Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa: Nurturing Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Tools and Citizen Participation (Information Technology and Global Governance) 3031187032, 9783031187032

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INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa Nurturing Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Tools and Citizen Participation Edited by Gedion Onyango

Information Technology and Global Governance Series Editor

Derrick L. Cogburn American University Bethesda, MD, USA

Information Technology and Global Governance focuses on the complex interrelationships between the social, political, and economic processes of global governance that occur at national, regional, and international levels. These processes are influenced by the rapid and ongoing developments in information and communication technologies. At the same time, they affect numerous areas, create new opportunities and mechanisms for participation in global governance processes, and influence how governance is studied. Books in this series examine these relationships and influences.

Gedion Onyango Editor

Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa Nurturing Policy Entrepreneurship, Policy Tools and Citizen Participation

Editor Gedion Onyango Department of Political Science and Public Administration University of Nairobi Nairobi, Kenya

Information Technology and Global Governance ISBN 978-3-031-18703-2    ISBN 978-3-031-18704-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 Chapter 4 is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). For further details see license information in the chapter. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © Weiquan Lin / Moment / Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To Emily, my wife, and children Amor & Mich

Contents

1 Crafting  Policy Technologies (PolicyTechs): An Introduction to Policy Digitalisation Pathways in Africa  1 Gedion Onyango Part I Technologies as Public Policy Tools and Venues of Public Action  27 2 State  Entrepreneurship in Africa: Realising Digital Transformation for Policy Effectiveness in Selected Countries 29 Gedion Onyango 3 Technological  Leapfrogging and Innovation: Re-imagining Evaluation Approaches and Practice in Africa  67 Kobena T. Hanson 4 Digital  Technologies, Data Commons and Rights in Africa: The Case of DigitalTransport4Africa 85 Jacqueline M. Klopp, Agraw Ali Beshir, and Esthelyne Dusabe

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5 Biometric  Turn and the Quest of Public Interest. Assessing the National Identification Policy in Cameroon115 Alphonse Bernard Amougou Mbarga and Raoul Tamekou Tsowa 6 Digital  Participatory Budgeting and Policymaking in Botswana135 Emmanuel Botlhale Part II Technologies as Avenues for Nurturing Policy Entrepreneurship and Performance 159 7 The  Digital Economy and Youth Employment in Africa161 Laura Barasa and Joy M. Kiiru 8 Digitalisation  of Agricultural Policy and Policy Performance in Tanzania183 Francis Aron Mwaijande 9 Information  Technology, the Complexity of Joint Action, and Child Protection Policy Implementation in Kenya209 Zedekia Sidha and Nixon Amuomo 10 Mobilising  and Securing Private Financial Flows from Digital Business Platforms and Curbing Tech-Enabled IFFs to Finance SDGs in Africa233 Lyla Latif Part III Technologies as Spaces for Citizen Participation 255 11 Strengthening  Citizen Agencies in Policymaking Through Social Media257 Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango

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12 Social  Media and Public Policymaking in Southern Africa279 Emmanuel Botlhale, Mokaloba Mokaloba, and Chinthemwa Sichinga 13 Technology-Mediated  Transparency, Accountability, and Participation in the Realisation of Citizen-Centred Health Interventions: Case Study of MobiSAfAIDS in Southern Africa299 Mamello Thinyane, Ingrid Siebörger, and Caroline Khene 14 Digitalising  Decentralisation Policy Across Regions in Africa343 Emmanuel Botlhale and Christopher Dick-Sagoe Part IV Emerging Challenges in Leveraging 4IR Technologies 365 15 Regulatory  Issues for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship in Electronic Money in the CEMAC Sub-region367 Gregory Mvogo, Desiré Avom, and Honore Bidiasse 16 Ethical  Dilemmas in Public Innovations and ICT Solutions During COVID-19 in Kenya385 Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango Index411

Notes on Contributors

Alphonse Bernard Amougou Mbarga, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Observatoire des Mutations Politiques en Afrique Centrale (OMUPAC), Faculty of Laws and Political Sciences, University of Douala, Cameroon. He is also a visiting professor at the University of Buea, Cameroun, and a visiting professor at the Pan African University/PAUGHSS, University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon. His research includes public policy, governance and administration, elections and sociology of organisations. Some of his recent publications are “L’évaluation des politiques au Cameroun: entre mise à distance, désistement et désarticulation de l’action”, Revue Ivoirienne de Gouvernance et d’Etudes Stratégiques, 2022, N° 14-1, pp.  113–132; “Public Policy in Cameroon: State-Building Programs Under the Influence”, pp. 350–360, in Gedion Onyango (ed), The Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, London, 2022; “Les partis politiques et le code électoral au Cameroun: enjeux et défis autour d’un instrument de la régulation de la compétition politique”. African Journal of Democracy & Governance/ Revue africaine de la démocratie & de la Gouvernance, Vol. 8, Nos 3 & 4, 2021, pp. 215–238. Nixon Amuomo, PhD, is a lecturer in the Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computing at Rongo University (RU), Kenya. He holds a BSc in Technology-Electronics, a Postgraduate Diploma in Computer Science, an MSc in Information Systems from the University of Nairobi and a PhD in Information Technology from Masinde Muliro University. He is the program coordinator for Computer Science at Rongo University xi

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and the project coordinator and technical activity lead for the HealthIT project—USAID-funded project for four counties (Migori, Kisii, HomaBay and Nyamira); project coordinator—UNDP-funded project with Lakehub (young women in digital space); and a mentor with the Presidential Digital Talent Program (PDTP). Before the current roles, Amuomo worked in the private sector for over 15  years. Notable roles being principal engineer (5 Years) at Safaricom PLC and senior manager for IT processes (2  Years) at Airtel Africa, amongst others. His current research interests are in e-health and telemedicine technologies using artificial intelligence. Désiré Avom  is a professor at the Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Yaoundé 2, Soa, Cameroon. He currently holds the position of dean. He is a specialist in monetary economics and the author of several publications. Laura  Barasa, PhD, is a lecturer in the Department of Economics and Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, Kenya, where she teaches econometrics and statistics. She is a professional economist specialising in development economics. Her research works appear in leading journals such as Research Policy. She is a European Investment Bank– Global Development Network (EIB-GDN) fellow experienced in impact financing of innovative African start-ups. She is a Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA) fellow and a Structural Transformation of African Agriculture and Rural Spaces (STAARS) fellow. Barasa’s affiliations include Afrobarometer—Kenya, Environment for Development—Kenya, African Economic Research Consortium, Partnership for Economic Policy, Network of Impact Evaluation Researchers in Africa and the African Network for Internationalization of Education. Barasa’s research interests include innovation, agriculture, environment, poverty and gender issues in low-income countries. Agraw  Ali  Beshir  is a Geographic Information System (GIS) research analyst at the World Resources Institute (WRI) Africa regional office. He actively engages in urban mobility and data-related projects at the Cities Program to support transit mapping in African cities for improved transport planning. Before joining WRI, Agraw worked as a research associate in a laboratory at the University of Seoul. Prior to that, he worked as an assistant lecturer at the Addis Ababa Science and Technology University. In addition to that, he has participated in various GIS, urban planning and

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design projects in Ethiopia. Agraw holds an MSc in Urban Planning and Design from the University of Seoul, Korea, and a BSc in Urban and Regional Planning from Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. Honoré  Bidiasse  is a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Economics and Applied Management, University of Douala, Cameroon. He is the head of the Division in charge of cooperation and research in the same faculty. He is a specialist in the economics of regulation and the author of several publications. Emmanuel Botlhale, PhD, is Professor of Public Administration in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Botswana, Botswana. His primary teaching and research interest area is public finance. Secondary teaching and research areas are public budgeting, financial administration, project management, public governance and research methodology. Christopher  Dick-Sagoe, PhD, teaches public administration at the University of Botswana, Botswana. His research focuses on the efficient delivery of decentralised service provisions such as healthcare. He does this by focusing on how the available revenues shape the spending behaviour of local government officials and the invisible incentives such revenues create for improving the efficiency of decentralised public service delivery. He is a climate activist and writes on environmental topics. His research interests are local governments, climate change, livelihoods and entrepreneurship. Esthelyne  Dusabe  is the Urban Mobility Project specialist for World Resources Institute (WRI) Africa. She works primarily on project coordination, research and administrative support for the WRI Africa Cities Program, including support in scaling transit mapping in African cities and integrated transport planning. Prior to joining WRI, Esthelyne worked as a junior project manager at Vias Institute, a major Belgian knowledge centre that aims to improve road safety, along with mobility and safety in general. She also had an internship at Rwanda Transport Development Agency (RTDA) in Kigali, Rwanda. Esthelyne holds an MSc in Transportation Sciences, specialised in traffic safety, from the Hasselt University, Belgium. Her thesis focused on the factors influencing motorcycle taxi crashes in the City of Kigali, Rwanda.

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Kobena T. Hanson, PhD, is Principal Evaluation Capacity Development Officer at the African Development Bank (AfDB), Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire. Before joining AfDB, he was a KM coordinator with the USAID-West Africa Biodiversity & Climate Change (WABiCC) Program, and earlier, head of Knowledge, Evaluation & Learning at the African Capacity Building Foundation, Zimbabwe. Kobena has authored many articles on issues of disruptive technologies, capacity development, natural resource management, knowledge management and public policy. His recent publications include Disruptive Technologies, Innovation & Development in Africa (2020) and From MDGs to SDGS: Rethinking African Development (2017). He holds a PhD in Economic Geography from Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. Caroline Khene, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Information Systems in the School of Computer Science and Informatics and a researcher in the Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK.  She is also a visiting professor at Rhodes University, Grahamstown, Makhanda, South Africa. Khene is the director of the MobiSAM project, focusing on digital citizen engagement and social accountability monitoring in basic service delivery and sexual reproductive health service delivery. Khene’s research interests are in the areas of ICT4D (Information and Communication Technology for Development), evaluation, project management, strategy formulation, digital citizen engagement and open data governance. Her main approach to research is pragmatist and qualitative in nature, as she values direct engagement with government, private sector, local communities and non-governmental organisations in addressing complex social issues using information and communication technology. Her experiences and that of her postgraduate students are reflected in many of her publications. Joy M. Kiiru, PhD, is a senior lecturer at the School of Economics, University of Nairobi, Kenya. She has researched and written on research leadership in higher education, microfinance, entrepreneurship, youth employment, gender and agriculture, among other areas. Her research has received international recognition. In 2009, her paper on “Policy Issues for Small Holder Farmers” was among the finalists in the Africa Wide Competition for Women in Science. In 2011 the Global Development Network (GDN) recognised her research and awarded her a First Prize for her research in microfinance. She was a finalist and was feted as an outstanding scientist at the Africa Science Week—Kenya 2018. She holds a PhD from the Center for

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Development Research (ZEF), Bonn University, Germany; an MA in Economics from Chancellor College, University of Malawi; and a BA in Economics and Philosophy from the University of Nairobi. Jacqueline  M.  Klopp, PhD, is a research scholar and director of the Center for Sustainable Urban Development in the Columbia Climate School at Columbia University, New York, where she also teaches in the Sustainable Development Undergraduate programme and spearheads the Environmental Justice and Climate Just Cities network. Her research looks at policies and pathways to move towards safer, low emission, equitable transport and land use and improved urban governance with a focus on African cities. She also explores how to leverage new technologies and data for these aims and is a co-founder of DigitalMatatus and DigitalTransport4Africa, and a founding member of the Clean Air Toolbox for Cities. In 2021, she was honoured by her peers and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development as one of the “Remarkable Women in Transport”. Lyla Latif, PhD, is a Kenyan-based lawyer with litigation experience and has drafted legislation for the Government of Kenya. She also holds a faculty position at the University of Nairobi, where she co-founded the Committee of Fiscal Studies (CFS). She has taught at Cardiff University and Warwick Law School. Lyla is an appointed member of the inaugural Tax Law Committee of the East Africa Law Society (2022–2024). She sits on the Advisory Board of the International Lawyers Project (2022–2024) and trains on tax-related content globally with Rotterdam’s premier tax training organisation: Capabuild. Based on her 11 years as a legal professional and researcher on fiscal responsible regimes, she has built an international reputation as a consultant producing scholarship and making evidence-based policy recommendations for governments and international organisations focusing on closing revenue leakages and financing human rights. She has worked with, advised and consulted for the European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation, WHO, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS (UNAIDS), The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Economic and Financial Committee, the Tax Justice Network Africa, East Africa Tax and Governance Network, Africa Forum for Debt and Development, Southern and Eastern Africa Trade

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Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI), the Kenyan and German Parliaments and several international organisations. Mokaloba Mokaloba  teaches public administration in the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Botswana, Botswana. Gregory Mvogo  is a lecturer at the ESSEC Business School, University of Douala, Cameroon, and member of the AfricaLics Scientific Board. He is a specialist in monetary and banking economics whose field of application is the development of financial innovation, particularly mobile money. Francis Aron Mwaijande, PhD, is Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Social Science Research at Mzumbe University, Tanzania, where his career development has been nurtured for 30  years. He worked as an adjunct instructor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Arkansas, USA, in 2008. He taught comparative African politics focusing on social policy reforms, including public sector reforms, the democratic reform process and the then Millennium Development Goals. Mwaijande is a Fulbright Scholar. He holds a PhD in Public Policy from the University of Arkansas, USA; an MA in Communications Planning from the University of Wolverhampton, UK; a BA in Education (Hons) from the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and a Master’s Degree in Monitoring and Evaluation from Uganda Technology and Management University (ABD), Uganda. He has been a principal investigator of various research projects. Mwaijande has accomplished performance evaluation of the agriculture subsidy programme in Tanzania, impact assessment of ASARECA (Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central Africa) projects and Assessment of Development Results for UNDP, Tanzania. Japheth Otieno Ondiek  has experience in managing policy analysis programmes on a wide range of issues, including digitalisation in the public sector. He has been involved in the field of public policy, ICT4D (Information and Communication Technology for Development), knowledge management, innovation and research with practical experience (both international and national) in designing research/survey methodologies and tools, collecting and analysing both quantitative and ­qualitative data, writing and presenting research reports, and designing robust dissemination mechanisms and tools for research and policy-related reports and briefs. Japheth has also accumulated extensive experience in conduct-

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ing analyses of policies and policy environments, knowledge translation and communicating research to policymakers and other general audiences, including research-to-policy communications and research utilisation by policymakers. He has recently co-­authored a book chapter in the Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa. Onyango, Gedion ed. 2022; and an article “Digitalisation and Integration of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in Public Organisation in Kenya” in Public Organisation Review journal. He continues to write articles and chapters in internationally reviewed journals and books on digital transformation and public policy. Gedion Onyango, PhD, is a Lecturer of Public Policy, Public Administration

and Comparative Politics at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, the University of Nairobi, Kenya. His other research roles include serving as Co-National Investigator at Afrobarometer, East Africa; and Research Officer at the Firoz Lalji Institute for Africa (FLIA), where he is also a  co-­ investigator for the Centre for Public Authority and International Development (CPAID), The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He is an associate editor for the Evidence and Policy Journal. Besides authoring several articles in international peer-reviewed journals, Gedion has edited three other books: State Politics and Public Policy in Eastern Africa: A Comparative Perspective (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023); Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa (2022) and Governing Kenya: Public Policy in Theory and Practice (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), co-edited with Professor Goran Hyden.

Chinthemwa  Sichinga is a programs associate under the Human Resources for Health (HRH) program at the Clinton Health Access Initiative, Malawi. As a programs associate, he is supporting the Ministry of Health to take an evidence-based approach to HRH planning by designing tools that (a) forecast health worker requirements across the health system and (b) cost the required investments to scale up pre-service education training. Over the years, he has taken a keen interest in the interplay between public policy, governance and socio-economic development. Thus, his research areas are political economy, public policy and public sector management. Zedekia  Sidha, PhD, is an Evaluation, Child Protection and Policy Sciences Expert. He is also an experienced manager of people and projects, with more than 18 years of experience in international development. In his various roles, Zedekia has trained a dozen of M&E professionals, developed M&E systems and strategic plans and facilitated baseline surveys and evaluations for over 20 international organisations and grassroots

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movements. His research interests include gender quotas, voter behaviour and public policy. Some of his most recent publications include “Street-­ Level Bureaucrats as the Ultimate Policymakers” (2017); “None Motorized Transport and Road Safety Policy Implementation in Kenya” (2017); “Housekeeping Chores or the Quality Education: The Dilemmas Faced by Lectures in Public Universities in Kenya” (2018); “Street-Level Bureaucrats as Policy Entrepreneurs: The Nexus Between Timing of Traffic Enforcement Activities and Road Safety Policy Outcomes” (2020). He is a member of Kenya’s International Data Visualization Society and the Evaluation Society of Kenya. He obtained his PhD in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Nairobi. He is working on his second PhD at Stellenbosch University. Ingrid  Siebörger, PhD, is an associate professor in the Department of Information Systems at Rhodes University, South Africa. Her research interests include ICTs in education, ICTs for development, digital citizen engagement and data for development. Ingrid received her PhD in Computer Science from Rhodes University in 2017. Ingrid’s teaching interests are around databases (theory and practice), data analytics and big data, and software design and engineering. Currently, her research work contributes to the Siyakhula Living Lab (working in rural and peri-urban communities) and MobiSAM (working in the areas of citizen engagement for service provision [basic and health]). Raoul Tamekou Tsowa, PhD, is a senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of Contemporary Dynamics of the State and Societies in Africa (Montreal, Canada), responsible for Axis I (state, politics and public action). A specialist in comparative public administration and policy, his research focuses on the international circulation of norms and models of administrative reform, as well as on the organisational, institutional, political, cultural and technological dimensions of public action, in a historical and comparative perspective. His recent work focuses on the digital transformation of public administration in Africa, the international action of cities and the sociology of scientific knowledge (social sciences) in Africa. Mamello  Thinyane, PhD, is a Principal Research Fellow at the United Nations University (UNU) Institute, Macau, China, where he leads research on data and sustainable development, critically investigating the sustainable development data assemblages and developing solutions to support the active participation of civil society stakeholders in these data

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ecosystems. He also leads research on cyber resilience, undertaking policy-­ relevant research, innovating technology tools and undertaking capacity-­ building activities to enhance the resilience of citizens and civil society stakeholders in smart digital futures. Mamello holds a PhD in Computer Science from Rhodes University and has over 15 years of experience managing multi-stakeholder and multi-disciplinary digital development projects in Africa and Asia. Before joining UNU, he was an associate professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Fort Hare, South Africa, as well as the director for the Telkom Centre of Excellence in ICT for Development at the same institute, where he helped launch and manage the Siyakhula Living Lab.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 2.5

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6

Mapping of digital government investment categories to GovTech focus areas. (Source: The World Bank [https:// www.worldbank.org/en/programs/govtech/priority-­themes]) 9 Public policy technology. (Source: Author) 13 Status of financing and budgeting of ICT infrastructure. (Source: National Broadband Strategy 2018–2023)45 Percentage of households who have functional landline and cellular telephone in their dwellings by province for 2019. (Source: StatsSA GHS, 2019) 56 Internet by province for 2019. (Source: StatsSA GHS, 2019) 56 Digital transformation projects expenditure trends and estimates in South Africa 59 National Integrated Cyber Infrastructure System. (Source: National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System (https:// www.sanren.ac.za/wp-­content/uploads/2022/04/ SANReN_2022_04_20b.png))61 Digital Principles for Development. (Source: Abigail Shirley via Wikimedia Commons) 89 Main pillars of the Declaration of the Cities Coalition for Digital Rights 93 DigitalMatatus map of matatus in Nairobi. (Source: digitalmatatus.co)97 DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A)s main project partners 99 Three core pillars of DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A) 101 Platforms to support the “Learn” pillar: (a) DT4A blog and (b) DT4A knowledge centre 102

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List of Figures

Fig. 4.7

Fig. 4.8 Fig. 4.9 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 6.2 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5 Fig. 13.1 Fig. 13.2 Fig. 13.3 Fig. 13.4 Fig. 13.5 Fig. 13.6

(a) Addis Ababa city accessibility mapping (https://fried705. carto.com/me) based on data from Addis Ababa transit mapping project in 2018 (https://git.digitaltransport4africa. org/data/africa/addis-­ababa) and (b) Kampala city public transit accessibility mapping web app (https:// worldresources.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index. html?id=cbab16378f0e410f830c2fcc6021d6ae)104 Project locations of the 14 GTFS datasets available in the DT4A data repository (https://digitaltransport4africa.org/ projects/)107 DT4A’s governance structure 108 Extent of opportunities for participation in the budget process (2019). (Source: Author, based on data from IBP 2019b)145 Botswana’s public budget participation scores 2012–2019. (Source: Author, based on data from IBP 2019b) 146 SAPPA digital policymaking platforms. Source 2: www. sappaportal.org193 Governance Structure of NAIVS. Source: Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, 2009 201 KDH Digitalised Fertiliser/Input Distribution and Management System. Source: Bizy Tech, 2022 203 Trend analysis of CPIMS reported cases. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal 214 Visualisation by age. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal 215 Case reporting by month. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal 216 Summary of current interventions by DCS. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal 217 Kenya DCS Data Flow. Source: Kenya Child Protection Report, 2016-2019 227 MobiSAfAIDS-illustrated process flow. (Source: Authors) 313 Number of issues through the resolution workflow. (Source: Authors)315 Number of issues reported per week. (Source: Authors) 321 Reporting of issues across the pilot countries. (Source: Authors) 322 Frequency of issues across categories and subcategories. (Source: Authors) 323 Common two-term phrases (i.e., bigrams) in the issues reported in different countries. (Source: Authors) 324

  List of Figures 

Fig. 13.7

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Common narratives across reported issues (from term co-occurrence graph). (Source: Authors) 325 Fig. 13.8 Number of logins for the different user roles. (Source: Authors) 327 Fig. 13.9 Duration of issues from reported to assigned. (Source: Author) 329 Fig. 13.10 Number of issues reported per user per country. (Source: Authors)331 Fig. 13.11 The evolving purpose of MobiSAfAIDS. (Source: Authors) 335 Fig. 15.1 Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in the CEMAC region. (Source: Summary from World Bank database 2021) 373 Fig. 15.2 Evolution of mobile money market in the CEMAC region. (Source: BEAC 2020) 374

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Table 2.1 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 2.5 Table 2.6 Table 6.1 Table 8.1 Table 8.2 Table 8.3 Table 8.4 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 9.3 Table 11.1 Table 11.2 Table 11.3 Table 13.1 Table 13.2 Table 13.3 Table 13.4 Table 13.5 Table 13.6

Proliferation of FinTechs, CivicTechs and GovTechs in Africa 7 Broadband investment and entrepreneurship model 46 Universal service fund projects 50 Communications authority’s tenders to digitise government services 2017–2022 51 KeNIA’S LIF beneficiaries for innovation in 2018/2019 53 Digital transformation projects expenditure trends and estimates in South Africa 58 The extent of opportunities for public participation in the budget process 144 Necessary Conditions for Digitalization of Agriculture in Africa 189 ICT and Digitalisation Status in Tanzania 195 Practice of Digitalization of Agricultural Services 196 Fertiliser Subsidy Requirement 2022203 Case categories 214 Types of interdependencies in organisations 220 Child protection policy implementation stakeholder analysis 224 Social media mapping of CBC public policy development by citizen agencies from 2012 to 2021 272 COVID-19 policy and coordination response 274 Policy processes in COVID-19 health policy measures 274 Strategic pillars of the “Transforming Lives” programme 312 The role of key stakeholders 314 Characteristics and metrics of usage across the pilot countries 316 Qualitative results for MobiSAfAIDS 318 Quantitative results for MobiSAfAIDS 319 Number of messages sent by different user roles 328 xxv

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List of Tables

Table 16.1 Table 16.2 Table 16.3

Set of ethical dilemmas in public service Framework for ethical considerations on innovations and IT in COVID-19 Technology applications and ethical dilemma framework

392 400 403

CHAPTER 1

Crafting Policy Technologies (PolicyTechs): An Introduction to Policy Digitalisation Pathways in Africa Gedion Onyango

Introduction For the last two decades, African governments and non-state policy actors have increased efforts to harness modern technologies to resolve today’s most pressing and complex policy problems or challenges confronting their public administration. African States are becoming more intentional in overcoming longstanding governance challenges that have characterised them since independence like extreme poverty and socio-­ economic inequalities, as well as new ones like climate change, terrorism and the growing urban population by seeking solutions in modern ‘governance technologies’. The result has witnessed a gradual but tremendous transformation of Africa’s political, economic and government systems.

G. Onyango (*) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_1

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Like elsewhere and even more radically, these technologies have undoubtedly redefined how different African societies and their organisations relate and transact businesses especially since the mid 2000s. Being part of the public governance or open government paradigms of state reforms (e.g. Kettl 2000; Cordella and Bonina 2012), technological transformations have been used to evaluate the quality of government, to promote performance, modernise policy systems, democratise and manage chaos in the public sector (Larsson and Skjølsvik 2021; Hanson et  al. 2020; Welchman 2015). Most importantly, the pursuit of appropriate technologies or ICT-­ enabled government structures worldwide has promoted public innovation and provides models to realise policy effectiveness (Hood and Margetts 2007; Onyango and Ondiek 2021, 2022). For that matter, technological adoption and appropriate technologies, in particular, have been primarily associated with increased production, efficiency and development in private and public sector organisations and businesses. The result has seen the flaring of homegrown innovation and user-friendly technologies. In Africa, some of the most impactful technological developments like Mobile Money and technologies  for civic engagements (CivicTechs), being employed in policy delivery, are largely homegrown despite being funded primarily by development partners at various levels. From this, technological adoption, particularly digitalisation,  has become the most fundamental feature of modernisation (Boateng et  al. 2022)  in Africa. Digital development has become a tool for evaluating government efficiency and innovation (Onyango and Ondiek 2022), democracy (e.g. McGuinness and Schank 2021) and development (Jauhiainen and Hooli 2019). It is no doubt that technological developments have distrupted how institutions, ideas and policy actors relate. They have relatively improved the state-society relations or realising a more citizen-centred political actions  by changing how governments interact with other actors in responding to societal needs. Government responsiveness and accountability are improving with the proliferation of digital technologies across Africa. These technologies align public interest and other policy feedback mechanisms by particularly altering how policy problems come to the government’s attention (policy inputs), or  how attendant solutions (policy analysis) are designed and expanding the nature and scope of policy tools, and the entrenching mechanisms for citizen participation (see World Economic Forum report of 2022). This was recently explicit in how policy actors responded to the COVID-19 crisis, where Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or drones, for example, were used to deliver medicines, blood,

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and COVID-19 vaccines promptly  to remote areas of Malawi, Rwanda and Ghana (e.g. Nyaaba and Ayamga 2021). Moreover, mobile money has also revolutionised the financial sector. Data creation and access, and social media has expanded public spaces, changed how governments, politicians and organisations interact with each other and the public. Indeed, these technologies have opened up uncharted territories or policy environments through increased collaborations between private organisations, government agencies, and mission-driven organisations worldwide, particularly in Africa, to realise effective public service delivery while enhancing public interest and participation. For this reason, the 2000s have featured a growing interest in understanding how the ongoing technological transformations are affecting African countries and governance in particular. We are witnessing a scenario where despite the state’s structural challenges, governments and development partners, especially the African Development Bank (AfDB), have seriously taken up the need to create and leverage Information, Communication and Technologies (ICTs). The African Union’s Agenda 2063 has also been intentional about the realisation of ICT-enabled government systems and public policy processes by member states. But while integrating digital technologies to promote  policy effectiveness (PolicyTech)  remains a noble endeavour, challenges  that primarily draw on the underlying structural factors like autocratic state norms and underfunding of public organisations remain. Building  policy technologies (PolicyTechs) as an act of amalgamating different technological dynamics into public policy processes, also confront regulatory challenges. The consequence is  leveraging PolicyTechs in policy systems effectively  to cause the needed transformation has been slow in public organisation spaces, and the impact has varied between policy sectors. While addressing various policy dynamics of this technological transformation, this book brings together predominantly African researchers, scholars and practitioners to assess the emerging linkages. Different chapters deal with understanding empirical and normative characteristics of the relationships between these technological transformations and African public policy systems. Doing so provides empirically grounded analyses within authors’ specialisation areas, policy sectors and countries across Africa. The objective is to show how the rapidly growing adoption of technologies sits with the public interest-oriented innovations, actions and discourses—public policy. Each chapter examines the impact of digital technologies that promote best practices in human-centred design

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in public policy, product development, process re-engineering, and data science to solve societal problems, otherwise referred to as Public Interest Technologies. Public Interest Technologies (PITs) promote an inclusive,  and iterative—continuous learning—platforms for improving and delivering better outcomes to the public.1 Those like McGuinness and Schank (2021) argue that PITs bring the citizens to the centre of the policymaking process as they involve smartly using data and metrics in designing policy, conducting small experiments and pilot programmes, innovative digital technologies and low technologies. The PITs are fundamentally candid about the people-centredness of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR or Industry 4.0). It is a blanket term used to capture the globalised proliferation or the ubiquitous adoption of interrelated modern technologies (Schwab 2017). The 4IR technologies are highly dynamic. They conventionally include robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), Blockchain, Artificial intelligence (AI), Big Data, Machine to Machine (M2M) Communication, etc. In Klaus Schwab’s analysis, as many other observers, the revolutionary feature of Industry 4.0. technologies resides in the abrupt and disruptive manner in which these technologies have built on digital technologies and how they have rapidly unfolded globally. These features set 4IR technologies apart from the previous industrial revolutions. In addition, the 4IR technologies tend to demystify the conventional contours between the physical, digital and biological spaces of action (Schwab 2017). This has resulted in unimaginable opportunities for governments and businesses. This means that despite deficits, mainly those concerned with the inadequate proactive measures to leverage these technologies in Africa, 4IR technologies can nurture policy entrepreneurship by state agencies, non-­ state actors and the citizenry. Evidence has shown how 4IR technologies entrench PITs that are recently being employed globally to improve policy instrumentation (policy design). According to International Development partners in Africa, 4IR technologies may offer solutions to governance problems and as such consider them as critical policy tools in policy analysis processes. PITs enhance evidence-informed policymaking, policy monitoring and evaluation (see Hanson in Chap. 3 of this volume). Overall, modern digital technologies are introducing policy  innovations central in  improving the governance environment  in Africa. They are 1  https://www.newamerica.org/pit/about/#:~:text=What%20is%20Public%20 Interest%20Technology,better%20outcomes%20to%20the%20public.

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introducing seemingly minor but critical changes that help with opening up unconventional governance spaces like the social media besides providing new tools for Citizen Participation. This book broadly unpacks  the impact or implications of these  technologies to three key areas—policy entrepreneurship, policy tools and citizen participation functions—to understand the interfaces between public policy and technological transformations in Africa. We take note that while the burgeoning literature on Africa has extensively and richly discussed how these technologies impact government policies and policy environment, empower citizens and drive innovation in Africa, the role of technology in public policy in Africa is still a developing research agenda. Also, challenges remain, especially regarding the knowledge of their functional roles in policy entrepreneurship, how policy actors leverage them to develop appropriate policy tools or instruments and citizen participation. There is no doubt that adequate knowledge exists. However, the larger part of this knowledge comes from development partner organisations and ongoing research projects in African universities and even outside, as well as from innovation hubs across the continent. Thus, integrating this knowledge  remains fundamental  to effectively inform the knowledge-­ sharing process for improved policy innovation in African countries. This demands more research, especially by government think tanks, robust collaborations and multidisciplinary empirical analyses; a void this volume make attempts to address. In so doing, it also strives to fill the gap around institutional sustainability of the rapid technological proliferation in Africa. That is to say, while there are intentional attempts to integrate these technologies into government systems and public policy processes, there is still a challenge in coupling them effectively with policy systems; and in identifying appropriate technologies and the capacities of government agencies to use these technologies and data being generated from them for policy purposes (see, e.g., Klopp et al. Chap. 4 in this volume). We argue that, even though 4IR technologies may potentially complicate existing inequalities or introduce more complex social problems, public interest and other digital  technologies are simultaneously taking  policy ‘innovation’ to unimaginable heights. As such, they are providing solutions to policy problems in a manner hitherto unanticipated and in a way that does not entangle deeply embedded, powerfully placed  political interests that are more likely to resist policy changes. African governments and policy actors have much to gain from leveraging 4IR technologies or transforming them into ‘PolicyTechs’. In other words, for a technology to become a

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PolicyTech, more intentional and robust efforts or investments are needed. This should involve identifying, designing and leveraging policy-­relevant 4IR technologies.  To achieve this, however,  African governments must go beyond merely instrumenting with or simply responding to the emerging symbolic connotations of technological adoption as a feature of modern public administration (e.g. Onyango 2017). Indeed, the symbolic adoption of 4IR technologies in African public services has resulted in some stakeholders showing little trust in African governments’ efforts to realise effectively functional ICT-enabled government systems. Therefore, critical questions still linger around the seriousness of recent efforts by African governments to harness 4IR technologies in order to redesign their’ systems of science, technology and innovation (STIs)  (Diyamett 2023). Also, challenges bordering on political will have primarily  characterised efforts to strengthen the National Innovation Systems (NIS) across Africa. Since the 2000s, National Innovation Systems entrech  various policy frameworks introduced or developed to integrate 4IR technologies into managing government business appropriately. These have been a consequence of extensive collaborations by African governments with international development partners and support from different local actors to employ best practice technologies in confronting today’s wicked policy problems, from climate change to security, as well as fostering Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In short, technological transformation present greater opportunities for development and is here to stay. It is therefore more pragmatic for African governments to rise to the occasion. This should be hinged on finding contextually informed or practical ways of leveraging 4IR’s PITs as these countries pursue Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063 (see Chap. 10 by Lyla Latif in this volume). This book, therefore also make attempts to identify some of the pathways or technological innovation streams that African governments have harnessed. This points out  untapped opportunities and inherent challenges akin to their broader political contexts as they use these technologies to improve policy effectiveness. 

Leveraging 4IR Technologies into PolicyTechs— Integrating FinTechs, CivicTecs and GovTechs The rapid proliferation of 4IR technologies in African countries has seen increased STI-related legislation and a more intentional allocation of resources to the NIS agencies and Research, Development and Innovation

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(RDI) departments. However, this differs across countries, with some performing better than others. The aim has been to drive evidence-based and inclusive policy development in government institutions (Lundvall et al. 2011; Mugwagwa et  al. 2022). The application of 4IR technologies in different policy sectors takes up broad categories with interrelated consequences for public policy. That is,  leveraging 4IR technologies involves various innovation streams and applications in different sectors, mainly, in the financial industry (FinTechs), Civic activism (CivicTechs) and the public sector (GovTechs). Most of these, if not all, promote the PITs as platforms for improving policy effectiveness  by putting the people at the center of innovation. In this way, we can broadly consider the term PolicyTechs to describe the integration of these technological innovation streams into public policy processes. Table 1.1 summarises the FinTechs, CiviTechs and GovTechs’ proliferation across Africa.

Table 1.1  Proliferation of FinTechs, CivicTechs and GovTechs in Africa Technologies What they are FinTechs

CivicTechs

GovTechs

Source: Author

PayTechs—Payment and transfer technologies, M-Pesa, etc. used in service delivery LendTechs—lending apps e.g. Tala, Branch, etc. BankTechs InsurTechs Blockchain Cryptocurrencies Policy advocacy digital channels, e.g. BudgIT (Nigeria), Mzalendo (Kenya), MOPA (Mozambique), and Amandla. mobi (South Africa), etc. Technologies: Supporting core government systems Enhancing public service delivery Mainstreaming citizen engagement Fostering GovTech enablers RegTechs

Rate of proliferation in Africa Between 2019 and 2021 17.3% growth from 491 in 2019 to 573 in 2021 (Disrupt Africa 2021)

Unrecorded but remain highly decentralised and homegrown. Leveraged for policy entrepreneurships and citizen participation Sub-Saharan African region relatively lags, or a few countries have leveraged GovTech focus areas (Dener et al. 2021)

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FinTechs have no clear definition and have been used to describe technologies such as payment platforms (Paytechs) like mobile money, cryptocurrencies, bitcoin and lending platforms (LendTechs), bank and insurance technologies. FinTechs have proliferated all other technological dimensions in the public sector (GovTechs), and are being used for Crowdfunding in civic activism (CivicTechs). Most  FinTechs have been homegrown around Africa despite the huge funding from development partners. The African Development Bank, for example, entered into collaboration with other funders in 2019 to establish Africa Digital Financial Inclusion Facility (ADFI) that continue to inject millions of dollars to support innovation around these technologies in Africa. Like FinTechs, CivicTechs also have a rather descriptive definition. For instance, CivicTech Fund Africa understands CivicTech more broadly to describe a “technology that reinforces citizen engagement and strengthens the accountability and transparency of governance processes and public services.” These technologies emerge and thrive “in a collaboration between civil society, public authorities and the private sector.” “CivicTech can also include a strong digital engagement focus  where technologies are used  to support the functioning of public networks and platforms, citizen engagement or public interest advocacy campaigns,”2 like was recently witnessed in #Fixthecountry advocacies in Ghana, and #FeesMustFall in South Africa, among others. In recent years, digital activism and spaces have become essential political marketing and mobilisation tools (see Mensah et  al. 2022), making CiviTechs critical in today’s public policy advocacy, democracy and policy communication (as discussed further in Chaps. 11 and 12). While closely related and complemented by FinTechs and CivicTechs, GovTechs can be considered as an amalgamation or a whole of government approach to leveraging PITs for improved government performance. According to the World Bank, GovTech solutions represent the recent evolutionary phase of the technological transformation of government structures: that is, from analogue, e-government, and digital government to GovTech (Elnir et  al. 2021). GovTech’s whole of government approach should enhance simple, accessible and efficient government services (World Bank 2020). GovTechs like other technologies are embedded in IoT, AI, M2M, robotics and others. In particular, a GovTech “involves articulating an ecosystem of new actors, promoting transparent and cross-­ sectorial collaboration with other departments, and generating public 2

 https://civictechfund.africa/

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ICT / eGov Infrastructure Gov Cloud, Interoperability Service Bus, Web Services/ APIs, Cybersecurity

CORE GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS PFM Systems FMIS, HRMIS, Payroll, e-Procurement, PIMS, Tax Customs

Sectoral Information Systems Digital health, EduTech, FinTech, Social Protection, Justice, Cadaster

PUBLIC SERVICE DE LIVERY

Disruptive Technologies Big Data, AI/Machine Learning, Blockchain, IoT, RPA, Smart App

CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT

Online Services e-Services (G2C/G2B/...), Portals, Mobile Apps, Digital Signature

Identification for Development Civil Registration & Identification Digital ID, Functional Registries, e-ID Services

Open Government CivicTech, Open Government, Open Data, Open Source, GRM

Leadership & Digi Skills Improve digital skills in PS, promote data-driven culture

GOVTECH ENABLERS Strategy & Institutions Regulations Enabling & Safeguarding Whole of Government, Institutions Data Governance, DPL, RTI

9

Innovation Public sector innovation, private investments/skills

Fig. 1.1  Mapping of digital government investment categories to GovTech focus areas. (Source: The World Bank [https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/govtech/priority-­themes])

services by leveraging data and new technologies. Developing a GovTech ecosystem strategy will vary according to the potential and momentum each of these areas has” (Elnir et al. 2021, p. 3). Figure 1.1, developed by the World Bank, shows the main areas that GovTechs focus on to improve policy feedback mechanisms.  The GovTech  integrates  core government systems, mainly,  ICT infrastructures and digital leadership and skills, as well as Public Finance Management systems, data systems and citizen engagement systems.  It is worth noting that these technological transformations do not occur in a vacuum and are a function of public administration’s structural, contextual and normative dynamics. This way, leveraging GovTechs remains a significant responsibility of African governments. More specifically, there is a need for African governments to confront the challenge of the lack of promptness to identify and engage with stakeholders or actors, assert the centrality of citizen agency, and unpack institutional capabilities and employee competence. There is also a need to stimulate and realise relevant and match  policy networks and instruments to generate more practical policy ideas and knowledge transfer of different technologies. It is believed that, by their nature, GovTech solutions will gear policy actors

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towards these ends. Overall, however,  establishing GovTech, FinTechs and CivicTech infrastructures is primarily determined by key institutional complementaries: legislation, regulation, capacity, and coordination across government (World Bank 2019). Contributors in this volume broadly handle these complementaries, paying attention to different  policy sectors and their technologies. Different chapters show how legislation, regulation, capacity, and coordination aspects relate to the structural hindrances or enablers of building effective PolicyTech solutions in public administration. They generally show how most African public services struggle with ensuring these complementaries, due to the weak regulatory state  among other challenges that mostly  border on political will and capacities at different levels of public administration. In other words, leveraging GovTechs is still relatively lagging in most African countries. Unsurprisingly, though, this has not stopped most governments and transnational policy actors (especially the World Bank and African Development Bank) from entering into joint ventures to upscale Public Innovation strategies, which was more significant during the COVID-19 responses (see Onyango and Ondiek 2022). At the same time, the contours between CiviTechs, FinTechs and GovTechs remain blurred and complementary. That is they are simultaneously being leveraged in different public policy spaces and service delivery mechanisms. FinTechs like mobile money, for example,  are used by the citizenry to pay for public services like water, electricity, health, etc., resulting in increased access and reduced administrative burdens. CiviTechs like social media platforms and Crowdfunding have boosted participation and expanded the transfer of technologies and resource mobilisation in public policy processes (e.g. Onginjo and Mei 2022). The co-production of public policy using these technologies is better demonstrated by how African governments and other policy actors dealt with the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries have responded to the pandemic by intensifying public innovation and leveraging digitally enabled service delivery systems (e.g. Onyango and Ondiek 2022; Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2022; Bakibinga-Gaswaga et al. 2020). Given this state of affairs, and despite relatively lower political priority in enhancing technological transformations by most African governments, GovTech infrastructures are increasingly finding home in African public service or policy systems. States and non-state actors are trying to realise them through their National Development Plans and targeted collaborations or financing that have been adopted by most countries since the turn of the 2000s (Onyango 2022a). That said, the proceeding

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chapters also variedly explore the state’s efforts to expand GovTech solutions in six areas—core government systems, shared platforms and standards, online services, digital citizen engagement, GovTech enablers and disruptive technologies—to improve policy effectiveness in the selected countries. This book presents both comparative and country-specific case studies that pay particular attention to specific transformational  components or public interest technologies in their different forms, as mentioned above. Each chapter shows how these technologies relate to public policy, which is an essential factor in discerning their natures and utility. And determines how they can be holistically integrated to, improve or ensure the appropriate adoption of modern technologies in the public sector to offer the solution policy actors are looking for. Put differently, a variance in leveraging these technologies exists in their practicality—capacity, affordability, contextuality, simplicity and seemless integration  for public service delivery and policy process. Meaning, policymakers need to know what kind of technologies to adopt or integrate to ensure the appropriateness of technological adoption in public policy processes (Dener et al. 2021; World Bank 2020). This remains a challenge in policy digitalisation in Africa; an issue  different chapters in this volume  seek to illuminate  to understand technological transformation pathways in Africa. The volume’s consideration of the broader political contexts of technological transformations also  points out underlying  structural threats (whether socio-cultural, political or conomical) to harnessing PolicyTechs in a manner that hinders their effective integration into the public policy. That is to say, African governing systems are still primarily oriented towards serving elites’ interests or are rather inclined more towards consolidating the regime’s power (where institutional priorities respond more to power) than pursuing people-centred policy outputs. In other words, technological developments are yet to effectively address challenges relating to autocratisation  (or centralisation of policy processes) and the conventional public leadership styles that may hinder public innovation and policy implementation. Even so, these challenges have not stopped gradual transformations taking shape due to recent digital developments’ opening up of hitherto highly centralised policymaking spaces in African countries (also see Onyango 2022a). Also, because African digital infrastructures are only developing, digital transformations have come with unintended consequences like the digital divide. These technological transformation challenges have created newer

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governance deficits  which are negatively impacting access to public services across African countries (Fuchs and Horak 2008). Moreover, the bureaucracy is still struggling with letting go of bureaucratic closed culture (prevalence of legacy systems in service delivery), secrecy, and dominion, which enhances distrust towards disruptive technologies associated with public innovation (Onyango and Ondiek 2021). In this book we showcase sectoral characteristics of some of these challenges, including a cross-­ cutting lack of adequate investment in relevant technologies and unco-ordinated  technological adoption strategies, a hybrid system and archaic regulatory landscape. In short, the complexity of emerging challenges from leveraging 4IR can explain why, most African states struggle with regulating their applications through, social media, cryptocurrency-­ based transactions and mobile money or tax digital money. These issues are given specific empirical treatment in a multidisciplinary fashion, as explained further below.

How We Approach Public Policy and Technological Development Interfaces This book underpins technological development processes and public policy within broader governance and state politics contexts. We believe the surrounding governance or political contexts form the macro-structural variables that moderate the degree of technological proliferation within a country. Therefore, a more democratic political context, for example, is likely to engender the proliferation of PITs than an autocratic political regime. We understand public policy as the state and its agencies’ political commitment or state institutions’ capacities to align political objectives with people’s interests and societal transformation. Thus, leveraging people-­centred technologies or adopting appropriate PolicyTechs is essential for improving policy effectiveness or public service delivery. But this may  only go as far as the political environment  allows especially with regard to policy entrepreneurship, the policy toolbox for policymakers and the degree of citizen participation in governance processes, as shown in Fig. 1.2. Regarding the critical role of the state, for example, we put together issues on the political will and institutional capacity in Africa. Factors like digital skills, resource allocation, and organisational culture form some of the key institutional capacity variables. Different chapters show how these

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Governments Local policy actors

Policy entrepreneurship Citizen Participation

GOVERNANCE CONTEXTS

Public Policy

Policy tools

International Actors

P Policy entrepreneurship

Technology

Fig. 1.2  Public policy technology. (Source: Author)

variables  relate to  influence  how  public institutions leverage ICT infrastructures and develop norms in public service delivery. African governing systems’ historical legacies are equally critical in understanding some of the structural variables behind technological proliferation. Based on the above approach, this volume is organised into three earlier mentioned areas—policy entrepreneurship, policy instrumentation and citizen participation. The last part focuses on emerging issues or challenges with technological development in Africa. It is important to note that the synchronising nature of technological development and integration produce seamless interactions between policy entrepreneurship, policy tools and citizen participation functions of these  technologies. This  means, these functions practically remain highly interrelated and complementary in public policy. Part I contains chapters that broadly showcase the policy instrumentation of 4IR technologies. It opens up with Chap. 2, which handles the big question of how the state and its politics are positioned with or its role in the ongoing technological transformation in Africa. It asks the question: what is the African state’s role, and how have its structures shifted in the era of 4IR? To answer this question, Gedion Onyango uses the state

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entrepreneurship lens to evaluate the role of the state in enhancing technological development  in different sectors, whether this concerns GovTechs, FinTechs or CiviTechs, with the goal of realising practical PolicyTechs. The Chapter identify variations underpinning technological developments across Africa, which it argues are primarily informed by the extent to which African states have invested in risky and expensive technological infrastructures. Intentional investments in technological infrastructures like Optic Fibre Internet Backbone, for example have set other countries apart from others in technological developments. The chapter draw on empirical analysis of some of the countries at the forefront of technological development in Africa, mainly South Africa and Kenya, to illustrate how African states are increasingly becoming entrepreneurial regarding technological development. That is to say, the state, especially since the 2000s, does not only sit on the fence or spectate amidst the ongoing technological revolution. Instead, most African governments have intentionally expanded technological infrastructures through expansive STI investments and collaborations with international development partners  and local actors. In particular,  State entrepreneurship in Africa also occurs within the increased global, continental and regional political commitments towards leveraging 4IR technologies to drive Sustainable Development policy frameworks like Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. In the end, this chapter provides an important dimension of understanding the proceeding chapters’ discussions on technological development in Africa and how actors can leverage these technologies to improve policy effectiveness in Africa. Chapter 3 extends this line of presentation. It is looking into the leapfrogging functions of 4IR technologies in development and public innovation in Africa. Kobena Hanson is particularly paying attention to the role of technological development in designing evaluation approaches and practices. In doing so, he mainly reviews the literature and discusses the instrumentality of 4IR technologies in designing evaluation approaches and practices in different African countries.  His approach interrogates how technological innovation impacts the modern evaluation space, policies and practice in Africa based on the extant literature on the 4IR. The chapter further  highlights the challenges, opportunities and possibilities that come with 4IR technologies and how the evolving dynamics push development projects. It argues that policy evaluators should be able to re-frame their practices and approaches to project evaluation, design and use  4IR technologies. Overall, the chapter makes a critical call for

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fit-for-­purpose tools in leveraging 4IR technologies in public policy in Africa. These fit-for-purpose tools should acknowledge and adequately capture complex data so that evaluators can speed up effective policy decisions and technological leapfrogging. Kobena notes that for Africa, the challenge with this is moving to the next phase with regard to changing how data utilisation is approached, how policy evaluators are trained and how they work with these data. In Chap. 4, Jacqueline Klopp, Agraw Ali Beshir and Esthelyne Dusabe continue with the review of some of the implications of the rise of digital technologies and data for policy and governance. They present an empirical analysis of DigitalTransport4Africa to illustrate how digital technologies have been used to the fit-the purpose of a policy. The DigitalTransport4Africa, as a policy tool, creates what has been termed as digital commons that brings together different partners into a digital community to solve a particular policy problem. The authors show that digital commons is critical in ensuring that digital development in different sectors, particularly in the transportation sector, is guided by ethical frameworks and harnessed in the public interest. The chapter further discusses the challenges and opportunities of the digital era in relation to the urban transport sector in African cities. And highlights some of the emerging principles and frameworks  which includes the Digital Principles for Development and the International Open Data Charter. These frameworks were created to transform new digital tools and data into PITs that underscore, learning, creating and sharing strategies. Most importantly, the chapter shows that how governments regulate, use, manage, govern and exercise stewardship—political or institutional—over data and technology companies has the potential to make a profound difference relating to what kinds of impacts may occur in society and who will benefit or lose from technological proliferation. In the end, the chapter shows that for digital technologies to effectively serve the public interest, political will and institutional capacities are critical. Even so, this remains a challenge as most African countries are still dealing with broader state capacity issues which have slowed progress of positive pathways made so far. In Chap. 5, Alphonse Amougou Mbarga and Raoul Tamekou Tsowa brings to light this state capacity variable in policy digitalisation experience in Cameroon. They discuss the recent integration of biometric technologies as a policy tool in Africa, demonstrating how these technologies are at the centre of current efforts by the African state, still undergoing state-­ building processes, to register its citizens or develop the capacity to

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regulate its population for policy purposes. But according to these authors,  the story behind leveraging biometric technologies is not only about identification and citizenship in Cameroon. Instead, there seems to be a central concern in enhancing cooperation between the market (transnational actors) and the state in providing biometric services. The result of this is that African states enter into poorly designed contracts to offer biometric services with private or specialised Western firms without the technology and expertise to operate biometric processes locally. In addition, even though the processes around modernising the Cameroonian identity take shape within specific legal instruments that make it possible to grasp the instrumental reality of biometrics as public policy instruments, the question of biometric identification goes beyond the strict issue of state control. Biometric identification technology, which is more of a policy instrument at the service of states, further raises the question of digitisation and the problem of the control of individuals. As such, the way it has been employed in Cameroon threatens the citizens’ freedoms while also laying bare the problem of state legitimacy. Another problem unique to Cameroon is the lack of digitalisation interoperability between government agencies to ensure data traceability. Therefore, the police services, for example, are not in connection with the tax services or the repression of traffic offences. These are some challenges we may consider common due to the country’s level of political institutionalisation, as has been discussed extensively concerning the African state and its politics (e.g. Onyango 2022b, 2023). Chapter 6 also delves into one of the most critical roles of technologies in influencing policy spaces: public budgeting, which is a core government system and an essential public policy process. In this chapter, Emmanuel Botlhale looks at digital participatory budgeting in Botswana. Despite the underlying structural challenges, leveraging technologies to improve public budgeting and procurement is increasingly being advocated for in public policy circles. With this broader view in mind, this chapter addresses this area. It empirically examines how digital or e-budgeting can be achieved in Africa contexts based on an analysis of Digital Participatory Budgeting in Botswana. It shows how e-budgeting (EPB) comes with other critical benefits for policymaking besides budget participation. However, this does not happen in a vacuum. Rather, contextual and institutional aspects matter. Essentially, a lot of political will and knowledge by the users—public officials and citizens—is needed for EPB to enable open government principles like Open Data and Big Data. Open Data lays out

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the value-premise of PITs needed to enhance budget transparency, efficiency and effectiveness as critical values in budget delivery. Drawing on the ‘basics first’ approach, the author argues that e-budgeting as a policy tool can enhance budget participation and engender the 3Es of management (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). But this notwithstanding, the author emphasises that basics (fundamentals or firsts) must be in place before rolling out e-budgeting as a policy tool. Using e-budgeting can improve the present budgetary system, requiring more intentional resource allocation and expanding the existing ICT infrastructures. Part II of this volume focuses on how technologies nurture or drive entrepreneurship or improve policy agency and performance. The chapters cover different topics ranging from youth employment, agriculture, and child protection to fund mobilisation for Agendas 2030 and 2063. In Chap. 7, Laura Barasa and Joy M. Kiiru deal with the most critical area in driving Africa’s technological transformation as underpinned by FinTechs: the digital economy and how it can  resolve the unemployment policy problem, including agencies for integration by government agencies. Using Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt as case studies, the chapter empirically examines the state of the art of digital economy in Africa. It specifically explores the opportunities and challenges of digital economy and their implications for youth employment. It also examines approaches and applications leveraged in digital youth employment programmes in selected African countries. The authors mainly identify the critical role of private-public partnerships (PPPs)  as one of the approaches to leverage frameworks for youth employment in a digital economy. They also note that digital youth employment programmes have tried to address the digital divide through different initiatives by actors like in training and funding. Indeed, through PPPs, actors have effectively implemented labour market policies to narrow labour demand and supply gaps in some instances. From concerns of digital economy and employment issues,  Chap. 8 empirically showcases how digital technologies are being harnessed to improve agricultural policies’ effectiveness. As the biggest sector in the economy,  employing most Africans,  the agricultural sector has recently been characterised by application of 4IR technologies to improve production. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Development partners have increased funding as governments also attempt to leverage FinTechs, LendTechs and M2M to enhance policy effectiveness. In this chapter, Francis Mwaijande handles this subject. He looks

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into how agricultural policy in Tanzania has leveraged digital technologies and other technological platforms, like LendTechs, to improve Agricultural policy performance. This chapter illuminates the realisation of ICT guidelines provided by the African Union framework, SADC strategy and Tanzanian National Agricultural Policy to enhance performance in agriculture. Specific cases in the agricultural sector are used to demonstrate how ICT is undertaken in monitoring and evaluating agricultural subsidies, extension services, and increasing smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and financial services. The chapter argues for realising an enabling policy environment through digitalising agricultural policy in Tanzania. However, the author also points out some competing arguments. These relate to whether the digitalisation of agriculture policy has effectively taken root or replaced the conventional policymaking process. His case studies show that challenges remain that limit agriculture policy’s digitalisation in Tanzania as  Africa  contexts. These challenges  include limited technological infrastructure and internet connectivity, low levels of digital literacy and low budget allocations. Ultimately,  the chapter suggests that increasing policy budget allocation may resolve some of these gaps. Apart from the above issues, we may also ask how modern governance technologies, as critical policy tools, be employed. That is, how have they been leveraged to drive effective policy implementation in contexts requiring joint actions by different stakeholders and government agencies? In Chap. 9, Zedekia Sidha and Nixon Amuomo deal with this issue by addressing problems of joint action in policy implementation using the Child Policy in Kenya. Specifically, the authors draw on practical experiences with the University of Nairobi’s HealthIT project. They rely on this project’s stakeholder consultation workshop data held in Nairobi in November 2021 on the Child Protection Information Management System (CPIMS) and the Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) case management process to analyse how Kenyan policy actors are employing CPIMS as policy instruments to reduce the problem of joint action in Child Policy implementation. CPIMS explicitly demonstrates the role of ICTs in promoting policy collaborations among various implementing agencies. This chapter’s findings show how such technologies can ease implementation deficits like coordination and duplications that tend to characterise policies with multiple dimensions involving different agencies. More to this, CPIMS has been adopted to monitor and evaluate Child Policy by relevant government agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations involved in implementing Child Policy in Kenya. The authors show, for example,

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that most donors, especially USAID, require project and programme evaluations to use CPMIS data to demonstrate programme impact. The Department of Children Services in Kenya also reported increased coordination because of CPMIS, reducing duplication of duties and overconcentrating protection funding/programmes to certain pockets of the country and other unserved areas. However, challenges still exist, bordering on institutional capacities and individual capabilities of the staff implementing Child Policy. Other challenges relate to the ICT infrastructure in the country, especially at the local government levels. Chapter 10 moves from this to look into another policy capacity dimension relating to how African countries can regulate Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs)  and tap into personal financial flows being undertaken through digital financial platforms or FinTechs. The chapter show that with most African states’ domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM) capacity remaining at less than 20 per cent of their tax to GDP ratio, they need to be more innovative by mobilising funds from IFF regulation to fund their Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. This is founded on the backdrop that IFFs have eroded African countries’ tax base, a scenario being exacerbated by the growing digital market platforms, mainly through the use of the dark web and FinTechs, both of which have proven challenging to regulate despite recent attempts. Lyla Latif uses empirical data to address this complex challenge of technological proliferation, while also identifying opportunities and specific  challenges that countries are likely to face in trying to regulate and mobilise funds from the digital economy and FinTech-based businesses. She recommends proactive strategies states can use to tax and safeguard the digital economy from IFFs. One of these may involve designing policies on financial flows over digital businesses and identifying loopholes that are likely to erode revenue generation. Part III of this book focuses on the citizen participation functions of civic technologies (CivicTechs), another key dimension of understanding PITs. The topics covered include the role of social media, how the citizens have used technology to mediate accountability and transparency in public policy and how governments can digitise decentralisation policy to improve public accountability and policy effectiveness. Accordingly, in Chap. 11, Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango examine how social media has improved citizen and NGOs’ agencies and participation in Kenya’s public policy spaces. They show the essence of these technologies in promoting policy entrepreneurship roles of non-state actors in the African policymaking landscape. The chapter draws on different case studies to demonstrate

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how citizens and their organisations acquire agencies or proactive roles through social media to assert their voices in the policymaking arena. Thus, the authors particularly examine social media-enabled citizen participation (agencies) in policymaking. The collective citizen agencies are framed within civic organisations that represent the interest of active citizens through analysing their social media engagements in the policymaking process in the education and health sectors during COVID-19  in Kenya. Overall, the chapter provides compelling findings and arrive at conclusions that may be applicable in other contexts to demonstrate how social media has revolutionalised the policymaking arena across Africa, including the political systems’ input-output mechanisms. Still, on social media, Chap. 12 by Emmanuel Botlhale, Mokaloba Mokaloba and Chinthemwa Sichinga looks into the challenges with regulating or lack of social media laws despite the growing influence of social media in policymaking. Because social media allows anyone to create any form of content, how to regulate and to deal with information being generated remains a challenge to governments globally. Instead, we have seen cases where regulation attempts on social media draw on other conventional legislation spaces like those dealing with hate speech and defamation. Therefore, even though social media  is critical in improving civic activism, it may hurt public and individual interests. This has played out in forms of disinformation and misinformation, including political propaganda, as was recently seen in the Kenyan elections. This chapter focuses on Southern African countries, mainly Botswana, South Africa and Malawi and shows that while social media can potentially enrich the policymaking process, there are no effective social media laws to guide public engagements  in most African contexts. The chapter accordingly  recommends the need for effective social media laws or regulatory regimes in African countries to harness its policy functions. In addition, the chapter shows that African countries like Malawi and many others have yet to use social media to improve the policymaking space fully. There is a need, therefore for political commitments by African states to properly legislate social media and allocate adequate resources, especially by investing more in ICT infrastructures. This, among others, may help in bridging the digital divide and effectively implement or realise aspirations like the ones in the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms. Relatedly,  in Chap. 13, Mamello Thinyane, Ingrid Siebörger and Caroline Khene provide rich first-hand data and discussion on citizen-­ centred interventions and data use or what they consider as

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technology-­ mediated public accountability and transparency in public policy processes in selected Southern African countries. In their analysis, the authors adopt Transparency, Accountability and Participation (TAP) objectives as the intermediate outcomes to frame the effectiveness of the MobiSAfAIDS. MobiSAfAIDS is a social accountability monitoring (SAM) platform for Adolescent Sexual and Reproductive Health (SRH) rights and services piloted in six Southern African countries to improve SRH outcomes for youth and adolescents. A study of MobiSafAIDS, therefore, provides findings on data-centric dimensions of public policy, which in this particular case, is a Sexual Reproductive Health Services (SRHS) and Rights (SRHR) social accountability monitoring (SAM) intervention. Specifically, the authors examine the associated technological platform’s contribution to policy information and policy outcome aspects of transparency, how it supports citizens’ voices and evidence of governments’ responsiveness in using these platforms. They also look into the nature and extent of citizens’ participation through MobiSAfAIDS, showing how technological adoptions depend on contextual factors, mainly social, political, technological and governmental variables. The chapter shows how these variables influence how the technology artefact is employed in supporting public policy objectives and outcomes, including TAP values. The chapter concludes with several recommendations and policy lessons on fostering technology-mediated policy interventions and collaborations for other African contexts. Chapter 14 continues with this line of discussion but paying particular attention to improving public participation in public policy. Emmanuel Botlhale and Christopher Dick-Sagoe look into how local government structures can be digitalised or ICT-enabled to improve policy effectiveness. Doing so, they argue, explores opportunities and constraints inherent in digitalising local governments or digitalisation as a tool for effectively realising a people-centred decentralisation policy. They draw on empirical cases of digitalisation of decentralisation policy in Botswana and Ghana, analysing these countries’ attempts at realising digitalised decentralisation while improving critical values of accountability, responsiveness and citizen participation. They present an interesting variation between these country cases that narrows down to levels of state investment in ICT infrastructures, as discussed in Chap. 1 and other chapters in this volume. The authors,  for example, show that  through the One-Gov approach, the Botswana government laid the foundation for e-government in 2011 and has spent billions of Pulas since the inception of the e-government project

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in 2012. Because of this, Botswana comes out as a more entrepreneurial state in generally leveraging ICT than Ghana, consequently performing relatively better in digitalising decentralisation policy. However, even though Ghana’s decentralisation policy design is technologically weaker, the Ghanaian government tends to allocate more resources towards implementing the decentralisation policy in other conventional forms  than Botswana, showing that policy digitalisation does not effectively in isolation of other contextual variables, as already mentioned in other chapters in this volume. In general, this chapter’s discussion takes stock of efforts made by country case studies, delving into the journey and challenges underpinning the digitalisation of decentralised policy and the implications these have on citizen participation in public policy processes. In the end, the authors present key policy implications that policy actors may consider in developing solid digitalisation infrastructures and policy tools to handle emerging problems like the digital divide and empower local governments’ digitalisation capacities and user capabilities of citizens. Part III of this volume contains chapters dealing with emerging challenges the African state faces in leveraging 4IR technologies to serve the public interest or couple political objectives with public-serving government structures and initiatives. As a concluding section, this part also deals with regulatory issues with specific attention to mobile money proliferation in Chap. 15 and ethical dilemmas faced by policy actors when fostering 4IR technologies as drivers of public innovation in Chap. 16. These chapters provide critical insights on the underlying or cross-cutting issues that feature or mentioned in other parts of this volume. In Chap. 15, Gregory Mvogo, Desiré Avom and Honore Bidiasse explore and examine the state of regulation of the disruptive mobile money technologies in Africa. The authors particularly pay more attention to the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) sub-­ region. They make overall generalisations by citing examples from other sub-regions in the continent. They explore the evolution of the regulation of mobile money and its efficiency in the CEMAC sub-region. According to them, efficiency should be founded more on the need for coordination of actions, trust-building, payment management and security. These critical dimensions should be achieved to ensure the reliability and effectiveness of mobile money technologies in public service delivery or crowdfunding for public policy. The authors provide an elaborate discussion and offer insights on improving regulatory environments to curb problems like money laundering or IFFs to leverage mobile money

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technologies in public policy effectively. In so doing, they recommend the need by African governments to implement regulatory framework that would gradually migrate from an institutional approach to a more functional one. Among others, this chapter base its arguments on the fact that the expected gains of having a more functional regulatory system  will ensure the payment system’s stability, reliability, and integrity. This will ultimately promote the financial inclusion of the poor. In other words, a regulatory framework must be part of a dynamic evolution of technological transformation to promote desired efficiency gains. Even though this is an area that most African countries are still struggling with, this chapter shows the kind of efforts being made to regulate mobile money and its integration into public service delivery. Whereas, it is commonplace that the profound challenge of integrating  most technologies in public policy and service delivery borders on ethical issues, ethical considerations and how to go about them are just emerging in most African contexts. In the last chapter of this volume, the discussion on ethical dilemmas is constructued mainly around reliability and integrity of how data generated by modern digital technologies are utilised or designed for use and dissemination by public administrators. Indeed, these integrity, reliability and ethical issues regarding technological adoption in public  administration became more pronounced during COVID-19 when countries were pushed or rushed to integrate different technologies to offer public service. In Chap. 16 Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango identify the ethical dilemma and issues that characterise various innovations and ICT deployments during COVID-19  in Africa. This discussion operationalises ethical dilemmas around beneficence, security, privacy, human dignity, autonomy and transparency. For a more nuanced and in-depth analysis, the chapter uses qualitative data from Kenya; one of Africa’s relatively more technologically advanced countries, to arrive at generalisable conclusions. The authors identify and classify a series of technological deployments and then examine ethical dilemmas in using these technologies in public administrations. They point out    the need to measure the impact and effectiveness of deployed technologies in relation to the extent to which they enhance public trust and confidence in public institutions. This is founded on the belief that assessing effectiveness is required to determine, for example, if the public health technologies’ impact was proportional to the trade-off of privacy.

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References Bakibinga-Gaswaga, Elizabeth, Stella Bakibinga, David Baxter Mutekanga Bakibinga, and Pauline Bakibinga. 2020. Digital Technologies in the COVID-19 Responses in Sub-Saharan Africa: Policies, Problems and Promises. The Pan African Medical Journal 35 (Suppl. 2): 1–3. Boateng, Richard, Sheena Lovia Boateng, Thomas Anning-Dorson, and Longe Olumide Babatope. eds. 2022. Digital Innovations, Business and Society in Africa. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77987-0 Cordella, Antonio, and Carla M.  Bonina. 2012. A Public Value Perspective for ICT Enabled Public Sector Reforms: A Theoretical Reflection. Government Information Quarterly 29 (4): 512–520. Dener, Cem, Nii-Aponsah, Hubert, Ghunney, Love E., and Johns, Kimberly D. 2021. GovTech Maturity Index: The State of Public Sector Digital Transformation. International Development in Focus. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/36233 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO. Diyamett, Bitrina. 2023. Science and Technology and Development in Eastern Africa—From Rhetoric to Actions: Citizens’ Agency in the Implementation of STIs Policies. In State Politics and Public Policy in Eastern Africa: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Onyango, Gedion, 325–345. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Disrupt Africa. 2021. African Tech Startups Funding Report 2021. Disrupt Africa. https://disrupt-­africa.com/funding-­report/ Fuchs, Christian, and Eva Horak. 2008. Africa and the Digital Divide. Telematics and Informatics 25 (2): 99–116. Hanson, Kobena T., Timothy M. Shaw, Korbla P. Puplampu, and Peter Arthur. 2020. Digital Transformation: A Connected and ‘Disrupted’ Africa. In Disruptive Technologies, Innovation and Development in Africa, ed. Peter Arthur, Kobena T. Hanson, and Korbla P. Puplampu, 295–305. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. Hood, Christopher, and Helen Margetts. 2007. The tools of government in the digital age. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. Jauhiainen, Jussi S., and Lauri Hooli. 2019. Innovation for Development in Africa. London: Routledge. Kettl, Donald F. 2000. The Global Public Management Revolution: A Report on the Transformation of Governance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Larsson, Karl Kristian, and Tale Skjølsvik. 2021. Making Sense of the Digital Co-production of Welfare Services: Using Digital Technology to Simplify or Tailor the Co-production of Services. Public Management Review: 1–18. Lundvall, Bengt-Åke, K.J. Joseph, Cristina Chaminade, and Jan Vang, eds. 2011. Handbook of Innovation Systems and Developing Countries: Building Domestic Capabilities in a Global Setting. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

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McGuinness, Tara Dawson, and Hana Schank. 2021. Power to the Public: The Promise of Public Interest Technology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Mensah, Kobby, Joyce Manyo, and Nnamdi O. Madichie. 2022. Framing Political Policy Communications in Africa. In Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 150–163. London: Routledge. Mugwagwa, Julius, Geoffrey Banda, Nicholas Ozor, Maurice Bolo, and Ruth Oriama. 2022. Optimising Governance Capabilities for Science, Research and Innovation in Africa. Technology in Society 68: 101804. Nyaaba, Albert Apotele, and Matthew Ayamga. 2021. Intricacies of Medical Drones in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Africa. Technology in Society 66 (101624): 1–8. Onginjo, Joseph Ochieng, and Zhou Dong Mei. 2022. A Study on the Social and Economic Sustainability of Rewards-Based Crowdfunding in Africa. Environment, Development and Sustainability 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10668-­022-­02451-­y. Onyango, Gedion. 2017. One-step Shop in Service Delivery in Kenya. In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, ed. Ali Farazmand. Cham: Springer. ———. 2022a. A Public Policy Approach to Governance in Africa: An Introduction. In Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 1–19. London: Routledge. ———. 2022b. Open Innovation during the COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Responses in South Africa and Kenya. Politics & Policy 00: 1–24. https://doi. org/10.1111/polp.12490. ———. ed. 2023. State Politics and Public Policy in Africa: A Comparative Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Onyango, Gedion, and Japheth Otieno Ondiek. 2021. Digitalisation and Integration of Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) in Public Organizations in Kenya. Public Organization Review 21 (3): 511–526. Schwab, Klaus. 2017. The Fourth Industrial Revolution. London: Penguin Group. Welchman, Lisa. 2015. Managing Chaos: Digital Governance by Design. Brooklyn: Rosenfeld Media. Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. The Study of Administration. Political Science Quarterly 2 (2): 197–222. World Bank. 2019. Building Tomorrow’s Africa Today: West Africa Digital Entrepreneurship Program: An Initiative of the Digital Economy for Africa (DE4A).Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/963641556793151009/West-Africa-DigitalEntrepreneurship-Program-An-Initiative-of-the-Digital-Economy-forAfrica-DE4A

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World Economic Forum. 2022. Regional Action Group for Africa Attracting Investment and Accelerating Fourth Industrial Revolution Adoption in Africa, White Paper. World Economic Forum in collaboration with Deloitte. Yeboah-Assiamah, Emmanuel, Clement Mensah Damoah, and Justice Nyigmah Bawole. 2022. Open Innovation Systems and Public Policy in Africa: Setting New Boundaries Against Wicked Problems. In Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 599–611. London: Routledge.

PART I

Technologies as Public Policy Tools and Venues of Public Action

CHAPTER 2

State Entrepreneurship in Africa: Realising Digital Transformation for Policy Effectiveness in Selected Countries Gedion Onyango

Introduction How have the state’s structures transformed, or how do state systems sit with or enable technological transformations in Africa? This chapter deals with this question. It examines the State Entrepreneurship towards technology and innovation or state-centric investments that facilitate technological transformations for public policy and service delivery in Africa. It gives specific attention to Kenya and South Africa for a more detailed empirical analysis. While cognisant of the predominant role of the aid regime and the easing democratic space in enabling technological transformation in Africa in recent times, the chapter shows that the African state does more than fence-sitting or is not only spectating amidst the booming technological proliferation in the region. Instead, the state in Africa  has increased its

G. Onyango (*) Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_2

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practical commitment to foster technological advancements. More than ever, African states are heavily investing in digital transformation despite structural innovation challenges that still encumber its effective performance. Understanding these developments considerably transcends the African state’s inertial and conservative development connotations, which often frames it as an arena of innovation dysfunctionalities and pays more attention to its over-reliance on foreign aid in public policy. In this chapter my discussion builds on the general view that, in the history of human development, it is the state, not the private sector, that has played the primary role in setting the economy towards technological transformation (Huntington 1965; Austen and Headrick 1983; Chang 2002; de Bruin 2018; Mazzucato 2014; Szirmai 2015; Sun 2015; Dener et  al. 2021; Onyango 2022). The state’s role or entrepreneurship is more profoundly explicit and critical in the technological transformation of the society or economy than in other areas of human development. Indeed, like the classical Keynesian and Schumpeterian literature of the past centuries, recent works have convincingly deliberated on this matter. Renowned commentators like John Freeman (1982) and North and Thomas (1970), among others, for example, noted not long ago how the state’s “institutional innovations” expanded trade and destroyed local monopolies during the mercantilism era. It “was and is the coercive power of the state on which the orderly operation and growth of markets depend [and] governments have sought to expand their control over economic and social relations and to develop new means through which to promote economic development” (Freeman 1982, p. 90). Examination of the state transformation in Britain and the United States, for example, and New Industrialised Economies (NIEs) (Chang 2002; Mazzucato 2014; Sun 2015), further shows how state entrepreneurship played a role in setting these countries apart from others on national development. Most importantly, we see how protracted political and economic leadership is critical in realising state entrepreneurship, an issue that states like those in Africa that are still dealing with legacies of state formation or colonial past are wrestling with. This notwithstanding,  African states have undertaken bolder steps in driving technological transformation to improve their policy and public service delivery. Thanks to their vibrant young population, regional political commitments like through the Agenda 2063 and support from development partners like African Development Bank (AfDB). The mid-2000s have especially witnessed steady technological advancements in most African countries under the intentional guidance of the state. The state in

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Africa has strategically invested in risk-averse areas  through intentional funding and heavy investment in technological infrastructures that private sector players are unwilling or unable to venture into solely. Indeed, even though today’s governance and managerialism reform paradigms in Africa, as elsewhere, have relatively tried to demystify the state’s central role, state entrepreneurship remains the chief repertoire in technological transformations. In  general, however, the current technological transformation in Africa presents nothing new concerning the central position of the modern state and its role in such development endeavours. This being the case, this chapter discusses state-centric investments or undertakings that have facilitated digital development in some African countries. The argument is that the state entrepreneurship lens explains the varying technological transformations between African countries despite problems common to them and those typical to specific state politics. With state entrepreneurship analysis, we can understand the state and society’s political histories regarding technological transformations in African contexts. Put differently, the technological transformations in African public and private sectors have undoubtedly been a function of the country’s history, social fabrics and colonial legacies (see, Diyamett 2023). State entrepreneurship, as used here, connotes state-centric investments or infrastructures created by the state to enable a country’s development. These include establishing fibre-optic internet backbone, financing digital development in the public service and technological start-ups in the private sector. These entrepreneurial initiatives package the state as the agent of innovation, carrying out new combinations which are pivotal to economic development (Ziemnowicz 2013). They go beyond the state’s legal policy frameworks and institutions for technological transformations to include ‘hardware’ infrastructures and intentional sectoral funding that government agencies engage in to expand connectivity  in the country. These also demonstrate purposeful leadership in technological transformations by the emerging crop of African leaders and citizenry in countries like Kenya, South Africa, Botswana and Egypt, among others. The Kenyan and South African states have been at the forefront in this endeavour and have been specifically selected for this analysis based on their relative high rating in the 2016 World Bank’s Digital Adoption Index (DAI). DAI covers 180 countries on a scale of 0–1; 0 represents the lower side of digital adoption, and 1 is the highest, looking into digital diffusion in three economic segments: business, people and governments (Arthur et al. 2020; World Bank 2016). With these three sub-indices, DAI emphasises the supply side of digital adoption that can accelerate growth by increasing opportunities

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for broad-based growth of businesses. More technology-savvy firms and government systems will likely be more competitive by tapping into digital opportunities to improve the welfare of the people (Public Interest Technologies—PITs), especially when well connected through proper and targeted investments in digital technologies. This way, the state’s technological investments in digital adaptation or digital masterplans and GovTech solutions, as seen in the Kenyan and South African cases, should enhance the government’s efficiency and accountability of public policy and service delivery (World Bank 2016, 2020). According to DAI, Kenya has 0.454 digital adoptions and South Africa 0.638. Kenya and South Africa, therefore, perform relatively better than most African countries in enhancing digital adoption in all three segments, ranging between 0.5 and 0.7. The variations in DAI scores across Africa stems from a complex mix of country-specific factors like political history, legal and regulatory frameworks, prevailing institutional capacities and citizen capabilities, socio-economic and operational environments, etc. Altogether, these country-specific variables call attention to how state structures perform or address concerns around leveraging digital transformation. Based on this, the chapter fronts two main observations: the first deconstructs the argument that the state’s role in Africa remains in the backseat as technological transformation is primarily shouldered by the private sector. This view is as inaccurate as it is flawed. It does not only mischaracterise  the structures  of technological transformation  but  also provides  an incomplete picture and little understanding of how the African state is driving technological adoptions in public policy systems and development processes. Still, more attention to African technological proliferation and public administration have focused on digital innovations from the side of the private sector and the role of international development partners. This discourse has mainly bordered on the private sector-focused funding of the FinTechs and CivicTechs, and challenges accruing to their effective implementation. This has consequently taken away the credit on recent digital developments from the state and its proactive interventions and incentives that have shaped and created markets for the private sector or non-state actors to leverage technology (cf. Mazzucato 2014). In this chapter, we see that despite operating primarily within the constraints of the aid regime (or development aid constraints) (Onyango 2022; Freeman 1982), African governments have since the mid-2000s have proactively or politically directed appropriate adoption of technological innovations to

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guide public policy. This makes state entrepreneurship an essential dimension in understanding the evolution of the African state in the era of technology 4.0. (the Fourth Industrial Revolution) and how PolicyTechs emerge in African policy and public service delivery systems. The second observation is that digital development and adoption of citizen-centred technologies like GovTech or PITs are democratic government functions. African states need to realise systems of popular participation in order to enhance the growth of PolicyTechs for policy effectiveness and public service delivery (Onyango 2023). PITs in the form of GovTechs, including RegTech designs, have much to say about the state’s democratisation journey because they bring citizens into the centre of public affairs. For instance, the political leadership’s priority on improving PITs may be higher in democratically oriented states than in authoritarian regimes. However, a case like Rwanda may come in handy in this regard. In Rwanda, a country, which according to  democracy indices, is more authoritarian political system than Ghana (see EIU 2021); and where  the regime  or state prioritises technological development for economic development rather than democratisation (see Hyden and Onyango 2021)  has made commendable progress in its technological advancements. There has been an expansion in the access to mobile phones in the last five years, with ninety (90) per cent of Rwandans accessing broadband internet, and 75% having cell phones (Duarte, March 2021). According to the Rwandan Government, as of January 2021, approximately 4.12 million out of the 13.28 million  population Rwandans  are internet users.  But as Rwanda performs better in expanding internet access, how the state intervenes in internet use has not improved citizens’ voice and agency to engage with the state effectively. There is a widespread restriction on Rwandans’ freedoms on the net. According to a 2022 Freedom on the Net report by Freedom House, the Rwandan government habitually detains, intimidates and imprisons online journalists. The government uses surveillance tools against dissenting ‘voices’, including the opposition. As such, there are high levels of self-censor in internet use, which constrains digital innovations that drive PITs. This means, an authoritarian regime may selectively adopt digital technologies in order to enhance regime priorities. Under such circumstances, digital technologies can be deployed to bring political elites’ interests to the centre of technological adoption but in a manner that hinder the proliferation of PITs that improves citizens’ political agencies. This is also clear in the way 4IR technologies are being leveraged in the Chinese and

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Russian political systems where despite the state portraying nothing close to democracy, it  scores higher in DAI segments or digital skills index (DGI) than most known democratic states around the world (see DSGI 2021).1 In short, a country’s technological transformation may  bear unclear connections to a democratic system. As such, state-­entrepreneurship analysis  does not seek to establish the relationship between a system of government and technological transformations. Instead, it considers the state’s role  as the central variable in promoting technological development. It is evident, however,  that  public interest-driven  technological developments, especially CivicTechs and GovTechs, are more likely to prolifirate  under democratic  or liberalised political environments  than autocratic conditions. The proceeding discussion relies on documentary analysis of statutory reports, surveys and official information on National Innovative Systems (NIS) in Kenya and South Africa  to examine state entrepreneurship and digital technological innovations in these contexts. This chapter is organised as follows: Section “Understanding State Entrepreneurship in Africa” provides an overview of state entrepreneurship in Africa through a historical analysis. It looks into the roles of continental and regional organisations and the state in promoting technological development since the 1960s. It further identifies the governance orientations of technological development and how the state matters in this endeavour in Africa.  Section “The State’s Technological Infrastructure Investments in Kenya” presents state entrepreneurship in Kenya. Section “The State’s Technological Infrastructure Investments in South Africa” presents state entrepreneurship in South Africa, and Section “Conclusion” concludes the chapter, giving a general overview of its subject matter.

Understanding State Entrepreneurship in Africa Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, the last two decades have witnessed an increased uptake and leveraging of science, technology and innovation (STI) in Africa. This has occurred through more targetted funding collaborations, institutionalisation policies and projects by governments and non-state actors (Onyango and Ondiek 2022). Besides being informed by globalised technological transfers, several continental, regional and national policy frameworks in Africa have built on previous 1  See, Overall DSGI Global Rankings retrieved on 15/12/2021 from https://dsgi.wiley. com/global-rankings/.

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groundbreaking initiatives. The key one being the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000 and others like the recently rolled out The African Union Fourth Industrial Revolution Strategy. Political stewardship has specifically  been critical in promoting this transformation. Africa’s Science and Technology Plan of Action of 2005 or the Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA), for instance, was a high-level political agenda by African states to prioritise the deployment of STIs in their economic development programmes. Like  these regional  programmes, recent national  efforts prioritise technological transformation composites of capacity-building, knowledge production or R & D, and technological innovation. The CPA plan’s adoption followed the constitution of the African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST) in 2003 (see Africa’s Science and Technology Plan of Action 2005). Since 2015, AMCOST has met under the auspices of the Specialised Technical Committee on Education, Science and Technology or STC-EST. This was after the African Union (AU) merged AMCOST with the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union (COMEDAF) to form STC-­ EST. This merger aims to enhance the harmonious coordination and coupling of different sectors and their effective and efficient operations towards leveraging STIs across Africa (Makoni 20 November 2015). This merger was key in fulfilling the four areas identified in a study  by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as requirements for promoting digital development across Africa. These areas are “(1) creating a harmonised payments policy framework across the continent; (2) increasing investment in physical and digital infrastructure; (3) enhancing cybersecurity measures; and (4) enhancing regulation and supervision” (ITU 2021, p.  31). These demonstrate that, and to paraphrase the late John L.  Enos (1995), Africa has become a continent acting, not being acted upon. And only the state can undertake these continental efforts more effectively, not the private sector. Therefore, despite the positive indications, Africans must take the issue of making their states work very seriously. In addition to these continental policy frameworks, the funding of tech start-ups for digital transformation in Africa has witnessed an upward trend since 2020. According to the Deloitte and World Economic Forum 20 January 2022 report that  covered 32 African countries, despite setbacks caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, Africa raised $1.2  billion in start-up funding for small and medium enterprises in 2020. This financing

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is projected to increase to $10 billion by 2056 despite not having increased investment in facilitating the Fourth Industrial Revolution technology (Industry 4.0). Moreover, a recent report on the continental performance of Agenda 2063’s First-Ten Year Implementation plan shows a surge in leveraging Goal 2: realising Well Educated Citizens and Skills Revolution Underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation from 25% in 2019 to 44% in 2021. From these we can see how national investments in modern technologies have been facilitated by regional political support towards technological transformation in Africa. Promoting technology has, therefore, taken centre stage in most African countries’ development priorities. However, these efforts differ profoundly between countries due to the varying political will  towards entrenching digital technologies. Political will in this way demonstrates the centrality of state entrepreneurship and technological development across Africa. The underlying variations in political commitment is key in realising the African Union’s The Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030) by member states. Today, the technological transformation between African countries and sectors varies considerably because of varied state-centric initiatives or investments in leveraging STIs. State-centric investments determine  technological capabilities and innovation within public and private enterprises. Here, we have seen some countries, especially South Africa, Botswana and Nigeria doing better than others  in the continent. Therefore, even though international development partners play critical roles in advancing technological advancement in Africa,  their initiatives can hardly succeed without the state’s politics and the government’s political priorities being aligned towards achieving their objectives. The state can  either promote or hinder initiatives  by development partners. This means, state entrepreneurship involves establishing external and internal linkages that can effectively couple different frameworks and models with the implementation contexts of technological transformation. As such, African states need to develop political confidence to navigate Aid conditionalities and international political economy impediments of technological development. This will allow them to reassert their interests concerning the political and financial ends of technological development. In other words, state entrepreneurship underscores state actors’ agency and autonomy in international development politics. However, this may be just one way of understanding  state entrepreneurship. Over the years, state entreprenuership has been investigated and conceptualised differently in many country contexts. In Africa, the

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colonial foundations of African state and subsequent processes of its integration into the international political economy, remain fundamental in conceptualising state entrepreneurship.  To this end, aid-conditioned reforms and globalisation oft provide the baseline for analysis, producing two broader understandings of state entrepreneurship in Africa. And each of these relate to major political-administrative reforms in the region since the 1960s, which have produced specific implications to technology and innovation in development process. For example, state entrepreneurship can be traced to the development administration (DA) era that sought socio-economic transformation as a response to colonial deprivation. During this period, technological transformation or innovation was necessary to move the African countries’ agrarian-based economies to industrial-­ based economies. This transformation involved attempts at adapting and implementing scientific production methods and ways of thinking, in line with the modernisation theory as the undergirding philosophy of technological advancement. Technological advancement built on and attempted to re-focus colonial technological infrastructures left behind by colonisers despite different attempts to innovate new ones, as recorded by telecommunications scholarship in Africa (e.g., Hall 1998; Kamga 2022). The telecommunications and technological adoption studies have shown that even though African countries may have approached the development and innovation issues in this period differently—through their economic development ideologies—the goal was the same: to realise a developmental state (see Mkandawire 2001 for a detailed discussion). Therefore, inasmuch as the African state may have found the needed ideological frameworks from  the DA or New Public Administration (NPA), there were serious concerns about the structural aspects, which mainly related to challenges around  the state capacity. Within this ideologicalstructural nexus (Mkandawire 2001), it can be said that the developmental state in Africa was therefore more vibrant ideologically than it was structurally. Lall and Pietrobelli (2005), show that the state could not effectively build the capacity to leverage existing technologies competitively and innovatively. In this way, the DA, as the paradigm for organising public administration and policy deliverables in the 1960s  and 70s, in most cases, created a neocolonial political economy (Nkrumah 1965) rather than helping African countries in their attempts of breaking away from their colonial pasts (see Leys 1975 on Kenya). In Mkandawire’s (2001, p. 290) analysis, the state in Africa lacked (and sometimes still deals with deficits of) autonomy from the social forces to

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devise long-term policies that are not embedded in myopic private interests, in the manner of the more consolidated state systems in the West. Whereas in the Western Europe and North America, these private interests are packaged and advocated for through civil society groups and political parties, among other organised groups, in Africa, they have been largely ordered around political settlements, elite capture and politics of regime consolidation (see Hyden and Onyango 2021; Onyango 2022). This way of organising public interest in Africa, makes it more challenging to align particular technological innovations to political objectives of regimes that  aim more at consolidating their rulership than  expanding popular participation venues like those  inherent in Public Interest Technologies (PITs). Another thing, deficits of  the state’s capacity in Africa is highly linked to its loose political institutionalisation in the society (see, Onyango 2023). The result is that the state may be constrained from building its capacity to embed  Aid-sponsored technological or institutional innovations  like those dealing with electoral administration and management.  Therefore, the argument regarding political will vis-a-vis the regime’s political objective comes out here, that is, the state may not be keen on leveraging technological innovations that could  threaten the regime’s power. The historical roots of state institutions and their relation with the society also matter. For example, given that the African state at independence and, in some instances today, struggles with issues of social legitimacy or loose state-society relations, some technological innovations may be loosely matched with systems of public service delivery. In addition, the colonial foundations of technological development is important. It explains the disparities of technological transformation between African countries today.  The settler economies like Kenya and South Africa transitioned with relatively better infrastructures for leveraging technological innovations and transformations than protectorates. For instance, the varying technological transformations between South Africa and Uganda  draws on the colonial state’s  technological investments. Here,  heavier investments in technology development  were more  profound in South Africa, as in other former settler economies across Africa. However, on top of this has been an imminent and enduring phenomenons of technology transfer to Africa since 1960s. And the deficits in state’s capacities to translate the  transfered echnologies to their contexts effectively. The second component of state entrepreneurship in Africa follows the introduction of New Public Management (NPM) or Structural Adjustment

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Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s. The SAPs are meant to realise market principles in oder to make the state perform in public service delivery. The SAPs, like DA or NPA, were offshoot reforms (isomorphic effects) in the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Australia (Hyden et al. 1970; Rosenbloom 1983). These reforms framed the state as too big to be efficient, effective and economical. Consequently the big state was a recipe for under-performance and innovation  in the public sector. Following similar arguments in the West, African countries were pressured to conform to the new wave of state reforms and adopt technologies that came with them. During this time, Evans et al. (1985) noted how, in the 1950s United States, the big state was already seen as hindering development. As such, alternative reforms were adopted that would reduce the state to playing the fixer and regulator roles instead of innovator functions. Still, as seen later in this chapter, such efforts hardly took away the state’s responsibility of  creating an environment where innovators and wealth creators could thrive in the market, including promoting novel technologies to make the market work. Within SAPs, state entrepreneurship dealt with how state-owned productive enterprises handled public interests through supply and demand market principles over democratic principles like representation, accountability and responsiveness. And social equity concerns like equality, fairness and justice that public policies or systems  often seek to deliver in modern society (see Denhardt and Denhardt 2015). Thus, the 3Es— Efficiency, Effectiveness and Economy—defined public value indicators upon which state entrepreneurship on technological development  was rationalised. But these equally  neglected important political values of accountability, responsiveness and responsibility, or even legal values of fairness and justice  that CivicTechs and GovTechs attempt to realise in public policy processes. The consequence of this was that implementing SAPs weakened the checks and balance mechanisms or public accountability components that are central to policy effectiveness. Enos’ (1995) study of Kenya, Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania, for example, shows that the realisation of technology and innovation within the SAPs framework took the negative turn. The main explanation behind  this outcome was that these technologies were not appositely coupled with African interests, and governance systems.  We can also  emphasise that SAPs primarily engendered elites’ interest. In this way, it would be proper to state that, the market-driven technological development in Africa denied state public authorities and citizens

40 

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the capacity to formulate and promote public interest. Since the 1980s, studies have showcased the severe impact of SAPs on the delivery of essential public services like health, water and education (see Onyango 2022; Ohemeng and Christensen 2022). In short, SAPs sought to realise innovative conditions where state entrepreneurship in Africa did not “eliminate a country’s reliance on foreign capital and technology [and where entrepreneurial policies contributed] to foreign indebtedness” (Freeman 1982, p. 93). This consolidated an aid regime in African states where, as further noted by Freeman (1982): State entrepreneurship [became] one of the principal means by which the public Authority, for its part, forges and maintains the triple alliance. Through policies of entrepreneurial substitution, authorities strengthen national enterprise and make possible a more orderly transfer of technology and capital to the dependent economy. In this way, the entrepreneurial initiatives of the State facilitate associated-dependent economic development. (p. 93)

By the 2000s, the SAPs had unsurprisingly failed, leaving behind critical policy legacies evident in most public institutions today. These legacies have further constrained institutional innovations as these institutions navigate the international and contextual feasibilities of leveraging technological innovation to improve policy effectiveness  through realising  related  market-based public sector reforms. First, modernisation and later marketisation principles were targeted at realising a western state’s operations model and technological development levels. As such, technological adoptions were contextually skewed. Second, eliminating the state from the development equation denied state institutions the needed hands-on capacitybuilding activities and experiences across Africa. A few exceptions were, however, noted under exceptional cases like in Tanzania and Botswana (see Botlhale 2017; Onyango 2022)—although these unique cases also had their own limitations due to underlying structural challenges. Indeed, it was not surprising that the mid-2000s saw the emergence of the neo-Weberian state  in Africa, as a response to failed attempts to entirely exclude the African state from development (Hyden and Samuel 2011). However, the return of the state into the centre was somehow ubiquitous at this time, as exemplified in Osborne 1993 and other  earlier  works  concerning, ‘the return of the state’ in the United States. The state’s return was characterised by the pursuit of a more re-invented and an entrepreneurial state to

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steward or lead  economic development and technological transformation (Chang 2002; Mazzucato 2014). In Africa, the return of the state following the 2008 financial crisis has increasingly paid attention to making the state work, especially, through creating  more functional governance approaches (see Hyden and Samuel 2011; Ohemeng and Christensen 2022). Since then, subsequent political and institutional reforms have been more intentional in leveraging modern technological developments in order to improve policy systems. Most importantly, the return of the state underscores the greater significance of political values. It is based on a recognition that the government cannot be run like a business but like a democracy (Denhardt and Denhardt 2015). And despite its significance in public service delivery,  an entirely market-driven economy remains a fallacy, and undoubtedly an end product or object of democracy. To achieve its political objectives, the state kicks off development processes through the market, whereby the latter becomes the means or an instrument the state uses to act by other means. However, to effectively instrumentalise the market and its technologies like FinTechs, the state needs to have acquired a particular level of political institutionalisation. This allows it to build the capacity to regulate market failures that threatens the state’s objectives of enhancing economic equality, and transparent and accountable public service delivery mechanisms. While this has been relatively achieved (the regulatory state) in the West, it remains a challenge in African countries.  This notwithstanding, the nascent African states were pressured to leverage technology development through the market. These countries could hardly regulate the market or have yet to develop the capacity to manage the emerging market failures. Overall, as rightly observed by Mariana Mazzucato, the market framing of the state as a lazy entity that should only remain as the fixer and regulator rather than the primary innovator is impractical and presents  a misleading  development blueprint. Mazzucato (2014, p. 4) states that: This conventional view of a boring, lethargic State versus a dynamic private sector is as wrong as widespread. [The] State has historically served not just as an administrator and regulator of the wealth creation process but a key actor in it, and often a more daring one, willing to take the risks that businesses won’t. This has been true not only in the narrow areas that economists call ‘public goods’ (like funding of basic research) but across the entire innovation chain, from basic research to applied research, commercialisation and early-stage financing of companies themselves.

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It follows, therefore, that the philosophical swings regarding the state’s role in national development are not as well delineated in practice as they seem in theory. In African contexts since independence and relatively until recently, the state has employed what some have termed control-based governance or quasi-market economies (see Peters et al. 2022) instead of a fully fledged market-oriented economy. The quasi-market based reforms means that technological adoptions, in particular, are to make the state work rather than replace it. Indeed, like in the West, the state in Africa has hardly remained in the shadows on national development issues. Since the 1960s, the state has been at the centre in setting and driving development agendas, especially in more economically sensitive sectors like the energy and the development of Local Content Policies (e.g. Andrews and Nwapi 2018). This role of the African state has become increasingly important in this century. There has also beeb relatively increased calls and pressure from international development partners and African Union  for the state to deliver and proactively derive an inclusive development. The state’s resilience in the development arena remains profoundly significant in Africa given the thin presence or absence of a vibrant private sector capable of driving the economy in place of the public sector. With no viable actor to replace the public sector and protect public values, the state’s role in the country’s development and interventions in societal issues remain irrepleceable. However, in this era of 4IR, the state must also remain more innovative and entrepreneurial in its engagement with society to address today’s increasingly complex problems.  The Shifting State Strategies in Promoting Technological Development Fred Block, in his much-cited work: Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States, notes that Despite the dominant role of market fundamentalist ideas in US politics over the last thirty years, the Federal government has dramatically expanded its capacity to finance and support efforts of the private sector to commercialise new technologies. But the partisan logic of US politics has worked to make these efforts invisible to mainstream public debate. (Block 2007, p. 1)

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Put differently, state entrepreneurship in the United States  has taken what can be considered a ‘hidden developmental state’. Like those in Europe, a hidden state has evolved into “a Developmental Network State” (DNS), that operates within the principles of new public governance or networked governance paradigms. DNS “involves public sector officials working closely with firms to identify and support the most promising avenues for innovation in such areas as new software applications, new biotech medications, or new medical instruments” (Andrews and Nwapi 2018, p. 48). In Peters et al.’s (2022) language, the state agencies have mastered how to effectively balance the application of control (state-­ centric) or the ‘hard law’ (Thou shalt or shalt not) and collaborative governance or ‘soft law’, that is, ‘why don’t we’ (p.  3). The latter describes softer models of governance by which the government approaches technological and innovation development. ‘Soft laws’ in the form of collaborations should “produce more effective governance, with lower transaction costs, than will control versions of governing that often create fierce opposition” (p. 3). In contrast, control-based governance is likely to bring more clarity regarding the technological development objectives than the more negotiated collaborative governance approaches (Peters et al. 2022). Within the hard and soft power connotations, the state’s targeted and more intentional control approaches should put in place the required structures and norms before collaborative approaches are used. On their part, collaborations are devised to ensure sustainability and expansion of widespread investments in monitored innovation and technological development. They are also appropriate for cutting costs or facilitating a cost-sharing technological adoption process between policy actors. While DNS strategies like Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and co-­ funding have seen tremendous growth in recent years, this kind of state entrepreneurship is still heavily constrained in Africa. One of the explanations concerns the state’s low capacity and aid dependence in driving technological development. Still, the growth of technological adoption due to collaboration with other stakeholders has produced a unique mixed basket of outcomes. This is  shown  in the case of Mobile Money regulation. However, the state’s aid dependence has similarly relatively undermined its control and the capacity to visualise and realise targeted investments in areas of technological development. This is especially so when it comes to concerns about regulation and identification of areas that may need

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significant investments as dictated  by  the context  or  sectoral-­ specific needs of technological adaptations. On a positive note, with the right conditions, international technology spillovers in Africa (international technology transfer) can result in an explosive growth, as was the case in the rise of NICs (Eden et al. 1997). To use Szirmai’s (2015, p. 138) words, Africa has profited “from technological investments in the lead countries without bearing the high risks and costs of R & D.” However, there is still a need for the state to put in place more intentional and long-term investments to boost overall technological development, as partly discussed in the preceding sections.

The State’s Technological Infrastructure Investments in Kenya Information, Communication and Technologies (ICTs), particularly GovTech acceleration in Kenya, occur within the broader governance environment. This is  underpinned by the broader framework of the National Development Plan (NDP) or Vision 2030 and specific legislation or policies on ICT. Vision 2030 is keen on leveraging ICTs to create governance infrastructures that are embedded in digital development. In Kenya, the value of the ICT sector is presumed to have expanded by 12% from 345.6 billion in 2017 to Ksh; 390.2 billion. This has been due to digital transformation and the adoption of new emerging markets for technology. Even though the usage of technology and ICT penetration is low in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya, like South Africa and Nigeria, has emerged as the ‘next generation’ government in public service delivery through leveraging ICT. In terms of funding and investment, the government proposed Ksh.111  billion (1.5% of the GDP during 2017/2018) that was distributed over five years. In recognition of the importance of ICT, the government has translated 0.3% of GDP to be spent on broadband each year, with funding being contributed from private investments through Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), National Treasury (National government) and Universal Service Fund (KNBS 2020). Kenya’s vision 2030 creates an enabling environment for exploiting opportunities that come with disruptive technology such as IoT, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Block-Chain, drones, big data and software-enabled services. The Kenya Digital Economy Report 2019 shows that the government underscore the digital economy’s critical role in establishing national

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ecosystems and monetary resources. As displayed in Fig. 2.1 and Table 2.1, the government, through its National Broadband Strategy 2018–2023, has identified digital transformation drivers that include digital government, infrastructure, digital businesses, innovation-driven entrepreneurship, digital skills and values.

Public-Utility Financing Model

• National and county Government providing certain financial and non-financial contributions such as feasibility study, way leave permits and duct access. • Direct funding from the Government through the MoICT • Funding by investors such as Pension fund

Public- Private Financing Model

• PPP requiring investors (Banks, Pension funds, Infrastructure funds) and lenders (private sector project financebanks e.g WB) • Creation of a special purpose vehicle- lending based on the projected income from the project Lenders “ring-fence” revenues and hold collateral against project assets. Project contracts are critical in mitigating against poerformance risks of equipment vendors Official sector (development banks) contribute to mitigate risk

Other Model

• Funding through the USF

Source: National Broadband Strategy 2018–2023

The level of and observations on funding for broadband backbone infrastructure (NOFBI) phased implementation are as follows:Current situations

Finance and Investment

Institutions

Monitoring and Evaluation (KPIs)

Target and programmes

• Phase 1-19 counties completed • Phase 2-28 rest of counties completed • Phase 3- to sub counties headquarters is yet to be funded • Level of investment is high yet the ownership of the NOFBI is unclear in terms of operations • Inadequate institutional framework from deployment and operation of public broadband infrastucture Central Bank of Kenya (CBK), Capital Markets Authority (CMA), commercial Banks, World Bank, Supplier Credit, IFC, National Treasury, Communications Authority of kenya (CA) and Universal Service fund (USF) % of government funding directed towards ICT, productivity of broadband, No of people employed in ICT, % of people employed in ICT sector, No. of graduates in ICT related, % of county government funding directed towards ICT, % of USF spent on broadband, amount of private sector ICT investments, study of true impact of the internet on the economy (positive and negative) • National Treasury full funding for BB projects as priority • PPP

Fig. 2.1  Status of financing and budgeting of ICT infrastructure. (Source: National Broadband Strategy 2018–2023)

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Table 2.1  Broadband investment and entrepreneurship model Broadband aspect

Description of models

Investment model

Direct investment: the public-run municipal network model (aka Public DBO) Indirect investment: the private-run municipal network model Support of bottom-up community-led initiatives: The community broadband model Operator subsidy (aka gap-funding or private DBO) Physical infrastructure provider (PIP), which owns and maintains the passive infrastructure Network provider (NP) which operates (and typically owns) the active equipment (incumbent operators, new independent operators, broadband companies) Service provider (SP) delivers digital services (e-health, elderly care, TV, internet, phone, video-conferencing, entertainment, teleworking, smart monitoring, etc.)

Business model

Source: National Broadband Strategy 2018–2023

To create sustainable digital transformation in Kenya, the government has focused on ambitious ICT infrastructure initiatives. These initiatives have become relatively dynamic in their development and include Konza City, National Fiber Optic Broadband Infrastructure, eLearning skills development which entails (Digital talent programme, Laptop programme, and Digital Learning programme) and Business Process Outsourcing (BPO). Other programmes initiated by the government include the localisation of content programmes by the government in Pasha Center and Tandaa Digital Content. Through these, the state in  Kenya has taken conscious steps to migrate from the satellite-based internet connectivity platform by investing in its own Fiber Optic-­ Backbone, Metro and Last Mile Infrastructure Standard: TEAMS—The East African Marine System in 2009. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) Economic survey, 2021, because of the shift towards fibre-optic internet, Satellite bandwidth capacity in Kenya fell slightly to 5460 Mbps in 2020 from 5520 Mbps in 2019. Notably, the fibre optic internet backbone is a capital-intensive technological project to create and maintain. It only makes sense that most private investors may find it risky to invest in solely, hence the state’s bold move to realise it.

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TEAMs cost Kenya approximately $79 million to build. It covers 5500 kilometres with a 5.2 T of upgradeable capacity. “TEAMS cable is connected to the Kenya national fibre backbone network and other major back-haul providers, thus extending the gigabit submarine capacity to the rest of the East African countries: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania through cross-border connectivity arrangements” (https://www.teams. co.ke/). The KNBS’ Kenya Economic Survey 2021 further shows an increased bandwidth of the undersea capacity in Kenya between 2016 and 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic contributed more to this surge, given the increased uptake of ICT platforms for business transactions and remote work. Specifically, the report mentions that The undersea bandwidth capacity increased by 29.6% to 8.1 million Mbps in 2020, of which 49.5% was utilised. Total fixed and wireless internet subscriptions increased by 11.7% to 44.4 million in 2020. Fibre-to-home broadband subscriptions increased by 67.6% to 340,271. In comparison, fibre-to-the-office broadband subscriptions decreased by 8.6% to 60,079 in 2020, partly owing to COVID-19 mitigation measures that encouraged working from home. (KNBS 2022, p. 241)

There was also an increase in business if the surge in domain registration in Kenya is anything to go by. According to Communications Authority, this has steadily risen in the last five years, as shown in Table  2.2. Still, Kenya anticipates installing 100,000  km of high-speed fibre-optic infrastructure, allowing internet access to schools, government offices, health facilities, homes, rural businesses and public spaces (The Kenya National Digital Master Plan 2022–2032). At the local government level, the county governments assume ownership of fibre-optic cables networks to monitor the deployment of ultra-fast networks deployed by telecommunications Cable TV, operators and cameras serving high-density areas in marginalised and rural areas. To spur development initiatives in the ICT sector, the government has embraced a multi-stakeholder approach in ICT projects to achieve the vision of accessible, affordable and secure broadband for all citizens. Specifically, the layout of NOFBI involved the collaboration between KETRACO, KPLC, KENHA, KURA and the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure. Similarly, connectivity to schools has been achieved through collaboration between KENET, the Ministry of Education and the private sector. In addition, utility service providers such as Nairobi Water and Sewerage

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Table 2.2 Domain

Users

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020 a

.ac.ke

Institutions of Higher Education Companies Government entities Information, e.g. blogs Personal websites & email Mobile content Network devices Non-profit-­ making organisations or NGOs Lower & middle institutions of learning Second Level Domain (SLD)

726

768

891

889

962

58,165 363

68,430 77,820 414 502

87,243 565

93,776 606

144

374

443

155

156

326

386

345

219

182

44 175 1860

126 466 1981

180 277 1976

40 96 1831

43 51 1930

833

1027

1212

902

838

..

..

2098

2226

2579

62,636 367 580,650 –

73,972 372 1160 650 –

85,744 382 1160 6,505,800

94,166 203 1160 6,505,000

101,123 190 1160 6,505,000

.co.ke .go.ke .info.ke .me.ke .mobi.ke .ne.ke .or.ke

.sc.ke

.ke

TOTAL Number of registrars Domain renewal fee in KSh Average annual fee to operate domain (Domain registration fee) in KSh Second Level Domain Registration and Renewal fee in KSh

Source: Kenya Network Information Centre Provisional_collection of data hadn’t started

a

Company with a customer base of over 250,000 are enlisted as part of broadband infrastructure connectivity to homes through smart metres. The private sector has also been engaged through innovative investment arrangements in the Built, Operate and Transfer scheme. This scheme has been primarily directed and enabled by relevant government institutions. On top of this, Kenya rolled out Universal Service Fund, managed by the Communications Authority (CA). According to the Communications

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Authority, “The Kenya Information Communications Amendment Act, 2009 (KICA 2009) and the Kenya Information and Communications Regulations 2010 (KICR 2020) established the Universal Service Fund (USF) to complement private sector initiatives towards meeting universal access objectives” (CA April 2022, p.  3). USF aims to provide citizens “access to modern, high-quality communication services, [noting that] While the private sector has an important role in meeting universal access targets through increased investments, there is a need for Government to promote investments in unserved and underserved areas through the provision of incentives” (ibid.). Doing so involves the provision of the following services. a) Promote communications infrastructure and services rollout in rural, remote and under-served areas b) Ensure availability of communication services to persons with disabilities, women and other vulnerable groups. c) Support the development of capacity building in ICTs and technological innovation; d) Support expansion of communication services to schools, health facilities and other organisations serving public needs; and e) Facilitate the development of and access to a wide range of local and relevant content. (CA April 2022, p. 3)

The USF implements a Mobile Telephone Network Expansion programme, especially in unserved and remote areas. Other programmes include Community Broadband Networks in villages and towns and facilities like schools and health care centres that collaboratively support the development of ICT Content and Applications, conduct ICT Capacity Building and Awareness, build and address the Broadcasting Infrastructure & Services and finally carry out special programmes in rural and other unserved areas. Table  2.3 summarises contracts and those under implementation to realise some of the projects mentioned above. In its recent 2022–2026 Strategic Plan, the CA estimates a budget between Kshs. 21.306 billion, with years 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 cost at 6.345 billion, 3.316 billion, 3.784 billion, 4.331 billion and 3.530 billion, respectively. These will be generated from license levies, government appropriations, endowments, grants and donations from stakeholders. The CA is currently more focused on implementing the Voice Infrastructure Connectivity project, which seeks to connect various parts of the country with mobile communications services. Education Broadband Connectivity project aims to connect public secondary schools to

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Table 2.3  Universal service fund projects S/ Project No

Status

Cost (KSH)

1.

Phase I: Voice Infrastructure Connectivity Project targeting 78 sub-locations with mobile network connectivity Phase II: Voice Infrastructure Connectivity Project targeting 101 sub-locations with mobile network connectivity Phase III: Voice Infrastructure Connectivity Project targeting 67 sub-locations with mobile network connectivity School Broadband Connectivity Project (connecting 886 public secondary schools to high-speed internet) E-health pProject (connecting level 4 hospitals to Local Area Network) Judiciary Automation Support National Police Service Digitization

Contracted (Implemented)

1.2 billion

Contracted (under implementation)

1.2 billion

Partially contracted (yet to commence)

1.5 billion

Contracted (Implemented)

822 million

Planned

582 million

Planned Partially contracted

Kenya Agricultural Research Organization (KALRO) Kenya Institute of Curriculum Development (KICD) Education Portal

Planned

250 million 526 million (out of which 221 million is currently contracted) 75 million

Planned

380 million

2.

3.

4.

5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

Source: Author with thanks to Timothy Chiimbiru Gimode, the Communications Expert at Communications Authority, Kenya

high-speed internet. National Police Digitization project, E-health and Judiciary digitisation project. Table 2.4 summarises ongoing digitalisation transformation investments or tender initiatives and how much they have cost under CA’s contracting out since 2017. These are in addition to initiatives articulated in Kenya Digital Blueprint’s Masterplan Flagship Programmes (The Kenya National Digital Master Plan 2022–2032). Also, the Kenya National Innovation Agency (KeNIA) is chiefly mandated to develop and manage the National Innovation System. It coordinates, promotes and regulates the National Innovation Ecosystem

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Table 2.4  Communications authority’s tenders to digitise government services 2017–2022 S/ no 1. 2.

3.

4. 5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

Tender name

Amount (KES)

Year

Contract for the Supply, Delivery, Installation and Support for Radio Frequency Spectrum Planning Software Tender for Supply, Installation, Commissioning, and Maintenance of a Network Monitoring Solution and Associated Hardware Contract for Maintenance of Services for the Authority’s Microsoft Exchange Email, Authentication and Antivirus System Contract for Maintenance of High Availability Class Storage Systems Contract for Supply, Delivery, Installation and Maintenance of Broadcast Loggers at CA Centre and Mazeras Contract for the Supply, Delivery and Maintenance of IT ffice Equipment (Enterprise Backup) Contract for Provision of Internet Connectivity and Related Services at CA Centre and Four Regional Offices Contract for the Provision of Internet Connectivity for the National Kenya Computer Incident Response Team— Coordination Centre (NATIONAL KE-CIRT/CC) Tender for Supply, Delivery, Configuration, Testing, Commissioning, Implementation and Support of a Root Certificate Authority (RCA) For the National Public Key Infrastructure (NPKI) Contract for Provision of Telecommunication Cellular Mobile Network Infrastructure and Services in the Un-served and Underserved Areas of Kenya—Phase 2-Safaricom Contract for Provision of Telecommunication Cellular Mobile Network Infrastructure and Services in the Un-served and Underserved Areas of Kenya—Phase-Airtel Contract for Provision of Telecommunication Cellular Mobile Network Infrastructure and Services in the Un-served and Underserved Areas of Kenya—Phase 2 Contract for Provision of Telecommunication Cellular Mobile Network Infrastructure and Services in the Un-served and Underserved Areas of Kenya—Phase 2

23,459,900

2022

31,879,518.4

2022

8,700,000

2021

5,881,266.47

2021

57,183,125

2021

9,198,198.70

2021

137,177,426

2021

14,192,032

2021

89,400,000

2021

295,044,453

2021

26,939,327

2021

372,538,306.29 2021

165,748,309

2021

(continued)

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G. ONYANGO

Table 2.4 (continued) 14. Contract for Provision of Telecommunication Cellular Mobile Network Infrastructure and Services in the Un-served and Underserved Areas of Kenya—Phase 2 15. Contract for Supply, Delivery, Installation, Commissioning and mMaintenance of Interactive Geo Portal sSystem 16. Contract for Supply, delivery, Installation, Commissioning and Maintenance of Broadcast Loggers at CA Centre and Central egional Office 17. Provision of cConsultancy sServices to uUndertake the iImplementation of the National Addressing System 18. Tender for Supply, Delivery, Installation, and Maintenance of Equipment for Quality of Service Monitoring System (QOSMS) 19. Tender for Supply, Delivery, Installation and Maintenance of ICT Security Solution 20. Tender Supply, Delivery, Installation, Training, Commissioning and Maintenance of Network Performance Quality of Service Monitoring System 21. Installation, cConfiguration, cCommissioning, and mMaintenance of Internet Connectivity for RFID mMail qQuality mMonitoring sSystem 22. Procurement of dDigital fForensic tTools for the National Cyber Security Centre 23. Tender for Design, Supply, Testing and Commissioning of an Additional New Quality of Service Monitoring System

252,630,381

2021

24,740,630

2021

112,520,000.00 2020

80,266,200.00

2019

83,349,565.37

2019

41,758,500

2019

163,500,000

2019

7,255,094.93

2018

42,412,502.03

2017

85,946,356.64

2017

Source: Author (thanks to Timothy Chiimbiru Gimode, the Communications Expert at Communications Authority)

(https://www.innovationagency.go.ke/who-­we-­are). Its priorities include capacity development, commercialisation, dissemination and awareness, identifying and developing legal and policy frameworks, and creating partnerships, linkages and funding. On funding, KeNIA recommends providing financial and any other assistance to any person or institution to enable that person or institution to develop technological innovations. Other support forms include facilitating grant applications, developing strategies for resource mobilisation for strategic innovation programmes, and developing schemes to fund and support innovation platforms and programmes. KeNIA’s Leadership in Innovation Fellowship (LIF) Programme has, since 2017, funded different technological innovation initiatives in different policy sectors. Table 2.5 summarises some of these innovations in various categories in 2018/2019 (the second cohort).

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Table 2.5  KeNIA’S LIF beneficiaries for innovation in 2018/2019 Innovation/project

Category

Eco tiles from plastic waste Shift in human feacal matter handling UniPron, Smugel & Smuscan gels Plastic waste to clean and affordable cooking gas Safi organics fertilisers Practical utility vehicle Ecobora Joto Jiko Alexcame for the visually impaired

Housing Technologies Environmental Management Health & Medical Technologies Energy & Environmental Management

Pyro-degrade waste management Online enterprise resource planning Water hyacinth to protein-rich animal feed The save machine for water management Super Moto: Bbioethanol energy Buji drones for data mapping

Agriculture Transportation in Agriculture Energy & Environmental Management Health and Disability inclusion Technology Energy & Environmental Management ICT in Business Agriculture ICT and Water Management Energy & Environmental Management ICT in Environmental Management

Source: Author’s tabling of KeNIA data

In addition, KeNIA’s mandates are directly complemented by Information, Communication and Technology agencies, especially CA and Communication and Technology Authority (ICTA), which specifically embed GovTech and related digitalisation infrastructures responsible for digital transformation. The ICTA in Kenya was created to enhance GovTech or digital governance solutions by expanding and regulating digital transformation in all development areas. ICTA’s core objectives are leveraging e-government, the country’s digital infrastructure, innovation and skills. As a State Corporation under the Ministry of Information Communication and Technology, ICTA was created in August 2013 to rationalise and streamline the management of all Government of Kenya ICT functions. Its specific functions include: 1. Set and enforce ICT standards and guidelines for the human resource, infrastructure, processes and systems and technology for the public office and public service; and 2. Deploy and manage all ICT staff in the public service; 3. Facilitate and regulate the design, implementation and use of ICTs in the public service; 4. Promote e-Government services; 5. Facilitate optimal electronic, electronic form, electronic record and equipment use in public service; 6. Promote ICT Innovation and enterprise; 7. Establish,

54 

G. ONYANGO

develop and maintain secure ICT infrastructure and systems; 8. Supervise the design, development and implementation of critical ICT projects across the public service. 9. Implement and manage the Kenya National Spatial Data Initiative. (https://icta.go.ke/page?q=6&type=about_ict_authority)

However, even though these projects have made tremendous pathways in leveraging technological innovations in Kenya, most remain encumbered by severe implementation deficits. We can argue that these deficits are inevitable and common to implementing institutions’ capacities and resource allocation and the developing nature of the Kenyan state. Therefore, they take on different dimensions ranging from organisational capacity, resource allocation or mobilisation to accountability issues. Consequently, CA, for example, has practically done little to achieve the identified objectives. Though, things are working in the end but not at the optimal performance.

The State’s Technological Infrastructure Investments in South Africa Unlike most African countries, South Africa enjoys a comparative advantage that builds on a rich technological infrastructure legacy dating back to the 1940s. This, for example, includes the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), created in 1945. Like Kenya, South Africa’s technological transformation is embedded in its National Development Plan (NDP-2030). With the liberalisation of ICT investments, South Africa has more than Kenya boldly directed her policy developments towards investments in the ICT sector that specifically supports National Integrated Connectivity across converging operating environments for e-commerce, postal services, broadcasting and IT. The state technology-led entrepreneurship policy in South Africa is founded on the need to generate greater economic activity, attract more investments and generate employment. Even though the government has not yet developed an investment and entrepreneurship policy in the ICT industry, there is a market liberalisation policy for the technology sector. This involves public-private partnerships, local investments, government and domestic spending, and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) (Government of the RSA 2012). The extent of state entrepreneurship and market liberalisation hastened the expansion of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in post-apartheid South

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55

Africa. This has been accompanied by an influx of large and medium technology players in the country. Through market liberation, there is expanded infrastructure by the enrolment of international submarine fibre optics (e.g. WACs, SEACOM and EASSy), leading to expansion of data growth and reduction of bandwidth costs. South Africa’s economic policy, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), has emphasised increased sectorial and national policy on the role of the state in the use of public enterprises to drive transformational economic growth. South Africa’s policy direction on technology infrastructure development, universal access, market liberalisation and enabling regulatory framework has led to the growth of fixed and wireless broadband capacity providers. It has also provided alternative service providers, teledensity, overall access, affordability, intentional connectivity and improvement in the main uptake of ICT services. South African government’s budget in the ICT sector is focused on key interventions to improve competitiveness, facilitate socio-economic inclusion and enable the 4IR. All key public sector IT-related investments and procurement in South Africa are managed by the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) (South Africa Information Technology Report 2021). SITA was created in 1999 as a state corporation. It describes its mandate as follows: SITA […] is committed to leveraging Information Technology (IT) as a strategic resource for government, managing the IT procurement and delivery process to ensure that the South African government gets value for money, increased productivity; qualitative solutions, services and products; and uses best-practice IT approaches in its modernisation and the delivery of services to all citizens. SITA offers end-to-end solutions across a complete spectrum of IT services to multiple national, provincial and local government departments […] The organisation’s value proposition ensures that it drives the progress of a connected government, supports the government with secure and well-maintained IT infrastructure, and that its outputs and outcomes are measured through quantifiable public service delivery interventions (https://www.sita.co.za/page/about). Unlike Kenya’s ICTA, which does not provide clear courses of action or is conscious of the GovTech concept of understanding a people centred technologically empowered government system, SITA is more aware of GovTech parameters. It stipulates clear roadmaps for promoting GovTech solutions and core activities in public affairs, some of which are also clearly being undertaken by Kenya’s ICTA. According to Statistics South Africa,

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Fig. 2.2  Percentage of households who have functional landline and cellular telephone in their dwellings by province for 2019. (Source: StatsSA GHS, 2019)

Fig. 2.3  Internet by province for 2019. (Source: StatsSA GHS, 2019)

an equivalent of Kenya’s KNBS, Fig.  2.2 shows percentages of regional distribution on cellular and landline telephone access, and Fig. 2.3 shows internet access as of 2019. According to the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA), an equivalent of Kenya’s ICTA, in 2021, there was an increase in total mobile services revenue and revenue from mobile data services by 7.8% and 31.7%, respectively. However, revenue “from text and multimedia messaging services and revenue from voice services decreased by 11.8% and 3%, respectively” (ICASA 2022, p. 19).

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The South African state and its stakeholders have invested $600 million in SEACOM (including five undersea cables), which “is a 17,000  km (11,000 mi) submarine cable connecting South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Djibouti, France and India. The SEACOM cable system was ready for service on 23 July 2009, supplied by SubCom.”2 In addition, there is South African NREN Backbone. NREN provides “a core national dark fibre backbone with several managed bandwidth backbone links at 100Gbps (in progress), backbone extensions (regional links) – typically at 10Gbps, back-hauling from the submarine cable landing stations at Yzerfontein and Mtunzini, capacity on five undersea cables, and several metropolitan area networks” (https://www.sanren.ac.za/backbone/). Kenya and South Africa are implementing internet connectivity nationally, with South Africa doing relatively better than Kenya. For instance, approximately 18 of 36 locations and sectors have been successfully connected in South Africa. These have allowed the country to develop comprehensive communications, digital technologies, economic growth and inclusion. And it is part of implementing the 2016 National Integrated ICT policy white paper. The 2016 ICT policy outlined the need to facilitate innovation across the value chain, including multiple stakeholders for inclusive digital transformation, establishing policies addressing the digital divide, infrastructure rollout and supply-demand issues to facilitate inclusivity. Therefore, South Africa adopted a private-public partnership funding model to leverage infrastructure financing. The largest chunk of the funding is largely private, with approximately 75% African-owned developers, commercial loans and Industrial Promotion Services (IPS), the industrial and infrastructure arm of the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development, with the government providing a platform for infrastructure landing sites. Table  2.6. and Fig.  2.4. summarise part of this information since the 2016/2017 financial year. The government essentially undertakes the technology and digitisation process with support from and partnership with the private sector and multinational donor support. In the integrated ICT policy white paper of 2016, the government established an ICT Research, Development, Investment and Planning Advisory Council. The latter’s mandate is to create a digital development fund and support an office of a digital advantage to provide funding for research and development in the ICT space. Some 2

 https://www.submarinenetworks.com/systems/asia-europe-africa/seacom.

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Table 2.6  Digital transformation projects expenditure trends and estimates in South Africa R (Millions)

2016/2017 2017/2018 2019/2020 2020/2021 2021/2022 2022/2023

ICT 268.8 administration ICT 46.9 International Relations & Affairs ICT Policy & 33.6 Development Research ICT 1516.6 Enterprise & Public Entity Oversight ICT 897.9 Infrastructure Development and Support ICT 57.3 Information Society and Capacity Development Total 2821.2 estimated expenditure

274.9

294.2

313.7

336.8

346.4

50.6

84.9

60.8

60.9

63.4

35.9

38.4

69.8

61.3

64.7

4636.5

3933.0

1750.2

1764.6

1734.8

630.9

411.2

1,127.5

1,620.0

358.0

55.2

64.9

72.5

74.9

75.6

5684.1

4826.6

3394.5

3918.6

2643.0

Source: www.treasury.gov.za and www.vulekamali.gov.za (http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/ national%20budget/2020/ene/Vote%2030%20Communications%20and%20Digital%20 Technologies.pdf)

prominent GovTech solutions that the state implements nationally to deepen ICT policy effectiveness include the Square Kilometer Array/ MeerKAT, South Africa National Research Network, Tertiary Education and Research Network and Digital Terrestrial Television Migration process. The government established South Africa Research Network (SANReN) as a cyberinfrastructure (CI) component to support the core scientific research in public universities, South Africa weather services and various science councils. SANReN has provided a vital component in bringing a

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Fig. 2.4  Digital transformation projects expenditure trends and estimates in South Africa

common approach to e-Science, e-Learning, and e-Research strategies to coordinate and deploy international and national communication networks and services. SANReN has benefitted over a million researchers, students and academicians in global knowledge production. This has been through the provision of 1 Gbps to 10 Gbps, including getting support from the Tertiary Education and Research Network of South Africa, which connects dedicated long-haul circuits to connect research institutions, metropolitan rings and the national backbone. SANReN forms a combinatorial role in the design, acquisition and cyberinfrastructure to ensure the successful participation of academicians and researchers in knowledge production. The government fully funds the operations of the infrastructure networks support coming from the Department of Science and Innovation (DSI), Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operational Expenditure (OPEX) by beneficiaries (Republic of South Africa 2019). Moreover, like Kenya Education Network (KENET),  South Africa’s Tertiary Education and Research Network (TENET) was created to support the national research and education network (NREN) as an education, research and innovation platform  in oder to realise national

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development goals. Specifically, the main focus is to secure IT and internet services for the benefit of associated public research institutions and universities. With government support, the platform is primarily funded through cost recovery from beneficiaries for services delivered to members and funding from Rural Campus Connectivity Projects (RCCPs), primarily organised by the private sector. Through the Digital Terrestrial Television Migration, the government of South Africa further approved Broadcasting Digital Migration Policy in 2008 to roll out Digital Terrestrial Television (DTTV), intending to migrate analogue infrastructure to digital broadcasting for television. Even though the government approach to funding migration infrastructure was based on supporting local set box manufacturers to increase sectors’ contribution to the economy, a new delivery model based on a subsidised scheme for ownership was introduced. The model enabled households to inject 70% towards the cost of set-top-boxes while the government-funded subsidy through Universal Service and Access Fund (USAF). Therefore, the spending on digital migration programmes supporting ICT infrastructure Development and Support Programme increased from R312.5 million in 2019/2020 to R1.4 billion in 2020/2021 estimations. Furthermore, the government realised the Square Kilometer Array (SKA). This technology is an array of radio telescopes developed to create a large group of engineers and young scientists in image algorithms, fast computing, fast data transport, large data storage centres and software radios. The project, whose full operations are expected to be completed in 2026, provides Square Kilometer Array (SKA) telescope, which should be linked with the mid-frequency component to scan space and feed the data to astronomers around the world. The government initiated the project to build the world’s largest radio telescope, enabling astronomers to monitor the sky thousands of times faster than existing systems. The project is also expected to provide a wide range of observations and clear image resolutions and create the ability to image huge sky areas in parallel. The SKA project is expected to provide unprecedented data connectivity needs that meet advanced technology and engineering. And local skills development to revolutionise data science and technology research to enable innovative new businesses and employment in the science, technology and engineering fields. The multi-billion funding of the project is mainly from taxpayers’ funds from the government of South Africa, a consortium of African governments and private sector partners across the globe.

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Fig. 2.5  National Integrated Cyber Infrastructure System. (Source: National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System (https://www.sanren.ac.za/wp-­content/ uploads/2022/04/SANReN_2022_04_20b.png))

MeerKAT telescope is an integrated national cyberinfrastructure system (NICIS) expected to cost the government around R800 million with an expansion in partnership with Italy, Germany and South Africa. MeerKAT telescope is expected to be integral part of SKA with additional antennas to ensure that South Africa has a reasonable share in the global space market. Figure 2.5 shows the NICIS connectivity. South Africa’s Technology Innovation Agency (TIA) an equivalent of Kenya’s KeNIA, seeks the key institutional intervention to bridge the innovation chasm between research and development from higher education institutions, science councils, public entities, and private sector, and commercialisation (https://www.tia.org.za/about-­us/). TIA focuses on technology development; from proof of concept to pre-­commercialisation. To achieve this, TIA rolled out state funds, which include: “the Seed Fund, the Technology Development Fund, and the Commercialisation Support Fund” (ibid.). TIA’s funding and partnerships focus on key sectors that would boost innovation and technological development to enhance sectoral collaborations in natural resources and health systems.

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Conclusion This chapter looked into state entrepreneurship in technological and digital development in Africa, using Kenya and South Africa as case studies. It shows that the African state is not simply doing the fence  sitting function. Rather, it is proactively engaged in technological and digital developments. The chapter demonstrated how the state in Africa, has intentionally taken bold steps to create technological and costly infrastructures to drive digital transformation in the public and private sectors. South Africa and Kenya have particularly gone beyond just creating technology and innovation agencies mandated to promote institutional innovation, research and technological development. But a few structural challenges still stand in the way as state entrepreneurship in South Africa and Kenya faces issues like disparities to access to digital technologies due to the limitations of technological infrastructure. In particular,  there is relatively limited ICT infrastructure coupled with low bandwidth and speed, limited granting of new ICT and technology licenses, labour-related issues and ICT skills base, and high service costs in ICT sector investments. There are also gaps in the regulatory effectiveness of the private sector, leading to problems like the digital divide. South Africa and Kenya’s leadership in the ICT sector is both emerging and sophisticated in the field of security software, mobile software and electronic banking. Both countries act as regional hubs and market supply bases, having one of Africa’s most advanced telecommunication markets. Several international technology corporations including Google, Unisys, Microsoft, Intel, IBM, Dell, Compaq and Novell have opened subsidiary operations in Kenya and South Africa. In conclusion, despite African countries’ digital development  challenges, they have made notable advancements  due to the state’s  intentional investments in relevant infrastructures, establishing collaborations and strengthening inter-governmental, public-private and international linkages. This way, the African state remains at the centre of technological proliferation in the continent  and is poised to paly a critical role in the future. Even so, the private sector’s role remains substantial in complementing the state’s entrepreneurialism through more targetted funding of start-ups and co-funding the establishment of costly infrastructures like Fibre Optic Internet Backbone besides assisting the government in developing effective and sectoral-specific regulatory policy frameworks.

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CHAPTER 3

Technological Leapfrogging and Innovation: Re-imagining Evaluation Approaches and Practice in Africa Kobena T. Hanson

Introduction The rise of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and its embrace of big data affect society in ways never imagined. Digital tools radically reshape labour force patterns, employment income, social advancement, and inequality (Schwab 2016). Africa is no exception (Hanson and Puplampu 2018; Manyika et al. 2016). The definition and popularisation of the term ‘disruptive innovation’ by the late Harvard professor Clayton Christensen (1997) have heightened our understanding of how technological innovations impact firms and industries, as well as how they impact consumer behaviours, markets, socio-economic systems, and more. Today, technology is more accessible, widely used, and seamlessly integrated than ever. Similarly, information travels and impacts society much faster and in an interconnected manner than ever before. Technology has become part

K. T. Hanson (*) The African Development Bank (AfDB), Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_3

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and parcel of our everyday fabric, demanding comprehensive, humancentred approaches. Technology is also redefining how we measure the performance of policy or governance initiatives. For example, advances in artificial intelligence, machine learning, human-machine interfaces, and synthetic biology are increasingly demonstrating that technological advances have social, cultural, political, and economic impacts. The evolving technological space, however, presents challenges as much as it does possibilities and opportunities. To this end, disruptive innovations are like a double-edged sword. The opportunities related to the possibility of gains in efficiency and productivity will introduce novel ways of doing things, create new employment opportunities, and drive economic growth. At the same time, this technology poses challenges related to issues of privacy, and the possibility of greater social and income inequality, particularly in the potential to disrupt labour markets—with new technology displacing old ways of doing and employees who are unable or unwilling to re-tool their skills being made redundant (Christensen 1997; Arthur et al. 2020; Bamberger and York 2020; Nalubega and Uwizeyimana 2019). The global evaluation marketplace is changing rapidly in the face of digitisation and the rise of disruptive innovations, and as data scientists ‘encroach’ on evaluators’ turf, policy and decision-makers are increasingly demanding evidence in real-time to address real-life solutions such as climate change and the COVID-19 pandemic. With the increasing shift towards the value of knowledge and the intellectual capital of people and organisations to use technology wisely, digital products have been predominant over physical products (Lee et  al. 2018; Christensen et  al. 2019). The associated winds of change present new challenges and opportunities for the field of evaluation and evaluators as practitioners. The evolving landscape has led to calls for improvements to the intellectual capabilities of evaluation scholars and practitioners to utilise the available opportunities presented in the technological innovations to develop practical, suitable, and sustainable solutions to monitoring and evaluation (M & E) issues. Given these dynamics, only by grasping how to harness and leverage these tectonic shifts will one be positioned to seize the opportunities of change. Taking a cue from the above, this chapter interrogates how the evaluation landscape and practice in Africa are rapidly being impacted and changed by the rise of disruptive innovations and digitalisation. The chapter draws on the extant literature on disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997; Christensen et al. 2015; Christensen et al. 2019; Lee et al. 2018),

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digitalisation (Majumdar et al. 2018), and the practice of technology in evaluation (Bamberger and York 2020; Nalubega and Uwizeyimana 2019; McKenzie 2018) to demonstrate the how technology is transforming the field of evaluation and its impact on public policy and development in Africa. It will also address the threats, opportunities, and possibilities that these technologies offer and how the evolving dynamics working in tandem with recent development such as the COVID-19 pandemic are compelling evaluators to rethink the practice and approach to African evaluation design and use. The chapter highlights how technological innovations such as mobile/ online platforms, artificial intelligence, machine learning, drones, geo-­ spatial analysis/satellite imagery, big data, blockchain, and the Internet of Things (IoT) are shaping data and information mapping, utilisation, and reporting on evaluation findings. Technology’s effect has also gained prominence recently due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which effectively disrupted person-to-person interactions that historically have characterised evaluations and field data collection. This chapter also addresses how real-time data not only facilitates evaluation quickly—impacting the collection/gathering, reporting, and dissemination, while at the same time redefining stakeholder feedback (Bamberger and York 2020)—but also how it has heightened physical-to-digital-to-physical loops and real-time reaction to shifts in the ecosystem—radicalising how policymakers utilise such evidence to inform policy (Nalubega and Uwizeyimana 2019). Yet another issue focused on is the challenge of technology and its ability to marginalise workers to access, costs, or an inability to re-tool—an issue closely linked to the simmering tensions between data scientists and evaluators and the marginalisation of local/indigenous evaluators in favour of ‘expatriate’ consultants due to the digital divide. The chapter concludes that negotiating disruption calls for fit-for-­ purpose tools acknowledge and adequately capture the effects of complexity (Bamberger et al. 2016). For Africa, the challenge becomes moving to the next phase—changing how we think, train, work, and utilise data. Doing so effectively will call for embracing new technology as disruption is here to stay! It also calls for capacity development (individual, institutional, and an enabling environment) to effectively address the human dimension of disruptive innovations and a more holistic view of evaluation—one that involves continuous awareness and training for evaluators and consumers of evaluation knowledge across the continent. Indeed, as Lavopa and Delera (2021) put it, the ability to benefit from 4IR is

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contingent on the availability (and affordability) of advanced digital production (ADP) technologies, together with the right level and combination of skills and capabilities.

4IR, Innovations, and the Quest for Technological Leapfrog The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), a term coined by Klaus Schwab (2016), is characterised by the convergence and complementarity of emerging technology domains, including nanotechnology, biotechnology, new materials, and advanced digital production technologies (Lavopa and Delera 2021). Schwab (2016) believes that the 4IR has been progressing since the start of the twenty-first century—characterised by ubiquitous and mobile telephony, Internet of Things (IoT); cheaper, smaller, and stronger sensors; and artificial and machine learning. While no single definition for the 4IR exists, the change it portends at its core is the marriage of physical and digital technologies such as analytics, artificial intelligence, cognitive technologies, and IoT (Hanson and Tang 2020; Deliotte 2018). However, what sets 4IR apart is the novel way in which hardware, software, and connectivity are being reconfigured and integrated to achieve ever-more ambitious goals, the collection and analysis of vast amounts of data, the seamless interaction between smart machines, and the blurring of the physical and virtual dimensions of production (Lavopa and Delera 2021). As Cronjé (2016) similarly notes, the exponential and unprecedented speed at which the 4IR is taking place is having a disruptive effect on entire systems, including the production, services, management, and governance of every industry. Technological innovations, in this sense, are transforming end-to-end steps in production and business models across various sectors of the economy (Hanson and Tang 2020; Kissinger 2018). The concept of technological leapfrogging is closely associated with 4IR, digitalisation (Cilliers 2021), and the boom in disruptive innovations (Arthur et al. 2020), and occurs when technological innovation is utilised to address a unique problem or to improve an existing process radically. Leapfrogging occurs differently and can take different forms, phases, or stages (Schlogl 2020; Steinmueller 2001). Kimble and Wang (2012), in their seminal work, identified three forms of technological leapfrogging, notably ‘skipping leapfrog’, ‘path creating leapfrog’, and ‘paradigm-­ changing leapfrog’. Therefore, the notion of ‘leapfrogging’, as utilised

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here, denotes adopting frontier technologies and skipping intermediate stages in technological development (Schlogl 2020; see also Steinmueller 2001). The context always remains key. In leapfrogging and other contexts, technological learning and innovation need to be appropriate to each country’s level of technological development, its economic structure, and the capabilities of its public institutions and the private sector (UNCTAD 2018). As Klingholz et al. (2020, p. 6) put it, leapfrogging portends skipping inefficient, environmentally harmful, and costly intermediate stages of development towards achievements that improve people’s lives. Indeed, the recent rise in digitalisation and linked disruptive technologies suggests that countries seeking to make progress need not follow the paths of frontrunners, as such steps can be achieved via leapfrogging. Viewed from this perspective leapfrogging, while transformative, is ‘inherently disruptive as it either destroys the value of “old stuff” and/or presents ways of doing things where it was not previously possible’ (Cilliers 2021, p. 222), and requires an environment that favours development leaps and does not create obstacles to implementation (Klingholz et al. 2020, p. 12). To this end, leapfrogging should always be supported by strategic innovation policies that strengthen the effectiveness of their innovation systems to promote and facilitate the deployment and adaptation of frontier technologies to their production needs and to build capacity for developing them further (UNCTAD 2018). This calls for policy consensus grounded on a shared strategic vision and bolstered by courage of conviction. Leapfrogging, however, should not be viewed as a given but rather an intricate scuffle between an old and established system striving to maintain its status quo and a new system that is developing dynamically due to changing conditions. How well and quickly the new system asserts itself depends on several factors, notably whether the disruptive innovation offers advantages for many people, whether it is accessible to many users, but also whether profiteers of the old system are using their persistence to keep new competitors off their backs (Klingholz et  al. 2020; see also Christensen 1997; Christensen et al. 2015). In fact, some like Pritchett (2019) argue that technological development from the global North reflects distorted price signals due to immigration barriers, among others. Pritchett’s position is that the adoption of technology developed in and for the global North is not necessarily advantageous in other circumstances—notably developing countries in the global South (see also Schlogl 2020).

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Such views notwithstanding, what is universally acknowledged is that whether the 4IR and associated disruptive innovations represent a new window of opportunity for leapfrogging or whether it constitutes a source of further risks for latecomers depends entirely on the country’s response and readiness, that is, its industrial policy, digital literacy, the skill and education (UNIDO 2019). Many leapfrogging opportunities are in technologies that offer an alternative solution for costly investment in infrastructure related to traditional technological paradigms (UNCTAD 2018), and the field of evaluation is no different. The following section looks at disruptive innovations that are transforming and leapfrogging Africa’s evaluation marketplace into the future.

Disruptive Innovations and Africa’s Evaluation Marketplace The rise of 4IR and the associated boom in technological innovations are offering leapfrogging moments for evaluators. This has been further enhanced due to the restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. The revised landscape—characterised by lockdowns, no travel bans, and more—has meant that face-to-face evaluations, surveys, and field investigations have now shifted into the virtual and remote realm (via phone, teleconferencing), use of artificial intelligence, machine learning, satellite imagery, drones, and geographic information systems to circumvent the inability to get onto the ground, while artificial intelligence and machine learning are increasingly being employed to delimit the evaluand (subject of evaluation). In the following sections, this chapter highlights some of the key technological innovations, listed in no order of importance or impact, offering leapfrogging prospects to the field of evaluation and the transformative effect they have had on evaluators and their practice. Mobile Telephony In 2021, the GSMA estimated that 515 million people were subscribed to mobile services across sub-Saharan Africa—a 46% increase on the number in 2020 (GSMA 2022). This widespread access to, and use of, mobile telephony has revolutionised how many people across Africa view and use the phone (Abdulhamid 2020; Hanson and Puplampu 2018; GSMA 2022). For evaluators, this boom in mobile telephony provides a

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transformative and cost-effective way to gather and interrogate socio-economic survey data in tandem with audio-visual material (e.g., photos taken from the same location over time to monitor changes in, say, household and community conditions). Mobile technologies are also being used to collect time-use and travel data from a sample of subjects, information on the use of public services and data on daily and weekly air-­time top-ups to estimate short-term changes in poverty. Indeed, advances in mobile telephony have facilitated communication via text, social media, the internet, and voice calls (Segal et al. 2016), redefining large-scale data collection efforts in many sectors, including evaluation. The efficiency and dependability of these mobile survey apps, even in offline settings, open doors to new evaluation opportunities and possibilities. Whereas evaluators previously relied on paper-based surveys, with the attendant challenges of poor data quality and increased cost and time of data collection and entry, there is a shift towards the use of digital surveying. The widespread availability of smartphones, tablets, and other mobile devices, coupled with their multiple functionalities and decreasing cost of acquisition and operation, has transformed evaluation field data collection, processing, dissemination, and utilisation efforts (Segal et al. 2016). Mobile devices are being utilised to obtain information from various sources—audio, video, text, and location information (GPS data) in a structured and efficient way (AfDB 2019). Today, many tools with varying mobile data collection functionality exist (e.g., Teamscope, Open Data Kit, KoboToolbox, REDcap, Magpi, Jotforms mobile, SurveyCTO, and CommCare). These mobile data collection tools are increasingly becoming synonymous with secure, reliable, and scalable research. They undoubtedly offer the freedom, flexibility, and adaptability of designing research-specific forms that work even in the most challenging environments—as resulted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tools such as SurveyCTO—a product that gathers high-quality data using Android phones/tablets or via the web—have the potential to improve data quality by monitoring incoming data in real-time while data collection is still underway. This allows for quick identification of survey flaws; enumerators who need additional supervision; and data errors and discrepancies that need correcting. In essence, it not only offers secure and collaborative data entry but also enables faster data analysis and visualisation. To this end, a unique feature of SurveyCTO is its ability to be programmed. It prevents enumerators from proceeding with an interview unless the consent field is signed—ensuring that ethical concerns are

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acknowledged and addressed (Wilkinson et al. 2016). Platforms such as SurveyCTO allow various evaluators to streamline, organise, and assess their field data collection in real-time. Evaluators can seamlessly submit their forms remotely for immediate review/fact-checking, thus enhancing productivity and minimising turnaround time. This positively impacts the study’s validity and reduces the time and resources spent on data cleaning, which can be channelled to tasks such as feeding results back to the communities. SurveyCTO also offers robust dashboards and automated reports, further enhancing confidentiality, data security, and efficiency. Elsewhere, others have utilised mobile telephony to gather qualitative data, which was subsequently triangulated with the findings from fieldwork and satellite data analysis (Anand 2020). A key aspect of the widespread usability and appeal of such tools and techniques by evaluators is the fact that they can affordably provide accurate information, be understandable and stored securely, and have broadly applicable language for knowledge representation (Cavalli 2018). Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, and Big Data A major appeal of using big data, artificial intelligence (AI), and machine learning (ML) for monitoring and evaluation (M & E) lies within the opportunity of having access to high-quality, timely, and accessible data to complement traditional sources such as national statistics and surveys (Soria et al. 2021). In a recent report commissioned by the Rockefeller Foundation, York and Bamberger (2020) unpack how data science can contribute to the field of evaluation and monitoring for development (see also Bamberger and York 2020) and argue program evaluation and data science have to join efforts to understand, more rapidly and cost-­effectively, whether a development project is working, what has improved, and how to scale the positive outcomes (York and Bamberger 2020). AI/ML technology and the data produced have contributed to multiple components of traditional impact evaluations worldwide. As pointed out by McKenzie (2018), AI/ML has the potential to affect every core impact evaluation concept, from measuring outcomes to targeting treatment groups. Indeed, across the global South, AI/ML is being used in creative ways to redefine evaluations. For instance, high-spatial resolution satellite imagery was employed in Sri Lanka to estimate poverty and economic well-being (Engstrom et al. 2017). Elsewhere in rural India, AI/ ML allowed World Bank economists to derive data on outcomes

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traditionally difficult to measure from village assembly transcripts (Parthasarathy et  al. 2019). Then in Colombia, researchers overcame ambiguity and bias-prone estimation of causal effects using machine learning to analyse data on ex-combatant recidivism (Samii et al. 2016). Closer home, studies on food security demonstrate AI/ML technology’s ability to target treatment groups for outcomes in their forecasts of food security in the Middle East and North Africa (Moody et al. 2017). Similarly, AI/ ML-produced hyperlocal data has been utilised to monitor progress towards improving household resilience to climate vulnerability in Mali and Malawi (Fraym 2020), teasing-out communities’ adaptive capacity while adding a new dimension to impact evaluation for resilience programming (Fraym 2020). Studies by Fraym (2020) demonstrate that leveraging an immense amount of data using sophisticated AI/ML techniques can transform impact evaluation by measuring more without overburdening program participants with surveys and questionnaires, providing a complete picture of the baseline and end-line context in which program participants are living, and generating impact measurements that include environmental and human information in one measurement—such as climate vulnerability (Fraym 2020). Similarly, the World Bank leveraged AI and ML for satellite data classification and running complex regressions (Anand 2020), employing ML algorithms in tandem with big geodata, including satellite imagery, to map out the factors associated with impact assessed through variable importance of the ML regression model (Anand 2020). Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the relevance of big data, ML, and AI for monitoring and evaluation has grown rapidly due to the need for real-­ time data upon which policy and decision-makers can act (Soria et al. 2021). Drones/Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) Drones/UAVs represent yet another leapfrogging opportunity for evaluators and the practice of envisioning evaluation across African countries to measure and respond more effectively to policy and planning needs. This technology offers an alternative to more laborious and time-consuming survey-based evaluations with boots on the ground. Their ability to collect, on a continuous basis, aerial images of infrastructure, economic activity, migration patterns, temperature, moisture levels, and other characteristics of the natural environment (Bamberger and York 2020; Appeaning Addo et al. 2018; Berie and Burud 2018) make it an invaluable

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tool for evaluators. To this end, drones are a powerful tool in geological, agricultural, ecological, and forestry growth monitoring and evaluation (Ren et al. 2019; Oduma 2020). The use of drones in monitoring hazards (i.e., landslides, floods, fires) is also key (Sibanda et al. 2021), as they generate near real-time, fine resolution, spatially explicit information (Xiang et al. 2019), ensuring the facilitation of appropriate corrective measures in the shortest time possible. Drone/UAVs further enable evaluations to more efficiently and effectively provide clients with vital information regarding soil quality, pests’ presence, and nutrient deficiencies on farms, enabling beneficiaries of such evaluation evidence to apply appropriate corrective measures, which allows their farms to have better production. Similarly, they have been used in evaluations to map the extent of farm cover and assess the state of crops and soils over large areas (Murugan et  al. 2017)—something that traditionally would have been both timeand resource-consuming, and labour-intensive—requiring many people to assess the condition of a small area. Elsewhere drones have been handy for doing rapid assessments in hard-­ to-­reach, isolated, and unsafe areas, assessing the extent of illegal mining and logging areas at different project sites, and collecting ground truth data for validating satellite data products (Anand 2020). Low-level high-­ resolution drone images have also been combined with high-level satellite images covering large geographic areas such as wetlands (Bhatnagara et al. 2021). Aside from drones offering evaluators an opportunity to map large tracts of land more easily than traditional evaluation techniques ever did, drones also have proved a cost-effective way to create more rigorous quasi-­ experimental designs as it is possible to match project and comparison groups on a wide range of socio-economic indicators, notably housing quality, community infrastructure and quality of maintenance, demographic movements and community growth rates, and estimates of the economic level of the household and community (Bamberger and York 2020). The above notwithstanding, there is a flipside to the application of drones. Specifically, not every evaluator is able to afford it, nor has the capacity to ‘fly’ one. This creates an issue of exclusion and marginalisation for the resource-constrained evaluator, although with adequate planning and targeted capacity development of M&E practitioners, this challenge can be addressed. Nalubega and Uwizeyimana (2019) flag privacy and data security issues, as using drones and geo-spatial tools to photograph

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large swathes of land and private properties raises serious ethical questions for evaluation based on drone technology (see also Berie and Burud 2018). Geo-satellite Imagery Geo-satellite imagery is increasingly being employed in communication networks and applications that draw on high-resolution imagery to monitor land use and urban planning, for example. As they become increasingly affordable, these satellite images diminish the need for investment in more costly and traditional satellite technologies, making them more appealing to evaluators. Its ability to gather and map out, continuously, aerial images of infrastructure, economic activity, migration patterns, agriculture/land use, and so on, over different periods, makes such tools versatile as such data can easily be triangulated or overlaid on drone images, maps, or previous survey drawings to reveal changes over time, trends, or patterns (Manyika et al. 2013). As Bamberger and York (2020) note, a great benefit of satellite data is that it is often possible to obtain longitudinal data sets spanning up to 20 years. Consequently, the geo-spatial analysis generated from satellites (as well as drones) is proving to be a cost-effective way to create more rigorous quasi-experimental designs as it is possible to match project and comparison groups on a wide range of socio-economic indicators (e.g., housing quality, community infrastructure and quality of maintenance, soil quality and agricultural output, demographic movements and community growth rates, and estimates of the economic level of the household and community). The COVID-19 pandemic and its restrictions have further compelled many evaluators to leverage satellite imagery and geographic information systems to circumvent the inability to get onto the ground. For example, the African Development Bank (AfDB) recently used geo-satellites to evaluate agricultural and infrastructure projects. Elsewhere, researchers have utilised high-spatial resolution satellite imagery to estimate poverty and economic well-being (Engstrom et al. 2017) or to triangulate qualitative data collected through smartphones with satellite data analysis (Anand 2020). Similarly, in Malawi and Niger, Fraym (2020) leveraged geo-spatial data and satellite imagery to pair environmental conditions on the ground with household-level data on susceptibility to shocks as determined by reporting of droughts, irregular rainfall, and floods. Fraym’s (2020) ability to leverage advanced ML algorithms to combine satellite imagery and micro data from household surveys has yielded comprehensive insights

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into people, their communities, and their livelihoods at the local level (Fraym 2020). Also, drawing on geo-spatial data and satellite imagery, they have been able to pair environmental conditions on the ground with household-level data on susceptibility to shocks as determined by reporting droughts, irregular rainfall, and floods. The World Bank likewise employs high-spatial resolution satellite imagery to estimate poverty and economic well-being (Engstrom et al. 2017), much as it has used satellite data to assess the effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of its interventions in land degradation, climate change, international waters, and thematic biodiversity areas (Anand 2020). This versatility and leapfrogging potential of geo-spatial and satellite imagery inform Manyika et al. (2013) position that technologies such as satellite imagery, geo-engineering, and smartcards comprise discoveries with a high possibility of disrupting global development (see also York and Bamberger 2020; Bamberger and York 2020).

Threats, Opportunities, and Possibilities As noted earlier, technological innovations that underpin the leapfrogging concept are not without their challenges. To this end, 4IR and the associated rise in digitisation and disruptive innovations are like a double-edged sword—with immense opportunities and challenges (Arthur et al. 2020; Hanson and Tang 2020). Another equally important challenge facing the global South lies in the lack of resources to process big geodata data and the adequate skill sets to do so. These, however, can be mitigated by using open datasets and free analytical tools and establishing partnerships with national research organisations (Anand 2020). On the other hand, opportunities related to the possibility of gains in efficiency and productivity will introduce novel ways of doing things, create new employment avenues, and drive transformation. At the same time, these technological innovations pose threats including, but not limited to, issues of privacy, the possibility of greater inequality, and disruption of labour markets—as new technology displaces old ways of doing and employees who are unable or unwilling to re-tool get rendered redundant (Bamberger and York 2020). As Rodrik (2018, p. 14) posits, ‘new technologies present a double whammy to low-income countries’: first, because such technologies are biased towards high skills and thus reduce the low-cost and low-skill labour advantage of developing countries; and,

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second, because developing countries are integrated into global value chains, which make it harder to compete via a low-skill advantage. As Bamberger and York (2020) further articulate, despite the need to adapt to new and complex data ecosystems, 4IR and associated digitalisation open up a host of opportunities for evaluators to adapt to the rapidly changing environment in which programs operate: 1. Increasingly access to quality data is becoming quicker and cheaper, and the types of data are increasing rapidly. New analytical tools for creating integrated databases are making it possible to combine multiple kinds of data into a single database. As a result, it is now feasible to integrate, for example, survey data, geo-spatial data, phone call logs, social media posts, ATM transaction records, and audio-visual data into a single data platform. Text analytics also have made it possible to interrogate the volumes of PDF files accumulated by agencies over the years. 2. Access to data and its rapidly declining costs now mean evaluators are able to work with huge datasets such as total populations, ensuring more granular analysis and sophisticated analytical models. 3. Historically, it was usually not feasible to incorporate these contextual variables into the evaluation design due to the cost and complexity of collecting data on the key contextual variables. However, today, it is possible to incorporate these variables and to start to use ‘complexity-­focused’ evaluation methods. 4. The growing use of big data is also availing sufficient information essential for deeper analyses of positive outliers/positive deviants to refine our understanding of what works. 5. Finally, geo-spatial analysis allows it to collect longitudinal data over periods, including before a project begins and after it ends. This makes it possible to evaluate program sustainability, which has rarely been done before.

Conclusion and Way Forward Leapfrogging in the evaluation space is challenging for many African countries, particularly with developing new technologies. Catch-up requires learning modern technologies, accumulating indigenous technological capabilities in innovation and technological know-how for

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production, and investing in physical assets (UNCTAD 2018). More importantly, claiming the benefits and limitless possibilities created by this fluid environment, requires a critical scan of the environment to recognise patterns, simulate, and model potential futures, and learn to predict scenarios better (Nalubega and Uwizeyimana 2019). Invariably, the result is an improved ability to map outcomes/changes and better target interventions (e.g., impact of regional/macro policies) and micro-level outcomes, which we might otherwise struggle to measure. At the level of the individual, it is transforming storytelling and how content is experienced. By the same token, leveraging huge amounts of data using sophisticated AI/ML techniques transforms impact evaluation by measuring more without overburdening program participants with surveys and questionnaires (Fraym 2020). Doing so yields a complete picture of the baseline and end-line context in which program participants live and generate impact measurements that include environmental and human information in one measurement—such as climate vulnerability. Undoubtedly, it can be overwhelming to choose from an extensive suite of tools and data available while getting excited at the prospects of their use and potential results. However, designing the right questions for an evaluation is the essential first step to generating useful information and not the other way around. Technology is not neutral in its impact. The focus on non-technical variables should be sensitive to, for example, the digital divide, which raises questions such as the access to and related cost of technology. Internet connectivity and bandwidth matters must be addressed for all such that evaluation research can better contribute to the performance of African development and policies in our increasingly interconnected and wired twenty-first-century society, irrespective of location. As we advance, evaluators will need to sensitise policymakers on how results from big data, AI/ML, can be utilised in crafting better policies to inform development outcomes. Evaluators also need to transparently consider the associated risks and clearly state the safeguards adopted regarding confidentiality protection and data governance. Further, the same rigour and quality of standards used in data collection should be applied to improve reliability and consistency. Doing so will enhance the quality and reliability of data captured by these technologies for M & E purposes even further than it currently happens.

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CHAPTER 4

Digital Technologies, Data Commons and Rights in Africa: The Case of DigitalTransport4Africa Jacqueline M. Klopp, Agraw Ali Beshir, and Esthelyne Dusabe

Introduction Driven in large part by the enormous expansion of computing and data storage capabilities as well as improved sensor technologies, the world is in the midst of stunning technological changes. These transformations are enabling increased use of automation, artificial intelligence, the Internet

J. M. Klopp (*) The Center for Sustainable Urban Development, Columbia University, New York, NY, USA e-mail: [email protected] A. A. Beshir • E. Dusabe World Resources Institute Africa, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

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of Things and decentralised networked computers to share and secure data (blockchain). Today, remarkable computing power and ability to generate data are also more dispersed and in the hands of vastly more people through the use of mobile phones and other devices with sensors (defined as machines that respond to a stimulus such as motion or particles in the air and transmit an impulse that can be used to measure or control). When used by large numbers of people, devices such as mobile phones generate “big data”, quantities of data so massive that specialised techniques and software that can parse trillions of records are needed for analysis (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2014). Africa is part of this transformation. Mobile phone use is rapidly expanding despite persisting digital divides, especially around gender and class (GSMA 2019). Big data linked to growing mobile phone use and other sources—such as increasingly open government data, crowd-sourced data from digital platforms and satellite imagery (Onyango and Ondiek 2022; Mutuku 2020)—is also increasing and is an important resource. Rapid growth in big data and related technologies, the development of local innovation and technology hubs as well as the influx and influence of global technology companies are transforming many aspects of politics, society and the economy (UN-Habitat 2021). Novel ways to leverage technologies to gather and store data have the potential to dramatically improve and update how governments collect critical information and create opportunities to democratise data (Lane 2020; Townsend 2013) as well as foster more innovation and accountability (Goldstein and Dyson 2013; Nyabola 2018). For example, every resident with a phone can contribute to the private creation of publicly valuable data and access a vastly larger volume of information quicker than ever before. However, these technological developments, while enabling new approaches to public policy, planning, programmes and service delivery, also create new sets of problems for governance, policy and law; the challenge is to ensure that society leverages the benefits of these technological developments and the new insights they enable while mitigating very real dangers. These dangers include the misuse of this data by governments and private companies including by violating the privacy of individuals through surveillance. Behavioural manipulation by governments and/or the private sector or the two working together through access to personal data in order to sell products or “surveillance capitalism” is a profound problem (Zuboff 2019). The use of big data and this kind of targeted

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manipulation, including through misinformation in politics, is also a serious threat. This was evident, for example, in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved political actors using data from individuals on Facebook for targeted political messaging and manipulation in the 2016 US Elections (Moore 2018, Wylie 2019), with the first experimentation in this vein conducted on in Africa (Nyabola 2018; Wylie 2019). In response to scandals and misuse of big data, legal and policy frameworks that help accelerate ethical and responsible creation, use and sharing of data are growing, including critical data protection and privacy laws like the 2018 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). However, governments across the globe clearly need to catch up to the very rapid pace of technological change in developing public policy and law. This includes promoting digital rights and data and technological literacy so that individuals can understand how they create data and make informed decisions about how that data gets used. Overall, how governments regulate, use, manage, govern and exercise stewardship over data and technology companies will make a profound difference in terms of what kinds of impacts will occur in society and who will benefit or lose from these technological advancements. This chapter explores questions of data and digital technology governance and policy in Africa using the urban transport sector as a case study. The growing use of digital technologies, especially global positioning system (GPS)-enabled mobile phones and other sensors, generates rich data that could enable improved planning, program designs, service delivery and employment, creating local technology ecosystems in the transport sector. Some of the growing data in transport are generated by the “digital exhaust”, signals from urban residents’ phones or from the use of apps that collect travel data, sometimes, unethically, unbeknownst to users (Valentino-Defries et  al. 2010); such data is often collected by private actors when people use their location-based apps to hail a ride or look for directions. This data provides value to companies—and is often sold to other companies—but it is not always shared in ways that protect privacy and promote the public interest (see Chap. 16 on ethical dilemmas and public innovation in this volume). Overall, it is critical to understand how data and data access play into power in society (data4sdgs.org 2022). How to access, build and govern useful data and share it while expanding awareness within government and civil society on the potential opportunities and pitfalls of new data and data-generating technologies is thus an important question. We will discuss this question in this chapter using

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the transport sector as a way to make the issues around digital technologies and data more concrete. After a brief discussion of the major questions around data and introducing some principles and frameworks to help develop policy, we review the broader transport sector in African cities in this context. Next, we draw on the case study of DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A), an open data collaborative. DigitalTransport4Africa promotes and supports government and local “ecosystem” capacities to create high-­ quality, standardised data and leverage it along with digital technologies for improving urban transport service. It does this by applying the Digital Principles for Development, including supporting the wide circulation of open, standardised data via a “digital commons”. It also shares open-­ source tools for collecting and analysing data while supporting community and local ecosystem efforts to build local capacities to understand, create, use and leverage digital data. By telling the story of DigitalTransport4Africa, we will be able to share more general insights into how African governments can develop strategies and governance frameworks that leverage technological change for the public good while protecting digital rights. Hence, we conclude by discussing lessons and some thoughts on the way forward.

The Rise of New Data and Digital Technologies: Digital Principles for Development and Rights In the early 2000s, key multilaterals, including the UN and World Bank, governments and civil society, recognised that many enabling conditions and practices need to be in place for societies to benefit from the rise of data and digital technologies. In response, they developed the Digital Principles for Development to support equitable access to technologies and data and leverage digital technologies for development goals while protecting critical rights (digitalprinciples.org 2022). Nine Digital Principles (or best practices) for Development emerged out of this effort (Fig. 4.1). These principles target designers of new digital tools for development to ensure that these varied tools have positive impacts. These include designing with the user in mind, understanding the existing ecosystem, designing for scale, building for sustainability and focusing on data. Open standards, open data and open-source innovation while addressing privacy and security are key. Open data is “data that can be freely used, re-used and redistributed by anyone—subject only, at most, to the requirement to attribute”

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Fig. 4.1  Digital Principles for Development. (Source: Abigail Shirley via Wikimedia Commons)

(opendatahandbook.org 2022). The Open Data Handbook summarises the key attributes of open data as: • Availability and Access: the data must be available as a whole and at no more than a reasonable reproduction cost, preferably by downloading over the internet. The data must also be available in a convenient and modifiable form.

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• Re-use and Redistribution: the data must be provided under terms that permit re-use and redistribution, including the intermixing with other datasets. • Universal Participation: everyone must be able to use, re-use and redistribute—there should be no discrimination against fields of endeavour or against persons or groups. For example, “non-­ commercial” restrictions that would prevent “commercial” use, or restrictions of use for certain purposes (e.g., only in education), are not allowed (opendatahandbook.org 2022). Open data can be a critical public resource, enabling multiple new uses, insights and benefits. Communities also emerge around open data encouraging participation in improving and updating data, helping lower costs of correcting, cleaning and updating. One well-known example is the Open Street Map community, with volunteers who help create up-to-date free digital maps for the globe, including features such as roads, trails, railway and bus stations, buildings and businesses (Ramm et al. 2011). This has been invaluable for humanitarian action and disadvantaged communities in “informal” settlements that often lack open and useable maps (Hagen 2011). Given the value of open data to society, in 2015, civil society and governments across the globe came together to create the International Open Data Charter, “a globally-agreed set of aspirational norms for how to publish data” (opendatacharter.net accessed Jul 30 2022). These involve six principles: 1. Open by Default 2. Timely and Comprehensive 3. Accessible and Usable 4. Comparable and Interoperable 5. For Improved Governance and Citizen Engagement 6. For Inclusive Development and Innovation However, it is critical to know as a public policy and regulatory matter what data to make open; in some cases, communities do not wish for sensitive data to be made available to the public, which can include powerful actors who may abuse that data  (Global Partnership for Sustainable Development Data 2022). The most often cited example of why open data can backfire in some cases is the project to digitise and share land data in Bhoomi, Bangalore. Opening land data led to great hardship for the

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poor as the data encouraged land acquisition by powerful interests with negative spin-offs for the community (Benjamin et al. 2007). Similarly, a conservation project that mapped out indigenous forest land in Kenya inadvertently led to land grabbing of those same forest areas targeted for protection (Klopp and Sang 2011). The power dynamics and ethics of opening data are critical to think through carefully in each case, along with the data agency of the communities involved; that is, do they have a say in the design, production and use of the data? (data4sdgs.org 2022). Government reformers often encourage official open data initiatives and policies to support public participation, innovation and value creation from their data and to build accountability, transparency and trust. Cities across the globe are increasingly opening up municipal data through open data portals, creating open data policies and digital innovation and protection positions (Goldstein and Dyson 2013; UN-Habitat 2021). Such open data initiatives and related portals are growing at the national level in Africa but require more support (Bello et al. 2015), including at the sub-­ national level (see Chap. 14). Many local and global civil society actors are supporting efforts to increase the amount of African open data. For example, the World Wide Web Foundation supports The Africa Open Data Network & Lab and runs the Open Data barometer, which tracks how well regions and countries are doing on opening data and leveraging its benefits according to the International Open Data Charter. The latest (2016) report for the Sub-Saharan African region found that “(1) Governments are too dependent on third-parties for creating and sustaining open data initiatives, (2) Only two countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya and South Africa, rank in the top 50 and (3) Only two out of 375 datasets in the regional analysis are truly open” (opendatabarometer. org 2022). There are many barriers to implementing the International Open Data Charter principles. In many cases, data is perceived as a scarce commodity that can bring in revenue to government bodies and often is a source of bribes as well for officials who informally sell it (Williams et al. 2014). As Kitchin notes, “[S]ince much data held within public and non-­ governmental bodies concerns the operations of those bodies, they provide a means to measure the success of their various programs and activities. Opening these data to public scrutiny thus makes the workings and decision-­making of an organisation transparent and can be used to assess accountability and value for money” (Kitchin 2014). Sometimes, however, government and some non-governmental bodies resist this

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accountability, fear revealing the poor quality of their data or simply do not have data, resources or technical skills to create and share the data (Borokini and Saturday 2021). There are also some emerging critiques of these open data efforts. Specifically, if only powerful commercial actors can use the open data provided through these initiatives, then such initiatives might simply empower commercial, often foreign, actors and fail in the objectives of generating benefits for society, including making it more democratic and open (Kitchin 2014; Gurstein 2011). This is especially true if those commercial actors are also not expected to make some of their non-sensitive, highly useful data available to the public or, in some cases, as in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, inform individuals when they use their data for purposes for which they did not provide consent. Thus, it is critical to put in place measures to support an environment that enables digital literacy, skill and rights to create a fair playing field around open data and enable broad “effective use” of it in society (Gurstein 2011). In response to these deep inequalities and power dynamics, data justice and digital rights advocacy is growing. Interestingly, cities are often in the foreground of these movements to encourage and enforce digital principles and rights. In 2018, the Cities Coalition for Digital Rights—a network of cities supported by the UN Office for Human Rights, UN-Habitat, Eurocities and United Cities and Local Government— committed to upholding digital rights, defined as those human and legal rights that allow individuals to access, use, create and publish digital media and use computers, other electronic devices and telecommunications networks (Medium.com 2018). The Cities Coalition for Digital Rights is committed to the following five important and evolving principles that promote equitable, fair and democratic development of critical digital technologies and services (for a visual representation, see Fig. 4.2). 1. Universal and equal access to the internet and digital literacy Everyone should have access to affordable and accessible internet and digital services on equal terms, as well as the digital skills to make use of this access and overcome the digital divide. 2. Privacy, data protection and security

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Fig. 4.2  Main pillars of the Declaration of the Cities Coalition for Digital Rights

Everyone should have privacy and control over their personal information through data protection in both physical and virtual places to ensure digital confidentiality, security, dignity and anonymity, and sovereignty over their data, including the right to know what happens to their data, who uses it and for what purposes. 3. Transparency, accountability and non-discrimination of data, content and algorithms Everyone should have access to understandable and accurate information about the technological, algorithmic and artificial intelligence systems that impact their lives and the ability to question and change unfair, biased or discriminatory systems. 4. Participatory democracy, diversity and inclusion Everyone should have full representation on the internet and the ability to collectively engage with the city through open, participatory and transparent digital processes. Everyone should have the opportunity to participate in shaping local digital infrastructures and services and, more generally, city policy-making for the common good.

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5. Open and ethical digital service standards Everyone should be able to use the technologies of their choice and expect the same level of interoperability, inclusion and opportunity in their digital services. Cities should define their own technological infrastructures, services and agenda through open and ethical digital service standards and data to ensure that they live up to this promise. Currently, African cities are not represented within this coalition, and overall, growing concern exists that many African governments, at both national and local levels, are missing the governance frameworks to leverage the technology and data revolution to protect people and create public benefit. This is particularly challenging in the context of strong technology companies, some with resources greater than many countries (Pulkkinen 2019); indeed, “digital colonialism” is a real threat. Coleman defines digital colonialism as a “modern day ‘Scramble for Africa’”, where large-scale tech companies extract, analyse and own user data for profit and market influence (2019, p.  417; Pilling 2019). Governments are increasingly adopting some data protection legislation, although often with loopholes (Coleman 2019), and civil society groups like the Africa Digital Rights Hub are working to support broader digital rights frameworks (africadigitalrightshub.org 2022), but much remains to be done in the legal, policy and advocacy realms. Clearly, it is critical to build pressures and capacities to push for frameworks and strategies in government and society to promote governing data for the common good and to protect the digital rights of individuals and communities. This will become clear when we look at the urban transport sector.

The Technological and Data Revolution in the Transport Sector in the African Context Addressing urban transport problems is a growing concern for African governments as the continent rapidly urbanises and faces an unprecedented expansion in need for varied mobility services. Current trends are somewhat disheartening as congestion and gridlock grow in many cities, along with severe public health and quality of life problems. Public health impacts of current urban transport systems include very high levels of crashes that kill and maim large numbers of people (Kazeem 2019, WHO Africa accessed Jul 31 2022) and air pollution that can reach dangerous

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levels leading to respiratory and cardiovascular problems, among others (Fisher et al. 2021). Investment in public transport infrastructure and operations is key, given the vast majority of urban residents rely on walking, cycling and shared mobility provided by the private sector in the form of minibuses or motorcycle taxis. More recently, given that Africa’s transport sector is a source of rapidly growing greenhouse gas emissions and urban air pollution, a shift has been occurring in investment in mass transit, driven in part by the availability of climate finance. Yet many governments continue to invest heavily in car-oriented, dangerous and high emissions infrastructure such as highways and ignore the need to improve infrastructure and operations in the modes most people use, sometimes called “popular transport” (Klopp 2012, 2021). Poor and dangerous conditions for walking or taking popular transport create market opportunities for new car-based shared mobility companies that use ride-hailing technologies that gather trip data. Evidence from different parts of the world suggests that such services may be keeping more cars on the roads, driving up emissions and exacerbating existing problems of inequalities and auto-centric development (Hidalgo 2018; Boateng et al. 2022). Transport investment decisions by African governments key to addressing these problems are often based on limited data collected by consultants using traditional household surveys, and these are rarely shared; this has tended to contribute to poor public participation in decisions and suboptimal designs that feed into public health and congestion problems in African cities. At the same time, data from sensors is growing; cameras can detect vehicles and their speed; traffic count devices are replacing manual counting; and “low-cost air quality sensors” are helping detect emissions. Smartphones now include cameras, accelerometers that measure changes in motion and a global positioning system (GPS) that gives the phone location. This means that people with a smartphone produce valuable private data about their trips that, when aggregated, are very useful for policy, planning and operations of transport systems. Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) like Uber or Taxify are also generating data from their ride-hailing platforms on passenger trips while raising privacy protection issues. Little of this data appears in the public realm in anonymized form and also does not seem to generally feed into public discussions, planning and investment in the urban transport sector. All these new technology-enabled transport data sources give much more detailed and granular information over time than traditional

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household surveys. Hence, they are a valuable resource for different policy actors in the sector, including especially governments. However, in line with the trends we discussed earlier, little open data exists on urban transport, and open transport data portals are missing. Indeed, it appears that the main actors in the sector, from those who finance transport infrastructure to the varied government actors involved, do not appear to follow or even be aware of the Open Data Charter and Digital Principles for Development. In addition, technology companies are also promoting the use of sensors and “big data” to manage traffic better and are selling their systems, software and dashboards to governments; many of these governments have the little internal capacity to use and evaluate the data and technologies. This deepens African government’s dependencies on third party, often external actors, for data, technologies and analysis, as was raised in the Open Data Barometer report for the continent. As a result, investments in urban transport with long-lasting impacts are being made without a shared, data-driven understanding of the problems or even how technologies and data can play into transport improvements. At the same time, with help from some multilateral institutions and foundations, many civil society actors—sometimes called transport techies—are increasingly leveraging smartphones and low-cost sensors to gather transport data, analyse and visualise it as well as provide services such as wayfinding to improve planning and provide better public information and services as well as following best principles on open data and digital development (Williams et al. 2015; Klopp and Cavoli 2019, Klopp et al. 2019). One of the pioneering projects along this vein is the DigitalMatatus project in Nairobi, which used GPS-enabled cell phones to trace out matatu (minibus) routes and stops. By riding the matatus with cell phones to collect digital and spatial public transport data, DigitalMatatus created a holistic, basic map of the matatu system in the city (Fig. 4.3), providing visibility and passenger information where none existed before except in sparse analogue or oral forms (Williams et  al. 2015). Funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and spearheaded by a data collaborative involving three universities (Columbia, MIT and University of Nairobi) and a design firm (Groupshot), the project aimed to make the data open in standardised form using the General Transit Feed Specification (GTFS), a static relational data format of agencies, routes, trips, stops, and fares and calendars. Further, the data creation process involved university students, matatu operators, drivers and extensive communications to build a community

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Fig. 4.3  DigitalMatatus map of matatus in Nairobi. (Source: digitalmatatus.co)

that understands and can use the data. The DigitalMatatus project was a proof–of-concept project that spurred digital mapping projects across the continent, most based on open data and participatory principles as well (Klopp and Cavoli 2019). Note that none of this form of basic transport data contains any personal data of individuals and does not include real-time data on where vehicles actually are at any point. As the data was in a standardised format, it could be imported into Google Maps and other digital platforms to help with wayfinding and could be used for accessibility studies and network analysis (Avner and Lall 2016; Campbell et al. 2019; Falchetta et al. 2021; Fried et al. 2020; World Bank 2016) Overall, improved open standardised data on Africa’s transport systems allows exploration of how well these systems work and hence also where they could be improved (Klopp 2021). Data collected by Accra Mobility, for example, enabled insights into how to improve the operations of trotros in Ghana without reducing revenues (Saddier and Johnson 2018). Low-cost air quality monitors are also increasingly useful for

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measuring transport emissions (Audu 2018) which can help hold transport sector actors accountable for their claims around emissions impacts of infrastructure projects as well as support electrification planning and other efforts to reduce air pollution. Another form of useful big data on transport is anonymised mobile phone data from users in African cities. In Abidjan, for example, IBM researchers accessing data from the telecommunications company Orange discovered the most frequented bus routes and then came up with sixty-­ five network improvements that would save passengers an estimated 10% of their time (Talbot 2013). In this case, the data was generated without deliberate citizen action but through the anonymised digital exhaust from cell phones (signals phones send out) which can be aggregated and analysed, revealing patterns in the ebbs and flows of city life (Ratti et al. 2006). Another interesting example involves analysing road traffic crash location data from Twitter accounts to explore where road improvements need to be made (Nairobi Accident Map/Resor 2022; Mulisheva et  al. 2021). Note that privacy protections are very critical in this kind of data analysis. Much of this kind of data from telecommunications or digital platform companies is not a primary source of profits for the companies involved, yet it is profoundly valuable for transport planning. Despite this fact, many of these companies are reluctant to provide this data for the public interest because they wish to commoditise it. While public-private partnerships around data sharing do occur, they are complex (GSMA 2021) and typically do not meet open data and digital principles or development standards. To address the public data gap, more and more data collaboratives are emerging around creating critical open urban transport sector data. At the same time, technology companies like WhereIsMyTransport, GoAscendal, IMB, Google or Uber are also generating data and often selling it to governments and other companies. Some aim to follow open data and Digital Principles for Development, whereas others benefit from open data while providing services and commodifying data for their own profits. Governments and policymakers more generally need to navigate this increasingly complex data and technology environment; the challenge is to manage the data and technological changes and harness them to meet society’s goals around transport. This includes the Sustainable Development Goal 11, target 2, which all African governments have signed on to that “all citizens will have access to safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable transport systems by 2030 by expanding public transport with special attention

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given to the needs of those in vulnerable situations, women, children, persons with disabilities and older persons”. Next, we describe one growing digital data for transport collaborative that aims to support this effort.

The Case of DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A) DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A) is a collaborative digital commons and global network that scales up and supports urban mobility projects through open data, open-source software and peer-to-peer knowledge sharing (see Fig.  4.4).1 Founded in 2017 by partners from the World Resources Institute (WRI), the French Development Agency (AFD), the DigitalMatatus project, Columbia University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), DT4A sought to build on new possibilities opened up by new data and digital technologies to address urban mobility and access challenges in Africa. In many ways, it is a global policy response to the challenges of improving urban transport in Africa described earlier. The project represents a large and diverse network of city governments, residents, universities, civic technology companies and collectives as well as international development partners committed to sustainable urban mobility for all, open data and the Digital Principles for Development. Members of DT4A pledge to advance safe, affordable, accessible and sustainable urban transport systems.2 This collaborative action leverages the powers of digital data to build sustainable urban mobility systems and

Fig. 4.4  DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A)s main project partners

1 2

 https://digitaltransport4africa.org/.  https://digitaltransport4africa.org/our-pledge/.

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help cities to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as described in Goal 11.2. The vision of the project is underpinned by five policy goals adapted to the unique transportation landscape of urban Africa and a broad commitment to quality open data: 1. Universal Access—connect all communities, with an emphasis on vulnerable groups, including women and children, people with disabilities and those living in extreme poverty, to the necessary opportunities and resources for urban life. 2. Efficiency—improve the reliability, affordability and quality of public transport services, including all formal and popular transit providers. 3. Safety—greatly reduce traffic-related fatalities, injuries and crashes. 4. Green—minimise the negative environmental impact of mobility, which includes Greenhouse Gas emissions and air pollution. 5. Adhere to principles of Open Data and transit data standards— follow the guidelines set by the Open Data Handbook (2018). “Good” open data can be easily shared and is available in a standard, structured format that guarantees consistency over time and trustworthiness. Open transit data in a standard format enables data integration and interoperability and uses a wide array of open-source tools, saving time and money for agencies and allowing for more transit comparability across cities.

Approach To implement the project activities and create a movement for open data on public transport across the African region, DT4A has formulated three project pillars, as depicted in Fig. 4.5. The approach is designed to build capacities to work with and leverage standardised data by providing expertise, tools and platforms for smooth communication among the stakeholders. The project gathers and presents cases of how data can help improve the planning and implementation of sustainable mobility, particularly in the popular transit sector.

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Fig. 4.5  Three core pillars of DigitalTransport4Africa (DT4A)

Learn Most decision-makers and citizens in Africa have limited knowledge of how to use digital and mobile tools and methodologies for the transport sector and mostly lack the resources needed for this purpose. The “Learn” pillar of DT4A is strongly based on exchanging knowledge and ideas on how to leverage the power of open transit data to influence policy and find novel solutions for problems in the public transport sector. The pillar aims at building the capacity of decision-makers and researchers to use digital data, tools and methodologies as a catalyst for data-driven decisions. This will ultimately contribute to the socio-economic development of the continent. The project organises and participates in  local and global transport expert meetings and facilitates workshops, training and roundtables. DT4A publishes guest author blog posts and user-submitted research

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papers on the DT4A blogroll3 and a GitLab-hosted knowledge centre.4 The DT4A website and blog serve as communications nexus for the big ideas and event announcements within the digital transport network. The knowledge centre is home to research products and tools, such as guides, research papers, technical mapping apps and other knowledge products, enabling cities to improve their mapping and transit planning (see, Fig. 4.6).

Fig. 4.6  Platforms to support the “Learn” pillar: (a) DT4A blog and (b) DT4A knowledge centre 3 4

 https://digitaltransport4africa.org/blog/.  https://git.digitaltransport4africa.org/learn.

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Create To improve urban public transport planning and operations, cities need at least basic data on urban transport. In most African cities, public authorities lack basic information on the actual state of mass transport services in their cities. More importantly, in some of the cities that have mapped their public transport, the data are not frequently updated, properly managed and shared across different sectors, a clear weakness in not institutionalising the main “civic hacktivist” projects and building government capacities and ecosystems. The “Create” pillar aims to provide technical and financial support to help cities map, manage, analyse and plan their transit networks. DT4A encourages the development of tools for data collection and analysis. The project also supports cities to “Go Beyond Mapping” by putting the output data from data collection into practical uses. This will add value to the raw data by solving a real-world problem or answering research questions. The data can be utilised for accessibility analysis, trip planning application development, analyse of passenger and vehicle flow across corridors and many more (see Fig. 4.7). DT4A launched the “DT4A Innovation Challenge” programme in December 20215—a competitive-based technical and financial support programme for startups, academic institutions and private organisations with projects that contribute to the movement for open data and innovation across the region. Four applicants were selected by DT4A and a jury of experts based on both technical and socio-political design and will each receive an award of US $30,000 and DT4A support to implement their initiatives. These initiatives are helping to shift transportation towards more sustainable, equitable results through open data, particularly in the popular transport sector. Winners of the Innovation Challenge come from across the continent—the projects are based in Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, South Africa and Sudan.

5

 https://digitaltransport4africa.org/innovation-challenge/.

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Fig. 4.7  (a) Addis Ababa city accessibility mapping (https://fried705.carto. com/me) based on data from Addis Ababa transit mapping project in 2018 (https://git.digitaltransport4africa.org/data/africa/addis-­ababa) and (b) Kampala city public transit accessibility mapping web app (https://worldresources.maps.arcgis.com/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=cbab16378f0e41 0f830c2fcc6021d6ae)

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Ewarren Mobility, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire Ewarren is a mobile startup app that offers a cashless payment system to passengers of “woro-woro” municipal taxis and traditional ferries in the municipality of Cocody, Abidjan. Ewarren plans to expand the app’s capabilities to allow passengers to reserve seats, access their traveller information and generate dynamic datasets around informal public transport in the standard GTFS format. The data will then be made available to others to use and test. Such a database could even be coupled with Abidjan’s formal public transport network to enable users to use both formal and informal services seamlessly. Ewarren also plans to expand digital payments to minibus services. AddisMap, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia YeneGuzo, by AddisMap, is a mobile application made from the open-­ source Trufi application and OpenStreetMap data with the Ethiopian Ministry of Transport and Logistics. YeneGuzo helps both transport service providers and riders understand different transport options available at a given place and time. The application works in the Amharic language and uses a minimal interface to be as accessible to as many riders as possible. Furthermore, it is freely distributed and open source, so it can be improved by anyone. AddisMap plans to improve awareness of YeneGuzo and its trip planning applications by including multiple modes, conducting a massive data collection and editing campaign, developing public relations and training materials, and launching a communications campaign. With more than 210 designated routes across 2 major public bus services, 2 light rail routes and more than 500 additional informal minibus taxi routes across Addis Ababa, each operating with its own schedules, routes and stations, there are significant efficiencies to be gained. GoMetro, Stellenbosch, South Africa GoMetro plans to collect and map the operational data of Stellenbosch’s minibus taxis with the purpose of developing a business feasibility model to transition the entire 80-vehicle fleet to electric. The minibus taxi accounts for 84% of public transport services and 74% of passenger journeys in South Africa, but little effort has been made to reduce the fleet’s carbon footprint. Beyond fewer carbon emissions, electrifying South

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Africa’s minibus taxis can bring benefits such as cleaner air, longer service life and improved service quality. But feasibility studies for the electric transition are difficult, if not impossible, without operational and mapping data on how minibus taxis are used day to day. GoMetro will collect a full-­ fleet operational dataset of the entire informal transit fleet in the town of Stellenbosch to investigate the operational opportunity of electromobility conversion from diesel to electric minibuses. KhartouMap, Khartoum, Sudan The KhartouMap initiative plans to map the semi-formal bus system of Greater Khartoum, home to nearly 8 million people, for the first time. No official map is currently available to the public. Working with the local government and transport authorities, they aim to generate both physical maps and GTFS-compliant data feeds that can then be integrated into other mapping services. In addition, KhartouMap intends to conduct the country’s largest household mobility survey to collect detailed information about origins and destinations, personal travel behaviour and transit accessibility. They also plan to build innovation capacity through “hackathon” workshops at local universities and entrepreneurial communities. These initiatives will get a chance to advance their projects with DT4A networking opportunities, and at the same time the entire network will learn and gain insights from these innovative projects. The DT4A Innovation Challenge is a pilot award that strives to be the first response to urban mobility data challenges, inspiring stakeholders in urban change by spotlighting successful initiatives and telling the stories of sustainable urban mobility projects that are leveraging digital data to make an impact on the African continent. To advance innovative practices, governments, development banks and other multilateral organisations must integrate mapping-related activities into broader infrastructure projects and provide funding in terms of awards and grants to civil society or startup ecosystems, enabling them to initiate projects and demonstrate impact— leading to more funding, and ultimately use of standard open data to cultivate data-driven transportation policies and planning.

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Share The “Share” pillar focuses on connecting users and data to a wide network of transport experts and advocates worldwide through the DT4A platform and data repository.6 The data repository is home to GTFS datasets from fourteen African cities (as of March 2022), which are contributed by the project partners and data collection projects undertaken by the DT4A project (see Fig. 4.8). However, the datasets need frequent updating to

Fig. 4.8  Project locations of the 14 GTFS datasets available in the DT4A data repository (https://digitaltransport4africa.org/projects/) 6

 https://git.digitaltransport4africa.org/data.

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portray changes on the ground. The aim is also to help foster a culture of sharing and open data among governments, the private sector and those who often fund and provide technical assistance to African countries like AFD and the World Bank to cultivate more open and data-driven transportation policy and planning.

DigitalTransport4Africa’s Governance Structure The World Resource Institute, a well-respected data-driven global NGO, is the anchor institution for these efforts and the Africa WRI office, based in Addis, is leading this work and spearheading the effort with the collaborative as a whole to develop a model of governance to manage this work. The current model of the DT4A project’s governance structure is composed of three core entities to achieve smooth communication and working relations among the different stakeholders (Fig. 4.9). The structure is aimed at enabling all sector stakeholders to learn about transit mapping, the importance of the Digital Principles for Development, curate transit data and tools and share knowledge to leverage data for critical transport improvements.

Fig. 4.9  DT4A’s governance structure

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The structure is framed in a semi-formal and horizontal manner where stakeholders can have a parallel role in decision-making. The semi-formal nature of the structure is based on the systematic influence of unwritten rules, shared expectations or norms (Stone 2013). This in itself is an ongoing experiment; the key policy aim is to develop flexible and effective cooperative structures and sustained collaborative networks to support a move towards building and sharing data, digital technologies and knowledge or a “digital commons”. This is to counteract the tendency towards the commodification of data that excludes many from its benefits and to act against digital colonialism and data dependency of African governments. By building internal capacities of African governments and fostering local ecosystems, including local civil society and technology companies, the goal is to avoid reliance on third parties, including large external technology companies and consultants, while creating local employment and harnessing the talents of African technology and data specialists.

Conclusions Technological transformation and the “data revolution” it is engendering, are impacting society in profound ways. This creates new opportunities and challenges in every policy sector and requires multi-level and sectoral responses around how data and digital technologies will be governed and used while protecting critical digital rights. Frameworks from the International Open Data Charter, Digital Principles for Development and Cities Coalition for Digital Rights can help, but these must be given life and force through advocacy, government and institutional reform. Open data laws, initiatives and portals, and learning and capacity building within society to enable agencies in data collection and within the state to build laws and policies to protect rights and promote data literacy are critical. As Taylor notes, we have the necessary knowledge to ensure “a socially just approach to the use of digital data; the key is translating that into policy, law and practice at a level that is usable” (2017, p. 11). We have presented one such effort to apply knowledge around ethical digital data development in the urban transport sector and make this data and “digital commons” approach usable and translatable into policy and practice in Africa—the DigitalTransport4Africa collaborative. This work is still in its early stages, but it points to the need and opportunities in all sectors and levels—to build communities around strong, just data principles. These

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communities can actively create ethical pathways in a “datafying” world to create, use, share and leverage digital data to generate broad and tangible public benefits. This, however, will only be lasting if this translates into deeper changes in law, policy and practice.

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Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

CHAPTER 5

Biometric Turn and the Quest of Public Interest. Assessing the National Identification Policy in Cameroon Alphonse Bernard Amougou Mbarga and Raoul Tamekou Tsowa

Introduction Modern society is characterised by wide automation of various spheres of human activity, and in these processes, a special place is occupied by the biometric identification of a person. The delay in development has not affected the entry of African countries into the era of Information, Communication, and Technology (ICT). Technology has invaded all areas of social life. In this perspective, the State of Cameroon has embarked on

A. B. Amougou Mbarga (*) University of Douala, Douala, Cameroon R. T. Tsowa Institute for the Study of Contemporary Dynamics of the State and Societies in Africa, Montreal, QC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_5

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an institutional change in its functioning geared towards leveraging ICT policy instruments. Digitisation and e-administration have become operational frameworks for any institutional modernisation in Cameroon, as elsewhere (Breckenridge 2021). The reform of the Cameroonian identity with the logic of digitisation, which is part of it, thus finds a framework for putting it into perspective. The space of digital and biometric systems thus encompasses the most varied places in the daily lives of Cameroonian citizens: bank cards, driver’s licences, voter cards, and national identity cards (NICs). Faced with the evolution of electronic exchanges and transactions, digital identity offers citizens modern means of identification, allowing them to access online services securely, simply, and in compliance with their private life. These guarantees can only help to energise the public sector, thanks to the services it is thus able to provide (e-governance) and, for the private sector, to strengthen its competitiveness. The NIC is thus at the heart of a battle, undoubtedly technological, but it has its source in the very definition of citizenship. Indeed, the digitisation of the identity system is becoming operational in a society where most people who claim to be Cameroonians do not have a birth certificate, an essential document for obtaining a NIC. It is at his first official examination in the primary school that the child must produce his birth certificate time to discover parents have never made it a priority in the existence of their offspring. Moreover, corruption has invaded all sectors of society, and the same individual ends up “officially” with several birth certificates depending on the changes he gives to his socio-professional trajectory. A public policy for securing the Cameroonian identity must consider the anthropological reality of Cameroonian citizenship. Possessing an identity document is not an individual’s priority as long as s/he does not have to do with the administration. The police control during interurban travel requires you to obtain an identity document to avoid being arrested. The fight against Boko Haram terrorists in the North of the country and “Ambazonian secessionists” in the English-speaking North West and South West increase police checks. Consequently, it serves as an incentive for the possession of NIC. According to the Cameroonian Law N° 90-42 of 19 December 1990 to institute a national identity card (Section 1–2), “the possession of a national identity card shall be compulsory throughout the country for all citizens aged eighteen or more”. Understanding the institutional and political-strategic dynamics surrounding the NIC biometrisation leads to considering the processes

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through which institutions adapt and reconfigure themselves according to realities to serve a political interest (Lyon 2008). Thus, the field of biometrics plays out the fight against terrorism and attempts to c­ onstruct/ invent and protect a Cameroonian identity. It is therefore questioning the mechanisms, the logics, and the stakes of the biometrisation in the Cameroonian identity. This relates both to the ideological dimension of this policy and to the choice of technological instruments pertaining to the implementation of this policy. The institutional implications stem from the uses that the actors make of them. Indeed, an institution does not move on itself but in the dynamics of the actors responsible for animating it. The instrumental dimension of a policy’s instruments comes from the actors’ incremental logic. The interest and originality of our chapter are revealed on two levels. On the theoretical level, the biometric turn remains little documented in the Africanist literature; thus, following Kurt Levin’s acknowledgement: “[T]here is nothing more practical than a good theory” (Hunt 1987, p. 4). In the emerging field, most works focus on security (Awenengo and Banégas 2018), migration (Madianou et  al. 2020), and electoral issues (Amougou Mbarga 2016). Although central to the biometric operation in Africa, the role and challenges of using public-private partnerships have been little studied. This chapter fills this gap and is at the critical intersection of several bodies of literature: public identification policies, public-­ private partnerships, organisational coordination, and  e-administration. Our empirical analysis relies on documentary and archival research, direct observation (posing as a citizen in police services) and semi-direct interviews, engaging in a group discussion on the issue of Cameroonian identity and security. In this chapter, we discuss the institutional, social, political, and administrative tensions that biometric techniques induce in the public service of national identification in Cameroon. The next section discusses digitalisation approaches that inform public policy and security in Cameroon, then follows the historical perspective surrounding regulatory and institutional governance, the technological choices, and strategical battles to secure Cameroonian ID conduct to analyse trends and issues when questioning biometrics.

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Approaching Digitisation: Public Policy and Security in Cameroon Biometrics is the means of identifying and authenticating individuals in a reliable and fast way through unique biological characteristics. Biometric identification determines a person’s identity (Piazza 2008). Biometric authentication compares data for the person’s features to that person’s biometric “template” to determine resemblance. In this perspective, it is to highlight that an attribute can be given to a person and, on the other hand, that this person corresponds to this attribute. The question of digitisation raises the problem of the control of individuals and the attack on the freedoms of citizens (Alterman 2003). The files and biometric data collected by the administration led to the creation of social subject tracking. Citizens can thus be spotted and identified wherever their digital footprints are present or can be accessed. The State must therefore ensure that authentication and identification measures are part of a public policy to safeguard the citizenry’s rights from infringement. Indeed, if public policies are intended to meet the needs of citizens and populations, they are also productions of meaning through which the State builds its legitimacy. Biometrics and identity security are a way for public authorities to prove that they have control over citizens and can direct their behaviour (Mordini and Rebera 2012). The transition to the digitisation of the identity card and the passport by Cameroon builds a political will and a specific social model. Biometric authentication aims to make life simpler and safer; data storage governs an individual’s life practically from birth to death and after him. Unique and invariable, the individual’s personal data can be used throughout life and in a measurable way, allowing comparisons. In public policy, the notion of path dependence associated with the surge of new institutionalism tends to define a situation where the present policy choice is constrained or shaped by institutional paths that result from choices made in the past (Pierson 2000). Thus, the biometric logic constructs a public dynamic of social regulation by meaning a reality for each person (recognising oneself in the Cameroonian nationality through the NIC or passport). Biometrics make it possible to differentiate one individual from another about existing technological means without making the technology invasive. Data collection must be able to be fast and simple with maximum reliability. Indeed, “[c]oncrete reform plans often fail to materialise, despite evident policy problems. When actual reform proposals are

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advanced, they tend to change the range, combination and usage of particular public services and policy instruments while leaving the underlying program theory intact. Policy termination and path switching may occur, but normally it takes a lot of reform failures to produce a significant shift in institutionalised public policies” (Torfing 2009, p.70). Contrary to the centralising and rationalist illusion put forward by the advocates of biometrics, we argue that implementing biometric policies has the effect of fragmenting and reducing the coherence of public action. Among the factors put forward as explanations are bureaucratic and social resistance to technical innovation and conflicts of interest between organisational and ministerial actors. Although the State of Cameroon intends to distinguish itself by choosing a technology, this subjectivity is constrained by the ability of actors to preserve strategic interests. As the government’s objective is to reduce the operating expenses of an administration without reducing the level of production, the solution may indeed involve the privatisation of certain productive tasks, the concession or outsourcing of certain activities, administrative, and budgetary mechanisms guide and “format” decisions. In no way do they constitute neutral tools. The political economy or public choice approach involves integrating government as an institution into the approach and understanding the incentives and constraints that affect the decisions of politicians and bureaucrats. It is now a question of focusing on the political process rather than on the effects of a particular public policy to improve public intervention (Blankart and Koester 2006). The biometrisation of identities is a technical revolution that makes it possible to overcome the technical failings of African states in terms of controlling and securing populations and borders. It offers States a centralising tool that allows for better regulation of populations, national territories and political spaces, and international migration flows. However, the technical and political benefits touted by the ideology of mass biometrics in Africa mask other underlying dynamics at the heart of this research. There is a collusion between the market and the State in the provision of biometric services. It has been established that the biometric turn in Africa represents a lucrative market and an export field for global capitalism and its logic (Ait-Hatrit 2020; Toesland 2021). African states sign public-private partnerships with specialised Western firms without the technology and expertise to operate biometric processes. However, these co-­ production formulas, which have high costs, segment populations into groups with different financial capacities, and clientele (Hodge and Greve

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2016). They, therefore, introduce a market logic and ultimately call into question the public foundations of the service provided: equality of access and inclusion.

Digital ID in Cameroon: Regulatory and Institutional Governance in Historical Perspective The biometrisation of the Cameroonian identity is part of an institutional process. From the colonial period, the identity card was in paper/cardboard format, established in any police station after the calligraphy and signature of the local commissioner. The lack of data centralisation meant that the same individual could have as many identity cards as possible. Such a problematic document highlighted the fragility of the morality of the one who issued it and introduced a related fragility to the holder’s statements. In reality, the wave of democratisation that swept over Africa in the 1990s raised fears of nationality distortion. In 1994, the State of Cameroon launched the SENAC project (Securing Cameroonian Nationality). In 1996, the police services took back the appellation DGSN (Délégation Générale à la Sureté Nationale). It should be noted that created in 1969, to combine francophone and Anglophone polices’ services after the 1961 reunification, the DGSN became SESI (Sécrétariat d’Etat à la Sécurité Intérieure) in 1984. This 1996 year marks the beginning of the production of plastic identity cards. This is the first step in the digitisation of Cameroonian identity. NICs’ cardboard was permanently withdrawn from circulation by 30 June 2004. In 2007, the president of the Republic signed a decree organising the issuing of the NIC (Decree N° 2007/254 of 4 September 2007). In a one-sided contract, the French company in charge of digitisation held all the data relating to the Cameroonian identity card. Although it is noted that the public-private partnership formula was used in both cases (partnership with the French company THALES in the first case and the German company Agentic in the second), the results seem to be relatively different in terms of efficiency and performance, based on the first years of observation. It has happened that the same person ends up with several computerised identity cards. In July 2015, the Cameroonian government signed a contract with Gemalto to produce and secure the identification system. A month after, a committee was installed by the

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DGSN to supervise the new system. In December 2015, the Cameroonian authorities re-signed the contract with the French operator SACEL, which oversaw ID pictures. More than the choice of instruments, securing the Cameroonian identity calls for a specific public policy in which the law occupies a special place. Legal instruments make it possible to read a public policy in the making. To this end, it should be emphasised at first sight that Cameroonian positive law does not recognise the possibility for males to acquire another nationality and this possibility is only open to females under certain conditions (Law N° 1968-LF-3 of 11 June 1968, Section 3-2). Obtaining an identity card assumes that you have a birth certificate that attests to your civil status and filiation (ordinance N° 81-02 of 29 June 1981). In a country where the parents often neglect the birth certificate until the individual finds themself confronted with the administration, especially in adulthood, it is easy to understand why “citizens” find themselves without NIC.1 Otherwise, the processes at work in making the Cameroonian identity take shape around specific legal instruments. They make it possible to grasp the instrumental reality of public policy instruments. The technology at work for securing Cameroonian identity must therefore begin with securing civil status: “[U]nless proved otherwise, the identity of a person shall be established by a national identity card” (Law N° 90-42 of 19 December 1990, Section 1-1). The Cameroonian civil status does not settle the question of identity; the centrepiece of establishing a national identity card itself is useful and important to obtain a passport. It turns out that the birth certificate does not benefit from optimal security. It was in December 2021 that the BUNEC (Bureau National de l’état-civil) launched the project to digitise and index civil status documents in an experimental and pilot phase in the city of Yaoundé. In cooperation with the European Union, the project aims to secure civil acts and facilitate electoral operations (Djakba 2021). Moreover, at the approach of the electoral deadlines, the president of the Republic has regularly prescribed that the issuance of NIC be free. However, in Cameroon, there is no link between the BUNEC in charge of civil acts; the DGSN, which manages NICs and passports; ANTIC (National Agency for Information and Communication Technologies), which ensures the security of information systems; and the public telephone operator 1  The sum required for the ID card is FCFA 2800, representing 1800 for the photograph and 1000 for the tax.

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CAMTEL (Cameroon Telecommunications), which manages bandwidth and fibre optic. A collaboration between these institutional and public agencies would have made it possible to establish efficient security of the Cameroonian identity. A pragmatic approach to the legal instruments relating to biometrics makes it possible to grasp the procrastination and guesswork of public policy. The first section of the 2007 decree regarding the characteristics of obtaining a national identity card specifies that “[t]he National Identity Card is a document in Teslin,2 laminated and secure, drawn up on a pre-­ printed background in the form of a rectangle with rounded corners, measuring 85 millimetres in length and 54 millimetres in width. It is computerised and personal.” The 2016 decree relating to the same matter provides that “the National Identity Card is a polycarbonate document, laminated and secure, drawn up on a pre-printed background according to the ISO/CEl 7810 standard in the 10-1 format. It is computerised, biometric, personal and contains an electronic chip” (Decree N° 2016/375 of 04 August 2016). From a modernist perspective, Cameroon has thus chosen an option that is close to international standards in this area insofar as the new technology chosen corresponds to that of most developed countries. Ignoring the legal dimension amounts to depriving oneself of a precious key to the intelligibility of conduct of public affairs. The law is not an accessory component, intervening only to legally translate or transpose choices and decisions made upstream and outside of it (Delpeuch et al. 2014, p. 143). The question of the Cameroonian identity’s security carries a complex singularity relating to scientific, technical, economic, social, and political operational issues that must be coordinated. The regulatory dimension of this operationalisation makes it possible to see/understand public policy instruments as producers of meaning. In a disjointed way, we also grasp the procrastination of a policy being built at the heart of an institutional mutation falling under bricolage. Innovation in regulatory systems is structured as a necessity linked to the uncertainties and multifaceted constraints of these security issues. The production of a secure identity card is, first and foremost, an attempt to secure Cameroonian nationality.

2

 Teslin is a waterproof synthetic printing medium manufactured by PPG Industries.

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Securing Cameroonian ID: Technological Choices and Strategical Battles From the beginnings of computing, the protection of access to personal, professional, and public data quickly proved to be a necessity, ensuring that access is only authorised and granted to those who need to know. Controlling access to data includes controlling access of all kinds, both digital and physical (Szuba 1998, p. 68). The security obligation limits the use of computers, and yet its use is now within everyone’s reach. Today’s major technology firms wield huge social and political influence worldwide to the point that their actions, and the content they host, are often seen as a direct challenge to national sovereignty and the norms and power structures that support states. Public policies being all that a government decides to do or not to do according to the formula of Thomas Dye (1972, p. 3), the option of the digitisation of the identity taken by the Cameroonian government makes it possible to grasp the choices of the public at work in an institutional dynamic. The choice of technology attached to these biometrics, its uses, and the actors in charge of its operationality are part of the same institutional choice. The supervision of such an action belongs to the political decision-maker; the shortcomings also concern him. The setting of electronic governance is dependent on elements that govern its effectiveness and efficiency. It emerges that implementing digital governance is essential for any State that wants to align itself with the new standards of global development (Oyane 2022). Accordingly, for the Cameroonian government, acting as a systemic protector, improving the protection of digital identity is as important as it is to ensure everyone has one. The biometric authentication enables police to have improved control over citizenship, manage criminal identities, and produce criminality statistics. Public policy is, in fact, the product of social actors and their interactions; it is also a category that the actors apply. Human behaviour has cognitive and institutional limits, which have profound implications for politics and decision-making in general. The choice of technology must obey and respond to the stakes of the actors. Technology is an integral part of public policy. It determines its meaning and defines the means necessary for its implementation. To this end, the reform of the issuance of identity titles by presidential decree in 2016 created the CNPTI (National Center for the Production of identity Titles) (Decree N° 2016/374 of 04 August 2016). It is a structure entirely

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under the administration of the Cameroonian police with computer and identification experts from the national security corps; the aim pursued is the mastery of the technology used and the security of the data of Cameroonian citizens. The centralisation of data for the constitution of a single identity file is done, according to the authorities of the national police, by degraded encryption.3 Access to its files and their decryption is reserved for sworn specialists according to several levels of security. Logistics with the software and hardware supplier is limited to maintenance, which also includes a transfer of technology and skills. In addition, since the identification posts are interconnected and the information is shared, it is impossible for an individual to have various cards made at different police stations. Men aside and behind machines conduct the process. Then, “an important counterargument holds that technology is not autonomous or deterministic at all but socially constructed, driven by social, economic, and political forces that are human in origin and thus subject to human control” (Greisler and Stupak 2007, p. 5). In fact, “these techniques combine what the user knows, what the user owns, and what physically identifies the user (biometric verification). The recognition process is based on the authenticity of specific biometric characteristics, whether physical or behavioural characteristics, with those biometric data that are in the database. The most important thing in building a biometric system is the way in which recognition will be based” (Saračevič et al. 2021, p. 1). The choice of technological innovation implies that securing identity is the primary concern of Cameroonian political authorities. Accordingly, the new ID has an electronic chip, which records the photograph and fingerprint of the holder. This technology means that a unique identifier is attributed to each citizen. In this respect, the new card will no longer be carried out by the naked eye, but that mobile electronic devices that can verify that the cardholder is the card owner will be used at various places around the country. The issuance of passports obeys the same level of security, especially since the application for a passport is conditional on the possession of a national identity card. The DGSN is betting on delivering them within 48 hours. Through an online pre-enrolment system, the applicant provides several pieces of information and a secure online procedure allows them to 3  The process of encoding a message or information in such a way that only authorised persons can access it.

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pay passport fees. The user himself indicates the day, place, and time of his registration. A printable file in PDF format is generated for the use of the applicant to serve as an enrolment ticket. The applicant then went to the settlement centre for the physical formalities, and within 48 hours, the police authorities issued him his passport (Cameroon Tribune, 2 July 2021). From the technical partner and operator, the DGSN of Cameroon has chosen the innovative technological solution that makes it possible to position Cameroon at the forefront of African countries in the field of secure identity documents. Electronic and biometric vouchers, in the format of a credit card, are designed to fight against counterfeiting and include multiple security systems, visible and invisible. For the first time, they include the cardholder’s colour portrait laser-engraved in high definition, not on the surface but inside the body of the card itself (Nasdaq GlobeNewswire, 10 October 2016). This innovative approach is a first in Africa. It offers the citizens of Cameroon the advantages of an indisputable identity document. However, unlike the passport, the NIC is unavailable within 48 hours; citizens find themselves for a year or several years with the receipt as their identity document (BiometricUpdate.com 2022). The advent of technology is redefining the missions of the police forces by moving them away from police routines. The agent becomes an operator to control data processing programs, capture devices, and decision support systems. Biometric identification forces police officers to support tools they have limited knowledge of. Biometrics brings police forces into the age of technology. The police authorities find themselves obliged to launch recruitment competitions to attract information systems and data processing specialists. According to the specifications of the authorities and the chosen technology operator, Gemalto polycarbonate titles are more resistant to humidity, heat, and ageing. This plastic with unique properties of marking and solidity makes it possible to obtain a rate of reliability and safety much higher than the materials previously used. NICs are equipped with a microprocessor that combines the document’s physical security with an electronic means of security. This new dimension thus opens possibilities of electronic identification for multiple new uses. They will allow secure access to electronic services of the e-government type via Internet portals, thanks to strong electronic authentication via a digital certificate issued by the card-issuing authority. The graphic theme of the new cards is visible on the back: it represents a landscape of the village of Rhumsiki located in the

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Far North region of Cameroon. Abstract geometric patterns and figures have been reproduced over this side, inspired by traditional Cameroonian fabrics. Holders of these cards will also be able to sign documents using a digital certificate electronically. Finally, the new titles are biometric and include two fingerprints. If it was chosen, it is because biometrics quickly stood out as the most relevant technology for confidently asserting the bearer’s identity and effectively combating identity theft. Cameroon is also modernising its citizen registration solution by choosing the Gemalto enrolment platform and its card personalisation solution with Gemalto Issuance software which implements colour laser engraving technology. The Cameroonian authorities have also chosen THALES mobile verification terminals (Thales 2021). As from THALES’ comprehensive training, maintenance, and knowledge transfer program underway, the DGSN will be able to operate the fully integrated system independently. The DGSN will thus be in a position to take full responsibility for registering citizens, issuing personalised cards, and then checking them using the terminals provided. The difficulty for the Cameroonian authorities lies not only in mastering the technology but also in the control and local security of the data of Cameroonian citizens. Indeed, the first experience of the project revealed that it was the French partner who ensured the conservation and management of the databases of Cameroonians. The strategic exploitation that could result to the detriment of the Cameroonian authorities and citizens was complex. Moreover, the paradox of this initiative is revealed in the fact that the Gemalto technology, of Dutch origin, adopted in 2016 by the Cameroonian authorities marks the return of the French group THALES to securing the Cameroonian identity after its acquisition of Gemalto (Reuters, 03 October 2019). Indeed, this French company had already been ousted from the SENAC project in 2014. This institutional clientage allows the Cameroonian authorities to “accidentally” maintain a strategic partnership with an ancient colonial master and shows public policies from the angle of agreement or accommodation. The rationalisation of political decisions and public choices must consider the multiple interactions in which the actors find themselves engaged. The choice of a technology instrument is not only a purely industrial and technical question but also a political one. Incorporating the talent and technologies of Gemalto, THALES develops secure solutions to address the major challenges faced by Cameroonian

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authorities. This combination (THALES-Gemalto) creates a world-class leader with an unrivalled portfolio of digital identity and security solutions based on technologies such as biometry, data protection, and, more broadly, cybersecurity. THALES thus provides a seamless response to customers, including critical infrastructure providers such as banks, telecom operators, government agencies, utilities, and other industries, as they step up to the challenges of identifying people and objects and keeping data secure (EDR Magazine, 04 April 2019). Modernity and Security Governance: ID Trends and Issues The rationale for e-ID cards and e-passports is very simple to most players in the e-ID industry. The digital identity, a digitised version of a legal identity, is no exception. Erected as a solution for greater economic, social, and political inclusion, it opens the door to considerable possibilities but also to the risk of abuse. For example, a state could use it for social and political control, while a private sector company could influence consumers in ways they don’t understand or want (PNUD, 09 July 2019). In the private sector, these electronic IDs play a crucial role in allowing financial services companies and telecommunications companies to meet the identification requirements of their KYC (Know Your Customer) customers and to carry out type KYE (Know Your Employee). The KYC process is to prevent illegal activities such as money laundering or fraud, and in return protects both company and client. Indeed, in Cameroon, the holder of a telephone number is required to register with his NIC with the operator, even if this remains factual, the objective being to avoid data piracy. Moreover, many citizens continue to be scammed despite the obligation to enrol the identity imposed on telecommunications companies, a growing phenomenon with the mobile money operations that these companies are developing. In addition, on their birthday, customers receive personalised messages from telephone companies. In the public sector, they also allow administrations to interact with their citizens more efficiently, 24 hours a day, thanks to a strong (or sovereign) digital identity carried by the identity card. The problem in Cameroon is the lack of interconnection between the different administrations to allow data traceability. As such, the police services are not in connection with the tax services or the repression of traffic offences, for example. During border control, combined with facial recognition and biometric authentication systems, the new ID cards and passports optimise security

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and speed up passenger throughput by allowing border authorities to be sure that the person who presents herself to them is who she claims to be. The question of biometric identification goes beyond the strict issue of state control. Technology, more than an instrument at the service of States, appears to be structured in the sense that it is expected to put an end, solely by virtue of its objectivity, to the recurring debate on legitimacy. The debate shifts from political decision-making and the categorisations it operates to the search for the best technical solution to a primarily technical problem (Arigbabu et al. 2015). This functional inversion of the ends-means relationship is characteristic of the mode of legitimation specific to modern bureaucracies. But with biometric identification, this inversion does not exclusively concern the bureaucratic sphere or the individual’s relationship with the administration. Individuals no longer just must prove their identity based on technical criteria adopted by the administration (Dubey 2008). E-government introduces a new way of perceiving emerging economies. Electronic documentation and biometrics make it possible to grasp the institutional changes that emerge from productivist perspectives. It is a model of economic empowerment insofar as capitalism and economic modernity carries the primacy of instrumental rationality. Biometrisation protects everyone’s rights by associating the logic of personal identity with the protection of individual signifiers. By liberalising and facilitating access to information, e-administration is a democratic instrument for speaking out and fighting against discrimination. Indeed, having a personal identity means existing not only as an individual but also as a citizen and social agent. The modern identification system is proving to be a tool at the service of economic development, as evidenced by the World Bank Group’s initiative called ID4D (Identification for Sustainable Development). These principles are intended to apply broadly to the creation and use of identification systems to advance development goals. Because of their central role in realising individual rights and facilitating access to basic services and entitlements in the physical and digital worlds, the focus of the principles is on “official” identification systems provided by, on behalf of, or recognised by, governments (World Bank 2021). Biometric security offers many advantages (to authenticate and identify strongly) but is not without controversy (Neyland 2009).​ This challenge is linked to privacy and citizens’ ability to control information about themselves. The use of biometric data to other ends than those agreed by the citizen,

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either by service providers or by fraudsters. As soon as biometric data is in the hands of a third party, there is a risk that such data may be used for purposes different from those to which the person concerned has given their consent. Thus, there may be cases of unwanted end use if such data is interconnected with other files or used for types of processing other than those it was initially intended. The risk of re-use of data is presented for biometric checks. The data can be captured during their transmission to the central database and fraudulently replicated in another transaction. A result is a person losing control over their data, which poses privacy risks.

Conclusion The choice of modernity, the commitment to protect Cameroonians, their identity and their rights, and the recognition of the values, which are due to them, constitute for the State so many means of consolidating confidence, which has become essential to lay the foundations of the future. The effectiveness of a policy lies in counselling all the stakeholders’ concerns about it (Tshombe and Molokwane 2022). Beyond the technological leap towards more security and protection of the identity it represents, securing civil status allows Cameroon to open the door to a trusted digital economy on which it can lean. It thus contributes to the country’s economic and social development and competitiveness for a greater national and international influence. If Cameroon shows its determination to computerise and secure data and documents relating to civil identity—particularly in the fight against documentary fraud and identity theft—it is because it is fully aware of the importance of persons’ identification. It is the foundation of a society that recognises in its individuals the value due to them. In addition, countries that make this choice of modernity for their national documents demonstrate to the rest of the world that they are modern, secure, and trustworthy states, capable of implementing new technologies and standards, and open to trade. Finally, secure identity technology, which can be used between countries (interoperability), is important because it promotes regional integration and stability and makes economic development more likely (Diagana 2019). Public policies are a central facet of government activity, whether to distribute income, collect taxes, conduct foreign policy, ensure the security of citizens, encourage companies to change their strategies, regulate administrative action, or communicate on government action. By analysing how government interventions unfold at the local, national, and

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international levels, the analysis of public policies offers a renewed and realistic vision of state action in modern societies. The identification policies are also the training policies of the Cameroonian State through a technology of mastery of the national population in all its ramifications. The material devices of identification are a central vector of state processes of nation formation and centralisation of power to include, exclude, or control individuals. This is a factor in the emergence of new moral and political subjectivities based on multiple and varied uses built on the possession of an identity document (Awenengo et al. 2021, p. 31). Making a public policy by the police remains in the order of maintaining order, the biometrisation of identity constituting an instrument of public security. The public authorities thus have a means of knowing who a citizen is and who is not. Such an initiative contributes to constructing a sense of belonging to format civic civility.

References Ait-Hatrit, Said. 2020. Biometric Identification a Coveted African Market. https://www.theafricareport.com/30838. Consult on 04 July 2021. Alterman, Anton. 2003. ‘A Piece of Yourself’: Ethical Issues in Biometric Identification. Ethics and Information Technology, N° 5, pp 139-150. Amougou Mbarga, Alphonse Bernard. 2016. Le passage à la biométrie au Cameroun; analyse des enjeux, des logiques et de la portée politique d’une technologie électorale, pp 69-92, in Onana, Janvier, dir. Leçons sur le changement politique en Afrique subsaharienne: regards croisés sur le Cameroun. Paris: OMUPAC/L’Harmattan. Arigbabu, Olasimbo Ayodeji, Syed Ahmad Sharifah Mumtazah, Wan Azizun Wan Adnan and Salman Yusso. 2015. Integration of Multiple Soft Biometrics for Human Identification. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2015.07.014. Consult on 11 September 2019. Awenengo, Dalberto S., and Richard Banégas. 2018. Citoyens de papier: des écritures bureaucratiques de soi en Afrique. Genèses 3 (112): 3–11. Awenengo, Dalberto S., et al. 2021. African Citizenships–A Biometric Turn? In Identification and Citizenship in Africa. Biometrics, The Documentary State and Bureaucratic Writing of the self, ed. Dalberto Awenengo and Séverine and Banégas, Richard., 29–48. London: Routledge. BiometricUpdate.com. 2022. Cameroon Seeks Escape from Its Biometric National ID Card Woes. https://www.biometricupdate.com/202203/cameroon-­seeks-­ escape-­from-­its-­biometric-­national-­id-­card-­woes. Consult on 08 March 2022.

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on Modern Data Mining Methods, ed. Bilan Stepan, Mohammed Elhoseny, and Jude D.  Hemanth, 1–17, Cham: Springer Nature. https://doi. org/10.1007/978-­3-­030-­48378-­4. Szuba, Tom. 1998. Safeguarding Your Technology. Practical Guidelines for Electronic Education Information Security. Washington, DC: NCES Publishing. https://nces.ed.gov/98297. Thales. 2021. Digital Dividends: The Positive Effects of Digital Identity. https:// www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-­identity-­and-­security/government/inspired/digital-­dividends. Consult on 12 October 2021. Toesland, Finbarr. 2021. African Countries Embracing Biometrics, Digital IDs. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/february-­2021. Consult on 15 April 2021. Torfing, Jacob. 2009. Rethinking Path Dependence in Public Policy Research. Critical Policy Studies 3 (1): 70–83. https://doi. org/10.1080/19460170903158149. Tshombe, Lukamba M., and Thekiso Molokwane. 2022. Public Policymaking in Africa. In The Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 179–190. London: Routledge. World Bank Group. 2021. Principles on Identification for Sustainable Development: Toward the Digital Age (English). Washington, DC. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/213581486378184357/Principles-­on-­identification-­ for-­sustainable-­development-­toward-­the-­digital-­age. Consult on 12 October 2021.

CHAPTER 6

Digital Participatory Budgeting and Policymaking in Botswana Emmanuel Botlhale

Introduction Digital public participation or civic engagement has become a critical determinant in how governments intervene in societal problems or respond to policy problems in modern times. Different policy actors use digital participation to evaluate or monitor policy performance. Recent studies like Afrobarometer and the World Bank’s surveys have shown increased civic engagement in Africa and other developing countries aimed at shaping policy inputs and outputs through CivicTechs and related digital avenues. The World Bank study in Cameroon, Kenya, Uganda and Brazil to design a practical guide for evaluating digital citizen engagement in 2016 showed how different non-state and state actors have positively leveraged digital participation in the public budget process. The Centre d’Appel Citoyen et TIC (TIC-GOUV) in Cameroon can be used as an

E. Botlhale (*) Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_6

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example. TIC-GOUV is a participatory budgeting platform that uses social media and Short Message Services (SMS) technology to improve public participation in budgeting decisions. Thus, despite some enduring challenges touching on socio-economic and political aspects of governance, Digital Civic Engagement (DCE) in public budgeting is finding ripe grounds in Africa, as already covered by different chapters in this collection. This can be linked to the expanding democratic space, which has allowed more Africans to assert their agency on how they are being governed (Onyango and Hyden 2021). An Afrobarometer survey based on 45,832 face-to-face interviews in 34 countries between 2016 and 2018 found that African citizens were raising their voices against their governments’ poor performance. During the period under audit by Afrobarometer and even recently, protesters took to ‘the streets to demand democracy in Eswatini and to show their opposition to anti-democratic power grabs in Tunisia and Sudan. Since April 2017, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has recorded more than 70 episodes in 35 African countries of protests focused on issues ranging from police brutality and presidential third-term attempts to COVID-19 restrictions’ (Afrobarometer analysis by Logan et al. December 2021).1 In this chapter, we focus on public budgeting, a core policymaking arena, to further understand how the state in Africa leverages and can improve digital engagements or participation in governing processes. The discussion aims to identify key considerations for implementing e-­ budgeting that can apply to African countries like Botswana with relatively higher digital publics. Undoubtedly, public budgeting is one policy area that has also recently featured an increased uptake of digital policy tools. The public budget remains an essential public policymaking exercise that decides who eats and does not. Therefore, it calls for maximum feasible involvement by citizens and concerned policy actors to attend this exercise. It is here where e-budgeting, which leverages the integration of Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) tools, may come in. This chapter shows how ICT can enhance budget participation through e-budgeting in Botswana. It demonstrates how e-budgeting enables ideals such as Open Data and Big Data besides budget participation and improves budget transparency, efficiency and effectiveness.

1  https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/when-africans-speak-out-are-their-governmentslistening/

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Based on the ‘basics first’ approach, the chapter argues that e-­budgeting can enhance budget participation and engender the 3Es of management (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). However, basics (fundamentals or firsts) must be in place before rolling out e-budgeting. In the end, the general lesson for Africa ensuing from this case is the need to graft the e-budgeting system on basics (fundamentals or firsts). It concludes that the utilisation of e-budgeting can improve the present budgetary systems. A discussion of e-budgeting takes on different components—human resource issues, institutional designs and governance objectives as core dimensions of GovTech solutions (see Bharosa 2022). Also, challenges confronting effective e-budgeting relate to those of public procurement, which tend to revolve around what Snow (1959) noted long ago: technology and policymaking inhabit two separate spaces. While this is so, there are points of convergence because technology is used to better policy. Policy benefits from many and varied benefits that technology confers to policymaking. Policymaking is wide and broad, so this chapter focuses on public budgeting as part of a policy process in designing political action or government interventions in societal problems. Oft understood as a document containing words and figures proposing expenditures for certain items and purposes of public interest (Wildavsky 1984, p. 1), the public budget consists of two components: (i) purchases and (ii) transfers (Mikesell 2011). The government uses the budget to allocate resources to programmes and projects to achieve its priorities (see Axelrod 1995; Mikesell 2011). The overarching objective of a public budget is to express the government’s revenue and spending priorities in a given year (Rubin and Bartle 2005). Budgeting is central to what governments do, and, in this regard, Hyde (2002, p. 1) emphasises its centrality, stating that ‘budgeting is the single most important decision-making process in any governmental organisation’. The budget process provides the medium for determining what government services will be provided and how they will be financed (Mikesell 2011, p. 41). Given the fact that a budget is a key political allocation tool that decides the all-important question, ‘who gets what?’, it is important that the process should be democratic (Botlhale 2010, p. 85). Budgeting should embody and engender critical policy values of accountability, transparency, responsibility and responsiveness of the government, which have recently become the domain of leveraging digital tools, as other chapters in this volume variedly demonstrate.

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Thus, it is a matter of undisputed logic that the budgetary process, particularly its formative stages, must be as democratic as possible, chiefly through popular participation (Botlhale 2013, p. 718), including the integration of the growing digital public space of public policy. Popular participation in the public budgetary process, from formulation, approval, execution, audit, and review, is called participatory budgeting. Participatory budgeting is the process by which citizens deliberate and negotiate the distribution of public resources (Warner 2017). It is impossible in the twenty-first century to fulfil these deliberations and negotiations without adopting appropriate digital public spaces. Studies on participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in South Brazil, where it originated in 1989, and elsewhere have shown that it is more likely to integrate different sections in policy decisions (e.g., Warner 2017). Since these findings, budget practitioners and academics have advanced participatory budgeting as an essential global tool for inclusive and accountable governance (Islam 2007, p. xv). This chapter focuses on the e-democracy components of budgeting, that is, e-budgeting in Botswana (EPB). According to Macintosh (2004, p. 1), e-democracy is “the use of ICT to support the democratic decision-making processes” and strengthen representative democracy’ (p. 2). The proceeding discussion will be structured as follows: Sect. 2 unpacks the concept of participation in the context of public budgeting. Section 3 delves into digital public budgeting (DPB) and its operationalisation, including implementation challenges in Botswana. Section 4 concludes this chapter.

Participation in the Budgetary Process Public participation involves people in a problem-solving or decision-­ making process that may interest or affect them (Horntvedt 2021). In this way, public participation is a fundamental element of democratic citizenship (Baum 2015). It involves those who may be affected by or interested in a decision through formal or informal channels (Lee and Sun 2018, p. 40). Its purpose is to enable participants to partake in public issues, be heard and affect the outcome (Lee and Sun 2018). The notion of citizens’ participation can be traced to four main sources: (1) classical democratic theory, notably the work of Rousseau (see, e.g., Held 1992; Pateman 2000); (2) Feminist theory (see Mouffe 1993; Phillips 1991; Young 2002); (3) development discourse (see, e.g., Fung and Wright 2011;

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Gaventa 2002); and (4) World Bank and International Monetary Fund (see, e.g., IMF 2007; World Bank 1999). Participation is actualised through many fora, for example, (1) deliberative forums, (2) surveys, (3) referendums and (4) participatory policymaking projects (Michels 2011). In all, public participation is a process, not a single event. For participatory processes to beget benefits, there is a need for a proper design—an issue that most governments, especially those in Africa, wrestle with. For example, there is no ideal solution to the conflict between the legitimate demand for public participation, the need for technical and economic rationality and the necessity for assuring accountability and responsibility of decision-making bodies (Webler et  al. 1993, p.  189). Again, most government agencies in Africa have no clear policies on public participation, hence, the gaps on who and how to effectively achieve public participation (Onyango and Hyden 2021). However, to address this, Cost-Benefit Analysis has become the most preferred model for designing the need for public participation in policymaking. Cost-Benefit Analysis is a policy assessment method that quantifies in monetary terms the value of all policy consequences to all members of society (Boardman et  al. 2001, p.  2). CBA is based on Net Social Benefits (NSBs), which is equal to Social Benefits (SB) minus Social Costs (SS). If the NSBs are positive, meaning that Social Benefits are greater than Social Costs, the intended course of action, such as a policy or programme, can be embarked upon. Thus, as per CBA, participation’s NSB is greater than 1. Like other societal processes, the budgetary process can benefit from citizen participation. In this case, the benefits associated with general citizen participation (e.g., see Arnstein 1969; Åström 2019; Baum 2015; Follett 1920; Horntvedt 2021; Roberts 2004) are applicable in the budgetary process. Similarly, costs associated with general citizen participation (e.g., see Barber 1984; Cupps 1977; Follett 1920; Hart 1972; King and Stivers 1998; Kweit and Kweit 1981; Pateman 2000; Stivers 1990) similarly attend to the budgetary process. However, the same CBA principle is applied in the budgetary process with the result that the Social Net Benefits of participatory budgeting are positive (or NSB > 1). Popular participation in the public budgetary process, from formulation, approval, execution, audit, and review, is called participatory budgeting (PB).

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There is no single definition of participatory budgeting (UN Habitat 2008, p. 3). Thus, the definition is contingent on PB’s local context and conditions (UN Habitat 2008). PB is ‘a set of structured methods to involve citizens in allocating the public budget’ (Bartocci 2018, p. 35). The Brazilian Workers’ Party developed the concept and practice of PB in the 1980s. However, the genesis of PB is traced to Porto Alegre. The city inaugurated PB in 1989 and quickly spread from Brazil to other Latin American countries and European cities in the 1990s (Warner 2017). Budget practitioners and academics have advanced participatory budgeting as an important tool for inclusive and accountable governance. It has been implemented in various forms in many developing countries around the globe (Islam 2007, p. xv). Participatory budgeting represents a direct-­ democracy approach to budgeting (Shah 2007, p. 1). Since its inception in Brazil in the late 1980s, participatory budgeting has been instituted in over 1500 cities worldwide (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012, p. i). There are conducive conditions for the successful operation of PB. In this regard, Wampler (2007, p. 24) argues that A combination of four factors makes it more likely that participatory budgeting programs will be adopted: strong mayoral support, a civil society willing and able to contribute to ongoing policy debates, a generally supportive political environment that insulates participatory budgeting from legislators’ attacks, and financial resources to fund the projects selected by citizens.

While PB originates in Latin America and Europe, Africa has not missed the boat. Thus, in Africa, PB is increasingly used to mainstream the citizens’ voices into budgetary processes and deliver public goods and services (UN Habitat 2008). A gradual but uninterrupted growth dynamic has characterised the spreading of participatory budgeting in the African continent (Atlas 2019). Madagascar has the largest number of PB processes, 270, thus representing 28% of the total number of PB processes in the region of the planet (Atlas 2019). Notably, Botswana has zero PB processes. While the case for PB is readily saleable because it democratises the budgetary space, the traditional budgeting system is ill-suited for PB. Thus, there is a case for e-budgeting because it is amenable to PB and, naturally, embeds critical public values beyond those captured in a policy design, which may have been hinged on different values.

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Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) It is deducible from various assessments, mainly Open Budget Surveys (see IBP 2019a), that there are PB issues. In an ideal world, there must be a feasibly maximum PB. The World Bank points out heightened cases of budgeting deficits during the COVID-19 pandemic characterised by vulnerability. While vulnerability, manifesting as abject poverty, pre-dated the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is every reason to believe that the pandemic will exacerbate the poverty situation in developing countries. Hence, there will be new and deepened poverty due to COVID-19 (Lenhardt 2020). COVID-19 will accentuate the concentration of poverty in Africa (Kharas and Dooley 2021, p. 5). It is forecast that by 2030, the nine countries experiencing extreme poverty will be in Africa (Kharas and Dooley 2021). The effects of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have reversed much of the progress in reducing poverty, with extreme global poverty rising in 2020 for the first time since the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s (UN 2021, p. 26). Also, health budgeting is crucial to procuring COVID-19 vaccines. Unfortunately, COVID-19 happened when sub-Saharan African economies were battling the effects of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis and the 2014–2015 commodity price shock. Thus, the pandemic outbreak meant a further squeeze on a reduced fiscal envelope. This makes it increasingly important to change the public budgeting architecture to advance PB’s contours. In addition, COVID-19 means a constraint on physical meetings whereby the community can partake in the budgetary process. Thus, there is a need to use alternative non-physical fora such as e-budgeting. Technology is harnessed to actualise PB in the form of e-budgeting (e.g., see Coleman and Sampaio 2017; Cunha et al. 2011). On a related note, technology is used in inter-related Es: e-participation, e-democracy and e-government. The term ‘e-budgeting’ addresses any ICT application or tool for budgetary functions, procedures or services across the budgetary cycle (planning, programming, budgeting, appropriations, control and evaluation of financial resources; European Parliament Think Tank 2015, p. 3). E-budgeting occurs at three different levels: (i) digitalisation of budgetary procedures; (ii) the diffusion of budgetary information to the public in an open format (open data) and (iii) the use of complex databases of budgetary information to inform policymaking (big data) (European Parliament Think Tank 2015). The digitalisation of budgetary procedures

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is done by establishing Financial Management and Information Systems (FMIS). FMIS support the automation and integration of public financial management processes, including budget formulation, execution (e.g., commitment control, cash/debt management, treasury operations), accounting and reporting (World Bank 2020). E-budgeting enables organisations to have accurate and automatic budgets, predictions and estimates (Mahajan et al. 2014). Also, it confers flexibility because the budget can be accessed 24/7 from anywhere in the world. E-budgeting is associated with many benefits (European Parliament Think Tank 2015; Mahajan et al. 2014). Some of the benefits are transparency (Bolívar et  al. 2015); cost savings and reduction of administrative burdens (European Parliament Think Tank 2015); and flexibility, accessibility, security, diversity, strategic planning tool, contingency and citizen participation (Mahajan et  al. 2014). Regarding citizen participation, Mahajan et al. (2014, p. 117) state that Budget proposals can be put on the web for voting of citizens to decide by getting opinion polls. This would give the citizens immense power and an advantage over the Chief Executive Officer or Finance Minister (as the case may be) to formulate the budget.

The use of digital technologies was pioneered by the municipality of Ipatimga, Brazil, in 2001. The city allowed dwellers to use digital platforms to vote for projects. The practice was later used by other Brazilian cities, for example, the Rio Grande do Sul (in 2003) and the municipality of Belo Horizonte (in 2006). The practice diffused out to cities such as Paris, New York City, Lisbon, Madrid, Mexico City, La Plata (Argentina), Cascais (Portugal) and district/city governments in Indonesia (e.g., see Gamayuni 2020). There are well-documented case studies on e-­budgeting, for example, Belo Horizonte (the capital city of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais); Gütersloh (a city in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany); the city of Cologne; and city of Freiburg that used the SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities and Probable Threats) tool (Rahman and Tewari 2014). Despite the celebrated Belo Horizonte case (e.g., Peixoto 2009), other cases like Rueil-Malmaison and Madrid exist. The French commune of Rueil-Malmaison (78,152 inhabitants), in the west suburbs of Paris, launched itse-­participation platform in 2018 to give citizens a voice in the decision-making process (Pastor 2020). The digital engagement platform enables a wide-scale participatory budget in the city (Pastor 2020).

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Decide Madrid (DM) is the first e-participation platform that allows citizens, associations, NGOs and companies to be involved in the policy cycle in Madrid municipality (Pina et al. 2019). The project was launched in 2015 and allows the citizens to make proposals, vote in citizen consultations, propose participatory budget projects, decide on municipal regulations and open debates to exchange opinions with others (Pina et  al. 2019). Notably, the DM project was awarded the 2018 United Nations Public Service Award in the category “Making institutions inclusive and ensuring participation in decision-making”. Bringing it back to sub-­ Saharan Africa, there are no e-budgeting case studies to draw from. The same is true of Botswana because there is no e-budgeting; thus, this chapter argues the need for the same in Botswana.

The Case of Public Budgeting in Botswana The Legal-Institutional Framework The legal-institutional framework of budgeting in Botswana comprises the Constitution of Botswana (CHAPTER VIII; Finance, sec. 117–124) (Republic of Botswana 1997) and the Public Finance Management Act (2011b) (Republic of Botswana 2011b). This is an Act to make provision for the control and management of public money, public supplies and matters connected in addition to that and incidental (Republic of Botswana 2012). Section 119 (1) of the Constitution on the Authorisation of Expenditure states that The Minister, for the time being, responsible for finance, shall cause to be prepared and laid before the National Assembly, before or not later than 30 days after the commencement of each financial year, estimates of the revenues and expenditure of Botswana for that year.

Section 119, Authorisation of Expenditure, does not make a provision for PB.  Thus, there was no space for PB in Botswana (see Phirinyane 2005). However, change came via the budget pitso (an opinion-gathering forum). The budget pitso was introduced in October 2010 after successful lobbying and advocacy by non-state actors, particularly the Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organisations (Botlhale 2013). In this regard, the then Minister of Finance and Development Planning announced that his Ministry intended to hold an inaugural general

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stakeholders’ budget pitso in October and another in November for MPs (GabzFM 2010). Thus, the budget pitso was an attempt to actualise PB in Botswana. The budget pitso has not been subjected to empirical scrutiny save Botlhale (2013). Botlhale (2013, p. 717) asks, ‘are pitso enough to enhance budgetary participation?’ and concludes that ‘relying on both primary and secondary sources, the answer is in the negative’. He further stated that ‘even though the pitso can enhance participation, there is a need for thoroughgoing reforms, for example, a Budget Act and a strong Parliament, to complement them’. Open Budget Surveys (OBS) are also used to assess the openness of Botswana’s budgetary system. The Open Budget Survey was launched in 2006 in response to the demand for better access to government budget information from civil society, international organisations, and others (IBP 2019a, p.18). Originally, the OBS assessment only included budget transparency, but, subsequently, two additional areas were added: (i) public participation and (ii) oversight (IBP 2019a). Public participation empowers citizens to use budget information to contribute to deliberations on policy priorities and, ultimately, decisions (IBP 2019a, p. 18). For PB to happen, budgets must be open to all stakeholders. Therefore, open budgets are transparent and offer opportunities for inclusive public participation and well-functioning oversight by independent institutions (IBP 2019a, p.  18). The OBS also assesses the formal opportunities offered to the public for meaningful participation in the different stages of the budget process (IBP 2019b). It uses 18 equally weighted indicators aligned with the Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency’s Principles of Public Participation in Fiscal Policies (IBP 2019b). The scores range from 0 to 100. In 2019, Botswana had a public participation score of 9 out of 100 (IBP 2019b). The extent of opportunities for public participation in the budgetary process in 2019 is shown in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1  The extent of opportunities for public participation in the budget process

Variable Formulation Approval Implementation Audit Source: IBP (2019b).

Score/100 20 0 0 0

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20

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20

18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

0 Formulation

Approval

0 Implementation

0 Audit

Fig. 6.1  Extent of opportunities for participation in the budget process (2019). (Source: Author, based on data from IBP 2019b)

Like Table 6.1, Fig. 6.1 below shows that there were few opportunities for citizens to participate in the budgetary process, from budget formulation to audit and review, in 2019. The scores are presented in Fig. 6.1. Consequently, the OBS 2019 offered recommendations. These were: 1. Botswana’s Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. … should also prioritise the following actions: Pilot mechanisms to monitor budget implementation. Expand mechanisms during budget formulation that engage any civil society organisation or member of the public wishing to participate, and provide feedback systems that communicate to the public how inputs were used. Actively engage with vulnerable and underrepresented communities, directly or through civil society organisations representing them. 2.  Botswana’s National Assembly should prioritise the following actions: Allow members of the public or civil society organisations to testify during its hearings on the budget proposal prior to its approval. Allow members of the public or civil society organisations to testify during its hearings on the Audit Report.

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3. Botswana’s Office of the Auditor-General should prioritise the following actions to improve public participation in the budget process: Establish formal mechanisms for the public to assist in developing its audit program and contribute to relevant audit investigations. (IBP 2019b, p. 7) Notably, pre-2019 Botswana’s OBS scores painted a similar picture; limited opportunities for the public to engage in the budgetary process. For example, in OBS 2017, Botswana scored 15 out of 100, thus, meaning that ‘Botswana provides few opportunities for the public to engage in the budget process’ (IBP 2017). In OBS 2015, Botswana scored 19 out of 100 (IBP 2015). A score of 19/100 falls within the 0–40 range, which denotes few opportunities for citizens to participate in the budgetary process. In OBS 2012, Botswana scored 19 out of 100 (IBP 2012). Notably, the score for public participation was the same in 2012 and 2015; both depict limited opportunities for the public to engage in the budgetary process. As demonstrated in Column Chart 2, in Fig.  6.2 below public participation scores have deteriorated since 2012. From IBP (2012, 2015, 2017, 2019a, b) there are PB issues in Botswana. Botswana had a public participation score of 6 (out of 100 in 2021; IBP 2021). Notably, the score was only slightly better than

Fig. 6.2  Botswana’s public budget participation scores 2012–2019. (Source: Author, based on data from IBP 2019b)

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Eswatini (2%), Lesotho (2%) and Namibia (0%). Similarly, the extent of opportunities for public participation in the budget process was poorly rated: formulation (20/100), approval (0%), implementation (0%) and audit (0%). Notably, Botswana uses the traditional budgeting system, which is not amenable to PB. Hence, there is a need to explore alternatives such as Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting). It must be stated that this chapter is not saying that Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) is the fabled silver bullet that would solve all public budgetary issues in Botswana. Admittedly, e-­ Participatory budgeting has challenges, for example, the management of information, guidance and deliberation and the usability of the platform (Lund and Juujärvi 2018) and online security (Ritchie 2016). However, on a balance of probabilities, the benefits outweigh the costs, hence, the use of e-budgeting. The next section proposes ways in which e-budgeting can be implemented in Botswana. Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) in Botswana Implementing Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) must follow the first basics approach in the tradition of Schick’s (1998) ‘basics first’ and Schick’s 2012‘s Basics First is Best Practice!’ approaches. The ‘basics first’ approach argues that basics must be attended to before worrying about ‘beyond the basics’ issues. While Schick’s (1998) ‘basics first’ approach pertains to Public Financial Management reforms, it is equally applicable to other public sector reforms such as budget reforms (e.g., Digital Participatory Budgeting [e-Participatory budgeting]). Similarly, the ‘Basics First is Best Practice!’ approach argues that countries that lack capacity must develop capacity before worrying about adopting best practices (which are not normally homegrown). In this regard, Schick (2012) gives examples of Singapore and Korea, which attended to basics (or fundamentals) in building capacity, which they lacked before adopting best practices in Public Financial Management reforms. Based on Schick (1998, 2012), this chapter argues that Botswana must attend to basics (or fundamentals) to ensure the successful implementation of Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting). Notably, basics (or fundamentals) are non-negotiable. That is, they are firsts. Therefore, they must happen first, as counselled by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (popularly known as Mahatma Gandhi). Making a

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case for the importance of basics (or fundamentals, or firsts), Gandhi said that ‘all compromise is based on give and take, but there can be no give and take on fundamentals and that ‘any compromise on mere fundamentals is a surrender’ (quoted in Blowers 2019). Taking a leaf from Gandhi’s exhortations, budgetary fundamentals or firsts are not negotiable. Notably, it is not feasible to cover all basics (or fundamentals or firsts) that must attend to the successful implementation of Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting). Therefore, only a few will be proposed. Appetite for budget reform; adopting Digital Participatory Budgeting is a significant reform endeavour that must be preceded by buy-in from the highest political office in the land (President or Prime Minister). Without buy-in, reforms die at worst or have minimal effect at best. Therefore, there is a need to cultivate and nurture the appetite for budget reform from the highest political office in the land. Once there is sufficient buy-in from the top, the same can cascade to lower levels, including the Ministry of Finance & Economic Development staff. Besides state actors, non-state actors, chiefly citizens and NGOs (to mobilise citizens), must be educated on the benefits of Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting). Notably, non-state actors, particularly the Botswana Council of Non-­Governmental Organisations (BOCONGO), often decry very low levels of PB in Botswana. Hence, it is plausible to hope that they have a latent appetite for budget reform which only needs to be grown, nurtured and maintained by the Ministry of Finance & Economic Development. At the same time, budget reform must be twinned with the Public Finance Management Reform (PFMR) programme that was inaugurated in 2010. The PFM Reform Programme aims to strengthen financial management systems to support fiscal discipline, strategic allocation of resources, effective and efficient service delivery and accountability (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning 2010, p. 1). Therefore, there is a need to forge synergetic links between the PFMR programme and e-budgeting. E-government platform; the successful adoption and implementation of Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) is largely contingent upon a well-functioning e-government platform. The Government of Botswana has spent billions of Pula since the inception of the e-­ government project in 2012 (Samboma 2019, p. 1). The legal-­institutional framework that underpins the e-government project is the National e-Government Strategy (2011–2016) (Republic of Botswana 2011a). There is the Botswana e-Government Master Plan (2015–2021) (Republic

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of Botswana 2015) to operationalise the e-Government Strategy. Despite the enthusiasm to found or establish an e-government platform and associated achievements, such as technological readiness, further strengthening the country’s path to adopting ICTs in its governance process (Phirinyane 2016, p. 1), some challenges remain. Examples are low levels of Internet penetration, telecommunications infrastructure constraints and lack of citizen awareness and participation (Nkwe 2012), and electricity and Internet challenges (Samboma 2019). This means that there are serious issues with the e-government project. Notably, the foregoing are commonplace e-government issues (e.g., see Shackleton and Dawson 2007) but are, nonetheless, resolvable. This, therefore, means that the said e-government problems must be resolved to have a well-functioning e-government platform in Botswana. Once the platform is up to standard, the Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting) framework will be grafted onto the former. Bridging the digital divide; Botswana, like other countries in sub-­ Saharan Africa, has a digital divide problem. The term ‘“digital divide’” refers to the gap between individuals, households, businesses and geographic areas at different socio-economic levels concerning both their opportunities to access information and communication technologies (ICTs) and to their use of the Internet for a wide variety of activities (OECD 2021). Botswana had a population of 2.37 million in January 2021, with 1.12 million Internet users (Kemp 2021). The number of Internet users in Botswana increased by 22,000 (+2.0%) between 2020 and 2021, and Internet penetration in Botswana stood at 47.0% in January 2021 (Kemp 2021). Despite these statistics, there are digital divide issues. Access to digital skills and affordable and quality Internet connectivity remains unevenly distributed in Botswana (Mudongo 2021, p. 1), with a Digital Access Value (DAI) of 0.43. Thus, the digital divide offends the ethic of equal access to the digital space as intended by the Communications Regulatory Authority Act (see Republic of Botswana 2012). It also offends the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms. Regarding Internet access and affordable access to the Internet, the Declaration states that ‘the internet should be available and affordable to all persons in Africa without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or another opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or another status’ (African Declaration Group 2014, p. 10). Therefore, there is a need to bridge the digital divide in Botswana to allow the feasibly maximum

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number of citizens to partake in e-budgeting. In a related vein, there are indications that the digital divide has a gender face in Botswana (Mudongo 2021). This should not be surprising because vulnerability, mainly manifesting as poverty, has a gender face in Botswana (e.g., see Botlhale 2011, 2014; Statistics Botswana 2013, 2016). Hence, a disproportionate number of women are excluded from the digital space. Hence, to ensure gender equity in e-budgeting participation, there is a need for gender awareness and gender responsiveness in the digital space. Amongst others, addressing the digital divide will entail amending the Communications Regulatory Authority Act (2012), ICT Policy (2007) and the Broadband National Strategy (2018). In addition, there is a need to address issues related to very slow and expensive Internet connectivity in Botswana. In relative terms, Internet charges in Botswana are expensive despite the government’s efforts to make Internet charges affordable. This latter effort has been through access to international bandwidth, such as the undersea cables of the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System (EAssy) and West Africa Cable System (WACS) (e.g., see Sunday Standard 2015). Thus, slow and expensive Internet connectivity militates against the effective use of e-­ government. In particular, slow Internet does violence to the Botswana Communications Regulatory Authority’s (BOCRA) pledge that ‘Botswana aspires for every Motswana to have at least 2 Mbps Internet connection to the household’ (BOCRA 2021). Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS); the digitalisation of budgetary procedures is best done by establishing a Financial Management and Information Systems (European Parliament Think Tank 2015). IFMIS support the automation and integration of public financial management processes, including budget formulation, execution (e.g. commitment control, cash/debt management, treasury operations), accounting and reporting (World Bank 2020). In this regard, even though Botswana inaugurated the Public Finance Management Reform programme in 2010, this is not predicated on any IFMIS architecture. Therefore, there is a need to found or establish an IFMIS so that Digital Participatory Budgeting can be grafted on the same. In addition, a Spatial Decision Support System, which uses a Geographic Information System, is best effected under a budgetary system based on an IFMIS. Hence, the establishment of an IFMIS is imperative.

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Conclusion While there are many budget reforms, the omnipresent one is Digital Participatory Budgeting (e-Participatory budgeting or e-budgeting). This chapter has shown how e-budgeting confers many benefits that include, but are not limited to, enhanced budget participation and engendering the 3Es of management (efficiency, effectiveness and economy). COVID-19, although a global pandemic, offers countries, particularly in Africa with pockets of low budget participation, the opportunity to use innovative tools like e-budgeting to improve budget processes. Steeped in the ‘basics first’ approach, the overarching aim of this chapter was to argue the case for e-budgeting in Botswana. Given Botswana’s low budget participation scores and rankings since the inaugural Open Budget Survey in 2006, it concluded that it could better budget processes by adopting e-budgeting. E-budgeting is not the fabled silver bullet. Therefore, there is a need to ensure the presence of basics (or fundamentals or firsts) before rolling out the e-budgeting system in Botswana. The general lesson for Africa from the Botswana case is the need to graft the e-budgeting system on basics (or fundamentals or firsts). Doing so will ensure the success of e-budgeting.

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PART II

Technologies as Avenues for Nurturing Policy Entrepreneurship and Performance

CHAPTER 7

The Digital Economy and Youth Employment in Africa Laura Barasa and Joy M. Kiiru

Introduction Africa has one of the largest youth populations in the world, with a median age of about 20 years. Sixty per cent of Africa’s population falls under 25 years (Rocca and Schultes 2020). While a sizeable youthful population provides an ample and energetic workforce, youth unemployment remains rife. In 2015, one-third of about 420 million youth aged between 15 and 35 years were unemployed, another one-third worked in vulnerable jobs, and one-sixth were in wage employment. In addition, most African youth work informally, are underemployed, and remain in poverty due to low wages and the lack of social safety nets. Moreover, about 12 million youth enter the workforce annually, while the economy only creates about 3 million formal jobs (African Development Bank 2016). This situation provides the context for understanding youth

L. Barasa (*) • J. M. Kiiru Department of Economics and Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_7

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unemployment, the digital transformation, and how African governments and youth have harnessed digital technologies. There has been an increase in the access and use of digital technologies, leading to a boom in African countries’ services sector. Services once non-tradable are now digitally tradable, leading to employment creation (Ndubuisi et al. 2021). In addition, high-speed broadband Internet in Africa is positively associated with employment creation through the increased firm entry, productivity, and exporting (Hjort and Poulsen 2019). Similar findings are reported in France, where high-speed broadband networks are causally associated with entrepreneurial activity, including creating new businesses and sole proprietorships (Hasbi 2020). Overall, improvements in the information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and mobile, online, and Internet-based digital technologies have transformed traditional jobs in Africa and created a digital economy, which provides a sustainable pathway out of poverty. This has resulted in new forms of work offering digital employment opportunities. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of the digital economy. Its broad definition focuses on sectors relying on the Internet or mobile technology-enabled communications and networks. The narrow and standard definition of a digital economy relates to the proportion of information and communications technology (ICT) in the gross domestic product (GDP). Nevertheless, digital employment is not limited to the IT industry but includes jobs where ICTs enable job seekers to find and engage in paid work online. It, therefore, comprises all jobs in the IT sector and digital jobs in the non-digital sector. Digital jobs include jobs created through the application of ICTs to new or existing activities or processes. They include short-term or permanent jobs that deliver goods and services using ICTs. Digital jobs consist of the performance of information-based tasks that build capacity for future work and fall into five categories (The Rockefeller Foundation 2013). The first category comprises jobs created in the ICT industry, including IT and business process outsourcing, broadband infrastructure development, and mobile, software, and hardware companies. These include system administrators, programmers, web developers, and call centre operators. The second category encompasses ICT-enabled jobs across different sectors such as education, agriculture, healthcare, manufacturing, and retail. These include billing and stock control in retail, mobile payments and e-banking in financial services, and claims and diagnostic management in the health sector. The third category includes

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online jobs. These are virtual jobs found online, performed online, and paid online. They include microwork, the gaming industry, and paid crowdsourcing that typically tend to be supplemental, with work coming from the government, small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and government. The fourth category includes jobs created through online platforms through e-commerce platforms, for example, Jumia, eBay, and Alibaba, and educational platforms for instructors, for example, Udemy and Skillshare. Again, the emergence of the sharing economy where users earn income by sharing their time and skills and lending and sharing resources such as cars, for example, Uber and Lyft, peer-to-peer accommodation, for example, Airbnb, and task and delivery assignments, for example, TaskRabbit. The fifth category includes jobs created by digital entrepreneurs using publicly available Big Data from government and industry. In addition, decreasing costs of microcomputers and digital fabrication machines, for example, laser cutters, Arduino and Raspberry Pi, and 3D printers, increases the likelihood of finding jobs for individuals with sales, design, and programming skills. Youth can also access free online training offered by tech hubs in Africa. In addition, crowdfunding platforms such as Kickstarter, Indiegogo, and Goteo offer initial start-up capital for small and growing businesses. In sum, the digital transformation in Africa involving the rapid adoption of digital technologies may foster youth employment through several channels. First, it can provide direct employment through the creation of digital start-ups. Second, digital transformation creates indirect jobs by fostering the integration of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and informal workers into regional and global value chains. Third, digital transformation has led to innovative financial technologies that provide innovative financing solutions to SMEs. Lastly, digital transformation provides means by which youth can develop and align their skills to the market needs. However, the private-public partnership is vital in enabling these channels (African Union Commission [AUC] and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2021). The next section describes youth employment opportunities in a digital economy. This is followed by a section discussing the implications of the digital divide on youth employment. Case studies of digital youth employment programmes in various African countries, including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, are considered in the next section. The chapter

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ends by highlighting the role of public-private partnerships (PPP) in fostering digital youth employment.

Digital Opportunities and Youth Employment Impact sourcing, online work, local content innovation, and e-public goods hold promising digital youth employment opportunities (Dalberg 2022). Impact sourcing builds Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) businesses that target the disadvantaged for employment by identifying individuals capable of carrying out ICT-related jobs. This enables disadvantaged individuals to overcome barriers to accessing digital employment opportunities. Impact sourcing can create decent, stable jobs for youth. Examples of BPOs include Samasource, Daproim, Digital Divide Data, and Invincible Sourcing. Impact sourcing is a national priority in Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa, where BPOs enjoy direct subsidies. Furthermore, Egypt and South Africa subsidise business training costs (Dalberg 2022). The Internet provides a medium by which individuals seeking online work and businesses with employment opportunities connect. Common forms of online work include freelance and microwork jobs. While both types of jobs require access to a laptop or smartphone, freelance jobs demand technical and professional skills and can be short term or long term. However, microwork jobs, for example, data entry, require basic literacy and numeracy skills and are short term. The Internet, coupled with IT solutions, facilitates online work. While these transactions can take place informally, they are increasingly becoming formal. For example, job seekers bidding for work, aggregators providing platforms where service providers and businesses conduct secure transactions based on contracts and ensure that payment is guaranteed, service providers offering quality assurance, and so on. Examples of aggregators and service providers include ELance, Samasource, oDesk, and Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Out of an estimated one million online workers globally, online work is emerging in Africa, with about 22,000 providers in Kenya and 10,000 providers in Nigeria joining global platforms. A growing market for Internet solutions has led to increasing demand for local content innovation, which demands advanced technical skills. Software development, including application development, has recently emerged as a source of digital jobs for youth. Mobile application development, adoption, and use in Africa have grown significantly. In Kenya and Ghana, mPawa—a blue-collar recruitment application—leverages the use

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of mobile devices to match job seekers and recruiters. Microsoft, Google, Nokia, and International Business Machines (IBM) support African local content innovation. Similarly, local media content development, including local music and film, has grown remarkably over the past decade, for example, Egypt’s Arabic film and television production and Nigeria’s Nollywood film industry. Also, distribution platforms such as Living Goods use micro-distribution models to support over 1000 entrepreneurs in delivering health products to rural Uganda and Kenya. Lastly, the adoption of e-public goods in Africa is on the rise. Governments are increasingly using the Internet and mobile-based platforms to provide services. The provision of e-public goods has increased the demand for customer service jobs comprising call centre operators and back-office operators. For example, the digitisation of court records in Kenya and Ghana’s digital governance strategy resulted in short-term digital jobs. The Digital Divide and Its Implications for Youth Employment While the rapid adoption of new and emerging technologies offers potential for job creation, the youth digital divide presents a major obstacle. The digital divide prevents African youth from accessing the Internet and related digital resources. Furthermore, the digital divide occurs between countries in Africa and within countries, posing a major challenge. According to Nielsen (2006), the digital divide consists of three stages: the economic, usability, and empowerment divide. The economic divide relates to the fact that some individuals cannot afford to buy a computer or access the Internet. While hardware prices continue to drop, many can now access digital technologies such as smartphones. However, computers and smartphones might remain out of reach for most youth in developing countries. The usability divide concerns itself with the complexity of technologies. While many individuals can use computers, they do not achieve the full benefits of modern applications due to their complexity. This is particularly true for youth with low-literacy skills. Lastly, the empowerment divide relates to participation inequality, with only about 1% of Internet users accounting for social networks and community systems contributions. Many users do not use the advanced search functions and cannot distinguish paid advertisements from organic search results. More importantly, most users accept the basic default settings of their computer rather than choosing applications suited to their needs. This is likely to be

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the case among disadvantaged African youth who are likely to lack education, knowledge, and skills. In addition, high-potential youth with the ability to learn entry-level ICT skills are generally overlooked in digital employment opportunities. Furthermore, a study in six African countries (i.e. Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa) shows that about 2 million youth enter the labour force annually. However, only about 41,000 digital jobs are created. Thus, apart from youth facing challenges arising from the digital divide, the digital economy faces a gap in the supply and demand for labour that mirrors the broader economy (Dalberg 2022). Case Studies of Digital Youth Employment Programmes in Africa Essentially, the digital divide underscores that the infrastructure and skills gaps and the supply and demand for labour gap emerge as the primary factors exacerbating youth unemployment in Africa (Baah-Boateng 2016; Jayaram et al. 2017). Initiatives such as the Rockefellers Foundation 2013 ‘Digital Jobs Africa’ programme aimed to address these gaps by enhancing youth employability in the digital economy (The Rockefeller Foundation 2013). This seven-year initiative targeted 1 million lives in six African countries: Egypt, Kenya, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. Similarly, in 2019 the African Development Bank and Microsoft partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation launched a ten-year programme titled ‘Coding for Employment’ online digital training platform. Its main objective is to impart basic, intermediate, and advanced digital skills to African youth across the continent. The pilot countries for this initiative include Nigeria, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, and Cote d’Ivoire. Digital youth employment programmes in Africa recognise that digital skills are vital in gaining decent employment and enhancing future employability. These programmes generally focus on three interventions. The first is impact sourcing, which actively targets outsourced jobs to high potential but disadvantaged African youth. This enables job creation by meeting the rising demands of local companies, multinationals, and government. The second involves working with local organisations to impart digital skills suited to the digital jobs market needs. These include transcribing and digitising information, data entry, data analysis, image categorisation, tagging audio and video files, learning Android and iOS platforms, office assistance, and communications and problem-solving. The third intervention concerns creating an enabling environment where government and

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businesses play an active role in supporting digital jobs. The aim is to eliminate the need for philanthropy and promote adopting inclusive business practices. Ultimately, youth employment in Africa generates socioeconomic benefits by improving household welfare and enhancing indirect job creation in communities such as transportation, housekeeping, construction, and small-scale food vendors. This section describes the digital economy context and digital youth employment programmes for four countries in Africa, including Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, as they account for over 60% of Africa’s digital entrepreneurial activity (Friederici et al. 2020).

Kenya Kenya has a GDP of US$98 billion and a population of about 53 million, of which 23.7 million are part of the labour force (World Bank 2021). Kenyan youth account for about 37% of the working-age population but only constitute 20% of the total employment. In 2011, Kenya had one of the largest disparities in the youth-adult employment gap in Africa and the lowest youth employment rate. This was attributed to the sluggish rate of youth employment creation (Escudero and Mourelo 2014). However, Kenya offers promising opportunities for digital youth employment. Kenya has about 57 million mobile subscriptions and surpasses the 100% mark of mobile subscriptions (Communications Authority of Kenya 2018). In 2007, Kenya launched mobile money services, becoming one of the first countries in Africa to launch mobile money (Aker and Mbiti 2010). Driven by the digital economy's growth, the ICT sector's value increased by 12.9% from KSh. 345.6 billion in 2017 to KSh. 390.2 billion in 2018. Furthermore, the total number of active data and Internet users was 45.7 million, with about 47.9% of subscribers being on broadband (Government of Kenya 2019a). Kenya is at the forefront of Africa’s emerging technology landscape known as the Silicon Savannah. Kenya acquired its first submarine fibre optic cable in 2009, with about six submarine fibre optic systems linking it to the rest of the world. The fibre optic technology offers high bandwidth and high-speed Internet while reducing costs associated with connectivity. As a result, Kenya is home to several digital innovative start-ups and is one of the countries with the fastest mobile Internet speeds globally. Furthermore, fibre optic technology facilitates speedy and less costly data exchange within and between businesses and institutions. These factors

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promote participation by youth in the digital economy as businesses create jobs due to increasing online transactions and the concomitant declining cost of doing business. Leveraging on Kenya’s digital transformation to tackle youth unemployment, the Kenya Private Sector Alliance, in partnership with the government of Kenya’s Ministry of ICT, Innovation and Youth Affairs, with financial support from the Rockefeller Foundation, launched Ajira Digital in 2017. This flagship programme promotes youth employment by offering mentorship and basic training on digital employment opportunities. The programme's main objective is to make Kenya a global destination for online work and a freelance hub. This is achieved by offering training, mentorship, and guidance to over 1 million youth seeking online job opportunities. The programme falls under the Mastercard Foundation’s Young Africa Works strategy, with the Kenya Private Sector Alliance and eMobilis—a software programming training institution—as implementing partners. Ajira Digital has about 240,000 members and 242 centres in Kenya. The programme provides youth free digital training resources through Ajira Youth Empowerment Centres, universities, and technical and vocational education and training institutions. All participating institutions have an Ajira Digital Club where peer-to-peer mentorship takes place. Training focuses on technical and soft skills that are vital for success in the digital economy. In 2022, about 7546 youth underwent training despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. About 50,000 youth gained work as graphic designers, online writers, and instructors in the same period. Moreover, a majority of the youth market their businesses through digital platforms. In addition, a major digital employment opportunity has arisen from the digitisation of judiciary court records (Government of Kenya 2022; Kenya Private Sector Alliance 2022). Kenya’s success in implementing the Ajira Digital programme is attributed to three factors (Dalberg 2022). The first is the inclusion of ICT and BPO in the economic and macro pillars of Vision 2030. In addition, Kenya has laid out the National ICT Masterplan, Digital Economy Blueprint, National Cybersecurity Strategy, and Youth Development Policy, which frame ICT and the digital economy as vehicles of industrial growth and youth job creation. The second factor relates to fostering and leveraging a culture of entrepreneurial innovation. Kenya has over 20 innovation and business hubs and incubators focusing on local content innovation to attract investors. Lastly, public-private partnerships (PPP) in Kenya align

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with the national strategy to build and drive access to ICT infrastructure (Government of Kenya 2008, 2018, 2019a, 2019b).

Nigeria With a population of about 206 million, Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa and the continent’s largest economy, with a GDP of US$423 billion (World Bank 2021). Moreover, Nigeria has one of the largest youth proportions, with over 35% of the population falling between 15 and 34 years. However, youth account for over 40% of the unemployed population (Akwara et  al. 2013). Some factors accounting for youth unemployment comprise slow economic growth, low level of industrialisation, lack of skills and experience, and the slow implementation of the national labour policy (Okunola 2020; Omotayo et al. 2018; Uddin 2013). With a rapidly developing ICT sector that accounts for 17.8% of GDP, Nigeria has the highest number of mobile subscribers, experiencing a growth of 711%, from 18.59 million subscribers in 2005 to 151 million in 2015. Moreover, Nigeria consistently leads on three ICT indicators: mobile subscribers, Internet users, and fixed telephone subscribers (Adeleye and Eboagu 2019). Nigeria has about 104.4 million Internet users, a 51% Internet penetration rate and a 90% mobile subscription rate (Kemp 2021). Nigeria’s digital economy features Jumia Group, one of Africa’s e-commerce leading platforms. Jumia Nigeria’s platform has over 11,000 vendors. Furthermore, Nollywood—Nigeria’s film industry— yields about 90% of its revenues from its online presence. This is due to the growth of Internet users and smartphone users. Nollywood comes second after India’s Bollywood in terms of output, that is, a number of films produced, and third after Unites States’ Hollywood and Bollywood in terms of revenue. Nigeria’s Nollywood contributes to about 1.42% of GDP and employs more than 1 million people indirectly or directly, making it the second-largest employer after agriculture (AUC and OECD 2021). As Africa’s largest digital market with venture capital investments of over US$660 million in 2019, Nigeria’s digital economy offers a viable job creation strategy for youth. The digital economy can support youth employment due to the rapid development of e-commerce, the film industry, and BPO (AUC and OECD 2021; Balogun 2020). Moreover, in 2014, Paradigm Initiative Nigeria and The Rockefeller Foundation launched a digital jobs project involving a campaign to create online work awareness and provide training opportunities for youth. This

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programme addressed youth unemployment by introducing online work opportunities, allowing youth to connect with the digital jobs market and ensuring digital inclusion and digital rights protection (Paradigm Initiative Nigeria 2022). This initiative offers six digital inclusion programmes: ICT, life skills, financial readiness, entrepreneurship (LIFE) training, digital rights, and Dufuna—a digital readiness programme and a software engineering school offering training and employment support for software developers product analysts and product designers. Dufuna also includes a software development training programme for female university students and graduates (Dufuna 2022; Paradigm Initiative Nigeria 2022). Over the years, Paradigm Initiative Africa has collaborated with government, private sector, civil institutions, and international organisations to offer ICT for development (ICT4D) interventions focusing on telecentre support, ICT education, and ICT applications in rural areas. Similarly, the A3 Foundation launched a free CISCO IT Essentials training with the support of the Rockefeller Foundation. This programme aimed to empower 1000 high potential but disadvantaged youth by equipping them with technical expertise to fill the shortage of certified and skilled IT manpower in the digital economy. The A3 Foundation achieves this in partnership with organisations and schools in Nigeria. In addition, the A3 Foundation partners with Viko Nigeria to offer trainees gainful employment in the hospitality sector in online jobs such as interstate bus bookings, airline bookings, and hotel reservations. The A3 Foundation also partners with Funds and Electronic Transfer Solution to engage trainees as mobile agents for a monthly commission of about US$70 (A3 Foundation 2022). Nigeria’s Economic Recovery Growth Plan (ERGP), 2017–2020, recognises that youth dominate the ICT and creative industries. The ERGP emphasises digital-led growth, promoting ICT clusters, skills development, and Internet penetration, among other initiatives. It also underscores the job creation potential of the digital economy (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2019a). Similarly, the National Digital Economy Policy and Strategy notes the contribution of Nigeria’s ICT to GDP and thus the importance of digital literacy and skills. The pillars of the strategy include digital literacy, skills development, infrastructure development, digital services, and digital content development and adoption. Moreover, the strategy aims to foster partnerships to advance an inclusive digital economy (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2019b). In addition, the Nigerian Broadband Plan 2020–2025 aims to provide high-speed

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Internet connectivity and facilitate access to low-cost broadband for youth and adults. It also promotes digital literacy and skills (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2019c). Lastly, the Nigerian Youth Employment Action Plan 2021–2024 considers the EGRP and the National Digital Economy Policy and Strategy in supporting the development of an innovative digital economy to address youth unemployment (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2021). While national policies and strategies outline measures aimed at enhancing youth employment in the digital economy, various factors hamper the growth of Nigeria’s digital economy and consequently impede the success of digital youth employment programmes. Nigeria lacks reliable and affordable electricity, Internet, and ICT infrastructure (Dalberg 2022). Furthermore, digital literacy and skills are lacking, especially among the youth (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2019b). Nevertheless, the role of PPPs in enhancing youth employment in the digital economy is underscored in digital youth employment programmes and the Nigerian Youth Employment Action Plan 2021–2024.

South Africa South Africa has a GDP of about US$301 billion with a population of about 59 million (World Bank 2021). South African youth aged 15-34 account for 63% of the unemployed, while those aged 25-34 account for 34% of the unemployed. Youth are the most economically vulnerable group in South Africa (Oyedemi and Choung 2020). Several factors are associated with the high youth unemployment rate in South Africa. They include sluggish economic growth, inadequate skills, poor educational outcomes, lack of information, limited sources of job searching and job application information, and the challenges associated with the legacy of apartheid’s spatial planning, which aggravate the digital divide (De Lannoy et al. 2018). However, while the economy has a skewed effect on South Africa’s unemployment rate, structural factors seem to matter more than economic factors. Structural factors include the intrinsic nature of technological advancement and concerns about inequality and its implication for access to digital communication technologies that are crucial for securing employment (Oyedemi and Choung 2020). Technological advancement directs job creation toward skilled sectors, adversely affecting the low-­ skilled labour force (Nonyana and Njuho 2018). However, South Africa is a highly developed economy in Africa and has an advanced ICT industry, ranking 20 globally. South Africa’s mobile

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subscription base has grown from 33.96 million in 2005 to about 87.99 million in 2015, reflecting a 159.13% increase. Similarly, ranking third, South Africa has an Internet penetration rate of about 51.91% (Adeleye and Eboagu 2019). In addition, South Africa’s Internet economy contributes about 2% of GDP. Notwithstanding, mobile broadband is costly, raising concerns about youth access to the Internet (Omarjee 2019). South Africa also has one of the highest rates of inequality in the world, which exacerbates inequality and exclusion. While the digital economy holds the potential to bridge the social and economic gap through job creation, it also holds power to worsen the gap. However, digital youth employment programmes targeting disadvantaged youth provide an opportunity to enhance job creation (Dalberg 2022). In partnership with the Rockefeller Foundation, South Africa’s Harambee Youth Employment Accelerator programme aimed to promote the growth of a digital jobs talent pool through training and behavioural interventions and job placement in BPO and financial services through its ‘pathwaying platform’. The programme also addressed inclusivity by considering poor, unemployed youth. The programme also included training aimed at imparting digital skills, for example, IT-based multi-tasking, numerical aptitude, touch-typing, and soft skills, including self-awareness and self-confidence, communication, and punctuality. Harambee’s real-­ world training methodology and job matching tools aid employers in assessing work readiness and increasing employee retention. The employment outcomes of Harambee included about 25,000 youth placements into entry-level employment and self-placement into employment. In addition, another 12,000 youth benefitted from job-searching support (Genesis Analytics 2018; World Bank 2018). Job opportunities were primarily developed in partnership with the private sector. Similarly, Business Processing Enabling South Africa (BPESA), in partnership with the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition and with the Rockefeller Foundation and Monyetla—a government-funded employer-led programme—equip unemployed and marginalised youth with digital skills for BPO jobs. Employers lead training curricula development to meet market needs. In addition, employers partner with trainers to ensure proper training delivery. Both programmes liaised with the private and public sectors to align policies to promote investment in South Africa’s BPO. In addition, about 20,000 gained employment from BPESA

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and Monyetla (Business Process Enabling South Africa 2022; Genesis Analytics 2018; World Bank 2018). South Africa’s National Youth Policy 2020-2030 is informed by South Africa’s Constitution, the National Development Plan 2030, National Youth Service Framework 2002, the National e-Strategy, and the Economic Reconstruction Recovery Plan, among other related frameworks. Digital inclusion of youth remains a primary aspiration, as evidenced by the implementation of the recommendations of the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) 2018-2019/2020-2021. This fostered the creation and growth of the digital economy by providing an enabling framework, infrastructure, access to digital hardware and software, and digital innovation. The National Youth Policy 2020-2030 underscores expanding connectivity and ensuring access to affordable data, providing access to broadband infrastructure, especially in underserved rural areas, and supporting access to information by youth (Republic of South Africa 2019). According to South Africa’s ICT and Digital Economy Masterplan formulated by the Department of Communication and Digital Technology, the digital economy offers an opportunity for collective prosperity. Its objectives include inclusive growth, job creation, and economic transformation. It highlights digital inclusion, skills for work, responsive governance, innovation and competition, and government digitisation as critical enablers for South Africa’s digital economy development. Job market platforms, e-commerce platforms, and government digitisation programmes by the Public-Private Growth Initiative play a vital role in creating jobs for youth. To achieve digital inclusion, the masterplan focuses on increasing access to high-speed broadband Internet while ensuring affordability. In addition, it provides incentives to enhance the manufacture of affordable smart devices, local content innovation, and ICT infrastructure development. The masterplan also proposes to ensure that primary and secondary curricula encapsulate digital skills so that individuals leaving school are equipped with basic digital skills. Furthermore, establishing an industry-wide mechanism for re-skilling and up-skilling, for example, through BPESA is imperative given the agility of the digital economy. Furthermore, the masterplan also indicates that black economic and digital empowerment are national priorities (Genesis Analytics and Knowledge Executive 2020). Lastly, the masterplan highlights that establishing regulatory frameworks and ensuring co-ordination between the public and the private sector are vital for fostering growth in the digital economy in South Africa.

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Egypt Egypt has a population of about 102.3 million and a GDP of US$361.1 billion (World Bank 2021). About 800,000 graduates enter the labour market annually in Egypt (World Bank 2020). Youth unemployment stands at about 30% (Statista 2021). This is attributed to a mismatch between the labour market demand and the youth's skillset and capacities (Kamel 2021). The ‘youth bulge’ and the high unemployment rate among highly educated youth were considered the main factors behind the ‘Arab Spring’– a youth-led democracy movement in countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and more specifically, in Egypt. Consequently, efforts have been made to promote inclusive growth by involving the highly educated in the local labour market (Murata 2014). Egypt’s ICT sector contributes 4.4% of GDP, with a total investment of US$3.5 billion (Government of Egypt 2021). Ranked second in Africa, Egypt experienced substantial growth, with mobile subscribers growing from 13.63 million in 2005 to 99.7 million in 2013, reflecting an increase of 631%. In 2021, the internet penetration rate stood at 57.3%. Egypt consistently led in the number of fixed telephone subscribers in Africa between 2005 and 2015 (Adeleye and Eboagu 2019). There were 10.3 million fixed telephone subscribers in Egypt in 2021 (Statista 2021). Egypt has launched major projects to enhance fixed broadband quality, reaching a total investment of US$1.9 billion in 2021. The private sector contributed to about 26% of the cost. The expected outcomes include high-speed Internet connectivity, accommodating the increasing volume of digital services offered, and the youth (Kamel 2021). Overall, Egypt has an enabling environment for digital services and a unique opportunity to leverage highly educated youth and its developed ICT infrastructure to advance the digital economy. Egypt has made BPO a national priority by subsidising firms’ training costs, for example, Wasla Outsourcing, BDO Esnad, Oworkers, and so on. In addition, the growing e-commerce industry is creating jobs in sales and service delivery (Kamel 2021), for example, Egypt Souq Egypt, Jumia Egypt, UBuy Egypt, Yashry, and so on. Egypt also has a thriving music and film industry (Dalberg 2022). Both BPO and the music and film industry employ the Arabic language to capture demand in the Arabic-speaking market. In addition, in support of digital start-ups, Flat 6 Labs Cairo focuses on funding and mentoring enterprises focusing on creative product design, mobile

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applications, and web-based applications. These start-ups are a source of jobs for youth with digital literacy and digital skills (Said 2015). Youth employment policies in Egypt, such as the Youth Employment National Action Plan 2010-2015 (NAP), include the participation of public and private sectors and important stakeholders comprising youth groups and social partners. However, youth participation in the implementation of employment policies is generally limited. Egypt’s youth policy environment is fragmented and lacks co-ordination, which hampers the effectiveness of youth employment programmes (Ghada Barsoum 2017). Youth employment interventions generally fall into four categories: training and skills development, employment services, subsidised employment, and entrepreneurship promotion (Angel-Urdinola and Bank 2013). However, there is a relative lack of publicly available data on youth employment policies and their outcomes (Ghada Barsoum 2017). The Digital Egypt Youth (DEY) training programme through the National Telecommunication Institute was aimed at enhancing digital skills, for example, freelance work, and promoting job creation. To support e-learning, the Digital Egypt Youth initiative aimed to provide soft loans to trainees in the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology to buy laptops. In addition, DEY offers training to impart skills in establishing, operating, and maintaining fibre optic networks, aiming to certify 3000 youth by 2021. Moreover, the National Telecommunication Institute offers CISCO IT essential training and a post-graduate diploma programme in information and communication engineering to graduate 120 professions annually (Government of Egypt 2021). Key state actors charged with employment policy are the Ministry of Manpower and Migration, the Ministry of Education, the Social Fund for Development, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Planning, and the Ministry of International Cooperation. While the Ministry of Education manages Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programmes, about 16 ministries manage a majority of public Vocational Training Centres (VTCs). Yet, TVET graduates are generally lacking in skills required by the market. A TVET Reform Strategy 2013-2018 and a Strategy for Technical Education were designed to address this fragmentation. However, these strategies remain unrealised (Said 2015). In addition, 86% of youth employment interventions were supported by non-governmental and non-profit together with private sector enterprises (Barsoum et  al. 2014). Increasingly, the government

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implements labour market interventions in partnership with non-­ governmental organisations (Said 2015). The Social Fund for Development generally oversees youth labour market interventions. Egypt has established various frameworks and strategies to support the digital economy. It is the only country in Africa with a National Artificial Intelligence Strategy. In addition, Egypt has a standalone National Cybersecurity Strategy and an e-Commerce Strategy (Abimbola et  al. 2021). Egypt’s vision 2030, digital transformation strategy, and the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology focus on three pillars to foster the growth of Egypt’s digital economy. The first pillar is digital transformation, which will be achieved by digitising government services e-services using e-platforms, mobile applications, and call centres, among others. The second pillar is digital skills and jobs, which will be achieved by offering training programmes to enhance digital literacy and skills. About 13,000 individuals were trained in 2020. The last pillar is digital innovation, which aims to stimulate entrepreneurial activity by investing in ICT research, development, and innovation. This is expected to position Egypt as a regional innovation hub and will be achieved through PPPs. Based on a PPP, Benya Raqameya—Digital Future was launched in 2020 to offer digital transformation support to enterprises. Digital Future partners with the Federation of Chamber of Commerce, the Ministry of Public Enterprise Sector, and multinationals including Microsoft, Honeywell, Cisco, and Dell, among others (Kamel 2021). Public-Private Partnership in an Integrated Framework for Digital Youth Employment While governments play a fundamental role in promoting the digital economy, the importance of the private sector as a major source of jobs cannot be overstated (Datta et al. 2018a). Overall, digital youth employment programmes in Africa demonstrate that while considerations are given to demand-side approaches aimed at incentivising employers, for example, direct subsidies and incentives in South Africa and Egypt, more attention is given to supply-side approaches directed towards unemployed youth (Dalberg 2022). In addition, digital youth employment programmes underscore the role of PPP involving collaboration between the public and private sectors to achieve growth in the digital economy (Kamel 2021). Public sector intervention in the labour market originates from market failure and society’s need for equality, which the private sector cannot

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provide. Yet, public sector intervention can result in undesirable indirect effects and inefficiencies. As such, PPP provides an effective instrument for addressing market failure deriving from the provision of public goods (Datta et  al. 2018b). However, the success of PPPs in stimulating job creation in the digital economy also depends on the integration and co-­ ordination of supply-side and demand-side approaches to address youth unemployment. The main challenges experienced by unemployed youth emanate from the digital divide: affordability, usability, and empowerment. In addition, youth are generally overlooked in the employment market (Datta et al. 2018a). Digital youth employment programmes address these challenges posed by the digital divide through several initiatives. First, supply-side interventions include initiatives that provide unemployed youth with hardware and software to facilitate e-learning. However, through PPPs, the private sector plays a crucial role in funding and building physical and digital infrastructure and driving access. Second, they aim to provide digital literacy and skills development. In addition, the private sector is involved in developing curricula that meet market needs and partnering with trainers to ensure effective delivery in public institutions. Alongside this, the government provides the private sector incentives and subsidies for online work training. In addition, PPPs are better able to effectively implement labour market intermediation to narrow labour demand and supply gap. Job matching platforms are also effective for reducing labour market mismatch. Job matching platforms cater to the supply side as well as to the demand side (World Bank 2018). In sum, PPPs are well placed to integrate and co-ordinate digital youth employment programmes, drawing on the synergy between supply and demand interventions. Governments can benefit from co-ordinating regulatory frameworks to tackle youth unemployment, build capacity, and provide ICT infrastructure. In addition, governments must consider that the rural and urban investment climate, the overall macroeconomic framework, and human capital policies are imperative for the success of demand-­ side interventions (Johansson De Silva et al., 2018). In this effort, private sector actors have an essential role in providing technical advice and supporting policy implementation by providing industry-specific expertise.

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References A3 Foundation. 2022. Digital jobs in Nigeria: Driving youth employment through ICT enabled services. https://thea3foundation.org/digital-­jobs-­nigeria/. Accessed 27 Feb 2022. Abimbola, O., Aggad, F., and Ndzendze, B. 2021. What is Africa’s Digital Agenda? Africa Policy Research Institute. Retrieved from Africa Policy Research Institute website: https://afripoli.org/what-­is-­africas-­digital-­agenda Adeleye, N., and C. Eboagu. 2019. Evaluation of ICT Development and Economic Growth in Africa. NETNOMICS: Economic Research and Electronic Networking 20 (1): 31–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11066-­019-­09131-­6. African Development Bank. 2016. Jobs for youth in Africa: Catalysing youth Opportunity Across Africa. African Development Bank. Retrieved from https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Images/high_5s/Job_ youth_Africa_Job_youth_Africa.pdf African Union Commission, & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2021. Digital Transformation for Youth Employment and Agenda 2063 in West Africa. In Africa’s Development Dynamics 2021: Digital Transformation for Quality Jobs. Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. https://doi.org/10.1787/bb1d4e48-­en. Aker, J.C., and I.M. Mbiti. 2010. Mobile Phones and Economic Development in Africa. Journal of Economic Perspectives 24 (3): 207–232. Akwara, A.F., N.F.  Akwara, J.  Enwuchola, M.  Adekunle, and J.  Udaw. 2013. Unemployment and Poverty: Implications for National Security and Good Governance in Nigeria. International Journal of Public Administration and Management Research 2 (1): 1–11. Angel-Urdinola, D.F., and W.  Bank. 2013. Building Effective Employment Programs for Unemployed Youth in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Publications. Baah-Boateng, W. 2016. The Youth Unemployment Challenge in Africa: What Are the Drivers? The Economic and Labour Relations Review 27 (4): 413–431. Balogun, F. 2020. Digital Sector Skills Gap Report. Mastercard Foundation, Jobberman. Retrieved from Mastercard Foundation, Jobberman website: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351129724_Digital_Sector_ Skills_Gap_Report_Digital_Sector_Digital_Sector_Skills_Gap_Report Barsoum, G., S. Puerto, and F. Weidenkaff. 2014. Interventions to Improve Labour Market Outcomes of Youth: An Inventory of Interventions in Egypt. International Labour Organization. Barsoum, Ghada. 2017. Youth-focused Active Labour Market Programmes in a Constraining Welfare Regime: A Qualitative Reading of Programmes in Egypt. International Journal of Social Welfare 26 (2): 168–176.

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Business Process Enabling South Africa. 2022. Business Process Enabling South Africa—(GBS) Global Business Services. https://www.bpesa.org.za/. Accessed 27 Feb 2022. Communications Authority of Kenya. 2018. First quarter sector statistics report for the financial year 2018/2019 (July-September 2018) (pp. 1–28). Retrieved from https://ca.go.ke/wp-­content/uploads/2018/12/Sector-­Statistics-­ Report-­Q1-­2018-­2019.pdf Dalberg. 2022. Digital jobs in Africa: Catalysing inclusive opportunities for youth. The Rockefeller Foundation. Retrieved from The Rockefeller Foundation website: https://www.rockefellerfoundation.org/report/digital-­jobs-­in-­africa-­ catalyzing-­inclusive-­opportunities-­for-­youth/ Datta, N., Assy, A. E., Buba, J., Johansson De Silva, S., and Watson, S. 2018a. Integrated Youth Employment Programs: A Stocktake of Evidence on What Works in Youth Employment Programs [Working Paper]. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi.org/10.1596/31424 Datta, N., A.E. Assy, J. Buba, and S. Watson. 2018b. Integration: A New Approach to Youth Employment Programs. Washington, DC: World Bank. https://doi. org/10.1596/31439. De Lannoy, A., Graham, L., Patel, L., and Leibbrandt, M. 2018. What drives youth unemployment and what interventions help? A Systematic Overview Of The Evidence And A Theory Of Change. High-level Overview Report. Poverty & Inequality Initiative, University of Cape Town & Centre for Social Development in Africa at the University of Johannesburg. Retrieved from https://redi3x3.org/sites/default/files/Youth%20Unemployment%20 report_Dec18.pdf Dufuna. 2022. Dufuna. https://dufuna.com/. Accessed 27 Feb 2022. Escudero, V., and E.L. Mourelo. 2014. Understanding the Drivers of the Youth Labour Market in Kenya. In Disadvantaged Workers: Empirical Evidence and Labour Policies, ed. M.Á. Malo and D.  Sciulli, 203–228. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-­3-­319-­04376-­0_10. Federal Republic of Nigeria. 2019a. Economic Recovery and Growth Plan 2017-2020. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.nipc. g o v. n g / p r o d u c t / n i g e r i a s -­e c o n o m i c -­r e c o v e r y -­a n d -­g r o w t h -­p l a n ergp-­for-­2017-­2020/ ———. 2019b. National Digital Economy Policy and Strategy 2020-2030. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.ncc.gov.ng/ docman-­m ain/industry-­s tatistics/policies-­r eports/883-­n ational-­d igital-­ economy-­policy-­and-­strategy/file ———. 2019c. Nigerian National Broadband Plan 2020-2025. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.ncc.gov.ng/documents/880-­ nigerian-­national-­broadband-­plan-­2020-­2025/file

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———. 2021. Nigerian Youth Employment Action Plan 2021-2024. Federal Republic of Nigeria. Retrieved from https://nigerianyouthsdgs.org/ nigerian-­youth-­employment-­action-­plan-­2021-­2024/ Friederici, N., M.  Wahome, and M.  Graham. 2020. Digital Entrepreneurship in Africa: How a Continent Is Escaping Silicon Valley’s Long Shadow. The MIT Press. Retrieved from https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/43517. Genesis Analytics. 2018. Evaluation of impact: The Rockefeller Foundation’s Digital Jobs Africa Initiative. The Rockefeller Foundation. Genesis Analytics and Knowledge Executive. 2020. ICT and Digital Economy Masterplan for South Africa. Genesis Analytics and Knowledge Executive. Government of Egypt. 2021. Ministry of Communications and Information Technology. https://mcit.gov.eg/en/Media_Center/Press_Room/Press_ Releases/57168. Accessed 28 Feb 2022. Government of Kenya. 2008. Kenya Vision 2030. https://vision2030.go.ke/ economic-­pillar/. Accessed 26 Feb 2022. ———. 2018. Kenya National ICT Masterplan: Towards a Digital Kenya 2018-2022. https://vision2030.go.ke/economic-­pillar/. Accessed 26 Feb 2022. ———. 2019a. Digital Economy Blueprint: Powering Kenya’s Transformation. https://vision2030.go.ke/economic-­pillar/. Accessed 26 Feb 2022. ———. 2019b. Kenya Youth Development Policy 2019. Retrieved from http:// youth.go.ke/wp-­content/uploads/2020/11/Kenya-­Youth-­Development-­ Policy-­2019-­Popular-­version.pdf ———. 2022. Ajira. https://ajiradigital.go.ke/#/index. Accessed 26 Feb 2022. Hasbi, M. 2020. Impact of Very High-speed Broadband on Company Creation and Entrepreneurship: Empirical Evidence. Telecommunications Policy 44 (3): 101873. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2019.101873. Hjort, J., and J. Poulsen. 2019. The Arrival of Fast Internet and Employment in Africa. American Economic Review 109 (3): 1032–1079. https://doi. org/10.1257/aer.20161385. Jayaram, S., W. Munge, B. Adamson, D. Sorrell, and N. Jain. 2017. Bridging the Skills Gap: Innovations in Africa and Asia. Springer. Kamel, S. 2021. The potential impact of digital transformation on Egypt. Presented at the Dokki, Giza. Dokki, Giza: The Economic Research Forum. Retrieved from https://er f.org.eg/publications/the-­p otential-­i mpact-­o f-­d igital-­ transformation-­on-­egypt/#:~:text=Digital%20transformation%20offers%20 Egypt%20a,inclusive%20development%20and%20economic%20growth. Kemp, S. 2021. Digital in Nigeria: All the Statistics You Need in 2021. DataReportal  – Global Digital Insights website: https://datareportal.com/ reports/digital-­2021-­nigeria. Accessed 26 Feb 2022. Kenya Private Sector Alliance. 2022. Ajira Digital Project. Kenya Private Sector Alliance website: https://kepsa.or.ke/ajira/. Accessed 26 Feb 2022.

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CHAPTER 8

Digitalisation of Agricultural Policy and Policy Performance in Tanzania Francis Aron Mwaijande

Introduction Digitalisation in emerging economies like Africa is becoming the subject of considerable interest in the public policy literature and practice. It is now believed that African economies need to leverage digital development in order to realise a competitive, innovative, and knowledge-based society, as aspired in the AU’s Agenda 2063 (e.g. Onyango and Ondiek 2021; Yeboah-Assiamah et  al. 2022). Often, the discussion entails adopting Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) required to modernise agriculture policy and agribusiness management (Annosi et  al., 2020; Ehlers et  al. 2021; Ortiz-Crespo et  al. 2021). Most importantly, digitalisation involves the application of ICTs and technical know-how for specific processes in the policy cycle that technocrats and implementers can use. Due to technology’s relevance in offering solutions to many socio-economic problems in other sectors, the agriculture sector is not exceptional for not adopting technology in the policy process (Bahn et al.

F. A. Mwaijande (*) Mzumbe University, Mzumbe, Tanzania © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_8

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2021). This sector has a wide range of challenges whose solutions can be digitalised. Digitalising agricultural policies are expected to solve multiple policy problems or difficulties related to food production systems (Annosi, et al. 2020), food price and markets, extension services, agricultural financing, and so on. Despite this trend, some reports indicate that more than 90% of “the market for digital services that support African smallholders remains untapped, with a turnover of an estimated €127m out of a total potential market of €2.3bn”1 (African Business 31 July 2019; Tsan et al. 2019). It is no secret that policy actors and farmers engage in uniquely designed structures and policy dialogues using digital platforms. Scholars like Tsan et  al. (2019) argue for digitalising agricultural policy because it is a game-­changer for “boosting productivity, profitability and resilience to climate change.” Digitalising agriculture enables inclusiveness and agricultural transformation for the improved livelihood of smallholder farmers (Tsan et al. 2019). Moreover, Ehlers et al. (2021) argue that digitalisation is expected to transform the food and farming industry. It assists production with precision agriculture and trade through online platforms and traceability systems. However, digitalising agriculture policy processes remain cumbersome and expensive, especially for Africa’s developing political economies. As a tool for realising popular participation in governance processes, digitalising agricultural policy is, therefore,  a policy consciousness that is only emerging as a way of improving the problematic state-society relations in African countries (Onyango 2022; Hyden and Onyango 2021). The fact that the African state is only developing may also mean that existing governing structures still need to acquire features that may allow smooth digitalisation. For example the government’s growing use of ICT requires a database which most African governments are yet to create (Onyango and Ondiek 2022). This has seen digitalisation policy spaces in Africa being  dominated by non-State actors working collaboratively with the government to complement the state’s capacity to realise effective digital policy instrumentation. Indeed, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)’s Strengthening Agricultural Policy Practice in Africa (SAPPA) highlights the benefit of e-tools while engaging policy actors through digitalised policy dialogue. Making more informed decisions based on facts validated on digital platforms becomes more accessible, although this also 1  https://african.business/2019/07/economy/unlocking-the-potential-of-agriculturaldigitalisation/

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requires capacity from government officials to actualise (e.g. Onyango and Ondiek 2021). This notwithstanding, digital platforms like SAPPA network’s peer-to-peer convenient environment ensure public policy data flows in the policymaking process. Lessons from the SAPPA project in Tanzania, Ghana, and Zambia indicate a paradigm shift, whereby stakeholders do not necessarily sit on round tables and board rooms to make decisions. Adopting digital information communication tools for policy development and management brings inherent conveniences that speed up the policy reform cycle (retrieved from www.sappaportal.org). Furthermore, digital platforms create new opportunities for governments to understand the public’s perceptions of agricultural policy problems quicker than before at lesser costs. This chapter is hinged on a rationale that digitalising agricultural policies can improve African policymaking processes and delivery performance  (Annos et  al. 2020). Following technological transformation in different sectors of African economies, the physical space is shrinking; agriculture being one of the primary sectors engaged, calls for adaptation to digital technology in the policymaking process. The chapter examines and discusses the concept of digitalisation of agricultural policies in the African context, particularly Tanzania. And for this discussion, digitalisation is used here to refer to the use of information and communication technology (ICT) in public policy processes and service delivery. It entails recent policy reforms that use ICT to provide services—public or private. This chapter particularly examines the application and adaptation of digital technologies in the agricultural policy cycle in Tanzania. It addresses the following questions: What frameworks support agriculture policy digitalisation? How can the digitalisation of agriculture policy support agricultural transformations? More broadly, this discussion is informed by the African Union (AU) framework, Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) strategy and National Agricultural Policy that embraces information and communication technology to improve performance in meeting development goals across sectors. Specific cases are drawn for applying ICT in monitoring and evaluating agricultural subsidies, extension services, and increasing smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and financial services. Overall, the chapter argues for an enabling environment (policy) for the practice of digitalisation of agricultural policy. It is structured as follows: Sect. 2 presents Africa’s regional and continental perspectives of digitalising

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Agricultural policy, referred to as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

African’s Continental and Regional Perspectives of Digitalising Agriculture Policy Bahn et al. (2021) consider digital agriculture as the design, development, and use of digital technologies in agriculture and the wider agri-food sector. It includes applying and adopting robots, digital communications, computational decision and analytical tools, and cloud-based technologies. Digitalising agriculture also encompasses controlled-environment agriculture in greenhouses and hydroponic farms that are increasing to leverage the use of ICT. Digitalisation for agriculture can be broadly categorised into four pillars: digital agricultural innovations, big data and analytics, business development services, and enabling environment (Baumuller and Addom 2000). This is a new trend in agricultural policy development in global, continental Africa, and particularly Tanzania. It is guided by the Theory of Change (ToC) that digitalising agricultural policies in African countries will deliver desired change more effectively and efficiently and realise policy outcomes. The application of digital technologies has been touted as a potentially revolutionary solution to improve agricultural production systems’ performance and sustainability because they have economic, social, and environmental dimensions (Bahn et al. 2021). Digitalising agriculture entails the use of digital technologies, innovations, and data to transform business models and practices in the agricultural value chain to address constraints, inter-alia; climate change, productivity, post-harvest loss handling, market access, finance, and supply chain management to achieve a higher income for smallholder farmers, improve food and nutrition security, build climate resilience, and expand inclusion of youth and women. (Baumuller and Benjamin 2000; Tsan et al. 2019)

Agriculture is the mainstay of many African countries (FAO 2022). It accounts for 30–40% of the region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employing an average of 54% of the working population. On this basis, any meaningful agricultural developmental policy must embrace digital transformations. However, digital transformations in Africa have been challenging due to limited budgetary constraints and institutionalisation

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deficits (Onyango and Ondiek 2021; Kudama et al. 2021). The African Union (AU), through Agenda 2063, sets a digital transformation strategy for Africa because it recognises that digitalisation is a driving force for innovative, inclusive, and sustainable growth across sectors (African Union 2015). The AU upholds that digitalisation stimulates job creation and contributes to addressing poverty reduction and inequality, facilitating the delivery of goods and services in agriculture and therefore contributing to the achievement of Agenda 2063 and the Sustainable Development Goals (African Union 2015). The overall objective of the AU digital transformation strategy is “to harness digital technologies and innovation to transform African societies and economies to promote Africa’s integration, generate inclusive economic growth, stimulate job creation, break the digital divide, and eradicate poverty for the continent’s socio-economic development and ensure Africa’s ownership of modern tools of digital management.”2 According to this, the African Union-specific objective, inter-alia, is to “build a vibrant sector approach to the digitalisation of the agriculture” (ibid). Given that the world population is projected to be over 9.8 billion by 2050 (Vasa et al. 2017) and Africa’s population is projected to be 2 billion by 2050, Africa needs improved food production systems to increase the demand for food in the region and the global markets. Digitalising agriculture policy is necessary because it offers many potential developments for youth and women in African countries (FAO 2022). For example, increasing farm productivity requires digital applications in agribusiness to accelerate access to markets and productive systems. When we talk of transformations in the agricultural sector, it includes inter-alia, digitalisation of agriculture policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation as a driver for transformation in the agriculture value chain (African Union 2015). The AU’s digital transformation strategy observes that “digital technologies can connect upstream input suppliers (suppliers of seed, machinery, fertiliser, finance, extension services) with farmers and farm enterprises and connect food buyers and sellers more efficiently within and across countries. This means digitalisation of agricultural policies improves agriculture extension services, inputs and subsidies, trade, and market. Through the 2  https://hub.unido.org/sites/default/files/publications/Report%20on%20Side%20 Event_Making%20the%20Fourth%20Industrial%20Revolution%20work%20for%20Africa_ WEB.pdf.pdf

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Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and digitalisation of agriculture policy, African Heads of state agreed to increase agricultural budgets to 10% of the national budgets to increase fertiliser usage to at least 50 kg per acre (African Union-NEPAD 2003). Some countries adopted a subsidy approach of providing agricultural inputs to operationalise agricultural transformations. The CAADP envisages improving effective, efficient agricultural extension services transformations and digitalisation of sustainable agriculture to improve production and farmers’ income and livelihoods. This could be facilitated by adaptation to ICTs. Farmers need real-time information to make informed decisions for farming, farmer advisory services, weather forecast, and market intelligence information. Therefore, to increase the effectiveness of extension services, ICT is an enabling platform for digitalising the implementation of extension services for African farmers. However, it has been challenging to meet all farmers’ needs. Baumuller and Benjamin (2000) comment that the enabling environment, including policies, institutions, and infrastructure, are necessary conditions for adopting and implementing the digitisation of agriculture policy. The digitalisation of agriculture policy should embrace interrelated conditions that facilitate sustainable agricultural transformation. Otherwise, contends Baumuller, Heike and Addom (2000), “in the absence of an enabling environment, developing and scaling suitable digital technologies and services for agricultural stakeholders will not be possible” (p. 4). This places responsibility on the government and other stakeholders to enhance the desired agricultural transformations, creating an enabling environment for digitalising agriculture policies, systems, and agribusiness in Africa (Tsan et al. 2019). However, FAO’s (2022) study on ICT status in African countries indicates that the digitalisation of agriculture transformation faces multiple constraints. These include inadequate “policymaking and regulation, limited access to finance, the status of digital skills, and lack of broadband infrastructure in rural areas and connectivity to mobile devices” (p. 14). This is even more critical in rural areas where agricultural activities take place. FAO suggests six areas to be considered for the digitalisation of agricultural policy, as summarised in Table 8.1.

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Table 8.1  Necessary Conditions for Digitalization of Agriculture in Africa KEY AREA

SCOPE OF INTERVENTION

INDICATORS

Infrastructure

Focuses on the essential infrastructure required for digitalisation, such as electricity, Internet connectivity, and mobile coverage

Number of people/ institutions connected to the Internet Number of agricultural institutions using virtual meetings Number of people with mobile phones Number of people/ institutions connected to the Internet

Digital penetration

Explores the degree of mobile technology penetration in agriculture, the start-up ecosystem, and social media platform engagement Policy and Highlights key legal enactments and regulation institutional setups related to ICT and agriculture service delivery Business Presents an outlook of supportive systems environment essential for investment in the agriculture sector as well as those that enable entrepreneurship Human capital Explores the literacy, skills, and employment dynamics of the human resources required to power the digital agriculture transformation process Agro-­ Weighs in on the research and development innovation (R & D) environment and innovation, taking cues from existing collaborative arrangements, research agendas, and links to agriculture productivity

Number of legal frameworks for ICT Number of ICT policies and regulations

Number of people with ICT skills/literacy

Per cent of agricultural innovations using digital technologies

Source 1: FAO 2022

SADC’s Perspective on Digitalising Agriculture Policy— Realising Climate-Smart Agriculture Agriculture is the primary source of food supply, job creation, and income for 61% of the population in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (FAO 2022). It contributes between 4% and 27% of GDP. It accounts for 13% of overall export earnings within member states. Therefore, improving performance in the agricultural sector strongly influences food security, economic growth, and livelihood in the region. The SADC’s strategic goal is to enhance digital technology applications across

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sectors, including agriculture efficiencies, specifically focusing on increasing smallholder farmers’ access to production factors, food systems, and markets (SADC, 2015). Implementing the ICT strategy in SADC is fundamental for transforming the agriculture sector within member states (SADC 2008). Therefore, having sound digitalised agricultural policies in the SADC region is highly desired to address critical agriculture challenges, including climate change. The digitalisation of climate-smart agriculture (CSA) offers a unique opportunity to address critical challenges that can improve the resilience and productivity of smallholder farmers in the SADC region. Notably, ensuring the effective implementation of CSA would require capacity for ICT use, capacity building, and financing of the CSA Investment Plan. Agricultural technicians, extension officers, development policymakers, and implementing agents need to enhance their capacity on digitalised CSA. Climate-smart agriculture (CSA) is an integrated approach to managing landscapes—cropland, livestock, forests, and fisheries— addressing the interlinked challenges of food security and climate change (World Bank, 2021). Since digital technology applications offer solutions to climate change’s negative impacts by providing real-time information on increasing temperatures and weather variability to farmers, SADC requires member countries to adopt technology to implement various policies, including agriculture. Notably, non-governmental organisations or transnational policy actors in the agricultural sector have tremendously contributed towards achieving these continental and national aspirations of digitalising agriculture in African countries. For instance, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has funded several projects targeting digitalising agricultural policies in African countries. AGRA-funded SAPPA programme seeks to digitise policy practices for public policy stakeholders (state and non-state actors) to engage in policy dialogue through digital platforms to promote digital policy processes. The Agricultural Policy Practice Index (APPI) rolled out a digital platform in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mozambique, and Tanzania. APPI, as one of the digital tools for policy self-assessment, enabling policy reviews and assessment whereby “policy reviewers through the AgriCitizensNET functionality” can dialogue (https://www.sappaportal.org/etools). The digital APPI application allows “information from the bottom up to make its way to policymakers and influences Policy Implementation and Reform potentially up to cabinet-level.” The APPI e-tool has revolutionised the

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policymaking process through its digital technology. “It is considered a game-changer from physical policy dialogue to digital platforms” because it allows for dialogue between Governments and other stakeholders, including farmers, businesses, Researchers and the general public.” Another initiative by Barefoot Education for Afrika Trust (BEAT) and Alliance for Agricultural Revolution in Africa (AGRA) embarked on a Country exercise in 11 countries to Benchmark and Landscape public policies on agricultural and food policies (https://www.sappaportal.org/ etools). The results from the piloted African countries provide evidence of showcasing digital applications in the public policymaking process across the continent (AGRA 2021). The proceeding sections now examine these perspectives regarding Agricultural policy in Tanzania.

Tanzania Perspective on Digitalising Agriculture Policy Agriculture in Tanzania contributes to 24.1% of GDP and employs 65% of the workforce, about 80% of whom are small-scale farmers, and 42% are youth (FAO 2022). The agriculture sector in Tanzania faces multiple challenges such as insufficient extension services, financing, low mechanisation, inadequate access  to fertilizer, and improved quality seeds and fertilisers. The National Agriculture Policy 2013 recognises the application of ICT in agriculture. ICT has been given high priority due to its potential to enhance agriculture and rural development, policy processes, and decision-making (URT 2011, 2013). This policy stipulates how ICT can be used in the conceptualisation, design, development, evaluation, and application of innovative agriculture methods. It seeks to address policy issues that include the high cost of ICT, inadequate web-linked databases, insufficient extension services, and private sector participation in ICT adoption in rural areas. To operationalise this policy, the Tanzania Ministry of Agriculture developed policy statements for the adaptation of ICT. This includes “participation of a wide spectrum of actors in ICT for agricultural development in collaboration with Ministry responsible for Communication, Science and Technology; utilisation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) for increased efficiency in information sharing in the agricultural sector; optimal use of existing and expansion of ICT capacity and infrastructure to reduce ICT access gap between the rural and the

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urban areas.” The National Agriculture Policy is implemented through Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP-II) 2017, which envisages agricultural transformations and technological adaptations in agricultural data management (URT 2017). The ASDP-II clarifies the public and private roles in improving support services, including agricultural extension services, which are limited in many rural areas. Extension officers cannot reach farmers due to an insufficient number of extension officers against the need for widespread demand for services in dispersed geographical locations. Considering the high demand for extension services, which farmers cannot get, the extension service can become more effective if they adopt ICT. This way, extension services can support farmers’ economic activities more facilitatively. Ehlers et al. (2021) argue that “digital extension and advisory services can use digital platforms to provide information and facilitate the interactive exchange to reach farmers more effectively” (p.9). Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF) of Tanzania developed a mobile platform named “M-Agriculture,” which uses mobile technology to facilitate extension advisory services to farmers, livestock keepers, and fishermen on their mobile phones. This technology is a breakthrough in digitalising agriculture policy in Tanzania which will provide solutions to the many challenges in the agricultural sector. Digitalising agricultural policy would guide the practice and financing of the digitalised extension services so that it becomes a functional facilitating platform for farm education, experience, and practices to farmers at once regardless of underlying geographical disparity. The digitalisation of extension services provides open learning platforms to different farm groups. The digitalisation of extension services facilitates farmers to link with other service providers, including agro-dealers, financial institutions for loans, and markets. Digitalising extension service needs to link sources of new technologies to farmers, including Tanzania Agricultural Research Institute (TARI), Sokoine Agriculture University (SUA), and many other African research institutions that can provide a strong network for helping farmers acquire farming research knowledge regardless of geographical locations. However, there are challenges that many research and technology innovations are not utilised because they are not disseminated to reach farmers for adoption. The digitalisation of agricultural research can increase the adoption of the developed technologies by farmers and policy decision-makers. The digitalisation of agricultural research is vital to improving farmers’ access to information about farming practices. This requires digital dissemination platforms with simplified methods and

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language to communicate effectively with farmers and extension officers (Barakabitze et  al. 2015). This is critical for ensuring that the intended beneficiaries receive the extension messages well and act upon them. Agricultural Policies and ICT Adaptations in Tanzania This section addresses how Tanzania’s digitalising agricultural policies evolved and the associated challenges. We limit our discussion to an enabling environment for the digitalising agriculture policy in Africa, particularly Tanzania. Like most African countries, Tanzania is predominantly an agrarian economy (FAO 2022), where digitalising agriculture policy is getting high attention. A study to understand how digitalising agriculture policy identified emerging technological transformations and digital spaces in Tanzania’s sectoral public policy process (FAO 2022). This study inquired how technological transformations had influenced agriculture policy processes. The response was, “it has enabled having policies on digital forms and platforms, and policies are now more easily available and disseminated than when they were just in hard copies (Respondent).” The policymaking process is perceived to be more transparent and consultative due to various digital platforms, including social media (Oginni and Moitui 2015, p.9). This means that digital platforms reduce the cost and time African countries usually budget for and invest in policymaking and assessment. For example, the SAPPA portal developed APPI e-tools, including “AgriCitizensNet,” a mobile advocacy application adopted in Tanzania to address agricultural problems and farmers’ challenges in real time through moderated conversations and discussions across the region (www.sappaportal.org). This is presented in Fig. 8.1.

Fig. 8.1  SAPPA digital policymaking platforms. Source 2: www.sappaportal.org

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The Tanzanian Agriculture policy of 2013, among others, identifies agriculture mechanisation as a strategy for increasing productivity. It is estimated that Tanzania has 8,466 tractors for 11.5 million hectares of arable land (Lyimo et al. 2014). About 92% of Tanzanian farmers still use hand hoes because they cannot afford to purchase tractors. It is a fact that smallholder farmers cannot afford mechanisation costs due to low incomes. Digitalising agricultural mechanisation services in Tanzania made it a feasible policy intervention to improve farming operations. It also contributed to farmers’ access to mechanisation services that enabled agricultural transformations and food security attainment. The policy intervention is to finance the e-mechanisation model, which allows farmers across the country to access e-mechanised services through the digital platform (Bahn et al. 2021). Leasing machinery rental through digital platforms has the potential to increase farm practices. The FAO (2022) study reveals the ICT and digital capacity status in 47 African countries where none has sufficiently utilised the ICT potential for digitalising agricultural policy. Of course, African countries are at different levels of ICT infrastructure development and ICT adaptations. The Government of Tanzania went digital by providing e-government services as a reform to improve efficiency, accountability, and transparency in governance. The introduction of e-government emphasises supporting internal and external clients in receiving transactions and services. Although Tanzania’s teledensity is low, the number of fixed and mobile cellular lines currently is 12 telephone lines per 1000 people (i.e. a teledensity of 1.2), and the number of mobile phone subscribers is 81 per 10,000 inhabitants. The government enacted the Information Communication Technology Policy 2003 (URT 2003), which facilitates e-Government services, including the digitalisation of agricultural policy. Within the digitalisation of agriculture in Tanzania, the Ministry of Agriculture conducts monitoring of food data, enabling the ministry to issue import and export permits to traders engaged in the food trade. The issuing of import and export permits is primarily done as a Government mechanism for monitoring food security based on food availability and price trend analysis. The MoA adapted ICT for the Agricultural and Trade Management Information System (ATMIS) to process online import and export permits. Traders can apply for export and import permits at www. [email protected]. Also, the government has put an optical fibre that assures Internet connectivity to implement the ICT policy. Despite the presence of optical fibre connectivity, many farmers are not able to access

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Table 8.2  ICT and Digitalisation Status in Tanzania THEME

INDICATOR

YEAR SCORE

Availability Access to electricity in rural areas (% of rural population) 2019 4G coverage (% of total coverage) 2019 2019 Mobile (device) ownership (% of the population) 2020 Secure access to Internet servers (per 1 million people) 2017 Availability of the latest technologies (index ranking 2019 1–7: not at all/to a great extent) Connectivity Mobile-cellular subscription (per 100 inhabitants) 2019 Active mobile broadband subscriptions (per 100 2017 inhabitants)

19.00 28.00 45.51 38.19 3.83 82.20 9.79 12,700

Source: FAO 2022

digitalised extension services in Tanzania. This is partly due to the lack of electricity in many rural areas where smallholder farmers are found. However, power infrastructure in Tanzania has been improving over time, with 19% of electricity distribution covering rural areas, compared to 73.2% in urban areas as of 2019 and about 11,070 public institutions connected to electricity (FAO 2022). This is shown in Table 8.2, following the successful implementation of structural economic reforms of 1980 that created a conducive and enabling environment for private telecommunication companies to flourish. By 2022, several public and private mobile operators will exist, including Vodacom, Tigo, Airtel, Zantel, Halotel, Smile, and the Tanzania Telecommunications Corporation (FAO 2022). The National Information Communication Technology Policy and the National Agriculture Policy enable the public and private sectors to practice the digitalisation of agricultural services. Table 8.3 indicates the practice of digitalising agricultural policy in Tanzania. Digital applications in agriculture are diverse, from agri-food, agribusiness, and production systems to policy processes. Bahn et al. (2021) identify and discuss the potential contributions of digital technologies to agri-food. The economic contribution of digital technologies is noted in increasing productivity and efficient resource use when used on-farm and downstream in value chains with supporting e-government services. For example, agricultural policies in Tanzania had targeted smallholder farmers to increase access to inputs since the 2006 Abuja declaration on fertiliser use in Africa (Wanzala 2011 p.14), when African leaders committed to

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Table 8.3  Practice of Digitalization of Agricultural Services Tittle of Technology

Author(s)

Digital Solution

Kilimo Akiba

Bizytech

Digital mobile data aggregator

Digital Mobile Africa ESRF Ministry of Agriculture

Digital savings for self-financing, smallholder farmers access to inputs. Linking farmers to agro-dealers-­ input suppliers, SMEs, and markets Digital extension services Processing online import and export permits

M-Agriculture Agricultural and Trade Management Information System (ATMIS Source: Author

increasing fertiliser use from 8 to 50 kg of nutrients per hectare. Even after ten years of CAADP implementation, agricultural performance targeting smallholder farmers through access to inputs has not maximally increased productivity. Nevertheless, the journey and practice have not been feasible because agricultural budgets have been lower than 10% of national budgets committed to CAADP (AU-NEPAD 2003; Brüntrup 2011). The case studies below are discussed to provide an empirical and in-depth analysis of the state of agricultural policy digitalisation in Tanzania for agricultural transformations and food security. Case Study 1: Savings at the Frontier Savings at the Frontier (SatF) project is a non-governmental project that was implemented in three African countries, Ghana, Zambia, and Tanzania, between 2015 and 2021, to realise the full potential of the African countries to attain food security. It is important to note that this project is a vivid case of private sector participation in the agricultural transformation stipulated in the CAADP, whereby the MasterCard Foundation, in collaboration with Oxford Policy Management (OPM), support a $17.6 million project (Resch 2017). In Tanzania, SatF project interventions aimed to mitigate the challenge of smallholder farmers’ access to agricultural inputs due to insufficient financial capacity to procure inputs and access to bank credits and reach out to the unserved groups (OPM). The project objective was to motivate a savings culture for inputs amongst smallholder farmers’ group savings using mobile network operator (MNO) mobile

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wallets. The overriding Theory of Change was that the project would inculcate a saving culture for inputs instead of bank loans with high-­ interest rates; this will eventually enhance farmers’ capacity in buying inputs using their own sources. SatF project in Tanzania worked with Bizy Tech private company as the partner who built Kilimo Data Hub (KDH) with digital solutions for saving culture. The digitised platform links farmers to their group wallets and other actors in the value chain, including banks and agro-input suppliers (OPM). The SatF project transformed the policy landscape of agriculture by transforming Informal Savings Mechanism (ISM) into digitalised savings kept in bank group accounts. The Farmers Digital Savings Solution (FDSS) has benefited farmers and the public and private organisations to access farmers’ data and use it to regulate and increase the volume of food produced from the farm level (see Mushi et al. 2022). Therefore, Savings at the Frontier is a digital saving concept and practice for increasing smallholder farmers’ access to inputs and enhancing farm productivity through digital financial inclusion. Due to inadequate finances, smallholder farmers have multiple problems, including a lack of access to inputs (fertilisers, seeds, chemicals). Farmers’ access to inputs is low due to inadequate financial capacity, unpredictable or uneven market information, and stiff credit from financial institutions due to lack of or inadequate collateral. The digital savings approach develops farmers’ saving culture to make savings for purchasing agricultural inputs. The aim is to increase fertiliser use from less than 9 kgs per ha to 50 kgs per ha, as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) recommended (African Union-NEPAD 2003). The fertiliser use as per the CAADP target is barely attained due to smallholder farmers’ inability to purchase fertiliser. Fertiliser prices in Tanzania have been increasing from Tsh69,000 to Tsh120 000 per 50 kg, depending on the type of fertiliser and distance from Dar-es-Salaam port. In the long run, smallholder farmers have become unable to access and use the recommended fertiliser due to high prices and the inability to buy during the farming season. In light of the ToC, enabling farmers’ savings increases their purchasing power and improved inputs (fertilisers, seeds, and pesticides) because of increased yield, income, food security, and reduced poverty. Digitalised savings through homegrown FinTechs have enabled farmers to develop a saving culture (e.g. Wang and He 2020), which in Tanzania and other African countries has been realised through mobile money payments. In this light, savings at the frontier encourages digital savings culture for

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increasing smallholder farmers’ access to fertiliser. This is an application of ICT for digital savings for Inputs as a technology innovation that provides a solution to smallholder farmers to increase access to farm inputs. For example, a Press release statement by Grameen Foundation in Arusha on May 29, 2017, titled Digital Toolkit to Give Tanzania Smallholder Farmers Access to Finance, Farm Supplies and Training, mentioned that this project is likely to address issues of low food production by small-scale farmers in Tanzania. In particular, The project will span eighteen months, including a six-month research and development stage and a twelve-month pilot stage to test the Toolkit with 15 Positive International dealers and 15,000 smallholders in Arusha and Mbeya regions. It will mainly focus on maize and beans, which are by far the most important crops in the local area. For example, in Arusha – one of the project sites, the two crops cover about 150,000 hectares but yield gaps of 213 per cent for maize and 152 per cent for beans. Increased uptake of quality inputs alone could potentially, boost yields by 150 per cent with a significant impact on household food security and income. (Grameen Foundation 2017)3

This statement further specifically noted that The potential market for the Digital Inputs Financing Toolkit in Tanzania numbers in the millions, said Karan Kapoor, the Managing director of Positive International. “Millions of smallholder farmers in Tanzania need access to affordable, high-quality inputs. We are piloting the product with 15 dealers in the next 18 months, targeting 15,000 farmers to prove its uptake and sustainability. From there, we plan to expand it to our full network of 500 dealers in Tanzania, without creating any new infrastructure”. (ibid)

Further to this, to address the problem of inadequate data on how to effectively finance small-scale farmers in Tanzania, Digital Mobile Africa (DMA), another private company, “aims to create a super-agent platform to help manage a network of SMEs and farmers on behalf of MNOs, FSPs and Input companies – merging mobile money onramps and offramp services, savings, credit and input supply chain inventory management 3  See https://grameenfoundation.org/stories/press-releases/digital-toolkit-to-givetanzania-smallholder-farmers-access-to-finance-farm-supplies-and-training

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systems” (Mercy Corps, Mar 30, 2021)4. DMA has, by 2021, linked approximately “5,000 farmers, 95 village-based agro-dealers and 5 input suppliers on the platform and tested the interaction across input transactions. Within 3 weeks of integrating input suppliers onto the platform, DMA collected 5,251 orders worth TZS 599 million” (Mercy Corps, ibid). Digital savings has revolutionised how farmers accessed finance in the past, when they made savings through groups or used paper-based information that disadvantaged the savings culture. Digital saving scales up from conventional savings to digital savings and transactions. The digital savings ensure that farmers can access agricultural inputs that can now be ordered and paid for digitally. Intrinsic to the model is that farmers are motivated to save money digitally and order inputs to agro-input providers through a digital platform. Case Study 2: Digitalizing Agriculture Policy Monitoring Monitoring is a systematic process of collecting routine data for tracking policy or programme progress using inputs and achieving outputs against targets. Policy actors’ interest is to collect facts on the use of policy inputs to deliver outputs (Waterman et  al. 2020; Alila and Hyden 2021). According to UNDP (2011), monitoring agriculture policy is a continuous process of collecting and analysing data to determine how well a policy or development programme is being implemented. Therefore, conventional monitoring collects routine data on resource utilisation on the intended objectives, activities, and schedules to produce outputs (goods and public services) for tracking key performance indicators (KPIs). Usually, the physical teams of M & E experts visit projects being implemented. Digitalised policy monitoring enables the monitoring of programmes and projects by collecting routine data based on agreed targets in real time, which help assess if the programme objectives are moving in the direction of implementation. It cannot be over-emphasised that digitalised M & E is a vital tool to help governments and institutions improve performance and accountability in real time. From 2008/09 to 2011/12, the Government of Tanzania implemented the National Agricultural Inputs Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) with 4  See https://www.mercycorpsagrifin.org/2021/03/30/new-digital-super-agent-modelfor-agriculture-bringing-financial-services-and-last-mile-input-supplies-to-smallholder-farmers-in-tanzania/

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the US $299 million World Bank’s support on Food Security Programme. The programme objectives were to increase productivity and production by improving 2.5 million smallholder farmers’ access to improved agricultural inputs and increasing agricultural technology adoption by subsidising the prices of improved seeds and fertilisers in targeted areas. The targeted farmers in the NAIVS subsidy voucher scheme were required to purchase one 50 kg bag of DAP, two 50 kg bags of Urea, and ten kg of seeds per acre from the engaged agro-dealers. The latter was expected to accept vouchers as government payments of 50% of the total input value and, after that, redeem the vouchers from the National Micro-Finance Bank (NMB) to recover their money. The National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (NAIVS) was adopted to intensify food production by giving farmers better access to inputs under accelerated food security. The National Agricultural Inputs Voucher System aimed to increase technology adoption by targeting maize and small rice farmers in Tanzania (URT 2013). NAIVS is among the government approaches for supporting smallholder farmers by subsidising prices of improved seeds and fertilisers for farmers’ poverty reduction. Assessment of agricultural subsidies has received mixed outcomes. Some studies indicate positive outcomes of increasing productivity and contribution to farmers’ increased production (also see Ortiz-Crespo et al. 2021), income, food security, and livelihoods, while others have not performed well. Poor governance and lack of effective monitoring of the subsidy have been cited as the cause of the agricultural subsidies. The structural and governance pattern in the National Agricultural Inputs Voucher System (NAIVS) facilitated manual budgetary, procurement, and delivery functions to farmers’ end users. The governance structures included the National Voucher Steering Committee, Regional Voucher Committees, District Voucher Committees, Ward Agricultural Inputs Committees, and Village Voucher Committees (Fig. 8.2) The National Voucher Steering Committee (NVSC) was the overall overseer of the NAIVS. NVSC was chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture (URT, 2009). It comprises representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Prime Minister’s Office, Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), and the National Micro-Finance Bank as financial institutions. One of the functions of NVSC was to allocate and distribute vouchers to regions. The regions received the allocated vouchers, which were then allocated and distributed to districts. The district allocated and distributed

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Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives

National NAIVS STAKEHOLDER FORA

National Voucher Steering Comittee

National Microfinance Bank

Regional Voucher Steering Comittee

District NAIVS STAKEHOLDER FORA

District Voucher Steering Comittee

Agro-Dealers

Village Council and Village Government

Village Voucher Comittee (VVC)

Beneficiary Farmers

Fig. 8.2  Governance Structure of NAIVS. Source: Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, 2009

vouchers to Wards (Ward voucher steering committees). The ward inputs committees allocated and distributed input vouchers to selected villages with Village Voucher Committees. The implementation and delivery of subsidy inputs were ineffective in terms of the inability to monitor the delivery of agricultural inputs timely before the farming season. In most areas, the farming season begins between November and December, but the inputs subsidy vouchers get to farmers between December and February (Holden and Lunduka, 2010, Kato, 2013). The evaluation indicated that inputs were delivered to farmers out of farming seasons. No application of information and communication technology could have facilitated information on how and where the input delivery process could be expedited. Providing input subsidies has been one of the agricultural policy interventions to promote and increase productivity and production in most African countries. Increasing fertiliser use for increasing agriculture productivity is given high priority in the CAADP through the country’s

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budgetary allocations and agricultural subsidies. However, the manual input subsidy distribution and management had challenges of late distribution, non-targeted farmers benefiting from the subsidy, and non-accountability. The lack of digital monitoring of NAIVS caused the failure of agricultural subsidies. With ICT adoption, agricultural input subsidy programmes are likely to improve. Due to its monitoring and targeting abilities, the expected benefits of using digital technology for agricultural policy include increased effectiveness and efficiency (Ehlers et al. 2021). The empirical evidence from the NAIVS performance evaluation indicated a challenge for non-targeted farmers benefiting from NAIVS. It was observed that the well-to-do farmers and people with political powers had more access to NAIVS resources than the targeted farmers. Although this was more of human nepotism, corruption, and weak capacity of VVC, it could have been better with the use of a digitalised database of farmers to benefit from the input subsidy scheme. Distribution of fertilisers and improved seeds was done manually through the agro-dealers network. The agro-dealers was a network of private agricultural input traders who agreed and entered into a contract with district voucher committees to stock and sell fertilisers and improved seeds to farmers using government-subsidised vouchers. The agro-dealers were required to apply through the District Executive Directors to be nominated and certified as agro-dealer suppliers every farming season. The use of agro-dealers for the input supply and distribution worked perfectly. However, there were complaints from agro-dealers about delays in processing their financial requests by the government that led to not receiving money from NMB. These could have improved the timely distribution of inputs to farmers by digitalising the input subsidy programme. To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of agriculture input subsidy, in 2022, the Government of Tanzania has adopted a digitalised fertiliser subsidy system. Table  8.4.  below  describes how the Government of Tanzania adopts digital technology applications to improve agriculture input subsidy performance. It indicates that Tanzania require 250,000 metric tons of fertiliser to get into the subsidy system, this includes 150,000 tons of Urea, 90,000 DAP, and 10,000 other fertilisers with the value of Tanzanian Shillings 685,756,600,000 ($298,155,043.48) (URT, 2022). To improve the implementation of agriculture subsidy systems, the Government use Kilimo Data Hub (KDH), the electronic system for

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Table 8.4  Fertiliser Subsidy Requirement 2022 Sn

TYPE OF FERTILISER

Mtons

COSTS (TZS)

SUBSIDY (40%)

1 2 3

Urea DAP Other

150,000 90,000 10,000

353,676,000,000 319,080,600,000 13,000,000,000

141,470,400,000 127,632,240,000 5,200,000,000

250,000

685,756,600,000

274,302,640,000

TOTAL Source 3: Ministry of Agriculture, 2022

Digital Input Distribution Flow

Farmer Organization

FO 1

Delivery

FO 2

Profiled led Farmer e-Wallet et ID Press Orders

Order Aggregation (ferilizer, Seeds, Pesticides and Packaging)

Inputs Supplier Portal See aggregated Demand

*149*46*3 #  WEB Portal

 Village Based Physical Agents

Farmer Organization Farmer Groups, AMCOS, SACCOS, Irrigation Schemes etc

FO 3

Payment to supplier from BTL A/C

 Mobile Applications

 USSD Code

Fig. 8.3  KDH Digitalised Fertiliser/Input Distribution and Management System. Source: Bizy Tech, 2022

monitoring, to overcome fraud loopholes and improve delivery management, efficiency on time, and costs. The digital M & E system coordinates all subsidy programme value chains ranging from producers, importers, agro-dealers, stockiest, farmers, and banks for repayment as the primary implementation actors of the agriculture input subsidy system (Fig. 8.3). The KDH digital platform is used to register agriculture actors in the fertiliser subsidy value chain to facilitate management and ensure that subsidies reach the targeted beneficiaries. In addition, the fertiliser subsidy system uses a QR code to identify the designated fertiliser companies, type of fertiliser, and the fertiliser bag number at a point of delivery where

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farmers buy the fertiliser. Agro-dealers (traders) are required to install QR codes on the fertiliser bags in their warehouses or shops, which send the diagnostic information to the digital system.

Conclusion and Recommendations The digitalisation of agricultural policy brings more hope for improving policy processes in the sector. However, not all public policy actors and stakeholders have access to digital infrastructure such as websites and Internet connectivity, which can be a problem. In Tanzania, there is still  limited digital literacy, and therefore digital divide between and within geography (rural/urban), social-economic classes, demographics (young/old; men/women, etc.) are a common feature of the digitalisation process, including in the Agricultural sector. There is no doubt that digitalisation of agricultural policy is a new phenomenon in the policymaking process  in Tanzania, as in most countries in Africa. This means the digitalisation of agricultural policies in Tanzania faces challenges ranging from digital literacy to availability and access to power-related problems. An interview with SAPPA noted that “over the last 10 years Africa continent has leapfrogged in the telecommunications realm.” Most importantly, for the digitalisation of agricultural policy to happen in Africa, there should be a political will to adopt the agricultural sector’s technological change. This goes with readiness to increase budgetary investment (Baumuller and Addom 2000). As already shown in other chapters in this volume, lack of adequate political will in most African countries is a critical policy outcome determinant hindering effective and contextually informed digitalisation process, and the Tanzanian case of Agricultural policy is not an  exception. One of the  ways of dealing with this concern should include coming up with well-developed national and regional fibre connections to enable fast Internet connections required for digital agricultural policies dialogue, information sharing, implementation, extension and advisory services, trade, and markets of agricultural goods. This will allow liberalisation of the policy process by allowing a more decentered decision-making, innovation and funding endeavours. Investing in both national and regional fibre optic cables will realise necessary conditions  for effective digitalisation of Agricultural  Policy (see e.g. Vasa et al. 2017’s studies in Western Balkan countries). These include

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broadband and Internet access and affordability, ICT literacy and ICT education for policy technocrats and decision-makers, and ICT facilities and infrastructure. Even though challenges remain  with realising  these infrastructural requirements in Africa and Tanzania, in particular, digitalising agricultural policymaking process is a paradigm shift in the continent, with a move from the conventional physical meetings in the policy cycle. The new technologies can be used to define agricultural policy problems, from extension services to financing or post-harvest management. Digitalising agricultural policy provides promises for improving efficiency and effectiveness in achieving policy outcomes. It has been observed in this chapter that digitalising policy monitoring and evaluation is more likely to  improve  real time or timely data collection and reporting to inform policy process and decision-making  in the Agricultural sector, as in other policy sectors or subsystems. This way, governments need to increase financing of digital adoption in Agricultural policymaking in order to realise efficiency and effectiveness  needed to create reliable food distribution systems in Africa. This should include building the capacity for digital literacy among all stakeholders and policy actors involved in the specific Agriculture policy community and related sectors like finance and the food manufacturing industry. Furthermore, concerned government agencies need to digitalise monitoring and evaluation of agricultural policies in order to ensure timely sharing of  information on how projects, programmes, and policies are implemented and meet the expected outcomes. Lastly,  since the digitalisation of the policy process requires telecommunication networks, and since some institutions and stakeholders are not connected to the Internet to overcome the challenges of digitalisation of agricultural policy in Africa, the government and relevant stakeholders need to increase budget allocation toward creating high Internet speed for faster connectivity. This should be accompanied by an increase in access to  electricity and improving  the  capacity  of electric power agencies and companies to produce and disseminate cheaper electricity, and network for consistent power supply, and reduce Internet costs in order  to make it affordable to allow widespread or more  inclusive  digitalised agricultural policy dialogues.

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Ortiz-Crespo, B., J. Steinke, C.F. Quirós, J. van de Gevel, H. Daudi, M. Gaspar Mgimiloko, and J. van Etten. 2021. User-centred Design of a Digital Advisory Service: Enhancing Public Agricultural Extension for Sustainable Intensification in Tanzania. International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 19 (5-6, 566): –582. Resch, E. 2017. Savings at the Frontier. UK: Oxford Policy Management. SADC. 2015. SADC Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan. Gaborone: giZ. Tsan, Michael, Swetha Totapally, Michael Hailu, and Benjamin K. Addom. 2019. The Digitalisation of African Agriculture Report 2018–2019. Wageningen, The Netherlands: CTA/Dalberg Advisers. https://cgspace.cgiar.org/ handle/10568/101498. UNDP. 2011. Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results. New York: United Nations Development Programme. URT. 2003. National Information and Communications Technologies Policy. Policy, March, 28. http://www.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/ictpolicy.pdf ———. 2009. National Agriculture Inputs Subsidy Voucher Scheme. Dar Es Salaam: Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. ———. 2011. Tanzania Agriculture and Food Security Investment Plan (Issue October 2011). Ministry of Agriculture. ———. 2013. Tanzania Agriculture Policy. Ministry of Agriculture Food Security and Cooperatives, 17. ———. 2017. Agricultural Sector Development Strategy-II. Asdp Ii. ———. 2022. Speech by the Minister of Agriculture, Estimated Income and Expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture for the Year 2022/2023, 148–149. Dodoma: Ministry of Agriculture. Vasa, Laszlo, Aleksandra Angeloska, and Nikola M. Trendov. 2017. Comparative Analysis of Circular Agriculture Development in Selected Western Balkan Countries Based on Sustainable Performance Indicators. Economic AnnalsXXI 168 (11/12): 44–47. Wang, X., and G. He. 2020. Digital Financial Inclusion and Farmers’ Vulnerability to Poverty: Evidence from Rural China. Sustainability 12 (4): 1668. Wanzala, M. 2011. Seventh Progress Report: Implementation of the Abuja Declaration on Fertilizer for an African Green Revolution. June. http://www. inter-­reseaux.org/IMG/pdf/Seventh_Progress_Report_Abuja_Declaration_ FINAL_June_2011.pdf Waterman, Amy D., Ana P. Rossi, Emily H. Wood, and Omesh N. Ranasinghe. 2020. Why Policy Changes May Be Necessary but Not Sufficient in Overcoming Disparities. Kidney International Reports 5 (9): 1385. Yeboah-Assiamah, E., C.M. Damoah, and J.N. Bawole. 2022. Open Innovation Systems and Public Policy in Africa: Setting New Boundaries Against Wicked Problems. In Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 599–611. London: Routledge.

CHAPTER 9

Information Technology, the Complexity of Joint Action, and Child Protection Policy Implementation in Kenya Zedekia Sidha and Nixon Amuomo

Introduction Public policy implementation remains the most challenging aspect of governance in Africa and one of the areas in the subfields of public administration that has received considerable attention from leading scholars in the discipline globally (Sidha et  al. 2021; Johns and VanNijnatten, 2022). However, implementation failure is widespread, and practitioners continue trying to find ways to deal with the problem to eventually turn policy objectives into results or outcomes (Li et al., 2022). In Kenya, as in most African countries, one of the areas with a wide gap between policy promises and outcomes is child protection. Although the country has a robust

Z. Sidha (*) National Defence College, National Defence University-Kenya, Nakuru, Kenya N. Amuomo Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computing, Rongo University (RU), Rongo, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_9

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legal and policy framework, as evidenced by the Bill of Rights in Kenya’s constitution 2010, the Child Protection Policy 2010, the Children’s Act, the Sexual Offences Act, and the Basic Education Act, child protection issues are still prevalent (Omondi 2022). An analysis of the Kenya Child Protection data portal revealed that 105,863 children were affected by different forms of violence against children (VAC), of which negligence accounted for 53.84 per cent of the cases, custody for 21.32 per cent, abandonment for 5.31 per cent, defilement for 3.62 per cent, parental abduction for 2.38 per cent, and physical abuse/violence for 2.14 per cent. Others were emotional abuse (0.93%), child pregnancy (1.15%), child marriage (0.71%), abduction (1.51%), child delinquency (0.75%), child truancy (1.51%), lost and found children (1.26%), orphaned child (2.62%), and registration (0.97%). The analysis showed that 94.5 per cent of all VAC cases occurred in family settings and were committed by people known to them, while many children abused drugs and lived on the streets (Ji et al., 2022). The policy framing regarding the implementation of child rights policies also remains problematic, besides being loosely enforced by the Kenyan government (see Ngutuku 2022). As part of the implementation process of the Children’s Act 2001, the government established the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) to coordinate child protection issues in Kenya, with a presence in all 47 counties. Over time children’s offices have been opened in 283 of the 290 sub-­ counties in Kenya. Additionally, there are 14 children’s remand homes, nine children’s rehabilitation homes, five children’s rescue centres, and two Child Protection Centres (CPCs) in Malindi and Nakuru. Also, two Reception, Assessment, and Classification Centres and a toll-free Child Helpline 116 have been created. In light of the multi-sectoral nature of child protection, the government developed a national child protection framework for Kenya in 2011. The framework identifies various agencies involved in child protection and their roles. Therefore, it is clear that a responsive public policy is not only in place but also being implemented. To this end, the policy failure remains a significant implementation problem in Kenya. In their seminal work, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984 outlined the complexity of joint action as one of the key explanatory factors for implementation failure. This failure mainly occurs because many public policies require more than one government department or organisation to implement, which brings about coordination problems. According to Pressman and Wildvasky, there are five main ways in which policy coordination can

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bring policy implementation failure: direct incompatibility with other commitments of the implementing agency from which implementation help or contribution is sought; the policy objectives’ incompatibility with those of the implementing agency from which help is being sought; the agency from which contribution is sought has a simultaneous commitment, which it cannot abandon to undertake activities sought from their department; the organisation from which implementation contribution is sought does not see a sense of urgency in the implementation process; and leadership or procedural differences between the coordinating agency and the agency from which implementation effort is sought. Implementing Kenya’s Child Protection Policy requires joint efforts from various government departments, including education, health, judiciary, police, and social services. Moreover, a considerable number of child protection policies are being implemented by non-governmental and international organisations. It was expected that the introduction of the Child Protection Information Management System (CPIMS) would ensure that all child protection information is amassed in one place. The government defines CPIMS as a child-focused database designed to 1. Facilitate policy monitoring and evaluation of child protection interventions, that is, to inform policy and evidence-based decision-making in Kenya, 2. Provide access to accurate, timely, and reliable aggregate-level child protection data 3. Facilitate record keeping and information management on individual cases of child protection, 4. Track vulnerable children longitudinally and geographically to ensure continuity of care and protection, including children in institutional care, 5. Facilitate appropriate information sharing between stakeholders and service providers in the child’s best interest, 6. Be flexible and extensible over time to cater for emerging needs in the children’s sector. In the end, this should allow policymakers to rescue children from any harm and place them in a safe location, find alternative family care (adoption, foster care, guardianship, kinship, kafaala), ensure family re-integration and re-unification, and track and support children in conflict with the law through the child justice system and legal and rehabilitation processes. It should also allow government officials to arbitrate, supervise (with or without court orders), establish parental bonds through written promises and joint parental agreements, and provide support services (counselling, family support)1. 1  See https://www.socialprotection.go.ke/children-protection-information-managementsystem-cpims/.

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By its design, CPIMS, as an implementation policy instrument, is ­embedded in and demands well-coordinated joint actions among stakeholders and implementing institutions, which falls under the State Department for Social Protection, Senior Citizens Affairs, and Special Programmes. Thus, in this chapter, we examine the contribution of CPIMS as a policy tool in enhancing the coordination of child protection issues among policy actors in Kenya. In the next section, we begin by exploring the state of Child Policy and its objectives in Kenya, followed by an overview of the “complexity of joint action” concept used in public policy implementation literature. The third section looks into the efforts the Kenyan government is making to foster PolicyTechs, before empirically examining the contribution of the CPIMS system to Child Protection Policy coordination. Finally, section four provides conclusions. This chapter’s discussion is based on primary and secondary data sources. The primary sources were extracted from child protection and information systems management experts and Directorate of Children Services (DCS) staff through Key Informant Interviews (KII). The KIIs were carried out during the stakeholder consultation meeting in Nairobi on the Visualisation of Data on CPIMS, which was part of the University of Nairobi’s HealthIT project held in November 2021, where about 15 DCs staff were engaged. The secondary sources were collected from the child protection management portal (CPIMS). The data collected through statistical abstracts in the CPIMS was entered into the SPSS data editor and MS Excel for processing. Descriptive statistics were then generated to explore trends, the spread, and the nature of child protection policy problems in Kenya. The qualitative data was analysed using predetermined thematic codes.

The State of Child Protection Policy Problems in Kenya Children’s rights in Kenya are protected under different international and municipal laws. To begin with, Article 53 of the Constitution (Republic of Kenya 2010) emphasises the right of all children to be protected from abuse, neglect, harmful cultural practices2, violence, inhumane treatment, punishment, and hazardous or exploitative labour (Government of Kenya 2

 https://www.unicef.org/kenya/child-protection

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2010). The Constitution also states that all international laws the country has ratified become part of its domestic laws. Kenya is a member state of the following conventions: the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Some of the municipal laws on children’s rights in Kenya include the Children Act of 2021; the Sexual Offences Act 2006; the Persons with Disabilities (Amendment) Act, 2019; the Basic Education Act No. 14 of 2013; and the Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) Act of 2011, among others. Despite all these efforts by the government and other agencies, children’s rights violations are still commonplace in Kenya. For instance, 105,863 VAC cases were reported in 2020/2021. According to the Child Rights International Network (CRIN), children in Kenya frequently face gross violations of their rights, including female genital mutilation; early marriage; child labour; trafficking and prostitution of children; violence; corporal punishment; torture and other degrading treatment; low criminal age of criminal responsibility; delinquency; defilement; and neglect, among others (CRIN, 2012). According to a Violence against Children Survey by the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection (MLSP) in 2019, one out of every two young adults in Kenya was violated in childhood. The survey established that 46 per cent and 52 per cent of women and men aged 18 to 24 faced at least one form of violence – physical, emotional, or sexual abuse – during their childhood. The report noted that child marriage prevalence among girls stood at 23 per cent (MLSP 2019). Table 9.1 summarises statistics on some of Kenya’s most common child protection issues. It shows that some commonly reported cases include neglect, custody disputes, abandonment, and defilement. Increased publicity about child protection issues and awareness about various support services offered by the government have resulted in increased reporting of cases of children’s rights violations. The graph flattened in 2020/2021 when child protection centres had been created in most parts of the country – the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 increased sexual abuse and exploitation of girls. This resulted in increased teenage pregnancies and child marriages. However, the number stabilised when schools were reopened in 2021 (Fig. 9.1). Most child protection cases occur between zero and five years of age. During these ages, more boys’ rights are abused compared to girls. The most frequent violations in the early years are neglect, abandonment, parental adduction, and custody issues. However, as they grow older,

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Table 9.1 Case categories

Case category

No. cases

Abandoned 5617.00 Abduction 596.00 Child delinquency 791.00 Child marriage 749.00 Child pregnancy 1213.00 Child truancy 1601.00 Custody 22,573.00 Defilement 3829.00 Emotional abuse 985.00 Lost and found 1331.00 Neglect 56,992.00 Orphaned child 2775.00 Parental abduction 2518.00 Physical abuse/violence 2265.00 Registration 1028.00 TOTAL 105,863.00

% cases 5% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 21% 4% 1% 1% 54% 3% 2% 2% 1% 100%

Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal

Fig. 9.1  Trend analysis of CPIMS reported cases. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal

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Fig. 9.2  Visualisation by age. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal

more girls are violated, with the most common violation being sexual exploitation and abuse, including defilement (Fig. 9.2). The data also indicates a surge in the reporting of cases during February, June, and September. Discussions with DCS officers indicated that cases of neglect are often not easy to report unless a child has been sent out of school. This results in most cases being reported immediately after school opening (Fig. 9.3). Another area where child rights violations are rising is online sexual exploitation and abuse. According to UNICEF, unsupervised teenagers comprise 25 per cent of Kenya’s Internet users, and 42 per cent of Kenyan children and young adults between the ages of 12 and 17 access the Internet at least twice a week (UNODC 2020). Similarly, a report released in 2021 titled Disrupting Harm in Kenya3 shows that between five and 13 per cent of children aged 12–17 using the Internet reported experiencing online child sexual exploitation and abuse in the year preceding the study. This number is likely higher as many children do not disclose it. A report by ChildFund on online child protection expresses 3  https://www.end-violence.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/DH%20Kenya%20 Report.pdf

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Fig. 9.3  Case reporting by month. Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal

concern over the rising cases of online child exploitation, which has negatively affected children in terms of exposure to HIV/AIDS, school dropouts, unwanted pregnancies, and post-traumatic stress disorder. In the same vein, in a 2021 report, ChildFund observed that seven per cent of children aged 12–17 had shared sexual images online, while four per cent were blackmailed into engaging in sexual activities. Also, Terre des hommes Netherlands noted that 10 per cent of children in Kenya had been approached for sex online. Therefore, it is evident that online child abuse is present in the country and might soon become a pandemic if action is not taken to prevent it. While the government’s steps to legislate and set up an office to fight against online child abuse are commendable, the war is far from over until it is proven that the perpetrators of such acts and crimes are arrested, and stiff penalties are instituted against them. While child protection cases have been reported, 50 per cent of these are unresolved. This phenomenon relates to the department being overwhelmed by the number of reported cases. Figure  9.4 provides a summary of the current interventions by DCS.

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Fig. 9.4  Summary of current interventions by DCS.  Source: Kenya Child Protection Data, Kenya Child Protection data portal

Understanding the Complexity of Joint Policy Action In their prescription for policy implementation success, Pressman and Wildavsky 1984 advise policymakers to find direct ways of executing their policy proposals without involving many agencies. In a rejoinder to this discussion, O’Toole and Montjoy (1984, p. 3) assert that “the mandating authority’s ability to induce action declines with the number of units involved”. There are a variety of reasons why intergenerational policy implementation is problematic. Implementation cooperation mainly occurs in the following circumstances: 1) if the contributing agencies see their contributions as part of their core mandate, 2) if there are shared interests in the policy outcome, and 3) if there is actual or expected reciprocal action from the mandating organisation. However, these conditions are hard to come by for various reasons. The national assembly sets up various organisations to fulfil specific policy mandates (Sidha 2017). Government departments develop strategies, work plans, budgets, and result frameworks to fulfil these mandates. Their performance is thus measured based on how they perform their core mandate. Therefore, while they may collaborate and carry out activities of

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sister departments, this can only be done during their free time. This phenomenon often results in delays in the policy implementation process. These challenges may be further compounded in scenarios of goal incompatibility. For instance, the principal mandate of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights is to protect all citizens’ rights. More often, they need support from the police to execute their mandate. The primary mandate of the police is to maintain law and order. Certain situations, such as the fight against terrorism, may require using reasonable force, which may be considered a human rights violation. There may also be cases where there is no direct incompatibility between goals of the mandated and contributing organisations but preference for other programmes. This occurs when there is no direct opposition between the policy objectives and the objectives of the partner organisation. However, the issues which the policy intends to address are not its priorities. For instance, while the implementation of road safety policy is part of the mandate for traffic police officers, their main preoccupation, especially in Nairobi, is traffic control. In the case of Economic Development Administration (EDA), the staff’s priorities were creating jobs in rural areas. They were not opposed to job creation in urban areas, but that was not their priority. The contributing agency may have a simultaneous commitment to other projects. Therefore, they cannot leave their project, which requires much attention to implementing the new policy. Sometimes the partner’s complete attention may be difficult to attain because the new policy may be enacted when the staff in their organisation are busy implementing a different project. Sometimes implementation challenges arise from dependency on others who lack a sense of urgency in the project. The implementation process may also be slowed since the implementing partner does not see any urgency in the project. For instance, the implementation process may require approval of the road engineer who lacks a sense of urgency for the project. Also, the development of a new plant may require an assessment and approval by the national environmental management authority, which may, however, not see the urgency of the project (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984) Pressman and Wildavsky 1984 also highlighted the difference in opinion on leadership and proper organisational roles as a grey area in policy coordination. The disagreement could also be over which agency should take the lead during the policy implementation process, that is, which staff members and departments should spearhead the policy implementation process. Placement of a policy issue in the wrong department can make

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implementation coordination difficult and negatively impact policy outcomes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). In Kenya, for instance, the National AIDS Control Council was placed under the president’s office rather than the Ministry of Health, despite AIDS being a health issue. Finally, there may be legal and procedural differences. The disagreement in the implementation process can also emerge as a result of the legal mandates of the different organisations and the implementation procedures. In addition, organisations tend to develop routines, or standard operating procedures, by which personnel interact in regular and predictable ways to solve recurring and predictable problems. Yet, by promoting cooperation in certain directions, these devices may limit the ability of an organisation’s personnel to achieve cooperation in other directions. Despite these problems, inter-organisational cooperation is important to public policy implementation. The increasing connectedness between policy proposals is part of the reason for network building and collaborative implementation. For example, while building a road may appear to be an easy task involving only road engineers, when the project starts one has to be content with the issue of expected environmental degradation, noise pollution, and relocation of houses. Other authorities automatically come into play. Moreover, governments are involved in international treaties and conventions, such as multispectral sustainable development goals or Agenda 2063, which predispose them to enter a joint action scenario. In addition, even in cases where projects involve a small array of issues, politics in the policy implementation process tends to broaden the policy mandates. This is especially so when politicians try to use the existing policies to respond to the needs of their constituents that may not have been outlined during the policymaking process (O’Toole 2003). Arising from the above discussion, there is an urgent need to understand the management of inter-­ organisational relations during the policy implementation process. Thompson (1967) posits a simple typology for the intra-organisational context: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence. Sometimes agencies implement pooled interdependence because they operate upon the same object during implementation (see Table 9.2). Even if the total impact of their efforts would be enhanced by coordination, no organisation requires anything from another to do its part of the job. Because of the constraints on inter-organisational relations, sequential operating interdependence is a case where the obligations of one unit may end before the other starts. In reciprocal interdependence, the organisation has an

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Table 9.2  Types of interdependencies in organisations S/N Relationship type

Advantages

Disadvantages

1 2

Pooled Sequential

No coordination cost Limited coordination cost, given that activities occur one after the other

3

Reciprocal interdependence

Limited coordination cost and collaboration are not dependent on the bureaucratic power of the mandated agency

No way of enforcing the decision Vulnerable to sabotage given that implementation by actor B cannot begin until actor A finalises its part It is not easy to predict policy outcomes, given that implementation is dependent on bargains by different collaborating agencies

Source: Adapted from Bree (2021)

exchange relationship between its different parts. An example of such a relationship is among the police, courts, and prison facilities. The prisons must wait for the offenders to be charged in courts of law; the courts also wait for the offenders to be arrested and presented by police officers. As will be shown in our empirical discussion, these joint action dilemmas are commonplace in implementing Child Protection Policy in Kenya, and CPIMS is anticipated to ease the process.

Fostering PolicyTechs as Policy Tools in Kenya The Kenyan government has a wide range of ICT initiatives and ongoing projects on ICT policy implementation, including The Konza City, County Connectivity projects, National Terrestrial Fibre Optic Network, Digital Migration, eLearning, Laptop Programme, Digital Learning Programme, Presidential Digital Talent Programme, Digital Inclusion (Pasha Centres/Digital Villages), Business Process Outsourcing, Local Content Programme, and Information Security. Citizens can access services from the comfort of their home or business premises through this robust infrastructure laid down by the government. Over 200 government services are accessible online at Huduma centres across the country. The government has enhanced Internet connectivity through partnerships with partners such as Telkom Kenya and Google East Africa. These have enabled youth to access opportunities through Ajira Digital platforms that support online learning and digital literacy programmes. With such

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an investment, the government can implement and roll out policies to citizens towards achieving Vision 2030. In particular, e-Government services in Kenya are one of the government’s priorities in realising the national development plan or Vision 2030. The public can access several public services offered by various Government Ministries, Departments, and Agencies through the e-­Citizen web portal. These include payment of taxes through iTax; renewal of drivers’ licences; business registration, passport application, and death and birth certificates, among others. Through the assistance of the ICT Authority, all 47 counties have ICT Roadmaps aligned to the National ICT Masterplan and the local county development plans. This supports counties in providing their citizens with the best, most cost-effective ICT-­ enabled services and resources. The roadmaps have also assisted the county governments in investing in ICT, consistent with the best practices globally, and the shared ICT services with the national government and the ICT infrastructure of neighbouring counties. The key approaches identified in the implementation of the roadmaps include connectivity and interoperability, human capital and workforce development, infrastructure and policy environment, and legal framework for public service delivery. As is the case globally, the Kenyan ICT sector has grown. This has resulted in the massive growth of the socioeconomic and business operations resulting from global digitisation. The Kenyan government has not been left behind in embracing digitisation in its practices and procedures. The country’s ICT sector has facilitated the reduction in the cost of communication, enhanced market information, and ease of doing business. Reddick and Anthopoulos (2015) note that the basic target for any e-­Government is to support a whole cycle of public policies. This cycle includes diagnosing and understanding society’s needs to plan and implement appropriate policies to meet them. Therefore, e-Government should be used for good governance, increased communication with citizens, cooperative implementation of planned programmes and services based on workflow management systems, immediate delivery of services through multiple physical and electronic channels, and evaluations of produced services by using e-democracy software. In general, e-Government tools can catalyse a massive wave of cultural change in a country. Developing nations like Kenya are turning to ICT-based services to implement public policy. This move is to eliminate corruption and offer residents high-quality services. The Kenyan government is attempting to ensure that government ICTs are open to the people and organisations

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that use its services, and open to any provider  – regardless of size (Communications Authority of Kenya 2020). Electronic public policy implementation in Kenya has been promoted via eCitizen projects. eCitizens’ aim is for the access points for delivery of essential public utility services, social welfare schemes, healthcare, financial, education, and agriculture services to citizens of the country with electronic means. The government can fulfil its goal of creating a society where everyone has equal access to opportunities based on race, class, gender, geography, and culture. Under this scheme, Huduma Service Centres have been established in all counties in Kenya as a one-stop shop to enhance the delivery of public services by ensuring efficiency and accessibility in providing these services through integrated platforms (Abdalla et al. 2015). Despite these service centres, the general public elsewhere in Africa has yet to benefit from these amenities. The environment, period, and viewpoint all play a crucial role in determining the success or failure of ICT-­ based programmes in developing nations. Studies like that by Onyango and Ondiek (2021) have pointed out the lack of resources and low literacy rate as challenges threatening the digitalisation of public policy in Kenya. Also, corruption and favouritism can be possible causes of ICT integration and policy failure. Some people, however, cannot use ICT appropriately and must resort to the time-consuming, manual approach. Those who lack awareness or knowledge of ICT-based services are a new obstacle to the successful deployment of these e-services in society. There is also a serious problem with Kenya’s ICT-based public policy implementation services because of a lack of sufficient physical infrastructure in various service centres. ICT-based services in underdeveloped nations fail because of a lack of qualified workers, lack of investment, and other cultural restrictions imposed by the societies in those countries. In addition, Khan et al. (2021) note that corruption has emerged as a much-debated topic in e-Government. However, there has also been much debate over the anti-corruption ability of e-Government initiatives (Onyango 2017; Elbahnasawy 2014; Nam 2012). But this argument also suffers from mixed and disorganised data, making it difficult to grasp an overview of the field and identify avenues for future research. Further, with successes such as Huduma centres, the ICT sector in Kenya still faces challenges, especially at the county level, such as financial restraints, inadequate personnel in the projects, poor handling of original documents and material, and inadequate resources for digitisation (see Onyango 2017).

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The project staff’s technical expertise and procurement procedures are other challenges hindering effective digitisation in Kenya’s public services. According to Hernes (2002), the sustainability of ICT-enabled programmes has four components: social, political, technological, and economic. Economic sustainability is the ability to finance an ICT-enabled programme over the long term in a cost-effective manner. Social sustainability is the community’s involvement in ICT programmes that promote national cohesion. These programmes must serve the community’s needs, and hence the important of realising Public Interest Technologies (PITs)oriented PolicyTech. Political sustainability has to do with the policies and leadership to embrace change. Technological sustainability is about choosing a technology that will remain relevant and effective over a period. Even though Kenya’s policy systems and ICT integration landscape are familiar with these challenges, CPIMS has presented a few notable successes, as we will show shortly. It is worth noting that CPIMS and orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) case management underscore inter-organisational relations. The policy goals of Child Policy are to ensure children’s rights to health, family life, play, education, an adequate standard of living and recreation, and4 protection from abuse and harm through the enactment of relevant laws and provision of services. The Department of Children’s Services (DCS) in Kenya is charged with these tasks. Successfully implementing child protection and social welfare services depends on the availability and use of relevant data that ought to provide information on the magnitude of, and any trends evident in, child protection issues and the impact of programmes and interventions. Kenya has a functional national CPIMS capable of providing accurate, timely information on key child welfare concerns. This enhances the work of the various actors in the sector. An adequate CPIMS facilitates the measurement of child rights and welfare progress, providing evidence to inform and guide the allocation of resources. This is significant for child protection programming in Kenya. The OVC management process in Kenya involves a variety of stakeholders, including the police, the judiciary, the National Commission on Human Rights, and the children’s department. The process also requires implementation efforts from various civil society organisations, including charitable children’s institutions, faith-based organisations, and non-governmental organisations. Moreover, these organisations have a variety of reasons for their 4

 https://childrensrights.ie/childrens-rights-ireland/childrens-rights-ireland

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involvement in child protection policy implementation. In the application of Thompson’s typology, these networks could be categorised as pooled, sequential interdependence, and reciprocal interdependence (cited in Bree 2021).

Child Protection Policy Implementation and the Complexity of the Joint Action Conundrum Child protection policy requires the contribution of various actors. Some of these, like the police, the judiciary, the National Commission on Human Rights and the department of children, are governmental departments. From Table 9.3 it is noticeable that most of the agencies involved in the child protection process have pooled relationships with DCS. For instance, the DCS refer violence against children (VAC) survivors to the Ministry of Health (MOH) for medical attention; DCS does not have a way to Table 9.3  Child protection policy implementation stakeholder analysis Organisation

Role

Network type

Incentive

Kenya Police Service

Apprehending child rights offenders

Sequential interdependence

Authority

Provision of OVC child protection services Provision of OVC child protection services Sentencing of child rights offenders Chair of Area Advisory Council Provision of education services Management of teachers

Pooled

Common interest Exchange

Social services NGOs/CBO/IGOs Charitable children’s homes (CCIs) Judiciary Ministry of Interior Ministry of Education Teachers Service Commission Ministry of Health County governments Parents Associations

Provision of health services Provision of health and early education services Child protection

Reciprocal interdependence Sequential interdependence Pooled

Authority Authority

Pooled

Authority

Reciprocal interdependence Pooled

Authority

Pooled

Common interest Authority

Reciprocal interdependence

Common interest

Source: Kenya DCS Data Flow (Kenya Child Protection Report, 2016–2019)

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guarantee the quality of services received by these children. The DCS staff interviewed also reported this policy conflict between DCS and MOH. For instance, all teenage pregnancies are considered defilement as per the Children’s Act. MOH policy is that they treat child mothers without reporting cases because if they report such cases, husbands will stop taking such children to hospitals and this will increase the maternal mortality rate. As a result of means to enforce agreements, sometimes there are disjointed implementations. One of the respondents noted, During the COVID-19 pandemic, the MOH reported an alarming rate of teenage pregnancies; given that we are responsible for children, we were asked to produce these children and have those responsible prosecuted. We failed to produce them because our numbers were not as high as those reported by MOH. We could not ask for data from them because their policy doesn’t allow sharing of patients’ identities.

Similar sentiments were reported in Uganda, where, on the one hand, COVID-19 increased VAC risk while, on the other hand, it undermined the protection services. One of the problems highlighted was the lack of coordination among various agencies responsible for child protection in the country. Similar coordination challenges were reported in other pooled relationships, such as those with the Ministries of Education and Interior and subnational governments. One of the respondents noted that some chief abets sexual violence against children by deciding defilement cases and encouraging out-of-court settlement. We have told them these are criminal cases beyond their jurisdiction. Respondent also observed delays in service provision in cases of sequential relationships. For instance, DCS depends on the police to investigate and prosecute VAC cases. However, police tend to be preoccupied with theft cases and only go to investigate VAC when they have extra time on their hands. They also conspire with the offenders to dilute evidence to avoid conviction. Similar problems were reported in the judiciary, where VAC cases are rarely scheduled in good time. Best practices were observed, such as charitable children’s homes, the Teachers Service Commission (TSC), and Parents Associations. For instance, TSC has created substantial deterrence for VAC in schools due to expedient investigation and application of sanctions. So how has CPIMS served as a policy tool for solving some of the above problems?

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CPIMS and the Complexity of the Joint Action Conundrum To deal with some of the problems stated above, the Kenyan government, through the support of USAID, created a child protection information management system for availing child protection in one place for easy decision-making, referrals, collaboration, and reporting. The platform also provides access to precise, timely, and consistent aggregated data on child protection; eases record keeping and management of information on individual child protection cases; tracks vulnerable children to ensure continuous care and protection; and facilitates proper sharing of information between stakeholders and service providers in the interest of the children (CPIMS Task Force 2019). Figure 9.5 summarises the CPIMS data flow among different stakeholders. Discussion with DCS staff and partners revealed increased collaboration among child protection implementation partners. One of the KII respondents noted that “before CPIMS, each partner used to do its own assessment and based on this, they would fundraise and design their own programme. Currently, one must refer to the CPIMS data while designing programs”. They further noted that most donors, especially USAID, require project and programme evaluations to use CPIMS data to demonstrate programme impact. The DCS staff reported that the increased coordination has reduced duplication of duties and overconcentration of protection funding/programmes in certain pockets of the country while others remain unserved. The CPIMS portal shows that there has been increased reporting of child protection issues since 2016 when the programme was launched. For instance, in 2016/2017, there were only 20,235 cases reported in the portal; however, in 2021/2022, there were 54,583 reported cases, suggesting an increase of 34,348 reported cases. One of the respondents noted that: Most of the data, especially at the grassroots level used to get lost, the community children volunteers did not have any tools for data capture and reporting, but now all the CBOs dealing with children have a place where they can key in cases and monitor their progress in the various stages of the case management cycle.

The respondents also reported that CPIMS had enhanced the referral system between agencies involved in child protection programming. One of the sub-county children’s officers noted,

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Level Partners

NCCS

Department of Children Services HQ (CPMIS)

OVC County Government County AAC

Area Advisory Council

227

Partners

AFC County Children Coordinator

County Level Partners

Sub County Children Officer

CCIs

CSACs + BWCS

VCOs

Court Users

Statutory Community Leaders (Chief + Asst. Chief, Headman)

CBOs FBOs

Other Agencies: Police, Immi-

State Actors

Non-State Actors

Feedback

Data flow

Fig. 9.5  Kenya DCS Data Flow. Source: Kenya Child Protection Report, 2016-2019 I now have the data of all the charitable children’s institutions in my constituency, once a case of abandoned, lost and under VAC survivor that requires protection, I know where to allocate them. Initially, some CCIs would be overcrowded while others are empty. The increased coordination has brought about fair distribution of children in various CCIs.

The respondents also noted that CPIMS has brought about evidence-­ based advocacy. Different children’s rights-based NGOs now have

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authoritative data upon which to base their advocacy initiatives. DCS can also lobby for increased funding based on the increased workloads. The department also uses human resources planning data based on the reported cases. CPIMS has also contributed to the accountability of the affected persons. The respondents noted that there was little follow-up on cases before the system was launched. CPIMS requires that DCS and its partners account for all the reported cases. DCS is thus obligated to take all the reported cases through the various stages of OVC case management before closing the file. Availability of protection data to multiple stakeholders also fosters information sharing, feedback loops, and transparency in OVC case management and other child protection issues. One of the respondents noted, During our monthly meeting with various stakeholders, we were to see if some things are not adding up. There was a case where children registered in a certain CCI and those reported to have benefited from a certain donor funding differed. This was detected, and we informed the CCI to take a corrective measure.

CPIMS was also reported to have aided supportive monitoring visits among DCS management, partners, and child-based civil society organisations. Effective supportive monitoring visits usually require adequate planning, which is impossible without sufficient data. CPIMS provides an opportunity for programme managers to develop dashboards to monitor the performance of their various projects in different locations in the nation-state and decipher areas where their officers could be struggling and thus in need of support. One of the programme managers noted, At times, you may notice increased truancy in a certain area, which may indicate other child protection issues such as child labour or commercial sexual exploitation of children. So, we normally follow up to get further details. Such detail helps to improve programming in our various stations.

CPIMS has also been said to have brought about the standardisation of child protection indicators and monitoring and evaluation elements. CPIMS is currently the official government system for data capture and reporting of child-based international NGOs (INGOs). INGOs and other civil society organisations have been forced to align their indicators and

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monitoring tools with CPIMS. This has made it possible to know where the country is regarding child protection. It is also possible to compare various interventions, cohorts, and regions of the country.

Challenges Challenges still exist even though the government has achieved some positive indicators for monitoring child abuse and neglect. A study conducted in Saudi Arabia (Owaidah et al. 2022) on barriers inhibiting child abuse and neglect reporting revealed that the health workforce’s availability of training and education programmes is a hindrance. Therefore, a clear, well-structured child protection policy guideline is needed to enable health workers to report abuse cases. Other causes of non-reporting of abuse are uncertainty, lack of knowledge, consideration of injuries as unworthy of reporting, and no legal consequences for not reporting. Concerning children, there is a lack of confidence, unawareness of the occurrences, and the fear of causing family breakups. In addition, Onyango and Lynch (2006) and Witter (2004) allude to the fact that social and complex dynamics contribute to the African context. The African social-cultural fabric, mixed with overall poverty levels, is a hindrance to CPIMS utilisation. In the Kenyan context, the following challenges contribute to CPIMS’s low uptake and data quality issues. i. Children’s officers’ burden: CPIMS has increased workloads for children’s officers who regularly key in data and ensure data quality through systems audits. One of the officers noted, “as a result of this new system, we work much more than our colleagues in the other ministries, yet the pay is the same. If it is not for the fact that I am passionate about working with children, I would be demotivated”. ii. Incorrect entries: Given the labour-intensive nature of the CPIMS data entry process, some officers allocate that duty to interns. Some interns are either not very keen or inexperienced, thus keying wrong information into the system. One health IT activity lead noted that “in some centres, there are a lot of data inconsistencies and incomplete information. For instance, you can have some male children with case categories of FGM and pregnancies. Because this data is usually informed public policies, fundraising campaigns, and

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­ rogram designs, it can be misleading and impact huge. Therefore, p we must take these data quality audits very seriously”. iii. Inadequate ICT infrastructure: The study noted that some sub-­ county DCS offices lack Internet connectivity, computers, and electricity. Some children’s officers do not have international computer driving licence qualifications and are thus handicapped regarding the ICT skills needed to manage CPIMS. iv. Limited use of information at the volunteer level: The study observed that data visualisation mainly happens in a few sub-­ counties and counties. The community child protection volunteers thus have no way of knowing if they are succeeding or not. One of the health IT officials noted, “We asked the protection volunteers about how they know they are making a difference among the children they serve. Interestingly, none of the responses related to the information collected on forms. Instead, CHVs listed existing data sources such as school enrolment, school performance, the effect on a child, and growth monitoring clinic cards”. v. Overconcentration on output level and quantitative indicators: CPIMS does not have space for stories of change. It thus hinders child protection programmers from prioritising quantitative over qualitative indicators. The system is also effective in identifying the numbers reached but limited in measuring the utility of the protection programmes to reach individual children.

Conclusions Using ICTs in public policy implementation increases the engagement of individuals in the administrative process by providing citizens with access to information and services. This chapter demonstrates how ICTs can assist in implementing public policy by providing an effective, efficient, accountable, and transparent system. To overcome issues of corruption, overwork, and administrative system failure in developing nations, ICTs are critical and may potentially address these issues. Because of the speed and accuracy of ICT-based services, the implementation process of public policy may be more flexible. However, African governments must guarantee the right infrastructures, as already discussed in Chap. 2, including qualified workers and resources to integrate ICT. It is also necessary to develop a public awareness campaign about ICT services. Studies and research should be done on using ICT in different departments to improve

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the system for citizens. We conclude that every country today can afford the costs of ICT-based services for the prosperity and well-being of its population, depending on its competence and the availability of resources, as in the case of the Child Protection Information Management System, Kenya (CPIMS) and the OVC case management process.

References Abdalla, Amir Ghalib, Joseph Karanja Kiragu, Florence Adhiambo Waswa, Felix Tebangura Ono, Josephine Wanjugu Kariuki, and Duncan M.  Ikua. 2015. Effect of Huduma centres (one-stop shops) in service delivery–A case study of Mombasa Huduma Centre. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences 5 (6): 102–117. Communications Authority of Kenya. 2020. National ICT Policy Guidelines 2020. Nairobi: The Government Printer. CPIMS Task Force. 2019. Child Protection Information Management System: 2018 Child Protection Case Management Information and Data Analysis. IMC, UNICEF, UNHCR, Jordan River Foundation, IRC, TdH, Institute for Family Health. Elbahnasawy, Nasr G. 2014. E-Government, Internet Adoption, and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation. World Development 57: 114–126. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.005. Government of Kenya. 2010. The Constitution of Kenya, 2020. Nairobi: Government Printer. Khan, Anupriya, Satish Krishnan, and Amandeep Dhir. 2021. Electronic Government and Corruption: Systematic Literature Review, Framework, and Agenda for Future Research. Technological Forecasting and Social Change 167: 120737. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2021.120737. Nam, Taewoo. 2012. Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Open Government and Government 2.0. International Review of Administrative Sciences 78 (2): 346–368. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852312438783. Ngutuku, Elizabeth. 2022. A Genealogy of Policies on Poor and Vulnerable Children and Youth in Kenya. In Routledge Handbook of Public Policy in Africa, ed. Gedion Onyango, 499–509. London: Routledge. Omondi, S.A. 2022. An Analysis of the Gaps in the Legislative, Policy, and Institutional Frameworks for the Protection of Children in Conflict With the Law in Kenya. Hershey: IGI global. Onyango, Gedion, and Japheth Otieno Ondiek. 2021. Digitalisation and Integration of Sustainable Development Goals (SGDs) in Public Organizations in Kenya. Public Organization Review 21 (3): 511–526.

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Onyango, Gedion. 2017. One-step Shop in Service Delivery in Kenya. In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, ed. Ali Farazmand. Cham: Springer. Onyango, P., and M.A. Lynch. 2006. Implementing the Right to Child Protection: A Challenge for Developing Countries. The Lancet 367 (9511): 693–694. O’Toole, L. 2003. Interorganizational Relation in Implementation. In Handbook of Public Administration, ed. B.G. Peters and J. Pierre, 440–465. London: SAGE. O’Toole Jr, Laurence J., and Robert S. Montjoy. 1984. Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective. Public Administration Review 44 (6): 491–503. Pressman, J.  L. and Wildavsky, A. [1973] 1984. Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. illustrated, reprint ed. California: University of California Press. Reddick, Christopher, and Leonidas Anthopoulos, eds. 2015. Information and Communication Technologies in Public Administration: Innovations from Developed Countries. Vol. 195. CRC Press. Owaidah, Sara F., Reham I. Alharaz, Sara H. Aljubran, Zahra Y. Almuhanna, and Ritesh G.  Menezes. 2022. Factors Affecting Reporting of Suspected Child Maltreatment in Saudi Arabia. Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 89: 2022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jflm.2022.102371. Sidha, Z. 2017. Street Level Bureaucrats as the Ultimate Policy Makers. Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs 5 (4): 1–6. Sidha, Z., P.  Asingo, and J.  Magutu. 2021. Street-Level Bureaucrats as Policy Entrepreneurs: The Nexus between Timing of Traffic Enforcement Activities and Road Safety Policy Outcomes. Politics and Policy 49 (1): 186–204. Thompson, James D. 1967. Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New York: McGraw-Hill. UNODC. 2020. Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

CHAPTER 10

Mobilising and Securing Private Financial Flows from Digital Business Platforms and Curbing Tech-Enabled IFFs to Finance SDGs in Africa Lyla Latif

Introduction Given the amount lost in Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), which is approximately USD483 billion (TJN 2021) and the global financial system’s size, scale and level of sophistication, the argument for a shortage of financing for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and Agenda 2063 seems flawed. This may be partly because global finance is rarely channelled towards sustainable development at the scale and speed required to achieve the SDGs and support Agenda 2063. In particular, the financial sector and its current technological forms (FinTech) is in a central position to influence global and continental agendas by reorganising global financial

L. Latif (*) Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya Committee on Fiscal Studies, CFS, Nairobi, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_10

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practices to generate funds for sustainable development. For example, in 2019, the gross world product was estimated at over US$86.60 trillion (United Nations 2019), and total global wealth reached US$360.6 trillion, out of which US$4.1 trillion reflected Africa’s minimal share (Credit Suisse 2019). From these statistics, there is another possibility to raise new finance streams by strategically leveraging private financial flows from economic activities carried out over digital technologies and FinTech. This chapter, therefore, explores whether digitalisation can offer new streams of finance for SDGs. It advances the argument on pegging progress towards achieving SDGs and Agenda 2063 by securing their financing using private financial flows from digitalised economic activities. Therefore, states need the capacity to protect this additional source of revenue from IFFs. That is to say, digitally sourced private finance is a sustainable form of taxation that can be used to tackle the growing global inequalities. However, such efforts may also present other regulatory conundrums that most African states may not be ready to confront or find hard to achieve if current deficits with controlling IFFs are anything to go by (Latif 2019). But this should not stop these states from trying because the already existing efforts to effectively regulate and tax digital transactions and monies by African governments show that there is potential feasibility. Another issue that may justify mobilising funds from taxing digital platforms and FinTech is inadequate continental action or investments towards people-centred programmes, including their accompanying technologies. For example, there is no clear information on financing gaps relating to implementing Agenda 2063. On the contrary, the United Nations (2019) estimates that the financing gap to achieve SDGs in developing countries is around US$2.5–3 trillion annually. On the other hand, Agenda 2063’s Financing and Resource Mobilisation Strategy (RMS), which explains how it is to be operationalised, does not provide such approximate estimates for Africa (Africa Union Commission 2015). Instead, the RMS only suggests that 75–90 per cent of domestic resource mobilisation (DRM) is to be channelled to finance Agenda 2063. The United Nations (UN) recommends boosting domestic resource mobilisation efforts to increase SDG financing (United Nations 2019). Altogether these agendas identify the need to strengthen global partnerships for sustainable development by combatting corruption and curbing illicit financial flows (IFF) as measures to increase DRM. In a world and a continent like Africa that is becoming increasingly interconnected by

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technologies, leveraging appropriate information and communications technology infrastructure is core to such an endeavour. This chapter shows that digital platforms and FinTech have changed how Africans store, save, borrow, invest, move, spend and protect money (Skan, Dickerson and Gagliardi 2016). Gallup data collected by McKinsey & Company in 2014 on 44 African states showed that an average of 54 per cent of adults utilised FinTech to make payments totalling approximately 5 billion transactions annually. Overall, these flows were estimated at USD760 billion (of which 50-60% of the transactions were in cash). If a conservative estimate of revenues at 2 per cent of the volume is applied, it will result in annual revenues of about USD6.6 billion from electronic payments alone. It is now estimated that the FinTech industry in Africa today will contribute between USD200 million and USD3 billion in revenues annually (Mauritius Africa FinTech Hub). This demonstrates that the correlation between FinTech and revenue mobilisation is quite strong. Therefore, can digital platforms and FinTech offer new financing streams for SDGs and Agenda 2063? The proceeding sections attempt to handle this question more broadly by discussing and analysing the extent to which private financial flows from digitised economic activities can be mobilised to finance SDGs. The problem with a critical examination of this proposal is that, firstly, not all digital economic activities are monitored by governments and subjected to taxation. Secondly, most of such private financial flows permeate as part of illicit finance. This is the core part on which the chapter focuses. It is necessary to understand digitally enabled IFFs if digital economic activities are to be leveraged to mobilise revenue and redistribute it towards financing SDGs. The chapter mainly presents discussions and action points to be considered in policy circles.

Methodology Quantitative data out of Africa based on approximating how much is earned as private financial flows from digitised economic activities and how much of it forms part of IFFs is challenging and inaccessible. Hence, this chapter’s data source was based on netnography (Kozinets 2015) as an online research method. The search strategy focused on topics related to the digitalisation of money and the mobile money landscape, including money laundering, IFFs and observing discussions on online hacker forums accessible through the surface web. I was able to identify some of these forums listed in reports published by Interpol, and by following

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leads dropped during conversations between online users I was observing on surface web hacker forums. Still, I was not able to access the sophisticated dark web links even by using The Onion Router (TOR: a free software for enabling anonymous communication) connection, which is easy to download and is not illegal. This is because the dark web hacking forums employ sophisticated anti-crawling measures to protect against visitor machines. Also, I was unaware of the specific code words to protect against spies. One such attempt to access the Black Hats hackers forum resulted in my computer crashing. Some of the websites that I was able to gather information on were: Samsara Market (selling stolen data and counterfeit consumer goods, uses cryptocurrency), Berlusconi Market (scamming website, uses cryptocurrencies), Darkode (selling malicious malware for hacking; examining customer reviews was helpful to identify this before the comments were closed). I then became worried about malware infection risk in continuing to investigate these websites further. The Sophos antivirus downloaded on my MacAir began picking up on warning signals. Many keywords were used as the search terms, from those linked with digital payment methods to those associated with clandestine markets. The data was then filtered to pick out relevant content. Official reports from the fishing sector discussing Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, and the use of technology to alter data transmission was also reviewed. Thus, what is presented here is an analysis based on accessible data and reports. The proceeding sections are organised as follows. Section 2 considers the extent to which FinTech can be leveraged to finance SDGs. Section 3 highlights the magnitude of IFF practices that are conducted online, resulting in tax base erosion. Section 4 then concludes the chapter.

Leveraging Digitalisation to Finance Sustainable Development Goals The South Centre (2022) recently published empirical findings on how much African states could mobilise in revenue by taxing the digital economy. East African countries were projected to earn between USD246 million (applying a 3% tax rate) and USD329 million (applying a 4% tax rate). Taken together, African states would see an increase in revenue between USD1 billion (3% tax rate) and USD1.4 billion (4% tax rate) from taxing

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the digital economy (South Centre, 2022). Such technology-led growth and earnings are due to the continent’s mobile phone and Internet coverage through which Africans transact. In as much as this has also presented additional regulatory conundrums that most African countries are only learning to deal with (see Chapter 15), mobile phones and the Internet have created new opportunities for the continent to raise finances. Seven hundred and sixty-five million sub-Saharan Africans use mobile phones and the Internet as payments, lending and remittance platforms.1 Gallup data collected by McKinsey & Company in 2014 on 44 nations in subSaharan Africa showed that an average of 54 per cent of adults utilised FinTech to make payments at approximately USD5 billion transactions annually (Kendall et al. 2014). The total volume of these flows was estimated at USD760 billion (50–60 per cent of the transactions were in cash). If a conservative estimate of revenues at 2 per cent of the volume is applied, it will result in annual revenues of about USD6.6 billion from digital payments alone. Africa is now home to approximately 491 FinTech start-ups, and this has become the most popular sector among investors, attracting 39.7 per cent of total funds raised (Finnovating for Africa 2019). In 2018, 200 of these 491 African-based FinTech start-ups raised USD334.5 million towards investments (African Tech Start-Ups Funding Report 2018), demonstrating that the correlation between digital technologies and revenue mobilisation is quite strong and can, therefore, be leveraged to implement SDGs. Moreover, statistics by Mauritius Africa FinTech Hub in 2019 suggest that FinTech is set to grow to USD3 billion from USD200 million in sub-­ Saharan Africa by 2020.2 In addition, in 2015, the Financial Sector Deepening Africa Report revealed that peer-to-peer (P2P) business lending in Africa accounted for US$16 million, donation-based crowdfunding generated USD31.4 million in revenue, equity-based crowdfunding totalled US$4 million, and reward-based crowdfunding generated USD8.5 million.3 Such financial acceleration is justified by the fact that 52 per cent of the world’s mobile transactions take place to and from Africa,

 https://mauritiusfintech.org/ (Accessed on February 2020).  https://mauritiusfintech.org/ (Accessed on February 2020). 3  https://www.fsdafrica.org/ 1

2

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and 58 per cent of the world’s mobile money accounts are registered in sub-Saharan Africa.4 Furthermore, the digitalisation of the economy has resulted in delivering services online through new digital business models, such as subscription-­ based, ad-supported, freemium and e-commerce. It has helped businesses to reach previously inaccessible rural and underdeveloped areas. Digital interaction has also enabled businesses to reach customers globally, resulting in increased revenues from sales and services. In 2019, Netflix, a subscription-based model accessible in Africa, generated total global revenue of approximately USD5.5 billion (see Watson 2020), while the ad-supported YouTube company, also accessible in Africa, earned USD15.1 billion from ad revenue globally (Alphabet 2019). Based on the freemium model, the African online gaming industry is estimated to be worth USD174 billion (Olawale 2019). In contrast, earnings from the e-commerce model are projected to generate US$29 billion for Africa (see, e.g., Kaplan 2018). These datasets indicate the potential in digitally sourced finance to strategically unlock, leverage and catalyse private financial flows and domestic resources towards financing SDGs and Agenda 2063 in Africa. Digitalisation, therefore, can change how African states choose to implement and, most importantly, finance SDGs. However, apart from common challenges with the state structure and politics, some challenges may stand in the way, mainly those unique to digitalisation. These are especially concerned with leveraging e-business platforms and tackling illicit financial flows so as to secure finances needed to achieve SDGs, as further discussed below.

Opportunities and Policy challenges Taxing Digital Business Platforms This section explains developing policy proposals linking private financial flows to financing SDGs. These flows can be sourced from FinTech and digital business platforms that have gained prominence in Africa (see Chap. 7 by Laura Barasa and Joy Kiiru). While some countries have fared relatively better than others in strengthening their tax bases, most African countries are still dealing with the problem of unstable and low tax revenue collection capacities. This has generally limited the adequate provision 4

 https://mauritiusfintech.org/ (Accessed on February 2020).

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of public goods and investment in human capital, redistributing income and insuring against shocks, which are part of the core indicators of monitoring progress on SDGs. African states’ domestic revenue mobilisation capacity remains at less than 20 per cent of their GDP comprising taxes, a level which is insufficient to address citizens’ needs and finance the SDGs (World Bank 2020). Such revenue constraints are impacted by the problem of IFFs that cost the world a combined loss of USD483 billion in global tax abuses (TJN 2021). Africa alone loses USD89 million in IFFs (UNCTAD 2020) annually. Relatedly, richer countries are also experiencing larger economic contractions due to global recession, which poses the risk of substantial cuts to official development aid and expected falls in foreign direct investment (FDI) to African states (Development Initiatives 2020). States are now off track to meet the UN SDGs, specifically SDG 2 (food security) and SDG 3 (health). To meet their financing needs, African states have escalated the burden of taxation on consumers by increasing consumption taxes and resorting to foreign debt. These measures are not sustainable in the long term, and aggravate inequality. Parallel to these global concerns, a report by Ahmed et al. (2022) and the Global Wealth Report by Credit Suisse (2021) demonstrated that there was a rise in billionaires’ wealth at a rate of USD 15,000 per second or USD 1.3 billion a day during the pandemic. Accordingly, there is a need to explore new avenues towards achieving sustainable taxation to tackle these inequalities. Mobilising private financial flows from digitised economic activities offers a solution. The UN has calculated that USD 2–3 trillion in additional investment is needed to achieve the SDGs (United Nations 2022). Private financial flows, if taxed nationally and through international cooperation, can further strengthen the effectiveness of tackling poverty and climate change and supporting the achievement of broader UN SDGs. This section explains the way forward in developing policy proposals on linking private financial flows to financing SDGs. These flows can be sourced out of FinTech and e-­business platforms which have gained prominence in Africa. A recent Quartz Africa report stated that Africa now accounts for 70 per cent of the world’s USD1 trillion mobile money value. The value of Africa’s mobile money transactions increased by 39 per cent to USD701.4 billion in 2021 from USD495 billion in 2020, highlighting the mobile future of African banking (Onyango, May 4, 2022). Similar reports are shown by Statista’s Mobile Money in Africa (June 15, 2022), which reported that as of June 15, 2022, the value of Mobile Money transactions

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in sub-Saharan Africa is USD697.7 billion. This varies regionally and nationally depending on the existing mobile money and Internet infrastructures. For example, the value of mobile money in East Africa stands at USD403.4 billion, with approximately 296 million mobile money subscribers. Nationally, in East African countries, for instance, the value for mobile money transactions in Kenya, as of 2019, was USD810.94 million with 32.63 million subscribers, Uganda had USD8.2 billion as of 2020 with 28.05 million subscribers, and Tanzania had USD3.9 billion as of March 2020. This growth in mobile money subscriptions and transactions has led to additional revenue collection channels from businesses. For example, Vodafone reported that approximately USD314 billion is being transacted through M-Pesa annually by its 51 million customer base.5 But disaggregated data on how much of it is taxed and redistributed towards financing SDGs is unavailable. However, the resilience of weak state capacity prevails, negatively affecting how governments can harness or translate these trends into additional sources of financing for their development. In particular, African governments are still wrestling with how to capitalise on taxing mobile money and other FinTech platforms as part of their unilateral measures against the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) BEPS Action Plans through which international consensus on taxing the digital economy is still under discussion. For most African countries, difficulties in leveraging or taxing digital money platforms arguably lie in the fact that the majority are decentralised. These digitally enabled economic activities occur in remote-based crossborder entities whose transaction details are unavailable to government and are utilised largely in the unregistered informal sector businesses. There is no logistical support for business transactions and monitoring systems that government can access, as further elaborated in Chapter 14 of this volume. Because of this, new revenue generation streams resulting from online or digital economic activities remain untapped and unapplied towards steering the financing of SDGs and Agenda 2063. There is a growing global consensus that the digitalisation of the economy is relatively under-taxed compared to traditional businesses. Specific inherent characteristics such as reliance on cross-border provision of services without physical presence, easy transfers of intangible assets, and novel ways to 5  h t t p s : / / w w w. v o d a f o n e . c o m / a b o u t - v o d a f o n e / w h a t - w e - d o / c o n s u m e rproducts-and-services/m-pesa

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create value make it particularly easy for enterprises to limit their tax liabilities. And they sometimes utilise digital platforms to evade taxation. African states should reform their corporate tax frameworks to align them with income-generating transactions within the digital economy and through FinTech being cognisant of their political economy and social capabilities. As already emphasised in Chapter 2 of this book, African states must be bold in engaging with external actors in digital transformation or, in this case, critical digital business stakeholders to maximise revenue collection effectively. They should particularly reconsider the bilateral treaties signed with countries whose companies have a digital presence in African markets. These include firms like Jumia, Airbnb and Uber, which do not recognise digital presence as a permanent establishment to trigger taxation, regardless of the political negotiations on imposing the digital tax at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the UN Tax Committee. Online platforms providing services to users by contacting independent taxi service providers and decentralised financial transactions or money transfers without physical presence have created a mismatch between tax rules and digitalisation (Onyango 2022; OECD, 2020). This has resulted in states losing revenue from being unable to impose tax on digital giants (such as Meta, Alphabet Inc., Microsoft etc). For example, Nigeria can raise ‘an additional USD100 million in taxes from (Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Alphabet and Microsoft) if taxed (and this is) enough to pay the annual salaries of 70,000 nurses’ (ActionAid 2021). Taxing private financial flows earned through digitised economic activities has further resulted in political differences on which state is to tax such earnings. Although academics, civil societies and governments are addressing the challenges of taxing the digital economy, there has been little systematic description of what policy recommendations should be made that would provide a practical template for developing African countries to rely on in enacting their own laws (Latif 2020). At both the global and domestic level, imposing the digital tax is top on most governments’ agenda. However, efforts towards unilateral measures have been curbed on the understanding that a unified approach outlined in the OECD/ G20’s Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan for imposing the digital tax may prove more beneficial in allowing states to adapt and expand their taxing rights by considering the new digital business models (OECD/G20 2020). Digitalisation has thus challenged the concept of tax sovereignty, in essence raising domestic revenue. The result is, states globally are

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re-­examining and debating the extent to which they should cede control over their digital tax policies to achieve global economic efficiency in an interdependent world (see Bunn et  al. 2020). This explains the current instrumentation with taxing digital businesses and transactions as demonstrated through e-levies in Ghana, South Africa and Kenya, among others (e.g. see Mpofu and Moloi 2022). Therefore, how can Africa capitalise on digital taxation to fund SDGs and Agenda 2063 despite their challenges to effectively tax digital businesses? The answer to these questions remains in strengthening the general state’s capacity, which lies in the transformation of state politics towards its citizen-centred dimensions or democratic activities (see Onyango 2023). It is worth noting that the financing of SDGs and Agenda 2063 affects domestic fiscal laws and policies. This will recursively affect international relations, subsequently impacting the implementation of the two agendas. African governments must ask themselves how the agendas can order the imposition of a transnational tax on private financial flows within a rapidly digitalising world. Generating tax revenue from online business activities becomes critical to ensure economic prosperity for the state that has allowed its territory to be the source of global e-commerce. The key challenge, however, has been to raise this digital tax and align it towards funding SDGs and Agenda 2063 so that it does not succumb to the governance challenges and IFFs that undermine the achievement of these development goals. Illicit Financial Flow (IFF) How we interact with money has changed significantly following the advancement of FinTech. Technology has been influential in digitising global economies and expanding financial inclusion. The growth of peer-­ to-­peer lending digital platforms, mobile money payments, smart contracts, and software that automatically facilitates transactions without human intervention continues to disrupt traditional money markets and institutions globally. Even as these new business models are partly regulated, for example, mobile money, they could potentially present additional risks related to the criminal aspect of illicit financial flows, which cause fiscal tensions in states eroding their tax base and undermining the achievement of SDGs. Weak or non-existing policies or regulations concerning the digitalisation of finance can, therefore, result in illegitimate

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markets attractive to money launderers, tax evaders and fraudsters who utilise digital platforms to evade the payment of taxes. Let us take the example of cryptocurrencies (see Vigna and Casey 2015; DuPont 2019). These are currencies that only exist online. Their value is based on speculation and existing demand. According to a recent UNCTAD report, ‘a significant proportion of Kenya (8.5%), South Africa (7.1%) and Nigeria’s (6.3%) populations are using these digital currencies. In June, the Central African Republic adopted bitcoin as a legal tender’ (Salami 2022, July 25). However, despite this trend, countries or central banks rarely control their supply or price, demonstrating regulatory vulnerabilities and policy challenges around their use. In other words, they are decentralised and not subject to tax. Transactions involving cryptocurrencies are peer-to-peer with no bank or service as an intermediary. They can be used for speculation and as a payment method for transactions both on the surface web and the dark web, such as licit and illicit transactions. Currently, bitcoin is the de facto standard for cryptocurrencies. A 2019 study found that ‘approximately one-quarter of bitcoin users are involved in illegal activity’, and around ‘USD76billion of illegal activity per year involves bitcoin’ (Foley et al. 2019). This indicates a digitalised symbiotic relationship between finance and the existing clandestine markets. The regulation of bitcoin through authorised blockchain would permit governments to source additional taxes out of bitcoin transactions and redistribute such taxes towards financing SDGs. The anonymous nature of the Internet and innovations in technology can provide criminals with multiple ways to launder illegally acquired money through covert, anonymous, and even seemingly legitimate online transactions (Ozkaya and Islam 2019). For example, opening several different accounts on various online games to move money, using job advertising sites to recruit money mules, or making payments using a PayPal account based on virtual credit cards funded with a scammed bank account. These activities, because they are unregulated and the platforms are beyond government supervision and access, result in the erosion of the tax base simply due to government’s inability to track online transactions and data. Digitalisation can also enable manipulating systems to monitor and surveil business activities. For example, in the fishing industry, the law requires the vessels to install monitoring and data transmission devices so that illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU) is prevented. While manipulating such monitoring devices does not result in the real-time

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transfer of illicit financial gain, such manipulation interferes with the vessel’s location’s accuracy, allowing the vessel to fish illegally above its permitted quota (Wilhoit and Balduzzi 2013). Proceeds from such sales are deemed illicit financial flows. This also has implications for SDG 12 that seeks to promote sustainable consumption and production. Digital technology that is used to manipulate fishing vessels from accurately disclosing their location and quantity of fish sourced undermines government efforts to reduce hunger, generate economic growth from its aquaculture and ensure future sustainability of its fisheries. Several online transactions take place daily on the web. The web ecosystem is such that part of it is visible, and the other is invisible. The visible part is referred to as the surface web, where search engines can find the content that is sought after. The surface web makes up approximately 4 per cent of the web. The invisible part, the underbelly of the Internet, is where search engines cannot find the content being sought since it is intentionally hidden (Ozkaya and Islam 2019). Ozkaya and Islam have categorised the invisible web into three parts: the deep web, the dark web and the dark net. Several legal and illegal activities occur within the deep web, making up almost 96 per cent of the web. Purely illegal activities are facilitated through the dark web, where content is intentionally hidden and cannot be accessed by users surfing standard browsers. The dark net is part of the deep dark web and can only be accessed through hidden web addresses and server locations. It is through the clandestine nature of the invisible web that illicit finance is transferred. This is where new digital business models can be used to steal financial data (carding), make illegal financial transfers (loot boxes), disrupt or manipulate data (phantomware for sales suppression) and execute any other unlawful actions (fraudulently intercept/bypass signal transmissions) all targeted to reroute earnings away from government detection. Each of these methods is discussed next, and the losses incurred by African states are indicated. Curbing against such methods is necessary, if governments are to secure their fiscal spaces and generate additional sources of revenue with which to finance SDGs. Carding: The hacker identifies a vulnerability in the victim’s online presence and exploits the weakness to send malware that infects the point of sale terminal. The malware then collects the victim’s information (reads credit card data), exfiltrates it and transfers it to the hacker. The hacker then uses the stolen data to make an earning by selling it to carding

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forums, which are websites for selling credit and debit card data.6 The buyer can pay using bitcoin. The card details are then sent to the buyer via a download link accessed over a TOR browser (Choudhary 2018) that guarantees anonymity. The buyer can then opt to convert the card data into a counterfeit plastic card. To do this, the buyer can create the counterfeit card themselves if s/he has the required Encoder hardware and software to write the data onto a plain plastic card with a magnetic strip. Such hardware is available on e-commerce websites, and the software can be purchased from the dark web. Alternatively, the buyer can access the dark web forums where criminals specialise in creating counterfeit cards using stolen data. The buyer can then swipe the counterfeit credit card to make in-store payments. In 2017, such criminal activity cost Africa US$3.5 billion in losses (Kshetri 2019). The illegal nature of this problem lies in its dynamism, which makes it difficult to regulate or design effective policies to handle it. African countries have become increasingly disadvantaged in fighting cybercrime, calling for more investment in appropriate infrastructures and capacity building of regulatory agencies. Safeguarding against carding is essential to protect against revenue leakages. The use of online gaming websites to create online money laundering accounts: Online game developers are usually not associated with money laundering. However, the game-based model itself can be used to launder money, and earn untaxed income/profits. The criminals involved will open several accounts on massively multiplayer online role-playing games, abbreviated as MMORPGs, that use credits players can exchange for real money. Immediately following the ushering in of the New Year 2020, the Financial Times reported that a popular video game developed and published in Seattle announced that ‘nearly all key purchases that end up being traded or sold on the marketplace are believed to be fraud-sourced’ (Bradshaw 2020). Money launderers liquidated their illicit gains by trading the ‘container keys’ used to obtain in-game items. Regulating gaming therefore can result in the state earning new additional sources of revenue which can be redistributed towards financing SDGs. In online gaming platforms, criminals can use illicit money to buy virtual currency or a particular item, then sell it, often at a lower price, to an unwitting gamer. Many online-based game developers have no built-in safeguards such as 6  Further detailed reading: The Underground Ecosystem of Credit Card Frauds, available at: https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-15/materials/asia-15-Singh-The-UndergroundEcosystem-Of-Credit-Card-Frauds-wp.pdf (accessed 1 February 2020).

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know your customer requirements or anti-money laundering regulations that apply to payment processors. A 2018 report prepared by the Commonwealth of Australia revealed that several games provide gambling-style transactions. They do this by selling chance-based items, referred to as loot boxes. The report estimated that the global gaming industry was valued at US$117 billion, of which 25 per cent was generated through loot boxes (Commonwealth of Australia 2018). The dark corner of the industry has targeted loot boxes. A 2019 report reveals that the Kenyan online game industry is worth over USD50 million. Egypt holds USD293 million as the lion’s share of the revenue from online games, followed by South Africa’s gaming industry, estimated at USD216 million. Morocco and Nigeria follow closely behind with estimated earnings at USD129 million and USD122 million (Gough 2019). The African online gaming industry is expected to be worth USD174 billion by 2021 (Olawale 2019). Financing SDG 13 (climate action) for Africa requires USD100 billion annually (SDG Action 2022). Regulating loot boxes and subjecting their private financial flows to tax will support African nations to finance climate action. Reliable data on whether money launderers have placed, layered and integrated their illicit proceeds through online games in Africa is unavailable. Electronic sales suppression and under-reporting of income: Most revenue authorities, in their attempt to mobilise additional taxation, opted for the use of digital technology for businesses to log their transaction data. In digitising the cash register to the electronic mode, questions arose around the integrity of the recorded transactions. While it ensured tax compliance by businesses, it also became susceptible to sales data deletion or alteration through purposeful misuse of hardware and software. In November 2019, the South African Revenue Service succeeded in holding Africa Cash & Carry guilty of using a sales suppression system to alter its sales data to reduce its tax liability (Dlamini 2019). Sales suppression is now more sophisticated. The use of phantomware (installed as software and becomes part of the sales register) and zappers (external devices or online programs that can be connected to the register) as electronic sales suppression tools have been commonly used to manipulate the sales record covertly. Sales suppression is also offered as an online service. The service provider, usually from a foreign jurisdiction, can delete, alter and replace sales data or cause remote hard drive crashing, making it difficult for tax authorities to detect (OECD 2017). Technology, therefore, can be manipulated and used to defeat the collection of taxes. This directly inhibits

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domestic resource mobilisation and undermines the state’s progress towards financing SDGs due to their constrained fiscal space. Interconnect bypass device: African states are also losing revenue from SIM box fraud. This device is used to bypass a call’s legitimate route, resulting in revenue loss. Those engaged in fraud use Voice over IP (VoIP) – Global System for Mobile Communications (VoIP-GSM) gateways and SIM boxes to receive incoming calls via wired connections and deliver them to a cellular voice network. The effect of such a bypass is that the call appears as a local call incoming from a customer’s phone. The lawful way to make international calls is first described, followed by bypass fraud. Person X in Kenya makes a call to person Y in London using Safaricom, a local mobile operator. Through its international gate, Safaricom transfers the call to a transient operator, who then routes person X’s call through Voice over IP to the mobile operator in London and pays a toll. After that, the mobile operator terminates the call through person Y’s network. In bypass fraud, the transient operator routes the call through a SIM box placed in London using VoIP; the SIM box reroutes the call through London’s mobile operator and pays for the local call. This averts the toll payment higher than the local call rate. SIM box fraud has cost Ghana USD5.8 million (Adepetun 2019), Kenya USD500 million (Kamau et al. 2016), and Uganda USD144 million.7 By curbing SIM box fraud, Kenya can mobilise an additional US$500 million which is sufficient to finance the development of seven level 3 public health facilities needed to guarantee the achievement of SDG 3 on health (Parliamentary Service Commission 2022). Generally, Africa loses at least USD150 million yearly to SIM box fraud (Neeraj 2018). Manipulation of electronic surveillance and monitoring systems: Fishing vessels engaged in illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) activities use digital tools to manipulate the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) that enables authorities to track and monitor their location. Fishing vessels are required by law to have VMS installed. These vessels are required to transmit signals on VMS. The reliability of VMS transmission can be compromised by tampering with its onboard black box by cloning the onboard communications terminal so that the surrogate gives out false information, interfering with the outgoing signal from the blue box or the incoming positioning signal from the GPS. Such manipulation allows the 7  SimBox fraud still thrives in Africa  – example of Uganda, ANTRAX (2019) Available: https://en.antrax.mobi/simbox-fraud-africa-example-uganda/ (Accessed February 2020).

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fishing vessel to engage in IUU fishing. According to UNECA (2020), the cost to achieve the SDGs by 2030  in Africa is estimated at about USD1.3 trillion. Global losses due to IUU fishing are estimated to be between USD10 and USD23.5 billion annually, a substantial portion of which if curbed can go towards financing specific SDG targets and indicators.8 West Africa loses approximately USD1.3 billion annually in IUU fishing (Watkins et al. 2016). Kenya alone loses USD100 million annually to IUU fishing (Oirere 2019). IUU fishing presents a challenge to achieving sustainable, legal and ethical fisheries. It also disrupts the economic and social well-being of local fishing communities. Technology, therefore, has the potential to pose digital threats to the fishing industry, as demonstrated in the example here, and to generate illicit finance. Whereas digital finance can add USD4.2 trillion in new deposits and USD2.1 trillion in new credit (Oirere 2019), such rapid growth of the digitalisation of the economy also makes it susceptible to illicit attempts. This is to either make an illicit gain, an illicit transfer or use the digital space to cover and integrate their illicit gains through the Internet and digital technologies. Consequently, this undermines the state’s tax collection capacity. The movement of illicit finance across the digital space broadly affects the long-term sustainable development of economies and the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2063. The Agenda 2063 Financing and Resource Mobilisation Strategy (FRM) has outlined the typology of the sources for financing Agenda 2063. These range from government budgetary increases to crowdsourcing for social causes to pure commercial finance from both public and private sources/savings, including domestic capital markets, concessional loans, market price-based commercial loans, equity and other market instruments, FDI, and portfolio investments by the private sector (through debt, bonds, equity and other securities). DRM has been positioned to shoulder the great burden of financing the interrelated SDGs and Agenda 2063. Despite the DRM-focused financing, the FRM does not adequately feature platform-centred businesses whose private flows can be leveraged to finance the agendas. In this regard, national tax policies can be developed to include subscription-based, ad-supported, freemium and e-commerce business models within the country’s tax base.

8  Environmental Justice Foundation, Out of the shadows. Improving transparency in global fisheries to stop illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (2018).

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Conclusion This chapter has provided estimates of the revenue that can be earned from digital business platforms and FinTechs. It has also discussed underlying challenges, unique to the digitalisation infrastructures and state capacities and relations with other actors dominating the growth of digital economy. FinTech is estimated to generate about USD11.7 billion by 2025 (Mc Kinsey & Co 2022). This can potentially be leveraged to progressively finance development goals or the policy frameworks set out in Agenda 2030 and Agenda 2063. Private flows from digital business models can also be tapped and directed to fund specific targets, besides improving the concerned countries’ tax base. As exacerbated through digitalisation once contained and curbed, loss of revenue resulting from IFF will also add to the available domestic revenue basket. The discussion in this chapter has empirically tabulated the amount of revenue that can be generated due to the digitalisation of the economy. Accordingly, in leveraging such available finance, African governments must comprehensively understand the nature, functioning and dynamics of the data-driven digital economy. Such understanding will then direct how digitalisation of finance can be used for development purposes, solving societal problems, helping improve economic and social outcomes and being a force for innovation and productivity growth. Hence, national-­ level analyses on (i) harnessing digitalisation to maximise development goals, (ii) determining the methods of financial flows over digital business platforms, and (iii) identifying loopholes that erode revenue generation are paramount to secure financing of the SDGs and Agenda 2063.

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mobile-­m oney-­m arket-­i s-­i n-­a frica/#:~:text=In%20the%20review%20 period%2C%20registered,just%20over%20a%20year%20before. Onyango, Gedion, ed. 2023. State Politics and Public Policy in Eastern Africa: A Comparative Perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan, https://doi.org/ 10.1007/978-3-031-13490-6 Oirere, Shem. Kenya strives to end illegal fishing, ramp up seafood production, SeafoodSource August 22, 2019. Ozkaya, Erdal and Islam, Rafiqul, Inside the Dark Web (Florida: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Press, 2019), see Chapter 5 on Cybercriminal Activities in Dark Net. Parliamentary Service Commission, Budget Options for 2022/2023 and the Medium Term (Parliamentary Budget Office, 2022), p. 54 Salami, Iwa, Cryptocurrencies are gaining ground across Africa. That’s both good news and bad. The Conversation, retrieved on 26/07/2022 from https:// theconversation.com/cryptocurrencies-­a re-­g aining-­g round-­a cross-­a frica-­ thats-­b oth-­g ood-­n ews-­a nd-­b ad-­1 87141?utm_medium=email&utm_ campaign=Latest%20from%20The%20Conversation%20for%20July%2025%20 2022%20-­% 202357923515&utm_content=Latest%20from%20The%20 Conversation%20for%20July%2025%202022%20-­%202357923515+CID_9a3 d12866efbc18f524370e62650ca51&utm_source=campaign_monitor_ africa&utm_term=makes%20the%20case (July 25, 2022) SDG Action, Funding those with the greatest need (2022) Available: https:// sdg-­a ction.org/funding-­t hose-­w ith-­t he-­g reatest-­n eed%EF%BF%BC/ (August 2022) Tax Justice Network, The State of Tax Justice 2021. Available: https://taxjustice. net/reports/the-­state-­of-­tax-­justice-­2021/ (August 2022) United-Nations. Financing for Sustainable Development. Inter-agency Task Force on Financing for Development. 2022. Available: https://desapublications. un.org/file/955/download (August 2022) Vigna, Paul, and Michael Casey. 2015. The Age of Cryptocurrency: How Bitcoin and Digital Money Are Challenging the Global Economic Order. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Watson, Amy. ‘Netflix’s revenue Q1 2011-Q4 2019, Statistica, 2020. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/273883/netflixs-­quarterly-­r evenue/ (Accessed February 2020). Watkins, Kevin, Miren Gutierrez, and Ishbel Matheson. Western Africa’s Missing Fish: The Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and Under-­ reporting Catches by Foreign Fleets, ODI (June 29 2016), retrieved on 26/ July/2022 from https://odi.org/en/publications/western-­africas-­missing-­ fish-­the-­impacts-­of-­illegal-­unreported-­and-­unregulated-­fishing-­and-­under-­ reporting-­catches-­by-­foreign-­fleets/

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Wilhoit, Kyle and Balduzzi, Marco, ‘Vulnerabilities Discovered in Global Vessel Tracking Systems’, Security Intelligence Blog, October 15, 2013. https:// blog.trendmicro.com/trendlabs-­s ecurity-­i ntelligence/vulnerabilities-­ discovered-­in-­global-­vessel-­tracking-­systems/ (Accessed February 2020). World Bank, Taxation, Inequality and Development. 2020. Available: https:// www.worldbank.org/en/events/2020/10/27/taxation-­i nequality-­a nd-­ development (August 2022)

PART III

Technologies as Spaces for Citizen Participation

CHAPTER 11

Strengthening Citizen Agencies in Policymaking Through Social Media Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango

Introduction: Understanding Social Media and Citizen Agency Since the 1990s, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have engendered hope for influencing public authorities’ responsibility, openness, equality, and efficacy (World Bank 1998). The highly interactive nature of social media has transformed it into one of the most utilised policy tools today. For example, unsanctioned and random video content and civil society’s and individuals’ increased online engagements have triggered spontaneous government action in areas hitherto invisible. Content creation and other engagements  through social media, has become the unseen ‘eye’ and information hotspots, creating online activism (see Gerbaudo and Treré 2015). These have often transformed in their own unique ways to inform and influence government agencies’ actions. In a context where content creation has starkly exposed the ‘irresponsibility’ of

J. O. Ondiek (*) • G. Onyango Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_11

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the government, especially under authoritarian regimes like that in Uganda, the government has responded by adopting predatory measures to shut it down. However, these autocratic tendencies in Africa have only proved that social media is here to stay. Indeed, most African government agencies continue to embrace Social Media as channels of engagement with citizens  to increase their capacities in addressing matters of  public interest, engaging in digital diplomacy and policy communications. Similarly, citizens have not only found social media to be the easiest, fastest, and most reliable means to communicate with one another and champion a change of policies but have also  taken an active participation approach through it. This shows how social media has functionally defined or distrupted how public administrators frame their policy proposals. In the current digitisation and  4IR technologies era, social media-­ enabled and growing citizen agencies influence decision-making and have become the most common tools people use to participate in governance processes and discussions. For these public and non-governmental agencies to be effective, there is a need for clear and interactive communication, engagement of huge numbers of people, and good leadership to influence public policy and the governance process. The government also needs to invest in infrastructures that enhance Internet access, as discussed in Chapter 2. Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter have enabled citizens to mobilise for change, lead community action, close the gap between governments and citizens, and spread stories of success across the country and globally. Maggie and Molony (2019) emphasise that sometimes what unfolds through social media is not necessarily driven by the citizen, and that state authorities and corporates oversee what is happening in social media networks. Still, citizens remain at the center of social media utilisation, hence the need to explore how social media relates to citizen agency, either as individuals or organisations in policy processes. This chapter intends to do just that. The expression ‘citizen agency’ refers to the actions of active individuals in political and social life which can impact decision-making in public policy and governance processes. According to Rajani (2008), “citizens agency is not only the purpose – or the ends – of development and democracy, it is also its most effective means”. Different factors, including inequality, discrimination, and injustice, push people to take up the roles of citizen agents. Individuals who take on the role of citizen agents are initially motivated by injustice, inequity, or prejudice. These individuals can be “activist citizens”, involved in script authoring and scene creation, or simply “active citizens”, who adhere to texts and participate in already created scenarios (Isin 2008). Both of these traits are critical for efficient action in policy environments.

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To function effectively as policy entrepreneurs, an individual will assert their citizen agency when in excellent health and knowledgeable, when they have trust in themselves and their rights, when they can access the data, and when they can articulate themselves to effect change and oppose unfairness and injustice. Moreover, people must believe that they are capable of change. Throughout history, activists and engaged or proactive citizens in emerging and developed nations have worked for several significant improvements – women’s equity, racial equality, and environmental concerns, to name a few. As Isin (2008) contends, without courageous and creative activities, it is impossible to envisage transformational change or to comprehend how individuals become residents who seek fairness, openness, liberties, and duties. Those people may become activists who write scripts, organise demonstrations, lead online opinion, or closely follow the government’s activities. The flip side of this is the recently emerging trend where online opinion leaders, especially with a huge following on Twitter, have somewhat turned into ‘social media hawkers’ or peddlers of online propaganda by selling their influence to the highest bidder to relay information. The result has been the growth of misinformation, disinformation and fake news, which has become a challenge to regulate on top of other prevailing ICT-related regulatory challenges. For citizen agencies to be successful, people need to be educated and confident, have access to information, and have a platform to voice their needs. Again, citizens need some answerability from the authorities for change to occur. Therefore, citizen agencies need to fulfil some basic conditions or produce a feedback mechanism to be effective. Effective citizen agencies need people with community identity and who feel part of shared interests and concerns in a community and have community and individual empowerment (Oliver and Lang 2018). Providing access to information is one of the most crucial processes conducted by citizen agencies. This makes social media one of the most reliable tools that have helped create active and effective citizen agencies. In essence, social media has created a platform where citizen agencies are re-energised to exercise their demands through soft power to influence governance environments  and policymaking. At the same time, the government need to be responsive to citizens’ demands generated through the social media besides encouraging effective civic  engagement through different social media platforms.  People and governments globally have recently demonstrated excellent use of social media applications to change governance structures fundamentally. This has resulted in mobilising movement patterns against

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and in support of governments, conducting electoral politics, and maintaining government–citizen interaction in the face of disorder, among other things (Morgeson et al. 2010). However, social media adoption in Africa faces several challenges. These mainly, include a lack of understanding of the technology, the availability and accessibility of e-services, public interest, government help, and the digital divide. Government confidence is integral to the e-adoption of new technologies in governance. Interacting with people is the most important component in developing trust in e-governance (McKnight and Chervany 2002). This is still challenging given the prevailing autocratic norms in most African contexts (Onyango and Hyden 2021). Again, the freedom of expression that comes with social media might result in the misuse of information and the spread of propaganda that may harm citizen agencies’ credibility. For instance, people can share misleading information that may disrupt people’s image of their government. To curtail this, citizen agents need to establish strong regulation aspects that track, monitor, and control information shared on social media. Therefore, to what extent do social media-based citizen agencies influence public policy processes? This chapter deals with this question. It analyses the policymaking process and citizens’ influence on policy outcomes through social media in the education and health sectors. Its comparative analysis examines Twitter and Facebook engagements in education and health policies in Kenya. The proceeding discussion is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches the evolution of citizen agency in public policy as an offshoot of public participation. Section 2 presents how citizen agencies influence the policy process through social media. Section 3 puts into context how social media-enabled citizen agencies have impacted education and health policies in Kenya. Section 4 concludes the chapter.

Evolution of Citizen Agencies in Public Policy Citizen agency is inherently people-centred, yet it cannot exist without responsibility from the government. As a result, some fundamental requirements must be met for residents to be capable of participating fully in sociopolitical life. Research has examined these necessary conditions and two distinct threads have emerged: Individuals must have a sense of belonging to a community with similar interests and concerns, finally leading to collective activities to assert entitlements. Agency encompasses the

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power to choose and act and the cognitive recognition that involvement is critical to a people’s self (Lister 1997). Personal and group empowerment is a necessary condition for community engagement. People must have a local government worth taking responsibility for (Sen 1999). People will join in national politics only if they believe they can contribute. Individuals must gain confidence to exert an impact on decision-making processes: local authorities or devolution of power is viewed as a means of strengthening the community through involvement (e.g. local-level planning, resource management, managerial and judicial authority) (Simeen 2004). While freedom of the press and freedom of expression are critical, research on their relationship to citizen agency remains ambiguous. Numerous studies have been undertaken, but with no conclusive proof, based on Lipset’s (1959) notion that mainstream press availability is necessary for mass engagement (Norris 2009). Nevertheless, worldwide experiences demonstrate that while knowledge is important for public engagement, it is inadequate. Yet, while information is no longer a prerequisite, it continues to be essential to citizen actions. To Easterly (2006), public participation through social media is critical in advancing good governance and democracy in developing nations, particularly in Africa. According to Bratton (1989), the term originated in the 1980s, after years of top-down policy initiatives in Africa had the unforeseen consequence of both strengthening the governments and decreasing public engagement. Economic power and corruption were further separating the government from the populace. Simultaneously, several social movements advocating for equality and justice were active and increasing. Therefore, a vibrant civil society was required to attain economic growth and democracy. There was a breakthrough with the World Bank’s Newspaper titled ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: from emergency to sustainable development,’ in which the failure of restructuring policies was credited to political, not economic growth, purposes: “underpinning the litany of Africa’s developmental issues is a leadership emergency” (World Bank 1989, p.60). A theoretical constraint in the subsequent wave of future development was the supplied definition of the public sphere; but while the phrase is extensively used in the legislative framework and even scholarly journals, its definition is vague. Mafeje (1998) asserts that since its origins in ancient Greek philosophy, the concept has evolved across cultures and ages: each historical period has engendered unique concerns about human situations and the worth of societies.

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Consequently, funders frequently use the phrase civil society with a ‘western’ meaning and ethical implication, culminating in the definition of civil society as community organisations, including advocacy organisations that focus primarily on public concerns in the space between the economy and the state. These definitions and explanations of civil society appear narrow and inapplicable to the African context. According to Lewis (2002), the primary issue is that the notion of civil society was established and evolved within a particular historical era in Europe and could be irrelevant in various political and cultural contexts. Throughout Africa, traditional organisations and self-managed sections of the population have been, in practice, sidelined from development strategies, despite their significant political and social contributions. To maximise the effectiveness of programmes and initiatives, legislators and development funders could use the term ‘civil society’ broadly, taking into consideration those facts that have historically gone unnoticed, namely a diverse range of social and cultural organisations working to safeguard “collective” desires. They encompass various movements formerly referred to as interest groups, including NGOs, ‘labour’ and ‘student’ organisations, and community organisations. The primary distinction between these groups and what was classified as civil society in the early 1980s is that these groups can operate irregularly, engage in self-help initiatives, and are frequently ingrained in the social and cultural milieu (Maina 1998, cited by Lewis 2002). We refer to this wider and more encompassing concept of civil society, which includes citizen engagement, as ‘citizen agency’. Involvement and independence are inextricably linked, and both are propelled and driven by a sense of belonging. These societies may be defined by a state or by cultural, traditional, religious, or social groupings. Thus, individuals can participate in community life not just as a result of their own autonomy but also as a result of their civil rights and obligations. Lister (1997) contends that citizenship may be viewed in this light as the legal right that enables people to take action as agents. From a representational view of democracy in which people are voters and persons with rights, the notion of democracy has evolved to one in which the authorities’ job is to participate in expanding communal spirit (Boyte 2008). This concept may represent the limited definition of civil society discussed above. When we consider citizen agency, the responsibility of individuals in democratic participation becomes somewhat limited. A new democratic framework may evolve in which people engage as co-creators

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and primary political and social change agents. Boyte (2008) refers to this as developing democracies. This framework views democratisation as a society, one that promotes activity across the sovereign, civilised society and marketplace, and one in which, as Sklar (1987) pointed out, any public authority is explicitly accountable for its acts. It is assumed that motivated and educated citizens create a developmental government. But this will also require citizens to organise themselves into different agencies or coalitions to engage the government on issues of public interest, and how to collectively or legitimately go about organising and addressing them. Technically, citizens can participate through two types of organisations: mutual gain groups and public welfare groups (Bergdall 2001). Mutual gain organisations are created with the express purpose of benefiting their participants. They are, in theory, responsible for their membership. Cooperatives, labour unions, and professional groups are examples of these groups. On either hand, public welfare groups are founded to advance society’s mutual interests, whose purpose is predicated on the shared views and beliefs of self-selected people presumed to be the general populace. These may include charitable organisations, civil society organisations, activist groups, and domestic and international wellbeing and development non-governmental institutions. Because of these public welfare organisations, non-democratic government communications infrastructure is under persistent, pervasive, and unrelenting assault  in Africa, especially from vibrant citizen agencies to promote their rights of representation. The social media environment has added to the complexity of this issue, especially when it comes to the act of balancing the negative implications that comes with it. Particular in this is the fact that Web 2.0 technologies are constantly growing while generating several potential risks in human behaviour, ergonomics, regulation, and technology (Trudel 2010; Penagiosis 2011; Nanjala 2016). Even if the government manages to handle one of these problems, one act may exacerbate another. For example, as people collaborate, communicate, and interact through the Web 2.0 environment, they may be more likely to participate in behaviours that infringe the rights of others despite the expanding civic spaces. The most common threats linked with user activity during Web interactions are those affecting identification, security, proprietary information, and personal and criminal content transmission. Social media can organise support for or opposition to a government or organisation. It is, as such, vulnerable to state politics’ control mechanisms and repressive responses.

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Advanced technologies on the Web have resulted in the creation of user-friendly interfaces and businesses. Web 2.0, mainly social media, now enables simple venues for sharing information about issues of governance and for citizens to interact with public administrators. Additionally, certain settings allow for anonymous execution of these tasks and participation. Such customisation flexibility may expose users to unintended violations of privacy, proprietary information, and other rules, as well as to activities that may be criminal. Even though citizen agencies wield free will to express themselves on social media platforms with few sanctions, organisations and governments have enacted legislation and rules defining what constitutes ‘correct’ and ‘inappropriate’ Internet and social media communication. While legal frameworks differ significantly by region, social media has a worldwide reach. In many instances, suitable penalties are established for violations of these laws. Due to the fast evolution of Web 2.0, legal frameworks must be changed constantly to account for these innovations. Nevertheless, because multiple stakeholders in a social media network hold varying positions and perform varying responsibilities, establishing accountability networks may be challenging. Additionally, with no awareness of the rules controlling the use of social networks and the repercussions for breaching a few of these regulations, users can easily fall victim to online offences and crimes (Landsbergen 2010; Ferro et al. 2013).

Citizen Agency in Public Policy Space: Traditional Media vs Social Media The mainstream press wields various tools to impact political agendas and other lawmaking procedures. Street (2001) differentiates three distinct types of power wielded by traditional mainstream media, which also illustrates social media’s impact. The first type of power is access power. The term ‘access power’ relates to how mainstream media exert control over various voices or preferences through various media and formats. The media utilised generates distinct barriers and opportunities for actors wishing to develop their concepts and frames, thus also affecting the possibility that these suggestions will reach a wider population. Second, mainstream media wield power in relation to the notion that people’s behaviour is shaped by their own information and knowledge, particularly by the frameworks they employ.

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People use the mainstream press to create their own perceptions of reality, which they then use to define and demand solutions to their problems. Thereby, the media’s power is mostly rhetorical in terms of its capacity for providing customised frames and transferring them to other stakeholders, potentially resulting in frame alignment. It is worth noting that it is not the channel itself that is the origin of discursive power but rather the channel partners who provide the images and information and the individuals who use and ‘consume’. Thirdly, media power can be described in terms of material power. The phrase ‘resource power’ relates to the capability of media groups to influence the institutional and negotiating power of states and authorities. Governments rely on the mainstream media to provide facilities and other valuable products (Street 2001). Web 2.0 technologies’ unique power capability has the potential to alter the enabling environment inside which people seek public attention. Web 2.0 has been dubbed the ‘social Web’ because its information can be obtained through user intervention and the collective knowledge of users as a result of their communication systems (O’Reilly 2005; Chadwick 2009). People can obtain roles other than passive recipients of content in Web 2.0 settings, acting as co-creators and co-producers. Web 2.0 enables these relationships to occur instantaneously between multiple people in different locations and at the same time. Adaptable, self-organised collaboration systems arise and promote effective learning by facilitating resource sharing, knowledge, interactions, and contacts via these technologies’ participatory linking capabilities (Bennett 2003). Such features may have significant implications for Web 2.0’s potential strength. Regarding information strength, social media platforms make joining a social network relatively simple. With low interaction costs, the loosely structured contacts in such a system can be rallied towards a specific objective. Web 2.0 technologies enable a scale transition that improves the efficiency of collective action involving many group members (Chadwick 2009). In discursive power, many-to-many information helps a rapid frame-alignment procedure, whereas the significant position of images, sounds, and other graphical interactions can help frame problems. Regarding resource capacity, Web 2.0 enables citizens to co-create quality information. Typically, traditional media outlets have complete control over the messages that are webcast. The institutions that own publications, radio channels, and television networks regulate the facilities of these channels. By contrast, due to the low cost of joining a social network or creating a blog, Web 2.0 applications are accessible to individual

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consumers. The functionality of these outlets does not require a significant financial investment or highly technical experience (Bekkers 2004). Governments have developed various online monitoring techniques and tactics in response to the rapid growth in citizen use of social networks, security concerns, and the potential for unexpected strategic events. These include techniques for monitoring and intercepting moves and operations, as well as reading and interpreting information (Bannister 2005). Connectivity to and monitoring functionality and features on social media is a modern phenomenon. Numerous software resources are available for tracking social networks. The private sector pioneered social media tracking. Such techniques are generally geared towards trend spotting, strategic marketing, and reputation accountability (Sen 2011). In this attempt, constructive and tactical orientations prevail, emphasising framing, viewpoints, and assertions among target audiences and anticipating possible opposition (O’Reilly 2005). Once people want to be involved, they require information to become cognisant, communication to arrange activities, an organisation to make their actions more efficient, and feedback to determine whether their actions were successful. Social media can be used as an innovative tool to assist citizens’ behaviour in those disciplines. The world’s leading information systems bring bidirectional or multidirectional communication through the Internet and real-time tools. Bidirectional communication empowers users and keeps relevant data current in actual time. By leveraging these attributes, social media can support civilian agency and, more broadly, the three primary pillars of civic participation (Norris 2001): what people realise about government issues (political knowledge), the public’s direction of assistance for the system of government and its actors (political trust), and traditional exercises aimed at influencing government and the decision-making procedures (political participation). This section demonstrates how social media has been used to assist citizen agencies in public policymaking processes (Chadwick 2009), mainly agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption. Some of these are further elaborated below. Social Media and Agenda Setting Social media platforms facilitate inadvertent exposure to political material and offer a place for politically engaged individuals and citizen agencies to readily exchange information with a potentially disinterested audience. The two-step efficient communication discussed by Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) in the live stream era is reflected in the digital

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communication of political news. This includes mainstream press information, which opinion makers start sharing via social networks, and less vigilant citizens benefit from low-cost information revealed by influencers on their social networking sites. Social media platforms, like in-person influencers before the Internet, may assist in distributing the mainstream media agenda to a larger audience through online influencers and accidental exposure. Agenda-setting effects may be strengthened if opinion leaders participate in information distribution via social media. The cognitive justification for the shift in problem prominence from the press to the general public is the ‘desire for direction’. The phrase “need for orientation” refers to an intrinsic need to comprehend and impose order on the unknown environment around each other (Matthes 2006). It has been characterised as a measure of political influence in politics, campaign discourse, and more specific questions about how significant a given issue is to one’s existence (Bulkow et al. 2013). McCombs (2014) observes that the socialisation framework conveys supplemental relevance and is frequently cited by survey participants as a reason for mentioning specific challenges as “the most significant”. Acknowledging the agenda set via social media requires knowledge of the peer transmission of significance in policymaking. Any time a person or a group posts a breaking news story on social media, they raise awareness and emphasise its importance; this has successfully pressed public administrators to set particular agendas about public issues. This combination increases the likelihood that issues discussed on social media, especially from reputable sources, will be conveyed with even more specificity than they would have otherwise. However, when it comes to agenda-setting repercussions, people who demonstrate instability and a lack of consistency in their views and thoughts should be more affected (Delli et al. 1996). Uncertain and politically inactive people avoid traditional news providers, favouring social networking sites like Facebook (Prior 2007). As a result, social media creates an atmosphere unlike any other in which citizen agencies with lower political impact and low degrees of uncertainty often come across unintentional political news or public policy issues. Political interest is generally utilised to operationalise applicability and uncertainties, making it a critical psychological variable to account for when studying agenda-setting consequences.

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Social Media and Policy Formulation Mendoza-Herrera et  al. (2020) assert that social media networks are a valuable source of information for policymakers and have garnered scholarly acknowledgement because they are constantly updated. They offer additional up-to-date metrics that are helpful to policy analysts and practitioners and could also be used to maximise initiatives, assist with monitoring, identify socially vulnerable individuals based on their geographic location, and educate allocation of resources. The researchers indicated that at least two-thirds of individuals in forty nations utilise the Internet, with 76 per cent of those adults frequenting social media channels, making such networks challenging to overlook. According to experts, incorporating social media into public policy development will allow for more reactive delivery of public services. It will also allow for early warning of potential failures in transportation, security, health, police departments, and social services, all while saving money and enhancing reliability (Leavey 2013). Broader application of ICTs – networking, textual, and image processing, data modelling, big data approaches, and grouping – may be used to extract insights from policy research. At the same time, public cloud and computing tools can be utilised to gather data and store knowledge. Social Media and Policy Adoption Social media platforms enable policymakers to acquire a broader range of information, including views, personal messages, discussions, and feedback for policy adoption, than traditional media, demonstrating its use in the policy development process (Lant 2014). This widespread usage of social media, whether solicited or spontaneous, provides a great opportunity for state inhabitants to become involved in policy reform (Bekkers and Edwards 2017). Social media platforms enable many individuals to engage in policymaking, facilitating the interchange of ideas and advancing information and argumentation. The scale of social media activity, with certain platforms like Facebook having around a billion active visitors, is unfathomable (Lant 2014). Lant (2014) adds that the quantity and variety of the people on social media networks should not be overlooked, and he advocates for an assessment of the platforms’ influence on policy reform. Recent developments in computers and modelling have made gathering information from social media

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networks simpler, allowing these networks to influence better policy formation and assessment (Battaglini and Patacchini 2019). Kouam (2019) encourages legislators to adopt a much more scientific approach to policy creation, administration, and evaluation by rendering social media an optional resource of public opinion (Kouam 2019). Social Media and Policy Implementation The creative capabilities of social media platforms have enabled a trend towards scrutinising all stages of policy integration organisations, and the imperative for legislators to engage these forums in discourse cannot be disregarded (Lant 2014). Citizens can now raise their voices and garner the attention they deserve through social media. This will allow them to structure their policy requirements, galvanise or lobby countrymen and women, and investigate alternative sources of knowledge about policy issues, as well as novel ways for citizens to participate in government policy (Bekkers and Edwards 2017). Researchers maintain that recent developments in theoretical modelling, computation, and data gathering permit the examination of the function of social networking in the stages of policy execution (Battaglini and Patacchini 2019). Three features distinguish social media as a critical component of policy execution (June 2011). These attributes are the way to reach a wider spectrum of citizen views and expose what can easily be overlooked through traditional methods of opinion gathering; the opportunity to meet users and offer them the opportunity to debate or share their opinions in real time or within a brief period; and finally, the ability to reduce users’ confidentiality, requiring them to be much more cautious about what they post online. This simplifies the process of crowdsourcing suggestions for policy formation, execution, and assessment using social media (June 2011; Rhodes et al. 2006).

Social Media and Citizen Agencies in Education and Health Policies Social media engagement can improve education and global health by actively participating in health and education research and providing policy input. Successful civic discussion requires an explicit and direct focus on health content, with natural conversation and cooperative, socially

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accepted, and decentralised messaging driving social media engagement (Smith and Smith 2015). Social media can also influence policymakers by shaping public sentiment (Bou-Karroum et al. 2017). Similar to citizens’ influence on public policy decisions, medical and educational professionals are in a unique situation to design and develop health and education policies. The reasons for this are numerous and include having positive role models, insightful frontline healthcare experience, personal connections, conducting research, and trying to implement evidence in practice, or obtaining direct experience in the strategic plan (Gimbel et  al. 2017). O’Connor (2017) argues that ICTs, including social media, can help nurses participate in policy design by facilitating them regarding the system and interacting with senior executives and lawmakers. The proceeding discusses social media-enabled citizen agencies in education and health policies in Kenya. Competency-Based Curriculum Education Policy in Kenya Several policies have been developed in Kenya’s education sector with the help of citizen participation and contribution. In Kenya, vibrant citizen agencies aim to monitor the government’s implementation of policy decisions in schools. Since citizen agencies are instrumental players, the sector is widely dominated by vibrant labour unions providing policy checks and direction through direct engagement, social media interactions, or traditional mainstream media. Labour unions have taken key centre stage in the formulations, and in monitoring and evaluation of policy directives initiated by the government. For example, in the Competency-Based Curriculum (CBC)1 reform and policy implementation, citizen agencies in the policy processes have been instrumental in shaping or monitoring CBC progress. To ensure quality education and training policies for all in Kenya, the government has therefore continued to implement measures to address access, quality, relevance, and equity in line with international, regional, and national policies and legal commitments. This has led to the government-­initiated curriculum-based reforms in the 2014 Education For All Review Report  allowing citizen agencies to contribute to policy development for curriculum change. According to the report by the Minister of Education, all stakeholders need to be involved in policy development: 1

 https://kicd.ac.ke/curriculum-reform/curriculum-development-policy/

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This policy provides a clear framework for undertaking curriculum reform in Kenya. The successful implementation of a new curricula will depend on the concerted efforts of all education providers, implementers and stakeholders. The policy has formalised the responsibilities of various actors involved directly and indirectly in the curriculum reform, development and implementation process. The policy strategies herein become part of the daily tasks and responsibilities of actors within the education sector.

Most importantly, CBC implementation is dependent on societal support, as demonstrated in the recent Afrobarometer study, where  more than half (52%) of respondents believed that  the CBC system would improve education (Afrobarometer 2022). With the emergence of the 4.0 Internet, artificial intelligence, and virtual classrooms with no physical schools, there is a need for a relevant student-centric, skill-based academic curriculum for future engagement. The Kenyan government developed the Digital Literacy Programme (DLP) to digitalise CBC. According to the Ministry of Information, Communications and The Digital Economy, over 75,000 primary school teachers have been trained to implement DLP effectively.  On top of DLP initiatives, CBC implementation has been embedded in collaborative implementation policy tools. For example, the CBC’s Elimu Yetu Coalition forum is an advocacy and accountability civil society forum comprising 102 local education actors, a teachers’ union, research organisations, and education professionals involved in education reforms. The coalition’s role is to influence policy development and implementation through effective advocacy and campaign engagements. The analysis of citizen agencies in agenda setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy monitoring is demonstrated in Table  11.1, which shows the findings from Twitter and Facebook in the development of CBC education policy since its inception. From the above assessment there has not been active rallying by citizen agencies in participating in the public policy development process, as evidenced by the mentions and activities undertaken through social media. Even though the debates on CBC policy and curriculum implementation are frequently mentioned and audited on social media platforms, much is not realised from the platforms used by key citizen agencies in the education sector reforms. The Elimu Yetu Coalition also does not seem to have many followers that can influence serious policy negotiations with the government through social media. However, from a review of reports, Elimu

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Table 11.1  Social media mapping of CBC public policy development by citizen agencies from 2012 to 2021 Public policy process

Activities and engagement in the social media platform Twitter

Facebook (820 followers, 784 likes)

Social media and agenda setting

3

8

Social media and policy formulation

2

5

Social media and policy adoption

-

-

Social media and policy implementation

13

21

Qualitative mentions and analysis

“The organisation was involved in 2012 in setting the CBC agenda when the first assessment report was tabled to parliament for adoption”. “The coalition has consistently followed up the formulation with parliament and other civil society organisations to ensure CBC policy is integrated”. “Even though there are no traces on social media about citizens’ activities in the adoption process, reports indicate the civil society’s role in rallying external donors to support the financing of the curriculum and training of teachers to ensure its adoption”. CBC implementation has received much attention from civil society, parents, citizens and teachers. Citizen agencies have been practical in pushing the government to change strategy in its implementation and have actively participated in the court processes that seek to change its implementation mode. Citizen agencies have influenced the implementation

Source: Authors

Yetu seems to be playing a much more central role in the public policy implementation process. For example, the coalition was involved in policy agenda setting in 2012 discussions with members of parliament to look into the review of the curriculum. Like other actors, the coalition was engaged in capacity assessment and forums on how to roll out CBC programmes in the country. Lately it has been involved in monitoring the implementation process

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and even giving views on the policy implementation process. Thus, citizen agencies, especially in the education sector, have not taken a keen interest in engaging with the government through social media to rally actors to develop public policy. Instead, and despite of efforts to digitalise the education policy, they still largely depend on traditional forms of engagement and advocacy to ensure policy development and implementation. Health Policy: COVID-19 Health Policy Responses from Citizen Agencies On February 28, 2020, the Kenyan President established a COVID-19 committee chaired by the Cabinet Secretary for Health to coordinate a preparedness response and prevention. The government adopted several containment measures, including heightened restrictions in most non-­ essential social spaces for gatherings and social distancing, teleworking where possible, night curfew, the establishment of isolation facilities, and limitations on public transportation passenger capacity. Most policy pronouncements from the COVID-19 situation arose from arbitrarily supranational policy responses influenced by the World Health Organization, scientists, and government pronouncements, making them non-­ participatory for citizens. Even though the nature of the COVID-19 response might have been initiated abruptly, citizen agencies were at least involved in social media participation to set the stage for policy adoption and implementation. Notably, two widely used metrics are implemented to assess a country’s readiness to deal with the pandemic: a) WHO’S Joint External Evaluation and b) the Global Health Security Index. There has been little to no effort to assess citizens’ responses to government pronouncements through social media. Different strategies and pronouncements inform this analysis of different actors in the policy implementation process towards the COVID-19 response. Analysing policy responses from various citizen agencies is challenging because COVID-19 led to development of many policies and mitigation strategies from different sectors. The public health national emergency policy response to mitigate COVID-19 was created, as shown in Table 11.2. There were discretionary actions by different agencies that might not entirely reflect their positions in policy development. To bring balance to the citizen agencies’ involvement, the analysis captures HENNET-Kenya, a civil society organisation within the health sector. HENNET is engaged

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Table 11.2  COVID-19 policy and coordination response Public health policies

Socio-economic policies

•  Travel ban policy •  Closure of schools and higher learning institutions •  Closure of places of worship and social gatherings •  Prison population release •  Mask wearing policies •  Additional healthcare workers and training

•  Tax law and amendments •  Cash transfers •  Food aid

Source: Authors

Table 11.3  Policy processes in COVID-19 health policy measures Public policy processes

Social media and agenda setting Social media and policy formulation Social media and policy adoption Social media and policy implementation

HENNET-Kenya: Activities and engagement in the social media platform

KEPSA- Activities and engagement in the social media platform

Twitter 2550 followers

Facebook Twitter 3651 46,000 followers followers

Facebook 12,036 followers

1

1

17

25

-

2

12

15

-

-

-

-

42

23

76

43

Source: Author

with coordination and networking among health-related civil society organisations and Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), a business membership organisation advocating for a level playing ground for the business environment in Kenya. Table 11.3 shows their reaction towards policy processes in COVID-19 health policy measures. Table 11.3 shows that most health policies related to COVID-19 were initiated and pronounced by the government without citizen participation. This, shows that the government can set policy agenda on its own, and formulate, adopt and implement it without social media participation and influence from citizens’ pressure groups, especially during a national

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crisis (see Muriisa 2022 in the case of executive policymaking during COVID-19  in Uganda). Therefore, social media platforms may  remain passive if not actively utilised by citizens and the government to influence the policymaking process. In the cases of the COVID-19 response, this passive inclination toward social media engagements could have been attributed to centralised approaches because of the need for certainty, control and urgency of interventions suggested to curb the crisis due to the spread of COVID-19 (Onyango and Ondiek 2022; Muriisa 2022). On the other hand, citizens’ participation through KEPSA Twitter and Facebook forums highlighted much participation in the agenda setting of most public policies related to socio-economics. It is evident that most policies were set on behalf of business people to cushion them from economic shocks caused by COVID-19. For example, in the agenda-setting stage of tax relief policy during the pandemic, KEPSA actively engages with citizens in social media forums, parliament, and business communities. KEPSA also enjoys a massive following from the public and has a wider social network reach, which translates to broad messaging and advocacy for policymaking. KEPSA was also active in social media engagement at the policy formulation stage, engaging with stakeholders, members* and government agencies to create a friendly business environment. HENNET Kenya, which represents several civil societies in the health sector, however,  does not actively participate in social media policy agenda setting, policy adoption and policy formulation on Twitter and Facebook. Still, citizen agencies suggest active engagements in social media at the policy implementation stage where the government, through the Ministry of Health and other actors, were engaged in discussing policy outputs on COVID-19 (cf. Onyango and Ondiek 2022). In the end, it was clear that  where the public or citizen agencies  directly engages in policy  argumentations, there were discussions on newer ideas  through social media spaces, as was presented by findings produced by KEPSA and HENNET-Kenya.

Conclusions This chapter examined specific citizen agency platforms and their contribution to public policymaking, focusing on education and health. The analysis highlights citizen engagements with particular policy development. However, citizen agency in public policy processes remains complex in the mix of social media advocacy and interaction. In Kenya, as in most

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parts of Africa, many citizen agencies and actors are not actively involved in policymaking through social media platforms. Even though individual actors can have strong credentials and follow the social media platforms to effect policy changes and processes, they can be weaker in influencing strong agendas that can create national conversations or discourses on public policies. Therefore, social media remains stronger or requires individuals to organise themselves to assert their voices on policy issues effectively. Still, the government can always decide to act or not to act despite individual pressures or citizen agencies depending on the policy regime in place. However, in this stay and age, we have seen that through collective citizen agents like civil society groups and online influencers, the government may be forced to convene and set policy direction for a particular task. This, therefore, calls for creating strong institutional legends of civil society organisations and individuals to be included in the active participation of public policy. Specifically, there is a need for structured frameworks that strongly enable citizen agents to advocate and directly engage with government in policymaking processes through social media. This is because individual organisations’ or groups’ disjointed deliberations may not effectively push for citizen-initiated reforms. In the Kenyan  education and healthcare contexts, policymakers view social networks as a valuable tool for increasing public engagement to develop and implement policies that deliver public services. In the same vein, engaging medical and educational professionals in the policy development process is critical and should be pursued by policymakers to ensure that user input from frontline staff nurses with medical, academic, and research expertise can contribute to the scope and direction of the policy. Social media platforms have enormous potential for disseminating health information. They enable the general population, patients, and medical practitioners to communicate about various health issues that may affect population’s health outcomes. Additionally, by utilising media platforms as a real-time learning resource, actionable insights into patients’ and caregivers’ requirements and desires across the continuum of care may be implemented.

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CHAPTER 12

Social Media and Public Policymaking in Southern Africa Emmanuel Botlhale, Mokaloba Mokaloba, and Chinthemwa Sichinga

Introduction In African countries, as elsewhere globally, social media has recently emerged among the public and informal policymaking spaces. Even though the extent to which it influences policy output in Africa is yet to be effectively established, online sites like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram provide information that can be used to inform public policy. Social media campaigns such as #feesmustfall in South Africa, #fixthecounry in Ghana, and #bringbackourgirls in Nigeria showcase the growing power of social E. Botlhale (*) • M. Mokaloba Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] C. Sichinga The Human Resources for Health (HRH) Program, Clinton Health Access Initiative, Lilongwe, Malawi e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_12

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media in the public policy space. Also, most African government agencies, leaders, and presidents have intensified their online presence, interacting with the public and stakeholders on pertinent policy situations. This chapter discusses social media’s role in policymaking in Botswana, South Africa, and Malawi. It shows that while social media can potentially enrich the policymaking process, it is still saddled with a lack of regulatory mechanisms like social media laws to guide the engagement, hence, the need for the same. Other lessons include bridging the digital divide and adopting the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms. Social media connote many things bordering on ‘a group of Internet-­ based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0 and allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content’ (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010, p. 61). A more coherent definition by Britannica (2021) states that social media are technologies, platforms, and services that enable individuals to communicate from one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-many. These are housed in digital platforms and could be mobile or stationary (Manning 2014). However, it is notable that not everything digital is necessarily social media (Manning 2014). Social media have two distinct characteristics: they allow for both participation and interactiveness (Manning 2014). The most extensive social networks are Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter. The ten types of social media and their uses are: (i) social networks (connect with people); (ii) media sharing networks (share photos, videos, and other media); (iii) discussion forums (share news and ideas); (iv) bookmarking and content curation networks (discover, save, and share new content); (v) consumer review networks (find and review businesses); (vi) blogging and publishing networks (publish content online); (vii) interest-based networks (share interests and hobbies); (viii) social shopping networks (shop online); (ix) sharing economy networks (trade goods and services); and (x) anonymous social networks (communicate anonymously) (Foreman 2017). However, this chapter will focus on social networks, principally, the biggest social networks being Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter. It will also explore how the same is used in the public policy space. Social media is pervasive; it has taken a life of its own, hence, the rise of terms such as ‘online communities’ (also called an internet community, web community, or virtual community). Online communities share huge amounts of online content, including photos, videos, and product reviews (Beer 2020). In 2019, 83% of global internet users regularly shared information online monthly, which was a

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cross-demographic activity (Beer 2020). Year-on-year, that is, July 2020 to July 2021, social media user numbers increased by more than 13% (Kemp 2021). As of July 2021, there were 4.48 billion social media users worldwide, which is almost 57% of the world’s total population (Kemp 2021). There are sizeable online communities in Africa. The distribution is as follows: Central Africa, 8%; North Africa, 45%; Southern Africa, 41%; and West Africa, 16% (Statista 2021). It is deducible from the foregoing that countries in Northern and Southern Africa have the largest share of social media users in Africa. The most active online communities in Africa are Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. As internet penetration continues to grow across Africa, so has the use of social media (Boakye 2021). Facebook is the most widely used platform; as of December 2020, there were more than 233-million Facebook subscribers in Africa (Boakye 2021). Thus, social media platforms provide information that can be used to inform public policy. Given the foregoing, governments have online platforms where they keep their finger on the pulse of things. Thus, this chapter asks: does social media play a role in the public policymaking space? Therefore, the all-important question is: does social media play a role in public policymaking? The answer is a nuanced ‘yes’ given that some people peddle misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and deepfakes on social media. This situation is patently seen during the COVID-19 era where pseudo-paramedics post false information, the latest example being using Ivermectin, an animal anti-parasite medication, to treat COVID-19. This chapter is organised as follows. The introduction introduces the subject matter to delineate the universe of the discourse. The first section interrogates the nexus between social media and policymaking. The second section presents case study 1: Botswana. The third section presents case study 2: South Africa. The fourth section presents case study 3: Malawi. The fifth section discusses policy implications emanating from the three case studies. The sixth section is the conclusion that has summarising thoughts.

Social Media and Public Policymaking With the advent of technology, policymaking has evolved social media applications as a public policymaking forums. There are huge volumes of public opinions expressed in social media platforms that can inform the policymaking process: both formulation and evaluation (Nguyen 2021). ‘Social media presents a growing body of evidence that can inform social

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and economic policy’ (Leavey 2013, p. 5). Recently, social media has been used by government agencies, the policy community, and public service delivery organisations (Leavey 2013). ‘Social media is a very public process … policymakers have the opportunity to’ listen, assess, and observe their connections with their constituents, colleagues, competitors, and many others they consider important (MSL Group 2016, p.  5). Social media is a platform for solicited and unsolicited citizen participation (Bekkers and Edwards 2015). Thus, citizens use social media to articulate demands and mobilise support for the same as instanced by the Arab Spring and los indignados in Spain and Occupy Wall Street in the US (Bennett and Segerberg 2012). In this regard, ‘in a “Big Data” world, the comments posted online by social media users can profitably be used to extract meaningful information, which can support the action of policymakers along the policy cycle’ (Ceron and Negri 2016, p. 131). Tran and Bar-Tur (2020) list six benefits of using social media in the government. These are as follows: (i) crisis communication (e.g., in COVID-19 management); (ii) citizen engagement (keeping the public informed about the policy and issues that matter most to them); (iii) build public trust; (iv) set the record straight; (v) test messaging (social media is a fantastic way to test your message with the public); and (vi) save money (traditional public outreach is expensive). Mickoleit (2014), similarly, lists these as (i) policy processes: more open, inclusive, and participatory; (ii) empowering people; (iii) enabling government (to be more responsive and to be quicker in responding to demands from stakeholders); (iv) supporting government transparency and accountability efforts; (v) reaching marginalised and hard-to-reach groups; and (vi) reaching younger people. Of course, there are challenges to social media (e.g., see Leavey 2013). Ruinously, some users, but not all, peddle misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and deepfakes on social media. However, on a balance of probabilities, benefits outweigh costs, hence, the use of social media in the public policymaking space. In the digital age, traditional or conventional modes of public policy are not equal to the task (Oginni and Moitui 2015), hence, the use of alternatives. One ubiquitous alternative is social media, as instanced by its increasing use in the public space to influence socio-political change (Muller and Merwe 2012). The foregoing notwithstanding, the current use of social media by various national governments is characterised by a ‘laissez-faire’ approach and is relatively experimental and reactive rather than proactive (Mickoleit 2014). In his study, Mickoleit found that seven out of

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twenty-­five responding governments had a dedicated social media strategy: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, South Korea, and the Netherlands. Other well-known examples are the US and the UK, where the social media platform is a key government communication strategy to engage citizens and other stakeholders (Mickoleit 2014). These countries have quickly realised that social media can be an effective tool for stakeholders to participate in policy processes to source ideas that would inform sound policy formulation, respond to requests, and collaborate with internal and external partners (Mickoleit 2014, p. 14). In the developed world, social media usage by governments has followed a linear path. Firstly, policymakers have used social media to broadcast policy news to various stakeholders and, secondly, policymakers have seen social media as a way to ‘crowdsource’ feedback about policy (Lampe et  al. 2011). The use of social media in the public policymaking space becomes more pronounced when conventional public policy instruments are becoming inadequate for addressing phenomena in the digital age. In this regard, African governments are using it as instanced by official digital presences. Some are friendly, but others are harsh, as instanced by unmerited shutdowns (e.g., Uganda, Nigeria, and Zambia). This chapter uses the case studies of Botswana, South Africa, and Malawi to discuss social media and public policymaking.

Case Study 1: Botswana Internet connectivity and usage have risen worldwide in the new millennium, which has since spread to developing nations (West 2015). Internet connectivity, usage, and affordability have also been growing in Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa. The increased accessibility to the internet has widened the use of the internet from its traditional uses to new areas primarily driven by social media. The increase in social media platforms has resulted in migration as news, announcements, discussions, and communication have moved mainly to social media platforms. Botswana has not been left behind in this migration as the country’s social media usage is rising. These include, amongst others, Facebook, Twitter, TikTok, WhatsApp, Instagram, and many other platforms. According to Afrobarometer (2020), 34% of Batswana use social media daily compared to 18% in 2014. This represents significant growth, especially among the youth in the country. The use of social media is informed by several reasons, initially starting as a recreational platform.

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However, over the years, many organisations, including government ministries and departments, have created social media platforms to disseminate information on services and receive feedback from clientele. In Botswana, the BW government’s Facebook page is the leading government social media platform (https://www.facebook.com/Botswana Government/). This site is a platform for government announcements and streaming of online government activities (including live parliament sessions). The BW presidency page is used for announcements by the office of the president (official @BW PRESID|ENCY Twitter account), while, similarly, the Botswana parliament, government ministries and department, and many others do the same. The comments section allows interaction between the administrators and those who follow the pages. Public officials, who are policymakers, also have Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram platforms, which they use to communicate with their followers on different issues. These pages always attract large numbers of followers. As of writing this chapter on 7 September 2021, the government’s official Facebook page had 705,451 likes, while the Twitter page (https://twitter.com/BWGovernment) had 280,800 followers. Government ministries and departments also have an online presence. For example, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development’s Facebook page is available at https://www.facebook.com/MFEDBOTSWANA/. These online platforms are home to animated discussions and announcements that directly influence public policy. The rise in social media usage has meant that several issues are discussed and directed through social media platforms. Many of these issues are of a policy nature. In Botswana, several issues have been ventilated in the social media, thus, leading to policy changes, or policy shifts/re-orientation, as next exemplified. (i) Eseng-mo-ngwaneng1 campaign: gender-based violence (GBV) and sexual exploitation targeting women and young girls are serious issues in Botswana (e.g., see Barchi et al. 2018; Mookodi 2004). Over the years, there has been a sharp increase in passion killings, GBV, rape, defilement, and related cases. Although laws deal with these problems, many perpetrators are not brought to book for several reasons. Among others, there is fear of stigmatisation of survivors and the slow legal process in prosecuting perpetrators. These issues have, over the years, not been ventilated mainly due to the lack of a suitable platform. Over the past decade, social media has provided a platform where survivors and the general public can come 1

 Literally translated, ‘not on the child’.

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together and address these societal ills and, most importantly, reach out to policymakers. In 2016, Sebina, a village in the Central District of Botswana, came under the national spotlight due to the alleged defilement and sexual exploitation of a young girl. The story found its way to Facebook and spread to other media platforms. This birthed several actions. Firstly, social media influencers organised a march to support young girls and women survivors of sexual exploitation (Botswana Gazette 2016). Secondly, a renowned social media influencer and lawyer followed the case and reported it to the Botswana Police Service. At the same time, he assisted the young girl with counselling and related services. The policy results of the foregoing bore fruit in 2019 when the First Lady launched the eseng-mo-ngwaneng campaign (UNICEF 2019). These campaigns were rooted in the Sebina saga and related cases, therefore, catapulting the issue of sexual exploitation targeting women and young girls to the fore of public policy. The campaign also sought to address the problems of rape, domestic violence, and related issues that affect the girl child and women in Botswana (Mokgosi 2018). This led to lobbying and advocacy to align the age of consent with the age of maturity (18); then, it was 16 years. (ii) Lockdown-related GBV: when Botswana underwent a hard-national lockdown in April 2020 due to rising COVID-19 infections, there was a consequent increase in GBV cases. Anecdotally, this was because partners, married or otherwise, spent 24 hours under the same roof for almost a month. The issue was ventilated on social media platforms, notably Facebook. The issue finally reached parliament and the presidency. In response, the president launched a 24-hour helpline for women and girl children to report issues of domestic violence and GBV. Furthermore, the Botswana Police Service established a special unit for addressing GBV issues (Baleseng 2020). On the justice front, special courts were introduced that primarily deal with cases of GBV. The first of such courts was launched in Molepolole in November 2020 (Thobega 2020). (iii) #VaccinateBotswana: COVID-19 vaccines have recently been among the most sought-after life-saving goods globally. In developing nations such as Botswana, procuring vaccines has been challenging despite the increasing COVID-19’s morbidity, mortality, and fatality. This resulted in an uproar by citizens against the slow rollout of vaccines. In social media circles, #VaccinateBotswana started trending. This aimed at pressuring the government to double efforts to secure and vaccinate the population. The president of Botswana acknowledged this initiative in his address to the nation on 13 August 2021 (Masisi 2021). The campaign was instrumental

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in influencing public health policy as instanced by the faster rollout of COVID-19 vaccines. This demonstrates the power of social media in influencing public policy. In this regard, the government’s bowing to pressure from social media indicates that social media influences public policy.

Case Study 2: South Africa South Africa is the second-largest economy in Africa, and despite its high inequality levels, internet access continues to grow and, consequently, the use of social media. There are 38.2-million social media users in South Africa (Staff Writer 2021). Facebook has over 27-million subscribers, followed by Twitter with 9-million subscribers and Instagram with 7-million subscribers (Staff Writer 2021). These figures represent more than half of the 60-million South African population. Hence, social media will directly impact government actions and non-actions. Like Botswana, the government and other public policy stakeholders have since embraced social media as a communication tool with citizens and other stakeholders. The government administers a Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/ GovernmentZA), and, as of writing this chapter on 7 September 2021, it had over 600,000 likes and 800,000 followers where updates from the central government are announced. This platform is mainly effective in communicating with youth who use social media platforms more than other groups. Announcements on COVID-19 interventions and vaccinations dominate social media platforms alongside other government issues. The national government also runs a Twitter page (https://twitter.com/ GovernmentZA) with 630,000 followers as of 16 June 2022. Provincial and municipal governments (8 metropolitan, 44 districts, and 226 local) also have official social media accounts that they use to make announcements and receive feedback from various stakeholders. It has been demonstrated in the foregoing that both the government and citizens use social media as an engagement forum. This section next uses two illustrations of the use of social media in the public policy arena. The following cases, and similar others, have been ventilated in the social media and led to policy changes, or policy shifts/re-orientation, as next exemplified. (i) #FeesMustFall campaign: tertiary education financing in South Africa has always been one of the most topical issues. Many students who pass their matric fail to proceed to tertiary institutions due to a lack of finances and the high prices of tertiary education. In 2015, at Witwatersrand

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University, the school management announced an increase in tuition fees by up to 10.5% (Mavunga 2019). The Student Representative Council (SRC) did not take kindly to this increment as many students had already failed to pay their fees. The SRC initiated a series of protests on social media platforms, primarily Facebook and Twitter. The protest assumed the moniker #FeesMustFall (FMF). The FMF campaign quickly spread across the country, and other universities such as Rhodes University and the University of Cape Town followed. Students mobilised and resolved not to return to classes until the issue of tuition fee increment was addressed. The campaign became violent as students protested on different university campuses across South Africa and destroyed buildings and property valued at over 600 million Rands (Bohmke 2016; Makhanya 2015). Amidst the boycotting of classes and destruction of property, the government had to respond quickly. Then Minister of Higher Education announced that the government had decided that the increment of tuition fees by tertiary institutions should be capped at 8% (Booysen 2016; Kaatle 2018). This announcement, meant to broker peace with students, worsened matters. Fresh protests erupted following the announcement by then Minister of Higher Education. The students, once again, boycotted classes in universities across the country, and the FMF campaign was revived and re-energised. In response, the government of South Africa announced that it would increase the annual budget for higher education by 17 billion Rands (US $1.18 billion) over the next three years. It was also announced that subsidies to public universities would be increased by 10.3 % (Linden 2017). Consequent to these remedial actions, the students toned down on their protests. The FMF campaign, pioneered by Facebook and Twitter, sufficiently demonstrated how social media could be used to influence public policy. The reaction of the South African government was largely influenced by the wildcat protests and destruction of property by students who used social media to air their grievances and organise and coordinate the FMF demonstrations. (ii) #RhodesMustFall movement: the Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) movement precipitated the #FeesMustFall campaign, anchored mainly on social media. The RMF movement began on 9 March 2015, and it was initially directed against the statue of Cecil John Rhodes, which was then sitting on the grounds of the University of Cape Town (UCT) (Castro and Tate 2017). The RMF movement’s mission statement read, ‘[W]e are an independent collective of students, workers and staff who have come together to end institutionalised racism and patriarchy at UCT’ (LSE 2015). The

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movement quickly spread to other campuses in South Africa and, afterwards, to Oxford University (Chaudhuri 2016). It is notable that although the RMF movement initially targeted the Rhodes statue at UCT, it quickly morphed into something bigger and touched on public policy issues. It ‘expanded into broader demands for cognitive justice; change of curriculum; de-commissioning of offensive colonial/apartheid symbols; right to free, quality and relevant education; cultural freedom; and overall change of the very idea of the university from its western pedigree (“university in Africa”) to “African university”’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2016, p. 195). Also, perhaps very importantly, it led to calls to decolonise the curriculum in South Africa. Thus, although RMF did not directly change public policy, social media was used to ventilate public issues beyond the Rhodes statute. Therefore, these issues are now on the front burner of public policy.

Case Study 3: Malawi Case Study Until 1993, Malawi was a one-party state, but since then, it has held multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections every five years. Politically, Malawi is a constitutional democracy and practises democratic governance characterised by the rule of law, constitutionalism, transparency, and accountability. In this regard, governance has been premised on legitimacy derived from the people. The current government has branded itself as a listening government. Therefore, it has opened various avenues for citizens to engage and connect with the government, such as the vice president’s Twitter account. This political will is echoed in the Malawi Public Sector Reform Commission (PSR) report. It states that ‘e-governance is an efficient provider of information, an enhancer of transparency thus eliminate corruption in the public sector and can provide opportunities for feedback’ (PSR Commission 2015, p. 30). However, despite the desire by the government to leverage the power of technology to improve service delivery and responsiveness to citizens, the full potential of technology, particularly social media, to augment public policy formulation has not been fully realised. This is instanced by, among other things, the lack of equipment and reliable internet connectivity in government offices. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the presence of citizens on social media is quite noticeable. As of July 2021, there were 729,000 Facebook users, 80,000 Instagram users, and 188,500 LinkedIn users in Malawi (NapoleonCat 2021). In Malawi, a few social media campaigns have

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received the attention of the government, thus, leading to a change in public policy as next exemplified. (i) #Datamustfall: in comparative terms, internet charges are high in Malawi, therefore, shutting a lot of people out of the public policy space that is potentially provided by social media. After futilely complaining about high internet charges, citizens took matters into their hands by ventilating the issue on social media. In this regard, in July 2020, a concerted social media campaign called #datamustfall was organised. Citizens used Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp to register their angst through the ‘Internet Data Must Fall’ online protest. In essence, the protesters demanded that Telekom Networks Malawi (TNM) and Airtel Malawi’s internet service providers reduce internet data bundle prices (Malawi Voice 2020). Subsequently, the Minister of Information advised the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) to engage mobile telecommunications companies to reduce the cost of internet data to enable more Malawians to enjoy services in the communication sector (Malawi Voice 2020). Thus, in August of the same year, Airtel Malawi, one of the biggest network providers, announced a reduction in data plans. The reduction made data affordable to those previously disenfranchised, consequently, allowing them to partake in the digital space, including engaging in public governance issues. (ii) Mahatma Gandhi’s statue: although Gandhi is celebrated as an anti-­ colonial civil rights campaigner, he is accused of being a racist in the mould of Cecil Rhodes (his statue led to the University of Cape Town’s #RhodesMustFall campaign in 2015). Hence, some object to celebrating his life through the erection of monuments such as statues. Inevitably, the Blantyre City Council met the same resistance when it decided to erect a statue in honour of Mahatma Gandhi in October 2018. The statue, erected in the commercial capital, Blantyre, was part of a deal with India, including the construction of a $10 million convention centre (Masina 2018). Then, it was contended that ‘the statue is an insult to Malawians and Africa because of racial slurs Gandhi made as a young man’ (Masina 2018). He is reported to have labelled black Africans as ‘savages’ and ‘kaffirs’ while living in South Africa in the late 1800s (Masina 2018). The protests assumed the moniker #GandhiMustFall campaign. Using social media, a group of youths began an online petition to stop the city council from erecting the statue, citing that Mahatma Gandhi was a known racist. The petition garnered about 4000 online signatures (Masina 2018).

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Critics, particularly the Gandhi Must Fall group, objected to Gandhi’s adjectivisation of Africans as ‘savages’ or ‘the Natives of Africa’ or ‘kaffirs’. The Gandhi Must Fall group argued in court that ‘being black people ourselves, such remarks have invited a sense of loathing and detestation of Gandhi’ (BBC 2018). In the end, the city council bowed down to the pressure and capitulated. Thus, social media brought pressure to bear upon the Blantyre City Council resulting in the halting of the erection of the statue. In addition, this forced a national conversation on the policy of national monuments. Unfortunately, this was a shallow victory because two years after the halting of the project, the Blantyre City surreptitiously unveiled Gandhi’s bust on 2 October 2020 to coincide with his birthday (Taylor 2020). It is unclear what actuated the government of Malawi to reverse itself other than commercial reasons because the statute project had a big carrot in the form of development projects. The foregoing demonstrates the potential of social media as a tool to engender political change in Malawi. Kaufulu and Burton (2013) studied the role of different media in the public policymaking arena. They concluded that the media, including social media, exposed bad public services, injustices, and public problems and galvanised public opinion around the same. Eventually, they asserted, this forces the government to respond to such issues and, thus, facilitates direct democratic influence and leads to better public policy. One illuminating example of the influence of social media in the public policymaking arena is the ‘Cashgate’ scandal which broke out in the local media in January 2014. Up to $250m (£150m) was estimated to have been lost through alleged fraudulent payments to businesspeople for services that were not rendered (Harawa 2014, p.  24). To eliminate the paper trail, it was reported that some records of transactions that occurred between July and September 2013 were deleted from the Integrated Financial Management Information System (IFMIS). The story was widely discussed in the media, including social media, influencing policy towards handling donor funds. It is notable that Malawi then was (still is) heavily dependent on donor support, including budget support. Hence, the ‘Cashgate’ scandal forced a rethink in handling foreign donations. Unquestionably, the Cashgate scandal would not have elicited the wide coverage and the swift response it did had it not been for digital activism. Despite the role of social media in public policymaking, the government of Malawi does not fully harness it. Like many governments within the sub-region, social media usage in public policy is nascent,

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‘laissez-­faire’, and ‘experimental’ (Mickoleit 2014, p.  29). The laissezfaire nature of social media usage in Malawi is exacerbated by the fact that there are no guidelines on the use of social media to enhance engagement and connection between government and its citizens, thus, informing policy decisions. For example, the Electronic Transactions and Cyber Security Act 2016 is quite vague on the use of social media. In broad terms, it states in Section 24(1) that there shall be no limitation to online public communication but for a few restrictions on public communication to curb incitement of violence, racial hatred, xenophobia, or violence and to protect public order and security (Government of Malawi 2016). The act gives freedom to social media users but is silent on how government can leverage the power of social media to inform public policy. Perhaps, the act presupposes that such guidelines would be developed based on the provisions of the law. Notably, there are no guidelines on using social media in policy processes. In a related vein, the Communications Act (1998) is silent on online media, perhaps because in 1998, online media was nonexistent in Malawi. In essence, although it can be concluded that there is a heavy presence of users on social media platforms in Malawi, the government’s engagement with the online community is largely weak. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a few social media campaigns in the recent past that led to a change in the policy give a ray of hope that social media can become an important element of public policymaking. Hence, the government of Malawi must develop policies and guidelines to coordinate engagement, feedback, and communication with citizens on social media to enrich the policymaking process. The government should take a proactive approach rather than a laissez-faire approach to using social media in policy processes. At the same time, it must address issues that are disenabling social activism. That is, as argued by Mutsvairo and Ragnedda (2017, p. 149), ‘the potential for digital activism in Malawi is plagued by lack of technological infrastructure as well as the powerful presence of a debilitating digital divide, which is illustrated along gender, economic status and location’.

Policy Implications from the Three Case Studies It can be deduced from the foregoing that there are online communities in the three case studies and that social media can be used as a participatory tool in the public policymaking process. The sampled illustrations are

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not exhaustive. Instead, they are used to demonstrate the use of social media in the policy space. It has been established that social media has three crucial applications: empowering the people, enabling government, and supporting government transparency and accountability efforts. These three applications can facilitate the use of social media in policy decisions so that public policy reflects the people’s interests. However, in many countries where social media has been embedded in policy processes, such as the UK and the USA, some strategies facilitate the engagement between the social media community and the government. The three case studies are not unique because they tell a typical African story where social media plays a role in public policymaking. For example, building upon the RMF campaign, social media was used to push back on the Gandhi statue in South Africa. In 2015, a Gandhi statue in Johannesburg’s Mahatma Gandhi Square was defaced with white paint. Although it was not torn down like Rhodes’ statue in Cape Town, the issue of monuments was ventilated on social media. Similarly, in Ghana, Gandhi’s statue was pulled down at the University of Ghana in 2018, two years after protests by a group of academics and supporters who wanted it removed due to Gandhi’s documented racism. In this regard, social media was employed to ventilate the issue. Based on the three case studies, policy lessons have application in the sub-Saharan sub-region as proposed. Firstly, there is a need for a clear and defined legal framework to govern social media in the form of social media legislation. The framework is needed to deal with social media maladies such as misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and deepfakes. In addition, and as amply instanced by the South African case, the use of social media to ventilate policy issues such as poverty and unemployment can result in deaths and economic ruination (see Ndaba 2021; Sunday Times 2021), so the need for social media regulation. The existing media laws in the three countries—for example, Botswana’s Communications Regulatory Authority Act (2012); Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act, Act 13 of 2000; Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of 2005 (ECA) and so on; and Malawi’s Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act, Act 33 of 2016 (the ETA)—are not tailor-made for social media regulation. Partly, the legal instruments were promulgated when social media was not a major communication platform. In this regard, while the South African government launched the Social Media Policy Guidelines in 2011, it did not go far because it is not a social media regulation act. Notably, managing risks associated with social media is crucial given the plethora of fake news that floods social media. Only the most accurate information

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must be used to inform policy decisions. Of course, social media regulation is a slippery slope in that some African governments, for example, Eswatini, Uganda, Nigeria, South Sudan, and Zambia, often shut down social media to suppress unwanted voices. Hence, this asphyxiates civil liberties. Therefore, there is a need for utmost circumspection in crafting social media laws lest these are used to curtail civil liberties. Secondly, there are issues of the digital divide in the sense that some people, particularly the poor, are excluded from the digital space. Thus, there are the so-called digital haves and digital have-nots. About 40% of the world’s population has no internet access, and most digital have-nots live in Africa (Jelinnek 2021). The causes are socio-economic factors, connectivity, technological access, and literacy and digital repositories (Garuba 2013). Regarding the three case studies, the issue is covered in Mudongo (2021), Lesame (2005), and Bichler (2008). The exclusion means that some voices are excluded from the public policymaking space because they cannot afford internet and data charges. Therefore, there is a need to close the digital divide by ensuring affordable internet and data charges. The government must continually engage with mobile service providers to lower internet and data charges. Where the government is a shareholder (e.g., the government of Botswana is the major shareholder in Botswana Telecoms), it must use its shareholding leverage to push through change. Thirdly, there is a need to recognise, respect, and enforce internet rights and freedoms by subscribing to the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms (see African Declaration Group 2014). This Declaration promotes human rights standards and principles of openness in internet policy formulation and implementation on the continent. Similarly, there is a need to align social media laws with the Declaration. While, admittedly, there is no official hostility towards social media in the three countries, attitudes can change overnight, subject to the whims and caprices of the rulers. Hence, there is a need to ensure social media freedoms by subscribing to the Declaration.

Conclusion Public policymaking has evolved with social media’s new fora like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. The multiplicity of social media plays a democratising function in policymaking, resulting in more accountability and responsiveness. The use of social media has led to digital activism in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g., see Mutsvairo 2016) as citizens use it to engage in public governance issues. Through digital activism, they bring issues to

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the fore of public policy that ultimately find their way into the policy formulation phase of the public policymaking cycle. Social media campaigns such as #feesmustfall in South Africa and #bringbackourgirls in Nigeria showcased the power of social media in the public policymaking space. The role of digital activism in the public policymaking space is a well-­ published story. Thus, some governments have online presences where they interact with stakeholders. Using the case studies of Botswana, South Africa, and Malawi, this chapter asked: does social media play a role in public policymaking? It concluded that, yes, it does and that it has been successfully deployed in the public policymaking arena. However, it noted all-familiar problems such as misinformation, disinformation, fake news, and deepfakes on social media. The foregoing is a pathological manifestation of digital activism. Other issues are the lack of social media laws, the digital divide, and the lack of application of the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms. The three case studies are not typical. Therefore, they are a microcosm of the digital social space in Africa. Therefore, their experiences generate general lessons for sub-Saharan Africa in promulgating social media laws, narrowing the digital divide, and adopting the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms. Doing the foregoing will facilitate digital activism, resulting in enhanced accountability and responsiveness and, ultimately, better public policy.

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Sustainable Development 14 (2): 158–172. https://doi.org/10.7916/ D85Q4VS0. PSR Commission. 2015. Malawi Public Service Reform Commission: Making Malawi Work. Lilongwe: Public Service Reform Commission. Staff Writer. 2021. The biggest and most popular social media platforms in South Africa, including TikTok. Business Tech, the 1st of July. Available at https:// businesstech.co.za/news/internet/502583/the-­biggest-­and-­most-­popular-­ social-­media-­platforms-­in-­south-­africa-­including-­tiktok/ (Accessed the 30th of August 2021). Statista. 2021. Social media penetration in Africa 2021, by region. Available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/1190628/social-­media-­penetration-­in-­ africa-­by-­region/ (Accessed the 31st of August 2021) Sunday Times. 2021. Looting cost KZN economy R20bn and probably 150,000 jobs: presidency. Sunday Times, the 20th of July Available at https://www. timeslive.co.za/politics/2021-­07-­20-­looting-­cost-­kzn-­economy-­r20bn-­and-­ probably-­150000-­jobs-­presidency/ (Accessed the 7th of September 2021). Taylor, M. E. 2020. Gandhi bust has just been quietly unveiled in Malawi despite protests. Face-to-Face Africa, the 2nd of October. Available at https:// face2faceafrica.com/article/a-­gandhi-­bust-­has-­just-­been-­quietly-­unveiled-­ in-­malawi-­despite-­protests (Accessed the 6th of September 2021). Thobega, K. 2020. Botswana sets up gender violence courts to tackle pandemic backlog. Reuters, the 30th of November. Available at https://www.reuters. com/article/botswana-­rape-­court-­idINL8N2IG3BE (Accessed the 1st of September 2021). Tran, T., and Bar-Tur, Y. 2020. Social Media in Government: Benefits, Challenges, and How it’s Used. Available at https://blog.hootsuite.com/social-­media-­ government/ (Accessed the 31st of August 2021). UNICEF. 2019. Eseng Mo Ngwnaneng: End Sexual Exploitation and Abuse. Available at https://www.unicef.org/botswana/reports/e-­seng-­mo-­ ngwaneng-­campaign-­brief (Accessed the 1st of September 2021). West, D. 2015. Digital Divide: Improving Internet Access in the Developing World Through Affordable Services and Diverse Content. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute [https://www.brookings.edu/wp-­content/uploads/2016/ 06/west_internet-­access.pdf].

CHAPTER 13

Technology-Mediated Transparency, Accountability, and Participation in the Realisation of Citizen-Centred Health Interventions: Case Study of MobiSAfAIDS in Southern Africa Mamello Thinyane, Ingrid Siebörger , and Caroline Khene

Introduction The decade of action for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has seen many interventions employ digital technologies to address enduring and complex challenges in sustainable development. Invariably, digital technologies are never a panacea but part of complex assemblages, comprising technologies, governmentalities, human factors, socio-cultural factors, policies, and political economy factors. Altogether, these interact in

M. Thinyane (*) United Nations University Institute in Macau, Macau, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_13

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complex and nuanced ways to shape sustainable development outcomes in specific contexts (Kitchin and Lauriault 2014). It is well-documented that digital technologies can contribute to each of the SDGs (Janowski 2016; Tjoa and Tjoa 2016) with variations across the SDGs and national contexts. Pathways through which digital technologies contribute to sustainable development include increasing access to information and the associated informational capabilities (Gigler 2011), amplifying collective capabilities (Thapa et al. 2012; Verstegen et al. 2019), and amplifying citizens’ voices, especially on matters related to governance and policy-­ making. In the context of health and wellbeing (i.e., SDG3), research suggests that improving transparency, accountability, and participation (TAP) is one of the pathways to accelerate the achievement of universal health outcomes and building responsive, inclusive, and sustainable health systems and policy (Chang Pico et al. 2017; Lodenstein et al. 2017). The TAP objectives are situated at the interface between citizens and governments in that transparency relates to the visibility of governments’ actions and processes to citizens, accountability is about citizens being able to hold governments responsible and answerable, and participation refers to citizens’ varied involvement in governance processes. In different contexts, digital technologies support and advance the TAP objectives in healthcare (Schaaf et al. 2018). In particular, the proliferation of mobile devices has made digital services accessible to citizens. Projects involving the use of mobile phones for SRHS have taken place in both high-income (HIC) and low- to middle-income countries (LMIC) (L’Engle et  al. 2016; Ippoliti and L’Engle 2017). Studies on mobile phones for SRHS show that most projects use mobile phones to disseminate health information to promote good health practices (L’Engle et al. 2016; Ippoliti and L’Engle 2017). Other projects also utilise mobile phones to provide counselling services for family planning, abortion and

I. Siebörger Department of Information Systems, Rhodes University, Grahamstown, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] C. Khene The Centre for Computing and Social Responsibility, De Montfort University, Leicester, UK e-mail: [email protected]

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post-abortion care, and HIV care and treatment, using mobile phones to improve the knowledge of young people concerning SRHS and SRHR to influence their behaviour (L’Engle et al. 2016; Ippoliti and L’Engle 2017). Hrynick and Waldman (2017) report on seven mHealth for accountability projects; two of the seven are with respect to “General Health”, while the remaining five focus on SRH (generally [2], maternal health [2], and HIV/AIDS [1]). Focusing on the five SRH-related mobile projects, only one project facilitated dialogue between the application users and the government. The other four projects collected feedback from the general public, collated and aggregated the data, and used it to engage with the government on behalf of citizens. Relative to health accountability projects that do not employ digital technologies, research has shown that ICTs can add operational value. This is by improving the collection, aggregation, and analysis of citizen-­ generated data; improving the availability, accessibility, acceptability, and quality (AAAQ) metrics associated with health data; and increasing the legitimacy of citizens’ service delivery failure claims (Schaaf et al. 2018). However, digital technologies also present barriers that can hamper the achievement of the TAP objectives; these barriers include citizens’ limited technological literacy, constrained ICT capacity within participating organisations, and lack of training and capacity-building to ensure effective data valorisation (Schaaf et al. 2018). For the last five years (2018–2022), MobiSAfAIDS, a social accountability monitoring (SAM) platform for adolescent sexual and reproductive health (SRH) rights and services, has been piloted in six Southern African countries towards improving SRH outcomes for youth and adolescents. MobiSAfAIDS is a collaborative project between the MobiSAM universities research team and the NGO SAfAIDS.  The focus was to build an artefact that addresses real problems faced by youth—and from the process (iterative research, implementation, and use), learn from the experience of communities, partners, the NGO, and the universities team. As part of a broader program framework, MobiSAfAIDS has been used to support youth to report service delivery challenges experienced at pilot site healthcare facilities across the six countries. This chapter reports on the usage of MobiSAfAIDS from the data collected on the platform. The research is guided by the following question: how has MobiSAfAIDS advanced or constrained transparency, accountability, and participation outcomes, as a pathway towards improved adolescent SRH services and policies? The rest of the chapter is structured as

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follows: the next section discusses the importance of transparency, accountability, and participation in health systems, followed by an overview of the “Transforming Lives” programme and the MobiSAfAIDS platform to explore the dimensions of TAP observed in the usage of MobiSAfAIDS. The chapter concludes with a discussion that synthesises the observations on the role of digital technologies in advancing TAP outcomes in health systems.

Transparency, Accountability, Participation (TAP) in Health Systems TAP has increasingly become key guiding principles for international development policies and programmes and has somewhat become a consensus in international development circles. Despite the wide consensus on these principles, questions remain about their impact on development. Their definitions also vary between different international development practitioner communities. They are operationalised differently by different stakeholders—for example, government stakeholders tend to emphasise the instrumental aspects that lead to increased government effectiveness by improving service delivery, preventing mismanagement, and enhancing social justice. Moreover, TAP objectives can also be driven by civil society stakeholders, including civil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights and democracy advocates. These latter stakeholders tend to emphasise the more political factors of these principles: increasing social accountability, enhancing citizens’ participation in public affairs through multistakeholder policy dialogues, and empowering citizens through capacity-building (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014; Chang Pico et al. 2017). TAP, considered a fundamental component of citizen engagement, is argued to assist in creating an inclusive society (Kumagai and Lorio 2020). An inclusive society supports or empowers all its members to participate in holding the government accountable. However, the 2021 Edelman Trust Barometer found that 47% of the world’s population does not trust their government to “do what is right” (Edelman Intelligence 2021). Yet, according to van der Meer (2017 cited in Kumagai and Lorio 2020), trust is necessary (emphasis our own) to achieve representative democracy. In a recent blog post, Peixoto (2021) explores the contentious issue of trust in government, specifically exploring the relationship between trust in government and government trustworthiness (Peixoto 2021). Peixoto proposes that

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“[a]ll else equal, individuals’ trust in their government should be expected to be proportional to the trustworthiness of that government”. He goes on to define a trustworthy government (quoting Levi 2019) as one that “keeps its promises (or has exceptionally good reasons why it fails to), is relatively fair in its decision-making and enforcement processes, and delivers goods and services” (Levi 2019). Therefore, the more a government keeps its promises and delivers services, the more the citizens should trust their government. Consequently, TAP can build communication channels between citizens and government to work together in addressing problems or shortcomings in service delivery, while facilitating a shared understanding of the government’s promises and delivery of services to citizens. Doing so may promote appropriate levels of trust in government and work towards improved service delivery. In health systems, TAP is grounded in the right to health imperative (Backman et  al. 2008) and correlates with the achievement of greater health outcomes. For example, a reduction in child mortality associated with increased community-based monitoring of public primary health care providers in Uganda (Björkman and Svensson 2009); enhancement of social accountability for patient-centred care in Afghanistan through the use of community score cards (Edward et al. 2015); and improvement of the health of women and children through independent accountability mechanisms in Nigeria (Garba and Bandali 2014). Despite the evidence of the effectiveness of TAP towards improved service delivery (e.g., health outcomes) and appropriate levels of trust, evidence also suggests that such effectiveness is mixed and dependent on many context-related factors. These include the perceived legitimacy of the TAP initiatives; involvement of key stakeholders, including government officials, healthcare experts, and professionals; citizens’ expertise and capacity to interact with the relevant systems and technology; reliability and accessibility of the generated data to support the TAP initiatives; and responsiveness of the healthcare providers (Joshi 2013). Beyond hampering the effectiveness, in some instances, TAP initiatives may be resisted by different health stakeholders, including health providers, administrators, and politicians, because of their potential to expose corruption, underinvestment, and implementation shortfalls (Schaaf et  al. 2018). The TAP objectives are adopted in this chapter as the intermediate outcomes to frame the investigation of the effectiveness of the MobiSAfAIDS platform towards improved health outcomes (e.g., service delivery and policies) for the youth.

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Transparency Transparency is generally defined in terms of the extent to which information is revealed about the decision-making processes, procedures, functioning, and performance of a specific entity to outsiders—thus the notion of inward observability (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013). Transparency can be grounded from many perspectives: from communication theory, it is about making information visible and understandable, or from political theory, it is about the human rights to know and about making government processes open to improving democracy, accountability, and legitimacy. Three distinct notions of transparency, which recognise its inherent multidimensionality and context-specificity, can be noted, particularly regarding computer-mediated government transparency: decision-making transparency, policy information transparency, and policy outcome transparency (Hood and Heald 2006). Decision-making transparency refers to the openness with which governments prioritise problems, identify potential solutions, and make choices to address the problems in their specific contexts. While decision-­ making transparency is about the process of developing policies, policy information transparency is about the openness of the policy stipulations, implementation details, and the anticipated pathways to impact. Lastly, policy outcome transparency is about policies’ real-world effectiveness and impact. Studies suggest that transparency is influenced by three factors— organisational capacity, political influence, and group influence—which predict each dimension of transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012). Organisational capacity connotes the resources and capital that governments are endowed with for implementing transparency measures, especially regarding ICT-mediated government services and information. Organisational capacity is a predictor of policy outcome transparency. Political influence is related to the accountability of governments to specific constituents and democratic processes (e.g., elections) and institutions within the country. This is a good predictor of decision-making transparency partly because governments tend to respond more to issues with strong ownership and political representation. Lastly, group influence refers to the effect of external stakeholders, such as interest groups, CSOs, and the media, to hold governments accountable and demand openness and visibility. Group influence has been a predictor of policy information transparency and policy outcome transparency (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012).

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Transparency is not only about the openness of government information and processes but also about the truthfulness, reliability, comprehensibility, accuracy, accessibility, timeliness, and balance of the information to satisfy the vital interests of citizens (Albu 2014; Chang Pico et al. 2017; Fung 2013). As far as citizens are concerned, the correct government information must be made available at the right time to the right people to enable relevant action (Cucciniello and Nasi 2014). Further, Fung argues that the effects of transparency disclosures can only be reached when societies’ social, political, and economic structures are shaped and organised in ways that allow citizens to take individual and collective action based on the information (Fung 2013). Therefore, transparency effects depend on countries’ underlying structural and societal dynamics. For example, socio-cultural factors associated with values of openness, power distance, and short- versus long-term orientation were found to explain the observed differences in the positive effects of transparency between South Korea and the Netherlands (Grimmelikhuijsen et al. 2013). Further, while the effect of transparency on public and social accountability is usually implied based on citizens being able to monitor, scrutinise, and demand accountability by having visibility of government decision-making processes, research shows that the effect of transparency on accountability—mediated through the impact on institutional trust, political involvement, and political trust—depends on several factors. These are a country’s level of corruption, which can lead to improved (i.e., indignation) or reduced (i.e., resignation) social accountability. Research has also shown that transparency does not necessarily lead to higher levels of trust but can lead to decreased levels of trust, where citizens have increased evidence to blame and be suspicious of their government (Grimmelikhuijsen, S.G. et  al. 2012; Peixoto 2021). A healthcare priority-setting experiment on the effects of transparency found that transparent decision-making procedures can weaken trust in healthcare. Further, it was found that the form of decision-making (i.e., open or closed) does not significantly impact the perceived legitimacy of those decision-making procedures and, therefore, the decisions which emanate (de Fine Licht 2011). Accountability Generally, accountability refers to one party’s (e.g., the government) obligation to demonstrate performance and be answerable to another party

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(e.g., citizens) on responsibilities, commitments, and expected outcomes (Chang Pico et  al. 2017). Therefore, accountability is two-sided, for example, with citizens’ voice and ability to hold the government accountable on one side and the government’s responsiveness on the other (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). Voice refers to the capacity for citizens to express their views and opinions on matters of concern (Peixoto and Fox 2016). Many factors, including socio-political and cultural norms, affect citizens’ ability to vocalise. The governance systems within countries also affect citizens’ voices, where more democratic systems might encourage and create enabling spaces (Gaventa 2006) for citizens to express their concerns (Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012). Voice is not only an individual citizen capability but also a collective capability that emerges from the combined effort of the citizens to express their views and opinions. For example, in the context of healthcare services, collecting citizen-generated data on service delivery concerns is an important step towards aggregating citizens’ concerns and building a collective voice to confront the lack of service from the government. However, the amplified and aggregated citizens’ voices must be met with the government’s willingness and capacity to act and respond to the raised concerns (Schaaf et al. 2018). Responsiveness is “the extent to which a public service agency demonstrates receptivity to the views, complaints, and suggestions of service users, by implementing changes to its own structure, culture, and service delivery patterns to deliver a more appropriate product” (Goetz and Gaventa 2001, p.  6). Government responsiveness firstly entails governments being able to listen to citizens’ input, for example, through citizen engagement processes and mechanisms (Stivers 1994). Secondly, it involves dialogue between citizens and governments towards resolving misunderstandings and contradictory agendas (Roberts 2002); thirdly, it entails the willingness to undertake necessary actions in response to the citizens’ input (Schaaf et al. 2018). While many socio-political factors influence the responsiveness of governments, the reality is that governments are responsive given appropriate circumstances and situations. For example, governments tend to be responsive at specific times (e.g., during elections) and generally to more powerful stakeholders and constituents (e.g., the business community and the media). Power is intricately intertwined with governments’ responsiveness and accountability in various forms, levels, spaces, operations, and manifestations (Gaventa 2006). Accountability mechanisms can be classified into two distinct forms: vertical mechanisms through which non-state

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actors hold those in power accountable (e.g., elections, media institutions, advocacy), and horizontal mechanisms, which are institutional procedures that are internal to the state (e.g., audits, oversight committees, reporting systems) (Goetz and Gaventa 2001). Accountability can also be considered in terms of three key components (Emanuel and Emanuel 1996): the loci of accountability—which refers to the different stakeholders that may be involved in accountability processes; the domains of accountability— the different activities that stakeholders can be held accountable for, such as professional competence, legal and ethical conduct, and adequacy of access; and the procedures of accountability—including the formal and informal accountability procedures. Different permutations of these elements can be realised in different contexts to frame the accountability mechanisms at play. In healthcare service delivery, the loci of accountability include the healthcare service providers, facilities, professionals, and government health departments. The domains of accountability relate to the different services offered by the health systems as well as the conduct of the stakeholders through the process of rendering services; lastly, the accountability procedures include formal reporting and handling of service users’ (i.e., citizens’) complaints and grievances. Participation Participation discourse is primarily framed around the capability of citizens to contribute to the decisions and actions that affect them meaningfully. This framing is expressed in several United Nations’ conventions and resolutions. For instance, the Aarhus Convention recognises the rights of the “public concerned” to access information and decisions about environmental matters. The SDGs framework highlights the need for “responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels” to promote good governance and achieve sustainable development in a transparent, accountable, and inclusive manner. In general, the UN defines participation concerning three civic rights: the right of citizens to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected, and the right to have access to public services (UN Human Rights Committee 1996). Several other frameworks define different levels and dimensions of participation. The classical Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation recognises citizens’ varied involvement in and access to information and decision-making processes (Arnstein 1969). White’s (1996) framework also

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defines participation at nominal, instrumental, representative, and transformative levels (White 1996). Nominal participation is about legitimation and display, about informing citizens of government programmes without giving them much influence in decision-making. Instrumental participation recognises the efficiency benefits of including different stakeholders in the programmes and interventions—in this case, participation is a means towards efficiency. Representative participation gives people a voice and recognises the people’s right to be heard and taken into account in the decision-making process. Giving “voice” to citizens and enhancing the population’s participation can contribute to an increased resource base of public services and improve accountability (Mehrotra and Jarrett 2002). Transformational participation empowers people to consider options, make decisions, undertake collective actions that advance their interests and concerns, and challenge the structural factors perpetuating marginalisation (White 1996). Invariably, participation is also intricately related to power and power dynamics between stakeholders—for example, power distance between citizens and governments. Gaventa’s (2006) power cube can be used to shed some light on the different forms, spaces, and levels of power that are at play in government and citizen interactions (Gaventa 2006). For example, citizen engagement typically is about governments creating invited spaces for citizens to participate and contribute, and citizen participation, which citizens typically drive, is about the empowerment of the citizens to create and claim the power to engage in governance affairs. Participation in health systems is similarly motivated by the need to include people affected by decisions in healthcare services. United Nations’ instruments such as the PARIS AIDS summit declaration, declaration of commitment on HIV/AIDS, and political declarations on HIV and AIDS have emphasised the importance of participation in health (Chang Pico et al. 2017). Beresford argues that it is crucial to consider participation in health within a broader political effort of increased democratic participation, which advances representation and the achievement of social rights (Beresford 2019). He frames participation in health along a phased approach that begins with (1) a move towards universal suffrage and social rights, (2) provisions for participatory democracy and community development, (3) provisions for participation in health and social care, and (4) reaction and renewal (Beresford 2019). Digital technologies have contributed to increased citizen participation in different contexts, for example, by aggregating and amplifying citizens’

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individual and collective voices. However, digital technologies can also be a barrier to effective participation when citizens face challenges of digital illiteracy, lack of access, affordability, and capability, and other limitations in their use of digital technologies. Overall, despite the important role of digital technologies in citizen participation, non-technical attributes associated with citizens’ social capital, cohesiveness, and the brokered participation by a legitimate “representative of the people” can contribute to increasing citizens’ voice and to accountability gains (Hernández et al. 2020).

Research Approach and Data Analysis This study uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches for data collection and analysis, triangulating evidence that explains the usage of the MobiSAfAIDS platform by the selected pilot communities across the six countries. The qualitative investigation is based on informal interviews and a strategy formulation workshop with government, youth, youth-led CSO, and SAfAIDS country staff. On the other hand, the quantitative investigation is based on an analysis of the usage data collected from the MobiSAfAIDS platform. The quantitative data that is collected on the platform and used in this analysis includes: • Issues—the SRHS service delivery issues (i.e., failures) that have been reported on the platform. Issues are assigned a status that indicates the status of the issue within the issue resolutions workflow: Open—when issues are created, Assigned—when a health facility assigns an issue to a service provider, Resolved—when the service provider has attended to issues, and Closed—when an issue has been successfully resolved. Date and time data is also collected on the key events throughout the workflow. • Discussions—for each service delivery issue that has been reported, the health facility and service provider officials can engage in discussions while addressing the issue. • User data—basic data is collected for each of the platform’s users; this data includes the user’s role, account creation date, location, and basic demographic data for some user roles. • Usage data—basic usage data is collected for key events, activities, and use cases within the platform, for example, login events, app registrations, and events throughout the issues resolution workflow.

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The analysis uses data that was collected between March 2019 and July 2021. The first part of the analysis provides an overview of the usage of the MobiSAfAIDS platform, highlighting the numbers of users, healthcare facilities, service providers, and the specifics of the usage in the different countries. The second part of the analysis investigates the influences of the MobiSAfAIDS platform on the TAP objectives across countries. The analysis focuses on the platform’s contribution to policy information and policy outcome dimensions of transparency. For accountability, the analysis is on citizens’ voices and governments’ responsiveness. Lastly, for participation, the analysis explores the nature (i.e., mediated/brokered participation) and the levels of participation enabled through the platform. Throughout the analysis, country-specific aspects of platform usage are highlighted and discussed.

MobiSAfAIDS Case Study Social Accountability Monitoring in Southern Africa Southern African countries continue to face challenges linked to the growing population of young people aged 10–24 (Caroline et al. 2013; Morris and Rushwan 2015). The population of young people in Sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to be one-third of the entire population (Caroline et al. 2013). For most young people, it is the period they try to understand and explore issues related to their lives, such as innovations, hope, education, and adolescence. For most youth, it is also the time they face challenges to access sexual reproductive health (SRH) services that address sexually transmitted infections, HIV-AIDS, gender-based violence, and unintended early pregnancies (Hervish and Clifton 2012). Aware of these challenges, governments in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have taken a stance to invest more in sexual reproductive health services for socio-economic transformation (Morna et  al. 2014; Graham et al. 2010). Therefore, to realise their goals and objectives in the delivery of SRH services, it is key that governments in the SADC region engage the youth in seeking optimal ways of addressing challenges they encounter when accessing SRH services (Hervish and Clifton 2012). The Southern African-based NGO SAfAIDS implemented a three-year (2018–2020) regional policy advocacy programme across the SADC region. This was entitled “Transforming Lives: Transforming the Policy Environment for Accelerating Access to SRHR by Adolescents and Young

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People” within an SDG framework. “Transforming Lives” has been implemented in six countries: Zambia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, eswatini, South Africa, and Malawi. The programme (still ongoing) aims at transforming the policy environment towards upholding the sexual and reproductive health and rights of adolescents and young people. It specifically focuses on preventing sexual gender-based violence (SGBV), teenage pregnancy, unsafe abortion, and promoting social accountability monitoring for access to SRH services by young people. The programme activities and outcomes contributed to achieving SDG 3 (i.e., Good Health and Wellbeing) and SDG 5 (i.e., Gender Equality). The programme is premised around four pillars of intervention: policy development; policy advocacy; social accountability monitoring; and evidence and knowledge sharing (Table 13.1). Particularly pertinent to SRH service delivery in SADC countries is the need for effective and efficient channels of information and communication that involve the youth, local government, and civil society organisations supporting SRH service provision processes. Local governments need meaningful engagement with the youth and CSOs characterised by a two-way communication process. The MobiSAfAIDS initiative is centred around Pillar 3 on Social Accountability Monitoring (SAM) of SRH services, working closely with regional and youth networks. Meaningful engagement should, as a direct result, give the youth a decision-making role and an ability to hold local government accountable for improving SRH service delivery outcomes. Moreover, the proper channels of information and communication between citizens and the government are doorways to driving government responsiveness and awareness. Therefore, implementing youth SRH engagement initiatives like MobiSAfAIDS is vital in evidence-based engagement and capacity-building to hold local government accountable for its SRH services. MobiSAfAIDS incorporates a reporting interface for citizens (via a mobile application or website) and a ticketing function (mainly used by the local clinic and service providers) to manage service delivery complaints. Figure 13.1 describes the process of reporting an SRH service issue and engaging with key stakeholders. The individual youth or youth-led CSO submits a report of an issue (i.e., SRH service failure) experienced when accessing SRH services, which is then opened as a ticket on the system. This ticket is then accessed by the health facility administrator, who assigns the ticket to the relevant service provider to address the issue. Once the issue has been addressed, the ticket is recorded as resolved by the service

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Table 13.1  Strategic pillars of the “Transforming Lives” programme Strategic Pillars Pillar 1: Policy development Working with: SADC Secretariat 1. Evidence generation through rapid regional baseline assessment of the SGBV response policy environment. 2. Development of SADC SGBV Response Guidelines for adolescents. 3. Advocate for the domestication of SADC SGBV Guidelines. 4. Support domestication.

Pillar 2: Policy advocacy Working with: SADC Ministers of Health, Education and Gender and Religious, Traditional and Political Leaders. 1. Develop a regional road map towards a SADC Minimum Package of Services for prevention of pregnancy and unsafe abortions amongst adolescents. 2. Launch a regional advocacy campaign on ending adolescent pregnancy and unsafe abortions. 3. Facilitate regional and sectoral policy dialogues for SADC health ministers. 4. Hold regional round table meetings for ministers.

Pillar 3: Social accountability monitoring (SAM) Working with: regional youth networks 1. Develop a SAM toolkit and MobiSAfAIDS App. 2. Capacity strengthening of youth networks on SAM of youth-friendly SRH services. 3. Pilot utilisation of the MobiSAfAIDS App in six countries and translation into advocacy actions through report cards, national coalitions, and regional AU, SADC, and SADC PF advocacy platforms.

Pillar 4: Evidence and knowledge sharing Working with: CSOs, governments, and donors & regional leadership. 1. Document working models, innovations, and strategies for packaging and sharing. 2. Produce booklets and case studies. 3. Contribute to major journals. 4. Present at key conferences in the region and globe.

Source: Authors

provider or health facility administrator. The youth or CSO that reported it is the only one permitted to close the ticket—which will depend on whether they are satisfied that the SRH service issue has been addressed or they are satisfied with the feedback or explanation given as to why service was unavailable, for example, a misunderstanding in protocol to follow in

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Fig. 13.1  MobiSAfAIDS-illustrated process flow. (Source: Authors)

receiving a service and guidance to have it addressed. The role of key actors that use MobiSAfAIDS is summarised in Table 13.2. MobiSAfAIDS Usage Across Pilot Countries Across the six countries, 2514 service delivery issues were reported. The first issue was reported in Zambia on 24 March 2019, and after that other countries also started reporting issues. Zimbabwe was the last country to start collecting issues on 3 June 2019. Of these issues across all pilot sites, 857 are Open, that is, they have been reported and have not yet progressed through the resolution workflow. In rare instances, which applies to three cases, some issues were reopened after not being satisfactorily resolved nor assigned to service providers (i.e., reassigned the Open status). Around 150 issues were Assigned, 649 were Resolved, and 858 were closed (see Fig. 13.2). The large number of issues that are Open have been reported and are waiting to be assigned to the service providers to be addressed. The responsibility for assigning issues lies with designated personnel at the

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Table 13.2  The role of key stakeholders Role

Description

Youth/SAM champion

Youth who experience a lack of access to sexual reproductive health services. They can report on this issue on the MobiSAfAIDS application. They also play the role of social accountability monitoring (SAM) champion to support other youth in reporting on service delivery and advocating for better services. The civil society organisations work closely with local youth on adolescent sexual reproductive health rights—and are mainly youth-led (often referred to as implementing partners). SAfAIDS works with these organisations, building their capacity for social accountability monitoring—they will cascade this training to the youth. These are individuals in charge of or who manage a public health facility. They receive and monitor reported issues on adolescent SRH services. Depending on the issue that needs to be addressed, they can also serve the role of a service provider. The service providers provide an SRH service to adolescent youth. When an issue is reported, they are assigned the report and are required to address it and/or provide feedback on the reported issue. They are the only ones who can “resolve” a reported issue, except for the health facility administrator, who can also be a service provider, depending on the reported issue, for example, staff conduct and resources. Examples include a nurse, health counsellor, midwife, and doctor. Responsible for implementing and managing the various pillars of the “Transforming Lives” programme and facilitating the interplay and collaboration of these pillars to meet programme goals. They also monitor issues (submitted and resolved) reported by the youth or youth-led CSOs and attempt to support advocacy activities and government responsiveness.

Youth-led CSO

Health facility administrator

Service provider

SAfAIDS

Source: Authors

healthcare facilities. As such, over time, this metric can provide a simple effectiveness indicator for healthcare facilities with regard to the resolution of issues. Given that 857 unhandled (unassigned) issues out of 2514 reported, the effectiveness in addressing healthcare service failures at the pilot healthcare facilities can roughly be calculated at 66%. For the Assigned issues, the responsibility for resolution lies with the healthcare service providers. Therefore, with 150 issues remaining unresolved out of the 695 assigned issues, the service providers’ effectiveness can be calculated at 78%. Lastly, marking the resolved issues as Closed to confirm satisfactory resolution is the responsibility of the issue reporters. This is a necessary

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Fig. 13.2  Number of issues through the resolution workflow. (Source: Authors)

and important part of the issue resolution workflow because it provides an assessment and feedback mechanism for the quality of the service provided to resolve the issues. Without this feedback mechanism, only the service providers have a say in assessing the completion and quality of the service provided. Currently, 649 of 1425 issues have been marked as resolved but not closed, which equates to an effectiveness of 54% for issue reporters. The overall effectiveness of the MobiSAfAIDS platform to achieve the intended program outcomes (e.g., enhancing social accountability monitoring) depends on the individual effectiveness of the different stakeholders (i.e., health facilities, service providers, and citizens as issue reporters) involved in the issue resolution workflow. Invariably different stakeholders have varying impacts on the overall effectiveness of the platform. For example, health facilities play a critical role in the initial handling and routing of issues along the different resolution paths, without which the issues remain unattended (i.e., the case of the 857 issues). On the other hand, the service providers play an important but slightly less critical role in that some issues can be directly handled or resolved by the health facilities without the service providers’ involvement—which is the case with 965

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issues. The overall effectiveness of the platform is also contingent on factors specific to each of the countries. This dynamic is illustrated by the differences in usage characteristics across the countries. There are significant differences between the countries in the programmatic setup and usage of the MobiSAfAIDS platform. Table 13.3 highlights some of the key differences, including the vastly different number of users who have signed up for MobiSAfAIDS—with most users in Zambia and the least in Zimbabwe; the number of health facilities participating in the pilot; the number of service providers associated with the health facilities; as well as the civil society organisations’ staff who are supporting the programme. These differences, including the inherent socio-political differences between the countries, contribute to the varied usage and effectiveness of the platform, as indicated in the number of issues at the different stages of the resolution workflow (see Table 13.3). These differences between the countries in the platform’s usage support the notion that technology use and its effectiveness are contingent on contextual factors and that technological artefacts are part of complex assemblages within SRHR and SRHS interventions. This complexity extends to the impact pathways and dynamics through which technology artefacts, such as MobiSAfAIDS, contribute to achieving intended SRHR outcomes. These dynamics are explored across the identified dimensions of the TAP objectives. Table 13.3  Characteristics and metrics of usage across the pilot countries Metrics # of issues # of open issues # of assigned issues # of resolved issues # of closed issues # of users # CSO staff # of facilities # of service providers Source: Authors

Zimbabwe

Zambia

eSwatini (Swaziland)

South Africa

Malawi Lesotho

181 125 4

348 19 17

523 26 20

484 31 48

842 650 58

136 6 3

9

154

226

171

69

20

43

158

251

234

65

107

157 1 1 1

8729 1 2 4

2415 1 2 2

2694 3 1 1

5637 2 1 1

885 2 1 1

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Contribution to Policy Information and Outcomes One of the primary affordances of MobiSAfAIDS is information dissemination related to SRH service delivery. For all the issues reported on the platform, relevant insights are made available at varying levels of granularity to the different users of the platform. All the users can track, through public dashboards, how many issues have been reported and the progress on resolving those issues (i.e., from open, assigned, resolved to closed). This high-level aggregate information on the performance of the healthcare facilities and the service providers is information that citizens would traditionally not be privy to. This is because reporting on the performance and operations of health facilities would traditionally be channelled through internal monitoring procedures and horizontal accountability mechanisms, such as a complaints box. As such, MobiSAfAIDS makes the strongest contribution to enabling citizens to monitor the effectiveness and impact of health service delivery and health policies within the country—this corresponds to enhancing policy outcome transparency. The MobiSAfAIDS platform also improves policy information transparency by informing citizens about the healthcare services at the health facilities. This happens when citizens interact with the health facilities and service providers to resolve the issues that have been reported. While citizens have access to a limited set of information, other roles—such as CSO staff, SAfAIDS country staff, and the administrators—have access to more information and details about the issues reported and the discussions that ensue between the different stakeholders. In measuring the achievement of MobiSAfAIDS, the initiative builds on the Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) Framework for the Regional Transforming Lives programme. According to the framework, results from the programme that MobiSAfAIDS support are mainly aligned. Strategic Objective 3 (SO3): Strengthen the Capacity of Regional Youth Organisations and Networks in Social Accountability Monitoring of the delivery of Youth-friendly SRH Information and Services as prescribed in the Maputo Plan of Action (2016–2030), in Southern Africa, by 2020. Table 13.4 summarises qualitative results from the M & E Framework and those identified in the MobiSAfAIDS strategy formulation workshops. Table 13.5 summarises quantitative results from the M & E Framework and those identified in the MobiSAfAIDS strategy formulation workshops. MobiSAfAIDS has already contributed to the above indicators, which are directly linked to policy information and outcome—consider the four

Source: Authors

Advocacy and policy-related actions triggered by the MobiSAfAIDS SRH evidence.

M & E Framework result Key policy and advocacy actions and commitments made by policy maker’s actors and service providers to improve SRH service provision because of evidence generated through SAM activities at community, district, national, and regional levels that have been actualised. Intermediary Key commitments made by policy maker’s actors and service outcomes providers to improve SRH service provision because of evidence generated through SAM activities at the community, district, national, and regional levels. Outputs Key action points by actors emanating from community score card rating and community hearing. Observable immediate reactions and sentiments, knowledge, and language commitments of service provider actors and other actors exposed to SAM activities (including AYP) and SRH issues were raised through MobiSAfAIDS.

Result level Long-term outcomes

Strategic Objective 3: qualitative results

Table 13.4  Qualitative results for MobiSAfAIDS

Issues reduced and service improved   •  Improved youth-friendly service provision Trained personnel on youth-friendly services at health centres Stronger partnerships with the government   •  New partnerships with governments.  • Government buy-in Self-sustainability MobiSAfAIDS   •  SAM champions are trained and competent to manage the programme Awareness   •  Awareness of youth on SRH rights Youth participation   •  Youth forums where open discussions can be held about evidence and analysis from MobiSAfAIDS data  • Improved engagements between services providers, policy makers and young people on addressing challenges to accessing SRH services by young people   •  Increased youth participation in civic processes that involve health such as budgeting processes

MobiSAfAIDS strategy formulation

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Table 13.5  Quantitative results for MobiSAfAIDS Strategic Objective 3: quantitative results Result level Long-term outcomes

M & E Framework result Number of policy makers, AYP, and service providers using SAM to advocate and demand for improved provision of youth-friendly services. Intermediary Regional and national youth outcomes coalitions, AYP participating in advocacy platform at national and within SADC on SGBV, safe abortion, early and intended pregnancies, and contraceptives.

MobiSAfAIDS strategy formulation

Issues reduced and service improved •  Number of teenage pregnancies • Number of HIV/AIDS transmission among adolescents and young people • Number of functional youthfriendly corners within health facilities • Extent of uptake and access to contraceptives by young people SRH improved • Prevalence/incidence rate of HIV/STI infections reduced • Number of teenage pregnancies and child marriages • Number of cases of gender-based violence and sexual gender-based violence within communities • Rate of mortality among adolescent girls and young women from unsafe abortions • Number of school dropouts among girls

Number of AYP applying social accountability monitoring knowledge and skills in tracking and monitoring youth-friendly SRHR services. (continued)

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Table 13.5 (continued) Strategic Objective 3: quantitative results Outputs

Number of AYP and service providers trained in SAM.

Number of AYP reached through MobiSAfAIDS.

Number and type of SRH issues raised through MobiSAfAIDS.

Issues reduced and service improved • Number of trained personnel on youth-friendly services at health centres Self-sustainability MobiSAfAIDS • Number of AYP people using the MobiSAfAIDS application • Number of users that use the application in a day • Number of downloads of the app per month? Issues reduced and service improved • Number of reported SRH issues reduced significantly among young people

Source: Authors

pillars of the “Transforming Lives” programme in Table  13.1. Policy development is a long-term process—using MobiSAfAIDS data and information integrated into the process becomes paramount for effective contextualised change. Supporting Citizen’s Voice Citizens’ voice, their capacity to express and exercise their views and opinions, is an important dimension of governance which can lead to improved service delivery and policies. The MobiSAfAIDS platform is primarily geared at amplifying this capacity for citizens to express their views on healthcare service delivery. The platform provides the functionality for youth to report and discuss service delivery challenges in a way that is accessible, using their mobile devices and available at any time they want to report. The data collected from MobiSAfAIDS provides evidence of how the citizens expressed and exercised their voice across the six countries. While reporting issues on the platform happened regularly throughout the period under review, there are also periods of concentrated reporting showing increased service delivery issues. Some of these periods

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correspond with the awareness-raising and capacity-building events undertaken by the project team. Participants would have been encouraged and reminded to report SRH service issues experienced at the health facilities. Figure 13.3 highlights these key periods of increased reporting—where, for example, there are about ten peak periods of more than weekly average reporting. This observation highlights the importance of non-technical interventions (e.g., training and awareness-raising workshops) to sustain the users’ motivation to report issues and support the MobiSAfAIDS platform’s effective utilisation. A more nuanced pattern of reporting emerges at the country level. For some countries (e.g., Malawi, South Africa, Zimbabwe), there is a similar, more pronounced concentration of issue reporting at specific periods. While for others (e.g., eSwatini/Swaziland), there is a more regular reporting pattern throughout the period under study (see Fig. 13.4). The analysis now turns to the content of the youth-reported issues to further explore the exercise of citizens’ voices. Health facilities across the six pilot countries offer a broad spectrum of sexual and reproductive health

Fig. 13.3  Number of issues reported per week. (Source: Authors)

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Fig. 13.4  Reporting of issues across the pilot countries. (Source: Authors)

services, which on the MobiSAfAIDS platform have been categorised into family planning and abortion care services, HIV testing services and treatment, and sexual gender-based violence. Each of these categories is further divided into subcategories of issues. From the data collected, most issues that have been reported are across the family planning and abortion care services (1190 issues) and HIV testing services and treatment (1197) issues. Only 127 issues have been reported under the sexual gender-based violence category. Figure 13.5 shows the further distribution of the issues across subcategories, which shows the top three being “Education promotion” for HIV testing services, “Information and access to condoms”, and “Access to other contraceptives” for family planning services. The least common issues are experienced around “Referral to counselling and legal support” and “Post-SGBV victim care and support” for sexual gender-­ based violence, and “Pre-exposure prophylaxis” and “Referral to HIV services” for HIV testing services and treatment. While these numbers might suggest that these are the services that most people are requesting (or not requesting) from the health facilities,

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Categories of issues reported The different categories of SRHS issues reported SRH information and counselling SGBV information and counselling Referral to treatment and care Referral to HIV services Referral to counselling and legal support

Subcategory

Pre-test and post-test counselling services

Issue Category

Pre-exposure prophylaxis

Family planning and abortion care services

Post-SGBV victim care and support

HIV testing services and treatment

Post-abortion care

Sexual gender based violence

Post exposure prophylaxis PEP Emergency contraceptive Information on safe abortion Information and access to condoms Education promotion Access to other contraceptives 0

200

400

600

Number of issues

Fig. 13.5  Frequency of issues across categories and subcategories. (Source: Authors)

in reality, the numbers only reflect those services that most people had issues and challenges with. In other words, it could still be that many people are going to health facilities for sexual gender-based violence services and that they are receiving good quality service. On the other hand, sexual gender-based violence can result in requesting other services, such as SRH commodities (condoms), other contraceptives, and even education promotion for vulnerable adolescents that succumb to SGBV. A more detailed investigation of the reported issues’ content corroborates the categorical frequency observed above (Fig. 13.5). An analysis of the most common two-term phrases (i.e., bigrams) from the text of the reported issues shows concerns related to family planning and contraception (e.g., “family planning”, “condom box”, “female condoms”, “access condoms”, “safe abortion”), HIV services (e.g., “HIV testing”, “HIV test”, “emergency pills”). The term frequency analysis also highlights some common service qualities that are referenced in the issue reports, such as “youth-friendly” and “friendly space” (see Fig. 13.6).

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Fig. 13.6  Common two-term phrases (i.e., bigrams) in the issues reported in different countries. (Source: Authors)

Mapping the network of common terms across the reported issues expands the observation from the term frequency analysis above to highlight some of the key narratives expressed by the users in relation to SRH services (see Fig. 13.7). Across all the countries, one of the common concerns and challenges is framed around “access” which is mostly about access to condoms and contraceptives (including pep—post-exposure prophylaxis) and access to services (including HIV testing), and access to information (including family planning). There is a regular mention of concerns with receiving condoms, condom boxes, condom distribution, and female condoms. Besides condoms, the other materials that users request from the health facilities include pills—contraceptive pills, emergency pills, and family planning pills, as well as test kits for HIV and pregnancy testing. Invariably, “services” also form another kernel of narratives in the reported issues. This is with regards to SRH services, (family) planning services, (pregnancy and HIV) testing services, (safe) abortion services, as well as the slow quality of the services (i.e., slow ➝ service). The other types of services that are

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Fig. 13.7  Common narratives across reported issues (from term co-occurrence graph). (Source: Authors)

discussed regularly include antenatal care services, abortion care services, as well as cancer screening—with cervical cancer being regularly mentioned. The practice of unsafe sex is also commonly mentioned in the issues reported. This is congruent with the nature of services that are mostly requested at the health clinic, with unsafe sex being a risk factor for unwanted pregnancy and HIV infection (Slaymaker et al. 2004). A few narratives associated with the quality of service at the health facilities also emanate from the analysis. One is about friendliness, specifically about being youth-friendly, having a friendly space or a friendly corner. However, many of these issues also refer to a specific environment at health facilities where spaces (i.e., youth-friendly spaces) are created to cater to the needs of the youth. Examples of these issues reporting on this include: “No counselling before giving condoms at the youth-friendly space.”

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“I would like to make a report over the hostility of the people found in the youth-friendly space. I would also like to stretch [sic] that services at the youth-friendly space are not available after 13hrs when they should be accessed by young people who are from school.” The other quality of service issue mentioned is time management, alluding to the challenge with timely or on-time access to services—as observed in the following report. “Today time management was poor, instead of starting at 8:00am they started at 8:21am. [W]e were just waiting.”

Beyond the content about service delivery issues, several key stakeholders are also commonly mentioned in the issue reports, such as SAM champions, service providers, and specific health facilities (see Fig.  13.7). The role and impact of these stakeholders are discussed in the later section that explores the nature of participation on the MobiSAfAIDS platform. The data collected suggests that the MobiSAfAIDS platform provided a tool that supported the youth’s voice by allowing them to report on a broad set of issues regularly and conveniently throughout the period in this study. eSwatini and Zambia show a more regular reporting pattern than the other countries (see Fig. 13.4). Across the countries, dominant healthcare service delivery themes emerge (e.g., “family planning” and “HIV testing”), which suggest a common experience of youth in these countries. Some differences also emerge between the countries in terms of the issues reported. For example, the youth in eSwatini expressed many more challenges associated with “social distancing” and “COVID-19”. The emergence of these common themes alludes to the role of MobiSAfAIDS in amplifying the collective voice of the youth by having different people reporting on the same issues and increasing the visibility of and attention to that particular issue—this goes beyond the fact that issues are clustered into pre-set categories on the platform. Evidence of Governments’ Responsiveness In the earlier sections of this chapter, government responsiveness was formulated in terms of three factors: the government’s willingness to listen, dialogue with citizens, and undertaking necessary actions in response to citizens’ input. With healthcare facilities as proxies/representatives of

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governments, the willingness to listen is evidenced primarily by the involvement and participation of the health facilities in the MobiSAfAIDS intervention. However, the willingness to listen can also be roughly ascertained from how often and regularly the healthcare facilities engaged with the MobiSAfAIDS platform to view and address the issues reported. A relevant indicator for this that is tracked on the platform is the login events on the web application (i.e., logins are not tracked on the mobile application) for the health facility administrators. A total of 107 login events have been registered for health facility administrators over the period under review—this is compared to 1349 events for the youth, 20 for service providers, 68 for CSO staff, and 1011 for SAfAIDS staff. The logins were more frequent up to the second half of 2020 and taper off to intermittent logins in 2021 (see Fig. 13.8). This may also relate to the end of the “Transforming Lives” programme’s pilot phase, and the regrouping phase by SAfAIDS (i.e., period of 2021–2022 cont.), in working to sustain the initiative through government buy-in and support for scaling the initiative. It is also worth noting

Fig. 13.8  Number of logins for the different user roles. (Source: Authors)

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that during a process assessment study conducted, several healthcare service providers and administrators admitted to only using the mobile application to interact with the MobiSAfAIDS platform, as they had access to their personal mobile phones and were personally investing in purchasing mobile data bundles from mobile service providers. These interactions with the MobiSAfAIDS platform do not form a part of the total login events discussed here. The second element of government responsiveness, engagement in dialogue, is ascertained from the nature and extent of the discussions between citizens and health facility staff members around the reported issues. On MobiSAfAIDS, once an issue has been reported, relevant stakeholders (i.e., issue reporters, health facilities’ staff, and service providers) can send messages to clarify matters in resolving the reported issue. Most of the messages on the MobiSAfAIDS platform have been from the health facilities’ administrators and the service providers (see Table 13.6). Most (n = 794) messages are a single response or notification on a reported issue. While this already suggests a level of dialogue, with the message being in response to the details of the reported issues, there is a clear suggestion of dialogue for some issues. For example, 106 issues have 2 messages, and 12 issues have 3 messages, suggesting a back-and-­ forth dialogue on all these issues reported in the system. In general, the number of messages sent by the health facilities and service providers further highlights the level of governments’ responsiveness by engaging in dialogue on the reported issues. The last element of government responsiveness is undertaking action in response to citizens’ input and requests. On the MobiSAfAIDS platform, this is considered in terms of issue resolution, that is, the extent to which health facilities undertake actions to process the reported issues. The basic action level on reported issues is having them assigned to service providers Table 13.6  Number of messages sent by different user roles User role Location administrator (SAfAIDS staff) Normal user Service provider Councillor Health facility administrators Source: Authors

Number of messages 3 129 254 23 688

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for resolution, and the highest level is having issues addressed and resolved. From the collected data, 857 out of 2514 issues are still open on MobiSAfAIDS, representing 34% of issues on which no action has been undertaken (see Fig.  13.2). Another 34% (n = 858) issues have been addressed and resolved (i.e., with a closed status). These numbers highlight the level of responsiveness of the government (through the health facilities) to the citizens’ voice, although many reported issues remain unattended. Along with the extent to which health facilities handle reported issues, another related dimension of the government’s responsiveness is how long they take to respond to reported issues. Figure 13.9 shows the duration of reported issues across the different countries. On average, it takes about two weeks for issues to get assigned. However, the quickest issues have been assigned a few hours after being reported, and the longest it has taken issues to get assigned is over 42 weeks. There are stark differences between the countries, with Malawi consistently being the quickest to get issues assigned, that is, the gap between the fastest and slowest assigned of the middle 50%

Fig. 13.9  Duration of issues from reported to assigned. (Source: Author)

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of the issues is just less than three days—Interquartile Range (IQR) of 2.54. On the other hand, Zimbabwe has the largest gap of approximately 39 days between the fastest and slowest assigned middle 50% of the issues. Drilling down to the country level reveals these different levels and dimensions of responsiveness in a way that provides nuance to understanding the contributions to accountability in the different countries. It also highlights the complexity of assessing effectiveness and impact on the specific accountability outcomes. For example, while the quick processing of issues in Malawi (i.e., mostly in less than three days for those issues that are processed) suggests some level of government responsiveness, there are also 650 issues (i.e., 77%) that remain open and unattended to, which suggests very low government responsiveness. On the other hand, Lesotho, which ranks the second slowest (i.e., in terms of the maximum and the IQR for the duration) in assigning issues, has approximately 79% of their reported issues resolved and closed—which also highlights both elements of responsiveness and lack thereof. Invariably, an argument can be made that the extent to which issues are resolved and closed is the more relevant measure of government responsiveness.

Nature and Levels of Participation in MobiSAfAIDS The MobiSAfAIDS platform enables citizens and other stakeholders (such as CSOs) to monitor healthcare service delivery in their countries. As noted earlier, participation is a power-laden affair associated with the various levels, spaces, and forms of power. As an initiative by a civil society organisation (i.e., SAfAIDS) in partnership with funders and implementing partners, MobiSAfAIDS represents a claimed space which affords citizens the power to hold their governments accountable for healthcare service delivery—this capability is expressed both individually and collectively (i.e., aspects of both “power to” and “power with”) (Gaventa 2006; VeneKlasen and Miller 2007). The functionality provided by the platform affords citizens different ways and levels of participating in social accountability monitoring. As discussed in the earlier sections, citizens can engage with MobiSAfAIDS purely for information consumption purposes, that is, to monitor the progress of issue resolution. Citizens can also engage in an information production modality, where they mainly just report the service delivery challenges they are experiencing without further engagement. This

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phenomenon is evidenced in the 649 issues that have been resolved but have not been closed by the reporters (see Fig. 13.2). Lastly, citizens can engage in bi-direction dialogue with the health facilities and services providers towards issue resolution. These three ways of interacting in MobiSAfAIDS are associated with and contribute to the different dimensions of the TAP objectives; for example, information consumption is more associated with the policy information and policy outcome transparency dimensions. An investigation of these three levels of participation in MobiSAfAIDS reveals that while there are approximately 20,517 people who are registered on the platform, not all are actively reporting on service delivery issues. In the period under review, a total of 501 people (i.e., 2.4%) reported all the issues (i.e., 2514) on MobiSAfAIDS. Regarding the frequency of reporting issues, most people, 320, have only reported a single issue, 49 reported two issues, 20 reported three issues, 11 reported four issues, and 13 reported five issues. The top five prolific reporters reported 246, 120, 64, 58, and 56 issues, respectively (see Fig. 13.10).

Fig. 13.10  Number of issues reported per user per country. (Source: Authors)

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In MobiSAfAIDS, the SAM champions, the youth recruited by the SAfAIDS program to provide monitoring assistance at the health facilities, played a crucial role in brokering and mediating the participation of other youths. They reported issues on behalf of the youth who couldn’t report their healthcare challenges (either because they didn’t possess the necessary mobile phone or access to the Internet or because they were unfamiliar with the MobiSAfAIDS application). They engaged with the health facilities personnel and the SAfAIDS country coordinators to support the SAM goals and activities. The dynamics of participation vary vastly between the countries, as does the role of the SAM champions (see Fig. 13.10). In South Africa and Malawi, many issues are reported by a few people, including the SAM champions, who report on behalf of the youth and on the general healthcare challenges they observe at health facilities. In South Africa, only two issues are uniquely reported by single users. On the other hand, in Zambia, fewer people singularly report many issues, with most (n = 120) issues being uniquely reported by single users. These three countries, particularly, highlight the different types of participation on and engagement with the platform: South Africa represents brokered and mediated participation, where most of the issues are reported by the brokers (e.g., SAM champions) and very few issues by individual youth; Zambia shows more direct participation by the citizen’s reporting most of the issues themselves, and less reporting through a mediator; and Malawi illustrates a mix of the two, both cases of mediated participation as well as direct participation by the citizens.

Discussion A digital platform’s purpose emerges from its use and usefulness for the problem it aims to address. MobiSAfAIDS was proposed as a tool to support social accountability monitoring of adolescent sexual reproductive health services. However, it is just that, a “tool”. The most important aspect of any digital citizen engagement project is that the platform is useful to all key actors involved in an initiative within their respective contexts. The embedding assemblages of contextual factors, such as the social, political, technological, and governmental, influence how the technology artefact is used to support programmatic objectives and outcomes, including intermediate outcomes such as TAP. The evidence from the deployment of MobiSAfAIDS across the six countries shows the vastly different experiences of how the platform was used and how it contributed to the

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TAP objectives in the different countries. In Lesotho, the uptake of the platform has generally been low in terms of the numbers of registered users and the reported issues. However, there is evidence of high responsiveness of health facilities and service providers as most of the issues reported on the platform have been addressed and closed. Zimbabwe has the lowest number of registered users and a relatively low number of reported issues. Evidence from the data suggests there are challenges concerning resolving issues—it takes a long time for issues to get assigned, and most (i.e., 69%) of the reported issues remain open and unassigned. In Zambia, there has been a high uptake of MobiSAfAIDS, with the largest number of registered users, the highest number of service providers, and a high number of participating health facilities. Zambia is generally responsive and effective in handling issues, taking on average about four days to assign issues, and having only 5% of their reported issues remaining open. The evidence from Zambia shows that citizens are directly and regularly participating in reporting issues themselves instead of relying largely on mediated participation and on being nudged (i.e., through awareness-raising events) to contribute. A similar regularity of reporting is observed in eSwatini (Swaziland), where only 5% of the issues remain open. While eSwatini has fewer registered users than Zambia (i.e., 2415 vs. 8729), more issues have been reported, resolved, and closed than in Zambia. South Africa has about 6% of their reported issues remaining open. Compared to eSwatini, Zambia, and Lesotho, issue reporting in South Africa is much more staggered and not regular—which could highlight the role of external awareness-raising and capacity-building activities to encourage reporting. However, this can also be explained by the observation that South Africa has some of the highest levels of mediated participation, where a few people (e.g., SAM champions) undertake most of the reporting. Malawi has the highest number of reported issues, roughly equally spread between individual reporting and reporting by mediators. At the beginning of the pilot study (i.e., in 2019), Malawi showed highly responsive levels of handling and processing issues. However, since 2020, there has been very intermittent bulk reporting of issues and the lowest level of responsiveness regarding assigning and resolving issues—most of the issues (i.e., 77%) reported by Malawian users have remained open. This nuance from exploring the data from each of the six countries is evidence of the context-specificity of technology interventions and policies. Besides being embedded within specific national contexts, primarily, MobiSAfAIDS exists as part of a clear programme and theory of change

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designed to advance improved SRH services and policies. Therefore, rather than existing as a solution in isolation, MobiSAfAIDS exists to support and is supported by the other key elements in the “Transforming Lives” programme. It was paramount that groundwork, sensitisation, and training were equally, if not more, important than the digital platform itself. It was essential to build the capacity of the youth, local government, and CSOs, in practising social accountability monitoring before introducing the tool—which was only introduced in the 2nd year of the “Transforming Lives” programme (2019). SAfAIDS already had established knowledge and background around building capacity and awareness around sexual reproductive health. They applied this in their various interventions in the six Southern African countries where the initiative was piloted. Table 13.1 shows the key strategic pillars of the “Transforming Lives” programme and how MobiSAfAIDS relies on all pillars to effect change holistically in the pilot countries. SAfAIDS developed a Social Accountability Monitoring (SAM) toolkit to guide the use of MobiSAfAIDS data in social accountability monitoring processes. The SAM toolkit plays a fundamental role in framing the purpose of MobiSAfAIDS and enabling TAP. One of the SAfAIDS representatives indicated: [T]he SAM toolkit is part of the bigger picture … the MobiSAfAIDS application is more of narrating the social accountability of the programme … it would not suffice for us to introduce the MobiSAfAIDS before people understood what are sexual reproductive health and rights before they understood the importance of social accountability monitoring, and why they have to demand specific rights in relation to accessing services.

Building capacity and awareness around social accountability monitoring are essential. However, so is the ability to harness evidence-based data to advocate for change effectively. The gap in this ability in the MobiSAfAIDS initiative was evident from the process assessment. Figure 13.11 illustrates the evolving stages and purpose of MobiSAfAIDS over time, adapted from the dimensions of citizen engagement by Gigler and Bailur (2014). Before MobiSAfAIDS was launched, the government or civil society may have shared information with adolescent youth about access to sexual reproductive health services. However, due to social and cultural challenges or challenges around the effectiveness of these information campaigns, many issues around access to adolescent sexual reproductive health

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Fig. 13.11  The evolving purpose of MobiSAfAIDS. (Source: Authors)

services remained unaddressed and significant. The challenge of access to SRH services is evidenced by the content of the issues that have been reported, where (as discussed in Chap. 4 in section “Create”) “access” or lack thereof forms one of the key narratives observed in the data. The launch of MobiSAfAIDS introduced an improved way to access information. It provided transparent two-way communication between the government (including local health staff and the national government) and young people. This not only contributed to the policy information and outcome transparency, supporting citizens’ voices and enhancing government responsiveness, but it has also enabled the participation of the young people in SRH healthcare systems. What has begun to emerge in the MobiSAfAIDS initiative is the collaboration between stakeholders such as the government, SAfAIDS country staff, and youth-led CSOs. For example, in Zambia, MobiSAfAIDS data has been used at youth forums with members of parliament to advocate for policy change. MobiSAfAIDS is growing in use and relevance, as national governments

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in countries like eSwatini and Zambia are considering ways of integrating the initiative in their existing government programmes. Given this development, it has become important to explore key avenues in leveraging the collective intelligence that can be facilitated through MobiSAfAIDS to support effective engagement, learning, joint decision-making, and, therefore, the empowerment of different stakeholders. These evolving stages of citizens’ engagement and participation in healthcare generally and in SRH services monitoring specifically locate this squarely within the broad political agenda of increased democratisation, which advances empowerment and the achievement of social rights (Beresford 2019). The pathways towards this goal are complex and vary for different countries through the intermediary outcomes of increased transparency, accountability, and participation. However, some common factors and lessons can be derived from the experience of deploying MobiSAfAIDS in Southern Africa. Namely, (1) programmatic framing of technology interventions within a clear theory of change and with support from other program elements is important; (2) there is a crucial and necessary role (i.e., in different contexts) that is played by stakeholders such as SAM champions—to mediate the participation of the youth and amplify their collective voice and the CSO organisations—to demand (i.e., claimed power to) accountability and government responsiveness; and (3) assessing success and impact is complicated and needs to be nuanced with an understanding of the associated assemblages in different contexts.

Conclusion Digital transformation, accompanied by suitable technology policies and artefacts, holds the promise of supporting the achievement of sustainable development globally. Digital transformation is not only about the digitisation of traditional analogue systems and artefacts or the digitalisation of processes and workflows; it is about unlocking the benefits of digitally mediated learning, decision-making, and action to unleash collective intelligence towards sustainable development. In so doing, spaces are created where different stakeholders, including citizens, communities, organisations, and governments, are empowered to pursue desired individual and collective outcomes. However, as illustrated in this case study of the implementation of MobiSAfAIDS in Southern Africa, digital transformation, including technology policy and artefacts, needs to be embedded within

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supporting programmatic frameworks and designed to consider the nuances and factors that are specific to different countries. In addition, it requires the buy-in of key stakeholders to mediate and amplify the collective voice of targeted communities while understanding the disparate context in which each intervention operates. There is a complex interplay of factors that influence the effectiveness of the implemented interventions and policies.

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CHAPTER 14

Digitalising Decentralisation Policy Across Regions in Africa Emmanuel Botlhale and Christopher Dick-Sagoe

Introduction The strength of local governments (LGs) lies in providing citizens with essential public social services, such as water, health, education and road infrastructure (Benedicto and Chalam 2016). To efficiently deliver these services, LGs need strong governance mechanisms (Benedicto and Chalam 2016), which can be realised through effective Information and Communication Technology (ICT)-enabled decentralised governing systems. Generally, despite practical critical gaps, decentralisation remains the most fashionable way of structuring governments in contemporary times especially since the dawn of democratisation in Africa in the 1990s and governance in the 1980s (e.g., UNDP 1999; Manor 1999). Even though decentralisation has been understood differently, it connotes a complicated, multifaceted concept that involves the transfer of authority

E. Botlhale (*) • C. Dick-Sagoe Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana, Gaborone, Botswana e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_14

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and responsibility for public functions from the central government to subordinate or quasi-independent government bodies and/or the private sector (Rondinelli et al. 1999, p. 2). However, decentralisation is not an alternative to centralisation because both are needed and ‘the complementary roles of national and sub-national actors should be determined by analysing the most effective ways and means of achieving the desired objective’ (UNDP 1999, p. 3). The practical task of arriving at or locating these complementary outcomes or roles has proved difficult in most settings for either political or capacity-related reasons. In Africa, studies have attributed the problematics of decentralisation to both. Most importantly, the broader political context of decentralisation in Africa is not mainly about maximising policy outputs or improving government performance, as shown in the Western world’s analysis of government structures. But, it is also concerned primarily with nation-building imperatives. This has meant that some reform policies like decentralisation may be re-adjusted if not thrown away altogether as the State tries to transform the society in its own image (Onyango 2023). This not only directs the political will needed for effective implementation of decentralisation policy, but it also makes up for the structural characteristics that undergird decentralisation politics (Chiweza 2022). Thus, whereas ICT deployment may improve how decentralised units work in Africa, it is yet to effectively overcome these structural characteristics. The political and governance composites of decentralisation have produced four main types of decentralisation: (1) political, (2) administrative, (3) fiscal and (4) market (Rondinelli et al. 1999). Each type has different characteristics, policy implications and conditions for success, but which must be carefully considered before deciding whether projects or programmes should support a decentralised unit’s reorganisation of financial, administrative or service delivery systems (Rondinelli et al. 1999, p. 2). At the same time, the four variants of decentralisation can occur in different forms and combinations in a given country or within sectors in the same country. Hence, Rondinelli et al. (1999) counsel that there must be a comprehensive approach towards decentralisation. Notably, ‘the process of decentralisation is a complex undertaking, taking on different meanings in different contexts and according to the desires and plans of those in charge of its design and implementation’ (Boko 2002, p.  1). In recent years, countries worldwide have been attempting—for several reasons and with varying degrees of intention and success—to create or strengthen sub-national governments (Smoke 2003, p.  7). African countries have

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reportedly confronted insurmountable tasks in making their decentralised units work. Theoretically, decentralisation resides in the Musgravean role of the State, being allocation, redistribution and stabilisation (Musgrave and Musgrave 1959). The redistribution and stabilisation functions are central government responsibilities, but the allocation role can be undertaken by both the central and local/sub-national governments. The role of local government in the allocation function finds theoretical support in Oates’ (1972) understanding of decentralisation. However, despite the varying versions of decentralisation, African countries, like other developing countries, have experimented with various strains to bring the government closer to the people. Studies have also shown varying outcomes across Africa, demonstrating decentralisation’s practical benefits and costs. Therefore, the effects of decentralisation take on economic, political and administrative dimensions (e.g., Oates 1972; Miller 2002; OECD 2019; Chiweza 2022). Economic benefits include information advantages because local governments have better knowledge of the preferences of local citizens (e.g., see Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios 2019; Tiebout 1956) and allocative efficiency (e.g., see Wallis and Oates 1988). There is widespread decentralisation in developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Post-independence, many SSA countries adopted decentralisation as a tool of local government and have varying degrees of decentralisation. There are three push factors: (1) homegrown (e.g., Botswana), (2) donor-driven (e.g., Ghana) and (3) homegrown but donor-supported (e.g., South Africa—see Galvin and Habib 2003). The push factors, notwithstanding, the implementation of decentralisation has been hinged on significant political and administrative benefits. These are increased citizen participation (e.g., see Huther and Shah 1998) and reduced corruption (e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny 1993), in which digitalisation has been projected to play a critical role. Nevertheless, costs or disadvantages, such as the attenuation of inter-­ regional inequalities, risks of resource/power capture by local elites or special interest groups and misuse of authority due to inadequate supervision/weak accountability mechanisms, remain (Miller 2002). How is the contradiction between advantages (or benefits) and costs (or disadvantages) resolved? Cost-benefit analysis is an important tool because it puts advantages (or benefits) and costs (or disadvantages) on a pair of scales and offers a verdict. It would seem from the weight of the evidence that advantages (or benefits) outweigh costs (or disadvantages), hence, the

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widespread use of decentralisation in both developed and developing countries. For decentralisation to succeed, some founding conditions must be in place (see Litvack and Seddoni 1999; OECD 2019). However, most recently, decentralisation has benefitted from digitalisation initiatives such as e-government and other GovTech structures being rolled out by governments. Digitalised decentralisation confers many benefits, for example, efficiency, effectiveness and increased interaction between citizens and their governments (Misuraca 2007). COVID-19 has particularly heightened the use of digitalised decentralisation in some contexts or countries with relatively widespread digital government structures like Botswana, South Africa and Ghana, among others. Due to limits on physical interactions and the need to better service provision to the vulnerable who disproportionately suffer the effects of COVID-19, governments made efforts to digitalise or realise some policy domains and service delivery. Therefore, this chapter first explores the opportunities and constraints of digitalising the same in Africa by using the cases of Botswana and Ghana. Secondly, it offers policy recommendations on leveraging digitalised local governments.

Digitalised Decentralisation There are two verbs that lie at the core of digital transformation: ‘digitise’ and ‘digitalise’. These must be defined to provide expository clarity in understanding how ICT is being leveraged in  local governments across Africa. To digitise means to convert physical documents into a digital format (e.g., scanning paper documents and photographs, saving them in a PDF format and uploading them on a company’s website). This involves converting analogue information into a digital format. To digitalise is to use digital technologies in business processes and interactions, for example, in an organisation. It is deducible from the foregoing that digitisation must precede digitalisation; that is, one cannot digitalise organisational processes and interactions without having digitised information first. Importantly, while digitisation deals with information, digitalisation involves processes and interactions. Digitalised decentralisation must be understood under the ambit of e-government. E-government uses ICTs to effectively and efficiently deliver government services to citizens and businesses (United Nations 2021). E-government is implemented in various stages (e.g., United Nations 2012; World Bank 2002). The government

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has different stakeholders in the form of citizens as consumers (C), business actors (B) and employees in government organisations (E) (Sijabat 2020). Hence, the e-government infrastructure assumes the following nomenclature: (1) government to citizen (G2C), (2) government to employee (G2E), (3) government to government (G2G) and (4) government to business (G2B) (United Nations 2012; Wirtz and Daiser 2015). E-government confers many benefits, for example, efficiency, effectiveness, empowerment and economic and social development (Misuraca 2007). Thus, with the appropriate e-infrastructure, LGs are favourably circumstanced to implement digitalisation. Examples of some case studies on ICTs and local government in Africa are Senegal (ACACIA Strategy or SAS); Ghana Study (ICTs and Traditional Governance); Uganda (District Administrative Network Programme or DistrictNet) and the City of Cape Town (‘Smart City’). Thus, digitalised local government is being used in Africa. However, with the outbreak of COVID-19 with limits on physical interaction and the need for better provision of services to the vulnerable who will disproportionately suffer its effects, more digitalised decentralisation is needed.

Case Study 1: Botswana Evolution and Legal-Institutional Framework of Decentralisation Botswana is a democratic republic with a two-tier system of government: a national government headed by the president and a local government (LG) headed by a mayor in towns/cities and a council chairperson in rural districts (CLGF 2018). The local government system in Botswana is modelled on the British model (Picard 1979a). Local governments (LGs) are the portfolio responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. The Ministry provides policy direction and guidance to LGs (CLGF 2018), which comprise 16 administrative districts (10 rural and 6 urban) (CLGF 2018). Two overarching reasons for decentralisation in Botswana are (1) to improve service provision and (2) to empower local institutions for good governance (Kathyola and Job 2011, p. 43). The origin of LGs in Botswana is traced to pre-independence events, notably the Administrative Conference of 1963 (e.g., Picard 1979b). It was not until 1963 that a committee of the Legislative Council recommended structural changes in  local government, including the

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establishment of several councils, with a majority of elected members, to provide certain services financed from local revenue (Picard 1979b, p. 289). Since Botswana became independent in 1966, a steady process of decentralisation has been undertaken by a Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) government (Tordoff 1988, p. 183). In 1978, 12 years after the establishment of LGs, the President appointed a Local Government Structure Commission. Its overarching aim was ‘to test the existing structure’s suitability and advise on the relationship between the four main institutions at the district level–the District Administration, the District Council, the Land Board and the Tribal Administration’ (Tordoff 1988, p. 183). The Commission’s major recommendation, in its 1979 report, was that then LG units, being Councils, Land Boards, Tribal Administration and District Administration, should retain their separate identities and that there be checks and balances among them (Tordoff 1988). Evaluation of Decentralisation and the Quest for a Decentralisation Policy Relative to other countries, Botswana is highly centralised regarding all three aspects of decentralisation (Schneider 2003). A 2003 study by Schneider (2003) scored 0.19, 0.17 and 0.5 for fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation, respectively. Although the survey refers to 2003, the picture painted then is still the same today because the legal matrix and architecture of decentralisation have not changed since 2003. On a related note, decentralised political systems have at least two tiers of elected local government, which possess substantial decision-making and revenue generation authority (Marks et al. 2008; Schneider 2003), but this is not the situation in Botswana. This bespeaks limited decentralisation because Botswana has one tier of elected local government. The political dominance of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and the central government’s dominance of the economy have reinforced the formal powers of the central government (Poteete et al. 2014, p. 23). Relatedly, Kathyola and Job (2011, p. 52) ponder the question: deconcentrated local councils or devolved local councils? They contend that ‘in Botswana, the operation of local councils resembles deconcentrated units of the Ministry of Local Government (MLG)’. Thus, they contend that local councils implement the MLG’s mandates, not that of residents. In the same vein, in an aptly titled paper, ‘Decentralisation in Botswana: The Reluctant Process’, Dipholo and Mothusi (2005, p. 40) argue that ‘the government has always argued that it is fully committed to decentralisation to promote popular participation as well as facilitating sustainable rural development’ but it ‘does not seem to be supporting its own efforts

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towards decentralisation beyond the mundane talk of capacity building’. Twelve years after Dipholo and Mothusi (2005), Mooketsane et  al. (2017), ‘Is Decentralisation in Botswana a Democratic Fallacy?’ arrive at the same conclusion: a constrained decentralisation. The trio argues that ‘the system has always exhibited elements of centralisation, with the local government lacking autonomy and independence and operating as an extension and implementing arm of central government’ (p. 57). Thus, it concludes that decentralisation is practised but attended to by serious limitations. Botswana’s civil society APRM’s report of 2021 discusses governace issues in Botswana, one of which is decentralisation (South African Institute of International Affairs 2021). The report decries that ‘inasmuch as local authorities have been established at the district level to bring services closer to the citizens, decentralisation has not been guided by a comprehensive policy’ (South African Institute of International Affairs 2021, p. 37). Botswana’s experience mirrors the SSA situation; partial decentralisation is characterised by inefficiencies and ineffectiveness concerns. Also, LGs are wanting of Public Financial Management, as evidenced by various Local Authorities Public Accounts Committee reports and Botlhale (2012). The result is a huge chasm between intent and outcome, hence the quest for a decentralisation policy. The quest for decentralisation policy actuated the government to partner with the UNDP to commission a consultancy for developing a policy in 2014. The policy was meant to be in sync with the broad governance framework relating to the roles and responsibilities of the central government, local governments and non-state actors to drive decentralised, inclusive and responsive service delivery and sustainable local development. Amongst others, the policy is to drive local service delivery. In this regard, the Minister of Local Government and Rural Development told the Botswana Association of Local Authorities (BALA) National Members Assembly in Maun on May 13, 2015, that the government was developing a decentralisation policy. He, thus, exhorted them to partake in the process. The culmination of the consultancy was the Draft Decentralisation Policy (2019). The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLG and RD) is currently consulting stakeholders before the draft is brought to parliament. For example, the Minster of MLG and RD consulted with the Jwaneng Town Council on April 20, 2021. He stated that ‘the policy would help upgrade the government service delivery system from

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ineffective to effective, devolved and closer to the people by improving transparency and accountability’ (Sennamose 2021, p. 2). The draft was meant to be discussed during the 2021 winter parliament (it is yet to be discussed). To ensure feasibly maximum fruit, this chapter argues that there is a need for comprehensive digitalised decentralisation in Botswana. Thus, digitalising decentralisation will ensure feasibly maximum fruit from the envisaged decentralisation policy. E-government and Digitalised Decentralisation in Botswana Notably, the two overarching reasons for decentralisation in Botswana are (1) to improve service provision and (2) to empower local institutions for good governance (Kathyola and Job 2011, p. 43). Digitalisation is thought to be in a position to address challenges currently hindering these objectives. Some have argued that digitalised decentralisation in Botswana will, under the right conditions, beget feasible public service delivery (e.g., see Misuraca 2007). Through the One-Gov approach, the government laid the foundation for e-government in 2011. The government of Botswana has spent billions of pulas since the inception of the e-government project in 2012 (Samboma 2019, p. 1). The legal-institutional framework comprises the National e-Government Strategy (2011–2016). There is the Botswana e-Government Master Plan (2015–2021) to operationalise the strategy. There are both successes, albeit limited (e.g., see Phirinyane 2016) and numerous challenges (e.g., see Nkwe 2012; Samboma 2019). Some of the challenges are low levels of internet penetration, telecommunications infrastructure constraints and lack of citizen awareness and participation (Nkwe 2012), and electricity and internet challenges (Samboma 2019). Botswana’s 2020 Network Readiness Index was 36.94/100 and ranked 99/134 (Portulans Institute 2020). This denotes low network readiness. At the same time, it is noteworthy that digitalisation is limited at LG levels (Madala and Phirinyane 2016). This should not be surprising, given that LGs are under-resourced and are most likely not benefitting from the fledgling e-government project. In addition, many challenges attend to the fledgling e-government project. The key ones are the digital divide (e.g., see Mudongo 2021), slow and expensive internet (e.g., see Sunday Standard 2015) and lack of an Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS). Based on the above, there is a need to lay a solid foundation for digitalised decentralisation by attending to basics (or fundamentals/firsts)

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first. Hence, the government must go back to the basics and, thus, re-look at the One-Gov approach, National e-Government Strategy (2011–2016) and Botswana e-Government Master Plan (2015–2021). The three should be re-engineered and re-calibrated to lay a solid legal-­ institutional framework for e-government in Botswana. In this regard, it is noteworthy that nothing beats peer learning and benchmarking and tried and tested best e-government practices. Therefore, the government must benchmark from established e-government frameworks in SSA and beyond. Once the national e-government framework is in place, the government must develop a sub-national e-government framework. Though modelled on the national e-government framework, the framework must be tailor-made for LGs in line with their mandates. Similarly, peer learning and benchmarking will stand LGs in very good stead. In this regard, there are cases from Senegal (ACACIA Strategy [SAS]), Ghana Study (ICTs and Traditional Governance), Uganda (District Administrative Network Programme [DistrictNet]) and the City of Cape Town (‘Smart City’) that the LGs can draw useful lessons from. For the e-government project to work, the digital divide, slow and expensive internet and the establishment of an IFMS must be addressed. Most importantly, the central government must support decentralisation, in this case, digitalised decentralisation, by deploying the requisite resources to LGs. The resources must be used to buy IT infrastructure and pay for training. The LGs must engage in public outreach programmes to educate their customers on the benefits of digitalised service provision to ensure good uptake of local e-government.

Case Study 2: Ghana Ghana’s Local Government System, History and Legal Framework The British colonial government introduced Ghana’s decentralised local government system after the Bond of 1844 was signed between the chiefs, representing the people of Gold Coast (former name of Ghana), and the British government. Using the native political institution (chiefs and elders), the British applied the indirect rule principle to rule Gold Coast (Antwi-Boasiako and Okyere 2009). The British ruled indirectly by constituting the chiefs and elders in a given district as the local authority with powers ‘to establish treasuries, appoint staff and perform local government functions’ (Nkrumah 2000, p.  55). As a policy document, the

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Municipal Ordinance of 1859 aimed to facilitate the creation of municipalities in the coastal towns of the Gold Coast and to make the decentralisation policy work. After Ghana’s independence in 1957, the Local Government Act, Act 54 of 1961, was passed to establish local authorities as agencies to support the central government. However, challenges such as finance, bureaucratic procedures and qualified, skilled professionals affected the performance of local government officials (Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004). A common feature of the LG system under the colonial government and that of the Local Government Act, Act 54 of 1961, was incompetent staff, bureaucratic procedures and lack of adequate funding, either transferred or locally raised (Bamfo 2000). The 1980 economic crisis forced Ghana to adopt the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Inanga and Osei-Wusu 2004). The economic liberalisation programme aimed to break down the bureaucratic procedures within the central government (Sabbi and Mensah 2016). This shift in the central government’s role warranted the need to reform the Local Government Act, Act 54 of 1961. However, the need to reform the Local Government Act, Act 54 of 1961, intensified in 1987 as decentralisation failed to meet local needs (Sabbi and Mensah 2016). The result of the reform led to the birth of the Provisional National Defence Council’s Law 207 in 1987 as the legal and institutional direction to constitute the first District Assemblies (Assibey-Mensah 2000; Ayee 2012; and Mensah et  al. 2015) to promote citizen participation (Antwi-Boasiako and Okyere 2009). Ghana’s current decentralisation programme began after 1990 with the introduction of the Local Government Act 1993, Act 462 (Crawford 2004, 2008). The 1992 constitution strengthened the objectives of decentralisation and local governance in Ghana (Government of Ghana 1992, p. 150). In 2016, the government of Ghana introduced a new Local Governance Act called the Local Governance Act, 2016, Act 936 (Government of Ghana 2016). Ghana’s local governments continue to face performance challenges like poor service delivery, financial challenges, lack of adequate qualified professionals and low levels of active community participation (Crawford 2004, 2008). A strategy which promises a solution to local government challenges is e-government. Thus, the next section discusses e-government in Ghana and how it can be used to solve local government challenges.

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E-government Development in Ghana In this chapter, the word digitalisation of the public sector is used interchangeably with e-government which refers to the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the public sector. E-government was initiated in Ghana in the year 2008 by Ghana’s Ministry of Communication and the World Bank in a development project termed ‘eGhana’. This project was meant to improve the operations of Ghana’s public sector and to make public services delivery efficient (Abusamhadana et al. 2021; Mathapoly-Codjoe 2015; Seifert and Bonham 2003). Further, the project provided strong incentives to promote transparency and accountability in the public sector by implementing online systems under public-private partnerships. It was envisaged that e-government would solve the challenges of resource constraints which affect the public sector in Ghana, thus saving costs in the public sector (Abusamhadana et  al. 2021; Tchao et al. 2017). Ghana’s drive for e-government started in the 1990s (Schuppan 2009). In 2004, Ghana developed an ICT policy called the National ICT for Accelerated Development (ICT4AD). This Policy (ICT4AD) sought to modernise the operations and service delivery of the civil service of Ghana. The policy mandated all ministries, agencies and departments to prepare their ICT policy statement in line with the framework of ICT4AD Policy. This was meant to achieve one of the 14 key components of the ICT4AD Policy: the promotion of e-government and e-governance. However, Ghana’s true public sector digitalisation came about in 2008 after a framework for the digital government was developed through an Act of Parliament called National Information Technology Agency Act 771, 2008 (hereinafter, NITA Act 771, 2008). The framework is under the control and implementation of the National Information Technology Agency (NITA): the ICT policy implementation wing of the Government of Ghana (Government of Ghana 2008). The key deliverable of the e-Ghana project is e-government application and communications (Mensah 2016). NITA, created by a decree of the Parliament of Ghana, executed the VMAX and the Multiple Layer Switch networks, which link all government ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) in Ghana. These networks, VMAX and the Multiple Layer Switch networks, connect the three main levels of government (i.e., national, regional and local levels) and their institutions to ensure the online presence of these government institutions. In addition, state corporations,

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agencies and organisations are also connected for better service delivery and interactions. With this in place, work coordination, exchange of information in a standardised format and interactions among the private sector, MDAs and the citizens will be enhanced. These are the expected gains from the e-government project of the government of Ghana. Thus, the e-government framework of the government of Ghana modifies interactions with itself, businesses and its citizens (Mensah 2016). As a result, web portals such as ePay, eServices, One-Stop Center and Government E-Workspace were created to make it easy for citizens to access government services and to provide a single source of government information (Mensah 2016). The reviews on local government and digitalisation in Ghana show that digitalisation solved the challenges of local governments in Ghana, as enumerated above. A study to assess the digitalisation of local revenue collection for Accra Metropolitan Assembly of Ghana showed that digitalisation (use of point-of-sale devices) improved revenue collection transparency and accountability. Notably, revenue amounts collected with the same point-of-sale devices increased revenue collection (Adu et al. 2019). For instance, low citizen participation is solved through increased transparency and accountability with e-government. Increased transparency and accountability arouse citizens’ interest in governance since government activities will be opened to citizens to know and question government actions and contribute to local policies (Tchao et  al. 2017; Dick-Sagoe 2020). Again, digitalisation’s ability to increase integration with the government, citizens and the business community also enhances strong citizens’ participation in  local governance. Another challenge of local government, which is the lack of adequate financial resources, will be solved by digitalisation’s ability to reduce the operational cost of local government in service provision. On the other hand, digitisation also improves local revenue collection levels (Adu et al. 2019). Further, service delivery levels improve as local governments, through digitalisation, respond swiftly to service provision for local citizens and, simultaneously, provide services that meet their citizens’ needs. In addressing local government service provision levels, Abusamhadana et al. (2021) argue that digitalised decentralisation touches all the aspects of local public service in terms of access, efficiency and cost. They further say that digitalised decentralisation eliminates intermediaries in  local service access, thus reducing the cost of service and corrupt practices. They further argue that access to service also increases under digitalised decentralisation as

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many citizens can be served at the same time online, reducing service waiting times. Also, service efficiency is improved by saving customer’s waiting time and swift local service delivery. E-government in Ghana’s Decentralised Local Governments: Overview and Challenges Ghana’s e-Ghana and e-Transform projects provided the framework for the government of Ghana to contribute massively to ICT development. Ghana’s national development policy paper, Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), also promotes the e-Ghana agenda by increasing the use of ICT across economic sectors. The same policy document supports the implementation of the National Electronic Security system and the promotion of other ICT-related equipment for the benefit of Ghanaians (Tchao et  al. 2017). Since the implementation of e-­ government is highly reliant on ICT and telecommunication technology, Ghana has focused on increasing the ICT penetration rate and efficient telecommunication networks to achieve smooth implementation of its e-Ghana initiative. With this, the Network Readiness Index (measuring from 1 [worse] to 7 [best]) shows Ghana’s improvement from 3 (2010) to 4 (2016) with an estimated annual growth rate of 1.29 per cent (Knoema 2017). Despite the said improvement, a score of 3 out of 7 means a low network readiness. Developing e-government services for LGs requires building technical and managerial capabilities. The diffusion process of e-government comes with changes in the organisational and institutional processes of LG bodies (Abdallah and Fan 2012). With these changes, skilled and technologically adaptable citizens and employees must make successful e-government diffusion (Abdallah and Fan 2012). Human resource capacity has been a long-standing problem for local governments’ performance in Ghana (Doh 2017), and digital diffusion has further exposed local government staff capabilities. Again, the expertise to plan, develop and deploy e-­ government remains a challenge in  local governments (Gyaase 2014), arguably, due to low salary structures for local government staff to attract competent IT staff. Another challenge militating against the successful rollout of e-governments at LG levels is the low technological appreciation among local government officials (Irani et  al. 2006) and citizens (Rose and Grant 2010).

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Long-term initiatives to roll out e-government by local governments have also been affected by the consistent struggle with service provision and functions between the central, local and regional governments (Al-Wadhi and Morris 2009). The central government of Ghana continues to take over constitutional functions and responsibilities originally in the hands of local governments. Again, the government has created several ministries which have ended up duplicating the functions of local governments and creating conflicts as to who does what. A typical example is the government of Ghana’s one-district factory initiative, which has taken away some of the functions of LGs in creating an enabling environment for investment and economic opportunities within their respective jurisdictions. Again, functions like education, roads, health and sanitation have been partially re-centralised, leaving LGs handicapped in providing these services. Successful e-government also combines human-based administrative processes with computer-based technology (Gyaase 2014; Ahn and Bretschneider 2011). This, when done successfully, results in improved service provision. Therefore, a successful rollout needs administrative and business delivery adjustment, requiring complete change management, which faces strong resistance at the local government level (Ahn and Bretschneider 2011). Investment outlays for e-government rollout plans are prohibitively expensive for most developing countries like Ghana. Therefore, Ghana has resorted to donor support to develop and implement e-government, which is subject to institutionalisation failures and challenges with sustainability, especially when donors cease their support in funding. Such a situation impedes the diffusion of e-government to local government (Dawes 2008). Privacy, data protection and security of local people who are intended to use the e-government infrastructure also remain a challenge as local people usually express low confidence in using such e-government services provided by the local government (Gyaase 2014). Being a socio-technical innovation, e-government involves processes, people and technologies and, therefore, understanding the local people’s sociocultural dynamics enhances the success of e-government (ITU 2008). In a study to document the challenges with e-government adoption in Ghana’s local governments, Gyaase (2014) outlines the following challenges as disabling factors. These are lack of awareness among the local people, limited budgetary allocation, inadequate skilled human resources and absence of ICT infrastructure. The latest study provides the following factors as disablers

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of digitalised decentralisation: digital divide and electricity (power) interruptions (Abusamhadana et  al. 2021). They further outline factors like cultural challenges, sabotaging of government infrastructure, security threats, citizens’ trust issues and low public knowledge of digitalised decentralisation in Ghana. In summary, Ghana has, to the extent possible, digitalised its LG systems. Notably, its LGs face the same digitalisation challenges as Botswana’s. Therefore, given COVID-19 challenges, with severe implications for physical meetings and the heightened need to provide improved services to the vulnerable who disproportionately suffer the effects of COVID-19, there is a need to invest more resources in digitalised decentralisation.

Contrasting Botswana and Ghana’s Decentralisation The two case studies show that Botswana and Ghana are wedded to decentralisation as instanced by their legal-institutional frameworks for LG. It is notable that while, on the one hand, Botswana has a weak form of decentralisation (more deconcentration and less devolution), Ghana has a strong form of decentralisation (largely, in the form of devolution) on the other. Regarding the e-government infrastructure, Botswana does not favourably compare with Ghana. Concerning digitalised decentralisation in Botswana, investment in e-government is meagre (Madala and Phirinyane 2016). Typically, the e-government’s allotment constitutes a small percentage of the total budget of ministries, departments and agencies. Contrariwise, Ghana has deployed a substantial amount of resources to digitalise LGs. The natural and logical question that should follow is: why are these differences? This question has not been answered before because no comparative study on LGs in Botswana and Ghana has been undertaken. It is important to note that the success of decentralisation is contingent on two factors: (1) political will by the central government to devolve powers to LGs and (2) resources. The Botswana government has variously avowed its commitment to decentralisation (e.g., see Sennamose 2021 and National Decentralisation Policy [2019]). As per the Policy, ‘the Government’s decision to formulate the Decentralisation Policy is underpinned and motivated by the persistent desire to address the challenges in Botswana’s quest for participatory democratic governance as well as inclusive diversified and equitable economic development’ (Republic of Botswana 2019, p. 3). However, the deed barely matches the word because Botswana is essentially a centralised state (e.g., see Poteete et  al. 2014; Schneider

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2003). Contrariwise, Ghana has shown a comparatively better implementation of decentralisation. Regarding resources, it is paradoxical that the government of Botswana is unwilling or refusing or reluctant to resource LGs adequately. It has also underinvested in digitalised decentralisation. Despite COVID-19-induced fiscal strictures, Botswana is an upper middle-income country (see UNDP Human Development reports) with the financial wherewithal to adequately resource LGs. While occupying a lower economic station vis-à-vis Botswana, as per UNDP Human Development reports, Ghana allocates more resources to LGs than Botswana. In addition, it has amply invested in digitalised decentralisation.

Conclusion While the two case studies demonstrated underlying variations in digitalising local governments in Africa, these are underpinned by a complex mix of factors, some bordering on the political history and power politics surrounding decentring resources from the centre. This chapter’s case studies have shown specific differences in the realisation of digitalised decentralised government structures while also providing cross-cutting challenges already identified in other African countries. These mainly include the digital divide, the degree of state investment in digital or ICT technologies, human resource capacities and public participation. ICTs-enabled LGs are relatively found in Ghana than in Botswana primarily due to political will, which naturally comes with other critical components like adequate resource allocation and policy commitment needed for policy effectiveness. Therefore, we can draw the following key policy implications: 1. a commitment towards digitalised decentralisation; 2. the development of an effective digitalisation infrastructure; 3. adequate resourcing of LGs; 4. training of LG staff on e-government; and finally 5. there is an imperative need to resolve digital divide issues, mainly gender dimensions and the digital readiness of government agencies and citizens.

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PART IV

Emerging Challenges in Leveraging 4IR Technologies

CHAPTER 15

Regulatory Issues for the Promotion of Entrepreneurship in Electronic Money in the CEMAC Sub-region Gregory Mvogo, Desiré Avom, and Honore Bidiasse

Introduction The growth of electronic means of payment is generating significant new prudential and legal challenges across Africa. Mobile money as a new means of payment potentially carries multiple risks, undermining the stability of banking systems, consumer protection, the fight against fraud and money laundering (Godeffroy and Moutot 2000; Mvogo 2016). The recent World Bank’s Global Findex 2021, which provides the global

G. Mvogo (*) ESSEC Business School, University of Douala, Douala, Cameroon D. Avom Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Yaoundé 2, Soa, Cameroon, Yaoundé, Cameroon H. Bidiasse Faculty of Economics and Applied Management, University of Douala, Douala, Cameroon © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_15

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statistics on how adults save, borrow, make payments and manage risk, shows that mobile money activity in African countries expands economic development, bringing more people into formal employment. However, regulating this emerging digital economy space remains challenging in Africa, whose regulatory state is only developing (e.g. Onyango 2021). The most vulnerable part to this state of regulation are networks of private points of sale, which can inhibit the entrepreneurial dynamic in the market sector. Under its characteristics, mobile money has become a tool for reducing the financial exclusion of populations in developing countries and achieving the ultimate objective of an economy without monetary signs in the COVID-19 pandemic era (e.g. Onyango and Ondiek 2022). Africa is now the leader in mobile money penetration and innovation. More than ever, COVID-19 proved the policy instrumentality of mobile money as several countries in sub-Saharan Africa harnessed it to expand their social protection policies. However, Klapper et  al. (2021) note that despite mobile money services presenting an opportunity to transfer safety net payments quickly, mobile money payments’ effectiveness depends on a supportive regulatory environment. In particular, “[r]equirements such as Know-Your-Customer (KYC) rules, consumer protection frameworks, and agent transparency can influence the ease with which people use mobile money” (p. 3). Most important to the objective of this chapter, these authors consider an enabling regulatory framework critical in developing innovative and sustainable mobile money banking services that can effectively benefit customers. This chapter examines the evolution of the regulation of mobile money and its efficiency in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) sub-region. The CEMAC sub-region provides an elaborate comparative case for discerning mobile money regulation in sub-Saharan Africa. Its geographical scope covers the Central African Republic (CAR), Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Chad. As of 2017, it had a population of 52.8 million inhabitants, a banking rate of less than 20%—one of the lowest in the world—an incidence of poverty of 45% and a mobile telephony diffusion rate of 89% and is full of all the characteristics conducive to the expansion of mobile money. Consequently, according to GSMA (2017) statistics and BEAC (2017), mobile telephone companies in all CEMAC countries, like in other African regions, have adopted an active mobile money service since 2011. However, the emergence of this financial service remains sluggish. So far,

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the number of mobile money subscribers has grown slowly given the size of the population, increasing from 7.4 million in 2014 to 15.1 million in 2016, for a penetration rate of 28.60%; the volume of transactions carried out in 2017 represents 7% of CEMAC’s GDP, a far cry from the 74% made in Kenya and the 25% made in Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA). These stylised facts thus highlight the existence of contextual constraints, particularly regulatory constraints, inhibiting the deployment of the mobile money landscape in this economic community. Yet regulatory issues are a determining factor in the operational landscape of most telecommunications industries (Tagoe 2016). It supports a more user-friendly regulatory architecture that facilitates market penetration. Therefore, we consider it an opportune time to develop a more robust and solid regulatory framework in CEMAC to allow mobile money operators to establish mechanisms to facilitate financial transactions effectively. In the literature, the definition of a regulatory framework for electronic financial services is not recent; it dates back to the work of Lielieveldt (1997) and Randall (1997), following the development of electronic terminals and magnetic cards. Its renewed interest in recent times, particularly in developing countries, follows the proliferation of electronic financial services by mobile phones, having a substantial impact on financial inclusion and the living conditions of the entire population (Nyaga Kariuki 2014; Tagoe 2016; Bernal 2017). Although developing a regulatory framework adapted to each study context, this literature sets out the conditions for the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework. With the proliferation of mobile phone financial services, the regulations must first ensure the protection of consumers, considering the multiple operational risks abounding in the design of electronic financial services and the range of services offered (Bara 2013; Tagoe 2016). Secondly, regulations must allow the different stakeholders to fully assess their role in deploying strategies and drafting business contracts (Kemp 2013). Third, these regulations, especially in the financial and telecommunications sectors, should be harmonised by integrating the different business models and the different forms of electronic money (Nyaga Kariuki 2014). However, besides various country-level studies and enacted regulations, there are hardly known studies focusing on the monetary union scale in CEMAC. This chapter addresses this gap by proposing a regulatory framework for mobile money activity in the CEMAC. It is worth noting that explicit operationalisation of the regulatory framework for mobile money is

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essential. First, to our knowledge, there is no work on determining a regulatory framework for mobile money in the CEMAC sub-region. As Nyaga Kariuki (2014) underlined, a regulatory framework would make it possible to promote specific efficiency components for financial services. Second, mobile phone companies and many private distributors offer mobile money, so a level of supervision is required to ensure consumer protection and guarantee operators’ profitability. Third, the range of services for which payment by mobile money is possible is expanding every day: it includes insurance, payment of tuition fees, payment of bills, collection of taxes, transfers, international calls, the purchase of communication credit and so on. More importantly, coordinated regulation can reduce the risks inherent in providing these services. Finally, considering the interoperability established in mobile money and especially the implementation of portability, which allows a customer to migrate from one telephone network to another without damage, an appropriate regulation would make it possible to define conditions for healthy competition. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents the current regulatory framework for electronic money in the CEMAC region, followed by a section on the organisation of the mobile money sector in CEMAC. The fourth section analyses regulatory issues. The fifth section proposes a regulatory framework and the final section concludes.

The Regulatory Framework for Electronic Money Activity in the CEMAC Region In the CEMAC region, the status of electronic money issuer is devolved to credit institutions only. The latter thus has a clear legitimacy, based on regulatory texts, allowing them to offer electronic money services. This legal and regulatory framework ranges from authorisation to the carrying out of electronic money transactions. Regulation No. 01/11-CEMAC/ UMAC/CM of September 18, 2011, defines the conditions for issuing electronic money. It also clarifies the roles of the regulatory authorities. According to this text, the activity of issuing electronic money is conditioned by an authorisation issued by the Bank of Central African States (BEAC). The regulator must then evaluate the potential for development of the applicant’s network and the applicant’s mastery of the technology likely to guarantee secure transactions. The provisions of this regulation

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set out the requirements to be met to be eligible to issue electronic money. The letter of authorisation from the BEAC guaranteeing the conformity of the applicant’s file is sent to the local monetary authority, the national representation of the BEAC and the Banking Commission. In addition, this regulation sets out the regime for the issuance of electronic money and the modalities for its conversion into fiduciary or scriptural money, which clarifies the rules of operation of electronic money. This concerns the loading and unloading of electronic money, the payment and transfer of value units and the pricing of services. It also defines the rules for closing the electronic money account. The said regulation fixes and defines the role of differents actors in charge of the regulation, the control and the monitoring of electronic money by subordinating the credit institutions to provide, according to the prescribed periodicity, information on the evolution of the activity. It is, therefore, a cross-cutting regulation covering all the functions of the electronic money business. The provisions of this regulatory text are aimed exclusively at credit institutions. This is understandable since, despite the intervention of many non-financial actors in creating electronic money, the issuance of electronic money remains the prerogative of credit institutions. However, three instructions have been issued in the perspective of harmoniously applying this regulatory text. Instruction N°01/GR/UMAC of October 31, 2011, on the supervision of electronic money payment systems: This instruction implements the previous regulation on the activity of issuing electronic money. Consequently, it defines the legal and operational basis on which the BEAC relies to guarantee the proper functioning of the issuing system. The objective is to ensure that authorised establishments comply with the conditions for exercising electronic money. This oversight framework specifies, on the one hand, the organisation of oversight of the institutions subject to oversight and, on the other hand, the terms and conditions of implementation of this oversight. As regards the organisation of supervision, it covers, on the one hand, the legal aspect relating to the adequacy of the regime for the issuance of electronic money and its conversion into cash and, on the other hand, the technical aspect relating to compliance with the security and efficiency standards of the issuance system. Regarding the supervision implementation methods, it is carried out based on documents and the spot. All monitoring missions result in a report, which is also sent to COBAC.

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However, it should be noted that, as defined, this instruction does not explicitly authorise each technical partner to have more than one credit institution issuing electronic money. In so doing, it legitimised quasi-­ monopoly situations in issuing electronic money, that is, one issuer for one technical partner. However, the possibility of a plurality of money issuers per partner may impact the pricing of electronic money and the traffic of this money. However, the CEMAC monetary authorities will take three years to correct this shortcoming. Instruction N°02/GR/UMAC of May 07, 2014: It is related to implementing “multi-banking” in the electronic money issuing activity context. It specifies the interoperability of electronic money for issuers with the same technical manager. It thus aims to encourage the emergence of positive externalities on both the supply and demand sides with the creation of networks of electronic money issuers. It establishes the conditions for participation in multi-banking, which is done at the institution’s request. In addition to ruling on the conditions of participation, this instruction specifies the various actors involved in the multi-banking network, emphasising the existence of a settlement bank responsible for clearing transactions between the institutions in the network. It also makes clearing conditional on the existence of a guarantee fund to cover delays and possible payment defaults. Finally, this instruction defines reporting obligations specific to the multi-banking of electronic money activity in addition to the previous instruction on the supervision of electronic money activity. This instruction implicitly lays the foundation for interoperability, hence the following instruction. Instruction N°001/GR/2018 of August 10, 2018: It is related to the definition of the scope of interoperability and interbanking of electronic payment systems in the CEMAC.  This instruction aims at defining the operating modalities of both interoperability and interbanking. Interoperability requires data exchange between platform members on all transactions on a network or several networks. It also establishes the security standards for electronic payment instruments issued by electronic money providers. Conversely, interbanking sets the terms and conditions for clearing and settling transactions across banks. It establishes the central bank as a settlement bank. In addition, it sets the conditions for participation in a platform outside the CEMAC. One of the conditions for this to be possible is to create a clearing and/or guarantee account denominated in XAF or Euros. Finally, this instruction sets deadlines for the platform to regularise its operations, with penalties in case of delay.

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Overall, the design of this regulatory framework essentially responds to market dynamics with the introduction of electronic money in the CEMAC in 2003, popularised by the development of mobile money in 2011 by cell phone operators.

The Operation of Mobile Money in the CEMAC Sub-region The above regulatory framework for electronic money develops the rules-­ of-­the-game that defines the entry into the market and affects players’ market strategies. Such a framework should have two primary objectives: ensuring control of operational risks in issuing electronic money and promoting the interoperability of electronic money networks. First, to limit the operational risks associated with the activity of electronic money, the monetary authorities have opted for a collaborative model in which banks issue electronic money by relying on a technical partner who happens to be an operator in mobile telephony. The latter ensures the distribution of electronic money and receives the money only to make transfers and payments at the customer’s request. The advantage of such a configuration lies in limiting the entry of corrupt agents into the electronic money market and ensuring a secure service. According to the 2020 Interpol report, this has recently posed a critical challenge with money laundering issues and related crimes like human trafficking, the drug trade and organised crime in African countries (INTERPOL 2020). These issues are justified given the strong penetration of cell phones, on the one hand (Fig. 15.1),

Fig. 15.1  Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in the CEMAC region. (Source: Summary from World Bank database 2021)

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and the dynamics of the mobile money market characterised by the increase in the number of distributors and the volume of transactions, on the other hand (Fig. 15.2). Thus, authorities issuing electronic money should assess the development potential of the applicant’s network and the latter’s mastery of technology capable of guaranteeing secure transactions. However, this bank-mobile phone operator association has enabled the central bank to be consistent with the prudential regulations, which only include deposit-­ taking institutions, even though electronic money is not a deposit currency. Instead, it is a monetary value stored in a technological medium controlled by non-financial agents operating outside the supervisory competence of the central bank. Therefore, it becomes necessary to develop non-prudential regulations to manage the technological risks not taken into account by the BEAC’s first regulation governing the activity of electronic money. Second, the BEAC’s regulatory framework aims to promote the interoperability of electronic money and, therefore, promote financial inclusion. To avoid the quasi-monopoly situations which emerged with

Fig. 15.2  Evolution of mobile money market in the CEMAC region. (Source: BEAC 2020)

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the first regulatory texts to make the electronic money market contestable, the monetary authorities have prescribed multi-banking to the various mobile telephone operators. That is to say, a mobile telephone operator can be a technical partner of more than one bank issuing electronic money. In addition, these mobile telephone operators must distribute electronic money beyond their network. Mobile telephone operators have the advantage and experience of managing low-value and large-volume transactions, which allows them to safely offer electronic money with a lower cost structure than banks and avoid niche customer situations specific to banking strategies. The idea is that consumers can transact beyond their service provider’s network. They should choose their suppliers by evaluating the offer that best suits them, considering, among other things, prices and the possibility of carrying out transactions with a larger group of individuals or with those with whom they interact more. Therefore, it was recommended that e-money service providers take steps to add value to their networks and attract customers, either by differentiating products or by reducing prices. However, regulators in CEMAC do not ensure that technical interoperability is achievable at a low cost. This has led to the consolidation of the dominant position of the leading operator, like what happened in Cameroon. In short, and as we have noted, the current CEMAC regulatory framework is full of shortcomings. It establishes the BEAC and the COBAC as regulatory bodies for the activity of electronic money and, therefore, mobile money. However, concerning the COBAC, it is difficult to perform with any efficiency given its current monitoring function. The current system confines it to the supervision of credit institutions, effectively abandoning the management of means of payment, which is reduced to the liquidity ratio. Mobile money, as the primary modality of electronic money in the sub-region, is disseminated through the collaborative model of banks-telecommunications operators. In this context, COBAC is limited to the prudential aspect, all the technical parts being under the control of another institution, in this case, the telecommunications regulatory authority. In other words, regulation is privileged to the detriment of the functional dimension. But, this is where most of the problems emerge. Likewise, the consumer protection dimension is absent in the current regulatory text. Finally, and as GABAC (2018) specifies, this regulatory framework does not provide the regulator with a mechanism to fight against money laundering and the financing of

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terrorism through the channel of electronic money. That being the case, there is a need to examine the challenges of mobile money regulation in the CEMAC sub-region to devise a regulatory framework that would accommodate and secure, favourable to innovation and consumer protection. Mobile Money in CEMAC: Regulatory Challenges Chaix and Torre (2015) state that mobile payments are offered in developing countries following the collaborative model. This is the same model adopted in the CEMAC sub-region, where credit institutions offer mobile money in partnership with telecommunications operators. In this model, each partner focuses their efforts on their own skills and knowledge to minimise operating costs. In this context, many challenges must be addressed to ensure the optimal functioning of the mobile money service. Most importantly, coordinating actions in regulatory authority is critical in establishing trust and managing means of payment and security. The issue of coordinating actions can be seen through two dimensions: the pricing of services and the exclusivity of transactions. Pricing of services is problematic because the offer of mobile money involves the intervention of credit institutions and telecommunications operators, two players that belong to two distinct sectors, each with its own business model. The oligopolistic structure may lead mobile operators, because of their database, to charge higher fees unfavourable to consumers, on the one hand, and to focus on consumer niches, on the other. By illustration, we have the case of Moov Africa and Airtel Gabon, which merged to increase their prices and benefit from economies of scale. The direct consequence is the accentuation of financial exclusion and justifies the sluggishness of the diffusion of mobile money in the CEMAC. As for the second dimension, it must be said that mobile money is distributed by several mobile telephone companies, each having exclusivity in carrying out transactions. For example, a network subscriber in Cameroon (Orange money) cannot carry out all the possible transactions in another network (MTN mobile money). At the same time, households are subscribed to telecommunications operators according to their advantages. This exclusivity of mobile money transactions in a distribution network inevitably helps limit the network effect, which is nevertheless necessary for distributing this service. Anything that can lead mobile operators to engage outside the business boundaries of financial and non-financial (insurance) institutions.

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The mobile money management unit within the telephone operators would be decoupled to function as a financial institution. Consequently, the coordination of actions requires the establishment of joint regulations between the banking authorities and those in charge of telecommunications to guarantee better pricing and define the conditions for interoperability, which contributes to strengthening the dominance of the largest mobile operator and ultimately foster financial inclusion. The second regulatory issue is household confidence in mobile money services. Two important elements determine this confidence: the liquidity of the mobile money points of sale and the quality of the telecommunications network. Regarding the first point, one of the major problems mobile money users encounter is the illiquidity of the points of sale for this service. Although these points of sale play a considerable role in the spread of mobile money, as observed in East African countries like Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the illiquidity of these outlets erodes the confidence of many consumers. This is because consumers have to bear additional transaction costs in searching for a liquid point of sale. These additional costs make the service expensive for poor households and rural areas, leading households to alternative money transfer solutions with the consequence of increasing the number of inactive subscribers. The second and no less important problem is the poor quality of the telecommunications network. However, poor network quality does not facilitate and guarantee the better transmission of payment orders. Network “bugs” can lead to payment incidents limiting the possibility of instant debt extinction. This insufficient network quality can undermine customers’ confidence, especially those who do not master the technology. The new regulatory framework must thus define the quality of the points of sale and the latter’s security to avoid recurring piracy problems in the CEMAC, as a relay in the distribution of mobile money to guarantee households’ confidence vis-à-vis this payment instrument. The legal issue manifests mainly when a payment incident occurs in mobile money. By way of illustration, two scenarios deserve mentioning. First, there is a legal vacuum in the management of death. Indeed, what procedure authorises a beneficiary to regain possession of the funds upon the death of a mobile money account holder? If in doubt, what are the remedies? The second case relates to the problem of debt extinction. For example, a user who has paid his bill by mobile money but whose creditor claims not to have received the transfer, or a subscriber of the electricity company facing a subscription suspension because the company has not

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received the payment of the bill by mobile money. What are the remedies in the face of the damage suffered by both parties? Therefore, the regulations must propose adapted solutions in the event of incidents occurring during the use of mobile money. Finally, taking security into account is essential when using mobile money. This dimension is more important as the operation of this service is based on the establishment and mastery of a computer system. In this regard, the protection of customers’ data, mastery of data decryption and managing computer bugs are challenges relating to mobile money security. By examining the inadequacies of the current regulatory framework for mobile money, the challenges identified allow us to suggest some avenues for reflection for a new legal framework likely to promote the optimal functioning of this service.

Proposal for a Regulatory Framework for Mobile Money The deficiencies in the legal framework mentioned above do not fully allow mobile money to exploit its potential as a payment and financial inclusion instrument. In addition, the current model for regulating mobile money services involves multiple supervisors (BEAC, COBAC and ART), which is inefficient due to the potential for regulatory overlap. Such an institutional approach is insufficient. An efficient regulatory framework must integrate all the stakeholders in the mobile money offer to trigger the opposite dynamic. To achieve this, we must migrate from the institutional approach to the functional one, which embraces all mobile financial service providers, both banks and non-banks, emphasising operational responsibility. The central bank oversees all institutions providing mobile money through this approach while maintaining control over market developments and ensuring a level playing field for all providers and distributors. In line with this approach, which integrates more significant operational risks, some mobile money functions require contractual relationships governed by commercial law, while others require specific regulatory mechanisms. Specifically, the regulatory framework to be defined must better ensure the conduct of providing financial services on mobile. Emphasis must be placed on consumer protection, the fight against money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the prospects for developing this service.

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Functions Falling Under Commercial Law These are the currency conversion functions and the store of values function. Currency conversion consists of a two-way exchange from electronic units to cash or cash to electronic units. This exchange takes place through two distribution channels: the first internal is controlled by the mobile money operator and the second is made up of a network of distribution partners. This exchange presents the main risk, namely the risk of fraud: it is linked to the activities of hacking or decryption of confidential information during mobile money transactions. This function must be governed by commercial law due to the implementation of a contract node during mobile money operation. A first contract binds the end customer to the point of sale. The second links the point of sale to the mobile money wholesaler. The third link is the points of sale, wholesalers and the telecommunications operator. It appears here that the financial risk is non-­ existent. In this case, prudential regulation is inappropriate but defines a legal-legal framework to protect households’ data. On the other hand, by ensuring currency conversion and allowing remote transactions to be carried out, mobile money can affect the speed of money circulation. Therefore, to safeguard the financial system’s stability, monetary authorities must have a say in developing transactions via mobile money. In this context, given that mobile money transactions are fully traceable and transparent, monetary authorities must demand, in real-time, regular data transmission from the mobile operator for monetary policy purposes. Mobile money also allows economic agents to put their funds in reserve, as long as they have a mobile money account. Unlike the Chinese model Torre and Xu (2019) described, no interest is paid to households that store their cash electronically. The latter use, it as a safe place to deposit their money and avoid unpleasant situations (assaults, theft and loss). In this case, mobile money is the current cash the household can have at its request. Thanks to this reserve function, mobile money allows economic agents to optimise their liquidity management. But this function also presents several risks: risks associated with data entry errors during transactions, theft and loss of money. To protect consumers from these risks and draw inspiration from prudential regulations, monetary authorities must ensure the integrity of mobile money is safeguarded. They must also set up a system for recovering data from mobile money customers in the event of loss of the phone, hacking, transaction error and even death.

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Such a system can be an entirely separate entity, independent of the mobile money operators (still the mobile telephone companies). It could, if necessary, be housed at the central bank since it involves all operators and partner banks in the mobile money offer. In addition, the centralisation of this system allows clearing operations to be carried out with greater ease. Finally, this centralisation can make it possible to fight more effectively against money laundering and possibly the financing of terrorism.

Specific Mechanisms Mobile money services that require a specific regulatory mechanism are fund deposits and withdrawals, fund transfers, bill payments and access to account information. The transfer of funds by mobile money is one of the services most requested by users, especially since low-income populations are the most concerned. But it poses many risks associated with the electronic form of this currency. Indeed, errors in data transmission (that is to say, an incorrect number and forgetting the password) and accounting errors resulting in balance discrepancies are all risks that undermine the reliability of the mobile money system. To guard against this, the related regulations must be geared towards the better functioning of the mobile money market and managing arbitrage situations. Indeed, establishing portability and interoperability is potentially the bearer of situations for which responsibility will have to be established. Consequently, establishing a clearinghouse will prevent overflow situations and ensure the stability of the electronic money market. The specificity of regulations is linked to the possibility of transferring money within the CEMAC region and outside. However, the current regulatory texts do not include international mobile money transfers. However, these movements of funds have an impact on exchange rate policy. Therefore, specific regulatory mechanisms must be implemented to avoid this state of affairs and protect the system of remittances existing in the economic community. Concerning the payment of invoices by mobile money, it should be noted that this service is more advantageous than the payment of invoices by the traditional banking system because of the immediacy of the transaction, subject to the effectiveness interoperability. However, this advantage is also a source of problems, similar to those mentioned during funds transfer. Because the contractors, like the receivers, need confirmation that the transaction has been completed. Hence the emergence of the risks of hacking, errors in data transmission, delays

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in the transmission of payment orders. The specific regulatory mechanisms must provide for a system that ensures the integrity of this process. This is precisely to identify the parties involved, set up special passwords and strengthen information protection by implementing encryption techniques, firewalls and so on.

Conclusion The emergence of electronic payments using mobile telephony infrastructure entails multi-faceted operational risks. State intervention is more than necessary, given increasing returns linked to telecommunications infrastructures and new risks linked to the interference of numerous non-­ financial agents in the traditional banking system. This chapter aimed to make proposals for improving the existing regulatory framework, which is insufficient, to bring out the efficiency gains expected from the use of mobile money in the CEMAC region. It emerges from this analysis that the supervisory function assigned to the BEAC and the COBAC cannot be carried out effectively since its current system confines it to the supervision of credit institutions, thereby abandoning the management of financial resources payment. In addition, all the technical parts are under the control of another institution, namely the telecommunications regulatory authority. Finally, this regulatory framework does not provide the regulator with a mechanism to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism through the channel of electronic money and, therefore, mobile money. Consequently, we propose considering the various challenges of mobile money regulation, namely the coordination of actions, establishing trust, managing means of payment and security. The regulatory framework migrates from the institutional approach implemented far towards the functional approach. It is precisely a matter of favouring two types of function: functions that require contractual relations and therefore be governed by commercial law and functions that require specific regulatory mechanisms. From this perspective, if the functions of currency conversion and reserve of values belong to the first category, the deposits and withdrawals of funds, the transfers of funds, the payment of invoices and the access to information on the account require inevitably specific regulations. In any case, the regulatory framework to be defined must better ensure the conduct of offering financial services on mobile, emphasising consumer protection, the fight against money laundering and financing of

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terrorism and the development prospects of this service. Such a regulatory framework for mobile money is likely to guarantee the payment system’s stability, reliability and integrity while promoting the financial inclusion of disadvantaged populations. Finally, we maintain that any regulation must be part of a dynamic of evolution to perpetuate the desired efficiency gains. Consequently, mobile money regulation must be defined to develop this service. By way of illustration, one objective could be to promote a transformation of mobile money accounts into current accounts, allowing users to carry out investment operations more easily.

References Bara, A. 2013. Mobile Money for Financial Inclusion: Policy and Regulatory Perspective in Zimbabwe. African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 5 (5): 345–354. BEAC. 2017. Etats des systèmes et moyens de paiement par monnaie électronique, Rapport d’activités de janvier-septembre. Yaoundé. ———. 2020. Etats des systèmes et moyens de paiement par monnaie électronique. Yaoundé: Rapport d’activités de novembre. Bernal, J. 2017. The Recent Law on E-money and Financial Inclusion in Colombia and the Regulatory Role of Central Bank. Journal of Payments Strategy & Systems 10 (4): 320–321. Chaix, L., and D. Torre. 2015. Le double rôle du paiement mobile dans les pays en développement. Revue Economique 66 (4): 703–727. GABAC. 2018. Les nouveaux moyens de paiement: Face aux défis de la lutte anti-­ blanchiment et contre le financement du terrorisme dans la zone CEMAC. GABAC, Rapport d’Août. Godeffroy, J.M., and P. Moutot. 2000. Monnaie électronique: Enjeux prudentiels et impacts sur la politique monétaire. Revue d’Economie Financière 53 (2): 21–37. GSMA. 2017. State of the Industry Report on Mobile Money: Decade Edition 2006–2016. GSMA. INTERPOL. 2020. Mobile Money and Organised Crime in Africa. INTERPOL. https://www.interpol.int/News-and-Events/News/2020/ Report-Criminals-infiltrating-Africa-s-booming-mobile-money-industry Kemp, R. 2013. Mobile Payments: Current and Emerging Regulatory and Contracting Issues. Computer Law & Security Review 4: 175–179. Klapper, L., A. Demirgüç-Kunt, D. Singer, and A. Ansar. 2021. Financial Inclusion, Digital Payments, and Resilience in the Age of COVID-19. Worl Bank Group, pp. 1–225.

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Lielieveldt, S.L. 1997. How to Regulate Electronic Cash: An Overview of Regulatory Issues and Strategies. The American University Law Review 46: 1163–1174. Mvogo, G. 2016. Thèse de Doctorat. In Conduite de la politique monétaire dans un contexte d’innovation financière en Union Monétaire: Une application au Cameroun, 1–217. Cameroun: Université de Dschang. Nyaga Kariuki, J. 2014. Mobile Banking Service in the East African Community (EAC): Challenges to the Existing Legislative and Regulatory Frameworks. Journal of Information Policy 4: 270–295. Onyango, G. 2021. Whistleblower Protection in Developing Countries: A Review of Challenges and Prospects. SN Business & Economics 1 (12): 1–30. Onyango, G., and J.O. Ondiek. 2022. Open Innovation during the COVID-19 Pandemic Policy Responses in South Africa and Kenya. Politics & Policy 00: 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12490. Randall, W.S. 1997. Regulating Electronic Money in Small-Value Payment Systems: Telecommunications Law as a Regulatory Model. Federal Communications Law Journal 49 (3): 701–729. Tagoe, N.A. 2016. Who Regulates the Mobile Money Operations by Telco’s? The need for an Effective and Robust Legislative and Regulatory Framework in Ghana. Journal of Business & Financial Affairs 5 (3): 1–4. Torre, D., and Q. Xu 2019. « La Chine aux avant-postes de la digitalisation des paiements ». Revue d’économie financière 3 (135): 99–114. World Bank database. 2021. World Development Indicators.

CHAPTER 16

Ethical Dilemmas in Public Innovations and ICT Solutions During COVID-19 in Kenya Japheth Otieno Ondiek and Gedion Onyango

Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic remains a catalyst for innovation and technology adoption in public administration. Besides efforts to ensure maximum vaccinations, African governments have introduced public innovations like digital vaccination notifications, contact tracing, smart devices and social distance tools to enhance the reduction of secondary transmission (Bawole and Langnel 2022; Onyango and Ondiek 2022; Bakibinga-Gaswaga, 2020). However, at the core of this progress lay little consideration for citizens’ and patients’ privacy globally and in African countries (Shekhawat et al. 2020; Bentotahewa et al. 2021). Still, the application of big data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT) during COVID-19 contributed to improving health care by allowing treatments

J. O. Ondiek (*) • G. Onyango Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9_16

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to be personalised, enabling clinical data to be collected beyond occasional patient-doctor visits, conducting clinical trials including mining patients data and recommending better management protocols. While this potentially strengthened responses to the COVID-19 outbreak in several ways, it posed ethical challenges related to technology. There were reports about and fears of the misuse of personal information and commoditisation of health data, misinformation and deepfakes, lack of oversight and acceptance of responsibility and abuse of sensor-based devices in health status tracking. This chapter discusses ethical dilemmas and violations around the recent use of digital technologies. These include digital security, privacy, over-tracking, over-surveillance, data management and implementation guidelines that cast doubts on their adoption. Even though the meaning of ethics remains contested, generally, we use it here to refer to a set of principles, rules and thinking that guides authority to act in a certain manner (Singer 1994). Menyah (2010) notes that ethics is about negative or positive values and gives honest public answers to hard questions about values. Preston and Samford (2000) noted that public sector ethics creates a situation where people make decisions and choices in public sector institutions, especially when faced with an ethical dilemma. Therefore, an ethical dilemma presents a complete set of principles in a given situation with undesirable or perplexing scenarios. Some common ethical dilemmas in the public sector include aspects of the code of conduct, personal values of public administrators, government directives versus professional ethics, policy dilemmas, nepotism, corruption and administrative discretion (Preston and Stanford 2000; Edwards 2001; Onyango 2022). Ethical dilemma in innovative environments presents a paradox for public servants simply because they are endowed to serve two masters: their own political consciousness and the political will of the day. Complexity from public bureaucracy, wicked systems, uncertainty and technological deficiencies pose wider dynamics and challenges to creativity and serendipity. Government administrative systems are traditionally structured in certain ways of operation (e.g. Onyango 2022). This includes the culture of administrative duties to citizens across the board. Any misfit or innovations that distort these norms and logic in operations completely offsets confusion, anxiety and the likelihood of underperformance (Menya 2010). Furthermore, the bureaucratic environments direct public administrators towards observing certain principles, including working in certain

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patterns and maintaining strategic directions. These strategies are scored quarterly or in annual appraisals. This means, any innovations that confront traditional delivery systems get into a mix of realities and introduce operational confusion, presenting an ethical dilemma to some extent. As governments transform into technological and digital organisations and design policy labs, there needs to be a new mindset and thinking. A framework that does not hide behind performance targets or complicates moral choices around innovation. It should equip civil servants with new skills. For example, as early as 1681, it was observed that innovations in governments are extremely dangerous because they present moral dilemmas and they are apolitical (Kattel 2019a, b). Jordan (2014) argued that ethical principles that govern public sector innovations should be similar to those governing research, as imperative in biomedical sciences. Since there are imperative innovative guidelines, what remains complicated is the environment where the public sector is expected to provide ethical procedures for innovation. In practice, one may ask whether such critical environments provide space for ethical innovation. Therefore, we assess whether crisis and critical moments provide ethical innovation opportunities. In essence, this chapter also raises pertinent scrutiny on the adoption, deployment and acceptance of techno-­ innovations introduced by public administrators and whether they present critical ethical dilemmas and likely ethical breaches. This chapter draws on an in-depth qualitative analysis of applications developed to enhance public institutions’ decisions on innovation and digital technology, paying attention to the ethical issues arising from their implementation. From preliminary analysis, a general framework for ethical dilemmas in innovation and IT deployment focus on privacy, safety and security, professional responsibility, transparency and accountability. The chapter proposes using a utilitarian theoretical framework to analyse the implementation and adoption of large-scale digital technologies during COVID-19. This framework presents new findings and insights on how digital technologies present an ethical dilemma for public administrators. The proceeding discussions are organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the public ethics literature to tease different ethical dilemmas. Section 3 discusses the implications of ethical dilemmas featured during leveraging ICTs to respond to COVID-19 in Kenya. Section 4 discusses the findings on ethical dilemmas in Kenyan public administration, and section 5 concludes the chapter.

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Ethical Dilemma in Public Service: A Review There has been a growing attention to developing practical ethical standards and frameworks around ICT applications in public innovation. This has generated several theories guided by complex ethical dilemmas. Theoretical development efforts have looked into the balance between the outcomes of leveraging ICTs and whether they comply or align with existing regulations or laws in the public sector. And whether rules and regulations upon which digital technologies are hinged are appropriate for their effective deployment. Another thing, the administrative culture of the public sector  also matters regarding technological adaptations. These concerns have been broadly covered within the teleological and deontological approaches to ethics. Ilona (2015) contends that teleological theories may ascertain what is ethically pertinent and logical within public sector decision-­making and the consequences, goals and purposes of agent acts. Teleological ethics theory assumes that every decision behind certain choices or conduct has to be framed as an assessment of respective outcomes (Ulrich 2012). According to Abderrahmane and Nur (2018), teleological ethics draws obligation from what is desirable or good to be attained in the end. It is also known as consequentialist ethics since it accepts utility as the basis for morality. The teleological theory looks into the principles of beneficence applied by public administrators to institute IT-related innovations and deployments to curb the pandemic. This perspective answers the question of what makes pleasure and pain. The promotion of the greatest happiness underpins the theory. However, the display of wrong promotes unhappiness, unending pain and deprivation of pleasure. Therefore, the teleological theory is based on the conviction that moral motives, rules and evaluation of actions are based on how much good they generate or how much bad is displayed and how they allow us to avoid it (Boss 2001; Velasquez 1988). For example, medical ethics is guided by four principles: beneficence, in which doctors should aim to benefit the patient, and autonomy, which is concerned with informal consent. There are also non-maleficence conditions Hippocratic Oath “first do no harm” and the principle of justice, which looks at equal treatment and fairness (Varkey 2021). The teleological group of theories emphasises the outcomes instead of the intent of individual behaviour (Gensler 2011). Teleology theory is hell-bent on prime basic duty to do the best that maximises the best consequences, including seeking the greatest balance of pleasure over unhappiness and pain for all those affected by our actions. The end game is that

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it does not matter what action has been taken to arrive at the end (Rallapalli et al. 1998). Teleological theories can be classified into ethical egoism, act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Public officials’ resolve to do good and probably lead the efforts of curbing the pandemic is driven by ethical perspectives of providing possible solutions as a decision maker and the inner desire to do well for the benefit of the majority. Riding on the pandemic, administrators attempt at least to generate the largest ratio of good over evil overrode the applicability of ethical principles in the ideal situation. What was applied by those in decision-making in accepting innovative systems and deploying IT solutions, including information sharing, was buoyed by the desire to achieve the greatest amount of good to benefit the suffering masses. Similarly, decision-making considered the principle of least harm deals in which the administrators considered to choose the least harm possible and to harm the least amongst the crowds. During the pandemic, knowingly or unknowingly, those authorities published COVID-19 health details of individuals on media and social sites without bearing the ramifications. Even though this might have been done without the intent of harm to pass lessons learnt to citizens on responsible mitigation strategies, it is ethically questionable regarding exposure to violation of individual privacy and data rights, which touch on deontological parameters of ethics. Such scenarios set by the predicaments amounted to an ethical dilemma among public administrators. Therefore, the obligation of the public officers to subscribe to the public good and yield the greatest benefits to most people is assumed to be ethically correct as per the accounts of the teleological and deontological theories. Deontological theories underscore the importance of rules and legislation undergirding ICT adoption—the process that leads to the results equally matters. Otherwise, evaluating the technological implications of public policy will be challenging. During innovation adoption in the public sector, the theory considers that the end of IT enrolment, choice or decision-making does not justify the means. To ensure this, Frankena (1973) articulated four criteria for promoting the principles of beneficence. These includes ensuring that administrators “ought not to inflict evil or harm.” Secondly, one ought to prevent evil or harm. Thirdly, one ought to remove evil or harm. Fourthly, one ought to do or promote good (Frankena 1973, p. 47). In the end, deontological approaches complement the teleological lacuna, which separates the achieved end of the result from the inflicted

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actions and decisions by which the ends were produced. Even so, some technological adaptations may occur under unclear legislation (or without a legal guideline), an issue that most African countries are still dealing with, given their generally weak regulatory regimes or loosely regulated public sector on ethical issues (see Onyango 2021). In the same way, deontological theory depends on the foreseen consequences derived from the majority. Therefore, balancing good and evil matters, even if it means exposing one’s health and individual data through breaching privacy. By quickly maximising the benefits of innovations and technology adoption for the masses through testing and recording personal health information and history, administrators were focused on identifying the greatest amounts for the greatest number of people in what is referred to as the greatest happiness principle. This trade-off concept was explicitly embraced for assessing the goodness of actions and the overall utility of a decision. Therefore, COVID-19 presented an unprecedented ethical dilemma for public organisations. They were caught between acting within existing legal frameworks and focusing on outcomes experienced elsewhere due to ICT-related responses to COVID-19. In some instances, government agencies developed new frameworks to provide the ethical landscape for leveraging ICTs during COVID-19. For example, Kenya’s National Community Health Digitization Strategy 2020–2025 may have been partly accelerated by its COVID-19 technological adoption and underlying ethical crises. Ethical Dilemma During the COVID-19 Pandemic The analyses of the social impact of IT deployment by public organisations during COVID-19 and the corresponding justification, including the formulation of policies for ethical use during the COVID-19 pandemic, are a requisite for ethical dilemmas due to the dynamics of difficult operating environments. In times of crisis and uncertainties, citizens expect that the success of governance should manifest through fair and just functionaries but with a high level of ethical conduct. This expectation emanates from the fact that all public functionaries should remain fair, open and impartial in all circumstances upon accepting government employment (e.g. Menyah 2010; CAPAM 2010). There has been considerable debate and proposals on improving services in the public sector. The rationale for the code of values and ethics has been summarised by Bozeman (2007), whose view is that the weak performance of public administrators results in the

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progressive failure of policy decisions. As a result, ethical standards in public service should nurture ethically responsible public administrators who are impartial, support equity in employment and ensure procedural fairness in all moral foundations (Ara and Islam 2019). Ideally, ethics considered the “soul and body” of the public administration, is the panacea to improved operational environments of the bureaucracy. It creates an environment to set policies and procedures, assign responsibilities and practices, ensure objectives are met, use resources responsibly and ensure accountability (ibid., 2019). Denhardt (1991) have argued that civil servants are endowed with a set of responsibilities and are expected to show the significance of ethical responsibility, including maintaining a level of integrity and morality that serves the interest of citizens while simultaneously demonstrating truthfulness and personal sense of responsibility. According to Ara and Islam (2019), ethical standards projected in public service can be influenced by individual ethical standards and the organisational arrangements and structures which maintain and develop ethical levels within the environment. Moreover, the ethical character of an individual can be tenuous and unpredictable, but the level of strong institutional pillars can virtually straighten and overcome an individual’s personality. The grand confusion in ethical dilemmas is confronted by push-and-pull factors at the individual and organisational levels. Along with other aspects of ethical dilemma, conflict of interest, favouritism, partiality in public service, bad administration and nepotism are some ethical concerns in public service. Therefore, an ethical dilemma found within the public service two folds. First is the individual ethical dilemma driven by inner self-doubts on the actions one is about to take. Second is an organisational dilemma where a department or government agency is pressured to act on a particular activity by its mandate to serve the public. Table 16.1 shows a set of ethical dilemmas in public administration. Today, ethical judgements in the public sector are fraught with peril. Professionals’ prescriptions regularly contradict the circumstances they encounter (CAPAM 2010). While the nature of public service is quickly changing, the policy proposals for addressing those conditions are usually familiar. For instance, the development of new financial derivatives is widely credited for precipitating the 2008–2009 recession. When the economic bubble exploded, new financial mechanisms were deployed by organisations, creating an over-leveraged state with devastating economic implications. Governments’ response has been to modify laws, although

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Table 16.1  Set of ethical dilemmas in public service Factors of ethical dilemma

The ethical situation during COVID-19 in Kenya

Individual ethical dilemma Organisational ethical dilemma

Driven by the hierarchy in decision-making to act in a certain way that benefits the citizens Responsibilities bestowed against organisations to act and deliver certain mandates force organisations to deliver actions in a manner that contravenes ethical standards. This could also be due to internal and external political pressure

Source: Author

legislation is usually seen as inadequate in addressing the underlying causes of leveraged situations of public ethics (Onyango 2019). This mismatch between novel issues and established solutions characterises a large portion of modern public service. For example, a look at global warming and Iraq’s insurgent war shows how unique situations are tackled using yesterday’s tactics. It is a cliché that the military has always been determined to face the preceding conflict in international relations. Thus, adopting tried-­ and-­true practices in public service stems from several essential characteristics of contemporary institutions. Today’s public service is characterised by constant innovation, insufficient resources, unpredictable outcomes and a low tolerance for mistakes. These takes place within complicated ethical environments of operations. With technological innovation, government agencies confront an ongoing need to address issues when resources dwindle, solutions fail and the public blames the government. Additionally, new circumstances emerge. The mapping of the human genome, the use of novel building materials, the use of nanotechnology and the growth of networked computation are unique situations that need experts’ creation and implementation of public policy (Berquist 1993). Public sector employees’ challenges come from adapting to changing circumstances (CAPAM 2010). This affects ethical reactions. We recognise that these experts must invent, but how can they do it in a way that builds on existing experience and knowledge? In other words, how can professionals adapt to continuous change while maintaining the skills and perspectives that constitute their profession?. Several interconnecting ideas may be applied in these instances. These are pragmatic and complex dynamic systems-related issues. Peirce, Holmes, James, Dewey and others

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established pragmatism as a different philosophy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to the massive changes sweeping across America and the necessity to confront that period’s discordant sources of knowledge (Menand 2001). West (1989) and Rorty (1982), for example, reintroduced pragmatism as a direct approach to the postmodern world’s contradictory conditions. At its heart, pragmatism emphasises the value, significance and need to focus on actual and specific circumstances as a prerequisite for living a responsible, informed and satisfied life. Practices and knowledge, concept and representation, the theoretical and the physical co-evolve and co-exist. One cannot exist without the other. According to Menand (2001), “Knowledge is an incidental result of [the] activity.” “Pragmatism supports the nominalist’s emphasis on particulars, the utilitarian’s emphasis on what is helpful, and the positivist’s disdain of metaphysical theorising and purely verbal answers to issues” (Menand 2001, pp. 350–351). For professionals confronted with ethical dilemmas in a changing environment, pragmatism has various traits that might aid in conflict resolution. Pragmatism emphasises the interconnectedness and contingent complexity of decisions, as seen in change processes. A proper approach under one set of facts may be incorrect under another set of conditions. The context must guide the choices, with the practical implications of the specific situation serving as a guide. As a consequence, knowledge is derived through experience and reflection. False and misleading knowledge is defined as that which is not founded on genuine experience. Such a context-based worldview emphasises the repercussions of choices over intentions. According to Bernstein (1992), pragmatism recognises the relevance of knowledge as relational by rooting judgement in actuality. Understanding is contingent on specific societal circumstances rather than some abstract, theoretical notion. These qualities can influence professionals’ ethical choices in a variety of ways. To begin, choices would be directed by concrete, actual consequences as a yardstick for ethical behaviour. Our initial focus is on the significance of the choice’s distinctiveness. According to Dewey (1990, p. 448; Baumane-Vitolinaa et al. 2016), “Morals are methods of acting that have been developed to deal with certain situations.” Secondly, ethical judgement is informed by considering the implications of the particular situation: “To act ethically is to conduct most finely or prudently possible.” According to Dewey (1990) path of action necessitates thought. He believed that the emphasis on utilising pragmatism to guide morals also

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plays to the strengths of professionals: “Values are concerned with the resolution of difficulties, the adjustment of means to ends, and the safeguarding of enjoyments that arise from reflectively regulated experiences.” This focus on the practical also stems from relational experience, which connects decisions to concrete outcomes. Professionals must demonstrate their abilities via action and contemplation. According to Peirce (1990, pp. 226–227; Thorne, 1994), “What a guy truly thinks is what he is willing to act upon and risk a great deal for.” Pragmatism teaches professionals to abandon pursuing a single unchanging concept and instead jump in, think and act. According to Menand (2001, p. 350), “The true difficulty is determining what is, given the particular situation before you, the correct thing to do or the truthful thing to say.” Professionals must continuously evaluate their obligations in the context of knowledge and practice progress so that specific circumstances guide the ethical decisions they are compelled to make. Managing this interaction and guiding the profession’s reaction is the fundamental ethical issue that government service professionals face in complicated situations. Pragmatism provides an experience-based, outcome-oriented framework for making ethical choices in the face of complexity. And which undergirds technological adoption dilemmas in the public sector. The next section looks into ICTs adoption in Kenya and its underlying ethical dimensions.

Adoption of ICT in Kenya During COVID-19: Ethical Implications Several digital technologies and innovations have occurred since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. These include the IoTs, AIs, Blockchain, Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Virtual Reality (VR), 5G Technology, and big data have been implemented to mitigate and tackle the pandemic (Ahmed et al. 2020; Myers and Miller 1996; Li et al. 2021; Elliot et al. 2020). The first quarter of 2020 saw an upsurge in technology use in Kenya due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike in the first quarter of 2019, mobile online activity increased more rapidly in the first quarter of 2020, when Kenyans, government agencies and companies underwent significant changes in their interactions due to the epidemic and shutdowns. According to Economist (2020), state agencies

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have had to swiftly devise new methods for retaining personnel who offer services to the general population from home, sustaining connections with suppliers, and servicing customers with little physical touch, if feasible. Following the onset of COVID-19, the government implemented new strategies for connecting with residents to provide government services and participation. Individuals continue to invent novel modes of social connection and consumption that need little physical touch. However, the extent to which technology is used highly depends on a country’s financial level. As a developing country, Kenya has demonstrated a lesser reliance on technology in reaction to COVID-19. For example, mobile internet use, a proxy for the use of mobile technology, increased faster in the first quarter of 2020 in most countries than in the first half of 2019. However, the adoption of technological solutions confronts many challenges and barriers have been realised in the use of smart devices, proximity apps and social distance apps due to poor signal strengths, limited access to the internet, inadequate infrastructural support, poor digital literacy and skills and poor ICT adoption culture (Onyango and Ondiek 2021, 2022). IoT adoption presents privacy and rights concerns. Data security and collected data are transferred through connected user devices in peer-to-peer or third-party applications for decision-making. An ethical dilemma arises from the adoption perspective, where IoT devices must be available on demand and accessible to all citizens. Therefore, cost and difficulty in using IoT and computational efficiency create hurdles for universal adoption. Even though the issue of ethical maladministration is underrated in a global context, there have been concerted efforts to approach socio-­ethical perspectives with an emphasis on mobile technology firms to practice ethical mannerisms (Caiden 1991; Onyango 2022). In particular and during the COVID-19 era, mobile companies in Kenya were involved in disseminating unsolicited COVID-19 related messaging to subscribers. The manner in which ethical implications and privacy of individuals on the use of technology and the challenges these ethical problems pose to the individuals requires deeper conversation with citizens, their organisations such as Civil Sociery Organisations  and ethical restrictions by authorities. The unsolicited messaging by mobile operators to pass critical information on creating order equally presents ethical dilemmas both to individuals’ rights to privacy. The Kenyan Data Protection Act of 2019 gives effects to the rights of data privacy and restrictions on further processing of data to maintain safeguards and protect personal data. However, in the light of

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exemptions, the government may be exempted to infringe on the data of individuals based on the assessment of national security or public order (Kenya Data Protection Act 2019). Accordingly, (Ware 1993, p. 205; Weber 1996) asserts that while social responsibility is confined to the right to privacy, the government has the right to gather personal and private information from citizens with the sole intention of ensuring order and harmony in society. Numerous government organisations have also explored innovative technologies in response to the health issue, most notably with digital financial services. For instance, the government temporarily removed taxes on mobile transactions and payments. It increased the number of mobile currency transactions permitted, resulting in a considerable rise in peer-to-peer transactions in value and volume (Bester and Carboni May 19th 2020). Additionally, according to Brown (2020), the government has launched five robots capable of delivering food and drugs and monitoring the temperature of 50–150 individuals per minute, assisting in limiting exposure of COVID-19 to health care staff. Jeune (2020) notes that numerous government organisations have benefited from telecommuting technologies such as Microsoft Teams, Skype and Zoom, allowing 95 per cent of their headquarters personnel to work remotely. According to Jeune (2020), government agencies rely on video-conferencing programs to enable about 80 per cent to 60 per cent of employees to work remotely, hoping that this arrangement may be sustained in part beyond the crisis. COVID-19 has presented unfamiliar grounds and raised many ethical challenges in healthcare systems and critical care resources. While policies for pandemics differ by applicable law, institutions and health system, the agreement is that patients should be treated to survive as first-order considerations (McGuire et  al. 2020). Equally, debates continue as to what administrative and clinical measures should be taken to determine what is ethically appropriate. Globally, bioethics and health administrators have been overworking to develop appropriate capacity and criteria to handle the influx of patients during the pandemic and help allocate decisions. For example, it is ethically draining for administrations in critical health care institutions in COVID-19 treatments and clinical judgements using ethical guidance on allocating scarce resources. In the United States for example, the Association of Bioethical Program Directors reviewed the ethical challenges with Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) save for adults and Pediatric Logistic Organ Dysfunction (PELOD) for

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children to estimate the probability of patients’ short-term into computing devices to help in decision-making. Such innovation and systems are likely to raise issues on prognosis accuracy and whether they are ethically accepted and fair. In the deployment of contact tracing apps, the government of Kenya deployed a libertarian approach which was not very straightforward. Attempts by the government to put contact tracing apps to enter private and public spaces or use public transport were not morally acceptable but were voluntary. An  increase in epidemiological surveillance increased data collection from individuals through digital traces, leaving harmful effects. The sophisticated IT systems and search engines have made it easy to detect respiratory illness in  local communities through early warning systems. Social networks have also upgraded and can help provide early warnings of vaccine refusal, while citizens’ movements and traces have been eased with the involvement of phone network data (Lucivero et al. 2020). Hildebrandt and Tielemans (2013) note that technologies should be designed so that ethical norms, values and legal principles are inbuilt. The inbuilt limitations should be able to check the excesses in times of crisis. Lucivero (2020) emphasises that governments require genuine deliberations that include experts, ethicists, human rights advocates and affected groups to create legal, organisational and institutional measures that are favourable and neutral to humanity. The application of geo-location and reference sites, WI-FI or Bluetooth signals to collect data remains universally petrifying as to whether data collected during the pandemic would be decentralised, stored locally on centralised databases run by health authorities and governments. Ostensibly, data minimisations, consent and data protection are all measures that legal and ethically conscious public administrators should be concerned with. It is also clear that when the pandemic was at its peak, public officers were under pressure with unclear and uncoordinated events that were acted on in an emotive structure. This reactionary stature was conditioned by hastened decision-making informed by global, continental and national trends of COVID-19 escalation. Data and statistics from health officials triggered most decisions. With no clear direction on medication apart from guidelines of standard measures instituted by WHO, governments across the board dedicated their support for mostly local and global innovations to try and combat the COVID-19 spread. The decisions arrived by the administrative states, public officials and health experts were regarded

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with utmost faith and were believed to have the potential to help scale down the spread of COVID-19. In this regard, decision-making and impromptu adoption of every means were approved in Kenyan public media briefings, including hastily solicited emergency meetings. Under undue pressure, specific public institutions, governments and departments were roped in to accepting technological innovations and endorsing them without the scrutiny of privacy, intellectual propriety rights, trademarks and security features. The extent of events and the nature of irreversibility, coupled with a general lack of consultation or acceptance among the citizens, confront the guilt of whether ethical considerations were adhered to in adopting and rolling out innovative solutions for combating the pandemic. The next section discusses the findings on ethical dilemmas in Kenyan public administration.

Findings and Discussions of Ethical Dilemma Implications Despite possible ethical benefits from integrated innovations and IT deployment during the COVID-19 pandemic, several ethical concerns emerge from the public administration perspective. Our discussions on this state of affairs consider key topical themes corresponding to ethical practices and dilemmas. Kenyan administrators were confronted with ethical dilemmas over existing infrastructures and access to the population. When deploying proximity tracing, the public administration should ensure that all public members can assess and have sufficient technological infrastructure to safeguard ethical use. First, the country was never ready and did not have widespread diffusion of internet, smartphones and internet access hence locking some out. Secondly, there needs to be a certain level of trust in government. Otherwise, the public is unlikely to use the application. Thirdly, the public must clearly understand how such technologies are used and be well informed. Despite these obstacles, the Kenyan government, corporations and people have employed disruptive technologies to respond to the issue. Examining how technological innovations were used in Kenya during the emergency indicates a diverse range of responses. Most prominently, smart social distance monitoring through IoMT smart devices has been used to enhance COVID-19 monitoring, quarantine, compliance, screening and

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social distance guidelines. In Kenya, for example, IoMT has been used to disrupt technological innovations through AI-based health monitoring devices. In addition, Smart infrared thermometers, smart face shields, pervasive mobile apps, location-based tracking technologies and smart computing devices  have been used to obtain real-time personal health data (Swayamsiddha and Mohanty 2020). In essence, IoMT devices have been instrumental in epidemiological modelling, evaluating public health measures and monitoring the virus spread. In addition, they have enhanced mobile health, telemedicine, telecare, remote monitoring of patients and diagnosis of diseases, telenursing and teleconsultations (see Swayamsiddha and Mohanty 2020). However, the implementation of digital tools has been affected by human behaviour, technical glitches and environmental factors. In some cases, the accuracy and reliability of infrared thermometers have been questioned as they may be influenced by external environmental temperature variables (Elliot et al. 2020; Wadvalla 2020). As a result of the health emergencies, many Kenyan public hospitals have delivered online health care swiftly, authorities have lifted limitations on telemedicine and consumers have welcomed the innovation, many for the first time. Additionally, the Kenyan government has adopted digital proximity technologies to confront the mitigation of COVID-19. However, the digital tools are upfront to raising ethical and privacy concerns for policymakers, stakeholders and citizens. Despite ethical concerns, governments did not consider how to implement and develop digital proximity tracking technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic. According to WHO (2020), contact tracing entails the process of assessing, identifying and managing people who have been exposed to conditions for onward transmission. The application of contact tracing is meant to break the chain of transmission in controlling infectious diseases. To ensure the effectiveness of contact tracing, digital technology was employed in various sectors to help manage COVID-19 transmission and spread. WHO (2020) notes that for the surveillance system to be effective, they need to be accompanied by transparency, responsive concerns to communities and effective privacy concerns. Proximity tracking is meant to determine the strength of the closeness between two gadgets (e.g. smartphones) to determine whether users have spread the virus from infected to unaffected persons. If one is affected, the other can be notified to take appropriate steps and quarantine to reduce health risks.

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Digital proximity tracking, however, faces limitations since it cannot replace outreach and contact tracing face-to-face or over the phone, including the inability to capture which users may acquire COVID-19. Even though data generated could assist in future pandemics and epidemics, data management may threaten liberties and human rights, thus posing an ethical dilemma. Therefore, there is a need for oversight mechanisms in disease surveillance, laws and policies that use digital proximity. Further, the ethical dilemma concerning fundamental rights and privacy of citizens is theoretical when the government involves the private sector to help collate, collect and analyse data harvested. Private sector institutions might commercialise the process by prominently integrating their architecture within public health infrastructure, including misuse of personal data for private interest and commercial exploitation. Therefore, public administrators must ensure technical specifications promote and preserve ethical values, privacy and transparency. Table  16.2 presents the framework for ethical consideration of innovations and IT during COVID-19. Table 16.2  Framework for ethical considerations on innovations and IT in COVID-19 Ethical principles

Ethics issues and conformity

Time limitation

It is within the powers of government operations to ensure that data is time-bound and discarded after use. Data collection needs to conform with law and should be justifiable, necessary and suitable to achieve the intended goal. Public administration should ensure no sale and use of collected data for commercial purposes or advertising activism. Sharing data with third parties not involved in health responses should be prohibited. Data collection and processes need to be concise, user-friendly and transparent. Risk prescription should be provided, including an algorithms model developed. Governments and third parties should conform to expectations of privacy, whether data is centralised or decentralised. There should be high security, including encryption of personal data on any device, network or server. Reliable algorithms need to be verified for assessing and processing data. There is a need for such applications to be open for testing by third parties to establish risk models. Accountability protection and safeguards against misuse and abuse should be in place. Government must inform the public about COVID-19-related measures to retain, use and aggregate data.

Proportionality User restrictions

Transparency and explainability Privacy-preserving data storage Security Accuracy

Accountability

Source: Authors

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Regarding privacy, personal data and information during IT systems’ deployment attracted ethical attention and primary concerns regarding decisions related to data sharing. During this period, there was active data sharing and management of COVID-19 information for physicians, researchers, funding agencies and governments to mop up together in developing therapeutics, vaccines, drugs and analytical methods for the treatment and prevention of the diseases. COVID-19 pandemic information includes electronic patient health records, biorepositories, ongoing clinical trials, COVID-19 outbreak tracking records, guidelines, regulations and policies. The Ethical dilemma arising from the adoption of contact tracing included whether advocating for compulsory adoption would work for all groups in society. Secondly, most of the population with no phone capable of downloading and installing the apps would remain discriminated against and treated unfairly. Thirdly, the process would inequitable expose the most vulnerable and COVID-19-positive patients to public lynching should the app detect positive results for those with COVID-19 in public spaces or public service vehicles. Therefore, the confusion and panic or somewhat false alarms triggered by the app could eventually lead to victimisation. Transparency, oversight and accountability in contact tracing also remain fluid. Public administrators never gave the citizens clarity about the aspects of how the app works, what kind of data is collected, the individuals who have access to the data, modalities, and the extent of data to be collected. There was unclear information on algorithms and data training sets installed in the app that would influence and automate the process. The contact tracing apps remain glaring since the privacy and protection of users’ data are not well addressed and guaranteed. Accordingly, the government must develop transparent governance and organisational infrastructure around contact tracing apps (Lucivero et al. 2020). The efficacy and use of digital surveillance apps designed for pandemic containment is another dilemma that Kenyan public administrators are grappling with. Efficacy use of an app is premised on the assumption that the public will be able to use the apps appropriately. However, assumptions about the acceptability and lack of adaptability by those who cannot afford to remain dare. This creates social inequality among the public and drives isolation among certain groups. When public administrators fail to

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recognise and address such inequality in the deployment of contact tracing and other data collection apps, systems are bound to create what it is not intended to do. When deploying such systems, many public administrators assume that behavioural inequalities, effectiveness, practicability, affordability and equity drive technological responses towards ethical challenges. During the pandemic, it became apparent that data security was threatened due to the uncoordinated deployment of technological devices for use in various capacities. In addition, at the peak of COVID-19, massive rollouts and enforcements of IT infrastructure for ensuring employees work at home exposed the public administrator’s unpreparedness in terms of knowledge and skills in technology use. Technology’s consequences became more important, forcing governments and organisations to provide cyber-safe remote working in both private and government offices. Public administrators did not take a keen interest in protecting and considering data security on the ethical front. Due to this tactic, the spike in cyberattacks was evident due to the rule of the “bring your own device approach” instead of the “Corporate Owned Personally Enabled” COPE approach. Working from home guaranteed government employees’ use of personal devices (e.g. tablets and phones) to access corporate information. This must have created a dilemma for government data since most employees do not have sophisticated detection and enterprise prevention measures. Moreover, home WI-FI networks and devices are easy to attack. For example, increased firewall software, computers, internet and video conferencing platforms generated new challenges. It was exploited by cybersecurity threats, including breaches in passwords, social media messaging, malicious websites, names and email addresses. Summary of innovative technologies proposed in COVID-19 and ethical dilemma experienced by public administrators (Table 16.3). Following the above technologies in Table 16.3, public administrators have found themselves in unfamiliar territories where they must navigate through wicked problems associated with governance to implement strategies for mitigating the COVID-19 pandemic. Unprecedented structural and internationalism management of the pandemic has further brought confusion on what to adopt and how to manage the restless citizens dependent on government support properly. Equally, regulatory authorities, including World Health Organisation (WHO), non-governmental organisations (NGO) and health ministries, have provided solidarity in the provision of health emergencies. Therefore, trade-offs and compassionate

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Table 16.3  Technology applications and ethical dilemma framework Technology

Main applications

Public administrator’s ethical dilemma and challenges

Internet of Things Collecting real-time data from (IoT) people infected with COVID19 by creating a network of electronic communication tools and using Wi-Fi technology protocols and standards to establish the communication link between computing devices; IEEE802.11ax, IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.11b.

Drones

IoT adoption presents data security, privacy and rights concerns since collected data are transferred through connected user devices in peer-peer or third-party applications for decision- making. An ethical dilemma arises from the adoption perspective, where IoT devices must be available on demand and accessible to all citizens. Cost and difficulty in IoT and computation efficiency create hurdles for universal adoption. Ethics decisions surrounding the implementation of IoT include privacy concerns, data security, lack of transparency. Drones were used to supply In COVID-19, the consideration of medicine, laboratory samples the utilitarian approach outweighs of patients and transportation privacy and safety concerns. of food. However, the ethical implications of In high-risk incubation centres, complete autonomy interventions drones were used to disinfect invade personal privacy and space hospital premises and high-risk using videos and cameras without rooms. people’s consent (Wilson 2014). Public administrators need to explore the line between privacy and security. This examines ethical issues around safety before using utilitarian and rights tests to explore ethical lines of medical and domestic surveillance since some data collection from surveillance violates persons’ privacy, justice and human rights. (continued)

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Table 16.3 (continued) Technology

Main applications

Public administrator’s ethical dilemma and challenges

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based applications

AI applications are widely used in surveillance and tracking applications in mobile phones in the fight against COVID19, including sharing real-time data and information about the pandemic with scientists, researchers and practitioners, for example, proximity tracing apps. AI is also used in developing vaccines and COVID-19 drugs using AI-based algorithms. AI was also applied in the social media management of COVID-­19 to address public concerns and questions and increase the use of chatbots. Mainly used as non-risk body temperature capture, including collecting real-time data for entry and exit points for COVID-19 screening.

The ethical dilemma in deploying AI systems corresponds to the digital divide between those who have smartphones and those who do not, especially the elderly, who are the most vulnerable. Notably, all AI-based algorithms are biased since it is impossible to be fair for all their attributes. Data security and privacy-related issues also raise concerns in implementation. Other ethical decision includes; consent, data transparency, beneficence and over-surveillance.

Non-contact infrared digital thermometer

Public administrators have the ethical dilemma of allowing unprofessional health care personnel to conduct the screening, which violates the public’s privacy. Many infrared digital thermometers read body temperature and display it on public screens, which exposes one’s private health status. Also, the device is prone to fluctuations in reading due to variable atmospheric environmental temperature and humidity (Crossley 2020). Ethical decisions and issues in implementations includes;over-­ surveillance, data transparency, data integrity and beneficence. (continued)

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Table 16.3 (continued) Technology

Main applications

Public administrator’s ethical dilemma and challenges

Digital disinfection booths/tunnels

Are Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) sensor-based sanitation booths that can detect an individual in real-time, including reading the body temperature and disinfection the whole body using sanitizer sprayed through nozzles within 10 seconds.

Single device installation is expensive, affecting beneficence as an integral ethical value. The device can affect one’s health as it can spill sanitizer into one’s mouth and eye, complicating one’s health. It also exposes persons’ temperature readings accessible to the public, undermining privacy, personal autonomy, beneficence and lack of transparency.

Source: Authors

appeals are made to save lives in such situations. In line with utilitarianism’s ethical philosophy, there is a need to maximise the benefits. Even though deontological and utilitarian approaches are essential in tackling COVID-19, public administrators should strive to apply ethical and moral values in integrating technologies in future pandemics.

Conclusions The COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to relook into ethical dynamics and issues that must be addressed in implementing digital technologies moving forward. Innovation and deployment of digital technologies are paramount in mitigating the impact of diseases like COVID-19 but this may come at a higher price of sacrificing individual rights and privacy. Therefore, they should be carefully introduced to avoid political and administrative violations of public ethics, practices and regulatory policies. Public administrators and regulatory authorities need to be responsible for crafting ethical guidelines and policies, implementation and ethical digital strategies guiding the development and integration of emerging technologies into health systems. Public administrators should enhance risk assessments and planning before integrating innovative technologies to mitigate COVID-19. Moreover, societal integration and acceptance should be the responsibility of public administrators. Proper advocacy training and proportional standards must be followed sufficiently, including frequently engaging potential users and developers.

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To neutralise the ethical dilemma associated with deploying digital proximity in mostly  unregulated environments, public administrators must be transparent to ensure that citizens’ levels of confidence, trust and uptake are improved. In addition, there needs to be ethical  measurements and indicators of impact and effectiveness to enhance public trust and confidence in public institutions. Assessing effectiveness is a sure recipe for helping to determine if the public health impact achieved is proportional to the trade-off of privacy. Therefore, we identified digital technologies and innovations introduced during the pandemic, developed a generic framework focusing on the ethical dilemma and centred on beneficence, security, privacy, human dignity, autonomy and transparency.

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Index1

A Accountability, 2, 8, 19, 21, 39, 54, 86, 91–93, 137, 139, 148, 194, 199, 228, 264, 266, 271, 282, 288, 292–294, 299–337, 345, 350, 353, 354, 387, 391, 401 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC), 213 African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms, 20, 149, 280, 293, 294 African Development Bank (AfDB), 3, 30, 73, 77 African governance, 3, 42, 88, 94, 108–109 African Ministerial Council on Science and Technology (AMCOST), 35 African public policy, 3

African Union (AU), 18, 35, 36, 183, 185, 187 African Union Fourth Industrial Revolution strategy, 35 Africa’s Science and Technology Plan of Action, 35 Africa Union Commission, 234 Afrobarometer, 135, 136, 271, 283 Agenda 2030, 6, 14, 17, 19, 249 Agenda 2063, 6, 14, 17, 19, 36, 183, 187, 219, 233–235, 238, 240, 242, 248, 249 Agricultural extension services, 188, 192 Agricultural policy, 17, 18, 183–205 Agricultural Policy Practice Index (APPI), 190, 193 Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP-II), 192

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Onyango (ed.), Public Policy and Technological Transformations in Africa, Information Technology and Global Governance, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18704-9

411

412 

INDEX

Artificial Intelligence (AI), 4, 8, 44, 68–70, 72, 74–75, 80, 85, 93, 271, 385, 394 B BankTechs, 7 Big Data, 4, 16, 44, 67, 69, 74–75, 79, 80, 86, 87, 96, 98, 136, 141, 163, 186, 268, 282, 385, 394 Biometrics, 15, 16, 115–130 Bitcoin, 8, 243, 245 Blockchain, 4, 69, 86, 243, 394 Business Process Outsourcing (BPO), 46, 162, 164, 168, 169, 172, 174, 220 C Cambridge Analytica scandal, 87, 92 Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), 22, 367–382 Chang, Ha-Joon, 30 Child labour, 213, 228 Child Protection Information Management System (CPMIS), 18, 19, 211, 226, 231 Child Rights International Network (CRIN), 213 CISCO, 170, 175, 176 Cities Coalition for Digital Rights, 92, 93, 109 Citizenship citizen agency, 9, 20, 257–276 citizen engagements, 8, 11, 135, 262, 275, 282, 302, 306, 308, 332, 334 citizen participation, 2, 5, 12, 13, 19–22, 139, 142, 270, 274, 282, 308, 309, 345, 352, 354 civic activism, 7, 8, 20

CivicTech, 1–23, 32, 135 cryptocurrencies, 8, 236, 243 Civil society, 8, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 96, 106, 109, 140, 144, 241, 257, 261, 262, 271, 275, 276, 302, 334, 349 Civil society organisations (CSOs), 145, 223, 228, 263, 273, 274, 276, 302, 304, 309, 311, 312, 316, 317, 327, 330, 334, 335 Climate-smart agriculture (CSA), 189–191 Competency-Based Curriculum (CBC), 270–273 Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), 186, 188, 196, 197, 201 Conference of Ministers of Education of the African Union (COMEDAF), 35 Co-production, 10, 119 Cost-Benefit Analysis, 139 COVID-19 pandemic, 10, 35, 47, 68, 69, 72, 73, 75, 77, 141, 168, 213, 225, 368, 385, 390–394, 398, 399, 402, 405 COVID-19 vaccines, 3, 141, 285, 286 Crowdfunding, 8, 10, 22, 163, 237 Crowd-sourced data, 86 Cybersecurity, 35, 127, 402 D Data management, 192, 386, 400 Data mining, 76, 386 Data revolution, 94–99, 109 Decentralisation policy, 19, 21, 22, 343–358 Deepfakes, 281, 282, 292, 294, 386

 INDEX 

Democracy, 2, 8, 34, 93, 136, 138, 174, 258, 261–263, 288, 302, 304, 308 Democratisation, 33, 120, 263, 336, 343 Deontological ethics, 388, 389 Development administration (DA), 37, 39 Digital Adoption Index (DAI), 31, 32 Digital agriculture, 186 Digital business platforms, 233–249 Digital Civic Engagement (DCE), 136 Digital colonialism, 94, 109 Digital commons, 15, 88, 99, 109 Digital divide, 11, 17, 20, 22, 57, 62, 69, 80, 86, 92, 149, 150, 163, 165–166, 171, 177, 187, 204, 260, 280, 291, 293, 294, 350, 351, 357, 358 Digital economy, 17, 19, 44, 129, 161–177, 236, 237, 240, 241, 249, 368 Digital entrepreneurs, 163 Digital exhaust, 87, 98 Digitalisation Developmental Network State, 43 digital era, 15 digital government, 8, 9, 45, 346, 353 Digital Mobile Africa (DMA), 198, 199 Digital money, 12, 240 Digital Principles for Development, 15, 88–94, 96, 98, 99, 108, 109 Digital publics, 135, 136, 138 Digital Rights Hub, 94 Digital security, 386 Digital skills index (DGI), 34 Digital tools, 15, 67, 88, 137, 190, 247, 399 Digital transformation, 11, 29–62, 162, 163, 168, 176, 186, 187, 241, 336, 346

413

DigitalTransport4Africa, 15, 85–110 Disinformation, 20, 259, 281, 282, 292, 294 Disruptive innovations, 67–78 Domestic revenue mobilisation (DRM), 19, 234, 239, 248 Drones, 2, 44, 69, 72, 75–77 E Early pregnancies, 310 E-government e-administration, 116, 128 e-budgeting, 16, 17, 136–138, 141–143, 147, 148, 150, 151 e-business platforms, 238, 239 E-health, 50 electronic money, 367–382 e-payments, 235, 367, 372, 381 Ethical dilemma, 22, 23, 87, 385–406 F Facebook, 87, 241, 258, 260, 267, 268, 271, 275, 279–281, 283–289, 293 Farmers Digital Savings Solution (FDSS), 197 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 213, 229 Financing and Resource Mobilisation Strategy (RMS), 234, 248 FinTechs, 1–23, 32, 233–242, 249 Foreign aid, 30 Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs), 54, 239, 248 Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR), 4–15, 17, 22, 33, 36, 55, 67, 69–72, 78, 79 Freeman, John, 30, 32, 40 French Development Agency (AFD), 99, 108

414 

INDEX

G Gender-based violence (GBV), 284, 285 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 87 Global Health Security (GHS) Index, 273 Global positioning system (GPS), 73, 87, 95, 96, 247 Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), 247 Google, 62, 98, 165 Government to business (G2B), 347 Government to employee (G2E), 347 Government to government (G2G), 347 GovTech, 1–23, 32, 33, 44, 53, 55, 58, 137, 346 GPS-enabled mobile phones, 87, 96 H HealthIT, 18, 212 Health systems, 61, 300, 302–309, 396, 405 High-speed broadband networks, 162 HIV-AIDS, 216, 219, 301, 308, 310, 322–325 Human rights, 218, 293, 302, 304, 397, 400 Huntington, Samuel, 30 Hybrid system, 12 I ICT infrastructures, 13, 17, 19–21, 45, 46, 54, 60, 62, 162, 169, 171, 173, 174, 177, 194, 221, 230, 356 Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs), 19, 22, 233–249 Industry 4.0, 4, 36

Informal Savings Mechanism (ISM), 197 Information, Communication and Technology (ICT), 2, 3, 6, 18, 21–23, 44, 47, 53–55, 57, 58, 62, 115, 116, 136, 141, 149, 162, 164, 166–171, 173, 174, 176, 183–186, 188, 190–196, 198, 201, 202, 205, 220–223, 230, 231, 235, 257, 259, 301, 304, 343, 344, 346, 353, 355, 358, 385–406 Information mapping, 69 Instagram, 279, 280, 283, 284, 286, 288, 293 Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS), 150, 350, 351 Integrity, 23, 246, 379, 381, 382, 391 International Business Machines (IBM), 62, 98, 165 International Development Partners, 6, 14, 17, 36, 42, 99 International NGOs (INGOs), 228 International Open Data Charter, 15, 90, 91, 109 Internet of Things (IoT), 4, 8, 44, 69, 70, 86, 385, 394, 395 Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 54, 289 Inter-organisational policy implementation, 219 iTax, 221 L Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), 35 LendTechs, 8, 17, 18 Local Content Policies, 42 Local Content Programme, 220 Local governance, 352 Local governments (LGs), 19, 21, 22, 47, 55, 106, 261, 311, 343, 345–352, 354–358

 INDEX 

M Machine to Machine Communications (M2M), 4, 8, 17 machine learning, 68–70, 72, 74–75 Microsoft Teams, 396 Misinformation, 20, 87, 259, 281, 282, 292, 294, 386 Mobile devices, 73, 165, 188, 300, 320 Mobile Money, 2, 3, 8, 10, 12, 22, 23, 43, 127, 167, 197, 198, 235, 238–240, 242, 367–370, 373–382 Mobile network operator (MNO), 196, 198 Mobile telephony, 70, 72–74, 368, 373, 381 MobiSAfAIDS, 21, 299–337 Money laundering, 22, 127, 235, 245, 367, 373, 375, 378, 380, 381 Monitoring and evaluation (M & E), 4, 68, 74–76, 80, 187, 199, 203, 205, 211, 228, 270, 317 M-Pesa, 240 Multinational Enterprises (MNCs), 44 N National Development Plan (NDP), 10, 44, 54, 173, 221 National Electronic Security system, 355 National identity cards (NIC), 44, 116, 118, 120–122, 124, 125 National Innovation Systems (NIS), 6, 34, 50 New Public Administration (NPA), 37, 39 New Public Management (NPM), 38

415

Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 17–19, 108, 143, 148, 176, 190, 223, 227, 262, 301, 402 O Online child abuse, 216 Open Budget Survey (OBS), 141, 144–146, 151 Open Data, 16, 88–92, 96–100, 103, 106, 108, 109, 136, 141 Open government, 2, 16, 86 Open innovation, 88, 103 Open Street Map, 90 Optic Fibre Internet Backbone, 14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 149, 163, 169, 240, 241, 246, 345, 346 Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC), 18, 223, 228, 231 P PARIS AIDS summit declaration, 308 Participatory budgeting, 135–151 Paytechs, 8 Pediatric Logistic Organ Dysfunction (PELOD), 396 Persons with disabilities, 49, 99 Public administration, 1, 6, 9, 10, 23, 32, 37, 209, 385, 387, 391, 398 Public authority, 8, 39, 40, 103, 118, 130, 257 Public budget, 135–137, 140, 146 Public ethics, 387, 392, 405 Public Finance Management Reform (PFMR), 148, 150 Public innovation, 2, 10–12, 14, 22, 87, 385–406

416 

INDEX

Public policy policy analysis, 2, 4 policy entrepreneurship, 4, 5, 12, 13, 19 policy evaluation, 4, 14, 205, 211, 270 policy implementation, 11, 18, 177, 190, 209–231, 269–273, 275, 353 policy instruments, 4, 13, 16, 18, 116, 119, 121, 122, 212, 283 policymaking, 4, 11, 16, 18–20, 135–151, 185, 188, 191, 193, 204, 205, 219, 257–276, 279–294 policyTechs, 1–23, 33, 212, 220–224 policy tools, 2, 4, 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, 22, 136, 212, 220–225, 257 public interest technologies, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17, 19, 32, 33, 117 Public-private partnerships (PPPs), 17, 43, 44, 54, 98, 117, 119, 120, 164, 168, 171, 176–177, 353 Public sector reforms, 40, 147 R R & D, 35, 44 RegTechs, 33 Rockefeller Foundation, 74, 96, 162, 166, 168–170, 172

Sexual Reproductive Health Services (SRHS), 21, 300, 301, 309, 310, 316, 332, 334 Short Message Services (SMS), 136 Skype, 396 Smart City, 347, 351 Smartphones, 73, 77, 95, 96, 164, 165, 169, 398, 399 Social Accountability Monitoring (SAM), 21, 301, 310–313, 315, 326, 330, 332–334, 336 Social Benefits (SB), 139 Social Costs (SS), 139 Social media, 3, 10, 12, 19, 20, 73, 79, 136, 193, 257–276, 279–294 Social safety nets, 161 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), 18, 189–191, 310, 311 Specialised Technical Committee on Education, Science and Technology (STC-EST), 35 State state entrepreneurship, 13–14, 29–62 state legitimacy, 16 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), 38–41, 352 SurveyCTO, 73, 74 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 6, 98, 100, 219, 233–249, 299, 300, 307, 311

S Satellite data analysis, 74, 77 Science, technology and innovation (STIs), 6, 34, 35 Sensor technologies, 85 Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA), 396 Sexually transmitted infections, 310

T Taxify, 95 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), 175 Technological adaptations, 192, 390 Technological innovations, 14, 32, 35, 38, 40, 49, 52, 54, 67–70, 72, 78, 123, 392, 398, 399

 INDEX 

Technological leapfrogging, 15, 67–80 Technological proliferation technological development, 2, 11–23, 34, 36, 39, 40, 42–44, 61, 62, 71, 86 technologies, 12, 13, 15, 19, 29, 32, 62 Technology hubs, 86 Tech start-ups, 35 Telecommuting technologies, 396 Teleological ethics, 388 Theory of Change (ToC), 186, 197, 333, 336 TikTok, 283 Transparency, 8, 17, 19, 21, 23, 91, 93, 136, 137, 142, 144, 194, 228, 248n8, 282, 288, 292, 299–337, 350, 353, 354, 368, 387, 399–401, 406 Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), 95 Twitter, 98, 258–260, 271, 275, 279, 280, 283, 284, 286–289, 293

UNICEF, 215, 285 Universal participation, 90

U Uber, 95, 98, 163, 241 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), 213 UNCTAD, 71, 72, 80, 239, 243 UN Human Rights Committee, 307

Y Youth employment, 17, 161–177

417

V Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), 247 Violence against children (VAC), 210, 213, 224, 225, 227 Voice over Protocol, 247 W Web 2.0 technologies, 263–265, 280 WhatsApp, 283, 289 Wildavsky, Aaron, 137, 210, 217–219 World Bank, 8–11, 31, 32, 74, 75, 78, 88, 97, 108, 128, 135, 139, 141, 142, 150, 167, 169, 171–174, 177, 190, 200, 239, 257, 261, 346, 353, 367, 373 World Health Organization (WHO), 273, 397, 399, 402

Z Zoom, 396