Objectivation: The Material Heritage of Peter L. Berger 9781839984556

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Chapter 8 OBJECTIVATION: THE MATERIAL HERITAGE OF PETER L. BERGER Michaela Pfadenhauer

“Objectivation” is key to the sociohistorical process of The Social Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In the architecture of Peter L. Berger’s and Thomas Luckmann’s theory of the sociology of knowledge, objectivation is the link between action and culture. Action is what people knowingly try to bring forward; culture is the long-lasting and often unintended effect of people’s actions, for example, institutions. Objectivation is at the center of the “dialectical” process that turns subjective meaning into social facts and social facts into subjective meaning. The former, called externalization, is informed by Durkheim and his postulate of social facts; the latter, internalization, is dedicated to Max Weber and his ideal of subjective meaning. Berger and Luckmann label these processes “dialectical” since they consider them to be permanent and continuing, in the sense that they run “simultaneously” both for the individual and for society as a whole (cf. Berger and Luckmann 1966, 149). The designation of this process as dialectical is not intended to place the subjective outside the social, as it were (Knoblauch 2020, 40). Instead, from a pre-social subject, social theory needs to proceed from subjects who are set in relation to others from the very beginning of their lives. Neither subjective meaning nor consciousness but relationality is therefore the starting point of social theory, which—similar to what is described in interactionism as the “looking-glass effect”—results in reflexivity and subjectivity. Husserl’s phenomenology, referring back to Kant and Descartes, is the classical source of subjectivity as a theoretical stance. It was Alfred Schütz who, informed by Bergson’s time phenomenology and Dewey’s pragmatism, transferred subjectivity into the empirical fact of intersubjectivity (cf. Schütz 1970). Anthropologically, actors must not be seen as entities already endowed with subjectivity but with the “capacity of subjectivation” (Steets 2019, 136).

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According to Silke Steets, “subjectivation is never just a one-way street from society to the  subject. It  is  this  interplay between one’s own reference to others and external reference from others that subjectifies” (Steets 2019, 136). Meaning is the way in which subjects relate to one another. And objectivations are crucial in these continuing action processes because they mediate the way in which subjects are able to refer to each other. Meaning, in this sense, should not be seen as the rational consideration of an action goal that is to be realized by an action performed later. Meaning is what compels humans to react in a specific way while perceiving the actions of others. And objectivation, as  both an integral element and the  result of action, enables and limits the  interplay of acting and reacting. Tomasello calls this “shared intentionality” (Tomasello and Moll 2010). Communicative action, referring to Schütz’s understanding of intersubjectivity, may help to avoid solipsistic misunderstandings raised by intentionality. Constitutive for this intersubjectivity is the triadic constellation of at least two actors and an objectivation.

Knowledge and Objectivation According to Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, objectivation is objectified meaning, that is, subjective meaning that becomes part of the environment. Meaning thus becomes objective, real, and permanent; in this way, it becomes accessible for others as knowledge. Knowledge is the quasi-“transmission belt” (Pfadenhauer 2013, 74) of the social construction of reality: It  ‘programs’ the  channels in  which externalization produces the  objective world. It  objectifies this  through language and the  cognitive apparatus based on language, that  is, it  orders it  into objects to be apprehended as  reality. It is internalized again as objectively valid truth in the course of socialization. Knowledge about society is thus a realization in the double sense of the word: in the sense of apprehending the objectivated social reality, and in the sense of ongoingly producing this reality. (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 66)

As Hitzler (1988, 65; my translation) puts it: “Knowledge transforms subjective meaning into social facts, and knowledge transforms social facts into subjective meaning.” When Berger and Luckmann proclaim an “objective world” and “objectively valid truth,” they are not referring to objectivity in an epistemological sense. At the very beginning of their explications, they put epistemology in brackets anyway. When they use the  term “objective,” they mean a  world and a truth that are neither objective in a positivist sense, nor merely subjective,



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but intersubjective. Their focus is, in their own words, on the “objectivations of subjectively processes (and meanings) by which the  intersubjective commonsense world is constructed” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 20). Subjectively meaningful processes can be gestures, but  also  facial expressions, that is, they can be physical behaviors as well as verbal utterances. An utterance, which once done cannot be withdrawn, is  an objectivation. To  speak of “objects” in  the  case of such bodily acts, even if they are to a  certain  extent detached from the  actor, and sometimes even opposed to him, is particularly repugnant to our sense of language. Knoblauch (2020, 10) suggests speaking here of “objectification.” In  general, “objectification” means: “the embodiment of subjective processes in processes and events of the everyday lifeworld” (Schütz and Luckmann 1974, 264). However, subjective processes are also  embodied materially, that  is, they are embodied in  objects. For  the  built environment, tools, technical artifacts, or any kind of materiality, such as books, “objectivation,” captures the essence of the  matter better than “object,” since all of them are originally based on human action. They are not simply external objects, but are objects detached from the  subject in  the  external environment: the  results of actions (i.e., of externalization) that come into use in relation to others in the course of social action or, to be more concrete, of acting communicatively or of communicative action. Objectivation thus transcends, materially or immaterially, performative practice. This  objectifying practice is  not original, but  is  oriented towards types of actors and actions. As  a  result of sedimentation, typification practically takes place “as if by itself.” But it would be short-sighted to assume it to be an unconscious habit, as practice theory holds. Sedimentation rather means that polythetic processes are condensed monothetically and are then available as types, that is, as knowledge (Knoblauch 2020, 41). This knowledge, which is decisive for the “social construction of reality,” occurs “as a communicatively realized form.” This means that this knowledge reveals itself in the course of communication and that it is brought into a certain form of communication, such as  a  novel that  follows a  certain  genre structure or a  PowerPoint presentation with a  certain  number of slides (cf. Knoblauch 2013a, 67f). Knowledge about the everyday world is thus realized in communicative forms and realizes itself in communicative action, which always takes place physically and with the inclusion of objectivations—that is, of materiality.

Duality of Objectivation Berger and Luckmann borrow the  term “objectivation” from the  Marx– Hegel tradition, but  distinguish objectivation from Marx’s non-dialectical understanding of reification. They  initially refer to Hegel, but  apply a

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broader understanding than is common for the conceptual externalization/ objectivation pair in the Hegel–Marx tradition. In their article, “Reification and the  Sociological Critique of Consciousness,” Pullberg and Berger try to clarify their meaning by differentiating between objectivation and objectification as  well (Versachlichung). However, unlike Knoblauch, they do not  intend to highlight the  bodily dimension addressed by materiality but the individual perspective on embodiment: “By objectivation we mean that process whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products that are available to oneself and one’s fellow men as elements of a common world” (Berger and Pullberg 1965, 199). By  defining subjectivity as  “intentionality in  movement,” Berger and Pullberg already stand apart from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. They  exemplify materiality, with material tools produced in  the  process of objectivation: By objectification we mean the moment in the process of objectivation in which man establishes distance from his producing and its product, such that he can take cognizance of it  and make it  an object of consciousness. Objectivation, then, is a broader concept applicable to all human products, material as well as immaterial. Objectification is a narrower epistemological concept, referring to the  way in  which the  world produced by man is  apprehended by him. Thus, for instance, man produces tools in  the  process of objectivation which he then objectifies by means of language, giving them ‘a name’ that is ‘known’ to him from then on and that  he  can communicate with others. (Berger and Pullberg 1965, 200)

Here, objectivation appears as the process in which whatever the individual— subjectively meaningfully—does, says, shows, or produces (thereby externalizing this  subjective meaning) can become an object for him, perceptible and recognizable as  such. With regard to the  fact that  something may become the  counterpart of subjective consciousness, even the  term “object” would have its justification, because accessibility is  inherent to the  object. With that, however, a  subject–object opposition is  addressed that  is  inherent in the concept of dialectics already problematized above. Instead, we have to think of subjectivity always in relation to others, and the actor’s perceptible expressions for these others are more comprehensibly called objectivation. Berger and Pullberg already dissociate themselves from a  connotation of objectification as  reification leading to alienation, because they see it as anthropologically misleading to understand the human being as a reified being. Peter L. Berger, however, concedes to religion a  certain  capacity for alienation in  the  sense that  “the  unity of the  producing and the  product



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is broken” (Berger 1967, 85). Religion has an “alienating propensity” because it proves to be a particularly stable “bulwark against anomie” (Berger 1967, 87). This is because religious legitimations are particularly predestined to mystify institutions and institutionalized roles—formerly human products—and to transform them into superhuman or extrahuman factualities. In  The  Sacred Canopy (1967), Berger therefore distinguishes two ways in which objectivation may proceed: one, in  which the  strangeness of world and self can be reappropriated (zurückgeholt) by the  ‘recollection’ that  both world and self are products of one’s own activity  – the  other, in  which such reappropriation is  no longer possible, and in which social world and socialized self confront the individual as inexorable facticities of nature. The latter process may be called alienation. (Berger 1967, 85)

Religion is  not to be equated in  principle with alienation. But  religious projections, precisely because the sacred can be experienced as an overwhelming “otherness,” are capable of juxtaposing the human with the alien, and thus also of alienating man from himself. Compared to the narrower epistemological concept of objectification, which captures how the world created by man is perceived by him, the concept of objectivation, applicable to all human products, material and immaterial, is the more comprehensive one. Thus, in the process of objectivation, man produces material products, for example, which he recognizes as such (= objectification), and which he names—that is, always also objectifies—by means of language, and through which he can communicate with others in this way. Objectification thus includes the process of designation (signification) and the classification of human “products” into a system of signs. Signification is  a  “particularly important case of objectivation” (Knoblauch 2016, 39). It is one communicative dimension of objectification in  a  narrower sense: “Objectivations are signs if and because they point to what  is  subjectively meant; signs are both material and immaterial objectivations that have a communicative function and stand for something that cannot be directly perceived sensually” (ibid.). This refers to the aspect of appresentation (Schütz and Luckmann 1974, 11), that is, the process of “co-presentation” (Hülst 1999, 235), in which two different “phenomena are constituted as a unity” . Even in the case of immaterial objectivations, such as utterances, it must not  be forgotten that  these signs have a  material carrier: the  spoken word, the letter, letters on picture screens, etc., or more precisely the communicative action, namely talking (to someone), writing (to someone), typing (for or

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with regard to someone, however anonymous), etc., produces these material carriers. Objectivation, then, means not  only the  process of transforming meaning into knowledge, but  also  the  result or product of this  process. Knoblauch (2013b, 303) calls this the “duality of objectivation.” The process of transforming meaning into knowledge leaves traces. It  produces results that  can be intangible, such as  utterances that  nevertheless formally stand in space, but also visible results, such as letters, cultural objects, and technical artifacts. Objectivation thus is accompanied by the process of making present. Steets (2015, 11) emphasizes the aspect of the “apprehensible” with regard to material objectifications, which has  the  connotation of the  comprehensible as well. Berger and Luckmann (1966, 49) use the example of a weapon to illustrate objectivation. They describe a knife stuck in the wall above the bed where someone slept, which more than metaphorically illustrates the  anger of the man with whom the sleeper had gotten into a fight. The knife is an artifact made to threaten physical violence. However, it  is  a  “motivated change” as  well (Schütz and Luckmann 1974, 273): “Because they  [objectivations] are products of action (Erzeugnisse), they are ipso  facto evidence (Zeugnisse) of what  went on in  the  mind of the  actors who made them” (Schütz 1972 [1932], 133). In  addition to the  subjective meaning of the  person who left the  knife as  a  warning in  the  wall, it  rather conveys the  objectivated meaning of a hunting tool or household utensil. As  elaborated in  the  social construction of technology (Pinch 2019), the  objectivated meaning of an artifact is  initially interpretatively flexible. However, a  process of closure happens as  soon as  it  becomes visible as an innovation. In  this  context, objectification can also  be understood in a figurative, namely civilizational meaning as objectification, insofar as both the  excitement of discovery and generation and the  societal excitement subside (cf. Steinmetz 2001, 874). This  closing procedure is  prominently described by the representatives of the SCOT approach using the example of a bicycle. Put differently, the  artifact is  endowed with certain  functional features, but is nevertheless interpretatively flexible. This openness to meaning also exists with regard to the question of whether, how, for whom, and in which contexts of use a technical artifact will prove useful on the basis of its respective functional features. It arises from the fact that the question of usefulness can be answered differently in view of the divergent purposes of use of different user groups and in view of the different requirements of different contexts of use. (Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer 2005, 5; my translation)



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According to Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer (2005, 5f.), this form of interpretative flexibility is based on an irresolvable regress of usefulness, for Whether a technical artifact has a useful functionality is ultimately only decided when it has found its users and has been successfully integrated into a context of use. But whether this will be the case cannot yet be known when it has to be decided with which functional features the artifact under development is to be equipped. (Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer 2005, 6)

As  a  product, an artifact always testifies to the  action and knowledge of the producer. Following Schütz (2004, 268), As an objective context of meaning, as a product, it points back to an ideal type of its producer that is to a great extent empty of content and to a great extent anonymous.  […] The  artifact stands, as  it  were, at  the  end of the  of anonymization line in  whose typifications the  social world of contemporaries is constituted. (Schütz 2004, 377; my translation)

An understanding of the  objective meaning context does not  suffice as  a  basis  for inferring subjective meaning because objective meaning “is abstracted from and independent of particular persons” (ibid., 135). Even at the highest degree of anonymity, however, one can speak of communication in the sense of an indirect reference. Following Villem Flusser, Reichertz (2014) states that artifacts can be understood as materialized gestures.

Duration of Objectivation In terms of reality construction, artifacts are relevant not only as objectivations of  subjective processes (like anger in  the  knife example), but  also  as objectivations of subjective knowledge. The  essential difference between “lifeworld objects” (like the  knife) and “lifeworld events” (like the  finger point) is  that  the  knowledge associated with the  actions imprinted in  them can be adopted temporally independently of the situation of origin. The only temporal constraint on knowledge adoption is  the  lifetime of the  artifact. In order to be grasped as a solution to a problem independent of the process of objectivation, all that is presupposed is a similar problem embedded in a similar pragmatic “functional chain” (cf. Schütz and Luckmann 1974, 276). As a rule, however, we do not adopt the knowledge elements objectified in an object, but we use the object, such as a tool, as an element of a typical course of action. Following Schütz and Luckmann (1974, 276), “we can consider tools as ‘objectifications’ of component parts of in order-to contexts,

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above all those associated with skills that have become routine.” This produces the  effect of sequential regularity (cf. Knoblauch 2020, 122). In  the  case of technology, evidence-based event contexts are, so to speak, “built in” to the  artifact, by which a  desired effect can often be reliably achieved even without much routine. This presupposes, however, that certain actors, namely rule-oriented experts, construct, control, and provide secure event contexts (cf. Schulz-Schaeffer 1999, 419). These event contexts are based on natural law cause–effect relationships. And by means of calculations, experiments and tests, it is ensured that the predicted effect occurs under certain conditions. With this  definition of technology as  an “artificially produced context” (Schulz-Schaeffer 1999, 410), the aspects of sensory relief and performance enhancement are connoted, which, according to Blumenberg, constitute the essence of technology. In the words of Blumenberg, technization means the “transformation of originally living sense formation into a method, […] which has  stripped off its sense development and no longer wants to be recognized in the satisfaction of mere function” (Blumenberg 1986, 32). Accordingly, the effect of the artifact depends not only on routines (sense relief), but  also  on the  fact that  technology can be used as  a  resource by laypersons with relatively little effort (performance enhancement). Giddens also points to this double structure of routine and resource. It not only accounts for the social significance of technology, but also contributes significantly to the social construction of reality. For this construction of reality, stabilization is decisive. This happens when patterns of action, within  which the  artifact is  an element of a  pragmatic functional chain, “solidify into a  typical sequence of events that  commits several actors equally” (Knoblauch 2003, 197). The  “sensible-practical proposal” of the producer is transformed over many (  justification) steps into a specification, with which compliance can even be sanctioned. This is what institutionalization is about. “Technologies are forms of institutionalization when they regulate certain steps of action with regard to certain objects and give them an expectable form” (Knoblauch 2016, 47). Some components of the institution, such as practices of action and regulations, are passed on to everyone as general knowledge or competence to act; others are ceded to specialists or experts as special knowledge. The transmission of knowledge, which is elementary for institutionalization, again is a communicative process for which special communicative formats are developed (cf. Knoblauch 2013a). This refers to the elementary interweaving of knowledge and action, which is essential for institutionalization, as it is action processes that solidify into regularities. However, as knowledge they are passed on communicatively. With regard to this  tradition, technology must be seen as  an institution (Rammert 2006). Rammert emphasizes the  double structure of factually



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objectified action and the action practices related to it. He is concerned with the independent significance of materiality when he argues for the socialization of “objectified” knowledge accompanied by the socialization of action and activity itself, which is also “objectified” on various levels. This means that the restriction of knowledge, which is elementary for institutionalization, is unavoidable. At  the  same time, a  tendency to persist is  not necessarily inherent to the materiality of objectivations. Digital technology in particular is characterized by the fact that its materiality is permanently in “flux” (cf. Pfadenhauer and Grenz 2017; 2019). “In  the  past, the  average lifespan of things was  usually longer than that  of the  people who used them. Everyday objects objectified a piece of the family memory and thus became symbols of continuity between generations” (Cavalli 1991, 220). According to Cavalli, the relation of human and thing in its “lifespan” is a socio-historical product. That holds true for its representation in social theory as well. Beyond the  integration of materiality into bodily processes and alongside the bodily genealogy of materiality in knowledge and action, materiality itself is increasingly becoming “mobile.” Because the feedback loops between operator and user are an integral part of the technical system here, the material properties of digital technology are constantly changed during operation (cf.  Grenz 2017, 120 ff). In  regard to these “processualizing data  (Grenz 2020), Hepp (2019) speaks of “deep mediatization.” Brügger and Finnemann (2013) label the  changeability of software-based mechanisms (algorithms) and perceptible navigation elements as  the  “moving architecture” of digital media. Digital materiality symptomatically transforms under the  hand (van den Boomen et al. 2009). Due to the feedback loops embedded in digital technology, digital materiality is characterized by a “substantial flexibility” (Grenz et al. 2014, 89).

The Foundation of Sociality Sociality and intersubjectivity are the fundamental questions of a social theory based on the  sociology of knowledge because they are what  everyday life is fundamentally about. “The  problem of intersubjectivity refers to the  givenness of the  other as a nonego in the experience of the ego. The problem of sociality thematizes the  way my thinking and acting is  shaped in  my relation to and  by others” (Srubar 2007, 210). Objectivation–that  is, materiality  –is  key to both: “The triadic constellation of at least two actors with reference to an objectivation is what constitutes sociality. And sociality formed by objectivation is the answer to the problem of intersubjectivity” (Schütz 1970). Acting communicatively, that is, coordinating bodily actions sequentially by means of objectivations, is the answer to the “cosmological problem,” which

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consists in the fact that the alter ego is inaccessible. However, at least indirectly, we are able to access the alter ego empirically in the course of coordinated actions. Since this problem is not permanently solvable, communication must always continue. The  evolution of social constructivism to communicative constructivism thus follows Alfred Schutz’s empirical turn in  the  concept of intersubjectivity, which Husserl originally elaborated in  his  logic of a transcendental phenomenology. This action is consequential, since incidentally structures emerge: “Even if communicative action is still analytically regarded as  a  form of action (guided by knowledge), communicative constructivism assumes that structures emerge from communicative actions that develop a life of their own vis-à-vis the actions” (Knoblauch and Schnettler 2009, 134). In  this  sense, objectivations are a  structural aspect of actions that  are effective because of the meaning sedimented in them. On the one hand, objectivation unfolds its “effect” through the meanings users mutually ascribe in  the  course of externalization. Schütz describes this as taking up the in-order motive of the other as one own’s because-motive. Thus, it is not sufficient to ascribe an effect to the object itself, as sometimes happens in theorizing on agency. A technical artifact, for example, is integrated into action processes and creates common expectations. However, there is  always the  option to move away from these expectations and invent new usages what  we framed as  the  “alienation of purpose” (Eisewicht and Pfadenhauer 2016). Finally, technology has  an effect in  that  actors without knowledge of the event context sedimented in it “ ‘reckon’ with the ‘behavior’ of technology, that is, use this objectivation as a resource.” To  the  extent that  these reciprocal consummations integrating objectivations are institutionalized, they follow predetermined trajectories and have a  relatively fixed pattern. They  have a  structure, of which the  artifact is  a  part, and thus exhibit  regularity and predictability to a  certain  extent. Thus, the theory of the sociology of knowledge initiated by Peter L. Berger and Thomas  Luckmann, which has  since been further developed towards communicative constructivism, emphasizes the  reproduction of structures in the course and as a result of communicative action. This happens by means of material carriers of expression and with reference to results of action, representational products, and technical artifacts—in short, materiality.

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