,250 in 2017 to 3804 in 2018 and further to only 82 in 2019! Therefore, the historical variations in the requests say nothing about OGI’s actual impact on the development of public participation. Fortunately, starting with 2019, all governments in China have used the same standardized template to define, calculate, and report OGI-related data, making meaningful cross-province and historical comparisons of requests for government information possible. By controlling for the population of a province, the number of requests in 2019–21 is used to estimate the level of public participation in that province. Furthermore, the average response and success rates in requests during 2019–21 are used to measure the interactions between the governments and the requesters in public participation. Nevertheless, the government’s replies to requests before 2019, however they were defined, still offer some usual insights regarding how the governments interact with participatory citizens and groups. Hence, this study also includes the response rate and success rate in an extended period of 2008–21. Table  10.3 summarizes the relevant statistics of public participation. Measured by the number of requests for government information per 10,000 residents during 2019–21, public participation varies significantly across provinces. With more than 30 requests lodged per 10,000 residents, Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin municipalities have led others in public participation. Residents in wealthy provinces such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong have also actively engaged in government affairs by requesting information. The national average is 8.3 requests per 10,000 citizens. Nevertheless, not all the requests succeed in obtaining the demanded information—despite high government response rates in most provinces, those with a more significant number of requests recorded a lower rate of success that leads to information disclosure. It is important to note that, on average, both the response rate and the success rate in all provinces during 2019–21 and 2008–21 were quite high—much higher than the success rate of 14% reported by Distelhorst (2017) who conducted a national field audit in 2010–11. It is also interesting to note that, at the national level, the response rate in the latest three years (2019–21)

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Table 10.3  Public participation in OGI Province

Beijing Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia Hebei Henan Shandong Shanxi Jiangsu Anhui Zhejiang Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Yunnan Hainan Guizhou Sichuan Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Xinjiang Tibet Qinghai National

Requests per 10,000 residents, 2019–21

Average response rate, 2019–21

Average success rate, 2019–21

Average response rate, 2010–21

Average success rate, 2010–21

64.7 36.4 34.6 6.0 6.2 0.2 4.8 3.2

95.0% 96.4% 97.7% 97.5% 98.4% 96.2% 97.6% 97.2%

39.0% 39.2% 39.3% 66.4% 53.7% 48.4% 49.1% 55.3%

94.5% 95.9% 95.3% 97.9% 98.8% 94.3% 99.2% 98.4%

45.5% 45.7% 54.4% 76.7% 53.7% 85.4% 60.6% 66.7%

4.4 6.4 9.0 3.0 12.4 5.3 13.6 6.9 2.8 5.0 5.6 11.2 N/A 2.9 8.3 3.4 6.9 9.1 4.4 12.8 1.5 4.5 3.6 8.3

97.7% 96.7% 98.6% 97.8% 97.4% 97.4% 96.6% 98.1% 98.9% 97.8% 98.3% 96.6% N/A 97.6% 96.0% 97.4% 95.1% 97.7% 99.2% 99.5% 99.8% 98.1% 99.5% 94.4%

54.3% 58.4% 57.0% 64.5% 51.9% 57.2% 57.5% 51.7% 75.4% 56.6% 71.0% 54.2% N/A 58.8% 67.1% 62.3% 52.2% 49.9% 71.6% 16.5% 68.1% 72.8% 57.0% 48.9%

99.0% 97.4% 99.3% 98.7% 98.3% 96.6% 99.2% 99.4% 99.8% 98.7% 97.6% 93.9% N/A 99.1% 98.7% 97.6% 97.6% 99.1% 99.7% 99.8% 98.6% 98.1% 99.7% 92.2%

62.1% 74.4% 73.1% 75.1% 56.4% 74.7% 63.2% 62.9% 84.2% 59.3% 67.9% 63.2% N/A 83.2% 74.6% 82.7% 71.0% 64.1% 79.0% 42.9% 71.1% 82.7% 84.2% 58.4%

was higher than that in 2008–21, suggesting that the Chinese governments have become more responsive recently. But the success rate decreased from 58.4% to 48.9%, implying that the disclosure of information has lagged behind the increasing rate of public participation.

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Bivariate analysis confirms the above observations. There is a significant and positive correlation between requests for government information and GDP per capita in a province during 2019–21—citizens in rich provinces are indeed more active in public participation. Meanwhile, the number of requests was significantly and negatively correlated with both the response and success rates in 2019–21. In other words, the government is more likely to turn its back on the rising requests for information. Furthermore, though it might be biased to conduct a longitudinal analysis of requests for information at the subnational level, data allows tracing the historical development at the central government level. As shown in Fig. 10.2, the average number of government information disclosures by a State Council agency in response to requests increased more than ten times from 2008 to 2018, suggesting significant progress in public participation brought about by the ROGI at the central level. Stromseth et al. (2017) discover, using data from China’s subnational divisions, that citizen participation through public consultation reduces contestation and increases policy compliance. Nevertheless, public consultation in this study is not related to the OGI.  The findings thus only extend indirect support to the OGI-induced positive relationship between

1202.53

851.63

600.69

595.3 379.31

327.38 100.69

81.97

89.57

2008

2009

2010

133.67 2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Fig. 10.2  Government information disclosures in response to requests per State Council agency, 2008–18. (Source: Duan et al., 2020)

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public participation and governance outcomes. Li (2022) finds that OGI improves citizens’ preference for legal and political institutions for dispute resolution over protest, adding more evidence, albeit indirect, to the possible positive impact of ROGI on public participation and, in turn, on governance outcomes of increased social stability. Accountability Following Zemans’ (1983) call to treat legal mobilization as a form of political participation, most empirical studies have focused on ROGI’s legal activism since 2007 to assess its impact on public participation and government accountability (Y. Chen, 2016, 2017; Distelhorst, 2017; Kim et  al., 2021; Lu, 2021; Zhu & Fu, 2017). Indeed, ROGI has created unprecedented institutional channels for Chinese citizens and social groups to take legal actions to participate in policymaking and hold the government accountable. Therefore, this study also uses the statistics of legal actions—administrative review2 and administrative litigation—to assess the impact of OGI on government accountability. This study, which focuses on the 2019–21 period with more standardized OGI reporting, employs three measures to investigate how active Chinese citizens and social groups defend their FOI rights through administrative reviews: the ratios of applications for administrative review to the requests for government information, to non-disclosure decisions, and the non-disclosure cases. In addition to notifying the requesters of a straightforward decision not to disclose the requested information, Chinese governments have also employed additional strategies to refuse requests (Lu, 2021). Typical excuses include that the request is vague, or the requested information is outside the domain of the target agency. The number of non-disclosure decisions is much smaller than that of non-disclosure cases. The ratio of applications for administrative review to non-disclosure cases is more accurately indicative of the extent to which the unsatisfied requesters insist on their efforts to demand government accountability. Furthermore, two additional indicators, the percentages of the review decisions affirming or correcting the previous non-disclosure behaviors to the applications for administrative reviews, are included to measure the outcomes of administrative reviews. 2  The ROGI uses ‘administrative reconsideration’ to refer to administrative review or appeal. This chapter uses them interchangeably.

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As shown in Table  10.4, in 2019–21, the percentage of requests for government information resulted in review applications varied by province, ranging from 0.9% to 14.1% and the nationwide percentage was 4.7. In other words, on average, about 1 of 20 requests turn into applications for appeal. Looking at the ratio of applications for review to the Table 10.4  OGI administrative reviews and outcomes, 2019–21 Province

Reviews/ request

Reviews/ non-disclosure decisions

Reviews/ Percentage of non-disclosure affirmation cases

Percentage of correction

Beijing Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia Hebei Henan Shandong Shanxi Jiangsu Anhui Zhejiang Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Yunnan Hainan Guizhou Sichuan Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Xinjiang Tibet Qinghai National

6.1% 3.6% 4.0% 5.3% 3.8% 0.9% 3.3% 3.0%

196.9% 88.5% 96.4% 106.9% 58.9% 16.7% 51.5% 65.1%

10.4% 6.3% 6.9% 18.0% 8.6% 1.9% 6.7% 7.1%

79.8% 87.1% 73.2% 67.3% 60.6% 66.7% 59.0% 52.0%

14.2% 6.0% 13.0% 19.6% 23.5% 0.0% 29.1% 19.1%

4.4% 5.0% 4.5% 4.9% 4.9% 4.5% 4.6% 1.7% 7.0% 5.0% 5.5% 2.9% N/A 6.7% 4.9% 7.7% 7.4% 3.8% 5.4% 14.1% 6.8% 4.0% 5.7% 4.7%

112.9% 92.9% 80.9% 118.9% 96.0% 89.1% 90.5% 28.1% 75.1% 83.4% 156.8% 38.6% N/A 109.3% 98.7% 110.6% 141.7% 71.3% 73.2% 510.7% 92.8% 34.2% 369.5% 88.7%

9.6% 12.6% 10.6% 14.5% 10.5% 10.7% 11.3% 3.7% 31.2% 11.8% 19.2% 6.6% N/A 16.9% 20.5% 21.0% 16.2% 7.7% 21.7% 17.2% 22.3% 13.9% 14.2% 10.2%

59.3% 61.5% 64.9% 35.7% 63.5% 41.9% 59.8% 60.9% 47.0% 58.0% 50.6% 67.2% N/A 57.4% 34.9% 50.5% 56.7% 53.6% 40.6% 78.4% 49.6% 26.5% 64.9% 59.0%

25.4% 20.3% 21.1% 33.1% 13.7% 31.5% 19.5% 30.6% 23.4% 22.3% 18.5% 13.5% N/A 23.4% 16.9% 21.8% 21.3% 25.9% 28.7% 0.9% 27.2% 4.9% 13.6% 15.1%

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non-­disclosure cases only finds that the national average is 10.2%, suggesting that one-tenth of unsatisfied requesters would seek the government’s reconsideration. In fact, such persistence has a better chance of obtaining the desired outcome—normally, 15.1% of applications for administrative review could ultimately change the government’s previous non-disclosure decisions. Bivariate analysis further finds that the ratio of applications for review to requests is positively and significantly correlated with the number of non-disclosure decisions and non-disclosure cases—this is not surprising. The percentage of correction decisions to review applications is positively and significantly correlated with the success rate of requests for information that result in disclosure. A province with a higher chance to disclose government information in the first place is also more likely to correct its non-disclosure behaviors subsequently. According to ROGI, dissatisfied requesters can apply for administrative reconsideration and, if unsuccessful, proceed with administrative litigation. Lin emphasizes that ‘the OGI litigations … offer a window to investigate to what extent and how the governments can be held accountable’ (2020: 217). This study thus employs three additional OGI litigation-­ related indicators to further gauge OGI’s impact on government accountability in 2019–21: the ratio of administrative litigations to the requests for government information, the percentages of court decision affirming or correcting the previous non-disclosures to all litigations, as reported in Table 10.5. Table 10.5 shows that, at the national level, during 2019–21, the ratio of administrative litigations to requests for information was 4.2%. In other words, the requesters eventually went to court to demand government accountability. However, the success rate in litigation was only 7.8%, which was significantly lower than the success rate in administrative reviews. After the first attempt fails to obtain government information, it becomes increasingly difficult to persuade the government to change its mind. Nevertheless, of the total 1,176,283 requests for government information in 2019–21 nationwide, 585,643 resulted in disclosures. Put differently, combining all successes in different stages, 50% of requests can ultimately succeed. This is a noteworthy accomplishment of the OGI in holding the government accountable. Indeed, research findings confirm the significant effect of OGI in improving government accountability in China. Many scholars note a creative conversion of OGI into new channels for political demands and

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Table 10.5  OGI administrative litigations and outcomes, 2019–21 Province

Ratio of litigations to requests

Percentage of affirmation

Percentage of correction

Beijing Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Heilongjiang Jilin Liaoning Inner Mongolia Hebei Henan Shandong Shanxi Jiangsu Anhui Zhejiang Fujian Jiangxi Hubei Hunan Guangdong Guangxi Yunnan Hainan Guizhou Sichuan Shaanxi Gansu Ningxia Xinjiang Tibet Qinghai Nation

3.6% 2.7% 3.7% 9.1% 4.6% 1.7% 5.3% 2.8%

71.7% 68.6% 64.4% 62.9% 50.8% 66.7% 65.5% 55.1%

5.0% 2.3% 5.0% 10.7% 6.0% 0.0% 6.7% 16.0%

3.2% 7.1% 3.5% 5.4% 5.2% 4.1% 4.8% 1.8% 4.9% 4.9% 6.1% 2.1% N/A 3.8% 4.5% 5.5% 7.5% 4.3% 3.9% 5.1% 4.3% 2.1% 4.7% 4.2%

54.3% 58.0% 64.3% 43.4% 58.8% 50.4% 54.7% 57.7% 62.7% 51.6% 60.2% 49.8% N/A 47.2% 49.1% 54.0% 58.5% 44.0% 30.3% 50.8% 59.5% 28.3% 44.7% 59.3%

12.2% 12.3% 8.2% 15.8% 4.3% 16.9% 5.2% 12.7% 12.3% 7.6% 9.2% 7.9% N/A 10.5% 11.3% 13.9% 6.1% 14.0% 9.3% 3.9% 7.2% 0.0% 1.7% 7.8%

policy advocacy by Chinese citizens and organizations (X.  Chen, 2008; Kim et  al., 2021; Lu, 2021). In most cases, the ultimate aims of OGI requests, administrative appeals, and litigations are not for government information per se. ‘Gaining access to government information was only one of their goals, and not even the primary one’ (Lu, 2021:. 96). Instead,

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OGI is just converted or exploited by citizens and groups as vehicles to pursue other, actual goals of policy changes. As a result of the institutional or policy transformation of OGI, unprecedented opportunities for ongoing political interactions between governments and citizens have emerged. These interactions, especially the legal mobilization of OGI reviews and litigations, in turn, have constantly redrawn the boundaries of political participation and government accountability in China (Distelhorst, 2017; Kim et al., 2021; Lu, 2021), leading to systematic policy changes in a wide range of areas (Zhu & Fu, 2017) and driving the continuous evolution of not only the OGI regime but also the modes of the Chinese governance. In particular, this study has clearly shown that together with other administrative laws, ROGI is initiated and implemented as part of and contributes to a fundamental transformation toward a more rule of law-­ based governance in China (Lu, 2021). The 15.1% success rate in OGI reviews and 7.8% success rate in OGI lawsuits all suggest a genuine commitment to government transparency and a growing respect for law in governance. Though ‘much work remains to be done’ (Horsley, 2010: 7), the implementation of the ROGI has already generated significant outcomes that have reshaped the Chinese governance.

Conclusion Since the promulgation of ROGI in 2007, China has implemented the OGI policy for 15  years. Based on a historical review of OGI development, this chapter offered a comprehensive assessment on how OGI has driven the enhancement of transparency, participation, and accountability in the country’s governance process. Drawing on data at the subnational level that covers most OGI work in China, the findings recognize a wide range of governance outcomes brought about by implementing ROGI. Specifically, measured by the information disclosed through self-­ initiation, the Chinese governments have become much more transparent and accessible. Most importantly, with the newly introduced institutions of requests for government information, administrative reconsideration, and administrative litigation, the ROGI has offered a substantial space for political interactions between the governments and the citizens, resulting in soaring public participation and improved government accountability. Overall, ROGI indeed has a far-reaching impact on Chinese

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governance—it is actually emblematic of a large-scale governance transformation that is underway in China. Nevertheless, what this chapter has achieved is simply a preliminary evaluation of OGI in China. Many critical questions remain unanswered. Stromseth et al. (2017) point out that it is particularly imperative to further investigate why the China’s leaders initiated ROGI as an essential element of the more fundamental governance reforms and what impact are they having. ‘This puzzle lies at the heart of Chinese politics.’ To solve it helps better understand what determines China’s political path in the years to come. However, this puzzle is largely neglected in the literature. Most prior research seems obsessed with trying to reconcile a presumed incompatibility between OGI and authoritarianism in China, losing a big picture sight of China’s governance transition ROGI represents. With 15-year OGI experiences, the time might be ripe to further the research on OGI in China. First, the authoritarianism paradigm should be abandoned as the dominant framework due to its limited explanatory power. This paradigm leads to two tendencies, as Stromseth et al. (2017) cautioned. One is cynically to view OGI simply as window dressing because it does not perfectly comply with the prescribed principles. The other is desperately to dig up from the OGI practices any inklings of political liberalization. Both tendencies hamper the ability to appreciate the significance of OGI in China. It thus calls for new localized theories and concepts to understand OGI more properly in the context of Chinese governance transformation. Second, to answer the call, it might be best and most feasible to start with building middle-range theories through more robust empirical studies. As demonstrated in this study, there are plenty of newly available data to support such empirical research and, in turn, middle-range theory building. In particular, OGI data at all government levels, including the central, provinces, prefectures, and counties, have been standardized since 2019, enabling advanced quantitative analysis and hypothesis testing. Meanwhile, all OGI litigation outcomes are available online, allowing more in-depth inquiry especially into the relations between OGI and government accountability. Furthermore, data also make it possible to compare China’s OGI and the entailed governance outcomes with other countries. Such comparative studies will certainly reveal more Chinese characteristics of the OGI practiced on the unique Chinese soil.

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References Article 19. (2015). Asia disclosed: A review of the right to information across Asia. ARTICLE19. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5643021b4.pdf Ball, C. (2009). What is transparency. Public Integrity, 11(4), 293–307. Central Government of the People’s Republic of China. (2005). A national summary of open village. Government and Enterprise Affairs 全国村务政务厂务公 开简况. http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-­07/01/content_11583.htm Centre for Law and Democracy. (2022). Global right to information rating. Retrieved from http://www.rti-­rating.org/country-­data/ Chen, X. (2008). Institutional conversion and collective petitioning in China. In K.  J. O’Brien (Ed.), Popular Protest in China (pp.  54–70). Harvard University Press. Chen, Y. (2016). Transparency versus stability: The new role of Chinese courts in upholding freedom of information. Tsinghua China Law Review, 9, 79–138. Chen, Y. (2017). Taming the Right to Information: Motive Screening and the Public Interest Test under China’s FOI-like Law. Journal of Comparative Law, 12(2), 236–267. Chen, G., & Yang, Z. (1988). ‘Two Disclosures and one monitoring’ showing its power. Renmin (People’s) Daily. https://www.laoziliao.net/rmrb/1988-­10­03-­1 Distelhorst, G. (2017). The Power of Empty Promises: Quasi-Democratic Institutions and Activism in China. Comparative Political Studies, 50(4), 464–498. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414015617960 Duan, Y., Zhou, M., & Shang, T. (2020). A study on the development and regulatory strategies of open government information in China (我国政府信息公开 态势及其调控策略研究). Journal of Modern Information (现代情报), 8, 121–128+177. Elklit, J. (1999). The Chinese village committee electoral system. China Information, 6(4), 1–13. Florini, A., Lai, H., & Tan, Y. (2012). China experiments: From local innovations to national reform. Brookings Institution Press. Horsley, J. P. (2007a). China adopts first nationwide open government information regulations. Freedominfo.org, 9, 1–13. Horsley, J. P. (2007b). Toward a more open China? In A. Florini (Ed.), The right to know: Transparency for an open world (pp. 54–91). Columbia University Press. Horsley, J.  P. (2010). Update on China’s open government information regulations: Surprising public demand yielding some positive results. http:// www.freedominfo.org/2010/04/update-­o n-­c hina-­o pen-­g overnmentinformation-­regulations/

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Horsley, J. P. (2016a). China promotes open government as it seeks to reinvent its governancemodel.http://www.freedominfo.org/2016/02/china-­promotes-­opengovernment-as-­it-seeks-­to-­reinventits-­governance-­model/ Horsley, J.  P. (2016b). China’s freedom of information act turns eight. https:// www.wilsoncenter.org/article/chinas-­freedom-­information-­act-­turns-­eight Horsley, J.  P. (2022). Chronology of Open Government Information (OGI) in China. http://www.freedominfo.org/regions/east-­asia/china. Hubbard, P. (2008). China’s regulations on open government information: Challenges of nationwide policy implementation. Open Government: A Journal on Freedom of Information, 4(1), 1–34. Kaiser, T., & Liu, R. (2009). Taking the pulse: The one-year anniversary of China’s open government information measures. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/taking-­t he-­p ulse-­t he-­o ne-­y ear-­a nniversar ychinas-­open-­government-­information-­measures Kim, J., Stern, R. E., Liebman, B. L., & Wu, X. (2021). Closing open government: Grassroots policy conversion of China’s open government information regulation and its aftermath. Comparative Political Studies, 55(2), 319–347. https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211024314 Li, H. (2022). Transparency for authoritarian stability: Open government information and contention with institutions in China. Available at SSRN 4069885. Lin, F. (2020). Authoritarian transparency: A comparative survey on open government information regulations in China. In X.  Zang & H.  S. Chan (Eds.), Handbook of public policy and public administration in China (pp. 206–221). Edward Elgar. Liu, J. (2005). The right to know and open information laws (知情权与信息公开 法). Tsinghua University Press. Lu, Y. (2021). Negotiating the right to information: Citizen–government interactions in the implementation of the regulations on open government information in China. Europe-Asia Studies, 73(1), 81–100. https://doi.org/10.108 0/09668136.2020.1841740 O’Brien, K. J., & Li, L. (2000). Accommodating ‘democracy’ in a one-party state: Introducing village elections in China. The China Quarterly, 162, 465–489. Piotrowski, S. J., Zhang, Y., Lin, W., & Yu, W. (2009). Key issues for implementation of Chinese open government information regulations. Public Administration Review, 69(S1), S129–S135. Schillemans, T., van Twist, M., & Vanhommerig, I. (2003). Innovations in accountability. Public Performance & Management Review, 36(3), 407–435. Shaw, N. (2011). Implementation of China’s 2007 open government information regulation. Hastings Business Law Journal, 7(1), 169–185. Stromseth, J.  R., Malesky, E.  J., Gueorguiev, D.  D., Hairong, L., Xixin, W., & Brinton, C. (2017). China’s governance puzzle: Enabling transparency and participation in a single-party state. Cambridge University Press.

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PART III

South Asia

CHAPTER 11

Integrating Social Equity into Right to Information and Access to Information Laws and Policies: Drawing on the Indian Case Jeannine E. Relly, Md. Fazle Rabbi, Himanshu Jha, Rajdeep Pakanati, and Meghna Sabharwal

Introduction India was a global leader in crafting Right to Information legislation, placing social equity at the center of the national law adopted in 2005. The law ensures that marginalized and underserved citizens have free access to public information and that assistance is provided. More than 15 years later,

J. E. Relly (*) University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA e-mail: [email protected] Md. F. Rabbi Institute of Public Finance, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_11

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data demonstrate the institutional innovations and challenges over time with implementing a socially equitable law. Using the case of India, this research builds on a framework of inclusive policymaking and administration to explore the implementation and public use in this ‘ideal-type’ equitable institutional environment design for information suppliers and requesters. Our study utilizes datasets from two field studies: one dataset includes in-depth semi-structured interviews with 69 study participants in 17 cities and towns across India. The other dataset is a case study in the state of Bihar. We argue why social equity should remain a focus in framing legislation and policies related to information rights in democratic countries. In building our framework for social equity-centered information rights-based legislation and implementation, we examine historical constraints to openness and other barriers to entry and potential ways of addressing these issues. We argue for political leadership in this area, social equity as a pillar of public administration, introspective and reflective administration, and administration-society linkages in the India case and beyond. Our overarching research questions addressed to what extent marginalized and underserved citizens are included in the process of requesting information under the Right to Information Act (RTIA). What barriers, if any, have kept this accountability institution from working in disadvantaged or underserved communities of citizens? How has the Right to Information movement played a role in advancing information rights for marginalized people? India’s landmark Right to Information Act (RTIA) adopted in 2005 has not only become a global hallmark example of good governance legislation (Relly & Pakanati, 2021: Relly et al., 2020; Roberts, 2010), it is also an exemplar case of legislation and policy designed to support citizens, particularly the poor and those who often are underserved or marginalized, seeking to interface and obtain information from the government. The law emerged as a potent societal tool to access information held by H. Jha University of Petroleum and Energy Studies, Misraspatti, Uttarakhand, India e-mail: [email protected] R. Pakanati O. P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India e-mail: [email protected] M. Sabharwal University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA e-mail: [email protected]

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political elites and bureaucrats to reduce information asymmetries (Sarangi, 2012) and to advance the ideal of transparent, accountable, and responsive government to citizens’ needs (Kejriwal, 2006). It has empowered ordinary citizens to combat state corruption and play an active role in participatory democracy (Ashraf, 2008; Government of India, 2006). The RTIA contains several provisions directed explicitly toward supporting information access for marginalized or minoritized people. Section 7 of the Act offers universal access to Indian citizens, and those living below the poverty line (BPL) are charged no fees. Moreover, their oral requests are converted into written ones, and those who are sensorily disabled or unable to read are provided assistance filing requests. More importantly, feedback and responses are in  local languages. The RTIA paves the way for underprivileged and marginalized individuals to participate in governmental operations and protects their legal rights and claims through potential engagement (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012). Globally acknowledged as among the best in the world from the citizen standpoint, among the 137 countries surveyed in the Global Right to Information Rating, the Indian access legislation is ranked sixth for ideal-type requesting procedures (Access Info and Centre for Law and Democracy, 2022). In this chapter, we argue why social equity should remain a focus in writing legislation and policies related to information rights in democratic countries, such as India, and how public participation in the process can work toward inclusion goals. In building our framework for social equity-­ centered information rights-based legislation and implementation, we examine historical constraints to openness and other barriers to entry and potential ways of addressing these issues. In implementing right to information in India, we argue for political leadership and social equity as crucial factors (Bhati, 2022; Blessett et al., 2019), introspective and reflective administration, and administration-society linkages. Our overarching research questions address the extent to which marginalized people are included in the process of requesting information under the RTIA.  We explore barriers, if any, that have kept this accountability institution from working in underserved communities of citizens.

Background The enactment of the RTIA has a deep-rooted association with a movement to advance the rights of marginalized people (Puddephatt, 2009). The most prominent example is the emergence and movement of the

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Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), a rural, grassroots civil society movement in India, which used the strategy of access to information to expose corruption in public offices and ensure citizens’ rights to social benefits. However, the social movement narrative has been problematised. For example, Sharma (2015) views the consequential role of a dense interpersonal elite network. Most recently, Jha (2020) holds that the RTI resulted from a long-drawn process of ideas emerging from within the state right since independence. The collective started working on RTI during the 1980s and gained formal recognition in 1990 (Kidambi, 2008). Initially, MKSS focused on the failure of the enforcement of minimum wage laws and the state Public Distribution System (PDS) to make subsidized food and other essential commodities available (Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Pande, 2014; Roy, 2018; Sarangi, 2012). Through that movement, MKSS realized the significance of access to information and gradually campaigned for RTI to become an integral part of their movement. MKSS, along with several other civil society organizations (CSOs), formed the National Campaign for People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), which transformed the RTI campaign into a national movement. NCPRI’s strategic lobbying in this area contributed to the passage of a state-level RTIA in Rajasthan in the year 2000, followed by several other states, and ultimately at the national level. It provided detailed input on the Draft Bill before the Parliamentary Standing Committee, which scrutinized the bill in 2005. The Committee suggested detailed changes, which the government accepted. The poor and the marginalized are offered special benefits and privileges through Section 7 of the Act, as indicated before (Jenkins & Goetz, 1999; Pande, 2014; Puddephatt, 2009; Sarangi, 2012; Singh, 2011; Jha 2020). RTIA is utilized in instances of social inequality, and we examine how it plays out in several contexts in India. The country has 22 official and many unofficial languages, and more than half of the workforce is poor (The World Bank, 2018). Religious, ethnic, and tribal groups, such as Dalits, often face harassment and discrimination (Soundararajan, 2018). For these reasons, we can argue that the Indian case provides the necessary context for emphasizing social equity in RTI legislation and policy. Social Equity, RTI and Democratic Governance Social equity and rights-based work have been steadily growing after the Cold War, but their significance emerged during liberation struggles and

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postcolonial thought in democratic spaces (Nelson & Dorsey, 2003; Cornwall & Nyamu-Musembi, 2004). Unlike most countries, the 2005 Indian Right to Information Act (RTIA) offers the poorest, least educated, and most disadvantaged in society the right and possibility of requesting and obtaining information from the government at no cost and with assistance when needed (Relly & Pakanati, 2021). Accountability institutions are considered a necessary precondition for improving services to the poor (World Bank, 2003). RTI laws provide a mechanism that establishes direct accountability of the public offices to citizens of all backgrounds and, thus, helps them know their rights and entitlements. In fact, the legislation has become an effective tool for grievance redressal and expediting service delivery (Right to Information Assessment and Advocacy Group and Center for Equity Studies, 2014). However, there are competing views on the effect of RTI on marginalized people, and the poor have limited capacity to represent their claims and must rely either on ‘self-provisioning’ or on elected political representatives for assistance (Harriss, 2005). Others, such as Pande (2007), argue that RTI can be used to mobilize the poor and raise their awareness through the media. This can assist in ensuring government accountability. We use the Indian case to argue, in principle, for a social equity model that incorporates RTI-type legislation and draws lessons from it. Diversity, social equity, inclusion, efficiency, and effectiveness are the normative cornerstones of public administration and policy practice and research (Bhati, 2022; Guy & McCandless, 2020). However, equity is frequently overlooked in policy and administrative decision-making, as concerns for economy, efficiency, and effectiveness take precedence. Current public administration and policy scholarship generally does not integrate the concepts of diversity, equity, and inclusion into theoretical or empirical studies. Diversity and its dimensions as it relate to race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability, religion, class, age, etc., often form the basis of individual differences and are overlaid onto issues of fairness and equitable access and inclusion in the workplace (local, state, federal, or nonprofits) or across sectors (healthcare, education, housing, transportation, environment, policing, etc.). The global COVID-19 pandemic and social movements of our time serve as examples of how this approach to equity can be furthered. With the global advent of #MeToo and the U.S.  Black Lives Matter movements, issues of systemic racism, inequities, and racial injustice have found their way into the mainstream discourse around the globe. The COVID-19

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pandemic has shed light on the extreme disparities affecting underserved communities worldwide. Even in countries with the highest GDP in the world, the pandemic revealed stark differences in outcomes related to access to healthcare, education, housing, transportation, etc., in underserved communities. If diversity, fairness, justice, equity, and equal opportunity are not adequately addressed, it is impossible to form inclusive organizations or societies. There have been several academic studies and other types of analyses focused on equity in information access in countries with transparency laws. Other research centered on the types of requesters and forms of requests. In the United States, for example, a country with a freedom of information (FOI) law for more than 55  years, business representatives and lawyers are the largest requester group (Relly & Schwalbe, 2016). Over the last two decades as well, studies have demonstrated preferential treatment in providing information based on several factors. An econometric study reviewing 2120 requests in a government office in Canada found that the agency processed business representatives’ and other groups’ requests more swiftly than those from news media and political parties (Roberts, 2002, p.  175). In South Africa, research showed that ‘historically excluded sectors of society’ had more challenging times obtaining information under the access to information law there (Darch & Underwood, 2005, p. 82). Cuillier’s (2010) field experiment study demonstrated that how information was requested mattered for the response. Michener et al. (2020) found that noninstitutional entities received fewer (nearly one-fifth fewer) responses to public information requests than those identifying as institutions and that searching for citizen requester information online prior to providing information likely contributed to preferential decision-making on information release. The 2011 Census of India puts the national estimate of the number of people with disabilities at 2.21 percent of the total population (26.8 million persons), including persons with visual, hearing, speech, locomotor, and mental disabilities, with the majority in the 19–59 age group. Of the people with disabilities, 49 percent are literate, 34 percent are employed, and 75 percent live in rural areas. Emerging literature has found that access to information for persons with disability and mental health issues is not bridged even using modern information and communication technologies (Kadijevich et al., 2020; Newman et al., 2022). When it comes to the implementation of RTIA, the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities published an Information

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Handbook in pursuance of Section 4 of the RTIA to provide information with respect to powers, duties, and functions of the Department and even a compendium of schemes for the welfare of persons with disabilities (RTIA, 2005). The potential of RTI to empower people with disability by knowing about welfare schemes, grants, concessions, and scholarships available to them has also been highlighted by a few civil society organizations. Sakshi Trust, Bangalore, and ActionAid India developed a guide on Right to Information for People with Disabilities and tailored application formats for people with disabilities so that they can use RTI as an intervention tool in obtaining a disability certificate, seeking an allocation from poverty alleviation schemes, getting barrier-free access to public spaces and offices, and looking for access to education and related services. The guide also contained information about employment opportunities for the disabled, assistive devices and ways to ensure that complaints are heard by the Commissioner for People with Disabilities (Deshmukh, 2013). More recently, in the Aseer Jamal v. Union of India case (AIR2018SC, 2018, p. 4612), the petitioner approached the Supreme Court of India ‘to direct the Union of India, the States and the Union Territories to provide an effective machinery for the enforcement of the fundamental right to have access to information of illiterate citizens and to provide effective machinery to visually impaired persons and such impaired persons who are unable to have access to the internet.’ While disposing the case, the Court asked the authorities to explore any kind of advanced technology to make RTIA more accessible to people with disabilities. RTIA in ‘Spirit’ and Its Application for Marginalized Citizens Use of the RTIA by marginalized groups would, ideally, be understood in the broader context of this law’s spirit, scope, and content. We flag four related points here. First, available legal routes to access information from public authorities aim to address the issue of corruption, transparency, and accountability in government. These elements aim to ameliorate core governance challenges in India, especially at the grassroots, and to include often excluded and often underserved groups. Secondly, this Act contains a powerful ‘public interest’ clause that trumps non-disclosure of information. Thirdly, this law not only is related to putting the state and its instrumentalities under scrutiny but seeks to ‘empower’ citizens about their rights and entitlements, making a solid connection between democracy

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Information Givers (Public Authorities)

Space for Accountability

Information Seekers (Citizens)

Fig. 11.1  RTI continuum

and ‘informed citizenry and transparency of information.’ Finally, to facilitate its use by marginalized/underserved groups, the RTIA stipulates special provisions for people below the poverty line, such as waiving fees for citizens in the BPL category. In this context, if we conceptualize the RTI regime in terms of a ‘continuum,’ one end is represented by the ‘information givers’ (supply side), i.e., the public authorities, and the other end by the ‘information seekers,’ i.e., citizens (the demand side) (Jha, 2018, 2019). The space between the two ends is one of accountability (See Fig. 11.1). Significantly, both ends of the continuum are interrelated. If state’s responsiveness on one end facilitates the RTI regime, its use by the citizens at the other end strengthens this right. This continuum represents the accountability linkages between state and society. What is the relationship between the two ends of the continuum? And what ramifications does this have for marginalized or underserved groups? To probe this relationship, we examine the patterns of RTI use at the national and sub-national levels covering different regions in the country. For analysis, we examine data from 17 cities and towns1 and the findings against existing studies to indicate comparisons and nuances. In addition, 1  We conducted a qualitative field study in 17 cities and towns across north, south, east, west, and central geographic regions of India from October 14, 2016, to June 4, 2017. After receiving institutional approval for the research, we utilized a purposive sample from two publicly available lists of initial recruitment. From there we utilized the snowball method to recruit additional study participants. Our in-depth qualitative interviews included 61 civil society organization (CSO) representatives and 11 social activists (N = 72), who do outreach in communities of marginalized people. The interviews were recorded, transcribed, and then analyzed using NVivo. Our research also used secondary data from reports published by CSOs in India and academic research studies. We compare our findings to other research and finally to a study (2014–2015) conducted by one of the authors in the state of Bihar, which historically has been considered challenging in terms of socio-economic development. Bihar has seen extensive use of RTI by its citizens. The case of Bihar provides us with information about the use of RTI by marginalized and minoritized individuals, given its history of challenges with socio-economic development.

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we also draw primarily upon findings of an in-depth study of the Indian state of Bihar and its two districts of Darbhanga and Supaul (Jha, 2018, 2019).

The RTIA and the Marginalized: Challenges and Pitfalls Some of India’s poorest citizens have used the RTIA for entitlements, ration cards, and pensions that were denied in the past (Relly & Pakanati, 2021). Before our study, a number of CSOs and scholars have found that, in effect, the RTIA acts as a grievance redressal tool for marginalized people and has produced numerous success stories regarding improving services (Webb, 2010). For example, a non-governmental organization in the state of Orissa found the misappropriation of rice allocated for the poor and worked to ensure supply (Orissa State Information Commission, 2009). The use of RTI helped to get school admissions for children—a visually challenged person was able to obtain disability benefits, a 90-year-­ old woman to get her passport, and supposed beneficiaries of the Indira Awas Yojna (a housing scheme) were able to have their rights enforced (Calland & Bentley, 2013). Moreover, while conducting a study in two urban slums of Bangalore, Bharadwaj and Ramamurthy (2012) found that the use of RTI helped establish supplementary nutrition centers and improve food provisions in existing centers and various other services. In Delhi, hundreds of poor residents received their ration cards and electricity connections in no time by exercising their right to information and asking relevant departments for reasons for the delay and names of those officials responsible for it (Kejriwal, 2006; Pande, 2007). In a field experiment on the access of one of the most marginalized groups of people, Muslim slum dwellers in Delhi, Peisakhin and Pinto (2010) found that RTIA is as effective as bribery in securing access to ration cards. There is also a clear rural-urban and demographic divide among requesters, indicating that specific segments of the Indian populace are lagging in reaping the benefits of the RTIA. Studies show that rural people are less willing or able to seek information. The scheduled caste is worryingly underrepresented in seeking information, while women constitute only 8–10 percent of the applicants (Right to Information Assessment Group & Centre for Equity Studies, 2014, p. 48; Right to Information

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Assessment Group and National Campaign, 2009, p. 8). A 2014 analysis found that only 14 percent of respondents who used RTIA lived in rural areas (Right to Information Assessment Group & Centre for Equity Studies, 2014, p.14). While analyzing RTI applications in ten different states, the union territory of Delhi, and central government, a systematic audit found over 29 percent of the applicants were from metropolitan areas, 60 percent were from cities and towns, while only 20 percent were from villages (Right to Information Assessment Group and Transparency Advisory Group, 2014, p. 81). The scope of our study was limited to responses pertaining to underserved or marginalized groups, but we examined perceptions of why marginalized people have low RTIA utilization. Respondents suggested a lack of awareness of the RTIA and literacy limitations were among the leading reasons for the lack of use. Though there have been widespread awareness and training programs around the country about using RTI, our analysis shows that these need to be ongoing events as youths become adults and potential new users emerge continuously. The government has been more of a partner with civil society organizations than a strong proponent of institutionalizing the public training aspect of the law. In addition, several socio-cultural factors such as gender inequality in society and hierarchical societal structure were said to hinder marginalized people, especially women, from seeking information under the RTI (Table 11.1). Our interviews indicated bureaucratic resistance to change contributes to marginalized people’s poor use of RTIA. Lack of Awareness According to the World Justice Project’s Open Government Index 2015, based on a survey of 102 countries and jurisdictions, less than half (40 percent) of survey respondents knew of any laws supporting their right to access government-held information. Socio-economic status had a significant impact as results showed that in 80 percent of countries, low-income respondents were less aware than high-income households of their right to information, and in 68 percent of countries, low-income respondents are less likely to request information from the government. Gender also plays a major role, as the survey showed that in 76 percent of countries women are as likely as men to request information from a government agency, which also extends to their awareness about their right to access information (World Justice, 2015).

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Table 11.1  Summary of the responses of interviewees Questions

Responses

No. of responses

A number of reports have noted a lack of women applying for information under the RTIA and a lack of female public servants handling information requests (a) Could you speak briefly about this phenomenon and why it may be? (b) Is there any organizational work done in this area? Could you speak about this?

Poor participation of women (n = 5)

What would be your assessment of knowledge of RTI among rural citizens or those from minority or marginalized groups in India? From your work with underrepresented or marginalized groups utilizing RTI, what are the hindrances for these individual(s) from utilizing RTI?

Awareness is low (n =7) No specific response (n =1)

8

Lack of awareness (n =3) Lack of coordination among civil society organizations (n =2) Bureaucratic resistance (n = 2) No discrimination (n =1)

8

How would you evaluate the level of knowledge or preparedness of individuals from underrepresented groups in requesting information under the RTI?

Not prepared (n = 2) Getting better (n =1) Reasons: Bureaucratic resistance/culture of secrecy (n = 1) Poor civil society initiative (n =1)

4

50

Reasons (more than one could be selected for each case): Society, culture, and tradition (n = 23) Gender inequality (n = 12) Illiteracy (n = 12) Anonymous application (n = 7) Bureaucratic resistance (n = 6) Distance, Hazard (n = 6)

Lack of awareness also contributes to poor preparedness in utilizing the RTIA (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2009; Right to Information Assessment Group and Centre for Equity Studies, 2014). Moreover, those with a modicum of awareness about the Act do not always know how to use the application forms, lodge the requests, and ensure the delivery of requested information. One of the respondents observed that in rural and marginalized communities, ‘I think … the communities at the ground level, they are aware that there is some kind of legislation, but they are not aware of how to use it. There are some issues for example with some people who were not able to write the RTI [requests]. But then there are supporters.’

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The reasons behind poor awareness are numerous, including lack of education, training, and awareness programs. In a study conducted in two districts, which are considered parts of the most favored destinations for higher studies in India, Gatty (2012) found that 23 percent of the requesters had not completed matriculation. Similar findings came out of a study (Right to Information Assessment Group and Centre for Equity Studies, 2014) that discovered that the government is not the major actor in raising citizen awareness. One of our study’s respondents maintained: It was the duty of the government official to disseminate information about this act (RTIA) to the masses, but the government has not done. Because, they do not want to bring transparency, they are not proactive … they have to put information in the public domain which they haven’t done. … We can well think about the rural and marginalized areas; people are not aware.

That said, the leaders at the national level noted that a movement works from the grassroots and elite levels to advance knowledge and ‘ideal-type’ conditions for information access. One national and global level leader, who acknowledges that poor and marginalized communities cannot fight the system on their own and that networking has been important, stated, There’s talk about norms and society, ethics, power, equality and sovereignty and the fact that still today, this [RTIA] law owes its origin to poor and ordinary people struggling. And even today, poor and ordinary people have latched on to the importance of it.

Our study and supporting literature indicate that RTI serves different constituencies in different ways. Advocacy work ranges from outreach at the grassroots training level to legislative and policy support work at the state and national levels. Socio-cultural Factors A hierarchical societal system and gender inequity in India, like in many countries, act as major barriers to the utilization of RTIA by some underserved people. Literacy plays a major role in whether or not individuals apply for information under the RTIA, yet civil society organization group representatives and more informal collective respondents indicate that many do outreach and train the trainers in communities around the

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country. Yet, nearly two decades have passed since the RTI law was adopted, and as study participants pointed out, training needs to be ongoing. Many public officials in India have historically been positioned in society as powerful and, in some cases, are in an elite stratum in a society which sometimes may look down upon those with low literacy or those from marginalized and minoritized groups in Indian society. According to a respondent working on RTI collective action at the national level, organizations such as the National Dalit Justice Movement represent marginalized groups to balance this power structure. These groups often utilize the RTI to obtain records that advance human rights for individuals. The RTIA permits requests to be submitted by mail, allowing individuals who are frequently denied access to government offices to request information. Still, frequently, a person’s name reveals his or her identity and origins. Respondents mentioned that caste, religion, attire condition, and other factors that identify an individual’s background may lead to information denial due to the social biases of officers handling a case. We did not find studies in the literature to support this, however. According to one national-level leader, some Indian citizens are under pressure from their families not to file RTI requests for fear of misrepresenting their social standing and inviting trouble from the authorities. Gender inequity is an issue in India, as overall women’s participation in public activities is less representative in society (Carswell et al., 2019; The World Bank, 2020). Some respondents told us that this holds true, to an extent, for women RTI activists or women stepping forward as leaders though there are well-known women leaders in the movement and at sub-­ national levels. The Indian bureaucracy is predominantly male, and from 1951, when the first woman joined the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) until 2020, women have made up only 13 percent of all IAS officers (Bhatia & Chawla, 2022). Some respondents indicated that some sectors of society, including poor women, have historically not felt comfortable in the male-dominated public offices and spaces. According to a combined report by two research groups: It can be speculated that perhaps historically, the men dealt with the government, and this might continue to influence the decision on who files the RTI application. It can also be argued that awareness levels about the RTI are perhaps lower among women, without being clear why this is so. (Research Assessment and Advocacy Group and Centre for Equity Studies, 2014, p. 61)

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Some respondents indicated there are fewer women activists in the RTI movement than other genders, yet we really have no way of verifying that. Referring to conditions in Tamil Nadu (an Indian state) one of the respondents pointed out: As far as I know, there are very few [female] activists and RTI is an activist tool and so when you have a low number of women activists in the first place then it is natural to have fewer [female-generated] RTI requests. … That is because of the prevailing gender inequality in our society, so it is a serious gender issue we have to fight so that more women … particularly, are in public life. It is extremely difficult for women because of the patriarchal society we live in.

In addition, some communities in rural society do not encourage women to engage in litigation or file complaints in public offices (Right to Information Assessment and Advocacy Group and Centre for Equity Studies, 2014, p.  61). As a dominant norm of Indian rural and lower-­ income society, respondents indicated that women frequently rely on their spouse, partner, or other male members of the family to obtain redress, though this is changing and some of the movement’s most visible leaders are women.

Reflections on RTIA at the Sub-National Level To triangulate our findings from the national study, we examine the patterns of the use of RTI’s legal regime at the sub-national level, primarily drawing upon Jha’s (2018, 2019) work in the Indian state of Bihar and the two districts of Darbhanga and Supaul.2 We probe the sub-national level because even though the RTIA was passed centrally at the Union government level, it covers the public authorities at the central and state levels. For the real-time administration of the Act, the sub-national 2  Two districts of Darbhanga and Supaul are examined keeping in view both socio-cultural similarities and economic-political dissimilarities. Darbhanga is comparatively prosperous with better development indicators (Economic Survey of Bihar, 2016, p. 21). In addition to field interviews conducted, applications of the RTI users from the two districts were analyzed by Jha (2018, 2019). For uniformity 10 percent of total applications reaching the State Information Commission in the state capital of Patna were selected for analysis (Jha, 2019). The research was carried out from January 15, 2014, to June 16, 2014, and between December 1, 2014 and March 31, 2015.

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governments become crucial agencies of implementation in the context of the federal structure of the Indian polity. The Act, therefore, needs to be actualized at the state level by the state governments, which have enacted their own statutory rules to provide implementation architecture there (Jha, 2018, 2019). Local issues are typically investigated using state RTI legislation. Why Bihar? The sub-national state of Bihar has been historically and chronically considered less developed than other states in India. Based on the multidimensional poverty index (MPI), it is the poorest state in India, with more than half of the state’s citizens living in poverty (Economic Survey of Bihar, 2019, p. 239). The state is characterized as poorly governed, with the ‘dominant and corrupt’ nexus of some state and society elements looming over development (Veeraraghavan, 2022). Moreover, unlike other Indian states (such as Rajasthan and Maharashtra), Bihar did not have any social or political mobilization around issues of transparency, accountability, and corruption prior to the promulgation of the RTIA. In this regard, the case of Bihar provides an appropriate field for a more in-­ depth understanding of the use of RTI by marginalized citizens. In the context of marginalized citizens, it is pertinent to understand the challenges and bottlenecks they face when claiming their rights. From our analysis and the literature, we see these challenges manifesting at four levels: awareness, accessibility, availability, and affordability. In this section, we evaluate the RTI regime around these four parameters by examining the RTI use at the sub-national and further down at the district level. Awareness As discussed, the lack of awareness about RTI prevents citizens from exercising it, particularly the marginalized, who frequently exist on the periphery of the mainstream. A 2006 study showed that more than 90 percent of respondents were unaware of the RTIA (Society for Participatory Research in Asia, 2006). Yet another study comparing Bihar and Rajasthan found that approximately 30 percent of respondents in the former were aware, compared to 55 percent in the latter (Kumar Mallick, 2016, p. 27). Another indicator of lack of awareness and marginalization is the somewhat skewed gender patterns of RTIA use in Bihar. In both Darbhanga and Supaul districts, 97 percent of RTIA users are predominantly males. However, it is possible that Bihar being traditionally a male-dominated society, especially in the rural areas (which is true of much of India),

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applications are primarily filed by male representatives on behalf of females and individuals identifying as another gender. However, RTIA awareness levels have increased over time. For example, in 2008 only 3 percent of Bihar’s population was aware of their right to know, and by 2018, 53 percent of the total households surveyed showed awareness about the RTIA (Statista, 2022). In more developed states such as Karnataka, awareness levels have increased from 15 percent in 2008 to 71 percent in 2018 (Statista, 2022).3 From these patterns, we are inclined to offer a conjecture that the increase in awareness levels is directly correlated to the increase in RTI use. For this reason, unsurprisingly, between 2005 and 2020, Bihar was among the top ten states in terms of RTI use (Transparency International India, 2020). Likewise, in 2011–2012,4 the State Information Commission (SIC) in Bihar received 129,807 RTI applications, more than in more economically prosperous states such as Andhra Pradesh (122,133) or Rajasthan (71,243), though less than in Maharashtra (682,286) or Karnataka (293,405) (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2013, p. 44), though the populations of each of these states at the time of the analysis would be critical for further study. Accessibility and Availability The limitations of citizen access to public authorities have deep ramifications for RTIA use, especially by disempowered groups. Compared to other citizens, engagement of marginalized and minoritized individuals with the state is limited. Field insights from the two districts show the relationship between ‘information givers’ and ‘information seekers’ (Jha, 2018, 2019). According to the public information officers, who handle RTIA requests in India, • Applications were vague; • Applications sought opinions or reasons instead of information; • Requests were often personal and frivolous in nature; • Too many requests added to an already arduous workload;

3  This statistic shows the result from a survey conducted in 2018 among urban and rural households across 13 states in India about the awareness among Indians of the Right to Information Act (RTI) in 2008 and 2018 (Statista, 2022). 4  The Bihar State Information Commission published annual reports only till 2011–2012.

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• Perceptions exist of RTIA users as ‘middlemen’ or ‘contractors’ who use RTI as a tool to ‘blackmail,’ ‘extort money,’ or ‘settle personal scores’ in cases of dispute. Administrative reluctance has serious implications for citizens in general, but specifically marginalized individuals and communities facing exclusion (Gatty, 2012). Section 4a of the RTI Act stipulates proper record-keeping by public authorities related to the issue of availability. In this study, record-keeping at the district level poses a challenge. For instance, the Public Information Officer (PIO) of the Revenue Department in Darbhanga collectorate admitted that record-keeping is poor as files only up to a specific date are available. He failed to answer all the queries relating to Revenue Department land records, some of which go as far back as the early 1900s. He was reluctant to admit this publicly and concealed the lapse. It was shared that, the record related to a time 10–20 years ago and the officer himself has to look for that information, which is a time-consuming exercise. You can imagine how much difficulty an officer is going to face when tracing a record from 20 years back. Records are hard to trace, and there is a space constraint in keeping the records. The record room is totally stuffed. Now, waste your total energy tracing that record. For example, in my department (revenue) information was asked whether a government receipt which was issued in 1967–68 is genuine or not. Tracing this kind of information is a big challenge.5

Another bottleneck for information availability is institutional capacity to maintain and protect records. For example, both the districts in this case study are flood prone. In 2012 there was a massive flood, and records (files) were waterlogged and destroyed. Thus, it was an insurmountable challenge to access records prior to 2012. A field visit corroborated the problem of availability of information and record-keeping. For instance, the state of one record room in Darbhanga was in complete disarray. Not surprisingly, those in the BPL category use RTIA less than those in the non-low-income category. This is evident from the patterns based on the selective data procured for the two districts of Darbhanga and Supaul 5  Interview with the deputy collector in charge of the Public Information Branch at Darbhanga collectorate, who is also additionally in charge of the Revenue Department, December 27, 2014.

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120 100 80 60

D

40

S

20 0

BPL

APL

Fig. 11.2  Use of the RTIA by above poverty level (APL) and below poverty level (BPL)

in Bihar. Most of the users are from the above-the-poverty-level category. This study gathered data from the BPL category of RTIA users who filled out Form-A, required for not having to pay the required fee of 10 Rupees (about 12 U.S. cents) for the RTIA application. In Darbhanga, 94 percent of the applications, and in Supaul, 97 percent of the RTIA users, were in the above-poverty category. Merely 6 percent of the RTI users in Darbhanga and 3 percent in Supaul were from the BPL category (See Fig. 11.2).6 Based on the economic profile of RTI users, it can be argued that at a broader level, marginalized groups appear to be on the periphery of RTIA use in these jurisdictions (Jha, 2019). Affordability Even though BPL citizens can use the RTIA free of cost, there are related expenses that may hinder its use by marginalized groups. For example, in the 2009 amendment to the Bihar RTI rule even below-poverty-line applicants were supposed to pay a fee to receive information going beyond ten pages. The amendment also stipulated that applicants would need to enclose a self-stamped self-addressed envelope with the application. These changes in the RTI rules clearly impact and discourage potential 6  These figures are based on the applications that reached for appeal at the State Information Commission (SIC). Ten percent of the total sample size were analyzed as a representative sample. Using random selection method 100 applications out of 1000 were analyzed for Darbhanga, and for Supaul 70 applications were used out of the total sample size of 700.

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low-­income information seekers, especially those who are not educated and living in rural areas (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2010). Even though the quantum of RTI use by marginalized groups is relatively low, some communities have been able to successfully mobilize around this ‘space for accountability.’ For instance, outside of the state of Bihar, a tribal population in the Thane district of Maharashtra organized an ‘RTI Satyagraha’ (meaning truth force, a passive form of non-violent resistance propagated by Mahatma Gandhi) to get their forest land titles. They collectively filed 1272 applications to access information on the state’s distribution of forest land titles, information constantly denied to them by the authorities (Deshpande, 2013). The tribal population initiated similar, information-seeking Satyagraha in Jawahar Tehsil of Maharashtra to get details about the development funds distributed to the local village government (ibid). Similarly, RTI applications from all over Bihar exposed massive financial irregularity in the installation of solar lights in 8000 panchayats (or villages) under the Akshay Urja Scheme (solar energy scheme of the government of India to promote renewable energy) as part of Backward Regional Grants Fund of the 13th Finance Commission (Nagrik Adhikar Manch vs. The State of Bihar and Ors, 2015). Yet another dimension of RTI and the marginalized is its unintended outcome in terms of empowerment and entitlement. The case of Mazloom Nadaf, for instance, a poor rickshaw puller from Bihar who used RTI to seek the status of his Indira Awas Yojna (government housing loan scheme for the poor) application was successful in exerting pressure on the local officials to sanction his loan. Later, he was celebrated as an example of how poor individuals are using the RTI to get their entitlements. However, in his own words he expressed the consequence of his RTIA use, resulting in social empowerment: ‘Neither my awards nor my RTI made me rich; I am still poor. However, … it made me “Mazloom Bhai” overnight’ (Jha, 2020, p. 2). Likewise, RTI use by a person from a minoritized community challenged and reconfigured local power hierarchies and underlying social norms (Jha 2018).

Discussion and Implications This research utilized the Indian case to study the extent to which RTI legislation and policy may impact marginalized groups, for the country is one of the few ideal-type democratic country cases in the world with social equity embedded into information rights legislation and policy. We also

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studied barriers, constraints, and opportunities across the country to analyze the impact of the implementation of legislation and new policies developed to address deficits in actualizing accurate and equitable information rights. Clearly, India is a leading country for equity in information rights in the letter of the law and policy in contrast to some of the countries with the oldest laws, often serving elites or responding to requests based on occupational or other characteristic biases (Cuillier, 2010; Darch & Underwood, 2005; Michener et  al., 2020; Relly & Schwalbe, 2016; Roberts, 2002). Our study found that the legislation and ensuing policies are necessary yet insufficient factors for ensuring the equitable dissemination of requested information under the RTIA.  Citizens’ lack of awareness and socio-cultural factors inhibited utilization of the RTIA to an extent, depending on the country location and time period of the requests, with recent years, to an extent, being fraught with jaded administrators and backlogs of information requests. In some cases, bureaucratic bias and lack of capacity served as barriers to access. Study participants indicated as time went on after the adoption of the 2005 RTIA, administrative compliance and capacity, related to the heavy load of requests, along with lack of reflexivity in practice, led to less than ideal-type institutional accountability arrangements. We found five deficit areas of concern for information rights among marginalized or underserved peoples in India that could be explored in future research: lack of awareness of the legislation because of government shortfalls in educating the public widely, issues with accessibility, availability and affordability of information, or contesting rejection decisions in some cases. We flag five related points here that could advance social equity in the Right to Information Act implementation in India, a global leader in this area. First, Section 4 of the RTIA puts the onus on public authorities to proactively disclose information related to its mandated objectives, powers, duties, and functions in various departments. All details regarding the welfare schemes administered by ministries and departments would also benefit from being put in the public domain. Voluntary disclosure on these lines would serve underserved citizens and facilitate their inclusion. Proactive disclosure of information can ensure that people resort to RTIA less as a grievance redressal mechanism, as seen in rural areas and relied upon by marginalized people. This type of major change would require political leadership and political and administrative state agreement at all levels of government, with updated institutional design and additional resources.

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Yet another important aspect of RTIA is its interrelatedness with other rights-based legislations, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program, which ensures at least 100  days of employment for the rural poor. Enhancing rural livelihood and incomes of the people existing on the margins can be facilitated with a robust information-­sharing mechanism which is not demand driven but voluntarily shared in the public domain. In some cases, such proactive disclosure has played a consequential role in revealing irregularities that may have hampered poor citizens from obtaining their due benefits and resulted in grassroots mobilization (Saran, 2021). Though we would not suggest technological determinism as a path to social equity, the study gathered evidence that suggests the potential for information and communication technologies, emphasized for years by the New Public Management, is not fully tapped. The Supreme Court of India suggested that authorities should offer advanced technologies to respond to information needs. This would complement the online application methods facilitated by the federal government in India and a few state governments. Notably, two such initiatives by the sub-national governments of Bihar and Rajasthan were successful in ameliorating issues of accessibility by marginalized sectors of society. Third, we note that awareness about the RTIA or information access legislation is a necessary condition in any country, and this is especially true for citizens living in outlying rural and tribal areas in India. Therefore, the sub-national governments should pay special attention to forming specific action plans around Section 26(1) and 26 (2) of the RTIA, which stipulates organizing educational programs for citizens to raise awareness and also to publish user guides in all of the languages utilized in India. One example of an innovation is the Bihar Institute of Public Administration & Rural Development conceptualizing a script in 2009 for a street play named Ab Janta Sab Janegee (Now citizens will know everything). A fourth note of emphasis is that governments must advance access to constituencies with disabilities and institutions responsible for executing poverty alleviation schemes to truly support social equity within the RTI regime. Very little research has focused on interactions between public information officers and underserved and marginalized sectors of society. We call on researchers to further examine this nascent area, for social equity is a relatively new field within public administration, particularly in examining historical legacies of imbalanced service and underserved individuals (Bhati, 2022). Among the many ways in which social inequity

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could be addressed for individuals who are underserved and/or marginalized would be to enhance barrier-free access in public spaces, provide assistive devices, and embark on targeted civil society organizations and grassroots groups’ campaigns to audit data on the utilization of the RTIA by individuals from groups on the periphery. Finally, the Central Information Commission, a key central oversight body for implementing RTIA and playing an adjuratory role, could bring needed focus on the needs of underserved communities, similar to its direction to the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment to take extraordinary measures to share data and to make its websites a centralized resource center from where members of the public may be able to access necessary information (Bhatnagar, 2021). Though progressive legislation and foresight were prominent in the language of the Indian RTIA nearly two decades ago, time, resources, the colonial legacy of secrecy traditions, and the positionality of members of society have made it abundantly clear that institutionalizing social change related to equity and information rights requires ongoing work and a variety of approaches beyond legislation and policies. The complex landscape of uneven treatment of individuals in societies is complicated. Progressive information rights legislation and policies have most certainly made the Indian context an exemplar for intended and unintended consequences of enlightened policymaking. Yet, at the same time, like any innovation, the context needs to be revisited continuously to navigate, adapt, and readjust to the circumstances and contextual realities. The Indian context demonstrates the critical role of civil society and grassroots organizations in implementation, but it also necessitates political and administrative collaboration for both effectiveness and efficiency, as well as achieving social equity goals in the public sector.

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Gatty, H. R. (2012). Study of capacity building interventions among the marginalized to utilize RTI effectively. Report submitted to the Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions. https:// tinyurl.com/m9467xnh Gaventa, J., & Barrett, G. (2012). Mapping the outcomes of citizen engagement. World Development, 40(12), 2399–2410. Government of India. (2006). Right to information: Master key to good governance. Government of India. Guy, M.  E., & McCandless, S.  A. (Eds.). (2020). Achieving social equity: From problems to solutions. Melvin & Leigh Publishers. Harriss, J. (2005). Middle Class Activism and Poor People’s Politics: An Exploration of Civil Society in Chennai. Working Paper Series, Development Studies Institute, London School of Economics. https://www.files.ethz.ch/ isn/137958/WP72.pdf Jenkins, R., & Goetz, A.  M. (1999). Accounts and accountability: Theoretical implications of the right-to-information movement in India. Third World Quarterly, 20(3), 603–622. Jha, H. (2018). Institutional progression of the right to information act: Emerging politics of accountability. Economic and Political Weekly, 53(10), 47–54. Jha, H. (2019). Emerging politics of accountability: Sub-national reflections from Bihar. In M. Sekher & R. Carciumaru (Eds.), Including the excluded in South Asia? Power. Springer. Jha, H. (2020). Capturing institutional change: The case of the right to information act in India. Oxford University Press. Kadijevich, D. M., Masliković, D., & Tomić, B. M. (2020). Familiarity with state regulations regarding access to information for persons with disabilities in Serbia. International Journal of Disability, Development and Education, 69(5), 1–11. Kejriwal, O.  P. (2006). Right to information act: Loopholes and road ahead. Economic and Political Weekly, 41(11), 940–941. Kidambi, S. (2008). Right to know, right to live: Building a campaign for the right to information and accountability. Center for Victims of Torture. https:// tinyurl.com/mr4663a2 Kumar Mallick, S. (2016). Right to information and People’s participation at local level (village and block): A comparative study of Bihar and Rajasthan (India). https://tinyurl.com/yc6cpzxx Michener, G., Velasco, R. B., Contreras, E., & Rodrigues, K. F. (2020). Googling the requester: Identity-questing and discrimination in public service provision. Governance, 33(2), 249–267. Nagrik Adhikar Manch Vs. the state of Bihar & Ors. (2015, February 23). Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 21443 of 2012. Patna High Court.

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cations filed by the people of India. In Empowerment through information: The evolution of transparency regimes in South Asia Volume II: Empirical Studies. Roberts, A. (2002). Administrative discretion and the access to information act: An ‘internal law’ on open government? Canadian Public Administration, 45(2), 175–194. Roberts, A. (2010). A great and revolutionary law? The first four years of India’s right to information act. Public Administration Review, 70(6), 925–933. Roy, A. (2018). The RTI story: Power to the people. Roli Books Private Limited. Saran, M.  R. (2021). Last among equals: Power, caste and politics in Bihar’s villages. Context. Sarangi, P. (2012). Can the right to information help? Journal of Democracy, 23(1), 149–159. Singh, S. (2011). The genesis and evolution of the right to information regime in India. In Transparent governance in South Asia (pp.  43–78). The Indian Institute of Public Administration. Sharma , P. (2015). Democracy and Transparency in the Indian State: The Making of Right to Information Act. London and New York: Routledge. Society for Participatory Research in Asia. (2006). Tracking the progress of right to information in 12 States (Abridged version). https://cic.gov.in/sites/default/ files/Tracking%20progress%20of%20RTI%20-­%20PRIA.pdf Soundararajan, T. (2018, December 3). Twitter’s caste problem. The New  York Times. https://bit.ly/2Bm3FF2. Statista. (2022). Share of Indians who were aware of the Right to Information Act (RTI) in 2008 and 2018, by state. https://tinyurl.com/5xnaxtm9 The World Bank. (2018). Rural population (% total population) – India. https:// bit.ly/3l5SVN8 The World Bank. (2020). Population, female (% of total population)  – India. https://tinyurl.com/52a4s549 Transparency International India. (2020). State transparency report 2020. https:// tinyurl.com/ctv3rxem Veeraraghavan, R. (2022). Patching development: Information politics and social change in India. Oxford University Press. Webb, M. (2010). Success stories: Rhetoric, authenticity, and the right to information movement in North India. Contemporary South Asia, 18(3), 293–304. World Bank. (2003). World development report 2004: Making services work for poor people. World Bank. World Justice Project. (2015). World justice project index, 2015. https://tinyurl. com/yckjxwxp

CHAPTER 12

Lifting the Shroud of Secrecy: State of Open Government and Information Access in Bangladesh Habib Zafarullah

Introduction After gaining independence in 1971 after years of British colonial and Pakistani pseudo-colonial rule, Bangladesh adopted the Westminster system of government where a parliament elected directly by the people was expected to be sovereign. However, this system was disrupted by a post-­ independence restrictive populist regime that pursued a draconian governing style and ruled the country with an iron fist. The regime was dislodged by the military and ‘democracy’ was suppressed for nearly 15 years. The post-1991 democratization process faced challenges as democratically elected governments were plagued by misrule, excesses of the ruling party, and indecisiveness in policy matters. Over the past 15 years, the country

H. Zafarullah (*) University of New England, Armidale, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_12

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has been dominated by a quasi-one-party regime, with a majoritarian parliament merely rubber-stamping the directives of the powerful prime minister, and the judiciary serving as a mere extension of the executive. The institutions of government remain weak, probity has declined, and the rule of law arbitrarily enforced. Despite some changes, government decisions, judgments and operations remain shrouded in secrecy, the flow and distribution of information strictly regulated, and the people are kept ignorant of their rights. The bureaucracy is highly politicized, operationally unsteady, administratively unaccountable and unresponsive, and behaviorally distressing for the people. The country has consistently received a low rating for political stability since 1996—averaging a score of -1.19 points only (See the reference to ‘political stability’ in Global Economy, 2022). In recent times, however, some initiatives in line with the idea of open government (OG) fostering a culture of transparency, accountability, and some form of participation for achieving broader policy outcomes and improving citizen-state relationship have been evident in Bangladesh, albeit with mixed results. Some initiatives have indicated few positive outcomes; others have gone amiss. This chapter explores these initiatives addressing governance issues from the standpoint of OG and freedom of information (FOI), and roles the state agencies play in obtaining outcomes or the problems they face in fulfilling obligations. It seeks to analyze the application of OG principles across government administration, the public sector, and the private sphere to gain insight into their transversal significance in public governance and their multifaceted effects on society. The focus is on the initiatives contributing toward making government transparent, accountable, upstanding, collaborative, inclusive, privacy conscious, and citizen friendly. More specifically, the impact of the ‘right to information’ strategy in closing the gap between citizens and the state and creating a culture of openness, trust, and public value will be examined. This is an exploratory-interpretive study based on a general survey of a cross-section of randomly selected citizens, interviews with selected higher officials in government and public agencies, and published empirical and secondary sources.

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Contextualizing Open Government in Bangladesh Under current conditions, Bangladesh is not a fully-fledged democracy. Freedom House classifies it as ‘partly free’ in terms of freedom (39 points overall out of 100) with low scores in political rights (15) and civil liberties (24) (Freedom House, 2022). It is a political system espousing an authoritarian approach in governing society. Bangladesh is ranked number 86 on the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI) and classified as a ‘moderate autocracy’ (score 4.25 on a scale of 1–10) with limited economic transformation potential (score 5.39) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022). The Polity Index assigns ‘autocracy’ status to Bangladesh with a score of -6. In the EIU’s Democracy Index of 2021, Bangladesh is ranked at 73 among all nations with an overall score of 5.99. Its other scores are: electoral process (7.42), functioning of government (6.07), political participation (5.56), political culture (5.63), and civil liberties (5.29) (EIU, 2022). Indeed, the country represents most of the traits of a combined hybrid-­ authoritarian regime (Amoros, 2022; Ahmed, 2022; Blair, 2010; Riaz & Parvez, 2021; Riaz, 2021a, b, c; Zafarullah, 2005). A power disequilibrium exists between the state and the institutions of civil society. Governance is in an errant state moving aimlessly. The judiciary lacks independence as both the higher and lower courts are influenced or controlled by the executive. Criticism of the government is not tolerated and often met with retaliation. Those who oppose the government are subjected to intense pressure, often facing torture and imprisonment. There are few checks and balances in place to prevent clientelism from permeating social interactions causing public interest to be overridden by interests rather than principles. Within government structures, accountability mechanisms are inadequate, allowing bureaucrats to act capriciously. Elections are not free and fair, and electoral fraud or irregularities are common. In an environment where the rule of law is weak, ruling party loyalists are shielded from legal consequences for their actions and corruption tends to be pervasive in the public sector. Impunity for violations by security forces, including enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, remained common (HRW, 2020; Ahmed, 2013; Riaz, 2021a, b, c). Bangladesh’s democracy is rapidly regressing in the face of rising autocratization (V-Dem, 2022). The doctrine of constitutionalism is there to inhibit governmental caprice and irresponsibility but, more often than not, political operatives at the highest levels are surreptitiously more concerned with

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serving the ruling party’s own interests than those of the ruled. Since independence, Bangladesh’s constitutional tradition has been blighted by the imprudent manipulation of the Constitution by all political parties in power in pursuit of their narrow political objectives. Although the country’s constitution does highlight ‘the rule of law,’ ‘fundamental human rights and freedoms,’ the ‘dignity and worth of the human person,’ ‘equality and justice,’ and ‘effective participation’ (GoB, 1972, pp. Preamble, Art 11), there is no explicit mention of people’s freedom of or right to information. Not only is government transparency not guaranteed by any constitutional provisions, but it is also not even a strongly supported political value. Flouting of recognized standards for freedom of expression has become the norm. Controlling the flow of information has been one of the hallmarks of this regime. A culture of secrecy has persisted in the Bangladesh body politic since colonial times when the Official Secrets Act (OSA) was enforced in 1923. This was basically an anti-espionage initiative and was focused on protecting colonial interests in the region, but after the British left the subcontinent, ruling parties utilized it discretely for their own benefit in Pakistan and later Bangladesh (GoB, n.d.). This law was enacted to keep sensitive information out of the hands of the general public for national security purposes, prohibiting the unauthorized collection or disclosure of secret information and imposing fines on violators. However, its retention after decolonization and enforcing some of its coercive features contradicted the very essence of freedom and democracy. Particularly, it has been used brazenly against political adversaries, critics, and a non-conforming media. The OSA is no longer relevant, but it has been replaced by the Digital Security Act (DSA) of 2018, which creates a climate of secrecy and fear and legitimizes a draconian approach to persecuting citizens, particularly over trivial matters that the government perceives as being in opposition to its parochial interests. By all counts, it “has become the government’s and ruling party activists’ preferred weapon to muzzle critics and stymie their freedom of expression, especially in cyberspace” (Riaz, 2021a, b, c). Prior to the DSA, the Information and Communication Technology Act (ICTA) of 2006 was used by a previous government to persecute individuals and groups for publishing or transmitting online materials that allegedly damaged the state’s reputation. The DSA expanded the OSA and the ICTA’s restrictive provisions that contravene international human rights law. As Article 19, an international human rights NGO puts it, DSA “grants carte blanche to the government to make rules in areas such as the

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collection, preservation or decryption of evidence or data” and the authority to make rules and regulations that are normally the responsibility of parliament (Article 19, 2019). Undeniably, excessive reliance on or abuse of DSA is in direct conflict with the Constitution’s priority of protecting individual liberties, including FOI. Meanwhile, in keeping with the recent trend of opening up government worldwide, the Bangladesh adopted FOI legislation in 2009—Right to Information Act (RTIA). This recognizes the primacy of transparency and accountability as two key pillars of good governance and underscores the significance of access to information and its preservation and publication as essential to governmental operations and, more importantly, integral to freedom of thought, conscience, and of speech (GoB, 2009). However, with the enforcement of DSA, the significance of RTIA has diminished, making citizens hesitant to challenge government actions detrimental to their interests. With political vigilantes lurking everywhere to uphold the hegemony of the ruling party, ordinary citizens are hesitant to present factual information in their public service applications for fear of these being deemed unfounded and litigable. Indeed, the DSA is a deterrent to good governance and has stifled citizen participation in public affairs. Another piece of legislation—‘Data Protection Act’ is being planned that, in effect, would seriously violate people’s right to privacy and absolve government agencies of any responsibility for monitoring citizens’ online and offline activities in search of sensitive information. It would also compromise the right to access information granted by the RTIA (Amnesty International, 2022). The RTIA’s idealistic goal was to empower the common people by giving them the agency to access and utilize information for their individual and collective needs. But its more practical purpose was to aid in reducing corruption in government, especially in the delivery of public service.

Open Government: Where Bangladesh Stands? As mentioned in the introductory chapter, OG focuses on transparency, accountability, inclusion and participation, and collaboration as contributing to government effectiveness, which is also influenced by rational policymaking and state-of-the-art technology. OG is supported by Open Government Data (OGD) and Online Service Portals (OSP), both of which are premised on Information and Communications Technology (ICT). OG is based on the principles of openness and transparency,

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participation, collaboration. It is a non-traditional form of governance designed to respond to shifting imperatives in a globalized world and hold governments accountable for their performance (Gascó-Hernández, 2014). The E-Government Development Index (EGDI) was created by the UN to measure e-government strategies, best practices, technology, and other relevant factors. It is based on sub-indices like the Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII), Human Capital Index (HCI), and Online Service Index (OSI). Together, these determine the effectiveness of services provided to citizens and indicate the level of government performance from a digital standpoint. Transparency—Tinged with Opacity Even after breaking the shackles of colonialism 75 years ago, Bangladesh continues to exemplify the legacy of colonial rule with its highly secretive and frequently cryptic government operations. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, due to its deeply possessive nature, a conservative bureaucracy has been hesitant to give up its monopoly on information acquisition, processing, storage, and dissemination (Zafarullah & Siddiquee, 2021; Baroi, 2017). This is despite the recent legislative steps to make government policies and their implementation practices transparent and the move towards information access and availability for the public. Proactive disclosure is still uncommon, but when attempted, it is typically done exclusively through various official websites. Such dissemination of information is often restrained by so-called institutional obligations to secrecy. The intelligence and enforcement agencies are protected from reporting on their operations, such as actual number of arrests, disappearance, extrajudicial killings, investigations and control (HRW, 2021). Broad exceptions to disclosure make it difficult for officials to decide what information to disclose without being penalized. The main issue, however, is that many people in need of information do not have access to the Internet. On fiscal transparency, Bangladesh has made significant strides: publishing yearly reports, making budget documents containing the allocation of funds to and earnings from state-owned enterprises accessible to the public. A US fiscal transparency report (USDS, 2022) suggests that while the budget data can be relied upon, the documents do not follow commonly recognized international standards or meet minimum requirements. The Audit Office lacks the desired autonomy, and its reports typically withheld from the public are not credible enough in reporting

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findings. Consequently, citizens are dissuaded from participating in the budgeting process and, thus, fails to inspire public confidence (New Age, 2022). The World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating (combining transparency, accountability, corruption; 1  =  low; 6 = high) for Bangladesh has dropped from a score of 3 in 2010 to 2.5 the following year and has remained constant since then. Quality of public administration (QPA) score is 2 from a moderate level of 3 in 2016; the score for public sector management and institutions (PSMI) is also low—2.5. in 2021, the South Asian average was 2.9 for QPA and 3.2 for PSMI, while scores for East Asia and Pacific was 2.7 for QPA and 3 for PSMI (World Bank, 2021). Accountability—Trapped in Formalism It is established in governance discourse that lack of accountability leads to administrative inefficiencies, poor policy judgements, and widespread bureaucratic wrongdoings. Conflicting bureaucratic priorities and questionable political goals impede government transparency and accountability (Huque, 2011). In Bangladesh, the combination of internal/external and formal/informal accountability mechanisms is either constrained or influenced by politics. Among the external-formal mechanisms, legislative instruments (debates, question sessions, committees) are dominated by members of the ruling party and thus cannot play an effective unbiased role, while the executive power is used to exert influence and control over government agencies and independent statutory bodies. The constitutionally mandated ombudsman has not yet taken office (even after 50 years), and administrative tribunals have been virtually useless, inconsistent with constitutional principles, and insensitive to issues of fairness and equality (Sirazi & Aziz, 2020). In most cases, they serve to absolve wrongdoers in the civil service of responsibility for their actions. Rarely utilized are the external-informal mechanisms (public hearings, interest group exercises). As in a typical bureaucratic setup, internal formal tools (rules, regulations) are widely used, but performance evaluations are limited in scope and reflect the personal biases of the reviewers (Ali, 2004; Huque, 2011). On the other hand, organizational culture as an internal-informal mechanism is typically hierarchical in nature due to the influence of structure, processes, bureaucratic impersonality, and authority levels that impact employee behavior and sense of responsibility and practice. Ubiquitous

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politicization of the civil service has compromised neutrality, impartiality, fairness, nonpartisan behavior, and probity, and the desired level of professionalism and ethics never crystallized (Zafarullah, 2021). This has negatively impacted accountability. In the Voice and Accountability Index, Bangladesh’s score has been constantly dropping since 2009 when the present regime regained power. It is now a dismal -0.77 and is in the weak percentile rank. Overall, accountability failures are the outcome of the political executive’s misplaced focus on this crucial aspect of governance, public officials’ failure to comply with codes of conduct, and accountability institutions’ inability to fulfill their responsibilities. The process is still formalistic and top-down with limited scope for upward or lateral accountability. Participation—Yet to Transcend Tokenism Active, engaged individuals who participate in public discourse and uphold their civic duties are vital to the success of any modern democratic state (Clay, 1996). However, in Bangladesh, political participation has been limited to voting during national and local elections. After the reinstatement of democracy in 1991, elections under caretaker governments after each 5-year episodes of party rule saw the spontaneous participation of voters and candidates. With several parties contesting and fairly high voter turnouts, electoral democracy began taking shape. However, with the caretaker system unilaterally abolished by the governing party that won government in 2008 with a large majority, citizens’ interest ebbed because of election engineering in the two elections that followed. The atmosphere featured law enforcement agents intimidating opposition parties, rampant rigging by ruling party members, fabricated cases against opposition candidates to prevent them from running for office, and an erosion in people’s trust in the election machinery. Apart from voting, citizens’ right to participate in political meetings and take part in protests and processions has been highly compromised. The brazen attempts to crush opposition’s peaceful assembly and protests in late-2022 further exposed the ruling party’s flippant attitude towards democratic norms. In the BTI, the country scores -4 in free and fair elections, 2 in giving people any scope to be part of the governing process, and -3 in exercising their right to assemble and express their demands (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2022). The Varieties of Democracy Participation Index ranks Bangladesh 142 (among 179 countries) with a meagre score of 0.3 (V-Dem Institute, 2023).

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In contemporary analyses of citizen engagement in public affairs, Arnstein’s work remains an essential reference point and, if applied to the Bangladesh context, this is trapped in the lower rungs of the ladder— ‘manipulation’ and ‘therapy,’ with an extremely limited scope for the people to contribute to public policy formulation or partake in deliberations and consensus building efforts. For political reasons, rather than allowing knowledgeable individuals to serve as experts, some people close to or sympathetic to the ruling party may be coopted onto advisory committees. There is no guarantee that the public’s opinions and requests will be taken seriously or lead to actual change just because they were ‘informed’ or ‘consulted.’ As theorized by Arnstein (1969), this is mere ‘tokenism.’ Misdirected political intents or misinterpretation of what public engagement means in a democratic system stifle progress toward actual participation. For instance, Bangladesh scores only 13 (out of 100) in the public’s participation at various phases of the budget process. It is below the global average (14) and well below that of neighboring Nepal (24). Scores are also low for budget oversight (39) and transparency (39). There are no ‘open budget sessions’ in which citizens can weigh in even though there is some scope for ‘pre-budget deliberations’ at the ministry level and parliament (IBP, 2021). Most public forums on national issues are organized by non-government think tanks and civil society organizations (CSOs), some of which are also distinctly partisan. While national participation is low, opportunities for citizens to participate in development at the local level arose following decentralization in the early 1980s. However, due to social, political, and institutional factors, neither positive devolution of power nor genuine participation has occurred, despite some initiatives aimed at including women in local government (Huq, 2014; Panday, 2019). Collaboration and Networking: Still Sprouting As mentioned in the introductory chapter, collaboration and networking can help increase openness, accountability, and public confidence in government by bringing together diverse groups of people from the public and private sectors as well as CSOs to forge consensus on how best to develop and implement policies. However, in Bangladesh, inter-agency, public-private, and public-CSO collaboration has not gained traction, or its scope is constrained. Lack of seriousness on the part of both public administrators and others has stymied efforts to convene multiple stakeholders (public agencies, CSOs, academics, general public) to obtain their

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policy inputs or giving them the opportunity to frame proposals on key issues for the government’s consideration. No strategies exist for developing productive, collaborative, and negotiating procedures. Similarly, the enabling environment for co-creation, co-production, and circular subsidiarity is not nearly as developed as it should be. Consequently, the role of citizens in producing public value by enhancing publicly preferred results is lessened (see, Loeffler & Bovaird, 2021). Nevertheless, there have been very few examples of non-hierarchical networked collaboration at the national level in Bangladesh, the most prominent being the partnerships between international and local non-­ governmental organization in different sectors, such as in education, health, social work, family planning, and microfinance. However, there is little evidence of grassroots co-creation in agriculture, networked micro-­ franchising in poverty alleviation, or institutional collaboration in disaster mitigation and recovery efforts (Kabir, 2021; Ullah et al., 2006; Lawson-­ Lartego & Mathiassen, 2021; Mohibbullah et  al. 2021; Osman et  al., 2015). While these initiatives do not demonstrate a significant impact on the effectiveness of OG in the country, they do indicate that collaborative enterprise and network building have been occurring. Inclusive Policymaking: Restricted Scope A trustworthy governing environment requires credible information, strong public interest judgements, and ethical behavior from competent people to achieve inclusive outcomes. Policies that seek to maximize participation from the general public can help government function more efficiently. Historically, policymaking in Bangladesh has traditionally been a top-down, government-only responsibility, with most decisions being made by bureaucrats at the direction of the country’s president or prime minister, often bypassing prescribed procedures for formulating, adopting, and enforcing policies (Chowdhury, 2003). This has been despite the existence of a constitutional and legal framework and a number of other official documents (such as the 5-year plans and development strategies) that provide general directions for policy agendas and the approach to formulating and implementing policies. The country’s Constitution and several national strategies are explicit about the importance of placing the people at the center of public policies, protecting the public interest and enabling a governance regimen for people’s welfare but policy design,

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adoption, and execution are devoid of any meaningful engagement of the citizens. While some inroads have been made in improving the policy process in recent years, it is still heavily eschewed towards an institutional-procedural policy process that is overly mechanistic in style. Both political institutions (executive, parliament, parties, judiciary, bureaucracy) and extra-political bodies (non- and quasi-governmental organizations, research institutions) are specified as policy stakeholders, but apparently their roles are not objective. Parliament is highly partisan, dominated by members of the ruling party; opposition parties have been rendered virtually irrelevant by the excesses of the ruling party; the judiciary continues to be influenced by the executive; the bureaucracy is deeply politicized; and, most disturbingly, the executive is determined to push its political agenda with the help of generalist administrators with specialists or professionals serving as mere onlookers (Shahan & Khair, 2018; Zafarullah, 2007). Arguably, the government has relinquished its policymaking control to the international organizations, and the participation of civil society in the policymaking process is either restricted or manipulated. Interest groups and think tanks are rarely given a forum in which to debate policy issues (Zafarullah, 2003). A survey found that the policy process is stifled, among other things, by lack of political commitment, conditionalities imposed by the donor community (World Bank, International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organizations, etc.) and a system of rules that hinders rather than facilitates effective policymaking (Aminuzzaman, 2013). Overall, in terms of ‘civic participation’ Bangladesh has fared poorly, placed by the World Justice Project in the ‘bottom tercile’ with a low score of 0.30. (Advanced countries score around 0.80) (WJP, 2022). In the E-Participation Index, Bangladesh ranks 75 of 193 countries with a very low score of 0.5227, but is showing signs of improvement (United Nations, 2022a). Extremely limited opportunities for citizen participation (via consultation and feedback) in the policymaking process have reduced the possibility of diversity of opinion and, consequently, diminished public awareness of matters of national importance. In a climate of citizen apathy in public policy, transparency has been blurred, accountability weakened, and the quality of governance has declined. Interestingly, the extent of citizen participation at the local level is notable and helped improve delivery of public services. By contrast, in the national policy process, citizens and civil society are hardly accepted as partners. One of the key factors why

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Bangladesh scores low in the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness Index is the absence of inclusivity in making sound policy decisions. Technology: Slow Growth Transparency, accountability, citizen-state engagement, equity, and access to public services are all areas where ICT may aid OG in its mission. While in Bangladesh citizens’ presence in the policy spectrum is hardly visible, the extensive use of ICT has, to some extent, improved governance practices, narrowed the citizen-state hiatus, and bridged the digital divide through gradual transformation of the informatization process. The communications network has been expanding, albeit gradually, to cater for high-speed digital data transfers via the Internet and smart phones operated by both public and private providers. With the goal of creating “Smart Bangladesh” by 2041, the government launched the ‘a2i’ or ‘access to information’ program whose goal is for all citizens to take advantage of cutting-edge, long-term digital solutions. Following on from an ICT Policy and a statute, a national portal encompassing ministries and agencies began delivering e-services using a digital accelerator, a national digital architecture along with an e-­government interoperability framework, and a blockchain platform connected the public with the state, and the state with the private sector and business concerns. The national portal serves as a hub enabling people and businesses not only to access information on a variety of tasks performed and services extended by state agencies, but also as a conduit to interact with them and transact services (For different types of services provided, see Siddiquee, 2016). UNDP, the World Bank along with other international bodies have funded and provided technical support for several of these projects. The United Nations E-Government Development Index (EGDI) assesses a country’s e-government status and effectiveness in delivering public services. It is a composite index based on the weighted average of three indices—Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII) measuring telecommunication infrastructure readiness (the number of personal computer, internet, landline, and mobile phone users), Human Capital Index (HCI) measuring adult literacy rate, primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment ratio, expected years of schooling, and average years of schooling, and Online Service Index (OSI) that covers online service delivery

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(including OG data, e-participation, multi-channel service delivery, mobile services, usage uptake, and digital divides) (United Nations, 2022b). As one of the ‘starter’ nations, in 2020, Bangladesh with a score of 30 ranks 73rd in the Global Connectivity Index, which is determined, among other variables, on the state of the ICT infrastructure, cloud investment and digital transformation (GCI, 2020). Despite some limitations in telecommunications infrastructure development, Bangladesh is at the top of the high EGDI group because of its notable success in advancing e-­government development. Its EGDI score is 0.563 based on subindex values: OSI (score-90.6521), HCI (score-0.5900), and TII (score-0.4469) (ibid). The Portulans Institute’s Network Readiness Index, based on (a) the level of technology, (b) people’s access to technology, resources, and skills, c) governance (regulation, digital inclusion) and impact on society and wellbeing indicates a poor outcome for Bangladesh—ranked 102 among 104 countries with ‘future readiness’ score of just 24.02, well below the global average. In terms of digital infrastructure and digital usage it performs poorly (Portulans Institute, 2022). Although Bangladesh has done better than some of her South Asian neighbors (Pakistan and Nepal) in making headways in using ICT in government, it still has a long way to go in sophisticating the technology and improving interoperability mechanisms to enable seamless communication and data processing between and within public agencies. Broadband coverage being limited and mobile network sluggish, the internet penetration rate is less than 32%. Slow fixed and cellular internet connection speed makes it difficult for users to connect or maintain connectivity to e-services (Kemp, 2022; Fanfalone, 2015). The majority of the people do not have access to computers/laptops or smartphones that restricts their connectivity. Internet value (speed relative to affordability) in Bangladesh is very low (just 0.0105) as citizens overpay for the poor-quality service they receive. According to the Surfshark’s ‘Internet Value Index,’ the country ranks 83rd globally and 26th in Asia which is a barrier to implementing the e-government initiative (Surfshark, 2023). The OG project is affected by these limitations in e-government. While it is undeniable that the Internet is an indispensable source for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, it is not affordable to the citizens of Bangladesh.

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Open Government Data: Still Embryonic Open Data provides the public with information in a variety of formats. On the Bangladesh government portal encompassing ministries, departments, and statutory bodies a lot of data and information float around and are made accessible to the public. However, there is an absence of the openness and obligation expected of a government. The political benefits of OG, such as openness and accountability, are not obvious in what they contain or how much they fully disclose, leaving the public to surmise. In Bangladesh, datasets from several ministries and departments have been publicly available since 2016 under the a2i initiative. The national portal was expected to serve as a one-step hub making government data from an array of social and economic sectors easily accessible to citizens mainly for information and promoting innovation and research (GoB, 2016, 2022). Datasets were thought to play a vital role in building public trust beyond just increasing transparency and accountability. Bangladesh’s open data framework, however, has not lived up to expectations. Data needs to be easily comprehensible to those using them. There are no open data champions among the senior ranks in public administration to provide authoritative directions. Thus, the Open Government Data Strategy, largely because of the lack of a solid policy and legal framework, is proving difficult to operationalize. Even though the supply-side for high-value data transactions is relatively robust, the demand-side lags. Some agencies have a strong sense of ownership and make their own ICT decisions, whereas others are excessively reticent about releasing data, and still others are concerned about the lack of cutting-­edge data analytics. There is a wealth of valuable data locked away in government databases but not published in a machine-readable format rendering them useless in many situations. In inter-agency exchanges, high-value, disaggregated data is frequently inaccessible because direct access is not always available. The public is often confused by outdated information on government websites, which are also not updated regularly (World Bank, 2020a, b).

Freedom to Access and Use Information The return of democracy in the early 1990s ushered in a period of widespread optimism that the newly elected leadership would govern in the best interests of the nation. However, despite some initiatives by the two

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ruling parties (1991–2007, 2009–present) and a caretaker administration (2007–2008) to consolidate governance, dilemmas persist, and the quality of governance has been fluctuating across the various indicators. Bangladesh scored in the negative on all sub-indices of the World Bank’s Governance Index between 1996 and 2021. The percentile value in the ‘Government Effectiveness Index,’ which measures quality of public services, civil service management, nature of the policy process and a government’s commitment towards continuous improvement, was -0.75 with a minimum of -0.94 points in 2004 and a maximum of -0.49 points in 1998. Points scored in other indices gave been similarly low—‘Control of Corruption Index’ (-1.07), ‘Regulatory Quality Index’ (-0.94), and ‘Voice and Accountability Index’ (-0.48). Freedom House has given an average score of 5 to Bangladesh in its ‘Political Rights Index’ and 5 points for in Civil Liberties Index’ for 2020 (Global Economy, 2022). Digital surveillance under the DSA has the effect of silencing and criminalizing citizen criticism of the government, its policies, and actions. Their efforts at exposing government culpability and demanding accountability are stifled. This has impacted efforts to combat corruption. Like most authoritarian regimes worldwide, Bangladesh has been honing their cyber-surveillance technologies, and free expression has been further hampered by vicious online harassment by government-backed trolls (Mahmud, 2021). TI’s ‘Corruption Perception Index’ indicates a low score of 26 and a global ranking of 147 (Transparency International, 2022). A fairly high percentage (72%) of surveyed citizens concur that corruption is a major problem in the country and has been on the rise (40%). Personal connections do matter in obtaining services (22%) and the more corrupt institutions include local government, the police, and the prime minister’s office among many (Transparency International, 2020). The Open Data Barometer (ODB), which reveals the presence and effect of open data initiatives worldwide, ranked Bangladesh in 2017 at 93 with an overall score of 11 among 115 countries—32 for readiness; 6 for implementation; and 2 for impact. The Open Data Inventory ranks Bangladesh at 142 (of 193 countries) with fairly low coverage and openness scores—43 and 34 (out of 100) respectively (Open Data Watch, 2022). Bangladesh’s below-average performance in adhering to the principles of the International Open Data Charter indicates that much work remains to be done to meet the aspirational standards of making government data accessible to the public via open platforms. The released

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datasets are insufficient in quantity and quality, as the Open Data Inventory indicates (Ibid). The Information Commission, an independent statutory body created shortly after the RTI Act was enacted, serves a very limited purpose in advancing transparency in the country. With its primary responsibility of issuing directives and providing guidelines for enhancing information access, it has been unable to fulfill its mandated research function, and its complaints resolution activities have been impeded by regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles. Surprisingly, it keeps a lot of its own business under wraps, reports on a limited set of metrics making progress tentative. Administrative and financial dependence on the government severely erodes its autonomy and its early flurry of public awareness events has somewhat slowed down (Bari & Naz, 2016; bdnews24, 2014; Itekharuzzaman, 2010). An investigative report discovered that individuals who submit RTI requests often encounter hostile responses from government officials who may use various tactics, such as threatening the applicants to withdraw their request, acting rudely towards them, falsely claiming that the information sought is exempt, or expressing indifference and transferring the request to another unit. Such behavior by government officials illustrates the difficulty citizens face in gaining access to information and highlights the need for greater protections for RTI users (Bari & Naz, 2022). The Information Commission, it is argued, has not done what it ought to have in terms of fulfilling its responsibilities, as its actions and efforts have not inspired confidence among citizens that their needs will be met. It has, for the most part, been unsuccessful in convincing stakeholders to take on a proactive leadership position (Bari, 2015). Almost 24 years after the RTI law was passed, the Information Commission still complains about a lack of personnel and infrastructure, a lack of awareness of the right to information among the general public, a lack of transparency in the appeals process, a reluctance on the part of public agencies to voluntarily disclose information and implement citizen charters, and so on (BIC, 2020). Its web portal is not updated regularly; for instance, the annual reports for 2021 and 2022 are missing, although it is obligated to provide these to the public, and the 2020 report was uploaded in June 2022. It has not conducted any research or surveys on issues related to transparency or RTI implementation, but instead spends money on publishing newsletters and colorful souvenirs of events.

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Public integrity, another pillar of OG, has faced ongoing challenges. Corruption is a widespread problem that continues to erode citizens’ trust in the government and public institutions, and this has been exacerbated by the government’s general lack of transparency and accountability. Nonetheless, apart from being the concern of the political leadership at the helms, public integrity is handled by a constitutional body—Anti-­ Corruption Commission (ACC) guided by the Anti-Corruption Act. The National Integrity Strategy (NIS) is a comprehensive framework for improving the performance of state and non-state institutions through increased accountability, transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness (GoB, 2008). It aims to institutionalize and implement effective public and private sector practices, legislative instruments, and administrative measures (GoB, 2012; Cabinet Division, 2013). Apart from these, the anti-­ corruption legal framework in Bangladesh is defined by a large body of legislation, administrative rules and procedures, and other instruments. However, political influence and direct interference in the administration of justice have hampered their application, resulting in a lack of impartiality and fairness in decision-making. The movement for FOI in Bangladesh began in the 1980s but was concentrated in the capital with no roots in the people. Openness was first proposed as a value by the civil society elite and the journalism community. Initially, the movement was not vigorous enough to influence the rhetoric of openness, accountability, and participation, nor were these tied to fundamental liberties, citizen agency, and inputs into government processes. The Press Council representing journalists, editors, newspaper publishers, and associated groups took the lead by advocating a law ensuring citizen’s access to information. Early in the new millennium, non-­ governmental organizations (NGOs), the print and electronic media, the academic community, and politicians joined journalists on an expanded platform to demand more openness. The average citizens were apathetic, not fully abreast of this right. The Law Commission argued that citizens’ access to information was crucial for redressing wrong decisions that violated their basic liberties or were detrimental to their welfare. It proposed a law that would guarantee the public’s access to governmental records, allow citizens to use them to hold officials accountable for their actions, and encourage officials to be more transparent and forthcoming with information to the public (BLC, 2003). Although the government took a huge step forward by enacting the RTI Act in 2009, it has subsequently demonstrated an astonishing lack of

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motivation to really implement it. Thirteen years down the track, enforcement has been constrained by bureaucratic snarls, wanton formality, and routine and an apathetic mindset. Its effects were minimal, with 80% or more of the population being unaware of its existence (World Bank, 2020a, b). Several government ministries and public agencies have been lethargic in updating their websites or publishing their annual reports (Rahman, 2021). The initial enthusiasm of the Information Commission in proactively disclosing an array of information and managing a well-organized website quickly evaporated. Tasked with enforcing the RTI Act and overseeing its operations, it has shown a lack of initiative and openness in carrying out this obligation. There is a mindset issue within government institutions that makes proactive information disclosure and dissemination extremely difficult. Journalists, as well, have a hard time gaining access to information kept by public or private agencies because of abuse and flaws in the Act. There is no serious effort to strengthen local government transparency or encourage proactive disclosure of information at the lower levels, where the information need is significantly greater (Baroi, 2017; Bari & Naz, 2022; Hossain, 2020). In Bangladesh, several impediments prevent the effective enforcement of the right to information law. Many citizens are unaware of their right to access government information, and even if they are, they may not know what to do if their requests are denied. Additionally, many government entities do not proactively disclose information, and requests are often arbitrarily denied by officials citing exceptions and exemptions. Government personnel may also lack the necessary training or resources to respond to RTI requests. Political interference in the RTI process is also not uncommon, with authorities refusing to release data on controversial issues. All of these factors have made it difficult to enforce the right to information in the country and gain the public’s trust in the process. FOI challenges and issues can be addressed by the combined efforts of the government, civil society, the media, and the general public. Increasing public understanding of the RTI Act, tightening enforcement, encouraging proactive disclosure, reviewing and revising exemptions and exceptions, removing political interference, and providing adequate resources for public bodies to manage RTI requests can all contribute to strengthening the FOI regime.

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Conclusion For OG to become a reality and for the FOI regime to be effective, it is important to develop strategies for improving transparency, accountability, citizen participation, and collaboration across sectors and organizations. Also, deepening the focus on citizen-centric public services, anti-corruption measures, inclusive policymaking, and the use of innovative and responsible technology would contribute to building and upkeeping sound governance. Easy access to and use of information would be essential for promoting a functional democracy enabling citizens to hold their government liable for its actions and facilitating their participation in policymaking. In Bangladesh, while positive steps toward digitizing government services and establishing digital portals for public access to government information demonstrate the government’s commitment to change, challenges hinder progress. The implementation of the RTI law has been sluggish, and widespread corruption and a lack of accountability in government institutions are not uncommon. The law fails to cover private entities or provide adequate protection for whistleblowers, which limits its effectiveness. Fears about smooth accessibility and quality of services, particularly in rural areas, abound. The Information Commission as the curator of the law has been less than effective in fulfilling its obligations, while the Anti-­ Corruption Commission has been remiss in its mandated pursuit for probity. Both entities are captives of political influence and bureaucratic formalism. Concerns also persist about media independence and restrictions on freedom of expression. Attacks on the press and those working for human rights are common, as are threats of physical abuse. Effective governing needs the inclusion of civil society, the private sector, and other stakeholders in the policymaking process and strengthened coordination among various state agencies to ensure efficient policy implementation. Fifty years and more since independence, democracy and governance keep teetering in Bangladesh. Consistent action from the state, civil society, and non-state sectors is critical  to increase openness and accountability, reduce corruption, and protect human rights in the country.

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CHAPTER 13

Quest for Democratic Governance in Nepal: The Relevance of Governance Legitimacy and Capacity Ishtiaq Jamil and Narendra Raj Paudel

Introduction Nepal is a landlocked Himalayan country of around 30 million people and one of the most diverse South Asian countries in terms of multiple ethnicity, religions and caste groups, languages, and geography (Lawoti, 2014: 131; Worldometer, 2020). In the last three decades, Nepal has experienced a number of political developments: The Maoists have ceased their armed struggle, the king has been dethroned, and a multi-party system of government has replaced monarchism. The country’s official Hindu status was revoked in 2006—it is now a secular state. After becoming a republic

I. Jamil (*) University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway e-mail: [email protected] N. R. Paudel Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_13

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in 2008, two constituent assembly elections were held twice in 2008 and 2013 elected 601 representatives in order to draft the constitution. After the promulgation of the new constitution in 2015, two general elections were held in 2017, and 2022 for House of Representatives, and the last election held in 2022 elected the 275 members (both directly elected and elected via party-list proportional representation system) to the Protinidhi Sabha (House of Representatives). In 2015, Nepal opted for a federal structure replacing the unitary system of government (Gyawali, 2018). These changes and political developments are ushering a ‘new’ Nepal. Under pressure from the Maoists and other marginalized and ethnic groups, the state has created avenues for more power sharing and representations from various ethnic groups (Lawoti, 2014: 133–134). However, in this country with huge variations, the challenges to democracy and inclusive governance remain daunting, given the legacy of elitism and high caste dominance in public offices (Jamil, 2019). The concept of open government (OG) is highly relevant for a country as diverse as Nepal where democratic governance opens for an inclusive and quality government. OG is associated with transparent, inclusive, responsive, participatory, and trustworthy governance that delivers public services following the ambition and needs of its citizenry. Bringing all of these characteristics of good government or democratic governance under one umbrella, which is largely enabled by emerging technologies such as social media, received renewed interest and attention while President Obama was in office, when he issued a Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, calling on his administration to develop recommendations that would “establish a system of transparency, public participation, and collaboration” (White House, 2009). From an academic and practical point of view, the issue is how to bring this concept into practice, especially in the context of developing countries. This chapter analyzes OG initiatives in Nepal after its transition to democracy from monarchism in 2006 (Lawoti, 2005) and from unitary to federal system of governance in 2015 (Gyawali, 2018). The major objective of this chapter is to analyze the development of OG, i.e., democratic governance as we refer to here, and the factors that explain this development. The study is based on citizens’ perception of the development of democratic governance in Nepal and what citizens perceive as factors that affect it. Our point of departure is that such development depends on two major factors—‘governance of legitimacy’ and ‘governance of capacity’ (Christensen et al., 2016; Christensen & Lægreid,

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2020a, b). In this chapter, our objectives are, first, to map the level of citizens’ evaluation of democratic governance in Nepal. Second, we investigate how citizens assess government capacity and legitimacy and whether these assessments influence their assessment of democratic governance. Although Christensen et  al. (2016) developed and applied these two dimensions of governance, namely, legitimacy and capacity, in crisis management in the aftermath of the Corona Pandemic in Norway, we argue that these two concepts are relevant and equally applicable in the context of OG and democratic governance, particularly in the context of developing countries such as Nepal, which has recently passed through and is still coping with various socio-ecosystem crises.

Open Government The OG concept is not new. Rather, it is an assemblage of different concepts related to democracy and good governance. From the literature, the concept of OG denotes diverse meanings. Some refer to OG as ‘freedom of information,’ anticorruption, and transparency, while others to transparency, participation, and collaborative government as open government (Nam, 2012; Reddick & Ganapati, 2011). Grimmelikhuijsen and Feeney (2017: 580) distinguish three dimensions of OG: accessibility (‘access’), transparency (‘government information’), and participation (‘decision-­ making arenas’). According to Maijer et al., OG denotes transparency and participation, while Wirtz and Birkmeyer (2015: 12) define open government in more integrative ways, such as a multilateral, political and social process, which includes transparent, collaborative, and participatory action by government and administration. To meet these conditions, citizens and social groups should be integrated into political processes with the support of modern information and communication technologies, which together should improve the effectiveness and efficiency of governmental and administrative action. According to OECD (2009), open government refers to the transparency of public sector actions, the accessibility of public sector information, and public sector responsiveness to third parties. (OECD, 2009)

We explain OG initiatives in the context of Nepal through two groups of independent variables, one denoting the legitimacy of governance, referred to as input legitimacy, and the other as governance capacity or output legitimacy (Christensen et al., 2016).

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What we bring to the table is a citizen-centric analysis of democracy’s progress in Nepal: What factors do citizens evaluate as crucial in the development of democratic governance? The methodology to support our research objectives has been quantitative to increase the external validity of the research across Nepal.

Explaining Democratic Governance: A Theoretical Discussion Nepalese citizens’ perceptions of democratic government serve as our point of departure. The development of democratic governance denotes transitions from traditional governance mechanisms based on hierarchy and central authoritarian system to more inclusive, responsive, transparent, decentralized, participatory, and OG (Bevir, 2010). In other words, democratic governance can be equated with good governance. According to the World Bank, good governance refers primarily to standard liberal democratic practices and norms: representative and responsible government, the rule of law, and an absence of corruption (Bevir, 2006, p. 466). Citizens’ evaluations are based on what is expected and what is accepted. Here performance is assessed based on government capacity; how effectively the required services for citizens are produced. How responsive are governments to wicked issues such as unemployment, corruption, crime, etc. On the other hand, acceptability is based on how and in what ways the services are produced and delivered, and whether actions by governments maintain democratic norms, rights, and privileges of citizens. According to Christensen and Lægreid (2020a) and Christensen et al. (2016), governance is not only about a government’s capacity to address societal demand and aspirations but also about the extent to which the measures that are introduced are accepted and legitimated by citizens. If government authorities have legitimacy, this encourages people to trust them and follow advice and instructions more readily. Let us, therefore, examine governance capacity and performance and governance legitimacy in greater detail. Governance (Output) Capacity and Performance Governance capacity is concerned with output (Christensen et al., 2016), the extent to which a government can meet socio-economic challenges and deliver quality services to satisfy its citizenry. We categorize governance

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capacity into four broad, but interdependent types: a) efficiency and promptness of civil servants as assessed by citizens; b) providing satisfactory day-to-day services such as water and electric supply, sewage and sanitation, infrastructure building and maintenance, garbage collection, etc.—labelled as called policy performance; c) responding to wicked issues such as unemployment, corruption, crime, pollution and environment hazards, etc.—or policy responsiveness; and d) managing both natural and human-made crisis such as flood, earthquake, tsunami, disease and epidemics, transportation hazards, etc.—referred to as crisis management capacity. Governance capacity is, therefore, linked to the quality of government in delivering required and quality services to the people (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In governance, the defining characteristics for good quality of government also apply: The relevant public sectors must be trustworthy, reliable, impartial, non-corrupt, and competent (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2012; Dahlberg & Holmberg, 2014). Good quality of government includes both the governance process and the outputs of that process. The output includes policy decisions and performance that ensure service delivery to people, especially when they are in need. When a government possesses such qualities, it can produce effective policies to deliver necessary services to the people in need. Governance (Input) Legitimacy According to Suchman (1995, p.  574), legitimacy is “the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Scholars consider it an integral component of political support that also includes identification, trust, satisfaction, and engagement (Easton, 1975). Therefore, the legitimacy of a government is measured by the extent of citizens’ support of the authorities and public institutions (Eckstein, 1961). Similarly, a government or public authority is legitimate if it rightfully holds and exercises political power (Gilley, 2009: 3), and it is the citizens who assess the legitimacy of their government. Governance legitimacy, sometimes referred to as input legitimacy, is concerned with whether a government’s policy responses are delivered in a legal, accepted, expected, transparent, and accountable manner. The legitimacy of governance is more ensured if this is based on the quality of democracy that includes citizens’ trust, participation, equality, and impartiality.

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The quality of democracy is measured by the extent of a government’s responsiveness to public demand and accountability for its political actions (Scharpf, 1997). In a democracy, political decisions must be based on the ‘will of the people,’ so that government actions are well accepted by all (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004, p. 4). Here, we measure legitimacy based on the level of democracy and other indicators that reflect that will. The quality of democracy also depends on the levels of fairness and corruption in the government (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In terms of democratic governance, the issue of legitimacy based on accountable and transparent governance is crucial. At the same time, citizens’ trust in government institutions is vital for the legitimacy of governance. Another related condition of legitimacy is the level of the government’s commitment towards public need. People assess the legitimacy of various public institutions, considering the extent to which they are committed enough to mitigate citizens’ misery.

Development of Democratic Governance in Nepal Nepal has been under feudal and authoritarian rule for more than 200 years, and Hindu religious and caste values have been practiced strictly and widely. This has resulted in lower castes and non-Hindu groups being marginalized and impoverished. In Nepal, everyone knows what caste and ethnic group one belongs to. As a fact of life, it is taken for granted that everyone has a caste or ethnic identity (Gellner, 2007: 1823). Political parties advocating for neutrality and more representation are dominated by Hill-Hindus and influenced by a Hill-Hindu culture. Their presence and domination are well-marked in bureaucracy, political parties, and civil society (Lawoti, 2014: 142). The Nepalese Constitution of 1990 established multi-party democracy and recognized the rights and privileges of all religions, ethnic groups, and women. However, it was also ambiguous and contradictory because it declared Nepal a Hindu state that would maintain and preserve all traditional practices. Women were barred from passing on their citizenship to their children. As such, the gendered, linguistic, religious—and ethnically-based discrimination and marginalization have continued. Despite the abolition of caste-based discrimination in 1963, hierarchies in the caste system are integral to the Hindu religion. The ethos of religious and cultural values is still important in everyday life, influencing relationships between castes, religious and ethnic groups, men

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and women, juniors and seniors, rich and poor, and between rural and urban people. Historically, caste or Jat has been a decisive factor for one’s status in the social hierarchy as well as for the choice of profession. One is born into a context, and mobility between castes is impossible. Accordingly, higher social functions, such as the performance of religious rituals, have been reserved for upper caste people—the Brahmins (Bahun). Political and administrative positions have been reserved for the next ranking caste—the Chetris or the warrior caste. Below them is the caste of merchants called Vaishaya. Menial work and craft-related occupations are traditionally specified for people with lower ranks in the caste system—called Sudra. During the Rana era, Kathmandu-based Bahuns and Newars (an indigenous community) monopolized bureaucracy and marginalized other ethnic and caste-based communities (Riaz & Basu, 2010: 104). Political and administrative elites (even during the Maoist movement, most leaders were from the higher caste) belong to the upper caste; hence the formulation and implementation of inclusive policies have seldom been entertained, despite provisions for consulting with the less advantaged groups. To illustrate: There are provisions in Nepalese law stating that Dalits and other socially excluded groups should be allowed to contribute to the formation of government policies regarding education, rural roads, health, and forestry, but as Sigdel and Sharma have found, “these have not been effectively implemented so far.” The “most disadvantaged and excluded groups have been women, Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, Muslims, Madhesis, indigenous nationalities and those people who are living in remote areas” (ibid.). These people consequently remain politically underrepresented. Because they cannot take advantage of development opportunities, they remain in poverty. Women, of course, cut across all groups. Despite constituting half of the population and contributing to 60% of agricultural outputs, they only own 8% of the land. Nepal’s bureaucracy has traditionally been dominated by Hindu Bahuns, and the caste still has hegemony over top bureaucratic positions. Policies on inclusive governance in Nepal have been formulated by higher caste people who have not adequately consulted with those the policies are meant to serve. It is, therefore, interesting to analyze how citizens perceive democratic governance in Nepal and what factors explain its development.

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Method of Inquiry The method applied for analysis is quantitative and data for this study was derived from the Governance and Trust Survey (GTS) funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) as part of the Norwegian Programme for Capacity Development in Higher Education and Research for Development. The GTS had three rounds (2008/09, 2014/15, and 2019/20) that covered three countries: Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. We use data for Nepal from the last round (2020) because it maps and provides up-to-date citizens’ evaluations of democratic governance and its determinants, i.e., governance legitimacy and governance capacity. The survey had a representative sample at the country level with a sample size of 2254 respondents conducted in 28 municipalities (rural and urban) in 25 districts (out of 77 districts) covering all 7 provinces and the 3 ecological regions of Terai, Hill, and Mountains. A group of academics, experts, researchers from the Department of Public Administration, Tribhuvan University, Nepal, in close collaboration with the University of Bergen, Norway, North South University, Bangladesh, and University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, were responsible for data collection. The database has contributed to several scientific studies—articles in peer-reviewed journals, reports, and policy briefs. The dependent variable for the current study is ‘democratic Governance’ in Nepal measured by two questions: ‘Are you satisfied/dissatisfied with the way democracy is developing in your country?’ (Coded as 1, meaning ‘very dissatisfied’ and 10 as ‘very satisfied’), and ‘People have different views about the system for governing this country. Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today?’ (Coded as 1 ‘very bad’ and 10 as ‘very good’). These two variables are merged to create an additive index, where 1 denotes ‘very bad and highly dissatisfied’ and 10 signifies ‘very good and highly satisfied’ with democratic governance in Nepal. The independent variables are categorized into two clusters, one representing ‘governance legitimacy’ and the other ‘governance capacity.’ We use four indicators to measure each cluster. Governance legitimacy is measured by the survey items related to a) right to information, measured by the question ‘Are you satisfied with the way the right to information in the country is upheld by public institutions? (Coded as 1, meaning ‘very dissatisfied’ and 10 as ‘very satisfied,’ b) trust in key public institutions, such as parliament, civil service, political parties, judiciary (higher and lower

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courts), the police, and central, provincial, and local governments measured by the question ‘I am going to name a number of organizations and institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them.’ Coded as 4, meaning ‘a great deal of confidence,’ 3 meaning ‘quite a lot of confidence,’ 2 meaning ‘not very much confidence,’ and 4 meaning ‘none at all.’ All these are merged to form an index measuring institutional trust, c) trustworthiness of public employees, based on a question where citizens were asked to evaluate civil servants on a number of variables such as to what extent ‘they serve their personal interests instead of that of the citizens, are friendly, difficult to get access to, reliable, treat all equally, not fully aware of their duties/responsibilities, resort to favoritism/informal relations/Act on Afno Manche (one’s own people), discharge their duties on the basis of established rules, procedures and norms, and honest and always tell the truth.’ Coded as 1 meaning ‘strongly disagree,’ 2 meaning ‘quite disagree,’ 3 meaning ‘partly agree,’ and 4 meaning ‘strongly agree.’ These are coded and recoded to match the positive and negative statements to a uniform scale, and thereafter an additive index is created to measure ‘trustworthiness’ and d) corruption among political leaders and government officials, based on the question ‘How many politicians, civil servants, and the police are involved in corruption.’ Coded as 1 meaning ‘none,’ 2 meaning ‘just a few,’ 3 meaning ‘some,’ 4 meaning ‘quite many,’ and 5 meaning ‘everyone.’ An index is created to measure the level of corruption in the country. Governance capacity is measured by four survey items, a) promptness and efficiency of civil servants, measured by a direct question asked to citizens about the extent of efficiency displayed by civil servants. Coded as 1 meaning ‘strongly disagree,’ 2 meaning ‘quite disagree,’ 3 meaning ‘partly agree,’ and 4 meaning ‘strongly agree,’ b) policy capacity, i.e., citizens’ evaluation of a number of public services and their improvements in the last 5 years, such as education (schools, colleges, and universities), health care, law and order, infrastructure development and maintenance (roads, highways, sewage, garbage collection, water, electricity, and energy supply, ICT development, public transport, and agriculture and animal husbandry development. Coded as 1 meaning ‘very bad,’ 2 meaning ‘bad,’ 3 meaning ‘not bad not good,’ 4 meaning ‘good,’ and 5 ‘very good.’ Several indices are created to measure different policy capacities,) policy responsiveness, i.e., citizens’ evaluation of a number of wicked issues (reducing poverty, checking crime, ensuring peoples’ safety and security, generating employment, checking pollution and environmental hazard, mitigating

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climate change, checking corruption, controlling human trafficking, human resource development for overseas employment, improving gender equality/women empowerment). Coded as 1 meaning ‘did not succeed at all,’ 2 meaning ‘did not quite succeed,’ 3 meaning ‘neither succeeded nor failed,’ 4 meaning ‘succeeded quite well,’ and 5 meaning ‘succeeded very well.’ An index is created based on 12 variables to measure ‘policy responsiveness’ to wicked issue, and d) management of crisis situations based on the question ‘To what extent do you think the government is capable of handling the following disasters and crisis?’ These are citizens assessment of governance capacity in coping with natural and manmade disasters. These are natural disaster (tsunami, flood, landslide, soil erosion, earthquake, etc.), accidents (fire, collapsing of buildings, etc.), disease and epidemics (cholera, diarrhea, dengue, malaria, etc.), violence (gender/ethnicity/religion-based violence). Coded as 1 meaning ‘very inefficient,’ 2 meaning ‘quite inefficient,’ 3 meaning ‘both,’ 4 meaning ‘quite efficient,’ and 5 meaning ‘very efficient.’ An index is created to represent Crisis Management. In addition, we used some socio-­ demographic variables as control variables. These are gender, age, educational qualification, and religion (Table 13.1).

Table 13.1  Descriptive statistics of socio-demographic variables Socio-demographic variables Gender (% distribution)  Female  Male Age (mean) (range 18–98) Religion (% distribution)  Hindu  Buddhist  Muslim  Christian Education (% distribution)  Illiteracy   Read and write only  Primary   Lower/higher secondary  Graduation/post-graduation

Descriptive statistics 48 52 38.69 86 07 05 02 10 11 06 48 25 N = 2256

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Data Analysis and Discussions We start by presenting dependent and independent variables. First, we carry out univariate analysis and after that multivariate analysis. The findings in Table 13.2 reveal that citizens are not satisfied with how democracy is developing in Nepal. A mean score of 4.83 on a 10 point scale means less satisfaction with democratic development. Similarly, citizens perceive that the system of governing is not good, a score of 4.61 testifies this fact. The index (computed by adding the above two variables—satisfaction with democracy and about system of governing in the country) score of ‘democratic governance’ is 4.72, which reveals that people perceive democracy development and system of governing below average. On a scale from 1 to 10, a score of above 5 is considered above average, which is not the case here. Second, we present the independent variables, which are grouped into two clusters—governance legitimacy and governance capacity. Table 13.3 presents descriptive statistics (only means scores) of independent variables computed into additive index. Let us present findings and our observations items wise. Governance Legitimacy Governance legitimacy is measured by 4 groups of variables—right to information, institutional trust, trustworthiness, and corruption among political leaders and public employees. Nepal enacted Right to Information (RTI) bill in 2007. However, it is observed that citizens’ perception of RTI as practiced in different public institutions in Nepal is not satisfactory. Table 13.2  Development of democratic governance in Nepal as perceived by citizens Democratic governance in Nepal

Mean

Satisfaction with democracy 4.83 Scale: 1 ‘very dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘very satisfied’ People have different views about the system for governing this country. Here 4.61 is a scale for rating how well things are going now: 1 means ‘very bad’ and 10 means ‘very good.’ Where on this scale would you put the political system as it is today? Democratic Governance (Index) 4.72 N = 2256

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Table 13.3  Determinants (independent variables) of democratic governance as perceived by citizens (Survey items, coding, and variable name) Item details

Coding

Variable name

Mean

Governance legitimacy (a) Are you satisfied with the way the right to information in the country is upheld by public institutions? (b) Confidence you have in parliament, civil service, political parties, judiciary, the police, the tax office, and central, provincial, and local governments (10 items)

1=very dissatisfied 10 =very satisfied 1=no confidence at all 4=A great Deal of confidence 1 = strongly disagree 4 = strongly agree

Right to information

4.97

Institutional trust (index)

2.81

1 = none 5 = everyone

Corruption (index)

3.36

1 = strongly disagree 4 = strongly agree 1 = very bad 5 = very good

Prompt and efficient

2.35

Policy capacity (index)

3.76

(c) Trustworthiness of public employees based on whether they serve their personal interests, friendly, difficult to get access to, reliable, treat all equally, not fully aware of their duties/ responsibilities, resort to favoritism, discharge their duties lawfully and legally, and honest (10 items) (d) Corruption among politicians, civil servants, and the police (3 items) Governance capacity (a) In general, civil servants are prompt and efficient

(b) How would you describe the improvement of the following services over the last 5 years? These are education (schools, colleges, and universities), health care, law and order, infrastructure development and maintenance (roads, highways, sewage, garbage collection, water, electricity, and energy supply, ICT development, public transport, and agriculture and animal husbandry development (17 items)

Trustworthiness 2.29 (index)

(continued)

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Table 13.3 (continued) Item details

Coding

Variable name

Mean

(c) H  ow well the government has succeeded in the following areas? These are reducing poverty, checking crime, ensuring safety and security, generating employment, checking pollution and environmental hazard, mitigating climate change, checking corruption, controlling human trafficking, human resource development for overseas employment, labor welfare, improving the general economic situation, improving gender equality/women empowerment (12 items) (d) To what extent do you think the government is capable of handling the following disasters and crisis? These are natural disaster (tsunami, flood, landslide, soil erosion, earthquake, etc.), accidents (fire, collapsing of buildings, etc.), disease and epidemics (cholera, diarrhea, dengue, malaria, etc.), and violence (gender/ethnicity/religionbased violence) (4 items)

1 = did not succeed at all 5 = succeeded very well

Policy responsiveness (index)

2.47

1 = very inefficient 5 = very efficient

Crisis management capacity (index)

2.71

Access to information is a precondition for open and inclusive governance. The mean score of 4.97 (on a scale from 1 to 10) is below average, indicating that the implementation of RTI Act has been weak and inadequate as public institutions are opaque despite the fact the level of awareness of the Act in Nepal is higher than in many other South Asian countries (Article 19, 2015). Several reasons have been cited as impediments to the proper implementation of the RTI Act in Nepal. First, the people, in general, are less aware of the Act, and even those who are seldom exercise their rights, Second, there is a shortage of well-trained and competent human resources in government agencies to help implement this statute and to proactively disseminate and publish information of public importance on websites to make people aware of it and make it functional. This was visible especially in an emergency, e.g., in the aftermath of the deadly earthquake that Nepal experienced in April 2015. Third, the administrative culture of secrecy among public bodies in Nepal inhibits sharing of information, often referring to the exemptions laid down in special laws to deny access to

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information, such as the Civil Service Rules and others. Fourth, the absence of a ‘nodal agency,’ a central body responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance, has been identified as a factor that limits the success of the implementation of the law (Article 19, 2015). However, despite non-transparent public institutions, citizens’ confidence or trust in public institutions is above average. On a scale from 1 to 4, the average mean score is 2.5; therefore, the mean score of Institutional Trust (index) which is 2.81 is above average. This means citizens have some confidence in public institutions. Of the 10 institutions that citizens evaluated, political parties were the least trusted, followed by the parliament. This means that the parliament and the political parties that vie for people’s confidence are the least trusted. This is because, after the restoration of democracy in Nepal, political parties have been involved in quarrels and blame games, curtailing the role of parliament as a forerunner of democracy and good governance. On the other hand, the most trusted institution in Nepal is local government, especially the office of the Chief District Officer (CDO) followed by the higher courts. The district is the third tier of government and there are 77 of them. Each district has its own district assembly, which in turn elects its own District Coordination Committee, which serves as the executive at the district-level. In addition, each district has a District Administration Office overseeing the general administration. The CDO is an administrative rank under the Ministry of Home Affairs in Nepal appointed by the government as the most senior executive magistrate and chief in charge of the general administration, which includes health, education, security, and other administrative tasks (Wikipedia, 2022). The findings on institutional trust are similar to what we found in earlier surveys (see Askvik et al., 2011). Another puzzle is that despite its low ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI) (Nepal’s position of 142 out of 189 countries and territories), the level of trust in public institutions is high (UNDP, 2020). When it comes to the ‘trustworthiness of civil servants,’ the mean score of 2.29 is below average, indicating that civil servants are not considered trustworthy, which again is detrimental to open and democratic governance. People have a negative impression of civil servants for many reasons: They are often perceived as unhelpful, unreliable, and inaccessible; they are often thought to be acting in their own self-interest rather than the public’s; they often fail to carry out their responsibilities in accordance with established protocols; they frequently resort to favoritism; and they

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are frequently thought to be dishonest. These findings are like earlier ones in that civil servants are not trustworthy (Jamil, 2019, p.  138; Jamil & Askvik, 2013: 158). Compared to trust in institutions, citizens place less trust in public officials. One reason could be that when asked in detail about different characteristics of a profession, people tended to have some obvious opinions about these features and responded accordingly. There is widespread corruption at the highest levels of government, including among political leaders, civil servants, and police. A score of 3.80 on a scale from 1 to 5 indicates that many of them are into corrupt activities, particularly political leaders. This may be one of the reasons that political parties generate low trust in Nepal. Corruption is widespread and extends to every sector, from the government to the judiciary, police, health services, and education. It ranked 117th among 180 countries and territories in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index of 2020 (The Kathmandu Post, 2021). Governance Capacity Governance capacity is measured by four items—promptness and efficiency of civil servants, policy capacity, policy responsiveness, and crisis management capacity. Citizens believe that civil servants’ promptness and efficiency are below average—a mean score of just 2.35. This is similar to findings on trustworthiness of civil servants that they serve their personal interests, entertain lobbying, and are not fully aware of their duties and responsibilities. A neutral and impartial civil service is necessary to implement policies unbiased but efficiently. Good governance is highly dependent on a civil service that can implement public policies and be responsive to societal needs. The following discussions focus on this aspect of policy capacity, responsiveness, and crisis management of the Nepalese government. The government’s policy capacity is measured by 17 items that include all basic services, such as education, health, infrastructure facilities, ICT, agriculture, and livestock husbandry and so on. To what extent citizens perceive that these services have been improved in the last 5 years? A mean score of 3.76 on a scale from 1 to 5 does indicate that citizens are positive about improvement of basic services. Citizens are most positive in the areas of education, health and social welfare, improvement in energy, electricity, and water supply, and development of ICT, but they are dissatisfied with sewage and sanitation, garbage removal, and agriculture extension. Day to day public services have improved in the last 5  years with few

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exceptions. The question is to what extent the government can handle wicked issues. As regards policy responsiveness or responding to wicked issues such as reducing crime, generating employment, ensuring safety and security, checking pollution and environmental hazard, mitigating climate change, controlling human trafficking, human resource development for overseas employment, labor welfare, improving the general economic situation, improving gender equality and women empowerment, the government has not succeeded much in addressing them. A mean score of 2.47 on a scale from 1 to 5 testifies that the government’s capacity to respond to these wicked issues is limited. The mean scores of all 12 items are below 3, which indicates that citizens have a low opinion of the government’s response to these issues. Citizens felt that the government performed poorly in checking corruption, reducing poverty, and generating employment. Those services which obtained high scores are women’s empowerment and gender equality programs, followed by people’s security and safety, and human resource development for overseas employment. Wicked issues are interlinked, requiring a holistic approach and intersectoral coordination at multiple levels to mitigate these. From our findings, it is evident that the wicked issues in Nepal remain a big challenge to good governance. Nepal is a landlocked and mountainous country bordering India to the south, east and west, and China to the north. Because of its unique geographic location, the country is vulnerable to natural hazards such as floods, landslides, windstorms, fires, and earthquakes (GoN MoHA, 2015; GoN NPC, 2015). Therefore, crisis management necessitates the government’s readiness to launch immediate aid and rescue operations while minimizing damage to society and people in general. Crisis happens unexpectedly and suddenly, and in this extraordinary situation, people depend more on the government and public institutions to mitigate, adapt, and initiate necessary actions to reduce the consequences and their miseries during and after the crisis. In this study, we asked citizens about the capability of the government in handling both human-made and natural disasters and crises. The findings suggest that citizens perceive the crisis management capacity of the government to be limited. A mean score of 2.71 on a scale from 1 to 5 reveals that citizens are not optimistic about the government’s capacity to handle and cope with disasters and crises. The 2015 devastating earthquake that caused serious damage to the country’s infrastructure and human lives and exposed how ill-prepared and

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ill-equipped the country was to cope with the disaster. Through subsequent actions by the government in mobilizing various help initiatives at the local, national, and international levels made significant contribution to support the victims. Nonetheless, it revealed national and local organizations’ institutional weaknesses in response effectiveness. In terms of crisis management and institutional responses, citizens believe that the government lacks adequate capacity to deal with disasters and crises because they are sudden, leading to severe and devastating damages and losses. Regression Analysis We developed several models to explain development of democratic governance in Nepal. Table 13.4 presents three models. In all models, a higher value of adjusted R-squared demonstrates a better model fit; more than 26% of variations (26%–46%) in the outcome variable (i.e., development of democratic governance) are explained.

Table 13.4  Regression models of development of democratic governance in Nepal (standardized beta coefficients) Independent variables Governance legitimacy Right to information Institutional trust Trustworthiness Corruption Governance capacity Prompt and efficient Policy capacity Policy responsiveness Crisis management capacity Control variables Gender (female) Age Education N Adjusted R2

Model 1

Model 2

0.48*** 0.24*** 0.11*** −0.02

−0.01 0.01 −0.11*** 1750 0.43

Model 3 0.43*** 0.18*** 0.05* −0.03

0.13*** 0.14*** 0.25*** 0.11***

0.06* 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.03

−0.04 −0.00 −0.09*** 1710 0.26

−0.04 0.00 −0.09*** 1536 0.46

*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. Dependent variable: Development of Democratic Governance

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Table 13.4 presents regressions between the development of democratic governance in Nepal and its determinants clustered in two groups of variables, governance capacity and governance legitimacy. We ran the variables separately and then combined them all to test the robustness of these models. Model 1 presents governance legitimacy variables and their influence on democratic governance. Except corruption, all legitimacy variables influence the development of democratic governance. The most influential variable is the right to information. Citizens perceive that a transparent and open government pave the way for democratic governance and its development in Nepal. Trust in institutions and the trustworthiness of bureaucrats also facilitate democratic governance. All the three variables enhance governance legitimacy and facilitate democratic governance. However, it was surprising that corruption did not have any effect on democratic governance. Corruption is rampant in Nepal, and in our survey, we had an additional question to measure corruption based on the question: ‘In recent years, have you or has anyone from your family been hinted or asked by public officials about paying bribe to do a job or get a business done (on a 5-point scale from ‘Never’ to ‘Always’)?’ Around 40% of the respondents answered in the affirmative to this question which also reveals that corruption is widespread in Nepal. One reason could be that corruption is systemic in Nepal as in other parts of South Asia, and as such, people are not bothered by it so long as it speeds up their businesses with government agencies. In Model 2, we present the effects of governance capacity variables on democratic governance. As the beta coefficients reveal, all parameters in this cluster, such as civil servants’ promptness and efficiency, institutional trust, trustworthiness of civil servants, and crisis management capacity of government, influence democratic governance. Citizens consider these parameters to be highly relevant in developing democratic governance. Policy responsiveness is the variable which affects democratic governance the most, followed by policy capacity. This indicates that citizens consider policy-related issues most influential in democratic governance. In Model 3, both the clusters, along with all parameters, are analyzed. Most of the variables affect democratic governance in Nepal. Corruption is again found to be unrelated, and so is crisis management capacity. This means that these two variables—corruption and crisis management capacity—have a marginal effect on democratic governance in Nepal. Among the control variables, only education related to democratic governance in all three models. However, a negative influence of education on

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democratic governance indicates that citizens with low education support democratic governance, whereas citizens with high education are skeptical of democratic governance. It may be because citizens with higher education are not satisfied with the way democratic governance is taking shape in Nepal amidst blame game politics and quarrels among political leaders. As it challenges the existing social order, it may also reflect a conservative attitude toward the development of democratic governance in Nepal. On the other hand, people with low education see the opening of a window of opportunity after democracy was restored in Nepal, and the hegemony of the upper caste in politics and civil service was challenged because of open and inclusive government policy (for example, quota system for recruitment to civil service for women, religious and ethnic groups, and disadvantaged segments in society, and proportional representation in the parliament). Nepal has a parallel voting system—one is first-past-the-post voting, and the other is members elected through party-list proportional representation system. However, it would be interesting to see if this trend continues in Nepal, and open and inclusive government becomes a reality in Nepal. From the findings above, it is observed that both governance legitimacy and governance capacity matter for democratic governance in Nepal. However, the former matters the most and the right to information is the most crucial in explaining democratic governance.

Conclusion This study revealed that democratic governance is a challenge in Nepal. At present, it is in deficit, but as the findings suggest, both capacity and legitimacy matter in explaining democratic governance in Nepal. Surprisingly, citizens did not see corruption as a fundamental explanation for democratic government. The right of citizens to information was found to be the most important factor in improving democratic governance. Despite its promulgation over a decade ago, the RTI Act has not facilitated a transparent, accountable, and open government in Nepal. This has, on the one hand, inhibited democratic and good governance and, on the other hand, failed to empower people to evaluate government performance and participate in its decision-making process critically. Other variables such as institutional trust and trustworthiness, along with civil servants’ promptness and efficiency, policy capacity and responsiveness, are also considered key to improving democratic governance in Nepal. If the government

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intends to enhance democratic governance, it needs to focus on these variables. Institutional trust and trustworthiness, as well as policy capacity, are evaluated positively by citizens and can be further nurtured to enhance democratic governance. Policy responsiveness and crisis management capacity are evaluated as low by citizens; these need to be further improved to enhance democratic governance. However, policy capacity, responsiveness and crisis management, institutional trust, and trustworthiness are affairs of long-term undertaking and commitment. On the other hand, what can be readily attainable is right to information and more transparent and open public institutions. Citizens perceive that their right and access to information are limited, and this is considered important by citizens as a predictor of democratic governance. In the age of ICT development and globalization, government requires to be more open and provide citizens access to information to reduce information asymmetry, provide reliable and trust-enhancing information. By doing so, the government is likely to enhance more inclusive, open, transparent, participatory, and democratic governance. The new federal system has been the result of demands from different sections of society in Nepal, which may facilitate in realizing OG.

References Article 19. (2015). Country report: The right to information in Nepal. https:// www.article19.org/resources/country-­r eport-­the-­right-­to-­information-­in-­ nepal/. Accessed 3 Sept 2022. Askvik, S., Jamil, I., & Dhakal, T. N. (2011). Citizens’ trust in public and political institutions in Nepal. International Political Science Review, 32(4), 417–437. Bevir, M. (2006). Democratic governance: Systems and radical perspectives. Public Administration Review, 66(3), 426–436. Bevir, M. (2010). Democratic governance. Princeton University Press. Boedeltje, M., & Cornips, J. (2004). Input and output legitimacy in interactive governance (No. NIG2-01). Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020a). Balancing governance capacity and legitimacy: How the Norwegian government handled the COVID-19 crisis as a high performer. Public Administration Review, 80(5), 774–779. Christensen, T., & Lægreid, P. (2020b). The coronavirus crisis—Crisis communication, meaning-making, and reputation management. International Public Management Journal, 23(5), 713–729.

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Christensen, T., Lægreid, P., & Rykkja, L. H. (2016). Organizing for crisis management: Building governance capacity and legitimacy. Public Administration Review, 76(6), 887–897. Dahlberg, S., & Holmberg, S. (2014). The Importance of Institutional Trust for Regime Support. Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. British Journal of Political Science, 5(4), 435–457. Eckstein, H. (1961). A theory of stable democracy (Research monograph). Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Gellner, D.  N. (2007). Caste, ethnicity and equality in Nepal. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(20), 1823–1828. Gilley, B. (2009). The right to rule: How states win and lose legitimacy. Columbia University Press. GoN, MoHA & DPNet-Nepal. (2015). Nepal Disaster Report 2015. The Government of Nepal (GoN), Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) & Disaster Preparedness Network-Nepal (DPNet-Nepal). GoN NPC. (2015). Nepal earthquake 2015: Post disaster needs assessment. GoN NPC. Grimmelikhuijsen, S. G., & Feeney, M. K. (2017). Developing and testing an integrative framework for open government adoption in local governments. Public Administration Review, 77(4), 579–590. Gyawali, G. P. (2018). Federalism: Challenges and opportunities in Nepal. Molung Educational Frontier, 8, 37–48. Holmberg, S., & Rothstein, B. (2012). Good government: The relevance of political science. Edward Elgar. Jamil, I. (2019). The promise of representative bureaucracy and citizen’s trust in the civil Service in Nepal. In Civil service management and administrative Systems in South Asia (pp. 121–147). Palgrave Macmillan. Jamil, I., & Askvik, S. (2013). Citizens’ trust in public officials: Bangladesh and Nepal compared. In I. Jamil, S. Askvik, & T. N. Dhakal (Eds.), Search of better governance in South Asia and beyond (pp. 145–163). Springer. Lawoti, M. (2005). Towards a democratic Nepal: Inclusive political institutions for a multicultural society. Sage. Lawoti, M. (2014). Reform and resistance in Nepal. Journal of Democracy, 25(2), 131–145. Nam, T. (2012). Citizens’ attitudes toward open government and government 2.0. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78, 346–368. OECD. (2009). Government at a glance 2009. OECD Publishing. Reddick, C., & Ganapati, S. (2011). Open government achievement and satisfaction in US federal agencies: Survey evidence for the three pillars. Journal of E-Governance, 34(4), 193–202. Riaz, A., & Basu, S. (2010). Paradise lost? State failure in Nepal. Lexington Books.

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Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2008). What is quality of government? A theory of impartial government institutions. Governance, 21(2), 165–190. Scharpf, F.  W. (1997). Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), 18–36. Suchman, M.  C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. The Kathmandu Post. (2021, January 28). Nepal slips down four places in global corruption perception index. https://kathmandupost.com/national/2021/ 01/28/nepal-­slips-­down-­four-­places-­in-­global-­corruption-­perception-­index. Accessed 2 July 2022. UNDP. (2020). Human development report, 2020. United Nations Development Programme. https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-­Profiles/ NPL.pdf. Accessed 2 July 2022 White House. (2009, January 21). White house memorandum on transparency and open government. Available: http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/ E9-­1777.pdf. Google Scholar. Wikipedia. (2022). District Administration in Nepal. https://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/District_administration_in_Nepal. Accessed 2 July 2022. Wirtz, B. W., & Birkmeyer, S. (2015). Open government: Origin, development, and conceptual perspective. International Journal of Public Administration. https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2014.942735 Worldometer. (2020). Nepal population. https://www.worldometers.info/world-­ population/nepal-­population/. Accessed 22 June 2022.

CHAPTER 14

Open Government and Freedom of Information: The Sri Lankan Experience Kishali Pinto-Jayawardena, Ashwini Natesan, and Inshira Faliq

Introduction On 14 December 1994, the United Nations asserted: ‘Freedom will be bereft of all effectiveness if the people have no access to information. Access to information is basic to the democratic way of life. The tendency to withhold information from the people at large is, therefore, to be strongly checked’ (UN, 1994). Since then, successive governments in Sri Lanka attempted to introduce the right to information (RTI) into the country’s legal framework but failed until 2015 when the country

K. Pinto-Jayawardena (*) Right to Information Commission, Colombo, Sri Lanka A. Natesan LIRNEasia, Colombo, Sri Lanka I. Faliq Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_14

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constitutionally incorporated a right of every citizen to have access to information through Article 14A of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution. On 4th August 2016, Parliament unanimously passed the Right to Information Act (No 12 of 2016) (RTI Act) which was operationalized on 3 February 2017.1 The enactment and implementation of the RTI Act, together with the establishment of the RTI Commission (RTIC) soon after, fulfilled one of the first 13 Open Government Partnership (OGP) Commitments made in 2016, when Sri Lanka became the OGP’s 68th signatory. Hailed as a watershed moment in the country’s public governance history, the RTI Act has been ranked 4th globally and 2nd in Asia on the Centre for Law and Democracy’s (Centre) Global RTI index (Center for Law and Democracy, n.d.-a, n.d.-b). The Centre’s rating is based on 61 discrete indicators drawn from 7 main categories: Right of Access, Scope, Requesting Procedure, Exceptions and Refusals, Appeals, Sanctions and Protections, and Promotional Measures (Ibid). The RTI Act came into being following decades of campaigning and lobbying by civil society activists, media organizations, journalists, and lawyers (Pinto-Jayawardena, 2018a, b). It must be noted that prior to the implementation of the RTI Act, non-disclosure of information adversely affecting citizens was the norm in the country (RTIC, 2017a, b). However, its operation for the last 6 years has given the citizens the long-awaited right to scrutinize their government, more effectively participate in decision-making, and exercise more active citizenship (Gomez, 2019). This has been the case even during extremely difficult times, such as when the Sri Lankan government declared bankruptcy and entered into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2022. Widespread food and medicine shortages and a breakdown in essential services resulted in mass rallies in Colombo and other major cities. In May, the Prime Minister and his Cabinet resigned, followed by the resignation of the President in July. Throughout the turmoil, however, the RTI was vigorously used to expose corruption and waste at the highest levels of government along with the squandering of public funds, which will be examined in greater detail later in this chapter. 1  See the 19th Amendment to the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka. However, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka has long recognized that the Constitution implicitly recognized the right to information. See; Fernando v. the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation ([1996] 1 Sri. L.R. 157, Visuvalingam v. Liyanage (1984). 2 Sri.L.R. 123, Environmental Foundation Limited v. Urban Development Authority (2005). The Official Gazette version of the Act in English is available at: http://www.news.lk/images/pdf/RTI-Act-SriLanka_E.pdf

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In looking at the RTI Act in more detail, several features in the Act make it one of the strongest legal frameworks in the world, enabling it to withstand political upheavals such as what Sri Lanka recently experienced. As discussed, below, the Act gives prominence to the public interest override, provides for the proactive disclosure of the information, prevails over all other laws, and establishes a Right to Information Commission (RTIC). Through the independent nomination of its commissioners by the country’s Bar Association, editors/publishers, and civil society, RTIC has been accorded a solid and independent role in protecting citizens’ RTI. Section 1 of this chapter gives an overview of the provisions of the RTI Act, specifically those that are of relevance to OGP, it also highlights the procedures enshrined under the Act that contribute towards a strong RTI regime in Sri Lanka. Section 2 analyses the various commitments of the OGP framework under broad categories through the lens of RTI Orders and the final section includes the challenges, limitations, and future considerations for RTI and OGP in Sri Lanka.

Overview of the RTI Act Section 3 of the RTI Act states that citizens have the right to access information in the possession, custody, or control of a public authority subject to certain limited exemptions stipulated in Section 5 (1). However, even if an exemption is found to apply, an overriding public interest would effectively trump the applicability of such exemptions as stipulated in Section 5 (4) of the RTI Act. Section 43 of the Act defines a “public authority”  (Public Authority) in very broad terms. Looking at the definitions from a comparative perspective, one commentator points that ‘this is unlike many of the laws in the region’ as the Act also brings within its scope State-owned enterprises and private bodies which undertake public functions or operate with public funding (Mendel, 2019). The Act requires all Public Authorities to appoint “Information Officers” (IO) and “Designated Officers” (DO) and prescribes penalties for failure to provide information on timelines specified in the Act. In the event the IO and DO fail to provide the requested information, an appeal may be made to the RTIC. As stated previously, the five Commissioners are appointed through an independent nomination process involving different stakeholders (Section 12). The Act lays down a simple procedure for information requests. As a first step, a citizen must approach an IO of a state or corporate or even

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non-governmental entity and file a request asking for the information he or she needs. A timeline of 14 working days is set down for the IO to decide on the request (Section 25 (1)). If the information is given, fees are charged in accordance with the Fee Schedule (RTI Regulations promulgated under the RTI Act) stipulated by the RTIC. Along with the power to prosecute officers who do not obey its decisions, the power to determine fees for the release of information is particularly an important power entrusted to the RTIC. In RTI regimes elsewhere, the fee schedule for the release of information is generally decided by the government and oversight bodies are not conferred with prosecutorial powers. If the response given is not satisfactory or no response has been provided, an appeal can be made to the DO within 14 days of such refusal (Section 31 (1)). Subsequently, the DO must respond within 21 days, and if the IO refuses or remains silent, the DO can appeal to the RTIC within 60 days (Section 32(1) (a)). Finally, if dissatisfied with an RTIC Order, the appellant or Public Authority may plead to the Court of Appeal within 1 month of receiving the decision (Section 34(1)). It is worth noting that from 3 February 2017 to 31 December 2023, 21 appeals were filed to the Court of Appeal (Court) against approximately 7000 decisions handed down by the RTIC, out of which 15 appeals are pending hearing/judgement by the Court to date. Three appeals have been withdrawn by the relevant Public Authorities and two appeals have been dismissed by the Court. On 28 March 2023, the Court affirmed a ruling of the RTIC in 2021 to the  Parliament to release a list of members who had legally been required to declare their assets and debts to the Speaker between 2010 and 2018. Parliament had earlier refused the request, saying that parliamentary privilege protected the “confidentiality” of the list, that declarations were submitted to the Speaker, over whom the Secretary General had no authority, and that information could only be requested under the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No 1 of 1975. In a significant decision upholding principles of transparency and accountability, the Court agreed with the thinking of the RTIC, dismissing the objections by Parliament and determining that the RTI Act (2016) overrode the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law (1975) (Daily FT, 2023). The majority of such appeals (17) has been filed by Public Authorities, including the Office of the President, the Sri Lanka Parliament, and several major state entities and banks, aggrieved at being directed by the RTIC to furnish information ranging from the declarations of assets and

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liabilities of politicians to salaries of executive management and fees paid to lawyers. Of these appeals, three such Orders are referred to in this chapter—Transparency International Sri Lanka v Presidential Secretariat, 2017; Verite Research (Pvt.) Ltd. v Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), 2018; and Chamara Sampath v Parliament of Sri Lanka, 2018. There has been general compliance by Public Authorities with Orders issued by the RTIC.  However, the number of non-compliance cases, where state entities delay releasing the relevant information following RTIC decisions have increased in 2022. On 2nd February 2023, on the eve of marking 6 years of the operationalization of the RTI Act, the RTIC filed its first prosecution against a Public Authority (viz; the Ministry of Health) for failure to adhere to an order to disclose a laboratory report on the quality of milk powder imported to Sri Lanka. The RTIC has announced that this would be the first of several prosecutions (Daily Mirror, 2023) Several key features of Sri Lanka’s RTI regime make the law unique. These are mentioned below. Public Interest Override In Sri Lanka, Section 5 (4) of the RTI Act states that the presence of public interest is an overriding consideration. Information may be released ‘where the public interest in disclosing the information outweighs the harm that would result from its disclosure’. A cross-section of RTIC appeals shows that the RTIC has often invoked the public interest clause, particularly in appeals where public finances are concerned2 or when fundamental matters involving governance and state accountability are involved.3

2  See, Dileep Amuthan v Ministry of Defence. RTIC Appeal 70/2018, Verite Research (Pvt.) Ltd. v Central Bank of Sri Lanka RTIC Appeal 26/2018, T. Rusiripala v People’s Bank RTIC Appeal 774/2019, Mansoor v Ministry of Urban Development, Water Supply and Housing Facilities (Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development). RTIC Appeal 1108/2019. 3  See, Dileep Amuthan v Northern Provincial Council RTIC Appeal 21/2017, Tharindu Jayawardena v The National Building Research Organisation, Sri Lanka (NBRO) RTIC Appeal 1890/2020, S. Rubatheesan v Parliament of Sri Lanka RTIC Appeal 369/2021.

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Proactive Disclosure The principle of proactive disclosure enshrined in Regulation 20 of the RTI is a core feature of the Sri Lankan RTI regime. This requires Public Authorities to actively release information concerning certain categories, including salaries of public officials,4 details of recruitments to Public Authorities,5 internal policies,6 government structures, proposals and so on. As highlighted in a recent publication (Pinto-Jayawardena et  al., 2022), there are at least three ways in which the principle of proactive disclosure changes the understanding of the RTI and contributes to open government (OG). First, by creating a legal and statutory obligation to disclose information, provocative disclosure ensures that the release of information is no longer according to the whims and fancies of the government. This results in a more open and transparent government. Secondly, the principle of proactive disclosure also reinforces the fact that access to information held by Public Authorities is a right of the people, not a privilege subject to the caprices of public officials. Thirdly, the principle also emphasizes that disclosure is the norm and withholding information the exemption. RTIC’s Power to Inspect Information The RTIC’s power under Section 15 (c) to inspect any information held by a Public Authority has been used in several appeal hearings7 to ascertain if the exemptions pleaded by Public Authorities to withhold information are justified. In many cases, this has prevented the Public Authorities from pleading Section 5 exemptions without a proper basis and denying the citizenry the requested information. 4  See, W.K.W.  Deshapriya v Information and Communication Technology and Agency (ICTA) RTIC Appeal 169/2021, T. Rusiripala v People’s Bank RTIC Appeal 774/2019. 5  See, M. Fasly v National Insurance Trust Fund RTIC Appeal 2211/2020. 6  See, Pulasthi Hewamanne v Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka RTICAppeal 2322/2020. 7  See, K. Guruparan v University Grants Commission RTIC Appeal 1891/2020, Centre for Policy Alternatives v Ministry of Justice and Prison Reforms RTIC Appeal 1491/2019, T.  Nadesan v Office of the Cabinet of Ministers RTIC Appeal 216/2018 and Mansoor v Ministry of Urban Development, Water Supply and Housing Facilities (Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development) RTIC Appeal 1108/2019 & Centre for Environmental Justice v Ministry of Urban Development, Water Supply and Housing Facilities (Ministry of Megapolis and Western Development) RTIC Appeal 1114/2019.

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Disobeying Orders The RTIC has the authority to prosecute officials who do not obey their Orders (Section 39 (4)). Because of this power, it has been dubbed ‘among the most powerful in the world’ (Mendel, 2019). Priority of RTI Act Research conducted by UNDP (2022) in Sri Lanka identified at least 105 existing legislations conflicting with the RTI Act. In anticipation of this conflict, the drafters of the RTI Act included a specific clause in the Act— Section 4, which states that in the event of an inconsistency or conflict between the RTI Act and any other written law, the RTI Act shall take precedence. The term “written law” is not limited to legislation enacted by Parliament but also includes ‘all orders, proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations, warrants and process of every kind made or issued by anybody or person having authority under any statutory or other enactments’. This provision has come up for determination in several appeals before the RTIC. In the highly contested 2017 appeal of Transparency International Sri Lanka v Presidential Secretariat (RTIC Appeal 06/2017), the RTIC held that the RTI Act overrides the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No. 1 of 1975.8 The RTIC acting as a “watchdog” (Transparency.org, 2020) over the entire RTI regime has been the driving force behind upholding citizens right to access information. For example, research indicates that between 2017 and 2020, the RTIC ordered the disclosure of information in approximately 84% of the appeals filed (74% full disclosure and 9% disclosure in part) (Natesan, 2020). Additionally, in the 10 months (December 2021 to September 2022), information has been disclosed (full and part) in approximately 80.43% of the appeals (RTIC, 2022). This data reflects that the RTIC has consistently prioritized information disclosure as the norm and rejection only as an exception, as aforementioned.

8  The Order of the Commission in this case was cited in the Global Freedom of Expression Index of Cases, Columbia University. globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/ transparency-internationalsri-lanka-v-presidential-secretariat.

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Open Government (OG) and the RTI Regime in Sri Lanka OG in simple terms means the ‘absence of opacity in governmental business’ (Zafarullah & Siddique, 2021). The OECD defines it as ‘a culture of governance that promotes the principles of transparency, integrity, accountability and stakeholder participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth’ (OECD, 2017). The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UN ESCWA) defines OG as, a government that is effective and efficient in carrying out its duties, its work is transparent and accountable, and everyone can access its services. It is also a government that responds to the needs of its citizens, values their participation, experience and knowledge in decision-making, and relies on modern and emerging technologies to enhance its governance. ESCWA believes that improving participation, transparency and accountability are the primary goals of open government, regardless of its definition. (ESCWA, 2020)

It is critical that the state makes critical information about its citizens’ individual and collective needs, as well as information about ‘public policies, decisions, or governmental actions that affect their lives’, available to them. The OGP was founded in 2011 in furtherance of the objectives of OG and is a ‘voluntary global initiative aimed at building trust and fostering collaboration between governments and their citizens to improve development outcomes’ (Lindroth, 2016: 1). Particularly, this initiative seeks ‘to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance’ (ibid). The OGP identifies three primary values as part of its OG goals—transparency, participation, and accountability—and countries are encouraged to address each of these values in their action plans. So far, the Open Government Declaration has been endorsed by 78 countries. As a signatory to the OGP, Sri Lanka commenced the development of its first 2-year National Action Plan in February 2016, which was approved and adopted by Cabinet 8 months later. The first OGP National Action Plan (NAP) had a total of 12 commitments organized into 9 thematic areas: health, education, ICT, environment, local government, women,

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women in political governance, anti-corruption, and RTI.9 The Second National Action plan (2019–2021) consisted of 15 commitments ranging from improving public engagement for the prevention of bribery and corruption to improving accountability through asset declarations and enhancing the rights of disabled persons.10 The enactment and implementation of an RTI Act, together with the establishment of the RTIC has turned out to be in fulfilment of one of the first 12 OGP Commitments made in 2016. OGP recognizes that the legal right to request information can lead to a more open, accountable, and participatory government. As such, OGP members are expected to have laws facilitating fair access to information. In Sri Lanka’s first action cycle plan of 2016–2018, early results and the potential impact of this commitment were flagged as “high”, in both the mid-term and end-of-term reviews (Open Government Partnership, 2022). The Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) of the National Action Plan noted that the ‘RTI legislation had a major effect in opening government’ during the period of review. However, an IRM evaluation of the second Action plan found that commitments under the RTI ‘received limited attention from relevant government stakeholders’ during the period covering the second action plan (Open Government Partnership, 2019). Without a doubt, the link between OG and the right of citizens to access information is obvious. OG enables citizens to participate more fully in governance and for governments to be truly open and transparent, all citizens must have equal access to information. Several OGP commitments focus on making information disclosure more inclusive and accessible for citizens, especially marginalized groups, to protect their rights and also to combat corruption in society. The RTI regime, which has been in operation for the past 6 years, has begun to change the landscape of governance in Sri Lanka and has given new light to the principle of OG. The RTI Act embodies a blueprint for promoting openness and accountability of the government. This objective is clearly laid out in its preamble:

9  Sri Lanka’s Frist National Action Plan (2015–2017). https://www.presidentsoffice.gov. lk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/OGP-NAP-1-English.pdf 10  Sri Lanka’s Second National Action Plan (2019–2021) https://www.presidentsoffice. gov.lk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/OGP%20NAP%202%20English.pdf

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there exists a need to foster a culture of transparency and accountability in public authorities by giving effect to the right of access to information and thereby promote a society in which the people of Sri Lanka would be able to more fully participate in public life through combating corruption and promoting accountability and good governance (RTI Act, 2016: Preamble; emphasis ours)

According to one study, RTI has had a measurable impact on the promotion of transparency in Sri Lanka (Natesan, 2020). This is evident from the disclosure of  criteria for obtaining Samurdhi (welfare) benefits by some Public Authorities; the publication of policies, directives, and circulars by the Ministry of Education; maintaining of records not previously maintained, for example, the RTIC order on Commission of Inquiry reports leading to the Department of National Archives implementing procedures requiring mandatory submission of such reports; information requests on financial statements of political parties on Election Commission’s website (Natesan, 2020). Further, while being one out of Sri Lanka’s 27 OGP Commitments, RTI also serves to accelerate the realization of several other OGP commitments, significantly those relating to anti-corruption and integrity, the accountability of elected representatives, and the delivery of public utilities. A review of some of the key Orders of the RTIC demonstrates the contribution of the RTI regime in promoting OG and Sri Lanka’s commitments under the OGP. However, it must be noted that the RTIC’s decisions alone are insufficient to ascertain the impact of the RTI in contributing to OG and OGP commitments. In many instances, information is released by the Public Authorities before the appeal stage which has had a huge impact on ensuring the government is accountable to its citizenry (Natesan, 2020). As such, the orders discussed below only provide a glimpse into how the RTI regime has promoted a shift in ensuring accountability and transparency in governance in the country.11 Sri Lanka’s 27 commitments under the OGP framework have been broadly categorized under the headings discussed below.

11  For summaries of the discussed cases in this chapter see; Pinto-Jayawardena, K (ed), A Practitioner’s Guide to Orders of the Right to Information Commission of Sri Lanka (Media Reform Lanka Initiative 2022).

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Accountability of Elected Representatives One of the key OGP commitments made by Sri Lanka involves ensuring the accountability of elected and public officials to the citizenry. These commitments include the establishment of an effective asset declaration system to ease submission, verification, and public access. In Sri Lanka, Parliament passed the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No 1 of 1975 (DALL), as far back as in 1975 itself. This provides for the submissions of Declarations of Assets and Liabilities by specified categories of persons. Though citizens can request asset declaration through this legislation, there is an archaic secrecy provision in the DALL Act that prevents the information from being made public (Section 8 of the DALL). As such, acting in contravention of the secrecy provision is made an offence and subject to prosecution in the Magistrate’s Court (Section 8 (4)) unlike in other South Asian countries. Enabled by this regressive law, there has been a persistent refusal by Sri Lanka’s elected representatives and public officials to publish their asset declarations. Over the past 6 years, several RTIC orders brought to the spotlight the duty of elected representatives and public officials to declare their assets and liabilities. The 2017 appeal of Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL) v Presidential Secretariat (RTIC Appeal 06/2017) concerned a request from a non-governmental organization to the Presidential Secretariat to disclose certified copies of assets and liabilities of the then President Maithripala Sirisena and then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe for 2015 and 2016. The Presidential Secretariat (Public Authority) refused the request citing a range of reasons, including privacy exemption and a lack of a legal duty in accordance with the DALL in providing these documents. In rejecting the argument put forward by the Presidential Secretariat to justify refusal, the RTIC held that: We do not accept the argument advanced on behalf of the Respondents that existing law would suffice to curb corruption and the unexplained acquisition of wealth of elected public officials through scrutiny of declarations of assets and liabilities and that the provisions of the RTI Act need not, therefore, be used for this purpose. Existing laws, such as the DALL, would only come into play only upon complaints being received on corrupt acts of individuals or when the same is discovered inadvertently. As practice indicates, this occurs only

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in selected instances. In contrast, the RTI Act enables a powerful check to be exercised on even potential corruption as this would deter those otherwise enticed to amass public wealth for themselves” (authors’ emphasis) (RTIC Appeal 06/2017; page 16) The Public Authority has challenged the Order of the RTIC in the Court of Appeal, which appeal is pending to date. In the 2018 appeal of Chamara Sampath v Parliament of Sri Lanka (RTIC Appeal 719/2018), the Appellant had requested the list of names of Members of Parliament (MPs) who had handed over their respective Declarations of Assets and Liabilities in 2018 and the list of names of MPs who have handed over their Declarations from 2010 to the date of the information request. In the appeal, the RTIC inter alia rejected the argument made by the Public Authority that information relating to declaration of assets and liabilities is “personal information” of MPs protected from release in terms of Section 5 (1) (a). The RTIC noted that the release of information relating to the MPs who have disclosed their assets and liabilities would ‘provide crucial insight into the compliance with the DALL by Members of Parliament who hold elected office and are financed by public funds’. As such, the RTIC observed an overriding public interest in terms of Section 5(4) in the disclosure of the information. On an appeal, as aforementioned, this order of the RTIC was affirmed by the Court.  Recent proposed policy reforms seek to rectify the situation in terms of compelling disclosure of declarations of assets. The government of Sri Lanka recently proposed an anti-corruption law which inter alia recommends the repeal of the DALL. The Anti-Corruption Bill introduced by the Ministry of Justice,12 makes commendable provisions compelling elected officials and Public Officials to periodically declare their assets and liabilities within and outside Sri Lanka (proposed Sections 77 and 78 of the Anti-Corruption Bill). The Bill provides for a centralized electronic system for the submission of such declarations and allows for reference to be made to such declarations by appropriate authorities and for investigations to be conducted. Clause 85 (1) of the proposed Bill provides that the centralized electronic system shall automatically generate a ‘redacted version of every declaration 12  See Proposed Anti-Corruption Bill. https://www.tisrilanka.org/proposed-anti-corruptionbill-available-for-public-comment/

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of assets and liabilities’ which would be accessible to the public through an IO and DO appointed under the terms of the RTI Act (Proposed Section 85 (2)). It also makes provision for ‘appropriate measures’ to be taken in respect of late submissions, non-declaration of assets and liabilities, and against false declarations. The draft law could be seen as a positive policy reform measure in the country’s right-to-information journey. Use of Public Funds, Anti-corruption, and the Public Purse In both the Action plans under the OGP, Sri Lanka has made several commitments to ensure accountability and transparency where the public purse is concerned and to introduce a robust framework to cement anti-­ corruption practices. As stated previously, an Anti-Corruption Bill has been proposed to amalgamate existing anti-corruption laws, namely the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) Act, the Bribery Act, and the DALL.  However, the gap between promise and practice remains a problem. There are numerous examples of the RTI Act being used to expose corruption, resulting in the release of information without recourse to the appeals process. For example, RTI requests were filed to ascertain the status of Sri Lanka’s foreign currency reserves with many citizens questioning the reason for the drastic drop in foreign currency reserves (Shamsul & Ruhi, 2022). Responding to one such RTI request in May 2022, the Central Bank of Sri Lanka clarified that, when the new government came to power in 2019/2020, the foreign currency reserve of the country stood at USD 7.3 billion. It then went on to describe how the money was used/ invested for different purposes, resulting in the dwindling of the reserves to near zero. Amongst others, this release of the information revealed the extent of the crisis faced by the nation and led to massive public outrage, one of the factors contributing to the resignation of the then President, the Prime Minister, and the entire Cabinet. In August 2022, the Prime Minister’s Office responded to an RTI request that sought details of former Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa’s visit to Italy in 2021 to address the G20 Interfaith Forum (Shamsul & Ruhi, 2022). This led to the disclosure that 26 million rupees of public funds were spent on the visit at a time the country was facing an unprecedented economic crisis (The Morning, 2022a, b). Since February 2022, Sri Lanka has been experiencing prolonged power outages due to a fuel shortage caused by the country’s deepening

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economic crisis. The Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) was unable to meet the country’s fuel needs due to a lack of foreign exchange reserves to cover the cost of fuel stocks imported into the country. Fuel scarcity also had an impact on the transportation and energy sectors, resulting in the simultaneous collapse of the public and private sectors. This had a significant impact on the country’s power generation, resulting in daily island-wide power outages that continue to this day. An RTI request was submitted to the CEB, inquiring about the supply of fuel for thermal power plants in the country and their daily requirement (Shamsul & Ruhi, 2022). The CEB response to the information request revealed that certain power plants occasionally malfunctioned due to the lack of sufficient fuel. Despite a worsening economic crisis, Sri Lanka celebrated its 74th Independence with much pomp and glory in February 2022, sparking widespread public outrage (Daily Mirror, 2022). An RTI request submitted shortly thereafter revealed that close to 95 million rupees had been spent on the occasion, the highest amount spent for an Independence Day celebration in the past 5 years (Shamsul & Ruhi, 2022). An RTI request by a research organization seeking details of a Presidential Fund established to collect public donations for covid relief in October 2021, amidst the third wave that had gripped Sri Lanka, revealed that only 6 percent of the said Fund had been used up to that point, despite high demand for vaccines, medical equipment, PPEs, and so on. (Public Finance.lk, 2022). Following these revelations, the government began utilizing the Fund’s balance to meet the critical needs of public health emergency. An RTI disclosure on the expenses related to the chairmen of dissolved Provincial Councils (PCs) unveiled glaring information on the misuse of public funds. This included the revelation that continuous payments out of the public purse were being made as salaries for chairmen of inactive PCs in addition to the salary payments for their personal staff, vehicles, and fuel allowances.13 Following the story, the Government took steps to control the expenses of chairmen of dissolved PCs and their personal staff.14

13  Ali R, “Dissolved PCs Drain Millions from Public Coffers” (Ceylon Today, April 17, 2022) https://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2022/10/23/chairs-staff-of-dissolvedpcs-get-slashed-allowance/ 14  Chairs, staff of dissolved PCs get slashed allowance (Ceylon Today, October 1, 2022) https://ceylontoday.lk/2022/10/01/chairs-staff-of-dissolved-pcs-get-slashed-allowance/2

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The RTI Act allowed PAFFREL (People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections) to obtain information about a Moneragala District local government candidate who offered voters various bribes at the last local government elections. This information resulted in a landmark decision by the High Court of Moneragala declaring the specific candidate’s appointment null and void. All of these disclosures occurred without RTIC’s appellate process being invoked. When the public purse has been a source of concern or corruption by a public agency has emerged, the RTIC staunchly highlighted the primacy of the public interest. These cases involve government salaries, public retirement funds, and public body corruption. Sri Lankan Airlines was accused of hiring political appointees with exorbitant salaries paid with public funds (The Sunday Times, 2017). The Airline Pilots Guild appealed to the RTIC in 2017 against the Airlines’ refusal to release information relating to salaries, allowances, and/or benefits for the top management and corruption, as well.15 The RTIC overturned the DO’s decision, observing that salary information must be disclosed because it directly relates to the ‘financial accountability and transparency of the Public Authority in the expenditure of public funds’.16 The RTIC Appeal (No. 26/2018) on the Verite Research (Pvt.) Ltd. v Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) had a far-reaching impact on accountability in relation to the management of public funds. It was of immense public importance as it concerned information relating to the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) which is considered the ‘largest social security scheme in Sri Lanka’ (Employees Provident Fund, n.d.). The RTIC directed the CBSL to disclose information relating to government securities market transactions of the EPF during 2015 and 2016, including primary market transactions held through auctions, primary market transactions held through direct placement and secondary market transactions. The RTIC noted that under the RTI Act, it was required to increase transparency and accountability in dealing with the EPF, which consisted of 17.3 million rupees that ‘members are mandated by law to contribute to as a retirement fund and do not have the choice of investing their money in other places’. The Public Authority’s objections, which were raised on the basis of being ‘commercially sensitive in nature’, were  See, Airline Pilots Guild of Sri Lanka v Sri Lankan Airlines Ltd. RTIC Appeal 99/2017.  Page 8 of Airline Pilots Guild of Sri Lanka v Sri Lankan Airlines Ltd (RTIC Appeal 99/2017). 15 16

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rejected. The public interest in disclosing the information, given its impact on the CBSL’s decision-making regarding public money entrusted to it, outweighed the harm that would result from its disclosure under Section 5 (4) of the RTI Act. The Public Authority has also challenged the RTIC’s Order in the Court, which is still pending. In the 2019 appeal of T.  Rusiripala v People’s Bank (RTIC Appeal 774/2019), the RTIC ordered the state-run bank to disclose details of salaries, wages, ex gratia payments, bonus (including performance bonus), overseas trip expenditure, and all other perks for officers recruited to the Senior Management Level from June 2010 to 2018. The RTIC stressed that public interest requires disclosure of information about public funds, citing previous orders and comparative jurisprudence. In the recent appeal of K.  Dileep Amuthan v Divisional Secretariat, Uduvil (RTIC Appeal 2224/2020), the appellant requested information on Uduvil Divisional Secretariat COVID-19 relief goods recipients. The RTIC ruled that the Public Authority must follow its statutory and administrative duties when disbursing relief goods using public funds. In both these instances, the RTIC’s Orders were not contested at the appellate Court level; the Public Authorities released the information to the appellants. Decision-Making in Public Authorities The RTI Act is the key mechanism providing citizens with the power to oversee the decision-making and actions of Public Authorities. Prior to its implementation, an ordinary person was prevented from seeking details of a decision-making process and the basis for policies being implemented. In the recently concluded appeal of Pulasthi Hewamanne v Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (RTIC Appeal 2322/2020), the appellant requested several items of information about the Human Rights Commission’s internal procedures, mechanisms, and circulars for processing complaints, its mandate, and any internal review process to disallow complaints. In its final order, the RTIC  observed that the information requested by the appellant was “institutional information” which should have been made available as a matter of public record in terms of Regulation 20. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) is a statutory body established in terms of the Human Rights Commission Act No. 21 of 1996 and is mandated to inquire into violations of fundamental rights. Given HRCSL’s critical public function, it is important that information

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about its internal procedures and decision-making process be made available to the public. In Suren D. E. Perera v The Attorney General’s Department of Sri Lanka (RTIC Appeal 88/2017) the appellant had requested the file notations made on a brief, indicating the reasons for the Attorney General’s decision to  not file an appeal against the acquittal of an accused, charged under Section 32 of the Penal Code read with Section 2 of the Convention Against Torture Act, No. 22 of 1994. On appeal, the requested information was released by the Public Authority. If not for the RTI Act, information relating to the reasons behind such decisions by the Attorney General would not be available to the public (RTIC, 2017a, b). The 2020 appeal of K.  Guruparan v University Grants Commission (UGC) (RTIC Appeal 1891/2020) concerned the decision taken by the University Grants Commission to bar academics employed within the accredited university system from practicing as Attorneys-at-Law. The decision was widely believed to have targeted the appellant who was at the time involved in several high-profile public interest litigation relating to enforced disappearances of civilians in the North and East (Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada, 2019). In his appeal to the RTIC, the appellant had requested documents pertaining to this decision by the UGC. The relevant Public Authority had refused to provide a copy of the letter sent by the Army Headquarters to the UGC citing exemption under Section 5 (1) (i) (Confidential information given by a Third-Party) of the RTI Act. Rejecting the reasoning put forward by the Public Authority, the RTIC noted that the release of the requested information ‘meets the requirements of the accountability and transparency provided for in the preamble of the Act’. The information was consequently released. Delivery of Public Utility Services A state’s primary responsibility is to provide its citizens with utilities for economic and social development. The lack of transparency and accountability in government operations not only breeds corruption and mismanagement but also contributes to the ineffective delivery of public utilities. Sri Lanka has made several commitments under the OGP to improve the delivery of public utility services, such as electricity, water, health, transport, and so on. In fact, the RTI is believed to be widely used by grassroots communities in gaining access to information relating to public utility services (Sri Lanka Press Institute, 2019a).

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One such incident was reported from Balapityain, the Southern Province of Sri Lanka. Villages from the Heenati South Grama Niladhari (village officer) division filed an RTI request regarding the dumping of garbage on their land with no regard for the environment or health concerns that may arise as a result. Soon after making the information request, the Pradeshiya Sabha arranged for the garbage dumping site to be relocated and the material recycled (Sri Lanka Press Institute, 2019b). In another reported incident, a road was renovated with the intervention of the government subsequent to an RTI request made by a youth group regarding the dilapidated road in the area (Sri Lanka Press Institute, 2019c). In R.S. Hettiarachchi v Ministry of Health (RTIC Appeal 2169/2020), the appellant had requested several information in relation to the disposal of clinical and acute infectious waste from hospitals and other related matters. The RTIC ordered the release of information because the appeal was of overriding public interest due to the State’s health and safety obligations. Several similar appeals have been filed over the past 6 years. Civil Liberties During Sri Lanka’s recent anti-government protests, there were widespread allegations that the government was using expired tear gas canisters to disperse protestors. The Sri Lanka police rejected a journalist’s RTI request for details on the procurement process, the amount of money spent, and the date the tear gas canisters were imported to the country. On appeal to the RTIC (The Morning, 2022a, b), the Inspector General of Police was ordered to release the information, with a warning that failure to do so would result in prosecution. Widely reported in the media, this appeal resulted in the police releasing the information in issue. In another appeal filed in October 2022, the RTIC ordered the release of crucial information pertaining to detainees under the abusive Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) (Daily FT, 2022). This included information relating to the number of detainees and their mental health and other related conditions. The RTIC stated that the disclosure of such information will benefit society as a whole and further public interest. Information was later released by the public authority.

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Environmental Damages In September 2022, the RTIC ordered the Department of Wildlife and the Marine Environmental Protection Agency to release post-mortem reports of dead sea turtles following the environmental disaster caused by the fire on the X-Press Pearl off Sri Lanka’s coast in May 2021 (Colombo Telegraph, 2022). Both agencies obliged. This was the worst environmental disaster the country had witnessed in decades causing an unprecedented loss of marine life. This decision is crucial as Sri Lanka has a history of successive governments taking short-sighted decisions as well as demonstrating continuous inaction in relation to environmental concerns (Mahindaratne, 2022).

Limitations, Challenges, and the Road Ahead In Sri Lanka, the RTI Act and the RTIC have played a central role in establishing a culture of transparency and accountability amongst several Public Authorities. Regardless, more coordinated efforts are required to reflect collaboration, inclusive policymaking, and technology. While the RTI regime has made in-roads into laying the foundations of OG, participative/inclusive policymaking, greater accountability leveraged through technology remains a challenge. Although the RTI Regulations impose obligations of “proactive disclosure” on Public Authorities, compliance is limited and intermittent. This is due to the absence of a mechanism designed to ensure that such information is routinely published. Several Public Authorities view the requirements as “voluntary”, although the bedrock of OG lies in proactive disclosure. This is an issue that requires attention and resolution. A further concern is the growing reluctance of numerous public bodies to disclose even routine information, necessitating an appeal to the RTIC.  A comparison to the nature of appeals heard in 2017–2019 to those since the pandemic in 2020, reflects even simple and straightforward information requests are being rejected. This could be due to the RTI officers’ (IOs and DOs) unfamiliarity with the RTI process, particularly given that the “initial fear of consequence” has been dispelled. They also reject requests in order to avoid any potential controversy that could arise from the information disclosed, preferring to “play safe” and reject an information request when in doubt. Widespread awareness and training

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are needed to implement the RTI ideal of ‘disclosure being the norm and rejection the exception’ at every level. The RTIC’s budgetary constraints are also critical, as they have a direct impact on the effectiveness of its operations. For instance, according to the RTIC’s Annual Reports, no legal officer was appointed during the first 3 years of its operation, and while some progress has been made, it is far from satisfactory. Processing financial allocations for staff through a line ministry despite the existence of an independent body raises doubts about its autonomy. Indeed, these are problems in the practical functioning of the RTIC which needs to be rectified. On the legislative front, the government has taken steps to introduce new laws, such as the proposed Anti-corruption Law to give teeth to the accountability process (The Morning, 2022a, b). However, in this instance as well, the lack of proper implementation and the corruption and politicization of law enforcement agencies undermine legislative gains. Sri Lanka passed the Personal Data Protection Act No 9 of 2022 and expected to come into force in a span of 18–24 months. Personal information and RTI disclosure may appear to operate on different planes on the surface, but in practice, public bodies routinely deny information requests on the grounds of privacy. Public interest in disclosure of information, which paves the way to open governance and better transparency, should be kept in mind in potentially conflicting situations. It is therefore, crucial that RTI obligations and personal data should be more closely aligned in the statutory and implementation framework. Further, new laws and amendments to existing laws should not create bodies that are not subject to RTI on the basis that they operate in exceptional circumstances. The Audit Act of 2018 provided that audit reports cannot be asked for under RTI until they are presented to Parliament. This clause is problematic in a context where this presentation can sometimes take several years.

Conclusion In the short 6 years since Sri Lanka’s Information Act and the Information Commission came into being, the notion of information as a right has become embedded in the nation’s political and civic consciousness and entrenched a process of - active citizenship, empowered powerless communities, and enabled public scrutiny of government decision-making.

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To reiterate, one of the cornerstones of OG leading to transparency, accountability, and better governance is the right to access information. The RTIC Orders discussed above and the use of the RTI Act by citizens lend credence to this and highlight how RTI has been a critical component in the rubric of OG.  However, effective  OG  relies on factors like participation, collaboration, inclusive policymaking, and technology in addition to openness. Complementary actions on the part of the government are therefore warranted. As a result of the RTI law and RTIC directives affirming fundamental rule of law safeguards, public agencies have gradually altered their policies and practices. Thus, it is important to protect these gains. The country’s citizens should fight to preserve and expand the key RTI victories they have already achieved. As Sri Lanka moves forward in times of deep economic stress and public unrest, these are priorities to focus on.

References Center for Law and Democracy. (n.d.-a). Global RTI rating. Retrieved from Center for Law and Democracy: https://www.rti-­rating.org/country-­data/ Sri%20Lanka/ Center for Law and Democracy. (n.d.-b). RTI legislation rating methodology. Retrieved from Center for Law and Democracy: www.law-­democracy.org/wp-­ content/uploads/2011/09/Indicatorsfinal.pdf Colombo Telegraph. (2022, September 12). RTI Commission directs information release on massive marine damage caused by the X-press pearl disaster. Retrieved from Colombo Telegraph: https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/ rti-­c ommission-­d irects-­i nformation-­r elease-­o n-­m assive-­m arine-­d amage-­ caused-­by-­the-­x-­press-­pearl-­disaster/ Daily, F. T. (2022, October 8). RTI Commission directs police to release information on PTA detainees. Retrieved from https://www.ft.lk/front-­page/ RTI-­C ommission-­d ir ects-­P olice-­t o-­r elease-­i nfor mation-­o n-­P TA-­ detainees/44-­740733 Daily, F.  T. (2023, March 1). Court of appeal directs parliament to release asset declaration information of MPs. Retrieved from https://www.ft.lk/top-­story/ Court-­of-­Appeal-­directs-­Parliament-­to-­release-­asset-­declaration-­information-­ of-­MPs/26-­745816 Daily Mirror. (2022, February 3). 74th Independence day celebrations: ‘What’s there to celebrate’ ask citizens. Retrieved from Daily Mirror: https:// www.dailymirror.lk/print/news-­f eatures/74th-­I ndependence-­D ayCelebrations-­Whats-­there-­to-­celebrate-­ask-­citizens/131-­230372

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Daily Mirror. (2023, February 3). Failure to disclose ingredients of imported milk powder: Files action against health officials. Retrieved, from https://www.dailymirror.lk/breaking_news/Failure-­t o-­d isclose-­i ngredients-­o f-­i mportedm i l k -­p o w d e r -­R T I -­C o m m i s s i o n -­f i l e s -­a c t i o n -­a g a i n s t -­H e a l t h -­ Officials/108-­253491 Employees Provident Fund. (n.d.). What is EPF. Retrieved from Employees Provident Fund: https://epf.lk/?page_id=2 ESCWA. (2020). Legal aspects of open government and open data. Retrieved from E/ESCWA/CL4.SIT/2020/TP.2: https://www.unescwa.org/sites/default/ files/pubs/pdf/legal-­aspects-­open-­government-­open-­data-­english_0.pdf Gomez, M. (2019). The right to information and transformative development outcomes. Law and Development Review, 12(3), 837–864. Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada. (2019, December 16). Sri Lanka: Dr. Kumaravadivel Guruparan and the decision to Bar academics from practicing law: Letter. Retrieved from Lawyers’ Rights Watch Canada: https://www.lr wc.org/sri-­l anka-­d r-­k umaravadivel-­g uruparan-­a nd-­t hedecision-­to-­bar-­academics-­from-­practicing-­law-­letter Lindroth, H. (2016). The open government Partnership in Asia and the Pacific. Retrieved from Asian Development Bank: https://www.adb.org/publications/open-­government-­partnership-­asia-­and-­pacific Mahindaratne, H. P. (2022). The use of the RTI act in the achievement of UNSDG 16 in Sri Lanka. In I. Faliq & N. Jeyaseelan (Eds.), Sri Lanka’s right to information regime and the United Nations sustainable Development goals. Media Reform Lanka. Mendel, T. (2019). Sri Lanka’s legal regime for the right to information in comparative perspective. In K. Pinto-Jayawardena (Ed.), Reflections on Sri Lanka’s RTI Act & RTI Regime. Right to Information Commission of Sri Lanka. Natesan, A. (2020). A litmus test for RTI in Sri Lanka: Analyzing the linkages between RTI and increased transparency/combating corruption. In I. Faliq & N.  Jyaseelan (Eds.), Sri Lanka’s right to information regime and the United Nations sustainable development goals: Thoughts for reflections (pp. 1–37). Media Reform Lanka Initiative. OECD. (2017). Recommendation of the Council on Open Government, approved by all OECD member countries. Retrieved from https://legalinstruments.oecd. org/en/instruments/OECD-­LEGAL-­0438 Open Government Partnership (2019). Sri Lanka 2019–2021 Hybrid Report EN  – Open Government Partnership. Retrieved from https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-­c ontent/uploads/2022/04/Sri-­L anka_HybridReport_2019-­2021_EN.pdf Open Government Partnership. (2022). Sri Lanka end-of-term report 2016–2018. Open Government Partnership. Retrieved from Open

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Government Partnership: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/ sri-­lanka-­end-­of-­term-­report-­2016-­2018 Pinto-Jayawardena, K. (2018a). The right to information in Sri Lanka: Fruits of long and Hard Labour. The Round Table, 107, 241–243. Pinto-Jayawardena, K. (2018b). The right to information in Sri Lanka: Fruits of long and Hard Labour. Round Table, 107(2), 241–243. Pinto-Jayawardena, K., Jeyaseelan, N., & Faliq, I. (2022). Legal commentaries to selected orders of the right to information Commission of Sri Lanka 2019–2022. Media Reform Lanka Initiative. Public Finance.lk. (2022, February 3). Retrieved from ‘The Government Spent Only 10.6% of the ITUKAMA Covid-19 Fund Balance.’ https:// publicfinance.lk/en/topics/the-­g overnment-­s pent-­o nly-­1 0-­6 -­o f-­t heitukama-­covid-­19-­fund-­balance-­1641814589 RTI. (2016, August 5). Right To Information Act, No. 12 of 2016. Sri Lanka Gazette. https://www.rticommission.lk/web/images/pdf/act/rti-­act-­en-­ 13122018.pdf RTIC. (2022). Statistics on commission appeals, 20.12.2021–31.08.2022 Information. Retrieved, from https://rticommission.lk/web/images/pdf/ Statics-­2022/Statics-­from-­20.12.2021-­to-­31.08.2022.pdf RTIC (2017a, September). Sri Lanka’s right to information act is a weapon of the people. Interview. RTIC. (2017b). Suren D.  E. Perera v The Attorney General’s Department of Sri Lanka. https://www.rticommission.lk/web/images/pdf/comm-­order-­suren-­ d-­perera-­v-­ags-­order.pdf RTIC. (2022). Statistics on commission appeals, 20.12.2021–31.08.2022 Information. Retrieved from https://rticommission.lk/web/images/pdf/ Statics-­2022/Statics-­from-­20.12.2021-­to-­31.08.2022.pdf Shamsul, B., & Ruhi, N. (2022, August 14). The Sri Lankan crisis spiked intense RTI activity. The Daily Star. Retrieved from The Daily Star: https://www. thedailystar.net/opinion/views/news/the-­sri-­lankan-­crisis-­spiked-­intense-­r tiactivity-­3094901 Sri Lanka Press Institute. (2019a). RTI helps get details of Nochchiyagama bi-road construction delay. Retrieved from Sri Lanka Press Institute. Sri Lanka Press Institute. (2019b). RTI Helps clear garbage dumping issue in Balapitiya. Retrieved from Sri Lanka Press Institute: https://rtisrilanka.lk/ en/rti-­helps-­clear-­garbage-­dumping-­issue-­in-­balapitiya Sri Lanka Press Institute. (2019c). RTI in action- Sri Murugan road repaired following an RTI application filed to the divisional secretariat. Retrieved from Sri Lanka Press Institute: https://rtisrilanka.lk/en/rti-­in-­action-­sri-­muruganroad-­repaired-­following-­an-­r ti-­application-­filed-­to-­the-­divis

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The Morning. (2022a, August 6). Sunny side up: PM’s office spent over Rs. 26 Million. Retrieved from The Morning: https://www.themorning.lk/ mrs-­2021-­trip-­to-­italy-­pms-­office-­spent-­over-­rs-­26-­million/a The Morning. (2022b, October 27). Police ordered to reveal tear gas truth before 14 November. Retrieved from The Morning: https://www.themorning.lk/ police-­ordered-­to-­reveal-­tear-­gas-­truth-­before-­14-­november/ The Sunday Times. (2017). Airline pilots guild goes to the RTI Commission. Retrieved from The Sunday Times: https://www.sundaytimes.lk/171224/ news/airline-­pilots-­guild-­goes-­to-­the-­r ti-­commission-­274514.html Transparency.org. (2020, September 28). Watching over citizens’ right to information: How a right to information law improved the Daily lives of Sri Lankans. Retrieved from Transparency.org: https://www.transparency.org/en/blog/ watching-­over-­citizens-­right-­to-­information# UN. (1994). Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, (E/CN.4/1995/32). UN. UNDP. (2022). Review of legislation for consistency with the RTI legal regime. Retrieved from https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/lk/ UNDPLKA---Review-of-Sri-Lankas-RTI-Regime.pdf Accessed 10/2/2023 Zafarullah, N., & Siddique, H. (2021). Open government and the right to information: Implications for transparency and accountability in Asia. Public Administration and Development, 41(4), 157–168.

PART IV

Middle East

CHAPTER 15

An Analysis of Digital Transformation in Public Organizations: The Case of the United Arab Emirates Abu Elias Sarker, Mohammad Habibur Rahman, and M. Rezaul Islam

Introduction Public organizations in the contemporary world face numerous challenges primarily because of unpredictable and turbulent environments. Diverse problems confronting the public sector are also complex, and mere A. E. Sarker (*) University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE e-mail: [email protected] M. H. Rahman Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government, Dubai, UAE e-mail: [email protected] M. R. Islam University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE Institute of Social Welfare & Research, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_15

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transformations in structure, processes, and functions are inadequate to withstand the wicked problems. Historically, public organizations were wary of technology. The triumph of technology, particularly information and communication technology (ICT) in the corporate sector, is an opener for public sector reformers. ICT has now become integral to public management’s theoretical and practical domains (Eom & Lee, 2022). Reform in public management is a continuous process. Public sector reforms in the past mainly focused on incremental changes in the structure and processes. In the late 1970s, the protagonists of the neo-liberal market ideology identified the overburdened state and the rent-seeking and inefficient bureaucracy as the two critical problems confronting the public sector. They came up with radical reform programs, including the privatization of various forms, the implantation of managerial principles in managing public services and good governance. With the pace of globalization, reform programs gradually expanded throughout the world. While radical managerial reforms were still in place, ICT entered the domain of public sector reform discourse in the 1990s. Business process reengineering (BPR) made inroads into the public sector facilitated by ICT.  Since then, governments around the world have not looked back. Different phrases such as e-government, smart government, and digital government are in vogue. ICT has recently been a catalyst for the digitalization of public services worldwide. This chapter aims to explore the dynamics of digitalization or digital transformation in public organizations in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which has been one of the early adopters of ICT in public service in the 1990s. Since then, the country has effectively managed the public service delivery system. This chapter highlights the digital transformation journey of the UAE, its enablers, and the outcomes regarding open government (OG).

Digital Transformation and Open Government: A Theoretical Appraisal of Concepts, Promises, and Contexts Common terms in ICT and public management literature include e-­government, digitization, digitalization, GovTech, and digital transformation. Despite semantic differences pertaining to the meaning, the application of digital technologies to solve public service problems is implied in

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all phrases. This chapter prefers to adopt digital transformation as the focus of analysis as it entails a more holistic approach than other concepts. Danielsen (2021: 318) states that digital transformation emphasizes organizational and societal changes and ‘transforms organizations and societies by implementing digital technologies.’ Vial (2019: 121) defines digital transformation as ‘a process that aims to improve an entity by triggering significant changes to its properties through combinations of information, computing, communication, and connectivity technologies.’ Several advanced technologies, including artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, internet of things (IoT), cloud and cybersecurity, automation, big data, and advanced analytics, have been utilized by public organizations to enhance the public service delivery system (Gilchrist, 2016). Public sector entities have recently initiated plans to embrace digital transformation to enhance efficiency (Hesse, 2018). As a result, organizations have been pushed to change their value-generation methods to stay competitive, incorporating a range of digital solutions (Vial, 2019). Though most recent studies have focused on the technical aspects of digital transformation (Henriette et al., 2015), some have emphasized the importance of organizational change to achieve this goal effectively (Duerr et al., 2017).

Conceptual Trajectory: Digital Transformation The digitalization of the public sector has its roots in e-government, and diverse models have proliferated since the beginning of the new millennium. These models focus specifically on the growth stages of e-­government. The model developed by Layne and Lee (2001) became quite popular in 2001, and it entailed four stages: 1. Publishing: Basic data and information are available on the web portals of the organizations. 2. Interaction: Websites allow downloading and printing of various documents and enable communication with clients and employees. 3. Transaction: Fully-fledged online services, including online submission and payment, are available. 4. Transforming: Representation of the long-term objectives of e-­government, allowing integrated services on the “one stop shop” principle.

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Since 2001, over a dozen stage models have emerged. For example, Chasin and Scholta (2015) suggest five stages in these models: (1) websites with relevant information, (2) communication with clients through electronic channels, (3) online transactions, (4) delivery of integrated e-government services, and (5) e-democracy. Several inferences can be drawn from these models. First, there is flexibility for public managers to improvise at any stage of the adopted model. Secondly, these models have different dimensions with scholars employing different perspectives. These dimensions include citizen/service and operation/technology, integration and technological and organizational complexity, time/complexity/integration and benefits/costs, and benefits and e-government sophistication. Thirdly, the stage models are essentially technology-oriented and devoid of critical factors such as governance, contexts, and change management (Scholta et al., 2019). Recently, the World Bank has developed a unique model known as GovTech, which is used for measuring the maturity of digital transformation in the public sector. According to Dener et al. (2021), ‘GovTech is a whole-of-government approach to public sector modernization that promotes simple, efficient, and transparent government with the citizen at the centre of reforms.’ The model entails four main areas: (a) supporting core government systems, (b) enhancing public service delivery, (c) mainstreaming citizen engagement, and (d) fostering GovTech enablers. In certain areas of public service delivery, the digital transformation of government has proven its effectiveness. Increasing efficiency and effectiveness in terms of cost-effectiveness, resource utilization, and speed in delivering services is evident in the extant literature. Digitizing public services has many positive outcomes for all stakeholders, including citizens, businesses, and social organizations. Multiple stakeholders can quickly and easily access the necessary data. It has expanded the internal decision-­ making process and relevant safety and security issues and facilitated intra-­ organizational coordination and collaborative governance with third parties. The number of global databases that allow for direct comparison and individual country studies using empirical methods has increased (see, United Nations, 2021). Open Government OG is deeply rooted in the principles of transparency, participation, and accountability (Moon, 2020). It is an old concept and a hallmark of liberal

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democracy. Openness in terms of transparency, accountability, and citizens’ right to information (RTI) has always been a normative concern (Tai, 2021; Geiger & Von Lucke, 2012). There is consensus in defining OG as data dissemination (vision) and civic participation (voice) (Yu & Robinson, 2012; Meijer et al., 2012). However, since the beginning of the new millennium, ICT has further reinforced the normative aspirations of openness of governmental affairs. Moon (2020) identifies new dimensions of OG—open government initiative, open data initiative, digitalized connectible and reusable data and information, interactivity (participation and collaboration), accountability and coproduction (co-designers and co-deliverers), and networked collaborative governance. Although empirical evidence on the effects of the new dimensions of OG has been scarce, scholars have deliberated on these shifts’ theoretical and empirical implications. In addition, most empirical studies have been conducted mainly in advanced countries. Aitamurto and Landemore (2016) found the usefulness of public deliberation in Finland’s online crowdsourced legislative reform. de Kool and Bekkers (2015) discovered a positive relationship between the presence of online portals for government schools in Germany and the frequency with which parents visited the portals. On the other hand, the study also found an association between frequent visits and perceived low performance of schools. Both internally and externally, OG initiatives were revealed to be catalysts for innovation in public agencies. Internally, OG initiatives include instilling a service culture and revamping procedural changes; externally, it facilitates new public services and website applications (Mergel et al., 2018). There are still many unanswered questions about the actual impact of OG. Tai (2021: 8) observes that ‘a common research finding is that practitioners tend to invest more resources in achieving a higher level of transparency or in working on information dissemination; however, they neglect the fact that OG initiatives also require informed citizens to have access to either public participation or public service delivery processes.’ At the theoretical level, there are many promises of OG initiatives, including social prosperity, personal freedom, social capital, education, and economic development. However, its noble goals may remain unfulfilled if robust institutions and pathways are not in place. Establishing the rule of law and controlling corruption is paramount to realizing the great potential that OG can offer (Mergel et al., 2018; Lee et al. 2019).

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Conceptual Appraisal A key area of the GovTech model focuses on fostering the enablers for the success of public sector digital transformation. Some enablers are not difficult to develop, including the development of appropriate legal frameworks and regulations and the availability of sufficient digital skills (Dener et al. 2021). Some other enablers, such as the regime type, the level of economic development, and sociocultural values, are hard to ignore as these may facilitate or impede the adoption and implementation of digital initiatives. A common misnomer is that states with advanced economies, liberal democracy and rational sociocultural values are better at achieving tangible outcomes of the digital intervention, including OG initiatives. However, numerous empirical research studies nullify the above assumption and provide evidence that positive outcomes are possible in many countries without democracy (Elnaghi et al. 2019; Maerz, 2016; Stier, 2015; Ingrams et  al., 2020). In addition, for OG to be effective, there must be both supply- and demand sides of the exchange of information (Porumbescu et al., 2020; Pasquier & Villeneuve, 2017). The supply side stipulates that governments deliberately disseminate required data and information on the digital platform for use and reuse by stakeholders, including the citizenry. On the other hand, the demand side implies the pressures the stakeholders exert for necessary data and information. Many countries have enacted the right-to-information (RTI) legislation though its implementation remains an intriguing issue. In fact, the poor state of RTI laws and other forms of civic activism are still glaring problems in several nations (Relly et al., 2020). Furthermore, while civic engagement via the digital platform is explicitly mentioned in policy documents, the saga of digital transformation is driven by the imperative of economic growth rather than democratic ethos. The supply side of public communication and developmentalism lend legitimacy to non-democratic regimes (Maerz, 2016). In 2011, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) was established to spearhead the OG movement for transparency, accountability, civic participation, and reduction of corruption. Since its inception, 77 governments, 20 local governments, and many civil society organizations have joined OGP. According to the latest report (OGP, 2019: 18), ‘civil liberties (the core of civic space) continue to experience a steady erosion, even in OGP countries. A 2018 OGP report found that nearly half of OGP countries had problems in (sic) each of the basic freedoms of assembly,

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association, and expression, as well as the fundamental rights that make transparency, participation, and accountability work.’

Digital Transformation and Open Government in the UAE This section deliberates on the anatomy of digital transformation and OG in the UAE. It reflects on the politico-administrative context, background, and current state of digital transformation and open government. Politico-Administrative System The UAE is an oil-rich country in the Arabian Gulf. It is a federal state with seven local governments or Emirates—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah, Fujairah, and Um Ul Qayen. The federation came into existence in 1971, and the constitution clearly demarcates the responsibilities between the federal and local governments. The system of governance is a blend of tradition and modernity. The conventional monarchical system prevails, while the administrative arm of government entails the precepts of the Western system (Saker & Alathmay, 2018). Since independence in 1971, the country has attained a remarkable level of social and economic transformations. The UAE state is characterized in different ways—clientelist, paternalistic, authoritarian developmental, and so forth (Mansour, 2018; Hividt, 2009; Gupta et al., 2012; Wright, 2021). Despite its clientelist authoritarian slant, transformations in the social, economic, and knowledge-based sectors have been remarkable. This fit resembles the dynamics of developmental states in East Asia to a large extent (Saker & Alathmay, 2018; Wright, 2021). Policy, Programs, and Performance In their seminal paper, Dunleavy et al. (2006) underscored the need for comprehensive application of IT in the public service delivery system. Interestingly, the UAE government contemplated this at the beginning of the new millennium. The government commenced the e-government journey by launching eDirham to collect fees online for public services, and the first e-government portal was established in 2005. The comprehensive strategy of 2012–2014 had as its strategic goals- the developing of

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advanced IT infrastructure, promoting e-readiness in government agencies, advancing and raising the e-transformation levels in public services, and fostering inter-organizational collaboration (Rahman et al., 2016). With the initial success of e-government initiatives, the government enacted a comprehensive strategy for digital transformation. It enhanced its drive towards user happiness, enabling shared services, developing capabilities of government agencies, and establishing a conducive environment for “smart” and mobile government. The UAE aspires to be ranked first in the world for online services by providing a world-class digital infrastructure, a unified digital platform and common digital enablers, a global digital infrastructure, integrated government systems and automated services, raising the level of digital capabilities and skills, legislation readiness to ensure a smooth and comprehensive digital transformation, and increasing the efficiency of government work (see Table 15.1). Most Arab countries have no strong or united plans or strategies regarding OG. Some, however, have partial or comprehensive national plans that include the implementation of some dimensions of OG (Table  15.2), while still others are in the process of setting such strategies, and six Arab countries (Jordan, Tunisia, Sudan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen) have confirmed “Access to information” laws. Most of these initiatives and programs are part of standing e-government projects, not part of any government strategy towards OG. The aim is either to increase openness through the launch of open data or to increase public engagement through social media (Idlebi, 2019). The UAE government has attained considerable progress in its drive towards digital transformation of public services. Comparative datasets from various international organizations and empirical studies provide glimpses of the government’s achievements. The United Nations E-Government Survey is an authentic study that reflects on the effectiveness of e-governments in the delivery of government services and identifies patterns in the development and performance of the digital government. The 2022 edition of the survey shows that the UAE is among the top 13 countries globally and ranked 1st in the Arab region and 3rd in Asia. Table  15.3 indicates the UAE’s rank in the UN E-Government Survey (EGDI) in 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022. It should be mentioned here that the UAE has attained the “very high” (VH) rating for the first time in 2022. Additionally, the UAE is ranked 1st globally in “content provision” and “institutional framework,” which are sub-indices of the “Online Service Index” (OSI). The country is ranked

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Table 15.1  The UAE strategy for government digital transformation 2021–2025 Indicators

Policy strategies

Objectives

Dimensions

Leaving no one behind

Inclusiveness of participation of all agencies. Inclusive and overcoming digital divide among aged, disabled, women, and children Leveraging emerging technologies to build capabilities in anticipation of disasters and proactive respond in crisis Promoting cross-sectoral and inter-ministerial coordination and collaboration, setting national priorities, and engaging relevant stakeholders Inclusive mechanisms for more user-driven, people’ needs and convenience for shaping processes, services and policies, and adopting Embedded policies with “digital” as a mandatory transformative element. Data as a key strategic asset in generating public value by rules and ethical principles for trustworthy and safe reuse Making government data and policy-making processes available for public engagement Ability of governments and civil servants to anticipate people’s needs and respond to them rapidly enough A world-class digital infrastructure. A unified digital platform and common digital enablers. Integrated, easy, and fast digital services designed based on the needs of customers. Digital capabilities and skills. Legislation readiness to ensure a smooth and comprehensive digital transformation. Efficiency of government work Unified digital platform. Shared digital enabler. Digital infrastructure and services. Digital engagement. Digital capacity. Laws, policies, and standard

Resilient

Fit for the digital age User-driven

Digital by design Data-driven

Open by default Proactiveness

Objectives and priorities

Create a broad cross-sectoral government commitment and embedding digital strategies

Road map

Comprises six main pillars that encompass 64 national digital enablers

(continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Indicators

Policy strategies

Objectives

Strategic KPIs

Public satisfaction

Citizen satisfaction towards digital government services. Businesses satisfaction towards digital government services Percentage of services listed on the unified digital platform. Percentage of services digitized (end-to-end). Services that require personal verification offer a digital option. Services that require a manual signature offer a digital option Workforce in the federal government trained on digital government capabilities and standards. Federal government workforce that has basic digital knowledge. Workforce in the federal government trained in modern technologies Percentage of transactions completed digitally end to end Engage, motivate, build commitment, and mobilize resources Execute the transformation agenda Organizational capacity, decision-making rules, and managerial actions aligned with strategic goals, as well as legal frameworks Legislation, administrative regulations, guidelines, and standards comply with transforming digital services Emerging technologies deliver of programs and services through digital platforms Increase security mechanisms to ensure protections to sensitive information, including private citizen information Emergent technologies for governments to transform digital services

Complete digital transformation

Digital capabilities

Digital adoption Maturity model

Leadership Strategy Governance Legal Technology Cybersecurity

Specific technologies and new trends Ministry/agency specific Commitment to 100% SDGs transformation toward electronic lifestyle for bridging digital divide and reducing inequality

Ministry/authority reflect some primary functions provided digitally Computerizing public administration. Adoption of e-services. E-services for rural areas. Satisfaction with the UAE digital government services. Satisfaction with online mobile services. Content for people of determination. Smartphone and useful sage. Education. Access (continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Indicators

Policy strategies

Objectives

Alignment with national development strategies

Unified Digital Platform Policy The UAE Strategy for Government Services

Provide all government services from one unified platform Provide 90% of the public services through a single digital platform by 2023, all government services will be accessible from anywhere and at any time Build the capacities of members of the community and enable them to use the Internet in a responsible manner, positive digital values and behaviors Forecast the future of all priority sectors and draft plans and policies Full-vision plan that extends for five decades after 2021 Boost government performance at all levels and use an integrated smart digital system to overcome challenges and provide quick efficient solutions Make the UAE, a leading global hub and an open lab for the Fourth Industrial Revolution’s applications Enhance proactive digital services, improve user experience in getting digital government services, raise government efficiency in providing services, enable integration and connection of digital systems of federal government entities, and raise trust in digital government services Launched on KidX, a digital platform for children aims to increase children’s participation in understanding the role of the government and improving them Establish a national platform for innovation, communication, and learning; encourage the community to take the spirit of initiative; try out new models of government for serving society; test advanced economic patterns and lay the groundwork to create new sectors; achieve scientific breakthroughs that focus on the welfare of people; and collaborate with leading international institutions and companies specialized in the field of innovation

National Policy for Quality of Digital Life Future Foresight Strategy The UAE Centennial 2071 The UAE Strategy for Artificial Intelligence Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) Strategy Digital Customer and Digital Government Service Policy

Gamification

National Strategy for Advanced Innovation

(continued)

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Table 15.1 (continued) Indicators

Policy strategies

Objectives

Alignment with local e-government development strategies

Abu Dhabi Digital Transformation Strategy Smart Dubai 2021 Strategy

Focused on government services and solutions, data and applied technologies, governance, and ecosystem enablement Smart, liveable, and resilient city, globally competitive economy powered by disruptive technologies, interconnected society with easily accessible social services, smooth transport driven by autonomous and shared mobility solutions, clean environment enabled by cutting-edge ICT innovations, and digital, lean connected government Achieve a 100% digital transformation of government services by the end of 2018, achieve a digital transformation of joint government services by the end of 2018, adopt 80% of digital services by 2021, complete digital transformation of 30 priority government services every 100 days, and raise financial efficiency of government services by at least 20% by the end of 2021 Implement comprehensive structural development through programs and initiatives which support customers’ happiness and satisfaction by offering excellent comprehensive services and accelerating transformation towards e-government Summarized in writing and published, that allows live, time-bound testing of innovations under a regulator’s oversight aims for novel financial products, technologies, and business models can be tested under a set of rules, supervision requirements, and appropriate safeguards

Ajman Digital Masterplan 2017–2022

Umm Al Quwain Vision 2021

Regulatory sandboxes

Source: The Government of United Arab Emirates (2022). The UAE Digital Government Strategy 2025. Available online at: https://u.ae/en/about-­the-­uae/digital-­uae/uae-­national-­digital-­government-­ strategy Retrieved 22 October 2022

fourth in investment in telecommunications services. The Survey mentions that ‘the [UAE] Government defines itself as the world’s first 100 per cent paperless Government—a feat achieved through the full digitalization of the education, health, community development, economy and security sectors’ (UN, 2022, p. 70).

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Table 15.2  Current digital and open government initiatives in the UAE Name of initiative

Activities

Federal law 1/2006 on Electronic Commerce and Transactions

Combatting cybercrimes that includes articles related to personal data protection 5/2012 on Access to information regulated by a guide Law 26/2015 on the Organization of Dubai Data Publication and Sharing Law 21/2001) on freedom of communication by means of post, telegraph, or other means of communication and guarantees their confidentiality Penal Code (Federal Law 3/1987) on sanctions related to corruption

E-government

Smart Dubai. Smart Abu Dhabi. Smart Sharjah. Smart Fujairah. Quick access to information without the need to visit government entities or their websites Abu Dhabi TAMM portal Access to 350 government services and Dubai Business Ledger on Blockchain, online court audience Electronic ID cards, Smart pass to access e-government services, and a UAE Pass App

Open data portals

Health, education, government human resources and employment, social affairs, labor and private sector establishments, finance affairs, environment, and justice

OGD portal (BAYANAT.AE)

Offering more than 2500 datasets covering various areas such as food security, economy, agriculture, health, education, technology and transportation, and others

Ma’an, Department of Community Development in Abu Dhabi Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) for data for happiness and wellbeing

Bringing together the government, the private sector, and civil society to support a culture of social contribution and participation The UAE golden Jubilee. Digital transformation. Technology for the financial markets. Security, safety, and justice. Smart sustainable cities. Travel and tourism. Education. Healthcare. Work efficiency and productivity

Fujairah Municipality Data

Municipality’s desire for continuous development by providing data and information needed for citizens in a transparent and smooth manner

Source: Developed by the authors based on OECD/UN ESCWA (2021). The Economic and Social Impact of Open Government: Policy Recommendations for the Arab Countries, OECD Public Governance Reviews, OECD Publishing, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/6b3e2469-­en

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Table 15.3  The UAE’s rank in the UN E-Government Survey (EGDI) Index E-Government Development Index (EGDI) Online Services Index (OSI) E-Participation Index Telecommunication Infrastructure Index (TII)

Rank in 2016

Rank in 2018

Rank in 2020

Rank in 2022

29

21

21

13

8 32 25

6 17 2

8 16 7

12 18 9

Source: UN (2022) https://desapublications.un.org/sites/default/files/publications/2022-­09/Web% 20version%20E-­Government%202022.pdf

According to the World Bank report, the UAE is one of the most mature countries in citizen-centric online public services in the Middle East and North Africa region. According to the report (Dener et al. 2021), The government uses a digital government maturity model as a unified reference to assess its own digital maturity. The United Arab Emirates also publishes its citizen engagement performance and has a dedicated website, mSurvey, that allows the public to articulate their opinions easily and to provide feedback transparently on policies and various development issues.

Table 15.4 shows the very high scores in all dimensions of the GovTech maturity index and component score for the UAE. The UAE is ranked in the “A” category and one of the top 11 countries with outstanding credentials. The above findings are further corroborated by numerous empirical studies. A study by Ahmad and Khalid (2017) shows that the end users are technology-savvy and keen to adopt m-government services as facilitated by the availability of mobile devices, mobile internet, and mobile net applications (Yaghi & Al-Jenaibi, 2017). The UAE showcases an interface between leadership and technological splurge in enhancing smart, digitalized services. A case study on Dubai Court by AlAli shows an encouraging digitalization process and its impact on employee performance and concludes that the implementation of electronic notification system has a positive impact on employees’ performance as they would spend less time on administrative tasks. However, the researcher envisages that the sustainable success of technological change in Dubai Court would depend on the nature of work in each department,

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Table 15.4 GovTech maturity index and component scores for the United Arab Emirates, 2020

Type of index GTMI = GovTech Maturity Index CGSI = Core Government Systems Index PSDI = Public Service Delivery Index CEI = Citizen Engagement Index GTEI = GovTech Enablers Index

345

Average score

UAE score

0.52 0.48

0.80 0.60

0.61 0.46 0.53

0.92 0.88 0.79

Source: World Bank (2021: 70)

the acceptance of systemic changes by employees, and so on. The study recommended drawing up strategies, regulations, and training employees (AlAli, 2020). Another study by Rahman and Sarker examines how the UAE leadership seizes the opportunity of blending a diffusion of technological advancement and institutional changes in spearheading an agile and citizen-­centric public service delivery. Based on a case study on Dubai Government Excellence Program towards the Elite Model of excellence, which is built on the success of the Fourth-Generation excellence framework, the researchers perceive how data science and artificial intelligence (AI), organizational agility and partnership inspire the public organizations to embrace the momentum of change in digital process. The study on this diffusion process concludes that digital transformation practices in the UAE could inspire digital reform initiatives in the Arab region (Rahman & Sarker, 2021). Recent research on intellectual property (IP) protection vis-à-vis digitalization by AlFalasi and Rahman (2022) observes that under the federal government in the UAE, IP protection varies according to the local law of each state as well as local differences in law enforcement procedures. If an IP right (IPR) holder wishes to file an infringement case in Dubai, they must register the trademark certificate from the UAE Ministry of Economy (MoE) at three local government bodies, namely the Department of Economic Development (DED), the Dubai Police, and the Dubai Customs. The IPR protection services provided by the IP Department at DED were developed in three phases. At first, claimants had to visit the office several times to manually record the trademark file and submit whatever hard-copy documents were required. Meeting these obligations was time-consuming for both the complainant and DED staff, given the number of visits required for follow-up and to obtain the inspection report. In

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the second phase, IPR infringement complaint services were digitalized: Soft copies of documents were required rather than hard ones, and users filed complaint forms online. The third phase began with the launch of the IP Gateway, whereby delivering IPR protection against trademark infringement and commercial agency infringement complaints no longer requires any physical interaction and could be undertaken anywhere, anytime. IP protection service stakeholders range from commercial agents, brand owners and their advocates, and/or their representatives. The reforms implemented at the DED in the shape of the digital transformation of IP infringement services represent an attempt to introduce the smart services required under the Government of Dubai’s paperless transaction strategy but also to ensure more efficient collection of fees, promote speed and accuracy, reduce the burden on operational resources, and extend availability. All these outcomes will boost national competitiveness, satisfy domestic businesses, and make the country more attractive to foreign investors. In consequence, creativity and innovation will be fostered across all IPR-related fields, including manufacturing, the arts, knowledge generation, invention, media, and trademarks (AlFalasi & Rahman, 2022). The UAE digital transformation has demonstrated its efficacy in handling major crises like the Covid-19 pandemic. Contemporary research suggests that despite being authoritarian, many countries, including the UAE government, aptly applied ICT in each step of crisis management (Serikbayeva et  al., 2021). The UAE digital transformative capacity has attained agility in responding to the crisis very swiftly and developing adaptive capacity in diverse sectors, particularly in public health, education, and business services (World Bank, 2021). Regarding the OG discourse, the UAE government is driven by the supply side in that the government is keen to share required data and information on the digital platform, which is facilitated by the Open Data Law and the engagement of administrators and political leaders with citizenry (Biygautane & Al-Taee, 2015)

Discussion and Conclusion Since the 1980s, three critical developments such as globalization, the marketization of state and society, and ICT have overwhelmed social and economic transformations all over the world. The rubric and modus operandi have undergone astounding changes in the public domain. This chapter has deliberated on the implications of the developments of ICT

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for the public service delivery system with reference to the UAE.  The UAE government has become one of the high-performing countries in managing public affairs through the digital platform. It commenced its digital transformation journey at the beginning of the new millennium. Instead of shying away from the global trends of economic liberalization, globalization, the ruling elites of the UAE embarked on massive public management reforms and availed themselves of the opportunity to intensify economic development. ICT emerged as a critical enabler for state-­ driven development and legitimacy on both the domestic and international frontiers (Stier, 2015; Maerz, 2016). The UAE government prioritized the ICT sector and gradually developed the pathways to digital transformation through critical interventions. From e-government, it embarked on smart government followed by mobile government. Now, the government has deepened the initiatives to realize the digital transformation goals outlined in the Digital Transformation Strategy 2021–2025. The government is on the verge of developing agility which it has demonstrated in tackling the Covid-19 pandemic (Rahman & Sarker, 2021). Despite very good performance, some grey areas remain, including capacity and institutional vacuum (Yaghi & Al-Jenaibi, 2017). Technology is not value-free. It must resonate with the socio-political imperatives of a country. There is no doubt that ICT has been a tremendous boon for humankind. It has revolutionized all segments of society. In the context of public service, ICT has shown great potential to neutralize the curse of red-tape and enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery. In terms of the administrative and political frontiers, transparency, citizen engagement, and accountability are assumed to be accelerated by the digital platform. Here comes the issue of OG. The OG literature presupposes the existence of transparency of governmental activities, active civic engagement in public affairs, and accountability. It has been mentioned that except for the RTI law, the UAE government has progressed considerably towards OG. Here, the OG concept is considered a supply-driven system. For that purpose, various forms of open data platforms and engagement with the citizenry are already in place. For example, one of the outcomes of open government is the reduction of corruption. The UAE’s record in controlling corruption is exemplary, as attested by numerous surveys conducted by the World Bank (2022), Transparency International (2022), and World Justice Project (2022). According to the Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project, the UAE

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is ranked 39th among 139 countries. Of the eight factors measuring the rule of law, the OG score is very low largely because of the absence of an RTI law (World Justice Project (2022). In addition, trust in government, implicit in OG, is also very impressive in the UAE (Lu et al., 2019). This chapter has unveiled the trajectory of the digital transformation journey of the UAE government. It has sought to argue that developmentalism is the cornerstone of the UAE government’s digital transformation, including open data. Despite some lacunas, the overall performance is impressive, yet it is impractical to expect radical reforms. However, the UAE government has adopted an incremental approach to the prevailing socio-political imperatives of the country.

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Dener, C., Nii-Aponsah, H., Ghunney, L. E., & Johns, K. D. (2021). GovTech maturity index: The state of public sector digital transformation. World Bank Publications de Kool, D., & Bekkers, V. (2015). The perceived impact of open inspection data on the quality of education in Dutch primary schools: A parent perspective. Social Science Computer Review, 33(5), 645–659. Duerr, S., Wagner, H. T., Weitzel, T., & Beimborn, D. (2017, February 12–15). Navigating digital innovation  – The complementary effect of organizational and knowledge recombination. In Wirtschaftsinformatik proceedings (pp.  1363–1377). https://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036 &context=wi2017 Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2006). New public management is dead—long live digital-era governance. Journal of public administration research and theory, 16(3), 467–494. Elnaghi, M., Alshawi, S. N., Kamal, M. M., Weerakkody, V., & Irani, Z. (2019). Exploring the role of a government authority in managing transformation in service re-engineering–Experiences from Dubai police. Government Information Quarterly, 36(2), 196–207. Eom, S.  J., & Lee, J. (2022). Digital government transformation in turbulent times: Responses, challenges, and future direction. Government Information Quarterly, 39(2), 101690. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2022.101690 Geiger, C.  P., & Von Lucke, J. (2012). Open government and (linked)(open) (government)(data). JeDEM-eJournal of eDemocracy and open Government, 4(2), 265–278. Gilchrist, A. (2016). Industry 4.0: The industrial internet of things. Apress. https:// doi.org/10.1007/978-­1-­4842-­2047-­4 Gupta, V. K., Yayla, A. A., Sikdar, A., & Cha, M. S. (2012). Institutional environment for entrepreneurship: Evidence from the developmental states of South Korea and United Arab Emirates. Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship, 17(03), 1250013. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1084946712500136 Henriette, E., Feki, M., & Boughzala, I. (2015). The Shape of Digital Transformation: A Systematic Literature Review. MCIS 2015 Proceedings, 10. Retrieved from http://aisel.aisnet.org/mcis2015/10 Hesse, A., (2018). Digitalization and Leadership - How Experienced Leaders Interpret Daily Realities in a Digital World. Proceedings of the 51st Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. Retrieved from https://pdfs. semanticscholar.org/1dd7/ecf8848e172c87ac569d57ede8cff5898429.pdf Hvidt, M. (2009). The Dubai model: An outline of key development-process elements in Dubai. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 41(3), 397–418. Idlebi, N. (2019). Can open government be implemented in the Arab world? Towards a policy roadmap (DPR-EN-008, Vol 1). Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government.

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Ingrams, A., Manoharan, A., Schmidthuber, L., & Holzer, M. (2020). Stages and determinants of e-government development: A twelve-year longitudinal study of global cities. International Public Management Journal, 23(6), 731–769. Layne, K., & Lee, J. (2001). Developing fully functional E-government: A four stage model. Government Information Quarterly, 18(2), 122–136. Lee, S. Y., Díaz-Puente, J. M., & Martin, S. (2019). The contribution of open government to prosperity of society. International Journal of Public Administration, 42(2), 144–157. Lu, J., Qi, L., & Yu, X. (2019). Political trust in the internet context: A comparative study in 36 countries. Government Information Quarterly, 36(4), 101386. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2019.06.003 Maerz, S. F. (2016). The electronic face of authoritarianism: E-government as a tool for gaining legitimacy in competitive and non-competitive regimes. Government Information Quarterly, 33(4), 727–735. Mansour, A. M. (2018). The national policymaking style of the United Arab Emirates: Fusing patron–client networks into modernity. In: Howlett, M., & Tosun, J. (Eds.), Policy styles and policy-making (pp. 263–286). Routledge. Meijer, A.  J., Curtin, D., & Hillebrandt, M. (2012). Open government: Connecting vision and voice. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78(1), 10–29. Mergel, I., Kleibrink, A., & Sorvik, J. (2018). A framework for interpreting social media interactions in the public sector. Government Information Quarterly, 30(4), 327–334. Moon, M. J. (2020). Shifting from old open government to new open government: Four critical dimensions and case illustrations. Public Performance & Management Review, 43(3), 535–559. OGP (Open Government Partnership). (2019). Open government partnership global report. Vol. I.  Available online at https://www.opengovpartnership. org/wp-­content/uploads/2019/09/Global-­Report_Volume-­1.pdf. Retrieved 21 October 2022. Pasquier, M., & Villeneuve, J.-P. (2017). Marketing management and communications in the public sector (2nd ed.). Routledge. Porumbescu, G. A., Cucciniello, M., & Gil-Garcia, J. R. (2020). Accounting for citizens when explaining open government effectiveness. Government Information Quarterly, 37(2), 101451. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. giq.2019.101451 Rahman, M. H., & Sarker, A. E. (2021, November 12–14). Is agile government the new panacea? Lessons learnt from the UAE. NASPAA South Asia virtual conference 2021 preparing public leaders in South Asia for a post pandemic world. Rahman, M.  H., Albaloshi, S.  A., & Sarker, A.  E. (2016). From e-governance to smart governance: Policy lessons for the UAE. Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. https://doi.org/10.1007/9783-­319-­31816-­5_2482-­1

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Relly, J. E., Rabbi, M. F., Sabharwal, M., Pakanati, R., & Schwalbe, E. H. (2020). More than a decade in the making: A study of the implementation of India’s right to information act. World Development, 136, 105088. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105088 Sarker, A. E., & Al Athmay, A. A. A. R. A. (2018). The changing facets of public administration in The United Arab Emirates. International Journal of Public Administration, 41(10), 832–844. Scholta, H., Mertens, W., Kowalkiewicz, M., & Becker, J. (2019). From one-stop shop to no-stop shop: An e-government stage model. Government Information Quarterly, 36(1), 11–26. Serikbayeva, B., Abdulla, K., & Oskenbayev, Y. (2021). State capacity in responding to COVID-19. International Journal of Public Administration, 44(11–12), 920–930. Stier, S. (2015). Political determinants of e-government performance revisited: Comparing democracies and autocracies. Government Information Quarterly, 32(3), 270–278. Tai, K. T. (2021). Open government research over a decade: A systematic review. Government Information Quarterly, 38(2), 101566. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.giq.2021.101566 Transparency International. (2022). Corruption perception index. Available online at: https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2021?gclid=Cj0KCQjwqc6aBhC4ARIsAN06NmOkkOW ivK4T5QXK1R YeoANemNd3hPCVDx9AFwYHqz7a2EHf0YtNlCcaAgAPEALw_wcB. Retrieved 21 October 2022. United Nations (2021). National Institutional Arrangement fir implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals: A five-year stocking, Public Sector Report. Retrieved from https://publicadministration.un.org/en/Research/ World-Public-Sector-Reports United Nations (UN) (2022). E-governance survey 2022 The Future of Digital Government, New York: United Nations. Vial, G. (2019). Understanding digital transformation: A review and a research agenda. The Journal of Strategic Information Systems, 28(2), 118–144. World Justice Project. (2022). WJP rule of law index. Available online at: https:// worldjusticeproject.org/rule-­of-­law-­index/. Retrieved 21 October 2022. Wright, S. (2021). Conceptualising Qatar’s political economy as a developmental state. In M. Zweiri & F. Al Qawasmi (Eds.), Contemporary Qatar: Examining state and society (Vol. 4, pp. 153–170). Springer. Yaghi, A., & Al-Jenaibi, B. (2017). Organizational readiness for E-governance: A study of public agencies in The United Arab Emirates. South Asian Journal of Management, 24(1), 7–31. Yu, H., & Robinson, D.  G. (2012). The new ambiguity of open government. UCLA Law Review Discourse, 59, 178–208. World Bank . Worldwide Governance Indicators, 21 October 2022 (2022).

CHAPTER 16

Assessing the Quality and Usability of Open Government Data Portals in the GCC Constituents Stuti Saxena and Charalampos Alexopoulos

Introduction Open Government (OG) is a recent phenomenon and has been gaining currency with the increasingly complex societal transformations with the ushering of the Society 5.0 and Industry 4.0 (Sołtysik-Piorunkiewicz & Zdonek, 2021). Hitherto, the governments would reserve their data in silos away from the public glare. On the call of the ex-President of the United States, Barack Obama, many countries across the globe sought to adopt the principles of OG, which promises transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and efficiency in public service delivery. One of the manifestations of OG is the provision of government/administrative data for

S. Saxena (*) Graphic Era University, Dehradun, Uttarakhand, India C. Alexopoulos University of the Aegean, Mytilene, Greece © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_16

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being reused by a diverse set of stakeholders (citizens, journalists, academia, farmers, non-profit sector, and the like) for value creation and innovation. This is termed Open Government Data (OGD). OGD is an advanced stage of the e-Government. OGD may be related to many administrative domains like environment, energy, transport, tourism, police, health, weather, etc. It is also referred to as Public Sector Information (PSI) or Open Public Data (OPD). A number of countries across the globe have rolled out the OGD initiative wherein online data is made accessible free of cost (in most cases) in user-friendly formats amenable to statistical interpretation. OGD is license-free, and there is no bar regarding the reuse and value creation via these datasets (Susha et  al., 2015a, b). OGD is also known to spur economic growth. Primarily speaking, there are eight principles on which the OGD initiatives rest: Data must be complete, primary, timely, accessible, machine processible, non-­ discriminatory, non-proprietary, and license-free. With the proliferation of OGD initiatives across the globe, research on the roll-out and implementation of these OGD initiatives has also witnessed appreciable growth. Studies on the drivers and barriers related to the OGD initiatives have been conducted spatially and temporally. However, the studies focusing on the OGD initiatives of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE)) are few and far between. The GCC countries have realized the potential benefits of OGD initiatives, and their step-by-step moves towards the rolling out and implementation of OGD initiatives are a testimony to that realization. Governments give incentives to provide the necessary impetus in this direction. For instance, the Government of Oman has reserved an award in the ‘open data’ category for its Sultan Qaboos Award for Excellence in eGovernment. Likewise, the Qatar Digital Government 2020 Strategy envisages government openness to invite the participation of different stakeholders to reuse OGD and study the trends meticulously for providing solutions to societal challenges. Similarly, in a bid to promote a digital knowledge economy, the UAE government believes in its OGD strategy to lay down the edifice for creating sustainable communities wherein the bulwark of the strategy shall rest upon the tenets of transparency and citizen participation. Similarly, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) believes that a sustained OGD initiative is required to realize its Vision 2030 for development and growth. Also, Kuwait counts the need for OGD initiative to benchmark its digital government initiative against international standards. In

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accordance with the Kingdom of Bahrain’s eGovernment Strategy, an Open Data Strategy has been developed to promote data reuse, improving people’s living standards while contributing to overall societal and economic development. In line with those described above, this chapter seeks to provide a comprehensive overview of the OGD initiatives of these countries by assessing the national OGD portals in line with qualitative benchmarks that are widely acclaimed in the extant literature (Máchová et al., 2018). The structure of the chapter is as follows: Following a brief review of the existing literature on OGD, an overview of the OGD portals of the GCC is provided. The findings are then summarized and concluding remarks provided, followed by a review of implications for academics and practitioners.

Related Research OGD is digital data made accessible for reuse and economic and social value creation by a diverse set of stakeholders (citizens, businesses, the non-profit sector, journalists, academia, and the like). However, for datasets that violate citizens’ privacy or security, OGD is made available through dedicated web portals as a ‘shared resource,’ implying that all may reuse these without discrimination under the terms of the Open Data License. To ensure proper dataset reuse, the OGD should be qualitatively superior, implying that the datasets are accurate, timely, and made available in machine-readable formats with appropriate metadata to support them. Seven distinguishing characteristics of OGD have been identified to assess their ‘openness’: availability, affordability, shareability, interoperability, usability, discoverability, and accessibility (Jetzek, 2016). There are several ways in which the OGD may be reused for social and economic value creation and innovation (Attard et al., 2016). For instance, citizens may assume the roles of consumers and producers of OGD and participate in public decision-making via crowdsourcing or acting as citizen journalists to report on significant matters. Likewise, the non-profit sector may identify relevant OGD for their purposes or act as intermediaries to impress upon citizens the importance of harnessing OGD in various ways. Furthermore, Private businesses, entrepreneurs, and the like can use the available OGD to better understand market segments, thereby creating jobs and bolstering the economy. Again, the academic community can use OGD obtained from government portals (election data, transportation

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data, and climate data, for example) to conduct research, thereby contributing to the knowledge and learning base that all can access. Likewise, the journalists tap OGD linked with crime, for instance, to prepare their reports and news items. Lastly, Citizens, such as farmers, may utilize OGD to gain a deeper understanding of a particular topic (fertilizer prices, for example) and base their decisions on OGD. Extant research on OGD unravels the appraisal of national OGD portals in terms of data, functionality, features, stakeholder participation, stakeholder feedback (Attard et al., 2015). There is ample literature on the barriers related to the release and publishing of datasets apart from those linked to the ability to reuse the datasets (McBride et  al., 2018). The OGD portals should be well-designed to provide high-quality and user-­ friendly datasets (Janssen et  al., 2012) so that these may be reused for value creation and innovation (Faini & Palmirani, 2016). The overarching aims and objectives of the OGD project are thwarted whenever the OGD portals are found to be of poor quality (Umbrich et  al., 2015). To put things in perspective, an OGD ecosystem should be in place for realizing the benefits of OGD initiatives (Dawes et al., 2016). For a critical overview of the OGD research so far, the works of Wirtz and his colleagues (2022) are important. Previously, research on OGD initiatives of the GCC region was scarce, with most of the OGD-focused research done in the West (see Table 16.1). It may be deduced from Table 16.1 that: (a) there has been selective research on the OGD initiatives of the GCC region; (b) that Given the gaps identified in the GCC region’s OGD initiatives, a review in the current context is warranted to determine whether there have been any improvements in the quality of the national OGD portals compared to what existed before.

Analytical Framework This study draws upon the highly cited framework of Máchová et  al. (2018) to evaluate the national OGD portals of the GCC. The framework has high validity because it is built on extensive OGD-related literature and has been used in several studies, demonstrating its utility (See for instance, Mutambik et al., 2021; Nikiforova & McBride, 2021; Saxena, 2019; Wang et  al., 2021).While the framework was initially applied in national OGD portals in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, India, and the United States, the framework’s raison d’être is that in order to

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Table 16.1  Extant literature on OGD initiatives of the GCC Author/s with year of publication

Context

Al Anazi and Middle East Chatfield (inclusive of all (2012) GCC constituents) Al-Kubaisi Qatar (2014) Sayogo, 35 countries Pardo, and including the Cook (2014) UAE Al Rushaid Saudi Arabia and Saudagar (2016) Saxena Oman (2016) Saxena Oman (2017a) Saxena (2017b) Saxena (2017c) Saxena (2017d) Tamimi et al. (2017)

GCC

Saxena (2018a) Saxena (2018b)

Oman

Al Kubaisi (2018)

Qatar

GCC GCC UAE

The Netherlands, Japan, Saudi Arabia

Findings

Out of the 13 countries under investigation, only 3 countries (UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain) have demonstrated the evidence of OGD implementation Citizen engagement via the national OGD portal is low The national OGD portal of the UAE does not provide the online facility to manipulate data and there are no features to facilitate the user engagement also There is a lack on the part of the government to introduce and drive home the benefits that may be possibly accrued by tapping the datasets There is ample scope for OGD if integrated with the Big Data analytics The national OGD portal of Oman needs to be improvised for ensuring that the quality is maintained for being reused by the concerned stakeholders OGD initiatives may help the GCC governments in realizing their vision of economic diversification OGD initiatives are at a nascent stage and much improvisation is required therein OGD initiatives in the GCC region need to further up their efforts at the institutionalization of these initiatives Whereas the datasets are complete, but the formats are not supportive for reuse. Also, API (Application Programming Interface) and guides are missing in a number of cases Challenges have been identified in the reuse of the datasets provided via the national open data portal Saudi Arabia, with its ‘collectivist’ and high ‘power distance’ score, is more reserved in implementing its open data initiative as compared with Japan or The Netherlands. Furthermore, with more degree of ‘uncertainty avoidance,’ Saudi Arabia prefers to remain on the safe side by publishing only those data sets that are non-controversial, insensitive, and readily available Qatar needs to chalk out a strategy for its OGD initiative to be a success and for increasing citizen engagement therein (continued)

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Table 16.1 (continued) Author/s with year of publication

Context

Findings

Al Kubaisi (2019) Katbi and Al Ammary (2019)

Qatar

Saxena (2019) Al Sukhayri et al. (2020)

Saudi Arabia

OGD initiative in the UK is far more advanced than that of Qatar OGD initiatives of Bahrain need to consider both supply and demand sides, assessing OGD initiative at all levels (national and local) and look into the quality issues related with the portal, data, and meta-data Datasets need to be updated and published on a timely basis Usability of the datasets is less owing to multiple formats of the datasets like Excel sheets, CSV files (Comma Separated Values), images, scanned documents, and social media sources such as Twitter Efforts on the part of the government should be more sincere and responsible to ensure increased consumption and reuse of OGD There are barriers to the reuse of OGD by the stakeholders-academia, in this case Identify the reasons as to why OGD is being tapped by some but not by the rest

Bahrain

Saudi Arabia

Katbi (2020) Bahrain

Abu Samra et al. (2021) Al Hujaylan et al. (2022)

UAE Saudi Arabia

ensure the usability of the OGD by the concerned stakeholders, the datasets must be easily discoverable, accessible, and reusable. Specifically, the framework seeks to evaluate the OGD portals based on three dimensions: (1) open data specification, which includes (a) description of data set, (b) publisher of data set, (c) thematic categories and tags, (d) release date and most recent status, (e) machine readable formats, (f) open data license, (g) visualization and analytics tools; (2) open data set feedback, which includes (a) documentation and tutorials, (b) forum and contact form, (c) user rating and comments, (d) social media and sharing; (3) open data set request, which includes such aspects as (a) request form, (b) list of requests, (c) involvement in the process. These dimensions underline the functionality of the portal and the feasibility of tapping the portals.

Results This section presents the results of the analysis in each country.

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National OGD Portal of Saudi Arabia If we look at the national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia (https://data.gov. sa/en/home), the objective of this initiative is “transparency… e-­ participation and (to) inspire innovation”(KSA Open Data, 2022). There is a provision to search for datasets with a caveat—that “data must not be used for political purposes, or to support illegal or criminal activity, or to be used in racist or discriminatory expressions, or in bringing about negative influence in culture or equality, or in provoking any behavior that is illegal or contrary to the customs and traditions of the Kingdom” (KSA Open Data, 2022). Nothing is on display at the ‘Privacy Policy’ link. The portal includes Arabic ‘guidelines’ on the benefits of OGD and how various stakeholders can use them. There are 6436 datasets across health, social services, education and training, social insurance, population, and housing, etc. (as of the date when the author accessed the portal). Datasets may be filtered through tags, organizations, groups, and formats and these may be accessed in Arabic and English languages. The national OGD portal may be appraised in terms of the benchmarks identified in the literature (Máchová et al., 2018) (see Table 16.2). National OGD Portal of Kuwait The OGD portal of Kuwait (https://e.gov.kw/sites/kgoenglish/Pages/ OtherTopics/OpenData.aspx) is a part of the Kuwait Government Online initiative (KGO) (KGO, 2022). Datasets regarding the population statistics, social statistics and services, Kuwait Fire Force, etc. along with the details of the publishers may be accessed via the portal. There is no provision to search or filter the datasets, however. In line with the indicators identified by Máchová and her colleagues (Máchová et  al., 2018), the national portal of Kuwait has been assessed (Table 16.3). National OGD Portal of UAE The national OGD portal of UAE (https://bayanat.ae/) (Bayanat.ae, 2022) aims to provide government data to promote transparency and increase citizen participation. It may be accessed in Arabic or English and has a ‘search’ option to look up a particular dataset. These are accessible across categories like food security, economy, education, environment, health, etc. In all, 2633 datasets shared by 48 organizations are accessible

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Table 16.2  Saudi Arabia’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. O  pen data specification (a) Description of data set (b) Publisher of data set (c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date (e) Machine readable formats (f)  Open data license (g) Visualization and analytics tools 2. Open data set feedback (a) Documentation and tutorials

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Not applicable

Comments Datasets’ description is conspicuously missing

Publisher’s information is provided Thematic categories and tags are provided Release date as well as the date of updation are provided Datasets are available in CSV, Excel, XML, PDF, and JSON formats There is a link to access the Open Data license but it doesn’t work There are provisions for drawing maps and graphs

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks A handbook is available alongside the FAQ to impress upon the stakeholders the utility of OGD (b) Forum and Contact forms are available to contact form hint at any technical issue, website feedback, etc. (c) User rating and User ratings and comments may comments be provided after creating an account on the portal (d) Social media and This provision is well in place sharing 3. Open data set Whether the datasets meet the request benchmarks (a) Request form There is a link to request datasets but the link ends up elsewhere (b) List of requests There is a list of requests provided on the portal (c) Involvement in Events and contests (bootcamps, the process workshops, etc.) are being organized from time to time Source: Machova et al. (2018)

PDFs are not amenable to statistical analysis and interpretation Open Data license should be provided The analytical tools need to be improvised to derive more value out of the datasets Comments Tutorials are not provided

There should be forums to discuss and deliberate upon the OGD

Comments Bottlenecks need to be redressed

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Table 16.3  Kuwait’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. O  pen data specification (a)  Description of data set (b) Publisher of data set

(c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date (e) Machine readable formats (f) Open data license (g) Visualization and analytics tools 2. Open data set feedback (a) Documentation and tutorials

(b) Forum and contact form (c) User rating and comments (d) Social media and sharing 3.   Open data set request (a) Request form (b) List of requests (c) Involvement in the process

Whether the datasets Comments meet the benchmarks Not applicable Data reeds to be described in terms of the metadata. Legends are conspicuously missing or inconsistent in many cases Links to the datasets have been provided alongside the publisher’s name Not applicable Datasets need to be sorted as per their themes and categories True in a few cases only Datasets are accessible as PDF, XLS formats

Complete information should be provided regarding the release and updation of the datasets User-friendly formats should be provided

Not applicable

Open Data license needs to be provided

Not applicable

Visualization and mapping tools need to be provided

Whether the datasets Comments meet the benchmarks Not applicable Documentation and tutorials need to be provided for generating awareness about the OGD initiative and the manner in which the data, may be reused for value creation and innovation Not applicable There is a need to address these issues Not applicable Not applicable

These issues need to be addressed

Tools for sharing the datasets via social media should be in place Whether the datasets Comments meet the benchmarks Not applicable This area merits a re-visit Not applicable This issue needs to be considered Not applicable This area requires redressal

Source: Machova et al. (2018)

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via the portal (Bayanat.ae, 2022), which may be filtered on the bases of contributory organization, theme, tag, or goals (viz., Sustainable Development Goals). The Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (FCSA) is responsible for the overall management and updating of the portal. The national OGD portal of the UAE has been appraised as below (Table 16.4). National OGD Portal of Oman The Sultanate of Oman is committed to the Open Data initiative under the overall supervision of the National Centre for Statistics & Information (NCSI). The national portal of Oman (https://data.gov.om/) (Data portal, 2022) mentions that datasets may be accessed free of cost, with a search provision. Datasets may be accessed across sectors like population, national accounts, housing, electricity, security, etc. In all, there are 39 datasets. The national OGD portal of Oman may be evaluated as below (Table 16.5). National OGD Portal of Bahrain The OGD portal of Bahrain (https://www.data.gov.bh/) is regulated by the Information & eGovernment Authority (Bahrain Open Data Portal, 2022). There is an option to search the datasets, a glossary of key terms is provided, and modules are there to enable learning about the portal and its utility. It is clearly stated that the datasets may be used for “accessing, copying, distribution, transmission, modification and adaptation... for commercial purposes or otherwise.” Datasets are available across topics like education, environment, finance, health, hotels, etc. The portal may be accessed in English or Arabic. An appraisal of the national OGD portal of Bahrain may be followed as below (Table 16.6). National OGD Portal of Qatar The purpose of the OGD strategy of the government of Qatar was to increase transparency and invite stakeholders to derive value from the open data. The OGD portal of Qatar (data.gov.qa) provides an option to ‘search’ the datasets, may be accessed across themes like population and vital statistics, finance and economy, environment and weather, sports, etc. (Qatar Open Data Portal, 2022). All 137 datasets may be accessed in

Table 16.4  UAE’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. O  pen data specification (a) Description of data set (b) Publisher of data set

Whether the datasets meet the benchmark This holds true for some cases only Not applicable

(c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date

Themes have been identified for the datasets

(e) Machine readable formats (f)  Open data license

Datasets may be accessed in XLS format

Not applicable

Comments Dataset description should be provided for all datasets Source of the dataset is missing unless the datasets are filtered on the basis of ‘organization’ on the homepage

Datasets do not have such details regarding their publication and update, if at all

Datasets are licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (g) Visualization Visualization and analytical Visualization, mapping, and and analytics tools are not provided statistical aids should be provided for tools conducting the statistical analysis 2. Open data set Whether the datasets meet Comments feedback the benchmarks (a) Documentation Guidelines are provided and tutorials regarding the possible reuse of datasets for value creation and innovation (b) Forum and Not applicable The forum to discuss open data is contact form not there and there is no contact form as such but for the postal address and telephone/fax details (c) User rating and Users may rate the datasets Provision should be made for comments but the option to comment commenting on the datasets on the datasets is not provided (d) Social media Datasets may be shared via and sharing social media 3. Open data set Whether the datasets meet Comments request the benchmarks (a) Request form Not applicable There is no form for requesting a particular dataset (b) List of requests Not applicable The list of requests for datasets is not provided in the portal (c) Involvement in Not applicable As such, there is no provision to the process secure citizen engagement Source: Machova et al. (2018)

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Table 16.5  Oman’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. O  pen data specification (a) Description of data set (b) Publisher of data set (c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date (e) Machine readable formats (f) Open data license

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Datasets are described in brief

Comments

Publisher information is provided This is true in all cases

Date of publication and date of updation are provided SDMX-JSON format is available Open Government License (Omanuna, 2012) is in place (g) Visualization and These provisions hold true for analytics tools a few datasets 2. Open data set Whether the datasets meet feedback the benchmarks (a) Documentation Introductory details are and tutorials provided regarding the Open Data initiative of the country (b) Forum and This provision holds true contact form (c) User rating and Not applicable comments (d) Social media and Datasets may be shared on sharing social media (Facebook and Twitter) 3. Open data set Whether the datasets meet request the benchmarks (a) Request form There is a provision to request datasets post-registration on the portal (b) List of requests Not applicable (c) Involvement in Very few events have been the process organized for furthering user engagement with the OGD Source: Machova et al. (2018)

Other user-friendly formats like XLS and CSV must be provided

Visualization and mapping tools need improvisation Comments

The possibility of rating and commenting upon the datasets should be explored

Comments

This aspect needs to be addressed Contests and activities need to be done on a regular basis for promoting user involvement

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Table 16.6  Bahrain’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. O  pen data specification (a) Description of data set (b) Publisher of data set (c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date (e) Machine readable formats

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Datasets are described in terms of the publishing agency/topic Not applicable Not applicable

Comments Description per dataset needs to be provided Dataset publisher details should be provided alongside the dataset Datasets need to meet this criteria

Not applicable

Dates of release are missing but the dates of release are yet to be provided Datasets may be accessed in PDF formats should be in user-­ XML, Doc, XLS, or PDF friendly formats. Some of the links to formats download the dataset are not working: This needs to be tackled (f) Open data Open Government Data A more detailed explanation is license Policy (Open Government required regarding the open data Data Policy, Bahrain, 2022) license as applicable for the datasets mentions this dimension provided vie the portal (g) Visualization This holds true for some cases Advanced tools and techniques are and analytics in a rudimentary form required for visualization and tools statistical analysis of all the datasets 2. Open data set Whether the datasets meet Comments feedback the benchmarks (a) Documentation Open Government Data and tutorials Policy (Open Government Data Policy, Bahrain, 2022) provides a brief regarding the potential utility of datasets (b) Forum and Contact details (email Contact form would be an easy way contact form address, postal address, and to communicate from the existing telephone) are provided details provided via the portal There should be a forum to discuss and deliberate upon the datasets and their usage (c) User rating Not applicable User ratings and feedback and comments mechanisms must be in place for appreciating if the value of the OGD initiative is percolating among the stakeholders (continued)

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Table 16.6 (continued) (d) Social media and sharing

Not applicable

3. Open data set request (a) Request form

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks For requesting a dataset, the authorities may be contacted via email Not applicable

(b) List of requests (c) Involvement in the process

Not applicable

Tools for sharing datasets via social media should be provided via the portal Comments Request farm should be provided in addition to the email address for quick disposal of requests This aspect needs to be worked upon by the government authorities Events should be held to understand if the stakeholders are able to derive value from these datasets

Source: Machova et al. (2018)

formats like XLS, CSV, or RDF. These datasets are published by authorities like Planning and Statistics Authority, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Culture and Sports, Civil Aviation Authority, etc. (Table 16.7).

Accumulative Findings Several inferences may be drawn from the previous sections. The national OGD portal of Saudi Arabia only provides datasets in Arabic, thereby making it difficult to reuse them by a more interested group of stakeholders. More regularly updated datasets need to be made available on the portal. There is also a need to provide advanced statistical tools to appreciate the datasets better. The national OGD portal of Kuwait does not exist per se, and only a page is dedicated for this. Datasets may be accessed by tapping the links, but some of these links do not work. There are very few datasets on the portal, and most are not updated. Not all the departments and ministries have contributed to the portal. The national OGD portal of the UAE merits major revisions and improvisation in line with the internationally acclaimed quality benchmarks. Not all the ministries and departments have contributed to the portal. Datasets mostly relate to Abu Dhabi while neglecting the other units of the UAE. Legends and other relevant descriptions are missing in a few instances, and the measurement units are also not specified in some cases. There are dated figures, and updating is, therefore, mandatory.

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Table 16.7  Qatar’s national OGD portal (based on established benchmarks) 1. Open data specification (a) Description of data set

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Datasets are described in brief

(b) Publisher of data set (c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date

Publisher details are provided Tags are provided against the datasets

(e) Machine readable formats (f) Open data license (g) Visualization and analytics tools 2. Open data set feedback (a) Documentation and tutorials (b) Forum and contact form (c) User rating and comments (d) Social media and sharing 3. Open data set request (a) Request form

Date of release is conspicuously missing, but updating date is there Datasets may be accessed in XLS, CSV, JSON formats Open data license information is in place Rudimentary analytical tools are provided

Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Open Data Policy and the Licensing Policy are provided Contact form is there

Not applicable Not applicable Whether the datasets meet the benchmarks Not applicable

(b) List of requests Not applicable (c) Involvement in the process

Not applicable

Source: Machova et al. (2018)

Comments The datasets are in a mix of English and Arabic. This makes it difficult to derive meaning

The date of publication should be provided against the datasets

Units of measurement and figures in English language are missing so the comprehensibility is lost; visualization and analytical tools need improvement Comments Tutorials are needed via the portal apart from the “Qatari Open Data Handbook for the General Public” Forum to discuss and deliberate upon the reuse and value creation by the diverse set of stakeholders The option to provide user ratings should be in place The facility of sharing the datasets via social media should be provided Comments There should be a provision to make requests for datasets The portal does not provide information regarding the list of requests Efforts should be made to arrange contests end workshops to increase citizen engagement

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User-friendly data formats apart from XLS need to be provided along with statistical tools for drawing inferences. There should be a contact point for requesting more datasets or contributing to the existing ones. Oman’s national OGD portal has published very few datasets, which is cause for concern for the government. Major improvements in the data portal are required in terms of technical (requisite IT infrastructure, tools for drawing statistical inference, etc.) and non-technical (training of users as well as the publishers, conducting events and contests to appreciate how the stakeholders are tapping the datasets for innovating their services, etc.) parameters. User-friendly measures should be in place to further the reuse of the datasets. The national OGD portal of Bahrain needs improvisation in terms of the quality and quantity of datasets. Analytical tools must be advanced enough for robust statistical interpretation. Datasets should be updated periodically, and efforts should be made to promote citizen engagement. Qatar’s national OGD portal shows the importance of quality and understandable datasets for stakeholders. Tutorials should be provided to increase the reuse of datasets, and efforts should be made to systematize the accessibility of datasets. Table  16.8 presents accumulative findings Table 16.8  Accumulative findings from national OGD portals of the GCC constituents

Open data specification (a) Description of the dataset (b) Publisher of the dataset (c) Thematic categories and tags (d) Release date and up to date (e) Machine-readable formats (f) Open data license (g) Visualization and analytics tools Open data set feedback (a) Documentation and tutorials (b) Forum and contact form (c) User rating and comments (d) Social media and sharing Open data set request (a) Request form (b) List of requests (c) Involvement in the process

KSA

Kuwait

UAE

Oman

Bahrain

Qatar

0 1 1 1 1/2 0 1

0 1 0 1/2 1/2 0 0

1/2 0 1 0 1/2 1 0

1 1 1 1 1/2 1 1

1 0 0 0 1/2 1/2 1/2

1/2 1 1 1/2 1 1 1/2

1 1 1 1

0 0 0 0

1 0 1/2 1

1 1 0 1

1 1/2 0 0

1 1/2 0 0

0 1 1

0 0 0

0 0 0

1 0 1/2

1/2 0 0

0 0 0

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from the study wherein 1 implies presence, 0 implies the absence, and 1/2 implies partial fulfilment of a particular metric. According to the framework chosen in this study (Máchová et  al., 2018), it can be extrapolated that OGD projects across GCC portals need to improve their quality and quantity to ensure optimal reuse of the datasets (Table 16.8). The most vital characteristic of the GCC OGD portals is the machine-readable formats, and this is very promising since it is an essential element of the open data movement. On the other hand, the most underdeveloped characteristic is the absence of a list of requests. This is a feature that allows different stakeholders to collaborate while also assisting data providers in improving portal usability and dataset quality. While there is room for improvement in the OGD data specification, more efforts should be made to improve the OGD request and feedback capability to promote stakeholder engagement and involvement. Finally, the GCC governments should aim towards targeting quality benchmarks for institutionalizing their OGD initiatives as recognized by the globally acclaimed indices like the Global Open Data Index (GODI) by Open Knowledge Foundation (OKF), Open Data Barometer (ODB) by World Wide Web Foundation (W3F), the Open, Useful, and Re-usable data (OURdataIndex) by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Open Data Inventory (ODIN) by Open Data Watch (ODW), the Open Data Maturity Report (ODMR) by European Union (EU), or the Open Government Development Index (OGDI) released by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA).

Conclusion The study’s goal was to provide a comprehensive overview of the GCC region’s OGD portals, with a focus on their quality as defined by Máchová and her colleagues (Máchová et  al., 2018). It may be deduced that the OGD initiatives of the GCC are still in a developing stage. This is understandable because “data management is a challenge both for OGD providers (public organizations) and for OGD users (e.g., scientists, analysts, journalists, active citizens)” (Charalabidis et  al., 2016, p.  52). Because there is a need to incentivize users to use OGD, this could be done by organizing contests, hackathons, discussion forums, and so on, or by providing inducements to develop various independent open data-driven start-ups (Kassan, 2017). Appropriate governance mechanisms must be in

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place to ensure that OGD initiatives achieve their full potential (Jetzek et al., 2014). Datasets are available, but they are not amenable to statistical interpretation. Efforts should be made to provide real-time ‘high value’ datasets (Nikiforova, 2021), and this requires the necessary wherewithal, Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, workforce training, etc. Apart from more sophisticated and user-friendly statistical tools, visualization and mapping tools should be provided on portals for better reuse and value creation (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Governments need to benchmark their OGD initiatives against established metrics to improve them qualitatively and quantitatively (Kucera et al., 2013; Veljkovic et al., 2014). It is crucial to establish synchronization between data publishers and data consumers (Nikiforova, 2020). Finally, the metadata should be complete in all aspects, and there should be a provision for linking the datasets. Putting things in perspective, it may be deduced that in order to address the barriers linked with the implementation and usage associated with the OGD (Martin, 2014), the governments need to undertake initiatives for “ensuring easy-to-understand content and formatting, involving appropriate stakeholders, setting up data management processes, developing a communications strategy, processing user feedback on artefact performance, organizing events and training, providing additional tools and materials, offering mentoring or financial support” (Susha et  al., 2015a, p.  201) besides factoring into consideration facets like technological infrastructure, political milieu, and the related structural-functional facets of the government (Grimmelikhuijsen & Feeney, 2016).

Implications for Academics and Practitioners The study throws significant pointers for further research. First, quantitative research may be followed up to ascertain the extent to which the stakeholders can reuse the datasets for value creation and innovation. Second, in addition to establishing the necessary legislative framework for the OGD initiative, perspectives from government officials and bureaucrats may be solicited to understand the obstacles involved in institutionalizing the initiative. Third, a comparative assessment of the OGD initiatives may be done to draw lessons from the experiences of the developed countries. Fourth, research is warranted to check the percolation of the OGD initiatives at the regional and local levels in the GCC region. Finally, it would be worthwhile to conduct a study on the tangible (technical infrastructure, manpower training, expertise, and the like) and intangible (user

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experience with the OGD, for example) dimensions linked with the implementation of the OGD initiatives in the GCC region. The study leaves insights for the practitioners. There should be a well-­ drafted OGD policy in the GCC to institutionalize the OGD initiatives wherein all the concerned departments and ministries, right from the national to the local levels, should be meticulously involved in providing quality datasets, preferably on a real-time basis. This implies that efforts should be made to institute the required state-of-the-art IT Infrastructure, human resources training, user engagement opportunities, and mentoring, etc. Contests should be conducted to invite the stakeholders to showcase how they have reused the open data for value creation and innovation.

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PART V

Epilogue

CHAPTER 17

Conclusion: Recap and Recommendations Noore Alam Siddiquee and Habib Zafarullah

Introduction Open Government (OG) and Freedom of Information (FOI) have always been crucial to modern democracies. However, there has been a growing global movement in favor of these concepts in recent years. This movement has been fueled by the proliferation of the internet and social media, making it easier for citizens to communicate with each other and their governments. One notable example of this movement was former US President Barack Obama’s ‘Open Government Directive’ issued in 2009, which required federal agencies to take specific steps to promote transparency, participation, and collaboration. These steps included publishing data online, establishing new channels for public feedback, and developing public participation tools. The directive was a significant milestone in the

N. A. Siddiquee (*) Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected] H. Zafarullah University of New England, Armidale, Australia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_17

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history of OG and demonstrated a commitment to transparency and accountability in government. It also significantly impacted policies and practices in many other nations, where transparency and accountability gained increasing priority over the years. Along with the requirement for information freedom, establishing and consolidating OG became critical issues in public sector reform and an essential component of democratic governance. In Asia and the Middle East, as elsewhere, both OG and FOI have been gaining increasing attention. However, there is still relatively little scholarly literature on the region’s experiences with these two elements of democratic administration—transparency and accountability. Not enough is known about the ongoing initiatives across many countries and their significance and impact. This impedes understanding of the region’s OG and FOI development and the adoption or adaptation of best practices. Then again, the existing literature focuses on only a few high-profile cases. Thus, more systematic research is required on the various initiatives underway in the region, their effectiveness, and their potential impact on democracy, governance, and development. The primary goal of this volume was to systematically document and analyze the development of OG and FOI in selected Asian and Middle Eastern countries within the context of the global OG movement and, to some extent, fill the void in the literature. This short but valuable collection of 13 country and regional cases from across Asia and the Gulf region helps shed light on the nature of OG and FOI initiatives and their effects on democracy and good governance. A wind of change is blowing throughout the region, albeit one whose contour and pace vary significantly from country to country. The policies and strategies being implemented reveal two overarching elements of this transformation: the use of FOI/RTI to bolster OG and the use of ICT to increase citizens’ access to government data. With roughly 60 percent of the world’s population, the region has seen profound economic, social, political, and administrative changes. Asia is a large continent with great diversity—the countries/regions differ not only in size and the level of economic development but also in political, institutional, and historical contexts. One common thread that connects them is the policy shift toward an OG regime characterized by the widespread availability of government data. This may have been prompted by domestic or international pressures for greater transparency, accountability, and

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participation, or may have been initiated simply to support the economic and social activities of the state. In line with the global trend, the right to information (RTI) has emerged as one of Asia’s most widely used tools for advancing the OG agenda. Eight of the thirteen country cases examined in this volume have enacted RTI laws to provide citizens with increased, if not unlimited, access to government information. They include India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, and China. Recently, some of them have implemented RTI laws. This has marked a new beginning, at least in theory because the laws allow citizens to monitor and influence the governance process through improved access to government information and decision-making processes. However, the evidence presented in the country cases shows that the FOI/RTI laws have generally failed to deliver due to inadequate implementation on the one hand and a variety of other weaknesses and limitations on the other. Inadequate administrative capacity, bureaucratic complexity, declining integrity, and poor record management are some of the most common issues that the region faces. Despite regulations to the contrary, governmental operations remain obscured, and proactive disclosure is limited. Citizens’ general awareness has remained unsatisfactory, and they rarely use RTI laws because of the numerous barriers that prevent access to government documents and data. Because of their conservative mindset, officials are notoriously reluctant to share vital information. On account of the pervasive culture of secrecy and bureaucratic red tape in public institutions, it is difficult for the public to obtain necessary information. Despite policy initiatives and reforms, cultural change has not occurred in the bureaucracy, thus limiting public access to government data. Even in relatively better-performing countries (e.g., India), socio-cultural challenges such as rigid hierarchical structures, gender bias, and a lack of education and training prevent many people, particularly marginalized communities, from exercising their legal rights or participating in societal affairs. The rule of law does not seem to apply equally to everyone and every community (Almqvist, 2014) However, this does not weaken the importance of open government arrangements or the laws and processes governing people’s right to know. The experiences of a few countries covered in this collection demonstrate that FOI/RTI laws there have had positive, if limited, results despite some shortcomings. As the mechanism is yet to be used widely by ordinary citizens, their lack of agency in policymaking remains problematic.

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One lesson from Asia’s FOI/RTI schemes is that legislation is necessary but insufficient to ensure their benefits reach the general public. It also does not guarantee that such legislation will increase transparency, accountability, and good governance. Effective execution of the principles of OG and enforcement of laws relating to FOI is critical. However, most Asian nations have underachieved, and the tools to monitor and evaluate their effect are less advanced than desirable. In contrast, Asian nations are enthusiastic adopters of the other worldwide OG trend—e-government and the digital transformation and open data platforms it entails. Instead of committing themselves to the FOI/ RTI scheme, many countries have embarked on extensive programs of open data management through various strategies and roadmaps. In most cases, this was spurred on by a desire to expedite socio-economic development rather than by political goals like bolstering democracy and good governance. Nevertheless, such actions did help advance the OG agenda. Even though utterances of increased openness, administrative responsibility, and citizen input as key OG elements are not uncommon in political rhetoric, OGD initiatives introduced in Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Hong Kong, and those in the GCC region are essentially part of public sector reforms aimed at making governmental operations efficient and effective. As with the FOI/RTI laws in the rest of the Asia-Pacific (such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand), the digital government initiatives in these countries show a wide diversity in nature and the level of implementation and their impact on public access to government data. Citizens’ perceptions and evaluation studies suggest a positive trend. However, it should be noted that many countries’ open government data (OGD) plans are still in their formative stages compared to international standards and best practices. Only a few Asian countries rank among the top performers in OGD management. Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have done well, while countries such as China, India, and Indonesia meander. Similarly, many Asian countries have weak or ineffective FOI laws. India, for example, has a relatively strong FOI regime, but bureaucratic obstacles and lack of political will often hinder implementation. Many other countries in the region, such as China and Hong Kong, have very limited avenues for people to access governmental information. Some Gulf states have partially functioning information access laws, but these have so many loopholes and exemptions that citizens’ rights are severely compromised.

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Overall, the region has made spotty progress in OG and FOI implementation. Many countries still struggle to implement them, with rampant corruption, bureaucratic bottlenecks, weak institutional frameworks, and limited resources posing varying degrees of difficulty. Challenges to OG implementation include poor coordination between government agencies, a lack of financial and human resources, public sector resistance to change, a lack of appropriate implementation mechanisms, and an absence of public officials’ understanding of the OG values (OECD/ ADB, 2019). While some countries’ performance with FOI/RTI has been satisfactory, in others, it is virtually non-existent (as in the Gulf region), severely constrained (China), or merely a figment of the constitution with curtailed freedoms (Bangladesh, Pakistan). In the latter group, FOI legislation typically allows citizens to access information about governmental operations, but numerous restrictions on the free flow of information are prevalent. Bureaucracies control and maintain an opaque governance style that is less open to public scrutiny. Bureaucratic malfeasance and declining probity impede the application of OG and FOI principles, making it more difficult for citizens to question government activities. In addition to the inadequacy or inaccuracy of data provided, information seekers face harassment, monetary exploitation, long wait times, and inefficient procedures. On the other hand, information requests from the public put a strain on government agencies that are understaffed or underprepared to respond effectively to public requests for information. Institutions in charge of information management continue to rely on antiquated methods as they struggle to adapt to new information technologies. Of course, transitioning to digital records and facilitating electronic access will undoubtedly ease implementation and grant citizens greater access to data. Some authoritarian regimes in Asia often try to manipulate information to present their preferred narrative. At the same time, individual privacy and state security concerns frequently justify restrictions on information dissemination. Under such regimes, bureaucratism predominates, and OG and FOI are generally encumbered due to bureaucratic intransigence, procedural roadblocks, and a lack of resources to implement plans (O’Connor et al., 2019). This narrows the scope of what OG and FOI represent. Nonetheless, the cases show that Asia and the Middle East have made a promising start towards establishing OG, albeit at times defined and understood in a limited sense of open data generation, storage, retrieval, and usage. The progress that has been attained thus far is noteworthy;

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however, there is a need to enhance overall performance and outcomes to meet expectations. The OG and FOI initiatives in Asia are yet to come closer to resolving the issues of information disclosure and public access to information to establish good governance. Diverse political systems, varying social values, and distinct local challenges have contributed to a broad spectrum of approaches towards OG arrangements and FOI management across Asia. The country cases show that the political, administrative, and institutional context in which RTI laws and OGI schemes operate significantly impacts their operation and impact. Therefore, it is critically imperative that such contextual variables are factored into the design and implementation of OG and FOI initiatives and, more importantly, in assessing their performance. It is imperative to devise strategies to mitigate potential obstacles and difficulties that may undermine OG and FOI’s fundamental tenets and goals. Their ultimate success hugely relies on whether their impacts and outcomes are regularly monitored and evaluated, with appropriate follow-­ through and follow-up. The Asian experience emphasizes the need for a comprehensive strategy that includes building administrative capacity, educating and engaging citizens, and re-orienting bureaucracy to achieve the desired outcomes. A reconsideration of the traditional roles and relationships between governments, citizens, and various stakeholders is necessary to create a systemic and collaborative approach to governance at various levels. The road to open government and information freedom in Asia and the Middle East is long and winding, requiring clear direction and strategic planning. Among other things, this calls for unwavering commitment and sustained drive by the political and bureaucratic leadership to move the OG agenda forward by addressing the limitations of the current approach and removing barriers that citizens and other stakeholders face when accessing government data.

The Way Forward Open government embodies the principles of transparency, accountability, and participation in shaping public policy and practice to promote democratic governance and foster inclusive growth and development (OECD, 2016; Smith & Stirling, 2017). Many nations are shifting their focus from viewing open government reforms merely as a matter of principle to using them to attain broader policy goals in diverse social, economic,

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environmental, and technological areas (Kosack & Fung, 2014). It thus becomes necessary to combine the diverse array of scattered initiatives into a cohesive, comprehensive national strategy for open government (OECD, 2016). For the Asian and Gulf countries, a lot needs to be done—creating an enabling environment, strengthening the legal framework, promoting a culture of transparency, lessening bureaucratization, embracing technology, building probity in government, narrowing the digital divide, and expanding the horizon of citizen participation. OG and FOI/RTI, being integral to democratic governance, have the potential to foster social change, economic development, technological innovation, human rights, and even political reform (Sagasti, 2013; OHCHR, 2013). The rapid rise of digital technology worldwide has had a substantial impact in harnessing new forms of citizen engagement, collaboration, and participation in governance. Transparency and accountability in traditionally opaque governmental processes like procurement, budgeting, and service delivery also benefit from the rise of digital technology. Sophisticated open data platforms and portals with information on government spending, public contracts, and other crucial areas of government activity are being made available to the public. Governments are more forthcoming in sharing information with citizens in real time and engaging with them through social media and other online platforms. Asia needs to continue along this trajectory. Some Asian countries (Taiwan, South Korea, India, Philippines, Indonesia, and UAE, for instance) have made significant strides in ‘big data’ management; others need to emulate. Narrowing the widening digital divide is daunting for many Asian countries. A high percentage of Asia’s rural population lacks access to the internet, and women and marginalized groups are the most affected. Disconcerting, too, is the wide gap in internet quality between and within countries. This has impacted governments’ capacity to transmit and receive information and citizens’ ability to access online services (Jeong, 2022). The efficient operation of OG and FOI/RTI systems requires incorporating best practices. A comprehensive legal framework to access government information is first and foremost. This is crucial to ensure citizens, civil society organizations, and the media have access to the information they need to hold governments accountable and participate in democratic processes. A consolidated all-encompassing legal framework should establish an enforceable obligation for public officials to proactively disclose information, subject to certain limited exceptions such as national security or personal privacy. It is also crucial to create an appeal process for those

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who are dissatisfied with the final outcome of their information requests, establish an independent oversight body to review decisions by public officials, protect whistleblowers reporting wrongdoing or disclosing information in the public interest, and infuse professionalism among officials to effectively implementing the FOI/RTI laws (Article 19, 2015). The principles of democratic governance can be upheld by instituting mechanisms for citizen engagement and participation like participatory budgeting, citizen juries, and public consultations; by providing support to civil society and other stakeholders in promoting OG and FOI; and by strengthening digital infrastructure and capacity to support governmental openness and people’s right to information. Comprehensive reform initiatives are necessary for countries where they do not exist or are inadequate.

Future Research The intended purpose of this discourse was to stimulate intellectual discourse by furnishing an overview of the OG framework, while simultaneously evaluating and offering insights into the preliminary ramifications of OG and FOI tactics and protocols. This is not meant to be an all-­ encompassing or extensive account of OG regimes across Asia. Furthermore, it has a few obvious failings and drawbacks, such as weak methodological robustness and insufficient empirical data for all the country cases presented. Therefore, further in-depth, empirical, and comprehensive research is critical for a nuanced understanding of the OG and its effects on democracy and governance in the region. A path forward would be more systematic and thorough research that seeks to evaluate and monitor the impact of OG and FOI initiatives. Evaluations must incorporate the perspectives and experiences of citizens and other relevant stakeholders. Because OG and FOI/RTI initiatives aim to increase governmental transparency, accountability, and citizen participation, future research must assess the extent to which OG schemes have effectively achieved such outcomes. Much of Asia is still in its formative stages regarding OG development, data openness, and FOI/RTI legislation. The inadequacy of empirical research hinders the comprehension of the intricate and dynamic nature of operations related to OG in Asia’s diverse political, institutional, and cultural contexts. According to current research, proactive information disclosure is limited, and the number of people who use FOI/RTI laws remains low in most cases. A limited number of studies examine the frequency of FOI/RTI requests, denials, grievances filed, and their

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temporal patterns. However, scant information regarding the demographics and objectives of individuals who utilize FOI/RTI laws is available. In future studies, it would be interesting to see if there is a correlation between people’s familiarity with the FOI/RTI regime and their socio-­ economic status. Such information would be fascinating to uncover within a particular setting and across the region. Also, OG/FOI research has generally investigated key government agencies at national/federal levels; operations of OG/FOI laws at the local, municipal, and district levels have rarely been the focus of scholarly research. It would be interesting to see how OG/RTI regulations are implemented at local levels, where citizens have frequent contact with agencies and many essential services are provided. The OG movement is founded on the premise that augmenting the accessibility of government records and data by implementing FOI/RTI laws and OGD would amplify transparency in governmental operations, thereby fostering trust in government institutions. Evidence suggests that people’s trust in government institutions worldwide is declining. However, despite the implementation of OG initiatives, numerous countries in the region still experience an increase in corruption and exhibit inadequate performance in significant governance indicators. This highlights the intricate nature of the issue and raises concerns regarding the effectiveness of the implemented strategies and programs. Several questions arise naturally and warrant further inquiry into the Asian nations. What impact OG strategies have had on public governance in Asia? Has enhanced access to information (under FOI/RTI laws) improved citizen’s perception of government transparency? What is the relationship between transparency and people’s trust in government institutions? How do open government and FOI laws ensure access to information for marginalized or disadvantaged groups in society? What mechanisms or frameworks are in place to handle conflicts between the need for transparency and protecting sensitive or classified information? Have technology and digital platforms enhanced the effectiveness of open government and FOI systems? How do open government initiatives and FOI laws vary across different jurisdictions, and what can be learned from comparative studies? Such questions are significant because transparency research elsewhere has produced mixed results, with greater openness leading to improved trust in some cases, less trust in others and showing little or no effect on trust at all in other instances (Cucciniello et al., 2017; Grimmelikhuijsen et al., 2020). Future research could help unpack such paradoxes in the Asian context. Finally,

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some of the countries in Asia have seen political and leadership changes (e.g., India, Nepal, and Indonesia) since the enactment of FOI/RTI laws; others have experienced substantial reforms that increased the number of private and quasi-private organizations involved in public service delivery. Their operations entail varying degrees of secrecy and are not amenable to the same level of public scrutiny. Examining whether and how these shifts have affected the OG landscape in these settings would be fascinating.

References Almqvist, J. (2014). Human rights, culture and the rule of law. Hart Publishing. Article 19. (2015). Asia disclosed: A review of the right to information across Asia. Article 19. Cucciniello, M., Porumbescu, G. A., & Grimmelikhuijsen, P. P. (2017). 25 years of transparency research: Evidence and future directions. Public Administration Review, 77, 32–44. Grimmelikhuijsen, P.  P., Piotrowski, S.  J., & Van Ryzin, G.  G. (2020). Latent transparency and trust in government: Unexpected findings from two survey experiments. Government Information Quarterly, 37, 1–10. Jeong, Y. (2022). Bridging the digital divide. East Asia Forum Quarterly, 14(2), 33–35. Kosack, S., & Fung, A. (2014). Does transparency improve governance? Annual Review of Political Science, 17, 65–87. O’Connor, K., Janenova, S., & Knox, C. (2019). Open government in authoritarianism regimes. International Review of Public Policy, 1(1), 65–82. OECD. (2016). Open government: The global context and the way forward. OECD. OECD/ADB. (2019). Government at a glance Southeast Asia 2019. OECD Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264305915-­en OHCHR. (2013). Realizing the right to development: Essays in commemoration of 25 years of the United Nations declaration on the right to development. United Nations. Sagasti, F. (2013). A human rights approach to democratic governance. In OHCHR (Ed.), Realizing the right to development (pp.  125–136). United Nations. Smith, A., & Stirling, A. (2017). Innovation, sustainability and democracy: An analysis of grassroots contributions. Journal of Self-Governance and Management Economics, 6(1), 64–97.

Correction to: Open Government and Freedom of Information: The Philippine Experience Alex Bello Brillantes Jr., Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan, and Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz

Correction to: Chapter 4 in: H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_4

The original version of the chapter was inadvertently published with incorrect author’s name Karl Emmanuel L.  V. Ruiz. The chapter has been updated with correct name Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz.

The updated version of this chapter can be found at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­031-­35863-­0_4 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_18

C1

Index1

NUMBERS AND SYMBOLS 1MDB, 129, 134 5th National Action Plan (2019–2022), 78 20-Year National Strategy, Thailand, 150 1973 Constitution, Philippines, 82 A Academic discourse, 4 Accessibility, 40, 45, 55, 87, 113, 119, 147, 247–251, 253, 277, 285, 355, 368, 387 Access to information, viii, 8, 10, 18, 36, 40, 41, 43, 57, 83, 86, 94, 107–123, 127–140, 164, 177, 186, 188, 191, 192, 233–254, 263, 270, 274–276, 295–296,

302, 305, 306, 310, 313, 314, 321, 338, 384, 387 Accountability, viii, 4–11, 14–17, 19, 30, 31, 38, 39, 42–47, 55–58, 63, 64, 68–69, 71, 76–80, 82–83, 86–88, 91–99, 109–111, 113, 117, 120, 133, 145–147, 158, 164, 167, 168, 176, 178, 185–188, 197, 207, 210, 212, 213, 215, 222–227, 234, 235, 237, 239, 240, 247, 251, 252, 260, 261, 263, 265–267, 269, 270, 272, 273, 275, 277, 288, 308, 309, 312–317, 319, 321, 323–325, 334–336, 347, 353, 380, 382, 384–386 ActionAid India, 239 Administrative agency model, 58–60, 66

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Zafarullah, N. A. Siddiquee (eds.), Open Government and Freedom of Information, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0

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INDEX

Administrative Court, Thailand, 154 Administrative litigations, 44, 222, 224, 225 Administrative practices, 12 Administrative reviews, 222–224, 222n2 Advocacy, 30, 78, 83, 92, 94, 97, 154, 225, 244 Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific (ANSA-EAP), 77, 94 Affordability, 45, 247, 250–251, 271, 355 Afghanistan, 128 Appleby, Sir Humphrey, vii Arnstein, Sherry, 267 Article 19, 8, 15, 16, 36, 85, 190, 193, 206, 262, 263, 295, 296, 386 Artificial intelligence (AI), 164, 177, 333, 345 ASEAN, 96 Asia, viii, ix, 19, 20, 27–48, 83, 85, 110, 146, 159, 206, 271, 306, 338, 380–388 Asian culture, 28 Asian democracy, 28 Asian democratization, 29 Asian financial crisis (AFC), 187, 188 a2i, Bangladesh, 270, 272 Audit Office, 264 Australia, 356, 382 Authoritarian system, 186, 213, 286 Automated Election System Watch, 78 Availability, 7, 16, 32, 35, 40, 45, 82, 86, 87, 113, 247–251, 264, 336, 344, 346, 355, 380 Awareness, 7, 36, 44–46, 76, 77, 92, 98, 191, 193, 201, 215, 237, 242–245, 247–248, 248n3, 252, 253, 269, 274, 295, 323, 381

B Bahrain, 38, 48, 354, 355, 362, 365–366, 368 Balapityain, 322 Bangladesh, 29, 31–36, 38, 45, 46, 85, 197, 259–277, 290, 381, 383 Bangladesh political context, 261–263 Barisan Nasional (BN), 41, 132–134 Basic Law, 111, 112, 116, 121 Below poverty level (BPL), 235, 240, 249, 250 Bentham, Jeremy, vii, 4 Bhutan, 35 Bihar, 234, 240n1, 241, 246–248, 250, 251, 253 Brahmins, 289 Bribery, 79, 193, 241, 313 British Civil Service, vii Broadband coverage, 271 Bureaucracy/bureaucratic/ bureaucratism, 8–10, 14, 16–19, 29, 30, 70, 86, 88, 111, 123, 130, 152, 154, 155, 157, 158, 191, 195, 201, 210, 213, 242, 245, 252, 260, 264, 265, 269, 274, 276, 277, 288, 289, 332, 381–384 Bureaucratic efficiency, 14 Bureaucratic polity, 111 C Canada, 57, 238, 356 Capacity, 5, 12, 14, 17, 45, 46, 70, 79, 88, 93, 94, 98, 99, 154, 191, 237, 249, 252, 283–302, 346, 347, 381, 384–386 Caretaker system, Bangladesh, 266 Cases, 20, 38–48, 65, 82, 88, 91, 113–115, 118–120, 122, 129, 131, 136, 151, 153, 154, 156,

 INDEX 

158, 159, 163, 165, 166, 176, 177, 190, 192, 194–196, 222, 224, 225, 233–254, 266, 293, 306, 309, 319, 321, 331–348, 354, 366, 380–384, 386, 387 Census, India, 238 Central Information Commission (CIC), Indonesia, 189, 190, 195, 196 Central Information Commission, India, 189, 192, 195, 254 Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD), 36, 37 Chetris, 289 China, 29, 32–35, 38, 40, 44, 107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 121–123, 205–227, 298, 381–383 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 206–209 Circular subsidiarity, 11, 268 Citizen-centric analysis, 286 Citizen engagement, 5, 7, 11, 15, 29, 94, 97, 99, 127, 267, 334, 344, 347, 368, 385, 386 Citizen participation, 3, 8, 13, 27, 35, 38, 42, 45, 76, 78, 79, 83, 87, 92, 95, 97, 108, 110, 112, 165, 166, 178, 215, 221, 263, 269, 277, 354, 359, 385, 386 Citizen Participatory Audit (CPA), 80 Citizen perception, 166, 284, 286, 293, 382, 387 Civic participation, 32, 56, 67, 185, 199, 269, 335, 336 Civil liberties, 28, 29, 261, 322, 336 Civil Liberties Index, 273 Civil society, 8, 17, 18, 28, 30, 36, 39, 56, 59, 62, 63, 67, 71, 77–79, 87, 91, 94, 95, 97, 99, 114, 133, 195, 200, 236, 254, 261, 269, 275–277, 288, 306, 307, 386 Civil Society Index, 78

391

Civil society organizations (CSOs), 15, 30, 45, 83, 94, 190, 214, 236, 239, 240n1, 241, 242, 244, 254, 267, 336, 385 Clientelism, 261 Co-creation, 11, 12, 35, 268 Collaboration, vii, viii, 5, 9, 11, 12, 56, 57, 59, 62, 67, 77, 78, 94–96, 109, 132, 133, 135, 136, 148, 164, 168, 176, 210, 212, 254, 263, 264, 267–268, 277, 284, 290, 312, 323, 325, 335, 338, 379, 385 Collaborative governance, 7, 334, 335 Colombo, 306 Colonial legacy, 254 Colonial rule, 264 Commission of Inquiry, Hong Kong, 114 Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance, 113, 120 Communications, viii, 6, 9, 13, 35, 37, 66, 70, 88, 97, 98, 110, 121, 128, 131, 147, 149, 168, 270, 271, 333, 334, 336, 370 Communications and Multimedia Act 1998, Malaysia, 41, 128, 132, 138 Communications technology, 13, 271, 333 Community Policing, 135 Complaints and appeals, 153, 154 Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA), 116, 117 Constitutionalism, 261 Control of Corruption Index, 273 Control variables, 170, 173, 175, 292, 300 Convention Against Torture Act, 321 Co-production, 11, 35, 186, 268, 335 Corruption, 4, 6, 9, 10, 16, 18, 19, 30, 31, 38, 41, 42, 46, 47, 55,

392 

INDEX

76, 79, 82, 86, 88, 91, 95, 108, 132, 147, 148, 154, 158, 159, 163, 165, 186–188, 190, 191, 197, 200, 201, 206, 218, 235, 236, 239, 247, 261, 263, 265, 273, 275, 277, 286–288, 291–293, 297, 298, 300, 301, 306, 312–317, 319, 321, 324, 335, 336, 347, 383, 387 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 79, 159, 200, 273, 297 Councilor’s discretionary fund (CDF), 58, 59, 65 Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), 265 Covid-19 pandemic, 5, 34, 65, 67, 137, 163, 168–169, 175–177, 237–238, 346, 347 Critical thinking, 4 Crozier, Michel, 18 Cultural change, 381 Cultural values, 288 Culture, 28, 40, 57, 78, 91, 109, 128, 191, 196, 260, 261, 265, 288, 312, 314, 323, 335, 359, 385 Culture of secrecy, 46, 76, 191, 262, 295, 381 Cybersecurity, 333 D Dalits, 236, 289 Data dissemination, 11, 89, 133, 335 Datasets, 14, 80, 167, 234, 272, 274, 338, 354–356, 358, 359, 362, 366, 368–371 Decentralization/decentralized, 14, 127, 199, 213, 286 Decision-making, 4–9, 11, 15, 18, 19, 29, 31, 35, 46, 47, 60, 65, 67, 80, 91, 111, 113, 115, 119, 120, 130, 135, 147–149, 165, 168, 185, 188, 206, 216, 237, 238,

275, 301, 306, 312, 320–321, 324, 334, 355, 381 Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law, Sri Lanka, 308, 311, 315 Define/definition, 57, 116, 132, 135, 138, 216, 219, 285, 287, 307, 312, 333, 342 Deliberative democracy, 6, 7, 16, 71 Demand-side, 16, 43, 156, 157, 187, 191, 193–196, 201, 240, 272, 336 Democracy, vii, viii, 3, 5, 6, 16, 18, 27–29, 36n1, 38, 43, 46, 56, 57, 69, 80, 92, 94, 107, 109, 130, 134, 148–150, 177, 186, 187, 213, 235, 239, 259, 261, 262, 266, 272, 277, 284–288, 290, 293, 296, 301, 312, 335, 336, 379, 380, 382, 386 Democracy matrix, 29, 36n1 Democratic governance, viii, 4–6, 8, 16, 18, 28, 46, 55, 76, 145, 146, 201, 212, 236–239, 283–302, 380, 384–386 Democratic governance, determinants, 46, 290, 294–295, 300 Democratization, viii, 31, 40, 63, 64, 123, 187, 188, 259 Denmark, 147 Department of Budget and Management (DBM), 79, 80 Designated officer (DO), 307, 308, 317, 319 Developing countries, 13, 18, 145, 146, 185, 284, 285, 290 Development of government transparency, China, 216, 217 Digital democracy, 130 Digital divide, 14, 46, 270, 271, 385 Digital government (DG), 33, 130, 138, 146, 150, 177, 332, 338, 344, 354, 382

 INDEX 

Digital Government Development Agency, 149, 150 Digital infrastructure, 34, 47, 149, 167, 271, 338, 386 Digitalization stages, 333–334 Digital platforms, 47, 77, 94–95, 336, 338, 346, 347, 387 Digital politics, 130 Digital Security Act, Bangladesh, 45, 262, 263, 273 Digital technology, 94, 138, 332, 333, 385 Digital transformation (digitalization), 34, 47, 271, 331–348, 382 Disability, 78, 237–239, 241, 253 Disclosing information/information disclosure, 40, 44, 67, 87, 112–114, 116, 169, 171, 175, 178, 186, 196, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221, 276, 311, 313, 323, 384, 386 Disinformation, 28, 131 Diversity, 68, 237, 238, 269, 380, 382 Doctor Anywhere, 173 Dubai Government Excellence Program, 345 E East Asia, viii, 38, 265, 337 Easton, David, 132, 287 eCitizen portal, 166 E-democracy, 130, 334 eDirham, 337 Effectiveness, 6, 19, 43, 56, 57, 67, 76, 77, 85n3, 88, 97, 107, 123, 147, 165, 213, 237, 254, 263, 264, 268, 270, 275, 277, 285, 299, 305, 324, 334, 338, 347, 380, 387 Efficiency, 6, 11, 14, 19, 55, 56, 70, 97, 147, 149, 214, 237, 254,

393

275, 285, 287, 291, 297, 300, 301, 333, 334, 338, 347, 353 E-government, 13, 14, 33, 35, 41, 42, 47, 56, 108, 109, 128, 133, 137, 138, 146, 147, 149, 164, 166–168, 270, 271, 332–334, 337, 338, 347 E-Government Action Plan, Singapore, 166, 168 E-government applications, 137 E-Government Development Index (EGDI), 33–35, 264, 270, 271, 338, 344 eGovernment Strategy, 264, 355 E-Government Survey, 33–35, 338, 344 Electronic Government Agency (EGA), 149 Elites/elitism, 94, 111, 128, 129, 131, 132, 139, 176, 177, 197, 235, 244, 245, 252, 275, 284, 289, 347 Empirical studies, 148, 165, 218, 222, 227, 237, 335, 338, 344 Empowerment, 31, 251, 292, 298 Environmental damages, 323 E-participation, 35, 271, 359 E-Participation Index (EPI), 34, 35, 269 E-services, 137, 166, 270, 271 Executive Order on FOI, Philippines, 36, 83, 88 F Facebook, 137 Fake news, 131, 137, 138 Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (FCSA), UAE, 362 Federal system, 284, 302 Feedback mechanisms, 92 Finland, 147, 335

394 

INDEX

Fiscal transparency, 64, 264 Fragile democracies, 10 Freedom of expression, 8, 29, 45, 85, 86, 188, 262, 277, 336 Freedom of Government Information Law (Taiwan), 61, 63 Freedom of information (FOI), viii, ix, 3–20, 27–48, 61, 75–99, 108–111, 129, 133, 137–139, 145–160, 168, 176, 178, 186, 201, 205, 213, 215, 222, 238, 260, 263, 275–277, 285, 305–325, 379–388 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), China, 150, 213 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Singapore, 42, 43, 178 Freedom of Information Website (eFOI), 39, 81, 83, 87, 88, 90, 98 Freedom of the Press Act, 1947, 145 Full Disclosure Policy, 39 Functional democracy, 4, 28, 277 G Gender inequality, 45, 242, 246 General Records Service (GRS), 112, 119 Global Connectivity Report, 34 Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency (GIFT), 77 Global Open Data Index (GODI), 32, 33, 128, 157, 369 Global Right to Information Rating Map, 36 Good Governance Plan (Philippines), 83 Governance, viii, 5, 7–11, 15, 17, 19, 20, 28–31, 39, 42–47, 57, 58, 60, 76, 77, 82, 86, 87, 90, 92, 95–99, 107, 109, 120, 122, 123,

128, 130, 146–149, 158, 163–166, 168, 169, 176, 178, 185, 186, 188, 190, 196, 200, 201, 206, 207, 210, 212, 213, 215–227, 234, 239, 260, 261, 263–266, 268–271, 273, 277, 283–302, 306, 309, 312–314, 324, 325, 332, 334, 337, 369, 380–387 Government information, 14, 15, 32, 39–41, 44, 45, 61, 63, 67, 69, 85, 87, 109, 111, 147, 154, 155, 168, 170, 178, 193, 195, 206, 209, 210, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221–226, 276, 277, 285, 381, 385 Government openness, 5, 8, 41, 42, 59, 112, 169, 171, 173, 175, 178, 199, 201, 354 Government Transparency Index (GTI), China, 216, 218 GovTech, 332, 334, 336, 344, 345 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 48, 353–371, 382 Gulf countries, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 48, 385 H Henry, Patrick, vii Hong Kong, 29–32, 38, 40, 41, 107–123, 129, 382 Hong Kong Chief Executive, 41, 111, 113, 114, 120, 122 Hong Kong Executive Council, 111, 113 Hong Kong Office of the Ombudsman, 110, 113, 115, 119, 122 Hong Kong Welfare Support, 116–117 Hood, Christopher, vii, 10, 19

 INDEX 

Human Capital Index (HCI), 33, 264, 270, 271 Human rights, 5, 7, 8, 15, 28–30, 114, 120, 245, 262, 277, 385 Human Rights Commission, Sri Lanka (HRCSL), 320 Hybrid-authoritarian regime, 261 I Ideological polarization, 68 Implementation, open government, 58, 67, 201, 212, 338, 383, 384, 387 Inclusion, 13–15, 38, 39, 47, 57, 58, 63, 67–69, 71, 133, 235, 237, 252, 263, 271, 277 Inclusive policies, 12–13, 289 Inclusive policymaking, viii, 9, 12, 109, 234, 268–270, 277, 323, 325 Inclusivity, 7, 270 Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM), Sri Lanka, 313 India, 29, 32–38, 44, 85, 197, 233–236, 239, 240n1, 241, 244, 245, 247, 248, 248n3, 251–253, 298, 356, 381, 382, 385, 388 Indian Administrative Service (IAS), 245 Indonesia, 29, 33–38, 43, 79, 85, 186–190, 193, 195–197, 199–201, 381, 382, 385, 388 Indonesian Centre for Environmental Law (ICEL), 188 Information access, 16, 17, 45, 79, 87, 98, 108, 120, 139, 165, 191, 214, 235, 238, 244, 253, 259–277, 382 Information and Documentation Officer, Indonesia, 192 Information & eGovernment Authority, Bahrain, 362

395

Information Commission, Bangladesh, 274, 276, 277 Information Disclosure Tribunal (IDT), Thailand, 151, 152, 156 Information dissemination, 13, 18, 94–95, 97, 121, 137, 264, 276, 335, 383 Information officer (IO), 189, 192, 253, 307, 308, 317 Information openness, 76, 78, 87, 95, 169 Information processing, 34, 264, 271 Information rights legislation, 234, 235, 251, 254 Integrity, viii, 8, 16, 19, 31, 47, 57, 80, 98, 147, 150, 163, 164, 176, 275, 312, 314, 381 Intellectual property (IP) right, protection, 345, 346 Interim Procedures of MOC on Open Government, 208 International instruments, 8 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 148, 190, 269, 306 International Open Data Charter, 273 Internet, 13, 14, 34, 61, 86, 94, 108, 128, 131, 137, 138, 164, 165, 168, 170, 172, 175, 176, 239, 270, 271, 333, 344, 379, 385 Interoperability, 35, 270, 271, 355 Iron Law of Oligarchy, 132 IT 2000, Thailand, 149 J James Madison Papers, 4n1 Jilin province, China, 219 Jordan, 134, 338 Judicial Commission, Indonesia, 192 K Kita Jaga Malaysia app, 135

396 

INDEX

Kuwait, 29, 33, 48, 354, 359, 361, 366 Kuwait Government Online (KGO), 359 L Laos, 85 Law Commission, Bangladesh, 275 Lebanon, 338 Legal-rational administration, 18 Legitimacy, 4, 6, 15, 46, 65, 82, 147, 283–302, 336, 347 Lesbian, homosexual, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ), 133 M Machine-readable format, 14, 272, 355, 358, 369 Madhesis, 289 Madison, James, 4, 4n1 Malaysia, 29, 30, 32–34, 36n1, 38, 41, 85, 86, 127–140, 200, 382 Malaysia Administrative Modernization and Management Planning Unit (MAMPU), 41, 136, 138 Malaysia Governance Index, 128 Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC), 134 Malaysian Inland Revenue Board (LHDN), 134 Malaysia Official Secrets Act, 1972, 41, 86, 128, 132, 135 Malaysia Sedition Act, 1948, 41, 132 Maoists, 283, 284, 289 Marginalization, 247, 288 Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), 236 Media censorship, 29

Michels, Robert, 132 Middle East, viii, 38, 344, 380, 383, 384 Mills, Wright, 132 Ministry of Justice, Sri Lanka, 316 Misinformation, 131, 137–139 Morocco, 338 Municipalities, 60, 207, 208, 215, 216, 219, 290 Muslims, 241, 289 N National Action Plan, Sri Lanka, 312 National Anti-Corruption Commission, Thailand, 154, 194 National Campaign for People’s Right to Information, India, 236 National Centre for Statistics & Information, Oman, 362 National Commission of Human Rights, Indonesia, 192 National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), Thailand, 152 National Dalit Justice Movement, 245 National Digital Transformation Strategy (2021–2025), 47, 347 National Integrity Strategy, Bangladesh, 275 National Police Commission, Indonesia, 192 National Privacy Commission (Philippines), 98 National Reform Council, Thailand, 152 National Reform Plan, Thailand, 152 National Security Bureau (NSB), 64 Nepal, 29, 33, 35, 36, 38, 46, 197, 267, 271, 283–302, 381, 388 Nepalese Constitution of 1990, 288 Networking, 139, 244, 267–268

 INDEX 

Networks, 11, 13, 34, 35, 90, 98, 135, 268, 270, 271 New Order, Indonesia, 187, 197 New Public Management, 110, 253 Non-democratic governments, 152, 153 Non-disclosure decisions, 222, 224 North Africa, 344 North South University, 290 Norway, 79, 147, 285, 290 O OECD, 6, 8, 13, 14, 33, 35, 57, 82, 109, 138, 147, 150, 157, 187, 285, 312, 369, 383–385 Official Information Act (OIA), 86, 146, 149–158 Official Information Act 1997, Thailand, 42, 146, 150–152, 159 Official Information Commission, Thailand, 86, 150, 151, 153 Official Secrets Act (OSA), 41, 86, 128, 132, 135, 262 OGP framework, 307, 314 Oman, 29, 33, 48, 354, 362, 368 One Data Portal, Indonesia, 200 One Map Policy, Indonesia, 200 Online civic engagement platforms, 39, 58, 62–63, 69, 70 Online Service Index (OSI), 33, 34, 264, 270, 271, 338 Online Service Portals (OSP), 263 Opacity, 29, 146, 195, 264–265, 312 Open budget sessions, 267 Open Culture Foundation (Taiwan), 64 Open data, viii, 10, 14, 32, 38, 41, 58, 61–64, 69, 70, 80, 83, 87, 130, 147, 148, 176, 272, 273, 335, 338, 348, 354, 358, 362, 367, 371, 382, 383, 385

397

Open Data Barometer (ODB), 38, 273, 369 Open Data Inventory (ODIN), 157, 273, 274, 369 Open Data License, 87, 355, 358 Open Data Platform, 39, 61, 63, 64, 70, 147, 347, 382, 385 Open Data Portal, 38, 39, 47, 80 Open Data Strategy, 355 Open Governance Data Index (OGDI), 33, 36, 369 Open government (OG), viii, ix, 3–20, 27–48, 55–71, 75–99, 107–123, 127–140, 145–150, 163–180, 185–201, 205–227, 259–277, 284–286, 300, 301, 305–325, 332–335, 337–347, 379, 381, 384, 385, 387 Open Government Data (OGD), 14, 163–180, 263, 272, 353–371, 382 Open Government Data Strategy, Bangladesh, 272 Open Government Declaration, 312 Open government, definition, viii, 57, 109, 132, 210, 285, 312, 335 Open Government Index (OGI), 78, 79, 157, 158, 199 Open government information, 167, 176, 205–227 Open Government Partnership (OGP), 7, 15, 37, 42, 47, 57, 77–80, 87, 93, 95–97, 166, 200, 306, 307, 312–315, 317, 321, 336 Open public data (OPD), 354 Open societies, 4 Organic Law of the Villagers Committees, China, 208 Organizational change, 96, 333 Organizational culture, 265

398 

INDEX

Orissa, 241 Outsourcing, 58, 59, 66 Oversight, 9, 10, 37, 76, 108–110, 112, 209, 254, 267, 308, 386 P Pakistan, 29, 31, 33–35, 38, 262, 271, 383 Panchayats, 251 Parliament, 36, 149, 152, 201, 259, 260, 263, 267, 269, 290, 296, 301, 306, 308, 309, 311, 315, 316, 324 Participatory budgeting, 39, 57–60, 60n5, 65–67, 69, 70, 94, 386 Participatory decision-making processes, 47 Penang Freedom of Information Enactment, 129 People’s Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), 319 People’s Money, 77 People’s Participation Partnership Program, 78 Performance, viii, 11, 19, 29–31, 34, 36, 38, 46, 48, 58, 63–69, 77, 108, 109, 116, 123, 128, 138, 139, 147, 159, 165, 167, 169, 171, 177, 186, 189, 193, 215, 216, 264, 265, 273, 275, 286–287, 289, 301, 320, 335, 337–348, 370, 383, 384, 387 Personal Data Protection Act, Sri Lanka, 324 Philippine Commission on Audit (COA), 77, 80 Philippines, 29, 33–36, 38–40, 75–99, 382, 385 Philippine transparency laws, 84–85 Policymaking process, 4, 12, 132, 218, 269, 277 Political interference, 31, 276

Political leadership, 93–97, 213, 234, 235, 252, 275 Political regimes, 28 Political Rights Index, 273 Political vigilantes, 263 Politicization, 266, 324 Politicization of bureaucracy, 266 Politicization of judiciary, 29 Pollitt, Christopher, 9 Pork Barrel Watch, 78 Portulans Institute’s Network Readiness Index, 271 Power elite, 41, 132, 133, 139 Pradeshiya, 322 Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO), 89–91, 98, 99 President Obama’s Open Government Directive, 56 Privacy, viii, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 40, 71, 87, 147, 260, 263, 315, 324, 355, 383, 385 Privacy Policy, 359 Proactive disclosure, 9, 16, 36, 39, 45, 47, 87, 189, 252, 253, 264, 276, 307, 310, 323, 381 Proactive information disclosure, 276, 386 Procurement Watch, 78, 94 Promotion of Civic Engagement and Participatory Budgeting Experiment, 59 Protinidhi Sabha, 284 Provincial councils (PCs), 318 Provision of Open Environmental Information, China, 209 Public accountability, 4, 47, 68–69, 71, 80, 87, 158 Public authority, 16, 108, 188, 189, 201, 239, 240, 246, 248, 249, 252, 287, 307–310, 314–316, 319–323 Public deliberation, 7, 335 Public distribution system (PDS), 236

 INDEX 

Public engagement, 57, 267, 313, 338 Public funds, 47, 139, 218, 306, 316–320 Public information, 6, 8, 43, 80, 83, 186, 188, 189, 193, 195, 197, 201, 233, 238 Public Information Disclosure Act (PIDA), Indonesia, 188–196, 199–201 Public information officer (PIO), 248, 249, 253 Public information regime, 18 Public interest in disclosure, 118, 119, 324 Public interest override, 307, 309 Public management, 7, 110, 127, 332, 347 Public Records Access Rules 1996, Hong Kong, 40, 111, 119, 122 Public sector, 13, 14, 33, 46, 60, 76, 78, 79, 92, 97, 98, 111, 114, 116, 119, 149, 176, 190, 200, 254, 260, 261, 265, 285, 287, 331–334, 336, 380, 382, 383 Public service, 11, 13, 14, 47, 61, 66, 94, 116, 147, 148, 163–166, 168, 172, 177, 178, 191, 263, 269, 270, 273, 277, 284, 291, 297, 332–335, 337, 338, 344, 345, 347, 353, 388 Public trust, 6, 7, 9, 13, 31, 38, 43, 56, 69, 110, 165, 166, 169, 171, 172, 175–178, 186, 272 Public utility services, 321–322 Q Qatar, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 48, 354, 362–366, 368

399

R Rajasthan, 236, 247, 248, 253 Regulations on Open Government Information (ROGI), China, 205, 209–211 Regulatory Quality Index, 273 Representative government, 16 Right to information (RTI), viii, 8, 13–17, 30–32, 35–38, 40, 41, 43–47, 78, 82, 86, 87, 129, 136, 147, 157, 185–201, 233–254, 260, 262, 274, 276, 277, 290, 293, 295, 300–302, 305–325, 306n1, 335, 336, 347, 348, 380–388 law, 14, 16, 31, 35, 37, 41, 43–47, 129, 187–190, 194, 196, 197, 199, 237, 245, 274, 277, 325, 336, 347, 348, 381, 382, 384, 386–388 movement, 15, 246 process, 16, 276, 323 rating, 157, 197 Right to Information Act, Bangladesh, 45, 46, 197, 276 Right to Information Act, India, 32, 44 Right to Information (RTI) Act, Sri Lanka, 47, 305, 307, 312–323 Right to Information Act 2005, 44 Right to Information Act 2016, 46 Royal Decree on Criteria and Procedures for Good Governance, 149, 156 RTI Commission, Sri Lanka, 46, 306 RTI Regulations, 308, 323, 387 Rule of law, 7, 16, 29–31, 88, 147, 206, 226, 260–262, 286, 325, 335, 348, 381

400 

INDEX

S Sabha, 322 Sakshi Trust Bangalore, 239 Satyagraha, 251 Saudi Arabia, 29, 33, 38, 48, 354, 359, 360, 366 Secrecy, vii, 4, 5, 16, 17, 45, 46, 76, 128, 147, 152, 185, 191, 196, 206, 210, 254, 259–277, 295, 315, 381, 388 Selangor Freedom of Information Enactment, 133 Singapore, 29, 30, 32–35, 38, 42, 163–180, 199, 382 Six pillars, 339 Smart Bangladesh, 270 Smart Dubai Strategy, 346 Smart governance, 164–165 Smart Nation Initiative (SNI), 42, 43, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 175–178 Social accountability, 39, 77 Social equity, 233–254 Social values, 355, 384 Socio-cultural factors, 242, 244–246, 252 South Africa, 79, 238 South Asia, viii, 38, 300 Southeast Asia, viii, 28, 38, 76, 86, 187, 188, 199 South Korea, 29, 31–34, 37, 38, 149, 197, 382, 385 Special Administrative Region, 40, 107, 108, 110 Sri Lanka, 29, 33–36, 38, 46, 47, 85, 290, 305–309, 311–325, 381 Sri Lankan Airlines, 319 Stakeholder, 5, 11–13, 18, 48, 57, 62, 63, 67, 68, 78, 96, 99, 130, 146, 148–150, 158, 164, 267, 269, 274, 277, 307, 312, 313, 334, 336, 346, 354–356, 358, 359, 362, 366, 368–371, 384, 386

Statutory rules, 247 Sudan, 338 Sudra, 289 Suharto, 188, 197 Sunflower Student Movement, 56, 60, 63, 65, 69 Supply-side, 16, 43, 45, 156, 187, 191–192, 201, 240, 272, 336, 346 Supreme Court of India, 239, 253 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 7, 8, 12, 16, 93, 133, 139, 362 Sweden, 15, 145–147 Swedish model, 147 Systems model, 132 T Taiwan, 29, 30, 32, 35, 38, 55–71, 381, 382, 385 Taiwan Open Government Action Plan 2021–2024, 57, 58 Tamil Nadu, 246 Technology, viii, 5, 9, 13–15, 17, 34, 47, 78, 80, 94, 109, 128, 133, 135, 138, 146, 147, 151, 164, 167, 168, 200, 206, 210, 238, 239, 253, 263, 264, 270–271, 273, 277, 284, 285, 312, 323, 325, 332–334, 347, 383, 385, 387 Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII), 33, 264, 270, 271 Thailand, 29, 33–35, 38, 42, 85, 86, 145–160, 197, 200, 381 Transparency, viii, 4–12, 15–17, 19, 29, 31, 37–39, 41–44, 46, 56–58, 63–65, 68–71, 75–80, 82–83, 85–88, 92–98, 108–110, 114, 116, 119, 122, 128–130, 132–135, 145–149, 154, 158, 164–168, 176–178, 185, 187,

 INDEX 

188, 190, 196, 197, 199–201, 205–210, 212–218, 226, 238–240, 244, 247, 260, 262–265, 267, 269, 270, 272, 274–277, 284, 285, 308, 312, 314, 317, 319, 321, 323–325, 334–336, 347, 353, 354, 359, 362, 379, 380, 382, 384–387 Transparency International (TI), 48, 79, 159, 186, 200, 273, 297, 347 Tribhuvan University, 290 Trust, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 16, 31, 38, 40, 42, 43, 46, 56, 69–71, 78, 110, 117, 133, 138–140, 163, 165–166, 168–173, 175–178, 180, 186, 210, 260, 266, 272, 275, 276, 286–288, 290, 291, 293, 296, 297, 300–302, 312, 348, 387 Tunisia, 338 U Ukraine, 165 UNGA, 8, 15 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 29, 30, 32–36, 38, 47, 48, 331–348, 354, 359–363, 366, 385 United Kingdom, 79, 356 United Nations (UN), 6, 8, 15, 33–35, 93, 133, 264, 269–271, 305, 334, 338, 342, 344 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 7, 12, 17, 270, 296, 311 United States (USA), vii, 4, 79, 145, 147, 213, 238, 353, 356 United States model, 147 University Grants Commission, Sri Lanka, 321

401

University of Bergen, 290 University of Peradeniya, 290 V Values, open government, 5, 6, 13, 19, 38, 69, 96, 109, 200, 312, 383 Varieties of Democracy Participation Index, 266 Voice & Accountability Index, 45, 266 vTaiwan, 62, 63 W Weber, Max, 18 WhatsApp, 137 Whistle-blower Protection Act of 2010, Malaysia, 137 White Flag movement, 135 Woolley, Bernard, vii World Bank, 7, 14, 29–32, 45, 48, 76, 77, 79, 87, 94, 148, 186, 190, 237, 265, 269, 270, 272, 273, 276, 286, 334, 344, 346, 347 World Governance Indicators (WGI), 29, 30 World Justice Project (WJP), 30–32, 79, 157, 199, 242, 269, 347, 348 WTO, 206 Y Yemen, 338 Yes, Minister, vii Youth Advisory Committees, 39, 58, 60–61, 65–67, 69, 70